

A “COMMUNITY CRIMINOLOGY”.  
PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME AND SOCIAL  
CONTROL AMONGST BRADFORD  
PAKISTANIS

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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## Acknowledgements

I dedicate this thesis to Rosanna and Mario, my 'settled' mum and dad  
(A Rosanna e Mario, i miei genitori 'stanziali')

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**Abstract**

Despite the undeniable significance of the ‘race and crime’ stream in criminology, knowledge held by minority ethnic groups on these matters is still much overlooked. It is this gap in the literature that this thesis begins to fill, based on both fieldwork and documentary research. The case-study through which the importance of minority ethnic views is investigated is a Bradford Pakistani one. The neglect by academic criminological accounts of a systematic analysis of minorities’ views, and their cultural specificities, may be imputed in part to the fear of pathologisation. On the other hand, many media accounts seem to look at alleged ‘dysfunctionalities’ of certain groups. After September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 and July 7<sup>th</sup> 2005, Muslim communities seem particularly susceptible to negative stereotyping. The research looks at ‘cultural agency’, avoiding ill-fitted generalisation and stereotypes based on an imposed essentialisation of the Bradford Pakistani community.

This thesis analyses Bradford Pakistanis’ perceptions of crime and its production, construction, sanctioning and prevention, through an ‘emic’ approach. Thus, emic units are discovered by the analyst in the specific reality of a study and the social actors, rather than created by her/him *a priori*, or by imposing universal categories created for other settings.

Through collecting perceptions around crime ethnographically, the research revealed that Bradford Pakistanis’ perceptions of crime and control are a combination of the formal and informal, or British and ‘traditional’ Pakistani, that are no longer separable in the diasporic context. The emic of cultural agency can be said to legitimise the term *community criminology*, but not in the sense that Bradford Pakistanis possess exclusive and monolithic criminological discourses, labelling, preventive strategies and rehabilitation practices. Rather, they engage with mainstream criminological and policy discourses in a way that might well be considered a kind of reflection representative of the position of their diaspora: *community* for them does not only include their traditional structures but all the intracommunal and intercommunal relations that are meaningful to them, both as resources and constraints.

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## Chapter One

### Introduction

Between spring and summer 2001 a series of violent disorders in Northern England created an atmosphere of mistrust against Muslims but in particular South Asian Muslim communities (see 4.6 and 4.7). This was only a preliminary exercise to the chaotic aftermath of the attack on the Twin Towers that September and completed the 'crisis of trust' between Europe and Muslims (Grillo 2004: 863).

Three main topics seemed to concern British public opinion as far as British Muslims were concerned: their rights and responsibilities within Multiculturalism, 'terror' and crime. Having been researching and making friends with British Pakistanis for five years at the time of the beginning of the doctorate, I was drawn to investigate the shift in their general perceptions from the "law-abiding to the screwed up" generation (Kamran, interview with author).

#### 1.1 Aims of the thesis

The thesis builds on an understanding of the recent history<sup>1</sup>. The research on which the thesis is based developed while the British government and most of the rest of the Western states were discussing global issues of the Islamic presence 'within'. I believe this had a great impact on the fieldwork not only as far as access is concerned, but also in terms of the questions posed and the answers collected. I believe a great amount of reflexivity engaged not only the present anthropologist

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<sup>1</sup> Part III of the thesis draws mostly on data collected through doctoral fieldwork between September 2004 and July 2005. Part II relies quite extensively on a previous Bradford based fieldwork that provided the author with basic knowledge of the setting (see Bolognani 2002 and 2007, forthcoming). Quotes where only the name of the interviewee appears are the ones coming from doctoral fieldwork, while quotes from undergraduate fieldwork are marked by reference to Bolognani 2002.



(as it should), but also the research participants and the practitioners involved. Discourses using sentences such as 'isolate the bad apples that are amongst you' may have triggered in many individuals a deep intimate discussion about whom 'we' and 'you' were. Constant debates in the media about what Islam is and what makes a loyal citizen have echoed in many conversations and interviews included as data in the present work. If we take for granted Wallman's formulation (1986) that ethnicity is something that stays "cool in the belly" until a particular encounter awakens it, it could be said that ethnicity (or culture, or religion, or cultural capital, as some may prefer to refer to) was wide awake by the time this research started.

The research therefore had four main aims:

To investigate the salience of a study of minority ethnic perceptions about crime as their views seem to have been mainly neglected (see Part I).

To follow a set of methodological approaches that would allow the researcher to prioritise local grassroots' views rather than deductive theoretical accounts (see Part II).

To analyse how practical concerns, cultural and religious beliefs and moral dilemmas may play a part in the construction of the idea of crime (Part III)

To explore possibilities of the presence of a distinct 'community criminology' (see Part III).

The main intent behind the present research, therefore, has been to give voice to the members of the Bradford Pakistani communities who in reality are much more diverse than the 'mainstream' British audiences may appreciate. This is

based on a specific set of approaches which leads to a particular kind of fieldwork that will be discussed in depth in chapter Six.

The underlying aim of the research as it unfolded related crime and deviance in this context to much more general topics discussed at a national level, including whether British Pakistanis are really insular, separate, angry, antagonistic and 'other'. This thesis therefore focuses on issues about criminality but is grounded in diasporic studies and problems of citizenship and Multiculturalism.

The main research question may be summarised in a concern to explore how far Bradford Pakistanis today might have rather distinctive outlooks and particular ways of living that may be regarded as generating their own community criminology, rather than one likely to be shared by the rest of British society. Behind this question there is by no means a thought that there is a unified Bradford Pakistani community that is homogenous in its way of life, and the researcher placed herself in a dual dimension such as insider/outsider. Indian anthropologist Andre Beteille addressed the 2006 ASA conference inviting his colleagues to reject dichotomies such as insider/outsider or we/other: within each group there is a wide range of points of view. It is in this belief that the present thesis is grounded: there are no homogenous communities, but there are common experiences that lead groups of people to be cohesive and find similar solutions to certain problems. In particular, in diaspora, members of such groups continuously negotiate different influences in order to find the most adequate solutions to their problems.

## **1.2 Chapters and coverage**

This thesis opens with a critical review of the race<sup>2</sup> and crime debate as it has developed in Europe and North America<sup>3</sup>. Chapter Two analyses how, since the abuse of Lombroso's biological statements during the Second World War, many criminologists have avoided discussing any relationship between race and crime that could not be justified by structural constraints. In the UK this has created a fertile and politically committed field that fights against criminalisation of certain ethnic groups and investigates discrimination by the criminal justice system. At the same time, however, the fear of constructing a pathologisation of certain groups has created the taboo of the study of any link between race and crime (Phillips and Bowling 2003). It will be argued that criminology seems to be discussing now what ethnic studies debated in the 1990s with, for example, the well-known dialogue between Benson (1996) and Werbner (1996). However, unlike in ethnic studies, the fear of pathologisation has grown so much that we lack satisfying accounts of minority ethnic groups' perspectives on crime. On the other hand, mainstream media and certain political movements manage to fill this gap in their own way, capitalising on the construction of an ethnic problem as far as crime is concerned. Scholars like Alexander, nevertheless, seem to prompt academics to abandon any kind of cultural reference as it is likely to construct a racialised folk-devil (Alexander 2000).

Chapter Three will compare Alexander's (2000) and Tatum's (2002) approaches to the study of race and crime (reviewed in Chapter Two) with material on Pakistani diaspora. This chapter will explore the need for criminological studies

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<sup>2</sup> Although the term race is controversial and some authors prefer the use of 'race', I have made a conscious decision not to use inverted commas as in the field of ethnicity there are too many controversial concepts to qualify them all.

<sup>3</sup> There is a great amount of publications about race and crime that have recently appeared in academic journals. I have only systematically considered the literature published until 1<sup>st</sup> January 2006 and made a selection on the basis of its relevance to the themes here discussed.

take into account the cultures of the study populations without essentialising them, and applying adequate methodology.

Chapter Four describes the methodology followed during the research for this thesis. The emic approach, or the standpoint that reads any pattern of behaviour through the framework of a coherent whole of the studied culture, informed the fieldwork. In addition to this very anthropological foundation, this research was based on classic ethnographic methods such as participant observation and in-depth interviews. Here it will be argued that these methods have been the only possible ones to guarantee access in a period when distrust in research and fear of interference from secret services started characterising the field.

Chapter Five sets the historical context of the Bradford Pakistani community. It will highlight how the initial settlement in the 1960s has significantly engaged with the territory so that it has transformed Bradford's skyline as much as local Multicultural politics. A critical review of different forms of peaceful and violent protest, resistance and resilience to discrimination and exploitation will trace the genealogy of many discourses that will emerge in the data chapters in Part III of the thesis.

Chapter Six will look at the definition of community of Bradford Pakistanis. Although in the conclusions of this thesis the possibility of 'community criminology' will be discussed, it is important to clarify that this does not mean that the author believes in a homogenous group of people. On the other hand, as pointed out in 6.4, there are elements of 'ethnic capital' (or 'ethnic resources and networks', see 6.2.1) that are used in different ways as resources and symbols by the descendants of the 1960s migration. By ethnic resources and networks we

mean the traditional inherited cultural framework, the organisation of social networks, the self-ascription process, the negotiation within the locality and dynamics of identity processes that are shared by a group of people. Whether this is a resource or an obstacle for Bradford Pakistanis will also be discussed in the chapter.

Chapter Seven is the first of the data chapters. Here the main preoccupations amongst Bradford Pakistanis as far as crime is concerned will be illustrated. Drugs will emerge as the 'mother of all evils' as they are perceived as the major cause of the increasingly fragile balance of families. Contrary to most of the studies produced in the Bradford context (see for example Singh 2002:168; Jan-Khan 2003:33), structural variables in terms of aetiology of crime, appear in chapter Eight as only secondary.

Chapter Eight represents emic views, consistently with the whole approach of the thesis. A major question for the data analysis that shows the potential disagreement between etic and emic lenses is: why objective general disadvantage found so little room and such discussion in the respondents' narratives? In comparison with political material produced especially in 1980s, the data collected during this research seemed to show a loss in the use of the language of structural resistance and made more room for cultural discourses.

Chapter Nine will focus on the cultural and social attributions of blame that seem to generate a variety of discourses far better articulated by informants than the structural ones. It is in chapter Nine that the different sources of moral discourses, identities and the process of negotiation between different narratives will start emerging. This analysis could not be completed without noting the moral

panic surrounding the community and influencing processes of reflection and action.

Chapter Ten then will focus on young men and the moral panic that they seem to generate not only amongst 'mainstream' British society, but also within their community. At the same time, typologies about their behaviour that have been produced by academic writers will be compared with the emic views collected during the research.

Chapter Eleven will reflect the evaluation of all those practices that may be called informal sanctions. Here popular strategies of both prevention and rehabilitation will be discussed in the light of the evaluation given by research participants. It will emerge that they are not considered effective unless they are combined with more formal provisions.

In Chapter Twelve, views about many local institutions, from mosques to the police force, will be analysed.

The conclusion will discuss how the emic of cultural agency can be said to legitimise the term 'community criminology', but not in the sense that Bradford Pakistanis possess exclusive criminological discourses, labelling, preventive strategies and rehabilitation practices. Rather, they engage with mainstream criminological and policy discourses in a way that might well be considered a kind of reflection representative of the position of their diaspora: the community for them does not only include their traditional structures but all the intra-communal and inter-communal relations that are meaningful to them, both as resources and constraints.

**Part I**

**Ethnicity, crime and the Pakistani diaspora**

## Chapter Two

### The race, ethnicity and crime debate

The link between race and crime can be said to have been a recurrent feature of criminological studies. Social scientists in different times have wondered whether there is a special connection between one's belonging to a group and their involvement in deviant behaviour (Russell 1992:669; Gabbidon and Taylor Greene 2005:50).

By referring to the race and crime debate here we want to delineate an area in which victims and perpetrators' perceived group background is considered to be significant in the study of the dynamics of crime and its prosecution.

The first two parts of this chapter will discuss the early days of the study of race and crime in the light of both biological and cultural studies.

The third section will look at how in the 1980s many British criminologists started looking at the debate mainly from the point of view of fair treatment of minorities in the criminal justice system. It will be argued that by focusing policy on urgent needs -made more cogent by events such as the Brixton riots- dealing with cultural specificities of ethnic minorities slowly became a taboo (cf. also Russell 1992 and Phillips and Bowling 2002). Priority was given instead to studies that focussed on discrimination both in policing and sentencing. Here it will be argued that the fear of essentialising minority ethnic groups in relation to crime by including cultural analysis made room for mostly structural accounts in which the agents' point of view was neglected (Phillips and Bowling 2003). By reviewing a selection of works that represent different perspectives on the subject (Alexander 2000, Tatum 2000 and Pryce 1979/1986) and debates about ethnicity studies in general (Benson 1996 and Werbner 1996) it will be theorised why filling this gap



by incorporating (cultural) knowledge by minority ethnic groups is an important step both for criminological and diaspora studies.

## **2.1. The origins of interest in race and crime**

One of the first scholars who made a clear and systematic analysis of the link between race and crime was the Italian anthropologist of crime Lombroso (Gabbidon and Taylor Greene 2005:50; Gibson 2002: 99; Phillips and Bowling 2002:580).

Lombroso's positivistic theory is interesting as a key study as it presented certain human physical features as indicators of a predisposition to crime. According to racial paradigms, therefore, certain physical features would automatically be the signs of a predisposition to deviance (Gabbidon and Taylor Greene 2005:50). These biological accounts, however, were also supported by 'ethnic' elements (ibid.) such as the belief that African or Oriental influences had impacted on brigands' criminal behaviour in Southern Italy. Although Lombroso was mainly interested in the study of race, as his essay 'White man and coloured man' (1871, cit. in Gibson 2002) shows, in his writings there was also room for speculations on social environment and its impact on the criminal mind (Gibson 2002:98). These nuances were overlooked when Lombroso's work was exported to the Anglo-Saxon world (ibid: 249; Gabbidon and Taylor Greene 2005: 58). Lombroso's theories were used to support social Darwinism (Gibson 2002: 98) and therefore after the Second World War were widely dismissed as racist and ideologically dangerous. Some assumptions about eugenics were still visible in some studies of deviance, but overt reference to Lombroso was avoided (Wootton 1959:45). In 1985, however, in America, Wilson and Herrnstein published a book

that appeared to revive some of Lombroso's attitudes towards the anthropological study of criminals. *Crime as Human Nature* argues that some biological differences must be taken into account when studying crime in different ethnic groups (Gabbidon and Taylor Greene 2005:59). For example, it is argued that a general higher muscularity amongst black men could be one of the factors that lead to a higher number of offences if compared to white men's. Although Wilson and Herrnstein openly refer to Lombroso (1985: 75) and look at the aetiology of crime also in terms of genetics (ibid: 90) and factors such as IQ, it would be unfair to summarise their work only in these terms. In *Crime as Human Nature* factors such as inadequate socialisation (ibid: 470), subcultural deviance (ibid.), ecology (ibid: 289), attachment (ibid.:218) and deprivation (ibid.:467) appear as some of the causes of crime. It is interesting, however, to see that some of Lombroso's positivistic approaches to the study of crime survive today. Overall, although some of the biological theories may survive (see for example theories about women committing crime at certain stages of their menstrual cycle, d'Orban 1991), nowadays the positivistic approach seems to be mostly accompanied by other sociological or psychological explanations, especially, as in the case of Winston and Herrnstein, when biology is connected to race. Biological or positivistic criminology was widely dismissed after the Second World War because of its connection with eugenics (ibid: 250). The study of the link between groups as cultural units (rather than biological) and their relation to crime, may at first sight appear less contentious. However, this can result problematic, as shown by the critique of the anthropologist Malinowski.

## 2.2. Crime and Culture

One of Malinowski's studies published in 1926 dealt with the question of crime and its link to different groups from a specific point of view: the socio-cultural. In *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*, Malinowski described norms and their violation in the Trobriand Islands. In this work, adherence to norms and labelling processes were seen as strictly connected to what he called the 'civic law' of the islands (ibid: 38). The possibility of committing a crime was not seen either as the product of biological predetermination or structural compulsion. Rather, the capability of an individual to deviate from the positive norms, was seen in terms of a cultural paradigm. This bore a double significance: first of all, the rational choice behind an action would be informed by the surrounding cultural context; secondly, deviance might be only labelled as such according to a specific customary law<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>The idea of crime as social construction seems to have become paramount in Criminology (Wilson and Herrnstein 1985:21-22; Muncie 1996: 9-10; Eadie and Morley 1999: 438). Furthermore, the connection between crime (especially as a violation of moral codes) and cultures is an issue common to many criminologists' writings (Muncie 1996: 13), whether discussed from a cultural, ideological, historical or political point of view. Malinowsky affirmed as early as 1926 that as customs are the primary instrument of social control, even occasional detachment from customs produces a tendency to criminality. In this view, perceived deviance gains its existence through a detachment from a community's standards, a concept similar to anomie.

In 1963, Becker outlined Labelling Theory that made the concept of crime relative. According to Becker, an act is criminal when it is labelled as such by society (Braithwaite 1989: 2). Becker's theory has more to do with hegemonic discourses rather than with culture: powerful groups invent the rules whose infraction means deviance. Deviance and crime are not products of bad individuals but are what people label as such. So, the rules created by society are not universally shared and change in time and contexts (Becker 1963). A criticism which has been put against Labelling Theory is that it neglects the role of socialisation of the individual (Braithwaite 1989:3). The level of engagement of an individual within his/her society is not taken into much consideration. If people were born in a specific society, they are likely to have 'absorbed' its behavioural prescriptions to some extent: 'we are moral beings to the extent that we are social beings' (Durkheim 1961, cit. in Hirschi 1971: 18). The role of socialisation seems to be neglected, therefore, in Becker's view. According to Braithwaite (1989: 9) this is a very important point because by linking the individual and his/her choices we will find out that they are constrained. An individual will commit a crime, therefore, not because he/she will have a different idea about crime from the one common in the context, but solely because this idea has been challenged by other factors that occurred to mediate the original concept of deviance inherited by his/her society. Braithwaite's theory of Reintegrative Shame has therefore its pillar in the concept that individuals committing crimes must be studied in a socialised context, and when they break the law they are aware of that and are actually breaking one of the rules of 'their' society. On the other hand, if the society simply casts out the criminal and prevents their reintegration through stigmatisation, for instance, it itself pushes them into creating their own subculture with their own set of constrained choices (Hirschi 1971: 3; Braithwaite 1989: 26; Wardak 2000: 162).

According to Malinowski, therefore, crime and deviance could only be studied by setting their definition and the consequential norms in a cultural context. The study of the Trobriands, however, was the study of a bounded community that appeared to Malinowski as extremely homogenous. In his view, "*the Melanesian*" (Malinowski 1926:64, my emphasis) followed the rules of nature as the laws to be respected. The innovation in Malinowski's study seems to lie in the critique of "modern anthropology" and its belief that "sheer inertia" constrained "the savage" to exert civic law (ibid.: 63), while ignoring social arrangements and psychological motives. Such approach was considered a victim of 'the mere glamour of tradition' (ibid.: 65) alluring to some anthropologists. However, Malinowski was not advocating more attention to individual agency; although personal choices were considered, they were seen as subjected to one supreme rule: reciprocity (ibid.). Webs of obligations and mutual services appear in this text as the one and all encompassing rule amongst Trobriandeses. Their behaviour and their law infringement were therefore read through the parameters of the rule of reciprocity and the Trobriandeses were considered to relate to crime and punishment in a way that was essential for a part of their cultural identity.

This poses a dilemma: if we deny Lombroso's biological connection between certain (racial) groups and crime, the question whether some cultures are likely to be more violent than others will still be unanswered. At the same time, however, if we agree with Malinowski and think that the particular structure of a group's culture regulates social control, one may still think that some groups, because of their culture, are more prone to break or construct some rules than others.

Melossi (2000:296) argues that both approaches may be reduced to Lombroso's positivism. The only difference would be that the latter is based on group culture, rather than somatic traits. Melossi's argument reproduces in criminology the discussion that has taken place in the social sciences about 'cultural racism'. Some have in fact argued that in the last thirty years racist ideologies have abandoned the emphasis on 'immutable biological differences' and transferred their attention from 'pigmentation to culture' (Back 1996:9). This statement may shed some light on the taboo that some have observed in criminological studies over considering race as a variable (Russell 1992:669; Phillips and Bowling 2003:271): by considering the specific link (albeit cultural and not biological) between a group and crime there may be the danger of constructing some groups as prone to deviance. In 1992 Russell argued that there was as much need of a 'black criminology' as there had been of a feminist one. Although Russell acknowledged the emancipatory and positive developments of criminology towards minority ethnic groups (for example in the study of discrimination), on the other hand she argued that the picture was always incomplete. For example, racial identity<sup>2</sup> was still mistaken with ethnic and there was a lack of social-ecological sensitivity that took into account ethnic diversity (ibid.: 671)

Even the inclusion of a plethora of variables in criminological studies on minority ethnic groups, argued Russell, such as age, gender, socio-economic status and employment status did not consider ethnic background adequately (ibid: 673). In 2003, Phillips and Bowling were still manifesting the same concerns, proving with their writing that criminological theory was much ahead of its empirical counterpart, still uncomfortable with tackling ethnicity. Recently Garland et al.

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<sup>2</sup> By using 'racial' we refer to an identity based on "supposed physical or biological groupings linked to skin and bodily features" (Harrison 2005:2).

(2006) have argued that not investigating the ethnic variables may be a result of taking the 'white condition as normal' (ibid.: 423). This is consistent with another theoretical article in criminology that denounced orientalist and occidentalist biases amongst criminologists (Cain: 2000).

### **2.3. Race and crime in Britain: discrimination, policing and the criminal justice system**

In Britain, by avoiding drawing any link between race, ethnicity and crime (Phillips and Bowling 2003:270), criminologists have often focused on discrimination towards minority ethnic groups in policing and in the criminal justice system.

Phillips and Bowling (2002:583) describe such development by analysing the historical context of the 1960s. Enoch Powell and other MPs contributed towards increasing the moral panic that White British media were developing against 'coloured immigrants'. When Margaret Thatcher was elected in 1979 her government sympathised with these fears and at the same time started her tough campaign against crime. In this tense climate, the Bristol (1980) and Brixton (1981) disorders occurred. These disorders were classed as somehow 'not English', aberrations to the nation (Rowe 1998:1; McGhee 2005:15). McGhee (2005: 22) argues that, while public opinion was reinforcing the widespread idea of the connection between African/Caribbean and crime, the Scarman enquiry and its report slightly changed these parameters: African/Carribbeans were not seen as inherently destabilising, but were seen as such in the light of the history of their settlement. According to McGhce, Scarman registered the experience of oppressive policing that African/Caribbeans had borne so far and highlighted the level of social and economic exclusion of the areas where many minority ethnic groups lived.

However, in spite of the general praise of the effort of the report in mentioning over-policing and under-protection by the police towards African/Caribbeans (see for example Phillips and Bowling 2002), McGhee argues that Scarman's report was still constructing race rather than racism as a social problem (2005:16).

At present, British data (Kalra 2003:142) show that some minority ethnic groups are over represented in prison. Whether this is caused by over-policing of certain groups or over-offending due to structural constraints is the centre of the debate (Phillips and Bowling 2002: 579). According to some commentators (Phillips and Bowling 2003:270; Chakraborti et al. 2004), what seems to be missing in most literature, however, is the knowledge *by* minorities.

In the growing interest in the race and crime debate in the 1980s, there is at least a study showing how race can be very meaningful in the understanding of crime. Secret and Johnson's provocative American study in 1989 hypothesised how race and not other variables such as socio-economic background, influenced attitudes towards crime control. Their conclusion was that race did influence those attitudes because different groups had developed different attitudes towards the police depending on how they had been treated in the past. Race was therefore an important element of studies in criminality as the perceived background of individuals deeply affected their chances, rights, interactions and consequential patterns of behaviour and construction of the criminal justice system. At the same time, Secret and Johnson argued that whenever the police had a good general awareness about a certain group, relations between them and such a group had more chances of being positive.

In the following pages we will present three different approaches to the study of race and crime, and towards the conclusion we will illustrate their connection to wider debates about the study of ethnicities.

#### **2.4. Taking culture out of the picture: Alexander's study**

*The Asian Gang* (Alexander 2000) is an ethnographic study of young Bengali men in South London. This study reflects on the complexities and dangers of what Alexander fears are all-encompassing notions of culture and ethnicity in relation to urban tension, violence and deviance. Here, any study that tries to link race and crime is seen as a pathologizing one. For this reason, rather than studying the 'gang', Alexander argues that such definition is a media construction coming as much from the Daily Mail as from the Guardian (Alexander 2000:5). The author's aim is to bring individual stories into the academic gaze and de-construct what she calls "the 'othering' process" (ibid.) in a way that has been repeated in other studies on Muslim men (Archer 2001; 2003). According to Alexander, in media accounts about episodes of violence affecting young Bengali men both as victims and as perpetrators, race is automatically seen as negative: if a group of friends have a fight and they all belong to the same 'race', they become a gang:

The spectre of "race" with its implications of absolute and hostile difference, conflict and "nihilistic ...violence" is left to speak for itself- at once cause, effect and justification (Alexander 2000:4)

Here, 'race' seems to blur with 'ethnicity' as it refers to cultural dynamics as well as bodily or biological features. Individual reasons and choices fade into the background because ethnic origin racializes any behaviour (ibid: 102): if more than two men involved in violence are of the same origin they are automatically described as a gang. This is one of the crucial points of Alexander's critique of



representations of young Asian men: racialization can hide other important variables such as masculinity, peer group (friendship) or individual histories. In retrospect, Alexander defines the inclusion of these multiple factors as the key characteristics for a new generation of ethnographers with “fragmented lenses” (Alexander 2006: 402). The concern to include those variables is shared also by those who claim there is a need to open up the race and crime debate. For example, Phillips and Bowling agree that focusing on ethnicity may obscure other important factors such as gender, class, sexuality and religion (Phillips and Bowling 2003:272)<sup>3</sup>.

Alexander’s concerns about the racialisation of the gang narratives, popular in the media (Alexander 2000:5), appear to be reflected in the fieldwork findings on which this thesis is based. However, in the attempt of filling the gap of ethnicity and criminality, it can be argued that the over-estimation of such concern may contribute to the formulation of the taboo mentioned by Phillips and Bowling (2002:271). If compared to the studies reviewed here and in chapter Three, Alexander’s is the one that most strongly points at the dangers of explaining patterns of deviance by incorporating race and culture in the analysis. What is called the “narrative” of Alexander’s study (instead of a theoretical framework, Alexander 2000: xv), is based on observing processes of inclusion and exclusion of family and peer groups, and dynamics of masculinity and age. According to

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<sup>3</sup> The same concern will emerge in some of the data collected by the present researcher:

Me: Is it true that there is a Pakistani gang?

Jamil: No. I would say *gang*, but there isn't a *Pakistani* gang, no...They are all races...but around here there are all Pakistanis...when you see a group of lads together they are all Pakistanis...so you really can't call them a gang. They grew up together and they stick around together, so it isn't really a gang...it is friends, you know...like a bunch. And anybody who drives around they think they are a gang. But it is not a gang.

Alexander, these are the dimensions that are forgotten by the 'old ethnicity approach' (ibid: 240, referring for example to Shaw's 1988 seminal study of Pakistanis in Oxford). On the other hand, masculinity, adolescence and peer groups are the dimensions that are more likely to work towards the construction of Asian youth as folk devil (ibid.). While criminological studies that focus on race are blamed for the racialisation of the topic, the sociologists who have tried to include masculinity and age as relevant variables end up, according to Alexander, by constructing even more pathological images (ibid: 20). Combining race and culture with masculinity and age (thus young Bengali men = Asian gang) is seen by Alexander as the peak of the racialisation process leading to widespread moral panic (ibid.). Goodey's (1999) and Macey's (1999, see chapter Three) innovation into bringing youth in the picture of ethnic studies is blamed for maintaining a "cultural twist" (Alexander 2000: 18). Masculinity and age would be subjected to essentialist and hegemonic views on Asian young men: 'Asian youth is in trouble and out of control' (ibid.).

Alexander's only possible solution seems to be to take culture out of the picture altogether. The actions of young Bengali men in South London thus should be seen in a cultural vacuum. It seems that in the de-construction of the Asian gang, family, peer groups, masculinity and age are seen as the only significant layers of the complex identity of individuals. This is an attempt to create a space in which commonality between individuals and not their difference from the majority is important.

Much of Alexander's critique is centred on the increasing attention given by the media to Muslim communities. However, not only the media are brought into the accusation, but the whole of the 'race relations industry', with anthropologists

as its allies. Alexander argues that only after the Rushdie affair and the first Gulf war did Asians become a heterogeneous fragmented front and 'problem youth' emerged (Alexander 2000: 6; see also Modood 1992 and Samad 1996). These two main events are seen as the milestones of the critique of the Asian 'Culture-rich/culture-bound' nature that contributed to 'othering' individuals of such background (Alexander 2000.:13). After the 1995 riots in Bradford, furthermore, Asian Muslims' culture has been seen as *backward* in opposition to *modern* British culture (Ibid: 10). If the assumption is that a culture is backward, studies thus generated may result in being patronising and pathologising. The solution would therefore be:

to argue for a more nuanced, local and historically situated account of identity formation, which encapsulates often contradictory processes of continuity and change, constraint and agency, solidarity and diffusion, representation and re-imagination (Alexander 2000.:23)

Whether the race relations industry and 'accomplice' anthropologists have really neglected change and agency will be discussed later in 2.7. Here, instead, it is important to highlight that according to Alexander contextualisation in time and space must be considered. In 4.3, in fact, it will be explained that the Bradford context and the post-9/11 era have impacted on this doctoral study in terms of motivation, methods and findings. According to Alexander, however, basing an analysis on a 'community', whatever meaning we might attribute to such an abused word, means essentialising a group (ibid: 13). Here we may disagree with Alexander as in 6.4 it will be argued that the local context of Bradford and its being so compact is important insofar as the notion of community bears a significance that goes beyond race but includes locality and intracommunal relations. In Bradford the idea of community is only relatively an abstract construction; apart from being a

term that is used by Bradford Pakistanis themselves, the pockets of high concentration of the same ethnic group with their semi-autonomous associations, structures and economic networks can justify the use of 'community' without worrying too much about the accusation of 'imagining a community'.

Alexander's arguments are therefore two. The main one is that including race and ethnicity in the study of deviance is necessarily a pathologising process. The second one is that grounding research in a 'community' is an arbitrary process that refers to outsiders' construction of such an entity. Alexander therefore appears as a strong supporter of maintaining the taboo of race/ethnicity and crime because such link would not enlighten any study but only contribute to the pathologisation of a group.

However, some of the statements in the second half of *The Asian Gang* seem to contradict the alleged solution of leaving race/ethnicity out of the study of deviance. For example, it is argued that the deep respect for one's family and community (sic) is one of the main tenets for young Bengali men in South London (Alexander 2000: 129). Getting to know each other through one's family status as portrayed by one's parents in relation to the background in Bangladesh is also considered important (ibid.). Ethnicity is also described as one of the axes of alliance for the making of peer group as much as age, gender, territory, history, geography and personality (ibid.: 166). Ultimately, culture seems to make its way into *The Asian Gang*. Even more clearly:

There is a need to reassert the constitutive nature of structure in the formation of cultural identities, the play of power and history, but also to recognize the only partial circumscription of marginal identities, the potential for disruption and the imagination of 'Other' sensibilities and alliances(...).Recognising the complex and shifting nature of identity also demands the recognition of solidarity and belonging; not the stasis of stagnant absolutes but the necessary emotional touchstone of family, friends and community (Alexander 2000:248).

Alexander seems to recognize that “cultural identities”, “belonging” and “community” are “necessary emotional touchstones”. Her critique is against “the stasis of stagnant absolutes” that seems to be conveyed by whoever deals with collective forms of identity. Her protest against the rise of a media and public pathologisation of young Asian men risks removing cultural analysis altogether rather than reforming it in non-essentialist terms. Alexander, however, analyses the relation between race and crime as it is written by media and sociologists: in a problem-orientated way. She is not tempted to ask whether ethnicity may be a potential resource for the fight against crime. This question does not seem to be raised because of the taboo mentioned by Phillips and Bowling (2003) about including ethnicity amongst the variables to consider in the study of crime.

However, in addition to the effort of including individuals with their personal stories in the academic gaze, there is another merit of Alexander’s work: her choice of de-pathologising masculinity and age and considering them as part of the set of variables that may influence one’s behaviour (see 3.5). This is not what happens with Tatum’s grand theory that may be considered a step back in the discussion of ethnicity and crime.

## **2.5. Colonial and Postcolonial criminology: Tatum’s theoretical framework**

In Tatum’s *Crime, Violence and Minority Youth* (2000) the main focus is to acknowledge the apparent failure of mainstream structural perspectives in explaining the high crime rate amongst minority ethnic youth in America (Tatum 2000:xi). By mainstream structural perspectives, Tatum means both ‘strain theories’

emerging from Durkheim traditions (anomie, opportunity theories and theory of delinquent subcultures, *ibid*: 3) and the 'colonial model' (*ibid*.).

By colonial model Tatum indicates a framework that privileges class on race and that can be traced back to Fanon (Tatum 2000: 6). In colonial theories, the alienation from one's cultural capital (whatever it is) and from political praxis are considered paramount to explain social mechanisms of exclusion and oppression. In the following section we will see how Pryce's idea of loss of cultural capital and sectarianism in Jamaican churches in Bristol might be seen as part of such a colonial model.

In the colonial model, some youth resist the dominant culture of 'internal colonies' (colonies within the boundaries of the nation) (Tatum 2000: 7). Their resistance is the reaction to oppression, and the colonial model recognises that race and racism play an important role in the history of internal colonies by examining alienation and frustration (*ibid*:13). In the economy of the present chapter, albeit Tatum does not refer to it in these terms, an analysis that starts from the relation of a subject to the oppressors rather than from the subject as an autonomous being becomes very important for the discussion of the role of the 'race relations industry' in studying minority ethnic groups (see below). Modood has expressed a relevant concern very assertively:

Most ordinary people wish to be defined in terms of a historically received identity...they wish to be known for what they are, not for what others find problematic about them (Modood 1988:398)

Muslims are wiser here than anti-racists: in locating oneself in a hostile society one must begin with one's mode of being [ethnicity] not one's mode of oppression [race] for one's strength flows from one's mode of being' (Modood 1990a:92)

According to Tatum, the major faults of colonial theory are not grounded in the initial standpoint, as may be Modood's view, but in three other arguments:

- It does not consider multiple alienations;
- It does not analyse differential responses to oppression;
- It does not account for class variables in impact of racism (Tatum 2000: 16)

The criminological neocolonial model coined by Tatum, therefore, aims at including such reflections. For example, alienation is investigated through a multiple model based on 'self-alienation', 'alienation from the racial or social group', 'alienation from the general other' and cultural alienation (ibid: 56). It is important to notice how alienation itself and not the (non) legacy of a certain culture or group is the most significant aspect of this model that is applicable to any minority ethnic group.

One of the main points of Tatum's neocolonial theory is that deviance studies should focus on differential responses to oppression, especially through social support systems (ibid.: 69). Considering class variables in the impact of racism on constrained choice related to committing crime, on the other hand, implies that one's class aspirations might dictate the perception of discrimination and oppression (ibid.: 87).

According to Tatum and the model tested through her quantitative survey, race, social class and their interaction with structural and perceived oppression are the main variables that should help in successfully investigating the relation between crime and minority ethnic groups (Tatum 2000: 27). These, however, cannot be enough if they are not paired with an analysis of the availability of specific ethnic social support systems (ibid.). Here we find a contradiction similar to Alexander's: by moving (a specific) culture out of the academic gaze, it is

possible to analyse 'the family forms that have developed and their impact on perceptual, affective, and behavioural adaptations of its members' (ibid: 23). The unchallenged consequential assumption, then, seems to be that families and social support systems exist in a cultural vacuum and they owe more to economic and racial constraints rather than to a resourceful deployment of heritages. However, Tatum herself argues that they are not: black families have in fact 'generally been regarded as deviant or pathological because they differ from the family structure of Whites' (ibid.).

Again, even in Tatum's postcolonial theory, culture cannot be avoided in spite of the struggle of her grand theory. The difference with Alexander's, however, is that in this example of neo-colonial theory a proper analysis of multiple variables including age and gender seems to be neglected. A combination of neo-colonial theory with multiple variables can however be found in a British 1979 monograph by Pryce.

## **2.6. 'Blacks don't have culture': Pryce's participant observation in Bristol**

Pryce's 1979 study of West Indian lifestyles in Bristol could be considered a British example of Tatum's neocolonial model, although the data are collected through qualitative methods such as participant observation, and deviance is only one of the aspects investigated.

The ground of the monograph *Endless Pressure* is the belief that history has had a very important role in shaping West Indians' lifestyles. Pryce originates six typologies of men's lifestyles that have probably inspired much later work on male youth identities (see 3.5, 10.1 and 10.3). According to these typologies, West Indians in Bristol can be mainly grouped under two categories: "stable law-abiding"



and “expressive-disreputable” (those who work and those who hustle, Pryce 1979/1986: xii). Other sub-categories are hustlers, teenyboppers, proletarian respectables, saints, mainliners and in-betweeners (ibid.). Much criticism of *Endless Pressure* came, after its publication, from black radicals. They argued that Pryce’s two main typologies were practically saying that some blacks were merely criminals instead of “closet politicians” (ibid. : 16).

The study mainly analyzes the causes for estrangement from legal work. All social tensions in Pryce (even the ones between West Indian men and women) are analysed principally in terms of exploitation and class. However, the analysis is not based on an all-encompassing vision of class overlapping race; rather, as argued by Tatum in terms of a neocolonial approach, a range of resistance strategies to oppression, based on different class backgrounds, are revealed.

In the discussion of the taboo of race/ethnicity and crime it is very interesting to see how Pryce’s neocolonial approach deals with culture. It may be worth pointing out here that Pryce’s work is based on participant observation, but in spite of the popularity of this method in anthropology, he is a sociologist. In 2.7 it will be shown in fact that the responsibility for a certain discourse around culture is placed by Benson on anthropology, but here we have an example of how a sociologist may be accused of a similar fault. In a section titled ‘Culture, Poverty and the West Indian family’, Pryce argues that some of the problems of the sub-category labelled as ‘teeny boppers’ have to do with the traditional family system back home:

The aetiology of the teenybopper problem extends back to the peculiarities of family life in the West Indies, which in turn owe their origin to practices evolved under conditions of slavery and colonialism and to macro-structural patterns of underdevelopment as reflected in the sub-standard educational facilities of the masses (Pryce 1979/1986: 108)

According to Pryce, therefore, the 'peculiarities of family life' are such because of the structural and historical constraints that have affected life in the West Indies. An anti-essentialist cultural approach might agree with this statement (cf. Werbner 1996), but in *Endless Pressure* culture is taken out of the picture again, at least as far as West Indians are concerned:

In England, some black youths (like teenyboppers) do not succeed in the struggle for survival because of *the failure of West Indians in general to develop a distinctive culture of their own* that is strong enough to counteract the disorienting effects of poverty and the frustrations of social rejection in a white-dominated society like Britain. This is a predicament which contrasts sharply with the situation of *Indian and Pakistani youths who tend to have a very strong sense of identity based on distinctive language, a distinctive religion in a highly normative family system*. The net effect on the West Indian young of the absence of a rooted sense of identity, capable of giving guidance and direction in times of crisis, is psychic and cultural confusion and lack of confidence in coping with the stress of racial rejection. (Pryce 1979/1986: 112, my emphasis)

It is almost as if Pryce gives cause to Benson's famous provocative statement:

'Asians have culture, West Indians have problems' (Benson 1996: 47). A very clear example of this approach is to be found when the 'subalternity' of women is discussed by drawing on the story of Bang-Belly and his girlfriend Pamela. Pamela is not jealous of the white prostitutes that Bang-Belly pimps, but would be if they were 'coloured' (sic) (Pryce 1979/1986: 80). Here this tension is seen in terms of exploitation and class, not much in terms of aspirations, ideals and cultural capital. That would be impossible as the author argues that Bristol West Indians lack of those things (ibid.:112). They appear not to have a culture strong enough to be used as a resource, a very essentialist statement:

[this] clearly reveals the weaknesses of West Indian family life and demonstrates vividly how, in the resultant collapse, it is the young who invariably suffer. (...) West Indians still lack a self-contained folk culture and a tight communal form of group life (Pryce 1979/1986.:119).

It is important to note how in all the three studies reviewed, family plays an important role, as it will do in the present research (see 9.1, 9.2, and 11.1). However, it is their problems and not their culture that make generalisations possible: 'the problems of West Indians in Britain are uniform enough to permit generalisation' (ibid. :271).

The premises seem therefore to be consistent with a colonial model based on alienation from cultural capital and from political praxis. At the same time the acknowledgement of different class-based strategies to fight oppression and build alternative support systems (such as the ones of 'mainliners', ibid.: 223) are enough to inscribe Pryce's work in the neo-colonial framework as defined by Tatum (2.5).

The most controversial part of this work, however, appears to be the idea that an entire population has been deprived of a specific culture due to colonial oppression. A reverse essentialism of this kind (a celebration of culture-rich/culture-bound cultures in a postcolonial context) is the core of the contention discussed below.

### **2.7. De-essentialising and de-pathologizing: Benson vs. Werbner**

Above we have seen how both Tatum and Alexander are critical of an approach explicitly drawing on cultures to develop an understanding of crime in certain groups. Alexander very openly criticises the 'race relation industry' and especially anthropologists for "disguising [their] voice as the legitimate voice of the other" (Alexander 2000: 225). In the late 1990s similar accusations grew so much as to accuse academics (and in particular anthropologists) of having started to support a second colonial indirect rule system within the national borders:

These cultural forms [i.e. music] continue to be imbued with an exoticised, othered status in the West and our primary goal has been to break out of the Orientalist tradition of making knowable these cultural productions for an ever-eager academic audience and other agencies of control(...) We recognize interest in a sociology of South Asian culture in Britain, and especially youth cultures, as having close ideological connections with the disciplines of command that police inner-urban neighbourhoods, close down Black clubs, collude in immigration control and so on (Sharma et al: 1996:2).

And again:

It must be acknowledged that the anthropological silence on questions of racism, power and domination had some uncomfortable resemblance to that earlier silence on questions of racism, power and domination in the colonial encounter. (...) Each people or minority is analysed in terms of a set of cultural practices and institutional arrangements proper to itself, or compared and contrasted in some particular respect with another people or minority (Benson 1996:50)

This debate was discussed thoroughly in the edited collection *Culture, Identity and Politics* (Terence et al. 1996). Here, anthropologist Werbner refused to accept that anthropology in Britain was an accomplice of orientalism and colonialism (Werbner 1996: 74). The debate between Benson and Werbner that appeared in the same edited collection seemed to be pivoted on essentialism and anti-essentialism. Benson argued that anthropologists were inclined to work with South Asian communities because while doing fieldwork on the door-step they were still able to map "predictable patterns" that "fit well with questions of caste, religion, marriage systems and so on" so typical of the classics of the discipline (Benson 1996:54). On the other hand, African/Caribbeans were considered lacking in these cultural practices and were seen as fragmented and 'disordered' (ibid.) Fluidity, change, re-invention were, according to Benson, too disturbing for anthropologists<sup>4</sup>. Benson described African/Caribbeans' culture as "a culture that makes itself up, and in

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<sup>4</sup> It may be interesting to note how a study that theorise West Indians' lives as 'disordered' and in many ways pathological is actually insider sociologist's study of a Bristol community, see Pryce 1979/1986 above.

some important respects knows that it makes itself up” (Benson 1996:54). The implication of this statement seems to be that other cultures may not “make themselves up” and anthropologists choose to study only those that tend to be more static. In her reply to Benson, Werbner used her own seminal work *The Migration process* (1990) to demonstrate how anthropological approaches were not essentialist, regarded structural constraints as well as cultural ones, and took into serious consideration the study population’s vantage points:

In *The migration process*, it is not assumed from the beginning that there is a clearly bounded and homogenous community. Rather, it is discovered that people who come from different backgrounds choose to make certain friends rather than others. They (the subjects) make up a level of homogeneity, this level is not imposed by the anthropologist. (...)It is a process (not a pre-given static condition). (...) It is not only supportive but powerfully coercive, disturbing, conflictual. (Werbner 1996:68, 69)

Again, adding a strong argument about the use of ‘community’ as a label to refer to a heterogeneous whole:

Community had become, in effect, a kind of argument through practice: an argument of images between those different knots of friends with their different lifestyles, consumption patterns and visions of what their community should be like, by comparison to other communities, seen from a particular vantage point. (Werbner 1996: 70)

Werbner argues that other subjects such as nation states and ‘those who draw on the past to think about the future and mobilise for action’ (Werbner 1996: 75) are inclined to essentialise communities. For this very reason culture is a very contested field, and demands to be taken more into consideration in any study that involves communities (ibid.: 76). Werbner however does not fully tackle another accusation by Benson towards anthropology in Britain: the lack of consideration for racism, power and structural constraints (Benson 1996: 50), all elements that according to

the three studies analysed above should never be overlooked. However, this particular criticism had already been tackled by Ballard in 1992.

## **2.8. The structural bias: deprivationism according to Ballard**

Ballard seems to have written one of the most outspoken criticisms of the 'race relations industry' in his 1992 paper 'New clothes for the emperor? The conceptual nakedness of Britain's race relations industry'. Here Ballard argues that authorities such as the Commission for Racial Equality still cannot make sense of ethnicity and prefer to stick to race and connected general disadvantage for any analysis they attempt to make. He argues that

an analysis which limits itself solely to an exploration of deprivation will inexorably suggest that the victims of exclusionism lack the capacity to take charge of their own destiny (Ballard 1992:484)

Ballard suggests that the 'race relations industry' should have started looking at the resistance against disadvantage rather than disadvantage itself. By doing this, not only the dignity of active subjects would be returned to ethnic minorities, but also the attention would be switched to a 'creative process' that will reveal much more about the existences of minority ethnic groups. Although "multiple resistance" is a concept used by Tatum to support her neo-colonial model, here Ballard's statement aims much further than neo-colonial theory. By analysing "the construction of an alternative moral and conceptual vision" (ibid. :485), policy makers would access "a set of values, expectations and understandings which are wholly unfamiliar to [minority ethnic groups'] oppressor" (ibid.). The membership of a specific ethnic network is considered vital by Ballard to the structural dynamics of multicultural societies. The pejorative label of 'deprivationism' is therefore given to the stream that apparently seeks to study groups in terms of economic disadvantage and

pigmentation (ibid: 492), but fails to consider sufficiently the aspects of agency amongst minority ethnic groups in Britain. The concern around deprivationism appears to parallel that discussed by theoretical criminology (Russell 1992; Phillips and Bowling 2003; Garland et al. 2006) about the taboos of race and crime and affecting empirical research. In educational research, Modood (2004) has addressed the same deficiency: minority ethnic groups have been considered by deprivationists as on the whole underachieving (ibid: 88). This all-encompassing notion has neglected the analysis of why there are some pockets of over-achievement. Modood argues that 'the system' (society-wide economic forces) must be analysed alongside 'community forces' (minorities' trajectories and dynamics) (ibid: 97). Community forces provide networks, skills and aspirations that shape action and resistance in society. By considering anything that has to do with ethnicity dynamic and fluid, this notion combines internal resources with resistance to the system and should provide a basic field of analysis for those whom are concerned with minority ethnic groups.

## **2.7. Conclusion: towards a 'minority criminology'**

In this chapter we have seen how the interest in the study of race and crime in Europe has original examples in Lombroso's positivistic accounts on the one hand and the culturally grounded observations on Melanesia by Malinowski on the other. Both these approaches carry the risk of essentialisation, and the use of Lombroso in eugenics has especially contributed to create a widespread suspicion about any study that may link aspects of crime to a certain group. We have also seen how essentialisation is not necessarily pathologising: Malinowski's 'bon savage' narrative can be for example considered consistent with British stereotypes such as

'law-abiding Indians' (or 'Leicester Gujaratis', Modood 2004:101 versus 'underachieving Muslims' ( or 'Bradford Pakistanis', *ibid.*). On the other hand, many cultural stereotypes carry a negative connotation, as the one leading to the construction of the 'Asian gang' (Alexander 2000). The studies discussed above try to answer the question of why certain groups commit crime in a certain way and tend to find a solution to the riddle in limiting the role of any specificity related to a group. For example, Alexander uses her "fragmented ethnographic lenses" (Alexander 2006) implying that there is no connection between the way individuals engage in crime and their belonging to an ethnic group.

In Britain the race and crime debate amongst scholars has mainly been characterised by an emancipatory approach that has tended to study discrimination within the criminal justice system. According to Phillips and Bowling this has contributed to the creation of a gap in criminology where there should have been developed an understanding of how issues are perceived *by* minority ethnic groups (2003:271). Miller (2001:2) has argued that often public discussion about the link between crime and minority ethnic groups has been very negative for race relations in Britain. This can be considered the result of what has been condemned as a new indirect rule system in Britain, where social scientists' knowledge is functional to social control agencies (Sharma et al. 1996:2). Innovative criminological approaches, on the other hand, are more likely to insert any variable in their study but the ethnic one (see for example 'reintegrative shaming theory', Braithwaite 1989:9), unless it is to the ends of a victimisation study. Information presented by the police deploys ethnicity but mainly in terms of statistical concerns (Kalra 2003:140).



The taboo (Russell 1992:671; Phillips and Bowling 2003:271) about minority ethnic groups and crimes seem to reflect the debate in ethnic studies that flourished in the 1990s (see especially Ballard 1992, Benson 1996, Werbner 1996). Then, the discussion was about the alleged essentialisation of certain cultures and the alleged neglect of power, economics and deprivation in ethnic studies. Some criminologists now seem to be asking themselves similar questions. This thesis aims at shedding some light on how Bradford Pakistanis view and 'live' crime within their 'territory', not on whether and how they differ from others in the extent or character of their criminal activities. Criminal activities will not be the focus of the study, but rather its concern will be with how Bradford Pakistanis as active subjects construct crime and react to it. Knowledge held *by* them, instead of knowledge *on* them, should include analysis of their ethnic resources and networks, not as an obstacle to their amelioration of status in society, but as a basis for different standpoints that may produce different constructions and understandings from white British ones. So far this type of awareness (that presupposes the idea that they may hold specific knowledge containing part of solution) has been unexplored. This hypothesis cannot be ruled out before research is done, although the result may be that cultural difference does not impact on this specific labelling process.

The data chapters in part III will attempt empirically to fill the gap detected by Phillips and Bowling's theoretical speculation (2003). This should not obscure other factors as both Phillips and Bowling (2003: 272) and Alexander (2000:102) point out, such as gender, age and structural constraints, for instance. However, as Ballard (1992), Werbner (1996), Kalra (2000) and Modood (2004) have argued, structural constraints may be 'cultural' or 'ethnic', not only economic. Ethnic

resources and ethnic networks must be acknowledged as generating important changes in the social world. Anthropology and its traditional methods can help understand this process provided that they do not become victim of the “mere glamour of tradition” (Malinowski 1926:65). Anthropology should help in trying to discover how culture may be a resource and a constraint, maintaining an equal distance between pathologisation and hagiography.

An analysis of Bradford Pakistanis’ values, labelling processes and perceived solutions to crime might reveal specific influences and implications for the city and its fight against crime. One hypothesis could be that these minority ethnic views may turn out to be the same as the ones of the white majority, but until studies are completed in this field we cannot be sure. Until then, if serious anthropological, sociological and criminological accounts fail to deal with the relations between ethnic capitals and crime, the primary analysis taking them into consideration will be a pathological one that depicts some groups and sub-groups as folk devils. In the next chapter some attempts to deal with this problem will be explored, taking into consideration methodology as an important variable as any research involving race (Kalra 2006: 467).

## Chapter Three

### **Ethnicity, religion, masculinity and crime in the Pakistani diaspora**

Chapter Two has established that so far criminology and sociology have tended to concentrate on certain aspects of the relationship between race/ethnicity and crime. This chapter will critically examine some attempts at engaging with the Pakistani diaspora and crime. The amount of literature produced in this field is quite impressive, although some of the material may be considered only tangential to criminology. This chapter, however, will not develop a full and chronological review of all the existing literature, but instead will select some academic works on the basis of the themes more relevant to this thesis.

The first study presented is Mawby and Batta's (1980) that reflects on how the experiences of migration and settlement impact on crime rates. Here, although cultural diversity is seen as relevant to the way the system decides to deal with Asian offenders, the specificity of the Pakistani heritage is only marginal to the analysis, and religion does not appear in the text unless it is mentioned as a cause for insularity. Male youth is not considered a 'problem' as in more recent studies.

It will be argued that the first substantial attempt to highlight religion in the study of crime and violence is Macey's (1999a and 1999b). In Macey's work religion seems to be closely connected to behavioural dynamics of male youth. In general, religion seems to be included in analysis whenever external circumstances encourage analysts to focus on it: Macey as well as Imtiaz (2002) are writing post-Rushdie affair, while another author who focuses on religion and crime, Quraishi (2005), is writing after September 11<sup>th</sup>. Amongst those who rather than focusing on religion, base their research on a 'thick description' of certain sub-groups as

problematic, there is Lien's ethnography (2005) on Pakistani gangs in Oslo. Webster's (1997) and Wardak's (2000) studies deal with religion and culture, but at the same time include multiple variables. Again, male youth is at the centre of attention. In the conclusion to this chapter it will be argued that the danger of pathologising minority ethnic groups when speaking about crime has not been completely avoided by these studies, especially when male youth is discussed, but also that the solution to the tackling of the taboo mentioned by Phillips and Bowling<sup>1</sup> (2003) could lie within methodology.

### **3.1. Criminology as a migration stage: Mawby and Batta**

The first study about crime and Pakistanis in Britain known to the present author is Mawby and Batta's *Asians and Crime: the Bradford Experience* (1980). Although this work is based on the very limited sample of the Mirpuri community of Bradford (Quraishi 2005:29), it attempts to explain changes in patterns of deviance according to a general paradigm connected to the stages of settlement of any relocating community. The migration process and the many adjustments that individuals have to undergo through it are, therefore, considered paramount for the analysis, in what Tatum (2000:6, see previous chapter) would describe as a "colonial model". Here, the alienation from one's cultural capital (whatever it is) and from political praxis are considered paramount to explaining social mechanisms of exclusion and oppression. The level of *attachment to one's culture* is considered an important variable for crime prevention, but *not the culture per se*, apart from exceptions (such as mafia) that do not seem to apply to Pakistanis:

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<sup>1</sup> In chapter Two we have already discussed Phillips and Bowling's belief that criminology has been largely affected by what they call the 'race and crime' taboo (2003:579) or the fear of pathologizing an ethnic group in relation to crime (see 2.3).

[The] strength of the culture of the migrant group has an important impact on social control and crime. This is not necessarily the case where a criminal tradition is imported, as in the case of the Mafia. But where a culture is able to provide a cushion against difficulties experienced in migration, or where the social structure of the country of origin is retained by the migrant group in the new society, a degree of insularity may 'protect' the migrants for a not inconsiderable time (...) where an immigrant group maintains its ethnic identity, for example through its religion, or where migration is seen as temporary and social control as imposed by the homeland is a meaningful reality crime rates may remain low (Mawby and Batta 1980:18)

Asians (sic) in Bradford were said to be protected from the worst structural and racist inequalities by their family system (ibid.:26), and this idea was reflected in how the Criminal Justice system would deal with young offenders: they were generally given care orders rather than other types of sentences, reflecting the idea of an efficient Asian system of informal social control (ibid.:41). In general, the study argues that in migrant communities the first generation tends to have low crime rates, but the second generation might increase them (ibid.:31).

Mawby and Batta seem to be very much aware of an Asian 'specificity' in terms of the authorities' perception and also partly in terms of some objective differences in offending in comparison to other groups (such as the lower rate in female crime). However, most of their attention is focused on the process of disruption of norms and values in general rather than the study of specific norms and values. The background of this study is in fact based in Social Disorganisation theory. The belief behind this approach is that offences are more likely to take place where traditional norms and values, of any cultural origin, are being disrupted (Eadie and Morley 1999; Lederman et al. 2002: 514). In the process of settlement, therefore, disruption of traditional values can lead to an increment in crime in the second generation. These considerations appear to be relevant not only to criminology but also to migration, diaspora and identity studies. Intergenerational

differences and tensions, and the breaching of some important social and cultural norms (as well as consequent sanctions), could reflect and even explain the process of cultural changes at different stages of settlement. Deviance and crime could be then considered almost as a natural stage of the migration process<sup>2</sup>.

One of the most interesting aspects of *Asians and Crime* is that religion is not considered as a crucially important element in the study of crime in that community. In 1980, studies of minority ethnic groups were focusing on issues of race and pigmentation, while at the time of the present research culture and religion play a much more significant role. Then, Islam was not considered as a key factor. Religion, and in particular Islam, only started to become much more prominent in ethnic studies since the Rushdie affair (cf. Modood 1992). While a number of publications have reflected this shift of interest within ethnic studies (see Lewis 1994), research on deviance has maintained some degree of distance from religion. According to Spalek (2002:51) criminology has done so because people's beliefs do not fit with "its claim of objectivity and rationalism". If we follow Phillips and Bowling's argument (2003) we may be persuaded that such dismissal of religion could derive from fear of pathologising a group. Below, two examples of how religion was included in the sociology of deviance will be illustrated.

### **3.2. Bringing religion into the picture: Macey's bold attempt**

The strongest impetus given to the study of religion and crime so far has probably come from Macey (1999a; 1999b). Macey writes after two very important events in

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<sup>2</sup> In chapter Eight the issue of criminality as process of adaptation will be discussed on the basis of the data collected for the present research.

the Bradford and British Asian history: the 1989 Rushdie affair and the 1995 riots<sup>3</sup>. Macey's article in *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (1999a) is written in response to Burley and Reid's (1996) account of the latter. According to Macey these authors had neglected social class and religion (Macey 1999a:845), but had had the merit of giving greater attention to gender differences within the group they were studying, while most of the sociology of deviance had supposedly so far left gender aside (cf. also Archer 2001:79). Material deprivation, poor educational provision, police brutality, institutional racism and masculinity, albeit present in the Bradford Pakistani community, are according to Macey in themselves inadequate explanations for the occurring types of violence (ibid.: 846). She suggests instead that patterns of crime are influenced by "ethnic, religious, gender, generational and socio-economic influences that intersect and interact with each other (and wider social structures) in dialectical formation" (ibid. : 852). While these factors are common coinage when processes of identity construction are debated (see amongst others Wallman 1979; Ericksen 1993; Sarup 1996; Kalra 2000), they still often fail to enter discussions about criminality. Macey is persuaded, however, that the "manipulation of cultural and religious resources to achieve desired ends" is very common in the community (ibid.).

Macey refers mainly to two examples, one 'public' and one 'private' (ibid.: 855). The example of public violence, where religion is manipulated in order to justify or threaten actual violence, is the campaign to chase the prostitutes out of Manningham, occurred just before the 1995 riots. At the time, a religious ethos was

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<sup>3</sup> In 2002 Macey published another study including an analysis of 2001 riots, but the considerations expressed with regard to the use and abuse of religion are substantially the same as the ones discussed in 1999a and 1999b and on which this section is based.

very clearly publicly attached to the violent action<sup>4</sup>. This followed years of frustration after asking the police to put an end to street prostitution in the area (Siddique 1993:119; Burlet and Reid 1996:146). The 'private' example is a consideration that arose from Macey's interviews. According to her data, much domestic violence in the Bradford Pakistani community was justified through an ad-hoc interpretation of Islam.

The most contentious part of Macey's work is her linking of the high number of Muslims in prison (cf. also Wilson 1999 and Kalra 2003:142) to Islam (Macey 1999a:856). However, her argument is not that Islam has intrinsic elements that lead young men to violence:

Whether this type of Islam is theologically legitimate is irrelevant: as long as men use Islam to justify violence, religion must be considered a significant variable in its analysis (Macey 1999a: 960)<sup>5</sup>

Macey is particularly sensitive to a possible connection between certain manipulations of Islam and those versions that are often described as its illiterate or rural forms (cf. 'religion vs. culture debate', chapter Six) practiced by the majority Mirpuri Bradford Pakistani population (ibid.: 859). However, as elsewhere (Furbey and Macey 2005), the inclusion of religion in a sociological analysis appears judgemental insofar as there is no analysis of its positive potential. Religion, and in particular Islam, has emerged as a 'protective factor', for instance in other studies that focus on addiction. (Orford et al. 2004: 23). Macey's understanding of religion, however, has the advantage of being a complex one, and of avoiding an essentialist

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<sup>4</sup> The film 'My son the fanatic' by Udayan Prasad, based on the homonymous short story by Hanif Qureishi, although not mentioning Bradford, represents very clearly the religious discourses manifested amongst the protesters in the Manningham area at the time.

<sup>5</sup> This observation reflects some comments about the use of Islam as justification for post-2001 terrorist attacks in Europe. While some commentators are keen to deprive the suicide bombers of the identity of Muslim, others argue that the very fact that Islam is used to articulate their message is *per se* a reason that demands an analysis that includes Islam (in whatever interpretation) as one of the factors that may lead to these acts. The theologian Siddiqui has clearly expressed this view (Siddiqui 2005).



view of Islam. Quraishi (2005), instead, is based on an all-encompassing and de-culturalised idea of Islam.

### **3.3. Islam and its 'betrayal': Quraishi's transnational study**

Although the title of Quraishi's book is *Muslims and Crime*, his analysis is the comparison of two very precise geographical settings: Haslingden in Lancashire (with a community mainly of Sylethis and Chachchis<sup>6</sup>) and a residential area in Karachi (Quraishi 2005:69). The aims of this book are to analyse how Islamic criminal law impacts on the understanding of crime of these communities, to explore how Islamophobia impacts on victimisation of Muslims, and to give some policy-orientated suggestions (ibid.: vii). Quraishi's book is definitely grounded in a post-September 11<sup>th</sup> context. At the outset Quraishi gives more attention to Islam than to any other cultural practices, unlike Macey's attempt to disentangle a plethora of aspects of religious belief and practice. The first chapter describes Islam, sectarianism and Islamic jurisprudence as an objective whole. This is supposed to give the reader the benchmarks against which to measure the level of impact of religion on crime in both Haslingden and Karachi. Quraishi's main criticism of previous literature about Muslims and crime is very heavily based on the alleged neglect of religion. When Quraishi reviews the work of Mawby and Batta (see above), for example, there is no acknowledgement of the study of resistance to racism at the time<sup>7</sup>. Rather, Quraishi's preoccupation is about their overlooking Islam. Quraishi's choice, instead, is to outline what Islam is supposed to say with regards to criminal law and test perceptions and behaviour of his two

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<sup>6</sup> Syleth is an area in Bangladesh and Chachchis are members of an ethnic group located in the Attock district of Pakistani Punjab.

<sup>7</sup> It may be worth noting that Mawby and Batta's study was published in the same year of the Bradford 12, see chapter Four.

sample groups against it. Although his sample is very ethnically varied (from Sylethis and Chachchis in Lancashire to Mohajjirs<sup>8</sup> in Karachi), this is not taken into account as he believes that they are all Muslims in the same way<sup>9</sup>. To make this even clearer, it is interesting to note his response to Webster's Keighley study.

While Webster argues that:

Islam as such cannot explain how Muslims behave, or how they might/ought to behave. Other factors outside Islam must be invoked (Webster 1997:79).

Quraishi replies:

Any cursory evaluation of Islamic hadith will provide, according to Muslims, the perfect role model for ideal behaviour, certainly at least how they ought to behave. Considering the majority of Webster's research population are Muslim, a detailed assessment of religious teachings, practice and influence upon youth conformity and community self-identity would substantially contribute towards deconstructing the Asian offending puzzle (Quraishi 2005:30).

While in chapter Two we have seen how essentialising can undermine attempts to include culture in the discussion of race and crime, Quraishi seems to fall into the same trap by not acknowledging culture in his work, and imposing an essentialised idea of Islam to his sample. This attempt, however, seems to fail, as in the conclusion Quraishi is forced to acknowledge that Islam is not the most prominent element influencing perceptions of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour in his sample, but "it is an individual interpretation (...)inspired partly by Islamic and partly by secular culture" (ibid.:123). Most of the authors who have attempted to fill the gap about race and crime in Pakistani diaspora, unlike Quraishi, have

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<sup>8</sup> Mohajjirs is the name, sometimes used controversially, given to the people who moved to the new Pakistan from India in 1947, and their descendants. It literally means 'migrants'.

<sup>9</sup> Not only is Quraishi oblivious to geographical differences in Islamic practices and to the 'religion vs. culture debate' (see chapter Six), but he also assumes that Islamic criminal law speaks to everybody in the same way, not considering the notion of *ijtihad*. This is a technical term of Islamic law that describes the process of making a legal decision by independent interpretation of the legal sources, the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The opposite of *ijtihad* is *taqlid*, Arabic for "imitation". ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic\\_law](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_law))

acknowledged another cultural system apart from Islam and British culture. This is often simply labelled 'culture' with reference to one's parents' heritage.

Anthropological research by Lien (2005) is pivoted around this.

### **3.4. The anthropological gaze: Lien's ethnography of deviance**

While studies by Mawby and Batta and Macey have focused on ecological reasons behind patterns of deviance amongst Bradford Pakistanis, Lien's study provides us with a description of these very patterns. Lien's study is based in Oslo and benefits from the author's twenty years' research between Pakistan and its Norwegian diaspora. Lien, as a member of the European network for the study of gangs, is interested in providing an investigation that highlights the intersection of general gang traits and the specificities of the 'Pakistani gang'. The universal aspects of gang life are described through reference to age span, symbols, self-definitions, territory, continuity, norms, types of violence and types of crime (2005a:2). Lien provides two case studies of Pakistani gangs in Oslo and articulates the general gang traits through their specific cultural background. For example, the specific structure of the Pakistani kinship system (*biraderi*) strengthens participation in the gang (ibid.: 12), and sometimes this become the very reason that attracts people to join: the whole *biraderi* (even up to forty members) may have to face repercussions because of the acts of one member and calls for self-defence. While most literature on gangs describes them as a substitute for families, Lien argues that in this case they overlap (ibid.: 15). Where this literature talks about power and status, in the context of Pakistani gangs in Oslo, this becomes a concept intertwined with specific notions of family honour (ibid.: 17). The fact that there are gang members of Indian, Vietnamese and cross-caste origin is seen more as constructive functional bridging

of social capital rather than a permanent characteristic of the structure of the gang (ibid.:9). Gangs can also opportunistically liaise from time to time with influential elites (for example journalists) and the welfare system (ibid.:19). Members of the gang may also use family traditions to achieve their goals: this is the case with traditional elders' mediation to resolve gangs' rivalries (ibid.:15). Lien capitalises on sociological and psychological theories of deviance drawing on notions of power, emotion and social bonds (2005b:7). *Izzat*<sup>10</sup>, for example, is treated as a psychological trigger that is translated into action through culturally specific manifestations of what is nothing other than the universal sentiment of pride. At times the description of culturally specific behaviours may appear more as an ethnographic curiosity rather than a useful tool to unravel criminological issues. For example, Lien describes in detail how members of a gang humiliate rivals by forcing them to touch their feet, a sign of submission and respect typical of the sufi tradition. Such descriptive excursions do not shed much light on the relationship between a specific group (that is considered highly criminogenic by the Norwegian press) and crime. Liens's study seems to be split between her ethnographic concerns that often appear to end up as mere curiosity, and sociological and psychological theories that use cultural specificities in order to confirm etic<sup>11</sup> theories promoting a universal pattern of involvement in crime. Two criticisms amongst those posed for anthropology in the previous chapter could be addressed to Lien's work: the orientalist argument and the 'indirect rule' one. Said's orientalist argument (Said 1985) has been used also in criminology to define the fascination, 'otherisation' and

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<sup>10</sup> *Izzat* can be broadly translated as family honour, status, respect or 'face-saving'.

<sup>11</sup> The etic approach assumes that there is always a possible degree of abstraction in the analysis of a behavioural structure and through abstraction the social scientist can impose models aligned to a specific structure: a theoretical framework constructed in totally different situations may be applied to a community that has a very distinct history, for instance. Consequently, an 'etic' approach is concerned with generalised statements about the data in order to compare them with other (Pike 1954:8).

essentialisation of another group and their perceptions of crime (Cain 2002). By indulging in some descriptions such as the rituals of reciprocal humiliation amongst gang members, Lien may be found close to an orientalist approach. By the indirect rule argument we refer to the accusation that had been moved to anthropologists such as Evans-Pritchard when their studies were used to subjugate new peoples under the British colonial rule. Lien, in her split between her ethnographic concerns and her etic theoretical abstractions, seems to produce knowledge relevant to controlling agencies (see Sharma et al. 1996:2, quoted in 2.7). The ethnographic aspects of her research, therefore, seems to be in function of etic arguments rather than of emic<sup>12</sup> analysis, leaving very little room for minority ethnic perceptions and interpretations of criminal issues.

In the ethnographic sections, Lien does not seem too concerned about why young Pakistani men in Oslo are actively involved in gangs, but rather with how they do it. Heritage becomes important in the deviant action primarily when it appears as a manifestation of an etic psycho-social theory, not in its prevention or even in the more abstract terms of social construction of deviance and labelling. Lien denies that there is a cultural specificity in the criminogenesis and her conclusion is that "crime is the cause of crime" (Lien 2005b:23). Lien argues that this is the only possible way to include the young men into programmes of rehabilitation: it is important to understand what crime acts do to individuals, not what their heritage is like. The cultural study of the dynamics of the gangs appears therefore as an exercise imposing etic psycho-social frameworks on a specific

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<sup>12</sup> Emic research "attempt(s) to discover and to describe the pattern of that (...) culture in reference to the way in which the various elements of that culture are related to each other in the functioning of that particular pattern, rather than an attempt to describe them in reference to a generalised classification derived in advance of the study of that particular culture" (Pike 1954:8).

cultural context. In Lien's work, even *izzat* seems to be discussed more as a universal feature of masculinity than as an aspect of a culturally specific dimension. In all the studies mentioned above, young men, with their identities and masculinity, play a very important part in the literature that deals with deviance in the Pakistani diaspora. In particular, the following two studies dwell on masculinity and identity as the most important factors when studying deviance amongst British Pakistanis.

### **3.5. Masculinities and identity: Webster and Imtiaz**

The following studies focus more on broader ideas of deviance rather than crime. They focus on men and mention ecological causes of deviance as well as more psychological and identity-construction-related ones, keeping on the edge between identity studies and sociology of deviance<sup>13</sup>. Webster's study (1997) is based on research in the Bradford District. While he dealt with the problem of crime in an earlier work (Webster 1995, 1996), here he broadens the scope of his analysis to a classification of male types in relation to their adherence to or deviance from behavioural expectations according to their parents' perceptions. Amongst the typologies the two categories of *experimenters* (1997: 77) and *go-betweens* (ibid: 78) are the ones including people who break the law. Breaking or abiding by the law, however, is not the only benchmark to classify deviance or "propriety" (ibid: 74). In fact, further categories are the *conformists* (who adhere to family and community expectations, ibid:77), *vigilantes* (older, frustrated by lack of police intervention and providing protection against "public improprieties") and *Islamists*

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<sup>13</sup> Amongst the studies about young Muslim men that give complex accounts of their lives, moving amongst gender, generation, identity, masculinity, racism, it is important to remember Archer's contribution (2003) in the field of education. Archer in fact follows Alexander in her theorisation of ethnic studies that should account for 'shifting discourses of the family, politics, age and territory' (ibid. : 161).

(the ones able to distinguish “between a Muslim and an Islamic identity”<sup>14</sup>). Both *experimenters* and *go-betweens* would guarantee stability to the community through the preservation of some norms, but would accommodate other emotional, social and psychological needs through a ‘double life’. This typology is clearly inspired by Pryce’s 1979 work, but also includes a model similar to Tatum’s neo-colonial one based on “self-alienation”, “alienation from the racial or social group”, “alienation from the general other” and “cultural alienation” (2000: 56). It is important to notice how alienation itself and not the degree of detachment from a legacy of a certain culture or group is the most significant aspect of this model that is applicable to any minority ethnic group. The main difference with Pryce’s and Tatum’s works is that exploitation and class are only two of the factors that cause the different typologies to arise. By bringing religion and culture in, Webster in fact seems to go beyond their models.

A similar approach that however tackles crime only marginally, is the very clearly contextualised study of Bradford Pakistani identities during and straight after the Rushdie affair. Imtiaz’s doctoral thesis (2002) in social psychology is mainly an analysis of the politics of representations of identity, and its relevance to this chapter lies with the fact that young men are seen as the problematic focus of the Bradford Pakistani community. Imtiaz argues that external representation, ideologies and hegemony play a crucial part in the identity generation process of young Pakistani men. Imtiaz’s model hence envisages three categories of reaction to a triple discrimination (racial, cultural and religious) by the different articulation of one’s cultural capital: *coconuts*, *rude boys* and *extremists* (Imtiaz 2002:124). These categories are claimed to be representations from inside (ibid: 125), gathered

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<sup>14</sup> Such distinction can be made clear by paraphrasing these labels with ‘Muslims by birth and Muslims by choice’.

among 'specialists' or members of the community who are engaged in paid or voluntary work with young men. The label *coconuts* refers to those young men who are 'brown outside and white inside' (Ibid:125); they are seen as having benefited from a certain degree of social mobility and distanced themselves from tradition, even by moving away from their own families. They would apparently be the ones that have internalised the external stereotype and created distance from its source (Ibid: 147): they supposedly reject whatever is looked down upon by the outsiders. Through this process they tend not to engage with illegal activities (although their rejection of their heritage might be read by some as deviant and destabilizing for the community in general).

The other two categories, instead of internalising the stereotype, resist it either by capitalising on the difference or by challenging external constructions (Ibid.). *Rude boys* in fact are seen as generating a tradition 'between Bollywood and bhangra' (Imtiaz 2002:147) and 'Mirpur and LA' (Ibid: 127) and revitalise their identity pride in spite of unemployment and disaffection from the wider society (Ibid.) However, they do not distinguish between their culture and their religion, about which knowledge is not very deep (cf. 'Culture vs. religion' debate in chapter Six). *Rude boys* are considered more likely to breach norms. Finally those labelled as "extremists" base their identity representation on the search for a 'pure' religion, relieved from the cultural medium of their parents (Ibid: 21)."Extremists" are considered agents of the preservation of 'order' in the community (Ibid: 133), a notion that overlaps with the one of stability that will be mentioned in chapter 7.6. The categories outlined by Imtiaz are said to be very fluid but at the same time delineate their subscribers' potential for deviance or adherence to norms. According to Imtiaz not *any* attachment to one's heritage (as in Hirschi's theory of social



control) is the major factor to explain patterns of deviance. In his work, the key element is instead the constructive use and translation of a *certain* religious and cultural heritage, together with historical pressures. Here, a study on identity manages to bring together the various aspects that Alexander considered as the most meaningful variables of deviance: age, gender, cultural influences and economic/political resources and constraints. This seems not to have been achieved yet by criminologists, although Wardak seems to get closer than anybody else.

### **3.6. Between etic and emic: Wardak's approach**

Wardak's study of young men and deviance in a mosque in Edinburgh draws on typologies similar to the ones described above and at the same time combines them with a universal criminological theory, such as Hirschi's control theory. Here attachment and belonging are the most important variables to classify the research participants within an analysis frame that can be reproduced in any other context. Wardak calls *conformists* the young men who follow their family's transmitted social norms (2000:155,156). Their inherited cultural capital is upheld as ideal and deployed in the real world; members of this group are trouble-free, and relational proximity between them, their families and the community acts as a deterrent to crime, as hypothesised by supporters of social control theory (Hirschi 1971:17; Burnside and Baker 1994:21). The category of *conformists* is followed by *accommodationists*, those who believe some compromises with the family norms are acceptable to accommodate their individual needs (ibid.:156). Their compromises are not inherently destabilising for the group they still feel they belong to. The category of *part-time conformists* repeatedly breaks social rules, but makes sure to preserve family's reputation by complying to some token activities

(ibid.: 157), such as attending mosque on Fridays or for funerals, behaviours that are consistent with the 'double lives' mentioned in Webster 1997. Finally, the group violating and challenging most of community 'propriety' is labelled *rebels*.

The main argument is that amongst Edinburgh Pakistanis, represented by the Pilrig boys, there is a widely shared notion of what 'public propriety' is:

'appropriateness, seemliness, decency, conformity with good manners, conformity with convention of language and behaviour' (Cohen 1979:124, quoted in Webster 1997:74). However, propriety often consists of adherence to family tradition, and is not independently forged by young men. Agency is mostly neglected. Rather than studying how households perceive deviance and engage in their choices, Wardak classifies them according to his own etic benchmark, attachment to their parents' culture. He does not agree with Alexander about the opportunity of studying young men in a cultural vacuum (Alexander 2000: 18, 102, 140), but rather he is only able to see them in a cultural context which is the one founded by the older generation of settlers in Edinburgh. Although faith and religious practice are important variables of the study (whose participants were all attending a madrasa), this did not seem to produce a sub-group as in Imtiaz and Webster's works. This may be because in the Pilrig mosque exclusivist influences (such as Tableegh Jamaat, see 11.1.2) were not present. The tension between Islam and the traditional cultural background is not registered: the only conflict represented is seen as the one smoothed out by the double lives of the young men. We have to remember, however, that Wardak's is an etic account. While at times reference to the boys' own (emic) constructions of propriety and deviance are analysed, his categories are based on his own analysis of the data collected amongst the Pilrig boys. His theorisation of sub-groups' different

behaviours is meant to become comparable to other studies based on Hirschi's social control theory, and gives only limited space to insiders' comments.

### **3.7 Conclusion: anthropology, minority perspectives and criminology**

The studies here analysed show that the field of crime in the Pakistani diaspora has produced a varied body of literature. These studies include and analyse variables such as gender, age, identities, religion, settlement and economic and political constraints. They tend, however, to focus more on the problems rather than the possible solutions. In this respect, there seems to be a tendency to pathologisation, especially as far as male youth are concerned. The aim of the present thesis is to move beyond these very important studies and look at agency and local influences as a resource, not only as a problem.

Studying specificities of a minority ethnic group does not necessarily follow from the will to collude with social control agencies (cf. Sharma et al. 1996 cited in 2.7). Instead, it follows from reviewing the literature above and the need to including more minority ethnic perspectives in this field. This does not want to be an invite to contribute to a government's indirect rule based on sociological analysis, but rather to highlight how in this field the inclusion of minority ethnic groups has been neglected.

If we consider social reality as made up by individuals, their choices based on certain values systems, their practices, and their thoughts as they practically engage with the world and the structures they built, we will need a wide and extensive knowledge of all these entities. Therefore, not only one aspect of the community under study will be considered as crucial to the understanding of it, but all the parts of that unique social world will concur to the progress of the research.

Local history is one of the important aspects that may contribute to produce relevant knowledge (see chapter Five). Acknowledging this standpoint should lead to the choice of an appropriate methodology that in the Bradford context has appeared to be emic and ethnographic, as it will be discussed in the next chapter.

**Part II**

**The contexts and the methodology**

## Chapter Four

### Methodology

This chapter provides the background information about the methodology applied to the doctoral research in epistemological, practical and ethical terms.

The epistemological observations will explain what approach has influenced this research and why the emic and interpretative interactionist choice seemed to be the most feasible way to build relevant knowledge about crime in the Bradford Pakistani Community.

Practical observations about the methods utilised during fieldwork are particularly important as access to Muslim communities for research after 2001 has proved particularly difficult (cf. Gilliat-Ray 2005; Spalek 2005). In the course of the chapter an excursus about anthropological method will discuss its crucial help in gaining access and developing knowledge of the study cultures in order to persevere with the interpretative epistemological framework.

The ethical issues encountered in the development of the research together with safety precautions will conclude the chapter.

#### **4.1. The epistemology of the research: the emic and the interactionist**

As discussed in 3.7, one of the main aims of the present work has been to give voice to an alternative point of view, *weltanschauungen* (views about the world), in the context of the Bradford Pakistani Community. Instead of evaluating external analyses that have so far investigated the criminal problems in this setting through class and deprivation, the emic approach “seeks experience from within (...) and attempt(s) to capture the meanings and experiences of interacting individuals” (Denzin 2001:40).

As stated in 2.9, the criminological debate on race and crime tends to focus on deprivation and class, while the combination of these structural factors with cultural ones (cf. Macey 1999a; Phillips and Bowling 2003) sometimes goes almost unnoticed. Even in the accounts where the culture is given some degree of importance, agency seems to be only ancillary to a more structural analysis. In this chapter the theoretical construction behind the thesis is discussed in order to explain how the emic standpoint seems to be adequate to represent agency and also to start filling in the criminological gap about minorities' perspectives (Phillips and Bowling 2003: 272).

#### **4.1.1 The definition of emic**

The terms etic and emic were coined by Pike in 1954. These terms were constructed through the study of the language analysis and the definitions of phonemic and phonetic. Pike was arguing that the study of any kind of complex human activity could not rely only on that specific activity, but should analyse it in the whole of a 'unified set of terms and a unified methodology' (Pike 1954:1). In an introductory example, Pike says that an analysis of a language that does not include an analysis of behaviour is bound to have theoretical and methodological discontinuities, and vice versa:

the activity of man (*sic*) constitutes a structural whole, in such a way that it cannot be subdivided into neat "parts" or "levels" or "components" with language in a behavioural compartment insulated in character content, and organisation from other behaviour. Verbal and non verbal activity is a unified whole, and theory and methodology should be organised or created to treat it as such' (Pike 1954:2)

From this starting point, building on the language studies analogy, Pike says that examining the structural whole of human behaviour can imply either an emic or an etic approach.

The etic approach assumes that there is always a possible degree of abstraction in the analysis of a behavioural structure and through abstraction the social scientist can impose alien models to a specific structure: a theoretical framework constructed in totally different situations may be applied to a community that has a very distinct history, for instance.

Consequently, an etic approach is concerned with generalised statements about the data in order to compare them with others (Pike 1954:8). An emic approach, instead, is concerned with only one “relatively homogenous” culture (ibid.). While etic research aims at comparison and generalisation, emic research

attempt(s) to discover and to describe the pattern of that (...) culture in reference to the way in which the various elements of that culture are related to each other in the functioning of that particular pattern, rather than an attempt to describe them in reference to a generalised classification derived in advance of the study of that particular culture. (Pike 1954:8)

It is evident, therefore, that an emic approach is clear from any deductive inference and can be consistent with abductive strategy and grounded theory: emic units are discovered by the analyst in the specific reality of a study, not created by her/him a priori or by imposing categories created for other settings (ibid:20).

It is important to highlight how a social scientist who subscribes to this approach may not be able to neglect any aspect of the lives that are being observed, as they all contribute in making the culture in question function as it does:

an emic approach must deal with particular events as parts of larger wholes to which they are related and from which they obtain their ultimate significance, whereas an etic approach may abstract events (...) from their context or local system’ (Pike 1954:10)

The broadest definition of emic is the one that includes notions of ‘internal’ or ‘domestic’ standpoint as the behaviour is classified ‘in reference to the system of



behaviour of which it is immediately a part' (ibid: 10). An etic study tends to produce an analysis of the structure in question very early (ibid.:9), while an emic one requires a longer process as even the study population might need time to produce conscious awareness of many of the units constituting a pattern.

Consequently the emic scientist will be as close as possible to the structure in question, while an etic analytical standpoint (which, on the contrary, might be called "external" or "alien") requires the analyst to stand far away or even "outside" a particular culture "to see its separate events of other cultures" (ibid:10)<sup>1</sup>.

If we consider social reality as made up by individuals, their choices based on certain value systems, their practices, and their thoughts as they practically engage with the world and the structures they built, we need a wide and extensive knowledge of all these variables. Therefore, not only one aspect of the community under study has been considered as crucial to the understanding of it, but all the parts of that unique social world in that historical moment have concurred to the progress of the research. What has represented evidence of the parts composing the social reality under study have been everyday concepts, practices and meanings as they have been produced, negotiated and transmitted within the community. Hence, three components and their interaction have been paramount in the social investigation: economic and political disadvantage (cf. chapter Seven), ethnic resources and networks (cf. chapter Eight) and individual histories (or, in more sociological terms, agency, see case studies in 11.1.1 and 11.1.2 ).

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<sup>1</sup> The terms etic and emic have been at the centre of anthropological debate for a while after Pike's publication of his 1954 work. Critics of Pike's theory have often been accused of having misunderstood his writings and misrepresented his concepts of emic and etic. The most famous controversy was the one stirred by Marvin Harris who wrote about his own understanding of the two concepts in *The Rise of Anthropological Theory. A History of Theories of Culture*, New York, Thomas and Y. Crowell, 1969. Harris's version of emic and etic is still considered by Pike's followers as a gross misunderstanding of the original concepts.

#### **4.1.2 The interpretative interactionist approach**

If the emic approach was deemed to be the most functional approach to unveil those variables about crime within an ethnic group in the shadow because of certain taboos of criminology (cf. Phillips and Bowling: 2002: 271) , the interpretative interactionist choice was a viable option for conducting the research in a social world to be considered a complex working whole. As Pike put it:

The value of an emic study is, first, that it leads to an understanding of the way in which a language or a culture is constructed, not as a series of miscellaneous parts, but as a working whole. Second, it helps one to appreciate not only the culture or language as an ordered whole, but it helps to understand the individual actors in such a life drama- their attitudes, motives, interests, responses, conflicts, and personality developments (Pike 1954:11).

I define the interpretative approach to social reality as one which focuses on social actors with their social and cultural capital as they interpret it. This is coherent with the choice of an emic approach because it does not seek a-historical generalisation, but rather emerges from the unique interaction of elements such as structure, culture and individuals, and the interpretation given from within. The possibility of getting to know this social world is given by the study of the set of meanings as they are lived, performed, interpreted and transmitted by the members of the Bradford Pakistani Community. How the different parts of the social world are constructed can be investigated through the study of the interaction of the history of the community (see 5.8), the biographies of people, their ethnic resources and networks (see 9.4) and how in the diasporic context they try to re-adjust, re-interpret or revitalize certain cultural and social assumptions (see 9.4, 10.5, 11.2, 11.5, 12.6.).

The awareness of the multiple influences shaping the experiences of this particular social world is grounded in an anti-essentialist standpoint that recognises the presence of multiple influences and experiences on the individuals

involved in the research. In this piece of work, saying that the community holds its own set of meanings does not simplistically mean that there is a homogenous and static entity where all the individuals behave very similarly (see Alexander's critique in chapter Two). This will be particularly clear when the sampling strategy will be discussed: individuals inform their behaviour through information coming from the community experience and draw on their ethnic resources and networks, but their choices in the end are motivated also by their individual histories.

Although the focus of this research is on emic sets of meanings, the role of the researcher in the building of a relevant knowledge should not be underestimated. The epistemology of this research is grounded in the process of the researcher's engaging with social actors as what is initially spontaneous and natural to them and is de-stratified and discussed dialogically (Geertz 1973), because 'interpretive interactionism attempts to make the world of lived experience visible to the reader' (Denzin 2001:34).

The lived experiences of the actors of the social world of the research have been tested iteratively in order for them to inform the subsequent steps of the research. This is the premise of grounded theory, but it is also coherent with an interpretive interactionism approach as 'properly conceptualised, interpretive research becomes a civic, participatory, collaborative project, a project that joins the researcher with the researched in an *ongoing* moral dialogue' (Denzin 2001:5, my emphasis). An abductive strategy that has reiteratively looked for relevance and accuracy of the categories used in the analysis has been employed on the basis of a grounded theory, "by drawing on the concepts and meanings used by social actors and the activities in which they engage" (Blaikie 1993:176).

## **4.2. The choice of classic anthropological methods**

As the thesis focus its interest on mainly three variables (economic and general disadvantage, ethnic resources and networks and agency) the methodology has to reflect this approach. In previous studies where the interaction between culture and structure has been investigated, the choice of the methods has been seen as problematic (Metcalf et al. 1996). While the choice of a large-scale quantitative survey is more able to abstract from general local economic factors, a qualitative and ethnographic approach enables the researcher to explore a multitude of experiences. Also, no quantitative strategy would be suitable for an interpretive approach, where the thoughts and interpretation of facts are relevant (Fabietti, 1991, Herzfeld, 1982). Furthermore, qualitative, interpretive research on a sensitive topic in the extremely suspicious Bradford Pakistani Community (McLoughlin, 2000) demands a very high grade of involvement of the researcher to gain first hand interpretation.

In the case of the present thesis a qualitative ethnographic approach allowed the researcher to collect a considerable amount of material about the insiders' points of view on the subject and also helped in establishing a bond of trust with the sample in order to gain access. It could be argued that an impersonal, quantitative approach would have never guaranteed me the trust and consequently the access that I was able to gain through the anthropological strategy. Although anthropology has been accused of being incapable of explaining very recent social phenomena where there is a high level of intertwining of factors (for an account of this debate see Werbner 1987), the methodology of this research is grounded in the belief that without anthropological methods the researcher would have not been able to gain access in the community and collect reliable data.

### 4.3. Access

Participant observation was a tool to build access before becoming the means to collecting data. Bradford Pakistani community, where most of the information system is based on word of mouth, has always required a very high level of involvement of the researcher to gain first hand information (Murphy 1987; McLoughlin, 2000). After 2001, high involvement has become indeed the only way to defeat suspicion of research and negotiate access. This denotes a significant change in strategy for the researcher as global politics affect what happens in the field.

Initially, there seemed to be a need to find a couple of 'official' locations where participant observation could be conducted at the same time as symbolically returning something to the community. Otherwise, I risked failing to respect the basics of the research bargain, or creating the exchange that aims at legitimising the researcher's work with the researched (Adler and Adler 1991:175; Lee 1993:137). Not being affiliated to any institution or community group meant that I was not seen as affiliated or espoused to any particular 'lobby'. In fact one of the characteristics of community groups in Bradford is that they are fragmented on a multiplicity of layers (McLoughlin 1998c) and therefore more or less subtle conflicts are quite common. Past anthropological research in Bradford (ibid.) relied on voluntary work in a specific setting for participant observation and the starting point of snowballing.

Although I was keen to develop a similar strategy I realised that the educational background of the Pakistani population in Bradford nowadays has improved to the extent that grass roots organisations are able to organise volunteer work with competent people from within the community rather than seeking outsiders.

While offers of collaborating with bodies that worked on forced marriages and gun crime were forthcoming due to my presumed 'expertise', these had to be declined as public affiliation could have undermined the ease people felt while talking with an outsider who was not publicly showing affiliations by pro-actively engaging with political or social activities. I realised that by engaging with the community on such themes I would occupy a public position and might be subjected to strict scrutiny.

The researcher-respondent rapport is however built on many more levels than simply economic or practical help (Sanders 2004:27). I had to respect the "norms of reciprocity" (Alder and Alder 1991:175), and expose my research persona as well as myself as much as I could in order to become visible, transparent, and recognizable. My identity had to become public and liable to observation (Harrington 2003:597) if the research was to succeed.

This did not mean that respondents would directly benefit by our relationship (as the highest degree of research bargain would imply), but they were given agency and more power by allowing that the researcher could be questioned and 'scanned'. Before collecting views from members of the community, it was only fair that they were allowed to get to know me and decide how much trust I should be afforded.

The snowballing process, or the practice of reaching individuals through a chain of acquaintances, made it possible for people to 'check my references' through those who introduced me. In a sense, the potential research participants exercised their power in controlling access for the researcher (Lee 1993:124). It was essential that I accepted becoming 'public'; I had to go through a 'scan' in order to be 'let in', not only by individuals but by the community at large. This is why the fieldwork was built on a series of activities that were not necessarily

directly functional to the data collection. These access activities included frequenting the sport centre, watching Bollywood movies in local cinemas, shopping at the local green grocers', textile shops and mobile phones shops, going to Cannon Mill market (a South Asian bazaar in a former textile mill), and attending concerts and public events. 'Hanging around' or waiting to be approached by passively stating one's interest has been considered key to gaining access (Harrington 2003: 612; Gilliat-Ray 2005: 25, referring to Lewis' successful research based on his ability to relate to Muslim clergy because of his position as 'man of God'). Physical proximity is the first step towards access (Lee 1993:133). The danger of getting too close to the sample was real, but this level of interaction was the only one that guaranteed access and trust during the interviews. The idea that I had a fluctuating position in the community but I was not necessarily always 'signposted' as a researcher by a tape-recorder and a note-pad, was nonetheless the opposite of the 'undercover' strategy. Being undercover would have been firstly impossible, given my appearance, and secondly would not have contributed to the process of gaining trust. Trust was a circular process, where given the potential sensitivity of the topics I was working on and the characters of some interviewees, I had to trust the respondents before spending time alone with them. Relational proximity can help with one's self protection. My personal safety, for example, was enhanced by my high involvement, through a system of patronage that made me known as 'attached' or 'affiliated' to some individuals. I also believe that informants were more likely to give me reliable accounts as our rapport would not end in the formal interview, but would linger and repeat itself on a number of occasions. Although at a first glance I might look English, as soon as I spoke with people, they spotted my foreign accent, and once questioned about my origins I found out that my status as a double outsider (non-English and non-

Pakistani) played a very important part in access. Perhaps there was an unconsciously strategic identity match (Harrington 2003:614): I was considered in a non-antagonistic manner and at the same time I was independent enough from the community to be trusted not to gossip within it, should I be given some 'saucy' piece of information. The fact that when interrogated about my faith I answered that I was a Catholic seemed, in the majority of cases, to contribute towards the idea that I was a person with good morals who followed a religious code and therefore could be trusted.

#### **4.4. Applying grounded theory through the analysis of the Pilot stage**

A grounded approach could be defined as the process of comparison, iterative analysis and creation of conceptual categories during the fieldwork, as opposed to an analysis taking place at the end of it or to a deductive strategy.

Strauss and Corbin (1997: viii) define one of the crucial characteristics of grounded theory as the process of researching through formulating theoretically oriented questions. At the beginning of the fieldwork in October 2004, my research questions were:

1. How do Pakistani people in Bradford perceive crime, its components and its significance? Are there variations between groups (based on generations, gender, class, etc.)?
2. Do Pakistani people in Bradford feel there has been an increase in crime within the community? If yes, what do informants generally perceive as the features of the change and the cause of the increase of crime?
3. What is generally perceived as the biggest problem as far as crime is concerned, and are there any differences of perception in different strata of the community (young people, older generation, community workers)?



4. According to the community, what role 'structure' plays in social control (external factors in their economic form, institutions, etc.)?
5. According to the community, what role does the 'culture' play in social control (tradition, beliefs, customs)?
6. According to the community, what role does religion play in social regulation?

At the end of the pilot stage (Christmas 2004), the research questions, theoretically driven by the emic and interpretive approach, seemed to be consistent with the preliminary results of the abductive strategy and therefore were not modified.

The pilot stage was important to realize the non feasibility of a participant observation that was not multi-sited. The multi-sited participant observation was on the other hand consistent with the anti-essentialist ontology of the research. The area that was more affected by the evaluation of the pilot stage was the sampling, as it will be discussed in the next section.

All the interviews collected during the pilot stage were transcribed and analysed through N-Vivo on a free-coding basis<sup>2</sup>. Such iterative analysis contributed to the establishment of ethnographically driven categories (Kalra, 2000:32) that compensated for some essentialist assumptions found in the literature review process (for a critique of essentialisation of Bradford Pakistanis see Webster 1997). This is to say that the themes that emerged from fieldwork were then translated into the organisation of the analytical categories (in N-Vivo terminology 'free nodes', see list in Appendix Two). When the researcher felt that 'theoretical saturation' (Goulding 2002:70) had been achieved, and new themes would rarely come up, free nodes were clustered (in 'trees') so different discourse

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<sup>2</sup> A much greater number of themes than the ones used in this thesis emerged during fieldwork. These may be utilised for further research or publication. Some of these themes have already been analysed for a paper on 1995 and 2001 Bradford riots (Bolognani 2007a, forthcoming).

analyses could be started. The organisation of causal links through the comparison of information about structure, culture and agency took place in the stage preceding the writing-up.

The process of continuous verification and comparison during the fieldwork inevitably produced different phases that kept influencing and adapting the methodology of the research. The organisation of these different phases can be represented as follows:

Table 4.1 Synopsis of the research process

Date	Theoretical Assumptions	Data Collection Activities	Data Analysis Activities	Changes implemented
Oct 04- Dec 04	Theoretical sampling	Interviews, Participant observation (fieldnotes), Stock-taking	Transcription, N-Vivo free coding	
Dec.04 'Step-back' (Strauss and Corbin 1998:7)	Writing-up of the Pilot Stage			Sampling changed according to insiders' categories. Inclusion of Focus Groups
Jan 05- March 05	Refinement of methods of data collection	Interviews, Participant observation (fieldnotes), Stock-taking	Transcription, N-Vivo free coding	
March 05 'Step-back'	Writing-up for conference papers			Identification of 'trees' of 'free nodes'
Apr 05- June 05	Consolidation	Interviews, Participant observation (fieldnotes), Focus Groups, Stock-taking	Transcription, N-Vivo free coding	
June 05 'Step-back'	Writing-up of the methodology chapter			Development of awareness of theoretical saturation: no new evidence emerges
July 05	Consolidation	Interviews	Transcription	
Sept 05			Analysis	theoretical elaboration

Given the success of the pilot stage, interviews conducted at that stage were included in the main body of data.

#### **4.5. The sampling and the labelling of sub-groups**

As this study aimed from the beginning at being an anti-essentialist account of the Bradford Pakistani community, at the start of the research a theoretically guided sampling strategy was created in order to guarantee the representation of different sub-groups. In order to set up the snowballing process and create benchmarks for the further stock taking, some sub-groups had to be identified as previous research and literature review seemed to suggest (i.e. by accounting for generational differences). Subsequently the selection of these theoretically constructed groups was adjusted through ethnographically derived categories.

First of all the sampling strategy had to take account of the representation of different generations and times of settlement in Bradford. Generational studies have had an increasing popularity in sociology (cf. Edmunds and Turner 2002) as they are supposed to reflect an important component of change in society. The question of generation for the Bradford Pakistani community can be controversial as the majority of marriages are organised between England and Pakistan<sup>3</sup> (Shaw 2001:319). If we consider individuals coming from Pakistan and gaining permanent residence in the UK as 'first generation' and their children as second, a problem of 'diluted' generation will occur in the definition of an individual born

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<sup>3</sup> Given the political implications of the debate on inter-continental marriages, the researcher feels it is important to note the heterogeneity of the stories of 'imported partners'; amongst the people interviewed, one woman who came in her late teens is twenty-five years later completely fluent and literate in English and weekly works as a volunteer in more than one local community group; one woman who comes from a city in Pakistan, after 8 years in the country, works in social care and leads a life that could be labelled as 'middle class'; a woman from a village in Mirpur has slowly learnt English, got a job, bought a house in a middle-class area with her savings and divorced her husband. Although these are not representative of the majority of cases, it seems important to remind the reader that 'imported partners' are not necessarily contributing to deprivation and lack of integration as it has been claimed recently (see Alibhai-Brown, Y. (2001) Mr Blunkett has insulted all of us *The Independent* 10 December).

of two parents of a different generation. For this reason, the generation-based sampling appeared soon to be problematic or even irrelevant for the representation of the individuals in the sample. See for example:

I think there is quite a divide between the elders who are generally quite religious and generally good people, you know, and then there seems to be boys...the second and third generation...I am first generation, really, because I was born in...my father came here and I was born here, I am the first generation who was born here. So we sort of grew up as the first generation of this country, but the second or third generation that came along, they...just their general outlook, just their cockiness, and that kind of stuff, their demeanour is different from what mine is.(Zameer)

Rather, experiences and organisation of daily lives, beliefs and level of integration in the community and in Bradford, seemed to be far more significant variables according to the first interviewees.

In the thesis, the only term used to define generation is 'first generation', by which people born in Pakistan and naturalised British are described. It is important to establish this convention as a few interviewees understood 'first generation' as the first individuals of Pakistani origins were born in UK. Two sample groups were initially identified as the 'young people' and 'parents' groups. The latter was supposed to provide the points of view of individuals who were likely to be seriously engaged in safety and moral issues concerning their children's upbringing. The second sample group was therefore chosen on two criteria: age and position in the community.

At the end of the pilot stage, though, two issues emerged as far as the second sample group was concerned. The first issue was about the language barrier between the researcher and the first generation; the first two members of the first generation that were approached for an interview agreed to answer my questions provided that their son would do the interpreting; this interference by a related subject could have undermined the reliability of the data. The second

problem regarded the finding that interviewees seemed to regard marriage as an important threshold rather than age and parenthood. Marriage was often described as a rite of passage for most of the individuals (see 11.1.4) who apparently tended to change their life style after the nuptial rites. Therefore, after the pilot stage, the second sample group became more an age *cum* marriage group and relied on an English speaking sample.

The popular debate about ethnic segregation in the city (see 4.3) had originally led the research to include only individuals who could be defined as 'Pakistanis' (although from 4.1 it is clear that the majority of the population classified by the Census in Bradford of Pakistani origin are actually from Azad Kashmir, that holds a special status within the geo-political boundaries of Pakistan). Four months into fieldwork the author was presented with the opportunity to include in the sample some willing Muslims of Gujarati origins. Gujarati Muslims seemed to be in most cases profoundly socialised within the Pakistani community (they live in the same areas, are invited to weddings, exchange visits, attend the same mosques, share patterns of marriage; mosques with Gujarati imams are attended by Pakistani people in spite of the usual ethnically based participation in prayers, (cf. Lewis 1994). One individual of Bangladeshi origin who is particularly socialised in the Pakistani community was also interviewed. In terms of area of residence, the vast majority of interviewees lived in inner-city Bradford. Their educational achievements and their social class<sup>4</sup> were varied.

Some white people were included in the sample in order to provide some terms of comparison in understanding and some alternatively generated

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<sup>4</sup> I deliberately excluded 'social class' from the core variables of the research as its definition would have been an etic one (see also 8.4). At present there is no study on emic perceptions of social class amongst British Pakistanis and such study was beyond the scope (as well as time and means) of this thesis.

information about the research context. Among these a focus group in a high school composed by white pupils and some white members of the police force who were interviewed as they held important insight about the 2001 riots.

The final organisation of the sampling strategy is consequently based on three groups:

1. Unmarried under twenty-eight (16 to 28 years old)
2. Married or divorced individuals
3. Practitioners

#### **4.5.1. Unmarried interviewees under twenty-eight**

This group includes unmarried individuals under thirties. In order to perform a periodical stock taking within this group, during the pilot stage these variables were highlighted as relevant to the heterogeneity of the representation:

1. gender
2. relation to the criminal justice system
3. location (in terms of interaction, i.e. peer groups, out-groups, etc.)
4. religion (how the commitment to religion is operationalised)<sup>5</sup>
5. how they are labelled by the community

During the pilot stage these variables remained unchanged, apart from the fifth that resulted to be a very inconsistent and fluid process (see 10.1).

Table 4.2 describes the first sample group in detail. The white pupils' focus group (eight students) has not been included as none of the data became relevant to the thesis.

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<sup>5</sup> It is impossible to describe in detail an intimate and personal thing such as faith; in order to describe the level of acquaintance with religion (but not necessarily the faith community in the case of the women who mostly do not attend mosque), levels of religious practice have been classified into three. 'Non practicing' for the non-believers; 'occasionally practicing' for those who would pray or attend mosque only on special occasions; 'practicing' as those who pray or attend mosque at least weekly.

Table 4.2 Unmarried interviewees under twenty-eight

Name <sup>6</sup>	Age	Gender	Religion	Area of residence	Occupation	Offences
1. Ali	26	M	Occasionally practicing	Leeds	Artist	n.a.
2. Zaara	22	F	Practicing	Manningham	Shop assistant	No
3. Adam	26	M	Practicing	Leeds Road	Community worker	No
4. Azad	19	M	Occasionally practicing	Leeds Road	Unemployed	Yes
5. George	17	M	N/A	Leeds Road	Catering industry	n.a.
6. Salman	16	M	Practicing	Leeds Road	Student	n.a.
7. Munir	16	M	Practicing	Leeds Road	Student	n.a.
8. Fatima	19	F	Practicing	Barkerend	Student	no
9. Bano	17	F	Practicing	West Bowling	Student	no
10. Yousef	16	M	Practicing	Heaton	Student	no
11. Bashir	19	M	Non Practicing	Shipley	student	no
12. FG1 (Focus Group 1) Bano	18	F	Practicing	West Bowling	Student	No
13. FG1 B	17	F	Practicing	Lidget Green	Student	No
14. FG1 C	17	F	Practicing	Leeds Road	Student	No
15. FG1 D	17	F	Practicing	Undercliffe	Student	No
16. FG1 E	17	M	Practicing	n.a.	Student	n.a.
17. FG2(Focus Group 2) A	16	F	Practicing	Barkerend	Student	No
18. FG2 B	16	F	Practicing	West Bowling	Student	No
19. FG2 C	16	F	Practicing	West Bowling	Student	No
20. FG2 D	16	F	Practicing	West Bowling	Student	No
21. FG2 E	16	M	Practicing	Leeds Road	Student	Yes
22. Mahima	28	F	Practicing	Great Horton	Student	No
23. Jamal	22	M	Practicing	Girlington	Student	No
24. Khalil (Bolognani 2002)	17	M	Occasionally practicing	West Bowling	Unemployed	Yes

<sup>6</sup> All respondents' names have been changed for confidentiality reasons.

#### 4.5.2. Married or divorced interviewees

Originally, as mentioned above, only individuals with children were to be included. In the pilot stage, however, childless individuals who were or had been married became relevant. The variables guiding stock-taking sampling were:

1. gender
2. occupation
3. time of residence in the UK

In this sample group many more individuals engaged in informal conversations but did not agree to be formally interviewed. For this reason the table below is composed by only 11 individuals, the ones interviewed in-depth.

Table 4.3 Married or divorced interviewees

Name	Age	Gender	Religion	Area of residence	Occupation	Offences	Born in UK
1.Jamil	36	M	Practicing	Leeds Road	Entrepreneur	n.a.	Yes
2. Imran	33	M	Practicing	Heaton	Teacher	No	Yes
3. Tahir	n.a.	M	Practicing	Great Horton	Teacher	No	No
4. Amir	35	M	Practicing	Little Horton	Unemployed	n.a.	Yes
5.Aliya	70	F	Practicing	Little Horton	Housewife	No	No
6. Akbar	70	M	Practicing	Little Horton	Retired	No	No
7.Zameer	33	M	Practicing	Great Horton	Community worker	n.a.	Yes
8. Shaheen	42	F	Practicing	Barkerend	Housewife	No	No
9.Hussain	27	M	Practicing	Barkerend	Unemployed	Yes	Yes
10.Fozia	27	F	Practicing	Barkerend	Uemployed	No	Yes
11.Shazia (Bolognani 2002)	30	F	Practicing	Keighley	Lawyer	no	Yes
12. Nadira	55	F	Practicing	Undercliffe	Housewife	no	no



### 4.5.3. Practitioners interviewed

The third sample group was identified as a cross-generational group whose feature would be to work within a field relevant to crime or crime prevention and therefore apparently possessing expertise. Categories it was possible to draw from were: politicians, police, social workers, youth workers, probation officers, media and members of the clergy.

In this group a higher number of non-Pakistanis have been involved, including police officers and community workers.

Table 4.4 Practitioners interviewed

Name	Age	Gender	Religion	Area of residence	Occupation	Offences
1. Abdul	42	M	Practicing	Leeds Road	Social Worker	n.a.
2. Ayesha	43	F	Occasionally Practicing	Girlington	Community Worker	No
4. Armley prison Muslim Chaplain	33	M	Practicing	Batley	Imam	No
4. Alina	37	F	Non Practicing	Heaton	Community Worker	no
5. Kamran	33	M	Practicing	Great Horton	Community Worker	n.a.
6. Ameena	21	F	Non Practicing	Undercliffe	Community Worker	yes
7. Umar	n.a.	M	Practicing	Manningham	Civil Servant	no
8. Alan	n.a.	M	N/A	n.a.	Police officer	No
9. Shamim	40	F	Practicing	Manningham	Community Worker	no
10. Majid	33	M	Practicing	Barkerend and Little Horton	Imam	n.a.
12. Iqbal	n.a.	M	Practicing	Leeds Road	Businessman and Politician	no
13. Andrew	n.a.	M	n.a.	n.a.	Police officer	no

#### 4.6. Applying the Methods

Participant observation with individuals seemed to be very encouraging already during the pilot stage. The feared distrust in researchers was although hanging in the atmosphere, quite easily overcome; people who met me for the first time agreed to meet for an interview after the first encounter. Urdu knowledge at beginners' level seemed to be a very effective means to convince individuals to participate in the research.

The ongoing process of a dialogue was consistent with the predicaments of the grounded theory. In the fieldnotes, this strategy of systematic reciprocity aimed at data collection but also at constructing a clear research persona with whom people could decide whether to engage or not, was called 'double exposure': I was exposed to the daily life of the community, and the members of the community were constantly exposed to my presence so they could get to know me, my aims and my personality. The 'double exposure' was the strategy that guaranteed the access in a context where researchers are seen with suspicion<sup>7</sup>.

Forty-eight individuals are represented in the Nvivo analysis. Numerous additional occasional short conversations were recorded in field notes and they crucially contribute to the general understanding of the relevant issues. The data were handled either through transcription of tape-recorded interviews, notes of unrecorded interviews or notes on focus groups. Some individuals were interviewed more than once.

In-depth interviews were mostly recorded. The individuals who asked not to be recorded never presented the issue as a confidentiality one, but instead they mentioned the fact that they would not feel at ease. Amongst these, the offenders are included.

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<sup>7</sup> This suspicion seems not to be directed to white researchers only, cf. Murtuja, S. B. (2004) *Pakistani Muslim Communities in Britain and Germany: Informal Familial Care of Elders and Processes of Social Exclusion* Sociology, Leeds:University of Leeds.

At the beginning the interviews were very structured, but once the answers became too repetitive and I became more confident with a more grounded project, the interviews became more unstructured, although they remained based on a check list of themes to be covered (see also questionnaire in appendix Three). After the pilot stage the key themes were directly drawn from the free nodes of the preliminary Nvivo analysis (see appendix Two). By employing unstructured interviews the spontaneity of the narratives seemed to be better preserved and the discursive streams that I would develop in the analysis became more evident. The interviewees were allowed to fall into an informal and more personalised language, more likely to represent their thoughts. This also gave them sufficient ease for digressing into stories and ‘grapevine’ accounts that could be subsequently recycled as ‘vignettes’.

#### **4.7. Focus Groups**

Focus Groups were the only data collection activity organised through formal channels. One respondent informed me that the school where she had taken her A levels had two teachers who were particularly keen in discussing local issues. Some classes in this well-known school were completely composed of Pakistani pupils and the teachers agreed to allow me to run three focus groups in exchange for two lectures on crime. Two focus groups were composed by students of Pakistani heritage and one by white pupils. The scheme of work of the focus groups is reproduced in Appendix Four. Two students agreed of being interviewed in-depth one week after their focus group.

All the focus groups were tape recorded and the students were given flip charts to develop their ideas in writing, but only the first two focus groups were transcribed and analysed through Nvivo.

The addition of focus groups to the set of methods of data collection was made necessary by the realisation that young teenagers would otherwise be difficult to interview. The delivery of a short lecture before each focus group had also the aim of helping the researcher and the participants to develop a mutual understanding in terms of the terminology used to describe deviance (see again Appendix four).

#### **4.8. Conclusion: ethical and safety issues**

The fluidity of the approach would not have allowed a coherent and fruitful use of 'consent forms' for the interviews, but the ethics of the research emerged from my close involvement, as I would continuously be in contact with the research participants. Paradoxically, consent forms could have undermined the relationship of trust. The ethical practices of the research had to match the social and political context of the field.

A great deal of flexibility had to be deployed in other contexts as well. For example, a number of conditions were set by some interviewees during meeting me. I contacted a man whose phone number was on a leaflet of an anti-drugs event; he referred me on to an older person who agreed to meet me to check if I was the kind of person his acceptance would have an interview with. During a second meeting, the interview took place, and it was recorded both by me and the interviewee. Once my political views were exposed through an informal chat, I was actually overwhelmed with information and both written and audio material.

Others asked to be given a list of questions beforehand in order to negotiate in advance what they would answer and which topics were off-limits (see appendix Three). This never led to a censorious action, but reading the questions seemed more a tactic to scan my beliefs and intentions to find out what I

was really getting at. Once the questions were positively sanctioned, nobody ever refused to answer a query.

Given the emic standpoint of the thesis, the ethical grounds for the research were set according to the hints given by the informants. At the beginning of the fieldwork, some issues were presented to me by some informants with whom I was negotiating an interview:

1. Bradford Pakistani Community is over researched and researchers either are not accurate and suit their needs in the writing up of their findings, or the results of the research are never disseminated amongst the interested subjects
2. different researchers tend to speak with the same people ( the so-called community leaders) over and over again and some strata of the community are neglected (especially women)
3. research tends to focus on tragic or problematic situations and the positives are overlooked as they do not lead to sensationalism

In order to reassure the individuals who have generously contributed to the research that my findings will be re-invested in the community<sup>8</sup>, I have collaborated with different grass roots organisations where my alleged 'expertise' was required I organised lessons based on preliminary findings of the fieldwork in the school where the focus groups were organised. More broadly, 'things were put back in the community' in less evident ways, such as lending material about Bradford to students who were writing relevant dissertations. This was important also in terms of triangulation of data. In December 2005, for example, I printed some research findings thanks to the Centre of Ethnicity & Racism Studies at Leeds University (Bolognani 2005). Those were circulated amongst most of my

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<sup>8</sup> 'Putting things back in the community' will later emerge as a clear discourse of reciprocity generally positively perceived by respondents (see 7.5.1). In the case of the researcher I found that a similar ethical concept could be applied.

research participants so that I could gain feed-back on my data analysis. In terms of triangulation, it seems important to highlight that often it was impossible to check some information given by interviewees, especially when names of criminals were denied. In spite of the danger to reproduce inaccurate or imprecise information, given the emic approach, perceptions of events rather than their realistic description, seemed to matter more to the ends of the present research.

The second ethical issue seemed to be resolved through an effective sampling strategy.

The issue about the supposed sensationalism of most Bradford based research seemed to me resolved by the original idea behind the thesis that together with the emic approach I wanted to focus on the agency of the community, and therefore my strategies implied an a-priori belief that the study population had the potential for a positive assertiveness towards its own future.

As basic good practice, the researcher made sure that before engaging in any of the data collection activities, the aim of the research was clearly explained to the participants. Anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed to all informants. As some interviews became possible only on the grounds of a very profound trust of the researcher (cf. Finch, cit. in Mason 1995: 201), during the analysis of transcriptions, where possible, such trust was valued by seeking feed-back from the informants whenever there was a doubt about the interpretation of a statement.

Safety was a very important feature of participant observation. In the initial stages of the research, while I was establishing my research persona and building the 'double exposure', I was particularly cautious in revealing details about myself and my research. Basic research precautions for fieldwork in settings where *pardah* is prominent were followed: unless in a public space I was never alone

with a male. Only once was I invited to a place where I felt my safety might have been at risk had the man I did not know before turned out to have a hidden agenda. Apart from this episode from which I disentangled myself without any problems, I never felt in danger, threatened or harassed at any moment of the fieldwork, even in situations where I was the only woman present and I was not necessarily complying with the traditional dress code of Muslim women (i.e. in a gym sauna).





## Chapter Five

### History of *Bradistan*

The city of Bradford is home to the largest Pakistani population outside of London and is widely referred to, satirically, as *Bradistan* (McLoughlin 2006b). As a post-industrial city with economic problems and such a high percentage of South Asian inhabitants, Bradford has been a centre of attention for debates on citizenship, race and class and violent disorders.

This chapter will draw on the existing literature and on the author's findings collected in previous fieldwork (January-August 2002, Bolognani 2002) and follow the history of the city and its intersection with the Pakistani community since the early 1960s. The processes of settlement, survival through economic disadvantage and the emergence of political awareness will also be discussed. The account of the last fifteen years of violent episodes will be primarily addressed descriptively, but it will draw upon the most significant studies about the riots<sup>1</sup> in order to emphasize how deprivation, racialism and politics may have influenced urban tensions, outsiders' perceptions and the lives of the communities who inhabit Bradford.

#### 5.1. A 'BrAsian' city

To newcomers, Bradford is generally described as ruled by Pakistanis:

First thing I was told when I moved here, my uncle he said to me: "Whatever you do, don't upset a Pakistani". I went: "Why?" He said to me: "They tend to be really violent here". I said: "Why?" "Because there are so many of them. They think they can do anything they want, kick off with a Bengali, with an English or

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<sup>1</sup> Although the term 'riots' has been disputed by academia (Burler and Reid 1996:155), the public opinion recognizes such events under this label and, more importantly, 'riots' has been the charge applied to young men convicted in 2001.

whatever because they know all they need to do is to phone a few numbers and all their friends and family come to help. They have all the connections because they know all of them come from the same place [in Pakistan], (...)If you do [upset a Pakistani] run. Don't stay there because in five minutes you will have fifty of them" (Chilli, Bengali University student from Northampton, quoted in Bolognani 2002)

In reality, Pakistanis constitute no more than 19% of the nearly 500,000 inhabitants (2001 Census), but the clustering is such that the inner city appears to visitors as mainly Asian<sup>2</sup>. Stressing the idea that the city is not Bradford any more but is instead *Bradistan*, may contribute to worsening the relations between communities: the African/Caribbean community, for instance, apparently feels neglected because of the prospect that Pakistani lobbying deprives them of the attention they seek towards their problems ( Singh 2002:62; Harrison and Phillips 2005:196). However, the prominence of the 'Asian' aspect is a reflection of the impact that South Asian Muslims have had on this Northern town. However, Bradford is also rich with descendants from various other nationalities: Indians, Bangladeshis, Italians, Polish, Ukrainians, Chinese, Germans, Afghanis, South Americans, Irish (Mawby and Batta 1980:34; Siddique 1993:18; Singh 2002:17). Most of them were drawn to Bradford by the prospect of work in the textile industry.

The first study of Bradford Pakistani men was published in 1974 by Dhaya. The object of the study was mainly related to residential patterns and community history since the 1960s (McLoughlin 2006b). Some of his observations were about

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<sup>2</sup> Although in the Bradford district "Asian" is commonly used to indicate Pakistanis, in this thesis the term Asian will be used to indicate people who were born in South Asia or who descend from there. The term Indian will include Sikh and Hindus. When not specified, the term Pakistani will refer to Muslim independently of their sub-group (i.e. Pathan, Kashmiri, etc.). The term Kashmiri will refer in particular to the people coming from the Mirpur District, who are the majority group within the Pakistani population of Bradford.

*biraderi*<sup>3</sup>-based support, the widespread suspicion about White people, the reasons for clustering and the lingering on of the myth of return (Bolognani 2007, forthcoming).

In 1964, when Dahya started his research, the Pakistani population in Bradford was estimated at 12,000 (5,400 Mirpuris, 3,000 Chachchis, 1,800 Western Punjabis, 300 Pathans, 1,000 from various parts of Western Pakistan and 1,500 Sylhetis) (Dahya: 1974). In the 1961 Census, only 3,457 Pakistanis<sup>4</sup>, 1,512 Indians and 984 African/Caribbeans were recorded. In 1970 the Pakistani population in Bradford was already estimated as 21,000 (*ibid.*).

The 1991 Census registered the Bradford population of South Asian descent as 65,450 (14% of the city population). 48,900 of them are being regarded as Pakistani/Kashmiri. As such, Bradford became the second largest British urban centre for Pakistani concentration. The latest data (Phillips: 2001) show that in only a decade, the Asian population has grown to 94,520. Importantly, 73,900 of them are Pakistani/Kashmiri.

Table 5.1 Asian population in Bradford from 1961 to 2001

	1961 Census	1964 Figures (Dahya: 1974)	1970 Figures (Dahya: 1974)	1981 Census (Macey: 2001)	1991 Census (Phillips: 2001)	2001 Census (Phillips: 2001)
Number of Asians	3,457	12,000	21,000	46,720	65,450	94,520
Percentage of Asians	1.1%	...	...	10.6%	14%	19%
Number of Pakistanis/ Kashmiris	...	5,400	...	34,116	48,900	73,900

<sup>3</sup> The extended family of agnatic descent (see 5.2).

<sup>4</sup> Until 1977, year of Bangladesh independence, the term Pakistanis includes Bengalis as well.

As far as single nationalities are concerned, Bangladeshis (mainly Sylhetis) compose the smallest significant identifiable sub-group within the Asian community (around 4,000 in 1991) and are distributed in the city with a pattern very similar to the Pakistani one, that is to say, they tend to cluster according to provenance. Nevertheless, there is no area where Bangladeshis are present in a percentage higher than 5% (Phillips 2001:2).

Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs, or Gujarati Hindus, have a very different location from Muslims in the geography of the town. These relatively small communities who once lived side by side with the Muslims, or even shared accommodation, are now moving to suburbs or to more heterogeneous areas (Ouseley 2001:9; Singh 2002:25). Ethnic clustering, self- or forced segregation are some of the themes that will recur in the thesis when arguments about the alleged insularity of Bradford Pakistanis will be put forward (cf. 9.3). More than 80% of Pakistanis live in areas defined as affected by multiple deprivation<sup>5</sup>, against 45% of Sikhs (Phillips 2001:3).

## **5.2. Ethnic disadvantage**

Having been one of the wealthiest parts of the country when the textile industry was at its peak, Bradford is now amongst the most deprived (Neighbourhood Statistics 2001). TUC researches have suggested that Asian unemployment in Bradford is the worst in the country (Singh 2002: 168). Businesses are suffering from the bad image and are considerably affected by crime (Bradford Chamber of

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<sup>5</sup> By multiple deprivation we refer to a situation of disadvantage in more than one field: poor housing, overcrowded households, malnutrition, illiteracy, educational underachievement, unemployment, etc. The criteria used to measure these factors might be perceived in a different way depending on the background of the observer; for instance, a household perhaps might be defined as overcrowded more easily by a White British person rather than by a British Asian, but statistics use established UK official standards.

Commerce and Industry 2003). Social conflict in the former industrial centre is high due to several factors such as racial tension, wide spread economic disadvantage, drugs and criminal groups (WYP 2003: 14-15, 17); the Pakistani population is often blamed by some of the local white working class for violence, crime (Webster 1995:11), political corruption and periodic riots (Amin 2003:461). For some the perpetuation of Asian models of living also affects an already precarious situation, brought about by the textile crisis of the 1970s (Webster 1995). Other commentators focus their social analysis of the context on supposed Pakistani underestimation of education, different attitudes to consumption, marriages with partners sent from Pakistan and gender issues (Macey 2001).

The 1991 Census revealed that the unemployment rate among Bradford Asian and African/Caribbean youth was amongst the worst in the country with one out of three young people from minority ethnic groups out of work,

In education Bradford schools are apparently amongst the poorest performers in the nation, in terms of structural inadequacy, quality of teaching and truancy (Ouseley 2001:13, Singh 2002:172).

Together with residential segregation, there is also a phenomenon of school clustering, and the situation in non-white schools is generally supposed to be the worst.

In the educational sector many issues of Multiculturalism are challenged. We are speaking amongst others about language problems, different festivities, and lack of staff recruitment from ethnic minorities. More than 30% of primary school pupils speak English as a second, third or even a fourth language (Singh 2001). The survival of the use of the original languages may be partly due to the fact that for a long time every year 60% of the marriages in the Asian community

were transcontinental (Darr and Morrell 1988)<sup>6</sup> and therefore one member of the family will speak their mother tongue with the children; children frequently only play with peers of the same cultural background and consequently tend not to speak English; most of their afternoon since the age of six is spent in Mosques where the Quran is not taught in English.

In 2001 Muslim pupils attended school in only seven of the thirty Bradford wards (Lewis 2001); the 13 Asian councillors (out of 90 for the city as a whole) have been elected from these same wards. Nineteen First Schools, eight Middle Schools and three Upper Schools are attended by 90% of all the Muslim students (ibid.). National statistics for examinations taken by 15 and 16 years olds indicate that while Indian children out-achieve white pupils – 54% getting five or more GCSEs at Grade A-C against 47% for whites in 1998 – the figures for Pakistani and Bangladeshi pupils are 29% and 33% respectively. This will be reflected in their occupational patterns (ibid.: 1).

While clustering and general disadvantage have characterised the history of the Bradford Pakistani community, it seems important to highlight that economic and wider resistance strategies to general disadvantage have changed throughout the history of the settlement.

### **5.3. The migration history**

In Bradford there is a paradigm of South Asian male migration recounted more or less in the same way in all households encountered by the present writer.

Typically, a male member of the family would have been given a voucher to go to Britain and work in the textile industry. Men from the Mirpur region were

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<sup>6</sup> More recent data are not available, but during fieldwork the impression was that a great number of marriages are still transcontinental.

prioritised in the distribution of such vouchers as compensation, agreed by the Pakistani government, for the loss of land as a result of the construction of Mangla Dam (for a deeper analysis of the consequences of the dam, see Kalra 2000: 65).

Once settled, individuals attracted relatives or friends over, organizing their journey and provided accommodation on their arrival. Through these processes financial remittances to the family or village increased, and when the original voucher had had to be topped up with family help, this was the occasion to reciprocate efforts. The migration system has been described as *chain migration* (Ballard 1990:222; Shaw 1994:39; Ilahi and Jafarey 1999:1). Chain migration is “the processes by which prospective immigrants learned of opportunities, were provided with passage money, and had initial accommodation and employment arranged through previous immigrants” (Macdonald and Macdonald 1962:435). Such processes help explain why the Asian communities of Bradford are so homogenous in provenance: migration was based mainly on personal relations on which were built mutual help and support. Some informants recalled their fathers’ experiences like this:

After Second World War there was a lack of men in this country. England had a massive wool industry and needed cheap labour. Our grandparents came here to help them. (Sharukh, quoted in Bolognani 2002)

My grandfather fought in the Second World War [and stayed here]. Then, my father came over, and the rest. Bradford was famous for its mills. He wanted to make money and go back. Then he realized he could earn 15 or 20 times what he got in Pakistan [and stayed] (Sadiq, quoted in Bolognani 2002)

My dad comes from Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and came here in the Fifties. He worked in Scotland and in the Midlands. (...) He came through an agency, British people sponsoring British interests.(...) He

brought a few relatives when he got established. In the Sixties, my mum came.(Amjad, quoted in Bolognani 2002)

These stories sometimes carry a romantic attachment, as they seem built on the heroic motives of men leaving the homeland for an economic but somehow epic adventure (Werbner: 1980), although this experience was not totally new, as Pathans, Kashmiris and Bangladeshis apparently were traditionally travellers.

My dad came on a boat in the late Sixties, not earlier. He had no money, the only thing he had was the clothes he was wearing. He used to be in the army, he was a male nurse and he had saved up [for the journey]. [All he] had [was] the name and the address of a person in Newcastle (Ronnie, quoted in Bolognani 2002)

My father was from North West frontier in Pakistan. There was a very difficult climate in the Fifties and he decided to move to Karachi and Dubai. He was fifteen at the time.(...) His leg needed to be amputated. His friend in Dubai had the same operation in England.(...) My dad was a world famous tailor. He sent his brother on a scouting mission, just to see.(...) My uncle came over in 1960, he did not know a word of English but he got by. He had an English girlfriend. When my dad came over, he kicked the girlfriend out, had his leg amputated and became the first textile merchant in Bradford. (Amir, quoted in Bolognani 2002)

Nevertheless, the idea of the pioneer generation in Britain and the aura around what has been described as the 'community of suffering' (Werbner 1980) carries consequences in the definition of an alleged generational gap today, a recurrent topic in the present research interviews (cf. 9.2) :

I think generally [elders] tend to think that our youth today they are out of hand because they don't have jobs. That is one of the most popular reasons. They haven't got jobs, they are bored, they want to cause troubles, that [is] why they do it. And they don't look upon [the younger generation] too greatly, the elder generation. They seem to think that if we had the hardship that they had in their times, then we'd be more...sort of responsible, more thoughtful in what we do, but we are only reckless, and thoughtless because we have more freedom, we've got more facilities available to us then they ever had in those times. I remember my father used to tell me he used to survive on 5 pounds a week, that was his wage. And I could never survive on 5



pounds a day, never mind a week. But you see the time have changed and they strongly believe that because the times have changed we have been given...what's the word...more freedom and more...more...flexibility. (Zaara)

The first waves of the migration could not build on any chain. Men at the time used to link up casually and move in together regardless of caste and provenance in order to minimize their expenses. It seems that the very first Indo-Pakistanis arriving in Bradford were a group of sailors who made their way from Hull in 1941 and rented rooms from Polish families (Dhaya 1970; 1974). Today it is still possible to see traces of the once large Polish community in the area between Manchester Road and Little Horton Lane: their catholic church, the working men's club and a delicatessen.

Slowly the Polish relocated and the Pakistanis pooled enough money together to buy their first houses. Bradford was still a textile capital, they were working long hours and did not waste their earnings. Importantly, their traditional informal system of non-interest money lending helped make their start on the property ladder possible (Siddique 1993; see also 6.2.2).

With the purchase of the first buildings, an institution of mythical connotations was born: the *bachelors' house* (Werbner 1980). The era of these overcrowded basic houses is recalled by the first migrants as the golden era of the migration: the only rule seemed to be camaraderie. In the accounts of the people who lived in a bachelors' house there are extraordinary episodes of generosity; if a new arrival did not find a job straight away, he was maintained by the rest of the group even for up to one year; if a member of the family died in Pakistan, the men of the house would raise the money to send the relative home. These times might be seen as the ones when these men were happiest, when they maintained their traditional values and beliefs, apparently unspoilt by the

materialism of Western life, another recurrent theme in the fieldwork on which this thesis is based (see for example 8.3).

The living conditions of such accommodation, however, were very poor: the eldest or the ones who had been in England for longer had their own beds, while the others used to share one (the so called “warm bed”) with whoever was on a different shift, but many slept on the floor or on two chairs put together (Siddique 1993: 20).

The heterogeneity of provenance in *bachelors' houses* did not last long; different contingencies modified the orientation of migrants of different origins in different ways. For instance, Sikhs who had fled Pakistan after the blood events post-Partition (Ballard 1990:226; Singh 2002:24), decided to make England their new home and before any other ethnic group called their families over (Mawby and Batta 1980:36). The same thing happened with the Punjabis expelled from East Africa. With women and children, bachelors' houses became unsuitable, although they survived for some time within the Pakistani community. Some observers have seen earlier family reunion of other Asian peoples as one of the reasons behind better economic achievements and integration patterns when compared to Bradford Mirpuris (cf. Singh 2001).

With the arrival of families, the organization of the immigrants' areas changed considerably: halal meat shops, garment retailers, specialised green grocers and especially mosques and madrasas started flourishing. The first proper mosque (men originally prayed in a room of a house) was opened in 1959; in 1969 there were six mosques in Bradford, growing to seventeen in 1979, and by 1989<sup>7</sup> there were thirty four.

Although accurate data have not been produced, probably due to the problems in self-ascription, it is commonly known that most of the Pakistanis were from a relatively small and deprived district of Azad Kashmir called Mirpur, and this group is still the majority (McLoughlin 2006b). Other migrants were from Campbellpur district, in the Attock region. People from Attock are called Chachchis and are popularly seen as a sub-caste of Pathans. Pathans, who are not very numerous in Bradford, came from the North West Frontier, near Afganistan. The Punjabis of Bradford are mainly from Lyallpur (Faisalabad), Rawalpindi and Gujar Khan. Only a few are from urban areas. There is also a small community from Pakistani Gujarat (Mawby and Batta 1980:36). These different ethnic origins still seem to play some role in social interactions and stereotypes circulating in Bradford (cf. 10.5).

Anthropologists have argued that the rural origin of the migrant population has contributed in shaping chain migration and subsequent settlement. Ballard (2001), for instance, argues that the typical family organization of the Pakistani rural areas is characterised by an active solidarity that guarantees a better performance of an individual in a foreign land in terms of reciprocal moral and financial support. Furthermore, in the rural areas the common mentality suggests relying only on your own people and being suspicious of strangers. Trying to avoid borrowing money outside the family, living in a sober way and not relying on anyone but relatives seem parts of the rural Pakistani culture, especially the Mirpuri (see 5.1).

Direct sources and relevant literature (Dhaya 1970; Anwar 1979) agree in depicting the first years of life in England as nostalgic of the homeland; men were hoping to return to their land and families as soon as they had built up some

capital to invest. England appeared as the land of sacrifice where no rest or pleasure should undermine the achievement for which the family in Pakistan had sent a man abroad. On the other hand, there were attempts to integrate; for instance, Siddique (1993:25) describes Pakistani men who dismissed the traditional Muslim outfit in favour of jacket and tie and socialized with the indigenous opposite gender.

Contacts with the relatives were kept constant through letters and pictures. Shaw (1988) argues that a difference in attitude came about when in 1962 a rumour spread that the United Kingdom wanted to restrict immigration laws. Apparently, Pakistani travel agents took advantage of the rumour to encourage more men to leave. Young children of 7-9 years old joined a father or an uncle and, sometimes, by claiming to be older, apparently entered the textile mills. Overall, however, children were systematically enrolled in local schools as education was generally seen as a good investment (Siddique 1993:21). The Pakistani migrants felt that they had to make the most out of the last years of relatively easy immigration, and as a result some women followed their male family members. Some men who had attempted to return saw their business projects fail and came back to England. The majority thought it better to stay, fearing that if they were not successful in Pakistan, they might have not been able to enter again. One informant described her father's experience in this way:

My dad borrowed the money off my mother's side. My mum's dad had given him the land because he didn't want him to take his daughter away. (...) After two years he went back. He realised the money wasn't enough and came back again. Eventually my mum came over. Then I was born and they were trapped. (...) My mum always says "he brought me here saying we would only stay for a few years" (Shazia, quoted in Bolognani 2002)

Collecting the money for the journey was not an easy task, especially if contacts with a textile mill had not been established in order to get a voucher. The ones who left for England were people who were not deprived. Most of them belonged to higher castes that had had better contacts through the army (and had been apparently the favourite groups to be recruited during the British Raj; Ballard 1994) and usually were better off.

Some informants confirmed the relative prosperity of migrants:

My dad [and his relatives] they came from quite a small village. They didn't have to come. They were quite comfortable there (Amjad, quoted in Bolognani 2002)

The first time I went back was two years ago, wanted to see the place where I was born.(...)I saw huts with dried leaves and mud. They were really poor people, they live there. It made me think. (Did your dad use to live like that?) my family was better off than the ones in huts because they used to farm.(...)We are *Raja*<sup>7</sup>(Malik, quoted in Bolognani 2002)

#### **5.4. "From textile mills to taxi ranks" (Kalra:2000)**

In the 1970s, textile mills and related industries, such as engineering, were in difficulties. The textile industry had coped, in spite of obsolete machinery, partly because of the cheap labour provided by South Asian workers (Mawby and Batta 1980:33; Siddique 1993:20; Amin 2003:461). Nevertheless, not even the flexibility of the workers proved to be enough.

Migrants who were making their way to England after exhausting interviews in migration offices in Pakistan would not be given category A visas any more<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> Short form for 'Rajputs' one of the highest castes of landowners.

<sup>8</sup> According to the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act, category A visas were given to people who had been offered a job in the UK, category B to people with qualifications and category C to unskilled workers (Siddique 1993:22)

By the 1970s, however, many Asian families had settled down. The working men who had been made redundant acknowledged the benefits of the welfare state, and some of them were able to build realistic expectations out of the education available to their children. In this context, most of the families decided to stay instead of returning to their homeland. In earlier study rare cases have been reported to the present writer of people trying their fortune back in Pakistan (Bolognani 2007b, forthcoming).

Neither investment in Mirpur nor in Bradford was rewarded straight away. In Pakistan, lack of infrastructure to support ambitious business, bureaucracy and complicated family dynamics apparently undermined the success of courageous entrepreneurial attempts. In England, poor economic conditions meant tight competition between Asians and Whites for jobs, accommodation and other kinds of resources (Mawby and Batta 1980:33; Singh 2002:169).

In 1959 Pakistanis in Bradford owned only five enterprises: two food stores with a butcher and three cafes. In 1966 there were 133 businesses owned by Pakistanis: 51 food stores and 16 cafes; in 1970 there were 260 amongst which were 15 private clubs and two bakeries (Dhaya 1974). In 1978 Pakistanis owned 600 businesses (35% of which were in Manningham) (Aldrich et al. 1981).

Some data collected in 1982 show that in Britain 18% of Asian men were self-employed, against only 14% of whites (Modood:1996). This proportion is similar to Bradford's and shows that entrepreneurship is a likely outcome for Asian minorities. Instead of being a consequence of investing an already present capital, the aetiology of Asian entrepreneurship is much more complex (see 8.1).

While between the 1970s and 1980s the demographic growth of the Asian population naturally required more and more specific shops, recession did not hold

back their economic development. Entrepreneurship was in fact a solution to what has been called “blocked upward mobility” (Aldrich et al.1981). Furthermore, during recession, the Pakistani community was able to rely on resources that were not available to the white community: they widely took advantage of traditional interest-free credit options within the community (i.e. *kameti*, a system of credit rotation especially used by women, Shaw 2000; Werbner 2001). While English shops were closing down, Asian shops were being opened. Asian entrepreneurship was not only a symptom of assertiveness but seems to have been generated primarily by resistance to adversity. In businesses, mostly run by family, flexibility of workers and total commitment guarantee better outcomes and durability compared to the contemporary unstable condition of the British labour market.

The success of the businesses in those years depended on the need for a specific market able to provide for the specific needs of the Asian community. The differentiation of the market kept the competition between English and Asian enterprises to a minimum for a long time and has also been seen as a factor enhancing segregation in the city (Aldrich et al.1981).

One evident change, like in other former textile cities in the North, was what has been captured in the phrase “from textile mills to taxi ranks” (Kalra 2000).

Pakistani-owned taxis are significant indicators of the economic history of the community. This is a very convenient occupation for men who still appreciate the value of tradition by performing all the duties of visiting family and friends, or who periodically return to Pakistan for several weeks, as Private Hire Companies can be flexible (Bolognani 2002). Sometimes the taxi licence is shared by relatives, so the same car can be on the road for more than one shift, driven by

more than one person. Taxi drivers seem to represent a substantial part of the 'Asian economic niche' (see 8.1). At the same time, however, due to their mobile lives and relatively unsanctioned freedom, they appeared during the research as the occupational category more likely to be treated as a folk-devil (cf. 8.1). Perhaps the most famous Asian business sector in Bradford, however, is the catering industry; Bradford is often referred to as the UK's 'Capital of Curry'. Importantly, attached to this industry are related activities such as specialised butchers and food import companies. However, this is only one of the industries that have flourished in Bradford as a result of Asian entrepreneurship. Recently, a new plan of regeneration for the city has been based on the *BrAsian* (McLoughlin 2006b) identity of Bradford: a museum of spices and a public hall called 'Casa Mela'<sup>9</sup> which is hoped will be the centre of the renewed city centre. The identity of Bradford, it seems, is now permanently bound to its strengthening Asian component

### **5.5. Assertiveness, self-defence and political struggles in the 1980s**

While the Asian communities in Bradford were struggling to survive following the economic recession of the 1970s, the early 1980s saw the British National Party widely campaigning in West Yorkshire. The National Front opened the Yorkshire Campaign to Stop Immigration, and racial attacks and violent episodes increased. Asians were being blamed for the bad economic situation (Amin 2003: 461) and some of them felt compelled to find alternative ways to resist and defend their community.

In 1981 the police arrested twelve teenagers (later to become known as the 'Bradford Twelve') who were putting together home-made bombs, apparently for

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<sup>9</sup> 'Mela' is the Indian term for 'fair', from the hindo-european root 'ml' (to meet).



the purposes of self-defence (Murphy 1982; Singh 2002: 27; McLoughlin 2006b). At the same time the Asian community found itself once again cohesive in spite of internal differences; they built a strong lobby to persuade the council to provide halal meat in schools (Siddique 1993:162, Singh 2002:27).

Between 1982 and 1984, Bradford was on the front pages of national newspapers through the so called Honeyford affair. Honeyford was the headmaster of the Drummond Middle School in Manningham, one of the areas with the highest concentration of Muslims. Honeyford published a series of articles against the multicultural position of the City Council. In an article which appeared in the Times Education Supplement, he accused the Pakistani population, according to Siddique's (1993:168) and Kureishi's (1996) reconstruction, of having a genetically hereditary lack of democratic knowledge. If these racist views were not enough, some crucial passages from the Salisbury Review were translated into Urdu in the Yorkshire Post (Singh 2002:35) and they had such publicity in the Muslim community that many of the families felt as if they had been challenged in their *izzat*. Subsequently, an alliance between Muslim families, left Labour and Socialists compelled Ray Honeyford to retire.

The Honeyford affair has been regarded by some interested in the political history of Bradford as a turning point for the participation of the Asian community in public democratic life. Mirpuris in particular, who successfully mobilised against Honeyford, realised their capacity to apply pressure even without involving other Asian groups. The council for Mosques opened in 1981 and quickly gained recognition in the city by participating in a variety of political campaigns; its members took part in the first attempts to free Lumb Lane from prostitution by organising petitions (Siddique 1993:119).

## 5.6. The Rushdie affair and vigilantism

After the awakening of political awareness during the Honeyford Affair, there was another event which marked a turning point in the way the Pakistani community perceived itself in the city-the Rushdie affair.

In January 1989 a group of Pakistani men publicly burnt a copy of *The Satanic Verses* (Samad 1992; Siddique 1993; Lewis 2002; Singh 2002; Herbert 2003). The Local W.H. Smith was forced to remove the book from its shelves and even today Bradford University Library only gives access to a copy after the completion of a form; the subject is still considered sensitive.

The promoter of the public outcry was the Council of Mosques, the same institution that had coordinated the upheaval against Honeyford and had been commonly perceived (Lewis 2002; Singh 2002:41) as a major example of good will in Bradford race relations matters.

The absence of a blasphemy law covering the Muslim faith became the focal point of the protest (Herbert 2003) and heated debates in the city lasted until they were absorbed in 1990 by issues surrounding the war in Iraq. In this tense atmosphere, somewhat like that of post - September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001, Bradford Muslims became victims of physical attacks and prejudice (Samad 1992). It seems that the popularity of and the reliance on the Council of Mosques grew sharply. While the few Asian councillors were perceived as too diplomatic, the Pakistani community saw in the Council their principal defendant. Samad argues that, thus, a pseudo-religious revival got started. In fact, religion was in some sense a political issue and a means of cohesion, as the number of people regularly attending mosques did not undergo any change:

The Youth were resorting to Islamic idioms and metaphors to express their discontent against society which refused to accept them on an equal footing. Symbolically this was epitomised by their exclusion from the Yorkshire Cricket Club, despite being excellent cricketers who were born and bred in Bradford (Samad: 1992:516)

Samad also reports about some young people lobbying the council of Mosques - willing to create continuity with the younger generation- not only to condemn the war on Iraq, but also to support Saddam Hussein. It was clear that none of these positions were seen favourably by the majority of the city, and political success on these matters naturally was impossible.

Together with the pseudo-religious revival, Herbert (2003) has pointed out how important it is to contextualize the Rushdie affair in the Mirpuri cultural locality. Herbert argues that Bradford Muslims, with what is considered by many as almost worship of the Prophet as almost a deity, were particularly affected by the 'lamponing' of his person in the book.

While the Honeyford affair was a political matter relating to multiculturalism and citizenship, the Rushdie Affair and its continuation for some participants into the support of Saddam Hussein became a stimulant for religious radicalisation.

One informant synthesised this process in these words:

It is a logical step to become radical as a Muslim in the West  
(Amjad, quoted in Bolognani 2002)

One of the main manifestations of public actions based on or at least articulated through religion was the eight week violent struggle in 1995 against prostitution in Manningham, followed in the summer by the riots.

The 1995 riots were the climax of something that had been building up since the elections in the spring. The electoral campaign in the Asian areas was

characterised by contests imported from Kashmir. Even the younger generation got involved, and groups of young men organised noisy public manifestations in the streets shouting “Jat” or “Bains”, depending whether they were supporting the candidate of one caste<sup>10</sup> or the other (Vine 1997). In Pakistan, this is the way electoral campaigns are conducted (Samad 1992), but it may have contributed to creating a climate of unease in the city.

At the same time, a group of residents, including whites, started patrolling the streets in order to prevent prostitution. Soon a religious group monopolised the campaign. The clamour for action led to other men joining in the campaign and it was soon transformed into something else, as described by Bradford-born novelist Alam:

(...)Manningham [is] a pretty quiet part of town, compared to what it used to be a few years before. The locals, mostly fanatical Muslims (words from the press, not me) set up little petrol squads which chased out prostitutes and dealers (...). And when I say chased, that's just what I mean: ran them out, with bats, petrol bombs and God knows what else. (Alam 2002: 123)

The action lasted eight weeks. As the campaign had started by referring to the necessity of changing Manningham into an area more compatible with Islamic values and customs, the religious idioms were taken over by the ones who had joined later and resorted to violence. Many older men, although taken aback by such action, struggled to condemn the degeneration of the campaign because of its Islamic connotations. After rediscovering their Muslim identity in the Rushdie Affair, the younger generation tried it out as a powerful cohesion device, as a source of pride and satisfaction (Macey. 1999a, 1999b)

The riots took place between 9th and 11th June 1995. Around 300 young British Pakistanis attacked the ‘Cop Shop’ on Toller Lane and non-Muslim shops,

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<sup>10</sup> The author is aware of the controversial use of ‘caste’ in Pakistani studies. However, the use of this term in the present research reflects the one made by research participants.

looted and got hold of petrol bombs. At the end of the riots, the action was reconstructed (Allen 1996; Singh 2002:43) the starting point was traced to a rumour about police attacking a Pakistani woman and her child and the running over of a Pakistani man. Further investigation (Allen, 1996; Macey: 1999a, b) showed that police had only intervened to suspend a street football match that had appeared to be becoming violent. When the police were insulted as a response to their intervention, the tense atmosphere and the prejudice which had built up in the few months earlier exacerbated the situation. Rumours circulated and stirred a protest not addressed to any specific target. Some Pakistani women tried a mediation in the streets between the police and the men ready to riot (with the experience gained after the guerrilla action against prostitutes), but unsuccessfully. There is a belief nowadays in Bradford that police tend to disregard many ambiguous behaviours of Pakistanis, because they have experienced how easily a riot can begin even from an innocent intervention of theirs, but this is countered by perceptions of 'over-policing' and complaints about discriminatory stop and search (see 12.5).

Subsequent interpretations noted the lack of preparation of the police and bias of the council (Taj 1996). The Conservative government refused to invest money in a public inquiry and Bradford itself was able to produce documents which were not cohesive and ended up being published separately (Taj 1996; Macey 1999a; Singh 2002:46).

### **5.7. The climax of tension: 2001**

Between 1995 and 2001 Bradford's smaller police stations were attacked a couple of times and periodically small groups of young Pakistanis confronted the police. The national press had overlooked such incidents and the outburst of the 2001 riots

surprised British public opinion. Bradfordians, however, had seen the escalation of violence and some were in a way prepared for it. In spring 2001, a commission chaired by Sir Herman Ouseley had started working on the report that was launched just after the riots in July.

The Bradford riots had been preceded by a series of events in Northern England that had put the police on the alert (see disorders in Lidget Green, Bradford, Leeds, Burnley and Accrington, Lancashire, and Oldham, Macey 2002; Bagguley and Hussain 2003b). On 7<sup>th</sup> July 2001, after a public Anti-Nazi league rally against the BNP (who had threatened to march on Bradford, but had been banned by the local authorities) the worst riots in 20 years on English soil took place (Macey: 2002). The rioting went on for two days in the Manningham area<sup>11</sup> and cost Bradford council 23 million pounds and the Police 10 million pounds (ibid.).

The 2001 riots seem to differ from the past as there was no clear collective political agenda behind it and it was mixed with organised looting and stealing (see Khalil's quote below). The political demands implied but not articulated with the same force as in the previous 1980 and 1995 episodes were that police should have defended the territory from the BNP/NF:

[The rioters] were really pissed off with the police because the police took their [BNP] sides rather than ours, rather than moving them out, they moved us out...as if...these were outsiders, they should have got rid of them first, they shouldn't have allowed them to come<sup>12</sup> (Jamal)

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<sup>11</sup> Manningham was the centre of 1995 and 2001 riots and its history and demography has made it a popular setting for research and media accounts of Bradford problems. Locals strongly believe that a serious postcode discrimination is implemented against people from Manningham (Harrison and Phillips 2003:200). Manningham is one of the most deprived areas of Bradford with 32% unemployed compared to the 10% average of West Yorkshire (Phillips 2001). Amongst the young Manningham Pakistanis the situation is even worse and unemployment is calculated as around 45% (ibid.).

<sup>12</sup> This seemed to be the general perception. However, the police publicly declared that four NF members arrived at Bradford Interchange station and were sent back from that very platform (Bagguley and Hussain 2003c)

A clash between the young men and the police materialised in the absence of the real target, the BNP/NF. The Pakistani community, however, seemed to be united in its condemnation: most of the elders condemned the events and it is said that many denounced the young people who had taken part in it (Macey 2002) when pictures of more than 150 rioters or alleged rioters were published (Bagguley and Hussain 2003b). However, a feeling of double standards in terms of sentencing prevailed, and in 2005 it was more popular amongst Bradford Pakistanis to observe a feeling of indulgence for the rioters: the 2001 riots seemed to gain a more rounded political status after their occurrence. Had it not been for the harsh sentencing, the condemnation of the actions of the few young men may have lasted longer. The majority went to prison and the harsh sentences they served were widely criticised:

These young lads only wanted to go looting (...) but what about these football hooligans? How comes they are not in for 3/4 years? (Amir, quoted in Bolognani 2002)

The harsh sentencing was perceived as discriminatory against minority ethnic groups (Kalra 2003), as a result, on coming out of prison the young men were not ostracised by the community and some were even praised:

My sister was just telling me that one of her friends', her brother just got released from prison, not because of the riots, but because of something else, and on the same day there was this other boy who had been released because of the riots, and their family, they ordered a limousine and they had like quite a lot of music, and happiness that he had come out of prison. But they made a big show about it! (Laughs) It was this idealising way, that you took part in a racial thing...fighting for your own territory. (Fatima)

In 1995 the lack of policing in areas inhabited mostly by Pakistanis and the perception of police racism were some of the causes of the riots. Locally, the institution of the Minority Police Liaison committee guaranteed a better exchange

between minority ethnic groups and the police. Nationally, the publication of the MacPherson Report (1999), with the recognition of Institutional Racism, dictated new guidelines and focused public attention on the police. The recognition of minority ethnic groups and their needs became paramount. The 2001 riots seem to have been organised on a different premise. Most of the community was not behind the young men who participated in the violence. Collective rights were not part of the discourses used by most of the rioters when speaking about their experiences:

Jamal: The people I know who were in the riots, they said 'we were just having a laugh'...their intentions was to get past the police, go into town, break into shops, get all the design clothes for themselves, keep them or sell them , this is all they wanted to do.

Me. You imply there was no link with the threat of the BNP?

Jamal: That was an excuse. The first guy who got slashed by the BNP<sup>13</sup> lives around here and I was chatting with him yesterday and the guy who has come out from prison was there as well, it was the three of us. Basically he said...the riots was because of the BNP and the BNP shouldn't have been there, (...) so it was a bit of both...a laugh and the BNP.

Causation may not adequately be explained by thinking in terms of a response to a pattern of social exclusion and discrimination linked to racist governmental practices, but rather in terms of a multiplicity of local factors (such as long term cultural, educational and material deprivation, see 4.2) and grievances with local police accumulated over a number of years.

Numerous racist attacks against Asians took place after the riots as a punishment for the 7<sup>th</sup> July disorders.

Below there are two reports about the event: the first by a member of the Anti-Nazi League, the second from a young man who was not present but whose best friends were involved and claims to know exactly how things developed:

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<sup>13</sup> This refers to a racist attack carried out by a white man on a Pakistani man in the early afternoon of the first day of the riots. The perpetrator's membership to the BNP has not been confirmed.



They all blame young people and the Anti nazi league and individuals like myself. (...) if anything actually gave that the publicity... the fact that there was violence... they reported it much more because of the violence... Like in Prague, like in Genoa<sup>14</sup> (...) they had to start (...) it was perfect and that's what happened in Bradford (...): for the whole day was tense (...) we got Mps, pop stars, nobody talks about that, nobody talks about the fact that there was no violence between midday and half past four (...) (...) I think it was a bit of fun once the riots had happened. (...) The police, they portrayed it as if 700 people [from BNP] had turned up in Bradford and were attacked by an Asian mob, the whole day wanted a riot. You have to look at Genoa with Fini<sup>15</sup> visiting all the police stations (...) something very similar happened in Bradford. They know how to provoke Asian youth, 15/16/17 years olds kids. But I tell you what if we need 15/16 years olds (...) to stop the National Front and the BNP from doing what they did in Oldham and Burnley we'll do it again. (...) I won't condemn the young people for the violence because it is far too simplistic to condemn them. (...) The bourgeoisie politicians who equipped the police with stone guns (...) gas and rubber bullets (are to blame) We are not the problems! I get a bit worked up ... I just think newspapers are full of too much crap and all it is to bring down Asians (Shahid, quoted in Bolognani 2002)

Khalil: We get searched whenever they want

Me: Is it because of September 11th or the riots?

Khalil: I feel it has more to do with the riots, do you get what I mean? (...) I've got plenty of friends who were there. (...) My mates just say shit happens, it's just one of them things, innit ? I was abroad, when I came back I said "Wow, I should have been here". (...) After that white people in white areas smashed up Asian shops and restaurants. Lot of my mates got 4-5 years just to throw three stones. (...) [The ones who stole the cars] took the cars first, no number plates... what can you say shit happens. Them people who were trying to sell them were White and Jamaicans. The pakis got shafted, all the rest [enjoyed] free shops you could get what you wanted and nobody said anything. (...) (If I had been there) I would be a millionaire now. (Khalil, quoted in Bolognani 2002)

Between 2001 and 2002 Bradford was in the limelight when major political changes were occurring both in Europe and on a global level. While the debate about the civic loyalty of Muslims was developing in Britain following the riots,

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<sup>14</sup> Where in that year manifestations organised by the Seattle Movement ended up in violent confrontations with the police. In Genoa, 20 years old Carlo Giuliani was shot dead by a police man.

<sup>15</sup> Gianfranco Fini at the time was the leader of the Italian post fascist party, Alleanza Nazionale.

the world was struck by September 11<sup>th</sup>. In spring 2002, in France, Le Front National with its candidate Le Pen won second place after Chirac in the national elections, increasing the fears of fascism that had stirred the riots in Northern England eight months before.

### **5.8. Local and Global: Bradford post 11<sup>th</sup> September**

Bradford in 2001 was struggling to reduce the national stereotypes about the city that seem to be perceived as mainly related to its Pakistani community. At the same time, a series of problems connected with crime had served only to reinforce the general perception of a 'degeneration' of inner-city life. In 2002 Bradford had been given the name 'Capital of Heroine' (Apaxton 2002). Although there are no data that screen the ethnic proportion of the criminals, Asian areas of residence are widely affected by the phenomenon (ibid; Careers Bradford 2002: 3). Drugs are one of the main problems and the police have taken up a zero-tolerance strategy to break the dealing business (WYP 2004). In 2001 and 2003 the Bradford Chamber of Commerce and Industry conducted an independent crime survey among its members as well as responding to the one distributed by the British Chamber; the results show that all five priorities outlined by the respondents in order to improve their business regarded the fight against deprivation and crime control (BCCI 2003).

Although in Bradford there is little official evidence of a significant Pakistani share in drug related business or in drug consumption, the city seems to have been victim of a moral panic that regards Pakistanis as the main agents of trafficking and selling (Webster 1996; Macey 2002). Emphasis on the alleged self-segregation of communities (Phillips 2001), their 'otherness' (Alexander 2004) and the

international climate of suspicion affecting Muslims (Grillo 2004) have all contributed to a moral panic about British Pakistanis in general and Bradford Pakistanis in particular.

As we have seen in this chapter, since the Eighties with the Bradford Twelve episode, the Honeyford case, the Rushdie affair, and then the 1995 disturbances and the 2001 riots, the Pakistani community in Bradford has presented an image of assertiveness. But, at the same time, forms of unconventional protest have contributed to the racially motivated moral panic present in this northern city (Samad 1992; Herbert 2003). Various cases of violence have taken place in the last twenty years which have been viewed as political acts or as self-defence (Mawby and Batta 1980:18). Asian Vigilantism was a turning point in territorialisation and the process of acquisition of a local identity (Webster 1999: 549, 551; Alexander 2000: 4), but has been misread as the change in reliability on law-abiding Asians (Alexander 200: 8, 128; Kundnani 2002). Visibility of territorialism, and 'spectacularisation' of particular events like the public disturbances have given a bad image to the Pakistani community (Webster 1997).

It is the intent of this thesis to investigate to what extent the crime issue is affecting the Bradford Pakistani Community and how it is tackled by all generations in terms of prevention, social sanctions and reintegration of the criminals. This reflection may benefit from a contextualisation into the diasporic history of the community, as the level of general integration may also be measured in terms of patterns of deviance, as Alam sarcastically states:

I'd come across ignorant racists in my time and the ones on the drugs scene sounded no different. For these people, pakis took their jobs, their women, their shops, their homes, and now, pakis were in on their criminal activities. Us pakis, we had this habit of taking one liberty after another (...)Fucking losers couldn't even work out why they were so shit at what they did. (Alam 2002:70)



## Chapter Six

### **Ethnic resources and networks in the Bradford Pakistani Community**

Chapter Five described the history of the settlement of Pakistanis in Bradford. This chapter will provide an analysis of the elements that may justify the use of a singular noun to refer to the Pakistani community. Although the author is very conscious of the number of different provenances, castes, religious sects that may lead some to think that there is no justification for the use of a singular term to describe the community, it will be argued that an exclusive history, a broad cultural reference and the outsiders' un-nuanced representation is mirrored in the interviewees' own use of 'community' rather than 'communities'. Both Saifullah Khan (1976b) and Imtiaz (2002, cf. 3.5) have made a point out this. The latter argues that hegemonic representations of Muslim youth during the Rushdie affair were internalised and re-elaborated for the production of self-representation; the former, more broadly, argues:

Contact with non-Pakistanis who tend to classify minorities according to nationality, colour or some notion of "Race" influences the self-perception of the individual concerned, particularly when and if the connotations are derogatory. This external definition, and the accompanying behaviour influence the development of a minority. (...)The external definition of the majority is indicated in the persistent use of such terminology as "The Pakistani Community" in the society at large, in the media and, most significantly in the field of community relations.(Saifullah-Khan:1976b:104)

This chapter will therefore explore the heterogeneity and at the same time the consistency of the Bradford Pakistani community, providing the description of the main cultural and social elements that will be functional to the social control analysis of the following chapters. At the same time the analysis will show how at

the present stage in Bradford adaptation leads to some major internal changes. Throughout the chapter a particular focus will be placed on family, its 'moral economy', the social specificity of *biraderi* and the debate designated 'religion vs. Culture'.

### **6.1. The role of family in the settlement**

Anthropologists have argued that the scale and the success of the Mirpuri migration can be satisfactorily explained only by taking into consideration their traditional family structure (Saifullah-Khan 1974; Ballard 2001). In fact, external circumstances such as the distribution of vouchers after the construction of the Mangla Dam (cf. 5.3) would have not been successfully taken advantage of unless there was a supportive network sustaining the migrant. For example, the family cooperated in pooling extra money together for contingencies, in looking after the wife and the children of the migrant and in guarding properties.

The importance of the Kashmiri family system imported to Britain has been considered as paramount also for the development of entrepreneurship (Metcalf et al.1996; Ballard 2001), for the urban segregation of communities (Alder, Cater et al. 1981; Phillips 2001; Singh 2003) and the choices about education and careers (Shaikh and Kelly 1989; McLoughlin 1998a; Shaw 2000).On the other hand, the family has gone through changes and has adapted to the social environment.

#### **6.1.1 The 'moral economy of kin'**

Analysing the various elements that compose cultural capital in the Bradford Pakistani community will underlie the basis for the evaluation of whether there is

a form of cultural capital that may prove successful in the economy of crime prevention. Values such as internal solidarity and rules of reciprocity appear to be consistent with the definition of cultural capital by Bourdieu as 'symbols, ideas and preferences as they have been consciously or unconsciously transmitted and accumulated in order to inform individual actions' (1986:245).

The family was important for many reasons: for chain migration, for finding jobs, for buying the house- kameti<sup>1</sup>, no interest loan. Family is finishing now. Also, the family had a role in education: people compare their children's careers. In all this marriage, family play a very important role, as without it people would have struggled to get married (Umar)

In these instances, cultural capital has proved profitable (Bourdieu 1986:241), as it has been converted in the 'economic capital' (ibid.).

Understanding the family structure and its gender underpinnings may help to highlight some dynamics of discourses about family based crime prevention in part III (for example 9.2 and 11.1). The main question to be answered is whether traditional kin groups may be able to successfully translate their cultural/moral capital in a way adequate to a current British urban environment.

Families' settlement in Bradford only occurred in a second phase of migration. Unlike many other migrant populations, the Mirpuris started their relocating adventure as only men (cf. 5.3). Furthermore, while nowadays part of female migration from South America and other Asian countries is stimulated by a need in private care for female workers (Williams 2001:486), in 1960s UK there was not a high demand for women in private care, while the textile industry was still requiring a cheap workforce. More than anything else, as the honour (*izzat*) of the women in Mirpur is a priority because it affects the reputation of the entire

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<sup>1</sup> 'kameti' or 'committee' is an informal mode of credit rotation.

extended family (Afshar 1989:214), sending them abroad to work in promiscuous environments would have been putting the whole of family honour in jeopardy. It has also been suggested that some families did not wish to encourage women to join their husbands in order to incite their return (Saifullah-Khan 1974). As families were concerned about physical and moral safety of their women (see also 7.4 and 11.1.1) and the living conditions of the up to then transient men were not appropriate and comfortable for women, Mirpuri women did not come to England straight away. They also arrived much later than some other spouses, for example Sikhs, who joined their husbands with the intention of settling and staying after the traumas of Partition (Singh 2001). Saifullah-Khan (1974) again reports informants' tales of Mirpuri women sent to England once gossip reached villages that men were seeing English women and spending their money on them. At this point *biraderis* (extended family) sent their wives abroad (*vilayat*) to remind them of their obligations.

Once the women arrived, the bachelors' houses (see 5.3) changed into family houses. Properties were rented and bought around the mills where the men had temporarily settled. Families started transforming the alien environment into something more familiar.

Informants from previous study by author (Bolognani 2002) state that as the banks were reluctant to start mortgage procedures with Pakistanis, and Islam discouraged them from dealing with money lending unless interest-free, they chose to pool money together and start buying the cheapest houses around the mills where they worked. As previous migrants or white people were moving out of inner city areas (Singh 2002), they were able to buy houses close to each other and establish a setting in some respect similar to the villages back home.



In rural Kashmir, families belonging to the same *biraderi* live in houses attached to each other. As well as being a way to maximise collaboration and defence, such a building strategy allows the women to move freely among related households. The division of the living quarters is an effective image to help understand the gendered roles in the Mirpuri family. In Mirpur, men are normally taking care of the external world and the family connections to it; they lead a social life that goes beyond the home walls and their reputation and honour is expected to be constructed or challenged in the public sphere, in contrast with women's domain in the private sphere (cf. Gilmore 1987; 1990).

Women are however generally in charge of certain matters within the home walls (Saifullah-Khan 1974; Afshar 1994; Wardak 2000; Ballard 2001). They are generally meant to be the principal educators of the children as far as behaviour and values are concerned (Afshar 1994), and at the same time they seem to be the most responsible for the family honour (*izzat*).

In 9.2 and 11.1 family and children upbringing will emerge as one of the most important variables of crime prevention strategies according to research participants. In 8.2 family will be mentioned as an economic shock absorbent providing an informal welfare system in times of hardship. Women seem to play a very important role in the administration of the family 'moral economy'. They also seem to be supposed to contribute in an essential way to the perpetuation of ethnic resources and networks. Women not only are socially constructed as markers of the community for the way they behave or implement traditions of honour and purity, but also are the main transmitters of cultural values to their children (Afshar 1994; Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1996; Archer 2001:97). In

particular, women are the main *izzat* carriers. *Izzat*<sup>2</sup> is situationally translated as family 'honour', 'reputation'. 'face-saving' and 'prestige':

Amrit Wilson (1978) reports *Izzat* to be more than honour or self-respect, it is "sometimes plain male ego. It is a quality basic to emotional life...It is essentially male but it is women's lives and actions which affect it most. A woman can have *izzat* but it is not her own, it is her husband's or her father's. Her *izzat* is a reflection of the male pride of the family as a whole. [What is more] saving her *izzat* (and through her own *izzat*) is perhaps the greatest responsibility for her parents or guardian" (Afshar: 1989: 214)

How a woman manages her *izzat* can consequently be considered as an indicator of her family's status, their socio-economic position and their moral values.

*Izzat* is a pillar of the social life of rural Pakistan. The role played by a family in a community is strictly linked to its reputation (Lutz 1991:129) and reputation may be strictly linked to the concept of reciprocity (Chaudhary 1999:68). The importance of reciprocity or the diasporic version of 'putting things back into the community' will be discussed in 7.5.1. The question of honour is therefore typical of closely knitted *gemeinschaften*<sup>3</sup> and appears to be more the consequence rather than the cause of isolation (Ibid.). Bradford Pakistani communities, being still very 'face-to-face', seem to continue to be largely regulated by *izzat*. As one interviewee put it:

What happens in the Asian culture itself, it depends ALL on your family background. It is...my opinion, I am not suggesting...but it is my own opinion. It all depends on how your family is, how you've been brought up, how your ancestors...it goes back...you know, it is the entire family, the way they were (Jamil)

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<sup>2</sup> Chaudhary (1999:64) considers three types of 'shame': *izzat* ('prudery or consciousness of what constitutes shame'), *haya* ('inner modesty') and *ghairat* ('successful defence of honour and women'). In the fieldwork and in the diasporic literature review this author has only encountered the term *izzat* that seems to include both *haya* and *ghairat*.

<sup>3</sup> For the difference between *gemeinschaften* (community) and *gesellschaften* (society) see Tonnies, F. (1887) *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, Leiptig, Fue's Verlag

Later in the thesis it will be investigated if *izzat* had an influence on criminal behaviour, in deterrence or in social control (see 11.1 and 11.2).

## 6.2 Definition of *biraderi*

Kinship amongst Bradford Pakistanis is thoroughly constructed on the *biraderi* structure, as it is in rural Punjab, Azad Kashmir and the Attock District, where most families come from. The definition of *biraderi* has been considered a complicated matter and is still controversial; a digression that explains practically what its role is seems to be necessary as the term is considered to be very flexible. According to Anwar (1979), *biraderi* derives from the Persian word *baradr*, brother, and indicates a group of men who recognize descent from a common ancestor. Rather than a static and rigid unit, however, the *biraderi* should be seen as a system of alliance as often it includes men who virtually join because of a specific merit towards a family or special friendship. In *biraderi* inclusion, blood relations are ideal but not crucial. Wardak, quoting Wakil (1979) synthesizes the combination of kinship and affinity in *biraderi* in this way: the *biraderi* “is generally an endogamous group of individuals who *consider* themselves related to each other (...) (my emphasis)”. Relations considered as if based on blood ties, but not so in reality have been called *biraderi of recognition* (Saifullah-Khan 1974:44), of *participation* (ibid: 230) or *effective biraderi* (Wardak 2000), that however are invented terms not used by non-scholars. In theory, the *biraderi* should not cross caste, but esogamic<sup>4</sup> marriages do occasionally take place in Pakistan and are increasing in Britain (Shaw 2000).

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<sup>4</sup> Literally: “out of one’s group”. It can refer to interethnic marriages but in this case to cross-caste ones.

Loyalty and attachment to *biraderi* are considered to be particularly crucial values in Mirpuri moral economy; non-Kashmiri groups in Bradford claim that the 'MPs' (derogatory nickname for Mirpuris) lobbies take over most of the enterprises and make opportunities rare for others (Bolognani 2002) and such clan attachment plays a major role in the outsiders' definition of the Mirpuri as backward (McLoughlin 1998a:97). Sometimes the loyalty within the *biraderi* is sarcastically described as Mafia (see 10.4), as again exemplified by the novelist Yunis Alam:

This was a kin thing, a fucking biraderi thing, an OUR mother-fucking thing that I wanted no part of. We were worse than the fucking Mafia when it came to those troublesome family matters. (...) One thing that got me was how all these people were the same. Either they were relatives, or people who lived in the same village in Pakistan. Most of all, there was this caste thing going off, and that was what really got me thinking. (Alam 1998: 92)

As well as being the main network of help and support, the *biraderi* is also a controlling unit; an informant described the influence that *biraderi* control and its "politics" had on his family in this way:

Sadiq: I don't like living in Manningham, there's too much Pakistani politics.

Me: What did you mean by Pakistani politics?

Sadiq: My sister was restricted. She went to upper school and then she didn't do anything else because of relatives saying "She shouldn't do this, she shouldn't do that" (...) A lot depends on the elder members of the family. The majority of my relatives live around me (quoted in Bolognani 2002)

Social studies acknowledging *biraderi* (Saifullah-Khan 1974; Anwar 1979; Werbner 1989; Chaudhary 1999; Shaw 2000; Akhtar 2003) and direct observation conducted by the author in the Pakistani community of Bradford in 2002 and in

the Mirpur district in 2003, contributed in creating the following list of features of the *biraderi* system:

- in subjects' *biraderi* usage recalls terms cohesive with family context;
- although shallowly translated into English as "extended family", *biraderi* can include non-blood related individuals who were included on an honorary basis because of special deeds, out of friendship or because they come from the same area and they have shared the same experiences abroad;
- it is often influenced by caste in spite of the egalitarian tenets of Islam;
- it has a normative and controlling role and regulates information and communication;
- it has recognized hierarchies within it;
- branches of *biraderi* separated by migration tend to interrelate and influence each other's decisions;
- it is the main context of *vartan bhanji*<sup>5</sup>;
- its members perform *lena dena* (reciprocal taking/giving);
- it maximises the flows of goods and services.

Such complexity and dynamism of *biraderi* very clearly embodies the close relationship between Bradford Pakistanis' cultural and social capital. Not only is *biraderi* the ensemble of relationships, but it also seems to be the vessel for specific cultural symbols, norms, and ideas:

Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition- or, in other words, to membership of a group- which provides each of

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<sup>5</sup> Exchange of gifts or services and extensive exchange of visits.

its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital (Bourdieu 1986:248-49)

Another specificity of *biraderi* is the contextualisation of its meaning. It can in fact from time to time refer to national provenance (or *quom*, Chaudhary 1999:11), village provenance (or *sharika*, *ibid.* :13), caste subdivision (or *goot*, *ibid.*:13), family tree ( or *khandan*, *ibid.*:14) or nuclear family (or *ghar*, *ibid.*:15).

*Biraderi* appears therefore to be a very broad concept that in terms of social capital is not clearly definable in terms of strong/weak ties (Granovetter 1973) or bonding/bridging social capital (Putnam, 2001:22; Woolcock 2001:13-14).

### **6.2.1 Biraderi as a unique ‘ethnic capital’**

Granovetter defines strong ties as the closest relationships that one has (i.e. family and friends) and weak ties as the ones that link the individual to the outer world (1973:1378). Woolcock defines bonding social capital in a similar way to strong ties and bridging social capital as the one encompassing “more distant ties of like persons, such as loose friendships and workmates” (2001:14). In detail,

Some forms of social capital are, by choice or necessity, inward looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups. Examples of bonding social capital include ethnic fraternal organizations, church-based women’s reading groups, and fashionable country clubs. Other networks are outward looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages. Examples of bridging social capital include the civil rights movement, many youth service groups, and ecumenical religious organizations. (Putnam, 2001: 22)

‘Inward looking’ to describe bonding social capital sounds negative and indeed Putnam privileges bridging capital (Field 2003:36): bonding may in fact be the mode of gangs, satanic sects, etc.

The specificity of *biraderi* is that strong and weak ties or bonding and bridging fail to be easily distinguishable. *Biraderi* may imply any term of the dichotomy at different times. However, positive and negative perceptions coexist as they do for social capital. This may be even more apparent when analysed in a historical continuum.

Kinship-based networks had a paramount importance in the first stages of migration when without such unconditional support it would have been impossible to buy houses or start enterprises. The role of such networks nowadays, however, will appear throughout the thesis as being quite controversial (cf. 9.3) and may be referred to with the derogatory form 'biraderism'. Currently, the link between relationships, networks, and the traditional cultural capital may not be as consistent as it used to be. For this reason, although Bourdieu's definition of cultural capital seems to describe some aspect of *biraderi*, the broader and more pragmatic Putnam's definition of social capital may be more apt. However, Putnam's definition of social capital, refers to any kind of interrelation between individuals and individuals and between individuals and communities (Field 2003:34-36, 65) and it is always described as a positive feature (Boggs 2001:287). *Biraderi*, as someone has pointed out about social capital (Bankston and Zhou 2002:286), may be failed by definitions that do not consider its form as a process rather than as quantifiable content (more appropriate to cultural capital or 'cultural stuff', Barth 1969). For this reason, and in order to avoid value-laden definitions such as Putnam's, the term preferred in this thesis will be 'ethnic resources and networks'.

### 6.2.2 Changes in *biraderi* through the stages of settlement

Informants have often linked the key to a successful *biraderi* to marital strategy. In the Mirpuri community marriage between cousins is generally explained as rooted in the necessity of maintaining the property undivided. The marriage to cousins (preferably patrilineal parallel, but also cross or matrilineal cross<sup>6</sup>) is also seen as beneficial as it emphasizes the internal *biraderi* connection as the marriage happens between two different households and individuals involved will feel more part of both (Shaw 2001:326). Relations within the *biraderi* are very complicated to understand for an external observer: a hypothetical male *ego*, for instance, can be at the same time cousin and husband to the same woman, nephew and son-in-law to a couple, cousin and brother-in-law to his brother's wife.

Agreement and balance within an endogamic unit might become difficult from time to time, but the collective belief in the importance of *biraderi* is a very strong incentive to make marriages work. One informant expressed his views about endogamic marriages in this way:

If you don't get married inside the family you get grievances, they don't forget easily (...) Plus, if I get married outside the family and [the wife] doesn't get on with my mum, whom should I side with? (Sadiq, quoted in Bolognani 2002)

Later on when the role of family management of social control will be discussed, it will be interesting to review how individuals compromise between their personal interests and the ones of the family; most of the time these overlap. Shaw (2000), for example, gives an insight when a young Pakistani man refused a prestigious, interesting and well-paid job for a local Council as this wouldn't be as beneficial to the family as his employment in their garage; the man was not

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<sup>6</sup> Cross cousins are the children of the father's sister or the mother's brother; parallel cousins are the children of father's brother or mother's sister.



regretting his choice because his personal satisfaction overlapped with that of the *biraderi* (see also concept of 'propriety' discussed in 3.5 and 10.1). On the other hand, *biraderis* are not always a cohesive and collaborative unit. Financial matters, contrasting views about marriage plans or simply clashing personalities can divide the family<sup>7</sup>.

Akhtar (2003) argues that while *biraderi* is a system that resists change to an amazing extent because it provides the individual with all he/she regards as important (an affective network, a moral authority, unconditional solidarity, a sense of security), for some people, *biraderi* has now become a cause of misery because it is considered as a priority itself and is reluctant to allow for internal historic changes.

British Pakistanis' marriage strategy, nevertheless, has gone through some relevant changes, although it has been argued that marriage strategies in Pakistan are much more flexible than outsiders are led to believe (Fischer, forthcoming). A West Yorkshire study (Darr and Modell 1988, quoted in Shaw 2001) and one conducted in Oxford (Shaw 2001) register an increase of marriage amongst first cousins in the younger generations since the 1960s. At the same time 'the rate of marriage to cousins and other relatives seems to decrease the longer the youngsters have lived in Britain' (Shaw 2001:330). The younger generation appear to work towards family recognition of a personal choice of partner by calculating the level of compatibility of the bride or groom with their family (Smart and Shipman 2003). The first example of the switch from bonding to bridging is therefore in the changing patterns of marriage strategies.

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<sup>7</sup> Malinowsky (1926:112) described the same dynamics in Trobriandese clans saying that the 'clan dogma' of unity was a fissured core, 'not a perfectly welded unit'.

Families progressively growing out of *purdah* and *izzat* in general, will do so more easily if they can transcend the exclusiveness of the Pakistani community, where the *log*'s (people) opinions affect gossip. Some families might decide to move out of Asian areas to be less influenced by surrounding *log*, while some might only restrict activities not well looked upon to non-Asian areas (McLoughlin 1998a reports the case of a young Pakistani girl who was asked by her father not to renounce going clubbing but to go outside Bradford to avoid gossip). Bridging may therefore imply the weakening of strong ties and this dilemma will be a crucial theme of discourses of attribution of blame for crime (see 9.4).

Moving out of Asian areas is possible for economically successful families, for professionals who find jobs elsewhere and for the ones who do not have a large family in the vicinity. On the other hand, families who have many relatives in England seem to feel more responsibility in preserving *izzat* for everybody's sake and if they live surrounded by other Asians, will find it more difficult to dismiss *purdah* and *izzat* in general (McLoughlin 1998a; Shaw 2000).

While *izzat* is considered to be restrictive and static, on the other hand some families are becoming more flexible towards it. This is sometimes possible through changes in religious practice.

### **6.3. The 'Culture'<sup>8</sup> vs. religion' debate**

Contrary to the common western understanding of Islam as patriarchal or even misogynist (Fallaci 2005), it is possible that a more thorough understanding of the

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<sup>8</sup> I must thank Keir Martin from Manchester University for sharing with me his research notes on *kastom* and social change in Papua New Guinea. Although a systematic comparison of our data has not been attempted, many of his reflections have helped me in finalising the analysis of the label 'Culture' in the Bradford setting.

religion is becoming a crucial tool for some women to become more assertive and less dependent on their families' traditional standpoints (Afshar 1994:13).

McLoughlin's findings about a cathartic use of Islam for Bradford Muslim women are summarised like this:

For at least some women, 'reinvented', 'authentic' accounts of their religious experiences are the most organic feminist tools that they have to 'think' alternatives with (McLoughlin 1998a:103)

My respondents (...) experienced Islam as a set of discourses and practices which could be deployed both hegemonically, in an attempt to control and discipline young women, and counter-hegemonically, so as to legitimate their concerns about issues such as higher education and marriage (McLoughlin 1998a: 105)

Inspiration for assertiveness and independence has been found by informants throughout the Quran. Whether this is a particular interpretation or a theological statement, they have found grounds for autonomy in reading the holy book:

The Prophet's wife was a merchant banker, she proposed to him (Shazia, quoted in Bolognani 2002)

Family history, social class and social relations, together with affiliation to a particular school of South Asian Islam, affect the meaning given to the religion. Therefore, there is a large spectrum of women with very differing attitudes towards their lives. Age is also an important variable, as many women from the older generation are not generally fluent in English. There are also a high number of spouses coming every year from Asia and if they are coming from rural Pakistan they will have a perception of life more similar to the older generation.

While a religious revival or a revival of Muslim identity may be very popular amongst women in Bradford, with a gendered division that will be encountered many times throughout this thesis (cf. 7.4, 10.6 and 11.1.1), there is

evidence a growing number of young men are resorting in their personal lives to behaviours incongruous with the Islamic teachings:

[Young men are] able to take advantage of the relative laxity of parents to be largely irreligious in behaviour but Muslims in name.... Young [Muslim] women may, in a sense become the targets of the assertive Muslim identity of their male peers, who find that a convenient way of emphasising their own 'Muslim' credentials is to insist upon the virtuous conduct of their wives, sisters and daughters (Samad:1998: 430)

The role of religion in ethnic studies is quite controversial. Barth (1969) and Smith (1992) tackle religion as if it is one of the elements instrumental to the cause of ethnicity. Others, like Jacobson (1997) distinguish very clearly between ethnicity (intended as the cultural capital of a group) and religion. According to Jacobson, ethnic boundaries are flexible and blurred, while religious boundaries are more clear-cut, given and non-negotiable.

If Jacobson's view was applied to Bradford, this would go along with the most popular emic one. Amongst young Muslims the idea is very common that Islam in South Asia has been profoundly influenced and contaminated by local cultures and there should be a process of purging from it what is not consistent with the Prophet's teachings. 'Spurious' Islam would affect the lives of Muslims in a very different way from the original one, as one informant put it:

...they should give girls some autonomy because Islamic law allows girls some autonomy (...) Bradford is conservative, the community is conservative. The biggest problem I think is the culture, and culture has nothing to do with religion. For example: weddings. The traditions (of weddings) are Hindu traditions.(...) (it is something) that has been inherited and it sticks, like culture. (Sadiq, quoted in Bolognani 2002)

An attempt to go back to 'the original Islam' has been adopted by movements and associations of young people (for example Young Muslims UK, the Muslim Women Forum and Islamic Society of Britain, cf. McLoughlin 2006a) in

Bradford and is the cause of most of the changes in the practice of Islam locally. For example, in 2002 the Muslim Women Forum was promoting the creation of areas for women in the local mosques, as only a minority of buildings provide this facility. One of the changes in the perceptions of Islam by the younger generations is that while for a large part of the older generation Islam becomes important during life-cycle rituals (McLoughlin 1998a:99), for an increasing part of the younger generation who read the Quran in translation, religion is apparently an integral part of their lives which has a constant bearing in daily life. For these individuals religion becomes a public matter and is practiced through strict dietary rules and the political demands (for halal meat in refectories, for example).

In times of discrimination or even offences against Muslims, Islam becomes a resource for asserting individuals' collective identity (Samad 1992; 1998). In the context of growing Islamophobia, young people tend to revert to Islam, protect it and feel protected by its community:

I think it is important [the Whites] associate me with Islam, and then with my race, my ethnic background. I have to protect my faith, I am not bothered by my ethnic background (Tehmina, quoted in Bolognani 2002)

In spite of an originally very culturally mediated version of Islamic education, the older generation has started practicing religion on a different basis. First changes occurred with the reunion of families, as the presence of children led to money collection for opening mosques and madrasas. Some (for example Kalra 2000:146) relate the new religious engagement to the profound changes brought by differences in life styles after the economic crisis in former textile towns:

Look, sardarji, our story is a simple one. When we worked in the mills we were in the pubs and drank beer and ate kebabs. Now we are out of work we spend our time in mosques saying "Allah Allah" (Haaji Mehrban, quoted in Kalra: 2000:146)

While in the first years of migration different sects and ethnic groups prayed together in the same rooms adapted to mosques, with the arrival of families diverse forms of Islam became prominent (McLoughlin 1998c:.217). Pathans, Mirpuris and Bangladeshis built their own mosques. At the present time, however, many Pakistani Muslims seem to be resorting to global Islam as their comprehensive Umma (Muslim global nation) (McLoughlin 1996); although individuals keep attending mosques where their families have gone for years, nevertheless there is less emphasis on sects. Muslim brotherhood is felt all over the world, especially in an era when Muslims have been involved in conflicts:

You know, it's like the Christians having this thing about the body of Christ...it's our local community and our national Umma: when a Muslim dies needlessly, when somebody is martyred, you feel pain. (...) In Bradford these issues have been discussed.(...) Muslims have all been victimised in Bosnia, Chechnya, but also in Bradford, in France...(Amjad, quoted in Bolognani 2002)

Attachment to other causes of Muslims around the world is shown through an electronic network that daily inundates with emails that denounce Israel and the United States or report on human rights violations against Muslims in other parts of the world.

Although a new rhetoric and certain terms of global Islam are becoming more familiar with Bradford Pakistanis, Samad argues that it is not ascertained how much there is a clear understanding of the underlying issues:

Islam.... Plays a role in the construction of masculinity;...[the young] project a 'hard' image of tough aggressive macho men...[and claim] membership of Hamas or Hizb-ut-Tahrir<sup>9</sup>... Yet the same individuals were unaware who Shias were, and how they differed from Sunnis, and did not know what Hamas or Hizb-ut-Tahrir represent. Neither were they observant in their religious rituals.... and were quite often in trouble with the police for petty crime, drugs etc. Thus the daubing

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<sup>9</sup> Hizb-ut-Tahrir is an international Muslim organisation which is described often as extremist. It publishes a monthly magazine, Khalifat that works towards the ideal of the re-establishment of the caliphate.

of the walls ... with the slogan ' Hamas Rules OK ', or supporting anti-semitic, homophobic and misogynist organisations such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, was more an act of rebellion and defiance rather than the rise of 'fundamentalism'. ' It is all about being 'hard'... these affiliations seemed to be linked with territory... [with Islamic nomenclature, such as Hamas, Hizb-ut-Tahrir or Tablighi Jamaat [used] to [map and] define territorial control. (Samad:1998: 425)

#### **6.4. Caught between *biraderi* and Umma**

This chapter has described how *biraderi* is a central and probably unique feature of the Pakistani communities of Bradford and the historical development of their settlement can be only fully understood by acknowledging the role of *biraderi* in it. For the scope of this thesis, however, it was important to highlight how a traditional structure such as *biraderi* may strengthen internal relational proximity that has been considered by some as a crucial variable of informal social control (Braithwaite 1989:14; Burnside and Baker 1994:19, 21; Wardak 2000:16; Hope 2001:430). Such internal proximity may be considered both an asset and a liability and later on in this thesis it will emerge that there is an increasing number of individuals who would refer to 'biraderism' as a negative phenomenon (see 9.3). During the research stronger ties were often perceived to potentially cause fragmentation, while weak ties as more advantageous for individuals (see 9.5 and 13.4). Virtual ties such as the one of the global Muslim nation, Umma, also played an important role of reference for discourses encountered during fieldwork.

By comparing the researcher's 2002 findings (Bolognani 2007, forthcoming) and the present ones, it was possible to see a consistent use of the word 'community' as the signifier of an ethnic and religious group. Although this term was rather fluid and could significantly change depending on the contexts, by for example referring to regional parochialisms, it was important to confirm

that a Bradford Pakistani distinctiveness was recognised in terms of culture, symbols, religion and modes of interaction. In spite of the internal fragmentation of diasporic groups, it has already been observed by other commentators (see also Saifullah Khan in the introduction to this paragraph), that 'community' may not be an imagined construct necessarily conveying ideas of homogeneity. Back, for example, argues that

Ideas about 'community' are understood to consist of a series of organising principles (community discourses) that are interrelated and mutually reinforcing (a semantic system). (...) I view the notion of 'community' or 'local style' as the product of competing social definitions, not homogenous, and composed of a variety of community discourses and although I accept that in some contexts particular definitions-or versions- of community predominate, all community discourse should be treated as having equal significance (Back 1996: 29,30)

Werbner illustrates a similar standpoint through a British Pakistani example:

Community had become, in effect, a kind of argument through practice: an argument of images between those different knots of friends with their different lifestyles, consumption patterns and visions of what their community should be like, by comparison to other communities, seen from a particular vantage point.

Community was nevertheless constituted as practice by the traces of localised discourses and interactions taking place in a myriad of public events: at weddings and funerals, fund raising drives, mosque elections factional struggles, public protests, religious festivals, national and religious celebrations and ceremonies, as well as in multi-cultural or multi-racial or multi-religious forums and arenas created by the state and local state (Werbner 1996:70).

During the Bradford fieldwork the strong sense of community and the frequency with which it was made reference to, contributed to understanding how Bradford Pakistanis earned the name of 'urban villagers' (Saifullah Khan 1976a) in the 1970s. Today, they may be called 'global villagers', an exception in the "isolated, anomic, acted out segmented roles of urban men and women" (Bell 1976:292), but at the same time increasingly literate with discourses of international



brotherhood and sisterhood, of universality and maximum 'bridging'. They have preserved certain characters of distinct ethnic resources and networks, "trust, norms, networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions" (Putnam 1993:167) and have characterised the survival at first of a *gemeinschaft* in a *gesellschaft* (Ibid:114), but now seems more and more inclined to situate itself in a global 'Ummatic' setting (see for example role of Muslim satellite channels in social control in 12.2).

**Part III**

**Crime, control and prevention: the emic views**

## Chapter Seven

### The construction of crime within the community

Section 2.9 highlighted the necessity of more studies about race, ethnicity and crime involving minorities' perspectives (Philips and Bowling 2003: 270, 272) and accounts of structures as well as agency. Literature advocating such a change registers a 'taboo' in criminology derived from the fear of pathologizing minority groups in relation to crime (ibid: 271). Outside academia, instead, racialization of crime (that is to say the alleged link between a specific group and some criminal activities) has been much more explored and often, it has been argued, with counterproductive results for race relations (Miller 2001:1), reviving the belief that some cultures may be more violent than others (Curtis 1975:115, see 2.2).

Werbner (2004: 898), for instance, has exposed the situation of a 'South Asian morality' under scrutiny by the public gaze of White Britons. Webster has denounced the construction of a "British Asian criminality" (1997) and Alexander (2004:535) has recorded a widespread public concern towards an "Asian disfunctionality". As described in 5.8, this moral panic has particularly affected external representations of Bradford and its Asian community since 2001 when the riots took place and the attacks on the Twin Towers spread the fear of 'home-grown terrorists' (see Sengupta 2005, in *The Independent*).

Instead of reviewing external views on crime in the community, this chapter will analyse the internal points of view. Unveiling the major preoccupations according to the community rather than to outsiders will link practical crime concerns to an emic 'working whole':

The value of an emic study is, first, that it leads to an understanding of the way in which (...) a culture is constructed, not as a series of miscellaneous parts, but as a *working whole* [my emphasis]. Second, it helps one to appreciate not only the culture (...) as an *ordered whole* [my emphasis], but it helps to understand the individual actors in such a life drama- their attitudes, motives, interests, responses, conflicts, and personality developments (Pike 1954:11)

Analysing how practical concerns, cultural and religious beliefs and moral dilemmas play a part in the construction of the idea of crime will be the first step towards verifying the existence of a distinct 'community criminology'.

The chapter opens with an evaluation of the positions on a supposed Bradford Pakistani pathology in reference to crime. Informants denounced a moral panic about their community stirred by biased media attention, while their community, it was said, was facing the same problems as any other. An ethnic specificity, however, was to be found in a distinctive way of facing the same problems and defining criminal activities. A classification of the priorities in the fight against crime emerged in terms of the crimes perceived long term effects on the structure of the community, and drugs were indicated as the present greatest problem.

By comparing the main concerns expressed by the media (i.e. terrorism and racial tension bursting into rioting) and those expressed by the community, the conclusion will attempt to produce the first data-based evidence of distinct community criminological discourses.

### **7.1. Crime in the community: an endemic problem?**

In starting to investigate the existence of community-based criminology, it was important to delineate a definition of 'community' responding to its usage made by the research participants. The fluidity of the term community or '*apna log*' (our

people) has already been discussed in 6.4. It is important to recall here that a strong Bradford Pakistani distinctiveness was recognised in terms of culture, symbols, religion and modes of interaction both by insiders and outsiders, but at the same time coexisting subcultures, religious differences, or ethnic provenances constituted important variables of heterogeneity of discourses.

Once the existence of such constructions of the community was verified, it was possible to investigate whether Bradford Pakistanis also believed that their relations to crime as both victims and perpetrators had some specificities if compared to other groups in the city.

Throughout the research, participants claimed that in their views crime in the community had risen exponentially in the last few years (usually it was said in the last ten years). Most of the sample lived in areas with a high level of clustering (cf. 5.3) and this may be a reason why when they spoke of crime they mainly referred to deeds committed by members of the community, and only in a few cases by outsiders (either people coming from different cities or Bradford Whites, African/Caribbeans and Gipsies).

The transmission of the Channel 4 documentary 'Edge of the city'<sup>1</sup>, however, had a considerable impact on the interviewees, a majority of whom saw it as a biased account of some of the district's problems that damaged the reputation of the Pakistani community. They had felt over-exposed as a group for the actions of a few individuals when, it was argued, similar things were happening in all communities. The reaction of the community towards the documentary had reached such an extent that a young film maker was researching into the topic in order to make a counter-documentary:

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<sup>1</sup> The documentary was the account of the working lives of Keighley social workers fighting against a spiral of 'grooming' of young girls by Pakistani men (see Hall 2004).

Have you seen the programme 'Edge of the City'? You see, that's why we are gonna do this [documentary], we do it in response to 'Edge of the City', because when I watched that I was really disappointed (..) on things that we can see happening in Bradford(...) It is not only Asian men, it is a big... it doesn't only happen in Bradford, it happens in Manchester, London and it starts...some people come from Liverpool, Manchester here and they start...treating the girls nice and stuff and give drugs, and they sell drugs or start mixing the drugs. It might just be simple marijuana but it might be mixed with cocaine to make it stronger. (...) (Ali)

In the course of fieldwork the research itself was often challenged as most interviewees found that such a study on crime might create a pathological view of their community, while they believed that the whole of society was under the same strains. However, once the aim of the research was clarified, participants usually pointed out that some degree of specificity existed:

I personally don't think it is a problem with a particular community. I believe there is a problem with the society at large; the only difference is that certain communities have decided to deal with it differently (Imran)

Although the whole society had to face the same problems, then, the Pakistani community was seen as having a distinctive mode of facing them. This specificity regarded how some deviant behaviour interacted with ethnic resources and networks (see 9.3 and 10.5), the solutions proposed (see 11.8), but also the labelling process.

## **7.2. The labelling process: crime within and without the community**

One of the first questions that the research had to answer was whether the Pakistanis in Bradford had a distinct idea of crime and deviance. Some literature

has in fact highlighted how in cross-cultural settings, these definitions may be ambiguous (Krase and Sagarin 1980:215; Wilson and Herrnstein 1985:440).

Labelling seemed to be based on a classification of potential dangers to the community: the higher threat seemed to be perceived as the one that was potentially more destabilising for the group.

Some expressed the view that the centrality of the self-preservation of the community was testified by episodes in which the condemnation for crime committed elsewhere did not stir as much uproar as the ones committed within:

A young boy was knocked over in White Abbey Road. He was just going home with his father and his brother and he was crossing the road. Now this person was in a car...three men overtook three cars and went straight into middle aisle and killed him instantly on the spot. They were speeding (...) they overtook three cars unnecessarily, because they had stolen that car. They took someone's life...these same people having been causing a nuisance in our neighbourhood for God knows how many years. We know this person's brother has gone to jail because he killed this person in Batley (...) with a screwdriver...they are from our neighbourhood, so...he has gone to jail and his brother has just taken another life. They boast about the fact [that they killed a white man in Batley]...they won't be boasting this fact 'cos it is...as sad as it is to say...they killed an Asian person, a white person to them didn't matter, they were boasting about that (...). It is disgusting, but they found it all right but now because they killed an Asian person they are not going to get away with it in a sense where the community will not allow to get away with it. And they are not gonna be scared of them because somebody has lost this child and they are gonna do something about it whether it is taking them to court or do something themselves as a family, as it happens (Zaara)

This, as it has already been mentioned, did not mean that crime was seen as mainly perpetrated only outside one's community, but rather that the recent rise of crime inside was creating a moral panic even amongst Pakistanis. This moral panic was mainly articulated through images of deviant young men as will be explored in detail in 10.1. Two women, one in her thirties and the other one in her forties, commented on the fact that now the situation was such that one happened

to be almost as prejudiced as white people (sic) when encountering young Asian men on the streets:

I think for a Pakistani to be afraid of a Pakistani it is very sad, isn't it? I think going back a long time, when we came, everybody at that time they wanted to live with their own community, we want to live with Pakistanis...but now we are running away from it. Very sad (Shamim)

All the young people interviewed knew somebody who had been sentenced either for drugs, stealing cars or the riots. According to some respondents the situation had degenerated so much that already the idea that crime was something to put up with had started trickling into the popular understanding:

They [the parents] will be worried because it is their kids at the end of the day, but the thing is, right, you know when there is something happening in the community and is happening regularly like a routine sets... (Adam)

The kids...I suppose...it is all they know...they are very street wise in the sense that they know what is going on around them and I think they accept that sort of life. (Bashir)

But I think [by] the elder generation...they are looked down upon...but they [the older generation] don't say it, because of this 'we are gonna die soon, it really doesn't matter'. You know the sense of hopelessness...it does exist, quite a lot. (Fatima)

The ones who were able to compare today's situation with the one of their adolescence seemed pessimistic:

I am not joking but virtually every second family...is accepted. It has become a social construction thing now, where it is accepted as an ideal (Amir)

Me: And what about these shootings that happened, do you think people are scared of walking around?

Jamil: No, this is normal! Seriously...

Adam: He is right...you see, something happens, a couple of days later...

Jamil: It dies out!



However the diffused sense of hopelessness and frustration was accompanied by a unanimous indication of only one key-source of the general criminal threat to the life of the community:

When we were growing up there wasn't so much drug around, and there wasn't so much violence...and we, I am not saying we were angels, because as teenagers you do good and bad, you misbehave and I think we misbehaved as well, but the difference is proliferation of drugs (Zameer)

The causes of the recent proliferation of deviant behaviours, therefore, were not to be looked for in a Pakistani endemic pathology, but in the universal problem of drugs.

### **7.3. Many problems, one name: drugs in the community**

As we have begun to indicate, one of the findings consistent with other published information (Apaxton 2002; WYP 2004) was that one of the main problems affecting the community was considered to be drugs. Although there is only a limited amount of research on the drug problem amongst Asians in the Bradford district, this is consistent in reporting that Asians are under-represented amongst users (Webster 1996:11; Pearson and Patel 1998:17). In spite of these data, drugs were cited by the respondents as their main concern.

Drugs were seen as the trigger of almost all the other criminal activities, from prostitution to gun crime, but also, and more importantly, as destabilising for the core of the community. Drug-related offences, in fact, were seen to jeopardise the stability of families and produce role models and lifestyles not consistent with either the Muslim ethos (cf. 9. 4) or the binding collective social values of the Pakistani traditions (cf. 9.2).

Although drugs were part of those problems considered by the research participants to affect all communities, there seemed to be a popular understanding that the drug market nowadays was mainly in the hands of men of Pakistani origin. One teenage girl expressed the view that asylum seekers from Iraq were playing a major part in the local drug market at the moment, but this view was not been expressed by anybody else or backed up by any evidence. The popular understanding was instead that the drug market had been taken over from men of African/Caribbean origin by men of Pakistani origin.

Twenty years ago when I was growing up, you had the Afro Caribbean community, quite a large community in Bradford. And they were into a lot of the drug dealing, prostitution and stuff like that. Now we have sort of taken over from them, while the Afro Caribbean community have sort of moved on, and we are doing that kind of stuff, although if you look at it from our community, it is frowned upon, that kind of behaviour, if you look at our background, our religion...you know, that is the last thing we should be doing, selling drugs and pimping (Zameer)

Tahir: When I am travelling in a taxi I talk with taxi drivers, and they tell you. Some of them are very hurt that the community is into this, some of them are very proud that all the drug business is ours now, and we are taking over. I have heard this! 'We have taken over from the Afro Caribbean, and there was a big fight', and whether it is bravado or this person is involved, God knows, but you would hear 'we have taken over', but obviously this person is criminal, that is why he is very happy with his achievements.

Me. They wouldn't tell me these things...

Tahir: Yes, but because I am mischievous myself and I try to find out information, I am saying 'what is happening with this fight' and the lingo would suggest that I want information 'what is going on here' and also they think maybe I am Pakistani, I would approve this, or maybe [I would] feel happy, a part of the gang maybe (laughs).

The black community are currently kicked out from Bradford because the Pakistani Community, the drug dealing Pakistani Community, is too strong. (Abdul)

### 7.3.1 Drug dealing, drug taking and the chain of criminal activities

While during the interviews the older generations did not clearly distinguish between drug taking and drug dealing, the younger the respondents were, the more they were able to provide detailed information on the drug market.

Drug dealing, according to all the young respondents, was in some sense spread more widely than drug taking as some people would take up the former as a business venture or as a way to gain quick cash but would not take part in its consumption:

I used to believe that they had to take drugs to sell them on, but there is somebody, some sort of disgustingly selfish people, who look after their own body but won't think twice about destroying someone else's body. There will be people who take drugs and sell them but then I also know people who are very clean-cut, the only thing they take from the drugs is the profit they make by selling them on. (Zaara)

Participation in the drug business was described as to be not necessarily a life-time activity. It was possible, it was said, that some individuals would agree to sporadic drug deals (cf. also Webster 1997:78) or even a one-off job when in need to pay a debt or to invest in a business venture. The demand for such jobs was such that one could easily move in and out of the drug dealing circle, unless caught:

There were two Pathans, they were brothers and one of the brothers said to the other, if you bring the heroin back you can pay the mortgage off and you will have a big life. And the police followed them from UK to Pakistan and chased them and they caught them in Manchester airport. (...) They used to work and everything, and they got into this one drug thing and nobody knew until they got caught. (Adam)

Such mobility across the boundaries of criminal activity (some people being defined by Webster as 'go-between's', see 3.5) was, albeit disagreeable, not a major source of stigma for the ones who had been known to have participated in

illegal activities for a limited period with a view to investing such revenue into a 'kosher business' (Kamran, interview with author). Those who did this tended to benefit the community in some way, for example through donations to mosques (Amir, interview with author). As discussed above, the higher grade of stigma appeared to be based on the relation between a criminal activity and the stability of the community: the most serious offence was the one perceived as undermining the community. The ones living off the drug business and drug addicts, therefore, were the cause of the most serious preoccupations expressed in the course of the research. Informants tended to believe that drug taking would rarely be a sporadic activity, but would often become an addiction, in contrast with existing research evidence registering high rates of recreational use (Pearson and Patel 1998: 17).

Because of health and behavioural effects known to be produced in the addicted, class A drugs were linked to the potential breakdown of families, the core of the community structure (cf. 6.2.1). More surprisingly, when addiction was discussed, dependence on prescription drugs appeared to be a major concern, especially as far as women were concerned (data consistent with Pearson and Patel 1998: 14, 15). Practitioners recorded a rise in depression and consequently a growth in the chance of abuse of the medicines prescribed (see below).

Individuals who abused prescription drugs were often said to having sunk into depression or 'stress' due to family problems. Sometimes even the consumption of cannabis was linked to family problems, although amongst young men its consumption had often started as a recreational activity:

Me: What do you mean by stress then?

Bano: A lot of Asian families I think...what happens in families nowadays, maybe when...I have got a mate, a really, really good mate, and he is a guy and his sister ran away from home and he smokes weed like on a daily basis, like he has 2,3 cigarettes a day of weed, and I was asking 'why do you smoke?' and he says 'it just releases me,

it is like if I did not smoke it and I came to school, I would be like a miserable git, so when I smoke weed I feel so happy, it just releases the tensions'. The sister, she liked this guy and she ran away from home. She has gone back now but it is like...we call it izzat. Basically it is bad name, like if it goes out in the community, it will be really bad name. That is why a lot of guys smoke it because they can't take the pressure, they just want to get everything off their shoulders and that is the main reason why guys smoke weed. (...)

[My dad] started smoking weed when he was about 15 and now he is about 40 something.

Me: Is your dad born here?

Bano: No, my dad was born in Pakistan. He came here when he was about 10. He has been here most of his life and he smokes weed, so...but he is so addicted to it he can't leave it and that is why he is so ill, because when he leaves it he gets so ill. Because when my granddad had a stroke he fell into depression and now he hasn't really been able to get out of it.

Many people who would smoke cannabis would not drink alcohol, as their popular understanding of the Quran, orally transmitted by older friends or family members, mentioned alcohol but not cannabis (cf. Pearson and Patel 1998: 15). Recent research about addictions in Asian communities in the Midlands found that amongst Muslim drinkers, the majority tended to indulge in 'binge drinking' (Orford et al. 2004:27) and even in Bradford it was rare to hear of occasional drinkers amongst Muslims, as those who broke the Quranic law were, according to interviewees, more likely to be 'binge drinkers' or alcoholics.

Men consuming alcohol or drugs were perceived as more likely to commit other offences, including domestic violence. Although it was not one of the most commonly mentioned issues in the research, domestic violence was a serious concern for practitioners who were said to see a high proportion of these episodes happening in the Pakistani community:

Obviously [domestic violence] is not only [based on] one factor, is a combination of factors, and majority of my clients, I can say with certainty, they are either dealing drugs (I am just focusing on the Asian community, because I work with Asian clients), or taking drugs, and all kinds of frauds. I have got clients whose husbands are doing

benefit frauds, or clients whose husbands who are known pimps in Bradford (Alina)

Domestic violence was therefore again something connected with the use of drugs. Nevertheless, according to some respondents, it was part of the troubles present in the community even in the pre-drugs era.

During the research, honour crimes such as killings or mutilations were very rarely talked about, but sexual behaviours not conforming to Islamic laws that prescribe abstinence before marriage were seen as connected with deviant behaviour. In particular an imam who was routinely called to help families whose children were taking drugs (see also 11.3) was convinced that it was through sexual encounters that young people would start breaking the Islamic law and then experiment with alcohol and drugs. At other times, through the consumption of drugs and alcohol, young people would agree to have sex and therefore, in his opinion, it was difficult to separate sexuality from drugs. Again, if drugs were connected to promiscuity, it was obvious that they were threatening the core structure of the community.

Amongst the crimes mentioned most often as a cause of deep concern there was gun crime, borne, according to the respondents, from drug-related activities. This may have been due to the location of a big part of interviews and participant observation on the Leeds Road area, where in 12 months there had been a few shootings, some not reported by the press but known to the participants:

I myself went to an MP (...) and I said 'OK it is gun crime but has anyone tackled why they are using the guns, getting to the point why' ...I even said to this MP, one of those kids will get killed, that [drugs] is what it gets down [to]...and what happens? Three weeks later someone is killed and I could say that to him, it happened because the community won't tackle the problem, they don't get to the core of the problem. Ok, it's gun crime, but what is related to gun crime? (Adam)

FG2I. I don't know if they [my parents] are scared, but there was like that shooting on Leeds Road, a couple of minutes from our houses...

FG2A. But it is not like we go out and they shoot us, they don't just shoot you...

FG2C. It is their enemies...

FG2A. If you've got a problem with someone they'll sort it out that way.

In January 2005 a video was publicly presented by Age Concern about safety in the Asian Community of Barkerend Road (parallel to Leeds Road). In the video, a Muslim woman complained that the area was affected by burglaries, car theft and fights, all related to the drug business. On top of that, a new concern was emerging: some of the more established drug dealers had taken the law in their hands, and with the excuse of helping acquaintances to sort out their grievances, they managed a system of revenge that was growing in popularity. The fear expressed in the video was that this would soon become a vicious circle of violence.

#### **7.4 Women as an indicator of the level of deviance in the community**

In the panorama of crime a particular position seemed to be held by women, as described by a young female student:

Me: What about drug taking?

FG2A: I don't know because like the female in the Pakistani culture is like...even if...a boy was defined as a drug taker he won't be seen as so bad...because it will be seen like 'this is just what boys do'...like 'he will grow out of it, forget it'...but if a girl did it, it will be just too bad for the girl.

Afshar (1989:215; 1994:134) has observed how in West Yorkshire Pakistani women are considered to carry a double moral burden: an individual one based on their conduct as thought appropriate to their gender, and a family one, based on their successful maintenance of the family honour (*izzat*).

While existing literature on deviance refer mainly to men as perpetrators (Alexander 2000, 2004; Wardak 2000; Goodey 2001), female deviance or victimhood amongst Pakistani women has been overlooked (Macey 1999b). In the present research, however, data concerning women was crucial for two reasons: it showed the level of diffusion of deviance by erasing the stereotype that Pakistani women do not engage in crime, and confirmed the hypothesis developed during fieldwork that labelling is based on the degree of threat that an action poses to the community. Women in Pakistani cultures are in fact considered to be the core of the family life and therefore of community (Ali 2000: 118; Khanum 2000:132,133; Wardak 2000:63).

During fieldwork the more informed and 'street wise' research participants communicated a growing awareness of issues starting to affect young women. This was seen by some as the horrendous but unavoidable stage for a shock that would raise self-criticism and change in the community:

In Bradford they will only become the vehicle of change when the same epidemics [of drugs] will hit here because nobody really wants to know at the moment. They are quite happy with the flashy cars and the money coming in, but the vehicle of change will happen when the impact of drugs will hit their daughters. And that is when the community will start crying 'oh my God!' It is still not enough for a change to happen, and this is what will happen...as soon as the honour of your family becomes....you start looking for that change. (Ayesha)

Once again, the factor of main concern was the consumption of drugs, but in this case the denomination of drugs was extended to prescription drugs. In fact it was reported that a growing number of women would 'get on' anti-depressants. This attitude might be considered the equivalent of the above mentioned cases of young men smoking cannabis as a reaction to the stress derived by family problems:

They get on drugs mainly because of family pressures, stress, to forget problems. They put eye drops and they go back home and are not



normally found out. If they are found out they get sent back to Pakistan. (Ameena)

This does not exclude women, especially the youngest, from the use of cannabis, hard drugs and alcohol out of peer pressure, pleasure and escapist desires linked to tense family situations:

Fatima: Because there is a problem now of girls taking drug within the Pakistani community.

Me: Any drugs?

Fatima: It is more...I think, because of this face value of showing off or trying to look cool...the kind of peer pressure that they have is more starting from spliffs and marijuana and when they are older like 19, the girls I know now have moved into first class drugs and even drug dealing...so...because that problem hasn't been highlighted in the Pakistani community and gets brushed under the carpet and the girl gets sent back home, but when they come back here, when they come back from Pakistan, that problem still exists, it hasn't gone away, so the way the Pakistani community or the parents deal with it, is...I think it is not correct and it doesn't deal with the problem.

Some community workers lamented a wide spread tendency amongst GPs of easily prescribing antidepressants to Asian women who have ended up being considered as a group with an endemic problem of depression and mental health; some women would become addicted to such prescription drugs and would take them for life. Although no statistical evidence was collected to triangulate community workers' perceptions, depression was a very well known and often spoken about problem by almost all research participants (cf. Pearson and Patel 1998).

The news of a recreational drugs phenomenon amongst women seemed, however, not to have become popular knowledge in the community, not even amongst the ones in their early thirties:

Zameer: I have to say, but the issue predominantly is with males, isn't it? I think the indigenous white population, you have white women using drugs, but I think it is a lot less, far less in the Asian community...

Me. I have heard quite the opposite...

Zameer: Depends what [drugs] you mean...

Me. It is even hard drugs...

Zameer: Right? I mean...I am a bit away from...

On the other hand, some parents are starting to hear frightening accounts of what happened at universities, for instance:

I have very recently learnt that there are females taking or selling drugs, which was shocking, also when I am travelling in a taxi I talk with taxi drivers, and they tell you. (Tahir)

I came across a woman whose daughter was at university and she became a heroin addict. Her daughter is 27 now and still an addict. She lives at home with them. And she [the mother] is part of an Asian women support group whose kids are on heroine. They are not very open and she was just telling me how horrendous it is. She is part of a mothers' group, they are meeting at each others' homes. Her daughter was in and out of home, she was on rehab, she lived on her own... (Ayesha)

I have heard about [women taking drugs at University], but I did not know if it was only whites...and some parents don't want their kids to go [to university] and don't want to mix with people to do all this...(Shamim)

Shamim's preoccupation that this phenomenon might impact on the new positive rates of education of Pakistani young women is supported by the account of one university student:

Jamal: I am at uni and I know about 5 girls from the top of my head who can drink a big bottle of vodka in one day...I mean, like them big bottles. I know about 5 from the top of my head, come in the morning, they won't go lectures, they'll go sitting in the car and buy a bottle of vodka and get pissed and get totally wasted and then they would sleep, wake up, sober up and then go home. And if they are still not sober before 4, 5 o'clock, they'll ring home and say 'I am in the library doing work' and about 7,8,9 o'clock they will go home.

Me. Why they do that?

Jamal: They see it as...they enjoy it.

Me. Don't parents find out eventually?

Jamal: No. When exams come they'll probably won't go for a drink, they'll have a smoke of a joint to calm themselves down.

This account is somehow different from others where the research participants tended not to blame the girls for their use of drugs and somehow to deny them an agency. Young girls taking drugs tended to be seen more as victims rather than as individuals who made a choice in consuming certain substances. In the following conversation recorded during a focus group, some young girls discussed an imaginary scenario in which a Pakistani girl of their age was found consuming drugs by her family:

FG2C: [People would say]: 'She is going down the wrong path' and stuff...

FG2A: She would be looked down upon not just by her family, and there would be so much stigma attached to her, like probably nobody would want to get married to her or nothing, and then...that's why girls don't want to do it.

FG2C: I think it would be difficult for girls to get hold of drugs...

FG2B: (laughs)

FG2I: You think that because you don't know how it works...you think like 'where do you get drugs from?'...but someone comes to you and they give it to you. That's all it is. [These girls] probably want to get married as well.

Here the imaginary girl was seen as 'naturally' wanting to get married, but was corrupted by others to use drugs and her path to marriage was hijacked by her victimisers. The difference between the involvement in crime of men and women was explained by one of this focus group's participants in this way:

I think boys get more attracted to go outside than girls do. (FC2C)

As in the discussions about parental strategies (11.1.1 and 11.1.2) with the description of parental roles based on soft, passive and 'domestic' mothers and authoritarian, active and 'public' fathers, this dyadic gender perception affected representations of youth. If the popular conception was about girls who 'naturally'

aspire to creating a home, it is evident that a greater threat was posed to the system if they were involved in deviant lifestyles.

Western feminist criminology has been analysing the question of female deviance since the 1970s, basing its major findings on the argument that criminology had always tended to portray criminal women as pathological or double deviant (Rosenhan 1973; Carlen 1985:2) as they not only were breaking the laws of the state but also what are believed to break the laws of a nature that 'produce them' with 'weak' attributes.

Another example of the victimisation of women was given by linking drug consumption to 'grooming' and prostitution:

The Asian girls, now... I have seen myself they are all taking drugs and everything it is unbelievable. What happening at university now, 4 years ago it wasn't like that, but the culture at university has completely changed it is unbelievable. You see, with me I have got friends in Manchester, people in Birmingham, London, when I go there, ah, it is just completely different culture shock they are smoking heroine, and spliffs and everything...but I am talking about the grooming...they will start with a cigarette and then the boy will say let's smoke a spliff, the spliff is like cannabis, and they put a line of heroine in it, and it is like a drink, if you have a drink and someone spikes it with a bit of vodka you don't realize they are doing it. That's what they do, they put a line of cocaine so it makes it stronger, so when you take it, you are put on it, so you will always take it more and more and everything. (Adam)

The young women I work with do mostly cannabis but some are on heroine and cocaine, and end up in prostitution. Their boyfriends are their pimps. (Ameena)

You can see it in town, I know so many people who have seen it, but it is just one of those things, it is really difficult to deal with it because the girls are thinking there are some guys who are paying attention to them. 'I've got myself an older boyfriend and he's got a car and he's got money...' So what can you say to those girls, 'No, you've been fooled'. They are not gonna believe you. (Ali)

One imam was told by taxi drivers that Asian girls are to be found working in saunas as prostitutes in Bradford to pay for their drug habits.

While these taxi drivers' rumours were not corroborated by any direct experience, accounts about Pakistani girls ending up in prostitution had been circulating in the community at least since 2001, when a Pakistani female lawyer recounted to me of when she had been called in by the police when they had arrested a young Pakistani girl during a prostitution raid.

Women were often also seen as the first victims of their partners' or husbands' criminal deeds. Aliya -an old lady to whom families in her neighbourhood refer as being believed to know special prayers and be very effective with them- recounted the tragic parable of a woman whose life had been destroyed by her marriage to a drug dealer:

Aliya: When Salma at number 6, her husband [went] to jail, she [was] poorly, she [had] kidney problems. She [was] crying [a lot], the husband for two years [went] to jail, [and] she collapsed.

Amir: She was so depressed, so she came to [Aliya]'s. She is only 24 years old. Her mum said [to Aliya], 'Can you put a spell on her...' not a spell, but sort of a pray for her, and *shawal* [literally 'question', 'demand'], [reading] certain passages of the Quran that [could] actually help her to get over her sorrow, so they [came to see Aliya].

Aliya: She [was] very tight [thin], not eating...

Amir: [Aliya] cursed the parents...her uncle, his sons have gone to jail [too], and [Aliya] criticized them: 'why didn't you show to your children the right way?' (...) Her husband has gone to jail, and his family are the ones who go to jail, but because she is an outsider, a young girl coming to this family, her husband is in jail for the next 10 years, she is depressed, the family uses her as a slave, so it is the case of...[Aliya] feels very, very sorry for her and for example her brother in law has been to prison now and he got married and he is divorced now, or she has divorced him, but now the mother is saying [to Aliya] 'why don't you pray, can you pray for him to get another wife?' and [Aliya] quite obviously says 'no! he doesn't deserve another wife, he did not deserve a wife in the first place', so she is a very straight talker, she doesn't care who she is talking to.

Drugs, either sold or consumed, were therefore perceived as the greatest threat to the community, with consequences that were trickling into the heart of family lives.

## 7.5 Poisoning the community

While most of the press attention and moral panic about Bradford and its Pakistani community involved fear of terrorism and other rioting, these were topics rarely discussed by the respondents, unless openly asked to. Terrorism and rioting were considered extraordinary episodes that would not necessarily erode the core of the community, although there was awareness of the effects of terrorism-related Islamophobia and the strain on their reputation produced by past riots. Behaviours seen as having long term destabilising consequences, instead, were of greater concern. This was evident in conversations with shopkeepers on White Abbey Lane (where the 2001 riots started) and Leeds Road (once defined by the Telegraph and Argus as 'Bronx' and now commonly referred to as such). The former were optimistic about the development of their business and were surprised that I mentioned the riots as a symptom of a general disadvantage of the area; they considered it an isolated episode that had nothing to do with the community, but rather with the reaction to an isolated event: the threat of the BNP marching on Bradford. By comparison the latter group, in spite of enjoying a renaissance of Leeds Road where many new shops had opened and the house prices had considerably gone up, tended to have deeper concerns about the future of their areas<sup>2</sup>. These, according to some parents, ranged from anti-social behaviour to drug dealing:

Anti-social behaviour impacts on the community because we are living in the community, it impacts on me! (...) we are Pakistani, yeah, and if you grow up in an area where there is quite a lot of your extended family there, you are very inter-linked, aren't you? One is doing it, potentially the other one is doing it, the third is doing it, the cousin is doing it, the nephew is doing it...they find it quite difficult to manage that...where...a son is going off the rails, and another son is going off the rails and they all seem to get off the rails, they are all

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<sup>2</sup> Similar views seem to be expressed in Bradford amongst the white community (cf. Harrison and Phillips 2005:183).

hanging around in gangs, they are not doing anything constructive...they are not going to school, they are not learning...they might not be selling drugs, but it may go on to that kind of behaviour and they are finding it very difficult (Zameer)

One respondent defined the long term process of negative change with the evocative expression of 'poisoning the community':

They have poisoned the community. And you know, when you do well in the community, everyone wants a piece of that. If you've got a nice car outside your house, the next person will buy a nice car as well. If you buy nice clothes, [the] next person wants to wear it. This is what I am talking about. They are like sheep, they can't think for themselves. The thing is they can't think for themselves because they don't understand they are poisoning the community, their own family. Because they are all following their way (Abdul)

Another seemed to express a similar concept with a religious metaphor:

So for example the teachings of Prophet Mohammed...for example, he says that if you keep company with a blacksmith you will smell like a blacksmith afterwards. So you haven't done anything, you just kept company with him, but his type of job is very dirty, very smelly and if you keep company with him you'll smell like him after a while. But if you keep company with someone who sells perfumes you will smell like him afterwards, so we do believe that changing the atmosphere and the company makes a big difference (Imran)

Pearson (1999:401) has observed how modernity in its various forms can be seen as the cause of the 'erosion of communities', especially when supposedly "rootless urban anonymity" destroys "social bonds of culture and tradition". Here, however, the poisoning had both this moral form and a more practical one:

Jamil: Business wise we have been affected (...) because a lot of people have [been] driven away from this area, so people...you know, we used to get a lot of the clientele from outside, to come to the area to buy. Now we don't get much of that.

Me: And is that because of the reputation of the area?

Jamil: Exactly. (...) They [drug dealers] are not benefiting the community, they are making it worse because to be honest with you, if somebody hangs around, 16-17 years old, doing nothing and being better off than anybody else, they will want to do the same thing as him. That is why they don't go and work for somebody. They don't wanna work hard labour, they want it the easy way.

If they [criminals] had actually stopped and thought about it, they looked back at it, they would see how much impact it has on people who are stealing...they might steal from, let's say, a supermarket, and they might steal for years and years and years, what it comes down to at the end, it comes down to the taxpayers, that loss...or even your local community such as in the riots when in my area...our taxes have been high. I couldn't actually get a credit card for two years because I lived in that area of Bradford. It was just my postcode that stopped me from getting a credit card. And I actually found this out when I spoke to someone about it 'cos I kept being refused. And I talked to someone and said? It must be your postcode' and I asked 'Why does that matter?' They went: if there have been a lot of troubles in that area, if that area is black listed for some reason or the other and it is not a potential area where we can get profit from that area, so...things like that they have an impact (Zaara)

The poisoning of the community was a practical and moral term also linked to 'community breakdown'. Participants normally referred to a time when the community was very cohesive and the crime rate low, while at present the situation was the opposite. Sometimes, however, there were different positions on whether the breakdown was an effect of drugs and their string of deviant behaviours, or whether these had been generated by it:

Akbar: Everybody now is [a] family man. Before they live[d] with 15, 20 people, not just by myself [oneself], it was too different [a] position [from what it is] now. Everybody [no is a] family man, the children are born, children grown, that is a problem, growing. When they grow it is problem, it is not all the time [the] same position (...) everybody think of himself, [they are] not in the same position [to] help one another.

Amir: I think because before they were only single males from different families, and then some brought the wives over, then they got their own families and the second generation, third generation, their families have got so big that they can only help themselves.

If I am out for myself, who cares if I affect another 15 people...at last I have succeeded and this is the mentality we have been bred into. This is the mentality my father has been bred into, and this is the mentality the kids are growing into. (Imran)

The idea of poisoning and contamination can help in understanding the managing of the classification of crime within the community.



### 7.5.1 Purity and Contamination: *haram*, *halal* and *makkru*

Amongst the behaviours threatening to 'poison the community', drug related issues were the one mentioned most often. The strings of their consequences were also considered as jeopardising community life. Moral fervour and ideas of order, of purity and non-purity<sup>3</sup> in the community seemed to be underpinned by both a religious and a cultural discourse with blurring boundaries typical of the 'religion vs. Culture' debate (see 6.3). Religious terms used to describe wrong doing were *haram* for the deeds (i.e. 'drinking is *haram*') and the deeds' profit (i.e. '*haram* money through drug dealing') and *hrami* (also translated as 'bastard') for the subjects involved in *haram* activities (i.e. 'do not speak with that guy, he is *hrami*'). These religious terms seemed to bear a cultural connotation when they were used to increase negative labelling by quantifying their impact on the community networks:

You know, a lot of businesses in Bradford, the ones who were really successful, when they came first over, they are the ones who brought

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<sup>3</sup> Pollution as threat to society order is common coinage in anthropology. Douglas has argued that the fear of 'dirt' is fear of 'disorder' (Douglas 1966/2002:2): 'eliminating it is not a negative moment but a positive effort to organise the environment' (ibid.). And again: 'the ideas about separating, purifying, demarcating and punishing transgressions have as their main function to impose system on an inherently untidy experience. It is only by exaggerating the difference between within and without, about and below, male and female, with and against, that a semblance of order is created' (ibid: 4); 'disorder spoils pattern' (ibid: 95). Those are in fact dynamic features: 'there is every reason to believe that they are sensitive to change. The same impulse to impose order which brings them into existence can be supposed to be continually modifying or enriching them' (ibid: 5). The idea of dirt is not only to do with hygiene, but also with respect of conventions (ibid: 7). 'Propriety' (appropriateness, conformity with conventions, etc.) may be a form of purity, as it seems relevant to this context.

Society 'reward[s] conformity and repulse[s] attack' (ibid: 115). Ideas of purity and non-purity maintain the social structure (ibid: 132). However, as showed by the case study of the Nuer (ibid: 133) when sense of outrage is 'adequately equipped with practical sanctions', 'pollution is not likely to rise' (ibid.). Pollution is then clearly linked to the feelings of threat, of a perceived danger that arises frustration as society members recognise an incapability of practically sanctioning disorder: 'when moral indignation is not reinforced by practical sanctions, pollution beliefs can provide a deterrent to wrongdoers' (ibid: 134). In the case of pollution by drugs in the Pakistani community, the lack of practical sanction obviously does not refer to the inexistence of a legal system that rule on drug dealing and drug taking, but to the widespread frustrating feeling that there is not much that can be done about it.

the stuff over first and everything. I can quickly mention companies and names...(…) because you know my mum, my family, you go to Mirpur and everybody knows everybody, it is a community where they know everything and it is like...my mum tells me stories that so and so, how they have done it. And we say *halal* or we say *haram*. *Halal* is when you are eating from your plate and you are sharing, and people do *haram* when they have got so much but they don't share from the same plate.(Adam)

And again:

If you feed *haram* to your family, it will grow *haram*. (Adam)

In Islamic jurisprudence, *haram* is translated as 'unlawful' or 'forbidden'; *halal* is its opposite, while *makkru* is the area in between where what is accepted but not encouraged lies. The most known side of this part of Islamic jurisprudence is related to food: alcohol is *haram*, meat butchered according to the Islamic way is *halal* and in absence of *halal* meat, any meat but pork may be consumed, as in that circumstance it would only be *makkru*. During fieldwork this terminology was much more widely deployed, as from Adam's example above.

The definition of *haram* in fact seemed to include the potential of a contamination: money earned through criminal or non-Muslim activities (e.g. selling alcohol) was seen as creating negative contamination. For any act of contamination, however, there seemed to be an act of purification that, however, would not necessarily happen without controversies. Some respondents, for instance, were aware of a highest form of money laundering, or money purification, that some drug dealers seemed to exert. Through donating part of their *haram* earnings to mosques or charity, the rest of the capital was by some believed to turn into *halal* as it had gone through purification. Henceforth:

Amir: It is the case we have to have...and then the drug dealer in the community or the businessman will say 'well, I will donate so much'...

Mahima: You are not allowed to accept that money because that money has killed and ruined families...

Me: Is it *haram* money?

Mahima: It does not belong anywhere.

Amir: The number of mosques that are run with *haram* money...(sighs)

Pakistani people believe that religion and business are one, unlike the Pathans, so the Pathans see nothing wrong in drug dealing. Ok, they see it as 'we are breaking the law, but we are not breaking Islamic law', you know what I mean? But they do, because it is not *halal*, it is *haram* (Jamal)

Many respondents of Mirpuri origin held the belief (not corroborated by Pathan research participants) that Pathans would make allowances for themselves in doing *haram* as they were living in a non-Muslim country and therefore they survived taking advantages of the corruption of the land. A similar view described with the concept of '*ghanimat*'<sup>4</sup> was said to be circulating in groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and referred to the idea of war booty, in the case of drug dealing in exploiting *kuffars* (infidels). One fifth of the war booty is supposed to 'belong to Allah' and therefore may be used for *zakkat*<sup>5</sup> related activities.

Other comments about living in a *kafir* (singular of *kuffar*) land, although completely detached from war metaphors, were reflected in comments about living as good Muslims in such environment. Shaheen, whose two 15 years old nephews had been sponsored by a local mosque to go to India and become Quran hafiz<sup>6</sup>, believed that being away from any *haram* manifestation (from bad television programmes to drugs) was the only feasible way to pursue a *karim* (blessed) life.

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<sup>4</sup> Thanks to Philip Lewis for alerting me to the concept of *ghanimat* and to Mazhar Malik and Tajul Islam for their help in coming to terms with it.

<sup>5</sup> The annual amount of charity compulsory for all Muslims, one of the five pillars of Islam.

<sup>6</sup> Hafizs are those who have learnt the Quran by heart.

Some allowances for *haram* activities seemed to be made in an instance that seems to be consistent with the concept of *makkru*. For example, a rumour circulated in Bradford that a religious figure was willing to make *taweez* (amulets, see 11.3) for the success of businesses in spite of them selling alcohol.

The extreme of the view about the dichotomy *haram/halal* was represented by Faisal, a young listener of a Sunrise Radio talk show at the end of February 2005, who called the programme to complain about the views represented on air that tended to blame the parents for young Asians going astray. Faisal instead said that in a country where Muslims could hardly avoid *haram* substances hidden in food colorants etc. or were not bothered by eating *halal* meat, let alone drinking alcohol, these forms of intoxication could not help but develop bad behavioural patterns. The effectiveness of prayers would also be jeopardised by the presence of *haram* in the body. This view, however, never emerged during fieldwork. Research participants were instead concerned with a broader concept of *haram/halal* and pollution, strictly linked to the preservation and well-being of the social structure. Social structure, however, was considered positive only in its broadest connotation. Inward looking networks were in fact considered negative in the crime prevention economy (see 9.3).

## **6. Crime as threat to the community stability**

This chapter has explored the main concerns about criminal activities from the Bradford Pakistani point of view. In the focus groups the initial brainstorming led to acknowledgement of drugs (smoking), rape, gun crime, street gangs, unprotected sex (AIDS), kidnap/abduction, joy-riders, mugging/stealing, racial abuse and drinking as their parents' concerns. Burglaries in some areas were also

described as a serious problem, and practitioners added domestic violence to the list. Anywhere, however, the greatest preoccupation emerged as drugs. Some were aware of what was considered a massive threat to the preservation of the community: the involvement of women in criminal activities, or their struggle in coping with families where drugs had been taken up by the men of the family. In conversations, drugs were described as the source of a chain of deviant behaviours including all the ones mentioned in the focus groups, burglaries and domestic violence. Furthermore, drug addiction and the emulation of the dealers' life-style were considered as main causes of family and community breakdown, the "emptying-out of social structures, of the institutions of socio-economic and cultural regulation" (Collison 1999:437) experimented by other urban communities.

The Pakistani community was therefore confirmed as an important element in the study of deviance for three reasons:

- community appeared to be the benchmark for the classification of crimes (the greater the threat to the community, the greater the crime)
- the diffused panic about the 'erosion of community' (cf. 9.2)
- the community's distinctiveness in dealing with crime (cf. 11.8)

A widespread necessity of self-preservation and stability of both families and the community is recurrent in other Bradford based research on Pakistanis (Harrison and Phillips 2005:173, 175) and here emerged from interviews across the sample groups:

[Parents] are afraid they [sons] might just walk out of the house. This is what they are afraid of (Jamil)

Me: I heard stories about families not really caring about their children dealing, but starting getting worried when they take it...

Zaara: [Because] it is gonna affect the balance of the family. Especially if it is girls.

Although community was an endangered element, and its stability at stake, that very community was seen by many as the potential solution to the present problems:

The first generation community is looking for stability; the second generation has lost its identity...how do we bring it back? Identity is brought back by longing to something, whether it is football club, or it is an association, by belonging to an association you need to have something in common (...). You have to start initially to bring that stability back, some of these after schools mosques or Sunday schools, or after school hours, I would encourage anybody to send their child to go and learn the language of their mothers and fathers. (Iqbal)

The vision that the community is at the centre of threat but will also provide the solutions to the problems was corroborated by a narrative of what in the analysis was called 'putting things back in the community'. By reinvesting into one's community, both economically and personally, many research participants believed that the drift towards bad role models could be fought:

So I joined the Public Services course and learnt everything from there and decided: 'yes I want to go in'...for many reasons, such as putting back something in the community I grew up in, it sounds such a cliché...I'm sorry, but giving something back to the community you have lived in and helping someone, if you help one person it might be a minor difference to someone else (Zaara)

I was kicked out of my school because I was always in fights with other girls and boys. I decide I would do something for people like me, people who did not get anything out of school. I decided to take up youth work, although I had been offered a job at the Inland Revenue and I would have been paid more. (Ameena)

'Putting things back' appeared often as a criterion to address positive and negative role models: passivity towards the community was generally considered as much of a sin as being involved in illegal activities. A respondent, in spite of his being

very devout, accused some religious groups like *Tableegh Jamaat* (see 9.5 and 11.1.2) of neglecting the community by employing their energies outside it:

That's the other extreme, they don't work, they become very lazy, they give nothing back positively in the community (Imran)

On the other hand, many interviewees defined 'putting things back in the community' as a strategy to win if not consensus at least non opposition from their area:

Some drug dealers sponsor good things in the community, they are saviour with one hand and instigator with the other (Kamran)

Exceptions aside, the narrative of 'putting things back in the community' seemed to identify a commonly shared moral value in the circulation of positive norms, models and finances. This seemed to suggest the positive connotation given to horizontal ties, a theme that will be dealt with in 9.2.

Overall, the construction of a pathological Bradford Pakistani community was strongly challenged although very serious concerns about its future emerged. The solutions, however, were according to many lying within the community itself. At a conference organised by a grassroots organisation, one Pakistani man working for a local institution spoke in the plenary session in order to criticize the organisers. He argued that they were letting people leave the conference with a very damaging idea about the Pakistani community, thus contributing to diffuse the views that external commentators had created about Bradford. Instead of focusing on drug abuse, mental illness and forced marriage, he suggested the conference should have been about the potential of the Pakistani community who, according to him, happened to have more resources than other communities to fight these problems. As an example, he mentioned the role that the extended family could play in helping children in leaving drugs and getting employment

(cf. family as an agent of social control and reform in chapter Eleven). The community resources and networks (cf. 6.2.1) were described as essential to articulate discourses around crime, the same principles on which national community crime prevention strategies are based (Burnside and Baker 1994:19).



## Chapter Eight

### Attributions of blame: structural variables and the environment

The previous chapter focused on the fact that the majority of research participants did not believe in crime as an 'endemic' problem in the Pakistani community, as opposed to the national view tending to represent Bradford Pakistanis as dysfunctional (Imtiaz 2002:11; Modood 2004:101). Criminological studies that have tried to dispel the myth of some 'racial' pathologies have however drawn attention to specific structural constraints affecting certain groups.

Consequentially, it may seem that a group, although not criminogenic *per se*, could be criminogenic in virtue of the specific structural disadvantages affecting it, producing similar effects: its essential deviance (Tatum 2000: xi, 5, sees 2.5).

Many accounts on the lives of Pakistanis in Britain have pointed at deprivation as the main factor leading to general disadvantage and social problems (Singh 2001:8; Bagguley and Hussain 2003c:1; Jan-Khan 2003: 33, see 5.2). Pakistanis are also one of the poorest communities in Bradford (Ouseley, 2001). So far the tendency has seemed to be to research the community as a *pathological* context where economic struggle victimises the community. Some authors, on the other hand, have tried to balance this view by saying that focussing only on economic variables may be the equivalent of attaching to the community a passive character (Ballard 1992, see 2.8). Others have highlighted a series of questions that cannot necessarily be answered only by deprivationism, i.e. why some men of South Asian heritage are academically under-achievers and others over-achievers (Modood 2004:95). We have already discussed how Ballard (1992, cf. 2.8) suggests that an analysis focussed mainly on external, structural factors tends to

convey the idea of a passive group incapable of reaction to contingencies. This approach can potentially produce a patronising attitude in the researcher and is usually constructed around Western benchmarks and values. In studies thus conducted there is little space for emic accounts, that is to say an approach that links evidence into the coherent complexity of a specific context, and consequently for the acknowledgement of agency.

Some respondents seemed to agree:

You know, there is that defeative [sic] attitude where...you know...'the world is against us'. The world is not against you! You can think like that and you will never get anywhere, right, and that doesn't mean that there is no discrimination, because there is, there is no doubt about it. You see it in the work place, and if you say there isn't, then there is something wrong. It is there, but you've got to make an effort and you've got to challenge it and things don't change without people doing something. You as a person, you as a community are not gonna change unless there is an effort made. So you can't blame all your problems on everybody else! You've got to take some responsibility!(...) You know, humans have a choice between making right or wrong (Zameer)

So I think the cause of the problems for drugs is not the area you live in, it is not if you live in a terraced house or a semi-detached house or a council estate area, because I know some Muslims who do live in [a] council estate area, but they...you know...nice family, there is no drugs in their house or anything like that. They are having no problems with their children, because the upbringing of their children has been Islamic. (Fatima)

These views seemed to reflect the mentality that has been described in this way:

"We as a group are striving and struggling to achieve higher status and prosperity, respectability, in this land where the dice is loaded against us but success is achievable, and you have to play your part"(Modood 2004:100). Moved by the need of combining knowledge of agency, this study will consider both environmental and cultural variables that may share attribution of blame as far as crime is concerned from the study population. This chapter will focus on the data that refer to an environmental part played in the production of crime.

As environmental or structural factors we mean all those elements that are not internalised in the community or the individuals, but are objective existent variables that have to be accounted for in social life. Environmental or structural factors mentioned during the research were economic recession, discrimination, deprivation, demography and education, and the conclusion will evaluate their role in the production of crime as it was expressed by the research participants.

### **8.1 The Asian Economic Niche**

Some authors have described ethnic entrepreneurship as the minorities' saviour from the harshest backlashes of the 1970s recession and the industrial crisis (Ballard 1990:224; Basu 1998: 314,315, 323; Singh 2001:9) and some have referred to this stream of analysis as 'ethnicity as a resource' (Modood 2004:88).

The conversion from textile mills to catering and taxi ranks (see 5.4), however, has only been partially investigated in its long term economic or social consequences in the lives of Pakistani communities in Britain (Kalra 2000). According to many research participants, some choices made by the pioneers of ethnic entrepreneurship led to some fundamental changes to family life and consequently the community.

One of the most popular views in this respect will be mentioned with regards to bad parenting (cf. 11.1): local politician Iqbal proffered a sort of *mea culpa* by saying that fathers who worked on multiple shifts day and night or for unsociable hours in take-aways or taxi ranks had unavoidably neglected their children who grew up without guidance. Community worker Kamran said that when the ones who were supposed to be role models were out working day and night, their sons could only find guidance amongst their peers, and that was when

everything went wrong in the community. Kamran also believed that the drug problem within the Pakistani community was something that came about not earlier than ten years ago. Many others, on the other hand, were ready to point at contiguity to drugs much older than that, and that had origins connected with the new 'Asian economic niche'. They believed in fact that although the nature of the involvement in drugs was different at that time ('it wasn't a life-style like it is now', Kamran, interview with author) many of the older generations had been involved in the drug business as a sporadic activity in order to pay a mortgage, open a shop or start a restaurant (cf. also Pearson and Patel 1998:220):

Let me tell summat...you know, a lot of businesses in Bradford, the ones who were really successful, when they came first over, they are the ones who brought the stuff [drugs] over first and everything. I can quickly mention companies and names...(...) because you know my mum, my family, you go to Mirpur and everybody knows everybody, it is a community where they know everything and it is like...my mum tells me stories that so and so, how they have done it. (Adam)

Amir: 99%, 99% of Asian businesses are from drug money, or...

ME: I will have to write this, are you sure you want to say it?

Amir: I am serious...or on crime related money, that is a fact. The only business I know that has not built upon in the whole Bradford it is my dad's business and it closed down because we couldn't survive.

ME: What is your perception, Mahima ?

Mahima: I am sure the majority is drug money.

ME: But the drug business came along quite recently...

Mahima: You can go back 20 years and you can look at one of the biggest companies around...can I mention people's names?

ME: Yes, but I will delete the name in the transcription.

Mahima: Ok, like (...) for example. We all know that his wife went to jail because she was bringing drug over from Pakistan to start the business here. She got caught, but a lot of them...

Amir: All gold shops are [built on drug money] as well...

According to some, the new professions that come with the 'Asian economic niche' brought with them an ideal flexibility for bigger illicit profits; for example, many believed that in taxi ranks the drug business had flourished due to the mobility implied in the job. Hence, many research participants refused to

introduce me to taxi drivers who often appeared as the 'folk devils' of Bradford. Certain timetables typical of the catering business were seen as ideal to provide a suitable alibi in front of the parents (see also 'double life' in 10.2):

They [the parents] will worry, but now it has come to a stage where lads will say to mum and dad 'I am going to work, I am working in a restaurant or a take away somewhere' and they will be out dealing, rather than working in a restaurant from 5 till 3 in the morning and get £15, 20 ...if you look at the small time dealers they can make a couple of hundred quid in a night, but then if you look at top end dealers, who are heroine dealers, you know...they can make...what? Sell a kilo of heroine for 90 grand and they get it for a third and they sell it 90 (Jamal)

Many respondents said that whenever people did not withdraw from the drug business after the alleged 'one-off' paid costs of a mortgage or a shop off, drug-related fights or arson attacks between drug dealing clans (see 10.4) led to a vicious circle where crime started feeding more and more criminal activities. This was not only a case of 'poisoning the community' (cf. 7.5) by creating bad role models, but also the cause of a more practical effect such as the discouragement of investments in the areas affected:

You were destroying your own community because you know, (...)if people are gonna give investments to the Asians, it is not gonna happen, is it? (Zameer)

So, if a certain area missed development opportunities as investors were discouraged to put money where there were so many troubles, the area would get more and more impoverished.

## **8.2 Deprivation, discrimination and unemployment**

The concept of poverty or deprivation was described in this way:

When someone is poor it means there are not enough jobs, not skills enough, the education attendance is poor (Kamran)

Shamim, who had been a health visitor and community worker for 20 years, recounted that when she started her home visits in the Pakistani community she would see families living below the breadline. Although she would no more see episodes of starvation, she still had to deal with overcrowded houses, poor health, lack of health sense and gender discrimination or even domestic violence all related, in her opinion, to ignorance and lack of education. The idea of the respondents employed within the social services or grass-roots organisations tended to be that it was too early to celebrate a success in the fight against deprivation although something had been achieved. Where social disadvantage was still present, they would expect criminal behaviours to develop, although dictated not by an economic necessity but by lack of education or even 'greed'.

Lack of education and opportunities were generally classified under deprivation, and the frustration about it appeared in the following words of a woman whose job is to organise training about equal opportunities. In her view, the attention of politics and the media was erroneously focussed on issues that were not the ones mainly affecting the youth:

Across the border is discontent. I think for a lot of young people, for not being able to access jobs, career opportunities, schooling, they see the discontent in the way they are treated and they are not heard. You know, with me when people say 'oh this Asian youth are so aggressive and so loud', but when you go to a white council estate, what do you see? White aggressive youth, it doesn't matter what colour they are, and I think it is time that people stop seeing them as colour, as black and white, but see them as kids and young people. When we did our last conference we had the media ringing up 'we want to interview you, we know you do stuff on forced marriage and we want to speak with a young person' and this was like national media, but I said 'I am sorry, but I am not interested, this is not the only thing we work on. We do drugs, culture, truancy, substance misuse, we are doing it on issues that affect all young people and there is a bit on forced marriage, that is it'.(Ayesha)

Sometimes deprivation was seen as an act of denial of resources for what should be a right (to education, health, etc.) by either the government or the council:

The most common problem in Horton Grange is poverty. When someone is poor it means there are not enough jobs, not skills enough, the education attendance is poor. There are two or three schools in the area, but there is one teacher and one or two support workers for 30, 40 students (it is because the government spends all the money on war). (Kamran)

The council says for example: 'We'll give you one to three grand but we want you to do this', but we don't necessarily agree with [what they want us to agree to]. (Imran)

Ayesha: There was nothing, there is absolutely nothing. Bradford Council is the worst local authority when it came to South Asian women. I did a piece of work to look at allocation of funding and I compared the funding to an Asian women refuge and a White women refuge and the Asian women refuge would receive 42 grand a year, the white refuge over 150,000 a year.

Me. Is it because of the numbers?

Ayesha: Racism, right in your face! And the men in the community aren't going to support it, because they don't want women's refuges.

Some, however, still saw the general lack of job opportunities as the cause of some young people turning to crime:

Me. So do you think people turn to drugs because they don't have any other opportunities?

Jamal: There is no other way out. I know a guy with a PhD who is dealing because he can't get a job. He has got a PhD and his friend has got a master in Philosophy or something and none of them can find a job, so they are dealing in drugs. That is what it has come to. I have got a cousin of mine who has got a master in chemistry and he can't find a job.

Me. Why do you think they are not as law abiding as the first generation...is it because of unemployment?

Jamal: Exactly, there is no industry around here, the mills are closed, so...

Men in their thirties, however, would refer to the 'laziness' of the younger men in comparison to their experience, and entrepreneur Jamil complained he struggled to find people to employ in his local shop:

It is hard at the moment, nobody wants to come into this trade, nobody wants to work now. (Jamil)

It is not the case about making a quick fix, nobody wants to struggle now, nobody wants to say 'I've got to get up at 4 o'clock in the morning, go to the factory and walk there and come back at 5 in the afternoon'... [rather] 'son, forget that, just get a couple of kilos of heroin, go and sell it on the corner, come around in a nice Porsche'...it is accepted unfortunately.(Amir)

Twenty-three years old drug dealer Azad admitted that after working hard in a local greengrocer's for six years he wanted to 'chill out a bit' with a different life-style. On the other hand, some believed that laziness was not a character feature of drug dealers:

Me. Other people would argue that if they really wanted a job they would have it, but they are lazy.

Jamal: You know, drug dealers work hard for the money. It is not easy dealing with drugs.

Although institutional racism (MacPherson 1999: 5, 20-35) did appear in the interviews, mentioned by those who had familiarised with this terminology and theory through their job, many more views found that it was insufficient to justify the rise in criminal activities in the community:

There is a lot...there is still a lot of stigma about racism and it does exist, there is no doubt about that, but ... it is up to you... my belief is, if I didn't get into a job that was the dream job I wanted, and even if I did believe and had solid proofs it was due to racism, I wouldn't turn to crime, I just got back and do something else until I knew that maybe there will be a chance to get this job in the future and tackle this racism head on if I can, and I will do it, but going into crime (...)You are not starving. You are choosing to be a criminal, it is not out of desperation. If for example...in Britain there is no reason why anyone should be a criminal, unless for very extreme reasons. For example if you...someone was in Iraq at the moment with all the situation going on now, someone was stealing, and you can't...and you say to them 'Why have you stolen?' 'It is because I need food'. You can justify it. Not saying it's right, but you can justify why they have done it, you can sense a logic in that, but here you have every single benefit that you can possibly think of. (Zaara)



Some thought that mentioning racism was the 'survival of the survival argument':

[Some] people say, 'you know we are in an alien environment we've got to survive and survival is the highest priority, so can we really condemn?' (Abdul)

Hussain and Fozia, a married couple in their late twenties, had been looking for jobs for some time when they were interviewed. They did not believe in institutional racism, but Hussain was convinced that many employers had a problem in taking him up because of his beard and his Islamic tunic, a style he had slowly developed after abandoning the peers who had apparently introduced him to light drugs. This was one of the many cases encountered during research where Islamophobia was mentioned as one of the causes of frustration and discontent amongst the Pakistani youth. Islamophobia was mentioned more times than racism as a form of prejudice and discrimination. On the other hand, Hussain and Fozia who were also first cousins, said that they could rely on two sources for surviving: their extended family (cf. Mawby and Bhatta 1980:26; Wardak 2000:72; Harrison and Phillips 2005: 181) and the welfare system. They did not perceive discrimination at a State level and praised the welfare state as many other informants did, although some worried that 'signing on' would become a habit for many young men who had never seen their fathers working.

### **8.3 'The lure of big things': opportunity theory**

If many participants agreed that in Bradford criminals did not become so out of necessity, thanks to the welfare state, on the other hand many could see a cause of an economic nature behind the rise in crime:

I think a lot of it has to do with easy money. I think it is when the kids, they have got this head set, it is easy money, fast cars, fast life, and

they'll be the heroes...and for others it will be more putting food on the table, keeping the family together, because the responsibility of some young men who are forced to take for themselves, you know, as ...you will grow up, get married, take responsibility of your parents, your family, and you will provide. Very, very big responsibility (Ayesha)

It is like families from generations that they say 'don't do it' and then their kids are revolting against them you know, they want to make money really fast because they have seen their family poverty and they don't want to be in that, so to get money really fast, this is what people have done (Abdul)

Some called it poverty, although they were not speaking of situations below the breadline, but of a relative deprivation:

Young people commit crime because of poverty; if they like a pair of trainers and they can't afford it, they will use any means to get it. But they don't have to do that for food or accommodation, the parents provide for that. (...) They also say: 'I am not gonna screw up with a degree and still [be] driving a cab' (Kamran)

Young people tended to describe scenarios where other young people would be influenced by 'the lure of big things' and aspired to a life-style that either for lack of education or alleged 'laziness' was precluded to them:

I think is the lure of big things, money, cars, nice clothes, status, recognition. I think it is the lure of those things why people do illegal things because then they become recognised (...) in the community, [you] become highly respected if you've got money you've got clout. (Abdul)

FC2 A: you've got the culture...like with [R'nB] music [videos] and stuff...and little kids wanna...and you see all these people make easy money, innit? And kids want that, they want them cars, they see that is the only way to get it that easy.

FC2 B: They want a good life...everything.

Discourses of relative deprivation and lack of opportunities to reach the goals that consumerist society promotes seemed to be compatible with Merton's opportunity theory (Merton 1938): individuals frustrated by the impossibility of achieving

what they aspire to due to society's 'must-haves' are likely to by-pass orthodox ways and resort even to criminal activities (Braithwaite 1989:31; Eadie and Morley 1999; Tatum 2000:5)

Older people, instead, tended to assume a more judgemental position labelling this attitude as 'greed' (Abdul, interview with author):

My reasoning for that is this came about because the whole mentality, whether it was Asian mentality whether the indigenous population mentality was actually changed during the Thatcher era, because the greed factor came in. Prior to that I remember as a child you know, we didn't have that greed factor. It was just...we got by, ok. But the greed factor came in where I noticed you know, being having been through that, instead of the intellectuals, the people with skills, being given, how should I say, the priority instead of accountants, the people who were high earners in those days. Priority wasn't given to the thinkers, the teachers, the people who do the very important jobs like electricians, plumbers, engineers and plus they were not paid accordingly to what accountants' pay was. And that's when things changed and accountants decided how many nurses should be working in this department instead of the person who was in charge of the nursing staff. So that's when the change came about and affected everybody, not just the Asian community. (Iqbal)

### **8.3 Class and '*Sharifisation*'**

Class and its relation to crime was rarely mentioned. Whether there was a belief that middle-class individuals were less likely to commit crime was therefore left unexplored, although comments on the positive relation between education and areas of residence and lawfulness may assume that working class people were more likely to engage in crime. However, comments seemed to be more concentrated around status, perhaps relying on the original importance of caste (*zat*) in rural Pakistan (Werbner 1990; Shaw 2000; Lyon 2004).

Informants have suggested that back home, politics and social relations are still very strongly determined by caste and the fact was not really concealed as its practice was considered to be an indicator of decent morality, in spite of Islam's

egalitarian teachings (Werbner 1990). In *vilayat*, however, issues regarding caste as a hierarchical system were apparently sheepishly avoided. Changes in the perception of *zat* (caste) reportedly regard also *Ashrafization*<sup>1</sup> or enhancing the pride of one's caste independently of its traditional ranking.

A similar process seemed to be in action amongst drug dealers. One interviewee interestingly pointed out how drug dealers enjoy all the commodities that originally people assumed were only owned by eminent figures of the community: 'They live a life of *log sharif*' (Fatima, interview with author). '*Log sharif*' in Urdu means 'respectable people'. This paradox is not due to the fact that drug dealers are treated as respectable people, but to the fact that they are able to share the same façade:

I do believe that as a result of them becoming more affluent within the community because of the car, the nice house, when they see this is what they were, this is where they are now, nice house, nice car, you know...and the community although it knows that they have done this by these means, i.e. drugs...it is haram money...they know that, there is a certain eliteness, look, I don't care, I got here, this is what you wanna be anyway (Imran)

This could suggest that the aspirational reference (cf. 'opportunity theory' above) is similar for any subgroup, but the means to achieve it are different. This may be confusing:

People who don't deal in drugs, but they have got a top end car, still dress well, they are labelled as drug dealers. A friend of mine has just spent £17,000 on car and he is not a drug dealer, but still he is labelled as a drug dealer wherever he goes. (Jamal)

It is the case everybody knows what is going on, and there is something...people who have really worked hard all their lives, the ones who have worked their backsides off and then drive around a nice

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<sup>1</sup> Ashrafisation (Werbner 1989: 100) is the process through which someone adopts a name and a way of life different from the original ones in order to be more cohesive with a caste that would be more similar to the status gained by a person through economic success. Islamisation, on the other hand, is the process of adoption of a puritan Islam that goes together with an improvement in economy and status.

car, unfortunately are labelled as drug dealers as well, due to the majority of lazy people.(Amir)

Drug dealers therefore seemed to be engaged in a process of *Sharifisation*, by developing consumerist patterns and acquiring status indicators that once belonged to *log sharif* such as doctors, lawyers, etc. At the same time, however, the children of *sharif* families were developing the 'bad boy fashion' (cf. 10.3), allegedly causing some confusion in bad stereotyping. One anecdote shows how this confusion may reflect on outsiders' perceptions. One evening the author was speaking with one lawyer and one former policeman in their BMW, parked on a cliff, eating a take away, as it is customary with many Asian young men<sup>2</sup>. The two men were dressed in casual designer clothes (style that may be adopted by some drug dealers, cf. 10.3). A police van stopped and questioned us, searched the car and caused some tension when one police officer seemed to make inappropriate remarks.

#### 10.4 Demography and education

So far the discussion on the Asian economic niche and on opportunity theory has seemed to focus mainly on the experiences of young men<sup>3</sup>. The attention given by the community to them will be more thoroughly discussed in 10.1 when taking

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Hanif Kureishi's interview with the boxer Amir Khan, The Observer, 12<sup>th</sup> February 2006

<sup>3</sup> It is clear that the Pakistani community has a very young population:

Table 8.1 Population of Bradford District 1998 by Age and Ethnic Group.

Ethnic Group	Age 0-15	Age 16-17	Age 18-24	Age 25+	Total
African Caribbean	1685	203	573	3751	6212
Bangladeshi	2163	269	858	1901	5191
Indian	3387	504	1430	8106	13427
Pakistani	26166	3043	9426	26999	65634
White	78375	9784	32734	268353	389246
Other	2374	310	845	3162	6691
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>114150</b>	<b>14113</b>	<b>45866</b>	<b>312272</b>	<b>486401</b>

Source: Bashford et al. 2004:7

into consideration masculinity. Here the analysis will be limited to the demographic issue as one of the alleged causes of the rise in crime:

Me: What changed from when people came here to open honest businesses, and now...

Akbar: Most of families, Indian and Pakistani, they don't have children at that time. Because not lot of family.

Amir: What he is trying to say is that in the 1960s if the children were growing up, there would have been something going on! (laugh)

Many respondents believed that taking risks was a sort of rite of passage for young men in any society and therefore the demographic indicators specific to the Pakistani community would automatically mean a proportionally higher rate of crime. This was consistent with literature on youth and crime (Collison 1999:434). Social worker Abdul called it 'the sense of invincibility' of the youth, and younger respondents agreed with this view:

Me. [Do you agree with the statement that] young people are believed to be more likely to commit offences much more than older people? Do you think this is the case in your community?

FG2C.I think yes, probably it is.

FG2A.yes.

Me Why?

FG2C.I think people grow out of it, don't they? The younger ones they just want to have fun, a bit of a laugh, then they grow out of it.

Me. Do you think so too?

FG2I. Yes...that is what it is, innit? It is that they are mates. This is what I think, it is all about your friends, people you hang about with, stealing and stuff is not a big thing in front of them and they do it.

I think amongst crimes like car thefts and...things like that, they happen amongst teenagers. One of the reasons for that is they are bored, there is not enough to do in that community...I have not come across that, I have met people who were stealing especially when I was young but I never come across someone doing it just to feed themselves, to put something on their table.(...) ...they should just realize that teenagers...it's not good to do crime, but they want to have fun. (Ali)

This may be one of the reasons why some families may be lenient with their sons:

We (parents) know it is *haram*, but we say: 'he is only young, he is only enjoying himself.(...)' (Sheikh Ahmed Ali)

If youth are more prone to commit crime as a characteristic of their age which they will grow out of, the educational system where they are supposed to spend a substantial part of their lives was bound to be scrutinised in its roles and duties in controlling potential deviants:

And I think are schools which are failing all kids in Britain and that is why if you do a careful study of the statements we hear, we expect prisons to bring up our children, we have a solution: schools, and if not, they go to prison and we expect the prisons they are now doing their job (Tahir)

I know courses in Bradford, Bradford college courses are full, University courses are full, so a lot of them don't think it is for them...there is not a role model for them. And they think to succeed in Bradford you have to do a business. You see, a lot of Muslim or Asian businesses have succeeded very well, from small to large...it seems that is the way to progress. Education doesn't seem to be the way forward, it is only with a few people who persevere and think 'that is what I want to do', education doesn't seem to be the way forward. (...)I don't feel there is hyper-activism from the Council to push education in these communities. A lot of the youth I talk to, they want to, but they feel there is not enough support for them, whether they ask from parents, whether they ask from Bradford college, there is not enough support out there to lure these young kids into education. I think there is that problem as well. (Imran)

These views were consistent with much of literature on educational achievement of local young Muslims living in inner city areas (McLoughlin1998c:222, Singh 2001:11) and with other research data that highlighted the fact that many parents would consider sending their children to Islamic schools because of the lack of trust in the educational system (Khanum 2000:131).

Some even thought that inner cities schools may become oppositional to the upbringing at home (see also 12.3.1):

Eight hours the child spends in schools, you know the filth they teach you. Eight hours the child spends in these schools, they are attacking these imams in every direction, they are working that this child somehow becomes a *kafir*, if he doesn't become a *kafir* he accepts and

embraces the ways...they work on the child for 8 hours a day (Sheikh Ahmed Ali)

In the interview with Umar, he explained that the educational system was so bad for Asian pupils that one may think that it was a strategy set up by White politicians in order to block the social ladder for minorities and guarantee cheap labour in the Capitalist society. He added that it once had been the same for the white working class (Irish and Polish people), but now it was easier to rely on what he defined as 'the global underdogs': Muslims. Others, instead, argued that Muslims in Bradford happened to have a more business-oriented mentality than an education-oriented one:

You see, with the Sikh community, their daughters, their sons, they all work, they are in a community where they all work, they get education and everything. Our community is following that but they are a bit...lack in mind...they don't thrive in education, they thrive in their own businesses, you see the take-aways, the restaurants, and when the father opens a restaurant, take-aways, taxi stands, and places like that, the extended family goes in there and works in there and they won't pursue a career in education and they find it more difficult because they follow their parents (Adam)

More often, both pupils and practitioners lamented an institutional racism within the system that discriminated against Pakistanis who were believed to be less likely than other ethnic groups' students to rate education high in their aspirational frame (cf. Modood 2004:93):

I hated school, I think schools for me just didn't work, I think if I was let to my own devices I would have learnt more myself, because there was always this attitude 'she is an Asian girl, she will get married at 15, so what's the point?'. Teachers used to tell us all the time, even the Asian teachers (Ayesha)



## 8.6 Conclusion: the emergence of agency within structural constraints

While in the previous chapter the threat posed to the community was defined as the benchmark against which crimes were classified, here we have analysed views on the production, rather than the construction, of criminal activities.

Commentaries reproduced here showed how although there seems to be a link between criminal activities and environmental factors, on the other hand participants were reluctant to consider them as the main causes of crime. They acknowledged, instead, a greater role of group and individual agency, “behavioural strategies” (Mamadouh 1999:400) and moral beliefs:

We don't believe that pumping money into community does anything. I absolutely, more than 100% disagree with that sort of mentality and I just think it is very short thinking...[if] you are pumping money, it is like saying crime does not exist in Westminster because there is a lot of money there, it is like saying that crime does not exist in white collar industries...it exists. Crime exists in all industries, whether you are a millionaire and you do fraud...but it just depends on what sort of crime you do. That's what matters. I don't believe by pumping in finance in a community is gonna sort out anything. What will sort anything is a common purpose in life. I know examples of people who have come off hardcore drugs because of women, because he is falling in love with a woman. (...) [My organisation<sup>4</sup>] believes that progression is not that you have a successful job, progression in the community is not that you have a big house or a nice car, or you are married to a beautiful woman or you are married to a large family, no...that's not progression. For us progression is how best have you lived your life in order to prepare for your next and that might sound a bit religious-type, but I do believe it is the spiritual education that is gonna remove the youth from the aspects of it...this is not to say that you don't aspire for these things...I am an example of that: I have done my degree, I am moving into a nice comfortable career and yet I haven't compromised my identity, I haven't compromised who I am and am still able to contribute to these communities as well as anybody else and I do believe that there are role-models for the youth and they just haven't spoken yet, they do exist, it is just they haven't spoken yet. It is a matter of giving these people a vision, people who don't have a vision, role models of this particular type, and give them a strong identity and that strong identity I believe and [my organisation] believes has to be on the Islamic basis. (Imran)

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<sup>4</sup> Imran's organisation is a non-profit cultural circle primarily concerned with youth and with a strong Islamic ethos.

Some participants tended to see a combination of structural and cultural factors as the most accurate aetiology of crime in the community, reproducing discourses that were more similar to recent New Labour agendas such as 'Respect' (Knight 2006) than to deprivationist views. Others seemed to refer to discourses of Islamic revivalism, like Imran. Similar attitudes in other studies (Tatum 2002:16) have been described as a "postcolonial theory of crime violence and minority youth" as like other postcolonial theories accounts not only for structural constraints, but also for responses to oppression coming from the oppressed and their support systems<sup>5</sup> (for example, in the case of Imran, from religion). Modood (2004:99) has linked the agency in resisting society-wide oppressive socio-economic forces to the management of ethnic capital, emerging from the agents' combination of their cultural and social capitals (Ibid. 101; see also 5.2.1)<sup>6</sup>. The next chapter will analyse the role of ethnic resources and networks in the process of attribution of blame for crime. These appear to be more common explanations of the rise of crime in the community, recording a significant switch from 1980s deprivationist discourses (see Aldrich et al. 1981) to more 'cultural' ones.

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<sup>5</sup> At the same time Tatum argues that lack of expectations may lead young people from minority ethnic group to a stage where they struggle to recognise oppression (Tatum 2000:23)

<sup>6</sup> While in American sociology the relation between social capital and ethnicity is nowadays an established field (Bankston and Zhou 2002:289), it has been argued that in the UK this is still virtually unexplored (Modood 2004:98), making the deprivationist analysis the most subscribed approach, in spite of the 1990s recommendations about what has been called 'ethnicity as a resource' (Werbner 1990; Ballard 1996). Combining environmental constraints with social and cultural capitals, therefore, has been perceived by some as the only answer to empirical questions that still have counter intuitive answers for many, for instance why in the same originally economically disadvantaged group there are both a high concentration of high achievers and a high concentration of underachievers (Modood 2004:88).

## Chapter Nine

### Attributions of blame: ethnic variables (resources and networks)

Chapter Seven discussed the process of construction of crime in the community. It emerged that crime seemed to be classified in relation to its moral and practical effects on the community and the narratives of contamination and 'putting things back in the community' were analysed. Chapter Eight investigated how the environment was seen by many research participants as contributing to the rise of crime in the community. This chapter will examine how some ethnic resources and networks (cf. 6.2.1) were seen as interacting with environmental agents in producing crime in the community.

Overall, research respondents across generations were not reluctant to think of the rise in crime by establishing a link between some environmental factors and specific ethnic resources and networks, in particular when referring to family structure and traditional sets of values. This is not in contradiction with the claim made in chapter Seven of this part that crime was not seen by participants as endemic to Bradford Pakistani cultures; the interaction of certain ethnic elements with the environment, however, was indeed considered as problematic.

Respondents described the interaction between the environment and their ethnic resources and networks according to four discourses that will be here denominated as: 'out of place' Culture, erosion of ethnic networks, *biraderism* and fatalism.

#### 9.1 The 'out of place' Culture

Family, attachment to it and its function in regulating behaviour in society has not only been a popular feature of recent New Labour policies (Knight 2006) but has been a popular object of criminological analysis of the causes of crime (cf. Hirschi 1971:95;

Wardak 2000:167,178). In the context of British Pakistani studies, particular attention has always been given to family (Saifullah Khan: 1979; Shaw: 2000). Two aspects of family life seemed to be very important in the discussions of the attributions of blame: the culture transmitted by the parents (discussed in this section) and the forms of relations and reciprocity embedded in such culture (discussed in 9.2).

What will be called here Culture represents the traditional custom that young informants perceived as consciously or unconsciously passed on by their parents<sup>1</sup>. For older research participants, Culture was a set of values and behaviours that differed both from Islamic practice (see 'religion vs. Culture debate' in 6.3) and from white people's traditions<sup>2</sup>.

In the course of the research many young respondents argued that Culture was either obsolete or not appropriate for dealing with the problems of urban Britain:

I don't have high regard for the first generation, I think they are really stuck in their old ways and they haven't really moved with the time, they really haven't and they don't want either. (...) Part of the problems the youth are facing [is that] the first generation, their parents, they are not moving, they are not willing to compromise, not willing to change, not willing to look at the same circumstance from a different reality, they are stuck. (Imran)

The youngsters are more aware (...) [the elders] are like my dad: he doesn't understand the broader picture, he can't see what can be good for my development. They don't realize there is a world outside Manningham (Malik)

This was also the argument of the Muslim chaplain of Armley prison who disagreed with the notion of bad parenting put forward by some interviewees and preferred describing it as parenting 'inadequate to the environment'. This definition seemed to include the lack of knowledge about the problems affecting youth, as exemplified through other data:

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<sup>1</sup> This perception is consistent with Bourdieu's definition of cultural capital and has been widely used in ethnic studies, cf. Modood 2004:88.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 8 in 6.3.

Me. Do you think in general parents know what goes on exactly as far as drugs are concerned, and drug crimes and other things?

(...)

FG2C. They don't know how harm they can really be.

FG2A. Like if somebody gets addicted...they wouldn't know...we see it from the streets, but they wouldn't know.

Many of our parents came here 30, 40 years ago, they came here to work, earn money, and to be honest I don't think they are really aware of the amount of drugs and crime that is going on within society. As people get older they get older they get to know people, like us young people we are growing up in this society, we get to school, we get to college and university, and you get to know people who are associated with things like this, but I don't think our parents know about this, I don't think so. I would personally say...speaking on a personal level, I wouldn't say my mum knows about all this...my dad he owns his business and stuff and he is probably aware, but speaking towards perhaps female members of the family, perhaps my mum, I don't think she is aware of the vast majority of crime going on in Bradford society (Yousef)

The “inappropriateness” of family transmitted beliefs, priorities, aspirations, however, seemed to be a particularly popular subject when intergenerational communication was discussed. Some informants described how the family is supposed to take up the burden of any problem affecting any of its members (see chapter Six and 8.2). Children brought up in this context should see members of their families (normally uncles and aunts) as confidantes. Yet, some problems could not be told even to the more sympathetic relatives, and in those cases, young people would feel lost. The thoughts of a teenager who does not know whom to turn to when facing a problem was described by Fatima who, by her own definition, used to live “a life at odds with Islam”, until she went on *Umra*:

Before, when I was 16, I was really confused. I had this Pakistani traditional values to be held at home, outside I used to be a different person. So I did not know how to deal with my problems because I could not turn to my parents because I know what they would say, I couldn't turn to my grandparents, because I know what they would say, and I wouldn't have liked to hear what they wanted to say. But I still knew, even if I turned to my friends they wouldn't tell me something that is correct as well, so I could only trust the one thing, which is my religion, my Islam (...)(Fatima)

The respondents emphasised the inadequacy of Culture in relating to the environment. Some informants seemed to perceive that crime would have been manageable and preventable had the individuals been able to draw from knowledge and well defined norms that at the moment seemed to be lacking in the community<sup>3</sup>. Others, like Fatima, seemed to think that a certain tradition within Islam could provide families with aspirations and values that would be a very efficient crime prevention strategy.

However some could see a resource in Culture. This was not related to its 'contents' or practices (the "cultural stuff", Barth 1969) but rather to its form and articulation, the ethnic networks. The loosening of community ties was considered by some as one of the causes of the recent crime rate.

## **9.2 The erosion of ethnic networks: generation<sup>4</sup> gap, vertical and horizontal ties and *khidmat***

According to the above quotes, Culture seemed to be a dominium of the community elders who were failing to adapt it to present day necessities<sup>5</sup>. At the same time, many preferred to criticise the elders for lacking rapport with the younger generation rather than for failing to adapt Culture to the environment:

The parents don't have that interaction with their child (FG2A)

Parents, obviously there is a communication problem, that's why the problem has risen in the first place (Iqbal)

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<sup>3</sup>Most informants complained that in the community there was a widespread ignorance of drugs and their effects (see 11.8 and 12.1.2).

<sup>4</sup>It has proved impossible to construct a consistent use of a time or culturally uniform unit called 'generation'. For this reason, this term is used by different respondents in different ways, and the author will prefer to use 'younger' and 'older'. In this instance the term is used to describe the general divide between parents and their children.

<sup>5</sup>Alexander (2000:240) has argued that the essentialisation of 'first generation' and discourses based on the dichotomy traditional/non-traditional are paramount in contemporary ethnic studies.

Both outsider (Webster 1996:11, 1997:67, Archer 2001:82; Kundnani 2002) and insider (Imtiaz 2002:11; Malik 2004) commentators have viewed 'generation gap' as one of the main problems of some ethnic minorities' youth, impacting on their sense of identity and belonging.

'Gap' in the context of this research means the distance between members of different generations (when they do not spend time together or scarcely interact) and the differences separating the two (when they do not share the same expectations, values and sometimes language). In this research such a view was widely shared across sample groups and the issue was believed to have very practical consequences that went much beyond the more abstract questions of identity and heritage that ethnicity scholars usually draw upon. The gap between a stereotypically law abiding first generation and one that does anything "hardly by the books" (Jamal, interview with author) meant that there may be a real obstacle in fully developing parents' potential as agents of crime prevention (see 11.1.1).

An example of a generational overview of the community was given to me by Jamal, 36, businessman :

The old generation was nothing else but work, work, work, and then take the money back home and that's it. But the new generation they are not bothered by work, they are getting money, they live. (Jamal)

Jamal, 22, student, instead, tried to challenge such absolute comments:

The first generation in them days were worse than the second generation now. When it comes to drugs and stuff, plenty of people from the first generation they did it (...). Majority of the first generation was good and minority of the first generation was bad. Second generation seems as the other way round. The majority of the second generation is socially excluded or whatever you want to put it and there is a minority who does everything by the system, go to school, get GCSEs, do A levels, go to Uni, get into debt, get a degree and work the rest of your life to pay Uni fees off. That is the system. Then you have people who are out of the system , don't bother with GCSEs, don't bother with A levels, leave school at 16, get a job, work

for a couple of years, buy a car...got a car, what shall I do? 'I am driving around anyway, so I might as well sell drugs while I am driving'. (Jamal)

Some respondents narrated episodes from their childhood when visitors from Pakistan would come hiding drugs for personal use in their clothes. The view that drug consumption was not extraordinary amongst the older generation is backed by other Bradford based research (Pearson and Patel 1998:213,218). Some, however, argued that drug smuggling beyond personal use had happened as well (Ibid: 220). Amir, 35, unemployed, in conversation with his father Akbar, seemed convinced that the community had always been contiguous to drugs, but for the elders this was a side-business linked to survival or economic development (see 8.1), while for the younger generation it had become a life-style (see 10.3). Still, once the myth of the 'perfect' first generation was dispelled, the model of the old generation as "grafters" and young generation as "screwed up" (Kamran, interview with author) survived. The difference seemed to be in the horizon in which even illegal activities were put by the older generation: the community<sup>6</sup>.

I think that the current generation they are lacking or are deficient in the knowledge that reliance, dependence on each other, discipline and sacrifice of the individuality, what it means it gives you protection, it gives you security means that your needs are much better met and we all have needs. We have emotional, psychological needs (Abdul)

In the generation gap, there seemed to be a loss for the young people who missed out on a system that provided 'reliance, dependence, discipline'. While during fieldwork a strong criticism towards an obsolete Culture emerged from some, the loosening of the

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<sup>6</sup> For some informants the level of toleration of illegal activities would be affected by the potential positive side effects for the community (i.e. when drug dealers invested in charity or created legal employment). So, if somebody seemed to carry out illegal activities keeping the welfare of the community in sight, some may forgive such 'short-cuts', as it seemed it had happened at some stage during the settlement process. This notion may be related to the concept of *khidmat*, or service to the community (cf. Werbner 1997: 238). See also 'putting things back in the community', in 7.5).



traditional community ties was regretted by others. Iqbal criticised the transformation in the nature of support networks by placing attention within the family:

Why should they [young people] need them, mothers and fathers? I was talking to somebody from India, (...) and I put the question to him and I said 'What about these relationships' and he said 'Every relationship is based on need...and when you have the welfare state, what does a wife need you for, as a husband? What does the husband need a wife for?'. I mean, (Laughs) there is plenty of restaurants and takeaways and launderettes and vice versa, and the welfare state is there. Same with the child, what does he need the mother and father for? As soon as he is 16, 17 does he need the mother and father? There is no need for that, he is independent. The welfare state itself creates a problem...I mean, it solves a lot of problems, but it creates a lot of problems as well...I am not saying that we should do without welfare state, because I believe in Welfare State, but it does create that problem, somehow, because we have to put that structure back in...how do we put it back in, I don't know. (Iqbal)

According to Iqbal, unless young people felt part of a system, they would not abide by any rule apart from their own interest.

In Bradford, it seemed that there had been a general weakening of these ties.

Fatima, although only 19, was able to compare the situation of today to the supportive networks of her father's accounts:

So say for example in a community there should be this sense of trust the sense that we can go and talk to each other about it (...) when it comes to these problems and these matters [talking about young women taking drugs and running away from home], basically, we leave your own family to deal with it, there is no sense of help to each other, so I think that is a great loss within the community. Because in the past, my dad, you know when they used to have a problem and stuff?, they all used to get together and deal with it, you know, in the correct way, but nowadays... (Fatima)

One statement by the oldest respondent in the research, however, seemed to cast light on the process of the weakening of the wider community networks, not by blaming external factors such as Western socialisation (see below) but by simply acknowledging what naturally happened in the course of settlement:

Akbar: Because everybody now is family man. Before they live with 15, 20 people, not just by myself, too different position now.

Everybody family man, the children are born, children grown, that is a problem, growing. When they grow it is problem, it is not all the time same position.

Amir: I think [he means] because before they were only single males from different families, and then some brought the wives over, then they got their own families and the second generation, third generation, their families have got so big that they can only help themselves.

It almost seemed that due to the growing family concerns less priority was given to the well-being of the collective sphere. Or, without making a causal correlation, less people practically adhered to the ideology of “putting things back into the community”. Wider horizontal ties were therefore weakened together with the vertical generational hierarchy that gives a sense of belonging and duty to the community (*khidmat*). The families’ inward cohesiveness, instead, seemed to resist more successfully than the community’s. However, some research participants argued that this was the result of ‘keeping up appearances’ in spite of multiple threats to the family system and that sometimes the strive for such preservation may be counterproductive for the community at large (see *biraderism* below and in 6.4).

### **9.3 The risks of excessive bonding and *biraderism***

Whilst rapport was considered a very positive feature and individuals and families interactions with the rest of the community for the common good were generally considered crucial (see again the concept of *khidmat*), the particularisation of bonding within one’s *biraderi* was believed to have many negative effects<sup>7</sup>. Akbar’s description of a society that would strive for one’s family rather than for the wider common good could be seen as the first step towards complacency about deviance. When the good name of the family was at stake the struggle to protect it and therefore the denial of the problem was believed to have repercussions on the rest of the community.

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<sup>7</sup> For similar more theoretical findings cf. Bankston and Zhou 2002:290.

According to Akbar, parents were bound to keep quiet in the face of children's misdeeds as they were under threat of being left by their children:

If anybody has the problem and they put pressure too much on children, now they will [have] lost the children because they leave the home. If you have a problem with children you ['d] better keep quiet (Akbar)

Even worse, some respondents thought that some parents had transformed the traditional struggle over status competition of different *biraderis* into something that belonged to a culture<sup>8</sup> where different 'clans' measured themselves in this way:

Me: Parents must be worried for what is going on...what do you think they think the solution is?

Zaara: You see, they are proud. They are proud of the fact, like I said earlier, 'My son is a drug dealer, nobody will touch me because...they won't start with me, that's it...my son is gonna go and sort them out'.

Me: But don't the parents question their kids when they see their kids not working and buying big cars?

Jamil (Laughs) No, they don't care: they have a nice car outside!

Even parents who may not encourage criminal activities were considered complacent when withdrawing from the responsibility of delivering appropriate guidance or at least checking on their children's networks and behaviours. This attitude was often linked to the alleged habit of some young dealers to 'treat' the parents to jewellery, plane tickets to Pakistan and even cars, in order to make them turn a blind eye to their illegal activities:

I know a guy on our street and he deals in heroin and his family and friends are not bothered, he says: 'here you are mum, five grand, you go and do yourself shopping'. To the dad 'here you are twenty grand go and buy yourself a car', his sister 'take a couple of grand go and buy some jewellery and clothes'. They aren't bothered, money is money for them. (Jamal)

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<sup>8</sup> The expressions 'mafia culture' or 'gangster culture' were widely utilised during the research, maybe also because of my Italian identity, see 10.4.

Who is the one who turned a blind eye when his son had a £40,000 [car] outside his house and he knew that his son did not work. Who is the one who did not question his son when he put £1,000 on the table when he knows that he doesn't work? (Sheikh Ahmed Ali, from the tape 'Muslim youth')

Funny thing is, these days I see fathers, five-times-a-day people with beards, the prayer beads and the tickets to paradise, knowing damn well what their sons are up to and not doing a thing about it. Matter of fact, as long as the sons bring in a few hundred notes every week to go towards the mansions in Pakistan, or the upkeep of the family four wheel drive, there's no problem (Alam 2002:150)

The reasons behind parents turning a blind eye were described either as because of being keen on a series of 'treats' or as being motivated by the preservation of the family *izzat*:

The Asian community is a very tight community so (...) if anybody else in the community finds out it just looks bad on them, so that's why they don't want anybody else to find out. (...) They've got this...*izzat*, like that, so (...) when they do[find out]...rather than dealing with it they just push it away. (Ali)

Because my experience is that the elders are not addressing the issues, they are only waffling basically to protect the honour of the family (Alina)

It is about the whole family...if you deal with drugs it affects the family *izzat*...if my son is doing it, my brother will be ashamed in introducing me thinking of my son... (Shamim)

The Muslim chaplain of Armley prison recounted some cases where young men had been protected by their parents until they were arrested and their names were published in newspapers. Then, in order to protect their standing in the *biraderi*, parents had not accepted them back in their home. Some thought that parents had a further reason to conceal their children's misdeeds: apart from the threat to the whole family's *izzat* there seemed to be a tendency to blame the parents before blaming anything or anyone else:

[If you imagine a situation where somebody is taken to prison] I think the neighbours will start blaming the parents, they will say, you know, perhaps 'if he had been brought up in the right way he wouldn't have done such a crime', but then I think, they will start talking and

they would actually start blaming the parents 'so and so's son'...you know, they won't even mention the person's name, you know, they wouldn't say my name, you know, they would say the parent's name, 'so and so's son', they actually put more blame onto the parents (laughs) (Yousef)

If you have just come out of jail people will say 'So's and So's son', they will never mention your name, they will always mention your father's name. 'So and So's son has come out of jail, he went in for drugs. (Jamal)

Some participants, therefore, seemed to perceive a parallel decline of wider community relations alongside the growth of a negative exclusivism of family ties. Criminology has debated whether relational proximity, the closeness of a group, may be considered an advantage for reciprocal social control. In fact some studies have emphasised the deterrent role of shame in front of close acquaintances (Goffman 1968:43, 49; Burnside and Baker 1994:21), while others have shown how close relations tend to be more forgiving (Erickson 1977:6, 8; Braithwaite 1989:87). The perceptions reported in this section seem to be consistent with the latter criminological hypothesis. The situation was explained in an account of the exclusive bonding inside the family or extended family that was detrimental to society, both for its protection of the criminals and its causational link to the diminishing of interrelations with the wider community:

There are a lot of people from Mirpur and a lot of people from Attock, they are Chachch...from Campbellpur area. Quite a large community both of them. I know, a lot of people from Mirpur won't mix, would not intermarry outside their *biraderis*... it is true...they marry in the family, they keep it very close knit, and what you find is that when people are so insular and keep themselves to themselves, their mentality doesn't change, and their behaviour within their family structure, their *biraderis* or whatever you wanna call it, their clan, it stays very sort...within themselves, and the same with the Chachch community, they are very sort of insular as well, they very rarely marry out, even though things are changing slightly...(Zameer)

#### 9.4 Competing Sources: Culture, Islam and the West.

So far three different discourses on blame attribution have been discussed: 'out of place' Culture (1), the erosion of ethnic networks (2) and excessive bonding or *biraderism* (3). What has not been described yet is what generates different positions and whether these produce alternative choices that may be presented to an individual once he/she feels let down by his/her community in its cultural or social forms. An example of a strategy to find an alternative has already been presented in the person of Fatima who described her frustration in being unable to seek help either from elders (with inadequate knowledge) or from the community (deprived of its collective focus). Fatima's choice of an alternative source of guidance and support had been religion. Her adherence to a form of 'de-culturised' or 're-culturised' Islam (cf. McLoughlin 2006a) made her a supporter of the first discourse.

The 'religion versus Culture' debate has been recently the focus of many discussions in Islamic revivalism (Cesari 2004:54). Although Muslim and non Muslim scholars (El-Zein 1977: 240; McLoughlin 1998a:106, 2006a; Ramadan 2004:9) have talked about the natural adaptation of Islam through local identities and environmental circumstances, revivalist discourses tend to refer to an orthodox Islam in opposition to its mediation through any cultural capital alien to the Arabic matrix (Cesari 2004:153; Ramadan 2004: 6). In the research data, whenever the word 'culture' was presented, it seemed to have a negative connotation:

Most families are uneducated or too cultural (...)What parents still do is tell the children, the male, the boys [against the Islamic principle of equal inheritance amongst brothers and sisters], that when they die they will inherit all their money, all their wealth, this is through their house, their car, their properties, their businesses, the money in the bank, everything...nothing to the daughters (...)This has an effect on the education, or on crime as well, because I think that once the sons become street wise at the age of 16, because they are out of school, if they are gonna inherit their parents wealth or live off their parents

throughout their life, they are gonna play truant as well and miss their classes, and that's where crime starts .(Mahima)

From your parents you find that you get culture and from the mosque you get religion. (...)so what you find is that religion is just mixed with different cultures to make one and I think that this is where the mistakes are because what's wrong in culture they say it's wrong in religion but in a lot of cases it is not. So that's why when I see people studying Islam and stuff, they study it and then they realize that they made a big mistake here, mixing the two, they are very different and they should separate them (Ali)

The opposition seen between culture and religion further undermined the role of Culture in maintaining stability and sustaining progress in the community. Often Culture represented the rural and uneducated background where most of the migration pioneers in the 1960s came from (cf. 5.3):

Because a lot of the Asian community in Bradford are from Mirpur and they are not educated, they lack the parental skills to build a relation with their children and they raise their children to place their beliefs on culture rather than religion, when the sons do commit crime, the Asian males of community commit crime, it is not looked down [on] as bad ... (Mahima, herself of Mirpuri heritage)

Young people tended not only to claim that Culture might be co-responsible for crime in the community, when in the name of 'reputation' illegal activities were hidden instead of being dealt with, but also that it was an obstacle for the development of 'true' Islam:

[Traditional culture] is more [about] giving Islam in a secular way, it is just personalised in your own home, it is praying your *salat* -your obligatory prayers- and respecting your elders, it is just picking certain things that are taught, and that doesn't equip you with problems that you will face in the wider society. As Muslims we should accept Islam in its totality so we shouldn't be knit picking so you are going to find at home somebody who is totally different, but when you are outside in the wider society, if you've got drugs problems, girlfriend-boyfriend problems, society problems, free mixing problems, you know, all this type of different problems, we are not gonna see them, we are not gonna see Islam dealing with these problems because our institutions like *madradas* or these mosques are little study circles that...they haven't taught, they haven't equipped us with the true Islamic ideas to deal with those problems because it has been given in a very secular way.(Fatima)

'Supporters' of both Islam and revival of *khidmat* as a solution, however, often seemed to have to fight the same 'demon': Western culture. Participants who prioritised Islam as their main point of reference may criticise those who relied on Culture. Those who privileged the system provided by the traditional community networks as the supportive system generating common good may accuse certain interpretations of Islam as being too exclusive and not concerned with the community at large<sup>9</sup>. Both positions, however, seemed to fear a vision of life that was coming from the present environment:

Fatima: Ideas like freedom and individualism, that (...) is where Islam or religion (...) basically doesn't start to play that major role...

Me: So you think Western culture actually prevents the Pakistani youth from being close to religion, Islam?

Fatima: Yeah.

Me: And where do you think the young Pakistanis have picked up Western culture?

Fatima: I think...(...) firstly they get these ideas from obviously the people they have grown up with and the way society pushes certain things, say for example freedom and individualism (...)

Me: And you think this detachment from religion or otherwise this kind of proximity with Western culture is giving the Pakistani community some problems?

Fatima: I think it is giving problems to the Pakistani Muslim community because you find that the way they would idealise the ideas of freedom and idealism...it is not handed out on a plate 'this is freedom, this is individualism', is covered up with so many attractions so many illusions that the youth have been given, so it is through the role models, like the media industry, you know, the pop stars and rock stars, whatever, this kind of mentality of Bollywood, even, so the way they take in this culture or these ideas of freedom and individualism is a very disillusioned way...they think they will get this freedom and you know get what they want out of it and you understand the way this affects the Muslim community or the Pakistani community is in a negative way, so now you have seen that the parents have taught them in one way and they are going in another way which is away from their parents' culture and the way parents think. So this creates quite a lot of family problems in itself because

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<sup>9</sup> The example of people belonging to Tableegh Jamaat was put to my attention many times, see for example 11.1.2.



the parents are not willing to accept their values and nor the children to accept their parents' values... (...) we are still humans at the end of the day, there will be problems, but equipping the youth, taking their disgusting Western ideas out of them, you know the idea of freedom, that they are free to do whatever they like, this is all...

Let me just call you an incident. There was a trouble in a street and the police contacted the mosque. I don't know how it happened, there was [a] representative of the mosque, [a] police person and there were youth, so the police said to the mosque chairperson, 'you need to look after your lot', and what the response from the mosque chair person was -I found it amazing-, 'this is not our lot. This is your lot. It comes from your schooling system, from your system, from your society, it is not my lot, it is your lot. My lot is me, my age group. We came, we never went into crime, so don't tell me this is my lot, this is your lot. You have done this'. So it was very interesting, I just happened to hear. Do you understand 'it is not my lot, it is your lot', because 'this is the product of this system, I haven't agreed to this system'. (Tahir)

The position critical of 'the West', on the other hand, was heavily criticised by the majority as a "cop out" (Zameer, interview with author):

That is...total nonsense in my opinion. If it is all down to the Western culture, then the West don't believe in honour killings which the Eastern culture believes in, so they have found their roots and said the Western made them into gangsters, so when they came to the eastern culture side, and they decided to do...my sister ran away with so and so, I believe this deserves to be called honour killing, that's also like a gangster act as well...so it is not the Eastern, it is not the western, it is what they believe in. (Zaara)

Even more interestingly perhaps, some supporters of the 'out of place' Culture discourse believed that Western knowledge would be positive in helping their community to deal with crime problems:

In the communities where I work (mainly white and black) where they have centres where there are print-outs of places where you can have...drugs [treatments]...HIV projects and stuff, they are doing that in their own community day in day out. That's why I have worked in that community, I have learnt so much from the white community it is unbelievable. If I was in the Asian community...nobody is there to put these protocols forward for me to learn all this (Adam)

A further group of individuals who do not believe that any of these sources (Islam, Culture or the West) have anything to do with crime can be represented by Akbar, whose point of view will be described in the conclusions as 'fatalism':

Me: When your children were growing up were you worried that they would lose their tradition or religion?

Akbar: I really not, I don't think that, because the children are like lottery ticket, you don't know what will be their position when they grow. If it growing right ok, if not, not. It is a free country, otherwise if I worry if they grow what they do and I take them to my country and grow there, I don't know what they can do there.(...) All over the world something is wrong. In one country one thing is good, another country another thing is bad, you can't decide, but I think England is better.

## **9.5 Conclusion: theories of community criminologies**

This chapter has compared the different discourses that combine cultural and social aspects with environmental factors in the search for attribution of blame for crime.

The first position (1) referred to Culture (see Table 9.1 below). Participants who supported this view argued that norms inherited by parents were insufficient for helping young people in dealing with the risk of deviance in Bradford. This group was formed mainly by young people and was divided into two. The first subgroup (1a) claimed that adopting a set of norms which claimed universality (such as Islam) instead of the particularity of the Pakistani ethnic resources would be a solution. The second subgroup (1b) believed that enhancing parents' awareness about specific risks through Western knowledge would be sufficient.

The second position (2) referred to a very wide sense of ethnic networks. Those sharing this standpoint pointed to the erosion of the organisation of the community and the dynamics of passing values on, rather than to the content of what was passed on. This group was formed mainly by older people or individuals who had a very good relationship with the elders. In this discourse both Western individualism (2a) and

certain religious traditions (2b) that neglected community concerns (such as Tableegh Jamaat) were blamed.

The third position (3) referred to a particular aspect and degeneration of Culture: *biraderism*. Almost all of the interviewees agreed that this was a very popular trend in the community. Those who would put their *biraderi* before of anything else, even at the cost of turning a blind eye to illegal activities, were the focus of blame in this discourse.

A fourth position (4) of those resigned to fate (*kismat*) was also identifiable. However, the reticence of these respondents raises the doubt whether their standpoint may have been dictated by their attempt to avoid attributing blame to any specific set of values or behaviours.

These discourses are summarised in the following table:

Table 9.1 Theories of community criminologies

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>(1) 'Out of Place' Culture</b></p> <p><u>Focus:</u> Culture</p> <p><u>Attribution of blame:</u> immobility of cultural capital</p> <p><u>Supporters:</u> 1a) believers of the religion vs culture argument (Islam as positive solution) 1b) most young people and practitioners ('Western knowledge can help')</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>(2) Erosion of ethnic networks</b></p> <p><u>Focus:</u> interrelations, from intergenerational to intracommunal, <i>khidmat</i></p> <p><u>Attribution of blame:</u> erosion of wider than <i>biraderi</i> intracommunal ties and dismissal of the 'common good'</p> <p><u>Supporters:</u> 2a) critics of some aspect of Western individualism; 2b) critics of exclusive religious groups such as Tableegh Jamaat.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>(3) Biraderism</b></p> <p><u>Focus:</u> <i>biraderi</i></p> <p><u>Attribution of blame:</u> excessive intra familial bonding</p> <p><u>Supporters:</u> almost all interviewees who look down on 'cultural Muslims'; the West does not impact on this discourse.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>(4) Fatalism</b></p> <p><u>Focus:</u> <i>kismat</i></p> <p><u>Attribution of blame:</u> none, resigned to fate</p> <p><u>Supporters:</u> individuals who do not believe Culture, Islam or the West have anything to do with crime</p>

These typologies do not always exclude one another, as proven by reactions against *biraderism* that were shared across supporters of different theories.

These different discourses seem to add an important element to what will be discussed in thesis as the core of community criminologies: the threat to the community itself.

This element is the consideration of a split between *biraderism* and community, where families appear to be not necessarily functional to the stability of the community anymore, but the exclusiveness of intra-familial bonding may jeopardise the collectivity. Families' strong ties ('a combination of the amount of time, intimacy and reciprocal services', Granovetter 1973:1361) once perceived as being the pillar of internal cohesion may now be an agent of fragmentation wherever the particular interest of a family is in conflict with the community common good:

Community, I don't think they are united, so it doesn't really make a difference, it takes a big thing to happen to remark their presence, which is negative sometimes. Then personally I do not feel that a lot of community activities take place or a lot of discussion takes place (...)You are already a small community and if you differ because of religious sectarianism, language, ethnicity, geographical orientation, then obviously your voice will be difficult to...you are not Mirpuri, Chachchis...(Tahir)

This would add a variable to Hirschi's social control theory according to which delinquents acts occur when individuals' bonds to society are weak or broken (Hirschi 1971:16). In this emic study the theory must acknowledge all the levels of ties, intra-communal and inter-communal, vertical and horizontal, and the specific *biraderi* variable gives an insight that might have fooled an etic analysis that, for example, tried to impose universal notions of Putnam's social capital to this context.

## Chapter 10

### Labelling and male subcultures

The previous chapter analysed competing discourses in the community in order to shed some light on the processes of attribution of blame for the rise in crime. This chapter will provide a description of the groups and the areas at risk. If the views in the preceding chapter implied that erosion of ethnic resources and networks was impending on many young people, widespread internal (see below) and external (Webster 1997:65; Kundnani 2002; Alexander 2004; Burdsey 2004:764) moral panic about young men seemed to reveal that they were more at risk of crime than young women (see also 7.4).

This chapter will analyse the data relevant to the correlation between young men, competing cultural capitals, and deviance. 8.5 already tackled the allegedly demographic explanation of the relation between Pakistani men and crime, but ignored its interaction with cultures and masculinity that has been considered by other writers as an essential point in the creation of subcultures (Goodey 2001:434). In this context it will be highlighted how some young Pakistani male subcultures are not considered to be deviant *per se*, but are described as 'grey areas' between good and evil, where young men are more likely to be lured to criminal activities. In certain descriptions it will emerge that subcultures may be a product of environmental and cultural interaction. This may be one of the reasons why the concerns surrounding young women and crime produce a different kind of moral panic, based on more 'cultural' notions such as gender roles in the community (see 7.4). As far as men are concerned, competing

resources and networks seem to co-exist in their choices in how to relate to the local social environment (see for example vigilantism in Webster 1997).

### **10.1 Pathologizing young men: subcultural studies in the British Pakistani context**

Traditionally (see 6.1), men in the Pakistani community of Bradford are considered the main breadwinners. This expectation is considered to be an essential part of their gender, and therefore they may be considered the economic pillar of their families. In spite of this, many young men nowadays are considered to be a liability as destabilising agents for their families and the whole community (cf. 7.3.1 and 7.5).

The extent of the state of wariness surrounding young men is reflected in a series of conversations on their characters recorded during the field and through literature review of Bradford based research. These views go from the brief theorization of three categories of young men by Umar, a research participant, to the academic work written by Bradford born Dr. Imtiaz and echo in works of white academics such as Webster (1997) on the Bradford district (see 3.5).

Views emerged during the present research were very similar to Imtiaz's model analysed in 3.5, although tending to emphasize that categories were very fluid and could only delineate a potential of deviance or adherence to norms. In particular, one respondent, who sometimes writes for a local newspaper, combined the categorization of youth with an historical and gendered perspective. Umar believed in fact that twenty years ago there was 'only one type of Pakistanis', now there were three: category 1 (educated, middle class),

category 2 (religious, all the range from liberal to fanatics) and category 3 (described as street jobs or criminals and '*lafanga*' who wore chains around their wrist and chest and spoke 'like Afro Caribbeans'). *Lafanga* is a Punjabi term that was explained to me in this way:

*Lafanga* is somebody who is not pursuing an education just messing about, it is not a term for someone who is a drug dealer. There is not like a certain word for someone who deals and stuff like that. *Lafanga* is someone who is lazy and just messing about (Adam)

*Lafanga* I would say it is someone who is always around the streets, you know, not taking care of anything, they say *lafanga*... (Jamil)

For Umar, *lafangas* were also those young men who took advantage of the 2001 riots to go looting. *Lafangas*' lifestyle was also blamed for the bad stereotypes outside the community:

You see some of the youngsters and their behaviour is very disrespectful you know, and it is very...and sometimes the way they would park up in cars...and...they might not do anything wrong, but it is just what they portray to people...and particularly to the white community, the sense I get is that they are quite wary of Asian kids, Asian teenagers and youngsters, you know when there are three or four in car, they may not be doing anything wrong, but it is just that...maybe it is sometimes the thing that we portray...(Zameer)

*Lafangas*, otherwise described as 'screwed up', or 'lazy', resulted in being the folk devils of the community. Although only Umar presented a full system of classification of youth subcultures, almost all interviewees spoke about an equivalent of his 'category 3'. According to Umar, 9/11 had been a catalyst for the proliferation of category 2, but category 3 was the one 'to be worried about' and had been the result of bad schools (see also 8.5 and 12.3.1) and lack of discipline at home (see also 11.1). The proof of the latter would be in the comparison of female and male siblings: the girl would always be 'better', as she would be more likely to have grown up disciplined. Girls would be respectful, do housework, and even be explicitly told 'not to behave like boys'. The boys,

instead, would become '*ladla*' (favourite) and the parents would not check what they would do with their money. Most of the responsibility would be on the mothers (cf. 11.1.3), as fathers would be too busy with work (cf. 8.1) and would only intervene if something major happened. According to Umar, children socialised in a family with strict norms would end up in category 1, where it was required to be either 'in or out', and there were no chances to lead a 'double life'. The idea of bouncing in and out and to live a double life has been expressed also by Webster (1997) as discussed in 3.5.

It may be interesting to the purposes of this chapter and the study of labelling processes to compare existing literature on male subcultures in British Pakistani diaspora<sup>1</sup> with the research data (see table 10.1). These analyses tend to overlap in their acknowledgement of different dynamics in combining diverse sets of resources and networks, while disagree in some instances in their identification. The first striking difference is that only in Umar's labelling a 'good', role-model eligible sub-group is present, *category 1*. Members of such group would disenfranchise themselves from any specific set of resources and networks in order to pursue a perceived universal 'common good'. Although in Imtiaz's classification *coconuts*<sup>2</sup> are seen as law abiding, that very label suggests a derogatory sentiment and this category is not perceived as a good role model because of its perceived detachment from its own community. In Wardak and Webster's studies there is reference to a positive, trouble-free "public propriety" as "appropriateness, seemliness, decency, conformity with good manners,

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<sup>1</sup> Recently, a growing number of pieces of research about Muslim male subcultures seem to have developed in the UK. Amongst these, Archer's research on Muslim boys and education (2003) and Shah and Dwyer's Leverhulme funded research in Slough (2006). However, for the purposes of this thesis and word length constraints only a selection of studies could be reviewed.

<sup>2</sup> The label 'coconut' describes an individual who is brown outside and white inside (Asian in appearance but English in life-style), cf. Imtiaz (2002:125).



conformity with convention of language and behaviour” (Cohen 1979:124, quoted in Webster 1997:74). However, this propriety is adherence to family tradition, and is not independently forged by young men. In Wardak’s Edinburgh study the positioning in a cultural vacuum/ universal ground that was positive for Umar is seen as negative, as this is the attitude of those rebelling to everything and therefore may undermine community stability. Wardak is also striking for the absence of an Islamist sub-group in his study (see 3.5). While in Bradford-based accounts the combination of different sets of resources and networks is seen as negative (see next section), Wardak does not seem to register a negative view in his sample with regard to this process. Imtiaz’s and Umar’s emic views, together with Webster’s etic account, depict a negative picture of individuals or groups that try to combine cultural capitals.

The table below summarises the views discussed above.

Table 10.1 Comparison of British Pakistani male subcultural models

	Adherence to traditional resources and networks	Combination of resources and networks	Adherence to exclusivist resources and networks	Reference to alternative resources and networks	Do not ascribe to any specific resources or networks
Imtiaz (2002)		<i>Rude Boys</i> (mix 'religion' and 'culture', capitalise on their difference within mainstream society)	<i>Extremists</i> (reject traditional culture, resources and networks in favour of one vision of Islam)	<i>Coconuts</i> (ascribe to alternative resources and networks, while detaching themselves from traditional ones)	
Umar (present research interviewee)		<i>Category 3</i> (mix Asian and African/Caribbean culture, lack adherence to norms)	<i>Category 2</i> (described as "religious", "all the way from liberal to fanatics")		<i>Category 1</i> (ascribe to the idea of a universal common good above competing sets of resources and networks in the community)
Webster (1997)	<i>Conformists</i> (passive guardians of "public propriety"; blame youth and may be rewarded by integration within white society) and <i>Vigilantes</i> (active guardians of "public propriety", use improper means for the white society's standards)	<i>Experimenters</i> (defend what used to be racialised territorialism and now is control over drugs) and <i>Go-betweens</i> (occasional criminals)	<i>Islamists</i> ("non-cultural" Muslims)		
Wardak (2000)	<i>Conformists</i> (full-time followers of social norms: no separation between real and ideal).	<i>Part time conformists</i> (stick to a few 'token' activities to avoid being labelled 'deviant' for family sake) and <i>accomodationists</i> (more like conformists but allow for some compromise)			<i>Rebels</i> (violate and challenge all norms)

## 10.2 'Double consciousness' or 'torn between two cultures'?

Negative comments about those who try to juggle different sets of behaviours are easily predicted as the boundaries between propriety and impropriety (see above) may blur.

In a community where for many it still seems so important to have a widely recognised social standing in front of others (see 11.1), it seemed to be natural to question how it was possible for *lafangas* to conduct their alleged life of 'chilling' (Azad and Khalil, interviews with author) without being restricted or sanctioned by their families. A common answer to this question was a criticism against their 'double life':

Me: But the children [who are involved in crime] don't actually get to the point of leaving the house...

Fatima: That's right. Because (...) they were still brought up with those values or some values or morals towards their parents, so they are totally different outside the home than they are at home.

Me: But they would want to move somewhere else away from the parents?

Fatima: No, they would still...because for example the values they have been given by their parents when they were small, this idea of being good Pakistani children living with your parents ...that's the way of tradition, you know, the boy and the girl...the children live at home and if they do, when they do get married they can still stay at home if they want, so this view, this concept ...but the Western values, they still have a dominance in the children's way of life because when they go outside the home, they act upon those western values.

Khalil had even planned to go to Pakistan and get married to a cousin chosen by his parents, make them happy and at the same time put his conscience at rest. In this way he would provide them with a carer for their old age, and through this he would have enjoyed more freedom than now as this, according to him, was what really mattered to his parents: perpetuation of and stability in the *biraderi* (see 7.6). In some aspects, therefore, the traditional cultural capital was preserved, but room was made for the individual's choices. According to the

models above, Khalil could have been a *rude boy*, an *experimenter* or a *Part-time conformist*. In Imtiaz's thesis, however, a point was made that labelling in the research ignored women, thus responding to an external hegemonic representation of Muslim women that was not as threatening to wider social order as the men's was.

In the course of the present research, however, some women could have been described as 'rude girls', leading a double life and seriously, albeit not necessarily willingly (cf. 7.4), threatening the community stability:

[Some girls start dealing] because I think...they have these two sets of...like identities. So when they are at home they have a different identity, when they are outside in the wider society, they act differently. It is the sense that you are free outside in the world but when you come home, your dress in a certain way, you speak in a certain way and them sort of girls that I have described...basically they haven't got the freedom from home so they leash out their freedom in that way. So you know...they have that sense of control, so if they have been controlled at home they want control outside. So this is the way they find their control, this is the way they experience their freedom.(...) (Fatima)

Hence, given the freedom, even girls could activate a double-life system.

In Umar's opinion, there may be individuals who move from his *category 1* to *category 2* and vice-versa, but there were no hopes for *category 3*'s young men who combine 'Mirpur with LA' (Imtiaz 2001: 127), although their parents might cultivate ambitions of seeing them in *category 1* (their frustrated aspirational frame, see 8.3), they will never get the tools to shift there. One interesting comment made by Umar was that he would estimate that in Bradford only 100 girls would fit in *category 3*, which was an essentially male group, while many women would comfortably fit in *category 2*. Double lives regimes, therefore, appeared not as a positive resourceful dynamic to fit into any environment (Gilroy 1993), but rather as a strategy to maintain family stability

without missing out on individual desires and aspirations. This regime seemed however easier to be assumed by males. A reduced freedom of movement for girls, in fact, may push them towards looking for alternative set of resources and networks as they could not bounce in and out their family control with the same ease as boys. For this reason they may appear as more prominent agents of change. For instance, a girl who is not allowed enough freedom to lead a 'double life' as many men appear to do, may be more motivated to fight for radical changes in her family norms that will allow her to have the life style she aspires to<sup>3</sup>. Young men, on the other hand, may be content to live their freedom in the space created by their 'double life' regime.

Although the numbers mentioned by Umar do not hold statistical reliability, his theory of young subcultures may be interesting for the analysis of the constructions around young men that are talked about in Bradford and are related to criminality. *Category 3* was not described as necessarily made of criminals, but this would be the potential labour for criminal activities. *Category 3* seemed to equal other descriptions of youth by many other research participants: lazy, "hanging-out", and *lafanga*. Hirschi (1971:22) had theorised that involvement in conventional activities prevents young people from committing crime for the simple reason that they would be too busy to do it. This attitude was shared in many portrayals of *rude boys*.

### **10.3 Rude boys' lifestyles: appearances and locations**

The boys 'on the edge' seemed to be one of the most popular topic recurring during interviews. *Lafanga* or *rude boys* may not be criminal, but they were

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<sup>3</sup> Some girls may utilize their growing knowledge of Islam to convince their parents to change some traditional norms and expectations they do not feel are fair or even consistent with their religion (McLoughlin 1998a:103)

dangerously living a life that in between switches of behaviours may produce deviance. Some description caused a certain deal of confusion. Sometimes it seemed that some rude boys were unfairly labelled as drug dealers. Some respondents argued in fact that drug dealers were known to the rest of the community, although the biggest deals happened at night. Even young teenagers were reported to know who the dealers were, and were supposedly going to ask for some work to share the drugs earnings. On the other hand, there seemed to be a spectrum of differences amongst drug dealers, their beliefs, life styles and whether they only dealt or were also consumers that made their recognition more difficult. One of the most surprising examples was told by Bano:

Bano: (..) you know what a *hafiz* is? When you know the Quran by heart. A lot of Asian boys they are becoming *hafiz*, I know quite a lot [of them].

Me. Do you think that is going to keep them off [drugs].

Bano: Not really, it depends. Because I know a guy and he is a *hafiz* and on the side he is a bit of a drug dealer. How does he cope? I asked him that question. I actually get shocked 'cos it is like (...) your religion...he is like 'I do it for a living', it is like 'you can't do it for a living'. Living is like a job, working for Morrisons part-timer is a job, not dealing in drugs, it is not a job.

Me. Does he take drugs as well?

Bano: No he does not take drugs. He only deals.

Me. So he hasn't got another job...

Bano: I think he's got a job, I am not too sure about the job...I think he does [dealing] for pleasure and as they say, one day you are gonna get banged up and that will be the end...

Me. And has he got a beard [and dresses in the Muslim way]?

Bano: Yes, he has a beard and he wears the traditional dress and all and it is actually quite shocking because when you look at him you think 'aaahhh', and when you hear about anything, you think 'aaahhh'...

Me. And do people around him know?

Bano: I don't think so, I don't think his family know, but his friends know, because I am one of his friends and I know, but I always think 'you can't do that, that is really bad', but he sees it as a way of living.

The creative use of religious set of resources as described by Bano was not presented in any explicit elaboration of subcultures (see table 10.1), although in Webster's data (1997) there is evidence of "public impropriety" colluded with certain interpretations of Islam in the *Vigilantes'* category.

If outsiders may be preoccupied by certain traits of the youngest Pakistani generation, reinforced by theories of disaffection towards British society stirred by post-2001, many insiders showed similar concerns about the ramification that *rude boys'* lifestyle could have in the community. It seemed they were negatively seen as being perceived as 'cool' by younger and younger boys (see 'poisoning the community, 7.5):

Young men do it because of easy, quick money, and there is also the fashion of the 'bad boy' (Ameena)

Our friend who lives down the road, he has got a degree in...I can't remember, something to do with biology, genetics or something, and he can't find jobs and he turned to drug dealing. His younger brother knows, his older brother knows, but his mum and dad will never know. His younger brother is at that age when it is cool if your brother is a drug dealer...it is the 'in' thing to be a drug dealer, it is a fashion statement. (Jamal)

Recurrent features describing *rude boys* were big cars and designer clothes, although this may be totally deceiving as in the case of a Quran *hafiz* with beard and tunic described above. On the other hand, integral to *rude boys*, and the ones amongst them who may be lured into drug dealing, was the status competition based on such goods (see also 'sharifisation' in 8.4):

'I am a drug dealer, let's see who's got the biggest car, who's got the best car, who spends most on the car, who's got the most jewellery on, who has the best clothes on', it is one big competition. People who are against it, they look down, but in the drug dealing community is a trend: 'I have just bought this car today, I have just spent 5 grand on car' 'I have just spent 20 grand on a car'.(Jamal)

The people I know who were in the riots, they said 'we were just having a laugh'...their intentions was to get past the police, go into

town, break into shops, get all the design clothes for themselves, keep them or sell them , this is all they wanted to do. (Jamal)

A couple of years back the coppers, the police were always stopping and search young Pakistani Asian lads with furry tops on, with trainers and track suit bottoms thinking 'these are the guys up to no good', but if you look at it, drug dealers are moving away from that...a drug dealer, for example, if he's got a hoodie top on, a track suit bottom and a pair of trainers you are attracted to think 'he is dealing in weed' and he is probably driving a Subaru sport car, dealing in skunk, with a 4,5 grand car...fair enough, he is dressed like (not clear), but then if you've got somebody who is driving for example a Range Rover and the guy only dresses smart, he'll be the type of guy you presume he is dealing in top end drugs such as cocaine and heroine. So there is always a stigma, a label attached. (Jamal)

Me: Don't you have an idea of people in the area who deal with drugs?  
Fatima: Yeah, you know for example, if you have like a boy who is like a drug dealer and he is making really good, quite a lot of money from it, and then they do the house [up] really nicely, they've got a nice car and all that, [you'll know]...

They can get the cars and designer clothes so easily (FG2A)

When the person next door has got a Porsche or a Ferrari, they say: 'Hang on, if you can get a Porsche or Ferrari we can get something better'...and they don't work! They have got a 60,000 car parked outside a 40, 000 pounds house.(Adam)

The importance of consumerism in the *rude boys*' subculture may be a cultural extension of opportunity theory (see 8.3). Collison (1999:432) in fact has described "unnecessary consumption" as a mean of constructing self-identity in front of others to enhance one's perception. Depending on the opportunities, the means at hand, then, such a process of identity construction can be more or less legal.

A certain image, though, has begun to make some members of the community feel uncomfortable on the streets:

It used to be guys hanging around street corners and even if they weren't doing anything wrong, just the walking past them, walking down the street and seeing 10, 15 young lads with hoodie tops on and



trainers and stuff, smoking, you would feel intimidated by them, regardless whether they were being doing something or not (Jamal)

“Keeping them off the streets” -an expression that often was used to describe the need for new youth or sport centres- seemed then to acquire a double meaning: not only would young men have needed a place where they could be involved in activities, but also a place that would attract them and leave the streets more secure (see also 12.1.2 and 12.3). Streets were widely seen almost as criminogenic: “hanging out” (as described by older people) and “chilling” (by *rude boys* themselves) might in fact lead to criminal activities, either out of boredom or observation of exciting but unaffordable lifestyles:

When I first came over to Bradford I asked my sister in law's brother, where do your guys ...where is the most popular hang out place for Muslims? I think you know anyway for white communities there is your pub, your club, etc. etc., so there 's lot to do, but for Muslim communities...well, the answer I got when I went around and they showed me around, it's cars! You see a car there, and you see 5 guys sitting in a car, and some of them even have the portable televisions. Because for them that is their space, this is the space, this is the private space, they don't get that at home. They live at home, maybe someone is married, his wife lives at home, you know...maybe a brother, married, the other brother lives at home, the sister lives at home and you have got a two-bedrooms house. And that's what they do, drive around, sitting in cars, cup of coffee (Imran)

Snooker centres were widely considered an unhealthy alternative to the streets:

Imran: Snooker places, but ... I was recommended not to go there. (...)(laughs).

Me: But there is no alcohol there, is there?

Imran: No, but unfortunately a lot of drug dealing in those places...takes place in that environment. This is the reason why I was advised not to go. Because when someone is involved in drugs, to be honest, they don't see colours, they don't see loyalty, they just see a customer, benefits. When it comes to drugs there is no boundaries.

ME: You mean these places are affected by drug taking as much as drug dealing?

Imran: Drug dealing.

ME: Not drug taking?

Imran: Not drug taking. There are some places that I don't know of, but I have been told. But the snooker places I have been to they are more a mixture of whites and Pakistani community. If they are mixed

you tend to find there is not that much of drug taking in those places. So if it predominantly Pakistani area, you find there is something happening there.

If streets were seen as almost criminogenic, at least they were safer than once for young men of Pakistani heritage who did not seem to have to face the racist attacks their fathers had to.

#### **10.4 From self defence to heroes: the growth of 'mafia mentality'**

Some believed that the present subculture of *rude boys* was somehow connected with the era when self-defence had to be organised by young men against the fascists (see 5.5):

I heard that a group of young men I was talking to they said they went to a pub the other night and there is a group of few white men there and said 'they dare not even start anything'. Once upon a time you walked into a pub one person or two people you get beaten up, but now we are sure that we are safe they didn't even lift their heads up. So those kinds of ideas have been reinforced that if you are strong if you can fight back you get respect and I think that's wrong. (...) That conflict has been there since I was very young in the Seventies... (Abdul)

According to Abdul, this attitude that tends to show strength is a survival of a legitimate right and need of self defence that emerged when Pakistani men rebelled against the myth of the 'white sahib' (sic) and discovered that if you hit a white person "their blood had the same colour" (a citation from the book 'Hand on the Sun', by Tariq Mehmood, a member of the Bradford 12, see 5.5):

So, once these people found was they were here, this was their home they had rights and the individuality that they developed at school is very much apparent and they have rights as individuals and eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth kind of thing, if you brought up with those values, these kids found that yes the myth of the invincible white master the 'sahib' that was shattered amongst kids. (Abdul)

Although interviewees denied that racist attacks would be a constant threat in Bradford nowadays, there is some evidence that this problem had survived in some areas in the 1990s:

Bashir: When we were growing up in Bradford 3 we were different groups organised around friendship and the sort of locality...like your street...I think it had to do with the fact that we were Asians and there was a few White people living close-by and they did not like us for some reasons.

Me. So was it white groups and Asian groups?

Bashir: Once they started playing with branches like weapons and then we would start...and when we would go back home for dinner they would break the boughs in the garden...my mum encouraged us in a way to get sort of...'if anyone puts you down you've got to teach them a lesson, if someone starts on you, you can't just back away and say "I don't wanna fight". But sometimes they would come up to us without any reasons, like one time we were just playing football in the field and one jumped (interruption)...when I was there it was only between the whites and the Asians because within the Asians, your parents knew each other and you couldn't really get into fight with anyone because the parents would get involved and you would get into troubles...it is not worthy then...you just deal with your differences.

One view was that emancipation from passivity might have led to the formation of groups that may have escalated to other kinds of mutual help and activities, with a sense of invincibility and competition, ascribable to youthfulness and masculinity:

Currently they think they are invincible, all 18 years old think they think they can drive at 150 miles a hour on the motorway and nothing is gonna happen to them. At 18 you think like that, until something happens, of course. I just heard at the weekend a 15 years old stole a car wanted to impress his girlfriend and of course he was killed he had a crash .(Abdul)

I don't know what goes on with many of these large families, my guess is that...they are looking at their children and they think if x can do it, and y can do it... (Zameer)

Young lads growing up now, you know like gangs...ganging up and stuff like that (Jamil)

'Gangs', 'gangsters', 'mafia', were expressions often used to describe groups involved in criminal activities; often they were even described as belonging to the same *biraderi* (although not necessarily), but this would enhance the efficacy of the mafia metaphor, around which are written Bradford based crime novels by Bradford born author MY Alam (see also 6.2).

This seems consistent with the fear of a negative impact from the excessive intra-familial bonding described in 9.3. Hence the popularity of the mafia scenarios:

Bano: My little 9 years old brother (..) knows all the gangsters in West Bowling, and it is actually quite scary sometimes, because...

Me. What do you mean by gangsters?

Bano: There is like, you have got like...in West Bowling you have got guys who are well, well, well known, they are really well known, maybe because they have got really good cars, or maybe because they are drug dealers, or just maybe because they have got older brothers who are really, really famous. I don't know, it is like being in 'pop stars' when you have got the really famous people that you can look up to. That [is] what it is like for youngsters in west Bowling.

Strength amongst individuals and groups is feared by any community (...). [The elders] have great contempt, but because they have money you don't know when they are gonna be able to do you a favour, so people again are very pragmatic. (Abdul)

They are afraid because them people have got that...they've got that respect...basically they've got the car, the money, nobody can say anything to that because they have made it up there, whether it is by drugs whether it is by anything. (...) It is like a gang culture, a mob culture...they are afraid of that type of people. They are not ostracised, but basically there is a sense of 'we can't tell them off because we might get into troubles ourselves'. (Fatima)

Me. Were you saying you know somebody who got arrested? Did the people know he was dealing before he was actually caught?

FG1B. Yes, because they've got that image, haven't they?

Me. What image?

FG1A: Like...where I live there is this guy and he deals drugs but no one...it is not a good thing, but the fact is that everyone is very scared about him and no one ever has the guts to...you know...like stand up...because he has got so much back up, so much people...even if

you say something, you get your head bashed and you know...that is like normal.

Adding to the subcultural 'mafia mentality', territorialism was mentioned as one of the concerns informing young men's behaviour. Graffiti used to be sprayed in the Leeds Road area before a council task force cancelled them. At the time of the research only a small one was still visible and it used the gangster lingo: '[Name], [Name], [Name], Lower Rushton Mafia'. Protection of the territory was also seen as one of the triggers for 2001 riots (see Bolognani 2007°, forthcoming).

### **10.5 Conclusion: young men and moral panic**

Studies including subcultural models in the Bradford district (Webster 1997 and Imtiaz 2002) present some overlapping traits and are partially consistent with a similar theorisation made by research participant Umar. They differ from the etic system of classification of youth cultures elaborated through the Edinburgh based research amongst the young men attending the Pilrig mosque (Wardak 2000). Although only one research participant articulated a subcultural grand system to apply to Bradford young men, most interviewees mentioned a male youth culture similar to Umar's *category 3* (almost overlapping with Imtiaz's *rude boys* and Webster's *go-betweens*).

Young men who combined sets of values and behaviours coming from family (for example "cultural Mirpuris"), television (for example through R 'n B "gangsta videos") or other minority ethnic groups (for example reference to a stereotypical black "LA culture"), were largely considered the folk devils of the Pakistani community of Bradford. Far from being considered agents of a proactive process of combining local and global sets of values and behaviours

(multiple consciousness), they were considered 'at risk'. Their "hanging out" on the streets, their material aspirational frame, their exposure to the deals of the established gangsters and the lack of control exercised by their parents was generally thought as easily pushing them into criminal careers. Additionally, activities such as sitting in cars in back alleyways and "hanging out" on street corners wearing hoodies were considered behaviours that would project a bad image of the community to outsiders and they were sometimes blamed for the bad reputation that Pakistanis had gained in Bradford.

Although 'mafia mentality' and 'gangsters' culture' were often mentioned to describe deviant behaviours in the community, the networks and organisations of the allegedly existent gangs were still rather obscure to informants. One of the reasons for this lack of information may be that some of the dealers' networks were said to be mainly based on their *biraderi* or on their ethnic origin. We have mentioned above the rumours circulating about many Pathan and Mirpuri families. The knowledge about what were called gangs seemed to be still quite obscure, while generalisation and subcultural descriptions of individuals living in the grey area of *rude boys* resulted as much more articulated. Young men as folk devils seemed to be the subcultural definition resulting from a moral panic about male youth (see also 8.3 and 8.5). However, the anecdotes about the biggest drug dealers and their deeds that interviewees enjoyed recounting ('proper gangsta stuff, I tell ya!', Adam, interview with author) were most regarding men in their 40s and 50s. This was somehow in contradiction with the views about the law abiding old generation and the deviant younger one (cf. 9.2), but the concerns about young *rude boys* seemed to be considered a priority by most of the interviewees.

## Chapter Eleven

### Internal evaluation of informal social control

In the previous chapters of Part III it has been highlighted which problems seem more cogent to the community, and some discourses about the production and construction of crime have been analysed. This chapter will focus on the current informal devices of social control that the Pakistani community sees deployed in Bradford. In the following chapter the focus will then be on the formal devices. 'Social control' will be broadly defined as 'the set of rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity and trust embedded in social relations, social structures, and society's institutional arrangements that enables members to achieve their individual and community objectives' (Lederman et al. 2002:509) in preventative and correctional forms. In this concept of social control 'softer' forms of control operating through the shaping of ideas, values, and attitudes (especially via faith) co-exist with more enforcing institutional systems such as policing.

Studies on informal sanctions at informal levels such as those of family and friends, have been long considered as very important trigger mechanisms to reinforce normative climates in communities (Anderson et al 1977:104; Braithwaite 1989:1, 14), and human relationships are now considered an essential part of crime prevention strategies (Burnside and Baker 1994:19; Hope 2001:430). Following this criminological interest, the chapter will open with an analysis of the evaluation of social control exercised by families that in chapter Nine was part of the attribution of blame system (see 9.5). However, in the emic analysis of present forms of social control it emerged that great attention was also paid to the system generated by formal institutions. The next chapter will

therefore be complementary to the present one. These findings will be particularly significant in the conclusion where the definition of 'community criminology' will have to consider the enmeshing of formal and informal elements in the local criminological discourses.

### **11.1 Social control through the family**

In chapter Nine it was argued by some that family may be problematic in terms of social control for two reasons: for the parents' "out of place" Culture and an internal exclusive bonding (see 9.3). This section will present the detailed evaluation of both the potential and the alleged inadequacies of many families in dealing with social control. Two main issues were highlighted. The first was that many parents would be keen in delegating moral education to others, and in particular mosques, as soon as the child comes of age to attend the *madrassa*. The second was that family upbringing was gender biased and ended up conceding too much freedom to boys. Views criticising the aspect of delegation to the mosque included:

I think the first teachers are your parents, I mean, they actually bring you up in the norms and values that they share...they are supposed to teach you in the right way. There are certain things that your parents are supposed to do while you are small. They are supposed to teach you right and wrong, the difference between right and wrong and things like 'you shouldn't lie, you should go to the mosque, etc.', but once the person reach[es] a certain age they will have their own understanding and they go to the mosque and then it is the duty of the imam of the mosque, the priest of the mosque to teach them norms and values...(Yousef)

When you are little...you stop going to mosque when you are about 8 or 9. Before that time you are not gonna...if you don't give your kids values and beliefs and...aspects of living your life, then...when your kids are like 8, they become total morons...I am not being general, but...your parents start giving you off...they teach you stuff, they teach you manners, they teach you everything and when you are old enough to go to mosque [this is delegated to mosques] (Bano)



Views about a different exertion of social control on boys and girls included:

A lot of issues that came up while visiting homes...you could tell there were problems they were reluctant to talk about, it showed whatever tension or...problems...so we got involved to find out what the problem was and found out that they [some women] weren't allowed to go out and the family was afraid that they would mix in with the society and that would mean that they will misguide them (Shamim)

I think it is different between boys and girls. I mentioned the situation where a girl was taking drugs and ran away, but with boys I think it is very different because first of all our upbringing has taught us that the boys can get away with anything really, and then the girls are the ones who...the kind of...we need to control them more than the boys. (Fatima)

Social control exercised by families seemed to be mainly about prevention towards girls and retrieval towards boys, as it will be discussed in the next section.

In general, however, evaluation of social control exercised by families tended to focus on one element: *izzat*. While preservation of the family honour (see 5.4) would in theory be a trigger for preventing deviance in one's children, many respondents described family social control as functional to the preservation of an honourable façade (see section on gossip and scandal below) rather than the uprooting of deviant behaviour (cf. family exclusivism in 9.3). Rather than tackling a problem, things may be 'swept under the carpet':

Our community...I don't know what to say, they don't want to open up, they don't want to talk about issues and things, and that word again, *izzat*, because they are scared, and what is happening in their family unit what their kids are doing and everything because they don't want other people to know their business. (Adam)

One imam recounted that when he saw a member of a family he knew pictured in the Telegraph & Argus following their arrest for drugs related offences, he went to visit the family to offer emotional support, but he was called '*maulana (maulvi)*

bastard' on their doorstep and turned away as they despised his acknowledgement of the dishonour that had occurred to their family.

As already discussed in 6.1.1, *izzat* has a special link to women and perhaps for this reason, respondents registered different articulations of social control for boys and girls.

### **11.1.1 Prevention for girls and retrieval for boys: a case study**

Parents were generally seen as more lenient with sons than with daughters, and all the women interviewed felt that cultural traditions made men feel as if they were always forgivable. This supported the idea that social control was gendered:

If the Asian males of the community commit crime, it is not looked down as bad as if it was a woman (Mahima)

Considering the widespread belief that women are the carrier of the family *izzat*, the damage to reputation created by the bad behaviour of a son seemed to be retrievable, while the actions of a woman seemed to carry bigger consequences for her parents. This view was supported by an anecdote circulating during fieldwork:

I know of this family. They don't live in our neighbourhood but people used to...the story used to circulate from Bradford 8 to Bradford 1, so you are bound to hear somewhere along the line. This family...they were an Asian family, they weren't very religious and they weren't really bothered about the way they were. A lot of people said they were westernised, but westernised is what you think it is westernised, not...so, they were just themselves, they were free people, they weren't eastern, they didn't have eastern values or culture, what our parents believe to be eastern. So they were just themselves, and...their sons started taking drugs, being smoking, they were very light, you know, 'we need to do something about him, we need to make him get off this drug'. The daughter started to take the drugs as well. She was kicked out of the house, like you said you heard. She had nowhere to go, so she ended up with her drug dealer. They said this was her ultimate decision, this is what she wanted from day one, that's why she made us kick her out...and excuses for covering up why they kicked her out.' This is what she wanted and that's why we've done it'. The son was continuing still taking the drugs, no matter what they would

do to stop him because it is very hard unless you get proper help, but the son was sort of...I don't know what it is with boys in Asian family... they are seen as better assets. And she was like...all her focus was on the son, but none on the daughter. The daughter was kicked out of the house, it doesn't matter about her, it doesn't matter. It is like she was replaced...they did not need her. She ended up with her drug dealer and she ended up in a very bad state. Had she got the help she needed from the family or whoever...she would have maybe you know...did something about it. She ended up with someone who wasn't going to really get her off it, because he needs her. In fact he made her go back home, steal gold, Asian gold is like...very valued in family...made her steal all the gold, everything so basically her life was...because to this day she isn't allowed to go to her family now. As far as they are concerned she is dead.

This anecdote, recounted more or less in the same way by different sources, seems to convey the idea that rehabilitation of a daughter is more difficult than rehabilitation of a son. It may be for this reason that preventive social control appears to be stronger for girls who are generally more limited in their freedom of movement than their brothers. However, the expulsion of a daughter from a family seemed to be an extreme and rare resolution as it may be a very publicly recognisable sign of the breach of family *izzat*. For this reason, a family who had expelled their daughters might hide it in different ways:

They say she is studying, she's gone to stay with an auntie somewhere. If she is in Bradford they say she's gone to London, if she is in London it will be Bradford (Ali)

Other families may choose to send the daughter back to Pakistan for 'rehabilitation' or ask for religious or magical help (see below). Parental strategies appeared to be varied, but dictated by the common concern of protecting *izzat*.

### 11.1.2 Three case studies of parental strategies

Prompted by my questioning about parents' knowledge and parental resources, community worker Adam introduced me to three individuals to explain his view of parenting as potentially the main source of social control.

The three men introduced belonged to well known local families who had developed businesses and achieved an economic status that was described as 'middle class'. The first was Iqbal, a businessman and politician born in the Mirpur District who migrated to the UK as a child. According to Adam, he had managed to involve all his children in the family businesses (even the one who had graduated) and had always managed to stay close to them. None of them had ever been involved even in minor crimes, quite common amongst Pakistani teenagers in the area who wanted to have 'a bit of fun' (sic). Indirectly, Iqbal described his ethos as a parent in this way:

I think that parents have to be strict and I think strictness is something that doesn't come about at the age of 16, it has to start at a very early age, but the problem that has been with...how shall I say...with the Muslim community was the father was too busy working, because the mother wasn't allowed to work, or the mother wasn't in the position to work, and ...but the basic education, where does that come from? How do you discipline the child...how does that come from? The mother wasn't able to do it, and the father was too busy working. I think the Asian community has come to thinking: 'well, the Muslim community, we were too busy working and we neglected the children. (...) I realised that when my son was born...and I realised that wasn't the way forward, I think my children have to come first, so I'd better be with him. But sometimes when you have like mother and father back home, your family here, so you are torn between those two things ... (Iqbal)

In order to show me a comparative example to the idea of good parenting as the simple act of spending time with one's children (especially sons, according to the quote) from early childhood, Adam presented me with the example of 23 year old Azad, unemployed. At the time of the interview Azad was busy gathering his

friends (and personal driver) to arrange the Saturday night drug business. Azad's father was described by Adam as a famous mullah respected by the whole local community as somebody who had 'made it big' at an international level and was very respected. According to Adam, Azad's father spent most of his time abroad, preaching from California to Malaysia, he earned a fortune, but completely neglected his sons who turned into drug dealers. Instead of completely rebelling against the family, Azad had decided to preserve the family *izzat* by accommodating the parents' desires such as going to Pakistan at least once a year to visit relatives<sup>1</sup>. During these absences, he would 'sell up to a friend', that is to say he would rent his phone where he received the orders and would get the phone back once he returned to Bradford.

Azad's brother had been arrested for an armed robbery before becoming a Quran hafiz<sup>2</sup>. Azad justified his new life style by saying that he had worked for too long for a local greengrocer's and now it was time 'to chill'. Apparently, his father said to him that he could do whatever he wanted as long as he did not get to know about it. Adam's critical view of a parent who is too involved in religion to look after his children was mentioned also by a Londoner, a newcomer to Bradford:

The other extreme dimension is when people have kids, I have a personal example, a very-very close friend of mine since uni, his father would go...Tableeghi Jamaat...(...) He has got 4 kids, married man, who goes to Tableegh for 9-10 months a year. Two months he will come back and then he will go again to different countries, yet there is not father figure at home...(...)Tableegh is where people believe you have to dedicate at the minimum 30 days a year of your life to the Mosque, where you go...for example, you are in Bradford, you go to the mosque in London, in Malaysia, and you invite people from that

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<sup>1</sup> Azad himself could have fitted in Wardak's category of 'accommodationists' (2000: 156, 157) described in 3.5.

<sup>2</sup> Quran hafizs are those who know the Quran by heart.

area to come to the Mosque. This is your top priority. Some people have taken it to such an extreme that they won't do 30 days, they'll do 9-10 months a year, but they will only come back just to like...recuperate, and then go back again. That's the other extreme, they don't work, they become very lazy, they give nothing back positively in the community (Imran)

The third example Adam presented in order to make his point about parenting concerned another local businessman who, according to local residents, had shared much of his good luck in business with the neighbourhood, providing jobs to many young people and improving the reputation of the area with a well established business venture. Although Jamil was only 36, he seemed to embody all the essential characteristics that people tend to ascribe to the 'first generation': hard-working, not tempted by quick money and expensive commodities, and concerned about the well-being of his community (cf. concept of 'putting things back into the community' in 7.5). Adam's view of the man as a businessman was very respectful:

I think in the community at the moment everybody are driven by their own interest. They are not interested in what the community is doing. I have seen him [Jamil], he's got businesses and he's done a lot for the community, he has brought young lads from the community in here and he has helped them to gain that experience...he educated them, gave them a chance to develop life skills! (..) He has been an inspiration for the young lads in the area, but then again [Jamil] has got his life, he can't be there for them all the time. He has been a role model for the young kids, he's done really well for himself, and he's got his business set up and everything. His brothers are all here, they are all working, like he was saying, 12-13 hours shift. He says he is here all the time, he only goes home to sleep. Then he comes back here (...) it has a knock on effect on the community where people see that and they want to do better and go forward and open businesses (Adam)

On the other hand, the view about the man as a parent was quite critical: Adam wondered whether his children would see enough of him. Again, as in the quotes

discussed above, the time spent with one's children became of major concern as one of the variables that would secure good parenting:

A lot of things today [are] about bad parenting. No matter how good the parents are as people, if they don't spend enough time with children, they can't grow up straight (Adam)

The lack of time spent with children was linked by one informant to the erosion of the family system:

We have broken the family system, there is nobody in the family who is solely responsible for the upbringing of the child, we have created the stigma of one parent, if he or she says 'I look after children' we think he is useless, or she is useless, wasting time, so you would not hear, maybe a very happy response to say 'I'm a housewife' or maybe 'I'm a father, my wife works and I'm doing this' (Tahir)

The position of Jamil himself on the matter was based on a belief that role models in the family, no matter how present they are in their lives, will automatically dictate the good path to their children:

Me. So what do you think went right for you and wrong for the others who hang out on the road? Is it because you are assertive and they are not or...

Jamil: There are two things. When I was at school, I was still at school, after school, go to the shop, help out in the shop. It just came, you know, just naturally came to me that we had to work for a living. And from that day on we just worked. Because our parents always worked, from day one. It just came from there, and then when I grew up I thought 'I have to work' and I just had to put the hours in, and not everybody wants to put them hours in.

Overall, there seemed to be a popular understanding that the problem was the result of a very carefree upbringing and rooted in either the fathers' absence (cf. reference to the 'Asian economic niche' in 8.1) the lack of discipline and norms, and often because of mothers' attitudes (see below) or erosion of ethnic networks (see 9.2). Such a 'laid back' trend set in early childhood was considered difficult to reverse later in the teenage years,, especially for boys (see Iqbal's quote above).

Bad parenting was normally equated with giving too much freedom to children, whether examples referred to children running unsupervised in a shop, to children whose playmates were not controlled and were outside at all hours, or young boys who were allowed out for the whole night:

I think the kids are out of control of the parents and I think it comes from when the child is very small, as a baby and when he is growing up, how the parents discipline the child and sometimes, 3-4 years old, he is ruling and he is the boss and they are just doing...it comes from an early age when parents should discipline them and keep an eye and give them a good atmosphere at home, good education and just work towards that, but I noticed that in some families they have kids and it is just normal, they get up in the morning and they do their routine...they are doing their own things and parents let them. So I blame the parents, who are not strict with them, they should discipline them so then they could avoid... (Shamim)

This seemed to some as not being related to bad will, but rather to a lack of understanding of a different environment and its necessities<sup>3</sup>. This attitude could be labelled 'passive bad parenting':

I think it is just lack of education for parents, they have no knowledge. (...) I will just tell...you know, in Pakistan, in India...you know children can play out, and here the houses are all closed in and sometime people have like 6 kids in one room and for parents and for kids it is not good, not healthy, and therefore at an early age, parents will say, 'go on, play out', where in Pakistan they are not allowed to play out like that, you know, because the extended family is there, and they are safe there, but here, because they can't cope with so much, people just sitting in one room, so I think that is one of the reasons, that they don't have enough space to play with...a play area, and the weather as well, so parents are frustrated and they think 'well, let them go out and do what they can do, so at least I can get on with my house work' and therefore kids are left on their own for too long...they are left too long. In Pakistan, if a child stays out for more than half an hour, everybody will say 'oh, he hasn't come home yet', but here, because there is so much going on, so much on parents' mind as well...(Shamim)

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<sup>3</sup> Observations on very relaxed attitudes towards disciplining very young children in rural Punjab have been discussed by some anthropologists (Lyon 2004). Lyon recounted episodes when serious mischief by his hosts' youngest son was laughed at, and the guest was reprimanded for trying to stop the child touching his computer: the child was not believed to be capable of understanding (ibid: 75-78).



Some relevant observations were made by a woman in her forties who had attended a majority-white school in the years when the local 'bussing' policies were in force, aimed at increasing ethnic interactions by sending students to schools in other wards. She stated that she realised how much less discipline she was subjected to, compared to her English counterparts:

The school was very difficult because there seemed to be a sense of...you know for the white kids it was really different because their life used to be more structured than ours, in the sense they would go home, have tea, have supper, da -da-da, they were set into a routine and that was represented in the way they came across, for us there was nothing like that, it was sort of like...you went home, you didn't have tea, you had a cup of tea and biscuits and then you had your *roti* at half past seven, eight o'clock, that was our main meal. And instead of going to bed...you know...for my mum it was you go to bed when you are tired. You weren't sent to bed if you had school in the morning. So at half past nine, ten o'clock, my younger sister and my younger brother I would put them to sleep myself and then I would come down and watch telly till midnight and in them days everything switched off at half past eleven, twelve o'clock, you didn't have all night telly. (Ayesha)

While the above views might be ascribed to a feeling of frustration promoted by the unused potential of social control within the traditional family structure, some respondents were inclined to blame a more 'active' or 'conscious' form of bad parenting, in their opinion produced by some features of rural Pakistani family structure:

Zameer: I think we have to take some responsibility for ourselves on that, the way we portray ourselves, and the thing is, at the end of the day, we are a law abiding community, because if you look at the Indians, Indian Muslims, and the Indian Hindu population in West Yorkshire, you don't get to see many of them misbehaving, the way the Pakistanis do...they don't, do they? You don't see many of them involved in drugs.

Me. Why?

Zameer: That is a good question, why. That...because you see an Asian, physically, you are not gonna know if this guy is a Muslim or Hindu or Sikh, but why is it that the Muslim Pakistani kids may potentially misbehave much more than the Hindu or the Gujarati kid? It is a big question, because the Gujaratis, right, some of those are

Muslims, so there is something which is not right here...if a Gujarati kid from India in general do much better than Pakistani kids...is that something to do with the make-up of the families? Where your mentality, it is something to do with your clan, where you live...I think it is, it is the way we may be behaving in our families, the way some of it is acceptable, some of that so called deviant behaviour is acceptable.

Chapters Five and Six have already highlighted some perspectives extant in Bradford concerning the lack of education in the Mirpuri heritage and the prioritising of *biraderi* interests at the expense of the common good, and the 'cultural' practice of Islam. Below we provide an analysis of what the gendered division of parental roles based on cultural tradition may mean for social control.

### **11.1.2 The mothers' roles**

In Adam's examples given above, the point about good and bad parenting was made partly on the basis of reference to the fathers. In almost all interviews, however, respondents tended to talk about parents in general, and when questioned about the different roles of mothers and fathers in raising children there seemed to be unanimity in describing a division in parental roles. Mothers were the worrying, listening and forgiving part, and fathers more strict and inclined to produce chastisement in the form of physical punishment (cf. also Irfan and Cowburn 2004:96):

My mum (laughs), she always says, even if I am 18, what I should do or shouldn't do. Sometimes I go out and see my friends and if I am late she is always calling me 'where are you?' in case I am in an accident somewhere, she is always worried. (...) I think it is everybody, in the majority it is always mothers who get worried, you know. (Yousef)

During participant observation I witnessed several arguments in which mothers were 'told off' by husbands for being too lenient with the children, or even by daughters who argued with mothers who had lied to their husbands in order to protect their sons from chastisement.

Imran: You'll find that the mothers usually hide these issues and they are in more or less denial...

Me: You mean they hide it from the fathers as well?

Imran: From the fathers as well...you find fathers are at work, so they don't really know what is happening at home, it is the mothers who know the real happenings of the family. She knows what the daughter is getting up to, she knows what the son is getting up to, you know, she knows that. And a lot of the times you find that she hides it, keeps it secret from the father. Especially she feels that the father will be very heavy in dealing with it, you know, whereas on the father's side...I mean, these are only general...general stuff...the family decides to deal with it. If it is the father who deals with it...the fathers I met, they aren't actually understanding to problems (...) simply because they don't know problems or the pressures they have to face when they go to schools, colleges, on the streets...they don't understand the pressures they have actually been put...so you'll find that the fathers are very heavy handed in dealing with these issues.

The widespread belief that in Pakistani culture, or even in Muslim cultures, the man has a more public role and the woman a private one, seemed to be backed up by many interviews in a way that is consistent with relevant literature (Irfan and Cowburn 2004). The mother represents a 'softer' traditional culture, the father authority and prescription:

My dad is more educated than my mum, and he has been brought up in England, that plays a big factor on my dad's character, my mum tends to have a big part in our culture, whereas my dad doesn't (Mahima)

It was felt that while fathers might be more or less present in the upbringing of children (and their absence would create lack of discipline) the more stable presence of the mother may fail to provide the adequate upbringing either for her softness or her being unprepared to deal with the problems facing the youth. This may be related in the essentialised perceptions of gender characteristics as outlined in 7.4: women may be in fact considered softer, passive and passively involved in deviant behaviour. So women taking drugs may be seen as victims of a polluted society, and mothers who do not adequately discipline their sons are considered victims of their soft nature.

So far preventive social control has been discussed and we have only hinted at the actions that families may take once the children have already been involved in illegal activities. Some forms of retrieval strategies will be evaluated here below.

#### **11.1.4 'Home made rehabilitation': 'village rehab' and the 'marriage cure'**

Some elders seemed to retain an idealised concept of 'back home'. In many families it is still a custom to send children back home during their holidays in order to enhance their 'real life' and show how 'lucky they are' (Kalra and Mcloughlin 1999; Bolognani, 2007b forthcoming):

At one time all the children were encouraged to go to Pakistan for a holiday, during the summer, but nowadays the tendency is getting less and less. (...) It is because the children don't wanna go, but by not going they are missing out on something, like you know, (...) I am sure it helps your education and it helps by understanding other people's problems, you know you understand how other people live, and it is not all the same. (Iqbal)

Whether the idealised morality is supposed to simply rub off on the young *vilayatis* (foreigners), or there will be a rational realisation of their privileged condition in the UK, the results of these 'travels of knowledge' are quite controversial. According to some young men who had recently been, such visits could become counterproductive and they believed that the idealisation of 'back home' was misplaced:

Me. (Pointing at his vodka and red bull) There's nothing like this in Pakistan, is it?

Khalil: There is! A lot stronger than this! It is called *kuppi*...you know, if you had that much, you would not wake up for about 2-3 days. I've got 2 of my friends who have come back from Pakistan now, 2 weeks ago, one of them has been drinking and smoking so much...smoking that black...he's been smoking so much of that, he was taken to hospital. Because it is warm as well, innit? So you are always sweating

and stuff, and it dries you out, innit? I've never drank in Pakistan because I go with my uncle and with my family, do you know what I mean? But this time we go we are not gonna go home, we go home for the first week or somewhat, and then just stay out and enjoy, see places and everything, and have a good life. (...)

Azad recounted how much 'chilling' he is used to doing in Lahore, where 'everybody' (sic) is on drugs. Some literature on the subject refers to anecdotes about the development of a 'holiday habit' (Pearson and Patel 1998: 218), an addiction developed during a sojourn in Pakistan. Hussain, when asked about drugs in the community, answered by saying that it is quite natural for Pakistani people to use drugs: evidence of that would lie in the natural and lush growth of marijuana in the Indian subcontinent. However, the practice of sending children back home to take them off drugs was still in use at the time of the fieldwork. Of particular interest was the news reported by some tabloids after 7/7 that one of the London bombers from Leeds had been sent to Pakistan by his family to take him off alcohol, but there he might have developed an interest for discourses that played a part in his terrorist action. During fieldwork, however, some respondents recounted stories of successful 'village rehabilitated' acquaintances as well as failed ones. Interestingly, different strategies of rehabilitation seem to have grown out of the original one, including the use of clinics in Pakistani cities:

Fatima: I have one cousin, not cousin, but like family cousin, who lives just a few streets away. I think he is in his thirties and something and he used to take drugs and he actually went to Pakistan to get rehab from there and I was there in Pakistan at the moment so...

Me: Do you mean he went to a clinic?

Fatima: Yes, in Pakistan. They have rehab there. Then... They sat him into a rehab clinic and stuff like that and I think the wider community, the elder generation they are aware that there is a problem with drugs, and that there are institutions to deal with it, but in the past, or even now in the present there has been this sense of hiding, put it under the carpet 'he'll be ok, we'll deal with it ourselves'. So say for example if you have been affected in a family with drugs, and you put it under the carpet and you see you know, two doors away from you, that the same...people from the same background, people have got the same

problem with drugs, that family...family A won't go to family B because first they will keep their problems to themselves so they don't want to go them people and help them, because this family has got this concept of 'we dealt with it ourselves, they can deal with it themselves'...do you get it?

In this way the rehabilitation may be kept secret from the rest of the community who do not have contacts in Pakistani cities.

Sometimes rehab back home may be paired with marriage:

Me. What if parents found out about a son taking drugs?

Jamal: I'll give you an example. I have got someone I know and he found out that his son was smoking cannabis when his son was only 14, so he sent him off to Pakistan and got him married at the age of 14! This was years ago, we were kids, I was about 14, no 16, he was two years younger than me, that kid...he was smoking some weed and his dad saw him and he got his passport, took him to Pakistan, kept him there for 1 year, got him married, brought him back, set him to work in a restaurant, the guy is now about 20 now, he brought his Mrs over...and he's got a kid! He is a father by the age of 17.

Me. Do you think it worked?

Jamal: No, because he still does it.

Me. What is the reasoning behind it?

Jamal: Discipline. The eldest...for them, it is a real discipline 'oh well, if I give him some responsibility and get him married and having a family, he might just stop it because it is your responsibility'...it is about discipline. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't. I know people for whom it worked, man. I know people who were drunkies, I know one at the bottom of our street, my friend's older brother and he is a drunkie and heroine, cocaine and all sort and drinking...everything. Partying...going out every night not coming home for 3, 4 days...his dad took him Pakistan, got him married, came back now and you won't believe he is the same person. He stopped drinking, stopped the drugs, stopped everything. (...)Yes. Sometimes it works...but at the age of 14, what do you know about life? You try to enjoy yourself...I used to do all sorts that my mum and dad don't know about.

Some would argue that there is a value of treatment attached to these types of marriage (cf. also Werbner 2004:903):

The mother is crying 'My son, why did you go to jail, come on, let's go to Pakistan and get you married', as if marriage is some miracle cure that suddenly the son becomes a doctor and goes to university when he comes back... I am sorry but it doesn't work like that (Mahima)

The wide-spread awareness of such custom is shown a literature example:

At the first sign of trouble, the one word that gets mentioned is marriage. No shit, it really is the quickest thing going. *Your son turning to petty crime? Want to stop mixing with white women? Think he is a serial killer? Then get him wed. If marriage won't sort it out, nothing will.* (Alam 2002:40)

However, reflecting on Jamal's accounts, it is interesting to see how apart from giving responsibility to the 'derailed' child, there are other advantages: the whole *biraderi* is kept happy and the 'prodigal son' is, through the rite of marriage, reintegrated into his family of which he accepts the desires:

I think parents, they feel they owe it to their family back home, that's sense of guilt, I think that is what it boils down to. Is the sense of 'we are here, you are there, so if we intermarry and your kids come over...', and I think a lot has to do with that. (Ayesha)

#### **11.1.5 Word of mouth, role models, gossip and scandal**

Respondents often referred to sanctions that were activated against families whose members had been, for example, arrested. Some would not be invited to functions such as weddings and reciprocal visiting would be interrupted. When a reciprocity in invitations to weddings was interrupted, the sign of a breakdown in *lena dena* (taking giving, see 6.1.1) would be obvious. This, according to some respondents, would only happen when there was formal public evidence of the offences committed (i.e. incarceration or information published in the local papers). Where judgements were made according to rumours circulating in the community, sanctions would be less definite. Mothers would ask the children not to go out with members of the rumoured family, for instance, but no public shaming would take place. According to Bano, her parents would be very cautious as gossip may irreparably and unfairly damage a whole family:

When my mum and dad say that they would think about it one hundred times, because in my family it is wrong to talk about people, because if

they talk of so and so's daughter, they've got a daughter at home and if they talk of so and so's son they have got two sons at home, so that is why they don't tend to talk about things because anything could happen. (Bano)

Rumours were considered a form of envy too and therefore not always accurate.

As Alexander noted in the Bangladeshi community in London, the ubiquity of gossip may make it void (Alexander 2000:128). When during fieldwork rumours about well-known entrepreneurs doing money laundering were compared, it was sometimes argued that this was malicious information spread by competitors :

Jamil: [Here there is] too much gossip! If you can get to the *izzat* of any family, you'll just go for it, innit?

Adam: Yeah, you'll go all the way to Pakistan to find out! (Laughs)

Perhaps it may be interesting to note that the crime committed may be of relevance to the intensity of community sanctions. For example, as hinted in 4.7, riots were not generally considered a major law infringement:

Obviously there is the sense of this person being in the riot and it was quite bad at the beginning. But people keep quiet about it; they might talk about it behind our backs [but will not shame us in public].(Fatima)

In the process of public shaming therefore, a form of collaboration between institutional sanctions (i.e. arrest and prison) and informal sanctions seemed to be vital as the former triggered the latter (cf. Braithwaite 1989:97).

Word of mouth could assume the form of negative gossip, but also the form of an informal source of knowledge and support (see also media and the word of mouth in 12.2). This seemed particularly developed amongst women who seemed to have less access to imams and may be less likely to consult practitioners and privileged informal support networks (cf. Orford et al. 2004:25):



Me. Do you think who the ones who have got a doubt will feel comfortable and close enough to the imam to ask about these questions?

FG2C. I am not really sure.

Me. Do you think they'll ask somebody else?

FG2C. I don't think they will go to the imam because they don't wanna tell them that they are doing it, but I think they will ask people, so somebody else, yeah.

Me. Are there any religious people you can speak about these issues?

FG2C: yeah.

Me: So if you had a doubt, would you go to the imam and discuss these things?

FG2A. I wouldn't personally go to the imam and discuss these things. I would ask my parents...my mum and then she would look into it for me. She can ask other women as well, you know...who know more about Islam.

## 11.2 Importing a communal system of social control

In 6.2.1 the particularity of *biraderi* as an institution that is half way between family and community was discussed. While in the preceding section we have focused on the more familial aspect of social control, here we will concentrate on its community aspects.

While in chapter Seven we have highlighted how respondents tended to agree on the fact that the Pakistani community had the same problems as any other, we have also seen that some aspects of Pakistani culture (such as *izzat*) may play a role in social control. Cultural features of this kind appear in some literature as advantages in crime prevention:

Studies from Europe, Israel and America all suggest that the strength of the culture of the migrant group has an important impact on social control and crime. This is not necessarily the case where a criminal tradition is imported, as in the case of the Mafia. But where a culture is able to provide a cushion against difficulties experienced in migration, or where the social structure of the country of origin is retained by the migrant group in the new society, a degree of insularity may 'protect' the migrants for a not inconsiderable time (...) where an immigrant group maintains its ethnic identity, for example through its religion, or where migration is seen as temporary and social control is imposed by

the homeland is a meaningful reality crime rates may remain low (Mawby and Batta 1980:18)

How *biraderi* can be seen as providing a 'cushion against difficulties experienced' has been discussed in 8.2. Here we will focus on how the 'social structure of the country of origin (...) may protect' the community.

A different form of collaboration between informal and institutional sanctions was also cited in the case of 'mediation'. With 'mediation' it is possible to define an informal system of restorative justice bearing similarities to an institutional practice in the Indian subcontinent, the *panchayat* (Chaudhary 1999:85). Whilst restoring a right or order in general may be considered a form of social control, as it prevents the development of further feuds, it is not so much about resolution but about 'group harmony' (Lyon 2004:185). And while in the Indian subcontinent the village *panchayat* is made up of a group of elders, and both victim and perpetrator appear in front of them to have to give evidence and discuss what will make amendment for the contentious deed, mediation in the diaspora is less formally organised:

Mediation is somebody just sitting between parties and trying to resolve it (Ayesha)

If something big comes up normally my mum gets called as a mediator because she is neutral so people get her to sit down and kind of keep the diplomacy...but in general it is elder figures like grandma, grandpa...because they will have more authority over everyone (Bashir)

It is the pain of our life...because our granddad says: 'So and so came, they respect me, they have come to see me, they respect my opinion, my own children and my own grandchildren won't take me...they'll take me for granted and you don't respect me'. But it is not that, sometimes it is just wrong. It happens quite a lot. I can't say...but I would say, it is 99% I bet every Asian family has got someone who is a mediator. Someone to look to if something goes wrong. (Zaara)

I think it is less now, but mediation used to take place when there was a break down in marriage relationships. It did work, but now with the

third generation, kids don't want that mediation, they don't wanna know. I don't think that goes on a lot now. But mediation does take place, but obviously on smaller issues, where there is misunderstandings between two or three parties...(...) it is only for minor cases. Cases where...murder and attempted murder, I think it would be unwise to get involved with that sort of things...it is better to let the police to deal with it. (Iqbal)

Anecdotes reported during the research referred to episodes of mediation only in conjunction with the formal criminal justice system. For example, the potentially violent confrontation between two families who both wanted to sell ice creams in the same area was dealt with through the mediation of an elder who was considered wise and neutral but during the mediation a legal discussion of what the law implied took place.

Sometimes mediation was the name given to the help given by a third party in dealing with the police:

In the summer, a particular family approached me because I am an educated person so maybe I could help, I think it was a mother who was feeling very vulnerable, teenagers were playing football, throwing the ball on the walls...white teenagers, I think...there was one Asian as well. (...) again she is very unhappy with the police, they haven't helped her and haven't responded to her calls. She is highly educated but her English is not as fluent as maybe required to persuade the police (laughs) (Tahir)

At other times, mediation is a corollary to a case dealt with by the police:

The person who threatened to shoot my brother in the head, my grandfather knew his father from Pakistan as well (my granddad is from Pakistan), he is a Raja<sup>4</sup>, [Rajas] they are perceived high in Pakistan. So as a Raja, in Pakistan he had a lot of say...like here, well, here it is not as much, but in Pakistan is unbelievable, so...he called that boy's father to his house, after the police had gone, and he made that boy, drug dealer, apologize because he was rude to my mother as well, so he called my mother, my brother, apologised to them and he actually apologised saying 'I didn't know whose daughter you were', he said to my mum, and his dad was there, and he said to his son 'you don't know but this man in his time, he has knocked a few heads together as well' and everyone ...it came to an end. He said 'In the future do not be rude to this family' (Zaara)

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<sup>4</sup> Rajas or Rajputs are one of the zamindaar (landowner) castes.

Mediation, however, seemed to be used more in marriage matters than in anything else. Some mediation would take place while a divorce was already being discussed in court, with sudden reconciliations when one of the parties accepted the others' conditions (for instance the newly wed couple would buy a house by themselves and stop living with the in-laws). In cases of domestic violence, mediation seemed to be considered more a patriarchal feature rather than a useful instrument, unless accompanied by the law in the form of social services' action or the presence of a police officer:

Me. Is mediation successful to any extent?

Alina: Unfortunately not. It is not mediation, I would not call it mediation, it is sheer blackmail, emotional blackmail by the elders. Obviously they are not worried about the woman, how this violence is emotionally or psychologically impacting on the woman or the children, all they are worried about is honour, what people would think. Obviously emotional blackmail can't work together and there is a time when the woman says, 'Enough is enough, I have to do something about it now'. Because my experience is that the elders are not addressing the issues, they are only waffling basically to protect the honour of the family. Also the majority of women who come over from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, they want to take some steps, but they have this immigration threat over their heads, the family uses it as a threat and the majority of them don't know what their rights are, they only know what they are told by the partners' families. They don't even have their passport, they are kept in custody.(...) Sometimes women who know these are their options, they are too scared to do that on their own so they need somebody to guide them through the whole process. (...). It is very hard and unfortunately in the Asian community...we have had some success stories, but when a woman lives in an extended family, for her to go down this route is highly difficult and her options are that she either moves into a refuge or goes to a separate property. But women who live in a nuclear family, for them is much easier. That is where we have some success, where women live in a nuclear family.

Ayesha: It is really difficult because for some women...one woman for instance, she said ' I don't wanna leave my home', I just want the beating to stop. I have got two kids, I live with my husband and my father in law and both beat me, I just don't want to leave my home, go and talk to them' (...) and in this case I said, 'what do you want me to do' and she said 'go and talk to him'.

Me. Was it a kind of mediation?

Ayesha: Mediation is just something I don't believe in, I am not really interested in it. Mediation is somebody just sitting between parties and trying to resolve it. But I remember what the Southall Black Sisters said, they said mediation does not work, because when she comes to you, she has already passed all them stages, she has tried to resolve it and because it is not resolved is the reason why she has come to you and the family might force mediation to get her to come back home. So anyway I went, I said 'go on then, pick up your stuff and we'll see'. I went. The police officer who used to work with, very close, I told him...he said 'I'll come with you', so they came with me. But the main thing was, I knew the woman, I knew the family and they knew me. (...) so I went to their house, and the father in law was there and the husband and me and the police officer went in and she goes to me in our language 'talk to them first see what they've got to say' (...) I says 'you know what? If she wants to, she can have you outside of this bloody house and she can live here on her own until her kids are 16, 17 and you'll have to pay the mortgage and the maintenance. We can do that. I can do that within days. Give me a week and I will have you out of here', because she was bruised, because he had pushed her downstairs. So I said 'you know what? You really have to re-decide what you want, because I am not here to sweet talk anybody' I was really furious and my temper was...mmmhhh...and he looked and goes 'No, no, *putter* [child], I am really sorry'...I said 'don't apologize to me, you haven't done anything wrong to me, I am doing my job, but when I am doing my job I see what you are doing and what effect do you think that has on the kids?' 15 years down the line, this woman still lives in the house, she has still got the kids.

Involving an authority may be the only guarantee of fairness:

Me: So let's say something happens in your family...

FG2A: It depends what kind of problem it is. If it is a problem that can be solved without the police getting involved...otherwise you don't have a choice.

FG2C.If there is a rape you don't wanna call the police because you are gonna be put in papers and stuff.

FG2A: But then if you want to have justice, you've got to call the police.

### 11.3 Between Culture and religion: *taweez*

Religion may be an effective means of social control. Aware of the debate that has been labelled 'Culture vs. religion' (cf. 6.3) before analysing the real impact of faith we will describe a feature of social control that rests between the two:

*taweez* or, as some would call it, 'black magic' (Mcloughlin 1998a:99). *Taweez* literally means amulet, but by extension a number of practices that have to do with the alleged healing power of Quranic verses are grouped under it. The following quotation seems to embody the blurring boundaries between magic and religion implied by *taweez*:

I cannot really explain because it is weird and wonderful, it is one of those magical things that happen and make you believe in religion.  
(Amir)

Some respondents were aware of the practice of having a *taweez* made for children who were on drugs, but also for depression, relationship problems, illnesses, exams and in one case even to try to break a love marriage that had taken place against the will of a family.

In Islam there is a tradition of spiritual healing (*rukhia*) through the reading of the Quran, as Shamim says:

God has said that if you...for every bad thing or illness if you read it properly and follow those things, there is a cure, there is a cure for everything in Quran, is a complete book (Shamim)

The difference between *rukhia* and *taweez* lies in the different use of the Quranic verses; while in *rukhia* the Quran is read by or to the person to be healed, *taweez* may consist of the action of wearing, hanging on a wall or even swallowing some verses. Scholars are divided about what is to be considered consistent with the religious teachings, and many consider *taweez* as it is practiced by many in Bradford as *jaddu* (magic).

Many anecdotes gathered during fieldwork include parents who as soon as they found out about their children's drug habit consulted mullahs in order to have prayers read or *taweez* made. Often the request for amulets implies the belief that a *jinn* (spirit) has been the cause of the problem:

For good health they use *taweez*, for anything that is going wrong they will try to sort out through *taweez* and somebody who is on drugs they will say 'it is not his fault, it is somebody who has done something to him' (laughs) (Shamim)

They may look to that thing, 'somebody has put them up to it, or some bad thing has happened and they are taking drugs'. They will look at an excuse, put it in that way, and *taweez* is one thing, the jinn, and this and the other, something has got hold of this individual and that's why he is taking drugs (Zameer)

[The reason why people take drugs is] mostly because they are weak and the parents have not been teaching how to do correctly. What you normally find is people possessed by *jinn*s are normally the good, law abiding, religiously (interrupted) (Amir)

Two imams said that they would not make amulets but would agree to do special prayers for the young men in trouble; this would be used as a strategy to get to speak with the family and the person in question and start suggesting other means of dealing with the problems.

#### **11.4 Religion as a protective factor**

If the deep albeit controversial faith in *taweez* was certainly popular, faith itself was another element of potential control. Religion and religious institutions were often mentioned as one of the variables of social control. Elders would recall the role that mosques played in 'keeping the community disciplined' in the first years of migration, when 'young men at the time were wild, with all the *gores*<sup>5</sup>' and needed the 'discipline Islam provides' (Umar). Younger respondents instead would be familiar with narratives of 'redemption' (see below) through the re-discovery of faith. For example, in 2003 a youth centre in Girdlington staged a play written by local members about a drug dealer who discovered religion after his father's death and repented and became a very observant Muslim. A similar

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<sup>5</sup> Gore is the singular for 'white woman', while the plural should be 'gorian'. 'Gores' is the anglicised plural.

paradigm of sin and potential redemption was narrated in the Keighley based film 'Yasmin'<sup>6</sup> where the protagonist's brother is a dealer but gives it up once he is involved in an extremist Muslim organisation (although he ends up going to Afghanistan to join *ihadists*).

Although it was clear that religion was widely considered as a "protective factor" (Orford et al. 2004:23), how this worked was rather obscure. The views about what religion is and what it prescribed were very varied. Interviewees disagreed on many aspects of religion; from the possibility of enforcing religious practice to matters like 'is marijuana allowed in Islam?'. The way madrasas were organised was blamed by some for the failure of mosques' to effect social control on youth, something which will be discussed in the next chapter. However, here it is important to point out that the idea that a better understanding of the Quran or a higher attendance at the mosque would make youth more law-abiding was controversial:

I think it is true in some of the cases. I think the issue you are presenting is brought up by the Edge of the City programme because a lot of madrasas and community leaders then came out and said 'these kids need to learn these things from the mosque', some sort of values have to be instilled in these people. And then other said well these kids were involved in paedophilia, they will never gonna go near a mosque anyway so... (...)Marta, one of the biggest misconception amongst the Pakistani Community is that Islam is a very forgiving religion. A lot of people are out drinking, they would commit adultery, they will commit illegal acts on the basis 'I am fallible, I make mistakes, and God will forgive me'. So religion is very conveniently put aside especially among people who are gonna go out and break law so they will use religion when it suits them, they will put it aside when it does not suit them. Religion, I believe, plays very little part. I think is the lure of big things, money, cars, nice clothes, status, recognition. I think it is the lure of those things why people do illegal things because then they become recognised (...) of the community, become highly respected if you've got money you've got clout. (Abdul)

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<sup>6</sup> 'Yasmin' is based on a screenplay written during a workshop organised by the film director with local members of the Pakistani community.



While faith might help individuals who had gone onto a wrong path, it was generally considered a variable independent from humans' will and therefore could not directly be used in crime prevention. Humans cannot control faith. However, many believed that an upbringing that emphasised Muslim identity may lead to some positive results.

### **11.5 Social control through transmission of values and identity**

Although they may wish for more investments in their areas and "pumping more money into the community" (see Imran's statements in 8.6) interviewees generally related crime to the lack of moral values and the prominence of individualism and avidity. Iqbal theorised this by mentioning the cross-cultural effect of Thatcherism which affected youth in terms of aspirational frame (as they shared the same aspirations of higher classes but had not been given the means to achieve them, see 'opportunity theory' in 8.3). Respondents engaged in revivalist Islamic groups also referred to 'moral values' and identified the need for them to be 'pumped into the community':

I am a Muslim, I am aware of whom I am, my identity is either Muslim or Pakistani, or as an Arab, and Muslim is my identity and I haven't adopted my identity from my fathers as my father is Pakistani. My identity is Muslim. So it gives me the confidence of a Muslim. I don't want to succeed in life, my success is my progression...how well do I do in pleasing my creator. And part of that pleasing is that you have to be successful in this life and the one after. So you do whatever you can in the best way, for example my belief encourages me, whatever I do, to do it best, so if I am cleaning the roads I should do it as best as I can, there is no shame in cleaning roads or cleaning toilets, that's my job and I should do it the best as I can, so it really gives you comfort in that way. So really it is a combination of both and at the same time I should actively interact with the community I live in, because I believe there are common problems which in a community (...) I do believe that that is the right direction to go towards, rather than isolation in both ways. (Imran)

Moral values had often a religious connotation and the ideas of good and bad seemed directly derived from one's knowledge of what Islam said. Most of the time this would overlap with Christian or even secular values, but the language in which they were expressed was of clear Islamic derivation (see discussion of the haram/halal dichotomy in 7.5.1).

Prayers are considered a protective factor too:

The reason for 5 times prayers...they are not all at one time, there is a reason. One in the morning, one in the afternoon, one in the late afternoon, one in early evening, one last thing at night. Human beings are weak. We tend to do things because we are mischievous and the devil...if we do it at those five equal points a day, this sort of reminds us...remembering God. (Amir)

### **11.6 Purification, reintegration and 'reconversions'**

Reintegration into the family and community life, as we have already seen with examples of 'home-made rehabilitation', appeared to be possible even after major *haram* deeds. Purification could be exercised through religious pilgrimages (i.e. Umra or Hajj), or even by 'visible' conversions: for example, girls may start wearing the hijab and boys would perform daily prayers, attend mosque and even grow a beard. These processes were commonly called 'reconversions', a term that alludes to the common belief that every human being is born as a Muslim but may abandon the Muslim ethos or beliefs. In some cases prison sentences triggered reconversion (see next chapter), but in others, individuals narrated an epiphany, a sudden enlightenment:

My cousin, when he got caught doing something he started getting into religion and stuff ...they made him go to mosque and things...and then stopped it because he got into religion (...)[There is another case of a ] guy (...). but that was murder. What happened was that this...I can't remember actually if it was a Pakistani guy or a white guy, he came to his house and threatened his mother, and he came out and he stabbed him and then he was in prison for a while. When he came out, he embraced Islam. (Ali)

I have got a very close friend who is actually. I think he is about 25 now, but he has only come to Islam recently, I tend to go to Mosque myself and I have started talking to him, etc. and he was involved in this kind of stuff, if you know what I mean, but at a young age he actually got involved in a wrong group of people and he got involved in drugs and crime and he has only recently started to get away from it all and he has started coming to the mosque etc. and he says the majority, they do actually come to the mosque, it is only for the Friday prayers, etc. they do tend to come to the mosque but I mean, it is no use, if you know what I mean, if you are gonna go, if you are gonna come to the mosque and ask for forgiveness for your sins, but if you are gonna get out there and do the same thing again, there is no point for it(...)He actually went to an Islamic talk and he heard the speaker in English. I mean, I think the thing with our mosques is that...especially for the young people, for the young generation, they'll go for Friday prayers and you have the imam and you'll have them talking in Urdu if you know what I mean and it is a very strong Urdu that they are using, they use...they tend to use the slang amongst themselves (...)I think what we need is we need some English speakers...and like this friend of mine, he actually went to this talk and he heard a very good English talk and afterwards he got together with that English talker, the speaker, and he actually got a one to one with him, and he got him thinking and he got...and after that he started coming to the mosque slowly-slowly (...) it was actually that talk that changed him...and it is actually pretty amazing, some of the stories that he tells but what he has told me is that it is very tempting, you know...there are always temptations out there, to go and do the wrong thing, but you know...if you've got what it takes...(...) he used to say, when he goes out there, the world...his mates are gonna come back to him and say 'let's go for a night out and this, that and the other' and it's gonna be really hard for him to see, and stay away from it all...but if you come to Islam then what we believe in, is God is gonna help you, you know, and he is actually making an effort, and he is actually ok, he makes time to come to the mosque every so often and he is actually away from the wrong path and it is actually helping him. (Yousef)

I don't know...a lot is...when I turned 17, I started looking at things in a different view and...because I have got like 2 other brothers and they respect me so much for what I do and it is...when you are an Asian girl and you have family traditions and family values, people look at you in a lot of ways, and I realised...obviously what I wear (a hijab) (Bano)

Before when I was 16, I was really confused.(...) I think...my experience, especially with...because I went through, even after Umra, after basically becoming more religious and practicing...(Fatima)

Some respondents argued that some religious groups deliberately target young drug addicts as they are perceived as more easily involved in their doctrines. This appeared to informants to be the case of Hizb-ut-Tahrir. On the other hand, some imams who believed more in prevention than rehabilitation seemed to have acquired great popularity. Hussain, himself redeemed from a cannabis habit while developing a deep reconversion that took him to Hajj, introduced me to the work of a very popular Bradford based imam: Sheikh Ahmed Ali.

### **11.7 Popular preaching as social control: Sheikh Ahmed Ali's case study**

Sheikh Ahmed Ali is a British Muslim who was religiously educated in Bury dar-ul-oom<sup>7</sup> and in Cairo. He has founded the Islamic academy in Bradford and is not associated with the conservative approach of elder local Muslim leaders (Lewis forthcoming). The aims of the Islamic Academy are to convey much of religious education in English, and engage youth with their faith through a number of activities such as summer camps, day trips and sports tournaments (ibid.)

Ahmed's tapes sell worldwide and are particularly concerned with youth (two popular titles are: 'Muslim youth' and 'Drugs, the mother of all evils'). Ahmed's approach is not institutional: his tapes are heard in cars or at home and his speeches are informal gatherings not necessarily occurring in mosques. However, the messages conveyed are not as liberal. They tend to reproduce the criticism of bad parenting (see above) and family exclusive bonding (see 9.3), and the praise for a strict adherence to the Quran and the hadiths is supported by detailed description of punishments in hell. His speeches, however, represent an attempt to talk with youth, albeit in a controversial way that sometimes stirs juxtaposition between Muslims and the West, and refer to real life situations. His knowledge of

urban British life and young people's aspirations is conveyed through vivid language, a diffusion facilitated by means such as CDs and internet marketing. Local contemporary knowledge is reinterpreted through Islamic tradition, as appears in the following extract from 'Muslim Youth':

There was a time when every Muslim child was a gem.(...) Every child that a Muslim mother gave birth to was unique because behind the making of these children there were mothers and fathers even greater. The only concern of a mother was to preserve the child from the fire of hell. But now things have changed and in the last 15, 20 years things have changed drastically. Muslim mothers are giving birth to drug pushers, Muslim mothers are now giving birth to drug takers; Muslim mothers are now giving birth to smugglers; Muslim mothers are now giving birth to car thieves and children who would still the shoes of the worshippers. Muslim mothers are now giving birth to stealers, shooters, killers, and we have fallen so low that Muslim mothers are now giving birth to children who are living on the dirty earnings of bad women. (Sheikh Ahmed Ali, 'Muslim Youth')

Sheikh Ahmed Ali repeats themes that we have analysed in Chapter Nine, such as the alleged helplessness of parents and the generational gap. On top of that he shows a deep knowledge of a variety of activities young Muslim men are said to be engaging with. As we have previously highlighted in 7.4, women are thought to be of increasing concern for the community:

Muslim mothers are now giving birth to daughters who are walking hand in hand with a kafir<sup>8</sup> without nikkah<sup>9</sup>. Muslim mothers are now giving birth to daughters who roam in around the streets with the latest GTI without hijjab, purdah, with the latest glasses.(...) (Sheikh Ahmed Ali, 'Muslim Youth')

The main culprits of a 'gangster' culture (see 10.4) seem to be the parents, either passive or complacent:

Who is to blame? Who is responsible? Who has made this children drug pushers, thieves and gangsters, who is the one who taught them to

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<sup>7</sup> 'Seminar' of the Deobandi tradition, see Gilliat-Ray 2005 and Lewis forthcoming.

<sup>8</sup> Kafir (sing.) or Kuffar (plur.) refer to non Muslims. Increasingly they have been used by some preachers such as members of Hib-ut-Tahrir in a derogative way.

<sup>9</sup> Nikkah is the religious wedding ceremony.

break the laws of Allah? Who is the one who turned a blind eye when his son had a £40,000 outside his house and he knew that his son did not work. Who is the one who did not question his son when he put £1,000 on the table when he knows that he doesn't work?(...) And the truth is that nobody is to blame for this outcome except for you and I, the mother and father. (Sheikh Ahmed Ali, 'Muslim Youth')

The contrast between a 'Pakistani culture' and Islam (cf. 'Culture vs. religion' in 6.3) is one of the main points of Sheikh Ahmed Ali's preaching:

Why? Because we are the ones who neglected these children, the ones who taught them how to break the laws of Allah and his message, the lesson of disobedience.(...) Many of us are from Pakistani background. In this background the child is only six months and you will see a golden ring on his finger, a golden chain around his neck. This child did not purchase it! (...) It was mother, father or one of the relatives. (Sheikh Ahmed Ali, 'Muslim Youth')

Religious expressions such as 'haram' become the pivots of labelling:

You know, I know that gold is haram with a male. It will become a means to him to go to hell. (...) We say: 'he is only a child, when he grows up he will realize'. This is the first time we tell this child that we break the laws of Allah. (...) Now it is time for the child hair cut. We know this modern day style hair cuts are haram (...).Who pays for these haircuts? Who goes with his child to the barber's? It is the father (...). And what do we say? 'It is only a child, when he grows up he will stop doing this'(...) The kid wants his ears pierced. (...) We teach him this lesson so well that he breaks the rules of Allah by taking intoxicants, by selling drugs...he begins to break the law of Allah with fornication, he begins to commit adultery, he begins to break the law of Allah with regard to interest, he begins to wheel and deal.(...) (Sheikh Ahmed Ali, 'Muslim Youth')

However, the final and greatest condemnation is for the phenomenon that we have seen described as *biraderism* (see 9.3):

When do we realize that our child is out of control? When do we start teaching him the lesson of obedience? When there is the million dollar question. And what is the million dollar question? 'Son, now you are 20, the time has come for you to marry. Your uncle's daughter is good looking, she will make you a good wife'. The child turns around and says 'Abba, no thanks, not for me'. Now we begin to teach him the lesson of obedience. Not because he does something which displease

Allah and his messenger, but because he has done something that displeases me. Because he won't agree to marry the uncle's daughter now, we will begin to teach him the lesson of obedience and we will say 'Do you know what the Quran says about respecting the mother and father?' (Sheikh Ahmed Ali, 'Muslim Youth')

### **11.8 Conclusion: informal control as partial solution**

This chapter has looked at how informal social control is exercised through family, community and certain interpretations of religion. These three elements seemed to be perceived as having the potential to help both in terms of prevention of crime and reintegration of criminals. However, all three elements seemed to be insufficient by themselves in fully assisting youth. As previously observed in other chapters, family carries the risk of *biraderism* (cf. 9.3), religion of exclusivism (cf. 9.5) and the community is in constant threat of erosion of its ethnic ties (cf. 9.2).

Families could benefit from a traditional family structure which supposedly provides for all the needs of its members (cf. 8.2); however, as seen already in 9.3, the exclusiveness of family bonding and the fear of the publicity of the breach of *izzat* might be counterproductive. Parenting was considered as a problem given some inadequacies (cf. 'out of place Culture', in 9.1) in parental skills. Interventions of 'home-made' rehabilitation such as 'village rehabilitation' or the 'marriage cure' were sometimes successful, but at other times were perceived to have reintegrated the deviant individual without having completely rehabilitated him/her.

Community mediation was considered by some to be flawed, but others agreed that in a pluralistic approach where it was combined with formal and legal

aids, it could be successful in resettling peace, order and stability and prevent vicious circles of family feuds.

Common practices such as *taweez* were also used in conjunction with other interventions, as two imams reported: amulets could be the first step towards approaching a person in trouble who might be eventually convinced to seek professional help.

Faith was a source from which many of the notions of good and evil were drawn. Proximity with pious environments was generally considered a 'protective factor' in terms of crime, but not even this was deemed as a completely safe path for the exertion of crime prevention. In fact faith was considered somehow independent from the will of human beings as accounts of epiphanies confirmed. However, religious practice through English as a medium was generally evaluated as a safer strategy as it was the conveyor of universal Islamic moral values that would benefit the community through encouraging the inner change of individuals.

The next chapter will analyse how formal institutions are evaluated by the community in terms of their role in crime prevention and control.



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## Chapter Twelve

### Evaluation of formal social control

In the previous chapter informal means of social control exercised by family, community and faith appeared to be considered not completely effective by themselves, and many respondents pointed out how their potential was only fully developed when combined with formal devices.

This chapter will focus on the role that both formal religious and state institutions play in the community. Attention will also be given to the media as 'instigator and saviour'. We will open with an overview of the present activities of the formal community religious institutions (mosques and madrasas) and evaluate their differences, as seen by informants, in tackling crime problems. Perceptions of the role of policing and other formal systems will be scrutinised through the fieldwork data.

#### 12.1 Mosques: caught between the Local and the Global

Faith communities are increasingly being considered at a social policy level as one of the agents that can help community cohesion and the development of communities (Furbey and Macey 2005). The idea behind it would seem to be that:

Our major faith traditions- all of them more historic and rooted than any political party or ideology- play a fundamental role in supporting and propagating values which bind us together as a nation (Blair 2001, quoted in Furbey and Macey 2005:97)

Some informants believed that Islam in particular had a structural organisation that may be ideal for the policy needs of the State:

I think Islam has got very strong influence or infrastructure in place to tackle these kinds of [criminal] things. And again Friday is an

institution, I would not say that in other religions it doesn't happen, but it is heavily attended, maybe 4,500 people attending, so if mosques want to do something they can play a very positive role in educating, tackling these things. I would say it is very complex, actually. You have people who are really doing their reciting and here, yes, kids are not on the streets, they are not involved in any other activities, police is very pleased with that, I have discussed this with some people, because for 2 hours they are not on the streets, so they are doing a great job in terms of keeping kids off the streets, and not only that, the whole ethos, it is a religious place, and there is very strong discipline (Tahir)

Mosques' activities that may be linked to social control are principally organised in two parts: through the preaching (especially on Fridays during the sermon) and through religious education in the madrasas.

Friday prayers and the Friday speech have lately been in the limelight as a possible means for the glorification of terrorism, such as the sermons of Abou Hamza who was on trial in February 2006. According to interviewees, mosques in Bradford differ a great deal in how the Friday speeches are organised and in the last twenty years the themes tackled by the prayers leaders have significantly changed. Some pointed at the detachment of the preaching in the mosque from local issues, while more and more attention is paid to the *Umma* (the virtual Muslim global nation):

I know some mosques when for example in the Eighties there was the AIDS campaign, they were telling about the disease that was discovered. This was in the Eighties. If you go to Mosques especially nowadays I think they have much more discussions than they had in the past, I can't remember in the Eighties that many discussions...there was the occasion of the Eighties, but...everything that was going on outside the world...there will always be 'Oh, the West is gonna corrupt you...' 'Don't drink, don't take drugs, Don't do this, don't look at white women' and then...but nowadays, especially in the Nineties I realised there was much more talks, much more...and more people were going there to watch videos and things, or having people who talks about Americans and stuff...(...)they scare people, just like Fox News scares the Americans in a very extreme way, you get some mosques will scare the local members of the community on the opposite really. And then I think, when these things like that...especially very right wing news channels, they will say 'we are right, look what they are doing, look what they are preaching' (Ali)

You will find it surprising, they don't mention about drugs and what is going on in the community and everything...they will give a speech on what is happening in Israel, Palestine and places like that, but they don't address the community, the problems facing the community. So they don't mention in *duah*, in the prayer, people who are poor, people who are going the wrong way. But like I said, in mosques they don't know how to address that (Zaara)

Some respondents believed that in many cases mosques failed to address local issues, not out of ignorance but out of fear:

Akbar: Maulvis try to [make] people to come to mosque and pray, try to [make people to] remember God, bring the children for pray, reading Quran, the maulvis cannot do more than that. If they do anything strict maybe they [will be] kick[ed] off from the mosque.

Amir: That is true, they will get kicked out and also the parents...because there are so many mosques around...they will go to another mosque. "This maulvis is harassing us, we don't want to go there, everybody's children are dealing with drugs, we don't want him to preach to us, we will go to another mosque".

Some mosques are concerned with the well-being of their community: our treasurer [reference to a grass roots organisation] is the secretary of the local mosque. But also the imams are scared to say things in the mosque because they don't want bricks through the window.(Kamran)

Me: But who decides who is going to be the maulvi of the mosque?

Amir: There is a committee...for example there is one here...I have seen them fighting in the street over it...control of the mosque. People's legs have been broken, stuff like that. So this is control of the mosque? So you think at that level...how the hell are they gonna be able to control...

Me: But what do they gain...

Amir: It is prestige, the name, it is 'our mosque'. We do what we want to do in our mosque. If we say you can't have a chat afterwards, read the hadith afterwards, you've got to get out. So they have full control of the mosque. Ridiculous. If the mosques are in that state, if we cannot sort the mosques out, what chance have we got to sort out the community? It is very difficult.

Sometimes imams would mention local problems in very general terms so as not to upset any members who might be involved:

When I go to mosque on Friday the mufti, the imam at the mosque tends to mention it: 'young lads now are turning to self employment'

and self employment meaning drugs, working for themselves, selling drugs... (Jamal)

I am quoting spider man here (Laughs) but with great power comes great responsibility and it [is] the case that they've got to be very-very careful because they are in a position where they are talking through the whole of the community (Amir in conversation with Mahima)

In these cases, mosques may be a comfortable space for drug dealers too, as one recounted:

I go mosque when I wanna go mosque (to be honest with you I haven't been for a long time...once a year, do you get what I mean? On Eid only. I know I should, but what can you do, innit? Everyone is different, innit?) Well, it's alright [when you go to mosque] it's a good atmosphere, innit? Everyone who is gonna be there is who you know or from your area, do you get what I mean, so you don't have no problems, everyone you know go there, you look, "Alright?, Alright?, Alright?" safe, you know what I mean? Ten minutes and you are out of there. Think about it, it is ten minutes, so it doesn't really matter. (Khalil, previous study)

In some mosques, allegedly, local drug dealers were involved in their administration and this had a definite consequence on what themes would be discussed:

When I go there [to the mosque down the road]...I haven't gone to the mosque again. Shall I tell you why? Because I don't like seeing what I see when I go there. I go in there, I have a wash, I look around, and there are the thugs...giving you dirty looks, talking during the *hazan*, while you have to keep your mouth shut. And they are talking and talking. No one tells them to shut up, not even...these groups are getting bigger and bigger, they've found the place where the police can't come in and they don't come in because if they do it will be all over papers. But they are dealing drugs in mosque. No one is gonna question them. (...)I know for example some mullahs whose sons are all criminals. Do you know why? Because they are known, they think they can't be touched. They think the people respect the mullahs and their sons can get away with anything, so they remember them days when there was a set of patterns going on even them...again we are generalising again, but the ones I know, their sons are all criminals. So who are they to talk and tell other people how to run their lives if they can't control their own lives, just because they are mullahs it doesn't make a good parent. (...)People know the sons are drug

dealers. He loses his face. They won't say it in front of his face, they will say 'It's God's will, it is not your fault', but really, I am sorry, it is his fault. It really is. (Amir in conversation with Mahima)

The closure of certain communities around their mosques, therefore, seemed to present a problem even for those maulvis who may be willing to tackle local problems but fear for the future of their mosque or live under pressure of the Mosque committees. This problem which may again be ascribed to the theme of excessive bonding (cf. 9.3) was, according to many interviewees, emphasised by the importing of imams who had privileged connections to some *biraderi* (cf. also McLoughlin 1998c:222). In these cases, mosque policies were influenced by these:

The Pakistani Community is very close knit you need to go back and look at how (...) in Pakistan and that's based on the *biraderi* system, tribal (...). That has very much continued I think that is breaking down radically but there is still a sense of 'blood is thicker than water' try to exploit (...) There is no such thing as priesthood in Islam. You don't have to go through schools and qualify and sit exams as you do in Catholicism and other religions. Yes, a lot of times you have the Carlisle Mosque, the Manchester Road Mosque, these are village communities all made by *biraderi* groups so they are self managed, self financed so they will want to bring a maulvi from the village back home. (...) [In the same way] a lot of brothers, I am thinking of an example of three, four brothers who have got two sisters, they all married their children to each other so that would[n't] need anybody else. It is respectable for the drug dealer in his close group and everything is ok. (Abdul)

Importing imams from 'back home', then, may create mosques which cater only for small communities, and which may not be able to relate to current local issues, advise youth or even make their sermons understandable:

I have been to quite a lot of Friday speeches and what I used to... basically I used to go to a local mosque, on Barkerend Road, and he used to speak in Urdu and I could understand but I am sure that a lot of the youth who used to go there, they probably did not understand. That's why there was a very low attendance from the youth themselves and with... I think there is a majority of mosques who are like that and resemble that... you know, like, Urdu speaking and... you know, the secular Islam that they give, so it is always wish-

washy, it is always stories of the past...but how these stories affect you today! That is not given (Fatima)

Me. Do you think the imams you know would accept [to discuss drugs and sex]?

FG2A.No, because it is mainly because...the imam in my area is the language barrier, they don't understand. Most of them come from back home, innit? And it is like...

FG2I.You know...it is mostly guys, if at all, speak to the imams, innit? Like the women...I don't know, I think you've got a bit mixed up, like the actual mosque where the prayer is read, obviously only men are allowed to go there.

It is a channel of communication, you know, and it is partly...have you got the right imam there? In the sense that...things are changing, but some of the imams, obviously, come from Pakistan and their command of the English language is non-existent<sup>1</sup>...(Zameer)

### 12.1.1 Madrasas and the understanding of Islam

The problem of the teaching in madrasa was a very hot issue in Bradford (cf. Lewis forthcoming) and the mosques where the teaching is done in English currently have a long waiting list (for example Abu Bakr on Leeds Road). Preaching in English did not necessarily mean a more liberal approach to life (cf. case study of Sheikh Ahmed Ali in 11.7) but was widely considered an important variable in maximising the effect of Quranic teachings in everyday life.

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<sup>1</sup> Language was the same problem affecting some parents-children relations. The language used by the parents appeared sometimes as not completely intelligible for young people. Many younger respondents in fact said that they could speak Punjabi, but were not confident enough to have conversations that went beyond food, plans and inquiring around one's family's well-being. Some older people, instead, confessed that whenever they felt like having a heart to heart with a younger person, they would switch to English, no matter how proficient they were in it. The sudden switch to the language commonly perceived as informal would give out the sign to the younger person that the conversation did not have to be affected by rigid rules of respect of the elders or was supposed to encourage them to open up and liberally express their opinions. The existence of only one form to address a second person ('you') instead of the three in Urdu ('tu' for younger or subordinated individuals, 'tum' for people one may be intimate with and 'ap' for the elders or authorities), as well as the use of first names rather than titles, are all characteristics that contribute to the feeling that some conveyed to me by saying 'English is a very disrespectful language'. Communication in English based on parents' good will, however, was not always successful: some young men said that their parents would not be able to empathise with their problems, not even when they encouraged communication in English, and therefore there was no point in opening up.

None of the members of the sample who grew up in Bradford had had their religious teaching in English or had to learn the Quranic contents on top of learning how to read Arabic. The ones who had studied Islam in depth had all done so after leaving the madrasa. As one interviewee put it:

Have you ever seen a parrot? They can talk...you can teach a parrot to talk and it will regurgitate whatever you taught it, but it doesn't understand a word of it. It is exactly how the youth are today...exactly the same way. They would know more of the Arabic language than I would. A 9 years old in many cases that I know, knows more than what I do about the Arabic language and yet he doesn't understand nothing. I know people with big beards, you ask them why have you got a beard? 'That's because my religion wants me to', and yet that same individual deals in drugs, simply because he hasn't built a criteria that this is halal and this is haram, not allowed. Halal or not halal is restricted to what I can do in the mosque, or...'I can't eat this chocolate because it has E45 number on it', or 'I'm not allowed to eat pork', that's it. This is the limitation of what I can or cannot do. Outside of that they've never been taught, they've never been cultured that you have dos and don'ts outside that environment. (Imran)

Respondents who engaged with mosques for work affirmed that they were starting to see changes in some madrasas:

In my work I had the opportunity to go out to a number of mosques and simply talked to maulvis about professional criteria for what is acceptable for example it is against the law to give corporal punishment to children. We were getting referrals by children who had been smacked on their hands with sticks and that is clearly against the law, it is a crime. Now, in a lot of instances the maulvi will want to learn about the law. Because they have actually no idea about child development, how children grow, how children learn.....different perspectives. (Abdul)

At the same time, the theme of the delegation of moral teachings to mosques (cf. 11.1) was reinforced by the lack of involvement of parents in the madrasas. The more conscientious parents, for instance, would organise private tuition rather than engage with changes in the local madrasa. Others emphasised how the average parent would keep sending children to the madrasa but would not follow their tuition:



Such is the concern we show to our children that the child will go to the madrasa when he is 5 he will remain there for ten years, and such is the love that we have for our child. In these ten years not once we will visit the madrasa to visit the teacher of our child and ask about the progress of our child. (...) Never mind monitoring the child education on a daily basis, never mind on a weekly basis, we won't even walk in there in a period of ten years, so busy we are. And this is the love we've got for our child, such is the love we've got for Allah. (Sheikh Ahmed Ali, 'Muslim Youth')

But I think if in certain areas they are not discussing then it is up to parents, the parents go and raise...say 'we'd really like you to mention this because there is a problem in this area' and it is about people getting together and bringing it to the maulvi's attention (Shamim)

For this reason, some argued, the responsibility was unfairly placed on maulvis; parents and the whole community were responsible too, as they did not encourage reform within mosques through the mosque committees.

### **12.1.2 Mosques as community centres**

Mosques seem to be run by the Mosque committees rather than the imam's, the authority of which, in many cases, is strictly subordinated (cf. McLoughlin 1998c:215, 2005:1061):

Some of the speakers from the mosques might not give interviews without permission of the committee, it happens all the time, and you can understand why as well. If I am interviewing any practitioners without permission of the line manager, it is exactly the same. (Tahir)

The Mosque committees also seem to have control over the duties that mosques attend to, from the organisation of the life cycle rituals (McLoughlin 1998a:99) to charity (Kalra and Rehman forthcoming). Many, however, complained that local mosques were not taking full advantage of their potential and were not developing their role as a point of reference for those seeking advice:

It is more [about] giving Islam in a secular way, it is just personalised in your own home, it is praying your *salat* (your obligatory prayers) and respecting your elders, it is just picking certain things that are

taught, and that doesn't equip you with problems that you will face in the wider society. As Muslims we should accept Islam in its totality so we shouldn't be knit picking so you are going to find at home somebody who is totally different, but when you are outside in the wider society, if you've got drugs problems, girlfriend-boyfriend problems, society problems, free mixing problems, you know, all this type of different problems, we are not gonna see them, we are not gonna see Islam dealing with these problems because our institutions like *madrastas* or these mosques are little study circles that...they haven't taught, they haven't equipped us with the true Islamic ideas to deal with those problems because it has been given in a very secular way.(Fatima)

Me. What do you think about the role of mosques?

FG2A. In the Muslim community the mosque is meant to be the central and direct...nobody should feel like they can't go to the imam and ask him a question like you said before, and the mosque should be more open and open to everybody.

This was especially cogent as some who had been in mosques outside Bradford had heard of or experienced a much more active approach that involved campaigns against drugs, domestic violence, etc.:

Me. You think mosques can really be the agents of change?

Ayesha: Of course they can, but you know what it is, the mosques...some of them they are doing absolutely an amazing job, some of the mosques down London, in Tower Hamlets. They say there one member every four household is a heroin user. So the mosques had to become the vehicle of change. In Bradford they will only become the vehicle of change when the same epidemics will hit here because nobody really wants to know at the moment.

Given the lack of forums for discussion, consultations with imams who had a reputation for being able to address the needs of young people may be organised through email or by phone:

I would speak with (...) the imam's wife as well. We often go to her because I go to mosque a lot and we have classes on Wednesday for little girls...just starting...about 10 years old...Quranic classes. We teach the girls, but we are learning ourselves as well...we need volunteers to help for little girls. So we go to the imam's wife because she's got a lot of knowledge because of her husband and you can ask her and she tends to know a lot more than we do.( FG2D)

You know, normally women get to ring the imam at the mosque. Abu Bakr Mosque on Leeds Road, that's what happens, like after he's done his prayer, he just stays in that room for a few hours and he gets called. (FG2I)

The ideal dimension of mosque, as a community centre providing for almost all community needs (McLoughlin 1998c:211) was described in this way:

Your masjid is not only a place to worship, is a community centre, it is where your affairs should be dealt with, and if there are issues, that is where it should be dealt...it is like your social club; it is a place for worship first, secondly it is a place where the imam on Friday should be giving the *khuthba*, the speech which tackles the problems in the streets, where issues should be resolved in the community, but I don't think this is happening personally, it is very easy to give a good speech by the imam, very easy for us to go on Friday, do our prayers and then come out again (Zameer)

You know one of my ideologies, my ideas, my protocols was...these mosques they are building, they are spending thousands and thousands of pounds, if they had the education facilities, the computers there, where young kids could go in there and access...you know like the mosque is like the way to the future now, mosques with facilities like sport centres getting kids in there to do certain things, then they could pray, mosque is not just a place where you just go to pray, what counts...it is the place where you get knowledge and experience. This is how it was going back in history, so much people used to come from different countries to go to the mosques and there were books in different languages where you can learn certain subjects and everything, written in different languages, and this is how people got the knowledge from.(Adam)

The fact that most mosques in Bradford do not have female spaces, however, reduced the feasibility of mosque-community centres that benefit women as much as men (cf. 'word of mouth' and 'network reliability' for women in 11.1.5):

It is a problem, a lot of masjids [mosques] don't have access for women, which is not ideal, I have to say, but the issue predominantly is with male, isn't it? I think the indigenous white population, you have white women using drugs, but I think it is a lot less, far less in the Asian community... (Zameer)

Women cannot take advantage of the mosque centres, and must therefore rely either on a supporting network of acquaintances to improve their knowledge and seek advice, or look for help in the information industry.

## 12.2 Media

Some media have given explicit and public recognition to some problems and have upheld something of a mandate to provide instruments with which both parents and the youth themselves can deal with their problems.

In the previous chapter it was pointed out how many women may find it difficult to break the ice and speak with professionals when they face a problem; they seem to be more likely to rely on their strong ties rather than dealing with practitioners (Orford, Johnson et al. 2004:25). Above we have also seen how access to religious institutions and authorities may be problematic and sometimes is even bypassed by asking advice from the imam's wife. Other means of mustering information to exercise a better informed social control were radio and television:

I think now the word is going around because they are discussing it on radio, you know like in Ramadan, in our fasting month, and the people listen more to the radio and this programme on Islam and religion and fasting and what God wants you to do, not just 'you have to be a good Muslim'...some people listen to it, and every day they do bring something like those issues and people would ring in...people who are doing the radio programmes are from Bradford and sometimes they invite certain persons, and sometimes it is somebody who knows more about certain issues...I don't know about the youngsters, but during Ramzan there is that sort of atmosphere where everybody is enjoying that more than television, so maybe I have noticed in that month people bring a lot of things up because the radio is on most of the time, so that is the best time, and now I am very happy that things have changed because now people are talking openly about it. Before they weren't. Because it is affecting everybody, so everybody is concerned, so everyday now... on television there is an Islamic channel on, where people can ring in and talk about any issue and people ring for different things 'oh, my son...' there are different channels...and there are regular programmes every day, for women as well, there is a lady

who does all issues to do with...and it is in Urdu. And in different languages, you see it in Bengali as well...(Shamim)

The popular access to satellite programming did not only include Bollywood channels and Islamic channels, but an increasing number of families seemed to follow News channels. During interviews documentaries and TV programmes were often quoted as sources of knowledge and word of mouth was enhanced by summaries of what was being broadcast, watched by some members of the community and then recounted after mosque, in cars, in restaurants, or after football matches (see for example recurrent reference to the documentary 'Edge of the City' in 7.1).

Some TV programmes appeared to make up for deficiencies in madrasas:

Now on television they do this programme where they teach children to learn Arabic and they go through one sentence and then they will explain in Urdu, they will explain in English, and it is like half a hour, teaching kids, so they are working towards it. I think people in the Pakistani community have realised there is a problem. (Shamim)

While some respondents shared sociological criticism of television like Putnam's (Boggs 2001:288; Field 2003:31; Kivisto 2004:16) and blamed TV for the erosion of networks (cf. 9.2), others saw it as an up-to-date device able to maximise the delivery of their cultural and religious messages. 'Virtual' consultation through phone or email or messages from other continents seemed at first glance to be valued more than local institutions run by individuals who may be too young to bear much authority.

### **12.3 Local institutions**

Some mosques in Bradford have now got facilities that include computers and libraries. In other areas, however, very similar 'learning centres' are run by the council, but their popularity varies from ward to ward:

There is an Advice centre [in BD8], the youth club, hardly anyone goes there now, and the guys hang around on street corners. 11, 12, 1 in the morning, you see them there hanging around smoking, drinking, dealing in drugs, or just hanging there doing nothing, because there is nowt there for them. (Jamal)

Others suddenly become popular when day-trips or journeys to Europe are organised, according to Salman and Munir, 16 years old, who would attend one of the youth centres in Bradford 3 and who said that they spent most of their time either there or at mosque.

According to some, one of the main benefits of youth centres was to 'keep the kids off the streets', but nobody would rely on them for an active and strategic social control. Young men (for whom the majority of centres seemed to be catering) could be 'kept off the streets' by other agents:

There is a very nice snooker place they opened now...in West Bowling...I think it is opened by a private person, I have never been myself, my brother is going to it, but they have opened that and it is really good because guys who used to hanging around on street corners they are actually going in there and just have a laugh. (Bano)

People my age group, 19-20, especially the ones who are starting to practice Islam, we believe that...I don't think even a greater police influence or setting up a youth centre down the road, they can actually truly solve the problem. Yeah, you can have these institutions to get people off the street, but what is gonna stop them from taking drugs inside the centre itself... I don't think the centres work at all. I think it is a good tool that can be used, a good style that can be used, but if the youth are still having the ideas of having...if the youth don't need free time...I mean, we don't need time to play pool or basket ball or tennis...yes, that's fun time, but what gonna stop that person from now after basket ball just taking the spliff or marijuana in the cloakroom? Unless that person is equipped with the correct ideas to solve these problems correctly, then he is not gonna basically see a problem. He is just gonna keep carrying on. He doesn't care. He will be good at basketball but he will be good at taking spliffs or whatever. (Fatima)

The activities of one youth centre were described in this way:

[The centre in BD8] did help a lot in keeping people off the street...first it used to be guys hanging around street corners and even if they weren't doing anything wrong, just the walking past

them, walking down the street and seeing 10, 15 young lads with hoodie tops on and trainers and stuff, smoking, you would feel intimidated by them, regardless whether they were being doing something or not, and the youth club was open 6 till 9, so the lads would say, rather than hanging around, why don't we just go there and play football, basketball, pool, table tennis, just chill out, playing the computer, just doing some uni, college work, get some work upstairs because we had IT facilities and internet upstairs so people could come in on a night and do college work or school work. We had 3 workers at the youth club, employed by the council and then we had me and my friends who were volunteers. Some helped the lads out with their work. Tuesday nights were for girls only, then on weekend we would have a homework club for girls and boys, 10 to 11 you do your homework, then 11 till 12 you do whatever you want: pool, football, whatever.(Jamal)

If council run centres where mostly young youth workers were employed did not provide the assurance of formal social control, then the views about the roles of schools and teachers were just as controversial.

### **12.3.1 Schools**

There was a widespread scepticism about the possibility of schools being able to exercise social control. Many parents seemed to believe that when schools did not teach discipline (and given the bad publicity for Bradford schools in national media it seemed evident they did not) then they could not rely on schools to promote moral values:

I am not talking...I don't know generally, but my family...my parents...my parents wanted my brother to come out with a good education because they can get a better job and they can live the life they want. They don't rely on school and that, they rely on the person: they rely on me, they rely on my brothers to have that, because education is a gift and if you want to take that gift you can take it...(Bano)

Kids will be brought up by schools, society, by media and that parents have no control on that, and I am not talking about Pakistani parents, I am talking about parents in general. And I think [it is] schools which are failing all kids in Britain and that is why if you do a careful study of the statements we hear, we expect prisons to bring up our children, we have a solution: schools, and if not, they go to prison and we expect the

prisons they are now doing their job: education, opportunities, employment, training, everything is taking place in prisons (...) and our government proposal to extend school to 6 p.m., we will realise very soon it is wonderful experiment, it will bring its own problems, and children need love, care, people to show that they are caring for them, they care for them, they cook meals for them, and this is how children love the person who cares for them, and if they see that everybody is busy with their own...and 'we are not priority', they will find their recreational activities somewhere else.(Tahir)

Much of the impact of school on young people seemed to be seen as dependent on how parents valued school:

I think that because the parents don't have much interaction with the teachers...so the children don't take that notice as well. But I don't think that school has a big influence on them. (FG2C)

I wanted to become parents' governor several months ago. That's the kind of thing, it is very easy for parents and stuff like that to say 'schools don't do anything', but hang on, you've got responsibility as well to make contact with the school and do things at home with kids...if you are not approaching, you know, maybe the school should be also approaching the community and the parents and stuff like that, and providing information, but the question is, why don't you go and ask? Why don't you get involved? You don't have to become necessarily a parents' governor, but there is no reason, (...) why not going and ask 'how is my child doing?' 'what is his behaviour like?' 'who does he hang around with?' because, you know, we come to work, we spend a lot of time with our colleagues at work, 7/8 hours a day, same thing kids spend a lot of time with teachers at school, don't they? That is a good place to know whether...hang on, is my kid at school first of all, is he there regular...is he...how is his conduct at school, is he studying, is he not studying, who does he hang around with, what influences are out there? Does it make sense? It is very easy to blame other people, but I think you have to take some of the responsibility for yourself as well...(Zameer)

When Kamran was asked to comment on the paucity of Muslim governors, the reply was: 'Now you show you are a gore', as if to imply that, traditionally, family focus would be on other matters, but not on interacting with their children's school.

An interesting example was presented by Tahir who described how one mosque engaging with the school attended by its young students had triggered positive effects for both institutions:



There are excellent examples of Mosques which are doing very good jobs in Bradford and you can't get admission there, 300, 400 people on the waiting list, you can't because these people are full time teachers and maulana as well, for example on Leeds Road there are two, one is the head teacher of Maths in a school, and in this they have a partnership with the school, so for example when children perform very well in the mosque, the school knows the result, so the teacher is praising them 'well done at the mosque' and at the same time, when they perform well at school, the imam knows as well. So they are working in partnership, this is what we want, whereas other than that, this is my very informed view, that a lot of head teachers, they [slag off] mosques in schools, they think that kids are wasting time, they have extra burden, you will come across all sorts of issues. And when you say, ok, extend the school hours for another hour, (unclear), then Mr Head teacher is lost again (Tahir)

When social control failed to be an effective means of crime prevention, then the penal system would have to intervene. On this matter, views were quite surprising as they seemed to contradict previous research on minority ethnic groups and the criminal justice system.

#### **12.4. Prisons**

In one of the above quotations, Tahir indicated how he thought that society was requiring prisons to do the job of schools, implying that rehabilitation could have been avoided by a thorough process of prevention.

Prison sentences, however, often appeared as an effective albeit not always durable way of changing matters. According to the Armley prison Muslim chaplain, many British Pakistanis 'as prisoners find their identity as Muslims'. Sometimes a return to their religion by birth produced long lasting effects through the phenomenon previously called 'reconversion' (11.6), but at other times did not survive their release. When the state shame of incarceration triggered community shame (Braithwaite 1989:97), families might not accept their children back and consequently they were pushed towards illegality as soon as they came out of jail.

Some families had been known to hide the prison sentences of their members by mentioning trips to Pakistan or work in London, but the growing interest of the local press in crime amongst Asians seemed to have made this strategy less feasible as photos and details of offenders were now often published:

If I say, 'where have you been all this time'...'oh, I've been to Pakistan, I've been on holiday, I was working outside the country', stuff like that, this is what they will tell you. They won't tell you the truth. And you hear stuff like your next door's neighbour has been drinking and driving their car, they have been caught, before you did not know they had been drinking and driving, but now they have this crime column in the T&A, and the name is printed, how much fine they get, and they are like 'wow!', do you know what I mean? People they don't expect their neighbour to do that.(Adam)

Unless, while in prison, a reconversion took place, perception of the penal system was not very positive:

[Going to prison] is more bad! Because they want holiday! They have good food there, play football, watch television, they don't bother. In Pakistan, if you go to jail you'll never do it again because they start from morning work, and finish evening and they give dhal and just water for food, they never go there again...other people [first time offenders] yes, but them no. If anybody wants food they go to jail because it is more better (Akbar)

FG1A: My uncle went to jail for beating someone up and he said you can get heroine, anything in jail.

FG1C: Yes, there was that programme that came on BBC 4 with hidden video cameras and the person going undercover...and actually the police asked the prisoners to open the window while they were smoking the weed. The coppers can smell everything and they [only] told [the inmates to put it out]...

Prison sentences therefore seem to be effective only given certain collaboration from the outside world: support, shame, etc:

For people I know who went to prison, they do come out to a much more stronger family support, they will have...the Asian community is very strong in terms of family values anyway, they are a lot more closer...you know, there is no way I would put my mother in a nursing home, you know, that kind of mentality, we don't do things like that, so we...like, you mum looks after you, brings you up, your father...you do the same when you grow up, you look after them and the network, the family, what you call *biraderis* or your clan...they

are quite close, they will support each other...maybe if you commit an offence, some kind of a sexual offence, something very extreme, you can understand that, you will be stigmatised, shut on the side, but generally we will come out to much more support, to much more structure in terms of what is available for us.(Zameer)

### **12.5. Policing**

The policing of minority ethnic communities in Bradford has generated a long history of grievances, from the rumours of mistreatment of females that led to the 1995 riots (Macey 1999a, b) to complaints about stop and search policies extant up to the present time. For this reason, some commentaries by interviewees are surprising. For some, the police seemed to be considered as the only way forward for these communities, despite the acknowledgement of past conflicts between them. However, there was certainly a negative inheritance too:

My dad is like second generation, while I am third, and people like my dad in their forties or thirties and everything, they have this sense that they can't rely on the police, or we can't rely on these other institutions.(Fatima)

I strongly, personally, I can't say it is a fact, but from experience from living there 22 years of my life, is very close knit and any outsiders...and I don't mean as outsiders people who come to live in the neighbourhood, but I mean as outsiders the police...anything to do with the law is very unwelcome because maybe in the past the older generation have had problems with the police and they have been passed on these views and thoughts, have been passed on to the younger generation.(Zaara)

Yet many respondents seemed to recognize the potential role that the police could have, although the majority complained that, at the present time, there was not enough patrolling in some areas and that police intervention was not always satisfactory. Although many complaints about stop and search policies were registered, there were as many complaints to do with the supposed lenience of the police:

I personally think, I know it is heavy-handedness, but the police need to make a stand. They promised they would after the riots and they haven't. (...) I think they need to enforce, for example pulling cars over, punishing people, you are speeding, you have no insurance? Right, go to prison for 3 months, put points on your licence (Amir)

[Police] is not racist, they are doing their jobs! Why are you doing bad sins? If you don't, they stop. In 40 years nobody stopped me on this road or they never asked me 'why do you do that?'. If the police come, I am happy you know, but the people who don't want the police involved, they are drug dealer and all. Now they have let people, mostly in Bradford, the most people, now it is our people, you know, they do a lot of bad things. And if the police care, they just say 'oh, they are racist'...not true!, because they do bad things. If they never do anything...the police force in Bradford is not only English, they are Pakistani, Indian, Sikh, my son is a policeman (Akbar)

Some were persuaded that sometimes police 'turned a blind eye':

The police aren't doing much, I think they are just ignoring some of the things (Shamim)

The fact is a few years ago, if West Yorkshire police had reached their quota of arresting Asian people...if they had arrested any more people after reaching their quota, they would have been considered as a racist police force, and that is why they don't arrest anybody else (Amir)

If the police actually try harder, and not just like...suspect certain people and they suspect everyone, maybe they can get something out of it. (...)They could [do more], because they are doing a lot, like night watches, cameras and CCTV everywhere, and that really helps but they could do more, they could do a lot more, 'cos that is what the police are there for, this is what they are getting paid for. They are getting paid for looking after the community, not for sitting on their backs, not having a cup of coffee, they get paid so they can get look after the community and the community feel secure to live in their own houses. (Bano)

You know sometimes I've heard many times many people saying that the police encourage it, but obviously I don't know how to believe that. But...sometimes it makes you wonder(...)There was a case...very serious case...it needed involvement of local councillors, local MP before the police came out, and when they came out they didn't do nothing (...) it was a very serious case, the police was called and they never came around, very serious case where there was attempted murder and they never came round. And they came round after the local councillor and the local MP were involved and when they came out after 4 days they didn't do nothing and that was...I was very surprised. (Iqbal)

The idea that police would not deal properly with problems seemed to have more to do with a sort of perceived incapability rather than institutional racism or an unfair approach, but also some may fear repercussions as police intervention is perceived as the last resort, resorting to an extraneous force:

In my own family, 3 months ago, my auntie was assaulted in her own home by someone in her neighbourhood and it started off really silly. It started off over their...these two people...my auntie's son and this other lady's son arguing...they are only 5-6- years old, they had an argument, they hit one another...the lady came over to complain to my auntie. My auntie said to come inside and said 'they shouldn't do that, let's speak to them, listen to their parents'...she was trying to put some sense in their heads. When they came they had a bit of a dispute and started smacking my auntie so my auntie called my family. I was at work, I couldn't leave and so my auntie called my family, she didn't call the police.(...) To be honest, as a family we have no problems calling the police. If we need the police, we'll be there to call them. A lot of people have problems, they are very afraid to call the police because they are scared of repercussions, not only in the sense of what will happen with the community, because the police have been called the community is gonna sort of stop talking to us 'cos we have got outside that boundary. The police are seen as the last resort, but the last resort that should never be taken...that step should never be taken. Then, there is also that sense that the police come and the Asian community feel that the police haven't done their job to the satisfaction of what the people should think the police should do. Then, they think it is a waste of time to call the police. There are many reasons why people won't call the police, but if they do and then don't get the right results they are hoping for, then that's it, from that experience the police won't be called again. (Zaara)

Wherever the community felt that the police were engaging with them there seemed to be positive results. Officers on the beat with a will to get to know their culture seemed to be much appreciated:

I think at the end of the day, what it boils down to is that there has to be more visible policing. (Iqbal)

The particular policeman I dealt with I found him extremely helpful, not only that, he was learning Urdu, taking Urdu lessons, so I was really impressed. The thing is, he was from a business background, he had a very good customer focus, I asked him what was his reason. And he said that his learning Urdu was not really viewed as something

of a normal good thing, because he was on a customer relationship background, he thought he would be more able to talk with people and people would be more 'acceptive' if he spoke their language, which is sensible, very clever, so...(Tahir)

In particular, the existence of the Minorities' Liaison Committee (Bradford and District Minority Ethnic Communities/Police Liaison Committee Constitution: 1998) was generally positively acclaimed as an example of the police force engaging with and consulting the local communities, and acknowledging their needs. The Committee was founded in 1998 after recurrent episodes of violence had focussed the attention of the police on the frustration of minorities in Bradford, especially in 1995, first with vigilantism on Lumb Lane and then with the summer riots (see 5.6):

Lumb Lane campaign was the result of frustration of non intervention of the police, people took action in their hands, so now the prostitutes are in an industrial area where they don't disturb families. Now the police is talking more to the community, but it is not sure if the relation between the two has improved. (Umar)

## **12.6 Conclusion: complimentarity of formal and informal social control**

This chapter has looked at the relation between different structures of social control in the areas touched by the research. The analysis started from data regarding mosques, where according to many participants, messages are delivered often by ignoring local 'hot' issues such as drugs. The potential enjoyed by such spaces was therefore often considered wasted in relation to prevention and discussion of the most preoccupying problems of the community. The lack of knowledge and skills in dealing with young people ascribed to many imams was also mentioned as a factor that kept many mosques alien to a process of change that instead seemed to be carried out by pilot projects like the one in Batley, where one madrasa is running a drug awareness course. The majority of madrasas in Bradford, instead, were thought to concentrate on a learning process based on memorising Quranic verses rather than discussing them.

While the preoccupation about Muslim youth was measured by the increasing attention to drugs given by some Muslim media and by the increasing funding

given to youth centres, opinions about the effectiveness of many 'topped down' social control strategies were controversial. In particular, a widespread mistrust of schools and teachers was recorded across the sample. Perhaps surprisingly, many research participants looked at the police as one of the most potentially effective means of social control, in spite of the history of mistrust between the Pakistani community and police officers. Prison sentences, on the other hand, often appeared as an effective albeit not always durable way of changing deviant individuals, for example through the phenomenon called 'reconversion'. Overall, research informants seemed to see potential for change in both public and cultural institutions, but especially in the collaboration of the two. The complementarity of the structures appeared to articulate a meaning of 'community' that went beyond an ethnic projection, but included all the resources (public and cultural) available in one's area, as it will be discussed in the conclusions of the thesis.

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**Part IV**

**Conclusions**

## Chapter Thirteen

### Conclusions: from *biraderi* to community: a Community Criminology

The outline of the present thesis as illustrated in the introduction had four key aims. The first one was to investigate the salience of a study of minority ethnic perceptions about crime, given that their views seemed to have been relatively neglected (see Part I). The second aim was to follow a set of methodological approaches that would allow the researcher to prioritise local grassroots' views rather than deductive theoretical accounts (see Part II). The third aim was to analyse how practical concerns, cultural and religious beliefs and moral dilemmas play a part in the construction of the idea of crime (Part III). The fourth aim was to explore possibilities of the presence of a distinct *community criminology* (see Part III).

Theoretically, the thesis has investigated two main concerns: a criminological and a diasporic one (see Part I). Methodologically the thesis has pursued the application of an emic and ethnographic strategy to the Bradford Pakistani context, and considered its effectiveness in terms of analysing knowledge of crime held *by* minority ethnic groups (see chapter Four). Empirically, the knowledge held by Bradford Pakistanis has been explored through the analysis of their views about crime construction (chapter Seven), crime production (chapters Eight and Nine), labelling (chapter Ten) and informal and formal social control (chapters Eleven and Twelve). This concluding chapter, therefore, will discuss theoretical, empirical and methodological outcomes and their relation to *community criminology*.

### **13.1 Theoretical and empirical conclusions**

In chapter Two we argued that in criminology there is a gap in the study of race and crime. While a substantial amount of literature has been written on discrimination against minority ethnic groups in the criminal justice system, there is still a need to incorporate (cultural) knowledge from minority ethnic groups (see 2.3). Some have argued that this deficiency may be traced back to the fear of pathologizing minority ethnic groups in relation to crime (see Phillips and Bowling 2003). While this debate can be compared to the one about essentialising and pathologizing minority ethnic groups that occurred in the 1990s (see 2.7), this thesis argues that academics should go beyond anti-essentialism. For example, neglecting the fact that minority ethnic groups have at their disposal internal shared similar experiences, throughout the stages of settlement, may be detrimental to the understanding of the dynamics of their engaging with crime. Although we have discussed evidence of the heterogeneity and fragmentation of Bradford Pakistanis (see 6.4), we still argue that the term 'community' may be of use in this field.

The discourse about community (Hoggett 1997: 3) has been very important in recent times in the Bradford context (see for example Ouseley: 2001). This northern city has been considered an important place for implementation of community cohesion strategies, in the aftermath of the 2001 riots (Pankhurst 2002). Nonetheless, community crime prevention has not received as much attention in the public agenda, perhaps because of fear about racialising boundaries that are at the same time ethnic and geographical (with most Pakistanis clustered in inner city areas), or maybe because of distrust apparently developed towards representatives of the community or community

leaders (Ouseley 2001, Kundnani 2002). Despite an interest in community discourse, community crime prevention strategies have not been openly discussed in relation to the potential of the local Muslim population. Studying specificities of a minority ethnic group does not necessarily arise from the will to 'collude' with social control agencies (cf. Sharma et al. 1996 cited in 2.7). Instead, it follows from reviewing the general literature and the need to include more minority ethnic perspectives in this field. Analysing local history, and knowledge produced and re-invented in the community (practical concerns, cultural and religious beliefs and moral dilemmas), plays a crucial part in the study of the relations between Bradford groups and crime. It would be useful for policy-makers to see how these things work in local grassroots' organisations.

The second part of the thesis was based on an analysis of the data collected during the fieldwork. The analysis developed through the concerns that emerged (chapter Seven and Ten), the views on the aetiologies expressed by the respondents (chapters Eight and Nine), an overview of how formal (chapter Twelve) and informal (chapter Eleven) control is currently working, and finally the supposed solutions to the crime problem (chapter Twelve).

Labelling seemed to be based on a classification of potential dangers to the community: the higher threat seemed to be perceived as the one that was potentially more destabilising for the group. At the same time, community resources and networks (cf. 6.2.1) were described as essential to articulate discourses around crime, principles similar to the ones on which national community crime prevention strategies are based (Burnside and Baker 1994:19).

The social production of crime seemed to be discussed in either ecological or cultural terms. Some participants tended to see a combination of structural and

cultural factors as the most accurate aetiology of crime in the community, reproducing discourses that were more similar to recent New Labour agendas such as 'Respect' (Knight 2006) than to deprivationist views. Others, like Imran, seemed to refer to discourses of Islamic revivalism. Similar attitudes of resistance through one's cultural background, in other studies (Tatum 2002:16) have been described as a "postcolonial theory of crime violence and minority youth", as like other postcolonial theories, they account not only for structural constraints, but also for responses to oppression coming from the oppressed and their support systems<sup>1</sup> (for example, in the case of Imran, from religion). Ethnic resources and networks seemed the most common factors mentioned in the process of attribution of blame for crime. This may be a significant switch from 1980s deprivationist discourses (see Aldrich et al. 1981) to more 'cultural' ones. Further research might complement these findings by investigating how far public policy discourses post-2001 may have influenced in a hegemonic way the preference given to culture and identity rather than objective structural disadvantage.

Public discourses about 'male youth as a problem' seemed another concern shared by 'mainstream' British society or media and many Bradford Pakistanis. In certain descriptions it emerged that Bradford Pakistani male youth subcultures may be seen as a product of environmental and cultural interaction. Here competing resources and networks seem to co-exist in the choices of young men as to how to actively engage with the local social environment.

In the last two chapters formal and informal social control were discussed in relation to potential solutions to crime. The solutions were grouped around four agents: the family (see 11.1), the mosque (see 12.1), the public institutions

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<sup>1</sup> At the same time Tatum argues that lack of expectations may lead young people from minority ethnic groups to a stage where they struggle to recognise oppression (Tatum 2000:23).

(services and educational systems, see 12.3 and 12.3.1) and the police (see 12.5). These elements had been mentioned in the previous chapters both as perceived causes of problems and as being faulty in exercising social control, but the research highlighted that by complementing each other they are believed to retain still some positive potential as agents of solutions to crime problems.

Families were seen as closely tied to the main concerns around drugs; they were mentioned as the main target of drugs, whose ramifications in society would eventually undermine progress and their stability. At the same time, families were part of the aetiologies of the perceived rise in crime: they had been seen as passive in their omissions in upbringing, and in some cases as complacent of criminal activities in order to protect their *izzat* or improve their financial status. On the other hand, they were mentioned as agents of great potential in crime prevention, provided they would liaise with social services, mosques and schools.

Mosques were also seen as part of the concerns related to criminal activities: some imams had been known to have been threatened by powerful drug dealers, and some mosques were said to be a safe place for selling drugs. Mosques were also seen as playing a part in the aetiologies of crime in the community. They were criticised to some degree as backward institutions that were putting their efforts into something that did not provide young people with the answers to their problems or their doubts, or that even preferred to draw their attention to international matters. The high percentage of madrasas that were delivering only reading classes, did not have English speaking imams, and cultivated boys more than girls, were compared to a few illuminating examples of mosques as community centres. These 'modern', 'Arab style' (Adam, interview with author), 'community centres' (Amir, interview with author) types of mosques were

considered invaluable means of crime prevention. The elements that were judged positively were English-speaking imams, internet centres, and organised speeches about local problems relevant to youth.

Public institutions such as schools were part of the concerns as they had been seen as lowering their expectations towards young Pakistanis (boys and girls) in a wave of pessimism about the situation of the community. They were also seen as part of the causes leading to crime, as the social control and the values passed on to students were not considered appropriate, and some respondents even thought of colleges and universities as places where young Pakistanis would familiarise themselves with drug culture, for instance. On the other hand, a reform of schools, an improvement of relations between teachers, students and families, and a penetration of cultural awareness in public services were seen as solutions to the current inefficiency of public institutions as agents of crime prevention. The police although possibly not being seen as part of the aetiologies of crime, were widely considered problematic in their relations to the local Pakistani community and their efficiency. On the other hand, many participants mentioned police as the main agent in helping with the improvement of the criminal situation locally, and therefore the potential of the police was marked as being of a very high level.

These findings seemed significant for the definition of *community criminology*, while the alleged complementarity of formal and informal elements seen in the local criminological discourses shed a new light on the use of the term 'community' with regard to Bradford Pakistanis. The views emerging from within seemed to point to solutions lying within a multi-agency effort or partnership able

to combine the cultural needs of families and mosques with the practical expertise of public services, and the objective and fair force of renewed policing.

### **13. 2 Methodological conclusions**

In chapter Four we argued that this doctoral research was made feasible by two methodological approaches: the epistemological emic and the practical ethnographic.

The emic approach allowed the researcher to counteract the existing material on Pakistani diaspora and crime that tends to use universal categories to explain phenomena that may be specific to one group. Bearing in mind the concern that criminology has mostly neglected knowledge held *by* minorities (see above), the anthropologically grounded emic approach offered a potential solution to the problem. By the deployment of an emic standpoint, patterns of crime construction, crime production, labelling and informal and formal social control were analysed with reference to the way in which Bradford Pakistanis presented their perceptions of the various elements of their lifestyles as they are related to each other. No deductive framework was deployed.

On a practical level, the emic research could only be conducted through ethnographic methods such as participant observation and in-depth interviews. Ethnographic fieldwork worked on a double level. Firstly, it allowed the researcher to progressively build trust through what has been called 'reciprocal exposure' or the process of opening up oneself when asking others to do the same. In a moment when the crisis of trust between Muslims and white researchers was at its height (cf. 5.8), 'reciprocal exposure' was the only possible and reliable way of securing access. Secondly, the triangulation of methods helped to tackle a



context where fear of secret investigation and opportunistic research can be catalysts of suspicion and distress. A relatively open approach seemed to be the most effective means to release tension and work towards access.

While ethno-anthropological strategies emerged as very apt for the research context of difficult access, they may appear not in tune with present preferences and even anachronistic to some. Recent studies have usually been based on in-depth interviews, but overall participant observation may be absent, and researchers may want to avoid situations where they have the opportunity to build trust and interaction across the many layers of the community. In some cases snowballing is produced from one single community organisation, with the risk of reproducing a hegemonic point of view that claims to be widely representative. Doctoral students might be more fortunate as their status allows them to interact with the community over at least a two-year period, but these issues need to be taken seriously by funding bodies as already indicated by Gilliat-Ray (2005:29). The time and the level of closeness with respondents helps informants to give reliable accounts as the rapport with the researcher ideally does not end in the formal interview, but lingers and repeats itself on a number of occasions. The high degree of personal involvement of ethno-anthropological strategies helped to facilitate the development of an understanding of the material offered by interviews and participant observation that surveys and quantitative methodology might struggle with, given their degree of detachment (Lee 1993:119). The reliability of the data also lies in the personal rapport between researcher and respondents, while participant observation offers a means of triangulation of what is expressed in formal interviews when respondents are

likely to portray certain views influenced by the surrounding political context and its understanding of Islam.

Ethno-anthropological methods were significant to this research especially as far as deconstructing the essentialised 'Muslim community' was concerned. 'Accessing all areas' (in terms of environments and groups of individuals) and stock-taking to prevent a self-appointed (and not necessarily representative) highly politicised sample, seemed the keys to challenging the monolithic public discourse about 'the Muslim community'. This could be considered an ethical issue of representation as, especially post 7<sup>th</sup> July 2005; the idea of a 'Muslim community' has provided grounds for inaccurate generalisation and consequently grievances amongst Muslims. The issue of adequate representation, especially as a sampling concern, is a political problem that puts the burden of political responsibility on the researcher.

### **13.3 A 'Community Criminology'**

Perhaps there is a general tendency for sociologists of complex societies to study formal control and anthropologists to study informal control (Krase and Sagarin 1980:211). For example, research in the British Pakistani setting of Edinburgh narrowed its focus down to 'the community's social institutions (or agencies of social control) [that] promote order and regulate behaviour through the social bonding of members/participants to its moral and social order' (Wardak 2000:16), instead of the community evaluation of formal institutions. In the present research we have explored a general pluralistic discourse that considered a combination of formal and informal structures as the most effective social control repertoire.

While some respondents looked at formal social control systems as more efficient

and fairer ('if you want to have justice, you've got to call the police', FG1A), the government may look at informal cultural means such as faith communities to enhance crime prevention. This, however, may create controversies, as Tahir described when criticising those who see mosques as infrastructure but do not help them financially as they would other institutions with the same function:

In terms of the comments this person made, 'these people do not have any moral teachings in the mosque', I would say it...(...) you have an emotional response and say 'no moral teaching is going on', but this is not the case, because the nature of these imams, (...) if you maybe hold a conference and present this statement to maybe 30 maulanas, they will jump up and down and say, 'look, we are doing the best we are doing', yes? Now, with regards to the question whether they go to learn the Quran, the mosque is providing that service and this is what parents expect. So parents haven't said 'do something else as well' (...) so there is a contract and the contract is being fulfilled and again if you only pay one pound to the mosque to do this service you shouldn't expect the high quality education, because they can't provide it. The reason I am saying it is a very, very complex issue, is...for example if we want to do shopping we are going to Tesco or Asda, or maybe other stores, you tell me there is a good store there, I will try that, but why don't we do it for our own kids? Who are our future, and city's future, and country's future, we don't pay them serious [money]...and when we ask the mosques to do that, they can't do this because they don't have resources. We are very keen to jump and criticize mosques, and churches, gurdwaras, mandirs, but we don't give them funding to provide that work. Why do these educational institutions exist? Because the mainstream education is not catering for the children need, then government is not supporting them financially, council is not providing any resources, so what do you expect?(...)[They live on] donations, so every Friday, I think mosques are very concerned about getting 4/500 pounds a week and that will go for bills, maintenance, everything. And if you go to a mosque and you smell a disgusting smell, you know that the money is not being spent, but we are very quick to make legislation, saying these maulana are coming from that country...(Tahir)

Other respondents saw a solution in a partnership between mosques and police where part of the deal would be some drug awareness training delivered in mosques, through mosques, by officers (as for instance the Armley Muslim Chaplain is doing in Batley):

Like going in and explain it. When these attacks [shootings] happened I said to a police officer, a sergeant, 'go into the community, go into the mosque and deliver a speech or give a presentation, this is what happened and we want people to come forward'. I haven't seen that. (Adam)

The present thesis argues that the emic analysis of criminological discourses has highlighted the presence of a variety of approaches within the same community. However, in comparison to previous research it appears that the sense of bridging between different resources within one's locality is generally considered to be the most effective approach and that this may have led to a different construction of the idea of community at this stage of the post-settlement in Bradford: community is no longer only *biraderi* but is an ensemble which includes even those local institutional bodies which are inclusive.

The emic analysis of criminological discourses has highlighted the presence of a variety of approaches within the same community. The initial question of whether in Bradford there is cohesive community criminology with reference to the Pakistani community has been problematic in the sense that the views across generations and occupational groups were very varied. The terms in which the function of family was described, for instance, fluctuated from positions where the traditional structure was blamed (as inconsistent, not apt, and therefore counterproductive to the necessities of British life, see 9.1), to views according to which the erosion of that very system had led to the drift towards crime (see 9.2). On the other hand, more coherence was to be found in the process of delineating which agents would hold the potential to make a difference in this respect: families, mosques, public institutions and the police. Some of the more critical views about the 'original' culture of the majority of the community were paralleled by a belief that where such culture failed, there should have been a

different and more assertive intervention from what used to be the host society. If many families failed for some time, for instance, to see British formal education as a way to improve oneself, the educational system, social services and even the Government should have paid more attention to that problem, preventing it persisting.

In comparison to previous researches it appears that the sense of bridging between different resources within one's locality was quite generally considered to be the most effective approach, and this may have led to a different construction of the idea of community at this stage of the post-settlement period in Bradford: community is not only *biraderi* (see 6.2 and 6.2.1) any more, but is an ensemble which includes even institutional bodies that are operating in one's locality.

While there is a tendency of seeing Muslim as the ultimate others (Alexander 2000:6), the dimension of the combination of traditions in diaspora has somehow become lost or under-valued in the analysis. This thesis has shown how formal and informal, or British and 'traditional' Pakistani, can be combined and are no longer separable in the dynamics of social control.

The emic of cultural agency can be said to legitimise the term 'community criminology', but not in the sense that Bradford Pakistanis possess exclusive criminological discourses, labelling, preventive strategies and rehabilitation practices. Rather, they engage with mainstream criminological and policy discourses in a way that might well be considered a kind of reflection representative of the position of their diaspora: *community* for them does not only include their traditional structures but all the intra-communal and inter-communal relations that are meaningful to them, both as resources and constraints.

The term 'community' in Bradford in relation to the stage of settlement may be better understood by comparison to another Pakistani transnational setting. In December 2005 I attended a public meeting with the small Pakistani community of Desenzano del Garda, Northern Italy. The members of the community present at the public event were male apart from two teenage girls; in the meeting there was one interpreter who described the ten years' history of the migration to the Brescia county. He had to translate all which was said that evening for his countrymen who did not speak Italian. The choice of words was particularly interesting as he decided to translate the word community ('comunità' in Italian) as 'biraderi'. He also introduced a 'rappresentante della comunità' ('community representative') who declared himself as the only link between the local 'Pakistani biraderi' (sic) and Italian society. At a very early stage of migration, where families have not been reunited, mosques have not been built and community relations are organised on the basis of self-appointed representation, the term used to describe community is biraderi, or brotherhood, extended family, closed *blood cum caste* unit. This definition is now far from the Bradford Pakistani one. In the latter context, the term 'community' covers family, specific cultural and religious institutions (mosques), but also public services and police. This definition helps us to understand the difference between a positive connotation of 'community' and a negative connotation of 'biraderi' as it has been illustrated above.

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## Appendices

Appendix 1  
Leaflet for sample recruitment<sup>1</sup>

**AGAINST CRIME**  
**How do Bradford Pakistanis react to Bradford criminality?**

This research sponsored by Leeds University aims at collecting ideas on how criminality is impacting on the Pakistani community of Bradford.

Bradford, being characterised by a substantial drug market, often appears in the media as badly affected by criminality in general. The research aim is to assess how much this impacts on the Pakistani community. It will therefore be crucial to give voice to as many members as possible from the Pakistani community (parents, teenagers, community workers, teachers, etc.) in order to ascertain their fears concerning the city and their ideas about crime.

The research will include people who have been the victims of crime, people who are worried about crime, people who have witnessed crime, or work in contact with it, and also people who have had experiences with the criminal justice system or have acquaintances with such experience.

This project intends to counter the stereotype of 'Asian criminality' that has so often appeared in the national press, and intends to collect stories and examples of Pakistanis who are actually fighting crime and are positively engaged in a project for a better Bradford.

For more information or to contribute to the research please contact [splmb@leeds.ac.uk](mailto:splmb@leeds.ac.uk) or phone 07771878146.

**'Deviance is everywhere and leaves traces everywhere. It marks those who report it, those who attempt to control it, those who gain from it, those who suffer from it, those who imaginatively describe it, and the contexts in which it is accomplished' (Downes and Rock 2003:43)**

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<sup>1</sup> This leaflet was unsuccessfully used in order to recruit research participants.

### Appendix 3 Questionnaire<sup>1</sup>

This questionnaire intends to guide a discussion between the researcher and Bradford Pakistani parents in order to gather their ideas on widespread concerns about bringing up children in Bradford. While the council and other institutions tend to rely on the opinions of well-known members of the community, or 'community leaders', this research aims at collecting the thoughts and ideas of those parents who are not normally involved in the process of decision making. The questions below are grouped into four subheadings: *worries*, *responsibilities*, *community* and *solutions*.

#### 'WORRIES'

Are parents worried about the environment where their kids are growing up?  
What are the main concerns?  
Has Bradford changed in the last 20 years? How?  
Who are the ones more at risk of being 'led astray'?  
Who are the characters considered to be more likely to 'lead astray'?  
Are there better or worse areas in Bradford where to raise children?

#### 'RESPONSIBILITIES'

Who is more responsible in the upbringing of Pakistani children? (Parents, mosques, community, council, schools, police, youth workers, etc.)  
What role does religion play in the upbringing of children?  
Are parents normally 'equipped' with the knowledge of the surrounding environment so they can understand the risks their children may encounter?

#### 'COMMUNITY'

How does the community react to criminal or deviant acts?  
Have there been any changes in how the community see illegal activities? (i.e. a way of surviving in spite of racism, a consequence of living in a corrupted society...)  
Is the community really aware of all the illegal activities that take place in the inner city, for example?  
Who or what is generally blamed for the increase in criminal activities in the Pakistani community?  
Are people scared by the recent events like shootings, drug raids, riots, etc.?

#### 'SOLUTIONS'

What can be done in terms of crime prevention?  
Who should be considered the main agent of social control?  
Is there anything the council could do?  
Is there anything the mosque/madrassa can do?  
What can the parents do?

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<sup>1</sup> This is the sample questionnaire passed onto people who wanted to have a clearer idea of what the research was about before the interview.



**Appendix 2**  
**List of Free Nodes for N-Vivo analysis<sup>1</sup>**

- 1 against capitalism
- 2 against deprivationism
- 3 alcohol
- 4 "all communities are the same"
- 5 Asian police officers
- 6 bad communication
- 7 bad parenting
- 8 benefits and allowances
- 9 "best of both cultures"
- 10 *besti*
- 11 bilingualism
- 12 *biraderi*
- 13 boredom
- 14 boundaries of acceptable transgression
- 15 boycott
- 16 Bradford image
- 17 Bradford Twelve
- 18 Chachchis
- 19 changes in Bradford
- 20 character, question of
- 21 "chilling"
- 22 choice of entering the police
- 23 clothing
- 24 coming out of prison
- 25 committing crime inside and outside the community
- 26 communitarianism
- 27 community break-down
- 28 community centres
- 29 "community of suffering"
- 30 community sanctions
- 31 community spokespeople
- 32 council restrictions
- 33 crime stats in Bradford
- 34 deprivation
- 35 "dirty linen"
- 36 divorce
- 37 domestic violence
- 38 "double life"
- 39 drug dealing
- 40 drug market in Bradford
- 41 drug taking
- 42 drugs and businesses
- 43 drugs and prostitution
- 44 drugs in Pakistan
- 45 Edge of the city (documentary)

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<sup>1</sup> This is the complete list of the themes emerged during fieldwork.

46	education
47	E. activities <sup>2</sup>
48	emancipation from passivity
49	family adaptation
50	family as shock absorbent
51	family break-down
52	family up-bringing
53	fear for safety
54	fear of drugs
55	fight
56	forgiveness
57	gang
58	generational gap
59	getting used to crime
60	gossip
61	government intervention
62	graffiti
63	greed
64	gun crime
65	hanging out
66	<i>haram-halal</i>
67	here to stay
68	hiding prison sentences
69	home made rehabilitation
70	honour killings
71	<i>hrami</i>
72	identity crisis
73	individualism
74	interventions aimed for the Asians
75	Islam and moral teachings
76	<i>izzat</i>
77	<i>kameti</i>
78	<i>lafanga</i>
79	language
80	laziness
81	Leeds Road
82	Lumb Lane
83	madrassa
84	mafia mentality
85	Manningham
86	maulvis
87	mediation
88	men's freedom
89	Mirpur
90	Mirpuris
91	mistrust in research
92	mosques
93	mothers

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<sup>2</sup> E. is one cultural circle engaging with Muslim youth.

94	Muslim identity
95	myth of return
96	National Front
97	need
98	NIMBYSM
99	not facing the problems
100	omerta <sup>3</sup>
101	Opportunity Theory
102	Pakistani 'peculiarity' in dealing with crime
103	parents' expectations
104	parents' lack of knowledge
105	passivity
106	Pathan
107	patronage
108	pedagogy
109	peer pressure
110	'poisoning the community'
111	Police and community
112	Police discrimination
113	Police intervention
114	Police turning a blind eye
115	preaching in Mosques
116	prejudice
117	purpose in life
118	'putting things back in the community'
119	racism
120	rebellious kids
121	rehabilitation and prevention through religion
122	relational proximity
123	religion and Culture
124	revenge
125	riots 1995
126	riots 2001
127	role models
128	safety
129	segregation
130	self-defence
131	'sense of invincibility'
132	shootings
133	Sikhs
134	snooker centres
135	socialisation of the West
136	socio-economic variable
137	sporadic crime activities
138	sport
139	stability
140	status competition
141	stop and search

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<sup>3</sup> This is an Italian term used to express the refusal to speak about crime in Mafioso contexts for fear of reprisals.

142	strength and respect
143	survival argument
144	Tableeigh Jamaat
145	<i>taweez</i>
146	terrorism
147	the 'marriage cure'
148	'trapped in two cultures'
149	travel of knowledge
150	'treat the parents'
151	understanding of Islam
152	unemployment
153	village mentality
154	'village rehab'
155	welfare state
156	Western 'pollution'
157	women and drugs
158	women and Islam
159	women involved in crime
160	<i>zat</i>

**PAGE  
NUMBERING  
AS ORIGINAL**

**Appendix 4**  
**Lecture about Crime and Focus Group<sup>1</sup>**

*Assalamaleikum,*

Thank you for accepting to work with me this morning. I am a PhD student at Leeds University and I am researching issues of crime, deviance and social control in the Pakistani community of Bradford. While I will have the chance to explain the details of my research when we meet, I would like to point out from now that the reason I have chosen to research this ethnic group is not because I believe they are more 'deviant' than others, but because I feel that there is a generally profound lack of understanding of the dynamics of this community (and because for personal reasons I have a special affection towards Pakistanis and Bradford!). I hope you will help me to discuss a few issues I am interested in, or even suggest what I should investigate during my research.

This morning we will work in two separate sessions.

In the first session I will explain to you what my research is about and how it is connected with what you are studying for your A-levels (I will briefly outline the methods of sociological inquiry I employ in my research, and then we will touch upon definitions of crime, social control, power; we will also discuss the different points of view about the causes of crime and the arguments about its social distributions according to age, gender, social class, ethnicity and locality; we will define the concept of 'moral panic' and analyse its relation to mass media).

In the second session we will organize a 'focus group'. Here I would like to listen to your opinion about issues of crime and social control in Bradford. We will together jot down notes about the discussion. This will help me immensely with my research and I regard your views as very precious because they are representative of what young people in Bradford think. So, please, be honest, open to hear your mates' views, and, above all, don't be shy. I will ask you to sign a consent form so that in my thesis I can write about

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<sup>1</sup> This material relates to the work carried out in a local school. The focus groups were preceded by a lecture where the researcher and the participants developed an understanding of their 'vocabulary' in the field of deviance.

what you have said in the focus group. I will guarantee your anonymity.

Thanks again for participating in this project,  
Marta



### FOCUS GROUP CONSENT FORM

This consent form outlines my rights as a participant in the study of 'The emic of cultural agency in relation to crime among Bradford Pakistanis' conducted by Miss Marta Bolognani, Department of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, Tel. 0113 3434681, Email: [splmb@leeds.ac.uk](mailto:splmb@leeds.ac.uk)

The focus group will explore students' views about crime and social control in Bradford.  
It will take approximately 50 minutes.

I understand that:

1. It is my right to decline to answer any question that I am asked.
2. My name and identity will remain confidential in any publications or discussions.

I HAVE READ THIS CONSENT FORM. I HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO ASK QUESTIONS CONCERNING ANY AREAS THAT I DID NOT UNDERSTAND.

Signature of Focus Group member  
name of Focus Group Member

Printed

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

-----/-----/2005

## Session 1

### Bringing the Syllabus to Bradford..

#### 1) EXPLANATIONS OF CRIME AND DEVIANCE

The first part of my research is about investigating what are the popular explanations of Crime and Deviance in the Pakistani Community of Bradford.

Some classical views about crime and deviance are:

1. Deviance as individual or biological difference (Lombroso 1870): deviance is what is implemented by individuals who are born with certain features.
2. The legal basis (Tappan 1947): crime is what is defined as such by the legal definition (so is it law that is actually the cause of crime?)
3. Deviance as Social harm (Sutherland 1949): the essential characteristic of crime is its legal description as an act which is socially harmful (so are social problems like the family breakdown criminal acts?)
4. Deviance as Social Construct (Becker 1963): deviance is what is labelled as such in a specific society in a specific moment (so can we really consider the law as objective?).

In the focus group I will ask you to discuss what is considered to be criminal/deviant in the Pakistani community of Bradford.

#### 2) SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION, SOCIAL CONTROL AND POWER



If we consider crime as something which is socially constructed (as opposed to socially produced), we have to acknowledge who constructs the notion of crime and where the power to do it is mustered.

Foucault is a contemporary philosopher and sociologist whose major work is about power and social control. Foucault argues that western society lives in the illusion of freedom as institutions like through mass communication and psychoanalysis end up reproducing models of social control that are likely to exclude the ones who do not conform.

In the focus group I will ask you to discuss who generates the social construction of crime and deviance in the Pakistani Community of Bradford. Also, who you believe are the main institutions that are largely believed to deal with social control?

### 3) THE CAUSES OF CRIME

When we speak about crime as social construction and social production, we are essentially dividing the theories about the cause of crimes in two groups.

Theories connected to social production regard crime as a deterministic consequence of historical or economic processes (e.g. deprivation as the main factor leading to criminality).

Theories connected with social construction are keener on analysing cultural factors that may concur in crime raise.

Here you find two examples:

- Opportunity theory (Merton 1947): individuals who lack the opportunities to achieve what society depict as desirable (i.e. expensive car, designer clothes, etc.) will try to achieve the same goals ('aspirational frame') by illegal means.

- Anomie (Durkheim 1893, 1897) or Disorganizational theory: in societies in rapid change people may no longer feel subject to social discipline and 'go astray'.

In the focus group I will ask you to discuss your ideas about the causes of crime in the Pakistani community of Bradford.

#### 4) THE SOCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF CRIME

Most sociologists agree that age, social class, ethnicity, gender and locality are important variables for the analysis of crime.

**Age:** young people are considered to be more likely to be involved in criminal activities, but they are likely to 'wear it out' when they get older (the Home Office statistics show that the peak age of offenders is 18 years for men and 15 for women). Some statistics disagree with this statement as young people are only more likely to be reported for getting into trouble as they are controlled by a range of institutions.

**Social class:** links between social class and crime are well established in the criminological literature and most offenders in prison classify themselves as working class. Some argue that social status is actually something that is influential at the stage of deciding whether or not to prosecute. White collar crime, fraud, tax evasion might also be more difficult to prosecute.

**Ethnicity:** while black people are disproportionately represented in the crime statistics, some sociologists have argued that discrimination make black people more likely to be stopped and searched arrested, etc. (Coleman and Moynihan 1996).

**Gender:** Pollack (1961) argued that the 'dark figure of crime' regards women as they are less likely to be detected and arrested as perpetrators of crime. On the other hand, certain offences relate only to women (only mothers can be charged with infanticide and prostitution related offences).

**Locality:** since the Chicago School when the 'zone of transition' was regarded as the area with higher rate of deviance, different localities have been considered more likely or less likely to be crime settings. One view about localities and crime depicts urban spaces as more likely settings for criminal activities than rural ones.

In the focus group I will ask you to discuss how these variables are seen by the Pakistani Community of Bradford.

#### 5) MORAL PANICS

The concept of moral panics explains public anxiety and official reactions to increases in certain types of crime. To call something 'moral panic' suggests the scale of the response is disproportionately greater than the scale of the issue.

This concept became famous firstly with Stanley Cohen. In 1973 he wrote about the moral panic generated by the media about 'Mods and Rockers'; a single event happened in 1964 had triggered off diffuse anxiety about this subculture.

Nowadays, the notion of moral panic has been applied to family morality, asylum seekers, terrorism and paedophilia.

In the focus group I would like you to discuss whether moral panics are present in the Pakistani community of Bradford.

## **Session 2**

### **Focus Group**

**Please discuss the following questions:**

1. What is considered to be criminal/deviant in the Pakistani community of Bradford?
2. Who generates the social construction of crime and deviance in the Pakistani Community of Bradford? Also, who you believe are the main institutions that are largely believed to deal with social control?
3. Discuss your ideas about the causes of crime in the Pakistani community of Bradford.
4. How are variables such as age, gender, social class, ethnicity and locality are seen by the Pakistani Community of Bradford?
5. Are moral panics present in the Pakistani community of Bradford?

## **Appendix 5 Glossary**

<b>ASA</b>	<b>Association of Social Anthropologists</b>
<b>BCCI</b>	<b>Bradford Chamber of Commerce and Industry</b>
<b>TUC</b>	<b>Trade Unions Congress</b>
<b>WYP</b>	<b>West Yorkshire Police</b>
<b>BNP</b>	<b>British National Party</b>
<b>NF</b>	<b>National Front</b>