

The Public Sphere and the
Construction of Peace Narratives in Angola:
From the Bicesse Accords to the Death of Savimbi.

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own, and that appropriate credit
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
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Abstract.

This thesis sets out to examine five separate arenas within the Angolan public sphere, and investigate their contribution to peace discourse. The five arenas are: the Angolan churches, private media, civil society organisations, community based material and traditional authority. The objective of this thesis is to highlight these discourses, and to investigate their importance to Angolans as arenas of peace engagement. These peace discourses have remained poorly developed or ignored within the Angolan literature. Collectively, these five discourses offer a perspective ‘from below’ on peace and conflict in Angola, and are analysed within a Habermasian public sphere framework.

The thesis argues that many Angolans have been critical of the various peace processes, seen as agreements between the militarised elements of Angolan society. The exclusion of national civic forces from these agreements, such as the churches and civil society, is regarded as a reason for the failure of the Bicesse and Lusaka peace agreements. The thesis sets out criticism of international mediation efforts, interpreted in some arenas as an obstacle in the search for peace, because economic interests were seen as taking priority. By focusing on oft excluded actors, an emphasis is placed on Angolan ‘agency’ in favour of peace, demonstrating significant Angolan peace engagement throughout the years of conflict. The thesis also underlines the importance of addressing traditional and cultural issues in understanding the causes of the Angolan war, and in developing new approaches to building peace. Simultaneously, another finding concerns the fundamental role Angolan history has played in shaping the Angolan public sphere, and how this impacted negatively on the ability of Angolans to organise collectively and address peace issues.

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Glossary of Terms.

AAD	Acção Angolana para o Desenvolvimento, Angolan Action for Development, Angolan NGO.
ACA	Associação Cívica de Angola, Angolan Civic Association.
<i>Advinhador</i>	Diviner.
AEDSA	Acção Ecuménica para o Desenvolvimento Social de Angola, Ecumenical Action for Social Development in Angola, Angolan NGO.
ADRA	Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural de Angola, Action for the Rural Development of Angola, Angolan NGO.
AEA	Aliança Evangélica de Angola, Angolan Evangelical Alliance.
AJPD	Associação Justiça Paz e Democracia, Association for Justice, Peace and Democracy.
AJUDECA	Associação Juvenil para o Desenvolvimento Comunitário de Angola, Youth Association for the Community Development of Angola.
AIC	African Independent Churches.
Alliama	Alliance de Mayumbe, the Mayumbe Alliance, a Cabindan nationalist movement.
AMC	Amplo Movimento de Cidadãos, Broad Citizen Movement.
<i>Bairro</i>	Suburb or shantytown.
CAIE	Conselho Angolano de Igrejas Evangélicas, Angolan Council of Evangelical Churches, later became CICA.
<i>Cáritas</i>	CEAST humanitarian and development organisation.
<i>Carnaval.</i>	A street party or festival made famous in Brazil. It takes place on the days preceding Ash Wednesday, within the Christian calendar.
<i>Carnival de Vitória</i>	Victory Carnival. Celebrated initially on March 27, 1979 and for many years afterwards, to mark the end of the purge after the 1977 attempted coup. It is no longer commemorated.
CCF	Christian Children's Fund.
CEAST	Conferência Episcopal de Angola e São Tomé, Episcopal Conference of Angola and Sao Tome, Catholic Church.
CICA	Conselho das Igrejas Cristãs em Angola, Council of Christian Churches in Angola.



CNDA	National Democratic Convention of Angola, Convenção Nacional Democrática de Angola, an opposition political party. COIEPA Comité Inter Eclesial para a Paz em Angola, Inter Ecclesial Committee for Peace in Angola.
COIEPA	<i>Comité Inter Eclesial para a Paz em Angola</i> , Inter-Ecclesial Committee for peace in Angola.
CPJ	Committee to Protect Journalists.
<i>Comício</i>	Rally or gathering, usually of a political nature.
<i>Conselho</i>	Advice.
CUANC	Comité d'Action d'Union Nationale des Cabindais, The Action Committed for the National Unity of Cabindans..
<i>Curandeiro</i>	Portuguese word for traditional healer.
DfID	UK Department for International Development.
DJERC	Departamento de Justiça, Evangelismo, Reconciliação e Cooperação, Department of Justice, Evangelisation, Reconciliation and Co-operation, (part of CICA).
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire.
DW	Development Workshop, a Canadian NGO, one of the longest international NGOs in Angola.
EDICA	Encontro de Dirigentes das Igrejas Cristãs em Angola, Meeting of the Leaders of the Christian Churches in Angola (joint AEA-CICA forum).
FAA	Forças Armadas Angolanas, Angolan Armed Forces.
FAAT	Forum das Autoridades Angolanas Tradicionais, Forum of Angolan Traditional Authority.
FALA	UNITA armed forces.
<i>Feitiço</i>	Sorcery or witchcraft.
FESA	Fundação Eduardo dos Santos, Eduardo dos Santos Foundation.
FLEC	Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda, Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda.
FNLA	Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, National Front for the Liberation of Angola.
FONGA	Forum das ONGs Angolanas, Forum of Angolan NGOs.
FpD	Frente para Democracia - Democratic Front, opposition political party.

GRAE	Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Éxilio, Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile.
GURN	Governo da Unidade e Reconciliação Nacional, Government of Unity and National Reconciliation.
IECA	Igreja Evangélica Congregacional em Angola, Angolan Evangelical Congregational Church.
JMPLA	Jovem MPLA, MPLA Youth movement.
<i>Jornal de Angola</i>	National daily newspaper.
<i>Kimbanda</i>	Angolan traditional healer.
LAC	Luanda Antena Comercial. A private radio station in Luanda.
Mãos Livres	Free Hands, Angolan NGO.
<i>Mestiço</i>	In the specific case of Angola, it usually refers to the biracial children of white Portuguese and black Angolan unions.
MINARS	Ministério de Assistência e Reinserção Social, Government Ministry for Social Affairs.
MONUA	Missão de Observação das Nações Unidas em Angola, UN Observation Mission in Angola. Replaced UNAVEM III.
Mosaiko	Mosaic, Angolan NGO.
<i>Movimento Pro Pace</i>	CEAST Peace Movement,
MLEC	Mouvement de Libération de l'Enclave de Cabinda.
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola).
MPD	Mulheres Paz e Desenvolvimento, Women, Peace and Development, Angolan NGO.
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NGO(s)	Non-governmental Organisation(s).
<i>Óbito</i>	A funeral wake.
OMA	Organização da Mulher Angolana, Angolan Women's Movement, affiliated to the MPLA.
PADPA	Partido de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento e Progresso de Angola, Party of Support to Angolan Development and Progress.
<i>Padrinhos</i>	Official witnesses at a marriage ceremony.
PAJOCA	Partido de Aliança Juventude Operário e Camponense de Angola, Party of Youth, Factory and Agricultural Workers Alliance.

PDA	Partido Democrático de Angola, Angolan Democratic Party.
PIDE	Polícia Internacional e Defesa do Estado-Segurança Colonial, the colonial secret police.
POC	Partidos da Oposição Civil, coalition of fourteen opposition political parties.
PRD	Partido Renovador Democrática, the Democratic Renewal Party
<i>Promaica</i>	Promação da Mulher na Igreja Católica, Catholic Women's Organisation.
PRS.	Partido de Renovação Social, Party of Social Renewal.
<i>Rede da Paz</i>	Peace Network.
RNA.	Rádio Nacional de Angola, Angolan state radio.
SADF	South African Defense Forces.
SJA	Sindicato de Jornalistas Angolanos, the Union of Angolan Journalists
<i>Soba</i>	An Angolan chief, traditional authority figure.
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation.
TPA	Televisão Público de Angola, Angolan state television.
TROIKA.	Portugal, Russia, and the United States.
UNAVEM	United Nations Angolan Verification Mission, responsible for overseeing the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.
UNAVEM II	Second UN Angolan Verification Mission, responsible for the verification of the implementation of the Bicesse Accords.
UNAVEM III	Third UN Angolan Verification Mission, responsible for implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.
UNITA	União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.
UNMA	United Nations Mission in Angola.
UNOA	United Nations Office in Angola.
UNTA	União Nacional do Trabalhador Angolano, The National Union of Angolan Workers, trade union movement affiliated to the MPLA.
UPA	União dos Povos de Angola, People's Union of Angola.
UPNA	União dos Povos do Norte de Angola, People's Union of the North of Angola, later became UPA.
USAID	United States Agency for International Development.
Vorgan	UNITA's former radio station.

Map of Angola.



The first research location, Luanda, is located on the Atlantic coast, just south of 8° latitude. The second, Dundo, is located in the north-eastern province of Lunda Norte, near the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, just north of 8° latitude.

Chapter 1.

Introduction.

This thesis analyses Angolan perspectives on peace from the signing of the Bicesse Peace Accords in May 1991 to the death of Jonas Savimbi in February 2002, and situates these in relation to the Angolan public sphere. Setting out five national ‘peace narratives’, those of the historical churches, the private media, civil society organisations, community-based organisations, and traditional authorities, the thesis explores how efforts to resolve the Angolan conflict were understood from within Angolan society during these years. These peace narratives are analysed within a Habermasian public sphere framework, particularly conducive to illustrating how historical events have crucially shaped the Angolan public sphere, and how this in turn has influenced the search for peace in Angola. The five peace narratives are quite different from each other and are diversely situated within the public sphere in terms of urban and rural contexts.

A focus on Angolan perspectives and interpretations of how peace was pursued, and of the conflict that assailed the country, remains central throughout the thesis, revealing a concern with locating Angolan ‘agency’ for peace (Mamdani 1995) within Angolan society. This focus on national perspectives goes further however, and specifically seeks to articulate a view ‘from below’ within Angolan society. It is here that the significance and distinctive nature of this thesis lies, in focusing on the discourse of these five Angolan arenas. A view ‘from above’ would have given preference to the perspectives of the Angolan government, UNITA (*União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola*, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), and some of Angola’s political parties. While these latter narratives are of great importance, they will be dealt with from the viewpoint of the arenas chosen for research.

A brief explanation of the title, *The Public Sphere and the Construction of Peace Narratives in Angola: from the Bicesse Accords to the death of Savimbi*, provides further introduction of this thesis. Firstly, the term ‘Public Sphere’ specifically refers to the

theoretical framework within which the research is set out. The framework, outlined fully in chapter two, is based on Jurgen Habermas's model of the public sphere. From an early stage of research it became clear that the nature of the Angolan public sphere was an important issue to address, a crucial point of entry into analysing Angolan peace narratives. The reason for this is that the narratives take place within a space that has a particular history which influences the ability of individuals and organisations to communicate and organise. As I will show in this thesis, the Angolan public sphere is not a 'neutral' place, but has particular memories which have had consequences for peace. Secondly, the word 'construction' suggests something being built over time. The perspectives on peace put forward by the Angolan organisations researched in the thesis have developed and evolved over many years, and have responded to the changing political and military reality of Angola. These are not static discourses. Rather they reflect the challenges and difficulties presented throughout the years under review, to articulate a viewpoint on peace. Thirdly, by 'peace narrative' I am referring to the material presented in response to two research questions to be outlined below, concerning the analysis and activity of particular Angolan actors in relation to peace. Finally, the title indicates the time frame for the research focus on Angolan peace narratives, i.e. the period from the Bicesse peace Accords of 1991 to the death of the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, in February 2002. In exploring this arena of Angolan perspectives on peace, the thesis sets out to address a significant gap in the Angolan literature, where these perspectives are poorly developed.

Two specific questions will be explored throughout this thesis:

- What perspectives and analysis emerged from within these five types of Angolan organisations regarding peace in the period under review?
- What did these organisations do to promote or further peace in the same period?

In the context of this research, the responses identified to these two questions in the five separate arenas constitute a 'peace narrative'. Other related questions develop this primary focus, such as:

- What did these organisations identify as the reasons for the conflict?
- What did they say about the war and how it was conducted?
- What did they say about peace and how it could have been achieved?

- How was international mediation assessed?
- What peace initiatives, if any, were suggested or promoted, by these organisations?
- What do the peace narratives reveal about the nature of the Angolan public sphere?

These research questions reflect a desire not only to understand what Angolans said about peace, but also what was concretely done to address issues of conflict¹ during a particularly destructive period of Angola's history. The internationally brokered Bicesse Accords initially brought sixteen years of civil war between the MPLA government (*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and UNITA to an end, but UNITA's rejection of election results in September 1992 ushered in Angola's most brutal period of warfare. The Lusaka Protocol of November 1994 again briefly ended this new military conflict,² but four years later Angola was again back at war making Angola "one of the worst conflict resolution failures of the 1990s" (LeBillon 2001:59). Jonas Savimbi's death in combat in February 2002, finally brought hostilities to an end and led to the signing of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding in April 2002.³ Against this cyclical background of peace and conflict, this thesis explores national perspectives within the public sphere on the key issue of peace.

1. *Structure.*

The thesis is divided into eight chapters. This first chapter sets out the overall research objective and research questions for the thesis itself. Section one outlines the structure of the thesis, offering initial comment on each of the chapters. Section two deals with the research methodology and methods used in conducting this research. The third section presents an historical overview of the actual conflict, introducing the principal national and international actors in the Angolan conflict. Finally, section four looks at Angola's

¹ Kibble (2002:17) estimated that 1.5 million people were killed in the conflict from 1975. USAID (2002) calculated 4.3 million people were internally displaced and 465,000 refugees in neighbouring countries.

² The literature distinguishes between the violent expression of conflict, and conflict where no violence occurs (cf. International Alert 2001:4). Throughout this thesis I will frequently use the word conflict as shorthand for violent or military conflict.

³ Full title: *Memorando de Entendimento do Luena Complementar ao Protocolo de Lusaka - Luena Memorandum of Understanding Complementary to the Lusaka Protocol*, *Jornal de Angola*, April 23 2002.

three peace agreements: the 1991 Bicesse Accords, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, and the 2002 Luena Memorandum of Understanding.

Chapter two sets out the theoretical framework for research, a Habermasian public sphere framework. Habermas's original work on the public sphere, first published in 1962, and translated from German to English in 1989, provides the foundation for this framework, but a later article written in 1992 in response to ongoing academic research on the public sphere, is also important to this research. In it Habermas revisited his earlier work and outlined areas where his understanding had developed, suggesting a need for certain modifications within his earlier articulation of the public sphere. This article confirmed the dynamic nature of the public sphere as a site for discourse and offered possibilities as to how Habermas could be used for research in an African context, a context radically different from the western societies of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, analysed by Habermas. The chapter presents a revised model of Habermas's public sphere, and highlights strengths and weaknesses of his research framework.

Chapters three to seven deal with specific Angolan peace narratives. Collectively they illustrate that Angolans have been neither silent nor passive in relation to the conflicts that devastated and impoverished their country. Chapter three examines the narrative of the historical Christian churches, the most influential of the Angolan actors advocating peace examined in this thesis. Benedict Schubert's (2000) doctoral thesis on the Angolan churches, and Christine Messiant's (2000) introduction to his book, are important contributions towards understanding what the Angolan churches said about peace. Schubert's study concludes in 1991, where this thesis commences, though Messiant's work offers more recent reflection. Little has been written about the Angolan churches since the Bicesse Accords, which is surprising given that the churches have been at the forefront of the search for peace. Specific attention is given to the arguments put forward by the two main Protestant church organisations, AEA (*Aliança Evangélica de Angola*, Angolan Evangelical Alliance) and CICA (*Conselho das Igrejas Cristãs em Angola*, Council of Christian Churches in Angola), and also the Catholic Church CEAST (*Conferência Episcopal de Angola e São Tomé*, Episcopal Conference of Angola and Sao Tome), during the years of conflict. A considerable body of literature emerged from

within the churches in the form of public statements, pastoral letters, conference reports, published speeches and interviews. The chapter examines the work of COIEPA (*Comité Inter Eclesial para a Paz em Angola*, Inter Ecclesial Committee for Peace in Angola), the first ecumenical body formed by the three church organisations to work for peace in Angola. COIEPA has been influential, but the fact that it was established as late as 1999 points to tensions between the churches in the search for peace.

Chapter four examines the private media. It outlines the argument put forward by private publications that emerged and developed since the mid-1990s, and also looks at private broadcasting. Private media voices are a relatively new phenomenon in Angola, where the landscape has been dominated by the state controlled media. The private media has become an important vehicle for communication and public opinion but has faced challenges in relation to financial viability and operating costs. It also has had to deal with periodic government opposition, most noticeably after the country returned to war in 1998. The chapter engages in analysis of the content of the various private newspapers, as well as looking at two Luanda based private radio stations. Attention is also paid to published cartoons which offer an interesting perspective on Angolans' perceptions of the war. Chapters four to seven adopt a thematic approach to the research questions, whereas a chronological approach is followed in chapter three on the Angolan churches.

The fifth chapter deals with the peace narrative of civil society organisations which, like the private media, are a relatively new type of actor within the Angola public sphere. Given the very wide range of organisations that comprise this arena, it was necessary to focus on a selected number. By applying the research questions, a set of themes emerged as significant in presenting the peace narrative of Angolan civil society organisations. These themes enabled the research to group organisations in a particular way. For example, we can speak of organisations that adopted a human rights approach to peace by promoting human rights education and awareness. Some have published brief documents or 'think-tank' reflections, which outlined possible means of achieving peace. Others engaged in debate on the new Angolan constitution, which must be approved by the National Assembly before elections can be held. A women's organisation offered a unique gender perspective on how war affected Angolan women. Also, Angolan organisations

worked together to promote ‘capacity building for peace’, an interesting sign of a maturing civil society at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

The sixth chapter takes this research into local communities where I examine peace narratives constructed at a community-based or grassroots level. The framing of the research questions within these local arenas generated material that interpreted peace at a relational level within one’s immediate environment, emphasising the need to address local conflict to secure local peace. This arena has increased in importance since the death of Jonas Savimbi in February 2002. The material looks firstly at local Christian communities and examines existing structures that promote peace and address conflict. The chapter draws on the experiences of other national peace agreements where it has been shown that violence frequently rises in periods of post-conflict, and that peace agreements rarely address issues of local violence. Material on the role played by traditional healers in demobilising former soldiers at the psychological, spiritual and emotional levels, is also presented. Traditionally these soldiers required purification before being readmitted to their communities, and were expected to undergo a process of demobilisation through participation in special rituals that goes deeper than anything undertaken in any of Angola’s peace agreements.

Chapter seven examines perspectives on peace put forward by Angolan traditional authorities, in other words the views of Angolan kings and queens, local chiefs and community elders. Traditional authorities had begun to reorganise in the late 1990s through the creation of an organisation promoting their interests. The chapter suggests a possible role for traditional knowledge within peace processes and argues that traditional dynamics in the conflict could possibly have been better understood and harnessed if a deeper appreciation of the importance of traditional knowledge had existed. Fieldwork interviews form a substantial part of the perspective from traditional authorities, plus a number of traditional authority conferences held around the time of Jonas Savimbi’s death also proved informative. The chapter examines the Angolan *ondjango* or traditional village meeting place, which was also the site of conflict resolution within local communities. Particular attention is paid to the spatial dimensions of the *ondjango*, where I argue that appeals for dialogue and renewed negotiation to end the conflict call for the

restoration of a space where Angolans could talk about the problems that assailed them. Though the use of the *ondjango* has declined nationally, Angolans have been calling for the establishment of *ondjango*-like space as a mechanism to address national concerns.

The final chapter draws together the principal strands that run through this thesis. It looks firstly at the contribution of the Habermasian theoretical framework to this research, dealing with its strengths and limitations. Secondly, the chapter sets out the principal themes emerging from within the five Angolan peace narratives and will argue that important resources exist within the arenas analysed that have been engaged in peace and reconciliation during the years of conflict, and can be built on in a time of post-conflict.

2. *Research Methodology and Sources.*

In addressing the research concerns regarding Angolan peace narratives, qualitative as distinct from quantitative research methodologies were employed. Qualitative methodologies refer “in the broadest sense to research that produces descriptive data - people’s own written or spoken words and observable behaviour” (Taylor & Bogdan 1998:7). These methods facilitate the exploration of perspectives and attitudes, generally allowing “greater expression and insight” (Harrison 2000:74) than quantitative methods. Harrison (2001:74) outlines a fourfold division of qualitative data: interviews, observational research (including participant observation), documents and media resources. I propose to follow this outline in setting out the research methods used in this thesis, where all four types of data collection were used in the research undertaken.

2.1. *Interviews:*

Ethridge (1990:192) makes the comment, that

“[s]ometimes the easiest way to find out what people think or believe about politics is simply to interview them. ...interviewing involves direct, personal, and usually extended contact with those whose attitudes, beliefs, or behaviour are the focus of research”.

Conducting interviews is generally considered better than carrying out surveys or questionnaires as ideas can be explored and responses probed, developed and clarified. Apart from difficulties with poor response rates from questionnaires, written responses tell

us nothing about tone of voice, facial expressions and hesitation, which can be important in assessing answers received (Bell 1999:4). Ethridge (1990:192) also points out that interviews usually “generate a much richer body of data” than survey methods, but are generally more time consuming.

The majority of interviews were conducted during two periods of research fieldwork in Angola from May to August 2000, and September to December 2001. Other interviews were held during conferences or meetings relating to Angola.⁴ The primary objective in conducting interviews was to collect new information or data, but interviews were also relevant in the verification or ‘triangulation’ of information already received, and in the validation or negation of personal impressions of events.⁵ Harrison (2001:168) defines ‘triangulation’ as a “process by which two or more kinds of data from different sources are used to see if the information is corroborated”. In the early stages of research, interviews tended to be ‘standardised’ or ‘structured’, in that I went through a specific set of prepared questions, but later they became more ‘unstandardised’ or ‘unstructured’ (Harrison (2001:90-94), and were carried out with the assistance of an ‘*aide memoire*’ (Walker 1985:4), a memorised list of questions to ask or issues to raise.

Three types of interviews were conducted: individual interviews, group interviews, and resource group interviews, all of which played an important role in validating the information received. The issue of validation is more acute in qualitative methods because responses have to be interpreted and contextualised, whereas quantitative data is usually grounded in statistics that can be replicated if necessary.

Firstly, a wide range of individual interviews were conducted with ‘key informants’ such as prominent church figures, journalists, newspaper editors, radio directors and personnel from civil society organisations, and were an important part of the research process.

⁴ For example, British Angola Forum meetings or conferences. Some interview material was also collected in France and Ireland where I interviewed individuals with first-hand knowledge of Angola.

⁵ For example, I frequently asked interviewees whether they considered views and opinions expressed in newspaper articles to be representative of a wider constituency. This was also important regarding traditional peace making methods where little documented evidence is available. By conducting interviews with groups in both Dundo and Luanda it was possible to get a sense of the similarities of approach across different ethnic groups.

Nearly all interviews were conducted in Portuguese. Manheim (2002:320-321) describes these as 'elite interviews,

“[if] they have knowledge that, for the purposes of the given research project, requires that they be given individual treatment in an interview. Their elite status depends not on their role in society but on their access to information that can help answer a given research question”.

Interviewees preferred not to be recorded but readily gave permission for note taking. Most interviewees were willing to be quoted, but others were not. Taylor (1998:96) states that “few legitimate research interests [are] served by publishing people’s names”, and recommends that anonymity be preserved, a point this research disagrees with, on the basis that the credibility of research is strengthened through the publication of names and an indication of who the person is that provided the information. For the most part in this thesis, it has not been necessary to preserve the anonymity of interviewees, but in a limited number of cases it was. In such circumstances I will give an indication of the status of the person providing the information. On the whole, I found interviewees forthcoming in their responses and supportive of the research concerns. Before starting a first interview, I took a few moments to explain the nature of my research and stated clearly that I was interested in material that was ‘public information’ in some way, and not secret. I found this type of introduction put interviewees at ease, reassuring them that I was not involved in some covert study.

Secondly, a considerable number of group interviews were conducted (i.e. two people or more). The majority of interviews with women, for example, were conducted as group interviews for reasons of cultural sensitivity. Frequently this involved some translation by one of the women of responses from one of Angola’s national languages into Portuguese. Nearly all the interviews conducted with Angola’s traditional authorities were group interviews. Interviews were usually arranged by prior appointment, and as a result, a number of the community elders participated in the meeting with the local chief. Some individual interviews turned into group interviews when the original interviewee invited someone else whom s/he felt had something to contribute. This happened on many occasions and may have been due to the interviewee not fully understanding the purpose

of my research and wishing to have support.⁶ The nature of ‘group interviews’ is rather different from individual interviews. The researcher needs to be able to moderate or facilitate such a group, ensure that everyone feels they can contribute, that no one person dominates the group, and also be able to manage interaction within the group (Taylor 1998:113-115).

Thirdly, a ‘resource group’ I formed during fieldwork in the town of Dundo (one of the fieldwork locations, outlined later) is important to highlight. I owe this group a particular debt of gratitude for its time and guidance during fieldwork. The group of three men and three women comprised of individuals I had previously known while resident in Angola from 1993 to 1998, whose opinion I respected and with whom I had good rapport. This group proved invaluable in helping to evaluate information and also assisted in arranging relevant interviews.⁷ Members of the group sometimes accompanied me during interviews and assisted with translation into Portuguese. During fieldwork in 2001 the resource group was reconstituted and expanded for the purpose of a five-day workshop on ‘Peace Initiatives within Angolan Society’. The course content dealt with the themes of this research and was an important forum for feedback and the validation of research findings.⁸ Most of the twelve workshop participants were from the area and had been invited to attend, or had expressed an interest in hearing how my research had progressed since the previous year.⁹

In discussing the importance of interviews, it is appropriate to raise the issue of ‘oral testimony’ in research. Lawrenson (1994:250) argues that

“combining oral testimony with other sources, [such as] documentary evidence, is a useful exercise in developing a sociological picture of the phenomena under investigation”.

On the same page he points out that “oral history has been neglected by both history and sociology”, and it merits serious consideration. Throughout the five narratives, I attempt to

⁶ Many of the interviews were set up by phone and I can appreciate how my request for an interview to discuss ‘peace related issues’ may have sounded strange to some.

⁷ As a general comment, I found it helpful when I was introduced to a potential interviewee or when the interview was arranged on my behalf by someone who knew the person I wished to meet.

⁸ Workshop held in Dundo, Lunda Norte, October 1-5 2001.

⁹ Seven of the participants were from the Dundo area, three from the south of Angola, one from Malange, and one from Congo-Brazzaville, of whom seven were male, five female.

ground my argument in documented sources, but I also want to recognise the valuable place of oral sources exercise within this research. The later chapters in particular exhibit a greater reliance on oral testimony. The credibility of the evidence is an issue, but this applies to all verbal testimony collected in interviews. I have attempted where possible, to address this by using a variety of sources pointing in the same direction, which allows an opinion to be generalised

2.2. *Observational Research.*

‘Participant observation’ is an important qualitative research method or ‘participant-as-observer’ to use Burgess’s (1984:80) phrase, and played a key role in gathering material for this research. “When researchers actually become part of the events under study, they are engaging in participant observation” (Manheim 2002:333). Participant observation allows researchers form their own opinion of what they see and hear, rather than solely relying on impressions of others, and to have greater confidence in the quality of their data. Manheim (2002:331) refers to this kind of data as ‘soft’ as it is subjective and can be challenged, noting that even “well-executed observations depend a great deal on skill, energy, and insight of the observer and may be difficult to reproduce”. Qualitative research is sometimes portrayed as unrepresentative and atypical, especially when compared with the research results of quantitative methods where generalisations can be made with a higher degree of certainty (Marsh & Stoker 1995:141). On the positive side, however, participant observation brings the researcher much closer to their area of study, exposing them to events and dynamics that would otherwise go unseen.

Foster (1994:82) states: “One of the questions always asked of participant observers is how they gained access to the social worlds people later read about”. A great deal of the ‘access’ this research enjoyed was provided by church organisations and by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) where I was personally known, especially in Dundo and the *bairros* of Luanda. In certain parts of Luanda it was necessary to be introduced to the group I was meeting. The access enabled me to form a personal opinion on what was taking place within communities in relation to promoting peace and to discuss this in the course of the interviews.

A form of participant observation that also took place relates to participation at a number of conferences and workshops during fieldwork. The most important of these was undoubtedly the July 2000 *Pro Pace* Peace Congress held in Luanda, dealt with in chapter three. Other workshops attended included a seminar on 'Human Rights and the Mass Media', held in Luanda, 23-25 October 2001; the annual meeting of the national Catholic 'Justice, Peace and Migrations Commission', in Luanda, October 30-November 1, 2001; and a workshop for NGOs on 'Lobbying and Advocacy', held in Luanda 20-23 November 2001. Access here was frequently on the basis of an invitation by someone aware of my research interests, suggesting that participation might be of benefit to the research, which it invariably was. This also had the added advantage of bringing together relevant individuals and organisations engaged in promoting peace with whom it was possible to arrange follow-up interviews.

2.3. *Documents and media resources.*

I will deal here with document and media resources together, as many of the points I propose to make are relevant to both. A large number of documents were collected during the course of this research. Some such as NGO reports, church archival material - pastoral letters, conference reports, and end of year messages - were collected during fieldwork. Other documents were downloaded from the internet.

Specifically in relation to the Angolan media, I have been in receipt of the Angolan private and state newspapers since 1999 and have built up a substantial archive of photocopied articles for the purposes of this research. These have been a valuable source of ongoing information on Angola, giving extensive coverage of Angolan political life as well as to civil society organisations and the churches. The Angolan print media is not as partisan as media institutions in other countries, but a certain caution is healthy in approaching the coverage given. The scope this research was able to give to the broadcast media was of necessity more limited, because it was only possible to tune in during periods in Luanda. Nonetheless, time was spent in the archives of *Rádio Ecclésia* transcribing some of its programmes and taped copies were made of archived radio debates. These are highlighted at the end of the thesis, after the list of interviews

conducted for this research. This provided a broader basis upon which to investigate the peace narrative of the broadcast media.

The above media sources were analysed by taking relevant articles and comment, which were incorporated thematically within the thesis. This form of ‘analysis of content’ is much different to the ‘content analysis’ cited in the literature, where for example Ethridge (2002:223) writes: “The process by which researchers convert the contents of documents into quantitative form is known as content analysis”. This invariably deals with column inches dedicated to an issue or topic, whereas my concern was with the nature of the argument put forward in the media

In summary, these are the qualitative research methods used during this research: interviews, participant observation, and analysis of document and media resources. The next section briefly outlines the two research locations where fieldwork was conducted.

2.4. Research locations.

The research questions were explored in two separate locations. The first was Luanda, Angola’s capital city; the second Dundo and its hinterland in the north eastern province of Lunda Norte. The selection of Luanda as a research location was crucial because of its importance to Angola, and because it is frequently possible to gauge what is happening in other parts of the country from the capital. Personal knowledge and experience of Dundo were the main criteria behind its selection, but it also offered an interesting contrast to life in the capital city, given its distance from Luanda. From the early stages of research the selection of two locations was considered an essential part of the research process, in order to assess whether a particular peace narrative could best be considered national or local. For example, it became clear early on that the peace narrative of the private media, especially the print media, had limited reach beyond Luanda. Hence, a singular focus on Luanda as a research location would likely have resulted in an overstatement of the significance of the private media, given that rural communities had little or no access to that media. Furthermore, in the case of Angola’s traditional authorities, an exclusive focus on Luanda would likely have resulted in an understatement of their significance, best approached and assessed within a provincial or rural context.

A brief description of both locations is appropriate. Accurate population figures for Dundo are unavailable but an estimate of approximately 100,000 people seems reasonable. Even though Dundo is an urban area, research material from the area has a certain 'rural feel' as a population explosion took place there following the return to war in 1992, when people fled their villages and hurriedly built provisional homes in the *bairros* on the periphery of Dundo. For people in Dundo village life and the land are strong reference points, creating an 'urban-rural' discourse. Though much of the surrounding countryside was effectively in UNITA hands during the war, the town itself remained in government control. The material covered in this thesis reflects activities which occurred within government controlled areas of the country. At no stage did UNITA forces occupy the research locations in the period under review. The province of Lunda Norte is best known for its rich alluvial diamond deposits to the south and east of Dundo. From colonial times to the mid-1990s, Dundo had been the administrative centre for mining activity in the region, but this has since changed. Insecurity and difficulty in reaching the mining areas of Nzaji and Lucapa from Dundo, led to the construction of new airports to directly service these areas from Luanda. Some fieldwork was also carried out in the town of Nzaji, 90kms from Dundo.

Specific areas of the city of Luanda comprise the second research location. The capital has an estimated population of three million people and sprawls to cover a vast area. Researching such an area would be impossible, therefore it was necessary to delimit the area of inquiry. I did this by selecting the *bairros* of Prenda and Rocha Pinto near to the international airport, which straddle the old and new parts of the city. I knew these parts of the city well, and had access to them through local church structures. I also however, wanted to examine Luanda in a more general or non-geographical sense, in order to research the peace narratives of the churches, private media and civil society organisations in particular, and thereby investigate the city at a spatial level. Doing so involved conducting interviews with key informants in their places of work, at their residences, or in a place of mutual convenience. In this way, research in Luanda had a double focus: specifically on the *bairros* of Prenda and Rocha Pinto, and a spatial focus on a number of relevant Angolan organisations.

3. *Historical Background.*

In providing background information relevant to the overall thesis, I will briefly outline the origins of the MPLA, FNLA (*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola*, National Front for the Liberation of Angola), UNITA, and FLEC (*Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda*, Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda), and then look at attempts to unify or form a common front between these nationalist organisations.

Thereafter I set out international involvement in the conflict, before dealing with Angolan peace agreements since 1991. This historical focus makes the fundamental point that division between Angola's nationalist parties predates the internationalisation of the conflict. While external factors were immensely important in fuelling the conflict, it was internal division that created the conditions wherein such a bloody civil war broke out. As Cramer (1995:159) writes:

“external intervention ... was inconceivable without the ruptures within Angolan society and between civil society and the state. Further, arguably this foreign involvement in the war was less important, and the internal divisions more important, to the sustenance of war in Angola than in Mozambique or Nicaragua. ... In terms of understanding the roots of war the internal cleavages were more important in Angola; the resumption of war after the elections in 1992 and in the context diminished foreign involvement only confirms this”.

In a number of the peace narratives outlined later, this rupture emerges as an important theme.

3.1. *Principal national actors.*

The origins of the MPLA as a political party are dated to December 10, 1956, founded as a result of the amalgamation of other political parties and organisations (Carreira 1996; Lara 1998; Mabeko Tali 2001a). The support base upon which the MPLA was built came from among the white, *mestiço* and Ambundu¹⁰ communities in the Luanda area, thereby creating a multi-ethnic organisation (Marcum 1969:16-22). Forms of political organisation were extremely difficult at this time because of the “profoundly repressive character of the Portuguese colonial system” (Mabeko Tali 2001a:54). Agostinho Neto, later to become Angola's first president, was one of many within the early MPLA leadership educated

¹⁰ Marcum and others refer to the Kimbundu people here. In this thesis I follow Neto (2001a:30) in naming Angola's principal ethnic groups. She refers to the Ambundu people (who speak Kimbundu) and the Ovimbundu people (who speak Umbundu).

outside Angola, where they were introduced to anti-colonial thinking. Simpson (1989:67) notes that for

“the first five years of its existence the MPLA adopted peaceful methods of protest against colonial rule but the organisation was eventually forced into exile. ...In 1961 a policy of armed struggle was adopted, the first manifestation of which was an abortive uprising in Luanda by MPLA supporters”.

This uprising on February 4, 1961 signals the beginning of the Angolan war of independence.

The FNLA on the other hand originated among the Bakongo people of northern Angola. Originally founded as UPNA (*União dos Povos do Norte de Angola*, People’s Union of the North of Angola) in July 1957, it later became UPA when the reference to ‘North’ was dropped. UPA initially hoped to revive the ancient Congo kingdom (Schubert 2000:68). In March 1962, the FNLA was formed after the amalgamation of UPA with PDA (*Partido Democrático de Angola*, Angolan Democratic Party), another northern party (Marcum 1969:9). Holden Roberto, the leader and central figure within the FNLA was much influenced by political events within the former Belgian Congo, and enjoyed the support of President Mobutu Sese Seko when he came to power (Marcum 1991:43-44). Roberto formed an Angolan government in exile known as GRAE (Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Éxilio - Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile) in Kinshasa (Heimer 1979:29), which lobbied internationally for Angolan independence. Jonas Savimbi was a member of GRAE, serving as foreign minister. Pélisser & Wheeler (1971:161) situate Angolan nationalism within “two main currents” at this time:

“the modernists, subject to a definite Marxist influence; and the ethno-nationalists, who were far more powerful since they had a limited but secure tribal base in the ancient kingdom”.

The balance of power prior to independence lay with the FNLA, based on its superior military strength, and who were the most likely of the nationalist parties to assume control of the Angolan state from the Portuguese (Kapusinski 1987). Simpson (1989:200) gives a figure of 15,000 FNLA troops compared with the MPLA’s 10,000 in January 1975,¹¹ figures that appear quite small when compared to the numbers under arms by the year 2000.

¹¹ Simpson (1989:200) quoting Wheeler (1980:9).

UNITA was the last of the three major nationalist movements founded. Having accused Roberto of factionalism and regionalism, and no longer willing to work with him, Jonas Savimbi left GRAE in 1964. His departure however was not with an immediate view to forming UNITA. He had explored the possibility of cooperation with the MPLA during his time as GRAE foreign minister and these discussions continued (Marcum 1969:134). March 13 1966, however, saw Savimbi form UNITA drawing support principally from among the Ovimbundu people of the central highlands, Angola's largest ethnic group. The formation of UNITA pushed ethnicity to the fore in a new way in Angolan politics, and reduced Holden Roberto's support base primarily to the Bakongo people in the north.

These three nationalist movements were to negotiate independence from Portugal after the Lisbon coup of April 1974. Mention however must also be made of FLEC, the nationalist movement in the enclave of Cabinda. Since the death of Jonas Savimbi the question of Cabinda has come into sharper focus and received more attention than in previous years. Marcum (1969:95) points to an initial consolidation of nationalism occurring in Cabinda in 1963, when the three Cabindan nationalist movements merged to form FLEC,¹² representing the Fiot peoples of Cabinda. FLEC's political aims called for full independence or a degree of autonomy for the enclave.¹³ FLEC played no part during the independence negotiations where the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA secured the status of "sole legitimate representatives of the Angolan people" (Marcum 1969:255). The subsequent Alvor Accords of January 1975 proclaimed Cabinda as "an inalienable component part of Angola". Despite the continuation of conflict in the province since 1975, neither the Bicesse Accords nor the Lusaka Protocol addressed in any way FLEC's issues with the Angolan state. In this thesis, I include material in relation to the Cabindan conflict insofar as it emerged within the research locations prior to Jonas Savimbi's death, as a component of responses to the research questions. It is therefore not a specific focus of this research, but runs as a subtext within the thesis. As I outline later, many argue that it is premature to speak of peace in Angola until this second conflict is resolved.

¹² The three were MLEC, *Mouvement de Libération de l'Enclave de Cabinda*, CUANC - *Comité d'Action d'Union Nationale des Cabindais*, and Alliamia - *Alliance de Mayumbe*.

¹³ FLEC has since broken into three distinct groups: FLEC-R (Renewed), FLEC-FAC (Armed Forces of Cabinda) and FDC (Democratic Front of Cabinda), (Human Rights Watch 1999:41). Human Rights Watch also refers to government negotiations with FLEC in 1995 and 1997 that broke down.

3.1.1. *Nationalist rivalry and unity attempts.*

A notable feature of Angolan nationalism prior to independence is the failure of the nationalist organisations to unify against the common colonial enemy. Internal struggles seriously undermined and diminished their effectiveness in dealing with shared aspirations for independence (Cann 1997:7). In fact, these struggles frequently resulted in the three independence movements turning their guns on each other, further weakening the nationalist campaign (Marcum 1978:211). Wright (1997:60) pinpoints one such attack as the moment that triggered the first civil war in 1975:

“The Angolan war began in mid-February 1975 when the FNLA attacked MPLA forces near Luanda. The FNLA was trying to gain political and military foothold in the capital and militarily overwhelm the MPLA”.

Control of Luanda was fundamental at the time because power was to be handed over on November 11, 1975. I underline this point here because, as will be seen especially in the chapter on the private media, this period in Angolan history continues to be a ‘live issue’ in certain quarters, part of the peace and reconciliation agenda that needs to be revisited.

All attempts made to unify the nationalist movements, or at least to create a common front against the Portuguese, failed. Marcum (1969:253, 263-267; 1978:206) details a number of such efforts to promote unity between the MPLA and FNLA. For example, a pledge of cooperation was signed in Tunis on January 31 1960, but ignored by Holden Roberto. Two meetings held in the former Leopoldville in May 1962 also failed. A further meeting in August saw Agostinho Neto put forward three proposals to Roberto seeking:

- i) a rapid fusion of the two parties into a single movement;
- ii) close political and military collaboration;
- iii) a joint military command structure over all Angolan forces.

These proposals were eventually lost amid accusations of racism and tribalism directed at Roberto and his government in exile. On this and other attempts to forge unity Marcum (1978:206) writes:

“[in general] a movement actively sought unity with one or both rivals when it was comparatively weak and in danger of eclipse or when it felt confident of turning an alliance to its own advantage. It purposely shunned unity when it perceived itself as strong enough to achieve ascendancy alone or was fearful of being subordinated or absorbed within an alliance”.

Wright (1997:14) identifies failures at the level of leadership as the reason behind the inability to unite or form a unified front, as “the organisation’s leaderships were unwilling to compromise their power”. Schubert (2000:75) refers to the “personal rivalry” between the three nationalist leaders who “felt called and capable of occupying, alone, the leadership of the independence struggle”. Both authors point to personality rather than ideology, as the reason for division between the parties. This failure to unite led to external alliances in bids to secure political power, or to destabilise the country when such power was not achieved. For Guimarães (1998:199),

“the Angolan civil war was a domestic conflict for power which was internationalised with consciousness and purposefulness by the rival movements”.

Foreign intervention did not create the Angolan conflict, but rather exploited already existing mistrust and division between the parties.

3.2. *Principal international actors.*

With war breaking out in 1975 between Angola’s nationalist parties in a desperate bid to gain control of Luanda prior to the Portuguese withdrawal in November, foreign powers became increasingly engaged in the conflict. As Portugal departed Angola, the former Soviet Union, the United States, Cuba, and South Africa progressively became more involved in Angola’s internal affairs. The brief comments I make here on each of these international actors simply indicate the alignments occurring within Angola in the period.

As early as 1962 the Soviet Union supported the MPLA in the nationalist struggle,¹⁴ and provided important material assistance at the time of independence through the provision of weapons. The Soviet backing of the MPLA was important throughout the period of the first civil war. Even in 1990 “Soviet support to Angola was estimated at £430 million a year, together with around 1,000 technical staff and military advisers” (CIIR 1991:19). However, as Shubin & Tokarev (2001:608) point out, the “history of Soviet relations with the Angolan liberation movements and of the military involvement in [the] country ... still has to be written”. Russia’s present day interest in Angola is primarily economic with

¹⁴ Marcum (1969:252-253) comments on a *Radio Lisbon* broadcast on March 9 1962, alleging that the MPLA enjoyed the backing and financial resources of international communism. Ten days later the Soviet newspaper *Pravda* published an article praising the militant programme of the MPLA.

significant investments in the diamond industry, particularly the Catoca project, north of Saurimo in the province of Lunda Sul.

Early US engagement in Angola was complicated by the fact that Portugal was a NATO ally with control of such strategic locations as the Azores islands, which the US did not want to jeopardise by overtly supporting the nationalist struggle. Nevertheless, economic assistance was provided to Holden Roberto from 1959, who was later placed on a CIA retainer of \$10,000 annually (Wright 1997:36). By 1974, with Portugal discussing the transition to independence with the three nationalist parties, the CIA had begun to ship large shipments of arms to the FNLA (Wright 1997:57).¹⁵ Post-independence involvement however, was severely curtailed when the US Congress passed the Clark Amendment in February 1976 which “specifically prohibited any assistance that might involve the United States more deeply in the Angolan war” (Wright 1997:67). This was to avoid another Vietnam situation developing. After the repeal of the amendment in July 1985, covert funding resumed to UNITA.¹⁶ The US also has considerable economic interests in Angola, particularly in the oil sector, with Angola supplying 7% of US oil imports (Global Witness 1998).

South African involvement in supporting and arming UNITA during the first civil war was considerable. Mohanty (1992:168) suggests that South Africa had three specific objectives in Angola:

“first, it hoped to head off the establishment of a Marxist, militarily hostile government on the border of Namibia. ... [S]econdly, it hoped to destroy the base of operations in southern Angola of the South-West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO). ... [Thirdly], to protect its investment in the Cunene [hydroelectric] Dam ... along the border between Namibia and Angola”.¹⁷

Prior to the withdrawal of Portugal in 1975, South African troops had invaded Angola and marched with UNITA to within 120 kms of Luanda in an attempt to defeat the MPLA.¹⁸

¹⁵ China also sent the FNLA instructors and arms in 1974 (Marcum 1978:245-246).

¹⁶ HRW (1999:13-14) states that “U.S. covert aid totaled about U.S. \$250 million between 1986 and 1991, making it the second largest U.S. covert programme, exceeded only by aid to the Afghan *mujahedeen*”.

¹⁷ Ekwe-Ekwe (1990:102-104) states that the dam had been built largely by the South Africans during the last three years of Portuguese colonialism and was intended to generate power for the zinc, copper, uranium, and diamond mines in northern Namibia.

¹⁸ Kapuscinski (1987) provides interesting detail of this period.

FNLA and Zairean troops from the north had come to within 20 kms of Luanda (Simpson 1989:206). The departure of South African troops from Angolan soil, finally came about after the signing of the New York treaty in 1988 which negotiated independence for Namibia and secured the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola (Wright 1997:145-156). The New York treaty led to the establishment of the United Nation's first mission to Angola known as UNAVEM, the United Nations Angolan Verification Mission, charged with the supervision of Cuban withdrawal (MacQueen 1998).

The role of Cuba on the side of the MPLA in 1975 was crucial in repelling the South Africans from the south and the FNLA attack on Luanda from the north. Fidel Castro regarded Roberto's FNLA "as an American pawn", and from October 1966 Cuba had been providing military training and assistance to the MPLA (Marcum 1969:225). About 1500 Cuban advisers were in Angola prior to independence on November 11, with an additional 4,000 troops deployed days later. Within a month the figure had reached 10,000 troops before peaking at 50,000. The arrival of Cuban troops quickly changed the military situation in Angola, enabling the MPLA to reorganise and push back the attacks on the capital.

Following the resumption of hostilities in 1992, the conflict became even more internationalised. A key source detailing the extent of this internationalisation is the United Nations Fowler report of March 2000, dealing with the violation of UN sanctions against UNITA. Different packages of sanctions had been applied against UNITA after it returned to war in 1992, but these were initially ineffectual.¹⁹ UN resolution 864 of September 1993 imposed an oil and arms embargo. Resolution 1127 of August 1997 imposed travel restrictions on senior UNITA personnel, the closure of UNITA offices, and banned the provision of aircraft to UNITA. In June 1998, resolution 1173 froze UNITA's financial assets and forbade the sale of diamonds from Angola that did not carry a certificate of origin. Diamonds were the key source of revenue for UNITA, replacing the assistance formerly provided by the United States and South Africa (Human Rights Watch 1999:5, hereafter HRW). Malaquias (2001:532) estimated that "[d]uring the 1990s, the

¹⁹ See <http://www.un.org/News/ocssg/sanction.htm#Angola> for a full list of sanctions relating to Angola.

rebels have been able to sell diamonds worth more US \$4 billion”, finance which sustained the war. Given the extensive disregard for sanctions, the UN passed resolution 1237 of May 1999 establishing a panel of experts to investigate the violation of sanctions. Known as the Fowler (2000) report, it lists a host of countries (and business interests) which provided support to UNITA in violation of sanctions. UNITA had procured weapons from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burkina Faso, Congo-Brazzaville, Rwanda, South Africa, Togo, and Zambia. Military equipment had originated in Bulgaria, Belarus and the Russian Federation. Neighbouring countries - the DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, Zambia and Namibia - supplied various amounts of fuel, while Gabon and Uganda provided aircraft refuelling facilities.²⁰ Diamond transactions had been facilitated by some of the countries already mentioned. Morocco was cited for circumventing financial sanctions, and Portugal for keeping UNITA offices open. The Fowler report makes explicit the increased international dimension to the Angola conflict throughout the 1990s.

4. *Three Peace Agreements.*

The next three sub-sections focus on the peace agreements signed between the Angolan government and UNITA at Bicesse, Lusaka,²¹ and finally Luena in April 2002. I outline the nature of these agreements and how each sought to end the Angolan conflict, treating them chronologically.

4.1. *The Bicesse Peace Accords.*

On 24-25 April 1990, the Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, José Durão Barroso brought together the Angolan government and UNITA to begin a process of negotiation that eventually led to the signing of the Bicesse Accords. The early negotiations were far from easy, but

²⁰ The report (paragraph 68) also commented on the supply of fuel to UNITA areas from within Angola, stating: “Credible and reliable reports also continue to be received of flows of petroleum products from Government controlled areas into UNITA controlled areas (though not necessarily to UNITA), however the Panel is not able to quantify these flows”.

²¹ At various points in this thesis I will use ‘Bicesse’ and ‘Lusaka’ as shorthand for the ‘Bicesse Accords’ and ‘Lusaka Protocol’, reflecting the way these agreements are referred to generally in Angola.

“a significant breakthrough came at the fourth round of talks, held in September 1990, when the US and the Soviet Union became directly involved in negotiations for the first time” (Pycroft 1994:248).

Collectively known as the Troika, Portugal, United States and Soviet Union, were instrumental in brokering the agreement, signed near Lisbon on May 31, 1991. Hodges (2001:13) outlines its principal tenets:

“The Accords provided a ceasefire, the quartering of UNITA troops, the formation of new unified armed forces, the demobilisation of surplus troops, the restoration of government administration in UNITA-controlled areas and multi-party parliamentary and presidential elections”.

The TROIKA also implemented a ‘Triple Zero Option’ which meant that international military support to both sides would end once a cease-fire was in place and an election timetable agreed. In the parliamentary elections, the MPLA won an outright majority taking 53.7% of the vote, UNITA gained 34%, other smaller parties received 12%. Eduardo dos Santos polled 49.6% and Jonas Savimbi 40.1% in the presidential elections. As neither candidate gained an absolute majority, a second round of voting was required between the two leading candidates, but the renewed fighting prevented this from taking place.

Margaret Anstee’s (1996) account of her time as UN Special Representative for Angola, and head of the UNAVEM II mission is an important source in outlining why the Bicesse Accords failed. I highlight four reasons put forward by Anstee to explain the failure of the peace agreement. Firstly, Anstee was critical of the structure adopted during the negotiations which led to the peace agreement itself, in particular the lack of UN input into an agreement the UN was later called on to implement. Anstee (1996:13) writes:

“... the long negotiations had been mainly carried out by the three observer countries. There had also been some participation by the Organization of African Unity and African Heads of State, but virtually none by the United Nations. ... The United Nations had been represented only during the later stages, and then only at the military level, by the Deputy Military Adviser to the Secretary General, who acted as ‘a technical adviser on the cease-fire aspects’; there was no representation at the political level”.

Elsewhere Anstee (1996:532) writes: “Many of the problems encountered in Angola were rooted in the nature of the Bicesse Accords, in the negotiation of which the UN played no role”. This criticism was addressed during the Lusaka negotiations when Anstee’s successor, Alioune Blondin Beye, chaired the actual peace talks.

Secondly, Anstee (1996:11) questions the scope of the UN mandate itself, which proved too narrow when the peace accords went into crisis. The role allocated to the UN by the signatories of the Bicesse Accords was solely one of verification, as the Accords make clear:

“Overall supervision of the cease-fire will be the responsibility of the Government of the People’s Republic of Angolan and UNITA acting with the framework of the Joint Political-Military Commission. ... The United Nations will be invited to send monitors to support the Angolan parties, at the request of the Government”.²²

The nature of this mandate imposed significant limitations on the UN’s ability to respond when the situation on the ground changed so drastically in late 1992 and mediation was required. For Anstee (1996:xii), the UN mandate in effect forced it to operate “with one hand tied behind its back”. When new negotiations finally took place between UNITA and the Angolan government in Addis Ababa and later Abidjan, the UN sought an expanded role to include mediation and arbitration, in contrast to the restricted tasks of observation and verification (Anstee 1996:462). Human Rights Watch (1999:154) echoes Anstee on this point, describing UNAVEM II as

“a text book example of the sort of peacekeeping operation that should not occur. It was powerless to intervene when it became evident early on that both sides failed to comply with the demobilization plan of the ‘self-implementing’ Bicesse Accords”.

Thirdly, Anstee criticised the international financial commitment to securing peace in Angola. She quotes the assessment of one observer who described UNAVEM II as “a UN mission done on the cheap - a totally false economy on the part of the international community” (Anstee 1996:223). The UN Security Council had wanted “a small manageable operation” (Anstee 1996:32) but this was later expanded when the UN Security Council passed Resolution 747 in 1992. Even so funding difficulties remained. Alluding to the numeration of the resolution, Anstee (1996:38) commented that her task as Special Representative was similar to flying a 747 Jumbo “but provided with fuel sufficient only for a DC-3!” Vines (1997:30) contrasts the under-funding of UNAVEM II with the 1990 UN election-monitoring budget for Namibia:

²² Bicesse Accords Cease-fire Agreement, section entitled Definition and General Principles, paragraph 4. UAN (2001) contains a copy of the Bicesse Accords and the Lusaka Protocol.

“At its peak, the number of UN personnel in Angola was about 1,000. By contrast, some 8,000 personnel were made available to monitor the Namibian elections in 1990, in a country whose population is only one-sixth of Angola’s. The total budget of UNAVEM II from June 1991 to October 1992 was £118 million, compared with that of \$480 million for the Namibian operation”.²³

The Namibian comparison makes clear the level of under-funding involved.

Fourthly, management of the transition to democracy was problematic at a number of levels. For Anstee (1996:534) “the ‘winner takes all’ concept [was not] helpful in consolidating the smooth transition to democratic government”. Efforts had been made to secure a role for the losers of the election during the Bicesse negotiations but “neither of the combatants wanted to hear of it; each was bent on nothing less than total victory” (Anstee 1996:534). Opposition parties had in fact argued for a period of transition to normalise political life in the country before holding elections.²⁴ At the time UNITA was confident of electoral victory as were its US backers (Wright 1997:159), and Savimbi was unwilling “to accept anything less than being head a state” (Howen 2001:22). Smith (1992:101) spoke of the “genuine incredulity in the UNITA camp” after it had lost the elections. Hodges (2001:14) also points to the insufficient time period prior to elections “considering the number and complexity of the tasks to be carried out, the distrust between the two parties and the logistical obstacles”. In a country with such high levels of people displaced internally and across borders, sixteen months was too short a period of preparation (Kaure 1999:60). Prior to the signing of the Bicesse Accords UNITA had originally wanted elections after 12 months, whereas the MPLA had argued for 36 months, in order to make the necessary electoral preparations (Tvedten 1992:111).

Despite these criticisms of the Bicesse accords and the UN mandate, ultimate failure for the breakdown of the Bicesse accords has been attributed to the Angolan parties themselves. The then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali stated in January 1993 that the fundamental cause for the breakdown of Bicesse had been:

²³ *Times Literary Supplement*, 5 September 1997, p. 30.

²⁴ In João (1992). Paulino Pinto João is leader of the political party CNDA (*Convenção Nacional Democrática de Angola*, National Democratic Convention of Angola), Luanda, and of the fourteen opposition parties collectively known as POC, (*Partidos da Oposição Civil*) the civil opposition parties.

“the failure, often deliberate, of both parties to implement in full the provisions of the Peace Accords relating to political, military and police matters or to make the necessary efforts to promote national reconciliation” (quoted in Anstee 1996:375).

During the period immediately after the resumption of war there was a tendency to apportion shared culpability to both sides in order to remain evenhanded, hoping that some accommodation could be reached to end the bloodshed. As this approach failed, a shift in emphasis occurred and the finger of blame was unequivocally pointed at UNITA for the resumption of war, in particular at Jonas Savimbi and his thirst for political power irrespective of the cost. In January 1999 Kofi Annan stated:

“the root causes of this deeply regrettable state of affairs are well known. They lie in UNITA’s refusal to comply with basic provisions of the Lusaka Protocol which demanded that it demilitarise its forces and allow state administration to be extended throughout the national territory” (taken from ACSTA 2000).

4.2. *The Lusaka Protocol.*

As the new civil war raged on Anstee desperately sought to negotiate a cease-fire, but to no avail. Talks initially took place in Namibe, a coastal town in southern Angola, then in Addis Ababa, before completely breaking down in Abidjan. With the appointment of the new UN Special Representative, Alioune Blondin Beye, new peace talks in Lusaka lasting over a year finally bore fruit in the November 1994 Lusaka Protocol. This protocol was “largely based on the Abidjan protocol on which [the sides] so nearly reached agreement a year and a half earlier” (Anstee, 1996:543), but at that stage peace negotiations were secondary to events on the battlefield.²⁵ UNITA’s initial gains saw it control an estimated 70% of the countryside including many key urban areas such as Huambo and Uige. As the government reorganised militarily, having abandoned the ‘triple zero option’, it managed to regain much territory including Angola’s second city of Huambo in UNITA’s heartland. With UNITA on the back-foot after losing Huambo, and government forces pressing onwards, the Lusaka protocol was signed much against the wishes of the resurgent Angolan military which felt it could defeat UNITA.

²⁵ The Abidjan peace talks came remarkably close to success. Pycroft (1994:256) states that a “compromise was reached on 46 out of 47 of the clauses of the Abidjan protocol. The stumbling block was point 11, which called for the phased withdrawal of UNITA forces from areas they had occupied since the resumption of the war”. UNITA wanted a settlement that reflected the balance of power at the time.

Hodges (2001:15) again sets out the main elements of the Lusaka Protocol, stating that:

‘[it] built upon the Bicesse Accords, but introduced some important innovations, including provisions for power-sharing, the postponement of further elections until after the completion of the military tasks, the UN’s direct responsibility for overseeing implementation of the peace process and the dispatch of a large UN peace-keeping force. UNAVEM III had 7,000 troops at its height’.

An ‘insider’ account of the Lusaka negotiations is provided by Paul Hare (1998), the American representative during the talks. The importance of his work is somewhat diminished by the fact that it was published as Angola returned to war, and had been written on the assumption that the Lusaka Protocol had been successful, a “model of how peacekeeping operations should be carried out” (Hare 1998:xviii). One of Hare’s (1998:xviii) major concerns had been to illustrate how “[b]reaking the cycle of violence and placing Angola on the path to peace required major external intervention”, especially that of the UN and TROIKA. A most notable omission in Hare’s work, identified by Kibble (1999), was the “complete absence [of Angolan people] from the book”. This thesis will address dimensions of this omission.

While the Lusaka Protocol sought to rectify failures within the Bicesse Accords, Human Rights Watch argues that a major weakness in its implementation was the UN tolerance of human rights abuses practiced by both sides, which fundamentally undermined the agreement and fostered a culture of impunity.

“The failure of the Lusaka Peace Process was not only due to the bad faith of UNITA. The UN’s strategy of refraining from disclosure of public action against violations of the accords, its lack of transparency, and its failure to implement U.N. embargos undermined any respect that UNITA or the government had to observe the Lusaka Protocol. With the collapse of the Lusaka peace process this strategy of see no evil, speak no evil appears to have backfired badly” (HRW 1999:6).

The Lusaka Protocol limped from one crisis to another from the time of its signing. Beye showed remarkable tolerance in his dealings with both sides, working tirelessly to foster trust and understanding. However, his untimely death in a plane crash in Abidjan on June 26, 1998, as he toured the region seeking support for the peace agreement, hastened the resumption of military conflict. Another period of war was initiated in December 1998 when, at the opening of the fourth MPLA Congress (December 5-10, 1998), “President dos Santos stated that the only path to lasting peace was the total isolation of Jonas

Savimbi and his movement” (HRW 1999:28).²⁶ In the eyes of the Angolan government the UN had failed in disarming UNITA for a second time. Not only were United Nations’ forces “the shields behind which Jonas Savimbi dug his diamonds and re-armed”,²⁷ but the UN had “accept[ed] the fiction of a demobilised UNITA army” (Munslow 1999:556). Apart from a small delegation of UN human rights officers, the UN was expelled from Angola.

The causes of conflict had clearly shifted throughout the decade since the signing of the Bicesse Accords. Savimbi’s insatiable thirst for political power was regarded as the reason for the return to war in 1992, but the struggle for control of natural resources, such as oil and diamonds, also became crucial.²⁸ State revenues from the oil sector were heavily invested in the military so as to resist and defeat the threat posed by UNITA. For its part UNITA sought to control large segments of the diamond trade to rearm and maintain its military strength. In many respects the struggle for, or to maintain political power, became indistinguishable from the struggle to control the financial benefits accruing from oil and diamonds. As Howen (2001:20) writes:

“Angola’s vast mineral wealth was not one of the original causes of the conflict. Today, however, it appears to be one of its driving forces. The parties are fighting for control of a state apparatus that gives access to the huge income from oil and the opportunities this brings to exercise patronage”.

4.3. *The Luena Memorandum of Understanding.*

The death of Jonas Savimbi on February 22, 2002 transformed the political landscape of Angola and created new possibilities for peace. Events moved quickly in the weeks following his death. A cease-fire came into effect at midnight on March 13, part of a fifteen point peace plan announced by the government.²⁹ This plan dealt with issues such

²⁶ Interviewees, resident in Huambo in late 1998, stated that the military confrontation was underway much earlier, from July or August that year. Military conflict had begun to look increasingly likely from May 1997 (*Africa Confidential*, Vol. 38, No 24, May 12 1997). Conflict did break out in June 1997 when government forces attacked UNITA in Lunda Norte, retaking many of the diamond mines UNITA operated in the area, but fighting was short-lived (*Africa Confidential*, Vol. 38 Number 12, June 06 1997).

²⁷ *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 43, number 8, April 19 2002.

²⁸ Simon (2001:511) describes the Angolan conflict as an “archetypal resource war” where “oil and diamond revenues are being monopolised by the very narrow political, military and economic elites”.

²⁹ In *Jornal de Angola*, March 10 2002. See also *Angola Peace Monitor*, No. 7, Vol. VIII, April 9 2002.

as the demilitarisation of UNITA and its reconstitution as a legitimate political party,³⁰ a general amnesty in order to promote national reconciliation, the extension of state administration over the whole country, the approval of a new constitution and voter registration prior to holding elections, and the promotion of tolerance and forgiveness. On April 4 2002, the Memorandum of Understanding was signed in Luena between the governments' armed forces, known as FAA (*Forças Armadas Angolanas*), and UNITA's military leadership. Mussagy Jeichande, who had been appointed representative and head of the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) in July 2000, described the Memorandum as a benchmark in Angolan history.³¹ The signing of the Memorandum led to over 105,000 UNITA troops with their families, making their way to one of 38 quartering areas across the country.

This chapter has introduced the research topic to be explored in this thesis, an arena of inquiry that gives priority to Angolan perspectives on peace from the Bicesse Accords to the death of Jonas Savimbi. I have set out the research questions that guide this thesis, and also outlined the qualitative research methods used in conducting the inquiry itself. The research questions will be operationalised in two Angolan locations which will enable wider appraisal on the nature of the five peace narratives selected for research. This chapter presented introductory background material of an historical nature on the Angolan conflict, presenting the principal national and international actors involved at different stages in the Angolan conflict, before concluding with a brief outline of the three peace agreements. Further detail will be provided on this material throughout the thesis.

³⁰ *African Research Bulletin*, Volume 39:8, September 2002, p. 14966, reported that UNITA officially disbanded its army on August 2 2002.

³¹ Mussagy Jeichande, speaking at the BAF (2002).

Chapter 2.

The Public Sphere: Habermas and Beyond.

This chapter sets out the theoretical framework within which later Angolan peace narratives will be analysed. This framework takes the model of public sphere developed by Jurgen Habermas (1989) as a starting point, and incorporates important revisions suggested by other authors, working within Habermas's model. Fraser (1992:111) argued that while "the general idea of a public sphere is indispensable ... the specific form in which Habermas has elaborated this idea is not wholly satisfactory", suggesting that there is a need to critically interrogate Habermas's idea. An interesting feature of Habermas's (1992) later writing on the public sphere is that he recognised some of the historical inaccuracies in his original project, acknowledging that certain revision was in fact necessary. Unfortunately Habermas never undertook the task of reworking his public sphere framework, but agreed with some directions for revision suggested by other writers using his theoretical approach, which I examine later (Habermas 1992). This suggests therefore, that the 'Habermasian public sphere' needs to be understood in two senses: in a narrow sense, to refer to Habermas's original work; and in a wider sense, to include ongoing research which engages with his theory. For the purpose of research, the theoretical framework outlined in this chapter adopts this wider understanding of the 'Habermasian public sphere'.

Habermas's *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* was first published in German in 1962, and only translated into English in 1989. A number of descriptions of the public sphere help give an initial sense of what Habermas's analytical construct deals with, before setting out Habermas's own definition in a later section. Benhabib (1992:85-86), for example, described the public sphere as a place of "political participation and the widest-reaching democratisation of decision-making processes". Participation and discourse were therefore the fundamental principles of the public sphere. Holub (1991:3) suggested that "what attracted Habermas to the notion of a public sphere ...[was] its potential as a foundation for a critique of society based on democratic principles". For Fraser (1992:110) the public sphere

“designates a theatre in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk. It is the space where citizens deliberate about their common affairs. ...it is a site for the production and circulation of discourses”.

Finally, Habermas (1992:447) himself places the public sphere within a “discourse-centred concept of democracy”. These descriptions of the Habermasian public sphere as a ‘participatory discursive arena’ raised the possibility that it might prove an appropriate analytical framework for addressing the research concerns of this thesis. The chapter explores this possibility and potential.

Before proceeding further, I briefly set out the structure of this chapter. Section one details the specific public sphere outlined by Habermas, namely the ‘bourgeois’ public sphere. The origin of the concept in western political philosophy raises an initial question concerning its appropriateness for research in a non-western context. Azarya (1994:87) addresses this issue stating that terms such as civil society, bureaucracy, and democracy, are also western in conception, hence the origin of the public sphere does not in itself render it inappropriate as an analytical tool. Section two examines criticism and revision of Habermas’s original public sphere construct and begins the task of exploring how the concept might be useful for investigation in Angola. These revisions enable the research to focus on the churches, the media and civil society organisations as actors within the public sphere. Because the literature on Angola frequently assesses these actors within a civil society framework, I have considered it important to contrast the respective frameworks of ‘civil society’ and the ‘public sphere’, which is undertaken in section three. The section contains a number of subsections which look at areas of similarity and difference between the two frameworks and also raises the question of the place of traditional authorities within a public sphere and civil society approach. Though the discourse of traditional authority figures exhibits many public sphere qualities, I conclude that traditional authorities belong outside a public sphere framework because of their political identities. I argue however, that the public sphere approach permits a valuable reading of the peace narrative of traditional authority, in a manner that a civil society framework does not facilitate. Section four returns to Habermas’s original public sphere work and explores his notion of a ‘plebeian public sphere’, referring to the ‘culture of the common people’ (Habermas 1992:427). Habermas did not subject this plebeian sphere to analysis but I

propose to briefly explore its potential for analysis of community based material, the remaining peace arena to be situated in relation to the public sphere.

1. *The Bourgeois Public Sphere.*

In tracing the origin of the Habermasian bourgeois public sphere one is dealing with political and economic developments within Britain, France and Germany in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Habermas (1989:11) identified the emergence at the time of an “enclave within a society separating itself from the state” which engaged in public discourse to argue and defend its interests. Public meetings held in coffee shops and journalistic writing were examples of where this enclave became visible within society. London reportedly had three thousand coffee shops in the first decade of the eighteenth century and were a key location for well-to-do men and property owners to openly discuss issues relevant to them (Calhoun 1992:12). From the very beginning those who gathered were “a reading public” (Habermas 1989:23), thus explaining why journals exercised a key function within the early public sphere. The daily print media later became important in this regard. These written and discursive arenas of critical rationality were at the forefront of this emerging public sphere.

It is relevant at the outset to put forward Habermas’s (1989:27) own definition of the public sphere:

“The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labour. The medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people’s public use of their reason”.

Two comments are relevant with regard to the definition. Firstly, the public sphere is located outside the realm of the state or government authorities. While references to ‘commodity exchange and social labour’ are relevant to the specific context, the definition refers to a sphere where individuals came together to discuss and debate the rules that governed them. Secondly, the concern is with public discourse, with public rationality. Individuals used reason to discuss their concerns in a public way, and this could be

scrutinised by others. Such publicness or publicity was central to the public sphere, a key to bring about social change and reform. As Habermas states:

“Publicity was, according to its very idea, a principle of democracy not just because anyone could in principle announce, with equal opportunity, his personal inclinations, wishes, and convictions-opinions; it could only be realized in the measure that these personal opinions could evolve through the rational-critical debate of a public into public opinion” (Habermas 1989:219).

Calhoun (1992:13) identifies four key features of the public sphere which further outline the Habermasian public sphere. Firstly, the public sphere was understood as a place of critical discourse where a person’s status was put to one side. It represented a “kind of social intercourse that, far from presupposing the equality of status, disregarded status altogether” (Habermas 1989:36). The public sphere was therefore a place of idealised discourse. Secondly, rational discourse alone was to decide the strength of an argument, irrespective of the identity of the speaker. In theory, debate was won or lost on the basis of an individual’s ability to argue and defend a point a view, not their public office or position in society. Thirdly, public sphere discourse focused on matters of public concern and involved the “problematization of areas that until then had not been questioned” (Habermas 1989:36). Such matters had previously been considered as belonging to the realm of the state or the church, but the public sphere challenged these boundaries. Finally, the public sphere sought to be inclusive and receptive to the participation of all, to remain open to new ideas. These four features will be revisited later in the chapter, where it will be examined if this idealised form of rational discourse reflected the reality of the time, or if in fact the public sphere was not based on certain exclusions.

The question of whether there was one or more public spheres leads to different views within the literature. Calhoun (1992:37) explains that some authors favour a notion of multiple, sometimes overlapping or contending public spheres, before expressing a preference for a singular notion:

“[it appears] a loss simply to say that there are many public spheres, however, for that will leave us groping for a new term to describe the communicative relationships among them. It might be more productive rather to think of the public sphere as involving a field of discursive connections”.

The confusion arises in part from Habermas's own references to multiple spheres, to the existence of bourgeois and plebeian spheres, thereby clearly suggesting two separate arenas. The question of single or multiple spheres appears unresolved overall within Habermas, but by introducing the terminology of 'publics' within the public sphere Fraser (1992) suggests something of a compromise, and maintains the theoretical integrity of a single sphere. This research favours the notion of a single public sphere because the five 'peace narratives' emerge from within a similar location, i.e. national peace perspectives 'from below', and because of similarities between them. Fraser's 'publics' facilitate differentiation between the Angolan perspectives presented, while underlining the similarity of the space from where they emerge.

2. *Habermas's public sphere: some revisions.*¹

Habermas came to regard his original public sphere work as in need of certain revision, stating that "[h]istorians have rightly complained of empirical pitfalls" (Habermas 1992:423). For example, Habermas (1992:425) recognised that he could have introduced "greater internal differentiation" which his model of public sphere. He had in fact considered rewriting it, but on rereading it after almost a generation, concluded:

"I was initially tempted to make changes, eliminate passages, and make emendations. Yet I became increasingly impressed with the impracticability of such a course of action" (Habermas 1992:421).

Rather than revise his earlier work Habermas left it untouched because his own academic interests had moved on. As a result we are left with an original piece of writing on the public sphere which Habermas later considered incomplete, but accepted subsequent research findings from other authors highlighting the need for some revision. In other words, the notion of the Habermasian public sphere becomes wider than the original text

¹ The public sphere literature uses both 'revision' and 'reconstruction' in describing academic engagement with Habermas's work. It is not always clear whether the words are used interchangeably. Dahlgren & Sparks (1991) for example, speaks of 'reconstruction'. Fraser (1992:111 & 113) too speaks of 'reconstruction' in her analysis of Habermas before basing her account on 'revisionist historiography'. I take the view that it is important to differentiate between the two words: reconstruction suggests something rebuilt or significantly altered; revision suggests remodeling or minor alteration, less extensive than reconstruction.

and includes the perspectives of other theorists who engaged Habermas's concept critically.

Dahlgren and Sparks (1991:2-3) have argued that it is important to engage in revision of Habermas in order to render his methodology "serviceable" to present day democracy:

"To the extent that one is concerned about democracy, we need an understanding of the public sphere which is congruent with the emerging realities of today, and serviceable to both research and politics. This involves coming to terms with Habermas's analysis, incorporating it and modifying it within new intellectual and political horizons".

In effecting such modification Dahlgren and Sparks believe it is imperative to retain Habermas's "critical dimension" but move beyond Habermas's own analysis. Garnham (1992:359) states that criticism put forward of Habermas's model "do[es] not undermine the book's continuing claim to our attention as a fruitful starting point for work on contemporary issues". In fact, criticism has brought about the opposite, pointing to the validity and continued relevance of the initial concerns outlined by Habermas. Academic criticism and revision of his concept have drawn increased attention to the fundamental importance associated with the notion of the public sphere itself.

With these introductory comments I proceed to examine three revisions within the public sphere literature, relevant to the later presentation of Angolan peace narratives. I provide some comment on the media in section 2.1, where the suggested revision argues that Habermas understood the media in too narrow a sense. Section 2.2 examines the role of the Churches which Habermas did not situate within the public sphere, pointing to an historical inaccuracy within the original articulation of the public sphere. Section 2.3 explores forms of reasoning occurring within the public sphere. This is based on my own reading of Habermas, whom I believe insufficiently distinguishes between individual and representative forms of reasoning. On the basis of this, I propose an amendment to Habermas's definition of the public sphere itself which has consequences for the Angolan discourse examined in later chapters, and facilitates analysis of civil society organisations.

2.1. *The Media.*

Habermas (1989:181) regarded the media as “the public sphere’s preeminent institution”. He pointed out that the effectiveness of the public sphere is premised on the guarantee of a number of basic rights: “freedom of speech and opinion, freedom of association and assembly, and freedom of the press” (Habermas 1989:227). Only when these rights were secured was the public sphere considered effective as an arena of rational-critical discourse.

Despite the fundamental role which Habermas attributes to the media in the development of the public sphere, he progressively adopted a pessimistic view of what the media had become as it modernised, arguing that the world of radio and television promoted passivity rather than participation within the public sphere (Habermas 1989:140). He identified a correlation between an expanding media and the decline of the bourgeois public sphere, stating that the “world fashioned by the mass media is a public sphere in appearance only” (Habermas 1989:171). The public sphere of Habermas had always been a literary public, where written journalism and academic writing enjoyed a high profile. As the media developed and became more popular its critical edge was diminished rather than enhanced. One of the criticisms made of Habermas in this regard is that he

“tends to judge the eighteenth century by Locke and Kant, the nineteenth century by Marx and Mill, and the twentieth century by the typical suburban television viewer” (Calhoun 1992:33).

On this same point Curran (1991:46) writes:

“Habermas’s analysis - though stimulating and thought-provoking – is deeply flawed. It is based on contrasting a golden era that never existed with an equally misleading representation of present times as a dystopia. The contrast does not survive empirical historical scrutiny”.

In other words, Habermas did not compare like with like.

Assessing Habermas’s treatment of the media, Zaret (1992:213-214) concluded that Habermas underestimated the capacity of printing in itself to generate and stimulate new opinion within the public sphere:

“Equally neglected are the implications of the printing and scientific revolutions for new views on public reason that were incorporated in political appeals to a reasoning public. While Habermas refers implicitly to the printing revolution in his

discussion of the rise of a reading public, he regards it narrowly as a means for disseminating and sharing ideas and *not as an independent causal factor that shaped new modes of thought*" (emphasis added).

With specific reference to Britain, Zaret (1992:218) argued that it was "printing that brought Parliamentary debates on religion and politics into the streets, and printing also presented parliament with popular views on these topics". Printing therefore, was much more than simply a medium by which views could be exchanged and opinion generated or contradicted. In itself it shaped popular thinking and generated issues for political discourse. Zaret in effect, is calling attention to the important formative dimension of the media, which is not independent of its crucial informative function.

The private print and broadcast media in Angola exhibit some of the features of the Habermasian public sphere. Of the five peace narratives presented it most closely resembles Habermas's concept, though the context is different. Many of the basic rights identified above by Habermas as necessary to secure the effectiveness of the public sphere, were highly contested in Angola throughout the 1990s. Attempts to promote and consolidate rights such as freedom of expression, the right of assembly and association, and to a free press, have been a significant feature of Angola's democratic development throughout the 1990s. However, against a background of military conflict, it has been difficult to assert these rights and there have been many setbacks.²

2.2. *The Churches.*

The role of religion in the public sphere, and by extension the role of the churches as religious institutions, is also dealt with by Zaret. In doing so he directs our attention towards an omission within the public sphere, arguing that Habermas's

"account glosses over the relevance of religion for the emergence of a public sphere in politics at a time when religious discourse was a, if not the, predominant means by which individuals defined and debated issues in this sphere" (Zaret, 1992:221).

Habermas's (1989:11) own justification is that the "status of the Church changed as a result of the Reformation; the anchoring in divine authority that it represented - that is,

² C.f. Amnesty International (2000) *Angola, Freedom of Expression on Trial*.

religion - became a private matter". Calhoun (1992:35-36) adds to this by situating Habermas within the tradition of philosophers who imagined that

"religion must decline as the enlightenment progresses. That secularisation is part and parcel of modernity and, closely linked to the rise of rational-critical discourse, goes unquestioned. This view contributes to Habermas's blind spot on the role of religion both as a central thematic topic in the early public sphere and as one of its enduring institutional bases".

According to Zaret (1992:221, 223) theological developments within Protestantism after the Reformation

"created a public sphere in religion that cultivated nearly the same critical, rational habits of thought that Habermas locates in the public spheres of politics and letters. ... The crucial point is that conscience and opinion were both associated with public reason, whose use was thought to be accessible to the common lay person".

Therefore, in terms of revising the Habermasian model of public sphere it is important that religion (the churches) is situated within the public sphere as an historical corrective.³ This revision is quite important in facilitating later analysis of the Angolan churches which have played a fundamental role in safeguarding the Angolan public sphere particularly after 1977, when the public sphere was greatly reduced, but also in promoting critical debate on questions of peace and conflict in Angola since independence.

A brief comment is relevant here on how civil society theory deals with the churches. It is customary in Africa at least to situate the churches within civil society. Gifford (1995:8) argues that from the

"perspective of civil society, it is obvious why churches are seen as so important to Africa's democratisation. In so many one-party states, the churches were the greatest single element of civil society".

The prominent role played by the churches as political actors in the South African struggle against apartheid is a good example of this (Borer 1998). The emphasis on religious

³ Habermas's later work places significant emphasis on religious discourse within the public sphere. Junker-Kenny (2003:15) wrote: "In *Glauben und Wissen* Habermas (2001) shows an unprecedented openness to the value of religious contributions to the public sphere. They can challenge scientific and other ideological assumptions such as the 'market' conception of the human person in which self-interest, competitiveness and choice are what seems to be left of the original concept of autonomy". Elsewhere Junker-Kenny (2003:1) noted that "Habermas accords religious communities an important role in the pluralist public sphere".

institutions within African civil society appears greater than elsewhere. Guyer (1994:224) notes:

“the prominence of the church as an institution and particular church officials as personalities has been a marked feature of civil society in Africa and different from the secular vision of the classic civil society theorists, whose emphasis fell on voluntary societies”.

On the place of the churches within civil society, Kassimir (1998:55) argues for their inclusion on the basis of what they do and how they engage generally within society. He argues against situating the Churches within civil society as part of an *a priori* designation. An examination of the history of many Churches frequently details support for oppressive and dictatorial regimes, indeed churches have worked against each other at key times.⁴ The Catholic Church in Angola for example, was closely associated with the colonial power prior to independence, and had remained silent at a time when Portugal carried out a scorched earth policy against the nationalist movements which involved substantial loss of life and massive population displacement (Grenfell 1998; Schubert 2000; Péclard 1998). After independence this changed and the Catholic Church adopted a more critical stance and can be regarded as a civil society actor

From a theoretical perspective, both a civil society and an original public sphere framework have difficulties in dealing with the place of religion and with religious institutions, partly because of the shifting nature of these institutions. Based on the activity of the churches, it is possible to situate them within a civil society framework, or based on their possible location as a discursive participatory arena, they can be analysed within the public sphere. However, in the Angolan context, as I will illustrate in chapter three, it is particularly at the level of creating space for public discussion on peace that I identify a crucial role played by the churches, explaining why a public sphere approach is preferred. A civil society approach does not offer the same focus on spatial issues which this research considers fundamental in assessing perspectives on peace.

⁴ As witnessed in apartheid South Africa, when the white Dutch Reform Churches aligned themselves with minority rule at a time when most other churches had adopted a critical stance.

2.3. *Forms of Rational Discourse Within the Public Sphere.*

The differentiation between the private use of reason and the representative use is important within the Habermasian framework. It is clear from the public sphere definition outlined earlier that Habermas was concerned with private individuals exercising reason in a public arena. For example, Calhoun (1992:1) summarises Habermas's theoretical project in a question:

“What are the social conditions ... for a rational-critical debate about public issues conducted by *private persons* willing to let argument and not statuses determine decisions?” (Emphasis added).

Habermas's (1989:11) public sphere developed as an arena when private persons broke away from the “feudal powers, the Church, the prince, and the nobility”, entities he described as “the carriers of the representative publicness”. In Habermas's view this representative publicness differs from private individuals engaging in public discourse.

The question arises however, whether public sphere discourse can be reduced to individual discourse? Was Habermas correct in doing so? The point is relevant to this research because the peace narratives outlined in later chapters are largely examples of representative discourse, not individual discourse. The narratives of the churches, civil society organisations, community based organisations and traditional authorities are, on the whole, not the discourses of individuals, even though they may be spoken or written by one person. The media discourse is clearly different in this regard, though journalistic writing that is obliged to strictly follow editorial policy is moving close to representative discourse. The peace narratives outlined later reflect collective approaches to the question of peace where individuals represent their organisations, communities, or specific groups to engage in critical debate and discourse. The distinction is important because Habermas's definition demands that private individuals conduct discourse, not their representatives. Though the content of what is communicated may be the same in both cases, we are theoretically dealing with two different discursive types.

Interestingly, despite Habermas's emphasis on individual discourse as the basis of public sphere discourse, there are a number of examples within the *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* where Habermas includes representative discourse within the public sphere. For example, he comments on “organised rival interests” (Habermas 1989:210),

“group opinions” (Habermas 1989:221), and “special-interest associations” (Habermas 1989:232) within the public sphere. The inclusion of these groups is based on a distinction Habermas makes between the representative publicness of feudal powers, Church, etc., and that of ‘organised rival interests’. Habermas (1992:426) argues that the former was based on exclusion of individuals, where the people simply “functioned as a backdrop before which the ruling estates, nobility, church dignitaries, kings, etc. displayed themselves and their status”. This is radically different to the representative publicness of the groups Habermas lists, where such domination does not occur and the people are part of communication occurring on the basis of previous participation. The inclusion of these groups is not immediately clear within his definition, because of the emphasis on individual discourse within the public sphere. It would seem that the representative discourse was in fact a significant feature of critical public discourse occurring at the time, that the public sphere contained individuals who spoke on behalf of associations, organisations, and interests groups. In other words, individuals were not speaking on their own behalf, hence a wider definition of the public sphere is called for, to make this dimension more explicit, and this has important consequences for this research. The following additions in italics to Habermas’s (1989:27) original definition would appear to resolve the issue:

The public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people *or civic representatives*, come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor. The medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people’s *private or representative* public use of their reason.

The inclusion of representative discourse within the public sphere is important for a number of other reasons. Firstly, it is not always possible to distinguish between individual or representative discourse. The speaker in question may not particularly wish to differentiate and may use the ambiguity effectively in putting forward a point of view. Secondly, in a political environment where individuals feel that freedom of expression is not fully guaranteed, where expressing views publicly could be dangerous or life threatening, it is to be expected that instances of individual discourse might be less than if such restrictions did not exist. In such circumstances individuals may choose to

communicate through various associations or organisations on the grounds that it is safer to do, rather than as individuals. Habermas's theoretical approach appears to presume a high degree of personal individuation, with individuals expected to speak on their own behalf to represent themselves. This emphasis on private individuals is quite central to Habermas, but for a variety of reasons, including personal security, individuals may choose to communicate in a different way. Thirdly, the inclusion of representative discourse expands the public sphere boundaries in relation to where public discursive arenas are identified and located. Crucially in terms of this research, this situates the representative discourse of civil society organisations within the public sphere for analytical purposes.

This second section has set out three revisions to the Habermasian public sphere, each of which has critically engaged Habermas's original concept. Firstly, it was shown that a wider understanding of the media's role as a formative and informative medium is helpful. Secondly, the historical omission from the Habermasian public sphere of religion and the churches was addressed. Thirdly, it was argued that a wider definition of the public sphere was appropriate, based on the *de facto* participation of groups and associations within the Habermasian public sphere construct, illustrating that the public sphere was more than just the private use of reason. On the basis of this wider definition I argued that present day civil society organisations can be situated within the public sphere. These revisions have revised Habermas's theoretical framework and situated three of the five peace narratives this thesis addresses within this revised framework. The question of if, and how, African traditional authority can be situated within the public sphere will be addressed at the end of section three. The place of community-based organisations in relation to the public sphere will be explored in section four.

3. *Interface of civil society and public sphere.*⁵

Civil society theory has come to inform much political and social research on the African continent. By contrast, few employ the public sphere framework in African research, though there is evidence that this is changing (Berger 1998, 2002, Dahlgren & Sparks 1991; Monga 1996, 1997). This section sets out to explore some of the key conceptual issues, including similarities and differences between the African based civil society literature and the public sphere model. Section 3.1 looks at both theories in relation to their understanding of the state. The private-public distinction, important in both theories, is explored in section 3.2. In section 3.3, I ask about the place of civil society theory and the public sphere in relation to democratic transition and consolidation. Section 3.4 examines a dimension of the civil society literature which attempts to shift the definition of civil society away from ‘associational life’, to a ‘spatial’ concept similar to the public sphere. Finally in section 3.5, I explore the institution of traditional authority within both theoretical approaches.

3.1. *Civil Society and Public Sphere in relation to the State.*

A fundamental premise upon which civil society theory is based is that it points to the activity of actors autonomous from the state. Bayart, one of the first Africanists to use the concept, was initially reticent to do so, but his definition clearly points to civil society as a sphere of activity separate from the state:

“Though it is arguable that the concept of civil society is not applicable outside European history, I shall define it provisionally as ‘society in relation with the state ...in so far as it is in confrontation with the state’ or, more precisely, as the process by which society seeks to ‘breach’ and counteract the simultaneous ‘totalisation’ unleashed by the state” (Bayart 1986:111).

This separateness from the state has remained fundamental. Organisations therefore belonging to state structures, those part of political patronage or clientelistic networks, are understood not to belong to civil society. Azarya (1994:94) writes:

“not all associations are considered to be agents of civil society. An obvious precondition is that they should not be formed or controlled by the state; otherwise they would simply be agents of state hegemony and would undermine civil society

⁵ Issues raised in section four of this chapter were presented as a conference paper entitled ‘The Public Sphere: a Useful Framework for Analysis?’ at the Leeds Post-Graduate Conference, June 25, 2002.

rather than strengthen it. Although there is no disagreement on the necessity of autonomy from the state, in practice it is more difficult to determine the degree of state control over associations”.

Furthermore, as White (1994:379) points out, civil society is also separate from the family:

“[the] main idea which is common to most current uses of the term is that of *an intermediate associational realm between state and family populated by organisations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and are formed voluntarily by members of the society to protect or extend their interests or values*” (italics in original).

Civil society is understood to be situated between the state and the family. The sort of civil society that comes into view from this description includes among others, non-governmental organisations, voluntary associations, human rights organisations, independent trade unions, and the private or independent media.

Within this interface between civil society theory and the public sphere, some brief discussion is relevant here on Habermas’s references to civil society. Habermas was engaging and refining the Enlightenment concept of civil society wherein a member of civil society was a citizen, a member of the state (Fine 1997:8). Keane (1988:35) reminds us, for example, that until

“the eighteenth century, European political thinkers without exception used the term civil society to describe a type of political association which places its members under the influence of its laws and thereby ensure peaceful order and good government. In this old European tradition, civil society was coterminous with the state”.

For Hegel the two arenas of state and civil society interpenetrated and were in conflict with each other on a range of economic and political issues (Baker 1998:510). However, based on the Enlightenment understanding of civil society, Habermas (1989:11) identified the emergence of an enclave within “society separating itself from the state”, which he referred to as an “emerging public sphere of civil society” (Habermas 1989:23). Locating this public sphere outside the functioning of the state created a specific category, radically different to the Enlightenment understanding of civil society.

The present day understanding of civil society which places ‘associational life’ at the centre of civil society, shares this Habermasian distinction, that separates civil society activity from the realm of the state (Allen 1997:31). Cohen and Arato (1992) trace the reemergence of the term ‘civil society’ to the “struggles of the democratic oppositions in Eastern Europe against authoritarian socialist party-states”, especially the rise of ‘Solidarity’ in Poland, and other oppositional groups in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (Cohen & Arato 1992:15). From within this context, the present day usage of the concept has developed. Keane (1988:1) writes:

“After more than a century of neglect ... the old topic of civil society and the state is again becoming a vital theme in European politics and social theory. ... [I]t enjoyed a brief but remarkable career in Europe until the second half of the nineteenth century, when it fell (or was pushed) into obscurity and disappeared almost without trace”.

The modern usage has moved away from the classical understanding and is radically different to the term used in the Enlightenment. However, as stated above, it is based on a similar understanding to that found in Habermas, concerned with an arena or sphere that takes shape outside state activity. The contemporary understanding of civil society is premised on the identification of ‘associational life’ outside the state, whereas Habermas’s public sphere is premised on ‘the public use of reason’ outside the state. As I will show in later chapters, this different emphasis in Habermas enables the research to engage Angolan peace narratives in a manner that facilitates greater understanding of the narratives themselves.

Writing about African civil society, Chabal and Daloz (1999:17-18) have questioned the possibility of successfully achieving a distinction between the state and civil society on the ground:

“the dichotomy between state and society, which is substantially taken for granted in most current interpretations of African politics, does not reflect realities on the ground. ... There is on the continent no genuine disconnection between a structurally differentiated state and a civil society composed of properly organised and politically distinct interest groups”.

They argue that the extent of interpenetration between the state and civil society on the continent blurs the conceptual distinction. Though in favour of the concept’s usefulness in approaching African politics, the authors suggest that civil society should be used to designate “social networks distinct from the state and capable of transcending primordial

family, kin and communal ties” (Chabal & Daloz 1999:12). An interesting feature of some civil society writing on Africa, which Chabal and Daloz illustrated here, and which I explore further later, is a tendency to propose new definitions of civil society when faced with particular difficulties in naming African dynamics, that civil society fails to analyse adequately, evidence of which we see here. It was precisely such a difficulty that led this research away from the initial selection of a civil society analytical framework, to explore an alternative research framework with a greater emphasis on space.

The characterisation of the state within civil society and public sphere frameworks is also relevant to explore. I take civil society theory first, where a negative characterisation of the state strongly permeates the literature, which “tends to direct attention away from real or potential democratic qualities within the state itself” (Berger 2002:26). Hartmann (1994:220) illustrates this, stating: “[a]s our understanding and disillusionment of the state has become greater, our optimism and interest in civil society in Africa has grown.” In so many parts of Africa, the state is described as ‘weak’ or ‘collapsed’ and is clearly in crisis. The undemocratic and corrupt nature of many African states, coupled with their failure to secure the basic needs of their populations, has created widespread disenchantment and disillusionment with the state, in many respects justifying the negative characterisation. By contrast, the growth of civil society within African societies is seen as positive and its development encouraged. Diamond *et al* (1995:26) have argued that civil society “has become the cutting edge of the effort to build a variable democratic order”, clearly investing great expectation in the potential of civil society to transform the state. A paradox that will emerge later in this thesis in relation to this point, is that while Angola civil society has become more vocal and assertive over the period under review, power within the Angolan state became highly centralised in the hands of the President, not what one expects when civil society is developing.

In a similar vein, the view has been expressed that the capacity to uphold democratic forms of government

“is likely to depend more on the development of associational life and the further empowerment of civil society rather than on the action of the state and its agencies” (Adigun Agbage (1990), quoted in Chazan (1994:255)).

Beckman (1993:23) interprets the civil society discourse essentially as an arena for state

delegitimation, where civil society

“[is] substituted for the ‘nation’ as the principal locus of legitimation. ... The more ‘alien’ the state can be made to appear the less legitimate is its pretense to represent the nation”.

Yet this dichotomy is also problematic and points to the need to investigate the arena of civil society itself, to scrutinise the objectives of the various representatives of civil society and their organisations, as it has been described an arena for recycled or displaced elites who have secured another forum from where to pursue political objectives (Chabal & Daloz 1999). Furthermore, this characterisation locates the possibility of reform and change within civil society, not within the state’s ability to reform itself. There is here a tendency to overstate the power of civil society to achieve its goals. Unlike the state, civil society does not enjoy executive power and must rely on the power of persuasion or of public opinion to exert pressure on government to attain its objectives. This is relevant to Angola, where analysis of the failure of civil society actors (including the churches) to end the war over-emphasised the power of civil society to influence the conflict and affect government policy (c.f. Messiant in chapter 3).

To contrast the ‘civil society’ characterisation of the state with the characterisation of the state in the public sphere is difficult, because of the limited use of public sphere framework in Africa. However, from the premises upon which the public sphere is built, namely rational discourse based upon democratic participation, there is nothing to suggest that the state would be viewed any differently within a public sphere perspective. Both frameworks would be critical of states which deny or impede basic rights such as ‘freedom of association’ and ‘freedom of expression’. In terms of emphasis, a public sphere approach would envisage greater ‘freedom of expression’ for citizens, given its discursive basis, while civil society would emphasise ‘freedom of association’, because of its associational nature.

3.2. The Public-Private Distinction.

This section explores a further distinction within the civil society and public sphere literature where the basis upon which the private and public realms are differentiated within both theoretical frameworks is challenged.

As we have seen, the household or family are also placed beyond the scope of civil society (White 1994). The family is understood to possess an inward focus, whereas civil society actors are assumed to direct their attention outwards towards the collective or public good. Tripp (1998) who uses a civil society perspective in Africa, believes that a clear distinction between the public and private is only possible because of the gender-biased legacy accompanying civil society theory. The manner in which women participate in public life is directly affected by gendered practices in the home where heavy responsibility for housework and child rearing restricts women's political participation. She argues that the boundaries between public and private have been constructed culturally, socially, juridically and politically, thus the very nature of what is considered 'the private sphere' must change for women to participate fully in public life. In effect, the private sphere itself needs to become politicised.

“The sharp separation of public-private does not appreciate the centrality of the family to civil society and the public sphere. It neglects the close connection between private and public spheres. For example, family relations that prevent women from participating in associations and in politics have repercussions for the broader polity” (Tripp 1998:84).

Tripp (1998:85) argues that what is required is an “expansion of political space in the notion of civil society [in order to] break from the gender-based legacy that ‘civil society’ currently carries”. Here again we see an author utilising a civil society framework in Africa, finding that the concept needs to be adapted in some way because it inadequately addresses realities on the ground. Interestingly, Tripp's argument is in favour of a wider notion of political space within civil society.

The theoretical bracketing of personal status was earlier cited as a characteristic of the public sphere (Calhoun 1992), as was the ideal that rational argument alone was the basis for resolving issues. During public discourse, the public sphere merely suspended but did not address existing social inequalities. Fraser (1992:119) is of the opinion that such 'bracketing' probably never took place, that debate “within the bourgeois public sphere was governed by protocols of style and decorum that were themselves correlates and markers of status inequality”. She argues that these protocols functioned informally to marginalise women and members of the lower classes, and that it would have been more appropriate to unbracket status altogether, to problematise it in accordance with the ideal

of inclusiveness central to an understanding of the public sphere. Any theoretical bracketing of status most likely served the interests of the dominant group, providing a mask for the privileges of class and gender of participants in the public sphere.

The claim that the public sphere was open to ‘all’ appears rather like the ‘all’ of Athenian democracy, where women of all classes were excluded, as were men who owned no property. Such openness was based on the assumption that women were represented by their husbands or fathers. Habermas (1992:427) acknowledged this weakness in his theory when he wrote: “the growing feminist literature has sensitized our awareness to the patriarchal character of the public sphere itself”. He went further however, and argued that the feminist critique of the public sphere needed to distinguish between how women and non-propertied men were excluded. His point is that on accession to property men were granted the right to participate, whereas propertied women were denied this right, thereby negating both the theoretical openness of the public sphere to all, and recourse to reason as sole arbitrator in the public sphere. In Habermas’s (1992: 428) own words:

“unlike the exclusion of underprivileged men, the exclusion of women has structuring significance. ... Under the conditions of a class society, bourgeois democracy thus from its very inception contradicted essential premises of its self-understanding”.

As can be seen both frameworks have been challenged by the feminist literature, where instead of applying a strict distinction between public and private sphere the task is to problematise dimensions of the private sphere which prevent the participation of women in public political life.

3.3. *Promoting Democracy.*

The place of civil society and the public sphere within an overall approach to promoting democratic forms of government is important to explore. It will be seen in later chapters that the peace narratives of the churches and the media especially, make a fundamental connection between the promotion and consolidation of democracy itself and the furtherance of peace. For this reason I briefly examine the relationship of the two theoretical frameworks to democracy. As seen earlier, the public sphere for Habermas (1992:447) was based on “discourse-centred concept of democracy” that sought to

promote democratic participation within decision making and political processes. Democratic processes were furthered through participation in the discursive arena of the public sphere. This section adds some further comment on the place of the public sphere within democratic theory, but will focus primarily on civil society within democratic promotion.

Though civil society deals broadly with manifestations of associational life, Harbeson (1994:4) makes the comment that “civil society is not simply synonymous with associational life”, therefore not all forms of associational life are considered as civil society activity. Harbeson confines civil society activity to associations involved in furthering democratic processes. However, the dividing line between forms of association considered excluded or included is highly contested within the African civil society literature, where the reason for exclusion varies. The place of ethnic organisations is illustrative in this respect, excluded within most civil society accounts. For Diamond (1994:6) ethnic organisations do not encompass “pluralism and diversity”, a distinguishing feature of civil society activity and therefore placed outside civil society analysis. Rothchild and Lawson (1994:255) point to the “absence of a social contract” among “ethnic self-determination movements”. Azarya believes this exclusion is to keep kinship and primordial ties away from civil space as much as possible. He takes issue with this, because

“trade unions, professional associations, and growers’ co-operatives also defend very particular interests of specific sectors in society, no less than ethnic welfare associations or hometown organisations. It is not clear why the former would *a priori* be included in civil society and the latter would not” (Azarya 1994:95).

As a consequence, Kasfir (1998:5) believes that by definition

“much, probably most, public associational life is excluded from civil society and thus from any proper analysis of the impact of civil society on the struggle for democracy and its consolidation”.

The net effect is an exaggerated sense of the importance of organisations regarded as belonging to civil society, whereas ethnic organisations, which play a vital role Africa, are placed outside the civil society focus.

Some expressions of associational life therefore, such as the above mentioned “ethnic welfare associations”, are not considered within the ambit of the conventional notion of

civil society. Chazan's (1992:7) comment that the "future of the civic realm on the continent is contingent on the capacity of individual organisations to strike deep social roots", seems blind to the presence of organisations with already existing deep roots across the continent. A relevant question that arises here is: what does civil society theory make visible and bring into focus? Sachikonye (1995) comments that while civil society would appear to be quite visible in many urban parts of Africa, it is quite sparse within rural areas. He states that "it has been questioned whether civil society in the conventional sense, exists in rural Africa" (Sachikonye 1995:10). This raises a fundamental issue in the context of this research, regarding the peace narratives a civil society approach captures or 'sees' in Angola. I argue later in this thesis that both a civil society and public sphere framework are strong when analysing the historical churches, private media and civil society organisations, but that the weakness of civil society theory becomes evident when attempting to assess informal, rural, transient arenas where structures are more difficult to identify. A public sphere approach interrogates these arenas more productively than a civil society framework, facilitating discussion of vital peace related material.

This visibility issue is also relevant in another sense, in relation to particular forms of civil society created as a result of donor funding. Kasfir (1998:134) writes:

"organisations, whether new or old, are likely to make a political impact when resources of a completely different magnitude than that available from within the society are poured into them. In fact, for a time they may contribute to the appearance of a vigorous society. But donors rarely create autonomous organisations. Unless the externally funded African organisations can develop effective social roots and local resources of their own, they will die on the vine as soon as their foreign patrons depart or lose interest".

This issue is a real one for civil society across Africa where foreign finance plays a very important role and, as will be seen in chapter six, has influenced the direction and activity of civil society organisations. Tripp's (1998:90) comment in relation to Uganda can be generalised for the continent: "civil society tends to become identified with the activities of organisations that are formal, registered, middle-class and urban based". Hearn (1997:237) writing about Kenya, has suggested that in many cases we are dealing with an artificial or contrived civil society, with poor roots within society. These viewpoints raise serious doubts about the capability of civil society to further democratic development.

Kasfir (1998:1) has observed that attempts to secure democracy in Africa have “come to depend quite substantially on civil society”. He argued that the concept of civil society has been shaped to serve the goal of better governance, particularly democratic reform, rather than explored to provide a deeper understanding of the relationship between social groupings, the associations that represent them, and the state. In other words, civil society has been invested with certain democratic expectations as seen in the following statement from Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1988:26), for whom civil society “has become the cutting edge of the effort to build a variable democratic order”. Harbeson (1994:1-2) expresses a similar view:

“civil society is a hitherto missing key to sustained political reform, legitimate states and governments, improved governance, viable state-society and state-economy relationships and prevention of the kind of political decay that undermined new African governments a generation ago”.

Foley and Edwards (1996:47) wonder whether any civil society is capable of all these tasks and question the actual link between civil society and democracy:

“the civil society argument as it is commonly presented is partial at best and seriously misleading at worst. In many respects, it presupposes precisely the sort of political peace that it imagines civil society providing. Where emphasis is placed on the ability of civil society to oppose a tyrannical state, its ability to oppose a democratic one is either ignored outright or countered with qualifications that themselves undermine the power of the civil society argument generally”.

The literature clearly expresses doubts about the links between civil society and democracy, and asks that the suggested linkage be closely scrutinised.

In relation to the place of the public sphere within democratic theory, it is not possible to pursue the issue in a similar way to that of civil society. The reason is that we are dealing with a spatial construct, rather than expressions of associational life. Habermas’s understanding of the public sphere as a democratic discursive arena, a place of public scrutiny where individuals participated through talking, was outlined earlier. As Calhoun (1995:33) argues, Habermas’s approach is based on the belief that “all significant differences are ultimately resolvable - at least in principle - on the basis of rational discourse”, revealing an understanding of democracy as a conflict resolution mechanism. The implication is that the promotion and consolidation of democratic processes provides society with structures to address conflict, by ensuring that spaces are created when communication and discussion can occur. This public sphere approach to democracy

reflects the concerns of Angolan actors outlined in this research, who argued that democratic institutions needed to be reformed in a particular direction, that of ensuring greater debate and participation.

3.4. *Conceiving of civil society as 'space'.*

It was earlier pointed out that some researchers have experienced difficulties utilising the concept of civil society within Africa. The civil society approach appears not to capture dynamics or issues these researchers seek to name or identify. The concept seems best suited to achieving understanding of the activities of urban and formal organisations, leaving the researcher to struggle with a limited concept outside these areas. Faced with difficulties of this nature, this section examines a particular strand within the African based civil society literature, where theorists have attempted to shift the definition of civil society away from 'associational life', in the direction of a 'spatial' concept.

I begin by looking at Callaghy (1987:235) who has expressed doubt that civil society "can do much to elucidate important processes in contemporary Africa, can do more than label them vaguely". He describes civil society as a "metaphor masquerading as a player", suggesting that we are dealing with appearances, and argues that if the concept is used at all, it should be in a very restricted sense dealing with the consensus on "norms defining a civil sphere". Callaghy suggests that civil society should be conceived of as

"a space or realm defined by newly constituted norms about what the state should not do and by the rules of politics in that space, including politics by nonstate actors" (Callaghy 1994:235).

Callaghy is arguing for a political space where politics is conducted according to certain norms. In a similar vein, Michael Walzer (1991:293, quoted in Kasfir 1998:4) writes:

"In its broadest reach, civil society can be conceived as including all public political non-state activity occurring between government and family, the space of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational networks - formed for sake of family, faith, interest and ideology - that fill this space".

These are further examples of authors who utilised civil society as a concept within an African context and found shortcomings particularly in relation to the 'spatial' reach of civil society. They suggest that without a wider spatial focus, civil society is of limited use for the purposes of research on the continent.

A particularly interesting example of this ‘spatial’ issue is Celestin Monga, who has written about African political life, with special reference to the Cameroon. He proposed a redefinition of civil society where he imagined an arena which strongly echoed the definition of the public sphere, referring to “networks of communication and forums for discussion” before shifting to a Habermasian public sphere concept. I set out two quotations from Monga which illustrate this shift towards a spatial understanding of civil society. Firstly, Monga (1996:148) writes:

“African societies were able to generate their own *networks of communication and forums for discussion* within which it was possible to express collective fears and dreams. For me, the term ‘civil society’ refers to those birthplaces where the ambitions of social groups created the means of generating additional freedom and justice” (emphasis added).

Civil society as the birthplace of ambitions, where groups created the means of generating freedom and justice, and so on, appears somewhat vague, but the author is articulating the importance of communicative networks and forums where people can discuss issues of freedom and justice. The following year Monga was back in print, this time framing similar views with reference to Habermas’s public sphere. He wrote:

“Habermas has elaborated a concept of the public sphere that is useful for understanding what is occurring in Africa today, even though the application of his ideas to different historical and geographical settings is subject to debate. Indeed, if the emergence of public spaces where members of different social groups can freely discuss the issues of the day is the best evidence for democratic transition, then the boom in the number of places where people are talking deserves attention” (Monga 1997:163).

The importance of Monga to this research is that he has actually moved from a civil society framework to a public sphere framework to conduct analysis of events in Africa. He is one of the few authors to do so, but in a wider sense we have seen others moving in a similar direction, proposing spatial definitions or understandings of civil society.

3.5. *Theorising traditional authorities.*

Finally in this section, I explore traditional authorities in relation to both theoretical frameworks. We are dealing with a somewhat elusive category when theorising the place of traditional authorities, because of how this institution has been transformed since first colonial contacts. In effect this section is asking about the place of former clan leaders and former royal families who lost power, within the two theoretical frameworks. Particularly

in rural Angola, traditional authorities continue to exercise important leadership roles within their local communities, though in urban areas their role is virtually non-existent.

Within the civil society literature, Guyer (1994) has argued for the inclusion of traditional authority or chieftaincy among the institutions of civil society in her analysis of Nigeria. The basis upon which she does so is by redefining civil society as follows:

“those organisations created by nonstate interests within society to reach up to the state and by the state to reach down to society” (Guyer 1994:216).

The definition is suspect on a number of grounds, particularly given that organisations created by the state are excluded from civil society (Allen 1997:31). In fact chieftaincy, appears to elude Guyer’s definition in many respects because the institution predates the creation of the state and, in principle, is neither created by the state nor by nonstate interests.⁶ Later in the article Guyer (1994:217) appears to posit chieftaincy within civil society without arguing for its inclusion, because it is a ‘persistent organisation’:

“focusing on the spatial reach of the *persistent organisations* that by any of the various definitions would qualify for inclusion in civil society may be a first step toward applying ethnographic methods to the larger problem of the political processes being sustained along the state-society interface” (emphasis added).

The theoretical difficulties faced when trying to categorise traditional authorities within civil society are often not shared on the ground. Angolan traditional authorities have formed their own civic organisation which is a member of the Forum of Angolan NGOs (FONGA), but this however does not resolve the problem of whether to theoretically situate the institution of traditional authority within civil society.

Given the limited utilisation of the public sphere model on the continent, it is hardly surprising that questions in relation to traditional authority appear not to have been explored. Detailed discussion on the institution of traditional authority will be left until chapter seven, but a number of theoretical strands can be presented here to put forward some initial argument. Firstly, in dealing with traditional authorities we are dealing with former royal families that have been stripped of political power by colonialism, missionary Christianity and the policies of the post-independent state, and are firmly

⁶ This statement requires some qualification because many African governments have appointed chiefs for particular purposes and these stand alongside the hereditary chief. With time the distinction between the two becomes less clear. As will be seen in chapter seven, Angola exemplifies this.

located outside the realm of the state. Hence, locationally it would seem that traditional authorities currently occupy a similar terrain to civil society and public sphere actors. Secondly, it is possible to draw on Kassimir's (1998) argument regarding the inclusion of the churches within civil society based on the activity of the churches themselves through an empirical assessment, rather than an *a priori* designation. When one examines the important role traditional authority figures play in rural communities and the civic nature of their activity, particularly in the area of conflict resolution within the community, a case can be made for their consideration within civil society, and indeed the public sphere frameworks, based on their functioning outside the state.

Thirdly, specifically in relation to a public sphere framework it is worth recalling that Habermas excluded the churches from the public sphere, because of the representative publicness these engaged in. This argument is also valid in relation to traditional authority historically, as these personalities formerly enjoyed executive power within their kingdoms. However, in charting the transformation of traditional authority in Angola, and bearing in mind that Habermas posited two types of representative publicness, it appears to me that we are also dealing with the transformation of representative publicness from one Habermasian sense to the other. In other words, that traditional authority itself has travelled a similar path to the churches: from the representative publicness of the medieval church, to the representative publicness of the churches as civil society actors.

However, given these possible grounds upon which to support the inclusion of traditional authorities as public sphere or civil society actors, I argue against their inclusion because Angolan traditional authorities see themselves as political actors and aspire to political office. As will be shown in chapter seven, traditional authority requested that a second parliamentary chamber be established for traditional authority figures within the framework of a new constitution. Despite many of their civic qualities, their political aspirations theoretically situate them outside the public sphere and civil society. However, I will argue that significant dimensions of traditional authority activity and space can be analysed from a Habermasian perspective, in a particularly fruitful way. A Habermasian approach reveals important insights into the nature of traditional society, particularly the traditional discursive arena called the *ondjango*, where the community met and talked

under the authority of the chief. The importance of this arena can best be captured, in my opinion, within a public sphere approach.

4. *A 'plebeian' public sphere?*

Previous sections of this chapter have incorporated key revisions which expanded Habermas's original public sphere concept. These revisions created the conditions whereby it was possible to situate the media, the churches, civil society organisations within a revised Habermasian framework, without 'over-stretching' Habermas's model. Section three explored key areas of similarity and difference between a civil society and public sphere framework, before weighing up the possibility of also situating traditional authorities within the revised public sphere framework. While the Habermasian approach has much to offer and is helpful in analysing this traditional institution, I do not include it within a revised public sphere, because of its political orientation.

It was also noted how some of the African based civil society literature struggled with the concept of civil society, engaging in efforts to redefine the concept along spatial lines. I find these efforts interesting and relevant to this research, and in this fourth section I take up this discussion on 'space' again, this time to explore the spatial dimensions of Habermas's 'plebeian public sphere', particularly with regard to how it might be useful in relation to this Angolan based research (and perhaps more widely in Africa). The concept I believe, offers a possible 'spatial' research tool to facilitate understanding at the community-based level, the remaining peace arena of this thesis, which I have yet to situate with respect to the theoretical framework.

While Habermas's (1989:30) bourgeois public sphere was a phenomenon of the town or urban life, the 'plebeian public sphere' was considered by Habermas (1992:427) to be part of the "culture of the common people". In fact, Habermas (1992) later acknowledged the error of solely focusing on the bourgeois public sphere to the exclusion of the plebeian, in his original work. Garnham (1992:359) articulates the point in the following way:

“[Habermas] neglects the importance of the contemporaneous development of a plebeian public sphere alongside and in opposition to the bourgeois public sphere,

a sphere built upon different institutional forms, e.g., trade unions, and with different values, e.g., solidarity rather than competitive individualism”.

It is on the basis of such analysis that Fraser (1992:116) makes the observation “that the bourgeois public was never *the* public” (emphasis in original), but was one of a host of competing publics from the start, citing ‘nationalist’, ‘popular peasant’, ‘women’s’, and ‘working class publics’, as examples, which carries the suggestion that there was never a single public sphere, highlighting an arena of greater complexity and diversity than Habermas had envisaged.

It is interesting to read Habermas’s response to this criticism. He explains that he had originally understood the plebeian public to be “a variant of the bourgeois public sphere that remained suppressed in the historical process” (Habermas 1992:425). He reevaluated his position after reading E. P. Thompson’s *The Making of the English Working Class*, and Mikhail Bakhtain’s *Rabelais and His World*, both of which offered him a different perspective on political mobilisation within the rural lower classes and the urban workers, and exposed him to inner dynamics of plebeian culture. Habermas (1992:427) writes:

“This culture of the common people apparently was by no means only a backdrop, that is, a passive echo of the dominant culture; it was also the periodically recurring violent revolts of a counter-project to the hierarchical world of domination, with its official celebrations and everyday disciplines”.

The clear implications for research are that the ‘culture of the common people’ or ‘plebeian public sphere’, cannot be ignored and must be explored in seeking to identify public sphere discourse. It is here that I locate the community-based material of chapter six, but whether it is appropriate to situate the plebeian public sphere within the revised Habermasian public sphere framework is a question I address at the end of the chapter.

We have seen how the coffee-house was an important location for bourgeois public sphere discourse. Stallybrass and White (1986:80) make the point that particular sites generate particular discourses:

“Patterns of discourse are regulated through the forms of corporate assembly in which they are produced. Alehouse, coffee-house, church, law court, library, drawing room of a country mansion: each place of assembly is a different site of intercourse requiring different manners and morals. Discursive space is never completely independent of social place and the formation of new kinds of speech

can be traced through the emergence of new public sites of discourse and the transformation of old ones” (quoted in Scott 1990:122).

The implication quite clearly is that the “manners and morals” of the coffee-shop yield a different discourse to the “manners and morals” of the alehouse, the church, a civil society or community based organisation, or traditional authority meeting place. As Scott (1990:122) wrote, “[e]ach site, owing to the social position of its habitués, generated a distinctive culture and pattern of discourse”. In other words, to expect or designate any one site as ‘the public sphere’ is mistaken, that the public sphere is a wider construct, involving discourse emerging from different sites where public participation occurs. Therefore Habermas’s public sphere is in effect one of the ‘publics’ within a wider public sphere referring, as he clearly indicates in the title of his work, to the ‘bourgeois public sphere’.

This wider construction of public sphere appears to lie behind a definition of the public sphere articulated by Seyla Benhabib (1992:87):

“The public sphere comes into existence whenever or wherever all affected by general social and political norms of action engage in a practical discourse, evaluating their validity.”

Benhabib’s definition, like the Habermasian, reflects an idealised form premised on the discursive participation of all, on the validity of that which governs people’s lives. It is an arena where public, social and political life is scrutinised through talking. Once these ‘discursive’ dynamics are in place we can speak of the public sphere in any particular setting, urban or rural. The emphases within the plebeian public sphere are different to those of the bourgeois public sphere, with a decreased role for the media (because of literacy levels and prevailing poverty), with increased attention to informal communication processes where news is passed on by word of mouth, and an increased role for the churches (given their importance in Africa). Indeed culture and tradition are likely to play a greater role in the communicative processes of these plebeian arenas, and ritual playing an important part of the communicative process.

Benhabib’s (1992:78) suggestion of a temporary or transient public sphere, which “comes into existence whenever and wherever” people engage in practical discourse is interesting and helpful in assessing community-based material. An image of the public sphere as

‘emerging and receding’ reflects realities on the ground, particularly in countries where ‘freedom of expression’ and ‘freedom of association’ are subject to constant or occasional government clampdowns, where the public sphere contracts and expands. Benhabib (1992:78) uses the term ‘public space’ to refer to spaces within and beyond institutions, “private dining rooms”, “a field or a forest” can become public spaces if they are “the object or location of an action in concert. ...they become sites of power, of common action through speech and persuasion”. The reference to a “private dining room” is interesting, because as Bonnin (2000:303-304) points out with reference to apartheid South Africa:

“a white middle-class South African family would be likely to have experienced the household as a private space, while for a poorer black family, subjected to the invasions of the pass laws and the regulations of resettlement, privacy would have been less assured. The private space of the white household was frequently the public space of the black domestic worker’s workplace, while for many women involved in informal sector activities the home was, and is, also their workplace”.

The comment further calls into question the public-private distinction made earlier.

An important theoretical question emerges here in relation to the ‘plebeian public sphere’, where I situate the community-based material. The question is: are we dealing with the Habermasian public sphere? Strictly speaking, in relation to Habermas’s *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, the answer is negative, because Habermas does not engage these issues, focusing solely on the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere, while remaining silent on the nature of the plebeian public sphere. Had Habermas initially written this work after reading E. P. Thompson or Mikhail Bakhtain, it is possible that he would have taken a different approach and possibly included the bourgeois and plebeian within a more integrated public sphere.

Furthermore, I have included within the Habermasian public sphere actors that can be situated there by effecting certain revisions to Habermas’s earlier work. I distinguish these ‘revisions’ from attempts to ‘reconstruct’ his theory, which in my opinion, subject Habermas’s project to more radical alterations, yielding categories that are not Habermasian. It is on this basis that I regard community-based material to be ‘beyond’ what I consider ‘Habermasian’, and therefore do not include it within the revised Habermasian public sphere. I do however intend to read community-based material

through Habermasian insights and concerns, particularly with regard to its publicness. It is for this reason that I have entitled this chapter ‘The Public Sphere: Habermas and Beyond’, to suggest that the research framework within which the five Angolan peace narratives are to be examined belongs within Habermas’s concerns, particularly those of the media, the churches and civil society. However, the dynamics of the “culture of the common people” or plebeian public sphere, and the political orientation of traditional authorities take us beyond the Habermasian model. The title also suggests that I wish to take Habermas ‘beyond’ more familiar settings of inquiry, from a Western to an African setting; to examine the peace narratives of a people in a time of recurring and devastating military conflict; to examine public communication in urban and rural settings where history, culture, tradition and ritual, all play vital roles. The next five chapters, beginning with the Angolan churches, set out the peace narratives of these discursive arenas.

Chapter 3.

The Historical Churches: A Defining Narrative.

In setting out Angolan perspectives on peace and interpretations of the military conflict, it is of crucial importance to examine the role played by the Angolan historical churches. Of the five peace narratives chosen, I deal firstly with the churches because of the extent of the analysis put forward, stretching back over a number of decades. The historical churches are important institutions in Angola with a “powerful influence among the people” (Birmingham 1999:63). They see themselves as speaking on behalf of the Angolan people who paid the highest price for the various failures to resolve the conflict. The peace narrative of the churches is a national narrative, put forward by a group who lived with the “suffering people”, and who had contacts on both sides of the conflict (Schubert 2000:209-210). Furthermore, when examining the Christian churches, we are also dealing with the discourse of “the most legitimate and organised network for peace and change in a fractured Angola” (Howen 2001:29).

The word ‘church’ embraces a wide reality in Angola, from the older better known churches to the newer African Independent Churches (AIC).¹ In order to delimit this arena and give priority to the churches who have been most visible and vocal in the search for peace, this chapter will focus on the main Protestant and Catholic ‘historical churches’, thereby differentiating them from the new AIC’s that have flourished in Angola over the past twenty years or so. This is in no way intended to treat these as less than the other established churches, but rather to focus the area of inquiry. Even so however, the category of ‘historical churches’ remains quite wide, but by and large the peace narrative of these churches finds expression through three institutions: CICA² (Council of Christian Churches of Angola), AEA (Angolan Evangelical Alliance), and CEAST (Angolan Catholic Church). The first two are ecumenical organisations for the principal Protestant churches, and all three are widely known in Angola by these acronyms, which I will use. References to the ‘Angolan churches’ throughout this

¹ The exact number of churches in Angola is unknown. A CICA (2001c) newsletter referred to 87 churches with state recognition, and a further 750 other churches. Viegas (1999) provides a brief outline of many Angolan churches.

² For example, the principal Protestant churches, the Methodist Church, Baptist Church and Congregationalist Church are part of CICA.

chapter is shorthand for these three organisations. Rather than treat the narratives of the Protestant and Catholic churches separately which the Angolan literature generally does, I will treat them collectively because of the significant similarities existing between their analyses.

The following questions are addressed in this chapter:

- What did the churches identify as the causes of the conflict?
- How did the churches view the conflict itself?
- How did the churches believe peace could be achieved?
- Did the churches envision a role for themselves in resolving the conflict?
- Did the different churches work together in pursuit of peace?
- Has the churches' analysis changed over the period of conflict? If so, in what way?
- What role, if any, did the churches play in facilitating debate regarding peace, within the public sphere?

The church-based literature in the form of pastoral letters, public statements or speeches, conference documents and reports, and fieldwork interviews, form the basis upon which these questions will be addressed. In almost all instances we are dealing with 'representative publicity' or 'representative discourse', as outlined in the previous chapter, hence the importance of the addition to Habermas's definition.

A number of important works have examined the role of the churches prior to the signing of the Bicesse Accords. The most significant of these is Schubert (2000), but others include Grenfell (1998), Henderson (1979, 1990), and Péclard (1998). These have outlined the relationship between the nationalist parties and the three main Protestant churches, and the relationship of the colonial power to the Catholic Church. The three main Protestant churches - Methodist, Baptist and Congregationalist - were birthing places for the three main nationalist parties, MPLA, FNLA and UNITA, respectively. The Catholic Church was seen as having collaborated with the Portuguese administration (Humbaraci & Muchnik 1974:205). The situation was more complex than the representation of two homogenous blocks, as some of the Protestant churches were not involved in the independence struggle, while many Catholic

missionaries supported the MPLA, FNLA and GRAE (Mateus 1999).³ This chapter will not explore these issues, seeking instead to bridge the gap in the literature since the Bicesse Accords.⁴

That the churches have played such a key role in Angola is rather ironic. After independence there were suggestions that the churches should be outlawed (Birmingham 1999:63), and Agostinho Neto thought the churches would have died out completely within fifty years (Schubert 2000:139). It was thought that “Christianity in Africa would become ever less significant” after independence, but this has proved not to be the case (Gifford 1998:21). John de Gruchy (1998:57) points to the “considerable importance” of churches to democratic transition in “reducing conflict and building trust without which such transitions are unlikely to succeed”. Earlier de Gruchy (1998:49) argued that “in many places democratisation will not take place and cannot be sustained unless the churches give their critical support to the process”.

Churches or church institutions have played an important role in promoting peace and reconciliation in many places. Naidoo (2000) comments on the pivotal role played by the Sant’Egidio community in facilitating peace talks in Mozambique, which eventually led to the signing of a peace agreement in October 1992. The Carnegie Commission’s *Preventing Deadly Conflict* (1997:114) listed five factors which give religious leaders and institutions a comparative advantage in dealing with conflict situations from the grassroots level to the transnational level:

“1) a clear message that resonates with their followers; 2) a long-standing and pervasive presence on the ground; 3) a well-developed infrastructure that often includes a sophisticated communications network connecting local, national, and international offices; 4) a legitimacy for speaking out on crisis issues; and 5) a traditional orientation to peace and goodwill”.

Despite these advantages religious leaders and institutions have also played destructive roles in many conflicts and atrocities, such as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Longman (2001:164) comments that:

³ Alexandre do Nascimento (later Cardinal of Luanda) was imprisoned with many other priests for supporting the MPLA. Fr. Manuel das Neves was accused of having been the organiser of the attack on the prison on February 4, 1961, which initiated the war of independence (Mateus 1999:19-41).

⁴ The internet has also become a valuable source of information on Angolan church related activities. For example, the Diocese of Benguela website http://huizen.dds.nl/~mh2/po_index.htm; ‘Paz Angola’ <http://www.pazangola.org>, Kairos <http://web.net/~iccaf/humanrights/angolainfo/angola.htm>, and *O Apostolado* <http://www.apostolado.info/> linked with *Rádio Ecclésia* news.

“[i]n the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, many people inside and outside the country have struggled to comprehend the involvement of Rwanda’s churches in the violence”.

As mentioned in chapter one, I propose to outline the peace narrative of the churches chronologically. This was considered preferable to a thematic approach, providing a better sense of what was being said over the period of time under review, and expanding the historical material outlined in the first chapter. A chronological approach also helped address the research question dealing with how the churches’ analysis changed as the conflict went from one crisis to another. Only the church-based literature permits this approach, covering the entire research period. In structuring this chapter, I set out five separate periods which situate the churches’ narrative within the political and military context of the time. Firstly, though outside the specific research period, I briefly examine material prior to the Bicesse Accords of May 1991 where many of the major themes evident in later church analysis can be located. Secondly, I deal with the period from Bicesse to the first multiparty and presidential elections held in September 1992. Thirdly, the second civil war from the post-election crisis to the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994. Fourthly, the period of ‘neither war nor peace’ from the Lusaka Protocol to late-1998. Finally, I look at the period covering the third war from December 1998 to the death of Jonas Savimbi in February 2002.

1. *Church Narratives prior to Bicesse.*

In situating the principal peace related themes of the churches prior to the 1991 Bicesse accords, I take the Gbadolite Accords of June 22 1989, as a starting point. After a summit of eighteen regional heads of states in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (former Zaire), President Mobutu announced that a cease-fire had been brokered in Angola (Pycroft 1994:247). The Gbadolite Accords offered amnesty for UNITA soldiers, and the integration of UNITA into Angolan society and government. However, the agreement quickly broke down and hostilities resumed, with both sides having different interpretations of what was agreed.

“The MPLA claimed that the Gbadolite accords made provision for UNITA members to be absorbed into MPLA structures, with Savimbi ‘retiring’ from Angola. UNITA argued that the Gbadolite accords represented the first stage in negotiations towards a cease-fire, a new constitution, and multi-party elections. In UNITA’s interpretation there would continue to be a powerful role for Savimbi” (Pycroft (1994:247).

For Malaquias (1995:241), the “[f]ailure of Gbadolite revolved around the question of who said what and when. [It was also] poorly planned prior to Mobutu’s trip to the USA”. Gbadolite is perhaps best remembered for providing the first hand-shake between President dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi. At the time of Gbadolite, two important themes crystallised in the church literature that are relevant for later sections: commentary in favour of democratisation; and analysis of the causes of the war. The next two sub-sections examine these.

1.1. *Democratisation.*

In discussing what the churches said about democratisation it is necessary to situate this discourse within the political reality of the time, remembering that Angola was then a one-party Marxist-Leninist state. Church members were obliged to leave the MPLA or forced to publicly reject their religious belief (CICA 1984:7). Government was sensitive to what it considered ‘political’ comment emanating from the churches, though it accepted the ‘religious’ nature of the churches’ work. The boundaries between what is considered ‘political’ and ‘religious’ are quite different in the minds of both government and church leaders. The latter does not see a sharp dividing line between the two arenas, particularly when human welfare is considered in jeopardy. Government on the other hand, has frequently viewed comment of this nature as church intervention in politics and been critical of church statements.

The churches warmly welcomed the Gbadolite Accords. AEA and CICA congratulated the Angolan President on securing peace for Angola and practicing a “politics of forgiveness”.⁵ CEAST⁶ understood that a time of democratic transition had begun, that such a transition was part of the process of national reconciliation:

“the dialogue of reconciliation that had begun, was along democratic lines and ought to continue to build and consolidate peace” (CEAST 1989:212).⁷ⁱ

Later in 1989, with Gbadolite clearly a failure, CEAST reiterated that the path to peace and national reconciliation involved democratic reform:

⁵ This letter to President dos Santos is referenced as AEA-CICA (1989).

⁶ The CEAST documents from 1974 to 1998 were published in a single volume in 1998. In referencing CEAST statements of this period, I cite the year of the statement in question, followed by the page number in CEAST (1998), to enhance readability of the text. Hence, CEAST (1998:212) becomes CEAST (1989:212).

⁷ The use of roman numerals indicates that the original Portuguese text is included for consultation at the end of this work (Portuguese Texts used in Thesis). I express my gratitude to Colm Reidy, a colleague, who has international experience in this field, for reviewing my translations.

“We need an authentic peace which changes Angola into a truly free and democratic country, where all her children have a place and a voice. This voice will only be genuinely heard in free elections. It is necessary to find ways to establish a just peace. ... For the present a cease-fire is needed. ... The time for personal, direct, and frank dialogue has arrived, from one Angolan to another” (CEAST 1989:214).ⁱⁱ

The same document also challenged the political leaders on both sides to stop sacrificing the children of Angola to their party interests. Pro-democracy statements of this nature illustrate how far the Catholic Church had shifted since its support of the colonial regime.⁸ That it had come out so clearly in support of democracy reflects political changes occurring elsewhere at the time, especially as change swept across Eastern Europe. It is somewhat unusual however, to see such a supportive statement in favour of a particular political system. As de Gruchy (1998:48) makes clear, “Christianity cannot be equated with any system of government, including democracy, but must remain critical of all social order”.

The MPLA government was quite irritated by the CEAST intervention. Two articles published in the state owned daily newspaper *Jornal de Angola* on November 30 1989, accused CEAST of obstructing the search for peace by adopting positions identical with those of the United States and UNITA.⁹ The government response is one of a number of examples where CEAST was strongly rebuffed for the content of its pastoral letters.

The views expressed by CEAST were representative of feelings within the churches generally, regarding what shape political change should take. The two Protestant ecumenical organisations AEA and CICA, also viewed democratic change as the surest way to secure peace, setting out their views in 1990 in a joint submission to the third MPLA national congress.¹⁰ Advocating democratic principles the joint document read:

“The peace and tranquility of the people depend on a commitment of openness to multiparty politics. ... Multi-party politics should not be a hypothesis yet to be proved, but an objective to be achieved within a determined period. The commitment to multiparty politics could determine peace, and this in turn bring about democracy” (AEA-CICA 1990).ⁱⁱⁱ

⁸ Hastings (1995:40) notes the paradox here, especially within the Catholic Church which “clearly supports democracy in the state but clings to autocracy in the church”. He argues that democracy “in the state can hardly convincingly be advocated by a church which refuses to practise anything comparable within its own life”.

⁹ These articles are published in CEAST (1998:216-219).

¹⁰ The MPLA had solicited such submissions from within society on the future direction of the country (AEA-CICA 1990).

The submission also commented that the promotion of democracy would positively shift the balance of power in favour of the people, in a manner not permitted in one-party states:

“the governments of one party states maintain their power on the basis of corruption and a large military and security apparatus which defend the regime against the people it governs. ... Until now, the government and the sovereignty of the Angolan nation have been confused with that of the [MPLA] Party. ... Our peace, our development, the national unity for which all of us should be striving, are achieved through democracy”.^{iv}

The pro-democracy position of AEA and CICA is slightly tempered by a viewpoint in the same document where the establishment of democracy was considered separate from the question of whether Marxist-Leninism should be abandoned, an issue the document stated required further reflection. However, the submission is interesting from the point of view of identifying criticism of the MPLA government emerging within the Protestant churches. This is especially relevant in the case of AEA which had seen political involvement as a betrayal of its Christian mission, and it was rare for either AEA or CICA during the post-independent period prior to Bicesse to make public pronouncements on peace (Schubert 2000:157, 207). Church-based public sphere discourse came primarily from CEAST during these years, which, through the Africanisation of its leadership, had significantly transformed itself from its ‘collaborator’ image (Schubert 2000:130).

It would not be true to state that these statements mark the beginning of the churches’ advocacy in favour of democratic change and multiparty democracy in Angola. An earlier call for democracy can be dated to an ecumenical document in June 1975 when the Christian bishops of Angola (six Catholic and one Methodist) issued a joint statement, calling for the establishment of “sincere dialogue and truly democratic processes” in the new Angolan state.¹¹ The document is evidence of the churches working together across the Catholic-Protestant divide, but significantly it seems to have been the only such initiative until COIEPA (*Comité Inter Eclesial para a Paz em Angola*, - joint AEA-CEAST-CICA ecumenical peace commission examined later) was founded nearly twenty-five years later.

¹¹ *Pastoral Message from the Bishops of the Christian Churches on Peace and Harmony*, published in CEAST (1975:390).

1.2. *Causes of the war.*

Reasons for the conflict between the MPLA government and UNITA are also dealt with in the church based literature. In the case of the Protestant churches, a 1984 document is especially relevant, where CICA outlined its understanding of the causes of the war at the time.¹² The document *Churches Memorandum on Peace, Justice and Development in the Popular Republic of Angola*, which I consider one of the most important in the church related literature, identifies two distinct levels or dimensions in the search for peace: an external/regional dimension, and an internal dimension. In commenting on how to build peace, the document also sets out CICA's understanding of the causes of the war.

At the external/regional level, CICA (1984:4-5) identified three issues which affected or sustained the war in Angola. Firstly, CICA argued that the apartheid system in South Africa needed dismantling so as to reduce regional tensions. For example, the South African Defense Forces (SADF) military campaign against SWAPO freedom fighters saw SADF make many incursions into southern Angola in pursuit of SWAPO, and created much instability. Secondly, CICA identified a need for compliance with UN resolution 435 on independence for Namibia. Prior to Namibian independence, South Africa and Angola shared a common border, which gave South Africa easy access to Angola in terms of border crossings and supply lines to UNITA. The signing of the 1988 New York Accords between South Africa, Angola, the United States, the former Soviet Union and Cuba, was significant in bringing about Namibian independence, thereby reducing the external military threat. Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, overseen by UNAVEM I, was a significant factor in the granting of independence. Thirdly, CICA called for an end to the "politics of militarisation and destabilisation" promoted by neighbouring countries. As well as references to South Africa, one can read here criticism of the former Zaire, used by the US government as a supply line for UNITA.

External factors alone were not sufficient in explaining the causes of conflict. CICA (1984:5) argued that the problem was internal and ultimately needed an internal

¹² The document is entitled *Memorando das Igrejas sobre Paz, Justiça e Desenvolvimento na R.P.A.* CICA replaced an earlier church organisation referred to CAIE (Conselho Angolano de Igrejas Evangélicas), and strictly speaking should be referenced as CAIE (1984). For readability purposes I refer to the document as CICA (1984) in the text. It is listed in the bibliography as CICA-CAIE (1984).

solution: “it is necessary to regard a lack of unity as the determining factor slowing down the search for peace, for justice and development”.^v CICA addresses this ‘lack of unity’ and these internal divisions from a number of perspectives. It points to the “divide and conquer” policies utilised by the colonial administration, which fomented racial and tribal conflict between Angola’s ethnic groups. CICA is especially critical of the way in which evangelisation was conducted by foreign missionaries which reinforced ethnic and tribal differences. It explains that Baptists worked among the Bakongo, Methodists among the Ambundu, Presbyterians and Congregationalists among the Ovimbundu, Lutherans among the Kwanhama, and Pentecostals and Evangelicals among other ethnic groups. Because of missionary methodologies, historical differences between ethnic groups became religious differences and subsequently political differences, when the nationalist parties emerged from within these ethnic-religious identities. CICA argues that colonialism was able to exploit these identities in a way that enabled it maintain its hold on power, appearing to suggest that mission Christianity reconstructed historical differences in a particularly divisive way, that ultimately had disastrous consequences for the country.

Internal divisions created what CICA considered “a monster”, when the 1975 government of transition was formed. This monster brought

“a tragedy never before experienced, because our Nation lost more people during the 1975 confrontations than were lost in the first war of national liberation” (CICA 1984:6).^{vi}

The document argued that “until the beginning of 1976, obstacles to national unity were much more tribal and opportunistic, than ideological”.^{vii} Of particular note here is that CICA is naming ‘tribalism’ as a cause of the war, pointing to a time before political ideologies differentiated the political parties. Working for peace required addressing these underlying problems and necessitated:

“redoubling efforts in the struggle for unity of the churches and of the Angolan nation, fighting vigorously against any form of division which presents itself among [the churches] and within Angolan society”.

The document concluded:

“Once again we wish to underline that the basis problem lies in a ‘lack of unity’ and not in the lack of political reconciliation between the two political powers, whose political ideologies are totally opposed. ... We believe that the real solution lies in our capacity to preserve our identity as Angolans” (CICA 1984:11).^{viii}

Some seven years later, just weeks prior to the signing of the Bicesse Accords, CEAST expressed similar views to those of CICA on the causes of the conflict, again highlighting a lack of unity manifest in tribalism. According to CEAST (1991:250-251) some ethnic groups considered themselves superior to others:

“Our country’s greatest problem which affects everything else, is a lack of unity. A unity based on truth and justice, and anchored in love. ... Therefore it is important to examine what divides us, not so as to open old wounds, but to eradicate the seeds of discord. Tribal differences ... have degenerated into a motive for mutual rejection, for disrespect, and the division of tribes into superior and inferior. This is serious. It compromises the future and the nation’s very existence, opening doors for others to exploit. ... Division and fratricidal hatred represent a most serious betrayal of the Nation”.^{ix}

Though CEAST did not spell out these mutual ethnic perceptions, it was stressing that ‘tribal differences’ could be exploited by others in a destructive way unless, the ‘seeds of discord’ were somehow examined and healed. Echoing CICA, CEAST argued prior to Bicesse that the causes of conflict were internal, that internal divisions had led to the creation of external alliances. Collectively the churches believed that democratic processes would help in addressing these underlying issues.

2. *Bicesse Accords to 1992 elections.*

The sixteen months from the signing of the Bicesse Accords in May 1991 to the holding of national elections in September 1992, are referred to in Angola as the ‘*mini-paz*’ or mini-peace. The end of the war came as a relief to the Angolan people who could travel and visit family members they had been unable to see for many years. In exploring this brief period, I wish to treat four key themes addressed by the churches. I examine comment made regarding democratisation; the media; the need for greater voter education; and finally, military considerations.

2.1. *Democratisation.*

The change from a one-party state to multiparty democracy was welcomed by the churches, who believed that national reconciliation had been advanced. For the churches, the introduction of multiparty democracy afforded Angola an opportunity to begin again, to place peaceful discussion and political debate at the centre of political life, leaving military conflict in the past. There was a hope that the years of war had taught Angola a lesson about the futility of war, and the need to pursue peaceful means. For AEA (1991:2) the change to multiparty democracy required the involvement

of every Angolan to promote “the pacification and reconciliation of the whole Angolan family”.^x The task of ‘pacification’, sometimes expressed as ‘pacification of the spirits’, is one that has emerged after each of Angola’s peace agreements, with government calling on the churches to assist in pacifying the nation, to lance the boil of hatred caused by war. The issue of ‘pacification’ is important to address, but one I leave until chapter six for discussion in a wider context.

For all the churches, multi-party democracy was understood and presented as the new arena for the peaceful resolution of conflict. As a new form of dialogue, democracy replaced the dialogue of weapons. A statement from AEA (1992) just prior to the holding of elections illustrates this view:

“In a democracy, free speech should promote peace and the well being of society: access to power is gained through voting, not force or violence. Weapons must yield to dialogue; a dialogue which reveals wisdom, a dialogue based on debate over socio-economic progress. A dialogue which directs people towards development and respect for the dignity of others”.^{xi}

CEAST (1991:289) addressed the key post-election role opposition parties would have in building a healthy democracy and encouraged those defeated electorally, to embrace this role. It underlined the importance of an effective opposition in ensuring better governance within the Angolan state. For CICA (1992b), multi-party democracy was a form of permanent dialogue based on the “peaceful coexistence of political parties”. Quite clearly the churches viewed multiparty democracy as a discursive arena, where peaceful politics ensured development and national progress.

However, the churches had concerns that this view was not shared by the political parties. CICA expressed a sense of foreboding about the elections and the period afterwards speaking of a “dark cloud” that created anxiety, particularly as demobilisation had not been completed. It presented the elections as a means towards greater democratisation and pacification, not an end in themselves:

“[Elections] are a door for a new era which we want to be of justice, peace, and freedom, for the happiness of all. These elections are the first and we do not wish them to be the last” (CICA 1992b).^{xii}

The churches had real concerns about the post-election period. AEA (1992) commented on the disquiet felt by those who wondered what would happen “if one of the signatories of the Accords, or the two, were to lose the elections?” CEAST (1992:289) spoke of the need for political parties and candidates “to know how to win.

to know how to lose, and to accept the result”,^{xiii} calling on the parties to exercise “democratic wisdom”. AEA (1992) encouraged the political contestants to adopt a “civic posture” after the elections.

It is worth developing here a comment made by CEAST two weeks after the signing of the Bicesse Accords which expresses a concern that has appeared frequently within Angolan society generally. CEAST questioned the exclusion from the political process of those who had not been involved in the armed conflict, of those who had struggled for peaceful resolution of the war:

“[May we not be led into thinking that] only those who carried weapons deserve political rights, thereby marginalising those who suffered as a consequence of those weapons, as well as those who without recourse to violence fought for peace and democracy. Such a dangerous temptation could lead to new forms of unjust discrimination” (CEAST 1991:266).^{xiv}

This theme is an important one within many of the narratives covered in this thesis. From the Alvor Accords in 1975, to the Bicesse and Lusaka agreements, and more recently the Luena Accords, only those who have engaged in military struggle have secured a seat at the negotiating table. The voices and opinions of those who adopted non-military means to pursue their objectives, have not been considered during crucial moments of negotiation concerning Angola’s future. Within the Habermasian framework, the criticism clearly relates to the exclusion of public sphere discourse from the wider political arena, denied access to give ‘opinion’ on what shape Angola’s future might take.

Much of the public communication from the churches during these sixteen months after the Bicesse Accords reveals serious reservations about the extent of political commitment to the democratic process. The churches hoped these misgivings would be unfounded, that Angola could move forward and build a lasting peace, but as can be seen from these statements there was a sense that all was not well in Angola at the time.

2.2. *Role of the media.*

A particular concern of the churches in the build up to the 1992 elections, was the content and tone of the media, particularly state controlled media and UNITA’s *Vorgan*. With the exception of *LAC*, which began broadcasting a few days before voting, private media institutions did not exist in Angola prior to elections.

On numerous occasions the churches called for the modification of language used in the media. Both sides continued to broadcast propaganda against each other beyond the signing of the Bicesse Accords, which led CEAST (1991:265) to request that the media also observe the Bicesse Accords! The churches were conscious of the power of the media in relation to opinion formation, but also as a power to foster peace and reconciliation.¹³ AEA (1991) expressed concern at the “language of intolerance in the mass media: instead of educating citizens about harmony, it feeds the tension and hatred which still exists”.^{xv} For CEAST (1992:272):

“The provocative language that the two major parties continue to use in the media does not convince listeners they are seeking peace. Once more we appeal to those responsible for information to eliminate all aggressive and provocative content from their communication. Seek the unity of the people, not their division”.^{xvi}

In June CEAST (1992:281) again requested moderation this time ominously stating, “it was exactly similar language to this that was heard before war broke out in 1975”.^{xvii} Though the government and UNITA were on cease-fire, their media institutions remained on a ‘war-footing’.

2.3. *Military issues.*

It is also relevant to examine military issues, given that Angola returned to war soon after the elections. I am specifically concerned with reflection on demobilisation, reintegration of former military personnel, and references to rearmament. CICA (1992b) clearly linked demilitarisation and democratisation, stating:

“The destiny of this country and its people depends on the success of the present democratisation process, where the corner stone is military demobilisation, the formation of a single army, and the holding of free and fair elections”.^{xviii}

How well was this process going?

In October 1991, CEAST (1991:269) raised concerns about demobilised troops still in possession of their weapons. The extended length of time demobilised troops were staying in the quartering areas led to increased insecurity for nearby local populations, sentiments we also hear echoed elsewhere in the wake of Jonas Savimbi’s death.¹⁴ The formation of a single national army remained problematic, resolved only two days

¹³ Barnett (1998:553) highlights a further crucial role exercised by the media in Africa in terms of “extending processes of democratic participation”.

¹⁴ International Crisis Group (2003).

before elections through an official declaration that demobilisation had occurred (Anstee 1996:67). When war broke out in late October 1992, CEAST (1992:293) named this formal solution as a major factor in permitting a return to war. As became painfully obvious, UNITA had not demobilised in compliance with the Bicesse Accords, but had rearmed and hidden its army in the bush away from international observers.

The reluctance of local populations to return to their villages fearing that war would resume, was highlighted in March 1992. Their fear, according to CEAST (1992:273), was based on accusations that both sides were hiding weapons “lead[ing] one to believe that their owners will use them if they don’t win the elections”.^{xix} Further disquiet was expressed in June 1992 about information regarding the secret movement of military equipment (CEAST 1992:281). No details were set out about these movements but CEAST asked why this was occurring if neither side was preparing to launch an attack? Here we see the churches voicing popular opinion regarding difficulties within the peace process. Local people were far from convinced that war was a thing of the past for UNITA, and could see that military preparations were ongoing while the democratic option was pursued.

2.4. *Voter education.*

Given that Angola has only once held parliamentary and presidential elections, it is worth exploring comment from the churches in relation to voter education. The issue is important because elections are due to be held again most likely in 2004 and, despite the fact the 92% of the 4.86 million registered voters cast their vote at the last elections, between 10-12% of the votes were either spoiled votes or blank ballot papers, which “only confirm[ed] the failure of voter education” (Maier 1996:75). Clearly there are important lessons to be learned for future electoral planners.

AEA (1992:2) commented on the length of time democratic transitions take, and pointed to the need for political education among the population:

“Democracy does not end with a simple act of voting, sometimes manipulated or worse still bought. Democratising a country is a long and exhaustive process. It necessarily involves education of the population at all levels of national life”.^{xx}

The extent to which voter education appeared to have been absent from the electoral campaign can be gauged three months prior to the elections.

“Much is said about the democratic elections in September, but the people do not know what they are for. And they cannot know why, while they haven’t been informed about electoral law, the manifestos and political programmes of the diverse parties. Three months from the elections it is time everything was published and made available to the electorate. These need to know soon who they should choose... and they also need to know how the parties intend to govern. A liking for this or that candidate is not enough, it is necessary to know their political ideals with regard to governing” (CEAST 1992:283).^{xxi}

Six weeks before the elections the situation was not much improved:

“The forthcoming elections will only be free if there is informed choice. And there will only be informed choice if the electorate know the parties sufficiently, their programmes and candidates, so as to compare one with the other, and choose between them which one seems best” (CEAST 1992:286).^{xxii}

The document continued:

“the general norm for a candidate or a party to be electable is the guarantee that they offer us of dedicated service to the common good and respect for human rights”.^{xxiii}

Based on these comments from the churches, it is quite clear that voter education was not given the priority it required, and with approximately half a million blank or spoiled votes the issue is one that will need much greater effort and commitment the next time around.

3. *From 1992 elections to Lusaka Protocol.*

After the September 1992 elections, Angola was thrown once again into the chaos of war. The alarming extent to which UNITA had not demilitarised in accordance with the Bicesse Accords became shockingly evident as it quickly took control of an estimated seventy percent of the country (Rothchild 1997:135). In the context of this new and bloody conflict, I examine four aspects of the churches’ discourse during the period, looking at: encouragement to accept democratic processes; the devastation caused by war; underlying factors in the new conflict; and the media. I rely substantially on documents from CEAST, as few AEA or CICA documents exist for the immediate post-election period.

3.1. *Acceptance of democratic processes.*

Initial disquiet after the elections centred on accusations of fraud that were not upheld by the international community, which declared the elections free and fair (c.f. Anstee 1996:235-236). The first accusations of fraud were made by a number of the new political parties, and later by UNITA.¹⁵ With Angola on the brink of war in 1992, CEAST encouraged the pursuit of legal mechanisms to resolve these fraud allegations. It reminded the parties that a second round of the presidential elections was still required as no candidate had achieved the required fifty-percent to guarantee election in the first ballot. It advocated a return to the spirit and the letter of the Bicesse Accords to overcome the political crisis and safeguard the “miracle of peace” (CEAST 1992:292). Peace was too valuable a prize to let slip and democratic processes should be accepted. These appeals were to no avail.

According to AEA (1994) and CICA (1992c) the only way out of the conflict was through dialogue, tolerance and forgiveness. Dialogue did take place at a number of locations. The first meeting was at Namibe, a southern Angolan coastal town, where hopes were high that a cease-fire could be secured (CEAST 1992:198). Failure resulted in talks being moved to Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, where CEAST (1993:303) asked the parties to “negotiate with their eyes fixed, not on their own Party interests, but the suffering of the people”.^{xxiv} Still without a cease-fire, the talks were transferred to Abidjan in the Ivory Coast but without success. The Abidjan failure saw the departure of Margaret Anstee as UN Special Representative, and marked the end of peace negotiations until the process was resumed in Lusaka under the new Special Representative, Alioune Blondin Beye.

The desperation and anger of the churches at the failure of the Abidjan talks was palpable. CEAST (1993:311) wrote:

“Abidjan was a hope that turned to despair. The alleged reasons for its failure, even with the best will in the world, do not make sense to us. ... We had hoped that serious political will would inspire the imagination of the negotiators to find a solution to the impasse. But it did not happen. And the people continue condemned to death with hunger, exile, and all sorts of torment inflicted on them by the war”.^{xxv}

¹⁵ This point is not strongly made in the literature. In an interview with Paulino Pinto João, (party leader of CNDA, and leader of POC, a coalition of fourteen political parties) he stated that the first accusation of fraud was made by the FNLA on October 2, 1992. On October 5, he was spokesperson for a group of political parties, also claiming fraud, including UNITA. Finally, on October 12, UNITA generals suspended their participation in FAA. Interview, Luanda, November 17 2001.

This focus on the effect of the war on local populations has consistently been a key element in the churches discourse throughout the years of conflict, critical of both sides inability to protect the lives of those for whom they claimed to be fighting.

3.2. *The devastation caused by war.*

The first few weeks of conflict were of an unprecedented nature in Angolan history and saw thousands of people killed across the country, and much destruction to national infrastructure (CEAST 1993:301). The majority of those killed in Luanda were Ovimbundu, suspected of being UNITA sympathisers. A second wave of violence swept Luanda in February 1993 directed against the Bakongo people from northern Angola, many of whom had previously lived in the DRC (CEAST 1993:301). The attacks were triggered by rumours that the DRC was involved in the war on the side of UNITA, which brought suspicion to bear on Bakongo people living in Luanda.¹⁶

By 1993 CEAST (1993:302) described the war as

“a systematic violation of the most sacred human rights. Weapons of long range with great destructive power, both aerial and terrestrial, indiscriminately devastate our towns and cities, without even sparing sacred places. Churches, hospitals, crèches and other congeneric places, have always constituted sacred zones, which even so called uncivilised people respect during war. ... [T]o achieve its ends war has little regard for the means adopted”.^{xxvi}

Great concern was expressed about the relentless bombing of cities. Mention was made of Bié, Malanje and Menongue, bombed for many months by UNITA troops, and of Huambo, bombed by government air force jets (CEAST 1993:312). All appeals for a cease-fire or a truce failed and at no stage did the Angolan government or UNITA open humanitarian corridors to permit assistance to populations under siege. As a result international humanitarian organisations were forced to stand by until the fighting ended. This new war made little or no attempt to distinguish between military and civilian personnel.

The churches public discourse reveals great frustration at not being able to impact on the direction of the war or bring it to an end. The conflict took hold despite the logic of

¹⁶ This wave of violence, referred to by many people as ‘Bloody Thursday’, was quickly brought under control. Many Bakongo keep this day as an unofficial day of mourning because of the nature of the attacks perpetrated against their kinsfolk.

argument presented with appeals for renewed negotiation or dialogue. The discourse however reveals a strong humanitarian concern for the civilian population subjected to such appalling suffering. In terms of public sphere discourse there is a strong emotional content to what the churches said. It is discourse that can be characterised as ‘crying’ and ‘shouting’, rather different to the formal discursive arena Habermas suggests in his public sphere (Curran 1991:41). There is a tremendous urgency about what the churches are communicating, as they sought to challenge the logic of war with their religious-humanitarian rationality.

3.3. Underlying factors in the conflict.

In examining what the churches identified as underlying factors in the new conflict, it is noticeable how the churches, especially CEAST, refrain from apportioning blame in the conflict. This is somewhat surprising given that the international community was unambiguous in seeing UNITA’s rejection of the election results as the reason for the war (chapter one, section 4.1). In so far as I have been able to establish, at no point in the church based documentation is UNITA referred to as the reason for the resumption of war. CEAST believed that to take sides in the war would not have been conducive to the overall goal of national reconciliation, nor have facilitated the church’s role in that process. CEAST (1993:304-305) explains its position:

“For those hoping to see in the pastoral documents of CEAST condemnation of whoever is to blame in the actual conflict, it beholds us to state that to exercise our ministry of reconciliation, this is not the best way. ... However, we cannot refrain from condemning unjust situations by drawing attention to them in a way that people can examine their consciences, recognise the responsibility that belongs to them and take measures to end [these situations]”.^{xxvii}

While apportioning no individual blame, CEAST points to injustices existing within warfare.

The CEAST position raises the question of whether in fact it considered UNITA to have been responsible for the resumption of hostilities, but refused to say so? CEAST was in a difficult position on this issue as to have taken sides in the war, could have placed many of its personnel in danger who worked in areas controlled by the government and UNITA. The CEAST documents however, suggest that whatever the trigger factor in the war, it was quickly overtaken by other factors which then became the real issue. An examination of CEAST references to tribalism and political manipulation clarifies this point.

Firstly, a few weeks into the conflict in November 1992, CEAST spoke of tribal rivalry and hatred as the motivation behind much of the killing. A prominent CEAST figure stated in an interview that the war had briefly taken on tribal overtones after hostilities began.¹⁷ Most seriously, CEAST (1992:297) commented that tribal rivalry had been “ignited” in order “to reap political dividends”. It took the view that the wave of tribal killing had been politically orchestrated:

“If the Angolan people were not manipulated, they would live together fraternally without turning ethnic differences into an obstacle to peace. Some years ago the city of Luanda used have hundreds of thousands of citizens from other ethnic groups, mostly Mbundu [Ambundu] and Kikongo and there were no reports of tribal difficulties between them, nor with the local ethnic group. The same can be said of other locations in the country. For this reason, the responsibility for the recent political-tribal events goes beyond the level of the ordinary people” (CEAST 1992:299).^{xxviii}

Secondly, twelve months later CEAST again addressed this theme of political manipulation of tribal sensibilities:

“If in recent times things have happened that can have tribal connotations, this is due to the manipulation of leaders, who for their own interests, exploited dominant political rivalries in certain ethnic sectors. For this reason therefore, it is to the political leaders above all, that we address our appeal that they show human maturity in accepting their brothers and sisters from whatever ethnicity, in a generous spirit of national reconciliation, without any form of exclusion, without regarding them as possible political rivals” (CEAST 1993:320).^{xxix}

These are serious accusations that CEAST levels at the feet of the political leaders, accusing them of having instrumentalised ethnic tensions for political gain. CEAST is making the point that ‘ordinary’ people had learned to live peacefully together, but the political leadership had not. These failures of political leadership were a crucial and deadly dynamic in the conflict. Schubert’s (2000:123) comment on the understanding of political power within the Angolan nationalist parties is most relevant:

“The government just as much as the rebels were only able to conceive of political power as a monopoly, combatting one another with a determination ever more exaggerated”.

While Schubert was referring to Angola in 1975, CEAST was making a similar point in 1993.

¹⁷ Interview in Luanda, November 7, 2001.

3.4. *Media.*

The critical stance adopted by the churches vis-à-vis the Angolan media continued throughout this period, becoming more pronounced. The severest criticism came in late 1992 when CEAST expressed the view that the state media had played a key role in setting Angola on the road to war again.

“The most decisive instrument in mobilising feeling for peace or war is the mass media – newspaper, radio and television. *We have absolutely no doubt about the devastating influence the media has exercised in relation to recent events.* We therefore repeat our appeal to those responsible for the media on both sides, to use information to unite Angolans, and not divide. The substance and the shape, even the tone with which communication is transmitted, the editorials and daily news, can be as much an invitation to reconciliation and peace as a stimulus for hatred and war. End this ... communication which sees only good in your own party, and only evil in the other” (CEAST 1992:300) (emphasis added).^{xxx}

Clearly CEAST regarded the state and UNITA media as an instrument of war in the hands of the Angolan government and UNITA and called for an end to the demonisation of the opposing side. CEAST linked the frenzy of killing at the outbreak of war with the nature of media broadcasting during the same period. The media was a key instrument in achieving political manipulation. CEAST hoped to eventually counteract this through the relaunch of its own station *Rádio Ecclesia* (only achieved in 1997), which had been closed since 1977. In this analysis from CEAST we hear echoes of how radio was used in Rwanda to organise the genocide of 1994 (McNulty 1999).

4. *From the Lusaka Protocol to the 1998 war.*

After a year of negotiations in Lusaka, Angola’s second international peace agreement was finally signed on November 20, 1994. The Lusaka Protocol ushered in a four-year period of relative peace, Angola’s longest period without war in the post-independence era, a period described as one of “armed peace” by Messiant (2000:2), and of “neither peace not war” by Munslow (1996:187). The implementation of the Protocol was slow with many missed deadlines, though it did witness the inauguration on April 9 1997, of GURN (*Governo da Unidade e Reconciliação Nacional*), the government of unity and national reconciliation.¹⁸ The period was to end with Angola once more at war. In this section I outline the churches’ peace engagement in the following areas; the need for

¹⁸ Angola Peace Monitor Vol. 3, No. 8, April 25, 1997.

concrete action to consolidate peace; democratisation; building a culture of peace; (re)defining the conflict; and the media.

4.1. *Peace requires concrete action.*

Within the churches there was a sense of relief that a new peace agreement had been signed. However, the bitter experience of the Bicesse failure and the subsequent devastation caused by two years of war, meant that more than ever, the signing of a peace deal was but one component in a wider peace building task. The churches had learned to be suspicious of promises that could prove hollow and challenged the peace signatories to consolidate the agreement through concrete action. The history of 1992 had shown that a highly publicised peace ceremony and lengthy verbal assurances counted for little, while rearmament was secretly occurring.

By March 1995, four months after the Lusaka Protocol signing, there was already public unease that the agreement was in trouble, as war preparations were once again in progress. CEAST (1995:343) expressed its profound apprehension at the importation of weapons, and the recruitment of individuals below the minimum age for military service. It called on the international community to act immediately and deploy the promised UN blue helmets as a matter of urgency. In August 1995, AEA and CICA (known collectively as EDICA) issued a press statement which outlined fresh concerns in the peace process, highlighting the laying of new landmines, emphasising that the quartering of troops was not underway, and that military confrontation was still continuing (EDICA 1995a). The statement also expressed criticism of the slow arrival of UN 'blue helmet' peace keepers nine months after the Lusaka signing. All of this provided evidence that the Protocol was in difficulty and that much needed to be done to bolster the peace agreement.

4.2. *Democratisation.*

In 1995, AEA and CICA announced a first ever EDICA conference called 'It's Time to Construct'.¹⁹ The published conference documents provide important insights into the Protestant churches' thinking regarding the democratisation process during this post-Lusaka period. A conference paper by the CICA secretary-general, Augusto Chipesse

¹⁹ *É Tempo para Edificar*, Luanda, September 6-10, 1995, with 350 participants. *Edificar* can also be translated as to build, to edify, to enlighten, to instruct.

(1995:19), affirmed democracy as the only means for achieving lasting peace in Angola, which in turn would foster “development and a just distribution of the wealth of the country”. He also argued:

“It is within parliamentary democracy that ethnic problems, created generally by colonialism in Africa and Angola in particular, are and should be debated and resolved, because by any other means war will continue to enrich the weapons manufacturers, and producers of emergency food rations, of the already wealthy nations” (Chipesse 1995:9-10).^{xxx}

International weapons manufacturers and food producers were seen as benefitting from the Angola war.

Despite the failure of elections, democracy was still understood as the best political framework within which to work for peace. However, the thinking had developed in the direction of seeing parliamentary democracy as the means to guarantee development and an equitable distribution of the nation’s wealth, as the ideal forum for the resolution of Angola’s problems, ethnic and otherwise. The seventy UNITA parliamentarians elected in 1992 had still not taken up their seats in the parliament. They would do so later, but at the time of Chipesse’s comment, the parliament consisted of the MPLA deputies and a handful of opposition parties.

Emílio de Carvalho, bishop of the United Methodist Church of Angola (who had signed the 1975 ecumenical document referred to earlier), argued in his presentation for a new approach to politics within the churches. On the lack of Christian leaders within politics, he commented:

“We have a dilemma: as politics progressively becomes the most decisive power in our society, ... we are the less able to act within it as Protestants and Christians. And what’s happening? Cruel forces are taking control of our political institutions and our view of these institutions as contrary to ‘Christian principles’ ... means we do not participate in them. As a consequence of our attitude, Christianity in Angola will not exert any significant or positive influence in our future society” (de Carvalho 1995:2).^{xxx}

A new theology of engagement was being called for within the churches, which considered politics as an arena of Christian activity. Those who wanted to enter politics as part of their Christian commitment were encouraged by Bishop de Carvalho to do so. Given the theoretical distinction between the public sphere and the state, this represented a call for individuals to move from the public sphere into the political arena.

The EDICA conference also provided evidence that the Protestant churches had begun to review their former political affiliations. As mentioned earlier, the main nationalist parties had strong links with the principal Protestant churches, but by 1994 AEA was expressing regret for “failing to have been non-party political” (AEA 1994:2).^{xxxiii} This expression denotes a shift away from party-based support for particular political parties, to a concern for the wider health of the Angolan political system. The resolutions of the conference illustrate this shift, four of which address political issues faced by the churches.²⁰ Firstly, church members were encouraged to engage positively in politics to build a harmonious society, to promote justice and true peace, echoing the sentiments of Bishop de Carvalho above. Secondly, Christian leaders were encouraged not to establish political parties, a resolution probably connected with the proliferation of political parties occurring in Angola. Thirdly, Christian leaders were to refrain from making party-political statements which compromised their churches, but should use their influence to educate the people. Fourthly, the churches were not to identify with any particular political party, but were to transcend party politics. These resolutions capture the extent to which the major Protestant churches were redefining their public role in Angola and realigning themselves within Angolan society. At a church policy level, the resolutions reflected a desire to be politically relevant without being party-political. It was interesting how at a time when the churches were encouraging members to pursue a career in politics, to leave the public sphere in Habermasian terms, the churches themselves were seeking to take up a position more clearly within the public sphere by redefining their public role. This was a process CEAST underwent in the early post-independent years (Schubert 2000:127-130).

4.3. *Building a ‘culture of peace’.*

It is relevant here to introduce the concept of a ‘culture of peace’, before examining it more fully in chapter six, in the context of local communities. The churches began to speak of a culture of peace in the post-Lusaka period to suggest that working for peace was the challenge of every Angolan, illustrated in expressions such as “tolerance is the face of peace” (CEAST 1995:338), and “peace building is the work of all” (CEAST 1997:374). A statement made by Ntoni-Nzinga (1995:7-8), later secretary-general of the churches ecumenical peace commission COIEPA, regarding the prevalence of a culture of violence in Angola and the politics of exclusion, is important to highlight:

²⁰ The relevant EDICA (1995) resolutions are 3a, 3c, 3d, and 3f.

“In the past eighteen years many lives have been cut down by people wanting to increase their sphere of influence, wishing to declare themselves kings of Angola. Each one uses the political pronouncements of the other to justify their use of a culture of violence. Today as a result, only those who carry weapons and kill ...are seen as wise in Angolan society. Whoever refuses to use firepower is viewed as stupid and refused the right of participation in decision-making affecting his/her life. ... This expression of a culture of violence, which maintains the political agenda inherited from colonialism is regrettable, and has never served the true interests of this nation”.^{xxxiv}

The promotion of a peace culture by the churches was conceived of as a means to address the culture of violence that Ntoni-Nzinga argued had taken root in political life. An interesting suggestion made in the same presentation was for the establishment of an Institute of Peace and Development. Though the nature of this institute was not spelled out, the creation of COIEPA four years later can possibly be connected with the need identified here, for a wider structure to specifically address the peace agenda in Angola.

4.4. *(Re)defining the conflict.*

As early as November 1992 CEAST revealed a fundamental shift in understanding the Angolan conflict when it stated:

“the fighting of a new civil war will be against whom? Of UNITA against the MPLA, and of the MPLA against UNITA? None of these. It will be both sides against the people. ... In a civil war it is always two armies fighting against the people and the Nation” (CEAST 1992:298).^{xxxv}

This analysis of a war against the people formed the basis upon which CEAST, in 1996, defined the war as genocide. The relevant text emerged after the Lusaka Protocol:

“... our past must be a lesson for the future. Therefore, what has our past been in terms of the war? A cruel genocide which wiped out hundreds of thousands of innocent people. A hell of destruction that has sent our country from the vanguard of most advanced African countries, to the bottom of the most needy people of our continent” (CEAST 1996:363).^{xxxvi}

CEAST was the only church to apply the term genocide to the Angola war.²¹ Because of the seriousness of the charge, I will explore the use of the term and ask whether the designation is appropriate. The term is emotive, and its use just two years after the Rwanda genocide suggests that certain parallels were being drawn. The application of the term in peacetime is somewhat unusual.

²¹ The genocide claim was also made by Namibia’s National Society for Human Rights (NSHR) in a report on UN sanctions in Angola, Entitled ‘A Critical View Of The Angola Sanctions Regime, An Appeal For Urgent Angola Dialogue’, located at <http://nshr.namweb.com.na>, dated April 27, 2000.

As CEAST did not offer a definition of genocide, it is helpful to look at the definition agreed at the 1948 UN ‘Convention for the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’. Article 2 defines genocide as:

“Acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group”.

Destexhe (1995) highlights four constituent parts within the definition of genocide: 1) a criminal act; 2) with the intention of destroying; 3) an ethnic, national or religious group; 4) that is targeted. Any attempt to apply these constituent parts to the Angolan conflict raises questions in relation to ‘who are the perpetrators of the criminal act?’ ‘What intentional criminal act was committed?’ and ‘what group was targeted?’ Attempting to apply the four elements of the definition to the Angolan context is problematic. Having redefined the war as ‘a war against the people’, it is possible to point to the ‘Angolan people’ as the target group, but this seems an over-generalisation. Attempting to locate ‘criminal activity’ on both sides of the war is also complex, though less so in relation to UNITA. The suggestion of ‘criminality’ within the Angolan state, carrying the implication that it was engaged in a war against its own people, raises serious questions about how CEAST viewed the state, and its understanding of the legitimate use of force by nation states. A further comment is significant in this regard from a CEAST 1998 document *On the Danger of a Return to War*. Events had deteriorated within the country after the death of the UN special representative Beye and the prospect of another war was considered as inflicting greater misery on the Angolan people than that caused by the slave trade in previous centuries. In calling for further dialogue to avert a possible war, CEAST stated:

“Faced with the possibility of renewed warfare no one can remain indifferent when thinking that 15 million Angolans will be sacrificed, their lives and property, to the personal agendas, perhaps party agendas, of a few” (CEAST 1998:386).^{22xxxvii}

This reference to warfare as ‘the personal agenda of a few’ is as close as CEAST comes to locating criminality within the state to justify the genocide claim. At no stage is the identity of these people explored publicly. This notion of the ‘instrumentalisation’ of both the state and UNITA by ‘a few’, is not unique to the churches’ narrative. It also emerges within the discourse of civil society organisations, and will be examined further there. Does this criminalisation-instrumentalisation of

²² The population of Angola is usually put at 12 million, though there has been no census since independence. The Human Rights Watch global report 2002 puts the population at 12,479,000.

military structures on both sides merit the description of genocide? It does seem imprecise in the context, appearing as an emotional appeal for help within a conflict that had become unbearable for the majority of the Angolan people. The Protestant churches did not use the word genocide, speaking instead of an unjust or fratricidal war.

While the international literature on Angola places much emphasis on the ‘control of resources’ argument (LeBillion 2001; Malaquias 2001), the church based literature does not. The vital role of revenue from oil and diamonds is unquestionable in enabling both sides prosecute the war. CEAST referred on numerous occasions to Angola’s wealth as a ‘curse’, as neither side would have fought over a poor country to such an extent. When CEAST comments on the role of natural resources, it is within a wider context and includes those involved in international trade with Angola. For example, CEAST referred to the existence,

“[of] groups, if not countries, interested in ruining our country even more with destructive weaponry sent here in exchange for diamonds and oil. To these people we simply ask that they not do to us what they would not want for themselves” (CEAST 1995:344).^{xxxviii}

The comment requests countries and businesses involved in trade with Angola to consider what their purchase of oil and diamonds enabled the government and UNITA to do militarily. The resource argument is sometimes implicit within criticism of corruption within the country, and the disparity of wealth between rich and poor:

“a word of condemnation against those who turn war into a lucrative business. To accumulate accounts in foreign banks and to get rich at the expense of the hunger, suffering, blood and death of your brothers and sisters is repugnant, which never should have a place in the heart of an Angolan, or any person” (CEAST 1999).^{xxxix}

The churches however, have never argued that the war is about control over natural resources. Oil and diamond revenues were utilised to prosecute the military campaign that, in the view of the churches, was caused by the inability of political leaderships to reach accommodation and be reconciled.

4.5. *Media.*

During this post-Lusaka period, significant changes occurred within the Angolan print and broadcast media. Private newspaper titles such as *Folha 8*, *Actual fax*, *Angolense*, *Agora*, and *Actual* commenced publication, and *Rádio Ecclésia* began broadcasting. *LAC* was already on air. These provided Angolans with a wider range and variety of

news sources. The emergence of these non-state media institutions was exciting and new at the time. In public sphere terms, their development was most relevant, bringing change to the Angolan public sphere, as a new ‘public’ began to take shape alongside of the churches. This issue will be examined in the next chapter.

Prior to the arrival of these titles however, EDICA (1995b) had called for the creation of a permanent church commission to work with the government and other state bodies “to insist on the implementation of the press laws in the country and the abolition of censorship”.^{x1} The comments reinforce the churches’ view of the state media as problematic within Angolan society.

5. *The Third War.*

To date this chapter has primarily focused on what the Angolan churches ‘said’ about peace, and in doing so addressed earlier research questions dealing with the churches understanding of the causes of conflict, how the conflict was viewed, how the churches’ believed peace could be achieved, and whether the churches’ analysis changed over the period. The chapter has traced this narrative over approximately ten years, and seen the argument change in response to political and military events, as well as in response to the humanitarian crisis. The churches collectively and consistently argued that dialogue represented the best way to achieve lasting peace, and identified ethnic divisions as the underlying factor in the conflict. Democratisation was seen perhaps in an idealised way, as the surest means to consolidate peace in Angola, and provide the proper forum where ethnic differences could be addressed in a non-violent manner. Though the question of ethnicity or tribalism is referred to as a factor in the war, at no stage was the war described as an ethnic conflict. We have seen how CEAST described the conflict as a war against the people and later as genocide (repeated in 2000, c.f. CEAST 2000), but this interpretation was not shared by CICA or AEA, who adhered to the language of a ‘fratricidal war’. The humanitarian concerns of the churches were also outlined.²³ The discourse also pointed to serious misgivings and reservations in relation to the role played by the state media, which stood accused

²³ The true extent of the humanitarian crisis only emerged after Savimbi’s death. The international NGO MSF published a report in April 2002, stating “malnutrition witnessed by [MSF] among people emerging from the war zones in Angola [was] among the worst seen in Africa in the past decade”.

of having whipped up ethnic hatred at sensitive times. It was also argued that the war was the personal agenda of a few on both sides.

While this discourse is important, the other crucial research questions in relation to what the Angolan churches ‘did’ also need to be addressed. In this section I focus specifically on the activities and initiatives promoted by the churches in favour of peace. This involves looking at the way in which the churches worked together and deals with spatial dimensions in relation to the discourse of the churches. The return to war in 1998 reveals a new determination within the churches to work for peace, and a change in strategy manifest in new concrete peace initiatives. I divide this section into three, looking firstly at the work of COIEPA, the ecumenical peace commission; secondly, the Luanda Peace Congress of July 2000; and finally, mediation initiatives.

5.1. *Formation of COIEPA.*

The coming together in 1999 of AEA, CEAST and CICA to form COIEPA, was a significant development.²⁴ COIEPA was responsible for “coordinating the church contribution to the search for peace” and described itself as the product of a new ecumenical vision in Angola (COIEPA 2001). It hoped that the churches could participate more actively in the search for just and sustainable solutions to the problems underlying the national conflict. As far back as 1992, CICA (1992a) recognised that ecumenical relations were unsatisfactory, and that Angola’s peace and reconciliation depended in many ways on a strong ecumenical base in order to unite the nation. The suggestion here is quite clear: that peace between Angola’s political parties depended on the ability of the churches to work together, depended on ‘peace’ between the churches. In a similar vein, Messiant argues that the failure to secure peace in Angola is also a failure of the Christian churches, arguing that traditional rivalries and disunity between the churches impacted negatively on the search for peace and reconciliation:

“... within the failure to secure peace, one cannot but equally see a failure of the Christian churches, to the extent that, uniting about 90% of Angolans, they were the largest civil force in 1991 and the only possible national moral authority. Failure, firstly, in that they could not avoid a return to arms ... And also perhaps, a failure in its message of peace and reconciliation” (Messiant 2000:1).^{xli}

²⁴ A provisional working group was formed on 19 October 1999 for six months, and COIEPA was founded on 15 April 2000 (COIEPA 2001).

The linkage suggested by Messiant raises important issues, though she overestimates the membership and authority of the Angolan churches in 1991.²⁵

A number of reasons are suggested as to why the churches failed to unite for peace. Schubert (2000:202-205) highlights the option of the Methodist church to uncritically support the MPLA government after independence, in effect becoming the state church and remaining silent. Heywood (2002:182) points to the strength and dominance of CEAST as a problem, because, as “the only national organisation with the prestige and power to challenge the state on behalf of the suffering Angolan people, [it] failed to find common alliance with the weaker and more marginalised Protestant and independence groups”. Elsewhere, Schubert (2000:219) suggests that CEAST was content to go it alone rather than pursue an ecumenical approach. Interviews with church personnel and other individuals familiar with the Angolan churches during this period, also identified ‘leadership’ as an issue in the failure to unite for peace, commenting on an inability of prominent church leaders to compromise or cultivate a common approach.²⁶ The official launch of COIEPA in April 2000 after some significant leadership changes had occurred, appears to justify this opinion.

Messiant (2000:9) locates the churches failure in relation to peace specifically in the absence of a common ecumenical peace vision. Without a joint approach, she argues that the churches could not have an effective role in advocating peace:

“Given the strength of Christianity in this country, and the lack of autonomy and resources to which ‘civil society’ has been reduced by the war and dictatorial forces, I believe there could not be a successful Angolan intervention in favour of peace, which would be the work of one denomination, no matter how strong and respected it may be”^{xlii} (Messiant 2000:9).

That the creation of COIEPA as an ecumenical forum had taken so many years, is a criticism and a reflection of the churches inability to work together.

Particularly within the international community COIEPA, achieved prominence and became the vehicle of communication at an international level for the Angolan churches, and indeed for many within civil society. Ironically within Angola, COIEPA

²⁵ Different figures are given for the number of Christians in Angola. Hearn (1997:201) gives a figure of 69%. Henderson (1991:8) suggests 50% Catholic and 20% Protestant, but mentions that membership is counted differently. Catholic numbers include children who are baptised, with Protestant figures stressing adult membership. Consequently the figure of 50% for Catholics could be revised downwards.

²⁶ Observation made by Angolan missionaries, Luanda, July 27, 2000.

remained relatively unknown.²⁷ Nationally individual churches preferred to use their own names and structures when communicating on peace, as they were better known than COIEPA. The 2001 award of the European Union's Zakarov human rights prize to bishop Zacarias Kamwenho, president of COIEPA and CEAST, did much to raise COIEPA's profile at home, and recognise much good work already done at the level of international advocacy. The award served to focus attention generally on the growing peace movement within Angola. Kamwenho himself spoke of the award as a recognition of all Angolans working for peace.²⁸

The guiding principle within COIEPA was that dialogue represented the best way to achieve peace and reconciliation. The basis for dialogue was the Lusaka Protocol, which COIEPA considered

“a forum of approximation, where the most delicate issues and representatives of all interested sectors of the nation, would be brought to the negotiating table, so as to avoid possible political pretexts for a return to war”.^{29xliii}

The principle of ‘dialogue’, appearing to suggest renegotiation of the Lusaka Protocol, brought COIEPA into conflict with the Angolan government, which ruled out such a possibility. For government, the time for dialogue was over, full implementation of the Lusaka Protocol was required. For the churches however, much had changed in Angola that needed incorporation within the peace process since the signing of the Protocol. The general secretary of CICA, Luis Nguimbi summarises the churches’ argument:

“Lusaka continues to be valid because there is no other document to substitute it. But Lusaka cannot be the bible for the country. It is a solid basis, but it belongs to seven years ago. The country has not stopped, politics has not stood still. The country has developed and this must be included”.^{30xliv}

In Angolan public sphere terms, COIEPA represented an important institutional development. Its call for dialogue on the Angolan conflict resonates with Habermas’s notion of the public sphere as a discursive arena, a place for rational critical debate on issues of concern. As an institutional mechanism it promoted cohesion between the churches and provided a focal point for many civil society organisations working for peace. In fact, COIEPA ‘institutionalised’ this focal point further when it founded a

²⁷ It was quite striking during fieldwork how few people knew of COIEPA and its function.

²⁸ Zacarias Kamwenho, Catholic University of Angola, November 16, 2001.

²⁹ CICA (2001b), newsletter (91-93), June 15 2001.

³⁰ Interview with Rev. Luis Nguimbi, Secretary Geral of CICA, Luanda, November 21 2001.

peace network in November 2001 called *Rede da Paz*, (Peace Network) which brought together other churches, civic organisations, NGOs, and traditional authority figures, all sharing the objective of ‘peace through dialogue’. It is for this reason that I refer to the peace narrative of the churches as a ‘defining discourse’ in the chapter title. to capture the sense in which many organisations defined their positions on peace within the space created by the churches, and in relation to what the churches said.

5.2. *Pro Pace Congress 2000.*

The hosting of a peace congress in July 2000, under the auspices of CEAST’s peace movement *Movimento Pro Pace*, was an event of much significance. It brought together representatives from the Angolan government, from political and parliamentary parties, from twenty two churches, NGO and civil society organisations, as well as foreign ambassadors.³¹ A detailed analysis of the content of the Congress is likely to miss what it achieved in terms of creating space for political, civil and religious actors to discuss peace collectively. It is possible however, to summarise the main points of the Congress by reference to a number of the 10 conclusions presented on the final day (CEAST 2001c). For example, the Congress called for: a greater spirit of democracy (No.1), greater tolerance (No.2), human rights education as part of school curriculum (No 6), and action against landmines (No.7). It also called for a cease-fire (No.8) as a “first step towards peace” and the establishment of some form of permanent dialogue to include “the most representative levels of civil society, such as the churches, political parties and other institutions” (No.9).^{32xlv} Clearly the form of ‘dialogue’ envisioned by the churches, frequently referred to as ‘inclusive dialogue’, includes public sphere and non-public sphere actors.

The space for open debate on peace has always been contested in Angola and it is above all in relation to this public sphere dimension that I propose to assess the importance of the four day Congress, where an important contribution was made. It is possible to gauge some aspects of this contestation from comment in the state media, where I confine my remarks to the national newspaper *Jornal de Angola*. For example, an editorial entitled ‘The Road to Peace’ on the first day of the congress, July 18 2000, adopted a confrontational stance against “those who wanted peace at any price”. It

³¹ From the final document of the Congress, Luanda, July 21, 2001.

³² I note here that civil society generally does not include political parties

reaffirmed the Angolan government's position that peace depended on the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, or the acceptance of a pardon offered to Jonas Savimbi. The editorial presented the government's military campaign as a defense of democracy and of sovereignty:

“In the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, it fell to the Angolan government to take the difficult decision, to reduce and dismantle the war machinery of Jonas Savimbi. The government had no other choice: either it made war, or it passively watched the ruin of the nation. If today, sectors of civil society come together in relation to a peace movement, it is because the campaign of the Angolan Armed Forces has positively changed the balance of power militarily. ... It never ceases to cause amazement why pressure for peace is not applied in the direction of UNITA's armed wing. ... It is strange how those who want peace at any price, pretend not to know that a peace agreement already exists. ... [It was] to guarantee freedom and democracy - that the decision was taken to disarm the illegal forces threatening the country”.^{xlvi}

An article on July 19 criticised CEAST for treating both sides in the war as ‘belligerents’ and for not pointing the finger of blame at Jonas Savimbi as the sole reason for the continuance of the war. The editorial of July 20 categorically declared: “the military wing of UNITA does not walk the way of peace”. A column on July 21 accused “apologists in favour of dialogue of placing the aggressor and the victim on an equal footing, and of ignoring the 1992 elections”,^{xlvii} all of which read as propaganda against the Congress, and the impossibility of dialogue with UNITA.³³

The sense that the Congress had expanded the public sphere is referred to by one commentator:

“it opened debate on ways to achieve peace, and helped society lose its fear of publicly discussing alternatives in order to leave behind the intrigue of war”.^{34xlviii}

Bishop Mata Mourisca, president of *Movimento Pro Pace*, summarised the principal benefits of the Congress as “breaking the taboo of silence regarding the road to peace”,³⁵ and challenging the principle that the third war would ultimately bring peace to Angola. As far back as 1994 a message of ‘encouragement’ from a group of Protestant churches to those involved in the Lusaka negotiations, stated that the war had “no military solution”.^{36xlix} CEAST (1997:370) made the same claim in 1997, that

³³ Prominence was also given throughout the week to UNITA's campaign of terror and killing.

³⁴ Espiritanos (2002).

³⁵ Espiritanos (2002).

³⁶ The text is signed by Octávio Fernando of AEA, and Augusto Chipesse of CICA, referenced as (AEA-CICA 1994). Similar comments were appearing in the international literature at the time, that the war had no military solution, c.f. Minter (1994).

“this long war of thirty five years has left it abundantly clear. that the Angolan question does not have a military solution”.¹ Broadcasting the debates live on *Rádio Ecclésia* throughout the four days ensured that the themes covered reached a wide audience in the Luanda area. An edited version went out on short wave each morning and evening. As a result the Congress challenged the boundaries of the public sphere, and expanded the space for open debate on peace. Having personally participated in the Congress and found the various presentations relevant and interesting during the four days, it is probable that the longer term significance of the Congress will be its public sphere contestation dimension, rather than the content, a point I return to in chapter eight.

A number of issues around the question of church discourse within the public sphere are worth exploring in terms of the ‘mechanics’ of communication. Modern communication methods have grasped the centrality of ‘packaging’ in user friendly ways the message one seeks to communicate. This is something the churches were particularly weak at over this research period. CEAST has considerably improved its ‘pastoral letter’ form of communication,³⁷ and all churches are learning to access the various print and broadcast media, particularly *Rádio Ecclésia*. Peace communication from the churches however, needed to be effective in a multi-lingual environment which has implications ‘upwards’ and ‘downwards’. ‘Upwards’ in the sense that Portuguese is not an official working language of the UN (it is in UNESCO), which means that any national government or diplomat attempting to pay close attention to public church discourse must either understand Portuguese or arrange a translation. In other words, the churches did little to get their message into the international forum, which a simple translation facility would have facilitated. By ‘downwards’, I make the same point in relation to Angola’s many national languages. Though Portuguese is widely spoken, there is a significant percentage of Angolans, perhaps a majority, who are not conversant in Portuguese, for whom the discourse of the churches must be translated *in situ* by local missionaries, placing an extra burden on them. A small investment in personnel at the level of translation facilities could have impacted positively on the public discourse of the churches nationally and internationally.

³⁷ The change of style in CEAST’s pastoral letters is quite noticeable over the period 1975-2002. Some of the earlier documents are strongly doctrinal running to seventeen pages (1984, 1988), but the latter tend to be shorter (4-6 pages) prepared for public reading in churches.

5.3. *Mediation initiatives.*

At different stages in the Angolan conflict offers were made by various churches to mediate. The earliest such offer in the literature is from CEAST (1986:131) in February 1986, which fell on deaf ears. In 2000 COIEPA put forward a considered proposal, suggesting a panel of twelve members to explore possible avenues towards peace between the two sides. This was rejected by the government.³⁸ Again in 2001, church-based mediation was on the agenda, this time in response to Jonas Savimbi's May 2001 letter to CEAST, where he expressed support for the churches' peace initiatives, though he did not request church mediation. The letter states:

“I write ... about the great challenge for peace (through dialogue). I also write to actively encourage you to participate in this difficult task which the present moment bestows on us. ... We would like to see COIEPA and Pro Pace initiatives move forward. We believe they have an historical and relevant role to offer the Angolan people, providing incentives for reconciliation” (Savimbi 2001).^{li}

It took some time to establish the authenticity of the letter, but when CEAST replied in August it came as a joint response from the Catholic bishops of Southern Africa, who had met in Harare. The document reads:

“In the name of Christ and of the suffering Angolan people, we ask the Angolan president and leader of UNITA to meet in a neutral place with the view to dialogue on the ending of war and the future of the nation. The Church gladly offers its help in finding a convenient location, as well as competent and acceptable facilitation for such dialogue”^{lii} (CEAST 2001a).

This offer to find acceptable facilitation for dialogue was not accepted.

CEAST was criticised in some quarters because its views reflected a return to a polarised understanding of the Angolan conflict, suggesting that a resolution could be achieved by President dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi meeting together. This offer departed from the consensus that had been growing within civil society, that meetings of this sort were part of the problem, as other civil foces were excluded. In response to this criticism CEAST (2001b) revised and restated its position later in 2001:

“... however we believe that it shouldn't only be the government and UNITA sitting at the negotiating table, but also representatives from other political parties and civil society”.^{liii}

³⁸ ‘Government rejects church offer to mediate peace talks’ <http://www.reliefweb/int>, August 11, 2000.

By the end of 2001, there were clear indications that both the Angolan government and UNITA were open to renewed mediation by the UN. Ibrahim Gambari, the UN's special envoy to Angola had informed the Security Council that

“a ‘window of opportunity’ existed to end the war and that the two parties had agreed to resume peace talks, on condition that certain aspects of the 1994 Lusaka Peace Protocol could be renegotiated” (SouthScan 2002).

The parties wanted a role for the churches and certain sectors of civil society in facilitating the discussions. The details regarding these discussions had yet to be worked out when events in eastern Angola overtook the possibility of renewed negotiations, and the death of Jonas Savimbi was announced on February 22, 2002. It was clear that the churches had envisioned a role for themselves in resolving the conflict, but the conflict did, after all, have a military solution.

By way of conclusion, I propose to comment on the outstanding research questions dealing with whether the churches worked together in pursuit of peace, and if the churches played a role in facilitating public debate within the public sphere. During the period covered in this chapter it is clear that significant approximation took place between the historical churches, particularly in latter years. Such recent approximation however, should not disguise the almost total absence of ecumenical peace initiatives throughout the years of conflict. While criticisms of the churches by scholars such as Heywood, Messiant and Schubert are well founded, it is important to distinguish between the power of the churches as moral authorities enjoying significant popular legitimacy, and the power of those at war. The executive and military power of the government and the military power of UNITA, are of a different nature to the power of argument and advocacy adopted by the churches. The recent war in Iraq for example, illustrates how war can be prosecuted even when many political and religious leaders, international organisations and agencies, and international public opinion are opposed. The power and influence enjoyed by the Angolan churches should not be overestimated.

The churches clearly saw a role for themselves in resolving the conflict, evident throughout the public statements issued over many years, and offers to mediate. Whether such a role could have been accommodated at an earlier stage in the conflict remains an open question. Neither the MPLA nor UNITA sought the inclusion of the churches when the Bicesse Accords were negotiated, nor during the Lusaka Protocol.

Had the churches been incorporated into the negotiation structures adopted by the Troika or the UN, their outcomes may have been different, ... but perhaps not. The churches themselves appear to have been insufficiently organised to make an intervention at this level. When they finally did organise collectively, they found that the international community was sympathetic and willing to listen, as the later stages of the conflict make clear.

Finally, one of the key contributions made by the churches was at the level of creating space for public debate. This has particular importance for other actors such as the media and civil society organisations who developed in close proximity to the space created by the churches. Henderson (1991:8), a respected church historian, identifies this as an important CEAST contribution during the years of one-party rule especially.

“The measure in which [the Catholic bishops] raised their voices against violence, human rights violations, in favour of democracy, peace and reconciliation, they pointed the direction the nation should follow. Even in the darkest days, the pastorals gave hope to Angolans”.

This space was consolidated throughout the 1990s as AEA and CICA redefined their public roles and their political affiliations. This was important in strengthening the public sphere as a place of public scrutiny outside the state, a place especially concerned with ways to end the war and defend a people decimated by the actions of both armies.

Chapter 4.

The Angolan Private Media: Fostering 'Discursive Space'.

The Angola private media grew in importance throughout the 1990s and came to exercise a key role within the Angolan public sphere in the circulation of ideas and perspectives on the national conflict and efforts to promote peace. Prior to the 1992 elections, the only existing private media institution was radio *LAC (Luanda Antena Comercial)* which began broadcasting a few days before voting took place. The media landscape of the time was dominated by state institutions, such as *RNA* (Angolan state radio), *Jornal de Angola* (national daily newspaper), and *TPA* (state television). This continues to be the case, but since the mid-1990s a host of private media institutions have emerged which offer a greater diversity of opinion and news sources. The importance of media institutions in a time of conflict is worth underlining at the outset, as they play key roles in transmitting information and in building consensus towards peace or can be responsible for maintaining momentum in war. The Carnegie Commission's report (1997:121) *Preventing Deadly Conflict* identified a fundamental media challenge during conflict:

“to report conflicts in ways that engender constructive public consideration of possibilities for avoiding violence. The media can stimulate new ideas and approaches to problems”.

I firstly provide a brief overview of both state and non-state institutions to give a sense of the public sphere within which the peace narrative of the private media developed, beginning with some background material on the state-run media: *Jornal de Angola*, *RNA* and *TPA*.¹ All are financed by the Angolan government and dominate the arena within which the private media functions. The origins of the *Jornal de Angola* date to the colonial newspaper *A Província de Angola*, first published in 1923 (Coelho 1999:105). After independence it reopened as *Jornal de Angola*, and remains Angola's only daily newspaper. Approximately 10,000 copies are sold daily, the vast majority in the Luanda area.²

¹ Castro (1964) and Coelho (1999) are important sources on early Angolan journalism.

² Coelho (1999:108) gives this figure for 1997.

For the majority of Angolans living in the provinces, the national radio station *RNA* is the key source of information. Many also access international broadcasters such as the *BBC*, *RFI* of France, *Rádio Renascença* of Portugal, *VOA* of the US, and *Canal África* of South Africa.³ *RNA* broadcasts on FM in Luanda and nationally on short-wave. Many provincial capitals retransmit the national signal locally on FM through provincial radio stations, and engage in local broadcasting of news programmes and talk shows in Portuguese and national languages. The origins of *RNA* date to 1952, when *Rádio Angola* was established in Luanda (Coelho 1999:124).

National state television, *TPA*, began broadcasting in 1972 (Coelho 1999:144), initially only in Luanda. The signal has gradually been extended to many other urban centres where a significant percentage of the population now owns a television. Television is an increasingly important medium of communication in Angola, though radio remains the most accessible to the majority of Angolans. After the Lusaka Protocol, the UN was refused permission to establish its own radio station (HRW 1999: 162-167), but instead was allocated time on *TPA* for broadcasting, which it used to outline developments within the peace process. With regard to Dundo as a research location, the principal media sources for local people are from state television and radio, or international broadcasters. There is little access to private media institutions.

A brief word is also appropriate here on UNITA's former media institutions, *Vorgan* and *Terra Angolana*. At the time of the Bicesse Accords, UNITA's radio station, *Vorgan*, broadcast on short-wave from Jamba in the south eastern province of Cuando Cubango. UNITA intermittently published a newspaper, *Terra Angolana* from Lisbon, not readily available in Luanda. As part of the Lusaka Protocol, *Vorgan* was to cease broadcasting and be replaced by *Rádio Despertar*, a commercial FM station. This did not materialise and eventually *Vorgan* was seized when government troops captured Jamba in 1999. State-run and UNITA media institutions were the principal sources of news and information until the emergence of the private media. These were frequently used for propaganda purposes by both sides during the conflict, which rather polarised debate within the public sphere. We saw in the previous chapter how the churches criticised the propagandist use of the media to stir up tension and hatred.

³ Dundo Workshop, October 5, 2001.

The first private print media titles emerged within this polarised arena in the mid-1990s. One of the earliest, *Imparcial fax*, ceased publication in January 1995 after the assassination of its editor Ricardo de Mello in unexplained circumstances.⁴ *Folha 8* began on March 25 1995, and was a biweekly publication for a time, before reverting to a weekly edition. All of Angola's other private newspapers: *Actual*, *Agora*, *Angolense*, and *O Independente*, are weekly publications.⁵ The latter title is an example of a private publication from the colonial era founded in 1907, but closed down after the attempted coup of 1977 (the coup attempt is examined later in this chapter). It reopened in November 1997.⁶ A weakness of Angola's print media is its limited reach outside the capital city. No distribution network exists to ensure that copies are delivered to Angola's provinces, thereby confining readership almost exclusively to Luanda.⁷ The circulation figures for these private titles are low by international standards, with collective weekly sales of between 15-25,000 copies.⁸ Readership figures are much higher than sales figures however, because of multiple readers for each newspaper. Costing approximately \$1 per copy (*Jornal de Angola* costs \$0.35), the price of private publications is beyond what many can afford, which places these newspapers under considerable financial pressure to ensure viability. The authorship of writing within private publications includes articles penned by journalists and 'opinion pieces' submitted by public figures, such as members of political parties. There is almost a total absence of popular writing such as 'letters to the editor' which, when coupled with the prevalence of opinion pieces, occasionally transforms the private print media into something of a political journal.

⁴ Nobody has been charged with his murder.

⁵ A number of other publications existed for a while. *Actual fax* became *Actual*. *Comércio Actualidade* was significant for a time, but no longer publishes. *Actual* (August 12, 2000) announced the arrival of a new paper *Faro*, but I have not seen any editions. Maier (1996:210) refers to a Huambo based paper called *O Jango*, whose editor David Bernardino was assassinated in 1992 by UNITA gunmen.

⁶ The title lasted 56 days in 1907. It was resurrected in September 1974 before being closed three years later. It resumed publication on November 7, 1997, (*Angolense* September 23, 2000).

⁷ Two comments are relevant here. Firstly, during fieldwork in Dundo in 2000 most of the private newspapers were on sale. This was made possible by a number of people who arranged to have the papers bought in Luanda and then flown to Dundo, where they sold them. When I returned to Dundo in 2001, I was told this initiative had ceased as many Dundo residents had not paid their arrears, rendering the initiative unprofitable. Secondly, some attempts to distribute private newspapers in the provinces were blocked by local provincial governors. For example, HRW (1999:81) states that in 1997, the then governor of Huila province, Kundy Paihama, prevented the sale of *Agora*, *Folha 8*, and *Comércio Actualidade*, all regarded as critical of the government.

⁸ Journalists interviewed in Luanda, suggested average print runs of 3-5,000 copies per edition.

Five private radio stations exist in Angola, two of which broadcast from Luanda, *LAC*, and the CEAST owned *Rádio Ecclésia*. The other three are *Rádio Morena* in Benguela, *Rádio 2000* in Lubango, and *Rádio Comercial* in Cabinda. These three and *LAC* began broadcasting in 1992 and their major shareholders have strong MPLA links (HRW 1999:83). *LAC* was initially quite radical and controversial but became less so. Both *Rádio Ecclésia* and *LAC* programming involves a mix of news, music, discussion and debate. *Rádio Ecclésia* includes a significant proportion of religious broadcasting, particularly on Sundays. Its news content is regarded as more objective than that of government institutions and generally to be trusted (HRW 1999:83).⁹ Overall however, listeners tend to be generally sceptical of news programmes, and frequently contrast information from various sources in order to reach their own conclusion.¹⁰

Rádio Ecclésia, established in 1955, was closed by the Angolan government in 1977. It resumed broadcasting in 1997 and has become the most influential and prominent of the private media institutions. On a number of occasions it has been in conflict with the Angolan government regarding its broadcasting, a point I examine later. In public sphere terms, because of the pre-independence origins of private media institutions such as *Rádio Ecclésia*, *Angolense*, and *O Independente*, their contemporary development represents the reemergence of a ‘public’ within the public sphere, in Fraser’s (1992) sense, outlined in chapter two. This reemergence was a significant development during the 1990s, although its influence was confined primarily to Luanda. Even though state media material belongs outside the public sphere, some of its content will be included in later sections of this chapter because of its relevance and the general importance of state institutions within the media nationally.

The following are Angola’s principal media institutions:

State media.	Jornal de Angola; RNA; TPA.
UNITA.	Vorgan, Terra Angolana.
Private print media.	Actual, Agora, Angolense, Folha 8, O Independente.
Private broadcast media.	LAC, Rádio Ecclésia.

⁹ This view came across strongly in interviews. Manuel Quintino, director of NGO OIKOS, interviewed in Luanda, August 9 2000; José Alberto Noé of CICA, interviewed November 29 2001, in Luanda.

¹⁰ The *TPA* evening news is the most criticised in this regard and can be quite polemical. I have frequently watched with Angolans and have been intrigued by ‘their live commentaries’ on what was broadcast, revealing a capacity to critique and analyse public communication, rather than merely take the news broadcast at face value.

The research questions for this, the second of the five Angolan peace narratives, are as follows.

- What did the private media identify as causes of the Angolan conflict?
- How did the private media analyse the Bicesse and Lusaka peace agreements, and the role of international mediation?
- How was the Cabindan conflict analysed?
- How did the media evaluate the churches' role in the search for peace?
- What issues or themes did the media focus on in covering the conflict?
- How were the Angolan President and UNITA leader characterised?
- What role did the media play in the development of the Angolan public sphere?

By addressing these questions the chapter will outline the major elements of the peace narrative of the Angolan private media.

The chapter is structured as follows. Section one examines the Bicesse and Lusaka peace agreements. Section two looks at media commentary of international peace intervention in Angola. The third section deals with media coverage of church activity in favour of peace. Section four focuses on the Cabindan conflict. The fifth section explores revisionist writing on the 1975 transition to independence, and the May 1977 attempted coup. This writing highlights important issues and dynamics within the Angolan public sphere. The sixth section contrasts two pillars of the private media's portrayal of the conflict: the humanitarian crisis and political corruption. The seventh section examines coverage and characterisation of the Angolan President, José Eduardo dos Santos, and the UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi. Section eight explores issues in relation to the capacity of the private media to give coverage to the conflict. The final section highlights a number of public sphere issues.

Before setting out these sections, I address four media issues relevant to the chapter as whole. These relate to the use of cartoons; the importance of radio as a means of communication; allegations that elements within the private media were in receipt of finance from Jonas Savimbi to enhance his media image; and the government clampdown against the media from 1998, during the third war.

Firstly, the chapter includes a range of cartoons which provide an interesting perspective on Angolan perceptions of the conflict, highlighting a different form of

‘voice’ within the public sphere.¹¹ For many years until the mid-1990s, the *Jornal de Angola* frequently published the work of the cartoonist Lito Silva on its front page. The cartoon represented an ‘independent space’ within the newspaper’s overall structure, and expressed criticism of the Angolan government regarding corruption, press censorship, a lack of parliamentary debate, and of UNITA’s military campaign, before eventually being dropped. Many of the private print titles have introduced cartoons dealing with similar and other issues. A particular strength of cartoons is their communication through imagery, leaving one with a mental picture that can be more powerful than a written article. Individuals satirised or lampooned in cartoons are in an invidious position, likely to appear rather more foolish if they take exception to their depiction, because it was ‘only a cartoon’. Humour as entertainment is a strong component within cartoons, but Aulich (1992:85) also underlines the capacity of cartoons to educate. An appealing feature of Angolan cartoons is their ability to capture the humour of the Angolan people, which they have managed to retain despite the destruction and devastation caused by war. The cartoon also manages to transcend the dividing line between literate and non-literate worlds in a society where literacy levels are under 40%.¹² The importance of cartoons was underlined for me when I included them in human rights courses I taught in Angola. I was surprised at the level of recognition associated with cartoons, especially those of Lito Silva, given the low newspaper circulation figures in the provinces.

Secondly, radio is a very important medium for communication in Angola and plays a vital role in opinion formation, particularly in Luanda where individuals can choose between state and private stations. Radio performs a different function within the public sphere to the print media, being accessible to a much wider audience, and to those who cannot read or afford newspapers. Wilcox (1975:77) underlines the importance of radio by situating it within the arena of ‘oral tradition’, so vital in Angola and Africa generally. During fieldwork in Dundo and Luanda, I frequently noticed people listening to radio outside their homes or as they walked the street. Homes, the workplace, markets, and taxis, are all locations where Angolans tune in to radio. In 2001, *Rádio Ecclésia* introduced a weekly ‘review of the national papers’

¹¹ The cartoons used in this chapter were the basis for a lecture entitled ‘Cartoons as Commentary within the Angolan Conflict’ on March 14, 2003, part of ‘Portuguese Week’ at the University of Leeds.

¹² *Jornal de Angola*, October 30, 2000, quoting vice-Minister of Education and Culture Francisca de Espírito Santo, who gave a figure of over 60% illiteracy.

which gave radio listeners a taste of coverage within the newspapers. Broadcasting in national languages is another strength of radio, and extends its reach among local populations. The space radio provides for participation in the form of discussion, the airing of views, and the venting of anger, is radically different to what can be achieved in the print media in terms of immediacy. This ‘participative space’ has been an important feature in the type of broadcasting *Rádio Ecclésia* particularly sought to promote. Many of its programmes include the possibility of listeners telephoning to express an opinion or raise an issue. Frequently the station sent roving reporters on to the streets to solicit views, which brings radio as a medium closer to its audience. This form of broadcasting is an example of the formative as well as informative roles the media can play (Garnham 1992). *Rádio Ecclésia*’s Saturday morning two-hour debate was very important at this level,¹³ and perhaps because of programming of this nature, it was possible to detect a change in the language people used when talking about peace in Angola. Individuals could hear discussions taking place on radio which presented them with the arguments for and against the war, which helped them reach their own conclusions, and also to build on this argument as part of their own discourse. In this chapter I use both the print and broadcast media in highlighting the issues I raise. Some of these sections reveal a greater emphasis on private newspapers than radio, which reflects the fact that I have received the Angolan newspapers since 1999, whereas the possibility of securing radio material was limited to periods of fieldwork. As I have stated, however, I consider radio a more important medium for communication in Angola.

Thirdly, allegations emerged in 2001 suggesting that elements within the private media were benefitting monetarily from finance provided by Jonas Savimbi to improve his image. The allegations began to emerge in the *Jornal de Angola* from mid-2001 in articles by Alfonso Bunga, Paulina Frazão, Rui Tristão, and António Maceira, (names believed to be pseudonyms for an MPLA working group) and centred especially on *Folha 8*, particularly its editor William Tonet. They were not levelled against journalists in general. The allegations may well represent a campaign to discredit Tonet, who was quite outspoken in his criticism of the Angolan government. For example, an article in July 2001 asked, “Is it possible that Tonet is a person with a

¹³ *LAC* was the first to introduce the idea of live debates. National radio introduced debates in 2001.

double personality reflecting the duality of his political alignment". On November 21 2001, the *Jornal de Angola* wrote:

“William Tonet and his *Folha 8* tirelessly pursue the military campaign ... proposed to him some time ago: to try to convince us that Jonas Savimbi could be an unblemished politician ... dedicated to achieving peace”.¹⁴

The intrigue surrounding these allegations deepened when similar accusations were made within the private media itself. An article by Graça Campos, editor of *Angolense*, accused Tonet of extortion, blackmail, and of being employed by UNITA:

“William Tonet should certainly not ignore the fact that I know of many of the alliances, some self-defeating, which he formed to found *Folha 8*”.¹⁴ⁱⁱ

The allegations suggest the existence of ‘cheque-book’ or ‘brown-envelope’ journalism (Khan 1998:594) within Angola. It is because of such allegations that I have avoided the term ‘independent’ when referring to the ‘private’ media. ‘Private’ is a more neutral term, involving less of a value judgement than the designation ‘independent’.¹⁵ The point confirms the impression of two respected Angolan journalists who described the private print media as “a world of mystery, intrigue and secret alliances”,¹⁶ illustrating some of the complexities of the Angolan public sphere.

Finally, a brief comment on the Angolan public sphere itself, which I have already described as a polarised arena. With the outbreak of war in 1998, government became increasingly concerned with media war coverage, and a clampdown occurred against the private media in early 1999 (see HRW 1999:87-91; Amnesty International 2000; MISA 1999, on this government clampdown). Initially a blackout on military reporting was called for which state media institutions adhered to. A *Jornal de Angola* editorial in July 1999 suggested “that by reporting on the war, journalists were ‘facilitating’ the efforts of [UNITA] in its war against the government” (quoted in MISA 1999). The Minister of Communication, Hendrik Val Neto, threatened to ban certain publications that he regarded as a “column of Jonas Savimbi’s rebel movement”(quoted in MISA 1999). The private media was seen as jeopardising state security by publishing information on government troop movements and military developments.

¹⁴ *Angolense*, February 23-March 2, 2002, p.7.

¹⁵ Howen (2001:36) makes a similar point from a different perspective. For Howen, the business interests of MPLA members in the private media renders the term ‘independent’ somewhat problematic.

¹⁶ Interviews in Luanda, August 2000 & October 2001.

The clampdown lasted throughout 1999 and 2000, and brought pressure to bear on journalists. In September 1999 the Union of Angolan Journalists (*SJA Sindicato de Jornalistas Angolanos*) called for an end to police intimidation of journalists.¹⁷ On numerous occasions journalists were arrested and questioned by police (IRIN, August 26 1999; MISA 1999; IRIN, September 6 2000), and some journalists also had their homes searched by the police (MISA 1999). Government prevented *Rádio Ecclésia* from broadcasting its link-up with the Portuguese *Rádio Renascença* (MISA 1999), and VOA offices were attacked by armed men (MISA 2000). A number of journalists during the clampdown were assaulted by armed individuals (MISA 1999). It is important here to distinguish between attacks on media premises and journalists by armed elements, and specific government actions. All brought pressure to bear on journalists, but need to be differentiated. At one point fifteen journalists were barred from leaving the country, which had not occurred previously.¹⁸ A journalist in the province of Kwanza Norte, living in government accommodation was served an eviction notice for using his residence to report for private media (IRIN June 19 2000). The listing of the Angolan President in May 2000 on World Press Freedom Day, among the ‘ten worst enemies of the press’ by CPJ (the Committee to Protect Journalists) did little to lessen the tensions between the Angolan government and the private media (MISA 2000). This was later rescinded.

The private media coverage of troop movements during this time was quite limited, and the government clampdown was successful in eliminating what little existed. The clampdown generated however a range of writing that explored the meaning of ‘freedom of expression’, the limits of the media in wartime, and the link between a free press and a healthy democracy.¹⁹ Government sensitivities regarding war coverage were new in 1999, and were rather unusual given that prior to the Lusaka Protocol the state media frequently carried reports on military activity which were not seen as endangering state security. 1999 was different however, as for the first time the government was faced with a national non-state media reporting the war, which challenged its war strategy, and the clampdown reflects an attempt to reduce this challenge.

¹⁷ Agora, September 18 1999.

¹⁸ Agora, November 20 1999.

¹⁹ See for example, *Actual*, January 29 2000; *Folha 8*, 9 February 2000; *Folha 8*, March 25 2000; *Agora*, June 17 2000; *Actual*, 23 September 2000; *Actual*, 14 October 2000.

1. *The Bicesse & Lusaka Agreements.*

The Bicesse and Lusaka agreements have been set out in the previous two chapters. This section briefly comments on how the private media reported these agreements. I utilise the categories suggested by Onadipe and Lord (1998) of 'factual reporting' and 'evaluative analysis or opinion' in examining Bicesse and Lusaka. Both peace deals were invariably dealt with together reflecting the private media's emergence after the Lusaka Protocol. *LAC*, though broadcasting from 1992, had no archived material that I could access.²⁰

Factual reporting, as the phrase suggests, outlined the content and nature of the two agreements. The impression during fieldwork was that few Angolans had detailed knowledge of either agreement apart from a cease-fire between the government and UNITA, and the demobilisation and demilitarisation of UNITA.²¹ This was primarily due to poor dissemination of information by the Angolan government, UNITA and the UN. Both print and broadcast media did make some attempt to address this gap. For instance, *Folha 8* published four special supplements on the Lusaka Protocol in September & October 2001, also incorporating later developments on UN sanctions against UNITA and the Fowler report investigating sanctions violations. The educational intent of these articles was clear, but impact was limited to the narrow group who read these papers. Radio programming was more effective in promoting discussion on the two agreements, which I discuss below.

Evaluative reporting, which overlaps with factual reporting, frequently takes the form of editorial writing or opinion pieces where some assessment is offered. Media opinion on the peace agreements either argued that the Lusaka Protocol needed renegotiation, or that it could not be altered. The views of William Tonet and Aguiar dos Santos, editors of two of the leading private publications, *Folha 8* and *Agora* respectively, are relevant here. Both stressed the importance of the Lusaka Protocol for Angola but argued that the agreement should have been regarded as a basis for future discussion and negotiation. In 1999, Tonet wrote that Bicesse and Lusaka "privileged the

²⁰ Interview with Louisa Fonsoni, director of *LAC*, Luanda, December 10 2001.

²¹ This was clear during the Dundo workshop (October 2001) and in many interviews where I asked about what both agreements involved.

ideological interests of the largest political parties” to the detriment of other groups in Angola.²²ⁱⁱⁱ A month before Jonas Savimbi’s death, Tonet argued that Lusaka failed:

“by not prioritising authentic national reconciliation. ... failed by rejecting the participation of other actors: [such as] disarmed political parties, churches, civil society and traditional authority. ... the Protocol never had programmes or schedules [or] concrete gestures with a psychosocial impact, capable of mentally disarming the belligerents, and infusing them with a new spirit and understanding of harmony”.^{23iv}

Aguiar dos Santos, writing in June 2001, pointed to the exclusion of key segments of Angolan society as a key failure in the agreements, a view also expressed in the previous chapter:

“The experience of these seven years of ... the Lusaka Protocol, has shown that the bipolarised nature of ‘negotiations’ [has only produced], a reductive simplistic vision of how to achieve ... national reconciliation. The logic of compromise ... underlying the Accords, did not provide the minimum possibility for cohabitation between the signatories, much more concerned in not allowing any space for involvement of other segments of society, potential pacifiers of decades of hatred, repression and distrust”.^{24v}




Fig 1: Front page of *Angolense* from April 6, 2003. *Angolense* on April 6-13, 2002,²⁵ printed the title ‘Excluded Once More’, and carried the following statement:

This view on the exclusion of Angolan actors from the peace negotiations carries the suggestion that ‘inclusion’ could have made a difference. The views of these editors differ from those of the state-run media outlined in the previous chapter, where government comment on the Pro Pace Congress was highlighted. For *Angolense*, the history of exclusion continued during the Luena Accords, negotiated between military personnel from FAA and UNITA. The front page of

²² *Folha 8*, September 1 1999, p.2.

²³ *Folha 8*, January 26 2002.

²⁴ *Agora*, June 2 2001.

²⁵ The system employed by *Angolense* to date a newspaper differs from the other newspapers. As can be seen here *Angolense* lists the week of publication, others papers list the Saturday of publication.

“This space should have been filled with the photo, which *Angolense* hoped to take at the formal signing ceremony of the cease-fire agreement signed on Wednesday, April 4, in Luanda. As once again we were excluded from an activity, to which various personalities and foreign journalists were invited, *Angolense* decided not to seek a photograph for this space. With this, (*Angolense*) expresses its total repudiation of all practices of exclusion”.^{vi}

The statement shows the depth of feeling around the issue of exclusion.

A *Rádio Ecclésia* morning phone-in programme on November 21 2001 revealed how opinion on the validity of Lusaka was far from unanimous. Most callers suggested that Lusaka needed amending to incorporate the increased possibilities for peace that inclusion of the churches and elements from civil society could have offered. One caller succinctly voiced this majority opinion:

“Lusaka is valid, but it is not sufficient because it is only between the two sides. We need to open a window for civil society and religion to see if they can find the key [to a solution]”.^{vii}

One who disagreed argued that the full implementation of the Protocol was required, not further negotiation:

“Savimbi was the one to violate Lusaka. What is there to negotiate at the moment? The country is not a football. We need Savimbi to declare a unilateral cease-fire and disarm his troops”.^{viii}

While most callers saw Jonas Savimbi as the reason for the war, some also suggested that the behaviour of the Angolan government was a reason for the Protocol’s failure, pointing to how the extension of state administration was conducted:

“[Lusaka] failed in the implementation of state administration. It was disastrous. I saw people fleeing the administration of the state because they were being hunted down by the state, and they took refuge in Bailundo. Reconciliation failed, the blame lies with the government for not coming close to the people”.^{ix}

This last statement is quite important in the overall context. Howen (2001:25) points to the suffering inflicted on ‘ordinary villagers’ by “abusive police and officials sent by the government to assert state authority”, and how this failure of governance had a destabilising and negative impact on the peace process.

Whether the Lusaka Protocol should have been renegotiated was a crucial question after 1998. Opposing views clearly existed, illustrating that opinion within the public sphere was not unanimous. I conclude this section with a quotation from the university lecturer and political commentator Justino Pinto de Andrade, who expressed the view

in a newspaper article that there had been no true peace process at all in Angola. He stated:

“I believe there have not been true peace processes. Mechanisms were put in place to accommodate personalities, yes, based on an understanding that what motivates people is purely and simply material ambition, ambitions for power”.^{26x}

His view is among the most radical expressed in relation to the Angolan peace processes, that the Bicesse and Lusaka agreements were mechanisms to ‘accommodate’ personalities seeking power, above all that of Jonas Savimbi.

2. *International Intervention.*

Assessment by the media of the role of the UN, the Troika of observer nations (Portugal, the US and Russia), and of the international community was rather negative. Significant suspicion surrounded the reason for international involvement, centring on a belief that intervention to promote peace was secondary to defending economic interests. Filomeno Vieira Lopes, a prominent FpD (Frente para Democracia, Democratic Front) opposition politician, expressed this suspicion in *Agora* in 2000:

“The international community in general, ‘seemingly’ did not understand the depth of the peace process and invested everything in the formal results of elections, and has now ceased to have a relevant role in the search for peace. (It does not understand the social movement dimension for peace, confining itself to the role of mere manager of sanctions, and at the same time deepening its military relations with the regime). It is only concerned with strengthening economic co-operation, the consequences of which for the Angolan people are clearly dubious”.^{27xi}

The comment suggests a lack of understanding within the international community regarding what was required for peace in Angola, indicating that the main international priority was the strengthening of economic interests. This view emerges again quite strongly in chapter seven on traditional authorities.

Two cartoons from the *Jornal de Angola* around 1992-1993 suggest how the UN was perceived at the time. Both deal with the UN’s inability to ‘see’ what was happening in Angola. For example, the deployment of a space telescope or the use of binoculars (figs. 2 & 3 overleaf) by the UN were not particularly helpful when the requirement

²⁶ *Folha 8*, November 18 2000, p.11.

²⁷ *Agora*, January 13 2000, p.9.




Fig. 2. Jornal de Angola (1993). UN binoculars.




Fig. 3. Jornal de Angola (1993) UN Telescope.

was to see events on the ground. The comment made by the bandaged Angolan in fig. 3 reads: “it seems that the defect is from the factory”.

With reference to the TROIKA, Justino Pinto de Andrade mentioned earlier, was particularly critical in a newspaper article of Russia’s mediation role because of its involvement in arms sales to Angola in 1995 and 1998. He also questioned Portugal’s role, as military contracts for the air force had been signed between Portugal and the Angolan government in 1996, during the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.²⁸ For many commentators, military involvement with the Angolan state by members of the Troika invalidated their observer role, and indirectly involved them in the conflict. For Simão Catete, the youngest presidential candidate in the 1992 elections:

“The Troika of observers has long since ceased to contribute positively to the ending of the war... The problem is that the countries which make up the Troika have interests which lead them to place great importance on a very narrow relationship with the government, [while remaining] silent on dramatic situations which arise from the duration of the conflict, or [ignoring] other proposals or contributions which have emerged, namely the suggestions from civil society and opposition parties. ...For the Troika, only the positions of the government are of interest or counts when taking a stance. In this way, it contributes little towards peace and harmony among Angolans”.^{29xii}

²⁸ *Angolense*, February 23-March 2 2002.

²⁹ *Folha 8*, December 8 2001, pp.12-13.

A sense of disillusionment with the international community became more pronounced through the 1990s in terms of its role in facilitating peace.

Ten years or so after the Troika's inception many Angolan commentators no longer considered it credible, advocating that it be disbanded or reconstituted. The logic behind the formation of the Troika was relatively clear prior to Bicesse as both the MPLA and UNITA had their former sponsors, the Soviet Union and US respectively, within the mediating mechanism, with Portugal acting as a broker and mediator. When the US formally recognised the new Angolan government in 1994, the logic of the Troika altered and UNITA no longer had support within the mechanism. The journalist Joaquim Cabanje, reporting on a conference entitled 'The Role of the International Community and of Civil Society in the Resolution of the Angolan Conflict',³⁰ held days before Savimbi's death, highlighted calls to reformulate the composition of the Troika in order to guarantee greater impartiality and inclusion of Angolan civil society. None of the three Troika countries were regarded as neutral and were accused of using their positions to pursue business interests in Angola. Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark or Holland were suggested as possible candidates to replace the original Troika nations. Chapter seven will explore this criticism further.

The Angolan government's opinion on international intervention varied from positive appraisal to frustration and condemnation. In January 2002, the Angolan president spoke positively of international involvement, particularly in implementing UN sanctions against UNITA.³¹ Previously, government comment in late December 1998 by contrast, was highly critical of the UN for allowing UNITA to rearm a second time, while the UN kept watch:

'The Government finds it hard to understand how thousands of United Nations observers stationed in Angola within the framework of Unavem II and Monua never perceived that fact, especially when, earlier this year, they endorsed UNITA's formal statement [that] it had completely disarmed and demilitarised its forces'(quoted in Munslow 1999:566).

The examples illustrate a rather mixed appraisal of international intervention by the Angolan government, an appraisal that is more negative in civil society circles.

³⁰ Luanda February 20 2002, sponsored by Open Society. *Folha 8*, February 23 2002, p.7.

³¹ *Jornal de Angola*, January 12 2002, p.5.

3. *Coverage of the Churches.*

This brief section outlines private media coverage of the churches' peace engagement. I do not examine coverage given by *Rádio Ecclésia* because it is church owned, however, it is important to recognise that *Rádio Ecclésia* gives a significant amount of air-time to news from the other churches, not simply the Catholic Church. In interviews with members of CICA,³² it was clear that many churches felt they enjoyed good access to *Rádio Ecclésia* and supported its work.

The private print media was supportive of the Churches' advocacy for peace, giving extensive coverage to COIEPA activities, the *Pro Pace* Congress, church statements and pastoral letters, events organised by individual churches, and interviews with religious personnel. Little criticism of the churches is advanced within the private media unlike the state-run media, as seen in the previous chapter. As Leopoldo Baio editor of *Actual*, made clear in an interview, this lack of criticism was intentional. He argued that his publication wished to focus on the 'real issues' of Angola, the greatest of which was the need for peace and therefore actively supported those seeking peace through dialogue or negotiation.³³ In his opinion, other issues could wait until this national challenge had been achieved.

A particularly clear example of this support is evident from an editorial in *Actual* of June 17 2000, written in support of a CEAST pastoral letter:

"In the name of Angolans, the church has once again expressed a desire for the peace Angola needs. Challenging the voice of a powerful minority in the country, who advocate 'war to end war', the religious [have enabled] the voice of reason be heard. ... Recently criticised by those holding power, the religious are clearly opening up space in order to make themselves heard in Angolan society. ... The recent church pronouncements refute the discourses coming from overseas, which reveal a lack of interest and/or knowledge of the Angolan reality, supporting as they do, the military option as the only means for peace between Angolans. The blessing of Washington and others for example, especially those exploiting the principal natural resources of Angola, show how [little] interest they have in ending hostilities in the country. Everything indicates how the little interest they have in the life of Angolans. ... In this context the option chosen by the churches - peace through talks, is in our opinion the most realistic. ... Therefore great applause for the church".^{xiii}

³² November 21, 2001, Luanda.

³³ Interview, Leopoldo Baio, Luanda, November 19 2001.

We see here support and encouragement offered to the churches, contrasted in this case with negative appraisal of foreign intervention in the Angolan conflict.

Important questions arise here however, around this support for the churches. For example, did this supportive stance actually serve the best interests of Angola in relation to peace? Would a critical approach have been more appropriate? Perhaps the churches needed questioning about their lack of unity, and how this impacted on peace? A critique (evaluative analysis) of statements and pastoral letters from the churches could possibly have been more helpful than the largely 'factual' reporting, and perhaps succeeded in bringing the churches closer together in the search for peace.

4. *Cabinda.*

Since the death of Jonas Savimbi, the Cabindan conflict has received a great deal of attention in the media. In this section, I briefly address this conflict because of its importance as the 'second' of the two state conflicts fought against the Angolan government, but I do so primarily with reference to material prior to Jonas Savimbi's death. Some background material was outlined in chapter one on the rebel movement FLEC, excluded from the Alvor Accords and fighting for independence since 1975.

Media articles trace the origins of the Cabindan conflict to the 1885 Berlin Conference, when Africa was partitioned between the European powers. To ensure access to the Atlantic Ocean, the Conference gave the former Belgian Congo a strip of land along the river Congo, physically separating Cabinda from Angola. Though Portugal contested the division, it was forced to accept it when the Congo river was later internationalised.³⁴ Until 1933, Cabinda remained a Portuguese protectorate, at which point it was incorporated as one of Angola's districts.³⁵ Cabindan protests were evident from 1956 when the Portuguese government transferred the administration of the province to Luanda.³⁶ The military conflict has been on a lesser scale to that of UNITA's, explaining why it has received much less attention. As mentioned in chapter one, neither the Bicesse nor Lusaka agreements addressed the conflict in Cabinda, confining themselves to issues between the Angolan government and UNITA. The

³⁴ *Folha 8*, September, 21 2001, p.8.

³⁵ *Agora*, September 21 2001, p.9.

³⁶ *Folha 8*, May 24 2000, p.13.

1992 elections were extensively boycotted in the province, with only 5000 votes cast for the election of five parliamentary deputies.³⁷ The reason for the boycott was that electoral participation would have given consent to the *status quo*, would have confirmed the identity of those in the province as ‘Angolan’, when they regarded themselves as ‘Cabindan’.

A range of voices are heard on the Cabindan conflict in the media, such as those of the various FLEC factions and traditional authorities. Prior to the death of Jonas Savimbi, the most vocal were those of local church figures who favoured independence for the province. Full independence is the most radical of the calls made, with others arguing for some degree of autonomy, perhaps within a federalist solution.³⁸ This would guarantee greater local authority and administration of the wealth of the province, which contributes over 60% of Angolan oil exports (Hewitt 2003:122). Appeals have been made by church personnel for a referendum on the question of independence, confident that the vote would be carried in favour of local sovereignty.³⁹ A suggestion in 2002 by the leader of the FLEC-FAC faction, that the local Catholic bishop mediate in the Cabindan conflict, was discounted as unnecessary by the MPLA secretary-general, João Lourenço.⁴⁰ Cabinda remains unfinished business.

5. *Historical revision.*

A crucial component of the private media’s peace narrative has been to revisit and re-examine key moments or periods in Angolan history. This section looks at two such historical moments: the transition to independence, and the attempted coup of May 1977. Both of these events have particular importance when analysed from a public sphere perspective, as they impacted on the ability of Angolans to pursue peace, on the space Angolans had to organise in defence of their interests, and the space to freely express their opinions. While these events have important spatial implications, it has been suggested, as we will see, that the long-term process of national reconciliation in Angola requires that these events be addressed in some way. In Angola, as Kapuscinski (1987:34) noted, “the past takes up more space than the future”. Different

³⁷ David Kramer at British-Angola Conference, London, November 13 2002.

³⁸ *Folha 8* interview with Fr. Jorge Congo, January 21 2001, p.14.

³⁹ *Agora*, December, 21 2002, p.12.

⁴⁰ *Agora*, September, 21 2001, p.9.

constituencies attribute varying degrees of importance to these two events. The need to examine the transition to independence is higher on the agenda of UNITA and the FNLA, than of the MPLA. The importance of the coup attempt is greater for certain groups within the MPLA, and political parties such as the PRD (*Partido Renovador Democrática*, Democratic Renewal Party), the first political party founded after the multiparty reforms in 1991,⁴¹ than for UNITA and the FNLA.

5.1. *Transition to independence.*

The anniversary each year of Angolan independence, November 11, has generated writing and radio commentary exploring the 1975 transition to independence, which resulted in armed conflict between the three nationalist parties.⁴² Prior to independence a transitional government had been created, involving the three nationalist parties and the Portuguese administration, and a question posed in the media asks, ‘was war inevitable’? Was a peaceful resolution of the issues dividing the Angolan parties not possible then? Unsurprisingly perhaps, contradictory responses emerge.

Firstly, Jerónimo Wanga of UNITA, the Minister of Education and Culture in the transitional government stated:

“In 1975 the major political forces in the country, FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA, had not exhausted the possibilities of coming to an understanding. What happened was that military logic and the desire to eliminate the other at all costs, were stronger in each of the parties. The proof of this was the introduction of foreign troops, already visible in April and May 1975, well before November 11”^{43xiv}.

The foreign troops in question were Cubans arriving in Luanda to support the MPLA, the South African army marching on Luanda from the south with UNITA soldiers, and Zairean troops supporting the FNLA from the north. By contrast, Beto Van-Dunem of the MPLA, argued that a peaceful transition was impossible:

“ideologically UNITA and the FNLA were not at the same level as the MPLA, not at one with it. The MPLA was a movement which fought for the Angolan people, the other two movements fought for power. Therefore, there was absolutely no possibility of cohabitation”^{44xv}.

⁴¹ Among the first PRD acts was a visit to a mass grave of victims of the coup attempt, where allegedly 1,500-2,000 people have been buried. Interview with Silva Mateus and José Fragoso, president and vice-president of the *Fundação 27 de Maio* (May 27th Foundation), Luanda, December 2001.

⁴² Mateus *et al* (2000) is an interesting collection of opinion on Angola’s 25 years of independence containing a wide range of views from within civil society.

⁴³ *Angolense*, November 11-18 2000, pp. 12-13.

⁴⁴ *Angolense*, November 11-18 2000, p.8.

Such a view is rather contentious, but is critiqued later in this section.

The journalist Fonseca Bengui voiced a popular sense of confusion in 2000, in relation to events as the Portuguese were departing:

“Nobody really knows what happened. Everyone blames the war, but ‘why war’? ... The MPLA wanted all power for itself, because it represented the urban intellectuals, but the FNLA [also] wanted power for itself, because the true hopes of the oppressed people resided within it. If that wasn’t enough, Savimbi came along later forming UNITA, bringing together the peoples from the south. These movements never got on from the beginning, each had their own way of seeing Angola, each imagined their own type of independence. ... Sometimes the rebels talk of ‘root causes’ which one supposes are the same causes that led to the formation [of each party]”.^{45xvi}

A caller to a *Rádio Ecclésia* debate spoke for many when stating:

“conditions for dialogue existed, but unfortunately war was the preferred option. ... I often ask myself why those nationalists who did everything to achieve independence, hardly do anything now to achieve peace?”

The caller voiced a sense of disillusionment palpable among Angolans regarding their leaders, with the relentless pursuit of war as the means to achieve political objectives, coupled with a reluctance to negotiate and implement a lasting agreement.

Van-Dunem’s comment that the MPLA was somehow different to the other parties is contradicted by Vincente Pinto de Andrade, also of the MPLA and a possible presidential candidate in the next elections. In November 2001, de Andrade argued that none of the three movements were willing to settle for anything less than absolute power, and suggests that a peaceful transition was highly improbable. He argued that no movement understood what it meant to ‘liberate’ Angola or to promote freedom, in the sense of “granting political, civic, economic, social rights”. He added:

“[After the creation of a one party system], political exclusion, the denial of others, and political intolerance had fertile ground to grow. It was the MPLA who did this by proclaiming independence, but the other two liberation movements would have done exactly the same, because the logic, at the time of independence, of these three movements was the seizure of political power and the exercise of this power alone, solitarily. Their idea was not to share political power, it was not to respect the spirit of the Alvor Accords”.^{46xvii}

It is a rather damning indictment de Andrade offers of the three independence movements.

⁴⁵ *Actual*, November 11 2000, p.7.

⁴⁶ *Rádio Ecclésia* debate, November 10 2001.

The views of Holden Roberto, president of the FNLA at the time of independence, are worth considering.⁴⁷ Roberto was particularly critical of the role played by Portugal during this crucial time, arguing that it failed to implement the Alvor Accords.

“It was Portugal that violated the Alvor Accords by permitting the entry of foreign forces. The colonial power should not have permitted the MPLA to take power. As a co-signatory to the Accords, Portugal should have put in place a process to bring the three movements together and put the process back on track. ... This is the basis of everything. This violation caused all the trouble we are living with today. Portugal should assume this responsibility, because the difficulties began in Alvor”.^{48xviii}

Ngola Kabangu, also of the FNLA and Minister of the Interior in the transitional government,⁴⁹ blames Portugal for having been partial to the MPLA in the transition process. He argued that when conflict broke out, the Portuguese administration

“which constituted the nucleus of this [transitional] government, openly supported the MPLA for ideological reasons, [and] didn’t know how to carry out the process of decolonisation in Angola”.^{50xix}

There can be little doubt that Portugal’s withdrawal from Africa, a process of abandonment rather than decolonisation, created immense problems for its former colonies. However, suggesting that Portugal was responsible for everything that went wrong in 1975, as Roberto and Kabangu do, is surely misplaced, failing to attribute any culpability to the nationalist parties themselves.

Before concluding this piece on the transition to independence, I propose to highlight reflection which emerged around Independence Day from 1999 to 2001. When commemorating the 25th anniversary of independence in 2000, *Folha 8* saw no cause for celebration and printed a stark front cover under the heading ‘Black November’, presenting a single candle flame against a black background. The following year the paper carried a photograph of President dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi beside the caption: ‘Different but Equal in the Culture of War.’ Tonet’s editorial expressed anger that a cease-fire had not been called during the president’s 2001 Independence Day speech, as many had expected. Bishop Zacarias Kamwenho had been awarded the Zakarov prize by the European Union some weeks previously, an award that had

⁴⁷ Holden Roberto lived for many years in France after independence, returning briefly after the Bicesse Accords to contest the 1992 Presidential elections, arriving too late to mount a viable electoral campaign. After some further years in France he returned to Angola in the late 1990s. (Summary from *Angolense* 11-18 November 2000, p.6.). His views appear occasionally in the private media.

⁴⁸ *Folha 8*, November 10 2000, pp.7-8.

⁴⁹ *O Independente*, November 11 2000, p.13.

⁵⁰ *Angolense*, November 11-18 2000, p.10-11.

furthered expectation that a cease-fire announcement would be the government's response. Tonet wrote:

“to declare peace is not a concession to Savimbi, [it is] not even done because of him, but is a response to the cries of millions of Angolans who have died ingloriously all these years”.^{51xx}

The President's speech signalled no change in government policy, where he clearly outlined his vision of how the war would end: Jonas Savimbi would either surrender, be captured or killed in combat.

The *Rádio Ecclésia* news of November 12, 2001 carried a report by the journalist Laurinda Tavares, evaluating the President's speeches from 1999-2001, which provides an interesting perspective of the legacy of 26 years of conflict. She stated:

“The future begins now, Angolans can begin to dream, and the future has already begun. These are the main points of the President's speeches on the occasion of the last three anniversaries of independence, speeches which create within the population expectations that the war is at an end, and the country journeys safely towards normality. Observers comment that yesterday's speech brought nothing new, once again the President invoked the war as the worst of all evils, thereby justifying so many mistakes of government during these 26 years of Angolan independence.... Yesterday, José Eduardo dos Santos stated he was not open to negotiate with Jonas Savimbi, considering him a chronic liar. He pointed out that only a miracle could save UNITA from defeat. In 1999 after the fall of Andulo to government troops, the presidential speech carried the same victorious tone. After 25 years of independence José Eduardo dos Santos once again said the war was ending... Some people continue to believe that such a satisfactory date will come soon, others argue that only with dialogue between the government and UNITA can there be peace. The fear is justified by the fact that after so many victories claimed by the FAA, it has not been possible to end the war. ... Hunger, illness and misery continue to be the reality for the majority of Angolans. For many Angolans the future has not yet begun”.^{xxi}

Quite clearly, individuals had grown tired of hearing that the war was ending, while all the time their lives became more miserable.

The private media was an important location where independence related issues were aired, where some of the political parties involved sought to put forward their perspectives on what happened. UNITA and the FNLA are particularly interested in seeing these issues debated publicly, as part of the process of understanding what set Angola on the path to war, over quarter of a century previously.

⁵¹ *Folha 8*, November 17 2001, p.3.

5.2. *The attempted coup of 1977.*

The attempted coup of May 27 1977, known as *27 de Maio*, is regarded as an ‘open wound’ in the psyche of Angolans. While the details of the coup attempt are important, my primary concern here is to examine its consequences for Angolan society, for the Angolan public sphere, and the ability of Angolans to promote peace. As Maier (1996:35) reminds us:

“[f]ew Angolans have forgotten the massive killing spree that gripped Luanda after Nito Alves ... attempted to seize power in 1977”.

In a fieldwork interview, a *Rádio Ecclésia* journalist commented that the consequences of the events symbolised by this date, explain why many Angolans assumed a posture of silence, withdrawing from what could be interpreted as ‘political space’.⁵² I explore the background to this observation.

The coup attempt led by Nito Álvés, a member of Neto’s cabinet, was quickly put down by forces loyal to President Neto with the help of Cuban troops (Birmingham 1998:9), and appears to have been quite poorly organised. Álvés was eventually caught and executed with many of his supporters. The exact number of those killed is unknown. One government source is quoted as saying that about 200 people were killed,⁵³ while the *Fundação 27 de Maio* (May 27th Foundation) claims that the figure is between 40,000 and 82,000 people.⁵⁴ The Foundation interprets *27 de Maio*, not as a single date, but as the period of time from May 27 1977, to the ‘*Carnival de Vitória*’ (Victory Carnival) on March 27 1979. That the attempted coup continues to cast a shadow into present-day Angola is clear from the following comment from a 2001 *Rádio Ecclésia* debate on *27 de Maio*:

“To speak of *27 de Maio 1977* is, even today, extremely delicate and even dangerous in this country. To hold an open debate on this issue is not easy, as many wounds are still open. ... We [Angolans] are accused of being passive and fearful, despondent and introverted, silent and unaware of our situation, phlegmatic or even apathetic, in part because of the consequences of this sad day”.^{55xxii}

⁵² Interview, Luanda, November 8 2001.

⁵³ *Angolense*, 11-18 November 2000, p.9 quotes Iko Carreira’s estimate of 200 dead.

⁵⁴ Founded September 26 2001. Interview with Silva Mateus and José Fragoso, Luanda, December 4 2001.

⁵⁵ *Rádio Ecclésia* debate, November 10 2001.

Some of the trauma associated with this date relates to the arbitrary nature of executions conducted, the use of torture, and the non-return of bodies to families for burial.⁵⁶ For others the trauma relates to the MPLA executing its own people, many of whom had fought for independence. It was clear during fieldwork that this history remained 'live' in the psyche of Angolans, and that the private media had begun to facilitate examination of this 'wound' within the public sphere. An interesting contribution here was made by *Folha 8* which initiated a serialisation of an unedited version of a book by Nito Álvés entitled '*13 Teses em Minha Defesa*', '13 Theses in My Defense', dated February 11, 1977. *Folha 8* described its serialisation of these extracts, which continued from May 4 to December 21 2002, as a "Folha 8 contribution to Angolan history".⁵⁷

Silva Mateus and José Fragoso, president and vice-president respectively of *Fundação 27 de Maio*, have suggested that the continuation of the war with UNITA was in part, a pretext by those in power to avoid dealing with unaddressed internal MPLA issues related to the attempted coup. Their suggestion was that the MPLA was able to remain cohesive because the war provided it with an external focus.⁵⁸ They went so far as to argue that the issues requiring reconciliation within the MPLA, were on a greater scale than those between the MPLA and UNITA. These are very strong claims to make, but with Jonas Savimbi no longer a factor in the equation, and the basis for lasting peace apparently improving, it will be interesting to see what happens within the MPLA regarding these historical issues. One of the few MPLA statements regarding *27 de Maio* was made 25 years after the coup attempt when its 'Political Bureau' stated that it had 'negatively marked' Angolan history, without outlining any further detail.

From the perspective of the public sphere, *27 de Maio* is fundamental with regard to understanding Angolans' fear to engage in public sphere discourse, and explains why Angolans have chosen a self-imposed silence. The terror waged by UNITA is also

⁵⁶ While Cuban troops were credited with acting swiftly to put down the coup attempt, there has been a growing emphasis within the private media on their role in organising the purge that followed, in torturing and executing the victims of *27 de Maio*. See for example *Agora* March 29 2003, article entitled '*Tropas Cubanas Exterminaram em Massa*', Cuban Troops Exterminated en Mass'. This role has yet to be fully explored.

⁵⁷ From *Folha 8*, December 21 2002.

⁵⁸ Interview, Luanda, December 2001.

important, but *27 de Maio* has exercised Angolan commentators in quite a different way. The point is made by Campos Neto, a caller to the *Rádio Ecclésia* debate:

“The whole of our society has been conditioned by *27 de Maio*. ... Those who replaced Neto did nothing to change things; on the contrary, they took advantage of the fear and continue to take advantage of the fear imposed on the population, while misgoverning the nation. It is necessary to take the next step. One must speak of *27 de Maio* in order to demystify it, so that we can begin to build a new society based on law and order, if not we will continue to be prisoners of *27 de Maio*”.^{59xxiii}

The terror created by *27 de Maio* has shaped the Angolan people’s ability to publicly engage in critical discourse, including peace discourse, simply because they felt unsafe to do so.

Just how deep the fear associated with *27 de Maio* is, can be deduced from analysis of a demonstration in 2000 organised by the political party, PADPA (*Partido de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento e Progresso de Angola*, Party of Support to Angolan Development and Progress), to protest at a 1600% fuel price rise. The party leader Carlos Leitão used *27 de Maio* as the framework within which the significance of the demonstration was interpreted:

“It is true there exists among the population a certain reluctance to participate in demonstrations, afraid perhaps of what happened during *27 de Maio*”.^{60xxiv}

An article by Wilson Dáda suggested something very important happened through the realisation of this demonstration. The article entitled ‘They have Defeated the Barrier of Strategic Fear’⁶¹ included the statement:

“this barrier has its historical roots immersed in the bloody repression which happened in 1977 and subsequent years”.^{xxv}

For Leopoldo Baio, the editor of *Actual*, this and a subsequent demonstration soon afterwards were the first protest marches in Angola since May 1977,⁶² illustrating the ‘psychological’ constraints imposed on the public sphere by *27 de Maio*.

A key issue here is that the space associated with the Angolan public sphere cannot be conceived of as a neutral space. It has its own specific traumatic history which strongly

⁵⁹ *Rádio Ecclésia* debate, November 10 2001.

⁶⁰ *Folha 8*, March 4 2000, pp. 5-6.

⁶¹ *Folha 8*, February 26 2000, p.11, ‘Venceram a barreira do medo estratégico.’

⁶² *Actual*, March 18 2000, pp. 3-4.

influences Angolans' ability to organise and speak publicly, foundational rights of Habermas's public sphere.⁶³ Munslow (1999:560-561) makes the important comment:

“One has to revisit [Angolan] history to understand the limited space that exists for civil society to flourish in Angola. Under colonial rule independent African organisations were suppressed. ... Within the ranks of the MPLA, the Nito Alves coup attempt of May 1977 had enormous ramifications for constraining the potential future growth of civil society in Angola”.

With the exception of the Angolan churches, who continued to engage in public discourse, the Angolan public sphere was in effect closed down by *27 de Maio*. It must be understood that the private media (and civil society) organisations are emerging from within this space.

In the *Rádio Ecclésia* debate above, Vincente Pinto de Andrade suggested three ways to move forward in relation to *27 de Maio*. Firstly, one could follow a judicial process similar to the Nuremberg trials, a method he opposed on the grounds that too many people were involved. Secondly, forget about the past and move on, which de Andrade argued was an impossibility given the emotion attached to the issue. Thirdly, hold some form of truth and reconciliation commission along the lines of that held in South Africa, which was his preference. As noted, prior to the death of Jonas Savimbi, calls for a South African style truth and reconciliation commission in Angola, were in relation to *27 de Maio*, not in relation to UNITA years of brutality. As CIIR (1999a:1) noted in relation to Angola, “there appears to be no desire at government level to confront the past, and strong government resistance to investigations or calls for them”.

27 de Maio has had long lasting repercussions within Angolan society generally, transforming the public sphere into a fearful place where self-imposed silence was preferred to speech. Furthermore those who did speak were more likely to do so in a representative rather than an individual capacity, hence the importance of the corrective I suggested to Habermas's definition in chapter two. Habermas's work on the public sphere does not address issues of fear and trauma, which curtail the ability of an individual or a group to assert their rights of association and expression. Nor does he address historical legacies which give the public sphere its specificity in each

⁶³ Minter (1996:114) locates the trauma of Angolans and their “fear to speak out and participate” in violence that followed the 1992 elections. This research argues that the 1992 violence reinforced the trauma from *27 de Maio*.

context, and that a nation may have to face as part of building peace and national reconciliation. Clearly within the Angolan private media, the manner in which the transition to independence occurred and the attempted coup of May 1977 are two issues still demanding attention.

6. *Contrasting Images of the Conflict.*

Two quite contrasting images emerge in the media's coverage of the Angolan conflict: one illustrating how a majority of Angolans became impoverished, the other depicting how a minority became tremendously wealthy, in many cases through corruption.⁶⁴ By drawing largely on newspaper articles, I will outline these two contrasting realities, focusing firstly on the extent of the humanitarian crisis caused by war, and secondly on the levels of corruption and self-enrichment occurring in its shadows.

6.1. *Humanitarian crisis.*

Print media coverage given to the humanitarian crisis and to levels of corruption, share a similar reliance on international reporting of these issues. Foreign media coverage and the reports of international organisations such as MSF, OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), and UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), were significantly relied upon in outlining the humanitarian situation particularly after 1998. Some of the disturbing statistics for 2001, when Angola was classified 146 on the 'human development index' out of 162 countries, include the following:

- 75% of Angolans lived below the poverty line
- Angola was considered among the ten worst countries in which to be poor.⁶⁵
- 3.8 million Angolans were displaced, with 1.9m depending on food aid.
- Average life expectancy was 45 years.
- Highest child mortality rate in Africa.
- 62% of Angolan population were without access to clean drinking water.
- 56% had no sanitary facilities.
- 43% of population were undernourished.
- 8 doctors for every 100,000 people.
- 1 in every 500 Angolans is an amputee, nearly all landmine victims.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ As early as 1990 President dos Santos publicly acknowledged the seriousness of corruption in Angola, describing it as "the second most important problem of the state after the problem of war" (Fituni 1995:151).

⁶⁵ *Angolense* July 14-21, 2001, p2. *Agora*, October 27 2001, p.13.

⁶⁶ From *Agora*, December 8 2001, p6; *Folha 8*, December 8 2001 p.9.

Newspaper headings such as ‘The Extermination of the Angolan People’ (*Folha 8*, April 21 2001) and ‘Government indifferent to Suffering of the People’ (*Actual*, February 19 2000), drew attention to the seriousness of the plight faced by so many.

Newspaper and radio gave significant coverage to these statistics, using them to renew calls for a negotiated end to the war. While photographs of starving children were used to illustrate the humanitarian needs of the people, I propose to highlight how a number of cartoons created images of the crisis, some of which leave the reader ‘seeing more’ than a photograph, particularly as many have two tiers, offering a contrast. A sense of




Fig 4. Mozambican floods.



Fig. 5. Presidents dos Santos & Chiluba.

irony is presented in fig. 4 as the speaker, presumably a government official, calls for help for Mozambican flood victims in 2000, while ignoring the plight of fellow Angolans in Kuito, Caxito and Gabela (*Actual*, 15 April 2000). Fig 5. depicts Presidents Chiluba of Zambia and President dos Santos at the airport, with the Angolan president speaking of economic and social progress in Angola, while the second image shows two tattered figures, one foraging for food among the rubbish, the other beside a bag of ‘misery’ (*Actual*, March 25, 2000).

Fig. 6 (overleaf) (*Folha 8*, April 20, 2000) shows a man surrounded by skulls and bones shouting to another passing overhead on a cloud (suggestive of the Angolan flag). The man below calls out: “Hey! Oh holy saints (Santos)! Come here below and have a look at this s**t!” suggesting that President dos Santos needed to have a closer .



Fig. 6. Man on a cloud passing over Angola.




Fig 7. State finance for *Carnaval*, the poor suffer.

look at the misery of his people. Finally, fig. 7 (*Actual*, March 25, 2000) captures the perception that while little money was available to alleviate the suffering of the people, money was available for public street parties such as ‘*Carnaval*’.

As public discourse, cartoons have a strong visual impact, which goes beyond the ‘bubble’ comments cartoons frequently contain. Through depiction, they can subvert the official discourses of government and the powerful by representing a view from the ‘underside’, in a way statistics and well-argued articles do not.

6.2. Political Corruption.

Media coverage of the humanitarian crisis and of levels of political corruption served to question the legitimacy of the war. Taken together these images asked the question: ‘was the humanitarian crisis worth the price?’, and suggested that the logic behind the war was in fact to disguise processes of illicit self-enrichment, of political corruption. Filomeno Viera Lopes argued in 2001, that “war has become necessary [for those] involved in the primitive accumulation of capital” and the transfer of the nation’s wealth to “selected private hands”. Szeftel (1998) defines political corruption in the following way:

“Political corruption involves the abuse or misuse of public office, public roles, public duty or some public obligation, for purposes of private (personal, group or sectional) gain”.

The question of corruption in Angolan society received little or no ‘public scrutiny’ until the emergence of the private media. In this, the private media broke new ground,

and exposed the shady side of the war. On one level, media coverage of corruption merely confirmed what Angolans knew already through their informal communicative networks in markets and bars, and by means of stories relayed and retold by people travelling from different parts of Angola. In a Habermasian sense, the media brought to 'publicity' issues that previously had only been discussed in informal spaces, material that circulated as rumour or hearsay. In other words, we are dealing with content within the 'plebeian public sphere' becoming 'public' within the wider public sphere. Interestingly the way in which this happened was not by Angolan journalists engaging in investigative journalism and uncovering political corruption, but by publicising international reports on Angola such as those of Global Witness dealing with corruption.

A Global Witness report on Angola in 1998 focused on the role of conflict diamonds in providing UNITA with revenue to rearm. The publication of a second report in 1999 on the misuse of oil revenues to bankroll political elites, created quite a stir. When *Folha 8* and *Agora* attempted to publish material related to the second report, they found their articles censored by the printers, merely captionless photographs of oilrigs appearing on pages allocated to carry the story (MISA 1999). The censorship was possible because shareholders in the printers *Litotipo* are close to the Angolan president, though it must be pointed out that *Litotipo* has only rarely intervened in the publication of articles. Other examples to gain prominence included the trial in France in 2000 of Andre Tarallo of Elf Aquitaine, accused of securing exploration rights in Angola and elsewhere, by paying African leaders a commission of 45 US cents per barrel of crude oil.⁶⁷ Also in French courts, the trial in 2001 of Jean-Christophe Mitterand, son of the former French president, brought much unwanted publicity. His trial for alleged illegal arms shipments to Angola and secret payments to dos Santos is still ongoing at the time of writing. The ranking of Angola as the fifth most corrupt county by the NGO Transparency International in 2000, was damning at a time when the government sought to legitimise the war against UNITA.⁶⁸

A high profile case of corruption, publicised without sourcing material internationally, was that of the governor of Malanje province, Flávio Fernandes. Based on the Fowler

⁶⁷ *Agora* July 22 2000, p.8. Tonet mentions 90 US cents, *Folha 8*, July 22 2000, p.7.

⁶⁸ *Folha 8*, September 16 2000, page 5; *Agora*, September 16 2000, p.8.

(2000) report's suggestion that prominent Angolan public figures had sold fuel to UNITA in violation of UN sanctions, an *Agora* article of June 23, 2001, cited the governor of Malange as a provider of fuel to UNITA at a time when it was besieging and bombing the city.⁶⁹ The private media regularly condemned the way the province was administered and accused the governor of selling provincial government property for personal gain, and of personally appropriating the provincial budget for 2000.⁷⁰ In 2001 *Angolense* described his provincial administration as being "in a high state of criminality".⁷¹ Despite these allegations, Flavio Fernandes's removal from office came about in July 2002, not through dismissal by the President, but by collective public repudiation, which I outline in chapter six.

The cartoons commenting on corruption clearly reveal an understanding of the Angolan conflict as a resource-based conflict. Fig 8 situates the character Borrego in a



Fig 8. War: the most lucrative business. Fig. 9. Oil, diamonds and distracted leaders.

classroom where he is asked what is the most lucrative business in Angola (*Actual* September 2, 2000). His answer 'It's the war!!' leaves his teacher and female colleague speechless, but receives the applause of his fellow male student. Another classroom scene (fig 9, *Actual*, June 1, 2000) suggests three answers to the question, "why is Angola considered a country in crisis?" The replies identify petroleum, diamonds, and distracted leaders as the reasons for the crisis.

⁶⁹ *Agora*, June 23 2001, p.6.

⁷⁰ *Agora*, April 7 2001, p.7.

⁷¹ *Angolense*, April 7-14 2000, p.14.

In fig 10 Borrego (*Actual*, September 23, 2000) is told that “the Angolan participation in Sydney is awful”, to which he replies, “of course. If it had to do with robbery,




Fig. 10. Sydney Olympics.




Fig. 11. War Intensified in the Country.

deception, and war, we would have won many gold medals!” Fig 11, (*Jornal de Angola*, 1993) from the state media, carries the newspaper headline ‘War Intensifies in the Country’ and suggests that war was a profitable business for some in Angola.

In fig. 12, (*Actual* March 2, 2002) from just after Jonas Savimbi’s death in 2002,



Borrego looks pensive and asks “who will they blame now?” His comment suggests that Savimbi was somehow needed in order to conceal and justify poor and corrupt governance in Angola.

7. *The Private Media: 'Scrutinising' Public Figures.*

In chapter two, the public sphere was described as a place of 'public scrutiny', a description I draw on here to examine how the private media 'scrutinised' the two key personalities of the Angolan conflict, José Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi. I look separately at how these men were treated in the media. A significant degree of analysis of both men occurs in literature critiquing the health of Angolan democracy.

7.1. *Scrutinising the Angolan President.*

The previous section highlighted allegations of political corruption made against the Angolan president. I do not explore the truth or falsehood of these allegations in this thesis, but rather focus on the private media's coverage of the President and on his commitment to democratic transition and to peace, issues many commentators regarded as intrinsically linked. Filomeno Vieira Lopes for example, writing in January 2000, suggested that the continuation of the war reflected the lack of democracy in the country.

"In Angola, as in other parts of the world, there is an intrinsic relationship between peace and democracy. ... It was believed that the deepening of democracy would be the corner stone for the consolidation of peace in the country. ... War offers a pretext for anti-democratic forces to exercise strict control over society, restricting citizen intervention. ... *The basic issue is that the insipidness of democracy in Angola feeds the war*"^{72xxvi} (emphasis added).

We see here a similar argument to that made by the churches, a belief that greater democracy would promote peace.

Within the Angolan political system the president holds great power. He is the head of government and the armed forces and has the right to nominate provincial governors. The government of unity and national reconciliation, which President dos Santos presides over was formed in 1997, comprises members of the MPLA, UNITA, and the PRS, the Lunda based party. In an attempt to promote national unity, 28 ministerial and 55 vice-ministerial posts, were allocated to these parties.⁷³ The President's political power increased after he sacked the Prime-Minister in 1998, leaving the post vacant until the end of 2002, though the constitution required the position be filled.

⁷² *Agora*, January 13 2000, p.9.

⁷³ *Angola Peace Monitor*, Vol.3, No.8, April 25 1997.

The private print media's coverage of the Angolan President has been regarded by many as rather sensationalist and at times too confrontational, though important questions were being asked of the President regarding his administration of public office.⁷⁴ This public scrutiny of the President reflected what was essentially new 'discursive material' in the Angolan public sphere. This 'public scrutiny' came to a head in 2000 when the journalist Rafael Marquês, (then writing for *Agora* but later became director of Open Society Foundation), accused the President, in a published article, of being a dictator. The article created quite a storm, and eventually Marquês and his editor, Aguiar dos Santos, were put on trial for 'defamation of the President'. The trial, partly heard in secret, was subject to much international attention (Amnesty International 2000, MISA 1999) and both men were found guilty under a previously repealed law.⁷⁵ They were fined and received suspended jail sentences.

Two examples of criticism levelled against the President question his style of leadership, indicating that little room for divergent opinion existed within his party, and that political power had become too centralised. Firstly, in 2000 William Tonet criticised the lack of internal democratic structures within the MPLA.⁷⁶ Tonet, perhaps one of the President's strongest critics, pointed to the levels of 'conformism' within the MPLA, and argued that "democracy in Angola, [was] at serious risk" because of it.^{xxvii} Secondly, in August 1999 Aguiar dos Santos contrasted the man who assumed the presidency in 1979, with the same man twenty years later. Aguiar concluded that the former 'immaculate' image had given way to one of a politician damaged by allegations of commissions on oil and arms deals. Aguiar was also critical of the President's style of leadership, describing it as a "democratic dictatorship", pointing to the exercise of "strong presidentialist power". He concluded that the system was "founded on not allowing the necessary 'power-balances' in a democratic regime, breathe".^{77xxviii} The lack of 'checks and balances' was a frequent criticism of the

⁷⁴ This opinion frequently emerged in interviews, where it was suggested that the sensationalist style of the print media was about promoting sales. In two interviews with private media journalists (July 11 2000; November 5 2001) I asked about this 'sensationalism' but both denied that their papers were in any way sensationalist.

⁷⁵ IRIN (2000) posted March 21 2000. Jeanette Minnie, Regional Director of MISA, stated that the relevant law had been repealed in 1978.

⁷⁶ Vincente Pinto de Andrade expressed concern at the lack of democratic procedures within political parties, regarding the extent of fragmentation within political life a cause of serious concern for the future of democracy. *Agora*, June 10 2000, p.5.

⁷⁷ Victoria Brittain's book (1998) is highly critical of how power became centralised in the hands of the president, and describes the Angolan political system as "presidential regime" (Brittain 1998:94).

Angolan political system, explaining why many authors argued that the system itself needed restructuring, with some proposing a federalist system of governance. The nature of Angolan democracy has frequently been described using a phrase, the origin of which I am uncertain, '*democracia para os Ingleses ver*', 'democracy for the English to see'. It suggests that a veneer of democracy exists which disguises the lack of authentic democratic practices within the system.

The functioning of the President's foundation, FESA (Fundação Eduardo dos Santos), was also criticised because of the potential damage it was doing to democratic structures. FESA, founded by the Angolan president in 1996, functioned like an NGO, rehabilitating clinics and schools that were sometimes reopened with great media attention during the week of the President's birthday in August.⁷⁸ Christine Messiant's (1999) article in *Politique Africaine* on FESA, published by *Agora* on August 28, 1999, suggested it represented a new form of clientelistic distribution, creating a forum whereby the President acted benignly as a private citizen in society. By engaging in the health and education sectors, he distanced himself from the failures of his government and portrayed himself as a generous caring figure in the midst of a failing and incompetent state. Messiant argued that FESA represented an attempt by the President to occupy the space of civil society, presenting himself as its symbolic leader and patron, further extending his power.

The comments of the Angolan President after the death of Jonas Savimbi were well received in the private media, when he called for forgiveness between Angolans, and the need to forget about past hatreds. His speech to the nation was published in *Folha 8* under the heading 'Those who Love Peace, must Learn to Forgive'.

7.2. *Scrutinising the UNITA leader.*

The figure of Jonas Savimbi was strongly demonised in the state-run media, where he was presented as the reason for the continuation of the Angolan conflict. The private print media took a somewhat different view, arguing that because Savimbi was part of the problem, he must also be part of the solution, though this view was far from unanimous, (see cartoon below). Many within the private media believed that renewed negotiations were required for peace. Prominent opposition politicians for example,

⁷⁸ The FESA (2003) website outlines further the range of activities engaged in.

such as Ngola Kabangu of the FNLA, believed that renewed negotiations incorporating developments since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, such as the formation of COIEPA, represented new avenues to be explored in seeking peace.



Fig 13. Savimbi and Dialogue.

A September 1 2001, article in *Actual* was critical of the possibility of renewed dialogue with the UNITA leader. The cartoon in fig. 13 which accompanied the article, depicts Savimbi saying: “with me, it is murder in order to dialogue, and dialogue so as to murder!?” The implication was that either way, it was all about killing for Savimbi. *Agora* in September 2000 published an article ‘The Fall of the Devil’ after the UNITA bastions of Andulo and Bailundo were taken by government troops. The author António Pinto described Savimbi as a ‘monster’:

“[Megalomania], intolerance, and cruelty, are the dominant characteristics of this controversial political personality, who could have been the great alternative within the Angolan opposition”.

He went on to speak of his legacy in terms of mass graves and holocaust for the Angolan people. Eugenio Manuvakola, signatory to the Lusaka Protocol on behalf of UNITA, argued that renewed negotiations with Jonas Savimbi would have been anti-democratic.⁷⁹ He had broken away from UNITA and formed the UNITA-Renovada (Renewed) party.⁸⁰

Public awareness of the gravity of the atrocities committed by Jonas Savimbi can probably be dated to revelations in 1992 that he had ordered the death of Tito Chingunji, “one of the most brilliant UNITA activists”,⁸¹ along with his wife and three children. These killings led Fred Brigland (1986) who had written a biography of Savimbi, to reappraise what UNITA represented. The image of Jonas Savimbi as anti-communist fighting for democracy quickly unravelled after the signing of the Bicesse Accords, and accelerated upon his return to war after the elections.

⁷⁹ *O Independente*, February 3 2001; *O Independente*, February 10 2001.

⁸⁰ Munslow (1999:559) mentions rumours that “the *Renovada* founders had received three million dollars each from the government” to found UNITA-Renovada.

⁸¹ *Angolense*, 16-23 March 2002, p.10.

8. *Media Capacity.*

The capacity of the private media to cover the war is an important issue to explore. The question arises because we have seen a significant reliance within the private print media on research conducted by international organisations, which it then reported. As stated earlier, the Angolan private media was a relatively new phenomenon and at an early state of development in the 1990s, seeking to express itself in a country where freedom of expression had been curtailed by the experience of war and the 1977 coup attempt. This meant that, to a certain extent, the media had to work 'under siege' and create a space within which it could exercise its role. A number of other constraints can be identified however, which further reduced the capacity of the media to cover the war.

Firstly, I underline the possibility of professional training for those seeking to pursue a career in journalism. The Luanda school of journalism is a second level institute, generally regarded by journalists themselves as providing inadequate preparation. During the course on 'Human Rights and the Mass Media' which I attended in October 2001, journalists spoke openly of their need for further training to enhance their professional writing and communication skills.⁸² Curiously, journalists from the state-run media institutions were more open and interested in this training than those from the private media.

The question of financial resources is also relevant to the issue of media capacity at different levels. The print media was publishing in a very difficult environment, in a society where a high proportion of personal income was spent on basic necessities. The Angolan journalist Reginaldo Silva suggested that newspaper sales covered only ten percent of the costs involved in publishing, that advertising revenue was required to bridge the shortfall.⁸³ A lack of advertising revenue was the reason behind the closure of *Notícias* in 2001, a promising Dundo based newspaper.⁸⁴ Also, some journalists

⁸² Course organised by the NGOs ADRA and Search for Common Ground. I comment further on this in the next chapter.

⁸³ *Folha 8*, December 8 2001, p.19.

⁸⁴ *Notícias* published five editions between July 2000 and August 2001, and reported on events in the provinces of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul. It began promisingly with businesses eager to advertise. The first four editions covered topics such as: the poor treatment of Angolans by local mining companies; the plight of displaced people; UNITA attacks in the region; PRS, the local political party; poor Dundo prison conditions; interview with the local Catholic bishop; and a suggested division of Lunda Norte as a province. Advertisers gradually withdrew amid suspicions that the provincial government pressurised them to do so. After four editions the paper opted for publication as a supplement to *Angolense*. One

were salaried while others were paid per published article. For the latter, this meant that journalism was but one job among others engaged in, to earn a living. This restricted the time available to pursue an 'investigative' journalistic line.

The ability of the media to report from the front-line was also limited. Travel in Angola is expensive and precarious, and journalists were not welcome in certain areas. As a result, the print and broadcast media relied heavily on local reporters to provide information. Those reporting from Dundo, for example, were faced with basic problems such as access to telephones and fax machines, having to join the queues waiting to use the town's two phone lines. Given the difficulties of travelling to cover a particular story, there is a sense in which the media waited for news to 'travel' to Luanda from the provinces, which posed problems regarding the reliability of news.

The print media had great difficulties in securing newsprint for publication, all of which has to be imported. *Actual* ran a front-page headline on December 18 1999, entitled 'The Paper War', protesting at the shortages of paper. The private print media have on occasions provided their own newsprint to the printers to ensure publication.⁸⁵ Ziegler & Asante (1992:30) have suggested that controlling the allocation of newsprint is a means by which governments control the media.

The tradition of investigative journalism is weak in Angola and has not served the country well at crucial times. One wonders could investigative journalism have altered the course of Angola's conflict as early as 1992, had journalists set out to scrutinise the implementation of the Bicesse Accords and follow up suggestions that UNITA had secretly hidden its army in the bush. The same point may be made with reference to the Lusaka Protocol, where it seemed that the discovery of 'secret armies' was the task of international observers or peace keepers, but not of Angolans.

article in the supplement is thought to have angered the provincial government, which resulted in *Angolense* refusing to print further editions of *Notícias*. The article assessed the performance on national television (July 4 2001) of a government delegation commemorating the province's foundation. By all accounts the delegation did very poorly, causing acute embarrassment. *Notícias* accused one participant of "stretching the truth" by stating that the number of classrooms in the province had increased from 48 in 1997 to over 100 in 2001, when "not a single classroom had been built since 1975".

⁸⁵ Interview with *Actual* journalist, Luanda, November 5 2001.

Finally, with the death of Jonas Savimbi, *Angolense* declared the end of the “Savimbi boom” for Angolan journalism.⁸⁶ It likened the UNITA leader to “the goose that laid the golden egg” for the private media. A photograph of Jonas Savimbi on the cover usually pushed up newspaper sales, an acknowledgement that different methods were used to drive the sale of the private newspapers. *Angolense* recognised that the post-Jonas Savimbi era would confront the media with new challenges, particularly that of improving the quality of its work.

9. *The Public Sphere.*

Chapter two pointed out that Habermas (1989:227) premised the effectiveness of the public sphere on the guarantee of basic rights such as “freedom of speech and opinion, freedom of association and assembly, and freedom of the press”. I wish to review the Angolan public sphere in the light of these rights, bearing in mind that some initial discussion on the freedom of association and assembly has taken place in the section on historical revision. There, I underlined how history profoundly influenced and shaped the Angolan public sphere, most particularly the events surrounding *27 de Maio*, which led to the substantial closure of the Angolan public sphere. Here, I propose to focus on issues related to the possibility of ‘freedom of expression’.

A particular difficulty faced by the private media in general was the relatively polarised political arena they were communicating into, where political discourse was invariably characterised as either pro-government or pro-UNITA, as if only two possibilities existed. The lack of critical reflection within the state-run media, providing sympathetic and largely uncritical reporting of government activity, created a very narrow arena within which communication was conducted. As a result, criticism of the government was reductively equated with pro-UNITA sentiment. The private media tried to address this polarisation by encouraging an understanding of ‘constructive criticism’ and fostering a culture of public debate. For example, a *Rádio Ecclésia* debate in October 1999, explored the theme of how to be patriotic and simultaneously express criticism, challenging the basis upon which this polarisation was founded.⁸⁷ Much more needs to be done in this regard. Seeking to engender a

⁸⁶ *Angolense*, January 4-11 2003, p.3

⁸⁷ Outlined in *Folha 8*, October 20 1999.

culture of debate is an important contribution *Rádio Ecclésia* has made to the Angolan public sphere. The discursive space created through its Saturday morning debates was the most public of the public sphere spaces identified in this research, where a strong notion of ‘equality’ prevailed, based on speech. These public debates attempted to build citizenship through public talking and reflection, hence the reference in the chapter title to fostering ‘discursive space’.

The government clampdown following the return to war in 1998 was highlighted internationally by Amnesty International (2000) and MISA (1999) reports. Journalists interviewed during fieldwork described this time as particularly difficult, with many



Fig. 14. Too much freedom of expression Fig 15. Private media under threat!

personally fearful for their safety.⁸⁸ A number of cartoons give voice to perceptions at the time which are worth exploring in terms of what they reflect about the public sphere. In fig. 14 (*Actual*, January 22 2000) an MPLA representative states there is “too much press freedom” as two journalists stand before him gagged and blindfolded. In fig. 15, (*Folha 8*, December 24 1999) the government is rather shockingly depicted as urinating on the private media. These cartoons reveal a public sphere where the private media was under significant pressure to be less critical, and where freedom of expression was subject to significant restraint.

⁸⁸ Interviews with private media journalists, July 5 2000; July 10 2000; July 11, 2000.




Fig 16 General Mobilisation. Fig. 17. 'Our' Children.

Following the resumption of war, an article by Tonet on January 20 1999, in *Folha 8* entitled 'General Mobilisation', commented on the "selective recruitment" of the children of the poor "while the children of the leaders go overseas". This article was accompanied by the cartoon in fig. 16, and both were likely partly responsible for the government clampdown itself. The cartoon shows youths in a line awaiting army registration,

commenting: "here we go once again paying for the mistakes of politicians"; "I have already lost four brothers in this stupid war, I'm all that's left"; "while they are getting fat, we're being served as cannon fodder"; and "afterwards we will be abandoned like dogs on the street". Fig 17, from *Folha 8*, of January 23 January 1999, is on the same theme. The first caption states: "the defense of the country is a duty of every citizen", followed by "their children" about to board a plane, and "our children" awaiting military registration. These

cartoons expressed what many felt was

the case, but the Angolan government took a dim view of such comment. The private media was at this time engaged in a fundamental struggle to assert a foundational premise of the public sphere, that of 'freedom of expression', which these cartoons highlight. The government sought to restrict the space for 'freedom of expression' as it prosecuted the war, while the private media sought to engage in debate on the reasons for the return to war and articulate its disagreement with the military option. We see here that in a relatively short period of time the Angolan private media had become

significant as a vehicle of public opinion, particularly for the churches, civil society organisations, journalists and politicians, and was essentially engaged in a struggle with the Angolan government over the legitimacy of the war and the right of the government to declare war on behalf of the people.

A striking feature of the private print media within the public sphere, and in its discursive struggle with the Angolan government, was the space given to politicians of the opposition parties. A similar space was not available to them within the state media. Contributions in the form of articles or interviews turned the private media into a 'mini-parliament', giving the private media a high political content. From a theoretical perspective this raises questions as to whether the private media belongs within the public sphere framework, given that political parties are not public sphere actors in the Habermasian sense. Civil society theory is faced with a similar definitional question based on the exclusion of political parties from civil society. The issue can be partially resolved if articles and interviews were conducted in a private capacity, but this was not the case. In many cases, the authority of an article or the importance of an interview lay precisely in the person being a spokesperson for his/her party. I do not propose to exclude the private print media from the public sphere because of the range of actors who have a voice within the media, but its inclusion needs to be qualified because of the significant involvement of political actors.

By way of conclusion, I propose to briefly review the earlier research questions. It was seen how the Bicesse and Lusaka peace agreements were criticised for excluding non-militarised sectors of Angolan society that could have played a positive pacifying role between the two sides. A generally negative assessment of the role and influence of international organisations within the Angolan conflict was put forward, where peace involvement was regarded as secondary to the economic interests of the international community. The peace engagement of the churches was viewed positively by the private media, but I have questioned whether this was the best approach to adopt. Some brief discussion relating to the Cabindan conflict was also presented, a conflict that received little media coverage before the death of Jonas Savimbi.

It was shown how the media argued for a negotiated end to the war by presenting the appalling humanitarian cost of war in conjunction with the levels of corruption in the country. By offering such a contrast, the private media argued that war was not worth such suffering, that the price was too high. The roles of the Angolan president and Jonas Savimbi were also examined, where both men received negative coverage for their inability to end the war. The fundamental importance of historical issues to peace and national reconciliation, and to the development of the Angolan public sphere, emerged as a key theme in this chapter. A public sphere approach enabled the importance of the spatial issues involved here to emerge and be assessed in a manner that a civil society framework does not permit, underlining the importance of the theoretical framework chosen for research.

Chapter 5.

Civil Society Organisations: A Multi-Focused Narrative.

The third of the Angolan peace narratives dealt with in this thesis is that of national civil society organisations. These organisations have grown numerically and become quite influential since the Bicesse Accords. In a similar way to the private media institutions, the development of national civil society organisations throughout the 1990s signals the re-emergence within the public sphere of a dimension of Angolan life that disappeared after the introduction of the one-party state. While the particular focus of this chapter is the role of national organisations, it is important to acknowledge the key role international organisations and international NGOs have played as ‘facilitators’ within the development of Angolan civil society, a point I examine later. It is also important to highlight the role of international agencies and NGOs, in responding to the humanitarian crises since 1992 (Kibble 2000). These played a vital role through the provision of personnel, finance, food aid and medical support during a particularly difficult period of Angola’s history.

The Carnegie report *Preventing Deadly Conflict* (1997:111), highlights an array of peace related activities engaged in generally by civil society organisations to address conflict and promote peace in different parts of the world. The report points to attempts by NGOs to mediate in conflict, build trust between warring parties, provide conflict resolution training and education, the strengthening of democratic and judicial institutions which can provide a framework for conflict resolution, building indigenous capacity for coping with ongoing conflicts, fostering development of the rule of law, and enabling the creation of a free press. This list of possible peace activities highlights the need to interpret ‘peace related activity’ in a broad sense, as wider than efforts to directly resolve conflict. Initiatives which enhance the rule of law, strengthen legal and democratic institutions, promote human rights issues, provide space for reflection on the causes of conflict and how peace could be promoted, are fundamental to the building of a peaceful society. This chapter adopts such a broader approach in highlighting Angolan peace related initiatives, hence the chapter sub-title ‘A Multi-Focused Narrative’.

The research questions for this chapter read:

- What were the principal areas of civil society engagement in favour of peace during the period under review?
- What form of analysis and reflection occurred within civil society in relation to promoting peace and characterising the Angolan conflict?
- How prevalent were civil society organisations in Angola and how extensive was their impact?
- What implications did civil society development have for the development of the public sphere?

In addressing these questions, this chapter focuses on particular aspects of Angolan civil society organisations, most of which are engaged in a wider range of humanitarian and developmental activities.

The chapter is structured as follows. In section one I trace some contours of the Angolan public sphere prior to the Bicesse Accords, a period when the first civil society organisations were established. In so doing I situate the origins of organisations such as AAD (*Acção Angolana para o Desenvolvimento*, Angolan Action for Development), ACA (*Associação Cívica de Angola*, Angolan Civic Association), and ADRA (*Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural de Angola*, Action for the Rural Development of Angola) within the political climate of the one-party state, on the eve of the introduction of multiparty democracy. Section two begins the specific focus on components of civil society peace related activities by looking at how human rights were promoted by three local NGOs, *Mãos Livres* (Free Hands), *Mosaiko* (Mosaic), and AJPD (*Associação Justiça Paz e Democracia*, Association for Justice, Peace and Democracy). Section three examines two texts which I term ‘peace appeals’, produced by groups within civil society, and which provide an important window on how Angolan civil society analysed the nature of the conflict post-1998. The fourth section highlights the peace engagement of MPD (*Mulheres Paz e Desenvolvimento*, Women Peace and Development), one of the few women-only civil society organisations in Angola. The fifth looks at a submission from a group of civil society organisations regarding the new Angolan constitution. The final section explores initiatives concerned with enhancing ‘capacity building’ within civil society in relation to

peace. I examine what ADRA, *Mãos Livres*, *Rede da Paz* (Peace Network) and FONGA (*Forum das ONGs Angolanas*, Forum of Angolan NGOs) did in this regard.

1. *Civil society stirrings.*

As indicated in the introduction, I begin by exploring the space within which the first group of civil society organisations emerged prior to the Bicesse Accords. The section further develops the discussion from the previous chapter regarding the defining importance of specific moments in Angola's history which have impacted upon the public sphere, through to the present day. In chapter four I showed how events surrounding the *27 de Maio* coup attempt had profound implications for Angolan society and public sphere development, particularly in relation to the 'freedom of expression'. Here, I want to highlight the significance of colonialism and the years of one-party rule, in order to underline their impact on the public sphere and on the capacity of Angolans to organise independently, and to assert their right to 'freedom of association'. I do not posit a strict separation between 'freedom of expression' and 'freedom of association', nor intend to suggest that *27 de Maio* only impacted on 'freedom of expression'. These rights of association and expression are deeply intertwined in Angolan history, and have impacted on the ability of civil society organisations to pursue a peace agenda.

In relation to the impact of colonialism on Angolan civil society, the historian Maria da Conceição Neto (2001a:39) makes a valuable contribution.

“To understand the weaknesses of ... civil society in Angola we must study Angolans' social and political experiences. People commonly refer to the 'sixteen years of one party rule', or to lack of freedom of the press under the 'MPLA regime'. But we must look back further in time. Angola was dominated by a Portuguese political system that, after 1926, was a fascist single party regime. Even formally, it allowed no room for anybody to practice democratic politics”.

Spatially, Neto is making a most crucial point. By including the colonial legacy within our argument instead of taking the MPLA rise to power as a starting point, a sense of continuity between the MPLA one-party state and the Portuguese administration becomes clear. This continuity is above all a continuity of space. It is important to remember that

Angola did not inherit a democratic form of government or democratic institutions in 1975.¹ As Munslow (1999:557-558) commented:

“Portugal’s colonial legacy left few democratic footprints upon Angolan soil. Autocratic rule brooking no opposition was the ubiquitous legacy of the Lusophone African empire”.

The period of one-party rule, which continued to the Bicesse Accords, must be appraised from a number of perspectives. While seeking to avoid repetition of arguments made earlier in relation to the *27 de Maio* coup attempt, it is important for the purposes of this chapter to underline the sense of terror that accompanied the manner in which the government dealt with the coup threat. Coming soon after the birth of the new nation, it ushered in a culture of silence and withdrawal which for Schubert (2000:125-6) meant, that “from then on the people knew they must keep their distance from issues of power and political responsibility”.¹ It marked a fundamental rupture between the Angolan state and a significant section of its citizenry. Faria (2000:18) makes the point that *27 de Maio* illustrated how the government proposed to deal with dissent in the new state. By not following due process in granting Nito Álvés and his co-conspirators a fair trial, the state made it clear that dissent would not be tolerated.

The introduction of Marxist-Leninism at the Party Congress of December 1977, in the wake of the government response to the coup attempt, served to reinforce the closure of public space already occurring. It led to the initiation of a ‘rectification’ process which brought all civic organisations and associations under the direct control of the Party. Somerville (1986:90) quotes a 1977 MPLA document which described rectification as,

“[a movement] launched at all levels in order to correct errors, improve methods of work, cleanse the organisations of harmful elements and unite all militants behind the party’s goal. The rectification movement will be the guarantee of unity within the party and of ideological firmness of its militants”.

Independent organisations were incorporated within the MPLA’s various ‘mass organisations’, such as the women’s movement OMA (*Organização da Mulher Angolana*); the trade union movement UNTA (*União Nacional do Trabalhador Angolano*); and the youth movement JMPLA (*Jovem MPLA*), thereby eliminating

¹ Bender (1978) provides a comprehensive outline of Angola’s experience of colonialism, and exploded the myth of racial equality that had dominated Portuguese thinking in relation to Angola.

independent expressions of civic associational life. In his analysis of this period Malaquias (1995:54-55) writes,

“[the] Soviet-model adopted by the MPLA ... did not allow for the development of civil society. In fact, it discouraged even the most simple and innocuous initiatives from individuals and/or groups. Thus, important segments of the population that had not been co-opted or incorporated into the regime - including peasants, traditional leaders, religious groups, as well as some intellectuals and members of the petite bourgeoisie - were not only excluded from the political arena but also prevented from constituting an independent social sphere outside of the realm of the state”.

As can be seen, 1977, with an attempted coup and the introduction of Marxist-Leninism, was a key year in reducing the public sphere. Apart from the churches, no other organisation existed independently of government, which underlines the importance of the churches to the survival of the public sphere itself in Angola.

The above description of Angola at the end of 1977 contrasts sharply with that of life in Angola from 1974 to 1976. Again I quote Neto (2001a:42-44) who wrote:

“Whatever attitude one takes about the course of Angola’s transition to independence and about its consequences, it was certainly a time of great popular mobilisation. ... During this period the people had opportunities for expression and action which they had never previously enjoyed. ... [T]hey tried various forms of organisation, although often without continuity or success; many people had their first leadership experiences (particularly women and young people). For many Angolans the transition from colonialism to independence was a period of great participation”.

This sense of openness and spontaneity had been quickly overturned by the combination of factors outlined above. These years were rather unique in Angola, situated between the colonial experience and the birth of the one-party state, both characterised by the exercise of strict control over public spaces and the curtailment of ‘freedom of expression’ and ‘freedom of association’.

1.1. *Signs of change.*

The latter years of the 1980s witnessed a slight opening up of the Angolan political system, but significant change was only to occur as a result of the peace negotiations preceding the Bicesse Accords which witnessed Angola move towards multi-party democracy. Notable in this regard, was the abandonment of Marxist-Leninism as the political ideology of the MPLA during its third national congress in December 1990. In

effect, these changes were to establish the ‘legal’ parameters which facilitated the re-emergence within the public sphere of civil society organisations and private media institutions. Hodges (2001:50-51) lists some of the principal laws passed during this period of reform:

“A constitutional revision law (law 12/91) was enacted in May 1991, coinciding with the Bicesse Accords. This proclaimed a democratic state based on the rule of law and respect for human rights, and introduced a multi-party system. The constitutional revision was accompanied, in the same month, by new laws on associations (law 14/91), political parties (law 15/91), the right of assembly (law 16/91), the press law (law 25/91), and the right to strike (law 23/91). Further laws in April 1992 established a new electoral system, [and] permitted the establishment of private radio stations”.

The constitutional revision law referred to here did not lead to a new constitution, a task reinitiated in 1998 and covered in a later section.

Prior to the introduction of the new legislation during this pre-Bicesse period, the first of the modern civil society organisations were founded. AAD, ACA and ADRA were among the first. The challenges faced by these organisations as they sought to establish themselves, permit certain contrasts to be drawn.

Firstly a few words on ADRA which from rather humble beginnings developed throughout the 1990s to become one of the leading Angolan NGOs. As director since its foundation, Fernando Pacheco has done much to strengthen the organisation, and expand its activities throughout many parts of Angola. ADRA was originally founded to assist in national rehabilitation and reconstruction after the Bicesse Accords, focusing particularly on agricultural development. According to Pacheco, ADRA experienced relatively few difficulties when it was founded in 1990, though it took until 1993 for the organisation to be legalised.² The lack of legal status however, did not prevent ADRA’s development or functioning as an organisation. Those setting up ADRA and AAD were known within the government and their initiatives were regarded as not posing a threat. There is a sense in which ADRA and AAD did not represent the birth of new ‘independent’ organisations, so much as a migration of personnel from government institutions, the public sector and the MPLA, to this new ‘non-governmental’ sector.

² Interview with Fernando Pacheco, Luanda, July 14, 2000.

Malaquias (1995:195-196) takes the view that these early organisations had nothing to do with the development of civil society, but were part of a strategy to extend MPLA influence and retain power:

“the emergence of organised groups commonly associated with civil society and their dependent relationships with the state constitutes an integral part of a well-designed strategy by the regime to keep itself in power. The MPLA had not planned to liberalise the regime and institute a genuine democratisation process that would eventually make party-state accountable to common citizens. In fact, the reverse is closer to reality”.

The comment rings true for AAD and ADRA whose origins were rather uncomplicated, but does not explain why the foundation of ACA (examined below) was so contested, except to conclude that ACA, as a first generation civil organisation, was outside the sphere of influence of the MPLA. The comment also fails to convey the sense in which ‘independence’ from political structures can be achieved over time, as appears to have happened with ADRA in particular. While maintaining agricultural development as its primary focus, ADRA has in fact widened its activity base to include the promotion of human rights, civic education and media training, suggesting that close links with the MPLA may have been necessary initially, but that organisations can develop independence over time and become critical of government.

ACA was founded on January 25 1990, and many of its members were active in political life to some degree. Its formation was opposed by the MPLA on the basis that it might become a political party.³ However, having failed to prevent ACA organising, the government sought to secure the election of its own candidates to prominent positions within the organisation. The threat of a crisis was overcome when it became clear that both the MPLA and ACA wished Joaquim Pinto de Andrade to be the Association’s president. The intervention of significant MPLA personalities such as Lopes de Nascimento (former chairman of the MPLA and a possible presidential candidate), and Marcolino Moco (former Prime Minister) in support of ACA, was also instrumental in creating space for the organisation to establish itself initially. During fieldwork in 2001, ACA’s president, Imaculada Melo described the climate of tension and fear during ACA’s first meeting as participants noted the heavy police presence outside, and anticipated being

³ Interview with Justino Pinto de Andrade, Luanda, November 8 2001.

arrested for their actions.⁴ ACA was certainly viewed by the government in a different light to either AAD or ADRA. Melo explained that the delay in securing ACA's legal recognition was a significant factor in causing the association's energy to dissipate. By the time the legal status had been secured, many ACA members had joined political parties and become politically active. In March 2000, after many years of decline and inactivity, ACA relaunched itself with Imaculada Melo elected president.

The composition of ACA, AAD, and ADRA in 1990-1991 renders their inclusion within civil society or the public sphere somewhat ambiguous, given the presence there of members of political parties and the existence of significant links to the state. This ambiguity had changed significantly and was much less evident by the turn of the century. The early activity of these organisations indicates a certain direction within 'civil society' towards development and post-war rehabilitation in the case of AAD and ADRA, and towards greater political and civil rights in the case of ACA. Within a short space of time these directions were overtaken by the crisis that unfolded when war resumed, and the urgent need for a response to the humanitarian crisis witnessed the arrival of many international organisations and NGOs. These were to have a significant impact on the development of Angolan civil society, an impact I briefly trace next.

1.2. The role of international civil society.

As the humanitarian crisis deepened after the outbreak of war in late 1992, organisations such as the World Food Programme and a host of international NGOs moved quickly to establish structures and deploy personnel in response to the plight of Angolans. The majority of these organisations were new to Angola, but collectively they played a fundamental role in providing necessary assistance to the unfolding post-electoral humanitarian disaster. Howen (2001:34) put the figure of international organisations in Angola in 2001 at about ninety-five, which marks a significant increase from the single digit total of pre-Bicesse days.

After the signing of the Lusaka Protocol many international organisations redefined their role and functioning in Angola. While humanitarian relief work remained a priority

⁴ Interview with Imaculada Melo, Luanda, November 9 2001.

concern, many began to assist the development of national organisations particularly through the provision of funding. This post-Lusaka period was one of major growth for national organisations, with international organisations actively encouraging the development of local partnerships and exercising a ‘facilitation’ or ‘enablement’ role within national civil society. Many international organisations worked closely with local organisations frequently taking their lead from them.⁵ They provided important funding for local organisations to engage in a wide range of activities dealing with human rights promotion, adult literacy, poverty reduction, gender issues, the private media, and so on. Though Prendergast & Smock (1996) concluded in a consultancy report in early 1996, that “NGO-sponsored peace activities hardly exist in Angola”, it is during this early post-Lusaka period that I date the beginning of what became a significant peace engagement by Angolan civil society organisations in the form of human rights promotion. This development represented the emergence of a ‘second’ generation of national civil society organisations.

2. *Promotion of Human Rights.*

Murithi (1998:276) noted that since the ending of the Cold War, the task of maintaining peace and security has “gradually been linked to the promotion of the respect for human rights”. He quotes the 1993 report to the Security Council by the then UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, concerning peacekeeping and conflict in Angola, which makes explicit the linkage between building peace and promoting human rights. Boutros-Ghali (1993) stated:

“respect for human rights constitutes a vital, indeed a critical, component among measures to resolve, on a long-term basis, conflicts of this nature, including efforts to promote enduring conditions of peace, national reconciliation and democracy” (in Murithi 1998:276).

This clear statement regarding the importance of human rights work as a vital part of a long-term peace approach is praiseworthy for the ideals it sets out, though the UN in

⁵ It is also relevant to highlight an advocacy role of some international organisations on behalf of Angola. For example, the Angolan Peace Monitor has contributed significantly to knowledge on Angola. Alex Vines has been a key figure in this, and was also influential in promoting the British Angola Forum as a location for ongoing reflection on Angola. Jim Kirkwood has done similar work in Canada through the Angola Peace Action Network, which helped maintain Angola on the political agenda.

Angola has been severely criticised for turning a blind eye to many human rights violations and of having pursued a strategy of “see no evil, speak no evil” (HRW 1996:6).

In reviewing Human Rights Watch’s *Angola Unravels*, Margaret Anstee (2000) highlights some of the difficulties associated with an overt position of publicly denouncing human rights violations as advocated by Human Rights Watch. Anstee argued that such an approach

“overlooks the harsh reality that the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), as a mediator, must remain in communication with both sides and that public declarations can result in the breaking of that vital link. ... Moreover, denunciations by an SRSG are useless unless backed up by elective action from the Security Council, which has not been forthcoming in the past. ... transparency, though desirable, is not always advisable in delicate negotiations where premature revelation runs the risk of new approaches being strangled at birth”.

While not suggesting that human rights are not fundamental to promoting peace, Anstee is stating that a delicate path must be followed between denunciation of human rights violations which may antagonise one side or the other, possibly damaging relations during peace negotiations, and turning a blind eye. The suggestion within the Angolan literature is that this delicate balance was not achieved. Howen (2001:25-26) for example, argued that human rights violations played an important part in fuelling mistrust between the Angolan government and UNITA.

Reports assessing the human rights situation in Angola generally make grim reading, with both UNITA and the Angolan government accused of violations.⁶ The 2000 Human Rights Watch report on Angola stated:

“[t]here was little sign of greater respect for human rights as the violations of the laws of war for which this conflict has been notable continued. Both the government and the rebels... have been responsible for these violations.”

The Angolan government’s response to accusations of human rights violations, was frequently one of frustration, as the organisations alleging violations rarely had access to UNITA held areas. On many occasions the government’s reply to them was to take their message directly to UNITA, instead of equating government violations with those of

⁶ C.f. the annual reports of Amnesty International, United States Department of State Human Rights Reports, and of Human Rights Watch.

UNITA. Apart from highlighting the extent of human rights violations in Angola, these reports also served to underline the difficult context within which national civil society organisations operated. As Vines (1998:25) pointed out, organisations preferred to label their human rights work as ‘civic education’, a much less controversial term.

Organisations made the point during fieldwork that many human rights violations in Angola were independent of the war itself, that the military conflict did not explain or justify all human rights violations.⁷

Finally, it is interesting to note how the international community’s promotion of a human rights agenda changed over the period of this research. From being ‘absent’ under the Bicesse Accords, human rights promotion formed a significant component of the Lusaka Protocol. After Lusaka, increased human rights activity was noticeable, especially with regard to training human rights activists, and through the UN’s coverage of human rights issues, particularly on national television and radio. Speaking during the 2000 Pro Pace Congress, the head of the human rights division within the UN Angolan Mission stated that the UN “regarded human rights as part of the peace process in Angola” adding that the human rights division “had become the principal contribution of the international community in the search for peace since 1999” (Howland 2001:112).ⁱⁱ The point illustrates how much the international community itself shifted in terms of stressing the relevance of human rights work.

2.1. Human Rights: a Threefold Focus.

In outlining where Angolan organisations have focused their human rights activity, I suggest that three interconnected areas can be identified. Firstly, I look at efforts to build public awareness in relation to human rights issues, particularly through the media. Secondly, I examine a more focused educational approach which attempted to train human rights activists by conducting human rights workshops and seminars. Thirdly, I deal with a specific human rights issue focused on by a number of organisations, which illustrates increased capacity and awareness within Angolan civil society. I deal with each in turn. Firstly, the role of the state and private media has been important in fostering public awareness of human rights issues. In assessing this ‘public awareness’ dimension, I offer a

⁷ Interviews with AJPD and *Mãos Livres* personnel.

specific focus on the NGO *Mãos Livres*, translated as ‘Free Hands’.⁸ The composition of *Mãos Livres* is unique: David Mendes the director was a former member of the government’s counter-intelligence; Alexandre André Sebastião was a sitting parliamentary deputy and member of the National Assembly’s human rights commission; Pedro Mateus João was a 2000 PhD graduate from Lancaster University⁹; and also included other lawyers and journalists. By 2001 *Mãos Livres* had established provincial offices in Lubango, Benguela, and Sumbe, and was active in many other provinces. The organisation was involved in preparing articles for publication each Monday in the *Jornal de Angola* under the title ‘Law and Citizenship’ (*Direito e Cidadania*), so as to build awareness of human rights. Some of the articles dealt with domestic violence (12.03.2001), women’s rights (03.04.2000; 10.04.2000; 16.10.2000), rights of the child (12.06.2000), the right to trade union membership (18.12.200), and the police in relation to human rights. For a time the column also hosted a monthly competition entitled ‘Know your Rights’, for which prizes were awarded.

Mãos Livres also furthered awareness of human rights by hosting a radio programme on *Rádio Ecclésia*. In March 2000 it began broadcasting a programme called ‘The Citizen and the Law’ (*O Cidadão e a Lei*) each Monday morning from 10.00-12.00.¹⁰ Many of the programmes I listened to were informative, often based on letters from Angolans seeking legal advice on court cases, housing issues, unlawful detention, and so on. Callers also rang in with queries which the panelists dealt with, or if it required a fuller explanation referred the question to the next programme. According to David Mendes, the programme had been transferred from *LAC* after management there wished to screen callers in a bid to control content, which *Rádio Ecclésia* did not attempt to do.¹¹ These examples illustrate approaches adopted by an Angolan NGO engaged in promoting human rights awareness. It illustrates a relationship of inter-dependence between this form of

⁸ A direct translation is difficult as the phrase suggests hands that are not handcuffed or bound, hands not compromised or tarnished, in other words, an organisation that acts without reserve in favour of human rights. The full title of *Mãos Livres* is ‘Associação de Juristas e Journalistas na Defesa e Divulgação dos Direitos’, the ‘Association of Lawyers and Journalists in the Defence and Diffusion of Rights’.

⁹ João P M (2000).

¹⁰ Each Tuesday and Thursday morning from 10.00-11.00 a similar programme called ‘Entre Nós’ (Between Ourselves) with the subtitle ‘Conversas na rádio sobre a nossa diária, a nossa vivência, e os nossos direitos’ (Radio conversations about our daily life, our living and our rights), was broadcast.

¹¹ Interview with David Mendes, Luanda, October 19, 2001.

peace work and media institutions. Positively, this ensured that activities engaged in received publicity and reached a wider audience around Luanda. Conversely however, given the limited reach of the private media and newspaper circulation, large parts of Angola are not exposed to this civil society activity.

Secondly, although many NGOs have engaged in promoting human rights workshops and seminars, I propose to look at one organisation active in this area, the Catholic based organisation *Mosaiko* established in 1995. It was among the most prominent and important of these because of its commitment to training human rights activists across Angola, and also for its publication of a human rights training manual dealing specifically with Angola (*Mosaiko* 1999). By the end of 2001 *Mosaiko* personnel had conducted workshops in at least eleven of Angola's provinces. A week-long workshop held in Dundo in 1998 brought together representatives from local churches, the police, local government and from surrounding villages. In other places traditional authority figures have also been involved. The *Mosaiko* trainer's manual, around which workshops were organised, is divided into four parts:

- 1) the history of the universal declaration on human rights;
- 2) an explanation of each of the articles within the declaration;
- 3) situating human rights within a number of the world religions;
- 4) a specific focus on human rights in Africa and Angola in particular.

The chapters raise issues about the implications of each article for life in Angola and set questions to facilitate group reflection. Methodologically the manual is quite interesting as it seeks to avoid the suggestion that human rights are being 'imported' into Angola, by highlighting the relevant articles within Angolan constitutional law which defend the principles of the universal declaration. It locates human rights within the framework of the Angolan constitution, thereby connecting the promotion of human rights with securing the constitutional rights of each Angolan citizen.

Thirdly, in terms of dealing with specific instances of human rights violations, the NGO AJPD was one of many civil society organisations working to address prison detentions

and instances where the period of preventative detention had overrun.¹² I examine this issue because of its consequences for the Angolan state itself, seen here to be acting outside of the law by failing to follow due process with regard to the legal rights of its own citizens. AJPD was a relatively new NGO founded by Fernando Macedo and a group of young Angolans in 2000,¹³ all of whom were motivated by their Christian beliefs to promote, as the title of the organisation suggests, peace, justice and democracy in Angola. In interviews with NGO personnel,¹⁴ many thought that AJPD was overly confrontational in its approach, particularly Macedo who on numerous occasions had publicly asked Jonas Savimbi and President dos Santos to remove themselves from political life in order to allow the Angolan people to live in peace.¹⁵ Others were impressed with the directness of their approach, and found it refreshing.

Under Angolan criminal law a person may not be held for longer than 135 days without trial, or a maximum of 180 days of preventative detention under the national security law. Regarding these laws, the United States Department of State Human Rights (2001) report commented:

“Over 90 percent of inmates in Luanda still are awaiting trial, and it is believed that the national average is over 50 percent. Inmates who have been awaiting trial for 2 or 3 years are common”.

The extent of the problem highlighted by AJPD and other NGOs was quite serious and went unaddressed for many years. According to one press report, AJPD successfully secured the release of a twenty-one year old man who had been detained without trial for seven years for stealing a pair of jeans.¹⁶ AJPD also co-ordinated a seminar on ‘the Administration of Justice and the Penitentiary System’ on October 11-12 2001, which examined difficulties inherent in the Angolan justice system and explored ways forward. Recommendations made included the need for greater financial investment and reform of the legal system, where some laws date back to 1886. A UNDP (1999:99) report

¹² *Folha 8* interview with Fernando Macedo, December 9 2000, page 10.

¹³ AJPD published its statutes in *Diário da República* on August 11 2000, but still had not been legalised by the ministry for Justice in August 2002.

¹⁴ September 25 2001; October 19 2001; October 21 2001.

¹⁵ One such instance was during the 2000 *Pro Pace* Congress.

¹⁶ Named as Faustino Nguamba, from *O Independente*, December 9, 2000.

highlighted article 421 in particular, by which crimes involving small sums of money can lead to twelve years in prison.

The above outlines some of the activities undertaken by Angolan civil society in relation to human rights. I do not suggest they were occurring evenly across Angola, but they represent significant new initiatives from within Angolan civil society in relation to furthering peace. As public sphere discourse, these organisations were involved in calling on the Angolan government and UNITA to act legally and within a constitutional framework in defence of the human rights of ordinary Angolans. This discourse involved an appeal for law and order, directed from within society to the parties at war. It represents something of a reversal of the argument one is more familiar in Britain and elsewhere, where the state is seen to call on citizens to respect law and order. Here civil society is calling on the state and UNITA to do so.

3. *Civil society 'peace appeals'*.

A significant dimension of Angolan civil society's response to war was the publication of short treatises or reflections on the conflict, which I term 'peace appeals'. These read like position statements or open letters, and are relevant to examine because of insight they provide into how key groups within civil society analysed the war, and proposals made to achieve peace. In so far as this research could ascertain, since the resumption of war in 1998, four such documents have been published which fall within this category. Firstly, the 1999 document called 'Manifesto for Peace in Angola', is probably the earliest of these texts. Secondly, the April 1999 document from GARP (*Grupo Angolano de Reflexão para a Paz*, Angolan Peace Reflection Group) entitled 'Let us Opt for Dialogue as the Definitive Solution to the Angolan Conflict'. Thirdly, an appeal made in 2000 by MPD, a women's NGO; and finally, a document published in 2001 by AMC (*Amplo Movimento de Cidadãos*, Broad Citizen Movement). For the purposes of analysis, and given that similarities in structure and content exist between all four appeals, I will focus only on the first two appeals which were the most important and detailed of the documents. These are included as appendixes 1 and 2 at the end of the thesis. I also add some brief comment on the MPD peace appeal in the next section.

Before examining these documents I draw on a distinction advanced by Ottaway (2000) who characterised a relationship between a civil society organisation and its constituency as one of either trusteeship or representation. Representative organisations, such as trade unions or business associations are formed to articulate the interests of members and negotiate on their behalf. Trustee organisations on the other hand:

“are organisations whose leaders have taken it upon themselves to define and represent the interests of people who do not speak for themselves” (Ottaway 2000:83).

Trusteeship in fact, catches the nature of the ‘peace appeals’ examined here, as well as much of the activity engaged in by the civil society organisations highlighted throughout this chapter.

The ‘Manifesto for Peace in Angola’ (hereafter ‘Manifesto’) was signed by over one hundred and twenty individuals including journalists, sociologists, university lecturers, lawyers, trade unionists, pastors, NGO personnel, musicians, and writers. A number of parliamentary deputies and political party affiliates also signed. It had hoped to collect ten thousand signatures but this total was never reached. In a 2001 conference paper Justino Pinto de Andrade and Rafael Marquês (2001) stated:

“[the Manifesto] should be considered as having been the real launching moment for a series of explicit and co-ordinated demonstrations within society, in favour of peace and reconciliation”.¹⁷ⁱⁱⁱ

The GARP document was the product of a ‘think-tank’ which included among its membership: Daniel Ntoni Nzinga, general-secretary of the ecumenical body COIEPA; Filomeno V Lopes, member of the political party FpD, (some of whose analysis was covered in the media chapter); Rafael Marquês, the journalist accused of defamation of the President; and Francisco Tunga, the director of FONGA. Some international commentators described the GARP document as a ‘breath of fresh air’ at the time.¹⁸ A number of points can be made jointly about both documents.

¹⁷ de Andrade & Marquês (2001).

¹⁸ IRIN website <http://www.irin.org> of July 26, 1999, entitled ‘New Peace Movement Launched’.

Firstly, each can be considered essentially a trustee document, written by groups claiming to be representative of the Angolan people. For example, the opening line of the 'Manifesto' reads:

"The Angolan people want a lasting peace, social justice, good governance, the right to citizenship, and mutual respect for the diversity of people and cultures, which comprise [Angola]" (emphasis added).

Throughout the document the sense of trusteeship became stronger through the repeated use of the phrase "we, the Angolan people". The GARP document expressed trusteeship by questioning the legitimacy of the war, stating:

"Nobody has the right to speak on behalf of the people to start a civil war by citing arguments of defence or of resistance. The people were not consulted."

The method by which such a consultation could have been conducted was not clarified, but both groups clearly saw themselves articulating the view that the Angolan people were opposed to the war. The authors of both documents saw themselves as speaking for a wider constituency than that of civil society or public sphere actors, speaking on behalf of the Angolan people to those who waged war in their name.

Secondly, the documents set out their understanding of what led to war in 1998. The signatories of the 'Manifesto' argued that the war was about those in power "plunder[ing] the nation's wealth", but their analysis also suggested something more sinister, when they commented on "the total perversion of power" that operated behind the conflict. The 'Manifesto' stated that the war would only end when it was realised "that there was no definitive military solution for Angolan conflict". The GARP document was more forthright in setting out its views on the logic of the war:

"All that appears to matter is the will of half a dozen Angolans immune to the sufferings of an entire people and estranged from ... the majority of the people. This reignited war is about disguising a deliberate process of disengagement from issues related to the identity and the unity of the Angolan people. The current war, imposed on the Angolan people, is nothing but a disguise for the lack of political and ideological arguments ... The denial of politics hides the actions of minority groups through the slow destruction of the Nation. War has not served the Angolan people".

It was suggested to me by one of the GARP authors, that while the phrase 'half a dozen Angolans' needed to be interpreted figuratively, it referred to a very small group of

individuals on both sides.¹⁹ The argument suggests that the Angolan state and UNITA were instrumentalised by these individuals in pursuit of narrow political and economic objectives.

Thirdly, the question of control over Angola's natural resources was also put forward as a reason for the war. In both documents, the struggle for control of oil and diamonds was situated in a wider context, placing the international community at the centre of the struggle. The GARP document highlighted international economic interests and weak Angolan political will, in explaining the continued conflict:

“the successive failures in the peace processes is due to a lack of political will among the belligerents, in conjunction with the immediate [economic] interests of the international community”.

The Manifesto argued that the “plundering of the nation's wealth” was carried out

“in partnership with speculative²⁰ outsiders and foreign countries. Oil, diamonds and their revenues are the major source of greed by the rulers, the armed opposition and the oil multinationals, in particular”.

There is little differentiation here between the ‘plundering’ roles of the Angola government, UNITA, and those of foreign countries with economic interests in Angola. All are seen as contributing to the misery of the Angolan people.

Fourthly, the above references regarding the international community's role in Angola are part of wider general scepticism, also seen in the media chapter, in relation to international involvement in Angola. The GARP analysis was extremely critical, believing that foreign intervention had in fact become part of the problem, and partially explained why peace had failed in Angola. It listed Alvor, Mombasa, Gbadolite, Bicesse, Addis Ababa, Abidjan and Lusaka, as locations where peace negotiations on Angola had occurred under international supervision, each attempting to bring international pressure to bear on Angolans. The ‘Manifesto’ was equally critical of international intervention calling on the United States, France, England, Brazil, Russia, Portugal and South Africa to “reverse their efforts”, meaning that

¹⁹ Interview with one of GARP authors, Luanda, October 22, 2001.

²⁰ My text is an English translation and uses the word ‘adventurous’ here. I suspect the original Portuguese word is *aventureiro* which I would translate in this context as speculative.

“instead of pursuing immediate economic and political interests [in Angola],’ these countries ought to examine how their involvement in the oil and diamond industries served to fuel the conflict, and consequently worked against the reconciliation of Angolans”.

These were strong criticisms of the international community. It is normal to expect that civil society would engage in ‘scrutiny’ of the functioning of the state, but these comments reveal a much deeper ‘scrutinising’ involving analysis of the functioning of the international community, finding it complicit in the Angolan conflict because of its economic involvement which enabled both sides to wage war.

Fifthly, both documents set out a number of ways forward. The ‘Manifesto’ addressed seven demands to the Angolan government, to UNITA and to FLEC. These were:

- 1) an immediate ceasefire;
- 2) the establishment, with civil society mediation, of formal communication between the warring sides;
- 3) the setting up of humanitarian corridors;
- 4) the inclusion of a humanitarian budget within the military budget;
- 5) the elaboration of an agenda for peace talks;
- 6) safe passage for those wishing to participate within a process of national dialogue;
- 7) funds from within the military budget to cover the costs of procuring peace.

None of these seven demands were met by the various parties which led some to regard the ‘Manifesto’ as a failure, even though there was little that could be done concretely by the group itself in relation to most of its demands. A possible exception is the second demand calling for the establishment of formal communication between the warring parties. Although Jonas Savimbi was under siege from persistent government offensives at the time, the possibility of formalising contact with the UNITA parliamentary deputies in Luanda loyal to him seems not to have been explored.

The way forward for GARP was outlined in the opening line of its document:

“the time has arrived to deal with, in public forum, the absolute promotion of dialogue as the exclusive means to find adequate ways to end the Angolan holocaust”.

The nature of this dialogue was also spelled out:

“this dialogue must be inclusive, in relation to the different currents and tendencies within civil society, rejecting the idea that without foreigners Angolans are

incapable of mutual dialogue, and discover their own way to national understanding”.

For GARP, the question of peace in Angola concerned every Angolan. The authors believed that a pacific solution was obtainable if the process of dialogue was left to Angolans themselves, and included representative societal groups. Again we hear the argument that the exclusion from the peace process of Angolan ‘civic’ actors, had undermined the search for peace itself, and had been a key structural weakness of previous peace agreements. All four ‘peace appeals’ in fact, were insistent that renewed dialogue offered the best chance for peace.

A sense of collective ownership in relation to Angola’s difficulties, and an attempt to restructure the manner in which the question of peace was framed through inclusion of civil forces permeates these texts. Also emerging was the view that Angolans had to take responsibility for their own crisis, evident in the following GARP statement: “We should not keep on blaming the colonial heritage and/or third parties for our grievances”. Publicly, a shift in understanding was occurring that moved away from blaming the colonial legacy or the Cold War for the conflict in Angola, arguing that it was time to look deeper and accept greater collective responsibility for the continuation of war and the failure to secure peace. The ‘Manifesto’ echoed this sentiment stating “we, the Angolan people, should take full responsibility for the solution of our own problems”. It was quite clear that around the year 2000, the argument for peace put forward by Angolan civil society, the media and the churches, had crystallised around key concepts or themes: the need for renewed dialogue and negotiation, the need to include civil forces in building peace, that the international community was compromised as a peace broker because of its economic interests, and that war was a disguise for plundering the nations’ resources. This structure also revealed a growing awareness that civil society had a fundamental role in resolving the conflict. It reflected a degree of ownership from within society, absent in the past, in the search for peace.

Biggs & Neame’s (1996:45) statement that a great deal of NGO or civil society activity does not belong within the scope of what can be ‘delivered’ in the usual NGO or donor sense of the word, is helpful in interpreting these documents. I add peace engagement to

their comment that “[the promotion of democracy and civil society] are goals to be achieved rather than processes and arenas that continually evolve”. Appraisal of these appeals is best done from a perspective of process and arena. Public sphere and civil society ‘space’ is not likely to develop in a linear fashion, but rather evolve by expanding and contracting over time. Losses and gains are best assessed with a degree of hindsight rather than at the moment of perceived success or failure. It is possible, for example, to be critical of the Manifesto for making too many demands which were not considered. However, given the general weakness of Angolan civil society and the restraints it operated under as the new war began, these appeals were dissenting voices within the public sphere offering a critique of both government and UNITA, and international bodies.

4. *Women’s organisations.*

Women exercised a variety of important roles within Angolan civil society and were reasonably visible with the sector in the period under review. Many key organisations such as ACA and the Development Workshop peace programme (discussed later) were run by women, though on the whole the number of women exercising prominent leadership positions was rather small. This section looks at MPD, mentioned in the previous section, one of the few exclusively female organisations within Angola civil society.²¹ Founded in 1999, MPD described itself as a

“civic movement of women in the defence of peace and reconciliation, democracy, human rights and the development of Angolan society, without political or religious affiliation”.^{22iv}

The founding group of over twenty people was largely comprised of professional women who were lawyers, psychologists, economists, journalists, teachers and businesswomen. A number had trained overseas on government scholarships. By the end of 2001 membership had risen to over one thousand, and MPD had established itself prominently within civil society. I highlight here three of MPD’s peace initiatives. Firstly, I look at its ‘peace

²¹ OMA, the *Organização da Mulher Angolana*, affiliated to the MPLA is the largest women’s organisation in Angola. Founded in 1962, OMA reportedly had 1.8 million members in 1989, and 800.000 ten years later (figures quoted by Ana Maria Bastos Nascimento during MPD conference, Luanda, June 15, 2001).

²² Article 1 of MPD Statutes.

appeal'; secondly, I examine the June 2001 women's conference on peace organised by MPD; and thirdly, I comment on the organisation's expressed wish to personally meet Jonas Savimbi in order to discuss peace.

Firstly, the MPD peace appeal of May 2000 shares many similarities with the GARP and 'Manifesto' documents, but what distinguishes it from these appeals is that it is written from the perspective of Angolan women. There is a real sense of anger in the document that springs not merely from the continuation of the war, but from the fact that women as wives and mothers had lost husbands and children in the war. This personal sense of loss at the level of family is not present in the other documents. Cesinandra Xavier, the MPD president, had expressed the view that the women of Angola were tired of having children only to see them used as cannon fodder in the war. The organisation had in fact encouraged women to become conscientious objectors and not allow their children join the armed forces.²³ As International Alert (2001:18) noted, many women's organisations and "women activists express their values, behaviour and codes explicitly as a factor of their gender". Clearly MPD was doing this in its peace appeal and brought a unique gender perspective to bear on the reality of the Angolan war.

Secondly, this gender perspective was also evident when MPD hosted the first women's peace conference in Angola, held in Luanda from June 14-16, 2001. The conference (MPD 2001) entitled 'Let us Search for Peace with Love', set out as a principal objective: "to define a more active role for women in the resolution of the Angolan conflict".²⁴ International Alert (2001:21) observed that in most peace processes and peace negotiations there is a tendency to exclude women, despite a "common request from peace activists and commentators that there should be more of a female presence". All speakers at the conference were women and among the themes developed were: 'war and its impact on women'; 'displaced women during wartime'; 'building a culture of peace, tolerance and reconciliation'; and 'women in the Angolan peace process'. The live broadcasting of the conference on *Rádio Ecclésia* as well as extensive coverage in the private press were

²³ Opinion of Cesinandra Xavier expressed in *Agora*, March 31 2001, p. 5.

²⁴ From the closing communiqué of the conference.

significant in maximising the publicity associated with the event, and in placing a female perspective on the war at a higher level within the public sphere, even if only temporarily.

The paper delivered by Cesinanda Xavier contained an interesting reflection on peace, which I highlight:

“we desire development in our society but we know that without peace there will be no development. We also know there will be no peace without dialogue and reconciliation. Within the African societies we belong to, based on orality, dialogue presents itself as the socialising element between men and women, and the most effective mechanism for the resolution of conflict. ... Therefore, for peace to be achieved in Angola, the only means to do so is through inclusive and encompassing dialogue. ... Many Accords have already been signed, many peace negotiations taken place. All this effort in favour for peace failed for two reasons:

1. The causes were not addressed, only the effects and symptoms.
2. The process involved only those who possess weapons and make war, not all those interested in the pacification of the country”.^y

Here we again encounter civil society’s emphasis on dialogue as the preferred means to end the war, with the conviction that a negotiated settlement was possible despite two failed peace agreements. For MPD, this inclusive dialogue envisaged the coming together of political parties, church representation, traditional authority, civic movements promoting peace, and individuals with an important contribution to make. A strong female component was envisaged in all this, which involved public sphere and non-public sphere actors working together.

Thirdly and finally, the MPD initiative to request a personal meeting with Jonas Savimbi to discuss ending the war, is worth highlighting. UNITA’s representative in Portugal, Carlos Morgado (2001), described the initiative at the time as one of “immense courage” with “the capacity to bear fruit”. He was critical of the UN’s silence and lack of support in relation to the initiative. When interviewed on this issue, Cesinanda Xavier was less critical of the UN, stating that the request apparently had to be processed through the UN in New York, but did express disappointment that no meeting took place with Jonas Savimbi.²⁵ The example is an important instance of a group of Angolans attempting to intervene directly in the search for peace in their own country.

²⁵ Interview with Cesinanda Xavier and Ana Maria Bastos de Nascimento, Luanda, November 13 2001.

5. *A new constitution – a civil society contribution.*

The issue of a new constitution moved up the political agenda when the National Assembly formally agreed to draft a new one in 1998 (law 1/98).²⁶ As seen in section one, the need for a new constitution had been agreed prior to the signing of Bicesse Accords (law 12/91), but the process was not underway before war broke out, being put on hold until these new procedures were established in 1998. The need for debate on the new constitution was important within the context of building peace. In South Africa and Northern Ireland for example, constitutional reform has frequently been a key component within the peace process itself. It provides society with an opportunity to re-imagine and reshape political structures that may have been divisive or discriminatory, and also to build new structures that foster inclusion and a greater sense of nationhood. It potentially provides society with a key moment in terms of laying new foundations for peace, with an opportunity to start again. The holding of future elections in Angola is dependent on a new constitution being ratified. A constitutional revision law of February 1996 (18/96) stated that the new constitution must be approved before future elections can be held.²⁷ Speaking at the British Angola Forum conference in 2002, Bornito de Sousa of the MPLA, a key member in the drafting of the new constitution, thought everything should be completed by 2003-2004, and then spoke of a possible 12-18 month adjustment period before elections would be held in 2004-2005.²⁸

In this section I examine the contribution of sixteen civil society organisations who together formulated constitutional proposals.²⁹ Under the initiative of AAD, ADRA and *Mosaiko*, these organisations focused primarily on ‘part two’ of the government’s seven-part provisional constitutional structure, dealing with ‘rights, freedoms and fundamental guarantees’. where a civil society contribution was felt most relevant and appropriate.³⁰

²⁶ Angola Peace Monitor, Vol. IV, number 8, April 30 1998.

²⁷ Point highlighted in *Mosaiko* (2001) summarising the law establishing the constitutional commission.

²⁸ Speaking in London November 12, 2002. The comment caused some surprise as 2004 had previously been indicated as a probable election year.

²⁹ A copy of the submission is available at <http://www.oaang.org/adra.htm>

³⁰ The new constitution will be divided into seven parts: Part 1 - Principles and Fundamental Objectives of the State. Part 2 - Rights, Freedoms and Fundamental Guarantees. Part 3 - Economic & Social Organisations. Part 4 - Organisation of State Power. Part 5 - Defence and National Security. Part 6 – Guarantee and Control of the Constitution. Part 7 - Final Dispositions. The Angolan government’s constitutional commission’s website is located at <http://www.comissao-constitucional.gv.ao/>.

Three meetings were held to prepare the submission. The first on December 15-16 1998, examined the history of Angolan constitutional law, and identified 'part two' as the key area where civil society could formulate proposals. At the second meeting a week later, it was decided to widen the process of consultation and seek opinion and proposals from across the country and from a greater number of civil society actors. This was in response to article 7 of law 1/98, which stated:

“parties recognised by the national assembly, social organisations and citizens. may present proposals and contributions on the project of a constitution for the Republic of Angola, to be directed to the president of the national assembly, who submits them to the Constitutional Commission”.

The third meeting in late February 1999 elaborated the final document which was sent to the president of the National Assembly on June 28, 1999.

Many of the points made in the submission reflect concerns of the time. With journalists coming under increasing pressure in 1999, these organisations requested that the protection offered to many other professions also be extended to media personnel. It argued for greater respect for human rights, focusing particularly on the rights of prisoners. The organisations advocated that the rights of conscientious objectors be upheld, requested to perform a form of civic or community service instead of military service. Other points reflected contemporary concerns, such as the inviolability of a person's mail and all forms of private communication. The latter reflects a suspicion that phone conversations were listened to by the state. Also highlighted were the right to a basic education for all Angolans, including those with disabilities; the need for clarification in relation to access and use of land, reflecting the growing concern that traditional rights were not being respected. In 2000, ADRA personnel approached the chairperson of the constitutional commission with a view to establishing if any of the suggestions had been accepted. The document had apparently not been forwarded to the chairperson of the commission. A further copy of the document was provided.

Two years after the initial submission, a new range of constitutional issues had gained prominence. *Mosaiko* personnel identified two key issues around which debate on the new constitution had crystallised: whether the eighteen provincial governors should be nominated by the President or elected by the population of each province; and how should

traditional authority be defined within the new constitution?³¹ In relation to the first issue, many within Angola argued that the new constitution should opt for the election of provincial governors in a bid to strengthen local democracy. The argument was that if provincial governors were elected by the people, rather than nominated by the President, they were more likely to govern better. A National Assembly debate in March 2002 decided the new constitution would maintain the former system of presidential nominations. According to the report, only the Lunda based party PRS voted against the proposal.³² It seems however, that the new constitution will require that provincial governors be chosen from the political party with a majority of parliamentary seats in each province.

Attempting to define traditional authority posed a number of problems for those drafting the new constitution. Despite having no legal status in law, traditional authority figures were entitled to a salary from the state and were classified as public service workers. This raised the question as to whether they were state employees and representatives of the government, or as they saw themselves, representatives of the people before the government. The administration of traditional justice by traditional authorities, and its relationship to state justice also needed clarification, given that state law is applicable nationally, and traditional justice systems are required to correspond to this. The new constitution envisaged the establishment of local government in Angola, which Pacheco (2002) believed needed to accommodate traditional rulers and civil society within its structures. He argued that this

“would allow for a smooth transition between the current situation and full democracy. It would constitute a magnificent opportunity for civil society to play an important role in the restructuring of local societies and the institutional strengthening” (Pacheco 2002:59-60).

The 1999 submission from a collective of civil society organisations and the later debate on the future constitution itself, were partially hampered by the absence of a constitutional lawyer within civil society. This did not prevent civil society however, engaging with ‘part two’ of the proposed constitution.

³¹ Mário Rui of *Mosaiko*, speaking at the annual meeting of the Catholic Commission for ‘Justice, Peace and Migration,’ held in Luanda from October 30 – November 1, 2001.

³² *Jornal de Angola*, March 7, 2002, internet edition entitled ‘Governadores provinciais vão ser nomeados’.

6. *Capacity building for peace.*

This section examines ‘capacity building’ as a particular dimension of civil society’s peace agenda. The reason for this inclusion is based on the general characterisation of Angolan civil society as ‘weak’, hence I explore efforts to strengthen civil society itself, and how such efforts enhanced peace involvement. As outlined in the introduction, I use the term ‘capacity building’ to include the ability of an organisation to lobby in pursuit of its objectives but, specifically in this case, refers to the ability of civil society organisations to organise and co-ordinate action in favour of peace.

As indicated earlier, many Angolan civil society organisations were founded in the period after the Lusaka Protocol. My recollection of this time is of the many workshops and seminars held to improve the managerial skills of these organisations, as well as skills in the areas of needs assessment, project elaboration, report writing and accounting. This initial emphasis appears to have been followed by an emphasis on ‘capacity building’ to improve the quality of existing outputs. In exploring peace related capacity building, I examine how ADRA, Development Workshop, FONGA and *Rede da Paz* engaged in this area to illustrate some of the activities undertaken.

Firstly, I explore a point of collaboration between the national NGO ADRA and the international NGO Centre for Common Ground, referred to in the previous chapter. The context was a three day seminar in 2001 for Angolan journalists from the private and state media on ‘Human Rights and Social Communication’ which I attended.³³ The seminar was organised and financed by the Centre for Common Ground, but ADRA personnel were sourced to facilitate the seminar. Forty journalists participated during the three days, many of whom had attended previous seminars dealing with media training. An important theme examined during the seminar was how better utilise the media to promote peace at various societal levels, including awareness of human rights. Many participants pointed to the lack of training available to journalists in Angola, where no third level qualification in journalism can be obtained. Others highlighted restrictions imposed by editors who prevented publication of work overly-critical of government. They argued that a greater

³³ ‘Direitos Humanos e Comunicação Social’, Luanda, October 23-25, 2001, facilitated by Helena Farinha of ADRA. My thanks to Centre for Common Ground for their invitation to participate in the seminar.

peace agenda engagement was not primarily a matter of incapacity or inadequate journalistic training, but a question of ensuring their work got past the editor. The point is important because it relocates the problem from one of journalistic incapacity to one of censorship.

During the seminar, a consensus emerged that journalists needed to challenge this perceived or real editorial space, and reengage professionally in favour of peace. It was especially journalists from the state media institutions who raised this issue and by all accounts it is they, not private media journalists, who are most eager to frequent similar NGO-led seminars. A point made by Berger (2002) is helpful here, which suggests that capacity building of this kind belongs more to a public sphere rather than to a civil society approach. Berger (2002:34) comments:

“While the civil society perspective suggests that the solution to government control of broadcasting is deregulation and privatisation, the public sphere approach calls for the transformation of government propaganda media into properly public media. This conceptual difference has significant implications”.

It appears to me that the facilitation undertaken by ADRA personnel and promoted by Centre for Common Ground, was about transforming media institutions into informative, critical sites of inquiry, which asked real questions about peace and conflict, about the long term development of Angola and the good of its people, irrespective of their designation as ‘private’ or ‘state-run’. The facilitation approach adopted in the seminar revealed a concern with improving the quality, and exploring the possibility of public debate within the media, a concern essentially with constructing a critical public sphere.

Secondly, I highlight two examples of where a number of organisations came together to strengthen their collective capacity in working for peace: the peace programme of Development Workshop (hereafter DW),³⁴ and the peace network known as *Rede da Paz*, both of which are significant in this regard. According to the DW peace building programme co-ordinator, Eunice Inácio, the programme was closely linked with the

³⁴ Though a Canadian NGO, DW is one of the most established international organisations in Angola, operating there since 1983 (Kibble & O’Neill 1997:332). The DW peace programme reflected the activities of local actors such as AEA, CICA, CEAST, AEDSA (Ecumenical Action for Social Development in Angola), IECA, *Mosaiko* and FONGA. For this reason I include the DW peace programme as an Angolan location where perspectives on peace were discussed and developed.

activities of the major Churches or church organisations, especially at local level.³⁵ In chapter three it was seen how the historical churches established COIEPA as an institutional mechanism in 1999 to work together for peace. Prior to this in 1998, the churches and a number of NGOs had come together with a view to “providing assistance to small initiatives of churches and civil society organisations that aim at leadership, conflict resolution and human rights” (Development Workshop 2001). At local or community levels, many churches and civil society organisations had programmes to promote peace and the DW initiative attempted to consolidate these.

The other example is that of *Rede da Paz* or ‘Peace Network’, established by COIEPA in late 2001. The sole criterion for membership of the network was the acceptance that dialogue between those at war represented the best means to secure peace. It brought together many civic organisations including traditional authority figures, and its very formation was a clear and public statement in favour of alternative methods to end to war, other than the military campaign under way at the time. It was a further attempt to institutionalise the Angolan peace movement by speaking with a unified voice and establishing clearer communication in relation to peace. The initial impact created by *Rede da Paz* was positive in terms of publicity and media coverage. After the death of Jonas Savimbi *Rede da Paz* called for a role for civil society in the monitoring of the Luena Peace Accords. At a meeting held in Luanda from May 29-31 2002, the peace network met to analyse the Luena document itself. I discuss this meeting briefly in the next chapter, as some of concrete proposals put forward are particularly relevant at the community level.³⁶

In setting out these examples of capacity building, mention must also be made of FONGA. Given its role as an NGO forum, it is reasonable to expect that FONGA would have taken the lead in initiatives of this nature. Indeed FONGA was a member of both the DW peace programme and *Rede da Paz*. However, it appeared beset by many internal problems and in need of serious reorganisation and reform at the end of 2001. Faria (2000:25) criticised FONGA for acting primarily as an intermediary organisation between local NGOs and

³⁵ Interview in Luanda, October 26 2001.

³⁶ See Friedrich Ebert Foundation (2002) for the full text of this document.

donor agencies, rather than offering leadership within civil society. Other criticisms to have emerged in fieldwork in relation to FONGA, included: it was undemocratic and in breach of its own constitution by not conducting elections; it failed to bring Angolan NGOs together or serve as a forum for reflection and priority setting. Munslow (1999:561) highlights a general assembly held in 1997 where only 70 of the 300 registered NGOs participated, and of these only 30 had actual programmes. During fieldwork research in November 2001, FONGA called a meeting to draft a letter to represent the views of Angolan NGOs for Ibrahim Gambari, then UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Africa. Only five organisations were present at the meeting.³⁷ Such weak participation reflects disillusionment with FONGA, as NGOs no longer regarded it as representative of them. There remains however a need for a well co-ordinated Angolan NGO forum.

6.1. *Capacity Building: some financial considerations.*

The question of international funding for Angolan organisations is one I propose to address in a general sense, in relation to its potential to enhance peace related capacity. The issue is important because a significant degree of civil society's development is a direct result of the availability of external funding. Also, civil society organisations themselves have been highly responsive to the shifting emphases and directions of donor finance and donor priorities, particularly as Angola moved from the humanitarian crisis of 1993-1994, to post-war reconstruction following the Lusaka Protocol and an increased emphasis on human rights promotion, then back to crisis again in 1998 with a new emphasis on supporting local peace initiatives. Some interviewees were of the opinion that some organisations were good at tracking the changing donor environment, and submitted projects for funding that had more to do with identifying donor funding priorities, than anything that emerged from a basic needs assessment.³⁸ This is suggestive of what Chabal (1996:46) termed the 'Caliban syndrome', the "extent to which Africans have learned to speak the language we [non-Africans] want or need to hear" (quoted in Jackson 2003:20).

³⁷ In September 2002, Ibrahim Gambari, was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Angola and head of UNMA, the United Nations Mission in Angola.

³⁸ Interview July 27 2000; interview October 22 2001.

Questions over the role of funding are prompted by an assessment of Angola's early civil society development offered by Malaquias (1995) in his doctoral thesis. Analysing thirteen of the first national NGOs, he wrote:

“they were created by individuals who wanted to take advantage of the real or perceived economic and financial advantages associated with having an NGO. This inflation of pseudo-NGOs was further stimulated by the perception that financial help would be forthcoming from the government and, possibly, from international partners as well” (Malaquias 1995:198-199).

The author is unequivocal that the first generation of NGOs were founded primarily as a response to potential financial opportunities on offer. Malaquias's overall assessment of Angolan NGOs prior to 1995 is rather negative. It leads to the impression that the creation of these NGOs was more about personal gain for their founders, than about pursuing objectives in relation to development or reconstruction. Malaquias's view not surprisingly, differs to that outlined by Fernando Pacheco, who situated ADRA, the organisation he founded, within the anticipated requirements of post-war reconstruction following the Bicesse Accords. There is no doubt that many people involved with national NGOs have done well financially, through their salaries paid in foreign currency, the lease of properties as office space, foreign travel and other opportunities. But to suggest a singular reason for the development of the NGO sector in Angola is overly reductive, and denies the possibility of altruistic and patriotic motivations of those involved. Angolan civil society seemed a different place at the end of 2001 to that identified by Malaquias in 1995.

The perception that a great deal of international funding was available to Angolan civil society is seriously challenged by data from a number of surveys. For example, Hodges (2001:82) quotes a 1996 survey conducted by the UNDP and the government ministry MINARS, which found that the average annual budget of national NGOs was less than \$170,000, compared to international NGO budgets of \$2.4 million. Howen (2001:33) adds further detail to national NGO finance by quoting a 2000 PACT³⁹ survey which stated that “51% of NGOs had annual incomes of less than \$20,000, and only 7 organisations or 8% had funding of over \$200,000 per year”. illustrating that the majority of national organisations deal with relatively small sums of finance. Howen also quotes an ADRA survey which revealed interesting findings regarding the salaries paid to NGO personnel.

³⁹ PACT - Private Agencies Collaborating Together Inc. Howen is quoting an unpublished survey.

ADRA found that only 29% of NGO staff received a salary, that 18% received some form of subsidy, and 53% received no remuneration. It is unclear how extensive this latter survey was, but taking the data at face value, these figures point to a very high level of dependence on voluntary work within civil society, and that almost 70% of Angolan personnel are non-salaried staff. These must presumably secure income from elsewhere, perhaps the informal sector, but the figure has profound implications for the capacity of any civil society organisation to achieve its objectives or to engage in peace related issues. Taken collectively, this data from Hodges and Howen challenge the suggestion that civil society organisations are motivated primarily by perceived financial rewards, pointing instead to nobler values.

Some of these values include altruism and dedication, perhaps even patriotism, and a sense of doing something positive by helping those in need. I would also suggest that some of the initiatives outlined in this chapter, such as human rights awareness and capacity building initiatives, were motivated by a sense of professional engagement with peace, that many from within a civil society 'workplace' engaged creatively and professionally to transform Angola incrementally. These professionals, part-time or full-time, understood peace work as a long-term strategy that went beyond an end to military confrontation, but involved addressing structural and institutional issues. This professionalism may have been born out of frustration with the unending nature of the war and its devastating impact on the country and its people, and with the inability of the Angolan government and UNITA to implement any of their peace agreements.

I conclude this chapter with some brief discussion on the earlier research questions. The chapter has explored key aspects of Angolan civil society peace engagement, revealing a significant emphasis on human rights awareness, which became a key component of civil society discourse within the public sphere. A civil society contribution in relation to the new constitution was also outlined, highlighting a willingness within civil society to come together to influence the content of the future constitution. The chapter also examined a women's organisation which contributed to peace by appealing for an end to the war and creating space for women to meet and discuss peace issues, especially how women were affected by war.

The analysis of two peace appeals was particularly insightful regarding perspectives on the conflict from within Angolan civil society. These revealed a desire for greater national participation by non-political actors in the search for peace, and were highly critical of the Angolan government and UNITA, arguing that war had become necessary for elements on both sides to pursue economic and political objectives. The documents negatively appraised international intervention, suggesting that a civil society component was essential in any future peace process, illustrating increasing maturation occurring within civil society generally. The chapter identified the post-Lusaka period as significant in the development and growth of Angolan civil society, a time when its peace engagement became more prominent.

The 'public sphere of civil society' was certainly a much larger place at the beginning of 2002 than that which existed prior to the Bicesse Accords. This related to quantitative issues, such as the numerical growth of associations and organisations active in peace, humanitarian and developmental areas, which consolidated the associational basis of civil society. However, it is the discursive basis of civil society, its contribution to public sphere discourse in relation to peace issues, that this chapter identified as having particular importance in qualitative terms. As a form of critical discourse, indeed 'critical trustee discourse', civil society challenged the basis upon which war in Angola was fought. This challenge, had previously been located within the discourse of the historical churches, but now also found expression in civil society and in private media institutions.

This development, in terms of a plurality of locations engaged in critical discourse, presents a theoretical paradox in Angola. As seen in chapter two, a democratic expectation accompanying the development and growth of national civil society is that the state becomes more accountable and transparent before its citizens. The paradox in Angola is that the development of Angolan civil society, where the public sphere has also increased spatially, has not resulted in increased governmental transparency or accountability, but instead witnessed state power become progressively centralised in the hands of the presidency. One must conclude that the expectation of greater accountability accompanying civil society development is either unfounded, or that civil society must reach a particular level of maturity and stature before the expectation is met. Either way,

during the latter years of the period under review, the processes of civil society development and governmental transparency and accountability, appeared to be relationally independent of each other.

Chapter 6.

Community-Based Peace Responses: A Narrative of 'the Common People'.¹

This chapter on 'community-based peace responses' situates itself within Angolan communities. Little analysis has taken place at this level within Angola either during the colonial or post-colonial periods, though as Robson (2001:6) pointed out:

“it is becoming clear that peacebuilding might involve actions at the community level that require some prior knowledge of social trends at that level”.

The focus of this chapter is slightly different to that of the previous, where analysis concerned how the national conflict was understood. Here, attention is more locally focused on what Angolan communities did for themselves to address issues of violence and conflict within their immediate contexts. On occasions this material will be relevant to the national conflict, but primarily the focus will be on local peace concerns which required local solutions. In adopting this approach, the chapter will contribute to a greater understanding of local Angolan communities, and their responses to violence and conflict.

A basic expectation of a peace process is that the cessation of hostilities leads to a reduction in violence and insecurity. Unfortunately this expectation is sometimes unfounded as peace agreements inadvertently usher in new forms of violence. A CIIR (1999b:11) report on Haiti, Guatemala and South Africa concluded that “it is not uncommon to find that formal peace processes alone are not enough to rid a society of violence”. Pankhurst & Pearce (1998:160) found that the El Salvador peace process,

“[had ended] the more extreme elements of violence, but ... poverty and human rights violations remain as persistent as ever, many exacerbated by the very conflict itself. Yet this is widely regarded as a *successful* mediation” (emphasis in original).

Afshar (1998:5) identified a weakness in formal peace deals, whereby

“[they] do not allow violence at the micro-level to be included in the negotiation process. They tend to draw a veil over the reality that though armed conflict may have been subsumed, ex-combatants are often responsible for domestic and other

¹ The reference here to 'common people' is in no sense intended to be offensive. It is taken from Habermas (1992:427) as a description of his plebeian public sphere, explained further in the chapter introduction.

forms of violence. Failure to resolve the structural issues which led to the conflict generate frustrations in the form of increased criminality”.

What persists is a form of ‘horizontal-violence’ (CIIR 1999b:11) which, though frequently a major issue during the conflict itself, was considered of secondary importance and placed to one side while efforts to resolve the national conflict were explored. However, with national peace agreements in place, the continuation of this violence becomes problematic and is seen as destabilising attempts at consolidating a peace process.

Chapter three of this thesis noted the rise in violence in Angola, identified by the historical churches in the months following the 1991 Bicesse Accords. AEA (1991) highlighted increased criminality and pointed to the failures and inadequacies within the justice system of the time, whereby “citizens [felt] obliged to take matters into their own hands”.¹ CEAST (1991:269) referred to levels of criminality and violence previously unseen in Angola. In effect, Angola’s own experience after the Bicesse Accords especially, suggests a similar reality to that identified in other countries, where conflict may have ended but violence and criminality threaten security and stability in new ways. Clearly peace processes in themselves do not necessarily bring about an end to violence. Other processes are required and it is at the local level that I explore community based responses and initiatives. These stand alongside the activity of civil society organisations, the churches and the media.

The research questions for this chapter can be set out as follows:

- What have Angolan local communities done to address violence and conflict?
- What specific issues have these local communities addressed?
- What mechanisms or structures have been used locally to promote peace?

In addressing these questions I have divided the chapter into two main sections: section one deals with community responses within local churches, and section two examines traditional community responses. I will outline the content more fully at the beginning of each section, but a brief explanation is relevant here. Firstly, interviewees pointed out during fieldwork that all the significant community-based organisations involved in peace

activities were associated with a church.² I was surprised by this response, but found it reflected of the nature of the organisations in question. Hence, the section deals with church-based community organisations. Secondly, section two uses the word 'traditional' because the peace related material here concerns the role of the traditional healer within rural communities. It explores the relevance of activities and practices engaged in by local healers for consolidating peace, especially in terms of 'psychologically' demobilising ex-combatants, particularly relevant following the signing of the Luena Accords. At the beginning of section two I will outline how the word 'traditional' is used in this research.

The word 'response' in the chapter title is an important indicator to the material that follows. It embraces more than the term 'organisation' which fails to capture some of the community-based activities this chapter considers important. Some church-based community responses clearly belong to organisations, but, as will be seen later, key elements do not. 'Responses' helps distinguish community-based organisations from civil society organisations, though I do not postulate an absolute differentiation between them. The two areas overlap and in many cases the distinguishing criterion is one of degree. For example, community-based organisations generally have deeper roots within Angolan society than civil society organisations and have little or no access to international donor assistance. If finance is available, it is usually micro-finance rather than project-based donor funding. Both leaders and members of community-based organisations generally have remunerated employment elsewhere, frequently considering their voluntary community involvement as a contribution to society or their church. Community-based structures are more informal and temporary than those of civil society. Traditional community-based material is better understood as a cultural response rather than an organisational one. Traditional healers apply their knowledge of healing as part of their profession, unrelated to any organisation. The word 'response' more accurately captures the nature of the material the chapter engages.

The use of Habermas's public sphere framework is faced with certain challenges and difficulties in the context of this chapter. The revisions to the public sphere set out in

² During interviews for example with Justino Pinto de Andrade, Luanda, November 28 2001; Manuel Quintino, Luanda, September 26 2001; Lourdes Diogo Almeida of CICA, Luanda, November 21 2001.

chapter two which expanded the concept of the public sphere in keeping with Habermas's original insights, enabled Habermas's theory to be used in the earlier part of this thesis. The concerns of this chapter however, take us away from these generally formal structures within Angolan society, to community based responses that are sometimes informal and often semi-structured. These concerns lead us in the direction of what Habermas termed 'the plebeian public sphere', which he excluded from his public sphere framework. I have shown in chapter two where Habermas recognised how he failed to appreciate the significance of this sphere in his original presentation of the bourgeois public sphere. It was not simply "a variant of the bourgeois public sphere that remained suppressed in the historical process", as Habermas (1992:425) had initially thought. Nor as we have seen, was it

"only a backdrop, that is, a passive echo of the dominant culture; it was also the periodically recurring violent revolts of a counter-project to the hierarchical world of domination, with its official celebrations and everyday disciplines" (Habermas 1992:427).

This plebeian public sphere or "culture of the common people" as Habermas (1992:427) described it, was radically different to the bourgeois.

In setting out the theoretical framework for this thesis, I sought to expand Habermas's insights in a direction that seemed appropriate and consistent within the parameters of his original concerns, based on Habermas's recognition of the limitations of his earlier work. To explore the "culture of the common people" within a revised Habermasian framework would, I argue, push Habermas too far away from his original field of inquiry and seek to name something as 'Habermasian', which Habermas did not engage. This is not to suggest that Habermas's insights cannot assist in furthering understanding of the plebeian public sphere, in this case community based realities, but to name this sphere as 'Habermasian' seems unnecessary and inappropriate. As I illustrate in chapters six and seven, Habermas's insights are instructive in understanding processes and cultures that his theory did not engage or envisage, but to frame these processes within a 'Habermasian public sphere' framework is beyond where I situate the limits of his theory. The public sphere dimension of these next two chapters is better captured by Seyla Benhabib's (1992:87) definition of the public sphere:

“whenever or wherever all affected by general social and political norms of action engage in a practical discourse, evaluating their validity”.

I refrain from calling it Habermasian, but where possible, I read these realities through Habermas’s public sphere.³

1. *Community-Based Church responses.*

Speaking at the ‘Angolan Reflections on Peace Building’ conference held in The Hague, Octávio Fernando (1999) of AEA delivered a paper on ‘The Role of the Churches and Church-based NGOs’ in promoting peace and national reconciliation. Referring to ‘micro level’ church involvement, Fernando identified the following activities as important contributions to peace: human rights workshops and seminars, civic education, conflict resolution and prevention, training of leaders, activities fostering the development of a harmonious society, ecumenical services and demonstrations. A number of these activities were examined in the last chapter, for example, human rights workshops promoted by the church based NGO *Mosaiko*, indicating a certain overlap between this and the previous chapter. I situate many of the activities listed above within this community-based approach to peace and reconciliation. Before examining these however, I look at the concept of ‘culture of peace’ which informs much of the activity occurring within the churches at the community level.

The ‘culture of peace’ concept became significant within the language of the historical churches in the late 1990s in framing its peace initiatives. This reflected its growing emphasis within international circles, most notably the UN, where UNESCO (2002) described a ‘culture of peace’ as:

“transforming conflict; preventing potentially violent conflict and rebuilding peace and confidence among peoples emerging from war. ... Building a culture of peace involves providing children and adults with an understanding of the principles of and respect for freedom, justice, democracy, human rights, tolerance, equality and solidarity. It implies a collective rejection of violence”.

³ I am keenly aware of the vastness of Habermas’s work and theorising. Given that my theoretical framework is based on Habermas’s public sphere and not other parts of his theoretical project, I will restrict the commentary I provide in this chapter to Habermas’s writing on the public sphere.

Malang's (2001) definition is similar but includes an important emphasis on "inter-cultural understanding". The notion of 'culture of peace' is important because it encapsulates much of what the churches contributed to peace at a societal level, where they have argued that an end to the war, understood simply in terms of weapons becoming silent will not bring about peace. Unchallenged violence, even in wartime, compounded the task of working for peace by creating a climate of insecurity. Building a culture of peace was seen as involving each member of society in an attempt to invert a culture of violence. This approach to peace is sometimes referred to within the churches as "education for peace" (CICA 2001a) or "creating a new mentality" (CEAST 1996:366), seeking to build or rebuild civic behaviour and foster wider citizenship. It reflects a belief that "the logic of peace begins with each one of us".⁴

A number of documented examples convey this broad civic approach to peace promoted by the Churches. For example, a series of seminars on 'Lasting Peace' by the Angolan Evangelical Congregational Church (IECA 2000), held in a number of Angolan provinces in 1998 and 1999, produced a report which stated: "every citizen has the duty to be an ambassador of peace in his/her house, place of work, and the city where they live". It added that "any programme of lasting peace is participative, and its success depends on the contribution of all its members". This work for peace was described as seeking to effect a deeper transformation of the person and society, in the hope "of having peace at home, peace in the street, peace in the schools, progress and prosperity for all".ⁱⁱ At one level these statements appear to reflect a top-down approach from a national church to local communities, which is undoubtedly a factor, but in an important sense these statements exemplify the national church reflecting back to the local community what the local community itself is saying. A further example again from the IECA church, was a youth conference held in Benguela in August 2000. A statement from the conference reads:

"the present war which has taken so many lives, has no foundation. peace is not simply the absence of war, but a process which ought to be concerned with relationships between human beings" (CICA 2000).ⁱⁱⁱ

⁴ Comment made during a meeting with a bible group at the Carmo Church, Luanda, November 21 2001.

It went on to call for greater action by the churches in the promotion of peace, arguing for the development of moral and civic education programmes within the churches, schools and families, and to include democratic education.⁵ Initiatives at the local level are not simply the implementation of institutional policies from above, but reflect shared concerns. As the example illustrates, the local level was asking for greater leadership and planning from above.

The section is structured as follows. Section 1.1 situates local churches within the community, underlining their role as places of ‘interpretation’ and as centres of ‘civic education’ for local people. This is important because it provides individuals and communities with a vision of a better Angola that seeks to strengthen the fabric of society based on civic and family values. The section developed out of a question I frequently posed during fieldwork about the reasons for an individual’s church involvement. Section 1.2 outlines some of the structures utilised by local communities in addressing violence, particularly domestic violence, which is a serious issue in Angola. Section 1.3 explores means by which local communities communicate publicly, examining the role of peace gatherings and peace marches, and also presents a statement by Angolan refugees living in Zambia, highlighting their desire for peace in their native land. Section 1.4 adopts a gender perspective, looking at the place and role of women’s organisations, specifically a Catholic organisation called *Promaica*, which challenged police officers and military personnel regarding the insecurity created by them in the communities where they worked.

1.1. *Places of Interpretation and of Civic Education.*

While churches are clearly places where local communities worship, they have also exercised other functions within Angolan society. On occasions local churches have been used as locations for the distribution of humanitarian aid, or church networks have been used to ensure that aid reaches the most needy in society.⁶ In many places churches are used as schools, health clinics, dispensaries, and as locations for holding meetings.

⁵ In 2000, CICA and COIEPA were working on a project called ‘Education for Peace’, which it hoped would result in a school textbook. Interview with Noé Alberto José of CICA, Luanda, November 21 2001.

⁶ Cáritas was responsible for a good deal of food distribution at one stage of the 1992-1994 war and used church buildings and personnel for food distribution.

Robson and Roque (2001:135) highlighted the “social and religious activities” undertaken by the churches, before commenting that:

“[c]hurches are almost the only places where residents of ... neighbourhoods can meet, discuss or take part in an activity together. ... Also, churches appear to provide points of stability in a context of rapid change”.

While the churches have provided stability for many people, they have also played an important role as ‘places of interpretation’, where people could seek understanding and advice in the midst of high levels of insecurity and poverty caused by war and internal displacement. This space, characterised by the promotion of values such as love and forgiveness, peace and reconciliation, and the affirmation of human dignity, (which is not to suggest that churches are immune to disharmony), became increasingly important as the sequence of wars unfolded especially for Angola’s poor, who transformed them into vibrant hopeful centres, in contrast to the harsh realities that surrounded them, becoming places where new interpretations and perspectives were gained. This space has been important on two levels.

Firstly, individuals responding to the question of why they were members of a church, frequently underlined the advice or ‘*conselho*’ received there.⁷ Catechists, teachers, preachers, priests, or pastors - whatever the designated term within different churches - were often described as people who listened and tried to understand, and could be called on for advice. For many, their church was one of the few places within society where advice could be obtained. Counsel had been sought on a range of issues, including personal problems, family matters, issues of reconciliation within the home, extended family or with neighbours. Others stated that this advice was part of the general communication process within the church, considering it as locally focused practical advice. It was civic in nature, promoted within a context where violence was rejected as a means to resolve disputes, and peaceful means encouraged. There was also a strong public quality to the nature of this communication, conducted in an open place. The style of communication varies from one church to another with some quite participative and discursive, suggesting we are dealing with a public sphere location in the Habermasian sense in such instances.

⁷ This opinion was voiced by many individuals and groups, perhaps most clearly during a meeting with over forty members of a ‘bible study’ group in Luanda on November 21 2001, at the Carmo church.

Secondly, the churches were also understood by many as places of interpretation of wider political and social issues. Church participation often provided a person with a language, usually biblically based, with which to identify and analyse Angola's ills. In the retelling of stories from the bible, for example, and reflecting on biblical themes such as oppression and liberation, slavery and freedom, many Angolans heard echoes of their own history, particularly the struggle for national independence. Themes dealing with conflict and the need for forgiveness, or hatred and the need for reconciliation, have also prompted reflection on the war and the need for non-violent means to resolve disputes. Epstein (1991:225) noted how some

“Christians like to point out that poor people in the Third World understand the message of the bible easily because it is about oppression and resistance in a society very much like those they live in”.

Those frequenting the historical churches would have heard communications from CICA, AEA, and CEAST, where the perspective from the churches' leadership were set out. The comment highlights a sense of identification experienced in local communities as biblical stories are recounted, an identification which instilled hope that things could change, that war could end.

1.2. *Local Structures to Address Conflict and Violence.*

The existence of groups with a mandate to act on behalf of the community in relation to peace, reconciliation and justice is a positive feature of many church based communities. It is not uncommon to encounter groups such as '*Comissão da Justiça e Paz*', (Justice and Peace Commission), '*Comissão da Família*', (Family Commission), '*Comissão do Lar e Família*' (Commission of the Home and Family), '*Assembleia de Catequistas*' (Catechists Assembly) and other similar structures. Though strength and effectiveness varies in different communities, the existence of these groups denotes the presence of an infrastructure that can be called on to address violence and to effect peaceful change, and also to engage with issues of social justice in society. These groups are not found within all church-based communities but were well established in the fieldwork areas. For example, CICA has a '*Department of Justice, Evangelisation, Reconciliation and Co-operation*' (*Departamento de Justiça, Evangelismo, Reconciliação e Cooperação*, DJERC), run by Noé Alberto José who co-ordinates local initiatives, including outreach

programmes to the provinces.⁸ Local ‘Justice and Peace Commissions’ within the Catholic Church are part of a diocesan and national structure. The IECA Church had a project called ‘*Paz Durável*’ (Durable Peace) based on the idea of a ‘peace *ondjango*’, the term used in Angola to denote the traditional meeting place and site where conflict was addressed.⁹ The *ondjango* will be explored more fully in the next chapter, a key structure within traditional society.

These examples point to community structures which provide a framework for local communities to address violence and conflict, thereby potentially making their local environments more peaceful. To explore these structures more fully I focus now on the specific issue of domestic violence and examine different approaches utilised.

1.2.1. *Domestic Violence.*

Meintjes (2002:4) makes the rather disturbing comment:

“[e]vidence confirms that the gender violence women experience in wartime increases when the fighting dies down”.

The quotation points to the importance of examining domestic violence within the context of this research, a form of violence that increases once conflict ends, and explore some of the means available to address the issue. Pillay (2002:35) notes that in the “aftermath of conflict” women’s exposure to brutality and torture generally escalates. This is related to the return home of soldiers from war, often traumatised and poorly equipped to speak of their experiences. Demobilised soldiers may not cope well with their new unfamiliar situation, perhaps adapting poorly to civilian life and feeling a sense of powerlessness away from their ‘familiar’ military context. Though women invariably suffer more than men during conflict, Sideris (2002:52) has suggested that “men’s identity might emerge from conflict even more damaged than women’s”, underlining the need for effective demobilisation programmes that address the question of identity, and experience of trauma in war.

⁸ Interviewed in Luanda on November 21 2001.

⁹ From APAN (2002), Update Angola, No.2 Vol. 4, July-September 2002.

Attempting to establish the incidence of domestic violence within any society is difficult because of under-reporting. No detailed reports exist for Angola which provide statistics on the prevalence of domestic violence, but the existing evidence suggests that the issue is a serious one.¹⁰ A *Jornal de Angola* editorial from April 2002 entitled 'Violence in the Home', strongly suggested that domestic violence was increasing and had resulted in the death of a number of women, though it did not connect this with the post-conflict increase in domestic violence mentioned above.¹¹ I have identified three approaches used to address domestic violence in Angola, which I set out below.

Firstly, domestic violence has been covered in the print and broadcast media, as part of an educational approach which highlighted and examined the issue, though in neither case could the coverage be considered extensive. *Rádio Ecclésia* programmes, particularly those dealing with human rights, also dealt with the issue. In the private print media the topic generally received greater attention during the month of March, when 'International Women's Day' and 'Angolan Women's Day' are celebrated. Within the churches this educational approach is evident through talks and seminars. CICA's women's department for example, promoted a series of talks in member churches on the theme 'Violence against Women'.¹² A perception prevails however, that domestic violence is a private issue which receives occasional publicity but then recedes again. It is a transient issue within the public sphere that moves between the private and public spheres.

Secondly, church groups occasionally intervene in cases of domestic violence. The pastor of the Seventh Day Adventist church in Dundo spoke of his church's twelve member 'Comissão de Lar e Família' (Home and Family Commission) which intervened in such issues.¹³ Many churches have similar family structures. While usually waiting to be invited by families needing assistance, such groups also take the initiative themselves. The

¹⁰ See for example, *Actual* December 8 2001, page 11; *O Independente* August 31 2002, page 7; *Jornal de Angola* reported a statistic of 1772 cases during the first six months of 2002 in Cazenga, Luanda's most populous *bairro*.

¹¹ *Jornal de Angola* (April 3 2002). It commented that the Ministry for the Family and Promotion of Women, the National Children's Institute and the Women's Network had important roles to play in addressing domestic violence.

¹² From CAA (2000).

¹³ Interview with Pastor Eliseu Vitor, Dundo, October, 2001.

right of church based groups to intervene is largely unquestioned, especially if those involved are from the same church. Despite the prevalence of violence, Angolans have retained a belief in talking or dialogue as the means to resolve conflict, inherited, in my view, from practices within the traditional structure of the *ondjango*. Though the *ondjango* is not found in the city, its principle of providing a forum where individuals meet and talk still prevails. Hecht and Simone (1994:85) commented that,

“[though] more and more Africans now live in urban areas, they’ve neither abandoned the sensibility of the rural village nor have they assimilated themselves into an urban ethos”.

Many, if not most urban Angolans, live semi-urban/semi-rural realities. In many respects, church-based interventions are built on traditional structures and principles, particularly the rights of elders to offer counsel as they would have done in the village setting, though this has changed in the context of the city. The mandate of church-based groups to intervene is built on this cultural understanding and expectation.

A third approach to domestic violence straddles church-based and traditional practices, based on the cultural practice whereby women have the right to call a meeting of key individuals to express how they are being treated. These individuals include: members of both extended families; those who witnessed the payment of the dowry, regarded as trustworthy in the eyes of the couple and both families; and those who were the official witnesses at the civil or religious wedding, known as *padrinhos*. These meetings provide the woman with an important forum to express her opinion, and outline her grievances. All present are given the opportunity to speak and if the relationship is considered irretrievable, the dowry may be returned and the couple divorce according to traditional means. If the relationship continues, a family member is sometimes nominated to accompany the couple. This forum, belonging to the private sphere, is more usual in rural than urban areas, and points to an important cultural mechanism invoked to address domestic violence.

There is also evidence of limited government support in this area through the creation of Advice Centres to support women. For example, a centre established by the ‘Ministry for Family and Development of Women’ dealt with 1,820 family related issues, many related to domestic violence, in the first six months of 2002 (*Jornal de Angola*, October 14.

2002). According to media reports, a number of cases were referred to lawyers, but in so far as I could establish during fieldwork from interviews with a number of lawyers, there has yet to be a case in Angola of someone being convicted for domestic violence. This raises the issue of an effective legal system that takes the question of domestic violence seriously and enables women to have confidence that the legal system offers them protection and the possibility of redress. These legal mechanisms are not in place in Angola.

1.3. *Local Communities Communicating Peace.*

This section sets out to consider ways in which local communities publicly communicated a desire for peace. Local communities have always prayed for peace and an end to the war. It was especially from within this sector of the population that the rank and file of the FAA and UNITA troops were drawn, in many cases through conscription (FAA) or conscription and capture (UNITA). Families frequently attempted to hide their sons during times of conscription so as to prevent them being drafted into the army. Often there was little that could be done when a new draft was announced and their sons were taken away. The families' pain and anguish was often compounded by a lack of information concerning where the young men were sent for training. Despite a feeling within local communities that this was not 'their' war, as shown in the cartoons in chapter four, these feelings rarely took the form of organised protest. This was due I believe, to a feeling of powerlessness that anything could be done to make a real difference and, bearing in mind the sense of terror that followed the *27 de Maio* coup attempt, by a fear of organising publicly.

Within this context where public protest was rare and perceived as dangerous, I highlight two examples which illustrate some occasional means used by local communities to express a desire for peace. The first is that of demonstrations such as peace marches or gatherings, where public communication was both verbal and non-verbal. Chazan (1994:273) noted how events such as demonstrations and vigils, were methods used by grassroots organisations "to express their positions". While peace marches usually involved speeches, the communication occurring is best judged, not from the content of the speeches, but from the size, mood, and enthusiasm of the crowd. A candle light vigil

for peace with people walking silently, for example, may communicate as powerfully as a well delivered speech. The second example is a document by Angolan refugees in Zambia, communicating their wish for peace and a desire to assist in the process, through their churches and an international organisation.

1.3.1. *Peace Demonstrations.*

Peace demonstrations in the form of gatherings or marches represent a popular forum where thousands have come together to express a desire for peace.¹⁴ These gatherings or marches are usually expressions of support for institutional peace initiatives, but also reveal an alliance between community-based organisations and leadership structures in pursuit of a shared ideal. It is not uncommon generally, for leadership initiatives and top-down processes to fail to attract popular support, but a feature of Angolan peace marches and gatherings was the support they enjoyed, revealing significant popular ownership and support for the peace strategies promoted by the institutional churches. This for example, was a feature of how COIEPA (the historical churches ecumenical peace commission) sought to mobilise public opinion in favour of peace, after its establishment in 1999. It is because these strategies enjoyed such local level support that I locate them within the framework of community-based responses, not within the peace narrative of the historical churches.

Though I have suggested that peace demonstrations represented a relatively recent phenomenon in Angola, they belong within an older cultural form familiar to Angolans, where events involve public walking and singing. Burials, for example, usually involve people walking from the home of the deceased to the cemetery, crying and singing as they go. In more recent times, the walking has been replaced by the hire of vehicles and, though the form may have changed, the public nature of the event remains. Marriage and betrothal ceremonies follow a similar pattern of public celebration. It is not uncommon in rural areas to encounter a crowd singing and dancing as a young woman is accompanied to

¹⁴ Schubert (2000:217) refers to an ecumenical celebration after the Bicesse Accords, held on June 2 1991, at the national football stadium in Luanda. It was requested by the Angolan president and was not an initiative of the churches.

the house of her future husband. Against this cultural background I interpret peace demonstrations as a public form of communication in favour of peace.

The Economist (2000) captured some of the vitality and dynamism of a peace march organised by COIEPA in 2000, stating

“COIEPA’s first big action was to organise a march for peace on June 11th in Luanda, which culminated in a huge ecumenical service in the national football stadium. The marchers set out from three points in the capital, to converge, singing and dancing, on the stadium. By the time COIEPA’s secretary-general rose to explain his organisation’s goals, he found himself addressing a congregation of 10,000. This is the churches’ strength: no other organisation can mobilise as many people”.¹⁵

Gatherings of this nature represented a means by which individuals and local communities expressed their desire for peace in their own right, and also supported the peace work of organisations such as COIEPA. Collective gatherings and peace marches of this nature represented a secure form of demonstration, on the basis of ‘safety in numbers’. Collective forms of demonstration address both the needs to communicate and to feel secure in doing so, representing, to use Scott’s (1985) celebrated phrase, ‘a weapon of the weak’. It has the advantage of ensuring greater security for those who may fear speaking individually and being singled out, and also ensures greater representativity than individual communication. These gatherings also validate ‘from below’ the positions adopted by organisations within civil society whose work reveals a posture of ‘trusteeship’, as outlined in the chapter five.

Popular mobilisation is by no means confined to church organisations. The government and UNITA have a long history of organising *comícios* or political rallies in support of their objectives (Schubert 2000:163). These involved speeches to assembled crowds who gathered to hear a speaker or number of speakers. Two examples are worth highlighting because they illustrate clearly this collective form of communication. Though not originating within church-based communities, the examples concern peace activity at a

¹⁵ CICA newsletter no. 49, stated that a similar peace march also took place in the province of Bengo on the same day. CICA no. 107, highlighted the strong peace theme that accompanied the ecumenical gathering held at the national football stadium in 2001, celebrating 26 years on independence in 2001. During my time in Dundo, many of the churches held public events to celebrate a religious festival or occasion, which invariably involved prayers for peace and an ending to the war.

community level. The first expressed popular approval after the April 2002 cease-fire; the second communicated disapproval at the administration of the governor of Malange Flávio Fernandes, during the President's visit to the city in June 2002.

Firstly, the *Jornal de Angola* of April 6, 2002 described the general sense of relief and celebration at the signing of the Luena Peace Accords, on April 4, 2002, manifested in a peace demonstration:

“Angola, from Cabinda to Cunene, yesterday dressed in white to salute the definitive end of the war and the arrival of peace. Thousands of people, especially in the provincial capitals participated in long marches to greet the signing on Thursday of the formal signing of a cease-fire between the Angolan Armed Forces and UNITA military forces”.^{16iv}

Over fifty thousand were said to have marched before gathering near the offices of the national radio station, to celebrate the ending of the war, a momentous moment in the history of Angola.

The second example centres on the Presidential visit to Malange in July 2002, part of the new ‘open presidency’ style of government, in which the President proposed holding regular government meetings outside the Angolan capital in order to have a clearer understanding and appreciation of local concerns. The *Journal of Angola* (July 6, 2002, p3) estimated that 70,000 people turned out to greet the President in Malange. After the President had spoken, the provincial governor Flávio Fernandes (mentioned in chapter four in relation to critical media coverage of his administration), was called on to speak. The disaffection with which he was held by the people became apparent as the crowd prevented him from making his address and protested by booing and holding placards aloft at his years of misgovernment.¹⁷ The President, who had seemed impervious to media criticism regarding Flávio Fernandes’ administration, was obliged to intervene and declare that the province would have a new governor. It was an extra-ordinary moment

¹⁶ The statement strangely ignores the fact that FLEC’s war in Cabinda had not ended. also evident elsewhere in the state media at the time. A *Jornal de Angola* editorial of November 11, stated “Today, for the first time in their history as a free nation, Angolans commemorate their national feast in peace”. The November 12 editorial quoted President dos Santos’s address to the nation on the previous day: “The page of war has been closed for good, and the political agenda for national pacification has been fulfilled”. In his 2002 end of year message, President dos Santos did speak of the Cabindan conflict, expressing the hope that peace would have been secured before the next elections.

¹⁷ *Agora*, July 13 2002.

and *Angolense* suggested that the protest reflected a new form of civilised ‘rebellion’ in the country.¹⁸ The public repudiation of Flávio Fernandes reveals the degree of exasperation felt by a people no longer willing to follow the script of the *comício*, to simply applaud what was said by political officials. The protest was probably not entirely spontaneous (placards require preparation) and it is an interesting example of people recasting their public behaviour to demand change, to reveal that local government no longer enjoyed their consent. Worth noting here is how the *comício* as a communicative arena was transformed and became a ‘temporary public sphere’ when the crowd began to express its disapproval and voice its own opinion. We have an example here of the culture of the common people breaking through to communicate with the political sphere. It shows that the public sphere within Benabib’s definition can be most anywhere, as long as people are engaged in critical communication with one another.

1.3.2. *Refugees.*

This sub-section highlights how Angolan refugees utilised their churches as a resource to communicate their aspiration for peace in their native land. The document entitled ‘The Mongu Communiqué on Peace Initiatives on Angola’, comes from refugees living in Zambia and is included as appendix 3 in this thesis.¹⁹ Some of the Angolans in the camps in question, had been refugees for thirty-four years and longed to return home. The document was the result of a visit to these camps on November 26-27, 2000, organised by the *Committee on Angola for Peace*, a sub committee of the *Southern Africa Churches’ Ministries for Uprooted People* (SACMUP 2000).

The text itself, signed by eight representatives of various churches within the camps, testifies as to how a group generally considered ‘voiceless’, successfully communicated their sense of desperation and a desire for an end to the war in order that they could return home. They utilised a resource available to them to articulate their point of view, namely their membership of different churches. The following extract illustrates their perception

¹⁸ *Angolense*, July 13-20 2002, page 5.

¹⁹ This text was forwarded to me by a colleague in Angola. All information in the document is attributed to Shirley Wolf, Regional coordinator of SACMUP. The refugees at Nangweshi and Mayukwayukwa Camps met at Limulungu Pastoral Training Centre, Mongu, Zambia.

of the war as senseless, and communicated their desire to be included, together with church leaders, in peace negotiations:

“As refugees, we feel rootless, abandoned, forgotten and have become a group of people without human dignity. It is in this vein that we strongly ask for peace in Angola because we do not have an answer as to why the war is continuing. ... We [recognise] the existence of a fragmented church; i.e. the urban, the bush and the refugee camps. ... We appeal to political parties to exercise tolerance and stop intimidating Angolans praying and working for peace. We recommend that leaders of the church in the diaspora be included in all efforts for peace in Angola. ... We hereby unreservedly offer ourselves to be included in all peace negotiations for Angola. We are tired of the war and we want to go home”.

A strong sense of isolation is palpable in the document, including the frustration of being unable to communicate effectively with the outside world. Circulated among the Angolan churches, the text reveals how refugees responded to a visit by an international agency to publicise their needs. The example shows that powerlessness and poverty do not necessarily imply passivity, but also suggests that the views of groups such as refugees, in order to receive adequate attention and due consideration, require other influential actors within the public sphere to highlight them. The document is an example of how discourse within the plebeian public sphere can be picked up by another party considering it important and relevant and communicated within the bourgeois public sphere.²⁰

1.4. *Community based women's organisations.*

The approach adopted in the previous chapter, examining the contribution of women's organisations as a specific category, will be continued here by looking at church-based women's organisations. I take a specific focus on a group called *Promaica*, a Catholic organisation engaged in promoting women's development. Organisations of this nature generally have multiple objectives including faith and personal development (through bible study, prayer and group meetings, talks and human development programmes), and skills development (literacy, cooking, sewing). These provide various settings for social interaction and offer practical means to improve the quality of people's lives. Many of these activities are directed at strengthening the 'private' or 'domestic' sphere, but these

²⁰ I also wish to include here a brief reference to a group of displaced people from the area of Lóvua, about 50kms west of Dundo. In 1997 they fled to Dundo and eventually settled as a group near the old airport. After building their homes, they proceeded to build two small churches, one Protestant, the other Catholic. It appears to me that for this displaced group, the rebuilding of community structures was intrinsically connected with the recreation of church structures, which maintained the cohesiveness of the group.

organisations are frequently characterised by a strong social commitment evident through a range of outreach activities. For example, during interviews with Lourdes Almeida of the CICA's women's department, and with personnel from *Cáritas* (CEAST humanitarian agency) in Luanda,²¹ it was pointed out that many groups had taken it upon themselves to visit prisons and hospitals recognising that prisoners and patients needed assistance, being among the most vulnerable in society.²² These groups would not necessarily have described this as peace work, but rather as part of their civic or Christian duty. In many instances those organising the visits had been displaced from their areas of origin and remarkably were addressing the hardships experienced by others through a form of 'meals on wheels'. Donations of food would be collected within the community, prepared and transported to the hospital or prison and then distributed. State institutions in Angola provide some food to prisoners and patients, usually insufficient to meet a person's nutritional requirements. Families generally have the responsibility of providing food. These are practical examples of attempts to alleviate the effects of war. Within this dimension of women's organisations' social outreach, I examine an instance of peace engagement in the southern coastal town of Benguela in 1999. I am aware that the example is from outside the chosen research areas, but I justify its inclusion because of its importance and the approach to peace and security it reveals. This engagement was recounted to me by *Promaica* personnel in Dundo and Luanda, who had attended a training course in Benguela in 1999, where they heard first-hand the details of what was undertaken.

I characterise the nature of the engagement undertaken by *Promaica* as an attempt to 'humanise the war'. Uniquely and courageously the organisation took it upon itself to challenge military and police personnel in Benguela regarding their threatening behaviour and the stealing of goods and money, primarily from local women as they returned home from their fields or traded in the town market. The issue of insecurity in Benguela has

²¹ Lourdes Diogo Almeida, interviewed Luanda, November 21 2001; group interview with Paulo António João, Ana and Quintas, of *Caritas* team, Luanda, August 4 2000.

²² For example, a number of Dundo churches collaborated over a number of years to ensure food was brought to the local prison each Friday. As a result, prisoners were not only fed once a week, but the prison was cleaned and tidied, which had not been occurring on a regular basis.

been highlighted elsewhere by Parson (2002) who commented on the government's 1997 'anti-banditry' campaign in the provinces of Benguela, Huila and Huambo. Parsons stated:

“[this campaign had to be] abandoned because the MPLA were forced to admit they did not have control over their own security forces, while in Luanda violence perpetrated by those services was often indistinguishable from general criminal activity”.

Clearly the area was experiencing serious internal security problems, independent of the threat posed by UNITA. International Alert (2001:22) identified the security forces as one of the institutions frequently most in need of reform in post-conflict contexts, where retraining is generally needed to ensure a reduction in violence and corruption.

Central to the approach adopted by the *Promaica* group was the use of a strategy based on shared cultural understandings of the extended family, whereby one addresses others as mother-father, grandfather-grandmother, aunt-uncle, brother-sister and so on. out of respect, though there may be no relationship of consanguinity. The usage appears somewhat unusual at first, and one is unsure of how these familial terms apply in different contexts. It does however, indicate friendship and respect for the person with whom one is speaking. Having received authorisation from the respective commanding officers, groups of six or eight women visited army barracks and police stations in the area, with smaller groups calling at checkpoints and to private security personnel. In their meetings the women got to know the personnel in question by engaging them in conversation about where they were from originally, if they received news from their families, if their families knew where they were and what their families did for a living. They asked how the war had affected their families, if they had been displaced, had access to food, to their land, and so on. Building on this information, they then asked how these men would feel if their families, their mothers and fathers, had food and money stolen from them, and were assaulted if they did not co-operate. The police and military accepted that such things should not happen which enabled the women to ask why similar things were being done to the men and women of Benguela who, in the cultural context, were also family, were their mothers and fathers.

The strategy produced tangible results as some of the military and police apologised for their behaviour, saying they had not understood what they were doing. Others wrote letters

conveying regret for what happened and thanked the women for their visit and for what they had said. Culturally speaking, the women were the mothers of these men, an understanding they were able to build on in addressing the issues threatening their livelihoods and the security of their households. We see here a group of women drawing on their gender and culture to address a local issue. The engagement promoted by these women was creative and remarkable, and I look at it from two perspectives: the nature of their political engagement and the possibility of engendering peace discourse.

1.4.1. Political engagement.

Swerdlow (1989:226) has characterised the political engagement of women's groups as "usually short-lived", leaving "an ambiguous legacy in terms of political culture and feminist consciousness". Though the women's group cited above continued to exist, its activity can be described as short-lived, reflecting a task-centred approach that focused on a specific achievable concern. Had the word 'political' been applied to the women's activity, they would possibly have terminated the initiative because as King (1989:282) states, "politics is by definition a big-time, abstract, male enterprise". Most likely the women would have characterised their activity as Christian rather than political, highlighting the overlap or ambiguity that oftentimes exists between religious action for justice and political engagement. Rowbotham (1992:294) however has cautioned against ascribing a consciousness to a group that they themselves do not claim and has instead spoken of "protests that have no name", a description that can perhaps be applied here.

This usage of familial terms reveals what Faure (2000:161) calls "an integrative mechanism" that "leads to a shift in problem framing". The question of insecurity in Benguela was not interpreted as an 'us-them' problem, but was addressed (not resolved) by establishing relationship and common links. This approach also sheds light on the unease felt by many at the community level in relation to what they perceive as the confrontational approach adopted by some media publications and civil society organisations. Confrontation, in the sense of condemnation, is generally only resorted to by community-based organisations when other methods have failed to produce a dividend. By conducting their campaign in familial terms, the women felt comfortable in doing what they did.

The right of women to speak publicly or voice protest in Angola raises issues about the discourse of women within the public sphere. Though no legal or constitutional restrictions to impede women in this regard, ambiguity arises at the cultural level as some interviewees suggested that women have no public voice and no authority to speak publicly.²³ These argued that rural women in particular had internalised a strong sense of not having a voice, highlighting the existence of significant cultural barriers that need surmounting. Despite these cultural assumptions and interpretations, and statements to the effect that women have no voice, Angolan women have protested and made their voices heard. This is sometimes done by organising in a different way through transient or task-centred structures, as in the Benguela example. It was also seen earlier in relation to domestic violence, where women speak by invoking family structures within which their right to protest is unchallenged. Peace demonstrations and marches were also used by women in communicating their desire to see an end to the war, and reflected some of the peace-related activity engaged in by Angolan women.

1.4.2. *Engendering Peace Discourses.*

Pankhurst and Pearce (1998:158-159) have raised an important question regarding the need to engender peace discourse. They stated:

“a gendered analysis of conflict would help to provide a more sophisticated understanding of conflict which could assist in conflict settlement and conflict resolution. In understanding the causes of conflict, there is a need even to reach the first level of engendering, i.e. making women visible amongst the male-dominated narratives of war which dominate those of conflict analysis”.

In relation to the Angolan conflict, the paucity of women's organisations speaking on behalf of women is noticeable. The various Angolan discourses outlined in previous chapters reveal a public sphere dominated by men. This is not necessarily to suggest that these voices are unrepresentative of women, but to underline the fact that women's experience articulated by women, has been weak within the Angolan public sphere. Though war disproportionately affects women, and peace is above all understood as a victory for women,²⁴ this differentiated experience remained under-represented in public sphere discourse.

²³ Group interview with seven Angolan women, members of a religious order, Luanda. July 27 2000.

²⁴ David Birmingham, concluding remarks at BAF (2002) Conference.

While the majority of Angolan women's organisations are most evident at the community level, there is a certain invisibility about them. The quiet unobtrusive way in which these organisations go about their work possibly contributes to this. Nevertheless, their importance for women and society should not be underestimated. These organisations represent important meeting places where women meet and talk, constituting one of the key arenas for women. A number of *Promaica* organisations I visited had over one hundred members present, with weekly meetings beginning around 6.00 am, (the early hour perhaps further explains why some women's organisations remain invisible)! One woman described her weekly meeting as "a place where women can speak freely. We all speak, we all want to partake".^y Conversation takes place across different languages, with women translating for one another. The establishment of community radio and community-based print media, neither of which exist in Angola, could be significant in ensuring that local voices are heard, especially women's, thereby promoting greater diversity of opinion.

Women have clearly created spaces for themselves where they can talk and communicate, but in many cases these places fail to achieve 'publicity' to be considered public sphere discourse. The public sphere is certainly weakened by the failure to have these 'other' spaces included, spaces where women feel more comfortable to communicate. Kendrick (1991) argues that it is especially within such spaces that solidarity is generated, which later becomes a basis for mobilisation. Women's peace action and peace discourse is largely a product of experiences of solidarity gained in these 'other' places.

Women's public discourse is faced with different issues to that of men's public discourse. One of these is the crucial role of culture, where women's public opinion is undervalued and often not welcome because of the gender of the speaker. Cultural influences shaping and constructing the public sphere should not be underestimated, where the female public use of reason is often invalidated because of the 'identity of the speaker', a key characteristic of the public sphere as seen in chapter two. Though Habermas failed to recognise the gendered nature of the public sphere, his belief in a space where identities were suspended so that rational argument could occur, is potentially an important contribution towards expanding the Angolan public sphere. Cultural processes of

exclusion within the public sphere need to be challenged to ensure the inclusion of women's voices.

2. *Traditional Community-Based Responses.*

This section on traditional community-based responses represents a different point of entry into the same arena as explored in the previous section. It outlines a second set of peace responses within this community-based arena, by applying the research questions to 'traditional' personalities, and asking about 'traditional' structures in the resolution of conflict. This section explores the role of the traditional healer, the *kimbanda*,²⁵ and will focus in a particular way on the rituals of healing employed by the *kimbanda*, when reintegrating soldiers back into local communities.

It became clear during fieldwork that local communities, particularly in rural areas, expect former soldiers to be demobilised in a specific way by partaking in traditional ceremonies and undergoing rituals of purification, ideally occurring before their reintegration into family and community.²⁶ Soldiers themselves had an expectation that they would undergo these rituals upon return to their villages. This traditional material which I had initially set out to explore as 'historical' material, continues to have contemporary relevance and application, and was used in Angola in the period after the Lusaka Protocol, as Honwana (1998) makes clear. There is need for ongoing research in this area in terms of highlighting peace resources within local communities and exploring its potential for promoting and consolidating peace. Effective demobilisation of UNITA troops will be crucial for stability in Angola and will also make considerable demands of local communities. The return of former military personnel, a potentially volatile group of individuals, may have a destabilising effect if inadequate attention is given to their transition to civilian life.²⁷ One can assume an increase in the incidence of domestic violence and general insecurity if the transition is poorly handled.

²⁵ The spelling of the word varies, sometimes appearing as *chimbanda*.

²⁶ I am grateful to the Dundo resource group for the insights provided in understanding the importance and the nature of these rituals, and to CCF (Christian Children's Fund) for the material made available to me.

²⁷ Comment made by Christopher Alden, during his presentation to the BAF (2002).

A key publication in the area of traditional rituals for demobilisation is the consultancy report *Local Knowledge in the Post-War Healing and Reintegration of War-Affected Children in Angola* by Alcinda Honwana (1998) for the Angolan Christian Children's Fund (CCF). CCF appeared to be the only organisation in Angola engaged in research at this level. Interviews conducted by Angolan CCF personnel were carried out in the post-Lusaka period when many troops were demobilised in accordance with the Protocol. CCF personnel found that local communities used rituals which involved the use of water, flour, ashes, eggs, and chickens in reintegrating returned soldiers, which I deal with later.²⁸ Of particular relevance here was the carrying out of this research in the provinces of Uige, Malange, Huambo, Bié, thereby covering the ritualistic practices of the Bakongo (Uige), Ambundu (Malange), and Ovimbundu (Huambo and Bié) ethnic groups, from where the major protagonists of the various Angolan wars drew support. For Honwana (1998:14), the CCF project was

“grounded on the conviction that, there is a body of knowledge rooted in local ancient traditions which informs specific cultural understandings about the causes of ill-health and psychological trauma; about notions of childhood and adulthood; and also about the effect that traumatic experiences and events might have on individuals and groups”.

Honwana highlights the importance of cultural anthropology in understanding how individuals found meaning and interpreted the world around them, especially regarding war and conflict, illness and health, and post-conflict reintegration. As Ranger (1992:703) has commented, “[the] need for healing ... depended on participants' understanding of their violence”. Evident here is a belief that effective approaches to health, trauma and distress, must be based on cultural understandings. Honwana (1998:6) argued that the

“dominant western conceptions of mental distress and trauma cannot continue to be blindly imposed on afflicted populations across the globe since the way in which people embody, give meaning and manage their afflictions is essentially shaped by social and cultural understandings”.

At issue is the need for a pluralist approach to health and illness, with western methods viewed as complementary to local methods.

²⁸ Interview with Carlinda Monteiro, Luanda, December 10, 2001

In examining traditional community-based responses, I begin in section 2.1 by outlining how the word ‘traditional’ is used here, and in chapter seven on traditional authority. In section 2.2, I provide examples which highlight the issues involved and illustrate how demobilisation is effected. Section 2.3 examines the figure of the traditional healer known as the *kimbanda*, or in Portuguese *curandeiro*. I also underline the role played by certain family members in this regard. Finally, section 2.4 inquires about the contemporary relevance of this traditional knowledge, and possible utilisation in consolidating the transition to peace.

2.1. ‘Traditional’ defined.

Vansina (1990:257) points out that the popular use of the term ‘traditional’ generally refers to a “lack of change”, to something static and in the past. Osaghae (2000:203) commented that we are trying to define a term where “colonialism and other external influences have transformed social formations in such fundamental ways that there is very little that may be considered authentically indigenous and traditional”. Zartman (2000:7) in his turn, stated that

“tradition is likely to have been updated, adjusted, and opened to new accretions in order to stay alive through changing times. Traditional does not mean unaltered or archaic”.

As in other parts of Africa, traditional structures in Angola have not remained static.

Osaghae’s (2000:204) definition of ‘traditional’ is helpful:

“the legacy of the past, including the changes and transformations that this past may have gone through. ... The search for traditional strategies of conflict management then looks for the past in present-day social formations that can be applied to modern conflicts, and stresses the indigenous content”.

Calhoun (1995:149) points out that tradition needs to be understood as

“an active verb, as *traditio*, referring to the passing on or handing down of information. Tradition, then, is a mode of transmission of information”.

Within Angola tradition is passed on through initiation rites (where they are practised), by observing what is done, and listening to the stories told within the community.

Hobbsbawm and Ranger (1983:1) use the phrase “invented tradition” to refer to this process where certain values and norms of behaviour are inculcated “which automatically implies continuity with the past”. This dynamic, adaptive, responsive nature of what is

considered traditional is how the term is employed here, suggesting a more modern usage than the term would initially indicate.

2.2. *Examples of traditional healing methods.*

Traditional communities expected that all soldiers returning from war would receive treatment from the *kimbanda*, the principal practitioner of traditional healing methods (Honwana 1998:75). Usually this involved withdrawing with the *kimbanda* for a period of time apart from the village, to talk through war experiences and explain what happened in order to '*tirar a guerra*', to 'remove the war'. This Portuguese phrase is used extensively in naming the therapeutic process engaged in. Honwana (1998:67) quotes a *soba* from Malange who explained:

“if a person goes to fight a war, he becomes another person, because he learns how to kill other people, even his own mother and father ... during that time he only thinks of killing ... when he returns he has to be treated to become his own self again”.

Not only are we dealing with a cultural expectation that soldiers undergo some form of treatment upon returning home to remove the war, but a cultural belief that it is possible to rehabilitate returned soldiers by enabling them move beyond their experiences of war, to distance themselves from the past.

A number of descriptions of rituals illustrate what was usually undertaken. The first involves washing in a local river.

“From the start to the washing in the river, the treatment took a month. During all this time one couldn't wash in the river. Having prepared the medication (purification) one goes to the river to wash. Your clothes are left to one side, and you put on new clothes after coming from the river. You cannot look back. After all this treatment you are not allowed to talk about what went on during the war”.²⁹

The second concerns the returning home alive of a person thought to have been killed in war, and involves the use of water and fire.

“The person cannot enter the village. A basin (calabash) of water is taken which is broken around the feet of the person, who then walks on the broken basin before entering the village. All the members of the village are told to extinguish their fires, and a new fire is prepared and lit. It is with this fire that food is prepared,

²⁹ Description provided in a CCF research account dated March 9, 1998.

which is eaten by all with the one who has returned. It is only by doing this that the person can live without having problems".³⁰

Traditional healing methods combine ritual and talking, differentiating them from psychotherapeutic models of healing which emphasise 'analysis' of one's problems.³¹ In fact, a key aspect of what individuals receive during these rituals is '*conselho*' or advice (The Lancet 2002),³² which echoes the responses set out in relation to church-based communities.

The rituals used for those who killed during war differ from the rituals for individuals who did not kill. The taking of another person's life implies possible contamination or possession by the spirit of the one killed. The belief is that the spirit of that person may seek to exact revenge against the perpetrator by taking possession of him, which then has consequences for the community to which the soldier returns. At issue here is a belief in the 'migration of the spirit', that a spirit can travel from one person to another with the potential to do harm. Communities need protection against this migration and from those who may have taken the life of others in war.³³ This is the reason for purification.

It was pointed out that during wartime, in their efforts to protect themselves and remain safe, soldiers taste the blood of their victims in order gain extra courage in war and to prevent the spirit of the dead seeking revenge.³⁴ Hence, the need to have different healing rituals for those who killed in wartime and for those who did not. Ellis (2001) has done interesting work on the use of "mystical weapons" by soldiers during the Liberian conflict, where fighters disembowelled their victims to eat the flesh or internal organs, particularly the heart.

"Practices of this sort stemmed from a belief, quite well-documented in Liberian history, that the essence of a person is contained in the heart and the blood, and that by consuming these a warrior acquires some of the power formerly possessed by his victim" (Ellis 2001:222).

³⁰ Description provided in a CCF research account dated March 9, 1998.

³¹ Crewe & Harrison (1998:34) argue that though "some writers have challenged the perception of local people's ignorance, many still assume oppositions between indigenous knowledge and science by assuming that the latter is in some sense more 'theoretical'."

³² *The Lancet* (2002) has given some brief coverage to traditional healing in Angola.

³³ Manuel Teixeira, Angolan missionary, interviewed in Lille, France, December 8 2002.

³⁴ Gabriel Mbilingi, Catholic bishop of Luena, interviewed Luanda, November 7 2001.

This form of 'African science' as Ellis (2001:222) noted, was grounded firmly within indigenous religious belief, within African traditional religion. I propose not to engage in lengthy discussion around traditional religion in Angola, where Altuna (1993) and Quipungo (1987) have done interesting work, but there are two issues I propose to explore that go some way to explaining what is involved in rituals of purification for demobilised soldiers, and why it is considered necessary as part of a post-war peace strategy. I examine the relationship within traditional religion between an individual and their ancestors, which situates the soldier or 'warrior' in a particular context; and then explore the means by which one becomes an ancestor, which places 'burial rites' at the heart of traditional peacemaking strategies.

Firstly, interviewees often pointed out that the ancestors are understood to be part of the world within which Angolans live and can be called on to assist the living from their place beneath the earth.³⁵ In relation to Angola, Tvedten (1997:132) commented:

"In the traditional cultural system, there is no room for the accidental, and ancestral and nature spirits are believed to play an important role in people's life situations".

Misfortune or illness are understood as signs that the ancestors have been neglected and this can be addressed by consulting with the ancestors through the mediation of the *kimbanda*, functioning in this sense as a diviner. Vansina (1990:98) noted "illness was the quintessential manifestation of abnormality and abnormality always resulted from the neglect of spirits or attacks by witches". Life within traditional religion is lived in relationship with the ancestors. The strong influence and presence of Christianity within the country prompts the question, 'whether, and to what extent, this understanding is still the case?' The answer requires multiple responses. Traditional religion is still practised in many parts of the country and is strong in the psyche of the people of the Lundas, the ones I know best. The eastern Angolan provinces by and large had their first systematic contact with Christian missionaries in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century. Dundo for example, dates the first missionary contact to 1927³⁶ whereas parts of western Angola have over 500 years contact. Many individuals draw on both religious systems, traditional and Christian, when seeking divine assistance and traditional beliefs permeate the

³⁵ Interview with Manuel Sabino, retired Angolan missionary, Luanda, August 2 2000.

³⁶ I was present in Dundo in 1997 when the seventieth anniversary was celebrated.

understanding of many who describe themselves as Christian, creating what Schreier (1985:145)³⁷ identified as the functioning of “dual religious systems” with people.³⁸

Secondly, while the role of the ancestors is crucial within traditional religion, the way in which one becomes an ancestor is also of vital concern, bringing into focus the centrality of funeral rites, the *óbito* or the wake, as essential components within a post-war peacebuilding framework. Funeral rites are given much attention and care to ensure that everything expected of a family is undertaken.

“[P]roper burial rituals, to appease, ask for forgiveness and place the dead in their proper positions in the world of the spirits, are seen as extremely important to avoid spiritual anger and retaliation” (Honwana 1998:65).

Willis (1999:32) spoke of funerals being “replete with symbolic acts of purification, clearly designed to separate the persona of the dead from the community of the living”.

Fortes (1965:16) wrote that

“[it] appears that death alone is not a sufficient condition for becoming an ancestor entitled to receive worship. Proper burial ... is a *sine qua non*”.

The point is that peace requires the proper burial according to custom of people killed in war so as to release their spirits into the world of the ancestors, and prevent the ‘migration of the soul’ with its potential to exact revenge and harm.

In a time of war however, the holding of burial rites is thrown into chaos as bodies are left unburied and the dead unmourned. The upheaval caused by war itself is compounded by a further upheaval at a cultural-spiritual level, with people psychologically fearful of the unmourned spirits left to wander and seek revenge. In relation to this, Andrade (2001:137) writes about the feelings of Angolans displaced by the war, stating:

“The people who left their places of origin under fire were completely disorientated - they had faced death in the most immediate sense possible. ... A factor that weighed heavily psychologically and caused grief was ‘leaving the dead

³⁷ Quoted in Magesa (1999).

³⁸ Also, the flourishing of independent African and Angolan churches, may have much to do with the syncretic nature of these churches and the accommodation of aspects of traditional religion within their worship, particularly the emphasis on the ancestors (Thomas 1997:21). To dismiss independent churches as problematic, as the historical churches have tended to do, fails to ask why these churches have multiplied in recent times, and the local needs they obviously address. Hastings (1979) speaks of prayer within independent churches as a mixture of prayer for healing and deliverance from witchcraft or sorcery, as well as for spiritual and material things.

without even burying them'. Older people showed the greatest anguish about this, since they have a particular respect for ancestors and for death rituals".

Honwana (1998:65-66) quotes an unidentified speaker:

"[w]ith this war many people died and did not have proper burials. their heads are in the bush ... the souls of those who died and were not buried are wandering around and will not let us have peace. The war will continue because the spirits are angry".

The absence of proper rituals is understood to impede this journey, resulting in the dead person's spirit being frustrated and unable to move on, underlining the importance of burial rituals within a peace strategy.

2.3. *The 'kimbanda'*.

This section situates the *kimbanda* or traditional healer within the context of the local community, and attempts to further understanding of their role. The *kimbanda* was described in the Angolan newspaper *Agora* as "a psychologist ... a specialist in natural remedies, ... an authentic mediator between the invisible world and the patient."^{39vi} To this I would add their knowledge and understanding of ritual practices. Before the arrival of Western medicine, Angolans consulted the *kimbanda* as the person who understood the curative qualities of plants, leaves and roots, and who could provide remedies and cures. Given the understanding of health and illness within African traditional religion, based on the quality of relationship with the ancestors, the *kimbanda* was understood to have the power to consult with the ancestors (divination) and to establish the cause of illness.⁴⁰

"In general, the belief in spirits (ancestral or natural), witches, and sorcerers is associated with a world view that leaves no room for the accidental. Whether events are favourable or adverse, responsibility for them can in principle be attributed to a causal agent - [the spirits or ancestors]".⁴¹

Thus curing illness invariably involved activities be undertaken to make amends and to restore the ancestral relationship.

The roles therefore of the *kimbanda* as traditional herbalist and a diviner (*advinhador*) are largely inseparable. Both can be required in making a diagnosis. However, in discussing

³⁹ Pedro Calueyo, *Agora*, August 12 2000, p. 10.

⁴⁰ See also brief commentary on 'Healers and Diviners' located at <http://www.chokwe.com/divination.htm> with reference to the Chokwe people.

⁴¹ From 'Angola, Indigenous Religious Systems,' located at [http://leweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+ao0088\)](http://leweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0088)).

the *kimbanda* it is important to introduce a word of caution. In some communities the *kimbanda* is feared because of their involvement in sorcery and witchcraft, known in Angola as '*feitico*'. These practices cloud the presence of some *kimbandas* within the community, sometimes creating an ambiguous figure. Discussion on these issues would take me away from the main focus of this section but it is important to acknowledge this other shadier dimension.

It is not just the *kimbanda* who conducts rituals for demobilised soldiers. On occasions other members of the family have a role in the process, as illustrated in the following account from one former soldier:

“I was demobilised in January 1997. ...When I arrived in the kimbo (village) my mother called our relatives and acted according to tradition. ... My aunt took a live chicken and rubbed it all over my body. as if she was dusting it, then she rubbed palm oil on my hands and some ashes on my forehead. After that she threw fuba (maize meal) all over my body” (Honwana 1998:70).

Clearly, the mother and aunt in question were aware of a requirement to perform certain rituals for the returning soldier. The family response fulfills a cultural need and can only be understood with reference to cultural beliefs.

These traditional community-based responses reflect a particular way of understanding the world, and are based on a set of epistemological assumptions informed by African traditional religion. These assumptions are quite different to those underpinning Habermas's public sphere, conceived within a western world-view. Habermas's theory reveals an emphasis on rational critical forms of discourse, whereas the traditional healing methods outlined here reveal an emphasis on ritual, shared communal assumptions, verbal and non-verbal forms of communication, a radically different and more complex communicative arena than the Habermasian public sphere. This arena is a location where meaning is communicated through ritual and participation in ritual (Karecki 1998:310). As Evans-Pritchard (1965:112) commented regarding research of this nature, “[it] demands a poetic mind which moves easily in images and symbols”. I do not situate these traditional community based responses within Habermas's public sphere because of the different nature of the communication involved. I do however wish to raise the question of the 'publicness' of this material, because while this material has received little national or

international publicity, its publicness is taken for granted within local communities, within the 'culture of the common people', but not outside it. In other words, Habermas's public sphere does not allow us to see this arena very clearly or appreciate its significance and importance.

2.3. *Contemporary relevance?*

In this final section, I examine the contemporary relevance of this material in relation to four areas: demobilisation; peace consolidation; the 'pacification of the spirits' (a discussion deferred from chapter three); and social capital. Some of these have already received brief treatment, so I will limit myself to brief comments.

Firstly, a different concept of demobilisation is clearly at work within African traditional religion, to that which prevailed in the functioning of the United Nations and international community in Angola. The demobilisation processes set in place after the Bicesse and Lusaka peace agreements involved the surrender of personal weapons, the granting of a document to certify that demobilisation had occurred, the gift of civilian clothing, money, blankets, food, and agricultural equipment. The demobilised were usually given transport to their area of origin, where arrival home marked the end of the process. Traditional knowledge by contrast, understands the demobilisation process to commence at this point. This is not to undervalue the clothing, money, tools, etc., that the demobilised received, but to recognise that culturally 'the war must be removed' before the person can be reintegrated within the local community. In other words, two completely different processes are understood by the term 'demobilisation', processes which are not contradictory, but in fact can be complementary.

Secondly, Honwana (1998) provides important evidence as to how some of this traditional knowledge could be structurally integrated into peacebuilding at an institutional or national level. The suggestion comes from traditional authorities and traditional healers in the Kuito area, who saw their region devastated in 1993-1994, when UNITA and the government fought for control of Bié. Prior to the resumption of war in 1998 these traditional personalities argued that the spirits of the dead must be honoured to secure peace.

“Kutximula and Aurord, two female traditional healers, stated that the government should organise a big feast to honour the dead of the plateau. Their views were shared by soba [traditional authority] Capumba who pointed out that ‘The government must think of having collective ceremonies to bury the bones of those killed by the war ... for example here in Kuito many people died and no ceremonies were performed to appease their souls. Their souls are wandering about and can afflict anyone’. Chief Kavingangi from Bié, went as far as saying that if the government gives its permission ‘it would be possible to collect all the bones that are still lying in town and in the bushes and bury them with an obito (proper burial ceremony [wake]). But for that we need the government’s approval, we cannot do it without their approval’” (Honwana 1998:27-28).

Such collective rituals are known locally as *ayele* rituals, and if implemented could last a week (Honwana 1998:28). As we can see, traditional knowledge was seeking expression in Angola prior to 1998 in calling for these rituals, but required Angolan government authorisation. Much more recently, *Rede da Paz* made an appeal in May 2002 for the introduction of reconciliation mechanisms based on the

“application of local practices of communal reintegration and social stabilisation which covered: a) the reception of people, b) (symbolic) purification, c) reintegration/acceptance, d) commencing a new life”.^{42vii}

These calls illustrate that traditional practices are still relevant for many Angolans, and that incorporating the wisdom of Angola’s traditional belief systems, can potentially have an important role in consolidating and securing peace.

Rituals of this nature to release the spirits of the dead, which many believe to be necessary for peace, are not unique to Angola. The *Guardian* newspaper of November 16, 2002, provided a moving description of a purification ceremony held in Bali when over two hundred people were killed in a terrorist bomb blast. The ceremony called *Tawur Agung Pamarisudha Kari-pubhaya* was directed at

“freeing the victims’ souls - which the Balinese believe were trapped between earth and heaven until yesterday - blessing the wounded, and forgiving the perpetrators”.

The government minister who coordinated the event said:

“the most important aim is to restore the microcosmic and macrocosmic balance between the earth, atmosphere and heavens”.

Two rituals were conducted as part of this purification, one took place at the bomb site and the other at sea, and both involved the sacrifice of animals such as buffalo, cow, goat, dog.

⁴² Final Document of *Rede da Paz*, located at Friedrich Ebert Foundation (2002) website.

piglet, goose, duck and hen. Purification and burial ceremonies play an important role in how certain cultures come to terms with the past, and address emotional, psychological and spiritual issues for peace.

Thirdly, the Angolan government specifically requested that the churches engage in the ‘*pacificação dos espíritos*,’ or ‘the pacification of spirits’. In a letter to the Vatican (*Jornal de Angola*, April 9 2002) President dos Santos spoke of

“a fundamental role to be played in the pacification of spirits, the re-establishment of mutual confidence, and the acceptance of mutual forgiveness between citizens [by the churches]”.^{viii}

As mentioned in chapter three, the churches have also used this language but generally utilise the terms reconciliation and forgiveness. The exact meaning of the phrase used by President dos Santos is somewhat uncertain, but it has distinct cultural overtones which may not be intended. However, even if unintended, it is language familiar to traditional healers who can exercise a role in this regard if called on by government to host *ayele* or other relevant rituals. For many Angolans, the hosting of such a ritual would represent a significant moment in consolidating peace and addressing their cultural needs.

Finally, this chapter has also pointed to the existence of important reserves of what Putnam (1993:167) defined as social capital:

“[the]features of social organisations, such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions”.

By way of comment on the levels of social capital in Angola, I would like to contrast two references on the subject. Firstly, Christoplos (1998:6) stated that:

“[at] a first glance Angola, does not appear to have high reserves of accumulated social capital. It lacks the conditions usually mentioned as essential for the development of social capital (democracy, trust, freedom of expression, etc.). These conditions require a degree of stability and faith in the future which does not exist in weak and collapsed states”.

Secondly, Robson and Roque (2001:140) provided comment specifically in relation to local church communities:

“the level of social capital is high inside churches. There is a high level of structural social capital (rules and established procedures) and a high level of cognitive social capital (norms, values, beliefs and trust) and this is reflected in the attitudes of solidarity and cooperative behaviour of members.”

In their research, Robson and Roque (2001:120) found that there was strong pressure on Angolan social capital given the levels of poverty and social crisis which prevail in the country. In promoting and consolidating peace, reconciliation and democracy in Angola, it seems clear that activities at the community level can do much to enhance these processes.

The material outlined in this chapter has illustrated how local Angolan communities have attempted to address questions of violence and peace. I have identified two significant arenas, those of church-based and traditional community responses which facilitated analysis of peace activity and engagement within Angolan society at this level. Both responses reveal a substantial degree of agency occurring within local communities, illustrating that ordinary Angolans have not been passive during the many years of war.

Two particular concerns emerged in this chapter: that of addressing domestic violence, and the need to reintegrate and heal former soldiers. Both reflect concerns to address local expressions of violence, including the possibility of violence from returning soldiers. Important mechanisms exist within Angolan society that have been called on to deal with these issues. While traditional healing methods can be utilised as part of a national peace strategy in a time of post-conflict with the consent of government, domestic violence will require a much stronger legal system if adequate protection is to be given to women.

Chapter 7.

Traditional Authorities, Traditional Perspectives: An Ancient and Modern Narrative?

The final of the five peace narratives examined in this thesis explores Angolan traditional authorities in relation to peace. The concerns of the chapter however, are much wider than an exclusive focus on traditional authorities themselves, as I also examine perspectives on the Angolan conflict and how the peace processes were pursued, from within a traditional context. In doing so, the chapter explores a 'traditional space' that has not been used in analysing the Angolan conflict. I propose to argue that this traditional space is a vital one, particularly for rural communities, and that the perspective offered here poses important questions on how peace was promoted in Angola, and how conflict was understood. Towards the end of the chapter I explore what I term 'traditional consultancy', how knowledge of Angolan traditions could have been drawn on to strengthen Angola's peace processes, and to further understanding of events that required analysis from a traditional or cultural perspective. This traditional knowledge is above all knowledge of relevant rituals employed by traditional authorities in addressing conflict and making peace. The chapter tries to make connections between this traditional material and how the UN and Troika pursued peace, and for this reason the chapter is partially explorative. Essentially I argue that working for peace needs to be based on traditional and modern methods and understandings of war and peace, especially the understandings of those in conflict.

Increased attention has been paid in recent years to the role and potential of traditional authority across the African continent in addressing conflict. Somalia has been the focus of much attention in this regard, where traditional mechanisms were successful in resolving local and regional conflict, but failed at a national level (Abokor 2002, Menkhaus 2000). The literature also points to the use of traditional methods in Burundi (Nindorera 1998), Kenya¹ (Duba et al 1997), Mozambique (Meintijes et al 2002, Harrison 1999), Sierra Leone (Barnes & Polzer 2000), Uganda (Pain 1997), and

¹ Research carried out among the Maasai, Borana and Turkana peoples of Kenya.

Namibia (Becker 2002). Zartmann's (2000) work in this area is also important. In a broad sense this literature is concerned with what resources Africa can draw on in resolving its own problems, with "[the] need to harness all our resources - traditional, intellectual and spiritual - for the building of peace in our troubled continent" (Kiplagat 1998). The British Government and some non-governmental agencies have placed the 'peace potential' of traditional authority on their agendas. The UK Department for International Development (DfID 2000) identified "helping to restore local Paramount Chiefs" as one component in a multi-dimensional approach to promoting peace in Sierra Leone, indicating a new policy initiative. The UK based NGO ActionAid (2001) "has been exploring ways to support the *Bashingantahe*² as part of [its] peace building work" in Burundi.

The Angolan literature on traditional authorities, known locally as *sobas*,³ is not very extensive but one frequently finds references within other research. For example, the work of Carlos Estermann (1956, 1957, 1960a, 1960b, 1961a, 1961b) on the peoples of southern Angola deals with traditional authorities within a broad anthropological approach to cultural issues. Similarly, José Nunes's (1991) important work on the Angolan *ondjango*, the village meeting place, examines traditional authorities. More recently, Pacheco's (2001) work illustrates traditional authority's continued relevance and function in the life of rural communities in the Huambo area. Neto's (2001a, 2001b) concerns are historical, highlighting difficulties associated with incorporating traditional authorities within democratic structures. Despite the fact that the influence of traditional authority had clearly declined over many years, it was re-emerging as a "potential political force" (Tvedten 1997:51) and achieving a significant degree of prominence at the turn of the twenty-first century. This points to the definition set out in the previous chapter, where 'traditional' was defined not as a static reality concerned with the past, but as dynamic and changing.

The research questions for this chapter are:

- What did Angolan traditional authorities identify as the underlining causes of the Angolan conflict?

² The term *Bashingantahe* refers to the traditional authority figures and was used "to designate a body of men [who] were an organised corporate group in whom was vested the social, political and judicial power of their society" (Nindorera 1998).

³ The origin of the word *soba* is from the Umbundu *osoma*, meaning traditional leader. The word is used across Angola to denote traditional authorities.

- What did Angolan traditional authorities believe was necessary to secure peace?
- How and where did traditional society ordinarily resolve conflict?
- Do traditional conflict resolution strategies have anything to offer modern methods?
- Can traditional authority or traditional knowledge provide insights to help explain the failure of recent Angolan peace accords?

The latter question will explore the ‘structuring up’ potential of this material, where I propose a notion of ‘traditional consultancy’, which possibly could have helped unravel some of the complexities of the Angolan conflict.

The chapter is divided into four sections. Section one sets out introductory material on traditional authorities past and present, from their former role as political leaders in Angola’s ancient kingdoms to one of significant marginalisation. I examine the processes that effected this decline. Section two outlines perspectives on peace from traditional authorities drawn from traditional authority conferences and fieldwork interviews. The third section examines where and how traditional society addressed issues of conflict, where I detail the importance of the key discursive site in traditional society known as the *ondjango*, and then deal with various rituals used in traditional peace making. The final section explores the concept of ‘traditional consultancy’ and its possible usefulness as a mechanism to incorporate traditional expertise and understandings, part of enhancing the knowledge base of a peace process, Angolan or elsewhere.

1. *Traditional Authority - past and present?*

The objective of this section is to place Angolan traditional authorities within an historical context that situates them in Angolan society, and identifies the major factors that led to their decline. I trace four factors - the years of Portuguese colonialism, the spread of Christianity, the growth in urbanisation, and policies pursued after independence by the MPLA government - which explain the eclipse of traditional authority as an institution, and highlights its contemporary ambiguity within present day Angola. These factors help contextualise the perspective on peace put forward by traditional authority.

The arrival of colonialism and Christianity introduced powerful new variables into Angolan society, progressively leading to the decline and marginalisation of traditional authorities. This decline was not uniform across the country because of the uneven nature of colonial penetration and the varying regional responses to Christianity. It was most accentuated in the areas of longest colonial exposure, while remaining significantly untouched in eastern Angola especially. Neto (2001a:31) stresses the importance of appreciating the unevenness of the colonial experience, arguing against a simplistic understanding of the length of colonial contact. She points out that the kingdom of the Congo had 500 years of irregular contact, but “the occupation of Luanda lasted 400 years ... 110 years in Malange and 72 years in Huambo”. This differentiation explains why the institution of traditional authority weakened particularly among coastal and urban populations, where it is not a significant reference point. This contrasts with rural and provincial areas where the institution exhibits varying degrees of influence and importance, where the *soba* in some areas continues to administer the local village, distribute land for farming, and practice traditional justice with a council of elders.⁴

Urbanisation too weakened traditional authorities as urban areas were more visibly under colonial control and influence, but also because access to land is an important dimension of the *sobas* power. This heterogeneous reality has implications for research, as rural communities attach much greater importance to traditional authority than those in urban areas. The peace narrative of this chapter can therefore be considered a rural one, which distinguishes it from the largely urban narratives of the media and civil society chapters.

The colonial administration recognised the importance of the *soba* within local communities and exploited them to extend the reach of the state. The cooption of the *soba* to ensure the collection of the Hut and Native taxes (Neto 2001a:34), the recruitment of labour (Pacheco 2001:62), and road maintenance (Maier 1996:48), collectively fomented local resentment. Attempts to resist the colonial process frequently resulted in the *soba* being replaced, though some *sobas* grew wealthy from their commission for tax collection.⁵ By independence many *sobas* had become

⁴ In many of the villages around Dundo this continues to be the case.

⁵ Point made by Dundo research group, June 3, 2000.

discredited in the eyes of their own people because of their collaboration (Tvedten 1997:51). Robson (2001:12) gives the example of *sobas* from the central highlands, who in 1973 were

“in favour of the forced concentration of rural people in protected hamlets because it would increase their power and influence and control over their communities: rural people were strongly against concentrations”.

For Robson, the example illustrates how the interests of *sobas* and their communities did not necessarily coincide. A further discrediting factor was the provision, forced or voluntary, of young soldiers to both UNITA and the government (Honwana 1998:34-35).

In more recent times, traditional authorities have challenged allegations of collaboration by pointing to their role in protecting and sheltering the various nationalist movements during the war of independence. Speaking at a traditional authority conference in February 2002, *sobas* from the northern provinces of Uige and Zaire stated:

“traditional authority played a fundamental role ... above all in 1961, when the armed struggle began. It was the *sobas* who welcomed the national liberation movements: ... who mobilised and organised the population to support these resistance movements during the first and second liberation wars against the Portuguese”.⁶ⁱ

This role however remains undocumented. Interestingly, since the creation of FAAT, the Forum of Angolan Traditional Authority (*Fórum das Autoridades Angolanas Tradicionais*) in January 2000, traditional authorities have sought to challenge aspects of their portrayal in Angolan history.

The years of greatest crisis for traditional authority were those following independence when the MPLA-government substituted many *sobas* by replacing them with members of the Party's central committee (*comité central*), who then assumed tasks previously undertaken by the *soba*.⁷ This period is particularly important in tracing the origins of contemporary confusion associated with the identity of the *soba*, as government nominees themselves adopted the title of *soba*, while the hereditary *soba* was pushed to one side but did not disappear. Like many other post-independence nations, the Angolan state “attempted to modernise and to replace traditional hierarchies with a

⁶ *Angolense*, February 23-March 2, 2002, page VII.

⁷ Interview with a group of five *sobas* in the *bairro* of Rocha Pinto, Luanda, June 11, 2000.

new system of government [but] never entirely succeeded” (Jorgensen 1996:43). The result is the existence of two sets of traditional authorities no longer entirely distinguishable. In fact, many ‘nominated’ *sobas* present a lineage to validate their hereditary credentials, thereby further blurring the possibility of distinction.

Other sources suggest that the penetration achieved by Christianity was of greater long-term significance in undermining traditional authority. David (1989:69) for example, wrote of how pastors and missionaries

“were the first to penetrate traditional society. By bringing a new religion, they brought the civilisation of the coloniser, and new ways of living and thinking”.ⁱⁱ

Anyinam (1992:142) wrote of how “European missionary activities led to the rejection of traditional beliefs [and] rituals [across Africa]”. The point is important because by challenging the religious foundations of African traditional religion, Christianity also undermined the political power of the *soba*, as political and religious power were intrinsically linked. The creation of other centres of power and authority within communities by the appointment of teachers, catechists and other church leaders also shifted power away from traditional leaders (Neto 2001a:35; Pacheco 2001:61).

At the end of the 1990s the Angolan government was re-engaging with traditional authorities for a number of reasons. Firstly, a national consultation had commenced in early 2001 to “clarify the role of traditional authority and its attributes in the process of national development”.⁸ The *Journal de Angola* wrote of the need to articulate

“the relationship between modern administrative structures and traditional authority from the perspective of promoting social and community development, and democratic consolidation”.⁹ⁱⁱⁱ

This consultation resulted in a traditional authority conference hosted by the Ministry for Territorial Administration from 21-23 March 2002 in Luanda. The consultation sought to situate and define traditional authorities within the proposed new national constitution, an issue left unaddressed since independence. Press reports leave unclarified whether conference participants were hereditary or ‘nominated’ *sobas*, or a mixture of both. Held a month after the death of Jonas Savimbi, this conference saw traditional authority express the desire to:

⁸ Comment made by the vice-minister for Territorial Administration, João Baptista Kussumua in *Jornal de Angola*, January 19, 2001.

⁹ *Jornal de Angola*, March 26, 2002.

“assist the central and provincial government with the registration of populations in rural areas, the reconstruction of roads, and of all that was destroyed in the war”.^{10iv}

It was the third such ‘national’ conference on traditional authority in a period of six months, which by any standards was quite remarkable activity. The other two conferences are examined later.

Secondly, the *soba*’s potential to influence public opinion during an election campaign may also explain the shift in attitude. During fieldwork in June 2000 (when 2001 had been mooted as an election year), a meeting I had arranged with the *sobas* of a village near Dundo was postponed because local members of the MPLA *comité central* were there with the *sobas* seeking electoral support from the villagers. In rural areas especially, *sobas* represent a means by which government communicates with local people.

Thirdly, following from this, Andrade’s (2001:145) research on displaced people in the provinces of Malanje and Benguela, noted that

“[the displaced had] been encouraged by the State administration to choose new *sobas* to facilitate communication between the administration and the displaced people. Relations with the State are maintained through the *soba*, and the *soba* has an important role in resolving family problems”.

Andrade also recognised that “[t]raditional leadership [was] important for the displaced people’s emotional stability”. These comments point to the role of the *soba* as a bridge between local communities and the State and underline the continued relevance of traditional authorities in different contexts.

2. *Traditional Authorities and peace: some perspectives.*

The formation in January 2000 of FAAT, was a significant moment for Angolan traditional authorities in terms of organisation and voice. Previously no mechanism or forum existed to facilitate traditional authority participation in the peace debate. Despite this development, FAAT struggled to establish itself as an organisation in 2001, due to a lack of structures, personnel and finance. FAAT seemed to have expected that donors would provide them with finance unquestioningly and were somewhat startled when faced with the expectations of international agencies

¹⁰ *Jornal de Angola*, March 27, 2002.

concerning project proposals, budget, and accountability. Struggles of this nature, according to Baranyi (1998:9), are characteristic of

“[o]rganisations representing sectors with a history of being marginalised [who] are often severely challenged by political and technical requirements of participation”.

FAAT was faced with this challenge early on and had sought assistance from FONGA.

I now explore material in relation to FAAT, by drawing on a number of sources to set out traditional authority perspectives regarding peace and war in Angola. In section 2.1, I look at a suggestion that traditional authorities could have exercised a mediation role in the conflict. Section 2.2 examines the first ever FAAT conference (September 2001) which dealt with the issue of peace. Section 2.3 deals with an Open Society conference (February 2002) where traditional authorities were involved. Finally, section 2.4 highlights a number of tensions and ambiguities related to traditional authorities.

2.1. *A mediation role?*

The suggestion of a mediation role for traditional authority within the conflict surfaced prior to the death of Jonas Savimbi. A *Jornal de Angola* editorial of mid-February 2002 noted positively the “increasing interest and passionate presentations [concerning] the role of traditional authority in the Angolan political system”,^{11v} including arguments favouring its inclusion in promoting peace. The editorial urged a degree of caution because of internal disputes over “inheritance, representativity and legitimacy” associated with traditional authority. A mediation role had been advanced in March 2000 by one of the minor political parties, the Angolan National Congress, whose party leader was critical of western mediation:

“[we believe] it was not necessary to go to the West to arrange mediators, The conflict is internal and it is not logical to bring foreign mediators who make mistakes which they have themselves admitted, of which the MONUA mission is a clear example. We have our ancient traditions, the *sobas* are there who could exercise an influential role in conflict resolution. Sometimes the politics practiced in Africa leave much to be desired”.^{12vi}

This call for mediation by traditional authority appears to be one of the earliest.

¹¹ *Jornal de Angola*, February 14, 2002, editorial.

¹² José Txingueletxi, interviewed in *O Independente*, March 4, 2000, page 11.

However, a 1996 United States Institute for Peace (USIP) consultancy report by Prendergast and Smock (1996), *NGOs and the Peace Process in Angola*, had urged research into “traditional Angolan dispute resolution processes and [how to] adapt them for contemporary use”, as part of a broad approach to “[national] reconciliation at the middle and grassroots levels of society”. The report expressed the opinion that the “views of the vast majority of Angolans have been neglected in the high-level negotiations and maneuvers”. USIP conceived of a role for traditional authority particularly with reference to land disputes.¹³

2.2. *The FAAT Conference.*

According to media reports, the first FAAT conference (September 10-13, 2001) brought together over three hundred traditional authorities from all over Angola. Conference papers on ‘Traditional Power: an Overview’ and ‘The Role of Traditional Authority in Armed Conflict’ were presented, as well as testimonies from the four kings and one queen present.¹⁴ The principal conference conclusion was a proposal to create a ‘traditional authority commission’ to mediate in the Angolan conflict. The commission appears not to have been established prior to the death of Jonas Savimbi, some five months later.

Among the recommendations put forward were for:

- a) two parliamentary chambers - for elected deputies, and for traditional authority figures;
- b) a cease-fire, and renewed dialogue (to include traditional authority) between those at war;
- c) governmental non-interference in the nomination of *sobas* because of the hereditary nature of the institution;
- d) inclusion within the state budget;¹⁵
- e) government not to sell land, because land was the basis of traditional power;
- f) government consultation with traditional authority before passing laws;
- g) the development of natural resources (oil, diamonds, coffee, timber, etc.) to be done in consultation with traditional authority;

¹³ The question of ownership of land is one that will be important to address in the aftermath of war, and has quickly moved up the political agenda since February 2002. Traditional grazing rights have come into conflict with ranching practices in southern Angola, where traditional pastoralists are being denied access to water for their livestock. The NGO *Leonardo Sikufinde* was working closely with traditional authority to ensure that these traditional rights were protected. *Rede da Terra* or ‘Land Network’ was established by ADRA in January 2003, to co-ordinate civil society’s response to the land issue.

¹⁴ From ‘Final Conclusions and Recommendations’ of the Conference. The four kings were: Vasco Felix Ekuikui IV of Bailundo, Henriques da Silva Meso Mankala of the Bakongos, Muatchisengue Watembu of the Lunda-Chokwes, Muana Wuta Kabamba of the Bayaka, and queen Nha Katolo.

¹⁵ The recommendation does not specify the form of inclusion hoped for.

h) the Angolan government to urgently promote social justice.

These recommendations cover a range of issues, illustrating traditional authority's multi-dimensional conception of peace. Peace was about ending hostilities in order to promote dialogue; about establishing processes of political inclusion and communication within society; and about the just development of Angola's natural resources. For traditional authorities, peace was much more than a cease-fire. It embraced political, economic, and social processes.

Many of the above recommendations where traditional authorities sought political power and inclusion within the decision-making structures of the state (the creation of a second chamber), theoretically situate traditional authorities outside the arena of civil society and the public sphere. As I argued in chapter two, it is for this reason I place traditional authorities outside the public sphere, while at the same time recognising that much of their discourse shares similarities to other public sphere actors. These other actors however, are not seeking political power, and this fundamentally differentiates the traditional authority narrative from the others in this thesis.

Traditional authorities however, saw themselves standing alongside civil society actors in the search for peace. FAAT's membership of *Rede da Paz*, the Peace Network, was an indication of this. The FAAT conference called for the inclusion of traditional authorities with the churches and politicians from the civil opposition parties, in renewed peace negotiations. As seen throughout this thesis, it had become increasingly clear from 1999-2000 that a range of national actors had emerged - traditional authorities, the churches, civil society organisations and some political parties - seeking national mediation within renewed peace talks. Some conceived of this exclusively as national mediation, others as a national component within renewed international mediation. This represented something quite new in Angolan politics compared to the political landscape of ten years previously, when only the churches could possibly have exercised such a role (Messiant 2000).

A second FAAT conference in Cabinda was announced by Francisco Tunga of FONGA in September 2002, but no conference dates were indicated.¹⁶ An objective FAAT set itself in the immediate post-Savimbi era was to work for a complete end to the Angolan conflict by seeking resolution of the Cabindan conflict. The death of

¹⁶ *Actual*, September 22, 2002, p. 14. I have been unable to establish if such a conference took place.

Savimbi did not bring peace to Angola, it brought peace to seventeen of Angola's eighteen provinces, which led some commentators to speak of the '17/18th peace'.¹⁷ This objective contrasts with the non-recognition of FLEC's conflict with the Angolan state, especially noticeable in the state media around the 2002 Independence Day celebrations as illustrated in the previous chapter, and in the celebrations following the signing of the Luena Accords.

2.3. *The Open Society Foundation Conference.*

The conference organised by the Open Society Foundation in February 2002 dealt primarily with the role of civil society in the Angolan conflict, and within this explored the place of traditional authority. It is unclear whether the Open Society Foundation, or its director Rafael Marquês, considered traditional authority as part of civil society, but theoretical distinctions of this nature were secondary to the greater concern of building public opinion in favour of peace through dialogue. One of the ironies of the conference was that its proposals and recommendations were published in the local media, or posted on the internet, on the day Jonas Savimbi was killed.

An internet report of February 22, 2002 entitled 'Chiefs Call for Cease-fire', is especially striking in this respect.¹⁸ The report called for a cease-fire and for a national conference on peace and Angola's future. It contained chilling descriptions of the devastation wrought by the years of conflict which are worth highlighting. The full text was published in *Angolense* under the heading 'We Sobas do not accept the Vision of our Leaders', and is included as appendix 4 to this thesis.¹⁹ The *sobas* stated:

"[the war had] already affected everyone. ... Traditional authority and local communities look on, increasingly revolted at the destruction of the country, at the waste of its natural resources, at the killing of the Angolan population. ... Today, Angola is a land of displaced people, the people live under inhuman conditions in displacement camps on the edge of large cities. Regrettably we see little or no political will to overcome this situation. ... The Angolan people have nowhere left to go. ... We, the sobas, as the true heirs of the cultures, traditions and wealth of our people, do not accept the vision of our political leaders. ... Angola has almost ceased to exist. The country is only Luanda. Family has come to mean only those who live in Luanda, as those who live in the provinces are condemned to isolation".

¹⁷ Vincente Pinto de Andrade, speaking at BAF (2002) Conference.

¹⁸ Report located at <http://allafrica.com/stories/2002022220010.html>.

¹⁹ *Angolense*, February 23-March 2, 2002, page 1X.

As the war with UNITA came to an unexpected conclusion, the description sets down a marker on how severely the conflict affected the lives of Angolans, especially those living in the provinces. Significantly, it shows that Angolan organisations had not given up on the possibility of a peaceful resolution to the conflict. In fact the conference called for a new type of peace process that

“[started] at the bottom and not from the top down, so that those at the top may come to understand that their position depends on those who are at the bottom”.

The above statement from the *sobas*, “we ... do not accept the vision of our political leaders”, raises a question about political legitimacy, and how traditional authorities viewed the political leadership of the country. A particular viewpoint within the traditional authority perspective saw the war in Angola as a logical consequence of political power having been usurped by the nationalist parties, not from the departing colonial power, but from traditional leadership. Many traditional authority figures see themselves as the disenfranchised legitimate rulers of the country, as “the true heirs of the cultures, traditions and wealth of our people”. The reason for this was given in an interview by a member of FAAT who stated:

“it was the *sobas* who sent their children away to study overseas, and when they returned they refused to recognise who their parents were, because they were motivated by personal greed”.²⁰

To a great extent, traditional authority believes that the nationalist parties seized their political inheritance.

2.4. *Traditional Authority: Tensions and Ambiguities.*

The previous sections provided reflection on how traditional authorities analysed the war and what they considered necessary for peace. We have seen how traditional authorities believed that further talking between the Angolan government and UNITA was deemed the most appropriate means to end the conflict. The peace agenda of traditional authority was also permeated with a political agenda, whereby they sought greater recognition and rehabilitation of their role in Angolan society, based as we have seen, on a perception that national independence should have passed to them as the country’s ancient rulers, rather than the nationalist parties.

²⁰ Interviewed in Luanda, November 20, 2001.

While the emergence of this perspective was interesting twenty-five or so years after independence, it was based on an autocratic understanding of political power which appeared to have shifted little over many decades. For Neto (2001b:I-II) many aspects of traditional authority were “incompatible with democratic rules” and universal suffrage. The democratic separation of powers is generally not understood within the institution of traditional authority, where these powers are conflated. The existence of a hereditary aristocracy combined with inherited socially inferior positions is difficult to reconcile with the constitutional equality of all citizens. Also, the lack of political power for women within traditional power structures serves to highlight some of the issues requiring attention and updating within traditional structures.

A further crucial perspective on peace relates to traditional authorities’ role in making war itself, in both past and recent conflicts. At first glance this suggestion appears to contradict what has been said about the *soba* as a potential mediator and seeker of peace, but ironically, by knowing how to wage war it was understood that the *soba* also knew how to make peace. The Angolan literature is largely silent on the *sobas* involvement in Angola’s wars. One of the few documented references emerged during the Open Society conference when *sobas* from eastern Angola called attention to this issue:

“we appeal to *sobas*, *regedores*, and *seculos*²¹ to cease the magical preparations of military personnel and leaders, because they kill, destroy and confuse the people. Afterwards [the military] go to the *curandeiros*, who are *sobas* and *seculos* to prepare their bodies so that nothing will happen to them”.^{22vii}

Elsewhere, Honwana (1998:41) highlighted the preparation of UNITA military commanders and soldiers by *curandeiros*. The comment in effect points to traditional practices within modern warfare, a factor explored in more detail later. This connects with the involvement of some *curandeiros* in sorcery, and to ‘mystical weapons’ mentioned in the last chapter, an extremely complex dimension of Angolan culture.²³ The recourse to sorcery was for the purpose of personal protection during combat.

²¹ Within *soba* hierarchy, the *regedor* (Portuguese term) was above the *soba*; the *seculo* (Umbundu term) was just below. Taken from Pacheco (2001:107).

²² *Angolense*, February 23-March 2, 2002, page VII. The identification of the *curandeiro* with the person of the *soba*, as suggested here, is not always the case.

²³ Fred Bridgland’s (1986) book contains an interesting photograph of UNITA soldiers engaging in a ‘traditional spirit dance’ prior to battle, suggestive of the ‘traditional preparations’ soldiers underwent prior to combat. The *sobas* would have had input into this preparation.

most likely through the use of potions and charms.²⁴ The malevolent dimension involved using sorcery to harm others. The extent of these practices during the war has not been ascertained, but its primary importance for military personnel lay at an individual level. This magical-religious world of traditional authority is never far from the surface in discussions with the *sobas*, and can be quite inaccessible.²⁵ The important point however, is that, for a significant number of people, these issues are important and played a part in the Angolan war.

3. *Traditional Peace Making: Where and How?*²⁶

This section examines peace making within traditional society, setting out to address the research question of where and how peace was made. In section 3.1, I look firstly at the *ondjango*,²⁷ the space and place where conflict was resolved within the community, with a view to understanding its significance for traditional society. Section 3.2 outlines how peace was ‘signed’ by illustrating the key place of ritual and ritualised food sharing. Section 3.3 explains how an oath was taken to ensure compliance with an agreement which involved invoking the ancestors. Though these three sections reach back somewhat into Angola’s past, I was struck during fieldwork by the animated responses to questions I posed about the relevance and applicability of traditional peace making methods in Angola in the 1990s. I include some of the replies received. It is important to state that the material in this section brings together responses from individuals and groups from across Angola’s major ethnic groups. This reveals similar approaches to peace making in traditional society, though specific details may differ from one group to another.

²⁴ Pacheco (2001:105) noted that sorcery was frequently directed at those who distinguished themselves economically or socially within the community.

²⁵ Interview with Maria de Conceição Neto, Luanda, December 6, 2001.

²⁶ An earlier draft of sections three and four has been accepted for publication (Comerford 2003).

²⁷ The origin of the word *ondjango* in Umbundu, is derived from ‘*ondjo*’ meaning ‘house,’ and ‘*ohango*’ meaning ‘issues’ or ‘talk’ (Nunes 1991:157). ‘*Ondjo + ohango*’ became *ondjango*, to denote the house where people talk or discuss issues. The relevant Kimbundu words are ‘*onzo*’ – ‘*hango*’, though the word *ondjango* is used. In the Lundas among the Chokwe peoples, the word ‘*chota*’ is used instead of *ondjango*. Structurally the *ondjango* was designed quite simply - an open circular structure with thatch roofing and a strong timber pole in the centre to support the roof. Any walls were low external ones made of mud and wattle, ensuring that proceedings could be followed from outside. Animal skins invariably hung from the rafters beneath which the *soba* and other elders would sit to signify authority. Various charms to protect the *soba* and the community were sometimes in evidence.

3.1. *The Ondjango: A Place to Make Peace.*

Before looking at the *ondjango* as the place where conflict was dealt with, I briefly outline some of its other functions. Its key function was as a community meeting place where issues were discussed in the presence of the *soba* and elders, representing a form of 'traditional parliament' (Nunes 1991:151). Villages, which were generally extended family units, had their own *ondjango*, whereas larger populations tended to have an *ondjango* in each *bairro*. Other important functions included the following. It was where guests and visitors were welcomed upon arriving in the village.²⁸ It served as place of socialisation for younger members of the community as they listened to the stories of the elders (Robson & Roque 2001:84). The *ondjango* functioned as a traditional court where crimes, misdemeanours, and other offences were dealt with, and fines or penalties imposed (Chikueka 1999:393; David 1997; Nunes 1991:166-167). It is also important to underline the educational role of the court system as offenders were instructed about what the community expected of them in the future. Finally, the *ondjango* was the place of peacemaking and reconciliation, a function closely connected with its role as a traditional court. Nunes and Estermann examined the 'traditional court' dimension of the *ondjango*, but left its peacemaking potential unaddressed. As can be seen from this, the *ondjango* exercised different functions within the community and represented a powerful institution within traditional Angolan society.

The description of the *ondjango* as a 'traditional parliament' disguises the fact that it was by and large a meeting place for men, though some *sobas* were women. Traditional society was patriarchal, with few administrative or leadership roles exercised by women. Women had the right to participate but in a substantially different way to men. From outside the *ondjango* women signalled their intent to speak by two claps of their hands and would then be called on. However, women's agreement or disagreement with what was said within the *ondjango* was frequently expressed to other women in such a way as to be clearly heard inside.²⁹ In the introduction, it was stated that DfID (2000) and ActionAid (2001) were exploring the peace making potential of traditional authority. There are serious reservations particularly among feminist writers to this, in that a renewed interest in traditional authority could have an

²⁸ Even today it is courteous to introduce oneself to the *soba* when visiting a village. Local cooperation may in fact depend on whether this courtesy call is made.

²⁹ Comment made during the Dundo workshop, October 2001.

adverse effect on women's democratic participation in society, by closing down the space women have worked hard to create. The fear is based on the lack of gender equality within traditional society, where gender determines one's right to participation.³⁰ The *ondjango* as a place of male discourse echoes, in many respects, Habermas's early public sphere where women were largely excluded from public discourse. The key difference however is that for Habermas, access to property was the determining factor in securing participation, whereas within the *ondjango*, participation was based on gender and age. Young men were deemed to lack the necessary experience to offer advice within the community and were excluded, though their temporary exclusion until a certain age, structurally differentiates it from women's exclusion.

It is difficult to establish how widespread the use of the *ondjango* is in present day Angola. Its decline is intrinsically connected to the marginalisation of traditional authority within the country. Many urbanised Angolans, especially the young, may never have seen an *ondjango* and are puzzled by it, expressing confusion with regard to its purpose and role.³¹ For them it points to a past that has been left behind as 'backward', in contrast to the apparent freedoms associated with city living. By contrast, Angolans from the provinces or those of an older generation speak with affection of the *ondjango* and recount stories of their participation in the past. Robson & Roque (2001:84) describe the *ondjango* as "an important institution in the countryside", while Pacheco's (2001:86) research found that the *ondjango* was still used in the Huambo region to address local conflicts. In Dundo, the use of the *ondjango* has certainly declined but there was evidence of its use to resolve disputes, particularly in relation to families' inheritance issues. In many cases the older generation favoured bringing their complaints before the *soba* instead of involving the police. On occasions I have heard people suspending an argument by saying "*vamos ao soba*", "let's go to the chief", for arbitration. In most places the *ondjango* itself is

³⁰ An International Alert (2001:24) publication on gender in peacebuilding put forward "two gender-based reasons why donors should approach material support for so-called 'traditional' reconciliation and conflict resolution mechanisms with caution. First, they are much more a reflection of highly gendered local politics and power relations than they are part of some value-free traditional culture. Second, women's needs are normally completely marginalised in their practice of these mechanisms and may even be undermined by them".

³¹ Opinion of young people interviewed at the Igreja de Carmo, Luanda, November 21, 2001.

no longer used, with sobas using the veranda of their house or a closed yard, to conduct their '*ondjango*' meetings.

Though the use of the *ondjango* in the resolution of conflict has obviously declined, a crucial issue to highlight here is the importance of the *ondjango* as a traditional space, which I explore as a form of archetypal space in Angola, an 'original blueprint' of what Angolan discursive space looks like. In spite of the gendered nature of *ondjango* discourse, it was the key communicative arena, a forum that made provision for the "rational guidance of society" (Calhoun 1995:30), where the (male) community gathered to talk and listen. There was no question of gender being 'bracketed', one of the ideals of public sphere discourse. In reflecting on the appeals for inclusive dialogue to end the Angolan conflict, made throughout these peace narratives, it is my view that these appeals are based on the memory of the *ondjango* as a place where the community met to talk about its problems, to review the past and make preparation for the future. Calls for dialogue are, I believe, calls for a form of *ondjango* communication, for the creation of an *ondjango*-like space where public talking could occur on the way to resolve Angola's conflict. The Pro Pace Congress of 2000 was just such an attempt to create an *ondjango* context, where people could talk about Angola.

3.2. *The 'Signing' of Peace Ceremonies.*

Traditional society used various mechanisms to maintain peace and harmony. For example, conflict within the community or village was sometimes resolved by communities breaking up and members leaving to establish a community elsewhere (Gesler 1999:120). Inter-marriage between members of different villages was also a means by which conflict was settled within traditional society.³² Conflict (or crime) was also addressed through the payment of fines in cash or livestock as restitution to the offended party. Major conflicts however, were much more threatening to the stability of the community and subject to special rituals involving the sharing of food and drink as signs of reconciliation. Turner (1969) referred to rituals of this nature as "rituals of affliction".³³ Cox (1998:x) underlines ritual as a communicative process to be entered into, where meaning is experienced through participation:

"ritual is a repeated and symbolic dramatization directing attention to a place where the sacred enters life thereby granting identity to participants in the

³² Interview with Conceição Neto, Luanda, December 6, 2001.

³³ Quoted in Cox (1998:x-xii).

drama, transforming them, communicating social meaning verbally and non-verbally, and offering a paradigm for how the world ought to be”.

While not all ritual necessarily involves this sacred dimension, Cox’s definition highlights a qualitative difference in terms of place and space when these are used ritualistically. In Angolan culture, the *ondjango* embodied this ritualistic place and space, presided over by the *soba* and community elders.

Important cultural considerations have emerged in the literature regarding the construction of peace agreements in non-western societies. With particular reference to Uganda, Pain (1997:94) described the western approach of “signed formal agreements” as “restrictive” with “minimal effect on the ground”. He stated that “the measure of reconciliation is that one will ... be able to share food together” (Pain 1997:76). The implication is that without some form of ‘peace meal’ one cannot assume that reconciliation has occurred. Fieldwork showed that Angolans echoed Pain’s view, and that all Angola’s major ethnic groups share this cultural assumption that the sharing of food was the basis for reconciliation, traditionally. Traditional Angolan societies ‘signed’ peace and were reconciled through participation in a ritualised meal. Sharing food was the ‘peace signing’ ceremony. Western peace agreements by contrast emphasise the legally binding nature of written documents where both sides publicly exchange copies of the signed agreement, with the event frequently televised as part of the public ritual of peace making (Sussman & Muliro 2000). This western model is not inappropriate in an Angolan context but, in my view, other models expressing the traditions and cultures of those making peace must also be incorporated.

Neither the Bicesse nor Lusaka peace agreements involved the sharing of food as part of the peace signing. Some interviewees felt that a ‘peace meal’ could have added another dimension to the signing of these agreements by further validating and consolidating what had been signed. After the signing of the Bicesse Accords both sides apparently went back to their respective hotels.³⁴ My memory of the televised signing of the Lusaka Protocol is of an elaborate event which prioritised the exchange of signatures. Paul Hare (1998:65) makes no mention of a meal, instead described the signing of the Lusaka Protocol as a “sweet moment”, one “filled with appropriately worded statements of peace and the rites of protocol”. The rites of protocol in question

³⁴ The recollection of a Portuguese missionary, resident in Portugal at the time of the Bicesse signing. Interviewed Luanda, September 25 2001.

are different to what one interviewee called “the cultural rites of protocol”, where food would have been shared as part of the reconciliation process.³⁵ São Vincente (1995:19) also noted the importance of song and dance as part of the process of restoring “harmony and understanding” within Angolan communities, issues I deal with later in another context.

As observed at the time, the absence of Jonas Savimbi from the signing of the Lusaka Protocol was a troubling sign that did not bode well. When word filtered through that Eugénio Manuvakola, who signed the Protocol on behalf of UNITA, had been imprisoned by Savimbi upon his return to Angola, the sense of foreboding deepened.³⁶ Some traditional authority figures interviewed suggested that the Lusaka Protocol should not have been signed because of Savimbi’s absence, pointing out that from a traditional perspective the delegates had no authority to make peace, only those in conflict had the right to sign the agreement.³⁷ This view however seems extreme and does not take into account the importance of the Lusaka Protocol in bringing to an end one of the most brutal periods in Angola’s history.

3.3. *Honouring the Ancestors: the Act of Oath-Taking.*

In the case of serious conflict, the peace meal was highly ritualised and included a moment when the ancestors were invoked as witnesses to the agreement. As pointed out in chapter six, the reason for this is located within African traditional religion, where the ancestors were understood to be intimately linked with the living, and peace therefore was about harmony being re-established horizontally between those in conflict, and vertically with the ancestors. The ancestral component involved pouring libations and symbolic drinking, and was a sacred moment of appeasing the spirit world. Honouring the ancestors also signified the moment of ‘oath-taking’ within traditional religion,³⁸ where few, if any oaths had higher significance.

³⁵ Phrase used by Álvaro Rodrigues, Baptist pastor, interviewed in Luanda, July 28, 2000.

³⁶ Burity da Silva, Pro Pace Congress 2000. Also, HRW (1999).

³⁷ Interview with five sobas in the bairro of Rocha Pinto, Luanda, June 11, 2000. They used the phrase “Ninguém cumpre cadeia para o seu filho” meaning “nobody goes to jail for their son/daughter”.

³⁸ Kouassi’s (2000:72) comment: “The most common methods by which the Akan[of Ghana] sealed their treaties, alliances, and diplomatic relations was the ‘drinking of the gods’. ... [A]ll members present would drink ... and then swear an oath to abide by the terms of the treaty on pain of being killed by the god”, indicated a similar form of oath-taking beyond Angolan borders.

These libations were traditionally conducted where the ancestors were buried, which raises the issue of applicability had this aspect of traditional peace methods been incorporated into a peace signing ceremony. Where would the honouring of the ancestors have taken place? It was generally accepted by those interviewed that libations poured at Bicesse or Lusaka would have been insufficient, and that libations could only be poured at the burial sites of the respective ancestors. The implication is that a second ceremony, or a second moment within the same ceremony, would have been required in Angola, with both UNITA and the MPLA personnel honouring their respective ancestors. The suggestion presumes that such a link with this ancestral dimension exists for both political parties, and furthermore that the MPLA and UNITA would have accepted participation in such rituals. Any ancestral link with the MPLA is more tenuous because of its strong historical connections with European culture (Birmingham 1992:12-13; Kambwa 2000:63; Kibble & Vines 2001:540). These traditional rituals would have been of greater importance for UNITA because of its origins in the central highlands.

An implication of this material suggested during fieldwork, was that this form of oath-taking could have gone far in building public confidence in peace agreements. Maier (1996:14) and Robson (2001:4) noted a general lack of confidence after the Lusaka peace process in particular. An approach to peace that sought to incorporate some of these cultural dimensions would have made the peace agreements 'culturally recognisable', particularly among rural populations.³⁹ It was suggested that public confidence in the peace agreements would have been enhanced on the basis that Angolans would have recognised their traditions at work, and understood what had been entered into. The suggestion runs deeper however, based on the implication that this cultural recognition would later have turned people away from either side in the conflict should they have attempted to break the agreements. In effect, the implication is that Jonas Savimbi's own people would not, and could not, have supported him in violating peace and returning the country to war. Having sworn an ancestral oath, his own people would have shunned him had he attempted to remobilise his troops. The argument is that Jonas Savimbi's non-compliance with international agreements must

³⁹ The material in this paragraph is from interviews conducted during fieldwork, including traditional authority figures, church personnel and a number of NGO workers Interviews conducted on October 10 2001; November 7, 9, 16, 28, 2001. One interviewee stated that UNITA soldiers were known to have said "we have never drunk from the *calabash*" implying that they expected to drink ritually as part of their decommissioning, echoing material presented in chapter six.

be located in this arena, that the cultural space left open allowed him to be duplicitous. At the cultural level these agreements were not binding on UNITA, highlighting a fundamental weakness in the agreements.

4. *'Traditional Consultancy': Exploring a Concept.*

This final section explores 'traditional consultancy', by which I mean an individual or group of individuals versed in the culture and traditions of an ethnic group or groups, capable of offering expert and informed advice. The concept I propose to argue, appears especially useful in the context of a peace process, where reliable information based on an understanding of culture and tradition could prove invaluable in smoothing the road a peace process has to travel. I explore how this concept of 'traditional consultancy', with its emphasis on furnishing traditional knowledge, could have been helpful in Angola at crucial times. The concept has already been in use in the previous section, where I sought to establish connections between traditional perspectives and the needs of a country in conflict. My coining of the phrase is partly a response to the lack of such advice available to Margaret Anstee during her time as Special Representative in Angola. Anstee (1995:527) wrote:

“I have several times described in this book how desperately lonely I felt at times of great crisis, with few means at hand to combat it, and seldom anyone nearby to whom I could confidently turn for advice”.

I was very struck by this comment in her book and was convinced that her mandate required expert advice in the area of tradition and culture.

Fisher (1998:3) highlighted a lack of attention to cultural differences within international decision making generally:

“We note that people responsible for international decision making often operate from a traditional Western vantage point and, in the process, fail to recognise their own intellectual ethnocentricity and their dependence on conventional conceptions about the ways that nations behave, or should behave. When confronting societies and cultures (e.g., ethnic groups) that follow less familiar patterns of logic, political leaders, military strategists, even diplomats tend to project their Western experience and analytical orientation without sufficient effort to take contrasting cultural realities into account”.

Fisher's argument is that when building peace, there is a need to understand the culture of those in conflict, to appreciate how the protagonists themselves perceive the conflict. Cohen (1991:95-96) has noted that political scientists use the word culture

“in a narrow, specialised sense ... more concerned with the study of national institutions and attitudes than with investigating the organic link between political behaviour and culture as it is understood by anthropologists”.

Such a narrow definition results in anthropological insights being lost. Cohen (1991:153) argues that though the cultural dimension may be hidden, it has a pervasive influence on the behaviour of individuals, groups and societies.

Before exploring ‘traditional consultancy’ in the Angola context, I propose to illustrate how some of the skills, understandings and knowledge operated informally to successfully avoid a ‘cultural incident’ during the early stages of the Mozambican peace negotiations. Mario Marazitti (2002:6-7), a spokesperson for the Sant’Egidio community in Rome which played a crucial role in facilitating the peace agreement, highlights the following moment:

“A far from insignificant moment arose over the choice of menu. In Mozambique, the head of the table has the right to the head of the fish. Knowing this the Italian hosts served two whole grilled fish, so that each delegation leader could have a head. It was these two fish which pointed towards the parties’ mutual recognition, and the moment when the ‘facilitators’ became the ‘mediators’”.

We are dealing here with issues of cross-cultural communication where symbolic meaning is of great importance. Awareness of cultural sensitivities enabled the hosts to avoid conflict and affirm the leadership of both sides. The example illustrates that traditional knowledge is not the exclusive preserve of nationals immersed in the traditions of their own people, but that non-nationals familiar with the issues at stake, can exercise an effective role.

I now examine three inter-related areas which suggest that some form of ‘traditional consultancy’ could have been helpful in Angola. Firstly, I deal with the cultural assumptions underpinning mediation within conflict and then look at the roles of the UN and Troika. Secondly, I highlight the need for those working for peace to appreciate informal and non-verbal communicative processes. In an Angolan context and probably Africa generally, this requires a competency in relation to understanding what ceremonies of welcome are saying, what the drum and dancer are communicating, and what rumour may be informing. Thirdly, I assess the place of ‘peace envoys’ or ‘peace delegations’, paying some attention to Blondin Beye, before examining the UNITA peace delegation stationed in Luanda after the signing of the Bicesse Accords, many of whom were killed when hostilities erupted in 1992. My

question concerns the consequences for peace of their deaths, from a traditional perspective.

4.1. *The role of mediators.*

In exploring mediation in the Angolan conflict it is important to differentiate between the role played by the UN Secretary-General's special representatives Margaret Anstee and Alioune Blondin Beye, and that of the Troika of observers. I treat these separately after making two points dealing with cultural assumptions underpinning mediation.

Firstly, from a traditional perspective those called to mediate take upon themselves a sacred duty and are accorded special respect and protection. The person who accepted the task of mediation stepped into a sacred space that set them aside from others in the community, explained further below. Secondly, within the *ondjango*, the mediator's task was to listen as each side set out grievances and explained the reasons for conflict. This initial step where both sides talked about the nature of the problem, was followed by a second which involved negotiations and attempts at resolution. Calhoun (1995:32) highlights a helpful Habermasian distinction between these two types of communication, differentiating between "speech oriented to understanding itself" and "speech oriented to practical effects". The former, I submit, captures the major concern of *ondjango* discussions, where opposing sides examined 'roots causes' of conflict; the latter suggests a task-centred approach to communication, where negotiations and timetables are prioritised. Theoretically, the latter follows the former in peace discussions. In interviews with traditional authority figures, the impression prevailed that the Angolan peace agreements focused on 'negotiations' rather than examining the 'root causes' of conflict, which they argued have never been examined. This is probably because international mediators believed they knew the root causes, and considered a negotiated ending more urgent. As mentioned, this urgency was particularly real during the Lusaka negotiations, given the scale of suffering caused by the war.

International mediators have set out their understanding of what motivated the Angolan conflict. Margaret Anstee identified "spoils politics" and "power" as the basic issue in a section of her book explaining her hope that a private, rather than a general meeting, between the parties might be more productive. She wrote:

“Carving up the spoils of government involved many delicate issues internal to Angola and the striking of bargains between people who were not just fighting one another, but also knew one another very well, had in some cases been to school together and were even related to one another. The basic issue was power, and how to share it. They were much more likely to get down to the ‘nitty-gritty’ on their own, face to face, than under the prying eyes of foreigners, however well-intentioned” (Anstee 1996:457).

The assessment put forward by Paul Hare (1998:xvii) was similar: “[the] prime motive behind the Angolan conflict has been the struggle for power and domination”. While these are undoubtedly central factors in explaining the war, in my view, Angolans were saying something different, that the way forward necessitated going back to the first step where, in an *ondjango*-like space, parties in conflict set out the reasons for disagreement and moved forward from there.

Three of Angola’s kings, interviewed in 2001, stated that they had the means to bring the conflict to an end.⁴⁰ When asked to clarify these means, they answered, “we as Angolans must sit down to talk about the reasons for this war, we must promote dialogue”. In doing so, they highlighted a fundamental assumption within traditional perspectives which shares a common assumption with Habermas’s public sphere, that conflict or problems can be resolved through talking. This view has been reflected elsewhere. Jaka Jamba, a UNITA negotiator during the Addis Ababa talks, argued that the Angolan peace accords were concerned with the division of power between the parties involved, while all the time ignoring the underlying causes of the war itself. He stated that:

“Bicesse created a ‘winner takes all’ situation through the mechanism of the 1992 elections, while Lusaka dealt with the allocation of percentages of ministerial posts and governorships to the various parties”.⁴¹

The issue of ‘roots causes’ arose in a curious way during the Addis Ababa talks.

Anstee (1996:384) quotes Manuvakola who at one point insisted

“that there should first be “general debate about the underlying causes of the renewed conflict in Angola” in plenary session. The government delegation did not want this and it was hard to see where a time-consuming reprise of mutual grievances would get us other than precipitating an unhelpfully acrimonious exchange” (Anstee 1996:384).

⁴⁰ Vasco Felix Ekuikui IV from Bailundo, Henriques da Silva Meso Mankala of the Bakongos, and Muatchisengue Watembu of the Lunda-Chokwes, meeting at their residence in Viana, Luanda, September 25, 2001.

⁴¹ Interviewed in Luanda, August 4, 2000.

Anstee believes that Manuvakola was ‘filibustering’ as he may well have been,⁴² but his statement appears to stand alongside others calling for discussion before negotiation.

The issue of mediation also concerns the Troika of observers who played a central role in the negotiation of the Bicesse Accords, and continued to ‘oversee’ the Angolan peace processes. Traditional authority’s evaluation of the Troika’s ‘observer’ role in the peace processes, and of international mediation in the conflict, has been rather negative. For example, in 2001 traditional authorities stated that in any future peace process, international organisations should not be “the only peace mediators in Angola”,⁴³ that a national mediation component needed to be included. In the course of fieldwork in 2000, *sobas* in Dundo made the following statement reflecting their disillusionment with international mediation:

“We have something to say about the war, for more than twenty years we have been waiting to speak. We have ways to resolve our own problems. We do not need foreigners to make peace. Those from outside are also making weapons and are making a great deal of money here. People from outside do not understand. We would get the two of them [President dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi] to sit down. We were born here, we are from the same family. The war is not in our interest, it is foreigners who are profiting, deceiving the two of them”.^{44viii}

At the Open Society conference, the following critical evaluation (appendix 4) was made of the Troika and international mediation as a whole:

“Whenever we have a problem, the first thing we do is call foreigners to resolve our problems. Independence was like that, and the various peace processes. Stop and have a look. We have a snake in the chicken coop, which is Angola, and we have called a fox to get rid of the snake. We ask ourselves, will the fox be more interested in running after the chickens to eat them, or in chasing away the snake? And if three foxes had been called, what can we expect of them?”⁴⁵

This use of simile or metaphor to describe a problem is not unusual in Angola. The above comment represents the sharpest criticism this research encountered of international involvement in trying to resolve the conflict. The suggestion is that

⁴² In a private communication (telephone conversation April 2000) with Margaret Anstee, she stated that this suggestion came very late in the day and was interpreted as a stalling mechanism so as to give UNITA troops more time to consolidate their military gains in Angola.

⁴³ Taken from a FAAT conference document dated September 12, 2001.

⁴⁴ Meeting with eight *sobas*, Dundo, June 5, 2000.

⁴⁵ *Angolense*, February 23-March 2, 2002, pp. IX-X.

mediation has made the problem worse, that the mediators (foxes) forgot what the original problem was and set about feeding themselves, looking after their own ‘interests’, shorthand for ‘economic interests’. The members of the Troika have substantial economic involvement in terms of oil, diamonds and other business interests in Angola, and traditional authorities believed these were of greater concern than their mediation role. This perspective is a reversal of the usual resource argument, in that those seeking control over Angola’s natural resources are not those at war, but those involved in mediation.

4.2. *‘Communicative Competencies’*

Here I suggest that a particular expertise of ‘traditional consultancy’ would be its communicative ability and competency, not merely linguistically in terms of speaking a language or a number of languages, but dealing more widely with an ability to unpack cultural metaphors and similes, to measure and assess non-verbal and “informal means of communication” (Chabal & Daloz 1999:25-26), such as rumour, music, dance, drums, and gift-giving. It refers to an ability to analyse public communication at different levels, other than at the ‘rational-critical’ level one associates with Habermas’s public sphere discourse. I give an example from the colonial period which illustrates some of the subtleties involved, then go on to explore traditional welcome ceremonies, before looking at rumour and oral communication.

4.2.1. *Subversive nationalist music and dance.*

The following example of how Angolan music and dance played a subversive role during colonial times, provides a basis upon which to read traditional ceremonies of welcome, examined in the next two sections. The Angolan author Xitu (1989) points out that cultural displays, performed for foreign visitors, were sometimes used to communicate a different message than that imagined by the visitors. Xitu (1989:146-147) refers to the music

“[known as] ‘get out of here’ and another, ‘one day we will get rid of you’, at the time when the coloniser was fleeing the Belgian Congo ... It was music written in great quantity that alarmed the PIDE [colonial secret police] and confused the Portuguese government... These singers and musicians continually offered a critique, singing about suffering, about their peoples’ misery, there were spokespersons of ancestral culture. One could even say they gave birth to the revolution. ... In the colonial era, we were forced many times to sing and dance for the president of the Republic, ministers and their retinue visiting from Portugal and other places in Europe. In these songs and dances

we succeeded in mocking the visitors, without them knowing. On the contrary, the visitors clapped appreciatively because they didn't understand the significance of the words in the national languages".

The example illustrates that something other than what visitors suspected was occurring before their very eyes. It shows that music and dance have been used by Angolans as part of their communicative repertoire and that such communication was not always accessible, hence the need for 'consultants' competent to unpack the various layers of meaning.

4.2.2. *Traditional Welcome: Gift Giving.*

Music and dance form part of the 'traditional welcome' afforded important visitors in Angolan culture. Here I examine the welcome given to Margaret Anstee and her delegation prior to the Bicesse Accords during a visit to Jamba, then UNITA's key strategic base. Anstee (1997:179-180) describes her visit as follows:

"The reception on our arrival was mind-boggling. A large concourse of young girls and youths were frantically dancing and chanting to the beat provided by equally frenetic drummers. ... After we had visited the quarters of our two observers – grass huts – there was a large and long-drawn-out luncheon followed by more speeches and the presentation to me of an elaborate carved wooden apparatus. In the centre of this was a large cylindrical pot, with a lid, and lined with yellow plastic foam. The central pot was surrounded by several smaller pots, connected to it and to one another with spokes like an open wheel. I felt it impolite to ask what on earth it was for, and no one has been able to tell me since".

Interviewees who knew Jamba well and to whom I showed this description made a number of points which I set out here. In terms of understanding what is being communicated in a welcome ceremony, it is important to go beyond the content of the speeches and ask what the dancers expressed in their dance, and what the drums said.⁴⁶ These were not merely providing entertainment, but communicating a message as seen in Xitu above. Also, in Angolan culture it is polite to ask what a gift means. It is a way of expressing appreciation, and it would have been appropriate for Margaret Anstee to have requested an explanation of the gift. An interviewee who had lived in Jamba for many years, pointed out that UNITA craft-workers held meetings to discuss and prepare artesanal gifts for visitors, and a great deal of reflection went into what gifts

⁴⁶ Chernoff's (1979) book is an interesting study of the communicative power of African music and dance. For example, he describes how in traditional society, court historians were drummers, and how the drummer continues to be the 'master of ceremonies' at public events (Chernoff 1979:27-75). Browning's (1995) study of the communicative power of dance in Brazil, traces many of the Brazilian expressions of dance back to their African roots prior to the slave trade. Browning (1995:xxii) refers to dance as a form of "cultural record keeping".

were given and why.⁴⁷ None of my informants however, knew the meaning of the gift to Margaret Anstee, but thought it could only be about the peace process.

Again I suggest that a form of traditional consultancy familiar with the language of symbol and gift-giving, with the language of the drum and the dancer could have exercised an important role here, particularly in relation to the nature of the communication taking place beyond the cultural reach of international mediators and observers.

4.2.3. *Traditional Welcome: Placards?*

Paul Hare's (1998:72) description of his trip to Jamba some years later, shares remarkable similarities in structure with Anstee's at the level of speeches, dancers and drummers:

“On their arrival, the visitors received a rousing welcome. A special programme of speeches, plays, and traditional dances was presented. Commenting on the music, I wrote: A somewhat ragtag but determined military band played martial music, spurred on by the drummer who somehow managed to throw one of his batons in the air and retrieve it, while gyrating in circles and thumping the drum exactly on beat. I also noted the ‘release of two doves by the children’s contingent who held placards, sometimes upside down, that contained only one word, ‘*Paz*’ or ‘Peace’”.

Many of the same points can be made about the need to understand the form of communication, but some of the same interviewees who commented on the above text were intrigued by the description of the children's placards. Aware of possibly over-interpreting the text, their own experience of similar events, especially where children are carefully lined up, led them believe that the placards were upside-down because they were supposed to be, that UNITA was saying that the peace process was upside-down! Whatever the truth of the matter, the moment required some mechanism to facilitate and translate the communication occurring.

⁴⁷ Interview with Bernardo Bongo, Luanda, November 15 2001.

4.2.4. *Oral Tradition.*

A concern with oral tradition and rumour is by no means a marginal concern (Fonseca 1996).⁴⁸ Anstee (1996:346) described Luanda as “always a-buzz with rumour” after the Bicesse Accords pointing to rumours that UNITA had hidden its army in the Angolan bush (Anstee 1996:52-53) and that both sides were rearming (Anstee 1996:337). The ‘truth’ of these rumours was later to painfully unfold. The Kimbundu word *mujimbu* is frequently used to refer to rumour and can be asked as a question, *mujimbu?* to mean ‘any news’? Xitu (1985:35) provides an interesting description of *mujimbu*:

“the newspaper with the largest print run, circulation, and distribution in Angola, is the *Mujimbu*, which is read and discussed by almost all the country’s inhabitants, even by the illiterate, blind, dumb and sick. ... The *Mujimbu* is the cheapest paper in the world: it’s free and has a believing audience without precedent. Distribution and diffusion in the streets, the bars, clubs, beaches, markets ... all over, without exception, *mujimbu!* ...the term which simply means, news, information, conversation, quarrel, trouble, problem, complaint, lost its true and original meaning to become RUMOUR” (emphasis in original).^{ix}

As Monga (1996:151-152) points out, in countries where the media is state-owned and where freedom of expression is curtailed or restricted, it is important to pay attention to oral communication as a “means of effectively distributing critical messages”. One interviewee stated that for many in Angola the only news believed and trusted was *mujimbu*, the news on the street, often the product of people returning from various parts of Angola and recounting their first hand experience.⁴⁹

Though contradictory at times, an appreciation of oral communication and rumour is fundamentally important. Within a culture where individuals are reluctant to speak publicly, and are fearful of being personally identified with an opinion, there is a tendency to anonymously ‘suggest’ what is known, to “deliberately adopt an imprecise way of communicating in order to protect themselves and disguise their first-hand knowledge” (Monga 1996:152). Given that rumours existed regarded UNITA’s hidden army and rearmament,⁵⁰ the question must be raised as to why no means was found to

⁴⁸ In his review of Dia Kassembe’s book *Angola 20 ans de guerre civile. Une femme accusée*, Réne Pélissier (1996:320) quotes the author who “warn[ed] the reader against the *boato* (rumour), an intrinsic part of the societies set up by the Portuguese”. Lefebvre’s (1973) book on the role of rumour in France at the time of the French Revolution illustrates that rumour has played a very important role also in western societies, particularly when society relied on oral forms of communication for information.

⁴⁹ Interview in Luanda, October 22 2001.

⁵⁰ Bakewell (1999:150) comments on how Angolans were aware of arms caches and soldiers hidden in the bush, indicating that there was widespread scepticism about the peace process.

explore these allegations by attempting to follow the rumours back to their source, or indeed to work with the churches who had expressed similar concerns, as seen in chapter three.

Traditional consultancy could also have exercised a vital function at the level of linguistics. Jonas Savimbi was renowned for his linguistic skills, and rumours circulating prior to the elections expressed concern at the content of his speeches when delivered in national languages. In contrast to the more accommodating tone he adopted when addressing the crowds in Portuguese, oral reports described the threatening tone of his speeches in national languages. A disturbing example of this dates from the post-election period, during the welcome ceremony afforded Blondin Beye upon his first visit to Huambo. According to three key informants present, Blondin Beye was warmly welcomed by Jonas Savimbi who spoke to him in Portuguese and French and presented him to the crowds as the new UN Special Representative.⁵¹ As he did so, Savimbi broke into Umbundu and ridiculed Beye for dressing like a woman in his long Islamic robes. Encouraging the crowd to chant Beye's name, he told them that no man dressed as such could have any authority. While the example reflects negatively on Savimbi (and demoralised the crowd who understood what had taken place), it also reflects negatively on the UN missions, poorly resourced linguistically to cope with such situations.⁵²

4.3. *The role of peace envoys.*

Because it is not always possible in a mediation process to bring together both sides in conflict, delegates or envoys are appointed to represent their leaders. These delegates are traditionally accorded the same rights and protections as the peace mediators because of the importance of their duties. After the signing of the Bicesse Accords a UNITA delegation was stationed in Luanda to deal with peace related matters. There was no need for the Angolan government to have a reciprocal delegation. A crucial question arises from a traditional perspective when these delegates are killed or

⁵¹ Interviews November 16 2001; November 21 2001.

⁵² A further example from this linguistic arena concerns the phrase where Jonas Savimbi is referred to as '*o mais velho*', sometimes carelessly translated as 'the oldest one'. A more accurate translation would be 'the senior elder', but even that misses the point, because '*o mais velho*' is a translation of the Umbundu '*Sekulu yo-la sekulul*', meaning the 'chief of chiefs', 'king of kings'. In other words, within his own linguistic group, Savimbi aggregated to himself the title of the country's traditional ruler, which none of the translations capture.

threatened, or when the mediator is killed, as happened when Alioune Blondin Beye was killed in a plane crash in Abidjan on June 26, 1998. What if any, are the consequences for peace when such events occur? I examine Beye's death, firstly.

A brief introductory comment is relevant concerning the death of Beye. I was resident in Angola at the time of his death and aware of popular concerns that war between UNITA and the government might resume. However, I was not aware that some of these fears concerned a possible war with Mali. During fieldwork in 2000, I was told of Angolans who left their homes at the time of Beye's death to temporarily hide in the bush, assuming that a Malian declaration of war was imminent in order to avenge and honour the death of their son. Dundo is close to the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and these people assumed Mali would invade overland. Significantly, the non-declaration of war was understood by some as irrational, as a failure by Mali to honour its son. The understanding behind this perception was that Beye had been killed while involved in 'sacred duties' of mediation, that Angola had failed to protect him. Beye had worked tirelessly for peace in Angola, and his demise was a contributing factor in Angola slipping back into war later that year.

The death in Luanda of members of UNITA's delegation in 1992 raises serious and complex issues. In effect, it suggests that the trigger factors behind the conflict, were not solely UNITA allegations of fraud and rejection of the election results, but that cultural issues were also involved. Fieldwork research inquiring about the implications of these deaths yielded contradictory responses, with some considering these deaths as irrelevant, while others believed they were *the* issue in the post-election return to war.⁵³ The different responses hinged on whether the UNITA delegation was considered a 'peace delegation' in the traditional sense. The point was frequently made that the UNITA delegation did not behave as a 'peace delegation', to be considered as such. Their "behaviour in Luanda infuriated the civilian population" (Maier 1996:100). They were heavily armed during peacetime and in television interviews they threatened war rather than promised peace. This behaviour contradicted claims that they were a 'peace delegation' in the traditional sense.

⁵³ On two occasions when conducting group interviews during fieldwork (October 2001; November 2001) these divergent opinions emerged. On both occasions the opinions reflected the ethnic origin of the speaker, with Ambundu interviewees stating the episode was unrelated to the resumption of war, while Ovimbundu interviewees arguing that it was the trigger factor.

An important question here, is how did Jonas Savimbi and UNITA understand the status of this delegation? It is here, I believe, that Anstee's book becomes an especially invaluable resource on Angola, because she records her conversations with Jonas Savimbi after the outbreak of fighting in Luanda before full-scale war had erupted. Two examples from her book are especially relevant. Firstly, Anstee (1996:420) quotes Savimbi at this time of renewed hostilities, in an address to the nation in March 1993:

“Wars are bad and destructive but often they are worth it so that, once peace is established it will be a lasting peace...’ ‘The war was started by the MPLA assassinating our men in Luanda when they were on a peace mission’”.

Here Savimbi was referring to the killing of Chitunda and Salupeto Pena, and other members of the UNITA delegation.⁵⁴

Secondly, her description of a meeting with Jonas Savimbi outside Huambo, is particularly important:

“As in the case of the marathon telephone calls during and after the recent conflict in Luanda, we had the impression that Dr Savimbi was presenting ‘a stream of consciousness’ and obtaining psychological relief by pouring forth his grief and grievances. ... There was much agonising and speculation over what had happened in Luanda and on the death of his closest collaborators (You never kill an envoy; you send him back and then the envoy may be changed or the message may be changed)” (Anstee 1996:308).

It is clear from Anstee's account that Jonas Savimbi understood his delegation in Luanda as a peace delegation. Though approximately ten thousand had been killed in Luanda at the start of the war, it was the deaths of members of the delegation that was of singular importance, constituting from a traditional perspective a declaration of war. An attack on the peace delegates was an attack on the peace process. Furthermore, Salupeto Pena was Savimbi's nephew, and within Umbundu consanguinity was Savimbi's heir and closest relative. Despite the fact that Savimbi had many children of his own, culturally his sister's son was his immediate heir. Within the traditional framework, the death of Salupeto Pena was of the greatest importance within the peace process because it meant that Savimbi himself had been killed.

⁵⁴ C.f. Anstee (1996:292-310) on the post-electoral outbreak of violence. UNITA frequently called for the return of the bodies of delegation members, c.f. a letter from Alcides Sakala to the United Nations on September 12, 2001, quoted in *Folha 8*, September 29, 2001. UNITA thought the bodies had been kept in storage but Manuvakola disclosed in a *LAC* radio interview (Agora, September 29, 2001), that they had been buried prior to the Lusaka negotiations.

The implications of this material suggests that while the international community was engaged in trying to get UNITA to accept the election results, a different concern was propelling UNITA back to war, a concern which only traditional and cultural knowledge can explain. As a prominent member of a national NGO stated in an interviewee:

“though UNITA had fought and lost the elections, its return to war had little to do with electoral defeat, but was about avenging the death of its peace delegates”.

This analysis however is not without its difficulties because it does not explain why UNITA had begun to remobilise its forces and had occupied the town of Caconda on October 8, weeks before the battle of Luanda (Maier 1996:83). UNITA was undeniably on a war footing prior to the killing of members of the delegation. Nonetheless, Jonas Savimbi’s comments to Margaret Anstee about the ‘death of the envoys’ cannot be explained except at a cultural level, representing for him according to Anstee’s account, the moment that triggered full-scale war.

Paul Hare highlights another episode during the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol where a form of ‘traditional consultancy’ could possibly have assisted. It shows that events on the ground in Angola overtook international mediation efforts at key moments in the peace process, and that mediation failed to appreciate the significance of what was happening.

“Another serious setback occurred during a shooting incident at the residence of General Ben Ben in Luanda on October 14, 1995. ... Ben Ben and two other UNITA generals had come to Luanda to discuss various military issues, including the number of troops UNITA would contribute to the FAA and the concept of ‘global incorporation’. The presence of high-ranking UNITA military officers in Luanda was considered a sign of UNITA’s commitment to the peace process. When I saw Ben Ben immediately after the incident, he was agitated. The shooting reignited memories of the October 1992 massacre in Luanda. ... I tried to persuade Ben Ben and his colleagues that they should stay in Luanda, but the military team went back to Bailundo shortly thereafter, and the peace process slowed to a snail’s pace” (Hare 1998:95-96).

Shooting at General Ben Ben would ordinarily not imperil the peace process, but doing so while he was a peace delegate was very different.

The material outlined here suggests, to answer an earlier research question in terms of what insights a traditional perspective can provide, that certain traditional factors were at work within the Angolan conflict. International mediation needed a mechanism that

facilitated an understanding of Angola's traditions and cultures and which could offer traditional knowledge to the peace processes. This suggestion parallels a point made by Munslow (1999:558) regarding Linda Heywood's work on the Ovimbundu peoples.

Munslow commented:

“scholars of Angola need to pay as much attention to traditional African political ideology as to Western ideas of democracy. ... Ovimbundu ethnic identity and pride were cultivated by Savimbi's intimate knowledge of traditional beliefs”.

Zartmann (2000) and others in his edited work, have attempted to 'structure upwards' traditional methods of conflict management in order to address national conflict. It is not an argument I make here. Instead, I argue that the 'structuring upwards' of traditional knowledge and perspectives, employing a mechanism such as 'traditional consultancy', could strengthen the knowledge base of a peace process and help in reading complex events. It is for this reason I include the words 'ancient and modern' in the chapter title, to suggest that 'ancient' traditions and perspectives have something to offer 'modern' approaches in understanding and addressing conflict, a question I posed at the beginning of this chapter.

Earlier sections of this chapter addressed the questions of where and how traditional society resolved conflict. The *ondjango* emerged as the key site in this regard, where communicative processes and ritual were seen as occupying key places within traditional peace making methodologies. Traditional authority perspectives on the causes of the conflict were also put forward, where the international community was situated, not as a peace broker in the conflict, but as a player in the conflict itself because of its economic interests. The need for *ondjango*-like space within which to conduct peace negotiations emerged as a key theme within the peace narrative of traditional authority.

The issues highlighted in this section are culturally complex, but validate Cohen's (1991) argument that cultural issues can have significant implications for peace negotiations. I have attempted to present the material in a way that reflects the nature of the responses I received, which at times were contradictory, but point to important issues regarding what pushed Angola back to war. When Alioune Blondin Beye was appointed as the UN Secretary General's special representative it was felt that an African man would have a better chance in bringing peace to Angola, because he

would understand his fellow Africans better, than a European woman. The issues involved here, appear however to revolve around questions of socialisation, and not gender or place of birth. An urban environment with strong western influences socialises individuals and communities in a radically different way to a rural environment. This should not surprise us. Different socialisation processes explain why some Angolans interviewed discounted the material presented here, while others verified it.

I conclude this chapter with a comment from Fisher (1998) regarding the work of Robert McNamara (1995), US Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam War. As the quotation illustrates, the cultural and traditional issues highlighted here are by no means unique to Angola, but have a wider relevance in cross-cultural situations:

“[McNamara] cites disaster after disaster in decision making as the right questions about local cultures were not asked and events were ethnocentrically interpreted, especially as attempts were made to quantify as many factors as possible to make the conflict fit into a systems analysis framework. Consequently, a war was pursued in a very foreign place with little appreciation for the real motivation and purpose that drove the Vietnamese in both the North and the South – and consequently little appreciation of the inappropriateness of the objectives and strategy pursued by the United States. This was the more ironic as the decision makers at the centre were known as ‘the best and the brightest’ in the American system. But it was a brilliance that did not travel well across contrasting cultural systems” (Fisher 1998:4).

The quotation underlines the importance of factoring cultural issues into analysis of the causes of conflict, an issue requiring serious attention in any peace process.

Chapter 8.

Conclusion.

The final chapter of this thesis has two principal objectives which I deal with in two separate sections. The first section revisits the theoretical framework adopted for research, commenting on the usefulness and appropriateness of the 'revised Habermasian public sphere' as a research tool. The second section draws together the principal themes and findings to have emerged within the five Angolan peace narratives from the Bicesse Accords to the death of Jonas Savimbi. In outlining these, I readdress the research questions outlined in the introductory chapter, which situated this thesis within the arena of Angolan perspectives on peace 'from below'. These questions related to how Angolans themselves interpreted the nature of the conflict, the reasons they identified for it, what they said about peace and how it could have been achieved. The questions also asked how Angolans in these arenas assessed the peace efforts of the international community.

1. *Public Sphere framework.*

Chapter two set out the theoretical framework within which research was conducted, a 'revised Habermasian public sphere'. There, I argued that it was possible to locate the historical churches, private media and civil society organisations within this framework, but that community-based organisations and traditional authorities fell outside. By incorporating a number of minor revisions to Habermas's original public sphere concept, an analytical framework was established for the first three Angolan peace narratives. In the case of community-based material, I argued that it was situated within the 'plebeian public sphere', and not part of Habermas's original theory. Though the institution of traditional authority shared much in common with the historical churches, the private media and civil society organisations, I have situated it outside the public sphere framework because traditional authority regard themselves as political actors and have argued for their inclusion within the institutions of the state. In both cases, I introduced Habermasian material which promoted further understanding of these peace narratives, and in so doing maintained a 'Habermasian focus' on these arenas which I considered to be 'beyond' a revised framework.

The use of Habermas has been fruitful in analysing how the five Angolan peace narratives situated themselves in relation to peace. The Habermasian public sphere introduced crucial spatial issues into this research, which provided the thesis with an important and original point of entry into analysis on Angola. These spatial concerns are fundamental in understanding the possibility of 'freedom of expression' and 'freedom of association' in Angola, of which the Habermasian framework facilitated due consideration. The framework also proved particularly relevant in relation to traditional authorities where, despite the decline in the use of the *ondjango* as an institution, Habermasian concerns interpreted the *ondjango* as an important Angolan spatial construct, holding the memory of how Angolans came together to talk about community concerns, and promote harmony and peace. The *ondjango* shares many similarities with Habermas's public sphere, and represented the key discursive arena within Angolan traditional society. I argued that when Angolans called for renewed dialogue and peace negotiations between the Angolan government and UNITA, they were appealing for the recreation of this traditional discursive space where 'talking' could take place.

In assessing the appropriateness and the potential of Habermas's public sphere for the research outlined here, I propose to make five points. In doing so, I argue that the research potential of the framework is strong in Angola (Africa), and should be explored further to help overcome many of the difficulties encountered by researchers working within a civil society framework, as I highlighted in chapter two. The framework brings the fundamental question of the nature of public space into focus, a key issue underpinning the development of associational life and civil society organisations, which civil society theory does not fully address. It seems clear, for example, that citing the numerical growth of civil society organisations as an indicator of civil society development may be rather misplaced, if the public sphere in terms of 'freedoms of speech' and 'freedom of association' is not also expanding. A Habermasian approach enables some measurement of this to take place, giving a sense of how the public sphere is developing, which a 'head-count' of civil society organisations does not achieve.

A great strength of Habermas's model of public sphere is the strong focus on public rational critical discourse, a democratic space where individuals discuss issues of

concern to them. A weakness of this focus is that other public forms of discourse, expressed according to a different rationality, are diminished in importance. The later chapters of this thesis highlighted the communicative power and potential of Angolan ritual, the Angolan drummer or dancer, as key components of traditional Angolan communicative processes. The richness, diversity and importance of these processes are missed by the emphasis on rational critical discourse, yet for those concerned with how communication is conducted and what is said publicly, these require scrutiny and appraisal, otherwise the communication occurring can be lost. Public communication, in fact, is more varied and complex than that presented by Habermas within his public sphere model.

Secondly, a weakness in the conception of the Habermasian public sphere is its inability to deal with questions of untruth, deceit, duplicity or lying, when these emerge within public discourse. "The political arena", as Barnes (1994:30) reminds us, "is second only to warfare as a domain where lies are expected, do in fact occur, and are to a substantial extent tolerated". The issue is important because within a peace process, one would like to assume truthfulness of communication, given that building peace is based on building qualities such as transparency, honesty and trust. All too often however, in the Angolan peace processes, the absence of these qualities had to be confronted, especially as UNITA secretly rearmed while it officially declared to be disarming, and had these declarations confirmed by the UN. Habermas appears unable to offer much guidance with regard to issues of untruth within communication. To quote Barnes (1994:4) again:

"Given the interdependence of the concepts of the truth and the lie, the central attention paid by Habermas ... to the concept of truth seems out of proportion to the lack of critical attention he and his followers have given to deception".

His public sphere is based on the presumption that collective debate and scrutiny will expose falsehood within the public sphere. This does not necessarily happen, revealing the public sphere as poorly equipped to deal with untruth.¹

¹ It is not just Habermas who struggles with the question of untruth. Kucich (1994:19) writes: "[Foucault] is unable to imagine lying - in terms of his own dramatology of power and knowledge - as an attempt to create and protect a counterdomain of knowledge, or as an attempt to refuse the legitimacy of institutional technologies of truth, or even as a repudiation of the political structures associated with 'truth' production".

Thirdly, Habermas's approach gives preference to non-violent forms of engagement in seeking to resolve discord and conflict, whether at local or national levels. There is therefore, an underlying belief in his work that rational public discourse provides society and government with the required mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflict and crisis. The weakness in this approach concerns the legitimate use of force by governments in defense of sovereignty, and safeguarding the protection of its citizens. While governments may be hasty in going to war, the legitimate use of force as the right, and even the duty, of sovereign government must be recognised and upheld. This argument was frequently used by the Angolan government in its struggle with UNITA's military wing, but Habermas, in his framework comes close to not conferring this right on sovereign governments. This is perhaps a reflection on Habermas's own experience of war in Germany.

Fourthly, the Habermasian 'spatial' approach to society is, in my view, among the greatest strengths of his theory. Throughout this thesis, issues and events which shaped and scarred the Angolan public sphere came into focus as part of what enabled or disabled Angolan actors to organise and communicate. It was seen how Angola's colonial experience, the *27 de Maio* attempted coup, and the introduction of Marxist-Leninism, combined to shape and demarcate the boundaries of the Angolan public sphere, to limit the rights of 'freedom of association' and 'freedom of expression'. This attention to public space is similar to what Trivedy (1996:101) calls 'situational analysis', an analysis of the political space within which development organisations and other agencies work. As Trivedy (1996:99) writes:

"How do development agencies assess the political environment in which they operate? ... There are relatively few studies which have documented the ways in which development agencies have sought to use and create 'political space' for their operations. Moreover there appear to be no systematic methods for analysing, and finding, ways of working effectively in different political climates".

In my view, the public sphere framework is such a methodology to facilitate 'situational analysis'. The Angolan public sphere is not neutral, but has its own traumatic and turbulent history which weighs heavily on the public sphere, and greatly affects the ability and capacity of Angolans to organise collectively and express their views.

Finally, the Habermasian model also facilitates analysis of important moments when the boundaries of the public sphere were challenged, and the space for freedom expanded. In an interview, the president of ACA, Milá Melo, pointed to three events of particular importance in tracing qualitative change within the Angolan public sphere.² I dealt with these in earlier chapters, but I bring them together here because of their salience to the point at issue. Melo pointed to the work of *Rádio Ecclésia* since its relaunch in 1997, underlining its important educational role in enabling individuals to express their views, the provision of information that is generally trusted, and being a key vehicle of public opinion. Secondly, she considered the events surrounding the trial of Rafael Marquês important. Through his articles in the private media, Marquês raised issues of public interest and showed that President dos Santos was not beyond public scrutiny. Marquês broke an unwritten convention or taboo in his journalism, and his work in effect, involved the “problematization of areas that until then had not been questioned” (Habermas 1989:36). Thirdly, Melo highlighted the importance of the 2000 *Pro Pace* Congress which directly addressed, for the first time, the question of peace in Angola. She believed that the Congress created a sense of collective ownership by carrying out an ‘audit’ on how the quest for peace had been conducted, and asked hard questions of the Angolan government and UNITA. To these three, I would add the importance of the demonstration held after the 1600% fuel price rise in 1999, the first peaceful demonstration in Angola since the *27 de Maio*. It represented a psychological breakthrough that should not be underestimated.

Habermas’s model of public sphere, once subjected to a certain scrutiny and revision to correct historical inaccuracies, is a most valuable analytical tool, offering an important research framework for analysis of the spatial constructs underlying society. Furthermore, his unexplored concept of a ‘plebeian public sphere’ also offers interesting research possibilities, which I have found useful in approaching this Angolan based research, as it recognises the importance of ‘common culture’ as distinct from the ‘bourgeois’ in the construction of the public sphere.

² Interview in Luanda on November 9, 2001.

2. *Themes and Findings.*

The final section of this chapter outlines eight themes and findings to have emerged within this research, where Angolan perspectives ‘from below’ have been prioritised. These point to key areas within the peace narratives explored.

A central theme underlined in many of the peace narratives concerned the exclusion of Angolan civil organisations and personalities from the negotiating table in Bicesse, Lusaka, and indeed, Luena. It was suggested that this exclusion had been detrimental to the search for peace, in that Angolan actors, who could have exercised a moderating influence on both the Angolan government and UNITA, were unable to do so. Both the conflict itself and its resolution were framed within a polarised arena where only the Angolan government and UNITA’s voices were heard in relation to peace. This polarisation appears to have taken root within the context of the Bicesse Accords, when the Troika brokered the peace deal. For example, at no stage did international organisations promote the inclusion of the Angolan churches or opposition political parties, even as observers, in order to influence the direction of peace negotiations. This is not to suggest that international organisations did not consult with the churches and other Angolan organisations,³ but that no mechanism was established to guarantee their inclusion. The clear suggestion from the narratives presented in this thesis is that such exclusion was a factor as to why peace settlements failed.

We have seen a clear emphasis throughout on the need for dialogue and negotiation, with war understood as a failure of political will. This emphasis prevailed despite the failure of two international peace agreements where lengthy negotiations occurred. As I suggested in chapter seven, calls for renewed dialogue which were made right up to the death of Jonas Savimbi, can be located within the memory of the *ondjango*, where traditional society met to talk and address its problems. This memory believed that discussion on the causes of the war was an essential first step before negotiations, a step upon which none of the peace negotiations were built. Despite the decades of conflict, the peace narratives presented here continued to believe in the possibility of a negotiated solution through renewed dialogue. For traditional authority in particular, this dialogue required that the causes of conflict be placed on a peace agenda.

³ In conversation at BAF (2002). Margaret Anstee mentioned that the Angolan churches frequently met with her to discuss the peace process.

These chapters also highlighted an approach to peace as a long term strategy, as a task that involved scrutinising democratic institutions, promoting human rights, critiquing the judicial system, creating greater space for public debate, highlighting issues of corruption, putting forward analysis of the war, engaging in the elaboration of a new national constitution, and so on. Engagement with these issues revealed a strong sense of citizenship within the arenas explored in the thesis, where many organisations were actively involved in building foundations for a more peaceful participative Angola. This peace work belongs within the notion of ‘positive peace’ articulated by Galtung (1995), which he contrasts with ‘negative peace’, which may see the end of widespread violent conflict, but where other forms of social and structural violence continue, with domestic violence increasing and social inequality deepening.⁴ Even during war-time these organisations were engaged in promoting ‘positive peace’.

The ongoing conflict in Cabinda emerged as a theme within some of the narratives. The ‘Angolan conflict’ has frequently been referred to in the singular, to highlight UNITA’s military campaign against the Angolan state, thereby not recognising the existence of FLEC’s conflict in the province of Cabinda. Following the death of Jonas Savimbi, significant coverage was given to the Cabindan conflict though, apart from the private media, coverage prior to February 2002 was insignificant. Perhaps the low intensity nature of the conflict explains why it received little attention. Nonetheless, peace in Angola remains dependent on a solution being found to FLEC’s grievances, and this is pending.

A dynamic was identified towards the end of the 1990s, which was long overdue in Angola, when attempts were made to create visible Angolan peace structures, which had the effect of uniting and consolidating local organisations working for peace, but also raised the profile and visibility of national peace efforts. The formation of COIEPA was the most significant in this regard, with *Rede da Paz* also important at a later stage. By positing a third arena, these structures helped to break the polarised manner in which peace had been discussed in Angola, where people were identified as either pro-MPLA or pro-UNITA. This centre tried to transcend politics and voice the need for peace on behalf of millions of displaced Angolans, whose lives were reduced

⁴ Taken from *International Alert* (2001).

to abject poverty. Furthermore, it took the position that the war had no popular consent among Angolans.

A major finding of this research was the significance of 'traditional' material within Angolan peace narratives. Although I was aware of the importance of tradition while resident in Angola, it developed further over the period of fieldwork to occupy a crucial place within the thesis overall. This traditional perspective is particularly evident in the final section of chapter six and in chapter seven. It is clear that traditional healing methods, where still practised, can help address the needs of demobilised soldiers and facilitate their reintegration into society. In putting forward the concept of 'traditional consultancy', I have argued that there is a need for greater understanding at this traditional level, that its perspectives and insights must be appreciated when pursuing peace. because grievances and underlying causes of conflict may sometimes only be understood from within this perspective. Chapter seven set out some of these 'traditional perspectives'.

A further major theme running through the thesis related to the role of international mediation. As the 1990s unfolded, the peace narratives examined in this thesis adopted a more sceptical and negative evaluation of this role. In this regard, the traditional authority and private media analysis was most critical, where the international peace mediation efforts by the Troika were seen as secondary to their economic interests. A popular sense of frustration existed within Angola with regard to the failures of international intervention to secure peace. As we saw, towards the end of the 1990s, the possibility of national mediation emerged quite strongly, with the churches in particular indicated as the most likely national organisation with the capacity to conduct internal mediation. It is interesting to note that though UN failures in Angola have been many, the 'Lessons Learned Unit' of the UN, established in 1995, has not yet reported on its failures in Angola.⁵

⁵ The 'Lessons Learned Unit,' located at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/llu2.htm#Reaching>. "The Lessons Learned Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was set up in April 1995 in response to a need for a structured mechanism to collect and analyse information on the various missions being fielded by the United Nations and to recommend ways to improve their effectiveness". It was collecting and analysing information on the peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) and Angola (UNAVEM).

Finally, the chapters in this thesis have pointed to important peace resources within Angola, have located centres of ‘agency’ within Angolan society. While the war destroyed much of the physical infrastructure of the country, this thesis has pointed to an array of Angolan actors who potentially can exercise an important role in the rebuilding and healing of a nation afflicted by decades of war. I do not wish to overstate the capacity of these resources, which generally have limited financial or political power, but they do point to important ‘national’ arenas where Angolans are rebuilding their country. In some instances these arenas represent new spaces within Angola, such as civil society and media organisations, but others belong within more established and familiar spaces, such as the Angolan churches at an institutional and community level, and personalities such as traditional healers or traditional authorities. These have provided important spaces for Angolans to work for peace and to address conflict in a time of war, and it is to be hoped that they continue to provide and develop these spaces in the post-Jonas Savimbi Angola.

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Appendix 1.

Manifesto for Peace in Angola.

The Angolan people want a lasting peace, social justice, good governance and the right of citizenship, and mutual respect for the diversity of people and cultures, which form the Angolan Nation project. These are the fundamental principles for the setting of a common ground among the Angolan people. In essence, these principles are the foundation for an in-depth revision of the Nation's concept and valorisation of the Angolan citizenry. As well as the consensual definition of a vision for Angola and its course towards the future.

Unfortunately, the war is still being used against the Angolan people. While at the same time those who hold power plunder the nation's wealth, in partnership with adventurous outsiders and foreign countries. Oil, diamonds and their revenues are the major source of greed by the rulers, and the armed opposition and the oil multinationals, in particular. All with the complacency of countries like the United States, France, England, Brazil, Russia, Portugal and South Africa. Instead of pursuing immediate economic and political interests, these countries can reverse their efforts into a platform of values, contributing, in that way, for the reconciliation of Angolans.

The war in Angola will only come to an end when civil society, the people in general, realise that there is no definitive military solution for the Angolan conflict. People must be aware of the process of destruction in which they are targets, consequently claiming their lives and dignity. What is even more perilous, in this regard, is that the silencing of guns will not mean, by any chance, in the Angolan context, the end of the war. The Angolan mentality, specially those of the politicians, ruled by selfish interests, are more armed than the armies under their command.

In the case of Angola, peace has always been seen as the end of fighting, the disarming and demobilisation of the soldiers. This vision, especially harboured by some foreign institutions and internal emotions, is little more than a tranquiliser for the ones who desperately seek true peace. And a feast for those who serve themselves with immediate

peace to profit and to strategically and geopolitically position themselves in the running for the Angolan riches.

We have reached the extreme stage of suffering, social humiliation and the total perversion of the use of power. Hence, we have come to the conclusion – a difficult one, because it is elementary and evident in spite of being consensual – that we the Angolan people, should develop a common ground for the causes as well as for the consequences of the military and political conflict we are facing. It is fundamental that we, the Angolan people, recognise with courage and determination, that we are all accountable for the political and military devastation. As well as the social and economic chaos of the country, whether in an active passive way. We must as well recognise the serious mistakes and abuses committed by ourselves during our historic course.

We, the Angolan people, should take full responsibility for the solution of our own problems. We should not keep on blaming the colonial heritage and/or third parties for our grievances. It is self-pity and a way of self-attesting to ourselves a certificate of capacity for systematically transferring the resolution of the national conflict to foreign intervention.

Before the verge of total sweltering of the Angolan society, the moment has come for us to act persistently, in a peaceful, courageous and moderate manner, in order to rescue the most sought and deserving treasure for Angolans: Peace through Dialogue. The Angolan people defend peace in that way, while the belligerents assume that the war is the way to reach peace, even if this means the humiliation of one part of the nation by another, because this war does not have any patriotic sense.

Therefore, we, Angolan citizens, demand that:

1. The government, UNITA, and FLEC observe an immediate cease-fire through the national territory.
2. The urgent opening of formal communication lines between the belligerents, through the mediation of the organised civil society.
3. The immediate opening of humanitarian corridors to assist the people affected by the war, especially in the countryside.

4. The government and UNITA, in co-responsibility, include in their military budgets the assistance to deprived people, instead of transferring the burden, of their own war against the Angolan nation, to the international community.
5. The definition of an agenda and schedule for peace talks, by the government (MPLA), the armed opposition (UNITA and FLEC) and organised civil society, for the definitive resolution of the causes of the Angolan conflict.
6. The establishment of conditions for the inclusiveness and sage participation of Angolans in the Process of National Dialogue for Peace, throughout the country.
7. The government and UNITA include in their military budgets the necessary funds to make peace, with patriotism and dignity. Because, if there is enough money to sustain war, then there should as well be enough money to achieve Peace effectively.

We have decided to fight with persistence and determination for the full accomplishment of our demands and to work actively for the achievement of a lasting peace in Angola, through a patriotic vision of social justice and national equity.

Appendix 2.

GARP Document.

Paz pela via do Diálogo.

É chegada a hora de abordar, em foro público, a promoção absoluta do diálogo como a única via para e encontrar soluções adequadas ao fim do holocausto angolano. Em definitivo, esse diálogo tem de ser inclusivo, em relação às diferentes correntes e tendências da sociedade civil, e afastar a ideia de que sem os estrangeiros os angolanos são incapazes de dialogar, entre si, e encontrar o seu próprio caminho para o entendimento nacional.

A guerra, ao contrário do que se anunciou, não vai acabar com a guerra, pelo contrário, está e vai continuar a dizimar o povo angolano e os seus parques haveres. A guerra está aí para provar que o seu alvo principal é a população civil, a despojada de privilégios, e a razão de ser deste projecto de Nação. Só assim se pode explicar o nível de mortalidade, deslocamento e de destruição de milhares de vidas. Por outro lado, afigura-se difícil falar de paz, em iniciativas de paz, sem se abordar a questão da justiça, a que age em função da verdade dos factos e da razão.

O que importa Angola diante do angolano? O que importa as instituições do Estado diante do povo? Serão as instituições mais importantes que o povo? Essas perguntas são essenciais para definir o nível de prioridade na resolução do conflito Angolano. Para tal, a imparcialidade e a constituição de uma tribuna de consciência social se apresentam como pontos de partida na busca nacional de soluções do conflito.

Relativamente ao cenário actual, já muito se tem dito e o suficiente para gerar uma onda de solidariedade interna a favor das vítimas que diariamente morrem indefesas em vários cantos de Angola. O mínimo que se pode fazer é abandonar o medo, enfrentar o terror e chamar à razão os detentores do poder, mas não da verdade, sobre o holocausto angolano. Já nada justifica para que os angolanos, ainda sensatos, continuem a lamentar

pela sorte dos irmãos de Malange, do Kuito, de Maquela do Zombo, de Cabinda, do Andulo e do Bailundo como se de um holocausto alheio se tratasse.

O sentimento que se alimenta em Luanda, onde se concentram todos os centros de decisão e de definição social não deve continuar a ser de desprezo em relação ao que se passa no resto do país. Temos verificado, com bastante tristeza, a incitação ao ódio, à morte dos condenados a inimigos e, assim, vemos o angolano a cavar no peito do outro angolano em nome de um poder que não serve o povo. No meio rural, principalmente, as populações chegam a ser mortas pela simples razão de terem sido deixado vivas por um dos beligerantes, sob a acusação de informantes do inimigo. Os que, às vezes, resistem a acompanhar um dos contendores também têm o mesmo destino.

Desde o reacender da guerra, em Dezembro passado, mais de 600,000 pessoas foram obrigadas a abandonar os seus lares e a viver como deslocados em condições sub-humanas e quase exclusivamente dependentes da caridade da indústria humanitária. Os mortos deixaram de ser contados, tanto os civis como os militares, as perdas materiais também já não são contabilizadas. O que parece contar apenas são as vontades de uma meia dúzia de angolanos imunes ao sofrimento de todo um povo e alheios às reivindicações culturais da maioria.

Essa guerra, reincidente, vem esconder um processo consciente de desarticulação dos factores de identidade e unidade do povo angolano. Essa mesma guerra vem cobrir o esgotamento dos recursos humanos e financeiros do país, o debilitamento da individualidade e da capacidade de cidadania da maioria dos angolanos. A guerra actual, imposta ao povo angolano, não é senão o encobrimento da falta de argumentos políticos e ideológicos, assim como das escassas realizações sócio-económicas e culturais dos instigadores da tragédia nacional. A negação da política esconde processos de grupos minoritários através da destruição paulatina da Nação.

A guerra não tem servido ao povo angolano. Este não quer a guerra, seja por que motivo for, porque é uma guerra contra si próprio e na qual é o único derrotado. Ninguém tem o direito de falar em nome do povo para fazer a guerra civil, seja esta com o argumento de defesa ou de resistência. O povo não foi consultado. Já não adianta apontar o dedo a quem faz a guerra pelo poder e/ou para enriquecimento e manutenção de privilégios

individuais. Importa, acima de tudo, reunir todas as sensibilidades da sociedade civil, desejosas de paz e de justiça social para uma convergência de interesses nobres e para a luta pacífica por uma causa justa. Acabar com o ódio e a intriga política que fomentam a divisão e a destruição do povo angolano. Sucessivos têm sido os falhanços dos processos de paz por falta de vontade política dos beligerantes, conjugados com o jogo de interesses imediatistas da comunidade internacional.

Resta, para a resolução da guerra civil, o recurso à sociedade civil como único factor sobrevivente para criar os fundamentos de superação da guerra auto-sustentada. Há a urgente necessidade de intervenção da sociedade civil com voz própria e autónoma, com rejeição absoluta da ideia da guerra e como factor de harmonização de todos interesses, humanamente justificáveis, existentes na sociedade.

A promoção absoluta do diálogo interno, e entre todos, é a única via para se encontrar soluções adequadas ao fim do holocausto angolano. Desde Alvor, passando por Mombaça, Gbadolite, Bicesse, Addis Abeba e Abidjan até Lusaka, as negociações de paz para Angola sempre foram mediadas e pressionadas pelos estrangeiros.

Como angolanos, temos que abdicar do alarme da nossa intolerância e nos envolvermos em guerras, ficando à espera de alguém do exterior, supostamente neutro, para mediar as nossas crises. Os angolanos têm que conseguir desenvolver a capacidade interna de mediação, ao nível de base, intermédio e de topo. É preciso demonstrar a nossa maturidade política e cívica na resolução das causas dos conflitos que geram a violência entre nós.

É hora de dar as mãos, juntar os cérebros e os corações e trabalhar para a causa comum.
A PAZ.

Feito em Luanda, aos 2 de Abril de 1999.

Peace through Dialogue.

The time has come to address, in the public forum, the promotion of dialogue as the only way to seek adequate solutions to end the Angolan holocaust. Such a dialogue must be inclusive, in relation to the different currents and tendencies of civil society, and throw away the idea that without foreigners Angolans are incapable of talking to each other, and find their own way to national understanding.

War, contrary to what has been announced, will not end the war. On the contrary, It will continue to devastate the Angolan people and their few belongings. War is there to prove that its principal target is the civil population, the removal of privileges, and the reason behind this 'national project' (of destruction). This is the only way to explain the mortality and displacement levels, and the destruction of thousands of lives. On the other hand, it is difficult to speak about peace and peace initiatives, without addressing the issue of justice, which acts in relation to reason and the truth of the facts.

What is the importance of Angola compared to the Angolan people? What is the importance of state institutions compared to the Angolan people? Are the institutions more important than the people? Such questions are essential to define priorities regarding the resolution of the Angolan conflict. For this, impartiality and the establishment of a tribunal of social conscience emerge as starting points in national search for solutions to the conflict.

As regards the current situation, much has already been said, indeed enough, to generate a wave of internal solidarity in favour of the defenseless victims who die every day in various corners of Angola. The least one should do is overcome fear, face the terror, call those who hold power, but who are not the truth holders, call them to account and to see reason regarding the Angolan holocaust. There is nothing to justify why Angolans, with the power of reason, continue mourn the fate of their sisters and brothers from Malange, Kuito, Maquela do

Zombo, Cabinda, Andulo and Bailundo, as if one were dealing with someone else's suffering.

The prevailing sentiment in Luanda, where all the decision making and socially defining centres are concentrated, must not continue to be contemptuous in relation to what is happening in the rest of the country. We note with great sadness, the incitement to hatred and to death of those condemned as enemies, and in this war we see Angolans destroying the heart of other Angolans, on behalf of a power that does not serve the people. In the rural areas, above all, local populations are being killed for the simple reason that they were left alive by one of the belligerents, and are then accused of being enemy informers. Those who sometimes refuse to join one of the warring parties often share the same fate.

Since the resumption of war last December, more than 600.000 people have been forced to leave their homes to live as internally displaced people in inhumane conditions, relying almost exclusively on the charity of the humanitarian industry. The dead, both civilian and military, are no longer being counted, nor are material losses being calculated. All that appears to matter is the will of half a dozen Angolans immune to the sufferings of an entire people and estranged from the protests of the majority.

This reignited (renewed) war disguises a deliberate process of disengagement from issues related to the identity and the unity of the Angolan people. This same war hides the drain of human and financial resources of the country, the powerlessness of the individual, and of weak capacity for citizenship among the majority of Angolans. This current war, imposed on the Angolan people, is nothing but the disguising of the lack of political and ideological arguments as well as the lack of social, economic and cultural achievements from the perpetrators of the national tragedy. The denial of politics hides the actions of minority groups through the slow destruction of the Nation.

War has not served the Angolan people. They do not want war, regardless of its motivation, because this is a war against them and in which they are the only

ones destroyed. No one has the right to speak on behalf of the people so as to carry on this civil war, using either the argument of defending sovereignty or of resistance. The people were not consulted. It is no longer a question of pointing a finger at who is engaging in war to achieve power and/or for enrichment or the maintenance of individual privileges. What matters above all, is to gather together all those promoting civil society sensibilities, eager for peace and social justice in order to bring together people of good will, and for a peaceful struggle in a just cause. We need to end hatred and political intrigue which foments the division and destruction of the Angolan people. Successive peace processes have failed due to a lack of political will on the part of the belligerents, enmeshed with the short-term interests of the International community.

What is left to us, in order to resolve the civil war, is recourse to civil society as the only remaining factor which can create the necessary basis to overcome this self-sustaining war. There is an urgent need for the intervention of civil society with its own autonomous voice, to completely reject the principle of war, and as the element which can bring together all interests, humanly justifiable, which exist in society.

The radical promotion of an internal dialogue between all, is the only way to encounter adequate solutions to end the Angolan holocaust. From Alvor, to Mombasa, Gbadolite, Bicesse, Addis Ababa, Abidjan and to Lusaka, the peace talks for Angola have always been mediated by and pushed by foreigners.

As Angolans, we have to renounce the fear of our own intolerance which involves us in wars, and then waiting for someone from outside, supposedly neutral, to mediate our crises. Angolans must develop the capacity for internal mediation, at the grassroots, at the intermediate level, and at the very top. We must show our political and civic maturity in the resolution of the causes of conflict which create violence among us.

It is time to join hands, to unite minds and hearts and work together in a common cause, PEACE.

Luanda, April 2 1999

Appendix 3.

Mongu Communiqué on Peace Initiatives on Angola

The 'Mongu Communiqué on Peace Initiatives on Angola' by refugee pastors living in Mayukwayukwa and Nangweshi Camps Zambia, November 26,27, 2000.

“Peace is what I leave you, it is my own peace I give you. I do not give it as the world does. Do not be worried and upset, do not be afraid” John 14:27.

We, the refugees at Nangweshi and Mayukwayukwa Camps met at Limulungu Pastoral Training Centre, Mongu, Zambia on Nov. 26, 27. The meeting was organized by the Committee on Angola for Peace, a sub committee of the Southern Africa Churches' Ministries for Uprooted People (SACMUP). The objectives of the meeting were:

- To inaugurate and foster dialogue between SACMUP and Angolan refugee pastors
- To share experiences and ideas on the pastoral care of Angolan refugees
- To explore ways in which the regional church body can accompany peace processes in Angola
- To raise awareness in the local Zambian churches in order to enhance their support and solidarity.

We noted with pain that some Angolans have been refugees for over 34 years, whilst several ministers have been living among the displaced people since 1976. As refugees, we feel rootless, abandoned, forgotten and have become a group of people without human dignity. It is in this vein that we strongly ask for peace in Angola because we do not have an answer as to why the war is continuing.

We therefore recommend the following:

1. We recommend to bring the awareness of the Angolans and all Christians in the region on the existence of a fragmented church; i.e. the urban, the bush and the refugee camps. We therefore strongly recommend the total breaking of the walls of

divisions leading to one united church in Angola. We furthermore recommend that the church in the region be involved in this initiative.

2. We appeal to political parties to exercise tolerance and stop intimidating Angolans praying and working for peace.
3. We recommend that leaders of the church in the diaspora be included in all efforts for peace in Angola.
4. We recommend that meetings of this nature be organized regularly with wider participation.
5. We recommend for a gender sensitive and biased peace exchange program for women and youths.
6. We recommend that ecumenical members share with others what has been learned, and put it into practice.

We hereby unreservedly offer ourselves to be included in all peace negotiations for Angola. We are tired of the war and WE WANT TO GO HOME.

Signed by 8 representatives from various churches.

Appendix 4.

Nós, Sobas, não aceitamos a visão dos líderes.

Gostaríamos, antes de mais, de agradecer o Senhor Rafael Marquês, representante da Open Society em Angola, pela oportunidade que nos dá para exprimirmos as ideais das autoridades tradicionais no seio do Fórum Angolano das Autoridades Tradicionais. O tempo não nos permite uma maior contribuição, por isso vamos nos concentrar no questão do conflito armado.

A guerra em Angola já mexeu com todo o mundo, e a busca de soluções já recebeu muitos recursos. Mas a guerra parece nunca acabar. Porque o jogo de interesses e as agendas secretas dos que fazem e apoiam a guerra continuam a complicar o processo de construção de uma paz autêntica e duradoura. As Autoridades Tradicionais e as comunidades de base assistem, cada vez mais revoltadas, à destruição do país, ao esbanjamento dos seus recursos naturais e à matança da população Angolana. A maioria da população foi e continua a ser forçada a abandonar as suas áreas de origem, as suas lavras e as suas riquezas.

Hoje Angola é um país de deslocados, as populações vivem em condições deshumanas em campos de deslocados nas periferias das grandes cidades. Vemos, com muita tristeza, que a vontade política para se ultrapassar essa situação ou é pouca ou não existe. Essa falta de vontade é reflectida pelo comportamento dos beligerantes, da comunidade internacional e mesmo da parte do povo. Tudo isso, porque os interesses particulares e individuais, por enquanto, ainda são mais fortes do que a força do povo. Hoje, o povo Angolano não tem rumo.

Nós os sobas já tomamos consciência de que esta guerra é contra os interesses das comunidades angolanas. Pelo contrário, a continuação da guerra está a destruir as vidas, as idenitdades culturais - os usos e costumes - próprias de cada comunidade. Já nem falamos da desumanização de que os deslocados são vítimas.

Essa guerra está a ser movida por líderes ou dirigentes que parecem estar interessados em criar um ‘homen novo’, um novo tipo de cidadão angolano, com novos valores culturais e morais desconhecidos pela maioria. É essa a visão que os nossos políticos têm de Angola? Acabar com os angolanos para inventar outro povo? Vão matar o povo todo para entregar Angola a quem? Vão matar todo o povo porque odeiam tanto o povo porque não se identificam com as culturas de Angola? Um provérbio do Rei Salomão diz, no capítulo 11 e versículo 14 da bíblia, que ‘o país sem conselheiros só pode caminhar para o seu desaparecimento’.

Nós, os herdeiros dos reinos que formam Angola, somos tratados como miseráveis, matumbos, atrasados, pessoas que não sabem o que é a civilização. Então, nós os sobas, perguntamos aos nossos filhos políticos que nos governam ou querem que nos governar o seguinte: ser civilizado, ser dirigente é comandar a morte do próprio povo? É roubar as riquezas do país? É destruir o próprio país em nome do inimigo? Mas, quem é esse inimigo que merece tantas honras, tantos sacrifício, sobretudo o sacrifício do povo inteiro? Um pai que não tem pão para dar aos seus filhos, convida os vizinhos e os seus filhos para o banquete. Podemos dizer que esse pai é civilizado?

Sempre que temos um problema, a primeira coisa que fazemos é chamar o estrangeiro para resolver os nossos problemas. Assim foi com a independência, assim tem sido com os vários processos da paz. Então vejamos. Nós temos uma cobra no galineiro, que é Angola, e chamamos a raposa, para correr com a cobra. Então perguntamos, a raposa vai estar mais interessada em correr atrás das galinhas para comê-las ou vai mesmo se preocupar com a cobra? E se forem três raposas o quê que vão fazer?

Nós sobas, como verdadeiros herdeiros das culturas, das tradições e das riquezas do nosso povo, não aceitamos a visão dos nossos líderes políticos que se dizem civilizados.

Pelo que.

Apelamos a todas as comunidades angolanas, aos jovens, velhos, homens e mulheres, representantes das igrejas e outras instituições da sociedade, que se unam com as suas autoridades tradicionais para que se definam os mecanismos de defesa dos seus direitos e da protecção do património cultural na sua diversidade, dos recursos naturais e das lavras das populações. Nós, os sobas, julgamos que a paz deve ser discutida ao nível das

comunidades (através de consultas e debates) para que todos os angolanos possam manifestar as suas ideias sobre o futuro do país. A paz não é só mandar calar as armas. E depois?

Para já apelamos às comunidades que não entreguem mais os seus filhos aos que fazem a guerra, porque estes só destroem o país e as populações, enquanto escondem os seus filhos na Europa e na América onde esses senhores escondem as riquezas de Angola e buscam o apoio para a sua política contra os filhos de Angola. Mas, também são as comunidades que alimentam a guerra com os seus filhos, os soldados das FAA, os agentes da Polícia e os guerrilheiros das FALA. Todos filhos das comunidades. Essas mesmas comunidades são as principais vítimas da guerra, porque estão reduzidas à condição de cidadãos de terceira classe.

São essas comunidades que padecem nos acampamentos de deslocados, sujeitas á fome, à nudez, à miséria e à morte. Hoje, Angola praticamente já não existe. O país é já só Luanda. Família é só aquele que vive em Luanda, porque os que vivem nas províncias estão condenados ao isolamento.

Por isso, pensamos que o processo da paz tem que começar na base e não a partir do topo, para que aqueles que estão em cima percebam que estão a ser segurados pelos que estão em baixo. As folhas e os troncos, por mais fortes ou impressionantes que sejam, dependem totalmente das raízes que os sustentam.

Para o bem de Angola e de todos os angolanos verdadeiramente patriotas e amantes do seu povo, os sobas, reunidos no Fórum Angolano das Autoridades Tradicionais, apelam ao povo para que todos exijam a realização de uma conferência nacional soberana para a paz e o futuro de Angola. Nesse conferência, devemos definir os papéis dos partidos políticos, da sociedade civil, das autoridades tradicionais e das igrejas na resolução do conflito angolano. Essa definição poderá ajudar na criação de um entendimento comum para o processo de reconciliação, de governação transparente e patriótica, e de reconstrução do país. É nessa conferência onde poderemos, como angolanos, traçar uma ideia para o futuro de Angola, para que amanhã, as novas gerações possam seguir caminhos rectos e de prosperidade.

Translation.

We Sobas, do not accept the vision of our leaders.

Before proceeding we wish to thank Rafael Marquês, representative of the Open Society in Angola, for the opportunity presented to us to express the ideas of traditional authorities within the Forum of Angolan Traditional Authorities. Time does not allow us go into great detail, therefore we will concentrate on the question of armed conflict.

The war in Angola has already affected everyone, and great attention has already been given the search for solutions. But the war never seems to end. Because the interests and hidden agendas of those who make war and support war continue to complicate the process of building an authentic and lasting peace. Traditional authorities and local communities look on horrified at the destruction of the country, at the waste of its natural resources, at the killing of the Angolan population. The majority of the population was and continues to be forced to abandon their areas of origins, their fields and their wealth.

Today, Angola is a land of displaced people, the people live under inhuman conditions in displacement camps on the edges of large cities. Regrettably we see the weakness or non-existence of political will to overcome this situation. This lack of will is reflected in the behaviour of the belligerents, of the international community and even among the people. At this time private and individual interests are stronger than the will of the people. Today, the Angolan people have nowhere left to go.

We the sobas are aware that his war is against the best interests of Angolan communities. The continuation of war is destroying lives, cultural identities - habits and customs - belonging to each community. This is without addressing the question of dehumanisation of which the displaced are victims.

This war is promoted by leaders who seem to be interested in the creation of a 'new man', a new type of Angolan citizen, with cultural and moral values, not known by the

majority. Is this the vision our politicians have of Angola? Put an end to Angolans so as to create a new people? Are they going to kill the whole people, and then hand Angola over to whom? Are they going to kill all the people because they hate them, and because they do not identify with the different cultures of Angola? A proverb from King Solomon, in chapter 11, verse 14 of the bible, says 'a country without advisers is bound to disappear'.

We, the heirs of the kingdoms which make up Angola, are treated as miserable, stupid, backward, people who do not know what civilisation is. Well then, we sobas, ask our political sons and daughters who govern us, or seek to govern us the following question: to be civilised, to be a leader, is it to order the death of your own people? Is it to steal the wealth of the country? Is it to destroy your own country in the name of your enemy? But who is this enemy who deserves such honour, such sacrifice, above all the sacrifice of an entire people? A father who does not have bread to give his children, invites his neighbour and children to a feast. Can we call that father civilised?

Whenever we have a problem, the first thing we do is call foreigners to resolve our problems. Independence was like that, and the various peace processes. Stop and have a look. We have a snake in the chicken coop which is Angola, and we have called a fox to get rid of the snake. We ask ourselves, will the fox be more interested in running after the chickens to eat them, or in chasing away the snake? And if three foxes had been called, what can we expect of them?

We, the sobas, as the true heirs of the cultures, traditions and wealth of our people, do not accept the vision of our political leaders, who call themselves civilised.

Therefore,

We appeal to all Angolan communities, to the young, the old, men and women, church representatives, and other institutions of society, to unite with their traditional authority figures, so as to define the means by which to defend their rights, and defend the diversity of cultural patrimony, of the natural resources, and farms of the population. We, the sobas, believe that peace should be discussed at the level of the community (through consultation and debates) so that all Angolans may put forward their ideas on

the future of the country. Peace is not just about silencing weapons. What comes afterwards?

For now we appeal to the communities not to hand over their children to those who make war, because these merely destroy the country and its people, while they themselves pack their children off to Europe and America, where these 'gentlemen' hide the wealth of Angola and seek support for their policies against the children of Angola. But the communities also feed the war through their children, the soldiers in the FAA, the members of the police, and the guerrillas of FALA. All are children of our communities. These same communities are the principal victims of the war, because they are reduced to the condition of third class citizens.

It is these communities who suffer in the displacement camps, subjected to hunger, nudity, misery and death. Today, Angola has almost ceased to exist. The country is only Luanda. Family has come to mean only those who live in Luanda, as those who live in the provinces are condemned to isolation. The leaves and the trunks [of the trees], no matter how strong they are, depend totally on the roots which sustain them.

For the good of Angola and of all true patriotic Angolans who love the people, the sobas, united in the Forum of Angolan Traditional Authority, appeal to the people to demand the holding of a national sovereign conference on peace and the future of Angola. In this conference, we should define the roles of the political parties, of civil society, of traditional authorities, and of the churches in the resolution of the Angolan conflict. Defining these roles could help in the creation of mutual understanding towards a reconciliation process, of transparent and patriotic government, and national reconstruction. It is at such a conference that we could, as Angolans, outline ideas for the future of Angola, so that tomorrow, the new generations may follow pathways that are straight and prosperous.

List of Interviews.

I provide here a list of important interviews conducted in relation to this research. I begin with fieldwork conducted in 2000, highlighting interviews in Dundo and then Luanda. Thereafter I list Dundo and Luanda interviews during fieldwork in 2001. before concluding with a number of interviews conducted outside of the research locations. In some instances, I use the word 'meeting' rather than interview, to denote an informal (social) exchange that proved significant, and where the description 'interview' would involve a misrepresentation of the exchange that took place.

1. Dundo Fieldwork 2000.

May 23, interview with Felizardo Gurgel. Lunda Norte's provincial government's delegate for culture.

May 23, interview with Benedita Rosa of Promaica.

May 24, interview with journalists from RNA (Angolan National radio). TPA (Angolan Television) and ANGOP (Angolan news service): Alberto Muguenhi. Amado Jorge, António Wazeia. André Cristovão & Miguel José.

May 26, interview with John Coleman, Irish Catholic missionary, then resident in Dundo.

May 26 & June 1, interview with Augusto Calonji, church leader in the Catholic Church.

May 26, June 3, group interview with Dundo resource group, Paulinho Chilengueno, Sr. Maria Ngueve, Silvestre Mwamulengue, Augusto Ihano.

May 29, June 15, interview with Pastor Carlos of the Methodist Church.

May 30, interview with Pastor Carlos and Vitorinho, of the Methodist Church, and Joaquim Cassemuka of the Plymouth Brethren.

May 31, interview with Paulinho Chilengueno, church leader in the Catholic Church.

June 1, interview with Madalena Calonji, business woman and market trader.

June 3, June 5, group interview with soba Mwanguvo and community elders, with members of resource group present.

June 4, group interview with six women from various Dundo churches: Benedita Rosa. Ana Hebo, Cristina Malu. Maria João, Maria Rodrigues & Veronica Mujinga.

June 4, interview with António Cataco, teacher and member of the MPLA.

June 6, meeting with six women market traders also members of various churches: Helena, Maria Matuca, Isabel Mahamba, Suzana Ndala, Suzana Aldina & Muchama.

June 7, group interview with personnel from OMA, Joana Meta & Helena Clemente.

June 7, meeting with Alberto Nakatambuê, plumber and farmer.

June 7, June 15. interview with Sr. Maria Ngueve. Angolan missionary.

June 7, interview with Helena Vega, government delegate in the Ministry for the Family and Women's Development.

June 7, meeting with soba Santos.

June 8, group interview with 17 sobas in the village of Camafica.

June 9, interview with soba Fortuna in his ondjango.

June 9, interview with Tomas Makela, Catholic priest resident in Dundo, now deceased.

June 13, group interview with youth in Dundo: Barros Satula, Eduardo Mateus & Alberto.

June 15, interview with António Upeme, trade union representative.

June 15, interview with Augusto Ihano, catechist in Catholic church.

June 18, interview with Alberto Ihalo, state journalist, (in Nzaji).

June 18, interview with João Maluca, trade union representative (in Nzaji).

June 19, interview with Pastor Manuel Mbunge, Methodist Church (Nzaji).

June 19, interview with Rev. Lourenço, Italian Missionary (Nzaji).

June 20, interview with Alberto Mwamwene & António Mwassua, retired catechists (Nzaji).

June 21, interview with soba Sacajange in bairro Icongula (Nzaji).

June 21, interview with soba Francisco Agostinho in bairro Xico-Carreiro (Nzaji).

June 22, group interview with Pedro Bwalle (president) and other members of ANACA, (Associação dos Naturais e Amigos do Cambulo, Association of friends and those from Cambulo). Pedro stated that ANACA was the second Angolan organisation to be legalised (February 13, 1993) after the introduction of multiparty democracy.

June 23, interview with Francisco Catonde, church leader in Catholic Church (Nzaji).

June 27, interview with Manuel Domingos, church leader in Catholic Church (Nzaji).

June 27, group interview with catechist Luciano Camanhine and members of the church community in Cassanguidi (25kms from Nzaji).

2. Luanda Fieldwork 2000.

May 12, informal meeting with Mary Daly (then of Development Workshop), Cathy Bond-Stewart (Africa Community Publishing and Development Trust), Bob van der Winden, (author of van der Winden 1996).

May 17, interview with Paul Robson of Development Workshop, (author of Robson 2001).

June 30, July 12, August 9, interviews with Manuel Quintino of the Trócaire, and presently director of OIKOS, a Portuguese NGO.

July 1, July 6, meeting with Lara Pawson, former BBC correspondent in Angola.

July 3 & 20, interview with Manuel Teixeira, Angolan Catholic missionary.

July 5, interview with Carlos Gonçalves, former Rádio Ecclésia journalist in Dundo.

July 5, interview with Gustavo Silva, Rádio Ecclesia journalist.

July 6, meeting with Dona Nanda, retired widow internally displaced in Luanda.

July 6, meeting with a captain in the national police force.

July 9, and July 16, group interview in bairro Prenda with six catechists internally displaced in Luanda: George da Costa, Ernesto Kanda, José Mota Soares, Cocuuna Kange, Manuel Koieza, Silva António.

July 10, interview with Benjamin Castello, director CAA, Church Action in Angola. Former minister of Agriculture.

July 10, meeting with Herculano Coroado (freelance journalist), João Faria (lawyer and freelance journalist), Gilberto Neto (Folha 8 journalist) & Mário Vaz (Rádio Ecclésia journalist).

July 11, interview with Gilberto Neto of Folha 8.

July 11, interview with Herculano Coroado (freelance journalist).

July 11, group interview with sobas displaced from various Angolan provinces: Vincente Muta Kambu, Ndala Muta Fergão Kalunga all from Malange. and Manuel Goveia Dala from Uige.

July 14, interview with Rev. Paulo Roberto Palaoro (Brazilian missionary) from bairro Golfo.

July 14, interview with Fernando Pacheco, director of ADRA, Angolan NGO.

July 14, interview with Bernardo Bongo, Angolan Catholic missionary.

July 15, meeting with Rev. André Cangovi Eurico of the IECA church.

July 19, meeting with Eugénio Dal Corso, Catholic bishop of Saurimo.

July 20, meeting with Jeremias Praia, Belmiro Chissenguete, Bernardo Bongo and Bernard Duchene, Catholic missionaries in Angola.

July 24, interview with Daniel Ntony Nzinga, secretary general of COIEPA.

July 27, interview with Revs. Zeca and Mário Rui of Mosaiko.

July 27, meeting with Benedict Schubert, Luanda, author of Schubert (2000).

July 27, meeting with Ana Maria M. Bastos do Nascimento of MPD, Angolan NGO.

July 27, group interview with four Angolan missionary Spiritan sisters.

July 28, interview with Rev. Álvaro Rodrigues, rector of the Baptist seminary in Luanda.

July 29, interview with two catechists Máxima e Rafael in the bairro of Realojamento Luanda.

August 1, group interview with Florbela Catarina Malaquias and Margarida Sebastião N'guida of *Semente para o Desenvolvimento de Angola*, Angola NGO.

August 2, interview with Rev. Manuel Sabino, retired Angolan missionary.

August 2, interview with Rev. Jaka, director of Rádio Ecclésia.

August 3, visit to the Women's Prison in Viana, Luanda, with Search for Common Ground personnel.

August 4, group interview with Paulo António João, Ana & Quintas, Caritas team for *Promaica*, and training of Caritas personnel.

August 4, interview with Miguel Filho of the independent trade union SINPROF.

August 4, interview with UNITA parliamentary deputy Jaka Jamba.

August 8, interview with Manuel Maria Difuíla, secretary general of CGSILA, an independent trade union.

3. Dundo Fieldwork 2001.

October 1-5, workshop on 'Peace Initiatives within Angolan Society'.

October 2, interview with Miguel José, journalist at the Provincial radio station.

October 3, interview with António Mussumari, editor of *Notícias*. Dundo based newspaper (no longer published).

October 4, interview with Augusto Calonji, church leader in Catholic Church.

October 4, interview with Dr. Carolina, member of *Mãos Livres*, Angolan NGO.

October 6, interview with John Coleman, Catholic priest.

October 8, interview with Pastor Eliseu Vitor of the Seven Day Adventist Church.

October 10, interview with Dr. Milton Kilandamoko, Angolan lawyer and presidential candidate in 1992.

October 10, interview with Paulino Chilengueno, church leader in Catholic Church.

4. Luanda Fieldwork 2001.

September 25, interview in Viana, Luanda, with Revs. Zeca and Mario Rui, of the Catholic NGO Mosaiko.

September 25, meeting with Rev. João Domingos, member of Mosaiko, and director of second level social science institute in Luanda (ICRA).

September 25, group interview with three Angolan kings, Viana: king Ekuikui IV of Bailundo, king Muana-Uti of Mbanza Congo, king Muatchissengue of Lunda-Choke.

September 26, December 3, interview with Manuel Quintino of OIKOS, a Portuguese NGO.

September 28, interview with Steve Utterwulghe, director of US NGO Search for Common Ground.

October 15, meeting with Ian Dolan, field director in Trócaire Angola.

October 19, interview with David Mendes, director of *Mãos Livres*, Angolan NGO

October 22, December 4, interviews with Daniel Ntony Nzinga, secretary general of COIEPA.

October 22, interview with Benjamin Castello of CAA.

October 25, interview with Aristides Neiva, former director of *Rádio Ecclésia*, present director of *O Apostolado*, internet newspaper associated with *Rádio Ecclésia*.

- October 26, visit to the Women's Prison in Viana, Luanda, with Search for Common Ground personnel.
- October 26, interview with Eunice Enácio, director of DW peacebuilding programme.
- October 29, November 5, interview with cartoonist Vává, (Osvaldo Bala).
- October 29, interview with Helena Farinha of ADRA.
- November, various meetings with Professor Carolyn Nordstrom, of Notre Dame University, USA.
- November 5, interview with *Actual* journalist Victor Custodio.
- November 5, interview with Frei José Paulo, vice-director of Rádio Ecclésia.
- November 7 & 16, interview with Bishop Gabriel Mbilingi in Luanda, Catholic Bishop of Luena.
- November 8 & 28, interview with Justino Pinto de Andrade, lecturer at the Catholic University, Luanda.
- November 9 & 28, interview with Maria da Conceição Melo, president of ACA. Angolan civic organisation.
- November 11, meeting with Rebecca Verónica, widow and market trader.
- November 11, meeting with João Faria, lawyer and independent journalist.
- November 13, group interview with Cesinanda de Kerlan Xavier & Ana Maria Bastos de Nascimento (president and vice-president of MPD).
- November 15 & 23, interview with Francisco Tunga, director of FONGA.
- November 15, interview with Carolina, lawyer working with Mãos Livres, Angolan NGO.
- November 16, meeting in Luanda with Rev. Manuel Gonçalves, Catholic missionary.
- November 16, present at the honouring of Zacarias Kamwenho, at the Catholic University, for the award of the Zakarov Prize.
- November 16, interview with Paulino Pinto João, leader of the political party CNDA.
- November 19, meeting with Maria Chenda (business woman) and Carlos (employed by international NGO).
- November 19, interview with Leopoldo Baio, director of private media publication *Actual*.
- November 20, 22, 24, group interview with members of Promaica in Bairro Prenda.
- November 20, interview in Luanda with Rev José Imbamba, lecturer at the Catholic University Luanda, and author of Imbamba (1999), doctoral thesis.
- November 20, group interview with members of FAAT.
- November 20, group interview with eight internally displaced women: Paula Samuleca, Madalena Njia, Cesaltina Saimia, Cristina Waimona, Suzana Mbunge, Verónica Sachinhingue, Ana Maria Josefina e Kilora Kimuthu.
- November 21, interview in Luanda with Rev. Luis Ngimbi, secretary general of CICA.

- November 21, interview in Luanda with Lourdes Diogo Almeida, director of women's department at CICA.
- November 21 & 29, interview in Luanda with Noé Alberto José, co-ordinator of CICA's Department of Justice, Evangelism, Reconciliation and Co-operation (DJERC).
- November 21, meeting of a bible class, Carmo church, approximately 30 people present.
- November 22, interview with Manuel Pembele of AJUDECA (Associação Juvenil para o Desenvolvimento Comunitário de Angola).
- November 22, interview with Mateus João Pedro of Mãos Livres. author of *Mateus* (2000).
- November 26, interview William Tonet, editor of *Folha 8*.
- November 26, interview with Moisés Cipriano, vice-governor of province of Lunda Norte.
- November 30, interview with Ana Faria, private media journalist.
- November 30, interview with parliamentary deputy Alexandre André Sebastião of political party PAJOCA.
- November 30, interview with Rui Lopes, Portuguese businessman also involved in Angolan drama and theatre.
- November 31, meeting with Mário Rui of Mosaiko at national Catholic Justice and Peace Commission Conference.
- December, interview with Rev. Otávio Fernando of AEA.
- December, meeting with Moisés Nele, MPLA parliamentarian for Lunda Norte.
- December 4, interview with Silva Mateus and José Fragoso, president and vice-president of *Fundação 27 de Maio*.
- December 4, meeting with Ingrácia, Search for Common Ground.
- December 5, interview with the Dutch Ambassador, Luanda.
- December 6, interview Dr. Conceição Neto, Angolan historian (author of Neto 2001a: 2001b).
- December 7, meeting with Graça Campos, editor of *Angolense*. Angolan private newspaper.
- December 7, group interview with personnel of AJPD, Angolan human rights NGO.
- December 10, interview with Louisa Fonsoni, director of *LAC*.
- December 10, interview with Dr. Milton Kilandamoko, Angolan lawyer and presidential candidate in 1992.
- December 12, interview with Nzakimuena Daniel Ntango. CICA archivist and editor of CICA newsletter.
- December 12, interview with Carlinda Monteiro, CCF, Christian Children's Fund.

5. Other interviews.

May 2000, meeting with Colonel Bernard Howard, Dublin, Ireland, worked in Angola as part of UNAVEM II mandate.

April 2000, telephone communication with Dame Margaret Anstee.

September 2001, interview with Marício Camuto, Angolan missionary, Dublin Ireland.

October 2001, group interview with Michael Kilkenny and Brendan Carr, Dublin, Ireland, both of whom worked as missionaries in Angola.

November 13, 2002, interview with Fr. Jacinto Pio, at British Angola Forum, London.

November 13, 2002, meeting with Dame Margaret Anstee at BAF (2002).

December 8, 2002, interview with Manuel Teixeira, Angolan Catholic missionary, Lille, France.

March 2003, meetings with Gregório and Álvaro Rodrigues, Angolan theological students, Dublin, Ireland.

6. National Media Institutions:

Jornal de Angola, Rua Rainha Ginga, 18-24. Luanda.

Actual, Rua Albano Machada, N° 6, 1° Andar, Bairro Macuusso, Luanda.

Angolense, Rua António Feliciano de Castilho, N° 103. Luanda.

Agora, Avenida Comondante Valódia, N°59, 2° andar, Apt. 24, Luanda

Folha 8, Rua Conselheiro Júlio de Vilhena, N° 24, 5° andar, Apt. 19, Luanda

O Independente, Rua Cónego Manuel das Neves, N° 22. Apt. 12, São Paulo, Luanda.

RNA, (Rádio Nacional de Angola), Angolan national radio. Broadcasts on FM in Luanda and on SW nationally. Repeater stations in most provinces enables FM reception locally within a short radius. Other stations in the Luanda area part of RNA include: *Ngola Yetu*, broadcasting in Kimbundu, *Rádio Luanda*, *Rádio Cinco*, sports channel; *FM Stereo*, music channel.

TPA, (Televisão Pública Angolana), Angolan national television. Broadcasting from Luanda. Coverage in the provinces depends on the existence of repeater stations boost the signal. In 2001 TPA opened a second channel (TPA 2), primarily broadcasting music in Luanda and Benguela.

Rádio Ecclésia, CEAST owned private radio station, broadcasting from Luanda. It is envisaged that the station will broadcast nationally on short-wave.

LAC (Luanda Antena Comercial), private radio station, broadcasting from Luanda.

Vorgan, formerly UNITA's radio station, broadcasting on SW from Jamba. Ceased broadcasting in 1999 when FAA troops took the town.

7. Archival Material.

Pertaining to the historical churches:

AEA.. Address, Caixa Postal, 3715, Luanda.

CEAST. Address: Rua Comandante Buila, 118, Luanda.

CICA. Address: Rua 10, Prédio N° 76, Bairro Cassenda, Luanda.

COIEPA. Address: Avenida de Portugal, N° 45, 3° Andar, Apartamento F, Bairro dos Ingombotas, Luana.

8. Pertaining to radio broadcasts.

8.1. *Rádio Ecclesia* material recorded on tape, transcribed from the archives or listened to while in Luanda:

May 26, 2001. Debate on *27 de Maio* (May 27).

September 9, 2001. *Progressos para a paz* (Progress towards Peace).

September 18, morning programme call 'Paz com Justiça' (Peace with Justice).

September 24, 2001, *Terrorismo* (terrorism).

September 27, radio interview with Holden Roberto of the FNLA.

September 29, morning phone-in programme discussion on the '*Campanha contra a Guerra*' initiative (Campaign Against War), launched by CEAST's *Movimento Pro Pace* and Open Society Foundation that day.

October 25, twice weekly human rights programme called '*Get up, stand up*'.

November 10, 2001, *26 Anos de Independência* (26th anniversary of Independence).

November 12, 2001, midday news item evaluating presidential speeches (1999-2001) transcribed from archives.

November 21, *Fórum Ecclesia*, morning phone-in programme on the Lusaka Protocol.

November 24, '*Primeira Página*', a review of the principal events of the week, a phone-in and discussion programme.

December 4, '*Entre Nós - Conversas na rádio, sobre a nossa diária, e a nossa vivência. e os nossos direitos*', human rights programme prepared by the NGO Mía Coupe.

December 5, *Fórum Ecclesia*, morning phone-in programme on the Angolan asylum seekers in the Netherlands under threat of expulsion.

December 10, '*O cidadão e a Lei*', human rights programme co-ordinated by Mãos Livres.

No date, *Poder Actual rota de Colisão com Poder Tradicional*. (Contemporary Political Authority on collision course with Traditional Authority).

8.2. Other stations.

October 6, *RNA* debate on 'O Conselho Nacional de Comunicação Social, hoje' (the National Council for Social Communication, today).

November 9, *Rádio Luanda* phone-in on housing conditions in multi-storey building in Luanda.

November 10, *Rádio LAC*, debate on Angolan healthcare.

November 10, *Rádio LAC*, debate on Angolan educational system.

December 8, *RNA* debate on 'Terrorismo', (terrorism).

December 8, *Rádio LAC*, debate on Angolan constitution.

Portuguese text - Chapter 3.

ⁱ “O diálogo da reconciliação já iniciado está na linha da democracia que deve continuar a construir e a consolidar a paz no meio de nós”, (CEAST 1989:212).

ⁱⁱ “Necessitamos de uma paz autêntica, que converta Angola num País verdadeiramente livre, democrático, onde todos os seus filhos tenham lugar e tenham voz. Esta voz só fará ouvir genuinamente com eleições livres. É preciso encontrar caminhos para uma paz justa, num país moderno e fraternal. Mas para já impõe-se a obrigação de um cessar-fogo urgente. ... Já é chegada a hora de um diálogo pessoal, directo, franco. De Angolano para angolano” (CEAST 1989:214).

ⁱⁱⁱ “... a Paz e a tranquilidade do povo estão também dependentes do compromisso da abertura para o multipartidarismo. ... O multipartidarismo não devia ser uma hipótese a comprovar, mas um alvo a alcançar num tempo determinado. O compromisso do multipartidarismo poderá determinar a paz e esta desenvolverá a democracia” (AEA-CICA 1990).

^{iv} “... os governos de Partido único se mantêm à custa da corrupção e de um grande aparato militar e de segurança que defende o regime contra o próprio povo que governa. ... Até agora o governo e a soberania da Nação angolana são confundidos com o Partido. ... A nossa paz, o nosso progresso, a unidade nacional pelos quais todos devemos estar empenhados, passam pela democracia” (AEA-CICA 1990).

^v “No caso de Angola, é necessário considerar a falta da unidade nacional como factor determinante na luta que se trava pela paz, pela justiça e pelo desenvolvimento” (CICA 1984:5).

^{vi} “Esse monstro saído dos acordos de ‘Alvor’ trouxe ao Povo Angolano a tragédia jamais conhecida, pois que o nosso Povo perdeu mais gente durante as confrontações de 1975 do que perdeu na primeira guerra de libertação nacional” (CICA 1984:6).

^{vii} “Até princípios de 1976, os obstáculos da unidade nacional eram muito mais tribais e oportunistas do que ideológica” (CICA 1984:6).

^{viii} “Temos que acentuar, mais uma vez, que o problema fundamental está na ‘falta da unidade’ e não na falta de reconciliação política entre as duas forças políticas, cujas

ideologias políticas são completamente opostas. ... Acreditamos que a verdadeira solução está na nossa capacidade de, como angolanos, preservar a nossa identidade”.

^{ix} “O primeiro problema do nosso País, aquilo que tudo condiciona, é a falta da unidade. Uma unidade baseada na verdade e na justiça, ancorada no amor fraterno. ... É pois, urgente examinar tudo quanto nos divide, não para avivar feridas, mas para erradicar as ervas daninhas e gérmens de discórdia. ... As diferenças tribais, em vez de servirem de estímulo para nos completarmos, degeneraram em motivo de rejeição uns dos outros, de desprezo uns pelos outros e de divisão entre tribos superiores e inferiores. Isto é grave. Compromete o futuro e a existência da própria Nação e a bre as portas aos conquistadores de sempre. ... A divisão e o ódio fratricida constituem a maior traição da causa da Pátria”.

^x “O momento que o nosso País atravessa com a democracia multipartidária, um verdadeiro patriota e sobretudo cristão, não pode deixar de se preocupar e contribuir na pacificação dos espíritos e reconciliação de toda a família Angolana” (AEA 1991).

^{xi} “Na democracia a linguagem deve estimular a paz e o bem estar de toda a sociedade: o acesso ao poder se fará através de votos e não de força ou violência. As armas devem dar lugar ao diálogo; um diálogo que demonstre sabedoria, um diálogo baseado na disputa pelo progresso socio-económico. Um diálogo que oriente o povo para o desenvolvimento e respeito a dignidade alheia” (AEA 1992).

^{xii} “É uma porta para uma nova era que queremos seja de justiça, paz e liberdade, para a felicidade de todos. Estas eleições são as primeiras e não queremos que sejam as últimas” (CICA 1992b).

^{xiii} “Após o acto eleitoral, é preciso saber ganhar, saber perder, e saber aceitar. Chamaríamos a isto a sabedoria democrática” (CEAST 1992:289).

^{xiv} “Longe de nós a tentação de pensar que, na prática, só merecem direitos políticos aqueles que pergaram em armas. marginando aqueles outros que sofrem as consequências dessas armas, bem como aqueles que, sem violência, lutam pela paz e pela democracia. Tão perigosa tentação poderia levar-nos a novas formas de discriminatória injustiça” (CEAST 1991:266).

^{xv} “Linguagem de intolerância nos meios da comunicação massiva: que ao invés de educar os cidadãos na concórdia, alimenta o foco de tensões e o ódio ainda existente” (AEA 1991).

^{xvi} A linguagem provocadora que os dois grandes Partidos continuam a usar nos seus Meios de Comunicação Social não convence os ouvintes de que estão a procurar a paz. Mais uma vez apelamos aos Responsáveis desse órgãos de informação que eliminem da sua linguagem todo o teor de agressividade e provocação. Procurem a unidade do povo e não a sua divisão” (CEAST 1992:272).

^{xvii} “Era exactament uma linguagem semelhante a esta que se ouvia antes de rebentar a guerra em 1975” (CEAST 1992:281).

^{xviii} “O destino deste País e o do povo depende do sucesso do processo da democratização em curso onde a pedra angular é a desmobilização dos exércitos, a formação do exército nacional e a realização das eleições justas e livres” (CICA 1992).

^{xix} “faz pensar que o seu dono pegará nelas se não ganhar as eleições” (CEAST 1992:273).

^{xx} “A democracia não culmina com simples voto por vezes manobrado ou mesmo comprado na pior das hipoteses. Democratizar um País é um processo longo e exaustivo. Passa necessariamente pela educação da população, envolvendo todos os sectores da vida nacional” (AEA 1992).

^{xxi} “Fala-se muito nas eleições democráticas de Setembro, mas o povo não sabe para que são elas. E não pode sabê-lo enquanto lhe não derem a conhecer a Lei Eleitoral e os Ideários ou Programas políticos dos diversos Partidos. A três meses das eleições, é tempo de tudo estar publicado e posto à disposição dos eleitores. Estes precisam de saber oportunamente o que devem escolher. ... E precisam de saber também como é que os Partidos pretendem governar. Não basta a simpatia por este ou aquele candidato, é necessário conhecer as suas ideias políticas a respeito de governação” (CEAST 1992:283).

^{xxii} “As próximos eleições só serão livres se forem conscientes. E só serão conscientes, se os eleitores conhecerem suficientemente os Partidos, seus programas e candidatos, por forma a poderem comparar uns com os outros, e escolherem entre eles o que lhes parecer melhor” (CEAST 1992:286).

^{xxiii} “A norma geral para um candidato ou um Partido ser elegível é a garantia que nos oferece de serviço dedicado pelo bem comun e de respeito pelos direitos humanos” (CEAST 1992:286).

^{xxiv} “... pedimos que façam as conversações com os olhos postos não nos interesses do próprio Partido, mas nos sofrimentos do Povo” (CEAST 1993:303).

^{xxv} “Abidjan foi uma esperança que se converteu em desespero. Confessamos que as alegadas razões do seu fracasso nem com a melhor das boas vontades cabem na razão. Pelo menos, na razão do povo. Como este, também nós esperávamos que uma séria vontade política inspirasse a imaginação dos negociadores no sentido de encontrarem uma solução para o impasse. Mas tal não aconteceu. E o povo continua a ser condenado à morte, à fome, ao desterro, e a toda a sorte de torturas que a guerra lhe inflige” (CEAST 1993:311).

^{xxvi} “A guerra que nos martiriza tornou-se uma violação sistemática dos mais sagrados direitos humanos. Armas de grande alcance e poder destruidor, quer aéreas quer terrestres, vão devastando indiscriminadamente as nossas vilas e cidades, sem poupar sequer os lugares sagrados. Igrejas, Hospitais, Creches, e outros lugares congéneres, desde tempos antigos constituem zonas sagradas que até povos ditos não civilizados respeitavam durante as guerras. ... para atingir os seus fins, a guerra não olha a meios” (CEAST 1993:302).

^{xxvii} “Para quem espera ver nos documentos pastorais da CEAST a condenação deste ou daquele culpado no actual conflito, cumpre-nos informar que para exercer o nosso ministério da reconciliação não é esse o melhor caminho. [Mas] não podemos deixar de condenar ... quaisquer situações de injustiça, chamando para elas a atenção dos homens, por forma de examinarem diante delas a sua consciência, verem a responsabilidade que lhes cabe e tomarem as medidas que devem tomar para lhes pôr cobro” (CEAST 1993:304).

^{xxviii} “O Povo angolano, se não for manipulado, é capaz de conviver fraternamente sem fazer das suas diferenças étnicas obstáculo algum para a paz. Há vários anos que têm vivido na cidade de Luanda centenas de milhar de cidadãos doutras etnias, sobretudo bundos e quicongos, e não consta que tenha havido recontros tribais, nem entre eles nem deles com a etnia local. O mesmo se pode afirmar doutras localidades do País. Por isso, as responsabilidades dos recentes acontecimentos politico-tribais ultrapassam o nível do povo simples” (CEAST 1992:299).

^{xxix} “Se nos últimos tempos houve acontecimentos conotados de tribalismo, isso deve-se a manipulações de Responsáveis que, para seus interesses, se aproveitaram das

rivalidades políticas predominantes em determinados sectores étnicos. Por isso, é principalmente aos dirigentes políticos que endereçamos o nosso apelo para darem testemunho de maturidade humana, sabendo aceitar os seus irmãos de quaisquer divergências étnicas, num espírito grande de verdadeira unidade nacional, sem exclusivismos de espécie alguma, e sem especular neles eventuais rivalidades políticas” (CEAST 1993:320).

^{xxx} “O instrumento mais decisivo na mobilização dos espíritos para a paz ou para a guerra é a comunicação social – jornal, rádio e televisão. Não temos dúvida alguma acerca da nefasta influência que ela exerceu sobre os últimos acontecimentos. Por isso reiteramos o nosso veemente apelo a todos os responsáveis da Comunicação Social, quer dum lado quer do outro, no sentido de utilizarem a informação para unir e não para dividir os angolanos. ... O fundo e a forma, até a tonalidade com que se transmitem os comunicados, os editoriais, e as notas do dia, tanto podem ser um convite à reconciliação e à paz como um acicate ao ódio e à guerra. Acabe-se com a comunicação maniqueista, que só vê bem no seu partido, e só mal no outro” (CEAST 1992:300).

^{xxxi} “É através da democracia parlamentar que os problemas étnicos criados pelo colonialismo em Africa em geral, e em Angola em particular, podem e devem ser debatidos e resolvidos, porque de outra forma as guerras continuarão a enriquecer os produtores de armas e da comida de emergência do países já ricos à custa do sofrimento e da morte dos angolanos” (Chipesse 1995:9-10).

^{xxxii} “E é então entramos num dilema: como a politica vai-se tornando cada vez mais na força mais decisiva na nossa sociedade, e quando mais isso se torna verdade menos capazes nos vamos tornando para agir nela, como protestantes e cristãos. E o que está a acontecer? Forças crueis estão a tomar contróle das nossas instituições politicas, e como pensamos que esses movimentos são contrários aos ‘princípios cristãos’ ... então não participamos! ... Como consequência desta nossa atitude, o Cristianismo em Angola não irá exercer qualquer influência forte e positiva na sociedade do futuro” (de Carvalho 1995:2-3).

^{xxxiii} “a nossa falha de algumas vezes não termos sido apartidária” (AEA 1994 Resolution No.8).

^{xxxiv} “Nos últimos dezoito anos muitas vidas têm sido cefadas por gente que querem expandir a sua zona de influência, querendo por este meio se proclamar reis dos Angolanos. Cada um deles utiliza as expressões políticas dos outros para justificar o seu uso da cultura de violência. Enfim é hoje certo que só aqueles que têm armas na mão e matam quanto podem passam por sábios da sociedade Angolana. Quem recusa de utilizar a força das armas de fogo é tido como stúpido. A este é recuzado o direito de participar na tomada de decisões que condicionam hoje a sua vida. ... temos ainda de lamentar esta manifestação da cultura de violência que continua de sustentar a agenda política que herdamos do colonialismo a qual nunca serviu o os verdadeiros interesses deste nação” (Ntoni-Nzinga 1995:7-8).

^{xxxv} “A luta duma nova guerra seria contra quem? Da UNITA contra o MPLA e do MPLA contra UNITA? Nada disso. Seria de ambos contra o povo. Este é que ficaria sem casa, ... Numa guerra civil são sempre dois exércitos a luta conta o Povo da sua própria Nação” (CEAST 1992:298).

^{xxxvi} “... o nosso passado deve ser a lição do futuro. Com efeito, o que foi o nosso passado de guerra? Um cruel genocidio que imolou centenas de milhares de inocentes. Um inferno de destruições que retirou a nossa Pátria da vanguarda dos países africanos mais avancadas para a retaguarda dos povos mais carenciadas no nosso Continente” (CEAST 1996:363).

^{xxxvii} “Perante o spectro duma nova guerra, ninguém pode ficar indiferente ao pensar que 15 milhões de Angolanos vão ser sacrificados, na sua vida ou nos seus bens, aos interesses pessoais, talvez partidários, de un poucos” (CEAST 1998:386).

^{xxxviii} “... há grupos, se não países, interessados em arruinar ainda mais a noss Pátria, com as armas destruidoras que para cá enviam em troca de diamantes e pertóleo. A esses senhores pedimos simlesmente que não nos façam a nós o que não querem para si mesmos” (CEAST 1995:344).

^{xxxix} “uma palavra de denúncia contra aqueles que fazem da guerra um negócio lucrativo. Somar contas em bancos estrangeiros e enriquecer à custa da fome, do sofrimento, do sangue, e da morte de seus irmão, é uma infâmia repugnante, que jamais deveria ter lugar no coração dum angolano nem de homen algum” (CEAST 1999).

^{xi} “... que seja criada pela AEA e CICA uma comissão eclesiástica permanente, para junto do Governo e das entidades do estado, exigir a aplicação prática da lei de imprensa vigente no país e a abolição da censura”, resolution 6b.

^{xli} “Mas não podemos deixar de ver neste fracasso da paz, duma certa maneira, igualmente um fracasso das Igrejas cristãs, na medida em que, reunido estas cerca de 90% dos angolanos, eram em 1991 a grande força civil, a única autoridade moral nacional possível. Fracasso, em primeiro lugar, já que não puderam evitar o retomar das armas - mesmo que não se possa, é claro, imputar-lhes a sede de poder de qualquer um dos ‘partidos armados.’ E também talvez, um fracasso na sua mensagem de paz e reconciliação, entre elas próprias, bem como no seu seio” (Messiant 2000:1).

^{xlii} “Dada a força do cristianismo neste país e a falta de meios e de autonomia a que a guerra e os poderes ditatoriais reduziram a “sociedade civil”, não penso que possa haver uma intervenção eficaz dos angolanos em favor da paz que não seja a acção de uma única confissão, por mais poderosa e respeitada que seja” (Messiant 2000:9).

^{xliii} “Na fase actual do conflito angolano, o COIEPA aceita o *Protocolo de Lusaka* como base essencial para a aproximação de todos, e espera que representantes de todas as forças vivas da Nação e os assuntos julgados sensíveis sejam trazidos à mesa das conversações, para se evitarem possíveis pretextos políticos de retorno à guerra”, (CICA 2001a).

^{xliv} “Lusaka é válido porque não há outro documento para o substituir, mas Lusaka não pode ser a bíblia do país. Lusaka é uma boa base, mas é de 7 anos passados. O país não parou, a política não parou. O país evoluiu, e isto tem que ser incluído” (Rev. Luis Nguimi).

^{xlv} “este Congresso pede que no referido diálogo e no processo de reconciliação sejam admitidos, além das partes em causa, os mais representativos estratos da sociedade civil, tais como Igrejas, Partidos e outras instituições” Conclusão No.9, Congresso Pro Pace.

^{xlvi} “No exercício das suas prerrogativas constitucionais, coube ao Governo de Angola a difícil decisão de deter e desarticular a máquina de guerra de Jonas Savimbi. O governo não tinha outra alternativa: ou se fazia a guerra, ou assistia-se, passivamente, ao desmoronamento (ruin, crumbling, collapse) de toda a Nação. Se hoje, sectores da sociedade civil reúnem-se em torno de um movimento pela paz, é porque a campanha

militar das Forças Armadas Angolanas alteraram positivamente a correlação de forças no plano militar. As vozes hoje dedicadas à pregação da Paz dificilmente seriam ouvidas no cenário que se desenhava há pouco mais de um ano. ... Mas não deixa de causar mais espanto o facto de as pressões pela paz não sejam carreadas na direcção da UNITA Belicista. ... [Foi para] garantir a liberdade e a democracia – que se tomou a decisão de desarmar as forças ilegais que ameaçavam o país” (*Jornal de Angola*, July 18, 2000, page 2).

^{xlvii} “Para o nosso caso específico, os apologistas do diálogo têm colocado em pé de igualdade o agressor e a vítima, fazendo tábua rasa às eleições de 1992” (*Jornal de Angola*, July 21, 2000, page 2).

^{xlviii} “abriu o debate sobre os caminhos da paz, e fez a sociedade perder o medo de discutir em praça pública as alternativas para sair do novelo da guerra” (Espiritanos 2002).

^{xlix} “Cientes ainda de que a via militar não é solução” (EDICA 1994).

ⁱ “...esta longa guerra de 35 anos, já deixou suficientemente claro que o problema de Angola não tem solução militar” (CEAST 1997:370).

ⁱⁱ “Faço-o porque todo e qualquer momento é bom comunicar, especialmente perante o elevado desafio da paz (através do diálogo). Também o faço para vos incentivar a participar vivamente nesta difícil tarefa que o momento nos impõe. ... Gostaríamos de ver as iniciativas da COIEPA e do PRO PACE a andar para frente. Pensamos que existe um papel histórico e relevante que podem prestar ao povo angolano, incentivando a reconciliação” (Savimbi 2001).

ⁱⁱⁱ “Em nome de Cristo e de todo o povo angolano que sofre, pedimos ao Presidente de Angola e ao Líder da UNITA para se encontrarem num lugar neutral a fim de dialogar sobre o fim da guerra e o futuro da Nação. A Igreja de bom grado oferece a sua ajuda para se encontrar um lugar conveniente assim como também uma competente e aceitável facilitação para tal diálogo” (CEAST 2001a).

ⁱⁱⁱⁱ “... embora julguemos que não deveriam ser somente o Governo e UNITA a sentar-se à mesa das conversações, mas também representantes de outros Partidos Políticos e da Sociedade Civil” (CEAST 2001b).

Portuguese Text – Chapter 4.

- ⁱ “William Tonet e o seu Folha 8 prosseguem, infatigáveis, a missão militante e espinhosa a que se propuseram, de há uns tempos a esta parte: convencer-nos de que Jonas Savimbi seria um político sem mácula, com um passado irrepreensível, firmemente empenhado em alcançar a Paz para Angola”, *Jornal de Angola* 21.11.2001.
- ⁱⁱ “William Tonet, por certo, não deve ignorar que eu sei de uitas alianças, algumas delas contraproducentes mesmo, que ele fez para criar o F8. William Tonet sabe que eu sei que ele tem vindo a cuspir nos pratos em que comeu fartamente”, *Angolense*, February 23-March 2, 2002, page 7.
- ⁱⁱⁱ “os acordos até *Agora* assinados, que privilegiaram os interesses ideológicos dos maiores partidos políticos, em detrimento dos interesses dos vários povos, que compõem o tecido angolano”, Tonet, *Folha 8*, 1 September 1999.
- ^{iv} “Na prática Lusaka falhou, por não privilegiar uma verdadeira Reconciliação Nacional. Lusaka falhou por rejeitar a participação dos outros actores políticos desarmados, igrejas, sociedade civil e autoridades tradicionais. O Protocolo, por outro lado, nunca teve programas nem calendarização com etapas e actos concretos com impacto psico-social, capazes de desarmar as mentes dos beligerantes e insufá-las de um novo espírito e conceitos de concórdia”, *Folha 8*, 26 January 2002.
- ^v “A experiência destes sete anos de (não) vigência do Protocolo de Lusaka veio demonstrar que a bipolarização assente no ‘negócio’ a dois conformou apenas, com as consequências que se conhecem, uma visão redutora, simplista, de como se alcançar a tão propalada reconciliação nacional. A própria lógica de cedências ou garantias mútuas subjacentes ao acordo, não propiciou a mínima possibilidade de coabitação entre os seus subscritores, muito mais preocupados em não deixarem qualquer margem de envolvimento de outros segmentos importantes da sociedade, potenciais apaziguadores de décadas de ódios, recalcamientos e desconfianças”. Aguiar dos Santos, 2 June, 2001, p.9.
- ^{vi} “Este espaço deveria ser preenchido com a foto que o Angolense esperava fazer na cerimónia de assinatura formal do Acordo de Cessar-Fogo, realizada quinta-feira, 4 de Abril, em Luanda. Como mais uma vez fomos excluídos de uma actividade para a qual até foram convidadas diversas personalidades e jornalistas estrangeiros, o
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Angolense decidiu não encontrar uma foto alternativa para este espaço. E com isso, expressa o seu mais vivo repúdio a todas as práticas de exclusão”, *Angolense* April 6-13, 2002.

vii “Lusaka é valido, mas não basta. Porque é só entre os dois lados. Precisamos abrir uma janela para a sociedade civil e a religião. Isto é para ver se há mais um segredo que eles podem oferecer. Isto é além da TROIKA e a comunidade internacional.” 2001.11.21. Fórum Ecclésia.

viii Rui Augusto. “Lusaka é a base de reconciliação nacional, porque desde a sua implementação algo positivo tem sido feito. Quem violou Lusaka foi Savimbi. Neste momento que se vai negociar. O país não é uma bola. Precisamos que Savimbi declara um cessar-fogo unilateral, desarmar a sua tropa.” 2001.11.21. Fórum Ecclésia.

ix Armando Caetano. “Lusaka pode servir como base para futuro diálogo. Não podemos insistir num Protocolo que falhou. Falhou porque tem erros. Muita coisa mudou em Angola e é preciso actualizá-lo. Falhou na implementação da administração do Estado. Foi um desastre. Eu vi gente a fugir a administração do Estado porque foram caçados pelo estado, e foram buscar refúgio em Bailundo. Falhou a reconciliação, foi por culpa deste governo que não se aproximou ao povo”. 2001.11.21. Fórum Ecclésia.

x “Penso que não houve verdadeiros processos de paz. Houve, sim, o estabelecimento de mecanismos de acomodação de personagens, a partir duma leitura precipitada de que o que move os homens são pura e simplesmente meras ambições materiais. ambições de mando, de protagonismo”, *Folha 8*, November 18, 2000, p 11.

xi “A Comunidade Internacional, na generalidade, que ‘aparentemente’ não entendeu a profundidade do processo da Paz e investiu tudo nos resultados formais da eleições. deixou de ter um papel relevante na busca da paz (não ‘entende’ a dimensão do movimento social pela Paz, satisfazendo-se como mero gestor de sanções e aprofundando as relações militares com o regime), passando meramente o reforço da cooperação económica cujos resultados, no actual contexto, para o povo angolano, são claramente duvidosos”, Filomeno Vieira Lopes. *Agora* January 13, 2000. p 9.

xii “A Troika de observadores há muito que deixou de trazer contributos positivos para o fim do conflito, hoje está desqualificada para um possível papel de facilitador do diálogo entre as partes. O problema é que os países que compõem a Troika têm

interesses que os levam a privilegiar um relacionamento estreito com o Governo. E isso faz com que muitas vezes funcionem como autênticas caixas de ressonância das posições do Governo, ignorando ou silenciando situações dramáticas que resultam do prolongamento do conflito, ou outras propostas e contribuições que têm surgido, nomeadamente as emendas da sociedade civil e dos partidos da oposição. Além disso, salvo raras e honorosas exceções, para a Troika, só as posições do Governo interessam e contam para as suas tomadas de posições. Ora deste modo, pouco contribuem para a paz e concórdia entre os angolanos”, Simão Catete, *Folha 8*, December 8, 2001, pp. 12-13

^{xiii} “A Igreja mais uma vez expressou, em nome dos angolanos, o desejo da paz que Angola necessita. Desafiando a voz da minoria, mas poderosa no país, que advoga a ‘guerra para acabar com a guerra’, os religiosos da capital angolana, no último Domingo, fizeram ouvir a voz da razão. ... Evidentemente, os religiosos, ultimamente criticados publicamente pelos detentores do poder, vêm abrindo espaços para se fazerem ouvir na sociedade angolana. ... Os recentes pronunciamentos da Igreja contrapõem os discursos, que, vindos do estrangeiro, manifestam a falta de interesse e-ou de conhecimento da realidade angolana, já que animam a opção armada, como a única via para a pacificação entre os angolanos. O aval de Washington, por exemplo, e outros provenientes, particularmente dos países que exploram os principais recursos naturais de Angola, evidenciam quão interessados estão no fim das hostilidades no país. Não lhes interessa, tudo parece indicar, a vida human angolana. ... e neste contexto, a via seguida pela Igreja: a paz por via de conversações, é quanto a nós, a mais realista, ... que os filhos desta terra vêm tendo ao longo de quase trinta anos, incluindo aos da independência. Portanto, um aplauso bem grande para a Igreja.”
Editorial by Daniel Salweio, *Actual*, June 17, 2000, page 2.

^{xiv} “Em 1975, as grandes forças políticas do país, FNLA, MPLA, e UNITA não tinham esgotado todas as possibilidades de entendimento. O que se passou foi a lógica da força militar e o desejo de procurar a todo o custo esmagar o outro, eram mais fortes em cada um dos partidos. Prova disso, foi a introdução no país de forças militares estrangeiras, já visíveis em Abril e Maio de 1975, muito antes do 11 de Novembro.”
Jerónimo Wanga, Minister of Education and Culture in the transitional government, *Angolense* 11-18 November 2000, page 12-13

^{xv} “Porque ideologicamente a UNITA e a FNLA não estavam à mesma altura do MPLA e muito menos sincronizadas com ele. O MPLA era um movimento que lutava pelo Povo angolano e os outros dois movimentos lutavam pelo poder. Portanto, não havi hipótese absolutamente nenhuma de coabitarmos,” Beto Van-Dunen, *Angolense* November 11-18, 2000, page 8.

^{xvi} “Ninguém sabe ao certo o que aconteceu. Todos dizem que é a guerra. Mas porquê a guerra? ... Porque o MPLA queria todo o protagonismo para si, por representar a intelectualidade urbana, mas a FNLA queria-o para si, porque era nele que residiam as verdadeiras aspirações do povo oprimido. Como se não bastasse, depois veio o Savimbi a criar a sua UNITA, congregando povos do centro-sul. Esses três movimentos nunca se entenderam desde o princípio, cada um tinha a sua maneira de ver Angola, cada sonhava o seu tipo de independência para Angola. As grandes potências só se aproveitaram dessas divisões entre os próprios angolanos para implementar a sua guerra de ideologias. Este é guerra feira com armas e dinheiro fornecidos pelas duas potências de então, EAU e URSS (hoje Rússia). Os rebeldes por vezes falam em «causas profundas», mas supõe-se que sejam as mesmas causas que originaram a formação da FNLA, no Norte, MPLA na capital do país e centros urbanos adjacentes, e da UNITA no Centro-Sul”, Fonseca Bengui, *Actual*, November 11, 2000, page 7.

^{xvii} “... Criou-se aqui um sistema de partido único. Logo exclusão política e recusa de outros e, a intolerância política teve condições para crescer. Foi o MPLA que fez isso ao proclamar independência, mas os outros dois movimentos de libertação fariam precisamente o mesmo, porque a lógica que estava no espírito dos três movimentos de libertação na altura da independência era tomada do poder político e exercício deste poder numa forma solitária, única. Não era partilhar o poder político. não era respeitar o espírito do próprio Acordo do Alvor”, Vincente P. de Andrade, November 10, 2001.

^{xviii} “Quem violou os acordos de Alvor foi Portugal por ter permitido a entrada de forças estrangeiras. O próprio poder colonial não devia permitir que o MPLA tomasse o poder. Como subscritor dos acordos, Portugal deveria arranjar meios de reunir os três movimentos para meter o processo sobre os carris. Isso é a base de tudo. A violação provocou toda esta confusão que hoje vivemos. Mas Portugal deve assumir esta grande responsabilidade porque as dificuldades começaram em Alvor”, *Folha 8*, 10.11.2000, page 7-8, Holden Roberto interview.

^{xix} “... o MFA que constituía o núcleo duro dessa governo apoiava abertamente o MPLA por razões ideológicas – não soube levar a cabo com responsabilidade o processo de descolonização de Angola”. He denies any CIA-FNLA collaboration, saying it was an orchestrated MPLA campaign. Ngola Kabangu of FNLA, *Angolense* 11-18 November 2000, page 10-11.

^{xx} “... declarar a Paz, não é um favor a Savimbi, nem por causa dele. mas uma resposta ao clamor de milhões de autocónes, que ao longo destes anos têm morrido de forma inglória,” *Folha 8*, November 17, 2001, page 3.

^{xxi} “O futuro comece agora, os Angolanos podem começar a sonhar, e o futuro já começou. Assim ficam apontados os discursos do Presidente da República dos três últimos aniversário da independência, discursos que tem em comun o facto de criarem no seio da população expectativas do que a guerra está mesmo no fim, e que os país caminha passos assegurados para a normalidade. Observadores comentam que o discurso de ontem não trouxe qualquer novidade, mais uma vez o Presidente invocou a guerra como o mau de todos os maus, desculpando assim tantos erros de governação, nestes 26 anos de independencia de Angola. ... Ontem José Eduardo dos Santos afirmou que não está disponível para negociar com Jonas Savimbi, que considerou ser um perdedor crónico. Resaltou que só um milagre pode impedir a derrota da UNITA. Já em 1999, depois da tomada do Andulo pelas tropas do governo, o discurso presidencial caregava o mesmo tom vitorioso. Nos 25 anos da independencia José Eduardo dos Santos voltou a dizer que a guerra está a terminar. ... Para algumas pessoas a esperança duma data satisfactoria em breve continue a detem, outras tantas defendem que só com negociações entre o governo e UNITA que poderá chegar a paz. O receio é justificado pelo facto de, apesar de todas as garantias das vitorias alcançadas pelas FAA, não tem sido possível acabar coma guerra. ... A fome, a doença e a miséria continuam a ser a realidade da maior parte dos Angolanos. Assim para muitos Angolanos o futuro ainda não começou”, Laurina Tavares, 12.11.2001 *Rádio Ecclésia*.

^{xxii} “Falar de 27 de Maio de 1977 é, aindo hoje extremamente delicada, até mesmo perigoso neste país. Fazer um debate e franco sobre esse questão não é fácil, pois muitas feridas continuam abertas. ... Somos hoje acudados de ser um povo passivo e medroso, acabrunhado e introvertido, silencioso e alheio a sua própria situação, fleumático ou mesmo ápatico. em parte por causas das consequências deste triste dia”, *Rádio Ecclésia* debate, May 26, 2001.

^{xxiii} “Se tivéssemos discutido o 27 de Maio até hoje ... eu já não seria esta coisa que ainda mete medo ... porque a nossa sociedade, toda ela, está sente, portanto, foi condicionada pelo 27 de Maio. ... Mas o regime, os que substituíram o A .Neto nada fizeram para mudar, pelo contrário, aproveitaram-se deste medo, a continuam a aproveitar do medo que impuseram à população, para continuarem a desgovernar esta nação. É preciso fazer o próximo passo. Tem que se falar do 27 de Maio até que ele fica desmistificado, para começarmos a construir uma nova sociedade, já baseada, digamos assim, na lei e nos direitos, porque senão continuaremos a estar prisioneiros do 27 de Maio.”

^{xxiv} “É verdade que existe ainda uma certa apatia no nosso povo de participar em manifestações, talvez por medo do que aconteceu no ‘27 de Maio’”, Carlos Leitão, presidente PADPA, *Folha 8*, March 4, 2000, pages 5-6.

^{xxv} Title of piece - ‘Venceram a barreira do medo estratégico’. “Abrimos aqui um breve parênteses para recordar que esta barreira tem as suas raízes históricas mergulhadas na sangrenta repressão que ocorreu em 1977 e anos subsequentes, cujo balanço na ordem das várias dezenas de milhares de vítimas ainda está por se fazer”, Wilson Dáda, *Folha 8*, February 26, 2000, p. 11.

^{xxvi} “Em Angola como igualmente em várias partes do globo, há uma relação intrínscas entre a Paz e Democracia. ... Acreditou-se que o aprofundamento da democracia seria a pedra angular para a consolidação da Paz no país. ... Da mesma forma, a guerra oferece um pretexto para as forças antidemocráticas exercerem um controlo estrito sobre a sociedade, limitando a intervenção dos cidadãos. O esperado fim da guerra criaria então as condições para a emergência duma verdadeira democracia. ... A questão de fundo é a insipiência da democracia em Angola alimenta a guerra”, Filomeno Vieira Lopes, *Agora*, January 13, 2000, page 9.

^{xxvii} “A situação é preocupante e as decisões da última reunião do CC dos camaradas demonstra que a democracia, em Angola, corre sérios riscos”, Tonet *Folha 8*, March 1, 2000, p.2.

^{xxviii} “Um poder fortemente presidencialista. um governo e parlamento maioritários, incluindo o controlo dos tribunais. Um sistema assim alicerçado não deixar respirar os contra-poderes necessários ao exercício de um regime democrático”, *Agora*, August 28, 1999, pp. 2-3.

Portuguese Text – Chapter 5.

ⁱ “A partir daí a população sabia que tinha que se manter afastada das questões de poder e de responsabilidade política”.

ⁱⁱ “Seria justo dizer que no presente momento, a posição das Nações Unidas respeitante à paz em Angola, está a ser construído e está a tentar aprender com as suas falhas do passado. É claro que as Nações Unidas agora vêem os direitos humanos como parte do processo de paz em Angola. De facto, a divisão dos Direitos Humanos tem sido a componente principal da contribuição da comunidade internacional para o alcance da paz desde de 1999”, Howland (2001:112).

ⁱⁱⁱ “O Manifesto pela Paz, declarado em 1999, e assumido solidariamente por um largo espectro de figuras, deve ser considerado como tendo sido o verdadeiro “pontapé de saída” para uma série de manifestações explícitas e coordenadas no seio da sociedade, em prol da Paz e da Reconciliação. Em Julho de 2000, teve lugar ‘Congresso Pro Pace’, o ponto mais alto das mais diversas manifestações a favor da Paz e Reconciliação entre todos os angolanos”. Paper by Justino Pinto De Andrade / Rafael Marques entitled ‘Uma Solução Para O Conflito Angolano’ at *Fórum Sobre As Múltiplas Conseqências Da Guerra Conference*.

^{iv} “O movimento ‘Mulheres, Paz e Desenvolvimento’ (MPD), é um movimento cívico de mulheres de defesa da Paz e da Reconciliação, Democracia, Direitos Humanos e Desenvolvimento da Sociedade Angolana, sem carácter partidário ou religioso, sem discriminação da raça, cor, origem cultural e politico-social, voluntário, humanitário e sem carácter lucrativo”. Article 1, page 3 of MPD Statutes.

^v “Nós primamos pelo desenvolvimento da nossa sociedade, mas sabemos que não haverá desenvolvimento sem paz. Também sabemos que não haverá paz sem que haja diálogo e reconciliação. Nas sociedades africanas a que pertencemos, baseadas na oralidade, o diálogo surge como um elemento de socialização das relações entre os homens e é um mecanismo eficaz na solução do conflito... Por isso, para se alcançar a paz em Angola, a única via é o diálogo, abrangente e inclusivo. Só dialogando é que poderemos analisar as

causas do conflito angolano e encontrar as saídas e soluções que se ajustem melhor às nossas realidades. Já se assinaram muitos Acordos, houve muitas negociações de paz. Tudo esse esforço para paz em Angola pecou por duas razões principais: 1. Não se atacaram as causas, mas os seus efeitos e sintomas. 2. O processo envolveu apenas aqueles que detêm as armas e fazem a guerra, não todas as partes interessadas na pacificação do país”.

Cesinanda Xavier.

Portuguese Text – Chapter 6.

- ⁱ “... os cidadãos se vejam forçados a fazer justiça por mãos próprias” (AEA 1991).
- ⁱⁱ “Todo o cidadão tem o dever de ser embaixador da paz em sua casa, no seu bairro, no lugar de trabalho, na cidade em que vive, contribuindo desta forma para que onde impera o ódio, reine a afeição. ... Qualquer projecto, de paz durável é participatório e o seu sucesso depende da contribuição de todos os seus membros ... O objectivo final é ter paz em casa, paz na rua, paz nas escolas, progresso e prosperidade para todos” (IECA 4).
- ⁱⁱⁱ “... a presente guerra que consome bastantes vidas. não tem razão de ser, e por outro lado a paz não é somente a ausência de guerra, mas, é um processo que deve caracterizar o relacionamento dos seres vivos”.
- ^{iv} País vestese de branco e saúda a paz. “Angola, de Cabinda ao Cunene, vestiu-se ontem de branco para saudar o fim definitivo da guerra e a chegada da paz. Milhares de pessoas, sobretudo nas capitais de província, participaram em longas marchas para saudar a assinatura, quinta-feira, do acordo formal de cessar-fogo entre as Forças Armadas Angolanas e as forças militares da Unita”, from *{PRIVATE}Jornal de Angola*, April 6, 2002.
- ^v “É um encontro onde as mulheres podem falar a vontade, nós todas falamos. ... Todas querem participar, só as que estão a trabalhar não estão na reunião. ... Eu venho traduzir em Kimbundo para as que só falam Kimbundo, tenho compromisso com elas, não quero faltar”.
- ^{vi} “Os curandeiros Bantu são psicólogos e o seu poder de sugestão é sempre eficaz, o que em resumo se pode dizer que o curandeiro Bantu é um especialista em remédios naturais. pisotearia, é como um verdadeiro sacerdote medianeiro entre o mundo visível e o doente”. Pedro Calueyo, *Agora*, August 12, 2000, page 10.
- ^{vii} “Aplicação de práticas locais, de reintegração e estabilização social nas comunidades. que englobam: a) Recepção das pessoas; b) Purificação (simbólica); c) Reintegração/aceitação; d) Início de uma nova vida”.
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^{viii} “A Igreja, mais concretamente as suas comunidades religiosas, podem desempenhar um papel fundamental na pacificação dos espíritos, no restabelecimento da confiança recíproca e na aceitação e perdão mútuo entre cidadãos até agora desavindos. Finalmente a Paz”, *Jornal de Angola*, April 9, 2002.

Portuguese Text – Chapter 7.

ⁱ “As autoridades tradicionais tinham um papel fundamental no Maquis, sobretudo em 1961, quando iniciou a luta armada. Foram os *sobas* que acolheram os movimentos de libertação nacional; foram os *sobas* quem mobilizaram e organizaram as massas populares para apoiar esses movimentos na resistência da primeira e segunda guerras de libertação nacional contra os portugueses” *Angolense* February 23-March 2, 2002. page VII.

ⁱⁱ “No campo da opressão cultural há também de referir o papel da religião. Os agentes religiosos cristãos (padres, pastores, missionários) foram os primeiros a penetrar nas sociedades tradicionais. Ao levar-lhes uma nova religião, levavam, também, a civilização do colonizador novas maneiras de viver, de pensar que interessavam à dominação colonial. A religião cristã, vinda da Europa ou da América, foi muitas vezes imposta pela violência, até que foi assimilada por uma boa parte dos africanos” (David 1989:69).

ⁱⁱⁱ “Segundo o ministro, os resultados do encontro permitirão definir claramente o relacionamento entre os órgãos administrativos modernos e a autoridade tradicional, na perspectiva da promoção do desenvolvimento sócio-comunitário e a consolidação da democracia”, *Jornal de Angola*, March 26, 2002, internet edition.

^{iv} “Os *sobas*, que manifestaram o seu apoio no decurso de uma audiência que lhes foi concedida, na manhã de segunda-feira, pelo Presidente da República, comprometeram-se, concretamente, a ajudar os governos central e provinciais no reassentamento das populações nas áreas rurais, na reconstrução de estradas e de tudo o que foi destruído pela guerra”, *Jornal de Angola*, March 27, 2002, internet edition.

^v “Um tema que tem vindo a ser motivo de crescente interesse em vários meios e de abordagens apaixonadas, o papel das autoridades tradicionais no actual sistema de poder político em Angola...”, *Jornal de Angola*, February 14, 2002, editorial, internet edition.

^{vi} “... não era necessário ir ao Occidente buscar mediadores até hoje como temos vindo a assistir. O conflito é interno e não é lógica trazer aqui mediadores estrangeiros que até cometem erros de palmatória como por exemplo a missão da MONUA é um exemplo vivo. Temos as nossas tradições antigas, estão aí os *sobas* que podem também

exercer um papel preponderante na resolução de conflitos. Às vezes a política em África deixa muito a desejar”, *O Independente*, March 4, 2000, p. 11.

^{vii} “Apelamos aos *sobas*, regedores e seculos que deixem de fazer a preparação mágica dos militares e dirigentes porque eles matam, estragam e estranham as populações. Depois vão nos quimbandas, que são *sobas* e seculos para lhes preparar os corpos para que não lhes aconteça nada”, *Angolense*, February 23-March 2, 2002. page VII.

^{viii} “Temos alguma coisa para dizer sobre a guerra, estamos mais do que vinte anos esperando falar. Isto acabará com a conversa. Temos maneiras para resolver os nossos problemas. Não queremos estrangeiros para fazer a paz. Os que vem de fora também estão a fabricar armas e estão a ganhar muito dinheiro aqui. O povo de fora não sabe de nada. Fazíamos sentar os dois, nós nascemos aqui, somos da mesma família. A guerra não nos interesse, são os estrangeiros que estão a ganhar bem e a enganar os dois”.

^{ix} O “journal de maior tiragem, circulação, divulgação de Angola, o Mujimbu, que é lido e comentado por quase todos os habitantes do país, até pelos analfabetos, cegos, mudos e doentes. Tem a sua sede principal em Luanda; os correspondentes, repórteres e jornalistas espalhados em toda as províncias. ...O Mujimbu é o journal mais barato do mundo: grátis. Com uma audiência de credibilidade sem precedentes. Distribuição e divulgação nas ruas, nos bares, buates, praias, mercados ...em tudo-todo, sem excepção, mujimbu! Eh, mujimbu, vende-se mas não é gritado. Os ardinias não podem nem devem gritar a sua publicidade, é a disciplina fundamental do jornal Mujimbu. É curioso, o estrangeiro que chega pela primeira vez a Angola, a principal novidade que o preocupa é o jornal Mujimbu. Este vocabulo de origem da língua nacional que se julga ser kikongo e que significou somente: novidade, notícia, conversa, demanda. maka, problema, queixa, perdeu o seu verdadeiro e original significado para BOATO” (XITU 1985:35).