

**Building a Culture of Peace:  
Peace Education in Kenyan Primary  
Schools**

**Solvor M. Lauritzen**

Doctor of Philosophy

University of York

Department of Education

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## **Abstract**

Although education in recent years has been recognised as holding the potential for both building peace and fuelling conflict, research in the area is scarce. This thesis therefore investigated the role education has played in peace-building following the 2007/08 post-election violence in Kenya. Kenya was chosen because a peace education programme was launched following the violence, making the country particularly progressive in that respect. In order to generate in-depth knowledge on the matter, a case-study approach using mixed-methods was adopted. In addition to four case studies, interviews were carried out with national policy makers and local school authorities to generate data on peace education policies. The qualitative data from the schools was triangulated with a teacher survey from a larger number of schools. The study found that education can indeed build peace, and that the Kenyan peace education programme can play a role in this. Drivers of conflict were also identified in the schools, pointing to a need for a holistic approach to peace education, where the whole school culture is addressed. Only one of the four case-study schools was found to have implemented peace education to the extent encouraged by the Ministry of Education. The three remaining schools were not found to have implemented peace education to the extent that policy makers had hoped. Within these three schools, a range of challenges faced by peace education initiatives were identified. In particular, the perceived relevance of peace education, location of schools, school leadership, sense of ownership of peace education, and national peace education policies were found to have a particular influence. The findings are followed by a set of recommendations for policy makers, teacher trainers and head teachers, arguing that there is a need for further grounding in national policies, more follow-up work in schools and more thorough training in peace, for peace education to reach its full potential in Kenya.

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
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**Map 2: Map of Rift Valley highlighting research locations**



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*It's the dream we carry  
that something wondrous will happen  
that it must happen  
time will open  
hearts will open  
doors will open  
spring will gush forth from the ground—  
that the dream itself will open  
that one morning we'll quietly drift  
into a harbour we didn't know was there.*

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## **Declaration**

I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work and I am the sole author. This work has not previously been presented for any other award at any other institute. All sources are acknowledged as references.

# Chapter 1: Introduction

Whereas violent conflicts were previously mainly fought between states, today's conflicts are mainly fought within the borders of nation states. In these civil wars, civilians, including children, have become the main target of violent attacks. Simultaneously the importance of education in emergencies has gained growing attention over the last two decades, and education has been argued to have the needed potential for achieving peaceful co-existence. However, little research has been carried out to investigate what role education can actually play in peace-building, and what quality indicators are needed in a school to play this role. This chapter presents peace-building education in Kenya as the focus of the research, and gives the research questions the study sets out to answer. A short introduction is given to the approach taken. The key concepts of peace and peace-building are then conceptualised before an overview of the structure of the thesis is presented.

## **1.0 Introduction**

In any multicultural or multifaith environment, there are few more important peacebuilding institutions than the classroom (UNESCO, 2011, p. 242).

As the above quote illustrates, education has in recent years been argued to hold the potential for building peace in post-conflict environments. However, it has also been argued that a well-developed education system does not equal peace, and that the relationship between education and conflict is highly complex. High-income countries with well-developed education systems are involved in conflict, and education itself has been found to enforce conflict (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Davies, 2001; Smith, 2005). Literature on the topic has been largely dominated by anecdotal evidence, and more research on what role education can play in peace-building and the conditions that need to be in place for education to be fruitful in this process is needed. This study accordingly examines the role education can play in peace-building following the post-election violence (PEV) in Kenya. Kenya was chosen as a suitable location for the study because a Peace Education Programme (PEP) was put in place following the PEV of 2007/08, making the country particularly progressive in the area of peace-building in developing countries.

The overall aim of the study is to critically examine the relationship between education and peace-building in Kenya. I will explore the role of education in creating a culture of peace at the school- and community level, and the role the PEP has played in this. The findings of the study are translated into recommendations for policy makers, teacher trainers and head teachers, aimed at making peace education more influential in Kenyan primary schools.

### **1.1 Focus of the research and research questions**

Much has been written about peace education in the industrialised world, particularly when citizenship education and conflict resolution education are included in the definition (see for example Harris & Morrison, 2003; Hicks, 1988; Calleja & Perucca, 1999; Goldstein & Selby, 2000; Andrzejewski, Baltodano & Symcox, 2009). However, evidence on the effectiveness and impact of peace education

following conflict in low-income countries is scarcer. This study seeks to contribute to a growing body of research in this area.

The main question this study sets out to answer is:

*What role has education played in building a culture of peace following the PEV in Kenya?*

From this overarching question the following sub-questions have emerged:

- 1. How have schools responded to the PEV?*
- 2. What activities are schools undertaking that could potentially fuel conflict?*
- 3. What activities are schools undertaking to build peace?*
- 4. To what extent does the PEP have an impact on the daily lives of the school population?*
- 5. What factors influence attitudes towards peace-building in Kenyan schools?*
- 6. What are the recommendations and action points for peace education in Kenya?*

During the data collection period, I was an intern with the UNICEF, Kenya office, in the section for education and young people. The Kenyan UNICEF office had been working in communities and schools badly affected by the PEV, particularly in the Rift Valley, including the towns of Eldoret and Nakuru. The UNICEF office introduced me to the district education officers (DEOs) and municipal education officers (MEOs), in the respective areas affected by the violence, who granted me access to the schools.

A mixed-method, case-study approach of four schools badly affected by the PEV was adopted to answer the research questions and to ensure I captured the perspectives of a wide range of stakeholders in the schools, including the head teachers, deputy heads, teachers, pupils, parents and members of the school management committees (SMCs). Interviews were also conducted with policy makers on a national level, and DEO/MEOs at district level. The study also made use of observation at the school and classroom level and a questionnaire survey of teachers, to gauge their perceptions of peace and the impact of the PEP following the violence.



## 1.2 Defining key concepts

A state not at war may not be peaceful (Harris & Morrison, 2003, p. 12).

As peace and peace-building are central concepts in this study, I will in this section define the key concepts of “peace” and “peace-building” and clarify how these will be used throughout the thesis. The discussion will provide a platform for further exploration of the role education can play in peace-building.

In order to identify peace-building indicators for use in a school, the understanding of peace itself must be established. The most fundamental conceptualisation of peace made is that between negative versus positive peace. In this thesis, peace will be conceptualised as positive peace. Fundamental to the conceptualisation of positive peace is the absence of structural violence, violence that is not direct but all the same kills (Galtung & Høivik, 1971). Structural violence includes any serious form of social oppression such as poverty, starvation, no freedom of speech, and unequal access to education (Barash & Webel, 2002). This definition lies close to the one used in the Peace Education Training Manual designed to train Kenyan teachers in peace education which argues that “true peace is a condition in which true justice (social, economic and legal) flourishes and consequently, people are free from the fear of all kinds of violence” (MoEa, 2008a, p. 12). This stands out from the understanding of peace as negative peace, which only addresses the absence of *direct* violence: a society without overt violence such as rioting, terrorism and war (Barash & Webel, 2002). Whereas negative peace was achieved to a certain extent in the months following the PEV, I shall argue that structural violence is still oppressing and killing people in Kenya, and needs to be addressed through peace education.

Positive peace is best achieved through peace-building, as opposed to peace-keeping. Peace-building stands out from peace-keeping as it addresses the root causes of violence, and will therefore be argued to be the most sustainable approach in this thesis. Peace-building refers to a process where the drivers of conflict are addressed, and positive peace is aimed at through the elimination of structural violence. This approach is compatible with what is expressed in the Charter of the United Nations, where human rights, dignity and worth, equal rights for men and

women, and promoting social justice are seen as equally important to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (United Nations, 1945, p. 2). The PEP and peace-building initiatives in schools will therefore be evaluated according to this four-way framework. Peace-keeping in contrast to peace-building is an approach that merely seeks to “creating an orderly environment” (Harris & Morrison, 2003, p. 11). Partly through using violent strategies, it aims to stop violence from escalating. At a school level, this can mean using authoritarian strategies, such as corporal punishment for unwanted behaviours, to establish negative peace in schools. Peace-keeping will therefore be referred to in the thesis, but peace-building is throughout seen as the desired approach to peace education.

### **1.3 Organisation of the thesis**

Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides contextual information about Kenya, with a particular focus on relevant history and politics. My analysis of the political economy provides a backdrop for the PEV and important contextual information for understanding the context in which the PEP is set. Throughout the chapter, drivers of conflict will be identified that are thought to have led up to the PEV and should consequently be taken into consideration when designing peace education programmes for the Kenyan context.

Chapter 3 reviews the literature on education and peace-building in three sections. In the first section, 3.1 ‘Education and conflict’, I discuss the emergence of education in emergencies and peace-building education as fields in academia and development. In section 3.2 ‘Building a culture of peace in schools affected by conflict’, I discuss the role education can play in building peace and fuelling conflict, with particular focus on equally-distributed education, language of instruction, conflict-sensitive curricula, developing a pedagogy of peace, non-violence in schools, the role of the teacher, and schools as zones of peace. Section 3.3 focuses explicitly on peace education in Kenya. The section discusses peace education theory, and draws on interview data with policy makers at national level and analysis of policy documents, in order to discuss the development of the PEP and its

implementation. The section provides background information on the PEP as well as the policy context in which it was developed.

Chapter 4 discusses the methodological approach to the study. I will argue that case studies using a mixed-methods approach were appropriate for ensuring authenticity of voices for a thorough understanding of the processes involved when encouraging post-conflict schools to implement peace education. A rationale is also given for the sampling of four schools for case-studies and the methods used to collect the data (including participant observations, semi-structured interviews, video observations, diaries, elicitation technique, documentary data and questionnaires).

Chapter 5 presents the findings from each of the four case-study schools in separate sections. The impact of the violence on the community, how the schools responded to the violence, what the schools were doing to build peace, and the role the peace-building programme has played in this are the focal areas of the chapter.

Chapter 6 builds on the previous chapter and compares the findings across the four case studies to draw out general conclusions on the role education can play in peace-building in Kenya. Location, leadership, motivation, ownership, and policy are areas which were identified as having particular relevance. The chapter also looks in more detail into the pedagogy of peace and the contents of the teaching. All the case-study findings are compared with the findings from the survey carried out in twelve schools.

Chapter 7 presents a set of recommendations emerging from the data analysis. The recommendations are directed to policy makers, teacher trainers and head teachers and are aimed at improving the implementation of the PEP, and further development of peace education policy in Kenya.

## Chapter 2: The Kenyan Context

In this contextual chapter I will discuss the emergence of drivers of conflict in Kenya leading up to the PEV. I will argue that the drivers of conflict need to be taken into consideration when designing and implementing peace education in schools. As the analysis will reveal, although the violence in 2007/08 followed a disputed election, the drivers of conflict can be traced back to previous presidencies, colonial history and the independence struggle. This chapter will therefore analyse the political economy from a historical perspective, identifying drivers of conflict of relevance to the PEV and beyond. I will argue that incited violence, disputed elections, political allegiance along ethnic lines, loss of state monopoly on legitimate force, political leaders motivated by personal gain, and land disputes were all drivers of conflict leading up to the PEV. As these drivers of conflict derive from decades before the PEV, I will argue that the PEV was not surprising from a historical perspective, and that these insights therefore need to be taken into consideration when analysing the role of education in peace-building.

## 2.0 Introduction

Kenya had been the safe haven in a tumultuous region and suddenly Kenya itself was going (Kofi Annan cited in Cohen, 2008, para. 6).

The above quote was given by Kofi Annan on his arrival in Kenya on the 15th January 2008 to mediate between the conflicting parties. Like the rest of the world, he had followed the reaction to the 2007 general election in a state of shock and horror, and his voice was in unison with many when he said “we can’t let this happen to Kenya” (Cohen, 2008, para. 5). However, as this chapter will argue, the violence with all its grimness was not surprising from a historical perspective (Klopp & Kamungi, 2008; Branch, 2011). In the words of Branch (2011) “the symptoms of the crisis, including ethnic division and political violence, are all too often confused with its cause” (p. 22). Education in emergencies must not only address outbreaks of direct violence, but aim at change in the structural violence of the country (Kagawa, 2005). Novelli and Smith (2011) argue that “supporting social transformation is not a neutral activity and is likely to be perceived as more political and interventionist” (p. 32). They therefore conclude that thorough analysis of the political economy of the context where educational interventions are put in place is vital. This thesis builds on this understanding, arguing that peace-building initiatives must acknowledge the causes of conflict and structural violence in order to build sustainable peace.

This chapter will therefore analyse the PEV from a historical perspective with a particular focus on the political economy of the country. I will first introduce the research locations of Nakuru and Eldoret, arguing that these locations represent the conflict both with regard to its symptoms and causes. In order to fully understand the research context, the chapter then moves on to describe and discuss the PEV nationally, and the disputed election of 2007. I will then argue that Kenya’s previous presidencies and the colonial heritage have embedded drivers of conflict in Kenyan society. Throughout the chapter I will identify and highlight the drivers of conflict that led to the PEV.

## **2.1 The research locations: Nakuru and Eldoret**

The research undertaken for this thesis was carried out in one of Kenya's eight provinces: Rift Valley. Being the province hardest hit by the PEV, and the first to receive training in and distribution of PEP materials, the province stood out as the most relevant for answering the research question. Nakuru and Eldoret were singled out as suitable locations within the Rift Valley because they were both hit by the violence, and were comparable in size. Further, the locations represented both sides of the conflict in relation to ethnicity. Kenya is home to 42 ethnic groups, which can be divided in three linguistic categories; the Bantu, the Nilotic, and the Cushite. The PEV could simplistically be described as engaging the Nilotic and Bantu-speaking communities.

Eldoret is an area perceived 'indigenous' to the Nilotic speaking communities with the Kalenjin being the largest ethnic group (Lynch, 2011). As the following sections will discuss, land disputes and political allegiance along ethnic lines were among the drivers of conflict leading up to the PEV. This reality was of particular importance to rural Eldoret, where Kikuyus settled in Kalenjin-dominated areas as farmers and later landowners, during and after the colonial rule, which led to land disputes. The growing tension around land is likely to have triggered the crude outbursts of violence in Eldoret. Because of commercial interest, urban Eldoret is more ethnically mixed than its rural surroundings.

As in Eldoret, the urban area of Nakuru is ethnically mixed. Nonetheless, the rural areas are dominated by Bantu-speaking communities, in particular Kikuyus (Hornsby, 2012). However, land disputes are less prominent in this district, which could serve as an explanation for why rural Nakuru was not as hard hit by violence as was rural Eldoret. Whereas rural Eldoret represents a location from which people fled during the violence, rural Nakuru was a location receiving large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs), in particular Kikuyus fleeing Eldoret and the surrounding areas.

Although the PEV was largely fought across ethnic lines with Kikuyus on one side, and Kalenjin and Luo united on the other, the root causes of the violence were

far more complex than ethnic divisions, which will be addressed in the following sections.

## **2.2 The post-election violence**

The PEV in Kenya left more than 1000 people dead and up to 500,000 internally displaced (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Thousands of women were raped, and private properties and schools burnt and destroyed (Branch, 2011; UNESCO, 2010). Although the dynamics of violence were highly complex, three types of violence can be distinguished (Harneit-Sievers & Peters, 2008). First, Nairobi and Kisumu were affected by the aftermath of mass demonstrations. Second, Rift Valley, and in particular Eldoret and its surroundings area, were affected by both planned and spontaneous violence aimed at “settlers” in the area. And finally gang violence erupted in Naivasha, Nakuru and the slums of Nairobi. As the research for this thesis was carried out in Nakuru and Eldoret I will focus this section on the violence in these areas.

Eldoret was the epicentre of the PEV (Branch, 2011). The Kalenjin population attacked those they saw as non-indigenous to the area, in particular the Kikuyus. People were raped, killed and displaced, and New Year’s Day a church was burnt in the village of Kiambaa outside Eldoret, killing at least 35 people including infants and elderly people (Branch, 2011). Although the PEV was often described as a spontaneous reaction to the electoral results, UNOSAT maps reveal that outbreaks of violence in fact started before the presidency was officially announced, confirming the assumption that the violence here was planned in advance by those wanting to see the Kikuyus leave the area (Anderson & Lochery, 2008). The violence in Eldoret can therefore be described as an attempt at ethnic cleansing, emerging from “long-standing grievances about land” (Harneit-Sievers & Peters, 2008, p. 140). The locations of the violence were mainly towns where ethnicities are mixed, and rural areas where settlement schemes had been applied (Anderson & Lochery, 2008). The colonial politics surrounding these schemes will be discussed further in section 2.4.

Nakuru was characterised by retaliatory violence (Branch, 2011). Initially at the receiving end, Kikuyu youth, partly from the displaced communities, were recruited into the ‘Mungiki’ gang based in Nairobi, to take revenge on innocent Luos and Kalenjins in Nakuru, Naivasha and Nairobi for the violence in Eldoret (Klopp & Kamungi, 2008; Harneit-Sievers & Peters, 2008). Mungiki is known to have connections and contact with the government, which raises suspicion as to whether the violence was incited from politicians (Klopp & Kamungi, 2008). Nakuru was one of the target areas for the Mungiki retaliatory violence (Anderson & Lochery, 2008), a reoccurring theme in the interviews in the urban school in Nakuru. Mungiki had prior to the violence wished to take control over the commercial scene in Naivasha and Nakuru (Anderson & Lochery, 2008). The PEV was perhaps mainly used as an excuse to achieve this goal. However, the chaos of the election itself has also been argued to have triggered the violence.

***Driver of conflict:  
Incited violence***

### **2.2.1 The chaos of the 2007 Election**

Although the outburst of violence in 2007 had deeper historical roots, it was nonetheless the election in December 2007 that triggered this particular outburst. In the run-up to the election, the incumbent president Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) and Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) were the two rival favourites. The electoral campaign in the build-up to the election in 2007 was the most extensive the country had seen, both in terms of official media campaigning and of more informal channels including speeches, flyers and emails (Willis, 2008; Osborn, 2008). The campaigns, and in particular the one promoting Kibaki through informal channels, focused on painting a gloomy picture of Odinga. Willis (2008) argues that the “impressions created by the two campaigns affected not simply the casting of votes, but also shaped events and attitudes after the polling stations had closed” (p. 270). Both sides had created the impression that a change of government would lead to massive change in the way the country was run. The ODM campaigned for strengthened local governance, whereas PNU wanted the power to stay with the central government. This was particularly important because a



localised power-structure could be a threat to the minority ethnic groups and their right to own land in the districts, relating back to the land disputes discussed in the previous section. Whereas the prospect of these changes represented a threat for the PNU supporters, the same changes were so “alluring [to ODM supporters] that disappointment could only lead to violence” (Willis, 2008, p. 270).

Whereas Kibaki had initially dominated the opinion polls, the gap between the two presidential favourites narrowed in the weeks running up to the election (Branch, 2011). According to the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), official figures suggested more than 70 percent turned up to vote, and despite political tension, the voting process itself went peacefully (Harneit-Sievers & Peters, 2008; Branch, 2011). The initial voting results made official by the Kenyan media on the first day indicated a victory for Odinga, with Kibaki more than one million votes behind: it seemed that Kibaki would be the first Kenyan president to lose an election (Snow, 2009). However, the announcement of the final result was delayed significantly, and tension grew accordingly (Branch, 2011).

As tensions grew, so did the expectations that Odinga would win the election (Branch, 2011). Kikuyu residents living by the Ugandan borders were warned that, if there was any election rigging they would be evicted, an event likely to be repeated elsewhere (Branch, 2011). The national newspapers had already prophesied Raila’s victory when Mr. Kivuitu, the Chairman of the ECK announced an improvement in Kibaki’s position, claiming him to be within 100,000 votes of Odinga (Snow, 2009). The Chairman failed to give a convincing explanation for why numerous results were missing, and speculations of whether the government was holding back results until they knew how many votes they needed to win arose (Snow, 2009). Also alarming was the fact that votes for the incumbent president in Nairobi kept increasing, even after the final results from the city were announced (Snow, 2009). Something was not quite right.

In a somewhat hasty process, Kibaki was declared president with 4.58 million votes against 4.35 for Odinga within thirty minutes of the count being completed (Snow, 2009). Independent election observers, including teams from the European Union, the Commonwealth Observer Group, and the East African Community all

reported major flaws in the counting of the presidential votes. The Chairman of the ECK would admit a few days later that he did not know who had rightfully won the election, admitting that some votes had not been returned. He further disclaimed responsibility for the votes the ECK had certified, blaming the supporters of Kibaki for putting pressure on him. Despite the admissions, the Chairman would not resign until the ‘Kriegler’ report, which “concluded that the elections were a resounding failure” (Snow, 2009, p. 117), was made public and his resignation became less of a choice.

The US embassy’s analysis of the situation concluded that it would never be clear who actually won the election (Branch, 2011). It was obvious that rigging had taken place on both sides. Although violent incidents had already taken place before the results were announced, it was nevertheless after the announcements that violence truly escalated. Although issues like class and age are likely to have played a role in the casting of votes, the most prevalent voting pattern formed along ethnic lines (Bratten & Kimenyi, 2008). Central Kenya, dominated by Kikuyus, had mainly voted for Kibaki, whereas the West and the Rift Valley dominated by Luo and Kalenjin preferred Odinga (Harneit-Sievers & Peters, 2008). Both the discussion of whether to localise the governance of the country, and the electoral campaigns painting gloomy pictures of the opponents, were factors contributing towards the focus of ethnicity in the election and the violence that followed.

***Driver of conflict:***

***Disputed elections***

While violence escalated, and the country was almost on the brink of civil war, Kibaki and Odinga showed no sign of a willingness to negotiate (Harneit-Sievers & Peters, 2008). Towards the end of January the situation was looking bleak, and the international community feared for Kenya’s future (Branch, 2011). It was not until former UN General-Secretary Kofi Annan threw the weight of his reputation behind the demand to bring the two sides together that Odinga and Kibaki agreed to speak directly for the first time since the elections (Harneit-Sievers & Peters, 2008). Annan announced that he would not leave Kenya until peace was secured, a process that took five weeks (Harneit-Sievers & Peters, 2008). On 28th February 2008 the two parties signed the National Dialogue and Reconciliation Accord (Njogu, 2009).

Kibaki kept the post as president, and Odinga was appointed Prime Minister (Harneit-Sievers & Peters, 2008). Although the equal sharing of ministerial posts could be argued to be an improvement, it was nevertheless an elitist agreement, compromising future stability with short-term peace (Branch, 2011).

As this section has argued, the voting along ethnic lines in the 2007 election undoubtedly acted as a trigger of violence. However, it would be too simplistic to argue that conflict automatically broke out between ethnic groups predisposed to animosity due to an 'ethnic' election. The outbreak of violence was also conditioned by a range of external influences, such as the hostile images painted of the opposition through electoral campaigns, the focus given to local versus centralised government in the campaigns (and the expectations of a change in fortunes that this focus generated among some ethnic groups), the flawed election, the chaos surrounding the counting and announcements, and the lack of engagement in the peace process by top politicians. These factors have all emerged in the analysis as equally important violence triggers. Considering this, it becomes clear that in order to answer the research question on what role education can play in peace-building, a more holistic approach addressing democracy is also needed. The next section will therefore provide a necessary context and much-needed historical perspective, by discussing previous presidential elections and the presidencies of Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki.

### **2.3 Kenya's presidencies: Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki**

What we have in Kenya is a contradiction *within* the political elite that has led to a failed election fracturing the nation along historic faults of resource inequality (Githongo, 2008, p. 363).

Instability during a general election was not unique to 2007. Since embarking on self-governance after the country gained independence, the ruling elites of Kenya have been characterised by an acting out of self-interest and by a sometimes ruthless insistence on retaining power at any cost. This section analyses the three presidencies of Kenya since independence, namely those of Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Arap-Moi and Mwai Kibaki. The analysis will also shed some light on the history of violent

elections in the country, and how the importance of ethnicity has increasingly become tied up with political power struggles.

Kenyatta, although initially seen by the British as a radical national extremist, was, soon after his release from detention, found to be acceptably moderate, and the best successor of the British power in Kenya (Kyle, 1999). Even before independence, in the aftermath of the Mau Mau struggle, ethnicity was established as a prominent feature in political Kenya, reflected in the policies of the two main political parties of the pre-independence era. The Kenya African National Union (KANU) was mainly supported by Kikuyu and Luo, and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) was mainly supported by the coastal people, Kalenjin, Maasai and white settlers. The main political struggle between these two parties was KANU wanting a centralised political structure, whereas KADU wanted a more federal structure. Upon losing the elections in 1961 and 1963, KADU was dissolved, and a whole string of new parties were formed, dissolved and reformed until Kenya effectively became a one-party state. Although a one-party state was argued to bring stability to the nation, it also brought with it criminalisation of political debate and restricted freedom of expression. Two new pieces of legislation were also introduced: the power of the government to censor, and the right to hold suspects in detention without trial. Kenyatta, who had been an advocate of non-violence and had preached reconciliation to his fellow countrymen, became increasingly withdrawn and dictatorial during the early 1970s (Branch, 2011). He entered his last term as president in 1974 without being challenged by any opponents.

***Driver of conflict:***

***Political allegiance along ethnic lines***

Upon Kenyatta's death in 1978, Moi succeeded to the presidency. Gaining popularity had been easier for Kenyatta, seen as the 'father' of the nation, and affectionately known as 'Mzee' ('the old man'), who after independence had had the privilege of giving to the Africans what the colonial powers had possessed (Mueller, 2008). For Moi the circumstances were different. Under Kenyatta, the Kikuyus were said to have been economically favoured, but now the Kalenjin were waiting for their share (Throup, 1987; Mueller, 2008). In order to fulfil their expectations, Moi as a Kalenjin "systematically set about the political marginalisation of the Kikuyu elite"

(Branch, 2009, p. 206). Historically, the people of Kenya were ‘right’ to vote for a candidate of their own ethnicity, as this has shown itself to be the decisive factor in their securing of benefits from the government, which in turn provides a possible explanation for why great disappointment can turn into violence. The Moi era was much more repressive than Kenyatta’s rule (Mueller, 2008). Although the country had in practice been a one-party state for years, in 1982 this was written into the Constitution (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995). Despite attempted military coups, broad dissatisfaction among the people, and growing violations of human rights, Moi entered his third period of rule in 1988 without being opposed (Branch, 2011). Branch and Cheeseman (2008) argue that the style of rule introduced by Moi had a significant influence on the outburst of violence following the 2007 presidential election.

Although Kenyatta’s rule had not been free from violence; under Moi it exploded. Measures that were initially intended to support the state soon grew out of control, and came to threaten the state’s monopoly of legitimate force (Mueller, 2008). Mueller (2008) identified four types of extra-state violence that emerged under Moi. First, politicians started to have

***Driver of conflict:***

***Loss of state monopoly on legitimate force***

bodyguards and gangs supporting them. Second, youth thugs emerged, initially used by the state and politicians to “kill and displace opposition supporters in the Rift Valley, the Coast, and other provinces prior to two multi-party elections in the 1990s” (Mueller, 2008, pp. 187-8). Third, Mafioso gangs emerged in the Nairobi slums and elsewhere that were sometimes supported by politicians. Finally, the general level of crime grew to threaten ordinary citizens. These clusters of violence all bubbled to the surface during the crisis of 2007/08. Despite this rather grim picture, the Moi period also saw a committed group of intellectuals, lawyers and church leaders forming an alliance demanding the legalisation of political opposition. Although it was immediately outlawed and punished, Moi was forced to reintroduce a multi-party political system when the international community entered the scene and suspended aid to the country. The first multi-party election since independence was held in 1992 (Branch, 2011).

Although Kenya was in many ways portrayed as an African success story prior to the 2007 election, electoral violence was not new to Kenya. As the first multi-party election in Kenyan history drew near in 1992, it became increasingly

***Driver of conflict:***

***Political leaders motivated by personal gain***

clear that the presidential candidates were not driven by aspirations for a ‘second liberation’, but rather individual power (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995). With the opposition split into eight, Moi consequently won the election. His victory, however, came at a heavy cost for the Kenyan people.

Ethnic clashes, possibly supported by the government, resulted in more than 2000 deaths, and left more than 300, 000 homeless. Similar events continued throughout the decade, and the instability they caused partially contributed to Moi being re-elected in 1997. Towards the next election it became obvious that a change was needed, and Moi chose a peaceful transformation (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995). Under the constitutional reform, detention without trial was outlawed, a greater freedom to hold rallies was granted, and the rules for registering political parties were relaxed (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995). A coalition government was created in 2001. Kibaki was then elected president for the first time in 2002. An election more peaceful than the two previous ones gave hope of a stable democracy in Kenya.

New hope was associated with Kibaki when he won the presidency in 2002 and among his promises was one to fight corruption in the country. Under his rule, Kenya became “a model of stability and future possibilities” (Mueller, 2008, p. 185). Moi had initiated freedoms of speech, press, and association, which were expanded upon under Kibaki (Mueller, 2008). Increasing the democratic structures, “imprisonment, detention without trial, and torture of opposition party supporters” were outlawed (Mueller, 2008, p. 185). An economy which had been destroyed by Moi seemed to be back on its feet under the new government (Mueller, 2008). Despite these promising developments, however, Kenya scored low on the World Bank’s Governance Indicators in the areas of government effectiveness, political stability, control of corruption, and the rule of law; worrying figures for the upcoming election (Mueller, 2008).

The Kenyan democracy has moved in the right direction. However, history also points to a ruling system where remaining in power has been prioritised at the

expense of democracy and the interest of the people. This culture among Kenyan politicians did without doubt influence the election in 2007. When building grass-roots democracy through peace education, this context is important, as it means not only addressing a single standing incident, but a culture built up over years. Part of this culture can also be traced back to colonial times and the independence struggle which will be discussed in the following section.

## **2.4 Unhealed wounds: Colonial times and the independence struggle**

In Kenya the rivalry between the Kikuyu and the Luo is a product of colonialism (Nyangira, 1987, p. 29).

The underlying tensions triggering the PEV in 2007/08 can be traced back not only to the previous presidencies and elections, but also to the colonial era. In order to understand the issues facing education for peace-building in Kenya, insights into the dynamics during the colonial times and how they changed Kenya are needed.

In order to pay for British investments in the East African Protectorate, a programme of bringing white settlers to the Kenya Highlands was introduced. Accordingly, more than half of Kenya's agricultural land was given to fewer than 2000 white farms, and Africans were forced to work as wage labourers on the farms, or else move to 'tribal' reserves, which in reality were more like detention camps (Berman & Lonsdale, 1992). Most affected were the Maasai on the plains and the Kikuyu of the eastern highlands; a quarter of the Kikuyu population found themselves bound to work on white farms. The white settlements had an immense influence even in the reserves. As a way of controlling the Kenyans, the British introduced "local chiefs" to govern the country in the rural districts. The arrangement led to the formation of an African elite who accumulated land and wealth, that they would later be very reluctant to let go of.

The political struggle resisting the British took off in the 1920s (Anderson, 2006). This was fuelled by the country becoming a colony after years of being a British protectorate, and economic hardships in the aftermath of the First World War, that saw reduced wages and higher taxes for African labourers. Many men were

forced to leave their families to look for paid work in the outskirts of Nairobi, where early leaders like Harry Thuku and his Young Kikuyu Association sowed the seeds of nationalism. One of the major grievances from the early 1930s onwards was how African wages were kept artificially low by the system of the 'kipande', an identity card that had to be carried by every African labourer, on which the employer would state the previous salary of the worker, so that it would be impossible to negotiate better wages in the next employment (Anderson, 2006, p. 10). The resulting economic hardship led to growing disputes over land.

The issue of land as one of the driving forces behind the PEV can partly be traced back to this early resistance movement. The Kikuyus were farmers and were one of the groups most affected by the British land grabbing. But they were also the tribe who was most strongly drawn into the European economy as wage labourers, learning English, and being politicised. This could partly explain their influence in post-independence Kenya. One of the central figures of the 1930s anti-colonial movement was Kenyatta. A Kikuyu himself, Kenyatta was sent to Europe to campaign for the Kikuyu cause, where he remained to study for fifteen years. By the time he returned, the British colonial government had cracked down on African political activism, and all political parties had been banned. The coming of the Second World War, however, would revolutionise colonial nationalism, in Kenya and most other European colonies. During the war, more than 90,000 Kenyans were recruited into active service, acquiring new skills and gaining new awareness. Some had witnessed the independence movement in India; others had seen black Americans do "white jobs". On their return to Kenya, however, their newfound capabilities did not lead to more rights, political influence, or even a job, which gave the Kenyans another reason to resist and protest.

***Driver of conflict:  
Land disputes***

The first major stepping stone towards independence was when the African nationalist organisation, the Kenya African Union (KAU), was formed in 1944. This organisation was more forceful in its demands than the brand of 'moderate' nationalists of the previous generation of nationalists, who had received their education at mission schools and were often 'Westernised' in their attitudes



(Anderson, 2006, p. 11). The organisation was dominated by the Kikuyu, the group who had been worst affected by the landlessness and land alienation. They also made up two thirds of the population in Nairobi. Jomo Kenyatta took over the leadership on his return from England in 1947. The KAU grew to 100,000 members in 1952. Kenyatta advocated a non-violent approach, but as time passed without the demands for political rights being fulfilled, a more militant brand of nationalism emerged among landless Kikuyu, urban workers and the unemployed – the origins of a radical underground movement that would take up arms in the 1950s, under the name of Mau Mau (Anderson, 2006). Kenyatta was identified by the British as one of the ringleaders of the movement, and was imprisoned for seven years (Anderson, 2006).

The rebellion that followed provoked the declaration of a state of emergency that would last from 1952 until January 1960. The local chiefs introduced by the British to govern the country in the rural districts were largely Kikuyu. They became loyalists and supported the British against the Mau Mau, which was also Kikuyu dominated. The land and freedom movement therefore contributed to splitting the Kikuyu tribe. As the emergency controls increased, police posts were established throughout the Kikuyu reserves. Detention camps for Kikuyus were also established, where Kikuyus were held without trial. Elkins describes the detention camps as “a murderous campaign to eliminate the Kikuyu people” (Elkins, 2005, p. xiv). Although documentation is scarce, it is estimated that during the emergency 1.5 million (nearly the entire Kikuyu population) were held in reserves, somewhere between 160,000 and 320,000 people were in detention camps, and between 130,000 and 300,000 Kikuyus were killed (Elkins, 2005). The Kikuyu was in the first place a group badly affected by the colonisation of the country, but now they suffered during the freedom struggle. During this period, ethnicity became more important than it had ever been previously in Kenyan history.

The state of emergency was removed in January 1960, when the British felt in control of the rebellion. Following this, things changed quickly towards granting the country independence. A transitional Constitution was introduced which legalised political parties, and a large majority of the legislative council was handed over to the Africans. The KAU was reorganised, and given the new name KANU with Mboya and Odinga as its leaders. Kenyatta assumed the leadership after his release

in 1961, and won the election, to become prime minister in 1963. The country became independent from the British on the 12<sup>th</sup> December the same year. Exactly one year later, in 1964, the country was declared a republic, with Kenyatta as president.

This short introduction to the colonial history of Kenya shows that the tensions surrounding issues such as the struggle for land have underlying causes that go back several decades. Behind the simplified story of colonial liberation and the birth of the Kenyan nation-state, unjust social structures put in place by a white minority, and how this led to ethnicity gaining in importance, have only been partially addressed. It could be argued that while privileges have simply been transferred from a white colonial elite to an African postcolonial elite, little has changed for the wider population of Kenya, in terms of economy and opportunities; structural violence still flourishes. Furthermore, much of the bitterness dating from the Mau Mau uprising has never been publicly addressed. Therefore, although the PEV was often described as an ethnic conflict by the media, analysts who point to it being more a grievance over land and other underlying long-term issues may very well have a good point.

## **2.5 Conclusion**

The violence was often, although not always, depicted as a surprise, an aberration or a specific event tied to the rigging of the election, rather than as the latest episode in a much longer history of political violence (Branch, 2011, p. 19)

In this chapter I have argued that the PEV did not come as a surprise from a historical perspective. On the contrary, the country had had a history of violent elections, and from the analysis of the political economy of Kenya ranging back through the previous presidencies to colonial times and the independence struggle, the following drivers of conflict have emerged: incited violence, disputed elections, political allegiance along ethnic lines, loss of state monopoly on legitimate force, political leaders motivated by personal gain, and land disputes. While the PEV in

Kenya subsided after the power-sharing was agreed between Kibaki and Odinga, history suggests there is still unresolved tension.

The fact that the violent outburst in 2007/08 was grounded in the history of the country is unlikely to be unique to the Kenyan context. I will therefore argue along the lines proposed by Novelli and Smith (2011) that any peace education programme should grow out of an examination of the country context, taking the drivers of conflict into consideration. Such an approach is necessary for peace education to contribute to sustainable peace. As the drivers of conflict go far back into history, people are unlikely to simply 'forgive and forget'. The question is whether education can play a part in peace-building through developing knowledge about the issues addressed in the drivers of conflict, providing a space for constructive discussion, and whether these can contribute to peace-building. These questions will be explored throughout the thesis. In the next chapter I will look at what literature say about the role of education in the peace-building process.

## Chapter 3: Education and Peace-building

This chapter introduces the field of education and peace-building, and the Kenyan PEP. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first aims to map the field of education and conflict in general terms, focusing on how education has increasingly been seen as important in development, and how conflict disrupts education. I will then move on to argue that education can both fuel conflict and build peace. Some elements of education policies and school practices will be discussed in particular; equally distributed education, language of instruction, conflict-sensitive curriculum, developing a pedagogy of peace, non-violence in schools, the role of the teacher, and schools as zones of peace. The above-mentioned sections argue that in order for education to build peace, a holistic approach must be adopted where the whole school culture is addressed. The third section introduces the Kenyan PEP, which was a central component of the educational response to the PEV. Peace education programmes will first be conceptualised before I move on to discuss the Kenyan PEP more specifically. I will argue that although an integrative approach to peace education can be traced back to independence in Kenya, the country has in recent years focused mainly on the additive approach, through introducing peace as a separate subject in the curriculum. Finally, I will argue that the theories of change guiding the PEP were implicit, leading to a reactive interpretation of the PEP.

### **3.0 Introduction**

Throughout the last decade there has been a growing recognition of education's role as a response to conflict, so that it is seen as the fourth pillar of humanitarian aid alongside food and water, shelter, and health (Machel, 1996, 2001). Schools and teachers can be used to provide a safe space and sense of normality during situations of instability, and contribute to the physical, psychosocial, and cognitive protection of children, adolescents, and adult learners. Schools can also become sites for inter-agency collaboration and harmonisation of relief efforts. Because of the vital role education is perceived to play in recovery following conflict, there has recently been a focus on the role education can play in peace-building. However, although 55 percent of the peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2005 mention education in some form, only a small number mention peace education for regular schools, which indicates that further research and awareness raising is required in the area (Dupuy, 2009).

The main research question for this thesis asks what role education has played in peace-building in Kenya following the PEV. Whereas the previous chapter gave an overview of the political economy of the country and identified drivers of conflict, in the light of the main research question, this chapter will review the literature on the role education can play in peace-building following conflict and introduce the Kenyan PEP.

Because this thesis investigates education for peace-building following conflict, the first section of the review (3.1) deals with the field of education and conflict in more general terms. Having been largely neglected as part of emergency responses, education has recently grown in importance. Consequently, UNICEF responded to the PEV in Kenya with an Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Programme (EEPCT) (Barakat, Hardman, Connolly, Sundaram & Zyck, 2010). This section discusses the emergence of education and conflict as a field, and the challenges facing education systems in times of conflict.

In the second and most substantial section of the chapter (3.2) the literature on building a culture of peace in schools is reviewed. While this is a broad area, I have narrowed it down to an examination of seven specific topics of particular

relevance to the Kenyan context: equally distributed education; the language of instruction; conflict-sensitive curricula; developing a pedagogy of peace; non-violence in schools; the role of the teacher; and schools as zones of peace. As I will argue, peace-building education requires interventions across the whole education system.

The third section (3.3) introduces peace education programmes in general and the Kenyan PEP in particular. I will discuss the PEP in light of published literature on the topic, policy papers, and interviews with national policy makers. The section argues that although peace has been integrated into Kenyan curricula since independence, a more additive approach was taken following the PEV. I will further argue that peace education in Kenya can be seen as reactive due to policies on distribution.

### **3.1 Education and conflict**

Education has traditionally been seen as a part of long-term development, rather than emergency intervention. However, academics and practitioners alike make a valid argument for the role education can play both in being a site for inter-agency collaboration and relief efforts, and providing safety and psycho-social support to children in any emergency, however short or long (Barakat, Connolly, Hardman and Sundaram, 2013). The PEP was initially part of the EEPCT programme in Kenya, aimed at addressing the longer-term effects of the conflict (Barakat et al., 2013). As the research question for this thesis asks what role education can play in building a culture of peace following the PEV, this section will provide a discussion of the field of education and conflict.

That there was previously little international awareness of the area of education in conflict can be illustrated by reference to the first Education For All (EFA) conference from 1990, which made little mention of education in emergencies, and when it was mentioned, the focus was merely on conflict as an impediment to achieving enrolment (Inter-Agency Commission UNDO, UNESCO, UNICEF & WORLD BANK, 1990). Machel's (1996) report was a seminal work in addressing children in war, and brought education firmly into the picture. In her

report, she argued for the establishment of education as the fourth pillar of humanitarian aid alongside food and water, shelter, and health. The report upheld both the fundamental right to education regardless of context, and the positive impact education can have in conflict-affected countries.

In the following EFA report from 2000, education in emergencies was given much more attention. Emergencies were recognised as a major obstacle to achieving educational goals, the need to include provision of education in emergencies in the national EFA plans, including it as one of the nine EFA flagship programmes is recognised (UNESCO, 2000). It was at the same EFA conference that the International Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) was established. The INEE framework of minimum standards and conflict-sensitive education has become standards in the field. Further, the Global Monitoring Report of 2011 was dedicated to the thesis that conflict in the world's poorest countries is one of the greatest barriers facing the EFA goals and the wider Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Both the minimum standards and the global monitoring report illustrate the growing attention education in emergencies has gained in recent years.

The growing attention in the area of education and conflict has revealed a range of challenges for education systems during conflict. Comparative statistics on enrolment and achievements clearly show that education systems in conflict zones are disadvantaged. Although significant progress has been made towards achieving the EFA and MDG goals globally, the same progress is not as evident in conflict-affected countries (Mundy & Dryden-Peterson, 2011). In conflict-affected developing countries, enrolment in primary and secondary education is lower than in other developing countries, children are more likely to drop out of school once enrolled, and literacy levels are lower. Poverty reinforced by conflict leaves children out of school as it undermines economic growth and leaves children unable to pay for the cost of schooling, or forces them to leave school to earn an income for their families (UNESCO, 2011). Schools and children are also deliberate targets of war, which instils fear and leaves children out of school (O'Malley, 2010). In Kenya, schools were burnt and looted from during the PEV. Figures show that 400 teachers at schools in the Rift Valley asked to be transferred from their current teaching positions, and within Nakuru municipality 248 pupils were relocated (O'Malley,

2010). Further, conflict increasingly leads to displacements, and displaced populations live largely without access to education (UNESCO, 2011). The constant fear and trauma caused by violence is likely to affect the learning of the pupils, but as O'Malley (2010) points out, more research is needed to document the disruption of learning outcomes caused by trauma. In short, conflict severely affects access to education and school performance.

The question of what role education can play in peace-building following conflict has sprung out of growing advocacy of the importance of education in times of crisis. Although the disruptive effect of conflict on education has been increasingly documented over the last decades, little research has been carried out on the role education can play in peace-building. As Pherali (2011) points out, it is crucial to ask whether the international agenda on enrolment in education leads to increased quality, or whether it simply leads to “more of the same” (p. 141). If the quality of schooling is poor in terms of peace-building, the increased access to school “may actually ‘harm’ schools rather than doing them ‘good’” (Pherali, 2011, p. 142). The next section seeks to emphasise quality indicators towards building a culture of peace through education.

### **3.2 Building a culture of peace in schools affected by conflict**

The previous section mapped the field of education and conflict and argued that education is becoming the fourth pillar of humanitarian aid. It was also established that education is often severely disrupted in times of conflict, leaving children out of school and affecting the quality of schooling. This section shifts the focus to discuss educational policies relevant to the Kenyan context which can promote a culture of peace in schools. Education for peace-building must include more than specific education programmes such as the PEP (Smith, 2005). Knutzen and Smith (2012) identified three rationales for the role education can play in peace building in their literature review. First, that education can be a ‘peace dividend’: the end of conflict provides a valuable opportunity for governments to increase their involvement in education and show commitment to social services to their country by increasing the quality of education. Second, education could potentially contribute to stability if it is



‘conflict sensitive’. And finally, education has been argued to be ‘transformative’ in that it can “transform values, attitudes and behaviours” (Knutzen & Smith, 2012, p. 64). I will therefore in this section discuss a range of aspects at both policy and pedagogy levels. In particular, equally distributed education, the language of instruction, conflict-sensitive curricula, developing a pedagogy of peace, non-violence in schools, the role of the teacher, and schools as zones of peace will be discussed. In sum, the section argues that peace-building education has to take a holistic approach to ensure that the entire school culture is promoting peace.

### **3.2.1 Equally distributed education**

One way in which education can fuel conflict is through limited provision of educational opportunities. Throughout history numerous people have experienced exclusion from access to social and economic opportunity on the grounds of race, religion, culture or other group identity (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000). Politics along ethnic lines was identified as a driver of conflict in chapter 2, and this section will discuss how unequal access to education could be a manifestation of this in Kenya, and how ensuring equal access could contribute to peace-building.

In ethnically stratified societies, education is frequently kept as a privilege for the dominant groups. For example, although all children in Kenya have the right to free primary education, an examination of the education system showed that there was close correspondence between Gross Enrolment Ratios, number of schools, number of qualified teachers and the ethnicity of the ruling elite (Alwy & Schech, 2004). Such educational inequality has been found to heighten the risk of conflict (Pherali, 2011, 2013).

From the perspective of equity theory, conflict derives from experienced injustice in society. People are often drawn into conflict by “direct experience of social and economic injustice” (UNESCO, 2011, p. 165). Education may be particularly important in this context, as educational discrimination will not only have immediate effects, but also long-term impacts on the socio-economic status of the groups in question (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000). That violence has broken out in Kenya following general elections could be a manifestation of this, as Kenyans have

experienced the importance of having a president of their own ethnic group for accessing social services such as education (see chapter 2).

Limited access to education typically also reinforces poverty and results in unemployment. Where education is distributed along ethnic lines, this can lead to higher unemployment of youth in certain communities. The violence in Nepal, for example, was found to be driven by social exclusion based on caste and ethnicity, and the recruitment of school children into violence was particularly prominent in areas of ethnic exclusion (UNESCO, 2011). This illustrates how limited opportunities can place young people in vulnerable and frustrating places where they are more prone to turn to violence. An analysis of youth employment in Kenya showed that likelihood of employment rose with the level of education (UNDP, 2013). When statistics reveal employment possibilities and human development to be higher in the areas associated with the ethnicity of the ruling elite, it is questionable whether this injustice could have contributed to fanning the PEV (Omolo, 2012).

In this section I have argued that unequal access to education can interrupt stability and fuel conflict. For educational institutions to act as peace-building catalysts, equal access must therefore be ensured. It should therefore be taken into consideration in any peace-building policy, as was done in Rwanda where the policy removing ethnic and regional quotas for access to education was a key factor in increasing the enrolment in primary education by 33 per cent the first five years following the genocide (Nicolai, 2009). That the unequal educational opportunities in Kenya are not explicitly stated in any policy should not stop the peace-building initiatives in the country from addressing the unfair practices. One step that has been taken in Kenya to include various ethnicities in schools is a language policy which does not favour a particular group.

### **3.2.2 The language of instruction**

Even though instruction in the mother tongue has been recognised as positive for cognitive development (Akinnaso, 1993; Benson, 2004; Fafunwa, Macauley, & Soyinke, 1989; UNESCO, 2004), Kenya has adopted a policy where English is used as the language of instruction from Grade 4-8 (age 10-14) (Muthwii, 2010). This is

done partly because English is seen as having a unifying effect on the ethnically stratified country, a point that was repeatedly made in the interviews carried out for this thesis. This section will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this language policy.

In Kenya, the roots of this policy can be traced back to the time when knowledge of English was instrumental in order to access high-status jobs and positions under colonial rule (Kioko & Muthwii, 2001). The English language, as opposed to vernacular languages, may have a unifying effect. However, instruction in the mother tongue has been recognised as improving academic outcomes, reduce repetition of grades and dropouts, and be a cost-effective way of increasing the quality of education (UNESCO, 2004). Supporting the same argument, marginalising the mother tongue in the school system has been shown to have a negative effect on cognitive development of pupils, as well as elements such as “self-concept, self-esteem, social and emotional adjustment, employment prospects and moral development” (Young, 2002, p. 230). However, arguments can also be made in favour of bilingual education. Bilingual schooling gives access to global languages, and research has also suggested that when the initial years of schooling are conducted in the mother tongue, a later introduction of other languages can give benefits in learning outcomes (UNESCO, 2004).

However, using a “neutral” language for instruction has also been recognised to unite ethnic groups. Over half the countries going through armed conflict are highly diverse linguistically (UNESCO, 2011); a situation which is also true for Kenya. It is therefore reasonable to hypothesise that the language of instruction is an aspect that has both contributed to peace-building and fuelled conflict around the world (UNESCO, 2011). The introduction of Spanish in Guatemala, Turkish in Turkey, and Nepali in Nepal as languages of instruction for all, including minority groups, are examples of language policies which fuelled conflict, as the respective languages were all seen as a threat to the identity of minority groups (UNESCO, 2011; Pherali & Garratt, 2013). In Tanzania and Senegal, however, language has had a unifying effect. In Tanzania, Kiswahili was declared ‘ethnically neutral’ as it was not the mother tongue of any ethnic group. When introduced as the single national language as a medium of instruction in schools, it played a role in fostering “a sense

of shared identity” (UNESCO, 2011, p. 22). Similarly in Senegal, French was introduced as the official language rather than the dominant minority language of Wolof, which was partly a “conscious effort to defuse conflict over language and ethnicity” (UNESCO, 2011, p. 242). Drawing on the above examples, where the mother tongue of one ethnic group is introduced as language of instruction this can cause a marginalisation of minority groups which can fuel conflict. However, language of instruction can contribute towards a unified identity and peace-building when the language introduced is ethnically neutral.

In Kenya the official languages used for teaching and examinations are Kiswahili and English. In addition, schools are encouraged to develop language policies to restrict the use of the mother tongue in social settings within the school (Noor, 2009). Although this might have a negative impact on learning outcomes in schools, the policy is claimed to build a common identity across ethnic groups. Using national languages for instruction could therefore be argued to be beneficial from a conflict-sensitive point of view. In the next section I will argue that a similar evaluation must take place in respect to the curriculum to ensure conflict-sensitivity.

### **3.2.3 Conflict-sensitive curricula**

Where an appropriate curriculum and teacher training is not provided, schools often end up as “political battleground[s]” (UNESCO, 2011, p. 169). Educational systems can reinforce prejudice and intolerance through the curriculum. However, this does not mean that political discussion should best be avoided, since as for education to reach its peace-building potential it must “deal with collective narratives and deeply rooted historical memories and social beliefs” (Kupermintz & Salomon, 2005). This section will argue that for the Kenyan education system to effectively build peace, sensitive issues must be used as a starting point for reflection and critical thinking rather than be left out of the curriculum.

In Rwanda, education has been recognised as one of the causes of the genocide, as “the Rwandan educational system was characterized by injustice, discrimination and a version of history that served the people in power” (Bijlsma, 2009, p. 219). More specifically, the political ideology which contributed to the

genocide had been disseminated through the teaching of history in schools, where the Hutus were described as the indigenous and superior population in the country (Obura, 2003). Bijlsma (2009) argues that, in the case of Rwanda, establishing a historical narrative to be taught in schools is essential, as the absence of an established version of history could give rise to alternative accounts based on ethnic identity. Although less extreme, this argument is also valid for Kenya. As will be discussed in chapter 5, the teachers interviewed for this study were reluctant to address or discuss the political economy of the country or the drivers of conflict in their teaching for fear that they would stir up violence.

The teachers interviewed were therefore ‘sanitising’ the curriculum, leaving out issues that would be controversial to discuss, and thereby losing out on important opportunities for reflection and critical thinking (Davies, 2004). When a review process was carried out in 2003 following the DFA initiative, the language used in the curriculum was critically assessed by curriculum developers to make the curriculum more conflict-sensitive. In the subject of Social Studies, for example, a component was called “our district”. The curricula developers feared that this implied a tribal ownership of the district, and the wording was changed to “the district” accordingly (KIE official 1 interview). Although these changes are likely to have contributed to a positive change in the curriculum, the process did not include a rewriting of history, where sensitive issues could have provided a starting point for discussion and critical thinking. Davies (2004) argues that through ‘sensitising’, a process heavily relying on the development of critical thinking and analytical skills, roots of conflict are discussed rather than merely removed from the curricula and textbooks.

Cunningham (2011) found in his research in Northern Uganda that “young people can become active citizens through a synthesis of knowledge, values and skills” (p. 228). Whereas the PEP is designed to empower the pupils with skills and values, the lack of direct mention of conflict leaves the knowledge out. This, then, is left to the regular social studies curriculum. However, as will be discussed in chapter 6, the teachers were not trained to include the pupils in open discussion in the classroom teaching.

### **3.2.4 Developing a pedagogy of peace**

Whereas the focus of international non-governmental organisations and the UN has for decades been to increase access to education, this section argues for the need to increase the quality of the education inside the classroom. Pedagogy in developing countries has been the focus of increasing attention over the past decade (Alexander, 2008; Smith, 2005). This section seeks to link the studies of classroom pedagogy with peace education. I will argue that participatory learning holds the potential for creating useful knowledge through a basis in the lived experience of the learners (Turay & English, 2008).

In common with other sub-Saharan African countries, the comparatively few studies that have been carried out into classroom pedagogy in Kenyan primary schools show a teacher-dominated discourse promoting rote learning and recitation. Such interaction often takes the form of lengthy recitations made up of teacher explanation and questions, and brief answers by individual pupils or the whole class (Abd-Kadir & Hardman, 2007; Hardman et al., 2009). Helping teachers to transform classroom talk into a purposeful and productive dialogue, through a pedagogy and curriculum which is relevant to the lives and linguistic profile of the communities from which the pupils come, is therefore seen as being fundamental to improving the quality of primary education (Tharp & Dalton, 2007). The promotion of a more 'learner-centred' form of pedagogy has been high on the agenda of primary teacher education reform in many eastern and southern African countries, and, as will be discussed in section 6.2.2, is seen as being central to the effective teaching of peace education.

The development towards dialogue and discussion seems to be particularly important in fragile contexts. Davies (2011) establishes that pedagogy can contribute to conflict. Bird (2003) found that the didactic methodologies used in Rwanda, where questioning and critical thinking were discouraged, had affected people's response to the genocide. Ensuring a less authoritarian teaching practice, therefore, is not only important for ensuring quality, but for allowing educational institutions to move from fuelling conflict to building peace.

According to Abebe, Gbesso and Nyawalo (2006), many countries in Africa have already included elements of peace education in their curriculum. They argue, however, that a shift in methodologies used is needed in order for them to accord with what is taught and to validate the content. Learner-centred methodologies are essential to this, and Baxter and Ikobwa (2005) propose increased classroom interaction, activity learning or discovery learning, or alternative methods such as theatre, art and music groups. This can be exemplified through the approach taken by the Association Facing History And Ourselves in Rwanda in their work on developing an alternative approach to the teaching of history (Bijlsma, 2009). Rather than presenting one version of history, the approach aims at training pupils and students in analysing different historical narratives (Bijlsma, 2009). Such approaches to teachers and learning, based on critical pedagogy<sup>1</sup>, are more likely to achieve the goal of understanding among pupils, which again could lead to internalisation of knowledge among learners.

Kenya has in recent years increasingly focused on the quality of education, and all schools are committed to use learner-centred methodologies (MoE official 1 interview). Because of the importance of the quality of classroom interaction for peace-building education, classroom observations were carried out to determine the extent to which teachers were using a more learner-centred pedagogy during their peace education lessons in this study. The use of corporal punishment was another practice that was researched for my study, which will be discussed below.

### **3.2.5 Non-violence in schools**

Families and schools use authoritarian tactics to resolve disputes, teaching young people to use force when faced with conflict (Harris & Morrison, 2003, p.10).

That schools themselves have often been violent places is well documented (e.g. Harber, 1996; UNESCO, 2010; UNESCO, 20011). One aspect of this culture of violence is corporal punishment, which is still widely used as a disciplinary strategy

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<sup>1</sup> Critical pedagogy refers to the teaching and learning of critical thinking, with the goal of achieving awareness and consciousness of democracy and the learners' own situation in society (Friere, 1974; Friere; 1970).

in schools across the world and commonly seen as an enforcement tool to facilitate pupils' learning (Davies, 2004). Corporal punishment was used in all of the four case-study schools in this research, and widely used in three of them. This section will argue that a culture of violence nurtured by corporal punishment not only leaves children with psychological trauma, but is likely to have an effect on the wider violence pattern in society.

Despite physical punishment of children being defended as a pedagogical practice, research has found that threats “limit the brain’s capacity for learning” (Davies, 2004, p. 115). This may partly explain why, although cultures are found to support the use of corporal punishment, the children of the same culture express anger, hurt and sadness when discussing the practice (Davies, 2004). Research has also showed that “corporal punishment may produce in children neurotic reactions such as depression, withdrawal, anxiety, tension, and in older children, substance abuse, interference with school work, and precocious sexual behaviour (Human Rights Watch, 1999). When corporal punishment is partly accepted in the wider society, there are few ways the children can channel these repressed feelings of anger. Bitensky (1998) proposes that this repressed anger can easily get channelled through “adult aggressiveness, authoritarianism, and lack of empathy” (p. 431). The repressed anger from childhood is in other words acted out at the expense of others.

Furthermore, the use of corporal punishment communicates that the use of violence in a more general sense is accepted and legitimised (Davies, 2004). If children internalise the norm of corporal punishment, the possibility is there that using violence to solve problems will be generalised to other domains in life (Lansford & Dodge, 2008). Although the direct link between the use of corporal punishment and violence in wider society is difficult to prove, research shows that in cultures where corporal punishment is the norm, there is also a higher level of societal violence (Gershoff, 2010). It is likely that when children frequently experience adults using violence, the probability that children themselves will be involved in violence when they grow up increases (Landsford & Dodge, 2008).

Kenya is one of the countries where corporal punishment has been abolished by law in the home, in school, in the penal system and in alternative care (Global



Initiation to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, 2012). Although this is a step in the right direction, over half of the adult population in Kenya still believes that their religion allows them to physically punish their children (Plan International, 2012). Due to the evidence presented in this section on how corporal punishment contributes to both trauma and potentially accelerates violence in the wider society, working towards ending corporal punishment in schools should be part of any peace-building mission at the school level. Taking the above findings into account on the well-being of children and the possible spill-over of violence from school to society, schools aiming to be peace-building institutions should abolish the use of corporal punishment. As with most changes at the school level, teachers play a crucial role. The role of the teacher in peace-building will be discussed in the next section.

### **3.2.6 The role of the teacher**

Teachers can hardly be separated from the above topics with respect to developing a pedagogy of peace and ensuring non-violence in schools. In that sense the above sections testify to the importance of teachers. All the same, this section will discuss the role of the teacher in more detail as I found that teachers were not sufficiently trained to promote critical thinking or use interactive methods in their teaching (section 6.2.2).

Teachers are a reoccurring theme in the EFA Global Monitoring Report (GMR) on armed conflict and education (UNESCO, 2011), in particular when discussing the high teacher/pupil ratio, ensuring proper teacher salaries, the need for more teachers in general and the need for higher qualifications among teachers. The report also refers to research showing that teachers can make a difference to pupils' welfare when providing support, and that increased recruitment of female teachers and gender training can increase the enrolment and achievements of girls (UNESCO, 2011). Feuerverger (2001) argues that a key future in a school working for peace in Israel was that they had both Palestinian and Jewish teachers. This enabled them to hear both points of view. Encounters were described as happening both through the pupils meeting each other, and through observing how the teachers interacted. Despite a weak evidence base on the role teachers can play in peace-building, the

GMR report (UNESCO, 2011) is permeated with claims about the importance of teachers, sending a strong signal on the importance teachers are perceived to play. This gap between perception and evidence calls for further research on the topic.

Curricula, policies and frameworks go a long way in guiding the content taught. However for peace education to be successful, the teacher must “truly internalise all the skills, knowledge, values and attitudes associated with peace education” (Baxter & Ikobwa, 2005, p. 28). It might not be as effective teaching the children about non-violence if the teachers themselves are caning the pupils. Likewise, it might not have a great impact teaching children about freedom of speech if they are not allowed to express their own opinions in the classroom.

As this section has discussed, there is little research to back the importance of teachers in the peace-building process. Chapter 5 and 6 will further discuss the role of the teachers in the case-study schools, and section 7.1.2.2 will argue that there is a need for teachers in Kenya to be trained in the pedagogy of peace.

### **3.2.7 Schools as zones of peace**

As discussed in section 3.1, attacks on education is a major obstacle for educational provision during armed conflict, and Kenyan schools were subject to violent attacks during the PEV (UNESCO, 2011; UNESCO, 2010). Ensuring access to education is important on many levels, including ensuring continuity of learning, avoiding physical damage and providing a safe space and normality for children undergoing psychological trauma (UNESCO, 2011). Schools are often the only safe arena in addition to the family, where the children have daily social contact, and it is therefore important that schools arrange for the children to socialise in a “non-confrontational setting” (Wedge, 2008, p. 12).

In Nepal UNICEF has helped developed a Schools as Zones of Peace (SZOP) initiative as a response to the need for school safety during violence (UNICEF Nepal, 2010). Similar efforts have been made in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, and Northern Ireland (UNESCO, 2010). The initiative in Nepal came as a response to the violent decade from 1996-2006 where schools had been badly

affected through, among other things, child soldier recruitment and exploitations of schools for political purposes (UNICEF Nepal, 2010). To avoid school closure, politicisation and harassment, SZOP was initiated to strengthen the resilience of the schools (UNICEF Nepal, 2010; Shrestha, 2008). Developing codes of conduct for school, village and district level as well as armed groups is a central element in the initiative, which unites the communities round protecting educational rights (UNICEF Nepal, 2010).

According to UNICEF Nepal (2010), promising steps have been made to implement the framework, and the results are encouraging: Schools are open on more days, codes of conduct have been developed at national and school levels, and political armed groups have moved out of schools (UNICEF Nepal, 2010). Consequently, children in the respective schools access more days of education than they otherwise would, and in a safer environment. The SZOP initiative therefore stands out as one of the most effective ways of counteracting attacks on education. During the PEV, schools in Kenya were closed, and displaced children were largely without access to education. It seems reasonable to think that developing a SZOP framework for Kenya, could potentially have contributed to counteracting this.

### **3.3 The Kenyan peace education programme**

This section will introduce peace education as an approach to building peace in schools and communities, and look at the design of the PEP from the perspective of policy makers. The section is based on published literature on peace education, interviews, document analysis and participatory observations with policy makers in Kenya. The interviews were conducted in the spring of 2012 with education officers from UNICEF, UNESCO, Kenya Institute for Education and the MoE. Following the national stakeholders, I also interviewed DEOs/MEos. However, as they had not gone through the training themselves they were very vague and gave very general comments. Participatory observation was carried out in meetings, conferences and workshops with MoE, UNICEF, UNESCO and other key stakeholders where peace education was discussed on a national level. As will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6,

the programme design and distribution policy influenced the attitudes of schools to the programme, and will therefore be discussed in this chapter.

I will start the section by discussing the theoretical foundations for peace education, arguing that the PEP can best be understood as a conflict resolution education programme. I will then move on to discuss the integrative and additive approaches to peace education. Prior to the PEV, an integrative approach to peace education was adopted, where peace was integrated into the formal curriculum. Following the violence, however, policy makers saw the need to strengthen the teaching of peace in schools, and consequently adopted an additive approach through adding peace as a separate subject in schools through the PEP. As will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6, the dual approach discouraged some schools from implementing the programme as they argued peace was already taught in the curriculum through the integrative approach. Following the discussion of programme design, I will move on to discuss the implementation process, which led to an understanding of the PEP as reactive, as it came as a response to the PEV. As with the programme design, this discouraged some schools from implementing the programme, as they saw it as merely a response to the PEV. As the discussion below will reveal, the peace education policy of 2012 encouraged a national implementation of the programme which is aimed at addressing all levels of violence in the society, moving away from the reactive approach.

### **3.3.1 Peace education: Theoretical foundations**

As part of the EEPCT Programme, the PEP was designed for Kenyan primary schools. As will be discussed in the following section, the programme that came about as an emergency response became, in 2012, policy, and will be implemented in all primary schools countrywide. Consequently, the PEP became a natural part of my research on the role education can play in peace-building in Kenya. In order to place the Kenyan PEP in a wider research context, this section will discuss theoretical foundations of peace education programmes relevant for my research. I will start by conceptualising the term ‘peace education’ before moving on to arguing that peace education is more of a process than a subject, that inner peace is commonly a

component of peace education, and that peace education is generally aimed at achieving non-violence. I will further argue that from a theoretical perspective, the PEP can best be understood as a conflict-resolution programme. The section concludes with a discussion of the relationship between peace education and other peace-building initiatives.

Placing the PEP in a wider peace education context proposes a range of challenges, one of them being the vast variety of programmes under the peace education umbrella. The following quote illustrates some of the diversity in peace education:

Peace education is a generic term used to describe a range of formal and informal educational activities undertaken to promote peace in schools and communities through the inculcation of skills, attitudes, and values that promote nonviolent approaches to managing conflict and promoting tolerance and respect for diversity (World Bank, 2005, p. 60).

Peace education programmes exist for all age groups: adults, youths or children. They can be implemented within the school system, either as part of the formal curricula, or as extra-curricular activities. Or they can occur completely separate from the school system through camps or other informal training. The content of peace education varies as much as its form, ranging from “advocacy to law reform, from basic education to social justice” (Baxter & Ikobwa, 2005, p. 28). It can comprise areas such as human rights education, education for development, environmental education, gender training, global or international education, landmine awareness, life skills education, citizenship education, conflict resolution education and psychosocial rehabilitation (Fountain, 1999; Harris & Morrison, 2003; Nicolai, 2009; UNESCO, 2011). Within UNICEF, the terms ‘peace building in schools’ (ESARO), ‘education for peace’ (Rwanda), ‘global education’ (MENA), ‘education for conflict resolution’ (Sri Lanka), and ‘values for life’ (Egypt) have all been used to label the initiative (Fountain, 1999).

Although research into peace education which provides evidence of effectiveness and impact is limited (Hart, 2011), there is plenty of literature conceptualising peace education (Harris & Morrison, 2003; Hicks, 1988; Calleja &

Perucca, 1999; Goldstein & Selby, 2000; Andrzejewski, Baltodano & Symcox, 2009). One uniting factor in peace education is how it is more a process than a subject (Reardon, 2000). Although knowledge is a component in peace education, skills, attitudes and values are as important (Baxter & Ikobwa, 2005). The process is accordingly emphasised as much as the outcome, and exploration is a major component. A major challenge for peace educators is thus to develop processes whereby pupils and students are given the opportunity to explore complex questions (Davies, 2004). The PEP lesson plans promote an interactive pedagogy, aiming to let the pupils to take active part in the lesson and discuss questions related to their own lives (MoE, UNICEF & UNHCR, 2008). What is not addressed, however, is the political economy of the country, and how peace can be achieved on a national level (see section 3.2.4).

In challenging individuals' attitudes and values, peace education aims to change something inside the individual. Some peace education programmes even argue that all peace has to start within the individual, with inner peace, defined as "peace of mind and absence of fear" (Harris & Morrison, 2003, p. 13). Inner peace has been promoted by a range of spiritual non-violent activists including the Dalai Lama, Thomas Merton and Thich Nhat Hanh. They argue that in order for a person to create peace with her environment, she must first be at peace with herself. Providing guidance and counselling for pupils affected by trauma is one way of promoting inner peace (Harris & Morrison, 2003). The PEP also includes a module on 'handling emotions', which to a large extent focuses on achieving inner peace (MoE, UNICEF & UNHCR, 2008).

Another uniting factor of all peace education programmes is that of non-violence, aiming at the prevention of both overt and structural violence. Conflict resolution education is one of the most obvious ways overt violence can be addressed (Harris & Morrison, 2003). The PEP does not focus on the root causes of violence, but teaches about relationships and ways to avoid and tackle conflict. It can therefore be argued that the PEP mainly teaches for peace, focusing on values and skills necessary for peaceful behaviours. One problem, however, is that it assumes knowledge of areas such as politics and peace and conflict studies by pupils. Learning about peace is to a certain extent covered in the social skills curriculum, but

as will be discussed in the findings chapter, the teachers did not think the pupils were old enough to learn about the backdrop of the PEV. In this sense, the Kenya PEP resembles conflict resolution education, which aims at teaching children to resolve conflict constructively; that is through cooperation as opposed to competition (Akgun & Araz, 2013).

Although conflict resolution programmes vary across contexts, they generally have two goals in common: to better the school environment by making it safer and more caring, and to socialise children into learning conflict resolutions skills which they can benefit from throughout life (Akgun & Araz, 2013). Targeting the individual, the approach aims at understanding conflict dynamics and learning communication skills, thereby empowering pupils to manage relationships peacefully (Harris & Morrison, 2003). Components such as anger management, impulse control, emotional awareness, empathy development, assertiveness, and problem solving skills are therefore essential in these programmes; all are included in the PEP (Harris & Morrison, 2003; MoE, UNICEF & UNHCR, 2008). Through the programmes, children are expected to learn to handle interpersonal relationships among themselves, not by eliminating conflict, but through handling emerging conflicts in peaceful ways (Harris & Morrison, 2003).

Although peace education programs could play a part in peace-building, these programs have traditionally aimed at changing people's behaviour, whereas peace-building includes the aspects of social and economic justice which must be addressed at a national level (Baxter & Ikobwa, 2005). Peace education could therefore never compensate for peace-building at a society level. However, it *can* foster peace at grassroots level. In the previous chapter, I discussed structural inequalities between ethnic groups in Kenya. Peace education is unlikely to be able to completely change this, but can serve to raise awareness in the communities on how these issues can be addressed and dealt with. In order to achieve this, it is crucially important to have an eye for more than crime levels and the number of fights and confrontations. As Sagy (2008) point out, the only measures used to evaluate the Peace Education Program run by the UNHCR in Dadaab was levels of crime and numbers of fights. If positive peace is the final goal, however, indicators for measuring structural violence in local communities and schools must be developed. This study argues along these lines,

pointing to the need for addressing whole school cultures when assessing the impact of peace education.

### **3.3.2 Moving from integrative to additive peace education?**

Peace education can be integrated into the school system through an integrative or additive approach (Hicks, 1988; Sommers, 2001; Cardozo & May, 2009). In recent years it has become increasingly common for peace education to come in form of a programme (Harris & Morrison, 2003). This additive approach leaves peace education with its own materials and slots in the timetable. In the integrative approach, peace is mainstreamed into already existing subjects, so that it becomes a “dimension across the curriculum” (Hicks, 1988, p. 11). According to Carson and Lange (1997), the integrative approach is the most effective way of integrating peace education in schools. They argue that mainstreaming peace into all curricula makes a more consistent challenge allowing students to critically reflect on the many elements of peace. However, others argue that peace education programmes are more likely to succeed when they have a dedicated slot in the curriculum compared with being integrated into the wider curriculum (World Bank, 2005). This section will discuss peace education in Kenya with reference to these two frameworks.

The integrative approach to peace education made its first appearance in the Kenyan education system when the country gained independence. Principles and general objectives promoting peace were established, and a commission was set up to work on integrating aspects of national unity into the curriculum. On encouragement from the DFA (UNESCO, 2000), the KIE carried out a review process in 2003 in order to strengthen the integrative approach to peace education and mainstream peace into the various primary school subject curricula (KIE official 1 interview).

Although the Kenyan school system was already teaching peace education through an integrative approach, policy makers felt the need for introducing an additive approach appeared after the PEV. That peace was integrated into the formal curriculum made it subject to examinations. This was seen as a weakness by the MoE, because it could lead to pupils memorising for the exams without internalising the values. As one MoE official stated:



So historically, it has been there traditionally, even in the curriculum, but the influence it has had on the learner and the teacher is minimal. Because students who has excelled with an A grade in Social Studies, when you look at their behaviour it contradicts what social studies propagates. Because even in 2008 if we went to a standard 4 class and asked a kid there ‘what are the causes of conflict?’ she would tell you how we can resolve conflict. We talk about mediation, but it has not been internalised (MoE official 1 interview).

When the PEP was designed it was decided that it should not be examinable, as this previously had been in the way for internalising peace values. Consequently, the MoE has lately emphasised the need for peace education to be incorporated into teacher training, as non-examinable subjects requires other teaching methods. The MoE was therefore working towards integrating peace education into teacher training in 2012 (MoE official 1 interview).

The PEP was created in collaboration between the MoE, UNICEF, the KIE, and UNHCR. Following the initial development and launch of the programme, UNESCO has taken UNHCR’s place. According to the interviewees consulted for this research, it was personal commitment by key educational officers that drove them towards creating the PEP.

Within the MoE, the Education in Emergencies Committee argued for a long-term initiative, in addition to the emergency response that had been provided (MoE official 1 interview). Meanwhile, UNICEF lobbied for the creation of a peace education programme (UNICEF official interview). After the decision was made to provide an educational response to the PEV, the KIE was approached for curriculum development. The decision had already been made to take on an additive approach, in order for it to complement the already existing appearances of peace in the curriculum, but the details had still to be put in place. According to the KIE, they were initially approached to create a peace education curriculum. However, the KIA argued that as the issues of conflict were urgent, the time frame did not allow for the creation of a curriculum. Instead they suggested the development of activity books focusing on peace which could be integrated into the Life Skills Curriculum; a suggestion that was embraced by the MoE and UNICEF. UNHCR was subsequently

approached, as they had previously worked with peace education programmes, particularly in Dadaab refugee camp. The consultant Pamela Baxter was commissioned to help with capacity building. UNICEF supported the initiative with funding, capacity building and facilitation.

The PEP had the status of an independent programme within the education sector in 2008. It was decided at an early stage to adopt the inter-agency curriculum on peace education previously used in Dadaab. The main task for the curriculum development team was for the materials to be adapted to the Kenyan context. This programme was skills-oriented, meaning that it was based on an assumption that peace can be achieved through peaceful behaviour acted out through peaceful skills (Obura, 2002). The materials were launched at the KIE in December 2008<sup>2</sup>. Although an additive approach to peace education was seen as necessary following the PEV, the debate on whether an integrated approach would have been more fruitful was still ongoing in 2012.

UNESCO only works under stable governments, and therefore does not have emergency responses as part of its mandate. Consequently, it was not involved in the PEP from the beginning, but entered the process when the situation had stabilised. Their mandate was to create a sustainable policy. The approach taken by UNESCO was rather different from the direction taken under the control of UNICEF and the MoE. Whereas UNICEF, the MoE and the KIE with the support of UNHCR established peace education as an independent programme within the education system, UNESCO urged a focus on the integrative approach. The main objective guiding all of UNESCO's work is related to peace: to "construct defence for peace in the minds of men" (UNESCO, 1996). In all their work, UNESCO focuses on a holistic approach to peace, and strives towards a culture of peace where the whole school culture is taken into account (UNESCO, 1996). This continues to be the case in their involvement with peace education in Kenya. According to the organisation, "it is about the system, not the subject" (UNESCO official interview). Having analysed the Kenyan school system from a perspective of "culture for peace", they found it to be violent as it was fiercely competitive, failing to include marginalised

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<sup>2</sup> See appendix 1 for list of materials developed, and contents of materials in the PEP

groups and widely using corporal punishment (UNESCO official interview). In the UNESCO official's own words:

The system has got to be peaceful, not violent. Unfortunately, we don't want to admit it, but more and more our system is becoming very violent as a structure. So we need to work on that. Even in the school cultures, we need to make them promote peace and so forth. You know the system itself as it is doing now promotes inequality, because very few, it is very academic, exam oriented, fiercely competitive so that very few people get to the top, get the best scores, the national schools and so forth. Then, in as much as you do peace education, the whole system itself is violent. It is anti-thesis to what we are trying to do. So that is why we say we want to focus on the broader system, and have the ministry share this vision (UNESCO official interview).

With this as the starting point, UNESCO argued that peace education has to move beyond the mere teaching of peace as a subject, and address the violent school cultures, the organisation of schools, and the policies guiding the system. Due to the lack of agreement between the different stakeholders involved in the PEP, they have taken on both the integrative and additive approach in the peace education policy. UNICEF as a whole embraces the integration of peace education into Life Skills curricula, but also keeps a focus on a holistic approach to peace education. According to Fountain (1999):

Peace education in UNICEF refers to the process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values needed to bring about behaviour changes that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural; to resolve conflict peacefully; and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national or international level (Fountain, 1999, p. 1).

Fountain (1999) further argues that UNICEF ideally sees peace education as a process to be mainstreamed into the whole education system, rather than as being a distinct subject within it. However, she argues that depending on the complexity of

the context, the introduction of a peace subject can be used as a step towards the final goal of a system embracing peace.

This dual approach to peace education can be seen in the National Peace Initiative Proposal from UNICEF Kenya (2012). The proposal states that peace education is an integrated approach, but that it needs structured activities to make the intervention sustainable, acknowledging the value of both of the integrative and additive approach to peace education. In the monitoring exercise carried out by UNICEF in September 2009, where the first phase of the PEP implementation was addressed, both approaches to peace education were also in evidence (Noor, 2009). The findings of the monitoring report also revealed some of the expectations UNICEF as an organisation had to the programme, for instance the development of language policy, the establishment of a group of trained teachers to sensitise their colleagues, to integrate peace education into subjects and clubs, to use Life Skills lessons to teach peace education, and to establish peace clubs. As such, the PEP was more than a separate subject in the curriculum. However, more overarching questions such as those proposed by UNESCO regarding violent school cultures, the organisation of schools, and the policies guarding the systems were not included in the approach.

During the development of the peace education policy, the different approaches available became particularly evident. Various stakeholders were pulling in different directions; with UNESCO strongly advocating the integrative approach, and the MoE arguing for the additive approach (Field notes from workshop on the peace education policy, October 18, 2011). When the policy was finalised in February 2012, it integrated both approaches. It stated that “the education sector shall make deliberate efforts to mainstream peace education in the curriculum at all levels” (MoE, 2012, p. 16). It is thereby evident that the MoE is aiming at education for peace – where the whole school system incorporates the ideas of peace within it. At the same time, however, the policy is treating the PEP as a separate programme within the school system. That the two approaches are both integrated into the programme approach is also seen in the policy document, when it is stated that there is a need for the programme to be researched, monitored and evaluated, and that the “culture of peace” is given a separate section within the policy, where holistic issues

such as language policy, learners' participation and respect for diversity are emphasised (MoE, 2012).

In sum, an integrative approach to peace education can be traced back to when the country gained independence. However, the PEV raised new questions of whether this approach was sufficient, and a decision was made to adopt an additive approach through the PEP. When the peace education policy was formulated in 2012, however, the debate on whether to go forward with an integrative or additive approach was renewed. A dual approach was adopted, where the PEP was to be brought forward, alongside an emphasis on the need to strengthen the integrative approach and the building of a culture of peace. That the peace education policy was formulated nearly four years after the distribution of the materials reflects the fact that the PEP was an emergency response, which will be further discussed in the next section.

### **3.3.3 Adopting a reactive approach following the post-election violence**

The PEP first came about as an emergency response in reaction to the crisis the country was experiencing during the PEV. Within UNICEF's work, it is common that peace education programmes are established after conflict, rather than proactively (Ashton, 2007; Cardozo & May, 2009). This section will discuss the PEV as an incentive for the programme, and how the peace education policy of 2012 has moved away from this approach, to adopt a more proactive approach addressing all layers of violence in the society. I will argue that the 'theories of change' guiding the PEP should be made explicit, in order for better communication with schools and improved implementation of the programme.

As discussed in the previous section, the PEP was initiated by educational officials at the national level who felt a commitment towards preventing further violence in the country through peace education. Consequently, peace education was mentioned in the MoE Post-Election Response Plan (MoE, 2008b). Under the directorate of Quality Assurance and Standards (QAS) it was stated that in collaboration with UNICEF, teachers and QAS officials should be introduced to "peace building and citizenship education skills" and that peace building education

was necessary for “imparting skills on harmonious living in diversity” (MoE, 2008b, p. 18). Within the budget, the following activities were funded; development of peace education training materials, a trainer’s guide and training schedule; training of ‘trainers of trainers’ in peace education, training of teachers, QAS officials and SMC’s on peace education and citizenship. The PEP was a key element in the emergency response from the MoE. This clearly shows that the PEP initially came out as an emergency response, and that it therefore was a reactive programme.

This was further confirmed in an interview with the KIE where the official described how they did not see any need for carrying out their common procedure of a needs assessment when commissioned to develop peace education materials, since the MoE and UNICEF had a thorough knowledge of the educational situation on the ground during the violence. This illustrates that as far as the KIE was concerned, the programme was strongly affiliated with the PEV, and was created specifically for the affected areas. In addition, parts of the materials were designed for the children to deal with trauma through expressing emotions by drawing and writing (KIE official 1 interview). That the PEP came about as an emergency response is important because it has implications for the perception of the programme and its implementation at a local level, which in chapter 5 will be discussed as a barrier for successful implementation.

The process of disseminating the PEP started immediately after the materials had been finalised. Lack of funding made a country-wide implementation of the programme impossible, and the programme leaders were forced to prioritise. Continuing the emergency-response approach, the three regions hardest hit by the violence were given priority. Teachers from the Rift valley were assembled for one week where they were introduced to the materials, the goal being for them to internalise the concepts. They were then expected to disseminate the training to fifty teachers in their region. All the teachers participating in the training were given copies of the peace education materials.

The implementation strategy reinforced the impression that the programme was primarily an emergency response, aimed at the areas most affected by the PEV. This impression was further strengthened by the statement that the PEP was

“designed especially for the areas that were hard hit during the PEV”, and was never meant to be introduced in other areas (KIE official 1 interview). KIE further argued that the main purpose of the PEP was to act as a fire extinguisher and provide therapy for traumatised children and teachers. UNICEF also emphasised the healing that took place as a result of the training. As one UNICEF official stated in his interview:

And the beauty of the whole thing was the perspective the training took was sort of a healing. People whenever they go for the training, that was happening because we would have teachers coming from a district, but different ethnic groups. And in the process of peace training, people start softening for each other. People start seeing that most of the things which make them collide is mainly of perception. And this was one of the best things which was coming out of the training (UNICEF official interview).

Peace Education as a psychosocial intervention was kept in the peace education policy. In addition to strengthening the emergency response, the focus on the psychosocial aspects indicates that inner peace was integrated as part of the peace-building. One of the main challenges for the PEP as of 2012 was how to make the programme move away from its initial reactive approach, to a more sustainable proactive approach. A representative of the MoE regretted that the policy of the PEP had been launched mainly as an emergency response, arguing that the programme was in fact designed for the whole country. The rationale behind this was that the programme was initially meant to address all layers of violence in society, and was not specifically and exclusively addressing the PEV.

I can tell you that this was not the right approach because the message we communicated to Kenya was that we were being reactive. Yet peace education needed to have been proactive (MoE official 1 interview).

As this MoE official put it, it seemed to be a common perception that the PEP came about as a reaction to the PEV. The MoE further explained that it was in the areas most prone to conflict that training and implementation had taken place. At the same time, however, they said that they were hoping to move beyond peace education as a response to conflict towards a more proactive approach.

That efforts were made to leave the reactive peace education approach behind could be one of the reasons why the PEV as a driving factor is not mentioned under the rationale for peace education in the peace education training manual (MoE, 2008a). Instead, the rationale is described as threefold. First, the study by Machel (1996, 2001) reaffirmed the importance of education in shaping a peaceful future. Second, the rationale argues that peace education is necessary because Kenya is signatory to international treaties and conventions such as UN Human Rights Conventions, the MDGs, and the EFA. Third, the Kenyan government has committed itself to providing basic and quality education to every child. In this rationale there is no mention of the PEV, considering neither the influence the violence had on the creation of the programme, nor the fact that the areas most heavily affected were given priority in the implementation process. In the preface written by the MoE, and the foreword by the permanent secretary, it is mentioned that the programme is “timely and critical”, and violence is mentioned in relation to the creation of the programme (MoE, 2008a, p. 5). However, there is no discussion as to whether the programme is mainly an emergency response or a long-term intervention, or whether it is meant for the whole country or only affected areas. Due to the absence of this discussion, it is left to the reader to interpret the underlying policy.

It was not until the peace education policy was formulated in 2012 that the PEV was addressed: “the post election violence of 2007-2008 in Kenya acted as an impetus for development of [the] peace education programme” (MoE, 2012, p. 9). It emphasised, however, that the PEV is only one layer of violence, and that the PEP has come about as a response to “the emergence of conflict situations such as public riots, inter-community and interpersonal conflicts, school unrests including Post Election Violence” (MoE, 2012, p. 10). The peace education policy, therefore, tries to justify the roots of the programme as wider than the PEV in order to justify a national implementation.

However, a UNESCO official and one of the key partners in the PEP, admitted that he had reservations towards a nationwide implementation of the programme. His argument was that the original programme was designed for the restricted setting of a refugee camp, and not for a nationwide use. Because the setting had been restricted to a camp, it had allowed for several implementation strategies to



be piloted. In a country-wide setting, he argued, a similar piloting process is not possible because of the complexity of contexts. Although the programme was already piloted in Dadaab he argued that this was insufficient, as the restricted camp setting is significantly different from the wider country setting.

As the above discussion has revealed, there was inconsistency between the policy makers on what the PEP was aiming at. Care (2012) argues that ‘theories of change’ are often implicit in peace-building interventions, and that these must be made explicit for peace-building initiatives to be more effective. Explicitly stated theories of change provide a clear picture of where the programme is going, and testable hypotheses on impact (Care, 2012). In the establishment of the PEP in Kenya, these theories of change were indeed implicit. It is therefore unclear whether the programme aimed at a settling back to normality following the PEV, or whether the programme was established to build sustainable cultures of peace in Kenya. Recommendations on theories of change guided by the findings of this study will be given in section 7.1.1.5.

In short, then, the PEP was first introduced as an emergency response to the PEV. It constituted one of the main areas in the MoE Post-Election Response Plan, and the programme was disseminated in the Rift Valley, one of the hardest hit areas in the country. Efforts have been made to adopt a more proactive approach, however, and in the peace education policy of 2012, the PEV is argued to be more of an impetus for developing the programme, and that it aims at addressing all layers of violence in the society. As will be discussed in chapter 5 and 6, the reactive approach of the programme discouraged some schools from implementing it. Whether the peace education policy will change these attitudes remains an interesting topic for further research.

### **3.4 Conclusion**

The main research question for this study asks how education can build peace in Kenya following the PEV in 2007/08. I have argued that although the importance of education in conflict-affected countries has received growing recognition by the international community in the last couple of decades, the recent nature of this

perspective means little research has been carried out in the area, in particular in relation to the role of education in peace-building. The conclusion to be drawn from this finding is that peace-building education has to address the whole school culture to achieve an optimal impact. Seven areas in particular have been highlighted: equally distributed education, the language of instruction, conflict-sensitive curricula, developing a pedagogy of peace, non-violence in schools, the role of the teacher, and schools as zones of peace. In sum, these focal areas raise the point that promoting peace through education requires an extensive approach, reaching from the policy on intake of children to the interaction in the classroom. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the drivers of conflict leading to the PEV are deeply rooted in Kenyan history, and peace-building education must therefore seek to address these on more than one level. This is also a situation that could be transferred to most other conflict-affected contexts, and is therefore an important lesson to carry forward to global designs of peace education approaches.

Teaching peace through explicit peace education supplements the approach to peace-building education discussed above. Peace education is a generic term describing a vast range of educational initiatives. In Kenya it refers to the PEP, which in particular focuses on conflict-resolution skills. In discussing the role of high-level engagement in the education system on issues related to peace and education two issues in particular have emerged: whether more is to be gained by an integrative or additive approach, and by being proactive or reactive.

The historical analysis of peace education in Kenya has shown that an integrative approach was adopted after independence when the first objectives for peace were formulated, and that this approach was further strengthened following the launch of the DFA initiative in 2000. UNESCO has since advocated an integrative approach to peace education in Kenya. Following the PEV, however, an additive PEP was introduced, mainly due to the initiative of UNICEF and the MoE. In the peace education policy both the integrative and additive approaches are encouraged. Although this could be argued to be a strength, it also imposes challenges to prioritising. The analysis in chapter 5 suggests that an additive approach gives renewed interest in peace education initiatives, and an opportunity for training and materials distribution. However, peace-building education requires a holistic

approach addressing the whole system. I will therefore argue that taking an additive approach proposes the challenge of educators being ‘satisfied’ with their contributions to peace-building once peace education is taught, without taking on the wider challenges of the school system, such as promoting non-violence and developing a pedagogy of peace as discussed in chapter 2. This chapter has also discussed the reactive approach of the PEP. The results of this policy will be further discussed in chapters 5 and 6, where I will argue that this approach influenced how the programme was received in schools. However, before discussing the findings from the schools I will give an account of the methodology adopted for the study.

## Chapter 4: Methodology

Methodology and methods strongly influence the nature of findings in any study. This chapter will therefore discuss the relationship between the methodology, methods and findings. I will start by discussing the adoption of a case-study approach, in order to gain in-depth insight into school life and practices. I will then move on to discuss the criteria for sampling of schools for the three phases of this iterative study. In order to allow for authenticity of voices a range of methods were used to collect data in the schools. These will be presented and discussed in the following order: participant observations, semi-structured interviews, video observations, diaries, elicitation techniques and analysis of documentary data. In order to triangulate the case-study findings with a larger sample of schools, a questionnaire was designed and carried out in 12 schools in total in phase three of the study. At the end of the chapter ethical issues are discussed and the chapter concludes with a discussion of the trustworthiness and authenticity of my findings.

## **4.0 Introduction**

The starting point for this study was 'education in emergencies'. Through reading the literature on this topic the area of peace-promoting education following conflict emerged. As discussed in chapter 3, peace education has been a priority for the Kenyan MoE, UNICEF and UNESCO in Kenya following the PEV, with teachers trained and materials distributed to enable peace-building to have a dedicated space in the Kenyan education system. Because of these efforts, Kenya was found to be a particularly interesting focus area as their implementation of the PEP makes the country particularly progressive in the area. I therefore decided to make this the focus of my study.

The study was iterative, and the data collection was conducted in three phases. Phase one lasted two months (October-November 2011), and enabled familiarity with the context, generate information on national policies, and piloting the instruments. After the piloting of instruments and discussion with my supervisor, the developed methods were concluded to be fit for purpose, and some changes were made. The second and third phase lasted for three months (January-March 2012). In the second phase, I expanded on the case studies initiated in phase one, and in phase three I carried out a survey in twelve schools. During the whole period of data collection, I was an intern with the Education and Young People UNICEF country office in Nairobi. Being an intern with UNICEF eased the process of accessing information from policy makers and schools.

This chapter starts with a discussion of my research design, arguing that the case studies and mixed-methods were most suited to answer my research question as they allow for in-depth analysis of school cultures. I then move on to discuss the three stages of school sampling. Each of the research methods used is then discussed: participant observation, semi-structured interviews, video observations, diaries, elicitation techniques, analysis of documentary data and questionnaires. Within each of these sections I discuss the choice of method, the research instruments, and the process of data analysis. Finally, ethical issues and measures taken to achieve a desired degree of trustworthiness and authenticity are reviewed.

## 4.1 Research design

The aim of this study was to describe and generate theory on peace-building practices in Kenyan schools. As the study is the first to my knowledge on peace-building education in Kenya, a qualitative methodology was adopted to generate as much in-depth information as possible. A holistic understanding of school cultures was necessary to answer my research questions, and a case-study approach was therefore adopted, as it allowed me to apply a range of methods within each school to triangulate and compare. To capture this holistic picture the study used a mixed-methods case study design. The mixed methods case study research design combines qualitative and quantitative methods to “allow the various strengths to be capitalized upon and the weaknesses offset somewhat” (Bryman, 2008, p. 603). A case-study approach is further argued to be a suitable method when exploring “a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context” (Yin, 2009, p. 2). In my study, ‘contemporary phenomenon’ and ‘real-life context’ were important keywords, as I wanted to explore among other things the relationship between local cultures and peace education policies put in place by national policy makers. Case studies have also been argued to be suitable for exploring relationships and processes (Denscombe, 2010), which again was central to my research.

Case studies have been criticised for not providing a strong enough ground for scientific generalization (Yin, 2009, p. 15). To a certain extent this is true – case studies are not carried out to “enumerate frequencies” but rather to “expand and generalize theories” (Yin, 2009, p. 15). It is therefore important to keep in mind that findings from a case-study are not only relevant for the specific case being described, but are part of a bigger picture (Denscombe, 2010). As this study was the first to my knowledge to explore peace education in Kenya, generating theory was its main purpose. To strengthen the theory building from the findings I decided to adopt a multiple-case approach (Yin, 2009; Merriam, 1998). I found the number of four case-study schools to be ideal, as the number was small enough for me get to know the schools in depth, yet still big enough to explore both rural and urban schools in two locations and their influence on the peace-building practices (see section 4.2.2 for details on sampling of schools for phase two).

The case-study approach has further been criticised for a ‘lack of rigour’ as researchers do not have one specific set of procedures to follow (Yin, 2009, p. 14). By not having a set frame to fall back on, a bigger responsibility is left to the researcher, and the danger is that the researcher becomes biased. In my study, part of the design was to build a relationship with each school population in order to ‘get under the skin’ of the schools. Although it could be claimed that by doing this I lost part of my objectivity as a researcher, I would also argue such insight to be necessary to understand the data. Steps were taken to overcome bias through triangulation of methods. By approaching the research in this way, the potential lack of rigour could be turned into a strength. Through participating and spending whole weeks in the schools, I captured some of the school atmosphere in a way that just would not have been possible through the use of other methods.

## **4.2 Sampling of schools**

### **4.2.1 Sampling of schools for phase one**

The study was carried out in three phases. During the first phase I mainly gathered contextual data on the PEV, UNICEFs work, and the PEP. I also piloted my research instruments.

As the research question deals with education for peace in the aftermath of conflict, it was important for the research that the schools should be located in affected regions. As the region most affected by the PEV, the Rift Valley was accordingly singled out. The Rift Valley was also the region where the PEP was first rolled out and as such was an area of priority for peace education. Nakuru was identified as suitable for phase one, as this location had received training in the PEP.

One urban and one rural school were chosen within Nakuru for phase one. The rationale behind this choice was mainly due to the fact that the PEV had affected urban and rural communities in different ways. The rural schools in affected locations were generally either hosting IDPs, and as such acting as IDP-camps, or saw their numbers increase vastly due to integration of IDP pupils. The urban schools, on the other hand, were more likely to have been closed during the violence due to violent incidents in close proximity to the school. Also, urban and rural

schools were chosen because of their difference in ethnic composition. As discussed in section 2.1, urban schools were more likely to have a mixture of ethnicities reflecting the cosmopolitan situation in urban areas. The rural schools, on the other hand, were more likely to be dominated by one ethnic group.

The two specific schools were chosen on the basis that they had been affected by the PEV, and that staff had received training in the PEP. UNICEF helped in the identification of the schools, and chose the respective schools because they were perceived to have been successful in their implementation of the PEP. Although involving UNICEF in the identification of schools had the potential of causing bias I decided it was for the best as it was advantageous for the study to conduct the study in schools where the PEP had been introduced. This would allow me to generate data on ‘best practices’ and examine what role schools can play in peace-building once teachers have been trained in the new curriculum.

One of the schools was an all-girls school. I was not informed about this before my first visit to the school. However, after having been to the school, I decided to keep it in the study despite it being ‘untypical’, as the school had made good progress in implementation of the PEP.

#### **4.2.2 Sampling of schools for phase two**

From the first phase, I decided to keep the two schools and add two schools from a different location. This was done in order to allow for comparisons between urban/rural schools and to explore the influence of location on peace education. Eldoret was chosen as a suitable second location as it was comparable to Nakuru; it was situated in the Rift Valley, was heavily affected during the PEV, and was of similar size to Nakuru. At the same time it was seen as complementary to Nakuru because the Kikuyus in this area were the main target of the violence from the Kalenjins rather than the instigators (see section 2.2). Through including schools from both Nakuru and Eldoret both ‘sides’ of the conflict would be represented.

Two schools were identified in Eldoret that would match the schools in Nakuru. The same criteria used for the selection of schools for phase one were



applied. Information on relevant factors across the four schools is given in Table 1 (below):

**Table 1: Criteria for sampling of schools**

<b>Macheleo</b>	<b>St Peters</b>	<b>Logos</b>	<b>Upper Hill</b>
Rift Valley	Rift Valley	Rift Valley	Rift Valley
Trained in PEP	Trained in PEP	Trained in PEP	Trained in PEP
Affected by PEV	Affected by PEV	Affected by PEV	Affected by PEV
Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Multi-ethnic	Single ethnic	Multi-ethnic	Single ethnic
Nakuru	Nakuru	Eldoret	Eldoret

As Table 1 shows, all selected schools were located in the Rift Valley, had received training in the PEP, and had been affected by the PEV. In addition to these criteria, half of the schools were urban and half were rural, half of the schools had a multi-ethnic composition and half were dominated by a single ethnicity, half of the schools were in Nakuru and half in Eldoret. The influence of these factors on the implementation of peace education will be discussed throughout the thesis, and a comparative analysis will be provided in section 6.2.1.

#### **4.2.3 Sampling of schools for phase three**

In addition to the case studies, a quantitative survey was carried out in a total of twelve schools to triangulate the overall findings emerging from the case studies. The schools were selected with help from the MEOs/DEOs, applying the same criteria as described in the above section.

### **4.3 Methods**

In this section I shall describe the methods used to collect the data. I adopted a mixed-methods design for my study to enable triangulation of data and to strengthen validity (Bryman, 2008). Combining qualitative and quantitative methods provided me with a more complex picture of the topic, and compensated for strengths and weaknesses found in each of the two methods (Denscombe, 2010). This section will discuss the methods used.

As previously discussed, I spent 2-4 weeks in each school. This allowed me to carry out participant observation, and understand the context of my data (section 4.3.1). Within the schools, semi-structured interviews served as the main data collection technique, generating information on how the schools responded to the PEV, what activities the schools were undertaking that could potentially fuel conflict, what activities the schools were undertaking to build peace, the impact of the PEP, and what factors influenced the implementation of the PEP (section 4.3.2). Video recordings were also used to investigate pedagogic practices in the teaching of the peace education curriculum in each of the four schools (section 4.3.3). Pupil diaries were used to supplement the pupil interviews (section 4.3.4). In addition, an elicitation technique was carried out with one class in each school to create ‘ground rules’ for peace and to provide insights into the general ethics of the school (4.3.5). Documentary data was collected to gain insight into national peace education policies (4.3.6). Finally, a questionnaire survey was carried out in twelve schools in total to triangulate the case-study data and include a larger number of schools (4.3.7).

#### **4.3.1 Participant observations**

Participant observation is a method originally developed and applied in social anthropology. Through first-hand experience, the researcher aims at gaining insight into “the subjective reality of the lived experience” (Pole & Morrison, 2003, p. 16). In my study, the interviews were designed to give insight into how the stakeholders perceived the reality around them, and the survey was designed to provide quantitative data on the same reality. Participant observation was adopted to triangulate these findings in order to answer research question numbers 3 and 4 in

particular (section 1.1), asking what activities the schools were undertaking to build peace and for the impact of the PEP. The participant observation generated findings of the actual practices in the school.

#### ***4.3.1.1 Applying participant observation***

I spent 5 months in Kenya doing research, and depending on the time it took to collect the data I spent between 2-4 weeks in each of the case-study schools. During the whole research period I was an overt researcher. That is, I was an “observer-as-participant” (Denscombe, 2003) and the schools were aware that I was there to research and evaluate. Field notes were made throughout my stay to document instances or conversations which I thought were of particular importance to the study. The participations gave me valuable insight into how each school functioned and the general atmosphere of the school. During the days spent in the schools, I conducted unstructured interviews. During these interviews I did not follow any prepared guide, and parts of the encounters were “casual conversation” (Mertens, 2010, p. 370). Unstructured interviews are particularly useful in order to find out what the informants really care about and what is important to them. Particularly during tea- and lunch-breaks I interacted with the various members of the schools’ populations. As part of the participant observations, these unstructured interviews were recorded in the field notes. The field notes were written up in the evenings.

I spent approximately eight hours in the school each day. I arrived together with the teachers in the morning, and left after the formal classes had finished. During the day, I conducted the data collection, and between these tasks I participated in teacher meetings and parents meetings, I observed school assemblies and the children when they had breaks, I had lunch with the teachers, and I spoke to teachers, head teachers and deputy head teachers. At Macheleo and St Peters I met with the Peace Club; in the other two schools there was no active peace club. Through all this informal interaction, the teachers and pupils alike became accustomed to my presence, and I believe that this contributed to the creation of relationships in which the schools’ populations felt that they could trust me. This was particularly crucial in Eldoret where several participants said that they had feared

that I was a spy for the International Criminal Court (ICC) and that it therefore would have been dangerous for them to open up for me in interviews. The MP from Eldoret North was one of the politicians under investigation from the ICC. There was therefore a rumour in the city that the ICC was sending ‘spies’ to Eldoret to research and gather evidence against him. Participants said, however, that by getting to know me they had been convinced that I was not a spy. This serves to illustrate the importance of a certain continuance and building of relationships to get under the skin of a school. However, the sensitive climate at the time that I was there limited the amount of information from the participants, and I found, particularly at Upper Hill, that the informants would not give specific information about what had happened during the violence.

There were two particular challenges which I encountered in relation to the participant observations. First, I found at St Peters that the head teacher limited my contact with the teachers. When I spent time in the staff room, I was frequently sent for by the head teacher who wanted me in his office. This could be understood as a friendly gesture. However, it was part of a sequence of incidents that gave me the strong impression that it was a way of limiting my access to information. The data collection was therefore more challenging in this school, but by spending extensive time in the school and building trust with the teachers I limited the impact of these challenges on my data collection. Another factor potentially influencing my relationship with the schools was the fact that Eldoret had not recovered as well from the conflict as Nakuru. IDP camps and remains of burnt houses were located in close proximity to both schools. As discussed above, the charges by the ICC against the local politician William Ruto were also confirmed shortly before my fieldwork in the schools. These factors might have made it more difficult for the participants to open up to me as a researcher.

The above challenges shed light on the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity in participant observation. Being an instrument in the data collection, it is evident that the observer will influence the data to some degree. The contextual challenges discussed above potentially influenced the relationship between informants and researcher. I would argue, however, that the subjectivity associated with the method enabled me to pick up on these dynamics to a larger extent than

other, more traditional objective methodologies would have allowed, and that the subjectivity was therefore turned into a strength.

#### ***4.3.1.2 Analysis of field notes***

The information gathered from the participant observations contributed to the research on two levels. First, it informed the data collection by pointing to areas in need of further investigation. The observations informed the development of the interview schedules and the questionnaire in particular. Second, the data was recorded as field notes in diaries. This data was read through, and notes were made of key incidents and reflections that enriched the case studies.

#### **4.3.2 Semi-structured interviews**

The main data set was collected through semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews were identified as the most appropriate method in order to focus on the interviewees' "feelings, emotions and experiences" in relation to how the schools had responded to the PEV and their role in peace-building (Denscombe, 2010, p. 174). All the research questions were addressed in the interview schedule, and the interviews therefore accounted for the most substantial part of the data collection.

##### ***4.3.2.1 The interview guide***

As is common for semi-structured interviews, I developed an interview guide with clear topics to be addressed. The questions were not followed rigidly, but were used as a starting point for discussion and a check list to ensure that the same themes were addressed across all interviews.

Before officially starting each interview, I collected general information about the participants: name, how long they had been in the school, and other relevant information depending on the participants. The interview guides were made up of five questions, and were arranged according to a timeline of events<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> See Appendix 2 for interview guides

1. The **first** question dealt with the PEV in the community.
2. The **second** was about the role the school played during the PEV. These two first questions were designed to get the participants to think about the violence, the causes of the violence, and the effects it had on them, the community and the school. They also served to create the context for the subsequent questions.
3. In **the third** question, I moved on to ask about the role the school had played in rebuilding the community after the violence. This was meant as an open question in order to give the interviewees room to express what they saw as important factors in rebuilding the peace before I steered the conversation to talk about the PEP.
4. The **fourth** question addressed the things the school had put in place after the PEV.
5. The **final** question explicitly asked about the PEP, and what had been put in place in the school as a result of the programme.

These five general topics were found to be comprehensive eliciting information in the first phase and were not altered for the second phase. However, the wording and sequence varied slightly between the participants as the semi-structured interview was designed to allow them to lead the discussion.

#### ***4.3.2.2 Interviewing one-to-one***

I decided to use one-to-one interviews when interviewing the teachers, head teacher and deputy head. Interviewing one-to-one allowed the interviewees to express their opinions more freely than if they had been interviewed in groups. Further, I was collecting personal stories, which are particularly suited to a one-to-one setting. The choice was also made for practical reasons, as it would be far more problematic to bring together a number of teachers at the same time during the school day. When interviewing one-to-one, I was able to carry out the interviews whenever the teachers in question had a free time slot. That way, my interference in school life was

minimised. I received positive feedback on this practice from the school administrations. Group interviews might have been beneficial for the second half of the interview where the issues of peace-building were addressed. However, this was compensated for by triangulating the interviews with other methods such as participatory observation.

#### ***4.3.2.3 Interviewing in groups***

Pupils, parents and SCM members were interviewed in groups of three. There were several reasons for this. First, it was less complicated to get hold of these stakeholders in groups. Second, these groups of people were less likely to feel intimidated as a group. In my experience the group interviews worked well, and the interviewees did not come across as intimidated. Although I aimed to interview in groups of three, the groups ranged from one to six participants because of circumstances. Although the length of the interviews varied according to the number of participants in each group this did not seem to influence the information from the interviews, and the varied numbers did therefore not seem to be a problem.

#### ***4.3.2.4 Choice of participants for interviews***

The pupils participating in the interviews were chosen according to two criteria. First, that they were in standard 7. This age group was chosen as at their age (13 years) they would have the clearest memory of the PEV. Second, that they were members of the Peace Club in the schools where such clubs existed. In the schools where there was no such club the pupils were selected randomly from standard 7.

The head teachers and deputy heads were interviewed in all four schools. The teachers trained in the PEP were sampled, and accompanied by teachers from standard 7 who were teaching Life Skills and Social Studies. Applying snowball sampling, sometimes the teachers suggested colleagues whom they thought it would be fruitful for me to interview because they had a special story or had been involved in work related to peace. In most cases, I integrated these additional teachers into my schedule. At Upper Hill, I interviewed all the teachers teaching standard 7 because of the small number of teachers in the school.

I left it to each school to decide which parents and SMC members would be interviewed. They generally chose people on the basis of who spoke the best English. I chose to include parents in the interview sample because a study conducted in Israel and Palestine found that parents' attitudes influence on pupils' internalisation of peace values (Yahya, Bekerman, Sagy & Boag, 2012).

Nearly all the interviews were digitally recorded and then transcribed. This was done in order to catch the detailed content of what they were saying. The interviewees were informed about the recorder and most of them agreed to be recorded. In seven instances, the participants did not want to be recorded. In those cases I made notes during the interviews.

Table 2 shows the numbers of interviews conducted and of interviewees in the various schools.



**Table 2: Number of stakeholders interviewed<sup>4</sup>**

<b>Schools/ Institutions</b>	<b>Stake holders</b>	<b>Number of interviews</b>	<b>Number of interviewees</b>
<b>Macheleo</b>	Teachers	7	7
	Pupils	11	35
	Deputy Head	1	1
	Head Teacher	2	1
	Parents	3	6
	SMC	3	5
	<b>Total number</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>St Peters</b>	Teachers	9	9
	Pupils	9	25
	Deputy Head	2	2
	Head Teacher	1	1
	Parents	0	0
	Community partners	1	3
	SMC	1	2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>Upper Hill</b>	Teachers	8	8
	Pupils	9	27
	Deputy Head	1	1
	Head teacher	1	1
	Parents	2	6
	SMC	4	6
	<b>Total</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>Logos</b>	Teachers	9	9
	Pupils	9	29
	Deputy Head	1	1
	Head teacher	1	1
	Parents	2	6
	SMC	2	3
	<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>MEOs/DEOs</b>	Nakuru	1	1
	Nakuru North	1	2
	Eldoret	1	1
	<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>National Officers</b>	KIE	2	2
	MoE	2	2
	UNESCO	1	1
	UNICEF	1	1
	<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Total number</b>		<b>108</b>	<b>202</b>

<sup>4</sup> See appendix 3 for list of interviewees according to location

#### **4.3.2.5 Interview analyses**

Template analysis was found to be a useful way of analysing the interviews, as it allows for the combination of top down and bottom up styles of analysis (King, 2012). Following standard practices in template analysis, I defined some a priori themes before embarking on the analysis. These themes acted as the first codes, and derived mainly from the research questions, the interview guide, and the questions in the questionnaire.

In the next step I applied the template to 16 interviews, including interviews with national stakeholders, DEOs, teachers head teachers, parents, SMCs, and pupils. This was done to ensure that all stakeholder perspectives were taken into account when forming the template. All four schools were represented in the sample. During this coding process a range of new themes were discovered. These were then integrated into the template. The codes in the final template integrated a priori themes and themes deriving from the data itself. I used main codes and sub-codes in the analysis<sup>5</sup>.

The template developed through these steps was then applied to the whole set of transcripts. In cases where new themes of crucial importance emerged during the main data coding, these themes were integrated in the template.

#### **4.3.3 Classroom observation**

Video observations of classes were conducted in order to obtain insight into the pedagogy used when teaching about peace. It was particularly important to gain insight into whether the PEP had impacted on teaching practices in response to RQ 5, and whether teaching was among the activities undertaken to build peace in response to RQ 3. Whereas the interviews and questionnaires gave an account of participants' perspectives and attitudes, participant observations and classroom observations provided an opportunity for me to see the school from a different perspective. Teaching practices were addressed in the interviews, and observing classes gave me an opportunity to cross-check teachers' perceptions of what went on inside the

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<sup>5</sup> See appendix 4 for codes used in Nvivo

classroom from an ‘outsider’s perspective’. I also found during the research that being present in the classes was important in building a relationship with both teachers and pupils.

#### ***4.3.3.1 Unstructured observation***

During phase one, I initially wanted to observe classes taught in Life Skills and Social Studies at Macheleo and St Peters. Both of these subjects are obligatory in the Kenyan education system. Life Skills was chosen because Peace Education is supposed to be integrated into this subject. Social Studies was chosen because it includes modules on peace, democracy and justice. I was also interested in seeing whether the topic of peace was included when other subjects were taught. However, St Peters was not teaching Life Skills despite it being mandatory, and in this school I therefore chose to concentrate on Social Studies.

The schools were informed that I was conducting research on peace-building, but I chose to give very little information on what I was looking for so my observations would be “unobtrusive in character” (Bryman, 2008, p. 411) and I would be a “complete observer” (Gold, 1958). I sat at the back of the classes, and generally neither the teachers nor the pupils seemed to be disturbed by my presence. I was told that it reminded them of when the school was being inspected, which takes place once a year. Both schools had also had researchers visiting before. During phase one the observations were unstructured, and I wrote notes on the content and teaching practices.

#### ***4.3.3.2 Video observation***

Although the open observations in phase one gave me valuable information, particularly with regard to teaching practices, teacher/student relationships, and attitudes towards aspects of peace-building, having reviewed phase one I realised that I needed more systematic observations for phase two. I therefore decided to employ video observations in phase two. This change was made for two reasons. First, I found the exercise very time-consuming, not only because of the time spent in the classroom, but because I could not carry out interviews in the time immediately

before or after the observations. Second, I found that the information which I acquired during the observations was overwhelming, and I found it difficult to make enough notes of both content and interaction in the classroom. Filming the classes would provide ‘hard’ observation data in addition to the field notes from the participant observations.

Observing Life Skills and Social Studies classes fitted the purpose of observations during phase one. The fact that St Peters was not teaching Life Skills was in itself an interesting finding, so I decided to keep those two subjects for phase two. However, I had not taken into consideration the changes which the start of a new year would bring in terms of the curriculum. Whereas towards the end of the year (phase one) the teachers were teaching governance and peace in Social Studies, at the beginning of the second year (phase two) the teachers were concentrating on geography. However, the teaching still provided valuable insights into the dominant classroom pedagogy that teachers used across the curricula.

Only two of the four case-study schools were teaching Life Skills (Macheleo and Logos). At St Peters there were five streams, and it was easy to organise the recording of four Social Studies classes. At Upper Hill, however, there was only one stream, which made the recording of four classes in one subject more complicated. Consequently, I decided to observe two classes in Christian Religious Education in addition to two in Social Studies. I chose Christian Religious Education because the curriculum includes topics into which peace could naturally be integrated. The table below shows the number of classes recorded in each subject across the schools.

**Table 3: Observed classes (video)**

	<b>Social Studies</b>	<b>Life Skills</b>	<b>Christian Religious Education</b>
<b>Macheleo</b>	2	2	
<b>St Peters</b>	4		
<b>Logos</b>	2	2	
<b>Upper Hill</b>	2		2

#### ***4.3.3.3 Analysis of videos***

The recorded classes were analysed through two frameworks. First, critical moments were selected for further analysis (Heath, Hindmarsh & Luff, 2010; Moyles, Hargeaves, Merry, Paterson & Esarte-Sarries, 2003). I watched all the videos, selecting passages where peace either occurred or where peace education was challenged. These passages were then transcribed to allow for triangulation with the interview data.

All video observations were then analysed using a timeline-based observation schedule informed by previous international pedagogical research studies focusing on what can be observed in the act of teaching (i.e. task, activity, interaction, assessment) so as to ensure that the observations of classroom processes were as valid and reliable as was practically possible (Alexander, 2008; Hardman, Ackers, O'Sullivan & Abrishaminiam, 2011)<sup>6</sup>. It allowed for a more objective measure of the frequencies and time spent on key teaching and learning behaviours to ensure the validity and reliability of the findings.

The timeline systematic observation schedule drew upon a 3-part teaching exchange structure that is central to teacher-pupil interaction (Sinclair & Coulthard, 1992; Alexander, 2001). In its prototypical form a teaching exchange consists of three moves: an initiation, usually in the form of a teacher question, a response in which a pupil, or group of pupils, attempts to answer the question, and a follow-up move, in which the teacher provides some form of feedback (very often in the form of an evaluation) to the pupil's response (from now on referred to as IRF).

Research into classroom interaction suggests that the IRF structure can take a variety of forms and functions leading to different levels of pupil participation and engagement, particularly through the use that is made of the follow-up move. Such studies suggest that teacher follow up which goes beyond evaluation of the pupil answers, by asking pupils to expand on their thinking, justify or clarify their opinions, or make connections to their own experiences, can extend the response in order to draw out its significance resulting in the creation of a greater equality of participation. In such cases, the IRF pattern can be said to take on a dialogic

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<sup>6</sup> See appendix 5 for timeline systematic observation schedule

function. In the timeline schedule I recorded the main teaching activities from a list of prompts at five minute intervals throughout each lesson. The timeline analysis is presented in section 6.3.2.

#### **4.3.4 Diaries**

To triangulate the findings on what activities the schools were undertaking that could potentially fuel conflict (research question 2), what activities the schools were undertaking to build peace (research question 3), and the impact of the PEP (research question 4), a diary exercise was carried out with a group of students in each school. The participants were selected from standard 7. The diaries had the following structure<sup>7</sup>:

- 1. Introduction.** In this section, I introduced the research and its purpose, I then explained the task which they were expected to carry out, and guaranteeing anonymity.
- 2. Questionnaire/prompts.** In this section, I listed ten questions starting with ‘How many times ...’ followed by different activities. The questions were intended to function as prompts to guide the diarists in their writing (Bryman, 2008). They were also provided so that the behaviours could be quantified at the end of the week. For each question, a space was provided for a quantification of ‘in the school’ and ‘in the community’ so as to capture the whole lives of the pupils.
- 3. Open question.** The questionnaire included space for the pupils to write a short description of how they understand peace.
- 4. Diary.** Two pages were provided for writing of the diary. A defined space was provided for each day (Monday to Friday).

The diaries were handed out on Mondays. I asked the participants to write the diary each day, and then they were given time on Friday to read through their own writing and quantify their records according to the questionnaires.

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<sup>7</sup> See appendix 6 for pupil diaries

Before handing out the diaries to the whole class, the instrument was piloted by three pupils. As the pilot of the diary worked well I did not make any changes. However, during phase two it became evident that the pupils had not understood the wording in the questionnaire. While they were doing this exercise, I got the feeling that they had not really understood what to do; some were not looking at their writing while filling in the numbers, and some had filled them in before coming to school on Friday. I therefore decided to leave out the questionnaires from my data analysis. Section 4 in the diaries was still used, however. In analysing the diaries I highlighted and transcribed particularly interesting fragments of text to triangulate them with the interview data from the pupils.

#### **4.3.5 Elicitation technique**

Pupils' perceptions of peace and peace-building (research question 3) were collected using an elicitation technique. Elicitation techniques are used in order to allow participants to provide data on personal understandings such as concepts, beliefs or behaviours, and are particularly useful when exploring complex ideas or opinions (Copeland & Agosto, 2012). In this study, an elicitation technique of creating 'ground rules for peace' was carried out to explore pupils' opinions and understandings regarding peace and peace-building. One standard 7 in each school conducted an exercise. Before starting, I gave examples of 'ground rules for passing exams' to explain the exercise for the pupils. I then divided them into groups of four, and gave each group a piece of paper on which they were to make a list of between six and ten ground rules. In the analysis I added up all the ground rules within each school and made one set of rules which reflected the most repeated rules by the pupils.

#### **4.3.6 Documentary data**

Documentary data was collected to gather data on the schools' response to the PEV (research question 1) and what activities the schools were undertaking to build peace (research question 3). Documentary data were collected at the national policy and school level. National policy level documents were provided by UNICEF and

collected from meetings, workshops and conferences documenting government policies and practices relating to peace education. Documentary data was also collected in the schools wherever available, particularly data related to implementation of peace education. This data was secondary, however, and was only used to support and supplement the data collected at the school level.

#### **4.3.7 Questionnaires**

A questionnaire was included in the data collection to triangulate the other largely qualitative findings. The method was primarily chosen for two reasons. First, the standardised responses gave me the opportunity to quantify some of the issues deriving from the four case-study schools. Second, it was used to give an indication of whether the findings from the four schools were represented in other similar schools. Although the latter aim could also have been achieved through interviews, these would not have been time-efficient for the purpose. I decided to carry out the questionnaire survey among teachers. They were key informants in the interviews, and the easiest group to involve in the exercise.

I used purposive sampling for the questionnaires because I targeted schools that were badly affected by the violence and trained in peace education. I was interested in finding out whether the same issues surrounding the implementation of the peace curriculum that I had uncovered in the four case-study schools were being played out in other schools. The initial analysis of data from phase one suggested that the ethnic representation in a school and its urban/rural location affected the attitudes towards ethnicity in the school. This was also an issue that I wanted to address through the questionnaire. As the overall purpose therefore was theory-building, being able to generalize from sample to population was not a priority (May, 2011). I therefore used purposive, non-probability sampling; the selection of schools was made according to known characteristics (May, 2011). Twelve schools in Eldoret and Nakuru were sampled in total, including the 4 case-study schools. The number of respondents in each school ranged from 5 to 30, with an average of 14. The total number of respondents was 172, 111 of whom were from urban schools, and 61 from rural ones. The distribution between Nakuru and Eldoret was more equal, with 78



from Nakuru and 94 from Eldoret. See section 4.2.2 for details on sampling of schools.

As the participant groups were teachers, they were sufficiently literate for a self-completion questionnaire, which ensures that the questions are asked in exactly the same way to each participant. This was also the most practical way, as I could reach all the teachers during a break between lessons thereby causing minimal disruption to the school day. I was, however, present in the room while the teachers were completing the questionnaire. First, this was a way of ensuring the cooperation of the respondents (Fowler, 1988); my presence allowed me to give oral information about myself, the research and the questionnaire, which seemed to motivate the participants to take part in the exercise. My availability during their completion of the questionnaires also allowed them to ask questions wherever something was unclear.

#### ***4.3.7.1 The questionnaire design***

The questionnaire was designed using mainly closed questions, both attitudinal and factual. The list below outlines the different parts of the questionnaire<sup>8</sup>:

- 1. Introduction.** In the introduction to the questionnaire I informed the teachers that the research would be used for my own PhD research as well as on behalf of UNICEF. I then promised confidentiality and anonymity. Finally, I thanked them for their participation. I kept the introduction as brief as possible as I would myself be present and could give a more detailed introduction orally.
- 2. Section 1 a: Classification questions.** The first section was devoted to classification questions where I asked about gender, the name of the school, how long participants had taught in the school, what subjects they were teaching, what standard they taught, and additional responsibilities they had in the school. All of these factors were believed to have an impact on attitudes towards peace-building.

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<sup>8</sup> See appendix 7 for teacher questionnaire sample

- 3. Section 1 b: Definition of peace.** The next question, which asked the participants to give a short definition of what they understand by peace, was the only open question in the questionnaire. The preliminary analysis of the case studies suggested that the understanding of peace varied significantly between the schools. It was therefore not guaranteed that categories made by me would fit all the schools, as I did not know the school culture in the additional eight schools. I therefore kept the question open in order to gather some information that would “reflect the full richness and complexity of the views held by the respondent” (Denscombe, 2010, p. 165).
- 4. Section 2: Factual questions.** In the next section, I included closed questions on the teaching of peace education in the schools, the training received on peace education, and the implementation of the peace-education programme. This information was in itself interesting for my research. It was also collected in order to compare it with opinions and attitudes from the next section in the questionnaire. Through this, I hoped to be able to obtain an impression of relationships between training and implementation of peace education, and opinions and attitudes.
- 5. Section 3: Opinion questions.** Section 3 was made up of questions on attitudes. A three-point scale was used in which the respondents ticked ‘agree’, ‘not sure’ or ‘disagree’. The questions were designed primarily to address attitudes on the need for and possibility of peace-building in schools. Closed questions ease the analysis of responses as pre-coded data can easily be quantified and compared (Denscombe, 2010). A range of limitations are associated with this method, however. First, closed questions can be “problematic if people have not thought about the question which is asked” (May, 2011, p. 111). Similarly, the statements are not likely to reflect “the exact facts or true feelings” (Denscombe, 2010, p. 166). This limitation was, however, compensated through collection of extensive interview data in the case-study schools and section 5 of the questionnaire.
- 6. Section 4: Opinion questions.** In Section 4, opinion questions were asked specifically addressing the peace-education programme. The same attitudinal

scale was used as in Section 3. The section was kept separate from Section 3 in order to address exclusively those using the programme.

- 7. Section 5: Additional information.** Respondents might become frustrated if they do not feel they are given the opportunity to express their full views (Denscombe, 2010). This might particularly be the case when closed questions are used. To compensate for this, I included space at the end of the questionnaire for the respondents to include any additional information which they might wish to give.

The questionnaire was based on the literature review and the qualitative data from the case studies. Knowledge of how words and concepts were understood in the context minimised the chances for ambiguity in the questions. The questionnaire was then piloted at Logos primary school. I sat down with three teachers whom I had already interviewed. While they filled out the questionnaire, I asked them to give me feedback on whether they could easily understand the questions, and other comments and questions they might have. The teachers said that the questionnaire was easy to answer, and had answered it acceptably. I therefore decided to keep the questionnaire in its original form.

#### ***4.3.6.2 Analysing the questionnaire***

In order to analyse the questionnaire, a database was first created in Excel. Variables were then defined for each answer in the questionnaires, including for missing data and 'not applicable'. These codes were recorded in a separate coding book. To ensure that the questionnaires were coded correctly, the data was first checked for errors within the variables, that only possible numbers were found in each row (Pallant, 2010). I then double coded 10 percent of the sample (17 questionnaires). One mistake was found during this check for accuracy. A new 5 percent of the sample was then checked, and no mistakes were found. The data was then considered substantially correct, and the data was uploaded to SPSS (IBM Corporation, Armonk, NY, USA). The analysis carried out involved solely descriptive statistics, namely frequencies and chi-square. As most of the responses were categorical variables, using frequencies was the best way to present the answers (Pallant, 2010).

As discussed in the section above, the questionnaire was partly used to explore issues that had emerged in the case-study interviews and observations. To explore possible relationships between categories I systematically went through all the items in the questionnaire and noted where a relationship would be of interest for the study. These were then run through the chi-square to test for statistical significance in the relationships. For questions where the categories were agree/not sure/disagree, only 'agree' and 'disagree' categories were included in statistical comparisons. Notes were taken of all the results. In line with common educational research practice, an alpha level of 0.05 was adopted. All reported p-values are two-sided.

#### **4.4 Ethical considerations**

The research was initially approved by the university's departmental ethics committee. The research strategies were further discussed with UNICEF and local school authorities. In addition, the following four ethical issues were considered; whether the research would cause harm to the participants, whether there was informed consent, whether there was an invasion of privacy, and whether deception was involved (Bryman, 2008).

*(i) Cause no harm*

The term 'harm' is in this context referred to any negative consequence caused to the participants taking part in the study. In my research, the greatest challenge in this respect was related to the interviews about the PEV. As a large majority of the participants had traumatic memories from the time of the violence, there was a danger that the interviews would stir up trauma and indeed cause real psychological harm. The pupils were never interviewed on their own, so that they would have the comfort of fellow pupils at all times. Extreme caution was paid to the pupils throughout the interviews, and whenever I sensed difficulty for the pupils I directed the conversation to a new topic. I also worked closely with the teachers and administration of the schools at all times so that there was awareness around what I was doing, and which pupils were involved.

(ii) *Informed consent*

The local school authorities were consulted before any research was conducted in any of the schools, both for the case studies and the larger sample of survey schools. Information was thereby given to the head teacher on the topic of my research and the activities carried out in the school, and the head teachers approved my research in each school. Informed consent was then given by all the individual participants. Before each research exercise, I informed the participants about the research, asked if they wanted to participate and made it clear that they could withdraw from the research at any point. Although no-one withdrew from the research altogether, seven participants did not want their interviews to be recorded, in which case I made extensive notes during the interview which were later written up.

(iii) *Privacy*

All the research was designed to take place within the school, and throughout the whole period I was an overt researcher. The participants therefore knew that I was there to carry out research. As described above, informed consent was given by all participants in the study, and the participants were free to withdraw from the study at any time or refuse to answer questions. I further assured participants that I would not 'push' them to answer questions where they were reluctant to do so. This was particularly relevant in Eldoret, where the participants were more reluctant to discuss the events of the PEV than in Nakuru. Anonymity is ensured through the changing of all names of schools and participants.

(iv) *Deception*

Regarding deception, I decided to be transparent with the participants about what I was doing. I informed the schools that I was researching peace-building in schools. Although this carried the risk of them changing their behaviour, I also think that co-operation was the best way to acquire the information I needed.

#### **4.5 Trustworthiness and authenticity**

Although most studies have traditionally been rated with reference to reliability and validity, scholars have argued that it is more suitable to measure qualitative research

according to trustworthiness and authenticity (Bryman, 2008). Although my study was mixed-methods, qualitative methods accounted for the main part of the data collected, and I will therefore argue that the research is both trustworthy and authentic.

(i) *Trustworthiness*

In order to ensure trustworthiness, measures were taken to increase credibility, conformability and transferability (Bryman, 2008). As “there can be several possible accounts of an aspect of social reality”, an important task for any researcher in social sciences is to make sure the findings represent the lived reality of the research subjects (Bryman, 2008, p. 377). As respondent validation was impossible in this study because of: the large numbers of participants, the location being in Kenya, and the sensitive nature of the topic, credibility was addressed through triangulation. As discussed in this chapter a range of methods were used within each school so findings could be cross checked. The conclusions arrived at are therefore based on numerous accounts from a range of methods.

The triangulation of methods also worked to ensure conformability which means not letting “personal values or theoretical inclinations manifestly to sway the conduct of the research and findings deriving from it” (Bryman, 2008, p. 379). It was important to my study that the voices of the school populations were represented objectively. I therefore triangulated methods, to ensure that even if the findings from one method were influenced by the researcher so as to misrepresent the reality and opinions of the participants, findings from other methods would steer me to the most appropriate conclusions.

As discussed in section 4.1, the case-study approach is concerned with depth rather than breadth (Bryman, 2008). Therefore, to ensure transferability so that the findings can be generalised, details on context must be provided to the reader. I have approached this on three levels. Firstly, chapter 2 gives a detailed introduction to the Kenyan context, describing the political economy of the country in which the PEP was set. Secondly, chapter 4 describes the wider educational setting and the policies on peace education. And finally, each of the sections in chapter 5 presenting the case-studies is introduced with a section on the context of the specific school in

which the study was carried out. In sum, these chapters give the necessary contextual information for the identification of factors that could be appropriate to other schools affected by the PEV.

(ii) *Authenticity*

Authenticity is concerned with the wider political impact of the research. Through triangulation and staying close to the data, an attempt is made to fairly represent the variety of views found within the schools. Further, the focus of the research raised awareness around peace-building in the schools. In one school, a teacher told me that the pupils would tell their parents that peace-building was important because there was someone in their school working on it. The teacher was convinced that through my research the community would gain raised awareness on the importance of peace-building. One school also asked whether I could help them to set up a peace club. Consequently I gave information on how a peace club could be run. I also encouraged all the schools to make full use of the peace-education programme. In that way I think my study had an impact on the participants and their surroundings.

## **4.6 Conclusion**

My research project set out to answer the question ‘What role has basic education played in peace-building following the PEV in Kenya?’ To answer this question, a multiple case-study approach was adopted to allow for in-depth analysis of school cultures and their practices. Nakuru and Eldoret were found to be suitable locations for the research due to their involvement in the PEV and the timing of the distribution of PEP materials. Both urban and rural schools were included in the sample to investigate the influence of context on peace education implementation. Within each of the four schools a range of qualitative methods were adopted for triangulation purposes, including documentary analysis, participant observations, classroom observations, semi-structured interviews, diaries and elicitation technique. Interviews comprised the largest data set, and template analysis was adopted to include both theory identified in the previous chapter and the participants’ own voices on the theory generating. Structured analysis of video-observed classes was

also used to gain insight into pedagogy and teaching practices in the respective schools. To triangulate the case-study findings further, a questionnaire survey was designed to explore the emerging issues in a larger number of schools. The findings from the questionnaire will be discussed in chapter 6. In the following chapter the findings from the case studies will be discussed.



## Chapter 5: Peace on the ground: Four case studies

Each of the four case studies tells their own story about the relationship between education and peace. This chapter tells their stories, based on the data collection described in the previous chapter. The schools are presented in different sections to allow their individual contexts and practices to be thoroughly discussed. At Macheleo, the head teacher was a national trainer in peace education, and the school as a whole was actively working to integrate peace-building into their teaching and school life. At St Peters they argued that there was no need for peace education, as the violence in the country had stopped. The third school, Logos, had interpreted peace education largely as counselling and as a way of settling back to normality. The school was therefore not actively building peace at the time the research was carried out. In the community surrounding Upper Hill the violence had hit particularly hard, and members of the community had participated as perpetrators. This context made it difficult for the school to address peace, as it was seen as too sensitive a topic. In sum, the analysis provides a range of peace-building practices that could be argued to contribute to peace in the school and communities. However, the chapter also argues that the context largely influences the willingness and ability to embark on such a task, and the bottom-down approach of the PEP is questioned.

## **5.0 Introduction**

This chapter will discuss the case-study findings of the study. As I argued in the methodology chapter, a case-study design was chosen in order to gain an in-depth understanding of the role education can play in peace-building. In order to best answer the research question and to ensure transferability, the decision was made to present the case-study schools in separate sections. This structure will further allow for a more in-depth analysis of the school contexts and a more detailed discussion of the findings from each school.

Each school section will draw on all the semi-structured interviews undertaken with stakeholders in the schools, participant observations, pupil diaries and the elicitation technique. Contextual information on each of the schools is provided covering school location and ethnic composition. This is followed by a discussion of how the PEV impacted on the schools and their surrounding communities. The main part of each section comprises of a discussion on peace-building practices in the school and relevant factors influencing this.

The first school, Macheleo, was found to be the most committed among the four in promoting a culture of peace in the school. They had integrated peace education into the curriculum through the teaching of Life Skills and by ensuring that it featured in the teaching of other subjects such as Social Studies and Christian Religious Education. The strong engagement in peace education at this school was particularly attributed to the external support the school had received in the light of the head teacher being a national trainer of peace education. The head teacher in turn monitored the teaching of peace among the teachers, and gave them new input whenever she thought it necessary. That the school stressed that peace-building had to take place within each individual also inspired the peace-building work. Peace messages were observed to feature in a range of settings, including teaching, on displays in the school, in the morning assembly, at parent meetings, and in the Peace Club. In sum, the section argues that external support and follow ups, committed school leadership, and an understanding of peace that can be related to the individual level are all important for sustainable peace education.

Although the second school, St Peters, had previously made efforts to build a culture of peace, by the time I visited it they were neither using the PEP materials nor building peace through other activities. This change in school ethos was reported to have taken place with the change in head teachers. This clearly illustrates what will be argued in the section on Macheleo; that committed school leadership is crucial for the sustainability of the programme. It was surprising to see that the school had been able to abandon the peace-building practices, such as the teaching of peace education, and the Peace Club without any external monitoring or inspections noticing it. The understanding of peace did not contribute to the school's motivation. As peace was merely understood as absence of violence, the school did not see the necessity of peace-building initiatives in their present situation. However, according to my analysis there was a gap between the general perception in the school that peace was prevailing and the culture of violence that was evident from the stakeholder interviews and observations.

In the third school, Logos, it was found that there had been an initial commitment to reconciliation and peace-building following the PEV by the head teacher and his staff, but that it had not been sustained once the violence had subsided in the local community and beyond. The issue of external support will again be raised, in addition to the national implementation process which signalled that the programme was merely a reaction to the violence and created to encourage the schools and communities to return to normality.

The fourth school, Upper Hill, had been heavily affected by the violence. The community had committed acts of violence on a minority ethnic group, and all the Kikuyus had fled the school, not to return. The school came across as reluctant to implement the PEP programme, as it was felt it might be a driver of conflict, by stirring up contentious issues that are best avoided, and because it was seen as tantamount to admitting their guilt. The PEP materials had thus never been used in the school despite the training having taken place. The section raises questions about the relevance of the PEP and the need for a localised approach to follow ups.

## **5.1 Macheleo: Peace starts with me**

### **5.1.0 Introducing Macheleo**

In this section I will describe and discuss what role Macheleo was playing in peace-building. In the analysis, I will argue that, compared with the other three schools, it was the most advanced in terms of implementing the PEP. The importance given to peace-building was reflected in the ethos of the school, which became particularly evident in the ground rules for peace created by the pupils through an elicitation technique. Peace education was infused in the school, and consequently peace-building was found in many and varied practices. The school was being supported by UNICEF through PEP and the child friendly schools initiative and, as will be argued, there was evidence that these interventions were having an impact by helping to build a culture of peace in the school and surrounding community.

As discussed in Chapter 4, a range of data collection methods were used across all four case studies, including semi-structured interviews, participant observations, video observations, questionnaires, diaries and an elicitation technique. The semi-structured interviews provided the largest data set for the study, with the main bulk of the data being collected at Macheleo; a total number of 55 stakeholders were interviewed, including 7 teachers, 35 pupils, the deputy head, the head teacher, 6 parents and 5 members of the SMC (see the methodology chapter for further details on sampling and amount of data collected). Drawing on my data analysis, this section will discuss the most important roles the school played in peace-building and the impact of these at the school and community levels. The section will focus on the thematic areas raised in the research questions: the schools' response to the PEV, activities potentially fuelling violence, peace-building activities, the school as a positive peace-building force in the community, the effect of the PEV on the school population, and factors influencing attitudes towards peace-building.

The section starts by giving necessary contextual information on the school and community, including school composition and descriptions of the PEV. The contextual information creates the backdrop for my analysis of the role the school played in peace-building in the local community. The school had a range of peace promoting initiatives in place, such as a peace club, peace parades, displays of peace

messages, and school councils. Through this, the school was actively building peace on several levels, ranging from inner peace within individuals, facilitating interaction and relationships between individuals and groups, and work at a policy level, enhancing democracy within the school and beyond. Each of these aspects will be discussed in turn before some overarching conclusions are drawn from the analysis.

### **5.1.1 Contextualising Macheleo**

Contextual information about the community in general and the school in particular is necessary in order to understand what role the school played in peace-building. Such contextual information is also crucial in case-study research as it sets the ground for transferability (see 4.5). I have therefore chosen to give an account of the context of the school before moving on to describe the PEV in the community and the school.

Macheleo is a Catholic all-girls' school located in the city centre of Nakuru. The school had, according to the register, a total enrolment of 1036 girls in primary classes, and 72 in ECD, adding up to a total of 1108 pupils. The school did not keep a record of the tribes represented in the school. However, the head teacher repeatedly claimed that they had all the tribes of Kenya represented. Although this claim is most probably an expression of positivity towards tribal diversity rather than an exact fact, the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luhya, Kiisi, Kamba, Meru and El Molo were mentioned by name in teacher interviews, suggesting that the school had children representing a wide range of tribes. According to the head teacher, the majority of the pupils in the school were Christian, but there were also Muslim girls in the school. From my observations the minority groups were accepted and well integrated into the school.

According to the head teacher, the school composition had changed slightly during and after the PEV. She claimed that the school lost students originating from Nyansa in 2008, but that many of these pupils had returned by 2010. She further claimed that there was an influx of pupils from the central province; particularly Kikuyu coming from Eldoret and Kisumu. In the next section I will discuss the nature of the PEV in the school and community, in order to gain an understanding of the background for the peace-building efforts.

### **5.1.2 Macheleo and the post-election violence**

As the literature review established (section 2.1), Nakuru was heavily affected by the violence, which was part of the reason why this location was chosen (section 4.2.1). In this section I will discuss the nature of the PEV in the school and surrounding community in order to discuss the influence this context had on the role education played in peace-building. The section responds to research question 1.

The school population in Macheleo was in general very open and expressive. The topic of the PEV was no exception, and this section therefore builds on an account of narratives richer than the other case studies. Each interviewee had their own narrative to tell, which gave the impression that they had previously been given time to talk. The descriptions of the PEV were also closely connected with the passion for peace-building expressed in the interviews.

From the accounts describing the violence in Nakuru, two particularly important factors stood out. First, the narrative descriptions of the violence unambiguously asserted that the perpetrators were mainly “outsiders” rather than neighbours. The Mungiki was regularly mentioned as the main negative force involved (section 2.2). Second, as discussed in section 2.2, the PEV is widely interpreted as an ethnic conflict, and Nakuru was no exception. Nakuru was commonly described as a cosmopolitan city with a wider range of ethnicities represented. Although the interviewees at Macheleo were generally positive in their descriptions of the multi-ethnic community, there were also critical voices, pointing out that mixed ethnicities could make the community more prone to violence.

The whole city was affected by the violence, and narratives of fear and trauma reoccurred repeatedly in the interviews. Many of the interviewees had witnessed violence at close quarters, or had been affected themselves. From my observations, the children who witnessed others being affected by violence were also traumatised. Seeing friends and acquaintances drop out of school, and children becoming orphaned or street children were both described as particularly traumatic. The pupil interviewees expressed regret that they were not able to help their friends. The feeling of helplessly watching others being hurt was bitterly described, and it seemed like these experiences had been life changing for the pupils.

The PEV was described as a dramatic time for the school population by all of the interviewees. The day when the school closed, and the pupils had to be held by their parents was described as particularly traumatic. The two weeks school closure served to illustrate how severe the violence had been, and the pupils expressed how they feared their absence from school would affect their future. Pupils from three of the eleven focus group interviews said that they would have preferred being in school to being at home, as there was peace in the school whereas at home they did not feel at peace. That the school embraced a culture of peace prior to and during the PEV will be discussed later in this section (5.1.3.1). The majority of the boarders remained in the school during the violence, together with the boarding mistress. This was described as particularly traumatic for both the head teacher and the boarding mistress.

After the violence had calmed down, the school reopened, and the students trickled in after being encouraged to come back by the head teacher, teachers and fellow pupils. However, all focus group interviews with pupils described reasons that had prevented them from returning to school when it first opened; a lack of resources such as school materials, uniforms, food, and money for fees were mentioned, as well as continuous displacement.

Eight out of the eleven focus group interviews with pupils reported that they had been displaced from their homes during the violence. Three types of displacement were described. First, since the violence broke out during the school holidays, many were already in rural areas. Many families chose to remain in their new locations until the violence calmed down, and were therefore displaced from their homes for a period of from two weeks to three months. Second, some families fled their homes spontaneously and camped for shorter periods of time in churches, police station or with relatives. These displacements were also described as lasting for a shorter period of time. Third, some people fled from their homes to IDP camps. Nakuru hosted a number of IDP camps. Macheleo as a result received more than 100 new pupils and 5 new teachers due to displacements in 2008. Despite the numbers of IDPs that came to the school, the enrolment decreased from 1057 in 2007 to 998 in 2008, illustrating the fact that large numbers left the school during the clashes.

IDP camps were located in close proximity to the school, and the IDPs were described with compassion. According to the interviews, the IDPs had been received well in the school, and the children emphasised that they had shared what they could with those in need. As discussed above, witnessing trauma among other pupils was also traumatic.

For the main part, the present situation in Nakuru was described as peaceful by the interviewees. Despite describing the community as being at peace, the interviewees were also pointing to drivers of conflict which were still present in the community. One of these issues was regarding justice – the fact that the violence had never been thoroughly dealt with, and that the perpetrators had not been held accountable for their crimes. In short, justice had not been done, a feeling illustrated in two quotes by pupils: “Our neighbour, she was there. She used to wanting to cut us because we were the Luos” (pupil 30 interview). “And the thing that is disturbing me is that our neighbour wanted to destroy us” (pupil 23 interview). The quotes illustrate how most of the children still felt vulnerable to further outbreaks of violence. It seemed that, although the community was of present peaceful, they had not left the violence completely behind. The lack of a truth and reconciliation process could have contributed to this.

Despite this, all of the interviewees were optimistic about the next election; they thought Kenyans had learnt their lesson in 2008, that the new constitution provided a new ‘foundation wall’ for peace, and that the country was now better prepared with peace-keeping forces. In addition, they thought the ICC would stop politicians from inciting violence again. Despite the optimism among the interviewees about the prospect for a peaceful election, the interview data also revealed unresolved issues, like the lack of justice illustrated in the above quotes. The optimism could therefore partly be interpreted as expressions of hopes and wishes.

This section has set the scene for the discussion of peace-building. At Macheleo, the school population had personally experienced the PEV. Despite these experiences, the school had managed to preserve a culture of peace throughout the critical time, and in the months and years that followed. This not only provides



evidence of the school's resilience, but supports the findings that there was a strong commitment to peace-building in the school. Three factors in particular will feature in later discussions; that the perpetrators mainly came from the "outside", that the school had an ethnically-mixed community and the lack of truth and justice processes. These emerged as important contextual factors influencing the peace-building processes, and will emerge in the following section on findings from Macheleo.

### **5.1.3 A culture of peace at Macheleo?**

"So when we went for the workshop I really sat and listened. And then I started this crusade of peace" (head teacher 1 interview). As this quote illustrates, my evidence from Macheleo suggested it was a school committed to making progress in peace-building. In this section, I will discuss findings on the peace work in the school. In addition to the head teacher, two other teachers who had attended the PEP workshop were still working in the school. Following the workshop all the teachers were trained internally in the school, and according to the head teacher she had provided several follow ups on the training. Each of the teachers had one copy of the PEP materials, and teaching it was incorporated into Life Skills which was timetabled. However, the teachers and head teacher stressed that the teaching of peace was not restricted to Life Skills, but was supposed to be integrated into all subjects. The head teacher described an effective monitoring system of teaching peace in her interview; she personally checked the teachers' schemes of work within two weeks of the term starting, and checked their lesson plans fortnightly. Whenever the teachers were not incorporating peace into their lesson planning, she called them together and addressed the importance of peace. In addition, the school claimed to be preaching peace in every annual general meeting with parents, class meeting and the SMC meetings. Although I was unable to observe any of these meetings, I did observe the head teacher, teachers and pupils promoting peace messages in parent meetings, the school assembly and at a meeting preparing standard 8 for their final exams.

In the next subsections I will discuss the different approaches to peace-building that the school was putting in place, including building a culture of peace,

fostering inner peace, imparting knowledge and advocating for peace, encouraging peaceful behaviours, teaching for attitudinal change, facilitating reconciliation and sustainable friendships between pupils, promoting the notion of citizenship, and giving pupils a voice in how the school was run. The last sub-section of this section will discuss what more the school could do to develop awareness of the political backdrop of the PEV in order to make the pupils more resistant to future incitements to violence.

### ***5.1.3.1 Building a culture of peace***

In response to research questions 3 and 5, I will in this section discuss how Macheleo encouraged a culture of peace and how it provided an example of peaceful coexistence for the community. The section starts by a conceptualisation of the culture of peace. I will then move on to discuss the culture of peace in terms of safety kept during the PEV, non-violence efforts, and mediation skills. Finally I will discuss efforts made to achieve equality: across religion, tribes and statuses.

The varied practices discussed in this section could all be synthesised in the term ‘culture of peace’:

As you come in you will find that on the roof there is written “peace starts with me, embrace it too”. So anybody coming in knows that this is a peace zone. So you cannot just come with any negative things around the place (teacher 1 interview).

The above quote by a teacher illustrates how the school promoted a culture of peace. First, the quote suggests that the peace message was communicated to any person entering the compound, illustrating how the whole compound was seen as a peace culture. She further explained how this message encouraged people to let go of negative feelings when they entered the compound, illustrating how peace was seen as a state that has to be actively fought for.

The school as a culture of peace was maintained throughout the PEV crisis. The school administration called on extra guards to protect the school to ensure its safety. Staff of different ethnicities also stayed in the school throughout the violence

and managed to keep co-operating despite the tribal clashes taking place outside the school. For example, the Kikuyu worker left the compound to buy food when the Mungiki were threatening the other tribes and other colleagues were thus in danger. That the school was also concerned to keep the compound a culture of peace during the PEV illustrates the strong commitment in the school population. It also suggests that there was a commitment there before the training in the PEP.

At the time of the research the teachers were preaching non-violence in the school, reminding the pupils about the negative consequences of violence, and teaching them about violence at different levels. As part of the focus on non-violence, the teachers were encouraged to replace corporal punishment with other discipline strategies. The head teacher claimed that corporal punishment had been expelled from the school altogether, and the teachers in the staffroom passionately explained how “it only installs fear”. Although corporal punishment was never mentioned in any of the pupil interviews, the diaries suggest that it was still practiced to some extent in the school. As one diary described: “Today I had witnessed some two girls being caned. The girl was caned for not finishing the teachers work and the second for being late” (pupil diary 7). The head teacher confirmed that the pupils were given an occasional slap over the fingers. However, the following quote indicates that it could be worse at times: “Some of my school class mate was being beaten thirteen canes, but I didn’t feel good” (pupil diary 8).

Despite this quote, most pupils came across as feeling confident and safe in the presence of the teachers and the head teacher. For example, when the pupils came late for parade, they walked confidently to their place in the rows. This was in stark contrast to St Peters and Logos, where pupils were made to sit at the gate and wait when they came late, and were severely punished when the parade was over. At Macheleo the pupils were often seen in the staff room where they were welcomed by the teachers when seeking advice. Further, they approached the teachers when they entered the school compound, contrasting with St Peters where they were often seen to run away when teachers approached them.

The school was also encouraging non-violence through teaching mediation skills as a way of overcoming conflict without violence. The pupils were actively

involved in these processes; as one pupil explained: “When someone other have conflict we create peace by listening to their problems and then we settle down. Then now we start talking, but not talking about others, but we talk to each other” (pupil 34 interview). The quote illustrates the weight given to dialogue. Mediation and conflict resolution will be discussed in further detail in section 5.1.3.4.

Whereas the above efforts were mainly focused on expelling violence from the school and thereby promoting negative peace, the school was also building positive peace through working for equality across classes, tribes and religions. Efforts to change tribal attitudes are described in section 5.1.3.5. In short, the school was preaching anti-tribalism and appeared to be treating the people of different tribes equally. The school had also banished the use of the mother tongue on school grounds to encourage a sense of national identity. A similar approach was also taken towards religious identity, summed up by the head teacher as “we have no religion in this school” (head teacher 1 interview).

That ethnic and religious minorities were integrated in the school was visible in the school council, where a Somali Muslim was elected to be the minister for peace and justice. That a Muslim girl was chosen as the minister for peace and justice illustrates the attitudes held towards diversity in the school. Although she was a national and school minority according to both tribe and religion, she had been given the majority of the votes cast. Apart from such illustrations it is difficult to measure whether all tribes were treated equally. However, the head teacher said that she refused to speak in her own mother tongue, even to the parents of the same tribe as hers, which indicates an attitude where tribes are not taken into account.

The school encouraged a general culture of sharing and a sense of community. On one occasion, the deputy head teacher told the teachers off in the staff room because they had not paid the 200 shillings they were supposed to have paid, when a colleague was bereaved. On this occasion, it was the cook who was bereaved, and the teachers were supposed to contribute towards the funeral. The deputy head argued that it did not make any difference that it was the cook and not a fellow teacher, and the teachers agreed and paid the money. Although there seemed to be some reservation among the teachers, the incident clearly illustrates the

administration's approach to equality. Similar practices to equalise status were encouraged among the pupils. For example, each class had a minister for health who was responsible for checking if all the pupils in the class had food for lunch. Whenever a child did not have lunch, there was a procedure to follow, including checking if anyone in the class had enough to share, and bringing the issue to the notice of the teacher. Through such practices the school worked towards equality and positive peace in the school.

In this section I have discussed the school as a culture of peace. Through being a peace culture, the school illustrated for the learners how a peaceful society can be built. An example was also provided for the wider society. Both negative and positive peace were strived towards. Maintaining safety, encouraging non-violence, and teaching mediation skills all contributed to a state of negative peace, where violence was abolished. While analysis of the other schools will show that the peace efforts were mainly striving towards negative peace, Macheleo also worked towards achieving positive peace. This was mainly done through striving towards equality; across religions, ethnic boundaries and statuses. Putting the practices together illustrates the holistic approach adopted by the school; peace work was not only part of the work in the school, but seemed to pervade everything they did. In the next section, the more philosophical stand of the school's peace work will be discussed, which I will argue laid the foundation for the peace work, namely inner peace.

#### ***5.1.3.2 Fostering inner peace***

In response to research question 5 I will in this section discuss the understanding of peace at Macheleo and how it influenced pupils' and teachers' attitudes towards peace-building. Peace was interpreted holistically in the school, and 'inner peace' was often used when describing their work. Inner peace can be understood as a state within each individual, and is commonly used in non-violent peace movements across religions and contexts. Inner peace was mentioned by all groups of stakeholders interviewed, making it a crucial part of the school's work. Striving towards inner peace had first been a reaction to the PEV; now it was used as a

response to a range of difficulties the school population was facing in their daily lives.

The collective understanding of peace in the school was that it had to start from within each individual, as illustrated in the school slogan: “Peace starts with me, embrace it too!”. The data gave an unambiguous impression that peace had grown to mean far more than the absence of conflict in the school. Peace was repeatedly described as “being calm”, which applied to a variety of settings. That the school adopted a bottom-up approach to peace-building contributed to making peace a state every individual had to work for, which could explain part of the success the school had in its peace-building mission.

The focus on inner peace in the school can probably best be described as peace of mind. As one pupil illustrated in her diary: “I felt I had no peace when my pen was missing. In the community I felt I had no peace when I lost the keys to our house but later I found them” (pupil diary 1). The children and staff said that when feelings of pain came up, they exercised meditation to replace these negative feelings with a state of mental peace. One example was a conversation between two teachers in a break. The husband of one of the teachers was very ill in hospital.

Teacher A: Can you have peace?

Teacher B: [sighs] Yeah, it starts with me, I have to embrace it.

Teacher A: Amen.

As the sample conversation illustrates, peace was seen as a state of mind one should strive towards, regardless of how stressful the circumstances are. This approach to peace left the school population with a feeling of being empowered. Reaching a state of peace was within everyone’s reach every day, in any circumstance.

Religious practices were also used to strive towards inner peace. Religion in general plays a major role in Kenya, and as Macheleo was a Catholic school, Christian practices dominated. According to my observations, inner peace was strived towards through both teaching about being at peace with God and through

prayer. In addition to helping the pupils to concentrate on mental peace, prayer provided an opportunity for the children to feel that they were doing something for their country and that they were making a difference. The pupils repeatedly explained in the interviews how they were encouraged to pray to God for the leaders of the country, and that Kenya might have peace. Regardless of religious conviction, prayer can be argued to be a way in which the pupils had the space to focus on peace. Prayer could therefore be argued to be an awareness raising activity.

Guidance and counselling was another activity which aimed at achieving inner peace. The pupils were encouraged to forget the past in order to have peace with themselves. It seemed like this was the conclusion of much of the guidance and counselling given. In several of the lessons and peace club meetings I attended, the children were encouraged to forget the past or asked whether they had forgotten the past, which the pupils affirmed. Forgetting was seen as necessary to move on. However, the teacher leading the Peace Club said in her interview that it was impossible to forget the PEV trauma, which contradicted what she told the Peace Club members during meetings. Drawing on these observations, inner peace could be interpreted as a means of overcoming trauma as well as of being calm in stressful situations. The teaching of Life Skills and peace education were also seen as bringing about inner peace. This was because the teachers were helping the pupils to find peace with themselves through giving them tools to cope with daily challenges which could potentially disturb their peace.

Peace was also strongly associated with well-being. For example, when I attended a peace club meeting, the leader of the Peace Club emphasised the importance of access to sanitary pads. She then explained the connection between this and peace; namely that when the children lacked sanitary pads, it was difficult for them to be at peace. She also made the club members repeat “when we are healthy we are at peace”, clearly illustrating the connection between well-being and peace.

What I would argue to be a particularly striking aspect of the understanding of peace in this school was how it was upheld as a concept to be actively fought for by everyone. The goal of peace had not been achieved, although the country at

present was at peace. This understanding of peace gave peace education constant relevance, and seemed to have a great influence on the peace work in the school. That peace was first and foremost interpreted as a state within each individual empowered the school population in their peace-building. They said that they believed community peace had to be built through one individual at a time being at peace. This understanding made the school population very powerful, as they actually influenced the peace situation in a very concrete way. The violent powers in society were pacified, as tools were developed to cope with any circumstance, and to allow the person concerned to remain at peace with themselves. The pupils and teachers alike seemed empowered; they were fighting the violent powers in society by being peaceful in every thought and action throughout the day.

I would argue that the concept of inner peace and the central place this was given in the school's work is vital to the whole understanding of peace-building at Macheleo. In contrast to the other schools, where they argued peace had to be achieved at a national level, Macheleo took a bottom-up approach and made peace achievable for every individual. That peace-building was necessary for every individual only strengthened the relevance of peace work. One way in which the need for peace was communicated was through the preaching of peace messages. In the next section the advocating and teaching for peace will be discussed.

### ***5.1.3.3 Imparting knowledge and advocating peace***

Like the other case-study schools, Macheleo advocated peace through peace messages. However, the school also gave thorough teaching on peace, through the PEP and integrated into other subjects. In this section, I will respond to research questions 3 and 4 by discussing the two approaches for promoting peace, starting with the advocating of peace messages before moving on to the teaching of peace.

Peace messages pervaded the school. The school motto was painted on all the ridges of the roofs: "Peace starts with me, embrace it too". Peace messages were also displayed in the head teacher's office and in the staff room. The head teacher explained that they tried to make the focus on peace work visible for anyone entering the school compound. That peace work was given a central place in the school was



confirmed in interviews with all stakeholders in the school. The two following quotes illustrate this: “Peace message, we were using it and teaching it in season and out of season. Everywhere you are just talking about peace” (teacher 2 interview). “The teacher talked about peace two times. She had to teach us to be of peace. And we must be peace makers so our school could be recognised because of peace” (pupil diary 13).

As the quotes above illustrate, peace messages were described as to having pervaded the school since the teachers took part in the PEP training. The Peace Club members also held a particular responsibility for spreading messages on peace. The members performed songs, poems and small dramas in the school assembly fortnightly. This responsibility was stated in the Peace Club Rules. I observed one of these assemblies, which because of its focus was referred to as a “peace parade” by teachers, school administration and pupils. The parade was led by a teacher, but the pupils were responsible for the main bulk of the content. In particular, the Peace Club performed poems, dances and songs on AIDS, Malaria, hand washing, saying no to sex, and sanitary towels; a variety of topics which reaffirms the wide interpretation of peace described above in the section on inner peace. Peace was also the focus of the talks given by the school MP for Peace and Justice, and the School President in the assembly. In addition, the whole school prayed the prayer of Saint Francis in chorus: “Make me a channel of thy peace”.

That the school had integrated peace messages into most areas of their school work shows a strong awareness of the role of the school in peace-building. However, the messages of peace in themselves were mainly encouraging peace without addressing the causes of conflict, and its effectiveness in peace-building on its own can thus be questioned. It is therefore crucial that the school was complementing the preaching of peace messages with more thorough teaching of peace. The peace teaching was described as being integrated into most subjects. However, the PEP was also integrated as part of Life Skills, which was timetabled to take place once a week for all classes in the school. Life Skills and the PEP were integrated with each other, and as peace was interpreted holistically, skills for life were seen as part of teaching peace. The PEP materials were also strongly influencing the teaching of peace in the school. Indeed, the core values of peace were mentioned by several interviewees as

being the goal of the teaching, indicating that the interviewees had been learning from the programme. In the Peace Club peace and peaceful behaviours were taught in more depth.

Video-observations showed that although most of the teaching was teacher-centred, the teachers did ask open questions to the pupils, such as “Can you give examples of emotions we have?”, “How can we handle negative emotions so that we can stay at peace with others?” and “What different relationships do you have with people?”. Through these questions the pupils were brought into the lesson and were given an opportunity to relate the topic to their own reality. Towards the end of one of the Life Skills classes the pupils were also given the opportunity to raise questions *they* had on the topic. The video observations will be discussed further in section 6.3.2.

In response to research questions 3 and 4, this section has discussed the preaching and teaching of peace. I have argued that the preaching of peace shows awareness and engagement, but that the effectiveness of the approach is limited by its lack of involvement in the causes of conflict. Similarly, the teaching of peace and peace mechanisms lacked contextualisation, and did not address the roots of the conflict. This weakness will be further illustrated through discussion of the teaching of politics later in the chapter (5.1.3.9). In the next section I will discuss the encouragement of peaceful behaviours. Preaching and teaching about peace was not an isolated initiative, rather the pupils were encouraged to make the knowledge influence their everyday actions.

#### ***5.1.3.4 Encouraging peaceful behaviours***

This section responds to research questions 3 and 4 by discussing the promotion of peace-keeping and peace-building behaviours described by all the 55 interviewees in the school. I will start this section by discussing the peace-building behaviours; how the school worked towards achieving a society of positive peace where there is equality and justice. I will then move on to focus on peace-keeping behaviours encouraged in the school: namely behaviours that aim at resolving already existing or emerging conflict. Among the peace-keeping behaviours, I will focus particularly on

conflict resolution and mediation skills. My analysis suggests that the pupils had a profound understanding of the connection between individuals' actions and peace-building.

Peace-building behaviours were repeatedly described in the interviews. This included being a good citizen, such as being honest and co-operative and showing love and concern for others. These behaviours were often mentioned in relation to the PEV, but the pupils also pointed out that they emphasised them at the time of the interviews. In the elicitation technique, when pupils were creating ground rules for peace, there was a strong focus on peace-building behaviours.

**Table 4: Ground rules for peace at Macheleo**

<b>Ground rule for peace</b>	<b>Frequency</b>
Good behaviours	<b>21</b>
Love each other	<b>15</b>
Co-operate	<b>13</b>
Respect others	<b>12</b>
Avoid fighting	<b>11</b>
Don't gossip	<b>8</b>
Advise each other	<b>6</b>
Obey others	<b>6</b>

The ground rules for peace created by the pupils in one standard 7 were strikingly concerned with peace-building behaviours, and give evidence of the general culture of peace in the school. That the rules are practical and specific clearly illustrate how peace-building had been brought down to earth and been made the responsibility of every individual. All the rules were concerned with pupils' own everyday lives, and what they could do personally to build peace through positive behaviours. This relates to the previous section where inner peace was discussed (5.1.3.2). Peace-building was related to the individual level, which empowered the pupils to actively build peace in their everyday lives. This contrasts the ground rules

for peace in the other schools, which are far more centred round peace-keeping, respecting authorities and keeping rules.

In terms of peace-keeping, the school encouraged the pupils to avoid conflict and resolve any emerging conflicts. The Peace Club had their own set of rules, which stated that they were not allowed to fight with other students. The third rule of the Peace Club reads “Never to be a source of conflict – if found, the member must apologize on parade ground”. In this rule “punishment” is seen as a conflict prevention strategy. The danger of such a rule is that it could potentially stifle open discussion, as the Peace Club members might avoid expressing what they feared could cause conflict. In this way, the rules were in conflict with the democratisation of the school. It also contrasts with the focus of the rest of the school, where conflict resolution and mediation skills were rated highly.

Mediation was the conflict resolution skill most frequently verbalised, and was mentioned in 6 of the 11 focus group interviews. The skills were used to solve minor matters between friends in school, between friends outside school, and between parents and neighbours. As one pupil wrote in her diary: “This morning I tried to play my part as minister for peace and justice in our class by stopping a conflict between two classmates” (pupil diary 19).

Mediation and dialogue was also reoccurring in my classroom observations. For example, when observing a Life Skills class for standard 6, “talking to each other” was suggested by a pupil as a way to conflict resolution. When she gave this answer the teacher encouraged the rest of the class to clap her. Mediation also seemed to be the most highly regarded strategy, which possibly had to do with the respect and gratefulness that was expressed towards Kofi Annan, who acted as the mediator during the PEV in Kenya. The following quote is from the interview with the head teacher:

When you talk of peace, they want peace. If something has happened in class they solve it. Before they bring it to the teacher they have already tried to solve, they have already looked for Kofi Annan’s and whatever in their own

class. They are traitors there. You know when it becomes hard, is when they come. But we told them in solving problems, when there is a conflict both parties will have to agree, and when both parties agree “I've made a mistake, make me own it”. You have made a mistake, let me own it. Then how are you going to solve it. And then they solve it and then there is no conflict (head teacher 1 interview).

The Peace Club members had a particular responsibility to mediate in cases of disagreement. The importance of listening by both sides was emphasised, and to find out from each side the reason behind the disagreement. The Peace Club members were expected to actively seek out fellow pupils who were fighting and act as mediators. Where the pupils were not able to resolve the conflict, the teachers were called upon. It seemed very important for the school to resolve minor disagreements as they were seen as a threat to peace for two reasons. Firstly, they disturbed the inner peace of the pupils. Secondly, they could escalate to become major conflicts. It was repeated in the school almost like a mantra that the PEV started with a small disagreement. During Peace Club meetings time was spent discussing how to resolve conflicts between pupils in the respective classes. This provided practical training and backing by the school for their conflict resolution practices.

In the record of a Peace Club meeting from 2<sup>nd</sup> June 2011, two issues of conflict were recorded. In the first case, the problem was described as “A member asked how she should go about [a girl] who just fails to keep quiet in class even if she is told to stop making noise”. The solution agreed by the club was that “such a student makes others not concentrate hence should be reported to the teacher”. This illustrates how everyday matters were brought to the club for the members to discuss. As the pupils had done their bit by trying to talk to the girl in question, the matter was brought to the teachers.

The mediation skills that the pupils acquired were also given attention outside the school, and were discussed in interviews with parents and SMC members. As one SMC member said: “And they are taught how to restore peace in classrooms. They resolve their own problems, even without teachers. As for me in my class I have

never heard of any issues” (SMC member 5 interview). The quote was given in response to a question on what the school was doing to build peace. The awareness among the parents and SMC members illustrates how the efforts in the school spread to the wider community. The pupils were also explicit about the resolution skills not being restricted to the school. Several of the interviewees had suggestions for how the conflict back in 2007 could have been resolved at an earlier stage; one of them was that the politicians should have listened to each other and thought through alternative solutions. Another pupil suggested that people should have held peaceful demonstrations instead of using violence. The conflict resolution skills they learnt in school therefore seemed to influence their understanding of the political economy of the country.

In response to research questions 3 and 4, this section has discussed an impressive range of peace-building activities being undertaken. Moreover, the pupils openly discussed what implications such skills might have on the peace situation in the school and wider community. Both staff and pupils seemed convinced from the interviews, that this was the best strategy to build peace, and they extended these skills to criticising the country’s handling of the election in 2007. It is evident that peace work was given priority in the school, and that the children showed a sophisticated understanding of the causes and potential solutions for conflicts, indicating that that they were given the opportunity to reflect.

#### ***5.1.3.5 Teaching for attitudinal change***

In response to research question 3, this section discusses how attitudinal change was given a strong focus in the school as a major means of achieving peace. In particular, the school focused on changing attitudes related to tribalism. All the 55 stakeholders interviewed blamed tribalism for their trauma back in 2007/08, an explanation that is in consistent with the general interpretation of the crisis in the country (section 2.2). As tribalism was given the blame for the PEV, the importance of challenging these attitudes became crucial for peace-building. Likewise, all stakeholders interviewed said that they were committed to exterminating tribalism from the country. The influence of tribalism was reported to have become stronger after the violence, and

tribal attitudes were described by pupils as still stopping people in their local communities from talking to each other: “When I’m at home and I hear people speak about tribalism I just feel like they are just... They have not learned their lesson” (pupil 10 interview). That tribalism was still playing a role in the community was a worry to both staff and students:

In school, some pupils hate other pupils from other tribes and something even if they are playing together they will still have the hatred in their hearts because only of their tribe they come from. In the community, it is said that the people who belonged to the other tribe which the leader do not belong, they are sometime chased away from the village or sent to jail for not doing anything (pupil diary 7).

Because of these attitudes, the school worked towards counteracting the attitudes pupils met in the community. A major part of the attitude-changing mission was therefore implemented through preaching anti-tribalism. The rationale for counteracting tribalism was repeatedly stated, by reminding the pupils that tribalism had caused the PEV and other wars and conflicts on the African continent. The teachers further reminded the pupils of the negative consequences of war, for example that the school had had to close during the crisis. The preaching of anti-tribalism was described as taking place in classes and other meetings where the community was welcomed. In my video observations this never occurred, but it was a hot topic in the staff room during breaks, where the teachers made clear it was a topic they felt passionately about.

The second most common rationale given for challenging tribalism was that it was not supported by the Christian faith. Most of the faith-related reasons given were general claims like “God like people who maintain peace” (pupil 32 interview). The children also argued that all people are equal because they are created in the image of God, and due to this, people should live like brothers and sisters, irrespective of ethnic communities.

In addition to preaching anti-tribalism, the school challenged tribal attitudes through action; in particular treating all tribes equally. The teachers explained that they never used tribal names in the classroom, which is common practice in Kenya,

but addressed the pupils using their personal names. Teachers and pupils alike argued that they never felt they were being treated in terms of their tribe, but that they were all treated equally.

In order to diminish tribalism, the school also actively facilitated interaction between the pupils. It strongly believed that through interaction perceptions would be changed. But interaction and friendships across tribes were also seen as a way of building identities, based on other indicators than purely tribal ones (see section 5.1.3.6). The language policy introduced represented one step towards facilitating interaction. The teachers argued that when the school population was forced to speak English and Kiswahili as *lingua francae*, it made it easier for them to mingle with other tribes, and their tribal identity would be weakened.

However, the school also celebrated positive tribal identity. This was particularly evident when the school once a term organised a cultural day where the pupils performed songs and dances from different ethnic groups. On that day guests were also invited from the community, together with the parents. This is how one pupil described the cultural days:

The cultural days are usually prepared one week before, and then the head teacher invites two guests or more. And then from every class we will have a song. Maybe it is coming from the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, any culture of the 42 tribes which are in Kenya. And then maybe if you understand the tribe and the song and what it means you can tell the neighbour what it means (pupil 19 interview).

The pupils seemed particularly proud to tell me that they regularly performed songs and dances from tribes other than their own. As parents and other community members were invited on these days, this could be seen as an initiative to promote peace in the community.

Although the school was actively working towards diminishing tribal attitudes in the school, there was lack of willingness to actively engage with the drivers of conflict related to the PEV, and the causes of why tribalism entered communities. Instead, the approach taken was that they tried to balance the negative



attitudes the pupils met in the community with positive messages in the school. This approach was safe, as there was general agreement on the surface that tribalism is negative. The sustainability of this approach is questionable, however, when the root causes are not addressed. The school approach discussed, of preaching anti-tribalism and facilitating interaction, is perhaps more effective in overcoming prejudice than building sustainable peace. In the next section, I will discuss reconciliation and friendships across tribes, which could be argued to be a prolonged effort to achieve attitudinal change.

#### ***5.1.3.6 Facilitate reconciliation and sustainable friendships between pupils***

As described in section 2.2, neighbours and friends turned against each other during the fatal months of 2007/2008. Although the violence in Nakuru was mainly carried out by perpetrators coming from outside, the need for reconciliation and mediation was as much needed on a local level as nationally. In response to research question 1 on how the school responded to the PEV, I will in this section discuss the initial reconciliation talks that took place in the school following the PEV and how this led to strategies aimed at creating sustainable friendships.

The importance of making teachers and pupils interact across tribes was emphasised by the head teacher and four of the seven teachers interviewed as a continuous priority from when the school first opened after the violence. The teachers in particular strongly emphasised that no conflict had taken place between the pupils, rather, it was between politicians, and that there were therefore no reasons for the pupils to stay estranged after the violence. In the reconciliation talks emphasis was accordingly given to blaming the politicians for the violence, which again provided the rationale for the common man to seek reconciliation; the fight was not theirs.

However, in contrast to the other case-study schools, the reconciliation talks did not end when normality returned. Rather, the preaching transformed into facilitation of sustainable friendships between tribes. One practical way in which this was facilitated was through the introduction of a new language policy, where mother tongues were banished from the school.

The head teacher explained that she wrote “no speaking in mother tongue” on the board in the staff room after a teacher IDP came to the school in 2008. Having experienced persecution and her life having been threatened the concerned teacher felt scared when hearing the language of her persecutors being spoken in the school. It made her believe that they were planning something against her. The rule was therefore written on the board, and adopted by the teachers.

The head teacher, four teachers, and three of the focus groups with pupils stressed that mother tongues were banished because using them could potentially strengthen tribal identities, cause conflict, and stand in the way of cross-tribal interaction. As expressed by one pupil: “Talking in [the] mother tongue might bring conflict” (pupil 13 interview). The language policy was therefore upheld by teachers and pupils alike as a peace-building initiative.

In order to build peace in the school (research question 3) the school actively used reconciliation as a step towards facilitating the creation of sustainable friendships between pupils. In this section the language policy in particular has been used to illustrate the policies adopted by the school that could potentially influence the friendships for peace. In the next section I will discuss how these efforts can lead to development of new identities.

#### ***5.1.3.7 Promoting the notion of citizenship***

The schools’ promotion of the notion of citizenship and national identity can best be understood as a continuation of the work for attitudinal change and sustainable friendships, and these findings therefore also respond to research question 3. The school encouraged the pupils to put their national identity first, and then celebrate their ethnicity. Whereas the work to change tribal attitudes in the school was largely a reactive effort following the PEV, the promotion of citizenship was similar to the facilitation of sustainable friendships, in that both initiatives aimed at building something new. In this section I will discuss how the school worked towards the idea of citizenship in terms of pupil identity, by emphasising the common ground of the pupils as more important than their differences. I will first give the rationale for the

identity development. I will then move on to give examples of uniting identities used in the school, before discussing tribal versus national identity in more depth.

The fact that tribalism was perceived to have contributed to the PEV was commonly used to argue for a need to limit the growth of tribal identities. The teachers in particular argued that strengthening identity indicators that united the pupils in the school could limit the importance of the tribal identities. A common identity was seen as a necessity in order to avoid further violence and build a peaceful and stable Kenya. Consequently, the Kenyan national identity was upheld as more important than tribal identities, which is consistent with the goal of enhancing patriotism in the PEP.

Uniting identities was found in many aspects of the pupils' lives. "We are one and the same thing" was a mantra repeated by several of the pupils and teachers alike, during both interviews and observations. The uniting identity was that they were all teachers, or pupils, and all belonged to Macheleo. In addition to preaching these truths, the teachers emphasised that they were treating all children the same, regardless of tribe. This rhetoric was also used when talking about how the IDPs were received – the pupils were encouraged to focus on what they had in common and perceive them as normal pupils: "We accepted them because they were just pupils like us" (pupil 7 interview).

The identity markers most commonly addressed were those of tribal contra national identity. The pupils seemed to have gone through thorough teaching on the understanding of ethnicity. They described ethnic communities as the background where people come from, that geography does not make people different, and that judgements of a person's character cannot be made on this basis. They further claimed to have learned from the teachers that it was important for children to stay together as one, because arguing over ethnicity might be fatal for the country when they grew up. Strong tribal identities might lead to the country being divided and consequently to further violence. At the same time, however, positive aspects of tribal cultures were given attention through, for example, culture days (section 5.1.3.5). The language policy was also taken into account in identity development. It

was claimed that speaking the same language allowed the different tribes to interact and this strengthened the common national identity.

Divided identities were perceived to have contributed to the PEV. The school consequently worked to challenge any identity divisions in the school by enhancing common identity markers. Although this was seen in all four schools to a certain extent, Macheleo stood out in that it provided thorough teaching on ethnic identities with the aim of strengthening national identities. In the case of further ethnic violence in the country, a strong national identity could limit the involvement of the school community. The teaching and awareness raising described in this section had thus empowered the pupils to challenge tribal propaganda. In the next section I will discuss further work done in the school on empowering the pupils by giving them a voice in how the school was run.

#### ***5.1.3.8 Giving pupils a voice in how the school was run***

The school had an explicit agenda in empowering girls to be self-reliant. In this section, responding to research question 3, I will discuss these practices in terms of peace-building and discuss how bringing up well-rounded, empowered and self-reliant girls can be understood as a peace-building approach. I will start the section by discussing how training and support had empowered the staff to then empower the children. I will then move on to describe the student council as a means of empowering the pupils in political engagement.

The head teacher, teachers, pupils and parents emphasised the importance of the support the school had received from UNICEF in the change of policy to become more child-centred. In particular, the training and support for becoming a child friendly school, the PEP and the introduction of Life Skills lessons were all upheld as important in this context. The head teacher, deputy head, one SMC member and three of the teachers interviewed described the training as having been transformational, and argued that without it they would not have had the same perspectives that they had at this point.

“We have set the pupils free” (head teacher 1 interview). The quote illustrates the head teacher’s attitude to the pupils in the school. Pupils discussed how they were empowered through school activities, acquired knowledge and support from the school to stand up for what they believed in. This meant standing up for positive values, and not be seduced by politicians or other elders, including parents, if they were preaching or acting against the peace-building principles and practices which the pupils had learnt in school. In such situations they were advised to remember that peace started within them (section 5.1.3.2) and stay firm with what they had learnt in school.

Through creating an environment where the children felt safe and appreciated, the school staff made the pupils able to stay firm in what they believed. Guidance and counselling formed a major part of this, maintaining a close connection with inner peace. The counselling did not end after the worst PEV trauma had calmed down, but continued to address challenges pupils experienced in their daily lives (for example quarrels between parents). The counselling took place in large groups of students, for example during assemblies, Life Skills classes and the pastoral care programme. In addition, the teachers were trying to create a warm atmosphere where the pupils could feel safe and protected. During participatory observations, I found that teachers and school administrators were succeeding in being warm and loving towards the pupils. In stark contrast to the other schools in this study, the pupils at Macheleo were always warmly welcomed when they came to the staff room during breaks. Moreover, rather than running away when the teachers entered the school compound, which was the case at St Peters and Logos, the pupils repeatedly swarmed round the teachers. I also experienced openness on both sides, and the pupils were boldly asking the teachers for advice and help when needed.

Student councils were mentioned by the head teacher, three teachers, one parent and two focus groups with pupils as a major way in which the school was working towards empowering the pupils. The concept of student councils is integrated in the idea of child friendly schools, and schools trained in this concept have been encouraged to establish councils in their schools. Making schools child centred is the cornerstone of the child friendly schools initiative, and giving the

pupils a voice through student councils is one of the major ways in which this can be achieved.

The student councils encouraged by UNICEF in Kenya reflect the structure of the national political system. Within each class, there are elected MPs governing one area each, such as health, peace and justice, and academics. Among these there is one elected MP for each of these areas at a school level. In addition, there is a President and Prime Minister governing the school. In addition to attending student council meetings, the MPs had different responsibilities according to their positions. For example, the head teacher explained that the MP for Health was responsible for ensuring that all the fellow pupils in her respective class had food to eat for lunch. When someone had no food, it was the MPs responsibility first to check if anyone could share their food with the child, and if that was not possible to bring the case to the attention of the teachers. The head teacher argued that this made the pupils more self-reliant and gave them practice in problem solving. She seemed convinced that this empowered the children to be peace builders.

The MPs for Peace and Justice were responsible for settling emerging conflicts in their respective classes. All of these MPs automatically became members of the Peace Club, which in turn provided training and support for the children. During the meeting the teacher leading the club gave the pupils the opportunity to raise any issues that had emerged. Time was then given for the matter to be discussed. The Peace Club came up as a peace-building initiative in 10 of 11 interviews with pupils, 6 of 7 with teachers, 1 of 3 with parents, and with the head teacher and deputy head. One pupil group in particular described how they had received support from the club in finding the best method to mediate between quarrelling girls in their class. As previously discussed the learning of conflict resolution without violence was seen as a major peace-building strategy across the school.

According to my interviews and observations, these democratic structures were central to the school's work and identity. In the head teacher's own words they were "bringing up an all-round child" (head teacher 1 interview). Through empowering the children, as described in this section, they were equipping the

children with inner strength when approaching the political situation by themselves. The children gave the impression that they were not afraid to voice their opinions either. Pupil participation was also encouraged by the teachers. For example, in the lessons I observed, the teachers encouraged the pupils to participate and a range of answers were accepted, including answers different from what the teacher initially had in mind. The training in democracy within the school had given the pupils confidence that they could contribute on other levels too:

From my opinion I can just say that the nation should give us children so that if we have anything to say about peace we could advise the nation, because us children we are not given any opportunity to speak up for the nation. Now maybe you have something important that could assist the nation throughout, and you are not given that access because maybe you are poor, you do not have any access to even to the counsellor (pupil 10 interview).

The quote illustrates the confidence among the children, and their strong belief that they could influence Kenya. Support from UNICEF had provided the school with frameworks to create a safe and protective environment for the pupils to engage in the politics of the school and express their opinions. Although the school gave the pupils practical training in democracy, there was a lack of a will to engage in the wider politics of the country.

#### ***5.1.3.9 Teaching politics***

Despite all the above mentioned efforts to build peace in the school, there was a reluctance among the teachers to address the political backdrop of the violence. When discussing the PEV trauma in the interviews, the political and historical backdrop of the violence was frequently emphasised. There seemed to be consensus that there were political reasons for the violence to break out. Poor governance, incited violence and ethnic tension were all claimed to be reasons for the outburst of violence. A high awareness and involvement in the political backdrop of the PEV was evident in interviews with the teachers, pupils, deputy head, head teacher, parents and SMC members. The pupils gave detailed descriptions of what had happened during and after the election, in the following crisis, and the political

reasons behind it. The following quote is taken from an interview with a pupil from standard 7, and is a typical response:

During the PEV people went to vote. And after the voting, the results were out. There were two sides. The people thought that the ones who were supporting the one who did not win. They said that the votes were stolen, and they did not have peace there. No, they started fighting saying that the votes were stolen (pupil 31 interview)

The quote illustrates how alive the memories were from the time of the crisis. Similar descriptions were given of reasons why the violence broke out. The pupils interviewed also seemed well informed on the ICC process (section 5.1.3), and had strong opinions on who was and who was not guilty. As one pupil put it: “Like she said we did not know which person who was causing the violence, but now the ICC, I hope they will be able to find the people who were responsible” (pupil 19 interview).

The interviews with pupils clearly demonstrated the strong awareness of politics among the pupils. However, when interviewing the teachers, there was a general understanding that the pupils were too young to learn about politics:

When we are in school we really don't talk about politics. Remember they are twelve years old so their minds have not been opened up about politics and all that. So we don't talk about Politics. We only talk touch about [it] in Social Studies. Maybe we talk about the day-to-day activities that take place within the parliament, the government, within the local council and all that. But if you mean the word ‘politics’, politics doesn't come in (teacher 1 interview).

The quote illustrates an attitude found among the majority of teachers. Although the Social Studies curriculum addressed the political system of Kenya, peace and conflict, and governance, the teachers seemed to be of the opinion that the pupils neither had knowledge about, nor were interested in, the connection between politics and the PEV. However, as all pupil interviews showed that they were aware of the politics of the country when describing the backdrop to the PEV, it is questionable whether it would have been more beneficial for teachers to have guided



and challenged their thoughts and perceptions, rather than leave it to the community to influence and form their perceptions and understandings.

As discussed in section 4.2, the PEP was designed to be integrated into Life Skills. A likely consequence of this policy is that peace is associated with everyday life challenges and peace as part of Life Skills works in tandem with the inner peace approach (section 5.1.3.2). However, it can move the focus away from the role of teaching politics in peace-building. Although it is a valid approach to focus on inner peace and Life Skills in peace-building, it is somewhat contradictory to leave out politics when this aspect is given such a strong focus in the explanation of why the PEV happened. During a lesson observed in Life Skills discussing conflict resolution, one pupil did initiate a discussion about the PEV. The teachers picked up on her wish, and asked the pupils for reasons for why the violence took place. The following answers were given by the pupils: disobedience, fighting, fighting for land, the land issue, IDPs, tribalism and Kenya's 47 tribes, desire for independence, bad politics, and cattle rustling. Through this, the pupils showed a very high awareness of different reasons for conflict. However, the PEP and Life Skills did not provide the framework for further discussion of these statements, and the pupils were therefore left without further discussion.

Life Skills can be instrumental in resisting incitement and avoiding influence from negative forces. Thus in Life Skills classes observed, the teacher was teaching the pupils about assertiveness and peer pressure. However, in order for assertiveness and peer pressure to be a tool in resisting incited violence, the pupils need to see the violence as negative. Assertiveness empowers the pupils to stand up for whatever they believe in, and strengthens their position wherever they stand. Assertiveness could therefore potentially encourage the pupils to voice their tribal attitudes. However, at Macheleo the teaching of assertiveness, and of the other topics from the PEP, were taught in tandem with positive attitudes, and the pupils were therefore using the skills to voice positive peace-building opinions. However, in order for this to be a sustainable approach, the pupils have to be given a foundational understanding of politics and history, and to place the PEV within this context.

I would thus argue that in order to engage with the pupils' own understanding of the conflict, and in order to adopt a sustainable approach to peace-building, the political backdrop has to be taken into consideration and included in the teaching. The lack of such engagements was the biggest gap found in the peace work in the school. However, in order for the school to take up this challenge, more thorough training of teachers is needed, and the PEP must be changed to provide a better framework for such discussion.

#### **5.1.4 Conclusion, Macheleo**

This section has discussed Macheleo as a school making progress in peace-building practices. Nakuru was heavily affected by the PEV, and the school therefore faced massive challenges during and after the crisis. The school answered with a strong commitment to peace-building, and was creative in its approach. This section has discussed the nine most prominent roles the school played in peace-building: providing a culture of peace, fostering inner peace, imparting knowledge and propagating messages about peace, encouraging peaceful behaviours, teaching for attitudinal change, facilitating reconciliation and sustainable friendships between pupils, promoting a notion of citizenship, and giving pupils a voice in how the school was run. These practices could be placed in three layers; preaching peace, teaching peace, and practicing peace (section 6.3).

The school was strongly committed to the PEP. However, the peace work was not limited to teaching this material, but also provided inspiration for the integration of peace into all the school's practices. This made Macheleo stand out from the other three case-study schools, as will be discussed in the following sections. The commitment could partly be attributed to the head teacher being a national trainer in peace education. Through this, she received continuous training and follow ups, which contributed to a feeling of ownership to the programme. This was then passed down to the teachers by the work she did in monitoring the teachers' teaching of peace and their continuous input on peace education.

The aim of the school's work was to change the attitudes of its pupils, and teach them how to live in peace. That peace was interpreted holistically as inner

peace made peace relevant for every individual. Through specific activities put in place, such as the Peace Club, student councils, use of the PEP materials and training in conflict-resolution skills, Macheleo made their pupils aware of peace-building in everyday life. The section also discussed how a stronger engagement in politics could have strengthened the peace work in the school. As with the other case-study schools, there was little willingness to engage in the political backdrop of the violence. A thorough introduction to this could have made both pupils and teachers more resistant to incited violence.

## **5.2 St Peters: There is no violence now**

### **5.2.0 Introducing St Peters**

In this section, data on peace-building from St Peters school will be presented and discussed. The school was supported by UNICEF after the PEV through PEP and the child friendly schools initiative, and was suggested for case-study by UNICEF because it had been recognised by UNICEF as a school with peace education initiatives. However, I will argue that despite the early commitment to peace education identified by UNICEF, the school was, at the time of the research, actually doing little in terms of building peace. I will argue that on the contrary the school was infused with tribal attitudes, and that several of its practices were fuelling violence rather than building peace.

Within the school a wide selection of research methods were applied, including semi-structured interviews, participant observations, video observations, diaries and elicitation technique. Interviews again contributed the largest dataset, with 39 informants in total; 9 teachers, 25 pupils, 2 deputy heads, the head teacher, 2 SMC members and 3 community partners were interviewed. The school did not allow me to interview parents, however, and to compensate for this, I interviewed three church representatives closely affiliated with the school. A more detailed account of the sampling and data collected is given in Chapter 4.

The first two sections provide contextual information on the school and community, including school composition and descriptions of the nature of the PEV. The contextual information provides the backdrop for a more detailed discussion of

the most prominent roles the school is playing in peace-building. As my analysis will reveal, the school was no longer actively implementing the PEP by the time the fieldwork was carried out. Moreover, the school ethos was largely infused by a culture of violence. The factors discussed under peace-building will therefore to a large extent point to a potential for change. The findings are organised under the following thematic areas: making an effort to build peace, teaching peace, facilitating social interaction, awareness of the culture of violence, and giving the pupils a voice.

### **5.2.1 Contextualising St Peters**

St Peters had a total enrolment of 2270 students. The school was mixed, with an equal distribution of boys (1132) and girls (1138). Located in Nakuru North, the school was classified as rural. The school did not keep a record of the tribes represented in the school, but the majority of students and staff were Kikuyu. During the violence the Kikuyu population had increased drastically, and the representation of other tribes had declined; this was because Nakuru North was originally a Kikuyu-dominated area. The total increase of pupils between 2007 and 2008 was 751.

The head teacher and two teachers in the school had received training in the PEP. The female trained teacher had lost interest in peace education immediately after the programme, and described herself as not having done any work related to peace after the training. The male teacher was responsible for the Peace Club in the school, which was described to have been very active and successful under the previous head teacher's leadership. I never observed the PEP materials being used in the school. Neither Life Skills nor PEP was specified in the timetable. According to my observations peace did not seem to be a priority within the school, and the school ethos was largely infused by a violent culture and authoritarian values. The leadership in the school had changed after the PEV. According to the interviewees, the previous head teacher had been concerned about peace-building, and implemented the PEP in the school. However, with the change of head teacher, the school ethos also changed, and the PEP was no longer implemented. Before moving on to discuss peace education in the school I will give an account of the PEV in the school and community to place the initiatives in context.

## 5.2.2 St Peters and the post-election violence

Although Nakuru North, where the school was located, was not a site for direct fighting, the community was strongly marked by the violence. This section will discuss the effect of the PEV on the school. I will start by making a general remark about the violence in the school, before moving on to polarising and tribal attitudes in the school. The section concludes with a discussion of the IDP influx in the school after 2007/8.

The PEV was, as in the case of Macheleo, described in crude terms by the pupils and teachers, and the themes of burnt houses, murder, IDPs and displacement, and orphaned children recurred repeatedly in most interviews. However, only one violent incident in the community was described, where the two sides met in the Menengai crater, in close proximity to the school for a battle. Apart from this one incident, the violence was mainly visible to the Nakuru North population through the media and the influx of IDPs.

The Rift Valley experienced a significant polarisation during the PEV, and Nakuru North was no exception. In contrast to Macheleo, ethnocentric views were commonplace in the interviewees' descriptions of the violence in the school. These attitudes showed through in the interviews and conversations with all stakeholders. The pupils and teachers described how the teachers of tribes other than the Kikuyu left the school during the violence: "Even the teachers who were other tribes they went. And the school was left with Kikuyu teachers. They went and never came back. They were afraid because of it" (pupil 44 interview). These teachers were generally not sympathised with, as the Kikuyu population saw no reason for them to flee the area:

We even had some teachers here; they used to be in groups and kept to themselves. They were Luos and Kalenjin. They used to complain, saying that this was their place, and that the Kikuyus should go back to the central province (deputy head teacher 3 interview).

In this quote a teacher is describing hostile attitudes among Luos and Kalenjin against the Kikuyu. This is a paradox, as the Kikuyus were in an absolute majority in Nakuru North. It is therefore unlikely that these groups were of any threat

to the community, and the statement can be put down as an example of negative tribal attitudes. Tribes other than the Kikuyu were generally given the full blame for the violence.

Whenever the other ethnic groups were described in positive terms, they were described as assimilated into the Kikuyu culture. For example the teacher in the quote below explains that the other ethnic groups have learnt to speak the Kikuyu mother tongue: “We have children from other tribes, but you can’t even know. They always speak the same mother tongue” (teacher 8 interview). As the quote illustrates, the school held ethnocentric views, and were doing little to support and celebrate diversity, in stark contrast to the situation portrayed at Macheleo.

Although Nakuru North remained peaceful for the most part during the conflict, the community was indirectly affected through the influx of IDPs: “They were not happy, they had relatives out, who were getting hurt. Other[s] has friends who were getting from place to place, and need a lot of help” (teacher 8 interview). The IDP children described the fleeing from their homes as traumatic. The IDPs settled in camps, or with local families. Some IDPs still lived in camps in the area. These camps were looked at with displeasure, and were seen as a threat to peace prevailing.

Teachers and pupils described how they were unsettled by seeing lorry loads of people entering the community, seeing the trauma and fear in colleagues’ eyes, and hearing stories about what the displaced population had been through. The combination of factors made the community worried that the conflict would reach Nakuru North:

The area was peaceful, but there were some terrible destruction. Because, when those people came, they came with so many problems. And so they aroused the people here. So the place was not so very peaceful. Our people are being killed; our people are being chased away from their homes. So what do we do? We can go there and revenge. There were people from all over Western Kenya and also Rift Valley who were being chased away from their homes. So people were not so much peaceful (deputy head teacher 2 interview).

The quote illustrates the unsettling effect the IDPs had on the community, and the tribal identity; the feeling that they should go and obtain revenge on behalf of their tribe. The school remained polarised in 2012, and was still bearing the mark of the influx of IDPs. Although the IDPs had settled into the community, the lives lead could not be compared with those which they led before. Reconciliation between the IDPs and the perpetrators had not taken place: “I don't feel in my heart that I should go back to teach the same pupils that I had taught for about ten years that turned against me” (teacher 13 interview). As this quote illustrates, the vast majority of IDPs in the community were described as having settled in the area without plans to go back to the places from which they had fled. The quote also illustrates the lack of reconciliation between perpetrators and victims, which could potentially be one of the reasons for why the school was not ready to engage in peace-building work.

The influx of children put a high pressure on the infrastructure of the school. The traumas that IDP children carried with them also left a mark on their fellow pupils. The interviews unanimously described a warm welcome given to IDPs. Welcoming them in words and deeds went hand in hand. The school managed to stay open throughout the violence, but the pupils were not forced to come to school.

The school community, although not directly affected, had been severely affected by the violence. The whole population had seen masses of IDPs arrive in the area, and some had been displaced themselves. The school's response to the violence was described by teachers and pupils as very positive, with IDPs being welcomed and many of them settling into St Peters and having remained there ever since. However, the data also reveals ethnocentric attitudes, particularly in relation to statements about the teachers from other communities who had left the school. The transition from a mixed to a more single-ethnic school composition will be discussed in further detail in the following sections, where the main findings related to peace-building in the school will be discussed.

### **5.2.3 A culture of peace at St Peters?**

In this section I will discuss the main findings on peace-building at St Peters. My analysis suggests that the school had previously been actively building a culture of

peace, but had, with the change in school leadership, abandoned these practices. The whole school ethos and school culture seemed to have changed drastically since the change of leadership, and the school was infused by a culture of violence.

The head teacher and two teachers had attended a PEP workshop following the PEV, and the head teacher had been trained through another school. The two teachers, who were both still at St Peters, described that they had sensitised their fellow teachers following the training. Initially after the violence the school had an active Peace Club, and was implementing the PEP in the teaching of Life Skills. When the research was carried out, however, the findings indicated that the PEP was no longer implemented; Life Skills was no longer on the timetable, and the PEP materials were not observed as being used in the school, nor were they referred to in interviews. Similarly, the school population did not show awareness of the need for peace-building, and did not express any willingness to engage in peace-building practices.

In this section the thematic areas emerging from the data analysis will be discussed in the following order: making an effort to build peace, teaching peace, facilitating social interaction, awareness of culture of violence, and empowering the pupils.

#### ***5.2.3.1 Making an effort to build peace***

From my observations and interviews it was evident that the school was not actively building a culture of peace. As discussed in the methodology chapter, the school was partly chosen because it had been identified by UNICEF as a school with good peace-building practices, and because it fulfilled the other criteria for selection. From the interviews it seemed that the school had previously been active in peace-building but had altered its practices. At the time of the research, the school population expressed satisfaction with the present situation. Despite this, my findings portray a negative school ethos, including a general culture of violence, structural violence present in the school and community, and negative ethnocentric and tribal attitudes flourishing. When these topics emerged in the interviews, the school administration was more direct in addressing the issues, whereas the teachers and pupils avoided the



topic. It could seem like the teachers were not as honest as they could have been in fear of criticising the school administration.

I will in this section discuss the understanding of peace emerging from the interviews with pupils, teachers, school administrators and SMC-members in the school and the consequences of these perceptions on the peace work. I will start by discussing peace as development and stability, before moving on to more ethnocentric attitudes and the perception that the school as an institution was powerless with respect to peace-building. The section concludes with a discussion of the influence these perceptions had on the effort made to build peace in the school.

The common understanding of peace in the school was related to development and stability. The three most reoccurring themes were: political stability, end of displacements, and development. First, peace was seen as directly interlinked with political stability. Peace was largely interpreted as negative peace: a situation of no direct fighting in the community. The 2012 situation in the community was compared with the crisis in 2008, and the conclusion drawn was that the community was now at peace and there was no longer any need for peace-building. This conception of 'peace' can be contrasted with Macheleo, where peace was interpreted as having to be achieved within each individual and in every relationship.

Second, the end of displacements and the closure of the IDP camps was a crucial part of the school perception of peace. The presence of the IDPs seemed to threaten the perception that the conflict had ended and that the country was politically stable. In particular it seemed important that the people who had fled the area had returned, illustrated by the following quote by a teacher: "The children who belong to other communities, after the violence they came back. And as a result of coming back we could encourage them to live in peace" (teacher 10 interview). The interviews did not give a unanimous impression that this was the case. However, there was a consensus that returning and resettlement of IDPs was a necessity in order for peace to fully prevail.

Third, development was seen as closely tied up with peace. The end of poverty was one of the aspects within this, and sharing goods with each other was

held up as a way of achieving it. When I asked what the school did to build peace after the violence, the majority of the interviewees gave the sharing of food, shelter, and other material goods as the main contribution. The other aspect of development related to improving the school infrastructure and exam results. Peace as development in this respect relates to the end of structural violence and building positive peace. However, the argument that peace was synonymous with development contributed to the belief that there was no need to work actively for peacebuilding through other means. Addressing the drivers of conflicts behind the PEV conflict was seen as unnecessary, and could even take away the focus from improving the school infrastructure and exam results.

In addition to the understanding of peace discussed above, ethnocentric attitudes were hindering the school from making an effort to build peace. Although the school portrayed itself as integrating different ethnic groups and facilitating interaction between them, my data analysis also revealed a culture of ethnocentrism in the school. In the diaries the children gave examples of hostility between tribes: “We were rough at the person because he was Kisii” (pupil diary 34). “In our school I heard a negative statement about a Kambah. In our class I feared a Kisii boy because I thought that he was a witch” (pupil diary 32). The ethnocentric views underlying these statements were also voiced by the school administration. This was particularly evident in explanations given on the political economy. The head teacher, for example, stated in his interview that the Kikuyu group had the mandate to rule Kenya, “but others join together like last year to take over the power” (head teacher 2 interview). In his explanation it was obvious that he saw the Kikuyu tribe as superior to the other ethnic groups. This view was confirmed by the deputy head teacher who explained to me how the Kikuyu tribe was not violent. He argued that they did not have a violent nature, and were not the ones starting the fights in the PEV. Similarly, one of the pastors interviewed who co-operated closely with the school, explained that the Kikuyus had, previous to colonial times, been the object of a divine intervention, and were a chosen people in the country. This perception of reality in combination with a whitewashing of the Kikuyu role in the PEV influenced the school attitudes to the PEP, and is likely to have guided the administration to the conclusion that a Kikuyu-dominated school did not need peace education.

Lastly, the school was rated powerless in terms of peace-building by its own leadership. Both the head teacher and the one deputy head teacher doubted that the school could make a difference to the stability of the country because the violence had been incited by national leaders. Giving the national leaders the blame played down the role education could play in addressing conflict and building peace:

And you see when the leaders do not fight then the common man will not fight. [...] Because you see when people are fighting, you see these people had lived together for a long time. But they only incited and turned against each other. A lot of input should be put on the government so that the politicians don't get involved in hate speeches. Because were it not for the politicians we had not had that violence (head teacher 2 interview).

The school leadership was of the opinion that the school could not contribute to preventing conflict or building peace, but that structural changes had to be made on a national level for peace to prevail in the country; particularly addressing land ownership and elections. As the deputy head teacher put it:

I would like to ask you... You are trying now to talk about peace. But you see peace comes when the country is stable. When there is stability there is peace. But when there is no stability there is no peace. And what caused the country to be violent has not been resolved. We are talking about peace, but the cause of the problem has not been solved. You see, there is a root cause of everything. So the root cause of the violence was the election, and the land. So unless the two are solved, there will not be a long lasting peace. There must be a system of election; there must be a system of owning land in this country. So that the peace can be prevailed forever. Unless you take these roots, even if you talk about peace, then we should not get it. [...] this school can play a very small role in that. By teaching peace to the children, because they will be the future leaders. [...] But for now, someone has to play that role and that is the politicians. They should come out and give rules for the election, for the land, so that for now we have peace. But when we are planning for the election twenty thirty years to come, these children

understand that we should live together. But for now we also need peace (deputy head teacher 2 interview).

In his opinion the only contribution the school could make was through educating good leaders for the future. Although this is a valid point, it is questionable whether the school was making the most of its potential when the roots of the conflict were not properly addressed in the teaching. Although it is an established theory that incitement played a major part in the escalation of the conflict (section 2.2), peace education is founded on the belief that education can empower the communities through the pupils to challenge the speeches of charismatic leaders, to think critically and to resist incitement. Interestingly, both the head teacher and one of the deputy head teachers had been through the peace education training. Although the training focused on critical thinking, perception and assertiveness, this connection did not seem clear to the two interviewees. It seems likely that ethnocentric views in favour of the Kikuyu tribe influenced their willingness to understand and accept this connection. Blaming the national leaders was thus used to diminish their own responsibility.

When interpreting the relationship between the understanding of peace and the peace practices in the school it is difficult to conclude which factor influenced the other more. When I asked the interviewees about peace education, they often gave short answers stating that they had peace now. The explanation for this attitude could be found in the discussion above; peace was interpreted in a way that excluded the need for active involvement; their tribe was in itself not violent, and peace-building had to happen at a national level. This stands in contrast to the discussion of findings from Macheleo, where the strong emphasis on inner peace empowered the school population to build peace in their everyday lives. At St Peters the power was taken away from the individuals and given to the system.

On a different note, the abovementioned perceptions of peace and peace-building could be interpreted as a whitewashing of the school's lack of peace education. If peace was exclusively understood as negative peace and defined as solely the responsibility of national leaders, this would justify why the PEP was not used or addressed in the school. However, I would argue that the school through its

lack of engagement in the drivers of conflict behind the PEV was contributing to keeping these alive.

Based on these findings, the PEP training could be criticised for not reaching the trainees with the inclusive attitudes it proclaimed. This leads to the question of whether the training policy was sufficient to challenge the perceptions of reality which underlay the above discussed attitudes. That the school did not believe in peace education was also reflected in their lack of teaching, which will be discussed in the next section.

### ***5.2.3.2 Teaching peace***

As I have argued, the teaching of peace was no longer a priority at St Peters. Although mentioned in a few of the interviews, and observed in one class, it was not given priority. In this section I will discuss possible reasons for this, including the lack of a national peace education policy, a lack of commitment on behalf of the head teacher, the notion that peace was already covered in the teaching of religion, and the low status given to the subject as it was not examinable. I will then move on to discuss the teaching of peace in other subjects. The section responds to research questions 3 and 5.

The head teacher claimed that the PEP *was* implemented in the school. However, the teachers interviewed had not heard about the materials at all, with exception of one teacher who claimed she had received the materials from the head teacher on the same day as her interview with me. Life Skills was not on the timetable, and was, according to the teachers, not taught. An adequate framework for the PEP was therefore not put in place. At the time of the research, the school did not have a Peace Club. Apparently, the former head teacher had been an active supporter of the PEP and *had* established a peace club and my interviewee pupils had been members of it. The teacher responsible for the club explained that it had lost out to clubs such as drama and sports that were competing with other schools.

The previous section discussed a general lack of motivation for peace-building in the school. These reasons are applicable to the present discussion. In

addition, some more specific reasons for not implementing the PEP were also revealed. First, the Peace Club had been replaced by a Character Building Programme. This programme was described as teaching the pupils Christian values, which the teachers believed to be peace-building. As discussed in the section on Macheleo, religion holds a strong position in Kenyan society. Whereas staff at Macheleo had integrated religion into the PEP through their focus on inner peace, St Peters found the programme incompatible with their teaching of religious values, and had replaced it with an explicitly Christian programme. This raises the question of whether integrating faith in the PEP could have made the implementation process easier. Second, the lack of a national peace education policy was mentioned as a reason for not implementing the programme. The head teacher argued that they were not obliged to use the materials, as there was no policy regarding it. Thirdly, the school argued that one lesson per week was not sufficient for teaching peace. That the school was not willing to timetable Life Skills indicates that the critique of the framework was more of an excuse than an actual obstacle. All the same, this argument could be used in the debate about whether peace is better taught through an integrative approach (section 4.2). Finally, the PEP did not fit into the strong focus the school had on examinable subjects. As one teacher stated: “What I see here is education, education. Books, books, books. So they don’t give part to peace education” (teacher 14 interview). The PEP was apparently unconnected to exam results and consequently the ranking of the school. This indicates that whenever non-examinable subjects are introduced, there is a strong need for building motivation and follow ups.

Peace was to a certain extent addressed in the teaching of other subjects. Although hardly mentioned in the interviews, a few of the diaries gave evidence of peace being preached. As the school did not have a policy for disseminating peace messages, this depended on the individual teacher. In the diaries, the subjects Christian Religious Education, Social Studies, and English were mentioned, in addition to the extracurricular activities (PPI, Bible Club, Character Building Programme), as were school assemblies. Apart from stating that peace was preached however, the diaries did not give any further details on the content, illustrated by this typical quote:

Today our class English teacher taught us about new words and said to live in peace as sisters and brothers. She told us we are all equal to God. He preached for us about peace in school and in the community. We are all very happy because we know what is peace (pupil diary 44).

One of the Social Studies classes observed did address peace and conflict, and as the curriculum requires, the causes of conflict were addressed. The teacher boldly used the PEV as an illustrative example. Although it was mentioned, the root causes of the conflict were not discussed, and the topic was not made relevant to the pupils' lives. More importantly, the pupils were not given a chance to ask questions or give their opinions. As at Macheleo, the teachers at St Peters argued that the children were too young for politics. However, this was in stark contrast to the impression the pupils themselves gave me in their interviews, where they expressed strong opinions about the PEV.

When asked about what happened during the PEV, all the focus groups with pupils showed an awareness of the connection between the violence and national politics. Their understanding of the conflict was mainly one sided, however, and as the majority population were Kikuyu, the interpretation was consequently in favour of Kibaki. Below is a sample of quotes from pupils explaining why the PEV took place, and how they understand the power balance:

Because Raila Odinga was saying that the PNU had stolen the votes. So that PNU had won. That's why they wanted Raila to be the president (pupil 44 interview).

The people started negotiating that they must be ruled by the Prime Minister Odinga. The president Kibaki said that they should mediate to. They must not argue; they must be given the right vote. The prime minister said that the president had stolen the votes. But that was not true (pupil 43 interview).

In the 2007 elections the ODM group were saying that PNU had not won. So, the ODM they started war (pupil 42 interview).

The quotes illustrate that the pupils were well informed and had opinions about the violence, which indicates a need for addressing the political economy of the country in the teaching, in order to reach a more balanced understanding of the situation. The quotes also indicate a slightly hostile attitude towards the opposition, and an unwillingness to engage in both sides of the conflict. Balanced explanations of the conflict were few and far between. Reaching a balanced understanding can be an important step towards reconciliation, and should be addressed in the teaching. This engagement could be difficult for teachers who had themselves been affected by the violence. However, thorough training and follow up of teachers could be a step towards empowering them for this work.

Two of the nine teachers and four of the focus groups with pupils mentioned conflict resolution in their interviews. However, the content of the teaching did not seem to have much depth apart from encouraging them not to fight: “For example when I find these two fighting, I go and tell them to stop fighting, and if they refuse, I take them to the teacher” (pupil 55 interview). This quote represents a typical description of conflict resolution. As we can see in this and the following quote, the pupils did not seem to have an in-depth understanding of conflict resolution.

I had solve a matter of two boys were fighting by one another. I went between them. I ask them what is wrong. One of the boys told me that they boy were fighting with he had refused to give him food and I solved the problem that day (pupil diary 43).

The quotes were typical examples of how conflict resolution was described by pupils. There was a general unwillingness in the school to engage with the drivers of conflict. This seemed to be consistent, from addressing the PEV to the conflicts between children in the school. In the next section facilitating social interaction will be discussed. Like the teaching of conflict resolution, this area of peace-building was in practice merely rhetorical.



### ***5.2.3.3 Facilitating social interaction between different groups***

The school claimed that it was facilitating peace-building through social interaction, and social interaction was a recurring theme in the data from St Peters. Inclusion of IDPs dominated the descriptions of the school's PEV response. "Living together" was considered a requisite for peace, and indicators for coexistence were extracted from all school practices. In this section, I will discuss the facilitation of social interaction among pupils and parents as it was described in the interviews. Although social interaction was a recurrent theme in the data, I did not see any evidence of efforts in my observation; neither did the school give any evidence of measures put in place. The section therefore concludes with a discussion based round my observations, concerning questions 3 and 4.

The facilitation of social interaction was described in the interviews on several levels, ranging from tribes, stakeholders and church denominations. The role of the school in bringing people together was solely to provide a space for interaction, on the one hand forcing people to interact, and on the other hand allowing them to do so. The descriptions were vague, and few reflections on why this practice was building peace were given. For example, the fact that the pupils ate lunch together and worked together in class was emphasised, without further details about how this was used to build peace. The social interaction was never connected with work on accepting differences or enhancing tolerance. As was described earlier in this section, the school was infused by ethnocentric values, making such work necessary for bringing people back together.

Similarly, the head teacher described a school allowing parents of all tribes and pastors of all denominations to take part in parents' meetings. However, few details were given of what the school offered in terms of peace-building once the people were gathered together. Stating that all groups of people were welcome served as a pretext for the reality of a school where peace-building was not on the agenda.

Although social interaction was mentioned by the head teacher, the SMC, the community partner and five teachers, none of the interviewees could give evidence of measures put in place to ensure fruitful interactions. The descriptions seemed

more like philosophical reflections around requisites for peace rather than information on systematic peace-building in the school. What can be drawn from the above analysis, however, is the emphasis given to coexistence in the school's understanding of peace. As the community was mainly dominated by one tribe, the actual coexistence was very limited. The school community said that they wanted the other tribes to return to the school. This was also given strong emphasis at Upper Hill, which will be described in a later section. As this section has shown, the school did not exhaust its potential related to facilitating social interaction. This is similar to the thematic area that will be discussed below, on awareness of a culture of violence and building a culture of peace.

#### ***5.2.3.4 Awareness of the culture of violence***

As discussed in the previous section on Macheleo, establishing alternatives to corporal punishment can be a powerful tool in building peace. Compared with the situation at Macheleo, there seemed to be far more violence at St Peters. This was particularly visible in their practice of corporal punishment, by which the children could learn that violence is an acceptable way to settle disputes. In response to research question 2 this section will start by describing the corporal punishment in the school, giving concrete examples of when this discipline strategy was used. I will then move on to discuss the justifications given for these practices by the school administration, teachers and pupils. The section ends with a discussion of these practices in relation to peace-building.

From my observations, the school was pervaded with corporal punishment and although these practices are illegal under Kenyan law and discouraged by the MoE, the school was openly punishing their children. Pupils were severely beaten and otherwise physically punished in front of me from my first day in the school. The youngest children were lying on their bellies and the older children were kneeling while they were beaten with a tyre. The beating continued even when the children cried. During the interviews I conducted in the school yard, I could often hear pupils being beaten in classrooms. I also witnessed a class being collectively punished in the school yard during class. Among the 46 diaries from the pupils, 22 of

them wrote about corporal punishment, illustrating the importance this played in the children's lives. The impact the punishments made on the pupils were obvious in the diaries, for example one pupil wrote: "When I arrived to school I saw some teacher beating other people with no sin. That day I was very afraid" (pupil diary 24). As this quote illustrates the corporal punishment made the pupil feel afraid. It also made pupils feel anger:

On Thursday things are not good because I am feeling that I had no peace because at school was beaten and at home I was beaten. That day I was very angry. I am feeling bad that I can kill somebody. I am not happy at all (pupil diary 25).

Violence was accepted as a practice in the school, and neither discouraged nor hidden. The head teacher, three teachers and six of the focus group interviews with pupils openly described violent practices. For example, the pupils explained to me that according to the school rules they were required to bring packed lunches. Whenever children did not bring lunch, they were punished by having to stand on their bare knees under the sun for the whole lunch break, and any teacher passing them was allowed to beat them with a cane. This was something I also witnessed during my stay in the school. During the school assembly observed on the Monday morning, the teacher leading the assembly was holding a cane in her hand throughout the assembly, pointing it at the pupils, while another teacher was walking among the crowd of pupils randomly beating them. The head teacher explained after the assembly that emphasising discipline and school-rules was seen the most important role of the assembly.

The head teacher in particular was concerned with school discipline, and corporal punishment was in that context seen as a necessary evil. After he took over the leadership of the school two years earlier, the previously school motto had changed to "he who loves discipline loves knowledge". I discussed these practices with the head teacher, and asked why it was used, and about its necessity. He argued along the lines of most of the teachers, that that it was only used in the most extreme cases, "to tame the most unruly children" (head teacher 2 interview). Spiritual explanations were also given as to why physical punishment was necessary. The

head teacher explained how some pupils were possessed by evil spirits, and that these had to be beaten out, “as it is not possible to talk to spirits” (head teacher 2 interview). To illustrate his point about possessed children, he described one girl who had slept with an older man and a boy who had gone to the toilet in the classroom. Pupils also quoted verses from the Bible taught to them by teachers that could be interpreted in favour of physical punishment. Two girls argued that punishing pupils was a way in which the school was building peace. In their opinion, punishment made the pupils aware of their mistakes, and when mistakes were not repeated, peace could prevail. Similarly, one pupil wrote in the diary: “On Tuesday we talk in Kiswahili. The teacher beat me, and I thanked the teacher because she did something good” (pupil diary 41).

Practicing corporal punishment is illegal under Kenyan law and discouraged by the MoE and UNICEF. Accordingly, some teachers and pupils did argue against it. One teacher in particular said that she did not like using the cane, and did not always carry it with her to class, something which was common practice among the other teachers. However, none of the teachers expressed an awareness of the culture of violence that had developed in the school, and the potential effect this culture might have had on peace-building. Six of the focus groups with pupils described corporal punishment, and vividly described the negative consequences of the practice; fear, anxiety, and at times severe pain. One pupil in particular said how the teacher/pupil relationship was problematic for peace-building in the school. When I asked what more the school could do to build peace, this was his reply: “By not punishing pupils, but talking to them without any shout. Talking to them in peace” (pupil 58 interview). It was repeatedly reported in interviews that the pupils’ opinions were not taken into account when punishments were given, and for example, if they argued with the teachers over whether they had done something wrong, the punishment would be harder, as it was seen as rebellious behaviour. According to these narratives from the children, it is natural to think that the punishments were strangling the pupils’ voices, as they were living with a constant fear for falling out of favour with the teachers. Not allowing the pupils to express themselves freely in turn worked against the democratisation of the school. Further, it was indirectly teaching pupils that violence was an accepted means of making

people change their behaviour, and to force your own opinions on someone else. Although corporal punishment and the PEV cannot be compared, they are still violence at different points on the scale. The PEP is founded on the belief that a peaceful national culture can be built through the new generation of school children. However, in order for this to work, the words would have to be consistent with the deeds.

The fact that the school was unwilling to change these practices supplements, the other findings discussed above on the school's reluctance to engage in peace-building. Through the severe use of corporal punishment, the school was building a culture of violence rather than a culture of peace, indirectly teaching the pupils that violence is acceptable – whenever there is a reason to practise it. The discipline strategy was also used to strangle the pupils' voices. This relates to the final thematic area that will be discussed in this section: giving pupils a voice.

#### ***5.2.3.5 Giving the pupils a voice***

As discussed in the previous section, the pupils at St Peters were not encouraged to voice their questions and opinions in a safe environment. Despite the reservations made by the head teacher and deputy heads, my observations suggest that the school did not work towards giving the pupils a voice in how the school was run. Rather, as this section will discuss, the school stressed the importance of obedience, discouraged critical thinking and strangled pupils' voices. These elements, which will be discussed in the order given above, all worked against the building of a school democracy and responds to research question 2.

Giving the children a voice in how the school was run was never discussed or mentioned at St Peters. This contrasts with my analysis of Macheleo, where student councils were put in place in order to empower the pupils. At St Peters the understanding was rather that the children were supposed to obey authorities such as teachers, parents, elders or prefects, rather than have a voice of their own. In the elicitation technique, 4 of the 10 most rapidly mentioned ground rules for peace were obedience; obey the rules, obey the teachers, obey the bell, and obey authorities.

**Table 5: Ground rules for peace at St Peters**

<b>Ground rule for peace</b>	<b>Frequency</b>
Obey the rules	<b>26</b>
Good behaviours	<b>22</b>
Be good to others	<b>15</b>
Obey the teachers	<b>13</b>
Do not fight	<b>10</b>
Love one another	<b>10</b>
Discuss and co-operate	<b>10</b>
Do not steal	<b>9</b>
Obey the bell	<b>7</b>
Obey authorities	<b>5</b>

Whereas the ground rules at Macheleo gave practical advice about peace-building activities, the above rules are of a more passive character. In addition to the strong emphasis on obedience, the rules also show that peace is understood to be created through avoiding certain behaviours. With the exception of “be good to others”, “love one another” and “discuss and co-operate” which do focus on building a positive culture, the remaining rules are all focused on obedience and keeping rules. This contrasts with Macheleo where the focus was largely on building a culture of peace. The rules can be supplemented by the following quote given by a pupil in response to the question of what the school was doing to build peace: “We as pupils we are maintaining order. We follow instruction” (pupil 45 interview).

A consequence of the focus on obedience was the fact that the children were not encouraged to have their own opinions. This supplements the findings discussed in the previous section, where corporal punishment was found to be used to stifle pupils’ voices. Indirectly, the teachers were teaching the pupils that even if the authority’s explanation is wrong, they should not protest, as the result might be violence. There was no awareness of the necessity of being critical of authority, or of the necessity of critical thinking with respect to obedience. As incitement from politicians was given part of the blame for the PEV, education could potentially empower the civil population to resist this negative influence. At a school level this

would require, however, that the pupils were trained in critical thinking and assertiveness, both focus areas in the PEP. However, this focus within the PEP challenged the school ethos, and was potentially considered to be a threat to what the teachers and administration saw as good and fruitful behaviour among pupils.

That the pupils were not encouraged to raise their own opinions was confirmed in the lessons I observed, where the teaching was largely teacher-centred. Participation by the children was limited to rote learning, answering “yes” and “no” in chorus, and repeating what the teacher said. They were also asked questions like “Who are the needy among us” to which they gave individual one-word answers. Moreover, all the four teachers I observed made fun of the pupils when they gave the wrong answer. In one of the Life Skills lessons observed the pupils did voice their opinions were simply treated as wrong. For example:

Teacher: Who else in our society is needy?

Pupil: Refugees.

Teacher: No. Are they needy?

Pupils: Yes.

Teacher: Are they needy? How?

Pupils: (everyone talking at the same time)

Teacher: Are they needy? I thought they had everything.

Pupils: No.

Teacher: So there are those who are needy. Like the ones who are where? Are the Sudanese who are living with us needy?

Pupils: No

Such dialogue was typical of the response from teachers when the pupils gave a different answer from what the teacher expected. The pupils potentially indirectly learnt that their instinctive answer was wrong and that their opinions didn't matter.

This section has shown that the school was not willing to engage in democratisation or critical thinking, but rather emphasised obedience to authorities. Grounded in the school ethos, these attitudes and practices held a strong position in the school. Consequently, thorough training would be needed to change attitudes and raise awareness among teachers.

#### **5.2.4 Conclusion, St Peters**

In this section, the role of St Peters in peace-building has been discussed. Although the school claimed to build peace, my analysis found that few practical measures were in fact put into place. The above sections on making an effort to build peace, teaching peace, facilitating social interaction, awareness of culture of violence, and empowering the pupils therefore reads more like problems with peace-building initiatives.

Overall, the school was not found to be implementing the PEP or proactively building peace through other educational activities. As the school ethos and culture had changed with the change of leadership in the school, peace education was no longer given priority. The section has explored attitudes towards peace, violence and politics which are likely to have influenced the commitment towards peace-building. As the school interpreted peace as merely negative peace, or the absence of conflict, it did not see the need for peace-building. Further, the blame for the national crisis was given squarely to the politicians, thereby diminishing the importance of the school's own potential involvement.

All of these perceptions and attitudes came across as disempowering the school population, and discouraging peace-building initiatives. Where the school could have focused on empowering the pupils, the data revealed a school infused by a culture of violence. This was also reflected in the lessons, which will be discussed in section 6.3.2. Several of the practices described in the discussion are practically the opposite of what the PEP is designed to achieve. The authoritative structures in the school were suppressing the pupils' voices rather than building a pupil democracy. Corporal punishment was extensively used, and upheld as a necessary evil in achieving peace, again interpreted as obedience. These findings support the argument for a holistic approach to education for peace where the whole school system is transformed to a culture of peace (section 4.2).



## **5.3 Logos: Peace education as counselling**

### **5.3.0 Introducing Logos**

Logos was partly chosen because having received training in the PEP and having been provided with PEP materials, it was recognised by the Eldoret DEO to be a good example of PEP implementation. As in the previous case studies, the semi-structured interviews were the main source of information, and will guide the data analysis. In total, 49 stakeholders were interviewed in the school, including 9 teachers, 29 pupils, the deputy head, the head teacher, 6 parents and 3 SMC members. See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of sampling and data collection.

I will first discuss the context of the school, including the PEV trauma in the school and community. This contextual information will form the basis for the following discussion on findings related to peace-building in the school. The findings are organised under the following thematic areas: reactive peace efforts, accommodating opinions, uniting ethnically diverse children, and involving the community. The school stood out from the other case studies because after the PEV it had interpreted the PEP as merely a counselling programme and the initial commitment had therefore not been sustained. By the time I visited Logos, there was little evidence of peace education efforts. This section will discuss why the building of a culture of peace was not sustained in the school, how this relates to the cascade model of the programme, the lack of follow ups and the close affiliation the PEP had to the PEV.

### **5.3.1 Contextualising Logos**

Logos had a total enrolment of 2,734 pupils and was a mixed school, located on the Logos estate, a large slum in urban Eldoret. There was no record kept of the ethnic communities in the school, but Kikuyus, Luos and Kalenjin were claimed to be the largest affiliations represented. During the violence the school closed, and despite many children leaving the area during and after the PEV, the school had an influx of students following the violence, due to IDPs settling in the area.

The school had received training in the PEP, and because it was seriously affected by the PEV, 7 teachers were trained. The school had access to PEP materials, although they did not seem to be used frequently in the school. However, two classes were observed where the lesson plans *were* applied. Neither Peace Education nor Life Skills was specified in the timetable, however. There did not seem to be a high awareness of peace education in the school, but negative attitudes towards the programme were not observed. The school had also received training in peace education from the Nairobi Memorial Centre. Following this training, a peace club had been established in the school. However, the club had stopped running after the funding for the programme had run out.

### **5.3.2 Logos and the post-election violence**

Described as the location where the violence had been most severe in Eldoret, the narratives from Logos were marked by trauma and pain. This section starts by giving an account of the tensions prior to the violence, the political explanations and the ethnic aspects involved. I will then move on to discuss the actual violence witnessed by the school population, and the mark it left on the pupils. The section ends with a short description of the displacements.

As with the other schools, there was consensus that the general election had triggered the violence. However, Logos was the only school where the interviewees emphasised the build-up of tension prior to the election, acknowledging the underlying tensions and drivers of conflict influencing the outbreak of violence. Like St Peters, historical grievances over land and poor governance surrounding national elections were given as the main drivers of conflict triggering the violence. Added to that was the history of violence in connection with elections. As one SMC member stated:

It became chaotic because the politicians, the words they used before the election really carved up people. Especially among the community that live in this area. Because all along there has been that misunderstanding of historical injustice. And especially of land. There has been issues of elections since 1992 since we received multi-party; there has been fight every election. The

tribes here have not lived in co-existence and peace. They have been living in fear. So towards the general election of 2007 there was that build-up of hatred. And now when it had come to the real election, like in this community, what made people to fight actually, it was that past violence. People were not trusting one another, and the issue of land and many other things. So when we voted, and they said that there was rigging, so they found the reason for that thing to explode. And the community just begin to fight one another” (SMC member 8 interview).

Although these tensions were emphasised by a number of interviewees, others claimed that the violence had happened spontaneously, a statement that resurfaced in the interviews from Upper Hill discussed in the next section. The interviewees claiming the violence to be spontaneous commonly blamed rigging of the elections for the outburst: “But unfortunately Kibaki rigged the election, and when the election was rigged and every member of the society knew that election was rigged chaos started” (SMC member 10 interview).

As in the other locations it was simply taken for granted that political affiliation was guided by ethnicity. The PEV was described by one teacher as a “party-war”. As at the other schools, Kalenjin, Luos and Kikuyus were described as the main ‘participants’ in the violence. The two largest groups in Logos were the Kikuyu and the Luo, who were on opposite sides politically. Their perception of the crisis was largely influenced by their ethnicities. One teacher claimed that the Kikuyus owned most of the houses in the slum, and during and after the violence they refused to renting to Luos, which made a large proportion of that ethnic group homeless. Whereas in Nakuru the main perpetrators were described as gangs coming from outside the community, the narratives from Logos described neighbours attacking each other. It was also claimed that people were forced to participate in the violence: “The fellows who attacked me and my family [...] were just local people, idlers, those people working, doing jobs around, those who hang around looking for jobs” (head teacher 3 interview).

Logos was also the school where the violence was described in crudest terms. A large number of the school population had been displaced during the violence, and

because the violence had happened within the estate where the school was located and the children were living there the children had witnessed the burning of houses, murder, stealing, looting, and people being “circumcised with broken glass” (pupil 77 interview). Dead bodies and cut off heads were described as just lying around or hanging in trees.

But even the children saw it. Really life it was a bad incident. It was horrible, because you could even pass, you get a body, the head is hanged, the body is not there, and you are trying to pass and go very quickly and you have children. They saw what happened. They ask: mummy who are killing these people? (teacher 23 interview).

In the pupil interviews, innocent people who had been affected was a recurrent theme, in particular children, babies and pregnant women. The majority of the interviewees knew someone who had been killed in the violence, either family or friends. Consequently, the pupils were described as very traumatised after the violence. The two quotes below give an account of this:

Because during that time, or even shortly after their minds were not upright. You could tell them even to write a composition, and the message they give in their compositions was just about violence. They could talk more of violence than any other thing. [...] We saw some places burning, we decided to run away from home, such stories. [...] Even a standard one, even a nursery school child you can tell to draw something for you, the child could draw burning houses, people holding guns or bows and arrows. Such things (teacher 19 interview).

You could see in the children a lot of traumatised cases. You could hear children talk about the events that they witnessed. Sometimes they could talk of seeing heads of people [...]. Others could talk about challenges they went through when they were staying in the police post or in the church. Others were narrating how life was in the camp when they were in the showground (teacher 22 interview).

Similar stories were narrated by other teachers, describing how the children were terrified, fainted in class, screamed, or showed other signs of post-traumatic stress. Following the violence the teachers were faced with massive challenges in reintegrating traumatised children back into the school:

Talking you realise that in the same class the child maybe notice that it was the father of so and so who cut my uncle. It is the father of so and so, or the uncle, who burnt our house. So it was not very easy. We did even find as we were teaching a child getting those hallucinations, screaming “they are coming, they are coming to burn” (teacher 17 interview).

The interviewees also described how the school was infused with tribal attitudes following the violence. The cruelty of the violence witnessed, and the severity of the trauma among both teachers and pupils is likely to have contributed to the fear which developed between the tribes. The following quotes give witnesses to this fear: “A child from one community could not feel very secure to be with children of other communities” (teacher 22 interview). And “Children watched their fathers being killed. And they were told your father was killed by tribe A. And they hate that tribe” (SMC member 9 interview). As the last quote illustrates, the trauma contributed to complicate the reconciliation process. The reconciliation efforts made by the school will be described in section 5.3.3.1.

When the school reopened, the numbers had gone down because of displacement. Many of the pupils and teachers were described as being in IDP camps, on their reserves, or as having migrated to other towns. After the violence, the pupils were encouraged to come back to school. New pupils from IDP camps were also admitted, and the interviewees proudly described how they warmly welcomed them. However, the increased numbers of pupils stretched the school facilities, and this was claimed to have affected the school’s exam results.

The brutality of the violence, and the fact that the perpetrators were from within the community complicated the reconciliation process. The following section, which will discuss the findings related to peace-building in the school will show how the severity of the challenges faced by the school following the violence contributed to making the implementation of the PEP less effective.

### **5.3.3 A culture of peace at Logos?**

As the previous section has established, Logos faced a massive trauma following the PEV. Following reconciliation processes initiated by the head teacher, the teachers and pupils who were initially divided after the PEV were reconciled. As this section will argue, the school had an early commitment to reconciliation and peace-building, but these efforts became less evident as the community returned to normality. The discussion of factors influencing this decline in commitment to peace-building will be discussed under each of the following subsections; reactive peace efforts, accommodating opinions, uniting ethnically diverse children, and community involvement.

#### ***5.3.3.1 Reactive peace efforts***

As described in the previous section, the school and community had been massively affected by the PEV trauma. The initial school response after the PEV was therefore focused on healing and helping the pupils to settle back into learning. Although this was a necessary initial approach, the consequence of interpreting peace education as a reactive initiative resulted in a perception that peace education was no longer relevant when the violence had calmed sufficiently down and the signs of severe trauma were gone. This interpretation did in practice hold back a continuous implementation of the PEP. In response to research questions 3, 4 and 5, this section will discuss a range of activities which were introduced in the school as a reaction to the PEV. I will start by describing how preaching peace was seen as guidance and counselling, moving on to the reconciliation efforts made among teachers. I will then discuss how the PEP was used in the reactive efforts after the violence. The section concludes with a discussion on the need for more follow ups to make the PEP more efficient, and how the programme could have been used more proactively.

All stakeholders interviewed, including the 8 teachers and 29 pupils, agreed that the school had provided some level of guidance and counselling to the pupils following the PEV trauma. The school had a guidance and counselling office to whom the most traumatised children were referred. This service was very limited, however, and most counselling took place in class. During the class counselling the

teachers were reported as having preached peace, reconciliation and anti-tribalism. The preaching efforts were said to have had a soothing effect on the pupils, and were mainly aimed at distracting the children's attention from what had happened during the PEV. As the preaching efforts to a large extent were interpreted as a reactive counselling effort following the violence, these activities decreased in frequency as the school population slowly settled back into school and the trauma was no longer as evident as in the beginning. The preaching efforts had initially played a positive role, but the fact that the approach taken was not sustainable, illustrates the difficulty of combining the proactive and reactive approach to peace education discussed in section 4.3.

Although the teachers were expected to preach peace and reconciliation following the PEV, they were themselves experiencing difficulties in their own collegial relationships. One teacher in particular expressed in her interview the view that there was a "gap" between them when they returned to school. To illustrate her point, she described a prayer group for teachers that had stopped running after the violence because the teachers of different ethnicities no longer wanted to meet. However, despite the initial hostility, the teachers made an effort at reconciliation. The following quote from a teacher illustrates this process.

Because I remember one day after the violence. That teacher stayed for about two weeks without greeting one another. One day she took a time, even she started with me. She came round, "I have just come to apologise for what happened on behalf of our children". Because for the Kalenjin the children were involved, even her children. So she came asking for forgiveness on behalf of the children. So we can start going on smoothly after forgiving one another. So it is true we started reconciling teachers (teacher 25 interview).

In the above quote, a teacher was described as having taken the initiative to reconcile. Others claimed that the head teacher had been the key person in initiating and encouraging reconciliation. This illustrates the crucial importance of the school leadership being pro-reconciliation. This initial reconciliation process was frequently described in the interviews. However, there was no mention of the reconciliation

process continuing, which strengthens the argument that the reactive approach to peace-building probably restricted the peace-building process (section 4.3).

Following the training in the PEP and by the Nairobi Memorial Centre, peace education was taught in the school. Both programmes were described as helpful, in particular in relation to healing trauma and bringing about reconciliation. However, as with preaching peace and reconciliation discussed above, the peace education initiatives were largely interpreted as reactive to the violence, and had consequently lost relevance as the conflict calmed down. One teacher in particular criticised the programme for its reactive approach.

According to my observation, the government showed that they had not been prepared, because this programme was only brought as a result of the conflict. They did not have a constituency plan, a plan that is always put in place, even when there is no conflict. And if the government has to put systems in place it must ensure that programmes are there when there is conflict or when there is no conflict (teacher 22 interview).

The above quote illustrates that the way the PEP was disseminated communicated a reactive approach. Although the peace education policy embraces both the proactive and reactive approach, the message reaching the school was largely that it was a reaction to, and closely affiliated with, the PEV. This resembles findings on the same issue from St Peters, where they argued that the PEP was no longer needed because they had reached a state of peace (section 5.2.3.1).

Although teacher 22, as quoted above, interpreted the PEP as reactive, she seemed to have seen the proactive potential in the programme. This became evident when she argued for a need for more follow ups so that the programme could be used to address “emerging issues” in the community:

Although we feel it is not enough just to have workshop once and it is forgotten. There must be follow ups that will keep the fire burning, and of course to address the emerging issues. Because even after we had that time, there are other new things that have continued emerging which has to be addressed from time to time. Because normal circumstances when we say the



conflict is over, it is like it becomes the beginning of a new conflict. And conflict may come in different ways. We might have been having a conflict as a result of PEV. But we can have conflict based on different interests. So I feel that this program needs to be enhanced (teacher 22 interview).

Although the programme was interpreted as reactive it was still used to a certain extent in the school. Two classes were observed where the PEP materials were used, and it was once mentioned in the diaries:

On Tuesday we learn about assertiveness, that there is aggressiveness, assertiveness and submission. He talk us that we must be assertiveness when we are assertiveness we can't do bad things. Always we must be assertiveness (pupil diary 49).

Whereas the diary quote suggests a lesson where the message had been communicated effectively, one of the classes observed where the materials were used clearly illustrates the two abovementioned issues; that the programme was seen as a reactive response and that more thorough training and follow ups would be beneficial. Whereas the lesson in question was aimed at teaching the pupils about communication through a drawing activity, the class rather communicated violence. Initially, the exercise was that pupil A was to describe a picture or figure to pupil B. Sitting back to back, pupil A was dependent on good explanations to draw the picture correctly. The difficulty in the exercise illustrates how communication can be difficult. In the second exercise, pupil B was allowed to see what pupil B was drawing, easing the task and illustrating the importance of two-way communication. Misinterpreting the exercise in the PEP materials, the teacher asked pupil A to draw one person killing another with a panga: "I want you to tell your partner to draw someone who is carrying a panga who is cutting someone. Without communicating" (teacher). In the second round pupil A and B co-operated in drawing the picture. Throughout the lesson the teacher was holding a cane in her hand, and criticised the drawings and made fun of them in front of the whole class: "Some of you cannot draw. You cannot even make the head of a human being" (teacher). The whole lesson lasted 15 minutes in total, although the standard time for a lesson was 35 minutes. That the exercise could have brought back traumatic memories for some

pupils was not addressed. The lesson illustrated the teacher's perception of the PEP being closely affiliated with the PEV. It also illustrated the need for thorough training in how to use the materials.

Although the PEP was mainly interpreted as a reactive approach within the school, one teacher commented that she was using the PEP proactively in preparation for the next general election.

We have not said that there is no fight now, so we can stop, we are still going on with the lessons. We are still continuing. We have not stopped. It is a continuous process. Because now especially you can see now this year, now we are about to elect again. We are still going on telling pupils and even the parents, and praying that this thing will never come back again if we get united (teacher 23 interview).

That the impressions of the programme were so varied among the teachers indicates that there was no clear school policy guiding the implementation. This resembles the debates at the policy level, on whether the programme was mainly intended to be proactive or reactive, and illustrates how the conflicting interests on the national level influenced the implementation at the school level. Although the programme was described as having been useful as a reactive response in healing trauma following the violence, the close association with the PEV seemed to have hindered the continuous implementation of the programme. The next section will build on this argument, discussing how reactive PEV efforts hindered the school in accommodating the opinions of the children.

### ***5.3.3.2 Accommodating pupils' opinions***

Ultimately the school was anxious to maintain a state of peace. This section will discuss a range of these rules and practices in relation to accommodating pupils' opinions. Although these efforts might to some extent have been necessary immediately following the PEV, this section will argue for a need to modify the rules to give a more sustainable approach. The section starts by describing how arguing, talking about politics and referring to tribal names were abandoned. Following on from that I will discuss the ground rules for peace, which indicate that the pupils

were of a different opinion from the school rule with regard to what was beneficial for peace-building. I will then draw on the video observations to discuss to what extent the pupils' opinions were accommodated in the teaching, before giving a concluding remark on the practice of corporal punishment in the school.

Following the PEV, conflict and disagreements were closely associated with violence. Consequently conflicts on all levels were discouraged, including small disagreements among the pupils. Peace-keeping efforts were put in place, and teachers described in the interviews that whenever children were found arguing with each other they were punished. Although reducing arguments immediately after the violence might have been necessary in the process of helping the pupils to settle back in, it is questionable whether it was beneficial in the long term. A little conflict can be a necessary driving force in a community. The role of education is therefore not to hinder conflict, but to teach students to deal with conflict in a constructive manner, such as was done at Macheleo through the Peace Club and the teaching of mediation skills.

Because talking about politics was seen as a potential cause of conflict, this was also banned by the school. Initially, this could be argued to have been necessary to allow the pupils' and teachers' minds to shift focus from the trauma to school work. However, in the long run it is likely that the pupils and teachers alike would have benefited from discussing the political economy, and especially so in a community where violence is reported to have followed all the multi-party elections. Rather than banishing political discussions altogether, the school could have facilitated fruitful discussions for greater understanding of the other side. Peace education could have been a natural initiative to incorporate such discussions.

Another school rule introduced following the violence was the banishing of the use of tribal names. As with the abovementioned school rule on conflicts and disagreements, punishments were introduced for children naming tribes in school. Although the work on discouraging tribalism was mainly described as peace-keeping, some proactive efforts were also mentioned, as the quote below illustrates:

We also give them examples of Obama. He is an African. But where he is, he is in a white country. But he is leading people. Why? What they saw in him is

not what he is. It is not what tribe he comes from, but the leadership in him (teacher 18 interview).

In this quote the focus has shifted from merely ignoring the different tribes to giving an example of a situation where ethnicity was not seen as a hindrance to the politics.

The ban on arguing, talking about politics and using tribal names contrasted markedly with the pupils' own perception of how peace should be built, as expressed in their ground rules for peace:

**Table 6: Ground rules for peace at Logos**

Ground rule for peace	Frequency
Love one another	9
Finish corruption	8
Obey school rules	5
Respect one another	5
Solve conflicts	5
Respect the elders	4
Avoid conflict	4
Avoid civil war	4
Avoid tribalism	4

Avoiding problematic topics and obeying rules is well represented in Table 6 through “obey school rules”, “respect the elders” and the three last rules on avoiding conflict, civil war and tribalism. However, the pupils were challenging the school policy when they made “finish corruption” the second most important point of their list. As corruption is a highly political issue, the pupils showed through this point that they saw involvement in politics and political change as a main contributor to the peace-building process. Further, ‘solving conflict’ is also rated highly. Although “avoiding conflict”, which was the school policy is mentioned further down, more groups saw solving conflicts as a more fruitful way of dealing with conflict.

Although the pupils showed by their ground rules that they were thinking critically, this skill was not encouraged or accommodated in the school. All the classes observed in the school were teacher-dominated, leaving no room for the voice of the children. This was also true for the classes where the PEP materials were used. Although these classes were more varied in their use of teaching methods, and the pupils were brought into the lesson through role play and drawing, the teacher did not ask the pupils open questions.

Another practice which most likely affected the extent to which the pupils felt free to express themselves was the use of corporal punishment in the school. As one pupil wrote in the diary: "One day a teacher called [name of pupil]. He is a bad teacher. One day he caned one pupil. That pupil faint" (pupil diary 46).

Although the punishments I observed did not seem as harsh as at St Peters, corporal punishment was openly practiced. For example, children who came late for parade had to sit by the gate for several hours before they were beaten by a teacher. I also observed a teacher running around in the school yard when the bell rang for class, randomly hitting children with a long tyre to make them move faster to their classes. That the pupils were punished for talking about politics and arguing could at best be seen as peace-keeping efforts, but made it impossible for the pupils to voice their opinions or discuss issues related to the PEV.

The abovementioned rules and practices were introduced in the school following the PEV, as part of the peace-keeping efforts. Peace Education training and materials should have helped the school to move on from this stage, to engage in more peace-building activities. When the initial response was kept on, however, it led to a situation where the pupils' opinions were not accommodated, a situation that could be damaging for the democratisation of the school. That negative attitudes were still flourishing in the school and community will be discussed in the next section. This emphasises the point that it would have been more fruitful to have had open discussion and exchange of perceptions and opinions.

### ***5.3.3.3 Uniting ethnically diverse children***

Despite the efforts made by the school to help the children settle back in after the trauma of the PEV, tribal views were still held by the majority of people interviewed. The school argued that they had made efforts to challenge these views. However, as will be discussed in this section, there were no relevant strategies put in place. The school claimed that mixing children in classrooms and during lunch breaks built peace. However, there was no evidence that these situations were used as opportunities for ethnicities to mix; it was left to chance. A description of the attitudes emerging from the data will set the scene. I will then describe efforts made to mix the children initially following the violence, in particular through the lunch programme. The section ends with a discussion of the effectiveness of the school efforts. The section essentially answers research question 3.

The tribal attitudes held by individuals became particularly evident in the explanations given of the PEV. For example, one SMC member and a teacher stated: “Kikuyu as a whole, they really don’t won’t support other ethnic tribes” (SMC member 10 interview). “We were brought a head master. Though he was a Kikuyu. But he was a good man” (teacher 21 interview).

Tribal attitudes were also evident in the descriptions of the IDPs still living in camps, who to a large extent were described as Kikuyus taking advantage of the system. One teacher claimed that since the community in Logos was very poor, most people were better off living in the camps, where they were provided with shelter, food and education. Although the camps were described to have catered for the needy people during and soon after the violence, the population was at this point highly suspicious of the IDPs, as the quote below illustrates:

But even those who are in IDP camps they are not the original. They are from Central province. Not because they were displaced. [...] They are not really eligible IDPs. But because Kibaki is from Central their tribe is in power, they have really tried so much to allocate them, relocate them with plots and other building materials. Even here in Eldoret there were some farms bought for them, they have houses where they live (SMC member 10 interview).

As the section on the PEV established, both sides of the ethnic conflict were represented in the school. Although tribalism had been outlawed initially following the violence, the diaries described incidents of ethnic tension. For example one pupil wrote:

I saw two tribes being in conflict. They were talking negative words about each one's tribes so one could not take it. He decided to fight with the other. I came between them and told them to live as children of one family. They apologize to each other and they accept my words (pupil diary 48).

The quote indicates that there were still tensions in the community when the data were collected. Although mixing children in classrooms and in lunch breaks was claimed to unite ethnically diverse children, no measures were described in interviews or observed that would ensure that this happened in a productive way. The claims therefore came across as merely rhetorical. The interviews made no reference towards the establishment of a common Kenyan identity, which could have made the uniting efforts more effective.

As described in the section on the PEV in Logos (section 5.3.2), pupils and teachers from all ethnic groups were welcomed into the school following the violence. This was described as a peace-building activity in its own right, as it gave the pupils and teachers a common ground to interact. The teachers in particular mentioned having ethnically mixed classes as a positive initiative, and emphasised that no efforts had been made to separate the children into different classes. The pupils pointed out that the teachers had made them share textbooks and generally work together while in class. A parent argued in the interview that further efforts could have been made to integrate the diverse ethnic groups, for example through the peace group in the school.

The children can also be put in peace groups. At a certain time given, they go into their groups, there is a chairman, there is a secretary, they go and discuss. And when we are doing this, teachers should select on tribe basis without the children knowing. You will find one Kisii, one Luo, so they can be able to come out with something and will preach peace among themselves (parent 9 interview).

The school also had a lunch programme sponsored by the charity Mary's Meals, which provided free lunch for all the pupils and teachers in the school. That all children were provided lunch regardless of ethnicity was repeatedly described as a peace-building initiative.

Children are eating together. They share the little, even if it is little. And you see from the outlook alone is that unity. Because if a Luo and a Kikuyu can share, don't you see as they are young as they are. What about when they grow up? They will not forget. They will know that this is Otieno [typical Luo name]; we used to share in my class (deputy head teacher 4 interview).

Despite the efforts described to create a common ground for the pupils through learning together in class and eating together, no reference was made to the establishment of a unifying Kenyan identity. This makes Logos stand out from the three other schools, where the identity development was rated highly. The effectiveness of Logos's peace-related initiatives could be questioned because of this.

Although the school claimed to be building peace through mixing ethnicities, there were no strategies put in place, which left the occurrence of interaction to chance. The potential inherent in an ethnically mixed school composition was not really used to promote citizenship and a national identity. Teaching peace education could have provided an opportunity to do this. However, as peace education was interpreted as a reactive approach, closely affiliated with the PEP, continuous peace education was not seen as appropriate. Although the interviewees were eagerly arguing that they were building peace, there was also an element of the current work not being sufficient. This was particularly evident in the discussion on community involvement, which will be discussed in the next section.

#### ***5.3.3.4 Involving the community***

Logos was the school where a need for stronger involvement of the community was advocated the most. As with the teaching of peace, some outreach activities were described as having taken place initially after the violence. However, parents and SMC members in particular urged a stronger involvement of the parents in peace-



building work. This section will start by describing the initial outreach efforts made by the school. I will then move on to describe how the initial reconciliation efforts in the school inspired the community before moving on to discuss the potential influence the school could have. The section responds to research question 3.

Although preaching peace at parents' meetings was mentioned as a peace-building strategy, this did not come across as a conscious strategy by the school, but rather as an initiative by some particularly engaged teachers. Similarly, two teachers said that the Peace Club at an initial stage had made some community-based efforts, such as walking from door to door in the local community preaching peace messages. However, as with the other activities carried out by the Peace Club, this ended when the funding from the Nairobi Memorial Centre ran out.

The school was described as having influenced the community with respect to reconciliation after the violence. One SMC member in particular described the positive effect of the school reconciliation process on the community.

And they are living in harmony as I can say within the school compound. We as the community we also had a time to learn some basic areas to what effect within our homes. We borrowed some ideas from the teachers. And we took them to our homes. We also told them from homesteads to live in love. To accept the happiness, and to appreciate. I know that appreciation is that today, but it will change tomorrow. And they have to help with that. That is the role the school played. And it has, it shows some light (SMC member 8 interview).

The quote illustrates the potential influence schools can have on their communities. The SMC member reported that the initial peace efforts in the school inspired the parents to preach peace in their own homes. However, the 6 parents and 3 SMC members argued strongly for a stronger involvement of the community in peace-building. They argued that for peace-building efforts among pupils to be effective, consistency was needed between messages conveyed at school and at home. One parent in particular suggested the establishment of peace groups for parents, which could provide a space for parents of various ethnicities to meet and discuss co-existence.

As discussed in the previous sections, most of the peace-building efforts took place initially following the violence. This was also true of the involvement of the community. Whereas the school had at first inspired the community to reconcile, organised outreach activities and preached peace at parents' meetings, these efforts had slowed down by the time of this study, hence the arguing by one teacher for stronger follow-up to the activities. The parents themselves raised the need for a stronger involvement by parents to ensure consistency in messages conveyed to the pupils. This raises an important suggestion about the effectiveness of peace education in general.

#### **5.3.4 Conclusion, Logos**

My analysis of Logos has revealed a school strongly affected by the PEV trauma, and initially committed to reconciliation and peace-building. However, these efforts became less evident in the school over time. The analysis suggests that the lack of sustainability was related to the PEP being closely associated with the PEV. As chapter 4 discussed, the programme came as a reaction to the violence, and its implementation was prioritised in the most affected areas. The school therefore saw the programme merely as a help to get back to "normality". This perception was enhanced by the lack of follow ups, monitoring and support from external agencies. The reactive approach has been reflected in all the elements discussed; the need for the school to accommodate to opinions more, make a better effort to unite ethnically diverse children, and to involve the community more in the peace-building activities. The reactive interpretation of the programme contributed to stagnation in the peace education progress, and could be attributed to the severity of the trauma experienced by the school population.

This section has clearly illustrated the need for a clearer policy on peace education, together with more thorough training in peace education and more follow ups by trained teachers. The section has also argued for a greater involvement by the community, in order to create more consistency in the messages being conveyed to pupils at school and at home.

## **5.4 Upper Hill: Peace education is too sensitive**

### **5.4.0 Introducing Upper Hill**

Upper Hill stands out from the other schools as they did not make any effort to implement the PEP. The rural school had previously been ethnically mixed, but as all the Kikuyus had fled the area during the PEV, the school was now single-ethnic. Although the teachers had received training in the PEP, my analysis did not find any signs of implementation. The fact that the school identity was problematic could have contributed to this; rather than being victims, perpetrators came from the surrounding community. While staff said that they wanted the IDPs to return to the area, they were in denial and did not make any effort to change the school culture. The fact that the DEO identified the school as an example of successful implementation of the PEP strongly suggests that the school had not received any external support, monitoring or inspections.

I will start the section by giving an account of the PEV trauma in the school, and discuss the impact the violence had had on the school up until the time the research was conducted. As the PEP was not implemented, and other peace education initiatives were not put in place, the findings section will mainly discuss reasons for why the PEP was not seen as relevant in the school.

### **5.4.1 Contextualising Upper Hill**

As of 2012, the enrolment at Upper Hill was 156, making it the smallest of the case-study schools. The school was mixed, with both boys and girls. Located in the outskirts of Eldoret, the school was classified as rural, although it was within Eldoret school district. There were no records kept of the ethnic groups enrolled in the school, but the interviews suggest that it catered for mainly the Nandi, a subgroup of the Kalenjin tribe. As will be discussed below, the school had, prior to the violence, had a significant Kikuyu population. However, as the school and community were heavily affected by the violence, the PNU supporters had left the area in 2008. The school had consequently experienced a significant decline in numbers following the violence, and was still recovering from the effects of this. Several of the classrooms in the school were not in use.

The school had received peace education training and PEP materials. However, as will be discussed in the findings section, the programme had not been implemented. Life Skills was described as having previously been on the timetable, but had later been removed. There was a general reluctance to teach peace in the school, which might be due to the slow recovery from the violence. In the following section, the PEV and its effects will be discussed in relation to the school and the community.

#### **5.4.2 Upper Hill and the post-election violence**

The school and community were both heavily affected by the PEV. This section will explore the narratives given in interviews on the PEV in the community. I will start by giving a general account of the violence before moving on to discuss how the community had been involved as perpetrators, and how they were anxious to describe the violence as spontaneous. I will then move on to describe the community itself as relatively peaceful during the crisis, but as a host to large numbers of IDPs, and the impact the IDPs had on the school. The section concludes with a discussion on truth and reconciliation in the community, and the prospect of the next general election.

As with the other three schools, the violence was described as being a result of the general election. Delay in votes, expectations that Raila would win, rigging of the election, and incitements from politicians were all given as explanations of why it happened. However, the issue of land ownership was also mentioned as a trigger for the violence, as one teacher stated the aim of the attacks was mainly to “go and take property” (teacher 29 interview). As in the other schools the violence was described as being characterised by killing, burning of houses and people, destruction of property, sexual violence, and displacements. What differed from the other schools was that the violence was described in less detail, and that stealing and destruction of livestock and food security was given more emphasis.

There seemed to be more or less consensus in the school that it was the Nandi branch of the Kalenjin ethnic community that had started the violence against the Kikuyus. A few of the interviewees described retaliatory violence from the Kikuyus.

Most of the descriptions of the PEV given by interviewees at Upper Hill were largely impersonal and very general. The explanation for this could perhaps be found in the PEV itself. One parent told me in his interview that the head teacher had to convince him to come, he had heard rumours that there was a foreigner in the school talking about peace, and suspected that it was a spy from the ICC wanting information about perpetrators. He had only accepted to take part in the interview when the head teacher had convinced him that the foreigner was a 'good person'.

That the parent was reluctant to give an interview could best be understood through an outside perspective on the school. Whereas the school population themselves were unwilling to give personal testimonies of what had happened in the community in terms of violence, the head teacher from the neighbouring school was merciless in her descriptions. She claimed that Upper Hill had a bad reputation in Eldoret because a large number of perpetrators had come from that area. The fact that my taxi driver felt uncomfortable driving me to the school confirms this general reputation.

At Upper Hill itself the interviewees were more anxious to defend the community and school, which might indicate that they were aware of the reputation:

And when people say, when other people say the Kalenjins are bad, you would not understand. [...] You will wonder where the issue comes from. [...] I can talk about these Kalenjins that they are really merciful. They were merciful (teacher 29 interview).

Another factor that recurred in the interview, and which came across as defending the school reputation, was the emphasis given to the violence as being spontaneous. As the literature review discussed, there are indicators suggesting that much of the violence was planned (section 2.2). At Upper Hill, however, they anxiously emphasised that this was not the case:

I was watching the TV, but all of a sudden when they were announcing I heard a lot of noises everywhere, and then when I came out I see houses burning. People started, they started the violence straight away. [...] So it just spontaneously started like that (teacher 31 interview).

That the interviewees were reluctant to give details about their personal experiences of the violence made the reconstruction of events difficult. However, it seemed that the population remaining in the school had been relatively safe during the violence. As the quote from an SMC member illustrates: “No, we did not have to flee. This area was peaceful. We had no problem” (SMC member 12 interview).

What was described in detail by all stakeholders interviewed, however, was the masses of IDPs that were hosted by the school and community during and after the PEV. The interviewees emphasised that the community had assisted the IDPs with food during their stay. Although some interviewees reported how they had welcomed people to stay in their homes, the majority of IDPs stayed in the school, which acted as an IDP camp hosting 10-15,000 people during the violence. There was no consistency in the interviews regarding which tribes stayed in the school. Some claimed that it was mainly Nandis and other Kalenjin tribes, whereas others mentioned Luhyas and Kisiis.

As the school acted as a camp, it was closed for learning during the violence. When it reopened, the impact the camp had made on the school infrastructure was evident. All pupils interviewed emphasised the destructions, describing desks, books, trees and fences being used as firewood for cooking, classrooms and the school compound being dirty, latrines full, windows broken and water tanks empty. Because of the negative impact on the school, the pupils in particular were hostile towards the IDPs: “We didn’t like the IDPs. Because they destroy our properties. And maybe desks were destroyed and been taken to use for cooking their lunch or supper” (pupil 109 interview).

When the school reopened, some of the IDPs enrolled in the school. However, the overall enrolment had declined significantly, and the school was understaffed. When the research was conducted classes were not full, and some classrooms were not in use because of the low numbers.

Although some interviewees were positive about the prospects for the next election, a large number of them were concerned that the violence would happen again. As at Macheleo, there had been no truth and reconciliation process following

the violence: “The youth started this violence. [...] The youth are still around” (teacher 31 interview).

Teachers and parents reported that they feared that the politicians would incite violence come the next election. The continuous poverty in the community was also described as a potential trigger for the violence, as people felt that “our chances have been denied” (parent 18 interview).

As the above analysis suggests, the school and community were still recovering from the violence. Both had been heavily affected by the violence through participating as perpetrators and hosting IDPs. That they were still recovering from the violence could have been part of the reason why the school was reluctant to address peace in their teaching and adopt the PEP, as will be discussed in the following section.

#### **5.4.3 A culture of peace at Upper Hill?**

Whereas St Peters and Logos had initially made use of the PEP materials, Upper Hill had neither made use of them nor implemented other extra-curricular peace education activities. In the interviews, meetings of the Christian Union, competing in sports with other schools, singing the national anthem, teaching about peace in Social Studies, abolishing the use of tribal terms, and preaching peace at parades and at parents’ meetings were all claimed to contribute to peace-building. However, these were all general school activities that were not initially implemented for peace-building purposes. From my analysis, the school appeared to ignore what had happened during the PEV. As perpetrators had come from their community, it seems likely that the topic was too sensitive, or that they were afraid to admit guilt. This section will discuss reason why the programme was not implemented.

A few teachers vaguely thought they had heard about peace education, but none of them had used the books. However, the teacher responsible for special needs and the head teacher had both been trained in the PEP. On my last day at the school I was surprised to find a large stack of PEP materials hidden behind the door in the head teacher’s office. When I asked the head teacher about it he claimed that the

books did not belong to Upper Hill alone, but that teachers from the nearby schools were meant to come and pick them from his office. That the materials were hidden away and not used clearly shows that he did not see the value in the books. As an outsider I was surprised to discover that they were allowed to ignore the programme, without any monitoring or inspections picking up on the situation.

The ground rules for peace at Upper Hill partly reflect that the pupils had an understanding of peace building practices at school level.

**Table 7: Ground rules for peace at Upper Hill**

Ground rule for peace	Frequency
Respect others	8
Obey others	8
Co-operate	8
Love others	7
Be patient	4
Pray	4

This suggests the pupils had a good understanding of peace building despite the fact that the school had not implemented the PEP. It therefore points to the importance of giving the pupils a voice in how the school is run. If the school had actively listened to and integrated the voices of the children in the running of the school through pupil councils and peace clubs, active peace building would have played a more central role in the everyday life of the school.

#### ***5.4.3.1 Mixing tribes as a necessary condition for peace to prevail***

As described above, the school and community was heavily affected by the PEV, largely through being involved in the violence and receiving IDPs, and the PEP materials were not in use in the school. This section will unite these two aspects, arguing that the change in the school composition following the violence discouraged the school from practicing peace education. In response to research question 5, the section starts by describing the ethnic composition, then moves on to discuss



attitudes towards mixed ethnicities at this point in time, and how returning IDPs were seen as paramount for peace. The section ends with a discussion of the potential for peace-building at this point in time.

Whereas prior to the PEV the school had catered for multiple ethnicities, all groups in support of PNU had fled the area during the violence. This made the school stand out in the case-study sample as the only one where the numbers had *decreased* following the PEV. The school estimated that 3 teachers and 50-70 pupils had left the school. At the time of the study, there were no Kikuyus enrolled in the school. As one teacher put it:

We had Kikuyu teachers who were teaching in this school. But because of tribal clashes they were forced to move from this place. The following year they seek for transfers. The same to the pupils. The pupils who were learning in this school from the Kikuyu tribe was also forced to move away (teacher 26 interview).

That Kikuyus and other Bantu speaking tribes had fled not to return was described as a great loss for the school. It was also central to their understanding of peace; peace could not be fully restored before they had returned to a state of mixed ethnicities. This was further confirmed by the pride they took in having received a Kisii deputy head teacher in 2011:

But as for now we have a Kisii. It is now mixed. We have a Kisii deputy. A Kisii. The ones who used to fear to come. [Laughter] And we have one Kisii being the deputy. [...] Those who were affected most who feared this place was the Kisiis and the Kikuyus. So for now we have a Kisii. So any teacher can come now. There is no fear (teacher 29 interview).

The Kisii deputy was an exception, however, and the school had at the time of the research not enrolled any Kisii or Kikuyu pupils. That the Kikuyus had not returned to the area might be due to the negative reputation of the school discussed in section 5.4.2. Despite dissociating themselves from the past, tribal attitudes were still to some extent present. As one teacher stated in his interview: “some people are not free with others” (teacher 29 interview). The head teacher, who was a Luo, claimed

that he would not have accepted the post in the school had he been a Kikuyu. The deputy head teacher, and the only Bantu speaking representative in the school, stated the following when I asked him how he had been received by the community:

In every house, in every community, at least there are those who can be for you, and there are those who are not for you. But in the first place as I have said they were very welcoming. But inside them you cannot miss a few who can be having different motives or different feelings that we wish we had so and so from our own. You see? So I think, you see even these, whatever conflict that comes, even now, it is just from a few people who could be having different minds (deputy head teacher 5 interview).

Although he explained that some people in the community disagreed with the employment of a Kisii deputy, most people had received him well. The belief that mixing ethnic groups in the school and community was necessary for peace to fully prevail was emphasised by one focus group with pupils, the head teacher, the 6 SMC members, and 3 parents. Although this could be argued to be a healthy attitude, it was also used to argue that peace education could not take place: “The school it cannot do that much because now, you see that the... Unless the school is mixed up totally is how we can avoid this [violence]” (SMC member 13 interview). Peace and mixed ethnicities were seen as two sides of the same issue. As the two were dependent on each other, teaching about peace did not seem to be worth the effort. As noted above, there was no school policy on peace education, and the PEP had not been implemented. However, because of the unwillingness to implement peace education or other peace-building initiatives, the school population had not changed, which was unlikely to increase the willingness of IDPs to return.

Despite these attitudes, there were also voices pointing to the potential of the school as regards peace-building. The relationship between the school and parents was described as having been ‘challenging’ under the previous school leadership. Since the new management team had been put in place, this was improving according to the interviewees. The parents were eager to make the most of this emerging relationship with the school. Two parents in particular suggested how the

school could be used as a meeting point for parents of different ethnic communities to promote peace:

I will prefer the school if there is some parents from different communities, and this other community to bring them together and have something to do together. Because as you already said, two will not go together unless they agree. They must have something to do together. Even they can have something to for example, something like a light together, and be scarce and be free, and know each other deeply. So I think that is something the school can do to bring peace. These people to meet. Because you know if the parent from another community came to school, maybe he came, enter into the office, talk to the principal and then take his way back home. And then another one came, so... But if the school could organize something, maybe apart from even lunch or whatever. Even a group to discuss something together, share together, so I think it will be good. Or even to have a fellowship together, spiritually, to come and sing and pray. I think that is one thing which can bring these communities together and learn that another community is not an enemy to another community, and learn that those other people are very equal as we are. Because if you see somebody from a distance, you can escape from him or you can see him as an enemy. But if you come together, sit together, discuss, I think it will bring together peace in the community (parent 14 interview).

Also as you can know the school has the school committee. So, if the SMC, if I am the Kalenjin, he the Kikuyu, she the Luhya, and we held a meeting here about our school. All of us we will be having a common mind, that is our school. So this is our school, what can we do about our school? So our differences and enmity will automatically disappear because we will have a common mind. We share one common call together, the school is ours, we love our school, and then our differences will actually go down. Like now we are seated. It is more difficult to hate when we are all together (parent 15 interview).

In addition to pointing to a peace-building potential in the school, both parents raised an interesting point about creating common ground as an important aspect of peace-building. They argued that creating a common interest among parents of diverse ethnicities could serve to unite and build peace in the community. The first parent suggested discussion and spiritual fellowship as a common bond between the parents; whereas the other argued that the development of the school could serve as a common interest. In the section on Macheleo, identity development as part of the peace-building process was discussed. The PEP materials encourage patriotism and being Kenyan as a common identity marker. It is questionable, however, based on the quotes above whether it would have been beneficial for the schools to find localised common ground where they could have interacted and bonded.

This section has discussed the importance of mixing ethnic communities for peace to fully prevail. Although some negative attitudes towards other tribes could still be traced in the community, most importantly the interviewees voiced a strong wish for the IDPs to return, so that the school could again be mixed. This was further seen as a necessity before peace education could be taught in the school. As such, the present single-ethnic composition became an excuse for the school not to teach peace education. Two parents encouraged the school to use its potential, however, arguing for the need for common identity markers and common ground to be developed in order to unite the diverse groups already represented.

#### ***5.4.3.2 Peace through poverty reduction and food security***

In this section, responding to research question 5, I will argue that the pressing issues of structural violence, such as poverty and food security, were also obstacles stopping peace education programmes from being implemented. Even though the PEV had hit the community severely, poverty and food security were at the time of the research more urgent issues to be addressed, which made peace education become secondary.

A common answer when I asked the question of what role the school was playing in peace-building was that they now had peace, and that the challenge at

present was food security and poverty. The PEV, which had taken place four years earlier, seemed to bother the population less than the present situation of growing poverty. The shortage of food in particular was raised as an issue by the head teacher, the deputy head, one SMC member, 4 of the 8 teachers, 5 of the 9 focus groups with pupils, and both groups of parents: “My parents are dead and we have a lot of hunger” (pupil diary 1).

One parent described the community as getting poorer over time, arguing that this growth in poverty made the pressure on land greater. This also relates to the food security in the community, as access to land and food security are closely connected:

So I think we need a way forward so that peace can be retained. I think we have been living peacefully. During those times, when the land was still spacious, there was nothing wrong. Because somebody can get poor grade here in school, and go home and get something out of the farming. And get something to earn the living. So that was at least slightly better. But now it is getting worsen, poorer. Because there is no farm, there is no capital to begin business. So that is another challenge that is great (parent 14 interview).

As the quote from the parent illustrates, poverty was seen as an obstacle for peace to prevail. As one teacher said: “Children who are well fed are also at peace” (teacher 28 interview).

Just as mixed ethnicities were seen as a necessity for peace, poverty and food security were described as obstacles to peace education. All interviewees mentioned food and food security in their interviews, arguing that these were more important focus areas than peace education. Lack of food was also described as an obstacle to learning, and as a threat to peace in the school and community: “Some are not able to have some food in their homes. [...] So when we play with them they can fight because they are hungry” (pupil 90 interview); “You know those children who don’t go for lunch, some of them are wild. They don’t even like playing with the others” (teacher 28 interview); “In the evening I went home. I found that there was no food for me. I started breaking the utensils” (pupil diary 6).

Structural violence was also seen as being an obstacle to peace. The community saw themselves as underprivileged, and felt that they were not given the same chances as people in the urban areas. As one parent put it:

Because since the other children perform well, and such children cannot perform well and that is the same country. That will also be a problem in future; there will be no peace in future. Since those who are children in school now will feel they are neglected since they went to poor school. This will not bring peace in future since others felt that they were poor children since they were not given facilities. I think if these other schools could be given more facilities, also that could bring peace in future. Since also these problems that we were having now was built in the past, so this problems will be carried forward, forward, forward. If we ended up having such solutions, then our future could be peaceful (parent 15 interview).

A similar issue was raised in a lesson observed on justice:

Teacher: In Kenya we have our national leaders. And remember Kenya is a large country. So when they are distributing funds, funds for constructions, buying materials all that we need in a school. Do they know that Upper Hill exists?

Pupils: No

Teacher: But there is a MoE.

Pupils: Yes

Teacher: So if Upper Hill is known and they are assigning, distributing funds to textbooks. You also get part of the money. Isn't it? So in Kenya the MoE is doing what?

Pupils: Justice

Teacher: That is one way to show justice in the nation.

Poverty reduction and ensuring food security was seen as primary concerns in the community and the school at this point in time, outweighing the need for peace

education. In their local understanding of peace, involving IDPs returning, poverty being reduced and food security being ensured, the PEP materials did not seem relevant and were consequently not used. This supports the argument that the PEP needs to be more contextualised and address the political climate more explicitly.

#### **5.4.4 Conclusion, Upper Hill**

The above sections have revealed a school deeply affected by the PEV. When the research was carried out, the school was still recovering from the trauma, in particular in relation to the integration of multiple ethnic communities. The analysis has raised questions related to the relevance of the PEP. In the school's understanding, integration of Kikuyus, poverty reduction and food security were all necessary for peace to prevail. The PEP therefore, which focuses on peace-building through conflict resolution, seemed less relevant than the abovementioned issues. Like the findings from St Peters and Logos, the findings from Upper Hill suggest that stronger sensitisation and awareness raising concerning the aims and objectives of the PEP are needed. Further, the analysis raises questions about the relevance of the PEP for peace-building, and argues for a stronger integration of political and social issues in the programme.

### **5.5 Conclusion**

This chapter has provided separate accounts for the four case-study schools. The contexts of the schools varied, two of them being urban, and two rural, two located in Eldoret, and two in Nakuru. Uniting the four, however, was the fact that they had all been badly affected by the PEV, and that they had all been part of the initial roll-out of the PEP. As the commitment to peace education varied enormously across the schools, context emerged as one important factor in explaining successful implementation of peace education.

Macheleo stood out among the four schools as particularly committed to peace education. In addition to providing examples of peace-building initiatives on the ground, examination of the school gives an indication about what arrangements

have to be in place for implementation to be successful. One of these was their understanding of peace as not merely negative peace and the absence of violence, but as positive peace which had to be worked for actively, starting within each individual. This understanding provided motivation and empowered the school population. This stood in contrast to the other schools where peace was largely understood as negative peace, which in practice meant that there was no need for peace-building initiatives, as the violence had calmed down. Further, the political understanding in the school emerged as an important factor. At St Peters in particular, keeping peace in the country was seen as the responsibility of the politicians, which discouraged the school from implementing peace education. This was challenged by Macheleo, where they saw peace as having to be built from the ground up, in particular through fostering inner peace and teaching constructive conflict resolution. Leadership emerged as another key factor. In all the four schools, the attitudes of the head teacher towards peace education seemed to strongly influence the teachers' implementation of peace education. At Macheleo the head teacher was a national trainer, and was thus strongly committed to peace education, which was reflected at all levels in the school. In the other three schools, however, the leadership had a discouraging effect on the teachers. The policy factors discussed in chapter four were also of strong relevance to the schools: the lack of an official national implementation policy in 2008 had discouraged some schools from implementation, and the reactive approach had led three of the schools to thinking that the programme was mainly designed for settling back to normality.

In the next chapter all of these emerging factors will be discussed further, in a cross-case analysis. In addition to comparing the data from the four case-study schools, the chapter will draw on the questionnaire to triangulate the findings with a larger number of schools. The chapter will also discuss the pedagogy of peace in greater detail, arguing that there was a general reluctance towards addressing the political economy in the country, and a need for further training in interactive teaching methods.



## Chapter 6: Cross-case analysis

Drawing on the case-study findings presented in the previous chapter, the survey findings and the video observations of classes, this chapter will answer the first five research questions proposed for the study. I will argue that whereas all schools made efforts to settle back into normality following the PEV, a SZOP framework would have been beneficial in providing the much needed safety and stability during the PEV. I will further establish that a range of schools are fuelling conflict through avoiding the teaching of politics, employing a teacher-centred pedagogy, using corporal punishment in disciplining the children, and discouraging ethnic diversity in schools. Regarding peace-building I will argue that although a large number of schools claim to be teaching peace, this could more correctly be characterised as preaching peace, and the teaching and practicing of peace are largely missing from the schools. The impact of the PEP is therefore not reaching its potential, despite the fact that a large number of schools have been trained in the programme and received the materials. In order to explain the lack of teaching and practicing of peace in schools I will, towards the end of the chapter, argue that perceived relevance of peace education, location of schools, school leadership, the feeling of ownership towards peace education, and national school policies largely influence the attitudes towards peace education. In sum, the chapter argues that education has not reached its peace-building potential following the PEV in Kenya.

## **6.0 Introduction**

So far, the four case-study schools have been discussed separately. Overall the analysis of the case-study schools shows that Macheleo was the most advanced in terms of implementing the PEP and building culture of peace. At St Peters, the school had previously taught peace education, but had stopped with the change in school leadership. Logos made some use of the PEP, but the programme had mainly been implemented as a reactive peace effort, and in 2012 the programme was therefore not used regularly. The fourth school, Upper Hill, had not implemented the programme, and had not made other efforts to mainstream peace education. In this section I will draw on these four case studies, the video observations and the survey findings from the 12 schools in order to answer the research question on what role education has played in building a culture of peace following the PEV in Kenya. The discussion will address the first five sub-questions introduced in section 1.1:

1. How have schools responded to the PEV?
2. What activities are schools undertaking that could potentially fuel conflict?
3. What activities are schools undertaking to build peace?
4. To what extent does the PEP have an impact on the daily lives of the school population?
5. What factors influence attitudes towards peace-building in Kenyan schools?

### **6.1 How have schools responded to the PEV?**

As argued in section 3.1, the relationship between education and conflict has in recent years had been the object of increased attention. Education has been recognised as one of the largest obstacles for achieving the EFA goals due to lowered enrolment statistics caused by reinforced poverty, schools as targets of war, displacements, and trauma (UNESCO, 2011). This section will answer the first research question by discussing the four case studies' responses to the PEV. I will first argue that although the four schools were affected to varying extents, the educational mandate was disturbed in all four schools. I will then describe how the schools responded to the emerging challenges caused by the violence.

Due to the changed nature of war, schools and children have become deliberate targets of war (O'Malley, 2010). The Kenyan PEV was no exception, and during the fatal months in 2007/08, schools in the Rift Valley were targeted through burning and looting (O'Malley, 2010). The four case-study schools were all affected by the violence. Macheleo, Logos and Upper Hill were all closed for periods of time, and the learning at St Peters was disrupted due to children not turning up at school. Upper Hill acted as an IDP camp, and was for that reason the most affected in terms of infrastructure. Stakeholders in the school reported that desks and books had been used to make fires for cooking; the latrines were full, and windows were broken when they returned to school (section 5.4.2). All schools experienced alteration of the student composition following the violence, with St Peters and Upper Hill the most affected. St Peters had had a large influx of IDP children, and was still using a tent as a classroom in 2012. Upper Hill had lost all its Kikuyu pupils, and classrooms were still unused in 2012 due to the decrease in school population. In addition, pupils in all the case-study schools described traumatic experiences.

The literature suggests that trauma can disrupt learning (O'Malley, 2010), but that schools can play a role in providing the much needed safety and psycho-social support of children in response to the trauma experienced (Barakat et al., 2013). Although all the case-study schools described efforts made to provide a sense of normality following the PEV, Upper Hill did not report any counselling or reconciliation efforts. In the three remaining schools this was emphasised, however, and peace education was used in all three as part of their counselling programmes. In addition, Upper Hill provided counselling and psycho-social support for pupils during parade and for individual pupils. Macheleo and Logos had also engaged reconciliation efforts following the PEV. At Macheleo the language policy introduced was given as an example of what the school had done to unite teachers in the aftermaths of the crisis. At Logos the head teacher had banned the discussion of politics in order to avoid conflict among staff and pupils. In sum, the case studies showed that schools can play a role in helping teachers and pupils to settle back to normality following conflict.

As we have seen, education was disrupted during the PEV in Kenya. Three of the four case-study schools had initially responded to the crisis by closing down their

activities. When the conflict calmed down and the schools reopened, the schools admitted IDP children, and some provided psycho-social support through continuous learning and counselling. However, as all the schools were disrupted with respect to their teaching during the time of the crisis, it is advisable that a SZOP framework is put in place in order to secure the safety of the schools in future (section 7.1.1.4). This could secure the much needed stability and safety for children during any future crisis.

## **6.2 What activities are schools undertaking that could potentially fuel conflict?**

As argued in section 3.2, education can fuel conflict (UNESCO, 2011; Bush & Saltarelli, 2000). Four areas in particular were identified in the case studies as destructive to peace-building; avoiding the teaching of politics, teacher-centred classrooms, corporal punishment, and discouraging ethnic diversity. The following four sections will discuss these areas in more depth.

### **6.2.1 Avoiding the teaching of politics**

All four case-study schools were found to avoid teaching related to the political economy of the country. Whereas the pupils showed a high awareness of the events of the PEV, the school sanitised the curriculum through avoiding the topic. This could potentially fuel conflict as the pupils were left with biased narratives from the different communities.

With the exception of Upper Hill, where the pupils were reluctant to discuss the PEV, the pupils at the other three case-study schools showed a high awareness of the political economy of the country. They had relatively detailed knowledge on topics such as the presidential election as a trigger for the violence, the new constitution, the ICC charges, the incitement of violence and mob culture. However, with a few exceptions among pupils at Macheleo, the accounts given were one-sided and strongly influenced by the tribal identities of the pupils. One reason for this lack of nuance could be that the teachers in the schools did not address the political

situation in their teaching. Logos and Upper Hill provided particularly interesting examples.

At Logos the teachers described how political discussion had been explicitly banned from the school following the PEV, that this was seen as a peace-building strategy, because disagreement was perceived as a driver of conflict resulting in the PEV. Interviews and observations suggested, however, that although the banning of discussion might have contributed to immediate calm, this was merely a peace-keeping strategy, as the disagreements among teachers were still strong, and ethnocentric views were still widely held in the school. By avoiding the topic altogether the school lost out on an important peace-building opportunity, where the different sides in the conflict could have been brought together through fruitful discussion and acknowledgement of differences.

At Upper Hill the reluctance to address the political economy and the PEV was even greater than at Logos. Part of this could be attributed to the suspicion that I was affiliated with the ICC (section 4.3.1). However, the situation seemed to be more profound, as the school was in denial of its need for reconciliation and peace-building. Other issues were simply rated more important in the interviews, such as food security and poverty reduction. However, the fact that the Kikuyus had not returned to the school following the violence was a sore point, indicating that they were not happy with their present situation. All teachers and pupils interviewed said that they wanted the Kikuyus to return, and they argued that peace could not prevail before they had done so. However, the political economy and the community's contribution in the violence were seen as something that had to be forgotten rather than discussed. As such the community were living in denial.

Curricular contents can fuel conflict. In the case of Rwanda the historical narrative expounded through the education system was found to have fuelled the 1994 genocide (Bijlsma, 2009; Obura, 2003). Although the Kenyan schools were not found to teach biased narratives, they avoided the topic of politics all together, which in practice meant leaving children with the uncontested narratives which they learned in the community. These narratives were largely biased, as I found in my interviews with the pupils. Davies (2004) argues that rather than 'sanitising' the curricula, such

as was done in all the case-study schools when teachers refused to discuss politics with the pupils, education can be ‘sensitised’. The process of sensitising in this case would involve exposing the pupils to a nuanced account of the political economy and engaging them in fruitful discussions, where their expertise on the communities’ understandings of the violence were taken into account; the pupils could then develop critical thinking and analytical skills.

By sanitising the curricula pupils are deprived of opportunities for constructive discussion and development of critical thinking and analytical skills. In order for these issues to be addressed constructively, a pupil-centred pedagogy must be put in place.


### **6.2.2 Teacher-centred classrooms**

Whereas the previous section argued for a need to move from ‘sanitising’ to ‘sensitising’ the curricula, this section will discuss pedagogy and teaching as a potential driver of conflict. For real empowerment and adjustments of attitudes to take place, the pupils must be involved in the teaching, and room must be provided for them to express their opinions. When the teaching is largely teacher-centred and transmission based, this could potentially act as a driver of conflict, reinforcing the authoritarian culture in Kenya. As this section will discuss, only Macheleo showed attempts to move in the direction of a more interactive pedagogy with some evidence of exploratory talk. In all schools, however, the teaching remained highly teacher-centred. In this section a timeline analysis of the teaching activities will be presented, prompting the questions of whether the most dominant activities served to empower the pupils to think critically around issues relating to peace and conflict. I will argue that a shift has to take place towards more interactive teaching methods in order to ensure cognitive engagement and internalisation of peace-building values.

As described in the methodology chapter, unstructured observations were made during phase one (section 4.3.4.1). In phase two 16 lessons were video recorded for a more structured analysis of teaching practices (section 4.3.4.2). The video observations were analysed through a timeline analysis to identify the most

dominant activities, and through transcriptions of critical moments. The graph below illustrates the activities over time in all 16 lessons.

**Figure 1: Classroom activities applied in timeline analysis of recorded classes**



Key: A1 = Teacher explanation/question & answer; A2 = Teacher rote/chorus responses; A3 = Teachers writing on chalkboard; A4 = Teacher reading to whole class; A5 = Pupil reading to whole class; A6 = Pupils working individually; A7 = Pupils working in pairs/groups; A8 = Pupil demonstrating to class; A9 = Teacher reviewing lesson topic; A10 = Teacher marking work; A11 = Class management; A12 = Class administration; A13 = Interruption to lesson; A14 = Pupils off-task

As the graph shows, the three most dominant activities were lecturing including question-and-answering (A1), chorus learning (A2), and the teacher writing on the chalkboard (A3). This reflects what Alexander (2008) found to be the most commonly used teacher talk activities, of rote, recitation and expository instruction, which he argues are not techniques that will “maximise cognitive engagement and growth” (p. 33). The dominance of this pedagogy denies children quality education, as they are not participating actively in the learning and teaching process (Alexander, 2008). In order to facilitate cognitive engagement and understanding in the classroom, a shift from the previously mentioned activities towards discussion and dialogue needs to be made. Drawing on findings from previous studies on pedagogy in Kenyan schools (e.g., Abd-Kadir & Hardman, 2007), I conclude that the pedagogy in Kenya is generally speaking teacher-centred. In addition to not maximising cognitive engagement, this transmission-based pedagogy was accompanied by an authoritarian style, which teaches the children to obey authority rather than think critically.

Highly teacher-centred classrooms are not compatible with the PEP, which promotes child-centred teaching. When the vast majority of the time is spent on teacher-centred activities, little room is left for engaging of pupil opinions or interactive learning. Indeed, teaching style could potentially be a driver of conflict as the pupils are not given the opportunity to raise critical questions or discuss things. In turn, democratic processes are not learned through experiencing them, and the teaching of peace becomes less powerful, as there is a gap between what is taught and how it is taught.

Only one of the video-recorded classes engaged the pupils in paired/group work. Peace education, being a non-examinable subject, is largely about internalising values rather than memorising them (Baxter & Ikobwa, 2005). The timeline analysis, however, suggests that the teachers were not sufficiently trained in, or aware of the benefits of, interactive teaching methods for internalising values. Further, the pupil off-task curve (A14) rising to nearly 60 percent before the end of the lesson clearly shows that the time needed for more interactive methods is readily available. The time spent off-task could have been spent on engaging the pupils in fruitful discussions.



The leading activity in the classroom was lecturing via a question-and-answer technique. Although this included a certain level of pupil involvement, the potential was not exhausted, as the vast majority of questions were ‘closed’ (calling for a single, predetermined response or offering facts) as opposed to ‘open’ (calling for more than one answer). There were a few exceptions where open questions were used, however, such as in a class taught at Macheleo where the teacher asked the pupils the following questions: “What types of relationships are you in?”, “What do you talk about in your girl-to-girl relationships?”, and “How are your relationships with your teachers?” (transcript video-recording). In this class, the topic was not only made relevant to the pupils’ lives through the questions, but the teacher was open to other perspectives than her own, allowing critical thinking to take place.

Evidence of encouraging critical thinking was rarely found in the data. At Macheleo, the Student Council and the Peace Club were described in interviews as providing opportunities for the pupils to engage in democratic processes. In these settings the pupils were encouraged to find their own solutions to challenges, which engaged them actively in critical thinking. Such activities were rather exceptional in my study. In the other schools an authoritarian school culture marked by the criminalisation of challenging authorities, with corporal punishment as the result, was commonly seen. Using more open-ended questions in the teaching, and allowing more pupil-centred methods would be an important step in the direction of a peace-building pedagogy enhancing critical thinking and involvement. The PEP materials encourage a pupil-centred methodology, as the programme aims at developing values, perceptions and attitudes. One example can be found in lesson 4, designed for year 7, where one of the tasks is to “Ask the pupils what they think the word peace means. Write all the suggestions on the board” (MoE, UNICEF & UNHCR, 2008, p. 60). In this lesson plan the opportunity is given for the pupils to actively engage in the topic.

With a few exceptions from Macheleo, this section has argued that the pedagogy guiding the teaching in the schools did not support peace-building as they were largely teacher-centred and did not engage the pupils in discussion and critical thinking around the issues of peace and conflict. Arguing along the lines of the previous section on the teaching of politics, real involvement by the pupils is

necessary to build sustainable peace, rather than just an apparent peace where the underlying drivers of conflict are still flourishing under the surface. Abandoning the use of corporal punishment is another important step towards a child-centred classroom.

### **6.2.3 Corporal punishment**

Although schools hold the potential for building peace, they are often themselves violent places (Harber, 1996; UNESCO, 2010; UNESCO, 2011). One particularly visible aspect of violent school cultures is the use of corporal punishment. This section will highlight the fact that corporal punishment was used in all the four case-study schools, and that this practice could potentially fuel conflict.

Johnson (2004) found that more than 60 percent of children in Nairobi had been physically abused in schools by teachers. Although corporal punishment has been legally abolished in Kenya since Johnson's study was carried out (Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, 2012), my study found that it was still used in all four case-study schools. Only Macheleo was found to be taking steps towards abandoning the practice. The head teacher claimed in her interview that corporal punishment had been completely replaced by alternative discipline strategies, but even here the pupil diaries gave evidence suggesting that it was still in use to some extent (section 5.1.3.1).

The punishments were particularly harsh at St Peters, and the pupils were constantly threatened with violence as teachers carried canes at all times (section 5.2.3.4). In accordance with the literature on the topic (Human Rights Watch, 1999), children interviewed at St Peters expressed the view that corporal punishment made them feel anxious and angry. As one pupil wrote in the diary following incidents of being beaten by both parents and teachers: "That day I was very angry. I am feeling bad that I can kill somebody. I am not happy at all" (St Peters, pupil diary 25). These negative feelings installed in the pupils through physical punishments might serve to explain why research has pointed to a connection between the use of physical punishment in schools and the level of violence in the wider society (Gershoff, 2010;

Lansford & Dodge, 2008). There is a danger that the repressed anger might come to the surface through violence.

Despite the expressions of anxiety and anger described above, pupils at St Peters also claimed corporal punishment to be a peace-building practice (section 5.2.3.4). This indicates that peace-keeping strategies dominated the peace discourse. The fact that seven out of the ten ground rules for peace focused on obeying authority and keeping rules further supports this understanding. It also indicates that the pupils had internalised what was explicitly taught; namely that violence was an accepted way of solving conflict.

The PEP was partly designed as a response to the rapid development of societal violence in Kenya (section 2.2.1). As research has pointed to a connection between use of physical punishment and the level of societal violence, this should be addressed in peace-building education. Recommendations are therefore made to reinforce the laws abolishing corporal punishments in schools and train teachers in alternative disciplinary strategies (section 7.1.1.4).

#### **6.2.4 Discouraging ethnic diversity**

As discussed in section 3.2.1 educational discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, culture or other group identity has been recognised to fuel conflict (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Pherali, 2011; UNESCO, 2011). In this section I will argue that two of my case-study schools contributed to such ethnic discrimination by avoiding the integration of ethnic diversity in their schools.

Although all schools argued that they were encouraging ethnic diversity, the reality observed was quite different, especially at Upper Hill and St Peters. At Upper Hill they catered mainly for the Kalenjin community after the Kikuyus had fled the area during the PEV. Although all stakeholders repeatedly expressed the view that they wanted the Kikuyus to return to the community and the school, no measures were actually put in place to ensure reconciliation or peace-building (section 5.4.3.1). I will therefore argue that although they did not explicitly discourage Kikuyus to return to the school in 2012, their lack of initiative in ensuring inclusion led to a

homogenous school composition. Similarly, St Peters argued that they wanted teachers and pupils from the Luo and Kalenjin communities to return to the school following the violence (section 5.2.3.3). However, unwillingness to address the continuous negative attitudes towards these communities, by for example blaming them for the outbreak of violence, is likely to have made the school community less attractive for the respective communities to return to.

In Kenya, research has shown that sharing ethnicity with the ruling elite leads to more schools and more qualified teachers (Alwy & Schech, 2004). Such discrimination has laid the ground for political affiliation along ethnic lines, a driver of conflict identified in section 2.3. Although this points to a need for reform on a national level, individual schools can do their share of encouraging ethnic diversity. Examples of such initiatives can be found at Logos and Macheleo. At Logos the head teacher initiated a reconciliation process following the violence through encouraging teachers to talk to each other across ethnic affiliations (section 5.3.3.1). Building on similar efforts Macheleo had continued to encourage ethnic diversity through initiatives such as culture days (section 5.1.3.5). Such practices might have made various communities feel welcome in the school.

As discrimination along ethnic lines has been found to fuel conflict in a range of contexts (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Pherali, 2011; UNESCO, 2011), this is clearly an issue that needs to be addressed when aiming for a peace-building education system. In my study Upper Hill and St Peters were found to discourage ethnic diversity. However, at Logos and Macheleo the school leadership had actively put measures in place to ensure ethnic inclusion. Recommendations on the issue of encouraging ethnic mixture are therefore given in section 7.1.3.4.

### **6.3 What activities are schools undertaking to build peace?**

As was established in section 3.2 in the literature review, there is more to peace-building education than peace education programmes (Smith, 2005). This section will focus in particular on the three layers of peace education identified in section 5.1: preaching peace, teaching peace, and practicing peace. I will argue that the majority of peace-building efforts carried out in the schools could be characterised as

preaching peace, and that there was little evidence of teaching or practicing it in schools.

The first layer of peace education is preaching peace. This layer of peace education merely implies the spreading of peace messages without engaging knowledge of peace theory or drivers of conflict. All the four case-study schools claimed to be preaching peace. At Macheleo I observed this in school assemblies, parents' meetings, classes and a meeting preparing pupils for their exams (section 5.1.3.3). Peace messages were also displayed on the school buildings. As will be discussed below, Macheleo built on the preaching of peace to engage in the two following layers of peace education; teaching peace and practicing it. However, the evidence suggests that most of the peace-building efforts described at St Peters, Logos and Upper Hill could be characterised as preaching peace. For example, teachers at St Peters and Logos argued that they encouraged the pupils to interact peacefully with each other across ethnic boundaries. Although this implies practicing peace, I would argue that it is better characterised as merely preaching peace, as no measures were put in place to actually facilitate such interaction. I did not find that these efforts had any impact when isolated, as they did not have much substance on their own; they could really only be argued to be peace-building when part of a more overarching peace-building policy.

The second layer of peace education, teaching peace, goes beyond the mere propagating of peace messages as it involves imbuing the pupils with necessary knowledge and skills for living in peace. As argued in section 4.2, peace has featured in the Kenyan curriculum since the first objectives for education were established after independence. Accordingly, all four schools claimed to be teaching peace through the integrative approach (Hicks, 1988; Sommers, 2001; Cardozo & May, 2009). It was certainly true that Macheleo taught peace through the PEP materials, through making sure messages of peace featured in the other subjects (section 5.1.3.3), through promoting the notion of citizenship (section 5.1.3.5), and through teaching for attitudinal change (section 5.1.3.5). However, St Peters, Logos and Upper Hill were not found to actively teach peace through the additive approach. Although the survey data revealed that 88 percent of the respondents reported that peace was taught in their school (q3), I question whether this referred to actual

teaching, or whether it merely referred to preaching peace. On the question of where peace was taught, 53 percent reported that they taught peace education in assemblies, 48 percent through extra-curricular activities, 79 percent in classes, and 30 percent in other places (q4). These numbers indicate that peace was preached and taught across the school activities. However, as the findings from the case studies revealed, there was a gap between what the schools claimed to be doing and their actual practice. These numbers could therefore indicate that although the schools addressed peace across a range of settings, it most likely took the form of a more superficial preaching of peace rather than thorough teaching on the subject. All the same, the high numbers also suggest that a cross-curricular approach had been adopted in many schools. This could be partly due to the history of an integrative approach to peace education discussed in section 4.2, where peace was described as having been integrated and mainstreamed across subjects after independence and in the review process in 2003. As the overall analysis in this thesis suggests that the programme has not been thoroughly implemented in the schools, the question arises as to whether it would have been more easily implemented if the programme had been more explicitly linked to already established peace education efforts. The implementation of the PEP will be further discussed in section 6.4.

The last layer of peace education identified in the case studies was practicing peace. Although all four schools argued that they were ensuring equally distributed education by giving all children the same opportunities regardless of ethnic identity, I only identified Macheleo as a school where they were actively practicing peace. At Macheleo they were making an effort to practice what they preached and taught as described in the above paragraphs. Through fostering inner peace, understood as “peace of mind and absence of fear” (Harris & Morrison, 2003, p. 13) they encouraged the pupils to gain confidence in their own contribution to peace on a micro level (section 5.1.3.2). Conflict resolution skills were not only taught as theoretical concepts at Macheleo, but were put into practice through initiatives such as the Peace Club (section 5.1.3.4). The school had further put measures in place to facilitate reconciliation and sustainable friendships among pupils (section 5.1.3.6). One of these initiatives was the banning of the use of the mother tongue, which has been identified as a potential unifying policy (UNESCO, 2011). Lastly, the school

gave the pupils a voice in how the school was run, through the school council, which also served as a practical lesson in democratic practices (section 5.1.3.8). Macheleo was the only school where this layer of peace education was identified.

In short, peace education can take the form of preaching peace, teaching peace and practicing peace. Whereas the first layer of preaching peace was found in all the case-study schools, the last two layers were less evident. The survey revealed that a 88 percent of the survey schools perceived themselves to be teaching peace (q3), but comparing these findings with the case studies suggest that this was more an assumption than actual practice. I concluded that the perception that preaching peace was sufficient involvement in peace education hindered the schools from engaging in teaching and practicing peace.

#### **6.4 To what extent does the PEP have an impact on the daily lives of the school population?**

Building on the teaching of peace discussed in the previous section, this section will look more at the impact of the PEP. I will argue that evidence of impact was found in two of the case-study schools. Comparing the survey data with the case studies, I will argue that although the survey replies indicate positive attitudes towards the programme, this does not correlate with the case-study findings. This section addresses the training in the PEP, the dissemination of materials, implementation on school level, and the need for more training and follow ups.

All four case-study schools had received training in the PEP. Among the teachers in the 12 survey schools, 31.5 percent replied that they had attended a training workshop on peace education (q5a), and 59 percent reported that they had been trained by colleagues (q5b). This adds up to 90.5 percent in total, indicating that the training had reached a large number of teachers in total. The questionnaire analysis further showed association between training and implementation of the programme: Among those who had received training (q5a), 88 percent claimed to be applying it in their teaching (q5c), and those trained in peace education were more likely to have been given copies of the programme (q6a), 58 percent among the trained versus 35 percent among the untrained,  $p=0.006$ , and were more likely to

have used the materials in their teaching compared to those not trained (q6b), 75 percent versus 43 percent,  $p < 0.001$ . Overall these findings indicate a positive effect of the training; where teachers were trained they were more likely to have received the materials and be using it in their teaching.

Moving on from the training to the implementation at school level, 42.5 percent of the teachers answering the questionnaire claimed that they had been given copies of the programme (q6a), and 46 percent claimed to have been using it in their teaching (q6b). The latter number being higher than the first suggests that some respondents interpreted the question as asking whether they personally had received copies, rather than whether it was available in the school. An interesting follow-up question from this would have been to ask about the regularity of use. The above statistics do not differentiate between teachers who had used the materials once and those using it on a weekly basis. However, drawing on the data from the case studies and observations made in the survey schools, it seems unlikely that there was a high use of the materials on a regular basis. I observed for example the PEP materials hidden away in one of the survey schools, and in two it was kept in the head teacher's office as in Upper Hill (section 5.4.3). In one of the survey schools it was hidden in a closet in the staff room because the trained teacher was bitter (he said) that he had not been chosen to be a national trainer. Evidence of impact was therefore only observed in two schools in the study: Logos and Macheleo. At Logos the PEP had supported the school in the initial reconciliation and counselling process (section 5.3.3.1). At Macheleo it had a wider impact, inspiring and guiding the wider peace education efforts (section 5.1.3).

The need for further training and follow ups in peace education was emphasised in the interviews at all the case-study-schools, a finding confirmed in the larger survey where 98 percent agreed that teachers needed more training in teaching the PEP (q24). Observations conducted at Logos suggested that more training in the use of lesson plans was needed for them to be used productively. At this school, the PEP was largely interpreted as a reactive approach to the violence. In one of the lessons observed at Logos, the lesson plan which was intended to enhance communication skills turned into a violent lesson. Firstly, the pupils were asked to draw a violent incident without further discussion of why. Second, the teacher openly



criticised the pupils' drawing skills in front of the whole class while holding a cane in her hand (section 5.3.3.1).

As the PEP is non-examinable, this opens opportunities for teachers to use interactive teaching methods and give the students opportunities to discuss things (section 6.2.2.). However, as the abovementioned lesson illustrates, teachers were not sufficiently familiar with the use of interactive and pupil-centred teaching methods, and further training in dialogic pedagogy is therefore needed.

The questionnaire data indicated that a large number of teachers had been trained to use the PEP and were employing it in their teaching. Questions have arisen however as to whether these statistical facts truly reflect reality, particularly in areas where they are significantly challenged by the findings from the case studies. The next section will discuss factors that were found to influence the attitudes towards, and the implementation of, peace education in Kenyan schools.

## **6.5 What factors influence attitudes towards peace education in Kenyan schools?**

As the two previous sections noted, the comparative data analysis indicates that the PEP faced challenges in relation to school implementations in a number of schools. This raises the question of what factors influence the level of implementation on the school level, which will be the focus of this section. I will start by discussing the perceived relevance of the programme and its influence on implementation at school level. In particular, the conceptualisations of peace and peace-building, the non-examinable nature of the PEP and the lack of religious links in the programme will be examined as factors influencing the perceived relevance. I will then move on to argue that location influenced the implementation. The programme was more readily implemented in Nakuru than Eldoret. In addition, factors like the degree of violence, the ethnic composition of the school, and school location will be shown to have impacted on the implementation process. I will further argue that the school leadership played a particularly important role in determining the school ethos, and that ensuring sufficient training for and motivation of the head teacher are key to a successful implementation of the programme. The focus is then on the issue of

ownership, where I shall argue that cultivating a feeling of ownership towards the programme is also crucial to a successful implementation. Finally, the national peace education policy will be discussed, in particular in relation to timing. I will argue that launching the peace education policy four years after the teachers were trained and materials distributed affected the impact of the programme negatively. In short, the claim is that contextual factors specific to schools as well as national policies influenced the implementation of peace education.

### **6.5.1 Perceived relevance**

This section examines the relationship between perceptions of relevance and motivation for peace-building. I will argue that whereas the survey findings indicate that the PEP was of relevance, the case-study school findings indicate the opposite. This leads to an examination of what factors influenced the perception of relevance in the schools. I will argue that where peace is understood merely as negative peace, this is likely to discourage the implementation of peace education at a school level. I will further argue that a subject without assessments or examinations might prove difficult to implement in a fiercely competitive education system. Lastly, I will argue that as schools in Kenya are generally positive towards religion, introducing a religious link in the PEP might have improved the perceived relevance of the programme.

The survey findings indicate that teachers overall found the PEP relevant: 73 percent of the teachers who claimed to be teaching peace found the PEP useful in the process (q23) and 91.8 percent agreed that peace education was a good way to build peace in Kenya (q20). Further, 95 percent agreed that the PEP was necessary for schools to teach peace effectively (q8), indicating that the programme was seen as necessary for the schools. 73.3 percent agreed that the PEP was making a valuable contribution to the building of peace in Kenya at the national level (q21) and 92.4 percent at the local level (q22), indicating that the respondents saw the programme as making a contribution to peace-building. However, only 48 percent stated that a programme was necessary for effectively teaching peace (q8). This indicates that the teachers were ambivalent in their rating of the programme. This inconsistency was

also found when comparing the survey to the case-study findings. Although the questionnaire data gave the general impression that peace education was perceived positively and given priority in the schools, this was only observed in one of the four case-study schools. This suggests that the survey replies reflect the perceptions of peace-building found in the school, and not the actual practice.

Perceptions of peace, assessment, and religion were found to influence the perceived relevance of peace education. First, as introduced in chapter 1, peace can be conceptualised as either positive peace or negative peace. Whereas negative peace merely implies the absence of direct violence, positive peace acknowledges structural violence as an equally disruptive force in people's lives (Galtung & Høyvik, 1971; Barash & Webel, 2002). Peace is conceptualised in the PEP materials as positive peace (MoE, 2008a). My case studies found that when such an understanding was shared by the school, this improved the perceived relevance of the programme. Negative peace was the dominating discourse at St Peters, Logos and Upper Hill. At St Peters and Upper Hill they argued that peace education was not necessary, as the country was already at peace. At Logos they had used the materials as part of their counselling programme immediately following the violence, but did not see the need to continue using them when things calmed down. Among the four schools, therefore, only Macheleo saw the programme as highly relevant to their every-day teaching. In this school positive peace was dominating the discourse, as structural violence and the need for each individual to have peace of mind was emphasised. In correspondence with the aims of the PEP, the head teacher and teachers at Macheleo argued in interviews that they used the teaching of peace as a platform for building an identity based on other indicators than ethnicity, and to build peaceful relationships between the pupils. As structural violence has been found to be carried out along ethnic lines elsewhere in Kenya (Alwy & Schech, 2004), this indicates a conceptualisation of peace as positive peace. The case studies therefore suggest that when schools interpret peace as merely negative peace the sense of responsibility and need for addressing underlying drivers of conflict are weakened. As part of the training in peace education it might therefore be beneficial to inform the trainees about the connection between drivers of conflict and the likelihood of a community returning to conflict (section 7.1.2.1).

Second, the perceptions of whether peace was best achieved through peace-building or peace-keeping was also found to influence the perceived relevance of the programme (section 1.2). Although 95 percent of the respondents to the questionnaire agreed that teaching about peace can reduce everyday violence in the community (q11), 47 percent did not think that education could bring lasting peace to Kenya before major political issues were resolved on a national level (q14). These percentages point to some of the duality that was found in the case studies as well. Particularly at St Peters the teachers appeared in the interviews to be mainly of the understanding that the PEV was solely the responsibility of the politicians, and that peace therefore had to be built on a national level. As these perceptions devalued peace-building on a local level, it discouraged them for implementing the programme themselves. Drawing on these findings it is unsurprising that the questionnaire showed correlation between opinions on the role of politicians in peace-building and peace education practices; among those agreeing that peace education cannot build peace before national issues are resolved (q14), 18 percent reported that their school did not teach peace education (q3), as opposed to only 3 percent among those who disagreed,  $p=0.01$ . This clearly shows that blaming the politicians for the PEV and understanding peace-building as a merely national concern could weaken the motivation with regard to peace-building on a local level. In turn, this could contribute to disempowering the school population and make peace-building efforts in school seem pointless.

The third motivational factor emerging from the interviews was that of assessment of peace education. Exam results and competitions are in general given a strong emphasis in the Kenyan school system. That Life Skills and the PEP were not examinable discouraged the schools from implementing the subjects in a very competitive system. Similarly, there is a tradition that after-school clubs like drama and sports clubs compete with other schools; a tradition not yet established for peace education initiatives like peace clubs. In a school culture where exams and competition have served as external motivators for school developments, basing a programme solely on internal motivational factors might prove challenging. As was discussed in section 4.2, making the PEP examinable was not regarded as reconcilable with a programme which aimed at internalising values rather than

teaching facts. However, as will be discussed below, religious affiliation emerges as one potential motivator for the programme.

As many communities in Kenya are strongly religious, making more links to faith-based value systems in the PEP might have strengthened the perceived relevance of the programme. During the interviews religious faith was used as a rationale for the need to live in peace, and it is therefore likely that references to faith-based value systems could have helped to increase the motivation for implementing peace education. At Macheleo, the holistic interpretation of peace as having to start within each individual was compatible with the Christian faith, as prayer and worship was seen as a step towards inner peace. At St Peters the teachers were committed to teaching religious practices through for example the Character Building Programme, but were not committed to teaching peace. They argued that the school had to enhance its exam results, and could consequently not spend time on non-examinable subjects such as Life Skills and the PEP. However, as the school did spend time on the Character Building Programme which was not examinable, this gives the impression that the PEP was not rated important enough. Due to the strong religious affiliation of the Kenyan people in general, adding faith to the PEP could have provided a motivational factor for the teachers to implement peace education.

In this section, the perceived relevance of the programme in schools has been discussed. Whereas the survey findings generally indicate that the schools found the programme relevant, my case-study findings indicate the opposite. In particular, understanding peace as merely negative peace and perceiving peace to have to be built on a national level emerged as influential factors in the motivation for peace-building. That the programme was not examinable or did not have any religious affiliation further decreased the motivation. In essence, the section has discussed how both internal and external motivational factors were lacking for a satisfying implementation of the programme.

### **6.5.2 Location**

In each of the case-study sections in chapter 5, contextual factors have been discussed. This section will argue that the school location also influenced the

attitudes towards peace education. I will first argue that Nakuru had come further in the healing process than Eldoret, which in turn could have facilitated the implementation of the programme. The urban and rural locations in the two districts are then compared, arguing that peace education is more easily implemented in urban settings. The third contextual factor draws on the two previous ones, I discuss the nature of the violence across the four case-study schools, arguing that implementing peace education in communities heavily affected by violence is more challenging than in communities where the violence is not as severe. Pulling these factors together at the end of the section, the question is raised as to whether the programme would have benefited from a more localised implementation strategy rather than a national policy.

Eldoret and Nakuru were identified as locations suitable for research because they had both been badly affected by the PEV and were comparable in size. Although the locations were chosen because of their comparability, the analysis revealed significant differences between the two locations. Firstly, the attitudes varied between the two locations. In the questionnaire, teachers in Nakuru agreed more frequently than teachers in Eldoret with the statements that their own ethnic group would participate in further violence if it was incited (q9), 36 percent versus 16 percent,  $p=0.02$ . Although this could be read as an indicator for Nakuru being more prone to violence, the case studies challenge this. In the qualitative case studies, the interviewees from the two schools in Nakuru discussed the violence more openly than the teachers at the two case-study-schools in Eldoret, where there was a general unwillingness to discuss politics, and proneness to violence was ignored. As discussed in section 5.3.3.2, talking about politics was banned at Logos, as disagreement was seen as a driver of conflict. The same was true for Upper Hill, where the school was in denial of the PEV in order to build a positive image of the school and community. The schools in Nakuru also came across as having healed more than the schools in Eldoret, as they discussed the events of the PEV more openly. Taking this into account, the questionnaire results might indicate that the population in Nakuru was more willing to see the conflict from two sides and accept their own ethnic group's contribution to the violence. Drawing on the case studies where the findings clearly show that wherever the school disclaimed any

responsibility for the PEV, motivation for implementing the PEP went down, the question occurs of whether a different approach would have benefited Eldoret, and whether the schools in this location would have benefited from more follow ups.

As indicated above, the case-study and questionnaire findings are not always compatible. The case studies found that all four schools had received the PEP materials, but were using them to varying extents. The questionnaire (q6b) showed that teachers in Eldoret were more likely to have used the materials in their teaching (64 percent) than those in Nakuru (40 percent),  $p=0.002$ . This suggests that the PEP had been received differently in diverse locations, which calls into question the effectiveness of a national implementation, and raises the question of whether the initiatives needed to be more adjusted to local contexts.

Second, the urban/rural context was explored in relation to its influence on peace education. The qualitative study found that neither of the two rural schools were using the PEP materials in their teaching, whereas both urban schools did to different extents use them. The questionnaire showed significant differences in relation to the PEP. The urban locations were more likely to; have attended a workshop (q5a), 37 percent versus 21 percent,  $p=0.03$ ; been trained by colleagues (q5b), 65 percent versus 48 percent,  $p=0.03$ ; have been given copies of the peace education materials (q6a), 51 percent versus 27 percent,  $p=0.003$ ; and to have made use of the materials in their teaching (q6b), 63 percent versus 37 percent,  $p=0.002$ . This strongly indicates that urban schools have been favoured in the national programme, and that measures need to be put in place to ensure that rural schools are reached.

In general, urban communities are more ethnically mixed than rural communities in Kenya. This was part of the reason for choosing an equal number of urban and rural schools for the study. According to the questionnaire teachers were generally positive towards mixing ethnicities in schools and communities, with only 6.5 percent seeing this as a threat to peace (q12). Equally, 95.9 percent agreed that mixing groups in schools and communities builds peace (q19). The four case studies found that ethnically mixed populations could be a positive factor in the peace work. In the urban ethnically-mixed school Macheleo interviews and observations showed

that this mixed population was celebrated in the culture days, and the teachers and pupils prided themselves in providing an example of peaceful co-existence to the wider community. The data analysis showed that the school encouraged interaction straight after the violence had calmed down, between pupils, teachers and parents. At the other end of the spectrum, at the more single-ethnic school of Upper Hill all stakeholders interviewed argued forcefully for the need for a more mixed school community in order to build peace effectively. At all four schools, social interaction across ethnic boundaries was emphasised as a necessity for peace. The training that teachers had received in the PEP was treated as an opportunity for the teachers to interact with other tribes and expand their perspectives. Drawing on these findings I conclude that it is advisable to facilitate interaction through training or other activities.

Third, the data analysis suggested that the nature of the PEV in the respective communities influenced the attitudes and practices in peace education. The case studies suggested that heavily affected schools like those in Eldoret, experienced greater difficulties in the implementation of the PEP. Upper Hill was concerned with reconstruction after having acted as an IDP camp and building up a positive image after the PEV, which prevented them from focusing on peace education. Logos largely interpreted the PEP as a counselling programme, which led to the programme being used as a tool for settling back to normality. Conversely, the schools in Nakuru achieved an early implementation of the PEP: Macheleo, which was the school least affected by the violence had the strongest implementation of the programme, and St Peters had also implemented it early. This suggests that where the violence was particularly severe, more support is needed from outside in order for the school members to work together for peace-building.


The identity of the perpetrators of the violence further appeared to have played a role in the implementation process. Whereas interviewees in Nakuru mainly blamed the Mungiki for the violence in the community, the interviewees in Eldoret described the 'common man' as the main perpetrator. Comparing the two urban schools, at Macheleo the teachers emphasised that the violence was caused by 'outsiders' such as the Mungiki. The violence at Logos was largely caused by people from *within* the community. As a result of this the school community at Macheleo



distanced themselves from the violence, and constructed a common enemy which might have eased the building of a unifying identity. Conversely, the teachers at Logos described how the perpetrators being people from their local community had been particularly traumatic for the children. This indicates that reconciliation is particularly challenging in communities torn apart from the inside. As the violence had hit Logos and the surrounding community particularly hard, it might suggest that more assistance from outside the community would have been beneficial for the reconciliation process.

No clear correlation was found in the questionnaire between the implementation of the programme and the locations of Eldoret versus Nakuru. However, the above discussion has revealed other indicators of relevance for the implementation process, as illustrated in the figure below:

**Figure 2: Contextual factors influencing the implementation of peace education**



As the figure illustrates, the case studies suggested that schools which were lightly affected by the violence, with a mixed ethnicity and an urban location found it easier to implement the PEP. Similarly, heavy violence, single-ethnic school composition and a rural location challenged the implementation.

Drawing on these indicators, the question arises as to whether more localised approaches to the implementation would have been more beneficial than the national approach adopted. In particular, it is questionable whether more support in form of training or follow ups would have been advantageous for communities characterised by several of the indicators identified as challenging. The importance of training, and the crucial role of the school leadership will be discussed further in the next section.

### **6.5.3 Leadership**

The findings from the case studies suggested that the leadership within the schools largely determined the school ethos and peace education practices. This section will discuss how the leadership proved important in each of the case-studies. Macheleo and Logos will be discussed first, as schools where the leadership was playing a positive role in reconciling teachers and implementing peace education. From there I will move on to St Peters to discuss how the change of leadership seemed to impact negatively on peace-building in the school. Lastly, Upper Hill will provide an example of a school where the head teacher's disapproval of the PEP led to the teachers not receiving the materials. In sum the case studies suggested that more thorough training and follow ups of head teachers would be beneficial for the PEP.

At Macheleo the interviews and observations suggested that the head teacher was personally committed to the programme, and had prior to the violence held positive views towards ethnic diversity. She was described in teacher, pupil and parent interviews as having played a crucial part in the success the school had in implementing the PEP and keeping it running. The data also suggested that the head teacher was crucial in creating a feeling of ownership towards the programme among teachers and students. Through monitoring the appearance of peace in lesson plans, the head teacher gave teachers feedback on their commitment to teaching about peace, which made the teachers feel that it was important. The head teacher was also described in teacher interviews as raising awareness and motivating the teachers to teach peace through preaching peace in staff meetings, and inviting guests to the school to preach peace. That the head teacher was a national trainer in the programme meant that she regularly received training and follow ups from UNICEF

and the MoE. This is likely to have affected her motivation positively, and made her feel a stronger sense of ownership towards the programme. In one of the schools visited for the survey, the teacher trained in the PEP explained that he felt bitter because he had not been chosen to be a national trainer, and had consequently not trained the other teachers in his school. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the teachers at Macheleo said in the interviews that they were proud of the fact that their head teacher was a national trainer, and saw their own peace education efforts as part of the reason why she had been chosen for this position.

Similarly, the teachers at Logos described the head teacher as having been a key figure in bringing the rival parties back together and facilitating the first reconciliation process following the PEV. The teachers reported in the interviews that when the school reopened after the violence there was a “gap” between them, and that Luos and Kalenjins did not talk to Kikuyus and vice versa. Reconciliation efforts in the school initiated by the head teacher were said to have helped the teachers come back together. The two schools both illustrate the importance of having the head teacher on board when implementing a new programme.

The overall analysis of the data from St Peters further supports the idea that the school leadership was of importance for the implementation of peace education. In this school, the interviewees reported that the change of head teacher had contributed to a change in the school ethos and policy in relation to the implementation of peace education. Whereas the school under the previous leadership was described by UNICEF as having been committed to peace-building, the school at the time of the research was found not to consciously practice any peace-building activities. This was confirmed in the interviews where the school leadership and teachers expressed that they did not see any need for building peace. Interestingly, the teachers trained in the PEP and the deputy heads had, under the previous head, worked for peace-building in the school, but by 2012 they were not carrying out any such activities, which indicates that the leadership has a strong influence on the quantity and quality of peace-building practices.

At Upper Hill the interviews and observations suggested that the school had not at any point in time implemented the PEP or consciously built peace through

other teaching or activities. The materials were in the school, however, hidden in the head teacher's office. The head teacher stated that as he did not see the importance of peace-building in the school, the materials had not been given to the teachers. Other issues were rated as more important, such as food security, poverty reduction, and the reputation of the school. This indicates that training of teachers and distribution of materials cannot compensate for a head teacher who is not motivated for peace education.

All the four case-studies support the argument that the leadership in the schools was crucial to the successful implementation of the PEP. That the head teacher was especially important for successful implementation of the programme emerged in all four case studies. This was particularly evident at Macheleo, where the head teacher was a national trainer and monitored the teaching of peace in the school. At Logos the head teacher was described as having initiated the reconciliation process. In contrast, the leadership at St Peters and Upper Hill proved equally destructive for the PEP implementation. At all four schools it was evident that the head teacher to a large extent determined the school ethos and the peace education practices. This argument raises the question of whether the head teachers' attitudes and actions should be more closely targeted in training, monitored and follow ups.

#### **6.5.4 Ownership**

Cultivating a sense of ownership towards the PEP emerged from the data analysis as a crucial motivational factor for successful implementation of peace education. This will be illustrated by drawing on findings from two schools in particular; St Peters and Macheleo. While the lack of perceived relevance in the programme seemed to discourage ownership at St Peters, the opposite was the case at Macheleo where their peace-building work was highly commented by UNICEF. I will argue that the recognition of the peace education efforts at Macheleo made the head teacher and teachers feel a sense of ownership towards the programme which served as a major motivational factor with respect to putting peace education into practice.

As previously discussed, the school leadership and teachers at St Peters did not find the PEP relevant to their context. This was partly due to their understanding of the political backdrop of the violence, and partly due to the lack of religious affiliation in the programme. As a consequence, the leadership and teachers did not feel ownership towards the programme, but rather felt that the programme had been forced upon them by the MoE. That lack of feeling ownership could lead to the programme not being implemented was confirmed at the previously mentioned school visited for the survey study, where the trained teacher in the school had hidden the materials in a cupboard in the staff room and had not trained his colleagues to use them (section 6.4). He bitterly explained that he had not been chosen to be a national trainer, whereas the head teacher at Macheleo had. It was obvious that he did not feel properly part of the programme because he was not recognised by being given a position in the national programme.

In contrast, all the stakeholders interviewed at Macheleo expressed a strong sense of ownership towards the programme. Peace Education was described as something they all took part in, rather than being the responsibility of only the Peace Club or certain teachers. Part of the feeling of ownership could be attributed to the holistic interpretation of peace, where peace was seen as having to start within each individual, which increased the relevance of the PEP. Further, the head teacher acted as a national trainer for the PEP, and had as a result become an expert in the field. She herself and the school in general said in their interviews that they took pride in this role, and gave the impression that they felt their work had been noticed and that it mattered to people outside the school. In the same way as UNICEF recognised the work the head teacher did, the head teacher reported that she monitored and recognised the work the teachers were doing in peace-building. Through this monitoring system they were given feedback and recognition. The same recognition was given to pupils through the school council and the Peace Club. Through these activities being put in place, the teachers provided scaffolding for their development and work in peace-building via encouragement, engagement and responsibilities given. The fact that the Peace Club performed at local festivals and events in the community outside the school could also have contributed to the feeling of ownership.

From the above discussions ownership is clearly a key factor in the successful implementation of peace education. It appears from the analysis that the perceived relevance of the programme increased the feeling of ownership, and that this in turn increased the motivation for its implementation. It also seemed important for the stakeholders that the work they were doing was recognised and acknowledged by outsiders such as UNICEF. External motivation can be developed through acknowledging the peace-building work by, for example, external follow ups and continuous training, as was done at Macheleo. However, grounding peace education in a national implementation policy could also be an important external motivator, as the teachers then would feel obliged to implement it, as will be discussed in the next section.

### **6.5.5 Policy**

When teachers were trained in the PEP and peace education materials distributed in the aftermath of the PEV in 2008, no national policy for peace education was in place. Although a peace education policy was officially launched in 2012, this was four years after the initial training and distribution of materials. It became clear that the fact that the PEP was not initially grounded in policy was one reason for a lack of motivation and an unwillingness to implement the PEP. This section will discuss the influence of the policy gap, starting with St Peters' interpretation of the lack of policy, as a sign that the PEP was not given high priority within the MoE. I will then discuss how the absence of policy led to the programme being understood as reactive in Logos and Upper Hill. The section concludes with a discussion of how Macheleo compensated for the lack of a national policy by developing their own school policy. Overall, the section argues for the importance of national policies for effective implementation of peace education programmes.

As discussed in chapter 4, the PEP came about as an emergency response. The training of teachers and dissemination of PEP materials took place in 2008 following the violence, and because of the emergency situation the programme was not grounded in policy. At St Peters the missing policy was explicitly mentioned in interviews as a reason why the programme was not implemented. The interviews

suggested that the school interpreted the lack of policy as lack of commitment from the policy makers, and that its absence gave the schools an excuse not to implement the programme.

At Logos, the policy gap might have influenced the school to interpret the PEP as purely reactive and without having a proactive aspect. Because of the trauma experienced in the community, counselling of pupils was a pressing need. As a result, the teachers reported that they had used the PEP as part of their counselling work, and the programme was largely interpreted in this context. Although the PEP does have counselling as part of its mandate, the close association between the two made the programme seem less relevant when the immediate trauma was healed. As the programme was not grounded in policy from the beginning, it was largely left to the schools to interpret the purpose of the programme.

The reactive interpretation was also seen at Upper Hill, where this contributed to the programme being seen as a threat to the positive community image they were trying to build. The Upper Hill community had been active in the PEV as perpetrators, which had resulted in most of the Kikuyus fleeing the area never to return. The community and the school were struggling to overcome the negative reputation they had gained following the violence. It was therefore important for both to make an impression that peace was restored in order for the IDPs to return. Implementing the PEP, which at the other schools was largely associated with the PEV, might have posed a threat, as on some level it would imply admitting that there was a need for the community to learn conflict resolution skills.

Macheleo was the school where the consequences of the lack of policy were least evident. Due to the lack of lack of a national policy, the school developed their own system of monitoring the appearance of peace in classes. Such a system, however, depended largely on the commitment of the head teacher and the teachers. This was made possible at Macheleo because the head teacher was a national trainer in peace education. Through that, she was in contact with UNICEF and other stakeholders in the programme, and had received more training and follow ups than the other head teachers.

The section has discussed potential consequences of the lack of a national policy when the teachers were first trained and materials distributed, in particular the PEP being rated as less important, and/or being interpreted reactively. As discussed in chapter 4, a peace policy was formulated in 2012. The danger of a policy being formulated significantly after the teachers had been trained and the materials disseminated is that the training might be forgotten and the materials have gone missing or be regarded as irrelevant by the time the policy is put in place.

## **6.6 Conclusion**

This chapter has, through a cross-case analysis, answered the first five research questions. I have argued that education has two faces; that it can fuel conflict or build peace (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000). Specifically I argued that, although avoiding the teaching of politics, teacher-centred classrooms, corporal punishment and discouraging ethnic diversity in education can fuel conflict, education can also build peace. Initially, schools can respond to violence by providing a sense of stability and normality, and initiate reconciliation. Further, schools can build a culture of peace through the three layers of peace education identified: preaching peace, teaching peace and practicing peace. Although such peace-building practices was found to have impacted on one school in particular, a gap was identified between the rhetoric of schools and their actual practices. A gap was also identified between national policy intentions and actual implementation of peace education, and factors influencing attitudes towards peace education were identified. Perceived relevance, location, leadership, ownership and policy were all found to be particularly influential in the context of peace education in Kenya. This cross-case analysis has formed the basis for the conclusions and recommendations given in the following chapter.



## **Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations**

In the previous two chapters I discussed the implementation of peace education in Kenyan primary schools. The findings reveal good practices as well as challenges the programme is facing. Although the policy makers on national level have shown commitment to the programme, through the creation of teaching materials and a national peace education policy, my study has revealed a gap between these policies and the actual practice in schools. Change is needed on several levels for peace education to be fully integrated in Kenyan schools, and for the programme to achieve the level of sustainability and resilience envisaged by the policy makers. This chapter therefore gives a set of recommendations to accommodate this need. These are given for three levels in the Kenyan education system; policy makers, teacher trainers, and head teachers. At the end of the chapter I will give directions for further research, where research follow-up of the recommendations are included.

## 7.0 Introduction

This chapter will summarise the answers to the research questions from the previous chapter, and based on this answer the last research question on recommendations for peace education in Kenya will be answered.

The first research question asked how the schools responded to the PEV. The cross-case analysis found that learning was disrupted in all the case-study schools, but that three of them had put in place reconciliation efforts following the violence. However, only one had further developed this initial response into peace-building initiatives.

The second research question asked what activities schools were undertaking that could potentially fuel conflict. Four areas in particular were identified. Avoiding the teaching of politics was argued to be ‘sanitising’ the curricula, which avoided addressing and challenging drivers of conflict, and made pupils miss a crucial opportunity to develop critical thinking and analytical skills. This is closely related to the second area, where classroom observations revealed teacher-centred classrooms where pupils were deprived of opportunities to voice their opinions and make valued contributions to discussions. Corporal punishment was further identified in all four case-study schools as a practice implicitly teaching the pupils that violence is an appropriate way to solve conflict. Lastly, two schools in particular were found to discourage ethnic diversity, something which has been found to be a common driver of conflict in multicultural societies.

The third research question shifted the focus to peace by asking what activities the schools were undertaking to build peace. While all case-study schools and a large percentage of the survey schools were found to be preaching peace, there was less evidence of teaching or practicing it. The section argued that all the three layers of peace education should be in place for peace education to reach its potential.

The fourth question moved on to specifically address the PEP by asking what impact the programme had on the daily lives of the school population. The section argued that although a large percentage of schools had been trained in the PEP and

received materials for it, the programme had not had the impact it was designed to have in most schools, as it had not been sufficiently implemented.

Lastly, the fifth question asked what factors influenced attitudes towards peace education at school level in Kenya. Five areas were identified. Firstly, the perceived relevance of peace education was found to influence the implementation of peace education. In particular, the perception of peace and peace-building, the nature of the PEP as non-examinable and the lack of a religious link in the programme discouraged the implementation in schools. Secondly, location was identified as a factor influencing implementation, where rural schools heavily affected by the violence with a single-ethnic composition were less likely to implement peace education than schools with the opposite characteristics. Thirdly, the leadership in the schools was found to largely influence the school ethos and attitudes towards peace education. Fourth, where schools felt ownership towards peace education, this made implementation more likely. And lastly, the lack of policy in 2008 was found to have discouraged implementation in schools.

In sum I have argued that education *can* play a role in building a culture of peace following the PEV in Kenya. However, drivers of conflict were also identified in the schools. Due to this, and the lack of sufficient implementation of peace education through both the additive and integrative approach, peace education had not reached its potential in all schools. I have argued that perceived relevance, location, leadership, ownership and policy all contributed to this situation. The next section draws on these findings in order to answer the last research question: What are the recommendations and action points for peace education in Kenya? The recommendations and action points aim for improved implementation of peace education in Kenyan schools. The recommendations are given for three levels in the education system; policy makers, teacher trainers, and head teachers.

Following the discussion of recommendations and action points, I will give directions for further research. I will argue that research into peace-building education following conflict is scarce, and that the need for more research in the area is pressing. At the end of the chapter, I give a concluding summary of the thesis, pulling together the threads from all the previous chapters.

## 7.1 Recommendations

The gap between the intentions for peace education at national policy level and actual implementation on the ground led to the conclusion that changes are needed on three levels in the education system. Recommendations are therefore given to policy makers, teacher trainers, and head teachers in this section.

The first five recommendations, for policy makers, aim at creating a sustainable approach to peace education through reframing policy, and create a system for follow ups for teachers. The following three, for teacher trainers, suggest ways in which peace education can be better integrated into teacher training. The last three, for head teachers, focus upon school policies, aiming at a sounder integration of peace education at school level. All eleven recommendations aim at a sustainable approach to building a culture of peace. The recommendations and action points are presented in table 8 below.

**Table 8: Recommendations for sustainable peace education**

Level of involvement	Recommendations	Action points
Policy makers	Adopt a proactive approach to peace education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Retrain teachers</li> <li>• Provide workshops on peace education for teachers and head teachers</li> <li>• Send information to schools</li> <li>• Inform about the peace education policy</li> <li>• Integrate peace education into the formal curriculum</li> </ul>
	Establish follow ups for schools	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Collaborate with DOEs/MEOs</li> <li>• Institute Continuous Professional Development (CPD)</li> </ul>
	Ensure recognition for peace education initiatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Make school visits</li> <li>• Introduce peace education prizes</li> <li>• Promote teachers based on work in peace education</li> <li>• Create a peace education magazine with stories and tips</li> </ul>
	Stress the integral approach to peace education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Organise follow ups on non-violence regulations</li> <li>• Make school councils compulsory</li> <li>• Encourage the creation of a school language policy nationally</li> </ul>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Create a national SZOP framework</li> </ul>
	Monitor and evaluate the PEP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitor the implementation of the PEP and impact in areas where it was first launched, before expanding to new areas</li> <li>• Apply ‘theories of change’ in the evaluation</li> </ul>
<b>Teacher trainers</b>	Integrate peace education into teacher training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Make peace education an independent subject in teacher education</li> <li>• Integrate peace in all subjects</li> <li>• Stress the conceptualisation of peace as positive peace</li> </ul>
	Enhance training in interactive methodology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use more interactive methods in teacher training</li> <li>• Teach more about the learning potential in using interactive methods</li> <li>• Use the PEP lesson plans as examples of interactive teaching methods</li> </ul>
	Train teachers to teach about sensitive political issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Include the political economy in the curriculum</li> <li>• Address on-going political events as examples of how to address this in teaching</li> <li>• Encourage more discussion and critical thinking</li> </ul>
<b>Head teachers</b>	Follow up the teaching in schools	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitor teachers’ lesson plans</li> <li>• Provide workshops for and time for discussion for teachers</li> <li>• Have a school prize for excellence in teaching peace education</li> </ul>
	Encourage ethnically-mixed schools	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Encourage ethnic mixture in classes and clubs</li> <li>• Develop a language policy</li> <li>• Celebrate ethnicity through culture days</li> <li>• Teach and use tribal languages</li> <li>• Use greetings in different languages in morning assemblies</li> <li>• Use prayers from different religions in morning assemblies</li> <li>• Reflect on inclusive practices</li> </ul>
	Involve the community in peace-building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Invite visitors to school</li> <li>• Mark the occasion on international UN days</li> <li>• Establish a peace club for parents</li> <li>• Invite parents to school to talk about their own tribal languages and cultures</li> </ul>

### **7.1.1 Recommendations for policy makers**

The study found that the national education policies influenced school practices. This section therefore gives recommendations to national policy makers aimed at creating a sustainable approach to peace education. Four recommendations are given: adopt a proactive approach to peace education, establish follow ups of schools, ensure recognition of peace education initiatives, and stress the integral approach to peace education.

#### ***7.1.1.1 Recommendation 1: Adopt a proactive approach to peace education***

Three of the four case-study schools saw the PEP as a reactive response to the PEV, and were therefore reluctant to permanently integrate the programme into the school policy plan. The generally accepted view in these schools was that, since the violence had calmed down and the country had returned to normality, the programme was superfluous. However, as the policy makers decided that the programme should become a permanent part of the teaching in schools in 2012, adopting a proactive approach seems important.

The launch of the national peace education policy of 2012 was one step in the direction of making the programme proactive. However, as the programme had already been interpreted reactively in schools, I will suggest some actions to be taken in order for this impression to be counteracted. First, information about the programme should be sent out to schools, including information about the new policy. Further, teachers should be retrained or given the opportunity to participate in workshops. This would send a strong signal of the long-term importance of the programme. Lastly, peace education should be integrated into the formal curriculum to make it permanent. These measures would all contribute to the adoption of a proactive approach to peace education.

#### ***7.1.1.2 Recommendation 2: Establish follow ups to schools***

The comparison of the schools indicates that training and follow ups are crucial for the sustainability of the PEP. This was particularly clear when comparing Macheleo

with the other three case-study schools. As the head teacher at Macheleo was a national trainer, she received continuous training and follow ups from the MoE and UNICEF. The analysis suggests that this follow-up was a key factor for the school success in their peace initiatives.

Building on the same argument, the head teacher at St Peters argued that the policy makers were speaking in two tongues when launching the PEP. On the one hand, they wanted the programme to be implemented as an important addition to the standard curriculum; on the other hand, it was not introduced with an implementation policy confirming its importance. Although a policy was formulated in 2012, follow ups of schools initially trained would show commitment on behalf of the policy makers. Indeed, the head teacher at St Peters said that he would have felt more committed to the programme if the policy makers had shown greater commitment to the programme themselves. Such commitment could be shown through follow ups of schools and continuous professional development.

The findings further suggest that schools in rural settings, schools with single-ethnic populations and schools which were heavily affected by the PEV were less likely to implement the PEP than schools with the opposite characteristics. This calls for a localised approach to follow ups, where the school context is taken into consideration and the most vulnerable schools are given particular attention. As the DEO/MOEs received training in the programme and have localised knowledge of the schools they could play a key role in the follow ups.

### ***7.1.1.3 Recommendation 3: Ensure recognition for peace education initiatives***

In a fiercely competitive school system, teaching a non-examinable subject is controversial. This was also true for peace education, and the majority of teachers interviewed said that there was not enough time to focus on what was seen as an extra-curricular activity during school hours. Although I support the decision to make the PEP non-examinable, on the premise that the programme is value-based, I question whether other forms of recognition could not have replaced grades.

One factor that made Macheleo stand out from the other case-study schools was their strong feeling of ownership in the PEP. The feeling of ownership served to motivate the school at different levels towards continuous peace initiatives. According to my analysis, the feeling of ownership derived from the recognition given to the different stakeholders; the head teacher received recognition from UNICEF through follow ups due to her role as a national trainer, and she cascaded this down through monitoring the inclusion of peace in the teachers' lesson plans. The pupils received recognition through their responsibilities in the school council structure and membership in the Peace Club. The follow ups given to Macheleo were of a character which acknowledged the work of the school and increased a sense of ownership.

Based on these findings I would argue that follow ups aiming at creating a sense of ownership would benefit the programme. School visits by, for example, the DEO/MEOs, where the school gets an opportunity to show its work in peace-building, could contribute to this. Another idea is to establish a peace education magazine including stories and tips from schools. Based on collected materials from the school visits and magazine stories, a yearly prize could be given to a school in each education district excelling in peace education.

Acknowledgement of peace education practice was also raised as a topic at Logos, where teachers complained that excellence in peace education was not grounds for promotion in the teaching profession. I therefore recommend that peace education should be placed on equal terms with other school subjects as grounds for teacher promotion.

#### ***7.1.1.4 Recommendation 4: Stress the integral approach to peace education***

Throughout the whole thesis I have argued that peace education should not be reduced to a taught subject, but that peace-building has to take a holistic approach, incorporating the whole school culture through an integral approach. My findings illustrated this point, particularly the analysis from Macheleo, where I found that their work on creating a culture of peace was as important to their peace-building work as their teaching of peace education in class. As discussed in section 4.2, the



PEP assumes an additive approach, where peace education is introduced in the school as a separate subject. However, the 2012 policy on peace education aims at an integrative approach, where the goal is an education system infused by peace-building.

The case studies found violent practices in all four schools, in particular in relation to corporal punishment. At St Peters in particular, the school ethos was infused by authoritarianism. As part of this, corporal punishment was widely used, and the pupils' voices were suppressed. At the opposite extreme, Macheleo stood out as a school that had consciously worked towards creating a culture of peace within the school compound through marginalising the use of corporal punishment. In order for a culture of peace to be established in schools, I recommend a reduction in the use of corporal punishment. As part of this it is necessary to train teachers in alternative disciplinary strategies.

At Macheleo the school had a student council which gave the pupils a sense of empowerment and a say in how the school was run. This promoted active citizenship, and influenced the environment in the school in a positive way. It would be beneficial if such school councils could be established in all schools.

All schools visited had a language policy where the use of the mother tongue was discouraged. It was only at Macheleo, however, that the pupils understood the connection between using national languages and inclusion of ethnic groups. For the sake of establishing a culture of peace, strengthening the language policy through explaining its peace-promoting potential to teachers and pupils alike would be beneficial. As will be discussed in section 7.1.3.3, the use of the mother tongue could also be used positively to encourage ethnically-mixed schools.

Lastly, SZOP frameworks should be developed for all schools to ensure that the school compounds are peaceful environments, free from threats at times of both conflict and peace.

#### ***7.1.1.5 Recommendation 5: Monitor and evaluate the PEP***

This research has showed a gap between policy intention and actual peace education practice in schools. In addition, the research pointed to a gap between perceived changes the school had made as a result of peace education, and the impact as observed by me. This points to a need for monitoring and evaluating the PEP and other peace education efforts in schools.

Monitoring could be carried out in schools prior to further implementation of peace education. The monitoring could include measures in accordance with my findings presented in chapter 6 on what activities schools are undertaking that could potentially fuel conflict (section 6.2), and what activities they are undertaking to build peace (section 6.3). As part of this, the monitoring should capture school attitudes towards diversity, corporal punishment, interactive teaching methods, and the teaching of politics. The monitoring could further capture the three layers of peace education identified; preaching peace, teaching peace, and practicing peace. Such a monitoring exercise could provide a dataset that could be compared with results from an evaluation.

The evaluation should capture the impact of peace education. It should therefore be guided by ‘theories of change’ as discussed in section 4.3. As argued, the theories of change were in fact implicit in both the PEP materials and the peace education policy. For an evaluation to measure impact, however, these theories must be explicitly stated to guide the evaluation. Building on the findings in this thesis, and the proposed themes for monitoring above, theories of change could include: ‘If corporal punishment is banned from schools, then children are less likely to engage in violence, because research has found that there is a connection between corporal punishment and general violence in society’. Or ‘if children are trained in conflict resolution skills, then there will be less violence in schools, because they will have the skills to solve conflicts peacefully’.

#### **7.1.2 Recommendations for teacher trainers**

Although peace has been integrated in the formal school curricula since independence, the additive approach was first introduced in 2008 (section 4.2).

Consequently many teachers have not been introduced to the contents or the teaching methods of peace education during their teacher training. The thesis has identified the training of teachers as a precondition for sustainable implementation of the programme. This section therefore gives recommendations for integration of peace education into teacher education.

#### ***7.1.2.1 Recommendation 5: Integrate peace education into teacher training***

As of 2012, teacher education training in Kenya did not include peace education as part of its curriculum. As discussed in section 7.1.1.2, a reoccurring theme in the teacher interviews was the need for more follow ups in order to give the teachers the necessary competencies to integrate peace education into their teaching. This need was also backed with classroom observations, where in some cases the lack of knowledge and internalised values got in the way of the constructive use of the PEP materials. Integrating peace education as a subject in teacher education could meet this need for training teachers. The integration of peace education into teacher training will also allow for a more thorough training in the subject than in-service courses, and establish the subject as an equal part of the school curriculum. I accordingly propose that peace education should be established as a separate subject in teacher training, as well as integrated into other taught subjects. This would serve to both strengthen the status of the PEP, and enhance the integrative approach.

When peace education is integrated into teacher training, it is important that the concept of ‘positive peace’ is stressed. As was argued in chapter 5, three of the case-study schools understood peace as merely negative peace, which made peace education a less urgent matter in 2012, when the PEV was history. In contrast, the importance of positive peace was stressed at Macheleo, which encouraged the teaching of peace education. I therefore suggest that when peace is integrated into teacher education, it is important that the understanding of peace as positive peace is stressed, in order to motivate the teachers to teach peace education regardless of the political situation in the country.

### ***7.1.2.2 Recommendation 6: Enhance training in interactive methodology***

My video analysis showed that although the PEP promotes a child-centred pedagogy, the methods used in schools were largely teacher-centred, with question-and-answering, chorus learning and the teacher writing on the chalkboard dominating the classroom discourse. As argued in section 3.2.4, a more interactive pedagogy would increase the quality of education (Tharp & Dalton, 2007) and ease the process of internalising peace values in the children (Davies, 2011; Bird, 2003). For these reasons, integrating more teaching in child-centred methodology into teacher training is of crucial importance for establishing peace-promoting education in Kenya.

As teacher-centred teaching is widely established in Kenya however, it is important that teacher trainers are supported to strengthen their own use of interactive methods in their training of teachers. Further, the students need to be taught about the positive impact of interactive teaching on learning. As the PEP teaching plans are to a large extent based on interactive teaching methods these could be used as examples in the teacher training.

### ***7.1.2.3 Recommendation 7: Train teachers in teaching about sensitive political issues***

That schools were reluctant to address the political economy of the country in teaching was identified as a potential driver of conflict. This was particularly evident at Logos, where the head teacher had banned all talk of politics as part of the reconciliation process. Although this might have been necessary at the most tense time following the violence, the policy did also stop the teachers from discussing the political backdrop of the events with the pupils. Political reflection is also left out of the PEP materials and lesson plans, signalling to the teachers and pupils that conflict analysis is not part of teaching peace. However, as argued in chapter 2, the PEV was partly grounded in Kenyan history, making an understanding of the political history necessary for the country to build sustainable peace.

I accordingly argue that training teachers to teach about sensitive political issues is necessary for education to build sustainable peace. Such training would prepare the teachers to facilitate discussions among pupils on the political economy

in order to strengthen critical thinking among them. Such teaching and discussion could develop knowledge of drivers of conflict in the country, provide a space for constructive discussion, and as already mentioned strengthen critical thinking. A first step in this direction could be to strengthen the political economy in the teacher education curriculum, and discuss on-going political events with the students, to provide examples of how this could be addressed in teaching. In order for the teaching to be truly effective, the teacher trainers must themselves encourage discussion and critical thinking among their teacher trainees.

### **7.1.3 Recommendations for head teachers**

The school leadership has been identified as crucial for building a culture of peace in schools (section 6.5.3). As discussed in section 7.1.1 it is important that head teachers receive the necessary support to embark on the peace-building mission in their schools. This section gives recommendations for head teachers on the implementation of peace education in school through instituting follow ups of the teaching in their respective schools, encouraging ethnically mixed schools, and through involving the wider community in peace-building.

#### ***7.1.3.1 Recommendation 8: Follow up the teaching in school***

The findings suggest that the leadership of the schools had a large influence on the school ethos and the extent to which peace education was included in this. As discussed in section 5.2.3.2, the school ethos at St Peters had been altered with the change of head teacher, from having promoted peace to promoting more authoritarian values. At Macheleo, the head teacher showed commitment to the PEP, which in turn trickled down to the teachers (section 5.1.3). The head teacher at Macheleo monitored the teaching of peace education through regular checks of the teachers' lesson plans. The monitoring provided background for supervision, where the teachers were encouraged to maintain a focus on peace in teaching. These supervisions seemed to have had a great influence on the teachers' emphasis on peace education.

Based on these findings I recommend that the head teachers follow-up their teachers by monitoring lesson plans and ensure input on the importance of a focus on peace. Such follow-up is particularly important since peace education is a non-examinable subject, and is as such not followed up by exams. By providing follow ups and supervision the head teacher can give the teachers necessary support, and send a signal of the importance of peace education. Whether the head teacher actually gives such support could be monitored by the DEO/MEOs, as discussed in section 7.1.1.2. In collaboration with the local school authorities the head teacher could also provide workshops on peace education internally in the school. Indeed, based on the work of the teachers a yearly peace education prize could be given to one teacher who excelled in peace education.

#### ***7.1.3.2 Recommendation 9: Encourage ethnically-mixed schools***

Ethnically-mixed school populations were found to be an advantage for creating a culture of peace in the study. Teachers who had participated in the PEP training generally said that meeting teachers from the ‘opposite side’ of the PEV facilitated discussion, and that sharing views during the training had helped them overcome anger and frustration. Similarly, the reconciliation efforts at Macheleo and Logos were described as having helped the pupils move forward. Encouraging an ethnic mixture does therefore stand out as an important aspect of peace-building.

Based on these findings I recommend that HTs are encouraged to promote ethnic diversity in their schools. The head teachers could also, in cooperation with the other school staff, reflect on inclusive practices. As part of this the schools could make sure that the ethnic groups are mixed in both classes and clubs.

Further, schools could make an effort to celebrate the positive aspects of ethnic mixture. At Macheleo in particular, ethnicity was celebrated via culture days to facilitate a positive understanding of Kenyan diversity. Organising cultural events could be a way of showing the community their commitment to, and appreciation of, ethnic diversity. The children could further be exposed to indigenous languages in classes. However, a language policy banning the use of the mother tongue outside of pedagogical activities could usefully be applied in all schools.

All schools promoted national identity to a certain extent through singing the national anthem and repeating the pledge to the country, a practice that could have been extended upon through, for example, greetings made in different tribal languages during assemblies, or through using prayers from all religions represented in the school.

### ***7.1.3.3 Recommendation 10: Involve the community in peace-building***

The need for stronger community involvement was emphasised in interviews in all the case-study schools. The relationship between parents and the school at Upper Hill was described by the school leadership, teachers and parents to have been poor in the past, but to have improved over the last couple of years since the school changed leadership. The parents interviewed at Upper Hill argued for much greater community involvement, particularly for parents of different tribes to meet and interact. They argued that the school provided a common ground for parents from different communities, and that this could be taken advantage of to facilitate interaction (section 5.4.3.1). Similarly, parents at Logos were concerned about the need for facilitating peace-building between themselves. They argued for training and sensitisation of parents, and one parent in particular suggested the establishment of a peace club for parents (section 5.3.3.4). This, they argued, would ensure consistency in the messages being communicated to the pupils. That involvement of the community through parents could be fruitful was illustrated at Macheleo, where outreach to parents was done through preaching peace at parents' meetings and inviting them to culture days where various cultures of Kenya were celebrated.

Drawing on these findings, I recommend that head teachers in Kenya strengthen the involvement of the community in peace-building. This could, for example, be done through inviting visitors to school to discuss peace when parents attend meetings. International UN days could also be used as opportunities for calling parents to meetings. In continuation of the celebration of ethnicity discussed in the above section (section 7.1.3.3), parents could also be invited to school to talk about their language and cultural backgrounds. If a peace club was established for

parents, its members could hold a particular responsibility for organising the above suggestions.

## **7.2 Directions for further research**

As argued in section 4.1 case studies do not claim to be representative of the wider context. However, they provide certain ground for generalization. In this study schools were chosen according to known criteria (section 4.2.2). It was, for example, beneficial for the study to investigate schools where the teachers had undergone training in peace education. Studies of schools without such training would therefore most likely have generated different findings. Nevertheless I have identified patterns and trends that could form a hypothesis for future experimental and systematic research. Further, the findings can be generalised from through naturalistic generalization, “where readers gain insight by reflecting on the details and descriptions presented in case studies. As readers recognize similarities in case study details and find descriptions that resonate with their own experiences, they consider whether their situations are similar enough to warrant generalizations” (Melrose, 2010, p. 600). Thorough information is given in this thesis on the political economy of Kenya and the contexts of the specific schools. This information is provided to the reader can judge on the generalizability of the findings to other contexts in which they have knowledge.

The study has provided an in-depth analysis of peace education practices in Kenyan primary schools. It is the first study to explore the PEP in Kenya, and contributes to the small body of research into peace education in post-conflict settings globally. More research is needed into what role education can play in building cultures of peace in schools, and the role peace education can play in this. As the area is largely unexplored, the need for further research is vast. I have therefore framed directions for further research on peace education globally, and more specifically for the Kenyan context.

Similar research to this project needs to be carried out in a variety of post-conflict environments to allow for cross-checking of results across contexts. This study has argued that the integrative approach to peace education is more fruitful,



and the proactive approach more effective in the Kenyan context. Other studies exploring these factors would contribute to a sounder understanding of the influence of implementation policy on the perception of peace education programmes. Longitudinal studies exploring similar factors to this study would give a broader understanding of the impact of peace education on attitudes and behaviours.

As argued in chapter 2, the PEV in Kenya could partly be understood as a result of long standing grievances over resources unfairly distributed among ethnic groups. Section 3.2.1 argued that the children of the ethnic ruling elite have been provided with better education opportunities than other ethnic groups in Kenya. Building on this data, a study on the relationship between inequalities in education and conflict is recommended.

All the above questions are relevant to the Kenyan context, but some areas are of particular relevance. In the country-specific context of Kenya research is needed on the impact of political events on peace education; for example how the 2013 election and the ICC has impacted on schools and teaching. It would further be beneficial for the area to undertake research into whether education contributed to the relatively peaceful election of 2013. Similarly, school cultures could be explored by questions such as; is there less violence in schools and communities following the introduction of peace education? I have throughout the thesis argued for a focus on peace as positive peace. This is in accordance with the larger area of peace research, and it would therefore be beneficial to look into whether peace education contributes to positive peace. For example: does peace education lead to more equality? Does peace education encourage active non-violence, or does it pacify the children into passive non-violence?

Lastly, research into the recommendations given in this chapter would strengthen the argument. Do they make a difference? The introduction of new initiatives gives the opportunity for research with control cases, which would attend to the need for more hard evidence in the area.

### **7.3 Concluding summary**

This study was undertaken to gain an understanding of the role education can play in post-conflict settings, and more specifically following the PEV in Kenya. Fieldwork was carried out over a period of five months, with 2-4 weeks spent in each of the four case-study schools, and extensive time spent with the education and young people office of UNICEF Kenya. Although all four case-study schools were chosen because they had received training in peace education, my research found that only one of the schools was regularly using the PEP materials and was working to establish a culture of peace in the school.

The findings from the study were presented in three chapters in this thesis. In chapter 3, the PEP was introduced through analysis of policy documents and interviews with key stakeholders at policy level. I found that, although the programme initially came about as a reactive emergency response, the MoE and their partners were in 2012 working to adopt a more proactive approach and to implement the programme countrywide. Likewise, the MoE has, in the peace education policy of 2012, moved from the solely additive approach first adopted through the PEP, to include both the integrative and additive approaches to peace education. According to my findings from the schools both these changes could be fruitful for further development of peace education in the country. I have found that for peace education to be truly effective the whole school culture should be taken into account; supporting the integrative approach. Further, the reactive approach first taken to the PEP affected the implementation negatively in three of the schools in the study.

In chapter 5, the case-study findings were presented in separate sections. The analysis showed that only one of the four schools, Macheleo, was committed to peace education. In this school, the PEP was integrated into the teaching of Life Skills, and peace was also integrated into the teaching of other subjects. The school further taught peace through extra-curricular activities such as the Peace Club and the school council. The school's understanding of peace as having to start with each individual contributed to the motivation for peace-building. Further, that the school received external follow ups because the head teacher was a national trainer of peace education was found to be a key factor in Macheleo actively building a culture of

peace. At the second school, St Peters, the PEP materials were not used, and the school did not make an effort to build a culture of peace through other measures. The school policy on peace education had changed with the new head teacher. The leadership was therefore singled out as an important factor behind why peace education was no longer implemented. Further, the understanding of peace as merely absence of violence also discouraged the school from implementing the programme. At the third school, Logos, the PEP had initially been implemented following the PEV. However, as the school interpreted the programme as merely reactive, they stopped the implementation when the school returned to normality. Finally at the fourth school, Upper Hill, the PEP had never been implemented, and the materials were still piled up in the head teacher's office. The reason for this reluctance was found to be in part the sensitive nature of the PEV in the area, and other issues such as food security and poverty being more pressing.

The findings from the four schools were then pulled together in a discussion integrating the survey and observation data in chapter 6 where the first five research questions were answered. The chapter established that education can play a role in providing stability and counselling to children following violence. I argued that avoiding the teaching of politics, teacher-centred classrooms, the use of corporal punishment, and discouraging ethnic diversity can fuel conflict. I further argued that education can build peace, and that peace education programmes can impact on school populations when integrated. The chapter concludes that perceived relevance of peace education, location of schools, school leadership, feeling of ownership and national educational policies all influence the implementation of peace education.

In this concluding chapter, the focus shifted from discussion of findings to recommendations for peace education. The recommendations were given for three levels in the Kenyan education system, for policy makers, teacher trainers and head teachers. I recommended that policy makers adopt a proactive approach to peace education, establish follow ups of schools, ensure recognition for peace education initiatives and stress the integral approach to peace education. Teacher trainers are recommended to integrate peace education into teacher training, enhance training in integrative methodologies, and train teachers in teaching about sensitive political issues. At the school level, head teachers are recommended to follow up the teaching

of peace in schools, encourage ethnic diversity, and involve the community in peace-building. Comments were then made on directions for further research in the field of peace-building education.

This study is the first to research peace education in Kenya and was undertaken precisely as a response to the lack of research in the area. Kenya was chosen as a suitable location to conduct the study due to the PEP being introduced following the PEV in 2007/08, which made the country particularly relevant in a global context. The nature of the study was exploratory to allow for a mapping of the area and search for emerging themes. It was crucial to bring in perspectives of national stakeholders such as education officials from UNICEF, UNESCO, the MoE and the KIE as well as the local school perspectives. The main part of the study therefore reported on four case-study schools, examining how peace education was perceived and applied at school level. In-depth interviews allowed the voices of school staff, pupils and parents to be heard.

When these findings were triangulated with classroom observations and a survey I arrived at the conclusion that there was a gap between intentions at the national level and school practices. Whereas the policy makers were planning on expanding the programme to other areas of Kenya, my study found that peace education was absent in three of the four schools where it was initially introduced, both in terms of teaching peace education as a subject and on a more general basis of creating a culture of peace. Only one of the four case-study schools was actively teaching peace and trying to build a culture of peace. The PEP was implemented nationally shortly after the PEV, and was as such a response to the violence; that the schools would be motivated positively towards the programme was therefore taken for granted. My analysis showed, however, that this reactive approach came with more obstacles than benefits. However, my study also found that peace education can make a difference for schools and communities when implemented.

The findings have implications for the policy and further follow ups of the programme. Follow ups are at the core of the recommendations given to policy makers, teacher trainers and head teachers. It cannot be left to the individual teacher, head teacher or school to ensure the implementation of the programme; recognition,

follow ups and further training are all key elements in ensuring a stronger commitment to peace education at school level. National and local school authorities need to take responsibility for putting in place such measures.

Training is another key recommendation based on my findings. I found in my analysis that the knowledge base of the teachers was not sufficient to be left with the peace-building responsibility. Peace education needs to be integrated in teacher education to strengthen the knowledge in the new generation of teachers. In-service training needs to be given to teachers with peace education responsibilities. This training should also include training in interactive methodology.

Education in emergencies has gained ground over the last two decades both in academia and development contexts. Conflict has been recognised as one of the largest obstacles for achieving the EFA goals, and education has been recognised as a key institution in changing cultures of violence into cultures of peace. However, when aiming at achieving peace-building education, this study has shown that more than policies and good intentions need to be in place. The teachers and pupils on the ground have to be approached in a way that creates a feeling of ownership and motivation. When this is achieved, education can build peace.

# Appendices

## **Appendix 1: The Peace Education Programme materials**

The following materials were developed for the PEP:

- Peace Education Training Manual
- Peace Education Workbook
- Peace Education Teacher Activity Book Class 1, 2, 3
- Peace Education Teacher Activity Book Class 4, 5
- Peace Education Teacher Activity Book Class 6, 7, 8
- Peace Education Programme, The Story Book

The training manual and the workbook were developed to be used for the training of teachers. The manual provides detailed information on how to carry out training sessions, focusing on a good learning environment and interactive teaching methods. The book was divided into sessions, and provided readymade lesson plans for the trainers. Following the training suggested in the book, the trainees were expected to have gained some insight into Peace and Peace Education, skills and attitudes for peaceful co-existence, fruitful methods for use in training, and psycho-social interventions.

The teacher activity books provided information on positive classroom management, positive reinforcement, and lesson preparation. Using interactive teaching methods was emphasised throughout the PEP, and comes across as carrying as much importance as the content in the programme. The fact that teaching methods are emphasised not only indicates that peace education is about attitude change that is difficult to assess, but that it incorporates democracy at lower levels. Further, it indicates that one role of peace education could be to change the teaching practices in the school as a whole.

The activity books are made up of lesson plans. The story book is designed to accompany the lesson plans. The plans follow a spiral principle, and the same topics are addressed each year from class one to eight. The over-arching themes of the PEP are (wording taken from activity book class 6-8): patriotism, similarities and differences, inclusion and exclusion, listening, better communication, handling emotions, perceptions and empathy, co-operation, assertiveness, problem solving, negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution.

## **Appendix 2: Interview guides**

### **Head teachers & Teachers**

1. What happened during and after the post-election violence?
2. What role did the school play during the violence?
3. What role has the school played in rebuilding the community after the violence?
4. What things has the school put in place after the PEV?
5. What has been put in place in your school as a result of the peace education curriculum?

### **Pupils (grade 6-7)**

1. What happened here during the post-election violence?
2. What happened in your school and community during this time?
3. What has your school done to bring people back together?
4. When you returned to school, what did they do to help you settle back in?
5. What does your school do to promote peace?

### **Parents**

1. What does peace mean to you?
2. What has the school done to bring people back together after the PEV?
3. When your children returned to school, what did the teachers do to help them settle back in?
4. What does the school do to promote peace in the community?
5. Are your children bringing messages of peace back home?
6. What should the children in your opinion learn about peace in school?
7. What more can the school do to build peace?
8. After the introduction of the PEP, have the behaviours of the children changed?

### **UNICEF, MoE, KIE and UNESCO**

1. What role did schools play during the violence? (Particularly in Nakuru)
2. What support did schools receive from UNICEF/MoE during the violence?
  - A. What role have schools played in rebuilding the community after the violence?
  - B. What support did they receive from UNICEF to date?
3. What has been put in place as a result of the peace education programme?
4. Is the peace education programme bringing about a change?



### Appendix 3: List of interviewees

	<b>Macheleo</b>	<b>St Peters</b>	<b>Logos</b>	<b>Upper Hill</b>
<b>Head teachers</b>	Head teacher 1	Head teacher 2	Head teacher 3	Head teacher 4
<b>Deputy Head teacher</b>	Deputy head 1	Deputy head 2 Deputy head 3	Deputy head 4	Deputy head 5
<b>Teachers</b>	Teacher 1 Teacher 2 Teacher 3 Teacher 4 Teacher 5 Teacher 6 Teacher 7	Teacher 8 Teacher 9 Teacher 10 Teacher 11 Teacher 12 Teacher 13 Teacher 14 Teacher 15 Teacher 16	Teacher 17 Teacher 18 Teacher 19 Teacher 20 Teacher 21 Teacher 22 Teacher 23 Teacher 24 Teacher 25	Teacher 26 Teacher 27 Teacher 28 Teacher 29 Teacher 30 Teacher 31 Teacher 32 Teacher 33
<b>Pupils</b>	Pupil 1 Pupil 2 Pupil 3 Pupil 4 Pupil 5 Pupil 6 Pupil 7 Pupil 8 Pupil 9 Pupil 10 Pupil 11 Pupil 12 Pupil 13 Pupil 14 Pupil 15 Pupil 16 Pupil 17 Pupil 18 Pupil 19 Pupil 20 Pupil 21 Pupil 22 Pupil 23 Pupil 24 Pupil 25 Pupil 26 Pupil 27 Pupil 28 Pupil 29 Pupil 30 Pupil 31 Pupil 32 Pupil 33 Pupil 34 Pupil 35	Pupil 36 Pupil 37 Pupil 38 Pupil 39 Pupil 40 Pupil 41 Pupil 42 Pupil 43 Pupil 44 Pupil 45 Pupil 46 Pupil 47 Pupil 48 Pupil 49 Pupil 50 Pupil 51 Pupil 52 Pupil 53 Pupil 54 Pupil 55 Pupil 56 Pupil 57 Pupil 58 Pupil 59 Pupil 60	Pupil 61 Pupil 62 Pupil 63 Pupil 64 Pupil 65 Pupil 66 Pupil 67 Pupil 68 Pupil 69 Pupil 70 Pupil 71 Pupil 72 Pupil 73 Pupil 74 Pupil 75 Pupil 76 Pupil 77 Pupil 78 Pupil 79 Pupil 80 Pupil 81 Pupil 82 Pupil 83 Pupil 84 Pupil 85 Pupil 86 Pupil 87 Pupil 88 Pupil 89	Pupil 90 Pupil 91 Pupil 92 Pupil 93 Pupil 94 Pupil 95 Pupil 96 Pupil 97 Pupil 98 Pupil 99 Pupil 100 Pupil 101 Pupil 102 Pupil 103 Pupil 104 Pupil 105 Pupil 106 Pupil 107 Pupil 108 Pupil 109 Pupil 110 Pupil 111 Pupil 112 Pupil 113 Pupil 114 Pupil 115 Pupil 116

<b>SMC members</b>	SMC member 1 SMC member 2 SMC member 3 SMC member 4 SMC member 5	SMC member 6 SMC member 7	SMC member 8 SMC member 9 SMC member 10	SMC member 11 SMC member 12 SMC member 13 SMC member 14 SMC member 15 SMC member 16
<b>Parents</b>	Parent 1 Parent 2 Parent 3 Parent 4 Parent 5 Parent 6		Parent 7 Parent 8 Parent 9 Parent 10 Parent 11 Parent 12	Parent 13 Parent 14 Parent 15 Parent 16 Parent 17 Parent 18
<b>Community partners</b>		Community partner 1 Community partner 2 Community partner 3		

## **Appendix 4: Codes applied in Nvivo**

- 1. From violence to peace**
  - 1.1. Attitudes towards peace building**
  - 1.2. Healing and settling back in**
  - 1.3. Rationale for peace**
  - 1.4. Reconciliation and bringing back together**
  - 1.5. Understanding peace**
  
- 2. Peace building**
  - 2.1. Peace building in community**
  - 2.2. Peace building in school**
  - 2.3. Potential peace building in school**
  - 2.4. School influence on community**
  - 2.5. UNICEF peace education**
  
- 3. Post-Election Violence**
  - 3.1. PEV and community**
  - 3.2. PEV and school**
  - 3.3. Reasons for PEV**
  
- 4. Situation today**
  - 4.1. Haag and ICC**
  - 4.2. Negative situation today community**
  - 4.3. Negative situation today school**
  - 4.4. Next election**
  - 4.5. Positive situation today community**
  - 4.6. Positive situation today school**
  
- 5. Additional comments**
  
- 6. Other**

## Appendix 5: Timeline Systematic Observation Schedule

### CLASSROOM OBSERVATION RECORD: 5 MINUTE INTERVALS

<b>Observer:</b>	<b>Date:</b>
School:	Township:
<b>Lesson start time:</b>	<b>Lesson end time:</b>
<b>Subject</b>	<b>Grade:</b>
<b>No. of boys present:</b>	<b>No. of girls:</b>
<b>No. of boys absent:</b>	<b>No. of absent:</b>
<b>Lesson topic:</b>	
<b>Language(s) of instruction:</b>	

For each FIVE MINUTE section of the lesson, please record on the checklist the main teaching and learning activities you observe. Please use the note section to record activities NOT covered in the checklist and to provide further contextual information on your observations.

Where code switching between languages takes place, please record this in the notes section.

**Time - 1 to 5 minutes****Notes**

<b>MAIN ACTIVITY(IES)</b>		
1. Teacher explanation/question & answer		
2. Teacher rote/chorus responses		
3. Teacher writing on chalk board		
4. Pupils working from chalk board		
5. Teacher reading to whole class		
6. Pupil reading to whole class		
7. Pupils working from textbooks		
8. Pupils working in pairs/groups		
9. Pupil demonstrating to class		
10. Teacher reviewing lesson topic		
11. Teacher marking work		
12. Class management		
13. Class administration		
14. Interruption to lesson		
15. Pupils off-task		

## Appendix 6: Pupil diaries

**Dear student,**

On behalf of UNICEF, and as part of my PhD I am investigating how schools in Kenya are working to build peace. On these pages you will find a questionnaire, and a diary. Please make a record of the activities mentioned in the questionnaire in the diaries. I will collect them from you on Friday. The information you give will be treated with utmost confidentiality and your identity will remain anonymous. Please try to be as honest as possible when filling out the diaries and the questionnaire. Thank you for your contribution!

1. How many times did you use conflict resolution skills this week?  
In the school \_\_\_\_ In the community \_\_\_\_
  
2. How many times did you hear messages on peace being preached this week?  
In the school \_\_\_\_ In the community \_\_\_\_
  
3. How many times did you speak in your mother tongue in school this week?  
In the school \_\_\_\_ In the community \_\_\_\_
  
4. How many times did you witness hostility between tribes this week?  
In the school \_\_\_\_ In the community \_\_\_\_
  
5. How many times did you hear negative words about a certain tribe this week?  
In the school \_\_\_\_ In the community \_\_\_\_
  
6. How many times did you feel you had no peace this week?  
In the school \_\_\_\_ In the community \_\_\_\_
  
7. How many times did the teacher talk about peace this week?  
In class \_\_\_\_ Other settings \_\_\_\_
  
8. How many times did you witness someone being caned this week?  
In the school \_\_\_\_ In the community \_\_\_\_
  
9. How many times did you see someone being bullied this week?  
In the school \_\_\_\_ In the community \_\_\_\_
  
10. How many times did you take part in peace-building activities this week?  
In the school \_\_\_\_ In the community \_\_\_\_

## Appendix 7: Questionnaire

### *Dear Teacher*

*On behalf of UNICEF and as part of my PhD studies, I am carrying out research on the role of education in peace-building.*

*The information you give will be treated with the utmost confidentiality and your identity will remain anonymous.*

*Please try to be as honest as possible.*

*Thank you for your contribution!*

#### **1. Please fill in the following information about yourself:**

- a. Gender:       Male       Female
- b. Name of school: \_\_\_\_\_
- c. How long have you been teaching in this school? \_\_\_\_\_
- d. What subjects do you teach? \_\_\_\_\_
- e. What standard do you teach? \_\_\_\_\_
- f. What additional responsibilities do you have in the school?  
\_\_\_\_\_

#### **2. Please give a short definition of what you understand by peace:**

## **Section 2: Peace education in your school**

### **3. Do you teach peace education in your school?**

- Yes       No

### **4. If yes, when are the children taught about peace in school?**

Assemblies

Extracurricular activities (please specify):

---

Classes (please specify which subjects):

---

Other (please specify):

---

### **5. Training on peace education.**

#### **a. Have you attended a training workshop on peace education?**

- Yes       No

If yes, who organised the workshop?

---

#### **b. Have you been trained in peace education by colleagues?**

- Yes       No

#### **c. If yes to (a) or (b), have you applied the training in your teaching?**

- Yes       No



**6. The Peace Education Curriculum**

a. Have you been given copies of the Peace Education Curriculum?

Yes       No

b. Have you made use of the Peace Education Curriculum in your teaching?

Yes       No

c. Did you teach about peace before the Peace Education Curriculum?

Yes       No

### **Section 3: Peace-building in the community**

*Please indicate whether you agree, disagree with, or are not sure, about the following statements:*

	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Not sure</b>	<b>Disagree</b>
7. Peace must be built on a local level			
8. A peace education curriculum is necessary for schools to teach peace effectively			
9. If violence was incited during the next general election people from my ethnic group probably would take part in the violence			
10. Maintaining peace is the responsibility of the community			
11. Teaching about peace can reduce everyday violence in the community			
12. Mixing ethnic groups in schools and communities is a threat to peace			
13. Having to teach about peace is an extra burden on the teacher			
14. Education cannot build lasting peace in Kenya before major political issues are resolved on a national level			
15. Peace can be taught effectively in schools without a peace education curriculum			
16. Peace must be built on a national level			
17. To prevent future political violence in our community peace must be taught in school			
18. Maintaining peace is the responsibility of the politicians			
19. Mixing ethnic groups in schools and communities builds peace			
20. Peace education is not a good way to build peace in Kenya			

*IF the Peace Education Curriculum is used in your school, please answer the questions in section 4.*

**Section 4: Peace Education Curriculum**

	Agree	Not sure	Disagree
21. The Peace Education Curriculum is making a valuable contribution to the building of peace in Kenya at the <i>national</i> level			
22. The Peace Education Curriculum is making a valuable contribution to the building of peace in Kenya at the <i>local</i> level			
23. The Peace Education Curriculum resources have been useful for teaching about peace			
24. Teachers need more training in teaching the Peace Education Curriculum			

**Section 5: Additional information**

*Please add any additional thoughts you may have on the role of education in peace-building:*

**Thank you for your participation!**

# Abbreviations

DEO	District Education Officer
DFA	Dakar Framework for Action
ECK	Electoral Commission Kenya
EEPCT	Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition (Programme)
EFA	Education for All
GMR	Global Monitoring Report
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IRF	Initiation, response, follow-up
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU	Kenya African National Unity
KAU	Kenya African Unity
KIE	Kenya Institute for Education
MDG	Millennium development Goals
MoE	Ministry of Education
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
PEP	Peace Education Programme
PEV	Post-election Violence
PNU	Party of National Unity Kenya
QAS	Quality Assurance and Standards
SMC	School Management Committee
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

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