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THE POLITICAL WARFARE EXECUTIVE: A re-evaluation  
based upon the intelligence work of the German Section.

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## THE POLITICAL WARFARE EXECUTIVE: A re-evaluation based upon the intelligence work of the German Section.

Conventional interpretations regarding the role of the Political Warfare Executive during the Second World War have concentrated almost exclusively on the propaganda output of the organisation. The role of the intelligence sections working for and within the organisation have been largely disregarded or overlooked in the existing history of Executive. This thesis offers a re-evaluation of the PWE which includes this 'missing dimension', specifically here the intelligence work of the German Section of the Executive. This approach widens the scope of enquiry to include an exploration of the links between intelligence and propaganda, subversion and sabotage and considers the importance of this relationship for the way in which the PWE emerged. The examination of the Weekly Reports of the German Section identifies a different 'type' of intelligence which can be described as 'social/political' intelligence, which provided the British government with a unique view of the social and political conditions in Germany throughout the duration of the war.

The thesis concentrates on the period after the announcement of Unconditional Surrender in January 1943 to the early months on 1946, when the personnel and expertise of the German Section were transferred to the Foreign Office. The analysis of the intelligence reports of the German Section is focussed on three particular issues of interest to government at the time and to historians today. These are German resistance and public opinion, British occupational rule, and the emergence of the perception of the Russian 'threat' in Whitehall which signalled the beginning of the Cold War. Taken together these illustrate the way in which the PWE incrementally expanded its activities over this period of time, and provide the basis for the re-evaluation of the Executive.

**Pauline Elkes.**

**THE POLITICAL WARFARE EXECUTIVE:**  
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## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>CIA</b>	Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
<b>CID</b>	Committee of Imperial Defence
<b>COS</b>	Chief(s) of Staff
<b>DNB</b>	Deutsches Nachrichtenburo - German News Agency
<b>'EH'</b>	Electra House - Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries
<b>FO</b>	Foreign Office
<b>F.O.R.D</b>	Foreign Office Research Department
<b>IIC</b>	Industrial Intelligence Centre
<b>IRD</b>	Information Research Department
<b>I.S.T.D</b>	Inter-Service Topographical Department
<b>JIC</b>	Joint Intelligence (Sub-) Committee (of COS)
<b>JIS</b>	Joint Intelligence Staff
<b>JPS</b>	Joint Planning Staff (of COS)
<b>MoI</b>	Ministry of Information
<b>MEW</b>	Ministry of Economic Warfare
<b>MI5</b>	Security Service
<b>MI6</b>	Military Intelligence Service (later SIS)
<b>MID</b>	Military Intelligence Department
<b>PID</b>	Political Intelligence Department
<b>PRO</b>	Public Record Office
<b>PWD</b>	Psychological Warfare Division (of SHAEF)
<b>PWE</b>	Political Warfare Executive
<b>SIS</b>	Secret Intelligence Service
<b>SO1</b>	First (Propaganda) Division of SOE (1940-41)
<b>SO2</b>	Second (Operational) Division of SOE, after 1941 = SOE
<b>SOE</b>	Special Operations Executive
<b>WR[GPG]</b>	Weekly Report 'German Propaganda and the German'.

## CHAPTER ONE

### Introduction.

On 11th September 1941, the formation of the Political Warfare Executive<sup>1</sup> was announced in the House of Commons.<sup>2</sup> Little information was given, and answers were refused on grounds of secrecy.<sup>3</sup> This new department was established to conduct all forms of political warfare 'against enemy, satellite and occupied countries'.<sup>4</sup> The specific intention was 'to undermine and destroy the morale of the enemy, and to sustain and foster the spirit of resistance in enemy-occupied countries'.<sup>5</sup> Working in conjunction with the Special Operations Executive<sup>6</sup>, the dual strategy adopted was to 'create fear, doubt and confusion in the minds of the enemy' on the home- and battle-front,<sup>7</sup> whilst simultaneously 'persuading Europe to participate in its own liberation'.<sup>8</sup>

The formation of the PWE was the result of the decision to separate the operations of SOE which had been set up in July, 1940 when Winston Churchill had given Hugh Dalton then Minister of Economic Warfare, the task of 'setting Europe ablaze' using

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<sup>1</sup>Hereafter PWE.

<sup>2</sup>Hansard 11th September, 1941. Column 294.

<sup>3</sup>R. H. B. Lockhart, *Comes The Reckoning*. (London: Putnam, 1947) p. 126.

<sup>4</sup>Michael Balfour, *Propaganda in War, 1939-1945. Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany*. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979). p. 91.

<sup>5</sup>Lockhart, *Comes The Reckoning*. p. 125.

<sup>6</sup>Hereafter SOE.

<sup>7</sup>John Baker-White, *The Big Lie*. (London: Evans Brothers Ltd., 1955) p. 59.

<sup>8</sup>Michael M. Stenton, 'British Propaganda and Political Warfare 1940-44: A Study of British Views on how to Address Occupied Europe'. Unpublished Ph.d Thesis. (Cambridge 1980). p. 3.

sabotage and subversion.<sup>9</sup> The establishment of SOE had been a direct response to the fall of France in the summer of 1940 and the recognition in Whitehall that subversion was a potentially important means of warfare alongside the more 'traditional' instruments of war provided by the military, naval and air forces. In May, 1940, the Chiefs of Staff had identified subversion as an important weapon with air bombardment and economic blockade as the instruments of war that, used together, could give Britain a hope of changing the situation to her advantage<sup>10</sup> In *SOE in France*, M.R.D. Foot illustrates the importance attached to this 'irregular' warfare in Whitehall when he points out that the British strategic situation was so desperate that high hopes were placed in the new executive, and sabotage and subversion, alongside sea blockade and air bombardment were indeed seen as the main devices for bringing Germany down.<sup>11</sup> At this time SOE was responsible for all subversion and 'black' propaganda activities, and identified as a potential 'Fourth Arm' with an independent strategic role comparable with the army, navy or air force.

At the beginning of the war with Germany the principle behind British propaganda had been based upon the recognition that, 'every state leadership, be it democratic, authoritarian, or totalitarian, requires a certain degree of acclamation to exercise power in the long run'.<sup>12</sup> British propaganda, both 'black' and 'white', sought to split public opinion in Germany and destroy the consensus, and therefore the requisite consent, for Hitler to remain in power. This would be achieved through a strategy of projecting a picture of the British liberal democratic way of life as the 'good' way, and identifying the authoritarian dictatorial methods and practices of the Nazi regime as the 'bad' way. One of the most important distinctions which Government felt it

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<sup>9</sup>Churchill's legendary instruction to Dalton. Balfour, *Propaganda in War*. p.90.

<sup>10</sup> See J.M.A. Gwyer and J.R.M. Butler, *Grand Strategy. Volume III, Part I, July 1941 - August 1942*. (London: HMSO 1964) p. 42.

<sup>11</sup>Michael R.D. Foot, *SOE in France*. (London: HMSO, 1966). p. 9.

<sup>12</sup> Marlis G. Steinert, *Hitler's War and The Germans: Public Mood and Attitude During the Second World War*. Edited and Translated by Thomas E. J. Witt. (Athens, Ohio USA : Ohio University Press 1977). p. 1.

should make in their appeal to the German people was that the British people acknowledged and valued the existence of 'two' Germanys, and that the British Government would support the efforts of the German people to challenge, reject or overthrow the Nazi regime.

A changing sequence of events at national and international levels during 1940 and 1941 culminated, however, in a change in attitude towards the German people and the emergence of a distinctive Allied strategy and policy towards Germany. It also resulted in a re-appraisal of the concept of subversion and the importance of SOE as a 'Fourth Arm' which was eventually resolved by the break-up of SOE and the birth of the PWE.

The first influential factor was the changing international situation. The conflict was no longer confined to a war with Germany in which Britain was the only other combatant. Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union on June 22nd 1941 was followed by an agreement between Churchill and Roosevelt that they would give maximum aid to Stalin in his battle against Germany. This was underwritten in the details of the Atlantic Charter which set out an Anglo-American commitment to a post-war world, pledging that Britain and the United States would act to restore sovereign rights and self-government to those countries which had been forcibly deprived of them.<sup>13</sup> In addition to Germany's attack on Russia, the Battle of Britain was also instrumental in changing public opinion towards the German people. Those willing to make the distinction between 'good' Germans and Nazis became increasingly difficult to find in Britain, and eventually the distinction disappeared from official policy in Whitehall with the setting up of the PWE in 1941.

The second factor which led to the re-appraisal of the 'Fourth Arm' concept was that the plans put forward by SOE in June and re-drafted in July 1941 were flawed by

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<sup>13</sup>Martin Gilbert, *The Second World War*. Revised Edition. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989). p. 222.



serious logistic and strategic problems.<sup>14</sup> The third factor, which tied in closely with the separation of SOE activities, was the increasing interest in Whitehall concerning important advances in the techniques and potential for the use of propaganda in war. During the inter-war period the knowledge and expertise gained during World War One had increased and now incorporated the new techniques and skills available as a result of technological progress. The recognition of the limitations of subversion operations reinforced the need to use propaganda as effectively as possible. But the organisational problems and personality clashes within SOE were a serious threat to this aim, and the internal wrangling, 'dog-fighting' and damaging political rivalry had so far only served to obstruct the use of propaganda and political warfare in the war. Whilst it was understood that subversion and propaganda could still be potentially useful, if subsidiary weapons, the need to divorce propaganda operations from subversion activities was recognised. Within weeks of the JPS judgement on SOE operations, propaganda and political warfare activities were taken out of SOE control and established as a separate entity to be conducted by the PWE. It was intended that the two organisations would work together in that PWE would supply indoctrination material, propaganda, information, directives and other materials and SOE would organize and operate the agents in the field and be responsible for transport, security and other necessary operational functions. In theory this appears to be quite logical and an effective use of resources. In practice SOE and PWE found it almost impossible to work together.<sup>15</sup>

There has been no shortage of opinions about the efficiency and value of the work of the PWE, including many from individuals involved in the organisation and related departments. As already mentioned above, the relationship between the PWE and SOE was difficult from the very beginning. In a thesis concerned with British propaganda and political warfare during the period 1940-1944, Michael Stenton describes the relationship between SOE and PWE as based on the absolute need for

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<sup>14</sup>Gwyer and Butler, *Grand Strategy*. Vol.III. pp. 42-48.

<sup>15</sup> See M.R.D. Foot, *SOE in France*. Balfour, *Propaganda in War*. Charles Cruickshank, *Special Operations Executive in Scandinavia: The Official History*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

co-operation between the two organisations if either were to have any chance of success. Unfortunately, as Stenton concludes, co-operation was not to be a feature of their relationship and, 'long before they were in a position to do the enemy much damage with their political warfare, PWE and SOE had commenced operations against each other'.<sup>16</sup> These 'operations' were, however, only a small part of the ensuing 'major inter-department ...battle about the control of propaganda'.<sup>17</sup> A battle which SOE ultimately lost. The denigratory and dismissive opinions of the PWE by those working in SOE serves to illustrate the bitterness between the departments.

The Chief Organiser for SOE, Flemming Muus, obviously had no regard for the work of the PWE and argued that not only was a huge amount of propaganda 'wasted totally', but that it was also sometimes counter-productive. He firmly believed that the only 'propaganda' the German understood was bullets and high explosives which spoke louder than words.<sup>18</sup> One of the major problems between the two organisations was that some SOE members believed the propagandists were less security-minded than they should be and that this could lead the Gestapo to the saboteurs. Others within SOE dismissed the propagandists as 'the froth and bubble on the surface of resistance ... the glamour boys'.<sup>19</sup>

However, William Casey, as Chief of Secret Intelligence for General Eisenhower's European operations working with both SOE and PWE, rejects these conclusions claiming that 'the propaganda produced by the PWE was some of the slickest of the war and often drew admiration from the old German master himself - Dr. Paul Joseph

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<sup>16</sup>Stenton, 'British Propaganda and Political Warfare..' p.2. *See also* Charles Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm : Psychological Warfare, 1938-1945*. (London: Davis-Poynter, 1977).

<sup>17</sup> M.R.D.Foot, 'Was SOE Any Good?'. *Journal of Contemporary History* 16 (January,1981). pp.167-181.

<sup>18</sup>F. Muus cited in Charles Cruickshank, *Special Operations Executive in Scandinavia*. (Oxford:1986). p. 220.

<sup>19</sup>Turnbull cited in Cruickshank,Ibid.

Goebbels'.<sup>20</sup> As to the accusations of the 'glamour' of the PWE, Casey describes SOE as 'the most swashbuckling of the British organizations' with its own problem of 'image', particularly in the eyes of the European governments-in-exile, who 'were appalled when Special Operations pulled acts of sabotage that had little military significance and led only to brutal German reprisals.'<sup>21</sup>

The disagreements about the PWE were not always conducted in private, and the sensitivities of those involved in political warfare activities were illustrated by the following correspondence and the forum in which the discussion took place. In an open 'debate' conducted in The Times in the summer of 1973, concerning the effectiveness of the PWE in the use of subversion and 'black' propaganda during World War Two, Richard Crossman, who worked for the PWE, claimed that 'subversive operations and black propaganda were the only aspects of war at which we achieved real pre-eminence'.<sup>22</sup> In an angry reply George Martinelli, who was Head of the Italian Section, replied,

'Reading Richard Crossman's article of May 16, I was once again reminded that he never loses an opportunity of cracking up the propaganda services in which he worked during the war and ended up as chief. It is thus that a myth has been constructed almost to the point where we are asked to believe that Mr. Crossman won the war practically single-handed. .. his latest effusion on the subject ... is such outrageous and dangerous nonsense that I cannot allow it to pass without comment'.<sup>23</sup>

Martinelli argued that for the three years he worked for the PWE he had yet to see any evidence that the results achieved 'were more than minimal'; no doubt because 'the truth, as Winston Churchill knew, is that propaganda only becomes effective

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<sup>20</sup> William Casey, *The Secret War Against Hitler*. (London: Simon and Schuster 1990). p. 27.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid. p.26.

<sup>22</sup>The Times. Wednesday May 16th 1973.

<sup>23</sup>The Times. Monday June 4th, 1973.

when the enemy knows he is beaten, and then it is a useful auxiliary but no more'. In conclusion he added 'the whole of the Woburn Abbey set-up ... was a gigantic waste of human effort and public money'. This attack on the PWE brought forth an immediate reply from Lord Ritchie Calder, Director of Plans and Operations of the PWE. In this reply, also published in The Times, Calder took both Martinelli to task over his description of the operations at Woburn, which he hotly disputed, and Crossman for the claim of 'pre-eminence' of the PWE. Calder argued that any conclusions about the effectiveness of the PWE were extremely difficult to make, but added 'We were on the whole more efficient than others'.<sup>24</sup>

The history of the PWE has been recorded as the history of a department established for, and concerned solely with, the invention and implementation of propaganda campaigns in a supporting role to hasten the end of World War Two. Importantly, the historiography of the PWE has been dominated either by those involved in the PWE and related departments<sup>25</sup>, or by the 'official' historians of the British Government and post-war biographies of those involved<sup>26</sup>, all of which offer a consensus about the role of the PWE. This consensus is based upon the premise that the PWE was only involved in political warfare activities to support the Allied

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<sup>24</sup>The Times. Monday June 11, 1973.

<sup>25</sup>See : Lockhart, *Comes The Reckoning*. Balfour, *Propaganda in War*. M. R. D. Foot, *SOE in France*. M. R. D. Foot, *European Resistance to Nazism, 1940-1945*. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977). Baker-White, 1955. Patrick Beesley, *Very Special Intelligence*. (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1977). Charles Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm: Psychological Warfare, 1938-45*. (London: Davis-Poynter, 1977). Charles Cruickshank, *Deception in World War Two*. (Oxford 1979). Ellic Howe, *The Black Game: British Subversive Operations Against The Germans During The Second World War*. (London: Michael Joseph, 1982). Ronald Seth, *The Truth Benders*. (London: Leslie Frewin 1969). Hugh Dalton, *The Fateful Years: Memoirs, 1931-1945*. (London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1957). Anthony Eden, *The Reckoning*. (London: Cassell, 1965).

<sup>26</sup>J. M. A. Gwyer and J. R. M. Butler (Eds). *Grand Strategy. Volume III Part I, Volume III Part II*. (HMSO 1964). Ben Pimlott, *The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1940 - 1945*. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986). Tam Dalyell, *Dick Crossman*. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1989). John Charmley, *Duff Cooper: The Authorized Biography*. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1986).

military forces in bringing about the defeat of Germany. The two most influential authors underpinning this consensus are Michael Balfour and Charles Cruickshank. In *The Fourth Arm*, for instance, Charles Cruickshank concluded that British propaganda had not been used as effectively as it could have been because the government had failed to prepare plans for an 'efficient propaganda department'. The reasons for this failure are attributed to the Foreign Office who wanted to preserve their 'empire', the desire of the 'mandarins of Whitehall' who all wanted to put off the 'evil day when Britain would have to contemplate engaging in foreign propaganda' and the failure to establish a single department concerned with subversion in all its aspects.<sup>27</sup>

Michael Balfour in *Propaganda in War, 1939-1945*, goes much further in his explanations for the failure of British propaganda. For Balfour, Germany's defeat was a military one, brought about by the failure of Nazi strategy and politics. He makes the point that in the closing months of the war the 'Government and people made a remarkable effort in the face of heavy odds', still resisting until the bitter end and proving, for Balfour, that 'British propaganda to Germany must therefore be said to have failed'.<sup>28</sup> However, the importance of Balfour's conclusion is that he lays the blame for the failure of British propaganda on the Allied policy of Unconditional Surrender in 1943 and argues that the failure of propaganda must be attributed to this 'notoriously controversial decision' and not to any lack of skill on the part of the propagandists.<sup>29</sup>

Both Balfour and Cruickshank illustrate the assumptions about the potential power of propaganda which existed then and, to a lesser extent, today: Balfour by arguing that had the PWE been allowed to offer the German people concessions in order to bring about a surrender by political means that it may have been successful, and Cruickshank by suggesting that decisive government action in the re-organisation of

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<sup>27</sup>Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm*. pp. 177-179.

<sup>28</sup>Balfour, *Propaganda in War*. p. 438.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

political warfare may also have given the PWE a better chance of success. Secondly, from Balfour's conclusion it follows logically that the announcement at Casablanca in 1943 and later the inevitability of a German military defeat must have reduced the importance of the work of the PWE, which then became less important in direct proportion to the military successes of the Allied forces. Finally, the focus on the propaganda output as the *only* basis for the analysis of the PWE has resulted in the overly simplistic conclusion that the PWE failed because the propaganda output was subsequently judged to have failed.

There are a number of problems with these conclusions. The first is that they are based on the premise that the effects of propaganda can be identified and measured. But, the impact of propaganda on human behaviour cannot be easily assessed, and attempts to produce a scientific and quantifiable measurement of the impact of propaganda on social and psychological attitudes and behaviour have so far been limited in success. Secondly, the argument that if government organisation and Allied policy had been different then propaganda may have been successful is highly debatable. If government organisation for propaganda and the Allied policy of 'Unconditional Surrender' had been changed, and the war ended earlier, it would still remain a formidable task to assess the importance of propaganda in the complex conditions that together contributed to the ending of the war. This does not detract completely from the force of Balfour's argument, but it is important to see how it serves to marginalise the other activities in which the PWE was engaged which have not been adequately considered in the historiography.

This brings us to the central problem, which is the focus on the PWE as an organisation which was *only* involved in propaganda activities, and the omission in the evaluation of the Executive of the specialist 'intelligence' sections working for and within the organisation. There does exist in the literature some reference to the intelligence work of the PWE, but it is found within the history only in terms of the supporting role it played opposite the propagandists in the context of the charter it was given in 1941. There has, to date, been no research which has focussed on the intelligence work of the PWE, and the way in which this intelligence work acted to

expand and diversify the activities of the PWE beyond the narrow confines of propaganda and political warfare to end the war.

This is the 'missing dimension' in the history of the PWE, and the omission is important because, as Andrew points out, 'any analysis of government policy, particularly on foreign affairs and defence, which leaves intelligence out of the account is bound to be incomplete'.<sup>30</sup> There are a number of reasons for this omission. As we have seen, the limitations of the analysis of 'traditional' historians has focussed primarily on the propaganda activities of the Executive. Added to this, the political constraints existing in the national security atmosphere of the Cold War resulted in a restriction of access to the intelligence archives which were fundamental to any research activity. The 'official' history of the British intelligence services, *British Intelligence in The Second World War*,<sup>31</sup> cites four sources from which Britain gained her intelligence : physical contact in the form of captured documents; the censorship of mail and interrogation of prisoners; espionage and aerial reconnaissance; and Signals intelligence (Sigint). The intelligence produced by the PWE is not to be found in the 'official' history.

In the last fifteen years, however, the situation has changed dramatically. Events in Britain and America in the mid-1970s led to an intense interest in the clandestine activities of governments and this has been aided by an emergent 'open' approach by government to archival material containing the previously restricted and necessary documents and information for research. However, in Britain the problems of researching a department designated and functioning as 'secret' is still problematic because of the very nature of the activity which often led to documents being destroyed, the location of surviving documents and, finally this is compounded by

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<sup>30</sup>Christopher Andrew, *Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community*. (London: Heinemann, 1985) p. xvi.

<sup>31</sup>F. H. Hinsley, *British Intelligence in The Second World War. Volumes I and II*. (London: HMSO 1981).

the current government restrictions on papers relating to the PWE.<sup>32</sup>

Nevertheless, the study of intelligence is now a firmly established area of study in the academic community, and the rapid expansion of intelligence studies has led to the conclusion that an 'intelligence revolution'<sup>33</sup> has (or is still) taking place.

In *Espionage: Past, Present, Future?* Wesley Wark outlines the parameters of the field of intelligence studies responsible for this 'revolution', identifying the many different inter-related areas of study each with their own community of scholars, research agendas and problems.<sup>34</sup> The inter-disciplinary nature of the field which incorporates academics from the disciplines of history, political science, social science and international relations has, however, resulted in a lack of orthodoxy and the absence, to date, of a general theory or approach to the study of intelligence. Wark makes a significant point concerning this new field of study when he argues that the perennial question about proof of significance will be central to the future of intelligence studies, and more research funding and new scholars moving into the field are vital if it is not to 'die from lack of sustenance'.<sup>35</sup>

The revision of the history of the PWE in this thesis will seek to make a contribution to the intelligence revolution not least because the intelligence produced by the Executive, which can be identified as social/political intelligence, is a different 'type' of intelligence and therefore also a 'missing dimension' within the existing field of

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<sup>32</sup>CAB102/610 is still retained under Section 3(4). CAB 81/87-136 (JIC documents) released in April, 1995 are very heavily weeded, in some cases whole files are still retained under Section 3(4). Requests for information from Lockhart's relatives have also received a negative response.

<sup>33</sup>Wesley K. Wark (Ed.), *Espionage: Past, Present, Future?* (Essex: Frank Cass, 1994). p. 2. John Lewis Gaddis, 'Intelligence, Espionage and Cold War Origins', *Diplomatic History*, 13 (Spring, 1989).pp. 191-212. p. 191.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. Introduction.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. p. 8.



intelligence studies.<sup>36</sup> The history of the PWE has not previously been included in the area of intelligence studies, and there are two reasons for this omission. The majority of academics working in intelligence studies have been guided in their research by the theorists working on foreign policy studies in the disciplines of Politics and International Relations. Subversive and political warfare organisations exist within what is perceived to be a secondary or less important area of foreign policy studies, and this has led to their marginalisation and almost exclusion in both foreign policy and intelligence studies. The second problem is the difficulty of identifying the links between subversion and political warfare and intelligence. The need for the revision of the history of the PWE, and the reasons for the invisibility of its intelligence operations, can be understood by looking at these two issues.

Addressing the first problem, the location of the PWE within the governmental framework for foreign policy-making in Whitehall will identify why it has been overlooked by academics in the disciplines of International Relations and Politics, and also therefore in intelligence studies. In broad terms the foreign-policy activity of government can be identified as being located into four areas or components. These are political, security, economic and cultural components, and all four components of foreign policy have their own intelligence services.<sup>37</sup> The instruments available to governments to implement the cultural component of foreign policy are information, disinformation, propaganda, psychological warfare and political warfare. These instruments can be used alone or in a variety of combinations, almost always with other elements of the other three components, in order to pursue foreign policy objectives in both peacetime and during periods of war. Propaganda, which has a long history as part of the cultural component of foreign policy, is the mechanism for conducting relations with other states, as well as influencing opinion on the domestic

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid. See also Wesley Wark, *The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939*. (London: I.B.Taurus & Co. Ltd., 1985). Michael Handel, 'The Politics of Intelligence', *Intelligence and National Security*. 2 (1987).pp. 5-46.

<sup>37</sup>Foreign policy studies have concentrated research mainly on the political and security and to a lesser degree on the economic, components almost to the exclusion of the cultural component. Thus within intelligence studies, the intelligence element of the cultural component has also been excluded.

scene. It is concerned with the desires, aims and objectives of government, and thus society, attempting to influence, or in extreme situations such as war, to force their ideas, values and beliefs on to another society.<sup>38</sup> In the Second World War the PWE was one organisation established by the government to pursue these aims.

The reason why the PWE is still missing from the field of intelligence studies is that of all the four components which have been identified as specific categories of foreign policy the cultural component is the one area which suffers from a lack of academic interest. Foreign policy studies concentrate on the political, security and to a more limited extent on the economic dimensions of foreign policy, almost to the total exclusion of the cultural dimension. This is no doubt a reflection of the political climate of the Cold War years when national security issues dominated international relations, but is also a result of the idea that 'cultural' components of governmental policy were the concern of those studying international communications, media theorists and the comparatively new field of cultural studies. The concentration in foreign policy studies on the political and security components has also been emulated by the field of intelligence studies, who therefore also exclude the intelligence work of those involved in the cultural dimensions of foreign policy.

A further problem surrounds the difficulty of understanding the relationship between propaganda, political warfare and intelligence. The hidden dynamics of this relationship has been an important factor in complicating the analysis of the decision-making process and the way in which intelligence impacts upon that process. The way in which foreign policy is made and the 'secrecy' surrounding the intelligence services means that it is incredibly difficult to ascertain the contribution of intelligence to any policy outcome and such is the ambiguity surrounding the relationship that it is 'practically impossible to distinguish between policy-making on the one hand and

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<sup>38</sup>Ufote B. Inamete, 'The Nature and Management of the Cultural Components of Foreign Policy : A Comparative View'. Paper given at the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association. Atlanta, USA. March 1991.

intelligence input on the other'.<sup>39</sup> However, whilst it is difficult to be absolutely sure about the impact of intelligence on foreign policy, an understanding of the way in which propaganda, political warfare and intelligence operations exist in a mutually beneficial relationship can be explained and is important for the re-evaluation of the work of the PWE.

## Propaganda

The understanding of the modern term propaganda has emerged from the events of both World War One and World War Two, and today a wide variety of definitions are available.<sup>40</sup> As Gary Messinger observes, 'as sometimes used, the word seems to refer to almost any kind of systematic effort to win over an audience'.<sup>41</sup> The Oxford English Dictionary defines propaganda as 'publicity intended to spread ideas or information', whilst Collins incorporates the pragmatic 'organised dissemination of information, allegations etc. to assist or damage the cause of a government or movement'.

Propaganda can also be defined in a more sinister way as 'the presentation of

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<sup>39</sup>Michael Handel, 'The Politics of Intelligence' in *Intelligence and National Security*. 2 (1987).pp. 5-46. Handel also excludes this type of intelligence from his analysis, dealing with the army, navy and air forces only.

<sup>40</sup>See Balfour, *Propaganda in War*. Robert Jackall(Ed.), *Propaganda*. (London: Macmillan, 1995). Harold D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Techniques in The World War*. Originally published in 1927 (reprint New York: Peter Smith, 1938). J. W. Baird, *The Mythical World of Nazi Propaganda 1939-45*.(Minneapolis,USA: Minnessota Press, 1974). Z.A.B. Zeman, *Nazi Propaganda*. (Oxford University Press, 1964). John Black, *Organising the Propaganda Instrument : The British Experience*. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975). Gary S. Messinger, *British Propaganda and the State in the First World War*. (New York and Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992). Mariel Grant, *Propaganda and the Role of the State in Inter-War Britain*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). Charles Roetter, *Psychological Warfare* (London: Batsford, 1974). R.M.Christenson and R.O.McWilliams (Eds) *Voice of the People. Readings in Public Opinion and Propaganda*. 2nd Edition. (New York: Mcgraw Hill,1967).

<sup>41</sup>Messinger, *British Propaganda and the State*.. p. 9.

information in an emotionally appealing manner for a purpose that is not candidly announced, and in support of a point of view we would probably debate if we were presented with all the available facts that might bear upon the opinion and were invited to scrutinise the evidence prudently'.<sup>42</sup> It has been defined as the technique of influencing human action by the manipulation of representations'.<sup>43</sup> A more informative definition includes the aims of propaganda and the way in which is used as a policy instrument by government : 'Propaganda and information services represent ways of... organising influence and mobilising prestige to reach certain policy objectives, in alliance with the normal instruments of power'.<sup>44</sup>

### Intelligence

The problem of defining intelligence is as difficult as the problem of defining propaganda, and is , as Wesley Wark admits, a 'slippery problem'.<sup>45</sup> The English word 'intelligence' originally meant the gathering of 'news' or 'information', but as Andrew and Dilks point out the word has now taken on , as the word propaganda has, a political complexion.<sup>46</sup> One of the primary functions of intelligence is now identified as 'to obtain by covert means, and then to analyze, information which

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid. p.9

<sup>43</sup>H. D. Lasswell in Jackall, *Propaganda*. p. 13.

<sup>44</sup>D.W.Ellwood, in N. Pronay and D. W. Spring (Eds.), *Politics, Propaganda and Film. 1918-45*.(London: Macmillan, 1982) p. 51.

<sup>45</sup>Wark, *Espionage: Past, Present, Future?* p. 4. See Also Christopher Andrew, *Secret Service* (1985). Christopher Andrew and D. Dilks (Eds.), *The Missing Dimension. Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century*. (London: Macmillan, 1984). Christopher Andrew and P. Noakes, *Intelligence and International Relations 1900-1945*. (Exeter: University of Exeter 1987). Patrick Beesley, 1977. *Defence Analysis* Special Issue on Intelligence. 3 (June, 1987). F. H. Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War Vol. II and III*. Richard Langhorne (Ed.), *Diplomacy and Intelligence During the Second World War*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). John Lewis Gaddis, 'Intelligence, Espionage and Cold War Origins'. *Diplomatic History*.

<sup>46</sup>Andrew and Dilks, *The Missing Dimension*. p. 4.

policy-makers cannot acquire by more conventional methods.<sup>47</sup> According to John Lewis Gaddis intelligence is 'the open and clandestine collection of information, the organization and implementation of covert operations, and the systematic analysis of adversary intentions and capabilities'.<sup>48</sup> According to a CIA booklet, *Intelligence: The Acme of Skill*, 'Simply put, intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of the world that surrounds us'.<sup>49</sup> That knowledge and foreknowledge is gained, according to the CIA, by 'information management; gathering raw information; analyzing it; and disseminating evaluated information to decision makers, some of whom have been elected to make national security decisions'.<sup>50</sup> Thus whilst providing information, data and facts the intelligence reports also provides a 'picture' of the situation at any given moment and presents 'images' which policy makers consciously or sub-consciously draw upon in their consideration of any particular strategy or policy. Of course, the reverse also occurs, when the policy-maker disregards intelligence for any number of political, personal or strategic reasons.

### Propaganda and Intelligence

'Without intelligence there could be no propaganda : or at least no effective propaganda'.<sup>51</sup> The link between propaganda and intelligence is plain. Philip Taylor believes that 'propaganda and intelligence are different sides of the same medallion. Although they are contradictory in intent - with one devoted to secrecy and the other to publicity - in practice the distinction is rarely so clear ... official propagandists have long recognised the importance of secrecy and anonymity; practitioners of intelligence have equally long understood their connection with propaganda'.<sup>52</sup> The

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid. p. 5.

<sup>48</sup>Gaddis, 'Intelligence, Espionage and Cold War Origins. p. 191.

<sup>49</sup>James Der Derian, 'Anti-Diplomacy, Intelligence Theory and Surveillance Practice' in Wark, *Espionage: Past, Present, Future?* p. 29.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. p. 31.

<sup>51</sup>Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm*. p. 59.

<sup>52</sup>Philip M. Taylor. *International History Review*. xv,i. February 1993. p. 210-211.

fundamental aim of propaganda is to manipulate public opinion, and to influence behaviour, mood or attitudes. To do this, an accurate knowledge of the audience is an essential pre-requisite. Thus 'an exact knowledge of the prevailing climate and constellation of opinion is necessary for the successful influence of public opinion'.<sup>53</sup>

In addition to the need for an 'exact' knowledge of existing opinion, there is also a generally accepted criteria of the necessary elements for effective propaganda. According to Aldous Huxley, 'political propaganda is effective, it would seem, only upon those who are already partly or entirely convinced of its truth'.<sup>54</sup> It appears to be most effective when appealing to existing beliefs and values, and bearing some relation to reality, and 'influential only when it is a rationalisation of the desires, sentiments, prejudices and interests of those to whom it is addressed'.<sup>55</sup> On the other hand 'the limits of effectiveness were reached where propaganda ran against existing values and norms, encountered more plausible counter-propaganda (or counter-prejudice) and contradicted obvious reality and the evidence of people's own eyes'.<sup>56</sup> Discussing the potential for the successful manipulation of public opinion, Huxley concludes that 'written propaganda is less efficacious than the habits and prejudices, the class loyalties and professional interests of the readers'.<sup>57</sup>

The need for accurate and timely information about the audience in question is itemised within the criteria above for the effective use of propaganda. An accurate intelligence service to provide the required 'exact knowledge' of existing opinions and attitudes and a comprehensive knowledge of the political, social and economic

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<sup>53</sup>Steinert, *Hitler's War and the Germans*. p. 1.

<sup>54</sup>Aldous Huxley, 'Notes on Propaganda', in Christenson and McWilliams, *Voice of the People*. p. 326.

<sup>55</sup>Op.cit.

<sup>56</sup> Kershaw in David Welch, *Nazi Propaganda*. (London: Croom Helm, 1983). pp.200.

<sup>57</sup>Christenson and McWilliams, *Voice of the People*. p. 325.

situation within which opinions are formed is also necessary. Knowledge of the history, sentiments, desires and prejudices is also an important factor in the formulation or 'invention' of propaganda. Importantly, as David Welch points out, the reality of the situation or conditions of the audience is vital, as the element of 'truth' within the propaganda which will make the whole message credible to the audience. Intelligence is necessary, then, of the past, present and future aspirations and desires of the target audience.

The Ministry of Propaganda and Enlightenment recognised the fundamental links between propaganda and intelligence. In 1945, documents salvaged by the American authorities in Berlin included minutes ostensibly dictated by Goebbels as a diary and which included his 'Nineteen Principles' that appeared to underlie his propaganda plans. Principle 1 : Propagandists Must Have Access to Intelligence Concerning Events and Public Opinion. In theory Goebbels maintained that he and his associates could plan and execute propaganda only by constantly referring to existing intelligence.<sup>58</sup> Michael Balfour confirms this, pointing out that 'an essential part of any effective propaganda operation is a good intelligence service, not only to provide material for output and to guide policy, but also to supply an accurate estimate of the enemy's intentions'.<sup>59</sup>

### Political Warfare

Robert Bruce Lockhart, Director General of the PWE from 1942 - 1945, defined political warfare, incorporating propaganda, as an instrument of warfare that 'practises every form of overt and covert attack which can be called political as distinct from military. It seeks both to counter and by intelligent anticipation to forestall the political offensives of the enemy'. In addition to the use of propaganda to 'persuade' or change public opinion and behaviour, 'black' propaganda also includes what Lockhart describes as 'a whole series of secret or 'black' operations

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<sup>58</sup>Leonard W. Doob, 'Goebbels Principles of Propaganda' in Jackall, *Propaganda*. p. 193.

<sup>59</sup>Balfour, *Propaganda in War*. p. 100.

which can be suitably classified under the headings of subversion and deception'.<sup>60</sup> These operations involved providing educational information in sabotage skills such as loosening of railway lines, the manufacture of home-made bombs, extraction of poison from hedgerow plants and information about ways of producing short-lived illnesses in order to be absent from work. All this was designed to put a brake on the German economy and thus disrupt the military plans of the Nazi regime, and advance knowledge of the anticipated movements of the regime would increase the value of operations. There is evidence, however, that this policy failed and that the German economy remained strong and effective.<sup>61</sup>

### Political Warfare and Intelligence

If political warfare, in all its forms, was to have any chance of success then the PWE had to obtain information on a wide variety of issues. They required an intimate knowledge of the social and political conditions, and the latest, detailed and accurate information concerning public opinion and the 'state of mind' of people in Germany. Additionally, they needed access to particular information for the 'black' operations and activities outlined above. In short they needed to be as familiar with German society as the Germans were themselves. A huge task, and a 'new' task for the intelligence officers in the PWE. Political, military, economic and strategic intelligence was a well-established and understood function within Whitehall, whereas the nature of intelligence required by the PWE about German society was not available at the time, posing particular problems of its own.

Lockhart outlined the relationship between political warfare and intelligence when he stated that 'it demands a highly specialised intelligence service of its own and,

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<sup>60</sup>Lockhart, *Comes The Reckoning*. p. 155.

<sup>61</sup>See Tim Mason, *Nazism, Fascism and the Working Class*. Jane Caplan (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Chapter Two, 'The primacy of politics'. Richard Overy, *Why The Allies Won*. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995). Chapter Six, 'A Genius for Mass-production: Economies at War'. Noel Annan, *Changing Enemies: The Defeat and Regeneration of Germany*. (London: Harper Collins, 1995). Chapter Five, 'The Air Offensive'.



above all, an accurate estimate of the enemy's intentions'.<sup>62</sup> The importance of intelligence for the maximum gains in political warfare was expanded to include an assessment, or at least a partial idea, of the future situation. An accurate intelligence service would enable the PWE to anticipate the future moves of the enemy which could be incorporated into plans for propaganda and political warfare in order to negate, or at least create problems for the Nazi regime.

Having outlined why the revision of the history of the PWE is required it is still necessary to ask the central question of any research: 'So What?'.<sup>63</sup> So what difference will the focus on the intelligence component of the PWE make to existing knowledge? In broad terms, this 'missing dimension' is an important part of the evaluation of the PWE and as Christopher Andrew warns 'the great danger of any missing historical dimension is that its absence may distort our understanding of other, accessible dimensions'.<sup>64</sup> This is an important addition to the history of the PWE for a number of reasons. Firstly, it will contribute to an exploration of the links between intelligence and propaganda, subversion and sabotage. Secondly, the intelligence of the German Section is of a different 'type' of intelligence than previously produced in Whitehall. It is intelligence of the political and social conditions in Germany and represents a hitherto undiscovered dimension of the 'intelligence revolution'.<sup>65</sup> Directly relating to this, the content of this intelligence is useful as a source of information for those researching into the political and social history of Germany. The analysis of this intelligence will also be useful to those involved in the evaluation of British foreign policy during WWII, since it illustrates clearly the depth and breadth of information available to the policy-makers of particular issues at the time decisions were being made. Finally, the revision of the history of the PWE will

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<sup>62</sup>Ibid.

<sup>63</sup>Robin W. Winks, *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961*. (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1987). p. 63.

<sup>64</sup>Andrew and Dilks, *The Missing Dimension*. p. 1.

<sup>65</sup>Hinsley does not mention this type of intelligence, nor do any of the scholars in the field of intelligence studies to date.

identify the many different activities in which it was involved alongside propaganda, and will also trace the continuity of thinking and ideas in government after World War Two about the use of propaganda and political warfare as instruments of foreign policy.

The thesis argues that any evaluation of the PWE must be made on the basis of the nature of the work of the PWE which included, *but was not wholly comprised of*, propaganda activities. The emergence and evolution of an intelligence service to support and inform the PWE within the Executive is central to the history of the PWE. Essentially, it will show that the PWE became more and not less important after the announcement of Unconditional Surrender at Casablanca, as a result of the expansion of intelligence services at that time which facilitated a diversification of the activities in which it was involved after 1943. For this reason the thesis concentrates on the period from January, 1943 to the Spring of 1946, when on the directions of the JIC<sup>66</sup>, the intelligence operations of the PWE were transferred to the Foreign Office. An additional reason for the concentration on this period is that the sixteen-month period between the setting up of the Executive in 1941 and the end of 1942 was a period of intense internal political rivalry. It is only after the resolution of the main problems of political control that the PWE really began to expand and function in a co-ordinated way within Whitehall.

The first section of the thesis traces the evolution of government involvement in the organisation of propaganda and political warfare activities in the first half of the twentieth century from which the PWE emerged, and includes a detailed examination of the people, policies and operations of the PWE. The second section concentrates on intelligence documents of the PWE, focusing primarily on the Weekly Reports of the German Section, but also incorporating related documents produced within the PWE and the links between the PWE and the JIC. This part of the thesis will evaluate the content of the documents, not only for the particular value of the information they contain but as an indication of the changing role of the PWE

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<sup>66</sup>Joint Intelligence (sub-) Committee (of Chiefs of Staff).

between the period 1943 to 1946. The case studies of this section will therefore exist as a separate historical analysis of their content and at the same time illustrate the chronological phases of the diversification of work which the PWE became involved in. As a whole the thesis will locate the work of the PWE within the wider context of the British intelligence services during this period and illustrate the continuity of the belief in Whitehall concerning the use of political warfare as an instrument of British foreign policy.

The chronological historical approach of this thesis is based upon archival research, personal interviews and communications with individuals who had worked within PWE and SOE, and is informed and supported by secondary source material. In addition to the general and specific problems of research outlined above, the problems of using the intelligence reports and documents need to be outlined, and also the ways in which these were resolved.

The first problem concerned the relative value of this intelligence. The need to know the value of the Weekly Reports before concentrating on them as historical documents was a primary concern both in terms of the empirical content and the potential importance for inclusion into the evaluation of foreign policy. This was addressed by ascertaining the status of intelligence reports, since this usually indicates the value attached to the information they contain and the accuracy and reliability of that information. Additionally, the circulation list of such documents also indicates the value attached to them, and also identifies the people and departments who received them. This in turn indicates the potential influence this intelligence might have had in particular areas. Obviously different types of intelligence would be seen by different levels of departments, depending on the nature of the content. The 'Secret', or 'Confidential' documents would have a different and wider circulation than the 'Top Secret' documents which would only be seen by a chosen few.

Research on Foreign Office and Cabinet Office files produced information about the organisation, administration and propaganda functions of the PWE, but little about the German Section organisation itself. A report produced in 1946 by A.R. Walmsley,

who was intimately involved in PID/PWE intelligence work, specifically the German Section, was important. The specialised knowledge of Michael Balfour, Assistant Director of Intelligence and the brother-in-law of Duncan Wilson, the Director responsible for the German Section, was particularly helpful in understanding the importance of the reports.

From here some conclusions could be drawn. The first is that the status of the reports was 'high', with the information being seen as the 'base-line' for objective intelligence about Germany, the German people and the Nazi regime. According to Walmsley, the Weekly Report was an 'invaluable document' which was eventually circulated to all departments dealing with Germany, other than military or economic.<sup>67</sup> The circulation of the documents increased from the initial use by the propagandists and the BBC European Service and BBC to include the Foreign Office, JIC, and Joint Intelligence Staff. Additionally, the PWE was always represented at JIC meetings, either by the Ministers of Economic Warfare and Information or by the attendance of one of the Directors of the PWE for specific discussions on current issues.<sup>68</sup> The JIC and Chiefs of Staff had always been aware of the desire to have up-to-date information on morale and conditions in enemy countries, and in December, 1939 the JIC asked that the Weekly Report of the PID (continued after 1941 in the PWE) be made available to the JIC Sub-Committee.<sup>69</sup> At the beginning of March, 1940 the Chiefs of Staff drew the attention of the JIC Sub-Committee to the 'necessity of keeping a constant watch on propaganda with a view to obtaining possible indications

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<sup>67</sup>A.R. Walmsley, 'EH/PID/PWE German and Austrian Intelligence. Recollections of A. R. Walmsley', 20th January, 1946. Received from Walmsley, 5th February, 1995.

<sup>68</sup>PRO/CAB81/122 JIC (44) Report No. 177. 1st May, 1944. 'Effects of the Allied Bombing Offensive on the German War Effort with Particular Reference to "Overlord"'. CAB 81/122 JIC (44) 215 (0). 25th May, 1944. Discussion on the scale of opposition to "Overlord". CAB 81/93 JIC (45) 4th Meeting. 16th January, 1945. (London: Public Record Office). Assessment of the effects on German of heavy air attacks on Berlin in conjunction with Russian offensive. Also the potential use of German generals in British hands for political warfare to bring about surrender.

<sup>69</sup>PRO/CAB 81/87 JIC (39) Minutes of the 18th Meeting. 29th December, 1939.

of German intentions'.<sup>70</sup> At the JIC meeting on 23rd April, 1940 it was agreed that the Ministry of Economic Warfare and 'Sir Campbell Stuart's organisation will be asked to detail an officer by name who would be prepared to join the Intern-Services Project Board when matters affecting their respective departments were under consideration'.<sup>71</sup> Campbell Stuart's organisation was the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, known as 'EH', which after 1941 was absorbed into the PWE. The role of the intelligence of the PWE can now be seen in the context of the wider picture of the organisation of intelligence services in Britain during this period.

A third problem was the amount of material contained within the reports. George Martinelli complained that on visiting Woburn and seeing what he described as 'vastly inflated intelligence sections' he once calculated that 'one hundred times as much intelligence material was being churned out daily as anyone expected to make use of it could possibly digest'.<sup>72</sup> Produced every week throughout the war, the reports were sometimes twenty-two to twenty-three pages long, covering a wide range of issues reflecting the priorities of research for the section at the time. They also included a large amount of 'low level' information such as the 'greying' of Hitler's hair or the tone of voice of Goebbels on a particular day. This was not problematic as such, but merely time consuming in the sifting of the relevant information from the irrelevant.

Having discussed the aims and problems of this research all that remains to be done in this chapter is to give a brief outline of the structure of the thesis.

**CHAPTER TWO** offers an overview of the period from the beginning of the twentieth century to 1941 and traces the emergence and evolution of the propaganda, political warfare, subversion and intelligence activities of successive British governments. It identifies the key events and issues at home and in Europe which

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<sup>70</sup>PRO/CAB 81/87 JIC(40) Minutes of the 11th Meeting. 5th March, 1940.

<sup>71</sup>PRO/CAB 81/87 JIC (40) Minutes of the 24th Meeting. 23rd April, 1940.

<sup>72</sup> The Times. Monday June 4th, 1973.

led to the creation of organisations for the manipulation of public opinion. The aim of the chapter is to illustrate the necessary parallel growth of organisations for propaganda and intelligence during the inter-war period, and the political climate in which the PWE was established in 1941. It also charts the changing attitudes in Britain towards the German people, which was instrumental in the way in which the role and functions of these organisations was defined by government. Finally, the focus on the people working within these organisations from 1916-1941 is used to illustrate the continuity in thinking and expertise in Whitehall and belief in certain circles concerning the potential power of propaganda as an instrument of policy.

**CHAPTER THREE** concentrates on the organisational structure, the people and the changing policy and diversification of the activities of the PWE. It will identify the events of 1940 to 1941, which resulted in changes in attitude towards Germany in Britain, and the internal politics resulting from those changes which were the context for the establishment of the PWE. In order to consider the political atmosphere in which the intelligence officers operated, which is important for assessing their interpretation of events, the chapter will give biographical details on the key people working for the PWE, their background and their role in the Executive. Finally, the chapter looks at the intelligence officers and their contribution to the work of the PWE, and considers some of the important questions about the circumstances which determined the success or failure of the intelligence reports such as the availability of sufficient raw data, accuracy, problems of individuals perceptions of their role and the important problem of political interference in the intelligence process.

**CHAPTER FOUR** is the first of three chapters, focusing on the assessment of the Weekly Reports, and looks at the question of German 'resistance' to the Nazi regime and public opinion in Germany. There is a formidable amount of research and literature into this area of German history, as there is with the related studies on 'resistance' in Germany to the Nazi regime.<sup>73</sup> The announcement of the

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<sup>73</sup>Detlev J. K. Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany. Conformity, Opposition and Racism in Everyday Life.* (Penguin, Harmondsworth : 1989). Timothy Mason, *Social Policy in the Third Reich. The Working Class and the 'National Community', 1918-1939.*

'Unconditional Surrender' policy in 1943 in effect defined the policy in Britain that all Germans were to be treated as Nazis. By definition this policy denied the existence of the 'other Germany', of 'resistance' in Germany, which supported the Allied military strategy and policy towards Germany. However, it is not contradictory to examine the intelligence reports for information about 'resistance' in Germany during this period. The Weekly Reports contain a wealth of material about the social and political conditions in Germany and the reaction of the German people to the Nazi regime, and they are examined to find out how much information was available in Whitehall about 'resistance' in the Third Reich at a time when British policy was based upon the premise that there was no resistance. This chapter asks some particular questions. What do the intelligence reports tell us about the conditions in Germany at this time, and in the context of the research and literature now available on this, how accurate were they? What do the reports tell us about the reaction and response of the German people to the increasing coercion and terror of the regime after 1943? Is it possible to define a criterion which was used by the German Section to identify and define behaviour as 'resistance' as opposed to

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(Oxford: Berg, 1993). Ian Kershaw. *Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich. Bavaria 1933 - 1945*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). Ian Kershaw. *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation*. Third Edition (London: Edward Arnold, 1993). David F. Crew (Ed.), *Nazism and German Society, 1933-1945*. (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). David Clay Large (Ed.), *Contending With Hitler: Varieties of Resistance in the Third Reich*. (Washington, D.C. and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). P. Hoffmann, *German Resistance to Hitler*. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988). Klemens von Klemperer, *German Resistance Against Hitler: The Search for Allies Abroad, 1938 - 1945*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). Anton Gill. *An Honourable Defeat: A History of the German Resistance to Hitler*. (London: Heinemann, 1994). Michael Balfour, *Withstanding Hitler in Germany, 1933-1945*. (London: Routledge, 1988). Fabian von Schlabrendorff. Trans. Hilda Simon. *The Secret War Against Hitler*. (Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1994). Eberhard Zeller, Trans. R.P. Heller and D.R. Masters. *The Flame of Freedom: The German Struggle Against Hitler*. (Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1994). Ulrich von Hassell, *The Von Hassell Diaries. The Story of the Forces Against Hitler Inside Germany, 1938 - 1944*. (Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1994). Annedore Leber. Trans. Rosemary O'Neill. *Conscience in Revolt: Sixty-Four Stories of Resistance in Germany, 1933-45*. (Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1994). Patricia Meehan. *The Unnecessary War: Whitehall and the German Resistance to Hitler*. (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1992).

'dissent' or 'non-conformity' ? What intelligence was available to the foreign policy decision makers of the day engaged in the process of formulating policy towards the German people? Why was this information apparently ignored ? Finally, what 'images' of the German people were created by the intelligence officers in the Weekly Reports, and did these affect British attitudes towards Germany in planning for the post-war treatment of Germany and the German people ?

CHAPTER FIVE brings into focus the way in which the activities of the PWE were expanded after 1943 to include the major issue of the occupation of Germany after her military defeat.<sup>74</sup> The Executive was no longer only engaged in political warfare to bring about the defeat of Germany, but was involved in planning for the post-war treatment of Germany. The problems of occupying Germany were immense, requiring the maximum amount of information about the economic, social and political conditions existing during the war, and the likely conditions and problems which might arise after the defeat. The intelligence concerning the political 'resistance' and public opinion was vital in this respect and was used for the categorisation of the 'political reliability' of individual Germans after defeat, and the morale and likely attitude of the majority of the people during the immediate occupational period. How useful was the work of the German Section in this respect ? How accurate were their predictions of the conditions as the 'enemy' became the 'occupied' ?

The unprecedented and controversial decision by Britain to occupy an industrially

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<sup>74</sup>See N. Pronay and K. Wilson (Eds.), *The Political Re-education of Germany and Her Allies After World War Two*. (London: Croom Helm, 1985). Ian Turner, (Ed.), *Reconstruction in Post-War Germany. British Occupational Policy and The Western Zones, 1945-1955*. (Oxford: Berg, 1989). Alan Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*. (London: Methuen, 1984). Michael Balfour, *The Tides of Power*, (London: Routledge, 1991). Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Peace. Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War*. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993). Victor Rothwell, *Britain and The Cold War, 1941-47*. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982). T. D. Burridge, *British Labour and Hitler's War*. (London: Andre Deutsch, 1976). Peter Weiler, *British Labour and The Cold War*. (California: Stanford, 1988).



advanced European country was accompanied by the astonishing and 'breathtaking'<sup>75</sup> aim of re-educating the German people by 'changing their mind'.<sup>76</sup> What role did the PWE play in this process, particularly since they were recognised as being the department which held the most comprehensive intelligence about Germany and all things German? In considering this question the chapter will also include details of the PWE's involvement in producing information about the enemy and enemy-occupied countries for the use of Commanders in the Field in Europe. The Handbook for Germany, the 'bible' used by the occupying forces, will also be examined.

CHAPTER SIX assesses the final area of activity in which the PWE become involved. This was the monitoring of Russian propaganda to Germany and the movements of the Red Army in occupied Europe. The beginning of the perception in Whitehall of the Russian 'threat' to British interests, has been identified as having its roots in the Foreign Office. The origins of the perception of the Russian 'threat' which signalled the beginning of the early Cold War period is an important debate.<sup>77</sup> This chapter considers the importance of the changing 'images' of Russia and the information produced by the PWE, their interpretations of the motivations and reasons for Russian behaviour and the analysis of Russian propaganda in order to anticipate the future intentions of Stalin in the closing stages of the war. The chapter illustrates the way in which the 'image' of Russia in the PWE was never as positive as the

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<sup>75</sup> N. Pronay, in N. Pronay and K. Wilson. *The Political Re-education of Germany and Her Allies After World War Two*. (London: Croom Helm 1985) p.4

<sup>76</sup> Pronay, in *Ibid.* p. 1.

<sup>77</sup> Victor Rothwell, *Britain and The Cold War, 1941-47*. Richard Aldrich, (Ed.), *British Intelligence, Strategy and The Cold War, 1945-51*. (London: Routledge, 1992). Louis Halle, *The Cold War as History*. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967). Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Peace*. Anne Deighton (Ed.), *Britain and The First Cold War*. (London: Macmillan, 1990). John Zametica, *British Officials and British Foreign Policy, 1945-50*. (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990. M.P. Leffler and D. S. Painter (Eds.), *Origins of the Cold War. An International History*. (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). Peter Weiler, *British Labour and the Cold War*. (California: Stanford University Press, 1988). John W. Young, *Cold War Europe, 1945 - 1989*. (London: Edward Arnold, 1991).

'image' portrayed by the public rhetoric of the leadership in Whitehall. Finally this chapter will identify the continuation of the work of the PWE into the post-war years and the acknowledgement in Whitehall of the importance of the intelligence work of the PWE in relation to Russia. It will identify the way in which the government quickly responded to the perception of the Russian 'threat' and revived the organisation for political warfare, relocating the people with the expertise and techniques inherited from their work in the PWE.

**CHAPTER SEVEN** brings together the results of the assessment of the intelligence work of the German Section of the PWE, and incorporates this into the re-evaluation of the history of the Executive. Finally, this chapter offers some comments and general conclusions concerning the continuation of government involvement and organisation for the use of propaganda and political warfare as an instrument of foreign policy from the beginning of the century to 1947.

## CHAPTER TWO

### The Organisation of Propaganda and Intelligence:

#### The Origins of the PWE.

The growing belief in Britain during the inter-war years that propaganda could and should be used to manipulate public opinion at home and abroad was also accompanied by the paradoxical attitude of ministers in government who displayed a distinct reluctance to be seen to be involved in what was seen as a 'shady' or 'ungentlemanly' business. Whilst this was largely as a result of the experiences of World War One, the ambiguity surrounding the use of propaganda as a manipulative instrument of politics in modern society can be traced back to classical times when the dangers of the use of rhetoric in public life were first recognised.

Indeed, the origins of the modern term propaganda are to be found in classical times when rhetoricians appeared to make two opposing claims for their skills. One was propounded by those who taught their pupils the art of speaking well and who identified this skill with the attainment of the aesthetic principles of eloquent speech. The other was based on a pragmatic understanding of the use of public speech which led some rhetoricians to claim that the aim of their skill was to bring success in public life.<sup>1</sup> The former was based on the idea that language should be used as a social skill to enhance public debate, whilst the latter argued that the principal aim was not merely to enhance the debate but to win it. The critics of the pragmatic practitioners recognised the dangers of this new weapon. Plato accused these orators of placing victory in the debate which could lead to the decline of ethical and moral values in public life. He proclaimed that 'persuasion was an ignoble aim in itself and could only be justified if the orator was seeking to convince others of the truth',<sup>2</sup> whilst

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<sup>1</sup>Michael Billig, *Arguing and thinking. A rhetorical approach to social psychology.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Chapter Four: 'The science of persuasion'.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p. 54.

Philo accused the 'smooth-tongued orators' as being the descendants of the evil Cain.<sup>3</sup>

If a 'science' of rhetoric based upon rules and forms of rhetoric which guaranteed principles of certainty could be discovered, then in the hands of the wrong people it could have disastrous consequences. It was feared that the discovery of the 'secrets' of rhetoric would provide a guarantee of success to the practitioners regardless of the moral or ethical motivations of the speaker. It was believed that one of the 'secrets' which would lead to principles of certainty would be the ability to ascertain the thoughts and feelings of the audience in order to be in the most advantageous position to use that knowledge in order to 'win' victory in a debate. This recognition of the importance of understanding the human mind in order to manipulate behaviour can be seen as one of the earliest connections between the need for accurate 'information' about the human mind in order to influence public opinion and attitudes. It has also resulted in the idea that the use of language to persuade an audience has always been connected to psychological issues. Although it can be argued, as Grant does, that the pejorative definition of propaganda emerged after the events of World War One,<sup>4</sup> the origins of the modern day popular image of propaganda as not being about 'truth' can also be traced back to the fears aroused in classical times about the use of language to persuade an audience.

In 1481 Caxton illustrated his belief in the power of language when he defined rhetoric as 'a science to cause another man by speech or by writing to believe or to do that thing that thou wouldst have him for to do'.<sup>5</sup> The first use of the term 'propaganda' can be dated to 1622 when the Roman Catholic Church under Pope Gregory XV established a College for the Propagation of Faith to support overseas missions, and demonstrates the political use of propaganda in the context of

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid. p. 59.

<sup>4</sup> Mariel Grant, *Propaganda and the Role of the State in Inter-War Britain*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). p. 11.

<sup>5</sup> L. Cox, 'The Artye or Crafte of Rhetoryke'. (Reprinted: University of Chicago Press 1899) in Billig, *Arguing and thinking*. p. 52.

Church/State relations at the time.<sup>6</sup> During the course of the nineteenth century the use of pamphlets, speeches and personal appeals to persuade or manipulate public opinion became widespread. At the turn of the century this was given further impetus by development of mass-circulation newspapers, an instrumental factor in the emergence of a 'mass' audience who were increasingly interested in social, economic and political issues.

1903-1919

The Communications 'revolution' and War.

Before World War One the informal co-operation between the Foreign Office and the press had been based on the need to control information. In the aftermath of the disasters of the Boer War when the lack of control over the press had resulted in questions being asked about the loyalty of the press and the perceived failure to control the dissemination of information during the war had led to pre-World War One discussions on press censorship. The growing tension and dangers in Europe focused attention in government about the need for co-operation over press censorship and intelligence operations between the Admiralty, the War Office, the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and the India Office. In particular, the need for securing joint action in any future war was addressed in November 1903 by a committee chaired by Lord Esher to look into the situation and to propose changes in the way the War Office operated. In June 1904 Lord Esher's War Office (Reconstitution) Committee set out the problems in its first report. The result was the creation of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) which would be responsible for the essential task of bringing together the hitherto separate departments responsible for the defence of the realm. The aim of this pre-war Committee was 'precise and definite .. to provide the plans necessary to defend the country and the Empire'.<sup>7</sup> According to Christopher Andrew the Enquiry led by Lord Esher resulted in a radical reform of the

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<sup>6</sup>Jackall, *Propaganda*. Messinger, *British Propaganda and the State*. Grant, *Propaganda and the role of the State*.

<sup>7</sup>Sir Ivor Jennings, *Cabinet Government*. Third Edition. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959). p. 292.

War Office, and marked the beginnings of the emergence of a modern secret service intelligence community in Britain.<sup>8</sup> The Committee set up the institutional infrastructure which would provide a co-ordinated response from the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War, the Secretary of State for Air (from 1917) and Heads of Naval and Military Intelligence. They would report to the CID who in turn reported to the Cabinet. One essential task of the CID in the inter-war period was the co-ordination of supplies for the services. The system of co-ordinating the Cabinet Committees which arose out of the CID was then developed further by the War Cabinet in 1940-1945.

The importance of military cable censorship, and the need to guard and change secret codes to prevent sabotage and espionage, had been recognised during the Boer War by Sir George Cockerill. In 1905, reflecting the concern in Whitehall about censorship in government, Cockerill was recalled from South Africa to administer a Special Intelligence sub-division of the War Office. He began by imposing imperial cable censorship and making plans for censorship in the event of another war and in 1906 he was made head of the Special Intelligence Section where he stayed until 1908. By 1909 government interest and involvement in wireless and communications technology was already in progress, and the Colonial Defence Committee (renamed Commonwealth Communications Council after 1933) was already working on building and maintaining the 'Red Network', the undersea strategic cable communications system of the Empire expanded in 1909 to include a network of wireless stations.<sup>9</sup>

When Britain entered the First World War on 3-4th August, 1914 many people in Whitehall had also recognised the need for governmental action to address public opinion both at home and abroad. It was felt necessary to monitor and control the

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<sup>8</sup>Christopher Andrew, *Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community*. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1986). p. 62.

<sup>9</sup>N. Pronay and P. M. Taylor, 'An Improper Use of Broadcasting.. the British Government and Clandestine Radio Propaganda Operations against Germany during the Munich Crisis and After', *Journal of Contemporary History*. 19 (July 1984). pp. 357-383. p.371.

information the British public were receiving and also to make preparations for the use of propaganda to support British interests abroad. On 5th August the British government cut the transatlantic cable between Germany and America, thereby ensuring complete control of information going directly to America for some months.

On August 7th, 1914 an official Press Bureau was set up with extensive censorship powers and whilst it was headed by a civilian it was staffed largely by military and naval personnel. The War Cabinet and Admiralty became increasingly involved in postal, cable and wireless censorship which was seen as much more important in terms of military efficiency. Cockerill was reassigned to head the SIS (which later became known as MO5 or MI5) and the benefits of the pre-war planning ensured that Britain had complete control of the imperial channel of communication - the 'Red Network'.

At the beginning of the war, the appearance of German propaganda was brought to the attention of the Cabinet by Lloyd George. The British Ambassador in Rome had informed the Foreign Office that the German government had been 'flooding' offices in Italy with propaganda, which was assumed to have been in preparation for the onset of hostilities.<sup>10</sup> At the end of September the appearance of German propaganda in many countries in Europe was discussed and Lloyd George urged the Cabinet to set up an organisation to 'inform and influence public opinion abroad and to confute German mis-statements and sophistries'.<sup>11</sup> Charles Masterman was asked to head this organisation which was known as the War Propaganda Bureau and was located in Wellington House, Buckingham Gate.<sup>12</sup> According to Messinger, Masterman was the 'single person who, more than any other, caused the British state to become a major actor in the propaganda arena'.<sup>13</sup> His brief was not to engage in propaganda

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<sup>10</sup>Messinger, *British Propaganda and the State*. p. 33.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. p. 38.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. p. 25.

directed against the enemy or the home-front in Germany, but to concentrate on making the British case in Allied and neutral nations. The key principle adopted by Masterman, and which identified him as a propagandist, was secrecy. At this stage propaganda was only to use 'neutral' facts and information and not fabrication, and close attention to the mentality of the audience and public opinion was seen as the most important factor necessary for effective propaganda. Masterman divided the work of the department into different countries, and the staff worked closely with military and naval intelligence, as well as reading German newspapers and periodicals to glean information which could be used by the propagandists against the enemy.

In the Spring of 1915 the Directors of Intelligence at the War Office were becoming increasingly interested in propaganda. Cockerill's department had expanded rapidly and by 1915 included ninety five officers and twelve-hundred staff. During his stay at the War Office he began using the information collected by the censors to try to predict future conditions and particularly, from the analysis of business communications, the future needs of the wartime economy. The information collected by the censors also provided for the development of propaganda aimed at the enemy in uniform, to the soldiers in the trenches, which he described as 'army propaganda' as distinct from propaganda to civilians. This was followed in 1916 when a department known as M17(b) was established as a propaganda production department of the War Office under the Director of Military Intelligence. Housed in Adastral house adjacent to Wireless and Cable, the department was responsible for the 'compilation and distribution of propaganda by cables and by wireless'.<sup>14</sup>

By 1916 the War Propaganda Bureau was distributing six fortnightly illustrated newspapers, and had published three hundred books and pamphlets. They had three hundred centres of distribution and circulated four thousand photographs a week to press all around the world. But the signs of the problems of overlap between the official groups, institutional sources and private sector propaganda were quickly recognised. The Bureau was working in parallel with the Press Bureau which had

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<sup>14</sup>Pronay and Taylor, 'An Improper Use of Broadcasting..' p. 371.



been set up to censor newspapers, and also the War Office and Admiralty who were responsible for censorship of postal, cable and wireless. In addition to this the Foreign Office News Department also disseminated individual news stories. A rift developed over the control of propaganda and censorship with the Foreign Office and Home Office suggesting that control should be in the Foreign Office, whilst the War Office and Admiralty argued that a new department staffed with experts should be established.

During this period Lloyd George had replaced Asquith as Prime Minister and the administrative organisation for propaganda received serious attention. One of the reasons that Lloyd George became involved was that he understood the connections between political power in the twentieth century and the importance of access to the means of control of mass opinion. At his first meeting of the War Cabinet on 9th December, 1916 the matter of organisation and political control of propaganda was discussed, and it was agreed that a separate department was needed. In February 1917 the Department of Information was established, with its headquarters in the Foreign Office. John Buchan was made head of the Department and the War Propaganda Bureau was incorporated into the new structure where Masterman continued as head until 1918, overseeing literary propaganda, recruiting war artists, and supporting film making.

Under Buchan's leadership the size of the staff increased, as did the quantity of materials produced, with more films being made and overseas activity increased. One of the most important changes that Buchan brought about was in the increased use of propaganda against the 'enemy', re-directing the strategy which had focused on neutral and Allied countries to which Masterman had been limited previously by the Cabinet. Other important changes took place in the Department under Buchan's leadership. The recognition of the need for accurate and specific information led Buchan to set up an Intelligence Bureau and he employed R.W.Seton-Watson to work in this department. The Intelligence Bureau used its analysis of the daily newspapers of enemy countries to produce reports on the internal conditions from which the propagandists could work.

Another important change in British propaganda was the increasing resort to deception as a partner in propaganda, the increased contacts with other Intelligence departments and the use of counter-espionage techniques. One favoured method was that of 'leaking' intelligence information through the press via friends on American newspapers, the most famous being the Zimmermann telegram.<sup>15</sup> The Bureau also used, probably for the first time, vicious propaganda directed at children in the form of a subsidised book by Henry Newbolt entitled *Tales of The Great War*. This identified the Germans as 'Huns - the enemies of humane and civilized life' and accused them of the calculated mutilation of women and children through air attacks on England.<sup>16</sup> This can be seen as one of the very early examples of 'black' propaganda, reflecting the fears produced by the escalation of the war which now involved entire populations and also demonstrated the willingness to use any strategy against the enemy. But in 1918, whilst the propagandists were expanding their departments and techniques there was a growing concern in Whitehall over the increase in the size of these organisations. One of the main problems was the recognition that control should be in the 'right' hands, and that there should be ministerial responsibility for such a large organisation working within the government which was dedicated to the manipulation of public opinion.

As a result of these growing concerns in Whitehall Lloyd George upgraded the status of the Department of Information by establishing it as a Ministry of Information, which took over responsibility for most of the functions of the Department of Information. Lord Beaverbrook was appointed Minister whilst Buchan became his Director of Intelligence. At the suggestion of Beaverbrook, the job of developing propaganda to the 'enemy' went to Lord Northcliffe, who accepted the position on condition that Beaverbrook was not involved and that he only reported to the Prime Minister. In February 1918 Northcliffe took up his responsibilities as Head of the Enemy Propaganda Department. In the Autumn of 1917 he had returned from a

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<sup>15</sup>The 'leaked' telegram from Berlin to Mexico, which Britain used in an attempt to bring America into the war. See Andrew, *Secret Service* (1986) pp. 169-176.

<sup>16</sup>Messinger, *British Propaganda and the State*. p. 92.

mission in the USA and during this time had met Campbell Stuart, whom he appointed Deputy Director of the Enemy Propaganda Department. Stuart was helped in his work by the appointment of Henry Wickham Steed as policy adviser, whom Northcliffe had already made Foreign editor of *The Times*. The Department was housed in Lord Crewe's mansion in Curzon Street. This arrangement, however, also brought problems, and Balfour at the Foreign Office argued that the propagandists should not be privy to military and Foreign Office despatches. After considerable internal debate and conflict the Intelligence Bureau moved into the Foreign Office in March, 1918. Seton-Watson was re-located to the Political Intelligence Division of the Foreign Office but also continued to work closely with Campbell Stuart in the Enemy Propaganda Department.

At this stage in the war the government was unable or unwilling to define precisely their propaganda policy towards Germany, nor the functions of the new department. Stuart believed that 'propaganda should depend on policy', and he enlisted the help of H. G. Wells, a friend of Northcliffe, as Director of the German Section and asked him to produce a document for Ministerial approval which would provide them with a focus for operations. This document, submitted to the Department Steering Committee on the last day of May, 1918 set out the main aims of propaganda which should be based on the recognition of the need to draw a distinction between the German people and the German government. Propaganda to Germany was to include the message that, as soon as the German Government was changed, the people would not be held responsible for its behaviour. The other point made by Wells in 1918 was the need for a League of Nations, and he suggested that Germany should be informed that they would be allowed to join as soon as they had made a complete break with the Imperial system of government. The Foreign Secretary of the day, Balfour, broadly accepted this outline of the role of the Enemy Propaganda Department and the policy to be adopted towards Germany and the German people. Northcliffe's department based their propaganda around the speeches made by Woodrow Wilson which invariably distinguished between the German people and German policy, and emphasised that Allied policy was to liberate all people, including the Germans, from militarism. The aim of severing the ties between the people and the government, the

encouragement of the German people to throw off the shackles of their government was also to become the principal strategy adopted for British propaganda towards Germany in 1938.

According to Basil Liddell Hart, the beginning of 1918 and the establishment of Northcliffe's organisation witnessed the 'development and thorough organization' of government propaganda, when for the first time the full scope of such warfare was understood and exploited.<sup>17</sup> Liddell Hart also identified a strategy which was to be so controversially adopted in World War Two : the air bombardment of civilians to lower morale as an important psychological weapon of war. However, according to Michael Balfour, the 'myth' suggesting that Northcliffe's Department had been responsible for creating the low morale in Germany on the home front and thus also the 'stab-in-the-back' myth of the German propagandists is not supported by the evidence.<sup>18</sup> For Balfour, the Department did not produce 'any appreciable volume of political propaganda of their own wording', and even if they had the logistical problems of delivering it to the home-front meant that very few Germans would have received any of the leaflets despatched<sup>19</sup>. For Balfour, 'the 'propaganda' which weakened their will to go on fighting consisted of the responsible public utterances of the President of the USA and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom rather than of clever messages conveyed to them through newly-discovered channels by Northcliffe's organisation'.<sup>20</sup>

Almost before the Department had time to make any impact with propaganda to Germany the war ended, and the day after the Armistice was signed Northcliffe resigned and the Department was rapidly closed down. According to Philip Taylor, at the end of World War One Britain 'disarmed in the weapon of words as she did in

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<sup>17</sup>Basil Liddell Hart. *History of the First World War*. (London: Cassell and Company, 1973) p. 405.

<sup>18</sup>Balfour, *Propaganda in War*. 'The demythologising of Crew House' . pp. 3-10.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. p. 6.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. p. 7.

other conventional forms of armaments'.<sup>21</sup> However, this was not before the Foreign Office had made the necessary arrangements for a post-war propaganda campaign against the German people. It was believed that Northcliffe's propaganda now offered an opportunity for the British Government to drive home the message to Germany of her absolute defeat. According to Wickham Steed, this was to be used to enable 'the German people gradually to see why Germany lost the war, and to understand the force of the moral ideals which had ranged practically the whole world against her'.<sup>22</sup> In order to do this Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, reconstructed a smaller version of the Foreign Office News Department to carry on the work of the Ministry of Information, and to preserve the instruments of propaganda and publicity which could be put back into operation speedily if the situation required.<sup>23</sup>

At the end of the First World War the use of propaganda as an instrument of war against the battle and home front had been recognised as an important element of government. The conditions of 'total war' had led to the understanding that 'Propaganda is the task of creating and directing public opinion..since strength for the purposes of war was the total strength of each belligerent nation, public opinion was as significant as fleets and armies'.<sup>24</sup> The victory over Germany seemed to verify and legitimise the belief in the use of propaganda in the 'national' interest, influencing the mind and it was hoped, the behaviour of the enemy.

However, post-war revelations that a large amount of the information disseminated had been based on falsehoods and fabrication were confirmed in memoirs, giving the impression that citizens of all the nations involved had been misled and manipulated by propaganda. In the early years following the end of World War One, 'propaganda

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<sup>21</sup>Taylor in N. Pronay and D. W. Spring (Eds.), *Propaganda, Politics and Film. 1918-1945*. (London: Macmillan, 1982). p. 33.

<sup>22</sup>W.Steed cited by Taylor in *Ibid.* p. 27.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup>The Organisations and Functions of the Ministry of Information, Cmnd 9161, 1918. Cate Haste, 'The Machinery of Propaganda' in Jackall, *Propaganda*. p.105.

was not a word which most educated English men chose to discuss freely'. It was 'a good word gone wrong, debauched by the late Lord Northcliffe'.<sup>25</sup> The records of Parliamentary Debates in the House of Commons record the 'unanimous hostility in the House of Commons to Beaverbrook's Ministry of Information',<sup>26</sup> illustrating the widespread feelings of unease and distrust.

But the success of advertising and propaganda added to the growing body of literature being produced by social scientists which suggested that humans were capable of being manipulated by language, and social psychology verified these theories, giving them an alleged 'scientific' basis. At the end of the First World War propaganda had achieved scientific status : 'the public mind to the trained propagandist is a pool into which phrases and thoughts are dropped like acids, with a foreknowledge of the reactions that will take place'.<sup>27</sup> Although some questioned the validity of such theories, steadily throughout the inter-war years the belief in the power of propaganda increased dramatically alongside Government concerns about the need to control such an instrument.

1919 - 1935

Retrenchment and Discontinuities.

Within the first year of the end of World War One the arguments which had initially led to a reduction in Britain's capacity for propaganda were soon exposed as illusionary. As early as 1919 there was a growing body of opinion, not confined solely to the Foreign Office, which recognised that propaganda and publicity was a necessary, if unwelcome, addition to twentieth century diplomacy. The determination to retain an organisation for propaganda was confirmed in a memo written by S. A.

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<sup>25</sup>Taylor in Pronay and Spring, *Propaganda, Politics and Film*. p. 29.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. p. 24.

<sup>27</sup>New York Tribune, 12 July 1918, quoted in Harold Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*. 1927. p.209. Cited in Grant, *Propaganda and the role of the State*. p. 13.

Guest in the Foreign Office, setting out the rationale that the new methods and channels being used in post-war international relations meant that a permanent organisation for Political Intelligence and Propaganda was needed.<sup>28</sup>

Pronay identifies the inter-war years as the beginning of the most important period in the evolution of propaganda and publicity, when decisions were taken about the use of propaganda in an era when political developments in Britain were causing as much anxiety in Whitehall as the tensions in Europe. Despite the defeat of Germany, and the popular perceptions about the use of propaganda in the conflict, attitudes changed drastically towards continued Government practice of censorship and propaganda in peacetime. Now, government had to consider the use of propaganda and publicity to defend themselves at home as well as abroad. Gaining control of public opinion was seen as vital to the interests of the Government of the day.<sup>29</sup>

Whilst the belief in the potential power of propaganda was tempered by the anxieties in Whitehall about the desirability of adopting such an instrument of warfare, events outside the control of the Government heralded in a new era of censorship and control in Britain. The creation of a mass electorate in 1918, the lessons of World War One and the need for conscription, the growth of the Labour movement and strikes, including police strikes in 1919, and the General Strike of 1926 all took place in a society where the monopoly of information which had hitherto been held by Government was now being challenged. Whitehall became acutely aware that the opinions and perceptions of working people in Britain would from now on be important elements which would have to be taken into account by any future government. During these volatile years of the Depression, Government reaction to the situation was one of extreme caution. Broadcasting in Britain, apart from the 'hallowed traditions of Speakers' Corner, Wilkes and Liberty or the Freedom of the Press' was not to be allowed by any individual lest it should become an 'engine of

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<sup>28</sup>Taylor in Pronay and Spring, *Propaganda, Politics and Film*. p. 29.

<sup>29</sup>Pronay in *Ibid.* p. 5.

propaganda'.<sup>30</sup>

Additionally, during this period the recognition of the need for intelligence of potential enemies in Europe led to a re-evaluation by the CID of the intelligence services in Britain. In this the CID was at the forefront of setting up intelligence agencies for specifically identified areas of importance vital to British interest. One of the areas of interest, identified by the experience and problems of the First World War blockade of Germany, was the importance of economic warfare. The importance attached to such information was illustrated clearly in the decision not to publish the volume of the official history of the war which dealt with the blockade. The reasons given for not publishing, the only volume suppressed by the Government, was that it would be a valuable source of information to an enemy. As a result, the CID set up an Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in Time of War, which by 1925 had expanded its interests into looking at methods of economic warfare.<sup>31</sup> When the Allied Control Commission ended in 1928 it was recognised that Britain had lost a major source of information on the German economy and in 1929 the CID established the Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries Sub-Committee (FCI) 1929 to provide a substitute information service. This committee recommended the establishment in 1931 of the Industrial Intelligence Centre (IIC) which was to gather information and report back to CID on armament and war stores abroad. Until 1935 the IIC was funded by the Foreign Office secret vote. In 1934 it shared the headquarters of SIS and by 1936 was attached to the Department of Overseas Trade.<sup>32</sup>

Whilst the government established organisations to gather intelligence about political conditions in Europe during this time, the rise of National Socialism in Germany and the increased tensions in Europe brought the attention of Whitehall to the need to expand the existing facilities for the projection of Britain abroad. This change in thinking in Whitehall was illustrated in practical terms when Major Joseph Ball, who

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid. p. 13.

<sup>31</sup> Andrew, *Secret Service* (1986). p. 502.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. 502-503.



had worked for the Intelligence Services (MI6) in World War One, was given the task of building up a 'new kind of propaganda organisation which it was believed the age required'.<sup>33</sup> A pioneer in the analysis of the new role of propaganda in international affairs was E. H. Carr, who warned of the dangers of propaganda used by the Bolsheviks and the Third International which he felt was being met with a reluctance by the liberal democracies to take it up in their own defence.<sup>34</sup> The result was the establishment of the National Publicity Bureau in 1934 which was created to inform and manipulate public opinion.<sup>35</sup> The importance attached to the role of this bureau can be seen from the budget it was given, which was nine times that of Northcliffe's organisation in 1918.

Alongside the NPB the Government also established a department for the production of external propaganda and publicity, the British Council. In 1932, Sir Stephen Tallents, an important figure in government publicity during the inter-war years, had published a thirty-seven-page booklet entitled 'The Projection of England' in which he advocated the use of propaganda abroad and which, according to Balfour was a pioneering work which did much to prompt the foundation of the British Council.<sup>36</sup> After distinguished service in the First World War, Tallents had become secretary to the Cabinet committee dealing with the General Strike of 1926 and supervised publicity at the Empire Marketing Board from 1926 to 1933. In 1933 he became the first public relations officer of the Post Office whilst also acting as chief publicity assistant to the Supply and Transport Committee of the Cabinet, a secret organisation responsible for handling domestic crises.<sup>37</sup>

In 1934 the British Council was formed, under the auspices of the Foreign Office, to

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<sup>33</sup>Pronay in Pronay and Spring, *Propaganda, Politics and Film*. p. 17.

<sup>34</sup>Ellwood in *Ibid.* p. 52.

<sup>35</sup>Pronay in *Ibid.* p. 17.

<sup>36</sup>Balfour, *Propaganda in War*. p. 55.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.* and Grant, *Propaganda and the role of the State*. p. 34.

use propaganda powerfully and deliberately to put Britain's case in reply to criticism abroad. According to Ellwood, the Foreign Office expected dramatic results from the work of the Council and believed it could use British 'influence' and 'cultural propaganda' to avoid another European war. The strategy and policy of the cultural component of British foreign policy at this point was to use 'all means to fight the political debates in people's minds rather than on the streets'.<sup>38</sup> It has to be seen as an alternative to physical warfare - what Cruickshank describes as a 'genteel propaganda machine'<sup>39</sup>, and an important vehicle for the 'appeasers' to use in their strategy to avoid another World War.

But attempts to manage the political situation in Europe by the use of 'persuasion', were still viewed with regret and distaste in some quarters. In 1935 Kennard, the Ambassador to Poland argued, 'I feel that if we are going to follow the nauseating example of all others of conducting propaganda, we should do it well'.<sup>40</sup> This offers a perfect example of the 'private' belief in the potential to manipulate public opinion and the 'public' abhorrence of such a method. It is also indicative of the resentment felt that Britain had been forced to come to the 'defence on foreign shores of her predominant ideas, traditions and ways of life, things the British were as unused to defending or spelling out as they were their Constitution'.<sup>41</sup> Nevertheless, external pressures left the Government with no alternative but to involve itself in the propaganda war in Europe.

Nicholas Pronay argues that between 1918 and 1945 the new media and new techniques of 'communications' were perceived as having a fundamentally important political role. And, because this belief was acted upon by governments and

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<sup>38</sup>Pronay in Pronay and Spring, *Propaganda, Politics and Film*. p. 17.

<sup>39</sup>Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm*. p. 9.

<sup>40</sup>Ellwood in Pronay and Spring, *Propaganda, Politics and Film*. p. 56.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.* p. 54.

communicators alike, 'politics and communications' came to be inextricably linked.<sup>42</sup> In Britain the use of communications to disseminate information or propaganda was adopted in the inter-war years in an attempt to manage the serious political difficulties faced by the government both at home and abroad.

In *Propaganda and the Role of the State in Inter-war Britain*, Mariel Grant has provided an excellent survey of the growth of government publicity in Britain during the inter-war period.<sup>43</sup> Grant argues that at the outbreak of World War Two the British government was far from assuming total responsibility for the dissemination of public information and lists three reasons for this. The first was that publicity and advertising was considered an 'inappropriate' function of government, identified with the sale of goods not the sale of ideas in which the government wished to be engaged.

Secondly, the State was still wary of engaging in propaganda due to the negative connotations of post-World War One experience which resulted in an 'abhorrence of propaganda' in Whitehall. And thirdly, a reluctance in government to engage in publicity campaigns.<sup>44</sup> Her conclusions about government attitudes to the use of propaganda at home during the inter-war period mirror the reluctance of Whitehall to involve itself, publicly and privately, in the organisation for 'enemy' propaganda in war: 'the manner in which domestic publicity arrangements developed in Britain in the first half of the twentieth century owe more to the influence and attitude of the Treasury and of officials within Whitehall active in addressing the issue rather than any particular party in power'.<sup>45</sup>

In the first fifteen years following the end of World War One the gradual return to the use of propaganda to manipulate public opinion at home and abroad was also matched by the establishment of intelligence departments for the observation and

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<sup>42</sup>Pronay in Ibid. p. 16.

<sup>43</sup> Mariel Grant, *Propaganda and the Role of the State in Inter-War Britain*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. p. 249.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid. p. 253.

monitoring of political and economic conditions in Britain and Europe. It can be seen as the response of government officials, concerned about events at home and abroad, and their attempt to manage European affairs in the hope of avoiding another war in Europe. But, by 1935 ministers in Whitehall recognised the need to take further measures to make plans for the defence of Britain in the event of a future war.

### The War in Europe:

#### From Propaganda to Political Warfare.

In July 1935 a Sub-Committee of the Committee for Imperial Defence was formed to look into the capabilities of, and arrangements for censorship, and the use of news reports in wartime. At the initial meeting it was also recognised that a system would be needed for the issuing of news in wartime and another Sub-Committee, chaired by John Colville, was given the task of considering this issue. A year later, a sub-committee of this Committee, under the leadership of Rex Leeper who was then working in the Foreign Office News Department set up by Balfour in 1919, reported. The report suggested that a Ministry of Information should be created, consisting of five departments : Administration, News, Control (Censorship), Publicity and Collecting (originally called 'Intelligence'). It was to be the centre for the distribution of all information concerning the war, and its main function was to present the national case at home and abroad.<sup>46</sup> The main strength of the Foreign Office News department would be transferred to the News Division, which would be responsible for the rapid dissemination of information as opposed to 'propaganda'. The Publicity Division would be set up if war broke out, to ensure that the national cause was properly presented to the public at home and abroad. Within the Publicity Division a planning unit would be responsible for working out the policy of propaganda. The Collecting Division would gather all of the information the Ministry needed to fulfil the tasks allotted to each Division. The importance of these initial plans lay in the centralisation into one single department of the functions of gathering, assessing and

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<sup>46</sup>Balfour, *Propaganda in War*. p. 53.

issuing of all information relating to war-time governmental activities and the separating of this department away from the government departments.

In July 1936 Sir Stephen Tallents was appointed shadow Director-General designate, after Reith's refusal to take up the position, and spent the next two years trying to extract from government specific guidelines or functions and responsibilities of the Ministry. But whilst Tallents struggled, as Stuart had done in 1918, to ascertain specific guidelines on policy and to organise the Ministry into an efficient operation, events in Europe overtook the bureaucratic delays in Whitehall.

By 1938 public opinion in Britain about the use of propaganda was changing. Faced, as it was, by the irrefutable proof of the use of propaganda by her European neighbours, the 'unanimous hostility' which existed in the House of Commons in 1918 was transformed by February 1938 into unanimous support for the establishment of organisations to provide propaganda in the defence of Britain.<sup>47</sup>

Attitudes towards Germany during this period were also changing. During Chamberlain's period of Office as Prime Minister his policy of Appeasement came under increasing pressure with a polarisation of opinions at all levels. The anti-appeasement lobby had at its helm an influential and vociferous opponent of the policy, the Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, Sir Robert Vansittart. He had spent time as a student in Germany in the 1890s, and had come to believe that Germany wanted Britain's destruction.<sup>48</sup> His mistrust of the Germans continued throughout the Weimar period and led him to conclude that 'the Germans never wanted or cared for democracy and only accepted it because they had no alternative when the First World War was over'.<sup>49</sup> Essentially he believed that German

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<sup>47</sup>Taylor in Pronay and Spring, *Propaganda, Politics and Film*. p. 24.

<sup>48</sup>Aaron Goldman, 'Germans and Nazis: The Controversy Over 'Vansittartism' in Britain during the Second World War' in *Journal of Contemporary History*. 14 (January 1979). pp. 155-191. p. 158.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

psychology was centred on cruelty, envy and self-pity'.<sup>50</sup> Vansittart organised and led the opposition to Chamberlain's lenient approach to Germany and followers included Harold Nicholson, Duff Cooper, Churchill, Brendan Bracken, Hugh Dalton and Clement Attlee. So pervasive was this line of thought in Whitehall that the word 'vansittart' became a general term for anti-German, and had a meaning at international levels to the extent that when Churchill met Stalin in October 1944 and told him of the American Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau's hatred of the Germans, Stalin replied 'He must be a second Vansittart'.<sup>51</sup> The anti-Vansittart lobby who supported Chamberlain consisted of mainly left-wing or at least liberal people, clergymen, Labour MPs, German refugees and exiles, German political exiles, and included some who had been anti-Nazi throughout the 1930s such as Harold Laski, Victor Gollancz, Michael Foot, Stephen King-Hall and Eleanor Rathbone.

Vansittart's views became increasingly 'unwelcome' in Whitehall, creating divisions and conflict in government, and at the beginning of 1938 Chamberlain replaced him with Sir Alexander Cadogan. Vansittart was given the title of Chief Diplomatic Adviser and the Foreign Secretary (Eden), finding it difficult to find anything for him to advise on, suggested he should co-ordinate overseas British publicity. Given Vansittart's political views and the reasons for his removal from office it seems to have been a paradoxical decision for Eden to take. Nevertheless, Vansittart formed a committee and on 28th May, 1938 he sent a report directly to the Prime Minister, advocating the extension of the existing publicity departments, the creation of a new Film Council and the appointment of press attaches in key embassies. He also suggested the upgrading of Rex Leeper who had been the controversial head of the Foreign Office News Department with him in 1935.<sup>52</sup> Chamberlain acknowledged the report but said that Vansittart must wait for the Foreign Secretary, now Lord

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid. p. 160.

<sup>51</sup> Warren Kimball 'Swords or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany 1943-46' in Ibid. p. 163.

<sup>52</sup> Pronay and Wilson(Eds), *The Political Re-education of Germany and Her Allies After WWII* (London: Croom Helm, 1985) p. 38.

Halifax, to deal with it. Eden had resigned on February 20th over the policy of appeasement. Halifax did not deal with it immediately, no doubt because of more important issues of the day, but Leeper, who had a vested interest because it would strengthen his own position in the Foreign Office, reported that his Department accepted the proposals put forward. The Treasury dragged its feet on the funding of these ambitious and costly proposals until the Munich crisis of September focused attention once more on the potential use of propaganda and 'persuasion' to avert war.

At the same time King-Hall supported the arguments being made that Britain was faced with a war of ideas, a struggle between democracy and totalitarianism, between free and controlled thought. Britain's first weapon must be propaganda, regardless of the cost.<sup>53</sup> Tallents believed that the German people were divided and that propaganda could and should be used to exacerbate that division in an effort to bring about the downfall of National Socialism in Germany. He also made two suggestions which were fundamentally important for the evolution of the organisation for propaganda in war. The first was that there must be an organisation for the study of public opinion in potential enemy countries and the second was that material must be prepared in case of war.<sup>54</sup> The Defence Department endorsed this proposal.<sup>55</sup>

In February 1938 Tallents submitted a progress report to the CID sub-committee and again requested clarification of the exact role of the Ministry. Although he was aware of the role of the MOI as responsible for the distribution of all wartime 'information', he was not clear on the position regarding the preparation or distribution of other publicity material required by other Government departments. However, his attempt to define the parameters of his responsibility failed and he was told that the departments concerned were the best qualified to handle their own publicity and no transfer of existing organisation would be made. The sub-committee noted that although the work of the MOI and other Government departments would probably

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<sup>53</sup>Document: FO 898/1 28.9.38 cited in Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm*. p. 12.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. p. 14.

<sup>55</sup>PRO/CAB 16/127 f.273 in Ibid. p. 14.

overlap, nevertheless the transferral of responsibility and other departments should only come in the light of experience and desirability. For the next twelve months Tallents continued to try to gain ministerial guidelines upon which to organise the embryonic Ministry of Information, but with a minimum of success.

In September 1938, following the Munich crisis and in the light of the problems at the Ministry of Information, Chamberlain asked Campbell Stuart to set up a 'secret' organisation responsible for enemy propaganda. This was to become the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, which was to be funded on the 'secret vote' and responsible to the Ministry of Information. The headquarters of this new organisation was the same as that of Cable and Wireless, Electra House in London, and it became known as 'EH', after Electra House or CS after its first Head, Campbell Stuart. The selection of Campbell Stuart and his experience in enemy propaganda World War One, and the use of Cable and Wireless offices as the 'secret' location for their work in maintaining the Red Network were an obvious combination. Whilst the headquarters were in Electra House, the operations were located at Woburn Abbey.

Stuart carried on where he had left off in 1918, now with crucial the addition of the new medium of radio. Initially he reported to the Minister of Information, Law Lord Macmillan until 'EH' was transferred briefly to the Foreign Office in October 1939. It was moved back to the Minister of Information, Duff Cooper in June, 1940. The three other people, working alongside Stuart and involved in the running of 'EH' were Rex Leeper (PID and Foreign Office), Major Dallas Brooks and Robert Bruce Lockhart.

Sir Reginald (Rex) Leeper was born in 1888 and educated in Australia, initially, and then at New College, Oxford.<sup>56</sup> Between 1917 and 1919 he worked in the Intelligence bureau at the Department of Information and in the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office. His elder brother, Allan, was a close friend of Vansittart and Rex was also seen as a 'vansittart', strongly antagonistic towards

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<sup>56</sup>See also Select Biography.



Germany and appeasement. In 1939 Leeper moved to Woburn as Head of the revived PID of the Foreign Office. Bruce Lockhart, born in Anstruther, Fife in 1887 and educated in Edinburgh had been Acting Consul-general in Moscow between 1915-1917 and had also worked in the Political Intelligence Department.<sup>57</sup> Major-General Dallas Brooks, an ex marine Officer, according to Baker-White spent the whole of the wartime in propaganda at 'EH' and then the PWE, 'fighting its battles at the highest level with the departments, Chiefs of Staff Committee, War Cabinet and a Prime Minister who to the last remained sceptical as to the value of political warfare'<sup>58</sup>. Also working in 'EH' propaganda was Ivone Kirkpatrick, born in India in 1887, educated at Downside; he had also worked in Intelligence from 1916-1918.<sup>59</sup> Subsequently he was appointed First Secretary in Berlin 1933-1938, and had interpreted for Chamberlain at Bad Godesburg and was present at Munich in 1938.

The role of 'EH' was to produce all forms of propaganda to enemy countries. As soon as territory was occupied by the enemy the responsibility passed from the Ministry of Information to 'EH'. The department also began to liaise with the Communication Section of the Intelligence Service and for a while operated a short-wave transmitter which was used to broadcast propaganda to the German people purporting to come from a Conservative anti-Nazi group inside Germany. During the 'phoney-war' period three or four leaflets a month were produced and scattered over Germany 'instead of bombs'.<sup>60</sup>

During the same period and working alongside 'EH' the intelligence community in Whitehall was also expanding and two organisations emerged in 1938 which were later to be fused in the Special Operations Executive under Hugh Dalton<sup>61</sup>. Initially

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<sup>57</sup>See also Select Biography.

<sup>58</sup>John Baker-White, *The Big Lie*. (London: Evans 1955). p. 52.

<sup>59</sup>See Select Biography.

<sup>60</sup>PRO/FO898/290 cited in Balfour, *Propaganda in War*. p.90.

<sup>61</sup>See Select Biography.

they were under the control of the Special Intelligence Services. These two organisations marked the beginning of a major innovation in the war, the use of sabotage and subversion. In March 1938 Section 'D' (for Destruction) was established and headed by Major-General Laurence Grand, an Officer of the Royal Engineers whose Admiral was Hugh Sinclair then 'C', Chief of SIS. Section 'D' was involved in undercover operations to counter Nazi predominance in small countries that Germany had just conquered, or was plainly threatening. Kim Philby found his way into SIS through his appointment to Section D in July 1940, and was instructed to report to Guy Burgess at an address in Caxton Street, London.<sup>62</sup> The second organisation, GS(R) was a small, War Office funded, research section concentrating on tactics of guerilla warfare and whose Head was Major J. C. F. Holland.<sup>63</sup> In March 1939, after the German occupation of Prague, GS(R) was incorporated into the Military Intelligence Department, given the new title MI(R) and moved offices next to Section 'D'. Section 'D' expanded rapidly after the outbreak of war, eventually employing 140 officers by July 1940 - more than the main body of SIS.<sup>64</sup> Ian Walmsley, who went on to work for the German Section producing the Weekly reports, was recruited by Grand and initially worked for Section 'D', although he did not know the name of the organisation; he then moved over to 'EH' in 1939 and then PID/PWE in 1940. Christopher Andrew believes that 'if Grand achieved little else, he at least accustomed some senior civil servants and Ministers to the unheard-of idea that a secret department specialising in sabotage and subversion could contribute to the war effort'.<sup>65</sup>

The relationship of 'EH' and the wider intelligence community is clear. The JIC were aware of the need to have accurate information about the internal social and political conditions in enemy countries, and arranged to receive intelligence reports of the

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<sup>62</sup>Howe, *The Black Game*. p. 31.

<sup>63</sup>Andrew, *Secret Service*. (1986). p. 658.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid. p. 659.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid. p. 660.

Analysis of German Propaganda from 'EH' at the beginning of the war. Within months, the JIC had requested a named representative from 'EH' to attend meetings in which they had an interest.<sup>66</sup>

This early evolution of the organisations for propaganda, sabotage and subversion occurred within a political climate in Britain profoundly shaped by Chamberlain's appeasement policy. The principles during this time were, as already mentioned above, those put forward and followed by the Enemy Propaganda Department in 1918. That is the distinction between the German people and the Nazis and the need to appeal to the German people to 'throw off' Hitler's dictatorial regime in favour of a western liberal democratic style of government. It was acknowledged that there existed a separation between the Nazi regime and the German people, and at this stage the 'enemy' was clearly the Nazi regime, all it stood for and all who supported it. In clear contrast the German people were identified as the 'other' Germany consisting of all the 'ordinary' German people who were anti-Nazi and recognised as being oppressed by the terror and coercion of the regime. British propaganda policy during the 'phoney-war' period was based on the question : 'How can Germany free itself from the yoke of Fascism?'.<sup>67</sup>

But the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 23rd August, 1939 followed by the invasion of Poland and the declaration of war began a process of change in public opinion in Britain at all levels. British propaganda initially supported the principles of the government propaganda departments of 1918 and 1938 and continued to attempt to drive a wedge between the German people and the Nazi regime. Chamberlain confirmed the government's policy in 1939 towards Germany in a speech on 4th September, when he said that Britain was not fighting the German people but a tyrannical regime which

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<sup>66</sup>See Introduction. pp.22-23.

<sup>67</sup>Conrad Putter in Gerhard Hirschfeld (Ed), *Exile in Great Britain*. (Oxford: Berg 1984) p. 157.

had betrayed them.<sup>68</sup> The years 1939 and 1940, however, were to witness a change in attitudes, strategy and politics in Britain towards Germany and the German people which was reflected in a drastic re-appraisal and re-organisation of the existing departments of propaganda, subversion and sabotage.

At the outbreak of war Law Lord Macmillan was the Minister of Information, but almost as soon as the announcement of the war with Germany was made the scheme put forward by the CID immediately began to break down. The system for control of information and censorship did not work, and created embarrassing and potentially dangerous blunders at the beginning of the war. The Press were suspicious of the Ministry, fearing it would restrict their freedom and resented tight governmental centralised control. The failure of government to address and resolve the issues raised during the previous two years had resulted in the creation of a large organisation, which by 1939 employed nearly 1,000 people, without the policy decisions being made which were vital to the work it had to do. The work of the Ministry was also seriously jeopardised by the rapid succession of Directors and Ministers during the first year of the war. Tallents, having been thanked for his work during the Munich Crisis was, according to Balfour, asked to resign his post in January, 1939.<sup>69</sup> According to Grant, however, he was dismissed when he pushed for greater centralisation in the aftermath of Munich.<sup>70</sup> It was, however, probably a combination of these two events and the 'final straw' of the confrontation with Campbell Stuart who had been asked by the Prime Minister to set up an organisation ('EH') for enemy propaganda in the event of war. This was a department which would be responsible to the Minister of Information and yet Tallents had been kept in ignorance of its existence. Lord Perth, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, was appointed the first Director-General of the Ministry of Information, but within months was replaced

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<sup>68</sup>Goldman, 'Germans and Nazis: The controversy over 'Vansittartism' in Britain'. p. 161.

<sup>69</sup>Balfour, *Propaganda in War*. p. 55.

<sup>70</sup>Grant, *Propaganda and the Role of the State*. p. 242.

by Findlater Stewart. But within weeks, Stewart was recalled to deal with an India crisis and in December 1939 he was replaced by a third Director-General, Kenneth Lee who was at that time the Chairman of Tootals. Lee stayed in post until August, 1940 when the work of 'EH' was absorbed into SOE.

In September, 1939 in response to these problems, Hore Belisha, the War Secretary, suggested that responsibility be put back to the individual departments and the Press left to deal with them direct. The Cabinet accepted this proposal and effectively reversed the basis on which the Ministry of Information had been founded, leaving it responsible only for publicity. The News and Censorship Division was made into a Bureau, responsible to the Home Office.

Macmillan resigned from the Ministry in December, 1939 and John Reith, who had refused the position in peace-time, was appointed Minister of Information in January 1940. But his stay was equally as short as Macmillan's and, as already indicated, he handed over responsibility to Duff Cooper in May of that year. This constant replacement of people at the top in the Ministry, which was badly in need of experience and consistency in organisation, resulted in a lack of organisation and misunderstandings about the role of the Ministry of Information and who should be in control of propaganda to the enemy.

As the German Army swept across Europe defeating Poland, invading Finland and Scandinavia attitudes in Britain towards the German people hardened. On 10th May, the German 4th Panzer Division crossed the River Meuse in Belgium on their way to France. At 4.30pm Chamberlain announced his resignation. A new government was formed, including members from all political parties and Winston Churchill became Prime Minister. He also took on the role of Minister of Defence, with additional authority as head of a special Defence Committee consisting of himself and the Chiefs of Staff. Duff Cooper replaced Reith at the Ministry of Information.

Within two weeks the failure of the British bomber offensive to halt the German advance was matched by the failure of French troops on the ground, and towards the

end of May the decision had been taken to withdraw all British troops from the European continent at Dunkirk. The fall of France in the last weeks of June, 1940 brought home to Churchill and the War Cabinet the utter failure of regular warfare. After long and detailed technical and military briefings the conclusion was that for the foreseeable future if Hitler retained control of Europe, Britain could not launch a land attack.

The failure of regular warfare and the failure of the propagandists' attempts to 'persuade' the German people to reject the Nazi regime combined to suggest that both British strategy and policy needed to change. The previous conflicts and change of leadership at the Ministry of Information were recognised to have seriously weakened the ability to provide a fast, co-ordinated and effective propaganda campaign. Campbell Stuart had taken advantage of the problems within the Ministry to retain and increase his responsibilities at 'EH' and had been personally successful in that operation. But his department had made no significant contribution to the war effort and Churchill became immediately involved in propaganda and subversion activities. The situation in 1940 did not allow Churchill to enter the political debate concerning the moral problems of the use of propaganda or the desirability of using this 'ungentlemanly' technique. Importantly, Churchill's opinion of the War Cabinet as being 'hidebound, devoid of imagination, extravagant of manpower and slow'<sup>71</sup> was a forceful element in the decision to take control of the situation himself.

It was also a decision based upon Churchill's perception of his role and responsibility as Prime Minister at such a dangerous moment in the nation's history. Whilst it has been argued that Churchill remained unconvinced about the effectiveness of political warfare,<sup>72</sup> the decision nevertheless reflects Churchill's perception of his role as a

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<sup>71</sup>Alex Danchev, 'Dilly-Dally, or Having the Last Word: Field Marshall Sir John Dill and Prime Minister Winston Churchill', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 22 (1987). pp. 21-44. p. 21.

<sup>72</sup>This seems to be the consensus. See Balfour, *Propaganda in War* and Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm*.

politician who realised that 'the business of the politician is to consider not merely what is morally and theoretically desirable, but also the forces which exist in the world, and how they can be directed or manipulated to probable partial realisation of the ends in view.'<sup>73</sup> Propaganda and subversion were existing forces which, despite the problems of ethics and organisational difficulties, in 1940 were still available forces for the defence of Britain. Typically Churchill ignored the traditional route of diplomatic discussion and debate and, within days of the fall of France, he summoned Dalton, an anti-appeaser and Minister of Economic Warfare, to Downing Street where he gave him the 'secret' job of pulling together the existing but disparate strands of propaganda and subversion operations. Dalton's outlook on European affairs which was directed by his distrust and fear of Germany made him the ideal candidate to take over the 'black' propaganda and subversion operations against Germany.<sup>74</sup> Dalton's view of Germany was summed up in a private note to Eden, written in 1942 when he was Labour spokesman for Foreign Affairs, in which he put forward his ideas about the future for Germany and in which he stressed that 'Germany is, and will remain, even though defeated, the greatest potential danger to the world's peace and the lives of our children'.<sup>75</sup>

In assigning Dalton to Special Operations with the task of 'setting Europe ablaze' Churchill had already made the decision that Campbell Stuart's long career in propaganda was effectively over. Stuart was too closely associated with Chamberlain's policy and, identified as an appeaser, he had little chance of survival under Churchill's premiership. Stuart left Britain for a trip to Canada in June 1940 and returned to find he was very quickly marginalised and then disregarded in 'EH', his work and people being absorbed into Dalton's new organisation. Stuart's position in 'EH' was taken over by Rex Leeper whose political opinion and attitudes towards

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<sup>73</sup>E. H. Carr, *What is History ?* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988). p. 128.

<sup>74</sup>J. T. Grantham, 'Hugh Dalton and the International Post-War Settlement : Labour Party Foreign Policy Formulation, 1943-44'. *Journal of Contemporary History* . 14 (1979). pp. 713-729. p. 714.

<sup>75</sup>T. D. Burridge. *British Labour and Hitler's War*. (London: Andre Deutsch 1976) p. 66.

Germany, like Dalton's, were opposed to Stuart's. He was anti-German and an anti-appeaser and his friendship with Vansittart and background in intelligence in WWI all combined to put him in the front running for Stuart's job.

Thus, within weeks of taking over as Prime Minister Churchill had given the work of 'black' propaganda and subversion operations to Dalton, moving it away from the Ministry of Information to the Ministry of Economic Warfare, and had replaced Stuart at 'EH' with Rex Leeper. Both appointments signalled the change in the future direction of propaganda and subversion activities in the war. There is still some debate concerning Churchill's views regarding the value of propaganda. According to Michael Balfour Churchill 'was not interested in the subject ... propaganda was not going to win the war'.<sup>76</sup> However, Churchill's decisive engagement with these issues indicates that he felt propaganda and political warfare to be potentially important factors in the war effort at this time.

Two other issues had also been instrumental in the changing policy adopted by Churchill in June, 1940. The first was the lack of conviction in Britain of the ability to win the war after the fall of France in May, 1940. The second was the growing polarisation of public opinion in Britain about the German people, with the 'Vansittart' view supported by Churchill, Eden, Ernest Bevin and certain members of the Labour Party becoming more popular. Added to this, the principles, strategy and policy of 'EH' had now been proved to be a failure. The role of propaganda pre-1940 was now called into question as the nature of the Nazi regime and the German people was once again debated. With the German Army now only a few miles across the British Channel the 'soft-line' approach of the Chamberlain Government in propaganda to the German people also appeared to have been a serious error of judgement, and the previous distinction between the two Germanys was increasingly questioned.

At the beginning of 1940 'EH' had already started to shift propaganda from anti-Nazi

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<sup>76</sup> Balfour, *Propaganda in War*. p. 65.



to a generally anti-German line. In the Spring of 1940 the BBC felt it was no longer possible to make the distinction between the Party and the people and it was decided that the term 'Nazi' should be excluded from news bulletins and 'opposition was now crystallizing into a distinctive doctrine similar to Vansittart's'.<sup>77</sup> Throughout the period Vansittart had continued his criticism of the British propaganda line towards Germany, producing pamphlets and making the 'Black Record' radio broadcasts. This 'hard-line', making less of a distinction between the 'good' and 'bad' in Germany, now began to win support in both the British Cabinet and the Press. In March, 1940 he proclaimed that 'Eighty per cent of the German race are the moral and political scum of the earth .. they have got to be hamstrung and broken .. they are a race of bone-headed aggressors'.<sup>78</sup>

The Battle of Britain in July 1940 had the effect of reinforcing this attitude . Sefton Delmer noted that 'the promises of an independent and self-determined future for Germany .. were no longer desired to be heard'.<sup>79</sup> Eden outlined this change in feelings and mood 'I have no confidence in our ability to make decent Europeans of the Germans and I believe that the Nazi system represents the mentality of the great majority of the German people'.<sup>80</sup> The fundamental principle that a distinction had to be made between Germans and Nazis was now challenged by events abroad and the 'image' of the German people suffering under the 'yoke of fascism' was incrementally replaced by an 'image' of an aggressive, militaristic and expansionist nation led by the Nazi regime which had the full support of the German people. It was in this climate that Churchill took the decision to increase propaganda and subversion activities, based on the principle that the enemy was one Germany. The distinction between the 'two' Germanys had in effect disappeared.

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<sup>77</sup>Goldman, 'Germans and Nazis: The Controversy Over 'Vansittartism' in Britain'. p. 161.

<sup>78</sup>Cited by Anthony Glees in G. Hirschfeld (Ed), *Exile in Great Britain*. (Oxford : Berg 1984). p. 88.

<sup>79</sup>Cited by Conrad Putter in *Ibid.* p. 141.

<sup>80</sup>Cited by Anthony Glees in *Ibid.* p. 96.

One of the most important results of this changed attitude was the impact it was to have on the attempt by various individuals over the previous two years to open up negotiations with the British Government which would bring a negotiated peace settlement. Churchill's directive issued on 20th January 1941, in response to a peace feeler coming from a Swedish Baron named Knud Bonde began what was to become the 'establishment' position on policy towards Germany. He had approached Lord Halifax in December 1939 in the name of Goring with a peace feeler. Halifax responded and when Bonde appeared in January 1941 with a similar message Churchill sent a note to Anthony Eden saying that Halifax had been entirely misled in December and that 'Our attitude towards all such enquiries should be absolute silence'.<sup>81</sup> From now on peace feelers and attempts by the German resistance to open up discussions with the British Government were dismissed out of hand. As Klemperer points out, although Churchill had never subscribed to the Vansittart arguments 'one by one all distinctions between Germans and Nazis faded'.<sup>82</sup> Klemperer argues that this decision reflects Churchill's resolve to end the war militarily through forging a Grand Coalition against Hitler and that it actually pre-empted Roosevelt's demand for Unconditional Surrender in 1943. It also pre-empted the conditions attached to the Atlantic Charter of August 9th 1941 made between Roosevelt and Churchill which in effect denied Britain any possibility of taking unilateral action in attempting to negotiate with Germany a compromise peace. In August Churchill gained support from Roosevelt on the basis of a promise not to make any secret 'deals' with Germany, a decision he had already taken seven months earlier.

In his new role as head of Special Operations, Dalton acted quickly and established two separate but associated departments to bring together the previously dispersed and uncoordinated departments of 'EH', MI(R) and Section 'D'. SO1 took over the 'black' operations of 'EH' and MI(R) (propaganda and intelligence), and Section 'D' (subversion and deception) became SO2. At the same time the intelligence operations

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<sup>81</sup>Klemperer, *German Resistance Against Hitler*. p. 218.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

of SOE were increased when John Baker-White was summoned by the Director of Military Intelligence who instructed him that he was to become involved in political warfare activities which had now been extended to cover the German armed forces. His job was to start a daily special broadcast programme, liaising with the BBC and Ministry of Information, and also to become involved in leaflet and rumour campaigns. In *The Big Lie* Baker-White stated that the job was 'right up my street .. I have been in the game since 1923 fighting communism'.<sup>43</sup> Baker-White had an extensive knowledge of the German past and in common with those now being appointed by Churchill's government had an equally negative view of Germany and the German people. He strongly condemned all those who had been 'hoodwinked' by Goebbels and Hitler, in particular Sir Neville Henderson. Baker-White had intimate contacts with the Nazi underground, and especially with Ribbentrop's personal espionage service, and had information of everyone in France working for Germany. The initial staff allocated to Baker-White consisted of three young officers recruited from the German Section, namely Euan Butler, Paul Bretherton and Ian Colvin. On their first visit to the BBC they were met 'with a cold suspicion just short of hostility'.<sup>44</sup> According to Baker-White, Butler specialised in the Nazi hierarchy and knew many of them intimately; Bretherton had lived in Germany 'knew how their minds worked and talked their language'.<sup>45</sup> Colvin had been the News Chronicle correspondent in Berlin in the early 1930s where he had established secret contacts with some of the important German generals and also with individuals who saw in the 'Hitler Movement' the 'approaching ruin of their native land'.<sup>46</sup> Baker-White later bemoaned the loss of all three to PID/PWE in 1941.

The open propaganda work of 'EH' was left temporarily with Duff Cooper in the Ministry of Information. Menzies at SIS had hoped that 'D' and MI(R) would stay

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<sup>43</sup>John Baker-White, *The Big Lie*. (London: Evans Bros. 1955.) p. 11.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. pp. 55-56.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid. p. 55.

<sup>46</sup>Winston S. Churchill. *The Second World War. Volume I. The Gathering Storm*. (London: Cassell and Co. 1948) p. 64.

under his control and expand SIS, but in fact Churchill's decision took sabotage and subversion away from SIS and 'black' propaganda away from the Ministry of Information. Whilst Menzies was unhappy with this situation but took no action Duff Cooper, as Minister of Information, vehemently resented the loss of the 'black' activities of 'EH' and began a battle with Dalton to keep all propaganda activities under the single control of the Ministry of Information. Dalton argued that all forms of verbal approach to the populations of enemy and enemy-occupied countries should be co-ordinated and under the control of one Minister. In November, 1940 Dalton attempted to gain control of the remaining 'white' propaganda operations of 'EH', but Cooper reacted forcefully and demanded SO1 back. Cooper's argument was based on his conviction that 'open' and 'secret' propaganda should be handled separately but within one Ministry, namely the Ministry of Information. This, of course, was in direct contrast to the idea of bringing propaganda, sabotage and subversion activities all together within the SOE.

According to John Charmley, Cooper found himself in an impossible position at the Ministry of Information with a department lacking in the necessary support from Churchill in his efforts to find a role for the Ministry. In September of 1940 he was, according to his wife, bored and worried about his own position and believed that Churchill now hated him. One of the reasons for this was that as well as battling with Dalton and having little support from Churchill, he was convinced that Beaverbrook, a friend of Churchill, wanted control of the Ministry of Information for himself.<sup>87</sup> Cooper's health deteriorated as Dalton continued to fight for the control of all enemy propaganda within SOE. In December 1940 Dalton again tried to gain the upper hand in the row and failed, and Churchill appointed Sir John Anderson to act as mediator between the two warring departments.

In the Spring of 1941 Cooper made plans to appoint his own staff for propaganda and tried to get some of his own people back into the Ministry of Information, but was thwarted when Dalton learned of these plans and refused to part with any of his

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid. p.145.

people. Cooper's reaction was to demand that the people, expertise and activities of 'EH' which he felt had been too quickly absorbed into Dalton's 'empire' should be returned to the Ministry of Information. The row which had been simmering just under the surface between Dalton and Cooper now exploded into the open, and Sir John Anderson was once more summoned to try to resolve the differences between the two Ministers. The result was that on 16th May a triumvirate was formed with Eden, Duff Cooper and Dalton who would control their own staffs but co-operate with each other, but essentially the conclusion was that the responsibilities for propaganda and subversion operations should stay as they were; Dalton would be responsible for secret propaganda and subversion operations and Duff Cooper for open propaganda. Despite acceptance by all three Ministers this did not solve the problems, and Churchill brought in his trusted advisor, Lord Beaverbrook in a final attempt to sort out the differences between Dalton and Cooper.<sup>88</sup> On May 30th Beaverbrook sent for Bruce Lockhart and advised him that Eden wanted to make him an Under-Secretary and to co-ordinate policy and 'black' propaganda. Obviously Eden was also unhappy with the failure of the triumvirate of Ministers and had decided to try to solve it by appointing Lockhart, an experienced diplomat and at the time working for 'EH' and the Political Intelligence Department. Lockhart's career had begun in 1912 when he was sent to Moscow as vice-consul where he stayed until being recalled in 1917. At the outbreak of World War Two he rejoined the Foreign Office and worked for the Political Intelligence Department before moving on to become Director-General of the PWE.<sup>89</sup> Lockhart was advised to accept the post, but informed Beaverbrook that unless the friction between the Minister of Information and the Propaganda Department was resolved his task would be 'useless'.<sup>90</sup> The outcome of further negotiations was what Lockhart called 'a thoroughly bad compromise' with propaganda being placed under the control of a ministerial Committee composed of

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<sup>88</sup>According to Eden, Churchill's 'affection for Beaverbrook was a blend of sincere admiration and of a generation of political experiences shared together'. Eden, *The Reckoning*. p. 251.

<sup>89</sup> See pp. 101-103. and Select Biography.

<sup>90</sup>Lockhart, *Comes The Reckoning*. p. 117.

Eden, as Chairman, Cooper and Dalton.<sup>91</sup> Again Lockhart was asked to accept the job as Deputy-Under Secretary of State, and he replied that he would need time to think about it, feeling that he was being used to provide an easy and temporary solution to a 'silly ministerial squabble'.<sup>92</sup>

However, the weekend of June 22nd 1941 was to prove decisive in Lockhart's imminent entry into the propaganda field. He had accepted an invitation to spend the weekend with Lord Beaverbrook. During his stay Beaverbrook was hastily summoned by Churchill to help prepare a speech, and at 9pm Lockhart listened to Churchill's broadcast speech, which was an announcement of the German attack on Russia, and which Lockhart believed to have been 'perhaps his most important speech of the war'.<sup>93</sup> When Beaverbrook returned at 10pm on the night of the speech he had details for Lockhart of plans for the re-construction of propaganda activities and again asked Lockhart to accept the position he had been offered. Feeling that it was now a duty to accept he did so and his appointment was announced in Parliament on July 3rd.

On the 15th July Lockhart made his first report to Eden 'During the past fortnight I have made a much closer inspection of a situation which has been vaguely familiar to me since the beginning of the war. I found the confusion, overlapping and lack of organisation even greater than I had believed possible'.<sup>94</sup> At the same time the war between Dalton and Cooper over propaganda policy was being conducted at the highest level in Whitehall. Cooper wrote to Churchill suggesting the time had come to make some decision about the role of the Ministry of Information and a few days later made it plain that he would resign unless the serious problems within the

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid. p. 118.

<sup>94</sup>Ellic Howe, *The Black Game*. p. 50.

Ministry of Information and the conflict over 'EH' were resolved to his advantage.<sup>95</sup> Again he received the minimum of support in the Cabinet, and celebrated his last day at the Ministry of Information by dining at the Dorchester with Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart. The vacant post of Minister of Information was given to Brendan Bracken, Churchill's Parliamentary Private Secretary, who in fact continued the battle with Dalton over the future of SOE.

During this period Dalton put forward plans to the Joint Planning Staff for a subversion operation in Europe with the aim of producing a single, sudden and complete revolt in the enemy-occupied countries of Europe.<sup>96</sup> In essence the proposals involved using the manpower of occupied Europe to support the Allies. This was not a plan to encourage or foster guerilla warfare in the occupied territories, but a plan to train and arm patriots in preparation for 'single, sudden and complete' uprisings in carefully chosen occupied territories. The role of the British armed forces would be to isolate the area from German military intervention, to assist the patriots in capturing key areas and to destroy the enemy within the theatre of operations. The plans also incorporated the use of the air force to interrupt German communications and the navy, where possible, to land more troops who would assist the patriots and also protect the bases and harbours on which these forces depended. The overall strategy was to move from one chosen area to another and eventually to bring about a 'general political insurrection throughout Europe ... which would reproduce the condition of Ireland in 1920 or Palestine in 1936'. However, after consideration these plans were rejected because of the serious logistical and political problems involved. The rejection of these plans signalled the death of the 'Fourth Arm' concept of subversion as a separate and equally important weapon of war alongside the other 'traditional' weapons. More importantly for Dalton was that the rejection also relegated the importance of subversion from an independent to a subsidiary weapon, and undeniably weakened the strength of his arguments for keeping SOE intact. .

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<sup>95</sup>Charmley, *Duff Cooper*. p. 150.

<sup>96</sup>Gwyer and Butler, *Grand Strategy*. Vol. III. pp.42-48.

Within weeks, on 8th August, 1941 the Ministerial Committee appointed by Anderson on 16th May (now with Bracken replacing Cooper) put forward an outline for the separation of 'black' propaganda activities from SOE which was subsequently approved by the Prime Minister. Bracken, Dalton and Eden would act as the Standing Ministerial Committee to deal with major problems of propaganda policy and would be supported by an 'official' Committee of three: Robert Bruce Lockhart, Rex Leeper and Brigadier Dallas Brooks.

What is interesting is the choice of people for the 'official' committee. Aware of the problems of the past between Cooper and Dalton which had resulted in inefficient and unsatisfactory organisation and running of the propaganda war, it appears that Bracken and Eden worked together to ensure that Dalton did not win the next battle, which they assumed he would instigate in his 'war' to retain SOE. At first glance it would appear that the three 'officials' would represent their respective departments on an equal basis. But Lockhart's appointment as Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Leeper, like Lockhart a Foreign Office 'man', and Brooks who had worked for both at 'EH' ensured that the Foreign Office would have control. Dalton, obviously aware of this, suggested that the three 'officials' should not head the department but co-ordinate and direct the policy of government. Bracken and Eden accepted, and the three worked to produce a solution to the problems they faced. On 14th August Lockhart, Leeper and Brooks produced outline proposals for the make-up of the new organisation. Basically that certain sections of the Ministry of Information, BBC and SO1 should be brought together into one department to be known as the Political Warfare Executive.

Dalton rejected these proposals immediately, confirming the view that he was still determined to keep SOE together. He claimed that if 'black' propaganda were to be returned to the Ministry of Information he would lose half of his organisation which would be to act against the charter given to him by Churchill in July 1940. The conflict between Dalton and Bracken was far more vicious and personal than the one Dalton had conducted against Cooper, resulting in what Ben Pimlott has described as the deplorable situation that 'Instead of body-line bowling at the Hun, there was the



degradation of the Whitehall War' - Dalton and Bracken's war.<sup>97</sup> Lockhart told Eden on 11th August that Dalton was again halting any progress and that SOE's charter might have to be amended to allow their plans for the organisation of the PWE to go ahead. Eden, however, did not comply with Lockhart's request and instead told him that the Executive Committee did not think it appropriate at this time to alter the charter in any way.<sup>98</sup> On 22nd August, 1941 Lockhart once more wrote to Eden referring to the Standing Ministerial Committee of the day before, and bringing to Eden's attention the 'deplorable situation in which our propaganda machinery has been for a long time and still is', with 'most of the energy which should have been directed against the enemy has been dissipated in inter-departmental strife and jealousies'. Furthermore, he added, 'If our war effort is not to suffer, it is of paramount importance that our propaganda machine should be put in order at the earliest possible moment'.<sup>99</sup> Eden, marked the last passage in red and noted to Alexander Cadogan 'If this is still the position I shall have to take the whole business to the Cabinet. I have done all I can do to bring the warring departments together'.<sup>100</sup>

Eden's reply to Lockhart that SOE's charter could not be altered brought a swift and angry reply from the 'official' committee. On September 1st Lockhart, Leeper and Dallas Brooks penned an angry and joint reply to the Ministers stating that they believed their plan had been rejected as a result of the internal problems between the Ministers. On the 27th August D. Stephens (secretary) had received a memo signed by Dalton and Bracken, and in agreement with the Foreign Secretary they wanted the committee to 'submit as soon as possible proposed arrangements for providing the staff required for the complete fusion of personnel of the Ministry of Information, the

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<sup>97</sup>Ben Pimlott, *Hugh Dalton*. (London: Jonathan Cape 1985). p. 340.

<sup>98</sup>Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm*. p. 25.

<sup>99</sup> 'Memorandum from Lockart to Eden, 22 August 1941'. PRO/ FO 898/10.

<sup>100</sup> 'Note from Eden to Cadogan, 25th August 1941'. PRO/ FO898/10.

BBC and SO1 and include appointments in each area of a Regional Head'.<sup>101</sup> Their plan was the only basis for the efficient organisation of propaganda. Dalton tried once more to hold on to SO1, arguing that the PWE's activities outside Britain must be conducted through SOE, thus making him controller of all propaganda operations. Brendan Bracken was no more willing to accept this proposal than Cooper had been in 1940, and in the knowledge of his friendship with Churchill which Dalton did not have he refused Dalton's suggestion. Dalton, unpopular with civil servants in Downing Street and also vindictive in his remarks about his fellow civil servants in Whitehall was unwise in his outspoken pronouncements. He thought Eden to be a 'vain, feminine creature', and declared that he could not decide which was worse 'Eden's green eyes or Bracken's brainless bad manners'.<sup>102</sup> Bracken used Dalton's unpopularity in Whitehall and his own relationship with Churchill and Eden to weaken and undermine his position, and eventually in the Summer of 1941 the inter-Ministerial war was resolved in Bracken's favour. Dalton had now lost the war over propaganda, and the organisation for the PWE went ahead, splitting SO1 away from Dalton's 'empire' and incorporating it with the BBC European sections, and the Foreign Publicity Division of the Ministry of Information.

The battles between Cooper and Dalton, and then between Dalton and Bracken were in essence the problems of Ministers arguing about the 'traditional' responsibilities of particular Ministries. Bracken believed that he should be in control of propaganda, and therefore fought to bring back the 'black' operations of 'EH' under the responsibility of the Ministry of Information. Dalton's determination to keep SOE together produced a conflict in essence concerned with the Ministerial location of propaganda. 'Traditionally it had been within the remit of the Ministry of Information, and Churchill's decision to set up SOE had broken that tradition. A year later Dalton was moved to the Board of Trade and his successor at the Ministry of Economic Warfare was made responsible for subversion operations only. This left

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<sup>101</sup> 'Memorandum from Dalton and Bracken to Stephens, 27th August 1941'. PRO/FO898/10.

<sup>102</sup>Balfour Conference paper 1992.

Bracken at the Ministry of Information and Eden in control of the PWE, in effect returning propaganda and political warfare to its traditional location in Whitehall.

The PWE emerged in August 1941, fourteen months after Dalton had been given responsibility for propaganda and subversion and after a great deal of damage had been done to the war effort by the inability or unwillingness of the Ministers concerned to put responsibility to the country before their own careers. Only when the German army had taken France and were within striking distance of Britain did this situation change. During the battles within Whitehall, in June 1941 Hitler had launched Operation Barbarossa on Russia, and America and Britain were now committed to give Russia as much help as possible and had produced the Atlantic Charter which, as already discussed above, gave Churchill exactly what he wanted at no cost to British policy. America's entry into the war in December of 1941 sealed the fate of Germany, which would be a total military defeat, a message sent unremittingly to the German people. A Report at the end of 1942 assessing the impact on German morale of the latest Soviet offensive and Allied operations in North Africa illustrates the disappearance of the distinction of the 'two' Germanys : 'war weariness and general apathy are now established traits of German morale' and that although 'propaganda as such is largely discredited ...none-the-less it has been effective in persuading the German nation that in defeat it will be annihilated, and therefore they must stand or fall with the Nazi regime'.<sup>103</sup>

In conclusion the situation in Europe in 1940 left Churchill with few options, and one of them was the use of propaganda, subversion and sabotage as an independent weapon alongside the 'traditional' instruments of war. The fusing together of 'EH' (propaganda) and MI(R) (intelligence) into SO1 and Section 'D' (subversion and deception) into SOE was seen at the time to be an important step. For some months between May 1940 and June 1941 the potential for SOE to become an integral part of the war been taken very seriously in Whitehall. Whether Churchill was personally

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<sup>103</sup> 'Memorandum from the War Cabinet entitled "Morale in Germany" dated 24th December 1942'. PRO/ F0371/34425 File No.55.

convinced of the potential power of propaganda or subversion is not important, the reality was that he had the organisations already existing which he believed he could bring together as a useful instrument of war.

The decision to split up SOE and establish the PWE in 1941 was the result of a number of factors. The continued failure of the military forces to change the course of the war was compounded by the recognition of the limitations of the subversion and sabotage operations of SOE. Changing attitudes in Britain towards Germany had resulted in the gradual disappearance of the distinction between the 'two' Germanys and the acknowledgement of the need for a harder line in propaganda to answer the propaganda campaigns of the Ministry of Propaganda. The technical advances that had been made during the inter-war period and the first two years of the war had also resulted in the use of intelligence to anticipate enemy intentions, which could have been incorporated into propaganda campaigns. It was also recognised that the intelligence collected by the propagandists could have other uses and establishing SO1 as a separate entity would expand this potentially useful service. Finally, the organisational problems of SOE, resulting mainly from internal conflict and rivalry, had seriously jeopardised Britain's potential for an effective propaganda campaign against the enemy and promised to continue to do so. The rational and logical decision was taken, to separate the warring factions in the hope that SO1 and SO2 would function effectively as separate departments in a way that had proved impossible during the preceding twelve months.

## CHAPTER THREE

### The Political Warfare Executive.

During the summer of 1941, the plans put forward by Lockhart, Leeper and Dallas Brooks were implemented and the PWE was set up with Eden, Bracken and Dalton taking joint ministerial responsibility. However, the records of the House of Commons for 11th September 1941 when Churchill announced the formation of the PWE, clearly indicate that specific responsibility had been transferred to Bracken. Although the Prime Minister announced that the joint ministerial responsibility was shared by the Ministers of Information and Economic Warfare and the Foreign Secretary, in reply to a question from King-Hall asking which Minister would answer Questions about the new executive Churchill replied that 'There can be no Question on secret matters. On all other matters, to the Minister of Information'.<sup>1</sup>

The fact that ministerial control of the PWE was still jointly shared illustrated the continuing problems at that level over the control of propaganda and political warfare. The operational activities of 'EH' which were absorbed into the PWE continued to be based at the Riding Stables, Woburn and the London base was 2, Fitzmaurice Place which was also the location for the Political Intelligence Department and which the PWE used as a 'cover' until the end of the war.<sup>2</sup> Lockhart, as Deputy Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office was appointed Chairman and responsible for the day-to-day running of the Executive and liaison with the Foreign Office. As we have seen, he was assisted by two Regional Directors, Rex Leeper who was responsible for the 'Country' Headquarters, and Ivone Kirkpatrick who was responsible for liaison with the BBC. Major Dallas Brooks was appointed to the PWE from SO1 and his

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<sup>1</sup>Hansard 11th September, 1941. Column 294.

<sup>2</sup>'Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Standing Ministerial Committee and the Executive Committee [of the PWE], held on 17th September 1941'.PRO/FO 898/11.

responsibilities included liaison with the Chiefs of Staff, JIC and the Services.<sup>3</sup>

On 9th October, 1941 Bracken instigated a re-organisation of the elements of the BBC which were fundamentally important to the work of the PWE. The BBC Overseas department became External Services with separate divisions for European and Overseas operations. Tallents left the BBC and the existing Director of European Services also moved elsewhere, making room for Kirkpatrick to become Controller (European) Service and Noel Newsome to be appointed Director of European Broadcasts responsible for putting PWE policy into broadcasting terms. The work of the Executive was divided into seven Regional Directorates which were identified as France, Italy, the Balkans, the Low Countries (Holland and Belgium), Scandinavia (Norway and Denmark), Poland and Czechoslovakia, and Germany and Austria. The latter Directorate (Germany and Austria) was, for obvious reasons, the most important and had always had its own intelligence service, whilst the other six Directorates initially relied on the Foreign Office and the BBC for their intelligence. A Central Planning Section was introduced to carry out forward planning and to analyze the quality of propaganda output each week, and Ritchie Calder was appointed Director of Planning.<sup>4</sup> 'Open' propaganda was handled by the BBC, using directives from the propaganda department as guidelines although it should be stressed that the PWE had no authority over the BBC in this field. The Regional Directors submitted their Weekly Directives each week to Kirkpatrick before they went to the Executive and then to the BBC Regional Heads who had freedom in choice of items and presentation whilst keeping within the general framework laid down by the PWE. The fact that the BBC Editor-in-Chief was also responsible to Kirkpatrick meant that the directives and programmes based on these were in fact supervised by the same individual and although there were some problems between the two organisations this system did operate relatively successfully.

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<sup>3</sup>See also Select Biography.

<sup>4</sup>See also Select Biography.

Almost as soon as the Executive was created a committee, chaired by Sir Leonard Browett, was commissioned to streamline the organisation and in particular to look at the problem of overlapping in intelligence work between the BBC and the PWE.

At this time intelligence came from a variety of departments including the BBC Central News Room, BBC European Records Unit, BBC Overseas Research Unit, the PWE Propaganda Research Station and Press Cutting and Filing Library at Woburn, and the BBC News Information Bureau in Bush House. The PWE and PID also received information from the Foreign Research and Press Service ( which received information from The Royal Institute of International Affairs or 'Chatham House', based at Baliol College Oxford during the War) which reported directly to the Foreign Office.<sup>5</sup> The committee reported in November 1941 and recommended that the staff engaged in 'black' propaganda and the production of 'white' leaflets should remain at Woburn whilst all the other staff, particularly those who worked with the BBC, should be moved to London.<sup>6</sup> Additionally it was suggested that a PWE Central Intelligence Unit should be set up in London, and a Director of Intelligence should be appointed. Lockhart was asked to implement the recommendations. Again this proved to be difficult, since the BBC was reluctant to have their own departments moved to the PWE, and also because Dalton supported the Woburn people who objected to the move. They were also upset because Lockhart began to implement the decisions before the BBC had considered the report in total, but eventually in the early part of 1942 they did concede defeat. Regionalisation was introduced and PWE policy-making and some intelligence staff were moved to London, staffed largely by BBC staff to cater for the needs of the BBC and located on the top three floors of Bush House.

Acting on the recommendation of the Browett Report the Executive appointed Walter Adams' as Officer in Charge of Co-ordination of Propaganda Intelligence for the PWE, and Michael Balfour acted as Adams deputy until March, 1942. Balfour had

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<sup>5</sup>'Letter from Toynbee, Royal Institute of International Affairs to Rex Leeper at the Foreign Office, 7th October, 1939'. PRO/FO898/29.

<sup>6</sup>Howe, *The Black Game*. p. 51.

been working at Chatham House as part of a study group on 'Nationalism', moving to work for the Ministry of Information in 1939 and then to the PWE. In 1942 he worked as Assistant Director of Intelligence under Sir Eric Sachs and in 1943 went with Richard Crossman as Director of Intelligence for the Psychological Warfare Division/SHAEF until the end of the war. In July 1945 he was sent to Berlin as Director of Information Services Control after Lockhart told Balfour that there was a 'huge job' to be done in Germany which was a 'mess'.<sup>7</sup>

The establishment of the PWE, and the change of name from Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries to Political Warfare Executive, also reflected, as mentioned above, an important change in British strategy and policy towards Germany and the German people. The twin aims of the PWE which were attacking the enemy and supporting resistance in enemy-occupied countries explicitly rejected the acknowledgement of the existence of 'two' Germanys which had been the guiding principles of 'EH'. British propaganda policy was now focused on two issues, both based on the concept of the war now being a 'total war' where every member of German society was now a legitimate target. The first was that propaganda and political warfare must be used to attack the entire enemy population, both civilians and troops, by every available means. Secondly, the whole of the German nation must be made to understand that they were now identified as having to take some of the blame for the war because of their support for the Nazi regime.

The crucial problem for the PWE in 1941 was the divergence of opinion in Whitehall about the way in which propaganda could be used most effectively to pursue these two main objectives without producing a counter-productive effect. The more lenient view was that a tough, uncompromising line which reflected the most extreme 'vansittart' attitude could actually work against the Allies by forcing German public opinion into support for the Nazi regime and thus prolong the war. Opponents of this view warned that there was a great danger that a 'soft' or more liberal approach to the German people would go against the growing anti-German public opinion in

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<sup>7</sup>Interview with Michael Balfour. Birkbeck College, London. March 7th, 1991.



Britain, and in addition pointed out that such an approach had failed disastrously in World War One and with the inter-war policy of Appeasement.

An additional problem for the propagandists was what they perceived to be the failure amongst some Ministers and others in SOE and PWE to understand the distinction between 'preparatory' and 'operational' propaganda. In June, 1941 attempts had been made to define 'operational' which was 'that type of propaganda in which we attempt to persuade our listeners to *do* something rather than *feel* something'.<sup>8</sup> That is to incite the listener to take active measures to sabotage or subvert the enemy. At this time Ritchie Calder had replied that 'operational' propaganda had to be part of a wider strategy of economic disruption and military operations if it was to have any effect. This, of course, ties in exactly with the timing of the debate concerning the SOE plans for a campaign in Europe to support patriots in uprisings against the Germany forces. It was, as has already been discussed, rejected on logistical and political grounds. However, the question was raised once more in February 1942 when Calder chaired a committee to re-consider the use of 'operational' propaganda to Europe with special reference to the use of incitement to sabotage in open broadcasts. At this time SOE, not surprisingly given the events of July 1941, protested that this should be left to agents in the field. Nevertheless, it appears that SOE did eventually agree and Calder put forward plans to Lockhart for the use of open broadcasting to increase military action in the occupied countries by using the BBC to give instructions for subversive actions. But, on March 17th 1942, a 'divergence on the view of policy emerged' when the Regional Directors of the PWE articulated reservations about the plans and requested that the policy should not be mandatory.<sup>9</sup> The meeting to 'rubber stamp' the proposals was cancelled, Dallas Brooks went to see General Ismay and Lockhart had an interview with the Foreign Secretary. The outcome was that on March 24th Lockhart 'effectively killed the proposals, speaking against them with all the vigour at his command'.<sup>10</sup> The plans

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<sup>8</sup>Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm*. p. 50.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. p. 51.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. p. 52.

were abandoned, much to the astonishment of SOE and the PWE and Foreign Office who had agreed with them. There are three points that should be made here. The first is that the debate concerning the use of propaganda and subversion as an independent force for military insurrection in Europe had already been rejected at the highest level in Whitehall the year before. The second can be illustrated by looking, once more, at the Dalton and Bracken's relationship, but now during the early period of the PWE.

This continuation of 'discussions' between the departments about propaganda and subversion, which had only served to frustrate effective plans for action, had been repeated in the relationship between Bracken and Dalton. Whilst Lockhart worked to bring the PWE under control and working effectively, Bracken and Dalton's conflict continued unabated, characterised by the former's 'continual aggression, rudeness, and insulting baiting of Dalton'.<sup>11</sup> Dalton's opinion of Bracken was equally animated, describing him as 'rude, assertive, ignorant, inconsequential, stupid, angular and unreceptive'.<sup>12</sup> But Dalton either mis-read or misunderstood Bracken's position and dangerously over-estimated the relative strength of his own position. He was in fact in a much weaker position to quarrel with Bracken than he had been with Cooper. As Ben Pimlott pointed out, whilst Dalton thought Bracken was 'a guttersnipe', he was nevertheless 'a guttersnipe with influence. Influence of and in the Prime Minister'.<sup>13</sup> The conflict between Dalton and Bracken had been intensified by Bracken's decision to move the PWE back to London, a decision that had not been welcomed by everyone.

In the early months of 1942 the PWE had come under serious attack in the House of Commons, mainly on account of broadcasts to Germany which, according to Lockhart, many MPs thought were 'too friendly'.<sup>14</sup> Lockhart was growing weary

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<sup>11</sup>Ben Pimlott, *Hugh Dalton*. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985). p. 340.

<sup>12</sup>Balfour Conference Paper, 1991.

<sup>13</sup>Pimlott, *Hugh Dalton*. p. 344.

<sup>14</sup>Lockhart, *Comes The Reckoning*. p. 152.

of the many problems of the PWE, not least the current one of bringing the PWE to London whilst Dalton was supporting Woburn in their efforts to stay. He admitted that criticisms were justified, and that the PWE 'was deservedly in bad shape' and that it had few supporters in Whitehall.<sup>15</sup> However, changes were made and in February 1942 Dalton was finally moved from the Ministry of Economic Warfare to the Board of Trade. According to Howe and Cruickshank he was 'reluctant',<sup>16</sup> whilst Balfour maintains that he is sure that Bracken was determined to get Dalton out of propaganda 'by hook or by crook'.<sup>17</sup> He also believes Bracken's relationship with the Prime Minister had been close enough for him to persuade Churchill to offer Dalton the post, which in effect meant that Dalton had been 'kicked upstairs'.<sup>18</sup> According to Balfour, Dalton's greatest mistake was in thinking that the Labour Party would back him in the political arena for control of propaganda. Lockhart was also concerned about the support Dalton would get from the Labour Party.

But the Labour Party did not come to Dalton's aid, mainly because neither Attlee nor Bevin had any great affection for him and furthermore were unwilling to make the Prime Minister's job any more difficult than it already was in 1942. Consequently they did very little to support Dalton against Bracken, and the Conservatives, afraid that a socialist like Dalton would use his position to further his own creed also supported Bracken. Dalton, by now aware of his hopeless position, reluctantly accepted the new post but not before he had made one last attempt to influence the Labour Party. In a Minute sent to Eden on 6th March, he informed him that at the meeting of the Labour Party that day the future of the PWE would be considered, and that the Labour Party had a strong interest and a strong belief in political warfare and had a claim to be represented on the PWE. He added 'They are determined that Mr.

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Howe, *The Black Game*. p. 51. and Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm*. p. 34.

<sup>17</sup> Balfour, *Propaganda in War*. ff. 171. pp. 92.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

Bracken, whom they describe as "the Tory thug", shall not have control'.<sup>19</sup> Lockhart continued that the Labour Party would be content if Eden would assume full responsibility with a Parliamentary Under-Secretary to run the PWE for him. They did not, it seemed, want a Committee of three and if Eden did not wish to accept responsibility the Labour Party preferred a separate Ministry and Minister. Lockhart concluded that 'These views, I imagine, are sponsored by Dr. Dalton'.<sup>20</sup>

One of the most important outcomes of the discussions following Dalton's 'reluctant' departure was that his successor at the Ministry of Economic Warfare did not take over any of his responsibility for the PWE. Lockhart, was appointed Director General of the PWE and reported directly to Bracken who assumed responsibility for administration and Eden who took all policy decisions. Dalton's departure had effectively broken the ties which had produced so much conflict and aggravation, and in the process retarded progress in the propaganda field. To accept the proposals put forward by Calder would have been to reverse and negate the decision to exclude the Minister of Economic Warfare from propaganda activities which had been taken in order to achieve a co-ordinated and efficient propaganda department: Lockhart rejected Calder's plans and working with Eden and Bracken now brought the PWE firmly under Foreign Office control.

The third point about this whole episode is that it illustrates that, yet again, the inter-departmental politicking was still affecting the way in which Britain was failing to make the most of this potentially valuable weapon at a time when military successes still remained in Germany's favour. Thus, the first eight months of the PWE were characterised by the same well-worn conflicts and debates about who was doing what, why and how. However, with the departure of Dalton, Lockhart now had freedom to make more changes for the efficient functioning of the PWE. He immediately made Kirkpatrick a member of the Executive Committee and concentrated his efforts on moving the PWE to London. Also working with Kirkpatrick was Noel Newson

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<sup>19</sup>'Secret Minute from Lockhart to Eden', 6th March 1942.PRO/FO898/10.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

who, as Director of the BBC European Services, had the task of turning the PWE's policy into broadcasting items. Additional staff were appointed which included Ritchie Calder, Director of Plans and Operations, Hugh Carlton Greene who became Editor of the BBC German Service and his opposite number in the PWE, Richard Crossman who acted as Head of the German Section from 1941 to 1943. Working with Richard Crossman on specific projects was Ralph Murray (later Sir) who had initially worked with Walmsley in intelligence, and was then put in charge of the department's recording studios at Wavendon. Murray was closely involved in the plans and operations of Aspidistra.<sup>21</sup> He was assisted by Harold Robin, a technician funded by the SIS and attached to William Stephenson, a senior SIS member and Churchill's personal representative in the USA, and Director of British Security Co-ordination in the Western Hemisphere. Murray also worked with Crossman to produce plans for the Freedom Stations, where a small number of German political emigres were used as a result of the intimate knowledge of the particular countries to which they were broadcasting. The changing international situation and government policy and attitude towards the German people, however, resulted in the gradual exclusion and then dismissal of these political exiles from the PWE after 1942.

In April 1942, Lockhart suggested that the 'creakings that still occur in the PWE organisation has its roots in the absence of an effective planning system', and a Planning Section Committee was set up to resolve the problem.<sup>22</sup> An essential part of the planning within the PWE included the organisation for intelligence, and this aspect of the organisation also underwent a radical re-organisation during the last months of 1942.

The activities of the PWE relied on an efficient, accurate and timely intelligence service. As explained previously the German Section of 'EH' had its own

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<sup>21</sup>The powerful radio transmitter used to broadcast to enemy-occupied countries and located in Ashdown Forest, near Crowborough, Sussex. Howe, *The Black Game*. pp. 157-159. For details of Murray and Robin see Select Biography.

<sup>22</sup>'Most Secret and Personal Report "PWE Planning Organisation" from Lockhart, 6th April 1942'. PRO/O 898/10.

intelligence service supplied by the PID of the Foreign Office. This department was headed by A.R. Walmsley and supported by Valentine Williams, Ralph Murray and Leo Russell. Walmsley had worked on the analysis of German newspapers for both Grand (Section 'D') and Campbell Stuart for a short time before the two organisations were merged into SOE in 1940. On the day after Germany invaded Poland an intelligence department was set up comprising of Kirk, the Director of Communications at the Ministry of Information, Ian Colvin (ex SO1) , Joffe, Walmsley (who had worked in 'EH') and two secretaries.<sup>23</sup> Liaison with the Ministry of Economic Warfare was through Walter Ingrams. Together they produced a 'Daily Digest' of the content of Allied and German press and began setting up a Library. There was a weekly Saturday morning meeting attended by Rex Leeper, Dallas Brooks, Campbell Stuart and his assistants Gishford, Foss and Ryder. Foss had worked for the Daily Telegraph and also had experience in broadcasting, whilst Gishford had also worked as a journalist at Illustrated Newspapers and at the beginning of the war acted as Stuart's personal assistant at 'EH'. They also produced a weekly leaflet called 'Wokinger Beobachter', and a small four-page leaflet 'Londoner Post' which was sent to German addresses in neutral countries for distribution.

According to Walmsley, in the first twelve months of the war two major developments in intelligence work took place. In early November 1939 Walmsley, working at 'EH', experimented with a tentative quantitative analysis of German propaganda - BBC monitoring information - under set themes and Stuart commissioned a fortnightly report of German propaganda using this technique. This dealt with German home propaganda, propaganda to Britain, France and neutral countries. According to Walmsley this was the first systematic analysis of propaganda in this country which relied on quantitative analysis.<sup>24</sup> The second innovation, also in the field of propaganda analysis, was the deduction of enemy strategic intentions

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<sup>23</sup>A. R. Walmsley, 'EH/PID/PWE German and Austrian Intelligence. Recollections of A.R. Walmsley'. 20th January, 1946. Sent to me 5th February, 1995.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

from the analysis of enemy propaganda. Initially requested by Dallas Brooks who requested all possible information about German intentions of invading Britain, once the threat of invasion had passed this study was extended to all possible theatres of German operations.

The principles guiding this analysis were simple: to discover how German audiences had reacted to German propaganda, and how German propaganda responded to public opinion, to discover whether it was possible to identify patterns of behaviour. From the analysis of enemy propaganda Walmsley believed he could guess or anticipate the strategy of the Nazi regime, for instance by preparing the German people for particular military operations. This type of analysis was used in relation to German plans for the invasion of Britain, German expectations of defeating Russia, and from November 1943 onwards the possibility of the German retaliatory threats against Britain.

In March 1941 Walmsley asked Leeper for permission to begin 'morale research', feeling that the BBC were not providing enough information, or to be more specific the right 'type' of intelligence that he thought was vital to the success of the PWE. Leeper agreed to this and Dr. Klibansky, a lecturer in medieval philosophy at Oriel was engaged to help. Walmsley and Klibansky worked together, the latter becoming the expert in affairs concerning Italy whilst Walmsley continued working for the German Section. In June 1941 the 'Propaganda Man' was created as an instrument of analysis of German public opinion and can be seen as an early form of the contemporary qualitative research which today would be identified by specialist research in media theory which concentrates on audience reaction amongst other issues.<sup>25</sup> In a weekly report entitled 'German Propaganda and the German' the information was presented in three sections. The first part of each report sought to anticipate the intentions of the Nazi regime from an analysis of the propaganda output of the Ministry of Propaganda. The second attempted included direct quotations from the Press and broadcasts concerning what the German people were been told by the

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<sup>25</sup>eg Omgus Surveys after the war and today in the field of media studies.

regime. The third section, the most important, constituted the analysis and conclusions of the intelligence officers which incorporated the analysis of enemy propaganda and all the other information drawn from other sources which was available to the German Section. Additionally, occasional papers were produced on specific issues of particular interest and were circulated with the Weekly Report as a separate document. The important feature of these documents was the amalgamation of information of every grade of security up to and including 'Top Secret' and as such represented an important systematic and co-ordinated intelligence report on social and political conditions in Germany which no other department in the intelligence services in Britain at the time had developed. The German Section included in each report the most important issues of the week and usually reported them in terms of the past experience or information regarding each issue.

However, despite the apparent success of re-organisation which had resulted in the expansion of the output of the PWE, in the Autumn of 1942 it became clear that some further 'fine-tuning' of the intelligence operations was required. During the year the Central Intelligence Unit had attracted enough criticism during 1942 to warrant another inquiry, and Brigadier Eric Sachs was brought in to report on the situation and at the end of 1942, he was ordered to recruit and form the Directorate of Political Warfare Intelligence. He admits that at the time he 'quite literally knew nothing about 'Intelligence' and, if possible, less about Political Warfare'.<sup>26</sup> His job was 'to organise the gathering and analysis of necessary factual information ... to find out what was going on politically in all enemy and enemy occupied countries in Europe; to know how the war was affecting the ways of life and morale of the inhabitants; to provide reports as required by the JIC; and to transmit daily short bulletins to Winston Churchill on what was happening'.<sup>27</sup> Sachs recommended the strengthening of intelligence staff attached to the Regional Directors, a strengthening of the Central Directorate and the relocation of the remaining intelligence staff at Woburn up to

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<sup>26</sup>Sir Eric Sachs. 'Basic Handbooks Footnote', 1975. Middle Temple Library, Middle Temple Lane, London.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.



London. These recommendations were approved and in 1943 the remaining members of the intelligence staff were transferred to London. The Political Intelligence Department was disbanded and most of the staff, apart from those working on the German Section who remained with PWE, were moved to the Foreign Office Research Department. According to Sachs recruiting high calibre staff for the Political Warfare Intelligence<sup>28</sup> department was 'no easy task', not least because the reputation of the PWE had suffered because of the 'ways' of Richard Crossman and 'some of his colleagues'. Nevertheless he managed to recruit Lt.Col. Henry Hope who became senior Assistant Director, and Michael Balfour, Dr. T.K.Derry, Lt.Col. C. Battiscombe as other Assistant Directors and Stanley Hewitt Pitt, Major Sir Michael Malcolm, and Lt. Col. Stella A.M.Allen as his Personal Assistant.<sup>29</sup> By 1943 each Regional Directorate had its own intelligence officers working specifically on their own country or region and reporting to their own Regional Director and the Central Directorate.

The intelligence work of the German Section of the PWE continued, producing the Weekly Reports. Walmsley's work at 'EH' and then in the PWE had resulted in the establishment of a process which eventually resulted in the provision of an impressive amount of information. This information was gathered, collated, indexed and filed for the day-to-day requirements of the propagandists and for possible future use. The main sources of this information were : the Daily Digest of German Broadcasts from the BBC Monitoring Service; Press Reading Bureaux in Stockholm, Berne and Istanbul; interrogation of prisoners-of-war; information from private individuals, political exiles, refugees; information from the French army and Secret Service; War Cabinet Secretariat; Ministry of Economic Warfare; Ministry of Information 'network'; and a significant amount of information from the PID/Foreign Office through their diplomatic, military and other contacts. In addition the PWE had access to something like one hundred newspapers from sixteen countries which were supplied

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<sup>28</sup>Hereafter PWI

<sup>29</sup> op. cit. For details of personnel see Select Biography.

through enemy news agencies.<sup>30</sup> In addition to these sources the acquisition of three Hellschreiber teleprinter machines was important, since these machines allowed the PWE to 'tap' into the German News Agency (DNB) system and to obtain information direct from German sources. The value of this source of information was that the propagandists had access to information immediately, if not before, the rest of the German public and could therefore use counter-propaganda in an extremely effective way. According to Michael Balfour the most valuable conclusions came from the systematic analysis of the 'open' source material. All of this information was classified and ordered for maximum efficiency, into specific areas according to the country, issues covered and sources of information. For example the threat of retaliation with the 'V weapons' was monitored and the analysis, using Walmsley's method, in the Weekly Report for 8-14th January 1945 stated that there were increased references to these weapons in broadcasts which was measured at 7.1% and in talks at 2.1%.<sup>31</sup> The reports included details of the social and political conditions in Germany for all sectors of society, from the peasants' grievances to the July 1944 bomb plot, and from women's opposition to conscription and the war to the measures the Nazi regime was prepared to use to stamp out any dissent or opposition to its authority. Specific themes included Goebbels' Strength Through Joy, Strength Through Fear and Total War campaigns with commentary on the problems facing the Ministry in successfully achieving the desired results of each campaign.

An increasing concern to the Nazi regime, particularly after 1943, was the morale of troops at the front line and it was therefore also a concern of the PWE. Any signs of weakening morale were reported including evidence of the rift which was emerging between soldiers in the East and civilians at home, the desertion of soldiers, and domestic issues such as the refusal of the firefighters on the home front to attend fires caused by the Allied bombing campaign. The apathy of women to enlist in the Total War effort combined with the increasing pressures of an economy suffering an acute

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<sup>30</sup>Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm*. pp. 61 - 62.

<sup>31</sup>'Weekly Report "German Propaganda and the German", for Week 8.1.45 - 14.1.45'. PRO/FO 898/187.

shortage of labour were included in the Weekly Reports as evidence of the failure of the Nazi regime and the success of the economic blockade. It also provided the propagandists with specific targets for political warfare where their activities might be most effective.

As the war progressed into its final stages the intelligence officers concentrated on the rapidly chaotic situation emerging as Eastern territories were evacuated, and refugees of all nationalities poured into central Germany and notably Berlin. They also increased their analysis of Russian movements and propaganda, including summaries of anticipated German reaction to the 'Freedom' campaign and overtures apparently being made by Russia to the German people. The reports also contained information of accusations against the US Army and their treatment of German civilians as they occupied German territory. Finally, the reports considered the potential threat to the Allies from a resurgent militaristic and aggressive Germany after defeat.

By 1943 the major problems of organisation and control of the PWE had been addressed and to some extent solved, though not without a great deal of frustration, anger, pain and bitterness. In June, 1942 Peter Scarlett who chaired the Planning Committee of the PWE for the Foreign Office had replied to a letter from the British Embassy in Washington asking for details of the PWE. In his reply he referred to the 'young Gargantua whose initials are the PWE' which was 'no ordinary war baby... and since birth it has suffered a series of sea changes, all more or less painful' and outlining the problems of various 'personality' clashes between members of the PWE and the Ministry of Information.<sup>32</sup> As we have seen, the changes in ministerial control, the appointment of Lockhart as Director General and the re-organisation instigated and carried out by Lockhart and Bracken had, together, solved many of the major internal issues involving policy and responsibility. By 1943 the PWE was functioning efficiently and effectively, the intelligence operation had been formalised and expanded and this had facilitated the diversification of the activities of the

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<sup>32</sup>'Personal and Secret letter from Peter Scarlett, Foreign Office to F. R. Hoyer Millar, British Embassy, Washington, 6th March 1942'.PRO/FO 898/10. For details on Scarlett see Select Biography.

Executive. The German Section of the PWE was providing a complete repository of information about the social and political conditions in Germany during the war, the intimate knowledge of aspects of German life necessary for successful propaganda campaigns, and for other individuals and departments working on aspects of Nazi Germany both then and now. Today the Weekly Report can be seen as an important document for reasons already discussed earlier in this thesis, but at the time there was little importance attached to it by the Foreign Office. According to Walmsley in 1941 the Foreign Office had complete contempt for the subject and the people. Only in 1943 did they begin to recognise the 'special position of the PWE' in their contribution to the war effort and in 1946 Walmsley commented that it was still too early to say whether the Foreign Office had understood the importance of public opinion research.<sup>33</sup> This is not altogether an accurate picture, since evidence exists to show that the Foreign Office was sufficiently interested in the intelligence work of the PWE to make arrangements to carry on some of their work into the post-war years.<sup>34</sup>

Looking at the output of the PWE during the last two years of the war under Lockhart as Director General illustrates the way in which he did bring some element of co-ordination and organisational efficiency and effectiveness to the PWE. The three main areas of propaganda and political warfare can be broadly identified into two areas: the spoken word, as in broadcasts and rumour (or whisper) campaigns, and the written word, as in leaflets, posters, pamphlets.

Taking broadcasting first, this can also be divided into two separate areas. The first, the 'open' broadcasting of the BBC consisted largely of talks, bulletins and news which were sometimes aimed at particular audiences such as women, workers or troops. These usually involved 'invented' personalities, with whom the German people would identify, such as ordinary women workers and wives of soldiers waiting to hear from their husbands at the front. The programmes were not designed to be

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<sup>33</sup>Walmsley, 'EH/PID/PWE German and Austrian Intelligence'.

<sup>34</sup>See Chapter Five

subversive but to indicate to the German people that Britain had some idea of, and were sympathetic to, the everyday life they endured. The importance of these programmes was that they broke the monopoly of the Ministry of Propaganda on the information the German public were given, forcing the Ministry into a continual dialogue of justification for the war. The 'black' propaganda was a totally different exercise, using dishonesty and deceit to undermine the morale of the enemy. The 'black' stations, known as Research Units (RU's), were ostensibly run by secret resistance groups from within the territory at which the propaganda was directed in order to gain credibility. In France the aim was to encourage hatred of the Germans by pointing out German designs on the French colonial empire, the manipulation of France's finances, the forcible use of the French people as German workers and great emphasis was made of German brutality. It was suggested that the letter 'T' (for Traitor) should be daubed on the doors of collaborators. The 'black' broadcasts against Germany had the objective of causing as much inconvenience as possible to the regime. Programmes informed the German people that the details of air raid casualties would be available at local police stations, thereby inundating the already overburdened officers with anxious relatives all wanting immediate attention. The German people were told that the SS took certain brands of sleeping pills, the implied suggestion being that they too should do the same in order to sleep through the air raids. Horrific tales of families being destroyed in air-raids were given with the aim it would persuade others to avoid fire-watching duties, and stories of the pornographic eccentricities of their leaders and their luxurious lifestyle were used to increase dissension amongst the population.

An important advance was the purchase of an extremely powerful radio transmitter, codenamed 'Aspidistra', from America. This 500 Kw. transmitter was powerful enough to be able to transmit to enemy-occupied Europe and was also flexible enough to change frequencies quickly in order to avoid 'blocking' of broadcasts by the Ministry of Propaganda. The transmitter was located on a seventy-acre site in the Ashdown Forest near Crowborough, Sussex and was used by the PWE for 'black' operations and also the BBC who used it to boost their own capabilities. It was first employed on 8th November, 1942 and broadcast a speech made by President

Roosevelt after the landings in North Africa had been made.<sup>35</sup> It was also used by Sefton Delmer to transmit his programmes Soldatensender Calais, Sender Atlantik and Gustav Siegfried Eins. The latter was the invention of Delmer, and the character was used to criticise the National Socialist regime, to broadcast details of secret 'prisons' where Party sadists tortured their captives and of the first concentration camps.<sup>36</sup> According to Cruickshank, this programme was one of the greatest exponents of the purely 'black' broadcasting stations, stimulating distrust of the Nazis and administration in general and also creating distrust between the Party and the Wehrmacht.<sup>37</sup>

In conjunction with these broadcasts rumour, or whisper, campaigns were used to confirm and add to the essence of the propaganda themes. These were usually infiltrated by SOE and other agents in the field, and included details of ships arriving into port with pig disease which would result in a reluctance of the population to eat bacon, or stories of typhus sweeping across the continent from Poland. The U-Boat crews were informed, by rumours, of the weakness in the construction of their vessels, designed to create anxiety and confusion and problems for the Ministry of Propaganda to counter.

The second main activity of the PWE was the production of leaflets, and by 1943 fifty versions a month were being produced in ten languages. These could be either a single sheet or a forty-eight page booklet, printed in black or white or colour. Other items of propaganda dropped over or infiltrated into Germany, which fall into the category of political warfare, included forged ration books which would be used and thus distort rations and produce dissension, instructions on how to go-slow at work, how to fake illnesses to avoid work or conscription and forged bank-notes and stamps. The majority of this material was produced at Woburn in Ellic Howe's unit. Howe was a printer by trade, and an expert on European methods and types of printing. In

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<sup>35</sup>Howe, *The Black Game*. p. 164.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. p. 107.

<sup>37</sup>Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm*. p. 80.

October 1941 he became aware of the existence of the PWE and wrote to Hugh Dalton with details of his work, and included a paper he had written entitled 'Political Warfare and the Printed Word: A Psychological Study'.<sup>38</sup> In this paper he included enough technical detail and information to persuade Dalton that he should be brought into work for the PWE, and in October 1941 he left his job and moved down to Woburn. He worked for the PWE throughout the war, and made a major contribution to Sefton Delmer's work and 'black' operations in general.

However, whilst the Executive had recruited an expert in the field of printing, and had set up a unit to produce the goods, the PWE had major problems with the delivery of this propaganda. The use of the RAF was problematic, as it felt it was being used as a postal service, and complained that it had been 'saddled with the chore'.<sup>39</sup> They did however, have grounds for resenting the task of delivering the goods, since the danger of heavy loads affecting the trim of the aircraft or of the leaflets getting caught in the slipstream when they had been pushed out of the aircraft could be disastrous. Of course, 'Bomber' Harris had his own opinion of this work of the propagandists and resented his involvement in any way with the PWE. He believed that the leaflets merely kept 'Europe in lavatory paper', to which Balfour replies that at least they would be read before they were used.<sup>40</sup> But the real problem was that Bomber Command had no long-term details of targets and therefore the PWE could not produce specific propaganda for any issue or recipient of the leaflets. This did change after 1942 when Southern and Western Europe came into the field of battle and propaganda could be used in conjunction with Bomber Command to instruct or influence enemy troops and civilians.

What impact did this have? According to Cruickshank the main problem for Britain was that they were ill-prepared or unwilling to take the necessary steps to deliver the propaganda to the right people, on the right issues at the right time. He argues that

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<sup>38</sup>Howe, *The Black Game*. pp. 15-16.

<sup>39</sup>Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm*. p. 87.

<sup>40</sup>Balfour, *Propaganda in War*. p. 97.

the Americans, the 'professional brothers' played this part of psychological warfare game 'exactly right' with special squadrons, delivering special leaflet raids at special times to special targets.<sup>41</sup> Nevertheless, despite the problems Balfour argues that the combined operations did create a cleavage between leaders and led, stimulated an atmosphere of war-weariness and defeatism and above all the use of propaganda as political warfare to subvert or inconvenience the regime did help to spread deception and confusion.<sup>42</sup>

The PWE also expanded into other areas of activity, and the intelligence collected became a basis for much of this work. Almost as soon as Sachs had brought together his team of intelligence experts at the PWI, which by January 1943 numbered almost 100, the department was given its first major task. Bruce Lockhart informed him that the JIC recommended that Basic Handbooks should be produced for the guidance of the Commanders-in-Chief who were involved in liberating enemy-occupied territories and the conquest of enemy territories. An additional branch was formed, headed by Sachs who appointed Henry Hope (later Lord Rankeillour) as Assistant Director in charge of these volumes. Fourteen Basic Handbooks for individual countries were produced, the smallest containing some 160 pages and the largest, the one produced for Germany, was over 900 pages.<sup>43</sup> Each volume was delegated to the Regional Directorate responsible for that particular country or region, thus the responsibility for the German Handbook was given to Duncan Wilson and those working with him and was produced using the intelligence gathered by that Region, including the Weekly Reports. Wilson, Balfour's brother-in-law, had worked initially for the Ministry of Economic Warfare and then moved to the PWE until the end of the war when he was posted to Germany.

The Basic Handbooks, which in some countries such as Germany became known as

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<sup>41</sup>Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm*. p. 90.

<sup>42</sup>Balfour, *Propaganda in War*. p. 99.

<sup>43</sup>Basic Handbooks 1943/44 for Enemy and Enemy Occupied Europe. Middle Temple Library, London.



the 'bible', were produced using the intelligence system already in existence in the PWE and expanded by Sachs in 1943. The books were up-dated regularly with supplements containing any new information relevant to the Country or zone from the intelligence of each Regional Directorate. The Handbooks were in fact circulated to a much wider audience than the Commanders-in-Chief, and records in the PRO identify a number of Embassy officials requesting and thanking the PWE for the supply of these including the OWI, the US Government, and the American Embassy.<sup>44</sup> An interesting addition to this list is the War Crimes and Damages Group which thanked Dr. Derry, the Secretary of PWE/PID at Bush House for the sets of Handbooks supplied to them.<sup>45</sup> In the same file there exists a letter to Walmsley from Derry telling him that Colonel Wade had requested details on certain key men in Germany.<sup>46</sup> This was obviously in response to Derry's note to Colonel Wade, at the Royal Courts of Justice, The Strand, two days earlier on 15th May giving him information on war crimes in Yugoslavia.<sup>47</sup>

Gradually from 1942 the PWE also became involved in the planning of propaganda to support military operations. In June 1942 a 'secret' organisation had been established, identified as the London Controlling Section (LCS), which was specifically set up for planning and implementing deception operations. The planning for such operations was done by the XX (Double Cross) Committee which met on Wednesday afternoons throughout the war and included representatives from MI5, Directors of Naval, Air and Military Intelligence, the War Office, PWE and eventually COSSAC and SHAEF.<sup>48</sup> The first military operation in which the PWE was involved and in which the LCS also played a separate part was Operation

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<sup>44</sup> See PRO/FO898/423.

<sup>45</sup> 'Letter from Office of War Information, War Crimes and Dangers Group, American Embassy London to Dr. Derry, PID. 13th June, 1945'. PRO/FO898/423.

<sup>46</sup> 'Letter from Derry to Walmsley', 17th May 1945. PRO/FO898/423.

<sup>47</sup> 'Letter from Derry to Col. Wade', 15th May, 1945. PRO/FO898/423.

<sup>48</sup>M. Young and R. Stamp, *Trojan Horses. Deception Operations in the Second World War*. (London: Mandarin, 1989). p. 20.

'Torch'. This operation was planned for November 1942 and designed to give the Allies control of French West Africa from which to launch an attack on Europe. It was also thought that this would help Russia by drawing off German troops from the Eastern Front. For various political and military reasons it was to be seen by the outside world as an American operation but in fact the PWE were part of the Political Section attached to Eisenhower's Headquarters which included members from the OSS, OWI, PWE and SOE.<sup>49</sup> The PWE's role was to provide propaganda which would show that the liberation of French territory had begun and that the Americans had been welcomed as Allies. Importantly, propaganda was to instruct those living in enemy-occupied countries that this should not be seen as the beginning of the Second Front and that it was not a signal for a premature revolt or internal uprisings in the occupied countries. The LCS meanwhile set into operation three plans designed to deceive the German General Staff about the destination of the Anglo-American forces in order to lure German re-enforcements elsewhere. The operation was a complete success, not least because the Germans had believed that Malta or Sicily were the targets and failed to prepare to attack the landing convoys off Algiers and Oran.<sup>50</sup>

In March 1943 the PWE also became involved in the plans for Operation 'Huskey', the Allied invasion of Sicily, and Eisenhower was particularly interested in using propaganda to bring about an immediate surrender of the Italians after the landing. The PWE suggested that propaganda to 'soften up' the Italians might be useful since all indications were that the Italians would fight to the end in defence of their country. It was considered that a fake Armistice should be used, but after deliberations between Churchill and Eisenhower this idea was dropped.

In addition the PWE also began to be included in Committees and organisations concerned with the preparation of propaganda and political warfare materials which

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<sup>49</sup>Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm*. p. 136.

<sup>50</sup>Martin Gilbert, *The Second World War. Revised edition* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989). p. 375.

would be needed when the Allied forces began the liberation of Europe. The first meeting of the Joint PWE/MoI/BBC Re-Occupation Committee was held in Room 705, Bush House, London on March 29th, 1943.<sup>51</sup> Between then and the 21st January, 1944 the Committee held thirty-three meetings to consider the financial, military, civil and cultural aspects involved in re-occupation. The aims of the propaganda at the end of January, 1944 were defined as a) combat propaganda, that is 'tactical propaganda against enemy forces and towards the population behind enemy lines' and b) consolidation propaganda, that is 'designed to ensure friendly co-operation; and to create among the population opinion favourable to the war and post-war aims of the United Nations'.<sup>52</sup> In August 1943, the Foreign Office contacted Sachs to inform him that a new JIC Sub-Committee known as the Future Intelligence Needs Sub-Committee had been formed and asked him for suggestions for future operational intelligence, 'particularly political intelligence on areas likely to come into the operational picture'.<sup>53</sup> In the months before D-Day the PWE was involved extensively in the preparation for the Operation 'Overlord', which was to signal the beginning of the long-awaited invasion of Europe from the beaches of Normandy. Broadly speaking, they prepared propaganda which sought to lower the morale of the enemy troops and civilians, and to inform, instruct and raise the morale of those in occupied countries which were to be liberated. The Executive attempted to outline and understand the problems to be faced in the occupied territories and the ways in which they could ease those problems using prepared materials to accelerate rehabilitation.

Before moving on to evaluate and discuss the content of the Weekly Reports it is necessary to consider the political climate existing in the PWE and Whitehall during the time they were being produced, and to ascertain whether this affected the success

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<sup>51</sup> 'Minutes of the 1st Joint PWE/MoI/BBC Re-Occupation Committee', 29th March 1943. PRO/FO 898/361.

<sup>52</sup> 'Minutes of the 33rd Joint PWE/MoI/BBC Re-Occupation Committee', 21st January 1944. PRO/FO 898/361.

<sup>53</sup> PRO/FO 898/361 2nd August, 1943.

of the intelligence operations of the German Section. To do this it is necessary to look at the people working in the German Section who produced the intelligence and the personalities and politics of the elites in the PWE and Whitehall who were the users of that intelligence. According to Michael Handel intelligence success depends on three elements, all of which are interlinked and all of which are dependent upon human perceptions and interpretation; a separation for the sake of analysis is helpful.<sup>53</sup> These three elements are: the availability of sufficient raw data for balanced intelligence analysis; the extent to which the perceptions of the intelligence officers are accurate; and the political dimensions of intelligence.

Taking the first element, as already discussed the German Section had a wide range of sources available to it which was both detailed and current. Additionally, the systematic way in which it was gathered, classified and stored suggests that this material was quickly accessible. The second element, the extent to which the perceptions of the intelligence analyst and all other participants are accurate, is far more problematic. Information only constitutes intelligence through the medium of the individuals employed to gather, sift, interpret, analyze and then present the resulting 'intelligence'. The people involved in this process are operating from a position of subjectivity, pre-conceived ideas and beliefs, values and prejudices which all influence the process and conclusions. At the same time it is possible for them to be unduly influenced by the situation which they operate in, by the people for and with whom they work. The problem then is that 'the very process of assessment carries with it the danger that it will emphasise intelligence which conforms to the conventional wisdom of the time (which is invariably afterwards discovered to have contained at least some false assumptions) and exclude or underplay apparently eccentric information which points in other directions'.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>Michael Handel, 'The Politics of Intelligence', *Intelligence and National Security* (October, 1987). pp 5-46. p.4.

<sup>54</sup>Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (Eds.) *The Missing Dimension. Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century*. (London: Macmillan, 1984). p. 13.

According to Handel individuals involved in intelligence work are aware of this and he argues that two approaches can be identified which are adopted by intelligence officers, and which determine the accuracy or otherwise of their intelligence. The first is the 'professional approach' which is adopted by those individuals who believe that political pressures are inevitable but are nevertheless considered as dangerous and unethical and should be minimized. This approach puts 'truth' in reporting above all else and is committed to improving quality through distancing itself from the policy-makers. According to Handel the best professionals are the amateurs who serve their country during war, do not seek military promotion and are therefore in a better position to insist on the 'truth' since at the end of the war they can return to their civilian life. The second is the 'realistic approach' which arrives at the opposite conclusion about political pressures and rather than assuming the 'utopian' vision of the 'professional amateurs' actually advocates going with 'the flow of the tide' of political pressure whilst at the same time attempting to turn around the situation to their advantage. These individuals believe that the intelligence community must become more involved with the policy-makers in order to give them the best information available.

There are problems with both approaches. The first can lead to political sterility and aloofness which can, of course, lead to the policy-making elite disregarding the intelligence produced, whilst the second can be accused of being too sensitive to the policy-makers and therefore less than objective.

Applying Handel's theory to the officers working in the German Section, and from my own assessment of the content of the Weekly Reports some conclusions can be drawn. The majority of these individuals were amateurs, civilians from academic life, usually liberals who returned to their posts immediately after the end of the war and who therefore had less self-interest in the political pressures at other levels in Whitehall. What also stands out is the number of historians who worked for the intelligence service, drawn mainly from Oxford and Cambridge. To compare the profile of the people in the German Section with that of the Research and Analysis Department (a parallel organisation based at Yale University in America) one is struck

by the commonality of academic disciplines of those involved.<sup>55</sup> According to Winks, 'research and analysis are the core of intelligence', and the success of the Research and Analysis Department was due to some extent to a system devised which used the methods of the historian for both research and analysis.<sup>56</sup> A system which was also adopted, or as Walmsley would no doubt argue created, within the PWE. Additionally, talking to Michael Balfour about this issue he is absolutely clear that because of the danger of political pressure recognised at the time the German Section worked on the principle that their job was 'to put the picture as it was in reality rather than portrayed in terms of what it was wished to be', and they were determined to counter such a tendency and to 'depress those who would be asphyxiated by their own hot air' by offering 'a more sober assessment than others'.<sup>57</sup>

It is important, then, to take into account a range of factors which support the view that the intelligence officers in the German Section were concerned to adopt a 'professional' approach. Firstly, there was their social and educational background which provided a level of freedom from the necessity to take into account personal ambitions within the service. Secondly, according to Balfour, they were more than aware of the degree of political use of intelligence and took counter-measures to prevent it. Finally, the analysis provided within the Weekly Reports manifestly attempt to provide an objective and realistic interpretation of events regardless of the potential political consequences.

But whilst sufficient information for intelligence officers to work from was assured, and the interpretation of that information appears to have been as objective as could realistically be expected these two factors alone cannot be assumed to indicate the success of the German Section. The third element in the process is perhaps the most important, that is the political dimensions of intelligence, the acceptance or rejection

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<sup>55</sup>Robin W. Winks, *Cloak and Gown. Scholars in the Secret War 1939-1961*. (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1987).

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. pp. 62/63.

<sup>57</sup>Interview with Michael Balfour, St. Antony's, Oxford. 3rd February, 1992.

of intelligence by elites in Whitehall for particular reasons. The ways in which intelligence is used, mis-used, disregarded or misunderstood is the main obstacle to successful intelligence.

The political use of intelligence by individuals to promote their own interests is one particular area of concern. Churchill's use of intelligence to achieve his own political aims is a perfect example. His position as Prime Minister during the war gave Churchill the right and duty to make political decisions which involved the use of intelligence, was informed by intelligence, but not determined by it. An example of this is the way in which Churchill released information about German U-Boat losses to boost morale during the early days of the war, and alternatively suppressed information that the invasion of England had been called off in order to stimulate increased war production in Britain and increase anxiety in the United States at a time he was trying to bring them into the war.<sup>58</sup>

But what about the Ministers in control of the PWE? Handel identifies this level of the civil service as the 'users' of intelligence who are in a position to use the intelligence of the German Section for 'particular reasons'. Here, as in the German Section, there is a commonality of educational and political background but unlike those working in the German Section they were involved in politics in Whitehall at a much higher level. A brief biographical outline of the key personalities involved illustrates this.

Starting from the top with the two Ministers responsible, with the Foreign Secretary, for control of the PWE. Brendan Bracken [1901-1958], was born in county Tipperary and was the youngest son of a builder and monumental mason. Using private money he obtained entrance into Sedbergh and then secured teaching posts in Liverpool and subsequently in a preparatory school in Bishop's Stortford. He quickly made the acquaintance of Oliver Locker-Lampson, the owner of *Empire Review*, and at this time met and worked for Winston Churchill in his unsuccessful election campaigns in

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<sup>58</sup>Handel, 'The Politics of Intelligence'. p.8.

Leicester in 1923 and Westminster in 1924. During this time he was introduced to Major Crossthwaite Eyre, the owner of the publishers Eyre and Spottiswoode, who recruited him to work on an illustrated monthly magazine. By 1925 he had become a Director of the firm, which acquired and let him run the *Financial News*. From there he went on to found the *Banker* which gave him the introductions necessary to enter City institutions, and also to gain joint control of *The Economist* in 1929. The *Financial News* established him and with the support of Churchill, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, he secured adoption as Conservative candidate for North Paddington. In the 1930s he became close to Churchill, sharing his political views as a staunch imperialist and in opposition to the Appeasement policy of Chamberlain. At the beginning of the Second World War he became parliamentary private secretary to Churchill at the Admiralty, and when Churchill became Prime Minister Bracken went to Downing Street with him and throughout the war was one of his staunchest allies. In 1941 he was appointed Minister of Information and, according to Douglas Woodruff, Bracken 'deserves great credit for the vitality and imagination which he brought to the Ministry and for lifting it out of the disregard into which it had fallen'.<sup>59</sup> At the end of the war he was made first Lord of the Admiralty in Churchill's caretaker government. For Balfour, Bracken was an 'unconventional Conservative' who appeared to have a somewhat romantic approach to the truth and assumed attitudes which were not really his own. Nevertheless, his background in Fleet Street meant that he was the first Minister of Information to know how a newspaper worked and, most importantly, his friendship with Churchill and Beaverbrook meant that he 'was at the centre of things and able to argue on level terms with more senior colleagues'.<sup>60</sup>

Hugh Dalton [1887-1962], was born at Neath, Glamorganshire the eldest child of Canon John Neale Dalton. He was educated at Summer Fields, Oxford and Eton and went up to King's College, Cambridge where he became a close friend of Rupert Brooke. He was a socialist, and began work at the London School of Economics in

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<sup>59</sup>*DNB 1951-1960*, (Oxford University Press, 1971) pp. 135-137.

<sup>60</sup>Balfour, *Propaganda in War*. p. 65.



1911 on a thesis entitled 'Some aspects of the inequality of incomes in modern communities'. He also joined the Middle Temple and was called to the bar in 1914. In World War One he served in France from 1916-1917, transferred to Italy for the remainder of the war and was demobilised in 1919, returning to the LSE to lecture and complete his thesis. He entered politics in 1922 and by 1924 had fought three general elections and two by-elections as a Labour candidate. In 1929 he won the seat in Bishop Auckland, and when Ramsay MacDonald formed his Labour Government Dalton was appointed parliamentary under-secretary to Arthur Henderson at the Foreign Office. But his political career appears to have taken a turn for the worse in the early thirties as he did not serve in MacDonald's government in 1931 and lost his seat in the ensuing general election. For the next four years he travelled, visiting Russia, Italy, Australia and New Zealand and Germany, where he was appalled at the Nazi treatment of Jewish academics. On his return to England he also returned to politics, and in the years leading up to the outbreak of war established himself in the Labour Party, speaking out vociferously against National Socialism and warning of the menace of Hitler's Germany. He was, in this, a fellow traveller with Churchill and Bracken, and at the outbreak of war supported Churchill in his foreign policy. In 1940 he became Minister of Economic Warfare, and later that year was given the task of setting up the SOE. According to Nicholas Davenport, Dalton's work at the Ministry and SOE was recognised by Churchill and for this he was rewarded by his appointment to the Board of Trade in 1942.<sup>61</sup> As already outlined above this is not the view of his contemporaries, nor did Dalton himself perceive this as a promotion in recognition of his work at the Ministry. Dalton's greatest problem was his personality; many people found him to be a bully and rude, and his socialist political creed also worked against him in his battles with Churchill's inner circle in Whitehall.

The conflict between Bracken and Dalton over the ministerial responsibility of the PWE was a battle over the principle of 'tradition' and political power in Whitehall. Ellic Howe discussed the 'apparent puerility' of the manoeuvres of Dalton, Eden and Bracken many years after the end of the war with Clifton Child, who had worked for

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<sup>61</sup>*DNB 1961-1970*. (Oxford University Press, 1981) pp. 266-269.

the PWE at Woburn. According to Child they were 'jockeying for control of what they could make into a very influential (and personal) power-sustaining-machine in post-war British politics. There was a lot, career-wise, at stake for them... control of it was still very much worth fighting for'.<sup>62</sup> But did this affect the way in which the German Section worked or jeopardise the success of their intelligence work? I think not. From Walmsley's recollections of the way in which the intelligence operations evolved in 'EH' and then in the early months of the PWE it would seem that it would have progressed in the same small, ad-hoc and incremental way regardless of who had been in control at the top. The problems between the Ministers did affect the way in which the PWE was initially set-up, and no doubt acted as a brake on progress, but it seems that because the conflict was of such a personal nature the intelligence work started by Walmsley and others evolved quietly and without interference. Furthermore, Dalton and Bracken did share the same political views about Germany as Churchill and therefore it could be argued that they would have viewed and used the intelligence of the German Section in the same way.

The political level below this ministerial one, those in direct contact and control in the PWE with the German Section, is more interesting since it is these people who were the channel of communications for the intelligence between Whitehall and the German Section.

The Director-General of the PWE, Sir Robert Hamilton Bruce Lockhart [1887-1970], was born in Anstruther, Fife the eldest son of the Headmaster of the Waid Academy. He won a scholarship at twelve years old to Fettes College but failed in his scholastic promise and spent the next five years in sporting activities. His father sent him to Berlin and then to Paris where he learnt fluent German and French, and he became widely read in the literatures of the languages he studied. For three years he was a rubber planter in Malaya, and his memories of that time in *Return to Malaya* are characterised by an almost school-boy, romantic approach to life which was ended

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<sup>62</sup>Child cited in Howe, *The Black Game*. p. 52.

abruptly with a severe attack of malaria which brought him home.<sup>63</sup> His diplomatic career began when he was sent to Moscow in January, 1912 as vice-consul where he stayed until 1917, until he was recalled on 'sick-leave', but in reality because of his affair with a Russian Jewess. Six weeks before the Bolshevik Revolution he was sent out again to Moscow as Ambassador on a Special Mission, where he resumed his acquaintance with 'Moura', and was arrested and held in the Kremlin for a month on the suspicion of being involved with counter-revolutionaries in a plot to assassinate Lenin.<sup>64</sup> In the inter-war period Lockhart left the Foreign Office and spent time working in international banking before coming back to England and working on the *Evening Standard* as editor of the *Londoner's Diary*. At the outbreak of the war he re-joined the Foreign Office, working in PID and 'EH' between 1938 and 1940 and was also appointed the British representative with the Provisional Czech. Government. In July 1941 he worked on the committee which helped devise the structure which later became PWE and was given the rank of Deputy-Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office. He became Director General of the PWE in the summer of 1942 after the departure of Dalton where he stayed until the end of the war, and was knighted in 1943. Personal opinions about Lockhart are less than flattering with Balfour describing him as someone who 'drank too much and spent too much ... whilst Director General he spent a night in a police cell after being picked up inebriated in the street and at another time in danger of being declared bankrupt'.<sup>65</sup> Cruickshank described him as a 'sycophantic Scot'<sup>66</sup> and 'anything but a dynamic leader .. more interested in finding reasons for not doing things than taking the lead in shaping policies of the Executive'<sup>67</sup>, and quoted a dossier prepared for the Office of War Information which also identifies personal problems. The dossier, prepared for the

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<sup>63</sup>R. H. B. Lockhart, *Return to Malaya*, (London: Putnam, 1936).

<sup>64</sup>R.H.B. Lockhart, *British Agent*. (London: G.P. Putnam and Sons 1933) and Academy of Sciences of the USSR, *A Short History of the USSR*. (Translation: Progress Publishers, Moscow, first published 1965. p. 66.

<sup>65</sup>Copy of a Conference Paper given by Balfour and sent to me 19th March, 1991.

<sup>66</sup>Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm*. p. 25.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid. pp. 183/184.

American Secret Service, described Lockhart as 'essentially an 'outside operator' with no real sense of executive or organizational work or loyalties. He was once an extremely aggressive person but for various reasons including his 'personal habits' he is a shell of the man he formerly was... he has shown himself to be weak and unable or unwilling to take over effective control. He depends slavishly on Eden and tries to build up his strength by undercutting the strength and loyalty of his former colleagues'.<sup>68</sup>

Against this evidence of Lockhart's weaknesses, Balfour identifies some of the reasons why Lockhart was made Director General, not least because he 'had great charm, a gift for inducing people to work together and an ability to make himself trusted in high places, which when combined with the patronage of Beaverbrook enabled him to obtain for his staff freedom to get on with their jobs secure from undue interference'.<sup>69</sup> Equally important, Churchill wanted to bring the PWE under Foreign Office control and Lockhart's relationship with Eden and Bracken and his acknowledgement that the PWE should interpret and not make policy made him the ideal candidate for the job. According to Howe, Lockhart's promotion in 1942 'simply meant that it was the Foreign Office which now effectively controlled PWE'.<sup>70</sup>

Reginald (Rex) Leeper [1888-1968], was educated in Melbourne Grammar School, Australia and at New College, Oxford. He had an equally long diplomatic career, beginning with his work for the Political Intelligence Department from 1917 to 1919; he began working for the Foreign Office News Department in 1929 and became Head in 1935. He chaired the Sub-Committee of the CID which shaped the Ministry of Information in 1935-36 and moved to Woburn in 1938 as head of the revived PID where he worked with Stuart's propagandists of 'EH'. When Stuart left 'EH', Leeper was made Head of SO1 by Dalton. Leeper was anti-German, an anti-appeaser and,

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<sup>68</sup>RG 208 OWI Box 74, Ibid. p. 184.

<sup>69</sup>Balfour Conference Paper, 1991.

<sup>70</sup>Howe, *The Black Game*. p. 52.

according to Balfour, it was his friendship with Vansittart who was policy adviser to Dalton at SOE that got him the job.<sup>71</sup> Leeper stayed with the PWE until 1943, leaving to take up his appointment as Ambassador to Greece.

Sir Ivone Augustine Kirkpatrick [1897-1964], was born in Wellington, India the eldest son of Colonel Ivone Kirkpatrick. His mother was the daughter of Sir Arthur Edward Harding, commander-in-chief of the Bombay Army and later Governor of Gibraltar and Kirkpatrick spent the years between the ages of seven and ten travelling Europe with his mother learning French and German on the way. He was severely wounded in the early months of the First World War and spent the rest of the war on intelligence and propaganda work. He worked for British intelligence between 1916 and 1918, and from 1920 to 1930 spent his time working in the Western Department of the Foreign Office. In 1933 he was appointed First Secretary in Berlin [1933-38] where he gained an in-depth knowledge of Germany and in his book, *The Inner Circle* set out his detestation of the Nazi leaders and their doctrine. He acted as interpreter for Chamberlain at Bad Godesberg and was sent to identify and interview Hess in May 1941. Early in 1941 he was appointed by the Government to act as Foreign Affairs 'adviser' to the BBC and in a reorganisation in October 1941 he was made Controller of European Services. Later in 1941 he was invited to join the PWE Committee as a Regional Director with responsibility for liaison between the BBC and PWE. In 1944 he began to work with others in the PWE and Foreign Office for post-war planning, working on the Control Commission for Germany 1944-1945. He was instrumental in the setting up of the Russia Committee in 1946 and the Information Research Department in 1947. In 1950 he worked for the British High Commission in Germany, where he stayed for three years, before returning to England as Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office until 1956.

Major Dallas Brooks continued the work he had started in Stuart's organisation at Woburn and was responsible for liaison between the PWE and the Ministry of Economic Warfare, Ministry of Information, MI5 and the Secret Service. Given the

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<sup>71</sup>Balfour Conference Paper, 1991.

political problems surrounding the establishment of the PWE it is not surprising to find that when appointed to the PWE he spent the whole of the wartime in PWE fighting its battles at the highest level with other departments, the Chiefs of Staff, War Cabinet and a Prime Minister who according to Baker-White, 'remained sceptical as to the value of political warfare'.<sup>72</sup> Baker-White also attributes Dallas Brooks with bringing some co-ordination into the PWE, stating that 'after a number of high-level rows what had looked like a jig-saw puzzle thrown on the nursery floor became a tidy picture'.<sup>73</sup>

It is clear from the above that the changes in the institutional framework which were brought about throughout 1941 and 1942 that by 1943 the people in charge of the PWE were all highly experienced, conservative and career led diplomats. They all shared similar educational and social backgrounds, had travelled Europe and had worked in the Foreign Office during the First World War either for the intelligence services or as a diplomat. Churchill, through Bracken and Eden, ensured that propaganda and political warfare towards Germany were of the same political persuasion and held the same views towards the German people as he did himself. Bracken eventually managed to get Dalton removed, and worked with Eden to get the appointment of Lockhart as Director General of the PWE which would mean that the Executive was brought under Foreign Office control. The appointments of Leeper, Kirkpatrick and Dallas Brooks closed this particular inner circle. This is, of course, not of earth-shattering importance or unique in political life. But by understanding the political climate within the PWE in which the German Section operated it can help to explain or to suggest the way in which intelligence could be interpreted to 'fit' the existing views held in the PWE. It can also be helpful in understanding the way in which the views of the PWE might be slanted towards the views of the Ministers in control, who either subconsciously because of the existing climate of opinion, or for particular purposes of self-interest might present a particular interpretation of intelligence. As shown in this and the previous chapter Churchill's style of leadership

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<sup>72</sup>J. Baker-White, *The Big Lie*. (London: Evans Bros. 1955). p. 52.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid. p. 53.

was forceful, he appointed and promoted those people who had the same ideas and was quite willing to use or disregard intelligence when it suited him.

Historians writing about the personality of Lockhart all point out that he was a 'Foreign Office' man, Cruickshank accusing him of being a sycophant and Balfour arguing that his willingness to go along with his superiors, being 'unduly subservient' was due to his own self-interest and the lessons he had learned in the past from going against them.<sup>74</sup> Balfour also comments that Lockhart would not have lasted long if he had not had the ear of Eden.<sup>75</sup> Whilst it is without doubt true that Lockhart became a 'Foreign Office man' it also seems that he had great difficulty in adapting to the conditions he found in Whitehall during his time at the PWE. He may have been destined to become a career diplomat both by birth and by social pressure but his personality seems to have been ill-fitted to the constraints of such a life. His exploits in Malaya and Moscow, where he demonstrated a certain amount of political naivety, from which he had to be rescued by others does not suggest someone ideally suited to the political in-fighting that he was to be involved in during the Second World War. In essence Lockhart was always happiest away from the political life of London and preferred to spend time alone fishing in the glens in Scotland. Increasingly failing health led to his retirement at the end of the war.

Whilst the intelligence officers appeared to be able to distance themselves from the political process, this could not of course always be the case in terms of those responsible for conveying intelligence assessments to policy-makers at the highest level in Whitehall. The people surrounding Churchill and Eden were not in the same position as the people working for the German Section, the 'professional amateurs'. These people, it could be argued, would be those most likely to adopt the 'realistic approach' to intelligence, accepting that political circumstances and pressures had to be taken into account when considering the use of intelligence. The issues of self-

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<sup>74</sup>Balfour, *Propaganda in War*. p. 93.

<sup>75</sup>Balfour Conference Paper, 1991.

interest and politicisation of the process have then to be seen as a factor in the way in which the intelligence output of the PWE could have been used. Thus, the politics of power for influence in Whitehall carried on during the war, as illustrated by Dalton's war with both Cooper and Bracken, is a factor to be considered in the analysis of the PWE.

What emerges from this examination is that there is a general division of approaches to intelligence between that of the individuals in the German Section who produced the Weekly Reports, who appear to have at least attempted to take a 'professional approach', and those at a higher level within the PWE who adopted a 'realistic approach' to the use of intelligence. These individuals could have consciously or subconsciously slanted the conclusions of the German Section or suppressed views that they knew would not 'fit' with the climate of opinion or views in Whitehall, and can be identified as Bracken, Lockhart, Leeper and Kirkpatrick. However, this was not a static situation, and approaches to the production of intelligence and the political use of intelligence changed according to the issue and political conditions prevailing at the time, according to the particular issue, the climate of opinion at the time and political conditions and influence within and between the PWE and Foreign Office.

Whilst no hard and fast rules can be established about the politicising of intelligence, the consideration of the people at all three levels of the hierarchy within Whitehall and the PWE does indicate some of the factors which should be borne in mind when an evaluation of the work of the German Section is made. It also helps to explain some of the apparent contradictions between the content of the intelligence reports and the way in which this was interpreted and used by various individual and departments. It identifies some of the reasons for the tensions between the 'professional' and 'realistic' interpretations of intelligence, where in certain areas of central concern the German Section produced intelligence about conditions in Germany which appeared to 'go against the grain' of thinking in Whitehall and challenged specific policies. On balance it would be accurate to say that the intelligence officers of the German Section were concerned to provide objective and accurate information and assessments. They were aware of the political climate surrounding them, to the extent that they took



positive action to counter that climate. This is the context for the following analysis of the intelligence output of the German Section.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### Resistance and Public Opinion in Germany, 1943-1945.

At the beginning of the previous chapter it was argued that the two main tasks given to the PWE in 1941 denied the existence of 'resistance' in Germany: propaganda and political warfare was only used to support resistance in the enemy-occupied countries. The disappearance of the 'other Germany' which was explicit in the propaganda policy of the PWE was then confirmed with the announcement of 'Unconditional Surrender' in January, 1943. However, although the PWE's propaganda strategy denied any public acknowledgement of the existence of resistance in Germany it would be absolutely wrong to assume that Britain was uninterested in the relationship between the people and the Party. Quite the reverse. In fact the very reasons for Churchill's policy of 'Absolute Silence' in 1941 and the following Allied policy of 'Unconditional Surrender' in 1943 determined the need for continued surveillance of Germany society for any signs of opposition or resistance to the Nazi regime.

In 1938 the links sought between Germany and Britain failed, according to Maier, because Britain was 'too appeasement-orientated, too sceptical of the German efforts, or too anti-German without discrimination'.<sup>1</sup> By 1941 the increasing scepticism and suspicion regarding the motivations and aims of the German resistance was matched by a distinct anti-German climate of opinion in Britain. Furthermore the recognition of the need to consider both America and Russia in British foreign policy decisions was becoming increasingly important. According to Klemperer, Churchill was adamant that there should be no co-operation with the German Resistance for 'fear of offending the Russians'.<sup>2</sup> Thus the policy of 'Absolute Silence' was adopted. The announcement of 'Unconditional Surrender' in 1943 confirmed that a total military defeat was the fundamental aim, that the whole of German society was responsible in one way or another for the Second World War, and that all Germans would be treated

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<sup>1</sup>Maier in David Clay Large, *Contending with Hitler*. p. 146.

<sup>2</sup>Klemperer, *German Resistance Against Hitler*. p.316.

as Nazis until that aim was achieved. There are a number of reasons why interest in the internal political and social conditions in Germany increased in Whitehall and the PWE after January 1943, despite the conclusion implicit in Allied policy that there was 'no resistance' in Germany.

In Whitehall the concern centred on the recognition that any co-operation with the Resistance would depend upon the rescinding of 'Unconditional Surrender'.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, it was feared that if the Resistance was successful in overthrowing the regime then 'the "Old Army" generals might launch from the Vatican a peace move that would allow Germany to sue for terms other than those of unconditional surrender'.<sup>4</sup> After 1943 a total military defeat of Germany by the Allies was the only outcome acceptable, and the post-war plans for the eradication once and for all of the German 'problem' rested on this. If the Nazi regime were overthrown by internal resistance this would undoubtedly threaten those plans. For these reasons Whitehall continued to keep a careful watch on the internal situation in Germany.

For the German Section their interest was wider in scope. The intelligence reports provided detailed information for the invention of propaganda by the PWE which would undermine the morale of the German people. The German Section also monitored the behaviour and response of the German people to the regime for signs of any changes in the political climate in Germany as the war continued. This information was useful in identifying any potential resistance groups and was also used to anticipate the political and social conditions in Germany which would be useful to those engaged in formulating post-war plans for the occupation of Germany and the re-education of the German people. From an examination of the Weekly Reports it is possible to ascertain how much information the British government did have available to them about 'resistance' and public opinion in Germany during the period 1943-1945 when the policy of 'Unconditional Surrender' was being pursued.

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid. p.339.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. pp. 385/6.

Throughout this period the intelligence officers in their reports, and in their dealings with Whitehall through the PWE and the Foreign Office, repeatedly provided evidence which contradicted Allied policy. In fact in almost every Weekly Report for the last two and a half years of the war there is information which illustrated that 'despite all its shortcomings, the "other Germany" was a reality'.<sup>5</sup> This chapter considers the 'other Germany' and the way in which it reacted to the increasingly authoritarian policies, coercion and terroristic violence of the Nazi regime.

Ideas of German resistance have been transformed over the decades since World War Two. The initial, and influential, description of a 'totalitarian' state and society described by Hannah Arendt and Karl Dietrich Bracher began to lose credence in the 1960's following the publication of David Schoenbaum's book, *Hitler's Social Revolution* which proposed a new agenda for research on Nazi Germany.<sup>6</sup> The last fifteen years has seen an enormous amount of research and literature on the realities of everyday life in the Third Reich which has now replaced the 'black' and 'white' description of the early post-war years with a complex picture of a society at war and under extreme conditions reacting in a myriad of ways, some conflicting and often contradictory, towards the Nazi regime.

One of the most difficult problems of the history of German resistance concerns the definition of resistance. In 1995, fifty years after the end of the war, there is no consensus amongst historians about a definition of 'resistance'. What type of behaviour should be included or excluded under the heading of 'resistance'? Should resistance in Germany be identified as being radically different from resistance in the occupied territories, on the grounds that those resisting in Germany were active in resisting their own government and could therefore be accused of committing treason against their own country? Do those involved in resistance have to be seen to be effective in fundamentally challenging the Nazi regime? Or, can we say that to resist

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<sup>5</sup>Willy Brandt, Address to Conference at Goethe House, New York. (April, 1988). David Clay Large, *Contending With Hitler*. p. 9.

<sup>6</sup> David Schoenbaum, *Hitler's Social Revolution*. (New York: Anchor Books, 1967).

the regime at any level, publicly or privately, is important enough to be included in the history of German resistance ? Such decisions are sensitive and difficult to discuss, and have often led to emotional and accusatory discussions.

For Anton Gill, 'the smallest act against the Nazi government required enormous bravery'<sup>7</sup> and he questions the right of those who have not existed under such a regime to make judgements on such issues.<sup>8</sup> For Broszat 'the long-standing exclusive definition of resistance focusing only upon exceptional cases of fundamental resistance and active opposition has produced an idealized and undifferentiated picture of German resistance. A revised definition that includes the less heroic cases of partial, passive, ambivalent, and broken opposition - one that accounts for the fragility of resistance and the inconsistency of human bravery - may in the end inspire a greater intellectual and moral sensitivity towards the subject than a definition that includes only the exceptional greatness of heroic martyrdom'<sup>9</sup>. This chapter adopts Broszat's approach and examines the reaction and response of the German people to the Nazi regime. It outlines the many varieties of resistance, opposition, dissent, protests and non-conformity which existed at all levels in German society and the way the Nazi regime responded to this behaviour. In doing so it also incorporates German public opinion which was anti-Nazi in content, since this was defined by the regime itself as oppositional, and illustrates the changing relationship between the Party and the people as the war moved into its final phase.

Beginning with the 'ordinary' people, in the first week of January 1943 the intelligence officers studied Goebbels' New Year speech which they considered 'most revealing' because of his acknowledgement that the war was having a detrimental effect on the German people who, it seemed, were putting individual interests above patriotism. They concluded that as far as a sense of 'community' was concerned, the

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<sup>7</sup>Anton Gill, *An Honourable Defeat: A History of The German Resistance to Hitler*. (London: Heinemann, 1994). p. 23.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. p. 1.

<sup>9</sup>Broszat in David Clay Large, *Contending With Hitler*. p. 25.

'tendency is not towards consolidation under adversity but towards disintegration', and the evidence of this weakening community was provided by the growing list of executions (and the need to publish the list).<sup>10</sup> A supplement to Weekly Report for the following week entitled 'Growth of Peasant Troubles in Germany' surveyed the reaction of the peasants to new Nazi regulations which included information about the increased dissent amongst these people and their refusal to comply with the regulations which resulted in the hoarding or sabotage of foodstuffs, refusal to bring in the harvest and the refusal to maintain extra cattle stock for the benefit of the government. The reports of prosecutions for unjustified abandonment of farm work by labourers, open complaints for the first time about the war, the government and living conditions all seemed to underline this conclusion. Much of the dissent amongst the peasants was due to the 'speculation' by officials and their involvement in black market activities, and the warning given by the Reichsobmann of the Reich Food Estate was considered 'remarkable' not only because of its severity but because it seemed to be addressed to both officials and peasants, with a threat from the Fuhrer that they should both 'take the opportunity to collaborate politically .. or remain on the outside'.<sup>11</sup>

This information was important to the PWE, since it was believed that it was possible to slow down the war economy of the Third Reich by using propaganda to encourage the sabotage of the production of food. This intelligence would serve as the basis for future propaganda to support and incite such actions. Assessing the significance of this information the intelligence officers concluded that the refusal to obey the authorities was due to a combination of factors including the feeling amongst farmers that the newly acquired Eastern Territories would or should supply all the necessary food for the Reich, and the problems existing due to the shortage of everyday consumption goods. The report concluded that the failure of the peasants to meet the higher standards of production set by the authorities had caused sufficient concern

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<sup>10</sup> Weekly Report 'German Propaganda and the German' (Hereafter WR[GPG]) PRO/FO 898/185. For week 28.12.42 - 3.1.43.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. For week 4.1.43 - 10.1.43. 'Growth of Peasant Troubles in Germany', 10th January, 1943.

within the regime to warrant a fairly threatening response, but nevertheless emphasised that this particular form of dissent should not be seen as anything more than 'localised' reaction against the increased demands of the Reich Food Estate.<sup>12</sup>

This report also included details of the treatment of the aged and infirm in the Third Reich with evidence of people accusing the regime of having no sympathy with the old and ill people, and of only being interested in the healthy and robust. The intelligence officers commented that it was not surprising that fears were aroused about this issue, and quoted a Dr. Kloos writing in the '*Deutsches Tuberkuloseblatt*' in October, 1942 who had outlined the problems caused by 'asocial' patients and confirmed that 'nothing is done to arrest the course of the disease, and thus to prolong a life which is of no value to the community', and report from a Dr. Gercke, writing in '*Deutsches Aerzteblatt*' on 15th November, 1942 who stated that patients suffering from malign tumours should not be given extra food. The intelligence officers commented that there was direct evidence to show that in Germany the consciousness of this position was now widespread, giving details of a German officer who had gone home on leave from Russia in March 1942 and found that the SS had 'killed off his father', whose mind had suffered owing to an injury received in the last war. Also included was information that a young soldier who was in Germany in June 1942, had said that soldiers were being used as subjects for chemical experiments. From a number of sources it seemed to be apparent that the practice of euthanasia was being used for cases of incurable illness, mental cases and aged people who were unable to work.<sup>13</sup>

Throughout January and February the reports observed reaction to the 'Total War' measures being introduced, and noted that the judicial authorities were urged to show greater severity towards offenders against war-time regulations. In February, Goebbels made a 'rampant' attack on the German people, stating that 'Total war is thus the commandment of the hour'. The time had come to take off the kid gloves,

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/185. For week 4.1.43 - 10.1.43.

and Goebbels uttered unmistakable threats to the shirkers and 'bars in night clubs, luxury restaurants and shops, fashion salons, hairdressers, and beauty parlours, received their now customary measure of abuse'.<sup>14</sup> Goebbels had a 'special dose of venom' for the people in the Tiergarten, the officials who pack up the moment their 8-hour day is at an end, and 'the certain men and women who loll in the health resorts where they exchange idle gossip and rumour'. He warned these people that the National Socialist government had the moral and political duty to mete out 'draconian' punishment to anyone who avoided their responsibilities. The report noted that there was increasing evidence to show that many of those affected by labour conscription had been busy preparing their claims for exemption. Gauleiter Greiser of Poznan identified the 'certain groups of idle Germans ...who sit in cafes and discuss ways of evading the recently published labour duty regulations'.<sup>15</sup> The intelligence officers identified five points which pointed to a change of mood and attitude in Germany: people had lost the belief in victory; they were tired of fighting; they were no longer in the mood to submit to increasing war work which the government asks; they were now actively resisting total war measures and had lost confidence in the Fuehrer.<sup>16</sup>

At the end of February, the increasing concern of the authorities about manifestations of social disorder in Germany resulted in the regime establishing a special urban constabulary, the 'Stadtwacht', which was a semi-military force in addition to the local police, regular and SS forces. Reported in the '*Ostsee-Zeitung*' in Stettin it was described as 'an invisible auxiliary band of men trained in the use of arms who are ready to ...crush relentlessly any attempt by asocial elements of the population who endanger the property or security of other people'.<sup>17</sup> It was thought that the 'asocial' elements were probably foreigners, and the need for the 'Stadtwacht' was considered

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid. For week 1.2.43 - 7.2.43.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. For week 15.2.43 - 21.2.43.

<sup>16</sup> Confirmed in Steinert, *Hitler's War and the Germans*. p.186 and p.201.

<sup>17</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/185. For week 22.2.43 - 28.2.43.



to be an indication of the shortage of man-power as a result of the depletion of the police and SS personnel. This report was found particularly interesting to the German Section, since it showed the concern in the Nazi regime about the presence of millions of foreigners now working in the Reich, and the friendliness and sympathy being shown to them by the German people. The possibility of collaboration between the foreign workers and the German people against the authorities was something both the Nazi regime and the PWE had already considered. The PWE recognised the important role the foreign workers might play if such a collaborative relationship were forged, specifically in terms of their potential for taking part in an internal uprising, sabotage and subversion activities. Because of this the situation was monitored closely and details of the conditions and location of the foreign workers in Germany became the subject of a supplement to a Weekly Report at the beginning of April, 1943. This included data and information about the number of foreign workers in the Third Reich and the crimes they had been accused of committing. Briefly, the report concluded that 'Poles are the only large category of foreign workers who provide a percentage of reported crimes higher than the proportion of the total foreign worker population they represent. Whilst the Poles are represented as specialising in crimes of violence, the Russians appear to specialise in truancy, which accounts for over 60% of Russian crimes. The French, who represent 17% of both crimes and foreign worker population (including working prisoners of war), owe three-quarters of their convictions to their friendly relations with the civil population, almost entirely to relations with women'.<sup>18</sup> The report commented that there was clearly a brake on the reporting of crimes committed by Italians, who formed 4.5% of the foreign workers, where only one crime was reported. This 'forgery', is pointed out by the intelligence officer who also adds that a 'good source' has confirmed that the Italian workers had a bad reputation in the heavily-raided districts for looting after raids, even though no conviction on this charge seems to have been permitted in the German press. Finally, the report concluded that the Poles and Czechs accounted for the vast

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<sup>18</sup>Ibid. For week 5.4.43 - 11.4.43. 'Foreign Workers and Their Crimes', 12th April 1943.

majority of crimes classed as 'treason'.<sup>19</sup> This categorisation by the German Section of the foreign workers into nationalities and types of crimes they were assumed to be capable of committing would be useful in deciding which tasks could be given to which section of the foreign workers in any campaign launched by the PWE in order to get the foreign workers to do something rather than merely feel something. If this was the case the French would be used to 'persuade' the local population to help them, whilst the Poles and Czechs could be relied upon to take part in the subversion and sabotage. By the middle of July 1943 there was growing evidence of anxiety in Germany that the foreign workers might rise up against the German people in defeat, and that this fear had come to obsess a large part of the civilian population.<sup>20</sup> But it was not until a year later that serious plans were put forward by the PWE concerning the use of this 'pool' of foreign labour.

Meanwhile the information about the attitudes and behaviour of women to the Nazi regime was brought to the attention of the German Section. This is particularly interesting since the role of women in the Third Reich has until fairly recently been neglected by historians, with women categorised as either 'perpetrators' or 'victims'.<sup>21</sup> The reality was much more complex, and was documented at the time in the intelligence reports of the German Section. In January 1943 women were included in the plans for the 'total mobilisation' of German society and they were warned by Dittmar that their allotted task was compulsory hard work in the factories.<sup>22</sup> However, the regime's attempts to 'encourage' women to register for

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/185. For week 5.7.43 - 11.7.43.

<sup>21</sup>For the debate see Adelheid von Saldern, 'Victims or Perpetrators? Controversies About The Role of Women in the Nazi State', in Crew (Ed.), *Nazism and German Society, 1933-1945*. (London: Routledge, 1994). pp. 141-165. Ute Frevert, *Women in German History*. (Oxford: Berg, 1990). pp. 207-239. Gisela Bock, 'Antinatalism, Maternity and Paternity in National Socialist Racism', in Crew, op. cit. pp. 110-140. Claudia Koonz, *Mothers in the Fatherland*. (London: Methuen, 1988).

<sup>22</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/185. For week 10.1.43 - 17.1.43.

industrial work met with a negative response, and attempts to evade the call-up resulted in the creation of a bizarre range of illnesses and excuses. Amongst the many reasons given were such ludicrous ones as 'Studying Japanese and Chinese', or being a secretary 'to a friend', or the slightly more believable one of having heavy family responsibilities. Doctors' waiting-rooms were besieged by women trying to get an exemption certificate, and the authorities reacted swiftly by announcing that the Labour Office could and would disregard these certificates unless they were signed by a Doctor attached officially to the Labour Office.<sup>23</sup> It was clear that some women did not take the orders seriously, and others simply disregarded the instruction to register.<sup>24</sup> Eventually the evasion of the call-up resulted in publicity for these 'offenders' by the regime who announced in the Essen *'National-Zeitung'* that 'for incomprehensible reasons not everybody has taken any notice of the final date for registration. All these people are liable to be punished'. Women had still not registered for industrial work and it was believed they were being shielded by other members of society. To try to counter this the Dresden Labour Office stressed that 'all endeavours to protect over-anxious women by giving them less important jobs, are acts of sabotage, which must absolutely not occur'.<sup>25</sup> Of course the refusal to register and work in the factories cannot be assumed to be politically motivated action against the regime, any more than it cannot be assumed that it was not. One of the many complaints made by 'ordinary' women at this time was that they did not see why they should work in industry when the wives of influential men in the Party were exempt.<sup>26</sup> They also questioned whether it was either necessary or fair to be asked to do this sort of work, and this public questioning caused enough anxiety to the authorities to issue a warning that 'Nobody benefits by listening, but many are

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid. For week 8.2.43 - 14.2.43.

<sup>24</sup>Tim Mason comments that 'women conscripts proved themselves adept at fulfilling conditions for exemption' in Tim Mason, *Social Policy in The Third Reich. The Working Class and the 'National Community'*. (Oxford: Berg, 1993). p. 201.

<sup>25</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/185. For week 8.3.43 - 14.3.43.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. For week 15.3.43 - 21.3.43.

injured, since their confidence is paralysed'.<sup>27</sup> But one of the most important reasons for the failure of conscription of women was seen to be the way in which women had hitherto been identified within Nazi ideology and practice and the efforts needed to show somehow that the situation had now been reversed without undermining the authority of the regime.

An article in the '*St. Galler Tagblatt*' on 31st January, 1943 illustrates the dilemma faced by the Ministry of Propaganda :

'A significant fact which has not escaped widespread notice and popular comment is that only a year ago even Hitler declared himself opposed to the employment of women on a larger scale, because the future stamina of the German race depended upon girls and young women being shielded from the rigours of war for the function of marriage and motherhood. To-day Sauckel mobilises all women from 17 to 45 without exception, including all women who are married but not yet mothers'.<sup>28</sup>

The intelligence officers concluded in this report that the prevailing climate of opinion that 'the woman's place is in the home' was 'much more strongly and widely held in Germany than in this country', and that 'under these circumstances, it is to be expected that there will be considerable passive opposition to the new decree, and that women will find evasion of the decree easy to reconcile with their consciences'.

But all women did not use this 'evasion clause' just to avoid registration for industrial work; they also protested about other issues. Many questioned the regime about the very essence of Nazi ideology, and the role (outlined above) which had identified their tasks in the Reich as mother, home-maker and carer and now it seemed in war as a worker in the 'male' sphere for the Third Reich. They registered their protest in the latter case by their refusal to move into industry, and protested about the former in

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. For week 1.2.43 - 7.2.43.

a variety of ways.<sup>29</sup> The disillusionment and horror of the huge loss of life on both the home and battle front brought a reaction from some women who asked 'Why should we have children if they are to be killed in 20 years time?' and a young mother who bitterly complained that 'In Europe one does nothing but build for 20 years and then destroy - we mothers,..educate children for this, and when we have brought them up, from 14 years they no longer belong to us but to the state'.<sup>30</sup> These women were not talking from a nationalist perspective but from a human one which fundamentally questioned the reasons and purpose of war. It is a perspective that would, of course, be shared by many women in Britain at the same time.<sup>31</sup>

In May 1943, the intelligence reports included more details of women's willingness to confront openly the Nazi regime with details of a riot in front of the OKW Information office when 'thousands of women and elderly men gathered to obtain news about their relatives in the Afrika-Korps' and that 'similar' riots were reported from other parts of Germany.<sup>32</sup> In July it was noted that 'men and women still take up an attitude of passive resistance... and seem only to submit to compulsion and do not conceal their feelings towards the new work'.<sup>33</sup> Amidst this questioning and challenging of the regime, there were of course women who supported Hitler and were mobilised by the Ministry of Propaganda in an attempt to reverse the trend of dissent and protest of women. In September, the Reich women's leader Scholtz-Klink declared that 'The Fuehrer has mapped out for us the only possible path. It is of no

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<sup>29</sup>See Frevert, *Women in German History*. pp. 223-228.

<sup>30</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/F0898/185. For week 24.5.43 - 30.5.43.

<sup>31</sup> See Penny Summerfield, 'Women and war in the twentieth century', in June Purvis, (Ed.), *Women's History: Britain, 1850-1945*. (University College London, 1995). Penny Summerfield, *Women workers in the Second World War*. (London: Routledge, 1989). Gayle Braybon and Penny Summerfield, *Out of the Cage: Women's experiences in two world wars*. (London: Pandora, 1987).

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. For week 10.5.43 - 16.5.43.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. For week 19.7.43 - 26.7.43.

importance where the Fuehrer's path leads: out duty is to follow him'.<sup>34</sup> This attempt to convince the women of the Reich that they had no choice but to involve themselves in the war also failed, and at the beginning of November the intelligence officers noted that the 'passive resistance' of women was causing 'a very difficult problem for the German authorities .. Here Himmler's methods cannot be applied, at least on the grand scale, if only on account of the inevitable repercussions on morale at the front'.<sup>35</sup> At the beginning of December a Supplement to the Weekly Report included confirmation of the failure of the German authorities to force women into industrial work, the methods used to check up on defaulters and the use of police literally to force women out of their homes and off to work.<sup>36</sup>

Moving away now from the issue of women, the intelligence officers had noted in April, 1943 signs of the weakening of German morale with people publicly discussing the issue of responsibility for the war and increasingly talking of the desire for peace. Goebbels attempted to clear the regime of responsibility for continuation of the war by insisting that the Fuehrer was not responsible and in fact had done everything to avoid it. Later in the month the increasing instances of people listening to foreign broadcasts for 'information' which they realised the Ministry of Propaganda either would or could not give them was commented on. Their willingness to continue to transgress, despite the punishment for doing so, was the subject of an article in *'Der Fuehrer'*, on 11th April which, according to the intelligence officer, went much further than usual in admitting the authorities' fear of vulnerability of German morale to propaganda :

'Broadcast propaganda has become a weapon which, if it is not met with suitable counter-measures, will prove more paralysing and deadly than guns and machine-guns. For, if from the start the fighting morale of the people, their will to resist and their belief in victory are sapped

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<sup>34</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/186. For week 20.9.43 - 26.9.43.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. For week 8.11.43 - 14.11.43.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. 'German Women Defy Orders to Register', 6th December 1943.

or broken, the best weapons will be of no use'.<sup>37</sup>

It had been noted by the PWE that Hitler had maintained a low-key profile during the first half of 1943, and in fact had not made any speeches since he given a short statement on 'Heroes Day', 21st March. However, the defeat of Italy in September now forced him to break his silence. This was seen in Britain as 'evidence of the extreme importance of Italy's surrender as a factor affecting home morale',<sup>38</sup> and the intelligence officers noted that it was the first time a Hitler speech appeared to have been recorded in a studio. This latter fact was seen as evidence of the unpreparedness of the Nazi regime for Italy's surrender, and that they were, despite their denials, surprised by it. They commented that the speech must have been written by the Fuhrer himself, and in a hurry, since it was 'involved and illogical'. They believed that what Hitler was trying to get across to his audience was that the defeat of Italy did not affect Germany at all: 'Italy's withdrawal means very little from a military point of view'. The officers also believed that the regime was having to convince the German people that it was due to base treachery, and to use this constructed opportunity to warn the public and any internal oppositional groups against thinking such developments might be repeated in Germany. Underlining this, Hitler announced that brutal measures would be taken in Italy which would both satisfy the desire for revenge, for the regime it would act as a warning to remaining allies and finally urge the home and fighting fronts to still greater efforts. The German Section were encouraged by the response of the authorities, since it indicated that Hitler was 'clearly conscious of the possibility of a 'Badoglio coup' in Germany, when at the beginning of his speech he announced that measures had been taken 'in order to protect the German Reich from a fate which Marshall Badoglio and his men not only inflicted on the Duce and the Italian people, but into which they intend to drag Germany'.<sup>39</sup> What was important for the intelligence officers was the clear indication that Hitler was trying to identify external forces as being most likely to

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<sup>37</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/185. For week 19.4.43 - 26.4.43.

<sup>38</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/186. For week 6.9.43 - 12.9.43.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

challenge the leadership, in order to take the focus away from internal dissent. But, for the German Section, Hitler was demonstrating his awareness of the existence of the German oppositional leaders was anxious to avoid mentioning them. This was not the 'usual' pattern of behaviour of the leadership to opposition and dissent, and the intelligence officers considered that the coup in Italy had in fact brought about a panic amongst the Nazi elite.<sup>40</sup>

This theme was continued in German propaganda, when Goebbels' Reich broadcast of 17th September contained what the intelligence officers took to be 'clear and significant warnings to Germans at home, not to follow in the footsteps of the Italian traitors'.<sup>41</sup> It also appeared that Hitler's speech about the treachery of the King of Italy and Badoglio had backfired when information arrived showing the anti-Italian feeling amongst some German workers and their relations with Italian foreign workers which had resulted in 'undisciplined outbreaks of exasperation'.<sup>42</sup> What was also important news for that week's report was information that Himmler had been promoted to Minister of Interior. There was also a rumour in German official circles was that this move had been made to allow him to control Goebbels. But there were indications that this promotion may also have been made for other reasons, since it was noted that it had been announced alongside the publication of a spate of police-court reports warning of the future 'hard-line' approach to such behaviour. Whilst Himmler's promotion may not have given him much more power, it was certainly an indication of a change in policy towards defeatist talk and rumour in Germany. The lengths to which the Nazi regime felt they had to go in order to maintain their authority was entering into another phase, as the author of the report noted that 'Propaganda against rumour-mongering etc., has failed , and now the method of

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<sup>40</sup>Steinert discusses the impact of the coup in Germany and reaches the same conclusions. See Steinert, *Hitler's War and The Germans*. pp. 215-217.

<sup>41</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/186. For week 13.9.43 - 19.9.43.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.



arrest, imprisonment and execution is being tried'.<sup>43</sup>

To underline the results of this new policy under Himmler the report included details of what they described as a 'striking' example of a court case involving a 52 year old man from Korselt, sentenced to death according to DNB for 'helping the enemy and for activities aimed at destroying the power of defence by defeatist talk and spreading rumours'.<sup>44</sup> This is a good example of the awareness in the German Section of the paranoia of the Nazi regime which increasingly used the judicial procedure to control a disaffected public, a divided and fragmented society and the failure of the regime to achieve what was rapidly becoming the 'myth' of the 'Volksgemeinschaft', the 'national community'.

Following Himmler's appointment the Ministry of Propaganda publicised details of the recently announced 'Code of Duty' for the German people which constituted thirty rules, one of which was that 'sabotage of war morale means death', warning that 'high treason leads like lightning to the scaffold', treason being defined by the regime as 'those who commit treachery verbally or in their thoughts'. Himmler's 'mailed fist against defeatism' would be used in a purge against the well-to-do conservatives, particularly business-men who were labelled as 'profit-patriots', as well as the 'ordinary' people and all were warned that 'weaklings and traitors will be seized and annihilated'.<sup>45</sup> This report also contained details of the Gestapo arresting seven people for rumour-mongering, including one elderly man who was sent to jail for three weeks because he had 'incommoded his neighbours with his rumours to such an extent that they lost their patience'.

At the beginning of October the PWE reported that the morale of the German people and their ability to support the regime was weakening considerably. The evidence supporting this conclusion had come from two 'neutral' observers in August and early

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid. For week 20.9.43 - 26.9.43.

September, from different parts of Germany and different strata of society, who had stated that 'almost anything would be an improvement on the present state of things'. Germans, even those who were ardent Nazis a year ago, were saying openly to foreigners that they desired nothing but an end to the war, and were prepared to draw the conclusion that the regime must go, 'though there was still no evidence that they considered the possibility of themselves in assisting its departure'.<sup>46</sup> In the same week the report gave details of a 59-year-old Regensburg man, Johann Kellner who had been executed on 12th August because he had 'carried out Communist whisper propaganda and painted inciting slogans on house walls'.<sup>47</sup> Since his appointment on 24th August as Minister of Interior the German Section had received information of fourteen deaths and twenty-eight convictions which the intelligence officers noted was a tenfold increase. More publicity, increased terror and increased severity of punishment now included the death sentence for four people accused of distributing 'a political poem of an inciting and disruptive nature'.<sup>48</sup>

Whilst the weakening of morale on the German home front was seen as an important factor the intelligence department was also looking for signs of more practical results of this change in mood or attitude. As mentioned previously one of the ways this could be achieved was through the disruption of the war economy, and all the information received about strikes and demonstrations in the workplace was put together in a special supplement. Entitled 'Strikes and Demonstrations in Germany' the report included details of strikes in Austria, Hamburg, Essen, Duisburg and Oberhausen where some workers had been arrested whilst others were induced to return to work by the threat of shooting.<sup>49</sup> The report commented that this was not a practical solution the regime would be able to take since the 'acute shortage of labour, particularly skilled labour' would in any case make it difficult for the

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid. For week 27.9.43 - 3.10.43.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. For week 11.10.43 - 17.10.43.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. For week 15.11.43 - 21.11.43. 'Strikes and Demonstrations in Germany', 22nd November 1943.

authorities to deal with major strikes by wholesale imprisonment or execution. Whilst such behaviour might disrupt the regime's ability to carry on with the war, through lack of armaments and other vital equipment, the intelligence officers were also very aware that issues of self-interest were involved. This was illustrated in the report with a quotation from a letter written by a woman from Bocholt, Westphalia which implied that the strike action there had been 'designed to extract treatment according to regulations arbitrarily refused by the employer or manager'. However, a strike in Austria was seen to be a demonstration against food shortages, whilst anti-war demonstrations were also reported, particularly from heavily-raided towns where workers also deserted their work and fled to safer areas. The report acknowledged that the strikes might be 'not so much industrial disputes as political or quasi-political demonstrations, protesting against food shortages or demanding peace'.<sup>50</sup>

A major cause of anxiety for the regime had always been the possibility of a repeat of 1918 as a result of morale and public opinion going against the regime. At the end of October the intelligence officers commented that 'the 1918 parallel continues to be prominent in the press all over Germany', with the need for endless reassurances from the leadership that this was not possible because 'This time Germany has the Fuhrer. Like a rock in a stormy ocean, never wavering, never doubting, an example to all in strength and tenacity, in unshakeable determination and supreme concentration'(emphasis as original).<sup>51</sup> Two weeks later the intelligence officers include details of a speech made by Hitler which, for them, contradicted this. The report commented that again the speech appeared to have been written in a great hurry, and although Hitler's voice sounded fairly strong he had raced through his script and revealed little of his old powers as an orator and demagogue. But 'more striking than his delivery, however, was the absence of logical development of his arguments, his frequent return to points he has already made, and (increasingly towards the end) his inability to construct a straightforward, coherent - let alone

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/186. For week 25.10.43 - 31.10.43.

grammatical - sentence'.<sup>52</sup> At the end of this report the officers emphasised the increasing weakness of the regime and the growing criticism of the leadership which illustrated a growing rift between the Party and the people, and between the Party and the SS. It also highlighted the general acceptance of defeat amongst German officers who now thought that the regime would put off the admission of defeat until the last possible moment, and that these people were hoping that under these circumstances the Anglo-Saxon powers might forestall a Russian occupation.<sup>53</sup>

By the middle of November it had become clear to the intelligence officers from their analysis of the situation in Germany that since 'no German appeared to have any rational grounds for expecting any end to the war except defeat, it seems profitable to consider not so much the moral factors tending towards national collapse but rather those inhibiting immediate capitulation'. Importantly the German Section thought capitulation could be brought about either by the leadership or by the German people, an important distinction being made between them. The report contained a warning about the problems which might present themselves if a capitulation by the leadership did occur, reminding the reader that it may not necessarily represent a rejection on National Socialism but only 'abdication in favour of other leaders'. But, realistically, the officers confirmed that this was 'most unlikely', unless it was as a result of dissension between the leaders with 'some thinking that they see a way out for themselves by sacrificing others'.<sup>54</sup> But the intelligence officers also thought that 'the mass of people can, however, produce a situation which forces the leadership to capitulate'. As far as the intelligence officers were concerned the 'So-called leaders', ie. generals, industrialists 'must be regarded for the present purpose only as outstanding representatives of the general mass of the people, and despite their important status and position, cannot act. They are inhibited from acting by much the same factors as inhibit the general mass - difficulty of discussion, fear of denunciation, lack of organisation, lack of agreed aims, uncertainty as to the

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid. For week 8.11.43 - 14.11.43.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. For week 15.11.43 - 21.11.43.

consequences of action, conflict of loyalties, etc.' The report also noted that German Generals would be inhibited by their Oath of Loyalty to Hitler.

Underlining the recognition in the German Section of 'the other Germany' the intelligence officers considered that, 'the mass of people might act directly by revolution'. But in the final analysis this, too, was dismissed by the recognition that 'a revolution arising spontaneously out of the German people is very unlikely, since the most powerful factor inhibiting any revolution from below is still undoubtedly the Gestapo and all that it stands for'. Finally, the report considered one more avenue open to the German people to force the leadership out of power. This was the effects on the regime of the failure of the people to produce the goods necessary to carry on the war. The report concluded that even if this were to happen it would be achieved 'not so much by voluntary sabotage as by involuntary failure owing to the lack of will to make the necessary effort'.<sup>55</sup>

As 1943 drew to a close the intelligence officers again assessed the situation between the regime and the 'mass of people', given the information they had at hand concerning the conditions under which they lived which had resulted in total apathy and broken morale. The 'mass of people' could not be relied upon to bring down the regime, any more than the regime could rely on them to support it. The increased pessimism amongst the 'ordinary' people regarding the outcome of the war had resulted in their withdrawal into the 'private' sphere and a reluctance to become concerned or involved in political issues. Instead the civilian population were resorting to the 'simple, unpolitical ideals of domesticity and purely personal relations, and whilst accepting that the ideals of National-Socialism were an "illusion" they appeared to have no conception of any alternative for which they are prepared to work'. Equally problematic for the regime was the evidence which suggested that the troops now appeared to be 'taking refuge in the simple, unpolitical ideals of comradeship, obedience to established authority and physical courage'.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. For week 27.12.43 - 2.1.44.

Interestingly, the reports do not contain a great deal of information about German youth, but what is included certainly does not correspond with the idea of a massive army of young people supporting Hitler and the Nazi regime.<sup>57</sup> The Weekly Report for the period 22nd to 28th March, 1943 contained the information that over one million boys over 14 years old had been sworn in to the Hitler Youth.<sup>58</sup> At the end of May however, the report noted a 'serious problem' and evacuation difficulties in Oberhausen had arisen because the juvenile workers whose parents had been evacuated were not 'taking advantage' of the hostels provided for them by the authorities.<sup>59</sup> The problem seemed to be that these hostels were actually Hitler Youth training centres and were so unpopular with the working boys in the area that they preferred to find homes with other people living in the area than with the Hitler Youth organisation. It seemed that the Ministry of Propaganda had performed its job only too well by announcing on 12th May that the juveniles living in these hostels would 'be brought up physically, ideologically and morally according to the regulations which apply to the Hitler Youth, by specially selected hostel leaders and for educational reasons must wear the regulation uniform of the Hitler Youth'.<sup>60</sup>

One group of young people in Germany who did not conform to the above behaviour were known as the 'Swing'. At the end of June the intelligence officers quoted a Party announcement in the *'Hannoversche Zeitung'* dated 8th September, 1942 which revealed the existence in Hanover of a movement in Germany comparable with the 'swing' or 'zazou' movements of the Occupied Countries.

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<sup>57</sup>Recent research, also using PWE intelligence sources, confirms that the 'Hitler Youth were challenged at the very height of the Third Reich by a number of oppositional youth gangs'. Perry Biddiscombe, 'The Enemy of our Enemy': A View of the Edelweiss Piraten from the British and American Archives', *Journal of Contemporary History*, January, 1995. pp 37-63. p. 37.

<sup>58</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/185. For week 22.3.43 - 28.3.43.

<sup>59</sup>Steinert quotes an SD report which confirms 'indifference' and 'intentional rejection of admission to the Party' in certain sections of German youth. Steinert, *Hitler's War and The Germans*. p. 219.

<sup>60</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/185. For week 31.5.43 - 6.6.43.

The announcement read:

'we owe it to the honour of German youth ruthlessly to make a clean sweep of these adolescents and conspicuous types who .. draw attention to themselves by their physical neglect, their defective deportment, their dirty appearance and their provoking hairstyles and who already in peacetime refused to undertake any tasks whatsoever for the benefit of the community ... complaints of provoking and brazen behaviour , these people have met in the shelter huts and at seats and have annoyed passers by, insulting them in a vulgar manner'(emphasis as original).<sup>61</sup>

The same report went to on describe how, on the personal instructions of the Gauleiter, a whole group of these boys and girls of ages ranging between 14 and 18 were rounded up by the police. The usual punishment was that they would have to present themselves in working clothes with their hair cut according to the regulations and would be put to work for the President of the Police. Failure to observe this order could lead to arrest and even imprisonment . In October 1943, the intelligence officers commented that 'Doubts concerning the political attitude of the rising generation , as well as the need to employ every available labour unit, is suggested by the drastic measures adopted to round up those who have escaped mobilisation. 'Compulsory Youth Meetings' were announced in Kreis-Salzburg-Land to be attended by all young people between the ages of 10 and 18, and those who did not attend were warned that they would be fined up to 150 RM.<sup>62</sup> An even more drastic measure promised in some areas was that the Food Offices would collaborate in the registration of all juveniles by the Hitler Youth and food cards for these young people would be only be issued against completed Hitler Youth membership application forms.<sup>63</sup>

The following Weekly Report considered 'The Condition of the Young People', and found that the 'Hitler-Jugend training, the absence of fathers at the front and mothers in the factory, etc., have combined to destroy the family in Germany and leave

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid. For week 21.6.43 - 27.6.43.

<sup>62</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/186. For week 18.10.43 - 24.10.43.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

adolescents to grow up wild', that the Hitler Youth had 'taken the matter into their own hands' and subsequently an order had been issued forbidding all under the age of 18 from attending the cinema where performances are not due to end before 21.00 hours.<sup>64</sup> Additionally, the effects of the Hitler Youth programme were now being publicly criticised for the deterioration of school results. An article in the press in December, 1943 attempted to reject the claims that the amount of time taken out of school for training for the Hitler Youth was to blame for this, and argued that the problems stemmed from the conditions where the father was called up some years ago and the mother often 'professionally detained', resulting in deterioration of discipline in the home. The article did finish, however, by admitting that 'the pupils entrusted with tasks of leadership in the HJ might be physically and mentally overstrained'.<sup>65</sup> In the second week in January the intelligence officers returned to this issue and confirmed that they thought it might be a problem confined to the Meckleburg area since in the rest of Germany the Hitler Youth appeared to be 'fortifying' its position. They also noted that a decree published on 4th January (which had already come into force on December 11th) empowered Axmann, the head of Hitler Youth, 'uniformly to direct the utilisation of German youth for additional war tasks outside their school and vocational work'. A more sinister turn of events was noticed by the intelligence officers who reported that a directive had also been issued from the Ministry of Justice associating the Hitler Youth closely with the administration of the juvenile courts as from January 1st, 1944. They commented that 'It is hard to see what this means except that unruly HJ leaders will be able to snap their fingers at the judges, as at everybody else, while their more quiet contemporaries are completely at the mercy of adolescent sadism'.<sup>66</sup>

The problems the Nazi regime was facing with German youth, were considered in a supplement dated 10th July, 1944 entitled 'Youth Protection Camps in Germany', which included details of two camps that had been set up in Germany and which the

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid. For week 25.10.43 - 31.10.43.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid. For week 27.12.43 - 2.1.44.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid. For week 3.1.44 - 9.1.44.



intelligence officers believed were to deal with the increased problems of German youth 'running wild'.<sup>67</sup> The officers commented that it would be 'fanciful' to describe these as concentration camps, but that there were certain commonalities between the two establishments: the anonymity of camp administration so far as the public was concerned; the stress laid on harsh discipline; the possibility of adding an indefinite term of detention in a YPC to any legal sentence; and the imposition of police supervision on released camp inmates without the necessity of any legal process; and the possibility of imposing detention in a YPC without legal process and without warning. The officers of the German Section concluded that these commonalities indicated that it was 'safe to describe these camps as the first stage towards concentration camps for the young'.

Whilst the authorities took increasingly repressive measures against youth the Gestapo continued to use and increase their violent methods in order to pacify the increasingly resentful sectors of German society. It was repeated that people were now beginning to question openly the punishment meted out to individuals on account of the opinions they held and some of those persecuted and killed by the Gestapo, such as the Korselt man, had now come to be regarded as martyrs.<sup>68</sup>

The morale of soldiers on the Eastern Front was of particular interest to the PWE, and from a batch of captured letters written by German soldiers in Russia the intelligence officers quoted one from an officer who stated that every one of his soldiers was shouting 'I did not start the war, we were better off when we were unemployed, we were much better off before the National Socialist government set in'. This letter contained information about the breakdown of discipline on the Eastern Front, with the officer 'praying' that there would not be an unprecedented retreat homewards warning that 'I am deeply convinced that these hordes would behave in a worse manner than the Bolsheviks themselves, if only in order to

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid. For week 3.7.44 - 9.7.44. 'Youth Protection Camps in Germany', 10th July 1944.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid. For week 14.2.44 - 20.2.44. For details of the 'Korselt' man see fn. 44, p. 121.

establish some sort of political 'alibi' for themselves. One can sense a change in outlook among the majority of men - especially among the N.C.Os.'<sup>69</sup> These indications of a disaffected army were important areas of interest for the PWE, since if this dissent could be turned into positive action and become widespread amongst the soldiers and Army Generals then the possibility of a coup in Germany could still not be ruled out.

Moving from the 'ordinary' people to the possibility of a resistance movement in Germany, information that had been coming into the German Section since the end of May 1943 that there were problems within the Party and between the Party and the Army, was now confirmed by the regime. The officers had recognised the necessity for a general purge of defeatist, rumour-mongering individuals within the Party and prompted the intelligence officers to comment acidly that these people were 'rats on a sinking ship', who had no possibility of doing anything to form a political movement against the regime.<sup>70</sup> The reasons for, and effects of, the Purge were considered in the following week's reports, with the intelligence officers concluding that it was an attempt to clear out the educated and cultural elites within the Party who might be most susceptible to Allied propaganda. The information that such 'high personages' as Gauleiters might be involved in the Purge did, however, lead the German Section to consider that this might be a further 'breach within a supposedly united community'.<sup>71</sup>

The possibility of a direct challenge to the Nazi regime began to take shape in August 1943 when information in a Swiss newspaper on the subject of the Italian coup asked "whether a similar fate may not be in store for Hitler and National Socialism, naming Keitel, Doentiz and Goering as possible leaders."<sup>72</sup> The intelligence officers thought

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid. For week 13.3.44 - 19.3.44.

<sup>70</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/185. For week 31.5.43 - 6.6.43.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid. For week 7.6.43 - 13.6.43.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. For week 16.8.43 - 22.8.43.

Brauchitsch was an 'obvious analogy for Badoglio - a professional soldier, former Commander-in-Chief, latterly in retirement on account of his disagreement with the political Leader'.<sup>73</sup> Discussing at length the potential leaders the report concluded that at this stage all information available pointed to little more than 'idle speculation' and even if it were more than that it still 'represented the crudest possible interpretation of the Wehrmacht taking over'. The Weekly Reports continued to include details of the information regarding the events, rumour and gossip surrounding the Badoglio coup, and concluded that this move would be welcomed by the German people. The German Section included in this report information from a 'not very reliable report, from inside Germany through German emigre channels' that Rundstedt had been named as a possible Badoglio.<sup>74</sup>

In order to assess the probability of an internal coup the intelligence officers observed the reaction of the Nazi leadership to the situation, and noted that Goebbels was obviously taking the threat very seriously when in his speech of 3rd October he repeatedly stated that there was no soldier to be found of any rank who would put 'cowardly subjection above honour' since the German nation was too politically mature to be taken in by the hypocritical lies of the enemies and the 'bitter lessons of November 1918'.<sup>75</sup> The report concluded that the speech was 'practically an admission that the example of Badoglio has the same sort of appeal to the German people now as Wilson's Fourteen Points in 1918'. In other words the German people would be willing to surrender on the basis of a negotiated peace, a situation that the Nazi regime could not contemplate. This was confirmed in October when a report came into London that rumour in 'grand bourgeois' circles alleged that Himmler would soon be found co-operating with the Wehrmacht to oppose Hitler. This seemed to corroborate with 'good evidence' previously obtained that a military coup would be impossible without Himmler's co-operation, even if it meant that he would have to be eliminated later. The report suggested that Himmler proposed to make peace

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/186. For week 20.9.43 - 26.9.43.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid. For week 27.9.43 - 3.10.43.

with Russia over Hitler's head, which was thought by the German Section not to be 'impossible' since reports were also coming in that opinion in 'higher circles' in Germany suggested that 'the young men destined to be Germany's future leaders were inspired by admiration of Russia's success against Germany'. Unfortunately these 'future leaders' also were coming to the conclusion that National-Socialism had not been sufficiently totalitarian'.<sup>76</sup> This had always been at the heart of the problems between Churchill and those individuals who had tried to put out 'peace feelers' towards Britain. The feelings of mistrust about the aims of these people had resulted in Churchill's policy of 'Absolute Silence' in January, 1941.<sup>77</sup> But, in mid-October the intelligence officers concluded that those who had hoped for a German Badoglio in July had now lost heart due to the passage of time and also as a result of Himmler's increased campaign of terror against all dissenters. The main reason, however, according to the intelligence available was that the Generals who might be involved were 'paralysed by the occupation of key positions by other generals irrevocably committed to the regime'.<sup>78</sup>

For the next four months discussion concerning an internal coup seemed to have disappeared, but in mid February 1944, the intelligence officers began to receive information of rumours of impending developments, and that Rundstedt was already involved in negotiations with the Western Allies. Himmler, having already made contact with the Allies, was also still considered a possibility.<sup>79</sup> In the mid March the rumours continued, and a 'neutral source in contact with upper-class Germans' informed the PWE that high German officials were still talking of the desirability of a German Bodaglio but to the consternation of the German Section the rumours now emphasised a 'pro-Russian' approach.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid. For week 4.10.43 - 11.10.43.

<sup>77</sup> See p. 107.

<sup>78</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/186. For week 11.10.43 - 17.10.43.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid. For week 7.2.44 - 13.2.44.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid. For week 6.3.44 - 12.3.44.

As the military situation worsened the intelligence officers recognised what they described as an expected sense of hopelessness of the German people given the 'German propensity for self-pity', with the added barb that they would now cling to Hitler as a 'scapegoat .. somebody on whom the whole blame could be laid when the victorious Allies came to allot punishment for war-guilt'.<sup>81</sup>

Throughout this period the existence of 'the other Germany' to the intelligence officers of the German Section had resulted in various notes and memoranda being exchanged between the PWE and the Foreign Office concerning the possibility of issuing a declaration to the German people concerning Allied intentions in the post-war settlement. At the beginning of December, 1943 a note was sent from Harrison at the Foreign Office to Scarlett at the PWE about the announcement of a Joint Declaration of intention towards the German people.<sup>82</sup> Harrison asked if the PWE could 'dress them up' in a form which would be palatable to the German people.<sup>83</sup> A Memo from the PWE, setting out the principles of political warfare viz-a-viz the Draft Declaration included the suggestion that the Declaration 'should not suggest that we intend to interfere more than necessary over the long term in German internal affairs. In particular, the suggestion should be avoided that we intend to impose a Constitution on Germany or ourselves to undertake the re-education of the German people'.<sup>84</sup>

But, in a Foreign Office Minute entitled 'Propaganda to Germany' a typed note from

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid. For week 3.4.44 - 9.4.44.

<sup>82</sup> The issue of re-negotiating the declaration of Unconditional Surrender made by Roosevelt was an important issue for the PWE, as the correspondence shows. The Draft Declaration was an attempt to change this policy to 'prompt' surrender, or at least to outline to the German people the British understanding of this.

<sup>83</sup> 'Memorandum from Harrison at the Foreign Office to Scarlett', 7th December 1943. PRO/FO371/39076.

<sup>84</sup> 'Memorandum from PWE on Foreign Office paper', 9th December 1943. PRO/FO371/39076.

Roberts attached to the Draft Declaration indicated the feeling in the Foreign Office against such action :

'It is perhaps worth noting that Lord Vansittart's peace terms as published in the 'Sunday Dispatch' on December 3rd are not very different from our own. He goes rather further than we do in regard to detailed interference with German education but generally speaking his ideas seem to me to combine the necessary firmness and safeguards with moderation, and to be such as the British public might reasonably be expected to support after the first wave of anti-German feelings has subsided'.<sup>85</sup>

In February 1944, as a result of further discussions and the anxiety caused by the emergence of a pro-Russian tendency in Germany led the PWE to make representations to the Foreign Office. Talks had been taking place between the PWE/JIC/PID/War Cabinet and Foreign Office concerning the policy of 'Unconditional Surrender', and Charles Peake, the political Liaison Officer at Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force asked whether 'prompt surrender' should replace 'unconditional surrender'.<sup>86</sup> On 10th February Scarlett wrote to Sir Orme Sargent at the Foreign Office pointing out why a Declaration was desirable, including the fact that Goebbels' propaganda of the 'Devil's Plans' should be refuted and that as the war grew steadily worse the Germans would be likely to accept any alternative than continuation of the war.<sup>87</sup> Eventually, after further discussion on 25th April the proposal was put before Churchill by Sir Alexander Cadogan. Churchill's lengthy reply was a refusal to get involved:

'The matter is on the President. He announced it at Casablanca without any consultation. I backed him up in general terms.

I have pointed out to the Cabinet that the actual terms contemplated for

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<sup>85</sup> 'Foreign Office Minute "Propaganda to Germany" ' December, 1943. PRO/FO371/39076.

<sup>86</sup> 'Letter from Charles Peake, Political Liaison Officer to Foreign Office', 31st January 1944. PRO/FO371/39024.

<sup>87</sup> 'Letter from Scarlett to Sargent "Why a Declaration of Allied Intentions is desirable"', 10th February 1944. PRO/FO371/39024.

Germany are not of a character to reassure them at all, if stated in detail. Both President Roosevelt and Marshall Stalin at Tehran wished to cut Germany into smaller pieces than I had in mind. Stalin spoke of very large mass executions of over 50,000 of the Staffs and military experts. Whether he was joking or not could not be ascertained. He certainly said that he would require 4,000,000 German males to work for an indefinite period to rebuild Russia.

By all means circulate historical summary of events. Personally, I am not going to address the President on the subject. For good or ill, the Americans took the lead, and it is for them to make the first move.

It is primarily a United States affair'.<sup>88</sup>

This correspondence is important because it is an indication of the acknowledgement of the existence of 'the other Germany' despite the policy then in force, and Churchill's reply in refusing to 'get involved' illustrates the problems of those in the position of taking policy-decisions which might appear to others to disregard the intelligence services input. It is also an example of the intelligence officers' concern to get others to see the picture as it was, rather than as they would like it to be. This is not to say that the German Section sympathised with 'the other Germany', but that they were aware of the potential problems of the pro-Russian tendency and the existence of Germans to whom they could appeal over the heads of the Nazi regime.

One of the ways in which the PWE thought it might be able to appeal to the 'ordinary' people was by formulating a plan to bring them together with the 7 million foreign workers inside the Third Reich in an attempt to overthrow the regime. A plan had been put forward in 1940, which had been 'shelved' but was then revived by Ritchie Calder in April, 1944. The details of the numbers and locations of the foreign workers was information the German Section regularly updated, and the PWE believed that these people might act as a whole and fundamentally attack the heart of the German war machine from within. Calder's operational plan was codenamed 'Trojan Horse', and was designed specifically to come on-stream in support of

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<sup>88</sup> "Memorandum from Churchill to Cadogan', 25th April, 1944.  
PRO/FO371/39024.

Operation 'Overlord' - the planned invasion of Europe which would begin with the landing of Allied troops onto the beaches of Normandy. The aim of the paper produced by Calder was to 'examine the potentialities of foreign workers at present located in Germany..., what was already being done to utilise this element/force in psychological warfare operations and... to submit proposals on the subject which would link up with Overlord'.<sup>89</sup>

The paper estimated that there were 8,650,000 foreigners in Germany, comprising of 6,582,000 workers who were recruited as such, and 2,068,000 prisoners of war and civilian internees. Representing twenty nationalities and speaking as many different languages, with large numbers concentrated in Berlin, the industrial cities of the Ruhr and the northern ports and Austria, the report suggested that they had been recruited by enticement, indirect compulsion or by conscription. Calder argued that 'The loss to Germany of the foreign workers services would strike a mortal blow at the Nazi war machine and economic system'. The appreciation or definition of the problem was outlined first: 'hitherto the mass of foreign workers and conscripts in Germany has remained relatively docile, and the German authorities have succeeded in exercising an effective measure of control over them ... there is little evidence of industrial opposition .. apart from the practice of go-slow methods and restriction of output'. The paper went on to argue that 'It seems likely that the latter practices are as much a result of laziness and indifference as that of inspiration and organisation'. Nevertheless the report proposed that 'a conglomeration of approximately 9 million foreigners, including women, of whom many have been working in Germany for several years and have contracted certain social ties may be expected to develop certain explosive or revolutionary forces as the war enters its final critical period'. It was also thought possible that their fellow German workers might join in with them causing widespread strikes 'which in turn may lead to civil war' which was also considered to be a desirable outcome.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> PRO/FO898/370 22nd April, 1944.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.



Calder recommended 'fast action and policy', suggesting advice on go-slow tactics, exhortations to foreign workers to escape from their centres of concentration following heavy air raids, and to make their way home. It was also thought that it might be profitable to spread defeatism among German factory workers and civilians generally by getting them to listen to the BBC broadcasts. The use of leaflets to support the operation was rejected since there was little or no evidence that any of the ten million multi-language leaflets dropped during the previous nine months had even reached their target. Indoctrination of workers through PWE and SOE personnel was considered the more effective route, alongside a plan to drop five million small, powerful time-fuse incendiaries (Braddockes) for the use of the foreign workers in any way they chose.

Finally the report concluded with the one advantage of the plan, which was that if it were timed to coincide with 'Overlord' the operation could result in 'national revolution' and complete breakdown of the home and fighting fronts. The two disadvantages were that if the operation failed, then reprisals on foreign workers by the Nazi authorities would be blamed on the Allies and, secondly, if it were to be successful the chaos inside Germany would seriously hamper Allied military operations. The disadvantages heavily outweighed the advantages and the problems of political issues and military operations resulted in the plan being rejected - as Dalton's plans in 1940 had been rejected.

Whilst this plan was shelved, the German Section continued their observations of the situation in Germany and the possibility of an internal coup. The last report available before the attempted assassination of Hitler on July 20th, 1944 considered the impact of the Invasion of Europe on morale and concluded that there was 'an unwillingness to face facts' and that there now appeared to be a split between the service and civilian population.<sup>91</sup> The Weekly Report for 17th - 23rd July 1944, contained details of the failed attempt on Hitler's life. The intelligence officers noted that German propaganda was designed to implicate Britain and to deny any suggestion of

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<sup>91</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/186. For week 5.6.44 - 11.6.44.

an internal plot<sup>92</sup>. The report considered exactly who had been responsible, and identified Stauffenberg as the man who had placed the bomb under Hitler's table. They also believed that the strenuous denials from Hitler and the regime that the Germany Army were not involved probably indicated the exact opposite of this. The following week the officers noted continued attempts to describe the coup as 'Nothing more than a crazy attempt by a group of reactionaries on the Fuehrer's life'.<sup>93</sup> Goebbels' attempt to convince what the German Section describe as 'the ignorant and superstitious masses .. with his sober and unvarnished account.. amounted to an account of a miracle'. The report noted that Goebbels proclaimed that the Fuehrer's life was 'saved by a miracle..from a plot hatched in the enemy camp' who had been supplied with explosives by the British, illustrating the fear that the German people should not be made aware of the existence of internal resistance in Germany. The leaders of this 'enemy camp' were identified as Olbricht, Beck and Hoepner.

The German Section considered all the information they had available and concluded that Goebbels' account 'suspicious', not least because it did not account for the cutting of the telephone to Stockholm on the evening of the 19th'. The report also included the details that Fromm, Beck and Witzleben had been executed whilst Brauchitsch, Halder and Rundstedt had been arrested, and that Helldorf and Zeitzler had been involved in the planning but had failed to act at the critical stage. This information, included in a report just four days after the attempt testifies to the amount of accurate information the PWE had about resistance throughout this period.

At the beginning of August more information came through to England that exposed Goebbels' propaganda of 'a small internal plot .. and nothing to do with the German Army' for what it was: an attempt to smooth over what had been a serious and almost successful attempt on the Fuehrer's life. Goebbels offered one million RM ransom money as a reward for information leading to the capture of Goerdeler, and published a list of twenty four people who had been found guilty of being involved by a Court

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid. For week 17.7.44 - 21.7.44.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid. For week 24.7.44-31.7.44.

of Honour. Included in these were Field Marshall Witzleben, nine generals and thirteen other officers with 'famous names', and additional information that a Major of the General Staff had deserted to the Bolsheviks. The report concluded that Fromm had probably been the 'key' man and that Zeitzler and Hoepner had been involved, adding that they received information 'months ago' which discussed such a possibility and that Goerdeler was an intermediary. The severity of the punishment handed out by the Nazi regime which promised a 'universal purge' in which they would 'slaughter everyone who lifts a hand against us' was also included in the report and seen in London as further evidence of the pressure under which the regime now existed. A Berlin source 'believed to be reliable' informed them that between one and two thousand officers had been taken into custody for questioning by July 23rd.<sup>94</sup>

Towards the end of August the German Section began to receive information about the increasing criticism of the regime and the way they had handled the people alleged to be involved in the July plot. A particular criticism was the way in which the conspirators were summarily tried and executed. Furthermore, the intelligence officers believed that the 'discontent' in the Army which had led to the coup was now becoming more widespread. Another crisis for the regime was also identified in the reports when the appointment of Junglaus as Commander-in-Chief in Belgium was announced. According to the intelligence report Junglaus was not even a Waffen-SS General, but 'purely a policeman', and that the appointment 'suggested that the higher ranks of the Wehrmacht are so honeycombed with oppositional tendencies that a wholly reliable general cannot be found even for the supreme military command in an area directly threatened by invasion'. The report also pinpointed the date of Goerdeler's arrest as August 11th, which suggested that he had been shielded within the Third Reich by an organisation large enough to move him from house to house and therefore avoid detection. The news of Goerdeler's arrest was accompanied by the information that Lindemann, originally accused of deserting to the Bolsheviks, was now posted as 'Wanted'.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid. For week 31.7.44 - 7.8.44.

<sup>95</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/187. For week 14.8.44 - 20.8.44.

The German Section believed that a 'dangerous' situation had been created by the Nazi regime and their treatment of the 'Putschists' which had caused a further breakdown of loyalty within the ranks of the German military. Again, however, it was not seen as potentially leading to a political crisis for the regime because of the fear of persecution of those who might be willing to be involved. This fear had, of course, been increased by the severity of the Purge following the attempted coup when the Nazi regime had used it as an excuse to rid themselves of many troublemakers and dissenters.<sup>96</sup>

As the Allied forces approached the Reich frontiers the reports included details of a changed attitude amongst the soldiers expected to fight for Hitler 'to the bitter end'. Whilst not forming a resistance movement, which would be regarded as a treasonable offence, the troops were making an important distinction in their interpretation of the Soldiers Oath which they insisted was to the Fatherland and not to Hitler. The mass of 'ordinary' people were forced to dig trenches as part of the plans for the beginning of 'The People's War' in which the civilian population were expected to save the country from an enemy which demanded their extermination. Certainly Goebbels' propaganda had an effect, aided by the policy of Unconditional Surrender, and many in Germany believed that annihilation was their fate. An old woman living in Breslau had written 'The Russians haven't far to go now to the German frontier. If it gets very bad, there will be nothing left for us but the gas tap'.<sup>97</sup>

During the last months of the war the German people were bombarded with propaganda to re-enforce the message that it was now up to them to defend their country. Hitler's war had now truly become the 'People's War', and victory, they were told, was inevitable simply because they had managed to survive 1944. An appeal signed by Bormann, Funk, Goebbels and Himmler appealed for greater involvement of the people in this sacrifice and re-stated the need for the collection of all possible articles of clothing, particularly old Party uniforms, and equipment for the

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid. For week 21.8.44 - 27.8.44.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid. For week 4.9.44 - 10.9.44.

new Volksgrenadier and Volkssturm. Despite this, and the message that 'sentiment would have to be foregone - and the clothing of dead men sent in', the first day of the collection was met with a distinct lack of enthusiasm and only 'old rags' were handed in.<sup>98</sup> The German Section recognised that the military situation provided little material for the Ministry of Propaganda to fall back on and that they were now reduced to atrocity propaganda and the Strength Through Fear campaign. This was largely centred on the ill-treatment of prisoners-of-war and civilians, who according to the Ministry, were being shot in the back of the neck by the Allied troops. The intelligence report noted that this was accompanied in propaganda for Europe with a denial of German atrocities : 'German military quarters have stated emphatically that there have been no orders in the whole of the German Wehrmacht to shoot prisoners'.<sup>99</sup> As the position in Germany deteriorated rapidly, the Ministry attempted to keep the news of the military advance of the Allies secret and intensified the 'People's Sacrifice' campaign. The contradictions between propaganda and reality became pronounced, with the Ministry on the one hand claiming total success for the textile and equipment collections, and on the other announcing that in order to avoid 'inconveniencing' people by their having to take goods to the collection centres Party members would visit each household individually, with lists of requisitioned goods. Lists of names were also to be taken, ostensibly to be put into the German People's Book of Honour, but the underlying reason for the need for names was clear.<sup>100</sup> It was also noted in this report that a large number of those who had taken the oath to join the Volkssturm in Lodz on November 12th 1944 had not reported for service at all by December 8th. Officials in West Prussia and Danzig urged the people 'not to weaken, not to lose their nerve' whilst in the Saar region it became clear that Hitler Youth were being called up for service for fear that they might leave and seek safety with their families in the interior. All juveniles born in 1928, 1929 and 1930 (13, 14

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid. For week 1.1.45 - 7.1.45.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid. For week 8.1.45 - 14.1.45.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid. For week 15.1.43 - 21.1.43.

and 15 years of age) were kept back.<sup>101</sup>

At the end of January the intelligence officers included in their report a 'remarkable speech' said to have been made at Poznan by State Secretary Naumann of the Propaganda Ministry in which 'he not only took it for granted that Poznan would ultimately fall but instructed the women as well as the men (and all children over 12 instead of the normal minimum Volkssturm age of 16) to die fighting. The disintegration of the defeated armies had forced the Ministry of Propaganda in an article in *'Front and Heimat'* dated 22nd January, to 'stand firm at all costs' and that Himmler had been sent to the front 'to guarantee the command'. Whilst Himmler 'guaranteed the command at the front', the SS, Hitler Youth and Volkssturm with the support of the judicial administrative system 'guaranteed' the loyalty of the home-front. The first shell to hit in Ohlau coincided with the first execution in public of 'a coward devoid of honour' by a squad of Volkssturm men. The victim was the Second Burgermaster of the City of Breslau, Dr. Spielhagen who, the PWE initially believed, had been executed because he had tried to bring about the surrender of the City.<sup>102</sup> Later in February they discovered that in fact he was alleged to have deserted his post, and that others since had shared the same fate.<sup>103</sup> The 'ordinary' people in the besieged towns were increasingly subjected to a physical and mental bombardment. They were told that they must overcome 'tank-phobia' and to 'fight in cold-blood, unconfused, without reasoning why or when'.<sup>104</sup>

A supplement to this Weekly Report entitled 'Morale in Baden in Autumn 1944 Through German Official Eyes', contained the details of civilian conditions, with trench-digging, conscription, inadequate food and accommodation causing bladder and

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid. For week 22.1.45 - 28.1.45.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid. For week 5.2.45 - 11.5.45.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid. For week 29.1.45 - 4.2.45.

kidney infections amongst the elderly. The intelligence officers also noted that the authorities were keeping a 'careful watch on the Churches who they regarded as hostile political organisations', and that the foreign workers who were receiving leaflets encouraging them to commit sabotage and abandon their work 'represent a danger to the homeland'.<sup>105</sup>

Even at this late stage the German Section was considering the potential for an internal challenge to the regime, and indications were that the authorities were having to make efforts to control the Army. Now they believed that :

'nothing but a move by the Wehrmacht could overthrow the present regime and provide an alternative capable of executing an orderly capitulation. Present circumstances are such as might easily convince a rapidly increasing number of conscientious officers that it was now their duty to save at all costs whatever could still be saved out of Germany's ruin rather than allow the whole future, as the present, to be sacrificed to political intransigence'.<sup>106</sup>

The use of terror to keep back the inhabitants of the towns to fight to the end continued, and 'the mailed fist without the velvet glove' delivered 'brutal hardness' to anyone who disobeyed the authorities. A crucial part of the use of such tactics was the regularising of the policy of terror by a decree announced by DNB on 16th February and the setting up of a special court-martial for instant action against offenders. The court-martial would deal with 'all criminal actions endangering German fighting strength or fighting determinism'. Himmler, as Reich Minister of Interior, issued the decree on the Fuehrer's orders and now shared with Thierack, Reich Minister of Justice, the right to 'issue the regulations necessary to supplement, alter and execute it'.<sup>107</sup> This total control of the judicial procedures illustrated the loss of control of the civilian population, including Party and State officials since it

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid. 'Morale in Baden in Autumn 1944 Through German Official Eyes', 5th February 1945.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid. For week 5.2.45 - 11.2.45.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid. For week 11.2.45 - 17.2.45.

now 'regularised the procedure of the way in which the officials at Bromberg and the runaway Mayor of Königsberg were treated, and probably the execution of the Mayor of Breslau too'. The decree had been drawn up very carefully, in order to preserve the authority of the Gauleiter who in his capacity as Reich Defence Commission was responsible for appointing the members of the court and the prosecutor. He also confirmed the sentences and arranged the executions. The court-martial set up by this decree, however, could only pass the death sentence or order acquittal, otherwise the case was passed on to the ordinary courts. In effect Himmler and Thierack were now in total control of the judicial procedure in an attempt to terrorise the population to fight on, and could summarily sentence to death and execute individuals, and change the laws at a stroke in order to legalise their operations.<sup>108</sup>

Throughout February the Ministry of Propaganda made desperate efforts to prevent the people from 'sinking further into apathetic acceptance of inevitable defeat', whilst the intelligence officers noted that 'Hitler seems oblivious to evidence of widespread defeatism which appears from his own Press and wireless - or refuses to admit it goes beyond a few individuals'. In reply to an accusation against Hitler as being responsible for the problems Germany faced, the German Section quoted Hahn, a Party publicist who argued that if Hitler had not taken control Moscow would have done so and would 'eradicate the German intelligentsia, lower the standard of living to the level of the Russians, decimate the German population by famine, mass deportations and executions, and enslave the rest in a gigantic mass-production of armaments'. The officer writing the report commented sarcastically, that 'if death in war' was substituted for 'famine and deportations' the list would appear like one of Hitler's achievements.<sup>109</sup>

One of the main tasks of the intelligence officers at this stage was to try to anticipate when the end of the war would finally be admitted by the regime, and the morale of the population was considered an important indicator of this. This was based upon

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<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid. For week 18.2.45 - 24.2.45.



experience of November 1918 which had shown that an important factor was 'the general conviction of the civil population that the outlook was hopeless has been one of the principal factors bringing about the end of a war'. Considering this the intelligence officers concluded that :

'In Germany we are witnessing an attempt by an authoritarian government to continued an apparently hopeless war, not disregarding the civil population but recognising their co-operation is essential and methods of applied social science (propaganda, calculated intimidation, neutralisation of every potential nucleus of resistance, etc.) to force co-operation out of the civil population'.

Because there are no precedents nobody can guess how near it is likely to come to succeeding - that is, for how long it will be possible to wring the necessary support out of an unwilling population'.<sup>110</sup>

As the war entered into the final phase the intelligence officers recognised that all the hopes of the Nazi regime and the Fuehrer were now based on the youth of Germany, with the regime reduced to recruiting children into the Hitler youth, the youngest being 12-years-old. As the British forces crossed the Rhine the civilian population were ordered to 'stick it out and, if need be, to face death bravely'. Again all those under 14-years-of age were left behind, the propaganda of the previous years proclaiming that they were the future of Germany and therefore should be saved at whatever cost was cruelly forgotten, and they were sworn to unconditional obedience to the men left behind to take charge of the defence of German soil. This 'unheroic slinking away of the fighting men leaving defenceless non-combatants' caused even greater resentment and fear amongst the 'ordinary' German people.<sup>111</sup>

But the young people of Germany were not all in agreement with the aims or the ideas of the Nazi regime, as a 'strictly confidential' circular addressed by Himmler to the police authorities confirmed. The information of the 'cliques or associations of young people outside the Hitler-Jugend leading a life of their own according to principles incompatible to the National-Socialist ideology' were interesting to the German

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<sup>110</sup> Ibid. For week 5.3.45 - 11.3.45.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid. For week 19.3.45 - 25.3.45.

Section because they seemed to be in nature the same type of 'oppositional youth groups' as the Edelweiss-Piraten and Swing. Himmler's memo informed the German Section that these groups had been formed in all parts of the Reich, and increased in extent lately, bearing names such as 'Clique, Mob, Blase, Meute, Platte and Schlurf'. Whilst the groups were loosely connected, often with no membership certificate, Himmler pointed out that 'between individual cliques cross-connections sometimes exist, which may be either of a friendly or a hostile nature'. He identified three different types of 'cliques': one 'criminal-asocial', indulging in anything from mischief to organised robbery and sexual (particularly homosexual) offences; 'political-oppositional', with a general hostile attitude to the State and rejection of Hitler Youth; finally 'liberalistic-individualistic', who represented an Anglo-Saxon type who were upper-middle class, with English ideals, language, attitude and clothing who favoured jazz and hot music, swing dancing etc.,'. Himmler gave detailed instruction on how to combat the behaviour of these 'cliques', using police patrols, etc. and whilst the German Section point out the destabilizing effect these groups might have had on German society they commented that Himmler did not see in them even the 'germs of an opposition - that is,(in the narrow sense) politically dangerous.(emphasis as original) <sup>112</sup>

The last reports in this series cover the weeks April and May when the Battle of Berlin was in progress. Hitler's Order of the Day on 16th April included desperate measures to ensure that not only civilians but also the Army stayed to fight. Soldiers were ordered to kill any officer of whatever rank, if he did not know him, if he ordered a retreat. That such orders had been issued indicated to the German Section the extent of the disintegration of the Nazi regime and that Hitler had no grasp of reality or understanding of the situation in which he was in. Berliners were instructed that they were to arrest agent provocateurs and rebellious foreigners. Hitler's birthday was celebrated with an effort to revive what the intelligence officer called the 'blind and mystical faith' in him, whilst the enrolment of 10-year-old children into the Hitler Youth emphasised for the German Section the barbarity of the regime in its sacrifice

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid. For week 26.3.45 - 1.4.45.

of children.<sup>113</sup> Women were urged to arm themselves and fight, using the guns taken from the dead or in desperation the 'scissors from the home'.<sup>114</sup>

Finally, the 'playing down' in Germany of Hitler's death was viewed warily in the German Section who considered that it could have been done to 'support the line that Germany had turned over a new political leaf'. At the beginning of the report they even commenting that 'It would probably be excessive scepticism to doubt that Hitler is really dead'. They did, however, also make the point that it would also be doubted by the faithful, warning that 'if the body is not quickly found and publicly displayed the belief may be expected to persist among simple people (and perhaps become politically important from time to time) that Hitler never really died but is being hidden away somewhere and will come again'. Underlying their distrust of the whole situation the officers also warned that 'All German accounts of the manner in which Hitler met his death are suspect'. In considering the information they had which amounted to a disbelief that he had died in Berlin, thinking he had probably had an 'apoplectic seizure' on April 22nd or 23rd and had been moved to Berlin to use in the creation of the legend that he had died in defence of the Reich Chancellory.

At the end of this report the intelligence officers outlined the problems to be faced by the occupying powers which in essence contained a warning about the disappearance of major Nazi leaders, the existence of the 'Werewolf' organisation which was sworn to fight a guerilla warfare in Germany against the Allies, and the problems which lay ahead of the long-term effects that the ideological training of the Hitler-Jugend may have had on German youth.<sup>115</sup>

To summarise, it is clear from the work of the German Section that the British government was supplied with detailed, accurate and up-to-date intelligence of resistance and public opinion in Germany throughout the period covered by these

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid. For week 16.4.45 - 22.4.45.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid. For week 30.4.45 - 7.5.45.

reports. Information about the plans, potential leaders and the people likely to be involved in the Resistance Movement were known long before the July '44 attempt on Hitler's life. From the analysis of the intelligence officers it is also clear that they understood the practical problems facing these conspirators, their inability to take decisive action because of the relatively small number of generals and civil servants willing to become involved, and the power structure of the Nazi state in which all the key positions were held by people loyal to the Nazi regime.

As far as the 'ordinary' people were concerned, the Weekly Reports contain a wealth of evidence of a disillusioned and fragmented society, a society existing under extreme stress which increasingly registered its dissatisfaction with the regime in a variety of ways ranging from non-conformity through protest to resistance. In doing this 'the other Germany' challenged the authority of the regime and questioned both the ideology and motives which rendered them worthless as individuals. After the fall of Stalingrad the refusal to submit to the regime in 'blind faith and loyalty' was, for the intelligence officers, confirmation of the failure of the totalitarian aims of the Nazi regime and the 'myth' of the *'Volksgemeinschaft'*. The control of the 'other Germany' was ensured by the terror and brute force of the Gestapo and SS, aided and abetted by a corrupt judicial system, which was used against all who those did not fully support the regime.

This is not to argue that the intelligence officers were misled in their observations, or created naive 'images' of the German people for the policy-makers. Their interpretations were almost always accompanied with a consideration of the motives of those who challenged or opposed the authorities, such as political or economic self-interest. Thus the strikes of the industrial workers, and the behaviour of the young people were seen not as manifestations of political unrest or ideological resistance to the regime but as localised dissent to the authority of the regime for economic or social reasons. The 'asocial' behaviour of women in refusing to register for industrial work and their evasion of their 'duty' to involve themselves in the 'Total War' campaign were, for the intelligence officers, something they would need and be able to come to terms with. This is an interesting conclusion, since it presupposes that

German women might be expected to have supported the regime, and yet the PWE was actually engaged in propaganda and political warfare to undermine support. This is surely connected in some way with the understanding of 'male' and 'female' roles in society, and particularly in a society at war. Added to this is the fact that all the intelligence officers working within the German Section were almost certainly males interpreting women's behaviour.

In the final analysis, however, the intelligence officers were looking for signs of the existence of a potentially successful mass 'resistance movement' in Germany capable of challenging or overthrowing the regime, and as a result of this concluded that there was no 'resistance' in Germany. Nevertheless, the existence of 'the other Germany' was acknowledged and in February 1944 this was used in an attempt get the Allied leaders to make a declaration to these people. In this the German Section, and the PWE, were 'going against the grain' of existing policy in Whitehall, and doing what Michael Balfour argues they believed they should be doing, which was putting the picture as they saw it rather than supplying the one Whitehall would have preferred to see. What is most striking about these reports is the accuracy of the detail and interpretations made at the time, which was initially disregarded and contradicted by the post-war 'totalitarian' thesis of the 1950's and 1960's. The history of the resistance movement, which emerged immediately at the end of the war, providing detailed accounts of the protagonists has now been counter-balanced by the research into the 'varieties of resistance' in the everyday life of German society. The history of consent, dissent, conformity and non-conformity, and resistance has been extensively researched in the past fifteen years and the list of contributors to the debate is enormous.<sup>116</sup> The consensus of opinion amongst all of these historians is that 'the realities of everyday life in Nazi Germany will simply not submit to black and white descriptions'.<sup>117</sup>

One of the most important studies was, and still remains, Detlev Peukert's assessment

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<sup>116</sup>See Footnote [72].

<sup>117</sup>Crew in Crew, *Nazism and German Society, 1933-1945*. p. 1.

of everyday life in Nazi Germany.<sup>118</sup> Peukert identified the 'growing readiness to criticise the regime, and in part to engage in conflict with its representatives or with aspects of its policies, and how, although this criticism did not swell into a full-scale opposition movement, it was not suffocated either, by the Nazis' much-vaunted "national community".<sup>119</sup> The '*Volksgemeinschaft*' was, for Peukert and the German Section of the PWE, 'primarily a facade' and not an expression of social realities as a whole. The dissent and protests of the workers documented in the intelligence reports, and the officer's assessment of the weakness of their position as a result of the destruction of their organisations is also mirrored in Peukert's assessment. Although in the strictest methodological sense 'we should speak of "resistance" only where the motives and actions of the people involved were directed to overthrow the Nazi regime as a whole' and the structural conditions for 'mass resistance' did not exist, he nevertheless believes that 'resistance by workers formed the most significant component of the German resistance movement'.<sup>120</sup> The understanding in the German Section of the everyday life of the 'ordinary' people in Germany were reflected, 35 years later, in Peukert's summing up of his research:

'Although soon robbed of its mechanism of political expression by Gestapo terror, the resistance mobilised tens of thousands of people into performing acts of courage and sacrifice, but it remained decentralised, disorientated and historically ineffectual. The historical significance of the resistance was its preservation of non-fascist traditions'.<sup>121</sup>

The role of women in Nazi Germany has also become the focus for research with Gisela Bock and Claudia Koonz representing the two ends of a spectrum of behaviour which range from 'victims' to 'perpetrators'. This polarisation of opinion is now

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<sup>118</sup>Detlev J. K. Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany. Conformity, Opposition and Racism in Everyday Life*. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1989).

<sup>119</sup> Ibid. p. 22.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid. pp.118-119.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid. p. 247.

being challenged and Adelheid von Saldern argues that few women could be classed as either, and that the position of women in Nazi Germany allowed them a certain amount of freedom. She argues, as the Weekly Reports show, that women did not always choose the 'safe haven' of home life merely to avoid conscription, nor were they exempt from Nazi violence.<sup>122</sup> The information and conclusions of the intelligence officers about the 'myth' of the Hitler Youth and the problems the challenge they posed to Nazi regime by their unwillingness to conform the rules of the 'national community', have also been extensively covered in the historiography of the Third Reich. In *Hitler's War and the Germans*, Marlis Steinert uses secret intelligence reports and sources of the Nazi regime and the SDP to discover public opinion and behaviour of German society. In relation to the youth of Germany, Steinert outlines the problem of 'wild' youth and increasingly 'subversive behaviour' which resulted in the intervention of the secret police who resorted to 'special treatment' for these a-social elements in society.<sup>123</sup> In short, the information and conclusions contained in the Weekly Reports of 1943-1945 are reflected in the contemporary historiography of the Third Reich which illustrates the complex, paradoxical and sometimes contradictory behaviour of German society to the Nazi regime. The conclusion of the German Section of 'no resistance' in Germany denied the existence of the non-fascist traditions which Peukert, and others, have uncovered in their history of everyday life in Nazi Germany. The 'establishment' view of the German people in the early post-war years confirmed the totalitarian theories of mass support for the regime, and the conclusions of the PWE supported and justified this. However, the contents of the Weekly Reports testify that 'the other Germany' had continued to exist throughout the period of the Third Reich and explicitly rejects the policy of 'Unconditional Surrender', which was that all Germans should be treated as Nazis.

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<sup>122</sup> von Saldern in Crew, *Nazism and German Society*. pp.141-165.

<sup>123</sup> Steinert, *Hitler's War and The Germans*. pp. 219-223.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### British Occupational Rule and the Re-education of the German People.

In May 1945 as Germany became an occupied country, the war was replaced by a battle for 'the hearts and minds' of the peoples of liberated and neutral Europe.<sup>1</sup> In competition with Russia and America, and using propaganda the British government hoped to persuade these people to look to Britain first amongst the victorious powers. In Germany, Britain also went for the 'mind' and not the 'body', where the battle was to be won by what Pronay describes as the 'remarkable' and 'breathtaking' idea of re-educating the German people.<sup>2</sup> Psychological warfare would be continued, replacing the undermining of German morale during the war with the re-education of the German people after the end of hostilities.<sup>3</sup> This line of thought, with historical roots in the colonial philosophy of the mid- and late-nineteenth century, was first considered appropriate policy for Germany during the First World War. This 'unorthodox' idea emerged after World War One in the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office where Rex Leeper and William Tyrrell were based. However, after the Peace Conference of 1919 the idea was rejected in favour of a traditional policy based on established international codes of practice and conduct. During World War Two, the assumptions that the traditional approach to the German 'problem' had failed and resulted in Germany's second attempt within thirty years to dominate Europe, reinforced the arguments being made by those in Whitehall who were calling for a radical policy towards Germany and the German people. The policy eventually adopted was in fact the policy of occupation and re-education which had been rejected in 1918. What distinguishes British policy at this time as 'remarkable' therefore is not the policy itself, but the unprecedented application of colonial

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<sup>1</sup>Robert Cole, *Britain and The War of Words in Neutral Europe 1939-45*. (London: Macmillan, 1990). p. 169.

<sup>2</sup>Nicholas Pronay and Keith Wilson (Eds.), *The Political Re-education of Germany and Her Allies After World War II*. (London: Croom Helm 1985). p.4.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. p. 23.



philosophy, which is identified in some of its forms today as 'cultural imperialism', against a modern industrialised nation in Europe.

To date the discussion on why such a policy was adopted has focused at the level of elite politics in Whitehall, which was represented by the polarisation between two schools of thought in Whitehall during the war. On the one hand, the supporters of the 'Vansittart' school advocated demilitarisation, denazification, deindustrialization and democratisation with re-education being the core element in the plans. On the other hand the more 'liberal' school argued that a democratic and peaceful Germany could only emerge from within German society itself, albeit with some 'help' from the international community.

This controversial area of German/British history has, in common with German resistance, become the focussed for sometimes heated debate. In the Spring of 1987 David Welch published an article in German History which accused the British government of 'deliberately setting out to destroy the political outlook and traditions upon which German society had been based' in it's determination to create a new society in Germany through the process of 're-education'.<sup>4</sup> He added that recently released documents challenged the 'somewhat congratulatory impression of British missionary zeal' and that whilst the policy of re-education was undeniably colonial in origins the 'Vansittart' view was still prevalent in government circles.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, he dismissed the generally held view that Britain had a well-thought out and coherent plan for this colonial experiment, arguing that as a result of the intense rivalries within Whitehall between the proponents of this view and those who argued for a more 'liberal' approach, confused and contradictory policies emerged as a result of compromises between the two. Central to Welch's argument in this paper was his accusation that in 1944, even before knowledge of the death camps had appeared, there was a shift in British policy towards the German people based on the idea of

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<sup>4</sup>David Welch, 'The Political Re-education of Germany After World War II: A Need for a Reappraisal?', *German History*. 4 (Spring 1987). pp. 23-35. p. 23.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. p. 25.

'guilt mobilisation'.<sup>6</sup> This move towards 'collective complicity and guilt mobilisation' he argued, 'afforded the British the opportunity to reflect on the German national character traits and to ruminate on whether re-education was possible at all for such a people'.<sup>7</sup> And, whilst Welch argued that the 'insanity unleashed by the ideology of collective guilt produced some absurd observations' he also confirmed that people soon lost interest in the idea, instead choosing to use re-education in a pragmatic way as a means of projecting British values and the British way of life. This, of course, was seen as vital as a means of securing British interests in emerging conflict between the USSR and the USA for political influence in Europe.

However, in his article Welch identified Michael Balfour, who had been working in Germany as Director of Information Services Control in the first eighteen months of occupational rule, as an 'ally' of those people in the Foreign Office and Political Division who were responsible for the shift in policy in 1944 to 'guilt mobilisation'. Balfour replied in the Autumn edition of *German History* that he was 'saddened to learn ..that he (Welch) took such a poor view of our efforts to refashion German attitudes after 1945'.<sup>8</sup> He pointed out that a 'number of people in Britain, Europe and in America' had come to the conclusion that Germany had started two world wars and must be prevented from starting a third, that she had been left to carry out her own internal reforms in 1918 and had failed, and that there were very few alternative suggestions for policy towards Germany.<sup>9</sup> Finally, he asked what could be made of Welch's 'fine-sounding' term 'guilt mobilisation', and suggested Welch should consider the difference between 'responsibility' and 'guilt'. For Balfour 're-education' was the term used as a label for the plan of 'somehow inducing the Germans not to want to make war'. He concluded by saying that if Welch thought this should not have been done he was 'wrong-headed' and 'living in Cloud-Cuckoo

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid. p. 26.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. p. 27.

<sup>8</sup> Michael Balfour, 'Re-education in Germany After 1945: Some Further Considerations', *German History*. 5 (Autumn 1987). pp. 25-34. p.25.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. pp. 25-26.

Land'.<sup>10</sup>

This chapter examines the role of the PWE in this unique experiment in British history, and in doing so also contributes to the debate outlined above. Whilst re-education was the core element in British policy the Executive was involved in a number of different ways in relation to the immediate problems posed by the military occupation and administration of Germany. The first part of this chapter looks at the way in which the German Section provided intelligence for the short-term practical problems facing the occupying army. The second deals with 'official' PWE contribution to Committees and planning for the occupation of Germany. Finally some comparison will be made between the interpretation of the German Section and the PWE concerning the Germany people and the German 'problem'. Before the plan to re-educate the German people could be put into operation the short-term practical problems of achieving an efficient and ordered occupation had to be considered. The attitudes of the German people towards the Allied forces, and how they would react to the imposition of British control after six years of war was an important consideration. Central to this assessment was an understanding of public opinion and morale, and the question of what impact the twelve year rule of the Nazi regime had been on German society.

One of the areas considered to be important for attitudes and behaviour of the German people towards the Allies was the physical and psychological damage done during the bombing raids in Germany. In April, 1943 it appeared that the air-raids were being successful in affecting public opinion, when the intelligence officers noted that in the heavily bombed areas public morale was at its worst and opposition to the regime was at its greatest.<sup>11</sup> The Ministry warned Britain that the bombing would not result in the surrender of Germany, but would increase the German people's stubborn resolve and fighting power.<sup>12</sup> The German people were urged to 'Go through the streets of

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid. p. 33.

<sup>11</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/185. For week 19.4.43 - 26.4.43.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. For week 24.5.43 - 30.5.43.

Hamburg strewn with glass and rubble... set your teeth and do not forget who brought such misery. Let hatred glow in your heart'.<sup>13</sup> At the end of August the intelligence officers noted in their report that the Ministry of Propaganda had used a statement which have previously been made by Bracken in an attempt to warn the German people about the methods the British would use to implement their post-war plans:

'Brendan Bracken, who is greatly favoured by Churchill for intimate personal reasons, has stated that instead of sending teachers to Germany to re-educate her people after the war, the best form of instruction was that provided by Air Marshall Harris ...this provides further evidence of Churchill's desire to wage war on civilians'.<sup>14</sup>

It is not difficult to see why the German Section was concerned about the potential for conflict between the German population and the Allied troops, since the conditions the German people were living under as a result of these raids were bound to be instrumental in attitudes and opinions towards the occupying forces. Reports continued to contain information about the conditions in Germany as a result of the air warfare policy, with plagues of rats being reported, and the attendant fear of typhoid, and the lack of food and clothes for the civilians who had been made homeless. There was also increasing evidence that in the panic of the raids people were fleeing the towns, workers were abandoning their work, and fire-fighters were choosing to sleep outside the towns at night for their own safety.

What became a serious issue for the PWE in May and June 1944 was the Ministry of Propaganda's attempt to use the death and destruction wrought by the bombing to incite hatred of the Allies as a pre-invasion measure. On 26th May Goebbels issued an article which, according to the intelligence officers, encouraged the German people to lynch the Allied airmen who had been responsible for the bombing raids. Arguing that the population showed justified rage, Goebbels asserted that only the use of armed

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. For week 23.8.43 - 29.8.43.

forces had saved the lives of enemy pilots shot down during their attacks on the civilian population. He added that it would be asking 'too much if Germany was expected to employ German soldiers to defend the murderers of children against these children's parents'.<sup>15</sup> As far as the intelligence officers were concerned the attitude of the population towards the Allied invasion would be created by their experience of the air war, and by the way in which the air war was used in propaganda to whip up hatred and the desire for revenge. This would be part of the legacy of the Ministry of Propaganda, and possibly an important factor providing an obstacle in the way of achieving a successful and peaceful occupation.

The atrocity campaign mounted by the Ministry of Propaganda continually reminded the German people that surrender would mean annihilation, at the hands of either the Russians, British or American Forces. In January 1945 the German people were given details of the 'Gangsters in Occupied Europe', and the alleged killing and brutal treatment of women and children by the US Army. An article put out by DNB on 13th January included allegations that Americans who

'raped women, killed children playing, burnt haystacks, killed cattle and smashed furniture ..out of pure lust for destruction. They poured milk for starving babies into the gutter..deliberately bombed military hospitals, machine-gunned ambulances and the wounded .. put women and children behind barbed wire in open fields and forced them to camp out in the rain and snow'.<sup>16</sup>

All this was used in an effort to prove that American and Russian policy was to exterminate the German race. The following week Churchill's speech on his declaration of policy towards Germany was interpreted as reaffirming his plans for the 'Unconditional extermination of the German people, since he did not even shrink from recalling how in ancient times people were assembled on a beach and butchered'.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/186. For week 22.5.44 - 28.5.44.

<sup>16</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/187. For week 8.1.45 - 14.1.45.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. For week 15.1.45 - 21.1.45.

The Ministry publicised Allied statements as 'a new Wilson Swindle', accusing the Allies of attempting a 'huge propaganda trick by 're-editing' Wilson's points in order... to make more agreeable their destruction slogan of Unconditional Surrender'.<sup>18</sup>

The German Section considered the possibility of capitulation and concluded that the will to continue fighting was probably strongest in those areas where the Russians were fighting and where Nazi propaganda had instilled amongst the panic-stricken the 'blackest fears'. The author of a report from Southern Germany stated that he believed the fighting might cease if the fears of the Russians were overcome. The officer writing the report concluded, however, that what was perhaps more likely to develop was a demand for some sort of accommodation with the Western Allies in order to set Germany free to resist the Russian advance. But the report warned that 'it must be remembered that such talk has no influence on the German government, which is not dependent on public opinion like a parliamentary government'. Furthermore the officers commented that whilst 'such considerations might make civilians in Western Germany more welcoming to Allied occupying troops (until they were disappointed by finding that after all they received no freedom of action against the Russians), they would not affect the troops'. In short the German civilians had a 'low level of strategic understanding', although the arrival on German soil of the Russians has led to criticism of German strategy and a general loss of faith in the leadership including Hitler.<sup>19</sup>

The strategy adopted by the Nazi regime to keep the German people fighting was based upon the need to instil fear and hatred of the Allies. They were told that they were to be destroyed biologically and politically, and that Europe would be handed over to 'Bolshevism' in the event of a German defeat. Further it was claimed that the population was to be reduced by 40/50 millions and that 'a synthesis of the hate programmes propagated by Morgenthau, Vansittart and Ehrenburg provided for the

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid. For week 29.1.45 - 4.2.45.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

complete eradication of German industry and the deportation of German workers with Moscow as the centre of the modern slave trade. The destruction of Germany as a political entity was to be encompassed by complete disarmament, the immediate murder of all nationally minded Germans, the setting up of control commissions and the establishment of zones of occupation'.<sup>20</sup>

In the middle of February the German Section commented that the Ministry of Propaganda was now being forced to give the German people a 'deceptive picture of the military situation.. of growing stabilisation with the 'Bolshevik masses contained at the Oder', offering the hope of a great German counter-stroke to turn the tide. The intelligence officers pointed out that the Ministry was now willing to go to 'astonishing lengths' to paint a picture far removed from reality which was evidence of the very real difficulties the Nazi regime was now having in forcing the population to continue with the conflict.<sup>21</sup> During this last phase of the war the intelligence reports began to provide indications of the anticipated behaviour of the German people in defeat stressing that, contrary to what was required, which was a positive acceptance of responsibility before re-education could begin, the majority would probably try to deny their support of the regime and thus remove any responsibility from themselves.

One particular group of people considered vital to the post-war task of re-building Germany was the businessmen and industrialists, and the German Section included information of interviews in order to ascertain the attitudes of this sector of German society. This would be useful for the de-nazification programme, and the identification of those people who would be required to help with the economic recovery of Germany. Interviews with three leading industrialists were included in the Weekly report for 23rd to 29th April, 1945. The first was Koehler, a high official of IG-Farben in Frankfurt who had admitted that he had conducted propaganda for the National-Socialist policies on visits to the USA before the war.

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid. For week 11.2.45 - 17.2.45.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

He did not suggest that National-Socialism had caused any significant problems for his firm, except for excessive controls of the Gauleiters and others. He described himself as 'now really poor', but only as a consequence of the destruction of his personal property and German industry by the Allied bombing campaign and the expected devaluation of the German currency. For the loss of the war he blamed Hitler, because he had undertaken too much. He seemed to believe that IG-Farben would be given contracts by the Allies for the supply of synthetic fuel and seemed to have 'great confidence in the influence of 'his many good friends in American big business'. He offered the assistance of 'the leading brains in Germany' and was described as 'shocked' when he was told that the assistance of ex-members of the Nazi Party would not be welcomed. According to the intelligence report Koehler defended his position and role during the war saying 'We all had to join' and pointed out that if ex-Nazis were not involved in post-war reconstruction there would be nobody left, there would be chaos in Germany and he warned that 'the Bolsheviks will take over'.<sup>22</sup>

The second industrialist Lumme, who had been educated at Oxford and who was manager of the Metalgesellschaft, also sought to impress the interrogators by listing his 'important friends' in both America and Britain. A Party member since 1936 he now 'claimed to have joined for business reasons' and also blamed Hitler for the defeat of Germany. The intelligence officers noted that 'Voicing the usual fears of 'Bolshevism' he also expressed a hope for a prolonged American occupation in order to make sure that the Bolsheviks did not take over, and intimated that he expected the Allies to 'grant possibilities' for German recovery.<sup>23</sup> The third man in this trio, named Boehler, was a partner in a firm manufacturing frankfurters who, according to the report, 'lacked the assurance and characteristics of the bigger men, representing the more 'fawning' type found by the interrogators to be the majority in occupied Germany'. He was not himself a Party member, explaining that it had been sufficient for the business for his partner to be a member, he 'showed consciousness of guilt,

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid. For week 23.4.45 - 29.4.45.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.



having heard of atrocities in Poland, but said 'We are moral cowards. We offered only silent protest and took no action. But what could we do?'.<sup>24</sup>

Assessing these three interviews the intelligence report concluded that 'Most worthy of observation is the assurance felt by representatives of large concerns with international connections that they possess such influence in Britain and America that any weakening of their position resulting from defeat will be long-enduring. To have co-operated with the Nazi regime seems to them only normal business, which incidentally brought in good profits'. Finally, the intelligence officers warned that 'so convinced are they that powerful interests in Britain and America share their own fears of 'Bolshevism', that they regard Allied 'anti-Nazism' as mere talk'. Here the 'image' of a subservient, subjugated people is erased and transposed with the 'image' of the powerful leading industrialists who were vital to British interests in re-building Germany not accepting responsibility for the regime, not denying involvement and not showing any remorse. Furthermore, they appeared to the German Section to be arrogant and confident enough of their value to remind the interrogators of the reality of the position in Germany and use the fears of the West of a 'sovietized' Germany to suggest a re-thinking of the de-nazification programme.

If the German industrialists raised problems for the successful implementation of the denazification programme, the possibility of Nazis 'disappearing' into German society presented an even greater threat. The German Section warned of the evidence that whilst the 'ordinary people' were forced to stay behind and fight on to the last, minor Party officials were making use of the opportunity of evacuation from the threatened and bombed areas to 'shed their identity'.<sup>25</sup> A letter written in September 1944 by a woman in Bonn berated those involved saying, 'What is going on here in the homeland is contemptible and so cowardly that my heart revolts within me .. now that the time has come to prove their worth .. the Party members destroy uniforms

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. For week 15.1.45 - 21.1.45.

and badges and all documents'.<sup>26</sup> In February the intelligence reports included details of an order given by Bormann that the families of 'political leaders' must be evacuated first and that in the event of an invasion those leaders must receive Wehrmacht uniforms which would entitle them to protection under the Geneva Convention. The following week the Weekly Report took considerable interest in the leadership's official provision for Allied Occupation which included plans for the evacuation of the 'heads of offices who have been particularly politically exposed' who were ordered to hand over their jobs to local people and retreat to unoccupied territory.

As news of German atrocities and concentration camps began to filter through to the German Section the Weekly Report included a speech made by Guderian in which he denied German atrocities in Russia, saying 'I have never seen anything of the Satan's furnaces, gas chambers or similar products of a pathological imagination'. The German section commented that this was a 'limited denial' since he did not refer to crimes committed by German soldiers.<sup>27</sup> Nevertheless, it was the beginning of what the PWE saw as an indication of the problems which would have to be faced in bringing about a 'change of mind' in Germany in advance of any re-education programme. Recognising the increasing reports of denial of involvement in the crimes of the regime the German Section now pondered on this, and whether the failure to co-operate with the Volkssturm was also motivated by the recognition amongst the German people that they must be in a position to say they did not support the regime in resisting the Allied forces. Reports from the invasion areas provided evidence to the German Section of soldiers changing into civilian clothes, 'apparently believing they have put off war-guilt with the uniform', which was seen a further proof that this problem was now becoming widespread.<sup>28</sup> As the East and West fronts advanced towards Berlin the massive scale of the evacuation and the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons now living in central Germany compounded the problems of

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid. For week 11.2.45 - 15.2.45.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. For week 5.3.45 - 11.3.45.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

identification of Nazi Party members. Elites and soldiers in civilian clothes would be able to merge into this mass of people and make it almost impossible to carry out the process of de-nazification which was seen as vital to Germany's and Europe's interests.

A serious addition to the concerns of the PWE was added in April and May, with details of the establishment of a guerilla army in Germany known as the 'Werewolves'. It was known that the group had a radio station and, it was surmised, was probably controlled by the Waffen-SS. The intelligence officers noted the difference in the picture given of the organisation by Goebbels, who depicted it as a general movement of 'all active men, women, boys and girls in the occupied areas' against the description broadcast from the Werewolf Station which expressly stated that it consisted of a limited number of fanatics. Furthermore, whilst Goebbels stated that the occupying forces were the main enemy, the Station put equal stress on threats to German traitors and even passive collaborators. But Kriegk admitted the object of the Werewolf organisation, which was to 'ensure that German national unity, between the nation in the homeland and in the enemy-occupied areas, did not disintegrate. We had to make sure that Germans... would summon up the power to resist'. In their conclusion the officers of the PWE said that the creation of the 'Werewolf' organisation had probably been planned some time before February 1945, since on 22nd February commanders of certain Volksgrenadier divisions had been asked to select a number of men whose homes were in the occupied territories and who would be suitable to become leaders of this new organisation. These men would receive training in Slovakia, and the troops they would be likely to lead were assumed by the intelligence officers to be 'the more fanatical young soldiers from units disrupted by the Allied advance'. What did interest the German Section was a broadcast put out on 3rd April, 1945 by the organisation which supported their earlier theory of conflict between the SS and the Party. This broadcast indicated that the new movement wished to dissociate itself from some of the unpopular features of National-Socialism, particularly, 'We will suffer no careerists, no job-hunters, no doddering placeholders', which the intelligence officers assumed was an announcement by the SS leadership that there was no place in this new organisation for the Gauleiters,

Kreisleiters and others whose corruption and abuse of authority has, in their opinion, seriously damaged the prestige of the Party.<sup>29</sup> All this information led the German Section to warn that this new organisation was 'no mere propaganda stunt' and should be monitored closely. The following week the report from the German Section considered the claim that the 'Werewolf' organisation warned of their intention to become 'the rallying point for a European revolutionary movement fostered by chaos, distress and destruction'.<sup>30</sup> The PWE believed that the organisation was probably the result of internal re-formation by Himmler and the SS and represented 'the emergence of a 'neo-Nazi' movement as anticipated'.<sup>31</sup> The immediate danger for the Allies was in the claim that their 'ceaseless fighting would make life a hell for the occupation troops'.<sup>32</sup>

Having identified the 'Werewolf' movement as a potential threat to the occupying forces, the German Section began to consider seriously the possibility of the continuity of the philosophy of National-Socialism which appeared to be increasingly likely from the speeches and proclamations being made by the leadership. On 30th January Hitler broadcast a speech confirming that Germany would be victorious because through a 'superhuman effort' it would be able 'effect a military regeneration of the German body politic', at the same time admitting this would not be brought about by re-equipping with a material armed force but by a 'spiritual will to resist'.<sup>33</sup> He reminded the German people that on the twelfth anniversary of their advent to power it was even more necessary 'to harden our hearts and live up to the sacred resolution to wield our weapons no matter where, no matter under what circumstances until victory crowns our exhortations' (emphasis as in original). In the final part of Hitler's speech the officers noted that whilst Party propagandists protested that 'Germans only

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid. For week 2.4.45 - 8.2.45.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. For week 9.4.45 - 15.4.45.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. For week 29.1.45 - 4.2.45.

want to live', Hitler had made an oath that 'One day our dead will not have died in vain..One day we shall fetch back everything that belongs to us. We shall return to the East, you may be sure of that!'(emphasis as in original).<sup>34</sup> For the German Section this signalled an indication of the determination to continue the conflict, if not during this war, then through a third world war. At the beginning of February the speech made by Himmler on July 26th, 1944 was included in the Weekly Report, which appeared to support their conclusions of the previous weeks. The intelligence officers commented that it was a 'remarkable statement of Germany's war aims' with Himmler proclaiming that 'It is the beginning and foundation of the Great Germanic Reich, the expansion of our national basis from 90 million Germans to 120 million of Germanic blood,.. the mastering and ordering of Europe, and the solid extension of the German population frontiers eastwards at least 500 km from the frontier of 1939'.<sup>35</sup> The officers commented that although this speech was made within a week of the July 20th putsch, 'we may discount any suggestion that Himmler was living in a 'cloud-cuckoo-land' of megalomaniac dreams remote from reality. This is probably true of Hitler, but not of Himmler'.<sup>36</sup> They remarked that 'such a frank proclamation of German expansionist aims seemed very surprising at this last stage of the war', which led them to deduce that what Himmler was actually doing was taking the last 'great gamble' since for him there was no alternative between complete victory and complete annihilation. Any compromise settlement would entail his own and the regime's disappearance, and therefore the intelligence officers believed that Himmler was not looking for a compromise peace, but for an alliance with either Russia or the Western powers in what he assumed would be the continuation of the war between these two. The German Section believed that the National-Socialist regime 'have no inclination to imagine a desirable post-war settlement' adding that 'the opposite, of course, is true of the ordinary Germany

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. For week 11.2.45 - 17.2.45.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

private citizen, whose passionate desire is for peace'.<sup>37</sup>

Three weeks before the end of the war the German Section warned that 'The Werewolf station continues to prepare for resistance after the defeat of the German armed forces', whilst the official broadcasts to the people in occupied regions did not make any attempts to encourage them to resist the occupying forces. Instead the intelligence officers noted that 'they were rather sentimental appeals to patriotism, without any ideological tinge, they made no allusion to Allied 'atrocities' and the worst that was said of the enemy was that 'he would never understand this country's soul'.<sup>38</sup> In complete contrast to official advice from his own Ministry, Goebbels seemed to support the Werewolf ideas in principle, but had a very different idea of the way in which they could be used to prolong the war. Whereas the Werewolf methods were based on elitist guerilla warfare, Goebbels preached a 'people's war' involving all those in the Reich still able to fight, and whilst Goebbels believed it was the 'will' to go on that was lacking, the Werewolves contradicted this now stating, 'We believe that we do not lack men, arms and ammunition. But we need resolute hearts'.(emphasis as in original)<sup>39</sup> The concern for the German Section was of course that whilst they believed the 'ordinary' Germans were in no position to do anything at all and therefore did not represent a direct threat to the incoming forces, an elite and well-armed and trained guerilla organisation certainly did. In fact the German Section had information of a broadcast which indicated that three large Werewolf training camps existed, and that the first training course had been completed in these camps involving over 2,000 Werewolves who would be parachuted or smuggled in to occupied areas.<sup>40</sup> In this report the intelligence officers again considered the seriousness of this organisation and surmised what appeared to have taken place was a total re-formation of the National-Socialist Party. The thought that

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. For week 16.4.45 - 22.4.45.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

the 'Werewolf' movement now represented the 'new' National-Socialist Party in which the 'essentials' of National Socialism were preserved, but its mistakes admitted and disowned. The remnants of the Nazi regime now represented the 'old' Party. The picture was confused because although both organisations now existed, they could not come into open conflict because 'such internecine strife' in the present military and political situation would destroy them both.

The existence of a rival organisation, the 'Freikorps Adolf Hitler', established by the 'old' Party in reaction to the 'Werewolf' organisation was further evidence to the German Section of the chaos and rivalry within the Nazi leadership. In contrast to the 'Werewolf' movement this was 'a thoroughly amateurish affair' comprised of a 'scratch body of Party officials' who were committed to resisting the Allied advance rather than fighting under-ground behind enemy lines. The intelligence officers dismissed this vague attempt at re-organisation of the 'old' Party bosses which comprised of the 'local Ortsgruppenleiter at the bottom to the fat drunken Reichsleiter Ley at the top, whom the Werewolves disown'.<sup>41</sup>

Such was the pace of change at the end of the war that the previous two weeks concentration on information about the 'Werewolf' organisation in the Weekly reports was replaced by a short, sharp announcement that the organisation had apparently disappeared. After a short announcement on 23rd April, no more publicity had been put out, and it was assumed in London that the station had been transmitting from Nauen and overrun by the Russians. The only other possible reason was that its disappearance may have been the policy dictated by the needs of the peace appeals to the West.<sup>42</sup> This report also contained the news that 'Werewolf' recruits had been made from the Hitler Youth, and BDM girls had been trained to operate radio transmitters in Allied-occupied territory. Two statements from 16 year old boys recently captured seemed to suggest that in trying to find 'volunteers' for the organisation they came up against a certain amount of resistance and had therefore

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid. For week 23.4.45 - 29.4.45

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

used conscription to 'persuade' recruits. These two boys claimed to have refused to join and were sent to a political reformatory school at Ballenstedt where they were taught. They informed the interrogator that approximately 600 other boys were at this school and they had been taught to become instructors in weapons for their home communities.

During the last week of the war in Europe the intelligence officers reported the end of the Propaganda Ministry, and details of Hitler's death and 'legend'. The concern here was the attempt in Germany to retain the spirit of the Fuhrer by the Party leaders as an ideological focus for the re-vitalisation of National-Socialism. The disappearance of the major Nazi leaders was discussed, the information that Goebbels had committed suicide was accepted as 'probably true'. But the officers thought it 'sinister' that nothing had been heard of Himmler although they did consider the possibility that he had been 'eliminated' by rivals 'in the highest circles'. As far as post-occupation resistance was concerned the report included the details of a broadcast to the German nation, instructing them that Admiral Doenitz ordered 'all German men and women to abstain from any underground (illegal) fighting activity in the Werewolf or other organisations'.<sup>43</sup> The officers are still slightly unsure about the sincerity of the broadcast, saying 'It is almost certain that Doenitz and his associates genuinely disapprove of the whole 'Werewolf' plan, which, in so far as it succeeded, would render impossible that reconciliation with the Western Powers which they certainly desire, whether or not they expected it. It would probably be a serious mistake, however, to attach much practical importance to this announcement.. Doenitz only 'asks' Germans not to engage in resistance activities .. recognises he has no authority ..nothing at all is said about the dissolution of the organisation'.<sup>44</sup>

At the end of the war, as the Allied forces occupied Germany the information collected by the German Section provided some of the information necessary for both

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid. For week 30.4.45 - 6.5.45.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.



the short- and long-term objectives of British policy. The most logical and public use of this was for the formulation of propaganda campaigns, and the PWE used propaganda after 1943 to undermine morale and increasingly to begin to get the German people to understand that a complete social and political change of mind was necessary if they wished to re-enter the 'civilized' world.

Turning now to the 'official' contribution of the PWE to this phase of British policy, the first meeting of the Committee on Re-Occupation took place on 27th March, 1943 shortly after Lockhart had taken over as Director General of the PWE and Brigadier Sachs had reorganised and expanded the intelligence services of the executive.<sup>45</sup> The meetings were chaired by Ritchie Calder and attended by Sachs and Walmsley, Duncan Wilson (Head of the German Section), and representatives from the BBC, Ministry of Information and the war Office. Throughout the following year the committee met thirty-three times and discussed items of finance, personnel, broadcasting arrangements, printed matter, films and the Military Manual of Civil Affairs. From the records of these meetings it appears that the main concern in January, 1944 was to ensure the confidence and goodwill of the local population as their country was liberated. It was believed that this process could begin immediately if the people were given news, information and guidance about the activities of the outside world from which the Nazi regime had cut them off and to make sure that they understood the policies and intentions of the United Nations. It was decided that 'combat propaganda' or 'tactical propaganda' would be used against enemy forces and towards populations behind enemy lines.<sup>46</sup>

A joint PWE and BBC paper on 'German Re-Occupation - Propaganda and Publicity to Germany' outlined the central aim as the 'control and remoulding of the German

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<sup>45</sup> PRO/FO 898/361 'Minutes of First Meeting of Committee of Re-Occupation', 29th March, 1943.

<sup>46</sup> PRO/FO 898/361 'Minutes of Thirty-Third Meeting of Committee of Re-Occupation', 21st January, 1944.

mind after the war'.<sup>47</sup> This was to be done through the use of radio, films, censorship, education and denazification. The substitution of Nazi text books was considered to be necessary and the paper suggested that Germans in exile should be asked to produce examples of books which could be recommended for substitution. The paper also suggested that a British researcher (PWE trained) should observe trends in Universities since 'a national renaissance has more than once arisen in Germany through University; they therefore need very careful watching during the period of occupation and control'. Additionally, the 'minds and leisure of the German people' also needed to be observed so that it would be possible to recognise and if necessary 'arrest the development of a purely decadent trend as followed the last war and led to the rise of the 'Nazi' type'. Finally the paper suggested that the PWE should watch social trends and examine the results, consider telephone censoring and check the results of the counter-propaganda they are sure to put out'.<sup>48</sup>

Whilst the PWE and BBC were making these warnings and suggestions for the tight control of the media in Germany the difficulties of interpretation of policy amongst senior civil servants can be illustrated by the correspondence concerning a row between the Foreign Office and the PWE. On the 11th January, 1944 Duncan Wilson had put forward to Troutbeck and O'Neill at the Foreign Office a Draft Paper for the way in which the 'Book Officers' would carry out their duties in Germany. O'Neill wrote to Wilson saying that both he and Troutbeck were in agreement that one of the suggestions - the refusal of allocation of paper to 'objectionable publishers' - was not acceptable, mainly due to the problem of implementation.<sup>49</sup> Wilson's Second Re-Draft was also unacceptable to O'Neill who now informed Wilson that he had stronger objections to the re-draft than he had to the original. His main objections were that 'the whole plan is based on the conception that our rule in

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<sup>47</sup> PRO/FO898/370. 'German Re-Occupation - Propaganda and Publicity to Germany', January, 1944.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>PRO/FO 371/39054. 'Memorandum to Troutbeck and O'Neill from Wilson', 11th January, 1944.

occupying Germany will be to exert the minimum interference over the whole field of German life which is consistent with securing our political and strategic objectives. I also attach great importance to avoiding the appearance of total control of German intellectual life'.<sup>50</sup> In particular O'Neill was concerned about the political implications of the suggestion that Book Officers should deal with school text books saying that this thought 'fills me with horror. They will be regarded merely as British propaganda agents, and as such, any dealings they may have with German education will merely prejudice all our efforts to get the Germans to agree to this reform'. In summing up Wilson's proposals O'Neill concluded that the plans were not feasible and were impractical, and more importantly indicated an 'undesirable interference of British officials in the field of book publications'. Wilson submitted a Third Re-Draft at the beginning of February to which O'Neill said he now had 'no objections'... which makes the unending difficult correspondence about this seem even more superfluous'.

Wilson's suggestions for the control of films during military occupation which set out what he saw as the three phases of occupation, and which required three different approaches to the type of films used, were also met with hostility in the Foreign Office. Wilson suggested that the initial phase would require films showing fighting on German soil and Allied control, but of a non-political nature. During this phase the Security Police were to 'comb out all pro-Nazi elements', and the immediate months of Allied occupation would bring an end to all film production in Germany, and substitute 'escapist' films to help the military in 'keeping people occupied'. The second phase would continue to use American-English films but would also introduce a gradual re-commencement of studio activity and film-making in Germany. The third phase would mark the gradual transition from direct to indirect control.<sup>51</sup> O'Neill's reply was to remind Wilson that the purging of the film industry by the Security Police would, contrary to Wilson's understanding, have to be led by the PWE who

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<sup>50</sup>PRO/FO 371/39054. 'Memorandum to Wilson from O'Neil', 21st January, 1944.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

would be relied upon to tell them who to go after in this field. O'Neill also commented that he doubted that the problems Wilson envisaged in this area were as real as Wilson believed.<sup>52</sup>

At the end of 1944 the PWE became involved in a row between Richard Crossman and O'Neill concerning the non-fraternization and non-rehabilitation policy towards the German people. Crossman wrote to Lockhart on 29th December, enclosing an 'aide memoire' he had prepared for General McClure which was being taken back to Washington by General Barker, head of G1, responsible for non-fraternization policy.<sup>53</sup> Crossman outlined his fears about the effects of the 'sudden and violent change in SHAEF policy' towards the German people which he argued, had the effect of fundamentally changing the conception of their task from one of 'releasing a people from subjection and not simply conquering it' to what now seemed to be merely punitive since 'apart from the narrowest military requirements, nothing should be done to assist the Germans'. Crossman argued that whereas the 'soft' approach was successful in beginning to 'adjust the German mind', the 'hard' line was actually helping the Nazis by turning the German people against the Allies. He claimed that the policy had resulted in the whole nation of Germany now being the enemy of the British and American soldiers, with Germans living 'troglodized, living in shelters and digging up roots' to survive. O'Neill's response to this was to sweep it aside, commenting that Crossman's paper was 'a bit hasty, over-emphatic, and alarmist'. He did however, admit that there was 'something in it', suggesting that the policy should perhaps be more generously interpreted.

The contradictions of O'Neill taking Wilson to task for his harsh and impractical interpretation of policy in relation to books and films, and yet placating the PWE in its concern about the change in attitude to the German people illustrates the ambiguity surrounding the objectives and motivations of British policy. Additionally, O'Neill's

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<sup>52</sup>PRO/FO371/39054. 'Memorandum to Wilson from O'Neill', 6th March, 1944.

<sup>53</sup>PRO/FO 371/46729. 'Letter to Lockhart from Crossman', 29th December, 1944.

correspondence with Wilson and Crossman over particular issues can be seen to represent what Welch describes as the 'internal rivalry and conflict' and power politics in Whitehall, in this instance between the Foreign Office and the PWE, and on a more personal level between O'Neill and Wilson.<sup>54</sup>

What is clear from a 'Secret' paper sent from O'Neill to Steel entitled 'SHAEF Military Occupation Handbook. Policy on Relations Between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany' is that the policy became even more punitive. This document is a perfect example of Welch's argument about the absurdity of observations made at the time which were based on the notion of 'collective guilt' and the pre-occupation with German national traits.<sup>55</sup> Whilst the document is lengthy, the general tone can be understood from a few chosen quotations:

'The German mental attitude during the previous occupation of GERMANY ranged from hatred, through friendliness to fawning subservience'. 'Because of this war's greater air bombing damage and ground combat within GERMANY and because of the intense Nazi indoctrination, German hatred may be far deeper and more universal than in 1918'... 'The German conception of themselves as a "Master Race" has been too deeply implanted to be eradicated outright; ...efforts will no doubt be directed towards regaining a commanding position in EUROPE'... 'occupying forces must be prepared for civil disorders, including sniping and assaults on individuals, sabotage, provoked riots, perhaps even organised raids'.<sup>56</sup>

The Appendix then listed the way in which Allied personnel should conduct themselves, and which in some ways sought to eradicate some of the problems Crossman had highlighted in his report. These included strict measures in the control of alcohol consumption, non-fraternization defined as 'avoidance of mingling with Germans upon terms of friendliness, familiarity or intimacy .. but does not demand rough, undignified or aggressive conduct, nor the insolent overbearance which has

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<sup>54</sup>Welch, 'The Political Re-education of Germany'. pp.25-26.

<sup>55</sup>PRO/FO 371/46729. 'Secret paper from O'Neill to Steel', 13th March, 1945.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

characterised the Nazi leadership’.

Finally, the PWE had two additional important areas of work connected to the post-war plans for Germany. The Central Intelligence department run by Sachs, set up two separate but interlinking projects, incorporating the social and political intelligence collected by the Regional divisions of the PWE. The first collated the Personality Index Cards of prominent figures, whilst the second developed the Basic Handbooks. The Personality Records section consisted of index cards which contained details of leading figures in Germany: Church leaders, important administrative and political officials, publicists and journalists, leading figures in finance and industry, and Judges and others involved in the legal system. This file was useful in the planning for de-nazification as it provided information concerning leaders of the Party, and other important officials. At a general level this information was useful to the occupying forces, since it would enable them to identify and deal with Nazis and other ‘politically unreliable’ elements in German society. It would also provide them with the information about the location of the people whom they would need to help administer the occupation of Germany. The way in which this was done was to identify and categorise people into three ‘types’ of people and to have them registered according to three lists - ‘black’, ‘grey’ and ‘white’. The purging of the German Educational system was to be carried out by this method. The ‘black’ list consisted of all persons condemned as war criminals, Reich ministerial officials, all National-Socialists working in education at all levels, particularly Universities, present or past members of the SS, SA, present or past leaders of the Hitler Youth, DBM and any persons who acted as agents of the Gestapo or SD. In addition existing Rectors of Universities and Heads of Teachers’ Training Colleges should be dismissed if they had obtained their position under the National Socialist regime. The ‘grey’ list contained the ‘remaining categories of persons against whom there are reasonable positive grounds for suspicion’, basically those employed before the Nationalist Socialist regime came to power and who should not be dismissed without further investigation. Finally, the ‘white’ list contained ‘persons inside Germany whose character, professional standing, experience and political reliability render them especially

suitable to be placed in positions of special responsibility'.<sup>57</sup> It is not difficult to see the problems facing those given the task of purging the education system as a first step towards re-education, whilst at the same time being told by the Foreign Office (as O'Neill to Wilson) that they should not be seen to be taking too much control. In fact the authorities did attract some criticism from the German people themselves within the first weeks of occupational rule for not carrying out the process of de-nazification as thoroughly as some sections of the population would have liked.<sup>58</sup>

The expanded intelligence work and records of personalities in Germany by the German Section meant that it was bound to become involved in the identification and bringing to trial the Nazis accused of committing war crimes. In February 1945 Ivone Kirkpatrick wrote to Lockhart, this time at PID, Bush House, telling him that the Foreign Office had 'under consideration the question of securing the punishment of Germans and Austrians for atrocities against their own people' and asked Lockhart for 'lists of persons who might be guilty of such acts'.<sup>59</sup> On 19th March Sgt. Derry, the Secretary of the PWE, wrote to Sachs that Political Warfare Intelligence was the department 'better qualified than any other' to the work for Her Majesty's Government in the compilation of a list of Germans committing crimes against Germans. He commented that 'the work done in the department on the Handbooks must mean that we have the background knowledge from which to proceed'.<sup>60</sup>

In May the PWE was asked to provide information to the War Crimes Commission for which they furnished details about 'certain key men in Germany'.<sup>61</sup> Following a visit from Colonel H.H. Wade who was working for the United Nations War Crimes

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<sup>57</sup>FO 371/46729 Undated, but probably dated 1944 or early 1945.

<sup>58</sup>PRO/FO1005/739. 'Commission Control Policy Directive', Paper No.6. June, 1945.

<sup>59</sup> PRO/FO 898/423. 'Letter to Lockhart from Kirkpatrick', 19th February, 1945.

<sup>60</sup> PRO/FO898/423. 'Memorandum from Derry, PWE to Sachs', 19th March, 1945.

<sup>61</sup> PRO/FO898/423. 'Letter to Walmsley from Derry', 17th May, 1945.

Commission at the Royal Court of Justice in the Strand, Ian Walmsley, Head of the German Section Intelligence, replied immediately with information requested about particular figures in Germany.<sup>62</sup> In this memo Walmsley informed Wade that 'Oberlindober can be called a 'notorious Nazi' like any other leading men in Germany', but there was no specific evidence of war crimes. Walmsley advised that the Minister of Justice on the list should be deleted, in fact all the Ministeriate had better be deleted because 'many hundreds of others were just as implicated'. Answering the question about an individual called Rahn, the memo informed Wade that a capture order signed by him of a 'war crime nature' had been sent to the UNWCC. Finally, Walmsley reminded Wade that 'We would like to re-emphasise there are thousands of other individuals who are quite or almost as much "notorious Nazis" as anyone of the short list of about 200'.<sup>63</sup> This file has been very heavily 'weeded' by the Foreign Office and many papers are retained until the year 2020. There was however, a brief list of some of the war crimes committed which give enough detail to show the amount of detail collected by the intelligence department. The list had dates and information. One piece of information, dated 16th December 1944 gave details of, Oswieczim (Auschwitz) concentration camp, where 'workers were beaten to death (mostly Jews)'. The note added 'they walk in through gates and out through the chimney'. In this camp there were also some non-Jewish political prisoners, and Russian and English prisoners of war. The Camp Commandant was identified as an SS man named Schwarz and his Deputy was a Sudetenland German, Teuschart. According to the note it was 'generally known that thousands of Jews had been put to death in gas chambers', and the report also included the information that a 'popular trick of the Gestapo was to make prisoners fetch caps from over the electrified fence'.<sup>64</sup> The entry continued with: 28th August, 1944 'eight Englishmen (airmen) who had been shot down and hanged in Grabenstrasse, Russelheim'; 19/20th December, 1944 'Capt. Kugler in a village called Hahscheid ordered forty American

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> PRO/FO 898/423 List undated, 'War Crimes'. This information on list under date 16.12.44.



soldiers to be shot. Confirmed from another source; October 1944 'the man most responsible for persecuting Hungarian Jews - Eichmann, Himmler's brother-in-law'.<sup>65</sup>

The other work undertaken by the special sub-committee set up by Brigadier Sachs early in 1943 was the production of Basic Handbooks for the Commanders-in-Chief in charge of liberating and occupying territories, from which the most important publication was the Handbook for Germany.<sup>66</sup> This additional and specialised intelligence work proved to be so valuable that the JIC met with Sachs, Lockhart and members of the War Cabinet and Foreign Office in the early months of 1945 to make plans for the continuation of this work.<sup>67</sup> At this meeting the Minutes noted that the JIC had held its first 'representative meeting' in 1942 to discuss the production of these Handbooks, and the result was that Sachs had been appointed Head of the Political Intelligence Directorate of the PWE who immediately set to work on these. As already mentioned, this particular area of work of the PWE was one which was continued in the post-war months. At the meeting on 19th April, 1945 the Minutes also state that the 'Handbooks had met a long-felt need, one never fulfilled in peacetime and the information provided would continue to be of great value in the day-to-day work of the War Office, Air Ministry, Control Commission and Foreign Office, Department of Overseas Trade and Civil Affairs'.<sup>68</sup>

What is interesting about the Basic Handbook for Germany is the different view of the German people as represented in the Weekly Reports and the image portrayed by those responsible for the Handbook. Welch's criticism of the pre-occupation in Whitehall with 'national traits' is confirmed in this publication which relies on genetic features, historical legend and outrageous assumptions as useful indications of German 'national characteristics'. This Handbook was published in July 1944 and had

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> See Chapter Three

<sup>67</sup> PRO/FO 898/22. 'Minutes of Meeting on Basic Handbooks of European Countries', 19th and 27th April, 1945.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

'Restricted Access'. In Part I, *Geographical, Historical and Social*, Chapter I contained details of the geography and climate and population statistics. Chapter II focussed on 'Racial and Linguistic Divisions' and pointed to the 'age-long intermixture of 'Nordic' and 'Alpine' stocks, identifying the 'long-headed Nordic type, which in the East of Elbe becomes rarer and where the 'shape of the skull tends to be broader..from Saxony to Silesia there is a continuation of broad heads, with light colouring' although adding that 'the value of such descriptions is open to doubt'. The Commander-in-Chief was informed that the 'differences between German tribes (tribal consciousness being seen as 'folk' culture), speech and mentality' was seen as one reason why there was a late development of German unity'. Such differences, however, had been reduced in recent years - 'giving no clue to the possibilities of a revival of separatism in Germany after the collapse of the Nazi regime'.

Chapter III, *Historical Outline*, considered the 'important epochs' in development which had particularly influenced modern Germany. The first was the 'Roman influence' where the Handbook pointed out that 'Rome had been unable to conquer German tribes and therefore had recognised them as 'federates' ... and these newly federated barbarians set about imitating Roman civilization to the best of their ability'. The Handbook informed the reader that this contradicted the 'Nazi thesis of German antagonism to the decadent civilization of Rome!', and sarcastically commented that the only thing the Nazis had in common with the Teutons of Tacitus' day was 'their aggressiveness and preference for living on the spoils of the vanquished rather than by the sweat of their brow'. The 'Medieval influence' had an important part to play in understanding the ideological roots of Nazism, with Nazis being seen as 'inheritors of the tradition of medieval philosophy, philology and the literature of brothers Grimm, Savigny in Law, Freiherr von Stein and administrative reforms based on ideas of medieval corporate government'.

According to the Handbook, the following epoch, 'The Reformation and the Thirty Years War', had left a two-fold legacy of 'vital importance for the development of modern Germany'. Whilst the intelligence officers writing this noted that the Reformation was 'in England merely a part of the living past' they pointed out that

in Germany it had created a gulf between Catholics and Protestants and accelerated the trend of German history, which had ultimately resulted in the rise of Territorial powers. The strength of these territorial powers prevented the 'quiet, gradual, organic development of national unity such as took place in England, and the Unity of 1871 never freed itself from this artificial character... this in turn can be regarded as one of the main roots of the excessive, neurotic German nationalism of the twentieth century'. Furthermore, as a result of the devastation of the Thirty Years War feudal barriers were created along with feudal obligations where 'slavish endurance, instead of a strong independent sense of enterprise, became the main feature of the mental make-up of many Germans'.

This section of the Handbook described how the rise of Prussia and militarism and bureaucracy under Frederick William I (1713/40) had been marked by 'severe discipline, masochistic obedience to the military and other authority, and a concept of 'spartan duty'. According to the author, it was under Frederick the Great and the pressures of the Seven Years War that 'modern German nationalistic thought was born'. Following a potted history of the Congress of Vienna where the 'old authoritarian dynastic powers prevailed once more', followed by a brief note on the attempt in the Revolution of 1848 to gain 'unity and Liberty', and a discussion of the failures of the Weimar Republic which was 'born of one catastrophic defeat'. This was followed by the history of Germany and the German people, and the Handbook then moved on to consider 'Hitler', 'The Nazi Dictatorship' and the 'National Characteristics' of the German people. This section of the Handbook concentrated on the personal characteristics of Hitler and the German people, the philosophy and ideology of Hitler and the way in which the Nazi regime had seized and retained power in Germany. It also warned of the effects of this 'history' on the German people in an attempt to indicate to the reader the 'type' of people he would be confronted with in Germany and to point out to him the danger of assuming they should or could be treated in the same way as he would treat English people.

In the section on 'Hitler', the most important characteristics were identified as his 'fixed ideas of Pan-Germanism, anti-Semitism, and hatred of Social Democracy, but

also an unlimited ambition, an intense propagandistic energy, a hypnotic power of mass oratory and an extraordinary grasp of political tactics, combined with a gambler's readiness to risk everything to attain his ends'. As far as the working class were concerned the intelligence officers believed that they would 'attempt to continue the development forcibly interrupted in 1933', but would be even less prepared and more war weary than in 1918. The problems facing the working class in this attempt would be their distrust of words and promises, and as a result of their experience of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich 'this attitude of distrust and suspicion, particularly in political matters, may well be their outstanding characteristic'.

The sections in the Handbook concerning the 'National Characteristics' reflects a continued fear of the potential power of German conservative, right-wing political thought on a society already convinced of its basic principles. Accordingly the conclusion was made that the 'majority of Germans still think in terms of the Prussian tradition, and see their salvation in military power and military conquest'. Late unification had resulted in a 'national inferiority complex..a willingness to condone aggression..and on a personal level the German has a relatively small appreciation of personal liberty'. The 'German worship of power for its own sake partly explains the meagreness of resistance to Hitler'. A Note below did, however, point out that this generalisation had 'obvious and important exceptions. It does not detract from the heroic fight put up by thousands of individuals acting from personal conviction or devotion to a cause'.

Using this information to anticipate the reaction of the German people to occupational rule and the attempt to bring democracy to Germany the Handbook concluded that 'The word 'democracy' of course, exercises no magic spell on the German mind. Recent evidence of a revival in Germany in respect of democracy is not necessarily evidence of a genuine conversion'. This conclusion was based upon the German respect for power and the fact that the German people would, after all, accept that the 'system'; in other words the Allied forces had shown their superiority and power over the 'system' and would therefore appear to command some respect from the German people. The Handbook therefore suggested that the German respect for power and

legality should be used as the basis for occupational rule: 'Any government in Germany which wishes to be respected should at all costs exhibit power. But it should provide, wherever possible, a legal basis for its actions'. But the warning given here was that there was 'no reason to suppose that defeat will have made Germans more amenable to the indigenous British technique. Mild rule would probably be taken for weakness'.

The Handbook then moved on to the problems of education, particularly the fear that the indoctrination and education of Hitler Youth had produced leaders 'who are nihilistic, cynical, amoral and often brutal'. The book argued that the 'duality of character' of the German people manifested itself in the 'synthetic attachment' to German nationalism, and that 'once released from the influences of German nationalist thought, he becomes a peaceable, contented and hard-working citizen'. However, the officers using this Handbook were warned that beneath this exterior the darker 'other' side of the German character remained since 'even when he appears to have achieved a new and stable attachment, his latent aggressiveness and group ambition can be stimulated afresh, as the Nazi Auslandsorganisation has shown'. The Handbook warned that this duality of character meant that the German attitude to British rule could change rapidly, with a 'sudden change of heart from liking to hating the British' and that there was no reason to expect this dual attitude to be radically changed after the war. Finally, the section warned that 'The bulk of Germans are capable of greater brutality to human beings than the majority of Englishmen, Americans or Frenchmen, with an immature reaction to failure which resulted in self-pity'. The effects of the Nazi regime in its appeal to instincts and emotions had, according to the intelligence officers, 'produced mental discord and confusion in the minds of the more intelligent Germans, while it has no doubt succeeded in debauching the instincts of many of the less intelligent'. This section finished:

'To sum up, in dealing with Germans it is wise to be prepared for contradictions in behaviour which are uncommon in Britain and America. Hysterical behaviour is not uncommon .. technical experts may show a childish obstinacy and lack of proportion on questions outside their own sphere. Disillusionment with country and fervent patriotism.

The kindest hearted German may suddenly exhibit a brutality which alienates the foreigner.

The problem is not so much how to distinguish one kind of German from another as to distinguish the different types of personality which seem to exist within each German breast, and to determine the conditions in which the better or worse is likely to gain the upper hand'.

The following chapter in the Handbook assessed German foreign policy from 1870 to 1939, dealing first with 'The Prussian Tradition', then 'Industrial Expansion, and finally with 'Romantic Imperialism'. In concluding, The Handbook justified the policy of re-education of the whole nation in terms of the responsibility and guilt of the people and leaders for the way in which National Socialism had led to war and crimes against the international community:

'Both the world conflicts of the century have been precipitated by German ambitions. [The] Lack of proper balance between ends and means : Germany aimed beyond her strength and damaged her chances of success by over-reliance on force and palpable hypocrisy. [Germany as] failed to convince other nations that extension of power on her part are likely to work to their advantage (or at least not to their disadvantage).

But a verdict on German foreign policy cannot be allowed to rest on power politics alone. Germany has not merely failed, she has committed a crime against the comity of nations. During recent decades the world has been trying to get away from mere power politics and establish some system of international relations which will be based not simply on submission to superior force but also on respect for common moral principles.

The attempt is not easy and no nation may have been fully successful in carrying it out. But by reason of her failure to contribute to the development, but also in scorn, generally open and at best half-veiled, which she had displayed towards the underlying ideals. The Government preferred the method of unilateral repudiation, and most of her people applauded the policy and it's results. There is no real escape from guilt if it is argued that she was driven inexorably to expand and seek power abroad by the pressure of internal forces. For a great deal could have been done to resolve those forces if all the different elements in German society, but particularly those in power, had made a more generous and public spirited attempt to sacrifice their

narrow interests for the welfare of all citizens alike.

After the defeat of 1918 only a minority of Germans (misinformed by nationalist propaganda as they were) seriously accepted Germany's heavy responsibility for the war.

Yet, so long as Germans do not admit the wrongness (as well as the failure) of German foreign policy, a new start - an attempt at co-operation rather than domination - will scarcely be possible'.

It is clear from the content of the Handbooks, which were seen as the 'Bible' for the military forces and administration officers in Germany, that the Sub-Committee of the Political Intelligence Department of the PWE had a radically different 'image' of the German people from the German Section. The Handbook for Germany had been published in July, 1944 and it can be assumed that it did influence the way in which the German people experienced the first weeks of British occupational rule. The connection with the issuing of this Handbook and the 'shift' in policy which David Welch identified, and the effects of this 'violent and sudden shift in SHAEF policy' which Crossman complained bitterly about during the last months of 1944 cannot be proved but must be considered. What is important is that it was PID who were responsible for producing the Handbook which was influential in the way the German people should be treated and the way in which the 'German problem' should be solved. Whilst the German Section provided a very detailed and accurate, if at times negative, picture of German society and the complexity of the social and political conditions in Germany the Handbook offers a picture of a whole society in need of re-education. The problems of international order and European security could only be solved, it was believed, by the occupation and re-education of the German people and the adoption of the 'indigenous British technique' of government to bring democracy to an undemocratic people.

What then does the Handbook for Germany represent? A Whitehall-centric view of the German people as a race apart, a view in line with the Vansittart school of thought about all things German? A Handbook full of what Welch calls the absurd observations that result from the 'insanity of an ideology' based on national

characteristics? The use of physical characteristics to ascertain national characteristics was a return to the colonial philosophy of the nineteenth century.<sup>69</sup> How could it be adopted again? In *Civilization: A Personal View*, Kenneth Clark commented 'One mustn't overrate the culture of what used to be called 'top people' before the wars. They had charming manners, but they were as ignorant as swans'.<sup>70</sup>

But this is insufficient to explain the content of the Handbook and indeed the reasons for British occupation policy in general. This 'image' of the German people is an image based on fear. The fear in Whitehall was of a resurgent Germany, the 'other' ie Nazi Germany, and a third world war in less than thirty years. The decision to change the German mind was based on the belief in Britain that the German people had not been strong enough to resist Nazi rule, and in the post-war years would be in an even weaker position to do so. But more than this, as the Handbook illustrates, it was believed that the German national character was flawed by their experience of the failures in their history which had led to an unnatural acceptance of authority and militarism, and subservience to power. Most importantly, the Handbook suggested that this had led to the crimes against humanity for which the Nazi regime and the German people would be held responsible for.

As the Allied forces liberated occupied Europe the information reaching Britain about the concentration camps confirmed the worst fears about Germany and, as Roberts commented in his Memorandum, British public opinion would demand retribution and

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<sup>69</sup>The shape and size of the skull to determine national characteristics has a long history in American, British and French justifications for the subjugation of other races. Social theories derived from this 'scientific' measurement of physical attributes has also been used to 'rationalize, legitimize, or conceal repressive or unjust modes of social relation and expression' particularly in relation to state behaviour. See David Theo Goldberg, *Racist Culture, Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) p.153.

<sup>70</sup>Lord Clark, *Civilization: A Personal View*.(London: British Broadcasting Company and John Murray, 1969).p. 346.



a policy which would ensure that this could never happen again.<sup>71</sup> The denials in the Nazi press of responsibility re-inforced this opinion.<sup>72</sup> This was the final element which influenced British policy and also confirmed that a radical solution was necessary.

British feelings towards Germany at this time were subsequently described by Lord Annan.<sup>73</sup> Discussing the 'state of mind' of the British soldiers and civilians engaged in Germany directly after the end of the war he said :

'The days immediately after the Second World War were terrible days. They were terrible for so many reasons. The full enormity of the Nazi crimes - the holocaust, the extermination of Russian prisoners and of political enemies, the brutalities committed in reprisal against the guerilla forces in occupied territories - sickened the British Occupation Forces more than the Americans. The mood of the British in May 1945 was bitter'.<sup>74</sup>

The Commission Control Policy Directives for propaganda to Germany in the first weeks after the end of the war in Europe suggested the propaganda themes which should be used to address the 'minds' of the German people. The first Directive, dated 13th May, 1945, identified Germany as a 'hostile entity now disintegrated', and set out the themes of propaganda which would begin the process of re-educating the German people.<sup>75</sup> The four most important points to be followed were the 'culpable responsibility of all Germans for Nazi crimes, the power and determination of the

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<sup>71</sup>'Foreign Office Minute - Sir Frank Roberts typed note attached to this' PRO/FO371/39076, January, 1944.

<sup>72</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/187. For weeks 5.3.45-11.3.45. and 23.4.45-29.4.45.

<sup>73</sup>Lord Annan 'How Dr. Adenauer Rose Resilient From The Ruins of Germany', *The 1982 Bithell Memorial Lecture* , Institute of Germanic Studies. (University of London 1983).

<sup>74</sup>Ibid. p.3.

<sup>75</sup> PRO/FO 1005/739. 'Control Commission Policy Directive', 13th May, 1945.

Allies to enforce their will, the unanimity of the Allies and the spiritual importance of the individual'. Particular emphasis was to be given to the completeness of Germany's defeat and the fact that the 'unconditional surrender' of Germany was carried out by German Generals and Admirals in full military fashion under the authority of the Civil Government. This first point reflects the determination of the Allies that there should be no 'myth' created about Germany's defeat as in 1918. The second point emphasised the 'common responsibility of all Germans for Nazi crimes', and in support of this the reporting of details of the concentration camps should be continued and informed while a poster campaign was shortly to be launched based on the exhibition of films of Belsen and Dachau. Thirdly, 'the moral responsibility for these crimes must be laid wholly and solely on the German nation. They cannot be excused in terms of the Nazi regime, which was accepted whether actively or passively, by the vast majority of Germans. They surrendered their birthright, and will, against a mirage of national glorification through militarism regardless of right or wrong in the place of their own conscience. They have been caught red-handed'. Finally, the Directive pointed out that 'for all the victims of Nazism the Germans must be made to see the reasons for their treatment by the international society'.<sup>76</sup>

The weakness of the German people as a consequence of the overwhelming power of the Nazi regime, understood by the officers working in the German Section. The brutality of the regime which had been legalised by the manipulation of the judiciary, gave the leadership of the regime unlimited powers over citizens. Looking towards the immediate future the German Section had the task of identifying the short-term problems for the Allied troops. In doing so they identified the potential for the continuation of an element of German society committed to an aggressive, expansionist and militaristic policy. The expectation of continued conflict in the form of guerilla warfare involving the 'Werewolf' organisation, the existence of plans for a resurgent German nationalist movement and the disappearance of the leading Nazis at the end of the war pointed to a potentially serious situation for the occupying troops to face.

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

In the final analysis the intelligence officers' first duty was to provide information which reflected the most important issues for the military occupation of the country. The accepted weakness of the German people and their failure to resist the Nazi regime from the beginning when it was physically fit and able, now led the intelligence officers to conclude that in their extremely weakened state these people would be unable or unwilling to do anything to stop the Nazi regime. The focus of attention was on those who constituted a continued threat, and in this the intelligence officers provided evidence of the ways in which the Allied forces would be in danger. In this way the PWE provided evidence which suggested that there were still 'problems' to be faced in Germany, problems with the Nazi regime which the German people could not be relied upon to solve. The conclusion was that the occupation of Germany was the only solution. But whilst the intelligence may have been used to suggest occupation was necessary, it is difficult to conclude that re-education would be necessary after the elimination of the Nazi regime.

In relation to the the Central Directives and the Basic Handbook for Germany, the divergence between the 'image' of the German people and interpretation of the German 'problem' between the German Section and the PWE output in these is striking. The evaluation and conclusions of political and social conditions in Germany, provided in the Weekly Reports is at odds with the sensationalism and racism of the Basic Handbook. The content of the intelligence reports of the German Section and the way intelligence was used, or not, in the production of the Handbooks and by those responsible for the Central Directive, is an example of the way that intelligence can be used for political reasons by those in a position and with a reason for doing so. Both the Handbook and Directives reflect the existence of the 'vansittart' view of the German people, indicating that the PWE was a constituent element in the 'government circles' discussed by Welch. But most importantly, they articulate the reasons for the adoption of the policy of occupational rule and re-education and in doing so justify that policy.

The fact that 'the other Germany' existed, but was judged to have at least passively supported the Nazi regime meant that in the 'bitter mood' of May 1945 the

governments and peoples of Europe believed that a radical solution was needed for the German 'problem'. The policy of occupation, re-education and democratisation was planned and implemented in the belief that Germany was an 'uncivilized' society, with a history that had led them away from the liberal, western democratic style of government and society. The British solution to the 'problem' of Germany was to attempt to adopt nineteenth-century imperial philosophy and practice to resolve a twentieth-century problem.

## CHAPTER SIX

### The Cold War: The Return of the 'Bolsheviks'.

The history of the Cold War has, until recently, been the history of the conflict between Russia and the United States of America immediately following the end of the Second World War. If Britain entered into the discussion at all it was as a 'minor' participant in what was seen as a war between the two super-powers who were divided by opposing ideological and political philosophies and principles.<sup>1</sup> Britain, it seemed, had little influence over politics at such a 'high' level of international affairs.

This American-centric interpretation of the bi-polarity of the Cold War is now being re-assessed, and recent work has focused on the importance of including other issues, particularly the European dimension, in the history of the conflict. Equally important has been the search for an explanation for the origins of the conflict.<sup>2</sup> It is now

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<sup>1</sup>Stephen Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism. American Foreign Policy, 1938-1980*. 5th Edition (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1988). John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1944-47*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War*. (Boston, MA, 1977). Louise J. Halle, *The Cold War as History*. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967).

<sup>2</sup>John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War', in *Diplomatic History* 7 (1983). pp. 171-190. John Lewis Gaddis, 'Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War Origins', *Diplomatic History* 13 (1989). pp.191-212. John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Tragedy of Cold War History', *Diplomatic History* 17 (Winter 1993). pp.1-16. Anne Deighton (Ed.), *Britain and the First Cold War*. (London : Macmillan, 1990). Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Peace. Britain, the Division of Germany and The Origins of the Cold War*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). Victor Rothwell, *Britain and The Cold War, 1941-47* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982). John Zametica, *British Officials and British Foreign Policy, 1945-50*. (Leicester University Press, 1990). Peter Weiler, *British Labour and the Cold War*. (Stanford University Press, 1988). Howard Jones and Randall B. Woods, 'Origins of the Cold War in Europe and the Near East', *Diplomatic History* 17 (Spring 1993).pp.251-276. John W. Young, *Cold War Europe, 1945-1989*. (London: Edward Arnold, 1991). Hugh Thomas, *Armed Truce. The Beginnings of the Cold War 1945-46*. (London : Sceptre, 1988). Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (Eds.), *Origins of The Cold War*. (London : Routledge, 1994).

recognised that the events in Europe leading up to the defeat of Germany are important factors in understanding the way in which the division of Germany accelerated the deterioration of the relationship between the three partners in the Grand Alliance. In *The Impossible Peace* Anne Deighton has examined the role of British ministers and the way in which British policy-makers sought to secure British interests in what was rapidly becoming a struggle between the two super-powers for political control in Europe. According to Deighton, ministers in Whitehall recognised the dangers to British security from Russia long before America and in an effort to safeguard her interests in Europe targeted their political and diplomatic efforts towards gaining an Anglo-American Alliance. They believed that such an alliance was essential if the aim of establishing a western-style democratic Germany which would act as a buffer against the Russian bloc was to be achieved. The role of British ministers in the Council of Ministers meetings throughout the war, and the way in which British foreign policy was strategically constructed to achieve this alliance suggests, therefore, that far from a 'minor' role, Britain played an important part in bringing about the pre-conditions which ultimately led to the division of Germany and the formation of the East and West blocs and the beginning of the Cold War.

Whilst Deighton's thesis is open to the criticism of attaching an exaggerated importance to British foreign policy during this period, it nevertheless highlights the need to re-assess Britain's role in the period immediately before the breakdown of the Allied relationship in 1945 which signalled the beginning of the Cold War. Historians have now begun to look more closely at the way in which the climate of opinion in Whitehall towards Russia changed during the latter stages of the war, and the way in which individuals in the Foreign Office influenced the way in which foreign policy was formulated.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Peter Weiler, op. cit. Peter G. Boyle 'The British Foreign Office View of Soviet-American Relations, 1945-46'. *Diplomatic History*, (1979).pp. 307-320. Raymond Smith and John Zametica, 'The Cold Warrior: Clement Attlee reconsidered, 1945-7', *International Affairs*, 61 (1985).pp. 237-252. Raymond Smith, 'A climate of opinion: British officials and the development of British Soviet policy, 1945-7', *International Affairs*, 64 (1988).pp.631-647. Caroline Anstey, 'The Projection of British Socialism: Foreign Office Publicity and American Opinion, 1945-50'. *Journal*

In *British Labour and the Cold War*, Peter Weiler argues that during the Second World War the Foreign Office planned to base post-war policy on continued Anglo-Soviet friendship, viewing the actions in Eastern Europe not with alarm but with an understanding that this was desired for security. He believes that British policy started to change as the war came to a conclusion and tensions between the USSR and Britain emerged, resulting in the initial judgement giving way to suspicion, fear and then outright hostility.<sup>4</sup> Finally, research is now progressing on the way in which the breakdown of the relationship between East and West can be linked into the changing attitudes and opinions in Whitehall, and the establishment of departments to deal with emerging anxieties about the Russian 'threat.'<sup>5</sup>

Perhaps one of the most interesting facts to emerge from this research, and supporting Deighton's argument, is a rare consensus of opinion in Cold War historiography. This is that Britain was the first to recognise the threat posed by Russia and the first to act upon that recognition.<sup>6</sup> But exactly when this perception of threat emerged is still open to question, as Raymond Smith confirms: 'the extent to which a precise view of likely postwar activity was developed within British foreign-policy making circles during 1945 is still very much open to question'.<sup>7</sup> In *Europe in Our Time*, Walter Laqueur claims that 'Churchill realised much earlier than the Americans what

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*of Contemporary History*, 19 (1984). pp.417-451.

<sup>4</sup>Peter Weiler, *British Labour and the Cold War*. (Stanford University Press, 1988).

<sup>5</sup>Ray Merrick, 'The Russia committee of the British Foreign Office and the Cold War, 1946-47', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 20 (1985).pp.453-468. Lyn Smith, 'Covert British Propaganda: the Information Research Department: 1947-1977', *Millenium*, 9 (1980).pp.67-83. W. Scott Lucas and C.J.Morris, 'A very British crusade: the Information Research department and the beginning of the Cold War', in Aldrich, *British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War*.

<sup>6</sup>Lyn Smith, 'Covert British Propaganda'. John W. Young, *Cold War Europe*. Raymond Smith, 'A climate of opinion:' Jones and Woods, 'Origins of the Cold War'.

<sup>7</sup>Raymond Smith, in Deighton, *Britain and the First Cold War*. p. 33.

the Soviet advance into Europe meant'.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, Peter Boyle argues that Churchill was also instrumental in shaping American public opinion in influencing their early perception of this threat. He comments that Churchill's Iron Curtain speech at Fulton on 5th March, 1946 created an equally deep shock in America as Stalin's speech had done one month earlier. Halifax, who had been posted to the Washington Embassy after his resignation as Foreign Secretary in 1940, reported that Churchill's speech 'has given the sharpest jolt to American thinking of any utterance since the end of the war'.<sup>9</sup>

In *The Politics of Continuity*, John Saville outlines the growing concern in the Foreign Office for information about Russia and the Russian people, which resulted in a Committee on Russia Studies being set up in June, 1944. This committee, chaired by Sir Orme Sargent, was set up to 'consider means of ensuring that adequate facilities existed in this country for the study of Russian languages, arts, science, history, etc. and generally for the study of Soviet institutions and forms of political, economic and social organisation'.<sup>10</sup> During the same period the SIS (MI6), also under Foreign Office control, was 'quick to embrace the concept of a future Soviet adversary' and had turned its attention to forming a new Soviet section (Section IX) as early as the Summer of 1944.<sup>11</sup> Ray Merrick has described the 'anxious questioning concerning Soviet behaviour' in both the Foreign Office and the British Embassy in Moscow in the early months of 1946. In March 1946 the Joint Intelligence Committee had concluded that the Soviets would use all means, short of war, to challenge Britain, especially in Greece, Turkey, Iran and the Middle East.<sup>12</sup> Telegrams from Frank

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<sup>8</sup>Walter Laqueur, *Europe in Our Time. A History 1945-1992*. (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1992). p. 95.

<sup>9</sup> Peter G Boyle, 'The British Foreign Office View of Soviet-American Relations, 1945-46'. *Diplomatic History*, (Summer 1979). pp.307-320. p. 314.

<sup>10</sup>John Saville, *The Politics of Continuity. British Foreign Policy and the Labour Government, 1945-46*. (London: Verso, 1993).

<sup>11</sup>Aldrich, *British Intelligence*. pp. 23/24.

<sup>12</sup>Scott Lucas and Morris in *ibid.* p. 88.



Roberts, the charge d'affaires in Moscow, set out a 'sombre and disquieting account of Anglo-Soviet relations' in which he stated 'we are faced with a Soviet policy designed to advance Soviet interests at every possible opportunity, regardless of those of its allies, and it now seems regardless even of treaty obligations'.<sup>13</sup> Roberts was so concerned by the nature of Soviet policy that he proposed a body should be set up for the 'close and co-ordinated study of Soviet activities'.<sup>14</sup> The result of these anxieties in Whitehall was the establishment of the Russia Committee to co-ordinate policy towards Russia. This committee was set up just one month after Churchill's Fulton speech and was given the task of reviewing the development of Soviet policy and propaganda and Soviet activities throughout the world, particularly their activities against Britain, and to suggest what action the British government should take in such matters.<sup>15</sup> Merrick argues that the tasks given to the Russia Committee identified it as 'centrally involved in the British interpretation of, and reactions to, the onset of the Cold War'.<sup>16</sup>

In the following year, 1947, the recognition in Whitehall of the need to take action to counter the Soviet ideological 'offensive' against the West led to discussions about the need to maintain British prestige abroad and influence in the shaping of the post-war world. As British military and political power diminished, the relative value of propaganda and political warfare was identified as an essential element in British foreign policy with which to counter Russian propaganda. As a result of the discussion throughout 1947 the Information Research Department was established in 1948 to distribute anti-Communist propaganda in Britain and abroad. According to Smith, the role and functions of the Information Research Department demonstrates that Britain was the 'first to adopt a counter-offensive position against what was perceived as the threat of Communism -and in a highly organised, determined and

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<sup>13</sup>Roberts to Foreign Office 14th March, 1946. FO 371/67763 in Merrick, "The Russia Committee and the British Foreign Office". pp. 453/454.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. p. 454.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. pp. 453/445.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. p. 455.

aggressive manner'.<sup>17</sup> Scott Lucas and Morris trace the rapid change from a counter-offensive strategy to a 'defensive/offensive' programme in 1948 when Whitehall returned to the use of propaganda and political warfare as a weapons against Russian aggression.<sup>18</sup> The establishment of the IRD illustrated the decision in Whitehall to return to the methods of the PWE in order to ensure that 'the psychological conflict called the Cold War would be fought with psychological methods'.<sup>19</sup> Scott Lucas and Morris also the establishment of the IRD and the changes in policy towards Russia was not simply the product of the Foreign Secretary (Bevin) or of the Prime Minister (Attlee), nor even a co-ordinated reaction to Soviet expansion. It was 'the culmination of a campaign waged since 1946 by permanent officials of the Foreign Office, later supported by the military, for the adoption of a general 'defensive/offensive' strategy against the Soviets'<sup>20</sup>. The Foreign Office appears to have been instrumental as the location for the emergence of the anxieties in the West about future Russian intentions. The permanent officials of the Foreign Office are also identified as being responsible for the setting-up of departments to counter what was perceived to be a 'threat' to British interests. The links are also identified between the PWE and the post-war organisations for political warfare, specifically that by 1949 the IRD had become the 'peacetime version of the Political Warfare Executive'.<sup>21</sup> Britain was in a strong position to reconstitute the organisation for propaganda and political warfare due to the fact that even before the war had ended plans were made to continue elements of both SOE and PWE, and in doing so the 'important continuities of personnel and doctrine were thus facilitated'.<sup>22</sup> Thus, despite the change of government in 1945 when Labour won a landslide victory, the continuity in the belief in the use of propaganda and political warfare as an instrument

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<sup>17</sup>Lyn Smith, 'Covert British Propaganda'. p. 68.

<sup>18</sup>Scott Lucas and Morris, Aldrich, *British Intelligence*. p. 99.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. p. 86.

<sup>20</sup> bid. p. 87.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. p. 99.

<sup>22</sup> Aldrich, Introduction. *ibid.* p. 15.

of foreign policy was sustained.

During the war the PWE gradually became involved in the observation, analysis and reporting of Russian movements and propaganda in Europe. Again, this was an area not designated or foreseen in the tasks the PWE was given when it was established in 1941. As an example of the interest taken in Russian affairs, in the two-and-a-half years of Weekly Reports used in this research the intelligence concerning Russia is omitted from just seven of those reports. During this period the PWE became increasingly pre-occupied with, and eventually anxious about, Russian motivations and intentions. The intelligence officers working in the German Section were not constrained by the 'public' position necessarily adopted by Ministers towards Russia, and were free to include whatever information they considered important in their reports. This chapter is designed to illustrate the way in which the 'image' of Russia as an 'enemy' incrementally emerged in the Weekly Reports. The construction of the 'image' was the result of a combination of factors: the intelligence officers' understanding of the past history of Russia and her relations with the West, the events in Europe after 1943 and their interpretation of those events, and the information provided by the existing network of sources including the Ministry of Propaganda.

An examination of these reports provides an insight into the way in which the perception of the Russian 'threat' emerged in the PWE and when eventually 'the light of peace at the end of the tunnel of war came to be perceived as the light of the oncoming train of communism'.<sup>23</sup>

Before moving on to look at the Weekly Reports it is useful to review Lockhart's views on Russia and the Russian people. In *Comes The Reckoning*, Lockhart states that during the Second World War he was 'brought more and more by the Foreign Office into Russian affairs, and it was on the subject of Russia that I had my most intimate conversations with Mr. Eden'.<sup>24</sup> As far as the Russian people were concerned Lockhart was quite clear, stating 'I like and shall always like the

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<sup>23</sup>Merrick, 'The Russia Committee of the British Foreign Office'. p. 453.

<sup>24</sup>Lockhart, *Comes The Reckoning*. p. 142.

Russians'.<sup>25</sup> However, he was concerned about the possibilities of co-operation between Russia and Britain and the way in which this could be jeopardised. He believed that Russian behaviour was often unpredictable and difficult to understand, and that the Russian character moved between extremes of 'hot and cold, laziness and energy, political indifference and political fanaticism'.<sup>26</sup> His work at PWE in relation to the question of Russia was characterised with a sense of uneasiness about East/West relations, believing that 'the Russians regarded any agreement with a capitalist state as temporary and opportunist'.<sup>27</sup> For Lockhart 'inter-Allied unity was held together only by the cement of a common danger. It was not difficult to foresee that, as the danger receded, the divisions both in Britain itself and between the Allies would become accentuated'.<sup>28</sup>

The defeat of the German Army at Stalingrad signalled the beginning of the advance of the Red Army into occupied Europe. It also marked a turning point in the relationship between the partners of the Alliance. During the previous year tensions between Russia and the West had increased as a result of the failure of Britain and America to launch a second front in Europe in order to relieve the military pressure on Russia. In 1941 it had been assumed that the Russians would be weak and in need of the support of the West after the end of the war. After Stalingrad the success of the Red Army and their continued military successes had forced a rapid reappraisal of this conclusion. According to Lockhart,

'The agitation [for the second front] caused considerable anxiety amongst the Russian experts in this country to whom a new danger had now presented itself. Until two months ago both the British and the American Governments had assumed that Russia would need abundant Allied help during and after the peace because, although she would have been the main instrument of victory, she would be badly crippled,

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid. p. 93.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. pp. 229-230.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. p. 176.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. p. 185.

there was now at any rate a possibility of her winning the war without us and not needing our help at all'.<sup>29</sup>

In the first months after Stalingrad the intelligence officers reported the outpourings of the Ministry of Propaganda regarding Britain's new position within the Alliance. On the one hand the Ministry argued that 'everyone realises that Britain would not be able to check a victorious Russia on the Continent. Britain is bound to come out of this war crippled and impotent whatever happens... they are inhibited by their hatred and fear of the young Powers and peoples [Germany?] which prevents them from seeing their "strong man" Churchill in his true historical shape; a political adventurer who is throwing a world empire quite unnecessarily, and even against national interests, into a war situation which will destroy this Empire'.<sup>30</sup> On the other hand Goebbels warned that 'the British Empire will in any case be on the losing side at the end of this war - whether it is beaten by the Axis Powers (note: not Tripartite) or by the U.S.A... Britain has already lost too much power, prestige and possessions to be able to win'.<sup>31</sup> Three pieces of German propaganda were included in the Weekly Report report to illustrate the way in which the Nazis were attempting to undermine British morale. The first was a full page feature and map entitled 'Inheritance during lifetime' which showed the tentacles of the U.S. stretching out to all parts of the Empire; the second was a cartoon showing a hyena (the U.S) tearing a piece of meat (Africa) away from a sick lion (G.B); and the third was a full page article entitled 'Africa as the aim of Dollar Diplomacy'.<sup>32</sup> It was claimed that that Roosevelt wanted 'an armament monopoly for the U.S.A, a world dictatorship with fire, sword and hunger, a total suppression by force of great nations and a negation of all the laws of life and of nature - in short, a super-Versailles, such as can only

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid. p. 231.

<sup>30</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/185. For week 28.12.42 - 3.1.43.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. For week 4.1.43 - 10.1.43.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

arise from a diseased brain'.<sup>33</sup> German propaganda prophesied the eventual loss of the British Empire and the inevitable weakening of Britain's power and prestige abroad at the end of the war.

But of more importance to the intelligence officers were the reports of the beginnings of a change of opinion in Germany towards Russia as a result of the victory at Stalingrad. An 'indiscreet' article in the German Press had asked 'how is the gigantic Russian armament production possible in a country of comparatively primitive development.. perhaps the German with his well-known passion for absolute objectivity might be inclined to see something like a positive achievement by the Bolshevists...this in fact might bear the stamp of positive constructive work, worthy of winning the respect of the adversary'(emphasis as in original).<sup>34</sup> Goering's 'almost admiring reference to the Russian conduct of the first war in Finland which he described as 'perhaps the cleverest and greatest camouflage in world history hitherto' was recognised in the German Section as 'his practical admission that the German leadership had been completely deceived as to Russia's strength'.<sup>35</sup> Any change of attitude in Germany which was favourable towards the Russians was monitored closely by the German Section. Another Russo-German pact was always considered a possibility, particularly as German successes turned to defeat. In the report for the first week of February the intelligence officers commented that there were 'several important indications' that this opinion was already gaining some ground in Germany.<sup>36</sup> Goering's attack on the 'idiots who think that you could make an agreement with the Bolsheviks', and propaganda which exposed Stalin's attempt to 'de-Bolshevise Bolshevism in order to deceive the outer world', suggested that strong measures had been required to counter this opinion.

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid. For week 18.1.43 - 24.1.43.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. For week 25.1.43 - 1.2.43

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. For week 1.2.43 - 7.2.43.

The possibility of Russia taking control in Europe was a constant issue on the agenda for both the PWE and the Ministry of Propaganda, and in early February the Ministry published an article from Pravda in which Russia rejected as 'grotesque' the accusations being made by the Nazi regime about their intentions for the conquest of Europe. Nevertheless, the officers also noted that the Russians had incorporated into this rejection their long-term strategy for Europe, in which they pointed out that it was 'natural' that they would wish to recapture Bessarabia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.<sup>37</sup> For Lockhart this confirmed his fears that 'Russia, conscious now of her final victory, was determined to have her say - and a big say at that, in the future settlement of Europe - either in agreement with her Western Allies or without it'.<sup>38</sup>

At the end of February the intelligence officers commented wearily that the fundamental themes of the failure of the Western Powers to save Europe from Bolshevism continues 'at the same barrage strength as before. No further illustration is needed'.<sup>39</sup> Completely contradicting this statement, and indicating the concerns of the intelligence officers, the report included at least four pages of analysis of German propaganda and their statements about Britain's current and future position in Europe. The British people, and the Germans, were being told that one day Britain would thank Germany for her steadfastness and eventually have to admit that 'we have backed the wrong horse, we should have gone in with Germany'. The intelligence officers illustrated their concern at what was being said, and warned the readers that 'it is impossible to dismiss this just because the line is a very old one ... many other propagandists, including Goebbels, have said and are saying the same thing.'<sup>40</sup>

The German Section recognised the symbolic assertion that Britain was 'backing the

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid. For week 8.2.43 - 14.2.43.

<sup>38</sup> Lockhart, *Comes The Reckoning*. p. 233.

<sup>39</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/185. For week 22.2.43 - 28.2.43.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

wrong horse' as a direct reference to the situation in 1918 where Britain had made a serious tactical error in their support of the White Russian Army against the Bolsheviks. Lockhart, like Goebbels, also linked the problems of the Alliance to this issue. He recognised the parallel being made between the British intervention in the internal affairs in Russia , giving material and financial support to the White Russian Army in the Civil War, with the feeling at that time that Britain had 'backed the wrong horse'.<sup>41</sup> German propaganda now suggested that history was being repeated and that Britain, once more, had made a grave mistake in her choice of ally. Lockhart was also concerned about the suspicion of Churchill in Moscow who, after 1918, been seen as the 'great white hope of anti-Bolshevik Russians'. The Russian attitude to Churchill was, understandably, grounded in his involvement in their affairs in 1918 and summarising this Lockhart stated that 'the present rulers of Russia obviously disliked his past. They welcomed his present, because they knew he was determined to fight the Germans to the last. They almost certainly suspected his future'.<sup>42</sup>

The German Section were provided with details of Russian strength, with German propaganda describing the Red Army as a 'gigantic war machine...the most perfect tool of destruction ever devised ...driving the Soviet masses towards the West' in its commitment to a world revolution.<sup>43</sup> For England the message was clear. Through her partnership with Russia and America she had betrayed Europe, and in doing so had sealed her own fate since 'The post-war political order has, in the American view, a purely American and Bolshevik aspect. Europe will be given to the Bolsheviks as payment, and America will take over the Empire'.<sup>44</sup> Whilst the intelligence officers suggested in this report that it was merely 'more of the same' propaganda they also included a lengthy analysis a broadcast by Goebbels on 26th February, 1943 in which

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<sup>41</sup>Lockhart, *Comes The Reckoning*. p. 176.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/185. For week 22.2.43 - 28.2.43.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.



he argued that an international discussion of the danger of Bolshevism was now emerging with more and more voices in Europe pointing to the menace of the Red Army, a 'steamroller from the East'. German soldiers in the East were now 'fighting not only for the security of German lives, but for the future of Europe'.<sup>45</sup>

Reporting the way in which Red Army Day in was celebrated in Britain the German Section noted that 'broadcasts and the press fumed for several days about the celebrations'. Some of the more colourful interpretations of events as supplied by the Ministry of Propaganda were included, such as : 'With horror and disgust the entire civilized world witnessed the spectacle of official England - her King, Minister, Bishops - bowing down before the Bolshevik murderers'.<sup>46</sup> England's conduct had created an 'unbridgeable gulf between herself and Europe'; she had stabbed the West in the back. News broadcasts ridiculed Stalin's Order of the Day (23rd February, 1943) and his assertions that the Red Army had always respected the rights and independence of other peoples. The German propagandists reminded British ministers that 'he had omitted to mention the bloody attacks on Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Rumania... and that Stalin had pointed out to the West that the Red Army was bearing the burdens of war alone, in the absence of the Second Front, thus hinting that the Soviet Union intended to enjoy the fruits of victory alone'.(emphasis as in original)<sup>47</sup> A further review on the same day insisted that in fact because of the absence of the second front Stalin had rejected the 'glorification' of Red Army Day in London and instead 'reasserted the political programme of Bolshevism, with its claim to the sole right to conquer and destroy Europe'.(emphasis as in original)<sup>48</sup>

At the beginning of March the German Section noted that the Ministry of Propaganda was expanding its repertoire to include the political issues between the Three Powers

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

emerging from the advance of the Red Army into Poland.<sup>49</sup> The differences were pointed out between the Russian aim of retention of the frontiers of 1941, and the 'secret' promises given to the Poles in London that the frontiers of 1939 would be restored. The Ministry claimed that the demands for the restoration of the pre-war frontiers were irreconcilable with Anglo-American promises to Moscow and that the Poles were now in 'sharp conflict with London and Washington'. Germany accused Britain of betraying the Polish people, reminding them that 'Once upon a time, Britain praised the Poles and gave them guarantees against Germany; today she is willing to sell the Poles to the Soviets'. Reflecting the concerns in Britain about the seriousness of the situation and the way in which British principles were now being questioned, German propaganda claimed that 'in a sense Poland has become a test case for the moral reliability of English-Soviet relations as Allies. For England, Poland was nothing but an insignificant piece on her chessboard of world politics'.<sup>50</sup> Britain stood accused of sacrificing 'the very country which was the first to be sent to the battlefields to fight for British interests. Confronted with a dilemma she must commit herself to the betrayal of Europe or she must start preparing at once for a war with her present Bolshevik ally, her future foe and enemy of tomorrow'.<sup>51</sup>

Goebbels used the failure of the West to provide a second front as evidence of the way in which Britain was still an enemy of Russia. He gave voice to Russian fears, claiming that the West was unwilling to come to Russia's aid in the hope that Germany and Russia would exhaust each other before a second front could be launched and before she would have to commit British soldiers to the war in Europe. In an article in *Das Reich* he insisted that 'It is well known that in England there exist influential circles which had imagined that the war in the East would result not in the victory of either side but in the gradual bleeding to death of both sides. These people

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid. For week 28.2.43-7.3.43.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid. For week 8.3.43 - 14.3.43.

desire the predominance of the Bolsheviks no more than that of the Germans'.<sup>52</sup> 'England has lost her freedom of action - Churchill has made Britain into an auxiliary state of Bolshevism.. The gravedigger of the Empire is becoming the gravedigger of the United Kingdom itself'.

The Ministry of Propaganda's efforts to prove that America planned to push Britain from her position of influence was illustrated with the argument Britain was using up her Navy and merchant shipping whilst the USA was expanding civil aviation and 'nursing' her transport vessels and building a 'gigantic fleet'. Britain was reminded that although 'London used to imagine US rule could be limited to the Pacific. The USA was out for all the seas, even the waters around India and Australia'.<sup>53</sup> The war, it was argued, had meant a considerable loss of influence in world politics and economics and Britain was warned that the 'USA and the Soviet Union will decide which of the two is to play a leading role in Europe'.<sup>54</sup> The officers also noted that 'considerable prominence' was given to an article by Kingsbury Smith in the *Readers Digest* in which he claimed that Gibraltar and Suez should no longer belong to Britain alone, and that the protective customs barriers of the British Empire must be removed. This, for the Ministry of Propaganda, was enough to confirm that America had plans to take over the Empire, and that 'Roosevelt's demands for British Empire bases makes this perfectly clear'.<sup>55</sup>

The possibility of a negotiated peace between Germany and Russia was raised once more in March with a suggestion from the German Section that 'evidence of the existence of this feeling cannot be ignored'.<sup>56</sup> Information available suggested that 'certain German officers in Paris' had repeated rumours that Germany had asked for

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid. For week 14.3.43 - 21.3.43.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. For week 28.2.43 - 7.3.43.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid. For week 14.3.43 - 21.3.43.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

an armistice with Russia, and that Russia had refused. Additionally, prior to the battle of El Alamein in October 1942, London had received reports of rumours amongst German troops in Egypt that Hitler had already rejected a request by Stalin for an armistice. A German airman in North Africa, who according to the intelligence officer, was a 'qualified Nazi' had expressed the view that Russians would be ready to make peace when they had occupied Czechoslovakia and Poland. A report, believed to be 'reliable', confirmed that a 'relatively unimportant proportion of Germans were consoling themselves with the hope that the Russians would be ready to conclude peace after recapturing the greater part of the territory she had lost'. The intelligence officers ended this survey by stating that 'these latter two pieces of evidence should be set against - though they do not of course outweigh - the much stronger evidence of the German fear of occupation by Russia in case of defeat'.<sup>57</sup> The recognition of the possibility of another Russo-German pact is clear from the reports, and the German Section was not inclined to dismiss it out of hand.

The reports of the murders in the Katyn Forest which appeared in the Weekly Reports included the details of a campaign identified as 'one of the most sudden and intense in German home propaganda since the war began' with newspaper articles, news items, special talks, bulletins focused on the murder of Poles in the Katyn Forest.<sup>58</sup> Enormous stress was laid on the horrors of the dead, and German propaganda accused the Alliance of a 'conspiracy of silence', occasionally interrupted by the 'stammering denials of Moscow and London', and the 'Kremlin Jews' who were trying to make the European people believe that the Germans were responsible. The intelligence officers believed that the amount of propaganda surrounding this was due to at least four current problems facing the Nazi regime. The first was the need to increase support for Germany as the shield against the Bolshevik danger; the second was to rouse the feelings of Poles at home and abroad and create more problems for the Alliance; the third was to incriminate England and the USA (who were portrayed as handing over Europe to a similar fate and powerless to protect their allies anyway);

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. For week 12.4.43 - 18.4.43.

and finally to produce qualms amongst the Western Powers.<sup>59</sup> They also commented, sarcastically, that 'In the interests of truth and humanity the German authorities were suddenly eager to do anything for the Poles' and had set up an enquiry to look into the murders. The officers predicted that the Ministry would use this as evidence of the excesses of the Red Army as a vital part of their campaign to eliminate any pro-Russian tendencies amongst the German people and to re-inforce the message that they must continue with the war, or suffer the same fate as the Poles at Katyn. However, whilst the German Section was correct in their analysis of this, the very fact that this amount of energy and time was given to this issue suggest that the elements of truth carried within German propaganda were arousing some anxiety within the PWE. The facts were that Stalin was conducting the war in Europe alone, the Red Army was liberating occupied territories and neither Britain nor America appeared to be in any position to influence Stalin in his methods.

At the beginning of May more details of the atrocity at Katyn were published in the German Press. It was estimated that twelve thousand Polish officers had been killed in either March or April, 1940 thus confirming for the Germans that the Russians were responsible. The German Section was not, however, willing to accept this interpretation and added that 'careful study (of the Protocol of the European experts involved in the Enquiry) reveals that, in fact, the experts do more to expose than to support the German accusations'.<sup>60</sup> But the events in the Katyn Forest had not eliminated talk in Germany about the possibility of a peace with Russia, and the German Section began to receive reports that talks of an 'imminent' peace with Russia were again in the forefront of public discussion in Germany.<sup>61</sup> From a 'neutral businessman living in Germany with good opportunities of contact with highly placed Germans' the German Section received information of rumours that the Germans were having conversations with the Russians who, it was believed, would be willing to negotiate a peace before the end of the year. Furthermore, it was claimed that

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid. For week 3.5.43 - 10.5.43.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. For week 10.5.43 - 16.5.43.

Stalin was now beginning to move towards the opinion of his military advisers that Russia's interests would now be best served by retiring from the war - if only to recover and refit.

The intelligence officers advised that 'even if these rumours are only designed as part of the 'war of nerves' directed against the United Nations, their actual or possible influence on German opinion is not to be disregarded'. They warned that 'to the intelligent and well-informed in Germany it may well appear that there is a much better hope of a compromise peace with a Russia exhausted by heavy casualties and the loss of its most productive industrial and agricultural districts than with the Western Powers'.<sup>62</sup> The extent to which the PWE was concerned about such a possibility is illustrated by the inclusion in the reports of a large amount of German propaganda, and importantly by their own analysis of the situation. The way in which Russia had been weakened economically and militarily as a result of the failure of the Second Front was identified by the German Section as a potentially serious problem for the Alliance partners. The intelligence officers considered that it might be responsible for bringing about the conditions under which she would make a separate peace with Germany.

In the first week of August, 1943 the intelligence officers reported that 'the most outstanding development has been the threat of a Bolshevik German-Soviet Alliance' which was mentioned by Seyss-Inquart speaking at the enrolment of the Dutch Nazi Land Army on 1st August. He had stressed the indignation in London and Washington at the setting up of the 'Free Germany' National Committee saying, 'It irritates the British and Americans to read that the German people are promised a powerful and strong, although of course Bolshevik, Germany. Dimly their intellects begin to realise that the dissolution of the Comintern was a farce, and that the Soviet Union aims at the creation of a Soviet Germany attached to the USSR - that is the creation of an immense European-Asiatic Soviet bloc as the starting-point for the Bolshevisation of

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

the world'.<sup>63</sup> The report added that this was not the first time Seyss-Inquart had threatened a Bolshevik German-Russian alliance against the West, but now there appeared to be alternative reasons. Whilst the Ministry of Propaganda has initially warned that this would be as a consequence of a German defeat, now German leaders were warning that such an alliance could be brought about by the failure of the West to come to Germany's aid in defending Europe against the East. Hoping to dissuade the West from any further action which would aid the Soviet Union, Seyss-Inquart warned that the use of the 'Free Germany' Committee by Russia was the forerunner of the type of governments which would emerge in Italy, the Balkans and other countries - in other words, the establishment of governments sponsored and supported by the Russians, rather than the Alliance agreement that governments would only be 'sympathetic' to Russian interests.

The timing of the Quebec Conference, August 18th-19th 1943, was chosen by the Ministry of Propaganda to remind the Russians of the failure of West to provide the Second Front, and to remind the West of the cost of this failure. Propaganda insisted that the 'continuous difficulties with their troublesome Moscow ally' had forced the West to surrender Europe to Stalin as compensation for the massive losses he had incurred on their behalf.<sup>64</sup> Lockhart confirms the increasing problems within the Alliance, particularly with Stalin, who was now pressing publicly and privately for a real Second Front. According to Lockhart, Stalin 'disliked the Quebec talks and already saw in the close co-operation of the British and the Americans a post-war Anglo-America grouping against Russia'.<sup>65</sup> For Lockhart the Quebec talks were important in increasing the mistrust between the East and West :

'And, as always happens when Russian susceptibilities are hurt, he (Stalin) had begun to make his own counter-moves. Freed from his fears of a German victory, he had already broken off relations with the Polish Government in London and was moving forward his own Polish

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid. For week 2.8.43 - 8.8.43.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid. For week 16.8.43 - 22.8.43.

<sup>65</sup>Lockhart, *Comes The Reckoning*. p. 256.

pawns from Moscow. Now he showed his disapproval of Quebec by demanding a joint commission of control for Italy and by withdrawing M. Maisky from London and M. Litvinov from Washington. It is true that both in Washington and London there were experts who believed that the return of the two ambassadors to Moscow was an advantage and that, as victory loomed in sight, Stalin rightly wished to have his best English and American experts at his side. But the writing on the wall, I think, was plain. If Russia were not to be brought wholeheartedly into the Anglo-American counsels, she would go her own way'.<sup>66</sup>

In September 1943 the PWE began planning propaganda and political warfare activities in support of the launch of the Second Front. But, in direct contrast to the understanding in the PWE concerning the urgent need for the Second Front Lockhart was told by Eden 'not to go too fast' which Lockhart read as a sign that the Second Front 'was still some way off', adding pessimistically, 'I foresaw trouble with the Russians'.<sup>67</sup> He suggested to Eden that Britain should follow a policy of 'putting all our cards on the table and being absolutely frank' with the Russians about the problems of the launch of the Second Front. His advice fell on deaf ears, and he became increasingly concerned that 'our post-war problems with Russia should be settled during the war, preferably while Russia still desired and needed our help, and that every postponement increased the danger of a post-war conflict between East and West'.<sup>68</sup> Lockhart lamented that Churchill and Roosevelt were more concerned with military strategic problems and the post-war problems tended to be 'relegated to a background of vague and indeterminate discussion'.<sup>69</sup>

Lockhart's pre-occupation with the lack of negotiations between London and Moscow led him to discuss the problems with Benes, President of Czechoslovakia in exile, who

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid. p. 263.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid. p. 268.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.



confirmed his fears by saying that he thought Russia would settle the German, Polish and Balkan problems by occupation before Britain was even ready to discuss them.<sup>70</sup> An intensified campaign arguing that the West had been involved in a sell-out to Stalin continued throughout the Autumn of 1943, and the Weekly Report for the week ending 18th October included an article in *Pravda* quoted by the Ministry of Propaganda. Goebbels claimed Stalin had rebuked the Allied Press for their 'speculation' on political discussions. The interpretation of the Russian position, as outlined by the Ministry of Propaganda, insisted that the Baltic States, the Balkans and Turkish control of the Straits were the main objects of Moscow's demands, to which Britain had already agreed and to which America would agree if bases in Siberia were granted. German propaganda expanded this and claimed that dissension over the Italian Government was a serious issue with no agreement being reached between London, Washington or Moscow about the type of government desired. It was reported in the German press that Vyshinski had denounced Badoglio and declared that 'his government must disappear and that there was only one feasible form of Government for Italy, the Dictatorship of the Proletariat'.<sup>71</sup>

Aware of the way in which the Ministry of Propaganda had used Alliance Conferences for their own purposes in the past, the German Section now began to anticipate the way in which Goebbels might attempt to interpret the events of the forthcoming Moscow Conference. This time however, the Nazi regime attempted to create problems for the Alliance before the Conference began. In October the German Section warned that 'some attempt is noticeable in propaganda for overseas to counter a successful end to the Conference in advance, by sowing mistrust of each partner's integrity'.<sup>72</sup> A number of pieces of propaganda were included in the report to illustrate this; one quoted a German 'expert' on Russian affairs who forecast that Moscow would refuse to accede to Anglo-American efforts to lay down a real basis for post-war co-operation; another claimed that the Americans had instigated a

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid. p. 270.

<sup>71</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/186. For week 11.10.43 - 17.10.43.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. For week 18.10.43 - 24.10.43.

whisper campaign in Turkey to allay fears of a Russian dominated government. This rumour was to inform the Turkish people that whilst the Americans would appear to accede to Russian demands this was merely to keep the Soviets in the war. America realised that Russia would be so weak after the summer that all political problems would be solved after the end of the war.<sup>73</sup> It was believed in the PWE that the Ministry of Propaganda, by publishing the alleged 'whisper campaign' by America sought to intensify the fears already existing in Moscow about the way in which the negotiations were proceeding.

The Moscow Declaration was seized upon by Goebbels as yet another illustration of the increasing weakness of Britain's position within the Alliance. According to the Ministry of Propaganda Moscow was Eden's 'Dunkirk' where Britain, 'the alleged protector of small states, had met with a major defeat'.<sup>74</sup> The German Section noted that the Ministry had used the absence of a statement on frontiers as proof that Stalin's territorial claims had been admitted. As far as the Joint Occupational Clause was concerned, the Wilhelmstrasse spokesman insisted that Stalin had only agreed because he knew that 'the only decisive point is where the Soviet Armies will be on the day of the capitulation of their enemies', warning that in any case the Soviets would not cease hostilities before they had reached the desired points in Poland, Finland, etc. According to German political commentators the 'rubber-like wording' of the Declaration was a smokescreen for Stalin's confidence in the revolutionaries in all European countries who would eventually introduce Popular Front governments as they had in Italy.<sup>75</sup> Furthermore, according to the Ministry of Propaganda, Britain and America was aware that once the 'red rebellion' was let loose in Europe's capitals, the decisions taken by the London Commission would not be able to stop it.

The view again was exactly what Lockhart had been concerned about and which the intelligence officers in their reports covering the advance of the Red Army into Europe appear to support.

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid. For week 1.11.43-8.11.43

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

Whilst the intelligence officers recognised accurately the reasons for the themes adopted by the Ministry of Propaganda, and the way in which German interests would ultimately be served by the break-up of the Alliance it is unlikely that the accuracy of the reflection of British thinking on the subject of Anglo-Soviet relations was not also apparent. The increasing amount of information included in the reports testifies to the pre-occupation within the German Section, as does Lockhart's emphasis on his fears about the future in the way that Stalin was reacting to the way in which communications and negotiations between East and West were conducted.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the intelligence officers began to take more seriously the overtures being made by Moscow to the German people in the Free Germany campaign. The possibility of a 'negotiated peace' which was apparently being offered in Russian propaganda was considered serious enough to warrant analysis of its potential for success. The intelligence officers noted that the impact on German public opinion seemed favourable and that 'a striking number of independent sources agree that in certain Party circles there is now a trend towards the plan of a compromise with Russia... and that rumour names Himmler and Ribbentrop in this connection'.<sup>76</sup> A report received in London claimed that 'actual contact had been made (at Stockholm or elsewhere) and that negotiations had got as far as discussing future frontiers'. One of the factors considered by the German Section which might influence public opinion in this way was that the Anglo-American bombing raids were now a negative factor against the West and a positive factor in favour of the East with people in Germany saying that 'the Russians do not do such terrible things'. The need to monitor the possible change in attitudes towards the Western Powers and to Russia and the way in which the bombing raids might be having a potentially disastrous counter-effect in Germany continued. Reports concerning public opinion appeared to show that that these raids were now pushing German opinion into the hands of the Russians and that the pro-Russian feeling now being expressed was discussed in terms of the Anglo-American principal mode of warfare which was bombing innocent civilians whilst the Russians 'fight like good

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid. For week 18.10.43 - 24.10.43.

soldiers'.<sup>77</sup> The same source also claimed that the German working class were now 'definitely pro-Soviet'. The intelligence officers continued that 'the best evidence continues to suggest that the first desire of the average German is still to 'keep the Russians out of Germany' ... at the same time the continued Russian advance seems to be stimulating some 'wishful thinking' about Russian intentions'. This 'wishful thinking' was reported to come from commercial and financial circles in north-west Germany who believed that 'the Russians would not damage German towns or factories, because they hoped to use German machinery and personnel to rebuild the devastated areas of their own country. This opinion is widespread and persistent .. together with the alternative hope that the Western Powers will prevent Russian occupation'.<sup>78</sup> The officers were increasingly concerned that the policy of Unconditional Surrender was working against the West and possibly in favour of Russia who, it appeared, was offering a 'hope clause' which Churchill refused to even contemplate when approached by the PWE early in 1944.<sup>79</sup>

A further sign of the concern within the PWE about Russian intentions was the inclusion of information about the exact locations of the Red Army, their military manoeuvres and, as we have seen, the methods adopted by Russia in liberating the occupied territories. This information contributed to the overall picture of the presence of Russia in Europe, and at the beginning of 1944 the advance of the Red Army over the old Polish frontier brought Poland once more to the top of the political agenda in Britain. The German Section advised on the way in which the Ministry of Propaganda interpreted events, and reported that German propaganda was concerned to show the Russian disregard for the position of her Allies. The supposed evidence for this was the fact that Poland was only being discussed in London and Washington since Stalin had long since given up any pretence of doing so.<sup>80</sup> However, German

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid. For week 22.11.43 - 28.11.43.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> See Chapter Four.

<sup>80</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/186. For week 3.1.44 - 9.1.44.

propaganda inferred that the West was also in the process of disengaging itself from the problems of Poland and that 'A particularly base game is being played in London - the sacrificing of the so-called Polish emigre clique, the oldest protege of British policy. Nobody talks any longer about the guarantee of Poland for which Britain allegedly went to war'.<sup>81</sup> For the Ministry of Propaganda, the position of America on the issue of Poland was seen as a promising weak point which could also be used to damage the Anglo-American relationship. German propaganda insisted that 'the development of the Russo-Polish conflict is watched with growing annoyance in the USA ... and that the Russo-Czechoslovakian Treaty had not been received favourably in Washington and was being seen as a return to the old system of alliances and buffer states.(emphasis as in original)<sup>82</sup> The Ministry warned Britain that should Moscow continue along this line, reaction in the USA might grow strong and 'might result in the USA again turning away from a European policy'.(emphasis as in original)

Once more the problem of the Second Front was raised, followed by an accusation of double crossing by the West. In a radio broadcast from Radio Athens propaganda argued that 'the Allies expect to fool the Soviets ... Britain is a snake and wants to betray Russia first and Germany afterwards. The betrayal would come with the exhaustion of the two main adversaries ... The British expect to win by bluffing; but gossips say that a Second Front will never be opened, in order to prevent the delivery of Europe to the Kremlin'.(emphasis as in original)<sup>83</sup>

In his New Year Speech in January 1944, Goebbels proclaimed that Britain 'imagines she is pulling the strings, but actually she herself is being driven ... and will emerge from the war completely impoverished ... The British Empire is rotting whilst still alive'.<sup>84</sup> That she was 'no longer in the picture' and had no say in the future of

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid. For week 10.1.44 - 16.1.44.

Europe was clear, according to Goebbels, by the failure to deal with Russia in relation to the Polish question. Alleged proof of this was provided in a quotation from a *Tass* statement of 11th January, 1944 which, according to German propaganda, amounted to the proclamation of a Soviet Poland. Moscow had denounced the Polish emigre government in London and identified itself with the Polish patriots in Moscow, headed by Wanda Wassilewska. The creation of a Soviet-Poland like the Soviet-Czechoslovakia was intended as the springboard for further Soviet aspirations in the West and 'Moscow's aim continues to be the establishment of a Soviet world. Poland is to be a stage from which the Bolshevik snowball may roll on further'.<sup>45</sup> The Polish question continued into the next week with the Propaganda Ministry now making the most of the situation, claiming that the Polish people themselves were looking towards the Nazi authorities to save them from the Soviets.<sup>46</sup>

The fate of Poland was used to warn those in Europe who thought Britain might come to their aid that the idea was an illusion. News items claimed that Stalin had refused USA mediation in Poland, and the failure to discuss the Polish frontier had created 'real differences between London and Moscow'.<sup>47</sup> Whilst the problem of Poland continued to plague the Alliance, the intelligence officers began to try to estimate, from information received the possibility of a change of German public opinion in favour of a separate peace with either Russia or the West. The evidence to hand appeared to show that there was support for both, and the officers commented that those who preferred a peace with the Western Powers were the 'more balanced' military men together with all those who genuinely feared 'Bolshevism'. But, the report also noted that peace with Russia was favoured by a considerable number of professional officers and also Party members, including Gestapo officials, all of whom believed there would be a place for them in a Communist Germany. They did not believe that such opportunities would be available in any 'peace with the West. Reports suggested that the military men had been influenced by the 'Free Germany'

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid. For week 17.1.44 - 23.1.44.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. For week 24.1.44 - 30.1.44.

broadcasts from Moscow, particularly by the emphasis on the bombing raids of the West. However, the intelligence officers believed that this propaganda was designed to come to 'Anglo-Saxon ears' in the hope that it might influence the abandonment of the air-bombing. The report concluded that there was no indication of expectation of a compromise with either East or West, 'the question at issue is only the academic one, on which side would compromise be preferable, if circumstances made it necessary to compromise and choice were possible'.<sup>88</sup>

Just eight weeks before the opening of the long-promised Second Front the German Section noticed that the Ministry of Propaganda was going to even greater lengths to prove Allied rivalry, using a description of a 'fierce quarrel' over Saudi Arabian oil which had broken out between America and Britain as just one instance of the 'squabbling' over raw materials. This, for the Ministry of Propaganda, proved a) the falsity of alleged democratic aims b) US predatory imperialism and c) British helplessness and her growing fear of losing the war whatever happens.<sup>89</sup> Britain was warned that US trade policy was damaging to Europe because the sole aim was to capture Europe as a market for trading goods in order to prevent unemployment in America. Details of a trade agreement between Moscow and Washington were brushed aside as American naivety with a warning that 'only a people like the Americans, whose greed overrides their reason, could believe that the Soviets, in the event of their victory, would deliver gigantic quantities of raw materials to strengthen their only rival for world domination'<sup>90</sup>. An alleged interview with a captured Soviet soldier was used in German propaganda, and quoted in the Weekly Report at the beginning of May in which he was said to have stated that 'if we succeed in vanquishing Germany, we shall start our war against England. England is full of old traditions which cannot but interfere with a revolution like ours ... In future there will only be two dominating Powers in the world, each in its own hemisphere - the USA and Soviet Russia. Moscow would not be satisfied with a British partnership in the

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid. For week 21.2.44 - 27.2.44.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid. For week 10.4.44 - 16.4.44.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

European business'.<sup>91</sup>

By this time the German Section was becoming increasingly interested in the 'Free Germany' propaganda originating from Moscow, the intentions behind it and the way in which this was being received in Germany. The German Section believed that the shift in public opinion towards Russia and away from Britain was as a result of an increasing belief in Germany of Britain's weakness relative to Soviet strength, and admitted that 'it would not be an unnatural consequence of the contrast between the continuing relentless Russian advance and the apparent failure (up to now) of the Anglo-American operations in Italy'.<sup>92</sup> The report added that the Germans were 'particularly impressed by manifestations of strength' and concluded that 'this might be expected to encourage a certain 'pro-Russian' trend in German opinion, in the form both of more or less a grudging admiration of Russia and also of preparation to make the best of a possible Russian victory'. Considering the effect of the bombing raids and the existing conditions in Germany the intelligence officers advised that the situation now might lead 'many to feel that they and their children have no longer anything to lose, and perhaps even something to gain from a 'Bolshevik' civilization'. Added to this the beliefs stimulated by the 'Free Germany' campaign and the 'Union of German Officers' broadcasts from Moscow were assuring the German people that 'Russia, unlike the Western Powers, would not insist upon Unconditional Surrender and the demilitarisation of Germany'.<sup>93</sup>

Further confirmation of the increasing pro-Russian tendency in Germany was given by the strenuous efforts made by the Ministry of Propaganda to counter the 'Free Germany' propaganda. This began with an announcement by Rosenberg that the 'ideological training subject for the Reich for 1944/45 was to be 'Bolshevism - ideology and reality' and in which he stated that 'Bolshevism is undoubtedly a tremendous phenomenon of our day ... Hundreds of questions put by our soldiers in

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid. For week 1.5.44 - 8.5.44.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid. For week 8.5.44 - 14.5.44.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.



view of their experience in the East show the necessity of revising all former fundamental ideas'.(emphasis as original)<sup>94</sup> The intelligence officers surmised that the unprecedented amount of propaganda and the political programme of re-education was due to the very real fears within the Nazi regime about changing public opinion towards Russia. They concluded that 'he (Rosenberg) and his school are faced with an ideological crisis due to the blatant contrast between their 'old' picture of Bolshevik inferiority and the actual Russian achievements now being observed by the German people'.<sup>95</sup> The German Section identified the problem facing the Nazi regime and concluded that 'the belief which it is considered particularly necessary to counter is one which has been mentioned in German home propaganda before - that Russian Bolshevism has recently changed its character, ceased to be international and revolutionary and has become nationalistic and respectable. Recent constitutional changes within the USSR have clearly made a considerable impression within Germany'.<sup>96</sup> Ironically, within two years the same problem would be facing the British government, who had successfully influenced British public opinion towards a pro-Russian tendency during the Alliance.<sup>97</sup>

The concern within the PWE of a Russo-German rapprochement was heightened after the attempt on Hitler's life in the July 1944 plot when reports began coming into the Executive that some of those involved in the plot had also been in contact with Russia. Information suggested that both Seydlitz and Einsiedel were working with Stalin and the 'Free Germany' Committee in Moscow and that they also had links with the conspirators in the Reich to overthrow Hitler. It was also reported that the final stage of the coup would be the negotiation of an Alliance with Stalin.<sup>98</sup> The

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup>See Alan J. Foster. 'The British Press and the Origins of the Cold War'. Unpublished Ph.d Thesis. Open University, 1987.

<sup>98</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/186. For week 31.7.44 - 7.8.44.

amount of information coming into the PWE, the details contained in the reports all suggested to the intelligence officers that perhaps the 'Free Germany' Campaign was more than propaganda. During the Summer of 1944 when the campaign was attracting a good deal of attention within the German Section, Lockhart attempted to bring about some co-operation between Russia and Britain on political warfare issues. It would, of course, be useful to the PWE for some co-operation with Russia not least because they might have been able to discover exactly what was behind the Russian campaign. Unfortunately it was to be a very short-lived affair, ending acrimoniously. Lockhart describes how the analysis of German propaganda and policy Directives for propaganda from the PWE were shared with the Russians for the month of August, 1944<sup>99</sup>. He also states that he acted as interpreter to M. Saskin and General Vassiliev at the Anglo-American weekly policy meeting in order to get the Russians 'to co-operate with us generally in propaganda to Germany'.<sup>100</sup> However, after just one month the Russians failed to turn up at a meeting and also failed to keep an appointment to visit the various establishments of the BBC. Eventually Lockhart discovered that both men had been recalled to Moscow. The reason for the recall was given in a 'blast' from M. Lozovsky, the head of the Russian propaganda services, who had been informed that the analysis of German propaganda had contained a statement that Himmler was now advocating a separate peace with Russia. According to Lockhart the Russians took this as an insult, and had immediately withdrawn their co-operation. As far as Lockhart was concerned it was also a turning point in relations between East and West :

'Doubtless, the Russians had now made up their minds to go their own way. They had already taken their own line in Rumania and in Bulgaria and, although M. Mikolajczyk had at last made the journey to Moscow, a Russian-sponsored Polish Government was already in being in the Russian capital. In the absence of any agreed post-war plans for Europe it was clear that the new frontiers would be established not by treaty, but by the limits of the line of advance of the

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<sup>99</sup>Lockhart, *Comes The Reckoning*. p. 324.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

Allied armies'.<sup>101</sup>

Having 'taken their own line' throughout the liberated territories in Europe the possibility of the same thing occurring in Germany was obviously something high on the priority list within the PWE. The intelligence officers studied closely the 'Free Germany' propaganda and compared the current feelings towards Russia with their knowledge of German public opinion towards Russia prior to the Nazi's seizure of power.<sup>102</sup> The conclusions they reached are interesting and offer an example of the way in which the discussions and thinking about National-Socialism and Communism in the PWE begin to merge : 'Just as before 1933 there was a certain tendency for Communists in Germany to go over to National-Socialism, so now many National-Socialists may well feel leanings towards Communism, when it has on its side the prestige of approaching victory'.<sup>103</sup> This, according to the intelligence officers was because of the differing perceptions and understanding of 'Communism' in Germany who commented that 'it must be remembered that for most young Germans brought up under National-Socialism, Communism (that is to say, Communism as they understand it, namely a ruthless dictatorship exercised in the interests of the unproportioned social classes) is a much more intelligible political creed than Liberal Democracy with its incomprehensible values of personal liberty and freedom of thought'. In the same report the intelligence officers quoted an article in the *Journal de Geneve* in which a high German official had said that the acceptance of Bolshevism was a possible way out of the present difficult position. Although the war may have been lost, politically Germany might have a way out though an understanding with the Russians and 'efforts are being made to induce the Fuhrer to adopt these tactics'.(emphasis as in original)<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid. p. 325.

<sup>102</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/187. For week 21.8.44 - 27.8.44.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

By the Autumn of 1944 the accumulation of evidence a pro-Russian tendency in German public opinion, the historical and practical issues between the Alliance, the advance of the Red Army into Central Europe and the failure of the British and Americans to offer any 'hope clause' (as the Russians were doing to the German people) led the German Section to conclude that there existed a potentially serious situation. With the first crossings of the Reich frontier in the middle of September, 1944 they looked for the first signs of reaction amongst the German population to a war on German soil. The possibility that Germany would negotiate a peace when the Red Army had crossed into Germany territory could not be discounted, particularly in view of the evidence available that seemed to indicate a large cross-section of the German people were asking for peace, might have a 'grudging admiration' for the Russians and felt that they had nothing to lose by turning to the East.

This period was also the beginning of the period about which Dick Crossman had written to Lockhart with details of the way in which the Germans were being badly treated by the Allied troops and in which he warned the Foreign Office that the German people 'will turn to the East'.<sup>105</sup> However, it appeared from the first reports coming from Germany that this was now unlikely, and under the heading 'Anglo-American Occupation Welcomed' the Weekly Report for the week ending 18th September, 1944 began 'At last the first signs are appearing of the expected reaction to a simultaneous approach of Anglo-American forces to Germany's western, and of Russian forces to her eastern frontier - namely the tendency (at least in bourgeois circles) to welcome the "civilized" Anglo-Saxons as a safeguard against the Russian "barbarians"'.<sup>106</sup>

At the end of September the German Section included in their report a 'flood of items' on the press and wireless which gave a 'detailed and terrifying picture of "Soviet terror" in Finland where the "Ogpu executioners" were already at work to exterminate all "nationally conscious" Finns. It was alleged that regular man-hunts

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<sup>105</sup> 'Letter to Lockhart from Crossman', 20th December 1944. PRO/FO371/46729.

<sup>106</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/187. For week 11.9.44 - 18.9.44.

were made to prepare for mass deportations of workers to Siberia and that the population was facing economic ruin, starvation and misery; the Bolsheviks interpreted the dictate just as they wished'.<sup>107</sup> According to German propaganda Bulgaria and Rumania provided similar object lessons of Bolshevik 'terror', while reports of conditions in France, Belgium and Italy showed that Anglo-American occupation was just as bad.

At the end of October the intelligence officers included in their report even more information of atrocity stories of the 'Bolshevik' torture of the East Prussians. But they added sceptically that 'much of it is a rehash of that formerly used' with accounts of murder 'in practically every case as the result of a shot in the nape of the neck, rape, arson, looting etc.' They commented that the propaganda campaign now instigated had been stepped up to 'an hitherto unprecedented level', with alarmist stories such as : 'The Bolshevik object was not merely to kill everything in Germany, but to torture their victims beyond description; Soviet Beasts rage in East Prussian Border Area; and Beasts in Human Guise'.<sup>108</sup>

At the beginning of November the PWE received reports from Germany that the talk in Germany was that Russia no 'longer bothered' to discuss either the Morgenthau Plan nor the division of Germany into zones which was being discussed in America and Britain.<sup>109</sup> Again, the central theme of Nazi propaganda was the way in which Stalin was disregarding the West and making his own plans and gaining vital ground in Europe. German propaganda warned the West that Russia did not intend to destroy Germany but to 'Bolshevize' her in order to gain the 80,000,000 Germans would then form a 'gigantic reservoir' of organisers, technicians, keyworkers and engineers. The intelligence officers commented that 'this threat of a Communist German-Russian bloc has been made before, in Holland and in private in an address to Military Commanders when Allied bombing had been singled out as paving the way for the

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid. For week 25.9.44 - 1.10.44.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid. For week 23.10.44 - 29.10.44

<sup>109</sup> Ibid. For week 30.10.44 - 5.11.44.

Communization of Germany'. Furthermore the Report also noted that a 'live interest in Germany in the internal conditions in Russia and the familiar German respect for power and success was evident, alongside the absence of similar interests in America or Britain'.<sup>110</sup>

Another added complication for the PWE in their attempts to anticipate German-Russian relations arose in the middle of November when news of the formation of a 'Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia' was announced by General Vlasov. The intelligence officers believed that this could be important to the German people since it offered a potentially new and powerful ally in their fight against Bolshevism (and the West). The Nazi regime argued that this was indeed the 'final proof' of the reality of the Bolshevik tyranny -that if millions of Russians had joined in the fight against the 'Bolshevik terror' who felt themselves in 'mortal peril' this confirmed the peril to the German people. Together they could beat Bolshevism. The Ministry of Propaganda made every effort to impress upon the German people that this was an event of 'utmost importance', and that the new Russia with a National-Socialist type of government is to be a permanent ally of the Reich. The German people were told that 'the tasks which have to be fulfilled by the Russian people can be solved in an alliance with Germany. The interests of the Russian people link with those of the Germans'.(emphasis as original)<sup>111</sup> Interpreting this propaganda the intelligence officers noted the 'grandiose claim' of 'millions' and that the propaganda was to play an important part in clearing Hitler of guilt and folly in attacking Russia. Propaganda stressed that the liberation movement in Russia had been in latent existence for many years, and it was only Germany's championship of the anti-Bolshevik cause which enabled it to take shape. Propaganda for the Slav satellites claimed that 'the immediate aim of General Vlasov, who already has the support of thirty Generals, is to raise a formidable army ... it will exceed 1,000,000'and the point was emphasized that the political programme was national and socialist.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid. For week 13.11.44 - 19.11.44.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

This change in policy by the Ministry of Propaganda was attributed by the German Section to Himmler, who was reported to have addressed a telegram of congratulations to the Committee at the inaugural meeting in Prague. Additionally the intelligence officers identified that the two prominent SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Frank and Lorrenz who had attended the meeting were both Himmler's 'men'. But, the German Section also believed that Himmler's changed attitude towards the Slav peoples may have been the his recognition that 'desperate remedies' were now called for. In considering Vlasov's political programme the PWE commented that 'It is clearly his own programme, quite untouched by German 'New Order' ideas but rather Liberal-Democratic in tendency, insisting upon 'the institution of real religious freedom, freedom on conscience, freedom of assembly and freedom of the press and the inviolability of the individual'. However, they also noted that the 'typical Slav conceit' of which Himmler complained in 1943 still remained. The intelligence report concluded that the principal motive behind this new policy was one of manpower shortage. Himmler was acutely aware of the 'alarming lack of reliable physically fit men' and in appearing to support Vlasov he would instantly have a huge number of Russians who would be utilised as mercenary forces in the war against Russia and the West. Many of these Russians had been in Germany for nearly three and a half years, deprived of all links with the homeland and would have been 'persuaded' that Stalin regarded them as deserters anyhow. But the intelligence officers also noted that more than practical realities may have been responsible for Himmler's actions. Pointing out that Himmler, of all the leaders in the Reich, was the one who would have been willing to come to terms with Stalin (even if it included a partial Bolshevisation of Germany) the officers believed that since the Russians failed to meet him in this he was now seeking to avenge himself on Stalin by using Vlasov and his Committee.<sup>113</sup>

Events outside Germany brought the attention of the PWE back to the emerging problems between Russia and Britain over the question of Greece. In October British parachute troops had landed in Greece to liberate the whole of the Peloponnese and,

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

in previous talks with Stalin, Churchill insisted on a major British influence there. But during December it began to look increasingly likely that the agreement that Churchill had reached with Stalin was about to be broken. Greek Communist forces who had been active as anti-German guerilla forces were now taking control and Churchill intervened in order to ensure that there would be no Communist-led government in Greece as had happened in Poland. The intelligence officers commented that the Ministry of Propaganda was finding it extremely hard to handle this to their advantage, since previously propaganda had insisted that only Germany could withstand the Bolshevik forces. Turning the focus away from British strength the conflict over Greece was used to illustrate the way in which British policy had changed and Churchill was now 'denouncing the Communist type of democracy' and that Britain intended to fight these 'second-class democrats' after having armed them. Acknowledging the emerging conflict between East and West the PWE noted that the Wilhelmstrasse was now being cautious on the 'disunity' theme unwilling to commit itself further until the extent of Anglo-Bolshevik divergence was clear from Moscow's reaction to Churchill's denunciation of the Communists in Belgium, Italy and Greece was known.<sup>114</sup>

Churchill's determination to retain a strong British presence in Greece had, once more, brought home to the PWE the problems between Stalin and the West on policy for the liberated territories. At the end of 1944 the problems of the previous months as reported in the Weekly Reports identify several issues now uppermost in the minds of the intelligence officers in the Executive. The anxiety about the possibility of a Russo-German Alliance had increased, the military and political occupation of liberated countries had proved to be extremely difficult, and the problems over Poland and Greece all appeared to point to even greater problems at the end of the war. The German Press was not slow to take advantage of the cleavage over Greece, and at the end of the year used this to underline the weakness of the British position. Greece was described in German propaganda as:

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<sup>114</sup> Ibid.



'the scene of the first great actual clash between British and Soviet interests, a clash with such magnitude, fierceness and potential developments as had never been experienced since the inception of the Anglo-Soviet coalition...A vital expression of the fundamental contradiction of interests between the two countries'.<sup>115</sup>

Reviewing the situation at the beginning of 1945 Lockhart ironically mirrored and agreed with the feelings of the Ministry of Propaganda:

'Although victory was now only a question of months, victory itself settled nothing. What mattered was the new world that would emerge from it... The picture was not bright. True, nearly all occupied Europe had been freed, and in Germany the certainty of victory had now given way to scarcely concealed feelings of despair. But in the liberated countries the Germans had left behind them a legacy of famine and distress, and in the economic chaos new forces had arisen which threatened to turn the international war into a social war. To the countries of South-Eastern and Central Europe the Russians, both by the magnitude of their war effort and by their geographical proximity, had appeared not only as liberators but as the architects of their destiny.

And in the small nations the feeling that their security depended on an alliance with Russia was stronger than their fear of Communism... It was abundantly manifest that without a clear-cut understanding with Russia on the future shape of Europe there could be no peace'.<sup>116</sup>

January 1945 began with more information for the PWE about Moscow's 'Free Germany' Committee. The intelligence officers reported a change of attitude in the business community in Germany which appeared to contradict earlier information, and now suggested that businessmen pinned their hopes on Great Britain since it was acknowledged in Germany that the economic ruin of Germany would be contrary to the interests of Britain. Therefore they expected British assistance (even more than American) in post-war reconstruction. Further information pointing to the change of

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid. For week 27.12.44 - 31.12.44.

<sup>116</sup> Lockhart, *Comes The Reckoning*. p. 336.

mood away from the pro-Russian tendency was also included in the report in which the intelligence officers interestingly illustrate their own anticipations of Russian intentions in Germany. Having discussed the pro-British tendency in the German business community the report adds that 'meanwhile, the SS, said to have shown pro-Russian tendencies and a disposition to talk of an alliance with Russia ... is now disillusioned, believing at last that the Russians really intend to put SS men to forced labour reconstructing the devastated areas'.(emphasis as in original)<sup>117</sup>

As the Red Army moved forward into Europe the German Section reported that the German Army now had to admit that Lodz and Cracow were lost and that Warsaw had been evacuated. German propaganda moved quickly to turn the events around, warning the British that Stalin's offensive was aimed at forcing his Allies to accept Russian demands on the strength of his military achievements. Furthermore, it was used by Goebbels to argue that Stalin had chosen his time when the British and American forces had been 'considerably weakened by the German offensive. This means that Stalin is not out to win the war with his Allies, but alone and he would see how far he got before meeting Churchill and Roosevelt. The danger was that he might conquer Germany alone'.<sup>118</sup> This was exactly what the West feared, and the weekly reports contained information now on the military position of the Red Army and how fast they were moving and noted that the last day of January, 1945 was 'the turning point in the desperate effort to halt the Red Army at the Oder before Frankfurt and Berlin'.<sup>119</sup> The PWE now reported that the Red Army were regrouping and consolidating prior to renewing the assault, whilst German propaganda contained the warning that 'Berlin was ready for battle' and included what the officers described as the 'alarming phrase' that 'The Soviets are knocking at the gates of the City'.<sup>120</sup> As the Red Army entered Brandenburg Province and the loss of Upper Silesia became

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<sup>117</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/187. For week 8.1.45 - 14.1.45.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid. For week 15.1.45 - 21.1.45.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid. For week 22.1.45 - 28.1.45.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid. For week 29.1.45 - 4.2.45.

known the PWE considered once more the possibility of a German capitulation. They concluded that what might develop was a German demand for some sort of accommodation with the Western Allies in order to 'set her free to resist the Russian advance'.<sup>121</sup> The intelligence officers warned that 'it must be remembered that such talks have no influence on the German government, which is not dependent on public opinion like a parliamentary government'. What is interesting is not the conclusions about the influence of such talks but that the intelligence officers considered it a possibility at all. The policy of Unconditional Surrender announced in January 1943 had explicitly rejected any compromise or even a discussion on the possibility. The contents of the Weekly Reports and correspondence between the PWE and the Foreign Office confirm the continued interest and desire to re-assess this policy.

The concern in Whitehall about the 'Free Germany' Committee and propaganda brought the matter onto the Agenda of the JIC's meeting on 16th January, 1945.<sup>122</sup> An Annexe attached to the Minutes entitled 'German Generals in British Hands', shows that the Director of Military Intelligence requested that the Chiefs of Staff should be informed of the tentative discussions which had so far taken place with some of the German Generals in British hands. From the Minutes it is clear that the 'discussions' were centred on the way in which Moscow's 'Free Germany' Committee had obviously influenced these generals. From the 'discussions' it appeared that some of the generals would be prepared to act in an advisory capacity to SHAEF. They also believed that until a collapse happened, no local attempt to win over German commanders would succeed. The Minutes also contain the information that what the generals most wanted was a plan on a large scale to win over the Wehrmacht on all fronts, as well as within the Reich. The Director of Military Intelligence suggested 'that the time had come to get the Russians to explain the policy underlying the Seidlitz movement and their plans for its future'. He suggested that the next meeting of the Heads of Government might afford the opportunity to 'tackle the Russians on this point and the attitude of some of the German generals in the United Kingdom

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> PRO/CAB 81/93 JIC (45) Fourth Meeting (0) 16th January, 1945.

might provide a ground of approach'. The Chairman, Cavendish-Bentinck suggested that the Sub-Committee should submit a note to the Chiefs of Staff explaining what had been happening, suggested that the position should be discussed as the next Conference 'enquiries should be made at the highest level about the Seidlitz movement'. It is clear that the JIC were concerned about the possibility of the Russians making approaches to the German commanders on the Eastern Front.

Colonel Rawlinson (War Office) reported that the generals had also suggested that the approach to Rundstedt should be made through British Secret Service channels, whilst a simultaneous approach to all German commanders should be made by broadcasts and all other possible means. It seems from this report that the JIC were considering the possibility of using the German generals in Britain to persuade Germany to surrender. The Minutes of the meeting suggest that the German generals in Britain did not suggest an approach but discussed 'the' approach to Rundstedt.

The anxiety about Russia had now turned into undisguised distrust, and Cavendish-Bentinck referred to the Seidlitz movement and said 'that it would not surprise him if, as soon as the Russians had taken some large town in Germany, they were to set up a national government, as they had done in Hungary; and perhaps, also produce anti-Nazi German troops'. Major General Stewart Menzies (MI6), also agreed that the Seidlitz movement was not a 'propaganda stunt' and that 'it was important to discover the Russian intentions with regard to it'.<sup>123</sup>

On 1st February, 1945 with the Red Army less than fifty miles away from Berlin the city was declared a Fortress City, and just three days later Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill met at Yalta to discuss the problems of a post-war Europe and particularly those of Poland. The worry for the Nazi regime was that the Alliance would decide to make an appeal to the German people over their heads.<sup>124</sup> But this did not happen and the PWE noted the relief in Germany when no such appeal was made, nor any

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<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/187. For week 5.2.45 - 11.2.45.

modification to the policy of Unconditional Surrender'<sup>125</sup>. The PWE noted that German propaganda was still attempting to sow mistrust amongst the Allies, saying that Stalin had dominated the talks. Certainly, according to Eden Yalta had been difficult. Eden noted in his memoirs that he thought 'Stalin, as a negotiator was the toughest proposition of all...Of course the man was ruthless and of course he knew his purpose'.<sup>126</sup> In negotiations concerning the liberated territories he remarked that 'Stalin's attitude to small countries struck me as grim, not to say sinister'.<sup>127</sup> On the question of Poland, Eden was depressed saying 'Worst of all was the Russian behaviour over Poland... it was apparent that the Russians did not intend to give true effect to the Yalta decisions...By the final meeting on February 5th the deadlock was complete'.<sup>128</sup>

Lockhart's view of the Conference (and all of the Conferences it seems) was equally depressing, believing that like all the others it was 'doubtless necessary and useful, but never realised the expectations which the publicity given to them aroused in the hearts of the people. They took place in an atmosphere of unreality and with no sense of time and no fixed programme except the continuous physical performance of feasting and toast-drinking'.<sup>129</sup> He was particularly sarcastic in his analysis of the failure to reach any agreement over Poland, concluding that 'once again the unfortunate Poles were to learn that it was easier to die for Poland than to live in it'.<sup>130</sup> Whilst negotiations at Yalta were continuing the Weekly Report for the first week in February also noted the influence of 'Free Germany' propaganda from the results of a small sample of opinion amongst German soldiers on the Western Front

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<sup>125</sup> Ibid. For week 11.2.45 - 17.2.45.

<sup>126</sup> Anthony Eden, *The Reckoning. The Eden Memoirs*. (London: Cassell, 1965). p. 514.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid. p. 512.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid. p. 524.

<sup>129</sup> Lockhart, *Comes The Reckoning*. p. 337.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid. p. 338.

at the beginning of January.<sup>131</sup> It was noted that in Germany the general knowledge of Moscow's 'Free Germany' Committee was widespread, along with the information that Paulus and Seydlitz had been identified as its leading members, but that on the Western Front there was 'little knowledge or interest in its programme'. However, it appeared that the soldiers on the Eastern Front did know more about it, from Russian leaflets and other propaganda, and it was reported to be a common subject of conversation in the units and even with civilians. The intelligence officers assumed that approval of the Committee and its activities would only come from 'convinced Communists (who clearly approve of the Committee because it is sponsored by the Russians) or else from elderly men who welcome anything which they think might mean a speedy end of the war'.<sup>132</sup>

The pre-occupation with Russian affairs in the JIC, Foreign Office and PWE that this was not merely propaganda continued. In February, 1945 it was discussed at a JIC meeting, and noted that Lockhart's Committee had put forward plans for using the German generals in captivity in Britain in an attempt to 'break the will of Germans to resist'.<sup>133</sup> The Director of Military Intelligence reported that the plans had been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and Colonel Rawlinson reported that the German SS Brigadier Meyer wanted to go back to Germany to use his influence to get a German surrender. The Committee agreed that the Director of Military Intelligence should select a German officer to 'swop' for General Fortune (who was very ill) and to work with the PWE on 'priming' the officer being returned. However, at a subsequent meeting of the JIC the proposals put forward by Lockhart were then rejected. The reason given was that from the proposals it 'looked as though German generals would play a leading part during and after the surrender period'. The feeling in the Committee was that Ministers would not accept this, and added that any plans for negotiations with Germany must not contravene the policy of

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<sup>131</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/187. For week 5.2.45 - 11.2.45.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> PRO/CAB 81/93 JIC (45) 11th Meeting (0) 13th February, 1945.

'Unconditional Surrender'.<sup>134</sup> The reason why the JIC considered using the German generals to influence events in Germany was closely connected, certainly in February and March, 1945 to the growing mistrust within the JIC of Stalin and the 'Free Germany' campaign. Whether the plan was to use the German generals to in a counter-attack on this propaganda is not clear, but the suspicions in Whitehall that it was in fact more than propaganda were well-founded. In fact documents in the Russian archives identify the department established in Moscow as Institut 99 - the Institut existed to recruit and train German Communists and prisoners-of-war who were then infiltrated back into Germany during the latter years of the war as part of the 'Free Germany' campaign.<sup>135</sup>

In the middle of March the German Section received new 'evidence' which had been produced in Germany to prove that Russia intended to Communize Germany. This was in the form of an alleged 'training pamphlet' which had been produced in 1942 by the Bolsheviks which argued that the Soviets were not responsible for Germany's defeat and that in certain circumstances it would fight Britain in order to protect a Soviet Germany.<sup>136</sup> The Kantian philosopher Baumgarten was also brought into the propaganda exercise, urging the Western world to awaken to their senses about the Bolshevik danger. England was warned that eventually they would see that Germany must be preserved and not destroyed in order to provide the necessary bulwark against Soviet aggression.<sup>137</sup>

Despite the rapidly deteriorating situation German propaganda continued to offer hope to the German people that Allied disunity would save them. Russian antagonism towards the Western Powers was featured regularly as were the thinly veiled appeals to the West to save Germany and themselves from the 'graveyard silence of

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<sup>134</sup> PRO/CAB 81/93 JIC (45) 17th Meeting (0) 6th March, 1945.

<sup>135</sup> Dr. Sergei Kudryashov, Editor of *Rodina*. Paper given to the British International History Conference, Leeds. 1992.

<sup>136</sup> WR[GPG] PRO/FO898/187. For week 12.3.45 - 18.3.45.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

Bolshevism'.<sup>138</sup> In desperation the Ministry of Propaganda publicised details of the Russian programme for the biological integration of German and Russian people. The alleged 'plan' was that the Soviets would import German women for the purpose of producing children with Russian fathers, who would then be brought up by the state. According to Nazi propaganda the mixture of German intelligence and Russian fanaticism would make the Soviet Union the strongest power on earth. The only comment the intelligence officers had to make on this matter was that 'the German leaders apparently presume that the Western Allies have the same racial views as themselves'.<sup>139</sup>

A new campaign by the Ministry of Propaganda was launched which claimed that the Russians were now encroaching on the American sphere of influence. According to the Wilhelmstrasse spokesman Stalin had insisted on concessions from his Anglo-US partners before the Kremlin would agree to denounce the neutrality pact with Japan. These concessions were that the Soviet Union had three special votes at the San Francisco Conference, America must recognise Russian hegemony in Central Europe and that they would also abandon all Japanese possessions on the mainland to the Soviet Union - Outer Mongolia, Manchuria and Korea.<sup>140</sup> Pondering on the desire in the German mind always to see the West as weak and the East as strong the officers in the German Section presumed this was probably because the Russians were 'brutal'.

In the final Weekly Report before the end of the war the intelligence officers detected attempts to sow discord between the Allies 'even at the last moment', presumed to be made in the hope that they might obtain an 'armistice on the Western Front which would permit all German forces to be withdrawn and thrown against the

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<sup>138</sup> Ibid. For week 19.3.45 - 25.3.45.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid. For week 26.3.45 - 1.4.45.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid. For week 2.4.45 - 8.4.45.



Russians'.<sup>141</sup> The PWE thought the Doenitz administration would attempt to save 'as many Germans as possible from Bolshevisation and enslavement',

'there can be no doubt that Doenitz and his associates are inspired by a very genuine fear of Russian "barbarism" immediately and of a growth of Communism subsequently ... But they may not really believe that they can expect immediately to win Western support for the expulsion of the Red Army from Eastern Germany... statements suggest a much more modest and immediate aim of gaining time by political and military rearguard actions to enable as many as possible of those Germans who fear 'Russian barbarity' to escape into the zone of occupation of the Western Powers'.<sup>142</sup>

The defeat of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad had marked not only the beginning of the defeat of Germany, but also the beginning of the Russian advance into Europe. The political implications of the rapidly changing military situation were recognised by the German Section who became increasingly interested in Russian conduct as the Red Army moved across the continent into Central Europe. In the same way as the 'image' of the German people was necessary for the foreign policy makers, so too was the 'image' of the Russians. Stalingrad was the turning point in East/West relations. The strained collaboration between Russia and Britain where each power understood the other as an unsavoury but vital partner entered a new phase. The aim of defeating Germany was the only one that had held the Alliance together, and after the Spring of 1943 that became a probability rather than a possibility. But the military success of the Red Army signalled the increased power and strength of Russia, which was seen in London as a potentially dangerous relative decrease in British strength and therefore a threat to the power and security of Britain.

Throughout the war the intelligence officers working in the German Section observed practical examples of that increased strength and power, witnessing the way in which the Red Army liberated and the re-occupied countries in Europe with Moscow-led governments. Events in Hungary, Poland and Greece were seen as practical examples

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<sup>141</sup> Ibid. For week 30.4.45 - 6.5.45.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

of what was increasingly being interpreted as a return by Russia to the ideological principles of world domination proclaimed in 1917. The undesirable conduct in negotiations over these countries, and Stalin's reluctance to adhere to the agreements made between the Alliance before 1943 added to this anxiety. The problems of the second front, publicised with great effect by the Ministry of Propaganda, fuelled the mistrust between East and West. When the intelligence officers began to receive information of the 'Free Germany' Committee and propaganda campaign they immediately began to consider the possible effects of this on the German people - testifying to the concerns existing at the time of Stalin's motivations and intentions in Germany. The JIC reports confirm that by 1945 it was seriously considered, in some quarters at least, that Russia had returned to the 'Bolshevik' ideology and the aggressive, expansionist style of foreign policy with a drive for global domination. The reality, as the PWE was now well aware, was that in 1944 eastern Europe was largely dominated by Russia. The accumulation of information collected in the Weekly Reports illustrated the fact that Russia's success had now destroyed the previous European balance of power and was in fact replacing it with a Russian dominated Europe. Incrementally, through 1943 and particularly 1944, the 'image' of Russia in the Weekly Reports became the image of 'bolshevism' as another potential 'enemy' alongside Germany, with the methods and ideology of Stalin being equated with those of Hitler and the Nazi regime.

The question of whether or not the intelligence reports of the PWE concerning Russia were influential or not is a difficult one. Recently released documents identify the connections between the PWE and the JIC, where the Ministry of Economic Warfare and Ministry of Information were always represented and where Lockhart also attended on specific issues. Thus it is possible to see where that the information would have a forum for discussion. The relationship between Lockhart and Eden would also have allowed him to make some contribution to the discussion surrounding Russian policy and intentions, although it is evident from Lockhart's own writings that he had little, if any influence, in Downing Street. The intelligence contained in the reports provided the Foreign Office and JIC with the changing political and social conditions in Germany and also provided the information in the context of the

Russian advances in Europe. It can be seen, therefore, that the PWE was one of the departments providing intelligence about Russia during the period that the Foreign Office was drawing conclusions of a Russian 'threat' to British interests. If the PWE were not themselves influential in forming or changing opinions about Russia, the information they provided which supported the fears and anxieties already existing in the departments in Whitehall was available and was discussed by those in the Foreign Office who were influential in formulating strategy and policy towards Russia.

### Continuity : 1943-1946.

Although the German Section produced their last Weekly Report on 6th May, 1945 this was not the end of their intelligence work, nor the end of the use of political warfare and propaganda as an instrument in British foreign policy. On 23rd February, 1945 Lockhart had written to Colonel Capel-Dunn at the War Office outlining the importance of the intelligence work of the PWE.<sup>143</sup> He pointed out that as occupied countries in Europe became liberated and established their own civil governments, responsibility for propaganda and informational services to those countries passed from the PWE to the Ministry of Information. From the nature of its responsibilities the Ministry of Information would not need to establish the type of intelligence activities which the PWE had maintained. Lockhart informed Capel-Dunn that the plan was to 'liquidate' all sectors and regions of intelligence within the PWE other than their work on Germany (including Austria) and the Germans. The consequences of this, he believed, should be considered by the JIC and its constituent members. Lockhart outlined the 'indispensable' intelligence services involved in the production of the Handbooks and Personality Files and urged that the work of this 'temporary' department be continued in a post-war government.

This was discussed at the JIC meeting on 27th February when Brigadier Peake (War

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<sup>143</sup> 'Letter to Capel-Dunn from Lockhart', 23rd February, 1945. PRO/FO898/40.

Office) responded to Lockhart's letter and told the meeting that he believed it would be 'a serious loss if the intelligence functions now performed by the PWE were allowed to lapse'.<sup>144</sup> This of course, was just around the time that Lockhart and the PWE were closely involved with the issue of the German generals and the problems of the 'Free Germany' campaign. The JIC recognised the value of the analysis of German propaganda when considering other specific issues. It is not surprising then that it was agreed by the Committee that it was necessary to preserve the Handbooks and Personality Cards and that Lockhart should be asked to provide a detailed report for consideration by the JIC.

Following this, on April 5th a memorandum from PWI entitled 'Regional Intelligence Systems: J.I.C.' which outlined the intelligence work of the PWE, stressed that the work should be taken over as a single body 'since the importance of political/social trends ... are hardly likely to diminish as a factor affecting the policies of European Governments... and as far as the department was aware, its study is still not pursued elsewhere'.<sup>145</sup> The final point in the memo was to emphasise that the main objective was to get the units taken over as a whole - 'be it by F.O.R.D. or by I.S.T.D (as trustee for a future Central Intelligence Organisation, responsible perhaps directly to some new Ministers). (As a bad second it might be best to get the J.I.C. briefly to defer its decision until a speedy examination by independent experts has established to their own satisfaction how great a mistake division would be)'.<sup>146</sup>

A memorandum from PWI dated 17th April, 1945 suggests that a decision had been made. Entitled 'Reallocation of the Functions and Personnel of the PWI Directorate' this paper set out that on the date of change over, (C) Day, Lt.Col. Hope would become Director of Regional Intelligence. All Regional Staffs, apart from German and Austria would be responsible to Hope and he was in charge of transferring them

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<sup>144</sup> PRO/CAB 81/93 JIC (45) 15th Meeting (0) 27th February, 1945.

<sup>145</sup> 'Memorandum from PWI', 5th April, 1945. PRO/FO898/40.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

to the successor bodies nominated by the JIC.(emphasis added) Walmsley was to be responsible for the policy and preparation of the German and Austria Handbooks and Handbook material, whilst Hope was responsible for all other Handbooks. Under the heading 'Analysis of Russian Propaganda, etc.' it was ordered that: 'At 'C' Day Walmsley should make such arrangements within his own section as he thinks necessary in the interests of the German/Austria section for continuing studies of Russian propaganda, reporting on other countries' propaganda to Germany, on German minorities, etc. In a final 'Note' it was emphasised that as a general principle the work carried on within the German Division(presumably the new name for the German Section) is the same or substantially similar to that which before 'C' Day was being carried on in the PWI Directorate, and that it should be continued by the same members of Staff and that teams should be kept together.

A further meeting of the JIC took place on 17th April, 1945 when the future of the Basic Handbooks was discussed and it was decided that the ones for Germany and Austria should be updated and continued in the post-war government.<sup>147</sup> An ad hoc Committee of the JIC also met ten days later to discuss the reports of the PWE which had been submitted on the 4th April by the JIC detailing the organisation of the Intelligence branch and the expenditure for the Regional Staffs, the minutes of a special meeting for the users of the Basic Handbooks which had been held on 19th April. At this meeting Sachs, Adams, Hope and Derry and other members of the staff met with the Committee and the minutes illustrate that the history of the establishment of the PWE was discussed, and the conclusion was that 'it was generally felt that the Foreign Office would be the most suitable Department to take over the three functions of the General Intelligence, Handbooks and Personalities'.<sup>148</sup> The Committee also agreed at this meeting that 'The newly established technique and experience of the PWE Regional Sections had a value, in the field of foreign political and social intelligence, which alone justified the retention in being of a part at least

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<sup>147</sup> 'Reaclocation of the Functions and Personnel of the PWI Directorate', 17th April 1945. PRO/FO898/40.

<sup>148</sup> 'Minutes of ad hoc Meeting on Basic Handbooks', 6th May 1945. PRO/FO898/40.

of the present Regional Section Staffs'. The Handbooks, Personality Files and Regional Staffs, reduced to the minimum necessary for the above, should not be split up but should be taken over by one department, which it was recommended should be the Foreign Office, at least pending a final decision as the future organisation of intelligence.

In essence the plans made for the future of the PWE represented the continuation of the Executive, but under the guise of the Foreign Office Research Department. It would be staffed by the experts from the PWE, and the peacetime version of the PWE with Hope in charge who would work with Walmsley and Derry. The plan was to keep together the organisation which represented the 'new type' of intelligence, but for operational purposes separate the ongoing and important work of the German Section (which was also to continue with their analysis of Russian propaganda etc.) from the other regions, putting all regions other than Germany/Austria under the charge of Hope and leaving the former under the experienced hand of Walmsley and his team of intelligence officers.<sup>149</sup>

It is possible to date the timing of the transferral and location of the intelligence units of the PWE. On 20th January, 1946 Walmsley produced a document describing his experience in Section 'D' (SIS) in 1938, Electra House and finally the PWE. He wrote this just "a few hours before my intelligence unit pupates - to reawaken in a new guise under the Research Department of the Foreign Office".<sup>150</sup> Thus the PWE intelligence work of the Germany and Austria Section was continued, retained with the same people, expertise and the facility for the continued study of Russian propaganda.

Two months later, on 2nd April, 1946, the Under-Secretaries of State formed the Russia Committee within the Foreign Office headed by Kirkpatrick, Warner and

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<sup>149</sup>I have written to Walmsley enquiring about this but he remembers 'nothing' about the analysis of Russian propaganda. Letter from A.R. Walmsley 10th April, 1995.

<sup>150</sup>Walmsley Paper 'Recollections' dated 20th January, 1946.

Mayhew. The committee held weekly meetings to assess Soviet action and define policy, particularly concerned with the Soviet propaganda campaign against Britain and the way in which Britain should answer .

After the Soviet withdrawal from the Marshall Plan talks in July 1947 a defensive/offensive policy towards Russia was considered, linking it with the use of subversion against the Communist bloc.<sup>151</sup> On 17th October, 1947 Mayhew put it to Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, suggesting that a special department should be established for this function. Bevin was convinced and Attlee, the Prime Minister agreed. Kirkpatrick was given the task of making the necessary appointments, no doubt because of his close connections with such operations throughout his career and most recently with the PWE. Scott-Lucas and Morris trace the development of the IRD and also identify the continuation of personnel from the PWE to IRD - one being Ralph Murray, ex PWE, who was moved into the IRD.<sup>152</sup> On 3rd January, 1948 the Cabinet approved the proposals for the organisation, to be known as the Information Research Department (IRD) and it was funded on the 'secret vote', as 'EH' and the PWE had been, alongside MI5 and MI6.

Thus the continuity of thinking, ideas, expertise, experience and organisation for political warfare in the defence of British 'national security' in the coming Cold War were assured months before the end of the Second World War. In *British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War*, Richard Aldrich confirms this continuity, stating that 'Confronted with the unfamiliar problems of an East-West conflict conducted 'by all means short of war', Whitehall gradually returned to the doctrines of the wartime subversion operations, the SOE and the PWE, for response'.<sup>153</sup> That 'gradual return' to subversive operations was facilitated by the continuation of the PWE, and as the Weekly Reports indicate from at least the middle of 1943 the

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<sup>151</sup>Scott Lucas and Morris, Aldrich, *British Intelligence*. p. 90.

<sup>152</sup>FO 371/77623 N3583 Minutes of the Russia Committee Meeting 12th April, 1949. Scott Lucas and Morris, Aldrich, *British Intelligence*. p. 96.

<sup>153</sup> Aldrich, Introduction. Ibid. p. 15.

'concern' with Russian intentions began and quite quickly changed into an 'anxiety' to anticipate the impact of Stalin in Central Europe. Existing beliefs, events of the previous years, including the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 and the invasion of Finland without a declaration of war, the disputes over Poland, Rumania and Greece all worked together to increase that anxiety. Added to this, the 'image' of the 'Bolsheviks' was ever-present in the intelligence reports, supported by the information provided by the Ministry of Propaganda of the 'atrocities' being committed by the Red Army which re-enforced the stereotypical views held in Britain about Russia and the 'Bolshevik threat' which had been an intrinsic part of British thinking since 1917.

In addition, the presumed success of Nazi propaganda underpinned the existing 'belief' in Whitehall in the usefulness of political warfare as an instrument of foreign policy. After all, it was adopted as a major factor in foreign policy in bringing democratisation to Germany after 1945, it was logical therefore to assume that it could also be used in the psychological conflict against Russia. These factors all work together to explain why Britain was the first to recognise the 'Bolshevik threat' and also the first to act on that recognition. Whitehall had at its disposal the organisational structure, the people and the expertise to provide the instrument of political warfare and propaganda in the defence of British interests as soon as events provided the rationale for using it.

The Minutes of the Russia Committee Meeting for the 1st March, 1949 illustrate the way in which the use of political warfare assumed a growing importance in the early Cold War years when it was the only instrument of foreign policy available to Whitehall.<sup>154</sup> It also illustrates the polarisation of opinions still existing in Whitehall about the use of propaganda. In a discussion about the possibility of 'doing something' to disrupt the military build-up of the USSR, Sir J. Edelson suggested that 'it was quite possible that the Russian development of the atomic bomb could be seriously retarded if we could persuade Russian scientists to defect and sabotage the

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<sup>154</sup> 'Minutes of Russia Committee', 1st March 1949. PRO/FO371/77623.



work being done'. Frank Roberts disagreed, pointing out the great difficulties of such a scheme and pointed out to Edelson that the top scientists in Russia were a 'pampered and privileged class' and usually patriots, therefore not likely to be influenced by words. After some discussion the meeting concluded that 'a general scheme to encourage defection seemed, at any rate, worthy of examination'.<sup>155</sup> Propaganda and political warfare was, once more, seen as an instrument of foreign policy which could alter the situation to Britain's advantage.

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<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### Conclusion.

This thesis began by arguing that the existing history of the PWE is incomplete and in need of revision. The central problem outlined in the Introduction, is that the narrow focus on the propaganda operations of the Executive and the tasks it was given in September 1941, has effectively marginalised the equally important intelligence work of the department. The omission of this 'missing dimension' has resulted in a history and conclusions about the PWE which has failed to take into account the importance of the intelligence operations, and by doing so produced an unbalanced account. The inclusion of this element into a re-evaluation of the Executive is important for three reasons: the first is that a study of the intelligence function of the Executive has identified the emergence of a new 'type' of intelligence produced in Whitehall during the Second World War; the second is that examination of this intelligence provides a contribution to German social and political history from a British perspective: the third is that the focus on the intelligence side of the PWE's operations has illuminated the diversification of the activities of the department after the winter of 1942. Taken together these three elements constitute the re-evaluation of the history of the PWE, and the conclusions will be presented following the line of argument outlined above.

Before making these conclusions it is necessary to offer some comments and conclusions about the role of government in propaganda and political warfare organisations, and the close relationship between propaganda and intelligence. This will illustrate the way in which the PWE emerged and also the reasons for the evolution of this new 'type' of intelligence. Finally, although it has been argued by those working in intelligence studies that it is a popular misconception that it is always necessary to provide evidence of a direct link between intelligence and policy, the case-studies presented in this thesis were chosen and have been considered in relation to specific areas of British foreign policy. As a result some conclusions can be reached, contributing to the work of those specifically engaged in the field of British

foreign policy analysis.

The review of the emergence and evolution of propaganda and intelligence services from the beginning of the century to 1941 identified the particular and mutually beneficial relationship between these two activities. It is clear that overt government involvement in propaganda and intelligence was, and still is, regarded with suspicion. The rhetoric and reality of the Waldegrave initiative and the recent problems and controversy surrounding the Scott inquiry have only served to highlight this problem, influencing public perceptions and creating further mistrust of the 'secrecy' surrounding the activities of the British government in 1995. Nevertheless, during the inter-war period, events at home and abroad forced a reluctant acceptance of the potential power of propaganda as an important instrument of government policy. At the same time Whitehall was becoming increasingly aware of the need for accurate information of the 'enemy', for economic and military reasons as well as for the preparation of effective propaganda campaigns. The tensions and contradictions between the acknowledgement of the power of propaganda and information control and the reluctance *to be seen* to be involved in such activities was instrumental in the ad-hoc way in which organisations emerged in the inter-war period.

The Ministry of Information which was set up in 1936 is an example of this. For the first three years of its life little progress was made and, despite several attempts by Tallents, no clear Ministerial directive or policy was forthcoming. It seems that no one really wished to be too closely involved with the Ministry and few took the work it was set up to do very seriously. The rash of Director Generals and Ministers who were appointed to head the organisation, and who either left after a few weeks or months, illustrates the problem at government level of finding someone who would be willing and able to organise and run the Ministry effectively. It also helps to explain why, at the outbreak of World War Two, the system for information control set up by the CID within the Ministry of Information immediately broke down. The continuing problems within the Ministry, exacerbated by the inter-Ministerial wrangling between Cooper and Dalton, can also be seen to be a contributory factor for the slow and disjointed way in which the organisation for enemy propaganda

emerged. It must be concluded that the lack of serious attention and interest in government concerning the control of communications and media during this time resulted in confusion and a lack of direction, a trend which was only reversed when Churchill became Prime Minister in May 1940.

Although the PWE was established in 1941, this thesis is concerned with the period from January 1943 to January 1946. This period has been identified as important for a number of reasons. The first sixteen months of the Executive were dominated by the battle between Cooper and Dalton, then between Bracken and Dalton and finally by the constant re-organisation and re-location of different sections of the department. The decisions to move personnel from Woburn to London, from the BBC to the PWE, and from the Foreign Office (PID) to the PWE no doubt added further problems to an already difficult situation. It has been argued that these two factors were influential in the failure of the Executive, but this assertion does not take into account the changes brought about by the Ministers and government officials which in effect resolved these initial organisational problems.

By the end of 1942 the internal conflict over control of the PWE was solved by Eden and Bracken, essentially by the 'promotion' of Dalton to the Board-of-Trade and the appointment of Lockhart as Director-General. Additionally, the composition of the Executive Committee working for Lockhart which included Leeper, Kirkpatrick and Dallas Brooks ensured that the PWE for all intents and purposes was a 'Foreign Office' organisation. During the winter of 1942-43 the appointment of Brigadier Sachs as Director of Intelligence resulted in the intelligence operations of the PWE being expanded and re-organised in order to satisfy the demands of the increasing number of tasks it was given by the JIC and the Foreign Office. It was during this period that Walmsley's embryonic research into quantitative and qualitative analysis of social and political conditions in Germany progressed and was recognised as an important addition to existing intelligence operations in Whitehall. This expansion of the intelligence operations of the Executive occurred in conjunction with the re-alignment of the aims of the Executive to include planning for the post-war world, a re-alignment that eventually included the monitoring of Russian propaganda and the

continuation of government involvement in propaganda and political warfare activities in the early Cold War period.

What then are the conclusions of the three areas of research pursued in this thesis into German resistance, occupational rule and the Cold War? Regarding the German resistance to the Nazi regime, the PWE concluded in 1944 that there were no indications of the presence of a potential resistance 'movement' in Germany which would be able to challenge or overthrow the regime. This conclusion was arrived at by the application of a strict criteria of assessment which would only identify and acknowledge 'fundamental' resistance as politically significant. That is the form of resistance which would be led by the elites in Nazi Germany, probably the Wehrmacht, and supported by the majority of the German people. By adopting this 'operational' definition of resistance the analysis of the German Section disregarded all other forms of opposition to the Nazi regime, and resulted in the general conclusion was that there was 'no resistance' in Germany. The wider implication of this conclusion was that 'the other Germany' had disappeared and that all Germans were, in some way, supporting the regime. But, as illustrated in Chapter Four, there is a problem with this supposition. The reality was that the reaction and response of the German people to the Nazi regime was far more complex. The information in the Weekly Reports included sufficient evidence of dissent, protest, non-conformity and individual cases of resistance in Germany to suggest that the criteria adopted was too narrow and was in fact producing a misleading picture.

If we remove the constraints of the criterion used in 1944 and consider the social and political conditions in Germany in the context of the 'varieties of resistance' recognised by historians as valid today, then the conclusion of 'no resistance' is inaccurate. It is clear that all Germans did not support the regime and many often challenged it. The PWE and the Foreign Office accepted *at the time* that all Germans were not Nazis, that 'the other Germany' still existed, and suggested that this should be publicly recognised. They argued that although 'the other Germany' did not have the power to overthrow the regime, nevertheless a declaration should be made to offer 'hope' to these people. Churchill's rejection of this proposal was

pre-determined by the political and strategic policy of the Alliance, and in this particular area of policy intelligence clashed with policy and was ultimately disregarded.

The work of the PWE in the planning and implementation of occupational rule began in late 1942 when the government turned its attention to the problems it would face in a post-war world. Immediate post-war propaganda policy to Germany was formulated in terms of education, and the information in the Weekly Reports provided important indications about public opinion in Germany towards the Nazi regime. This was identified as one of the potential obstacles to the long-term plan of establishing democracy in Germany. The immediate aim was to provide the public with direct information about Germany's crimes and to ensure that the re-education process began with their acceptance of the part they had played in those crimes. It was believed that the German people should be made aware of the completeness of Germany's defeat, their 'culpable responsibility' for Nazi crimes, and the power and determination of the Allies to enforce their will.

The PWE was also involved in producing practical plans for the re-education of the German people by the censorship of books, films, radio and the media. These plans which were characterised by disagreement over policy and strategy, were extraordinarily ambitious and ultimately proved impossible to implement. In addition to this, information and conclusions regarding German resistance was now used to provide a categorisation of 'political reliability' of the German people. This took the form of basic 'black', 'grey' and 'white' lists of those who could or could not be used in the initial occupational phase to help the British administrators with the task running the country. The information collected in the Personality Index files were used to identify Nazis and, as we have seen, the PWE provided information to the United Nations War Crimes Committee. One of the most important tasks for the British administration was to re-start economic life in Germany, and this could not be done without the help of those already actively involved, especially the German industrialists. The Weekly Reports contained details of the economic conditions in Germany and, through interviews with businessmen, provided information about the

attitudes that this sector of society were likely assume towards the occupying powers. The PWE supplied information about the possibility of a resurgent nationalist movement, particularly the immediate threat to the occupying troops of the underground resistance of the 'Werewolf' organisation. One of the most important pieces of work the PWE was engaged in was the production of the Basic Handbook for Germany, which was seen as the 'bible' for the Commander-in-Chief and those involved in the immediate post-war phase of the occupation of Germany. It can be concluded that the PWE's involvement in relation to occupational rule was a drastic departure from the initial task in 1941 of using propaganda to undermine the morale of the 'enemy'. After 1943 they were engaged in a variety of ways, ranging from the provision of policy suggestions and plans to their practical involvement in the application of occupational rule after the defeat of Germany.

Regarding the role of the PWE in the early Cold War period, it is clear from the intelligence reports and Lockhart's own writings that the potential problems between Russia and Britain were recognised within months of the defeat of the Germany Army at Stalingrad. The increasing pre-occupation in the German Section with the advance of the Red Army into Europe and the way in which Moscow occupied the 'liberated' territories illustrates a growing concern in the PWE about Stalin's motivations and intentions. This concern turned to anxiety as reports of alleged 'Bolshevik atrocities' were received in the PWE, reviving memories of the methods employed by Stalin to control the Russian people in the purges of 1936-1939. Incrementally, an 'image' of the Bolshevik Russia of 1917 began to emerge as events in Hungary, Roumania, Poland and finally Greece appeared to confirm this. Goebbels use of propaganda, particularly his use of reports in *Pravda* which asserted Russian territorial ambitions, reinforced the feeling of apprehension in the PWE. Gradually events in Europe combined with the anxiety of the intelligence officers, and together resulted in a climate of opinion in the PWE that Russia was pursuing a dual foreign policy. It appeared that whilst working within the Alliance toward the principle aim of defeating Germany, Russia was at the same time returning to the ideology of communism with a foreign policy aim of world revolution and domination.

A turning point for the PWE came with the setting up of Moscow's 'Free Germany' Committee and propaganda campaign. Breaking a critical agreement between the partners in the Alliance, Russia appealed to the German people and appeared to be offering more favourable treatment for Germany at the end of the war than the West were willing to offer. The mistrust of Russia engendered by the activities of the 'Free Russia' Committee was heightened with reports that Moscow had been involved in the July '44 plot. By the Autumn of 1944 the anxiety and concern in the German Section concerning the possibility of continued co-operation with Russia mirrored the grave misgivings voiced on numerous occasions by Lockhart regarding Stalin's future plans in Europe. In conclusion, the perception of the 'Bolshevik threat' to British interests which the PWE documented in their Weekly Reports confirmed the anxieties which were emerging at the same time in the Foreign Office. The timing of the beginning of these anxieties confirms that the PWE were one of the first departments in Whitehall to perceive this threat, which contributed to the rapidly changing climate of opinion towards Russia and the beginning of the early Cold War period.

The final question raised in this thesis is the importance of the work of the intelligence of the PWE in relation to foreign policy. The conclusions here are problematic because, despite extensive scholarship and research, the relationship between intelligence and the crafting of policy remains unresolved. The case studies presented in this thesis concerning the intelligence output of the German Section represent only one element in the complex process of decision-making. Any firm conclusions about the influence this might have had on British foreign-policy could only be made by incorporating these into a methodological framework for the evaluation of specific foreign-policy decisions. This is not the remit of this thesis, and is the domain of those academics who specialise in foreign policy analysis. Nevertheless, some general conclusions can be made from the perspective of the PWE and German Section.

Regarding the German resistance to the Nazi regime, the conclusion of 'no resistance' in Germany supported the policy of Unconditional Surrender. Despite evidence of the continued existence of 'the other Germany' this 'establishment' view supported the imputations made in the early post-war years that all Germans had, in one way or



another, supported the Nazi regime. In relation to occupational rule, it can be concluded that in some areas the PWE used the intelligence produced by the German Section in a positive way. For example, forewarning the occupying troops of potential dangers, using propaganda to inform and include the German people in the occupation of their own country, and the de-nazification process. But in other areas, most notably the Basic Handbook for Germany, it is clear that the intelligence work of the German Section was disregarded. The Handbook provided a politically biased and racist interpretation of the history of Germany so far removed from reality that it has to be concluded that no accurate or up-to-date information about the German people, their past nor their relationship with the Nazi regime could have been used by the people responsible for preparing it. With this Handbook the PWE supported the anti-German 'vansittart' views and beliefs in Whitehall about the German people, and supported existing policy rather than informing those making policy. The only area in which the German Section and the PWE appeared to concur with the emerging climate of opinion in Whitehall was in relation to the perception of the 'Bolshevik threat'. Whilst it is impossible here to come to any conclusions in relation to changing British policy towards Russia during this time, it can be concluded that the PWE did have an input into the JIC and Foreign Office in this area. The monitoring and analysis of Russian propaganda in the very early stages of the Cold War, and the continuation of this work suggests that some value was placed on this intelligence contribution. The emergence of the Russia Committee in 1946 and the IRD in 1947 were both engineered, in part, by Kirkpatrick. His work in the PWE singled him out as the best person to organise and recruit the expertise necessary for the IRD, the 'peace-time' version of the PWE, and he used his past experience to suggest strategy and policy directives for effective 'psychological warfare' against Russia.

The research concluded above has identified and illustrated the chronological and issue-led expansion of the role and function of the PWE during the latter half of the Second World War. This thesis has confirmed that if the intelligence work and subsequent diversification of the operations of the PWE are taken into account, then a different history of the PWE emerges. That is a history of an organisation which began its life as a propaganda department but which increasingly became involved in

unforseen and unexpected activities which in turn required further expansion of the Executive. As a result of this the PWE became more and not less important after the announcement of Unconditional Surrender as a result of the incremental re-alignment of activities it became involved in. The decision of the JIC and Foreign Office to transfer personnel and to continue the operations of particular sections of the Executive after May 1945 supports this conclusion. However, it would be unwise to make the apparently logical conclusion that the PWE must then have been successful.

Whilst it has been concluded that the German Section were successful in fulfilling their role as an intelligence agency working within and for the PWE, it has to be concluded from this research that the PWE had no influence in Whitehall with those responsible for the formulation of foreign policy. When the intelligence of the German Section clashed with existing policy it was disregarded, and in the final analysis the PWE supported existing views in government and served only to implement policy decisions made in Whitehall.

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THE POLITICAL WARFARE EXECUTIVEMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE


The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [EDEN]  
 The Minister of Information [BRACKEN]  
 The Minister of Economic Warfare [DALTON]

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE


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 Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick

Secretary to Executive Committee

Mr. David Stephens

REGIONAL DIRECTORS

Mr. Reginald (Rex) Leeper      Sir Eric Sachs (Intelligence)      Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick



## APPENDIX [II]

### Select Biography.

**BALFOUR, Michael, [1908-1995].** Formerly Professor of European History at the University of East Anglia. Temporary Principal in General Division of Ministry of Information March 1939 - March 1942. Assistant Director of Intelligence in the PWE from April 1942, moving from there to the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF in 1944. At the end of the Second World War he became Director of Public Relations and Information Services, Control Commission, British Zone of Germany where he stayed until 1947. Awarded CBE in 1963.

**BRACKEN, Brendan Rendale, Viscount Bracken, [1901-1958].** Adopted as Conservative candidate for North Paddington in 1929. Staunch imperialist and supporter of Churchill, opposing the appeasement policy of Baldwin and Chamberlain. Parliamentary private secretary (P.P.S.) to Churchill at the Admiralty at the outbreak of World War Two, and in May 1940 went to Downing Street with Churchill as his P.P.S. He was appointed Minister of Information in May 1941 and became one of the three Ministers responsible for the PWE. At the end of the war he was made First Lord of the Admiralty.

**BROOKS, Brigadier R.A.D, [1896-1966].** A Marine officer, worked for 'EH' and then on executive of PWE with responsibility for liaison with the JIC, MI5 and MI6.

**COLVIN, Ian, [1913- ].** Berlin correspondent of the News Chronicle in 1939, gained information of German intelligence service and Gestapo. Worked for 'EH' from 1939 until moved over to the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office in 1941.

**COOPER, Alfred Duff, first Viscount Norwich, [1890-1954].** Foreign Office, 1913 - July 1917, from where he joined the 3rd Battalion of the Grenadier Guards. He saw active service in the 'Battle of the Mist' in 1918, and was awarded the D.S.O. in recognition of his gallantry and service during the First World War. On demobilisation he re-joined the Foreign Office. In February 1922, he was appointed private secretary to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary but resigned from the Foreign Office in 1924 and in the same year was elected Conservative member of Parliament for Oldham. In January 1928, he was appointed Financial Secretary to the War Office, but lost his seat in the General Election the following year. In 1931, as a protest against Baldwin's leadership, Cooper volunteered to stand as the official Conservative candidate for the St. George's Division of Westminster, won the seat and kept it until 1945. In September 1931, he returned to the War Office as financial secretary, in June 1934, he was promoted to the Financial Secretary of the Treasury,



and in November 1935, he became Secretary of State for War and a privy counsellor. In May 1937, he became First Lord of the Admiralty until he resigned his post over after the Munich agreement. When Churchill became Prime Minister in May 1940, Cooper was made Minister of Information, a post he held for only one year, leaving to become Duchy of Lancaster in July 1941. He spent some time in the Far East on behalf of the War Cabinet, and after Pearl Harbour was made resident cabinet minister at Singapore. In September 1944, he moved to Paris as British Ambassador where he stayed for the following three years. He was appointed G.C.M.G in 1948 and raised to the peerage as Viscount Norwich, of Aldwick, in 1952.

**CROSSMAN, Richard Howard Stafford, [1907-1974].** Educated Winchester and New College, Oxford. Leader of the Labour group on the Oxford City Council from 1936 to 1940 when he was drafted into the Ministry of Economic Warfare by Hugh Dalton to organise the British propaganda effort against Germany. Worked for 'EH' and then PWE until 1944 when he became Assistant Chief of the Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF until the end of the war. In 1946 he was nominated by Ernest Bevin to serve as a member of the joint Anglo-American Palestine commission. Elected Labour MP for Coventry East in 1945 which he retained until his death in 1974.

**DALTON, (Edward) Hugh (John Neale), Baron Dalton, [1887-1962].** Dalton joined the Middle Temple and was called to the bar in 1914. At the outbreak of war he joined the Inns of Court OTC and served in France in 1916 and 1917 until he was transferred to Italy where he served until the end of the war. In early 1919 he was demobilised and returned to the London School of Economics as a lecturer. Dalton entered politics in 1922, and in 1924 won his seat as Labour candidate at Peckham, before moving on to win the seat at Bishop Auckland in 1929. In Ramsay MacDonald's Labour government he was appointed Parliamentary Under-Secretary under Arthur Henderson, but he did not serve under MacDonald's 'national' Government of 1931. In the general election of 1935 he regained Bishop Auckland and was chairman of the Labour Party in 1936-37, in 1940 he was appointed Minister of Economic Warfare and given the additional task of setting up the Special Operations Executive in the same year. In February 1942, he was 'promoted' to the Board of Trade, and after the General Election of 1945 when he retained his seat at Bishop Auckland he was given the Treasury.

**DELMER, (Denis) Sefton, [1904-1979].** In 1927 began work for Lord Beaverbrook on the Daily Express and the following year moved to Berlin as head of the newspaper's new bureau. In 1933 he was sent to Paris as correspondent and in 1936 was despatched to Spain to report on the civil war. By 1940 Delmer was already engaged by the BBC working on broadcasts for the German Service and it was from here that he was recruited to the Special Operations Executive to organise 'Black Propaganda' broadcasts to Germany. At the end of the war Delmer spent a short time working for the Control Commission in Germany before rejoining the Daily Express as chief foreign affairs reporter. Appointed OBE in 1946.

**EDEN, (Robert) Anthony, first Earl of Avon, [1897-1977].** In September 1915, Eden joined the King's Royal Rifle Corps, in 1917 he was awarded the MC for rescuing his sergeant under fire and also became adjutant of his battalion. In 1918, at the age of twenty, he was made brigade-major, the youngest in the British Army. In 1922 he stood as Conservative candidate for Spennymoor, County Durham in the General Election and lost, but the following year was adopted for the safe seat of Warwick and Leamington. In October 1924, he became Parliamentary private secretary to Godfrey Lampson in the Home Office until he was appointed Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Marquess of Reading in 1931. In 1934 he represented the Foreign Office on a visit to Paris, Berlin and Rome, in early 1935 he visited Moscow. In June 1935, Eden entered MacDonal's Cabinet as minister without portfolio, responsible for League of Nations affairs, and later that year became the youngest Foreign Secretary since Lord Granville. When the Second World War broke out Chamberlain dashed Eden's hopes of a place in the Cabinet, instead appointing Churchill to the War Cabinet. However, after Chamberlain's resignation and after Halifax's departure to Washington, Eden was eventually appointed Foreign Secretary and entered the War Cabinet. He retained this position until the end of the war, and accompanied Churchill on all the major Conferences except for Casablanca. He was also one of the three Ministers responsible for the PWE, taking policy decisions, whilst Bracken took care of the administration. At the end of the war Eden was exhausted, but did go on to become Prime Minister in April 1955.

**GISHFORD, Anthony Joseph, [1908-1975].** Educated Westminster School, St. Gallen, Switzerland and Wadham College, Oxford. On the outbreak of the Second World War Gishford was enlisted into the Intelligence Corps. He had worked for Russell at Illustrated Newspapers Ltd. and at the beginning of the war he became Stuart's personal assistant at 'EH', also enlisting the help of Russell in finding suitable accommodation for the organisation.

**GREENE, Sir Hugh (Carleton), [1910-1987].** Daily Telegraph Berlin staff in 1934, becoming Chief correspondent in 1938 before being expelled from Germany in 1939. Joined the BBC as Head of German Service in 1940 until the end of the war when he was appointed Controller of Broadcasting in the British Zone in Germany where he stayed until 1948. Appointed OBE in 1950.

**HOPE, Henry John, Lord Rankeillour, [1899-1967].** Educated Oratory School, Christ Church, Oxford. Hon. Attache HM Legation Berne in 1917. Served throughout the Second World War and became Administrative Secretary to Preparatory Commission of United Nations Organisation in 1945.

**KIRKPATRICK, Sir Ivone Augustine, [1897-1964].** In November 1914, at seventeen years, old Kirkpatrick was commissioned into the Royal Inniskillin Fusiliers, and in 1915 he was severely wounded in action against the Turks. He spent the rest of the war in propaganda and intelligence work, the last year being spent in neutral Holland in charge of a network of British agents operating in German-occupied territory. From 1920-1930 he worked for the Western Department of the Foreign Office and made himself a reputation as a reliable and eager worker. From there he went to Rome for three years, and in August 1933 left for Berlin as First Secretary to Berlin where he stayed for over five years. In 1938 he returned to London and became involved again in propaganda and intelligence work, working as the Director of the Foreign Division of the Minister of Information 1940-1941 and as Government Adviser to the BBC on External Affairs. From 1941-1944 he was the BBC European Controller and also acted as a Regional Director of the PWE, responsible for liaison between the PWE and BBC. From 1944 he was in charge of organizing the Control Commission for Germany and spent a few months as British political adviser to Eisenhower at the Supreme Allied Headquarters. He returned to London and worked for the following two years as Under-Secretary in charge of Foreign Office information work, from 1947-1949 as deputy under-secretary for Western Europe, followed by a year as Permanent under-secretary of the German Section of the Foreign Office. During these three years Kirkpatrick was instrumental in the discussions and setting up of the Russia Committee in 1946 and the Information Research Department in 1947. In 1953 he succeeded Sir William Strang as Permanent under-secretary in the Foreign Office.

**LEEPER, Reginald (Rex), [1888-1968].** Began his diplomatic career in the Political Intelligence Department (PID) of the Foreign Office in 1917 where he stayed until 1919. In 1939 he became head of PID and in 1940-1 was a Director of SO1, the forerunner of the PWE. In 1941 he was appointed to the Executive Committee of the PWE and was appointed Regional Director, responsible for the 'Country Headquarters' at Woburn. He stayed with the PWE until 1943, when he was appointed Ambassador to Greece where he remained until 1946.

**LOCKHART, Sir Robert Hamilton Bruce, [1887-1970].** Lockhart entered the consular service in 1912, when he was sent to Moscow as vice-consul. In 1917, just six weeks before the Bolshevik Revolution he was recalled to London. Early in 1918, when the British government wished to establish unofficial relations with the Soviets he was returned to Russia, where he was arrested and held in the Kremlin for a month. In 1938 Lockhart worked at 'EH', and in 1939 he rejoined the Foreign Office and in 1940 was appointed British representative with the provisional Czechoslovak Government in exile. In July 1941 he became deputy under-secretary in the Foreign Office and in August 1941 was appointed an executive member of the PWE under the triumvirate of Ministers Eden, Bracken and Dalton. In 1943 he was made Director-General of the PWE and awarded the KCMG.

**MALCOLM, Sir Michael Albert James, [1898-1976].** Educated at Eton and became a Major in the Scots Guards. Severely wounded in the First World War Malcolm worked for the Attorney General's Department in the War Office between 1940 and 1944 before moving to the Foreign Office to work for the Political Intelligence Department.

**MACMILLAN, Hugh Pattison, Baron Macmillan, [1873-1952].** Educated at the Collegiate School, Greenock and Edinburgh University, gaining LL.B at Glasgow University in 1896. Brief spell as Minister of Information 1939-1940 before returning to House of Lords in 1941.

**MURRAY, Ralph.** Worked for the BBC with Crossman on broadcasting to Germany, particularly the Freedom Station 'Dawn Edge'. He also worked alongside Harold Robin setting up 'Aspidistra' station located in Ashdown Forest, near Crowborough in 1942 and was in charge of the PWE's recording studios at Wavendon. At the end of the war Murray worked for the Control Commission for Germany and for a short time was Head of the Far Eastern Information Department of the Foreign Office before being recruited into the Information Research Department

**O'NEILL, Hon. Sir Con (Douglas Walter), [1912-1988].** Educated Eton College; Balliol, Oxford. Called to the Bar, Inner Temple in 1936 and also entered the Diplomatic Service during that year. Third Secretary, Berlin in 1938 but resigned from the Service in 1939. Between 1940 and 1943 he worked in the Intelligence Corps. of the Army and then joined the Foreign Office where he stayed until 1946. For a brief period, 1946-1947 he worked as Leader-writer on the staff of the Times before rejoining the Foreign Office in 1948.

**RADCLIFFE, Cyril John, Viscount Radcliffe, [1899-1977].** Educated New College, Oxford and fellow of All Souls from 1922 to 1937. Became Director of Press and Censorship Department of the Ministry of Information in 1940, Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Information from 1940 to 1941 when he was appointed Director General of the Ministry - a position he retained until 1945.

**REITH, John Charles Walsham, first Baron Reith, [1899-1971].** Educated at Glasgow Academy, Gresham's School in Norfolk and the Royal Technical College, Glasgow. Served in First World War and at the end of the war took a post in the Ministry of Munitions. Reith joined the British Broadcasting Company (later to become the British Broadcasting Corporation) in 1922 and became the first Director General of the Corporation where he remained until Neville Chamberlain appointed him Chairman of Imperial Airways in 1938. In January 1940 Chamberlain appointed Reith the Minister of Information which was to last only until May 1940 when Churchill became Prime Minister and moved him from the Ministry of Information to the Ministry of Transport.

**RITCHIE-CALDER, Peter Ritchie, Baron of Balmashannar, [1906-1982].** Educated Forfar Academy. In 1922 he came a police court reporter for the Dundee Courier; worked for D.C.Thomson Press in London in 1924 and Glasgow in 1925; Daily News 1926-1930; Daily Chronicle 1930; and the Daily Herald 1930-1941. Worked for the Foreign Office from 1941 to 1945. Ritchie-Calder headed the small Directorate of Plans at the PWE which was responsible for producing a Central Directive for the European Service as a whole.

**ROBIN, Harold, [1911- ].** Educated Oundle and London University's City and Guilds College where he studied communications engineering. Robin's first job was at the Standard Telephone Company and from there he moved to Philco where he met Hope and was invited to run a radio station at Vadiz. Robin was in charge of PWE secret broadcasting operations, involved in the building and operation of the recording studios at Wavenden Tower which Delmer used and was also sent to America to investigate the technicalities and specifications for increasing the power of the 'Aspidistra' station which he worked on with Hope.

**RUSSELL, Leonard, [1906-1974].** Editor and Chief Literary editor of Sunday Times and Director of Times Publications Ltd. Also a Director of the Illustrated Newspapers Ltd., and as a friend of the Duke of Bedford arranged for 'EH' to occupy the Riding Stables at Woburn.

**SACHS, Sir Eric Leopold Otho, [1898-1979].** Born in London, Sachs grandfather, a banker, had come to Britain from Germany. He joined the Royal Artillery and served as a gunner officer in the First World War from 1917-1919. He was seriously wounded in his left hand, and on demobilisation studied at Christchurch, Oxford, where he read law. He was called to the bar in the Middle Temple in 1921 and took the silk in 1938. At the outbreak of war he immediately rejoined the army and served in the various departments of the War Office. In 1942 Sachs moved into the world of intelligence, and was appointed Director of Political Intelligence of the PWE where he produced the Basic Handbooks. On demobilisation he returned to the bar.

**SCARLETT, Sir Peter William Shelley Yorke, [1905-1987].** Educated at Eton and Christ Church, Oxford. Worked for the Foreign Office as third Secretary in 1929; Cairo, 1930; Baghdad, 1932; Lisbon, 1934. Promoted to Second Secretary in 1934 he acted as Charge d'Affaires in Riga in 1937 and 1938. Promoted to First Secretary in 1940 he was captured by enemy forces in 1940 and returned to work in the Foreign Office in 1941 where he stayed until his departure to Paris in 1944. In 1946 he then moved to the Allied Forces Headquarters, Caserta.

**STUART, Sir Campbell Arthur, [1885-1972].** Director of The Times from 1919 to 1960, during which time he fulfilled a succession of roles in imperial and Commonwealth communications. At the end of the First World War he was Deputy Director of Propaganda at Crewe House where he had worked as Northcliffe's Deputy. Stuart was summoned by Chamberlain to take charge of enemy propaganda and in 1938 he set up 'EH' where he stayed until his departure to Canada in July 1940.

**TALLENTS, Sir Stephen George, [1884-1958].** Educated Harrow and Balliol, Oxford. From 1903 to 1912 Tallents held a commission in the Surrey Yeomanry and he then moved to the reserve battalion of the Irish Guards. He was severely wounded at Festubert in 1915 and on recovery was recruited into the Ministry of Munitions. In 1916 he was transferred to the Ministry of Food and in 1918 became the Chairman of the new Milk Control Board. In 1931 Tallents was appointed to the Post Office telephone publicity department following a successful period working in the Empire Marketing Board and in 1935 he transferred to the BBC as Controller of Public Relations until 1940 and of the Overseas Service from 1940 to 1941 when he resigned. He was also director-designate of an embryonic Ministry of Information and was disappointed that Radcliffe and not he succeeded Reith as Director-General in 1938.

**WHEELER-BENNETT, Sir John Wheeler, [1902-1975].** Began his career as an unpaid personal assistant to General (Sir) Neill Malcolm moving to work in the publicity department of the League of Nations. In 1924 he established his own information service on international affairs with a fortnightly 'Bulletin of International News' and became involved in the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House). In 1929 he went to Germany to make a special study of conditions and in the course of the next few years cultivated the acquaintance of leading Germans of various backgrounds and political persuasions. Between 1939 and 1940 he was attached to the British Library of Information New York and was appointed Assistant-Director of the British Press Service, New York from 1940 to 1941. From 1941 to 1942 he acted as Special Assistant to the Director-General of British Information Services in New York and from 1942 until 1944 he was Head of the New York Office of the British Political Warfare Mission in the United States. In 1944 he was appointed European Adviser to the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office and then Assistant Director-General in 1945. In addition he was also Assistant to the British Political Adviser to SHAEF from 1944 to 1945, and was attached to the British Prosecuting Team at War Criminal Trial, Nuremberg in 1946.

**WILSON, Sir (Archibald) Duncan, [1911-1983].** Educated Winchester and Balliol, Oxford. After a brief spell teaching Wilson became Assistant Keeper at the British Museum before being recruited in 1939 to the Ministry of Economic Warfare where he stayed until 1941, becoming involved in the work of the PWE. Between 1941 and 1945 he was employed by the Foreign Office and served in Berlin with the Control Commission 1947-1949.

**WILLIAMS, Valentine, [1883-1946].** Educated Downside School and privately in Germany. Became sub-Editor for Reuters in 1902, acting as their Berlin correspondent between 1904 and 1909. In 1909 he moved to Paris to work for the Daily Mail where he stayed until 1913 when he was appointed war correspondent for the Daily Mail covering the Balkan War. In March, 1915 he became the first accredited correspondent at British GHQ. After being mobilised in 1919 he was put in charge of the Daily Mail Staff at Versailles. During the inter-war years Williams wrote and acted in radio plays for the National Broadcasting Co. of America and broadcast extensively in America and Britain. On the outbreak of the Second World War he joined the Foreign Office where he stayed until 1941 when he was appointed to the British Embassy in Washington. During this period he was enlisted by Stuart into 'EH', working as Leeper's Deputy at Woburn. His move to America coincided with some moves to establish SOE offices abroad. In 1942 he returned to London and between 1942 and 1945 published numerous works and continuing his work for the Foreign Office.