

**An Analysis of the Concept of Freedom and its Implications
for Educational Theory and Practice in Egypt, 1805-2000**

by
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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of other

To Ashraf and Nada

Abstract

The current study attempts to analyse the learners' right to freedom in education in order to determine the nature and content of their education. This analysis will be in relation to the philosophy of education in Egypt to improve the efficiency of the educational system. In this sense the aims of the study can be determined as follows: first to propose a theoretical framework of freedom in education in relation to its meaning, conditions, restrictions and value, secondly, to develop this theoretical framework of education based on freedom so that it suits Egyptian society, can improve the efficiency of the educational system through the idea of freedom, and thirdly, to identify the difficulties and challenges that might confront the claim to freedom in education in Egypt.

To achieve these aims the study contains seven chapters, an introduction, a conclusion and appendix that are necessary to achieve its aims and answer its questions. The introduction discusses the general outline of the study and the major issues, questions, aims, methodology and plan of the study. The main aim of chapter one is to analyse the concept of freedom in western and Islamic thought to build a theoretical framework of the meaning of freedom, its conditions and value, which is necessary and important to construct a theoretical framework of the meaning, conditions and value of freedom in education for learners at school level. Chapter two aims to construct a theoretical framework of freedom in education that will depend on the analysis of the concept of freedom made in chapter one. This analysis will deal with the implications of freedom in education with respect to its conditions, restrictions and value in education. Through this analysis, chapter two aims also to analyse and examine the learners' rights to be free regarding their education. To have a complete theoretical framework of freedom in education, chapter three discusses other implications with respect to restrictions which might limit learners' freedom by being subject to state authority.

Chapter four investigates and analyses freedom in educational theory and practice in the history of Egypt from 1805 to 1991, whereas chapter five focuses on the period from 1992 to 2000. Following the analysis of the concept of freedom and its implications in education

that will be made in the first five chapters, it would be sensible to construct a framework of educational theory based on freedom that, on one hand, should suite the Egyptian context in chapter six, on the other hand, that guarantees a range of freedom that allows learners and society derive benefit from its value in education. Having proposed a framework of a theory of education based on freedom that suits the Egyptian context to improve the efficiency of its educational system chapter seven will discover and examine the conditions and difficulties which need to be considered for the successful implementation of freedom in education. Also, the study will attempt to give some suggestions that might help to reduce the gap between the educational situation, its circumstances and the conditions that must be satisfied for the successful implementation of freedom in education.

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Introduction

1. Introduction

Freedom is a perennial issue in the life of human beings. They look for and demand freedom throughout their lives. The question of why freedom is important to an individual is complicated, and cannot be given a simple straightforward answer. It might be true that agitation for freedom arises when people actually want to do things which they are prevented from doing. When people demand freedom they usually look for freedom of speech and movement - freedom from arbitrary, cruel and unusual forms of punishment, and freedom to discover and act in accordance with their purposes. In this sense freedom can be justified on the grounds that it not only tends to promote people's interests, but it also maximises their opportunities for doing what is worthwhile.

Freedom is one of the fundamental ideals of modern democratic states. It is perhaps the most difficult of all political concepts to explain. As Barry (1995:204) notes

liberty tends not to become a separate principle or value, to take its place alongside others, but rather a shorthand expression for a closely related and allegedly symmetrical set of values: a surrogate term for a complete social philosophy.

The value of the individual's freedom comes from the belief in the intrinsic and ultimate value of each individual, and so the freedom of human beings is at the heart of political philosophy, especially liberalism.

it constitutes the grounds for the celebration of individual freedom, and is liberalism's fundamental moral and political value (Ramsay 1997:38).

The implications of the concept of freedom in education appear in a learner's right to be free to learn what is of interest to him with help from other people, for example, teachers, parents and so on, but not control or under influence. Teachers and parents should listen to the child in order to learn more about the child's views. The notion of freedom in education might help learners to develop their potentiality and make them autonomous, creative, self-learning, continuously learning, responsible and to help them to enjoy greater academic achievement. Moreover, in this way learners can understand their world and can make rational life-choices (Wringe, 1984:38).

2. Issue of the study

The importance of applying freedom in education becomes a necessary condition to deal with the massive changes taking place all over the world in every field. These developments demand a free mind to understand what is happening in one's surroundings and discover the factors and conditions that determine global conditions. As most other countries, Egypt is also undergoing extensive changes and challenges such as the effect of globalisation, the revolution of knowledge, information, human rights and democracy alongside a market economy. The issues of freedom in society and its use in the theory and practice of education have been widely debated. For example, the value of freedom in education has been understood as a means to give children the chance to choose; they have to take the risk and it does not matter whether they make the right choice or not. If they make the wrong choice, they will learn from their mistakes. When children have the chance to be a chooser, they will be responsible for their lives and their choices. Education is responsible for building and developing the personality, abilities, and capabilities of an individual to his or her highest potential. This means he will discover, build and develop himself. Society needs people who are autonomous, creative, self-learning, continuously learning, responsible and to help them to enjoy greater academic achievement. This claim indicates that education needs to create a climate in which the children have the opportunity to exercise freedom to derive benefit from its value in education. In this sense the right type of education is linked to one which makes the children free beings who are free to love, to be happy, think, choose and to make their own decisions. Any development in education has to aim to develop the potentiality of the individuals themselves, by themselves and for themselves. According to the above views, the claim of freedom in education could be the core of radical changes which the society needs for development.

Therefore, in this study I will attempt to analyse the learners' right to freedom in education in order to determine the nature and content of their education. This analysis will be in relation to the philosophy of education in Egypt to improve the efficiency of the educational system. In this sense the aims of the study can be determined as follows: first to propose a theoretical framework of freedom in education in relation to its meaning,

conditions, restrictions and value, secondly, to develop this theoretical framework of education based on freedom so that it suits Egyptian society, can improve the efficiency of the educational system through the idea of freedom, and thirdly, to identify and consider the difficulties and challenges that might confront the claim to freedom in education in Egypt. The theme of the study can be formulated in the following double question; what are the meaning, conditions, restrictions and value of freedom in education?, and how can the efficiency of the educational system in Egypt be improved in the light of this idea of freedom in education? This raises the following questions;

- (1) what is the meaning and what are the conditions, restrictions and the value of freedom in western and Islamic thought?
- (2) what are the implications of the concept of freedom in education regarding its conditions, restrictions and value regarding learners and educational processes?
- (3) what is the place of freedom in Egyptian history of educational theory and practice in Egypt (1805-1991)?
- (4) what is the place of freedom in Egyptian current educational theory and practice in Egypt (1992-2000)?
- (5) in what ways can the efficiency of the educational system in Egypt be improved in the light of the idea of freedom
- (6) what are the conditions and difficulties that affect the implementation of freedom in the Egyptian context?

3. Methodology and plan of study

The current study contains seven chapters, an introduction, a conclusion and appendix that are necessary to achieve its aims and answer its questions. The introduction discusses the general outline of the study and the major issues, questions, aims, methodology and plan of the study. A criticism which can be made for this kind of research is that it might not be possible to apply a western idea of freedom in education, that depends on a western concept of freedom which might be different in a different context such as Egypt. Thus an initial aim of the study and the main aim of chapter one is to analyse the concept of freedom in western and Islamic thought to build a theoretical framework of the meaning of freedom, its conditions and value, which is necessary and important to construct a theoretical framework of the meaning, conditions and value of freedom in education for learners at school level. The significance of analysing the concept of freedom in both traditions is to make sure that the proposal of freedom in education as a western idea the study will suggest suits the Egyptian context to improve the efficiency of its educational system. In short, it is important to identify whether there are religious obligations that might limit learners' freedom in Islam as a religion and practice in Egypt.

Chapter two aims to construct a theoretical framework of freedom in education that will depend on the analysis of the concept of freedom made in chapter one. This analysis will deal with the implications of freedom in education with respect to its conditions, restrictions and value in education. Through this analysis, chapter two aims also to analyse and examine the learners' rights to be free regarding their education. This is because it might be difficult for someone to accept the claim of freedom for young learners at an early age to be equal with adults. This refers to three important factors: the nature of the subject, the purpose of education and the sort of restrictions that limit learners' freedom. The analysis of learner's right regarding their education in this chapter will deal with learners at school. I investigate this particular age group for two reasons; firstly, unlike young children, learners at the university are mature enough to exercise their freedom and to fight for it. Secondly, although the learners' rights to freedom may be acknowledged in current Egyptian legislation, it is ignored in real educational practice.

To have a complete theoretical framework of freedom in education, chapter three discusses other implications with respect to restrictions which might limit learners' freedom by being subject to state authority. This is because for learners to exercise freedom in terms of non-interference and availability of making choices and decisions and to derive benefit from its value, they might be restricted by the nature of the curriculum, assessment, and teacher training. The significance of this chapter is that, first, it attempts to build a complete theoretical framework of freedom in education that provide the required conditions in which learners and society can benefit from the value of freedom to be able to satisfy their interests. Secondly, to try to suite the Egyptian society and its educational system to improve the efficiency of the educational system according to the idea of freedom in education

To achieve the aims of the first three chapters a philosophical approach is suitable to provide a high degree of understanding in defining the concept of freedom and its implications in education (see Scriven, 1988:132-6). Although there are many methods that can be used in philosophy there is one common method which is called analysis and construction. According to Peters (1966a:78-84), Peters, Woods and Dray (1987:26-9), Reid (1965:23-8) Hirst and Peters (1970) and Best (1965:46-54) philosophical analysis refers to the critical reading, and understanding of literature on the meaning of a particular concept, its implication and value in a particular field. In relation to the current study, philosophical analysis is suitable to build a theoretical framework of freedom in education in relation to its conditions, restrictions and value for learners and society. Then philosophical construction of the elements of the analysis will be suitable to build a theoretical framework of freedom in education that fit the Egyptian context to improve the efficiency of its educational system.

Chapter four investigates and analyses freedom in educational theory and practice in the history of Egypt from 1805 to 1991, whereas chapter five focuses on the period from 1992 to 2000. The aims of chapter four can be summarised as follows; firstly, to discover and analyse the conditions of freedom in relation to Egyptian society and its educational system. In other words, to investigate how far learners have been interfered with and are

subject to the authority of adults in their choices and decisions about what they study, what they are interested in and what they want to be or become? Secondly, to identify such educational practices that reflect the features of freedom. This will help to understand how the present educational system has come about, which is necessary to establish a sound basis for the implementation of freedom in chapter six and seven. Thirdly, to discover the sort of restrictions that determined learners' freedom in educational policy and practice. This will help to avoid such restrictions and prepare for such conditions as are important in the implementation of the idea of freedom in the Egyptian context in chapter six and seven. Fourthly, to identify the implications of freedom in education regarding its value in theory and practice. Also, to investigate whether the demand for learners' freedom in Egypt is desirable and valuable for learners and society according to educational thought. The significance of this aim is to give an indication of the suitability and validity of the implementation of freedom in education in the Egyptian context.

It might be important to note that a long historical period gives a wider range in which to examine how freedom in education has been developed and to identify its conditions, restrictions and value. The reason behind taking the year 1805 as the starting period is that it is the beginning of the building of Egypt into a modern nation. 'Egypt in 1805 achieved a certain level of modernisation and this was followed by development in education' (Hajar,1991:90-1). No significant implications of freedom in education can be recognised before that year. 'Egyptian society was under the Ottoman occupation for the previous three centuries. Ottoman policy aimed to isolate Egypt from the rest of the whole world and from the industrial development that started at that time in Europe. This policy was reflected in an education that aimed to keep society as it was without any attempt to develop the society' ('Ali, Hilmi, Aimam,1996:17). For this element of the research, and based on the work of Best (1981:132-4), Borg and Gall (1989:808-11), Hopkins (1976a:117-8), Cohen and Manion (1994:45-46) and Bedalla,1992:163-6) a historical approach was selected because it would help to illustrate the implications of the idea of freedom in education, provide the foundation for better understanding the question of the lack of learners' freedom in education, contribute to a better understanding of the idea of freedom in present theory and practice, help to illustrate how the present educational

system has come about, help to establish a sound basis for further progress in relation to the idea of freedom in education, and show how and why an idea such as freedom in education developed. Then, it helps to use former practices to evaluate newer, emerging ones. To achieve the aims of this chapter the period of the study will be divided into different periods according to the political situation. As I will show in this chapter the political situation had a great effect on determining the learners' freedom in education.

Egypt's current educational strategy, which presents a comprehensive framework of educational reform, was initially articulated in 1992. Thus the main concern of chapter five is to discover and analyse the idea of freedom in educational theory and practice in Egypt from 1992 to 2000. This chapter details the current educational situation in which the new proposed framework would be promoted, eliminated or modified. The year 2000 was selected as the end point of the current study because it is a crucial year in the development of Egyptian education. This is because many promises and hopes for great development in education were expected to be in place by that year. The descriptive inquiry method will be suitable to achieve the aims of this chapter that can be summarised as follows; firstly, to investigate and analyse the conditions of freedom related to Egyptian society and its educational system. In other words, to examine how far learners have been interfered with and been subject to authority by adults with their choices and decisions to study what they are interested in and to be or become what they want? Secondly, to discover such educational practices as reflect the features of freedom and unfreedom. This will help to understand the present educational system and establish a sound basis for the implementation of freedom in chapter six. Thirdly, to discover the sort of restrictions that determined learners' freedom in educational policy and practices. This will help to avoid such restrictions and prepare for such conditions that are important in the implementation of the idea of freedom in the Egyptian context in chapter six. Fourthly, to identify the meaning, features and the value of freedom in educational thought in the light of the theoretical framework that will be made in the first three chapters. The significance of this section is to give an indication of the suitability and validity of the implementation of freedom in education into the Egyptian context.

Following to the analysis of the concept of freedom and its implications in education that will be made in the first five chapters, it would be sensible to construct a framework of educational theory based on freedom that, on one hand, should suit the Egyptian context in chapter six, on the other hand, that guarantees a range of freedom that allows learners and society derive benefit from its value in education. Firstly, this framework treats the general components and aims of the purpose of education. Secondly, it will deal with the nature of the educational system, school curriculum, assessment and teacher education. Having proposed a framework of a theory of education based on freedom that suits the Egyptian context to improve the efficiency of its educational system chapter seven will discover and examine the conditions and difficulties which need to be considered for the successful implementation of freedom in education. Also, I will attempt to give some suggestions that might help to reduce the gap between the educational situation, its circumstances and the conditions that must be satisfied for the successful implementation of freedom in education.

As important methodological notes: firstly, Arabic literature used mainly in chapter one, four and five will be translated by the researcher. The translation will be in the form of a literal translation to the meaning of the Arabic text so as to give the real meaning intended by the author. To distinguish between the researcher's ideas and the translated quotations, the latter will be put between single commas. This will also distinguish them from direct English quotations. Secondly, the researcher will calculate some statistical data in chapters four and five with star mark '*'. Thirdly, the statistical data introduced in chapters four and five will be used, collected and organised in a way that makes the data more useful for the purpose of the study.

Fourthly, because of the nature and aim of the current study the researcher has used the Arabic and English literature related to the topic of the study, to build the arguments needed to construct a theoretical framework of education based on freedom, rather than having the literature review in a separate chapter. In analysing the idea of freedom in education in the historical and present situation of educational theory and practice in Egypt the researcher used also the studies and research that are important to investigate the idea of

freedom because the current study is the first one to investigate this idea in the Egyptian context.

Chapter One

An analysis of the concept of freedom in Western and Islamic thought

1.1. Introduction

One criticism that can be made about this kind of research is that it might not be possible to apply a western idea of freedom in education to a different context such as Egypt. Thus, the main aim of this chapter is to analyse the concept of freedom in both western and Islamic thought to build a theoretical framework of the meaning of freedom, its conditions and value. This is necessary and important in order to be able to construct a theoretical framework of freedom in education for learners at school level, in chapters two and three. The significance of analysing and examining the idea of freedom in both traditions is to make sure that the proposals for freedom in education as a western idea which the study will suggest suit the Egyptian context and will improve the efficiency of its educational system. Officially Egypt is an Islamic country where religion has a strong social and legal impact. In other words, 'all the Egyptian prescriptions relative to marriage, divorce, and inheritance are taken explicitly from the Qur'an, Sunna, and some prescriptions of Islamic law which the legislature has considered to be the most adequate to the needs of society' (Al-'Ashmawi,1998:52) and (Al-Ashmawy,1994:95). For example, the claim to freedom in education for girls so that they are equal to boys might not be applicable if it is shown that girls have less value and rights in Islam. Consequently, the implementation of freedom in education might not be possible in Egypt. In short, it is important to identify whether there are Islamic obligations which might limit the learners' freedom in Egypt.

To achieve these aims this chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section analyses the concept of freedom, its condition and value in western political thought. The major difficulty in doing this is whether there is one concept of freedom, which analytical philosophy can reveal, or whether there are a variety of concepts each of which depends upon certain other theoretical presuppositions. Therefore, this section analyses the concept of freedom that is central to the liberal tradition. According to Hallowell (1942:330)

liberalism espouses freedom for the individual from all authority that is personal, arbitrary, or capricious. As the political expression of an individualism that has

as its first premise the absolute value of human personality, liberalism demands freedom for the individual from every other individual, from the state, and from every will that is arbitrary.

The second section analyses the concept of freedom in Islam. Islam is a monotheistic religion, which lavishes great respect and care on individual rights. 'It considers mankind as free, responsible, and autonomous (Al-Mubarak, 1981:135). The first thing that should be known about Islam is that there is no single interpretation. Islamic thought on the interpretation of the Qur'an might be classified into two traditions: that concerned with the linguistic meaning of the verses of the Qur'an; and that concerned with the meaning of the Qur'an itself and the contextual meaning of the verses. Tradition calls everyone to think and use their minds to examine the Qur'an and the traditions of the prophet. It calls on people to follow the Islamic principle of thinking which is known as *ijtihad* (Islamic interpretation). This means an independent judgement and thus identifies that the Qur'an can be discussed, questioned and developed. In this sense, the Qur'an can never be finally and conclusively explained. I will analyse the meaning of freedom by following the second tradition which is the one I find most compatible with the nature of contemporary Egyptian society and the purpose of this study in which people are invited to free their minds in order to examine the Qur'an. However, through the analysis I will show several faces of the conflict between the two traditions.

1.2. Meaning of freedom in western liberal thought

From among the many ways freedom is understood, the following part of this chapter will be concerned with two points; the first takes freedom to be the absence of human interference and restrictions with an individual's actions. This is the way freedom has been understood by liberal tradition from Hobbes in the seventeenth century to Mill in the nineteenth, to the contemporary period by political philosophers such as Berlin, Rawls, Hayek and MacCallum. The second describes freedom in terms of what the individual can do. In other words, it is concerned with the process of being free to choose and act on one's own initiative and, the opportunity to pursue various specific human activities. For obvious reasons, these two different accounts have come to be called 'negative' and 'positive' freedom respectively. The division among political philosophers on positive and negative freedom reflects, though only roughly,

differences with respect to political sympathies as well. Negative freedom is concerned, almost exclusively, with limiting government. Laws, bureaucracies, and centralised power are taken to be the chief sources of the interference that destroys freedom. In the positive view of freedom, the state might be thought to have a wider role in securing the conditions, powers, resources and opportunities for individuals to become autonomous and self-directing. For most readers of political philosophy, Berlin's celebrated lecture (1969) 'Two Concepts of Liberty', comes immediately to mind when positive and negative freedom are mentioned. I will first discuss the negative concept and turn afterwards to the positive one.

1.2.1. The negative concept of freedom

According to Berlin (1969:121) 'negative freedom is involved in answering the question of the area within which persons should be left to do what they want without interference by others'. In Berlin's words, to be negatively free essentially means not being prevented by other persons from doing whatever one desires to do (Berlin, 1969:xxxviii-xI). Russell (1942:231) mentions the same idea by saying 'freedom in general may be defined as the absence of obstacles to the realisation of desire. "A man is free only when he does exactly what he wants to do, without let or hindrance" (Macmurray, 1932:163). In this sense "freedom is simply the total absence of external constraint" (Horsburgh, 1956:93). For Cobb (1941:13) freedom is "the right of the individual to exercise unrestricted control over the things which belong to him, unhampered by the constraints of arbitrary, man-made laws". For Hampshire (1965:93) and Brenkert "if people are stopped or diverted in what they are doing by someone else, if their efforts are made difficult, if the range of their choices or alternative is made less extensive, they are less free" (1991:65). "The individual agent is the final authority for declaring and identifying his or her wants" (Taylor, 1975:436). Accordingly, the physically handicapped, who do not have the capacity to perform some actions can be described as free unless it could be shown that their inability to do such things resulted from the interference of others. For Gill (1972:6) freedom stands for relief from some restriction.

Hobbes (1968:262), Parent (1974a:433) and Gray (1991:30) in their work on freedom did not agree with Berlin in identifying negative freedom with non-interference by the state and other individuals with a person's desires because there are different ways to restrict a man's available options without depriving him of or interfering with his freedom. According to Hobbes (1968:262) only a certain class of impediment can limit freedom and it does not incorporate any reference to a person's doing what he wants. For Hobbes someone might very well be rendered unfree to do what he dislikes. In this sense being free is fundamentally a matter of doing what one wants to do (Frankfurt, 1988:137). Parent (1974b:151) believes that interfering with a person's desires, though sometimes sufficient to curtail his freedom, is not necessary. This means that non-interference is all that is necessary to be free and it has nothing to do with one's desire to do something. Berlin's definition implies that one way to render a man free is to extinguish all his desires, which is not acceptable. As this definition has been heavily criticised, in his latest work Berlin (1969:xxxix), appears to reject his old definition and maintain that freedom properly conceived is the absence of obstacles, resulting from alterable human practices, to possible choices and activities.

Another criticism can be levelled at the negative definition regarding the notion of interference. According to Berlin (1969:122) and other defenders of the negative view of freedom, such as Hayek (1960:19) and Plant (1999:229), such interference must be deliberate. The notion of intention in Berlin's definition, according to Parent (1974b:159), is irrelevant to the question of freedom; X cannot be unfree only through the intentional actions or omissions of others. In Dixon's (1986:18) view, we live in complex social structures in which the intentions of legislators and others are not always and everywhere fully realised. In this sense X can be unfree by both intentional and unintentional actions. This might lead one to accept that all natural impediments are restrictions on freedom. However, White (1969:192) and Dyer (1964:445-6) disagree with Parent's argument. They think that unintentional action makes a person unable to do what he wants to do but not unfree. In this sense, Dyer's argument implies that there are no circumstances in which unintentional impediments can reduce freedom. This is a difficult issue to resolve. Both arguments are persuasive but each of them entails difficulties. Although others have offered some solutions even these solutions have some difficulties. Therefore, I will take Parent's view that interference by intentional

and unintentional action can reduce the individual's freedom because both actions prevent him from doing (or not doing) something he wants to do (or not).

1.2.2. The positive concept of freedom

The positive concept of freedom, according to Berlin, is the sense that "derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master". I am free, in this sense, "if my life and decisions depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind". If I am free "the instrument of my own, not of other men's, acts of will... a subject, not an object... moved by reasons, by conscious purpose, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside... deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own, and realising them" (1969:131). Freedom, in this sense, consists essentially of rational self-government (Dewey, 1942:76). Christman (1991:345-6) argues that.

for an individual to be self-governing it at least must be the case that she is not moved by desires and values that have been oppressively imposed upon her, even if she faces no restraints in performing actions such desires motivate

Similarly, Baier (1968:83), Hospers (1967:331) and Edwards (1969:64) argue that an agent is free only if he/she is self-determined and self-controlled for his/her desires and actions. For Feinberg (1975:159) "it is often said that the individual person is free when his ruling part or 'real self' governs, and is subject to no foreign power, either external or internal, to whose authority it has consented". According to Lotz, (1994:52), Berenson (1976:115) and Waldron (1987:132), to talk about freedom is to talk about the role an agent plays in the determination of his action. In Charvet's (1981:11) and Milne's view "to the extent that he directs his life wisely and prudently, he achieves a degree of self-determination and hence of personal freedom" (1968:148-9). In Taylor (1979:193), understanding the positive view of freedom argues that one must actually exercise self-understanding of what he wants and the nature of external and internal restriction on him, in order to be truly or completely free. Parent (1974b:152), in his critique of Berlin's definition, mentions that the

loss of rational self-mastery may well lead to but is not constitutive of unfreedom as we ordinarily conceive of it. Conversely, some prisoners might somehow manage to acquire an understanding of and control over their base criminal impulses through rehabilitation. These considerations indicate that freedom cannot be adequately elucidated as a rational self-mastery.

In Norman's view (1982:91) positive freedom links with the possession of social and institutional power; with material and economic requirements; with the possession of education and acquisition of knowledge, power, wealth and education. "When people have access to social power, material wealth and education, they are in a better position to make choices for themselves and therefore enjoy greater freedom". Ramsay (1997:40) argues that because positive freedom is concerned with identifying the ability, powers, capacities, opportunities and resources necessary for self-determination, or self-realisation, it is associated with an interventionist government and a wider role for the state in both public and private life. In this sense "the crude positive freedom concept seems to open the way for any dominant group to decide what is in the interests of the rest" (Jonathan, 1997a:117). For Berlin (1969:162-6) freedom increases when sovereignty is put into the right hands. In this view, then, the freedom of an individual depends on who has control. Indeed, a great deal of personal freedom might be impossible under authoritarian regimes. In this sense an individual's freedom can be sacrificed by a despotic government and can be diminished by a democratic government as well. In this sense, Dixon (1986:17) argues that defining freedom in terms of self-realisation or self-mastery allows the possibility in theory at least that external control over individual desire can actually be justified in the name of enhancing freedom. Similarly, Ramsay (1997:39) for the same reason also sees external control as an imposition of people's real selves over their actual selves. Plant (1999:249), however, argues that the positive view of freedom is both paradoxical and dangerous: paradoxical, because it can justify the use of coercion to secure someone's freedom, or in the famous phrase of Rousseau to force someone to be free; and dangerous, because of the licence it gives a particular group who think that they know what is good for man to force these values on him in the interests of freedom.

In the preceding section I have discussed in brief the main characteristics of the negative view of freedom and the positive one. Now I will consider whether it is true that there are two concepts of freedom, as Berlin suggests, or just one.

1.2.3. One concept of freedom or many?

One of the most important criticisms made for the two concepts of Berlin's definition can be seen in Gray's argument. Gray (1991:8) argues that negative concept of freedom does not imply who rules the other. Hence negative freedom is compatible with autocracy, provided the autocrat limits the extent of his/her interference. What matters for the positive concept of freedom is not the area of non-interference, but the fact of self-government. Hence positive freedom is compatible with extensive constraint, provided it is self-imposed. At their root, these two concepts of freedom - area of non-interference and self-government- may not seem very far apart, no more than negative and positive ways of saying much the same thing. Berlin (1969:127-31) himself deals with this problem by employing two terms, which appear to signify the well-known contrast between freedom 'from' (negative freedom) and freedom 'to' (positive freedom). Gray (1991:8), however, argues that these labels are quite unhelpful, since virtually any kind of freedom could be expressed in terms of either freedom from or freedom to. For Crocker (1980:6) "the positive and negative liberty are not wholly different phenomena, and... the distinction has sometimes produced historical classifications of dubious utility". In this sense Feinberg (1980a:5) and Teichman and Evans (1996:119) suggest that freedom from and freedom to are two sides of the same coin, each involved with the other, and not two radically distinct kinds of freedom. For Nadia (1991:41-2) and Feinberg "a free man all-told will be free on balance to do what is most worth doing and from those constraints most being without" (1975:167). According to Hunt (1991:300) the distinction is not between two types of freedom, but a distinction between two kinds of condition of freedom: the presence of enabling conditions of our capacity to pursue our interests; and the absence of countervailing conditions of such a capacity. In this sense freedom from implies no new freedom to other than the freedom to be without the thing one is said to be free from. The idea of two concepts of freedom has also been rejected by Feinberg (1975:143-4) who argues that a man is free if he is, happily without impediment or constraint to a desire that he has or might have to do, or omit, or be, or have something in particular (---- is free from ---- to do (or omit, or be, or have) ----). For Oppenheim (1981:64-5) there is just one concept of freedom which he calls social freedom. He believes that social freedom is a relation between three kinds of factors which are determined in the following form:

with respect to P, R is free to do or not to do X if with respect to P, R is neither unfree to do X nor unfree not to do X.

For Levine (1981:36) “when A is coerced by B to do X, usually, A is rendered unfree by B not to do X”. This means that there are two ways to say that an actor R is free to do or not to do X. The first is that P does not make it impossible for R to do or not to do X. The second is that P does not make it punishable for R to do or not to do X. Dyer (1964:444) has a similar definition of social freedom to Oppenheim which is based on the same three factors R, P and X given below. Dyer’s meaning of social freedom can best be understood by noticing what would be regarded as diminishing or impairing freedom.

if R is forced to do X his freedom is impaired. It may also be impaired by R’s being prevented from doing X. Now R cannot properly be said to be forced to do X unless it is impossible for him to do anything else instead. And he cannot be said to be prevented from doing X unless it is impossible for him to do it.

The notion of impossibility has also been discussed by Day (1977:261) and Steiner (1974:33). Steiner says that an individual is ‘unfree if, and only if, his doing of any action is rendered impossible by the action of another individual. That is, the unfree individual is so because another prevents the particular action’. In this sense, Oppenheim, Dyer, Day and Steiner emphasise the relation between unfreedom and impossibility. In Dyer’s thesis, R is unfree only if others by their actions or missions intentionally make it impossible for persons to do something they would choose to do. So is there one concept of freedom or many? Oppenheim’s, Gray’s, Feinberg’s and MacCallum’s arguments all claim that the two concepts (negative and positive) are two sides of the same coin. It seems that factor P is explicit (non-interference), factor R is understood as a human being and factor X is not explicit, but it is implicit, in that freedom is interpreted as interfering with a person’s desires. This enables one to conclude, as Swanton (1979:337-8) argues, that there is only one concept of freedom, which implies all three factors.

From the above discussion, it can also be concluded that any concept of freedom has to explain the nature of each factor and the relation between them. If not, it will result in difficulties in understanding the concept in a theoretical and practical way. In MacCallum’s (1967:314) view, there is only one concept of freedom, but at the same

time it is important to recognise that there are a number of different conceptions of freedom, which Berlin vainly tried to polarise into two categories, but which stand on their own as alternative explanations of agents, obstacles and objectives. MacCallum challenges the view that it is possible and useful to distinguish between two kinds or concepts of social freedom (negative and positive concept). He argues that there is only one concept of freedom. In his view (1967:314) social freedom of some agent or agents is always freedom from constraint or compulsion on, interference with, or barrier to doing, not doing, becoming, or not becoming something. Social freedom is thus always of something (an agent or agents), from something, to do, not to do, become or not become something. It refers to a triadic relation whose form can be schematised as follows:

X is (is not) free from Y to do (not do, become, not become) Z. He argues that freedom of agents can be meaningful and rationally assessed only after each term of the triadic relation is specified or at least understood.

According to MacCallum's view a genuine statement about freedom always contains three elements: (a) of something (the agent - X); (b) from something (the constraint -Y); (c) to do or to be something (the objective - Z). Concerning the freedom of agents, MacCallum (1967:320) argues that it can be meaningful and rationally assessed only after each term of the triadic relation is specified or at least understood. Nevertheless, MacCallum's definition of freedom focuses on two points; freedom from what and freedom to perform what activity. With respect to the second point MacCallum does not mean that one is only free to do something but also X is free not to do something. Steiner's definition (1974:35) focuses also on the same point by saying that the agent cannot only be free or unfree with regard to those actions which he wants or believes he ought to do. He can equally be free to do actions which he does not want to do (Steiner,1974:35). Parent (1974b:154) in his analysis of MacCallum's triadic relation, states that it is significant because it emphasises a much overlooked truth: translatability into the XYZ schema is a necessary condition of the intelligibility of any claim about social freedom.

However, MacCallum's definition has not gone unchallenged. He has been criticised for it in some areas; firstly, philosophers who interpret freedom as absence of impediments deny the claim that all genuine statements about freedom must contain the third of the three factors that make up the triadic- the Z factor. For example, Berlin (1969:xiii)

suggests that someone may want to be free from something without aiming at any particular objective. According to Berlin a genuine statement of freedom must be regarded as basically a dyadic rather than as a triadic concept. However, it could be argued that freedom from constraints might be an end in itself (Skinner, 1984:194). The views which deny the triadic statement claim that the meaning of freedom is different from the value of freedom, which is related to the third factor. It might be satisfactory to say that usually the need of freedom arises in order to do or not to do something. But there is always freedom to achieve particular objectives. For Crocker (1980:6,10) "if freedom is a triadic relationship, then an argument about the ranges of the three variables is, in the most straightforward sense, an argument about which triadic relation freedom is". Therefore, he examines the truth conditions of sentences of the form of 'A is free to do X'.

Secondly, for some philosophers the triadic formula eliminates conceptual issues in relation to freedom such as what is freedom from and what is an agent or constraint. It establishes X or Y or Z factors as conceptual issues. However, it does not help to resolve conceptual issues at the heart of debates about freedom, as there still remains controversy over the substantive meaning of freedom (Ramsay, 1997:65). Focus on what the variables are, according to Gray (1991:13-4) does not mean that conceptual disputes about the nature of freedom itself have disappeared. It may (and does) mean that dispute over the nature of freedom as a concept has ended, but it may not have ended (and does not mean that disputes over conceptions of freedom have ended). On the contrary, disagreements about what constitutes X, Y and Z factors are themselves a subsumed form of disputation about the nature of freedom. In this sense Parent (1974b:154) claims to specify or at least be able to specify who is free from what conditions to perform what activity when freedom is used in a social sense.

Thirdly, it is true that the triadic concept does not suggest the nature of freedom itself. Indeed, MacCallum has not eliminated all conceptual controversy about freedom. On the contrary, the essential conflictability of freedom as conception, not concept, is confirmed rather than removed by essential contestability of the term - variables. Weale (1983:51), for instance, argues that MacCallum's triadic analysis does not in fact offer us a definition of freedom, but simply a specification of the form of sentence about

freedom with which an adequate definition should be consistent. From the above it is clear that the differences of opinion over freedom depend on different interpretations of what purpose of freedom counts as an agent, a constraint, or an objective. In this sense Kymlicka (1990:146-7) argues that

every claim about freedom, to be meaningful, must have a triadic structure-it must be of the form X is free from Y to do Z where X specifies the agent, Y specifies the preventing conditions, and Z specifies the action.

Having analysed the meaning of the concept of freedom. I will now turn to specify the conditions of freedom.

1.2.4. The required conditions of being free

My purpose in the following pages is to examine the truth conditions of an individual being free from any constraints to do what he/she wants to do and how these conditions can make an individual's freedom worthwhile. It might be true to say that the meaning of freedom cannot be separated from its conditions. In this sense Gray (1991:44) argues that conditions of freedom are so integrally related to the concept of freedom that they cannot be separated from it. The meaning of freedom necessarily embraces its conditions, and if someone ignores these conditions, he/she leaves out of account a vital part of its essential meaning. Freedom has a context, and that context includes the essential conditions under which it exists.'

1.2.4.1. Freedom and non-interference

The main point in this section is to argue in more detail that being free from interference is a necessary condition for someone to be called free to do (not do) become (not become) what he/she likes. In my argument, I will discuss the notion of interference by other human beings. This means that I will not consider the argument about whether natural restrictions limit the individual's freedom or his ability. As my thesis is concerned with the learners' freedom in education at educational institutions, the restrictions on their freedom can be imposed by the government, teachers or parents or any social value. Therefore, the natural restriction does not apply here.

The traditional concept of freedom, according to Hobbes (1968:261) is that “liberty or freedom signifies the absence of opposition”. What Hobbes means by opposition is ‘external impediments of motion’. For Emmet (1968:206) agents are free when their choices are not determined by forces from outside, that agents are free from external compulsions, that their decisions are made by themselves. Peters, however, disagrees in part with Hobbes’ and Emmet’s definition, especially, with the section which emphasises external restrictions as being the only restrictions on an individual. Peters (1966b:180-4) believes that both external and internal constraints limit the scope of an individual’s freedom. Similarly, Dewey (1938:69), Taylor (1979:176), (Dixon, 1986:17-8) and Ramsay (1997:55) seem to agree that freedom means the absence of constraints, but they do not agree with the neglect of internal obstacles. Therefore, it is important to specify what is meant by external and internal restrictions. By external restrictions, I mean, any kind of intentional or unintentional action by another human being, or by cultural and social arrangements. Ramsay (1997:63) notes that lack of resources, abilities and opportunities, which are the result of inequalities in political, economic and social power, are also external obstacles to freedom. By internal constraints, I mean, any inability of the agent which results from lack of awareness, or false consciousness or repression, or other inner factors of this kind, as suggested by Taylor (1979:176).

Interference by others can also be exercised by making threats or offers. The argument about whether threats or offers limit freedom or not has been discussed widely by political philosophers such as Steiner. He believes that neither the making of threats nor that of offers constitutes a diminution of personal freedom (1974:43). Oppenheim (1981:63), Benn and Weinstein (1971:201-4) and Day (1977:257) believe that threats limit freedom but offers do not. Frankfurt (1973: 67-71) and Nozick (1969:447-52) argue that both threats and offers limit freedom. But no one maintains that offers limit freedom and threats do not. Whatever the relationship between offers and threats and freedom, it is my contention that both offers and threats can limit an individual’s opportunity of having freedom that is worthwhile. The next example illustrates how both threats and offers reduce the individual’s opportunities. Let us take a situation in which a lecturer threatens his students by giving them the option of buying his book or failing in that particular subject. In that case, the students have the freedom of choice to not buy the book and be free. But in this case they have to take the risk of failing in that

particular subject. On the other hand, they can buy the book and forget about freedom. In the first response it is true that the agent can act freely and according to his own choice but in this case freedom loses its value to satisfy his own desires. In the second response the agent's freedom has been limited and also freedom loses its value for the individual.

Similarly let us look at another example in order to examine whether making offers can reduce an individual's opportunity or not. For example, let us take the case of a poor student who can hardly afford to go to school. If this learner receives an offer from someone to work for him, his response might be to accept the offer although he wants to continue his studies, as he is in need of money. In this case the student might be described as free as he was free to make his own choice to accept the offer but actually his choice was impeded by his poverty. In such a case his freedom might not be of any value, as it does not enable him to do what he really wants to do.

It might be concluded now that interference limits the individuals' freedom and their opportunities to have worthwhile freedom. However, this does not imply the demand to remove all the obstacles on the individual to enjoy absolute freedom. The unqualified demand of absolute freedom according to Barrow (1975a:77) and Henderson (1958:87) is unacceptable, as people's freedom is always in conflict. In talking about Hobbes, Pennock (1965:103-4) notes that he [Hobbes] 'valued security far more than liberty, and wished to define the latter in such a way that it would be at once widespread and of little importance'. "What a man primarily demands from civil society is protection; and he is willing to pay for this by forgoing whatever liberty it costs. But, of course, he would like to buy protection as cheaply as possible" (Watkins,1973:85). The claim of individual freedom in society is one in which each individual discovers himself only against the backdrop of the community, therefore, any conception of the individual as isolated from the community would be an illusory abstraction. Similarly, Barnes' (1980:553) notes that, "freedom has no intrinsic connection with what is in conflict with what another wants, so, 'X' should not do what he wants, because this is good for society". Freedom can never be absolute because what one wants to do might prevent 'Y' from doing what he wants. It is thus extremely difficult to draw the line between one's freedom and another's.

“That this freedom is not absolute does not mean that it is non-existent” (Magid,1941:156). This conflict can only disappear if we say that every one will exercise his freedom in a way that will not impinge on the freedom of others or harm them. For Thomas (1972:209) people should be free “to satisfy their wants unless... the satisfaction of one person’s wants leads to the frustration of the wants of others”. This, then brings us to the question of how freedom can be protected from those who cannot control themselves, strong people who take it for granted or from people whose acts are intrinsically immoral and, therefore must be punished irrespective of whether they affect anyone else or not. As Karasimenov (1994:125), Berenson (1976:119), Beard (1942:8-9) and Gill argue laws, rules, principles, norms and rights are intended to protect freedom (1972:10) and can be seen as a means of organising the way people live in a society, especially, if we consider that acting freely does not imply that one’s acts have to be right. Freedom is necessary but it involves freedom to do wrong and to make mistakes and social progress depends upon this.

One of the biggest problems in defining freedom in terms of non-interference is that it demands us to limit the role of the state in securing a framework of mutual non-coercion and to protect individuals rights and civil liberties. Graham (1982:113) believes that there is no justification for obedience to the state. However, individuals cannot exist outside society, therefore, they are necessarily subject to law (Stankiewicz,1993:197), and (Brenkert,1991:65). “No government can afford to let everyone do as he likes; anarchy is not a practical policy in any existing society” (Hannay,1939:1). Because as Russell (1942:236) argues, when men are lawless only the strongest are free, and they, only until they are overcome by someone still stronger. In this sense (Barrow,1975b:97) and Komba argue that “although liberalism espouses individual choice, it recognises the inevitability of state authority as protector of the common good” (1990:196). “Man can never live socially without some kinds of authority and organised systems of behaviour” (Deininger,1965:121). Thus, Mill (1974:68), offers a solution to the problem through the principle of self-protection where society has the right to delimit the individual’s freedom or punish him, in case his action harms other people. In Mill’s view, self-protection could be a law. In relation to this, Russell (1942:236), Kilcullen (1981:292), Dworkin (1987:243) and Peters (1966b:186) note that laws

are not made primarily to restrain those who follow the moral law within: they are

made to protect ordinary people against those who acknowledge no such code or are free to abide by it only haltingly.

However, “any society which observes the principle of freedom is at least minimally emancipated” (Barnes, 1980:554). The law, in this sense, does not limit the individual’s freedom. On the contrary, it protects the individual’s freedom from other people who exercise licence. For Gray (1981:77) rules possessing certain formal attributes cannot restrict freedom inasmuch as they cannot be treated as truly coercive. Furthermore, the

law may be a necessary condition for liberty, since one man’s freedom depends on the law’s restraints on others but the law must restrain some to protect the liberty of others, as liberty cannot mean submission to law (Benn and Peters, 1973:213).

In this sense, freedom may be sacrificed in the interests of promoting social harmony, full employment, equality of opportunity or some other perceived socially desirable end. In this sense Barry argues that for the benefits of freedom to be enjoyed there must be a legal framework within which action can take place. The existence of a legal system means that one person’s freedom is another’s restraint (1995:212-3). Then, if both internal and external obstacles prevent the individual from doing or not doing something they limit the individual’s freedom. The impediments must satisfy three conditions to be restrictions on freedom. The impediments must be imposed by a human being; and it must prevent the agent from doing or not doing something with impunity and whether the person imposing the impediment does so deliberately or not.

1.2.4.2. Freedom and availability of making choices

Those who agree that negative freedom refers to the absence of interference see a simple or direct relationship between the range of available alternatives and the extent of freedom. According to Norman (1982:87), Kelley (1984:110) and Weiss (1942:186) unless agents can choose freely, their actions are not really free. Freedom of choice is not freedom of action; it is its pre-condition. However, Partridge (1967:224) does not agree that freedom will exist only where there exists the possibility of choice, and the possibility of choice in turn implies not only the absence of direct coercion and compulsion but also that the availability and the characteristics of alternatives must be capable of being known. For Carr (1982:39)

it cannot be said that [a man] is free to do as he wants if all alternatives to a given course of action are denied him – if he either lacks opportunities to do otherwise, is physically disabled or psychologically impeded from doing otherwise,

or is, in some other fashion, constrained from the pursuit of any other course of action.

For Crocker (1980:36) if someone is not in a position to choose to do X, then he/she is not in a position to do x at all. Similarly, Hayek (1960:17), Oppenheim (1981:67) and Plant (1999:248) the lack of opportunities does not limit an individual unless it is done intentionally to make it impossible or punishable for the individual to do or not to do something. On the other hand, those who agree that positive freedom is a process of choosing and acting on one's own initiative have been inclined to assert that a man is free only when he is actually allowed to choose, exercise his initiative and act deliberately or responsibly. For Mill (1974:123) the conception of freedom is firmly rooted with the notion of choice:

he who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses to plan for himself employs all his faculties.

Thus, an agent who has been so moulded and manipulated always wants what his ruler or superior wants him to be is hardly surprising. From the above discussion it becomes clear that defining freedom in terms of the availability of making choice is unacceptable to proponents of both negative and positive freedom. However, both sides agree that there is a direct relation between freedom and the availability of choice in terms of the value of freedom. This means that freedom becomes more worthwhile with the existence of wider possibilities for choices and individual initiative, which was what MacCallum considered to be factor Z in his triadic statement. In his latest work, Berlin (1969:lirii) also argues that the lack of opportunities and options restricts the worth of freedom, but not freedom itself. On the other hand, Weinstein (1965:158-160) and Gray (1991:31) claim that the more numerous the alternatives are, the greater the freedom is. Therefore, Barry (1995:210) argues that freedom requires positive action from the state to increase the opportunities of individuals. State action is said to increase freedom and not merely to reduce inequality. The main issue, which arises out of the availability of choices, is the question of which choices are relevant to freedom. Some choices, such as killing people are not relevant to freedom. In the general sense of freedom of choice which has so far been considered "a decision is free merely because it proceeds from the self and not from any external conditions" (Stout, 1940:221-2).

1.2.4.3. Freedom and having ability

Liberal people who define freedom as the absence of restrictions, as mentioned earlier, such as Partridge (1967:222), Steiner (1974:35), Day and Oppenheim completely reject the conception of freedom as ability. As Day (1970:180) points out that “the truth of A can do D is a necessary condition not only of the truth but also of the falsity of A is free to do D. That is to say, if somebody is able to do some thing, but is prevented by another person or group from doing what he wants, in this sense, he is not free despite having the ability to do whatever it is that he wants to do. By the same token, if he does not have the ability to do what he wants and nobody prevents him from doing it, then, the question of freedom does not arise. For Neely, (1974:34) agents are free to do only those things which their skills permit. Although Oppenheim (1981:67) agrees with Day and Neely that freedom does not imply ability; nor does ability imply freedom, he believes that one is still free if he does not have the ability to do so and nobody prevents him from doing it. Plant (1999:228) argues that if there is link between freedom and ability, then the degree to which an individual is free will depend on whether a person is able to fulfil his or her desires. This can be seen to make freedom variable between individuals. The degree to which each individual is free then turns upon the relationship between our desires and our abilities which is a subjective matter, rather than the objectivity which comes with the idea of coercion as an intentional action, rendering it impossible for someone to have done what he or she would otherwise have done. In addition, if freedom is our capacity to satisfy our desires then this could mean, as Neely (1974:38) has argued, that one could become freer by eliminating or reducing a set of desires which one did not currently have the capacity to fulfil.

However, there is one situation in which it is legitimate to equate lack of effective ability with unfreedom. This is the situation in which the lack of effective power in question is caused by human agency. For Vihvelin (1990:374-5) there is distinction between having an ability and being able to. “An agent is able to do X just in case she has the (unconditional and categorical) ability to do X and there is, on the occasion, no impediment to the exercise of the ability”. If, for example, a poor student can attribute his lack of ability to the fact that the educational system has been rigged against people like him, then lack of effective ability is equivalent to unfreedom. On the other hand, for some writers, especially defenders of positive freedom, freedom is synonymous with

the ability: the possession of freedom presupposes the possession of ability, and vice versa. It seems that liberals who uphold this distinction want to make clear a conceptual distinction between freedom (not being restrained) and the conditions which make freedom worthwhile. In other words, it focuses attention upon the issue of how freedom can become a reality rather than a formality. Ability is essential if an agent's freedom is to be valuable or meaningful to him/her (Parent, 1974b:164). For Benson (1987:312)

free action demands ability to do otherwise in the ordinary sense. When one performs an action freely one has a certain control over whether or not one performs it. But one can have that control only if one would intentionally refrain from the action in all likelihood upon setting oneself resolutely to do so.

Rawls (1972:204) and Simpson (1977:5) state that the inability to take advantage of one's rights and opportunities as a result of poverty and ignorance are not among the constraints of freedom, they ought to be interpreted as affecting the worth of freedom, or the value of freedom to individuals. According to Gray (1991:45) there is a straightforward correlation between a person's ability and the value of freedom to which that ability gives access. Although I do not consider freedom and ability to be the same, on the other hand an individual's freedom requires ability in order for him/her to enjoy and exercise a high degree of freedom and satisfy his/her desires. However, this does not mean that ability is a necessary condition to be free or unfree. But it is a necessary condition to have worthwhile freedom. That means worthwhile freedom can be seen as having ability. Having ability is seen by McCloskey (1965:504) as a necessary condition of freedom rather than synonymous with it. Accordingly, Gray (1991:44), concludes that although free is not identical to can, free does imply can and that the two notions are necessarily related, in that an increase in ability entails more freedom, and a reduction in ability entails less freedom.

The conclusion might be drawn from the previous section that non-interference (by human beings and social values) and the availability of making free choices are necessary conditions for someone to be called free and exercise freedom. However, having a variety of options and ability to perform such actions can be considered as conditions for someone to have and exercise greater freedom rather than being free. In talking about the purpose of the current study I will consider that non-interference and the availability of making free choices are necessary conditions for learners to be called free in their education. In addition, I will consider having a wide range of alternatives

in education as a necessary condition for learners to find out their interests to be able to decide what they want to do with their lives. With respect to the notion of ability and its connection to freedom it might be possible to argue that it has no place in talking about the conditions of learners' freedom. This is because, unlike adults education for young learners, it is mostly about building and developing their ability to be able to do what they want to do with their lives by allowing them freedom.

1.2.5. The value of freedom in western liberal thought

According to Ellrod (1992:137) and Feinberg "it would be impossible to demonstrate that freedom is good for its own sake" (1980b:20). Thus, Carter, (1995:845) argues that "freedom is valuable as such, or as having value independently of the value of things it leaves us free to do". There are others arguments, by for example Mill (1974:72-4), Feinberg (1980b:20-2) Ellrod (1992:137), Kymlicka (1988:183-9), Crocker (1980:116) and (Norman,1987:9-11) that imply that freedom is instrumentally, unconditionally or intrinsically valuable. For Crocker (1980:116)

liberty is valuable because it is a non-casual precondition of autonomy. Without something to choose, one cannot go one's own way. Since, excluding causal consequences, there is no reason one ought not to desire liberty and since, in the absence of such reasons, it is rational for the desire for autonomy to extend to this necessary condition, liberty is itself intrinsically valuable.

For Ellrod (1992:137)

freedom is primarily an instrument good, a power which is good insofar as it allows us to attain something else which is good in itself, and this is why it must guide itself by reference to some independent standard.

Discussing the value of freedom in terms of instrument will be compatible with the purpose of this study that suggests that allowing learners freedom in education is an instrument to help them to do or become what they want according to their interests. In others words the more learners exercise their capacity to make choices and decisions, the more they are free, the more valuable their lives are. In this sense Sutton (1978:108) argues that "the value of choosing for oneself resides not in the production of better decisions, but in the improved quality of life of the man allowed the opportunity to exercise his options". This might make them happy and might be followed by more achievement in their education. If freedom is merely absence of coercion as defined by negative libertarians, it is useful to question why it is important to be free from

constraints or coercion. As liberals believe in the intrinsic and ultimate value of each individual, they emphasise the value of individual autonomy, respect for individual judgement and the importance of individuals pursuing their own self-interested desires as they define them. Marshall (1997a:47) and Norman (1987:9) appear to consider this question when they claim that people need freedom to live a fully human life, to achieve human happiness, and to make their own decisions and judgements.

A similar view is expressed by Plant (1999:246) who says that the value of freedom is to be able to live a life shaped by one's own purposes and values, by one's own projects and ideas of what is worthwhile. The individual should be free from interference to pursue their own interests and their own conception of good. The only reasons for denying people freedom to make their own decisions, as noted by Mill, is when this harms others or when they are not fully rational. Mill (1974:72) believes that the only freedom is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. "This is to say, sane adults should be free from legal or social constraints to do what they want to, provided that their chosen actions do not adversely affect others" (Archard, 1990, 453).

1.3. Meaning of freedom in Islam

Having analysed the concept of freedom in western liberal thought, I am turning now to discuss freedom in Islam. I will build up my arguments in analysing freedom in Islam, starting with its meaning in the Qur'an and Islamic thought. With respect to the meaning of freedom in the Qur'an 'the word free (*hurr*) as an adjective, an adverb and verb is mentioned four times' (Rabah,1986:38). The word free as an adjective can be found in sura 2, verse 178 (PIRICG,1985) "O ye who believe! The law of equality is prescribed to you in cases of murder: the free for the free, the slave for the slave, the woman for the woman". In this sense, free individuals are legally different from slaves who belonged to their master and can not determine their own lives. Unlike free individuals no freedom is allowed to slaves to be free from interference by others and to make their own free choices and decisions. 'Wherever the institution of slavery existed, the definition of freedom presented no difficulties. It is the legal status of free individuals as opposed to that of slaves' (Al-'Irwi,1983:13). Sura 4, verse 92 uses the word free as a verb in "never should a believer kill a believer; except by mistake, and whoever kills a believer by mistake it is ordained that he should free a believing slave". This sura shows that freedom equates with life and slavery equates with death. From the preceding verses discussed above, it appears that the Qur'an considers freedom and life to be synonymous. According to the previous meaning of freedom in the Qur'an 'it seems clear that it differs from the meaning in European terms and modern civilisation' ('Abud,1979:62). Although the Qur'an does not explicitly define freedom in terms of its meaning, restrictions, conditions and value, this does not mean that the issue has not been discussed. On the contrary, the core meaning of freedom and its value has been included in several places. This is why in the history of Islam, as will be argued later freedom was widely debated in Islamic thought.

1.4. Meaning of freedom in Islamic thought

The issue of freedom in the Qur'an can be seen in many verses although these verses do not especially mention freedom. This can be found by equating the freedom with the right to make free choices and being free from constraints for someone to determine his/her own life. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the issue of freedom in Islamic

thought that interprets the Qur'an to identify the meaning of freedom and its value. In the following pages I will discuss the meaning of freedom in Islamic thought in relation to being free from constraints and doing free choices.

1.4.1. Freedom means absence of constraints

Islamic thought has defined freedom as the absence of any kind of obstacle or any form of interference. In this sense Qutb (1981:40-54) mentions that 'the true individual's freedom is being a slave to only Allah. Freedom means being free from fear, desires and a slave to social values'. For example, in sura 18 verse 46 it mentions that "wealth and sons are allurements of the life of this world: but the things that endure, good deeds, are best in the sight of thy Lord, as rewards, and best as (the foundation for) hopes". In this sense freedom means that no one has the right to compel any person to obey orders. 'It is not possible for any human being unto whom God has given the Scripture and wisdom and prophet-hood that he should afterward have said unto mankind; be slaves of me instead of God' (sura 3,verse 79).

Islamic thought finds freedom from interference is valuable for the individual to do or not to do something he wants. According to An-Na'im (1998:225), "to be free means that there are 'no physical constraints and to be secure in food, shelter, health, and all other preservations of life'. These physical or external constraints can be through someone's interference". In defining freedom, An-Na'im's points out that "if human beings are not secure in the preservation of life there is no obligation from any kind on them. They are still unfree because they obliged to obey others in order to feel secure". This can be considered to be a form of authority which is exercised without resistance from people. To say people are free means that "there is no class oppression, no pagan thoughts which had been imposed upon them, no ordinances and laws which had been imposed for the benefit of one group, or one class, over others" (Taleqani,1998:47).

According to An-Na'im and Taleqani, external restrictions can be social, cultural and political. Besides external restrictions there are also internal ones which have been neglected by previous views. Shari'ati illustrates one of these restrictions and called it the prison of the self. He argues that 'it is possible for someone to liberate himself from

history, nature or an existing social condition with the help of science. He cannot, however, extricate himself from the prison of the self by seeking help from science, since the latter is the possession of the prisoner' (1998:193). This idea leads to a definition of freedom in terms of desire. Thus, it is possible to say that an individual is free if that individual is not a slave to desires. "This means that man should not wish to obtain things that it may be difficult for him to obtain, this would force him to search after those things and leave him deprived of his liberty (Rosenthal, 1960:85).

There are restrictions on people's actions which prevent them from harming or offending others. If there are no restrictions, 'as the Mu'tazila shows, strong people or groups will exercise absolute freedom and authority against weak people or groups ('Imara, 1984:208-9)'. The prophet told his people that in the past in such a community 'if the rich or strong one steals they would not judge him. On the other hand if the poor and weak person did it, they would judge him' (Farahat, 1986:253). In fact, individual freedom is a fundamental right with a corresponding duty, namely, the proper exercise of such freedom. This means that there are some conditions or restrictions on the individual to protect others' freedom and not to restrict them. In this sense Al-'Alim (1970:199) argues that 'there is no absolute freedom, it is a responsible freedom that increases by being aware of rules and necessities that determine life'. This leads to the fact that the state has the right to legitimate and apply law which makes all people, equal. However, 'Asfwr (1961:80) argues that 'the authority of the state that aims to protect and organise freedom should be limited. Also, he points out the difference between protection of individuals' freedom and limitation of freedom in order to protect others' freedom'. Therefore, he further (1961:82) argues that giving relative authority to the state does not guarantee protection of freedom but it might limit it. In this sense 'freedom might be recognised as a gift the state offers to the individuals or organisations which has nothing to do with being free or not' 'Ali (1978:174-5). When the state has the authority to protect freedom it will also have the authority to put obstacles to it. This leads to the fact that the state has the right to legitimate and apply law under certain conditions, which do not limit individual freedom. Firstly, the sovereignty of the law, which makes all people equal (Al-Bana, 1999:101). Secondly, Al-Sanhuri (1952:10) argues that the state should not have absolute authority, but it should have relative authority that it is necessary to limit the state's authority by

creating a constitution or declaration of rights determined freedom. Then the state's role will be limited to organising these rights and freedoms'. Also, 'freedom should be protected by the judicial authorities. In case there is a conflict between state's authority and freedom, freedom should be the value to be protected' ('Asfwr,1961:86). Although it seems very difficult to recognise the line between protection of freedom and limitation of freedom, having a constitution and judicial authorities should limit the authority of the state and achieve more protection of freedom.

In talking about being subject to absolute authority under *shari'a* (Islamic Law) to determine life's affairs, it is true that there are verses which order the Muslims to obey God, the prophet and those in authority over them. Some interpreters find a conflict between these verses. It might be true to say that obeying God and the prophet is a consequence of the individual's choice to believe in God or not. Also obeying those who are in authority has conditions mentioned in the Qur'an. Firstly, the individual is free to choose people who will be in authority over him/her. Secondly, the individual is free to evaluate, object to or remove the ruler. As long as the governor is fair the individual has to obey him. All these characteristics can be classified under the broad term *Shurah* that 'takes into consideration people's rights and freedoms' (Al-Sharyda,1999:23).

Moreover, in Al-Bana's view (1999:101), because *shari'a* derives from the Qur'an and the Sunna, then, it is for everybody not for certain people. On the one hand this leads to a guarantee of the achievement of the first condition mentioned above. On the other hand, it is necessary to point out that someone might find the Islamic law limits his/her freedom because it derives from the Qur'an and the Sunna which it is not possible to follow because it is not compatible with the modern life. In this manner An-Na'im, and others point out that 'it is true that *shari'a* is a restrictive view of human rights within the historical context and that it also ceases to be so justified in the drastically different context of the present'. However, Al-Qurashi (1986:111-2), points out that 'Islamic law can be revised to enable Muslims to seek to achieve their right to self-determination in terms of an Islamic identity, including the application of Islamic law, without violating the rights of others to self-determination'. However, this does not mean that all perceptions in Islamic law should be changed. It is only the idea of making

modifications in some parts that suits the present context without changing the fundamental principles. This is the case of an Egyptian society that has revised many prescriptions of Islamic law to be adequate for the needs of society and allow people more freedom to adapt Shari 'a law to the context of the present.

1.4.2. Freedom means the right to make choices

In Islamic literature freedom has been equated with the notion of making choices. In this sense Khalaf-Allah argues that 'people have absolute freedom to choose, otherwise the question of submission to God or somebody else will not arise' (1998:43). It might be true to say that if someone chooses to believe in a particular religion, s/he will submit to that religion according to his/her free will. This submission does not contain any obligation from God. If the individual has absolute freedom to choose what religion to follow, then, s/he has to act according to his/her choice. In other words, the meaning of submission will not conflict with the meaning of freedom. In fact, submission in this case equates with absolute freedom to choose. However, as Al-Khwli (1990:55) notes, 'this submission is not absolute, as the individual has a variety of options open to him'. Islamic thought, in relation to the notion of being a chooser or not, can be divided into three doctrines.

According to the Fatalism doctrine 'an individual has no power over his action. He/she has no choice in their actions. Also they believe that God has determined everything even reward and punishment' (Rabah,1986:62). This doctrine cannot accept that the individual is a creator of his/her choices. This is because it conflicts with the idea that 'there is one creator who is Allah that creates human's action' (Al-Shahristani,1976:87) and (Al-Bughdadi,1978:199). The defenders of this doctrine find their evidence in some verses that show that the individual has no freedom of choice. For instance, verses such as, "say, nothing will happen to us except what Allah has decreed for us" (sura 9,verse 51). "Say I have no power over any good or harm to myself except as Allah willeth" (sura 7,verse 188) and (sura 32,verse 13) as well as (sura 74,verse 31) are some of the verses interpreted in this way. By explaining these verses in this manner, they show that 'the individual has no freedom to make choices. Because everything that happens in the world was written down in the distant past' (Al-Shahristani,1976:83-88), (Al-

Bughdadi,1987:99) and (Diraz,1982:184). Sometimes this is said to be the direct work of God, sometimes it takes place through a Pen writing on a preserved table (Lawh Mahfuz).

The Mu'tazila doctrine is completely opposed to fatalism and believes in the absolute free will of the individual (Gar-Alla,1984:98) and (Al-Fakhwri and Al-Bahr,1957:163) In this sense the action belongs to the individual him/herself ('Imara,1984:91). In Talking about Muhammad 'Abdu, 'Imara (1980:156) says that God has given the individual a mind and the ability to think and the freedom to choose and act, otherwise he will be like an animal. Mu'tazila's new interpretation, for instance, emphasises the individual's free will to make choices, which can determine his life as follows: (a) If the individual does not enjoy free will, then why does God make the individual responsible for his actions, create rewards and punishments? (Subhi,1982:148), (Madkur,1976:117) and (Nadir,1950:105); (b) Why does God send prophets and advise people? ('Imara,1988:98-9); (c) The Mu'tazila's interpretation suggests that certain verses in the Qur'an have been interpreted out of context. However, in the context in which it was written, it seems to be meant for non-believers who have the freedom to think and choose, but who choose not to believe. In life, they have the freedom to choose but will be judged by God after death ('Imara,1988:98-9); (d) The ability of the human being is insufficient to do particular things, which God can do. This means that the individual can make his own choices according to his ability (Al-Nashar,1981:436). The defenders of this doctrine find their evidence in some verses that show that the individual has the right to make his/her own choices. For example, "say, the truth is from your lord, let him who will, believe, and let him who will, reject (it)" (sura 18,verse 29). "We showed him the way: whether he be grateful or ungrateful" (sura, 76,verse 3). Also this right is mentioned clearly, in sura, 10, verse 108, sura 41, verse 46, sura 74, verse 38. In this sense 'Abud (1979:66) states that 'freedom does not mean to do what one wants, it is the right to make a responsible choice in the light of the religion's limitation'. Interpreters of these verses such as Qutb (1983:24) and Aibn Hazm (1975:23) believe that 'man has power over his actions. Also, they believe that the individual has freedom of choice'. Mankind was not born good or bad, free or slave. Nothing makes an individual good or bad unless the individual so chooses. God gives everyone the potential to be what s/he likes. The Qur'an mentions that "by the soul, and the

proportion and order given to it; and its inspiration as to its wrong and its right; truly he succeeds that purifies it, and he fails that corrupts it!" (sura 91, verses 7-10). Human beings are not absolutely bad, so they have to be punished or controlled and vice versa. Human beings are mixed between bad and good and have their own minds to choose what they prefer to be.

The contrast between the Qur'anic conceptions of human freedom and being a chooser can be concluded by answering the following two questions. Is it true that agents must be responsible for their action because they were the ones who chose to do them? Or are agents so completely subordinate to this overruling power of God, that they cannot do anything unless God wills it, at least in the sense of permitting. In answering these questions the Qur'an mentions in sura 33 verse 72 that God did indeed offer the responsibility to heavens and the earth and the mountains; but they refused to undertake it, being afraid thereof: but man undertook it. This means that human beings are responsible for their lives. In this sense Saliba argues that to be responsible for one's life freedom is an essential condition. In other words the restricted agents can not be asked to be responsible for their actions (1972:768). Similarly Al-Hababi (1972:22) mentions that to call someone responsible means that he/she is rational, mature and free to determine their own lives. This leads us to maintain that human beings are free to enjoy self-determination. However, it seems that there are some actions that agents cannot be free to do. In this sense Aibn Rushd states that human actions can be classified into two styles; there are some actions over which individuals have no power and some others actions over which individuals have power (Aibn Rushd, 1964:228) and (Al-'Iraqi, 1980:99). For example individuals have no power over their bodies, for example, they can not stop their heart beating but they have freedom to determine their lives' affairs. The defenders of this belief called Al-'Ash'ari reject the idea that individuals have absolute freedom to do what wants. They also reject the idea of being completely unfree (Al-'Ash'ari, 1928:52) and (Zydan, 1982:191). They believe that individuals have free will to choose between alternatives, but that these choices are determined by the will of God (Al-'Ash'ari, 1928:52) and (Al-Ahwani, 1962:156). According to 'Abd Al-Sattar (1973:108) this group believes in the doctrine of acquisition, whereby all acts are created and produced by God but attach themselves to the will of the man who thus acquires them. In Rahman's view (1979:92) Al-'Ash'ari

confirmed the absolute power and grace of God as orthodoxy had maintained it. All acts take place by the will and good pleasure of God, whether good or evil.

1.4.3. Freedom does not mean ability to do such actions

Freedom and ability are two different things but it might be true to say that having the ability makes the freedom one has more worthwhile. Shari'ati points out that the individual can liberate him/herself with the help of science (1998:193). Although it is clear that progress in science increases the ability of the individual to remove some of the restrictions, this does not in any way suggest that the individual was unfree before. Similarly, the Mu'tazila finds that ability is not analogous with freedom. It is their view that ability is not more than a means to make right choices and achieve them (Al-'Iraqi, 1979:160-161) and ('Imara, 1984:92). If freedom and ability were the same then only God would be free in this sense because only God would be able to do all that he is free to do. Also it should not be overlooked that there are many types of inability which it would be absurd to regard as restrictions on freedom such as being unable to fly. Mu'tazila finds that 'in order to exercise freedom individuals have to act according to their ability. The only limitation to freedom, then, is what God forbids' (Al-Qazwini, 1981:143).

1.4.4. Women's freedom in Islam

The significance of discussing women's rights in Islam is to find out if there are religious obligations and restrictions that place women in an inferior position to men. As a consequence, they would have less freedom to obtain the same rights to be equal to men. In other words, if the following arguments indicate that women have less rights and freedom in any field than men have, then, it will not be possible to inquire gender equality in claiming freedom for girls to be equal to boys in education.

Some scholars make much of the fact that women have less rights and freedom than man. Maybe this is true if they look at certain verses in the Qur'an in isolation, but not if they take an overall view. There are no special considerations set out for the male sex to show that in the eye of God they are deserving of special considerations. God does not differentiate between them for his esteem. The difference might come from man-

made law or some people's interpretation in favour of the conservatives. It has nothing to do with a woman's faith or her intelligence. In no way was the inequality between a helpless slave and powerful free man a result of mental or spiritual deficiency so that inequality between man and women should result from her mental and spiritual capacity. It might be necessary to argue that Qur'an does not mention any differences between women and men. Firstly, Women and men are equal and God in his book speaks to them without any differences. For example the Qur'an says, for Muslim men and women, for believing men and women, for devout men and women, for true men and women (sura 33,verse 35)

Secondly, as far as opportunity is concerned, in Islam there is equal opportunity for both men and women. I refer to sura 4, verse 32 "To men is allotted what they earn, and to women what they earn". An example can be shown in sura 36, verses 34-35, "we produce therein orchards with date-palms and vines, and we cause springs to gush forth therein: that they may enjoy the fruits of it". According to Bhutto (1998:108) "God does not give fruits, orchids, or the fruit of the soil just for men to enjoy; he gives it for both men and women. What there is in terms of income and opportunity, is available to both man and woman".

Thirdly, As far as forgiveness and reward are concerned, similar conditions are set down for both men and women. I refer to sura 33, verse 35 "for Muslim men and women, for believing men and woman, for devout men and women, for true men and women, for men and women who are patient and constant, for men and women who humble themselves, for men and women who give in charity, for men and women who fast, for men and women who guard their chastity, and for men and women who engage much in Allah's remembrance, for them has Allah prepared forgiveness and great reward. Finally, if it is a matter of giving advice, entering paradise, giving punishments, being responsibility and behaving toward parents, again emphasis is laid on equality between men and women. I refer to sura 9,verse 71,sura, 31,verse 8,sura 5,verse 38, sura 24 verse 2, sura 41 verse 46 and sura 17,verses 23-4.

In most of the articles written against women and their liberation, the authors boast of the fact that in his Holy Qur'an, God favoured men over women - mind and soul - in

three different matters. Firstly, God makes a women entitled to inherit only half of what a man inherits. Secondly, God considers her testimony (legally) worth only half of man. Thirdly, he allowed a man to marry up to four wives and divorce them at will, without their consent. These will be discussed in more detail.

Firstly, inheritance law gives twice the amount to a son, and half the amount to a daughter (sura 4,verse 11). According to Bhutto it is made abundantly clear that the “woman’s share is for the use of the woman alone. A man gets two thirds. One-third, the equivalent of third that a man gets is to provide provision for his wife and children. This is the obligation on the man. He gets that extra share so that he can provide for the family, the wife and the children. The wife is not responsible for the welfare of the husband and children. The wife is not even responsible for suckling her own child. If she chooses not to suckle her child, she does not have to. If she chooses to suckle her child, it is for the husband to supply her with provisions” (1998:108), for instance, the Qur’an says, “for parents, a sixth share of the inheritance to each if the deceased is left children.” (sura 4,verse 11). “It does not say the father must get double and the woman must get half” (Bhutto,1998:108). It goes on again to make an equal application when it says in sura 4,verse 12 “if the man or woman, who has left neither ascendants nor descendants, but has left a brother and two brothers and sisters, they shall share (one third of the estate after payment of legacies and debts)”. Moors (1995:48-49) states that “anthropological literature on rural areas, on the other hand, emphasises the great divide between Islamic law and inheritance practices, with women often not receiving their share in the estate”. Similarly, Granqvist (1935:256) in his research indicates that in the 1920s in Artas, “a village near Bethlehem, women rarely inherited. Still, this does not imply that urban women generally received their inheritance share while in the rural areas they consistently did not do so”. For Gerber (1980:233) not all town women inherited. Even if it is so, Moors (1995:49) indicates that this depends on the nature of the property involved. Also it depends on other factors such as class, the absence or presence of competing heirs, and the stage in the life cycle.

Secondly, the Qur’an says in sura 4, verse 3 ‘marry as many women as you wish, wives two or three or four. If you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly with them, then marry only one’. In verse 129 in the same sura, God says, ‘that you are never able to do

justice between wives even if it is your ardent desire'. If God himself says that he doubts that someone can be equal, it is not possible to agree with any man can turn around and say that God has given him this right to get married more than once. According to Bhutto (1998:110) it is not often that those among the vast Muslim population marry two, three, four wives. It is something that is related just to the privileged class. They can afford to do it. And they did not, as the capacity and the Muslim empire ruled, just marry two, three or four women, they went on to keep harems with hundreds of concubines. None of that had any thing to do with Islam, either. On the other hand, it might be true to say that this promotion gives the man the chance to marry another in case his wife has a terrible illness for example. In such a case he can keep the first one and marry another instead of having an illegal relationship. Also the first wife has the right to accept that or not. Women have the right to choose their husbands: if they are not happy with their spouse they do not have to keep them. When the divorce law is written, it is a contract of how you live together; you can write in the contract that "I want the right to divorce you"; you can write in the contract that in the event of divorce I want to be maintained according to the style that I am accustomed to".

Thirdly, the Qur'an mentions in sura 2, verse 282 "get two witnesses, out of your own men. And if there are not two men, then a man and two women, such as you choose, for witnesses, so that if one of them errs, the other can remind her". Some scholars who interpret this verse argue that in case one forgets the other can remind her. This argument leads to describing women as weak, inferior, inherently evil, intellectually incapable, and spiritually lacking (Zein-ed-Din, 1998:106). It is necessary to point out that there are several verses in the Qur'an and the Sunna that have to be interpreted in their historical context rather than looked at in isolation, because it leads to misunderstanding of their meaning. In this sense, it might be true that there are reasons behind making a woman equivalent to half man in the matter of testimony. First, 'women in the past had not as much experiences and education as men to let her be able to take this responsibility. Second, the man had absolute authority over the women to oblige her not to say the truth. So if one could not say it, the other one could do so. Third, the position of woman was so bad by the time Islam came that it was difficult to make her equal to man in this matter' (Al-'Adli, 2000:18,31,229). In this sense it might

be true to say that the matter has been left for people to change according to new circumstances and changes in life. This explains why it is not mentioned in the Qur'an that there are differences between men and women regarding their abilities to make rational decisions and act according to them.

A woman has the same rights as a man not because there are no differences between them. If there are differences between man and women, they relate to the experience that the man has. The differences are not to do with their essential nature. According to Muhsin "the Qur'an acknowledges the anatomical distinction between male and female. It also acknowledges that members of each gender function in a manner which reflects the well-defined distinctions, held by the culture to which those members belong which has not restricted women by functions related to her biology" (1998:131). It is true that there are functional distinctions between individuals, but these do not depend on specific values for males and females. Also "there is no term in the Qur'an which indicates that childbearing is 'primary' to a woman. No indication is given that mothering is her exclusive role. Although it does not restrict the female to functioning as a mother, the Qur'an is emphatic about the reverence, sympathy, and responsibility due to the female procreator. However The Qur'an does not propose or support a singular role or single definition of a set of roles, exclusively, for each gender across every culture" (Muhsin,1998:133). In particular, several verses from the Qur'an indicate value in the functional distinction between individuals and groups. An individual or group can earn or be granted a 'darajah' (step, degree or level) over another. The Qur'an specifies, for example, "to all are degrees (or ranks) according to their deeds" (sura 6,verse, 132). According to Muhsin, "distinguishing between individuals or groups on the basis of deeds involves problems with regard to the value of women as individuals. Although the Qur'an distinguishes on the basis of deeds, it does not set values for particular deeds. This leaves each social system to determine the value of different kinds of deeds at will. It does not matter how the deeds are divided between the males and the females (Muhsin,1998:133). The Qur'an acknowledges the need for variations when it states that the human race is divided "into nations and tribes that you might know one another: (sura 49,verse 13). It shows that the Qur'an does not divide labour and establish a monolithic order for every social system which completely disregards the natural variation in Society. The Qur'an does not specifically determine

roles, and the individual nations have not considered all the possibilities. (sura 4,verse 34) “Men are *Quwwamuna* of women, on the basis of that God has (preferred) some of them over others, and on the basis of what they spend of their property (for the support of women)”. ‘The verse says that the position between women and men is based on what God has preferred. Second what they spend of their property for the support of women. Many men interpret the above passage as an unconditional indication of the preference of men over women. *Quwwamuna* does not mean as some scholars think that men are in charge of the affairs of women or that the men are protectors and maintainers’ (Al-‘Adli,2000:67). However, ‘Imara (1995:142) argues that even if there are differences and distinctions between men’s and women’s roles equality in rights is considered.

Fourthly, it is not Islam which is averse to women rulers, it might be men. For example, ‘A’isha (wife of the prophet) after the death of the prophet, was responsible for many of the traditions that have been handed down to us (Bhutto,1998:110). The Qur’an does not mention any details related to this matter. Therefore, scholars who argue against the rights of women to share decision making and be politicians depend on one of the traditions of the prophet. They consider it as a good justification for their arguments. It says “Those who entrust their affairs to a woman will never know prosperity”. This hadith is so important that it is practically impossible to discuss the question of women’s political rights without referring to it, debating it, and taking a position on it. Mernissi (1998:120) in her article has made a double investigation-historical and methodological-of this hadith and its author, and especially of the conditions in which it was first put to use. Who uttered this hadith, where, when, why, and to whom? She closed her investigation by saying that the religious scholars of the first century did not agree on the weight to give that hadith on women and politics (1998:120). In talking about Muhammad ‘Abdu, Baywumi (1983:113-4) argues that there are no restrictions that might prevent a woman from working as a politician.

From the previous arguments women in Islam have the same rights and freedoms as men. Also Islam gives more freedom and rights to women than they had before the existence of Islam. However, the practices in many Islamic societies do not consider these rights and freedoms. Therefore, women are suffering from discrimination in the

favour of men. This means that many features of woman's freedom do not come from religious obligations or restrictions but they are political and social.

1.4.5. The value of freedom in Islamic thought

The different perceptions of freedom as liberation from restrictions, makes it necessary to ask the question what is freedom for? The notion of freedom in the Qur'an can be seen by equating freedom with the right to think freely. The Qur'an stresses the need for woman/man to 'listen, be aware, reflect, penetrate, understand, and mediate. All these verbs refer to intellectual activities leading to a kind of rationalisation based on existential paradigms revealed with the history of salvation' (Al-Ghazali,1984:71) and (Zaqzwq,1996:40). God says " do they not look at the camels, how they are made. And at the sky, how it is raised high and at the mountain, how they are fixed firm and at the earth, how it is spread out?" (sura 88,verses 17-20). Other verses such as sura 6, verses 76-79 show that freedom to think is a duty to know God, and then, to decide to believe in him or not, according to the outcomes of this thinking. Also there are no restrictions on the individual's thinking or choices. 'Man should not accept Islam with passive faith, without the active application of his intelligence' (Al-'Aqqad,ND:25). Rather, 'it invites him to understand it, to meditate on it to the limit which human intelligence and reason permits, and it challenges him to find a way to deny its superiority, or find a work which could be its equal' (Wafi,1980:79).

As An-Na'im (1998:225) says, "the will to be free exceeds the will to live in that it is the driving force behind the pursuit of spiritual, moral, and artistic well-being and excellence." Indeed the literature in Islamic thought stresses the value of freedom as a means to free the mind. Free will and freedom as Bazargan (1998:77) notes are means to concentrate, think, decide, and move. As such, they are the tolls of extraordinary evolution and progress among human beings as compared to animals. According to Bazargan freedom is a necessary condition to think and act freely. *shari'a* according to Kurzman (1998:23) encourages individuals to investigate and reflect. This is why the Qur'an does not mention every small detail. Therefore, even the Qur'an, the Sunna (The practice of the prophet) and *shari'a* can be discussed, questioned and developed (Iqbal,1998:263). The principle of thinking in Islam is known as *ijtihad* which it can be considered as an independent judgement encouraging people to think and not

accept any other judgements. For instance, “when Mu’adh was appointed ruler of Yemen, the prophet is reported to have asked him how he would decide matters coming up before him. He is reported to have responded by saying, “I will judge matters according to the Book of God.” When he was asked what he would do if the book of God did not contain any guidelines, he had answered with the words “Then I will act on the precedents of the prophet of God.” But if the precedent fails, he had said, “Then I will exert to form my own judgement” (‘Iqbal,1998:256). In another sense Muhammad ‘Abdu points out that ‘mind and critical thinking is not only a way to have faith in God and understand other subjects, but also to have independent judgement, particularly, if there is confusion in following the *shari‘a* (‘Abdu,1998:130). Further, ‘Abdu sees ‘*ijtihad* as a mode of thinking which is not only associated with religious interpretation, but also with life’s affairs. Therefore, it requires intellectual freedom, movement and change to new interpretation of Islamic principles and all other human interests. It is a way to discover new views on life, [to feeling uneasiness in its presence]. Unfortunately the closing of the door of *ijtihad* turns great thinkers into idols. In this sense, everyone is free to appreciate his position, re-construct his social life in the light of ultimate principles, and evolve out of the hitherto partially revealed purpose of Islam, that spiritual democracy which is the ultimate aim of Islam’ (1998:131).

1.5. Conclusion

This chapter was an attempt to analyse the concept of freedom in western and Islamic thought to build a theoretical framework of the meaning of freedom, its conditions and value, which is necessary and important to construct a theoretical framework of the meaning, conditions and value of freedom in education for learners at school level in chapters two and three. Firstly, the analysis of the concept of freedom in this chapter indicates that the two traditions have similarities in relation to the definition of freedom, its conditions and value.

(1) Both traditions point out that any definition of freedom should treat three areas; who should be free? What constraints should the individual be free from? And what is the individual free for? With respect to the first area, both traditions argue that a certain minimum degree of rationality is necessary for a person to be free. Who is in a position autonomously to choose to do or not to do, who has the desire to do or not to do something and who can determine his own life and make his own decisions. This means that both traditions argue against the freedom of the irrational person who cannot do so and accordingly cannot be responsible for his actions. Regarding the second area, both traditions consider that non-interference (intentional or unintentional) from others is a necessary condition to make an agent free. But in all such situations, when human beings are gathered together, it is completely unrealistic to suppose that individuals are ever, as a matter of fact, free to do what they like simply because of the inherent decency and good sense of all concerned. They are in fact free because some rule or other, in addition to the moral law, is effectively enforced which prohibits interference. The practical choice is never between simply doing as one likes and being constrained; it is rather between being subject to different types of constraint. From the point of view of freedom it is a better bet for the individual to accept a system of levelling constraints which limit his freedom of action but limit also the freedom of action of others to interfere with him, than to commit himself to a state of nature in which he runs the risk of being arbitrary coerced or subjected to merciless group pressure.

With regard to Islamic thought, it is argued that religious restrictions cannot limit freedom inasmuch as they cannot be treated as truly coercive, the individuals have absolute freedom to choose what religion to follow, then, they have to act according to their choice.

Regarding the third area, the two traditions argue that freedom is valuable as such, or as having value independently of the value of things it leaves us free to do. There are others arguments which imply that freedom is instrumentally, unconditionally or intrinsically valuable for the individual to do or not to do something he likes. In other words the individual has the chance to make his own choices and decisions. Islamic thought stresses the value of freedom as a means to liberate the mind. Free will and freedom are means to concentrate, think, decide, and move. As such, they are the consequence of extraordinary evolution and progress among human beings as compared to animals. Reason, perception, will, and morality is the result of free will and freedom. According to this view freedom is a necessary condition to think and act freely.

(2) Both traditions argue against the claim of absolute freedom. The unqualified demand of absolute freedom is unacceptable, as people's freedom is always in conflict.

(3) The two traditions distinguish between freedom and ability. Both arguments do not consider freedom and ability to be the same, on the other hand an individual's freedom requires freedom in order for him/her to enjoy and exercise a high degree of freedom and satisfy his/her desires.

The conclusion of this investigation means that implementation of the western concept of freedom in the sense it has been defined in the current chapter is not that different from the concept of freedom in Islamic religion and thought. Therefore, it might be possible now to make a decision to implement a western idea of freedom in education that depends on a western liberal concept of freedom in the Egyptian context without a feeling of unsuitability. In this sense Enslin (1999:185) states that "liberalism ought no longer to be seen as a doctrine that is put into practice and developed only in western societies".

Secondly, it has been argued that women in Islam have the same rights and freedoms as men. Also Islam gives more freedom and rights to women than they had before the existence of Islam. However, in practice many Islamic societies do not consider these rights and freedoms. Therefore, women are suffering from discrimination in favour of men. This means that features of women's unfreedom do not result from religious obligations or restrictions but they are political and social.

According to the analysis that has been made in the current chapter it might be difficult for someone to accept such a claim that learners at an early age have the same claim to freedom as adults. This refers to three important factors; the nature of the subject, the purpose of education and the sort of restrictions that might limit the learners' freedom. Therefore, the next chapter aims to construct a theoretical framework of freedom in education that will depend on the analysis of the concept of freedom it has been made in this chapter. This analysis will deal with the implications of freedom in education with respect to its conditions, restrictions and value in education. Through this analysis, the next chapter aims also to analyse and examine the learners' right to be free regarding their education.

Chapter Two

The implications of the concept of freedom regarding its conditions, restrictions and value with respect to learners

2.1. Introduction

In the first chapter of this study I concluded that there was a possibility of implementing a western idea of freedom in education. This comes as a result of the analysis of the concept of freedom, its conditions and value that indicates that there are similarities between liberal western and Islamic political thought. Through this analysis and investigation the previous chapter built a theoretical framework of the concept of freedom and its conditions and value which would be required to build a theoretical framework of freedom in education. The aim of this chapter is to construct a theoretical framework of freedom in education that will depend on the analysis of the concept of freedom made in chapter one. This examination will deal with the implications of freedom in education with respect to its conditions, restrictions and value in education. Through this analysis the current chapter aims also to analyse and examine the learners' right to be free regarding their education. This is because it might be difficult for someone to accept the claim of freedom for young learners to be equal to that of adults. This refers to three important factors; the nature of the subject, the purpose of education and the sort of restrictions that limit learners' freedom. The analysis of learner's rights regarding their education in this chapter will deal with learners at school level.

2.2. The implications of the concept of freedom in education regarding its conditions

In chapter one I analysed the concept of freedom in relation to its meaning, conditions and value. With respect to the conditions that limit freedom, it was argued that the concept of freedom joins together two main components: first the absence of constraints upon or interference with, and second, the notion of availability of making choices. When analysing the implications of the idea of freedom in education with respect to its conditions, I will focus on the learners' right to be left free from interference with their interests and choices in their education.

2.2.1. Freedom in education and non-interference with the learner's interests

According to the analysis of the concept of freedom in the previous chapter, non-interference (intentional or unintentional) from others is a necessary condition to describe an agent as free. The most important exception for interference is the prevention of the license of others. The claim for learners' freedom in education requires also that they should be left free to do (or not to do) to be (or not to become) what they want to be without interference from adults. With respect to children interference is not justifiable only for the prevention of license on others, which is, of course, an important exception. Despite remarkable stories of children surviving without adult help it is still the case that because of their size, inexperience and less-developed rationality they are more vulnerable than most adults and need protection and guidance. However, adults' right to make decisions for children's should be limited to making decisions in children's interests and to the provision of the necessary protection and guidance. Their rights will not extend to rights over children, regardless of what is in children's interests.

Amongst the important things children need to learn are how to find out information for themselves, study independently, pursue interests, make their own growth, and to build up their experience' so as to be able to make choices and decision for themselves. They cannot do this without having the opportunity to exercise freedom. In this sense Dearden (1972:64) recognised that the child's growth is one of the main components of the value of non-interference with learners' interests and wants. In his view "only the child can do his own growing; there is no sense in which an adult can do it for him. In this sense development and growth is a process which is logically non-transferable from someone to another". Moreover, Dearden (1972:75) argues that "growth is realising one's own pattern of potentialities and, thus, finding and forming one's own individual identity". Similarly, Downey and Kelly (1979:24-5) argue that

for the child to develop and function as a person. he needs to be treated as one. He needs to be able to develop the kind of self-concept that allows him to regard himself as of value. To treat children as persons in their own right...involves regarding them as responsible for their own actions and therefore having some control over what they do.

According to Carr (1985:60)

The child requires to learn to stand on its own two feet, but this will happen only if it has occasions for genuine discovery and experiment in which there is a real risk of failure as well as opportunity for success; for if it is to learn to accomplish what is right for correct it also needs room to experiences mistakes.

Peters (1966b:289) says that if learners are treated progressively, as persons, by being encouraged to plan their lives and to discover what is worth-while in spheres that are within their experience and competence, they will surely learn to be persons under a stable system of rules that guarantees a predictable environment.

Gradually their sphere of discretion is widened as their experience and knowledge of right and wrong increase and their competence and control over themselves and their environment is enhanced. They do not learn this either by being conditioned like performing seals or by being allowed simply to do what they want.

Another justification can be seen in Hopkins's (1979:11-2) argument when he states that freedom to direct one's own learning and non-interference with learners' desires to learn what they want allows learners to reap the benefits of intrinsic motivation. For example, he argues that learners will engage in a learning activity if that activity holds the promise of attaining results or rewards that will satisfy his drives and desires. For Neill (1992:104) preventing learners from being free to choose what they are interested in studying by interference means they will not be able to achieve the aims of what they are learning. In another sense Holt (1983:175) rejects the ideal of schools and classroom as places where, most of the time, children are doing what adults tell them to do because there is no way to coerce children without making them afraid. Being afraid as Neill thinks will make the learner even after starting work "docile, prone to obey authority, fearful of criticism, and almost fanatical in his desire to be normal, conventional, and correct. He accepts what he has been taught almost without question; and he hands down all his complexes, fears and frustration to his children" (1953:29). He further notes that giving learners freedom and not interfering with their choices leads the learner not to feel fear, which is the finest thing that can happen to a child. In his opinion this makes the child more free to express him self (Neill,1992:14). In this sense it might be argued that this type of individual will not be in charge to determine his life and take his responsibility towards the development of society. For the development of the child's personality, the learners' thinking should be left free from interference by others' thinking. It is the learners' right to think, investigate, examine and believe whatever they want to. They should also know that the only right opinion is not

necessarily the one that belongs to the people who are in a position to influence them, such as teachers, parents, writers and others. Young people in schools should be aware that there is no one reality or fact, or one way of doing something. This idea is supported for example by 'Ammar, (1998a:33) and Kingdone (1942:145) who believe that the aims of education should be made to liberate the individual's thinking from the interference to exercise his own thinking, to be a free chooser and be independent in his thoughts and actions. Similarly, Macmunn (1926:30) argues that "the unfree mind is the typical mind of the examine-combined formula with formula and fact with fact, but does not bring to its work that intensity of varied associations, sensory and emotional, present in the less formalised mind".

Although Haldane (1942:116) rejects the idea of complete freedom for children, he argues that

children can, in practice, be given freedom at early age if their training is directed to teaching them the recognition of necessity. This means that they must be allowed to see and feel the consequences of their own actions

Children should be given opportunities that allow their own experiences and other people's ideas and beliefs to influence their lives and development, but they do not need to be told who to be or what to become. From the previous arguments the defenders of the learners' right to be free regarding their education reject the idea of making the child fit the school instead of making the school fit the child. Therefore, they have paid serious attention to the claim for learners' freedom not to be subject to interference from others. For example, with reference to the philosophy used at Summerhill, Neill (1961:114) points out that "the child should not do anything until he comes to his own opinion". He also believes that the child can develop himself if adults let him be without suggestion of any kind (Neill,1992:9). Further Neill (1992:103) argues that the "community has the right to restrain the antisocial boy because he is interfering with the rights of others" but adults have no right to interfere with his/her choices and decisions. In Hopkins's view (1979:48) non-interference in education means that

there is no discipline or control aimed at determining another's behaviour in other ways- except for the prevention of license on others, which is, of course, an important exception. No individual can control another's beliefs. Every individual has the right to his or her own point of view, but he or she must protect the right of others to decide for themselves.

There is, then, no use of positive reinforcement or punishment, nor behaviour modification, aimed at determining or controlling another's actions-except, again, for the prevention of license on others.

Similarly Rousseau (1950:48-9), believes that a child should be nothing but a child:

he feels his weaknesses, but not suffer through it; he must be dependent, but he must not obey; he must ask, not command. He is only subject to others because of his needs, and because they see better than he. No one, not even his father, has the right to decide for the child what is of no use to him.

From the previous quotations basically the idea of freedom in education rests on a belief that children should have the same rights to determine their own lives as adults. The child should no more have to submit to an adult's preferences than the adult should to the child's. However, there is argument against that right which refers to the nature of the children, whereby they need to be interfered with for their own good. Gribble (1969:160-1) argues that it may often be necessary to constrain children in schools and defends his position by

referring to the intrinsic value of the development of rationality and understanding, and the need to exert authority and impose constraints in order to lead children to what is worthwhile.

It might be argued that this justification destroys the necessity for freedom as a condition for learners to develop their rationality and understanding of things and people. It is important for learners' development to find out what is worthwhile for them instead of leading them to it by interfering with their thinking and actions. For Devi (1998:172) no real and worthwhile education is possible without freedom in learning and teaching. In other words, learners must be free while participating in the dynamic process of education.

Another argument is made by Chamberlin (1989:63) who states that

there are some circumstances in which we are justified in coercing people for their own good, and that anyone who is concerned about the welfare of others should not always stand by and watch them come to some predictable and preventable harm.

In Chamberlin' (1989:51) view, "adults have the right to make decisions on behalf of children because they need protection and guidance, but this right has to be limited to children's interests and to the provision of the necessary protection and guidance". Dearden (1972:56) distinguishes between giving learners the freedom to do what they want and giving them the chance to do what they need. Also Dearden notes (1972:56) that to

motivate children by inducing or capitalising upon their states of need is something that should be regarded as immoral. Moreover, it might be possible to argue that the justification has been given by Chamberlin is an attractive one however, it does not give the adults the right to make decisions on behalf of children for the same reason. It is true that learners need guidelines and protection but this requires giving them the chance to act on their own with help from adults, not by giving them the right to interfere with their choices and decisions.

The main problem in exercising interference with children is that unlike children, adults can refuse any kind of interference which prevents their freedom, and moreover, they have the ability to fight for their rights. The matter is more complex in the case of children, as more often than not, they are ignorant of their rights. Even if they are aware of them, it is unlikely that they would have the necessary ability to fight for them. Therefore, adults are able to exercise power and authority over children with or without protest from them. However, unlike what Neill believes that learners in schools could manage without adults' dictation and, perhaps, without direction. I believe that learners need suggestions from others, and that they should be given guidance and help rather than merely being interfered by adults. Young people need adults' suggestions to develop their full potential. For example, a child will intuitively know what he is interested in learning. But as Holt (1983:175) points out, "he may not do it very well, but he can do it a hundred times better than we can. The most we can do is to try to help, by letting him know roughly what is available and where he can look for it". Likewise, MacCallister (1931:535) argues that "learners desire greater freedom to explore un-trodden paths. But learners also need guidance and must be willing to receive help". According to Devi learners are free to study any subject they choose at any given time; but this freedom has to be guided; the learners should experience freedom; but it might be misused: the learners have therefore, to be watched with care, sympathy and wisdom; the teacher must be a friend and guide, must not impose himself, but may intervene when necessary (1998:170).

This leads us to argue that relationships should be an equal, co-operative give-and-take between children and adults just as they should be between adults. There is no doubt that

children start out helpless and dependent, but needing help and even needing some control at first to ensure safety are not the same thing as adult controls over how a child will develop, what he or she will make. There would be no need for interference if the relationship between adults and children were equal in terms of having the same right to be left free to think, choose, object and express themselves. "The relationship between adults and children does not suggest that children are not persons in their own right but the property of someone, if not the parents then the state" (Wringe, 1981:94). According to the idea of freedom in education, the relationship between adults and children should not be one-way from adults to children. Freire (1998:63) argues that "it is important to live the balance between harmonious experiences between talking to learners and talking with them".

According to the idea of freedom in education analysed so far, it is the responsibility of adults to show learners what kind of opportunities and options they have, and what kind of consequences these will result in. Adults have a responsibility to help children to express themselves without exercising control over them. What adults can do is to listen to them and find out their interests, needs, frustrations and satisfactions about their lives and education. In this sense, Marshall (1997b:94) suggests that "adults may have to be taught how to listen to children and how to seek their opinion without loading all the responsibility on to them". In conclusion, it might be noticeable that non-interference with learners' choices and decisions is a necessary and required condition for learners to exercise their freedom in education and get benefit from its value as it will be examined later in this chapter. However, adults' right to make decisions for children's should be limited to making decisions in children's interests and to the provision of the necessary protection and guidance. Their rights will not extend to rights over children, regardless of what is in children's interests.

2.2.2. Freedom in education and availability of making free choices and decisions

As discussed in chapter one, the availability of making choices and decisions is one of the required conditions for someone to be free. Also discussed was the relationship between

freedom and the availability of choices in terms of the value of freedom. This means that freedom becomes more worthwhile with the existence of wider possibilities or choices. However, it is important to note that because of the nature of the subject here, which is young people, it might not be easy for someone to accept the claim of freedom of choice for learners especially at an early age. Therefore, In this section I will argue for the right of learners to make free choices and decisions.

Hopkins argues that in an educational setting, “children have to be left free to learn, to make their own choices, and to stand on their own feet” (Hopkins,1979:47). Each individual should have the right to learn and become what he so chooses. Children should have the same right to freedom as adults. In terms of equal freedom, “the child therefore has claims to freedom co-extensive with those of the adult” (Spencer,1970:172). Restrictions on this right should be minimised and the opportunity to fulfil it should be maximised” (Hopkins,1976b:190). In Hopkins’ view, to be free is to be a chooser; the capacity for choice will be compatible with the idea of personal autonomy, which is a development of some of the potentialities inherent in the notion of man as a chooser. Although the notion of freedom in education implies that learners need the right to be choosers, they need help at the beginning to be good choosers, especially, at an early age when they are still immature. Thus learners need open options and a variety of opportunities and suggestions from adults. As Rousseau (1950:49) points out, children have to depend on things only in order to be good choosers and to learn to make good choices. Peters (1966b:197) suggests that learners must live in a fairly predictable environment so that they can learn to make realistic assessments of the consequences. Hopkins (1979:47), in his philosophy of freedom in education, says that

learners should be left free to choose, to decide for themselves all things that affect only them. Others may influence their decision, but the individual makes the final choices. What one learns essentially affects only oneself. Indeed, to some degree, learning can be seen to affect how one fulfils one’s responsibilities to others, but there are many ways of fulfilling one’s social responsibilities allowing for a multitude of possibilities for what one learns. We may require that a person fulfils his or her responsibilities, but we have no right to require how he or she fulfils those responsibilities.

It is noteworthy that freedom in education rests on a belief that children should have the right to determine their own lives as adults. The objection, as Chamberlain (1989:109-10)

notes, which always arises here, is that children start out helpless and dependent, but needing help. Bantock (1970:68) makes a similar point when he claims that “no child is free to choose by the light of nature alone”. According to him, the “child’s capacity depends entirely upon the choices that have previously been made for him, by other people to enable him to be free to choose anything”. Thus, in this view, no child is free to choose until he is already ‘sufficiently disciplined to see the implications of his choice’. Similarly, Wringe (1981:110) argues that children’s freedom is limited by both his incomplete rationality and by the justifiable protection of the rights of others”. This does not mean that only adults can make good or rational choices, however. In fact, adults can be seen to make wrong choices as much as children. Hence, it is possible to argue that, unlike children, adults have more experience and might possess more knowledge to make good choices, but they acquire this capacity by learning through mistakes made in previous choices.

It can be argued that children should be allowed the right to take the same risk to choose, whether they succeed or not. If they make the wrong choice, they will learn from the experience and perform better next time. In this sense, Chamberlin (1989:63) argues that “the value of individuals in making their own choices is, simply because they are their own, and that for these always to be made by someone else, no matter how wise, would be in some way demeaning”. According to this line of reasoning, learners should be left free in a way which encourages independence of mind to make their own choices. As a result, they will learn how to be responsible for their actions. Similarly, Al-Khwli (1987:444) and Al-Zarnwji (quoted in ‘Uthman,1989:118) states that ‘learners are free when their actions come from inside them not from control from outside’. By having freedom, their responsibility for education will rise and grow. This responsibility will enable a child to choose what he wants to learn, the type of school he wants to attend and the teacher. Following Gibbs’s view on ‘rational reasons’ it could be said that learners need a kind of education that can help them to develop their ability to make rational choices so that these choices can be justified. In this sense, freedom in education can help learners to make the choice they want through the development of reason.

After having discussed the right of learners to make their own choices, I argue that having this right may not be worthwhile unless it is followed by giving learners the opportunity to make their own free decisions according to their choices. From this notion follows the idea that ‘learners also need opportunities to acquire the skills and experiences needed to make their own decisions according to their own choices’ (Salam,2000:112). The initiative to involve children in decision-making processes is sure to encounter much resistance because, in general, children lack the skills and experiences necessary. According to Charlton “this may be the case. It may be also be that this unpreparedness exists because schools have been unable, or unwilling, to provide opportunities for pupils to acquire the skills and experiences needed” (1996:63). Therefore, Cowie (1994:161) argues that

the ability to make decisions is best learned through experience. It is indeed an essential part of education that young people learn how to come to a decision in a logical manner which shows awareness of the situation, sensitivity to other people and a realistic understanding of the resources which are available. The great advantage of giving pupils this experience is that it encourages them to take their own ideas and those of their peers, seriously. Pupils who participate in a decision-making process of this kind are more likely to be committed to the procedures that ensue.

Similarly, Fitzell (1997:14) illustrates how children become ‘empowered’ when they are allowed to make decisions and take responsibility for those decisions. According to him,

when children feel powerless, they cannot act on their own behalf. It is evident that in developing self-determinism children will initially make a great number of mistakes due to their lack of knowledge and experience. However, this will give them an opportunity to learn from their own experiences. This means that it is impossible to expect too much from them at the beginning, but it is important that society allows them to be free to find their own way without any external control.

In conclusion it should be noted that the availability of making free choices and decisions is a necessary condition for learners to have freedom that enables them to determine benefit from its value in education.

2.3. The implications of the concept of freedom in education regarding its restrictions

In the previous chapter the necessary conditions of being free have been discussed. However, it has not discussed its restrictions because they are different according to the field of exercising freedom and who are in a position to exercise such restrictions. For

example, restrictions of freedom in the field of education are different than restrictions in the field of economy. Therefore, in the following pages the restrictions of learners' freedom will be discussed.

2.3.1. Learners' freedom and being subject to authority

The application of the principle of freedom in an educational situation is not so straightforward. It is a situation in which constraints are imposed upon children's wants. Holt (1973:27) believes that "the kind of influence or control or coercion that most adults exercise over children is wrong". According to him this is because authority allows little freedom of choice and more fear. According to Smith (1985:46) "if children are treated in an authoritarian manner they will learn little, for it is the nature of authoritarianism not to base itself on reasons, and children learn from being given reasons". Smith argues that freedom gives learners the opportunity to learn through reason. This suggests that learning should not obey authority for the sake of obedience. This idea is clearer in Haydon's statement (1999:113) when he states that

accepting uncritically what someone tells you because they are seen to be in authority is not a good thing... Doing what is right cannot be a matter of doing what one is told. Schools must produce people who are able to think for themselves what is right... to ask 'how do we know this is right or that is wrong?' Any pupil who is being taught to think ought to be asking such questions. And the same pupil ought to see that 'because I say so' is not an acceptable answer. Nor is 'because these are the values of your society'.

Similarly, Straughan (1982:65-6) states that a child appreciates the reasons which justify an edict and accordingly make it authoritative rather than merely authoritarian. However, if he obeys rules or authorities as such he is doing what he sees there to be good and sensible reasons for doing so. The core idea of Haydon's and Straughan's argument is that for learners to be able to exercise freedom rather than license and derive benefit from the value of it, they have to be in a position not to obey authority.

However, freedom in education does not mean that there is no authority over learners. This is because they are immature and inexperienced and so they need guidance and protection. Restrictions of children's freedom are important and must be justified to achieve certain

important ends. If present restriction is justified on the grounds that it will enhance future freedom, then the education provided must have this as one of its aims, and must work towards its realisation.

As Smith (1985:41) argues, authority should have grounds, some sort of rational justifying basis which can be demonstrated. “In a broad sense, this is how exercising authority can be seen as different from wielding power”. Similarly, Freire argues that

without authority it is very difficult for the liberty of students to be shaped. Freedom needs authority to become free. It is a paradox but it has its foundation in the freedom of others, and if authority denies this freedom and cults of this relationship, this founding relationship with freedom [...] is no longer authority but has become authoritarianism (Freire, 1987:91).

For learners to have a worthwhile account of freedom there has to be a right balance between freedom and authority (Power, 1982:359), between pressure and permissiveness, between self-expression and submission to discipline, which will enable each child to find the best for himself. For learners to do this they need to exercise the rights of being free from restraints by authority to be able to exercise it. In short, school should be an environment for learners to learn how to be free and how to submit to justified authority in the sense mentioned before. In this sense Magsino (1979:180) argues that

By a certain twist of opaque thinking, it is assumed that adults cannot be expected to exercise rights properly in a democracy unless as young people they were allowed practice in these rights in educational institutions.

At this point it is pertinent to ask, who has the right to exercise authority? Since parents, teachers and the state in general have authority over learners, in the following pages I will discuss the notion of authority by parents and teachers in more detail. Regarding the restrictions that might limit the learners’ freedom by the state in areas of curriculum, assessment and teachers’ preparation, this will be examined in chapter three.

2.3.1.1. Learners’ freedom and being subject to parents’ authority

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights legitimises the idea that “parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that should be given to their children” (Arajarvi, 1992:3). Similar declarations are to be found in the European Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom and The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Although these declarations vest the parents' right to be responsible for their children's education it does not give them the prior right to make such choices and decisions for children without listening to them and finding out what they want and what they are interested in doing at school. In this sense David, Davies, Edwards, Reay and Standing (1997:405) and Hargreaves argue that

parents make early educational decisions without much discussion with the child, but as the child grows, he or she will be assigned increased rights to share in educational decisions (Hargreaves,1997a:512).

The justification that always gives parents the right to make decision on behalf of their children is as Harris (1982:35-6) and Almond, argue that "children, especially in their early years, are too young, too inexperienced, and above all too infinitely malleable and adaptable, to determine the conditions and content of their education for themselves" (1991:195). This is why parents in the name of love and protection have to determine everything for their children regarding their education. If the justification for adults ever having the right to override children's wishes and make decisions for them is that this is in children's interests because they need protection and guidance, then adults' right to make decisions for children's should be limited to making decisions in children's interests and to the provision of the necessary protection and guidance. Their rights will not extend to rights over children, regardless of what is in children's interests.

The worst effect here is to see the children trapped between their own will and their parents, with no way out. It is evident that parents desire to see their children in good positions in society. This wish to see their children educated drives them to push their children to do things that they often resent doing. This might be in the interests of the parents, but a natural consequence of this forced education/schooling is an understandable lack of readiness on the part of the child to co-operate. It is arguable that parents do not always do what is in the best interests of the child. Even parents can be misguided and make such decisions that might be in conflict with the child's best interests.

However, this does not mean that parents have to allow their children to do as they want and do nothing. For instance, Sutherland (1988:78-82) notes, that “parents have the right to advise their children when the schools offer some options, to express their views about matters which affect their own children, to evaluate the work of the school in general or the performance of the educational system in general and to discuss the progress of their children with teachers and make enquiries or complaints about it”. Similarly, Darling (1992:48) points out that “the mere absence of adult authority is not enough and that sometimes more positive action is required”. This means helping children to grow rather than controlling them. As discussed so far, parents have to understand that their children can make their own choices and decisions according to their interests and wants. It is true that they might need help.

2.3.1.2. Learners' freedom and being subject to teachers' authority

Freedom in education implies that no unjustified authority should be exercised by teachers in the classroom. According to Downey and Kelly (1979:137-8) and Silk (1976:273) if the teacher is responsible for imparting knowledge, arranging examinations, and managing the learning situation this would automatically give him/her a certain degree of authority. This means that the teacher is an authority in his/her subject (White,1985:200). For example, a language teacher of either Arabic or English can be expected to exercise his/her authority in deciding what aspect of the language should be taught first. However, “the more knowledgeable a student is in a subject the less authority need be exercised over him. And thus, the need of authority here becomes a function of the inexperience of the subject” (Silk,1976:275). But, in cases where the learners have the opportunity to choose between the two languages, he/she does not have the right to exercise his/her authority on what language they should choose.

However, Bantock (1970:194-5) holds that “schoolchildren are confronted with the unknown of the subject or area of study, which requires them to make a leap of faith. Before any learning can begin they must simply accept the authority of the teacher, who is therefore, an authority in the sense that he possesses knowledge beyond the present grasp

of his pupils. They are in a position to understand any justifications he might offer for calling it knowledge rather than just something he felt inclined to say". Smith (1985:53) disagrees with Bantock's view and argues that the fact that the teacher is an authority in the classroom should not be regarded as a matter of his simply knowing more than his pupils. According to Smith,

They [children] are not barbarians at gates of knowledge who must put their trust in the teacher's cognitive authority before they can be admitted to learning. The extent to which children already possess knowledge, concepts and understanding and are capable of receiving explanation and perceiving the point of activities forbids this picture.

The point that begins to emerge from the process of teaching is that it is not just a matter of knowing one's own subject, nor even of understanding it deeply enough to be able to produce reasons for what one says based on its distinct logic or fundamental procedures. Teaching seems to involve understanding what learners are making of their experiences, including their schooling. In Langford's (1971:145) and Peters's (1973:47-8) view

teachers are put in authority by the community because they have qualified as authorities, to a certain extent, on those forms of knowledge with which educational institutions are concerned. This does not mean that their job is to stuff the minds of the ignorant with bodies of knowledge which they themselves have managed to memorise. For they are concerned with teaching others how to think, not just with telling them what to think. They should try, in other words, to introduce others to the critical procedures by means of which such bodies of knowledge have gradually been established and can be challenged and transformed. This is what makes their authority only provisional (Peters, 1973:47-8).

According to Hopkins (1976b:198), the teacher is an important resource for the learners, but that does not give him the right to control them "The teacher may initiate and argue for certain activities but not require them. The line is between influence and control. The teacher's ideas and beliefs may influence a learner's actions; if the learners so choose they may be used to determine a student's actions for them". For Reddiford (1971:17) the teacher "has a right to make pronouncements and issue commands because he has special competencies, training and insight". In this sense, Rose (1999:63-4) notes that "the teacher and learner relationship is at the hub of any successful learning process, and that it is dependent upon the ability to provide learners with the freedom to learn". It is, therefore the teacher's responsibility to make use of "whatever possibilities of self-determination the learners have to promote their aim of autonomy" (Haydon, 1983:227).

Among the many arguments about the teacher's role is the idea that teachers should be neutral in their teaching. Learners should learn by discovering things for themselves rather than by being told; and this course of discovery will include among other items the discovery that it is possible to hold different views about a vast number of subjects, between which views they will have to choose (Warnock,1979:160-1). In philosophy, for example, the neutral teacher will present to his learner the different views that exist, then, sit back and allow them to make up their own minds to discover evidence or other considerations which might favour the different views. For Nordenbo (1978:130)

there has been a growing demand for the teachers to refrain from inculcating in the pupils any special life philosophy, and in particular any special political viewpoint; in short, any particular system of values.

Also Falk (1996:26) states that the role of the teacher “is to give the students centre stage in the classroom, providing a setting in which the students play an active, inquiring role in their learning”.

In line with others Degenhardt (1976:112) also says that apart from providing learners with challenges and opportunities to be creative, “a teacher aiming at creativity must continually look for ways of teaching which combine a maximum of passing with a minimum of restriction. The relationship in the classroom has to have love, which may be as Entwistle (1974:70-1) suggests the key to discipline: it is only instrumental to a relationship which exists for purposes other than the development of personal rapport. It is fundamental to the character of the teacher-learner relationship that it must ultimately be dissolved’. On the contrary Rousseau’s (1950:84-5) advice to the teacher is in complete opposition to that of Entwistle.

Let him always think he is master while you are really master. There is no subjection so complete as that which preserves the forms of freedom; it is thus that the will itself is taken captive.

The teacher’s role in the classroom in the light of freedom in education is to make learners feel free to try things out. According to Kelly learners need to be confident that the teacher will look sympathetically on their failures as well as approvingly on their successes. Such work, then, requires teacher-learner relationships that are based on collaboration and mutual understanding rather than on distance and control (1990:125). The teachers have to

involve their learners in the decision-making process by asking them their views on lesson planning, determining activities to be done, choosing evaluation methods and even to evaluate their work. Neill (1992:104) mentions that in his school he never asked any of his teachers how s/he teaches. This was because Neill gave the learners the chance to evaluate their teachers and find out about their positive and negative characteristics in teaching. To do so, teachers should listen to the learners and find out about their interests and the difficulties they might have in learning what they are interested in. In doing so, the teacher does not have to exercise authority over the learners. On the contrary, the relationship between the teacher and the learners should be built on equality and respect towards each other. But as discussed before, freedom does not mean that the teacher should not be in authority at all. There must be some authority exercised by the teacher in the classroom. But if this is to happen, as Downey and Kelly (1979:141) argue, authority must be exercised in reasonable or justifiable ways. In this manner, Smith (1985:42) argues that “intellectually and morally the teacher is the sort of person to have good reasons for what he says and does”. Accordingly, a teacher must exercise authority over learners in the classroom only if s/he has adequate reasons for doing so, for example; if a learner breaks the rules. Rules can be considered an essential element in our social lives and experiences. The point of following the rules is not to conflict with the freedom of the learners. The learners must know what the rules are and why they have to obey them. They also have to share with the teacher in making the rules. Straughan (1982:66) argues that children should not obey a rule merely because it is a rule, nor that he must learn to obey it for that reason. It is only when rule-following is interpreted as obeying rules because they are rules that it becomes a conceptual non-starter; also, if a learner’s actions harm others or if a learner does not respect other people’s freedom.

After having discussed the relationship between authority by parents and teacher and learner’s freedom it is worthwhile discussing punishment in which authority can be exercised over learners. In this case the relationship between freedom and punishment has to be examined to find out if punishing the learners will or will not limit their freedom and what is the value of it.

2.3.2. Learners' freedom and being subject to punishment

The definition of punishment as Smith (1985:61-9), Flew (1973:85-87), Mabbott (1973:41-6), Marshall (1975:150-4) Peters (1966b:267-9), Kasachkoff (1973:364-370), Deininger (1965:205-9), Glover, (1970:199) and Hamm (1989,111-2) have suggested contains 'five necessary elements'. Firstly, the act of punishment cannot be a fortuitous event or happening. It cannot be done accidentally. Secondly, punishment must be painful or unpleasant. Thirdly, punishment must be enacted by someone whose authority to do so has been established. Fourthly, the infliction of pain or unpleasantness must be on an offender. Finally, punishment entails infliction of pain on an offender for a breach of a social rule. This condition is actually an elaboration of the fourth condition, since the notion of offender already entails the kind of culpability which deliberate breaching of rules results in.

The concept of freedom for learners in education also rejects the idea of inflicting pain as a form of punishment. Especially that they "probably do not prevent immoral actions... in fact they may elicit bad feelings in a child" (Pickering,1998:66). This kind of punishment, i.e. inflicting pain, as Wringe (1981:116) notes, "treats individuals as if they are not rational and not capable of desisting from the offence in question either through being persuaded of its wrongness or out of a prudent regard for their material interests". This kind of punishment is almost universal in state schools especially, in lower-class schools or working-class areas where the population has long been conditioned to accept physical pain as the normal means of socialising children.

Al-Qurashi (1986:173) believes that young people should feel secure from being punished, to think, object and express their own thinking and objections. According to Calvert (1975:11-3) it is true that learners, especially at an early age, do not have enough experience and knowledge to realise the difference between what is right and wrong. But this does not give adults the right to punish them. It is indeed, not logical to punish a young learner for doing something he or she does not know is wrong. For example, Neill and Rousseau completely reject the idea of punishing children on the grounds that they do not

know what is wrong and what is right. Rousseau (1950:56) maintains that teachers and parents should not make children ask forgiveness for wrongs that they did not intend to commit. It is true that a child does not have sufficient knowledge of right and wrong. At the same time, children do not have much control over their impulses and bodily movements. Neither are they able to predict the future and they have no notion at all of long-term consequences of their actions. In Peters' view, (1966b:288) even when a child has developed quite a good sense of what is right and wrong, it can still be reasonably argued that

he is so susceptible to peer-group pressure that it is only the very unusual and independent child who can stand out against his peers and refuse to do what he knows to be wrong. At an early age this type of pressure comes very near to coercion which is an accepted plea for diminished responsibility.

Similarly, Lewis (2001:317) argues that

There is a need to encourage teachers to avoid becoming coercive in the face of increasing in student misbehaviour and to rather respond by calmly punishing misbehaviour while rewarding good behaviour, discussing with students the impact their misbehaviour has on others and involving them in some of the decision-making surrounding rules and consequences. If teachers do not, it means less students time on task, and possibly more significantly, less responsibility.

However, although Wringe (1981:114) argues against punishment, in particular, physical punishment, he also talks about some instances in which punishment can be seen as justifiable. According to Rawls (1975:459) and Quinton (1973:62) no one should be punished unless the punishment has valuable consequences. For example, Wringe (1981:114) argues that the significance of punishment is to protect the rights of others "from the acts of a child not yet rational or at the level of morality, or to protect the child from the consequences of acts he would avoid if he were rational or at the level of prudence". Downey and Kelly (1979:156) and Freire and Shor (1987:93) point out, learners must be warned that freedom does not mean complete lack of punishment. The point is children should not be punished for the sake of punishment they have to be told that certain acts may warrant punishment.

When unjustified punishment prevents learners from doing what they want, it is not possible for them to learn to be self-controlled and self-determined. When learners are

given the freedom to learn, they should also be given the right to establish their own rules; this will allow them to be completely free to determine, accept and obey the rules. The idea of freedom, as mentioned above, is concerned with allowing children to acquire benefit from the value of freedom without the fear of external punishment. The idea of freedom upholds the necessity of involving children in making rules and determining the type of punishment for breaking them. If children are involved in determining their own rules and punishments, it will not in anyway inhibit their freedom, as they will be aware of what wrong they have committed to deserve being punished. In addition, Fitzell (1997:6) notes that involving children in making their own rules and punishments will help in their individual growth:

When children are involved in developing rules and consequences, they learn to use words to solve problems, to govern themselves, and to feel empowered. When rules deemed necessary by the teacher are explained and consequences are logical, children learn to be fair and trusting. When children who break the rules are involved in determining ways to solve their own problems, they learn to control their own behaviour. When children are taught to see situations from another child's point of view and are required to make restitution to the hurt party, they learn empathy, forgiveness, and caring.

In this manner, learners will learn the importance of rules in their lives as well as other people's lives. Following certain rules can be considered important for exercising freedom as it gives learners a guide to do what they want, without any comments or objections from other people such as teachers or parents. When learners follow rules that they themselves have determined, their actions will be acceptable and reasonable to other people or at least their actions will be justified and have moral causes. In such a context, punishment can be justified only if learners break their own rules. If they do not obey their own rules then they are clearly making a choice between following the rules and punishment. The significance of giving children the freedom to make and follow their own rules will teach them self-discipline. Self-discipline is thought to be educationally desirable because the submission to rules springs from the individual's own decisions in which some kind of autonomy is displayed (Hirts and Peters,1970:124-7). Self-discipline or self-restraint encourages autonomy in the individual and makes him a better achiever. Accordingly, the ability to exercise self-restraint and to behave autonomously depends to a large extent on the conviction that learners are responsible for their actions. This does not in any way suggest that discipline limits freedom, on the contrary, it helps the person to extend a number of

alternatives and, at the same time, it implies what Aviram (1995:71) calls the 'notion of commitment'. For Thompson (1980:117), "discipline and order create the boundaries within which particular freedoms operate". Similarly, Macmunn (1926:43) argues that the only true liberty is through discipline. Jeffrey (1971:30) uses the term 'self-limitation' to talk about freedom in a deeper sense. Moreover, in the same line Hannabuss (1987:17) argues that "freedom consists in: an ability to observe rules and an ability to make one's own rules". By the same token, Neill (1966:8) argues that by being free learners acquire self-control in which they will have the ability to think of other people and respect their rights.

2.4. The implications of the concept of freedom in education regarding its value

In this section I will analyse and examine the value of freedom in education. In this sense it might be argued that giving learners freedom has a value for them and value for their society as well. It will be an examination of whether; (a) happiness is the only aim of freedom in education when learners are allowed to do what they want, (b) autonomy, responsibility and creativity are valuable as educational aims. Then the following section will examine if that freedom is a necessary condition to achieve these mentioned aims, (c) allowing learners more freedom brings better academic achievement when the pressure of controls is blocking it and when there are a variety of options.

2.4.1. The relationship between being free and being happy

As discussed in chapter one, the value of freedom in its simplest terms as an instrument that leads someone to do something he/she wants to do. Accordingly, for someone to do what really interests him/her produces feelings of happiness. Therefore, it will be argued in this section that giving learners freedom to determine their education will make them happy. Also it will give learners the chance to have happy educational experiences which helps them to satisfy their interests and society's interests also. It might be important to note that many children find school and education as a generally unhappy experience because they do not feel happy in learning when they are not that interested in anything they are doing. In this sense Neill argues "happiness is not only the aim of the idea of freedom in education, but also the only goal of life (1961:24)". Likewise, Hopkins (1979:121) argues that freedom is the only means to happiness, and academic achievement "comes as a part of happiness, self-directed, and self-disciplined, not instead of them". However, I disagree with Neill and Hopkins that happiness can be an aim in the implementation of the idea of freedom in education

Freedom is only a means to let learners feel happy when they do what they like. Also because, as discussed in chapter one, it gives learners the opportunity to increase their powers and capacity through education to do things that they could not do before. When education reduces the gap between the learners' interests and their ability, it might increase

their happiness, but happiness in this sense will only be one product of education but not its aim. Moreover, freedom maximises the choices and opportunities that might lead to happiness, but it does not guarantee happiness. In this sense happiness might be a necessary condition for the learners to achieve other educational aims but it is not an aim in itself. According to O'Hear one can not aim at something which is necessarily a by-product of something else, and happiness is essentially a by-product in this way (1981:41). As Bantock (1970:64) argues, "happiness comes as a by-product of the achievement of some end, and the more we consciously wish to be happy, the more it eludes us". At the same time, Peters (1981:35-6) discusses three logical reasons against considering happiness as an aim of education. Firstly, education is not a necessary means to happiness, for many uneducated people are perfectly happy. Secondly, happiness is a complex state of mind that depends at least in part on having some desires fulfilled. Finally, it depends on objective conditions having to do with circumstances, which may change because of events for which the individual may not be responsible, and there is nothing much that education can do about these (see also, Chamberlin (1989:107-8) and Rafferty (1973:13)).

Moreover, happiness is changeable; it is a feeling that can change when the context or the circumstances change. What made the learner happy once might not make him happy again in another context. The learner will be happy, for example, if he does not attend a Maths class. But when faced with a particular situation that requires the skills provided by those classes, this non-attendance might result in his failure in dealing with the situation. The inevitable effect of such a failure is the learner's feelings of unhappiness.

It is noteworthy, however, that freedom is only a means to happiness. For instance, people who are not free to do certain things are still happy in doing other things. In this sense, freedom to learn might be one way to feel happy during the period of learning. The point is that learners need freedom to do or not to do something they like, and in being able to do what they want they will feel happy.

2.4.2. The relationship between being free and being autonomous

The value of autonomy as an educational aim has been emphasised by a number of professionals in education, for example, Strike (1972:276-7), Hannabuss (1987:17), Ridley (1990:138), Wringe (1997:115), Dearden, (1975a:7) and Oliver (1985:131). They state that one of the central features of the progress of learners is the development of their capacity to act autonomously. Therefore, Blenkin and Kelly (1983:85), Gardner (1985:242), Dearden (1975b:58) Hargreaves (1999:122) argue that schools must prepare learners to be autonomous and self-organised, networking, entrepreneurial in order to share in this world. This is because, firstly, as Neill (1966:8), Heathcote (1997:167-8), Allen (1982:205), Indabawa (1997:191-2) and Peters, Woods and Dray (1987:22) suggest, it is 'self organisation', 'self government' self-determination or 'self-realisation' that allows learners to ascertain things for themselves and learn by making their own mistakes. Because "the autonomous man has a mind of his own and a will of his own. He exercises independence in his thinking and in his decisions about practical affairs" (Benson,1983:6), Dearden, (1975a:7) and (Pring,1984:72). In other words, the virtue of autonomy is a state of character linked to reliance on one's own powers in acting, choosing and forming opinions. For Downie (1987:79) and Croce "when we educate a child, we aim to make of him a person able to go his own way as a free and autonomous being" (1942:63). In this sense Wambari (1991:197) believes that the autonomous person knows himself, understands who is, what he would like to make of his life and how best he can make of his life what he believed it should be. He also has a clear picture of the life he wishes to lead, his place in his community: he makes carefully reasoned choices that guide him towards the realisation of the aspired for life

Secondly, an individual who is autonomous is 'self-directed', has reasons for his actions and makes rules for himself (Atherton,1978:96), (Galston,1995:519), (Mason,1990:435), (Barrow,1975a:134), (Peters,1974:341) and (Arneson1985:433). Thirdly, an autonomous individual can exercise his freedom in a good way according to his own desire, and therefore will be responsible for the consequences of his actions. This is because as Martin (1988:68) and Smith (1997:130) believe, autonomous behaviour is based on "reason".

Therefore, the actions of an autonomous individual can be seen to be justified and responsible. Because “autonomy means that we are subjects of a moral law made by ourselves, and so imposed on us by ourselves” (Miller, 1998:77).

My argument here is that according to Telfer (1975:27-8), Crocker (1980:114), Kelly (1990:125), Wringe (1997:115) and Dearden (1975a:11) for learners to act autonomously they need to be free to trust in themselves and express their needs, wills and beliefs. In order to do this, learners need freedom to make up their own minds about what they would like to do and to do it (Phillips, 1997b:245). When individuals rationally and freely choose for themselves between many options rationality and freedom can be considered as necessary and sufficient conditions for performing autonomous actions (Bonnett, 1978:54), (Bridges, 1997:155-6) and (Gewirth, 1975:41).

In the event of being unfree, it will be impossible for learners to act autonomously. Autonomy is possible only if learners are given the opportunity to exercise their own free will in determining their education. According to Cuypers’s (1992:7) definition of autonomy, he believes that a person can be called autonomous only if “he is not alienated from himself, neither on the natural side by physical causes or blind drives nor on the social side by other people’s opinions”. Furthermore Benson (1983:9) argues that “to be autonomous is to trust one’s own powers and to have a disposition to use them, to be able to resist the fear of failure, ridicule or disapproval that threaten to drive one into reliance on the guidance of others”. Accordingly, giving learners freedom in education will help them to express themselves, to learn independently, make their own decisions and manage their lives.

Similarly, Dearden (1972:74-5) sees education as a process of growth which can be determined as self-realisation (the self to be realised is not the one which he is, but the one which it is desired that he should become) being oneself (Children need to be themselves), and being a chooser. To achieve these processes of growth, freedom is a necessary condition. Al-Said (1989:13) believes that freedom in education helps learners to be autonomous, to have a mind of their own and that it enables them to think for themselves. It

means that learners can make up their own minds on moral questions, and can choose their own moral views, and so on. Having a mind of their own may well mean having the wit to adapt, having the courage to take the initiative and having the ability to think out the solution to a new problem.

From the previous arguments it has been argued that freedom is a necessary condition for someone to be autonomous and act according to his/her own will and reason. It has been also examined that freedom is a necessary condition for exercising that activity. In short, achieving autonomy as an educational aim can not be done until learners have freedom to act, in the way argued before.

2.4.3. The relationship between being free and being creative

“Now, more than ever, the needs of a rapidly changing world require creative responses. Thus, educators are called upon to furnish conditions that support creativity in their students” (Weinstein, 1993:275). In this sense Hopkins (1979:10) argues that rapid change in a complex society and its culture calls for great adaptability and creativity in its individual members, not only to enable those individuals to find their way in that society but also to help that society adjust institutions and cultural mores to successfully meet the changing circumstances.

The following argument aims to investigate whether freedom is a necessary condition for creative action. For example, Foster (1971:37), Freire and Shor (1987:20), Kelly (1990:125) and Wilson (1977:113-5) state that nobody expects creative work from learners in a strict, authoritarian situation since this is likely to inhibit rather than promote the freedom that creative work requires. Similarly, Hopkins (1979:10) argues that “one of the most important circumstances necessary to develop creative people is freedom”. For Radford and Burton (1974:105) and Tischner (1994:15-7) there is relation between creativity and thinking which act simply by assuming freedom and self-direction. Similarly, Kleinig “the exercise of authority in teaching stifles creativity and the development of autonomy, leads to indoctrination, and substitutes for relationships of mutual respect and

interests, relationships of domination and subservience” (Kleinig,1982:210). “Other observers of the education scene detect a deadening of students imagination which seems to result from heavy classroom regulation and discipline of behaviour, and emphasis on memorisation and the authority of the teachers and printed sources” (Pfeiffer,1979:134).

I will discuss some evidence which demonstrates the importance of freedom for being creative. Firstly, as Suchman (1967:89) argues, non-interference and non-control are necessary conditions for being creative: “creative thinking is autonomous; that is, it is neither random nor controlled by some fixed scheme or external agent, but is wholly self-directed”. Therefore, freedom is a necessary condition in giving learners chances to “preserve their creativity by non-authoritarian attitudes on the part of parents and teachers, especially by not having negative evaluations put upon their initial efforts” (Gowan,1967:11). Accordingly, Barrow, Anderson et al note that creativity is ‘spontaneous behaviour’, where spontaneity is defined as ‘behaviour in the relative absence of environmental threat or coercion’ (Anderson,1965:47). Further, Al-Faywumi (1991:227-8) believes for learners to be creative they need to be left free, without interference to observe things on their own and develop self-discipline. They also need to be given the chance to ask questions, make choices on their own and to learn how to think. ‘All these skills must be learned in a free atmosphere in the classroom’ (Silim,1999:122).

However, non-interference and non-control do not mean that there are no rules at all, and there is no control on the child and his environment. For Entwistle (1974:60-1) rules and constraints are necessary for creative activity. In fact, Entwistle and White disagree with the conventional rule that “creativity requires being free from conventional rules” (White,1975:131). Thus, freedom does not mean the absence of rules, but it gives learners the opportunity for broadening the rules, ideas or conceptions in order to create new rules for new work. Exercising freedom allows learners to ‘exercise control within themselves’ (Butcher 1969:94). This means that they make their own rules to control their thinking and actions. This type of freedom is compatible with self-control and is the core of the claim of freedom in education. In this connection, Dewey (1938:60) notes that “no rules, then, no games; different rules, then a different game”. Similarly, Poole (1980:12) notes that “some

children produce most newness in a setting that is open and free, in which the child has the opportunity to produce what has meaning and significance for him or her. [...] Children produce more creative responses when they are forced to break through old conceptions and ideas in order to find newness”.

Secondly, the concept of freedom provides opportunities for learners to do what they want. Hence, the question of creativity is reasonable where there is no creative activity without the opportunity to think in different/new ways, to use different approaches or knowledge without any external control from others. Like Poole, Simon (1967:50) argues that another possible source of creativity would be to “draw on a mixture of ideas and cues garnered from different fields of knowledge”. In their discussion about creativity, Lytton (1971:104) and Stoddard (1959:187) mention that education has to provide opportunities for learners to live a creative life that demands the chance to make free choices. The notion of creativity is compatible with the findings of psychologists, who refer to the processes of self-regard, self-respect, self-realisation, self-expression, self-production, self-direction and self-actualisation, as creative processes. Evidence relating to the conception of opportunity suggests that when a learner is given freedom to do what he wants, he will be able to express himself in his own way, thereby using his own thinking. Similarly, Rogers (1970a:147-9), Suchman (1967:92-3) and Barrow and Woods (1988:140-1), hold the view that creative persons must do their own thinking and not simply parrot the thinking of others. For instance, when learners are given a certain amount of scope for free expression in the art room, they grow up less restricted in their artistic expression than those who are not given such freedom (Barrow and Woods, 1988:140-6).

Finally, freedom in education gives the learners a chance to be themselves and to learn on their own. Thus, it is clear that one cannot talk about the notion of creativity without talking about freedom. In this sense, Torrance (1962:114) maintains that many creative students prefer to learn on their own. According to him, when education does not give the learners freedom to learn on their own, not to be told what they do, there is a possibility of losing the potentially creative learners. This is because doing creative work is not that simple and requires doing many actions which can not be possible without freedom. For example

Torrance (1965:9), states that “the creative reader produces a variety of possibilities, uses a great variety of approaches, looks at the available information in a variety of ways, breaks away from commonplace solutions into bold new ways, and develops his ideas by filling in the details and making the idea attractive or exciting to others”. For someone to do so, freedom is a required condition that helps him to do creative work.

From the previous arguments it has been examined that freedom is a necessary condition for someone to perform creative action and develop that capacity. Also it has been argued that freedom is a necessary condition for exercising creativity. In short, achieving creativity as an educational aim can not be done until learners have freedom to act in the sense argued before.

2.4.4. The relationship between being free and being responsible

The value of responsibility as an educational aim can be seen in the arguments by Hannabuss (1987:17), ‘Usman (1979:292) and Diraz (1982:166). They state that one of the central features of the progress of learners and their society is the development of their capacity to be responsible for their actions. Talking about teaching learners responsibility as an educational aim requires that they should be free to make choices and decisions in which they learn how to take responsibility. Because as Hannabuss (1987:17) argues responsibility presupposes the exercise of free will and choice. In exercising choices, learners will not only come to a cognitive understanding of the tension between freedom and constraints but also, knowing the rules, choose to obey them. This requires freedom for learners to learn and exercise responsibility that helps them to make their own choices and decisions without interference from others.

To achieve responsibility as an educational aim the next argument aims to investigate the relationship between being free and being responsible. According to Strike’s view (1972:268) ‘Usman (1979:299) and Al-Hababi (1972:22), the idea of being responsible is compatible with that of being free to choose and being able to make-decisions. For Schofield (1973:259)

if we are free to act, we are free to do wrong or right. If we are constrained to do right, we lose our freedom of choice and consequently a very important type of freedom. Freedom of action makes responsibility for action inevitable.

According to Schofield and Gray there is logical connection between the two concepts: responsibility and freedom. On the one hand, the logical connection is centred in the concept of a person's action. "If you are morally responsible for your action then...the action must have been done freely" (Rowe,1991:237), Weiss (1942:186), Mason (1990:437), Taylor (1944:89) and Hallowell (1942:330). "When we have an obligation, we are required to do or omit some type of action" (O'Neil,1988:447). But a person's sense of responsibility will be complete if his action is ultimately and irresistibly unconditioned (Kristjansson,1992:104) and (Scheffler,1973:109). If choice is an illusion, there can be no praise or blame, and no responsibility (Glover,1970:198). The choices have to be ultimately and irresistibly unconditioned. Responsibility can be seen to be diminished if a person is under another's influence. "if there is virtue in having options between which free agents can make autonomous choices, this must surely be because exercising freedom is a means to personal commitment, satisfying pursuits and rewarding ways of life" (Jonathan,1997b:215-6).

On the other hand, If we accept Ayer's (1984:2,15) statement that it is a necessary condition for a man to have acted freely that he could have acted otherwise, then one should accept that the rational agent must be responsible for his free actions because according to Gibson when an agent chooses, he/she chooses for a reason (1936:257). According to Ellrod (1992:126) "the person with the power of free choice... is a source of actions... and a producers of results. The will is a sort of causal power: it gives rise to effects". This means that one's choice was under his/her control, therefore, he/she is held to be responsible. Smith (1985:104) argues that being able to give an account for his/her action is to be able to give reasons that hold for his/her action This is in case there are no factors which prevent agents from exercising control over choices, "for they either are unaware of crucial aspects of the situation which might lead them to alter their actions, or are compelled to perform certain deeds by force" (Ellrod,1992:124). For Chisholm (1976:23-4)

if a man is responsible for a certain event or a certain state of affairs... then that event or state of affairs was brought about by some act of his, and the act was something that was in his power either to perform or not to perform.

For Smith (1985:93-4) to treat someone as a responsible person in the first sense is

to regard him as one who has acted knowingly and willingly, when he could have acted otherwise. A responsible person has the capacity to make choices, to deliberate and act deliberately. The actions he performs are done under one intention or another, even if the intention is not always explicit: they are responses to the world as viewed under some description, rather than mere reflexes.

However, there is an almost universal belief that children do not have the capacity to be responsible persons. For example, Rosenake (1982:95) believes that children are “more likely to harm themselves and less likely to promote their own interests because of their cognitive and moral deficiencies”. He also shows that both children and adults are more competent than is generally thought in the relevant respects and that adults are less so. “Neither in their ability to make reasoned choices, nor in their tendency to make bad choices, are the majority of children clearly inferior to many adults”. In reply to this belief, Gray (1991:31) argues that being responsible does not mean that the subject of freedom (X) has to make only right and good choices; whether a person’s choices are good and right will depend on the person’s personal experience in making choices. Similarly, Harris (1982:38-45) points out that children are capable of planning systematic policies and strategies requiring a high degree of rationality. With reference to child psychology, Donaldson (1978: 33-59) notes that with children aged between 7 and 11 years’ intellectual status ‘is best understood and even defined by its being essential by only a preparation for, and so is necessarily inferior to, that of the adult’. Also she believes that ‘the gap between children and adults is not as great as has recently been widely believed [and that] children are not so limited in ability to reason deductively’.

This means that learners need the freedom to learn by their own experiences how to take responsibility. In short, to accept that learners have the right to be left free is to accept that they can be responsible for their choices and decisions. In an educational setting we cannot blame a person for failing in a particular subject if he/she was not given the choice to decide for him/herself. In such a situation, it would be more logical to lay the blame on the

person who had the opportunity to choose such a programme but still failed. In this sense Wringe (1981:113) argues that the child does not become rational and responsible for his acts all at once.

There may be some areas in which he is not competent to decide what he should do, and in which adults must assume responsibility for his actions. Simultaneously, there may be other areas in which he perfectly well understands the consequences and implications of his acts. In such areas it is quite in order to speak of his being punished by way of the forfeiture of certain rights when he does what he knows to be wrong. Normatively speaking, he is not a child, but an adult in respect of such acts, even though he may still be a child according to some institutional criterion such as age.

For Suliman (2000:180-196), Nwr-Al-Din (1997:200-4), Al-Said (1989), Gad (1996:149) and Pringle

the child who is denied the opportunity to exercise responsibility will fail to develop a sense of responsibility, for himself, for others or for material subjects (Pringle,1982:103).

From the previous arguments it has been argued that there is determined relationship between being free and being responsible, whereby nobody can be seen as responsible unless he/she can carry out such free choices and actions. Moreover, it has been argued that for young learners to learn how to take responsibility they need to act freely in which they will exercise responsibility at their early age.

2.4.5. The relationship between being free and academic achievement

Many traditional educationalists are deeply interested in the effect of freedom in education on academic achievement because it is their primary goal in education. I will investigate this relationship between freedom and academic achievement, but not because achievement will be greater by allowing learners freedom in their education. I intend to demonstrate that giving learners freedom in education will help them in their academic achievements up to a point, since giving them freedom will enable them to be autonomous, creative, and responsible, as discussed in the preceding pages. In Hopkins' (1979:121-2) view, no claim can be made that freedom will necessarily produce greater achievement than other educational philosophies. However, allowing freedom would bring more achievement when the pressure of control is blocking that achievement.

Hence, it is clear that freedom might be the only way to break away from older philosophies, which stress passivity and receptivity in the classroom. Freedom gives students the chance to acquire knowledge, discover facts, think critically and search for order, system and precision, in other words, it gives them 'intellectual education' as Dearden (1984:120) describes it. In some ways, as in creative accomplishment, achievement may be greater in an environment of freedom, but in other ways, as in rote learning, achievement may be less.

The fact that allowing more freedom brings more achievement when the pressure of controls is blocking it, has been demonstrated by Hopkins (1979:122-6). Hopkins presented many studies relating freedom to academic achievement. For example, studies of progressive education, open education, studies investigating the results of even more self-direction in education and studies investigating the relationship between the child and rearing practices and achievement. Recently there have been many studies investigating the relationship between freedom and learning different skills in particular subjects such as Schee (1999) and Lai (1999). Talking in a practical sense about the role of freedom in bringing more academic achievement can be seen in the free progress system as practised by the Sri Aurobindo International Centre of education Pondicherry (Devi, 1998:168-9). In this system, the two central fundamental concepts are freedom and progress. In this system, it is accepted that no progress is possible without giving students freedom in learning. They have found that there is a positive relationship between giving learners freedom and their progress. According to this system, progress means several things; an increasing amassing of information, development of certain skills, development of psychological abilities, development of body and life and mind, the training of the mind to deal with large and universal ideas and so on. Another example where freedom in education is at the core is Summerhill School as practised by A. S. Neill. The learners who have graduated from Summerhill include university professors, doctors, engineers, teachers, painters and writers. If the object of education is to give people the opportunity to take up such careers, in these cases Summerhill has succeeded, but from a Summerhill point of view that is not particularly important (Gribble, 1998:8). Moreover, many practices of freedom in education have been studied by Gribble (1998) such as Dartington Hall School (England, 1926),

Tamariki School (New Zealand,1967), Sudbury Valley School (USA,1968), Bramblewood School (USA,1969), Countesthorpe Community College (England,1970), Neel Bagh and Sunavanam (India,1972), The Pestalozzi School (Ecuador,1977), Kleingruppe Lufingen (Switzerland, 1977), Mirambika (India,1981), The Barbara Taylor School (USA,1985), Japan: Tokyo Shure, Nonami Children's Village, the Global School, Kinokuni (Japan,1985), The Democractic School of Hadera (Israel,1987) and Sands School (England,1987). It is clear from the previous evidences that the idea of freedom in education will not diminish learners' achievement.

2.5. Conclusion

The current chapter was an attempt to construct a theoretical framework of freedom in education that depends on the analysis of the concept of freedom made in the previous chapter. This analysis treated, firstly, the implications of freedom in education with respect to its conditions, restrictions and value in education. Moreover, through this analysis of freedom in education the current chapter aimed also to analyse and examine learners' right to be free regarding their education. Some conclusions can be derived from the previous examination as follows. Firstly, with respect to conditions of freedom, (a) it has been argued that non-interference with learners' choices and decisions is a necessary condition for learners to exercise their freedom in education to gain benefit from its value. However, interference is not justifiable only for the prevention of license on others, which is, of course, an important exception. Despite remarkable stories of children surviving without adult help it is still the case that because of their size, inexperience and less-developed rationality they are more vulnerable than most adults and need protection and guidance.

Also, it has been argued that although restrictions of children's freedom are sometimes justified, this is not because children are inherently subject to adults' authority or incapable of freedom or in some way less worthy of respect and consideration than adults. Restrictions of children's freedom are important, just as restrictions of adults' freedom, and must be justified. If the justification for adults ever having the right to override children's wishes and make decisions for them is that this is in children's interests because they need protection and guidance, then adults' right to make decisions for children's should be limited to making decisions in children's interests and to the provision of the necessary protection and guidance. Their rights will not extend to rights over children, regardless of what is in children's interests.

(B) it has been argued that the availability of making free choice and decisions is a necessary condition for learners to have freedom enabling them to acquire benefit from its value in education. But it is completely unrealistic to suppose that children are ever, as a matter of fact, free to do what they like simply because of the inherent decency and good

sense of all concerned. The practical choice is never between simply doing as one likes and being constrained; it is rather between being subject to different types of constraint.

Secondly, with respect to the value of freedom in education for learners, it was seen that: (A) happiness is not the only aim of freedom in education when learners are allowed to do what they want. Happiness is only a product of being free to do what they are interested in; (B) autonomy, responsibility and creativity are valuable educational aims. Moreover, the current chapter noted that freedom is a necessary condition to achieve these aims; (C) It was shown that allowing learners more freedom brings greater academic achievement when the pressure of controls blocks it and when there are variety of options. This leads us to recognise that freedom in education has great value for society. Educating learners to be happy, creative, autonomous, responsible and achieving greater academic progress will be valuable aims for society to satisfy its needs and interests for the sake of development without forcing learners to do particular things. Through the arguments it is suggested that children should have freedom regarding their education not for its own sake but because it has value for them and their society.

To have a complete theoretical framework of freedom in education, it is necessary to discuss other implications with respect to restrictions which might limit learners' freedom by being subject to the state's authority. Because for learners to exercise freedom (in terms of non-interference and availability of making choices and decisions) and to derive benefit from its value there are other implications in the areas of curriculum design, evaluation, and teacher training which should be examined. By having a complete theoretical framework of freedom in education it will be possible to propose one suits Egyptian society and its educational system and improve its efficiency.

Chapter Three

The implications of the concept of freedom in educational processes

3.1. Introduction

In chapter two the theoretical framework of freedom in education that was constructed depended on the analysis of the concept of freedom that was made in chapter one. This analysis treated the implications of freedom in education with respect to its conditions, restrictions and value. Through this analysis chapter two aimed also to analyse and examine the learners' right to be free regarding their education. To have a complete theoretical framework of freedom in education, chapter three discusses other implications with respect to restrictions which might limit learners' freedom by being subject to state authority. This is because for learners to exercise freedom in terms of non-interference and the availability of making choices and decisions and to derive benefit from its value, they might be restricted by the nature of the curriculum, assessment, and teacher preparation. The significance of this chapter is that, firstly, it endeavours to build a complete theoretical framework of freedom in education that provides the required conditions, in which learners and society can derive benefit from the value of freedom so as to be able to satisfy their interests. Secondly it tries to suit Egyptian society and improve the efficiency of its educational system.

3.2. The implications of the concept of freedom regarding curriculum content

In the previous chapter I examined how far learners, if they are to derive benefit from the value of freedom in education, have to be left free to make free choices and decisions without interference from adults. In line with these previous arguments it can be further suggested that learners should be the group that decides what is actually to be included in the curriculum content, with help from adults.

This is the way of determining the content of the curriculum has been understood by the defenders of the notion of freedom in education, such as Neill (1953,1961,1966 and 1992), Holt (1983) and Hopkins (1976b,1979). According to them learners at school should have the freedom to determine what they want to study and what they are interested in. Therefore, no one should interfere with the learner's choices and decisions

regarding what should be included in the curriculum content. The proponents of this view believe that learners should create the curriculum content themselves (Brandes and Ginnis, 1986:12) . Hopkins (1979:47) for instance, states that

it is the individual who decides what he or she will-or will not –learn as it becomes important to him or to her. The focus is on the self-directed exploration and investigation of what the individual student finds relevant to his or her own interests and goals, not on what society or teachers feel is important to learn.

Similarly, Holt (1974:183) maintains that

young people should have the right to control and direct their own learning, that is, to decide what they want to learn, and when, where, how, how much, how fast, and with what help they want to learn it.

This view suggests that it is the responsibility of the educational system to facilitate such investigation, opening up opportunities for the learners to determine what they are really interested in studying (Brent, 1978:215) and (Brandes and Ginnis, 1986:13) and to choose the curriculum content. Education based on freedom, which gives learners the right to choose their own content is a method of developing autonomy, creativity, responsibility and a feeling of happiness because of doing something they like.

There are some experiences which apply the notion of giving learners freedom to determine what should be included in the curriculum content. One example can be seen from Summerhill School as practised by Neill, (1954, 1961, 1966 and 1992). Another example can be seen in Professor Collings' school. He did not teach subjects, as these are commonly understood. The actual aims of his school were not conventional knowledge or skills, but the bettering of the present life of his pupils. In Kilpatrick's (1975:269) words:

his starting point accordingly was the actual present life of the boys and girls themselves, with all their interests and desires, good and bad. His first step forward was to help guide these learners to choose the most interesting and fruitful parts of this life as the content of their school activity. Following this, his aim was twofold, first to help the boys and girls do better than they otherwise would the precise things they had chosen, and second, by means of the experience of choosing and through the experience of more effectual activity gradually to broaden the out-look of the boys and girls as to what they might further choose and then to help them better effect these new choices.

According to the defenders of the right of learners to determine what they want to study, education should not lead to ends or certain aims such as the development of the industry of the society or the transfer of society's cultural values from generation to

generation. In our rapidly changing, pluralistic society, learners need to learn to be flexible, open, and tolerant of others, and to develop the capacity for living with others. Blenkin and Kelly (1983:50) claim that “education can have no end outside itself, it is its own end. It can only be viewed, then, as a continuous and life-long process of growth”.

It can be argued that this tradition provides the required conditions for learners to derive benefit from the value of freedom in education (non-interference and the availability of choices) However, it has its own criticisms. The main criticism of this approach is that giving individuals freedom in education to satisfy their interests might conflict with the satisfaction of society’s interests. As argued in chapter two, giving learners freedom is a necessary condition for being happy, creative, autonomous, responsible and academic achievement satisfy society’s needs. In this sense it might be argued that giving individuals freedom in education to study what they are really interested in does not in any way destroy the fabric of society. In fact, education and freedom, as Hopkins (1976b:199) shows, can be seen as “the interface between an individual and his society that gives him the tools to work with and in his society for his own self-determined benefit and for the benefit of others”. Neill (1992:103) proposes that the “community has the right to restrain the antisocial boy because he is interfering with the rights of others; but the community has no right to compel a boy to learn something he does not like”. Peters (1973:246), offers a solution to this problem by stating that it will be in the individual’s interest to acquire certain types of knowledge and skills that are considered to be socially beneficial. He further maintains that if one possesses knowledge and skills that are in demand in society, he would be likely to earn prestige and reward by exploiting these skills. According to Shotton (1998:188) giving learners freedom to study what they are interested in does not mean necessarily that their interests will be followed in isolation because, in any population of young people, some interests will be shared, so group work can be undertaken. Another criticism made against giving learners freedom is that children, especially at an early, age are too immature to be able to decide on their own what they are interested in studying. These arguments are rejected by Bantock (1970:62-8), Chamberlin (1989:106-7) and Dearden (1967:54). For example Dearden (1967:54) states that

we cannot ensure that in pursuing their interests children will acquire knowledge across that range of areas that some feel to be desirable, whether this is interpreted as

meaning a grounding in basic skills or initiation into discrete forms, understanding or realms of meaning.

The justification for the previous criticism can be seen in Thompson's argument (1980:57), in which he states that learners at school lack the basis for making rational choices. He observes that that is why they are being educated. They are consumers, who cannot be told fundamentally what is to be made available for them. There are certain things children need to know in order to survive in their state, to become part of the community and play their part in it, and to be able to make reasoned choices as individuals. Of course, an argument can be made that there is important knowledge that learners should learn, and that they do not have adequate experience to decide for themselves what this knowledge is. Bantock (1970:194), for instance, completely rejects the idea that learners should have the academic freedom to decide for themselves what they want to learn or even the idea that they must be shown the nature of what they are studying and the reasons for studying. While many educationalists do not totally reject the idea like Bantock, they take the position that there should be no conflict when it comes to deciding what kind of knowledge learners should be taught.

This argument appears to be intended as a warning to show that following their interests will not necessarily result in children acquiring the knowledge or skills which are desirable as an important aim of education. Moreover, Blenkin and Kelly (1983:51) postulate that children must have some knowledge and experiences before interests can be aroused. It is true that children need some knowledge and experiences before they can know their interests. However, this does not go against giving the right of learners to choose what they are interested in. Also this tradition does not deny the need for learners to obtain help from others to make such a choice especially at an early age, without interference with the choices and decisions they might need. For Young (1998:87) the idea of active learners who take responsibility for their own learning is an attractive one and is a recognition of something which traditional content-dominated models of education have all too easily forgotten. However, he notes some problems that may arise when this idea is put into practice.

firstly,... the capacity to make learning decisions can not be separated from the level of learning reached. The ability to make learning decisions is itself something which has to be learned, something recognised in the fashionable idea of learning to learn. Secondly it has been argued that they neglect the need for new roles for teachers and trainers.

It can be argued that the core idea of Young's argument leads to recognise another criticism to this approach. According to the rejecters of this approach learners are not mature enough to take the responsibility to determine on their own what they want to study. Likewise Norman (1979:180) argues that learners can find no academic subject in which they can engage in which interests them. Reid (1992:108) notes that

[the] Curriculum is a matter for experts, and if teachers are not expert, students are even less expert. If experts see a need for innovation, why should this be blocked by students who are in no position to understand the goals and processes of curriculum planning? But these same experts would no doubt claim that what they were doing was for the benefit of the student.

If we follow Reid's argument, then it is possible to say that both learners and parents and even teachers are not experts in this matter, but this does not mean that their suggestions should be neglected. It is clear that they can make a big difference when it comes to determining the content. Similarly, it can be argued that if the learners do not play a role in determining the content, they might not be interested in what they are studying and so might learn nothing. But when learners have the chance to determine the content with help from their parents and teachers they might succeed in determining what they are interested in to be included in their curriculum.

The second problem has been issued by Young concerns neglecting of the need for new roles for teachers and trainers when children have the freedom to determine their own content. As argued in chapter two the need for new role by teachers is a required condition for education based on freedom in which they have to provide their learners with the required conditions to exercise and to derive benefit from the value of freedom in education. In other words, the learners have to be educated in a way that they will not be a source of restriction on their learners' freedom, for example, by exercising authority over them. Moreover, they will have a serious role in decision making, as will be proposed in chapter six.

However, giving learners freedom to choose the content of their curriculum will not be suitable to be applied in Egyptian society because it might not contribute to the development processes. As will be discussed in chapters four and five, Egyptian policy is concerned with industrial development, therefore, it needs to interest children in following particular courses for the benefit of that development. This raises the issue of implementing an approach that suits Egyptian society, and which satisfies the interests

of both the state and learners in which it helps both to benefit from the value of freedom in education. This tradition takes the interests of the state as well as those of the learners to be the core of the curriculum content as can be seen in the work of Bantock (1970), Smith & Stanley & Shores (1957), Peters (1966b) and Chamberlin (1989).

Because of the changes in the social and economic circumstance which characterise the present period, it becomes essential to modify the relation of curriculum, its purposes and shapes, to the social and economic environment of the near future. In this sense Kress argues that "the new circumstances demand a response: new goals and new curricula which are appropriate to these new goals" (2000:134). Also these new circumstances produce new interests for the individuals which are connected to this new environment. Therefore, in the designing of a curriculum for the future, it is necessary to meet the interests of the individuals and the society. In a significant and crucial way learners are the central element in the educational process. Hence, education should be based on the nature of the child- a recommendation that we should base our decisions concerning the content of the curriculum on a consideration of the interests of the child.

For Blenkin and Kelly (1983:48) the emphasis in education should

be placed on the development of the child...this view of education regards it as of central importance that the choice of educational experience be made by reference to the child as the recipient of those experiences... that choice must be based on the needs of children and their interests.

This was a feature of Dewey's (1938:1973) philosophy of education, and this theory has been recently developed more fully in an attempt to resolve some of the difficulties that a child-centred approach to education presents. For instance, Kelly (1977:66-7) and White (1973:7) suggest that the plan for choosing the content of the curriculum has to be in response to the actual interests of children. In this sense Gingell and Brandon (2000:528) argue that the notion of an educated public does not call for uniformity but rather for serving people interests. Similarly, Doll (1978:24) suggests that real education involves experiencing freedom from imposed authority, with full opportunity to pursue one's interests and to develop one's potential. For Straughan (1978:151-3) if we wish children to act for reasons which they can see as reasons, accelerate their moral and rational development and make moral judgements and decisions, then we will have to take some account of what children want. Although Bantock (1970:62-8) and Chamberlin (1989:106-7) oppose the notion of giving learners academic freedom, they

consider the fact that the curriculum is made for the learner, not the learner for the curriculum: “Neither, in a sense, is made for the other; but both exist; and in some sort of way, they must be made to come into a relationship; a relationship not to be effected always at the expense of the curriculum” (Bantock, 1970: 62). For Beyer and Liston (1996:216) curriculum effort ought to be accomplished not for the economy, not for parents, but for students. However, this should have nothing to do with making learners interested in what the state feels they should be interested in or by starting from their interests and leading them on to what the state wants them to do.

The stress placed upon freedom in education by the preceding arguments implies an increase in the choices that students can make with regard to curriculum content. In this sense, this has nothing to do with using these interests to achieve the state’s own purpose, but to help the children to pursue their interests to achieve more effectively and with more discrimination and to organise their experiences. Also, determining the curriculum content to serve both the interests of society and learners does not mean, as Chamberlin (1989:113) states, that learners should be given enough freedom to learn what society needs them to learn.

Freedom in education implies that adults have a responsibility towards advising, encouraging and motivating learners to gain the kinds of knowledge in which they are interested. As Reimer (1974:90) puts it, freedom in education does not mean “to motivate learners to learn what others want them to learn. It is rather to provide the resources, which enable them to learn what they want”. But it may at times be necessary to exert pressure on children so that they master something irrespective of what they want. Many learners, for instance, have been told to write an essay on something in which they were not at all interested and, as a result, have developed a new interest in something. However, children should not be forced too much to do something adults think they will be interested in it.

The idea of freedom in education means that the learners should not be treated as a means to others’ ends, but as an end in themselves, for example, learners must not be prepared for certain needs of the society.

Determining the curriculum content to serve both the interests of society and learners seems an attractive approach which could be applied in the Egyptian context to allow learners more freedom for two reasons: firstly, it implies that the content of the curriculum will be chosen in the light of the interests of the state, so that children will acquire knowledge and skills the state wants them to do. Secondly, it implies that the content will be chosen according to the interests of learners as well so they will work better and learn more effectively because they will be interested in what they are required to do. Although this approach gives more freedom for learners to find a content compatible with their interests, there are no guaranties that can be seen. Moreover, there are no guaranties that learners will have the availability of choices between alternatives to exercise freedom and to derive benefit from its value. Therefore, in the following two sections I will argue, first, for the learners' right to be involved in determining their curriculum content. This is the only guarantee learners can have to protect their freedom in their education and to satisfy their interests. In the second section I will examine the truth of the statement: if having a national curriculum limits learners' freedom and in sequence raises the claim for different curricular to provide learners with a variety of options in an educational system based on freedom.

3.2.1. Learners' freedom to share determining the curriculum content

In answering the question of who should determine what is to be included in the curriculum content, for the state to guarantee that the content will be designed in a way that satisfies its interests, Barrow (1981:104) states that "a core curriculum and its broad framework is a matter for the state to decide". In others words, government, businessmen, public people and all kinds of professionals in the state can share in determining the interests of the state. Of course each of these groups can defend itself and find a way to achieve its own interests. Moreover, this view implies that it is also the state that can determine the content to satisfy the learners' interests. In doing so educationalists, philosophers, sociologists and psychologists can be involved. In this sense, Nelson, Carlson and Palansky (1996:270) argue that "we educate for some purpose we consider to be good and what we teach is what we think is a good thing. To do otherwise is an absurdity". However, this does not guarantee that the mentioned groups are able to find out about the learners' interests to plan the curriculum content.

According to Pring, what is judged valuable by the state may not then be valued by the learners (1976:53).

Therefore, determining the content of the curriculum should be shared between learners and the state to satisfy the interests of both. This requires as Carnie (1996:50-1) believes, that children should be included in curriculum design through active participation in decision-making. Having learners as a very active element in determining the curriculum content will guarantee that it will satisfy their interests. In other words, their choices reflect their actual interests, rather than those perceived by the state. Also by involving them in this process some educational problems will be solved. For example, Passé (1996:9) observes that “the possibility of making poor curricular decisions is reduced when students are given the responsibility of choosing the content”. As Passé notes, when learners are allowed to choose the content, they tend to select topics that interest them, thus avoiding motivation problems.

However, are the learners the best judge of what their interests are, or are the adults who stand in some teaching relationship to the learners, whether that of parent or schoolteacher? Few would claim that a child is always the best judge, without qualification. For example, Dearden (1975a:18) contends that learners might not be aware of their interests and goes on to say that children are not aware of what they are capable of, even if it is explained to them. However, it is also difficult for adults to decide on behalf of learners what they are interested in. If adults decide what children’s interests are, it is likely that the percentage of their failure might be higher than if learners decide for themselves. Kelly (1977:67) and Blenkin and Kelly (1983:49) address another problem, which is somewhat different from that discussed before. This is not just that problem of who knows what learners’ interests are in but the problem of determining the choices between the many interests that learners will undoubtedly have. The idea is that learners are the best judges of what interests them.

To answer the second question concerning the guarantees learners should have to protect their freedom, it is important, in the following section, to discuss a suitable way to deliver such a content. In other words, does having a national curriculum limit learners’ freedom and in consequence raise the claim for different curricula that provide learners with a variety of options?

3.2.2. Learners' freedom and national curriculum

The answer to the previous question might be straightforward where having different curricula is more compatible with the idea of freedom in education. This is because it provides learners with a variety of options from which they can choose what they are interested in. However, as argued earlier the interests of the state in terms of preparing generation of scientists for the occupational needs of society are also a very important consideration. Therefore, the question that might be raised is, what is the guarantee that the state should have. The answer that might be given is that having a national curriculum is the way that the state can be sure that learners will do what is the best for the development processes, whereby are committed all learners to derive a particular standard of knowledge and understanding. In this sense it should also be mentioned that having a national curriculum can be acceptable, especially in Third World countries (including Egypt), where there is a lack of educational funds and variety in the sources of knowledge. Planning a national curriculum can be seen as the only possible option since the resources are insufficient to offer different curricula. Also it is for the public as Nelson, Carlson and Palansky (1996:241) believe, to have some assurance that learners are learning something.

However, education based on freedom can not be implemented in the form of a compulsory and national curriculum unless there are guarantees that it does not limit learners' freedom. Moreover, such a national curriculum should provide learners with the required conditions to exercise freedom and to derive benefit from its value in education. Firstly, a national curriculum should be planned in a way that achieves equal opportunity for learners, especially in a country such as Egypt when there are various forms of inequality, for example between urban and rural areas. In response to these conditions, it might be argued that equal opportunity strategies have typically taken the national curriculum as their focus and have attributed discriminatory effects against class, gender, race and colour to its content and to the manner of its transmission in the classroom (Jones and Moore, 1996:312-3) and (Riley, 1992:1-2). This requires as, Harris (1995:222) and Kelly maintain that "the curriculum should be planned in such a way as to ensure that all learners have the opportunity to develop to a certain standard the skills and knowledge that will enable them to meet the demands of a technological state" (1977:164). This suggests that only the practice of a national curriculum will allow all

students to reach the same standard. Because “it gives equal access to essential knowledge, skills, attitudes and values” (Tomlinson et al,2000:248).

Secondly it should be planned in a way that takes into consideration the differences between the local provinces in the state. This is because as ‘Ali points out, that having the same curriculum for all ‘might produce the same types of thinking and minds even if the regional differences are not that great’ (1998:17). Therefore, as McLean suggests, all learners in a province should follow the same basic core curriculum (1996:39,45) with the curriculum planned in a way that provides

suitable differentiation in detailed content and presentation, and still with some provision for choice, to match different abilities, aspirations and needs. It also seeks greater coherence and continuity in school education as a whole. It is concerned with a framework for the curriculum and therefore, rightly leaves many details to be determined (Inspectors,1985:41).

Thirdly, the state has to provide learners with a variety of choices so they can choose between them what they are interested in. Gill proposes that learners should have the right to pick and choose what they want to study within the national curriculum they that will study (1990:407). “Such educational principles then follow, as that there should be much freedom of choice, many chances to pursue interests, and rich opportunities for discovery and self-expression” (Dearden,1976:53). Chanan (1981:205-9) in his argument for the need to extend the range of curricular diversity plus basics, holds that we are educating a community of complementary people, not a mass of interchangeable individuals. In this way, the national curriculum should give a chance to learners to learn and exercise how they make choices and decisions through the curriculum. Furthermore, it should help the learners, with help from their teachers and parents, to find out about their real interests. It is important that the curriculum gives opportunity for learners to meet their interests by opening opportunities, alternatives and choices. This leads to the statement that “a child’s environment should be rich in materials and possible experiences” (Hopkins,1979:55).

Fourthly, the national curriculum should be neutral in that it does not affect the learners’ freedom to choose what they really want and not because there are some hidden aspect that lead them to choose otherwise. In other words, it should have nothing to do with making learners interested in what the state feels they should be interested in or by starting from their interests and leading them on to what the state wants them to do.

This makes it clear that the state should not interfere with learners' decisions about what interests them. In this sense, Blenkin and Kelly (1983:49) reject the idea of deciding what they ought to be interested in and imposing that willy-nilly upon them rather than knowing what they are really interested in.

Fifthly, when there is a national curriculum there is call for a textbook. The textbook is considered a very important resource in delivering the knowledge the learners have to know (Slater,1992:11), Johnsen (1993:24), Richaudeau (1980:28) and Chambliss and Calfee (1998:6). 'For the teacher and pupil, the textbook can be seen as a working tool and as an instrument of communication' (Mitaw',1995:230). It is true that textbooks are also very important to achieve equal opportunity in the Third World. Firstly, as Castell and Luke, and Luke (1989:vii) argue, the textbook claims "to represent to each generation of students an officially sanctioned, authorised version of human knowledge and culture". Secondly, Chambliss and Calfee (1998:7) argue that textbooks offer learners a rich array of new and potentially interesting facts, and open the door to a world of fantastic experiences. For instance, in developing countries where learners do not have the same facilities as learners in developed countries, to read and get the knowledge they want textbooks play a very important and significant role. In the view of Altbach and Kelly (1988:3) in third world countries there are few instructional materials available at all. In many schools children share texts; in some they have none to share and the teacher writes the daily lessons from a textbook on the blackboard.

However, it might be argued that having textbooks in the previous sense limits learners' freedom to look for and discover knowledge on their own in which they are trained to be self-learning and to be choosers and decision-makers. Moreover, textbooks, because they are written under supervision from the state cannot be seen to be neutral. They "reflect the state's interests, beliefs, and values" Chambliss and Calfee (1998:168). This means that they limit the learners' freedom to make and follow interests, beliefs, and values. Also these authors observe that "children [...] know what they know, think what they think, and value what they value in some measure because of the textbooks they use" (Chambliss and Calfee,1998:168).

In the Egyptian context, as I will explain in chapter five, learners are not really badly in need of the kind of textbooks mentioned above. However, this is not to suggest that

there is no need for textbooks in schools. On the contrary, textbooks are important for learners, teachers and public, to teach and assess learner achievement with respect to knowledge acquisition, as the textbook provides all the information they are expected to acquire. Also, it is to help, firstly, to find out the kind of knowledge, skills and experiences previous learners had. This helps to predict what learners should study now. Secondly, to help parents to know what their children are learning and how they can help them with it. Finally, textbooks are important in given learners the guidelines as to what knowledge they have to look for and what they have to do with such knowledge. This means that learners will not depend only on their textbooks but they will have to look at different resources. This activity will help learners, for example, to be self-learning and be engaged more effectively in the teaching and learning process in the classroom.

Sixthly, a national curriculum based on freedom should pay serious attention to extra curricular activities, especially because as will be shown in chapter five these activities have no place in Egyptian education. The significance of engaging in such extra curricular provides learners with the opportunity to exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value to satisfy their interests and also society's interests. This takes place when learners have the opportunity to exercise freedom to choose the kind of activity they are interested in. For example, learners learn how to act freely and without conflicting with others peoples' freedom, when they are involved in teamwork, for example, to do a particular project. Also, it helps them towards self-discipline and self-learning when they do things with their hands and make their own choices and decisions about the activities they do.

Therefore, in education based on freedom there are some preparations to be made, especially in the Egyptian context. (A) It is important to note that learners, teachers and parents should be prepared for having extra curricular activities as a necessary and important part of the teaching and learning process. In other words they should be helped to understand the importance of extra curriculum activities, in which they can play their role as learners. Otherwise learners will miss great opportunities to exercise and enjoy freedom in education. (B) To fix the time for the learner to engage in free activities. Every learner can do whatever activity he/she wants to do with help from their a particular teacher who will be the organiser of these activities. This requires that,

in turns, every teacher takes responsibility to supervise these activities and help their learners without interference or asking them to do what they want them to do. (C) For a more effective functioning of the extra curricular activities these have to be guidelines for the organiser-teacher, learners and parents, to introduce them to the various activities and the equipment that the learners might need. However, it should only be a guide, not telling them exactly what they have to do, in order to give them the chance for creative work with their learners. (D) Activities can take place in the classroom and also in special rooms for doing such activities that requires more space and equipment, such as music and cooking. (E) The school will have to provide learners with all the facilities they might need for such activities. (F) The learners should not be required to pay for any of the activities. School should provide them for free, otherwise, not all learners will be able to have same opportunity which goes against freedom in education. (G) The learners should have opportunities to take a part in different activities in different fields such as culture, art, health and sport. 'Activities can be related to the curriculum subjects, such as collecting information, being involved in arts, taking photos, collecting stamps, cooking, visiting factories, museums, gardens, companies and hospitals' (Qassim,2000:187). (H) The activities should take place in the summer as well as during school term and outside as well as inside school. (I) 'The activities should be compatible with the learners' interests, abilities and suitable to their age' (Qassim,2000:187). (J) Fieldwork activities should take place to facilitate active and deep learning. In the more free learning environment, learners are found to be more proactive and teacher-learner rapport improves.

Seventhly, the national curriculum based on freedom should pay attention to the teaching methods that allow learners the opportunity to exercise freedom and get the benefit from its value, especially, as will be examined in chapter five the teaching methods used by Egyptian teachers are mainly lectures which do not help learners to feel free to engage in intellectual and practical processes. Therefore, the teaching methods wanted are those that allow learners to engage in such processes should be designed to support the view that learners learn more when they engage in two main activities; trying things out through practice and inquiring into things on their own through discussion. According to Arends (1994:337-8) for learners to be engaged in such processes they need an active involvement, and an atmosphere of intellectual freedom. This means that learners should be occupied in such processes such,

observing, predicting, hypothesising, raising questions, interpreting, evaluating, communicating. Moreover, learners will have the opportunity to participate in the inquiry process, to apply reasoning processes to particular questions and to understand and emulate the research skills of such fields to think rather than merely to remember. The significance of engaging learners in the two processes mentioned is demonstrated in the work of Foley (1999:82), Cook (1999:84-89), Schee and Dijk (1999:266), Lai (1999:252-3), Orton (1987:35), Solomon (1998:384-7), Waterson (1993:116), Watt (1999:185-6), Shemilt (1984:44), Pushkin (1998:195), Eggen and Kauchak (1988:207-10) and Romberg (1994:287). They hold that learners do not learn from talk, they learn to talk and do things on their own. What a teacher should do is to encourage them to join in with particular ways of talking about things they are doing. In other words learners will be engaged in both minds-on and hands-on science activities. Minds-on activities will involve learners in using their mental processes to think through a scenario in relation to developing understanding. Hands-on activities will involve learners in using the types of practical activities to learn through their own experiences.

Participation in teaching and learning processes in the classroom requires methods that allow more freedom for learners to induce them to ask questions, select and collect data to help answer questions, and to choose techniques to display and comment in particular terms about their findings. Through discussion things are learned and processes are developed. Through discussion growth is also enhanced, their own and their group's, and matters are resolved or made more satisfying. Thus the consideration in favour of discussion counts not just as products but also processes, and not just intellectual ones but also attitudes and behavioural ones, and further, not just individuals but also communal ones. (Dillon, 1994:108). In helping learners to do so teachers should be able to formulate questions on each of these six levels in order to encourage their pupils to employ a variety of cognitive processes. The six levels according to Perrott are: knowledge (to determine whether learners remember certain specific facts), comprehension (to help learners organise facts in such a way as to make some sense of them), applications (to encourage learners to apply information they have learned to reach an answer to a problem), analysis (to help learners to analyse information for underlying reasons such as cause and effect), synthesis (to help learners to form relationships and put things together in new or original ways) and evaluation (to help

learners choose among alternatives by judging which best fits some started value (1990b:38-41).

However, as it will be discussed in chapter five Egyptian learners are not used to discussion and they always feel too ashamed to engage in any activity in which they might give a wrong answer. Therefore, it is important first of all to help them feel powerful and able to engage in such a discussion then, as Perrott argues, help them to give a more complete and thoughtful response through pausing, promoting, seeking further clarification and refocusing their response; also to increase the amount and quality of learners' participation through redirecting the same question to several learners, framing questions that call for sets of related facts and framing questions that require the learners to use high cognitive thought (1990a:52).

In addition, it might be argued that the world will be more complex in the future when not only individual work will be needed but they will also be a need for group work. To work as part of a team learners need to be engaged in working as a group at school so as to prepare them for such a situation in the future. This is because working in a group, according to Sands helps learners to learn by co-operation, learning partly from each other and gaining respect for each other's strengths and weaknesses. It removes the sense of failure from slow learners and encourages learners to become self-reliant and work at their own space. It allows teachers to be available, to deal with individuals and to tailor a range of tasks for learners' needs and abilities more conveniently and appropriately (1990:146-7). In this work the teacher is only a facilitator and guide of learners (Arends,1994:377-8).

From the above it might be concluded that teaching methods should focus on engaging learners in doing and thinking of things on their own with a little help from their teachers. This requires making them feel free to make such choices and decisions with regard to what they want to do and discuss. Moreover they need to be engaged in working as a group as well as working as individuals. Having discussed the implications of the idea of freedom in determining curriculum, who should chooses its content and how can it be delivered to learners brings the argument to the idea of the value of knowledge when the idea of freedom is implemented. Therefore, in the following sections I will examine this value in the light of freedom in education.

3.2.3. Learners' freedom and the value of knowledge

As examined in chapter two, freedom is a necessary condition for learners to become happy, creative, autonomous, responsible, self-learning and acquire a good level in the academic sense. This requires that learners should not be slaves to the kinds of knowledge prescribed in the curriculum and imparted by teachers to free their minds to achieve the mentioned aims. (Al-Said,1989:207-10). In other words, freedom in education is against the view whereby more attention is given to the value of acquiring knowledge, rather than that of gaining experience through performing new activities, and it can be seen as a restriction on learners' freedom. This is usually because traditional educationalists tend to see the imparting of new knowledge as the ultimate value of education. As I will show in chapters four and five, the value of knowledge as the ultimate aim of Egyptian education is one of the restrictions that limits learners' freedom, in the sense mentioned above. Thus, I will examine in this section the idea that freedom in education does not in any way suggest that learners should not be taught any knowledge. It is concerned with questions like, what is the function of knowledge for learners in deriving benefit from the value of freedom? And how can it be introduced to learners in schools?

Education based on freedom does not consider knowledge as an end in itself but as a means to other ends. Likewise, 'Ammar (1998a:64-5) has also put forward the idea that knowledge is just a means to other ends. For example Thomson (1967:190) argues creative thinking, as an aim of education, is unlikely to be productive without collecting, selecting, and analysing data. This implies that the learners' minds should be left free without having to memorise large amounts of knowledge, as it does not make any sense merely to store information in the brain like an encyclopaedia. Also it implies that freedom allows learners the opportunity to use their minds to discover new relationships between isolated facts and to find out new knowledge about those facts. In other words, knowledge should be a means of acquiring new abilities and skills. As Cooper (1987:62) argues "to have knowledge is to have capacities and being educated consists of acquiring new capacities". Degenhardt (1982:81-2) also rejects the notion of knowledge as an end in itself and notes some of the ambiguities connected with this notion. He convincingly argues that the mere fact of someone acquiring knowledge is not useful in itself, and that freedom in education implies that teaching knowledge is not

an aim in itself. His argument is that an individual can achieve certain aim by different kinds of knowledge.

The learner's brain has to be left free to examine such knowledge and find links between different kinds of it to create new knowledge. Similarly, Darling (1984:167) states that

it is not profitable to spend a lot of time acquiring information which may become discredited. Instead children should be equipped to assimilate and cope with whatever new knowledge they may need in the future

Breese (1973:21) agrees with this argument when he says that "children should spend little time being required to learn isolated facts by heart; instead they should spend a great deal of time engaged in activities both mental and physical where they are required to master details". The point that must be made here is that knowledge in itself should not be the purpose of education. Knowledge should be a means to an end. For instance, 'Ammar (1999a:98) notes, that knowledge can be changed and modified according to new information and other new knowledge. He says that this kind of information revolution does not mean that learners need to collect all this information, instead what he stresses is the need for a methodology for dealing with it. In doing so learners will learn how to make a rational decision, solve problems and discover alternatives. Freeing the learner's minds and the development of their thinking should be the most important function of education.

Similarly, Young (1999:469-70) asserts that a curriculum for the future expresses "a transformative concept of knowledge which emphasises its power to give learners a sense that they can act on the work; a focus on the creation of new knowledge as well as the transmission of existing knowledge; an emphasis on the interdependence of knowledge areas and on the relevance of school knowledge to everyday problems". For example, Scheffler (1973:124) argues that "content should enable the learners to make responsible personal and moral decisions". This implies that freedom gives learners the opportunity to use their minds to discover new relationships between isolated facts and to find out new details about those facts. In other words, knowledge should be a means of acquiring new abilities and skills. It does not matter how much information the learners should know but it is the question how to use that information to achieve the aims of freedom in education. "if education is concerned with the development of the

rational mind..., then many of the difficulties over curriculum planning are solved” Downey and Kelly (1979:210).

For knowledge to be a means to different ends Bailey (1984:22) notes that the principles must be as fundamental as possible, so they can have general applicability:

principles are more fundamental than the particulars subsumed under them, though the principles may, in some cases, have to be arrived at by a study of particular cases; and those general clusters of rules and principles which we refer to as disciplines are more fundamental than any isolated facts or items of knowledge unrelated to anything else.

To learn by learning principles is not just to learn the same content by different methods, it is actually to learn a different content for a different purpose.

There are many arguments that can be made to justify the previous idea which considers knowledge as a means for learners to derive benefit from the value of freedom. For example, knowledge is not static, and according to Langford (1970:107) it is difficult to create a curriculum for learners which can teach them all the new knowledge that is created every second. This makes it possible to argue that even if the curriculum is designed very well, it cannot cover all the kinds of knowledge, skills and desirable experiences defined as educational. Macmunn (1926:30) makes a similar statement when he claims that “a child is not a passive machine to set working out human knowledge by the yard: he has a living mind impatient to build up a store of imagery, to weave it into the general fabric of his brain”. What is important here is not so much the kind of knowledge that should be taught, but how that knowledge can be used to allow learners freedom to obtain benefit from its value in education. One of the ways in which knowledge can be used to its full potential is by promoting imagination and ingenuity. This will give learners, as Woods and Barrow (1975:151) suggest, the capability to make the necessary imaginative leaps for breaking new ground.

The second argument has been recognised by Kelly (1977:168) and Beyer and Liston (1996:193) who note the difficulty of demonstrating “the superiority of certain kinds of knowledge and human activities over others to be included in the curriculum”. Similarly, Holt (1983:173) and (‘Ammar, 1998a:89-93) discuss the question of how we recognise one piece of knowledge as more important than another, or indeed, what we really mean when we say that some knowledge is essential and the rest, as far as school

in concerned, worthless? Holt also notes that since we cannot know what knowledge will be most needed in the future, it is senseless to try to teach it in advance. Holt further notes that the crucial question we must ask is what knowledge the schools should teach from the vast array of available intellectual resources, and goes on to say that the accumulated and ever-growing knowledge in all fields has reached such proportions that a comprehensive grasp of the total range of knowledge is out of the question for any one individual. This raises the question of how we can distinguish knowledge which is worthwhile from knowledge which is not. As previously emphasised, it is important to teach learners how to acquire the knowledge on their own instead of giving them the knowledge through the teacher or the curriculum. Spencer (1932:109) claims that

any piece of knowledge which the pupil has himself acquired, and any problem which he has himself solved, becomes, by virtue of the conquest, much more thoroughly his than it could else be. The preliminary activity of mind which his success implies, the concentration of thought necessary to it, and the excitement consequent on his triumph, conspire to register the facts in his memory in a way that no mere information heard from the teacher, or read in a school-book, can be registered.

The argument however does not end here, as I have mentioned before, determining the curriculum content in the light of the idea of freedom in education is sharing between state and learners. Therefore, the state should be neutral in introducing the type of knowledge in school which does not affect learners' choices. In this sense Pring (1976:28) maintains that subject-matters should be drawn upon to extend and refine further the life of the mind - the capacity to think, reflect, make choices, evaluate, criticise. It might be argued that although most literature claims that in school learners have to learn different kinds of knowledge related to different subjects to cover the whole area of knowledge, Young suggests that all curricula involve the assumption that some kinds and areas of knowledge are more worthwhile than others (1998:17). Since certain kinds of knowledge have a status and value greater than others they have a prior claim for inclusion in any curriculum. This is supported by Peters (1966b:28-32) who asserts that education is concerned only with those activities which have an intrinsic value. If this is the view that one takes of education, then it will follow that the curriculum for all learners must consist of these intrinsically activities and of all these form of knowledge or understanding (Hirst,1975:181-193) and (Hirst and Peters,1970:62-73).

According to this kind of argument, any learner whose curriculum excludes him from any of these areas of human knowledge and understanding is being offered an educational provision that is by definition inferior or is not receiving an education in the full sense at all (Kelly,1977:165). For instance, Hirst argues that syllabuses and curricula must be constructed so as to introduce pupils as far as possible into the interrelated aspects of each of the basic forms of knowledge, each of the several disciplines. And they must be constructed to cover at least in some measure the range of knowledge as a whole (1974:47).

Dearden (1976:33) and Blyth, for example, suggests that the essential elements of the national curriculum should be language, history, geography, science, mathematics, physical education, moral education, religious education, art and craft (1984:29-30). Hirst, too finds that that knowledge is divided into eight discrete forms of rationality (mathematics, physical science, human sciences, history, religion, literature, the fine arts and philosophy), each distinguishable from the other through its unique logical structure, and of education as the initiation of pupils into all these forms (1974:46). For White they are communication, mathematics, the physical sciences, arts appreciation and philosophical thought (1973:61-3). For Bellack (1964:265) and Lawton (1973:18-9) the curriculum should contain six core areas-five disciplines and one interdisciplinary unit. The six areas he suggests are mathematics, the physical and biological sciences, the humanities and social sciences (including history, geography, classical studies, social studies, literature, film and TV and religious studies), the expressive and creative arts, moral education and interdisciplinary work. The prescribed national curriculum subjects in England are; Mathematics, English and Science as the core subjects. The foundation subjects are History, Geography, Technology, Music, art, a foreign language and Physical education (Martin,1988:103) and (Anning,1991:101).

However, in practice it is clear that valuing the sciences gives subjects such as physics or mathematics more recognition than other subjects thereby making them compulsory, whereas arts and humanities are just options, as is the case in Egypt. This is a matter that has to be determined by the state. One reason that is constantly cited is the need for certain subjects such as physics, and computer studies as being important for the development of industry. Apple (1979:37-8) for instance, notes that there is a relation between economic structure and high-status knowledge. A capitalist, industrialist, and

technological society values the knowledge that most contributes to its continuing development. Mathematics, science and computer studies have demonstrably more financial support than do the arts and humanities. This leads to two important questions: first, whether this method of selection limits the freedom of those learners who want to study arts or humanities. The opportunity to study these subjects will be more than the opportunity to study arts and humanities. Second, whether learners feel that studying arts and humanities will be of less value than studying other subjects since these subjects are not given the recognition they deserve by the state. Nonetheless, the development of human beings cannot take place unless learners have an equal opportunity to study both sciences and humanities.

Even if learners are interested, it is likely that they will lose their interest in these subjects, because making certain subjects optional indicates that they are of less value. Dearden (1968:84-6) for instance suggests that a subject like creative art work should not be included in the curriculum as a compulsory subject. He observes that children should paint, write verse, sing, dance, play, play trumpets and throw pots voluntarily as much as they want to, but that it is not something that should be planned for them and made compulsory by the school. Although Bellack (1973:108) and Schwab (1978:377) argue that all material should be planned and made available to be used in the service of the student. Even if it is not compulsory it might not be possible to believe that it will not effect learners' decisions to choose such subjects when it is not fundamental or compulsory.

Having discussed the implications of the idea of freedom in determining the curriculum content I will turn now to discuss its implications regarding learners' assessment.

3.3. The implications of the concept of freedom regarding learners' assessment

As argued earlier, teaching and learning knowledge should be considered not as an end in itself but as means to such end. Therefore, the defenders of freedom in education argue against the significance of, for example, testing learners to find out how much knowledge they were able to memorise during the school year. For example, Holt (1970:55) maintains that

there are two main reasons why we test children: the first is to threaten them into doing what we want done, and the second is to give us a basis for handing out the rewards and penalties on which the educational system-like all coercive systems- must operate. The threat of a test makes students do this assignment. The outcome of a test enables us to reward those who seem to do it best.

At the most, a test may measure performance on a given day which has no connection with long-term retention by the learner. Learners may be bored or disaffected and not engage to the best of their ability with the test or examination. They may find the questions confusing or ambiguous. They may not be able to apply their knowledge because of the limitation of handwriting or other mechanical abilities. Many achievement tests merely measure endurance or persistence rather than learning. Some learners who are divergent thinkers may read too much into the question. Some learners become frightened and freeze up in the testing situation, especially, those who have little self-confidence or some kind of emotional or family disturbance (Broadfoot 1996b:36-7). On the other hand, Breese (1973:25) notes that examinations can be considered to be just one type of assessment, in so far as they provide information about how far each of the teacher's specific objectives have been attained by each individual and by the class as a whole. It is worth noting, however, that examinations are a poor form of assessment, as they do not reliably test the different abilities that students may possess. Likewise Hextall and Sarup (1977:155) and Clough and Davis and Sumner say that "assessment is put to no effective use other than to discriminate between children" (1984:71).

For instance, in talking about assessment, Holt (1970:53) asserts that

a best, testing does harm more than good; at worst, it hinders, distorts, and corrupts the learning process. Testers say that testing techniques are being continually improved and can eventually be perfected. Maybe.- but no imaginable improvement in testing would overcome my objections to it. Our chief concern should not be to improve testing, but to find ways to eliminate it.

Some problems in testing learners at a particular time, i.e. at the end of each school year are noted by Mathews (1985:52). Firstly, he says that we can only be concerned about what learners can do at the particular moment at which they sit the examination, but it is difficult to be concerned also about what they have done in the past, or what they may be able to do in the future. Hargreaves (1982:55) says that the everyday experience of young people has often been systematically excluded from the curriculum when we apply the public examinations. Secondly, then there is the need to distinguish between actual performance, what is actually set down on the script, and assumed characteristics which give rise to performance such as the ability to remember or assess. Thirdly, the need to distinguish the particular qualities within a narrowly prescribed area such as geography or physics, and general qualities, which are displayed in examinations as a whole. Finally, there is the need to distinguish between those qualities which examiners intended to test, the objectives and those which are actually displayed, the outcomes.

Although many argue that one important function of examinations is to confer a licence to practice. For Wilmot (1980:34) and Cotgrove (1972:80) examinations provide a framework to act as selection mechanisms. Similarly, Dore (1976:31), Burgess and Adams (1980:31) and Freeman and Lewis (1998:12-3) see schools as places where one gets certificates or passports to even better jobs. Broadfoot (1996a:32) notes that “the certificate process is in the epitome of the apparently meritocratic basis of contemporary society, since in theory it allows free competition based on academic ability and industry and thus is regarded as the fairest basis for the allocation of opportunities for high status or remunerative careers”. For Wilmot (1980:37-42) and Brown (1990:6) examinations are very important in providing an objective, reliable and precise measure of achievement. He further goes on to say that the use to which such measures were put was primarily one of selecting young people for such things as further study, training courses, apprenticeship or careers. This does not, however, mean that when learners get their certificates, they are necessarily qualified for what they have been studying. It might be possible to say that schools become a place to obtain a certificate rather than acquire good qualifications in particular subjects. Unfortunately, this century, especially, the last two decades have shown that certificates do not maintain a stable value. This leads Dore (1976:31) to call this a ‘terrible disease’. Mathews (1985:25) appears to agree, when he says “the decline in the value of certificates, and the associated demand for higher qualification as payment for access to careers, has led to a

level of certificates inflation which may undermine the educational systems notions just as surely as financial inflation can undermine their economic system". As mentioned before, having a certificate does not necessarily mean that a person is qualified.

However, this does not suggest that freedom in education means that there should be no assessment as a result of giving learners the freedom to do what they like, but that the function of it should be changed to help learners to perform. In his work, Ormell (1980:93) observes that assessment is very important because nobody can tell whether learners are achieving except by assessing them in some way. Therefore, as Flew (1976:81) states, an intention to assess is intrinsic to the intention of education. This is because assessment can "make statements about the recipients of an educational services, statements about their actual and potential accomplishments in relation to the opportunities for learning provided by that service" (MacDonald,1985:163). Further MacDonald (1985:163) states that "assessment is the basis for decisions about what students will get in the way of further provision, and for predictions of their future accomplishment". Assessment can be of significance if its aim is to give the learner, "good assessment information about his or her progress and successful, and unsuccessful, learning strategies, then this will be of assistance, even if in any individual case the desired end may be a different one from that intended by those planning the programme" (Murphy and Torrance,1990:13).

Therefore, the assessment in education to achieve the aims of education should be to answer the question of how a particular course could satisfy the learners' interests and help them to think, discover, and make responsible choices and decisions. The answer to this question will show that assessment, as Hopkins (1976b:198) points out, "becomes the examination of the learning environment in its ability to facilitate the investigations the students desire and find rewarding". This means that assessment becomes a process for finding out how far the developed and organised learning experiences actually produce the desired results, and that the process of assessment can be used to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the educational process. This requires as Salvia and Hughes (1990:15-17) argue, listening to a child and watching them. Therefore, a negative assessment of work does not indicate that the learner is inefficient or foolish. Assessment is important to find out about the success or failures in determining the educational processes. Further, Rogers (1970a:142-3) observes that it

is important that some degree of self-assessment be built into any attempt to promote an experiential type of learning. In his view, “when the individual has to take the responsibility for deciding what criteria are important to him, what goals he has been trying to achieve, and the extent to which he has achieved those goals, he truly learns to take responsibility for himself and his directions”. When learners are given the freedom to decide the criteria on which they feel they should be assessed, it might be possible to assess the different abilities possessed by learners. In this sense, Black (1994:130) argues that learners have to develop their own understanding of what their learning is meant to achieve for them, and to be as clear as possible about their own progress: so, learners have to be involved in their own assessment. Similarly, Harding & Beech (1991:3) argue that

assessment is desirable if the focus is to be on benefiting the child. The encouragement of different types of thinking and concepts development or enabling potential, reflect pupil-focus assessment. Where information is needed regarding the next steps to be taken in teaching, criterion referenced assessment comes into its own.

To assess learners in the previous sense of achieving the aims of freedom in education does not require the cancellation of examinations. On the contrary, examinations are very important procedures to make well-informed decisions about the achievement of the aims of education. However, examinations have to be modified to achieve the mentioned aims otherwise they will be one of the restrictions that limit learners’ freedom to achieve the value of freedom in education. This is to say that assessment procedures especially at an early age should not focus on direct questions and answers but teachers should make observations for the learners to find out how they use their freedom, how they manage it without conflicting with others, how they engage in teamwork, and how they respond to new information. Therefore, observations and everyday experiences should be systematically included in the assessment procedures beside the public examination, whereby avoiding the disadvantages of examinations they are noted by Broadfoot (1996) and Mathews (1985). In this sense, Shorrocks (1993:17-8) maintains that “observing children in an objective way, then, in class or anywhere else in school, is important... for assessing academic progress”. This means that assessment should be a continuous process throughout the year in which make learners engage in assessment situations and feel that it is part of their learning. In doing so learners will gradually lose the scared feeling they experience when they sit the public exams. Moreover, the certificate that learners receive at the end of each stage

will be more valuable in that it shows that a particular learner is qualified in particular subjects. Moreover, the types of examination questions should not aim to find out how much knowledge learners were able to memorise but what changes taken place in their minds after studying a particular course, especially since the aims of freedom in education can not be assessed by having the traditional types of direct questions and answers.

Having discussed the implications of the idea of freedom regarding learners' assessment. I will now turn to discuss its implications regarding teacher education

3.4. The implications of the concept of freedom regarding teachers' education

What we want to do with the teacher will be different according to what we want them to do in and outside the classroom. According to Bantock (1969:123) and Hoyle (1969:14) if the role of teacher can be understood as an authority, someone who simply hands on ready-made knowledge, then they have to be trained to be good in particular subjects and to know how to teach them. Therefore, teachers have to use the skills they have been trained in to transfer the knowledge they are supposed to teach. Similarly, Wilson (1975:108) and Stewart (1969:18) hold that teachers are trained for a particular job or task: to know their subject matter and how to teach it. For, Lipman (1988:152) teachers do what they have been trained to do- they teach as they have been taught. Moreover, McMullen (1969:37) argues that the teacher must understand children's needs, have a good knowledge of the material and an intensity of personal experience and knowledge, and have the ability to control learners, and to criticise their skills and judgement. Britton (1969:182) states that the failure to provide a good standard of subject knowledge is far more serious than failure to produce class control.

This makes it possible to say that the most important characteristic that can be used to describe a teacher is whether they know their subject or not. But according to John it is not by academic knowledge and thinking that teachers become effective or become good teachers (1996:96). This view of teacher preparation produces teachers who have similar ways of teaching, although they are going to teach different learners in different environments. This manner of training teachers can be seen to help candidates to be good in their subject but it does not guarantee that they will be able to teach that subject.

Also it could be argued that learners do not have freedom to be an active element in the classroom. Teachers are the ones who have to do everything and learners have to listen to what the teacher says without questioning him. The role of the teacher and the kind of relationship between teachers and learners do not seem to be a suitable way of handling such aims, and the curriculum concerning freedom in education is discussed in chapter two and the current chapter. This type of preparation does not help to educate candidates to help their learners to exercise the required conditions to derive benefit from freedom in education. For the idea of freedom to be implemented teachers, Stewart (1969:18) argues, have to be educated as individuals, not merely trained for the profession of teaching. Similarly, Peters (1977:137) states that “ an ‘educator duty is to educate teachers as persons”. This required that teaching candidates (i) should have a free choice to do a particular course in the teacher’s institutes (ii) be free to think and express their thoughts regarding their education. To prepare teachers to help learners to be independent thinkers requires, as Silim (1999:121) and (Shawqi and Abw Al-Su‘wd,1997:320) state, a free atmosphere in which teachers can be taught and also be free during their own teaching. (iii) be free to make their own choices, judgements and decisions. In short, they have to be educated in the same way as they are going to teach. That is to say, freedom in education in the teacher’s institutes is a required condition in which to produce free, creative, responsible, choosers and autonomous teachers who can achieve the aims of freedom in education in schools with their learners. This, also, requires teaching candidates to study and understand what freedom in education, its conditions and its value is, so that they can have a full understanding of the nature of their role in implementing this theory. It might be possible to argue that it is not satisfactory to train a large number of people in the same way to do the same job, which is the transfer of knowledge. They have to be different because they will teach different learners in different environments. Also they have to be able to manage a class; they have to know how to do things without the class getting out of hand; to know how to set or mark an examination; how to record learners’ progress; how to spot which children are working and which are not. Thus, to educate people in the mentioned way as free individuals means that they must perform their role in implementing freedom in education, whereby they will be able to provide their learners with the required conditions to derive benefit from the value of freedom in education.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter was an attempt to investigate the implications of freedom in education in relation to the curriculum, assessment and teacher's training, which provide learners with the required conditions, in which they and society can derive benefit from the value of freedom so as to satisfy their interests. Some conclusions can be drawn from the earlier examination as follows. Firstly, it is important to help learners to determine for themselves what they would like to do, what they need to know next and how to go about pursuing their individual investigations, but until they are equipped with the necessary skills and knowledge for this they should not be allowed complete freedom. The freedom to choose what line of study to pursue and how best to pursue it is inappropriate for children whose intellectual skills are relatively underdeveloped and who have insufficient experiences to know what choices are available. This means that several suggestions for possible choices should be sought by the teacher and considered by the children before the choice has to be made. In such circumstances adult suggestion, or adult instigation, which might theoretically be thought to narrow the range of choices and limit freedom, in fact enlarges it.

Secondly, I suggested that the curriculum content should be chosen with reference to the interests of the state so that children will acquire the knowledge and skills that the state wants them to have. Also it should be chosen according to the interests of the learners as well, so they will work better and learn more effectively because they are interested in what they are required to do. However, it is important to note that learner sharing should be essential and effective.

Thirdly, it was argued that having a national curriculum does not limit learners' freedom if it was planned in a way that guaranteed the required conditions for learners to obtain benefit from the value of freedom in education. Regarding textbooks, it can be seen that they are important for learners, teachers and public as guidelines but not for teaching and assessing learner achievement with respect to knowledge acquisition, as the textbook provides all the information they are expected to acquire. In this sense textbooks should not be the only resource learners depend on but they should be required to look at different resources. Fourthly, this chapter provided evidence that exercising authority in the consideration of knowledge as an end in itself and forcing the

learner to be slave to gain and memorise such knowledge, restricts the children intellectually and puts them in a particular formulation. However, education based on freedom pays attention to knowledge as means to reach such ends.

Fifthly, it is argued that freedom in education does not mean that there should be no assessment as a result of giving learners the freedom to do what they like, but that its purpose should be changed to evaluate the teaching and learning process and help learners to perform. Moreover, the types of examination questions should not aim to find out how much knowledge learners can memorise but what the changes have taken place in their minds after studying a particular course, especially that since the aims of freedom in education can not be assessed by having the traditional types of direct questions and answers.

Finally it suggested that implementing freedom in education requires teachers to be educated as individuals, not merely trained for the profession of teaching. This required that teaching candidates (i) should have a free choice to do a particular course in the teacher's institutes (ii) be free to think and express their thoughts regarding their education. To prepare teachers to help learners to be independent thinkers requires a free atmosphere in which teachers can be taught and also be free during their own teaching. (iii) be free to make their own choices, judgements and decisions. In short, they have to be educated in the same way as they are going to teach. That is to say, freedom in education in the teacher's institutes is a required condition in which to produce free, creative, responsible, choosers and autonomous teachers who can achieve the aims of freedom in education in schools with their learners. This, also, requires teaching candidates to study and understand what freedom in education, its conditions and its value is, so that they can have a full understanding of the nature of their role in implementing this theory.

Merely having a theoretical framework of freedom in education and its conditions and value it might not be sufficient for its implementation in the Egyptian context without analysing and examining the idea of freedom for the history and the present situation of Egypt. It will be necessary to find out; firstly, if there are other implications and factors that should be considered before implementing the idea of freedom. Secondly, to discover the features of freedom and unfreedom in the Egyptian system, which need to

be promoted in the case of the former and avoided in that of the latter. Therefore, in the next two chapters I will examine the idea of freedom from 1805 to 2000.

Chapter Four

Freedom in education in Egyptian history (1805 –1991)

4.1. Introduction

The main concern of this chapter is to discover and analyse the idea of freedom in educational theory and practice in the history of Egypt from 1805 to 1991, whereas the next chapter focuses on the period from 1992 to 2000. The aims of this chapter can be summarised as follows; firstly, to discover and analyse the conditions of freedom related to Egyptian society and its educational system for learners to get benefit from the value of freedom in education. In other words, to investigate how far learners have been interfered with and been subject to authority in their choices and decisions to study what they are interested in and to be or become what they want? Secondly, to discover such educational practices as reflect the features of freedom and unfreedom. This will help in understanding how the present educational system has come about. This is necessary so as to establish a sound basis for the implementation of freedom in chapter six. Thirdly, to discover the sort of restrictions that determined learners' freedom in educational policy and practice. This will help to avoid such restrictions and prepare for such conditions as are important in the implementation of freedom in the Egyptian context in chapter six. Fourthly, to examine the idea of freedom in education regarding its value in theory and practice. Also, to investigate whether the claim for learners' freedom in Egypt is desirable and valuable for learners and society according to educationalists' thinking. The significance of this aim is to give an indication of the suitability and validity of the implementation of freedom in education into the Egyptian context.

4.2. Freedom in education regarding its conditions

This section investigates and analyses the idea of freedom in education regarding its conditions. Firstly, it will examine learners' freedom to study what they are interested in and to be or to become something they want; in other words to answer the question of whether the state had taken into consideration learner's interests. It will discover the learners' freedom in making their own free choices to have a particular opportunity in education in accordance with their wills and interests.

4.2.1. Learners' freedom to determine what they are interested in studying

This section will investigate if learners' freedom to study what they are interested in and to be or to become something they want was interfered with. In other words to answer the question of whether the state had taken into consideration learners' interests? In the period from 1805 to 1848 Muhammad 'Ali's attempt to build Egypt into a modern nation did not consider the interests, wants and needs of the individual. 'Elite modernisation and education rather than public education were his main concern' (Sabri,1996:54-55). Heyworth-Dunne says that 'Ali's efforts to reform education reflect his desire to build the military and ensure his security (1968: 104). Therefore 'Ali built military schools to fulfil his aims' (Hajar,1991:35). "But even those that were not actually providing officers and men for active service were intended for some auxiliary service connected with the supply and demand of the force, either directly or indirectly. Not a single institution was set up philanthropically or for the sole purpose of improving the intellectual outlook of the people" (Heyworth-Dunne,1968:152). It is true that 'Ali allowed more freedom for learners to be educated in well-organised free schools and acquire new knowledge. However, he denied the importance and the necessity of the learners' role in determining their own learning; what, where and why they want to learn particular subjects.

On the one hand, 'Ali did not consider the question of learners' freedom to choose to go to a particular school or not. Moreover, learners did not have freedom to choose the type of subject they were interested in, 'social sciences, history or philosophical subjects had no

weight in the curriculum. The types of sciences that had to be taught were to facilitate the achievement of 'Ali's aims' ('Ali,1989:71-2). In this sense it might be possible to argue that learners and their families had started to believe that the natural sciences were more valuable than the social ones. On the other hand, learners were under the absolute authority and control of 'Ali to achieve his goals. 'They had to do what 'Ali wanted them to do, otherwise they were physically punished. Therefore, 'Ali treated schools like a military unit. Learners had a fixed time to do all activities such as studying, eating, or sleeping. Young learners used to study nine hours a day with very short breaks compared to the efforts they made' ('Ali,1989:67). This regime required learners to leave their families and live in schools for years until graduation. They did not have the freedom to leave schools for even a short time to visit their families or for their families to visit them. 'Every school was surrounded by barriers to prevent learners from thinking of running away from school' ('Ali,1989:67). It might be argued that this type of education had a bad effect by turning learners into obedient clerks, as 'Ali wanted them to be. They did not have the ability to do critical thinking, make decisions for themselves or to be responsible for their action. Moreover, it was impossible for them to be the technically and scientifically trained leaders so badly needed to develop their society because they had not been educated for that purpose.

After 'Ali's death new leaders ruled the country (Abbas and Sa'id). 'Abbas and Sa'id 'replaced most of the Egyptian employers of high rank by Turkish ones. Therefore, they saw no need to waste money in educating Egyptian people' (Al-Fiqi,1997:69,72). Consequently, in the educational policy at that time neither the interests, wants or needs of individuals and society nor their right to education were considered. In 1863, when Isma'il took over, he realised the importance of education to satisfy society's needs. Also 'he found that employing Egyptians rather than Foreigners was very important for his security' (Al-Fiqi,1997:80). Therefore, 'his policy stressed on expansion of free primary education as his main concern' (Sabri,1996:132). However, the idea of learners' freedom to study what they were interested in had no place in his educational policy. As I will argue later this might refer to the narrowness of educational thought at the time which did not realise the importance of considering learners' interests as the core of educational planning.

“By 1876, the Egyptian government was almost bankrupt. In 1882, British troops entered the country to suppress rebellion and consequently, the British became the actual governing forces behind the Ottoman Khedive” (Cochran,1986:9). The British implemented an educational policy with the aim of controlling the Egyptian community and training a section of the population to serve in the lower ranks of the government (Hargreaves,2001:248-9). Therefore, ‘the occupation’s policy meant allowing the minimum level of education for learners only to be able to do government jobs’ (Abw-Al-Ais’ad,1993a:114-5). From the point of the occupier there was no need for learners to have freedom to become interested in what they were studying because it did not serve British aims. It was not the British concern to educate the Egyptians in way that developed their thinking, experiences, knowledge and skills.

In 1923, although Egypt officially gained independence, the country continued to remain under British authority until 1952. (Szyliowicz,1973:180). Therefore, education continued to neglect the freedom of learners to develop their thinking, experiences, knowledge and skills or to consider these as central to its processes (Hargreaves,2001:248). However, unlike under the British occupation, education considered, for the first time in the history of Egypt, the needs and interests of society. Therefore, it aimed ‘to provide Egypt with technical leaders to meet her development needs’ (Nisim,1984:200) through preparing the children for practical life, not through learning a trade, but rather through increasing their interests in practical subjects such as manual skills (Cochran,1986:23-24). This continued to be the main aim of education even after full independence in 1952 ‘when for the first time Egypt came under the control of Egyptians’ (Raghib,1980:31-2) and continued until 1991. ‘Education focused on providing learners with knowledge and skills to suit the needs of the industrial and agricultural development rather than the individual’ (Al-Fiqi,1997:240-1). Being a free society was not really reflected in the way the educational policy thought of learners, their freedom and the role they can play for themselves and their society. According to Hargreaves (2001:250) “the aim of education was indirectly to serve the state. The improvement the revolutionaries sought was national and political improvement”. As under the British occupation, educational policy did not pay attention to learners’ interests, wants and needs. That is to say, ‘education did not focus on helping the learners to act

according to their free will, know their duties and their rights, be responsible for their actions, respect others, perform organised activities, follow their personal initiatives, make their own decisions or explore and discover things for themselves' (Khidr,1992: 135-140). However, the state could not achieve its main aim, so Egyptian commercial and industrial expansion was hampered by the lack of adequate trained personnel. This led to a state in which any effort spent on technical education was wasted because graduates were not qualified enough to perform their expected role in development. In 1970, when Sadat took over he "concentrated more openly on economics, recognising that both social and political aims depended on it. He sought the economic improvement of both the country as a whole but more especially the education sector" (Hargreaves,2001:251). The aim of education put in place by Sadat was to meet his aims of national economic improvement without paying attention to whether learners were interested in what they were studying. This continued to be the case when Husni Mubarak became president in 1981. Learners continued to study what the state wants them to do whatever their interests were. Moreover, individuals failed to play their roles in the process in development due to the poor quality of the education system at the time. Moreover, 'Ammar (1996a:25) observed that, 'there was no comprehensive philosophy for what the society and the individual needs from education. Every new government has a new and different policy for education. This produces confusion throughout the educational system'.

4.2.2. Learners' freedom to have free and equal educational opportunity

This section will investigate the learners' freedom to make free choices to have a particular opportunity in education in accordance with their wills and interests. This analysis is necessary to achieve the third aim of this chapter which is concerned with discovering such educational practices that reflect aspects of freedom and unfreedom in terms of the availability of educational opportunity. It will also investigate girls' freedom to find out whether there are social or political restrictions limiting their freedom, whereas chapter one indicated that there were no religious restrictions limiting girls' freedom.

4.2.2.1. Learners' freedom under Muhammad 'Ali (1805-1848)

For the first time in Egyptian history, learners had the chance 'to study new sciences, having many translated books from different languages into Arabic and being sent abroad' (Al-Fiqi,1997:49-52). 'Ali's policy in education was based on 'sending delegates to European countries to learn military sciences' (Qurani,1995:164). 'Ali (1995a:20-1) mentions that 'between 1826 and 1847 'Ali sent 281 learners to different European countries'. Most of the learners were 'sent to study military science and few of them studied civil sciences which were also required for 'Ali's military personnel' (Al-Fiqi,1997:49-1). To produce the technical and military personnel 'Ali sat up many special schools. Heyworth-Dunne mentions that in 1821, he established a military school and others were to follow. In 1827, a school of medicine was founded. In 1829, a school of pharmaceuticals was opened and from 1827 a school of veterinary studies was created. Within the military several schools were opened: there was a cavalry school, a music school and schools for the artillery, the infantry and the navy. Technical schools for mineralogy, engineering and applied chemistry followed. 'Ali developed civil schools to improve the skills of his administrators and several other specialists institutions were developed, for example, a school of agriculture, school of translation and a school of irrigation (1968:117-151). 'Because this emergent higher education had been established before primary and secondary schools' (Hilmi and Nuwir,1987:20), 'Ali was forced to use 'the existing religious education network as the sources of learners' (Al-Fiqi,1997:65). It was evident, however, 'those learners were not qualified to learn at the special schools' (Badran,1996:77). Therefore, in 1825, 'Ali sat up 'two preparatory schools' (Sabri,1996:56). However, 'Ali' thought that it was useful for a more effective military education that learners should be prepared for a few years in what were called *maktabs* before enrolling in the preparatory school. 'Between 1833 and 1837 Ali set up 67 *maktabs* for 5,500 learners to provide the preparatory schools with learners who could read, write, do simple mathematical functions and knew a little about the principles of religion. Also he intended by setting up these *maktabs* to improve the skills of his administrators and several other specialist institutions' (Sabri,1996:57). With the establishment of *maktabs* 'Ali had his own new educational system.

Under 'Ali's regime Egypt had two complete national educational systems. The traditional system where learners start their education in what were called *kuttabs* and continue their education at *Al-Azhar*, and the new system where learners start their education in the *maktabs* and continue through preparatory and special schools or go abroad. 'Traditional educational system in *kuttabs* was run privately by jurists and old men' ('Ali, Hilmi, Aïmam, 1996:37), this means that they were not under supervision from the state. Moreover, 'there were no transfer channels between 'Ali's system and the traditional one' (Al-Batriq, 1999:41). In this sense it might be argued that having two systems in the country produced 'a dualism in education that has continued until the recent period' (Qurani, 1995:165). The dualism in education limited the freedom of learners who attended the traditional system for two reasons; first, although 'Ali did not put any obstacles in the way of any learner who wanted to learn in his system, the educational opportunities he offered were very limited for the number of officers he wanted to do so. Second, he did not pay attention to the traditional system because 'it was not suitable to achieve his aims. In the main, he provided learners at his schools with clothing, food and everything they might need for studying' (Al-Batriq, 1999:40-42). Although these features of inequality and unfreedom between two the systems were obvious, Egyptian families did not complain or claim the freedom to obtain equal opportunities for their children. Unfortunately, 'Egyptian families preferred to send their children to work rather than to school, because they were not aware of the importance of being educated' (Al-Fiqi, 1997:63). Interestingly, 'the government obliged most children to attend school. Officers had to take them by force and put them in schools' ('Ali, 1989:68-9). This reflects the importance and necessity for society to be prepared for such a new system, otherwise learners will not derive benefit from it.

4.2.2.1.1. Girls' freedom under Muhammad 'Ali (1805-1848)

Girls did not have the range of freedom as boys, for two reasons: first, no claim for girl's freedom had been made by society because 'nobody wished to send his daughter to study at school, because they thought that girl's education was a bad thing' (Mursi, 1993:101). Second, 'Ali did not pay attention to their education because he did not need girls as part of his military. It was only, 'in 1832, that 'Ali set up free midwives school' (Hassan, 1980a:36)

and tried to force families to send their daughters to this school First, 'he forced his military officers to send their daughters otherwise they had to pay a big fine. Second, at a public party he commanded doctors to marry graduates from this school and provided every couple with all that they needed' (Hassan,1980a:36). As a result a number of poor families sent their daughters, especially after they realised that education helped girls to be independent and get well paid. Also, 'in 1835, a foreign school was set up to educate aristocratic girls' (Hassan,1980a:37). This reflects the effectiveness of political efforts to change social views towards such values.

4.2.2.2. Learners' freedom under Muhammad 'Ali's successors (1849-1881)

During the Abbas and Sa'id regimes 'less attention was paid to education and many schools were closed down' (Qurani,1995:165). At the end of Sa'id's term office there were 'two schools in Egypt: a military school and a medicine school' (Tawfiq,1984:3). Therefore, unlike the previous era, learners' freedom in education was limited in terms of the availability of educational opportunity. In the main, Abbas and Sa'id 'supported foreign schools rather than state ones' (Al-Fiqi,1997:75). This reflects the fact that learners' freedom to gain a place at school was dependent on the political will to offer such opportunities. 'The limitation of educational opportunity met with an objection from some educationalists who studied abroad' ('Ali,1989:99). However, their efforts were not adequate to claim freedom for learners in education. This might refer to the fact that the community was not sufficiently aware of the significance of being educated, to support such efforts.

In 1863, when 'Isma'il took over he 'set up one preparatory school for 185 learners and two technical schools in 1878' (Sabri,1996:133), in addition to special schools, 'such as those of medicine, law, pharmacy, engineering and translation. Just as his grandfather 'Isma'il gave attention to the military schools' (Al-Sahm,1997:81-8) and 'sent 162 scholar to study military sciences in Europe' ('Abd-Al-Karim,1945:775), for primary education 'Isma'il 'reopened all the schools had existed before under 'Ali, and built new ones. These new schools not only covered big cities only but also most small villages' (Al-

Batriq,1999:145). This means that learners in rural and poor areas enjoyed an equal opportunity with their peers in the cities, unlike earlier times. 'In 1878, 53,700 *maktabs* were opened for 137,553 learners' ('Ali,1995a:82-3). 'The percentage of enrolment at schools reached 41% for the total number of learners of the required age' ('Ali,1995a:83).

From the information given above, on the one hand learners' enjoyed more freedom in terms of having more educational opportunities, on the other, they enjoyed more forms of freedom. Firstly, 'learners had the freedom to choose to go to school or not. There was no compulsion for learners to remain at school until graduation' ('Ali,1995a:73). Unlike the 'Ali period schools changed from being military units to being institutions for learning, for those who had the free will to learn. 'Isma'il' 'forbade physical punishment and made sure that teachers treated learners kindly' ('Ali,1995a:73-4). In addition, 'learners had equal opportunities to enrol in school because there were no requirements for enrolment' (Al-Fiqi,1997:89). Also, 'schools accepted any learner who chose to learn, whatever his/her religion, race or class' ('Abd-Al-Karim,1945:52-5). Secondly, learners enjoyed freedom in relation to finding resources for knowledge since 'Isma'il' 'established a library in every single school to make knowledge available for learners' (Al-Fiqi,1997:105).

4.2.2.2.1. Girls' freedom under Muhammad 'Ali's successors (1849-1881)

Girls enjoyed more freedom than they had under 'Ali's regime in terms of educational opportunity. 'In 1872, 'Isma'il's wife opened the first Islamic school for girls' (Hassan,1980a:36). The number of girls at this school was very small compared to the foreign one; for example, in 1878, 'the number of girls in foreign schools was 4,625 comparing to 248 in the Islamic one. Unfortunately, the number of girls in the Islamic school was reduced to 206 in 1980 because of the unsuitability of its curriculum to the Egyptian girls' habits and needs' ('Ali,1995a:85). 'Another was set up in 1874' (Al-Fiqi,1997:94). Unfortunately, at the end of Isma'il's time 'one school was closed for lack of funds' ('Ali,1995a:85). However, these two schools were limited to rich families rather than the community, because girls' education was recognised as privilege for aristocratic girls. Also it was limited in terms of knowledge and subjects. Girls used to study 'a little mathematics, art, and geography, plus music, needlework, food science, the language and

Qur'an' ('Ali, 1995a:85-6). This reflects the low position that girls had in relation to the importance of their role in society. The community believed that their role was in the home to look after their husbands and children, not to be a social participator. In this sense, it is important to note that 'Isma'il did not make any effort to encourage the community to send their daughters to school.

4.2.2.3. Learners' freedom under the British occupation (1882-1922)

British policy meant to limit the number of educational opportunities to the number they needed for government jobs. Most of special schools, preparatory schools and *maktabs* created by 'Ali and his successors were closed. 'They established only four new primary schools between 1882 and 1924' (Mursi, Hilmi and Jamal Al-Din, 1991:421). In 1916, many *kuttabs* changed to what were called elementary schools, whose duration was four years increased to six by 1925 (Cochran, 1986:23). By 1911, the state set up 10 agricultural schools and one commercial school (Cochran, 1986:15-16). Clearly, state schools provided an education suited to the needs of the British. In 1913, as a result of the British policy, "the number of students in Egyptian schools was 3.5% of the eligible population, compared to 15% in Italy and France, 16% in Austria, Germany and Japan, 17% in England and 24% in the U.S.A" (Cochran, 1986:17). Moreover, 'the British policy in education can be reflecting in the serious 'rate of illiteracy that reached 99.7% in 1907' ('Ali, 1995a:107). For higher education the British had no financial investment at all. Cochran mentions that in 1908, "a group of Egyptian notables and leaders paid subscription and begun a public university. In addition, only the wealthy Egyptians could afford to have their children educated abroad at their parents' expense" (Cochran, 1986:16).

The British policy to limit learners' freedom in terms of educational opportunity took the following forms. Firstly, prior to British occupation, education had been totally free. Also, 'learners did not have to pay even a small amount for any other educational services' ('Ali, 1998:5). But, by 1907, 'free education was entirely prohibited' (Hassan, 1979:16). Education was mainly for the wealthy as most schools levied fees. 'Even those educated in modern primary or elementary schools had to be at least middle class, while the poor

Egyptians went to *kuttabs* which were founded at various levels by the endowment of each mosque or church' (Tawfiq,1984:6-15). As a result, not many families could afford to educate their children beyond primary schools. This policy resulted in privileging the wealthy by giving them a good education that was not available to those learning basic skills at *kuttabs*. Moreover 'the British had more financial investment in foreign schools rather than state schools' ('Abd Al-Karim,1945:833). As a result of the occupation's policy in controlling Egyptian society and limited the educational opportunity, individuals who believed in the importance of education in their fight against occupation to gain independence established a number of free schools for the public (see table 1).

Table 1
Numbers of schools and learners in state and public schools (1882-1920)

Type of school	State schools	Public schools	State learners	Public learners
Elementary	139	2940	18303	21349
Primary school	39	86	11592	14638
Total	178	3026	29895	35987

Al-Fiqi, H. (1997:148)

The previous information shows that big public efforts were made to offer free educational opportunities for the public in elementary and primary education. Moreover, 'they established secondary, technical and adults education' ('Ali, and Hilmi and Aimam,1996:67). These efforts increased the learners' freedom to know and understand the society's problems and claims under the British. Especially since 'the British continued to control the Egyptians and isolated them from their society and its problems' (Suliman et al,1966:125) and ('Ali,1995b:98-9), they avoided offering a way of democratic life at state schools. 'Life at these schools was very restricted and learners used to receive physical punishment without justification' (Abw-Al-Ais'ad,1993a:243).

Secondly, unlike 'Ali and his successors regime, 'the British changed the language of instruction from Arabic to English' (Hassan,1979:9). Moreover, the number of hours for teaching Arabic was decreased in favour of English, for example, 'in 1907, the number of teaching hours in secondary schools was 36 for Arabic and 94 for English' (Ali,1995b:98-9). Recognising the foreign influence in the education of young people, the Egyptians claimed that Arabic should be the language of instruction in schools. As a result, 'in 1907,

English became a mere subject to be taught at school, instead of being the medium of teaching' ('Ali,1995b:127).

However a close look to the data in table 1 shows that although there was a great difference between the number of state and public schools it did not meet with the expected increase in the number of learners. This was due to the fact society was not yet aware of the importance of education to send their children to school. When the number of educational opportunities had increased, education increased the learners' freedom to read, write, think, criticise, know their rights and duties, fight for their rights and freedom and organise themselves to work toward independence. For example, 'in 1906, learners in law school were able to organise a strike against the British occupation which made the occupier considers learners as a source of trouble. Also, in 1909, the learners were able to organise many peaceful demonstrations to express their anger about the British presence in Egypt, in addition to their role in the 1919 revolution' (Abw-Al-Ais'ad,1993a:247-251).

4.2.2.3.1. Girls' freedom under the British occupation (1882-1922)

As in previous periods, girls' education continued take place in foreign schools until 1900. 'From 1909 to 1920, the state established a few primary schools and one secondary school' ('Ali and Hilmi and Aimag,1996:83)'. This means that 'the establishing of state primary education for girls came 40 years later than boys' school and 90 years later than secondary schools' (Hassan,1980a:37). Table 2 shows how far girls' education was behind boys' in primary state schools.

Table 2
Numbers of boy and girl learners and schools at state and public primary levels between 1882 and 1920

Type of sex	State schools	Public schools	State learners	Public learners
Boys	34	61	10,749	11,770
Girls	5	25	843	2,868

Al-Fiqi. H. (1997:148)

In terms of knowledge girls' freedom continued to be limited to 'particular subjects that prepare them to be wives and mothers rather than social participators' (Mursi,1993:227). Gender inequality might be put down the inability of most families to afford the required educational fees for their daughters. In fact, they preferred to pay for their sons rather than

their daughters. This might reflect the fact that Egyptian society continued to think that girls' education had no value for them, their daughters or society. Also they did not accept the idea of educating their daughters by male teachers. With 'the appearance of the feminist movement and the opening in 1900, of a department for female teacher's education' (Abw-Al-Ais'ad,1993a:145-6) some families especially in big cities began to rethink positively about the education of girls and to send their daughters to be educated. This increased girls' freedom in terms of educational opportunity. As a result, the demand for more educational opportunities for girls was more than the state could supply. Therefore, a number of free public schools for girls were established (see table 2) to meet the new needs of the community. However, the opportunities for girls continued to be less than that for boys. This emphasises to the fact that any undesirable social value needs a long time and great effort until it can be changed. Moreover the previous two tables show how far public efforts helped in increasing girls' freedom compared to the state's efforts.

4.2.2.4. Learners' freedom during limited independence (1923-1951)

The change that was seen with respect to freedom in education was the increase in this right when education at elementary and primary education level was made free, unlike education under the British occupation. This came as a result of wide debate that was concerned with individuals' rights in society, as will be examined later in this chapter. Therefore, the Egyptian constitution of 1923 mandated that elementary education should be free and compulsory for all children from 6 to 12 (Williamson,1987:107). 'Primary school became free in 1944, but secondary and higher education tuition fees were charged' (Tawfiq,1984:15-6).

As a result the state established 762 four-year compulsory schools, and 600 additional schools were started in 1936 (Cochran,1986:23). However, this freedom was an illusion for two reasons; firstly, the state established the primary school, another state system, and had offered 'a four-years course in which a tuition fee was charged' (Tawfiq,1984:15). The existence of the latter produced inequality between poor and rich learners in education. For example, 'elementary schools taught no foreign language and were operated for a half-day.

They were limited in facilities, curriculum and instruction. Further, they received only 2 pounds per learner from the government, as compared to 20 pounds per student in the primary schools. ‘Instruction in the primary schools was notably superior to instruction in elementary schools as they had adequate financial resources’ (Fathi,1999:89). Moreover, because primary schools taught English and French, language learners were able to pass enrolment examination to secondary school, whereas those who had gone to elementary school or *kuttab* did not have the same opportunity. Otherwise they had to pay for extra tutoring in order to pass the language examination which was difficult.

Furthermore, although ‘primary school became free in 1944, and officially the two schools became one school in 1951, they continued to remain separated and different in terms of building, curriculum and quality of teachers’ (Fathi,1999:91). ‘Primary schools continued to be the best, and available only for rich families, because they were limited in number compared to elementary schools. This means that learners living in urban areas were the most likely to begin education in the primary school.’ (Fathi,1999:91). In this sense Fathi (1999:89) argues that the ‘the dualism between elementary and primary schools means that there is one school for the poor and another for rich’. This type of inequality can be considered as one of the restrictions on poor learners which limits their education.

The second aspect of having the illusion of freedom can be seen in the insufficient number of schools that allowed places for only a limited number of learners (see table 3). “By 1930, only 18% of the primary population were estimated to be enrolled in elementary or primary school” (Hargreaves,2001:249).

Table 3
Numbers of learners in elementary and primary (1925 –1950)

Level	1925	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950
Elementary	190,677	740,138	682,180	709,390	818,774	838,937	862,929
Primary	31,053	46,776	82,369	95,400	105,014	116,482	122,144
Total	222,761	796,695	775,981	818,091	939,006	974,759	1,030,486

Al-Qusi, ‘A. (1952:451)

The previous data shows that although the primary fees had been abolished in 1944, it did not result in a dramatic increase in the number of primary learners, as was expected. Al-Fiqi (1997:206) argues ‘that this refers to the insufficient number of schools because the

state did not prepare for an increase in the social demand for education' (Taweefq,1984:15-6) as a result of having free primary school for free. For example, it had 'no plan to investigate each county's needs, conditions, history, material and population' (Taweefq,1984:15-6). The failure in the preparation for such decisions can be seen as a restriction that limited the learners' freedom.

Thirdly, secondary education can be seen to reflect more freedom in terms of having free opportunities in 1950 (see table 4). The increase in enrolment might refer to the abolishing of educational fees in primary schools in 1944. This was followed by increase of number of higher education learners, though it still charged fees.

Table 4
Numbers of learners in state secondary school (1925-1950)

Year	1925	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950
No. of learners	8,100	38,823	44,810	50,279	60,047	70,234	93,767

Al-Qusi, 'A. (1952:451)

4.2.2.4.1. Girls' freedom during limited independence (1923-1951)

As under the British occupation, girls' education continued to focus on learning skills such as embroidery, needlepoint and home economics. In terms of educational opportunities although girls' freedom had increased with the expanding of free primary education girls' education kept far behind that of boys (see table 5). This might have been because; (A) they had very limited opportunities in past history compared to boys. (B) as in 'Ali's and his successors' regime, British policy also hired men for government positions which limited female educational effectiveness. Furthermore, having girls enrol and pay for education which trained them for the government positions available only to men, made little sense either culturally or economically. (C) the lack of official effort to help girls and their families to change their view towards female education. (D) the traditional view towards girls' education continued to limit their freedom especially in rural areas. In fact 'there was strong relationship between limited girls' freedom in education and their feeling of being in a low position as a social participator. Unfortunately, this affected the way girls used to think of themselves and how men think of their abilities' (ALECSO,1990:146).

Table 5
Numbers of boys and girls enrolment in state secondary school (1925-1950)

Year	1925	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950
Girls	41	3,388	4,074	5,336	6,330	8,103	12,810
Boys	8,059	35,435	40,736	44,943	53,717	62,131	80,957

Al-Qusi, 'A. (1952:451)

4.2.2.5. Learners' freedom after the socialist revolution (1952-1970)

According to Cook after the revolution free educational opportunities were increased dramatically at all levels (2000:479), which increased learners' freedom. Firstly, 'A 1953 law extended compulsory education from four to six years and it was provided for free' ('Abd Al-Nasir, 1968:20). 'In 1962, a far-reaching law was passed that extended free public education from the existing six-years primary school through preparatory, secondary, and higher education to the doctorate level' (Tawfiq,1984:75). Although education at all levels became free, learners had to pay fees for other educational services. For example, 'they had to pay for sport, food in science activities, health services, social insurance, insurance against lab accident, textbooks, using the library and sitting for examination. Also when the learner left the school for any reason, he/she had to pay to re-enrol in the school' (Tawfiq,1984:46,51,98,101,106), in addition to the expenses needed for the stationary material learners needed. Therefore, education was not free since many poor families could not afford to pay for the above mentioned educational services. As a result the freedom of millions of poor learners was restricted, especially in the rural and poor areas.

Secondly, learners were allowed more freedom to receive a worthwhile educational opportunity by introducing a new stage called preparatory (academic and vocation) (3 years) between primary (6 years) and secondary education (3 years). It was 'the product of the revolution of 1952, having been created in 1953/4, but it did not become independent until 1957' ('Ali and Hasan,1983:48-9). Cochran states that education "was severely restricted by a lack of facilities and teachers, for only 20 percent of the primary learners could be absorbed into preparatory schools" (1986:49). Even later the state could not increase the percentage of enrolment as was expected. For example, 'preparatory enrolment which was 15.8% in 1960 increased to 29.3% in 1965' (Ratib,1998:63). This is a reflection

of the fact that the state was not prepared to introduce the new stage. Regarding vocational schools, it might be possible to argue that these schools provided more freedom for learners to choose to do technical or academic subjects. However, it might be argued that 'six years of primary education is not adequate to provide learners with the minimum of basic knowledge and skills that are important to build their personality' (Muhammad,1991a:105) and find out their interests to make the choice between academic and technical subjects. Therefore, 'in 1967, the state abolished that type of school' (Al-Fiqi,1997:259).

Thirdly, the provision for free public education through to the doctorate had led to dramatically increased enrolment at all levels. Therefore, it was unlike the earlier occasion when any learner whatever his class, place, race, religion had the freedom to attend school (see table 6). However, this increase was not followed by an increase in the number of schools because the state could not manage to achieve universal enrolment in the primary school although it was compulsory (see table 7).

Table 6
Numbers of schools and learners in primary and preparatory level (1953-1964)

Year	Primary schools	Primary learners	Preparatory schools	Preparatory learners
1953	6,751	1,392,741	379	348,574
1954	7,152	1,580,089	643	346,376
1955	7,366	1,860,942	758	328,470
1956	7,701	1,975,874	743	318,243
1957	7,422	2,086,704	748	278,224
1958	7,312	2,286,067	771	247,792
1959	7,213	2,452,377	807	249,129
1960	7,159	2,610,169	876	253,737
1961	7,273	2,754,566	918	300,853
1964	7,698	3,294,832	1,045	472,568

(ME) Ministry of Education (1964:67-9), (ME) Ministry of Education, (1970:4) and (ME) Ministry of Education, (1961:52)

Table 7
Percentage of enrolment in primary schools

Year	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
%	69	69.8	71.8	74.6	76.8	78.8	83	71.9	74.4	76

Mursi, M. M. (1974:57)

As a result of insufficient number of schools, millions of children, especially in the rural and poor areas were kept out of school. Unfortunately, the state gave more attention to big cities and urban areas rather than rural and poor areas and this resulted in inequality. To solve the problem in 1968, a large number of schools and teachers had to work double or

treble shifts. It might be argued that this solution produced a kind of restriction on the learners' freedom to enjoy an equal opportunity.

Table 8
Comparison between one, double and treble shifts schools

Type of school	Length of lesson	Long of school day
One shift	45	5.5
Double shifts	40	4.5
Treble shifts	35	3.5

Ratib, N. (1998:122)

From a close look at table 8, it is clear that learners who had a place in the double and treble shifts schools had a shorter school day and lessons than their peers in the one shift schools. According to Hargreaves "children in multi-shift schools are calculated to lose five hours per week of instructional time and nearly all extra curricula activities. Buildings are often in bad repair and, in addition, the shortage of space leads to larger class sizes, frequently reaching 60 or 70" (2001:253). In addition these schools have a shortage number teachers, administrators and facilities which affects learning and teaching processes.

Another aspect of learners' lack of freedom in relation to the shortage of schools can be seen in the serious rate of illiteracy. For instance, 'Population figures for the year 1960 indicate an illiteracy rate of 76%' (GAIAE, 1996:194). My argument is that illiteracy is one of the restrictions which prevents learners' from having worthwhile freedom. This is because, as discussed in chapter one, it limits the ability of the individuals to have such things. In this sense it is important to mention that the state failed to reduce illiteracy. This refers to the inability of the state to achieve universal enrolment at the primary stage with an increased number of illiterate people every year. This means that without having full enrolment at primary school any effort to eradicate illiteracy has no meaning.

Fourthly, the policy of classification after the preparatory school interfered with the learners' freedom to choose the type of education they were interested in. 'The highest scoring students were encouraged to attend general secondary school, which, leads to higher education. The lowest scoring learners had to attend the technical secondary school, which specialised in industrial, commercial or agricultural studies, primary teacher-training college, and training institutions attached to other ministries' ('Ali and Hasan, 1983). That

is to say that learners were prevented from making free choice between these different paths because this policy affected their attitude towards such education. For example, learners and their families classified technical education as of less value than academic because the high-scoring learners were encouraged to attend the latter rather than the former. What supported this attitude was the fact that technical education was limited as regards facilities, curriculum, teachers and instruction. This might be because of the small amount of attention paid to it, although main concern was to satisfy the need for development. This reflects the separation between theory and practice in official thought that leads to failure to achieve such an aim. As a result, the percentage of enrolments in general secondary was far ahead of the technical percentage until the end of this period (see table 9).

Table 9

Number of secondary schools and learners in (Industrial 1). (Commercial 2). (Agriculture 3) and (General 4)

Year	1	Learners	2	Learners	3	Learners	4	Learners	% T*	% G*
1953	29	9,007	20	4,042	12	5,095	200	92,062	16	84
1954	28	6,846	21	4,517	12	3,669	197	106,095	12	88
1955	28	7,192	25	8,428	12	3,738	208	107,612	15	85
1957	24	11,594	31	17,104	14	6,119	202	109,395	24	75
1958	25	13,735	34	23,030	18	7,443	199	115,608	28	72
1959	25	15,722	34	27,159	21	9,001	211	120,767	30	70
1960	25	19,968	34	32,633	21	10,543	225	132,161	32	68
1961	26	22,626	44	34,220	22	11,149	240	131,885	34	66
1964	29	30,286	54	45,159	26	14,810	251	172,229	34	66

(ME) Ministry of Education (1964:97,171) and (ME) Ministry of Education (1970:34-5).

Fifthly, learners' in the second year of the secondary school had freedom of choice between the study of arts or sciences. However, the government interfered with their freedom by encouraging them to concentrate on science and technology. 'The government provided a greater number of openings and better pay to those secondary learners who majored in science compared to fewer job opportunities available to those who had followed literature studies' ('Ali and Hasan, 1983:114-5). In this sense someone might argue that learners were still free not to accept the government's offer, although refusing this offer seems a great price for the learners to pay for their freedom at any moment in time. However, as argued in chapter one offers are considered as indirect restrictions that limit individuals' freedom.

Sixthly, unlike the previous regime learners had more freedom in higher education. This can be seen in the increase in the number of learners at higher education (see table 10) and

the establishment of regional universities, plus the national university which opened in 1925. Although there was an increase in the number of learners, the higher education rate of increase was not high as was expected, especially after abolishing the fees in 1962, because of the inadequate number of universities and higher institutes.

Table 10
Numbers of learners enrolment and percentages of increase in higher education (1953-1969)

Year	Universities	%*	Higher institutes	%*
1953/1954	50,495		4,871	-
1954/1955	54,978	9	6,125	26
1955/1956	58,357	6	6,078	-0.8
1956/1957	63,454	9	6,445	6
1957/1958	73,870	16	7,447	16
1958/1959	76,638	4	9,785	31
1959/1960	82,705	10	11,857	21
1960/1961	86,539	5	15,520	30
1961/1962	91,363	6	20,335	31
1962/1963	97,927	7	22,498	11
1963/1964	110,394	13	25,779	15
1964/1965	119,305	8	26,605	3
1969/1970	140,210	18	32,118	21

Al-Fiqi, H. (1997:273)

4.2.2.5.1. Girls' freedom after the socialist revolution (1952-1970)

Girls' freedom in terms of educational opportunity remained far behind what boys had (see tables 11 and 12) although the state made education a high priority, with emphasis on compulsory education for both boys and girls. This can be seen in the level of girls' illiteracy. For example, 'in 1960, the illiteracy rate of boys was 56.2%, compared to 83.1% of females' (GAIAE, 1996:194). Unlike the previous period it might be argued that the state did not create obstacles to prevent girls from going to school but neither did it make any effort to remove obstacles that were inherited from the past. In this sense it might be argued that the limitation of freedom in education is not only made by creating obstacles but also by not removing such restrictions that prevent learners from enjoying their freedom. Moreover, girls are still slaves to 'the traditional view which believes that they have to take particular subjects that suite their abilities' ('Ali and Hasan, 1983:55-6).

Table 11
Numbers and percentages of girls and boys in primary (1), preparatory (2) and general secondary education (3)

Year	Girls (1)	% *	Boys (1)	% *	Girls (2)	% *	Boys (2)	% *	Girls (3)	% *	Boys (3)	% *
1953	526,110	38	866,631	62	72,406	21	276,112	79	12,903	14	79,159	86
1954	595,674	38	984,415	62	71,657	21	274,719	79	16,326	15	89,769	85
1955	685,703	37	1,175,239	63	73,288	22	255,182	78	17,047	22	60,566	78
1957	783,961	38	1,302,743	62	69,470	25	208,754	75	18,723	17	90,672	83
1958	860,388	38	1,425,679	62	65,343	27	182,449	73	20,706	18	94,902	82
1959	927,863	38	1,524,514	62	68,757	28	180,372	72	23,471	19	97,296	81
1960	997,266	38	1,612,903	62	71,294	28	182,443	72	27,748	21	103,413	79
1961	1,054,454	38	1,700,112	62	85,947	29	214,906	71	35,738	27	96,148	73
1964	1,285,008	39	2,009,824	61	142,236	30	330,332	70	47,517	28	124,712	72

(ME) Ministry of Education (1964:19). (ME) Ministry of Education (1961:30) and (ME) Ministry of Education (1970:6)

Table 12
Numbers and percentages of girls' and boys' enrolment in universities (1) and higher institutes (2)

Year	Girls (1)	%*	Boys (1)	%*	Girls (2)	%*	Boys (2)	%*
1953	4028	8	46467	92	1392	29	3479	71
1954	4970	9	50008	91	1741	28	4384	72
1955	6365	11	51992	89	2106	34	3972	66
1956	7773	12	55681	88	2213	34	4232	66
1957	9320	13	63550	87	2388	32	5059	68
1958	10693	14	65945	86	2782	28	7003	72
1959	11539	16	71166	84	3055	26	8802	74
1960	13680	16	72859	84	3774	24	11746	76
1961	14923	20	76440	80	4140	20	16195	80
1962	17464	18	80463	82	4601	20	17897	80
1963	22098	20	88296	80	5297	21	20482	79
1969	37750	27	102460	73	8922	28	23196	72

Al-Fiqi, H. (1997:273)

4.2.2.6. Learners' freedom at the beginning of the market economy (1971-1991)

Freedom in education had been increased in some aspects and limited in others. Firstly, learners were enjoying freedom with respect to having free educational opportunities at all levels, where 'the state issued the statement that public education is free from primary school through preparatory, secondary, and higher education to the doctorate level' (ARE, 1999a:4). However, as in the previous period, this right was limited by the other expenses the learners had to pay for other educational services which restricted the poor learners' freedom to go to school.

Secondly, unlike earlier times, learners had more freedom as regards having educational opportunities in the kindergarten, especially in the 1980s. For example, in 1985/1986, there

were 128,272 children compared to 120,411 in 1984/85 and 96,059 in 1983/1984” (Wilcox,1988:9). However, only a certain class enjoyed this freedom because it was neither free nor compulsory and it was only available in big cities. Poverty might not be considered a restriction on one’s freedom, however it produces inequality where poor learners can not compete with their peers who had the opportunity. Both have different abilities and needs regarding learning and teaching through all levels which might affect their performance.

Thirdly, as a result of a wide debate that was concerned with the insufficient length of the primary stage to provide learners with the minimum basic knowledge and skills that were important to build their personality, learners’ freedom was extended by the introducing of what was called basic education. In 1981, the state combined the first nine years of education and regarded them as a compulsory stage (Wilcox,1988:9). ‘Separate primary school and preparatory school buildings continue to exist but new schools are being planned that will provide all nine years of basic education in a single building’ (ME,1983:10). It might be argued that the introduction of basic education as free and compulsory increased the learners’ freedom to prevent backsliding into illiteracy and meaningful participation in practical life. However, this freedom was diminishing ‘in 1988, by reducing this stage to 8 years instead of 9, for economic reasons’ (‘Izzat,1990:96). An important indication related to the idea of freedom that can be recognised here is that the development of the learners’ potentiality was not the priority of the state. Instead and finding new resources of fund they cut back one year from the most important stage in the learners’ lives at school.

Fourthly, ‘in 1988, the state reopened the vocational preparatory school to receive those who had failed in level six, seven and eight to complete their basic education’ (Surwr,1989:118). From the point of view of the state, vocational education aims to help learners to gain the minimum training they need to start their practical life after basic education. According to ‘Ammar (1996a:38) it does not seem as ‘if education is helpful. It is just a matter of whether the school can keep learners until they complete the compulsory period. This is because the market does not need those learners because they are not qualified enough. This is because these schools lack good equipment, qualified teachers,

trainers, and above all learners have no motivation to study'. Moreover, this policy supported the negative view towards technical studies in term of its value because it accepted the weaker learners who were unable to continue their academic studies.

Fifthly, learners' freedom in terms of educational opportunity in primary and preparatory education was increased dramatically especially after the introducing of basic education (see table 13). However, the state failed to achieve universal enrolment where the percentage of enrolment in primary education was 66 %, 65.4 %, 66.5 %, 84 % in 1970,1974,1975,1984 respectively. 'For preparatory it was 50.2 %, 60 %, 49.2 % in 1975, 1978, 1983 respectively' (Ratib,1998:71), (Khatir and others,1979:10,16), (UNESCO,1976:107) (Hilmi,1978:54), (Badran,1996:244) and ('Ali, Hilmi, Aimam,1996:137). As a result 'the rate of illiteracy for these over the age of 10 reached 56.6%' (ARE,1990:311).

Table 13
Development of numbers of learners in primary and preparatory education (1970-1989)

Educational level	1970/71	1973/74	1976/77	1979/80	1988/89
Primary	3,740,551	3,918,396	4,151,956	4,300,000	6,955,455
Preparatory	848,587	1,099,291	1,435,529	1,600,000	2,383,336

Caneron, J. and Hurst, P. (1983:633-5) and Al-Fiqi, H. (1997:304,308)

Regarding educational opportunity in secondary education, as shown in table 14, the number of learners increased but it was still a very low percentage of the eligible group that was offered this opportunity. For example, 'in 1978 only 33% of individuals between 15 and 17 years old enrolled in secondary school' (Khatir and others,1979:17).

Table 14
Numbers and percentages of Learners in secondary schools (1970-1986)

Educational level	1970/1971	1973/1974	1976/1977	1983/1984	1984/1985	1985/1986
General	290,117	323,603	392,861	542,227	563,792	569,366
%*	51	50	49	42	41	39
Technical	271,639	321,327	403,550	759,666	802,847	877,399
%*	49	50	51	58	59	61

Caneron, J. and Hurst, P. (1983:633-5) and (NCER) National Centre for Educational Research, Arab Republic of Egypt. (1986:114)

A close look at the previous data shows that unlike the earlier times the percentage of enrolment in technical secondary increased compared to the general secondary school. A decreased enrolment in the general secondary school was made intentionally by the state,

especially, ‘in the 1980s, to reduce the percentage of enrolment in higher education, although that percentage was not high (see tables 15 and 16). This means that the state purposely limited the learners’ freedom in terms of educational opportunity in higher education. Moreover, the state determined the number of learners who were to enrol in each college or institute’ (ARE,1999b:127) and (ARE,1999c:43) without giving any attention to the learners’ interests.

Table 15
Learners’ percentage of the population 18 -22 in universities

Year	1974	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83
%	9.9	12.4	12.9	13	12.9	12.9	13.4	13.9	14.6	15.1

(ARE) Arab Republic of Egypt (1989:230-1)

Table 16
Numbers of enrolled in universities

Year	1986	87	88	89	90
Enrolled	661.347	629723	604846	587033	569126

(CIGMS) Central Institutes of General Mobilisation and Statistics (1992:56)

One indication related to the idea of freedom according to Wilcox is that learners admitted to technical secondary schools were those who scored on the (BECE) but this did not qualify them for admission to a general secondary school (1988:19). This means that technical education usually begins with the weaker learner who receives instruction from less qualified instructors, reflecting an acute shortage of technical and vocational teachers. This means that although technical educational expansion was still crucial for the development of the country, the admission process discouraged talented learners from selecting it.

4.2.2.6.1. Girls’ freedom in the beginning of market economy (1971-1991)

Girls’ freedom in education in terms of educational opportunity was increased compared to the previous regimes, especially after the introduction of basic education. However, girls’ freedom in education lagged behind that of boys (see tables 17 and 18). The limitation of girls’ freedom in education can be seen in their high rate of illiteracy. For example, ‘illiteracy rate was 71% in 1976 comparing with 42% for boys reduced to 62.2% compared to 37% for boys in 1986’ (GAIAE,1996:194).This refer to the same reasons discussed in the previous regime

Table 17
Percentage of girls' and boys' enrolment (1970-1986)

Educational level	Gender	1971	74	77	84	85	86
Primary	Girls	38	38	39	42	-	-
	Boys	62	62	61	58	-	-
Preparatory	Girls	32	34	35.5	61	-	-
	Boys	68	66	64.5	39	-	-
General secondary	Girls	33	33	34.5	37	37	37.5
	Boys	67	67	65.5	63	63	62.5
Technical secondary	Girls	31	33	35	38.5	39	40
	Boys	69	67	56	61.5	61	60
Teachers institutes	Girls	45	43	44	55	57	59.5
	Boys	55	57	56	45	43	40.5

Caneron, J. and Hurst, P. (1983:633-5) and (NCER) National Centre for Educational Research, Arab Republic of Egypt. (1986:114)

Table 18
Percentage of girls' and boys' enrolment in universities

Gender	76/77	85/86	86/87	87/88	88/89	89/90
Girls	30	32.5	33.3	33.5	33.7	34.9
Boys	70	67.5	66.7	66.5	66.3	65.1

(CIGMS) Central Institutes of General Mobilisation and Statistics (1992:25) and Caneron, J. and Hurst, P. (1983:633-5)

4.3. Freedom in education with regard to its restrictions

In this section, I will investigate and analyse the idea of freedom in education with regard to its restrictions. This investigation will be concerned with making decisions, teacher preparation, examination regulations and educational budgets. This study endeavours to achieve the third aim of this chapter which is concerned with discovering the restrictions on learners' freedom in educational policy and practice in Egypt in the period between 1805 and 1991.

4.3.1. Freedom in education and decision-making

This section will examine the learners' freedom to share in the making of educational decisions as a means to guarantee that education is planned in accordance with their interests. Also, this analysis will attempt to find out parents' and teachers' contribution to make educational decisions. From 1805 to 1882 'Ali and his successors 'considered themselves as the only authority in education, who decided its aims, set up schools, prepared a suitable budget and organised schools' affairs' ('Ali,1989:14) and (Al-Ayubi,1989:48). 'Within centralisation in education learners, teachers, parents and schools

did not have freedom to share in the making of educational decisions for two reasons; first they rules did not allow anyone to share this authority to achieve their particular aims' ('Ali,1995a:14) and ('Abd Al-Min'im,1997:33). Second, 'the community was not aware of the significance of their roles in education and left it to the ruler' ('Ali,1989:14).

During the British occupation the minister of education was the only official authority. However, 'he did not have freedom to make such decisions without obtaining the British consultant's approval' (Muhammad 'Abdu quoted in Amin,1960:62) and ('Awad,1996:64). There was no local authority to share educational planning and decisions. Moreover, there was no law made to establish the community's right to participate in making decisions. Therefore, the British were able to avoid any objections against their educational policy. However, 'some writers and Press leaders claimed the right of the public to express their opinions on their children's education' (Shinwda,1987:92) as a result, local 'authorities appeared for the first time in the history of Egyptian education. However, their role was very limited and 'they were abolished in 1914' (Tawfiq,1985a:5).

Unlike the situation under the British occupation, the period between 1923 and 1950 gave more freedom to the minister of education, the local authorities and schools to share in educational decisions. 'After the constitution of 1923, there was a demand for non-centralisation in education, and for the community to share in educational planning and decisions' (Tawfiq,1985a:40). For example, Taha Husayn pointed out 'centralisation in education gives the right and freedom for only one person to determine education for everyone else' (Husayn,1993:111). As a result, 'the local authorities appeared once again in 1939' (Tawfiq,1985a:42). On the one hand, for the first time in the history of education in Egypt, the public had the right and the authority by law to share in their children education. However, the communities were not very effective and the decisions continued to be made by the minister of education. Of course, the learners' freedom to play a part in sharing educational decisions was totally neglected in both theory and practice in education.

Although, in 1954, 'the ministry of education allowed freedom to local authorities and schools to share educational plans, the relationship between the local authority and the

ministry was not that clear' (Tawfiq,1985a:88). 'On many occasions the ministry denied the right of the local authorities and schools to share in educational decision and the carrying out of plans' (Al-Ayubi,1989:99) and (Tawfiq,1985a:88-9). This of course reveals the absolute power of the political leadership to control society and education. With respect to learners, teachers and parents there was no declaration of their right to share making decisions and judgements about educational practices. 'The period between 1971 and 1991 saw the extending of the range of freedom in society and the acknowledgement of individuals' rights' (ARE,1999a:3-7). The state declared that the minister of education is 'responsible for planning, follow-up, evaluation, development and provision of educational materials as well as for determining the standards and qualifications of the teachers. The law entrusts the local authorities with the responsibility for implementation and follow-up at the local level (while taking into consideration the national guidelines), the supervision of activities during the school year, the development and administration of examinations according to the present guidelines for the various levels, and to recruitment of teachers' (ME,1999a:11-2). In this sense, the state continued to be the only authority in education. The learners, teachers, head-teachers, administrators and parents had no freedom to participate in decision making or to object to decisions that had already been made. Moreover, Hyde (1978:56) stated that "students had no freedom of speech about the policy and had no real power to change their world. They had no freedom to demand any rights in education or any other field and were compelled to obey the rules laid down by the leader".

In conclusion, although it was stated by law that the local authority had freedom to share state educational planning and practices, the role of the local authority was limited to carrying out decisions rather than sharing in making such decisions. Moreover, learners, parents, teachers and school had no freedom in making educational decisions. This absolute authority can be considered as a restriction on learner's freedom to be heard regarding their education. Also, the educationalists had no freedom to share in making decision or even to be consulted in such decisions. This is because the results of their research were always against the will of the state. The state had its own research centre to support its policy which always came out in support of the state rather than the learners.

4.3.2. Learners' freedom and teachers' preparation

Under 'Ali's regime a learner's freedom to have a qualified teacher was limited especially in *maktabs* and preparatory schools because 'Ali did not set up particular institutes for teacher's preparation. 'In *maktabs* and preparatory schools teachers were not specialists in teaching particular subjects. They used to teach particular books in different fields instead of teaching particular subjects' ('Ali,1989:75). In military schools 'Ali 'employed foreign teachers to teach until Egyptians teachers could be trained abroad and take over' ('Ali, Hilmi and Aimam,1996:40). This reflects 'Ali's concern to train individuals for service in his military rather than develop their potential by given them the minimum basic education they might need in the early stages. Under 'Isma'il's regime it was believed that teachers should be qualified to teach and help learners act in proper manner. Therefore, he 'opened a first teacher preparation school in 1872' (Al- Fiqi,1997:96). 'Isma'il's main concern was to prepare teachers to be specialists in particular subjects and follow a particular educational course so as to be able to deal with children. 'This was the first attempt in the history of Egypt for teachers to study particular course in educational science' ('Ali,1989:88). However, he did not pay attention to the teacher's preparation for the *kuttab*. 'The only requirement for teaching in the *kuttab* was having a 'particular certificate confirming that the candidate is acceptable by his community' ('Ali,1995a:75).

Under British occupation and unlike the previous regime learners had the chance to be educated by qualified teachers. British 'set up a school for *kuttab* teacher's preparation' (Tawfiq,1985b:9), 'one for primary teacher's' (Tawfiq,1985a:18-9) and 'one for the higher school' (Tawfiq,1985b:22). For technical teacher's preparation, the learners 'who were experienced and graduated from high technical schools used to teach in the same type of schools' (Tawfiq,1985b:55-6). 'Education in these schools was free because the government was desperate for teachers. In addition 'the state used to give learners awards to encourage them to attend that type of education' (Abw-Al-Ais'ad,1993a:146). Therefore, 'the state obliged candidates to work for five years before they could leave for another job. Female teachers were obliged to remain single for the same period' (Abw-Al-Ais'ad,1993a:147). It might be argued that this policy encouraged many candidates to

attend teachers' school, however, the quality of teachers was very low in term of academic and professional attainment because the British only wanted them to transfer a particular kind of knowledge to the learners. As a result, the learners' freedom to be taught by qualified teachers was limited. Also, this policy produced the type of teacher who hated being a teacher because it was not his free choice. The candidate accepted it as the state's offer of a free opportunity which affected their performance. Moreover, a negative social view had crystallised towards the teaching professional because it was very low by profession in terms of salary and prestige.

Compared to the British policy the learners had more freedom in term of having an adequate number of qualified teachers between 1923 and 1950. For the elementary school 'the state had established a six-year training school for male teachers who had completed two years in the elementary school. In addition, a three-year school for female teachers who had the elementary certificate' (Tawfiq,1985b:79-89). For the primary school, 'the state established a two year course in a teachers' institute for those who had completed secondary education. For the secondary school, there was a two-year course in the teachers' institute for those who had a first degree in art or science. This meant that there were three resources for teacher's preparation according to school level' (Tawfiq,1985b:79-89). Teacher's preparation in this manner reflects some indications related to the idea of freedom; firstly, there was inequality between the learners in elementary, primary and secondary schools which limited the freedom of the learners of the first two schools to that of being educated by a less qualified teacher. Secondly, it created a belief that teaching at primary level only needed a minimum qualification although it was a very difficult stage and needed more qualified teachers than the higher level. Thirdly, it created an attitude among teachers that secondary teachers enjoyed considerable social prestige compared to primary though they were of the same government rank. Fourthly, the erroneous belief that knowing an academic subject was more important than being able to teach because the learners used to study academic subjects for four or five years then join the teachers' institute for two years for professional preparation. In fact this belief was not only the product of that period, it had existed from the time of 'Ali's regime when he paid no attention to social sciences and favoured the natural ones. Fifthly, the learners and their

families had a negative attitude towards teaching as a profession because the learners who had a higher degree joined a teacher's institute only when they could not find a better job especially as it was a low-paid profession. It might be argued that the teacher's preparation policy, as in the previous regime, continued to produce the type of teacher who hated being a teacher and consequently this affected their performance.

After the socialist revolution the learners enjoyed less freedom in terms of having an adequate number of teachers, due to the inability of the state to train a sufficient number, especially after expanding education (see table 19). Unlike the previous regime there were two resources for teacher's preparation instead of three. 'The secondary teacher's institute for primary teachers accepted candidates who had a preparatory certificate with a low score that did not allow them to enter the general secondary school' ('Ali, Hilmi and Aimam, 1996:145-8). As I have suggested, this policy continued to make learners and their families believe that the teaching profession was inferior because its institute accepted learners with low scores who were unable to join the general secondary school. Moreover, having a primary teacher's preparation in the secondary school rather than a higher institute supported such a belief that teaching at the primary level needed only minimum qualification. 'The higher teacher's institute for the preparatory and secondary level also accepted low-score secondary learners who could not join another institute college' ('Ali, Hilmi and Aimam, 1996:145-8). This meant that the candidates continued to join this kind of educational establishment because they could not choose otherwise. Another aspect of limited freedom of the learners can be seen in the high percentage of unqualified teachers due to an insufficient number of qualified teachers (see table 20) which meant that out of necessity, many unqualified teachers with less than 14 years of education were hired. This policy produced inequality between learners in which those especially in rural and poor areas, had less freedom than their peers who had qualified teachers in urban cities. This meant that teaching was a profession that required no qualification, which supported the community's belief about its low position.

Table 19
Numbers of primary teachers and percentage of increase

Year	primary	%*	Preparatory	%*	General Secondary	%*
1953	45,869	-	9,780	-	7,401	-
1954	43,461	-5	14,154	45	7,271	-2
1955	48,173	10	16,018	13	8,238	13
1956	51,131	6	16,058	0.2	-	-
1957	55,766	9	15,754	-2	7,981	-3
1958	60,942	9	15,977	1	8,411	3
1959	63,428	4	15,040	-6	8,734	4
1960	67,688	7	14,125	-6	9,105	4
1961	70,068	4	14,724	4	10,108	11
1964	-	-	19,716	33	10,401	3
1969	-	-	27,625	40	14,324	38

(ME) Ministry of Education (1964:77). (ME) Ministry of Education (1970:10) and (ME) Ministry of Education, (1961:55)

Table 20
General secondary education: teachers and its rates by qualified

Year	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1970
Qualified	7,097	7,822	8,553	9,407	10,400	10,731	10,702
%	74	75	79	79	80	79	80
Unqualified	2,530	2,579	2,439	2,527	2,638	2,815	3,238
%	26	25	21	21	20	21	20

Hyde, G. D. M. (1978:91)

With the changing of political and economic conditions in the 1970s and 1980s the learners had more freedom in terms of having an adequate number of qualified teachers, due to the increase of number in the teacher's institutes and colleges (see table 21). Although the percentage of enrolments at these institutes was high it did not reflect the free will of learners to be trained to work as teachers. This might refer to the guaranteed job the state offered the candidates. Also it might refer to the low score that was required for these institutes. In this sense the candidates were not free to choose to be teachers because they had to accept the state's offer, especially since the rate of unemployment in most other fields was high. Unlike the previous regime, the learners' freedom was increased in terms of having higher-degree primary teachers by 1988. For example, in 1970s "Only 1 percent of the primary school teachers were university graduates, though some 25 to 30 percent of the teachers in the primary and preparatory schools had less than the desired professional preparation" (Cochran, 1986:66).

Table 21
Numbers of teachers in teacher's institutes (1970-1986)

Educational level	1970/71	1973/74	1976/77	1983/1984	1984/1985	1985/1986
Number of teachers	25,526	31,288	32,744	71,545	77,535	84,587

Caneron, J. and Hurst, P. (1983:633-5) and (NCER) National Centre for Educational Research, Arab Republic of Egypt, (1986:114)

In conclusion, as has been shown, there were policies concerning the teacher preparation that affected the quality of the teacher and the value of the teaching profession compared to other professions. Firstly, until 1990 the teacher continued to be thought of as a person who delivered knowledge and information to learners without allowing them to share in the teaching and learning process. Secondly, these policies made people think that it was very poor profession in terms of social prestige and salary. Thirdly, teachers were not free to choose to be trained as teachers and the process of teaching treated them as persons who had only to deliver such knowledge to the learners. Fourthly, admission policies prevented talented candidates from applying to teacher's institutes, which limited the learners' freedom to have good-quality teacher. As mentioned earlier, these institutes started with weaker candidates. It might be argued that this type of teacher limited the learners' freedom by exercising unjustifiable authority on them because they thought that they were the ones who knew everything so the learners should listen to what they were saying.

4.3.3. Learners' freedom and the assessment system

'The British intentionally used the examination regulations to limit individuals' freedom by reducing their chances to continue their education at higher levels' ('Ali,1986:188). For example, according to Tawfiq and Khalil (1986:3-10,54); (a) 'the examination system did not consider the differences between counties, therefore, the learners, wherever they were living, had to sit for the same examination,' although they had been taught under different circumstances. In fact, this shows that village learners had less freedom and suffered inequality compared to their peers from urban areas. (B)'learners were obliged to sit for an oral exam in the English language that was difficult for them to', especially since 'passing the oral examination in all subjects was a condition for sitting the written ones. If the learners failed the oral, they were compelled to leave school. (C) learners had to sit an examination at the end of the primary and secondary stages in all subjects'. This required

them to be examined in what they had been taught for many years. In addition, the learners had only one opportunity to sit the examination, those who failed were compelled to leave school. (D) 'although there were some subjects divided into many branches the learners had to gain a minimum score in each branch to pass instead of obtaining a minimum score in the subject. In addition, the learners had to have mark of at least 50% in each branch to pass'. Moreover, there was no course work required under this policy. (E) 'the learners were obliged to produce an official certificate stating that they were in good health to sit the examination'. This meant that sick learners did not have the freedom to demand education. By limiting the learner's freedom in terms of having the required conditions to derive benefit from the value of freedom, 'the process of learning was seen as that of memorising the content of textbooks which learners were required to reproduce in examination' ('Ali,1995a:135-6). In other words, education aimed only to prepare learners for examinations. In short, learners were restricted by the value of certain type of knowledge needed by the occupier and they had no freedom to make free choices and decisions.

During the time of limited independence, on the one hand, as under the British, 'the aim of education was limited to obtaining a certificate that was the only means to secure a government job' (Hassan,1971:89). The importance of the certificate 'produced fear in the learners towards examination that made them spend the whole year preparing' ('Ali,1989:176), because 'the type of examination and the nature of the questions continued to be the means to find out how much knowledge the learners could memorise' (Nisim,1984:161). This meant there was no time left for the learners to engage in other activities except that of memorising textbooks, especially since 'the curriculum were overburdened with too much knowledge' ('Ali,1989:170) which made them think of knowledge as an end in itself rather than a means to others ends. On the other hand, unlike the British period the examination regulations were changed to allow more freedom for the learners to receive a type of educational opportunity that suited their abilities and was compatible with their performance. According to Tawfiq and Khalil; (A) 'the learners had two chances to sit the examination. (B) they were required to obtain only a minimum score in each subject to pass, instead of having a minimum score in each branch of the subject. (C) the minimum score was reduced, especially in subjects that required a special talent,

such as art or music. (D) learners were allowed to sit the transfer examination to move from level to another instead of having only one exam at the end of each stage. (E) primary school learners all over the country did not have to sit for the same examination, unlike the secondary school learners' (1986:12,63,64).

The examination regulations did not change much after the 1952 revolution, in which the state did not intentionally use examination regulations to limit the learners' freedom. However, as before, the examination regulations continued to limit learners' freedom in that they focused on how much knowledge the learners had acquired which gave more value to knowledge as an end in itself. In other words, the purpose of the examination was not to answer the question of how a particular course could satisfy society's interest in producing the technicians who were badly needed for development. As before, the aim of education was limited to obtaining a certificate that was the only means to land a government job, rather than concentrating on assessing the skills the learners should acquire. This leads to state that reform in education was not comprehensive, it was a partial reform that concentrated on one aspect rather than on the whole process of education.

The examinations' regulations between 1970 and 1991 did not limit the learners' freedom in terms of educational opportunity, as was clear under British policy. For example, firstly, "students were graded on the basis of a final test in each subject, 'which accounted for 60 % of the final grade, and assessments throughout the year, which accounted for 40 %'" (Wilcox,1988:10). This was the first time course work was introduced. On the one hand, the introduction of course work did not help the learners to exercise freedom to make their own choices, decisions and be responsible for their actions, because it took only the form of monthly examination. On the other hand it made learners more comfortable and secure in sitting the final exam because their assessment was not based on it alone. However, the learners lost this opportunity in 1988 when 'the state abolished the required course work at all pre-university levels to eliminate the problem of private tuition' (Surwr,1989:119). This is because the practitioners thought that teachers used this learning pattern to oblige learners to attend private tuition. Although, as will be discussed in chapter five, private tuition limits learners' freedom, the cancellation of course work was a big price to be paid,

especially since it did not eradicate this problem, because it was not its main cause. Secondly, according to Wilcox learners at grade 6 and 9 sat for an examination at the governorate level (Wilcox, 1988:10) which took into consideration the differences between counties and their needs. However, 'the learners had only one chance to repeat the examination, otherwise they had to join the poor vocational preparatory school, and for learners at grade 9 to obtain a certificate, they had to complete their compulsory education' (Surwr, 1989:117) and (ARE, 1999a:144). Unfortunately, this policy was an easy way to discharge learners who had problems in learning rather than investigating the reasons behind their failure. 'In 1988, learners who failed twice in any year in general secondary education were allowed to join technical education' (ARE, 1999a:5). This policy again supported the negative attitude towards technical education as of less value and suitable for weak learners.

In conclusion, firstly, as can be seen, the learners' assessment took the form of examinations that were held at the end of each year. Secondly, the purpose of the examinations was limited to obtaining a certificate that was the only means to land a government job. The importance of the certificate produced feelings of fear in the learners towards examination which obliged them to spend the whole year preparing. Thirdly, the nature of the examinations questions was to find out how much knowledge the learners could memorise. As discussed in chapter three, the assessment's purpose in this sense, limits learners' freedom to exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value. Fourthly, until 1991 the assessment regulations continued to limit learner's freedom in terms of having educational opportunities.

4.3.4. Freedom in education and educational budgets

Although 'Isma'il's educational policy aimed at expanding primary education 'he did not prepare the appropriate budget' (Al-Fiqi,1997,101-2) therefore, as mentioned earlier the state failed to achieve universal enrolment at the primary stage. Moreover the budget was unstable (see table 22) and this limited learners' freedom in terms of receiving educational opportunities.

Table 22
Educational budget (1868-1880)

Year	Budget	Year	Budget	Year	Budget	Year	Budget	year	Budget
1868	67,000	1870	66,473	1872	48,341	1874	51,820	1976	61,302
1869	91,242	1871	50,000	1873	49,240	1875	61,302	1980	59,415

'Abd Al-Karim, A. A. (1945:89-92)

During this period Al-Fiqi notes that 'a large share of the educational budget was saved for foreign schools rather than state ones' (1997,101) although the former did not need such support compared to the latter, especially since all its learners belonged to rich families who had the ability to pay for their education. For example, 'in 1875, 93 foreign schools were available for 8,916 learners compared to 36 state schools that opened for 4,878 learners' ('Abd-Al-Karim,1945:275-6). This meant that the Egyptian learners' freedom was limited in of terms educational opportunities and good jobs 'where as foreign school graduates used to enjoy the best prestige and salary job' (Al-Fiqi,1997,101-2).

Under the British occupation the lack of an adequate budget was one of the tools to limit learners' freedom to receive educational opportunities. There was no investment in education by the state, where a large share came in the form of obligatory fees paid by families (see tables 23 and 24).

Table 23
Development in educational budget between (1883-1922)

Year	Budget	Year	Budget	Year	Budget	Year	Budget
1883	99,549	1894	99,977	1885	84,689	1886	68,492
1887	68,452	1888	69,544	1889	69,846	1890	80,338
1891	88,478	1892	90,840	1893	92,544	1894	104,289
1895	105,000	1896	105,180	1897	105,180	1898	105,220
1899	107,864	1900	106,483	1901	107,638	1902	111,704
1903	115,303	1904	127,500	1905	149,300	1906	169,300
1907	374,000	1908	450,450	1909	483,669	1910	504,942
1911	506,187	1912	535,764	1913	551,454	1914	525,224
1915	422,981	1916	422,630	1917	467,758	1918	578,733
1919	685,203	1920	1,013,503	1921	1,123,273	1922	1,169,040

Abw-Al-Ais'ad, M. A. (1993a:71-76)

Table 24
The percentage of educational budget to state budget(1883-1922)

Year	State budget	Educational budget	%
1883-1888	68,000,000	492,000	0.7
1889-1906	222,000,000	1,850,000	0.85
1907-1914	137,000,000	4,000,000	2.8
1915-1922	229,000,000	5,883,000	2.5

Abw-Al-Ais'ad, M. A. (1993a:71-76)

According to previous data the educational budget increased from 99,549 Egyptian pounds in 1883 to 1,169,040 in 1922. However, 'the financial provisions were inadequate to sufficiently develop the system of education or to increase the number of educational opportunities' (Abw-Al-Ais'ad,1993b:67). Moreover, 'there was no equal distribution of the budget between the urban and rural areas. This meant that village learners had less freedom than their peers in urban areas to obtain a place in school' (Abw-Al-Ais'ad,1993b:98-9).

As discussed earlier it is true that learners' freedom in education was increased in terms of educational opportunity between 1923 and 1950. However, millions of learners remained out of school due to lack of funds. A close look at the data in table 25 shows that there was an increase in the educational budget, however, this increase was not adequate to meet the increase in the number of learners. As a result, 'the rate of illiteracy went over 74% in 1947' (Al-Fiqi,1997:203).

Table 25

Development of educational budget and its percentage to percentage of state expenses (1925-1950)

Year	1925	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950
Budget	2,336,447	11,635,657	12,416,015	12,576,619	18,656,817	22,145,727	26,738,440
%	6.83	12.21	12.11	13.30	10.17	11.81	12.98

Harbi, M. and Al-'Azawi (1958:58)

Moreover, Harbi and Al-'Azawi state that 'there was a misdistribution of the budget between educational stages. They mention that the biggest share of the educational budget was saved for secondary education to achieve the state's aim to train learners for the sake of development rather than achieving universal enrolment at the primary level. Primary budget was 39% in 1936 and this increased to 40% in 1952, although the state declared its intention to spend on free and compulsory primary education' (1958:58).

Also, after the 1952 revolution, the dramatic increase in enrolments at all levels did not meet with an equal dramatic increase in the educational budget (see table 26). The biggest share of the budget was spent on salaries. For example, '82% of the budget was spent on salaries in the primary sector in 1966. This increased to 92.6 in 1970. At preparatory level the budget was 88.5% and 84.5% at the secondary level in 1966' (Mursi,1974:78) and (Hassan,1980a:22). This means that only a small share of budget was spent on building schools and providing them with all facilities.

Table 26

Primary education budget (1953-1970)

Year	Budget	year	Budget	Year	Budget	Year	Budget
1953	26,434,900	55	33,252,700	57	38,500,000	59	42,344,000
54	28,731,100	56	36,173,000	58	39,326,000	64	68,095,306

(ME) Ministry of Education, (1961:52) and (ME) Ministry of Education (1964:19)

Unlike the previous regimes, the educational budget was not only inadequate but it also decreased, despite the increase in educational demand between 1970 and 1991. (see table 27).

Table 27

The rate of pre-university education budget to the government budget

Year	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1991
%	18.2	18.1	17.8	17.3	9.4	11.1	9.8	5.9

Al-Bana, R. (1992:73) and Nasif, A. (1984:6)

Reducing the educational funds limited learners' freedom in terms of educational opportunities and enjoying a good quality of education. For example, although 'the percentage of increase in a number of schools was 27.6, 17.99, 26.63 in primary, preparatory and general secondary respectively' (Surwr,1989:79-81) a large number of schools had to work double and treble shifts. For instance, 'the percentage of schools that had to work double shifts was 65 in primary and 37 in preparatory an with increase of class size' (Ratib,1998:121). Secondly, as a result of the lack of fund learners' freedom in rural and poor areas less than their peers in the cities which produced inequality between them in terms of the number of schools available and their facilities. In 1983/1984, for example, 'the primary percentage of enrolment in Cairo was 99.7 compared to 38.2 in Sena'. ('Ali, Hilmi and Aimam,1996:137).

In conclusion, from the information given above it can be concluded that inadequate educational budgets limited learners' freedom in terms of educational opportunities. It also, limited their freedom in terms of having the required conditions because the types of educational process discussed in chapter three required an appropriate budget to help learners to exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value.

4.4. Freedom in education regarding its value

This section has two main aims firstly, to examine the idea of freedom in education regarding its value in theory and practice. Secondly, to investigate whether the claim for learners' freedom in Egypt is desirable and valuable for learners and society according to educational thought. The significance of this section is to give an indication of the suitability and validity of the implementation of freedom in education into the Egyptian context.

The value of freedom in educational theory during 'Ali's and his successors' regimes was very narrow due to lack of educational opportunity and its quality. That is to say that the value of freedom in education was not recognised in the sense analysed in the last two chapters. However, educational thought at that time was concerned with some issues that

related to freedom in education. For example, 'educational thought stressed the necessity of having free educational opportunity and considered it the responsibility of the state to offer these opportunities for both rich and poor. For the teacher's preparation, educational thought for the first time recognised the importance of training teachers how to deliver knowledge to the learners, instead of only particular subjects being known' ('Ali,1989:87-88). For girl's education many movements arose to claim freedom for girls to be educated, for example, that of Refa'ah Al-Tahtawi who believed in the freedom of education and a respectful life for girls. 'He referred to the inability of the girl to fulfil her role due to the lack of education, which provides her with experiences' ('Awad,1994:217). Although he claimed freedom for girls to work, he put restrictions on this freedom, for example 'she can work only in case she needs money when there is no one who can support her and the type of work should match her nature and ability' (Mursi,1993:164-85).

There was no crystallised philosophy of education that took the child's freedom to be its main focus between 1882-1922. However, there was big debate over the child's freedom to have educational opportunity (as a result of British policy in limiting education). 'Ali (1989) notes six consequences as being characteristic of this period. Firstly, 'a debate over the children's right to free and compulsory education, especially at the primary stage and the responsibility of the state to offer enough opportunities, an appropriate budget, and qualified teachers. It is the responsibility of the state to encourage families to send their children to school to protect their right. Moreover the state should organise opportunities so that education does not go against the needs of the families for their learners support especially in agricultural areas' ('Ali,1989:124-130). Secondly, educational thought argues that aims of education should focus on the 'development of children's minds as well as their bodies to do free and creative thinking, evaluate things, opinions and knowledge, and discover and classify knowledge. It is the learners' right to be themselves and to make such choices and decisions' ('Ali,1989:131-135). Furthermore, educational thought recognised 'freedom as a necessary condition for the development of the children's potentiality and found that authority and interference with learners' interests effects negatively affects their growth' ('Ali,1989:136-140).. According to educational thought, learners also need help from adults rather than being subject to authority. Thirdly, there was big debate over the

value of textbooks in which teachers and learners should not depend on a particular textbook but should use different resources. 'Textbooks should only be a guide for teachers and learners to find new sources of knowledge to develop their free and creative thinking and form their own judgement of others' opinions and work' ('Ali,1989:142).. Educational thought considered the existing textbooks as a means to limit learners' freedom to investigate and discover knowledge on their own. Moreover the debate focused on the importance of having well-written textbooks through competitions in writing and translation. Fourthly, educational thought believed that 'teachers should respect children's freedom, nature, individuality, opinions and personality' ('Ali,1989:144).. That is to say, that teachers should not use their authority for its own sake they should use it to protect the learners' freedom. Then, when it comes to punishment it should be compatible with the action. Fifthly, there were claims 'for equality among gender and rural and urban areas in terms of having the same educational opportunities, teachers, schools and facilities' ('Ali,1989:150). Sixthly, 'educational thought discussed the need for co-operation between local authorities and the state' ('Ali,1989:155-6).

Regarding women's freedom, at the end of nineteenth century a number of liberals, who believed in women's freedom made useful contributions on the issue of girls' freedom of education. For example, 'Jamal al-Din al-Afghani believed that girls should have the right to be educated so as to be able to play their roles in their homes and take care of their husbands and children' (Yusif,1999:11). However, 'he denied their freedom to study particular subjects such as medicine or engineering. He believed that girls did not have the required abilities to do so' (Mursi,1993:227). In this sense, Muhammad 'Abdu argued that 'there is no way for social development when half of the population are uneducated and neglected' (Mursi,1993:247). As a result the Egyptian feminist movement started in the last decade of the nineteenth century. In talking about Amin, 'Imara (1989:327-48) 'found that Egyptian women; (A) had no right to share with men anything regarding their lives and children. (B) had to submit to their husbands' decisions and desires. (C) their place was in the home and they could not go out for any reason without their husbands' permission. (C) women were slaves to men who did not give their wives any respect. As a result, Amin stated that women's freedom meant freedom from the authority of men'. As a result of the

feminist movements a number of women gained a range of freedoms concerning education, work and political participation.

Having partial independence in 1922 allowed 'educationalists more freedom to think of education as a means to support and protect independence' ('Ali,1989:163). Secondly, Hassan (1971:250) points out 'that for the first time in the history of education, there was a crystallised philosophy focused on children's freedom in education. Educational thought discussed the importance and the necessity of moving towards the pattern of 'child-centred education'. According to Hassan (1971:143) 'educational thought stressed the necessity of educational theory and practice taking children's interests as its main concern rather than adults'. As a result of this 'there was a call to pay attention to school activities that play an important role in helping learners to find out their interests and talents' ('Ali,1989:187). Thirdly, there was a debate about democracy in education to achieve equal opportunity in education. The debate can be shown in two views. The first was crystallised by 'Isma'il Al-Qabani who 'claimed democracy in education through applying free, unified and compulsory education for everyone at the primary level and limited this right at secondary and higher education levels through applying fees ' (Al-Qabani,(ND):126). In this sense 'Abd Al-Rahman Al-Raf'i demanded that 'primary education should be free and compulsory for all. Moreover, the state should be responsible for education from primary to higher education' (Al-Raf'i,1988:362). Also, he added that 'expansion of education for all social classes is one of the most powerful methods to develop Egypt and it is the way to gain freedom and independence' (Al-Raf'i,1984:140). The second view was defined by Taha Husayn who 'argued that primary education which is the basis of democratic life, should be universal and compulsory' (Husayn,1993:65,83). Therefore, he announced that education is like air and water (Wahbah,1992:iv). By 1950, he supported the claim for free education at secondary level.

Fourthly, 'liberal educational thought was interested in finding ways to change social views towards girls' education through the claim for women to have the freedom to work as well as men. This claim helped the public to recognise girl's education as an investment and as a means for them to become economically independent. In consequence, families, especially

poor ones, were persuaded to send their daughters to school and allow them freedom to work. From this arose the demand to learn the same subjects as boys and have the freedom to enter universities' ('Ali, 1989:217-220).

Unfortunately, the claim for learners' freedom in education did not improve much between 1952 and 1972 due to the political leadership which controlled everything in society, even educational thought. For Faiq (1986:223-6), 'educational thought was concerned with the problems of educational practice more than with a clear philosophy of education'. Therefore, this period was guided by no theory or philosophy of education. The political and economic changes that took place in 1973 brought more freedom for individuals and this reflected in the educational field as well. Educational thought discussed freedom in education in relation to three main areas, as summarised by 'Ali (1995a). With respect to the aims of education, educational thought discussed 'the importance and the necessity of moving towards the pattern of child-centred education and claimed the learners' freedom to determine their own education according to their own interests or at least minimise interference and control over them' ('Ali, 1995a:266). According to this claim the aims of education are recognised as developing free thinking, creativity, responsibility, self-learning, team work and democratic participation in society. However, 'the claim also focused on achieving a balance between the satisfaction of learners' and society's interests' ('Ali, 1995a:270). Secondly, educational thought 'claimed freedom for learners in terms of having free and equal educational opportunities at all levels' ('Ali, 1995a:271). Educationalists stressed 'the responsibility of the state to extend basic education to 9 years, increase educational opportunity at all levels and offer alternatives, extend the school day, eradicate illiteracy and admit the right of the public to share in the making of educational decisions' ('Ali, 1995a:272).. Thirdly, educational thought 'claimed the need for technology to enhance learning' ('Ali, 1995a:274).. Fourthly, educationalists made clear 'that having choices in education is important for learners to maximise their opportunities to meet their interests' ('Ali, 1995a:276).

With respect to the value of freedom in educational practice, there was no reflection of the idea of freedom. As previously investigated, education was aimed at transforming learners

into obedient clerks as the state wanted them to be. They did not have the ability to think critically, make decisions for themselves, or be responsible for their actions. Learners interested in what they were studying as the aims of education did not concern their interests. In other words it was not the state's concern to educate learners in a way that developed their thinking, experiences, knowledge or skills. In talking about the value of freedom for society, individuals failed to play their roles in the development process due to the poor quality of the education system at the time. This might lead to the conclusion that limiting the learners' freedom to study their area of interest was one of the strongest reasons behind the failure of the development.

It might be argued that the lack freedom present in the education system, may be due to several reasons, depending on the period of investigation. It could be said that one of the reasons for this lack of freedom is political strategies. For example, during 'Ali's regime which lasted until 1952, political leaders used to do what they saw best for achieving their own aims, completely neglecting the development of individuals. After the revolution of 1952, the reasons could be due to the absence of 'a clear and comprehensive philosophy which both individuals and society require from education. Every new government has a new and different policy for education which causes confusion throughout the educational system' ('Ammar (1996a:25).

Regarding the second aim of this section, it might be concluded that the value of freedom in education has been discussed and expressed in educational thought. This indicates that the claim for learners' freedom in Egypt is not a new concept but rather a desirable one made by educationalists for both learners and society. However, despite this educational thought, educationalists did not reach a clear theory or proposal regarding freedom in education.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter was an attempt to discover and analyse the idea of freedom in educational theory and practice in Egyptian history from 1805 to 1991. In relation to the first aim it can be concluded that learners' freedom in the area of considering their interests to be the main concern of educational policy was limited. Learner's priority in education was not the main concern of the political leadership even after obtaining full independence and being a free society acknowledging individuals' freedom. Since 'Ali's regime and until the 1950s the purpose of education was limited to suit the needs of rulers more than individuals. After the revolution of 1952 education aimed to satisfy the needs of society rather than individuals. Regarding the second aim, educational thought discussed the idea of freedom in education and its value in the areas of developing learners' abilities to think freely, to make choices and decisions and be responsible for their actions. Also it recognised that the satisfying of society's needs does not go against the satisfaction of individuals. They are inter-connected and education should be concerned primarily with the first rather than the second. This indicates that it is possible for the idea of learners' freedom to be implemented in the Egyptian context.

With respect to the second aim of this chapter, the idea of freedom in the history of Egypt was always related to the claim for individuals to have free and equal educational opportunity. In this respect Criblez argues that the demands for accessibility must satisfy two requirements: freedom and equality (1999:117). For example these two conditions were very limited from the time of 'Ali's regime to the beginning of the 1950s when the revolution took place. This meant that until 1991 millions of children still had no schooling due to the lack of educational opportunity. As mentioned in chapters two and three, freedom in education primarily means that learners must have the opportunity to choose and decide for themselves without interference from others. 'Their freedom has to begin with the availability of places in the schools for learners, which is a basic need of education' ('Ali, 1997:351). If the number and the variety of educational opportunities are limited, this in turn limits learners' freedom to choose a place in the school of their choice. Moreover, they will be obliged to accept such opportunities as the state offers. Hence, it

might be important to define freedom in education as a right for learners to have free and equal opportunities so they can make their own choices between such alternatives as exist.

Regarding girls' freedom in education, it has been shown that their freedom is still less than boys' in terms of free and equal opportunity and they do not have freedom to study and work in particular fields like boys. The diminished freedom that they have has nothing to do with religious obligations, as mentioned in chapter one, nevertheless, it seems that girls are restricted by social values.

Regarding the third aim, the investigation explained the restrictions that could limit learners' freedom.

- Although it was laid down by law that the local authorities had the freedom and responsibility to share educational planning and practices, it focused only on putting such decisions into practice and played no role in decision-making. Moreover, learners, parents, teachers and schools had no freedom to share decision-making or even the freedom to object to the decision that had been made.
- As for teachers' preparation it can be concluded that some policies affected the quality of the teachers and the value of the teaching profession compared to others professions. Firstly, the teacher's role until 1991 continued to be thought of as that of a person who passed on knowledge and information to learners without allowing them to share in the process of teaching and learning. Secondly, these policies made people think that teaching is very low profession in terms of social prestige and salary. Thirdly, teachers were not free to choose to be trained as teachers and the process of teaching treated them as persons who had only to deliver such knowledge to learners. Fourthly, admission policies prevented talented candidates from applying to teacher's institutes which limited learners' freedom to have a good quality of teacher. As mentioned earlier, these institutes started with weaker candidates. It might be argued that this type of teacher limited learners' freedom through exercising unjustifiable authority on them because they thought that they were the ones who know everything and the learners should listen to what they were saying.

- As discussed, learners' assessment took the form of examinations held at the end of each year. Secondly, the purpose of the examinations was limited to obtaining a certificate that was the only means to obtain a government job. The importance of the certificate caused the learners to be frightened of the examination that made them spend the whole year preparing for them. Thirdly, the purpose of the examination questions was to find out how much knowledge the learners could memorise. As discussed in chapter three, the assessment's purpose in this sense limited the learners' freedom to exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value. Fourthly, until 1991 the assessment regulations continued to limit learner's freedom in terms of having educational opportunity.
- An inappropriate educational budget limits the learners' freedom in terms of having free and equal educational opportunities. Also, as a result of a lack of a budget the state failed to allow learners; (a) freedom to determine the type of study they are interested in when the state obliged them to do what satisfied its aims (b) alternatives and options in the curriculum and its subjects in which they can make free choices. In other words the required conditions for learners and society to exercise freedom and obtain benefit from its value in education (non-interference and the availability of choices) were not implied in the educational policy and practice during the period of the study.
- As indicated in this chapter, the illiteracy rate remained high although the state tried to eradicate it by introducing adult education policies. This leads us to state that these efforts can not eliminate illiteracy unless there is universal enrolment in basic education. This might lead to argue that illiteracy could prevent the public from demanding a share in making educational decisions or claiming freedom for their children.

With respect to the fourth aim, firstly, the value of freedom was not reflected in the educational practice. For learners, as investigated, the type of education aimed to turn them into obedient clerks as the state wanted them to be. They did not have the ability to do critical thinking, make decisions for themselves or to be responsible for their actions. Learners had no freedom to be interested in what they are studying because aims of

education did not concern their interests. In other words it was not the state's concern to educate learners in way that developed their thinking, experiences, knowledge and skills.

Secondly, the value of freedom in education has been discussed and expressed in educational thought. This indicates that the claim for learners' freedom in Egypt is not a new one but it is a desirable claim made by educationalists for learners and society. However, educational thought did not crystallise such theory or proposal to apply freedom in education.

Having investigated the idea of freedom in education in Egyptian educational history the next chapter will examine the idea of freedom in Egypt between 1992 to 2000, whereas the current chapter focused on the period up to 1991.

Chapter Five

Freedom in education in Egypt (1992-2000)

5.1. Introduction

Egypt's current educational strategy, which presents a comprehensive framework for educational reform, was initially articulated in 1992. Thus the main concern of this chapter is to discover and analyse the idea of freedom in educational theory and practice in Egypt from 1992 to 2000 whereas the previous chapter focused on the period from 1805 to 1991. The aims of this chapter can be summarised as follows; firstly, to discover and analyse the conditions of freedom related to Egyptian society and its educational system for learners to derive benefit from the value of freedom in education. In other words to investigate how far learners have been interfered with and subjected to authority by adults in relation to their choices and decisions to study what they are interested in and to be or become what they want? Secondly, to discover such educational practices as reflect the aspects of freedom. This will help us to understand how the present educational system has come about which is necessary to establish a sound basis for the implementation of freedom in chapter six and seven. Thirdly, to discover the sort of restrictions that determine learners' freedom with regard to educational policy and practice. This will help in the avoidance of such restrictions and in the preparation for conditions that are important in the implementation of the idea of freedom in the Egyptian context in chapter six and seven. Fourthly, to identify the meaning, features and the value of freedom in educational thought in the light of the theoretical framework made in the first three chapters. The significance of this section is to give an indication of the suitability and validity of the implementation of freedom in education in the Egyptian context. To achieve the previous aims this chapter will be divided into two sections. The first is concerned with an examination of the conditions required for learners to obtain benefit from the value of freedom in education. The second section deals with the sort of restrictions that determine learners' freedom.

5.2. Freedom in education regarding its conditions

This section will investigate and analyse the idea of freedom in education regarding its conditions (non-interference and the availability of making free choices and decisions) to achieve the first and the second aim of the current chapter. Firstly, it will investigate if learners' freedom to study what they are interested in and to be or to become something they want has been interfered with. In other words to answer the question of whether the state had taken the learners' interests into consideration? Secondly, it will explore the learners' freedom to make their own free choices to receive a particular opportunity in education according to their wishes and interests. This section gives some information about the actual practice in education (in the area of the purpose of education, curriculum planning, having free and equal opportunities and making decisions) which must be realised and understood before implementation of freedom in education takes place in the Egyptian context.

5.2.1. Learners' freedom to determine what they are interested in studying

According to Hargreaves, educational reform is often seen as a matter of national economic survival. Like Nassir's (1952-1970) and Sadat's (1970-1980) regime, Mubarak (1980-to date) believes that economic soundness can be reached through education, by concentrating on education in the field of applied mathematics, science and technology (2001:252). In training learners for various professions, it is the interest of society and not those of the individual that are taken into consideration. For instance, Timwr (1999:10) notes that the purpose of education is 'to provide the type of individuals that society needs'. Similarly, 'Ammar (1999b:7) observes that 'education in Egypt is influenced by two main schools of thought: firstly, the school of thought that emphasises an economic perspective. This group has a strong influence on the people who are in charge of education, as they control the economy and investments in the country. The second school of thought on the other hand, stresses the importance of developing the personality of the learners so that they can be autonomous in their choices and decisions and responsible for their actions as well as creative'. Similarly, Sh'aban (1999:9) points out, 'a society cannot develop without first

developing its citizens. Education should not only train individuals to take up responsible positions in society, but it must also equip them with the ability to be autonomous and creative'. As the influence exerted by this group is less powerful than that of the first group, the direction taken by education in Egypt is determined by who has more power in society at a given moment rather than by the interests of individuals in society. In this sense 'Ammar (1999a:13) argues that 'thinking of education in this way does not produce thinkers, creative, self-learners or responsible people but learners who are like mere machines that do what the state wants them to do'. In talking about interference by parents, it is fair to say that parents and teachers have nothing to do with planning or even sharing discussions about education. As I will discuss, they only have to continue the chain of interference by the state to oblige the children to study what the state wants and earn certificates that allow them to have a good job in terms of social prestige and salary.

For the state to achieve its goals it exercises authority over learners to learn for the sake of industrial development and the learners do not have the freedom to make choices regarding their interests. In the following sections I will examine in more detail the conditions that are necessary for learners to show benefit from the value of freedom in relation to determining curriculum and its content.

5.2.1.1. Learners' freedom and curriculum design

As mentioned earlier the purpose of Egyptian education is to prepare learners for the sake of industrial development. As stated by 'Ali (1998:185) and Shihata (1991:128) 'the curriculum is designed by the state for its own interests and needs'. This approach implies that the state determines the rules to force learners to do what society wants them to do by studying particular subjects. According to this tradition, the role of learners at school is to learn what the state wants (see the arguments of Kelly (1977) and Lawton (1981 for example). Regarding this approach, it is only the state that has the right (not the learners, teachers or parents) to decide what is to be included in the content which will help learners to acquire the knowledge and skills that are necessary for the development of the state.

According to this approach school knowledge is related to the developing needs of the economy (Moore,2000:19) and (Jenkins and Shipman,1976:23). It lies behind many of the calls for more science and technology in the curriculum (Langford,1970:107). This approach is guided by the product rather than by the process. What children learn, and how they behave, is central to the approach (Blyth,1984:32-4). In other words, planning the curriculum on the basis of what society may be said to be or to need, is to “attempt to use education to fit pupils into society, is to adopt an approach to education that is essentially utilitarian or instrumental” (Blenkin and Kelly,1983:48). In the same line Eraut (1981:151) argues that there is always “pressure to introduce more science, to make the curriculum more vocational and to devote more time to links between schools and industry”. Thus the purpose of education is the acquisition of knowledge by learners to develop industry for the state which needs “specialists of all sorts and generalists - generally cultivated human beings” (Adler,1988:43).

According to this approach, in determining the curriculum and its content Egyptian education does not provide the required conditions since the learners cannot derive benefit from the value of freedom. Firstly, as argued by Freire and Shor (1987:76), the problem of the state having full authority in the school curriculum is simply the producing of curriculum compatibility with control from above. That chain of authority ends in the passive, transfer pedagogy dominating schools and colleges. It also ends in teacher burnout, student resistance, and the continual eruption of liberatory reforms from below. Similarly, Phenix, for instance, (1975:165) observes that

students and teachers alike are prone to take the curriculum as they find it, as a traditional sequence of separate elements, without inquiring into the comprehensive pattern within which the constituent parts are located.

This shows that instead of developing the learners’ abilities, education serves to prepare learners as machines to do what the state wants them to do. In this sense, ‘education does not help to develop the learners’ mind and teach them how to think, analyse and criticise’ (‘Ali,2000:14). Similarly, this approach seems to give more attention to science and technology rather than art and literature for the sake of industrial development. In this sense it can be seen that it focuses on the acquisition of knowledge by learners, as the most

important and necessary aim of education rather than development of the learners' intellectual abilities and feeling of happiness, and responsibility. Therefore, it is necessary to find out how far Egyptian education values knowledge and how it affects learners' freedom to obtain benefit from it.

5.2.1.2. Learners' freedom and the value of knowledge

For most learners, 'going to school means memorising facts and information without understanding' (Abw Al-Wafa, 1997:35), and the tediousness of this process usually results in learners feeling that the 'educational experience is not a happy one, since it does not include interesting activities and so on which can capture their interest' (Al-Said, 1989:2). Learners are overburdened with too much knowledge and homework and they cannot cope with the extra workload'. Although the human brain is extraordinarily powerful and flexible there are limits to how much knowledge it can process at once. 'When these limits are exceeded, learners find it extremely difficult to assimilate all the new information they are taught' (ME, 1999f:55), and as a consequence begin to feel that they are failures. As a result, a discussion reported in the Al-'Ahram newspaper by Al-Bindari (1999:5) concludes that 'the heavy workload in schools is the most popular reason behind the high suicide rate among learners once they receive their examination results. This also explains the high drop-out rate and discontinuation'. This reflects the fact that Egyptian education pays more attention to the amount of knowledge learners should learn at a required age for the sake of industrial development.

Considering knowledge as an aim in itself produces more restrictions over learners' freedom to enjoy the required conditions to be free in their education. For example, it provides a justification for a compulsory and common textbook. The argument here does not go against the pattern of having a common textbook, the idea is that 'learners and teachers have little to say about these books, or what should be incorporated, and how they should be written. Such decisions are made for them, though in the name of their best interests. Learners are often the forgotten constituency' (NCERT, 1997:18). One big problem with Egyptian textbooks is the fact that they are often poorly written. This might

refer to the problems and difficulties that arise because textbooks are written by committees and consultants rather than taking learners' and teachers' views into consideration.

Firstly, textbooks are full of isolated facts that learners should know. Having textbooks that contain all the required knowledge 'does not give learners the freedom, for example, to look for more knowledge, discover the relationship between different variables or learn and how they can use such knowledge in a meaningful and worthwhile way. Learners are also not allowed to study other books except the textbooks even if it contains wrong information, as sometimes happens' (Shihata,1991:128). This can be seen as a reason for the loss of motivation on the part of learners to make an effort to examine, to discover or even to think of particular knowledge. This way of designing textbooks produces problems in the universities, 'as learners expect to find textbooks that they can read before the exam. When they do not find what they are looking for, they require lecturers to give notes similar to those they have been used to in schools' ('Abd Alla,1991:260). University learners also often complain about the system of examinations which is different from that of schools. Even after graduation they will still need to be told what they have to do, because they never had the chance during school and universities to think for themselves and make their own decisions.

Secondly, 'Ali (1998:185) states that 'only one dimension is considered and that is the perspective of the leadership and all other views are pushed to the background or completely neglected. For example, in the history curriculum, the selection of content is never a neutral enterprise, and choices reflect the priorities of those with the power to choose. The act of selection prioritises some content over others. In identifying a sense of chronology and time, an appreciation of continuity and change, and an understanding of cause and effect in human affairs, they placed the strongest emphasis on the second order concepts that define the essential nature of historical knowledge. Moreover, the content that is taught is the history of rulers, and types of policy rather than what ordinary individuals have done to help leaders to achieve their aims. The content also focuses on events rather than the reasons for the events and their consequences'. This way of presenting knowledge does not build self-confidence in learners, as the values that are inculcated are that only

leaders can achieve great things. This can give learners the idea that ordinary people cannot make a worthwhile contribution towards social change. This can result in a sense of powerlessness. They feel that to contribute towards social change, a person has to be in a position of authority or have money. Because of the way they are taught, learners are not aware of what group pressure can do, and they do not realise that as a group they can put pressure on the government to make changes. Very often, learners do not even object to decisions that are directly related to them. In fact, they are learning how to respect authority and obey rules and decisions so that they do not even have the desire to object. A similar example can be taken from the curriculum for the Arabic language. 'This curriculum appears to give learners the perspective of the author of the curriculum, for instance, why a certain poem is aesthetic. In this case, giving the perspective of the author can be seen to hinder the learners' ability to make their own judgements about the aesthetic qualities of the poem' (Muhammad, 1991b:98).

A third problem can be seen in Al-'Atar's argument (1999:57) he states that 'the kind of knowledge that exists in the textbook coerces and restricts the freedom of the learners' thinking. The learners are forced to memorise facts which are not related to their world'. For example, the conference on the development of the curriculum for the primary school recommended that 'the aims of the math curriculum were to help learners to use mathematics in their real lives and to develop their attitude towards it by using it in their day-to-day lives' (EODC, 1993:59). However, it has been found that the mathematics curriculum does not promote these aims. For instance, in 1999 Al-Aibyari (1999:210-11) finds that 'the problems used in the textbooks did not reflect the learners real-life situation, and therefore, they could not use the knowledge they had gained to solve these problems in real life situations' (Salah, 1999:178).

5.2.1.3. Learners' freedom and curriculum subjects

This section examines the nature of curriculum subjects to find out if they reflect other restrictions over learners that might limit their freedom to have the required conditions that are needed to derive benefit from its value in education. Firstly, according to the law no 139 of 1981 (ARE,1999a:142,144,189) 'pre-university school subjects such as music, food science, technical subjects in general education, needlework, physical education and religious education are not compulsory examination subjects (except religious education) and do not contribute in any way to the learners' final marks'. Even art which is a compulsory examination subject, it is looked on as an unimportant subject. Politicians are only concerned about scientific and technological knowledge, which is regarded as positively contributing to the history of the human race. Unfortunately, this leads to neglecting of these subjects in terms of designing new curricula or training teachers. As has been argued in chapters two and three, learners especially at early age, need neutral help and suggestions from adults to show them what options are available and their value in their lives. Then they have to be left free to make their own choices and decisions. The neglecting of such subjects by the law seems to affect the learners' views towards those subjects and any choice and decision they might make will not be made according to their real interests or choices.

The state has similar policies to make learners interested in the industrial development needs by paying more attention to subjects such as mathematics, science and foreign languages rather than the humanities. This has been the case since Muhammad 'Ali to the present time. For example, in 1993, 'the state began sending secondary school teachers abroad, to be trained only in the field of science, mathematics, English and French'. (ME,1999b:45). This highlights the neglect of subjects like literature, humanities, arts, music and physical education, as teachers teaching these subjects do not have the same opportunities. This goes against the core idea of freedom in education, as it prevents learners who are really interested in improving their knowledge and skills for example in, arts, music and physical education, from having the opportunity to learn from qualified teachers, as these subjects are given a step-motherly treatment. It seems quite natural from

such a policy that sciences have more value than social ones, and this put learners under an obligation from their parents to engage in the former rather than the latter.

Secondly, learners do not have the freedom to make choices between subjects or between branches of a subject because all subjects and units are compulsory. Only in the secondary school do learners have an opportunity to choose between doing art or science. However, they are not free to choose what they want as presented above. Thirdly, subjects at school are very isolated when there is no link between the different subjects or similar subjects at different levels. As discussed by 'Ali (1998:186), 'the teacher teaches a particular subject or unit without any reference to its relationship to the other components of the curriculum. The learners may study one subject after another with no idea of what his growth in knowledge and skill might contribute to an integrated way of life'. Fourthly, learners do not receive tuition about particular subjects or units such as design and technology, children's rights and human rights, globalisation, information technology, communications although these very important areas need to be taught in a rapidly changing world.

5.2.1.4. The place of extra curricula activities and limitation of learners' freedom

As has been argued in chapters two and three, learners need a suitable learning environment to exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value. In this sense it might be argued that having the opportunity to engage in different extra curricular activities is a chance for learners to learn and exercise freedom. Although the state considers extra curricular activities as central to a comprehensive education experience, in practice they have no place in the school. Even kindergarten learners have to gain knowledge instead of indulging free play, art, music, and physical activities. 'What we can likely to notice in school is; (a) the elimination of physical education classes and the changing to others. (B) the destination of a school playground for a new building. (C) the absence of necessary training material and resources required for physical education. (D) the lack of a school library, (E) the absence of programmes for the discovery of gifted youngsters. (F) the shortening of the school day, which does not allow any opportunities for such activities. (G) the lack of specific budget for extra curricular activities. (H) the absence of teacher'

role. (I) the scared feelings of learners faced with examinations that require them to use all their time studying and prevents them from engaging such activities' (NCERT,1995:89-103) and (Mughis,1996:26).

The absence of extra curricular activities might refer to 'the limited vision of the role of schools which resulted in the demise of many school related extra curricula activities' (Baha' Al-Din,1997:124). Moreover, 'there are wrong beliefs shown by parents that the role of the school is limited providing learners with knowledge and gaining full marks in the examination. Thus they believe that taking part in extra curricula activities wastes their children's time and does not help them to study and memorise all the required knowledge they need' (NCERT,1995:98). As a results of the absence of extra curricula activities learners' freedom is limited because they lose the opportunities to discover their interests, abilities and learn to be free, responsible, creative and autonomous.

5.2.1.5. Type of teaching methods and the limitation of learners' thinking

Because the curriculum is full of information and isolated facts, teachers find that giving lectures is the best way to teach, and their job is to help learners to memorise such information. It does not allow teachers and learners freedom to use different methods and techniques. According to 'Ali (1998:15) 'the curriculum has been designed as to make lectures the teaching method for all lessons'. For example, Muhammad (1991b:98) argues that 'teaching Arabic literature in secondary school is designed to make learners memorise vocabulary and their meaning. In addition, the nature of the curriculum obliges learners to memorise even the explanation of some of the poems instead of helping them to feel the language and make their own judgements'. 'Even teaching science and mathematics is treated as the same although they are concerned with the process of asking questions, investigating, inquiring and evaluating' (NCERT,1998:44). Therefore, it is common for learners to use private textbooks, which contain questions and answers as an easy way to memorise such information. Using lectures as the only teaching method limits learner's freedom to develop their intellectual abilities and feel free to make their own judgements, explanations, predictions, analysis and reconstruction of such knowledge and information.

Furthermore 'it does not help learners to develop skills such as selecting or using equipment, displaying data, basic measuring techniques, observations, illustration and investigations' (NCERT,1998:44).

5.2.2. Learners' freedom to have free and equal educational opportunity

This section investigates and analyses the learners' freedom in education in terms of the availability of educational opportunities to achieve the second aim of this chapter. (A) this section attempts to find out if learners are left free from interference or being subjected to authority to receive the free and equal opportunity they are interested in (B), to discover such educational practices that reflect the features of freedom and unfreedom which can be promoted or eliminated in implementing freedom in the Egyptian context. (C), this section investigates girls' freedom to find out whether there are social or political restrictions limiting it, whereas chapter one indicated that there are no religious restrictions limiting girls' freedom.

Firstly, 'although law number 139 of 1981 stated that public education is free from primary school to doctorate level' (ARE,1999a:4), learners' freedom was limited by expenses 'that are needed for textbooks, uniform, stationary, transportation and private tuition, especially as not all families in rural and poor areas could afford to pay for such things' (Diwidar,1997:36). This shows 'the absence of freedom, democracy and justice in education. In this sense education can be seen to be for only a certain class in Egypt, i.e for those who can afford it' 'Ali (1997:351), 'Ammar (1999a:138-140) Khidr (2000:73), Ahmad (1993:98), and Ghalyun, (1990:322). Lack of money can be considered as an unintentional restriction that limits learners' freedom to have free and equal opportunities. It is true that it was argued in chapter one that poverty is not one of the restrictions that limits individual's freedom. However, the situation is different in the case of children and their freedom in education. Children are young people who need education to develop and be prepared for the world and it is the state's responsibility to provide them with such an opportunity.

Secondly, in line with the historical analysis in chapter four 'the state still does not consider the pre-school education or kindergarten as a part of the educational system' (ME,1996:71). This means that it is neither free nor compulsory, it is rather private for those who can afford it (see the discussion in 4.2.2.6.).

Thirdly, in 1999, as a result of the wide debate concerning the insufficient number of years at the primary stage to provide learners with the minimum basic knowledge and skills, learners enjoy more freedom when 'the state once again revoked the decisions to delimit the primary stage to 5 years, by taking steps to introduce an extra year' (ME,1999a:22). Then basic compulsory free education becomes nine years divided into two stages; the first stage (primary) is 6 years. The second stage (general preparatory) or (vocational preparatory) is 3 years for all Egyptian learners between the ages of 6 and 15 years.

However, thinking of education as a means to prepare learners as tools for development, it makes the sole concern of the state that of preparing the appropriate number of learners needed for such development. In other words there is no need for investment for all to be educated because development does not need everyone. This might explain why there was no big effort by the state to protect learners' freedom, although educational law number 139 of 1981 (ARE,1999a:4-10) maintains that 'every child has the right to compulsory education at age 6'. If parents do not send their children to school the state will fine them 10 Egyptian pounds' which is a small amount compared to what the children can earn if they work. This means that the state takes no serious action against parents who do not send their children to school.

Fourthly, 'from 1991 to 1999, the number of primary and preparatory schools increased by 1.3% and 25.2% respectively (see table 28). The number of secondary schools increased from 291 in 1993 to 314 in 1997' (ME,1999f:17-8) and (ME,1999a: 58). Also the number of learners increased at all levels (see table 29). Moreover, the schools that work three shifts have disappeared and this increases the learners' freedom to have an equal opportunity in education.

Table 28
Numbers of schools and percentages of increase (1991-1998)

year	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
School	25,616	26,217	26,877	28,205	29,743	30,570	31,179	32,150
%*	-	2	3	5	5	3	2	2

(ME) Ministry of Education, (1999b:21)

Table 29
Numbers of learners and percentages of its increase (1992-1999)

Educational stage	Year	No. of learners	Increase	Increase %
Kindergarten	1992	223,051	105,089	47.11
	1999	328,140		
Primary	1992	6,541,725	809,393	12.37
	1999	7,351,118		
Preparatory	1992	3,593,365	559,259	15.56
	1999	4,152,624		
General Secondary	1992	572,026	396,682	69.34
	1999	968,708		
Technical secondary	1992	1,110,184	764,752	68.885
	1999	1,874,936		

(ME) Ministry of Education, (1999f:70-4)

However, although there is an increase in the number of schools, learners and the absence of the three-shift schools the number of schools is inadequate for universal enrolment at primary school. 'Ammar, (2000:20) notes that 'although the number of schools have increased there are still millions of children out of school because the number of schools is inadequate to offer places for the total number of learners of school age, especially in the rural areas'. According to Ahmad (1999b:106) in 1994 'there were 150,000 learners who could not enrol in school in that particular year, and another 150,000 who could not continue compulsory education and became illiterate as a result of the lack of education'. This means that 'about 13.19% of learners at age 6 are still out of school due to the insufficient number of schools in the country' (ME,1999a:25). This is why many schools still work double shifts and have a short school day (see table 30). It can be argued that there is inequality regarding the type of school the learners might attend. This is because learners who attend full time have more freedom than others to receive a good quality of learning. In this sense the shortage of schools can be considered a restriction that limits the learners' freedom to enjoy opportunities in education.

Table 30
Numbers and percentages of primary schools that works one and two shifts

Year	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
One shift	10,911	10,548	10,950	11,282	11,772	12,213	13,032	13,378
%*	71	67	69	70	73	76	83	86
Two shift	4,450	5,099	4,911	4,806	4,416	3,939	2,585	2,188
%*	29	33	31	30	27	24	17	14

(ME) Ministry of Education (1999b:33)

Secondary graduates' freedom to join higher education is also restricted because the state intends to limit this opportunity. 'The given justification is that there is an unnecessary increase in learners' enrolment' (Badran, 2000:120). However, in fact, this justification is not true because 'the percentage of enrolments of the eligible population increased from just 17.7% in 1994' (CU,1997,5) to 19% in 1997 (CU,1999,15) 'compared to 66% in USA, 39% in Japan and France and 31% in Spain in 1997' (Al-'Adwi,1998:161).

Fifthly, the procedures applying to learners in the secondary school according to Shukri (1999:47) 'divides graduates from the preparatory school into general and technical schools. Those who go to secondary schools make up about 30% whereas those who go to technical school consist of about 70%'. This classification depends on the score learners achieve in the final examination in the preparatory school. There are some noticeable shortcomings with this policy. (A) 'this division limits the learners' opportunity to continue the higher education, as general secondary education is the way to join higher education. For those who do technical studies, the secondary school can be considered as an end stage because learners do not have the same opportunity to join higher education' (Mughis,1996:20). A number of educational opportunities are available to them and those determined by the state are very small compared to the general school. This means that they have to obtain a very high score. For some colleges their scores have to be higher than those of their peers in the general secondary school. (B) 'although 70% of learners receive technical education, there is a surplus, as the economic market cannot provide employment for such a large number of people with the same sort of skills and qualifications' (NCERT,1993:22). This shows that 'the policy has decided on this rate so as to reduce the number of learners who can enrol in higher education, in spite of the rate of enrolment dropping to 19.8% in 1998' (Shukri,1999:47). This policy makes the community think that 'technical education has less value than academic because it starts with weaker learners, its

graduates do not have freedom to enter higher education and not qualified in their specialities because theirs is a poor education' ('Ali,1984:167). For instance, most graduates from 1986 to date do not have jobs. In 1993, 'the percentage of those unemployed in technical schools was 75.9 % out of the total number of unemployed people in the country' (ME,1997:2).

Moreover, technical secondary learners' do not have the required conditions to allow them to exercise and benefit from the value of freedom in education. For example, they do not have freedom; (a) to choose to follow this type of education. (B) to choose the technical field they are interested in from among the only three types that are available (industrial, agriculture or commercial) because they are classified according to their scores. (C) to receive similar opportunities to their peers have in the general schools. 'In terms of learning circumstances and facilities learners do not have the freedom to receive well-organised and facilitated education as their peers have in the general secondary school' (Al-Shabasi,2000:113-51). 'Although they are supposed to have a better education because they are the large group that one needed for development, which is the main concern of the state as discussed at the beginning of the chapter' (Mughis,1996:20). 'This means that the state does not pay serious attention to this kind of education' (Mughis,1996:20). This leads me to the argument that money and time spent on this kind of education is wasted because of the low quality of its graduates. This proves that 'the aim of secondary technical education is to reduce the number of learners in general secondary education who demand higher education but not because the development process needs them, especially as it is very poor education in terms of the quality of its graduates and the high rate of unemployment among them' (Al-Shabasi,2000:113-51). What makes the technical learners have less freedom is the fact that 'most of learners who attend technical education are from the lower classes who cannot compete with their peers in the general secondary education in terms of private tuition and private textbooks to gain a high enough score to enrol in higher education' (Ahmad,1997:8).

Sixthly, according to ministerial decision number 94 of 1989 (ME,1989b:2) 'learners cannot transfer, for example, from secondary technical school to secondary general school

although they can transfer from general school to technical secondary school'. Ministerial decision number 258 of 1989 (ME,1989a:2) also allows 'learners who fail the final exam in the general secondary school to transfer to the second year of technical school. For example, learners who fail in science can transfer to arts if they pass the required exam'. According to Shukri (1999:47) 'although the purpose behind these decisions is to help parents and learners to cope with the drop-out problem, these decisions also reflect the value of general and technical schools and the arts and science streams. This again makes people think that technical education is less valuable than academic education, and that studying arts is less valuable than studying science'. This policy can be considered a restriction that prevents learners from studying what they like, as they feel that the humanities and technical education are of no value.

5.2.2.1. Girls' freedom in education

In line with the historical analysis in chapter four, there is still a gap between the enrolment rate for girls and boys (see table 31), especially in poor and rural areas. This is because boys in Egyptian society always have a greater priority in education than girls. It can be argued that 'girls are restricted by the social view of women in Egypt, which gives preference to boys, regarded as hard, strong, dominant, aggressive, active, abstract and rational rather than girls, regarded as soft, weak, submissive, docile, passive, feeling, and irrational' (NCERT,1992:20-2). Parents who struggle to meet the cost of schooling are likely to send their sons rather than their daughters to school. As education is costly in terms of money for books and stationary, private tuition, transportation and so on, in most cases, especially in poor and rural areas, parents are more likely to send boys to school rather than girls. In this sense girls' opportunity to exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value is limited compared to boys.

Table 31
Numbers and percentages of male and female population
enrolled in the first grade of primary education (1990-1999)

Year	Male	%	Female	%	Total
1990	716,341	54.3	607,014	45.7	1,323,355
1999	688,282	52	633,378	48	1,321,660

(ME) Ministry of Education (1999a:26)

Table 32
Numbers and percentages of boys' and girls' enrolment in preparatory schools (1990-1998)

Year	Boys	Girls	*Boys %	*Girls %
1991	1,972,830	1,580,439	55.6	44.4
1992	1,973,381	1,619,984	55	45
1993	1,850,700	1,493,546	55.6	44.5
1994	1,850,630	1,502,728	55.2	44.8
1995	1,864,368	1,544,759	54.7	45.3
1996	1,921,644	1,618,196	54.3	45.7
1997	1,981,926	1,697,399	53.9	46.1
1998	2,107,309	1,820,136	53.7	46.3
1999	2,215,274	1,937,350	53.3	46.7

(ME) Ministry of Education (1999b:31)

In the secondary school, 'the percentage of girls' enrolment increased from 44% in 1991 to 46% in 1997' (ME, 1994b:48), (ME, 1995:56) and (ME, 1998:35). The previous data in table 32 indicates that the number of girls who enrolled in school is slightly less than that of boys. However, in higher education there is a gap between the percentage of boys' and girls' enrolment. Table 33 shows that the percentage of girls' enrolment was only 40.5% in 1994. Moreover, 'current education seems to find social studies is the suitable field for girls and technical and engineering for boys' (NCERT, 1995:77-8). In fact, there is still a gap between the enrolment of girls and boys, especially, in the poor and rural areas. This gap is further reflected by other economic indicators. According to the 1995 Human Development Report, the share of women from the 'total work force was only 25 % whereas the percentage for men was 75 %. At the same time, the percentage of women in parliament was 2 % in comparison with 20 % in the developed countries and 10 % in Latin America'.

Table 33
Comparison between boys and girls enrolled in universities (1991-1994)

Year	Boys	%	Girls	%	girls to boys %
1991	266302	61.7	165561	38.3	62.2
1992	286904	60.9	184454	39.1	64.3
1993	310975	59.9	208561	40.1	67.1
1994	355876	59.5	242088	40.5	68.0

(CU) Council of Universities (1997:5)

5.3. Freedom in education regarding its restrictions

This section investigates and analyses the restrictions that determine learners' freedom in educational policy and practice. The significance of this section is to avoid such restrictions and prepare for such conditions that are important in the implementation of the idea of freedom in the Egyptian context, in chapter six. To achieve this aim the following section will treat learners' freedom regarding the process of making decisions, teacher's preparation, the spread of private tuition examination' regulations, illiteracy, private education and the educational budget which might be seen as very important and effective restrictions on learners' freedom.

5.3.1. Freedom in education and decisions-making

According to educational law no 139, of 1981 (ARE, 1999a:3-5) as amended by decree law no. 233 of 1988, the minister of education is 'responsible for planning, follow up, evaluation, development and provision of educational materials as well as determining the standards and qualifications of teachers'. 'National and local politics strongly influence the context within which schools and colleges operate. Central government determines the broad characteristics of the educational system and this influence is inevitably underpinned by the political views of the majority party' (NCERT, 1994:11). 'The law entrusts local authorities with the responsibility of implementation and follow up at the local level (while taking into consideration the national guidelines), supervision of activities during the school year, development and administration of examination according to the present guidelines for the various levels, and to the recruitment of teachers'(ARE, 1999a:5-7). Centralisation in education is associated with decisions, directions and actions dictated by those in positions of authority such as directors, chiefs, ministers, and rules. This vertical structure of authority does not allow any opportunity for those in the lower ranks to make a worthwhile contribution. 'They are expected to conform, obey and implement. This also applies to the system of educational administration at its various levels, directed not only by the Ministry's bureaucracy, but also by the decisions of the minister himself' ('Ali, 1997:353).

According to the information mentioned above, the minister of education is the final authority on every decision for education. As a result of centralisation in education, firstly, the learners have no opportunity to participate in decision-making or to object to decisions that have already been made. For example, 'in 1988, the state reduced the number of years learners had to attend primary school from 6 to 5 years, and for economic reasons, did not share this decision with those who were involved learners, parents, teachers and educationalists. In May 1999, without consulting the mentioned groups, the state once again revoked the decision to delimit primary education to 5 years, by taking steps to introduce an extra year by the year 2000. It recommended revising and updating the curriculum in primary schools, especially after the introduction of the sixth year' (ME,1999a:22). Besides causing confusion and chaos for everyone, learners, teacher and parents, this hasty decision also costs valuable money, which could have been better spent improving the quality of education. As mentioned before, this decision was taken without consulting learners, teachers or parents. Some might argue that this kind of decision does not need input from, teachers and parents, and is one that needs expert opinion. But 'Ali (1998:14), reminds us of 'the importance of distinguishing between issues that need expert opinion and other issues, which directly concern, teachers and parents'. In the case of the above-mentioned decision, if the state had allowed an opportunity for discussion and debate, perhaps, the chaos, confusion and loss of money that ensued as a result of it could have been averted.

From the above, 'it can be seen that learners, teachers and parents have no freedom to share in making decisions' (NCERT,1993:16). In the making of decisions, the state neither consults learners, teachers, parents nor educationalists, and educational decisions are usually sprung on learners, parents, and teachers without prior warning. 'Ali (1998:14) notes that 'the relationship between the state and the community is just to let people know what the state has already decided to do not more'.

Secondly, there is an opportunity for learners, teachers, parents and educationalists to share decision-making, the law allows the council of parents at every school to discuss education and share decisions making. But, in practice this council has no authority to discuss policy

itself. The actual purpose of the meeting is to demand financial support from parents for schools. Moreover, 'Ali (1998:13) points out that 'the parents' council main job is to support the state's decisions which have to be acceptable to all groups including teachers, parents and educationalists'.

In the same way, although the law considers teachers as part of the committee in developing the curriculum, their actual contribution can be seen to be minimal. Their contribution is limited to supporting the decisions made by other groups in the committee. For instance, 'Ali (1998:52) mentions that 'teachers feel very embarrassed and are afraid of being critical of any of the views in the committee meetings. In addition, most of the contractors are usually their teachers' supervisors and compared to them, they feel inferior and not in a position to voice their views'. For sharing by educationalists in educational planning, for instance, 'Ali (1998:14) states that 'there are contributions by experts in education, but that most of these people have no authority to object on such decisions made by the ministry'. This clearly shows the gap between theory and practice in educational policy.

Thirdly, it is interesting to note that 'although the state would have been aware of the consequences of the above-mentioned decision but was neither prepared nor ready to deal with the problems when they arose' 'Ammar (1995:71-4). Firstly, 'the state was unable to handle the large number of learners who were in their 5th and 6th year, as an alternative to the reduced year had not been planned ahead. The ministry also faced similar problems in 1992/1993 and 1995/1996 in finding solutions to the doubling of learners in the preparatory and secondary schools respectively. In addition, there were also huge problems in the enrolment of learners in the university in 1997' ('Ammar,1991:11-2). This reveals that educational decisions are taken in haste and without the required preparation.

Fourthly, not allowing all parties freedom to share in the decisions made by the state makes learners, teachers and parents confused about education. For instance, in the 1990s the curriculum was changed several times in a very short time span. In 1993, 'the state curriculum was changed according to the National Conference on Curriculum Development

although the Centre for Curriculum Development which is a centre affiliated to the state, had already developed the curriculum and prepared new textbooks before the conference was planned. After the conference was held, the centre for curriculum development had to start all over again to prepare for a new curriculum and new textbooks which could be seen as an unnecessary waste of money and time' ('Ali,1998:12). This policy confirms two things: firstly, the exclusion of all parties from sharing decision-making and secondly the evidence that there is no agreement among the different authorities involved in preparing and revising the curriculum.

5.3.2. Learners' freedom and teachers' preparation

From the following data in tables 34 and 35 it is clear that, unlike previous times, the learner's freedom in terms of having a sufficient number of teachers has been maximised. For example, table 34 indicates that in 1998, the total number of teaching staff in the country as a whole amounted to 757,016 with an increase of 193,719 teachers at a rate of 34.4 %.

Table 34
Development of numbers of teachers (1992-1998)

Year	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Number	563,297	597,402	610,414	639,738	690,376	720,446	730,889	757,016

(ME) Ministry of Education, (1999b:45)

Table 35
Rates of learner to teachers in 1999

Educational stage	KG	Primary	Preparatory	Secondary	Industrial	Agriculture	Commercial
Learner/teacher	22	23	21	12	10	14	17

(ME) Ministry of Education (1999c:16)

Regarding improving the quality of teachers, educational policy considers teachers as a central factor in any educational reform. In 1994 'the ministry of education held a national conference that focused on upgrading and improving the status of teachers. Recommendations focused on the necessity of bringing about radical change in the concepts of selecting and preparing teachers, and how to provide them with educational methods that would enable them to catch up with the spirit of the age' (ME,1999f:43). Moreover, since 1993, the ministry of education has started sending teachers abroad to be trained in different fields as shown in table 36. This is an opportunity for teachers to benefit

from the exposure and experience of being abroad and receiving training. This in turn was of benefit to the learners who were taking those particular subjects.

Table 36
Development of numbers of teachers' missions (1993-1998)

year	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Number	339	596	813	1376	1099	1355

(ME) Ministry of Education (1999b:45)

However, 'there is big debate concerning the quality of teachers and role of preparation' institutes. The trainees are more concerned with helping the candidates for four years in school of education to be qualified in teaching their subject rather than helping them to learn how to teach or to educate them as persons. The teacher is expected to demonstrate an understanding of the knowledge, concepts and skills of specialist subjects and the place of these subjects in the school curriculum. Also they should be able to demonstrate knowledge and understanding of the national curriculum and attainment targets and the programmes of study in the subjects they are preparing to teach, together with an understanding of the framework of the statutory requirements' (Shawqi and Abw Al-Su'wd,1997:300). This approach has also been discussed by Sallam, (1995:67) and 'Abd-Al-Raziq (1984:15-6) and Al-Muslim (1993:71) who are concerned with training teachers to be able to do other things apart from teaching. For example, 'they have to be able to manage a class; they have to know how to do things without the class getting out of hand; to know how to set or mark an examination; how to record learners' progress; how to spot which children are working and which are not. However, it seems that knowing the subject is the most important thing among these skills the teacher has to be trained for. In addition, most if not all inspectors only assess how teachers prepare their lessons on paper and whether they are able to deliver all the knowledge in the textbook on time. They do not assess interaction between teachers and their students inside and outside the classroom'.

Moreover, this approach in the teacher's preparation is reflected in the teachers' work, for example, 'Iyd (1999:326-7) mentions that 'social studies teachers are only concerned with the low skills of gaining knowledge and neglecting high skills such as analysis, reconstruction, discovering relationships and evaluation'. In this sense 'they always depend on the textbook in their teaching without reading any other sources, especially as they have

no links with teacher preparation institutes after graduation' (NCERT,1997:18). They are used to the traditional way of teaching where the teacher 'stands up front talking and asking questions, and all of the children are supposed to learn in the same way and at the same time' (Suliman, 2000:180-196).

As examined in the previous chapter, the historical roots of this approach in the preparation of the teacher go very, very deep. From the historical analysis it should be noted that it was taken for granted that to teach a subject required nothing more than the possession of knowledge-or some portion of it- amassed in that discipline. This made for generation after generation of teachers who may have known their subjects but did not know how to teach them. Also they had never been educated as persons but as candidates who had to deliver this knowledge to their learners.

5.3.3. Spread of private tuition and limitation of learners' freedom

Private tuition can be considered as one of the most important and effective restraints that determines learners' freedom in terms of having equal opportunity and having the opportunity to derive benefit from the value of freedom in education. Regarding to its role in producing unequal opportunity, Hargreaves believes that "poor salaries encourage private tuition, which detracts energy away from the teacher in class" (2001:253). 'Teaching is a very poor profession in terms of social prestige and salary, although private tuition tends to be more lucrative' (Al-Shabasi,2000:113-5). Therefore, they used to find different ways to oblige learners to attend them. For example, before 'the state abolished the required course work at all pre-university levels in 1988' (Surwr,1989:119) teachers had the authority to mark learners' course work (40% of the total mark of the subject). Unfortunately 'they used to give full marks to the ones who joined private tuition and give the minimum score to those do not, even if the latter deserved the full marks. Others teachers have been accused of providing unclear or incomplete classroom instructing in order to ensure a student's need for tutoring to succeed in the examination' (Misiha,1998:132). 'Teachers often moonlight by giving private tuition and have no desire to put an extra effort into their salaried jobs especially in secondary schools' (Nwr Al-

Din,1997). Moreover, the shortened school day and the absence of effective and regular supervision on their work enables them to tutor their students after class

Interestingly, even after 'course work has been abolished and a law issued that punished teachers who obliged their learners to attend private tuition' (ARE,1999a:248) parents of their own free will sent their children in the hope that they would perform well in the examination. This is because, as mentioned earlier, the educational process depends on memorising knowledge and in turn the assessment questions come to give evidence on how much knowledge the learners are able to memorise. This makes it easy for most teachers to predict the examination' questions and prepare their learners who attend private tuition for such questions. Thus, parents select the one who made the closest predictions of the examination' questions. Actually, there is a match between what the teachers predict and what the learners have in the examination. In this sense, a so-called good teacher is the one who has experience in predicting exam questions and preparing learners for them. It is clear that private tuition is an easy way to achieve a good score in the final exam, especially in the secondary school as a means to enrol in one of the top universities. In such a situation, the learners' only job is to memorise the questions and answers to obtain a high score. Therefore, it is possible to find thousands of learners who scored over 95%, which raises the required score for every for college. Sometimes 100% of the total marks is the required score for top colleges such as medicine, which can not be explained without referring to the type of examination questions. Therefore, there is no relationship between the learners' score and the opportunity s/he receive.

From the above, it can be argued, on one hand, that learners who 'can afford private tuition have a good opportunity for education with the type of curriculum and the system of evaluation used' ('Ammar,1996c:106). Private tuition plays a major role in making certain educational opportunities available for learners who can afford it, and making the same opportunities unavailable for those who cannot. Although some learners have the ability to do well if given the opportunity, they cannot do so because of lack of money. On the other hand, although affluent people have the freedom to pay for private tuition, this freedom violates the concept of freedom in education, as very often teachers choose not to do proper

teaching in order to force learners to attend their tuition classes. As a consequence, poor learners lose their right to a good education and to receive the same opportunities that affluent learners enjoy. This forces learners to depend on their own ability or to completely forget about education.

Another serious issue related to the idea of freedom is using private tuition can be seen in 'Ali's argument (1998:196). In his view, private tuition inculcates 'the value of money above all others, so that power, authority and high prestige takes precedence over social justice, peace, equality and democracy'. He further states that this happens when learners realise the advantages enjoyed by their peers who have the economic ability to receive good opportunities that they cannot have because of lack of money. This produces two kinds of individuals: those who hate rich people because they appear to be freer than they are, to do what they want with their lives; secondly, those who surrender their rights and freedom to those who have power and authority. A problem that arises in this case is that these two kinds of individuals cannot contribute to the development of the country. Although it is up to the system of education to help learners to develop their potential, in practice education is in a sense the cause of individuals turning away from society as a result of the lack of opportunity in education. Learners who can afford private tuition learn how to exercise this new value and become aware of the importance of money. With the backing of wealth, it is easy for most learners to feel absolute freedom to do what they want as they feel that nothing can interfere with their wish.

Regarding the role of private tuition in limiting learners' freedom to exercise and benefit from the value of freedom in education, learners spend all their time memorising knowledge by means of question and answer. This way of teaching does not give learners the chance to be free to use their minds to think about what they study, but makes them take every single piece of information as fact without any attempt to investigate it or even to use it in different contexts. In short, it restricts their minds to memorise facts and information for the sake of the examination.

5.3.4. Freedom in education and assessment system

The assessment system in Egypt can be considered as one of restriction over learners' freedom as it limits it in terms of educational opportunities and of deriving benefit from the value of freedom in education. Firstly, in the area of the limitation of educational opportunity, law 139th of 1981, (ARE,1999a:142) states that 'learners in primary school from grades one to five have only one chance to repeat their examination. If they do not pass the exam, they will be automatically transferred to the next level'. 'In the sixth grade learners also have only one chance to repeat the required state exam, and if they do not pass they will be transferred to a vocational preparatory school' (NCERT,1993:65). 'Learners in the general preparatory school in grade one and two also have one chance to repeat. In case they do not pass they will also be transferred to a vocational school which requires learners to pass from level to level. In the last year of basic education, learners once again have only one chance to re-sit the examination. If they do not pass they will be given a certificate stating that they have completed their basic education' (ARE,1999a:144). In such a case they are excluded from school forever because they can not join the secondary school even as external candidates.

From the point of view of the ministry, this kind of vocational education aims to give learners who have failed in the government examination the minimum vocational training they need to start work after completing the compulsory period at school. According to 'Ammar (1996a:38) it does not seem as 'if this policy is helpful. It is just a matter of whether the school can keep learners until they complete the compulsory period'. As mentioned in chapter four, this type of education was started in the 1960s but it did not achieve its aims to prepare young learners for technical work, especially since the economic market does not need such learners because they are not sufficiently qualified. This is because these schools lack good equipment, qualified teachers, trainers, and above all learners have no motivation to study. In another sense it is difficult to think of 12 year old learners as failures because they could not pass the first government obligatory examination in their lives. It could be argued that having unsuccessful learners at this age does not mean that they are stupid. It means that the learner environment and circumstances

were not able to help them to keep up with their peers. The point here is that freedom in education is concerned with the question of why learners failed in the examination more than consigning them away to such poor education until they complete the compulsory period. Unfortunately, this policy limits the learners' freedom at a crucial stage to be happy, understand themselves and find out what they want to do with their lives. Moreover, it makes them always feel depressed and powerless to do anything useful.

Similarly, 'learners in secondary school also have only one opportunity to repeat the exam. Any learners who fail the exam have to leave school. If they want to continue their studies, they have to study at home and sit for the exam as external candidates' (ARE, 1999a:13). The justification for giving learners only one chance to repeat is because it is costly to keep learners in school and to allow them to repeat another year. The point, which I want to make here, is that it is not important to give learners a certificate stating that they have completed their basic education. The most important thing is to develop their potential as much as possible. My point is that the state finds it preferable to transfer learners or to accept them as external candidates rather than finding out why they dropout and what the possible solutions are. Although it can be seen that the rate of repetition decreased from 1992 to 1998 as shown in the following tables. This low rate still equals millions of learners who join the rank of the illiterate.

Table 37
The percentage of repetition in the primary grades (1993- 1998)

Year	Gr. 1		Gr. 2		Gr. 3		Gr. 4		Gr. 5	
	Boy	Girl	Boy	Girl	Boy	Girl	Boy	Girl	Boy	Girl
1993	0.33	0.29	7.19	5.23	6.4	4.62	10.68	8.25	12.74	9.53
1994	0.19	0.17	7.69	5.45	10.48	6.80	11.35	8.24	15.38	11.20
1995	0.19	0.16	6.56	4.54	7.51	4.80	9.41	6.78	14.65	10.83
1996	0.28	0.23	6.45	4.49	8.17	5.12	10.20	7.07	13.98	10.52
1997	0.69	0.53	5.14	3.40	5.31	3.19	7.75	5.20	10.68	7.29
1998	0.64	0.50	4.58	3.04	5.18	3.11	8.21	5.34	11.52	7.66

(ME) Ministry of Education (1999a:36)

Table 38
The percentage of repetition in the preparatory grades (1993-1999)

Year	Gr. 1		Gr. 2		Gr. 3	
	Boy	Girl	Boy	Girl	Boy	Girl
1993	13.22	11.56	8.23	6.78	16.11	12.07
1994	16.84	14.27	9.53	7.75	14.51	10.33
1995	15.17	12.40	9.21	7.08	14.99	10.81
1996	12.37	10.15	7.31	5.73	13.56	9.64
1997	11.96	10.00	6.01	4.46	13.51	9.69
1998	12.84	10.12	6.65	4.69	14.74	10.69

(ME) Ministry of Education (1999a:41)

Another restriction can be observed regarding the secondary examination regulation. Firstly, according to law 193rd of 1981 (ARE,1999a:17), 'the certificate of the final exam in secondary school becomes invalid after one year'. In the light of the concept of freedom in education it can be argued that this law limits the learner's freedom in terms of stipulating that they should start their higher degrees immediately after completing the final secondary school exam. If the learners are unable to start the higher degree in the same year for social or economic reasons, they are compelled to repeat the same exam again. 'This is an overload on learners and their families' (NCERT,1993:17). Secondly, 'learners in the secondary school all over the country have the same examination papers, although they may have been taught under different circumstances. For example, 'village learners do not have the same quality of teachers and facilities as learners in cities, so it is somewhat unfair to give them the same examination' (Shukri, et al,1999:101). In this sense the argument does not go against the pattern of having national examinations for all learners across the country. On the contrary, the argument goes against the inequality between learners in urban and rural areas in terms of learning circumstances that makes having a national exam unfair and one that restricts learners' freedom.

Thirdly, in 1994, 'secondary school learners had a very good chance to sit for the final examination twice in any number of subjects' (ME,1994a:2) and (ME,1994c:5). This 'gives learners the opportunity to find out about their performance in the examination so they can do better in the second. It also it helps them not to feel scared about the examination because they have a chance to repeat it' (Al- Akhbar Newspaper,1997:5). In this sense it might be argued that this opportunity has increased the learners' freedom to discover their interests and performance in studying such subjects. However, because of the absence of

learners' view and an understanding of the aim of this opportunity, they were unable to gain any advantage from it. In research by 'Abd Alla (1998:95-6), he finds that, 'because of a misunderstanding of this opportunity, learners spend 12 months memorising knowledge to sit for an examination in all subjects twice, even though they had the option of dividing up the subjects so as to do some in May and others in August. He also points out that learners were not able to perform as well as they thought they could in certain subjects they felt that they were interested in. He mentioned that this might be because of their inability to understand themselves and what they want to do and their inability to make the right choices'. In my view this inability refer to a misunderstanding of such opportunity by learners, their teachers and parents.

Also, this opportunity 'increased parents' and learners' worries instead of their being more comfortable at having two chances to do the same examination that was required for higher education' (Al-Akhbar Newspaper,1997:5). In my view, this opportunity was good for learners to learn how to make choices and decisions. However, before this opportunity had been given an appropriate amount of time for evaluation the ministry of education cancelled it in 1997. This is because the ministry was faced with the problem of admission to university and lack of time to correct examination papers twice and an unsuitable number of teachers able to work. This shows that they were unprepared for such decision before they put it into practice. The previous example shows the way the ministry implemented such decisions. Besides excluding the views of involved groups such as learners, teachers and parents it can be claimed that there was inadequate preparation for such decisions, for the problems that might be expected to appear and for alternatives that might be used.

Secondly, in the area of limiting learners' freedom in terms of enjoying the conditions required to derive benefit from the value of freedom in education, according to Hargreaves, the purpose of the assessment in Egypt aims to test learners' knowledge of material in the textbooks, which is compulsory in all classes (2001:254). This approach in assessing learners can be seen in Wilmot's (1980:33) and Harlen's (1976:32,38) work. According to them, assessment comprises not only the collection of information but the identification

and use of criteria for making judgements about that information. Therefore, assessment may involve the collection of evidence concerning learners' learning through tests or observation in order to know how best to help and encourage them. To secure this knowledge learners are assigned lessons which they have to study. Success is technically indicated by the ability to pass certain tests.

Likewise Freeman and Lewis (1998:10), Davis (1998a:13-7), Harris and Bell (1990:157-160), Black and Broadfoot (1990:191-7) and Davis (1998b:10-13) argue that assessment can be grouped under five headings: to facilitate matching and differentiating, to provide feedback to learners on their progress, to enable teachers to discover how effective their teaching has been, to measure the achievement of teachers and schools. The purposes of assessment are further described in Gullo (1994:16-8) and Freeman and Lewis (1998:12-3). For example, Gullo (1994:16-8) subdivides these into four different purposes which are then grouped under two main categories. The first category specifically deals with the assessment of the individual child, and the second with evaluating the effectiveness of the programme to promote learning to improve teaching. He points out that:

the first is the usefulness of determining what type of academic skills and factual knowledge the child has. Academic skills are the types of knowledge and problem solving abilities children have as a direct result of experiencing curriculum activities. The second [...] is to determine their current level of development functioning. Knowledge about children's motor development, language development, or cognitive development is essential to enable teachers to design appropriate curriculum activities. Also to determine whether they might benefit from alternative curricular experiences. A third [...] is to determine the effectiveness of educational experiences while it is in progress. The final [...] is determining the effectiveness of an educational experience at its conclusion.

According to the above quotation, it can be seen that assessment is usually carried out to help learners to recognise and build on their strengths and address their weaknesses. It is also helpful to the educational process as an indicator. The achievements of learners can indicate what improvements have to be made in the teaching process to help learners to achieve better in terms of knowledge acquisition. In others words, assessment can be understood to

identify those purposes related primarily to policies internal to the school and another cluster relating to those policies that are external to the school. For example, diagnosis, feedback to students and teachers, student grouping, curriculum improvement and

individual target settings are purposes internal to the school, whilst certification and accountability are purposes largely external to the school (James,1998:24).

However, in Egypt, the type of examination questions does not achieve even the previous aims of assessment because it does not give actual indications about the efficiency of the teaching and learning process. It is only concerned about finding out how much knowledge and information the learner could memorise. Hargreaves (2001:259) notes that the assessment is a selective system and its goals are to make

formal, written examinations, based on rote memorisation, the easiest instruments of assessment; especially since pupil outcomes from examinations are numerical and so on are straightforward to use, even with vast numbers of pupils. Examination traditionally motivated children to learn by heart in order to achieve high marks in written examinations.

From the point view of freedom in education examination questions can not measure how far learners are able to exercise freedom in education and derive the benefit from its value. According to (Al-Laqani,1991:254) 'the nature of the question limits the learner's ability to think and discover reasons and new relationship between isolated facts'. To ask a question, for example, what is the capital of England, limits the learners thinking as they have to memorise the answer and that is all it is also the only answer that learners can give. But if we ask a question such as, for example, Do you know why London, the capital of England has been built around the River Thames? This kind of question allows the learner to think about many possibilities as an answer to the question. At the same time the purpose of examination at all levels in schools, as 'Ali (1996:116) shows, is 'to examine the learners capacity to memorise facts'. In 'Ali's view 'the philosophy of assessment has nothing to do with how a particular course can help the learner to think, discover, and make responsible choices and decisions. This way of assessment encourages the growth of private lessons'.

In addition, by some chance, if one or two questions are set differently, both learners and parents become worried and unhappy. As 'Ammar points out, 'when learners are set questions that examine their capacity to think, they (and their parents) complain that the examination are not limited to the content of the curriculum' ('Ammar, 1999c:6). Another problem that arises as a result of the current system of assessment is the problem of cheating at examination, Al-Ryias (1999:12) shows that 'some learners either copy from

their neighbours or cheat by looking at pieces of paper on which they have written down the answers'. Thus the examination has become a means of merely testing one's capacity to memorise and cheat rather than a system to assess the knowledge that has been learnt. When the learners pass an exam merely by guessing or cheating, it can be said to inculcate wrong values by giving students the sense that the end (passing the exam) justifies the means (guessing, memorising or cheating).

5.3.5. Learners' freedom and the illiteracy problem

'Illiteracy is one of the oldest and known problems in the history of education in Egypt. However, no effort has been made so far to reduce it' (Ratib,1998:114). 'Population figures for the year 1996 indicate an illiteracy rate of 39.4 % out of which 29 % are males and 50.2 % are females' (ME,1999f:19). In other source, 'for 1996 there was an illiteracy rate of 47% of which 46.1% were males and 53.9 % females' (GAIAE,1996:194). According to Khidr (1997:211), 'the high rate of illiteracy in rural areas reflects the fact that the state pays more attention to education in cities rather than rural areas in which the majority of poor people in Egypt live. Hence, it is possible to consider illiteracy as both an intentional and unintentional restriction by the ministry over the learners in rural areas'. As discussed in chapter one, education increases the ability of learners, which in turn increases the learners' freedom to do or not to do to become or not to become.

Table 39
Illiteracy's Rate over 10 age

Year	Boys %	Girls %	General %
1990	35.5	55.2	47.1
1996	29.00	50.2	39.4
1999	24.00	45.00	34.2

(ME) Ministry of Education (1999f:19)

Moreover, lack of freedom for learners that is reflected in the absence of their view about what they are interested in studying leads to the conclusion that it is possible that the curriculum might not meet the interests of learners. As a result very often learners do not feel that education makes a difference to their lives. They feel that it is a waste of time, when they could utilise that time in a better way by earning money. Accordingly, they might infiltrate from school and join the number of illiterate people. Another indication

related to the idea of freedom seen here is that parents who are not educated can not help their children much to find out their interests and be free to make their own choices and decisions. This means that learners of uneducated parents will be left totally without help guidance and they might misuse their freedom. According to Loxley, there is a common belief that the students of uneducated parents have little chance to compete with families where there are educated adults (1983:43). Also there is no guarantee that uneducated parents will understand the value of freedom in education and its conditions when they are not considered a source of authority or interference for their children.

5.3.6. Learners' freedom and private education

The shortage of state schools leads to opening the door for individuals or groups to invest in private education (see table 40). 'Its system can be divided into two groups: one established by individuals and the other by the state' (ARE,1999d:16). The ministry gives special consideration to private education 'because of the contribution it has made in all fields of education at all stages' (ARE,1999d:6-7).

Table 40
Numbers and percentages of learners enrolment in private education (1991-1999)

Year	No. of learners enrolled	Increase in number	% of increase
1991/1992	837,759	227,258	27.12 %
1998/1999	1065,017		

(ME) Ministry of Education (1999f:74)

'The percentage of learners in private schools compared to state schools in 1999 was 53.65%, 7.47%, 4.04% and 8.26% in the pre-school, primary, preparatory and general secondary school, respectively' (ME,1999c:15). It can therefore be argued that, according to the concept of freedom, either private or government schools are free to provide alternative education in the form of private schools, for those who can afford the high fees.

Cohen in his argument against private education claims that

no-one must be allowed-in the first few laps at least- to gain a start which it will be difficult for anyone lacking that advantage to make up (1978:124).

However, this argument is only applicable if private education has no effect on learners in state schools who are unable to afford private education. The actual practice, however, demonstrates that private schools have an effect on the education offered in state schools.

For example, law 139th of 1981 (ARE,1999a:25) 'enables private schools to employ the best teachers who are already working in state schools. This, of course, limits the freedom of learners in state schools to learn under qualified teachers'. At the same time, 'the existence of private schools and the good education received by learners in those schools, leads to feelings of bitterness, as those who are affluent have the opportunity of receiving a better education than those in state schools' (Khidr,2000:81). For Cohen the objection to the private schools

might be thought to depend on the factual assumption that money buys a superior commodity...; a satisfaction, greater chance of good examination grades or a place at a university.

Even if private education provided a product that was in some important respect inferior to that which the state could supply, the argument, even here, does not go against private education but against its effects on learners in state schools in terms of having an equal opportunity. Learners who are poor and can not afford private education are still free to go to a state school. However, the good quality of education in private schools causes the market to prefer private education graduates more than state ones because of the quality of learners in the former, which is higher than in the latter. In this sense it might be argued that the existence of private education can be considered as one of the restrictions on learners to have the same educational opportunity, and this limits their freedom.

5.3.7. Learners' freedom and educational budget

Egypt's new educational reform policy has been supported through increased government financial allocations earmarked specially for public education (see table 41).

Table 41
Pre-university educational budget (1990-2000)

Year	Allocated funds for education
91/92	4,566,844,270
92/93	5,949,738,134
93/94	7,262,767,259
94/95	8,807,830,260
95/96	10,535,797,560
96/97	12,107,080,860
97/98	13,304,964,330
98/99	14,677,865,330
99/00	16,186,535,400

(ME) Ministry of Education (1999f:12)

According to the above table, the funds for education from 1990 to 2000 were increased by 350.6%. However, a comparison between the funds for education in the 1990s and those in the last 4 decades shows that the funds for education in the 1990s were less. 'The percentage of funds allocated for education from the total expenses of the government were 12.24%, 22%, 15%, 10% and 6% in 1953, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s respectively' (Al-Bana,1992:122) and (Anis,1996:56). It is clear that funds for education have successively decreased compared to previous years though the population has increased.

The results of reduction and having unsuitable budgets for education can be seen in the limiting of learners' freedom to enrol in the primary school or to join school again if they left for a particular reason. In this way, the lack of a budget can be considered as a restriction in which thousands of learners in poor and rural areas can not travel the distance to school every day because there is no available school in their community, especially for preparatory, secondary or higher education. In addition, because of the absence of a budget the state can not provide learners with all they need in their studies or at least give them a really free opportunity. This is because, as mentioned before, education is not totally free where learners have to pay for many things.

As a result of non-existence of a budget millions of learners who leave school for one reason or another, find themselves in the situation where the school is not in a position to accept them again into the class, which is compatible with their age or their stage (see table 42). So the result is that the child will lose their education forever and will join the millions of illiterate people. In the case of secondary school education too, Clause 23 of law 139th of 1981 (ARE,1999a:11) stipulates that ‘learners cannot enrol in secondary school if they are above 18 years of age’. Once again this indicates that the government does not protect the individual’s fundamental right and freedom to education.

Table 42

Numbers and Percentages of boys’ and girls discontinuation in primary and preparatory school (1991-1998)

Year	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Primary boys	102518	93,717	73,553	62,143	59,528	51,381	38,173	48,716
Primary girls	82,205	67906	136616	39,456	33,291	26,954	18,794	24,457
General %	3.85	2.47	3.09	1.44	1.27	1.05	0.76	0.98
Boys %	2.9	2.6	2.00	1.6	1.5	1.3	0.94	1.21
Girls %	6.5	2.3	4.46	1.2	1.00	0.78	0.54	0.70
Preparatory boys	176,794	70,034	64,081	53,787	73,051	62,783	50,842	53,700
Preparatory girls	123,045	82,122	49,801	34,378	48,388	36,738	34,196	33,105
General %	10.81	6.86	5.15	3.80	5.14	4.06	3.34	3.23
Boys %	11.54	5.73	5.3	4.19	5.67	4.7	3.72	3.73
Girls %	9.9	8.24	5.00	3.3	4.5	3.26	2.9	2.65

(ME) Ministry of Education (1999b:32)

5.4. Freedom in education regarding its value

As examined in the current chapter in training learners for various professions, it is the interests of society and not those of the individual that are taken into consideration. The purpose of education is to provide the type of individuals that society needs. As a consequence, individuals might not become interested in what they are studying and they might not reach the level of education required for the development process. Secondly, neglecting the individual’s interests can hamper the relationship between the state and its people, so that people may feel inclined to work for their own benefit rather than that of the state because they feel that society has not treated them fairly. In ‘Ammar’s view (1996b:45), this is ‘exactly what is happening in Egyptian society now’. ‘Ammar states that ‘Egyptian society is divided into different groups, and that each group is using the authority and power they possess for their own benefit. This enables them to break the law and even

create new laws for their convenience. Even other groups who do not have this power become complicitous in helping the groups that have power to achieve their aims'. The government's lack of interest in the individual's interests can be seen to have 'made young people in Egypt feel powerless and indifferent to what is happening in society' (Al-Said,1989:d). It is almost as if young people today 'are waiting for a miracle that would make their lives better. Nowadays most young people do not feel any connection with society, and as a consequence they do their best not for the country, but for their own benefit' ('Ammar,1995:151). They appear to be completely indifferent to how their actions might affect the country. This could be because society has neglected them, and they do not feel a sense of national identity, loyalty and pride towards their own country. In short the required conditions for learners and society to exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value (non-interference and the availability of choices) were not implied in educational policy during the period of the study. Learners, as discussed, have no freedom to determine their own education. In conclusion, it might be possible to argue that in the absence of the required conditions of being free, there is no value of freedom that can be achieved in the sense argued in chapter two.

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter was an attempt to discover and analyse the idea of freedom in educational theory and practice in Egypt from 1992 to 2000. With respect to the first aim of this chapter, learner's priority in education was not the main concern of the political leadership. This suggests that the required conditions for learners and society to exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value (non-interference and the availability of choices) were not implied in the educational policy during the period of the study. Regarding the second aim the idea of freedom in contemporary Egypt is still related to the claim for individuals to have free and equal educational opportunity. It is true that learners' freedom in this sense is greater than before, but until the year 2000 millions of children were still excluded from attending school due to the insufficient educational opportunities and because of inappropriate budgets. This means that learners are obliged to accept whatever opportunities state offers. Hence, it might be important to define freedom in education as a right for learners to make their own choices among the alternatives that are existed.

As for girls' freedom, as it is still less than boys' in terms of having free and equal opportunities and not having freedom to study and work in particular fields like boys. The reduced freedom they have is not because of religious obligations, as shown in chapter one, however, it seems that girls are restricted by social values. For example, someone might argue that some families still give more attention to their sons' education rather than their daughters'. Thus, it might be argued that family preference might be caused by unintentional restrictions made by the state. In others words when education is not totally free and there are no adequate opportunities in schools, families give priority to boys rather than girls. But if education was free and available to all it is possible that most families would treat their sons and daughters equally. This is especially important since most families in Egypt nowadays believe that life is becoming more complicated for both genders and education might be the only strategy left for survival. Also neglecting the need and importance of making such efforts to help families in rural and poor areas to change their views towards girls' education can be understood as one of the restrictions on girls.

Regarding the third aim, the study shown how that such restrictions can limit learners' freedom.

- Although it is laid down by law that local authority has the freedom and responsibility to share educational planning and practice, it has focused only on implementing decisions and has played no role in decision-making. Moreover, learners, parents, teachers and schools have no freedom to share decisions-making or even the freedom to object against the decisions that had been made.
- the approach is taken to design the curriculum and its content did not provide the required conditions where learners could benefit from the value of freedom, for example, (a) the curriculum pays more attention to the amount of knowledge learners should learn at a required age for the sake of development, because Egyptian education considers the gaining of knowledge as an aim in itself not as a means to others ends. (B) the textbooks are full of isolated facts that learners should know. Having textbooks that contain all the required knowledge 'does not give learners the freedom, for example, to look for more knowledge, discover the relationship between different variables or learning and how they can use such knowledge in a meaningful and worthwhile way. (C) learners do not have the freedom to make choices between subjects or between branches of subject because all subjects and units are compulsory.
- As, for teachers' preparation, knowing the subject is the most important element in teachers training. Teacher's role still considered as one whereby delivers such knowledge and information to learners without sharing with them in the process of teaching and learning. They are used to the traditional way of teaching where the teacher stands up front talking and asking questions, and all of the children are supposed to learn in the same way and at the same time. This approach in teachers' preparation makes teachers believe that they are the ones who know and have all the knowledge about everything. So learners have to listen and memorise what they are saying. This kind of education obliges learners to follow in other people's foot steps without thinking why they have to follow them and in the long run produces weak individuals who are afraid of criticism and change and who like to be silent and surrender to other people's ideas. In this sense education never leads to creativity or

innovation. Therefore, learners do not feel powerful and do not trust themselves to obtain knowledge or produce new knowledge on their own. As a result they always expect teachers to tell them what they have to do. This process is carried on from stage to stage so that when they become employees they wait for their boss to tell them what to do. Having this type of teacher preparation does not help learners to exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value. In short, this type of teaching is considered one of the restrictions on learners that limits their freedom.

- The spreading of private tuition and textbooks prevents learners from having free and equal opportunities, from learning thinking skills and enjoying the value of freedom in education.
- The purpose of the assessment and the regulations can be considered as one of the restriction on learners' freedom as it limits their educational opportunities and also their enjoyment of the value of freedom in education.
- As suggested in this chapter the illiteracy rate was still very high. This might lead to argue that illiteracy might exclude the public from the opportunity to share in making educational decisions or claims for their children's freedom. Moreover, uneducated parents can not fulfil their role towards their children by providing them with the necessary conditions to for exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value.
- As has been demonstrated, freedom in education is not opposed to private education but its effects on learners in state schools in term of enjoying an equal opportunities. Learners who are poor and can not afford private education are still free to go to state school. However, the high quality of education in private schools means that the market prefers private education graduates to than state ones because the quality of learners in the former is higher than in the latter. In this respect, it could be argued that the existence of private education can be considered as one of the restrictions on learners regarding equal opportunity.
- An inappropriate educational budget limits learners' freedom in terms of having free and equal educational opportunity. Also, as a result of the absence of budgets the state fails to allow learners; (a) the freedom to determine the type of studies they are interested in since the state obliges them to do what satisfies its aims (b) the alternatives and options in the curriculum and its subjects whereby they can make free choices.

- The curriculum has been designed so as to make lectures the teaching method for all lessons. Because the curriculum is full of information and isolated facts, teachers find that giving lectures is the best way to teach, and their job is to help learners to memorise the information. It does not give the teachers and learners freedom to use different teaching methods and techniques. Also it makes learners very negative elements in the teaching and learning process which prevents any chance to exercise freedom and benefit from its value.
- Extra curricula activities have no place in the school plan in which learners lose good opportunities to learn how to exercise freedom and benefit from its value.

Regarding the fourth aim from the arguments made in the current chapter it seems clear that educational thought discusses freedom in education and its value in the areas of developing learners' abilities to think freely, make choices, decisions and be responsible for their own actions. This suggests that it is possible to implement the idea of learners' freedom in the Egyptian context. Moreover, although educational thought demanded learners' freedom in education and called for their interests to be considered as the main concern of philosophy and the practice of education, there were many practices that could be seen to reflect these claims. This conclusion indicates that in educational planning and decisions educational thought was excluded from being shared.

Furthermore, three general conclusions can be made from the analysis made in the current chapter. Firstly, on many occasions in this chapter I have pointed out that the failure behind such practices relating to freedom in education was caused by society which was not prepared for such change, because change in education needs understanding, support and sharing by all the groups involved, to fulfil its role. Secondly, in some places I have shown that educational reform in its comprehensive sense has no clear philosophy. There is no harmony between its processes and this leads to the unsatisfactory results of such reforms. Moreover, all the aspects of the reforms that have been taken place were simple modifications. This might be linked by the fact that 'educational authorities are afraid of implementing radical change, because it involves a big risk. They prefer to implement

partial changes which have less risk associated with them and also may be achieved in a short time. Thirdly, there is a gap between theory and practice in education.

From the analysis and examination that has been made so far in the forgoing chapters, it should be possible to build a theoretical framework of freedom in education that suites the nature of Egyptian society and its educational system, to improve its efficiency for the benefit of learners and society.

Chapter Six

A theoretical framework of education based on freedom for the improvement of the efficiency of the educational system in Egypt

6.1. Introduction

The main aim of this chapter is to construct a framework of a theory of education based on freedom that suits the Egyptian context to improve the efficiency of its educational system. Although this theory depends on a western liberal interpretation of freedom in education as it has been made in the first three chapters it does not hold that it can not be suited to a different context such as Egypt. As discussed the previous chapters, freedom in education ought no longer to be seen as a doctrine that is put into practice and developed only in western societies for a number of reasons. Firstly, as can be seen in chapter one, there are similarities between liberal western and Islamic thought in relation to the concept of freedom and its value. Secondly, as argued in chapters four and five, the democratic order in Egypt and its education system presuppose some central distinguishing features of liberalism. For example, various rights are recognised, including the right to basic education, the right of equal access to educational institution. Freedom of belief, religion, expression and opinion in education are recognised. Thirdly, as noted in the previous five chapters, Egyptian literature has been used to analyse freedom in education and examine the place of freedom in education in Egyptian society. This means that freedom in education is desirable for Egyptian society and its goals.

6.2. Framework of a theory of education based on freedom in Egypt

According to the analysis of the concept of freedom and its implications in education that has been presented so far, it might be sensible now to construct a framework of educational theory based on freedom that, on the one hand, suits the Egyptian context and on the other hand guarantees a range of freedom that benefits learners and society. Firstly, this framework deals with the general components and aims of education based on freedom. Secondly, it treats of the structure of the educational system, school curriculum, assessment and teacher education.

6.2.1. Freedom for learners from interference and authority

According to the analysis of freedom in education presented in the previous chapters learners should be left free from interference and authority in determining their own lives; they have to be left free to determine their education. Learners have to be themselves not what adults want them to be. They need freedom to learn to be independent and to know their own interests, fears, and wishes by making their own mistakes. Moreover, education based on freedom is concerned with educating learners as free individuals who can rationally think about others' opinions. This means that they should not obey others for the sake of obedience or because adults have more experience and know more than they do. To say that an agent has a freedom is normally to imply that others have a duty not to interfere with his exercise of that right" (Olafson, 1975:174). In short, learners should be free physically and intellectually from any formulation to do or not, to become or not something they like.

To achieve this, Egyptian learners should learn first how to be free, in particular because, as has been argued in chapters four and five they do not exercise freedom at all regarding their education. This is because after being restricted and interfered for such a long time they do not know how to exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value. Without exercising freedom young people might doubt that freedom in education can help them to achieve their aims for their own benefit and that of society. In other words, freedom in education is about teaching learners how to be free in making their own choices and decisions. To achieve this the proper method to teach learners how to act freely is through freedom. According to Huus to teach individuals to act freely, they should be taught in a free atmosphere (1965:27) in which they gain the experience to share any decisions related to their education. This requires that the learners should be free to share educational planning and make decisions which guarantee that they fully exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value. For Tabberer (1998:93), learners should be given the opportunity to participate as active and informed citizens in a democratic society within an internal context. This requires, as Tomlinson argues, opening them to knowledge, ways of understanding and the development of abilities that create informed, caring and co-

operative citizens. It offers the development of intellectual capacities, economic skills, and personal qualities that every individual has the right to acquire (1994:7). In this sense the state

will have to arrange facilities and experiences for its members, and in particular its young, to acquire the knowledge, skills and attitudes necessary to make appropriate decisions for themselves and for their society (Pearson,1992:85).

6.2.2. Freedom to have equal educational opportunity

From the quantitative data that has been presented in chapter five, it can be seen that not all learners are free to enjoy an equal opportunity in schools. In education based on freedom Egyptian learners of all classes should be left free to receive an equal opportunity to advance socially and economically on an equal footing. By “all” here, I mean men and women, the old and the young, the rich and the poor, the educated and uneducated, the Muslim and non-Muslim in both rural and urban communities. For White (1995:230) and Hodgetts (1996:71) school should be open to all irrespective of colour, creed, intellectual ability, social class or economic status. For Norman (1982:103), social conditions should be arranged so that everyone has an equal opportunity to live a worthwhile life. According to Entwistle therefore, equality of opportunity, requiring removal of hindrances to the development of learners’ abilities, has to be planned through the educational system” (1978:7). To achieve this, a number of suggestions should be considered.

Firstly, as discussed in chapter four and five, education in Egypt is not entirely free since learners have to pay for many things. To eliminate this restriction education requires the freeing of learners to have educational opportunities without paying any fees which might limit their freedom of access to education (Dennison,1996:205-8). On the one hand, this ‘not only concerns the school fees but it also requires that learners should not spend any money regarding their education’ (‘Ali,1999a:99-101). On the other hand, the state will need to provide poor learners with things they might need for their studies, otherwise they will not be able to obtain the opportunities they want and that other learners might be able to enjoy. According to Illich (1971:6)

even with schools of equal quality a poor child can seldom catch up with a rich one. Even if they attend equal schools and begin at the same age, poor children lack most of the

educational opportunities which are casually available to the middle-class child. These advantages range from conversation and books in the home to vacation travel and a different sense of oneself, and apply, for the child who enjoys them, both in and out of school.

According to Illich it is the responsibility of the state to provide learners with public resources. In this sense Coleman (1983:195) argues for the importance of public resources to achieve equal opportunity because each child begins life with a set of private resources, genetic and environmental, which means that, in the absence of public resources, children have very unequal opportunities.

Secondly, the number of schools should be increased to cover the whole country especially the rural and poor areas, so that every learner at the age of four has a place at school. If learners have to travel some a distance they should receive free transportation during school time so that poor learners are not restricted and prevented from going to school. Each school should be open for children who are discontented or for learners who could not enrol in the school at the required age. All new and old schools should work a full day (between 9 and 3:30) and do away with double and treble shifts, for all learners to have the same time for instruction and engaged in extra-curricular activities. Increasing the number of schools and making them available in every small area and village will in turn reduce the class size which will improve the process of learning and teaching. Also increasing the number of schools should meet with an increase in the number of qualified teachers to guarantee an equal opportunity for all.

Thirdly, to protect and maximise learners' freedom the state will need to punish parents who do not send their children to school (see chapter five) with large penalties because child labour has big economic value: 'they are cheap workers especially in the rural and poor areas' (NCERT,1992:22). Fourthly, for learners during their schooling to have equality of opportunity in terms of achievement, options in educational opportunities should be available to all: "the range of worthwhile options available to all-a range which in part constitutes the preconditions of freedom" (Jonathan,1997b:213). In this sense education based on freedom gives "everyone the chance to obtain the knowledge and skills

necessary to participate and succeed in the larger world according to their abilities and accomplishments” (Paris,1995:105).

Fifthly, with respect to gender equality, it is important to remove all kinds of obstacles so girls having the same opportunity as boys. Equal opportunity between boys and girls might be achieved through; (A), transportation is one of the difficulties facing the girls when they decide to go to school because it is costly and because many families fear for the safety of girls travelling alone to school. Therefore, every small village in the country should have a school or transportation given them free. (B), ‘because of economic conditions in poor areas, families cannot support their girls as they do their boys’ (Al-‘Atar,1999:97). Therefore, it might be necessary for the school to provide girls with a school uniform or even to waive the requirement for it. It is true that there is strong justification for having a school uniform but in this case, achieving attendance should be the number one priority. (C), it might be helpful to provide poor girls with the free stationery they need. (D), as mentioned in chapters four and five, women have less value in society, therefore, it might be useful to use different lessons in different subjects to change society’s view of women. These lessons should try to present some good examples from history and the past to show the contribution of women in all fields and the expected contribution in the future as well. (E), the gap between the enrolment rates of boys and girls should be an issue of national concern and should be given exposure in the media to help change attitudes towards women.

Sixthly, as discussed in chapter five, there are further features of inequality evident in the existence of private schools and private tuition. However, in education based on freedom all reasons presented in chapter four and five, that oblige parents to send their children to private education and private tuition will be gradually eliminated. This is because the modification in aims, structure of the system, state of schools, curriculum, assessment and teacher’s education in the light of freedom in education will make private tuition of no use and learners and parents will not need these lessons any more. Also by improving the process of learning and teaching at state schools the gap between state and private schools

will disappear. Then having private education will not affect learners at state schools because both will provide almost the same opportunity.

6.2.3. Aims of freedom in education at school level

In addition to the general components that have been discussed in the previous section, a set of specific goals can be identified for Egyptian education, based on freedom, as follows: firstly, freedom in education aims to maximise learners' freedom by known reading and writing (Martin, 1981:54). This is because, as mentioned in chapters four and five, illiteracy is one of the restrictions that prevents individuals from increasing their ability to reduce the gap between what they want freedom for and what they can do when there are no other restrictions on them. Also it is because being illiterate limits the ability of the individual to be independent and autonomous to manage their own life. It makes them always dependent on other people who might use this inability to fulfil their own aims, in other words, to limit individuals' freedom to enjoy the value of freedom.

Secondly, according to the arguments in chapter two, education based on freedom aims to develop learners' minds and gives learners the chance to direct their own growth. In this sense schools, teachers, parents and knowledge are means to free their minds from any formulation (Martin, 1981:54). Developing learners' minds requires teaching learners the general thinking skills (Nisbet, 1995:290), (Wall, 1965:60) and (Eggen and Kauchak, 1988:21-3) that are the foundations for exercising and enjoying responsible and worthwhile freedom. Education based on freedom allows the learners the opportunity to develop a lively, enquiring mind, giving them the opportunity to question and to argue rationally, and to apply themselves to tasks at school or at home by speaking and acting freely. Giving learners this freedom helps them to understand the world in which they live, and the interdependence of nations. In this sense Bonnett (1994:13) argues that the development of the individual's thinking means that

they know more than they did before, they can think what to do in new situations, they can discuss or explain something that they could not before, they see something differently, they feel differently about something, they can work something out for themselves, that they could not before and they have some new thoughts, feelings, understanding, appreciation, awareness.

Learning general thinking skills can develop learners' minds for example to; (A) exercise critical thinking about people, things or theories. According to Quicke (1988:14) "the flowering of critical thinking demands that the freedom to experiment is taken seriously, as a guiding principle for teaching and learning". The value of exercising critical thought has been discussed, for example, by Oliver (1985:131) and Peters (1975:122). For Peters

critical thought is a development of evaluation, autonomy of choice, creativity of the attempt to launch out on one's own and to impose one's own stamp on a product; integrity is shown in sticking to one's principles in the face of temptation, and strength of will in holding fast to a policy that has been adopted as one's own.

It is important for learners not to necessarily accept everything they hear or read. They need to be critics who can identify possible flaws in their own as well as in other people's arguments. In this sense Passmore (1975:25), Phillips (1997a:261), (Yasin's,1999:8), (Khidr,1999:7) and Paris (1995:128) argue that the current discussion on education often envisions schools as ideally producing critical thinkers, individuals with certain generic skills and competencies, who can step into a job situation and develop the more specific skills required by the job. They can readily change and develop their skills as job requirements shift or even move on to new jobs altogether. Dewey (1983:334) argues that

education means the creation of a discriminating mind, a mind that prefers not to dupe itself or to be the dupe of others.... (it means) the habit of suspended judgement, of scepticism, of desire for evidence, of appeal to observation rather than sentiment, discussion rather than bias, inquiry rather than conventionalised idealisation.

(B) exercise evaluation skill, in other words, thinking skills also develop the learners' capacity to evaluate theories, knowledge and the standpoints of individuals., thus, for Dewey it is important to develop the skills necessary to evaluate other people's ideas and arguments (Dewey,1910:101-10). To achieve this, freedom is a necessary condition for learners to make their own judgement and mistakes without interference from adults. (C) exercise everyday problem-solving skills. According to Romberg (1994:287) problem-solving is now normally intended to imply a process by which the learner combines previously learned elements of knowledge, rules, techniques, skills and concepts to provide a solution to a novel situation. It is important to learn some concepts and practise some procedures so that one is a reasonably skilled performer, but it is also important for all students to have an opportunity to solve problems whatever their level of capability. For

Ashman and Conway (1993:46) and Tomlinson, (1994:6) all young people in the future will need to be able to solve problems (including some not yet imagined). One might argue that being able to solve problems or even to think rationally or evaluate things, does not in any way equate with the general concept of intelligence. So every learner can be a problem-solver and be able to undertake high intellectual thinking even if he/she is not that intelligent. An excellent example stems from the work of Neisser (1976:136-140) who argues for the need to differentiate academic intelligence from practical intelligence. Typically, intelligence tests tend to predict how well people do in academic settings. High scores on such tests, however, are no guarantee of successful everyday problem solving. In this sense Paris (1995:128) defines a problem solver as

the one who has learned how to learn, will be able to deal with the rapidly shifting workplace and be a continually productive worker.

The technological demands of the workplace of today and the future will require understanding and the ability to formulate and solve complex problems, often with others. Businesses no longer seek workers with strong backs, clever hands, and shopkeeper arithmetic skills. According to NCTM (1989:3-4) most workers will change jobs frequently and so need flexibility and problem-solving abilities to enable them to explore, create and accommodate changed conditions and activities, as well as to create new knowledge in the course of their lives.

However, teaching general thinking skills might generate problems concerned with the knowledge learners should know because as Higgins and Baumfield (1998:397) argue, thinking skills programmes are concerned with the process of learning and not purely with the conditions of knowledge. Learning to think is learning to dissociate association and implication, what we want to be true and what we have good reason to believe is true. In this sense it might be argued that for teaching general skills to earn a place in the school curriculum does not mean that learners will not gain knowledge. In education based on freedom, as was argued in chapter three, the school curriculum should be used to develop general thinking skills and should not be a sole end in itself.

Thirdly, freedom in education aims to educate learners to become autonomous (see chapter two). Traditional educationalists see education as a means of transferring knowledge to children through the curriculum. In the 21st century, transferring information in this manner is becoming increasingly difficult with the rapid developments taking place in all fields of knowledge. Today, if a person is free to think and act autonomously, s/he can easily obtain knowledge about a specific topic/subject and gain new knowledge about it with little help from outside. The world of work is being transformed, particularly by the information and communication technologies. Fourthly, freedom in education aims to educate learners as responsible individuals for their own choices and decisions (see chapter two). Fifthly, education based on freedom aims to educate learners as creative individuals (see chapter two). Someone might argue that creative ability is determined by intelligence and freedom in education cannot help all learners to be creative. If they have received poor average scores on intelligence tests, they feel that they are poor or average creative people. In this sense, Bransford and Stein (1983:51) state that some people assume that only people in the performing or other arts are creative. It seems reasonable to argue that there are degrees of creativity, in that it is not something that one either has or not. Many people erroneously assume that someone is creative only if he/she is like Einstein. However, if one looks for creativity only at that level of achievement, he/she will miss hundreds of opportunities to be creative each day. Someone might argue that children are naturally creative, and all adults continue to have this potential. An idea that you generate can be creative even if you were not the first person in history to think of it. What counts is one's ability to approach and solve problems in ways that are not routine for oneself. In this sense Bransford and Stein (1983:52-5) argue that

a creative idea is also one that is appropriate to the situation. The ability to identify a problem and an opportunity is one of the most important steps in the creative process. The second step is to define alternative goals. Different goals suggest different lines of thought and so have a powerful effect on the solution strategies that we consider.

Sixthly, education based on freedom aims to educate learners to practise self-learning and lifelong learning as this is a required ability in talking about education for the future. In other words "prepare students for flexible adaptation to new problems and settings" (Bransford et al, 1999:65). Self-learning and lifelong learning are required abilities and will be needed by all (Tomlinson, 1994:6) in the future for learners and society to cope with the

'huge changes in the field of technology, communication, knowledge, economics, politics, media and social life' (Nwful,1997:102-13). These abilities in the future will be considered as an established part of everyone's agenda (Tomlinson,1994:6) and (Day,2000:106). This is because the required abilities for the future to cope with the changing world go further ahead than the initial preparation for learners at their schools. With the changing of circumstances in the future education will be a self-process and a continuous requirement. Self-learning and lifelong learning can be seen as desirable aims to be achieved of education in themselves and also as means to such aims for example, as being autonomous, happy, responsible and creative. This is because as Oscanyan and 'Ammar suggest, it needs a certain independence of thought. It implies that a learner who can do self-learning and lifelong learning is able to develop inquiry and interest without being guided, helped, led or motivated by another person (Oscanyan,1977:78) and ('Ammar,1998a:82-93). For learning to develop their sense and understanding of self-learning and lifelong learning, freedom is a required condition to enable them to make free choices of what they want to study, when and why without depending on others. For Day (2000:106) and ('Ammar,1998a:82-93) a free environment, free of any barriers and availability of opportunities are essential elements for learners to be able to learn and exercise self-learning and lifelong learning. This requires that the state be responsible to open opportunities for individuals to satisfy their interests (Day,2000:106).

Moreover, it might be possible to state that there are others products can be seen through the achievement of the previous components and aims. For learners they will achieve the feeling of happiness they seek for a number of reasons. Firstly, education based on freedom gives them the opportunity to be themselves and study what they are interested in to become or to be what they want. Secondly, it treats them as persons who have the right to an active participation in their lives, their education and others' lives as well. Thirdly, it makes them feel powerful, that they are an important group in society and they are not only machines to be trained for the state's purposes. Finally, education based on freedom guarantees interesting study and time at school in which learners feel happy through the teaching and learning processes.

For society, education based on freedom is a means to acquire desirable products. For example, (A) regarding learners as persons who have rights like adults and making them feel powerful is the means to educate for citizenship (White,1982:110). To “develop understanding and respect for one’s cultural heritage, to preserve and to develop basic cultural skills, to recognise that children grow up in a multicultural society, to impart, instil and form in pupils those values on which our society is based, to create a community of shared values, to develop judgement in matters of morality, ethics and social justice” (Tabberer,1998:93).

(B), education based on freedom takes learners’ interests and development of their abilities as its number one priority. This makes learners feel that they belong to a particular society that considers their rights and interests. Accordingly, they feel and develop a sense of being responsible for sharing their society’s needs, interests and policies and problems in which they have to spend effort to work towards solving its problems and development. In other words, freedom in education is a means to deepen the values of loyalty and belonging’ (‘Ali,1987:156). (C) pursuing the global scientific and information revolution. (D) developing the productive skills of citizens. (E) linking theoretical training to critical and applied knowledge. (F) developing scientific and analytic skills necessary for decision-making. (G) preparing a generation of scientists. (H) being responsive to the occupational needs of society. (I) preparing learners for working in co-operation with others as team work.

6.3. A proposed structure for the Egyptian educational system in the light of freedom in education

On the one hand, according to the definition of freedom in education, learners should be free to obtain free and equal opportunity in education. On the other hand, as has been discussed in chapters four and five, there are some features in the Egyptian system that limit learners’ freedom to obtain equal opportunities. Therefore, in education based on freedom a new system can be suggested to maximise learners’ freedom as follows. The school year starts on the first of September each year and finishes in the middle of July.

Unlike the current system, the school year is divided into three terms; first term starts in the first of September and finishes in the middle of December. Second term starts in the second week of January and finishes in the middle of March. Third term starts in second week of April and finishes in the middle of July. According to this timetable learners can have holidays between each term to be engaged in any others activities they want.

For learners to have an equal opportunity the system can be divided into two stages: compulsory and higher education. Compulsory education will be for all between the ages of 4 and 18. Its duration is 13 years divided into four stages; (kindergarten) at age 4; primary at age 6; preparatory, at age 12; and secondary, at age 15. Having a long compulsory period maximises learners' freedom to acquire the minimum necessary preparation to join the market or higher education according to their wills and interests. Contrary to what Neill (1953,1961,1966,1992) and others argue, namely that obliging learners to attend school is wrong and goes against their freedom to do what they want, it can be proposed that compulsory attendance at school is not coercive or restriction on learners to come to school when they do not want (Callan,1983:51-2). Because when we talk about education we talk about young people who at the beginning need help and protection for their right until they understand the value of education for their lives. It is of course, as will be suggested later, required that life at school should be interesting and makes learners feel that there is a need for them to attend. It is also the responsibility of the state and parents to talk to learners about the difference education can make to them and their lives. This is totally different from exercising an obligation on learners to study something they do not like.

Unlike in the current Egyptian system, the kindergarten, in a educational system based on freedom, would be a new stage that comes as part of compulsory education for all for children aged between 4 and 6 years old. This stage is considered to be one of the most crucial phases in the life of the child, since it represents the cornerstone in forming an individual's personality, future ability and potentialities. Making the kindergarten stage compulsory can be considered a strong indicator of equal opportunity that maximises learners' freedom (see chapter four and five). Primary would be the stage that comes after the kindergarten for learners between the ages of 6 and 12 years old. The preparatory stage

would have learners between the ages 12 and 15 years. Unlike in the current system, the vocational school would have no place in education based on freedom. Also this school accepts learners who discontinued in the previous stages for economic or social reasons and they want to continue their education, but are at the same stage as the ordinary learners although they might be older. This requires that each school should have special classrooms for those learners who have been discontinued.

The proposed secondary stage would cover three years of post-preparatory education for all learners between the ages of 15 and 18. It would be only one type, with the same targets for everyone at the required age across the country. This means that unlike the current Egyptian system, the technical secondary school has no place in education based on freedom in Egypt as a separate school and system. However, eliminating the technical school does not mean that there is no place for technical education in an educational system based on freedom. As will be suggested later, technical education will exist as subjects at this stage which learners may choose to study. Secondary education can either lead to higher education or be an end point for those who want to join the labour market. Just like the preparatory school, the secondary school should have classrooms for those who have been discontinued at the previous stages. Higher education would be available for learners between the age of 18 and 20, 22 or 24, depending on the duration of each college or institution. This stage also would accept learners who have the secondary certificate whatever their age and whenever they gained the secondary certificate. Higher education would be divided into three types; universities, higher institutions and intermediate technical institutions, and would be an open opportunity for all who wanted to continue their education whenever they wanted and were able to attend. Someone might argue that maximising learner's freedom to join higher education might produce large numbers of higher education graduates. Accordingly, someone might argue that maximising learners' freedom in higher education produces a high rate of unemployment because the labour market cannot provide higher graduates with the job opportunities. It might be argued that if the unemployment rate increases in an educational system based on freedom, this will not be because of the greater freedom that learners are enjoying in terms of having better opportunities. It will refer to the deficiencies of the labour market and development process

to obtain benefit from those graduates. This was the case all the time in Egyptian society as a consequence of the mismatch between demand and supply of educated labour that increased after the revolution of 1952 and continued until recent times (Arabsheibani,1991:55). This was because there was no link between the specialisms of learners at school or universities and the needs of society. According to 'Ali (1996:22) 'educational developments are proceeding without being linked either to the development needs of society or the needs of the individuals'. This deficiency may also explain why there is a lack of some specialists in some fields and an over-abundance in others. For example, 'whilst there are far more commerce undergraduates than the market can absorb, there are relatively few studying technology or communication studies, although the local and the international market needs more people who are qualified in these areas' (NCERT,1992:25). In short the mismatch between demand and supply goes some way to explaining the high rate of unemployment amongst graduates rather than unemployment being a product of the rate of enrolment at higher education especially since it has been shown in chapter five, that the rate of enrolment is lower than 19% of learners who are at the required age.

6.4. Freedom in education and the school curriculum

For the previous aims of education based on freedom that suit the Egyptian context to be achieved by learners, there is a need for the curriculum to be designed to satisfy the interests of both individuals and society. As has been discussed in chapter three, learners should be involved in designing the curriculum and choosing its content to ensure that it will satisfy their interests and also learn how to be free through this process, which is the core of education based on freedom. Superficially, good practice in listening to the learner's voice in schools can be seen, for example, as Galloway and Davie maintains, in a curriculum which develops sharing and communication of knowledge, understanding and attitudes or in a structure that enable teachers to find out and respond to how pupils perceive the curriculum and school or classroom organisation (1996:139). However, the main concern here is how to involve all learners in this activity. The answer to this question requires thinking of giving learners freedom to be heard by the politicians and practitioners.

It might be suggested that learners with help from their parents, teachers and head-teachers can organise meetings in every school to talk about their interests, what they are expecting from school, what they want to be and what negative aspects they can see in their current education. In short, it is an opportunity for learners in every school to be heard. Then learners again, with help from adults, especially at an early age, can write a report that includes their views and expectations from education. In this way all interested groups (learners, teachers, schools) will be involved in educational planning and making decisions. Then it is the role of the experts to consider the learners' perspectives as well as the state's interests. The most important consideration in this process is to provide learners with many options and varieties through which they can make their own free choices and decisions according to their interests without interference. As can be seen in chapter five, the current Egyptian curriculum does not provide learners with the opportunity to satisfy their interests. Therefore, there is a need to rethink the current Egyptian curriculum and its subjects to make a decision about the modifications that should take place to satisfy learners' and society's interests, in terms of rethinking the value of knowledge and its function and adding new subjects (see chapter three). In chapter three, an approach was suggested that might suit the Egyptian context and guarantee that the curriculum and its content will satisfy learners' and society's interests. In addition, the following section will deal with some considerations in relation to subject matter. This is because the idea of freedom in Egyptian education that was examined in chapter five, reflects the lack of learners' freedom in relation to subject matter.

6.4.1. The nature of the curriculum subjects in primary and preparatory school

According to the arguments presented in chapter three, most of the literature classifies human knowledge into seven categories; religious sciences, languages, social sciences, mathematics, technology, Arts and aesthetic. Although the analysis in the same chapter consider knowledge as a means to reach such ends, learners at school, from primary to secondary in the light of freedom in education are required to know about all these areas of knowledge not merely for the sake of knowing. According to the analysis of the idea of freedom in Egyptian education in chapter five, learners are so overloaded by too much

knowledge organised in different subjects that they have to memorise. Education based on freedom especially in the primary and preparatory school should provide a basis for knowledge that enables learners to acquire the essential skills needed in a fast-changing world. For Alexander (1985:148) curriculum knowledge in the primary stage is not really an issue: the most important foci for professional training should be child development. In this sense, Makiya and Rogers (1992:16) argue that

pupils of nursery and lower infant ages come to school with expertise in solving problems, manipulating found objects, finding meanings in their surrounding and making choices, and with massively enquiring minds. The emphasis in the primary school is on unity of experience and fullness of life rather than on subjects.

Thus, the “basic principles of learning are the same whether we are concentrating on poetry or arithmetic” (MA,1956:4). In this sense education based on freedom is concerned with the right of learners to know a little about every field of knowledge to be able to find out their real interests. Schools should provide all learners with a generic introduction to the basic disciplines of knowledge and the development of effective communication skills. Therefore, I am suggesting that learners should be given the opportunity to do subjects such as music, physical education, art, food science, needlework, design and technology, information and communication technology, geography, history, citizenship education, religious education, the national language (Arabic), a foreign language (English), mathematics and science. I have deliberately reversed the normal order of the subjects because music, physical education, art, food science, needlework are in that order because they are entirely neglected subjects in Egyptian education. Secondly, design and technology, information and communication technology are in that order because they are new subjects that would be added to an Egyptian curriculum based on freedom in education. Thirdly, geography, history and citizenship education are in that order because the current Egyptian curriculum has a subject called social studies which contains units of history, geography and citizenship education that do not allow learners the opportunity to study each subject to exercise freedom and derive benefit from each different area. Fourthly, the religious curriculum is in that order because, although it is compulsory in the current system, it has been neglected in terms of adding its marks to the final score and in terms of teachers and the curriculum. Finally, I have put the rest of the subjects that already

exist and have high value between the others because, as some argue, they have intrinsic value in the process of development.

If the option subjects mentioned above were established as essential subjects, it is possible that politicians, some educationalists, teachers and even parents in Egypt might argue that these subjects are a waste of time; viewing them as unnecessary in school, and preferring mathematics and science for two reasons. Firstly, it is because these subjects are viewed as talent subjects which can and should take place out of school because not everyone can be talented. In response to this it might be argued that it is for precisely the same reason they have to be essential subjects at this stage, because not everyone can have the opportunity to do such subjects out of school and this leads to the sacrifice of many talented people. Especially that the gift for these subjects seems to show itself earlier than other skills and hence cannot be ignored as a crucial subject in school (Rogers, 1970b:226). Secondly, such subjects might be opposed because learning and teaching them might be presented as having no value in the process of industrial development. In this subject, it is important to observe that in an education system based on freedom, learners should have the freedom and opportunity to do such subjects according to their interests without interference from others. Moreover, there are strong indications that these subjects, when they are designed and taught appropriately, give learners the opportunity to exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value. They contribute to developing learners' abilities to achieve the aims of education based on freedom which satisfy society's interests, as examined in chapter two and the beginning of the current chapter. The importance of these subjects in the curriculum cannot be over-emphasised because they are an essential element in the lives of children. According to Hope-Brown (1973:xi), MEC (1998:6), Rogers (1970b:226), Adams (1999:17), Bailey (1999:31), Prentice (1999:146), Eisner (1972:12), Tanner (1989:3), Prentice (1992:104-9), Sparkes and Fry (1992:114-9) and Boyce-Tillman (1992:120-3) they have a unique and significant contribution to make to the overall education of every child. If the potential and range of these subjects' experiences is not fully realised, then that child cannot be said to be properly educated for many reasons; (A) they offer a chance to participate in active and creative activities. (B) the emotional development of the children seems particularly heightened when these subjects have their rightful place in integrated

learning. (C) these subjects develop focused minds, keen memory, analytical and critical thinking, co-ordination skills and physical self-awareness. (D) they encourage creativity, sensitivity, awareness of others and self-discipline. (E) they promote collaboration and communication, as well as encouraging individual responsibility. (F) they can foster creative expression and waken the imagination. (G) they are also a medium through which learners can join with their peers, their family and the wider community in meaningful, enjoyable experiences. Engaging in such activities gives opportunities for learners to learn how to be free to make choices and decision. Also it helps them to respect other people's freedom and be responsible for their actions in ways which they might not be able to do in mathematics and science. (H) study of these subjects helps to develop a particular way of demonstrating intelligence. To engaged in these activities of quality is to participate in an intellectually demanding, rigorous and disciplined form of valued human endeavour, to which, from an early age, everyone should have access, (I) moreover, the products of these subjects are not about something totally out of society's needs, interest and problems.

Although the above-mentioned option subjects would not be compulsory and learners would not be obliged to sit for examinations, this does not mean that they should be treated as of less value than mathematics and science. In an education system based on freedom they would be treated in the same manner as the compulsory subjects in terms of access to facilities and equipment, qualified teachers, and good planning for their curriculum and examination. To introduce such subjects to schools in that context and in order to strengthen their position requires two important things. Firstly, it is necessary to change the way that they are perceived by a large number of politicians, policy makers, parents, administrators, headmasters and teachers in Egyptian society. Secondly,

if children are to have more choice, they will need to be systematically introduced to a wide range of possible ways of working. The best way to achieve this is to let children explore, experiment and investigate these ways of working for themselves. In order to do this children need clear practical structure within which to work and their teachers need a framework within which to teach (Meager,1995:7).

Similarly, Rogers (1970b:220) argues that children should be given opportunities to handle a wide range of material and in working with them to discover their nature and their properties.

In addition to having the above-mentioned option subjects there would be compulsory subjects (design and technology, information and communication technology, geography, history, citizenship education, religious education, national language (Arabic), a foreign language (English), mathematics and science). The reason behind calling them compulsory is not that they are more valuable but it is because the options can not be taken up by all because they require special talents and gifts. The talented and gifted in art will gain more marks than who do not have the talent. As a consequence both learners will not be equal in terms of educational opportunity. I believe that having these subjects as compulsory is a kind of restriction that prevents learners from having an equal opportunity.

Having suggested new subjects to be added to the Egyptian curriculum in the following section will introduce these new subjects and explain how they play their role in an education system based on freedom.

6.4.1.1. Maximising learners' freedom through design and technology

Adding Design and Technology (DT) as a new subject to the primary and preparatory school curriculum will maximise learners' freedom by increasing the variety of experiences, skills and knowledge. It will also help them to learn through their own experiences. Primary school children need to learn much through practical experiences. This is often apparent when witnessing the pleasure children derive from a practical task. DT provides a more meaningful setting for this to happen. There is no doubt that DT will be a strange beast in the curriculum being proposed here. Some Egyptian educationalists might argue that it has been lurking in the shadows of the vocational preparatory curriculum for some years but in a different guise and with a different name. Others might argue that it has never been seen in this form before. Therefore, I will discuss in more detail the importance and nature of DT as a kind of justification for inclusion in the school curriculum.

According to Johnsey (1998:2) "Design and technology is a single curriculum subject with a mind of its own. It possesses a heart and soul that is unique and a strong underlying

rationale that is especially suited to the primary school. It is not like science, mathematics, art or IT and yet it has strong links with these areas of study and may, indeed, enhance children's learning in all curriculum subjects". It is an active study involving the purposeful pursuit of a task to some form of resolution that results in improvement (for someone) in the made world. It is a study that is essentially procedural and which uses knowledge and skills as a resource for action (DESWO,1989:1-7). Others would argue that technology should involve the use of predominately scientific knowledge and understanding. Thus O'Hear (1981:51-2) and Naughton (1994:8) suggest that technology is the application of scientific and other knowledge to practical tasks by an organisation that involves people and machines. This connection with scientific knowledge appears in some of the consultation documents preceding the current national UK curriculum orders for DT. Technology is the application of scientific and related knowledge to a problem, resulting in a solution that may involve the creation of a product. (NCC,1992).

There are three aspects of DT that teachers will want to promote in their learners as suggested by Johnsey (1998:7), Metz (1992:85) and Makiya and Rogers, (1992:6). Firstly, understanding the procedures of design and technology. This involves the identification of the skills that combine to make up how learners and others design and make products. This understanding also involves knowing when and how to use these skills in different contexts. Secondly, knowledge and understanding in DT. This involves areas of knowledge, which are unique to DT as well as knowledge from other subjects. Thirdly, practical capability. This involves an understanding of how to handle material, tools and related processes. It also involves an ability to solve practical problems. This ability often comes with prolonged involvement with practical tasks such as those associated with many hobbies, DIY or careers involving manual dexterity. The importance of having DT as a subject in the primary and preparatory school can be seen in Metz (1992:75-85) and Baynes's work (1992:11,19). Baynes suggests: all DT "is an attempt to serve human needs, wants and aspirations.... Design and technology looks towards the future. Its job is to envisage what should be made. It attempts the difficult task of trying to see, and then to bring into existence, places, building, products and images that society believes it needs." McCormick (1999:217) argues that a key issue in this definition of design and technology,

is that “improvement in the made world therefore cannot proceed without identifying the fact that something requires improvement.

This would seem to be a strong justification for teaching the subject to all children, in that it might provide skills and knowledge which would be useful in the future life of the pupil”. Johnsey (1998:7) adds that DT is essentially about carrying out tasks which make improvements in the world by satisfying needs or solving problems. This will involve children in making decisions for themselves when planning and executing their own route through the task. Moreover, children with design and technology capacity are able to recognise and explore people’s needs and wants, develop ideas about how these might be met and develop products that meet those needs. (SCAA,1995:4). Children at this stage will be able to have research skills, generating ideas and modelling outcomes and also “skills for planning and organisation” (Johnsey,1998:58-70). The requirements for design and technology call for teachers to involve their learners in situations that enable them to engage in the following: solving problems, responding to a variety of needs, thinking divergently and convergently, making use of resources, manipulating and using a variety of materials and media, exchanging ideas, and evaluating ideas and products (Makiya and Rogers,1992:6).

6.4.1.2. Maximising learners’ freedom through information and communication technology

There is general agreement between educationalists that the world beyond the classroom, and particularly in the place of work, has been irreversibly changed by Information and Communications Technology (ICT). It is likely that every occupation in the future will require capability with many aspects of ICT. Therefore, in order to maximise opportunities for living productive and fulfilling lives, children must be provided with both effective tuition in the use of ICT from an early age and take the opportunity to appreciate its potential. ICT according to Martyn (1999:130) “refers to the purposeful use of technological tools to support learners’ learning across a range of subjects. It is distinct from IT, which involves the development of technical skills and understanding across a range of electronic equipment and computer applications. The development of learners’ IT

capability provides the foundation upon which effective use of ICT can be built". The importance of having ICT as a subject in the primary and preparatory school curriculum arises from its value in helping learners to think in different ways which is the main aim of the idea of freedom in education. It provides the learners with varieties of tools to discover knowledge and increase their learning skills.

Some reasons for including ICT in the curriculum are noted for instance, by Underwood (1994), Whitebread, (1997), Martyn (1999), Wegerif and Scrimshaw (1997). For example Underwood argues that; (a) ICT "can be more than a workhorse, it has the potential to change our patterns of thinking and our ways of knowing (1994:8). Similarly, Martyn (1999:130) argues that as one of the most powerful tools ever invented, ICT offers huge potential to enhance children's lives... it has the power to motivate children, to assist them with many labour-intensive aspects of learning and to encourage the development of thinking in a variety of mind-changing ways. Whitebread (1997:16-31) indicates that collaborative ICT-based problem-solving tasks involving decisions-making adventure games and modelling applications can promote higher-order thinking, through providing exciting, relevant and meaningful opportunities to discuss and debate, raise questions, listen to other points of view and evaluate them, analyse data, rationalise decisions, hypothesise, predict and modify ideas. (b) The use of ICT in context-free problem-solving activities has an important role to play in developing productive classroom talk (Wegerif and Scrimshaw,1997:3-5). (c) As children progress through the primary school, they become increasingly able to cope with thinking, the context of which is distanced from their immediate environment and the here and now of their lives. Through web sites and the use of email, learners can engage in meaningful virtual contact with children living in distant locations. Email facilitates exchanges of information that can make possible comparison of lifestyle, culture and experiences, and motivation is maintained because of the speed at which responses can be received. Through simulation software ICT can give learners the chance to experience, virtually, situations that they would not otherwise be able to (Martyn,1999:130).

6.4.1.3. Maximising learners' freedom through geography, history and citizenship

In Egypt learners at Basic Education level study a subject known as social studies which contains history, geography and citizenship education. Although social studies as a subject gives too many students the impression that these subjects are merely an odd jumble of unrelated dates, places, and processes (Bennett, in 'Ammar,1996c:46), it still has its advocates and defenders in Egypt and in others countries. They argue on two fronts; 'first, that immersion in familiar particulars of local life builds children's academic self confidence and esteem; and second, that, for reasons of cognitive and developmental psychology-our youngest students are not yet ready for real History, Geography, or Civics' ('Ammar,1996c:46). Neither claim is true. "Ravitch has amassed an impressive collection of expert testimony on expanding environments, all of it negative. Joseph Adelson, professor of psychology at the University of Michigan, confirms: there is nothing in cognitive science, or in developmental research, which supports the present way of doing things. Jerome Bruner of the New School in New York City agrees: there is little beyond ideology to commend the programme and its endlessly bland versions. Philip Phenix, educational philosopher and professor emeritus at the teachers College of Columbia University, calls Expanding Environments positively ill-suited to the needs of young children, wholly without warrant, and a recipe for boredom and sterility, doing poor justice to the expansive capacities of the human mind" (Bennett, in 'Ammar,1996c:47). As mentioned in chapter two, freedom in education implies that young learners have the ability to make their own choices and decisions and to take responsibility. Of course it is possible to argue that although children have the right to study each subject separately and have a different understanding of knowledge and skills without fear, they are not mature enough to gain the required learning through the study of these subjects. In this sense Mahmud (1995:126-8) argues that 'although young children may not be prepared to absorb sophisticated causal explanations of our world's complicated past and the present, most of them come to kindergarten already aware-through television and other media of people and places far beyond the street between home and school, and they are ready and eager to have their enormous appetite for further information satisfied'. For including Geography as a subject in the primary school curriculum, Hicks and Holden (1995:100) argue that children

of this age are concerned not only about their personal future but also the future of their local community and the global future... children are trying to make sense of the world and their role in it and teachers should facilitate this process. Similarly, Cook (1999:81) argues that, by the later years of primary school, children are able to cope intellectually with advanced concepts and that this developing ability can be extended further through engagement with geographical enquiry and study. This learning is crucial for the overall educational and personal development of learners between the ages of seven and eleven.

With regard to citizenship, Ranson argues that the learner should have the experience to develop an understanding of the situation, or the other person; to have the ability to judge the appropriate ends and course of action, which presupposes a community based upon sensitivities and tact; and learning through action to realise good practice (1996:223). Therefore, the citizenship curriculum should not focus on talk about moral principles, it should focus on learners' practices that contain their own set of moral principles.

politically, therefore, the community must be so organised as to ensure maximal participation by its members. Machinery will have to be devised to respect the moral autonomy and responsibility of the citizens-an official opposition, a free press, periodic elections, safeguards for minorities etc. etc. Maximal participation will also mean that democratic decision-making is not restricted to central government (White,1982:116).

In this sense Halliday (1999:53) argues that a curriculum for citizenship

should be concerned to maximise opportunity to find touchstones by inducting learners into as many practices as possible so that they come to acquire those many forms of reasoning that enable participation in a democratic form of life.

To do so the call for personal autonomy and civic responsibility are required (Aspin,1997:253) to encourage children

to explore issues to do with power and politics and it is important to include factual information about the structures and process of government in any curriculum materials... children's lived experience... understanding that must be taken into account if we wish them to really appreciate the principles and purposes that underpin democratic practices (Howard and Gill,2000:357).

6.4.1.4. Maximising learners' freedom through religious education

Although religious education (Islamic and Christian) as a subject in schools has been considered a compulsory subject and is a required examination subject it does not contribute to the final marks. On one side, in an education system based on freedom having religious education as a compulsory and required examination subject which does not contribute in the final marks actually provides for greater equality of opportunity between Muslim and Christian learners. Egypt is an Islamic country and Islam is the official religion. Therefore, having religious education as contributor to the final marks might go against the idea of freedom in education where the Islamic religion already receives more attention in terms of having its teachers, textbooks, in addition to the contribution the media can make to them as well. On the other hand, teaching and learning religion might be more important than other subjects in terms of exercising freedom in a way that does not harm anybody else, to learn responsibility for oneself and to have and make ones own moral rules. The rationale for having religious education to be included in the curriculum has been discussed widely in the work of educational philosophers such as Hirst (1974:32-44), Hudson (1987:109-116) and Phenix (1964:4-8). According to them, the rational religious education in school would seem to encompass five areas; Religion as a form of knowledge; Religion as a distinctive form of human experience; Religion as having a role to play in any discussion on morality; Religious understanding as crucial in preparing learners for life in a multi-faith and multicultural society; Religion as making a significant contribution to structuring and understanding personal experience. Similarly, Broadbent (1999:67) argues that for learners from 7 to 11 years old “religious education can offer a vigorous learning experience. It offers opportunities to develop knowledge of the local and wider community, to explore religious beliefs and practices, to raise questions and to develop a sense of personal identity. It offers opportunities to become researchers and investigators, to become skilled in moral decision-making, and confident in social interactions with peers and adults”.

Having discussed the nature of primary and preparatory subjects the argument now turns to discuss the nature of subjects at secondary schools.

6.4.2. The nature of the curriculum subjects in secondary school

Unlike the current system, an education based on freedom in the secondary school would have varieties of different subjects (technical, science, mathematics and humanities subjects) out of which learners would choose five subjects to study according to their interests and what they want to do in the future. There would be no obligation for the learners to choose any specific subject. This would mean that instead of the traditional classification role of academic/technical division, the emphasis would be on “new and innovative kinds of connectiveness between knowledge areas and different forms of specialised study interwoven with a generic core of knowledge, skills and processes” (Young, 1996:117). This would require:

flexibility (the opportunity to make choices and combine different kinds of learning in new ways) and coherence (the sense of clarity that students need in order to be clear about their educational purposes and where a particular course of study (or cluster of modules) will lead to (Young, 1996:117)

In this sense each school should offer a range of specialisms in most of the academic, technical and humanities subjects. For learners in secondary school will choose according to their interests and what they want to be in the future. Therefore, unlike the current system there has to be a connection between the various subjects at secondary school and the subject required by the university. In other words, learners will have freedom first to find out what they are interested in and in what college they want to study it, then to make the choices between the available subjects. Subjects would be changed according to the interests of the learners and society as well. The main point behind having varieties of subjects is to meet the interests of the individuals and the society. With rapid changes all over the world, new subjects will be likely to attract the learners’ interest. This gives the chance for the new subjects to be preferred. This also makes work opportunity available for the learners, as well as making investment in education a real and practical principle. Regarding the learner’s choices between these subjects, it is necessary for them to be left free to decide for themselves with help from their parents and teachers to discuss their interests, the nature of each subject and the subject requirements for each college. This will help the learners to decide what they are interested in, and help them to make their own decisions.

6.5. Maximising learners' freedom through assessment practices

Assessment based on freedom in education aims, on the one hand, to enable learners to know about their performance and their interests. Also it helps learners to choose the appropriate subjects in secondary school and the type of study in higher education that they want to do in the future according to their interests. On the other hand the purpose of assessment is for the state to evaluate the teaching and learning environment. However, in secondary school, assessment through national examination plays a central role in classifying learners into groups according to their scores. Learners already understand the significance of qualifications, and see the place of examination in the competition to gain jobs. They assume that they cannot gain employment without qualifications of the traditional sort. In the implementation of freedom in education there are some considerations here and certain preparations that need to be made.

Firstly, in education based on freedom it might be possible to argue that there is no failure by learners, especially in the first nine years of their lives at school, when they learn how to read, write and think to be able to find out their real interests and what they want to be in the future. However, learners would sit for government examinations in grades six and nine in order to inform the learners, teachers and parents about their performance and interests. This proposal is made because failure in examination does not prove that learners are not good, rather it indicates that they need more help to adapt and learn. Therefore, learners would need only to pass these two examinations to be able to continue. Thus, it would not matter how well they scores, because the purpose of the examination would be to inform the learners about their interests that help them to choose between subjects in secondary school.

Secondly, learners at all levels should do course work for each subject so their achievement would be decided by both examination and course work. Final scores would not be based on the final examination only but would be divided into 40% for course work and 60% for examination's papers. To make sure that teachers will not use the course work to oblige learners to attend private tuition or for learners to have justice in correcting course work,

teachers other than the normal class teachers would undertake the course work. The significance of having course work is that; (a) it gives the learners the chance to do creative work and to learn how to make their own choices and decisions, (b) it makes the parents and their children less worried about the outcomes of the final examination and therefore reduces the stress on the children as well because their assessment does not rely on the final examination, (c) it is also important to point out that going back to course work will not encourage private tuition for at least two reasons. The first, is that assessment questions based on freedom have nothing to do with how much knowledge learners can memorise through the pattern of questions and answers in which private tuition can help. The second reason is that because course work will not include monthly test as it did before in the Egyptian system, which encouraged learners to seek private education. It would include teacher-marked essays, projects, exercises and class tests. Course work gives freedom from the constraints of a traditional examination paper. Time and place are no obstacles to motivated learners, and there is not the tyranny of trying to recall fact frenetically crammed at the final moment. Course work allows learners to collect their own ideas and examples, to work them out at their own speed, and to collect their own concepts at their own pace. It allows learners the opportunity to work together as a team, with each member contributing according to ability. It allows learners to choose for themselves what they are going to work on.

Thirdly, learners' achievement in each subject should be recognised within grades A*,A,B,C and D. Each of these grades would be constructed from a reasonable average instead of being as an exact mark in each subject and final score (as the current Egyptian system does). As enrolment in higher education has to depend on the learners' grades in each subject, this form of assessment will increase learners' freedom to acquire the opportunities they want, because in the current system very many learners lose their freedom to study something they are interested in because their score is just half or one mark less than that required. Fourthly, examination questions should be constructed to find out how learners think and how they use the knowledge they have to solve a particular problem. Fifthly, learners should have the right to be re-examined if they fail or if they wish to improve, any number of times, especially in secondary examinations that are

required for higher education. Learners who fail in one or more subjects should be re-examined in that particular subject only, and not in all the subjects as the current system requires, and learners should be evaluated by taking their actual marks not the minimum marks. It is important that learners should not pay fees for re-examination, to encourage them to achieve their goals by re-sitting examinations.

Sixthly, education based on freedom should allow learners to use their certificate in grades 9 and 15 any time they want to use it. It gives the learners freedom to join the next stage at school or higher education when they can and like. Seventhly, learners' final score in secondary school, which are required for enrolment in higher education, should be considered as the total marks in the three year. In this respect, there are some colleges that should devise their own selection criteria and not base their decision on secondary final examinations because for some studies it is a poor means of assessing suitability. It seems illogical to accept some learners in the arts or music colleges based on their scores in mathematics, science ... (etc) and not on their talent in art and music. Therefore, I propose that each college should devise its own selection criteria as a first requirement and utilise the school score as a secondary requirement. It also might be useful to allow learners to sit for another examination for each college.

6.6. Teacher education in the light of the idea of freedom in education

Education based on freedom cannot successfully takes place if teachers are unfree, autocratic or unwilling to adapt to change. As examined in chapter five unfortunately the characteristics of Egyptian teachers are not currently suitable to enable them to play their role in an education system based on freedom. In the implementation of freedom in education there are therefore some considerations and arrangements necessary in relation to the preparation and training of teachers. Firstly, unlike the current Egyptian system, it should be possible to train teachers by having them prepared in a school of education for candidates who have a first degree in a particular subject. This would ensure that the candidates had freedom to choose to be trained as teachers or to do otherwise. This is because teaching is not an easy job and it requires volunteers who are willing to play a

very important role. Also there should be well-structured interviews with these candidates before allowing them to be educated as teachers. Through these interviews the interviewer can decide if the characteristics of these candidates are suitable for him to do a teaching job or not. Such decisions can be made according to the arguments that have been presented in chapters two and three, namely that the candidate should work as a full-time teacher for another year under supervision before he/she can gain their teaching certificate. It is important that the relationship between new teachers and the school of education is to continue after graduation so that new teachers can have the opportunity for continuing advice or doing postgraduate studies. For Alexander (1985:139) "school is not simply a place where students practice what they have been taught in colleges, but is where they actually learn and study: the intended schools-college relationship is now reciprocal". For the type of education the candidate can receive in a school of education see chapter three.

Secondly, education based on freedom requires that teachers must have the confidence to be involved in tackling educational problems and contribute to the on-going policy debate (Garland,1985:71-3). Teachers ought to be a very important group in making decisions and they should share in the preparations for the implementation of freedom. Also their opinions should be considered in the analysis and solving of the problems that might appeared in the implementation of freedom. "A first step in this process is to help teachers to remind themselves that they do have a crucial role to play in making a difference to the lives of students" (Day,2000:110). As Tirri and Husu have argued,

the parents, pupils, and colleagues must know teachers as people who are caring, responsible, and capable of looking after our children in schools (2002:79).

As Day has emphasised,

teachers themselves must be more than pedagogical experts. Professional development opportunities in the future must provide support for classroom pedagogy that goes far beyond the mechanics of teaching... It is the creation and sustenance of the moral and professional purposes of teachers that should provide the main agenda for their continuing professional development (2000:113)

In this sense, as White (1985:203) suggests teachers will need, first, to understand the aims of the whole educational system; they will need to reflect on how to fit their own teaching into this framework ensuring at the same time that it meshes in with what their colleagues

are doing in other schools. Shanker (1997:118) argues for giving teachers the time to share ideas about teaching and problems they are having, time to ask such questions as

what are they doing with their learners? What are their expectations? What is this textbook like? Is it better than that one? Without this kind of chance to reflect on their practice and discuss it with colleagues, teachers are likely to go on doing the same thing they have always done - and, incidentally, the same thing their own teachers did.

In this sense O'Hanlon argues that it is important to allow teachers to learn from their own experiences in teaching and to improve their practice in the general advancement of their careers. This requires the fostering of contexts that enable teachers to engage in critical reasoning, like teacher education courses and in service training based on critical inquiry or action research (2000:149).

In another sense Fullan argues that for teachers to alter their practices, there must be changes in the actual materials they use, changes in their beliefs, and changes in how they teach (1982:116-120). In doing so teachers should have access to, and be familiar with, some or all of the following high and low technological tools: radio; television - terrestrial, satellite and digital; tape recorders; CD players; video players; calculators; cameras - analogue, digital and video; computers; scanners; fax machines; the Internet; e-mail and video-conferencing. Each of these tools can be used by primary, preparatory and secondary teachers to enhance their teaching and to support the learning of their learners in various ways. This requires "initial teacher training for the use of information and communications technology to meet teaching objectives in all subjects" (TTA,2002:1). 'The introduction of new technologies to classrooms has offered new insights about the role of teachers in promoting learning. 'Technology can give teachers license to experiment and tinker. It can stimulate teachers to think about the processes of learning, whether through a fresh study of their own subjects or a fresh perspective on students' learning. It softens the barrier between what students do and what teachers do' ('Abd Al-Nabi,1997:105).

Education based on freedom should be concerned also about teachers being free to have flexible time to do their job and other activities in which they feel more comfortable. In other words there is no need for teachers to stay the whole day at school if they do not have classes. This will give them the time for studying and reflecting on the teaching problems

they come across at school. Also teachers should not be overloaded by so many classes a day that they will not be able to treat all their classes equally. This requires a decrease in the number of learners to each teacher and this requires an increasing number of teachers. Fourthly, in line with the historical and present analysis of educational theory and practice in the implementation of freedom in education it is important to make a great effort to change society's views toward the teaching profession and teachers so that teachers are given the respect that they should have. This will help them to feel that they are a powerful and important factor in education based on freedom. Fifthly, teachers need to have a better payment for their job on one hand and on the other hand they should be treated as different and important in society. In other words they should have free access to all libraries, Internet centres, computer services, clubs. They might also be granted discounts in some others activities such as sports.

6.7. Conclusion

The main aim of this chapter was to construct the framework of a theory of education based on freedom that suits Egyptian society and its goals and that can improve the efficiency of its educational system. The framework that has been suggested in the current chapter suits the Egyptian context, on the one hand, on the other hand, it also guarantees a range of freedom that enables learners and society to derive benefit from the value of freedom in education. Firstly, this framework considered the general components and aims of education. Secondly, it addressed the nature of the educational system, school curriculum, assessment and teacher's education. The following chapter investigates conditions and difficulties that might affect the implementation of education based on freedom in Egypt and offers some suggestions that might help to reduce the gap between the educational situation, its circumstances and the required conditions necessary for the successful implementation of freedom in education.

Chapter Seven

Pre-conditions and difficulties determining the implementation of the idea of freedom in education in the Egyptian context

7.1. Introduction

The main concern of chapter six was to construct a framework of a theory of education based on freedom that suits Egyptian society and its goals and that can improve the efficiency of its educational system. In this chapter it is important to note that there are likely to be some conditions and difficulties that might affect the implementation of education based on freedom. Therefore, this chapter examines the conditions and difficulties which need to be addressed for successful implementation of freedom in education in Egypt. Also, I will attempt to provide some suggestions that might help to reduce the gap between the educational situation, its circumstances and the condition necessary for the successful implementation of freedom in education.

7.2. Conditions required to implement freedom in education

This section investigates and examines conditions that determine freedom in education when the implementation takes place and highlight the difficulties that might arise in implementing freedom in education in the Egyptian context.

7.2.1. Maximising individual's freedom through democratic participation in decision-making

Although Egypt has been turned into a democratic state, rather than an egalitarian socialist state, strong central control has remained in most fields, including education (Hargreaves,2001:258). 'The state is the final authority on every decision in which learners, teachers, parents, educationalists and schools have no opportunity to participate in decision-making or to object against decisions that have already been made' ('Ali,1972:81). Given this situation, the implementation of an educational system in Egypt that is based on the concept of freedom presented in this study cannot really take place. This is because education based on freedom cannot be achieved unless there are a range of individual freedom in society itself. This is because in a society that grants freedom to its citizens everyone has the freedom to share in decision-making. Education based on freedom requires the democratic participation of all parties

(learners, parents, teachers, educationalists, politicians, administrators and schools) in decision-making, together 'with the belief that each party can make a valid and valuable contribution' (Eraut,1981:152), ('Ammar,1998b:44) and ('Abd Al-Hamid,1991:63).

Freedom to participate is a required condition for learners and politicians to enjoy the value of freedom in education, for teachers to share ideas about education and teaching and play their roles with satisfaction, for educationalists to be able to support or object to details regarding implementation, for head-teachers and administrators to facilitate activities related to the enjoyment of learners at school to enjoy the value of freedom, for parents to ensure that their children receive the best free and equal opportunity that can be offered, for schools, to have sufficient autonomy to manage their daily affairs and make decisions without referring to the national or the local authorities. Participation of all these parties requires that the educational authority should listen to everyone and consider their opinions in making their initial decisions.

It might be possible to argue that there is general agreement that all mentioned groups, with the exception of learners, already have the right and the capability to participate in making decisions, although in a society like Egypt there is in fact no participation at all in the current system. However, the greater challenge is likely to be in arguing the validity of involving learners in making decisions and affirming the importance of learners' perspectives as a source for looking at education as a whole and in schools in particular. This requires tuning in to learners' experiences and views with the belief that they are capable of providing valuable insights. In the legislative sense the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Arajarvi,1992:20-1) gives the right to children

to express their views freely in all matters affecting them, and their views have to be given due weight in accordance with their age and maturity. Children should be provided with the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting them, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.

In 1989 the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the child brought the issues of protection and participation together: the right of young people to talk about their experiences and to be heard and to express a view about actions that might be taken in relation to them, was seen as a basis for protection. According to Rudduck and Flutter "children's rights have mainly, but not exclusively, been argued for by adults on behalf of pupils whereas pupil 'participation and perspective' suggests a stronger input by

pupils themselves and a readiness among adults to hear and to take seriously what they have to say” (2000:76). This right gives learners freedom to be recognised as social actors, as participants in society (Lansdown,1994:36). Moreover it makes them responsible for participation in decision-making regarding their own education (Smith,1965:254). Similarly, Freeman (1996:36-37) argues that

the right enunciated here is significant not only for what it says, but because it recognises the child as a full being with integrity and personality and the ability to participate fully in society... the views of children are to count when decisions ranging from education to environment, from social security to secure accommodation, from transport to television, are being taken.

In another sense learners are very important as a source for collecting reliable data about their education and especially about the teaching and learning process. Marland (1996:67), Charlton (1996:50) and MacCallum, Hargreaves and Gipps (2000:275) argue the importance of the pupil’s voice for example, as an important element in furthering people’s understanding of teaching and learning more generally. As freedom in education is now focused on learning rather than performance and standards’ of achievement, Bennathan (1996:90) and Duffield, Allan, Turner and Morris (2000:263) argue that listening to the pupil’s voice is very important to manage school improvement. Much research has been done that has produced good findings to support a rational case for using learning as a source of data. For example, in research to explore children’s attitudes towards rules and discipline in school, Cullingford (1988:3-4) states that learners were able to explore important issues clearly. In research by Campbell et al (2001:173) learners were able to recognise very clearly the type of approach teachers used in teaching. When teacher focused strongly on actively engaging learners and creating a supportive environment, the learners focused on learner-centred aspects of the class. In contrast, when traditional expository teaching methods were used exclusively, learners focused on transmission and reproduction. These two examples show that learners have the ability to recognise very complicated issues and problems in education in ways that might be difficult for outside researchers to do. Also, it might be possible to say that they have sometimes the ability to suggest solutions for such problems.

Turning again to the essential point that concerns the necessity of democratic participation of all groups (especially learners, parents, teachers, head-teachers and administrators) in the implementation of freedom in education, it is essential to make schooling accessible to public judgement (Simons,1987:195). In this way, learners, teachers and parents will have the opportunity to be involved in decision-making (see Carnie,1996:50). Parents should have the freedom to be well informed regarding their children's education through, for example, an open evening with an interview with the class teacher; a detailed school prospectus including accounts of the educational policy and teaching methods of the school and a school report (Eraut,1981:158-9). Learners should be the most important group to attend these meetings and they should have the opportunity to ask any question they may have about the new changes. This also requires that each school should hold open meetings where the matter is debated amongst the teachers, learners and parents, the main proceedings reported to the local authority and thence to the national authority. This requires that educational authority should make efforts to involve everyone in educational planning and decisions. In this sense 'Abd Al-Daim argues that ' political efforts are the most essential ingredients of genuine reform (1991:82). In this way, the views of all parties would be heard and also, the parties should have received information concerning proposed changes and have an opportunity to consider possible outcomes. In other words implementing freedom in education has to be considered as a national challenge, in which everyone has a contribution to make. Furthermore, freedom is an idea and hope for everyone not just in education but in life. People, when they believe in such an issue, become very powerful in achieving their goals. I believe that freedom in education is an issue that can be a national challenge because as Dewey (1959:31) argues, it is an issue in which everyone has an interest.

7.2.2. Implementation of radical and comprehensive changes

A theory of education based on freedom, as suggested in chapter six, has its implementation in the purpose and aims of education, the structure of the system, school curriculum, textbooks, teaching methods, assessment procedures and teacher's education. Implementation of freedom in education in the sense suggested in chapter six requires radical and comprehensive changes in all these areas rather than making partial changes. 'Changes to different aspects of the educational system have to take place

simultaneously. For example, changes in the curriculum cannot be achieved without changing the format of assessment, teacher's education and vice versa' (NCERT,1994:87). This is because radical and comprehensive reform focuses on human resource requirement, goals and objectives, financing and budget, curriculum, educational management (Ginnburg, Wallace, and Miller,1988:331-4), Merritt and Coombs (1977:254-7), Sack (1981:42-3), Simmons (1983:7-17) and Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu, Zegarra (1991:24-30). It might be argued that 'modifications or partial reform in one of these processes rather than the whole does not produce satisfactory results' (NCERT,1993:17). "The change is not that few changes have occurred, but rather that the changes which have occurred have not made a significant difference, because the spirit, on the whole, is what it always was" (Hare,1978:72).

The need for radical and comprehensive changes comes as a result of the analysis of the nature of the Egyptian educational reform. Most if not all the reforms that have occurred so far have been partial where any changes in one aspect did not consider the required changes that should be made in another areas. For example, 'secondary school learners were given the freedom to re-sit for examination if they wished to attempt to improve their marks' (ME,1994c:2). In 1998, school learners lost that freedom because it created many problems with respect to admission to universities and increased family expenditure on private tuition. Also, teachers did not have the time and strength to mark papers on time, and the proportion of candidates achieving the highest grade increased. All these problems came about because the change in the examination procedures was an isolated innovation and not accompanied by change to the curriculum. Also, there was not enough preparation for the change in schools and in universities. Therefore, learners lost a good chance to improve their achievement because of the way it had been introduced.

In a different area, 'in 1993, the state decided to implement extra curricula activities in schools. Thus, the state decided to extend the school day in some schools for the learners to have enough time to do all the kinds of activities they wished without first establishing the ability of the school to make the demand. In the same year, the local authority in every county started their plan to apply this decision to all schools across the country' (NCERT,1997:45). Applying such a decision immediately did not allow schools enough time for preparation and did not provide learners and teachers with all

they needed for extra curricula activities. As a result, learners and teachers stayed in school doing nothing. Because of the lack of equipment and facilities learners became bored doing nothing. Teachers and administrators became tired of keeping learners under control and also they felt that their time was being wasted. After a few months of enforcing the decisions, the state returned to normal school hours. This example illustrates how a seemingly good idea such as extending the school day for learners to undertake extra-curricula activities failed, due to a limited version of reform. It also exemplifies the way in which many initiatives are put into practice. Local authorities readily comply with instructions from the central authority without sufficient planning or the carrying out of feasibility studies.

7.2.3. Society's understanding of, and preparation for freedom in education

According to the analysis of freedom in education made so far, everyone in society has their role to play. In other words, educational planning, decisions and practices are shared between learners, teachers, parents, politicians and educationalists. This requires that education based on freedom should be 'understood by everyone in the society' ('Ali,1993:167), Nwr Al-Din (1997:199), Al-Matbwli (1995:145), Wragg (1976:18-20) and Manswr (2000:241). Implementation of freedom in education can be misguided and can cause serious problems not because there is something wrong with any of the educational processes, but rather due to a misunderstanding of these processes by any of the mentioned groups. Thus, for example, parents would be unaware of their role in helping their children, teachers would not be aware of what they should do with their students in different situations in the classroom, administrators would be confused about the planning of the school facilities, school timetable, school plan, etc. As has been mentioned in chapters four and five, 'Egyptian society is not always aware of what is going on with respect to the educational changes or reforms and this is why some promising innovations have failed' ('Ali,1993:167). To avoid the same mistake, implementing freedom in education in Egypt requires an understanding by everyone in society, otherwise the implementation may fail. For everyone to understand such new reforms all the mentioned groups will need much preparation to be aware of the complexity of their rights, obligations and roles. They need to acquire more skills as they accept a more equal partnership with each other in education based on freedom.

Therefore, all kinds of media, using all the new technologies, should be responsible for the preparation needed, as well as schools.

7.2.4. Commissioning research in order to develop more effective implementation

This study has offered a theoretical framework of education based on freedom and its implications in the Egyptian context in terms of favoured aims and guidelines for a suitable curriculum, assessment strategies and teacher education. However, "it is often unclear whether such new development in educational thinking and practice are better, or worse, than the regimes they replace" (Davies, 1999:109). This requires adequately evaluated means of carefully designed, executed and controlled trials, quasi-experiments, surveys, before and after implementation, high quality observational studies, ethnographic studies which look at outcome as well as process, or conversation and discourse studies that link micro structures and actions to macro level issues. For implementing such a new theory of education, research before, during and after that process is important to provide an information base for politicians and administrators, who can then add the necessary value judgements and thus legitimise their policies on a sound basis, work-out the implications of the new theories and evaluate them by checking the effectiveness of the innovations and intervention programmes and monitoring educational standards. Research techniques and trained personal would be needed to carry these out (Nisbet, 1981:163-4).

To do this, the educational research literature needs to be better registered, indexed, classified, appraised, and made accessible to researchers and teachers alike. Educators need access to this research and to be able to search and critically appraise it in order to determine its relevance (or lack of relevance) to their schools, learners, and educational needs. This is what is called evidence-based education. This has been discussed, for example by, Hargreaves (1997b:407-10) and Hammersley (1997:154-7) as the set of principles and practices which can alter what people think about education, the way they go about educational policy and practice, and the basis upon which they make professional judgements and deploy their expertise. Moreover, schools should be considered as a place for knowledge creation because better practices for teachers and head-teachers cannot be left solely to research institutions. In this sense Hargreaves argues that knowledge-creating schools are a path to more effective schools and to

better educational research. This requires that groups of schools should work on the same topic because what the single school can achieve is limited. This means that research must draw closer to teachers and head-teachers if they aim to obtain high-quality knowledge about effective teaching and learning (1999:136-41). In this sense it is important to motivate teachers to be involved in practitioner research as they represent the human resource closest to classroom life. The following are some of the relevant issues which might be investigated.

- Observations of learners and teachers inside and outside the classroom
- Investigation of the understanding of the idea of freedom in education by learners, teachers, parents, administrators and the general public.
- Modifications of the curriculum in the light of experience gained during implementation.
- Evaluation of the new subjects introduced into the curriculum, as I have proposed for years one to twelve.
- Study of how learners select subjects in secondary school.
- Study of the new system of assessment and modification of it in the light of evaluation findings.
- Analysis of teacher education and modification in the light of the guidelines presented in this study
- Study of school management to find out the different strategies for the implementation of the idea of freedom in education.
- Study of the possible school activities which might be added to schools and the resources required.
- Investigation of new sources of funding
- Study of the best ways in which the media can be used to introduce the new idea of freedom to everyone in the society.
- Study of the feasibility of extending the school day and the school year.
- Study of different ways to deliver the curriculum to learners.
- Feasibility studies prior to the introduction of new academic and vocational subjects into the curriculum.
- Study of appropriate methods of teaching to achieve the aims of freedom in education.

- Study of the freedom of the teacher to choose the content or part of the content for each subject.

7.2.5. The importance of collecting reliable data prior to implementation

One of the most important conditions to the successful implementation of freedom in education or any other idea 'is to have reliable data about the current situation' (Ahmad,1999a:147). 'Unreliable data makes it difficult to know the actual situation' (Ghanim,1997:173). I refer here to two types of data; firstly, quantitative data with respect to numbers of learners, schools, teachers, administrators and the facilities the school needs. Secondly, qualitative data concerning people's views about the deficiencies of the current system and their ideas and expectations of the new idea of freedom in education. Currently in Egypt, it might be possible to state that not all quantitative data are reliable or correct and this is why many projects have failed because reliable quantitative and qualitative data were not available or incorrect.

Implementation of freedom in education requires the collecting, analysing and classifying of all the quantitative and qualitative data needed. Egypt badly needs a totally new style of collecting the different data since most of the data currently available are not reliable or organised. Collecting, classifying and organising such data should be responsibility of a National Council. However, each learner in the school should have a role in collecting data. To involve learners, firstly, they should know what they have to do and why. Secondly, they should realise how important their roles are for that mission. Then each school should have volunteer groups to classify all the data for the school with help from their teachers, headmasters and administrators. Giving learners the opportunity to share in doing so makes them feel powerful, proud of themselves, believe in themselves and feel how important their role is, even though they are young. This will be one step towards achieving one of the aims of freedom, which is concerned with being creative, autonomous, responsible and independent. Then other volunteer groups can take the responsibility to collect all documents from local areas, classify them and submit them to The National Council.

Regarding qualitative data, firstly, the school may convene meetings of parents, businessmen and the general public to elicit their opinions about the new ideas and prepare them for their roles within the new system. Learners, especially at secondary school, are able to organise such meetings and record the meetings. They are also able to chair discussions, summarise the main points and write a report to the local authority with help from their teachers. One of the functions of such meetings is to encourage everyone to support the school through contributions of opinions, funds or facilities. Therefore, every school will know the extent of the support the community is able to provide. Involving learners for such activities helps them to; (a) understand what freedom in education is about and they can explain it to their peers, (b) learn how to organise free discussions, how to exercise democracy in real situations, how to make decisions and how to believe in what they are saying and convince somebody else, (c) evaluate their own work and other people's work (d) learn skills, such as writing reports and classifying data.

Many might think that these tasks would be too time-consuming for learners. The answer to this is performance of these tasks is a way to learn and achieve many skills. As suggested earlier in chapter six already, one hour of the school day is assigned to extra-curricular activities, and these responsibilities may be included amongst such activities. In that way, the means of fulfilling the idea of freedom would also partially meet the ends. Secondly, all groups involved in education should be considered as sources for qualitative data to discuss what they think of the current education and what they want for the future. This means that research has to be designed to interview all types of groups that can provide useful data before, during and after the implementation takes place.

7.2.6. Examining the theory of freedom in education before nation-wide implementation

It is true "that links between theory and practice are uneasy and uncomfortable bedfellows" (Hughes,1985:31). However, this relationship can be changed and improved by an understanding of theory and practice and how they relate to one another. As Hartnett and Naish (1976:3) state, there is a general way of making a distinction between theory and practice, in terms of theory as theorising (i.e. reasoning) and practice in the sense of doing (i.e. actions). In this interpretation, important

questions about theory and practice are raised, for example: what is the relationship between theorising (reasoning) about what to do and how to do it, and actually doing it; and what is the role of the theory of activities or skills (understood as the rules, maxims, precepts, etc. governing them) in learning to perform the activities and skills in question, and in actually performing them? Similarly, Bush (1989:3) argues that theory provides “a rationale for decision-making. It helps managers by giving them a basis for action. Without a frame of reference decisions could become purely arbitrary. It is not enough simply to note the fact of a situation and make a decision based on those facts. All such evidence requires interpretation. An appreciation of theory may also reduce the time required to achieve managerial effectiveness by obviating the need for certain levels of experience. In this sense theory may be regarded as a distillation of the experience of others” Theories are most useful for influencing practice when they suggest new ways in which events and situations can be perceived. Fresh insight may be provided by focusing attention on possible interrelationships that the practitioner has failed to notice, and which can be further explored and tested through empirical research. If the result is a better understanding of practice, the theory-practice gap is significantly reduced for those concerned. Theory cannot then be dismissed as irrelevant (Hughes and Bush,1991:234). Theory and practice are not two separate things. There is a relationship between them. It is possible that it might appear from the point of view of practitioners that there are some aspects in which this theory has to be changed or developed to accommodate real situations. In this sense Morgan (1986:335-6) argues that there is a close relationship between the way we think and the way we act...practice is never theory-free, for it is always guided by an image of what one is trying to do. The real issue is whether or not we are aware of the theory guiding our actions.

As has been discussed there is a huge gap between theory and practice in the educational system in Egypt. This gap arises from a misunderstanding of the theory or the absence of a rational and realistic plan for putting theory into practice. It might be relevant to mention that ‘many good ideas have been sacrificed in Egypt because they have been put in to practice without examining them first in a small number of schools to find out the difficulties that might arise’ (NCERT,1996:45). Therefore, it is important to reduce the gap between theory and practice by implementing the idea of freedom in education first in a certain number of schools in different areas to test the theory in real

schools and classroom situations. Implementing the idea first in a small numbers of schools reduces the gap between the theoretical expectations and the actual achievement that might take place. Also, identifying the difficulties experienced by schools and the resources they require at such a pilot stage will save time and money in the later stages.

7.2.7. The critical use of history and overseas experiences

Egypt has a very rich history in education, allowing politicians and practitioners to look at history as an inspiration for the present and future. 'It is informative to study the past to learn from the previous experiences of the society and the sources of some present problems. However, it should be remembered that not all successful innovations from the past may be borrowed for the present because of the change in circumstances' (Al-Jabri,1994:62). Using the past might provide many good experiences and provide good insights for the present problem. However, it is important to investigate well such experiences before bringing them into the present. The reason behind considering this condition is that in Egyptian education there are some recent changes that have been borrowed from the past in order to solve specific problems without a critical examination of their suitability to the present and the future (see chapter five). This has led to unsatisfactory results and caused new problems alongside the problems that existed already before applying such borrowed experiences.

In the same way, Egypt since the 1970s has put in place many educational reforms as a consequence of increasing dialogue with the western nations. This came about as a result of the belief that Egypt cannot survive and cope-with the advanced countries without assimilating the orientations of the modern world and its new patterns. It is true that 'although education is an outcome of every society, it is enriched by the experiences of other societies and their achievements' ('Ali,1999b:40). In this sense, Shanker (1997:120) argues, that in the absence of another model that is clearly better or even as good as theirs, we should look seriously at the model they follow and the results they have achieved. However, the current educational system in Egypt seems to have transferred some experiences directly from other countries, for example, applying technical education in secondary schools, or reducing primary education to five years instead of six. 'Ammar (1998a:18-9) and (Al-Jabri,1994:70) have commented, 'the Egyptian relationship with western civilisation consists in adopting their models without

being aware about the rational thinking behind these models and considering whether they are suited to the Egyptian context'. It is true that there has been some developments but this has been on the basis of transference without critical analysis and adaptation. This thesis has therefore sought to take account of both the nature of the concept of freedom and the nature of Egyptian society in proposing a new educational system for Egypt that is based on notions of freedom.

7.2.8. Preparation of the appropriate budget

An appropriate budget is one of the most important factors in determining successful implementation. However, it might be possible to argue that preparing a suitable budget is an easy condition in comparison with preparing the whole society for such a new theory. This is because it is straightforward work and it does not take a long time. I believe that when it comes to education, appropriate funds should be assigned. As Peters argues, it is the educationalists' responsibility to insist on what ought to be done from an educational perspective and to argue against political obstacles; whether we win or lose such battles is another matter. The point is that we cannot formally approve of cutting the coat of our ideals according to the cloth of politicians (1966b:173).

With respect to the situation in Egypt, the education budget has been reduced since the 1960s with a detrimental effect on the quality of education. 'This means that different sources of funds should be' found (Ratib,1998:119), Zidan (1983:425), Manswr (2000:237) and Ramadan (1985:207-9). Moreover, the state should achieve equity and adequacy between schools. In this sense Augenbick, Myers and Anderson (1997:76) recommend that the state should equalise support between schools for the construction and renovation of school facilities. Also, as Howell and Miller (1997:48) argue, schools require stability in funding and budgets should be predictable. However, money is necessary, but not in itself sufficient, to assure improved student achievement. Rather, it is the way that money is used to acquire other resource inputs (e.g. teachers, materials, supplies) and the way these resources are utilised in the school and classroom that will ultimately determine the impact of money on student outcomes. Sources of funding available in Egypt might be achieved in several ways, for example:

- Implementing freedom in education requires public support and the willingness to motivate and encourage everyone to share in education and feel that the small amount of money s/he gives really makes a difference. Therefore, it may be necessary to have a national fund to collect the money from everyone who is willing to contribute.
- Different ministries can share in building schools and supplying schools with the materials they need. For example, the ministry of health can provide schools with a daily lunch. The social affairs ministry may take over the responsibility for supervision of the kindergarten stage from the ministry of education. The ministry of culture can provide schools with books and novels for learners to do free reading. The ministry of media can conduct programmes to change the way people think regarding the position of women. Also, these two ministries may plan and fund events for learners who aspire to study media, history or archaeology in secondary school. The ministry of transportation may provide free services especially in the village in order to eliminate one of the obstacles preventing village children from going to school. The ministry of religious endowments which is one of the richest ministries may help in building schools which is part of their duty alongside building mosques. The ministry of youth and sports may arrange free visits to sport clubs and arrange for different visits of famous players to schools to engage learners in sporting activities.
- Part of the zakat money (zakat is a duty for every Muslim that he/she has to pay a certain amount every year to help the poor) can be used to build schools and provide them with facilities. In terms of religion, the zakat money should be allowed to be used in this matter because it helps poor learners to obtain free and equal opportunities.
- International funds can play a role in supporting education, especially as there are a number of international agencies, to which the ministry of education may be entitled to apply.
- As mentioned in chapter five, the ministry of education supplies private schools with teachers, the national curriculum and textbooks. Therefore, it might be useful to make some scholarships available for high achievers who would not otherwise be able to afford to enrol in private schools.

- It might be possible to encourage companies to support schools. They may provide schools with pens, pencils, paper, paint, exercise books, computer hardware, computer software, science equipment, art equipment, drama equipment, sports equipment, music equipment, etc. As Mountfield argues, a good relationship between the school and its business community may attract gifts in cash or kind. Equipment that is outdated for business purposes, or surplus materials that would otherwise be discarded, are frequently donated as gifts to schools. These gifts should be regarded as a welcome bonus, not as the prime purpose of the partnership (1993:49). Similarly, Marsden argues that the relationship between a school and company is strictly commercial. If a company wishes to hire school premises or to advertise its goods and services to learners and parents, it should offer a payment or sponsorship in return (1997:12). It is often to the advantage of companies to support schools, as there are returns for supporting the school or a particular project, such as company profits or improved public relations. "The company can help in kind at relatively little cost to itself. The company will receive permanent recognition for its support. The school presents its successes and achievements so that it appears to be worthy of support" (Marsden, 1997:159).
- The school can be a place for advertisements to receive more funds for supporting learners' activities.
- Depending on the type of school, and on any conditions imposed by the local authority, the school may undertake fundraising activities such as a tuck-shop, stationery shop, providing a private nursery and the sale of school photos (see Mountfield, 1993:81).
- The school might accept covenanted donations and gifts from parents (and possibly other members of the community). Also it might be useful to obtain donations from business who are working abroad. This requires, as Marsden (1997:11,158) mentions, the motivation of a person who can spare a little extra money to contribute to a school appeal. There are motivating factors which are common to parents and local companies. He suggests that the common factors are; they are approached individually, they feel that their support is greatly needed; they understand clearly the benefit of the project and think it is worthwhile; they are aware that others are supporting the appeal; they feel that the appeal will be successful; they see examples of contributions which are within their reach; they do not feel they are under pressure to contribute; their support will be permanently

recognised (not everyone requires or wishes this, but many do). Parents tend to be more motivated to make a contribution if they feel that their child will benefit and they are pleased with their child's progress at school.

- To reduce some expenses learners might be required to return their textbooks by the end of the year in good condition. In this way they learn how to respect and consider the freedom of others to have textbooks in good condition. Also they will learn how to be responsible for their textbooks until they hand them to others.

7.2.9. Maximising the school's freedom through effective participation in educational planning and practice

'Within the Egyptian context, the school does not have freedom to manage its own daily affairs' (Al-Matbwli,1995:140). The head-teachers or teachers do not have freedom to deal with any matter or problem at school. They have to report any matter to people who occupy high rank and wait for their decisions. Of course this takes a long time and the delay makes any problem worse. Therefore, this policy does not require a high quality of leadership at schools because it needs only one who passes every small demand or problem to others of high rank and who wait for such decision to put them into practice. Therefore, 'all head-teachers or local authorities have been chosen as the oldest teachers at schools' (Zanati,2000:132-3) and (Ramadan,1985:207-9). This means that most of them are quite old and they do not have the passion and desire to be involved in such hard work as implementing freedom in education. Most of them are appointed to their post two or three years before they are expected to retire. In the light of this system, it may seem difficult to apply freedom in education which represents a large challenge to people in positions of responsibility and authority.

"It is simply more efficient and effective in the late twentieth century to restructure systems of education so that central bureaucracies are relatively small and schools are empowered to manage their own affairs within a centrally determined framework of direction and support" (Caldwell and Spinks,1992:14) and Mees, (1996:44). In this sense the role of the state will be limited to the formulation of rights, duties and obligations and the organisation of funding (Hodgetts,1996:64). Therefore, each school should have the freedom to deal with its daily problems and all the facilities it needs. This requires a different style of leadership from both head-teachers and local

authorities, who can understand the nature of their roles. Hence, 'it is not advisable to select them only according to their experiences in teaching and past training courses (the course duration is 6 days)' (Zanati,2000:278). Selection should also be made on the basis of their qualifications and experience in school management. For example, 'they should be able to organise teamwork, work as part of a team, be able to work to deadlines, have confidence to deal with people at all levels, show meticulous attention to detail, be able to decide the school priorities, be able to organise their work programme, be able to raise and manage funds, be able to motivate all people at school to work and be able to apply the school rules fairly' (Zanati,2000:277-80). Although local management of schools involves devolving funding and resource management to governing bodies and school staff and greatly reduces the powers of local educational authorities (Bush,1995:4), the local and national authority still has responsibility for guiding the educational process across the country. Each county in Egypt should have responsibility for school-building, making funds available, making the requisite number of teachers available and so on. The national authority is by no means eliminated. On the contrary, the local authority will work according to the national guidelines but with more freedom to run their own schools. Moreover, the national authority has to provide for the poor local areas and support them, so that learners in these areas have the same educational opportunity as children in wealthier areas. This may be achieved through provision of teachers or equipment.

7.2.10. The requirement of teaching and learning technologies

Attempts to use computer technology to enhance learning began with the efforts of pioneers such as Atkinson (1968) and Suppes (Suppes and Morningstar,1968). The presence of computer technology in schools has increased dramatically and predictions are that this trend will continue to accelerate. 'The naive view of technology is that the mere presence of computers in schools will enhance learners' learning and achievement' ('Abd Al-Nabi:1997:98). However, as has been shown in chapter five, technology is almost absent in most Egyptian schools. Only a few schools in big cities and high standard classes have some computers and access to the Internet and these are not enough for all learners. Also this provision was introduced only a few years ago. That is why supplying new technology in all schools for all learners is really important for learners to have an equal opportunity to enjoy the value of freedom in education.

In terms of the function of ICT to provide learners with the required conditions to enjoy the value of freedom, several groups have reviewed the literature on technology and learning and concluded that 'it has great potential to enhance learners' achievement and teacher learning, but only if it is used appropriately' (Silim,1999:121). For example, Bransford, Brown, and Cocking (1999:195,217, 218) present several reasons for supplying schools with the most useful technologies to support learning and teaching. Firstly, technology has the capacity to create new opportunities for curriculum and instruction by bringing real-world problems into the classroom for students to explore and solve. Technology can help to create an active environment in which students not only solve problems, but also find their own problems. This approach to learning is very different from that typical of Egyptian school classrooms, in which students spend most of their time learning facts from a lecture or text and doing the problems at the end of the chapter.

Secondly, technology can make it easier for teachers to give learners feedback about their thinking and for students to revise their work. Thirdly, it is easy to forget that learners' achievement in school also depends on what happens outside of school. Bringing students and teachers in contact with the broader community can enhance their learning. For example, the Internet can help link parents with their children's school. School calendars, assignments, and other types of information can be posted on a school's Internet site. School sites can also be used to inform the community of what a school is doing and how they can help. Fourthly, Technology has become an important instrument in education. Computer-based technology holds great promise both for increasing access to knowledge and as a means of promoting learning. The public imagination has been captured by the capacity of information technologies to centralise and organise large bodies of knowledge; people are excited by the prospect of information networks, such as the Internet, linking students around the globe into communities of learners.

Fifthly, computer-based technologies can be powerful pedagogical tools - not just rich sources of information but also extensions of human capabilities and contexts for social interactions supporting learning. The process of using technology to improve learning is never solely a technical matter, concerned only with properties of educational hardware

and software. Like a textbook or any other cultural object, technology resources for education function in a social environment, mediated by learning conversation with peers and teachers. Sixthly, the new technologies provide opportunities for creating learning environments that extend the possibilities of old but still useful technologies, such as books and the blackboard. Linear one-way communication media, such as radio and television shows, also open up new possibilities. Although there are many reasons to provide schools with the new technologies to support learning and teaching, 'it is possible to say that technologies do not guarantee effective learning' ('Ammar,1998a:75-7). It may be argued that inappropriate uses of technology can hinder learning, for example, students spend more time picking fonts and colours for multimedia reports than planning, writing, and revising their ideas. Therefore, new technologies have to be used in way that supports teaching and learning and helps the learner to achieve, and to give more freedom to the learner to research for new information and liberate their minds from the limited information available in textbooks. In this sense 'using new technology requires modifications in the teacher's role, curriculum, textbooks and assessment process'(Al-'Atar,1997:85). 'Supplying schools with new technologies requires that each school should provide their learners with all the new technology they can, because it might not be easy for parents to make, for example, the Internet available for their children' (NCERT,1994:23).

7.2.11. Maximising learners' freedom through having universal enrolment in basic education.

As was shown in chapter four and five, there is a shortage of schools in Egypt and this prevents learners, especially in rural and poor areas from joining school. This limitation is considered as a kind of restriction on learners to enjoy freedom in education. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the state, with help from the public to open more schools all over the country for everyone to have free and equal access. Moreover, all school should be equal in terms of allowing learners to learn under the same circumstances. One important note regarding Egyptian schools is that most if not all except private ones, are not in good condition. They consist of old high buildings with no sense of beauty. I believe that schools should be an attractive place for learners and teachers to work in a good atmosphere. Therefore, schools have to be repaired and supplied with all the facilities that are required. Also they need to be ready in terms of

space for practising extra curriculum activities. One of the important outcomes from improving schools is that having well-organised and facilitated schools will reduce the gap between the state and the private school environment. Reducing this gap will maximise poor learners' freedom to have free and equal educational opportunities. Also it will make parents feel confident that state school will provide their children with a good opportunity similar to, or maybe even better than private ones. Another implication of building more school especially in poor and rural areas is that this will help to increase the rate of girls' enrolment as well as boys and eradicate urban, rural and gender inequality and illiteracy. Accordingly learners' freedom will be maximised because, as discussed in chapter four and five, all the mentioned features will be recognised as restrictions on learners to enjoy free and equal opportunities.

7.3. Difficulties determining the implementation of freedom in education

After having discussed the required conditions for education based on freedom to achieve its aims it is important to highlight the difficulties that might determine how far education based on freedom can help to improve the efficiency of the educational system in Egypt. From the examination of educational theory and practice in Egypt in chapter four and five there are some difficulties that can be highlighted. Firstly, the high rate of illiteracy among adults. This is because illiterate parents may not be able to play their role effectively towards their children. They may also limit their freedom by not allowing them to attend school, particularly girls in poor and rural areas. What makes the problem worse is that reducing illiteracy will take a long time, which might affect the outcomes of the implementation of freedom in education. on the one hand this requires maximisation of efforts by the state, as well as all kinds of media and schools to help and prepare uneducated parents for their new role in education based on freedom. Schools can be used in the evening for adult literacy lessons, providing special programmes on TV and radio. Also, I believe that it is worthwhile to involve learners in secondary and higher education in this campaign. On the other hand, eradication of illiteracy has to be one of the state's priorities which requires a huge effort and budget. However, it is important to note that without having full enrolment for all learners at age 4 at schools, any effort will not be able to cope with the increase in the number of illiterate people who might join every year.

Secondly it could be argued that some negative social values existing in Egyptian society might be considered as a difficulty when the implementation of freedom in education takes place. This is because such values might influence learners' freedom to make such choices and decisions which do not come from them. Also it is because it takes time to change. For example, (a) a lot of families in rural and poor areas still think that girls' education should come as a second priority to boys'. Moreover, they believe that girls should follow certain studies such as nursing or teaching rather than engineering or law. (B) fear of examinations and the high value given to the certificate. This makes learners think of education as a process of memorising information for the sake of having a certificate rather than as a means to develop their potential. It is important to note here that unfortunately all kinds of media support this view through the emphasis they give to public examinations especially secondary school examinations which frighten both learners and parents. Also it assume that they are attempting the impossible. (C) the importance of private tuition in the sense examined in chapter five. Learners and their parents should understand that implementing freedom in education, in the sense suggested in chapter six does not call for private tuition because learners will no longer need tools to help them memorise knowledge. (D) the value of certain subjects such as mathematics, science rather than humanities, art and music which encourage learners to choose the former when they want to choose otherwise. For example, the medical and engineering profession are popularly regarded as prestigious although a huge numbers of doctors cannot find jobs and, as a result, some have abandoned the profession. On the other hand, the popular view of the nursing profession is negative, although there is a shortage of nurses and they receive high salaries. So, should a learner have the ability to enter either profession and have the freedom to choose, s/he may be under social pressure to train as a medical doctor even if s/he would prefer to be a nurse. (E) the value of the textbook and the belief that it has all that learners should know and that all the facts found in it are true and does not need to be questioned. (F) the value of private education and the view that it provides better jobs which helps learners to gain the highest score they can.

Thirdly, as mentioned in chapter four and five, the current Egyptian teachers can not play their role in education based on freedom. This requires a well-designed training course for the available teachers and a continuous form of assessment of their teaching in the classroom. Although all the previous consideration will have no place in

education based on freedom, they can still be considered as difficulties because they need a concerted effort and time to be eliminated, especially since they have a long history in Egyptian education. In other words, they might cause problems at the beginning of implementing education based on freedom, but in time they will change to be successful factors of such education.

7.4. Conclusion

This chapter was an attempt to discover and examine the conditions and difficulties which need to be considered for the successful implementation of freedom in education in Egypt. Also, the current chapter gave some suggestions that might help to reduce the gap between the educational situation, its circumstances and the required conditions to be satisfied for the implementation of freedom in education.

Conclusion

1. Conclusion

In the light of the previous chapters the conclusion attempts to highlight the contribution of this study to the field of knowledge and practice in education in relation to the meaning, conditions, restrictions and value of freedom in education for the benefit of learners and society and to satisfy their interests.

2. Contribution of the study to the field of knowledge

The current study was an attempt to construct a theoretical framework of education based on freedom. This framework, firstly, treated the implications of freedom in education with respect to its conditions, restrictions and value in education. With respect to conditions of freedom, (a) it has been argued that non-interference with learners' choices and decisions is a necessary and required condition for learners to exercise their freedom in education to gain benefit from its value. However, interference is not justifiable only for the prevention of license on others, which is, of course, an important exception. Despite remarkable stories of children surviving without adult help it is still the case that because of their size, inexperience and less-developed rationality they are more vulnerable than most adults and need protection and guidance.

Also, it has been argued that although restrictions of children's freedom are sometimes justified, this is not because children are inherently subject to adults' authority or incapable of freedom or in some way less worthy of respect and consideration than adults. Restrictions of children's freedom are important, just as restrictions of adults' freedom, and must be justified. If the justification for adults ever having the right to override children's wishes and make decisions for them is that this is in children's interests because they need protection and guidance, then adults' right to make decisions for children's should be limited to making decisions in children's interests and to the provision of the necessary protection and guidance. Their rights will not extend to rights over children, regardless of what is in children's interests.

(B) it has been argued that the availability of making free choice and decisions is a necessary condition for learners to have freedom enabling them to acquire benefit from its value in education. But it is completely unrealistic to suppose that children are ever, as a matter of fact, free to do what they like simply because of the inherent decency and good sense of all concerned. The practical choice is never between simply doing as one likes and being constrained; it is rather between being subject to different types of constraint.

With respect to the value of freedom, it has been argued that: (A) happiness is not the only aim of freedom in education when learners are allowed to do what they want. Happiness is only a product of being free to do what they are interested in; (B) autonomy, responsibility and creativity are valuable educational aims. Moreover, it has been noted that freedom is a necessary condition to achieve these aims; (C) It was shown that allowing learners more freedom brings greater academic achievement when the pressure of controls blocks it and when there are variety of options. This leads us to recognise that freedom in education has great value for society. Educating learners to be happy, creative, autonomous, responsible and achieving greater academic progress will be valuable aims for society to satisfy its needs and interests for the sake of development without forcing learners to do particular things. Through the arguments it is suggested that children should have freedom regarding their education not for its own sake but because it has value for them and their society.

Secondly, the study proposes a theoretical framework of freedom in education in relation to educational processes. For example, (1) it is important to help learners to determine for themselves what they would like to do, what they need to know next and how to go about pursuing their individual investigations, but until they are equipped with the necessary skills and knowledge for this they should not be allowed complete freedom. The freedom to choose what line of study to pursue and how best to pursue it is inappropriate for children whose intellectual skills are relatively underdeveloped and who have insufficient experiences to know what choices are available. This means that several suggestions for possible choices should be sought by the teacher and considered by the children before the choice has to be made. In such circumstances adult suggestion, or adult instigation, which might theoretically be thought to narrow the range of choices and limit freedom, in fact

enlarges it. Therefore, the study suggests that determining the curriculum content should be done in the light of the interests of the state so that children will acquire knowledge and skills the state wants them to have. Also it should be chosen according to the interests of learners as well, so they will work better and learn more effectively, because they will be interested in what they are required to do. However, it is important to note that learners' sharing in decisions should be essential and effective because they are the best judges of what interests them. They have the ability to make this judgement and commit to it.

(2) The study has examined the idea that having a national and compulsory curriculum does not limit learners' freedom when it guarantees the required conditions for them to benefit from the value of freedom in education. Regarding the textbooks, it was seen that those textbooks having all the knowledge and information learners should acquire do not help them to achieve the aims of freedom in education. However, they are important for learners, teachers and the public as guidelines but should not be the only resource learners depend on since they must look at different resources with help from their teachers and parents.

(3) The study provided evidence that exercising authority in the consideration of knowledge as an end in itself and forcing the learner to be slave to gain and memorise such knowledge, restricts the children intellectually and puts them in a particular formulation. However, education based on freedom pays attention to knowledge as means to reach such ends.

(4) The study examined and analysed the fact that freedom in education does not mean that there should be no assessment as a result of allowing learners freedom to do what they like. In education based on freedom the assessment's purpose is to evaluate the teaching and learning process. Moreover, the types of examination questions should not aim to find out how much knowledge learners were able to memorise but to find out what changes took place in their minds after studying a particular course, especially since the outcomes of education based on freedom can not be assessed by having the traditional types of direct questions and answers.

(5) The study has argued that implementing freedom in education requires teachers to be educated as individuals, not merely trained for the profession of teaching. This required that teaching candidates (i) should have a free choice to do a particular course in the teacher's institutes (ii) be free to think and express their thoughts regarding their education. To prepare teachers to help learners to be independent thinkers requires a free atmosphere in which teachers can be taught and also be free during their own teaching. (iii) be free to make their own choices, judgements and decisions. In short, they have to be educated in the same way as they are going to teach. That is to say, freedom in education in the teacher's institutes is a required condition in which to produce free, creative, responsible, choosers and autonomous teachers who can achieve the aims of freedom in education in schools with their learners. This, also, requires teaching candidates to study and understand what freedom in education, its conditions and its value is, so that they can have a full understanding of the nature of their role in implementing this theory.

3. Contribution of the study to the field of knowledge regarding Egyptian education

Firstly, the current study provided an analysis of the concept of freedom in western and Islamic thought. The analysis of the concept of freedom in chapter one indicates that the two traditions have similarities in relation the definition of freedom, its conditions and value.

(1), both traditions point out that any definition of freedom should treat three areas; who should be free, what constraints an individual should be free from, and what an individual is free for. With respect to the first area, both traditions argue that a certain minimum degree of rationality is necessary for a person to be free. Who is in a position autonomously to choose to do or not to do, who has the desire to do or not to do something and who can determine his own life and make his own decisions. This means that both traditions argue against the freedom of the irrational person who cannot act and accordingly cannot be responsible for his actions. Regarding the second area, both traditions consider that non-interference (intentional or unintentional) from others is a necessary condition to make an agent free. Also they discuss the effect of both external and internal obstacles on the

individual's freedom. The exercising the authority by the state over the individual to limit his freedom, both traditions argue for the need for justifiable authority to protect the individuals rights and civil liberties. Man can never live socially without some kind of authority and organised system of behaviour. Laws are made to protect ordinary people against those who acknowledge no such code or are free to abide by it only haltingly. For Islamic thought, it has been argued that religious restrictions cannot restrict freedom inasmuch as they cannot be treated as truly coercive the individuals have absolute freedom to choose what religion to follow, then, they have to act according to their choice.

Regarding the third area, the two traditions discussed argue that freedom is valuable as such, or as having value independently of the value of things it leaves us free to do. There are others arguments, that imply that freedom is instrumentally, unconditionally or intrinsically valuable for the individual to do or not to do something he likes. In other words, the individual has the chance to make his own choices and decisions. Islamic thought stress on the value of freedom as a means to free the mind. Free will and freedom are means to concentrate, think, decide, and move. As such, they represent the cost of extraordinary evolution and progress among human beings as compared to animals. Reason, perception, will, and morality are the result of free will and freedom. According to this view, freedom is a necessary condition to think freely and act according by.

(2), both traditions argue against the claim of absolute freedom. The unqualified demand of absolute freedom is unacceptable, as the people's freedom is always in conflict. (3) the two traditions distinguish between freedom and ability. Both arguments have established that the freedom increases the ability of the agent and having the ability makes someone's freedom worthwhile.

In relation to women's freedom it has been shown that women in Islam have the same rights and freedoms as men. Also Islam gave more freedom and rights to women than they had before the existence of Islam. However, practices in many Islamic societies do not consider these rights and freedoms. Therefore, women suffer from discrimination in favour

of men. This means that features of women's unfreedom do not take the form of religious obligations or restrictions but they are political and social.

Secondly, the study provided an original inquiry of the history and present situation of educational theory and practice investigating and analysing the idea of freedom in Egypt from 1805 to 2000 in relation to its conditions, restrictions and value. This inquiry used the historical and current quantitative and qualitative data to show the growth of freedom and its value in education. In many places the study provided statistical data which was collected and organised by the researcher to show the place of freedom in the areas of free and equal opportunity with respect to number of schools, teachers and facilities. There are many conclusions that can be drawn from this investigation, (1) learner's priority in education is not the main concern of the political leadership. The purpose and aims of education are limited to suit the needs of the ruler or the state rather than individuals. It is only the state that has the right, not the learners, teachers or parents, to determine the content of education to make learners acquire the knowledge and skills which are necessary for the state to be developed.

(2) The required conditions for learners and society to exercise freedom and benefit from its value (non-interference and the availability of choices) were not implied in the educational policy during the period of the study.

(3) Freedom in education in the history of Egypt and the present was always related to the claim for individuals to have free and equal educational opportunity. This means that until the year 2000 there were still millions of children out of school due to a lack of educational opportunity. There are no kind of educational opportunity that allows learners freedom to choose a particular possibility in a particular school. This means that learners are obliged to accept such opportunities as the state offers. Hence, it might be important to define freedom in education as a right for learners to have free and equal opportunity so they can make their own choices between such alternative exist.

For girls, their freedom is still less than that of boys in terms of having free and equal opportunity. Also they do not have freedom to study and work in particular fields as like. The lack of freedom they have does not refer to religious obligations as examined in chapter one, but they might be restricted by social values. For example, someone might argue that some families still have more attention to their sons' education rather than their daughters'. The preference of the family might refer to unintentional restrictions that have been made by the state. In others words, when education is not totally free and there are no adequate opportunities in schools, families give priority to boys rather than girls. But if education is free and available to all, it might be possible to believe that most families will treat their sons and daughters equally. Also, it might refer to the belief that education is not as important for girls as boys because, at particular age, she will marry someone who will look after her and her children.

(4) The approach is taken to design the curriculum and its content does not provide the required conditions where learners cannot derive benefit from the value of freedom. Firstly, the curriculum gives more attention to the amount of knowledge learners should learn at a required age for the sake of development because Egyptian education considers the gaining of knowledge as an aim in itself not as a means to others ends. Secondly, textbooks are full of isolated facts that learners should know. Having textbooks that contain all the required knowledge 'does not give learners the freedom, for example, to look for more knowledge, discover the relationship between different variables or to learn they can use such knowledge in a meaningful and worthwhile way. Thirdly, learners do not have freedom to make choices between subjects or between branches of subjects because all subjects and units are compulsory.

(5) The curriculum has been designed so as to make lectures the teaching method for all lessons. Because the curriculum is full of information and isolated facts, teachers find that giving lectures is the best way to teach, and their job is to help learners to memorise the information'. It does not give the teachers and learners freedom to use different teaching methods and techniques. Also it makes learners very negative elements in the process of teaching and learning which prevents any chance to exercise freedom and derive benefit

from its value. As for extra-curricular activities, they have no place in the school plan and so learners lose excellent good opportunities to learn how to exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value.

(6) In the history of Egyptian education, admission policies in teachers' institutes affect the quality of the teacher and the value of the teaching profession compared to other professions. Firstly, these policies make people think that it is a very inferior profession in term of social prestige and salary. Secondly, teachers are not free to choose to be trained as teachers and the process of teaching treats them as persons who have only to deliver information to the learners. Thirdly, admission policies prevent talented candidates from applying to teachers' institutes which limit the learners' freedom to have a good-quality teacher. As it has been mentioned, these teachers' institutes start with weaker candidates. Although these policies have changed, the negative social attitudes towards teachers and the teaching professionals continue to be recognised.

As for as the preparation of teachers is concerned, knowing the subject is the most important factor in teachers' training. Teachers' role is still recognised as that of a person who delivers such knowledge and information to learners without sharing with them in the process of teaching and learning. They are used to the traditional way of teaching where the teacher stands up front talking and asking questions, and all of the children are supposed to learn in the same way and at the same time. This approach to teachers' preparation makes 'teachers believe that they are the ones who know and have all the knowledge about everything. So learners have to listen and memorise what they are saying. This kind of education makes learners follow in other people's steps without thinking why they have to follow them and in the long run produces weak individuals who are afraid of criticism and change and who like to be silent and surrender to other people's ideas. In this sense education never leads to creativity or innovation. Therefore, learners do not feel powerful and do not trust themselves to obtain knowledge or produce new knowledge on their own. As a result they always expect teachers to tell them what they have to do. This process is carried out from stage to stage so that when they become employee they wait for their boss tell them what to do. Having this type of teacher preparation does not help learners to

exercise freedom and derive benefit from its value. In short, this type of teacher will be considered as a one of the restrictions on learners that limits their freedom.

(7) The spreading of private tuition and textbooks prevents learners from having free and equal opportunities, learning thinking skills and enjoying the value of freedom in education.

(8) Assessment practices restrict learners' freedom in terms of having educational opportunities and also in terms of enjoying the value of freedom in education.

(9) Illiteracy prevents public from the demanding a share in making educational decision or claim for their children's freedom. Moreover, uneducated parents can not play their role towards their children to help them have the required conditions for exercising freedom and get benefit from its value.

(10) It can be seen that freedom in education does not go against private education but against its effects on learners in state schools in terms of having an equal opportunity. Learners who are poor and can not afford private education are still free to go to a state school. However, the good quality of education in the private school causes the market to prefer private education graduates more than state ones because the quality of learners in the former and higher than in the latter. In this sense it might be argued that the existence of private education can be considered as one of the restrictions on learners to having an equal opportunity.

(11) An inappropriate educational budget limits learners' freedom in terms of having free and equal educational opportunity. Also, as a result of the lack of a budget, the state has failed to allow learners freedom to determine the type of studies they are interested in, where the state has obliged them to do what satisfies its aims and.

(12) The role of the local authority focuses only on putting such decisions into practice and has no role in decision-making. Moreover, it was shown that there is no sharing at all by

learners, parents, teachers and the school in making educational decisions or even in having freedom to object to such decisions as have been taken. This leads to state that having a share by these groups are a very important factor in limiting learners' freedom to be heard regarding their education.

(13) Egyptian educational thought is concerned with freedom in education and its value in the areas of developing learners' abilities to examine free thinking, choices, decisions and be responsible for their actions. Also it have been argued that the satisfactions of society's interests does not go against that of individuals' interests. This indicates that it is possible to implement the idea of freedom in education in the Egyptian context. Moreover, while educational thought demands learners' freedom in education and call for their interests to be considered as the main concern of the philosophy and the practice of education, there are many practices than can be seen to reflect these claims. This conclusion indicates that educational thought excludes the idea of sharing in educational planning and decisions.

(14) On many occasions it was shown that the failure behind such practices related to freedom in education was because society was not prepared for such change, as such change in education needs understanding, support and sharing from all groups to be involved to perform their role.

(15) In some places it was shown that educational reform in this comprehensive and particular sense has no clear philosophy. There is no harmony between its processes, and this leads to the unsatisfactory results of such reform. Moreover, all aspects of reforms that have taken place were partial in one or two aspects rather than looking at the whole processes.

Thirdly, the study formulated a framework of a theory of education based on freedom suits the Egyptian society and its goals which can improve the efficiency of its educational system. On the one hand, it guarantees a range of freedom that allows learners and society to derive benefit from its value in education. This framework, firstly, treated the general

components and aims of education. Secondly, it dealt with the nature of the educational system, school curriculum, assessment and teacher's education.

Thirdly, in chapter seven the study investigated the conditions and difficulties which need to be considered for a successful implementation of freedom in education in Egypt. Also, it offered some suggestions that might help to reduce the gap between the educational situation, its circumstances and the required conditions to satisfy the implementation of freedom in education.

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