

**Changes in Czech Vocabulary against the Background  
of  
Socio-political Changes from the 1980s to the Present**

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## Abstract

The year of 1989 was for many an important year. Its affairs swept through Europe with a mighty force and resulted in the fall of the governments of Central and Eastern European countries and the disintegration of the Communist bloc. In Czechoslovakia, the process of change in 1989 was dramatic but tended to be non-violent; the events were even called euphemistically the “Velvet Revolution”.

The period from 1989 up to the present has been an era of major changes in Czech society. This will inevitably be reflected in the language. The Czech language before 1989 had its own typical phrases, clichés and words, certain meanings of which are now historical in nature. The socio-political changes in and after 1989 did not slow down developmental tendencies in the language or brought them to an end. On the contrary -- these tendencies continue under the new conditions. New phrases, clichés and meanings of words are being created and the process of infiltration of foreign elements into the language is affected too. My research explores changes in Czech vocabulary following the changes in the political regime in 1989. I investigate how extra-linguistic factors and language contact factors interact with language-internal processes of change in the language of a society that is undergoing dramatic transformations.

There have been no long-term, in-depth studies of change in particular lexical units in Czech. Studies of lexical change in the languages of the former Soviet bloc have been mostly focused on a broad view of developmental tendencies. Therefore I believe that my work will help to fill a gap in explaining what processes can be detected in the course of lexical change.

## Preface

The era from November 1989 to the present had been important one for Czech society. 1989 is a year that often carries an attribute 'revolutionary' in Central and East European modern history. Many historians and politicians consider it to be a year which can be ranked with the revolutionary years 1789, 1848 and 1917. The revolutions of 1789 to 1848 either sank in terror or were rapidly suppressed. Contrary to that, the events of 1989 were much more peaceful. They are often referred to as people's revolutions; the events in Czechoslovakia are even called euphemistically the 'Velvet Revolution'. Still, within several months, governments in Central and Eastern Europe fell, the whole structure of the Communist bloc disintegrated and the balance of world power shifted. The changes that took place after the change of the regime were so fundamental that they significantly affected all aspects of life in Czechoslovak society including its language. A reader not so familiar with the recent development in the Czech Republic, formerly part of Czechoslovakia, may appreciate a reference to some of its recent history and a closer explanation of the importance of the changes I have referred to. Some scholars and laymen may also question if it is correct to call the change of the regime in 1989 *revolution*. Therefore I am therefore to offer a brief description of the history and the situation in the country before November 1989. I will also give an account of various aspects of the term *revolution* to show that its use is justified.

### The History of Czechoslovakia in Outline: 1938 - 2004

Before WWII Czechoslovakia was the shared home of three nations: the Czechs, the Slovaks, and the Ruthenians whose territory was allocated to those of the Czechs and Slovaks based on the Saint Germain Peace Treaty of 10<sup>th</sup> September 1919 (Vykoupil 452). It was a state built on democratic principles as proclaimed by its president T.G. Masaryk (Bednář 62 – 63). This situation started to change with the growing power of Adolph Hitler whose claims for the expansion of Germany kept increasing. With the signing of the Munich

Treaty on 29<sup>th</sup> September 1938, the Czech Republic was forced to cede control of the border territories of the Sudetenland to Germany (Glenny 28). Soon after the agreement was signed, Poland occupied the territory of Cieszyn and Hungary annexed the territory of Southern Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia. All these steps were taken in line with the Vienna Arbitration of 2<sup>nd</sup> November 1938 (Jůzlová et al 468).

Hitler's pressure to acquire new territories grew. Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by the German Army in March 1939 and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was established according to Hitler's order on 16<sup>th</sup> March 1939. The protectorate was in place until 9<sup>th</sup> May 1945. Based on an agreement with Hitler, the Slovak Assembly announced an independent Slovak State on 14<sup>th</sup> March 1939. This formally was an autonomous state although it was totally dependent upon Germany (Čornej 342 - 343).

During the Second World War, which started on 1<sup>st</sup> September 1939, a resistance movement was active on Czechoslovak territory. This movement led to the Slovak Uprising in Slovakia on 29<sup>th</sup> August 1944, which was suppressed by the German Army on 27<sup>th</sup> October 1944 and the resistance continued in the form of partisan movement. In addition, partisan movements and sabotage activities took place in Bohemia and Moravia. The resistance activities culminated with the Prague Uprising in May 1945. On 9<sup>th</sup> May 1945 the independent Czechoslovak Republic was re-established. On 29<sup>th</sup> June 1945 a treaty annexing the territory of Carpathian Ruthenia to the Soviet Union was signed (Vykoupil 492 - 493).

Between 1945 and 1948 the republic destroyed in the war was being reconstructed on democratic principles. On 25<sup>th</sup> of October 1945 mines, steelworks and heavy industry and banks were nationalized in addition to land reform taking place. The Communist Party played a major role in the political life of the country. On 2<sup>nd</sup> July 1946 Klement Gottwald, a communist, became Prime Minister. In the government crisis of February 1948 the Communist Party took advantage of their influence and along with establishing a new

government they also introduced a new pro-Soviet communist regime (Čornej 392 - 397).

In the period of 1948 – 1968 society was controlled according to the Russian model, which meant that controls on speech and press similar to those in the Soviet Union were instituted. On 1<sup>st</sup> July 1960 a new socialist constitution was officially approved and the state changed its name to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, abbreviated as CSSR. This period of Czechoslovak history was characterized by a ban on privately owned business and companies; the agricultural sector was collectivised and industry further nationalised. Human rights were reinterpreted to exclude freedom of speech. The repression of dissent by the state was condoned and encouraged (Vykoopil 174 - 175).

Protests against the regime gradually grew stronger. A group of politicians lead by Alexander Dubček attempted to reform the regime imposed by the USSR in a way that would be more acceptable for Czechoslovak conditions. Warsaw Coalition Army entered Czechoslovak Territory on 21<sup>st</sup> August 1968, suppressed this movement, known also as the Prague Spring, and assisted in the reinforcement of the pro-Soviet regime (Čornej 406 - 407).

On 1<sup>st</sup> January 1969 the Act of the Czechoslovak Federation, which altered the organisation of the state, came into being; the Czech Socialist Republic and the Slovak Socialist Republic as two states under within one federation were formed. Between 1969 and 1989 life in Czechoslovak society was characterised by repressive measures against any democratic movement. Regular character checks and removing people from management positions were typical for the so-called “normalisation” process. Human right and liberties were even more restricted (Vykoopil 400 – 402).

Such a situation did not eliminate democratic groups and movements in the country. On the contrary -- it lead to their growing popularity. People were keen to read banned documents and publications spread through samizdat editions. The democratic desires of the society culminated in the Velvet Revolution on 17th November 1989. The news spread that a peaceful student



march through Prague to celebrate International Students Day had been confronted by the police. People were appalled by the force the police used against students and their dissatisfaction increased. On 19<sup>th</sup> November members of independent initiatives gathered together to form the *Občanské fórum* 'Civic Forum' movement, the mission statement of which was composed by Václav Havel. A similar alliance called *Verejnost' proti násiliu* 'the General Public against Violence' was founded in Bratislava, Slovakia on the same day. The statement requested the resignation of the most corrupt communist politicians, the release of political prisoners and also called for a possible general strike if these demands were not met. The knowledge of the events in Prague gradually spread across the whole country between 19<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> of November and the support for the Civic Forum grew. On 23<sup>rd</sup> of November 1989 the Central Committee of the Communist Party stepped down and the Civic Forum led the negotiations concerning the changes in government. The general strike under the slogan "*Konec vlády jedné strany*" 'An End to Single-Party Rule' in which 75% of citizens participated was held on 27<sup>th</sup> November. The efforts of Civic Forum were directed at organising free elections. At the beginning of December the Communist leaders submitted a proposal for a new, more acceptable government which was rejected due to the strong prevalence of Communists. Further consultations were held and eventually on 10<sup>th</sup> December the president, Gustáv Husák, appointed a new acceptable government and immediately resigned his post. It was announced that Václav Havel would be the candidate for president and Alexander Dubček would chair the Federal Assembly. It was also agreed that the so-called "Government of National Understanding" would act as temporary until free elections took place. Havel was elected president on 29<sup>th</sup> December 1989. The name of the state changed to the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic in Spring 1990 and the first free elections in which different political subjects participated were held in June 1990. The Civic Forum gained a majority of 51% of votes in the Czech Republic and the General Public against Violence (GVAP) in Slovakia achieved a similar support ([www.revoluce89.wz.cz](http://www.revoluce89.wz.cz)).

The Civic Forum and the GPAV further split into a spectrum of political parties. However it is possible to summarise the whole process in a statement

that democratic groups represented by Václav Havel took control of the government in a peaceful sequence of events and re-established democracy after nearly 40 years of being on a pro-Soviet course of politics. The changes in the political course of the country were shortly followed by changes in the economy. The voucher privatisation that was to change the ownership in the previously centrally governed economy was held between 1991 and 1994. This process resulted not only in the privatisation of industry, agriculture, and banks but also in the privatisation of health care and education. Although the country split in the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic on 1<sup>st</sup> January 1993, both republics joined the European Union in May 2004 (Vykoupil 92).

The events that started with a demonstration of university students on 17<sup>th</sup> November 1989 instigated a chain reaction that resulted in a major transformation of society. The changes in politics, economy and structure of ownership were the fastest and are seen as the most prominent. The material standards, social conditions, and people's values are changing in connection with the changes in economy. What may be seen as the slowest part of the transition are the changes in the way people act and think. I believe that further research work would reveal plenty of proof even in this area.

### **Revolution or Refolution?**

Whilst many denote the period of 1989 as revolutionary, others argue that the term *revolution* should not be used to describe the changes that took place in the region of Central and Eastern Europe. This is because the degree of continuity in the societies of these countries remained so high that the term seems to be inappropriate. Ash casts doubts over the validity of the term *revolution* to describe the events in 1989. On the other hand *reform* does not encompass the extent of the changes in his view. Therefore Ash coined the term *refolution* (Ash 1983). He claims that "This sudden and sweeping end to an *ancien régime*, and the fact that it occurred in all the countries of eastern Europe within the space of few months, may justify the use of the word *revolution*." (Sparks 74) and he freely uses the term in the titles of his books

The Polish Revolution: Solidarity and We the People; The Revolution of 89' Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague.

To contradict this argument, the term *revolution* has been used in the titles of books investigating the events prior to and in connection with 1989 and their aftermath. To justify the use of the term *revolution* in my thesis, I investigated the use of the term in the following sources:

The Concise Oxford Dictionary<sup>1</sup> defines *revolution* as: “2. complete change, turning upside down, great reversal of conditions [. . .]; fundamental reconstruction, esp. forcible action by nation. etc. to substitute new ruler or system of government [. . .].”

Peter Calvert in Revolution and Counter-revolution examines several theories of revolution and the development of the term through the course of time. He cites The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary where “ ‘Revolution’ [. . .] in politics it refers to a sudden change of direction. [2] forcible substitution by subjects of new ruler or polity for the old” (3). Calvert also refers to David Robertson, the author of the Penguin Dictionary of Politics, who defines revolution as follows:

A revolution, *properly so called*, is a violent and total change in a political system which not only vastly alters the distribution of power in the society but results in major changes in the whole social structure.[. . .] in political science the primary meaning *must* be deliberate, intentional, and probably violent overthrow of one ruling class by another which leads the mobilised masses against the existing system. (Calvert 3)

Calvert finds this definition very restrictive. He puts the wording to the test on the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions. He concludes that although it can be applied to the Chinese revolution, it does not match the French revolution as it was not intentional. This definition doesn't fit the Russian revolution either because it did not lead the mobilised masses against the system. He proposes

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<sup>1</sup> The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th edition, 1984, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK

that revolution “can be applied to a process of reordering government *after* political convulsions, of profound social change, of broadening participation in government and of progress towards a more humane society” (3 - 4).

Sparks points out that, “many definitions stress that the primary characteristics of a revolution is that the “ ‘change’ is ‘fundamental’ and ‘sudden’”, although revolutions do not suppose a total and complete transformation (73 - 74).

Many authors are confident in using the term *revolution* either in the titles of their books, such as Tearing Down the Curtain; The People’s Revolution in Eastern Europe, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe, Revolution in Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe Transformation and Revolution, 1945 – 1991 Eastern Europe in Revolution, or in the manner they use the term and justify its use:

The events of 1989 were revolutionary. In revolutions, those who were at the bottom suddenly ascended to the top. Prisoners take charge of the police, stokers become foreign ministers. Revolution turned things around in Eastern Europe in 1989, but with three crucial differences. First, except for Romania, these changes were accomplished without violence. Second, some of those who were previously on top were left on top. Third, those who were, until the revolution, left on the bottom would, under normal conditions in democratic countries, never have been at the bottom at all (Cipkowski 2).

### **Gentle, Velvet and Asymptomatic Revolutions**

Those who hold a view that a revolution does not have to be violent are for instance Jiří Pehe and Ivo Banac. Pehe writes that: “A non-violent revolution spearheaded by students and artists took place in the weeks following the events of November 17” (Pehe 346).

Banac is aware of the fact that revolutions do not infer a total and complete transformation of the old order. In fact some revolutions did not achieve the total transformation of the society, e.g. the Russian Revolution, however they set off a sequence of changes leading to a cumulative change (Sparks 74). Banac points out that “[. . .] the revolutionary processes were not completed --

and in some cases not even initiated -- in 1989 [. . .]”, but continues by stating that “The downfall of East European communism was a heralded revolution [. . .]” (ix - x).

The 1989 revolutions, particularly the “Velvet Revolution” had more asymptomatic features than just those described above by Pehe and Banac<sup>2</sup>:

- a) the process took place without a sense of a distinctive political strategy;
- b) it was repeatedly suggested that the events of 17 November 1989 were engineered by certain currents within the Communist Party itself to discredit the conservative leadership and replace it with new leadership opened to reforms similar to those of Gorbachev;
- c) the events were initiated by students and intellectuals who were at the time very sceptical of the support from the industrial workers (Banac 96 – 116).

In my opinion *revolution* describes the events that took place in 1989. I wish to mention a further two points which I took into consideration when I was looking for a definition of *revolution* which would support my view and which would fit the description of the events:

Firstly, the comparison between the relatively non-violent revolutionary affairs in the region of Central and Eastern European countries with the events in Romania. The situation in Romania was completely different. The changes happening elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc did not seem to affect Romania at all. As the journalists from The Observer write:

While other nations were falling over themselves to change their way of life, Party chiefs bowing to the will of the people, governments disappearing almost without a struggle, Romania remained unchanged. It won its freedom the hard way, in a bloody, vicious, spectacular and historic battle that nobody had anticipated, [. . .]”. (Hawkes 125)

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<sup>2</sup> More detailed information can be found in Tony R. Judt: “Metamorphosis: The Democratic Revolution in Czechoslovakia“, Eastern Europe in Revolution, ed. Ivo Banac (New York, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).

Secondly, the rapid speed in which positions of those defending the communist government were vacated in their effort to safeguard calm and order together with the quickly developing support of the armed forces to the revolution. The Observer journalists claim that “Units of People’s Militia were said to have ducked orders when faced with the enormity of their task; a riot police unit in one district declared that they no longer wished to be involved in ‘solving political problems’[. . .]” (Hawkes 118).

The above points show that revolution does not have to be blood-spattered and violent to achieve a total change in a political system which alters the distribution of power in the society and changes the whole social structure. I believe that all these prerequisites were met in the 1989 revolution in Czechoslovakia and other countries of the former Soviet bloc in. To establish a definition of *revolution* that describes the events in the 90s, I suggest a fusion of some of the above mentioned aspects of revolutionary processes of change from communist to democratic societies: “A process setting off a sequence of changes that lead to a cumulative change and result in reordering government after political convulsions, in profound social change and in broadening participation in government and progress towards a more humane society.”

## 1. Introduction

In this thesis I present a selection of instances of lexical change in the Czech language over the last 25 years. They are examined in the context of major transformations in the society in this period. I believe that my attempt to integrate cases of lexical and semantic change and interpret them through major theories of language change will contribute to better insight into interaction between language-internal and external processes of change.

### 1.1. Current Situation in Study of Lexical Change in Czech Linguistics

Changes in language, mainly its lexis, are a gratifying topic for discussion. Laymen may shake their heads over recent developments. They may either resist or keenly adopt the novelties these developments bring along; professionals attempt to describe and record them. The Czech language in particular experienced a period of increasingly frequent change in its vocabulary following the change of the political regime and the consequent transformation of society since 1989. Some linguists have commented on the way new expressions have been coined using language-internal sources, for instance *vytunelovat* ‘to strip of assets’. Others have observed that that words have been automatically adopted from foreign languages, mainly English, such as *management*.<sup>3</sup> A number of publications have appeared in the Czech Republic that directly or indirectly testify to the scope of change in the Czech lexicon. One of them is a dictionary of neologisms Nová slova v češtině ‘New Words in Czech’, volumes I and II, compiled by a team of linguists from the Institute for the Czech Language. The linguists from the Institute have also issued two valuable publications. The first book Čeština, jak ji znáte a neznáte ‘Czech, as You Know and Don’t Know It’ is based on a series of radio talks broadcast between 1993 and 1996 in which the experienced authors from the

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<sup>3</sup> For more details about these processes and linguists who observe them see for example František Daneš et al, Český jazyk na přelomu tisíciletí (Prague: Academia, 1997) or Světlá Čmejrková et al, Čeština, jak ji znáte i neznáte (Prague: Academia, 1996).

Institute informed listeners about recent developments and interesting pieces of information concerning the Czech language and languages generally. Therefore the book is structured as a collection of essays on language and its speakers. The second publication Český jazyk na přelomu tisíciletí 'Czech Language at the Turn of the Century' provides an outline of the complex situation in the Czech language at the turn of the century. Contributions to the book utilising the methodology of the Prague Linguistic School are meant as probes into the most characteristic and sensitive areas of contemporary communication. These publications provide an indispensable insight in contemporary Czech in general; however, they do not offer an in-depth analysis of the individual processes of language change.

## 1.2. Aim of the Work

The post-communist development in the Czech Republic since 1989 has been characterised by sociologists as a shift from a totalitarian and non-market system to liberal democratic capitalism.<sup>4</sup> The area of language where the impact of such changes will be most obvious is in vocabulary. Therefore I plan to investigate how extra-linguistic factors and language-contact factors work together with language internal processes of change in the language of a society affected by such a process. I will demonstrate some of the specific ways in which lexical change has been affected by relatively sudden changes in the political and social landscape. Czech philosopher Václav Bělohradský states that for some regimes, the relationship between a word and its meaning is the same as between a disease and a bacillus -- the word enters our mind and infects it with its meaning. He believes that certain words, such as *socialism* or *democracy* meant nothing for his generation because all other words that could have been used to explain their meaning were either prosecuted or banned.<sup>5</sup> His statement implies that lexical units have a significance in particular political contexts that transcend their dictionary definitions, and

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<sup>4</sup> Pavel Machonin, Milan Tuček, et al., Česká společnost v transformaci, K proměně sociální struktury (Prague: Sociologické nakladatelství, 1996) 333.

<sup>5</sup> Václav Bělohradský, "Je u nás dost svobody? O slovech a státech," Právo 29 – 30 Dec. 2001: 1, 11.



these significances can be accessed only by considering these contexts in some detail and depth. It also raises a point whether the awareness of certain meanings can be shaped by regimes and ideologies. My interpretation of his statement is that an ideology forms<sup>6</sup> the way we think; it influences the way we understand the world, it affects our ability and our opportunity to define and denote it. As a consequence, ideology can affect language since language reflects actual life experience. This also implies that some regimes prescribe certain public uses and definitions of words and exclude others. Consequently, when a regime changes, understanding of the world changes and the tools for denoting it change. This may explain why certain regimes promote or ban certain words to “infect”, as Bělohradský writes, minds of language users and disseminate mandatory lexical units and their meanings.

I have referred to the opinion that the Czech Republic has, since 1989, developed from a totalitarian and non-market system to liberal democratic capitalism. If, due to the prevailing communist ideology in Czechoslovakia before 1989, Czech was a language of the communists, then I expect that it has experienced a shift to the language of post-communist or non-communist society. The new ideology will affect the way everyday reality is conceptualised and the way this is manifested in the language and I will look for evidence of such transition in my work. Skalička comments that language is a social phenomenon and everything that happens within a society is reflected within its language in one way or another. Although being an independent entity, a language is constantly fed by impulses from the everyday life of a society (85). This suggests that one can reveal some of the processes of language change through learning of the changes in a culture and society. I plan to use such an approach and investigate some instances of lexical change within the context of socio-political changes in three cases studies in chapters 4 to 6. I will test the following hypothesis:

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<sup>6</sup> I wish to define ideology as a set of beliefs, values and goals of a social or political group that explain or justify the group's decisions and behaviour and prescribes the role of government: [www.multied.com](http://www.multied.com), [www.socialpolicy.ca/i.htm](http://www.socialpolicy.ca/i.htm)

### **1.2.1. Hypothesis**

The Czech lexicon has changed from the lexicon of a communist society to that of a post-communist society. Evidence of such lexical changes should be detectable almost instantly and it will be reflected in the imagery underlying the lexicon since metaphors are generally believed to play a central role in the construction of the reality. There should be significant evidence of both a lexical and a semantic change and it should be observable over the selected time. The processes causing language change should become more apparent if we examine them against parallel changes in culture and society.

To validate the hypothesis I have chosen three topics which have the potential to demonstrate the above mentioned connection between change in society, its culture and lexical and semantic expansions of the lexicon. The case studies follow a word, phrase or a group of thematically related words which have either experienced a certain degree of change or are perceived by native speakers as problematic in their development from 1980 up to the present. I decided to establish two approximate timescales within which the lexical units are followed: 1980 – 1989, and 1989 to the present. This provides a time span of nine years before the revolution and almost fifteen years after. The timescale for individual items may differ according to the year when they first appeared or started showing signs of change. The researched phrase or lexical units are presented in the socio-political and cultural context that initiated or contributed to their development and change.

### **1.3. Structure of the Study**

The purpose of chapters 2 and 3 is to review the work of various scholars in related areas of linguistics and to gain a deeper understanding of the observed processes of evolution and change within the Czech lexicon. The titles are selected not only to provide an explanation of how the change in regime was reflected in the lexicon but also and how it was projected into changes in the media environment in the Czech Republic. The literature selected in the chapters supports the arguments concerning individual examples of lexical and

semantic change together with changes underlying the lexicon. This is complemented with background information which documents how Czech mass media was run before November 1989 and what impact the revolution had on their day-to-day operation.

As already stated, I present my research in the form of three case studies. Although critics of case studies point to the fact that this approach might lead to generalisation as the facts are difficult to be cross-checked, the nature of the subject and the scope of the research that produces a series of case studies that are linked together and presented on a wider socio-political background does not carry along a high risk of distortion. The case study method is particularly suitable for my research as it allows me to focus on specific instances and various interacting processes that would otherwise be left aside. It also enables me to concentrate on detailed aspects of the problem tailoring the application of different research methods according to varying phenomena.

Titles of case studies *Back to Europe!*, *Česko* and *Mass Culture through the Language of the Media* may appear to be rather diverse at first sight but they are closely linked. The reasons for selecting these particular areas are that such expressions and phrases would appeal to and would concern all adult members of a language community, irrespective of their age, gender, political opinion or profession. Also, these issues used to be frequently represented in media discourse because after the revolutionary events of November 1989 people naturally asked questions about the most mundane and down to earth aspects of their lives. They contemplated how their everyday lives, their status, material living conditions, the national identity, culture and language would be affected. They considered where they would belong from now on, whether instead of a Russian influence there would be an American – or maybe too much of it. The three topics I selected reflect these themes and clearly show in what manner the process of transition was reflected in everyday life.

The topics of chapters 4 and 5 *Back to Europe!* and *Česko* most reflect the themes of national pride and identity and their impact on the lexicon. Chapter 4 *Back to Europe!* reflects the transition of the image of Europe as the Czech

Republic was coached for accession into the European Union. Compared to numerous English, German, and French linguists who have researched the changes of metaphoric images of Europe in connection with the European Union, limited attention has been paid to this subject in Czech linguistics so far. Further, the need to return to Europe was one of the most frequently discussed topics after the change of regime in 1989. I wish to extend the so far published findings from the western European discourse by evidence from Czech media discourse. I follow how perception of the phrase changed and how the meaning of Europe expanded between 1990 and 2004. The case study contains the largest volume of data out of the three case studies and therefore I divided it into two sections: I. between approximately 1980 and November 1989 and II. between December 1989 and the accession to the EU.

The part of my hypothesis applicable to the cases study is that prior to the revolution in 1989 the European imagery was very limited and subject only to restricted innovation mainly due to the seclusion of the country within the Soviet bloc. I intend to confirm that the continent was partitioned which affected all areas of life in the Czech Republic (formerly Czechoslovakia) and to do so I examine the Czech newspaper discourse in terms of thematically organised groups: the political scene, culture, sports, business matters and imagery of Europe as a PERSON, a BATTLEFIELD and a BUILDING SITE. I presume that the semantic and cognitive development of *Europe* has fundamentally changed since the Velvet Revolution. As the speakers' experience has changed and opened towards Western trends, the imagery has gradually become richer. Another mighty factor affecting the imagery and its demonstration in the lexicon has been the political pressure towards joining the European Union. I believe that this has boost emergence of European metaphors related to the accession process. The influence of Western political discourse is likely to be so strong to affect both the imagery of Europe and the definition of Europe, which will be reflected in the lexicon. Since cultural and social links between conceptualisation and reality are considered to be powerful agents in metaphor creation, I compare to what extent the metaphoric images of Europe used in the Czech media correspond to western discourse. For the purpose of clarity I maintain similar division into sections of political issues and business matters, culture and sports also in part II of the case study.

In chapter 5 I focus on another relevant item for an observation within a language community – the discussion among its members about the changing name of their country. The selection process of a “correct” name for the country was of interest to many Czechs in 1993. The split of former Czechoslovakia revived examination of the evolution of the one-word geographical name *Česko* and sparked heated discussions about the suitability of the toponym, as had occurred several times before in the history of the Czechoslovak state. Before I embark on an overview of the current situation concerning the unofficial one-word name of the country, I re-visit the history of discussions about the appropriateness of the name *Česko*. I approach the linguistic investigation in the chapter from the standpoint of linguistic purism and language planning. Language purism is directed primarily at lexicon and is closely connected to codification, language cultivation and normative work. The efforts of language prescriptivism have a long history in the Czech language despite the Prague School’s efforts to stress that the main measure of correctness should be functional adequacy. There are several tasks I follow in the case study. In the first place, I aim to verify some of the definitions of language planning as an attempt to influence language behaviour. In the second place, I examine the input of official bodies into the process of language planning and cultivation. The official input is complemented by observation of the informal purist input in the process, i.e. alternative proposals offered by lay Czech speakers and the rationale behind the word formation. Finally, I map whether and how Czech speakers are gradually accepting the officially selected one-word name of the country. I explain the processes of word formation and the meaning of the newly proposed forms. Although in this instance mostly lexical change plays a role, I wish to show that the evolution of *Česko* has not been spared semantic change either.

Chapter 6 contains the third case study *Mass Culture through the Language of the Media*. This study looks at some changes in the lexicon which have emerged in the language of the media when denoting certain aspects of mass media entertainment. I ascribe the changes mapped in the third case study in chapter 6 to two major causes, which are the change of the regime and

ideology and the changes in the ownership of the media. Such transitions inevitably lead to lexical innovation, which, in my opinion, was jointly caused by the intention to show the new focus of the medium and to follow fashionable trends coming mostly from the west. Due to the nature of visual mass entertainment, specifically series and soap operas, I expect that the Czech lexicon will be expanding through both lexical innovation – mainly borrowings and calques – and semantic change of previously existing expressions. I also presume that the main role in the second process will be played by extension of the meaning, pejoration and melioration. I examine whether the newly arriving words bear positive undertones because they are not connected to the previous regime and whether they are seen as markers of a new, fresh, free and better way of life. Further, I study whether the new arrivals into Czech lexicon altered their meaning and whether they are clearly understood and correctly used by Czech speakers. I believe that many of the lexical changes were introduced consciously to demonstrate the new face of the medium and they were brought in by official sources operating the media. Still, language users also initiated numerous instances of lexical innovation. Therefore, unlike in the first and second case studies where I searched for evidence in national printed media, I extended my search for data to unofficial sources such as chat room discussions.

I will consolidate evidence of lexical and semantic change from individual case studies in chapter 7 – Conclusions. In addition, I am going to describe whether and how extra-linguistic factors and language-contact factors worked together with language internal processes of change in the Czech language over the selected timescale.

#### **1.4. System of the Search for Data and Texts**

Although we cannot put an ‘equals’ sign between the language used in the media and the language used in everyday conversation, the language of the media was chosen for its power and potential. The media language represents a register applicable nationwide. The topics covered by the media are subjects of everyday conversation and are of interest to varied social groups throughout

the society. The media often serve as a mouthpiece for ideologies proclaimed by interest groups or a totalitarian government, as well as for the espousal of commonly accepted truths. The language of the media corresponds with the cultural level of the nation and the political situation -- both of which can provide incentives for initiation or suppression of public debates. The media inform their readers and listeners, influence public opinion and present people's opinions to the nation using the nation's language, thereby reflecting and influencing the state of the language. The media combine standard language with colloquial speech; new expressions and new words do not usually originate in the media, but are disseminated by them.

I selected three national newspapers: Právo, before 1989 known as Rudé právo, Dnes, before 1989 known as Mladá fronta and since then it changed its title to MF Dnes and then eventually to Dnes, Lidové noviny and three general interest magazines, Mladý svět, Story and Vlasta. These were selected because of their popularity amongst Czech readers, their publication continuity from before 1989, and finally because the newspapers do not solely support one particular political party or a specific political movement. There is one magazine in the selection that does not meet the criterion of publication continuity from before 1989. It is Story, which was established in 1984 and can be characterised as a witty society magazine aimed at an educated middle class reader.

The newspapers, including their Saturday magazines, were checked on a monthly basis. Issues were checked usually in the first week of the months. I searched the whole issue of the newspaper for suitable material. This was complemented with a purposeful search for material related to specific events. The three selected magazines are published weekly. I checked at least one issue of each magazine per month. The material found in this way was complemented by articles from various other newspapers and magazines which were found separately.

In the search for evidence in the printed media I have also utilised the Czech National Corpus, fulltext archives of Newton IT and various search engines. I searched both SYN2000 and PUBLIC corpora within the Czech National

Corpus. PUBLIC contains 20 million text words and SYN2000 100 million text words from between 1990 and 1999, 60% of which are from media texts. The size of the corpus gradually grew between 1990 and 1999. In 1993 there were just over 4 million text words compared to 1999 with approx. 11 million text words.

Newton IT searches for information from Czech media, collects and stores it in electronic form. The media monitoring service is operated by a private company, the biggest of its kind in the Czech Republic. The service was established in 1995 and the electronic archive of both printed media articles and transcripts of news programmes both broadcasted on radio and TV was launched in 1996.

The materials described above are further complemented by articles footnoted in studies and other publications such as:

- Language and linguistic periodicals, for instance: Naše řeč, Slovo a slovesnost, Čeština doma a ve světě, Český jazyk a literatura, Acta Bohemica, Journal of Linguistics, The Slavonic and East European Review.
- Economic, geographic and sociological publications, e.g. Ekonom, Geografické rozhledy.
- Short studies and articles from language columns and features in newspapers and magazines, together with books by authors in the areas of Slavonic language culture, lexicology, semantics, linguistics, etc. and other relevant disciplines of both Czech and foreign origin. These are listed in detail in the Notes and Bibliography section.



## **2. Literature Review and Methodology**

There are several reasons why I start my literature review with the Prague School of Linguistics and its contribution to functional linguistics. The school encouraged such a view of a language that describes it as a tool of communication (Vachek 14). The influence of the Prague School is reflected in my perception of a language as a social phenomenon and the most advanced instrument of human communication and also in the methodology of synchronic investigation, applied within the thesis. My study of lexical innovation is directly in relation to the school's claims that the efficiency of language is most apparent in the lexis and the choice of a particular lexicon can signal an unusual approach to an extra lingual reality. I build my investigation of language change on the present-day language of the media. This constitutes yet another reason why I should refer to the Prague School since the school promoted the living force of a language and the usage of modern standard Czech as recorded for example in the style of newspapers and periodicals and educated spoken standard Czech (Čmejrková 234 - 243).

### **2.1. The Prague Language Circle and Functional Linguistics**

The majority of Czech linguists and students of linguistics have been influenced by the analysis of language advocated by the Prague School -- the functional analysis of language. I therefore wish to inform the reader about the fundamental principles of the functional approach:

The linguists of the Prague Language Circle, known internationally as the Prague School of Linguistics, first met on 6 October 1926 with the intention to react to the Neogrammarian theory which prevailed in the linguistics of the 1920s and 30s. The group is referred to as a "branch of European structuralism" (Bussmann 375) and their approach to the study of language is described as functionalism. Apart from functional linguistics, the work of the school is connected mostly with the concept of the phoneme -- the phoneme

theory, defence of synchronic analysis of a language, strengthening foundations of contrastive linguistics that uses analytical confrontation of data obtained from both related and unrelated languages, and elaborating principles of foreign language teaching. In 1935 the Prague group launched its periodical Slovo a slovesnost “Language and Literature” which is published to this date. The Prague Linguistic Circle formally ceased to exist in 1950 but since the political changes in 1989 the PLC has been gradually reinstated.

The best known members of the group are V. Mathesius, B. Trnka, B. Havránek, J. Mukařovský, J. Vachek, N. Trubetskoy, R. Jakobson, F. and Trávníček.. The school defends three major arguments in which the functional analysis of a language promoted by the Prague School differs from previous approaches. These are:

1. promotion of the synchronic approach to the language,
2. stress on the systemic character of language,
3. emphasis on the functions performed by language in the given language community.

Although the Prague School group does not disregard historical research, it also stresses the importance of a synchronic study which prior to Mathesius was defended only by isolated linguists. The School holds a view that this can provide comprehensive material for research and that synchronic study is more controllable than diachronic (Vachek 11 – 13). While synchronic research in language is associated with the name of Vilém Mathesius, the credit for the work on the systemic and structural concept of language is ascribed mainly to Roman Jakobson. Jakobson states that no element of any language system can be properly evaluated in isolation and its correct analysis can be performed only in relation to all other elements co-existing in the same language system. He also points out that the evolution of language can only be properly interpreted if it is conceived as an evolution of the systemic whole within which relations of elements are often reshaped and/or replaced to maintain or restore the balance of the given language system (Vachek 13).

This third point, emphasis on the functions performed by language in the given language community, is probably regarded as the most important contribution of the Prague School to linguistics (Vachek 14). This approach considers language to be “a tool” performing many important tasks in the community of speakers. The most important and the most obvious task is communication, which is essential for understanding amongst the members of the language community. If a language is to function adequately, it has to perform its tasks adequately - - which means that the language needs to be able to communicate the new reality fluently. This role of language is most visible on the level of lexis which is continuously updated to correspond to the ever-changing reality. Vachek shows that there are certain elements in the language system, such as archaisms and poetisms, which may serve more specific purposes than just helping everyday communication. The elements may also signal speaker’s unusual approach to the extra lingual reality and thanks to them we can establish if the speaker restricts a statement to a simple factual announcement or points out inner connections of the facts in the extra-lingual reality. (Vachek 14).

The Prague School had a decisive influence on the development of linguistics towards functionalism which defines language as:

a functional means of communication whose structural sign system can be described through observation of concrete linguistic material in particular moment of use. [. . . ] The starting point of analysis is the intention of the speaker expressed through linguistic **utterances**; the analysis, then, begins with the function of the utterances in order to describe its ‘form’. (Bussman 374 – 375)

Standard language has always been central to the Prague School linguists. Since my research concentrates on modern standard Czech as recorded in newspapers and periodicals, I wish to clarify the description of a standard language and following that also how the school defined standard Czech and colloquial Czech, style and norm:

The Prague School has always promoted the use of modern Czech and has paid considerable attention to the analysis of standard language that many linguistic currents overlook. At the same time, I would also like to state that a focus on standard language at the expense of non-standard language varieties has been equally criticised by numerous linguistic schools. The Prague School analyses standard languages as open and dynamic systems, which comply with the condition of ‘elastic stability’ (Vachek 18). In this requirement, the attribute *elastic* refers to the dynamic nature of the language system and *stability* to the systemic character of the standard language. The standard language for a language community represents a stable norm which guarantees mutual understanding within the language community and “also the existence of identical literary and aesthetic values” (Vachek 18). The aspects of standardisation, language norms, and language system stability make a link to issues about correctness and prescriptivism. The schools addresses these concerns by stressing the criteria of functional adequacy upon which correctness should be decided. Vachek defines the view of school by stating that: “If a word or a phrase is functionally needed in the language and if it has managed to take firm root in the practice of language users, it has demonstrated its functional adequacy and must be evaluated as a ‘correct’ element of the given language” (21). In my opinion the use of “must” in this pre 1972 statement makes Vachek’s assertion very prescriptive. Since then linguistics has moved towards a more descriptive role. Still, the Prague School proposal makes a major step from the pre-functionalist historically prejudiced standardisation of a language of the 1930s, which assessed the correctness of lexical or phraseological elements according to their lengthy presence in a language, to a functionally driven one (Vachek 21).

Before I address the definitions of standard, common and colloquial Czech, I wish to specify that I do not examine the process of language change generally and I do not limit my investigation to standard Czech. My investigation concentrates at the language change at the level when lexical units enter the national media. I examine the contemporary language the national media use as a standard: modern language which does not focus at a specific gender, social or

professional group and is not likely to favour dialects. I take the notion of functional adequacy as a basis for my investigation and determine the functional adequacy of a word or a phrase through the context in which it appears in everyday printed media discourse.

The distinction between standard language and colloquial language, slang and dialects continues to play an important role even in contemporary Czech linguistics. Therefore, I offer an explanation of the terms *spisovná čeština* ‘standard Czech’, *obecná čeština* ‘common Czech’ and *běžná mluva* or *hovorová čeština* ‘colloquial Czech’ since they are also significant for definition of the scope of my research. In place of *standard Czech* the term *literary Czech* is sometimes used. To secure consistency of terminology I adhere to the term *standard Czech*.

### 2.1.1. Standard Czech, Colloquial and Common Czech

Česká mluvnice, “The Czech Grammar” by Havránek and Jedlička published in 1981 is still considered to be one of the best authoritative guides to the Czech language . The definition of standard Czech from Česká mluvnice illustrates the strong influence of the Prague School on current Czech linguistics:

Spisovná čeština je nejdůležitější a nejdokonalejší podoba národního jazyka českého a slouží dnes společnému dorozumívání všech příslušníků našeho národa ve všech oblastech veřejné lidské činnosti; má úkol celonárodní. [. . . ] Spisovný jazyk je útvar jednotný, s ustálenou mluvnickou stavbou a se společnou, rovněž ustálenou, ale stále rostoucí slovní zásobou.

Standard Czech is the most important and the most perfect form of the Czech national language and acts as a tool of communication for all members of our nation in all areas of human activity; its task is to serve the whole nation. [. . . ] Standard language is a system with a stabilised

grammatical structure and a common, also stabilised, but constantly expanding vocabulary. (4-7)

The representative form of Czech, the standard language, is used rarely in private or unofficial conversation. Krčmová explains that the reason behind this is that standard Czech was re-established in the 19th century as a language of official written communication and used mostly by Czech intellectuals. On the other hand, in private conversation either local dialects or German was used. The spoken form of standard Czech was developing only gradually, primarily for official and purposefully cultivated conversation (Krčmová 162). While the most representative variety of the national language, standard Czech, is valid across the whole area of the country and is capable of expressing some of the most complex ideas in an official forum, it may lack some devices necessary for less formal discussions. Therefore *hovorová čeština* or *bežná mluva* ‘colloquial Czech’ which is often referred to as “the colloquial style of standard Czech”<sup>7</sup> is used in not-so-official situations. Colloquial Czech is a spoken form of standard Czech. Sochorek characterises colloquial Czech as “standard language with certain simplified features used for general conversation”<sup>8</sup>.

The variety of the Czech language used in private conversation mostly in the territory of Bohemia is *obecná čeština* ‘common Czech’. A Moravian interdialect may be used in its place in Moravia. Also a professional dialect or a slang may be spoken in private conversation.<sup>9</sup> Krčmová observes that the position of common Czech has been recently changing from a rather stabilised substandard variety of the national language into the variety of public spoken communication which is used in areas where solely standard language was used previously (Krčmová 166). She offers a more complex definition of common Czech as a spontaneously spoken form of Czech language created:

1. through levelling of Czech dialects,
2. as language of semi-official communication,

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<sup>7</sup> Čeština po síti at [www.osu.cz](http://www.osu.cz)

<sup>8</sup> [www.sochorek.cz](http://www.sochorek.cz)

<sup>9</sup> Čeština po síti at [www.osu.cz](http://www.osu.cz)

3. or possibly its literary stylisation.<sup>10</sup>

There are three more terms that need to be explained together with the definition of a standard language, its stability and correctness – they are the *style* and the *norm* and its *codification*. A standard language system has a rich repertoire of grammatical and lexical devices which allow the language to accomplish various tasks. Such a selection of means of communication, both grammatical and lexical, which are stabilised in a particular area of communication is called a *style* (Havránek – Jedlička 8). The *norm* and its *codification* are defined by Havránek and Jedlička as:

The set of stabilised, i.e. regularly used grammatical and lexical elements and patterns (rules and natural relations), the use of which is called the language norm; the norm does not define the stabilised elements, it does not exist outside a language but inside it. Its codification, written in authoritative textbooks that tends to encapsulate the norms so as to instruct people about it, has to be distinguished from a norm itself [. . .]. (7)

The description of a norm respects the Prague School's postulate of elastic stability in a standard language. As I have stated above, the standard language is viewed as a dynamic and open system where the unity and stability of standard language elements and its norm still allow the language to be flexible and versatile (Havránek and Jedlička 7 -8).

I am inserting the next section to follow up the Prague School's appeal for the criterion of functional adequacy at the expense of prescriptive trends within standard languages. I will look at the chances the functional adequacy views stand, when users encounter an unfamiliar neologism, against the conservative views of correctness and appropriateness, which are mostly shaped by habits and prejudice. I will observe how the two conflicting positions were defended

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<sup>10</sup> [www.muni.cz](http://www.muni.cz)

and implemented in practice by laymen language users, specialists, and official representatives of the country together with the reaction of the media at the time when the new one-word name of the country was discussed.

## **2.2. Linguistic Purism and Language Planning**

### **2.2.1. Linguistic Purism**

My second case study observes the development of the geographical name *Česko* and demonstrates how the principles of linguistic purism and language planning - - corpus planning in particular - - are implemented in practice. Due to the nature of the lexical item, which is a name of their country, it has been a subject to extensive discussion and approval processes over several generations of Czech speakers. What purism and planning have in common are the efforts towards language cultivation, normative work and codification that have always been an essential part of Czech linguistics and Czech culture.

Linguistic purism is associated with the aversion to foreign-language elements present mainly in the lexicon. Thomas' definitions of purism states that:

Purism is the manifestation of desire on the part of a speech community (or some section of it) to preserve a language from, or rid it of, putative foreign elements or other elements held to be undesirable (including those originating in dialects, sociolects and styles of the same language). It may be directed at all linguistic levels but primarily the lexicon. Above all, purism is an aspect of the codification, cultivation and planning of standard languages. (12)

In the Czech language and culture there is a tradition of language prescriptivism which started more than three centuries ago with efforts towards *brusičství* "knife-grinding, language preservation and cultivation. In reference to the knife-grinding activities Thomas aptly observes a connection between the Czech functionalist school that defines language as a tool of communication and the grinding activity that sharpens its language tools (22).



Although I referred to the Prague School Linguists in the previous section, I need to go back to their view that various elements in language should be judged on the merits of their function and not on their foreign origin. The reason being that despite advocating such a position, the Prague School linguists still believe that a language should be cultivated. However, language cultivation, which the Prague school considers to be an essential component of general linguistics (6), bears for many traits of linguistic purism.

Thomas cites Ševčík's definition of purism in which the idea of regulated work towards language codification and cultivation to accomplish an ideal model of language sticks out: "[Purism is] an assemblage of views regulating the codification of literary language in accordance with an ideal model of a 'pure' language by the elimination of elements, which are at variance with this model." (Thomas 12)

In their work from the 1930s, the Prague functionalists dismissed understanding purism as a solely destructive force in language and made steps towards constituting purism as an integral part of linguistic research methods. On the other hand, their view of purism showed some shortcomings; they only took institutionalised and prescriptive activity into account, hence the ideal model of pure language which is expressed by Ševčík. I would question whether an ideal model of language could ever be achieved because of the dynamic nature of language and I would also ask who would have the capacity to define such a model. Further, I would like to add that Ševčík's definition does not take into account informal purism which comes from laymen linguists. While functionalists look at what is effective and useful in the language, purists are mainly interested in the aesthetic aspect. This explains why, apart from the general public, many poets and writers were also involved in the discussion concerning *Česko*.

Thomas' definition, which was quoted earlier in this section, is very elastic and amalgamates many aspects of purist activity as advocated by informal forces and by different linguistic schools, including the Prague Functionalists. It also

clearly describes purism as one aspect of language planning. In my view the process behind the creation of the toponym *Česko* and also some expressions in the Media case study shows typical signs of corpus planning which concerns the creation of new forms, modification of older forms and selection from alternatives in a written or a spoken code (Cooper 31).

### 2.2.2. Language Planning

Robert L. Cooper considers language planning to be “deliberate efforts to influence the behaviour of others with respect to the acquisition, structure, or functional allocation of their language codes.” (45) If I wish to apply the definition to the development within the Czech language, I find the definition rather brief since it does not specify:

1. who is behind the deliberate efforts
2. in what ways and through what means and
3. to what extent behaviours of others can be influenced.

Therefore, to make it more acceptable to the Czech language, particularly the language planning process affecting toponym *Česko*, I add some aspects of language planning expressed by various linguists between 1969 and 1986 and summarized by Cooper (30 – 31). According to them, language planning is, or includes:

1. normative work of language academies and committees, all forms of what is commonly known as language cultivation and all proposals for language reform and standardization,
2. deliberate language change; that is, changes in the systems of language code or speaking or both that are planned by organizations that are established for such purposes or given a mandate to fulfil such purpose,
3. coordinated measures taken to select, codify and in some cases, to elaborate orthographic, grammatical, lexical, or semantic features of a language and to disseminate the corpus agreed upon,

4. a government-authorised, long-term, sustained and conscious effort to alter a language itself or to change a language's functions in a society for the purpose of solving communication problems,
5. systematic, theory-based, rational, and organized societal attention to language problems.

Cooper finds various limitations in the above statements:

1. He believes that it is restrictive to define language planning as an activity undertaken by governments, government-authorised agencies, or other authoritative bodies, i.e. organisations with a public mandate for language regulation because in this case activity of such individuals as Dobrovský could not be classified as language planning (31).
2. Further, Cooper claims that it is misleading to define language planning as a process conducted in order to find a problem for a communication or language problem and prefers to describe it as “efforts to influence language behaviour” (35).
3. He also states that it is a mistake to define language planning only in connection with “aggregates [at a national or societal level] if *nation* or *society* is understood as synonymous with *nation-state*.” (35) This would exclude activities of an international scope, activities conducted by small politically non-autonomous groups, small ethnic, occupational or religious groups etc (35-36).

In response to Cooper I would argue that the process of language planning necessitates organised activity on a wider scale. Change in language behaviour is not likely to be achieved by an unsupported single individual. This can even be applied to cases such as Josef Dobrovský (1753 –1829) who belongs to the first generation of Czech revivalists and his involvement in rescuing the Czech language is irrefutable. He was sceptical of the possibility that the Czech language could regain the position of the language of literature and science that had been lost to German. He therefore concentrated on the Czech language as a language spoken by the general public and managed to stop the current purist

attempts and worked towards stabilising the unbalanced language norm. Dobrovský can be described as one of the first functional linguists since he examined language and its history as a tool of everyday communication (Hrabák, Jeřábek, Tichá, 147–151). Further, it should be noted that Dobrovský was active in the Czech Royal Society of Sciences, *Královská česká společnost nauk*<sup>11</sup>. The society was established in 1774 and was a predecessor of the current Czech Academy of Sciences, *Česká akademie věd*<sup>12</sup>. Dobrovský introduced his programme for the development of Czech Culture via the Society. His research was funded by Emperor Leopold II and therefore his ideas of Czech language revival were elaborated in a government-authorized agency although his work was not necessarily authoritative. Consequently, I would claim that single individuals are behind the ideas in the language planning process but if their work is to achieve the desired outcome and is to influence language behaviour, it needs assistance of a wider network of organisations or information channels, although not necessarily a assistance of government. Further, the deliberate effort mentioned by Cooper is usually triggered by an impulse. Such an impulse is identified in points 4 and 5 as a communication or language problem. Despite disagreeing with Cooper on two points, I share his opinion that the concept of language planning should not be restricted to one precisely defined area of a “nation-state”. This view can be confirmed in practice by numerous language planning processes affecting entire political and cultural regions.

If we consider language planning outside one precisely defined area of nation or state, then Cooper’s intention to describe language planning as a wide range of activities is not likely to be opposed. Although I acknowledge that language planning can comprise various activities, the description of language planning in Czech conditions may be for many incomplete. The Czech linguistic tradition prefers a more clearly defined framework. It is similar to that quoted by the linguists in the above points 1 to 5 and favours normative work and

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<sup>11</sup> Radko Šťastný: *Čeští spisovatelé deseti století*, SPN, Praha 1974, 47.

<sup>12</sup> Josef Hrabák, Dušan Jeřábek, Zdeňka Tichá, *Průvodce po dějinách české literatury*, Panorama, Praha, 1984, 147 – 148.

coordinated effort towards standardisation and codification which is carried by language academies. These definitions, together with Cooper's, make a good starting point for the investigation of *Česko* and I will re-visit them in the conclusions of the case study.

### **2.3. Language Change -- Definition, Typology and Causation**

When following the changes in Czech lexicon after the changes in society connected with the Velvet Revolution, I look at two aspects of the change: the types of changes affecting lexical or phraseological units and the ontogeny of the change. The following chapter contains an overview of the typology and causation of language change. In the first section of the chapter I look at various types of lexical change which will help me determine what types of language change the investigated units have undergone. This is followed by an investigation of Labov's mechanism of language change where I attempt to apply Labov's findings on the initiation of sound change to the ontogeny of lexical change.

Ferdinand de Saussure once stated that "Time changes all things: there is no reason why language should escape the universal law" (Aitchison 4). In the past many linguists attempted to map the laws of language change and came to the conclusion that language change was unobservable. Since the 1970s this situation has started to change. Whilst many linguists ignored geographical, social and stylistic language variations, others recognised them as indications of changes that were occurring -- in other words change across a language community could be glimpsed in part through examining variety within the community. Consequently, linguists have become more optimistic about mapping language change and they have realised that the process is observable if we know where to look for clues.

### 2.3.1. Definition of Language Change

The term *language change* was first proposed by Meillet in 1920 and since then there have been several definitions of the term. Not all of them are acceptable to everyone. Depending on the complexity of the definition, various linguists would find various nebulous points in them. Therefore, at this stage I opt for the broad definition provided by Matthews who states that language change is: “Any change that takes place, for whatever reason or at whatever level, in the history of language” (51).


### 2.3.2. Typology of Language Change

The typology of language change is not straightforward either. For instance Forston finds usual typologies of language change problematic due to the fact that not all types of change can be classified according to conventional typological categories and some types of change have not yet been described (650). Linguists are not united in their opinions concerning language change, and particularly concerning its effect on a lexicon. Some subsume under lexical change any change that affects a lexicon, i.e. phonological, morphological, semantic, as well as borrowing, etc., while others keep lexical and semantic change apart (652). Therefore some concentrate on these two processes as separate entities while others see them as part of the same process.

I treat lexical and semantic change as two closely connected constituents of the same process -- the change in the lexicon. For clarity of argument, I prefer to offer separate typologies, which also clearly shows their differences in definitions proposed by various linguists.

#### 2.3.2.1. Lexical Change

Hauser, who is the author of some of the most authoritative publications on Czech lexicology, offers the following typology of change in the lexicon valid for the contemporary Czech language (Hauser 97):

**Tab. 1: Hauser's Typology of Changes in Czech Lexicon**

A) Processes that expand the inventory of Czech lexicon:	B) Processes that do not expand the inventory of the Czech lexicon:
<p><b>1. Derivation,</b>  <b>Compounding and</b>  <b>Reduction of a longer phrase</b>  <b>or a name into an initialism</b>  <b>or an acronym</b></p> <p><b>2. Adopting lexical units from</b>  <b>other layers of the nation's</b>  <b>language and from slang</b></p> <p><b>3. Borrowing</b></p>	<p><b>1. Semantic change</b></p> <p><b>2. Formation of phraseological</b>  <b>or compound lexemes</b></p>

Trask defines his typology of the ways in which new words are acquired as evolving from the simplest and most obvious ways to those that are more complex:

**Tab. 2: Trask's Typology of Lexical Change**

<p><b>Borrowing:</b> Loan word</p> <p>↓</p>	<p>Calque/loan translation</p> <p>Combining forms</p>
<p>↓</p>	<p><b>Formation of new words:</b> Compounding</p> <p>Derivation</p> <p>Conversion /zero derivation</p> <p>Clipping</p> <p>Blending/ nonce formation</p> <p>Back formation</p> <p>Reanalysis</p> <p>Folk etymology</p> <p>Reduction of a longer phrase or a name into an initialism or an acronym</p>

McMahon's typology is based on the typology by Guilbert who distinguished among four sources of new words in any language. These are semantic neologisms, borrowing, phonological and morphosyntactic neologisms (McMahon 190). McMahon therefore divides her typology into two groups. The first deals only with that part of language change, which is caused by the language's internal creativity, and it combines semantic and lexical change. The part of language change, which is due to external influences is treated separately and is categorised as a type of language contact. For the purpose of clarity I give McMahon's description of semantic neologisms in the section on semantic change below.



**Tab. 3: McMahon's Typology**

<b>Semantic neologisms</b>	See 5.III.2.3. Semantic change	
<b>Phonological neologisms</b>		Onomatopoeia Formations ex nihilo
<b>Morphosyntactic neologisms</b>	<b>Productive processes</b>  <b>Less productive processes</b>	Derivation Compounding  Conversion Back formation Clipping Blending Acronyms
<b>Language contact</b>	<b>Borrowing</b>  <b>Convergence</b>	Lexical borrowing Structural borrowing

This typology may not be clear at first sight and may seem to be a blend of processes, categories, and features. Although I treat lexical and semantic change as two closely connected constituents of the same process -- the change in the lexicon, I prefer the simpler typology provided by Trask and also by Hauser with clearer boundaries between the two types of the change.

### 2.3.2.2. Possible Application of Labov's Mechanism of Sound Change to Some Examples of Lexical Change

The need to examine social factors in the study of language change has been recognised since the Neogrammarians. Probably no other linguist has been more successful than Labov in explaining the mechanisms of sound change from a sociolinguistic perspective and I am going to investigate if any parts of the process described by him in Sociolinguistic Patterns (1985) could be applied to some instances of lexical change.

Labov is not the only linguist who has attempted to create a model of language change. There are many other models<sup>13</sup> - one of which I decided to explore more closely. This was a model by James Milroy who also looks into language change within the phonological system and uses sociolinguistic methodology. The two authors however focus on different processes behind language, or linguistic, change which is the term used by Milroy. Milroy observes i) how groups of speakers are susceptible to innovation and ii) how social ties between them carry innovation. Labov focuses on i) types of speakers who innovate and adopt change and also ii) how issues of social and regional stratification and prestige affect the process. Therefore I will use Labov's work in an attempt to show a mechanism of some cases of lexical innovation and Milroy's work to find explanation for the element of intention in such mechanism, which is missing in Labov's research.

Before I offer a more detailed description of the two models, it is necessary to establish the difference between speaker-innovation and patterned language change. Milroy states that it is a speaker who innovates and an innovation is therefore "an act of a speaker which is capable of influencing linguistic structure" while change is manifested in the system (Linguistic Variation 169).

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<sup>13</sup>Livingston's computational model refers to Nettle's (1999) and de Boer's (2000) models of language change in phonological system.

Kirby (1999) and Yang (2002) devised models based on competition between two grammars. The models do not look at the lexicon but considers only the word order of the utterances.

Consequently, innovation has potential to become a change but not all innovations become changes.

There are several reasons why I selected Labov's model for my investigation and, with some modifications, I applied to some instances of lexical change. The reasons are:

- absence of language change models, which would be driven by competition within a lexicon,
- methodology of clearly defined and easy to follow steps,
- stress on aspects of social stratification and prestige
- definition of the innovator.

Currently there is no model inspecting language change driven by innovation within the lexicon. For this reason I extended my search<sup>14</sup> for an available model of lexical change model to a possible connection between mechanisms of such change and Labov's model that could have been carried out previously. The only applicable reference to Labov was the topic of lexical diffusion -- sound change affecting the lexicon. Reference to previous research concerning a lexical change caused by social and political incentives in connection with Labov's work was not found. In my opinion his division into a sequence of clearly defined steps provides a user-friendly manual which is easy to follow if one wishes to test his methodology outside the phonological system. I am going to consider his model of change involving variation that speakers are or are not aware of as a rationale behind lexical change in two of my case studies, *Back to Europe* and *Mass Culture through the Language of the Media*. These case studies explore some of the instances where I presume the lexical change was introduced due to prestige a persuasion and by high rank innovators -- politicians, party officials and people with social contacts outside the language community -- to innovate lexicon intentionally. Labov distinguishes between prestige at a macro level and a micro level. Prestige at a macro level is often institutionalised and found in mainstream society. Prestige at a micro level is

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<sup>14</sup> CSA Illumina and Google

subjective and created in situations where individuals interact on a personal level and often concerns groups at the verge of society (Milroy, *Linguistic Variation* 172 – 173). Consequently, innovators are described as “outgoing and sociable people with many contacts inside and outside their local groups who belong to the upper-working and lower-middle class which tend to be socially mobile and therefore they are good carriers of linguistic innovation and change” (Milroy, *Linguistic Variation* 183). Labov’s definition of innovators corresponds to my perception of innovators and their role in instances of deliberately introduced lexical innovation and I will give my definition of those who are central in initiation of lexical innovation in my methodology, within the section on causation of language change.

I will use the model proposed by Labov in two ways. Firstly, I wish to establish whether any parts of the described mechanism can be applied to the mechanism of lexical change. Secondly, I hope the application of the modified model can help me explain the element of intention in lexical change

### **A) Application to the Mechanism of Lexical Change**

The central factors in Labov’s research are regional status and high versus not so high social status. With these in mind, Labov divided the process of sound change into two stages: “the change from below”, i.e. the change involving variation that speakers are not aware of, and “the change from above”, i.e. change involving variation that speakers are aware of.

The regional status does not appear to be equally relevant in my research which shows that belonging to a certain geographic area is not a primary prerequisite for lexical change. It is also my presumption that the factor of social status could be replaced by a factor of membership to a political network. This presumption is supported by Nagy who observes that if the core group of factors relevant to the speakers’ social identities, experience and position within their communities did not “account for all of the variance, other factors

such as ethnicity, level of education, and network membership may be added”.<sup>15</sup>

Labov divides the mechanism of sound change into 13 steps. Steps 1 – 8 explain the *change from below* and steps 9 – 13 as *change from above* (Labov 178 – 180). I propose that his description could be modified and might provide another insight into the process of lexical change. I selected two lexical items that bore significant relevance to the future of the Czech speech community to test Labov’s explanation. The chosen lexical items are *the Common European House* and *perestrojka*. Both were coined by Gorbachev in the 1980s and were soon adopted by political leaders, journalists, newsreaders and consequently the general public in various countries. This indicates that the argument of relatively small regional area, which is central in Labov’s work, cannot be successfully defended for some instances of lexical change.

I examined each individual step proposed by Labov for the mechanism of sound change. I rephrased his wording so that it complies with the possible mechanism of lexical change. I then commented upon certain features of the steps which I felt should be stressed to point to its applicability and validate the description.

In the following points I offer the altered wording. In addition, comments have been appended to add weight to my argument on the validity of the mechanism in relevant sections:

1. The lexical change usually originated with a restricted subgroup of the speech community at a time when the identity of this group had been affected by external or internal pressures or incentives. The linguistic form which began to shift was not necessarily a marker of regional status but often a marker of opinion/views with an irregular distribution within the community. At this stage, the form is an undefined linguistic variable.

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<sup>15</sup> Nagy, Naomi. “A Comparative Model of Contact-induced Language Change,” University of Pennsylvania Working Papers in Linguistics: A Selection of Papers from NWAEL 25 4.1.:399 – 418. Citation details were e-mailed by Prof. Nagy on 21 March 2007.

Comment: In the case of the two selected lexical items I presume that the lexical change originated in a restricted group of party officials. Their position was affected by external pressures, i.e. outside of the subgroup and also outside of the speech community, and internal pressures, i.e. inside the subgroup and also inside the speech community. The linguistic form that began to shift, or in this case that began to develop, was a marker of certain innovative views. The regional status does not play a significant role here.

2. The changes began as generalisations of the linguistic form to all members of the subgroup; Labov refers to this stage as *change from below*.

Comment: The newly coined expression was gradually accepted by all members of the subgroup.

The membership of a particular social group could be explained as the membership of the same professional group. Members of such group can be expected to come from a very similar social category (i.e. party officials). In this instance the change came from *above*

3. Succeeding generations of speakers involved in stages 1 and 2 within the same subgroup, responding to the same social pressures, carried the linguistic variable further along the process of change, beyond the model set by their predecessors. We may refer to this stage as *hypercorrection from below*. The variable is now defined as a function of group membership but not necessarily of age level.

Comment: I suggest that the expression succeeding generations be replaced by the expression followers. I do not think that it necessarily takes an entire generation to carry the linguistic variable further. I therefore suggest that it is the followers who carry the expression further along the process of change. For instance, they spread it to another language, they do not translate it correctly into this language (as may be the case the *Common European House*) or they link it to other attributes or adapt it to their needs. This process can be detected in the expression *náš společný dvojdomek* “our

common semi-detached house” used to describe one of the possibilities for the arrangement between the Czech and Slovak Republics when the former Czechoslovak state was about to be divided.

Labov refers to this stage as *hypercorrection from below* but this case could be described as *hypercorrection from above*.

4. To the extent that the values of the original subgroup were adopted by other groups in the speech community, the lexical change with its associated value of group membership spread to these adopting groups. The function of group membership is now redefined in successive stages.

Comment: The lexical change is spread to the adopting groups from politicians and party leaders to journalists, newsreaders and through to the general public.

5. The limits of the spread of the lexical change may, in some cases, be the limits of the speech community, defined as a group with a common set of normative values in regard to the language. There may also be cases where the lexical change will spread to a wider geographical area affecting several speech communities at the same time.

Comment: This presumption was confirmed by the spread of the *Common European House* expression that was translated from Russian to other Slavonic and non-Slavonic languages. The expression *perestrojka*, on the other hand was not always translated as “*přestavba*” but effectively spread into many speech communities.

6. As the lexical change with its associated values reached the limits of its expansion, the linguistic variable becomes one of the norms which defined the speech communities, and all members of the speech communities reacted in a uniform manner to its use (without necessarily being aware of it). The variable is now a *marker* and begins to show stylistic variation.

Comment: The lexical change was spread from politicians and party leaders to journalists, newsreaders and through to the general public. The expression was likely to be perceived initially as occurring in style of journalism and political propaganda.

7. The movement of the linguistic variable within the linguistic system always led to readjustments in the distribution of other elements within the lexical space.
8. The structural re-adjustment led to further lexical changes which were associated with the original change. However, other sub-groups which entered the speech community in the interim adopted the older lexical change as part of the community norms, and treated the newer lexical change as stage 1. This recycling stage appears to be the primary source for the continual origination of new changes. In the following development, the second lexical change may be carried by the new group beyond the level of the first change.
9. If the group in which the change originated was not the highest status group in the speech community, members of the highest status group eventually would stigmatise or highlight the changed form through their control of various institutions.

Comment: Labov uses the expression *stigmatise*. Because the change was initiated *from above*, this expression may not be the most appropriate. It is my view that, in the two discussed cases, a contradictory process took place and the members of the high-status group “glorified” the changed form through their control of various institutions. The expression *stigma* would fit other instances of lexical change, i.e. some casual, colloquial or slang expressions which originated in not such high status groups. It is also possible to assume that an opposite process took place simultaneously and that glorification of a term by one group in society caused its stigmatisation in another group or possibly in another speech community.



Another point to be raised is to what extent lexical innovations which are being diffused in the media of the society which is changing from a socialist regime to a democracy will be instigated by low status groups and to what extent by those of high status. Usually the high status groups, i.e. the political leaders, are associated with such a process.

10.If stigmatisation was present in the case then this process would initiate change from above. This would mean an irregular correction of the changed form towards the model of the highest status group, the prestige model.

Despite this the linguistic variable now shows regular stylistic stratification as well as social stratification.

Comment: The process of stigmatisation was not present in this case. The highest status group originated the change and a prestigious model was created in the instance of the two expressions.

11.If the prestige model of the highest status group does not correspond to a form used by other groups in some lexical field, the other groups will show a second type of hypercorrection: shifting their usage of the lexical item further from the changed form than the target set by the prestige group. This stage may be called *hypercorrection from above*.

Comment: If this stage proposed by Labov for sound change was applicable to lexical change, which I suspect is possible, it would explain why some newly coined expressions do not get wide adoption and are soon shifted to the periphery of the lexicon or disappear. This is the next stage for a sound change observed by Labov.

12.Under extreme stigmatisation, a form may become the overt topic of social (or possibly professional) comment, and may eventually disappear. It is thus a stereotype, which may become increasingly divorced from the forms which are actually used in speech.

Comment: This is the case of most communist terminology used amongst various social groups.

13. If the change originated in the highest-status group of the speech community, it became a prestige model for all members of the speech community. The changed form was then used in certain forms of communication (contexts) by other groups in proportion to their contact with users of the prestige model, and to lesser extent, in less relevant contexts.

Although I could not confirm the exact sequence of Labov's steps 1 – 13 in the cases of the lexical items *Common European House* and *perestrojka*, the main features of the mechanism fit the process of lexical change. The reason why the sequence of steps could not be confirmed is because the *change* in the two cases came *from above*.

It is my opinion that the methodology is applicable to a wide selection of lexical items if one wishes to identify if their development was influenced by *change from below* or *above*. What is significantly different are the factors causing sound change and the factors causing lexical change. Whilst Labov identifies social and regional status as playing key roles, lexical change is not affected by these to the same extent.

**Tab: 4**

<b>Factor affecting</b>	<b>sound change</b>	<b>lexical change disseminated by the media<sup>16</sup></b>
Social status	Yes	Yes
Professional group membership	?	Yes
Limited by speech community	Yes	No
Limited by a region within the same speech community	Yes	No

The table shows that in the cases which I investigate lexical change spreads more easily than sound change since it is not limited by the same language or speech community and the same region within one speech community.

### **B) Intentional Change**

In the search for an explanation of the purpose or intention in linguistic change I followed Livingstone's advice and consulted work by James Milroy. I investigated the article *On the Origins of Language Change*<sup>17</sup>, most issues of which are discussed fully in *Linguistic Variation and Change*. These works were also sources of information concerning Milroy's model of linguistic change.

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<sup>16</sup> The results in the table are applicable to the cases of lexical change disseminated by the media. I need to point out that there are cases of lexical change that will be limited by aspects of speech community and region.

<sup>17</sup> *Historical Linguistics; Problems and Perspectives*, ed. Charles Jones (Longman: London and New York, 1993) 215 – 236.

Milroy views linguistic change as a process which speakers initiate and put into practice in their social interaction. He describes language change as a “social phenomenon” that takes place due to “reasons for marking social identity, stylistic difference and so on. If the process does not carry these social meanings, then it is not a linguistic change: it is a random variant [. . .]” (Milroy, *On the Social Origins* 231 – 232). Linguistic change cannot take place, unless the following three conditions are met:

- spontaneous innovation occurs first in the speech of a small number of people
- structural conditions in the language are favourable.

It is not enough for the two above conditions to feed an innovation into the language system as a change unless:

- the social conditions are also favourable (Milroy, *On the Social Origins* 232).

As mentioned previously, Milroy’s model of linguistic change focuses on groups of speakers and the social links amongst them. Milroy refers to Granovetter’s definition of weak and strong ties (*Linguistic Variation* 178). Groups with strong social ties are also known as close-knit communities. Weak ties are typical for loose-knit communities. Strong ties are important for the internal coherence of the community, weak ties carry innovation and influence from one close-knit group to another. Weak ties may also serve a purpose of bridges between communities linking them to a wider network which the strong ties cannot accomplish (*Linguistic Variation* 178). Individuals in the centre of the close-knit community are usually those who enforce norms. They tend to find innovation risky but not so risky to adopt if it has already spread at the periphery of the community.

Milroy stresses that, apart from the existence of multiple weak ties, there are other conditions for innovation -- some of the psycho-social. For an innovation

to be taken on, the receptors of innovation need to identify with the donors and feel that they will benefit from the process. Therefore Milroy finds “the idea of group identity and solidarity [. . .] more satisfactory than the idea of relying on prestige in social class dimension [. . .]” (Milroy, *Linguistic Variation* 182).

Milroy provides key issues that make the element of intention within lexical change more transparent. They are:

1. understanding the difference between innovation, a random variant and patterned language change,
2. recognition of an individual’s intention to be different from the others together with,
3. recognition of an individual’s or group’s identity and solidarity.

### **C) Summary**

The two models are widely considered to be competing. Despite this, it is my opinion that one model complements the missing arguments in the other when I apply them to lexical change. Labov’s research did not offer explicit links to an explanation of intentional change which Milroy’s did regardless of the fact that there are many factors of conscious language change that remain to be understood and may be explained with help of other disciplines outside the scope of linguistics.

The two lexical items I used for the exercise did not confirm Labov’s original sequence of steps 1 to 8 and 9 to 13. This is because the lexical items were imposed on language users from above. Had I selected such colloquial expressions as “*hustý*” ‘cool’ or “*fičet*” ‘to be in’, then the sequence could have been proven. At this point I should like to stress that all lexical items which I investigated have changed or came from above and that they arrived to the Czech lexicon from official information channels. The only exception could be *Česko* where some elements of the change came from below. With respect to this, I would like to return to my comment in step 9 that since it is usually the

high status group that controls various institutions and information channels, this group also has a vast opportunity to stigmatise some forms and highlight others and correct language forms intentionally. Therefore also innovators and early adaptors are usually recruited from the highest strata of the society and not from the class in the middle of the social hierarchy as in Labov's investigation.

I could not verify that the regional factor would bear the same weight in my work as it did in Labov's because the lexical items in question spread over a large geographic area, i.e. the Soviet bloc. The discrepancy however can be corrected by applying weak ties that carry influence and change between distant communities - this is exactly the case with countries in one political bloc.

There is still one area that should be tackled – to which extent are the instances of lexical innovation affected by prestige, as presumed by Labov and to which extent by solidarity and identity, as Milroy believes. I suggest that it may be a combination of both factors: for political leaders it was necessary to demonstrate their solidarity inside one political bloc and therefore they acted as early adaptors of innovated expressions. At the same time they needed to maintain the prestige in their own country and they spread the innovation into their own speech community. Since all conditions in the speech community were favourable, the innovation was adopted as patterned change.

Labov's model strongly relies on social stratification -- for some linguists the reliance is too strong and they believe that the model can work only in socially stratified societies. This aspect, however, is an advantage for my work because the lexical items I examine are fed to speakers through official information channels and often from the highest strata in society. Despite the fact that I could not verify Labov's model across the entire process of language change which I tried to reconstruct, it is evident that the theory is relevant to my work and it provides a reliable frame of change for some instances of lexical change disseminated in the media.

### 2.3.2.3. Semantic Change

Semantic change is usually defined as a change in a meaning of a word. Hauser describes semantic change as a process that expands a collection of polysemic words and creates new meaning of already existing polysemic words. He also includes breakdown of polysemy into homonymy into the processes of semantic change. Grepl, Forston, Trask, and McMahon identify the following tendencies that constitute the process:

**Tab. 5:**

<b>Grepl</b>	<b>Forston</b>	<b>Trask</b>	<b>McMahon</b>
Broadening (generalisation)	Broadening	Generalisation (broadening)	Extension (or generalisation or broadening)
Narrowing (specialisation)	Narrowing	Specialisation (narrowing)	Restriction (or specialisation or narrowing)
	Melioration	Melioration	Amelioration
	Pejoration	Pejoration	Pejoration
		Interference	
Metaphor	Metaphoric extension	Metaphor	Metaphor
Metonymy	Metonymic extension	Metonymy and synecdoche	Metonymy
			Folk etymology
			Ellipsis
Abstraction			
Concretisation			
Euphemism			
Dysphemism			

Elizabeth Traugott adopts a different approach to define the reasons for semantic change and thus avoids the more traditional typology provided by many linguists. Her description of the process is as follows:

1. External descriptions of reality become internal descriptions of perceptions and evaluations;
2. External and internal descriptions become textual meanings – they acquire meanings that give overt structure to disclosure;
3. Meanings become increasingly based in the speaker's subjective beliefs and attitudes.

Traugott suggests that one of the less well researched and described forces behind semantic change is the movement from discourse-external and objective features to the discourse-internal and subjective (Trask 46 – 47). Since linguists are only beginning to understand the rationale behind this typology of semantic change, I intend to rely mainly on the more traditional and verified typologies offered by Grepl, Trask and McMahon to draw my conclusions.

### **2.3.3. Causation**

How we describe the motivation for language change may depend on what question we pose. Some of us may ask “Why does a language change?” whilst others will ask “Why do people change their language?” Whether they approach the subject from one standpoint or the other, one of the answers they should still come to - - at least when examining lexical change - - is that language change happens because language adapts to the needs of the time. The issues of causation are common to all three case studies. In the following section I will give an overview of the factors which are generally believed to cause language change and I will also characterise those which are, in my opinion, most likely to innovate or change the lexicon:

Trask states that language change is ceaseless and remorseless (12). He observes that all living languages undergo continuous change and there is no easy explanation for why this happens. As with any change, language change



may also have multiple causes and it is unlikely to be caused by a single overriding factor. The causes of language change are numerous and not all of them are well understood and described. The factors causing language change can, however, be divided in various ways. Meillet, who first proposed the term *language change*, also identified three causes of meaning change as being *linguistic*, *historical* and, *social* with Ullmann adding a fourth *psychological* cause:

1. Linguistic causes are language internal and have nothing to do with factors such as material culture.
2. Historical causes are, on the other hand, connected with changes in material culture. In the process of language change set off as a result of historical causes referents change but names often remain the same.
3. Social meaning change is the process when a word tends to acquire a new meaning due to its use by a particular social group.
4. Psychological causes may cover cases of misinterpretation by children as well as Sperber's Freudian analysis of the fact that if we are concerned with a topic we are likely to refer to it more frequently (McMahon 179 – 181).

Aitchison offers a more simplified division of the causation:

1. External sociolinguistic factors – social factors outside the language system;
2. Internal psycholinguistic factors – which are embedded in the structure of the language and the minds of its speakers (134).

Aitchison's methodology is based on the sociolinguistic approach which focuses on three main causes of language change: fashion, foreign influence and social need. She prefers to call them "triggering factors" as they may act more like "accelerating agents that utilise and encourage trends already existing in the language" (151). Another reason is that sociolinguistic factors are only partly responsible for language change. They cannot be effective until the societal conditions create the change which is consequently reflected in the language. Even then some areas of a language are more resistant to a change

than others. The sociolinguistic causes, or triggering factors, may be seen by some as only superficial while there are still deeper causes of change. Therefore I am willing to adopt her suggestion to replace the term “superficial” with the term “immediate” and “deep” with “long-term” (151).

Aitchison’s approach to language change is more appealing to my work than Keller’s who looks at language change from the dichotomy of “Why does language change?” and “Why do speakers change their language?” (8). He discusses the possible answer to the first question from the standpoint of what he calls an “organismic” version that sees language as an organism, and the second from the mechanistic version seeing language as a mechanism (8). I agree with Keller that language is not a living organism and it does not change by itself. On the other hand my opinion of the mechanistic version, the essence of which is that “Speakers change their language”, differs from Keller’s. To Keller, the statement sounds “too intentional and too planned as if language were a man-made artefact, a mechanism that people could build and modify”(8). If we examine his statements with the tools provided by sociolinguistic methodology, we will detect several problems.

Keller also investigates the statement that: “The speakers change their language but unconsciously, not intentionally or according to a plan” (9). He concludes that “The speakers change their language neither intentionally, nor to a plan, nor consciously. This is generally true and there is nothing more to it” (13). I cannot agree with all parts of this statement. I would suggest that there is more to language change than this and one can observe a great deal of internationality in lexical change as I plan to show in my case studies.

Although not all of the triggering factors have been well understood, some have been identified and their effect has been well described, such as the effect of fashion, foreign influence and social need.

### **2.3.3.1. Fashion and Random Versus Intentional Change**

Both R. L. Trask and Paul Postal identify fashion as one of the triggering factors of language change. Postal goes considerably further than Trask in his extreme perception of the role of fashion and writes that “There is no more reason for language to change than there is for automobiles to add fins one year and remove them the next [. . .]” (Aitchison 135). This statement makes fashion, or possibly vanity and the desire to stand out from the crowd, the main factor underlying change, including language change. My opinion is that such a sole explanation is hard to believe and even more difficult to prove. Although people tend to change their speech which is similar to the way in which they modify and modernise the style of the clothes, cars or mobile phones, the reason for that is not just a sheer vanity. People change their speech to demonstrate that they are up to date with the latest development in society and its lifestyle and Labov has shown that fashion and social influence are not just random affairs and cannot be ignored. Speakers can alter their speech according to those who are around them and according to the environment in which they are. This is not done unconsciously since there can be a degree of intentionality in the process. It has been well established that there is a difference between conscious and unconscious change. Labov’s research shows that there are changes that people realise and encourage. These changes are triggered by pressure from above the level of conscious awareness. In addition to this, there are changes which people do not realise and these are set off by pressure from below the level of conscious awareness (Aitchison 55).

### **2.3.3.2. Foreign Influence**

Many linguists believe that significant language changes happen due to infiltration of foreign elements. Although some widespread theories, such as the substratum theory, may not be particularly relevant for my area of research, the process of infiltration with foreign and particularly international elements plays an important role in the contemporary Czech language.

Daneš observes that one of the most prominent features of contemporary Czech is a strong English influence on its lexicon (19). Written and spoken discourse is saturated with English expressions, both older and newer, the sources of which are the printed and spoken mass media and also growing direct contact with foreigners. Daneš contrasts the contemporary influence of English with that of Russian during the communist regime. He states that the influence of Russian was rather limited; it was most prominent in the area of political structures and ideology but not so prominent in specialist terminology of science and technology and minimal in everyday life. Daneš explains that the effect of English is massive due to the unpopularity of Russian. It has been caused by the association with political pressures and the values the Russian language once mediated. This could not bear comparison with the attractive values of a Western lifestyle brought to us by omnipresent advertising. Written and spoken discourse is saturated with English expressions, both older and newer, the sources of which are the printed and spoken mass media and also from growing direct contact with foreigners.

No other foreign language is currently considered to have a significant impact on contemporary Czech or to play a significant role in introducing foreign elements into Czech. The tendency described above results in the introduction of many English expressions into Czech despite the presence of existing Czech equivalents, which carries with it the potential for shifts in meaning. Several areas of contemporary Czech discourse, such as politics and the economy, are characterised by the frequent use of specialist internationalisms with the pervasive influence of English. English also has a distinctive effect on phraseology, where new items are not seen by many users as enhancing the established phraseological repertoire of the language, but rather as suppressing established constructions (Daneš et al. 18-24).<sup>18</sup>


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<sup>18</sup> A similar situation has been observed in contemporary Russian as Larissa Ryzanova – Clarke and Terence Wade document in *The Russian Language Today*, Routledge, London, 1999.

### 2.3.3.3. Social and Cultural Need

There is a notion that language alters because the needs of its users alter. This is often referred to as the functional view, and constitutes the third cornerstone of sociolinguistics. So far it has not been understood and documented where need occurs and where it is first felt and responded to. We do not know with certainty whether it is on the level of an individual or across the whole society. The process of innovation in language follows the same pattern as the need to innovate in all other areas of human life. Need is created by circumstances in society. Some individuals realise the new circumstances and the necessity to react to them more strongly than others. I do not think that the leaders in change are necessarily those who first perceived the need or are the original creators or instigators of the change. Leaders in dissemination may also have a reason why they wish to act in this position. Further, not every innovation is accepted and significantly affects the society or its language. I would therefore suggest that a possible model to describe how change in language occurs and spreads as follows:

#### Diagram a:



I see social and cultural need as two triggering factors of language change. To explain their role more closely, I rely on the work of McMahon. When looking

for connection between semantic change and social and cultural context, McMahon refers to older research by Anttila who suggests that “inexplicable meaning changes can be accounted for if we know about the cultural context of the speech community” (McMahon 175). McMahon reacts by pointing to the fact that “cultural context is an extremely specific factor which does not generalise to other changes” and that to understand a change in meaning, we may, amongst other information, also need a good understanding of the socio-cultural situation within the speech community (175). McMahon’s extension of Anttila also supports the first working presumption I have given in the introduction to the thesis that changes in meaning and changes in lexicon generally can be explained thanks to changes in society and its culture. Therefore, what I wish to apply to my work is the observation that has been repeatedly confirmed by various scholars that one of the many reasons why language changes is because the cultural and social situation in the speech community changes. This, together with Hauser’s description of semantic change as a process when lexemes often acquire polysemy and competing lexemes enter the language, helps explain various examples of lexical change. For instance, before 1989 *samoobsluha* ‘self-service store’ was the term for a shop where various groceries, cleaning produce, toiletries and stationery were on offer. After 1989 new and larger stores appeared and offered not only more modern and larger premises, a wider choice of produce but also different selling and marketing strategies. Companies opening the new stores did not want to be associated with the considerably less appealing conditions of old *samoobsluha* and therefore *supermarket* and *hypermarket* are used to refer to the new stores. This example shows a need for a change which could have taken the route of polysemy but did not do so. Instead of that *samoobsluha* underwent narrowing and pejoration and two new lexemes entered the lexicon. The change is conscious only on the part of store owners and advertising agencies. Language users are not likely to have initiated the change. They only adopt the expressions because the old terms were not adequate to describe reality and a new better fitting alternative was offered to them by advertisers and marketers.

The term *cultural and social situation* is broad since it can comprise many factors. I therefore suggest that social and cultural need, which is often recognised as one of triggering factors of language change, is only one of the components of socio-cultural situation, and when the need is felt, in a particular situation, than the process of language change can be triggered. Consequently, the initial sentence can be reformulated within a wider picture. I propose to expand the formulation by saying that “language alters because the socio-political and cultural situation in which it is used alters”. This corresponds to McMahon’s view that “semantic change is frequently socially conditioned, and crucially involves language use” (185). The expanded formulation can still be fitted securely in the framework of functional view, which examines language from a perspective where society, rather than an individual, is in the centre of attention. It does not contravene examination of language in terms of the functions the language has evolved to serve, and where the language is examined from the outside inwards to allow its interpretation according to position in the society.

McMahon identifies three prerequisites of semantic change (176 – 177):

1. polysemy,
2. discontinuous transmission of language,
3. arbitrariness of the linguistic sign.

It is points 1. and 3. which carry most relevance to my research:

Ad 1.: Words are typically polysemic; they can lose or gain meanings. It is suggested that that each word has one central and several peripheral meanings and that the change occurs when the central meaning is seldom used and the marginal meaning adopts the central position. Often loanwords may take the position of the central meaning of the native form, which becomes obsolete or may be retained with an altered marginal sense (McMahon 176).

Ad 3.: The components of a linguistic sign, the signifier and the signified, are linked arbitrarily. Arbitrariness allows us to consider the two parts as

independent of each other and either of them may change with the time (McMahon 177).

The disadvantage of her account of observability of language change, particularly semantic change, is that McMahon relies considerably on not-so-recent findings in the field, going back to 1946. Many of those who she quotes are sceptical about the process of observability and accountability for language change and since then it has been shown that language change can be observed. When debating more recent linguistic findings, McMahon pays more attention to the possible regularity and predictability of language change. She concludes that:

- semantic change is frequently socially conditioned and a meaning of a word alters because one sense is favoured and another disfavoured in a particular context;
- semantic change is highly unlikely to be as regular and predictable as sound change because the units involved and constraint on them are entirely different;
- our understanding of semantic change is unlikely to progress without a generally accepted theory of synchronic semantics. She suggests that application of structuralist principles to semantic system might be helpful. The application of this principle would then explain that the acquisition of a new meaning by one word will affect others in the semantic field (185-186).

Although these points will be useful to formulation conclusions, my research concentrates rather on the aspect of consciousness in change rather than its predictability. In contrast to McMahon's attention to Traugott's work, I see more relevance in the link to Labov's findings to which I have referred more closely in section 2.3.2.2. Although his work was not performed in the field of lexicology, I believe that his hypothesis can be linked to my investigation. This is due to my primary focus on the aspect of conscious choice in the process of



lexical change and the connection of the process to particular social groups and social need.

#### **2.3.3.4. Summary**

Speakers may not always change their language intentionally but it has been shown that some processes of language change can be intentional. I will attempt to show that there was an aspect of consciousness and purpose in some of the changes in the Czech language after 1989, specifically in its lexicon. Despite the possible element of consciousness present in the process I do not assume that all these changes were carried out according to a plan. The atmosphere of rapid and dramatic changes in society would have been an ideal environment for the co-existence of a recognised and omnipresent unconscious element of language change with a conscious element of the process. Alternatively, conscious desires for language change might have even amplified the process. Certain lexical units were perceived as outdated and the need was felt to replace them with more suitable ones that corresponded to the new circumstances.

The process of language change I study, specifically changes in the lexicon, was likely to be encouraged and promoted by certain social groups who may have played the roles of language innovators. I would argue that these lexical and semantic changes happened over a very short period of time and under such dramatic conditions that speakers were well aware of them. My hypothesis conflicts with that of Keller. I believe that some of the changes in Czech vocabulary following the socio-political changes after 1989:

1. had an aspect of conscious action,
2. had an aspect of planned action,
3. could have been linked to particular social groups who might have acted as their instigators,
4. happened as a response to a social and cultural need.

I intend to show that the conscious element can, in certain circumstances, provide a powerful impetus for language change that ends up affecting not only individuals but the lexicon of an entire society.

#### **2.4. Metaphor**

The largest of my case studies looks at recent changes in some metaphoric images resulting from changes in the way our reality is constructed. Compared to the situation in the not-so-distant past, metaphors are nowadays seen as powerful agents helping to create and explain reality. I believe that metaphors do contribute to the way our reality is perceived and if we monitor the so-called surface manifestation of metaphors within the lexicon, metaphors can also help us understand how and when our perception changes. I also believe that, within their function of a tool for constructing our reality, metaphors may be effectively used for persuasion - - irrespective of ideological or non-ideological purpose, the type of ideology it may serve, the period in history or the regime. Many thinkers, philosophers, linguists or scholars in other disciplines have studied metaphor, which in Greek means figuration and figurative expression. As it is said that: "Any serious study of metaphor is almost obliged to start with the works of Aristotle" (Cameron 69), I would also like to launch the literature review on metaphor by briefly presenting Aristotle's endeavour to explore and explain the nature and function of metaphor.

Misleading accounts of Aristotle's analysis of metaphor have been provided on numerous occasions. Claims have been repeatedly presented that Aristotle undervalued metaphor and he considered it to have only an ornamental function in the language and held elitist views on metaphor, believing that only a mastermind can use metaphor properly. In fact Aristotle pioneered a modern, cognitive view of metaphor as a substitution of one idea for another to achieve new understanding of reality. It is for instance Mahon who clarifies that Aristotle's views of metaphor were really modern (Cameron xiv) since he believed in ubiquity of metaphor in conversation and writing which supports current views about the omnipresence of metaphor in everyday discourse and printed media" (Mahon 69). Mahon also highlights Aristotle's views that

people are able to express themselves and be understood more clearly through using metaphors because they gain knowledge of things and understand them better through metaphors.

Interest in metaphor was revived again in the 19<sup>th</sup> century in connection with the growing interest in aesthetics, comparative linguistics and poetics. Metaphor has been of interest to all those branches of science working with signs and all schools focused on art and poetry. For many, however, metaphor is usually connected with poetry and fiction where it works as a figure of speech used to increase the intensity of expression or to open the eyes of readers to earlier unnoticed aspects of reality. The traditional approach may connect metaphors and similes due to their shared functions used in poetic language. Others claim metaphor differs from simile since it does not simply compare but it confronts meanings by replacing one word with another one from a different sphere of a sensory perception, different type of objects, or a different area of imagination. This process of contrasting functions is due to a difference in appearances, properties, quantities, functions, states and so forth. For instance Vlašín believes that a metaphor is close to a riddle, since understanding and using a metaphor requires a listener's, or reader's, active co-operation -- their experiences, notions, imaginations and common sense are employed and challenged to be able to understand and counteract which, consequently, gives them a satisfaction of being able to solve the puzzle and enjoy the game. At the same time he points to the fact that the primary function of metaphor is not the resolution of a hidden meaning. Lately, changes in metaphoric images in contemporary political discourse have been mostly investigated using the cognitive methodology. Despite the prevailing focus on cognition I still find Vlašín's more traditional account of a metaphor as a tool for emotional and imaginative enhancement of an expression useful for my investigation. The fact that metaphors may emphasize, suppress or conceal various meanings of an expression also supports my presumption that some metaphors may be introduced according to a political plan. In this case they are used not to explicate a particular item but to establish required areas of imagination for language users to adopt and believe.

### 2.4.1. Cognitive Approach to Metaphor – Supporters and Critics

Until the beginning of the 1970s metaphor was seen mostly as a phenomenon lying away from the centre of linguistic studies. Since the 1970s an intensive linguistic inquiry has been initiated into a field of the cognitive approach towards metaphor that is mostly associated with names of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson and that is based on a systematic link between metaphor and thought.

I was also interested to see how the cognitive approach to the study of metaphors would explain the changes in metaphoric images of Europe in Czech media and political discourse in recent years. Therefore I consulted one of the seminal titles in cognitive approach to metaphor which according to many scholars concluded work in the field -- George Lakoff and Mark Johnson: Metaphors We Live By:

Lakoff and Johnson's hypothesis is based on the claims that metaphors pervade our everyday life and that our conceptual system is metaphorical by nature. Metaphors are not an ornamental language device used to extend or enhance imagination but are used to decode or mediate meaning. Since the authors claim that human thought processes are mostly metaphorical in nature, metaphors help us comprehend a particular concept more easily. Our understanding does not take place on the level of individual isolated concepts but on the level of whole domains of our experience, such as MONEY, WAR, JOURNEY and so on. They strongly support the proposal of analogical mapping between a source domain and a target domain which, in other words, is projection of structure A into structure B. Therefore, to give a reader an idea of what is meant by analogical mapping and how a concept can be metaphorical in nature and can structure our life, Lakoff and Johnson present several concepts in the form A is B, for instance ARGUMENT IS WAR, which they document by a selection of examples.

The essence of their theory can be presented in the following points:

1. The Systematicity of Metaphorical Concepts

Individual metaphorical concepts tend to be systematic. Therefore the language we use to talk about that aspect is systematic too (7).

## 2. Conceptual Metaphor

Lakoff and Johnson introduce their theory of the conceptual metaphor. This can take the form of a structural metaphor, orientational metaphor, or an ontological metaphor.

## 3. Grounding of Our Conceptual System

Although most concepts are structured in terms of other concepts, there are some concepts that can be understood directly, such as spatial concepts UP – DOWN, or IN – OUT. Some concepts we live by are created through our interaction with our physical environment, while other, so called prototype concepts, are understood as gestalts. This means that we perceive a complex of properties occurring together better than their separate occurrence.

Lakoff and Johnson validate their hypothesis through work with universal metaphors the origin of which is not specified but which have been selected carefully to work across various cultures and languages, as for instance the above quoted ARGUMENT IS WAR. I was interested to see how they could account for the metaphoric changes in Czech discourse since 1989. One possible answer they offer is a strong connection between metaphor and culture, since culture together with the physical environment play a significant role in forming our conceptual system and creating new meanings. Still, this is not enough to explain why certain metaphors from Western media discourse were so easily adopted by Czech politicians and Czech media and so easily passed to the public when the cultural, political and historical background of the two regions are different. There are two more aspects of their work that can be considered as pointers to a potential solution:

A) A metaphor works “when it satisfies a purpose, namely, understanding an aspect of the concept” (97). If a metaphor is to accomplish its task, i.e. to work, then the metaphoric concept in task must fit the experience. Therefore when the authors speak about conceptualising our experience, they refer to the process when we select the important aspect of our experience, categorise it,

understand it and remember it. If I apply this on the evolution of imagery within my case study it means that the two previously antagonistic regions of the West and the East share the same experience. The two main incentives for the change in imagery, the collapse of the regime and the mind shaping exercise of the accession to the EU, were perceived and remembered equally by speakers in both regions.

**B)** The second aspect of Lakoff and Johnson's theory, essential for investigation of development within metaphoric concepts and variety of co-existing metaphoric images, is the finding that when a concept is structured by more than one metaphor, the different metaphorical structures usually fit together in a coherent way (86). This means that one concept can be structured in two and more metaphors that overlap and co-exist which is evident in my investigation of European imagery both before and after 1989. This is possible due to shared entailments. When metaphors are coherent, they do not have to form a consistent image. Although a single consistent image is not achieved, metaphors still fit together due to their overlapping entailments that create a link between them and show how much common ground the metaphors cover.

Lakoff and Johnson's theory of "conceptual metaphor" has received considerable support by for instance Gibbs (1994) and Glucksberg (1995), who also believe that metaphors do not simply link our conceptual systems but also play an essential role in constructing and restraining concepts. Consequently, when a linguistic metaphor is encountered, pre-established systems are triggered. On the other hand there are some for whom Lakoff and Johnson's theory seems simplistic. These researchers believe that our mental representations are not so simply structured and processing metaphors is not purely automatic. Therefore they claim that this theory can and only be applied to some types of metaphorical language. For example Quinn (1991) suggests that metaphors are acquired through social interaction. This implies that metaphor does not have only a cognitive basis but also its cultural aspect needs to be taken aboard. Lakoff and Johnson's theory of its own accord is not strong enough to explain why politicians and media rely on certain images used

outside their culture and bring them inside their culture and their language. It is here where Gerard Steen's research can be used to clarify the occurrence of deliberately created images and images artificially planted into the language and culture from outside. An additional reason why I refer to Steen's Understanding Metaphor in Literature is his comparative study of journalistic and literary metaphors.

Gerard Steen questions the strong link between metaphor and thought. Although highly appreciating Lakoff and Johnson's achievement in cognitive metaphorology, he remains critical of their work. Steen describes Lakoff and Johnson's definition of metaphor as "a figure of thought" the surface manifestation of which is metaphor as "a figure of speech" (6). He finds their approach to metaphor different from standard cognitive research into metaphor for two main reasons. Firstly, because they advocate experientialism and experientialism is based on gestaltism which is a rather restricted approach to understanding. Secondly, their methodology of analysing linguistic examples does not correspond to the methodology of cognitive paradigm. This methodology does not generally acknowledge analytical method of obtaining evidence (9). Steen does not agree with Lakoff's explanation of ready-made, simplified and automated mechanisms of mapping and processing because "what is a metaphor from an analytic perspective upon the language as a generalised code does not have to be a metaphor in the language use of every individual"(17). Steen himself states that the cognitive approach to the study of metaphor has presented it as "a highly revealing instance of human capacity for making sense" (3). This has had several significant consequences where the most important one for my work is that the cognitive approach undermined the almost exclusive relation between metaphor and literature.

Steen highlights that it is knowledge rather than meaning which is responsible for the awareness of similarity and which forms the basis of the process of understanding one thing in terms of another (10). Consequently, what he means by understanding metaphor in literature, is the "mental processing by individual readers of the (linguistic) metaphors occurring in particular literary

texts” (29). Although Lakoff and Johnson and Lakoff and Turner have demonstrated that metaphors in literature also are guided by general principles of cognition, Steen refutes the automated process of mapping due to two essential factors: these are the reader’s knowledge and the role of context. Since the nature of literary texts differs from non-literary ones, also understanding metaphor outside literature differs from understanding metaphors in literature. He proposes that literary metaphors have a special role, because:

1. They may involve new linguistic expressions of familiar conceptual metaphors
2. They may reveal newly constructed conceptual metaphors
3. Their function in literary reading is to act as an important crystallisation point of for subjectivity, fictionality, polyvalence and orientation.

Steen carried out a study<sup>19</sup> of literary versus journalistic metaphors based on an English corpus of metaphors in which the conceptual structure, emotive value, communicative manners and moral position of metaphors were assessed. His working presumption was that properties of metaphors would be based on more than one general discourse dimension and the discourse dimensions would differ for journalistic and literary metaphors. The results of the study show that there are two dimensions on which these two groups differ: the conceptual structure and the communicative manners. The literary metaphors are perceived as being more original, profound and subtle, whilst the journalistic metaphors are considered to be superficial and obvious. The journalistic metaphors, on the other hand, are found to be serious, formal and earnest (195). The outcome of the study corresponds to the theoretical assumption that journalism is ruled by the fact convention, which involves seriousness, formality and earnestness and avoiding humour, informality and flippancy (196). Steen observes that linguistic metaphors are present in literature more often than in other types of discourse where readers are

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<sup>19</sup> The study comprised two sections: an English and a Dutch corpora of metaphors. Because different scales of discourse dimensions were used for each study, I report only the results of the English section.



prepared for processing a more ornamental language and higher proportion of metaphors. He attributes the success of *metaphor*<sup>20</sup> processing in literature to the fact that once the readers are aware of reading a literary text, they employ specific reading strategies and knowledge about literary discourse which guide their reception process. I presume that a similar processing strategy, through which Steen explains processing of literary metaphors, is applied to a non-literary text, principally newspaper texts. Also in processing newspaper text, readers can mobilise their reading strategies tuned to the nature of newspaper texts and their knowledge of particular combinations of emotional or persuasive undertones and metaphors applied there. Such reading strategies, based on the reader's knowledge and the role of context assist in successful decoding of the newly emerged metaphor and their recognition by readers.

A scholar who also builds her research on cognitive methodology is Brigitte Nerlich. Initially, there are two main reasons why I consulted her work. The first is that she investigates metaphors within their context and not as separate statements which is also the approach I am using in my thesis. The other is that she does not stress the role of individual knowledge in conceptualising as much as Steen but identifies the importance of cultural and social links in this process and proposes that metaphors reinforce cultural and social stereotypes in a society. In their study "Conceptualising Foot and Mouth Disease. The Socio-Cultural Role of Metaphors, Frames and Narratives" Nerlich et al.<sup>21</sup> focus on the imagery of Foot and Mouth Disease represented in newspaper articles in the United Kingdom. The corpus of text metaphors is complemented by a corpus of picture images. Nerlich believes that the common ground for communication in media is achieved by text metaphors supported by picture images. These metaphors are then divided into groups according to the source domains and the source domains then constitute image fields. These 'image fields', *Bildfelder*, a term proposed by Weinrich (6), show clearly associations between individual words, concepts, semantic fields and images. These are in

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<sup>20</sup> Metaphor processing refers to any psychological process relating to linguistic metaphor while metaphoric processing is a *mode* of processing depending on two-way analogising (44).

<sup>21</sup> Brigitte Nerlich, Craig A. Hamilton, and Victoria Rowe

the study represented in the form of diagrams, which I found useful and opted for the same strategy within my case study “Back to Europe!” Nerlich studies individual metaphors step by step to follow and explain the process of their conceptualisation. Similar to Lakoff and Johnson she then explains why a how the same phenomenon can move to different, sometimes contradicting, source domains which I expect will occur in case of the changing imagery at the time close to the revolutionary events of 1989 in Czechoslovakia. She analyses prototypical narrative of certain concepts and explain how myth, beliefs, and stereotypes in culture can add more weight to one concept than to another. The impact of this on the lexicon is then illustrated in detail. The authors of the study note that some metaphors, if used in isolation, can appear conventionalised. However, the same metaphors can be instantly revived in the context and in connection with persuasive images.

What I value most about the study is at first the systematic, detailed, and clear methodological guidance into the practical application of the process of conceptualisation Nerlich provides. At second, Nerlich and her colleagues show that selected metaphors in certain cultures can be used as powerful tools of creating certain emotions and shaping public opinion in that culture which is a step beyond Lakoff and Johnson who work only with universal metaphors and therefore could not provide me with a satisfactory answer to the question of how and when metaphoric images of the same concept change. Although Nerlich et al. present metaphor as a device helping all those who are in contact with the metaphor to understand and “naturalise” the phenomenon that a metaphor represents, which is fully in line with Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive approach, they present metaphor also as a cultural and also social phenomenon indispensable to the general public, journalists and politicians trying to conceptualise successfully their experience.

#### **2.4.2. The Term *Europe* in Contemporary Metaphor and Discourse**

Andreas Musolff has been following European imagery in public debates for more than a decade. The book Mirror Images of Europe is an outcome of his

involvement in the Anglo-German Research Collaboration project developed by the University of Durham and the *Institute für Deutsche Sprache* in Mannheim. This project investigates linguistic manifestations of attitudes towards Europe in England and Germany and analyses neologisms and key terms specific for Euro debates. A corpus including the most frequently used metaphors drawn from British and German broadsheet newspapers was compiled as a part of the project (Musolff 3). The entries in the corpus relate to political concepts and attitudes concerning the European Union and its policies between 1989 and 2000.

Musolff's analysis of how attitudes towards Europe are manifest in media and political discourse is based upon two hypotheses:

1. Metaphors used by politicians and the media to describe and evaluate EU-related political issues reflect such changes as well as specific differences in the attitudes towards the EU between two countries.
2. The use of metaphors influences the way in which the public conceives of Europe as a political entity and of its political problems (4).

The author identifies seven main thematic domains which act as image sources for Euro debates. These domains contain a group of lexemes which are not in any of their literal senses connected to the topic of EU politics but still recur in texts on this topic. The domains and also their sub domains often overlap. Musolff also stresses that these domains do not reflect any rigid conceptual categories but are meant to be flexible. The domains are: *movement along a path or road in general; travel by specific means of transport; geometric and architectural structures of a static nature; social groupings; life and health, strength and size; competition, sports and war; show and theatre* (5).

Musolff makes regular connections to Lakoff and Johnson's theory of metaphoric processing and observes that their cognitive link between language and thought is particularly poignant in the case of discourse and ideology. He argues that the place where Lakoff falls short, though, is the insufficient

provision of linguistic evidence for the strong link between language and thought. Lakoff concentrates too much on the conceptual aspects of his theory. The arguments that metaphors underlie the public perception of political affairs need to be more supported by empirical data and this is the place where a corpus based analysis would be suitable to provide the empirical proof (24 - 25).

Musolff also identifies cases where Lakoff's theory may be too powerful an explanation of metaphor interpretation while the actual discourse is too weak to support it. This is because the meaning aspects of the source domains are not necessary but only optional. Therefore speakers can cancel aspects, which they explicitly did not mention, of certain schemas at will (26 - 27).

The analysis of the corpus data confirms both initial presumptions. This means that:

1. the British and German attitudes to Europe in politics are reflected in the use metaphors and their distribution;
2. specific metaphoric formulations have influenced and shaped the general public's opinion, which the politicians need to take into account (206).

In his conclusions Musolff stresses that metaphors do not make us think in certain ways. They only suggest various perspectives which we may or may not consider. Although there is no evidence to support the strong claim that metaphors can imprison the general public's mind, their use in political and media discourse can still, to some extent, shape public opinion (207).

The research published in Mirror Images of Europe is further complemented by Metaphor and Political Discourse where Musolff extends the list of domains to twelve source domains. These do not always correspond to the previous list and are divided as follows: *way – movement – speed; geometry – geography; technology – building; groups – club – class; school – discipline; economy – business; love – marriage – family; life – health – strength; game – sports; war – fortress – battle; performance – show; nature – weather.*

I refer to Musolff for two main reasons:

- 1) to compare how metaphoric images of Europe identified in his work, based on English and German media discourse, correspond to metaphors used by Czech politicians and Czech media and since the images should reflect differences and similarities in the attitudes towards the EU, I will attempt
- 2) to identify if any other metaphors were created in Czech discourse which are different from those in German and English discourse. There is a strong possibility that new images were created because the circumstances under which the Czech Republic joined the EU were considerably different to those of Germany and the United Kingdom. My presumption that different metaphors could be coined is also supported by Musolff's claim that the main political development is reflected in the distribution and political evaluation of metaphors (206).

Another author from the group of German scholars, who investigate images of European integration in the media discourse, is Gerlinde Hardt-Mautner from Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration. I plan to refer to her article "How Does One Become a Good European?: the British Press and European Integration" in my investigation of the changing definition of Europe. European integration has not only brought along economic and political changes but it has affected the cultural and social life of the individual European nations. Hardt-Mautner investigates how the British daily press has reflected the challenges caused by integration and how these have affected national identities. I will compare her definition of the proper name *Europe* and its adjective *European* to the situation in Czech discourse mapped by Czech scholar Ivana Bozděchová in her study "Do Evropy terminologicky i neterminologicky" 'Entering Europe Terminologically and Non-terminologically'.

### 2.4.3. Summary

Despite various claims made by cognitivists on the theory of metaphor, the nature of links between metaphor and thought is not yet fully understood. Some researchers, such as Lynne Cameron, point to extensive variation in what is understood by the term *cognitive*, since the term is used in cognitive psychology, cognitive linguistics, relevance theory and recently also in a cognitive approach to idioms. What some usually mean by *the cognitive approach* is its contrast to a traditional approach. The cognitive approach views language and conceptual systems as interacting mechanisms, while the traditional approach is believed to separate them. Also, the opinions of cognitivists themselves on the mechanism of metaphoric processing differ. For some it is only the process of analogising and mapping, others stress also the role of a broader context, individual's knowledge or cultural and social aspects.

As far as a satisfactory definition of metaphor is concerned, I agree with Cameron who states that Burke's definition of metaphor as "device for seeing something in terms of something else" (Cameron 3) seems to be the only point at which various researchers and theoreticians can meet. Irrespective which theory or school one favours, studying a metaphor is a complex task a successful completion of which may require an application of multiple research methods. I suspect that Lakoff's formulations are too far-reaching. They are not based on such solid discourse foundations as those of Musolff and Nerlich and do not take into account the reader's individual knowledge and the context stressed by Steen. Consequently I have decided to select an amalgamation of the above theoretical approaches by Steen, Lakoff and Johnson together with Musolff's practical work to examine the changing imagery of Europe in Case Study 1. I will also adopt some of the methodological guidance by Nerlich when I follow the evolution of individual images.

## 2.5. Semantics, Culture and Cognition

Some of the images I pursue in the case study *Back to Europe* are the *heart of Europe* and the assumed *soul of Europe*. To explain how work from the field of semantics, culture and cognition -- namely by Wierzbicka and Vaňková -- suits my investigation, I am starting with Leibnitz's statement that every human being is born with a set of universal human concepts which he defines as "the alphabet of universal human thoughts" (Wierzbicka 8). Leibnitz was amongst the first to notice that, although complex meanings may differ from language to language, the simple ideas that are put together to comprise these meanings can be the same all over the world. The alleged presence of semantic primitives made other scholars search for lexical universals which are concepts lexicalised in all languages. I have selected Wierzbicka's book Semantics, Culture and Cognition to gather information about the extent to which we can understand other languages and cultures and about the different meaning of words across culture and language boundaries. I follow her approach of decomposing in the investigation of the concept of the *heart of Europe* and consequently to my speculation about the *soul of Europe*.

Anna Wierzbicka's work focuses on issues of culture and semantics. The overall topic of her research can be described in two points: words differ in meaning across language and culture boundaries and certain concepts are products of certain cultures. Her concern is not whether meaning can or cannot be transferred from one language to another but it lies with the finer nuances of the process. She investigates the extent to which meaning can be transferred and also to what extent meaning is language-independent. In her view there is a strong link between these issues and the impact of human nature and culture on a language. Words differ in their meaning across language and culture boundaries (24) and certain concepts are products of certain cultures (26).

Wierzbicka has been following her research focus since the 1970s when she published Semantic Primitives where she offered a list of elementary human concepts. She neither claims that there are any universal words nor words in terms of which others could be defined. She believes that meaning can be

explained to a certain extent and to do that one needs a set of so called “presumed indefinables”; “presumed universals” are necessary to be able to explain meaning across cultural boundaries. In her view all languages have words for the basic human concepts and everything can be expressed by combining these concepts in the right manner. In 1992 Wierzbicka published Semantics, Culture and Cognition where she selects a set of concepts that are closely connected with everyday human life in most cultures and analyses them to explore various aspects of the meaning as they occur in different cultures. Wierzbicka stresses the need to find an objective, culture independent standpoint to succeed in such work and in my view, she certainly did so when exploring the concepts of *soul*, *mind*, *heart*, *fate* and *destiny* and their representation in lexicon of some Slavonic, Anglo-Saxon and Romance languages.

My contemplation of the *heart* and *soul of Europe* revolves around a statement by Václav Havel who has always been, even in his role of a president, more a writer and dramatist than a politician. Therefore, apart from the methodological guidance into decomposing the meaning, I value that Wierzbicka’s evidence has been gathered mostly from classical literature. Although I applied some of her methodology to my case study, I don’t think it provides a universal methodological solution. There are concepts that enter our culture from another one with already set meanings and there are others whose influx changes our perception of some concepts. Whilst ethnopsychology and ethnophilosophy may contribute a great deal to an analysis of a concept in literary discourse, this is not always the case with newspaper and political discourse. Also I don’t think that it is necessary to perform such a detailed decomposing into semantic primitives for the purposes of the study of lexical development. In many instances we can complete the analysis on a level above the semantic primitives. More general principles of analysis and definitions, for instance those used by Gerlinde Hardt-Mautner<sup>22</sup>, will suffice to obtain a clear picture of a development process.

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<sup>22</sup> Gerlinde Hardt-Mautner, “ ‘How Does One Become a Good European?’: the British Press and European Integration,” Discourse and Society 6 (1994): 177 – 205.



To compare if a Czech scholar carrying her own work only within the Czech environment confirms the same meaning of heart, I refer to a study by Irena Vaňková “Srdce to lidské (K jazykovému obrazu srdce v češtině)” ‘The Human Heart (On the Imagery of Heart in the Czech Language)’. Vaňková does not use the methodology of decomposing the meaning and does not investigate if and how meaning can be transferred to another language or culture. Her study follows a statement by Bartmiski that a meaning is like a precious stone, the individual sides of which offer different aspects of this meaning, and a scholar should attempt to show the whole structure of the crystal (248). Vaňková adopts this approach and proceeds from information on primary meanings, metonymical function, phraseology, through adjectives derived from the noun *heart* to its etymology, collocations and metaphors. Her evidence is gathered from Czech folk songs and poetry, 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century Czech poetry, definitions in dictionaries and generally valid phraseology and collocations from the Czech language. Having followed systematically the methodology of examining individual facets of a crystal she gives an accurate account of *heart* in Czech, however she does not present specific examples of the change in meaning.

### **3. Supporting Literature and Information on Changes in Media Practice**

Mass media play an important role in my research and one of the reasons why I based my work on research of printed media text is the cultural and political role of the media. Mass media keep a society in motion and no society exists without at least the most basic medium of communication. This chapter reflects the commonly held notion that a word is a powerful weapon and mass media are one of the world superpowers. Every regime relies on the media, controls the flow of information and the way it is communicated to the masses in one way or another. If changes in a particular regime and in a particular society are truly revolutionary, they should be reflected in the control over the media and their ownership.

This chapter presents information on mass media practice, systems, discourse and language in different regimes. I will start the section with the review of publications to which I refer in the investigation of the communist and post-communist media practice and systems. At first I will focus on changes in the communist discourse, distinctive features of the contemporary language of Czech media and politics and I will continue with three titles on changes in the media practice after 1989. This will be followed by information on the mass media practice in the Soviet bloc and with issues concerning the alleged power of the mass media. Then I will investigate characteristics of communist and post-communist media discourse. Finally I will present information on changes in the media practice after 1989. The purpose of the chapter is to show that the transition of the Czech media landscape has been so significant that its observation can be used as a reliable indicator of changes in a society.

### 3.1. Supporting Literature

#### 3.1.1. The Discourse of Communist Power

The content of the book Řeč komunistické moci ‘The Discourse of Communist Power’ by Petr Fidelius was originally a series of essays that were circulated between readers in samizdat editions and only later published in book form in Germany and France. In the Czech Republic the book was officially published in 1998. The essays that were written between 1978 and 1989 were later rearranged to create three studies: “Lid, demokracie, socialismus” ‘People Democracy, Socialism’, “Pohádka o Stalinovi” ‘A Tale of Stalin’, and “Zrcadlo komunistické řeči” ‘The Mirror of Communist Discourse’.

The author’s primary task is to clarify the referential function of communist language and he states that his book offers the only coherent study of the language and rhetorics used by the communist regime. Fidelius aims to investigate the internal order that governs the communist discourse and its cornerstones and to make an enquiry into the semantic and pragmatic aspects of communist rhetoric. The corpus of the investigated text comes from the newspaper Rudé právo, its editorials, party officials’ and readers’ contributions to the newspaper. Based on Fidelius’s study, the following features emerge as typical of the communist newspaper discourse:

1. The identity of the speaker and the recipient is fuzzy.
2. The speaker always presumes that the addressee totally shares his experience and views.
3. The intention of communist rhetoric is to change recipients’ thinking so that it corresponds to the programme and methodology of the Communist Party
4. The communist regime claims that the word is an ideological weapon.

Although earlier in the book Fidelius makes the claim set out in point 3 above, later in the book he goes a stage further. He believes that communist discourse no longer intends to spread positive ideas or convince of its truth. The language is no longer a tool of persuasion but a tool of administering power. Communist discourse is not about spreading ideas; on the contrary, it is about immobilising the ability to think. In this way the communist regime creates a “new discourse” (183) in which lexical units are rigidly connected to closely defined semantic contents “which can only be mechanically connected to pre-programmed strings” (183). The consequence of this for an individual’s ability to think will be enormous. Fidelius describes his vision of the impact as follows:

“Myšlení tím sice nebude principiálně znemožněno, bude [. . .] zbaveno možnosti vyjádření a sdělení [. . .]. Lidská mysl bude prakticky ochromena.”

‘In principle, thinking will not be disabled that way, it will [. . .] be ridden of the possibility to express thoughts and to communicate [. . .]. The mind will be practically paralysed’ (183).

Fidelius not only defines the consequences of communist discourse on the recipients’ thinking, he also investigates the building blocks of such discourse. Through this process he manages to identify the lexical units and their combinations which many native speakers would indeed remember as fundamental to communist rhetoric and which constitute a specific kind of communist terminology. Fidelius has put together a comprehensive corpus of Rudé právo citations with detailed bibliographical data. Rudé právo is one of the main Czech newspapers which has maintained its publication continuity to date. The corpus of data obtained from Fidelius can provide valuable support for investigation of developments within the Czech lexicon and its changes occurring due to socio-political changes in society. These can be further arranged into various semantic groups and if followed from there they can serve a valuable purpose in investigation of developmental tendencies in Czech vocabulary from the 1970s to the present.

The book was written as a samizdat publication and its primary task is to criticise and ridicule the communist language and communist rhetoric. Fidelius does not support his conclusions with any scholarly findings or theories, apart from citations of Marxist-Leninist philosophers. He relies solely on his own speculations. Throughout the book Fidelius makes very strong and confident conclusions. He very rarely presumes, on the contrary he immediately posits definite statements and places accusations.

The book should not be accepted as an objective scientific investigation of the Czech language between approximately 1978 and 1989. However, the author makes many apt observations which can be useful during the study of the Czech lexicon.

### 3.1.2. Discourse of Contemporary Journalism

Although the aim of my thesis is not to investigate exclusively the discourse of politics and political journalism, it has been very difficult to remain distant from this subject. Many linguists investigate the language of periodicals in connection with politics. They believe that the rationale for this approach may be best explained in Orwell's quotation: "The current political chaos may have something to do with the decline of the standard of a language and we may be able to improve the situation if we can start from the words."<sup>23</sup>

Jaroslav Bartošek, similarly to Petr Fidelius, finds that the pre-1990s media and political discourse typically utilised prefabricated building blocks, which were glued together to create a pre-planned socialist discourse censored by the ruling class (known as the *nomenklatura*). In Jazyk současné české politiky 'Discourse of Contemporary Czech Politics' Bartošek observes that the Czech media have considerably improved the standard of texts compared to the situation before 1990. Political and media texts consist predominantly of metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, expressive words, indefinite and

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<sup>23</sup> Jaroslav Bartošek quoting Orwell in: "Politika a anglický jazyk," Literární noviny 25 1992.

polysemous or ambiguous words, occasionalisms, foreign and borrowed words, trendy words and phrases, and clichés (Bartošek 9).

Compared to Bartošek, Jiří Kraus looks at the language of Czech journalists. In Novinářská čeština 'Czech Language in Journalism' he characterises media discourse by a clash between the necessity of complying with a certain level of standard language and colloquial language (Čmejrková et al 171). Additionally to this, he observes that media discourse needs to conform to the requirements of style adequacy and retain the reader's attention. At present, when the market is saturated with various titles, journalists may go the extra mile, in respect to the language they use, to maintain their readers. This is possibly one of the reasons why media discourse should not be always seen as one of the ultimate sources of information on development tendencies in a standard language. Despite this, I still believe that media discourse documents the evolution of a contemporary language well and that it can be used to analyse development tendencies in languages.

### **3.1.3. Changes in the Media Practice after 1989**

To probe this topic I have selected three titles which complement each other due to the different angle from which they approach the subject.

Colin Sparks approaches the topics of Communism, Capitalism and the Mass Media from the angle of “the critical project“ which is an investigation of links between the centers of political, economic and information powers in a society“. One of the versions of the critical project is defined by Sparks as the impact “on changes in the mass media so that they act to empower the mass of the population in their lives as members of democratic societies.” (19) He argues that mass media, and in particular television, claim a privileged place for themselves in understanding a society. Sparks is interested in relations between “different kinds of media performance and the structure of political life in a given society” because “the former will act as an important indicator of the changes in the latter.” (17) Sparks focuses primarily on changes in

television, paying much less attention to the press and radio. His scope of research is rather wide and comprises all the Visegrad countries.

Sparks limits his enquiry mostly to television, analysing it within the framework of “the critical project”. He investigates in-depth definitions of terms such as *revolution*, *democracy* and *totalitarian regimes*. He elaborates theories on the impact of revolution on the changes in a society. Sparks highlights their consequences on the mass media, and control over the media in the prism of economic and political factors. These factors are central to his argument that mass media are uncertain indicators of changes in a communist society. He gives the following three reasons to support his observation:

#### 1. Degree of fusion of ruling circles

Disparity between media owners and political leaders in bourgeois democracies is discussed in the mass media. Although these debates may be presented as viewed by a particular press owner, it is only when that owner is also a political party, that there is a link between the media and political power (Sparks 40). The existence of different political opinions allows public dissent in political debates.

In totalitarian societies, the fusion of ruling circles into one group was very tight. As a result of this, internal discrepancies were not likely to be debated publicly. However, different media were not necessarily uniform in their coverage of affairs and, in periods of internal conflicts amongst the *nomenklatura* ‘the ruling elite’, may have reflected different views of different political streams but they were not capable of achieving more than a supporting role (Sparks 41).

#### 2. Media as commercial enterprises

The mass media in bourgeois democracies, especially printed media, are run as commercial enterprises. They need to meet the expectations of their readers and their advertisers. This may force them to express views and take positions that are different from those of their owners. The presentation of dissenting

views can help the medium commercially, for example by attracting an advertiser or readers valuable due to the direct purchase of the newspaper.

The media in communist societies were command-driven. They did not operate according to commercial principles, but on principles of the political interest of the *nomenklatura*. Cover prices were not calculated to make profit; advertising was rather limited. Costs were negotiated in advance, subsidised by the state – all that in accordance with the central command economy and subject to planning. Due to this dependence, the communist mass media cannot be seen as the most important arena where social development was discussed and social crisis made visible. I would argue that, with hindsight, traces of crisis are evident in the communist mass media. These are best observed in the point of view on topics covered and the typical rhetorics of the *nomenklatura*.

### 3. Media practice

The communist mass media were directly incorporated in the ruling elite, where they occupied a central and relatively trouble-free position. This is not usual in bourgeois democracies.

Western media claim to be independent, objective and fair. The function of the communist media was to organise and mobilise the masses, educate them, fill them with enthusiasm for building socialism and fighting imperialism. The communist media were to improve the morale of the society, make citizens aware of the tasks necessary to build socialism and keep them alert to the dangers and threats coming from the West. Contrary to this, the objectives of editorial policies in bourgeois democratic media claim to balance information, education, and entertainment.

In my view Sparks identifies the forces behind the transition of some parts of the mass media in the Visegrad countries very successfully. At the same time I believe that it is necessary to also take into account the results of transformation other than political and economic ones. Sparks' critical project can be described as an attempt to re-invent a role for Marxist criticism in a



post-communist environment and such an approach will necessarily limit its relevance. His work has a significant position in this chapter and his findings contribute a great deal to the detailed picture of connections between regimes and mass media in the Soviet bloc. On the other hand I find some of his conclusions challenging; they are consequently compared with those of the Czech author Bořivoj Čelovský and also my own observations of the publication, staffing and ownership continuity in Czech printed media. The book cannot be relied upon to paint a full picture of the development of the media, mainly the press, in the Czech Republic from 1989. In this respect Konec českého tisku 'The End of the Czech Press' by Čelovský is more suited for the purpose of obtaining information on the situation in Czech press between 1980 and the present date.

Sparks criticises many authors and colleagues who carry out investigation of the mass media in post-communist societies for addressing the questions "obliquely" (17); Čelovský should not be seen as one of them. Despite the fact that his investigation is not performed on the European scene and his work remains confined to the Czech Republic and its closest western neighbours, his findings are well researched and presented in a very critical way. As already stated, Sparks is focused primarily on the hypotheses of the "critical project" which he applies, in a limited way, on several post-communist countries. If I should review Čelovský's research with respect to "the critical project", or at least that one version defined by Sparks above, then Čelovský also pursues a similar mission although with different means. Čelovský concentrates in detail on the changes in the printed media, and the forces behind these changes. His investigation therefore reveals the actual and everyday impact on the Czech mass media. His book provides readers with a concise history of the transition the Czech press during the communist regime and also in the post-communist era. On plenty of well researched evidence Čelovský demonstrates the relationships between Czech political forces and their more influential western neighbours, and the outcomes of their liaisons. What is most useful for the thesis is the information on publication continuity of various titles, staffing issues, ownership of the printed media, and legislation. The author shows how

power over the printed media was passed to foreign owners, and as a consequence of this, how individual titles and their bias, focus, standards of professionalism and of language were affected by the transition. Further, Čelovský pays attention to the tradition of Czech journalism, which the nation was once so proud of. He demonstrates how this tradition was either maintained and in which particular titles and in which it has gradually perished and due to which causes.

Čelovský, for some, may seem too pessimistic in his description of recent developments within the Czech printed media. His focus on the degradation caused by Western media and western as well as Czech political and economic forces is definitely prominent throughout the book. My objection to this book is that it should be secured on stronger theoretical foundations to prevent it from being considered purely as a practical guide to the destruction of the Czech press after 1989.

The third title by Jan Jiráček and Barbara Köpplová Média a společnost ‘Media and the Society’ covers changes in the structure of Czech mass media. The book is a compilation of papers presented at a conference held at Charles University in Prague in September 1995 Media ‘95; Experience and Expectations - - Five Years After. The title fits between Sparks’ investigation through the filter of “the critical project”, performed mainly at the executive level of political and media bosses, and Čelovský’s on the other side of the spectrum, mapping how the highest level liaisons affect individual titles. The common topic of the contributions gathered in the collection of papers from the conference is the transition of the Czech media in the European context. I concentrated mainly on the study “Changes in the Structure of Czech Mass Media” by Barbara Köpplová and Jan Jiráček which I use to document changes in the Czech media in section 7.4. The authors of the study investigate the aspects of the mass media transition both Sparks and Čelovský miss out on: the general public’s response to that transition.

### 3.1.4. Summary

The Czech media and journalism have undergone substantial changes since the 1989 revolution and they have diversified considerably. It would be an intricate mission to describe the whole process of these changes. There are many issues, which could be address in such a description -- and a task like this would be more suitable for the field of mass media study or media law. The combination of the three media titles I presented in 3.2. helps to obtain a view of the transition in the Czech media. Köpplová and Jiráček investigate the aspects of the mass media transition Sparks and Čelovský miss out on -- the general public's response to that transition. Despite the complexity of the matter I have attempted to offer an outline of the situation, which has shown what repercussions the fundamental changes, described above as a revolution, had.

I have referred to Fidelius earlier in section 1.2. to explain one of my working presumptions and to define the hypothesis that the Czech language will have changed noticeably with the change of the political regime. Fidelius is not the only author who makes connections to Orwell; many have characterised political and journalistic discourse, irrespective of the regime, as a variety of newspeak.<sup>24</sup>

To conclude, I would return to my previously stated comment that an investigation of a limited section of the mass media in a society will not suffice to understand this society. I would like to stress that to understand a society through the media, one should investigate all parts of the media life in that society including the response from the general public.

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<sup>24</sup> Tomislav Sunic: "Liberální dvojsmysly a jejich lexikální a právní důsledky", <http://cz.altermedia.info>. Also see comment 19 for reference to Bartošek

### **3.2. The Communist Mass Media Practice and Systems**

The communist mass media practice is based on the so called “Leninist theory of the press” (Sparks 46). The theory which prescribed the function of the mass media, mainly the press, and their role in the society are best explained in the citation by Lenin:

The role of a newspaper [. . .] is not limited solely to the dissemination of ideas, to political education, and to the enlistment of political allies. A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator, it is also a collective organiser. In this last respect it may be likened to the scaffolding round a building under construction, which marks the contours and facilitates communication between the builders, enabling them to distribute the work and to view the common results achieved by their organised labour. With the aid of the newspaper and through it, a permanent organisation will naturally take shape [. . .].” (Sparks 46)

The communist media systems in individual countries varied greatly prior to 1989. What was still common for all the countries was the uniform response to political imperatives and party directives. Czechoslovakia was considered to have had a mass media system which was the most dependent on Soviet materials and least co-operative with the world media market of all of those in the Eastern Bloc. The Czechoslovak media system, as well as other media systems in communist countries, was well established and stabilised. The media were controlled by bodies enforcing the prevailing ideological doctrine either directly or indirectly and monitored by the Communist Party.

Before the Velvet Revolution there were eighteen daily newspapers in Czechoslovakia in total.. Periodicals were published by state institutions, political parties, and by other organisations that were members of the so called National Front which safeguarded their adherence to the ruling ideology. The choice of magazines was not excessively wide but represented a selection of all basic types of magazines common in other countries of the Eastern and Central European region. Before November 1989, the press worked on authoritarian principles and was subject to direct party interventions. Hvížd’ala explains that the media in communist Czechoslovakia were run on the principles of

absolutist philosophy, where the right to know the truth was given only to the chosen ones who were selected to execute the state power. The press was supposed to transfer, transform and to explain the governmental politics to serve the state. It was a journalist's job to be the "gear box of the ideology" (Bezdiček and Žantovský 43).

The general public's attitude to the mass media prior to 1989 could be characterised by several points. One of them is best described in the then popular and light-hearted saying: "I need to read the paper to find out how I really am" and the second point could be the habit of comparing. The cost of newspapers and magazines did not represent a major burden for a family budget and consequently readers went through two or more titles a day. Periodicals were not monotonous as some might expect. On the contrary, specific titles were associated with highly appreciated sections, e.g. the well-known cultural section of Lidová demokracie or the comprehensive foreign section of Rudé právo or the weekly published Mladý svět. Another aspect typical for the pre-revolutionary media was that items read, heard or seen in the media immediately became a subject of everyday conversation. Consequently, as Jirák and Köpplová stated, "the mass media represented mass culture in its purest form" (Glenn and Šoltys 80 - 81).

The media in totalitarian and bourgeois democratic societies work on diverse principles and it can be presumed that they are indicators of changes in a society. The media in totalitarian societies are controlled through direct political intervention; their audiences are not allowed uncensored critical responses to the media themselves, and economic factors are subordinate to political factors in the society. On the other hand, media in bourgeois democracies are controlled mainly through economic power; direct political intervention is marginal and exceptional. The subordination of citizens in the society is mainly of an economic nature and not of both an economic and political nature as in communist societies. Despite many similarities the processes of change of the mass media in individual countries of the Soviet bloc were different and happened at different paces. Still, they had analogous

starting points and moved forward in a similar direction from command-driven to market-orientated media. The Czech Republic is one of the former communist countries which Sparks considers the “frontrunner of the transition period” and sees it as a model of “post-communist development” (Sparks, 157 – 63).

### **3.3. Language of the Power, Language of the Media**

In his speech at the 45<sup>th</sup> World Press Congress of the International Federation of Newspaper Publishers in 1992 Václav Havel stated that:

It is said that the press is the seventh power. I do not know which number it is, but a superpower it is. It carries a great deal of responsibility for our common faith [. . .]. In a way, the press -- as a part of the information and communication system of today's civilisation -- is the soul of humankind. I say this because I want to highlight the importance of the press, the importance of its freedom, intelligence and responsibility. (Glenn and Šoltys 38)

The quotation referring to the media as the seventh power was first used as a bonmot by the German chancellor Otto von Bismarck in the 1870s. Bismarck highlighted the enormous power of the press by putting it on the same rank with the six world superpowers that at the time were Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria and Russia. Many are concerned by the relationship between the media and the power and a lot has been written on the topic. The English sometimes refer to the press as the fourth estate in connection with the three ruling states: the clergy, peers and the Members of the House of Commons. The German use the expression *die vierte Gewalt* ‘the fourth estate’. The theory of the press as the fourth ruling power, together with the constitutional, executive, and juristic powers was adopted as the main theory of the press in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It was requested that in the process of searching for the truth the press should act as a partner for discussion and not as a tool of influencing the government. Recently, the media have been regarded as the fourth cornerstone of democracy (Bezdíček and Žantovský 42). On the contrary, Milan Knížák, Director of the Czech National Gallery, writes that:

The media are the biggest and the strongest political party and are mostly staffed by primitives. [. . .] I consider the media, as they are now, to be a manifestation of plebeian passions. When you put together such a manifestation of plebeian passion with speeches of plebeian politicians, you create a plebeian society that suffocates all signs of subtlety and sophistication.” (Bezdiček and Žantovský 69 - 70)

Vladimír Železný, the first independent director of the commercial television TV Nova, believes that the media in the Czech Republic have not crossed the line between power and influence. In his view the media are still safely operating on the side of influence. However, he believes that some decisions are easier to make than others, depending on the attitude of the media towards the intended decision. On the other hand no medium has stepped across the line with the result of gaining the ability to push through one decision or another (Bezdiček and Žantovský 145).

The journalist Ferdinand Peroutka<sup>25</sup> once compared the press to *nespolehlivá zrcadla*. This expression can be translated into English as “distorted” or “unreliable mirrors”. In this comparison he not only expresses his concern that the press, and the whole of the mass media, may not reflect life in society without distortion but also his view that the power of the press is stronger than their sense of responsibility (Bezdiček and Žantovský 99).

Petr Žantovský is rather critical of the current Czech media. His book Media on a Pillory published in 2004 deals with various aspects of journalism, in other words with media criticism. He observes that many current Czech journalists lack “a humble desire to learn new facts and be well informed about the affairs they write about”. Consequently their journalistic work is not informative and critical but is merely reduced to applying pressure and being political. They do not realise that their role is not to make history but to describe it. Many of them also forget that their role should be totally unbiased and they often lobby for certain interest groups either in economy or in politics (Žantovský 11 -12).

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<sup>25</sup> Ferdinand Peroutka (1895 -1978)

The term *media* clearly shows its original meaning that came from Latin, meaning “a mediator or a device of mediation”. The term *media* is one of the most often discussed terms in the current world. Thompson writes that if media disappeared, nothing would be the same any more” (Jirák and Köpplová 15). Modern societies are built upon information. Information is the most often traded commodity and journalists shape the process of information spreading and are often main instigators of the process. Mass media create new social networks in society, shape a group identity and assist individuals to find their place amongst others (Jirák and Köpplová 21 -22).

#### **3.4. Media Practice after 1989**

After almost fifty years of centrally owned, controlled and directed media a new media model was gradually being landscaped in the transforming society. Jirák and Köpplová (81) state that the changes in the media after November 1989 first concerned their contents. Journalists gradually started to show their resentment of the communist regime and started to support the new reality. Following this came changes in the management of the printed media and journalists’ efforts to make it clear that the papers were independent of the state and the old ideology. Editors started to take over control of their papers, irrespective of their regional or national status, spontaneously and without any legal support. Employees’ joint-stock companies were set up and foreign investments started to flow into them. The reasons why the newly founded companies invited foreign investments are obvious: first, it was a fast modernization of equipment and secondly, a guarantee against possible political pressure. The western media companies, on the other hand were quickly marking their spheres of interest. A report for the US State Department called Eastern Europe: Please Stand By writes: “Some countries seem prepared to go beyond the safe European models and are particularly attracted to American news and public affairs programmes. Western Europeans, especially Germans, are quickly positioning themselves. By contrast the presence of American broadcasting interests or experts is minimal” (Sparks 88).



Another report, prepared for the Gannett Foundation Media Center which in 1991 renamed itself the “Freedom Forum”, states that due to the rapid and complete transformation of all of the media, it was the task of the US government to move rapidly to ensure that the emerging institutions and practices were based as closely as possible on American models. (Sparks 88 - 89). To rectify this, the US government and media agencies organised numerous seminars and training events in Czechoslovakia, later the Czech Republic. Despite this effort and financial sacrifices, the Czech press distinctly shows European characteristics rather than American ones -- one of them being the emergence of the boulevard press aided by foreign capital from countries like Switzerland and Germany” (Glenn and Šoltys 35).

Czechoslovakia was the first country that started the transformation of its broadcasting systems immediately so that they would correspond to the new political, economic, and social requirements of integration into Europe. Consequently, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was the first from the former communist countries to adopt a new broadcasting law on 30 October 1991<sup>26</sup>. The vision behind the concept of the law was in accordance with the country’s foreign policy of integration within Europe -- i.e. the European Union, the Council of Europe and the NATO. President Václav Havel hoped that the country would become one “with a relative and political stability, which will be a dependable brick in the structure that Mr. Gorbachev calls the European Home” (Glenn and Šoltys 34). The legislation remained virtually unchanged after the split of the country into the Czech and Slovak Republics in December 1992 – January 1993.

Out of the former Communist countries, the Czech Republic is considered to be the most keen to remedy its economic and social problems in various fields with privatisation. As stated above, the broadcasting law was adopted only 3 years after the revolution. Contrary to this, the Press Law, prescribing the rights and duties for publishing periodicals, “had to wait” until 22 February 2000 -- i.e. more than ten years after the revolution and seven years after the

independent Czech Republic was established. Until then the 1966 Press Law with amended sections relating to the operation of media under the communist regime was in force. Journalists, writers and some politicians find it very alarming and almost unbelievable that the new Press Law does not define who can publish printed media (Čelovský 21). In the majority of Western countries, laws allow the highest foreign capital participation in mass media to be 30%. Czech law allows the foreign capital participation in the mass media to be unlimited, which resulted in 80% of the “Czech” press being owned by German firms.

I briefly mapped the situation, according to the data available in 2003, in the three major daily newspapers which also provide the corpus of material for the thesis; they are Rudé právo, later Právo, Mladá fronta, later Dnes, and Lidové noviny. Both Rudé právo and Mladá fronta were privatised although in different ways and with different results. The privatisation of Mladá fronta is described as a straightforward event in which the staff resigned one day and overnight launched a joint-stock company MaF. This was later transferred to a Czech-French joint-stock company MaFra, which was later sold to a German concern RBVG that owns MF Dnes to date (Čelovský 31 – 32).

Rudé právo itself was privatised and remained safely in Czech hands. The majority shareholder (60%) is the former head of the Rudé právo office in Washington, Zdeněk Porybný. On the other hand, all the regional editions of Rudé právo and all district newspapers previously shielded by district committees of the Communist party have been sold to a German concern Passauer Neue Presse. Čelovský states that: “In the majority of the cases those from Passau did not buy newspapers, but rather the right to silence them, to replace them with their own regional press and thus achieve an undisturbed monopoly over the regional daily press in the CR” (Čelovský 35).

In the 1930s Lidové noviny was associated with such outstanding Czech personalities as Ferdinand Peroutka, Eduard Bass and brothers Karel and Josef Čapek by many Czechs. The tradition of exquisite Czech journalism evoked by

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<sup>26</sup> Law of the Federal Assembly of the CSFR (Kaplan 40) 1991.

the name Lidové noviny has unfortunately disappeared without a trace and at present it is not likely to be revived. Lidové noviny was banned in 1952 and the signatories of Charter 77 started publishing the samizdat editions in 1988. In 1989 Lidové noviny was re-launched as an official newspaper and it was hoped that it would develop into an independent newspaper of a truly modern European format. However, its way forward was still rocky. When a Swiss company bought the newspaper in 1993, those involved with Lidové noviny were very optimistic about the future of the once respectable democratic paper. Just several months later the chief-editor resigned his post and three years later, in 1996, the newspaper became co-owned by a German press concern Springer Verlag, feared to be a main danger to German democracy. Several years later the newspaper was sold to RBVG. Currently, Lidové noviny is said to have started employing practices of boulevard journalism and strong pro-Sudeten German tendencies (Čelovský 52 – 54). Jan Čulík's comment on the fiasco of Lidové noviny was that the dream to found Prague's own version of The Times had not materialised (Čelovský 52 – 54).

Changes in ownership resulted in a different offer of printed media. According to Sparks (102) there were three types of publications offered to the readers in Central and Eastern Europe between 1990 and 1994:

- Many of the newspaper-like titles were organs of political groups and parties, and as these later proliferated, in some cases they were manifestations of oppositional currents, edited and run by dissidents who had kept them alive in the underground - as the best-known example is given Lidové noviny. Apart from those there were purely commercial publications set up by entrepreneurs with various kinds of backgrounds.
- Publications were set up directly by foreign, usually western, media corporations wishing to use the new market to their advantage, e.g. Blesk.
- There was also the continuation of existing press – in general this is the old party-press but under new ownership and new editorial direction.

I would like to add a fourth type to the above division proposed by Sparks. This is a new newspaper title founded by a team of ex-journalists who were sacked from newspaper posts following the Prague Spring 1968 and worked as manual labourers during the normalisation period. An example of this kind of press is the Moravskoslezský den, a regional newspaper of northern Moravia and Silesia, the first issue of which was published on 27 February 1990 which soon achieved a circulation of 150 000. Due to financial constraints and severe competition, the newspaper was sold to the German company PNP in February 2001.

Jirák and Köpplová believe that the habits of the general public in Czechoslovakia with regard to the mass media did not experience dramatic changes at the beginning of the 90s compared to the situation before November 1989. People still relied on their old daily newspapers and the same old broadcasting channels as before the revolution. The habit of comparing the information provided by various media and contents of individual newspapers temporarily got even stronger. The data provided by Jirák and Köpplová state that in 1990 each reader read on average 2.4 daily newspapers, although this trend gradually weakened and at the end of 1991 it was just 1 daily newspaper per reader.

At the turn of the 90s the number of periodicals increased dramatically and this trend continued until 1992 when the number of newspaper titles published in the Czech Republic reached the highest number since 1980s:

**Number of newspaper titles published in the year:**

**Tab. 6:**

Year	Czech Republic	Czechoslovakia
80s	18	30
1990	30	48
1991	38	56
1992	76	Data not available
1993	31	N/A

There were further attempts to create new daily newspapers, but these failed. The reasons for this may not only be financial constraint of Czech readers but the above described situation of the ownership of the Czech printed media. Also the description of a typical Czech reader who “opts for the golden mean between popular and prestigious (serious) papers, and is inclined towards professionally skilled work provided by papers such as MFD (Mladá fronta dnes) or Rudé právo” will certainly contribute to the composition of the Czech periodicals market (Jirák and Köpplová 84).

As the new owners brought their new marketing strategies, older newspapers and periodicals gradually changed their editorial policies, focus, and image. The titles have changed, e.g. Rudé právo got rid of its communist attribute *rudé* ‘red’ and its title is now Právo. Mladá fronta gradually was renamed MF Dnes.

The situation within the editorial boards has changed in several stages. In the first stage the most discredited chief-editors and journalists left the most prominent and visible posts. These removals demonstrated the willingness of the press to show its readers its genuine political independence – but at the same time they were mostly symbolic because these representatives of the old order quickly found new lucrative posts, very often again in the mass media. Sparks claims that “The representatives of the old order have found internal allies that help them survive in the new conditions [. . .]” (Sparks 173). I would argue that the expression “survive” is rather weak as many of these people did not only continue to live comfortably but obtained prominent posts.

The second stage of personnel changes and mass exodus of staff can be linked to privatisation of the press. What Jirák and Köpplová, compared to Čelovský, explain euphemistically, as the journalists’ “unwillingness to stay in one position for a longer time and their never-ending search for ‘something better’” (85), he ascribes to the large-scale redundancies and profit-driven management strategies of German owners (68 – 77). Čelovský opts for shock therapy, hoping this might provoke the Czechs to action which would block the expansion of the German influence on the Czech press, and quotes an entry

from Joseph Goebbels's diary that was made soon after the Munich Treaty: "We intend to build a German Press in Czechia. It costs a lot of money but one day it will be rather beneficial" (97). Two years later Goebbels in his speech to Czech journalists said: "I am urging you to speak in this sense to the Czech nation. If we did so ourselves, the Czech nation would not trust us [. . .]" (97).

### **3.5. Revolution in the Media – the Conclusions**

Sparks observes that the events of 1989 did not significantly disturb the broadcasting institutions of the old regime and the bureaucratic order was soon re-established without serious upheaval and conflicts. He also states that:

The transition in the press seems, on the surface, to have been swifter and more complete but, analysed more closely, demonstrates that many of the leading titles of the earlier period continued in production, with many of their former staff in place. The degree of continuity is much too great to support any theory of total transformation." (105)

In the thesis I argue that the events of November 1989 were revolutionary and I have offered a definition of revolution to which the events correspond. Sparks on the other hand observes that the changes in the media environment were not so significant and to be seen as revolutionary they need to sum up to total transformation. I would dispute his view. Čelovský shows clearly that the privatisation and foreign investments have considerably disturbed continuity of staffing, management and publishing. Further, I would make an objection whether it would be possible and realistic in a 20<sup>th</sup> century European society, even though it is a socialist one, to achieve a truly total transformation when we know that the society was advanced, how corrupt the communist system really was and that there was a strong connection between money and the power. Therefore I would continue to state that the events of 1989 set off a process that led to a cumulative change. Such a change, although not fitting the label of total transformation, is still significant in all areas of life in Czech society and resulted in the reordering of government after political convulsion.

In my opinion the transition of media systems in the Czech Republic has been a major one and it is possible to consider mass media to be reliable indicators of revolutionary changes in a society.

## Chapter 4. Case Study 1- - Back to Europe!

Motto:

Poslední základní geopolitické pojetí střední Evropy, které se objevilo v minulém vývoji Evropy, bylo snad nejjasněji zformulováno v článku M. Kundery „Únos Západu“ z roku 1985. Toto pojetí odráželo především skutečnost období studené války a střední Evropa v něm byla chápána jako část Západu, která je však v držení evropského Východu. [. . . ] Kunderovské pojetí z poloviny 80.let 20.století bychom tak mohli asi nejlépe označit konceptem střední Evropy jako „periférie Západu“.

The latest fundamental geopolitical concept of Central Europe emerging in the previous development of Europe was probably most clearly defined in the article by M. Kundera “Kidnapping the West” from 1985. This concept mainly reflected the reality of the cold war and Central Europe was understood here to be a part of the West which was in the captivity of the European East. [. . . ] Kundera’s concept from the middle of the 1980s could be best defined as the concept of Central Europe as the “periphery of the West”.<sup>27</sup>

### Introduction

The European continent between years 1948 and 1989 consisted of two blocs with antagonistic ideologies. Many would agree that despite the pervasive political division, these seemingly strictly defined blocs of the West and the East maintained the existence of culturally, politically and economically distinctive regions within them. The situation is presumed to change after the revolution which resulted in the removal of the iron curtain, integration and unification processes within the continent and the re-distribution of power and interest structures in the continent.

In the period after the revolution of 1989 the issue of “the need to return to Europe” started to be debated in connection with the new political direction of the country. Soon this phrase was adopted as a 1990 election slogan by the Civic Forum Party. Discussions over the return to Europe were still vivid 14 years after the revolution in 2003.



How was it possible to start talking about “the need to return to Europe” if, from the geographical point of view, the Czech Republic has always been an integral part of the European continent? After all a country can hardly leave a continent. Where would the country move then? Discourse shows that the key to answering these questions is the application of geographical versus geopolitical and interest views on the European continent and consequently on the concept of Europe.

#### **4. I. Europe between approximately 1980 and the Velvet Revolution of 1989**

Politics can be easily defined as the activity through which people make and maintain general rules according to which they live. It is usually politics and politicians that are commonly held responsible for the state of current affairs all over the world.<sup>28</sup> It is also a widely held belief that the European continent before the events of 1989 was strictly divided by different political ideologies playing their acts on both sides of the iron curtain. I open the case study with political media discourse which best illustrates the situation in Europe in the 1980s.

##### **4.I.1. The Political Scene and the American Enemy**

###### **The Political Scene:**

The very first article in the group of citations demonstrates the tense atmosphere in Europe and suggests that the imagery within the concept of Europe will be limited.

1) Vyzýváme spolkovou vládu odvolat souhlas s rozmístěním nových amerických raket v Evropě [. . .]. Dokument zdůrazňuje rostoucí obavy západoněmecké veřejnosti pokud jde o zbrojení a uvolnění napětí a vyzývá občany NSR nepřipustit přeměnu střední Evropy v základnu amerických atomových zbraní.

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<sup>27</sup> B. Hnízdo, “Střední Evropa v geopolitických proměnách kontinentu,” found on <http://veda.fsv.cuni.cz/doc/hnizdo.doc> on 1.4. 2007.

<sup>28</sup> [www.palgrave.com/skills4study/subjectareas/politics](http://www.palgrave.com/skills4study/subjectareas/politics), found on 1.10. 2008

We are calling on the FRG government to withdraw its approval of the new American rockets to be located in Europe [. . .]. The document stresses growing concerns of the West German general public about armament and reducing tension and it urges the FRG citizens not to allow the transformation of Central Europe into an American nuclear weapons base.

A more detailed look into the division created by the iron curtain will reveal the existence of regions with a different degree of hostility towards each other within these two blocs. However this division is not strictly obeyed; the borders of these regions shift depending upon the political point to be made and consequently the level of hostility changes. Thus West Germany, which the communist propaganda used as a flagship of anti-communist “bourgeois” ideology in Europe, was relocated to Central Europe in example (1) although it would be usually considered a Western European country. The reason for this was that the news covered an anti-American and anti-nuclear campaign in Germany which put the country into a more approachable light. The country is shifted closer to the East, the ideological division weakens and eventually the whole European continent is united against the imperialist American enemy in a peace-making process.

The same process was observed in references to Finland, which according to the political division which was valid at the time, would be placed primarily within the structures of the West. It should be noted that Finland’s international politics was always connected with the Helsinki Peace Accord and was evaluated positively by the official line of USSR politics. In example (2)<sup>29</sup> Finland is referred to, due to its wise and clear-sighted political directions, as a country in the North of Europe. It was not possible to label Finland as “our ally” but referring to it as a northern European country reduces the hostile anti-communist attributes of the West and makes Finland almost a “friendly country”. It should be noted that Finland’s international politics was always connected with the Helsinki Peace Accord and was evaluated positively by the official line of USSR politics.

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<sup>29</sup> The citation is listed in Appendix 1

The following citation not only depicts the characteristic rhetorics of contemporary European discourse in Czechoslovak media but also defines the country's vision for its international image firmly anchored in the structures of the socialist part of the European continent:

3) Dnešní Československo je pokrokový a vysoce rozvinutý stát, který důstojně přispívá k upevnování jednoty a semknutosti zemí socialistického společenství, k činnosti organizace Varšavské smlouvy a Rady vzájemné hospodářské pomoci, aktivně se účastní boje za upevnění bezpečnosti v Evropě, za mír, uvolňování napětí a odzbrojení.

Today's Czechoslovakia is a progressive and highly advanced state that works honourably towards strengthening the unity and closeness of the socialist community, the activity of the Warsaw Pact and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, actively participates in the battle to strengthen the security of Europe, for peace, lessening of tension and disarmament.

A theme of the phenomenon which for the purpose of this study I will call the "American Enemy" runs through the examined period. It is not possible to study the language of the newspaper discourse between 1980 and 1989 and avoid the topic of possible American military intervention:

4) Ti američtí politici, pro které jsou jiné zájmy důležitější než zájmy míru, by pak snadno mohli podlehnout choutce vystavit pro tyto „jiné zájmy“ Evropu jaderné zkáze.

Those American politicians for whom other interests were more important than peace could easily succumb to the temptation to subject Europe to nuclear destruction for the sake of their "other interests".

In example (1) we observed that the location of FRG experienced a shift to Central Europe. However, in example (5) the Western-European location of the FRG was re-instated. This is likely to be the result of the antagonistic policy of the country against trade with socialist countries. Germany's alliance with America, here metonymically referred to as Washington, seems to be another important factor here. Therefore we can presume that it is the combination of two features vital for a relationship with another country, the politics and the business matters, that have a severe impact on the country's shift within the European continent.

5) Několik týdnů zbývá do zahájení červnového zasedání nejvyšších představitelů členských zemí Atlantického paktu v Bonnu [. . .]. Na Rýně se ozývají obavy, že americký ministr obrany Weinberger prosadí další zostření kursu NATO a bude [. . .] kategoricky žádat větší „finanční oběti“ západní Evropy.

Only several weeks are left before the June meeting of the highest NATO representatives in Bonn [. . .]. Concerns can be heard on the Rhine that American Secretary of Defence Weinberger will set NATO on an even more aggressive course and will demand categorically bigger “financial sacrifices“ of Western Europe.

It was not only the countries of the Western bloc that were ideologically moved to different directions. Also the CSSR and other countries of the Eastern bloc experienced a similar modus operandi:

In (6) the Czechoslovak President Gustav Husák states that it was beneficial to exchange views on problems specifically in Central Europe and continues: “Rakousko i Československo chtějí, aby jejich lid žil v míru, aby se pokračovalo v uvolňování napětí, abychom se nedostali do katastrofy” ‘Both Austria and Czechoslovakia want their people to live in peace, to continue in relieving the tensions, not to end up in a disaster’.

This wording enables us to assume that the CSSR was being referred to as a Central European Country. However, later in the same article, a journalist interviewing Gustáv Husák asks a question in which we can find the CSSR specifically looked upon as an Eastern European country: “Jak vidíte vývoj v sousedním Polsku a vliv událostí v Polsku na situaci ve východní Evropě všeobecně, a v Československu zvlášť?” ‘What is your view on the development on the neighbouring Poland and the situation in Eastern Europe generally, and particularly in Czechoslovakia?’ It is also the question: “Jak dalece -- jestli vůbec -- se dotýká významná událost v západní Evropě [. . .] styků mezi Západem z Východem a zvlášť poměrů mezi Bonnem a Prahou?” ‘How far - - if at all - - does the important event in Western Europe concern [. .

.] contacts between the West and the East and particularly relations between Bonn and Prague?’

Attention should be paid to the attribute of “Central European” country here. This attribute highlights a position of the CSSR in Central Europe, half way - - possibly as a bridge - - between the East and the West. We can conclude that this attribute of a Central European country enables the country to weaken its strictly ideological position within the Eastern bloc and shed off the connotations of a dull, uncivilised satellite of the USSR, however daring it may seem in an interview with Gustav Husák in 1982.

The omnipresent issues of peace and security on the European continent are discussed in citation (7) where the concepts of *střed Evropy* ‘the centre of Europe’ and *srdce Evropy* ‘the heart of Europe’ are used. The article does not give an exactly clear explanation of what is meant by the *centre of Europe* or the *heart of Europe*. The list of countries which according to the article belong to the centre of Europe includes GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, FRG and also Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg. This provides us with a fuzzy geographical description of “the centre of Europe”. Also, the two concepts are used as synonyms. What still remains clear from this description of “the heart of Europe” and “the centre of Europe” is the fact that neither of them lacks an ideological aspect anyway.

7) Další kolo jednání vídeňských rozhovorů / Ulehčit Evropskému srdci

Vídeňské rozhovory [ . . . ] lze rovněž chápat jako součást úsilí o dosažení větší evropské bezpečnosti. V tomto smyslu jsou nedílnou součástí zápasu mírumilovných sil o ozdravení ovzduší, o snížení rizika vojenské konfrontace na evropském kontinentě. Byl-li při teritoriálním vymezení těchto jednání vybrán právě střed Evropy, byť není přísně geografický, důvodem k tomu byla skutečnost, že to je právě místo, kde spolu hraničí dvě vojenská seskupení a kde je relativně největší vojenská koncentrace. Proto má celoevropský význam, jestliže by se právě zde v této oblasti podařilo dosáhnout dohody o snížení stavu vojsk a výzbroje. Vždyť jde o území NDR, ČSSR a Polska na jedné straně, o NSR, Belgie Holandsko a Lucembursko na straně druhé.

A New Round of Vienna Negotiations / To Take Away the Stress from the Heart of Europe

Vienna negotiations [. . .] can also be viewed as a part of the efforts to reach better European security. In this sense, they are a coherent part of the peace-loving forces' struggle for a healthier atmosphere, reducing the risk of military confrontation on the European continent. If the centre of Europe, although not exactly the geographical one, was chosen when the territory of the negotiations was defined, the reason for that is the fact that this is the border-line of two military alliances and the place where the relatively highest military concentration can be found. Therefore it is of a European-wide importance if agreement on the reduction of the numbers of soldiers and weapons can be found right in this location. It is the territory of the GDR, CSSR, and Poland on one side and FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg on the other.


I recorded only one instance of the concept "the heart of Europe" in the newspaper discourse though it was a popular figure of speech of Czechoslovakia's communist politicians. I investigate the concept of "the heart of Europe" further in the second part of this study.

The atmosphere of military confrontation and the political tension on the European continent is easily detectable throughout the newspaper discourse, the examples of which are chronologically listed in the study. Example (8) was chosen to document the situation and to demonstrate that instead of the expression Eastern Europe a name of a country, *Sovětský svaz* 'The Soviet Union,' was chosen as a counterpart of *západní Evropa* 'Western Europe'.


8) Rozhodně také odmítl tvrzení této vlády, že jaderné zbraně údajně už desítky let chrání mír v Evropě, stejně jako falešný argument, že jaderné zbraně jsou prý pro západní Evropu nezbytné vzhledem k údajné převaze Sovětského svazu v konvenčních zbraních.

He definitely rejected the statement of the government that, allegedly, nuclear weapons had protected peace in Europe for many years as well as a false argument that nuclear weapons are important for Western Europe due to the Soviet Union's alleged dominant position in conventional weapons.

Based on the initial presumption that the European continent until 1989 was divided by the iron curtain into two antagonistic blocs, the East and the West the graph providing us with a definition of Europe should be:

**Diagram b:**

However, based on the above example (8), a graph used to define Europe would be as follows:

**Diagram c:**

As presumed initially, the above mentioned examples demonstrate a limited imagery of the concept of Europe. The printed media discourse from 1980 – 1989 discusses Europe mainly in terms of conflicts and antagonistic powers. The US is often pointed to as a common instigator of troubles in Europe and on various occasions the antagonistic powers of the East and the West get united against the US. The process of unification of the whole of Europe against the United States' effort to place nuclear weapons on the European continent can be observed through the course of the period from 1980 up to 1988 as documented in articles from the period. These are referenced throughout this case study and could be brought together in a sub-group that could have a title "the American Enemy".

**The American Enemy:**

Although the threat from the American enemy is not directly expressed in the following two examples, we can still observe a military and political division of Europe there. These aspects are enhanced by using such an expression as *styčná linie* 'line of contact' which in Czech is used distinctively in military

lexicon. This way Europe is reduced to two military groupings of the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

9) Sovětský svaz zaujímá kladný postoj k návrhům na vytvoření nejaderných pásem v různých oblastech Evropy, [. . .]. Vytvoření nejaderných pásem na Balkáně a v severní Evropě a rovněž oblastí bez jaderných zbraní na obou stranách styčné linie států Varšavské smlouvy a NATO přímo souvisí se snižováním vojenského nebezpečí a upevňování důvěry.


The USSR is positive about the proposals for nuclear-free zones in various areas of Europe, [. . .]. Establishment of nuclear-free zones in the Balkans and in Northern Europe and also areas without nuclear weapons on both sides of the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO is directly connected with the reduction in military deterrent and building the mutual trust.

10) [. . .] SSSR se snažil o takové poválečné uspořádání Evropy, které by zajistilo, aby již nikdy nedošlo k opakování tragických událostí z druhé světové války. Objektivní historik musí proto odmítnout hlasy na Západě, které dnes Jaltu označují za porážku západních zemí a žádají její „revizi“. Historické zkušenosti z druhé světové války ukazují, že k posílení míru v Evropě a ve světě je dnes v první řadě obnovit důvěru zejména mezi státy dvou hlavních vojenských seskupení, NATO a Varšavské smlouvy.


[. . .] the USSR strove for such European arrangements after the war that would make certain that the tragic WWII experiences would never be repeated. Therefore an objective historian must disagree with those from the West who currently see Jalta as the defeat of Western countries and call for its “revision”. The historical experiences from WWII show that, to strengthen the peace in Europe and all over the world, mutual trust amongst the states of the two main military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, must be first renewed.

A diagram drafted to show the definition of Europe would then be as follows:



**Diagram d:**

We should also notice, that the impact of the USSR on the arrangement on the European continent is stressed in both examples (9) and (10). This could be drafted as:

**Diagram e:**

The citation which has been used above as example (5) evokes a strong atmosphere of American threat to Europe by using such powerful expressions as “kategoricky žádat větší ‘finanční oběti’ západní Evropy” ‘demand categorically bigger “financial sacrifices“ of Western Europe’, “nové nátlakové akce Washingtonu” ‘new pressurising activities from Washington’. Based on statements such as:

11) [. . .] jsou to Spojené státy, které rozhodují o tom, co se bude dít s těmito zbraněmi v západní Evropě. [. . .] Jde o to, že Spojené státy jsou připravené zničit celou Evropu.

[. . .] it is the United States who decides what will happen with these weapons in Western Europe. [. . .] The problem is that the United States is prepared to destroy the whole of Europe.


and also:

12) Za příčinu zotřování napětí označuje rozmístování amerických jaderných zbraní prvního úderu v západní Evropě.

He sees the cause of increasing tension in placements of American nuclear weapons of the first attack in Western Europe.

it is possible to draft the following diagram:

**Diagram f:**



Although the initial hypothesis was based on the presumption that Europe would be clearly divided into two antagonistic blocs, the examples gathered from newspaper discourse between approximately 1980 and 1985 show that the understanding of Europe can vary, as diagrams **b**, **c**, **d**, **e** and **f** document.

#### 4.I.1.2 Impact on the Lexicon

Where neutral references to the ideological direction in various parts of the continent are applied, the continent is usually referred to as:

evropský kontinent	European continent
Evropa	Europe
celá Evropa	the whole of Europe
celoevropský	European-wide

On the other hand, when blame or praise is to be assigned, the distribution into the following, more precise, geographical and geopolitical categories is often applied which I understand as a result of an involuntary co-existence of two antagonistic blocs alongside one another.

západní Evropa	Western Europe
severní Evropa	Northern Europe

Balkán	the Balcans
tyčná linie Varšavské smlouvy a NATO	the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO
různé oblasti Evropy	various parts of Europe
Atlantický pakt	the Atlantic Pact
střední Evropa	Central Europe
socialistické společenství	the socialist alliance
NATO, Varšavská smlouva a Rada vzájemné hospodářské pomoci	NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA
Evropské státy	European countries

#### 4.1.2. Culture

The investigation of the concept of Europe would not be complete without a search through the culture and sports sections in newspapers. However, the task to find references to Europe was not a successful one. The proprium *Evropa* was documented three times and its adjective *evropský* was found only twice in the corpus of nineteen newspaper articles in expressions such as:

##### a) *evropský*

řada evropských a amerických muzeí	various European and American museums
kultury evropských národů	cultures of the European nations

##### b) *Evropa*

mladí lidé v Evropě	young people in Europe
přijíždějí ze severní, západní a jižní Evropy	they come from Northern, Western and Southern Europe
s mnoha hlavními městy nejen Evropy, ale i ostatních kontinentů	with many capitals of not only Europe but also other continents

There may be several reasons why the name Europe was not used more frequently. Some of them can be easily detected in the citations from the article “Umění je mocná zbraň” ‘Art Is a Powerful Weapon’ by Jaroslava Heřtová who presents views of the role of art in the socialist society as follows:

18) Sepětí umění se socialistickou revolucí se tedy projevuje i po "lidské", "osobní" stránce - - v tom, že umění (a kulturnost vůbec) je nedílnou součástí osobností vůdců revoluce. Marxističtí revolucionáři vždy - - i v nejtěžších dobách perzekuce a ilegálního boje - - věnovali pozornost klasickému i novému umění. [. . .] Socialistická revoluce potřebuje umění ne jako prostředek pouhé zábavy [. . .], ale jako mocnou účinnou zbraň v boji za nový, spravedlivější společenský systém i za nového člověka; a umění v ní toto poslání skutečně plní. [. . .] To, co bylo řečeno o vztahu umění a revoluce, je samozřejmě aktuální i pro dnešek.

The link between art and the socialist revolution can be detected in the "human" "personal" aspect - - in the fact that art (and culture generally) is an inseparable part of a revolutionary leader's personality. Marxist revolutionaries have always - - even in the hardest times of persecution and illegal fights - - paid attention to both classical and modern art. [. . .] The Socialist revolution needs art not as means of entertainment [. . .] but as a powerful weapon in the battle for both a new, fair social system and a new man; and art fulfils this mission . [. . .] What has been said about the relation between art and revolution is of course valid even today.

Culture was seen as a powerful ideological weapon. It was an imperative to preserve the socialist culture with the right ideological charge and safeguard it from being infiltrated with hostile ideas. Therefore the reason for the scarce occurrence of *Evropa* in the culture section of newspapers may be the fact that European implications and dimensions of cultural matters were constantly being suppressed and the country's belonging to a socialist bloc was stressed instead. This resulted in the denial of Europe as a cultural entity. This may give us an explanation of why the description of participation of artists from all over the world at the Prague Spring Music Festival chooses not to use adjectives such as *evropský* 'European' or *světový* 'worldwide'. Instead of that of it is carefully phrased as: "Umělci z osmnácti zemí připravili [. . .] 68 koncertů" 'Artists from 18 countries prepared [. . .] 68 concerts'.<sup>30</sup>

The festival, which Czechoslovakia was highly proud of, is referred to as an international festival *mezinárodní festival*, adjectives *evropský* or *světový*

<sup>30</sup> Jaromír Pešek, Zdeněk Vokurka, "Výrazný úspěch festivalu Pražské jaro v roce české hudby 1984/ Poselství miliónům," *Právo* 9 June 1984: 5.

*world* were not used to describe the event. The appraisal of the festival states that:

19) [. . .] uplynulý ročník Pražského jara, které je vizitkou naší socialistické společnosti, v níž umění má svůj nezastupitelný podíl na jejím utváření, přispívá k dorozumění a mírové spolupráci mezi národy a podněcuje rozvoj lidské osobnosti. [. . .] i to je jedním z hlavních rysů této významné kulturně politické události, která potvrdila společenský význam hudby, důstojně manifestovala naši hudební kulturu a dala lidem ne jeden silný umělecký prožitek, hodně radosti, krásy a posily pro další zápasy o vybojování světového míru.

[. . .] the past year of the Prague Spring, which does credit to our socialist society, where art plays an irreplaceable role in its creation, assists to reach understanding and peaceful co-operation between nations and encourages the development of human personality. [. . .] also this is one of the main features of this cultural and political event, which authenticated the importance of music for a society, manifested our music culture and provided the people with many strong cultural experiences, joy, beauty and strength for future battles for achieving the world-wide peace.

The choice of the expression “vizitkou naší socialistické společnosti” ‘credit to our socialist society’ over the expression “vizitka naší země” ‘credit to our country’, that could have been used instead, may be interpreted as the ideological way of thinking about culture at the time. It is further extended in a sentence stating that the festival was a “kulturně politická událost” ‘cultural and political event’. The evaluation of the festival does not call for recognition of the high quality programme, talent of musicians, singers, and conductors, it simply reduces music to a tool ideological education.

Meetings of various artists or festivals are not referred to as European ones in the current newspaper discourse but constructions such as “Mezinárodní setkání spisovatelů” ‘The International Meeting of Writers’<sup>31</sup> or “Festival zájmové umělecké činnosti socialistických zemí” ‘The Festival of Past-time Cultural Activities of Socialist Countries’<sup>32</sup> are used. An article with a promising title “Kniha nezná hranice státu” ‘Books Do Not Recognise State

<sup>31</sup> František Mareš, “Mezinárodní setkání spisovatelů,” Právo 5 Oct. 1985: 5.

<sup>32</sup> Irena Beblavá, “Jakou cenu má přátelství,” Právo 30 July 1985: 5.

Borders'<sup>33</sup> was found, however its examination revealed only a description of a trip to an event celebrating The Week of Children's Books and Work of Arts in Bulgaria. Ignoring the European cultural life makes the newspapers focus on local affairs or events within the social bloc, such as the above mentioned "Mezinárodní setkání spisovatelů", "Festival zájmové umělecké činnosti socialistických zemí" or cultural events within the communist bloc such as the "X. Festival of Latin-America Films in Havana"<sup>34</sup>. When information about outstanding events is given, such as Mark Chagall's and Kazimir Malevitch's exhibitions in Moscow, involvement of other countries is recognised as "mezinárodní spolupráce" 'international co-operation' and the potential European dimension of the event is not stated.

#### 4.1.3. Sports

The results obtained from searches in the Sports section were different from the Culture section. In the corpus of twenty-three articles from the examined period, the adjective *evropský* was documented on eleven occasions and the noun *Evropa* on fourteen occasions. It would be wrong to expect that, due to the higher occurrence of the examined lexical units *Evropa* and *evropský* in the sports context, sport was spared from ideological interventions and ideological education. Through the course of the examined period, several articles passionately describing "dirty plots" against the 1980 Olympic Games to be held in Moscow were found:

20) Lze s jistotou říci, že olympijské hry 1980 v Moskvě již nyní přispívají k uvolňování mezinárodního napětí a upevnění světového míru. Zároveň je nutné konstatovat, že OH v Moskvě mají v zahraničí nejen své příznivce, ale i nepřátele, kteří se tuto sportovní akci pokoušejí zneužít k šíření lží a pomluv o naší zemi, k zostření politické situace ve světě.

It can be said with a high degree of certainty that the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games contributed to relieving international tension and strengthening the peace all over the world. At the same time, it must be

<sup>33</sup> Josef Pohl, "Kniha nezná hranic státu," Právo 31 July 1985: 5.

<sup>34</sup> Bohuslav Borovička, "Na okraj X. festivalu latinsko-amerického filmu/ Ze společné studny," Právo 2 Jan. 1989: 5.

stated that the Moscow Olympic Games had its supporters as well as its enemies abroad who tried to misuse this event to spread lies and slander about our country, and to damage the world-wide political situation.

Topics of politics and the American enemy were discussed regularly in connection with sports and the Olympic Games:

21) Protesty proti snaze americké vlády v čele s prezidentem Carterem bojkotovat Olympijské hry v Moskvě neustávají .

Protests against the American Government's effort lead by President Carter to boycott the Moscow Olympic games do not stop.

or unethical practices of Western European professional sports:

22) O západním a především americkém profesionálním sportu se v buržoazním tisku píše téměř vždy v souvislosti s "balíky peněz" [ . . . ] na Západě skutečně existují sportovci, kteří vydělávají hodně [ . . . ] .

Western and mainly American professional sports are usually covered by the bourgeoisie press almost always in connection with "loads of money" [ . . . ] there are real sportsmen in the West who earn a lot [ . . . ] ."

Other articles focus on the first and foremost role of the Czechoslovak Sports Association which is not so much "masový rozvoj tělesné výchovy, sportu a turistiky" 'the mass development of physical education, sports and tourism' but "ideově výchovné působení" 'activity in the sphere of ideologically correct education' as the headline "Prvořadým úkolem výchova" 'Education is the first and foremost task' states.<sup>35</sup>

#### 4.I.3.1. The Lexicon

The occurrence of the adjective *evropský* and noun *Evropa* was found regularly through the examined period in constructions such as:

##### a) *evropský*

čtvrtfinále evropských pohárů  
evropská medaile

quarterfinals of European cups  
European medal

<sup>35</sup> "Prvořadým úkolem výchova," Právo 11 June 1984: 8.

evropská špička	European top
evropské pohárové soutěže	European competition
evropský pohár	European cup

**b) *Evropa***

juniorští mistři Evropy	junior Euroeapan masters
mistři Evropy	Euroeapan masters
mistrovství Evropy <sup>36</sup>	European championship
fotbalová Evropa	football Europe
desítka nejlepších Evropanů	ten best Europeans

Not only the ideological label of ‘the West’ was documented in example (22), the reference to *střední Evropa* ‘Central Europe’ was also found<sup>37</sup>.

As well as in other areas of life, the noun *družba* was also documented in sports within the article “Družba na kolech” ‘Druzhba on the bikes’<sup>38</sup>.

By comparing the Culture and Sports sections I raise a question of why these two topics show such different results in the use of ‘Europe’. Both areas reveal heavy political and ideological interventions as citations (18), (19), (20), and (22) demonstrate. The difference could be caused by the USSR’s sports success on the European and worldwide scene and consequently the participation in a high number of sports associations and competitions recognised in both blocs. Another reason - - although covered by the red veil of communist sports propaganda still not negligible - - could be the economic aspects of involvement in European sports life. It was the hard currency rewards successful sportsmen and sportswomen would bring to the state treasury, together with various Western sponsorship offers, which no socialist country was in a position to decline. The possible financial reasons for the existence of the entity of Sports Europe came to light after examining an article covering cycling and sponsorship in the Eastern bloc:

Let’s have a closer look at the conditions in which both professional teams will work: the main sponsor of the Soviet team is the concern the headquarters of

<sup>36</sup> *Mistrovství Evropy* which is often used in the abbreviated form *ME* was documented eight times in various sports articles from the followed period.

<sup>37</sup> “Obhájili loňskou pozici,” *Právo* 4. Jan. 1980: 8.

<sup>38</sup> “Družba na kolech,” *Právo* 2 July 1983: 8.



which are in San Marino [. . .] . The competitors are full of optimism and believe that they will earn enough to gain high profits. The symbiosis of the outstanding competitive quality of the Soviet Union with the professional approach of the experienced [. . .] Italian management wants to achieve high targets. The [. . .] technical provision of the team covers even the smallest of details such as the token of appreciation for wives and children of the competitors on their birthdays [. . .].”<sup>39</sup>

#### 4.I.4. Business Matters

It was within the intentions of socialist ideology to distract the general public from their mundane material concerns and to lead them to a higher level of non-material intellectual welfare and public interest. Both the party leaders and the people in the Eastern bloc countries were aware of the under-achievement in their economies and technology compared to the West. This affected differences in material standards of life between the East and the West. Since the idea of “if you cannot beat them, join them” was impossible to apply in practice, the strategy of censorship of economic information together with avoiding incriminating issues as much as possible was adopted. This is why East-West business and trade issues were rarely discussed in connection with Europe. The newspaper discourse concerning business shows the following:

A business article from 1981 contained a reference to the UN as a respectable body and unifying element in economic co-operation within the whole of Europe.

23) Na 36. zasedání Hospodářské komise OSN pro Evropu (HKE) vystoupil v úterý vedoucí čs. delegace [. . .] . Vyzdvihl nezastupitelnost úlohy HKE v rozvoji celoevropské spolupráce [. . .].

The head of the Czechoslovak delegation spoke at the 36<sup>th</sup> session of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) on Tuesday [. . .] . He highlighted the irreplaceable role of the ECE in the development of Europe-wide co-operation [. . .] .

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<sup>39</sup> “Družba na kolech,” *Právo* 2 July 1983: 8.

Further references to business matters are presented either as contacts between individual countries (24) or as references to economic structures of the EEC and CMEA and descriptions of extensive and highly sophisticated negotiations between the two structures (25) and (26).

In the texts where the EEC is discussed, its image is often painted in terms of internal conflicts, quarrels, and economic problems or in gloomy colours of constantly rising figures of unemployment (27).

Citation (28) is from 1987. The equation Europe = Sense + Co-operation could be seen as an overture to the Common European House concept first introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in the Autumn of the same year. Also, it should be noted that it is neither the two economic alliances of the CME and the EEC, nor the military structures of NATO and the Warsaw Pact that are seen as the main constituents of Europe here:

28) Jednání mezi RVHP a EHS má perspektivu / Evropa = Rozum + Spolupráce


Náš titulek bohužel zatím neodpovídá reálnému stavu, nejen když mluvíme o politice, ale i v oblasti hospodářství. Ačkoli právě v Evropě se soustřeďují ekonomické organizace RVHP a EHS.

Negotiations between the CMEA and the EEC have a good perspective/  
Europe = Sense + Co-operation

It is unfortunate that at present our headline does not correspond to the real situation, not only when we discuss politics but also economy, despite the fact that the economic organisations of the CMEA and the EEC are concentrated in Europe.

Unlike the previous quotations that defined Europe as an equation between political, economic, and military structures of the East versus the West, this article defines Europe as:

**Diagram g:**




which should represent the ideal situation on the European continent. The opposing powers and interest groups have been eliminated and replaced by desirable balance of mutually complementing influences.

The following two articles foretell the situation in which many countries of Central and Eastern Europe would find themselves several years later. Their leaders and people will experience the same feelings as those of Spain and Portugal, and Turkey and they will hope that their country will soon become a part of the actual Europe.


29) [. . .] členské státy EHS se dohodly na tom, že od prvního ledna příštího roku rozšíří Španělsko a Portugalsko evropskou „desítku“ na „dvanáctku“. Po mnoha letech tahanic, sporů a nedorozumění tedy v Bruselu bouchaly zátky šampaňského a padala patetická slova o „jednotě“ západní Evropy. [. . .] Ani jedna z vlád obou pyrenejských zemí neskryvá fakt, že vstup do EHS je pro ně především věcí politickou. [. . .] Španělský ministr zahraničních věcí Fernando Morán dokonce v Bruselu neváhal prohlásit, že „jsme nyní skutečně součástí západní Evropy, je konec komplexu méněcennosti, který v nedávných dějinách Španělska způsobil tolik zla [. . .]“.

[ . . . ] the EEC member countries decided that from the first January next year Spain and Portugal will extend the “European ten” to the “European twelve”. After many years of scuffle, conflicts, and misunderstanding, champagne corks were popping and passionate statements about the “unity” of Western Europe were proclaimed in Brussels. [. . .] Neither of the Pyrenees governments disguises the fact that accession to the EEC is mainly a political matter for them. [. . . ] The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs Fernando Moran even did not hesitate to state in Brussels that “now when we are finally an integral part of Western Europe, it is the end of the inferiority complex that caused so much damage in the recent history of Spain [ . . . ]”.

Two diagrams can be drawn to help define Western Europe. Diagram h defines Western Europe before 1 January 1986:

**Diagram h:**

It may be assumed that it is primarily the geographic location in Western Europe that assures that a particular country is recognised as having a Western European format. However article (29) clearly diagnoses the causes of inferiority complex of Spain as a result of lacking membership in a particular political and economic structure of other Western European countries. The shift in a location of a country we observed for instance in citations (1) and (5) also affected Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Although Italy is geographically classified as being a South European country, it was a member of E10 at that time and therefore labelled as Western Europe. The latter two, despite being geographically located more to the west than Italy, were excluded from the definition of Western Europe. If, following the article, we attempt to define Western Europe after 1 January 1986, the diagram may be drafted as follows:

**Diagram i:**

The connection between Europe and the EEC first established in citation (29) is confirmed in (30):

30) Modro před očima tureckého premiéra / Trnitá cesta do Evropy

Jenom docela malý kousek Turecké republiky spadá – z hlediska geografického vzato – do Evropy. Turecko by ovšem rádo patřilo do

Evropy celé. Nebo alespoň do Evropského hospodářského společenství, což je pro ně fakticky totéž.

The Turkish Premier Sees Blue/ A Thorny Path to Europe

Only a tiny part of the Republic of Turkey comes under - - from the geographical point of view - - Europe. The whole of Turkey, however, would like to belong to Europe; at least to the European Economic Community, which as a matter of fact for them is the same.

The above article stands out from the corpus of European images. It was written in 1987 and was ahead of its time thanks to the instituted parallel between the EEC and Europe that has been present in Czech newspapers and political discourse only since November 1989. Its headings “Modro před očima tureckého premiéra” ‘Turkish Prime Minister Sees Blue’ is directly related to the blue colour of the EEC flag. The article stresses that the Prime Minister’s intense endeavour to become part of the EEC and achieve the recognition of being a European country is due purely to economic reasons. In this citation it is not so much the geographical location but the membership of a group of countries with strong economies that brings financial advantages to its members and also the membership of a political alliance of countries that equates to a position in Europe. “Trnitá cesta do Evropy” ‘The Thorny Path to Europe’ then represents considerably more than only the metonymic reference between the Western European markets and Europe and is a subject to be examined in the following section of this study.

#### **4.I.5. 1980 – 1987: EUROPE IS A BATTLEFIELD**

The quotations show that the spectrum of European imagery pre-1989 is narrow. I suggest that the main metaphoric concept can, in line with Lakoff and Johnson’s methodology, be defined as EUROPE IS A BATTLEFIELD.

When I start subcategorising this metaphoric concept, the following streams of martial imagery can be observed in the above examples: BATTLE – TRUCE – DIALOGUE – PEACE.

### 4.1.5.1. The Lexicon

The desired imagery is evoked by expressions such as:

#### a) Battle:

horečné zbrojení	frenetic armament
aktivně se účastnit boje	actively participate in a battle
jaderná zkáza	nuclear disaster
styčná linie	line of military contact
žádat finanční oběti	demand financial sacrifices
zápas mírumilovných sil	battle of peace-loving powers

It is the formulation of “styčná linie varšavské smlouvy” ‘the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO’ that can be viewed particularly as a metaphor borrowed from modern military practice. The wording *styčná linie* ‘line of military contact’ that in Czech clearly indicates the confrontational concept of Europe.

#### b) Truce and dialogue:

mlčí zbraně	weapons are silent
snižování vojenského nebezpečí a upevňování důvěry	lowering military danger and strengthening trust
uvolňování napětí a odzbrojení	tension and disarmament relieving
zaujímat kladný postoj	to take a positive standpoint
najít společnou řeč	to find a common language

#### c) Peace:

vytvoření nejaderných pásem Europe	to create nuclear-free zones in v Evropě
mírové hnutí mohutní a sílí	the peace movement is getting wider and stronger
rozvoj celoevropské spolupráce	development of Europe-wide co-operation
důvěra a porozumění na evropském kontinentu	trust and understanding on the European continent

If we adopt a different approach to the search for imagery, yet remain within prevailing imagery of a BATTLE, the categories of construction versus destruction can be identified. They fit logically into the structure of war: i.e. war equals destruction, as destruction is a consequence of war. Further, that one who causes destruction and damage that we care about is our enemy. If

war equals destruction, then the opposite of war equals construction. Therefore peace equals construction, positive development and this is beneficial for us. The destruction caused by the West which is also happening in the West itself can be observed in constructions such as:

- přeměna střední Evropy v základnu amerických atomových zbraní  
transformation of Central Europe into an American nuclear weapons base'
- podřizovat se diktátu zvnějšku, účastnit se horečného zbrojení a omezovat státní suverenitu  
to subordinate itself to external dictates, to take part in a frenetic armament and to limit its state sovereignty'
- jiné zájmy jsou důležitější než zájmy míru  
other interests are more important than peace
- vystavit Evropu jaderné zkáze  
to subject Europe to nuclear destruction
- žádat větší „finanční oběti“ západní Evropy  
to demand bigger “financial sacrifices” of Western Europe

#### **4.I.5.1.1. PEACE IS WORK**

Construction of a better and happier future and work towards peace are two of the fundamental and most proclaimed statements of communist ideology.

The concept of peace plays a very important role in the conceptual system of a socialist society and the image of ‘peace and humanity - seeking’ East was painted carefully by propaganda. There are several ways to follow the concept of peace and to investigate its metaphoric potential. One of the streams of association evoked by peace can lead to rest, repose, and resignation (Longman Synonym Dictionary). These associations are not likely to be desirable for communist ideology. Socialist society was not supposed to rest and resign on its future; it was supposed to be alert, vigilant and fully involved. Therefore another suggested stream of association can lead from peace to contentment, pleasure and joy, and the will to maintain peace - to strengthen the foundations of the order that claims to allow the socialist man to live in that way (Longman Synonym Dictionary). This will enable the association with construction to be

created. Our experience allows the concept of construction to correspond to expansion and growth - - further leading to advancement and prosperity. Finally, prosperity is very closely related to welfare. The reasons why peace is so often highlighted in communist rhetoric can be summarised in the following structure:

peace = construction = expansion = prosperity = welfare of the people

Another phenomenon in the centre of communist ideology was the welfare of the people, i.e. the work force. Consequently, the concept of peace as a subcategory within the concept of Europe has been investigated. Types of images applied to the concept of peace, as recorded in the articles, were investigated and the following results found:

Although the Czech Language has a wide lexicon of verbs relating to war and peace, only a limited selection was recorded with repeatedly used verbs such as:

účastnit se	to participate
chránit	to protect
přispívat/přispět	to be contributing/ to contribute
mohutnět	to grow bigger
sílit	to grow stronger

and gerunds:

snižování	reducing
upevňování/ upevnění	strengthening
uvolnění	relieving

and these are used in constructions and statements such as:

- aktivně se účastní boje za za upevnění bezpečnosti v Evropě, za mír, uvolňování napětí  
it actively participates in the battle to strengthen the security of Europe, for peace, lessening the tension and disarmament'

- chrání mír v Evropě  
it protects peace in Europe



- ČSSR bude [ . . . ] dále rozvíjet spolupráci s cílem přispět k upevňování míru  
the CSSR will [ . . . ] further develop co-operation to contribute to peace  
strengthening.

These examples show that peace is presented not only as a frail object which is constantly in danger of being damaged and needs a lot of strengthening, maintenance and even construction. Peace is presented also as a precious commodity that could be taken away and, as such, needs to be guarded, secured and even fought for. Since the concepts of peace and war are polar opponents, it may not be simple to all members of a communist society to understand why peace is presented in terms of something that needs to be fought for. The investigation from the point of view of the ontological metaphor will cast light onto this aspect of peace.

A concept explained through the methodology of ontological metaphor will show us that precious commodities such as gold, diamonds or peace not only cost money, but also need to be protected and guarded so that we can secure their possession. Protection and guarding may include aspects of force, even armed force, to be actively applied on such commodities. If one adopts this explanation of the role of peace on the eastern side of the iron curtain, one will see the importance of the battle imagery and its role within the socialist line of thinking generally and also thinking specifically about Europe.

#### **4.I.5.1.2. Personification**

It has been noted that ontological metaphors occur frequently within the concept of peace. Ontological metaphors help us understand the world around us in terms that we are familiar with, e.g. peace is a frail object. These metaphors specify different kinds of objects, give us different metaphoric models and help us focus on different aspects of these objects (Lakoff 25 – 28).

One of the most typical examples of the ontological metaphor is personification which can be defined as a metaphor that specifies a physical

object as if it was a person. The investigation in this case study shows that the following concepts are subject to personification:

a) the categories of the West and the East:

styky mezi Západem a Východem  
East

contacts between the West and the

b) individual countries:

ČSSR bude dále rozvíjet spolupráci

the CSSR will further develop co-operation,

Sovětský svaz zaujímá kladný postoj

the Soviet Union is positive about [. . .],

Spojené státy jsou připraveny zničit celou Evropu

the United States is prepared to destroy the whole of Europe,

jsou to Spojené státy, které rozhodují o tom, co se bude dít s těmito zbraněmi

it is the United States who decides what will happen with these weapons,

and

c) names of cities which act as metonymical references to respective countries:

poměry mezi Bonnem a Prahou

relations between Bonn and Prague,

nátlakové akce Washingtonu

pressurising activities from Washington.

The mechanisms of personification do not only specify physical objects in human terms. This process can be developed further and various aspects of human beings can be added to the personified objects. Consequently, such constructions as “v zájmu celé Evropy je” ‘it is in the interests of the whole of Europe’ or “bude kategoricky žádat větší ‘finanční oběti’ západní Evropy” ‘it will categorically demand bigger “financial sacrifices” of Western Europe’ allow us to see Europe as a troubled person who needs to sacrifice and who is under threat of losing her<sup>40</sup> life. The United States is seen, not only as an opponent to Europe but, as an even more dangerous figure prepared to destroy her.

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<sup>40</sup>Evropa in Czech is a feminine noun. This is why the feminine gender was allocated to the noun in the translation into English.

#### 4.I.5.2. Battle Versus Peace, Work and Labour: the Lexicon

The lexicon of verbs and nouns used in the peace discourse of Czech newspapers in the 80s is not one of striking military language. I would suggest that the selection of verbs and nouns shifts it much closer to the lexicon of work and labour. Verbs *účastnit se*, *přispívat/přispět*, *mohutnět* and *sílit* ‘to participate, to contribute, to grow in size and to strengthen’ include attributes of team work, general public voluntary involvement in the activity, elements of creativity and systematically directed mass beneficial effort. The basic sense of the word work indicates activity, effort and achievement (Williams 334 – 37). Communist ideology stresses the consciousness of the physical and mental human activity in the concept of work. It is claimed that it was only the socialist order that freed a man from being exploited and the communist ideology elaborated a theory that in the communist order work will cease to exist as a labour for one’s livelihood and will become a man’s need. (Encyklopedický slovník 929 – 30)

If one agrees with the suggestion that the concept of peace may be equivalent to the welfare of people, i.e. the welfare of the work force, and carefully considers the concept of work as a part of the construction process aimed to achieve that welfare and conducted by the people for whom work is a need, then the categories of peace and work within the concept of Europe will be linked.

Ideologies are demonstrated through certain slogans and patterns. Political groups usually do not wish to remain open only to a handful of the chosen; they wish to gain power, spread, and recruit new members. However, to simply state one’s views or ideas will not be sufficient to make others adopt those views, change their routines, abandon their expectations, and act in accordance with one’s plans and desires. It is necessary to employ persuasive strategies.

In his essay *Politics and the English Language* George Orwell states: “In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defence of the indefensible” (*Language, Power and Ideology* 87). How else can the actions of countries

involved in increasing military potential and continuing to threaten others with a nuclear conflict while pointing to their peace efforts be explained other than purely as defending the indefensible and convincing the general public of the truths of the argument. Persuasive language is not intended to appeal primarily to reason but to the expectation and emotions of the recipients. The purpose of persuasion is not to inform the recipients but to make them believe, and eventually to make them act in accordance with their beliefs. Thus conviction is the primary aim of persuasion.

Sornig states that intelligibility is a prerequisite of persuasion – this is why those who are most easily trusted are those who sound most like the recipients. For the act of persuasion to be effective, the person to be convinced needs to understand all segments of the information communicated to him. Furthermore, the recipient of the information needs to adjust his views, i.e. to identify himself, to that which is being insinuated (Language, Power and Ideology 98 - 109). The mechanisms of seduction work differently to those of persuasion. Tactics of seduction employ trust in the truth and/or the credibility of the arguments. In the process of seduction, mutual understanding is not the primary goal. Through seduction attempts are made to make those who are being seduced “to do things as if on their own impulse but really upon instigation from outside [. . .]. the victims of seduction know they are being conditioned and controlled against their will instead of acting upon their own decisions” (98).

Sornig points out that different ideologies employ strategies similar to seduction and persuasion although these ideologies “concentrate on different aspects of behaviour depending on what is regarded as reasonable, respectable and righteous”(98).

Although it would be naïve to expect that normal Czechs would identify themselves with communist bosses, there are aspects that need to be considered to understand why so many of them would eventually be convinced or seduced to comply with the ideological line. Two of the aspects are the frequency and intensity of persuasion, the other one is the process of delivering official

propaganda. The propaganda is performed on two levels: the first being the level of censorship and the second the level of controlled disinformation of the general public. The process of conviction works mainly on cognitive argumentative basis not on the trust in the trust. Furthermore, being convinced of the truth of an argument or an idea in the first place doesn't prevent one from changing his mind later or having had his mind changed (97).

One of those who endured the years of socialist propaganda and neither changed his mind nor had his mind changed is Petr Fidelius. I am quoting his opinion on the automation operating the works of a totalitarian language since this provides another view of the potential of the concept of peace in communist ideology which is essential to understand the concept of peace in socialist ideology:

Jak funguje taková *totalitní řeč* v komunistickém provedení, o tom máme všichni dost a dost zkušeností. Připomeňme si tento mechanismus alespoň na několika příkladech.

Zmáčkneš třeba tlačítko „mír“: rozsvítí se světýlko a naskočí „demokracie“ a vzápětí nato „socialismus“. Jiný možný řetězec: „mír“ – „pokrok“ – „lid“ – „strana“ – „socialismus“. . . Odpověď je už předem naprogramována: „mír“ je ve skutečnosti „ideologický boj“[ . . . ].

All of us have plenty experience of the mechanisms of the communist version of *totalitarian talk*. Let's remind ourselves of this mechanism with several examples.

For instance we will press the button with the word “peace”: the light will go on and will show the word “democracy” and immediately after that “socialism”. Another possible combination: “peace” – “progress” – “mankind” – “the party” – “socialism”. . . The answer has been pre-programmed: “peace” is in fact “ideological war” [ . . . ]. (Fidelius 184)

Fidelius presents the totalitarian language as a set of ready-made building blocks used in particular circumstances. The communist political leaders were of course well aware of the ideologically split continent and it was their intention to support the image of a split Europe. Wodak, who examines various areas of political discourse, identifies mechanisms and functions of political jargons by stating that:

“Political groups need their own language and to portray themselves via this language; they define their territory by means of their language; they signal their ideology through certain slogans and stereotypes; their ideological structure is joined together in a certain way and so is their argumentation.” (Language, Power and Ideology 137)

The research of the concept of Europe based on articles mapping its use pre November 1989 have only confirmed the above statement. The language and stereotypes in the main ideological concept of both the East and the West show that the two blocs are highly antagonistic. There are only limited elements of unification or genuine co-operation between them. Therefore I conclude that the initial theoretical suggestion of the concept EUROPE IS BATTLEFIELD has been confirmed.

#### **4.I.6. 1987 – 1989: EUROPE IS A BUILDING SITE**

In 1987 a white flag was waved on the battlefield of Europe. In the speech to commemorate the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Great October Revolution, Mikhail Gorbachev first introduced his vision of the Common European House. This move brought along a breeze of fresh air into the stuffy atmosphere of Europe which was threatened by nuclear conflict. This is documented in 1987 when the Czechoslovak Prime Minister Lubomír Štrougal mentions *budování nové Evropy* ‘building new Europe’ in the greetings to the European Commission’s Convention. The expression of building a new Europe was documented only once and it can be concluded from the article that the “new” attribute of Europe prerequisites removing obstacles in European co-operation and development of corresponding political and economic infrastructure.

It could be claimed that it was the second time in the history of Europe that the Soviet Union took a step towards European integration. As Peter Coffey argues, the first time, which was the earliest and the most significant move to European integration on a wider scale, came from the USSR and the Eastern European states and resulted in the foundation of the Council of the Mutual Economic Assistance in 1949 (The Future of Europe, 22). Gorbachev’s image

of Europe thus initiated a process which can be illustrated in the gradual shift from the concept of EUROPE IS A BATTLEFIELD to EUROPE IS A BUILDING SITE.

The idea of the Common European House is interpreted by some primarily as a disarmament process, e.g. the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR Alexander Jakovlev explains how the Communist Party of the USSR understands the concept:

31) Jak my chápeme tento problém a zejména myšlenku společného evropského domu? Vždyť jeho budování zahájil helsinský proces, když evropské státy pochopily, že starým způsobem nelze dále žít [ . . . ].

How do we understand the problem and mainly the idea of the Common European House? Its construction was launched by the Helsinki Process when the European countries understood that we could not live the old way [ . . . ].

Others expand the initial interpretation of disarmament dialogues and extend it to a process of spiritual and intellectual revival of Europe:

32) Budujeme evropský dům

Zvláštní pozornost byla při jednání věnována Evropě a návrhu na budování „celoevropského domu“, který předložil Michail Gorbačov. Prezident Francois Mitterand charakterizoval tento návrh jako velkou myšlenku.

We are building the European House

During the negotiations, particular attention was paid to Europe and the proposal to build the “Europe-wide house” presented by Mikhail Gorbachev. President Francois Mitterand characterised the proposal as a powerful idea.

The following quotation is from 1989. While the articles the topic of which is situation on the European continent gradually use the imagery of the Common European House more and more, the military terminology and imagery has not been abandoned yet.

33) Na otázku, co považují za hlavní styčné body mezi Východem a Západem z hlediska možností urychlit proces sblížování v Evropě, budovat onen „evropský dům“, všichni shodně zdůraznili, že hlavní je

všeobecné pochopení nezbytnosti zajistit, na našem kontinentu bezpečnost.

In a reply to the question what they consider to be the main point of contact between the East and the West regarding speeding up the process of bringing one another closer within Europe and to construct the “European House”, everybody univocally stressed the general understanding of the need to make our continent safe.

The content of the selected quotation is most characteristic for Common European House talk at that time. A range of issues raised in connection with the topic expands. Co-operation in ecology, culture, and genuine appreciation of each other’s contribution to the common goals instead of confrontation are mentioned more frequently. The imagery of a house and the process of the construction that will be carried out in several stages are developed further in the sentence: “Podle jeho názoru bude společný nerozdělený evropský dům postaven postupně -- a pražské setkání je takovým stupněm k jeho realizaci” ‘In his opinion the common undivided European House will be built in several stages - - and the Prague meeting is one stage to its completion’.<sup>41</sup>

#### 4.I.6.1. The Lexicon

The lexicon of European discourse can be divided in accordance with the main political concepts into two groups. They are the surviving lexicon of military language and the language of construction, co-operation, and development:

##### a) military language:

- |                       |                           |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| • obraz nepřítele     | the image of the enemy    |
| • zajistit bezpečnost | to provide security       |
| • styčné body         | points of contact/liaison |
| • válečné riziko      | danger of war             |
| • odzbrojovací proces | process of disarmament    |
| • modernizace zbraní  | modernisation of weapons  |



b) language of co-operation and construction:

- proces sblížení                      the process of getting closer
- Evropa hledala společný jazyk      Europe looked for a common language
- společné zásady přestavby          joint principles of reconstruction
- jednat co nejkonstruktivněji        to act in the most constructive way
- rezervy v informovanosti            reserve in keeping people informed
- podkopat helsinský proces          to undermine the Helsinki process
- [hodnoty] je třeba zachovat a        the values need to be maintained and  
    prohlubovat                              and embedded more deeply
- pracovat společně                      to work together

Developments in personification mirror the changes within the political climate of Europe. Examination of personification reveals that Europe remains portrayed as a distressed, threatened person who decides to arm herself in the expectation of an attack although being uncertain of where the blow will come from and why. Compared to the person before 1988, the new Europe realises that retaliation is not the only solution. She would like to communicate and attempts to connect with her potential attackers and searches for a mutually acceptable language.

#### 4.I.7. Summary or From A BATTLEFIELD to A BUILDING SITE

The spectrum of European imagery followed between approximately 1980 and April 1989 was not static. The imagery of Europe being torn apart by internal conflicts, and therefore defined as EUROPE IS A BATTLEFIELD, was the prevailing one. We could also observe other streams of imagery, within the theme of Europe such as EUROPE IS A TROUDED PERSON or PEACE IS WORK. Through the course of time, the heavy military lexicon and imagery gradually developed into a more refined one. Since 1987 a new concept of Europe as *a building site* has emerged, however the metaphoric concept of EUROPE IS A BATTLEFIELD has not completely vanished from the political scene. It is possible to claim that the two concepts are beginning to co-exist alongside each other. The two neighbouring clans of the West and the East begin to recognise

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<sup>41</sup> Svatava Hodíková, "Hovoříme s účastníky pražského kolokvia o evropském domě/Obrysy se už rýsují," Práce 3 Apr. 1989:3.

that the current situation is unbearable for both. They realise they should learn to live next to each other amicably but old strife is not easy to leave behind.

The development within the concept of Europe between 1987 and November 1989 can be summarised in the quotation: "We cannot move in yet but the layout of the house is being drawn".<sup>42</sup> I will follow the imagery from April 1989 onwards to establish if the construction of the *Common European House* is going to progress and what other streams of imagery will develop alongside.

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<sup>42</sup> Svatava Hodíková, "Hovoříme s účastníky pražského kolokvia o evropském domě/ Obrysy se už rýsují," *Práce* 3 Apr. 1989:3.

## 4.II. From Europe to the European Union

Discussions about the need to return to Europe commenced soon after 17 November 1989. Although occasional references<sup>43</sup> state that “Back to Europe” was a revolutionary slogan, I did not find any written records substantiating the claim either in the printed media or in studies debating the time in question. A study by Naděžda Kvítková is the only academic account that is currently available<sup>44</sup> of the Velvet Revolution’s slogans. Kvítková follows the network of “mobilising texts” in Prague underground stations and other public places in the revolutionary period of 1989. Her study covers the persuasive function of the texts written by anonymous authors and their gradually changing focus. Quotations by ancient and classical authors, renowned Czech personalities, and quotations from the Bible were recorded. Kvítková classifies them as ethical messages and proof of the fact that the revolution identified itself with a wider European context and values of Christianity. However she does not report the existence of a slogan urging the nation to return to Europe.<sup>45</sup>

Calls to return to Europe are connected mostly to the changing political orientation of the country and emerged from the political discourse as the following text will show:

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<sup>43</sup> Pro a proti, [www.konzervativci.cz/pu/197/proti.html](http://www.konzervativci.cz/pu/197/proti.html), nalezeno 7. 10. 2002; Jana Šmídová: Zpátky do Evropy, *Lidové noviny* 22. 9. 1990, s. 1

<sup>44</sup> as at December 2002.

<sup>45</sup> The slogan Back to Europe is discussed and its message explained in several articles published in *Lidové noviny* in 1990, for example in:

Jiří Hanák:, “Předvolební,” *Lidové noviny* 2 May 1990:1,

Ladislav Hejdánek, “Návrat do Evropy,” *Lidové noviny* 18 May 1990:1,

Jana Šmídová, “Zpátky do Evropy,” *Lidové noviny* 22 Sep. 1990:1.

#### **4.II.1. Political Affairs and Business Matters**

Similar to the first section of the case study I will start the investigation of the imagery within the topic of politics and business

##### **4. II.1.1. Imagery of Europe between November 1989 and December 1990**

Quotations 34 – 36 show how the proper nouns *Evropa* was used immediately after the revolution, i.e. in November and December 1989:

34) Východní Evropa v pohybu

Geograficky to není zrovna přesné – tak třeba Berlín nebo Praha leží dál na západ než východněji situovaná Vídeň. Přesto se dlouhá desetiletí hovoří, hlavně na základě zcela jiných kritérií než čistě zeměpisných o dvou Evropách, východní a západní.

Eastern Europe on the Move

Geographically it's not very precise -- for example Berlin and Prague are located further west than the more easterly-situated Vienna. Despite this, we have for many years spoken about two Europes, eastern and western, based mainly on criteria other than geographical ones.

This article recognises the division of *Europe* into East and West on principles other than those of geography. It has been stated in the study that the presumed main incentive for dividing the continent is the application of geopolitical and interest views. The following quotations are from interviews; the first two from an interview with a West German politician Wolfgang Mischnick (35 and 36), the third quotation from an interview with a Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze (37):

35) Q: Pane předsedo, jak vy, jako zkušený politik, vidíte budoucnost Evropy?

A: Vidím šanci pro vývoj evropského mírového uspořádání, chcete-li k budování celoevropského domu. [. . .] Čím více postoupí odzbrojení kupředu, tím lehčí bude nastolit mírový pořádek v *Evropě*.

Q: Mr Chairman, how do you as an experienced politician, see the future of Europe?

A: I can see a chance for the development of European peace arrangements, if you wish, a chance for building a Common European House. [. . .] The more the disarmament goes ahead, the easier it will be to establish a peace order in *Europe*.

The metaphor of the *Common European House*, built on the foundations of commonly shared principles, is used. At the time in question, the commonly shared principles in reality represented disarmament. The article documents that a division of Europe into two blocs with different economic and political structures persists. However the two blocs are not seen to be strictly antagonistic; it is hoped that they may settle their differences. *Europe* connected with the attribute of “new” is used to refer to a continent where boundaries between countries will be superfluous.

The interview with Wolfgang Mischnick continues:

36) Q:Jak vidíte, pane předsedo, postavení Československa v *Evropě*?

A:Československo je součástí *střední Evropy* a doufám, že se bude brzy ucházet o to, být poradním členem Evropské rady a jít stejným směrem, jako jiné země *střední Evropy* ke smluvním vztahům s radou.

Q:Mr Chairman, how do you see the position of Czechoslovakia in *Europe*?

A:Czechoslovakia is an integral part of *Central Europe* and I hope that it will soon apply for advisory membership in the European Council and it will follow the same direction towards treaty relations with the council as other *Central European* countries are doing.

The answer suggests that Czechoslovakia is well integrated into Central Europe. The speaker hopes that the country will develop a fair and respectful relationship with the European Council. However it is possible to speculate that in the context of the article the country is excluded from being a European country despite being recognised as a Central European country. The answer suggests that only after agreements between the European Council and the Czechoslovak Republic have been signed, the country might have a chance to delete the adjective *Central* from the *Central European* attribute, which it is at present, associated with.

The second article reports on a meeting between the Soviet Foreign Minister Edvard Shevarnadze and Western European politicians:

37) Sovětský ministr [zahraničních věcí Eduard Ševarnadze] se v pondělí setkal se svým belgickým protějškem Markem Eysikensem. Vyslovil se při tom pro vytvoření nového ekonomického prostoru v Evropě vzájemným propojením ekonomik západních a východních zemí.[ . . .] SSSR se chce podílet na činnosti Banky pro rozvoj a modernizaci východní Evropy [. . .] tento proces bude záležet na ochotě USA k obdobnému stažení svých jednotek ze západní Evropy.

The Soviet Minister [of foreign affairs Edvard Shevarnadze] met his Belgian counterpart Mark Eysikens on Monday. At the event, he expressed his support for the formation of a new economic space in Europe through linking the economies of Western and Eastern countries.[ . . .] the USSR wishes to participate in the activities of the Bank for Development and Modernisation of Eastern Europe [ . . .] the process will be determined by the willingness of the USA to withdraw its troops from Western Europe.

Although both articles are published on the same day and even next to each other on the same page, they demonstrate substantially different concepts of *Europe* used by German and Soviet speakers. Whilst Mischnik introduces the *European* imagery used in a Western European political discourse into Czech political talk, the article about Shevarnadze follows the divided *Europe* concept that was described in the previous section. Mischnick's description of *Europe* is based upon the following conceptual structuring:

- a) *Europe* purely as the *European* continent
- b) *Europe* as a structure
- c) Metonymical concept, 'pars pro toto', – i.e. '*Western Europe*' for '*Europe*'.

This is based on the presumption that if the institutions referred to by Mischnick as *Common European* were of a truly European nature, these Eastern European countries listed in the following citation from (35) would have already joined them:

(see 35) [. . .] celoevropské instituce nejsou pro ně [read Maďarsko, Sovětský svaz, Polsko etc.] příliš vzdálené.


[. . .] the Common European institutions are not [read Hungary, the Soviet Union, Polsko, etc.] too distant for them.

Although intentions to withdraw the dividing screen between the East and the West are revealed in the interview with Mischnick, the division is still detectable. Czechoslovakia's hopes for speedy integration are built up and the tactic of labelling Czechoslovakia as a *Central European* country, instead of *Eastern European* one, is used to obtain the country's trust and boost its self-confidence. In the interview with Shevarnadze the image of the USSR is reminiscent of the examples presented in (2) and (10) of the previous section. The USSR welcomes Western European proposals but remains alert since the West continues to be the enemy and cannot yet be trusted. The United States still represents the decisive force driving Western Europe.


The two ideologies meet in these two interviews and their strikingly different approaches to the nature of Europe are represented in the languages they use to describe their hopes and intentions.

The following diagrams were drawn to illustrate the differences in Mischnick's and Shevarnadze's visions of Europe.

**Diagram j:** Shevarnadze's interpretation:



**Diagram k:** Mischnick's interpretation:



#### 4.II.1.1.2. Views on the Return to Europe in 1990

The then-President, Václav Havel, spoke of his vision of Czechoslovakia's position in *Europe* in his New Year's address of 1990. He used a quotation from President Masaryk to remind his fellow citizens of Jesus, Caesar, Komenský, and Chelčický:

38) Náš první prezident napsal: Ježíš, nikoli Caesar. Navazoval tím na Chelčického i Komenského. Dnes tato idea v nás opět ožila. Troufám si říct, že snad dokonce máme možnost šířit ji dál a vnést tak do evropské i světové politiky nový prvek. Z naší země budeme-li chtít, může už natrvalo vyzařovat láska, touha po porozumění, síla ducha a myšlenky.

Our first President wrote: Jesus, not Caesar. In this manner he adhered to both Chelčický and Komenský. Nowadays, this idea has been revived. I dare to say that we may even have the possibility to spread it further and thus bring a new element into European and world politics. If we wish it, love, a desire for understanding, and the power of spirit and thought can shine forth from now on from our country.

Havel continued:

Jsme malá země, ale přesto jsme byli kdysi duchovní křižovatkou Evropy. Proč bychom se jí opět nemohli stát? Nebyl by to další vklad, jímž bychom mohli oplácet jiným pomoc, kterou budeme od nich potřebovat?

We are only a small country but, despite that, we were once the spiritual crossroads of Europe. Why can't we regain this position? Wouldn't that



be another gift by which we could repay others the help we will need from them?

Havel's view of the European dimension of the country is clearly focused on the principles of humanity, understanding, and the spiritual and intellectual power of the country. He is aware that a change of regime alone is not sufficient to embed strong moral principles in the country's people. Although Havel does not explicitly call for "a return to Europe", he hopes for the country and its people to return to the focus of European matters of good will and prosperity by referring to the position at the crossroads where European paths, people, cultures and ideas meet. One could ask what is the essence of the truly *European* dimension in Havel's speech? I would suggest that it does not necessarily mean input from the entire continent, but first and foremost principles he perceives as European: humanity, morality, equality, and fairness together with principles of Christianity.

The Prime Minister Marian Čalfa introduced a considerably more down-to-earth plan of the events as described in the interview "Otevřít se světu" 'Opening up to the World' which is also the first written record of the "return to Europe" slogan in my survey. The interview was published on 2 January 1990:

39) Q: Hovoří se o návratu Československa do Evropy? Co si pod tím představujete?

A: Skutečné otevření se světu. Záleží nám na rozvoji vzájemně výhodné hospodářské spolupráce se všemi zeměmi světa. Mnohem hlubší a efektivnější musí být v RVHP. Klademe důraz na navázání kontaktů s Evropskými společenstvími, máme zájem o konkrétní spolupráci s ostatními zeměmi. Ekonomická spolupráce předpokládá dobré vztahy v politické a kulturní oblasti. Podílet se na budování společného evropského domu v zájmu míru a přátelství mezi národy, v zájmu lidí žijících na našem kontinentě i v celém světě - to je základem naší politiky. Odstraňování zátarasů na společných hranicích s NSR a Rakouskem, to je začátek a symbol našeho postupu, začátek hospodářského a politického procesu navrácení se do náruče svobodných evropských národů.

Q: Is the return of Czechoslovakia to Europe being discussed? How do you understand this process?

A: As truly opening up to the world. We care about the development of mutually beneficial economic co-operation with all countries in the world. It [development] must be much deeper and more effective in the CMEA. We stress the establishment of contacts with the European Community, we are interested in co-operation with other countries. Economic co-operation assumes good relations in politics and culture. The foundation of our politics is to participate in the building of a Common European House in the interest of peace, friendship amongst nations, in the interest of people living on in our continent and in the world. The removal of barriers on the borders between our country, Germany and Austria is the starting point and the symbol of our progress, the beginning of the economic and political process of the return to the embrace of free European nations.

Čalfa's explanation of the return to Europe has been quoted extensively, since it is one of the first definitions of the slogan aimed at the general public as officially printed in the national press. I wish to highlight two aspects of the above quotation as they constitute the key points of the study:

1. the imagery of Europe
2. the definition of Europe

It would be satisfying to conclude the political development in Europe with the optimistic slogan by FRG Communist Party Chairman Martha Buschmann: "We cannot move in yet, but the layout of the house is being drawn".<sup>46</sup> However, to obtain a full picture of the imagery, it is necessary to follow its development further. We could presume that the optimistic prediction will come true; development within the imagery of Europe as a house will remain undisturbed and the construction of the *Common European House* will go ahead. I will examine the validity of this assumption in the next section and I will base my work on the development within the metaphoric image of Europe.

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46 Svatava Hodíková, "Hovoříme s účastníky pražského kolokvia o evropském domě/Obrysy se už rýsují," *Práce* 3 Apr. 1989: 3.

#### 4.II.1.2. The Imagery of Europe after 1990

##### 4.II.1.2.1. *The Common European House*

Although the designer, Mikhail Gorbachev, sketched his vision of the *Common European House*, different architects had different ideas about the plan of the house and its foundations. Some European politicians reached a common understanding of the phrase based on ideas of peace, disarmament, respect for each other, and mutual assistance and seemed to be committed to the development process. Others, mainly the more conservative ones from the communist states, were not pleased by either the vision of the two German states as two “neighbouring apartments” or the “new house rules” (Musolff 94 – 95). Since they were still Soviet allies and were not supposed to oppose Soviet policies and thus cause instability within the Eastern bloc, they followed Soviet guidelines.

After the events of 1989 brought down the Berlin Wall and led to the disintegration of the Soviet empire and fundamental changes in the Central and Eastern European countries, the situation on the European building site diversified. The metaphor which was once so appealing and received so much attention from both politicians and the media gradually became old-fashioned and obsolete – at least for Western European politicians and media. Musolff reports that in the corpus his team used to examine the metaphoric images of Europe, there were only a few texts between 1990 and 1991 referring to this concept<sup>47</sup> and “by 1993/ 94 the once potent model only received either a nostalgic acknowledgment or [. . .] derision. Mikhail Gorbachev’s *Common European House* always raised hackles (as anyone who has ever shared a flat with a large aggressive rather untidy person with little money will understand” (Musolff 98).

Gradually it becomes obvious that while some hoped to build a shared house where all parties would enjoy the same standard of living and show consideration to each other, others decided to protect and fortify their living

quarters against potential neighbours who were not up to their standard. Before we commence our investigation into which structures are erected on the EUROPEAN BUILDING SITE, it should be stated that the EUROPEAN HOUSE imagery did not die. In the coverage of negotiations leading to the Treaty of Maastricht, the British and German media revived the house metaphor. The new version is different to Gorbachev's original idea and the concept of a European House is related exclusively to the European Community. It is stated that:

The Treaty itself introduced the quasi-technical metaphor of the three *pillars* of decision making in the EU [. . .]. There are new, creative uses of the *European House* metaphor, designed to polemicise against the problematic development in various *flats*. The Guardian [. . .] sarcastically described the Europhobic tendencies of the Tory Euro-debates as marking Britain off as a “social misfit” in the *neighbourhood or house community*: “Those people at number 15 who won't answer the door and do that late night screaming.”[. . .] One German commentator castigated the ‘nouveau-riche’ – type Germans as arrogant *occupiers of the first floor apartment*, who deemed the *wastebasket* good enough for foreign asylum seekers. However, they and the ‘Eurocrats’ who saw themselves as Europe's architects might one day find themselves in the same position as the builders of the tower of Babel, whom God punished for their pride [. . .].” (Musolff 98)

The conditions in the newly built, constantly refurbished and extended EUROPEAN HOUSE, in the context of EU, are far from idyllic, as is clearly demonstrated by Musolff. The following investigation will follow the situation in the Central and Eastern European sector of the building site.

#### 4.II.1.2.2. FORTRESS EUROPE

The study of the discourse in Czech newspapers revealed the presence of a group of metaphors within the STRUCTURE domain that can be labelled FORTRESS EUROPE. Several examples were found where the Czech discourse adopted the lexicon of the FORTRESS EUROPE image and introduced it in the Czech media, for instance:

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<sup>47</sup> For more details see Musolff: *Mirror Images of Europe*, p. 3 – 4

40) Švédsko vstupuje na most do Evropy  
Náměstek švédské ministryně zahraničí říká: Musíme [ . . . ] překročit určité mosty.

Sweden Steps onto the Bridge to Europe  
The Swedish Deputy Foreign minister says: We must [ . . . ] cross certain bridges.

41) Východní Evropa chce posilovat vztahy se Západoevropskou unií  
Smyslem fóra sice bylo rozvinout vztahy zemí bývalého východního bloku se ZEU jako budoucím politicko-bezpečnostním pilířem Evropy [ . . . ].

Eastern Europe Wants to Strengthen Relations with the Western European Union  
The purpose of the forum was to develop relations between the former Eastern bloc countries with WEU as the future political and safety pillar of Europe [ . . . ].

The above citation makes implicit references to concepts like *východní Evropa* ‘Eastern Europe’, *Západoevropská unie* ‘the Western European Union’, and *Evropa* ‘Europe’ united on the grounds of political and military agreements. The recognition of the three concepts together with the recognition of a structure metaphor in 1993 was a continuation of the tools used earlier at the turn of the ‘80s and the ‘90s. The observation of two co-existing concepts of Europe as a battlefield and Europe as a building-site based on the newspaper discourse in 1989 could only be reinstated in the 1990s. The imagery of Europe irreversibly divided into the East and the West was still recognised in 1995 when “Václav Havel Called upon the West to Be Braver”, “*Václav Havel vyzval Západ k větší odvaze*”, by stating that:

42) Bude-li Západ příliš dlouho váhat s integrací postkomunistických zemí do svých demokratických struktur, může se po nějaké době pouze divit. Démoni, kteří nebudou spoutáni na Východě, proniknou záhy i na Západ. A celá Evropa tím promarní historickou šanci stát se poprvé kontinentem mírové spolupráce všech [ . . . ].

If the West hesitates too long with the integration of post-communist countries into its democratic structures, after a while they will only be able to marvel [at what they see]. Any demons not bound in the East will before long penetrate the West as well. And the whole of Europe will waste a historical chance to become for the first time a continent of peaceful co-operation for all [ . . . ].

Although Havel's quotation did not refer to particular parts of a building, the general term *struktura* 'structure' was used. The metaphor of demons troubling the East was unique in the corpus of Europe metaphors. I felt that it offered a rich potential to create a metaphor of Europe as a haunted house or a haunted castle with plenty of sub-concepts within the domain of a structure metaphor. However, no records were found of such a metaphor being adopted and further developed in Czech European talk.

Alongside symbols of *a bridge, a pillar*, documented above, and the expression 'structures', the symbol of *doors and gates* were also documented in the European newspaper discourse:

43) "Ne" ústavě zavřelo Albáncům dveře do Evropy"

A "No" to the Constitution Closed the Door to Europe for the Albanians

44) Pohublí dotěrové před branami

Skinny Pests in front of the Gates

Another journalist commented on the EU accession procedure by stating that:

45) [. . .] dlouhé čekání před branami je demotivující [. . .] .

[. . .] a long wait in front of the gates is demotivating [. . .].

It is the common theme of *bridges, doors and gates* that separates the chosen ones safely tucked inside the *fortress* from those outside. Those who would like to enter are connected with the theme of *poor herds* waiting submissively for permission to enter:

46) Chceme, chceme k vám

Chce unie přibrat nové chudé členy, nebo nechce? [. . .] Nyní Pevnost Evropa hrozí monitoringem, tresty a pokutami. A v našem bytostném národním zájmu je - - byť poníženy - - vstup.

We Really Do Want to Join You

Does the union want to take on new poor members or not? [. . .] At present Fortress Europe threatens monitoring, punishment and sanctions. And entry, humiliating as it may be, is in our fundamental national interest.

47) Se zájmem jsem přečetl článek [. . .] Nechají nás Irové před branami?.

I read with interest the article [. . .] ‘Will the Irish leave us standing in front of the gates?’.

It needs to be pointed out that all quoted articles, with the exception of Havel’s quotation, discuss the topic of EU enlargement and all articles but one, “*Švédsko vstupuje na most do Evropy*” ‘Sweden Steps onto the Bridge to Europe’, were written by Czech speakers. Therefore it can be presumed that the citations provide a natural representation of the FORTRESS EUROPE metaphor and lexicon in the Czech newspaper discourse.

If the metaphoric domain of structure as reported by Musolff is compared with the identical metaphoric domain in Czech political discourse, it is revealed that Czech discourse adopted a limited number of elements from the Western architectural imagery. Only the themes of *bridges, pillars, doors, gates, and a fortress* became well-established in the Czech environment. The focus of the articles within which these images can be found, i.e. European Union discussions, is identical for both Western European and Czech discourse. In Czech newspaper discourse the metaphors of Europe as a structure were not found in articles focusing on topics other than EU and its enlargement. As no innovative procedures that would reflect Czech specific features were applied to these structure metaphors, their range remains limited to the use recorded in the source discourse. What was treated in a more creative way were the aspects of national pride. While Musolff reports the lexicon of *landlords, neighbours, community, neighbourhood, and occupiers* with the strongest recorded expression of *social misfits* in the field denoting the inhabitants in the *Common European House* (Musolff 93 – 104), Czech discourse goes further than that. A sarcastic approach was used to tackle the issues of national identity and national pride. Therefore the candidate countries are labelled as beggars,

paupers and criminals<sup>48</sup> who will be sanctioned, punished and treated very rigidly. Consequently, it can be stated that the metaphor that was adopted previously of EUROPE IS A HOUSE after 1989 has been gradually abandoned and transformed in EU discourse into an architectural image of a FORTRESS.

#### 4.II.1.2.3. EUROPE IS A SCHOOL

A specific domain of metaphors which can be termed EUROPE IS A SCHOOL resulted from the process of preparation for accession procedures. The media often use the tool of personification to inform on the procedures through which Europe gains the ultimate power, force and authority to be a potential conflict solver and ruler. Europe's supreme position and alleged abilities give her the role of a mentor.

48) Verheugen: Letošní hodnocení kandidátů neoznačí premianty

Verheugen: This Year's Evaluation of Candidates Will Not Identify the Star Pupils

49) [. . .] elaborát evropských komisařů je pro Českou republiku [. . .] dobrým vysvědčením.

[. . .] the European commissioners' concoction represents a good school report for the Czech Republic [. . .].

50) Reparáty asi nehrozí, nedostatky se ale trpět nebudou.

There May Not Be Threat of Re-sits, but Flaws Will Not Be Tolerated

Europe as an ultimate force - - as discussed above in connection with solving conflicts and injustice - - is given a different dimension here. Her supreme position and alleged abilities give her the role of a mentor. Musolff does not report the imagery of EUROPE IS SCHOOL in Mirror Images of Europe but he acknowledges the sporadic presence of this metaphoric domain within German and British discourse in his book Metaphor and Political Discourse<sup>49</sup>. To

<sup>48</sup> Petr Kamberský, "Chceme, chceme k vám," MF Dnes 27 July 2002: A6.

<sup>49</sup> The SCHOOL AND DISCIPLINE source domain takes seventh position, according to the overall number of passages from British and German public discourse in the corpus of eleven source domains (12).



understand why this imagery is popular in the Czech context, we need to consider relations between the former Communist states and the Western bloc. Norman Davies offers an observation about the relationship between West and East which, together with Lakoff and Johnson's model of how our experience is conceptualised, helps to understand the frequent use of the theme by the Czech media. Davis believes that West's attitude to outsiders has long been a patronising one: "They have to learn from us while we don't have to learn from them -- there is nothing to be learned from them."<sup>50</sup> Lakoff and Johnson state that "it is by means of conceptualizing our experience [. . .] that we pick out the "important" aspects of an experience. And by picking out what is "important" in the experience, we categorize the experience, understand it, and remember it" (Lakoff and Johnson 83). By applying Davies' observation onto Lakoff and Johnson's model, one can conclude that it is the experience of mentoring which results in regular evaluations and subsequent reports to bring the Czech Republic up to a "certain standard" and this links it with the experience of school. Czech journalists naturally employed school-related metaphors to make the situations clear to all their readers. In doing so they added their own value judgments about the process. The same may have happened in other Central and Eastern European countries.

#### **4.II.1.2.4. Personification of Europe**

My investigation of Czech military discourse revealed that media often personified Europe and the evidence for this is discussed in this section of the case study and also presented in the section investigating the definition of Europe. Although this section concentrates on the imagery of Europe, the issues of the definition of Europe cannot be avoided and I briefly mention them below.

The imagery of Europe as a troubled or frightened person, portrayed in the discourse before 1989, was re-established in the '90s and can be traced

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<sup>50</sup> Tomáš Sniegoň, "Norman Davies: Evropská unie? Experiment, ale nutný." Salon č. 291:1, *Právo* 24 October 2002. In this citation "us" denotes the Western Europeans and "they" those from Central and Eastern Europe.

throughout the entire political and military discourse between 1980 and 2000 with simultaneously occurring images of Europe as an architectural structure. The image of a structure such as FORTRESS EUROPE on one hand evokes a castle, refuge or a shelter but on the other hand, it also evokes solid grounds, ruling power and the ability to stand up for something. The notions of the power, strength, force, and protection of one's own principles show Europe as a force capable of helping the weak. The three images of Europe as a BATTLEFIELD, a STRUCTURE and a SAVIOUR coexist in Czech military discourse and they can be detected through the whole period between 1990 and 2000:

51) Evropa je bezmocná i v Bosně

Evropa je tváří v tvář válce [. . .] stále bezmocnější.[. . .] Evropa se zmožila jen na vyslání pozorovatelské mise [. . .] . Evropa snad ani nemohla na rozdíl od Ameriky oslnit velkolepými vojenskými operacemi [. . .] . Evropa ví, že její zájmy se na Balkáně střetávají.

Europe Powerless in Bosnia Too

Europe [. . .] is ever more powerless in the face of war . [. . .] Europe managed only to send observer missions [. . .] . Perhaps Europe could not [. . .], in contrast to America, dazzle with grand military operations [. . .] . Europe knows that her interests clash in the Balkans.

52) Evropa stojí na rozcestí

Jedním z největších úkolů Evropy v novém roce 1996 je definitivně ukončit válku v Bosně [. . .].

Europe on the Crossroads

One of the biggest tasks for Europe to achieve in the new year 1996 is to finally end the wars in Bosnia [. . .].

53) Albánie je v agonii, Evropa si opět neví rady

Vyspělá Evropa na svých summitech sní o nerozděleném kontinentu, jednotlivé státy však nezřídka zvažují i sebemenší prostředky, které by měly obětovat na oltář sjednocení.

Albania in Agony, Europe Is at the End of Her Wits Again

At summits, developed Europe dreams about an undivided continent but individual countries often carefully consider even the smallest sacrifice of their resources on the altar of unity.

The above examples substantiate the hypothesis that these three concepts exist alongside one another. The concept of a battlefield was confirmed by expressions: *ukončit válku v Bosně* 'to end the war in Bosnia', *Evropa je tváří*

*v tvář válce* ‘Europe is face to face with war’; the concept of an architectural structure by the expression *vyřešit krizi před svými dveřmi* ‘to solve the crisis on its doorstep’. All three citations use personification to create the metaphoric image of Europe as a powerful decision maker or higher authority beyond the level of individual states or regions; a person who will hopefully act as the saviour of the European continent. In the first article no specific European structures, either economic or military, which would define Europe are mentioned. Europe, in the role of a saviour, is used with no attributes. In the second article the expressions *vyspělá Evropa* ‘developed Europe’ and *Evropa* ‘Europe’, with no attributes, are put on the same level of importance. The expression *zbytek Evropy* ‘the rest of Europe’ separates Albania from Europe to achieve the contrast between Europe as a continent and Europe as a force able to resolve a conflict and offer help. Europe and the European Union, here called only the Union, are also almost equivalent, although a gradual shift from the concept of Europe as a whole to the concept of Europe as the European Union only is achieved by inserting the names of two of the most advanced countries in the region between the two concepts. The imagery of Europe as a building with a closed or even locked door is used here to highlight the EU’s elitism and isolation from the south-eastern part of the continent.

#### 4.II.1.2.5. The Scope of European Imagery

The scope of European imagery after 1989 is wider than before the revolution of 1989. Apart from the main streams of imagery reported here as the battlefield, architectural structure, ruler or mentor, and an educational institution, other minor streams represented only in a limited number of articles were documented. Europe was portrayed for instance also as a CHESS GAME<sup>51</sup>, an AILING PERSON<sup>52</sup> or a CLUB<sup>53</sup>, the latter two fitting into the main metaphoric domains of an institution and a person. While it was identified that the domains of peace and work played essential roles in European discourse pre-1989 and this was reflected accordingly in the lexicon of the discourse, no concept that

<sup>51</sup> This metaphoric concept can be detected in “Středoevropská iniciativa a příští ‘Evropa regionů’”, *MF Dnes* 27 Nov. 1992: 9.

<sup>52</sup> Found in e.g. “Evropa si počká na magický rok 1996,” *MF Dnes* 21 Jun 1996: 9.

played such a fundamental role in European discourse after 1989 was identified. If one concentrates solely on those texts related to the enlargement of the European Union, then the topic of integration into the democratic structures, sometimes paraphrased as an integration into Western Europe, does have a major influence on the choice of European imagery and lexicon.

#### 4.II.1.3. The Definition of Europe

Ivana Bozděchová demonstrates that the proper noun *Evropa* together with its adjective *evropský* have extended their meanings since 1996. The previously geographical and political term *Evropa* has since then been more frequently used to denote the European Union. The situation is caused by the practical and pragmatic need to find an economical name. Therefore *Europe* and *European Union* can be treated as contextual synonyms, the identification of which is usually easy (216 – 217). This observation suggests that the situation in Czech discourse is considerably more straightforward than in Western European discourse because, contrary to Bozděchová, Gerlinde Hardt-Mautner finds the term *Europe* itself extremely unclear. It can be used to represent the EC or it can refer to the mainland of Europe only, excluding the British Isles. Hardt-Mautner Europe or the EC does not have to be conceptualised as an assembly of individual nations, but can be seen as a whole, defined both geographically [. . .] and politically” (183 – 4). The meaning of the term *Europe* can be negotiable and several shades of meaning could occur in the same text. The semantic fuzziness characteristic of *Europe* extends to the adjective and the noun *European* which makes the adjective *European* gradable. It is her opinion that in recent discourse *Europe* has become malleable enough for users to understand it and use it within the confines of particular categories (184).

As far as the geopolitical definition of Europe is concerned, Hardt-Mautner offers the following examples of these categories:

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<sup>53</sup> Petr Kamberský, “Chceme, chceme k vám,” *MF Dnes* 27 July 2002: A6.

Europe defined geographically

Europe = as a whole

Europe = Continental Europe

Europe = mainland Europe only excluding the British Isles

When defined politically:

Europe = the EC

Europeans are defined as:

Europeans = supporters of the EC

Europeans = Continental Europeans

Possible definitions of the adjective European are:

European = belonging to “Continental Europe”

European = associated with commitment to European culture and traditions.

Used this second way, the adjective European is gradable and therefore: more

European or less European = more or less devoted to European heritage and the

European way of life.

Bozděchová and Hardt-Mautner give contradicting statements on the current clarity of the term *Europe* and its adjective<sup>54</sup>. According to Hardt-Mautner, the term itself is vague, which is symptomatic of the European question. The differences between their observations raise a question as to whether this innate vagueness of Western European discourse could have an effect on the Czech lexicon.

It is my task to provide an answer to the question and show whether the term *Europe* and its adjective *evropský* are perceived and defined clearly in Czech newspaper discourse, or whether the Czech discourse is affected by the ambiguity of its Western counterpart. I will look at the definition of *Europe* in Czech printed media followed by the definition of the adjective *evropský*, and I will also look into newly coined expressions linked to the proper noun *Evropa* whose meaning could be affected by such ambiguity.

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<sup>54</sup> Bozděchová does not comment on the expressions *European* and *Europeans* denoting a nationality.

## A) Definitions of Europe

### 1) Europe defined Geographically - United Europe

Although I have presented mostly images of a divided Europe amongst the quotations, it would be a mistake to presume that instances of a unified Europe do not occur in Czech media discourse after 1989. Examples of a united Europe and a Europe viewed purely as a continent without any geopolitical or interest dividing lines can be found in the political, economic and geographical sections of newspapers between 1989 and 2000:

54) Poměrně jednoznačné vítězství italské pravice by [. . .] mohlo ovlivnit i dění v celé Evropě. [. . .] celá Evropa musí počítat s přílivem radikálních proudů [. . .] nepolitická politika [. . .] asi veřejný život Evropy neovládne [. . .] má velkou šanci na vítězství kdekoli v Evropě.

A relatively unambiguous victory by the Italian right wing could [. . .] influence life across all of Europe [. . .] the whole of Europe must be prepared for an influx of radical movements [. . .] the non-political politics [. . .] will probably not take control of public life in Europe [. . .] it has a strong chance of victory anywhere in Europe.

### 2) Europe Equals the EU

The investigation of European talk in the Czech media revealed that in political discourse, the concept of Europe often equaled the European Union. Three newspaper articles were selected; one from a Czech source, discussing the Czech Republic's entry into the EU from the Czech point of view, one from a foreign source, looking at their country's entry from their point of view and thus representing a foreign discourse debating its own country's matters, and finally one of the most recent examples was Austria's view on the Czech Republic's entry and thus representing an example of Austrian political discourse discussing Czech affairs:

55) Evropa bližší než soused


Zdánlivě na míle vzdálený vstup České republiky do Evropské unie bude daleko větším vpádem do života každého občana. [. . .] Přihlášku do Evropské unie podáme v roce 1996. [. . .] Jsme tedy snad za půli cesty, na jejímž počátku bylo heslo Zpátky do Evropy.

Europe is Closer than Your Neighbour

The entry of the Czech Republic into the European Union, which seems to be miles away, will be a much bigger incursion into every citizen's life. [. . .] We will submit our application to the EU in 1996. [. . .] Hopefully we've walked more than half of the way that started with the slogan Back to Europe.

The connection between Europe and the European Union was used twice in the first example. Therefore there are no doubts that from the view of the Czech author of the article the diagram showing definition of Europe is:

**Diagram 1:**



The second example comes from a Swiss source adopted by CTK and informs about the issue of the EU membership and parliamentary elections in Switzerland. Here too, a parallel between the concept of Europe and the European Union is clearly visible:

56) Největších zisků docílily [. . .] strany, které svou kampaň postavily na jednoznačném postoji k Evropské unii . [. . .] „Zřetelné stanovisko, které zaujali jak socialisté, tak lidovci v otázce Evropy [. . .].“

The largest gains were achieved by [. . .] parties founding their campaigns on an unambiguous attitude towards the European Union .[ . . .] “The clear point of view taken by both the Socialist and the People's Party on the issue of Europe [. . .].”

Finally, in the third example the Austrian Chancellor expressed his country's views on the subject by using a parallel between Europe and the European

Union and also referring to the EU as the *European Fortress*. The metaphor of a fortified building was intensified to achieve an even more impressive effect of seclusion by equipping the door of the fortress with a latch:

57) Jeho země podle něj nechce být závorou na dveřích evropské pevnosti.

His country, according to him, does not want to be the latch on the door of the European fortress.

All three citations demonstrated the use of identical approaches to the concept of Europe that, in the context of EU discussions, is equal to the European Union. To highlight the concept of Europe marked by the borders of the European Union, Czech European talk also developed an attribute of *dvanáctihvězdičková Evropa* ‘twelve-star Europe’<sup>55</sup>, others talk about *rozšiřování Evropy na východ* ‘enlargement of Europe to the East’, meaning enlargement of the EU by the post-communist countries<sup>56</sup>. The adjective *evropský* ‘European’ was also applied to matters related to accession procedures, for instance:

58) Dodal, že se vstupem ČR do EU by mělo být jasně řečeno, že nemohou být z tohoto zákona žádné právní účinky, jež odporují evropskému duchu.

He added that, in connection with the CR’s entry into the EU, it should be stated clearly that this law cannot have any legal impact contradicting European spirit.

A diagram representing the definition of *Europe*, being identical for the three stated quotations, illustrates that *Europe* equals the *European Union* and therefore it can also be applicable to quotation (58).

<sup>55</sup> Jiří Franěk, “Co zavinil Jirásek,” *Právo* 23 Aug. 2001, p. 7.

<sup>56</sup> Karel Šplíchal, Václav Štědroňský: “Do Unie chceme kvůli ekonomice,” *Právo* Nov. 2001.



### 3) Fuzzy Definition of Europe

While on one hand the Czech discourse concerning political and foreign affairs associates Europe with the European Union, on the other hand examples of political discourse were found where the two entities were not identical and the overall definition of *Europe* was fuzzy:

59) Pokud jde o Rusko, shodli jsme se [. . .] , že je třeba dát Moskvě jasně najevo, že ji nemíníme vyhánět z Evropy nebo izolovat [. . .].

As far as Russia goes, we have agreed [...] that it is necessary to make it absolutely clear to Moscow that we do not intend to chase her out of Europe or isolate her [. . .].

Metonymic reference to Moscow representing Russia is used in the article discussing the integration of the Czech Republic into NATO. In the context of *Europe* as a military entity, *Europe* is defined differently compared to the context of the EU. Europe is understood much more as an alliance in which the membership of Russia is often questioned in the military context. When we look at the metaphoric imagery of *Europe* in this statement, Europe may signify an architectural structure or possibly a marked territory where only the chosen ones are allowed to stay – however Moscow is not one of them and would be forced out from there. Another case of a fuzzy definition of Europe in Czech political discourse was found in an article published by Lidové noviny in 1997:

60) Rusko [je] ochotno podepsat s aliancí exkluzivní smlouvu [. . .] přičemž přijetí tohoto dokumentu Kremlem je obecně považováno za formu ruského souhlasu s rozšířením NATO. A jaké jsou podmínky Moskvy? Smlouvy o konvenčních ozbrojených silách v Evropě.[ . . .] Co z toho plyne pro Evropu? [ . . .] Moskva se reálně, nikoliv jen demonstrativně, spojí s Čínou v jednu Západu nepřátelskou mocnost.

Russia [is] willing to sign an exclusive agreement with the alliance [. . .] while approval of the document by the Kremlin is generally considered to be a form of Russian assent to NATO enlargement. And what are Moscow's conditions? Agreements on conventional armed forces in Europe. [. . .] What are the consequences of this for Europe? [. . .] Moscow will truly, not only demonstratively, join China to create a single force hostile to the West.


The boundaries of Europe in the above article are marked according to a geo-political key and therefore the initial sentence defines Europe as NATO plus the countries hoping to join NATO.

**Diagram m:**



The section “And what are Moscow’s conditions? Agreements on conventional armed forces in Europe” suggests that Russia is a part of Europe since Moscow might not have vital interests in agreements on other continents.

**Diagram n:**



The section “Moscow will truly, not only demonstratively, join China to create one force hostile to the West” has two possible explanations: either NATO and the countries hoping to join NATO constitute the West, although those candidate countries would have been primarily from the East,

**Diagram o:**




or

Russia together with China will form one force hostile to the West but not to former eastern countries who later joined NATO.

Since the second explanation would not be plausible, this line of thought would bring us to the conclusion that, in the context of the article, Europe may equal West plus East minus Russia.

**Diagram p:**



To conclude the speculation over the possible definition of Europe, diagrams **m** to **p** were compared. Diagrams **m** and **o** showed the same results and therefore showed a new possible geopolitical definition of Europe: **m = o**, and therefore Europe = West.

#### 4) Position of Russia in Europe

Three years later Lubomír Zaorálek used the conception of Europe in a similar way in an article discussing the Russian role in the global defence of Europe. What was only a presumption based on the previous article, was confirmed by Zaorálek; Czech political discourse does not always rank Russia amongst European countries:

61) Bojí se Evropa špatně?

Evropa se nebojí Ruska, ale Ameriky, napsal Jiří Payne v Právu [. . .]  
[Solana Spojeným státům] nedoporučuje, aby instalovaly nový systém

protiraketové obrany bez debaty s Evropany a Rusy [. . .] Evropě hrozí, že se bude bát špatně. Tedy Američanů, a nikoli Rusů.

Is Europe Frightened of the Wrong Thing?

Europe is not frightened by Russian but by America, Jiří Payne wrote in Právo [. . .] [ Solana ] does not advise [the USA ] to install the new system of anti-missile defence without discussion with the Europeans and Russians. [. . .] Europe faces a danger that it will be frightened of the wrong thing: that is, frightened of the Americans and not the Russians.

The definition of Europe with respect to Russia within Czech military discourse is not instantly recognisable. Russia may or may not be classed as a part of Europe - - depending on the point of view of the commentator or the point to be made.

In the context of the above article Europe is treated either as an alliance or as an organisation - - not identical to the EU or NATO - - or personified. As already discussed in the section on the imagery of Europe, the attributes of a troubled and frightened person once allocated before 1989 are back and so is the image of a battlefield. This conception can be traced throughout the entire political-military discourse; however the notion of Europe as an architectural structure has not been lost.

Only the most prominent quotation has been given here to illustrate the situation in the area of political affairs and business matters. Further examples are listed in the corpus of quotations appended to the thesis.

## **B) Possible Definitions of the Adjective European *evropský***

I followed the occurrence of the adjective *evropský* 'European' in any context, with the exception of its use in the names of bodies, such as the European Union, laws and acts, such as the European Constitution.

- o When Europe was defined as a whole, the following constructions were observed:

*evropský/ evropská*

velmoc	superpower
kultura a demokracie	culture and democracy
nabídka	offer
téma	topic
celoevropská instituce	European-wide institution
evropské země	European countries

- The adjective *evropský* was recorded in the following constructions covering all aspects of Europe, defined as the EU and the matters it deals with:

*evropský, evropská* ‘European’

konflikt	conflict
summit	summit
model	model
projekt	project
struktura	structure
integrace	integration
integrační struktura	integration structure
agenda	agenda
exekutiva	executive
téma	topic
úroveň	level
strategie	strategy

- The image of a Europe divided geopolitically resulted in the following constructions:

a):

středoevropský nováček	Central European newcomer
středoevropské státy	Central European countries
středoevropská elita bohatých	Central European elite of the rich”

b):

západoevropská veřejnost	Western European public
západoevropská civilizace	Western European civilisation

c):

středo a východoevropské země	Central and Eastern European countries
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d):

východoevropská demokracie	East European democracy
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e):

protievropská snaha

anti-European effort

These expressions are common both in discourse about the EU and also in other topics relating to social, political, and economic matters. The recorded use of *evropský* confirms Bozděchová's observation that the meaning of the adjective may not be as easily identified as the meaning of the noun *Europe* and the reader may need to be aware of the semantics of the guiding noun (216 – 217).

### C) Newly Coined Expressions: Europanizace, Europeizace, Euroizace

Apart from the changes within the imagery and definition of Europe upon which I have concentrated so far, the new political direction of the country was confirmed by new coinages and several neologisms with the prefixoid *euro-* that have appeared in the Czech lexicon. These lexical units are related to this process. The prefixoid *euro-* with the meaning European in the geopolitical sense can be found in lexical units such as *eurofil*, *eurokrat*, *euroskeptik*, *eurostandardní*, etc. Not all of these words are of Czech origin or specific to Czech - - on the contrary, many of them were adopted from foreign languages. The eurolexicon is well illustrated in a two volume dictionary of neologisms Nová slova v češtině; Slovník neologismů by Olga Martinčová. The first volume was published in 1998 and it lists the entry *euro-* as a first part of compound words meaning *European* in newly coined words with a geopolitical meaning. The initial entry of the prefixoid *euro-* is then followed by 21 other entries of various *euro-* compounds. I selected *Europanizace*, *Europeizace* and *euroizace* for my investigation due to their regular occurrence in Czech media discourse and the fact that they are directly related to the process of the so-called return to Europe. None of the three made their way into the first volume of the dictionary.

The second volume containing material from 1996 to 2002 was published in 2004. Compared to the first volume, the second volume elaborates on the meaning of the prefixoid *euro-* as: 1. European in newly coined words with a

geopolitical meaning; 2. concerning the European Union; 3. concerning the Euro. The initial entry of the prefixoid *euro-* is followed by 93 entries of other *euro-*compounds. Out of the three expressions I am examining here, only *europeizace* is listed in the dictionary as 1. The introduction of EU common policies, EU regulations and norms; 2. The procurement of a European dimension, and inclusion of something amongst the European issues. Before *europeizace* appeared in the second volume of the dictionary, it was listed in the Academic Dictionary of Foreign Words<sup>57</sup> in 2001, meaning an application of European principles.

The process of word-formation for the lexical units *europanizace* and *europeizace* differs from other *euro-* neologisms. The two lexical units in questions are not formed by a prefixoid *euro-* added to an already existing noun, verb or adjective, e.g. *euro* + *okna* = *eurookna*; *euro* + *standardní* = *eurostandardní* but by combining the morpheme [europe] + [an] or [europe] with the suffix *-izace* used in Czech for derivation of foreign words.

To explore the occurrence of these nouns I searched articles stored in the Newton IT Electronic Archive between 1995 and 2002 and I established the following results:

### 1) Europanizace 'Europeanisation'

Newton IT found seven entries of *europanizace*, the first from 1997. *Europanizace* was used in the context of the so-called European integration, meaning the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU. Despite the common overall context, the meaning was found to be malleable:

<sup>57</sup> Akademický slovník cizích slov, Academia, Praha 2001: 209.

1. *europanizace kontinentu* ‘making the continent European’ or ‘Europeanisation of the continent’- in the context of protests against European integration used as a synonym for the loss of national identity and decline of cultures of individual nations.
2. *europanizace Německa* ‘making Germany European’ - in the context of political discourse this was an exceptional way for *europanizace* to be used, signalling as it does a rejection of the strong position of Germany in decision-making within the EU: “povede [to] k [. . .] německé Evropě místo evropanizaci Německa” ‘this will lead to the creation of a German Europe instead of the Europeanisation of Germany’.<sup>58</sup>
3. in the context of the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU *europanizace* was used for the strong influence of the already existing members of the EU on Czech internal policies, primarily intervention regarding the controversial issue of the Temelín nuclear power station; this is perceived by Czechs as threats to the independence of the Czech state.
4. *europanizace* in connection with the ownership of Czech institutions and companies and changes in policies in them; here *europanizace* signifies a considerably higher proportion of foreign owners and executive managers from the EU countries.
5. *europanizace* was also used in the context of the internal situation of Russia where it serves as a term denoting reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev.
6. *europanizace* versus *amerikanizace* were used as terms describing world-wide developmental tendencies in the 20 century. While the first half of the century was under the influence of *Europeanisation* the second half of the century was shaped by *Americanisation*. Further, *europanizace* was characterised as Europe’s success in shaking off American influence, its ability

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<sup>58</sup> Miloslav Rejzl: “Švédové litují, Norové se radují,” *Haló noviny* 11 Mar. 1997:7.



to control its own way forward and its ability to control the military situation and its nuclear safety.

7. the verb *europanizovat se* was found in an article covering a film hit-parade and denoted a process by which the predominance of American films in the hit-parade was replaced by European ones.

Only example 5 came from a foreign source, however it was not specified whether the article was a translation of the foreign original or only some information was used; all other articles were written by Czech authors.

## 2) Europeizace ‘Europeisation’

Sixteen entries were found, the first occurrence documented in 1996:

1. adjective *europaizovaný* ‘Europeised’ was recorded in the context of the EU’s rejection of the war in Iraq. The construction:

62) ‘společný’ evropský postoj [ . . . ] byl stěží něčím jiným než europaizovaným postojem Francie a Německa”

the ‘joint’ European standpoint was hardly anything other than the europeised standpoint of France and Germany’.

There is a contrast between “the joint European standpoint” and “europanised standpoint of Germany and France” that, I believe, was used as an oblique expression for the hegemony of France and Germany over the rest of the EU.

2. another occurrence of *europaizace* was found in an article by Jacques Rupnik. He commented on the motto *return to Europe* that symbolised the desire of the post-communist countries to rid themselves of the heritage of the Soviet empire, which soon became primarily a political ambition. Therefore the slogan of unification of Europe soon turned into the enlargement of the European Union which, on both sides, caused a lot of grief and misunderstanding. Rupnik’s apt commentary on the Union philosophy of enlargement instead of unification of the continent, which - - the authors of the idea worried - - could destabilise or completely dismantle the Union, therefore

used the construction *européizace demokratického procesu* ‘Europeisation of the democratic process’ as a contrast to *demokratizace evropského procesu* ‘democratisation of the European process’. By contrasting these two phrases *européizace* emerges as a EU strategy applied to the candidate countries for the enlargement of the Union which might not be as democratic as the EU claims and as the candidate countries would wish it to be.

3. *européizace* was used alongside *europánizace* to describe the process of individual countries losing their national identity as they became EU members.

4. president Václav Havel spoke about “*européizaci Temelína*” ‘the Europeisation of Temelín’ and admitted that Temelín Nuclear Power Station had become a European problem that needed to be tackled before the country joined the EU. Havel announced that he supported the process of Europeisation by stating “*jsem přítelem européizace*” ‘I am a friend of Europeisation’ which, according to his description in the article, meant respecting decisions made by the European parliament. As the above citations show, *européizace* ‘Europeisation’ can be defined as a process of introduction of EU legislation in the Czech Republic or a process of problem-solving with the guidance of the European Union.

Altogether three entries on *européizace* were found in connection with Temelín Nuclear Power Station discussions, in the context of which the verb *européizovat* ‘to Europeise’ was also documented. The verb *européizovat* was listed twice between 1997 and 2000. Its meaning can be derived from the noun *européizace* as ‘to introduce EU legislation in the Czech Republic or to solve problems under the guidance of the European Union’, which can occasionally have a derogatory undertone.

5. “*plíživá européizace [české] vlády*” ‘the creeping Europeisation of the [Czech] government’ was used in the context of the tax policy of the Czech government, which was being brought into line with the EU tax policies. In the

same article also “*evropanství české vlády*” ‘Europanship<sup>59</sup> of the Czech government’ was used as a criticism of the Czech government for not being strong enough to stand up to the EU orders.

6. *europeizace* in the context of accession to the EU was detected only once to have a positive undertone. It was within the context of culture, where it was stated that:

63) [. . .] členství Česka v bruselském podpůrném programu [. . .] přinese další europeizaci českého filmu – ne ve smyslu europudingů, ale koprodukcí se silným národním akcentem, které umožní českým filmům cestovat do světa.

[. . .] membership of Czechia in the Brussels support programme [. . .] will bring a further Europeisation of Czech films - - not in the sense of Europuddings but in the sense of co-production with a strong national accent, which will allow Czech films to travel the world.

7. in 1996 the Prime Minister Miloš Zeman used the construction “*europeizace aliance*” ‘Europeisation of the Alliance’ to mean the process of potentially diminishing the American influence in NATO through the growing power of European members. This was the only recorded instance when the aspect of Europe as a continent and international relations between Russia and other European countries were reflected in the meaning of the word instead of the aspect of Europe as the European Union.

8. *europeizace* as a linguistic term describing a general trend of close contact between European languages was recorded in Právo in 2000.

### 3) Euroizace ‘Euroisation’

Within the corpus of entries on the topic of *europeizace* one entry on a newly coined word *euroizace* ‘euroisation’ was found. *Euroizace* is used as a term derived from “Euro” as a name of the EU currency. The term was coined to

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<sup>59</sup> Or possibly ‘Europeness of the Czech government’

denote the process of joining the European Monetary Union and introducing the Euro as the only legal currency, which can be a consequence of membership in the European Union.

### Summary

The above investigation of the meaning of the newly coined words *europanizace* and *europaizace* shows that their semantics is affected by the fuzzy definition of Europe which can be detected also in Czech media discourse. Although it is the definition of Europe as the EU that has the primary impact on the meaning, the definition of Europe as a whole - - or Europe as a continent as opposite to America as a continent - - contributed to other possible meanings too. My analysis of Czech European discourse shows several features that are identical to both the Czech and the British or Western European discourse and I list them in the order given by Hardt-Mautner:

#### Europe defined geographically:

- (a) The term *Europe* can be vague in Czech discourse.
- (b) There are examples employing a definition of *Europe* as a whole geographic entity.
- (c) There are examples of Europe not identical to the European Union but still not identical to the full geographic description of the European continent either.
- (d) The understanding of Europe as mainland only, excluding Great Britain was documented in Czech European discourse.

#### Europe defined politically:

- (a) Numerous examples where *Europe* was defined clearly as the EU, formerly the EC, were recorded.
- (b) Politically united Europe is recorded in Czech political and economic discourse.
- (c) Europe does not denote the EU and at the same time does not relate to the usual semantics of European continent due to the controversial political position of Russia. There is an analogy to Britain's position in Europe, as

defined in relation to individual European nations in British or Western European discourse. It has to be noted that the position of Russia in Czech discourse is not determined solely by relation to individual European nations but also by relation to their interest groups, such as NATO.

(d) The perception of Europe as the EU was predominantly noticeable in the newly coined words *europanizace* and *europeizace*. In a total of thirteen examples, eleven worked with *europanizace* and *europeizace* as synonyms for becoming part of the EU and adopting its philosophy.

### Europeans:

I cannot confirm the presence of an exclusive meaning of the term *Europeans* as supporters of the EC, as Hardt-Mautner gives in Czech discourse. I did not find any data using *Evropan* ‘a European’ as a supporter of the EU or a supporter of the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU in my search. On the contrary, only examples such as 64) listed below were recorded, where *Evropan* undoubtedly represents an inhabitant of the European continent:

64) Americký prezident George Bush ve středu prohlásil, že maltská schůzka, na jejímž uspořádání se dohodli Michaiem Gorbačovem, se v žádném případě nezmění v ‘jednání o Evropě bez Evropanů’.

The American president George Bush stated on Wednesday that the Malta meeting, which he and Mikhail Gorbachev agreed upon, would certainly not change into negotiations ‘about Europe without Europeans’.

Some readers might interpret the citation as “if the Russians are not Europeans therefore also other European nations are not Europeans”. However, I would like to refer the reader to diagrams **n** and **p** and section **4.II.1.3.2.** of the case study where I explain the position of Russia in Europe.

Hardt-Mautner states that the adjective *European*, when associated with a commitment to European culture and traditions, can be gradable.

(a) The construction “*europeizace* českého filmu” ‘europeisation of the Czech film’ in the sense of belonging to the cultural structure, and

consequently the possible financial benefits, was recorded. The quotation showed appreciation of the Czechs' involvement in a European cultural network - - with *Europe* defined as the EU - - and their commitment to participation in the network. However, no records were found that would demonstrate comparative usage (more, less European) of the adjective in Czech newspaper discourse.

My investigation of Czech discourse proved that the meanings of the term *Europe*, together with the adjective *European*, were negotiable, although the negotiated meanings may not fit any of the categories which Hardt- Mautner suggests and which are described above. One of the examples is the use of the adjective *evropský* by the Ex-Prime Minister Václav Klaus in 1997:

65) [ . . . ] jsme se dostali na přiměřenou (to znamená evropskou) úroveň státního rozpočtu [ . . . ] .

[ . . . ] we arrived at a reasonable (this means European) level for the state budget [ . . . ] .

It is ambiguous what definition Václav Klaus intended to assign to the term *Europe* when using its adjective *evropský* in this context. The most likely explanation may be *Europe* understood as the *European Union*, or *Europe* as a group of market-economy countries. Consequently, it can be speculated that Klaus used the adjective *evropský* either as a synonym to *přiměřený* 'reasonable' or as a quantifier of performance.

Hardt-Mautner does not have a category in which Europe is defined geopolitically. My investigation of Czech newspaper European discourse, however, shows that even in the 1990s regions can be marked not only geographically, but also politically.

If we put definitions of the regions of Western and Central Europe side by side, their description in the 1990s differs compared to the situation prior to 1989. While before the Velvet Revolution Western Europe was defined mainly

in military terms and the terms of capitalist order, discourse at the very end of the 1990s favours understanding *Western Europe* as an equivalent to the European Union. Also the term *Central Europe* is characterised differently. The discourse of the beginning of the second millennium describes the region of Central Europe, *střední Evropa*, as a region of post-communist countries preparing to join the EU and geographically located within Central Europe. The noun *Středoevropan* “a Central European” and the adjective *středoevropský* “Central European” are used accordingly. What should be stressed here is the possibility that the terms *střední Evropa* “Central Europe” and *střed Evropy* “the centre of Europe” may not have the same meaning and may not be used to denote the same concept.

The article “Další kolo jednání vídeňských rozhovorů; Ulehčit evropskému srdci” ‘A New Round of Vienna Negotiations; To Lighten the European Heart’ from 1987 discusses the concept of *střed Evropy* ‘the Centre of Europe’ and rephrases it with the image of *evropské srdce* ‘the European heart’:

66) Byl-li při teritoriálním vymezení těchto jednání vybrán právě střed Evropy, byť není přísně geografický, důvodem k tomu byla skutečnost, že to je právě místo, kde spolu hraničí dvě vojenská seskupení a kde je relativně největší vojenská koncentrace. Proto má celoevropský význam, jestliže by se právě zde v této oblasti podařilo dosáhnout dohody o snížení stavu vojsk a výzbroje. Vždyť jde o území NDR, ČSSR a Polska na jedné straně, o NSR, Belgii Holandsko a Lucembursko na straně druhé.

If the centre of Europe, albeit not strictly the geographical one, was chosen when the location of the negotiations was defined, the reason is that this is the border-line between two military alliances and the place where the relatively highest military concentration is found. Therefore it is of importance to all of Europe if agreement on the reduction of the numbers of soldiers and weapons can be reached in this very location. This, after all, is the territory of the GDR, CSSR, and Poland on one side and FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg on the other.

It was noted in the previous section of the case study that the article does not give a very clear explanation of what is meant by the *centre of Europe* or the *heart of Europe*. The list of countries which, according to the article, belong to the centre of Europe or the heart of Europe enumerate GDR, Czechoslovakia,

Poland, FRG and also Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg which provides us with a vague geographical description of the centre of Europe. Despite the fact that the figure of speech *srdce Evropy* was recorded only once in the discourse prior to 1989, it was favoured by Czechoslovak communist politicians. The same imagery can be found in current international political and also cultural discourse even now<sup>60</sup>.

#### 4.II.1.3.7. The Core of Europe, the Heart of Europe, the Soul of Europe

As the discourse proves, it is a difficult task to define Europe. A layman's definition of Europe could state that it is the continent reaching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals. Definitions of Europe vary greatly based upon the application of either geographical or geopolitical and interest-focused criteria. For many it will not be easy to give a definition within the context of one set of criteria without being influenced by the other. It may even prove to be impossible for some to give a geographical definition of Europe without being at least slightly influenced by political criteria. If a geographical view is applied, it will seem reasonable to place Vienna in Central Europe. Instead, due to the general opinion affected by a strongly imbedded political view, Vienna is put in Western Europe despite the fact that the capital of Austria is geographically situated further East than Prague.

Many would argue that Prague is geographically in the centre of the European continent. Since the Velvet Revolution, politicians and the media have mostly referred to Czechoslovakia and then the Czech Republic as Central European countries. Newspaper discourse reveals that the term *Central European countries* defines post-communist countries geographically in Central Europe that are preparing to join the European Union. The *centre of Europe*, as evolving from newspaper discourse, denotes a strategic function. It is a place from which things can be controlled or where decisions are made which could influence the rest of the entity. However, several countries compete to be in *the centre of Europe* or at *the heart of Europe*. Posters in the Brussels Airport

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<sup>60</sup> i.e. in June 2005



welcome you to the heart of Europe<sup>61</sup>, Story informs its readers that Eva [Herzigová] “*to v srdci Evropy pro změnu rozjela na Silvestra*” ‘painted the heart of Europe red on New Year’s Eve for a change’<sup>62</sup>, the Swiss are proud that the heart of Europe is located in Switzerland.<sup>63</sup>

Although *the heart of Europe* does not explicitly state its central location, we can presume that metaphorically, the heart of something [somebody] is either in the approximate centre of that object or has a central function. Let’s investigate if the presumption will be confirmed in practice: Schaffner, Musolff and Townson reported the 1994 election CSU slogans proudly announcing that “our Bavarian homeland in the centre of Europe” and CDU arguments that Germany had moved from the fringe into the centre and had become the geographical and economic centre of Europe (p.5). In the early 1990s, before the Treaty of Maastricht, the arguments regarding the position of Britain within the proposed concepts of centre versus periphery of EU were very fierce. John Major protested against Britain’s position as an outsider in the EU, claiming, “I want us to be **where we belong. At the very heart of Europe.** Working with our partners in building the future.” (Hardt-Mautner, 183) Further, John Major and Douglas Hurd deeply desire to open a new era in which Britain gets closer to the heart of Europe on something like its own terms [. . .] (Hardt-Mautner, 183). Two days later after Major’s announcement, the Daily Telegraph proudly announced that “after Maastricht Britain remains firmly at the centre of the Community and in a position to wield real influence during the ongoing debate on the future of Europe” (Hardt-Mautner, 183). Reflecting these debates on the hierarchical structure of the European Union, I propose a metaphorical model of the *core* versus the *periphery*. To find the difference between the concepts of the *heart* and *core* with respect to their central position and obtain working definitions of the two terms, Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English [OALDCE] and Longman Synonym Dictionary [LSD] were consulted.

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<sup>61</sup> as at 2003.

<sup>62</sup> “Praha je zlatá loď”, Story 2, 7 Jan. 2003:5.

<sup>63</sup> Tomáš Sniegoň: “Norman Davies: Evropská unie? Experiment, ale nutný.” Salon č. 291, s 1, Právo 24 Oct. 2002.

- **OALDCE**

Heart: 1. that part of body which pumps blood through the system {*When a man's heart stops beating, he dies*}  
 2. centre of emotions; deepest part of one's nature  
 3. central part, the essence

Core: 1. (usu hard) centre [. . .]  
 2. central or most important part of anything

- **LSD**

Heart: 2. inner feeling, feelings, soul, spirit, [. . .]  
 3. sympathy, fellow feeling, understanding, compassion, [. . .] kindness, goodness, [. . .] humanitarianism, humaneness, humanity, love; [. . .] brotherly love  
 4. backbone  
 5. core, centre, nucleus, [. . .] sum and substance, essence, [. . .] essential part

Core: centre, heart, nucleus, [. . .] substance, essence, sum and substance, essential part, inner core, heart of the matter [. . .].

The working definitions obtained from OALDCE and LSD do not cast much light in the problems as too many aspects of the three concepts overlap.

**Tab.:7**

	Heart	Core
Heart of matter		✓
Sum and substance	✓	✓
Core/ inner core	✓	
Centre	✓	✓
Heart		✓
Nucleus	✓	✓
Spirit	✓	✗
Soul	✓	✗

However the term *core* lacks the aspects of spiritual issues. To obtain further insight into the concept of *heart*, I consulted Vaňková and Wierzbicka. Both *heart* in English and *serdce* in Russian are seen as the organs of emotions and so is the Czech *srdce*. *Srdce*, *serdce* and *heart* are used in the above contexts as names of imaginary organs of emotions and feelings, which means they are semantically distinct from the same words referring to parts of the body. Wierzbicka reports that the emotional heart (or *serdce* in Russian and also *srdce* in Czech) is possibly perceived as more closely related to the body than either the soul or mind (p. 47). However, neither *heart*, *serdce* nor *srdce* are considered to be centres of “all emotions but only of emotions which are seen as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’”. It is suggested that “*heart* is seen as not only an organ of feelings (good and bad) but also as an organ of empathy and benevolence (good feelings for others)” (48). Both the Russian and the Czech concepts of *serdce* and *srdce* correspond closely to the English term *heart*. To go even further, both Russian and Czech have two words that are perceived to be organs of emotion *serdce*, *srdce* and *duša*, *duše*, while in English people’s feelings are connected with the *heart*.

The definition of soul as abstracted from OALDCE and LSD is as follows:

Soul: 1. spirit, [. . .] vital spirit, [. . .] life  
 2. heart, centre of emotions, seat of feelings [. . .]  
 5. essential part, essence [. . .] sum and substance, heart of the matter,  
 [. . .] core, inner core, heart, centre, nucleus [. . .]

The comparison of the concepts of *heart*, *core* and *soul* provides the following results:

Tab.: 8

	Heart	Core	Soul
Heart of matter		✓	✓
Sum and substance	✓	✓	✓
Core/inner core	✓		✓
Centre	?	✓	?
Heart		✓	✓
Nucleus	✓	✓	✓
Spirit	✓	✗	✓
Soul	✓	✗	

Temporarily we can assume that the concepts *heart* and *soul* might be identical while the concept *core* is not because it lacks the aspects of the spiritual sphere and possibly also feelings and affections.

It still could be successfully argued that the above explanation of the concept *heart* will not be sufficient to justify a country's claims to be in *the heart of Europe*. I would argue that it will not be only empathy, benevolence, understanding, kindness, compassion and possibly also humaneness and humanity that would solely support the claim for location in the *heart of Europe* or the claim that a particular place is *the heart of Europe*. It is also the perception of the mechanics of the vital body organ pumping blood through the system *{When a man's heart stops beating, he dies}*, together with the non-peripheral, even though not necessarily central, geographical position on the continent, that play a significant role here. Norman Davies in an interview for Salon, the literature supplement of Právo, explains several points regarding the concept of the *heart* and the *heart of Europe*: not only that the heart and the centre are not identical, the heart is not located in the centre of a body but also to establish and mark the geographical centre is difficult. Depending on what will be one's definition of Europe and its borders, the geographical centre will be different. Similarly, depending on one's understanding of the concept of

Europe, its heart can be not only along the line of contact between the former Eastern and Western blocs, Belgium, Britain, Germany but also in Switzerland.<sup>64</sup>

Some would clearly stress the function of a heart as a vital body organ, and the power the heart has over the functioning of the rest of the organism, above the empathic and emotional function of the heart. Consequently, the emotional function may become a burden since power, control, and leadership may seem more important to the particular country, or to any of its politicians who claim for it that vital position. For their purposes the term *heart* perhaps lacked appeal or was too sentimental, and therefore a new term the *core of Europe* was coined. The term *core of Europe* denotes particularly France and Germany, who are united in their role as the EU driving force. This enabled the countries claiming to be in the *core* of Europe to rid themselves of the emotional aspects of that function and focus on the more technical aspects of the central organ or the central body, here in the sense of a central group, running the organism, together with a focus on performance and results:

Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Union (. . .) will today unveil its strategy for the next big reform step in the European Union (. . .) It will call for reinforcement of a "hard core" of the EU, and further strengthening of the close relations between France and Germany as its driving force. (Musolff 77)

The investigation of terms *the heart of Europe* and *the core of Europe* would not be complete if one did not ask why countries put themselves in the position of or within the heart of Europe and the core of Europe. Newspaper discourse showed reasons which, based on Musolff's work, I could summarise as 3Ps. These are:

- Position
- Power
- Prestige

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<sup>64</sup> Tomáš Sniegoň: "Norman Davies: Evropská unie? Experiment, ale nutný." 291:1, Právo 24 October 2002.

- **Position:** Those who claim to be in the *heart* of Europe or in the *core* of Europe insist on the central position of their country in Europe either geographically, or as in the centre of important events, or a combination of both. For some, the geographically non-central position of a country is seen as a major disadvantage.
- **Power:** They do not merely want to be involved passively thanks to their geographical location. They want to play an active leading, decision-making or at least advisory or mentoring role to the others. Some compensate for the non-central geographical position by increasing political activity so as not to be sidelined and acquire attributes of the periphery.
- **Prestige:** Those who claim to be in the *heart of Europe* or at the *core of Europe* desire recognition and appreciation in various aspects of international life.

Finally, the statements of those claiming to be in the heart of Europe or the core of Europe signal their vision of what Europe is and/or what Europe should be like.

Although Czech European discourse uses the expression the *heart of Europe*, the expression the *core of Europe* has not been documented. I found five newspaper articles discussing the themes related to the *core of Europe*, however the expression the *core of Europe* which could be translated into Czech as *jádro Evropy* or *evropské jádro* was not used in any of them. Not even an alternative term to the *core of Europe*, such as for instance *nitro Evropy*, was coined to denote a partnership between Germany and France seen as the EU driving force and the key players in EC matters, has been coined in the Czech language. The articles covering the relevant topic specifically named Germany and France as the *driving force* in the EU:

67) Německo a Francie podporují rozšíření ES o východní Evropu [. . .] Německo a Francie chtějí být nadále hnací silou evropského integračního procesu [. . .].

### Germany and France Support the Enlarging the EU to Include Eastern Europe

[. . .] Germany and France want to continue as the driving force of the European integration process [. . .].

and in the second example we can read that:

#### 68) Paříž a Berlín chtějí euroústavu

Francie a Německo se v pátek vyslovily pro vytvoření ústavy Evropské unie.[ . . . ] Nejvyšší představitelé Francie a Německa dali také najevo spokojenost [ . . . ] „Francie a Německo už nyní mají totožné stanovisko k velkému počtu těchto reforem [ . . .].” Francie a Německo byly dlouho označovány za motor evropské integrace. Loni v prosinci na summitu EU v Nice ale vyšly najevo některé neshody mezi nimi a pozorovatelé hovořili o tom, že se motor zadrhl.

#### Paris and Berlin Want a Euro - constitution

France and Germany approved the creation of the European Union constitution on Friday. [ . . . ] The highest representatives of France and Germany also showed their satisfaction [ . . . ] “France and Germany already have identical positions on a large number of these reforms [ . . .].” France and Germany have long been labelled as the motor of the European integration. However last year at the Nice summit, some disagreements were revealed and observers commented that the motor had seized up.

Czech authors, either in-house journalists or Czech correspondents abroad, wrote the above articles. Although the core of Europe, or its equivalent, was not present in the discourse, it was the imagery of an engine that was used for the combined French-German forces within the EU. Musolff reports that images of France and Germany as a motor or an engine of the EU “emphasise the *fast speed* and *avant-garde* role of France and Germany” as well as the image of the engine being overhauled (88 – 89). The first quotation comes from the Czech source whilst the source of the article “Paříž a Berlín chtějí euroústavu” is CTK, the Czech Press Agency. The use of the engine metaphor suggests that the article was adopted from a foreign source and translated into Czech; however, the imagery *core of Europe* is not used here. Musolff observes that the geometric source domain, where the core of Europe image is allocated, is closely linked with the technical domain. The images of France and Germany as pieces of machinery pulling forward the EU together with

images of an engine being overhauled, spluttering even as having stopped working are common in the corpus of European metaphors (88 – 89).

If Europe can have a heart, although who or what exactly makes it is not univocally agreed upon, it could be speculated that Europe can also have a soul. Both Vaňková and Wierzbicka look at similarities between the concepts of the heart and the soul. Vaňková lists *soul* as one of the meanings of *heart* in the Czech language since the *heart* is a feeling centre of a human being, its substance and a synonym of the *soul*, *cítící centrum bytosti, její podstata, synonymum duše* (259). Contrary to this, Wierzbicka suggests that in the context of emotions the *heart* and the *soul* might be equivalents, but it is not really the case. I believe that both in Russian and in Czech *duša* and *duše* are understood as organs of “deeper and purer, and more morally and spiritually coloured feelings than *serdce*” in Russian or *srdce* in Czech (Wierzbicka, 50). *Duša* or *duše* “is viewed as an internal spiritual theatre, as a place where events happen of a kind that could never happen in the world of inanimate things” (50). Wierzbicka further suggests that the feelings happening in *duša* or *duše* have a deeper and a more spiritual nature and can be linked to values. It should not be left unnoticed that, although Russian *duša* and Czech *duše* are seen mainly “as a moral and emotional core of a person, it does not totally exclude other functions of a person’s inner life, such as thinking and knowing, as long as those other functions are somehow linked to the values and to a person’s hidden inner world” (51).

Havel was probably not aware of Wierzbicka’s work on *heart* and *soul*. However, if we look at his vision of the CR’s position in Europe listed as example (38), we can detect his desire for the country to play the role of the soul of Europe. Havel’s ideas of a country whose intentions and actions are based on the ideas of intellectual power and humanity are expressed in the 1990 New Year speech and comply with the account of soul stipulated by Wierzbicka. Havel wishes for a place where the Europeans paths meet, where spiritual and moral values apply. All this together with the close-to-central geographical position of the country on the European continent fulfils the



requirements on the soul as given in the table above and based on the definition of *soul* provided by the LSD.

Although the concept of the soul of Europe is only a speculative one, post 1989 Czech newspaper discourse shows it can be justified. In the context of an article in the culture and religion section of Lidové noviny a construction *jeden z prvních českých Evropanů* ‘one of the first Czech Europeans’ was found.<sup>65</sup> The personality denoted as one of the first Czech Europeans is St. Vojtěch who is known to have largely contributed to the unification of Europe through spreading principles of Christianity, European morals and culture values. Consequently, the construction *český Evropan* represents not only a person who acted as a unifying element for the whole of the continent. It also gives the position of Czech lands in the European context a different dimension. It demonstrates the contribution of the Czech nation and the Czech culture to the rest of Europe; it brings to light the role the Czechs have been playing in helping others not only to gain their firm position and respect on the European continent but who also enriched the internal and spiritual life of others.

Also Jan Krekule, in his well founded article “*Splatí Praha dluh Rudolfovi II?*” ‘ “Will Prague Pay its Debts to Rudolf II?”, reminds the reader of the position that the Czech lands and especially their capital of Prague enjoyed in Europe during the reign of the emperor:

69) [Praha] matka měst [. . . ] se na čas stala těžištěm Evropy. Duchovním, kulturním i politickým. [. . . ] Výrazný byl podíl Prahy na výstavbě Evropy duchovní. Společně se svým souputníkem Antverpami, vyzařovala Praha univerzalistické ideje opírané na tradičních kosmologických základech představy mentální i politické jednoty křesťanského světa. [. . . ] Díky Rudolfovi se Praha na čas stala ve všech ohledech křižovatkou Evropy [. . . ] .

[Prague] the mother of cities [. . . ] temporarily became the focal point of Europe. The focal point of its spiritual, cultural and political life.[ . . . ] Prague’s share in the construction of spiritual Europe was prominent. Together with its fellow traveller, Antwerp, Prague radiated universal ideas supported by traditional cosmologic images of the mental and

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<sup>65</sup> Bob Fliedr: “Milénium: Vrcholem svatovojtěšských oslav má být návštěva papeže/ Jeden z prvních českých Evropanů,” Lidové noviny, 9 Nov. 1996: 16.

political unity of the Christian world. [. . .] Thanks to Rudolf, Prague temporarily became in all aspects the crossroads of Europe [. . .].

I have used part of Kundera's contemplation of Europe as a motto for this case study. The following citation had been written well before his motherland was troubled by the return journey to Europe:

EUROPE. In the Middle Ages, European unity rested on the common religion. In the Modern Era, religion yielded its position to culture (to cultural creation), which came to embody the supreme values by which Europeans recognized themselves, defined and identified themselves. Now, in our own time, culture is in turn yielding its position. But to what and to whom? What sphere will provide the sort of supreme values that could unify Europe? Technology? The marketplace? Politics, involving the democratic ideal, the principle of tolerance? But if that tolerance no longer has any rich creativity or any powerful thought to protect, will it not become empty and useless? Or can we take culture's abdication as a kind of deliverance, to be welcomed euphorically? I don't know. I merely believe I know that culture has already yielded. And thus the image of European unity slips away into the past.<sup>66</sup>

Although Kundera is very pessimistic about the role that culture, as a unifying element, could play in contemporary Europe, the investigation of the cultural sections of Czech newspapers after November 1989 proves otherwise.

#### **4.II.2. Culture**

Along with all of the changes in society that occurred as a result of what happened in 1989, there were also changes in culture. The forcefully interrupted developmental continuity of European cultural life was being revived. The more than twenty-year period of isolation for Czech culture was seen particularly as the reason for the crisis in spiritual life that Czech society had to deal with. Some warned that the damage caused by the period of

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<sup>66</sup> Milan Kundera, The Art of the Novel (London: Faber and Faber, 1988):127 - 128

normalisation might not be repairable.<sup>67</sup> The role of Czech culture on the European scene with Prague as one of exquisite art centres was recognised again and regularly brought to the attention of the general public. This may be why the frequency of use of *Evropa* and *evropský* has risen in newspaper discourse since 1989. In the corpus of fifteen newspaper articles the noun *Evropa* was documented six times and the adjective *evropský* five times; also the adjectives *evropanizovaný* ‘Europeanised’ and *středoevropský* ‘Central European’ were found.

#### 4.II.2.1. Prague – the Cultural Centre of Europe

70) Téměř dvacet let byla české veřejnosti odepřena možnost každodenního styku s hodnotami, jež Prahu druhdy zařadily mezi přední umělecká centra Evropy.

The possibility of everyday contact with those values that once ranked Prague amongst the foremost art centres of Europe has been denied to the Czech general public for almost twenty years.

Contacts with various cultural streams were not limited only to the ideologically suitable official cultural ambassadors any more and therefore one can read about *jazzových lahůdkách* ‘jazz delicacies’ served by the *evropanizovaní Američané* ‘Europeanised Americans’<sup>68</sup>. The general public gradually became more and more aware of Europe as a cultural entity without any of the geopolitical or interest divisions and exclusions that had been so prominent in political discourse. Czechoslovakia and later the Czech Republic is therefore presented as a part of the whole European cultural life:

71) Houslista Václav Hudeček, který patří mezi nejznámější evropské houslové virtuozy [ . . . ].

A violin player Václav Hudeček, who belongs amongst the most famous European virtuosos [ . . . ].

<sup>67</sup> Dagmar Fousková: “Jízdárna Pražského hradu chce dát odpověď na otázku jaká je Tvář moderního umění,” *Práce* 5 Jan. 1991, p. 4.

<sup>68</sup> Alex Švamberk: “Jazzová lahůdka,” *MF Dnes*, 27 Nov. 1992:11.

It was not only the Czech Republic that started to re-establish connections to European traditions and history abandoned by the socialist regime. In many countries of the former Communist bloc, so-called “European Institutes” were founded. The adjective *evropský* in the title of the institution was likely to represent not only a geographical definition of the institute but also part of the cultural and spiritual heritage of the continent, involvement in a broad international co-operation. In Prague the Goethe-Institute was founded. In the article covering the event, the division of Europe into several ideological blocs was used despite the predominantly cultural context. In an interview with the Director of the Institute, the current situation of Czech culture was assessed, and it was stated that “countries to the east of the Bavarian Forest have been cut off from information for a long time” and consequently Prague and other offices in Central and Southern Europe will not be subjected to budget reductions.

The ideological component introduced in the cultural section therefore resulted in the use of terms *střední a jižní Evropa* “Central and Southern Europe” which were otherwise not used in the cultural context.

#### 4.II.2.2. *Evropský* versus *Mezinárodní*

Although wider European cultural connections were recognised in the 90s, it cannot be said that the lexical units examined, *Evropa* and *evropský*, could be found regularly in articles discussing international cultural events. For instance, six articles covering the International Film Festival in Karlovy Vary in July 1999 were studied and neither the noun *Evropa* nor the adjective *evropský* was found. Only the adjective *mezinárodní* ‘international’ was used to describe the event and the attendance of participants. In other instances the adjective *mezinárodní* ‘international’ was used primarily to describe the participation of more than two countries and was void of any interest or political undertones. Before 1989 the attribute *mezinárodní* was used to mask European cultural connections. After 1989 it cannot be confirmed that by using the adjective *mezinárodní* in instances such as *XII. mezinárodní festival pantomimy neslyšících* ‘the XII. International Pantomime Festival of the Deaf’, *Pražský mezinárodní festival smyčcových kvartet* ‘Prague International Festival of String Quartets’, one is avoiding a possible European weight of the event.

### 4.II.2.3. Impact of the European Dimension on the Lexicon in Culture

As mentioned above, Hardt-Mautner, when identifying categories in which *Evropa* and the adjective *evropský* can be defined, stated that one of the possible meanings of the adjective *European* is:

- to be associated with commitment to European culture and traditions and
- if used that way, the adjective *European* was gradable.

Although appreciation of the involvement in European cultural network - - with Europe defined as the EU - - and commitment to participation in the network were noted in the section 4.II.1.3.4.2 on *europanizace* and *europeizace*, no proof of *evropský* being used as a gradable adjective in Czech were found either in the section on the political situation or culture. Nevertheless, Europe as a cultural entity with the adjective *evropský* carrying the same meaning has been gradually re-established since 1989. The European spiritual and cultural heritage seems to have resumed the development disrupted by the division of the continent into East and West more than fifty years ago.

### 4.II.3. Sports

The situation in the use of *Evropa* and *evropský* in the sports section remains very similar to the situation prior to 1989. In the corpus of fourteen newspaper articles the noun *Evropa* was documented four times and the adjective *evropský* eight times.

#### 4.II.3.1. Use of the Lexical Units *Evropa* and *Evropský*

The trend of using *Evropa* in the coverage of sports events remains virtually unchanged. While the expression “desítka nejlepších Evropanů” ‘ten of the best Europeans’ was recorded in 1988, in 1997 the expression “nejlepší

z Evropanů” ‘the best of Europeans’ was also recorded. *Střední Evropa* ‘Central Europe’ and *středoevropský* ‘Central European’ were recorded in 1989 and again in 1991. The expressions *Východ* ‘the East’, *Západ* ‘the West’ and their adjectives were not found at all after 1989. The expression *Seveřan* ‘North European’<sup>69</sup> was found in 1981, *sever Evropy* ‘North of Europe’ was found twice in the same article in 2000<sup>70</sup>, while adjective *severský* ‘North European’ was documented in 1980. The occurrence of *Evropa* and *evropský* after 1989 was found in constructions similar to those before 1989:

a) *evropský*

- |                             |                            |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|
| • Evropská hokejová liga    | European Ice-hockey League |
| • evropská konfrontace      | European confrontation     |
| • evropský fotbalový trh    | European football market   |
| • přední evropské ligy      | prominent European leagues |
| • evropské pohárové soutěže | European cup competitions  |
| • evropský šampionát        | European Championship      |

b) *Evropa*

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| • dvojnásobná krasobruslařská<br>mistryně Evropy | twice a figure-skating European<br>woman champion |
| • zahraniční hvězdy z Evropy                     | foreign stars from Europe                         |
| • soupeři v Evropě                               | competitors in Europe                             |

#### 4.II.3.2 Evaluation of the European Dimension Impact on the Lexicon in the Sports

The main change in sports European discourse after 1989 was caused by the disappearance of heavy communist ideological intervention. The division of the sports community into the East and West cannot be confirmed after 1989 since neither the nouns nor adjectives derived from the nouns East and West were found. Material and financial aspects of sports are not denied any more, as the construction *evropský fotbalový trh* ‘European football market’ documents. The sports discourse has not been affected by the changing or

<sup>69</sup>“Seveřané ostří na Prahu,” *Práce*, 18 Jan. 1991:8.

fuzzy definition of Europe. The existence of Europe as a sports entity survived the turmoil of political, social, and economic changes in 1989 and its presence in sports coverage continues.

#### 4.II.4. Conclusions

The case study shows an evolution within imagery of Europe which reflects changes in political climate on the European continent. The pre 1989 imagery reflected Europe as a continent divided into two politically antagonistic blocs of the East and the West. The metaphors of the period are heavily pro-Russian, pertinent to communist bloc and antagonistic towards western Europe and America. The fall of the iron curtain in 1989 marked a shift towards more West-friendly approach as the metaphor of the COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE shows. During the EU accession campaign Czech politicians relied upon and Czech media disseminated images of Europe directly adopted from Western media discourse.

My investigation confirmed presence of several metaphorical domains which co-exist alongside each other or overlap both before and after the change of regime in 1989. The post 1989 imagery of Europe can be described as newly adopted but not as newly coined. The discourse shows that the imagery used in Czech mass media copies the corpus of European imagery used by German, French and English mass media as Musolff documents. Even in instances when one can see a potential for a Czech language specific metaphor or imagery, the mass media or politicians relied on western images. This shows that Lakoff and Johnson's explanation of processes of analogical mapping is not the only answer to how metaphors are created and used. For this reason I support Musolff's explanation that metaphors offer various perspectives and it is up to us, language users, which perspective we consider. I observe explain that the choice of metaphors in Czech European discourse was deliberate and conscious. Particular imagery was selected to describe EU political issues and to demonstrate differences between EU member states and EU candidate states.

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<sup>70</sup> Radek Malina: "Finsko je skvělé rozplývá se Bednář," Právo 6 Sep. 2000: 23.

It was also deliberate to influence the thinking of general public about the European Union and Europe as a political and cultural entity.

As my corpus of citation shows, the imagery of Europe was introduced and innovated by high rank party officials and politicians and disseminated by the mass media irrespective of the investigated period and the regime. It is not clear from the limited scope of my investigation on what level the need to innovate or change particular imagery was first felt or to what extent the changes in images of Europe were affected by the necessity to persuade others, to improve communication or to adhere to a certain trend or fashion. What cannot be denied though is that the changes in imagery were introduced consciously by high rank innovators concerned with their prestige, i.e. politicians, party officials and people with social contacts outside the language community.

Although most attention was paid to changes in metaphoric concepts of Europe, I observed how this was projected into the lexicon. Both proprium *Evropa* and its adjective *evropský* have undergone semantic changes as I show in detail in section 4.II.1.3. A and B. As far as new coinages are concerned, I have commented on three of them formed with the prefixoid *euro-*, i.e. *europanizece*, *europizece* and *euroizece* in section.4.II.1.3 C.

To answer the initial question of why it was necessary for the Czech Republic to return to Europe, one needs to consider aspects of geopolitical division and interests on the continent. As Hardt – Mautner observes, the alternative views on the concept of Europe reflect unresolved and undisclosed conflicts and therefore the definition of Europe remains vague and changeable depending on the particular focus of discourse. The reason why the country felt the need to return to Europe is not that its geographical location had shifted, but that it had not been participating in structures and alliances that maintained the continuity of European democratic, cultural and spiritual traditions in which the country was once a valued and active member. Jan Krekule advises those who may need historical motivation to be conscious of the damage the interrupted historical continuity caused to the position of the Czech Republic on the



European scene. He believes that Czech history may be for some “a reminder of the times when people did not travel from Prague to Brussels to take important decisions . On the contrary – they travelled from Brussels to Prague to seek advice and nobody questioned that Prague was in Europe.”<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Jan Krekule, “Splatí Praha dluh Rudolfovi II?,” Právo 4 Jan 2003. found at [press.avcr.cz/pd](http://press.avcr.cz/pd).

## 5. Case Study 2 - - Česko

Motto:

[. . .] *Čechy*, země Česká bez svobody. [. . .] Dnešní už třetí *Česko* je dědictvím jakési politické nacionální hyperkorektnosti z dob pomlčkových sporů, štěpení Československa [. . .].

[. . .] *Čechy*, the Czech Lands without freedom. [. . .] The contemporary *Česko*, already third in succession, is the legacy of some kind of political hypercorrectness from the era of the hyphen battles, the fracturing of *Československo* [. . .]<sup>72</sup>

### 5.1. Introduction

On the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 1993, as the New Year dawned, a new independent state was also born, the official name of which is the Czech Republic. Discussions about the constitutional status of Czechoslovakia started soon after November 1989, and gradually led to a final split in the joint state of the Czechs and the Slovaks. What was considered to be a trivial and niggling matter by the Czech party was perceived by the Slovaks as a matter of fundamental importance. This was the hyphen between the two components of the name *Československo* – i.e. for the Slovaks *Česko-Slovensko*. Slovak politicians, radio and television presenters, newsreaders and commentators quite intentionally stressed the hyphen and the division of the name in speech. This behaviour was meant to establish a name where the component of *Slovensko* would be as equally stressed as the first part of the compound – i.e. *Česko*. It was not merely the hyphen that would be the reason behind the split of the country but the hyphen wars were symptomatic of the larger problems in interstate relations. Slovak political and economic requests, demands, argumentations and ultimatums reached a level that the Czechs were no longer willing to tolerate and, after the elections in June 1992, the Czech party accepted the proposal to split the state and began implementing it immediately.

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<sup>72</sup> Karel Steigerwald, “Česko a žactvo,” iDnes, e-mail servis, 26. 11. 1999.

### 5.1.1. Methodology

The development of the toponym *Česko* shows signs of linguistic purism that are manifest in the effort of a part of the speech community to preserve the language from features which they consider to be undesirable. These efforts are aimed at corpus planning. In the case study I observe the following activities:

- language cultivation
- a government-authorised long-term and conscious effort to solve a communication problem
- implementing co-ordinated measures to select and codify semantic and lexical features of a language and to disseminate the corpus agreed upon
- all the above activities are systematic, theory-based and organised.

I open the case study with the explanation of the function of the geographical name *Česko*. This is followed by an investigation into the historical development of the toponym. Further, I offer the most common objections to the name voiced both by public figures and the general public. The next section lists alternative proposals to *Česko* and their derivation possibilities. I also observe official steps towards disseminating the geographic name. To show if, and how, language users get used to the toponym, I list citations from newspaper articles between 1992 and 2002. Since the corpus of citations is not as extensive as for the previous case study, quotations are offered within the study and they are not appended.

It was my intention to perform a random search of the first issue of a daily newspaper each month across various topics. However, I attempted to get a balanced collection of topics that would demonstrate representation of the geographical name in various areas of media discourse. If no suitable material was found or the issue was not available, I continued my search in the subsequent issues.

I highlight the toponyms which are the subject of the case study in italics and I do not translate them into English in the translated citations of Czech media discourse. Below I list a glossary of Czech names of the Czech Republic used in the case study. Where there is a recognised English translation, this is given together with the Czech expression. I do not translate the alternative proposals into English but I only suggest the potential meaning of such a name.

### **Glossary**

<b>Czech:</b>	<b>English:</b>
Čechy	Bohemia
Česká republika	The Czech Republic
Česko	Czechia
Československá federativní republika	The Czechoslovak Federative Republic
Československá republika	The Czechoslovak Republic
Československá socialistická republika	The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
Československo	Czechoslovakia
ČR	CR
Morava	Moravia
Slezsko	Silesia
Slovensko	Slovakia

#### **5.1.2. System of Search**

It was my intention to perform a random search across various topics in the first issue of a daily newspaper in each month. I selected three national daily newspapers Právo, MF Dnes and Lidové noviny. The most frequently searched title was Právo, followed by MF Dnes and Lidové noviny; this was due to practical reasons and not due to a preference of one title over another. I have attempted to get a balanced collection of topics that would demonstrate representation of the geographical name in various areas of media discourse. If no suitable material was

found or the issue was not available, I continued my search in the subsequent issues.

The manual search was complemented by a search in the Czech National Corpus. Initially I searched in corpus PUB which is a subcorpus of SYN2000.

Additional search was performed in SYN2000. Contrary to my manual search, contributions from MF Dnes prevail over Lidové noviny and Právo, which comes fourth in the list of media titles in the CNK. My search for *Česko* starts in 1993 when approx. 4 million text words were entered in the corpus compared to approx. 11 million words in 1999.

I also examined texts from Newton IT fulltext archives.

## **5. 2. Official Political Names Versus Geographic Names**

The official political name *Česká republika* was clear as soon as the discussion about the split of the state had begun. A vast majority of the countries of the world have, apart from their official political name, a shortened name that usually consists of one word. This is the so called geographical name. The official names are used in official political contexts and geographical names are used in other contexts and situations, and primarily in everyday communication. Both names are equal however they differ in their stylistic usage and in the way they are used in different contexts. As Leoš Jeleček argues in his article “Jméno jako jablko sváru”<sup>73</sup>, geographical names are created in the process of development. However, we should ask the question: what constitutes that process of development? Is this development led or directed only by officials, and introduced through regulations, laws, norms, and decisions made by specialists in the language community irrespective of that particular language community’s attitude to the regulation? Or is this development driven by the language users themselves through their perception of individual lexical units and styles, through associations these create, their acceptability and their ability to integrate easily into the current language and

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<sup>73</sup> Leoš Jeleček, “Jméno jako jablko sváru,” Ekonom 52 (1999): 15.

the culture of the nation? Jeleček continues: “If they are included in normative dictionaries at a later stage -- for us it is the Slovník spisovné češtiny (Slovník), The Dictionary of Standard Czech, or a public administration material, in this case published by The Czech Authority for Land and Cadastral Surveys -- they become official.”

The document Names of States and their Territorial Parts, issued in 1993 by the Czech Authority for Land and Cadastral Surveys together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in compliance with OSN norms, states that the word *Česko* is a one-word geographical name for the Czech Republic and specifies its prescribed translations in foreign languages: *Czechia* in English, *Tscheichen* in German, *Tchequie* in French, etc. Specialists in historical geography and linguistics argue that the name *Česko* has been formed according to linguistic and language rules where the geographical name is based on the name of the majority nation living on the territory of the state. In Czech the geographical name is derived from the adjective form of the name of the particular nation, e.g.: *Slovák – slovenský – Slovensko*, *Maďar – maďarský – Maďarsko* – and hence also *Čech – český – Česko*. The alternative of *Češsko* that is sometimes proposed is invalid from the point of view of word-formation. The Czech language has a word *češství* ‘Czechness’ and derives adjectives from nouns ending in <ch> as *Valach – valašský* but in the case of the word *Čech* the adjective form has always been simplified to *český* and not *češský*. The geographical name *Česko* has not been created merely by adopting the first component of the compound *Československo*; it has also been created in accordance with the rules of word-formation in the Czech language.

### 5.3. The Evolution of Česko

#### 1777 – 1915

The written use of the word *Česko* has been recorded since 1777 in Kniha metodní pro učitelé českých škol (Bělič, Čech 300). The use of the word *Česko* has also been documented in the work of Czech and Slovak national revivalists. It appears in Kollár's Slávy dcera, Jablonský's Básně, and works by Kuzmány and Erben. Bělič claims that a one-word name for the territories inhabited by the Czech nation that would be equivalent to e.g. *Slovensko*, *Rusko* etc. was not regularly used in the past. Where a similar one-word name *Česko* was used, it usually stood for *Čechy* – i.e. the territory of Bohemia only. However, Bělič further claims that the work of national revivalists of Slovak origin proves that *Česko* may also be used to represent the whole Czech territory – i.e. the territory of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. (Bělič, Čech 300). The lexicographer Kott published a documented use of *Česko* in the magazine Krok in 1821 and the entry of a neuter noun *Česko* was included in Jungman's Slownjk in 1835 (Čižmarová, K peripetiím 2).

Karel Havlíček Borovský and František Josef Palacký are often mentioned and passages from their political articles are cited in discussions on the appropriateness of the one-word name *Česko*. In connection with the territorial limitation of the meaning of *Čech* and the etymology of this word, Bělič cites Borovský: “[. . .] our Czech represents exclusively the inhabitant of this kingdom and a Moravian [...] will neither call himself Czech nor will call his language to be Czech but Moravian [. . .]”. In connection with this quotation it is necessary to explain that in the feudal Czech state Germans were also lived on Czech territory and were also called Czechs. Palacký, for example, drew on this fact when he explained his decision not to participate in the German parliament in Frankfurt, saying: “I am a Czech of Slavonic descent [. . .]” (Bělič, Čech 299).

### 1915 – End of WW2

In 1915 Professor Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk emigrated from the Austro-Hungarian Empire to organise the struggle against the monarchy and to obtain support for the concept of a new independent Czech state. The original working name that Masaryk used for the new state was *Nezávislé Čechy*. Masaryk was joined by the Czech political scientist Edvard Beneš and the Slovak astronomer Milan Rastislav Štefánik and, together with other supporters of the independent Czech state, they established the Czech National Council, *Český komitét zahraniční*. From 1916 this functioned under the name *Národní rada zemí českých*. Many believe that the Slovak element was not included in the name of the new state mainly due to Štefánik, who viewed Slovaks as members of the Czech nation. (Čižmárová, K peripetiím 2). The ideology in the new state was the ideology of Czechoslovakism – conceiving the Czechs and Slovaks as a single whole. What should also be noted is the fact that in spite of Masaryk's Moravian origin, he did not highlight the Moravian and Silesian element in the name of the new state either. What seemed to play a major role in the concept of the new state for Masaryk was his trust in democracy as the political embodiment of humanity. Masaryk did not see the necessity to satisfy feelings of national identity and belonging to Moravia and Silesia, as he believed that 'All citizens of good will, without distinction of condition, religion or nationality, have been given the opportunity to build an exemplary democratic state, whose task will be to care for the interests of the entire free self-governing citizenry' (Pokorný 10).

In its final form, the state was conceived of as a multi-national Czecho-Slovak entity. The Slovak League abroad suggested that it should be called *Slavia*, which would have avoided privileging one nation over another. Čižmárová believes that Masaryk would have accepted the term, as no proof of his objections has been documented. Consequently the new state was named *Česko-Slovenská republika* with a short name *Česko-Slovensko* (K peripetiím 2).



It would not be true to say that this name was easily accepted – on the contrary. Many Czech and Slovak intellectuals commented on it. The most famous and most often cited in connection with the discussions on the appropriateness of *Česko* is the article ‘O tom jméně’ by Karel Čapek. Čapek intended the article as a timeless contemplation on the name. Apart from comments that the sound of the new name did not please the ear and sounded humorous, Čapek mostly objected to the process of the word formation of this title. In his opinion it was a glued-together word representing a glued-together political concept (*Žemlička IV*).

The public discussions about the word *Česko* started after the German occupation of the Sudetenland in 1938, when Slovakia acquired autonomy. František Trávníček, who at the time did not know about the recorded age of the word *Česko*, claimed in his article “Nový název našeho státu. Jak se má správně psát Česko-Slovensko” published in *Lidové noviny* on 4 December 1938: “We could avoid the unusual noun *Česko* by using the usual geographical terms *Čechy* and *Morava*. [. . .] But compared to the concise name *Slovensko*, the set phrase *Čechy a Morava* would be rather inconvenient and hence the concise and accurate term *Česko* is recommended. It may be a language novelty, but a language must come to terms with new circumstances, new constitutional arrangements.” Trávníček defended the name *Česko* several more times on the pages of Czech newspapers and repeatedly explained that *Česko* is not a discredited name equivalent to Hitler’s *Tschechei* which was a pejorative term denoting the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia – *protektorát Čechy a Morava* (Čižmárová, K peripetím 3 - 5).

### 1945 – 1968

Trávníček’s engagements in discussions on the validity of the one-word name *Česko* continued after 1945, at which point he was already aware of the age of this word and its use in the language of the Czech National Revival. Trávníček

considered this information when compiling the dictionary entry *Česko* in Slovník spisovného jazyka českého (SSJČ) in 1952. This definition states:

*Česko, str.* = *Čechy, nebo Čechy, Morava a Slezsko, protějšek ke Slovensko (říd., obrozen. Koll., Erb., Chaloupec, Gottw.)*

*Česko, n.* = Bohemia, or Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, corresponds to Slovakia (rarely used, national revival. Kollár, Erben, Chaloupec, Gottwald.)

Nevertheless, even then Trávníček's efforts failed to integrate the name *Česko* into the language awareness of the Czechs and everyday language use. In 1945, the language column "Jazykové zákampí" of Lidové noviny published an article signed by O.Š. who entered into polemics with Trávníček. O.Š. argued that he doubted that the name *Česko* had a good chance to become a living part of the language because the language competence of the language users would prevent this. The author believed that *Česko* did not first enter the Czech language as an independent word but as the first half of the compound *Československo*. He says:

Finding a new word would seem to be a more convenient option [...] Originally, I wanted to propose the title *Čechie*. This is a well-established word; I may say a respectable word, with an ancient tradition and many parallels in the names of other countries (Francie, Jugoslávie, Indie, etc.). But – even here the tradition causes difficulties since *Čechie* symbolises our motherland in the form of a female figure blessing the nation. I am therefore proposing to use not *Česko* but *Češko* (K peripetiím 6).

### 1968 – 1989

Discussions on the suitability of the chosen geographical name *Česko* are regularly repeated in connection with every change of the constitutional arrangements. These changes were introduced in 1968 – 69 when the Act of Constitutional Federation was approved and then again in 1992.

Čižmárová (K peripetiím 9) observed that until 1968 the disputes over the name *Česko* were conducted in an objective manner and were free from biased emotions. In 1968 when the poet Jan Skácel got involved in the discussions over the one-word name *Česko*, a new dimension was introduced in the discussions, which

since then has become typical for written and also oral disputes conducted by the opponents of *Česko*. Čižmárová calls this new dimension “the attacking aggressivity”. Skácel wrote in his polemic:

The word *Česko*) is ill-formed and you cannot turn a blind eye to it no matter how much you try. You cannot. I am ready to live in Moravia, in Silesia, in Bohemia, in Slovakia and, with a certain degree of renunciation renunciation, even in Prague. But I would not be able to live in *Česko*. I would not even be able to die in a country with such a name. I would feel out of place and I would feel ashamed [. . .] if someone, God save us from that, thought up something like *Moravsko*, then I would commit a crime – a murder. The arguments in favour of the word may be to the point, but the word sounds really lamentable. (K peripetiím 9)

Jan Skácel’s concerns about *Moravsko* have come true. “The Language Advisory Service” of *Naše řeč* published the following enquiry:

Několikrát jsem se setkal s názvem *Moravsko*, označujícím *Moravu*. [. . .]  
Prosím o sdělení, zda je název *Moravsko* spisovně správný.  
‘I have come across the name *Moravsko*, denoting *Moravia*. [. . .] I would like to find out if the name *Moravsko* is standard and correct.’

The reply from “the Language Advisory Service” states that the neologism *Moravsko* is neither incorrect nor generally understood. The language service further questioned the potential meanings of the toponym, which could be:

- a) denoting Moravia – which is then redundant just as e.g. *\*Italsko,\* Francouzsko* etc. are redundant alongside standard *Itálie, Francie*, etc.
- b) toponyms referring to Moravia and the Moravian part of Silesia. It is suggested that to distinguish between the geographical parts of the country and its regions in this manner would be splitting hairs.
- c) “If this toponym is created out of spite and is meant to denote the Czech Republic (the Czechs call it *Česko*, so we in Moravia are going to call the country *Moravsko*), this brings confusion into our identity [. . .].”<sup>74</sup>

Some could successfully argue that the expression “attacking aggressivity” is rather strong. It could be objected that what Skácel is using when expressing his own feelings is merely poetic licence, and the openness in his expression is a suitable reflection of the euphoria, enthusiasm, and resistance against authorities and directives that characterised the atmosphere of the Prague Spring in 1968. Nevertheless, Čižmarová is right in her observation that since Skácel’s involvement, subjective feelings and political preferences have prevailed over objectivity, even in the cases of professionals occupied in polemics on the usage of *Česko*. One can observe that stronger and stronger words are used to persuade, ridicule and crush the objector’s opponents.

In 1978 the word *Česko* was included in *Slovník spisovné češtiny* as a synonym for *Česká socialistická republika*. Another definition from 1989 states that:

*Plně spisovným synonymem pro Českou socialistickou republiku (ČSR, Čechy a Moravu) je Česko; obdoba výrazu Slovensko.*

‘A full and literary synonym for the Czech Socialist Republic (ČSR, Bohemia and Moravia) is *Česko*; a counterpart to the name *Slovensko*.’<sup>75</sup>

### 1989 – 1998

Although the one-word name *Česko* was codified, it was still not part of everyday usage, mainly due to the fact that *Československo* was used as the one-word name for the state. The authors of the article “Odborníci k názvu Česko” (“Specialists on the name Česko”) which is a shortened version of “Stanovisko geografů, historiků, jazykovědců a pracovníků dalších vědních oborů k otázce jednoslovného, tj. geografického názvu pro ČR, které vychází z diskusního setkání na půdě University Karlovy v Praze 29. 1. 1998” (“The opinion of geographers, linguists, historians and experts from other scientific disciplines on the official one-word geographic name for the Czech Republic defined at the discussion at Charles University in Prague on 29 January 1998”) express their view that the Czech

<sup>74</sup> *Naše řeč* 3 (1999): 168.

<sup>75</sup> Michal Ptáček, *Breviář praktické češtiny* (Praha: Novinář, 1989).

political apparatus of the normalisation period (1968-1989) followed the Soviet example and inclined exclusively to the official political name of the country. The one-word name *Česko* was understood to be too apolitical and non-ideological.<sup>76</sup> When searching for information that would support or refute this theory, no proof was found in favour of it but, on the contrary, several arguments were found that went against it. Bělič claimed that, in connection with the federalisation of the republic, the need to find a one-word name for the Czech part had become rather urgent (Bělič, *Čech* 300). Vladimír Šmilauer believed that there was a need for a short name for the Czech Socialist Republic and he used the equation “SSR: *Slovensko* = *ČSR* : *x*” to document his claim. . In Šmilauer’s opinion this *x* could only be represented by *Česko*. (Šmilauer 1981). Miloslava Knappová in the article “Česko = Česká socialistická republika” supports the one-word title *Česko* by highlighting the word’s two hundred years of documented history and linking it with the positive connotations of the Czech National Revival. Knappová believes that a more frequent use of the word would eventually rid it of its emotional undertone (by which we can understand its pejorative associations as a Czech equivalent for German *Tschechei*). She closes her article by writing that “[. . .] the as a word, *Česko* is correctly formed. [. . .] It is a synonym for *Česká socialistická republika*, i.e. the territory of that part of ČSSR where Czech is spoken and where the Czech nation lives. Its entry in Slovník spisovné češtiny is appropriate” (Knappová 206). Jan Trefulka, the writer, journalist and signatory of Charta 77, contributed to the discussion on *Česko* several times.<sup>77</sup> In the article “A znovu Česko”, Trefulka is very direct in his claims that in the 1980s it was the Communist Party representatives, journalists and linguists acting in line with instructions from the Party secretariats who enforced the use of *Česko* as the one-word name for the Czech Socialist Republic. These arguments clearly show that

<sup>76</sup> (<http://users.its.cs/-klasik/ces/ces1.html> found on 9.11. 2001).

<sup>77</sup> Jan Trefulka, “A znovu Česko,” Právo 5. 3. 1998; and also “Předčasný fejeton,” Literární listy, 12 (1968): 1 – 2.

the claim made by the authors of the article, amongst who were linguists, historians, and geographers, cannot be proven.<sup>78</sup>

As explained before, since the division of the country on 1 of January 1993, opinions on the one-word geographical name for the Czech Republic have been split.

President Václav Havel expresses his view on *Česko* by saying: “The above mentioned word has never passed my lips. I cannot explain exactly why, but for some reasons it will not pass my lips for quite a while yet. I would much rather make the effort and say *Česká republika*.” (Holeček, Rubín 135)

The objections to *Česko* from the general public *are* of a miscellaneous nature; one of the objections is that *Česko* is not entered in Pravidla českého pravopisu (Pravidla), The Guide Book to Czech Spelling. The explanation for this is very simple. There is no need to enter the word in Pravidla as the spelling of *Česko* does not cause problems and Pravidla is not the equivalent of Slovník. Other objections documented in Czech newspapers and studies<sup>79</sup> are, for example:

- The sound of the word *Česko* does not please the ear – *Čechy* sounds better
- The word *Česko* is too short - it sounds like it has been chopped off
- The meaning of *Česko* does not include the Moravian and Silesian parts of the country [*Morava a Slezsko*]
- The word *Česko* is a translation of Hitler’s *Tschechei* – therefore the word *Česko* is Hitler’s idea
- Why was the word *Česko* chosen – why not *Čechie*, *České země*, *Čechrava*, *Českomoravsko* or *Čechozemsko*?

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<sup>78</sup> The full list of names can be found in: Pavel Chromý, “Čechy, Čechrava, Česko (Aneb, jak zní zkrácený oficiální geografický název pro Českou republiku?),” Geografické rozhledy 4 (97-98): 98 - 99.

<sup>79</sup> Milan Žemlička, “Bud’me definitivně pro Česko,” Lidové noviny 2 May 1998: Nedělní LN: IV.

- Some language users would prefer a geographical name in the form of *Česká* created in accordance of the formation of toponyms like *Sadská*, *Srbská* [both these toponyms are names of Czech villages]
- Others do not see a need for a one-word geographical name at all
- Some language users think that *Česko* is a neologism and that future generations will fully adopt it in their vocabulary.

#### 5.4. Alternative Proposals to Česko

One has to agree with those who object to using *Česko* because the name does not allow derivations like *severočeský*, *jihocheský* in the sense in the north of *Česko* or in the south of *Česko*. The derivations *severočeský*, *jihocheský* mean ‘north Bohemian, south Bohemian’. *Česko* does not have the potential for such word formation whilst other geographical names like *Slovensko*, *Finsko*, *Maďarsko*, *Polsko*, etc. do. It should be noted the short name *Československo* could not make such derivations either and was still acceptable and freely used in everyday conversation.

To check whether the alternatives to *Česko* proposed by those objecting to it are used in everyday communication I searched through the Czech National Corpus. The proposed alternatives to *Česko*, which are *Čechrava*, *Čechozemsko*, *Čechie*, *Českomoravsko*, and *Morče* were searched in the basic form, not in the lemma form. The following results were obtained:

##### 5.4.1. *Čechrava*

72) Jsem odpůrcem názvu *Česko*. Je to odpor zcela iracionální. [. . .] Navrhuji proto zcela nesmyslný, nic neříkající, avšak pěkně znějící název *Čechrava*. Mohl by uspokojit i Moravu.

I object to the name *Česko*. This objection is totally irrational . [. . .] This is why I suggest the name *Čechrava*, which is a complete nonsense but sounds nice. This might satisfy even Moravia.<sup>80</sup>

The proposed name *Čechrava* is created through blending of the morpheme *čech* with the second syllable of the word *Morava*: - rava. *Čech* + - rava = *Čechrava*.

#### 5.4.2. *Čechozemsko*

The proposed name *Čechozemsko* is likely to be based on the historical title *Země Česká*. The principles of word-formation where the geographical name is derived from the adjective form of the nation's name were applied on the adjective *zemský* which formed the second part of the compound - *zemsko*. The origin of the first part of the compound *Čecho-* might come from the first part of an older compound *Čechoslovák* denoting the inhabitant of *Československo*. Although *Čechozemsko* is one of the proposed alternatives to *Česko*, the Czech National Corpus has not recorded it.

#### 5.4.3. *Čechie*

73) [. . .] ale zatím se zdá, že řada těch, kterým *Česko* nezní příjemně, marně hledá; asi je to proto, že se něco vhodnějšího najít nedá. Slovo *Čechie* by muselo hodně zevšednět (i když jeho protějšky jako angl. *Czechia*, franc. *Tchéqui* a něm. *Tschechei* se zřejmě už dost uplatňují) u sousloví *České země* přece jen vadí dvouslovnost a *Trojzemí*, *Čemoslez* či co ještě nebylo navrženo, asi neprojde.

[. . .] but so far it looks like many of those who consider *Česko* as not pleasing to the ear are searching in vain; the reason for that may be the fact that something more suitable cannot be found. The word *Čechie* would have to lose its connotations (although it seems that its translations like the English *Czechia*, French *Tchéquie* and German *Tschechei* are widely used), the compound *České země* is difficult because of it consists of two words, and *Trojzemí*, *Čemoslez* or whatever has not been proposed yet are not likely to be acceptable.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> doc/SPUB/1996/ln96227.



Many non-professional language users would prefer the name *Čechie*. They argue that this name sounds nice and gracious but professionals object that *Čechie* is associated with names of football clubs – for example *Čechie Karlín* or with the symbol of the Czech motherland represented by a woman's figure blessing the nation.

#### 5.4.4. *Trojzemí* and *Čemoslez*

The connotations of *Čechie* explained above seem to be too strong for some. The author of this article mentions proposed names *Trojzemí* and *Čemoslez*. Both names indicate that the territory of the *Czech Republic* comprises three geographical and historical entities *Čechy*, *Morava* and *Slezsko*. The first proposal utilises this fact by avoiding the toponyms and creating a name that can be translated into English as the 'three-land country'. The other proposal explicitly uses the initial syllable of the names *Čechy*: *če-*, *Morava*: *mo-* and the first syllable of the name *Slezsko*: *slez*.

#### 5.4.5. *Českomoravsko*

74) Podobný výklad ankety rozeslal do všech možných novin Výbor muzejní a vlastivědné společnosti, [. . .], a to nepodepsaným dopisem odeslaným z podivné neexistující země *Českomoravsko* (v originále *Czechomoravia*).

A similar explanation of the survey was sent to various newspapers by the *Výbor muzejní a vlastivědné společnosti*, [. . .], in an unsigned letter sent from a strange non-existing country *Českomoravsko* (*Czechomoravia* in the original).<sup>82</sup>

Another compound was formed by combining *Česko* with an occasionalism *Moravsko*.<sup>83</sup> The comment in parentheses suggests that the article was written in English and the translation of the compound was secondary. It is not clear why the

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<sup>81</sup> docS/PUB/1993/Ind93107.

<sup>82</sup> docS/PUB/1993/Inm9331.

part *-moravia* of the compound was translated as *-moravsko* and not *-morava*, as *Moravia* can be correctly translated into Czech as *Morava*.

75) Nedávno si povzdechl jeden náš státník, že pro označení naší *České republiky* se dosud nevžilo jednoduché *Česko*, i když je to název logicky utvořený podle stejných pravidel jako názvy *Slezsko*, *Slovensko*, [. . .] a ještě řada dalších. Proti pojmenování *Čechy* mají námitky Moravané a jakýsi vtipálek navrhl pojmenování *Morče*, které by mělo vyhovovat jak Moravanům, tak Čechům.

Recently, one of our statesmen has complained that the simple name *Česko* has not caught on as a term for the *Czech Republic*, even though this name is created logically, according to the same rules as *Slezsko*, *Slovensko*, [. . .] and many others. The Moravians object to the name *Čechy* and some joker suggested that the name *Morče* should suit both the Czechs and the Moravians.<sup>84</sup>

76) Řada čtenářů si však myslela pravý opak – že Česká republika jednoslovné pojmenování nepotřebuje [. . .]. Čtenáři včera v telefonní diskusi navrhovali také jiné názvy pro republiku. Nejčastěji to byla *Čechie*, *Češsko*, *Morče* (slovo vzniklé zkrácením a spojením *Moravy* a *Čech*) nebo *Czechland*.

Many readers thought the opposite – i.e. that the Czech Republic doesn't need a one-word name [. . .]. In yesterday's telephone discussion, readers suggested other names for the republic. The most frequent suggestions were *Čechie*, *Češsko*, *Morče* (a word created by shortening and combining the names *Morava* and *Čechy*) or *Czechland*.<sup>85</sup>

While the previous suggestions put *Čechy* or the Czech element in the first place of the compound, in this proposal the Moravian element, i.e. the morpheme *mor* is put in front followed by the first syllable from *Čechy*: *če* This created a name for the country which also means guinea pig in Czech. It could be speculated that the author wished readers to associate the newly-created state with a laboratory guinea pig, but no further information was found on this speculation.

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<sup>83</sup> The occasionalism *Moravsko* is explained in *Naše řeč* 3 (1999):168.

<sup>84</sup> docS/PUB/1996/letohr96.

<sup>85</sup> docS/PUB/1999/mf991127.

#### 5.4.6. Derivation Possibilities of Alternative Proposals

When investigating the derivational possibilities of the proposed alternatives to *Česko*, the argument that in the Czech language the geographical name is derived from the adjective form of the name of the particular nation, e.g.: *Slovák – slovenský – Slovensko* becomes invalid. The proposed alternatives have not been based on the name of the majority nation but on a combination of names of two or all three territories the Czech Republic comprises of.

In this respect the following derivational possibilities exist:

- *Čechie* could form an adjective form *čechijský* and could form further derivations e.g. *severočechijský, jihočechijský*, etc. meaning in the north of *Čechie*, in the south of *Čechie*.
- *Čechrava* could form an adjective form *čechravský* because the second part of the name is formed by the second syllable of *Morava*. The adjective form of *Morava* is *moravský*. Further derivations *severočechravský, jihočechravský*, etc. can be formed.
- The adjective of *Čechozemsko* could be *čechozemský* in accordance with the adjective form *zemský*; hence derivations *severočechozemský, jihočechozemský*, etc. can be formed.
- The proposal of *Morče* offers two speculations form *morčecí* ‘belonging to a guinea pig’ already existing in Czech and this could create the derivations *severomorčecí* ‘belonging to a northern guinea pig’, *jihomorčecí* ‘belonging to a southern guinea pig’, etc. The second option could be an adjective *morčeský*. This adjective is based on the presumption that the second syllable *če* represents the first syllable of *Čechy*, the adjective form of which is *český*. The derivations could be *severomorčeský, jihomorčeský*, etc.

- Also *Trojzemí* and *Čemoslez* can form similar derivations. Adjective forms *trojzemský*, *severotrojzemský*, *jihotrojzemský*, *čemoslezský* with derivations *severočemoslezský* etc. could be created.

As all the proposals have been formed to produce a name of the country where at least two of its territories have been represented, there is no ambiguity between a derivation denoting the whole country and a derivation denoting only one of its territories.

### **5.5. Steps towards Disseminating the Geographic Name Česko**

Various steps have been taken to support *Česko* by changing people's negative perception of the word and thus establishing its consistent use in everyday communication and the appropriate stylistic environment.

In autumn 1997 a Civic Initiative *Czechia* was established to promote the geographical name *Česko*. Amongst its co-founders was the Head of the Czech Language Department of the Paedagogic Faculty, Masaryk University in Brno and researcher in the area of toponyms, Rudolf Šrámek. As already mentioned, on 29 January 1998 the Czech Geographic Society organised an expert meeting where the "Standpoint" was presented. Representatives from across the Czech media were invited to attend, and the event received rather wide media coverage. A press conference on the usage of the names *Česko* and *Czechia* took place on the May 2001 and the media were invited. An article recounting how badly the Czechs were informed and misled about the history of the word *Česko* can be found in *Právo*. This article on the press conference informs the readers that it is the historical geographer Leoš Jeleček who is considered to be the father of the one-word geographical name *Česko*.<sup>86</sup>

The use of *Česko* is obligatory neither in the Czech Radio Company nor the Czech Television Company. The training department of the Czech Radio Company recommended in 1998 using *Česko* for the unofficial name of the state. The Czech Television Company did not issue any recommendation concerning the use of the name. However, the deputy chief editor of the sports section of the Czech Television Company admitted that journalists and commentators lacked a more familiar expression and using *Česko* is a purely individual matter.<sup>87</sup>

### 5.6. General Public Opinion on *Česko*

The specialists, mainly those from the field of geography, remain unsuccessful in implementing the one-word name *Česko* in everyday communication. No matter how hard they try to attack professionals in other disciplines and Czech political representatives and try to make them be consistent in using the one-word name, the tendency preferred by many language users goes against the usage the geographers would like to establish. As the above arguments prove, if speakers use the short form of the name of the state, it usually is not *Česko*. Avoiding the one-word name of the state plays a major role for geographers and historians. They claim that avoiding the one-word name is a genuine problem that has a strong cultural, political and geo-political impact and derives from the inferiority of the Czech national identity.<sup>88</sup> Linguists are much more lenient in commenting on using the one-word name. The Language Advisory Service of *Naše řeč* was asked, “What is the opinion of the Language Advisory Service on the name *Česko*?”<sup>89</sup> The answer from *Naše řeč* states that:

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<sup>86</sup> “Česko a Czechia – ano?,” *Právo* 21 May 2001:3.

<sup>87</sup> “Po pěti letech stále nevíme, jak své zemi vlastně říkat,” *MF Dnes*, <http://mfdnes.newtonit.cz>, 5. 1. 1998.

<sup>88</sup> Ke geografickému názvu České republiky; [www.sweb.cz/czechia-cesko/](http://www.sweb.cz/czechia-cesko/).

<sup>89</sup> It should be explained that *Naše řeč* is a highly respected Czech journal of linguistics. It is considered to be a valuable source of professional information on the Czech language and is regularly consulted by linguists, language students, teachers, and the general public. The Czech Language Institute that publishes this journal is also home to the Language Advisory Service which answers public queries on various aspects of Czech language.

From a purely professional angle there are no substantial objections to the name *Česko*. [. . .] The word formation of *Česko* is not a transgression against the “spirit of the Czech language”. The other side of the coin is people’s feelings and emotions . [. . .] Although there is no professional explanation for these, they need to be taken into account because a language does not live away from people but inside people. A language is not constituted only from words but also by people’s attitudes to them. We can disapprove of the word *Česko*, but only if a majority of people disapprove of it. We have neither the power nor the professional reasons to ban the word.<sup>90</sup>

From this answer, it is also apparent that the Language Advisory Service registered only a very few negative and emotional responses from language users. The linguist Ondřej Hausenblas admits that he does not like *Česko* either but he assumes that it will be adopted in the language because it is short and practical.<sup>91</sup> The practical aspects of life prove that there is a need of a one-word name for the country both to be used in everyday communication and in international contacts too. This is why the Business Chamber of Commerce proposed a norm ČSN ISO 3166-1 year 1998 on the one-word name *Česko*. This proposal was entered into the norm in February 1999 by the Czech Normalisation Institute in Prague. The norm recommends the one-word geographical title *Česko* for use in non-official everyday communication.<sup>92</sup>

The public opinion poll agency Factum carried out a poll on behalf of MF Dnes newspaper on 5 January 1998. The question the respondent answered was: “Which one-word name for the Czech Republic should be made stable and should be used?” The respondents were asked to choose one of the following options for the one-word name: *Čechy*, *Českomoravsko*, *Česko*, another name, *Čechie*, don’t know. 51.2 % of respondents answered that there was no need for a one-word name. 19.4% chose the one-word name *Čechy*, 9.8% chose *Českomoravsko*, 7.1%

<sup>90</sup> “Z dopisů jazykové poradně,” Naše řeč 1 (1999): 55 – 56.

<sup>91</sup> Jednoslovný název země je odvozen od adjektiva, <http://mfdens.newtonit.cz>, 26. 11. 1999.

<sup>92</sup> Česko. <http://www.ujc.cas.cz/poradna/porfaq.htm>. 14 Feb. 2002.

chose *Česko*, 3.3% would prefer another name (one of the most frequently proposed was *Bohemia*), 1.4% chose *Čechie*, 7.8% did not know.<sup>93</sup>

The Institute for Public Poll Opinion IVVM carried out a similar poll in May 1998. 60% of respondents stated that there was no need to look for a one-word name, 55% were not happy with the name *Česko*.<sup>94</sup> Lidové noviny reported on the same poll, stating that the name *Česko* is definitely acceptable for 8% of respondents, probably acceptable for 27%, probably unacceptable for 28% and definitely unacceptable for 29%. *Česko* is more widely accepted in Moravia by people with a high standard of living.<sup>95</sup> The statement that *Česko* is more widely accepted in Moravia clearly contradicts the poll by Factum, which states that 5.4% of respondents from southern Moravia and 8.1% from northern Moravia would use *Česko* as the one-word name compared to 6.1% respondents from Prague, 6.6% from central Bohemia, 12.2% from southern Bohemia, 6.7% from western Bohemia, 4.8% from northern Bohemia and 10.4% from eastern Bohemia.<sup>96</sup> MF Dnes asked its readers to take part in a survey asking them if they agreed that the one-word name for the Czech Republic should be *Česko*. The majority of the readers participating in the Internet survey agreed. The ratio was 806:642 in favour of *Česko*. On the other hand, the majority of those who rang the MF Dnes hotline found *Česko* “repugnant”<sup>97</sup>. Only 16 out of 52 callers did not object to *Česko*.<sup>98</sup> It could be assumed that in the case of this survey, the answers are affected by the age distribution of the respondents – i.e. the Internet is used mainly by younger age groups of Czech inhabitants whilst those who answered over the phone could be assumed to belong to the older age category. This presumption is not confirmed

<sup>93</sup> Pavel Chromý, “Čechy, Čechrava, Česko (Aneb, jak zní zkrácený oficiální geografický název pro Českou republiku?),” Geografické rozhledy 4 (97-98): 98 - 99.

<sup>94</sup> Česko, odmítané jméno republiky proniká do škol, <http://mfdnes.newtonit.cz>, 29. 11. 2001.

<sup>95</sup> “Název Česko se Čechům nelíbí,” Lidové noviny 27 May 1998:16.

<sup>96</sup> Pavel Chromý, “Čechy, Čechrava, Česko (Aneb, jak zní zkrácený oficiální geografický název pro Českou republiku?),” Geografické rozhledy 4 (97-98): 98 - 99.

<sup>97</sup> Názory čtenářů MF Dnes na Česko jsou různé, 27. 11. 1999, <http://mfdnes.newtonit.cz>, found 29. 11. 2001.

by the results of an independent Internet survey asking: “Do you agree with *Česko* as the official name of the country?” 22% of the respondents answered yes and the answers of 78% of the respondents were negative.<sup>99</sup> It has to be noted that this question is misleading, because *Česko* is not the official political name but a geographical one. Another Internet survey phrased its question in the following way: “I am not asking if you like or dislike *Česko*! I am asking if you have come to terms with the fact that from clearly practical reasons you will use the word”. This survey scored a positive answer from 58.8% of respondents and a negative answer from 41.1% of respondents.<sup>100</sup>

The assumption that opinions on *Česko* are affected by the age of the speaker is not based purely on the above arguments regarding Czech history, in particular the associations with the connotations of the Protectorate use of *Tschechei*. A further argument supporting this theory is the Information from the Ministry of Education of 5 October 1999 on the One-word Geographical Name *Česko* for the Czech Republic sent to all schools. The Minister of Education Eduard Zeman was the first politician after 1989 to support *Česko* officially and to recommend its usage in schools. As explained above, President Václav Havel refused to use the word. The ex-prime minister Václav Klaus was saddened that it had not been possible to find a one-word name that would be widely accepted, although he himself did not want to initiate a process to artificially create a one-word name. A section of the Czech general public expressed their disapproval of minister Zeman’s recommendation to schools. Zeman explained that he did not feel the absence of the one-word name to be particularly obvious at schools. At the same time, he said, he believed that if the one-word name were to be fixed in people’s minds and adopted in everyday usage, schools were a suitable vehicle for that.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Názory čtenářů MF Dnes na Česko jsou různé, 27. 11. 1999, <http://mfdnes.newtonit.cz>, found 29. 11. 2001.

<sup>99</sup> Lezou vám slimáci po těle při slově Česko?, [www.pedro.cz/noviny](http://www.pedro.cz/noviny), found on 28. 11. 2001.

<sup>100</sup> <http://novinky.cz/Index/Styl/3672>, found on 29. 11. 2001.

<sup>101</sup> Česko, odmítané jméno republiky proniká do škol, <http://mfdnes.newtonit.cz>, found on 29. 11. 2001



### 5.7. Quotations from Printed Media Between 1992 – 2002

My search through three Czech national newspapers, which is described in detail in the Methodology Section, showed the following results:

#### 1992

The journalists recognised the existence of the one-word name *Česko* and reminded the readers of the name in the articles “What People Expect after the Split of the State” that was published on 29 December 1992, i.e. before the official split of the state.

77) [. . .] - jestli Slováci myslí, že si pomohou, děj se jejich vůle. Věřím, že nám v *Česku* bez nich zle nebude.

‘[. . .] - if the Slovaks think that this is going to help them, let them have their way. I believe that we won’t be any worse off without them in *Česko*.’  
102

#### 1993

A heading of another article from the first of MF Dnes on 2 January 1993 says:

78) “Občané *Česka* příliš neslavili”

“The citizens of *Česko* didn’t celebrate too much”<sup>103</sup>

After those two occurrences, the use of *Česko* was documented only three times between 1993 and 2001. Where *Česko* could have been used either the abbreviation *ČR*, the full official title *Česká republika*, or *Čechy* were used instead.

<sup>102</sup> “Co lidé čekají po rozdělení státu,” MF Dnes 29 Dec. 1992: 1.

<sup>103</sup> “Občasně *Česka* příliš neslavili,” MF Dnes 2 Jan. 1993: 1, 3.

79) [. . .] se právě Polsko, Maďarsko a Německo mají z obav před brzkou měnovou odlukou mezi ČR a SR pokoušet o masový vývoz čs. korun do *Čech* a na Slovensko.

[. . .] it is Poland, Hungary and Germany which are expected to attempt the mass export of Czech crowns into *Čechy* and Slovakia due to their worries about the split of the currencies between ČR and SR.<sup>104</sup>

80) Po rozdělení federace ČSOB oddělila bilance pro ČR a Slovensko.

After the federation was divided, ČSOB separated balances for ČR and Slovakia.<sup>105</sup>

## 1994

81)[. . .] je ochotna do takzvaného agrobiznisu [. . .] připustit *Českou republiku*, Maďarsko, případně Polsko či Slovensko. [. . .] V případě *České republiky* například použili čísla platná pro bývalé *Československo*.

[. . .] is willing to let Česká republika, Hungary, and possibly Poland or Slovakia join the so called agro-business. [. . .] For example in the case of *Česká republika* they used numbers valid for the former *Československo*.<sup>106</sup>

This quotation can be used as one of the best description of the trend used by the Czech journalists. The official name *Česká republika* is used on the same stylistic level as the one-word geographic names *Maďarsko*, *Polsko* and *Slovensko*. In the second sentence the author of the article used on the same stylistic level the official term *Česká republika* and the one-word geographical name of the former Czechoslovak Republic *Československo*. This shows the author is deliberately avoiding the use of the one-word geographical name of the Czech Republic.

The same trend of mixing the two different stylistic levels of the official name and the one-word geographical term, which is intended for use in everyday communication, can be observed continuously, with a particular effort to avoid the

<sup>104</sup> "Polská národní banka bez zásob," Právo 2 Feb. 1993: 8.

<sup>105</sup> "ČSOB nezablokovala žádný účet," Právo 4 May 1993: 2.

use of the one-word geographical term *Česko*. This is documented in the following articles listed chronologically from 1995 to 2000.

### 1995

82) *ČR* je jednou z devíti zemí s jejichž vojáky se počítá pro novou mírovou operaci v Chorvatsku. [. . .] Podle zatím neoficiálních diplomatických informací se počítá s *ČR*, Kanadou, Belgií, Polskem, Ruskem, Jordánskem, Dánskem, Nepálem a Argentinou.

*ČR* is one of the nine countries whose soldiers are expected to join the new peace operation in Croatia. [. . .] According to so far unofficial diplomatic sources, *ČR*, Canada, Belgium, Poland, Russia, Jordan, Denmark, Nepal, and Argentina are expected to be involved.<sup>107</sup>

### 1996

83) Čtyři roky po rozdělení československé federace drtivá většina občanů *České republiky* i Slovenska uznává, že obě republiky kráčí svým tempem. [. . .] ten vyvolal v řadách Čechů žijících na území Slovenska tendenci [. . .] odstěhovat se trvale do *Čech*.

Four years after the split of the Czechoslovak Federation, a vast majority of citizens of *Česká republika* and Slovakia admit that each Republics is progressing at its own pace.[. . .] Amongst the Czechs permanently living in Slovakia this has resulted in a trend to move to *Čechy* permanently.<sup>108</sup>

### 1997

The use of *Česko* was documented in Lidové noviny in 1997. Although *Česko* was used in the appropriate style, it was followed by the abbreviation *SR*, even though *Slovensko* could have been used.

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<sup>106</sup> “Evropská unie zkouší české zemědělství,” MF Dnes 1 Jul. 1994: 7.

<sup>107</sup> “Chorvatské tanky útočí na Srby,” Lidové noviny 2 May 1995: 1.

84) “*Česko* dluží SR stovky miliard”

“*Česko* owes SR hundreds of milliards”<sup>109</sup>

### 1998

In 1998 the use of *Česko* was documented in MF Dnes, but only in the sports section:

85) Už i v *Česku* se na prodaných lístcích dá slušně vydělat.

Even in *Česko* one can make a good profit on tickets.<sup>110</sup>

In sections other than sports, MF Dnes was still avoiding *Česko*:

86) Je logické, [. . .] že se *Česká republika* snaží následovat země s nejnižšími cenami. [. . .] Porovnání cen s cenami v zemích se srovnatelnou ekonomikou, což pro nás není Francie, či Německo, ale Portugalsko, Španělsko, Polsko, Maďarsko, je velmi účinné.

It is logical [. . .] for *Česká republika* to attempt to follow countries with the lowest prices. [. . .] Comparing prices with countries that have comparable economies, which for us means not France, or Germany, but Portugal, Spain, Poland or Hungary, is very effective.<sup>111</sup>

### 1999 – 2000

Between 1999 and 2000 the use of *Česko* was found only in two of the three newspapers followed. *Lidové noviny* wrote:

87) “Slovenští Romové emigrují do *Česka*”

[. . .] v *Česku* lze čekat další vlnu slovenských utečenců. [. . .] Kromě Romů ze Slovenska se pokoušeli získat azyl v *Česku* i příslušníci [. . .]. Ze

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<sup>108</sup> “Z federálních svazků Čechů a Slováků přežívá už jen kultura,” MF Dnes 3 Sep. 1996: 10.

<sup>109</sup> “Česko dluží SR stovky miliard,” Lidové noviny 9 Sep. 1997: 6.

<sup>110</sup> “Plný stadion může vydělat statisíce,” MF Dnes 1 Nov. 1998: 27.

<sup>111</sup> “Unie tlačí na zvýšení cen léků,” MF Dnes 3 Nov. 1998: 1, 4.

stejného regionu pochází i 166 Romů, kteří o azyl v ČR požádali uplynulý víkend.

“Slovak Romanies Immigrate to Česko”

[. . .] in Česko we can expect a new influx of Slovak refugees.[. . .] Besides Romanies from Slovakia, also members of [. . .] attempted to obtain asylum in Česko. The 166 Romanies who claimed asylum in the ČR last weekend come from the same region.<sup>112</sup>

The use of Česko was documented in MF Dnes solely in the sports section:

88) Stanleyův pohár je opět v Česku. [. . .] se po roce opět na skok vrátil do Česka. [. . .] Hokejový klenot z Kanady je opět v Česku [. . .].

The Stanley Cup is back in Česko. [. . .] after a year it briefly returned to Česko. [. . .] The ice hockey jewel from Canada is back in Česko [. . .].<sup>113</sup>

Only the use of ČR and Česká republika were documented in Právo:

89) Český premiér Miloš Zeman (ČSSD) i německý kancléř Gerhard Schröder (SPD) se shodují, že Česká republika a Německo překlenuly problémy minulosti [. . .].

The Czech Prime Minister Miloš Zeman (ČSSD) as well as the German chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) agree that Česká republika and Germany overcame the problems of the past, [. . .].<sup>114</sup>

90) Nejoblíbenějším alkoholickým nápojem v České republice je pivo. [. . .] Nejoblíbenějším jídlem v České republice je řízek.

‘The favourite alcoholic drink in Česká republika is beer. [. . .] The favourite meal in Česká republika is schnitzel.<sup>115</sup>

100) Desetimiliónová zemička, jako je ČR, se ale nemusí bát. [. . .] Přesto by se ČR měla zapojit do evropského a celosvětového úsilí [. . .].

<sup>112</sup> “Slovenští Romové emigrují do Česka,” Lidové noviny 28 Jun. 2000:2.

<sup>113</sup> “Stanleyův pohár je opět v Česku,” Dnes 3 Sep. 2000: C6.

<sup>114</sup> “Podle Zemana i Schrödera ČR a SRN překlenuly minulost,” Právo 1 Sep. 1999: 1.

<sup>115</sup> “Čechům nejvíc chutná pivo a řízek,” Právo 1 Nov. 1999: 3.

A tiny country with ten million inhabitants, like the ČR, need not worry. [. . .] Despite that, ČR should be involved in efforts in Europe and worldwide [. . .].<sup>116</sup>

## 2001

The use of *Česko* changed in 2001 when newspapers started using the geographical name in all their sections. This is documented in three article headings and a quotation from the press, sports and motoring sections.

101) “Točením filmů se v *Česku* nebohatne”  
 “One cannot become rich by shooting films in *Česko*”<sup>117</sup>

“Kolik reprezentačních týmů dá *Česko* dohromady”  
 “How many national teams will *Česko* build”<sup>118</sup>

102) “Mnohá auta, která postrádají majitelé v *Česku*, končí v Kosovu”  
 Krádeže a vykrádání aut patří k *Česku* jako větrné mlýny k Holandsku, a proto policie zkouší systém nálepek, který se osvědčil v Anglii.

“Many cars, missed by their owners in *Česko*, will end up in Kosovo”  
 Stealing cars and breaking into them belongs to *Česko* like windmills do to Holland, and that is why the police are testing a sticker system, which has proved its worth in England.<sup>119</sup>

Robert Dengler from Právo, who answered my query as to what made Právo journalists start using *Česko* more frequently, explained that: “We started to use *Česko* more often because people have got more accustomed to it now. Some of our readers were surprised by that [. . .] but I think that after some initial polemics, they accepted it.”<sup>120</sup> The response is surprising. It suggests that the attitude to language planning in Czech conditions may be liberal, with less stress on the involvement of governmental authorities.

<sup>116</sup> “Česká zemička ve víru globalizace,” Právo 2 May 2000: 6.

<sup>117</sup> “Točením filmů se v *Česku* nebohatne,” MF Dnes 16 May 2001: 3.

<sup>118</sup> “Kolik reprezentačních týmů dá *Česko* dohromady,” MF Dnes 16 May 2001: 1.

<sup>119</sup> “Mnohá auta, která postrádají jejich majitelé v *Česku* končí v Kosovu,” MF Dnes 16 May 2001: Auto Moto 1.

<sup>120</sup> Robert Dengler, “Z Práva,” e-mail to Marie Sanders 6 May 2002.

Although *Česko* has been, when stylistically appropriate, used as a geographic name more frequently since 2001, its use is still not consistent. Journalists perceive the geographical term to be interchangeable with the official name of the country and with the abbreviation; they switch between them and use them as a means of updating the language. The trend in using the abbreviation and the official title on the same stylistic level as the short unofficial name of a country that is used also to countries other than *Česko* is documented in the following citations. The citations are organised chronologically from 2001 until 2002.

103) [. . .] taktickou lstí přispět k podstatnému zvýšení porodnosti v *Česku*. [. . .] je už čirý nacionalismus, který v integrující Evropě může znamenat pro *ČR* naprostou izolaci. [. . .] aby se český občan s rodinou mohl usadit ve Švédsku stejně tak jako švédský občan v *Čechách*. [. . .] Pokud v *Česku* nepřispívají ke zvýšení kriminality [. . .].

[. . .] a trickery used to increase a birth-rate in *Česko*. [. . .] it is pure nationalism, which could mean the total isolation of *ČR* in an integrating Europe. [. . .] to enable a Czech citizen and his family to settle in Sweden as easily as a Swedish citizen in *Čechy*. [. . .] If they do not contribute to increasing levels of crime [. . .].<sup>121</sup>

The following citation documents that a short geographical name is used on the same stylistic level as the official title and its abbreviation. This was applied not only to *Česko* but also on *Německo* and its abbreviation *SRN*, which stands for the *Spolková republika Německo* ‘Federal Republic of Germany’. The abbreviation is used in a row of geographical names of other countries and in a context where the geographical name *Německo* ‘Germany’ could have been used.

104) Evropští investoři chtějí *Česko* v Unii co nejrychleji. [. . .] rychlejšímu a bezproblémovému vstupu *České republiky* do Evropské unie. [. . .] aby se vstup *Česka* do Unie nekomplikoval. [. . .] nerovnosti v registraci zahraničních firem v *ČR*. [. . .] ECF vytvořily a financují obchodní komory Británie, *SRN*, Francie, Švédska a Nizozemska, reprezentující investory, kteří do *ČR* už přinesli [. . .].

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<sup>121</sup> Pavel Dostál, “Vulgární nacionalismus,” *Právo* 7 May 2001: 7.

The European investors would like to see *Česko* in the European Union as soon as possible.

[. . .] a faster and a less problematic accession of *Česká republika* to the European Union [. . .] so that the accession of *Česko* to the European Union does not become complicated.

[. . .] discrepancies in the registrations of foreign firms in the ČR.

[. . .] ECF created and are funding chambers of commerce in Britain, BRD, France, Sweden and the Netherlands, representing those investors who have already brought [. . .] to the ČR.<sup>122</sup>

The section of the newspaper where the usage of *Česko* can be documented most easily is the sports section.

105) Island se dočkal historického vítězství, *Česko* zažilo ostudnou porážku. [. . .] *Česko* potřebovalo v sobotu vyhrát. [. . .], které *Česko* už 12 let nehrálo.

Iceland experienced a historically important victory, *Česko* experienced a shameful defeat. [. . .] *Česko* needed to win on Saturday. [. . .] where *Česko* has not played for 12 years.<sup>123</sup>

## 2002

106) Obyvatelé *Česka* mohou začít žádat o své elektronické podpisy.

The inhabitants of *Česko* can start applying for their electronic signatures.<sup>124</sup>

107) Slovenská veterinární a potravinová správa včera zakázala dovoz živého skotu, hovězího masa a výrobků z *Česka*. Slovensko tak odpovědělo na zákaz dovozu slovenského hovězího do ČR, [. . .]. „Ministerstvo respektuje právo Slovenska na protiopatření, ale jeho reakci považuje za neadekvátní, protože četnost výskytu BSE je v ČR nižší než na Slovensku [. . .]“.

The Slovak veterinary and food board banned the import of livestock, beef and beef products from *Česko*. In this way, Slovakia responded to the ban to import Slovak beef to the ČR, [. . .]. “The ministry respects the right of

<sup>122</sup> “Evropští investoři chtějí Česko v Unii co nejrychleji,” Právo 28 Apr. 2001:6.

<sup>123</sup> “Ani ostuda fotbalisty nevyřadila,” Dnes 3 Sep. 2001:C6.

<sup>124</sup> “Lidé už mohou mít elektronický podpis,” MF Dnes 4 Apr. 2002:A4.



Slovakia to respond, but its reaction is considered to be inadequate, because the occurrence of BSE in ČR is less frequent than in Slovakia.”<sup>125</sup>

108) V obou případech Česko trápilo domácího favorita až do poslední dvouhry. [. . .] Francie – Česko (čtvrtfinále Světové skupiny Davisova poháru v Pau).

In both cases Česko troubled the local favourite until the last game. [. . .] France – Česko (the quarterfinals of the Davis Cup World Group in Pau).<sup>126</sup>

## 5.8. Frequency of Occurrence

### 5.8.1. Manual Search

In the following table I present the number of occurrences of the names *Česká republika*, its abbreviation ČR, *Čechy* and *Česko* in the collection of 106 articles from the period of 1992 to 2003 which I examined manually. The occurrence of *Čechy* was counted only when standing for the name of the whole country but not when denoting the geographical area of Bohemia:

**Tab. 9:**

Year	Total of articles examined	ČR	Česká republika	Česko	Čechy
1992 - 2000	37	20	15	3	3
2001 - 2002	21	23	11	36	2
2002 - 2003	23	2	11	8	0
2004 <sup>127</sup>	25	0	10	49	0
<b>Total:</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>5</b>

<sup>125</sup> “Slovensko oplatilo zákaz dovozu hovězího,” *MF Dnes* 5 Apr. 2002: A2.

<sup>126</sup> “Novák hraje třikrát za sebou,” *MF Dnes* 5 Apr. 2002: C3.

<sup>127</sup> The articles from 2004 were found in *MF Dnes* between 1 April and 30 June. This was the period when the accession of the CR to the European Union was discussed. The discussion boosted the use of the name Česko in the context of other geographic names such as Polsko, Německo, Švédsko, Finsko, etc.

The table shows that over the period from 1992 to 2004 the number of instances when *Česko* was used gradually increased. There were 96 instances of *Česko* counted in the collection of 106 manually searched newspaper articles. On the other hand the abbreviation *ČR* and name *Čechy* were used less frequently. I did not detect any occurrence of *Čechy* referring to the whole republic in the period from 2002 to 2003. Neither the abbreviation *ČR* nor *Čechy* were found through the manual search in the observed period in 2004.

### 5.8.2. The Czech National Corpus

The results of the manual search may suggest that *Česko* was used rather scarcely before 2000. To investigate the suggestion further I ran an additional check in the CNK SYN2000 in April 2007. I tried the public access to SYN2000 and searched for “*Česko*”. The corpus showed the first 50 occurrences out of a total of 1486. The expression *Česko* was used as a name of the country in 24 occurrences out of the 50 displayed. The remaining 26 listed *Česko* as a part of a compound adjective, for instance *Česko-německá průmyslová a obchodní komora* ‘The Czech-German Chamber of Industry and Commerce’.

Another check was run in SYN2000 where [lemma="Česko"] was selected and a negative filter was used on the hyphen to separate the examples with hyphen from the rest of the corpus. The search showed 2068 instances of *Česko* between 1993 and 1999.<sup>128</sup>

I counted the number of occurrences of *Česko* in years 1993 – 1995 and in 1996 manually.

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<sup>128</sup> The search was kindly carried out by Prof. Bermel on 21 April 2007.

**Tab.: 10**

Year	1993	1994	1995	1996	1999
Approx. no. of occurrences:	208 out of 2068	120 out of 2068	25 out of 2068	175 out of 2068	281 on first 30 pages

### 5.9. Observations

Several observations can be made based upon the theoretical information gathered and practical observations of the use of *Česko* as represented by citations from the three Czech national newspapers.

**Style:** on the level of stylistic examination, it is obvious that Czech journalists do not make a stylistic distinction between the official name of a country, its abbreviation and the so-called geographical name. In Czech newspapers, these names are used almost arbitrarily and their selection is a matter of an individual's style. Journalists combine all the three variants in the same style and treat them as a tool of actualisation. This means that the recommended stylistic functions of the official and the geographical names as proposed in “The Opinion of Geographers, Linguists, Historians and Experts from Other Scientific Disciplines on the Official One-word Geographic Name for the Czech Republic Defined at the Discussion at Charles University in Prague on 29 January 1998” are not respected. The official names of countries are frequently used in place of the geographical names, as the listed citations show. Abbreviations are not used systematically. In certain citations the use of abbreviations of names of countries suggests that they are used as a means of saving space in the article, irrespective of the style of the text, or merely to break a succession of unabbreviated names. This is understandable due to the typographic rules where the length of the texts needs to fit in the allocated space.

**Lexical level:** The unofficial geographical name *Česko* was created in accordance with the system rules of the word-formation in the Czech language and has been codified in Slovník spisovného jazyka českého since 1952. Other suggested geographical names remain only within the bounds of proposals or humorous innovations.

**Semantic level:** Linguists, historians and historical geographers involved in the polemics about *Česko* have agreed that the main reason behind the disapproval of the name *Česko* is people's emotions. It cannot be denied that emotions are one of the factors determining a choice of lexical units. When the older negative connotations of *Česko* associated with the protectorate *Tschechei*, which has been well documented by those initial polemics, are left behind, there are still several recent factors which have created negative connotations pertinent to the current situation. To overcome these negative connotations by reminding the Czechs of the use of *Česko* in the language of the national revivalists may not be very effective. The period of the Czech National Revival was strongly favoured by the Communist regime, which led to the profanation of the whole concept of the National Revival in the post-Communist era. Although the written usage of the word has been documented for more than two centuries, for many Czechs *Česko* remains an artificially created name representing a centralised power and ideology imposed upon people. Some could argue that these feelings have been intensified by the fact that the geographical name *Česko* been standardised in a norm effectively standardised by being entered in authoritative reference works. Some Czech speakers perceive this to be a very strong prescriptive measure not acceptable in a democratic society, particularly in a society where the basis of democracy is still fragile. They believe that such a standardising decision is worrying and that its consequences for the language could extend beyond just the area of lexicology.

Another approach that treats *Česko* as an unnaturally created name is the opinion that this is the name that remained after the split of the country. Many Czechs, and

to be fair also many Slovaks, disapproved of the split of the country, and they find the name *Česko* to be a humiliating residue of that process and of the original country called *Československo*. This claim is supported by a citation from the column “Budeme propříště žít v zemi bez medvědů” (“In the future we will live in a country with no bears”) written by Martin Komárek and published just the day before the country was officially divided. The author builds his arguments on contrasting *Česko* with the toponym *Čechy*. In this context *Česko* acquires the pejorative undertone of an expression used mainly by the Slovaks referring to the name of the Czech territory and the Czechs who lived at the expense of the Slovaks. This process results in a view of *Česko* which is no longer associated with the nation’s revival but with the nation’s moral decline, from a nation of Czechs who had to fight for their rights and independence, to a nation that suppressed, used, and cheated on the Slovaks.

28) Medvědi se přeci musí dělit podle územního principu! V *Česku* nežijí, tedy *Česko* je mít nebude. Proč však nežijí v *Čechách*, když se tam ještě nedávno vesele kolíbalí? “To je přeci jasné”, namítnete, *Česko* bylo civilizovanější, industriální krajinou, navíc s honuchtivou šlechtou a buržoazií.

Bears must be divided according to the territorial principle! They don’t live in *Česko*, so *Česko* will not have any. Why don’t they live in *Čechy* when they used to bounce round there merrily until not long ago? “This is obvious”, you will say; *Česko* was a more civilised, industrialised country, and in addition had a hunt-loving aristocracy and bourgeoisie.’<sup>129</sup>

Jan Trefulka took part in the discussion on *Česko* several times, as was explained earlier. Trefulka sees life in the Czech Republic from an angle different to that of Komárek.

For Trefulka:

29) *Česko* je vlastí sprostých tunelářů a klonováním namnožených úředníků [. . .], kterým od začátku nejde o nic jiného než o vlastní kapsu.

‘*Česko* is the motherland of ruthless asset-strippers and bureaucrats who multiply through cloning [. . .] who have never been interested in anything apart from lining their own pockets.’<sup>130</sup>

In these two lines Trefulka summarised people’s disappointment, their feelings of being cheated, the bitterness caused by developments that crushed people’s hopes for the country and the nation’s speedy recovery -- hopes that were built up by the Velvet Revolution. This citation reflects the pessimism primarily of an older generation of Czechs concerning their future. Negative aspects of the socio-political development in the country after the change of the regime and the split of the Czechoslovak state were projected into the word, and thus Trefulka's use of *Česko* has become an expression of anger and frustration.

Concerns about national identity, the inferiority of the Czech national identity or even its crisis have also been used as a pro-*Česko* argument by polemicists.

The argument that a temporary lack of a one-word geographical name would initiate a crisis of national identity cannot be justified. Some believe that the best way to boost the Czech national identity is to be different, and not to have an unofficial name for the country at all.<sup>131</sup> On the other hand, standardising the one-word name of the country should not be seen as the sole measure that would either prevent or solve such a crisis. On the contrary - discussions over the unofficial name of the country might even help to unravel what lies beneath the crisis, if a crisis of this kind really exists, and might act as a catalyst in the process of defining the nation’s identity. A cathartic process like this may assist in adopting a

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<sup>129</sup> Martin Komárek, “Budeme propříště žít v zemi bez medvědů.,” *MF Dnes* 31 Dec. 1992:6.

<sup>130</sup> Trefulka, Jan. “A znovu Česko.” *Právo* 5 Mar. 1998: 3.

<sup>131</sup> This opinion expressed by a reader of *Právo*, can be found in the “Z redakční pošty” section of *Právo*: [ondrej.pagac@model.cz](mailto:ondrej.pagac@model.cz). 29 May 2001:5.

different unofficial name that might be more acceptable than the current name *Česko* or may lead to shedding the negative connotations of both the name *Česko* and the country that bears this name.

### 5.10. Conclusions

I have investigated the issues of language purism and language planning which were related to an emotional topic of a one-word name of a country. Although the purist tendencies were represented mainly by laymen purists recruited from the general public, they were supported also by famous and prominent personalities. Cooper defines language planning as a process the purpose of which is to influence language behaviour (35) and I detected parts of the process in the language planning work on *Česko*. I observe the following reasons for language planning effort behind the proper name:

1. to solve a communication problem, i.e. to find a one-word name for a new state,
2. to change the language behaviour of others, i.e. to spread awareness of the term, bring users to accept it and start using it.

The impulses for the language planning activity on *Česko* came from governmental agencies as well as from individuals. Despite being initially cautious about dissemination the name *Česko*, the media were involved strongly. They reported on disputes, surveys and the planning process and the specialist printed media also reinforced it. The chances of establishing *Česko* in everyday Czech language have been fair since 1993. Since 2001 *Česko* has been used regularly in the three national newspapers I followed, and journalists presume that the Czechs have got used to the name. Schools have been instructed to be consistent in using the unofficial geographical name and the contemporary younger generation of Czechs does not carry the burden of the past negative connotations that play a significant role for the older generation. The very recent development in using

Česko from 2007 and 2008 and its regular occurrence in media discourse suggests that the criterion of functional adequacy has prevailed. This together with the incentives for consistent use promoted by official places is likely to make the name acceptable in the future and to be used without emotional undertones.



## 6. Mass Culture Through the Language of the Media

Motto:

Urází mě, když mě zařazují mezi takzvané celebrity. Těmi teď jsou teď všichni ti násilníci, neplatiči, podvodníci vzeší z reality show.

I find it offensive when I am ranked amongst the so-called celebrities. These are nowadays all the ruffians, cheats, and those who do not pay bills who emerged from reality shows.<sup>132</sup>

### 6.1. Purpose of the Study

After the two studies on the slogan “Back to Europe!” and the development of the short geographical name *Česko*, the topic of the third case study may come as a surprise. Nevertheless, I believe that there is a connection between the three topics. After the change of regime in 1989 people naturally asked questions about the most fundamental and down-to-earth aspects of their existence speculating about the future of their country, their national identity and the effect these changes will have on their day to day lives. The most common place where people turn to find funded answers to such questions are the mass media. In addition to this, the mass media are the place where one can observe how the changes in society affect the language of the society. Apart from providing information and evidence about current affairs, media also play another important role in society - - they provide entertainment. I am convinced that one of the best examples of the mass entertainment is the television and possibly the most wide spread entertainment genre is the genre which is called *soap opera* in the United Kingdom.

### 6.2. Hypothesis

In my hypothesis for the case study I presume that there are new expressions denoting a genre and its varieties which have been adopted after the change of the regime and are disseminated for the following reasons:

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<sup>132</sup> “Exkluzivní zповěď”; Jiřina Bohdalová, ”*Blesk* 3 Aug. 2006: 1.

1. a new reality has emerged and it is necessary to find a new name to denote it. In this case it means that a user who recognises the need to differentiate in communication between a previously occurring reality and the significantly different newly emerged reality will recognise a need for a new name,
2. the newly emerged reality may not differ fundamentally from the previously existing reality but the term which has been in use may carry undesirable connotations and therefore language users wish to replace it.

Further, it is possible to suppose that the already present and newly adopted lexical units may become subjected to the processes of semantic change which I have described in Chapter 5, table 5. One could assume that it will be the older lexical units which carry negative connotations because of their association with the previous regime, its values and its entertainment. The newly adopted lexical units should be free of such connotations. They are representatives of Western culture which for many is more appealing than the socialist mass media entertainment. From my experience of a native Czech speaker I suspect that this presumption may not be applicable to all the lexical units in this case study.

### **6.3. System of Search**

Initially I searched two electronic sources to find the occurrence of the three terms *seriál*, *soap opera* and *telenovela* in the Czech language. These were the Czech National Corpus and the Newton IT on-line database service. I searched the CNC between March and May 2005 and I use the results from corpus SYN2000 for this case study.

Apart from looking for the occurrence of the terms, I planned to search for adjectives that are connected with the investigated lexical units and that would prove if they carry certain undertones.

Since the results I obtained from the first search did not provide satisfactory evidence, I performed a second electronic investigation through Morfeo, a

Czech search engine that lists all available references to a particular relevant word on the Internet, focusing on Czech pages. I carried out the search via Morfeo between March and May 2005. The references that Morfeo lists can be either from newspaper and magazine articles in national media or their extracts in private archives, interest groups archives and also entries from chat room discussions. It lists more contemporary references than the CNC and Newton IT.

#### 6.4. Introduction: *Seriál, soap opera, telenovela*

Although Czechs were used to their once a week dose of *seriál* 'series', the arrival of *telenovela* 'telenovella' in the 1990s not only temporarily paralysed life in some Czech households but also changed the perception of the genre and its varieties. A telenovella comes originally from Latin America and can be characterised light-heartedly as the Latin American answer to a British soap opera or a Czech *seriál*. Still there are certain differences between them:

##### A) *Seriál*:

The storyline of a Czech *seriál* is realistic. Even the least expected twists and turns of the story remain within the remits of real life in Czech society. The characters of the original Czechoslovak series in the socialist era were mostly working people such as a shop-assistant (*Žena za pultem* 'The Woman behind the Counter'), chairman of a National Committee, a chef, a policeman or a team of policemen. Series from the hospital environment *Nemocnice na kraji města* 'The Hospital' and *Sanitka* 'The Ambulance' were also very popular.

The stories of new post-revolution series are placed mainly within the middle or upper-middle class characters or entrepreneurs. The only series that has a follow-up to the pre 1989 parts is *Nemocnice na kraji města* 'The Hospital'. The original key characters remained in the story, however now facing problems of new life and reality such as the privatisation of hospitals and health centres. Of course the aspects of love, betrayal, splitting relationships, extra-marital affairs or ethnic minority characters are added to make the story

correspond to dramatic and conflict-causing situations in contemporary life. The weekly episodes of a *seriál* are shown during evening prime time.

### **B) Soap-opera:**

To describe a British soap-opera, I sought a definition from OALDC:

“[ . . . ] radio or TV series drama dealing with domestic problems, etc in a sentimental or melodramatic way.” (OALDC, 818)

An article by Chris Forrester, “Telenovellas: the New World Order?” describes European soap operas as “grimy kitchen-sink sagas”. The difference between a *seriál* and a *soap-opera* is the latter’s focus on domestic issues and love, lust, and passion issues which the first usually balances with work.

The majority of most Czech series omit the pronounced melodramatic way of British soap-operas. The story-line of a *seriál* is created with the aim to be clearly closed and ended which is not the case of a soap-opera.

### **C) Telenovella:**

Most features of a telenovella have been indirectly described above when comparing the variety with *seriál* and soap opera. Telenovellas are likely to be so popular because people like to watch “the melodrama, the passion, the beautiful women and square-jawed men” (Forrester 64) and glittering settings. Viewers like to dream and hope for an unexpected twist in their own lives that could make them richer, happier, thinner, more beautiful or more successful.

A typical story of a telenovella will be one of “a handsome weight – trainer [who] gets involved with a beautiful deaf-mute woman” or “an orphan seeking her roots and falling in love with a young millionaire” (Forrester 65). The story will eventually climax in a happy ending. According to some TV networks, telenovellas are so popular because: “Buyers seemingly want to see more ‘real life’ on screen [ . . . ]” (Forrester 65). I would argue that telenovellas are not

likely to satisfy this kind of desire. In my view, telenovellas do not feed the curiosity for real life but rather the curiosity for real-life and unreal-life drama.

There are strong similarities between a soap-opera and a telenovella. These are the melodrama and the passion; they feed viewers' curiosity, help to overcome boredom. All this can be summarised in a statement that "they give their viewers the 'fix'" (Forrester 64).

The major difference between the soap opera and a telenovella is that the telenovella comes to an end after a high but definite number of episodes. The pre-1990 Czech *seriál* had a limited number of episodes, usually not exceeding twenty. This has changed recently and the creators of the newest Czech series<sup>133</sup> offer new sequels coming out after a several months long break, usually with a new season of the year.

The three varieties differ in settings and characters too. Current English soap operas have neither the dazzling settings and characters of telenovellas nor the middle class or entrepreneurs of a Czech *seriál*. Another difference between a soap-opera and a *seriál* is the frequency and time of day when episodes are shown. The Czech television networks tend to put South American telenovellas on their programme schedule daily on mid-mornings and early afternoons. The *seriál* is usually broadcasted once a week in the evening prime time.

Until March 2004 there wasn't an original Czech programme that could meet all typical features of a soap-opera. In March 2004 TV Prima launched Rodinná pouta 'Family Ties' which was, and still is<sup>134</sup>, being created with the vision of making the first Czech soap-opera.

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<sup>133</sup> For instance *Ordinace v růžové zahradě* The Rose Garden Surgery or *Ulice* The Street

<sup>134</sup> as is June 2005

## 6.5. Results of the Initial Search

### 6.5.1. *Seriál*

The SYN2000, listed 12 667 entries of the word *seriál*. I searched the first 350. The most common attributes connected with *seriál* were in line with the expected descriptions of TV programmes such as:

- rodinný seriál                                      family series
- dokumentární seriál                            documentary series
- původní seriál                                    original series
- kriminální seriál                                crime series
- kultovní televizní seriál                    cult television series

also the attribute *volební* ‘election’ was found in “*volební seriál, jaký nemá v Evropě obdoby*” ‘the election series that does not have a comparison anywhere in Europe’. Because the wider context in which this construction occurred was not available, I cannot draw results about the meaning of the construction; I can only presume that *seriál* was used to denote a series of public political performances or articles in the printed media.

Also the genre of South American telenovellas was described as a *seriál* on numerous occasions, for instance: *Otrokyně Isaura, brazilský seriál* ‘Isaura, the Female Slave, Brazilian series’, *momentálně nejsledovanější z nich je seriál Esmeralda* ‘the series Esmeralda, which has the highest viewing at present’.

When searching Newton IT, I recorded only one occurrence of *seriál*:

- 102) *Seriál Žena za pultem se znovu vrací na obrazovky. [ . . . ] “Je to přece svým způsobem úžasná telenovela, která má jedinou vadu, že má místo dvou tří stovek dílů jen třináct.”*

The *series*, The Woman behind the Counter, returns to the television screens. [ . . . ] “No doubt, it is a fantastic *telenovella*, the only fault of which is that it has only thirteen parts instead of two to three hundred.”

Although an original socialist *seriál*, with all the typical features described above, is mentioned in the quotation it is at the same time referred to as a *telenovela*. Since this particular *seriál* can be described as one of the pillars of

the Czechoslovak socialist television, I do not think that the term *telenovella* fits this programme despite the ironic undertone of the comment. When we consider how idealised the characters of the main heroes were, the term *soap opera* may be more appropriate. Even then, the story line is not melodramatic; it does not concentrate just on family affairs. On the contrary, the series highlights socialist morality, ethics, and norms of behaviour expected from the main characters building a communist society.

### 6.5.2. *Soap opera or mýdlová opera*

Although a Czech translation of the English term *soap-opera*, *mýdlová opera*, has been coined, both terms co-exist in Czech lexicon. *Slovník neologizmů* ‘Dictionary of Neologisms’ gives the same definition for each entry.

The definition in the dictionary says that both *mýdlová opera* and *soap opera* is: “*televizní seriál zobrazující v mnoha pokračováních idealizovaný každodenní život skupiny lidí, zvl. rodiny*” ‘ a television series depicting idealised everyday life of a group of people, mostly a family’.

SYN2000 found 9 entries for “lemma=soap”. The discourse showed situation similar to that one of a *seriál* versus a *telenovela*. I observed use of two terms describing the same form when searching for the occurrence of the term *soap-opera*. This is apparent in citation (103):

103) [. . .] romantické *seriály* pro ženy zvané *mýdlové opery* (soap operas). Momentálně nejsledovanější z nich je *seriál* Esmeralda, [. . .].

[. . .] romantic *series* for women called *soap-operas*. At present the most popular of them is the *series* Esmeralda, [. . .].

Another citation states:

104) [. . .] spousta škváru, ale občas se najde dobrý program a konec konců i z pitomé *soap opery* se dá pochytit leccoc z angličtiny [. . .].

[. . .] a lot of trash but from time to time there is a good programme and after all you can learn some English even from a stupid *soap opera* [. . .].

Newton IT found the following occurrence of *soap-opera*, which was the only example of the term being used out of the previously uniform context of TV programme lists. Here, a person's real life is believed to have the qualities otherwise associated with fiction only and therefore it is compared to fiction. This was also the only example of *soap-opera* written within inverted commas:

- 105) Kdyby chtěl někdo podle jejího života natočit příběh, vznikla by docela slušná „*soap opera*“.

If someone wanted to shoot a film based on her real-life story, quite a good “*soap opera*” could be created.

The term *soap opera* is used here as a comparison. I believe that for a word to be used that way in an article aimed at the general public, the word must become an integral part of the lexicon of that particular language and it has to be well understood by the language users first. We can presume, temporarily, that this process occurred in the case of *soap opera* and the term has completed the transition from a neologism to a lexical item fully established in Czech lexicon.

#### 6.5.2.1. *Mýdlová opera*

When searching the CNC SYN2000 for the entry “*mýdlová opera*”, I found 30 entries. The examples listed below document that the use of both terms is mostly confined to the genre of cultural columns and descriptions of TV programmes such as:

- 106) V boji proti AIDS na východě Afriky stojí i *mýdlová opera*, Arusha, [. . .].

Also the *soap-opera*, Arusha, fights against AIDS on the east of Africa [. . .].

- 107) [. . .] právě v Jižní Americe *mýdlové opery* vznikly, původně jako rozhlasový žánr.

[. . .] it was in South America, where *soap-operas* were created, originally as a radio genre.



Also citations referring to the intellectually undemanding qualities of the genre were found:

108) [ . . . ] témata, která se do jednoduchých schémat televizních *mýdlových oper* nevejdou.

[ . . . ] topics that will not fit the simple schemes of television *soap operas*.

109) [ . . . ] nenáročné *seriály typu mýdlových oper* nebo situačních komedií.

[ . . . ] undemanding *series such as soap operas* or sitcoms.

### 6.5.3. *Telenovela*

CNC listed 74 entries, the majority of them were limited to lists of TV programmes. Based on the search in SYN2000 I can observe that the programme Esmeralda, which has been described as a romantic series and a soap opera, as documented above, has also been referred to as a *romantická telenovela* ‘romantic telenovella’.

On the other hand, Newton IT found two newspaper articles in which *telenovela* is used outside the scope of TV programme listings. The first article remains within the context of culture:

110) Na úvodní schůzku odcházíme do jedné z desítek restaurací, které lemují bulvár zdejší Emy Destinové. Atmosféra připomíná spíše latinskoamerickou *telenovelu* než pracovní oběd.

To have our initial meeting, we are going to one of the many restaurants lining the boulevard of local Ema Destinová. The atmosphere resembles more of a Latin American *telenovella* than a working lunch.

The second article is a column from the front page of the newspaper Lidové noviny. Although the topic of the article is connected with the mass media and culture, specifically scandals with American investors into the Czech television station TV Nova, the expression *telenovela* is used deliberately in a political context:

- 111) Dramatická *telenovela* končí a její poslední díl nepřinesl české státní pokladně žádný happy end. Z rozhodnutí mezinárodní arbitráže musíme americkému podnikateli Ronaldu Lauderovi zaplatit více než deset miliónů korun jako náhradu za znehodnocenou investici do TV Nova.

The dramatic *telenovella* is coming to an end and its final part did not bring the Czech treasury a happy ending. The International Arbitration decided that we would have to pay the American entrepreneur Ronald Lauder more than ten million crowns to compensate for the devalued investment in TV Nova.

Both articles utilise parallels between typical features of telenovellas and real life situation. In the first example, it is the similarity between the glitzy sets, beautiful women and handsome men, presence of the rich and successful, etc. and telenovella is used as a comparison. In the second quotation, the expressions *telenovela* is meant to work as a metaphor where a court case is presented to readers as a television genre - - the telenovella. The expressions *poslední díl* 'the last part' and *happy end* 'happy ending' are used with the intention of underlining the systematicity of readers experience with a telenovella. The systematicity of experience is elaborated along two lines in the selected quotation:

1. The nature of the course of action: the problem is not solved promptly, the solution is being prolonged, postponed, and the audience being built up to the dramatic, hopefully happy, ending.
2. The nature of the main performers: main figures are rich, successful, corresponding to the prototype of square-jawed males characters of a telenovella, both unwilling to lose or back down and therefore fighting with unexpected and possibly unfair weapons.

These two types of imagery are coherent with the readers' and viewers' experience with a telenovella as a television genre on one hand and the court battle between Vladimír Železný, TV Nova Director, and Ronald Lauder, the American entrepreneur, on the other. This is why it was possible to use the

function of metaphor to “describe something, i.e. a court battle, in terms of something else, a telenovella” and why this metaphor works well.

## 6.6. Additional Search

From my experience as a native speaker I am aware that the terms *soap opera*, *mýdlová opera*, and *telenovela* can carry strong derogatory undertones. This, however, was not proven satisfactorily in the initial search. Therefore I searched Morfeo, During the searches Morfeo listed 574 references in the search for *soap opera* and 504 for *mýdlová opera* and 0 for *mydlinková opera*. These references were related mostly to the series Rodinná pouta ‘Family Ties’.

### 6.6.1. Soap opera

#### 112) Rodinná pouta aneb bohatí a chudí před pultem

Legenda nelhala, alespoň podle prvních dílů soudě jsou Rodinná pouta *soap opera* jako bič. [. . .] Přibližné *mydlinkové rychloherectví* provází zábavný úkaz. Méně totiž ubližuje mladým zatímco generace odchovaná Stanislavského školou prožívá přehrávání až k *telenovelám*.

Family Ties or the Rich and the Poor in Front of the Counter

The legend did not lie, judging by the first parts, Family Ties fits the description of a *soap opera* like a hand in a glove. [. . .]. Approximate *soapy crash-course acting* is accompanied by an amusing occurrence: it hurts the young less compared with the generation brought up on Stanislavský’s school which overacts so much that it reaches a *telenovella*.

#### 113) Díly jdou do stovek

„Jde o klasický *seriál*,“ tvrdil režisér prvních padesáti epizod Mojmír Kučera. Pojmy *soap* (*mýdlová nebo mydlinková*) *opera* či *telenovela* totiž nesou hanlivý nádech. Věcně však jen označují jistý žánr, typ levné pohádky pro dospělé, odlišný hlavně počtem pokračování.

The Number of Parts Will Reach Hundreds

“It is a classic type of *series*”, the director of the first fifty episodes, Mojmír Kučera claimed. Terms like a *telenovella* or a *soap* (or *soapy*) *opera* carry a derogatory undertone. In fact, however, they only denote a certain genre, a type of cheap fairy-tale for adults, which differs mainly in the number of episodes.

The above listed citations are typical representations of the references to a soap opera. There are neither any repeating adjectives that would clearly show the derogatory undertone of the term nor *soap opera* is used as a clearly derogatory expression. The derogatory effect is achieved through similes, comparisons or idiomatic constructions such as *soap opera jako bič*, *soap opera přiznává barvu*.

The only case in which the Czech translation of the adjective *soap* as *mydlinkové* 'soapy' was used as in a position of a derogatory attribute is in the construction *přibližné mydlinkové rychloherectví* 'soapy crash-course acting'.

The existing derogatory undertone is recognised in the citation (112) by the director of the programme who prefers referring to his work rather as a *klasický seriál* 'classic series' than a soap opera.

### 6.6.2. *Mýdlová opera*

Derogatory undertones of the term *mýdlová opera* are much more apparent in the following citations than in the case of *soap opera*. Two different pairs of quotations using *mýdlová opera* are listed here:

A)

114) [ . . . ] Bornův v podstatě intelektuální humor by se na obrazovce asi jen těžko snášel s kýčovitým barvotiskem amerických *mýdlových oper*.

[ . . . ] Born's basically intellectual sense of humor would not get on easily with the kitsch cheap print of American *soap operas*.

115) Rozsadili jsme se disciplinovaně před barevnými televizory, abychom mohli v klidu vychutnávat americký filmový škvár, *mýdlové opery* a přihlouplé story ze života texaských boháčů. Na provoz Národního přitom peníze nejsou, a nikoho to příliš nezjímá.

We spaced ourselves in the seats in front of the colour televisions in a disciplined way to be able to enjoy American film trash, *soap operas*, and fatuous stories about the life of rich Texans. At the same time there is not enough money to run the National Theatre but nobody is really interested in that.

In group A) there are citations that use either a contrast or a parallel between adjective + noun phrases:

- intelektuální humor      *versus*      kýčovitý barvotisk amerických  
mýdlových oper  
'intellectual sense of humor'      'kitsch cheap print of American  
soap operas'
- Americký filmový škvár      *parallel with*      mýdlové opery and  
přihlouplé story  
'American film trash'      'soap operas, and fatuous stories'

### B)

- 116) Jeden popisoval cestu [. . .] kýčovitě až parodisticky, jako v *mýdlové opeře*.

One described the journey [ . . . ] in a kitsch and a parody-like way as in a *soap opera*.

- 117) [. . .] Esmeralda sem sice ještě nedorazila, ale typické britské *soaps*, čili *mýdlové opery*, jí mohou co do kvality a nápaditosti hrdě konkurovat.

[. . .] Esmeralda has not reached the place yet but typical British *soaps*, or *soap operas* [ English translation of *mýdlová opera* as soap opera was provided to replace the English translation into Czech in the Czech original], can proudly compete with that as far as the quality and ideas are concerned.

In group B) *mýdlová opera* is used as a simile for kitsch, parody, poor quality and stupidity which is apparent only from the context in the sentence.

Although the definition for both *soap opera* and *mýdlová opera* in Slovník neologismů was identical, the citations show that the terms are not used in an identical way. It seems that *soap opera* is used more often as a neutral term to identify the genre. On the other hand, the Czech translation *mýdlová opera* has the power to describe the features of the genre of soap opera. The reason for this may be that although Czechs do understand both parts of the loan word *soap opera*, it is only in the Czech translation that *soap* is clearly understood as the adjective *mýdlový* and as such has the potential to be used in a more

flexible way, such as to make a comparative and a superlative and to be used to derive from it, such as the above documented adjective *mydlinkový* ‘soapy’. This also confirms my presumption in respect to citation (105) that the expression may have not become an integral part of the Czech lexicon and may not be easily understood by all Czechs.

### 6.6.3. *Telenovela*

Search engine Morfeo listed 3899 entries for the entry “*telenovela*”. I divided the citations into two groups:

A) respectable sources: commentaries and reviews published in a newspaper or magazine type of publication both electronic and non-electronic aimed at a wider circle or recipients,

B) individual’s views and commentaries: chat rooms commentaries, general public’s responses to articles from the corpus of the so called respectable sources.

#### Ad A) - - respectable sources:

118) Co ti mám udělat aneb *telenovela* s třešničkou na dortu  
Na rozdíl od hrdiny snímku, který byl v Itálii mnohonásobně oceněn, [. . .] jsem nevypozorovala žádné pravidelné rituály[. . .]. Pro mě to není *telenovela* o krásném princovi nebo smyslné odreakování od poměrně stereotypního způsobu života v manželství.

What Shall I Do to You or *Telenovella* with the Cream on Top  
Compared to the hero of the film that received multiple awards in Italy, [. . .] I did not observe any regular rituals [. . .]. For me this is not a *telenovella* about a beautiful prince or a sensual way of how to work off a rather stereotypical married life.

This citation is from a film review from a student newspaper. It is not clear from the article whether the author of the article thinks the film she is reviewing is like a telenovella or not. The main features of a telenovella, she identifies, are: escape from a stereotypical life, the story of the film is virtually about nothing and simple, the story-line is extended with no purpose.

119) 24. 3. odstartovala *telenovela* Rodinná pouta v televizi Prima [ . . . ] .

24.3. *Telenovella* The Family Ties was launched on Prima Channel [ . . . ].<sup>135</sup>

This is an entry from a private archive Louč on mass media affairs in the Czech Republic. Although the author of the contributions is a journalist, he refers to the series *Rodinná pouta* as a telenovella despite the fact that its creators compose the programme as a soap opera and its director refers to it as a series (see citations 14 and 15).

#### Ad B) - - individuals' views and commentaries

120) Děláte jako by to byl normální život, tohle je jako *telenovela*, někdo řekne konec s chatem, každej ho přemlouvá, a protahuje se to a je to furt o tom samým [ . . . ] to nedokážete říct prostě konec a čau?

You are acting like this was a real life, this is like a *telenovella*, someone says end the chat, everybody keeps persuading him, it is getting longer and it is the same round and round [ . . . ] can't you just say that's it and cheers?<sup>136</sup>

121) Tahle *telenovela* má další vtipné pokračování. K Mikuláši se mi rozbil počítač (a obešlo se to bez čerta a anděla), čímž omlouvám víkendové odmlky a pomalejší odpovědi na e-mailly.

This *telenovella* has another amusing sequel. My computer broke down on St. Nicholas' Day (and this was even without any assistance from a devil and an angel) which is my excuse for my weekend periods of silence and slower replies to e-mails.<sup>137</sup>

An identical use of *telenovela* was recorded also on the page *Chatařova telenovela* 'Cottage Owner's Telenovella' and *Lapiduch – diskusní klub Telenovela na pokračování* 'Body-snatcher Discussion Club Telenovella in Several Sequels'.

<sup>135</sup> web page Louč 120/2004

<sup>136</sup> web page GUEST Book chat

<sup>137</sup> Chat- room *Nárazník* 'Bumper'

The third citation is again from an individual's web page and has the form of an invitation to a scout's amateur performance taking place in a mental hospital in Prague.

122) Vážené sestry, vážení bratři

Dovolte, abych vás pozval na druhou premiéru 143. dílu latinskoamerické skautské *telenovely* NESPOUTANÁ LILIE. Premiéra se uskuteční ve středu 21. dubna 2004 v Divadle za plotem v areálu bohnické léčebny v 19,30 hodin.

Dear sisters, dear brothers,

Let me invite you to the second premiere of the 143rd part of Latin American scouts *telenovella* Unleashed Lilly. The premiere will take place on Wednesday 21 April 2004 in the Theatre behind the Fence in Bohnice Psychiatric Hospital at 19.30 hrs.

The difference between the two groups of citations A and B is primarily the source which then affects the way *telenovela* is used. In the first group, *telenovela* is used to identify the genre and its key features which result in the derogatory meaning of the term. The key features can be summarised as a simple, undemanding story-line, not likely to happen in real life. The length of narration is deliberately artificially extended as much as possible with no benefit to solving the problems of the plot.

The second group of citations, which compared to the first group are informal and represent the casually spoken and written discourse, picks up on the key features of *telenovella* and uses the term as a caricature of real life events.

When searching for adjectives that were most often connected with the term *telenovela* the only regular attributes were:

- |                               |                            |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------|
| • latinskoamerická telenovela | Latin American telenovella |
| • brazilská telenovela        | Brazilian telenovella      |
| • mexická telenovela          | Mexican telenovella        |
| • americká telenovela         | American telenovella       |

These only denote the geographic place of origin, not the quality of the programme. The only exception I located was in a reader's opinion concerning the article on the soap opera *Rodinná pouta* where *telenovella* was connected with attributes *stupidní* 'stupid' and *mexická* 'Mexican':



123) Může směle konkurovat i stupidním mexickým *telenovelám*.

It can compete boldly with stupid Mexican *telenovellas*.

### 6.7. Summary

Similar to previous case studies media played an important role in dissemination of the neologisms and borrowings by broadcasting the programmes the lexical units, which I investigate in the study, denote. By broadcasting them media also spread awareness of the new expressions and their meanings. These genres and also their names were introduced in a controlled way.

The case study shows both instances of lexical change and semantic change. Various attributes were used repeatedly in connection with the examined lexical units *seriál*, *soap opera*, *mýdlová* or *mydlinková opera*, and *telenovela*. These were mostly deprecating expressions kitsch, trash, cheap, and stupid. There was only one instance where *telenovela* was used in a positive way with the attribute *úžasná* 'fantastic'. This was in quotation (102) in reference to the series *Žena za pultem* 'The Woman behind the Counter'. *Telenovela* was used possibly due to the fact that it is seen as a trendy word compared with the traditional socialist *seriál*. The investigation shows that the newly acquired terms *soap opera* and *telenovela*, which probably first entered the national media as lexical borrowings to denote new varieties of the series genre, have undergone a process of semantic change - - pejoration, as citations (108), (109), (113),(114) show. The older name *seriál* does not show derogatory undertones as strongly as the other terms.

Although the genres of series, soap opera and telenovella have clearly defined differences, the terms denoting them are not used systematically. Both lay and professional Czech language users may understand the differences between the varieties but tend not to respect defining lines between them. Consequently

when referring to the series genre all the terms are used in an interchangeable way almost as synonyms.

On the other hand, Czech speakers are aware of the negative and neutral connotations of the lexical units in question and are able to use them accordingly, for instance as a metaphoric expressions, as citation (111) shows.

The results show that the terms may have not become equally established in the Czech lexicon. The expressions have undergone extension of the meaning and show that the genre they denote has become tasteless and tacky. This happened not because the genre would be connected to the communist or socialist regime but because of the quality of the genre.

## 7. Conclusions

The purpose of my work was to perform an in-depth search into the development of several lexical or phraseological units which have either undergone a transition or entered the Czech lexicon since the change of the political regime in 1989. I investigated how the extra-lingual factors, language contact factors and language internal processes contributed to the development and how the national media had been involved. My intention was not to give an overview of all development tendencies within the lexicon since these have been described in detail in publications by the Institute for the Czech Language and their details can be found in the bibliography. My work tested the hypothesis that the Czech lexicon has changed from the lexicon of a communist society to that of a post-communist society. Such changes could be observed within a short period of time and they will be reflected in the imagery underlying the lexicon and the lexicon itself. The processes causing such lexical change should become more noticeable if they are examined against parallel changes in culture and society. I am confident that the hypothesis was proven and if I summarize the findings from the three case studies, my observations are as follows:

I have demonstrated that some of the instances of change within the Czech lexicon:

1. have had an aspect of conscious change as my investigation of changing imagery of Europe and that of language planning work on *Česko* show,
2. have had an aspect of planned action which I have explained in conclusions to all three case studies
3. could have been or certainly were linked to particular social groups who might have acted as their instigators, which I have explained in conclusions to the first case study. I also proposed a model of such change and gave my definition of an innovator and described the rationale behind my observation.

4. have happened as a response to a social, cultural and political need within a society going through a major transformation although I could not identify with certainty where such need was first recognised .

Since Kundera's contemplation of the notion of *Europe* in The Art of Novel in 1988 the statements about "kidnapping Europe" and "return to Europe" have been purely figures of thought. The post-revolutionary vision of a return to Europe symbolised efforts to leave behind the position of the country as a satellite of the USSR, connection to a common European cultural heritage and, of course for some, it represented political ambitions. The extra-lingual factors - - political, cultural, social and economic - - have been behind the slogan since it was first mentioned and they have pushed forward development of the imagery of *Europe* and the definition of the term *Europe*. Together with extra-lingual factors, the language contact factor has also affected the development of *Europe* and the imagery. The language contact factor was so dominant that it pushed aside the cognitive factor according to which language-specific imagery could or even should have been created to reflect contradictory experience of language users in various part of Europe. This outcome can be ascribed to the strong involvement of the national media which disseminated the western imagery of Europe.

The presence of extra-lingual factors in the development -- or more precisely the revival - - of the geographic name *Česko* was detected. The split of the country ignited the search for a short, one-word name for the state. At the same time processes of language planning and purism instigated by official bodies interacted with processes of lexical innovation and purism coming from language users. Media acted as official disseminators of *Česko*, although at first in a cautious way. Gradually the frequency of its use grew and people's reservations about the name were reduced. This was visible especially during the accession of the country to the EU. In connection with the campaign to promote membership of the EU the national media disseminated governmental campaign texts which consistently used the name *Česko*.

I find the language contact factor and language internal processes of change to be the most prominent issues in the case study on some of the terms connected with mass entertainment. The national media first spread awareness of the lexical borrowings *telenovella* and *soap opera* through lists of television programmes. Soon language users started to connect the expressions and their calques with characteristics of the genre and the lexical units started to carry pejorative undertones. Due to their pejorative undertones the expressions have been used as a simile or a metaphor.

Ryazanova - Clarke and Wade write that “at the times of social upheaval non-standard, spontaneous and uncontrolled linguistic elements usually gain the upper hand over rules and regulations, and many disruptions of the linguistic norm occur during such period” (307). Due to the choice of the topics selected in the thesis, my work cannot confirm their statement. Majority of the cases observed in my thesis were introduced and disseminated either in a controlled way or deliberately and consciously. In all three instances the national media played an important role of a disseminator of the change and innovators or leaders in lexical and semantic change came from the highest strata of the society.

In summary, changes in contemporary Czech lexicon from the 1980s show the presence of extra-lingual and language contact factors which together with language internal process affect the vocabulary.

## Appendix 1

### I. Corpus of Citations for Europe pre 1989

1) Vyzýváme spolkovou vládu odvolat souhlas s rozmístěním nových amerických raket v Evropě [. . .].

Dokument zdůrazňuje rostoucí obavy západoněmecké veřejnosti pokud jde o zbrojení a uvolnění napětí a vyzývá občany NSR nepřipustit přeměnu střední Evropy v základnu amerických atomových zbraní.

We are calling on the FRG government to withdraw its approval of the new American rockets to be located in Europe [. . .].

The document stresses growing concerns of the West German general public about armament and reducing tension and it urges the FRG citizens not to allow the transformation of Central Europe into an American nuclear weapons base.<sup>138</sup>

2) V SSSR pozitivně oceňují iniciativy finského prezidenta vytvořit v severní Evropě pásmo bezjaderných zbraní.

[. . .] díky své prozíravé politice není Finsko nuceno – jako západoevropské státy podřizovat se diktátu zvnějšku, účastnit se horečného zbrojení a omezovat státní suverenitu.

The USSR is positive about the Finnish President's initiatives to create a nuclear weapon - free area in Northern Europe.

[. . .] thanks to its clear-sighted politics, Finland is not forced – as western European countries were to subordinate itself to external dictates, to take part in a frenetic armament and to limit its state sovereignty.<sup>139</sup>

3) Dnešní Československo je pokrokový a vysoce rozvinutý stát, který důstojně přispívá k upevňování jednoty a semknutosti zemí socialistického společenství, k činnosti organizace Varšavské smlouvy a Rady vzájemné hospodářské pomoci, aktivně se účastní boje za upevnění bezpečnosti v Evropě, za mír, uvolňování napětí a odzbrojení.

Today's Czechoslovakia is a progressive and highly advanced state that works honourably towards strengthening the unity and closeness of the socialist community, the activity of the Warsaw Pact and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, actively participates in the battle to strengthen the safety of Europe, for peace, lessening of tension and disarmament.<sup>140</sup>

<sup>138</sup> kov), "Protiválečné diskusní fórum v Krefeldu/ Výzva k zdravému rozumu," Rudé právo 17 Nov. 1980: 6.

<sup>139</sup> Jaroslav Matěj, "Užitečný dialog," Rudé právo 17 Nov. 1980:6.

<sup>140</sup> "Blahopřejné telegramy k 36. výročí osvobození," Rudé právo 9 May 1981: 6.

4) Právem se i v západní Evropě množí obavy z této nebezpečné politiky. Třicet šest let již mlčí v Evropě zbraně [ . . . ].

Ti američtí politici, pro které jsou jiné zájmy důležitější než zájmy míru, by pak snadno mohli podlehnout choutce vystavit pro tyto „jiné zájmy“ Evropu jaderné zkáze. V zájmu celé Evropy tudíž je, aby místo příprav na rozmístění amerických raket v západní Evropě bylo bezodkladně zahájeno jednání o omezení a snížení jaderné výzbroje v Evropě.

It is only right that concerns about dangerous politics are also growing in Western Europe. Weapons in Europe have been silent for thirty-six years [ . . . ].

Those American politicians for whom other interests were more important than peace could easily succumb to the temptation to subject Europe to nuclear destruction for the sake of their “other interests”. It is in the interest of the whole of Europe to commence without delay negotiations on a reduction and decrease of nuclear armament in Europe instead of preparations for a placement of American rockets in Western Europe.<sup>141</sup>

5) Několik týdnů zbývá do zahájení červnového zasedání nejvyšších představitelů členských zemí Atlantického paktu v Bonnu [ . . . ]. Na Rýně se ozývají obavy, že americký ministr obrany Weinberger prosadí další zostření kursu NATO a bude [ . . . ] kategoricky žádat větší „finanční oběti“ západní Evropy. [ . . . ] V této souvislosti se uvádějí nové nátlakové akce Washingtonu i západoněmecké reakce z CDU a CSU proti obchodu se socialistickými státy a proti projektu plynovodu ze SSSR do západní Evropy.

Only several weeks are left before the June meeting of the highest NATO representatives in Bonn [ . . . ]. Concerns can be heard on the Rhine that American Secretary of Defence Weinberger will set NATO on an even more aggressive course and will demand categorically bigger “financial sacrifices“ of Western Europe. [ . . . ] With respect to these matters also new pressurising activities from Washington and Western Germany’s responses from CDU and CSU against the trade with socialist countries and against the project of the gas pipelinesystem from the USSR to Western Europe are mentioned.<sup>142</sup>

6) V současné složité mezinárodní situaci má takové setkání přirozeně i širší význam, je prospěšné si vyměnit názory také na problémy Evropy, světa, zejména střední Evropy.

<sup>141</sup> “Nejcennější je mír,” Rudé právo 9 May 1981: 1.

<sup>142</sup> Jan Kovařík, “Zákulisní tahanice před bonnským zasedáním NATO ‘Belgické’ rampy do NSR?,” Rudé právo 10 May 1982: 6.

In the current complex international situation a meeting like this naturally has wider implications; it is beneficial to exchange views on problems in Europe, the world, and specifically Central Europe.<sup>143</sup>

(7) Další kolo jednání vídeňských rozhovorů / Ulehčit Evropskému srdci  
 Vídeňské rozhovory [. . .] lze rovněž chápat jako součást úsilí o dosažení větší evropské bezpečnosti. V tomto smyslu jsou nedílnou součástí zápasu mírumilovných sil o ozdravení ovzduší, o snížení rizika vojenské konfrontace na evropském kontinentě. Byl-li při teritoriálním vymezení těchto jednání vybrán právě střed Evropy, byť není přísně geografický, důvodem k tomu byla skutečnost, že to je právě místo, kde spolu hraničí dvě vojenská seskupení a kde je relativně největší vojenská koncentrace. Proto má celoevropský význam, jestliže by se právě zde v této oblasti podařilo dosáhnout dohody o snížení stavu vojsk a výzbroje. Vždyť jde o území NDR, ČSSR a Polska na jedné straně, o NSR, Belgie, Holandsko a Lucembursko na straně druhé.

A New Round of Vienna Negotiations / To Take Away the Stress from the Heart of Europe

Vienna negotiations [. . .] can also be viewed as a part of the efforts to reach better European safety. In this sense, they are a coherent part of the peace-loving forces' struggle for a healthier atmosphere, reducing the risk of military confrontation on the European continent. If the centre of Europe, although not exactly the geographical one, was chosen when the territory of the negotiations was defined, the reason for that is the fact that this is the border-line of two military alliances and the place where the relatively highest military concentration can be found. Therefore it is of a European-wide importance if agreement on the reduction of the numbers of soldiers and weapons can be found right in this location. It is the territory of the GDR, CSSR, and Poland on one side and FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg on the other.<sup>144</sup>

8) Rozhodně také odmítl tvrzení této vlády, že jaderné zbraně údajně už desítky let chrání mír v Evropě, stejně jako falešný argument, že jaderné zbraně jsou prý pro západní Evropu nezbytné vzhledem k údajné převaze Sovětského svazu v konvenčních zbraních.

He definitely rejected the statement of the government that, allegedly, nuclear weapons had protected peace in Europe for many years as well as a false argument that nuclear weapons are important for Western Europe due to the Soviet Union's alleged dominant position in conventional weapons.<sup>145</sup>

9) Sovětský svaz zaujímá kladný postoj k návrhům na vytvoření nejaderných pásem v různých oblastech Evropy, [. . .]. Vytvoření nejaderných pásem na Balkáně a

<sup>143</sup> "Před oficiální návštěvou v Rakousku/ Máme zájem na dobrých susedských vztazích," *Rudé právo* 17 Nov. 1982: 1.

<sup>144</sup> Milan Syruček, "Další kolo jednání vídeňských rozhovorů / Ulehčit Evropskému srdci," *Mladá fronta* 31 Mar. 1985: 5.

<sup>145</sup> Zdeněk Vilímek, "Rozhodné NE jadernému zbrojení," *Rudé právo* 17 Nov. 1986: 6.



v severní Evropě a rovněž oblastí bez jaderných zbraní na obou stranách styčné linie států Varšavské smlouvy a NATO přímo souvisí se snižováním vojenského nebezpečí a upevňování důvěry.

The USSR is positive about the proposals for nuclear-free zones in various areas of Europe, [. . .]. Establishment of nuclear-free zones in the Balkans and in Northern Europe and also areas without nuclear weapons on both sides of the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO is directly connected with the reduction in military deterrent and building the mutual trust.<sup>146</sup>

(10) [. . .] SSSR se snažil o takové poválečné uspořádání Evropy, které by zajistilo, aby již nikdy nedošlo k opakování tragických událostí z druhé světové války. Objektivní historik musí proto odmítnout hlasy na Západě, které dnes Jaltu označují za porážku západních zemí a žádají její „revizi“. Historické zkušenosti z druhé světové války ukazují, že k posílení míru v Evropě a ve světě je dnes v první řadě obnovit důvěru zejména mezi státy dvou hlavních vojenských seskupení, NATO a Varšavské smlouvy.

[. . .] the USSR strove for such European arrangements after the war that would make certain that the tragic WWII experiences would never be repeated. Therefore an objective historian must disagree with those from the West who currently see Jalta as the defeat of Western countries and call for its “revision”. The historical experiences from WWII show that, to strengthen the peace in Europe and all over the world, mutual trust amongst the states of the two main military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, must be first renewed.<sup>147</sup>

11) [. . .] jsou to Spojené státy, které rozhodují o tom, co se bude dít s těmito zbraněmi v západní Evropě. [. . .] Jde o to, že Spojené státy jsou připravené zničit celou Evropu.

[. . .] it is the United States who decides what will happen with these weapons in Western Europe. [. . .]  
The problem is that the United States are prepared to destroy the whole of Europe.<sup>148</sup>

12) Za příčinu zotřívání napětí označuje rozmisťování amerických jaderných zbraní prvního úderu v západní Evropě.

He sees the cause of increasing tension in placements of American nuclear weapons of the first attack in Western Europe.<sup>149</sup>

<sup>146</sup> “Začalo druhé kolo Stockholmské konference SSSR k posílení důvěry a bezpečnosti v Evropě,” Rudé právo 10 May 1984: 7.

<sup>147</sup> “Síla veřejné informovanosti,” Mladá fronta 17 Nov. 1988: 5.

<sup>148</sup> Karel Starý, “Zabránit jaderné válce,” Rudé právo 1 Apr. 1983: p.6.

<sup>149</sup> Petr Váňa, “Za bezjadernou Skandinávií,” Rudé právo 2 Apr. 1984: 1.

13) Bruselské Muzeum výtvarného umění připravuje dosud největší výstavu děl Breughelovské dynastie. [. . .] Organizátoři počítají s tím, že se jim od řady evropských a amerických muzeí podaří získat k výstavním účelům kolem dvou set až dvou set padesáti obrazů.

Brussels Museum of Fine Arts is preparing the biggest exhibition of the Breughel dynasty ever held. [. . .] The organizers hope to borrow for the exhibition between two hundred and two hundred and fifty paintings from various European and American museums.<sup>150</sup>

14) I naše generace si uvědomují, že se právě na řeckých a římských klasicích rodily kultury evropských národů.

Also our generations realise that it was the Greek and Roman classical authors who initiated the dawn of cultures of the European nations.<sup>151</sup>

15) V uplynulých měsících si mladí lidé v Evropě začali znovu palčivě uvědomovat, že válka, teror a násilí nejsou jen prázdná slova, která se jich bezprostředně nedotýkají.

In the past months, young people in Europe have become painfully aware that war, terror and violence are not just empty words that would not concern them closely.<sup>152</sup>

16) Nemine týden, ve kterém bychom se nesetkali s některými zahraničními spisovateli. [. . .] Přijíždějí ze severní, západní a jižní Evropy, vyhledávají nakladatelství, obcházejí knihkupectví a setkávají se s českými a slovenskými autory.

Not a single week passes without us meeting a foreign writer. [. . .] They come from Northern, Western, and Southern Europe, search for publishers, visit book shops, and meet Czech and Slovak authors.<sup>153</sup>

17) Praha má družební styky s mnoha hlavními měst nejen Evropy, ale i ostatních kontinentů. S některými z nich pořádá rozsáhlé akce. Jedna z nich probíhala [. . .] pod názvem Dny Varšavy v Praze (v prosinci se pak Praha představí v Moskvě).

Prague has town-twinning contacts with many capitals of not only Europe but also other continents. It holds an extensive range of activities with some of them. One

<sup>150</sup> "Kulturní mozaika," *Rudé právo* 7 January 1980: 5.

<sup>151</sup> Otakar Nádhera, "Antická knihovna," *Rudé právo* 4 Jan. 1989: 5.

<sup>152</sup> Petr Cincibuch, "Hlas umělcův/ Hlavní úkol poezie," *Rudé právo* 1 Apr. 1981: 5.

<sup>153</sup> Bohumil Nohejl, "Hlas umělcův/ Mít dobrou vůli," *Rudé právo*, 4 July 1983 p: 5.

of those was taking place [. . .] under the title Warsaw in Prague (in December Prague will introduce itself in Moscow).<sup>154</sup>

18) Sepětí umění se socialistickou revolucí se tedy projevuje i po “lidské”, “osobní” stránce - - v tom, že umění (a kulturnost vůbec) je nedílnou součástí osobností vůdců revoluce. Marxističtí revolucionáři vždy - - i v nejtěžších dobách perzekuce a ilegálního boje - - věnovali pozornost klasickému i novému umění. [. . .] Socialistická revoluce potřebuje umění ne jako prostředek pouhé zábavy [. . .], ale jako mocnou účinnou zbraň v boji za nový, spravedlivější společenský systém i za nového člověka; a umění v ní toto poslání skutečně plní. [. . .] To, co bylo řečeno o vztahu umění a revoluce, je samozřejmě aktuální i pro dnešek.

The link between art and the socialist revolution can be detected in the “human” “personal” aspect - - in the fact that art (and culture generally) is an inseparable part of a revolutionary leader’s personality. Marxist revolutionaries have always - - even in the hardest times of persecution and illegal fights - - paid attention to both classical and modern art. [. . .] The Socialist revolution needs art not as means of entertainment [. . .] but as a powerful weapon in the battle for both a new, fair social system and a new man; and art fulfils this mission. [. . .] What has been said about the relation between art and revolution is of course valid even today.<sup>155</sup>

19) [. . .] uplynulý ročník Pražského jara, které je vizitkou naší socialistické společnosti, v níž umění má svůj nezastupitelný podíl na jejím utváření, přispívá k dorozumění a mírové spolupráci mezi národy a podněcuje rozvoj lidské osobnosti. [. . .] i to je jedním z hlavních rysů této významné kulturně politické události, která potvrdila společenský význam hudby, důstojně manifestovala naši hudební kulturu a dala lidem nejen silný umělecký prožitek, hodně radosti, krásy a posily pro další zápasy o vybojování světového míru.

[. . .] the past year of the Prague Spring, which does credit to our socialist society, where art plays an irreplaceable role in its creation, assists to reach understanding and peaceful co-operation between nations and encourages the development of human personality. [. . .] also this is one of the main features of this cultural and political event, which authenticated the importance of music for a society, manifested our music culture and provided the people with many strong cultural experiences, joy, beauty and strength for future battles for achieving the world-wide peace.<sup>156</sup>

20) Lze s jistotou říci, že olympijské hry 1980 v Moskvě již nyní přispívají k uvolňování mezinárodního napětí a upevnění světového míru. Zároveň je nutné konstatovat, že OH v Moskvě mají v zahraničí nejen své příznivce, ale i nepřátele,

<sup>154</sup> Marie Slupečká, “Na téma současnosti i zítřka/ Umělecké pořady a výstavy na dnech Varšavy v Praze,” Rudé právo 4 Oct. 1988: 5.

<sup>155</sup> Jaroslava Heřtová, “Umění je mocná zbraň,” Rudé právo 2 Feb. 1980: 5.

<sup>156</sup> Jaromír Pešek, Zdeněk Vokurka, “Výrazný úspěch festivalu Pražské jaro v roce české hudby 1984/ Poselství miliónům,” Rudé právo 9 June 1984: 5.

kteří se tuto sportovní akci pokoušejí zneužít k šíření lží a pomluv o naší zemi, k zostření politické situace ve světě.”

It can be said with a high degree of certainty that the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games contributed to relieving international tension and strengthening the peace all over the world. At the same time, it must be stated that the Moscow Olympic Games had its supporters as well as its enemies abroad who tried to misuse this event to spread lies and slander about our country, and to damage the world-wide political situation.”<sup>157</sup>

21) Protesty proti snaze americké vlády v čele s prezidentem Carterem bojkotovat Olympijské hry v Moskvě neustávají . [ . . . ] Také šedesát známých francouzských sportovců v čele s bývalým olympijským vítězem Michele Jazy Moskvu podpořilo. Podepsali petici proto bojkotu Olympijských her, ve které uvedli: “Odmítáme být politickými rukojmími”.

Protests against the American Government’s effort lead by President Carter to boycott the Moscow Olympic games do not stop. [ . . . ] Also sixty famous French sportsmen, together with the past Olympic winner Michel Jazy, supported Moscow. They signed a petition against the boycott of the Olympic games that stated: “We refuse to be hostages of the politics”.<sup>158</sup>

22) O západním a především americkém profesionálním sportu se v buržoazním tisku píše téměř vždy v souvislosti s “balíky peněz” [ . . . ] na Západě skutečně existují sportovci, kteří vydělávají hodně [ . . . ] .

Western and mainly American professional sports are usually covered by the bourgeois press almost always in connection with “loads of money” [ . . . ] there are real sportsmen in the West who earn a lot [ . . . ] .”<sup>159</sup>

23) Na 36. zasedání Hospodářské komise OSN pro Evropu (HKE) vystoupil v úterý vedoucí čs. delegace [ . . . ] . Vyzdvihl nezastupitelnost úlohy HKE v rozvoji celoevropské spolupráce [ . . . ] .  
[ . . . ] ČSSR bude s HKE dále rozvíjet spolupráci s cílem přispět k upevňování míru, bezpečnosti, vzájemné důvěry a porozumění na evropském kontinentu.

The head of the Czechoslovak delegation spoke at the 36<sup>th</sup> session of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) on Tuesday [ . . . ] . He highlighted the irreplaceable role of the ECE in the development of Europe-wide co-operation [ . . . ] . [ . . . ] the CSSR and the ECE will develop their co-operation aimed at

<sup>157</sup> “Proti intrikám a lžím,” Rudé právo 4 Jan. 1980: 8.

<sup>158</sup> “Další hlasy pro Moskvu,” Rudé právo 2 Feb. 1980: 8.

<sup>159</sup> “Tvrdí muži,” Rudé právo, 3 Apr. 1981: 8.

strengthening peace, safety, mutual trust and understanding on the European continent.<sup>160</sup>

24) [. . .] ČSSR realizuje velkou část svého zahraničního obchodu [. . .] se zeměmi RVHP. Jak to bude vypadat v budoucnu s vývozem na Západ?

[. . .] the CSSR realises a big part of its international trade [. . .] with the CMEA countries. What will the export to the West be like?<sup>161</sup>

25) Ženeva: RVHP – EHS

V budově Mezinárodní organizace práce v Ženevě včera začalo druhé kolo rozhovorů mezi experty EHS a RVHP. Cílem dvoudenního jednání je pokračovat v přípravách návrhu společného textu prohlášení o úpravě vztahů mezi oběma mezinárodními ekonomickými organizacemi.

Geneva: The CMEA – the EEC

The second round of talks between experts from the EEC and CMEA started in the building of the International Work Organisation in Geneva yesterday. The aim of the two daylong talks is to continue in the preparation of the draft for the jointly produced proclamation on how to modify relations between both international economic organisations.<sup>162</sup>

26) RVHP – EHS: Třetí kolo

V budově Mezinárodní organizace práce v Ženevě včera skončilo druhé kolo rozhovorů mezi experty RVHP a EHS. Jeho cílem bylo pokračovat v přípravách návrhu společného textu prohlášení o úpravě vztahů mezi oběma mezinárodními ekonomickými organizacemi. [. . .]

Nakonec se však [delegace] shodly na tom, že ke konečné úpravě společného textu bude nutné uspořádat další kolo jednání

The CMEA - the EEC: The Third Round

The second round of the talks between experts from the EEC and CMEA was closed in the building of the International Work Organisation in Geneva yesterday. Its aim was to continue in preparations of the draft for the jointly produced proclamation on how to modify relations between both international economic organisations. [. . .]

Eventually, [the delegations] agreed though that another round of the talks would have to be held to achieve the final draft of the jointly produced proclamation.<sup>163</sup>

<sup>160</sup> "Pro porozumění v Evropě," Rudé právo 1 Apr. 1981: 7; another article where the UNO is presented as a respectable and trustworthy organisation is e.g. "Posílit důvěru mezi státy," Rudé právo 1. Apr. 1987: 1 – 2.

<sup>161</sup> "Před neoficiální návštěvou v Rakousku/ Máme zájem na dobrých sousedských vztazích," Rudé právo 10 May 1982: 6.

<sup>162</sup> "Ženeva: RVHP – EHS," Mladá fronta 19. 3. 1987: 5.

<sup>163</sup> "RVHP – EHS: Třetí kolo," Mladá fronta 21. Mar. 1987: 5.

## 27) Nezaměstnanost v EHS: Horší a horší

Nezaměstnanost v zemích EHS se bude i letošním roce dále zvyšovat. Podle oficiálních informací komise Evropských společenství bylo koncem roku 1984 v západní Evropě 10,9 procenta činného obyvatelstva bez práce.

## Unemployment in the EEC: Getting worse

Unemployment in the EEC countries will be growing even this year. According to the official information issued the EC commission, 10.9 % of the active population was unemployed towards the end of 1984.<sup>164</sup>

## 28) Jednání mezi RVHP a EHS má perspektivu / Evropa = Rozum + Spolupráce

Náš titulek bohužel zatím neodpovídá reálnému stavu, nejen když mluvíme o politice, ale i v oblasti hospodářství. Ačkoli právě v Evropě se soustřeďují ekonomické organizace RVHP a EHS.

## Negotiations between the CMEA and the EEC have a good perspective/ Europe = Sense + Co-operation

It is unfortunate that at present our headline does not correspond to the real situation, not only when we discuss politics but also economy, despite the fact that the economic organisations of the CMEA and the EEC are concentrated in Europe.<sup>165</sup>

29) [. . .] členské státy EHS se dohodly na tom, že od prvního ledna příštího roku rozšíří Španělsko a Portugalsko evropskou „desítku“ na „dvanáctku“. Po mnoha letech tahanic, sporů a nedorozumění tedy v Bruselu bouchaly zátky šampaňského a padala patetická slova o „jednotě“ západní Evropy. [. . .]

Ani jedna z vlád obou pyrenejských zemí neskrývá fakt, že vstup do EHS je pro ně především věcí politickou. [. . .] Španělský ministr zahraničních věcí Fernando Morán dokonce v Bruselu neváhal prohlásit, že „jsme nyní skutečně součástí západní Evropy, je konec komplexu méněcennosti, který v nedávných dějinách Španělska způsobil tolik zla [. . .]“.

[. . .] the EEC member countries decided that from the first January next year Spain and Portugal would extend the “European ten” to the “European twelve”. After many years of scuffle, conflicts, and misunderstanding, champagne corks were popping and passionate statements about the “unity” of Western Europe were proclaimed in Brussels. [. . .]

Neither of the Pyrenees governments disguises the fact that accession to the EEC is mainly a political matter for them. [. . .] The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs Fernando Moran even did not hesitate to state in Brussels that “now when we are finally an integral part of Western Europe, it is the end of the inferiority complex that caused so much damage in the recent history of Spain [. . .]”.<sup>166</sup>

<sup>164</sup> “Nezaměstnanost v EHS Horší a horší,” *Mladá fronta* 18. 3. 1985: 3.

<sup>165</sup> Martin Komárek, “Evropa = rozum + spolupráce,” *Mladá fronta*, 25 Mar 1987: 5.

<sup>166</sup> Petr Hirsch, “Komu ku prospěchu,” *Mladá fronta*, 6 Apr. 1985: 5.

## 30) Modro před očima tureckého premiéra / Trnitá cesta do Evropy

Jenom docela malý kousek Turecké republiky spadá – z hlediska geografického vzato – do Evropy. Turecko by ovšem rádo patřilo do Evropy celé. Nebo alespoň do Evropského hospodářského společenství, což je pro ně fakticky totéž. [. . .]

Proč ten zájem? Jde přece o dobře propočítaný tah: kdyby se Turecku podařilo dostat do EHS, mělo by širší přístup na západoevropské trhy, značné celní výhody a v neposlední řadě by také mohlo těžit ze zemědělských subvencí společenství.

## The Turkish Premier Sees Blue/ A Thorny Path to Europe

Only a tiny part of the Republic of Turkey comes under - - from the geographical point of view - - Europe. The whole of Turkey, however, would like to belong to Europe; at least to the European Economic Community, which as a matter of fact for them is the same. [. . .] Why so much interest? This is a well calculated move: if Turkey managed to get into the EEC it would gain a wider access to Western European markets, considerable duty advantages, and last but not least, it could profit from the community's agricultural subsidies.<sup>167</sup>

31) Jak my chápeme tento problém a zejména myšlenku společného evropského domu? Vždyť jeho budování zahájil helsinský proces, když evropské státy pochopily, že starým způsobem nelze dále žít [. . .]. V žádné části světa není soustředěno takové množství vojáků a zbraní jako v Evropě. To vyvolává dokonce i úvahy o iracionálnosti této situace. Evropa se z nějakého důvodu rozhodla vyzbrojit, přičemž se přesně neví, kdo se chystá proti komu bojovat a kdo má jaké zájmy a požadavky vůči sousedním zemím.

How do we understand the problem and mainly the idea of the Common European House? Its construction was launched by the Helsinki Process when the European countries understood that we could not live the old way [. . .]. Such high concentrations of soldiers and weaponry are not found anywhere else in the world as in Europe. This provokes thoughts of how irrational the situation is. For some reason Europe decided to equip herself with arms while it is unclear who is going to fight whom and who has what interests and what the claims are against neighbouring countries.<sup>168</sup>

## 32) Budujme evropský dům

Zvláštní pozornost byla při jednání věnována Evropě a návrhu na budování „celoevropského domu“, který předložil Michail Gorbačov. Prezident Francois Mitterand charakterizoval tento návrh jako velkou myšlenku. Máme-li fantazii a intelektuální odvahu, snadno si můžeme představit evropský kontinent a všechny jeho země jako nové společenství, spojené novými vztahy v jejichž rámci každý zůstává sám sebou, ale všichni spolupracují ve jménu shodných cílů. [. . .]

<sup>167</sup> Ivo Bartík, “Modro před očima tureckého premiéra/ Trnitá cesta do Evropy,” Mladá fronta 22 Sep. 1987: 5.

<sup>168</sup> “Síla veřejné informovanosti,” Mladá fronta 17 Nov. 1988: 5.

Kulturní a duchovní jednota Evropy je koneckonců realitou, která může a musí být vtělena do politiky.

#### We Are Building the European House

During the negotiations, particular attention was paid to Europe and the proposal to build the “Europe-wide house” presented by Mikhail Gorbachev. President Francois Mitterand characterised the proposal as a powerful concept. If we have the imagination and intellectual courage, we can easily imagine the European continent and all its countries as a new community connected through new relations within which all involved maintain their identity but co-operate to achieve identical goals. [ . . . ] The cultural and spiritual unity of Europe is after all a reality that can and must be embodied in politics.<sup>169</sup>

33) Na otázku, co považují za hlavní styčné body mezi Východem a Západem z hlediska možností urychlit proces sbližování v Evropě, budovat onen „evropský dům“, všichni shodně zdůraznili, že hlavní je všeobecné pochopení nezbytnosti zajistit na našem kontinentu bezpečnost. [ . . . ] M. Harbottle uvedl, že v Evropě se již začaly utvářet nové vztahy mezi státy, což je podmínkou pro budování „společného domu“. Proces jeho výstavby odstraňuje „obraz nepřítele“ ve prospěch vzájemně výhodných kontaktů.

In a reply to the question what they consider to be the main point of contact between the East and the West regarding speeding up the process of bringing one another closer within Europe and to construct the “European House”, everybody univocally stressed the general understanding of the need to make our continent safe. [ . . . ] M. Harbottle stated that new relations between states had been developing within Europe which is a condition to build the “common house”. The process of its construction eradicates the “image of an enemy” for the benefit of mutually positive contacts.<sup>170</sup>

## **II. Corpus of Citations for Europe post 89**

### 34) Východní Evropa v pohybu

Geograficky to není zrovna přesné – tak třeba Berlín nebo Praha leží dál na západ než východněji situovaná Vídeň. Přesto se dlouhá desetiletí hovoří, hlavně na základě zcela jiných kritérií než čistě zeměpisných o dvou Evropách, východní a západní.

#### Eastern Europe on the Move

Geographically it may not be exact - for example Berlin and Prague are located more to the West than to the easterly-situated Vienna. Despite this two Europes, eastern and western, have been recognised based mainly on criteria different to the geographical ones for many long years.<sup>171</sup>

<sup>169</sup> “Budujme evropský dům,” Mladá fronta 28 Nov. 1988: 1, 3.

<sup>170</sup> Svatava Hodíková, “Obrysy už se rýsují,” Práce 3 April 1989: 3.

<sup>171</sup> Milan Vodička, “Východní Evropa v pohybu,” Mladá fronta 18 Nov. 1989: 5.



35) Pane předsedo, jak vy, jako zkušený politik, vidíte budoucnost Evropy? Vidím šanci pro vývoj evropského mírového uspořádání, chcete-li k budování celoevropského domu. [. . .] Čím více postoupí odzbrojení kupředu, tím lehčí bude nastolit mírový pořádek v Evropě. Skutečnost, že Maďarsko, Sovětský svaz, Polsko a Jugoslávie jsou poradními členy Evropské rady a že se chtějí stát členy této rady ukazuje, že celoevropské instituce nejsou pro ně příliš vzdálené.[. . .] Jsem přesvědčen, že zítra nebo pozítří může vzniknout nová Evropa, kde hranice nebudou mít žádný význam.

Mr Chairman, how do you as an experienced politician, see the future of Europe? I can see a chance for the development of European peace arrangements, if you wish, a chance for building a Common European House. [. . .] The more the disarmament goes ahead, the easier it will be to establish a peace order in *Europe*. The fact that Hungary, the Soviet Union, Poland and Yugoslavia are advisers to the European Council and that they wish to become members of the Council shows that the common *European* institutions are not too distant for them. [. . .] I am sure that tomorrow or the day after tomorrow a new *Europe*, where borders will be superfluous, can be formed.<sup>172</sup>

36) Jak vidíte, pane předsedo, postavení Československa v Evropě? Československo je součástí střední Evropy a doufám, že se bude brzy ucházet o to, být poradním členem Evropské rady a jít stejným směrem, jako jiné země střední Evropy ke smluvním vztahům s radou.

Mr Chairman, how do you see the position of Czechoslovakia in Europe? Czechoslovakia is an integrated part of Central Europe and I hope that it will soon apply for advisory membership in the European Council and it will follow the same direction towards treaty relations with the council as other countries do.<sup>173</sup>

37) Sovětský ministr [zahraničních věcí Eduard Ševarnadze] se v pondělí setkal se svým belgickým protějškem Markem Eysikensem. Vyslovil se při tom pro vytvoření nového ekonomického prostoru v Evropě vzájemným propojením ekonomik západních a východních zemí.[. . .] SSSR se chce podílet na činnosti Banky pro rozvoj a modernizaci východní Evropy [. . .] tento proces bude záležet na ochotě USA k obdobnému stažení svých jednotek ze západní Evropy.

The Soviet Minister [of foreign affairs Edvard Shevarnadze] met on Monday his Belgian counterpart Mark Eysikens. At the event he supported the formation of a new economic space in Europe created by a link between Western and Eastern countries.[. . .] the USSR wishes to participate in the activities of the Bank for Development and Modernisation of Eastern Europe [. . .] the process will be determined by the willingness of the USA to withdraw its troops from Western Europe.<sup>174</sup>

<sup>172</sup> Jan Kovařík, "ČSSR do Evropské rady," Rudé právo 19 December 1989: 7.

<sup>173</sup> Jan Kovařík, "ČSSR do Evropské rady," Rudé právo 19 December 1989: 7.

<sup>174</sup> "SSSR – ES: Dohoda o spolupráci," Rudé právo 19 December 1989: 7.

38) Náš první prezident napsal: Ježíš, nikoli Caesar. Navazoval tím na Chelčického i Komenského. Dnes tato idea v nás opět ožila. Troufám si říct, že snad dokonce máme možnost šířit ji dál a vnést tak do evropské i světové politiky nový prvek. Z naší země budeme-li chtít, může už natrvalo vyzařovat láska, touha po porozumění, síla ducha a myšlenky. Jsme malá země, ale přesto jsme byli kdysi duchovní křižovatkou Evropy. Proč bychom se jí opět nemohli stát? Nebyl by to další vklad, jímž bychom mohli oplácet jiným pomoc, kterou budeme od nich potřebovat?

Our first President wrote: Jesus, not Caesar. In this manner he adhered to both Chelčický and Komenský. Nowadays, this idea has been revived. I dare to say that we may even have the possibility to spread it further and thus enrich European and world politics with a new aspect. If we wish so, love, desire for understanding, power of spirit and thought can radiate from our country eternally. We are only a small country but, despite that, once we used to be spiritual crossroads of Europe. Why can't we regain this position? Wouldn't that be another gift in which could repay others the help we will need from them?<sup>175</sup>

39) Hovoří se o návratu Československa do Evropy? Co si pod tím představujete?

Skutečné otevření se světu. Záleží nám na rozvoji vzájemně výhodné hospodářské spolupráce se všemi zeměmi světa. Mnohem hlubší a efektivnější musí být v RVHP. Klademe důraz na navázání kontaktů s Evropskými společenstvími, máme zájem o konkrétní spolupráci s ostatními zeměmi. Ekonomická spolupráce předpokládá dobré vztahy v politické a kulturní oblasti. Podílet se na budování společného evropského domu v zájmu míru a přátelství mezi národy, v zájmu lidí žijících na našem kontinentě i v celém světě - to je základem naší politiky. Odstraňování zátarasů na společných hranicích s NSR a Rakouskem, to je začátek a symbol našeho postupu, začátek hospodářského a politického procesu navrácení se do náruče svobodných evropských národů.

The return of Czechoslovakia to Europe is being discussed. How do you understand the process?

To be really open to the world. We really care about the development of mutually beneficial economic co-operation with all world countries. It must be much deeper and more effective in the CMEA. We stress the establishment of contacts with the European Community, we are interested in co-operation with other countries. Economic co-operation assumes good relations in politics and culture. The foundation of our politics is to participate in the building of a Common European House in the interest of peace, friendship amongst nations, in the interest of people living on in our continent and in the world. The removal of barriers on the borders between our country, Germany and Austria is the starting point and the symbol of

<sup>175</sup> "Novoroční projev presidenta ČSSR," Rudé právo 2 Jan. 1990: 1, 3.

our progress, the beginning of economic and political process of the return to the arms of free European nations.<sup>176</sup>

#### 40) Švédsko vstupuje na most do Evropy

Náměstek švédské ministryně zahraničí říká: Musíme [ . . . ] překročit určité mosty.

#### Sweden Steps onto a Bridge to Europe

The Swedish Deputy Foreign minister says: We must [...] cross certain bridges.<sup>177</sup>

#### 41) Východní Evropa chce posilovat vztahy se Západoevropskou unií

Smyslem fóra sice bylo rozvinout vztahy zemí bývalého východního bloku se ZEU jako budoucím politicko-bezpečnostním pilířem Evropy [ . . . ].

#### Eastern Europe Wants to Strengthen Relations with the Western European Union

The purpose of the forum was to develop relations between the former Eastern bloc countries with WEU as the future political and safety pillar of Europe [ . . . ].<sup>178</sup>

42) Bude-li Západ příliš dlouho váhat s integrací postkomunistických zemí do svých demokratických struktur, může se po nějaké době pouze divit. Démoni, kteří nebudou spoutáni na Východě, proniknou záhy i na Západ. A celá Evropa tím promarní historickou šanci stát se poprvé kontinentem mírové spolupráce všech [ . . . ].

If the West hesitates too long with the integration of post communist countries into its democratic structures, it can only wonder after some time. The demons not bound in the East can before long also penetrate the West. And the whole of Europe will waste a historical chance to become for the first time a continent of the peace co-operation of all [ . . . ].<sup>179</sup>

#### 43) “Ne” ústavě zavřelo Albáncům dveře do Evropy”

A “No” to the constitution closed the Door to Europe for the Albanians<sup>180</sup>

#### 44) Pohublí dotěrové před branami

<sup>176</sup> “Otevřít se světu, Rozhovor se předsedou vlády ČSSR M. Čalfou, ” Rudé právo 2 Jan. 1990: 1 – 2.

<sup>177</sup> Ivana Štěpánková, “Švédsko stupuje na most do Evropy/ Je neutralita Stockholmu pružná?, ” MF Dnes, 12 March 1992: 9.

<sup>178</sup> “Východní Evropa chce posilovat vztahy se Západoevropskou unií,” MF Dnes 21 May 1993: 8.

<sup>179</sup> Michal Mocek, “Václav Havel vyzval Západ k větší odvaze,” MF Dnes 31 Oct. 1995:8.

<sup>180</sup> Luboš Palata, “Ne ústavě zavřelo Albáncům dveře do Evropy,” MF Dnes 15 Nov. 1994: 9.

A tak Česko stejně jako ostatní chudí uchazeči stanovené podmínky postupně plní [. . .] na krásná slova o Evropě bez hranic se v praktické politice nehraje .

#### Skinny Pests in front of the Gates

And for that reason Czechia, together with all other poor candidates, fulfils gradually all of the set conditions [. . .] a game with grand words about Europe without borders is not played in everyday politics. <sup>181</sup>

45) [. . .] dlouhé čekání před branami je demotivující [. . .] .

[. . .] a long wait in front of the *gates* is demotivating [. . .]. <sup>182</sup>

46) Chceme, chceme k vám

Chce unie přibrat nové chudé členy, nebo nechce? [. . .] Nyní Pevnost Evropa hrozí monitoringem, tresty a pokutami. A v našem bytostném národním zájmu je - byť ponížený - vstup. Vaše práva budou nejméně sedm let okleštěna – s tresty začneme hned.

#### We Really Do Want to Join You

Does the union want to take on new poor members or not? [. . .] At present Fortress Europe threatens monitoring, punishment and sanctions. And it is in our fundamental national interest to enter - although humbly. Your right will be curtailed for at least seven years - punishments will be introduced immediately. <sup>183</sup>

47) Se zájmem jsem přečetl článek [. . .] Nechají nás Irové před branami?.

I read an article [. . .] Will the Irish let us stand in front of the gates? with interest. <sup>184</sup>

48) Verheugen: Letošní hodnocení kandidátů neoznačí premianty

Verheugen: This Year's Evaluation of Candidates Will not Identify the Star Pupils <sup>185</sup>

49) [. . .] elaborát evropských komisařů je pro Českou republiku [. . .] dobrým vysvědčením.

[. . .] the concoction by the European commissioners is a good school report for the Czech Republic [. . .]. <sup>186</sup>

<sup>181</sup> Tomáš Lokost: „Pohublí dotěrové před branami,” Právo 9 June 2000: 6.

<sup>182</sup> Helena Landovská, „Védřin vhodil kámen do vod před Laeken,” Právo 23 Nov. 2001:

8.

<sup>183</sup> Petr Kamberský, „Chceme, chceme k vám,” MF Dnes 27 July 2002: A6.

<sup>184</sup> Jan Zahradil, „Jsem pro smlouvu z Nice,” Právo 11 Nov. 2002: 6.

<sup>185</sup> Verheugen, „Letošní hodnocení kandidátů neoznačí premianty,” Právo 6 Nov. 2001.

50) Reparáty asi nehrozí, nedostatky se ale trpět nebudou.

There May Not Be Any Threat of Re-sits but Imperfections Will Not Be Tolerated.<sup>187</sup>

51) Evropa je bezmocná i v Bosně

Evropa je tváří v tvář válce [. . .] stále bezmocnější.[. . .] Evropa se zmožila jen na vyslání pozorovatelské mise [. . .] . Evropa snad ani nemohla na rozdíl od Ameriky oslnit velkolepými vojenskými operacemi [. . .] . Evropa ví, že její zájmy se na Balkáně střetávají.

Europe also Powerless in Bosnia

Europe facing the war [. . .] is constantly more powerless . [. . .] Europe managed only to send observer missions [. . .] . Europe possibly could not [. . .] compared to America dazzle with grand military operations [. . .] . Europe knows that her interests meet in the Balkans.<sup>188</sup>

52) Evropa stojí na rozcestí

Jedním z největších úkolů Evropy v novém roce 1996 je definitivně ukončit válku v Bosně [. . .].

Europe on the Crossroads

One of the biggest tasks for Europe to achieve in the new year 1996 is to finally end the war in Bosnia [. . .].<sup>189</sup>

53) Albánie je v agonii, Evropa si opět neví rady

Vypělá Evropa na svých summitech sní o nerozděleném kontinentu, jednotlivé státy však nezřídka zvažují i sebemenší prostředky, které by měly obětovat na oltář sjednocení. Ve stejné chvíli malá země na okraji evropského zájmu nabízí této sebestřednosti, která často nevidí dál na než píď za hranice unie, zrcadlo.[. . .] Také vinou nedostatečného zájmu Evropy se stává obrazem bídy, utrpení a hrůzy.[. . .] On i mnozí další dávají agonii Albánie do souvislosti se souhrou několika nepříznivých faktorů [ mezi kterými je i ] nedostatečná péče „zbytku“ Evropy. [. . .] Evropa sice doporučila zemi tržní hospodářství [. . .] nestarala se už však o to, jak se to vše uskutečňuje. Ani dvě nejvyspělejší země v sousedství, Řecko a Itálie, pak podle Rupnika nesehrály tu roli, kterou měly sehrát [. . .]. Zdá se, že unie je znovu zoufale neschopná vyřešit krizi před svými dveřmi. [. . .] Některé země [. . .] neprojevují ani ten nejmenší zájem o tento problém na jihovýchodním boku Evropy.

<sup>186</sup> Martin Hekrdla, “Co Brusel nemusel,” *Právo* Nov. 2001: 5.

<sup>187</sup> Helena Landovská, “Kandidátské země zůstanou dál pod drobnohledem Unie,” *Právo* 7 Oct. 2002: 9.

<sup>188</sup> Petr Pravda, “Evropa je bezmocná i v Bosně,” *MF Dnes* 13 April 1992: 9.

<sup>189</sup> Petr Pravda, “Evropa stojí na rozcestí,” *MF Dnes* 2 Jan. 1996.

<http://mfdnes.newtonit.cz>, online, 7 May 2002.

### Albania in Agony, Europe Is at the End of Her Wits Again

Advanced Europe dreams about an undivided continent on her summits but individual countries often carefully think about even the smallest resources they could sacrifice on the altar of unity. At the same time a small country on the edge of the European interest points a mirror to its self-centredness, often unable to see beyond the Union borders. [. . .] Also, due to the lack of interest in Europe, it becomes a picture of poverty, suffering, and dismay . [. . .] He and many others put Albania in connection with a coincidence of several unfavourable factors [amongst which is also] unsatisfactory care from “the rest of Europe”. [. . .] Although Europe recommended the establishment of a market economy for the country [. . .] she did not care how this was implemented. Not even the two most advanced countries in the neighbourhood, Greece and Italy, according to Rupnik, played the role they should have [. . .] . It looks like the Union is yet again desperately unable to solve the crisis in front of its door. Some countries [. . .] do not show even the slightest interest in the problem on the south-east side of Europe.<sup>190</sup>

### 54) Evropa bližší než soused

Zdánlivě na míle vzdálený vstup České republiky do Evropské unie bude daleko větším vpádem do života každého občana. [. . .] Přihlášku do Evropské unie podáme v roce 1996. [. . .] Jsme tedy snad za půlí cesty, na jejímž počátku bylo heslo Zpátky do Evropy. [. . .] Je těžké milovat nebo nenávidět Brusel, protože je to pro nás stále abstraktní pojem.[. . .] proto vstup do Evropské unie pocítí každá rodina [. . .] . Argumenty pro a proti Evropě se určitě střetnou v kampani před volbami 1996 [. . .] .

### Europe Is Closer Than Your Neighbour

The entry of the Czech Republic into the European Union, which seems to be miles away, will be a much bigger incursion into every citizen's life. [. . .] We will submit our application to the EU in 1996. [. . .] Hopefully we've walked more than half of the way that started with the slogan Back to Europe. [. . .] It is difficult to love or hate Brussels as it is still an abstract concept for us. [. . .] therefore each family will be aware of joining the European Union . [. . .] Arguments for and against Europe will certainly clash in the campaign before 1996 elections [. . .].<sup>191</sup>

55) Největších zisků docílily [. . .] strany, které svou kampaň postavily na jednoznačném postoji k Evropské unii . [. . .] „Zřetelné stanovisko, které zaujali jak socialisté, tak lidovci v otázce Evropy [. . .].“

The highest scores were achieved by[. . .] parties founding their campaigns on an unambiguous attitude towards the European Union .[. . .] “The clear point of view taken by both the Socialist and the People's Party in the issue of Europe [. . .].”<sup>192</sup>

<sup>190</sup> Petr Pravda, Luboš Palata, “Albánie je agonii, Evropa si opět neví rady,” *MF Dnes* 30 June 1997, , <http://mfdnes.newtonit.cz>, online, 7 May 2002.

<sup>191</sup> Petr Šabata, “Evropa bližší než soused,” *MF Dnes* 31 Dec 1994:12.

<sup>192</sup> “Parlamentní volby polarizují Švýcarsko,” *MF Dnes*, 23 October 1995: 9.

56) Jeho země podle něj nechce být závorou na dveřích evropské pevnosti.

His country, according to him, does not want to be the latch on the door of the European fortress.<sup>193</sup>

57) Dodal, že se vstupem ČR do EU by mělo být jasně řečeno, že nemohou být z tohoto zákona žádné právní účinky, jež odporují evropskému duchu.

He added that, in connection with the CR's entry into the EU, it should be stated clearly that this law couldn't have any legal impact contradicting European spirit.<sup>194</sup>

58) Pokud jde o Rusko, shodli jsme se [. . .] , že je třeba dát Moskvě jasně najevo, že ji nemíníme vyhánět z Evropy nebo izolovat [. . .].

As far as Russia is concerned, we agreed that [. . .] it had to be made clear to Moscow that we did not intend to chase her out of Europe or isolate her [. . .].<sup>195</sup>

59) Proto Evropa (a především ty země, které mají naději na brzké přijetí do aliance) doslova odezírá z ruských úst. [. . .] Rusko [je] ochotno podepsat s aliancí exkluzivní smlouvu [. . .] přičemž přijetí tohoto dokumenty Kremlem je obecně považováno za formu ruského souhlasu s rozšířením NATO. A jaké jsou podmínky Moskvy? Smlouvy o konvenčních ozbrojených silách v Evropě.[ . . .] Co z toho plyne pro Evropu? [ . . .] Moskva se reálně, nikoliv jen demonstrativně, spojí s Čínou v jednu Západu nepřátelskou mocnost. Pozitivistický názor tvrdí: Rusko se smíří s realitou [ . . .] a výhodně koncipovaná smlouva s aliancí je ještě více přiblíží k Evropě.

Therefore Europe (and first of all the countries hoping to soon join the alliance) literally read Russian lips. [. . .] Russia [is] willing to sign an exclusive agreement with the alliance [. . .] while approval of the document by the Kremlin is generally considered to be a form of Russian agreement with NATO enlargement. And what are Moscow's conditions? Agreements on conventional armed forces in Europe. [ . . .] What are the consequences of this for Europe? [ . . .] Moscow will truly, not only demonstratively, join China to create one force hostile to the West. A positivistic view states: Russia will come to terms with reality [ . . .] and an agreement composed in a beneficial way will draw it even closer to Europe.<sup>196</sup>

60) Bojí se Evropa špatně?

<sup>193</sup> "Schüssel žádá ČR přizpůsobit zákony Froweinově zprávě," Právo 7 Oct. 2002: 9.

<sup>194</sup> "Schüssel žádá ČR přizpůsobit zákony Froweinově zprávě," Právo 7 Oct. 2002: 9.

<sup>195</sup> Luboš Palata, "Václav Havel: Doba velkých společenských gest pominula," MF Dnes 3 Nov. 1994: 7.

<sup>196</sup> Pavel Novotý, "Gesta, slůvka, narážky," Lidové noviny 11 Jan. 1997:8.

Evropa se nebojí Ruska, ale Ameriky, napsal Jiří Payne v Právu [. . .] [Solana Spojeným státům] nedoporučuje, aby instalovaly nový systém protiraketové obrany bez debaty s Evropany a Rusy [. . .] Evropě hrozí, že se bude bát – špatně. Tedy Američanů, a nikoli Rusů.

Is Europe Frightened the Wrong Way?

Europe is not frightened by Russian but by America, Jiří Payne wrote in Právo [. . .] [Solana] does not advise [the USA] to install the new system of anti-missile defence without discussion with the Europeans and Russians. [. . .] Europe faces a danger that it will be frightened the wrong way. Therefore frightened by the Americans and not the Russians.<sup>197</sup>

61) Poměrně jednoznačné vítězství italské pravice by [. . .] mohlo ovlivnit i dění v celé Evropě. [. . .] celá Evropa musí počítat s přílivem radikálních proudů [. . .] nepolitická politika [. . .] asi veřejný život Evropy neovládne [. . .] má velkou šanci na vítězství kdekoli v Evropě.

A considerably unambiguous victory of the Italian Right Wing Party could [. . .] influence life in the whole of Europe [. . .] the whole of Europe must be prepared for an influx of radical movements [. . .] the non-political politics [. . .] will probably not take control of public life in Europe [. . .] it has a big chance for a victory anywhere in Europe.<sup>198</sup>

62) [. . .] ‘společný’ evropský postoj [. . .] byl stěží něčím jiným než europeizovaným postojem Francie a Německa”

[. . .] the ‘joint’ European standpoint was hardly anything else but a europeised standpoint of France and Germany’.<sup>199</sup>

63) [. . .] členství Česka v bruselském podpůrném programu [. . .] přinese další europeizace českého filmu – ne ve smyslu europudingů, ale koprodukcí se silným národním akcentem, které umožní českých filmům cestovat do světa.

[. . .] membership of Czechia in the Brussels support programme [. . .] will bring a further europeisation of Czech films - - not in the sense of europuddings but in a sense of co-production with a strong national accent, which will allow Czech films to travel the world.<sup>200</sup>

64) Americký president George Bush ve středu prohlásil, že maltská schůzka, na jejímž uspořádání se dohodli Michaiem Gorbačovem, se v žádném případě nezmění v ‚jednání o Evropě bez Evropanů‘.

<sup>197</sup> Lubomír Zaorálek, “Bojí se Evropa špatně?”, *Právo* 1 June 2000: 6.

<sup>198</sup> Viliam Buchert, “Ovlivní Itálie celou Evropu?” *MF Dnes* 31 March 1994: 6.

<sup>199</sup> Vilém Holáň, Problémy integrace, *MF Dnes* 1 Feb.2003:12.

<sup>200</sup> Radovan Holub, Kritici Variety vyzdvihli Babí léto, *HN* 11 July 2002:10.



The American president George Bush stated on Wednesday that the Malta meeting, which he and Mikhail Gorbachev agreed upon, would certainly not change into negotiations ‘about Europe without Europeans’.<sup>201</sup>

65) [ . . . ] jsme se dostali na přiměřenou (to znamená evropskou) úroveň státního rozpočtu [ . . . ] .“

[ . . . ] we got to the adequate (this means European) level of the state budget [ . . . ] .<sup>202</sup>

66) Byl-li při teritoriálním vymezení těchto jednání vybrán právě střed Evropy, byť není přísně geografický, důvodem k tomu byla skutečnost, že to je právě místo, kde spolu hraničí dvě vojenská seskupení a kde je relativně největší vojenská koncentrace. Proto má celoevropský význam, jestliže by se právě zde v této oblasti podařilo dosáhnout dohody o snížení stavu vojsk a výzbroje. Vždyť jde o území NDR, ČSSR a Polska na jedné straně, o NSR, Belgie, Holandsko a Lucembursko na straně druhé.

If the centre of Europe was chosen, although not exactly the geographical one, when the territory of the negotiations was defined, the reason is that this is the border-line between two military alliances and the place where the relatively highest military concentration is found. Therefore it is of a European importance if agreement on the reduction of the numbers of soldiers and weapons can be found in this very location. It is the territory of the GDR, CSSR, and Poland on one side and FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg on the other.<sup>203</sup>

67) Německo a Francie podporují rozšíření ES o východní Evropu  
[ . . . ] Německo a Francie chtějí být nadále hnací silou evropského integračního procesu [ . . . ] .

Germany and France Support the Enlarging the EU to Include Eastern Europe  
[ . . . ] Germany and France want to continue as the driving force of the European integration process [ . . . ] .<sup>204</sup>

68) Paříž a Berlín chtějí euroústavu

<sup>201</sup> “G. Bush o programu maltské schůzky/ O Evropě jen s Evropany,” Mladá fronta 24 Nov. 1989: 5.

<sup>202</sup> Václav Klaus, “Mimořádně obtížný státní rozpočet (I),” Lidové noviny, 13 Sep. 1997: 9.

<sup>203</sup> Zdeněk Vilímk, “Další kolo vědeckých rozhovorů/ Ulehčit Evropskému srdci,” Rudé právo, 17 Feb. 1987:6.

<sup>204</sup> “Německo a Francie podporují rozšíření ES o východní Evropu,” MF Dnes 23 Jan. 1993: 8.

Francie a Německo se v pátek vyslovily pro vytvoření ústavy Evropské unie.[ . . . ] Nejvyšší představitelé Francie a Německa dali také najevo spokojenost [ . . . ] „Francie a Německo už nyní mají totožné stanovisko k velkému počtu těchto reforem [ . . . ].” Francie a Německo byly dlouho označovány za motor evropské integrace. Loni v prosinci na summitu EU v Nice ale vyšly najevo některé neshody mezi nimi a pozorovatelé hovořili o tom, že se motor zadrhl.

#### Paris and Berlin Want Euro - constitution

France and Germany approved the creation of the European Union constitution on Friday. [ . . . ] The highest representatives of France and Germany also showed their satisfaction [ . . . ]. “France and Germany already have identical views on a high number of these reforms [ . . . ].” France and Germany have been long denoted as the motor of the European integration. However last year at the Nice summit, some disagreements were revealed and observers commented that the motor had seized.<sup>205</sup>

69) [Praha] matka měst [ . . . ] se na čas stala těžištěm Evropy. Duchovním, kulturním i politickým. [ . . . ] Výrazný byl podíl Prahy na výstavbě Evropy duchovní. Společně se svým soupeřem Antverpami, vyzařovala Praha univerzalistické ideje opírané na tradičních kosmologických základech představy mentální i politické jednoty křesťanského světa. [ . . . ] Díky Rudolfovi se Praha na čas stala ve všech ohledech křižovatkou Evropy [ . . . ]. Pro ty, kdož potřebují i dobové motivace by to snad byla připomínka časů, kdy se za rozhodováním nejezdilo z Prahy do Bruselu, ale z Bruselu do Prahy. A o tom, že je Praha v Evropě, nikdo nepochyboval. [ . . . ] Pro ty, kdož potřebují i dobové motivace by to snad byla připomínka časů, kdy se za rozhodováním nejezdilo z Prahy do Bruselu, ale z Bruselu do Prahy. A o tom, že je Praha v Evropě, nikdo nepochyboval.”

[Prague] the mother of cities [ . . . ] temporarily became the centre of gravity of Europe. The centre of gravity of spiritual, cultural and political life. [ . . . ] Prague's share in the construction of spiritual Europe was prominent. Together with its contemporary follower, Antwerp, Prague radiated universal ideas supported by traditional cosmologic beliefs of the mental and political unity of the Christian world. [ . . . ] Thanks to Rudolf, Prague temporarily became in all aspects the crossroads of Europe [ . . . ]. For those who also need historical motivation this might be a reminder of the times when people did not travel from Prague to Brussels to take important decisions but they went from Brussels to Prague and nobody questioned that Prague was in Europe.”<sup>206</sup>

70) Téměř dvacet let byla české veřejnosti odepřena možnost každodenního styku s hodnotami, jež Prahu druhy zařadily mezi přední umělecká centra Evropy.

<sup>205</sup> “Paříž a Berlín chtějí euroústavu,” *Právo* 2001.

<sup>206</sup> Jan Krekule, “Splatí Praha dluh Rudolfovi II?,” *Právo* 4 Jan. 2003. found at: [press.avcr.cz/pd](http://press.avcr.cz/pd)

The possibility of everyday contact with those values that once ranked Prague amongst the foremost art centres of Europe has been denied to the Czech general public for almost twenty years.<sup>207</sup>

71) Houslista Václav Hudeček, který patří mezi nejznámější evropské houslové virtuozy [ . . . ].

A violin player Václav Hudeček, who belongs amongst the most famous European virtuosos [ . . . ].<sup>208</sup>

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<sup>207</sup> Dagmar Fousková, "Jízdárna Pražského hradu chce dát odpověď na otázku jaká je Tvář moderního umění." Práce 5 Jan. 1991: 4.

<sup>208</sup> "Václav Hudeček vystoupí v Ostravě," MF Dnes 4 Feb. 1997: 3.

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## A Note on Format of Writing

The format of writing and citations recommended by the MLA<sup>139</sup> as described in the MLA Handbook, fifth edition, was adopted for the thesis:

To assist readers not familiar with Czech, translations of quotations are offered. If the quotation is run into the text, single quotation marks are used around a translation immediately following the original. If a translation is set off from the text, no quotation marks are used.

Single quotation marks are used for a translation of a foreign word or a phrase that follows the original directly.

Words that are subject to the study are italicised. Also words and letters that are referred to as words and letters are italicised. Foreign words in English text, other than short quotations running no longer than four lines, are italicised. Exceptions to this rule include quotations entirely in another language which are placed in double quotation marks. Also container words emptied of their meaning are italicised.

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<sup>139</sup> Joseph Gibaldi, MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers, 5th ed, (New York: The Modern Language Association of America, 1999).