Pakistani Muslim Communities in Britain and Germany: Informal Familial Care of Elders and Processes of Social Exclusion

Sheher Banu Murtuja

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of
PhD

The University of Leeds,
School of Sociology and Social Policy.

March 2005

Acknowledgements

Abstract

This thesis explores processes of social exclusion within Pakistani Muslim communities in Britain and Germany through the symbolic act of caring for one's elders. In particular social exclusion is explored through individual perceptions of what it means to be included or excluded with reference to their experiences and expectations of informal familial care Pakistani Muslim identities in diaspora are maintained, in part, through the continual exercise of Islamic and Pakistani cultural symbols. These symbols also serve to construct and sustain community boundaries, distinguishing 'us' (Pakistani Muslims) from 'them' (non-Muslim White British and Germans). Hierarchical structures based on gerontocratic principles, aligned with the importance of family, and ethics of *izzath*, result in widespread beliefs amongst Pakistani Muslim communities that 'we' look after our elders and 'they' do not. As a result familial care of elders has come to be seen as an integral symbol of 'Pakistani Muslim' identity in diaspora Such symbolic value results in the care relationship between elders and their kin being subject to Islamic and Pakistani cultural understandings of 'good' and 'bad'. Whilst these moral assertions have the potential to exclude, individual experiences, understandings and perceptions of them differ. Through an exploration of these experiences this study seeks to provide a grounded understanding of social exclusion.

Based on qualitative empirical data, consisting of 43 interviews, 26 of which were conducted in Germany, and 17 in Britain, the research advocates a re-configuration of the emphasis placed upon structurally constructed thresholds of social exclusion Through grounded accounts of the care relationship the thesis puts forward an alternative typology of care, which takes into account the ethics of *izzath*, *khidmath*, reciprocity and the corresponding structural frameworks of Islam and Pakistani culture. The research demonstrates that the diasporic Pakistani Muslim community's attempts at continuation and unity have the potential to exclude where conditions and values of such perpetuation are not met. However, such thresholds of exclusion are fluid, subject to individual resource and identity negotiations that call into question exclusion based upon 'indisputable' moral authorities.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract
Acknowledgements

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER TWO
THE CONSTRUCTION AND MORAL REGULATION OF PAKISTANI
MUSLIM COMMUNITIES

CHAPTER THREE
SOCIAL EXCLUSION, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND THE CARE
RELATIONSHIP

CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCHING PAKISTANI MUSLIM COMMUNITIES· A METHODOLOGICAL
ACCOUNT

CHAPTER FIVE
PAKISTANI COMMUNITIES IN BRITAIN AND GERMANY. THE
HISTORICAL COMPARATIVE CONTEXT

CHAPTER SIX
COMMUNITY: NAVIGATING THE BOUNDARIES OF 'US' AND
'THEM'

Chapter 1

An Introduction

1.1 *Contextual Framework and Research Questions*

This thesis explores processes of social exclusion within Pakistani Muslim communities in Britain and Germany through the lens of informal familial care of elders. In particular it considers the interface between individual experiences and expectations of familial care and structural influences of community norms and values. Through this exploration it provides a nuanced understanding of the symbolic perpetuation of diasporic communities and offers insights into grounded theorisations of social exclusion

Wray has observed that the "connection between ethnicity and ageing is central to understanding what it means to grow old in Western society" (2003: 512) This notwithstanding, "explorations of the ways in which ethnicity and migration influence the experience of ageing are still comparatively rare in British gerontological literature" (Moriarty *et al*, 2001) This gap is particularly evident given that, "there has been little research that has looked closely and qualitatively at minority ethnic older people's own views in the broader context of their lives and beliefs" (Bowes and Dar, 2000: 307). Within the context of diasporic communities, engaging with individual perspectives on growing older also has implications for wider policy debates of social exclusion. As Vobruba observes "[t]he terms inclusion/exclusion are the key to investigations of multidimensional dynamic processes of integration and dis-integration within society, focusing on actors' potentials in these processes" (2000. 604)

With these considerations in mind this thesis explores the perception of Pakistani Muslim elders in Britain and Germany with regard to their inclusion or exclusion into the Pakistani Muslim community in light of shifting informal familial care relationships. In so doing this thesis engages with and develops theories of social exclusion from an individual perspective, focusing specifically upon Pakistani Muslim familial care relationships between elders and their kin. The intellectual aims of this enquiry are three-fold Firstly through a grounded understanding of Pakistani Muslims' experiences and expectations this work offers a typology of care that will inform conceptualisations of the ethics underpinning the care relationship (Williams, 2001, 2000) Secondly, it aims to further understandings of the way in which diasporic communities seek to perpetuate their identities and boundaries

Thirdly, it engages with theorisations of social exclusion from a micro-level perspective. These aims are encapsulated in four research questions;

1. How, and why, is the care relationship between Pakistani Muslim elders and their offspring, and/or kin, relevant to their (elder and offspring/kin) inclusion into the Pakistani Muslim community?

2. What influence does the Pakistani Muslim community have on care relationships between Pakistani Muslim elders and their kin, and why?

3. Is there a relationship between the influence of the community on the care relationship and processes of social exclusion, and if so what?

4. How and why do individuals differentially experience processes of social exclusion?

Whilst this thesis makes reference to 'Pakistani Muslim' communities in Britain and Germany, it does not seek to imply homogeneity where there is none. Islam is understood, interpreted and practised in many different ways, and as Lewis observes "is less homogenous and less static than outsiders commonly suppose" (1994 59) In focusing upon 'Pakistani Muslims', and exploring Islamic influences upon community and familial care relationships, Islam is utilised as a conceptual tool to engage with the ways individuals negotiate daily social relations. This thesis does not purport to suggest, or impose unity of belief, understanding or practice of Islam Nor is the label 'Pakistani' used without the recognition that diversity permeates through shared ethno-cultural heritage. Further, examples from the empirical data are used as a means to illustrate, rather than represent, negotiations that occur within diasporic Pakistani Muslim communities and between elders and their kin

1.2 Thesis Outline

The thesis is divided into 9 chapters, of which the first is this Introduction Chapter 2 focuses upon the debates relating to the theoretical concepts of community and identity. Erected on the premise of difference, the sociological unit of community necessarily demarcates between 'them' and 'us'. From the outset the domain of community is one of exclusivity. As such, 'community' forms an essential conceptual apparatus for the exploration of social exclusion Chapter 2 seeks to accord the term 'community' conceptual clarity, focusing specifically on the issue of community boundaries and the ways and means by which those boundaries are perceived and sustained by their members With specific reference to the Pakistani Muslim focus, the chapter provides a brief overview of the global Muslim

community (the *Umm'ah*) and discusses the degree to which distinctions between
Pakistani culture and Islam inform a web of communities as boundaries are
constructed within boundaries (Stone, 2002, Donnan and Stokes, 2002; Werbner,
2002; Shaw, 2000, 1994, 1988; Ahmad and Husband, 1993) The dynamics between
individuals, communities and the 'webs' in which they are embedded are explored
through debates relating to the construction and re-construction of community
identities and symbols (D'Alisera, 2002, Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins, 2002,
Mohammed, 1999, Taylor, 1998, Hall, 1996, 1993).

The experience of community boundaries as symbolic is discussed in relation to
Cohen (1985), and paralleled with Durkheimian (2002, 1984, 1964) distinctions of
'sacred' and 'profane'. It is suggested that the integrity of 'us' is threatened in
instances where the boundaries of 'sacred' and 'profane' are traversed. This chapter
goes on to engage with Etzioni's (1998, 1997, 1995) notions of communitarianism
and suggests that community moral voices provide a potential mechanism by which
to defend the integrity of a community's boundaries through the regulation of
individual behaviour The chapter concludes by illustrating the potential for such
regulation of individual agency to contribute to processes of social exclusion, in spite
of the attempts at continuity, unity and coherence (Faqir, 2001, Afshar, 1994).

Chapter 3 explores the academic, theoretical and policy debates relating to the
concepts and processes of social exclusion, social capital and care. For the most part,
theories of social exclusion are concerned with socially constructed thresholds of
what it means to be included in society and societal structures (Byrne, 1999; Murray,
1995, 1988; Gailbraith, 1992) It is suggested that a more holistic conceptualisation
requires grounded understandings of individual experiences, perceptions and
circumstances. The chapter goes on to explore notions of social capital as they are
utilised in the construction and reconstruction of welfare state policies in Britain and
Germany. Premised on Putnam's (1993) notion of social capital, New Labour's use
of the term legitimises a re-calibration of state welfare in favour of individual
responsibility (Golbourne and Solomos, 2003, Heron and Dwyer, 1999). In contrast,
welfare state policies in Germany, premised upon notions of family, actively
encourage the accumulation of social capital through positive financial incentives
(Vogt and Zwingel, 2003; Seeleib-Kaiser, 2002, Annesley, 2002, Bourdieu, 1997,
1977)

Discussions of individual responsibility lead the chapter to engage with concepts of care, as understood in the context of informal relationships. Much of the academic debate relating to the concept of care advocate its re-conceptualisation (Dean, 2002; Hague *et al*, 2001; Williams, 2001, 2000, Rake, 2000; Sevenhuijsen, 2000; Daly and Lewis, 2000, Shakespeare, 2000, Tronto, 1993) Many of these re-conceptualisations seek to change the authoritative structural prescriptions to which the care relationship is subject Within particular contexts, such as diasporic Pakistani Muslim communities, an individual's conformity to these prescriptions can become the yardstick to measure the degree to which he or she is worthy or able to be included Chapters 2 and 3 set out the theoretical positions that underpin the exploration of social exclusion conducted in this thesis. This is placed within the context of Pakistani Muslim communities in Britain and Germany, looking particularly through the lens of familial care.

The aim of Chapter 4 is to chart the progress of this study from a simple research design to a fully-fledged piece of doctoral inquiry. In so doing, this chapter outlines the ontological and epistemological stance from which this doctoral research is conducted (Christians, 2000, Denzin, 1997, Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The chapter sets out the research questions explored, the reasoning behind them and provides a detailed breakdown of the methodology This chapter also provides a discussion on the research process, detailing the key methodological and ethical issues, challenges and solutions faced during the 'practical' aspects of research (Henry, 2003; Mason, 2002, 1996; Boeije, 2002).

In putting forward the historical comparative context of Pakistani migration and settlement to Britain and Germany, Chapter 5 begins to engage with the empirical data. The construction of community boundaries, and the experiences and expectations of familial care amongst first and second generation Pakistani Muslims in Britain and Germany are conditioned by processes of migration, citizenship and formal welfare provisions. This chapter provides a secondary contextual analysis of the Pakistani presence in Britain and Germany, and, with reference to the empirical data, locates respondent, or respondent family, migration trajectories within these contexts (Meijering and van Hoven, 2003; Green, 2002; 2001a, 2001b, Andersen, 2001; Hansen, 2000a, 2000b, Hansen and King, 2000; Dummet and Dummet, 1982) This chapter goes on to discuss routes to formal inclusion through citizenship (HO, 2002; Berger *et al*, 2002, Liedtke, 2002, Klopp, 2002; Cağler, 2001; Geddes, 2001; Anwar, 2001, 1998a, OBV, 1999, Brubaker, 1989). Further, it provides a brief

overview of the position of migrant/foreign nationals vis-à-vis formal provisions of social security and welfare in old age (Buchel and Frick, 2003, Bernard and Pettigrew, 2003, Neagle and Walker, 2002; Bowes and Wilkinson, 2001; Nesbitt and Neary, 2001, Windebank, 2001, Alber, 2001, Schulz, 2000, Guarngha and Markose, 2000, Araki, 2000, Walker, 1996, Samje, 1995)

Chapters 6, 7 and 8, provide in-depth engagement with the empirical data Chapter 6 begins the empirical analysis by exploring respondent perceptions of community Cohen (1985) suggests that an individual's most meaningful engagement with the community is located at his or her interaction with its symbolic boundaries. The significance o f such interaction i s s upported b y the empirical data a s respondents articulate their experience of communities using simple dichotomies of 'us' and 'them', differentiations that are constructed with reference to symbolic norms and values Further, Cohen (1985) suggests that perpetuation of symbolic boundaries occurs through the exercise of norms and values, which re-invest such symbols of community identities with shared values, and re-locate their importance with reference to the traditions, rituals and myths of the past The empirical data reveals that respondents consciously exercise Pakistani cultural, and to a greater degree, Islamic, rituals as a means of perpetuating what they perceive to be symbols of 'our' identity. Exercise of these symbols reconstruct and renegotiate individual and community identities as informed by, and constructed within, the diaspora. Through an exploration of respondent interaction with these symbolic boundaries, this chapter speaks to the norms and values that underpin much of the social interactions between members of Pakistani Muslim communities in Britain and Germany It is in the context of such norms and values, and the boundaries they give rise to, that individuals negotiate their daily interactions within care relationships

Chapter 7 provides an empirically grounded account of the concept and relationship of care. It analyses respondent experiences and expectations of care as Pakistani Muslims living in the non-Muslim countries of Britain and Germany Care is defined by respondents with reference to the concepts of *izzat, khidmat* and reciprocity *Izzat* forms the ethical framework against which the ideal Pakistani Muslim care relationship is constructed, and shares many of the principles put forward by Williams (2001, 2000). Respondents contextualise the degree to which *izzat* and *khidmat* influence, and are practised, within the care relationships of elders and their kin within frameworks of Islam, Pakistani culture and the principle of reciprocity. Through this analysis, this chapter provides an understanding of how the Pakistani

cultural and Islamic norms and values of the Pakistani Muslim community influence the construction, negotiation and exercise of care relationships between elders and their kin in Britain and Germany In so doing this chapter speaks to the potential for social exclusion, where community expectations, with regard to such care relationships, are not met.

Chapter 8 synthesises the conclusions of the previous 2 chapters, and considers these in the context of the different moral pulls to which an individual is subject. As symbolic of differentiations between 'us' and 'them', the care relationship, particularly that between elders and their kin, can signify individual participation in, and adherence to, the norms and values of 'our' community Negotiated within the frameworks of Islam and Pakistani culture, the care relationship and its participants, are attributed moral positions of 'good'. As social bonds subject to normative assertions of how individuals should and should not behave, care relationships can form the site of exclusionary processes

Analysis of the empirical data within Chapter 8 reveals that individual agency is influenced by moral voices of the self and the community (Etzioni, 1998, 1997, 1995). Moral voices of the self are often grounded in an individual's social roles, which are utilised as a resource to negotiate with alternative moral pulls. Moral voices of the community, on the other hand, are grounded in the cultural and Islamic norms of the community. As an attempted means of regulating individual participation within the care relationship, moral voices of the community can form mechanisms of inclusion to, and exclusion from, Pakistani Muslim communities in Britain and Germany. The degree to which such voices are granted authority over individual agency and inclusion are subject to negotiation as respondents use alternative roles, resources and Islamic interpretations to contest and deny their legitimacy. Through such negotiations moral precepts of 'good' are called into question, and in so doing, so too are socially constructed thresholds of inclusion and exclusion.

The final chapter (9) concludes the thesis with a concise summary of findings With reference to the four research questions the study set out to explore this chapter puts forward empirically grounded contributions to the debates of community, care and social exclusion. It re-visits respondent experiences and perceptions of the construction and perpetuation of diasporic Pakistani Muslim communities as explored in Chapter 6. These experiences and expectations are portrayed with

reference to the conceptual tools offered by Cohen (1985) and Etzioni (1998, 1997, 1995). The chapter also re-iterates the typology of care developed in Chapter 7, with specific reference to the contextual debates relating to the ethics of care (Williams, 2001, 2000) and understandings of dependency (Shakespeare, 2000, Tronto, 1993). Finally, this chapter turns to the insights offered by this thesis on processes and conceptualisations of social exclusion In particular, attention is given to negotiations whereby individuals utilise alternative resources and moral perspectives to challenge, contest and navigate through exclusionary mechanisms to which they are subject

The Construction and Moral Regulation of Pakistani Muslim Communities

2.1 *Introduction*

This chapter explores theoretical understandings of the way individuals experience and conceptualise their communities It also engages with the influence of, and relationship between, the moral authority of religion and community boundaries within faith based communities The chapter begins (Section 2 2) with a historical overview of how the global Muslim community, the *Umm'ah* developed Construction of the *Umm'ah's* boundaries are based upon the principle of shared moral values (Esposito, 1992) Since its inception, the *Umm'ah* has been divided on grounds of tribalism, and in more recent times, ethnicity, socio-geographical origins, and religious sectarianism (Khan, 2000; Tayob, 1999, Lewis, 1994). Given these divisions within the *Umm'ah,* the next section (2.3) explores the distinction between Islam and Pakistani culture. Academically Islam and 'Muslim culture' are often understood to be synonymous (Stone, 2002, Donnan and Stokes, 2002). In Section 2 3 it is suggested that a distinction between the two needs to be maintained if one is to explore how Islam and different ethno-geographical cultures influence the construction of community boundaries Distinctions made between Islam and the Pakistani culture demonstrate the construction of boundaries within boundaries (Werbner, 2002, Shaw, 2000, 1994, 1988, Ahmad and Husband, 1993) These distinctions are related to varying degrees and understandings of religious and ethnic affiliation, and thus inform conceptualisations of the 'Pakistani Muslim' community

Cohen's theory of Symbolic Communities (1985) is utilised in Section 2 4 as a means to gain further insights into the ways in which individuals interact with and maintain symbols of 'our' community boundaries and construct and re-construct distinctions between 'them' and 'us'. It is suggested that communities have an inherently symbolic element Moreover, it is essential to engage with this symbolism if one is concerned with the way individuals experience the communities in which they live and to which they affiliate Illustrating this through the use of Islam and Pakistani culture, Sections 2.5 and 2.6 demonstrate how the norms and values of Muslim and/or Pakistani communities in diaspora come to symbolise their boundaries. It is adherence to these norms and values which continue to demarcate the boundaries between 'them' and 'us', whilst simultaneously informing the identities of individual members (Hall, 1996, 1993) Through such mechanisms,

cultural and Islamic norms and practices become symbols of the diasporic 'Pakistani Muslim' community (D'Alisera, 2002, Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins, 2002, Mohammed, 1999).

Where community boundaries are perceived to be threatened exercise of the norms and values that symbolise differentiation of 'us' and 'them' come to act as a defence of these boundaries. The use of these symbols as a means of defence is explored in Section 2.7 The identities of individual and community are perceived to be under threat where they become subject to, and are affected by, different or 'alternative', values, especially values that are associated with 'them'. In particular, Section 2 7 explores changing understandings and experiences of community boundaries as they are perceived to be threatened. In such instances the negotiable and fluid character of identities, and thus boundaries between 'them' and 'us', are superseded by more static and rigid definitions of how 'we' are defined (Weekes, 2003) Finally, this section explores the concept of symbolic competition as the primary mechanism for defence In such competition symbols that are thought to represent 'us', and 'our' identities, are re-asserted, and thus re-configured, as a means to maintain and defend distinctions between 'them' and 'us'.

There is the potential for a community, in the defence of its boundaries, to exclude its own members Section 2 8 suggests the moral voice, as articulated in Etzioni's theory of communitarianism (1998, 1997, 1995), is one such potential mechanism of exclusion. The moral voice, which regulates individual agency in accordance to shared moral values, is enforced through 'moral suasion'. Whilst Etzioni provides a framework with which to conceptualise the moral voice, his understanding of the shared moral values this voice represents are unrealistic, unachievable and imbued in nostalgia (Prideaux, 2002). The section goes onto explore Etzioni's structuralist reading of Durkheim (2002, 1984, 1964) This reading facilitates much of the top down approach taken by Etzioni that sees individual agency as something to be shaped and informed by the morally conscious community Etzioni's advocacy of the communitarian community has the potential to lead to authoritarian structures, and can allow justification for the discrimination against, and victimisation of, minority and 'alternative' life styles (Yar, 2003; Prideaux, 2002).

Notwithstanding the weaknesses in his thesis Etzioni's conception of the moral voice raises important questions as to the construct and regulation of existing communities Do communities' possess moral voices which regulate the action and behaviour of

their members? And if so, how are they exercised? From where do such voices gain their legitimacy, if indeed they do? Moreover, is the exercise of such theoretically authoritarian structures acceptable to the members of such communities? And if not, what price is there to pay for disobedience? The penultimate section (2 9) contextualises these questions in the Pakistani Muslim diaspora as a case in point In a synthesis of Etzioni and Cohen's theories this section suggests that the moral voice of the Pakistani Muslim communities in diaspora ensure their symbols are perpetuated by posing a threat to individual and/or familial *izzat*[1]. In so doing the moral voice is able to maintain the identity of the community and thereby the integrity of its boundaries Further, it is the perpetuation of community boundaries that gives the moral voice its legitimacy. Thus, the moral voice becomes a means by which to maintain the Pakistani Muslim identity of the community at large, and that of individual members in particular The use of *izzat* to ensure conformity can result in the reduction of an individual or family's status within the community In such cases, exclusion becomes a real possibility Section 2.10 concludes the chapter by recognising that individuals can become excluded from within the community, even as the boundaries of that community, and therefore the unity of 'us', is trying to be continued and maintained. In so doing, this section sets the scene for the subsequent chapter (3), which explores in greater depth the conceptual processes of social exclusion with specific reference to social capital and care.

2.2 *The Muslim Community: A Historical Overview*

'Muslim communities' are conceptualised in global, national and local terms At a global level the Muslim community, known as the *Umm'ah*, is defined on the basis of shared religious beliefs, affiliation to which is thought to supersede tribal and national attachments (Esposito, 1992. 29). As a conceptual framework, the *Umm'ah* is difficult to define and is referred to in the Holy *Qur'an* in a number of contexts. Tayob (1999) cites the *Qur'anic* references to the *Umm'ah* as the whole of humankind (2 213, *translated by*, Yusuf Ali, 1987), a single human individual (2 218, *translated by*, Yusuf Ali, 1987), and a moral code (43.22, *translated by*,

---

[1] A multi-level, multi-dimensional term, *izzat* has three interconnected and overlapping levels (1) the *izzat* of the individual, (2) the *izzat* of the family, and, (3) the *izzat* of the community. It is understood as how *izzat* is perceived by oneself, how it is perceived by others and as the etiquette with which to conduct social relationships. This perception is influenced and informed by a host of issues such as honour, respect, moral fibre, esteem, reciprocity, identity, shame, reputation and pride *Izzat* is 'earned' and 'lost', depending upon context, values and behaviour A grounded definition of *izzat* is developed in Chapters 6 and 7

Yusuf Ali, 1987) to mean that the *Umm'ah* is a moral code itself, applicable to an individual, a group or to the whole of humanity. References to the *Umm'ah* within the Holy *Qur'an* extend beyond the remit of a moral code, although such mentions retain the principle of shared moral values. The term *Umm'ah* has been used in the past tense to describe groups of believers that did not follow the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH[2]), "to each community, a messenger [was sent]" (10.47, *translated by*, Khalifa, 2000) In other chapters the term *Umm'ah* refers specifically to the Muslim community, believers in the holy *Qur'an* and the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) and honoured amongst all *Umm'ah* "Ye are the best community that hath been raised up for mankind" (3.110, *translated by*, Yusuf Ali, 1987).

Shared moral values[3] have formed the basis of the *Umm'ah* since its creation in 622 AC (Esposito, 1992) The principle of shared moral values was exercised through the inclusion of Jews and Christians in the *Umm'ah* (whose faiths are grounded in the Torah and the Bible) by the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) (Rahman, 1988). Considered "'owners of the writings'" Jews and Christians were "distinguished .. clearly from unbelievers or pagans" (Hallar, 2003: 237) In Islam the Torah and the Bible are considered to be books of Allah (SWT[4]), and believed to be predecessors to the final and most important religious text, the Holy *Qur'an* (Forward, 1997). Over the centuries the use of the term *Umm'ah* has become limited to those of the Islamic faith (Bin Hamzah and Harrison, 2002)

Translations of the Holy *Qur'an* have differed with regards to the unity of the *Umm'ah* Yusuf Ali (1987) and Khalifa (2000) have interpreted Verse 52 (Chapter 23) reference to the *Umm'ah* to read "[v]erily this brotherhood of yours is a single brotherhood" or "[s]uch is your congregation – one congregation" respectively In contrast others such as Pickthal (1999) and Shakir's (1999) interpretations have read this to mean 'one religion'. At times the *Umm'ah* has been considered to refer to unity of affiliation and at others unity of faith. In practice the Muslim *Umm'ah* is not homogenous although it is often attributed a collective identity (Khan, 2000, Husain and O'Brien, 2000, Lewis, 1994) Whilst it's contemporary form retains aspects of the 'shared moral value' principle, the *Umm'ah* is internally divided along such lines as sectarianism, ethnicity, nationality, and spatial location. The specifics of these divisions are formally set out within the Islamic faith in two ways. The

---

[2] Peace Be Upon Him
[3] See Section 2 6.
[4] Subhana'wo'tallah

importance of rights and obligations, conferred by Islam, vary in accordance to hierarchical structures. This hierarchy is indicative of demarcations within the *Umm'ah*. In addition, divisions are formally recognised within the *Umm'ah* on the basis of the ethnic, racial and linguistic diversity of its members

The Islamic system of rights and obligations is divided into three categories, the rights of Allah (SWT) – *Haqq'Allah*, the rights of the individual – *Haqq al'abad*, and, the collective rights of individuals or communities – *Haqq al-saltanah* (Nyazee, 1994) The hierarchy of these rights and obligations is determined according to principles relating to kinship and geographical proximity. Rights and obligations of kin, categorised under *Haqq al'abad*, are secondary to those owed to Allah (SWT) - *Haqq'Allah*. Among the obligations owed to kin, those to the mother are the most important, followed by those to the father, and then to close family members[5]. These precede the rights and obligations owed to one's neighbours, spreading as far as 40 houses in all directions The rights and obligations to the global *Umm'ah* follow[6]. Religious affiliation is not considered to play a role in ones receipt of rights, as the same rights are accorded to non-believing kin and neighbours as to believing ones[7] (Zokaei and Phillips, 2000). This hierarchical categorisation of rights and obligations is indicative of formal divisions within the Muslim *Umm'ah*, based upon individual relationships.

The second set of formal divisions within the construct of the *Umm'ah* arise from, initially the tribal, and in more recent times, the national and ethnic identities[8] of the

---

[5] There is much academic, and indeed more widespread debate that centres on how the 'family' is defined. Classic conceptualisations of hetro-sexual couples with children as 'nuclear' families, and 'extended' families made up of biologically related kin (Morris, 1968, Firth *et al* 1970, Farmer, 1970; Fletcher, 1973, Nye and Berardo, 1973; Wilson, 1975, Spier, 1976; Leonard, 1980; Wilmott and Young, 1980, Oakley, 1982, Harris, 1983, Fletcher, 1988; Leonard and Hood-Williams, 1988; Crow and Allan, 1994; Jones *et al* 1995; Haskey, 1998) are giving way to more subjectively defined units (Gelles, 1995, Muncie and Langen, 1997, Giddens, 1998; David, 1998, Kiernan, 1998, Hantris, 1999, Silva and Smart, 1999)

[6] These obligations are formally regulated in one way through the duty of *zikaath* *Zikaath* is an obligatory tax owed on all liquid assets and is payable firstly to poor relations, and failing that, to those members of the Muslim *Umm'ah* who are financially destitute. Moreover, the receipt of *zikaath* is seen as a right held by all Muslims who are unable to financially provide for themselves (Al-Krenawi and Graham, 2000; Azmi, 1991). Notwithstanding the right to *zikaath*, its receipt is considered by some, to be a source of shame (see Chapters 5 and 7), grounded in much the same reasoning as notions of 'welfare dependency' (Mann, 1992)

[7] If the rights of a non-believer and those of a believer conflict those to a Muslim are given precedence (Nyazee, 2000).

[8] The concept of identities is discussed further in Section 2 5

Momineen (the Islamic people). Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) governed the *Umm'ah* with sensitivity to the existence of tribal identities, and the loyalties these provoked. These identities were not "simply transcended, but prioritised by political arrangement (leadership) and ethical values" (Tayob, 1999 108). Although life was governed b y the overarching moral b eliefs o f Islam, it was "conditioned by local contexts" (Esposito, 1992: 62)[9] Such governance recognised that individual identities were not restricted to religious beliefs. Notions of 'national' communities, based on common language, territory, ethnicity and history, became embedded within the *Umm'ah* in reaction to Western Imperialism, and took the form of anti-colonial independence movements (Lapidus, 2001; Esposito, 1992). The *Umm'ah* is also divided on the grounds of sectional affiliation, divisions that have been significantly documented (Lewis, 1994). In the specific case of Pakistani Muslims, Shaw (2000, 1994, 1988) observes that the caste system and regional politics can also form the basis for demarcations within the *Umm'ah* Reconciliation of these divisions to Islamic prescriptions and the alternative means by which to practice Islam, to which they give rise, are indicative of distinction between Islam and the 'culture' in which it is practised

2.3 *The Distinction Between Islam and Culture*

Constituted as a political unit from the outset, the *Umm'ah* accompanied an integrated vision of religion and society[10] (Ba-Yunas, 2002). The *Umm'ah* was governed in accordance to the first constitution, the *kitab*, which made no distinction between religion and state (Rahman, 1988) "Religion was integral to the leadership, life, fabric of society, providing norms for worship (duties to God) and social life (duties to society)" (Esposito, 1992 29) The Islamic faith, was, and still is, considered 'a way of life' (Khan, 2000) The all encompassing character of Islam means it is often conflated with the ethno-geographical cultures[11] of the Muslim countries in which it is practised (Donnan and Stokes, 2002). Such a conflation provides an inaccurate representation of the degree to which the two influence

---

[9] This is analogous to the 'web of communities' concept put forward by Etzioni, where he argues the practice of capitalist values are conditioned by spatially located lives (1995). Etzioni's thesis of communitarianism is discussed further in Section 2.6

[10] In his thesis on communitarianism, Etzioni too advocates a link between moral values and society – a link which, Etzioni believes, ought to curb individual rights in the face of the "clear and present danger" that arises where such link is not in place (1995 178-179).

[11] What constitutes culture is itself a highly debated and contentious issue For an excellent introduction to this debate see Baumann (2000)

individual identities and the relationships they share with the boundaries of a community

In his exploration of the way Islam is exercised and conceptualised in different countries, S tone (2002) a rgues I slam i s a c ulture a s w ell a s b eing a religion. H e justifies this argument by referencing the trends within different Islamic societies to defer to a central authority, be that a *caliph* (representative) or a community This authority is vested with the power to regulate and enforce the laws[12] of Islam In doing so the *caliph* or community is responsible for interpreting the ways in which these laws ought to be exercised Such an exercise in interpretation grounds the practise of faith within the group's cultural heritage Stone argues the subjection of Islam to interpretations based upon the socio-historical and geographical origins of the group within which it is practised results in Islam being a culture as well as a religion. This understanding is problematic as the interpretation of Islam through culture does not necessarily equate to Islam being a culture itself. Stone conflates the origins and justifications of a law with its execution and implementation However, different cultural norms and values result in different interpretations of Islam, not a different Islam *per se.* Stone's observation of the way in which Islam is practised suggests that it is informed by culture, but does not lead to the conclusion that it is defined by culture. When studying Pakistani Muslim communities it is important to;

> "confront a paradoxical diversity· Islam transcends ethnicity but is always mediated through it. Islam is universal, while ethnicity is usually linked to territorial identities" (Ahmad and Husband, 1993· 210).

The transposition of Islam and culture extends to daily engagements with Islam. This is particularly evident in discussions relating to the *hijab* (the Islamic veil) the practice ef which conforms to the Islamic prescription of *purdah.* *Purdah* refers to the means by which to, and is itself not, interacting with members of the opposite sex who are not directly linked by husband-wife, brother-sister or parent-child relationships (El Guindi, 1999) Although decreed to apply to both genders, *purdah*

---

[12] Stone utilises the terminology of 'laws' to refer to Islamic prescriptions. It ought to be mentioned that there is ongoing academic debate relating to such terminology, which advocates the use of 'guidelines' in favour of 'rules' or 'laws' when referring to structure in order to allow for individual agency (Finch, 1989) Stones conceptualisation of laws i s akin to what Durkheim (2002) r efers to as 'religious rites'. Chapter 8 suggests that respondents perceive Islamic prescriptions as normative guidelines, according to which they are able to negotiate care relationships. See also Chapters 3 and 7 on the negotiation of the care relationship.

is often enforced more stringently on women (Shaw, 2000) The recent 2004 British case of Shabina Begum is illustrative of interchangeable understandings of Islamic and cultural nuances of *purdah* Shabina Begum and her family went to court over claims of 'constructive exclusion' from her school which did not allow her to wear the *jilbab* a s p art o f h er s chool u niform O ne o f t he m ain s trands o f the s chool's defence (and the judgement of the court, which found in favour of the school) was that respect for Islamic dress had been incorporated into the school uniform through the *shalwar kameez* and head scarf (Jones, 2004) This understanding of Islamic *purdah* is insufficiently theorised, as the *shalwar kameez* is a Pakistani, not Islamic, form of dress

Shaw's (2000, 1994, 1988) study of Pakistani Muslims in Oxford found that the local Pakistani (*Punjabi*[13]) Muslim community sought to establish the *shalwar kameez* as a part of the school uniform Wearing the *shalwar kameez* is a means by which children are able to adhere to the Islamic prescription of *purdah* whilst maintaining their Pakistani identity[14]. The *jilbab* on the other hand is an Arabic form of dress. Neither ethno-cultural origins of clothing are overtly applicable to Shabina Begum, who is of Bangladeshi heritage. Whilst it is not necessary to debate the subtleties of Shabina Begum's identity affiliations her case provides a timely example of the way in which Islam and culture can be conflated in everyday language and understandings

Developing an understanding of the sociology of Islam, Ahmed (1988) suggests, requires the "juxtaposition of the 'Islamic ideal' with contemporary Muslim realities" (*cited in* Ba-Yunas, 2002· 108), not a synthesis of the two[15]. Maintaining this distinction, whilst recognising the interdependence of the two, makes it possible to explore the ways in which Islam and the ethno-geographical culture of a particular group inform the boundaries of a community in different ways Taking Shaw's study as an example, the 'Muslim' community can be said to constitute those who practice the act of *purdah* because of their adherence to the prescriptions of the Holy *Qur'an*

---

[13] Refers to the regional origins of the group
[14] The relationship between *purdah* and *shalwar kameez* was formally established in 1989 when, during the course of the Islamization of Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq declared it as national dress (Faruki, 1987).
[15] The different ways in which Islam and culture affect individual life, and the distinctions respondents make between the two, are illustrated in Chapter 6.

and the *Hadith*[16]. The practice of *purdah* through *shalwar kameez* may be seen to be indicative of a 'Pakistani' Muslim characteristic. Thus, the *shalwar kameez* becomes a means by which a symbol of Pakistani identity expresses an Islamic one In this way symbolic representations provide a valuable tool through which affiliations with communities, and in turn community boundaries, can be conceptualised

2.4 *Symbolic Boundaries*

Community is a largely ambiguous term Although its usage is common in everyday language its sociological definition remains a contentious issue. As a characterisation of some social groups to which individuals affiliate, the term community has been suggested by Anderson (1983) to refer to imagined networks. Anderson suggests that communities based on shared affiliation to a nation are imagined, in so for as "members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the mind of each lives the image of their communion" (1991· 6) Anderson attributes the rise of national communities to the decline of religious communities and dynastic rules. His conceptualisation of such national affiliations is based on a somewhat idealistic understanding of community, which he perceives to be characterised by a "deep, horizontal comradeship" (1991 7) In addition to this optimistic understanding of community, Anderson's work lacks a full articulation of the ways in which communities intersect, inter-link and overlap with one another.

In order to develop a more nuanced understanding of the interdependencies of community, and the relationships between individual members, it is prudent to understand the way in which the daily interactions between and within communities are experienced. Anthony Cohen (1985) has suggested that the most significant aspect of an individual's experiences of community are found at its boundaries. Of all the dimensions of a community, its boundaries are perhaps the most explicit in their exclusion of 'others'. As such, the boundary of a community is particularly relevant for the focus of this research

Similarly to Anderson (1991, 1983), Cohen suggests that communities, and in turn their boundaries, are largely imagined.

---

[16] Guidelines by which to interpret Holy *Qur'an*, as demonstrated by the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) in his daily life.

"Community is largely in the mind. As a mental construct, it
condenses symbolically, and adeptly, its bearers' social theories of
similarity and difference It becomes an eloquent and collective
emblem of their social selves" (1985: 114).

Given t he s ignificance o f c ommunity b oundaries, i t i s p articularly i nteresting t hat
Cohen suggests the imagined character of communities encompasses individual
perceptions of similarity and difference. These perceptions of similarity and
difference are integral to individual identities, as Cohen argues, it is only in the face
of 'others' that 'us' can accurately be conceptualised

For Cohen community boundaries take on a symbolic character in so far as they are
expressed through symbols that have come to denote the difference between 'them'
and 'us'. In this context Cohen talks of three types of symbolism First is the explicit,
such as that between gender, between life and death, and between generations.
Second is that which is explicit, in "fantasy of myth and totem" and, third is that
which has no explicit form, but rather is implicit in the meanings attributed to
"instrumental or pragmatic things in ordinary use" (1985 14) Similar symbolism
has also been attributed to the Durkheimian concept of mechanical solidarity, which
is seen to be "less an historical figment than it is a concerned symbolic expression of
likeness – of commonality" (Boon, 1982 54-5)

According to Cohen, the symbols of a community are made up of the cultural and
religious r ituals, traditions, beliefs a nd values c ommon to the community These
symbols are vested with individual and community identities, and are "created and
continually recreated by people through their social interaction, rather than imposed
upon them as a Durkheimian body of social fact or as a Marxist superstructure"
(Cohen, 1985 17) In apparent contrast to Cohen's observations of Durkheim, Poggi
(2000) suggests that Durkheim also refers to symbolism and agency in the identity
construction and perception of groups

Poggi (2000) contends that in his work 'The Elementary Forms of Religious Life',
Durkheim states that a group is only able to conceive of its own consciousness
through symbolic representation This understanding would suggest that symbols
allow social sentiments tangible form, and it is through such symbolic representation
that this consciousness can be perpetuated (see also Jenks, 1996; Durkheim, 1995)
People are conceptualised as active agents who seize upon tangible characteristics, in
the form of symbols, to provide definition to the elusive 'community' In this way,

these tangible symbols come to represent a diversity of meaning and significance, whilst embodying individual identities as part of 'us'. It is the commonality of symbols, and the values they are underpinned by, which distinguish 'our' community from all others[17] Thus, Cohen intimates an ongoing reconstruction of community boundaries as the symbols through which they are represented are subject to changing interpretations and a diversity of meaning This also has implications for the way in which the 'culture' of a community is conceptualised As Handler observes, 'culture' is itself a process, reconstructed through individual interaction, rather than a fixed and immutable "essence" of community (1994. 29). Such fluidity is significant in the considerations of the way in which Pakistani culture influences, and is influenced by, individual behaviour[18].

For Cohen, and according to Poggi's reading of Durkheim, communities do not constitute the end of individuality, rather, they provide a forum in the context of, and within which, a person's individuality can be exercised Symbols "provide media through which individuals can experience and express their attachment to a society without compromising their individuality" (Cohen, 1985. 18). In the context of 'race', distinctions between collectives and individuals has been made using the terminology of difference and diversity. Difference is what constitutes the boundary between 'us' and 'them', the distinguishing factors, whereas diversity is the recognition that, within any particular boundary, there exist internal differentiations (Mason, 1995)

> "Just as the 'common form' of the symbol aggregates the various meanings assigned to it, so the symbolic repertoire of a community aggregates the individualities and other differences found within the community and provides the means for their expression, interpretation and containment" (Cohen, 1985 21).

In this manner, the boundaries of a community inform individual identities through a set of pre-given symbols, whilst at the same time are themselves informed by individual identities as these symbols are subject to varying interpretations[19] (Cohen, 1985, see also Phillips, 2002)

---

[17] Similarly, Calhoun (1994) has argued that imagined communities are based on perceived common identities rather than direct interpersonal bonds

[18] The fluidity of Islam and Pakistani culture as articulated by respondents is discussed further in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

[19] Giddens puts forward an analogous theory of structuration which contends that individuals are shaped by structure whilst at the same time shaping and reconstituting structure itself (1991a, 1984, 1979)

Relationships between the symbolic boundaries of a community and the identities of individual members can also lead to what Cohen terms 'symbolic competition'. Where the integrity of the community's boundaries are perceived to be under threat, individual members, and the community as a whole, exercise symbolic competition through the meaningful (re)construction of these boundaries (Cohen, 1985, see also Schwimmer, 1972) Symbolic competition is a mechanism whereby the symbols of a community are utilised to re-assert and re-constitute the identities of the community, and in turn, those of its members This is done through the exercise of symbols such as the practice of cultural norms or the performance of religious rituals that are thought to represent 'us' and are believed to embody the identities of the community The exercise of these symbols also re-invests them with social value whilst protecting individual identities with which community boundaries are vested.

> "Through such symbolic behaviour people draw the conventions of community about them, like a cloak around the shoulders, to protect them from the elements – *other* people's ways of doing things, other cultures, other communities. The conventions become boundary through their re-investment with symbolic value" (Cohen, 1985 63, *original emphasis*).

Cohen's conceptualisation of the relationship between individual agency and the construction of community boundaries is similar to Giddens (1985), who suggests individuals internalise structural constraints through their own agency and practice, whilst at the same time, re-constituting those constraints Cohen's thesis also demonstrates that symbolic boundaries are relational The more assertive the encroachment upon a boundary is, the greater the feelings of affiliation between members of the same community, and the sharper the distinction between 'them' and 'us' (Cohen 1985).

Many of the symbols used to re-assert the identities of a community are derived from the past, from memories of 'better times', "a symbolic recreation of the distinctive community through myth, ritual and a 'constructed' tradition" (Cohen, 1985: 37). In such instances the past is viewed as the ideal, in comparison to which change is deemed negative and damaging These symbols are termed 'condensation symbols', as the nostalgic considerations of traditions and myth they represent become concentrated emblems of 'us'. Through such an ascription condensation symbols are

re-invested with social values Any action, contrary to these symbols breaches community norms, and the values that underpin the community[20].

> "Thus, one often finds in such communities the prospect of change being regarded ominously as if change inevitably means loss. A frequent and glib description of what is feared may be lost is 'way of life', p art o f w hat i s m eant is t he s ense o f s elf" (Cohen 1 985 109).

Cohen identifies rituals as the most important form of condensation symbols[21]. The exercise of rituals during the course of symbolic competition denotes the use of historical practices for the renewal of community boundaries. "[W]e thus encounter the paradox that, although the re-assertion of community is made necessary by contemporary circumstances, it is often accomplished through precisely those idioms which these circumstances threaten with redundancy" (Cohen, 1985 99). The exercise of these symbols re-affirms the existence of the community, for both insiders and outsiders, through symbolic recreation, by renewing and/or re-constituting the commonality of ideology and belief between 'us' in the form of practice. Through perpetuating individual identities, and entailing community participation, the exercise of rituals also speak to an individual's relationship with the rest of his or her community (Turner, 1967, 1969)

> "[B]oth in its social and psychological consequences, ritual confirms and strengthens social identity and people's sense of social location it is an important means through which people experience community (Cohen 1985. 50).

Cohen does not sufficiently theorise the role of structure in the construction and re-construction of community boundaries. This omission stems from Cohen's attempt to re-focus the community debate on to meaning In his exploration of the significance of individuals in relation to community symbols, and the continuation of a community Cohen does not conceptualise community in its own rights, away from the actions of individual members

> "Whether or not its structural boundaries remain intact, the reality of community lies in its members perception of the vitality of its culture. People construct community symbolically, making it a

---

[20] Here, Cohen relies on the views of Turner (1967), who suggested that as norms and values became attached to individual emotions, these emotional attachments themselves become ennobled through their perceived connection to social values.

[21] Similarly, Durkheim has previously argued that social integration and social unity are two of the most noted outcomes of ritual (Marshall, 2002). Durkheim is discussed further in Section 2.5.

resource and repository of meaning, and a referent of their identity"
(Cohen, 1985 118).

In her study of ritualistic sacrifice, Jay poses the question, "if ritual action is so unresisting, so vulnerable, to diversity of interpretation, and if that diversity is a feature of the necessary situatedness of the interpreter, how can there be any basis at all for recognizing validity in interpretations?" (1992: 11) In order for the exercise and interpretations of symbols to be accorded any meaningful significance it is important to recognise that the community exists independently of any one member The cultural and religious rituals, traditions, beliefs and values common to the community, aside from being subject to individual interpretation and re-constitution, are structures in their own right Individual interpretation of these rituals is grounded within the context of these structures. The significance of individual interpretation stems from 'how' the ritual is expressed, as it is through such expression that those explaining the ritual are demonstrating the relatedness of their consciousness. Whilst the community exists independently of any one member, the symbols they share and the way in which individuals experience and express those symbols are what make them members of the same community, of 'us' rather than 'them'. Consequently such experience is utilised as a way of drawing the boundaries of 'our' community, whilst grounding them in the pre-existing structural frameworks of the community itself

Cohen's (1985) exploration of community boundaries, and the way these boundaries are defended when their integrity is threatened, is important. Cohen's thesis allows for the recognition that community boundaries are flexible, even as it alludes to the potential for a community to exclude in defence of those boundaries In this way Cohen's thesis leads to two important questions that relate to the focus of this study. Which symbols are used during the defence of community boundaries and why? And, in what way are symbols re-created in order to reaffirm a community's existence? These questions are discussed in the context of identities, specifically those of Pakistani Muslim communities in diaspora, in the next section.

2.5 The Symbolic Boundaries of Islam and Culture: Continuity and Change

The concept of identity has significant implications for the processes of social exclusion, as it informs both a sense of belonging and the construction of community boundaries (Cohen 1985, see also Tempelman, 1999, Van Dyke 1977). Identity is a multi-faceted, multi-dimensional concept As the "bridge" between debates of structure and agency (Hall 1996 276), its definition is a highly

contentious, and sociologically debatable 'problem'. Identity is not a one-dimensional 'asset', rather, every individual possesses a multiplicity of identities, which are in a continual state of flux, subject to individual perception, (re)-negotiation and social contexts. Different dimensions of identities are not isolated, rather these dimensions are integrally related to, and able to influence, one another Consequently, individual attachments to a community, or to several communities, are complex and multi-variate, unrestricted to any one dimension of individual identity (Phillips, 2002)

Breakwell (1987) argues the construction and re-construction of individual identities is subject to the paradigm of content and value, where content is that which informs identity (factors such as ethnicity) and value is the importance any one individual places upon such factors (see also, Knott and Khokher, 1993). Continuous changes and re-negotiations of the content/value paradigm suggest the construction and re-construction of identities is a process (Bauman, 1996), as the relationships between numerous contents and values are continually re-negotiated and changed. These negotiations are shaped and informed by an infinite number of factors of which the individual is not always consciously aware,

> "We are necessarily the products of countless influences. Some go back to our childhood and are largely unknown to us, and many others operate so surreptitiously and unconsciously that we can become aware of them only after a most rigorous self-analysis A part of our identity thus always remains a mystery to us, and we are constantly surprised by what we say and do It also contains large areas of ambiguity, contradiction and fluidity, and we can never fashion ourselves into entirely coherent and transparent wholes" (Parekh, 2000. 4-5).

In the above quote Parekh reminds the reader that an individual's identities may be contradictory. Multiple identities need not be antagonistic however, as in practice Werbner argues, they may never come into conflict (2002; see also Saifullah Khan, 1979). She contends that as active and conscious agents, individuals are able to negotiate their way through different social contexts without needing to engage with any incongruity[22]. However, the very fact that there is negotiation between different facets of an individual's identities is indicative of at least some degree of conflict, however small

---

[22] See also Ballard's (1994) conception of 'code-switching'.

The plurality of identity has been encapsulated in terms such as *hybridity* (Modood, *et al*, 1994), *composite* (Husain and O'Brien, 2000) and *fluid* (Parekh, 2000) The values attached by an individual to particular content within 'composite' identities vary according to his or her circumstances at any one time In many instances, individuals are able to smoothly negotiate which aspect of their identities comes to the fore by attaching a greater value of importance to a particular facet at the expense of another, potentially conflicting content in accordance to their social circumstance As Taylor (1998) argues, whilst the faces individuals present to the world at any one time are an accurate representation of their identity, they are not a true reflection of who they are in their entirety

The 'composite' character of identities also points to an individual's membership of various communities at any one time. This gives credence to the argument that communities do not exist independently of one another, rather, they overlap, and in many cases, exist within the boundaries of one another. Such a web of communities mirrors Hall's (1992, see also Dwyer, 1999, Etzioni, 1997) conceptualisation of 'new ethnicities' Hall does not believe community, nor identity, is statically defined, restricted to one particular ethnicity or another. Rather, he asserts that their definitions and boundaries are ongoing, active processes of identification Similarly Giddens suggests that such identity constructions occur as the 'self' is "reflexively understood by the person in terms of his or her biography" (1991a 53). Thus, the social context of individuals, the structures in which people find themselves, and the ways in which these inform their biographies, are just as important as the individual within identity negotiations[23].

Husain and O'Brien (2000) observe that identity construction is often negotiated within the binary of 'me' versus the 'other'.

> "In constructing identity, the individual is at the same time reflecting an imposed identity, so in the simplistic white/non-white dualism, an individual becomes what she is not (I am black therefore I am not white; I am white therefore I am not black)" (2000: 3).

Questions such as 'how much of individual identities are structured?' or 'how does an individual's experience impact on his or her identities, and to what degree?' have

---

[23] It has been argued by theorists such as Cooley (1902) and Mead (1967) that identities are primarily defined by what they are not, rather than what they are; by 'them' rather than 'I'

not been adequately explored in the considerations thus far To reduce identity construction and perception to a question of either/or is to inaccurately dichotomise the issue Taylor (1998, see also Brah, 1996) views identity as a sense of coherence, where the 'I' at the 'core' of each individual 'unifies the fragmentation of experience' caused by the comparative definition of 'self' through difference In many ways this appears a tautological argument, 'I' is realised through difference, whilst difference is an expression of 'I' within social relations. This said, Taylor (1998) provides a useful means by which to theorise the multiplicity of identities

According to Taylor's theory, the definition of one's identity, with reference to the 'other', is where difference is utilised as a prism, which, although accurate in its portrayal of an individual within a particular context of social relations, is not expressive of 'I' in its totality Further, the social relations to which an individual affiliates, are, through their own structural constraints, determinate of which categories of individuals are given admittance So, for instance, labels of 'Pakistani' will, for the most part, be restricted to those who demonstrate some ethno-cultural affiliation with Pakistan In this manner, individual identities inform the structure of social relations whilst at the same time, are informed by them Although community boundaries are exclusionary, in that they necessarily demarcate between 'them' and 'us', where community boundaries are established is dependant upon the social context, and the individual negotiating within that context, at any one moment in time.

References to the 'other' become all the more salient where the 'other' is considered to be particularly powerful and/or a significant threat. This is especially so as identity is often used as a marker between 'them' and 'us' (Tempelman, 1999) Where 'them' begins to encroach upon what is meant by 'us', then the 'other' can be seen as a threat to the integrity of an individual's identities Khan's (2000) exploration of the identity construction of Muslims in Europe found power relations play a significant role in the relationship between majority and minority communities Often, perceived differences result in a large degree of mis-trust and hostility, a situation that has been shown to be especially prevalent within the majority/minority dichotomy of Britain.

> "There is a great deal of suspicion, perhaps even conflict, in the minds of both non-Muslims and Muslims of Bradford over the values each appear to hold sacred, and which each side is prepared to defend tooth and nail" (Siddique, 1993: 30).

Khan argues the social, political and cultural values of the mainstream are enforced on those directly, and indirectly, part of it, "with the objective of achieving conformity and social equilibrium" (2000 30) In such a context ethnic minorities hold onto their ethnic and religious identities as a means of defence from the perceived encroachment of the majority community. As Mohammed puts it, "'religio-culture' became both the reason for, and the means of, constructing a strong group identity" (1999 225 *sic*) Through such understandings it is possible to see how, and why, symbols of Islam and the Pakistani culture are used to re-assert and re-constitute the boundaries of Pakistani Muslim communities in Britain and elsewhere.

The sense of commonality experienced by individuals becomes more acute as it is faced with increasing degrees of difference[24] (Hall, 1993). It has been argued that in the face of widespread exclusion minority communities become more insular (Khan, 2000) The tendency to become inward looking in the face of exclusion has previously been explained by Hall in terms of a sliding scale, where community boundaries shift in the face of external forces (and internal differentiation), as and when the situation calls for it (1993; see also Tempelman, 1999). Exclusion itself becomes an expression of difference and a feature of the symbolic boundaries between one community and another.

Community boundaries do not necessarily exclude all difference. Given the fluidity and negotiable character of 'new ethnicities', Husain and O'Brien (2000) argue that Muslim communities are adopting certain western secular norms and values, both within community practices and individual identity construction. Similarly Vertovec (1997) highlights that the minority presence in Britain does not equate to an either/or choice as to which culture an individual is influenced by, rather these cultures are 'co-present' (see also, Blakemore and Boneham, 1994) As Parekh points out however, it is important to recognise that identity is "neither unalterable nor a matter of unfettered choice. It is alterable within limits and in a manner that harmonises with its overall character and organising principles" (2000: 6). Given the links between individual identities and community boundaries this suggests that not only do communities have to be amenable to change, but that change has to fit the context of those communities, both in their historical and present outlook. Further, the 'limits' placed on the negotiation of identities are derived from the distinctions

---

[24] See notion of Symbolic Competition in Section 2.4 (Cohen, 1985)

between 'them' and 'us', and the structural constraints of the community as to who can be included and who cannot.

2.6 *Boundaries Within Boundaries*

In addition to distinctions between non-Muslims and Muslims, terminology of 'them' and 'us' can also be applied within the Muslim *Umm'ah*. The demarcations within the Muslim *Umm'ah* are illustrative of boundaries within boundaries and echo Hall's (1992) theory of new ethnicities. Upon initial migration to Britain, forms of ethnic reference were collectivised, not only by the majority community, but by those of the minority. The identity content of being 'Muslim' or 'Asian' was of a greater value than being 'Pakistani' or 'Mirpuri'[25]. Collective identifications superseded the value, for the most part, placed on being of a particular religion, race or ethnicity. Expressing ones identity through the prism of being 'Asian' meant individuals were able to affiliate with a wider group of people In an often hostile and exclusionary environment such inclusive identity construction provided safety in numbers (Dahya, 1974)

As minority communities have become increasingly established and populous, there is a decreasing need to forgo the importance of the different facets of ones' identities in favour of more encompassing and collectivised labels of reference This is accompanied by an increasing acknowledgment of the need to recognise the existence of diversity within different categories and groups as a means to pay due respect to the multiplicity of identities (Mason, 1995). Sudbury's (2001) exploration of the political movement of 'black' women over a period of 20 years shows a recognition among 'women of colour' that definitions of self, which aim to establish unity among wider groups, must necessarily recognise difference within the group. Failure to do so would eventually result in the fragmentation, or complete breakdown, of such political mobilisation, as the group itself would fail to respect the rights of its members to hold diverse interests, affiliations and identities

This was demonstrated within Dwyer's study which concluded, that often, ethnically distinct communities, encompassed within the wider boundaries of the Islamic *Umm'ah*, contradict the presumption that there is a necessary connection between religion and ethnicity, as is inferred when the two are subsumed under labels such as

---

[25] Term of reference which signifies people from the Mirpur region of Pakistan (Shaw, 1988)

"Pakistani" (1999. 60) Such conclusions are contradicted by the earlier views of Barth (1969), who argued that ethnicity should be understood in terms of religion which is a mechanism used to define the boundaries of ethnic groups. However, as Werbner points out, "[the local Pakistani community] is not bounded by a single boundary, but contains boundaries within boundaries" (2002. 64) Prioritisation of certain relationships and identities above others (through the process of content/value negotiations (Breakwell, 1987)), illustrates the preference accorded to affiliation with certain communities over others, in particular contexts and periods of time. Thus, Pakistani communities are divided on the grounds of ethnicity, language, regionalism and religious sectionalism, not to mention issues of class, status (specifically in the form of caste), gender and age It is important for the purposes of this study, as well as wider sociological concerns, to remember that distinctions of 'them' and 'us' exist within the boundaries of the 'Pakistani Muslim' community, as well as without.

2.7 Defence of Community Boundaries

Although the nuances of the cultural and religious interpretations within, and identities of, a community are continuously changing, the 'defence' of community boundaries intimates a much more static and consistent view of what it means to be 'us'. This is especially the case where what threatens the boundaries is perceived to be so prevalent as to endanger the very foundations of the community The furore surrounding the Satanic Verses in Britain was just such an instance, where the integrity of the Muslim *Umm'ah* in general, and that of Muslim communities in the West in particular, were threatened by 'Western ideals'. As Weller observes, publication of the Satanic Verses was not only a slur on the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH), a central tenet of Islam, but became a question about "the nature of British society and the place of Islam and Muslims within it" (1990: 39) The public outrage against British institutions that permitted such an insult to be published and promoted in the popular media, and book burnings, were means whereby many British Muslims[26] were able to re-assert their 'Muslim' identity by distinguishing themselves from the British establishment, whilst overtly expressing the strength with which they held their Islamic faith, and the status of the Prophet (PBUH) (Ballard, 1994). In such an instance Mohammad (1999) argues, certain facets of identity are no longer negotiable Where the community feels under threat, "notions

---

[26] Not all Muslims agreed with the burning of the Satanic Versus, or indeed the hostile reaction to what was considered by some to be a piece of fictional writing (Ali, 1992)

of group identity [are] used by the Pakistani Muslim 'group' [to] construe cultural difference as immutable, absolute and incommensurable" (Mohammad, 1999: 236). This said, the way in which these facets are interpreted, even in the face of apparent 'threats' can differ along such lines as gender and age (Ali, 1992; Khanum, 1992; SBS, 1990)

Mohammed (1999) does not recognise the possibility that a defence of community boundaries, which calls upon the myth of the past, involves the re-construction of identity with reference to that ideal (Hall, 1993) Whilst identities, and thus community boundaries, may, where threatened, take on fixed characteristics, through their defence they are being re-constituted The Rushdie Affair was a significant example of this As Lewis observes "communities which feel themselves under attack tend to define and guard their boundaries with ever greater care against perceived enemies, within and without" (1994 75) In his study of Muslims in Bradford, Lewis contends that reactions to the Satanic Versus transcended ethnic and sectarian differences, as Muslims put up a united front.

Hall (1993) reminds the reader that historical commonality and the process of 'becoming' are two sides of the same identity coin Hall argues identity is constructed even as it is being portrayed and described to the outside world Although cultural identities "reflect the common historical experiences and shared cultural codes" (1993· 393) of a group, they nevertheless "undergo constant transformation. .subject to the continuous 'play' of history, culture and power" (1993 394). Cultural identity is at once the reflection of historical commonalities and shared 'cultural codes', and the process of becoming, as circumstances intervene and create differences within this shared history. Whilst the threat of the Satanic Verses was battled, through, what came to be perceived as, fixed and immutable understandings of what it meant to be a Muslim and the values one ought to hold dear, the identities of those involved, and thus, those of the communities which they purported to represent, were reconstituted in the process.

Exploration of the Muslim presence in Europe has identified Islam as becoming increasingly prevalent as a central "self-identifier"[27] (Husain and O'Brien, 2000· 3; see also Modood *et al*, 1997). Husain and O'Brien argue that in the process of

---

[27] The concept of one's own religious identities change as what it means to be a Muslim at the age of 9 is very different to that at 19 or even 29 (Afshar, 1994).

integrating with the wider majority ethnic community, and forming their own identity in this context ('new ethnicities', Hall, 1992), the younger generation of Muslim communities are in the process of rejecting ethno-cultural practices in favour of religious ones This is supported by a number of other studies which have revealed that first generation migrants to Britain believe their migration from Islamic countries to a non-Islamic one allows for the recognition of real Islam as opposed to one which is merely cultural (Jacobson, 1997; Scantlebury, 1995). Such re-interpretation is akin to the suggestion by Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins (2002) that symbols are utilised in specific ways in order to achieve particular outcomes (see also Hall, 1993; 'politics of identity') In their study, the same religious symbol is used by two different parties to come to a different political outcome. Identity construction for Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins, is strategic, and, they argue, it is only by taking this strategy into account, that it is possible to fully understand the influences of individual agency and social context.

In his study of West African Identity and Pentecostalism, Hunt suggests religion is utilised as a tool to develop one's own identity whilst providing a means to affiliate with "people more like myself" (2002 149) In a similar fashion, the use of symbols to create 'space' for diasporic Islam, "seem to provide fertile venues for the rethinking and reformulation of tradition and construction of an Islam for generations to come" (Mandaville, 2001 173) Islam is utilised as a conceptual tool with which to re-configure culture and one's identities. As Ahmad and Husband highlight "religion is one such potent mechanism of signalling difference, of differentiating *us* from *them*" (1993. 4, *original emphasis*). The changing trajectory of individual identity, toward Islamic rather than ethno-cultural affiliation is illustrative of processes of reflexive negotiation (Giddens 1991a), which facilitate the use of a religious framework to provide guidance and cohesion at a time of confusion and conflict. As a central factor in the construction of diasporic Muslim communities and a framework for the negotiation of identities, Islam plays a significant role in the exercise of individual agency.

2.8 The Moral Voice: Etzioni and Durkheim

The recent rise in the use of the term 'community' in political and academic circles owes much to the work of Etzioni (1998, 1997, 1995) and his Communitarian ideal (Levitas, 1998; see also Mulhall and Swift, 1996). Communitarianism, Etzioni claims, offers a blend of conservative and liberal thought in its projection of an ideal

society where individuals take on more responsibilities and less rights[28]. This responsibility is enforced by a nexus of community based networks which, in turn, lead to a reduced role for state regulation. The relationship between community and individual, as envisaged by Etzioni, has significant implications for the way in which the boundaries of a community are constructed, and the degree to which individuals are deemed worthy enough to participate within it

In a somewhat similar approach to Cohen (1985), Etzioni perceives community to constitute a "set of attributes, not a concrete place" (1997: 6). The location of community in an intangible set of attributes offers a theory whereby communities are grounded upon a network of relationships that can arise from countless different forms of shared affiliations such as spatial location, profession and/or religious belief Central to Etzioni's idealised notion of community is the place of 'moral values' which guide an individual's behaviour and make a community 'communitarian'. A communitarian society consists of a web of communities, the moral values of which may differ, but do not diametrically oppose each other. This co-existence necessitates a harmonious relationship in order to retain the social web As such, Etzioni seeks to identify and establish a set of core values, which form the 'moral glue' and to which all communities within the societal web should adhere.

Adherence to these core values has a significant impact upon the boundaries of a community. In his advocacy of communitarianism, Etzioni seeks to establish ' the new golden rule' which rests upon an equilibrium between social order and autonomy To this end Etzioni "look[s] at the proportion of values that are considered an integral part of the social order (and hence violating them is considered as undermining order) to those which members of the society are free to choose following their own normative commitments" (1997: 10) Where this equilibrium is unbalanced, Etzioni argues, social order is undermined Etzioni attributes the unerring desire to maintain the status quo to fundamentalists, and asserts Communitarians are those who seek to restore or sustain social order whilst remaining open to change In this, Etzioni's theory bears similarity to Cohen's understanding of the need to exercise symbols, thus re-investing them with social value, as a means of maintaining and perpetuating community boundaries.

---

[28] This aspect of communitarian thought has influenced a number of New Labour initiatives, particularly with regard to welfare state policies (Deacon, 2002, 2000, Heron and Dwyer, 1999, see also Chapter 3)

Despite his intentions to remain open to change, Etzioni has fixed, and in some instances highly judgmental opinions on what constitutes social order (Prideaux, 2002). His advocacy of communitarianism puts forward an ideal type scenario which he suggests will create and perpetuate self-regulating communities, free of violent crime, illegitimacy, drug abuse and other such "problems" (1995. ix-xii; see also Prideaux, 2002, Dwyer, 2000) faced by contemporary Western (and particularly American) societies Relief from such problems, argues Etzioni, would come from the re-establishment of a moral order, an emphasis on balancing rights with responsibilities, and, regulation through a community based 'moral voice'.

The moral voice of a community is grounded, according to Etzioni, in the core values of society These core values are normative, implicitly understood and 'good', categories that also grant them the accolade of being 'moral'. Through adherence to these core values, Etzioni seeks to "reduce the distance between the ego's preferred course and the virtuous one" (1997: xvii). The meaning of virtuous is centrally underpinned by Etzioni's theological affiliations For Etzioni an idealised society based upon his religious understanding is justifiable because "communitarians basically have faith in faith and seek to convince people of the value of their position" (1997: 16) rather than force their position on to others through legislation and state regulation For the most part, however, the 'persuasion' in Etzioni's work gives way to claims of right and wrong.

Etzioni's perspective on which moral values are right and which are wrong is often influenced by his religious beliefs, which in itself is not problematic. The difficulty arises however, in how one reconciles such understandings between communities in order to create and maintain the social web and ensure that the values of all are given due consideration and equal worth. In setting out the communitarian vision Etzioni utilises emotive language, such as "deadbeat fathers" (1997: 54), "bohemians, deviants and rabble-rousers" (1997: 63) "illegitimacy" (1997. 68) and derisively observes that in the 1960's "[t]he notion that one should not be judgmental gained currency" (1997: 69) Even out of context, such terms of reference render those who do not agree with Etzioni's values as being at best misguided and at worst immoral. In addition, values which are not grounded in religious belief are considered to be lacking moral resonance as Etzioni observes, "the secular language is rather limited   moral vocabulary has been greatly diminished" (1997: 121).

The danger of communitarian communities becoming puritanical is evident, even to Etzioni, who cites the example of Saudi Arabia as a community that got "carried away" and "where women must robe almost their entire bodies and cannot go out alone if they are single" (1995 41) That he cites the example of Saudi Arabia is telling of the tendency for Etzioni to see legitimacy only when he agrees with the moral or religious worth of the value. Although *purdah*, where forced upon a woman is understandably berated, its practice by many women around the globe is a religious observance and even considered to have "liberated and empowered them" (Bunting, 2001· 1). This liberation is indicative of a theological and feminist perspective that does not agree with what Etzioni understands to be a free and autonomous woman, and is what makes his derision noteworthy.

The moral imperative attached to communities by Etzioni is, he feels, cushioned by the lack of state intervention and his emphasis upon individual autonomy. Etzioni argues, that it is only when the social order is "aligned with the moral commitments of the members" (1997. 12) that there is no need for coercion, rather, individuals abide by the prescriptions of the social order through their own free will However, Etzioni provides little theorisation of what it means to be an autonomous individual or the consequences of going against the moral prescriptions of a community According to Etzioni "[i]n a communitarian society *..values are handed down from generation to generation rather than invented or negotiated*" (1997: 93, *original emphasis*). To Etzioni, individuals are merely blank slates, upon which parents, schools and society at large imprints a moral framework. Where a society is communitarian, such teachings will be adopted by the individual and he or she will abide by the shared moral values through choice This is an insufficiently nuanced understanding of an individual's morality and moral reasoning Etzioni pays scant attention to the plurality of moral voices to which an individual can be subject, or indeed to individual negotiations between different moral pulls.

Etzioni understands the moral voice to be the means by which a community lays claim on its members. The moral voice of the community is said to ensure individuals act in accordance to the shared moral values of a community in order to maintain social order. He suggests that shared moral values give rise to community duties, formed from "positive compelling commitments...that are beyond debate and dispute" (1995: 24). Failure to abide by these commitments elicits rebuke and condemnation from the community, a form of 'moral suasion'. This moral suasion can take the form of pressure and even exclusion whereby "[m]embers of the

community. seek to dissociate themselves from people [who behave in a manner that contravenes the moral values of the community]" (1997: 30). In this way individuals become answerable to the community for their actions, or lack thereof, as "communities draw on interpersonal bonds to encourage members to abide by shared values" (Etzioni, 1995 ix).

The assumption that communities must retain a set of shared values has significant implications for minority and disadvantaged groups These implications are further exacerbated by the authority of the moral voice, which is able, through 'suasion' to exert pressure for conformity, even where these values are not necessarily 'shared'. Where the moral authority of a community becomes too oppressive, Etzioni argues, individuals "will tend to draw on another community for their attachments" (1997: 128) Suggesting that individuals or groups can look to other community affiliations where such pressure becomes overbearing in no way alleviates the potential for such moral authority to become discriminatory, or itself, immoral (Yar, 2003, Prideaux, 2002)

As Prideaux (2002) observes Etzioni's (1998, 1997, 1995) ideas are neither new, nor innovative. Rather, many of his prescriptions can be traced back to his functionalist, and more specifically, Durkheimian roots. The most important of these roots, for the purposes of this study, is Etzioni's readings of Durkheim's (1984) conceptions of the conscience collective and collective representations. Etzioni's reading of these concepts significantly inform the role envisaged for the moral voice For a comprehensive understanding of Etzioni it is necessary to explore the American functionalist perspective on Durkheim in greater depth.

As with many sociological concerns Durkheim's work is subject to the overarching issue of structure verses agency, or the interaction of the two (Giddens, 1994, 1984, 1979). Etzioni's reading suggests that Durkheim, writing at a time when individualism was the preferred mode of sociological analysis, adopted a structurally deterministic stance (see also Morrison, 1995). Much of Durkheim's work can be interpreted to suggest that he conceptualised the relationship between individual and society as one of conformity and constraint.

> "Collective ways of acting or thinking have a reality outside the individuals who, at every moment of time conform to it These ways of thinking and acting exist in their own right The individual

finds them completely formed and cannot evade or change them He
is therefore obliged to reckon with them" (Durkheim, 1964. lvi).

Rather than positing individuals at the heart of causal analysis, Durkheim's approach
relegates agency to a simple by-product

> "It can be shown that behaviour of the past, when analysed, can be
> reduced to relationships of cause and effect. These relationships can
> then be transformed, by an equally logical operation, into rules of
> action for the future" (Durkheim, 1964: xxxix-xl).

For Durkheim, 'humanist' accounts of structure "hold that society is a superstructure
built upon the substratum of the individual consciousness" (1964 xlvii). These
perceive structure to be ancillary to the individual, and, presume to be able to
determine the whole by the sum of its parts This understanding of structure is
problematic for Durkheim. Instead, he conceives of structure as having been handed
down to individuals at any one time by the generations that preceded them
Moreover, D urkheim c ontends, w here individuals a re i nvolved i n the o rigins o f a
structure their participation is so "infinitesimal" as to be negligible (1964· xlv)
Thus, structures are essentially "different in nature from the states of individual
consciousness" (1964· xlix), and cannot be explored through individuals In
Durkheim's formulation, structures consist of laws and customs, that confer duties
upon the individual. S tructures a re e mblematic o f c ollective b eliefs a nd p ractices,
termed as collective representations Collective representations, as structural edicts
superimposed upon the individual, are akin to what Etzioni terms "shared moral
values" (1995. 25)

Durkheim attributes structures, or as he refers to them social facts, with two essential
characteristics, an independent conscience (the conscience collective), and the ability
to sanction Within this all-encompassing conception of structure the individual is
conceived of as "unbaked clay", to be "moulded", and "re-moulded" by the
structural developments of society (Durkheim, 1984. 143-145)

> "It [social fact] consists of ways of acting, thinking, and feeling,
> external to the individual, and endowed with a power of coercion,
> by reason of which they control him [the individual]" (Durkheim,
> 1984 3)

Many of the characteristics of Etzioni's community based moral voice can be traced
to a structuralist reading of Durkheim's conscience collective. The conscience
collective is based upon collective representations, said to be a key element to social

solidarity A 'psyche' attributed to society, the conscience collective exists independently of its individual component parts, and in many cases is different in its outlook In much the same manner as the moral voice, the conscience collective compels individuals to behave in accordance to collective representations Through this compulsion it ensures social solidarity by sanctioning against actions that would endanger it The moral voice is further akin to the conscience collective as it compels individuals to behave in accordance to shared moral values (collective representations) a nd r estricts i ndividualism, t hereby r estoring t he b alance b etween rights and responsibilities. The synonymity between the moral voice and conscience collective also extends to the mode of sanctions by which they are enforced.

The m oral v oice i s s aid to c ompel i ndividuals through c ondemnation a nd r ebuke Similarly, breach of the conscience collective is punished through repressive sanctions, which are punitive in character (Durkheim, 1984). Repressive sanctions aim to ensure the perpetrator 'loses out' as a consequence of his or her actions These sanctions t ake the form of 'moral outrage' and often cause the loss o f honour o r freedom. The loss of honour directly removes from individual social capital, and thus can prohibit an individual's participation within the community[29]. Etzioni's use of the social bond as a means to ensure conformity can also be traced to his reading of Durkheim's work The relationship between these sanctions and the punitive affect upon an individual's 'honour' reinforce the use of shame based strategies to ensure compliance with normative values.

The interpretations of Durkheim's work, evident in Etzioni's version of communitarianism, are highly contested and in themselves problematic. Such a structuralist reading of Durkheim is somewhat restricted to his earlier writings. Jenks (1996) suggests that Durkheim's structural or positivistic stance was limited to his observations of mechanical solidarity, where "a strict limit to human understanding and creativity" (1996. 21) is set. According to this reading of Durkheim, as society develops from consisting of simple to more complex structures individuals begin to take on a more autonomous role and are constituted as having their own characteristics

Within this account of organic societies, Jenks observes a 'reciprocal dependency'

---

[29] The concept of social capital, and its relationship with social exclusion, is discussed in Chapter 3

between individual and society which he locates in the sacred/profane dichotomy Durkheim utilises notions of the sacred to refer to "public knowledge and social institutions" (Jenks, 1996 22), whereas the profane is "representative of the potential of individual consciousness" (Jenks, 1996 22). For Jenks, Durkheim's move from considerations of mechanical to organic society is signified by considerations of symbols that are "constant components of a consensus world view" to "diffused and fragmented symbols" (1996 22). In an organic society, individuals are not perceived as passive recipients, rather they are active agents In such a society, Jenks observes Durkheim's use of the sacred/profane symbolism to describe how individual and society are locked in a continuously dynamic relationship. It is "through their [individual and structure] capacity to communicate symbolically" (Jenks, 1996 20) that society is realised (see also, Thompson 1996)

Using its theological origins, the sacred/profane dichotomy can be interpreted in a manner that although different, is still consistent with Jenks' reading Durkheim defined the sacred with reference to that which is holy or consecrated. In contrast the profane is "that which has the capacity to contaminate the sacred" (Morrison, 1995 191) As a mechanism that allows for theological justifications, the symbolic binary of sacred and profane can be used to make daily symbols and rituals irrefutable[30]. The potential use of this binary in faith based communities can inform and compliment Etzioni's understandings of 'compelling commitments'. Etzioni suggests that individual duties arise from 'compelling commitments', which are 'beyond debate and dispute'. The incontrovertible character of such duties permits the moral voice complete legitimacy. Turning to Durkheim, it is possible to see that where distinctions of sacred and profane, made with reference to the complete moral authority of a supreme being, are applied to such commitments, any dissent by one who acknowledges this authority is spurious. The profane constitutes actions that are 'beyond debate and dispute' because they are so diametrically opposed to the sacred[31]. Where the reasoning is located in a supreme being, the legitimacy of the conscience collective, or even the moral voice, in compelling individuals to act in accordance with the sacred, and in contravention of the profane, is absolute.

---

[30] The moral dimension attributed to this distinction has been criticised by Stark (2001) who argues it is not a religion's relationship to social solidarity, as Durkheim suggests, which lends it moral value, but the belief in a morally conscious supreme being

[31] Reference group theory and social integration theory both inform the way in which an individual's relationship with religion and religious groups can influence his or her actions with regard to the profane (Ford and Kadushin, 2002)

Distinctions between the sacred and profane are more widely applicable to the boundaries of a faith based community as they give rise to differences between 'them' and 'us' The religious affiliation of 'us' associates 'us' with the sacred, and 'them' to the profane. Distinctions of sacred and profane can also be applied after demarcations of 'them' and 'us' have been made. In his conceptualisation of community, Dixon (2001) argues that "boundaries do not only *reflect* pre-existing apprehensions By insulating 'us' from 'them', they help to create the kind of environment where outsiders become *constructed* as dangerous" (Dixon, 2001: 597, *original emphasis*). Coming into contact with one who is seen to transgress these boundaries, Dixon suggests, is met with emotions of disgust. This is similar to Etzioni's (1995) reliance upon moral outrage and suasion where an individual is considered to threaten the purity of 'us' and therefore 'our' homogeneity The 'disgust' that an individual's transgressions give rise to can result in withdrawal by other members of 'us' from social contact with him or her. Dixon's theory on the construction and enforcement of spatially located community boundaries also has many parallels to that put forward by Cohen (1985) on symbolic boundaries. The social isolation meted out to all those who threaten the integrity of these boundaries, by behaving in a manner which is akin to 'them' rather than 'us', may well be illustrative of processes of social exclusion[32].

As one of the 'founding fathers' it is hardly surprising to find echoes of Durkheim's theoretical framework in many modern day writings. As a theory of social solidarity Durkheim's views are especially prevalent in many sociological debates concerning communities. As has been suggested, Etzioni's (1998, 1997, 1995) thesis of Communitarianism is informed by a structurally weighted, albeit contested, reading of Durkheim. As well as being dismissive of individualistic traditions, Etzioni advocates a return to a more authoritarian structure of governance, and argues that individualistic liberalism is responsible for a breakdown of social cohesion Further, Etzioni draws upon notions of the conscience collective (through the concept of the moral voice) as an internal regulatory system responsible for ensuring individuals behave in accordance to the normative values upon which the community is based Failure to conform to such prescriptions should, according to Etzioni, be met with moral suasion, resulting in an individual being shamed into conformity (Dixon,

---

[32] See Chapter 3

2001) Thus, the moral voice is a means by which to maintain community solidarity and continuity.

The structural bias of Etzioni's (1998, 1997, 1995) notion of the moral voice leaves it open to numerous criticisms Individuals are by no means passive recipients of such external factors. As noted in Section 2 7, individuals play an active role in the construction and re-construction of community structures. Moreover, Etzioni's (1995) conceptualisation of how 'shared moral values' come, or ought to come about is restricted and insufficiently nuanced, with the potential to discriminate against minority and other groups who lack power, ownership and voice. Notwithstanding these drawbacks, Etzioni's thesis of communitarianism, as its roots in Durkheim's Sociology of Religion would suggest, has significant implications for religious communities. These implications, along with Cohen's theory of Symbolic Communities, will be discussed in relation to Pakistani Muslim communities in the next section

2.9 The Pakistani Muslim Community: A Case in Point

Diasporic Pakistani Muslim communities in Britain are often accused of being 'insular' (Khan, 2000). Such an inward focus may be attributed to the perception held by many members of these communities that their norms and values are directly opposite to those of the host country. In order to ensure their way of life, and indeed their identities continue, Pakistani Muslims in diaspora can look to their past, from which cultural and religious practices and rituals are embraced, and vested with present day values and therefore boundary significance Diasporic communities utilise religious objects, language and paraphernalia as a means of 'making Muslim space' (Metcalf, 1996). D'Alisera's (2001) study of Sierra Leonean Muslims in America concluded that they utilise 'codes' to maintain their sense of self Paraphernalia such as bumper stickers are used to assert their Islamic identity and develop a sense of belonging According to D'Alisera (2001), such objects are re-defined to take on a meaning which is representative of, and sensitive to, individual identities and social contexts. These objects also come to represent the "memory, fantasy, narrative and myth" (Hall 1993 396) of Muslim pasts, continually informing identities in the form of the ideal. Islamic and cultural norms and artefacts, which can be used to distinguish between 'us' and 'them', have been used by Muslims in diaspora to strategically define and assert their own identities and community boundaries (Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins, 2002). These symbols also

come t o r e-emphasise t he c ommonality o f b elief h eld b y a ll t hose w ho c onstitute 'us'[33].

As a community formed on the basis of shared moral values, the Muslim *Umm'ah* has many of the requisite characteristics of Etzioni's ideal type community[34]. For instance, much of the discourse conducted within Islam is premised upon the principle "each right has a corresponding duty" (Nyazee, 2000 97, see also, Dwyer, 2000), a balance Etzioni considers integral to the development of communitarian communities. Many of the shared moral values of Pakistani Muslim communities in diaspora originate from Islam and Pakistani culture. These shared moral values form the basis upon which the symbols of 'us' (Pakistani Muslim communities) are grounded. They also form the precipice from which the community moral voice seeks to regulate individual agency Through this moral voice the community ensures its members remain 'Muslim' and 'Pakistani' by sustaining the practice, and in turn importance, of Islamic and Pakistani cultural symbols This regulation provides the potential for the community moral voice to facilitate the perpetuation of community boundaries and its internal solidarity.

The moral voice is not as all-powerful as Etzioni contends Etzioni's suggestion that the moral voice is able to convey moral values so they are internalised by individuals can be located in his Durkheimian reading of the conscience collective

> "The greater the volume of the common conscience the greater is
> the individuals attachment to prevailing collective beliefs The
> extent of the attachment is greatest when society completely
> 'envelops' the individual" (*quoted in*, Morrison, 1995 132).

This attributes the degree of an individual's beliefs to the society in which he or she lives. Such a reading reduces the individual to nothing more then a socially determinate agent Perpetuation of collective representations and symbolic boundaries necessarily requires input from the individuals that make up the social group (Cohen, 1985). The moral values of, for example, Islam and Pakistani culture are not simply superimposed upon individuals. Rather, the community moral voice is exercised through, and informed by, Islam and culture, which are themselves re-constituted through individual agency. During the course of its exercise, the moral

---

[33] Distinctions between 'them' and 'us' were found to be made on similar grounds among Turkish Cypriot groups in Britain by Ladbury (1979).

[34] Crow *et al* 's study of neighbourly relations in a small town shows receptability to the moral voice is not restricted to faith communities (2002. 139).

voice leans on its religious and cultural origins in order to obtain its authority and legitimacy (Etzioni, 1997) As such, where the Pakistani Muslim moral voice is defending community boundaries it calls upon the Islamic and cultural rituals that are particularly significant for the social context within which that defence is taking place Thus, the Islamic ritual of fasting during the month of *Ramadan* is particularly important i n a s ecular c ountry t o r e-affirm a nd r e-assert t he c ommunity's Islamic identity[35].

The distinction made between Islam and culture in S ection 2 3, coupled with t he further divisions found within the Muslim *Umm'ah*, and the importance attached to individual agency, all question the notion of 'compelling commitments' put forward by Etzioni (1995) Within the Pakistani Muslim community there are multiple moral voices, of which those influenced by Islam and culture, are only two. Different origins, including an individual's own perspective, may give rise to different moral voices. In addition, alternative moral voices may all bear relevance to the content/value judgements made during the course of identity construction and re-construction (Breakwell, 1 987). An individual's identity as a mother, may, at any one time, supersede her role as a Pakistani Muslim, and thus, it is to the moral voice of motherhood that she will attribute greatest value (Silva, 1996). In such instances moral voices of the community, which espouse the norms and values of Islam and culture may well be rejected, threatening the 'compelling commitments' and therefore legitimacy, upon which they are based When different moral voices come into conflict, individuals are able to use their own interpretation of the moral high ground to determine which they agree with Such interpretation and agency however, is subject to an individual's position vis-à-vis the structures of the community (Abu-Lughod, 1991).

Etzioni (1995) advocates the use of 'shame based strategies'[36] to sanction breach of the moral voice. This means of sanction is particularly relevant and effective in the context of the Pakistani Muslim community As Werbner highlights "the politics of the subcontinent is a politics of honour and shame, of *izzat*" (2002: 27 *sic*) In this context *izzat* is simply defined as honour, and relates to the individual, the family

---

[35] See Chapters 6, 7 and 8.
[36] The sociological concept and study of shame is vigorously debated among academics Scheff argues "acknowledged shame, it seems, could be the glue that holds relationships and societies together, and unacknowledged shame the force that tears them apart" (2000 98). The concepts of honour and shame have implications for individual inclusion/exclusion as well as social solidarity

and the community at large. The concept of *izzat* is often documented in relation to the practice of separation of the sexes (*purdah*). More often then not, within the Pakistani Muslim context, women are "the appointed site of familial honour and shame and the representatives of the public face of the society's apparent commitment to its faith" (Afshar, 1994 129) The onus of 'honourable' behaviour is placed on the woman Moreover, as Husain and O'Brien (2000) remind us, action at the individual level can have an affect on the way the community, of which that individual is a member, is perceived by the 'outside' world. Actions contrary to the shared moral values of the community are thought, not only to diminish the *izzat* of the individual, but also his or her family, and in some instances the community at large Further, these actions are considered to be contrary to, and therefore diminishing of, the community's Islamic integrity.

Moral voices of the Pakistani Muslim community judge individual actions based upon the shared moral values of the community and attribute *izzat* (honour) or *ba-yzzati* (shame), accordingly This ensures that the community does not fragment from the inside by excluding those who pose such a threat (Mohammad, 1999, see also Dixon, 2001) An individual's standing in the community, their *izzat*, and that of their family, is judged according to the degree to which he or she acts in accordance to the shared moral values of the community. Thus, an individual who acts contrary to the Islamic and cultural values upon which the boundaries of a community are based can be made subject to processes of social exclusion as his or her *izzat*, and that of their family is diminished In more extreme cases, it has been documented that in some areas of the world, families, in order to protect or redeem their *izzat*, have been known to kill their female members, who are thought to have acted in a 'dishonourable' way (Faqir, 2001).

Izzat is not restricted to such gendered considerations as separation of the sexes. It has also become the measure of an individual's actions As such moral voices of the Pakistani Muslim community are able to regulate an individual's general behaviour by threatening his or her *izzat* It is important to note that in his preoccupation with structural determinism, Etzioni (1997, 1995) does not allow for consideration of an individual's receptability to repressive sanctions, especially where the penalty is loss of honour. If individuals have no concern or conception of honour, or *izzat* as the case may be, whether in relation to particular moral values or otherwise, then sanctions which affect this honour/*izzat* will not be effective in regulating their behaviour. In this way individuals may be able to manipulate sanctions according to

their own moral values. Further, the more power and voice an individual has, and the more social capital, in the form of *izzat* he or she has access to, the greater their potential ability to question the authority of the moral voice. Such manipulation of moral values illustrates the potential for individuals to negotiate inclusion to the community. As Foster observes, "Spaces, places and boundaries are not simply imposed orders· they involve negotiation and re-negotiation, including struggles to be included in s paces a nd p laces from w hich w e have b een e xcluded" (1997 9) Thus sanctions, whilst betraying the social cohesion offered by a particular structure, in this case the moral voice, also express the structures threshold of influence[37].

2.10 *Conclusion*

As stated in the introductory chapter this study aims to explore the process of social exclusion through familial care of elders within the context of Pakistani Muslim communities in Britain and Germany. Given the debates here about the construction and regulation of community boundaries it is important to consider what role, if any, care plays in the symbolic dimensions of the Pakistani Muslim community boundaries. In his consideration of the way in which minorities construct their symbolic boundaries Cohen (1985) puts forward the notion of 'symbolic competition'[38]. Symbolic competition entails the disadvantaged group rejecting the symbolic codes of the more powerful group and establishing its own symbols, which are considered to be relatively powerful or exclusive to the minority group Thus, those aspects of the past which relate to the negativities of 'them' are bought out and used to re-assert difference, such as, "'we' look after our elders, 'they' don't". As Ballard and Ballard observe, racism is a "strong and effective counter to compare Anglicisation and it is leading them [second generation Pakistani Muslims] to make some overt expression of a separate identity" (1979. 47). Such identity construction reflects what it 'means' to be 'us' (Mandaville, 2001). "It is a selective construction of the past which resonates with contemporary influences" (Cohen, 1984 99). As Blakemore and Boneham (1994) observed when exploring the ageing experiences of South Asians in Britain, it is characteristic of South Asians (including non-migrant second and third generations) to continue to define their expectations of care in

---

[37] See Chapter 8.
[38] Cohen takes this terminology from Schwimmer (1972)

relation to the norms of their ancestral or old country Care of ones elders has become, among this group, a symbol of their identities and community boundaries[39].

The debates upon the notion of community are illustrative of the way in which individuals engage and participate within informal relationships and networks. The discussion relating to the defence of community boundaries, with respect to both Cohen and Etzioni are illustrative of the means by which communities may seek to ensure their own sustenance and continuity, albeit with potentially negative consequences for some of their own members. This is not a justification for the way in which communities may exclude even as they seek to continue. It simply offers an explanation of why such exclusion may come about, an explanation that strives to ensure neither community, nor individual, is demonised

In conclusion, given the potential relationship between the moral voice and the processes of exclusion, community boundaries, and the corresponding distinction between 'them' and 'us', is of great significance. The rebuke and condemnation meted o ut b y t he m oral v oice h as t he p otential to e xclude w here a n i ndividual i s considered to have breached this boundary of difference. This possibility is increased where the boundaries of the community are symbolic, informed by 'shared moral values' and distinctions of sacred/profane, more so then tangible characteristics such as geographical locality or shared ethnicity. In such instances contravention of these 'shared moral values' can be compared to diminished affiliation with 'us' and a greater similarity to 'them', and is thus a foreseeable grounds for exclusion. If the care relationship is indeed a marker of differentiation between 'us' and 'them', and represents a norm and/or value of what it means to be a Pakistani Muslim, failure to meet the expectations of the moral voice with regard to this relationship, can potentially lead to social exclusion, as individual *izzat* is diminished through sanctions of the moral voice. The concept of social exclusion, and the possible role of the moral voice within its processes, as well as those of social capital and the care relationship will be discussed in the following chapter (3)

---

[39] Although, there is much debate as to what care constitutes, and how the subtle definitions of what this care entails is changing within this community and without, see Chapter 3.

Chapter 3

Social Exclusion, Social Capital and the Informal Care Relationship

3.1 *Introduction*

This chapter explores the concepts of social exclusion, social capital and care. In particular it illustrates the possibility for informal familial care relationships to become the site of exclusion where policy makers make presumptions of social capital, and/or moral worth. Section 3.2 begins this chapter by providing a brief overview of the different perspectives on the character and causes of social exclusion. Many of the central debates relating to social exclusion are concerned with factors related to the labour market and/or the welfare state. Within these debates theorists often strike a balance between the degree of responsibility attributed to structure or agent Whilst accrediting welfare provisions some causative value, the likes of Murray (1995, 1988) and Mead (1986) place the onus of responsibility on the individual, through debates on the 'underclass' and welfare dependency. In contrast, the likes of Byrne (1999) and Gailbraith (1992) emphasise the role of the labour market in maintaining social inequalities, and consciously or otherwise, perpetuating the existence of the socially excluded.

As a consequence of its socially constructed threshold, this section engages with the concept of social exclusion as a moralising one, whereby normative assertions are made to judge an individual's participation at a macro level. These assertions specify which forms of participation in which structures constitute inclusion, how individuals participate and what degrees of participation, or lack thereof, render an individual unworthy or unable to participate. It is suggested that in order to provide a more holistic understanding of the processes of social exclusion and the means by which these processes are contested it is necessary to engage with the way in which individuals experience and understand thresholds of participation and exclusion at a grounded level, alongside these socially constructed thresholds.

The term social capital has come to be utilised as a measure of, and a means to advocate, social bonds, not necessarily financial in character. Policy makers within the welfare states of Britain and Germany have used the concept of social capital, both directly and indirectly, to advance assertions of who ought to provide 'care'. Section 3.3 explores the potential for the British and German welfare states to cause and exacerbate processes of social exclusion through the use of social capital as a

justification for welfare policies. The current New Labour government in Britain has consistently advocated for the withdrawal of the welfare state in favour of informal provisions of care and a greater emphasis on individual responsibility (Deacon, 2000; Cabinet Office, 2000; Heron and Dwyer, 1999, DSS, 1998) This restructuring is underpinned by the value of social capital as understood by Putnam (2000, 1993, see also Blair, 2002), which is thought, by New Labour, to increase social cohesion as well as lead to the provision of bottom-up, user-friendly services (Golbourne and Solomos, 2003). This conceptualisation of social capital considers it to be generated and accumulated through reciprocal relations based on trust. Where such social networks do not exist individuals are considered to lack a certain degree of moral certainty. Commentators such as Roberts and Devine (2003) have argued that theories of social capital utilised as justification for the reduction of state welfare have the potential to lead to social disadvantage, rather than combat it.

Throughout the late twentieth century the German welfare state has been underpinned by the ideological assertion that the family is the lynchpin to a strong and good society (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2002, Annesley, 2002). Although the terminology of 'social capital' is not expressly used, the values to which it pertains can be seen to permeate through the German welfare state In contrast to the British case policies of the German welfare state that relate to the concept of social capital are akin to the earlier understandings of Bourdieu (1997 (1986), 1977) who emphasises the inherent value of social networks themselves, rather than valuing them for the use to which they can be put. Similar to its British counterpart, when it comes to the care of the elderly the German welfare state favours the provision of informal familial care, rather than formal care (Golbourne and Solomos, 2003, Roberts and Devine, 2003, Annasley, 2002; Seeleib-Kaiser, 2002, Prideaux, 2001; Schulz, 2000, Heron and Dwyer, 1999; van Kersbergen, 1995). This section suggests that the ascription of social capital to familial and other informal networks, leading to the presumption that they can, or should provide care, can have negative and exclusionary effects. Withdrawal of welfare provisions has the potential to exclude already vulnerable individuals, through their subjection to value-laden assertions which render them 'bad' for failing to participate in the morally 'good' act of care

The informal practice of care is often located in the family and can be categorised under headings of financial, emotional, personal and practical (Dean, 2002; Hague *et al*, 2001; Rake, 2000) Section 3.4 explores recent debates which suggest that care as a process occurs within all relationships, highlighting the interdependent character

of social interaction (Sevenhuijsen, 2000, Daly and Lewis, 2000, Shakespeare, 2000) This literature highlights the importance of recognising the person being 'cared for' and the 'carer' as equal, both of whose voices ought to be heard and acted upon (Williams, 2000, 2001, Tronto, 1993). The re-conceptualisation of care is advocated on the belief that informal care work is of equal worth to formal employment carried out in the paid labour market This section suggests that in the absence of such re-conceptualisations, the concept of care remains located within morally judgmental understandings Section 3 5 follows with a brief categorisation of care. As a day-to-day activity, the care relationship is not static, rather, it is constantly negotiated and renegotiated This process of negotiation is articulated in Section 3.6. In such a context, individual negotiations of the care relationship inform the degree to which participants are able to construct their own thresholds of inclusion/exclusion.

The chapter concludes by suggesting that where normative assertions of 'good' and 'bad' are applied to an individual's role in, and practice of, the care relationship, this relationship can become a site of exclusion. This is particularly the case where these assertions are considered to have pre-ordained moral frameworks such as those derived from a religion[1]. This is exacerbated where, for example, care becomes a symbol of what differentiates 'us' from 'them'. In such instances, not only do processes of social exclusion become moralising, they become a means to defend individual identities and community boundaries

3.2 *Normative Assertions and the Process(es) of Social Exclusion*

There are several ways in which one can engage with the concept of social exclusion. It has been defined by Room (1995) as "the process of becoming detached from the organisations and communities that make up society and the rights and obligations they embody" (1995: 243) As a process which takes place in the context of all societal structures, formal and otherwise, social exclusion is multi-dimensional. The Irish Poverty 3 programme views the range of social exclusion's multidimensionality as constituting a failure[2] of one or more societal structures. In particular, the programme highlights four structures, each of which is considered to promote a particular dimension of integration. First identified is the labour market

---

[1] See Chapter 2.
[2] Defining social exclusion as the 'failure' of a system presumes to suggest that there exist optimal conditions for the 'success' of a system, and that such systems are necessarily inclusive, an assumption which is not necessarily accurate.

which enables and facilitates economic integration Secondly, the democratic and legal systems are combined as a means of encouraging civic integration (see also Lockwood, 1999; Marshall, 1992). The third is the welfare system which is considered to promote social integration and, fourthly, the family and community are said to foster interpersonal integration[3] (Berghman, 1995). These structures overlap and intersect with one another, and an individual's strengths, or weaknesses, in one structure can influence his or her inclusion, or exclusion, from another (Oppenheim, 1998). This interconnectedness speaks to the longitudinal dynamics of social exclusion as its effects act as centrifugal forces that progressively exclude individuals from societal structures (Eurostat, 1997; Berghman, 1995; Walker, 1995).

Different categorisations of social exclusion can be applied to different individuals, who are excluded from different structures, in different ways, by different exclusionary forces. The manner in which an individual experiences social exclusion and the way in which that exclusion takes place, is dependant upon the structure that an individual is being excluded from (Eurostat, 1997; Payne and Payne, 1994). For instance, an individual who is excluded from the informal networks of family and community will experience different forces and symptoms of exclusion than somebody who is excluded from the labour market. Nonetheless, both experience social exclusion. The various categories of exclusion and the disparate means by which it can be experienced suggest that it is not necessary for all dimensions of social exclusion to come into play for an individual to become subject to the process More accurate terminology then, refers to the processes of social exclusion, in recognition of the plurality of causes, patterns and effects.

Although exclusion can occur instantaneously, for the most part, processes occur over a period of time, the accumulated effects of which result in an individual's exclusion (Walker, 1995). These processes affect individuals in different ways depending on the individual's social circumstances and what stage of their life they are in (Dewilde, 2003). Longitudinal explorations of the processes of social exclusion allow for holistic and in depth studies of root causes, permanent and transient symptoms, and the degree to which these processes have an effect on an

---

[3] Exclusion from the latter two structures is discussed in Section 3 3. Moreover, it is discussed in depth in relation to the empirical data generated for the purposes of this thesis in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

individual's life course (Perri, 1997; Berghman, 1995). This said, the experience of exclusion is not necessarily reflective of the longitudinal occurrence of its processes.

Vobruba (2000) argues that individuals experience exclusion as occurring in the context of 'decisive situations'. Whilst the processes and patterns of exclusion may affect daily life, Vobruba (2000) suggests that an individual's understanding of what it means to be subject to these processes, and/or be 'excluded', is encapsulated within a particular moment in time So, for instance, it is the opportunity, choice or access to a particular job that is articulated as the threshold of exclusion rather than the processes that lead to access being denied. The dynamics offered by this difference in perception and experience has significant implications for way in which the concept of social exclusion understood.

For the most part, academic considerations of exclusion take place against the framework of formal structures such as the labour market and the welfare state The contexts in which these processes are considered influence the degree to which particular characteristics and facets of exclusion are accentuated in favour of others. Many theories that explore social exclusion within the context of the labour market, highlight its relationship with poverty (Levitas, 1998) Within the context of liberal capitalist states, monetary resources are accurately recognised as a primary means of inclusion. Formal employment within the paid labour market facilitates such inclusion by enabling participation and providing the resources for further inclusion (Byrne, 1999). The perceived relationship between the labour market and the welfare state often leads to considerations of social exclusion within the context of the labour market to be tied to debates surrounding the provision of welfare.

In the 1950's, Titmuss observed three forms of welfare provision; social, occupational and fiscal (Mann, 1992), defined in accordance to their aim, function and relationship with "the division of labour in complex individuated societies" (Titmuss, 1963: 42). The relationship between welfare and the division of labour led to certain forms of welfare to be generally received by a particular 'class' of people As a result they became conceptualised in specified ways. Social welfare became associated with the poor and the 'undeserving'. This stigma led to greater divisions in society, as social welfare became a political tool for both government and the upper, middle and working classes (Mann, 1992) to argue that poverty, for the most part, was down to work shy individuals, rather than structural factors 'Legitimised' access to welfare was restricted to occupational and fiscal welfare, generally

considered to be 'earned' by those individuals in receipt of it This three tier hierarchy, still evident today, is indicative of the way in which capitalist ideology permeates through the construction and implementation of welfare state policies[4] as 'legitimised' access to the welfare state, like the labour market, is subject to an individual's access to monetary resources. Titmuss' formative thesis highlights the role of the welfare state in sustaining social divisions whilst claiming to make reparations for them

In reflection of the 'undeserving' association with social welfare, absence of an individual from the paid labour market is considered, by some, to be reflective of an individual's immoral character. Notwithstanding the potential for structural factors to cause such unemployment, some theories of exclusion give rise to the pathologization of the 'excluded', or as many term the 'underclass'. The terminology of 'underclass' is highly contentious and has in itself, been accused of attaching blame and stigma to the poor (Duncan and Edwards, 1999, Dennis, 1997; Whelan *et al.*, 1995; Gaille, 1994; Bagguley and Mann, 1992, Dean, 1991, Lister, 1990; Field, 1989; Hill, 1985; and Naxman, 1977). This said, it continues to be utilised in academic and political circles as a means to describe those who can, in some circumstances, otherwise be termed 'socially excluded'. Proponents of the underclass debate, such as Murray (1995, 1988) and Mead (1986) describe what they feel to be an immoral affliction amongst the uneducated and 'work shy', exacerbated by state welfare policies.

Murray (1995, 1988) argues that, for the most part, the underclass is responsible for its own exclusion from the labour market, a view reminiscent of Mead (1986) Murray believes that, in addition to being subject to abject moral poverty, those in the underclass are pampered by the welfare state. The availability of benefits as of right, without corresponding responsibilities, provides little incentive for the underclass to gain employment and better their own social position. Such theories of the underclass carry with them moral judgement that stigmatise the poor and put forward perspectives on how one ought to behave in order to be worthy of inclusion, whilst at the same time denying structural factors which may prevent individuals

---

[4] Esping-Andersen (1990) provides a comprehensive and distinguished typology of three different welfare regimes in light of the ideal aim of 'decommodification'; the liberal welfare state, the corporatist-statist model and the social democratic model This model is critiqued by the likes of Bonoli (1997) who argues classification of welfare states should capture how welfare is delivered, as well as how much, above and beyond the concept of decommodification (see also Gough, 2001; Lewis, 1992)

Page 49

from behaving in that way. Aspects of the underclass debate can be seen to have echoes in the policies of the current New Labour government in Britain (Dwyer, 2000).

In its 1998 report on 'Neighbourhood Renewal', the Social Exclusion Unit, a body commissioned by New Labour to comment upon the character and possible solutions of the issue of social exclusion, recommended a series of measures aimed at reducing the gap between the richest and poorest neighbourhoods in Britain. Its recommendations were accompanied by an assessment of the increased 'ghettoisation' of particular neighbourhoods, which resulted in progressively diminishing opportunities, choice, access and ability to participate in wider society In the absence of opportunities for employment and/or advancement, residents were cited as instrumental in the ghettoisation of their own neighbourhoods Similarly, in its 1999 report 'Bridging the Gap' Colley and Hodkinson observe that the Unit identified "social barriers by reference to the generalized characteristics of social groups" (2001: 341). In this report, the Unit (1999) perceives the non-participation and exclusion of youths to be resultant from the failure of professionals and educational establishments, and to be reinforced by negative ideas and values, such as 'there are no jobs', held by the youth themselves.

The position taken by the Unit on the causes of social exclusion, and the responsibility for inclusion, places the onus on the individual. This is further reflected in New Labour's policies to re-equate rights with responsibilities. As Lund suggests, emphasising the relationship between rights and responsibilities serves the purpose of "reconnect[ing] the 'socially excluded' to the mainstream via 'character' improvement" (1999. 447). Deacon attributes much of this attempt to 'enhance moralism' to "Anglicanised communitarianism" with its "emphasis upon moral regeneration and the need for social order" (2000. 12) and the resultant "shift in New Labour thinking from the problem of inequality to the problem of dependency" (2000: 15-16)

Whilst the Unit, and New Labour policies, go some way toward recognising structural factors in the processes of exclusion, they both continue to over-emphasise the degree to which individual agency can combat these constraints, especially where individuals are already vulnerable. Further, the Unit's assessments and New Labour policies do not sufficiently consider the structural and historic factors of causation, which can result in the exclusion of an individual They presume to suggest that

individual participation in society is mainly reliant upon his or her agency, and remains, for the most part, unimpeded by structural factors

In contradiction to the perspective espoused by the likes of Murray (1995, 1988) and Mead (1986), many theorists locate the causes of social exclusion in structural factors, direct and otherwise (Mingioni, 1997) Such factors are considered to be more detrimental to some rather than others. In particular, those who are in poverty are perceived to be particularly susceptible to processes of social exclusion Restricted access to monetary resources is thought to limit the power and choice available to an individual, thus reducing his or her capacity to act in the face of exclusionary processes (Batsleer and Humphries, 2000, Walker, 1995) By providing the means to act, monetary resources give an individual economic power, and corresponding choice, to combat particular forces of exclusion. However, it is not always this simple, as the accumulation of financial resources does not necessarily assuage pre-existing structural barriers (Lister, 1990, Rose, 1981) Such theorists contend that the link between social exclusion and poverty is not necessarily an outcome of individual action, or inaction, as the case may be, but structural forces which prevent the ability to act.

For the most part, theories that explore the relationship between the labour market and social exclusion from a structural perspective are rooted in Marxist observations (Byrne, 1999, Gailbraith, 1992). Within such theories terminology of the 'poor' and the 'socially excluded' is seemingly used synonymously. Walker believes material deprivation results in "limited choices" and "restricted opportunities" (1995: 116) which, he argues, sow the seeds of social exclusion through a process of isolation, as an individual's social bonds in all areas of life are progressively weakened or broken (see also Oppenheim, 1998; Mingione, 1997; Paugman, 1995). Similarly Leisering and Leibfried (1999) perceive the relationship between poverty and social exclusion to be one of degrees. They argue that terminology of 'exclusion' is applicable where poverty has permeated into all aspects of an individual's life, and is not simply restricted to instances where individuals suffer from a lack of minor resources of one kind or another.

Other theorists focus less on the effects exclusion has on the social bonds of an individual, and more upon its socially constructed necessity. Gailbraith (1992) argues liberal capitalist markets give rise to a 'contented majority' and a 'functional underclass'. The existence of the 'functional underclass', he contends, is actively

perpetuated by the contented majority and its representatives in government, in order to maintain their own position. Similarly, Jordan (1996) perceives the increase of commercialisation to accompany a rise in competitiveness, rather than interdependence, between individuals He believes this competitiveness results in distributional coalitions that collude to get the lowest rent at the expense of those external to them In an earlier comparable argument Mann (1992) observes the working class advance of terms such as 'undeserving poor' worked as a means to distinguish them from the lowest rung of the ladder, thereby maintaining, if not improving, their own social position. The working classes, through their use of negative terminology, were instrumental in the creation of the 'underclass'. The views of Galbraith (1992), Jordan (1996) and Mann (1992) are particularly salient for this thesis as they suggest that the social bonds between individuals or groups can act as gatekeepers, which govern access to certain structures or arenas of society Moreover, the 'moral' positioning adopted by particular groups in relation to others can inform the degree to which the 'immoral' or 'bad' are included.

Exclusion that is propagated by individual gatekeepers can form structurally embedded processes. This is evident from Byrne's (1999) critique of capitalist structures conceptualising the 'poor' as a 'reserve army of labour'. Byrne argues the exclusion of the 'poor' is a direct and inevitable consequence of an unfettered liberal capitalist market. This reserve army, Byrne argues, is consciously or unconsciously maintained as a means by which the labour market can be perpetuated. In this sense, Byrne echoes the views of Galbraith (1992), as both locate the causality of social exclusion in the attempt to maintain the status quo. These attempts sustain the 'lower' position of particular groups or classes, perpetuating economic inequalities in favour of the 'higher'.

Many of the theorists that focus upon monetary inclusion do not restrict exclusion to the lower 'class' schema[5]. In 1996, Hutton put forward a 30/30/40 divide in society He argues class divides are becoming increasingly blurred as a result of continual insecurity within the labour market Social exclusion resulting from limited or no access to monetary resources is no longer the sole property of the lower classes (Beck, 1992; Morris and Irwin, 1992). Despite this recognition, the sustained focus upon issues such as the 'underclass' results in other divisions in society, such as those put forward by Hutton, being ignored (Westergaard, 1992)

---

[5] The concept of class is discussed in greater depth by Runciman (1990).

Just as the likes of Murray (1995, 1988) and Mead (1992), rest the onus of exclusionary symptoms on the individual, inaccurately placing too great an emphasis on agency, theorists such as Byrne (1999) and Gailbraith (1992) fail to take into account the role of the excluded, reducing them to passive recipients of 'bad' structural forces (Lister, 1996) The construction of social exclusion as originating from an either/or dichotomy of structure or agent does not sufficiently consider the interdependent role of society and individual in the formation of social relations and reality (Giddens, 1991, 1984, 1979, see also King, 2000, Mouzelis, 1997) A study conducted by Eurostat (1997) concluded that processes of social exclusion consist of mechanisms, some of which are related to the individual and others to the characteristics and/or dynamisms of society. Even this, however, does not go far enough in recognising that both structure and agency play a role in all processes of exclusion.

Whilst Byrne (1999) asserts the necessity to recognise the role the 'excluded' play in the perpetuation of liberal capitalist markets, he does not extend this recognition to the role they play in their own 'exclusion', nor does he take into account their perspectives on whether they consider themselves to be 'excluded'. Whether theories of social exclusion lay the onus of responsibility upon the individual or upon structures, by neglecting to consider perceptions of the excluded they almost invariably perpetuate structurally constructed thresholds of exclusion In so doing, they reproduce normative assertions of what it means to be included or excluded, and, the means by which participation, and/or inclusion, is or ought to be measured

In theorising processes of social exclusion, academics on opposite ends of the spectrum, such as Murray (1995) and Byrne (1999) are guilty of advancing prescriptive conceptualisations of society, which foster moral positions on what individuals are excluded from, what characterises individual participation in 'society', and why those who are excluded are considered 'unable' or 'unworthy' of inclusion. Theories of social exclusion propagate perspectives of the 'right' way to behave through their assertions of socially constructed thresholds of inclusion that do not take into consideration individual perspectives on the structures themselves, the means or resources with, and through which to participate and what constitutes participation Through such application, the concept of social exclusion itself becomes moralising Further, where or should individuals choose not to be included, should exclusion be the preferred option to participation, the moralistic stance

equating participation to 'good' means such individuals become subject to debates such as 'underclass'. As Colley and Hodkinson observe, "such a focus on attitudes, values and behaviours is the hallmark of discourses which place a moral interpretation upon social exclusion, and pathologize those considered to be socially excluded" (2001: 7) As suggested in Chapter 2, the moral voice of the community has the potential to utilise just such moralising and pathologizing processes to regulate the behaviour of individual members, so as to ensure they maintain conformity to the norms and values upon which its boundaries are based (Durkheim, 2002, 1984, Faqir, 2001; Etzioni, 1998, 1997, 1995, Afshar, 1994)

Pre-occupation with socially constructed thresholds of inclusion runs the risk of overlooking alternative perspectives of what, and how, participation can be achieved (Powers and Wilson, 2000). In particular, conceptualising access to monetary resources as the primary means to combat the symptoms of social exclusion, and as the major (significant) cause of social exclusion, is inattentive to alternative values attached to social bonds (Levitas, 1998) Whilst recognising that monetary resources form a primary means of inclusion in a liberal capitalist society is not inaccurate, it only offers a narrow conceptualisation of what social exclusion can, and does, mean for individuals (Roche, 1997) Further, to reduce social exclusion to the consideration of monetary indicators is to devalue the social bond as nothing more than a financially dependent affiliation with society. Such theories of exclusion are, according to Colley and Hodkinson 'missed opportunity', "for the term 'social exclusion' offers the possibility of reflecting multidimensional aspects of inequality and disadvantage, pertaining to participatory citizenship, democratic rights and wider social bonds, which go beyond definitions focused solely on economic deprivation" (2001. 8).

The imposition of socially constructed thresholds of exclusion upon an individual, because he or she is considered to meet the criteria of what it means to be excluded, dis-empowers the individual concerned. Such imposition negates his or her participation in society and its structures through alternative resources and relationships, suggests restricted means of participation and promotes the idea that exclusion is necessarily 'bad', rather than allowing for the potential that it may have been a choice (Vobruba, 2000). In contrast to the dominant literature, the theoretical understanding of social exclusion within this thesis is principally concerned with an individual rather than a socially constructed perspective.

At a European level, conceptualisations of social exclusion focus upon the weakening or breakdown of an individual's social bonds, rather than through measurement of his or her economic/financial indicators (Eurostat, 1997). In order to explore social exclusion in a manner that is sensitive to alternative understandings of participation, and in recognition of the different values and connotations attached to social bonds, it is necessary to consider how and where individuals construct the threshold to inclusion/exclusion. This grants individuals a voice, enabling them to articulate their own experiences of exclusion rather than have one imposed upon them (Williams, 2001). Such conceptualisations of exclusion also recognise the potential for social bonds other than the financial, such as the care relationship, to be located as the site of social exclusion It also allows for different degrees of exclusion from the same structure as some individuals are better equipped, or more willing, to combat processes of exclusion than others. It is with this in mind that this thesis explores processes of social exclusion from within the informal structures of Pakistani Muslim communities.

The greater ability of some individuals to combat processes of social exclusion, in comparison to others has been attributed to their recourse to alternative social bonds. The exercise of these bonds and the values they give rise to can be conceptualised as 'social capital' (Putnam, 2000, 1993; Bourdieu, 1986). The weaker an individual's social bonds become, the more vulnerable an individual becomes to processes of social exclusion from all structures Progressive weakening of bonds corresponds with diminished power to act, as individuals are unable to call upon the resources these bonds would have offered (Putnam 2000, 1993, Bourdieu 1986). The use of social capital, as providing an alternative means to conceptualise an individual's inclusion and participation in society, is not, however, without its problems.

3.3 *The Accumulation of Social/Symbolic Capital*

As a concept which places emphasis on resources and relationships independently of their monetary value, the principle of social capital has come to be utilised by the British, and to a lesser extent German, welfare states as a means of creating a more cohesive society. There is considerable difference between Britain and Germany, both in the way social capital is conceptualised and the policy outcomes it gives rise to This said, policies of both welfare states cultivate didactic assertions of what constitutes 'good' social capital and what does not.

3.3.1 *The British Case*

Welfare provision in Britain is not the sole domain of the formal welfare state, rather, it is constituted by a variety of suppliers, the state, commercial sector, and the informal sector of voluntary organisations and other networks such as families[6], friends, neighbours and communities The formal British welfare state is increasingly withdrawing in favour of these informal welfare provision. In addition, the New Labour agenda for the British welfare state incorporates a shift toward "reciprocity rather than monadic individualism" (Heron and Dwyer, 1999 92) reflecting a drive toward re-equating rights with responsibilities[7] (see Deacon, 2000) This shift is thought to promote an increasingly 'stakeholder' society, which encourages individuals to be active citizens as well as improves the accumulation of social capital. In doing so the government aims to establish a reform of the welfare system which "helps people help themselves" (DSS, 1998: 8). This onus on individual responsibility is also being stretched to encourage disadvantaged groups to take responsibility for, and positive action towards, redressing the balance of equity and equality. In 2000 the Social Exclusion Unit published a report that encouraged 'partnerships' between local communities of minority ethnic groups and health service providers as a means to reduce the inequalities such groups faced within the health sector.

The current New Labour government places a large degree of importance upon the role of communities and families in the governance and social participation of particular groups. The restructuring of the welfare state is legitimised through this emphasis as New Labour argue care[8] is best provided within the contexts of local, informal networks. This is thought to serve a dual purpose, as it generates social capital, thereby enhancing the 'wealth' of communities and localities, as well as provides more sensitive welfare provisions (Golbourne and Solomos, 2003, Cabinet Office, 2000).

Reliance on notions of social capital to promote the benefits of an embedded moral order, and community 'cohesion', underpin New Labour's belief in the communitarian ideal (Heron and Dwyer, 1999, see also Deacon, 2002, 2000) By generating reciprocal relationships social capital is a means by which individuals are

---

[6] There are a wide variety of social, political and moral views taken toward what constitutes, or ought to constitute 'the family', see fn 9, Chapter 2.
[7] A view also espoused by the American Communitarian Amatai Etzioni (1998, 1997, 1995). See Chapter 2.
[8] What is meant by 'care' in this context is discussed in Section 3 4.

equipped to tackle social exclusion The principle of reciprocity, which underpins social capital, means individuals can call upon others to reimburse them for positive actions of the past. In this way interpersonal bonds, and the actions taken within the context of these bonds, become a resource that can provide the power to promote inclusion or combat exclusion

The term 'social capital' is highly contentious and has been conceptualised in many different, and in some cases contradictory, ways. A leading proponent of the term in America is Robert Putnam (2000, 1993), whose conceptualisation of the term is explicitly utilised by New Labour in its welfare agenda Robert Putnam's work on social capital promotes much of the same moral high ground as that of Etzioni's thesis of communitarianism, (1998, 1997, 1995)[9]. Putnam perceives social capital in terms of social networks, reciprocity and trust (Edmondson, 2003). He argues that in much of America families that have a high degree of unemployment and/or communities with ethnic diversity have replaced positive social capital with negative social capital (Edwards, 2003).

In his study of Italian regional governments, Putnam put forward the notion that social capital breeds social capital, "them as has, gets" (1993. 3). According to his study, democracy works where people "trust one another to act fairly and obey the law" (1993. 2). Societies that "foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity" (1993: 3) and where individuals act on the premise that "I'll do this for you now, in the expectation that down the road you or someone else will return the favour" (1993: 3) are considered, by Putnam, to be rich in social capital. Social capital is generated where individuals have reciprocal relationships with one another, and not simply where they live as a collective, sharing common beliefs, traits or symbols (Putnam, 2000). With striking similarities to Murray's (1995, 1998) theory on the 'underclass', Putnam attributes, at least in part, the social and economic isolation of inner city Blacks and Latinos to "profound deficiencies in social capital" (1993 5)[10]. The underlying subtext of Putnam's theory is the lack of moral virtues in those who

---

[9] As such, the use of Putnam legitimises New Labour's reliance on potentially authoritarian and prescriptive Communitarian ideology.

[10] Regardless of arguing that he does not do so, Putnam (1993) is exposed to the same accusations of blaming the victim as many underclass theorists are. His theory is also highly normative and patriarchal in its assertions. He goes so far as suggesting equality in the workplace for women has eroded the social capital generated from active parenting and familial networks In so doing he does not consider the structurally constructed restrictions and gendered roles which such 'active parenting' and familial networks imply.

have not accumulated networks rich in social capital. Coleman (1993) suggests that this absence in moral virtue has wider affects as a decline in social capital leads to the inability of "geographical communities to exert appropriate forms of social control over children and other community members" (*cited in*, Bruegel and Warren, 2003· 320).

Social capital is seen as a moral resource, which increases the more it is used, and decreases the more it is left and ignored New Labour's use of the term relies on Putnam's assertion that social capital "serves as a kind of collateral for men and women who are excluded from ordinary credit or labor markets" (Putnam, 1993: 6 *sic*). Many of New Labour policies aim to encourage the growth of social capital by developing the infrastructure for voluntary organisations to form cross-cultural and cross-gendered links and resources. It is thought that the accumulation of social capital through the reciprocal relationships such networks generate will enable individuals and voluntary organisations to develop local solutions to local problems, whilst empowering individuals to succeed in the labour market (Blair, 2002) The ideology of competition and market principles that are applied by New Labour to welfare provisions (Prideaux, 2001) ignore the inherent inequalities such systems engender Moreover, and in much the same way as socially constructed thresholds of inclusion/exclusion, they perpetuate popular assertions of a 'good' way to behave and participate in society.

By applying competitive principles to voluntary sector initiatives New Labour forces volunteer organisations to compete with one another for funds, and overwhelms them in red tape, making it all the more difficult for them to achieve their aims (Roberts and Devine, 2003). Putnam's "them as has, gets" (1993: 3) assertion intimates that those groups and localities that are already disadvantaged will become even more so, as they are unable, or unwilling, to mobilise the resources and labour power that other localities are able to, in order to attract funding streams. This is compounded by structural inequalities as the study conducted by Woods *et al* (1998) shows. This study found that working class parents were unable to accumulate the same degree of social capital, through participation in their child's schooling, as their middle class counterparts because their involvement was viewed as suspicious by teachers. Thus, the infrastructure Blair speaks of is often established in localities which may not be the ones most in need.

Bruegel and Warren (2003) observe that social capital, in much the same way as communities, is from the outset, exclusive. As a network of reciprocal relationships grounded on trust, the possession of social capital necessarily demarcates between those who are included within the network and those who are not. This is attributed in particular to the possession of 'bonding' social capital, the possession of which allows poorer communities to pool together their resources to protect themselves from market inequalities On the flip side bonding social capital may enable richer communities to close their walls to anyone else, thereby restricting opportunity and advancement At best the restructuring of the welfare state, as justified by New Labour, is a positive, but not necessarily effective, move toward encouraging the accumulation of social capital, and, at worst, a drive toward economic efficiency at the expense of the most (financially) vulnerable[11] (Prideaux, 2001).

New Labour's understandings of social capital may also commodify the care relationship. The more calls for the care relationship to be recognised as paid employment succeed, the more society may continue to value social relationships for the monetary value they yield. This in itself has the potential to devalue the care relationship and the ethics upon which it is based, as the care recipient moves from being a loved and valued member of social networks, to being a commodity, the care of whom will yield personal benefit to the individual carer. Such a perception does not sufficiently consider the immense personal benefit that can arise out of caring for members of ones family, community or even strangers (Williams, 2000). It would be better to suggest that the social bond of the care relationship should be valued for the sake of the bond itself and the degree to which it enriches social life. Even then, however, there is potential for this bond to be used as an exclusionary tool

The restructuring of the British welfare state, and the increasingly prevalent role taken by informal service providers, can be problematic (Johnson, 1990) as current demographic trends have led observers to predict that there will be fewer 'carers'[12], and more people requiring care, by the year 2025 (European Commission, 1996). In addition, such informal care is often gendered and unpaid, which means the onus of responsibility falls to women, who, as a result, can become subject to

---

[11] As the cross country comparative study by Heady *et al* (2000) demonstrates, economic efficiency and generous welfare provisions are not necessarily anti-thetical to one another

[12] The term carer is used here in the traditional sense, and does not allow for the recognition that everybody in society is at once a carer and is cared for, see Section 3 4.

marginalisation and exclusion (Lewis, 2000). The welfare state has the potential to not only exacerbate the problems of those already subject to many forms of exclusion, but also, through the shift of responsibility onto informal networks of care, cause the exclusion of those who otherwise may not be vulnerable

3.3.2 *The German case*

Since its inception the German concept of citizenship has focused on duties rather than rights, prioritising the family, social groups and distributional justice (van Kersbergen, 1995) As a result, the welfare state[13] has operated on the basis of providing welfare only if, and when, the family or community is no longer able to do so. Of late however, this ideology is thought to be incorporating a more 'liberal' stance. Similar to New Labour's individualistic emphasis on re-trenching rights with responsibilities, the German welfare state is in the process of considering which rights ought to be attached to duties (Annesley, 2002). The political direction in which the German welfare state is heading is considered by Schulz (2000) to be following the mould cast by New Labour's Third Way. A small number of the Schroeder cabinet have argued that the German welfare state and the *Sozialstaat* ideology it is underpinned by, ought to be reconstituted to "make each man the keeper of his own fate" (Schulz, 2000: 49). The liberal implementation of welfare policies in Germany are often constructed with conservative ideologies in mind. Whilst advocating a more liberal approach to the labour market, the underlying subtext of German welfare policy remains the traditional notion of the 'family'.

The term social capital has not been explicitly used in the formulation of German welfare state policies. Nevertheless, the values behind ensuring the welfare state remains centrally informed by the perpetuation and sustenance of family, and social groups, speaks to an inherent drive toward maintaining social capital. In the relationship between 'foreigners'[14] and the welfare state, ethnicity itself has come to be utilised as a means to generate social capital. As Bulpett observes the German corporatist welfare state has always "respected the collective voice" of social groups, which it believes "enables effective democratic participation by ordinary tenants" (2002: 146).

---

[13] A more detailed exploration of the position of 'immigrant' groups within the German welfare state will be discussed in Chapter 5.
[14] The persistent terminology used to describe non-ethnic/non-national individuals resident in Germany

A large part of the administration, provision and regulation of welfare services and social assistance schemes in Germany are the remit of the Church and voluntary welfare associations (Alber, 2001) Upon their migration to Germany, the principle of free association which governs their political participation, led to a trend amongst labour migrants, and other groups, to develop "self initiated social advisory and care services" (Bommes *et al*, 1999· 103). These voluntary organisations were encouraged on the premise that groups based around shared networks of ethnicity would be able to represent their communities at a structural level and facilitate their own welfare provision These are supported by particular sections of the Church such as Caritas (linked to the Catholic Church), Worker's Welfare (*Arbeiterwohlfahrt*, a social democratic agency) or the Protestant Church's Deacon Agency (*Diakonisches Werk*). "These agencies negotiated a broader conception of 'care for foreigners' with the Federal government during the 1960's" (Bommes *et al.*, 1999: 103). "Ethnicity is, in this context, used as a practical resource of organisation" (Bommes *et al*, 1999: 104), which enabled and facilitated formal welfare provision to these groups.

Social capital accumulated through, and within, reciprocal networks can be utilised as a resource whilst participating in formal political and welfare structures In contrast to the British competitive welfare system, volunteer organisations in Germany are often funded in a sustainable manner by the Church. This form of funding increases the social stratification between 'Germans' and 'non-Germans', the latter of which, and notwithstanding their participation, are consistently under-represented at public forums (Bulpett, 2002). In keeping with the trend towards increasingly liberal politics, there are moves toward more competitive funding structures in Germany which are proving to be increasingly negative on the solidarity and mutual trust generated by the social capital of such groups (Bulpett, 2002). This is especially significant given that the capital accumulated within voluntary organisations and families is more akin to Bourdieu's (1997 (1986), 1977) notion of symbolic capital, than Putnam's conceptualisation of social capital. Bourdieu is particularly salient for this thesis as not only do his theories of social/symbolic capital place the family at the centre of such conceptualisations, but he is also concerned with the relationship between capital and class based power (Edwards *et al*, 2003).

Symbolic capital is referred to as such because it symbolises the value of the relationship, and the relationship itself, as well as its economic worth. The symbolic

value of this relationship is termed as capital by Bourdieu, because in other circumstances, and between other people or actors, the same reciprocal relationship has the potential to be purely economical. According to Bourdieu, "what is valued is activity for its own sake, regardless of its strictly economic function" (1977 175) This is profoundly different to New Labour's conceptualisation of social capital because it speaks to the value an individual places upon the principle of reciprocity, rather than, as is the case with Putnam (2000, 1993) and his communitarian compatriots, to a morally deterministic ideal model of the way society ought to be constructed.

Nevertheless, the underlying subtext of 'family' within German welfare policies continues to place values of 'good' and 'bad' on the way individuals should behave. The corporatist welfare model, held to be akin to the German welfare state by Esping-Andersen (1990) "is shaped by the church and the Catholic principle of subsidiarity and is, as such, ' strongly c ommitted to the p reservation o f t raditional family-hood'" (Annesley, 2002. 84, see also Seeleib-Kaiser, 2002). This view is reflected in German "family links [that] have a strong component of obligation" (Naegele and Walker, 2002: 11). Historically, this focus on family has translated into state policies that actively discourage female employment in the labour market, and encourage the perpetuation of gendered divisions within the 'family' (Vogt and Zwingel, 2003). This is particularly evident from policies geared toward children The combined cost of the universal child allowance and the child rearing allowance represents almost 5 per cent of the social budget (Alber, 2001). Under the previous Christian-Democrat led government, laws which legislated for parental leave after the birth of a child restricted both parents taking leave simultaneously. As a result take u p o f t his p rovision was a lmost a lways b y t he m other In a ddition, f inancial benefits such as pension credits for those who are child-rearing, whilst going some way towards recognising the importance of informal work, were considered by observers to encourage women to stay at home. Such provisions and the resultant absence of many women from the labour market has had a profound affect upon the employability and career progression of women choosing to return to employment (Gottschall and Bird, 2003; Kolinsky, 1993).

Since 1998, the Social Democratic Chancellor, Gerhard Shroeder (SDP), in coalition with The Greens, has taken active steps to reduce the inequalities faced by women within the labour market and the informal sector. Since 2002 both parents can take parental leave simultaneously This measure is intended to encourage both fathers

and mothers to take parental leave, thereby equalising the position of women in the labour market with that of their male counterparts. The government has also promised to spend several billion dollars on increasing childcare provision, which it hopes will allow women greater flexibility for employment and education (Vogt and Zwingel, 2003). Nevertheless, these policies, although encouraging women out of the s phere o f t he 'family', a re aimed a t t he p erpetuation o f 'healthy f amilies', by ensuring that "workplaces of the future will ..become more family orientated" (Vogt and Zwingel, 2003: 468).

The exhortative and institutional design of the German welfare state is considered by Seeleib-Kaiser (2002) to be in a period of transition. The new emphasis of social policy on the 'needs' of the family underscores the fact that there is not only a process of re-commodification, but also, and perhaps even more importantly, a redefinition of state responsibilities Increasingly, support for the family through public policies has become the "'new' normative reference point for social policy, whereas in the past it was primarily related to the risks of the wage earner" (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2002: 35). In contrast to the British welfare state that advocates the strengthening of f amilial and community ties with a corresponding withdrawal of public welfare, the German welfare state aims at doing so with positive welfare reinforcements of these bonds. In relation to the family, social capital is institutionalised. The positive action taken by the German welfare state to encourage, sustain and perpetuate the family is akin to what Bourdieu would refer to as, an "endless effort at institution" where "the network of relationships is the product of investment strategies, individual or collective, consciously or unconsciously aimed at establishing or reproducing social relationships that are directly usuable in the short or long term" (1997: 52).

The German welfare state not only positively encourages the sustenance of family through f inancial incentives b ut o vertly e xpects t he f amily t o a ssume t he p rimary role as carer. Social assistance in Germany takes one of two forms *Hilfe in besonderen Lebenslagen* (assistance in special situation), is for ill and disabled people a nd f or p eople w ith c ostly c are n eeds. *H ilfe z um L ebensunterhalt* (general assistance for the cost of living) provides regular payments for people in private households with insufficient income These provisions, however, are contingent upon an individual's familial status. "Social assistance is paid according to the principle of subsidiarity, that is to say, help from alternative sources must be used up or ruled out first" (Annesley, 2002 86)

The German approach to care of the elderly is comparable to that of the British, as formal welfare provisions are retracted in favour of individual responsibility and informal provisions. A core element of the conservative welfare state in Germany is categorised by "its reliance on the family and other communal groups in delivering social services" (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2002: 26). Similar to its preceding Christian Democrat government, the federal government of the SDP has continued to reduce state responsibility for the elderly by limiting "social insurance contributions, by reducing the replacement rate and encouraging occupational and private arrangements in securing larger parts of retirement income" (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2002: 32)[15]. This is particularly problematic for migrant elders who may not have the requisite familial support and for elderly females who, traditionally, were encouraged to remain within the home, and consequently have little or no financial capability to provide for their own care (Bulpett, 2002)

The moralising stance taken by the German welfare state on the care of the elderly is reminiscent of both the conceptualisations of social/symbolic capital of Bourdieu (1977) and that of Coleman (1997 (1988)) Presumptions of the benefits of familial care for the elderly, advocated by the welfare state, are directly linked to the institutionalisation of these relationships at an early age. Coleman believes the accumulation of social capital, within the family, occurs as "parents invest in their children, as the next generation of the family who will in turn support them in later life" (cited in, Edwards *et al.*, 2003. 4, see also Coleman 1997 (1988)) Notwithstanding Bourdieu's (1977) belief that all capital is inherently rooted in economic reasoning, he perceives the development of social capital within families to give rise to institutionalised obligations that are continually re-constructed and re-constituted. Although both Bourdieu and Coleman's understanding of the principle of reciprocity provide justification for the blanket expectation, held by German welfare state, that the elderly will be cared for in the first instance by their families, Bourdieu recognises that such reciprocity is malleable and negotiable This malleability is particularly relevant given the transient character of familial relationships and structures (Gillies, 2003).

3.3.3 Social Capital as a Means to Exclude

---

[15] See Chapter 5.

Social capital generated through familial and community networks of care is seen as a resource that can promote integration and social cohesion. Edwards (2003) argues that the social policy pre-occupation with social capital has "emphasised local, micro-level phenomena at the expense of macro-level issues of social redistribution and crucial integrality of micro and macro, and legitimised state withdrawal from welfare service delivery" (2003: 306) The presumption of social capital as a means of legitimising any macro-level welfare policy, whether that be in the form of withdrawal, or to a lesser extent greater intervention, is problematic As Edmondson (2003) observes conditions for social capital cannot be politically constructed, especially in neo-liberal contexts With specific reference to Britain, Roberts and Devine (2003) highlight that the political use of social capital, where not accompanied by a consideration of the historical context, often results in a neglect of the inherent problems associated with a reduction in formal welfare state provisions. This observation can be extended to the German welfare provisions for the elderly, which, similar to their British counterparts are being reduced in favour of familial and individual responsibility. Thus utilised issues of social capital legitimise and detract from dealing with wider issues of social inequality, poverty and social exclusion.

Roberts and Devine (2003) suggest that the hollowing out (Jessop, 1999) of the welfare state which characterises New Labour's approach, whilst aiming at providing the means and purpose of strengthening social capital, is weighted toward diminishing the capacity to develop such networks. The reduction of formal welfare provisions by the state may lead to those vulnerable to exclusion, or those already excluded, to become further excluded (Dwyer, 2000, 1998). Where not matched with social equality and the means to access and participate in structures such an understanding of social capital has the potential to increase the divide within society between the included and the excluded, rather than decrease it. This is all the more problematic where issues of 'care' are involved as those in need of significant 'care' are at a particularly vulnerable stage in their life course.

Whilst the understandings of community social capital by the British and German welfare state may contribute to processes of social exclusion, possession of social capital by individuals can facilitate and support their inclusion Given the focus of this thesis upon individual understandings of social exclusion it is this individual possession of social capital which is particularly salient.

3.4 *The Care Relationship*

The informal activity of care is a pervading feature of familial relationships. This notwithstanding, there remain significant concerns over the way in which care is, or ought to be conceptualised. Sevenhuijsen observes that care is "a social process and a daily human activity" (2000: 12). Such an assessment re-evaluates the importance of care, equating its significance to societal life with that of, for example, the paid labour market Despite the role of care within everyday social relations, it is often devalued by policy makers in favour of the perceived financial, social and moral importance of paid employment (Dean, 2002; Hague *et al*, 2001; Williams, 2000, Lister, 2000; Rake, 2000). Moreover, perceptions, exercise and receipt of care are gendered, reflecting the fact that it is mostly practised by females, and the view that it is in a woman's 'nature' (McKie *et al* 2001). These gendered references to care, coupled with its disproportionate worth vis-à-vis the paid labour market suggests that for elders, gender, income levels and family circumstances may be just as important as date of birth, when it comes to the redistribution of wealth by the welfare state (Hills, 1996).

The continued derogation of care to the informal does not recognise its importance in the sustenance of the labour market, nor does it provide adequate recognition for the social importance of 'carer' and 'cared for'. As a result those in receipt of care are often typecast and dis-empowered, pigeonholed as 'dependants', and those who provide care are relegated to second-class citizens, in favour of their 'employed', and by implication, more respectable, counter-parts

Daly and Lewis (2000) conceptualise care so as to re-define its importance in society. Termed as social care, Daly and Lewis believe it is a multi-dimensional concept, of which they emphasise three They argue for care to be recognised as labour, attributing to it the same social value as that commonly attached to paid employment in the formal labour market. Secondly, they consider care to exist within a framework of obligation and responsibility, which underline its provision in social or familial settings. Within this context they also draw attention to the role of social/societal relations and the state in strengthening or weakening these norms of obligation and responsibility (see also Sevenhuijsen, 2000). Such an influence can occur in a number of ways. As the previous section suggests, New Labour aims to reinforce these norms through reducing formal provisions from the welfare state, whilst the German welfare state aims to do so through positive financial and policy action (Golbourne and Solomos, 2003, Roberts and Devine, 2003; Vogt and

Zwingel, 2003, Seeleib-Keiser, 2002; Alber, 2001; Heron and Dwyer, 1999) Finally Daly and Lewis (2000) highlight the importance of recognising the cost of care in both financial and emotional terms. This multi-dimensional consideration of care points out the relevance and affects of the normative, social and economic framework within which care is carried out

In bringing attention to the value of care in relation to the labour market Daly and Lewis (2000) question the inferior status of care, care recipients, and carers, in mainstream policy discourse, in comparison to issues of paid employment. Their re-conceptualisation and recalibration of the value of care suggests the existing importance accorded to formal participation in the paid labour market is based upon superficial evaluations of economic worth The every day social occurrence of 'care' facilitates and enables formal economic labour, and thus ought to be attributed just as much financial importance as paid work. Reconfiguring the balance between formal paid employment and informal unpaid care is particularly salient in the context of labour migration. Ascribing importance solely, or predominantly to paid employment negates the migratory experiences and sacrifices made by many women in order to facilitate and enable the paid labour market participation of their husbands, fathers, brothers and sons (Gardner, 2002).

Questioning the gendered perceptions of care, Daly and Lewis (2000) argue it is guided not through any inherent characteristic of the individual, but by obligations and responsibilities which hereto have been assumed the realm of women[16]. Normative assumptions of how one ought to behave are themselves gendered, the rightful responsibility of care often placed squarely on the shoulders of women. Given the potential for communities to become moralising structures the subjection of care relationships to such directive frameworks is a significant consideration for the context of this thesis By recognising the 'costs' of care, Daly and Lewis (2000) also question the silent assumption that care 'just gets done', and acknowledge that someone, in some way, bears this cost. When considering the costs of 'care' however, it is crucial to remember that overemphasis of such costs can result in an inequitable power balance within the care relationship and enhance suppositions of dependency and debt. Whilst recognising the costs of care in a wider societal context

---

[16] There has been debate as to the different moral frameworks of men and women (Gilligan 1982).

is important, it requires a delicate balancing as its presumption within a care relationship can infer that the care recipient is 'indebted' to the carer

Notwithstanding the importance of Daly and Lewis' (2000) observations, their conceptualisation lacks due consideration of those being 'cared for'. By defining care as an 'activity', they insufficiently consider, despite paying lip service to it, that care is a relationship. Their theory sustains the implication that those in receipt of care are unable to care for themselves. As Tronto (1993) reminds us, presumptions of dependency in care relationships are misleading, and do not recognise that everyone in society, from the young to the old, rich to the poor, and 'able' to the 'disabled', are interdependent. Such a recognition requires a broader conceptualisation of dependency, moving from a restricted and narrow view of physical dependency to incorporating other forms such as social dependency (Shakespeare, 2000). It also requires a broader conceptualisation of 'care' to include such things as housework and cleaning, which contextualise and locate different degrees and experiences of dependency In addition to such a re-conceptualisation it is important not to forsake the calls for independence. It should be recognised that interdependence is not antithetical to diversity and autonomy[17], and should be permeated by values of equality and respect. Conceptualisations of care as an interdependent reciprocal social relationship should acknowledge the civil rights of the person being cared for, as well as those of the carer (Sevenhuijsen, 1998).

Shakespeare (2000) advocates a similar re-conceptualisation of care that recognises it as occurring within a set of relations in which the interests of both parties are of equal importance, and where care is redefined in light of its invaluable and universal role in society at large. Shakespeare's theory emphasises, in particular, that care is a practice engaged in by everybody. In addition to the everyday interdependent experience of care, Shakespeare also highlights that at particular points of an individual's life course, an individual is more or less dependent given his or her circumstances. This does not preclude their independence at other times in their life course or indeed, in other relationships.

In promoting the call for autonomy and independence, Williams (2000) identifies a 'politics of recognition', which aims to credit the contributions of both carer and

---

[17] In order to genuinely achieve this there needs to be a re-assessment of socially constructed labels such as 'disability' which continue to denote categories of 'normal' and 'ab-normal' (Barnes, 1990).

cared for, as well as highlighting the importance of care as a social relationship Williams catalogues seven principles encompassed in this politics, interdependency, care, intimacy, bodily integrity, identity, trans-national welfare and voice These seven principles combined seek to make care a more socially justiciable[18] concept Williams' understandings of interdependency and care are similar to those already outlined The role of intimacy within this politics is to recognise that care does not only concern duty and responsibility, but also involves love and respect The fourth ethic, bodily integrity, seeks to ensure the right of an individual to protect ones body from internal and external abuse, and speaks to the power dimension of the care relationship. This power dimension is also evident in the fifth ethic of identity, which acknowledges that individuals are entitled to be recognised as one-self and accepted The ethic of identity accepts an individual's right to determine, and have recognised, his or her feelings of belonging, which have the potential to change the meaning of family, community and nation The sixth ethic of trans-national welfare contextualises the care relationship through the recognition that care is no longer the sole domain of nations states, rather the provision of informal and formal welfare occurs across nations (see also, Williams, 2001). The final principle of voice advocates listening to both the 'cared for' as well as the 'carer'.

For the purposes of this exploration the notion of voice bears particular salience It is only through listening to the voice of carers and care recipients that it is possible to appreciate the nuances of the care relationship Only those actively and consciously engaged in the care relationship can explicate what they feel is their right, what the costs of care are (for both carer and care recipient), and the framework of obligation to which it is subject. Listening to the voice of all participants within the care relationship also allows for greater understandings of circumstances where the rights of carer and care recipient collide As this study intends to explore social exclusion through the lens of familial care, recognition of an individual's voice provides a discerning and incisive picture as to an individual's threshold of exclusion where it is related to the care relationship (Vobruba, 2000). Further, this thesis engages and develops these principles through the perspectives of Pakistani Muslims in diaspora.

Whilst providing for a more equitable relationship between carer and cared for, the

---

[18] For an introduction to the term 'social justice' see Jordan (1998) and Franklin (1998).

politics of recognition (Williams, 2000) does not go far enough in stressing the importance of care vis-à-vis other societal structures. The notion of intimacy, which recognises the role of love and trust in a care relationship glosses over the degree to which such relationships are also governed, or influenced by, prescriptive and moralising understandings of obligation and duty (Daly and Lewis, 2000) In defence of Williams the politics of recognition can be seen as an ideal model of the way in which the care relationship ought to be conceptualised. However, such idealised visions are unlikely to be achieved if they insufficiently articulate the structures in which care relationships are constructed Williams' (2001) later theory of a 'political ethic of care', emphasises the civic virtues of care. This goes some way toward recognising the importance of care vis-à-vis other social relationships but remains ambivalent to the framework in which such relations are constructed (Daly and Lewis 2000).

There is a necessity to re-constitute the values attributed to care, particularly in relation to 'formal' social activities such as paid employment. As an everyday social activity, the exercise of care within the 'informal' sector allows activities within the 'formal' arena of societal interaction to continue. Those that undertake paid work within the formal sector share an interdependent relationship with those that work within the informal sector. This interdependent relationship relies on both parties fulfilling a particular role in society. Moreover, the fulfilment of these roles is influenced and guided by normative, and highly gendered, frameworks The exercise of care, as a means to enable the remainder of society to 'function' informs the manner in which it gives rise to social capital. As well as fostering reciprocal relations based on love, trust and mutual benefit, the worth of the care relationship can be utilised as a resource with which to bargain for rights and obligations within social relations in alternative contexts

3.5 *Categories of Care*

The care relationship can be divided into four mutually dependent and overlapping categories. It should be noted that these categorisations aim to provide ease of analysis for the purposes of this study, but are by no means comprehensive in their itemisation. They inform, but do not restrict, the grounded definition of care developed in Chapter 7. The four categorisations can be termed as financial, emotional, personal and practical.

Financial care, as the name suggests, refers to instances where money is given or lent, within an 'informal' capacity. This category is heavily related to issues of both class and gender, being dependant upon personal economic circumstances (Gardiner, 2000). However, it is important not to distort the effects that class and gender have. As Finch (1989) points out those who have more do not necessarily give more[19], and although men usually exercise direct control over the finances of the house, women often play an important role as negotiators and mediators in the exchange of monies Furthermore, Qureshi and Simon's (1987) study shows that the gender balance shifts with time, as financial support for grand children is as likely to come from the grandmother as it is from the grandfather, and grandfathers are more likely to help with hands on care. Ethnicity is also of relevance for the category of financial care There is considerable evidence which shows that migrants, especially those originating from South Asia (Shah and Menon, 1999, Nadvi, 1999; Ballard, 1994, Anwar, 1985), regularly send money back to their country of origin, and as a result may have restricted sources of income to care for those in the host country

The financial category of care also includes 'gifts in kind' such as the purchase of clothes and food or the provision of accommodation. Inheritance may also be viewed as a source of financial care (Finch and Mason, 2000). Life insurance, pension schemes, and ultimately the giving of assets following an individual's death, are all forms in which care can be given and received. For migrants, one form of financial care, which is of particular importance, is that relating to chain migration. Chain migration is a process whereby a relative or friend becomes established within a host country and then provides a link through which others are able to migrate (Shaw, 1994, 1988; Ballard, 1994, Finch, 1989)[20]. Often the individual migrating is helped with the fare, finding work, a temporary home, personal encouragement and moral support[21] (Finch, 1989)

---

[19] Studies of various groups at different times in history have shown that the less economically well off develop a form of mutual aid and exchange forms of support (Ross, 1983; Stacks, 1975; Anderson, 1971; Young and Willmott, 1957). Support in such circumstances is often limited in extent, and, dependant upon the ability of the other party to reciprocate (Tilly, 1984). Some commentators have also argued that such care is more a matter of necessity than choice, bought about by a harsh urban lifestyle and lack of alternative choices (Hareven, 1978).

[20] See also Chapter 2.

[21] The process of chain migration and the arrival of families often means many workers became financially bound to their host countries, compelled to set up adequate living arrangements for their families (Finch, 1989).

Emotional care is a very personal form of care. It involves "listening, talking, giving advice and helping people put their own lives in perspective" (Finch 1989 33) The necessity for emotional care can arise at many different times, in an individual's day-to-day life, at a particular time of crisis or in specific circumstances such as childrearing. At times the extent to which an individual gives emotional support is restricted b y f ears o f interfering (Finch, 1989). H owever, f or m igrants w ho have recently arrived in the country of origin emotional support is of great importance, and as such, often overrides such concerns In these circumstances emotional care only provides a stabilising and reassuring factor, but also aids in helping the new arrival integrate and accept cultural differences in the new community (Saifullah Khan, 1977). Due to its intimate nature, emotional care is often sought from friends, or impartial third parties (Brannen and Collard, 1982) as well as from relatives and close kin.

Personal care, in basic terms, refers to those activities involved in nursing someone or undertaking domestic tasks that an individual does not, or cannot, do for themselves. 'Nursing' an individual is not necessarily an active task, as it may involve simply exhibiting a presence Often this form of care is gendered, as women make up a large proportion of paid and unpaid nursing carers. Studies have shown four main principles that govern who administers personal care. Wenger (1984) shows spouses often become the primary carer, Glendinning (1983) shows the parent-child relationship also provides an important source of care (both from parent to child and child to parent). Qureshi and Simon (1987) show members sharing the same household, even if they are distant relatives, provide a large degree of care. Finally, gender cuts across all three of these factors, and even where there is an apparent choice between male and female, the carer is usually female (McKie, *et al*, 2001).

Practical care varies a great deal in the form that it takes (Bott, 1957). It can range from drying another's washing (Young and Willmott, 1957) and childcare (Cornwell, 1984) to giving lifts and decorating (Pahl, 1984). Again, it is predominantly undertaken by women, although certain activities are typically considered to be 'male', such as gardening (Finch, 1989). For migrants a common form of practical care is language interpretation, often done by the young for the old Many older generation migrants from South East Asia have little or no grasp of the language of the host country. As a result there is a day-to-day need of an interpreter. Second or third generations migrants often educated in the host country, and more

familiar with its practices, provide a constant source of information and access (Ballard, 1994).

The 'activity' of care can take one of four forms, although it is important to remember that at any one time there may be an overlap of caring activities occurring, and as such they are by no means distinct from one another. The variety of activities that c an b e c ategorised as c are a re indicative o f t he p otential f or a n i ndividual t o engage in the practice of care (as carer or care recipient) without being consciously aware of doing so as the activity does not fit the commonly held gendered and value laden conceptualisations of what 'care' is. The categorisation of care in this w ay recognises that it occurs within everyday circumstances and does not exist within a vacuum. Daily engagements with the care relationship illustrates its malleable and fluid character as it becomes subject to constant negotiations. It is with this in mind that the next section explores how relationships in general, and the care relationship in particular, are negotiated within the context of familial and structural frameworks of society. As the reciprocal character of the care relationship is central to the accumulation of, and return from, social capital, an exploration of how this relationship is negotiated will give a valuable insight into the character of such social networks. This is particularly relevant in explaining how, grounded in everyday conceptualisations o f accumulated social c apital, individuals can expect c are from members of their family, as of a right.

3.6 Negotiating Relationships

In her study of family obligations Finch (1989) concluded that family relationships are not conducted in accordance to any set precept. She suggests they are the subject of negotiations, where the individuals involved in the relationship negotiate their own roles in accordance to whom the relationship is with, and the context it is in (see also, Finch and Mason, 1993, Askham, 1984). The character of familial relationships, is thought by Finch (1989), to pivot on how they are negotiated

In 1979, Giddens[22] argued that an individual's motivations, when engaging in social relations, provide the link between individual action and societal conventions. He also argued that these motivations may not coincide with, nor are they always

---

[22] In later works Giddens has developed the notion of 'reflexive negotiation' in which he argues individuals are constantly seeking more intimate and understanding relationships, which they re-create through day-to-day activity based on their reflexive selves (1992, 1991b, see also Gillies 2003).

completely explained by, an individual's own rationalisations of them (Giddens, 1979, see also Maclean and Eekebar, 1997). Such a conceptualisation of the way social relations are enacted is .problematic. The relationship between societal conventions and individual motivations, as suggested by Giddens, implies an underlying set of 'rules' which in spite of motivational disagreements, are conducive to the exercise of (presumably) harmonious relationships, whilst at the same time alluding to an unconscious knowledge on the part of the actor

Giddens (1984) comprehends rules to take the form of 'generalisable procedures', the component parts of which do not refer to any specific event, rather, retain an inclusive quality. Central to this claim is that generalisable procedures are derived from structure. King (2000) qualifies Giddens argument by suggesting that the knowledge individuals have of such generalisable procedures are as likely to be derived from mutual negotiations between individuals as from particular structures Although generalisable procedures may originate from structures, the way they are understood, and thus implemented, is very much a process that involves both structure and agent.

Argyle and Henderson (1985) argue that certain rule-governed behaviour in familial relationships are widely, maybe even universally, applicable. The continuity of the family unit, and similar behavioural patterns exhibited across cultures all go toward supporting this argument. An illustration of just such a cross-cultural behavioural pattern is the gender imbalance in the maintenance of kinship networks, a task commonly associated with females (Shaw, 1994; Farmer, 1970). An argument advanced by Douglas (1971; see also Giddens, 1979) some years earlier however, provides a compelling argument as to why social rules are relative. As previously cited, Giddens (1979) has suggested that rules of social life are dependant upon the structures to which an individual is subject Furthermore, the way in which these rules are implemented is dependant upon the way they are understood, and who contributes to this understanding. As such, rules are relative to the structure from which they are derived and to the individuals who produce and re-produce them In contrast, Douglas (1971) argues that while individuals may understand and accept moral rules in an abstract sense, decisions as to whether the moral rule applies, how applicable it is, and, whether or not it is superseded by another moral rule, are all dependant upon the situation and context within which they are being made.

According to Douglas' (1971) perspective it is possible to agree with a rule in principle such as 'I would help a relative facing homelessness', and not believe it to be relevant in a particular circumstance (see also, Rawls, 1967, Wallace and Walker, 1970, Warnock, 1971). Given the countless different scenarios faced by individuals in their daily life, any number of rules are relevant to a particular circumstance, and all call for a different course of action. In the debate, as constructed by Finch (1989), she argues that in any given situation an individual's choice, made from an array of possibilities, is governed by different guidelines relating to the varying degrees of importance accorded to influential factors (see also, Firth *et al*, 1970) For instance, the decision o f a llowing a r elative t o s tay in o nes h ome may b e g overned b y the reasons the relative is homeless, or consideration of other members of the household, or whether or not he or she would do the same were the situation reversed Finch and Mason (1991) suggest that this gives rise to inconsistencies between those obligations thought to generally exist and those people consider ought to be held. Finch r ejects the t erminology o f r ules i n f avour o f "normative g uidelines" (1989: 152) t hat a ct a s p rinciples. S he a rgues t hat i n t heir uncompromising s ense, r ules remove the room for individual judgement, whereas guidelines encourage it In this conceptualisation of guidelines Finch draws upon the definition of principles understood by Grimshaw (1986).

Grimshaw (1986) conceptualises rules as removing the possibility of human consideration and subsequent action (a view which sits uncomfortably with Giddens, who sees no such inconsistency) whereas principles (concepts understood to begin with terms such as 'Consider..) by their very definition, are inevitably accompanied by it. Having considered these arguments Finch (1989) comes to the conclusion that 'normative guidelines' are principles, the criteria of which are followed in the exercise of individual agency. An example of such normative guidelines can be found in familial relationships, often thought to be influenced by rights and obligations. These rights and obligations guide behaviour toward a particular course of action, rather than being prescriptive of it.

Actions within a familial context may also be subject to principles of gerontocracy and patriarchalism (Weber, 1965). In such instances the power relations as derived from age, or inherited, and essentially gendered roles, can govern the decisions, negotiations, and bargaining powers of others within the family and/or kinship network Where principles of gerontocracy are given pre-eminence, as Weber observes, elders are thought to be "the most familiar with the sacred traditions of the

group" (1965: 346). Alternatively, in instances of patriarchalism "authority is exercised by a particular individual who is designated by a definite rule of inheritance" (1965: 346).

The process of negotiation to which the care relationship is subject, has implications for the accumulation of social capital and for the way social exclusion is experienced by different groups. These implications are derived from terminology such as rights and obligations. The accumulation of social capital within familial relationships generates a degree of expectations "The knowledge that one is locked into a relationship (or a set of relationships) in which there is a commitment to give support acts as a kind of insurance policy for the future. Especially if the normative pressure to reciprocate is diffuse and general" (Finch 1989: 166). As these expectations correspond to the rights and obligations of familial relationships, the expectations people hold, or are legitimately thought to possess, are dependant on the factors taken into account and the resource of social capital available to them What obligations, responsibilities, duties and expectations are, remains an ambiguous question, subject to an individual's perceptions, moral outlook and personal experiences. Their character too, is often formed through a process of negotiations Generally they are thought to represent at times moral values, at times natural feelings, and often a mixture of the two (Finch 1989). Throughout the remainder of this thesis terminology of duty, obligations and responsibility will be used, as they are in common social interaction, interchangeably.

The rules, guidelines or principles that contextualise care relationships are particularly salient for the Pakistani Muslim focus of this study. As Zokaei and Phillips observe, there remains a strong "role of cultural and traditional values in arranging caring relations and attitudes within the family" (2000 49) among Muslims in Britain. In addition "altruism is frequently asserted to be a key determinant of social interaction and the notion occupies a central position in the Islamic world-view" (2000· 45). The prominent role of care, especially within the informal relationships of family, suggest that the norms and values of the community, may influence individual agency and in turn the care relationship (Daly and Lewis, 2000; see also Chapter 2). The balance between structure and agent, in the negotiation of this relationship will be significantly affected by the degree to which cultural and Islamic norms and values are conceived of as rules, guidelines or principles.

3.7 *Conclusion: "Care' to Conform?'*

Social exclusion is a series of processes that are bought to bear through factors relating to both structure and agency. Processes of social exclusion are characterised by the weakening of social bonds, whether those bonds be financial, social or personal in character. The breaking or weakening of these bonds restrict, limit or reduce the degree to which an individual is able to participate in any given structure of society. Further, conceptualisations of social exclusion where super- upon an individual, are moralising, determining how individuals can be included, whether they are worthy of, or ought to be included, and the means by which this inclusion can be attained. This moralising framework is evident in the underlying subtext of social capital that can be found in many of the formal welfare policies of Britain and Germany.

Comparatively, w here t he British w elfare s tate r etreats i n o rder t o p romote s ocial capital through informal networks of care, the German welfare state takes a much more active and positive role in order to promote the same aim. In the case of the elderly, there is a convergent trend, as both the British and the German welfare states withdraw in favour of policies imbued with liberal capitalist and individualistic ideology. Although their use and understanding of social/symbolic capital differ, both the British and German welfare states are in danger of facilitating exclusion, as neither pay adequate attention to the historical context within which such policies are being implemented Through the moralistic assertion of the way families ought to behave, justified by positive notions of social capital, British and German welfare policies are at risk of causing exclusion.

It has been suggested in this chapter that conceptualisations of social exclusion are utilised as, or result in superimposed perceptions of how individuals should behave, and how participation is constituted. As a relationship which itself enriches social life, the exercise and receipt of care is invested with a moral dimension which suggests to care is 'good', and not to, is 'bad'. This moral positioning is also a means by which individuals are able to accumulate social capital. Considerations of the care relationship thus present a paradox. Whilst demonstrative of an individuals participation in social relations, the care relationship can also be the site of his or her exclusion.

The moral positionings that are expressed through processes of social exclusion are particularly evident in the context of informal structures such as the community As

suggested in Chapter 2, the symbolic boundary of the Pakistani Muslim community informs the identity of individual members whilst at the same time demarcates between those to whom one affiliates and the 'other'. "This boundary line space is a locus for the residuum of the social order, a twilight space of outcasts, danger and pollution. Certainly, the purity of the space it delineates can be policed by rules of exclusion and rituals of purification" (Armstrong, 1993: 394) Where the symbols of this boundary are derived from religious affiliation, their exercise, and thus the sustenance of the boundary, is maintained through distinctions between the 'sacred' and the 'profane' (Durkheim, 2002, 1984).

In a similar argument, Sibley (1995) suggests the symbolic construction of geographical boundaries that inform the construction of individual identity puts forth a landscape of exclusion. All practices that are contrary, and therefore external, to the symbolic boundary of the community are perceived to be 'contaminating' Thus, such boundaries "encourage the very practices of purification, insulation and exclusion that ensure their own reproduction" (Dixon, 2001: 596), and prevent transgression. Where 'care' takes on a normative value, originating from the Islamic or Pakistani cultural origins of the community, there is the potential that its exercise, or lack thereof, as the case may be, becomes the site for exclusion, as the community exerts its moral authority and attempts to defend the perceived sacredness of the status quo. Such a scenario has implications for the degree to which individuals involved in the care relationship can maintain their power, ownership and voice, and the extent to which re-conceptualisations of care are influenced by the religious and cultural nuances to which such relationships are subject. In order to explore these questions further, this research will generate empirical data from within Pakistani Muslim communities in Britain and Germany. Chapter 4 sets out the methodology by which this data was gathered, analysed, and understood.

Chapter 4

Researching Pakistani Muslim Communities: A Methodological Account

4.1 *Introduction*

This doctoral research seeks to explore processes of social exclusion in a manner that is sensitive to the different nuances of individual experience. The aim of this chapter is to provide a detailed account of how such an exploration was conducted and why. Section 4.2 begins by explaining why this research concentrates upon Pakistani Muslim communities in Britain and Germany. As part of diasporic communities, Pakistani Muslims in Britain and Germany are experiencing shifts in the way Islamic and Pakistani cultural norms and values are understood. The dynamics of care relationships between elders and their kin provide a platform upon which many of the intricacies and consequences of these shifts are played out. These shifts give rise to potential areas of conflict between community and individual understandings of Islamic and Pakistani cultural rituals Such discord provides fertile ground for explorations of the processes and mechanisms of social exclusion as alternative interpretations of Islam and Pakistani culture challenge widely held moral positions on 'good' and 'bad'.

The Pakistani Muslim focus of the research provides considerable impetus for the ontological stance of the study. Section 4 3 provides an explanation for the eclectic blend o f theoretical i nfluences t hat s hape t he c onceptual f ramework o f t he t hesis. This blend informs the epistemological positioning adopted in the formation and implementation of the empirical research stage Section 4 4 offers a breakdown of the four research questions that guided this inquiry. The reasoning behind each question and its relationship to the theoretical framework of the thesis are elaborated upon.

In seeking to provide a more contextualised theoretical understanding of the processes of social exclusion this research engaged with individual experiences of familial care at a micro-level. Section 4 5 develops an account of the methodology utilised to investigate the four research questions. In particular this section details the use of in-depth qualitative interviews to generate the empirical data, and the issues of insider research relevant to this project (Bhopal, 2001, Berik, 1996; Roseneil, 1993). This section then moves on to discuss the pilot study, sampling strategy and issues of access and accessibility. The data generated was subject to a combination of

grounded, comparative and grid qualitative analysis. The analytical strategy, and the reasoning behind it, is expanded upon in Section 4 6. Throughout the research process the study remained subject to a number of ethical considerations. Section 4 7 articulates the ethical issues pertinent to the study, and the measures taken to ensure that the research was conducted as sensitively and appropriately as possible. In particular questions of informed consent, confidentiality and power relations are discussed

As with any research project there remains a number of methodological, theoretical and policy limitations to the research design and outcomes of this study. Section 4 8 outlines these limitations and suggests possible avenues of further research and intellectual enquiry. Finally, Section 4.9 concludes the chapter by reiterating the significant contribution individual perspectives make to the theorisation of social exclusion In so doing this section provides a synthesis of the methodology used to generate and engage with the empirical data The following chapter (5) begins engaging with the empirical data by developing the historical comparative context of the Pakistani Muslim presence in Britain and Germany.

4.2 *Pakistani Muslim Communities: Case Studies of Social Exclusion and Care*

There are four main reasons why this research focused upon familial care relationships within Pakistani Muslim communities in Britain and Germany The first is related to Pakistani Muslim communities in diaspora. Following migration to non-Muslim countries first, second and third generation Muslims of Pakistani descent come into contact with norms and values that do not necessarily correspond with, or in some instances, diametrically oppose, those associated with their religious beliefs and/or ethno-cultural heritage (Khan, 2000; Siddique, 1993). As suggested in Chapter 2 discord within the community resulting from multiple interpretations of religious belief and varying degrees of importance attached to one's ethno-cultural heritage can be attributed to the alternative norms and values considered to be manifest within non–Muslim countries (Husain and O'Brien, 2000, Taylor, 1998). Such an ascription has implications for the continuation and construction of Pakistani Muslim communities (Cohen, 1985). The reason for this research project's focus upon Pakistani Muslims thus arose primarily from the potential for individuals to be excluded from their own communities even as community members seek to achieve continuity of community boundaries and retain their own identities (Dixon, 2001; Mohammed, 1999, Sibley, 1995).

Through the comparative element this research was able to explore in greater depth the dynamics between diasporic communities and those communities within the host country. This comparative is utilised to inductively explore the grounded development and conceptualisation of social exclusion (Mason, 1996). Such an exploration also illuminates the construction of community boundaries, and from the understanding gained engages with thresholds of exclusion and inclusion of informal structures. Through a comparative exploration of Pakistani Muslim communities in Britain and Germany this research is able to explore the character of diasporic identity construction, at both an individual and community level. It is this construction and maintenance of diasporic identity that gives rise to mechanisms of exclusion – the key focus of this study (Sibley, 1995).

The focus upon care relationships between elders and their kin provides another window through which to explore the construction and defence of Pakistani Muslim communities and their identities. The dynamics of inter-generational care relationships situate many of the instances where norms and values derived from the Islamic and Pakistani cultural perspectives of first generation migrants come into contact with those of second and third generations (Zokaei and Philips, 2000). Alternative means of interpreting Islamic and Pakistani cultural norms and values may threaten their location in the myths and traditions through which the status quo is perpetuated (Hall, 1993, Cohen, 1985). This has implications for this study of social exclusion as these norms and values form the vehicles through which processes of social exclusion take effect

The fourth and overarching rationale for the focus of this study stems from the need to provide a more refined and grounded understanding of the concept of social exclusion. Processes of exclusion are of scholarly interest primarily because of the way in which they are conceptualised, the effects they are thought to have on an individual, and the means by which individuals are able to combat them. Many theoretical considerations of social exclusion that retain macro level understandings can result in the top-down imposition of labels such as 'excluded' (Byrne, 1999, Murray, 1995, 1988, Gailbraith, 1992; Mead, 1986). This top down imposition can become moralising, asserting normative perceptions of what it means to participate in society, what one ought to or is required to do in order to be included, and the means by which such inclusion can be attained (Colley and Hodkinson, 2001; Vobruba, 2000). Explorations of social exclusion, by means of the inter-generational care relationship, enable a nuanced understanding of individual perspectives on

participation and the fluidity of inclusion/exclusion thresholds. As such, this study is able to offer a thorough and grounded exploration of the processes of social exclusion.

Combined, these four streams of rationale form the crux of this study and shape the central line of inquiry· If the care relationships between elders and their informal networks of children or kin, breakdown, are absent or discarded, do individuals become subject to the processes of social exclusion from within the Pakistani Muslim community itself? This principal concern informed and was in turn informed by the theoretical and practical considerations of the study

4.3 *The Theoretical and Practical Approach to the Study: A Brief Overview*

The theoretical framework against which the empirical data of this research is set spans a broad spectrum of sociological positions and perspectives. The diverse range of theoretical influences deserves a moment of explanation in order to establish a coherent conceptual context. Whilst some may consider the disparate blend of theoretical influences debated in Chapters 2 and 3 to contradict the basic tenets of each others' conceptual underpinnings, their selective and partial use within this thesis serves as a means to conceptualise the chaotic attributes of daily life.

Underpinning the theoretical positions on community, identity, religious perspective and care is the ontological proposition that "we are born into a socio-cultural universe where values, moral commitments, and existential meanings are negotiated dialogically" (Christians 2000: 144) That is not to say that social reality is defined by individual negotiation, but simply to suggest that individuals' experience of their social reality is fundamentally informed by the way in which they negotiate their understandings and perceptions of it. Moreover, these negotiations themselves are influenced by the structures and social reality within which they take place. From this ontological perspective, social realities are mediated through individual understandings, perceptions and negotiations, and the structures within which these take place As such, these conceptual frameworks of community, identity, religion and care remain fluid, subject to the grounded understanding derived from individual perspectives.

This ontological position also informed the suggestion that current conceptualisations of social exclusion remain insufficiently nuanced. Central to this research was the exploration of how individuals, through their mediations and

negotiations within care relationships, and with wider community structures, come to experience influence, shape and/or contest processes of social exclusion, and thresholds of inclusion/exclusion. The research design set out to explore processes of exclusion from the perspective that "persons are arbitrators of their own presence in the world" (Denzin, 1989. 81 *quoted in*, Christians, 2000: 144). To this end, the methodology adopted for this thesis was one that explored individual experiences and expectations from their own perspectives, whilst taking into consideration structural factors to which respondents alluded

In so doing, the thesis explores the care relationship from the perspective that "moral obligation must be articulated within the fallible and irresolute voices of everyday life" (Christians, 2000: 147). This allows respondents to put forward their own perspectives rather than restricting the analysis to the researchers own world view of what constitutes 'right' and 'wrong' (Christians, 2000). The question of whether elders perceive themselves to become subject to processes of exclusion from within the Pakistani Muslim community as a result of shifting care relationships forms the focal point of this research Such a grounded approach allows the exploration of social exclusion from a unique perspective Not only does this approach lead to a bottom up conceptualisation of social exclusion but it permits a far greater role for the agency of those considered to be subject to its processes.

This research framework has significant implications for policy debates concerning older people and carers from Pakistani Muslim communities in Britain and Germany. Much of the literature on social exclusion makes the explicit recognition that people in old age are particularly vulnerable to the processes of exclusion (Grundy and Sloggett, 2003; Clark and Laurie, 2000). In spite of this there is little academic research conducted from the perspective of people in old age in general, and even less for those from ethnic minority groups in particular, who often remain peripheral to concepts of 'successful ageing' (Wray, 2003). The vulnerability of ethnic minority elders is compounded by the provision of ethnocentric formal welfare. Furthermore, British and German welfare policies that seek to place greater roles and responsibility on informal welfare providers result in service provisions for black and minority ethnic communities becoming specialist concerns and further disadvantage such communities[1] (Ahmad and Atkin, 1996) As a consequence of New Labour's 'restructuring' of the welfare state, informal welfare providers are

---

[1] See Chapters 3 and 5

witnessing an increasingly heavier workload (Roberts and Devine, 2003) The outcomes of this research have the potential to augment the concept of care as well as informing the perceived role of the welfare state, through the targeted engagement of Pakistani Muslim elders

4.4 *Research Questions*

The central concern of this research was broken down into four research questions.

1. **How, and why, is the care relationship between Pakistani Muslim elders and their offspring, and/or kin, relevant to their (elder and offspring/kin) inclusion into the Pakistani Muslim community?**

Exercised throughout the course of an individual's daily life, the care relationship is influenced both by socially constructed assertions of the 'good' way to behave and by the exercise of individual agency as carers and care recipients negotiate roles, rights and responsibilities This question was posed in order to explore negotiations between individual agency and normative structures and their effects upon an individual's inclusion into the Pakistani Muslim community. In addition, this research question explored individual perceptions on the role of *izzat* within the care relationship, and the corresponding effects of the care relationship upon an individual's *izzat*. In so doing, the outcomes of this question provided further insights into how structural prescriptions on the 'good' way to behave shape individually constructed thresholds of inclusion.

2. **What influence does the Pakistani Muslim community have on care relationships between elders and their kin, and why?**

The second research question allows for an exploration of the ways in which the Pakistani Muslim communities regulate and enforce individual adherence to prescriptive assertions of 'good and bad', and their motivations for doing so, was implemented. In particular this question focused upon the ways in which moral voices of Pakistani Muslim communities[2] are bought to bear upon the care relationships between family members in general and elders and their off-spring/kin in particular The findings from this question also informed conceptualisations of the

---

[2] See Chapter 2.

way in which the Pakistani Muslim communities are structured and whether, the construction, application and enforcement of community moral voices have the potential to exclude

3. **Is there a relationship between the influence of the community on the care relationship and processes of social exclusion, and if so, what?**

Building on the two previous research questions the third question was posed in order to explore individual perspectives on how and what participation within the Pakistani Muslim community is constituted and understood Individual perspectives were sought as to the potential effects of community moral voices and such means of participation. The outcomes of this question informed understandings of the degree to which an individual's lack of conformity to the normative assertions of the community can affect or impede an individual's inclusion or lead to his or her subjection to the processes of exclusion.

4. **How, and why, do individuals differentially experience processes of social exclusion?**

The final research question allowed for a singular focus upon individual perspectives on inclusion and exclusion were re-visited. In particular, the question would focus upon the means utilised to negotiate with socially constructed thresholds of exclusion and alternative mechanisms of inclusion. In so doing, these findings augmented understandings of social exclusion, adding to structurally constructed thresholds of exclusion the importance of considering the dynamics of individual perspectives.

4.5 *Choosing Methods*

Within the remit of qualitative research numerous methodological strategies enable the engagement of individual perspectives. The two methodologies that had the potential to achieve the level of depth required in this study, and that were financially viable, were focus groups and one-to-one interviews. Each strategy offered advantages and disadvantages for the aims of this research. Focus groups have the potential to encourage a deeper and more contextualised picture as respondents are fuelled by each others' contributions (Willgerodt, 2003; Bowie *et al*, 1995) Equally, one-to-one interviews enable greater sensitivity to issues of a

personal n ature, a nd allow individuals to elaborate upon their u nderstandings and perspectives rather than giving way to others within a group setting (Mason, 2002). On the whole, interviews were considered to be more appropriate to the focus of this research. Focus groups were not a viable methodology as the presence of other people from the same community m ay have hindered individuals from expressing their perspectives and/or experiences of exclusionary forces from within the community (Neopolitano *et al* , 2002) In contrast, interviews offer a greater degree of p rivacy, i n t he c ontext o f w hich r espondents w ere a ble t o f ully a rticulate b oth positive and negative perceptions, understandings and experiences of community participation and morality. This said, 1 interview (in Germany) was conducted as a focus group at the request of the respondents. In this case, due to restrictions of time, and their own comfort respondents asked that they be interviewed together. As respondents themselves requested the focus group, concerns with regard to the barriers offered by this method were, to some extent, allayed.

A more difficult decision t o make was how i nterviews were to be s tructured a nd conducted (Price, 2002). The strategy adopted required the balancing of two potentially competing concerns. On the one hand it was necessary for the methodology utilised to provide an open and receptive forum whereby respondents would be able to articulate their experiences in accordance to their own understandings, perspectives, and words On the other hand, social exclusion remains an intangible concept, albeit one that may be evidently experienced As Trotter highlights, researching "phenomena [that] are invisible and unknowable to the researcher" (2003. 64) is particularly difficult where the researcher is concerned with respondents perceptions rather than elaborating upon one's own understandings Throughout the course of each interview, and in the analysis stage, a significant consideration was ensuring respondent perspectives were not influenced or restricted by interviewer understandings of key terms such as community, care or social exclusion. In addition to this, practical considerations of ensuring interviews remained focused on the remit of the thesis guided the implementation of interviews.

4.5.1 *In depth Semi-Structured/Narrative Interviews*

The approach utilised in the construction of interviews was in part semi-structured and in part elicited narrative accounts (Jones and Rupp, 2000). As far as possible questions were structured in a manner that did not restrict respondents to those issues felt to be relevant by the interviewer A partial narrative approach, constructed within feminist methodology, was utilised whereby respondents were given the

space and time to relate their experiences in their own ways. To this end questions were open ended and respondents were not stopped from expanding upon their answers in whatever direction they felt was relevant (Flick, 2002; Dossa, 1999) As Bhopal observes this method "not only allows women to articulate their own experiences, but also to reflect upon the *meaning* of those experiences" (2001. 282, *sic, original emphasis*) Through the use of this methodology respondents were able to articulate the importance they attach to care relationships and their understandings of how these bear relevance to their experiences and thresholds of inclusion/exclusion.

Use of the narrative methodology, independently of other approaches, raises a number of concerns. From the perspective of feminist methodology, within the narrative approach "one might say that *the function of the researcher is held to be to give voice and the printed page* to those who require mediation to get their voices into the public arena" (Wengraf, 2000: 7, *original emphasis*). Difficulties in using narrative methodology were particularly evident in relation to issues of context and subjectivity. As Oakley suggests "even when quoted material is allowed to 'speak for itself', it is not clear that the unmediated views of research participants provide the best way to understand the social world" (1998: 714). That is not to suggest that respondent perceptions are in some way lacking, but to recognise that any such account requires a degree of explanation and contextualisation.

The assumption that un-contextualised accounts will accurately represent an individual's experiences does not sufficiently recognise the potential inconsistencies of temporal accounts (Linde, 1993). This perspective is supported by Price (2002), who suggests that interviews with little or no steering can lead to superficial accounts that are not necessarily informative. The approach utilised with narrative accounts within this study, was to subject them to a "process of social and societal *contextualisation*" (Wengraf 2000. 141-142, *original emphasis*). This was reflective of Hollway and Jeffersons' perspective that, "the understanding of meaning in context has been at the heart of the development of narrative research" (2001 105) To this end the narrative approach was supported by the semi-structured one, as interviews were punctuated with prompt questions that asked respondents to broaden their contextual narrative of particular experiences (Arksey and Knight, 1999). Although such prompting may be considered to contradict the ontological perspective of the study, it was important given the specific focus of the research. The selection of prompt questions was 'laddered' so as to take into consideration the

context of the interview and how intrusive a particular line of inquiry may appear to respondents (Price, 2002). In additions, prompting within the interviews was constructed so as to ensure as far as possible that respondents were not led to give particular answers, thus inducing a foregone conclusion (Fine *et al* 2000)

Hollway and Jefferson (2001) suggest that any use of questions within an interview context, however general and vague direct the response of the interviewee "[T]he practical techniques used by researchers for eliciting narratives have powerful effects in the understanding of identity, or subjectivity that follows" (Hollway and Jefferson 2001. 121). This is not necessarily the case however, as Bornat *et al.* note that "people bring their own agendas and interests to the interview, consequently interviewer topics may well be reinterpreted, managed or straightforwardly resisted by the interviewee" (Bornat *et al.* 2000. 247)   Whilst the necessity to frame questions within the interview may inadvertently shape the responses a respondent gives, such influence is to some degree off set by a respondents own agenda, perspective, and indeed, personal identities.

Given the need to ascertain respondent perspectives there was also the concern that use of key terminology may dilute or otherwise sway individual responses to questions (Burns, 2000) As a means to reduce such influence as much as possible terms such as care or *izzat* were left undefined, introduced through questions like 'have you ever 'cared' for anyone?' Respondents were able to understand and talk of care in their own terms and about particular situations they felt were relevant In this manner, whilst constructing narrative accounts the methodology utilised allowed focus to be interjected into the interviews without leading respondents to answer in particular ways. Lists of the main and prompt questions can be found in Appendix 2.

4.5.2 Insider Research

As a Muslim researcher of both Pakistani and Indian heritage, researching within the Pakistani Muslim community raised the inherent complexities of insider research (Henry, 2003; Gitlin *et al*, 2002; Sherif, 2001, De Andrade, 2000) The fieldwork benefited from many of the methodological advantages insider research brings. There was a greater degree of access, trust and openness (Roseneil, 1993) As a Muslim woman of 'visible' Pakistani descent, access was granted to both men and women, as respondents made the tacit assumption that the researcher was both understanding and knowledgeable as to cultural and religious practices As a woman, access to female respondents was much easier then to their male counterparts

(Bhopal, 1997). This initial acceptance of the researcher as an 'insider' for the purposes of access was continually re-negotiated throughout the interview as respondents articulated and engaged with the ambiguities of identity and boundary construction (Henry, 2003, De Andrade, 2000).

The multiple boxes in which respondents were able to frame the researcher's identities - British, Pakistani, Muslim, young, female, un-married, single, educated, working class, middle class, Western (the list is endless) - meant that within each interview, and with each respondent, the researcher was continually perceived in different ways. Such multiple positioning mirrors Henry's account of performing identity - "there is no 'authentic' position from which to speak and to represent oneself...hybridity is performative" (2003. 233) During the course of the fieldwork different aspects of the researcher's identities and cultural and religious knowledge were 'performed'. similar to Berik's (1996) experiences the researcher's behaviour toward respondents of different generations and different genders was governed by 'insider' knowledge of cultural and religious norms. This 'performance' was particularly necessary given the sensitivity of the issues being explored There was the possibility that respondents may have felt let down and/or disappointed by their own family and/or kin. In such instances the status of an insider (Roseneil, 1993) was strategically used to soften elements of 'Britishness', so as to present a more cultural and religious understanding demeanour. "The researcher's understanding of her connectedness to the experiences of the research subject through partial identification is labelled 'conscious partiality'" (Mies, 1983: 123 *quoted in* Bhopal, 2001: 281). In such instances conscious partiality was an advantage as it allowed recognition and appreciation of the emotionally charged nature of particular questions or responses (Arksey and Knight, 1999) and facilitated the use of 'laddered' prompting (Price, 2002).

The position of 'insider' benefited the research in a number of ways, such as a greater and more fluid understanding of linguistic and conceptual tools, access to research participants, and understanding of cultural nuances within the research field However, it is important not to over-state such advantages, as insider research is accompanied by a network of power relationships that can hinder the research, and raise ethical questions as to the participation of respondents (Gitlin, *et al*, 2002) The performance of identities which corresponded to those being portrayed by respondents meant at times the researcher's identity was used as a tool with which to entice respondent participation. Whilst portraying oneself as the 'good little Muslim

girl' may have enabled respondents who felt overtly critical of 'Western' or non-Islamic values to discuss their opinions freely, it was a problematic strategy As Sherif's experience of doing ethnographic research in Egypt shows how a 'partial' insider balance between potentially conflicting identities had to be established in an "asymmetrical relationship" (2001 442) The experience of balancing in this research project mirror many of those articulated by Sherif, who states "being forced to balance an insider/outsider perspective on a daily basis, I ultimately became more sensitive to my informants' voices and experiences. I became increasingly careful in my own writing to avoid superimposing theories and generalizations onto their lives" (2001: 446, *sic*). Within this context, the performance of insider identities were mediated by the researcher's concerns of ensuring that the accounts elicited were reflective of respondent understandings and perceptions rather than that which respondents felt the interviewer wished to hear.

In addition to this, the role of insider also made difficult the narrative strategy adopted during the course of the interviews. There were many instances throughout the fieldwork when respondents in both Britain and Germany presumed the researcher would understand a particular perception or experience. As a result it became necessary to interrupt or supplement respondent narratives by asking them to explain their understandings of certain terms such as *izzat* or *khidmat*[3]. This was particularly difficult during some interviews where respondents insisted that the researcher reveal her own understanding of these terms, or that she should already know.

> "Interviewer: how important is *izzat* in your life, and that of your family?
> First it is important to define *izzat*, what do you think *izzat* is?
> Interviewer what do you think *izzat* is?
> No, I am asking you, you have a developing brain, you should answer it, my brain is old now
> Interviewer: but I need to learn what your experience is?
> Experience does not govern everything, you tell me what you think it is" (Latif, German male: 13[4]).

4.5.3 *Pilot Study*

---

[3] Whilst questioning respondents about concepts such as *izzat* and *khidmat* may be considered leading, analysis of respondent narratives focused specifically upon respondent understandings and definitions

[4] The figure placed at the end of a respondent quotation refers to the page number of the transcript

Prior to the main stage of fieldwork a pilot study was conducted with the specific aim of refining interview technique and the question frame (Kvale, 1996). The pilot was conducted through the use of gender segregated focus groups. Whilst focus groups and one-to-one interviews have a different dynamic, restrictions of time, space and respondent availability prevented a series of one-to-one interviews for the purposes of a pilot. The advantage of conducting a pilot study through the use of focus group was that a number of perspectives on interview style and question frame could be obtained in a short space of time.

Arranged around access rather than specific sampling criteria, the pilot consisted of two focus groups, one male and one female. All participants in the pilot study were generated through pre-existing networks of the researcher. The group sessions lasted approximately one hour each and utilised a combination of Urdu and English. The female focus group consisted of 5 participants, whereas the male group consisted of 3. Questions asked within the pilot study can be found in Appendix 1a below. Following each focus group session participants were asked to give their own opinion on the questions asked. They were specifically asked to assess whether they felt the structure or content of questions restricted their responses in any way, or whether they would have preferred to talk about particular issues but felt unable to do so because of the perceived remit of the questions. These views, along with the researcher's assessment of the focus group discussions, were used to revise the structure and content of the questions for the main study. A table of the suggested and implemented revisions can be found in Appendix 1b below. As a result of the pilot study it was possible to improve interview technique and question structure so as to better facilitate the narrative accounts of respondents.

4.5.4 *Generating a Sample*

The sample for the 'real' project was generated from Pakistani Muslim communities of Britain and Germany. All potential respondents were asked whether they considered themselves to be 'Muslims' and of 'Pakistani' heritage. The ages of respondents within Britain and Germany ranged from 25 to 76. With the exception of spousal relations none were from the same family. All the respondents from Germany were first generation migrants, whereas those in Britain were a combination of first and second generation. No second generation migrants were interviewed in Germany due to the relatively recent migration of Pakistani Muslims, which meant that second generation Pakistani migrants in Germany were very small in number Only two of the second generation Pakistani Muslims encountered during

the fieldwork were over the age of 16, and neither wished to be interviewed Factors of time, access and financial resources restricted sample location in Britain to a number of northern towns and cities, and in Germany to one major city.

The sample consisted of 43 respondents who can be categorised thus.

		First Generation	Second Generation	Total	
British	Female	5	5	10	17
	Male	3	4	7	
German	Female	12	0	12	26
	Male	14	0	14	
Total		34	9	43	

Table 1: *Respondent Breakdown*

Of the 43 respondents 22 were women and 21 men. 17 of the respondents lived in Britain and were based in the north of England. 26 were based in Germany, all in one major city. A more detailed breakdown of the base data can be found in Appendix 4 The sample is weighted in favour of the German sample group for two reasons Initial sampling criteria in Britain sought to interview people in Britain that originated from the Jhelum district of Pakistan The sample was geographically located in this manner in order to account for the effects of chain migration (Meijering and van Horen, 2003; Ballard, 1994, 1987). However, as interviews in Britain were conducted it became evident that chain migration did not affect respondent understandings of 'our' community boundaries. Any reference to regional origins spoke to diversity within, rather than difference from 'us' (Mason, 1995). Time restrictions prevented further interviews being conducted in Britain that would have balanced the sample

Access to German respondents was easier than to their British counterparts This can be attributed to two reasons A number of those asked to participate in the study in Britain located their reticence in already having been interviewed for previous research projects, or of having known people who had been (Fountain, *et al*, 2003). The main objection arising from having participated in, or having known about projects was the little tangible benefit or difference that individuals saw from such research In contrast many of the German sample had never been interviewed Many had to be assured that their interview was for a doctoral research project, that may be

made public through academic papers, but was not related to the media[5]. Secondly, many of the German sample felt it important to accede to being interviewed as the researcher was perceived to be one of 'us'.

Samples were generated through pre-established and newly developed social networks and the snowballing technique (Babbie, 1995). In addition to the initial geographical criteria applied to the sample in Britain, sampling strategies in both countries were theoretically-driven to focus upon Muslims of Pakistani heritage. Access was also sought through informal welfare providers such as voluntary organisations and community centres as well as religious establishments such as Mosques Following the end of each interview respondents were asked whether they knew of any other 'Pakistani Muslims' who would be willing to be interviewed (Mason, 1996). In order to avoid the sample group becoming exclusive to a particular chain of people, no more than two respondents were snowballed off any one individual Furthermore, no snowball chain was extended beyond two respondents (Seale, 1999).

4.5.5 Methods of Data Collation, Transcription and Translation

Prior to beginning the interviews all respondents were asked if they had any objections to being audio-taped All but one of the respondents agreed Tapes from each interview were then transcribed in the language[6] in which the interview was conducted Transcriptions were verbatim so as not to lose any of their meanings or emotive content (Sayer, 1992) These transcripts, where necessary, were translated into English with literal translation techniques (Birbili, 2000). The translation of words or terms that do not have lexical equivalents in English was aimed at achieving conceptual similarity (Temple, 1997), a process aided by the researcher's 'insider' status which enables 'intimate knowledge of the culture' (Birbili, 2000). In addition to the benefits of this insider status respondents were also asked to elaborate upon, or give a more precise definition to particular terms (Esposito, 2001) Where equivalent terminology or explanation could not be derived for words, they were kept in the initial language in order to retain accuracy of meaning. Each translation was then translated back into Urdu or Punjabi and compared with the original transcript in order to ensure the meanings remained accurate (Erckan, 1998). Where

---

[5] This concern was related to issues of confidentiality, a mis-trust of 'Western' media and concerns over the legitimacy of their migration and settlement trajectories (see Chapter 5).

[6] Interviews were conducted in Urdu, Punjabi or English depending on respondent preference.

necessary the English version was amended Extracts from this translation exercise can be found in Appendix 3.

4.6 *Analysis*

In order to conform to the principles of the ontological and epistemological stance taken in this study, grounded definitions of key issues such as the care relationship and the processes and thresholds of social exclusion were developed. In doing so, an 'interpretative sufficiency' approach was adopted which "enables people to come to terms with their every day experiences themselves" (Christians 2000. 145). In addition to the interpretative sufficiency approach guiding principles for the analysis were also derived from Glaser and Strauss' grounded theory (1967).

4.6.1 *Developing Grounded Definitions*

The grounded theory approach advocated by Glaser and Strauss (1967) develops theory through research rather than allowing theory to shape the research process and outcome (Henwood and Pidgeon, 1993). A grounded theorising approach was adopted during the course of this research in two ways Firstly, theoretical language, such as care, was "grounded in instances of data" (Seale, 1999: 89) Secondly, concepts such as *izzat* were derived directly from respondent transcripts, and were in essence descriptive. Through a combination of these two perspectives, the analysis was evaluated so as to generate inductively a theory of the processes of social exclusion from the data (Seale, 1999) The grounded concepts were not treated as static and rigid accounts, but were accorded a degree of fluidity in the recognition that at any one time "the data gathered through interviews represents an incomplete but working account of social reality" (Price, 2002: 275).

Within the course of the analysis it was recognised that the researchers position cannot be so simply segregated from respondent accounts. As Bhopal observes "it is what we see and who we are that contributes to the end product of the research" (2001: 284). Empirical data is subject to the collation, analysis and representation of the interviewer/researcher Moreover, even prior to the interview, decisions of topic, approach, location and sample all have a bearing on the content of such data. Thus, "final texts are always mediated accounts, with the researcher's own interpretation woven into the words" (Henry, 2003: 239-240). As far as possible the researcher sought to analyse the data in a manner that remained reflective of respondents' perceptions and understandings. The collection of data as a means to explore the

processes of social exclusion meant the data was inevitably subject to some direction and interpretation.

4.6.2 *Comparative Analysis*

In addition to the grounded and interpretative approach, the data was also subject to comparative a nalysis. R espondents w ere f irst g rouped u nder c ategories o f g ender, first or second generation migrant, and place of residence (Britain or Germany (Windebank, 2 001)) A c ombination o f i nter- a nd i ntra- g roup c omparisons were then made on the basis of these demarcations. Each group was subjected to three stages of comparative analysis, following the constant comparative method as understood by Boeje (2002, see figure 1). In the first stage of analysis each interview was coded and analysed independently of all others Having done so, the second stage of analysis involved comparing interviews with others in the same group and at the third stage comparisons were made between interviews from different groups. Boeje elaborates upon two more steps to this model, but these relate to a specific study focusing upon couples and particular spousal relationships These steps were not relevant for the purposes of this research, and were therefore not used.

The first step of this 3-stage analysis involved the coding of single interviews. Following the intention to develop grounded definitions of key concepts such as care and *izzat*, an open coding strategy was adopted (Charmaz, 2000; Seale, 1999) Transcripts were thematically coded on a statement-by-statement basis and informed by the way in which particular concepts, relationships or social realities were defined, experienced and perceived by any one individual. Data was coded both manually and, in part, through the aid of a computer, in particular QSR NUDIST software. Coding on a statement-by-statement basis was particularly relevant given the sheer amount of rich data. Such a coding strategy ensured coding was systematic, rather than "construct[ing] life narratives spiked only with the hot spots" (Fine *et al*, 2000: 118).

However, in order to show that the analysis does not rely on selective data or, 'hot spots' to use Fine *et al 's* terminology, thereby misrepresenting the views of the respondents, data coded under the same headings was subject to qualitative grid analysis, presented in a tabular form in Appendix 5a, 5b and 5c. This highlights the number of instances particular viewpoints, experiences and/or perceptions arose within the data set as a whole Examples from the grid analysis need to be taken in

consideration of the potentially skewed outcomes. Given the inherent bias of applying grid analysis to qualitative data, the onus is not on the accuracy of the quantitative understanding. Nor is such a grid analysis intended to be representative of the frequency of a particular occurrence The qualitative focus of the research methodology, and use of semi-structured and narrative strategies in the interviews meant not all respondents were asked the same questions, or discussed the same issues. As a result, quantities and percentages within the grid analysis do not represent all of the respondents' views. Percentages given within the analysis in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8, are intended to be illustrative of the kinds of processes, mechanisms and negotiations that take place within the religious and cultural contexts of Pakistani Muslims in diaspora

The second stage of the comparative analysis involved comparing the variety of grounded concepts to emerge out of any one interview to others from within the same group. British interviewees were compared to other British interviewees, or German interviewees with German interviewees (Boejie, 2002). Comparisons were also made on the basis of gender and generational cohorts At this stage, a synthesis was developed for each case study with regard to care relationships, community and the processes of social exclusion. The final stage of the comparative analysis process involved comparing the British case study with that of the German one. This comparison took place at both the macro and at the micro level. At the macro level the groups were compared to one another as a whole, and differences between them explored in greater depth At the micro-level, exceptions within each case study were compared with each other. Such dissenting voices are used at various stages of the analysis to supplement the main comparative

Type of Comparison	Analysis Activities	Aim	Questions	Results
Comparison within a single interview	Open coding; Summarising core of the interview; Finding consensus on interpretation of fragments	Develop categories of understanding	What is the core message of the interview? How are different fragments related? Is the interview consistent? Are there contradictions? What do fragments with the same code have in common?	Summary of the interview; Provisional codes (code tree) Conceptual profile Extended memos.
Comparison between interviews within the same group; that is persons who share the same experiences	Axial Coding: Formulating criteria for comparing interviews Hypothesising about patterns and types	Conceptualisati on of the subject Produce a typology	Is A talking about the same as B? What do both interviews reveal about the category? What combinations of concepts occur? What interpretations exist for this? What are the similarities and differences between interviews A, B, C...? What criteria underlie this comparison?	Expansion of code words until all relevant themes are covered; Description of concepts; Criteria for comparing interviews, Clusters of interviews (typology).
Comparison of interviews from groups with different perspectives but involved with the subject under study	Triangulating data sources	Complete the picture Enrich the information	What does group 1 say about certain themes and what does group 2 have to say about the same themes? What themes appear in group 1 but not in group 2 and vica versa? Why do they see things similarly or differently? What nuances, details or new information does group 2 supply about group 1?	Verification of provisional knowledge of interviewees from group 1; Additional Information; Memos

Figure 1: *Different Steps of The Constant Comparative Analysis Procedure in Key Words*, Re-produced from Boeije (2002. 396)

4.7 Ethical Considerations

Christians (2000) suggests that by agreeing with the moral and ethical viewpoint of participants, researchers need not concern themselves with issues of informed consent, invasion of privacy or deception, describing them as "non-issues" (2000: 149) To presume blanket immunity from these very pressing ethical considerations is highly problematic. Respondent moral positions, however agreeable to the researcher, do not absolve him or her from the ethical considerations of researching and engaging with individual lives. Accepting the moral and ethical considerations of respondents as valid is necessary for social research which seeks to explain the way in which particular situations and contexts are negotiated. However, through interaction with respondents, the interviewer plays an active role within the research process. Notwithstanding the drive toward providing respondent groups with a voice, interviewer bias is inherently interwoven within the representation of the data generated (Henry, 2003). Thus, issues of informed consent, privacy and deception still remain pre-eminent.

4.7.1 Informed Consent and Confidentiality

Informed consent is an integral part of the sociological code of ethics when conducting, in particular, qualitative fieldwork. As such, it remained an overarching consideration throughout the course of the fieldwork. After gaining access to potential respondents, and before commencing the interviews, respondents were explicitly asked whether they consented to being interviewed. At the start of each interview it was stressed that they were under no obligation and were free to stop the interview or decline to answer any question at any point, and as many times as they wished. As Christians (2000), quoting Punch (1994) reminds the reader, informed consent is not unproblematic, and obtaining it through full disclosure can impede, and in some cases, even prevent, a research project

For the purposes of this study it was felt that informing respondents of the focus on 'social exclusion' would not only result in leading their answers down a particular course, but may also restrict their responses for fear of stigma and blame, made all the more likely by the researchers 'insider status' (Sherif, 2001). The project was introduced to respondents by informing them that it was being conducted for the purposes of doctoral research and was looking at the familial care of elders within Pakistani Muslim communities of Britain and Germany All respondents were asked, at the beginning and at the end of the interview whether they had any questions they would like to ask of the researcher and/or of the research project. Notwithstanding

concerns of leading the interview, any and all questions asked by respondents were answered honestly and completely. Before the interview was continued, or bought to a close, respondents were asked whether they were completely satisfied with the answers given, and if they were still happy to continue and/or for their interview to be used in the research project. In this way access and re-access was negotiated continually throughout the interview (Miller and Bell, 2002).

It was decided that consent forms to 'protect' respondents would not be used. This decision came from the insider knowledge that such a degree of formality would negatively affect the interviewer-interviewee relationship. More importantly such a form would imply a power imbalance and respondents may potentially view the researcher as the 'authority' (Fine *et al.*, 2000). It was also decided that the use of such forms would presume a level of written literacy, a presumption that may well be inaccurate and further compound feelings of inequality and inadequacy.

In addition to informed consent, principles of confidentiality are essential considerations when conducting qualitative research All respondents were assured of complete privacy and anonymity before interviews commenced. All respondents were allocated a pseudonym from the outset and transcription and storage of data was done with reference to these pseudonyms (Mason, 1996). Names of family members, friends or acquaintances as well as places were also omitted F inally, information given to the researcher outside of the interview context was not included in the analysis of the data unless express permission had been granted by the respondent(s) concerned.

4.7.2 Power Relations

During the fieldwork it was impossible to ignore the effects the role of the researcher had within the interviews. As Christians' asserts, a "noncontextual, nonsituational model [of research] ..ignores the situatedness of power relations associated with gender, sexual orientation, class, ethnicity, race and nationality" (2000: 142). The position of researcher can be added to these criteria, as this itself presumes or portrays elements of control, ownership and thus, power (Denzin, 1997, Ryan, 1995). This is particularly the case as the researcher was being given access to deeply personal and private information, whilst disclosing very little of herself. Coupled with this imbalance, such access also leaves respondents vulnerable to how their narratives can be used.

In some instances it was evident that respondents also felt 'unworthy' of being knowledge brokers in light of the researchers educational qualifications However, as Phoenix (1994) reminds the reader however, power relations within the research relationship are by no means fixed dynamics. Throughout the course of the fieldwork, instances arose where the power attributed to the researcher was superseded by her perceived lack of experience, a direct inference from her age In a . number of cases, the researcher's upbringing in Britain, and her gender, were also seen as placing respondents at a higher level of authority Upon reflection the interview situation can be perceived as "a complex site of power, one which could be conceptualised in a number of ways, either as a web, network or text of the bodies living in it" (Henry 2003: 237). As such, it is important that the presence of power relations are acknowledged, but it was not felt necessary for them to be considered to any great length during the analysis.

4.8 *Limitations of the Research*

There are a number of methodological, theoretical and policy limitations to the research design and outcomes of this study. The size and breadth of the sample lend two empirical limitations to this research Both the British and German samples benefit from diversity along the lines of gender, age, marital status and parental status. This said, the sample group from Germany is limited in terms of generational diversity. The absence of second generation respondents from Germany is reflective of the relatively recent migration to Germany and young family structure of the Pakistani Muslim group[7]. Further, the sample size is weighted in favour of the German sample as a result of limited time, access and shift in sampling strategy[8]. Had time and resource allowed, fieldwork would have been resumed in Britain as a means of redressing this balance, and developing a more comparable sample in terms of migration trajectories and socio-economic circumstances in Pakistan This notwithstanding, the comparative of Pakistani Muslims in Britain and Germany conducted in this research is the first of its kind, and shortcomings within the sample are themselves illustrative of the contextual frameworks it is shaped by.

Theoretically, discourses of 'care' and 'social exclusion' sit within wider debates of

---

[7] See Chapter 5.
[8] See Chapter 4.

the welfare state, gender and the labour market, to which the analysis here only alludes. In addition the research speaks to the over-arching sociological debate of structure and agency, but does not seek to provide any comprehensive accession to this discussion. Lengthy discussions and explorations of these theoretical debates and problematics were beyond the scope of this research The most pertinent strands of the macro-level political, legislative, social and economic contexts and factors were addressed in Chapter 5.

The research would benefit from a more in-depth exploration of the implications the socio-economic circumstances of respondents have on community construct. Such an exploration would confer yet another dynamic to the exploration of social exclusion conducted here. Further, the common occurrence of inter-ethnic and inter-faith marriages amongst male respondents in Germany adds an interesting and potentially significant dimension to the Islamic practice and community construct of the German sample. Such a dimension also has the potential to significantly contribute to the comparison of British and German samples. In particular it raises the possibility of whether attitudes of German male respondents toward moral voices of the community stem from the necessity they face of having to step out of their cultural understandings of Islam in order to find marriage to German women acceptable. These theoretical questions leave open numerous avenues of further research, re-visited in Chapter 9.

4.9 Conclusion

Perhaps the most difficult aspect of conducting qualitative research projects is doing justice to the life narratives and accounts entrusted by respondents to the researcher. By remaining focused upon their understandings and giving due consideration to their accounts of exclusionary processes and inclusionary mechanisms, this project stays as true to such accounts as possible In this chapter, the methodological tools utilised to gain access to, gather and analyse such data have been presented. To re-iterate, the focus of this study is the experiences and expectations of familial care amongst Pakistani Muslims living in Britain and Germany. Through an exploration of these experiences and expectations, this research looks at the processes of social exclusion from within Pakistani Muslim communities, and the means by which they are challenged. In order to do so, it engages with individual perspectives and accounts of the care relationship, through which the processes of social exclusion are

inferred and explored. The following chapter (5) provides a structural compaiative of Pakistani migration and settlement to Britain and Germany, with specific reference to the empirical data.

Chapter 5

Pakistani Communities in Britain and Germany: The Historical Comparative Context

5.1 *Introduction*

This chapter mainly focuses upon mechanisms of migration, settlement and formal inclusion through citizenship These two macro-level contextual frameworks condition the construction and re-construction of diasporic Pakistani Muslim communities and their experiences and expectations of familial care. In the latter sections, this chapter also provides a brief overview of formal welfare provisions in Britain and Germany. Whilst the structured environments of formal welfare provisions may contextualise, and therefore affect experiences and expectations of familial care (Walker, 1996b), they are not the focus of this study. Indeed, in speaking of the care relationships in which they participate, or hope to do so, respondents mention formal welfare only to the extent that it is not favourable, or, in most cases, not an option. Within the data it is taken for granted that care remains the family's domain[1]. The principal formal provision that affects respondent care relationships between elders and their kin is that of pensions Even still, the availability of social security in old age does not undermine the family as the main site of care, rather it alters the ways in which 'care' is defined and expected. In reflection of this, social security provisions in old age will be touched upon briefly in this chapter as a means to contextualise respondent circumstances.

Respondent migration to Britain and Germany has followed considerably different trajectories. Whereas migration to Britain was generally economic, respondent migration to Germany was for the most part on the basis of political asylum. Section 5.2 explores these different trajectories within the policy contexts of host countries Whilst economic migration to Britain was initially supported by government mechanisms, respondents were subject to increasingly restrictive policies (Meijering and van Hoven, 2003, Hansen, 2000b; Dummet and Dummet, 1982). As forced migrants applying for stay on the basis of political asylum, the majority of the male respondents in Germany experienced a different context and character of legislative policy. Post-war German asylum policies were considered to be some of the most liberal in Europe. Following the cold war, and the sharp increase of asylum seekers entering Germany, these policies were made considerably more restrictive (Green,

---

[1] See Chapters 7 and 8.

2002, 2001a, 2001b; Anderson, 2001).

In light of ever more prohibitive policies migrants to Britain and Germany were offered, at least in part, a means of formal inclusion through the attainment of citizenship of the host country. Section 5.3 explores the different mechanisms by which formal inclusion was or could be attained, and the legislative context in which it was/is done so. The naturalisation process within Britain was relatively straightforward It consisted of few formal requirements, allowed dual citizenship (Hansen, 2000a, Hansen and King, 2000), and was premised on the belief that formal citizenship would facilitate 'integration' (Hansen, 2000b). In spite of the majority of migrants to Britain having obtained British citizenship, there is widespread concern in the literature over the limited political participation and representation enjoyed by ethnic minorities (Anwar, 2001, 1998b; OBV, 1999). In recent decades naturalisation in Britain has become more difficult. The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002 now requires applicants to demonstrate a high degree of British affiliation and integration (HO, 2002). Although this recent legislation does not effect the legal status of any of the British respondents it does serve to create a climate of unease, especially with regard to respondent feelings of belonging[2].

In contrast, naturalisation in Germany was, and still is, much more complicated. Citizenship in Germany is based on the principle of *ius sanguine*, conditional upon blood ties and ethno-cultural affiliation (Liedtke, 2002, Green, 2001b). Notwithstanding the large numbers of 'foreigners' settled in Germany (Green, 2001b), there has only been nominal change in citizenship laws in the last 50 years. Reforms in 1977[3] and 1991[4] allowed second and third generation migrants the right to apply for citizenship status although such applications are subject to demanding measures of formal integration Regardless of such restrictive naturalisation legislation 'foreigners' in Germany are involved in a large degree of political activity, including that related to welfare. Such activity has led some commentators to suggest that citizenship is a diminutive, albeit formal, indicator of inclusion (Brubaker, 1992, 1989). Arguments to the contrary suggest that the political participation of 'foreigners' in Germany is less an indication of 'integration', and more a reflection of their struggle to achieve equality (Berger *et al.*, 2002, Geddes,

---

[2] See Chapter 6.
[3] Einburgerungsrichtlinien (EinbRili).
[4] Ausländergesetz (AusIG).

2001).

Section 5 4 provides a brief overview of the social security provisions available in Britain and Germany In so doing, this section contextualises the discussion of respondent experiences and expectations of informal familial care that takes place in Chapter 7. 51%[5] of respondents suggest that the provision of the basic state pension, in both Britain and Germany provides a degree of financial security in old age. Whilst respondents do not suggest they will take advantage of this pension system, its existence does influence expectations from the care relationship. The penultimate section (5.5) explores the position of South Asian migrant elders vis-à-vis British and German welfare policies. Many of these policies are based on presumptions and/or ascriptions of social capital, in Britain to the South Asian community in particular, or in Germany to the populous as a whole Both sets of presumptions are overly-simplistic understandings of South Asian diasporic communities and can result in respondents being marginalised from welfare provisions. This section indicates the potential for such presumptions of social capital to re-emphasise, support, and indeed strain, bonds of familial care. In the concluding remarks, Section 5 6 questions how the distinctions between 'them' and 'us', as emphasised by the migratory and naturalisation policies of Britain and Germany, affect the construction of Pakistani Muslim communities. In so doing, this chapter sets out the line of enquiry exploring respondent experiences and interactions with community boundaries that forms the focus of the ensuing chapter (6).

5.2 *Migration Trajectories and Legislative Frameworks*

Patterns of Pakistani migration to Britain and Germany over the last 50 to 60 years have differed considerably. The variance in pattern owes much to the political and legal stance adopted by each country toward migrants and immigration. These differences can also be located in the socio-economic circumstances of respondents in Pakistan and the factors contributing to their migration. In light of these divergences the migrations of the British and German respondents are comparable only in so far as they differentially inform the construction and negotiation of community boundaries and individual identities in a 'foreign country'.

5.2.1 *The British Context*

---

[5] Percentages cited throughout the thesis refer to respondent numbers, for instance 74% of respondents and not to the number of times a certain opinion was expressed in the data.

Migration o f s tudy p articipants from B ritain f ollowed t hree trajectories, e conomic migration, family reunion and asylum All but one of the first generation male respondents migrated to Britain as labour migrants. T he exception, Mubin, was a political asylum seeker[6]. All but one of the first generation female respondents migrated to Britain as wives or fiancés of men who had migrated to work. The exception, Azra, migrated from where she lived in Kenya, to Britain, following official policies of 'Africanisation'[7] Whilst first generation females tend not to participate directly in the paid labour market, they play a large part in the facilitation of male labour activity[8]. Their migration although generally labelled family re-unification, is also, to a large degree, economic (Gardner 2002). All second-generation respondents were asked about their parents' migratory history. All stated their fathers had come to work and their mothers had followed. The earliest recollected migration year among both first and second-generation respondents was 1950, with the latest in 1992.

Respondent m igration patterns a re c onsistent w ith the g eneral m igratory t rends o f people from South Asia to Britain. Following the Second World War the British government looked to the Commonwealth to fill the demands of the labour market (Anwar, 1996). Correspondingly, the 1947 partition of India, compounded by widespread displacement and poverty and a desire to achieve a better standard of life made migration to Britain an attractive prospect. As Sassen observes, following the Second World War, Pakistan emerged as one of "the main non-European labour sending countries [to Europe] in the 1950s and into the 60s" (1999: 100 *sic*). A high proportion of immigrants that came to Britain as economic labour from Pakistan were former residents of an area known as Mirpur, displaced during the construction of the Mangla Dam[9] (Anwar, 1996) Although this displacement may have

---

[6] Mubin, 1st generation was a Pakistani journalist working in Afghanistan During interviews with Afghan warlords, his life was threatened and he was forced to migrate to Britain.

[7] Following independence Kenya pursued a policy of 'Africanisation' which was "designed to drive [South] Asians out of Kenyan economy and Kenyan society" (Hansen and King, 2000: 398). A loophole in the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act allowed South Asians in Kenya a right of free entry to Britain. In light of Kenya's hostile policies however, this right was revoked by the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act in fear of a potential 200,000 entrants, an exaggerated figure cited by James Callaghan (Hansen and King, 2000. 398, see also Hansen, 2003).

[8] See Chapter 7.

[9] Mangla Dam is the third largest earth filled dam, and lies 115 km south-east of Rawalpindi

'accelerated' their migration, it was not the sole reason for it (Shaw, 2000)

On the whole, migrants from Pakistan to Britain were from peasant farming families (Evans and Bowlby, 2000). As Shaw (2000) reminds the reader, however, classifying people thus is problematic. Such classifications can perpetuate stereotypes that 'rural' equates to being uneducated and 'urban' to educated, without sufficiently qualifying what it takes to become 'rural' or 'urban'. All first generation female respondents and two of the first generation male respondents describe themselves a s ' uneducated'. M oreover, o f t he s econd g eneration r espondents only speak of having parents who are 'educated'. All respondents whether they categorise themselves o r t heir p arents a s e ducated o r n ot d escribe t hemselves a s b eing f rom 'rural' farming villages in Pakistan.

> "She [sister in law] didn't put me in school, nor did she teach me the *Qur'an Shareef*, it was my childhood I was careless as well, I did not study well either" (Azra, 1st[10], UK female. 5).

> "I will tell you about Pakistan, but people do not have as many resources. Only rich men are getting their children religious, political and worldly education" (Kamil, 1st, UK male: 14)

> "we witnessed bathing at the well, animal's milk, I have milked animals myself with my own hands, I have fed them, we had a cow, a goat...we didn't even have the notion of a car...[but] I was educated" (Naim, 1st, UK male: 20-21).

Until 1962, entry into Britain was unrestricted for Commonwealth citizens (Ballard, 1987). In the face of growing social unrest among certain sections of the populous, and as a result of political parties motivated by electoral gains, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act was enacted in 1962. This Act aimed at stemming the indiscriminate flow of economic migrants to Britain. Although initial migration was temporary (Anwar, 1996) the 1962 Act provided individuals with an incentive to stay by restricting their return to Britain were they to leave. Paradoxically, the system of sponsorship and visas set up by the Immigrants Act of 1962 facilitated the process of chain migration (Ballard, 1987)[11], as individuals present in Britain became conduits for other economic migrants (Meijering and van Hoven, 2003).

This group began to 'call over' family and loved ones, thereby forming established

---

[10] Refers to 1st generation migrant.

settlement patterns (Ballard, 1994). This resulted in pockets of densely populated community and kinship networks (Shaw, 2000) Instead of restricting the free flow of migration and dispelling racial tensions, the Act of 1962 succeeded in making South Asian immigrants even more visible The arrival of women further consolidated the South Asian presence as families, religion and culture became established in Britain and the myth of return became an ever increasing fiction (Shaw, 1994). Amongst the British sample there are no instances of inter-ethnic marriages to women of British citizenship. Rather, men returned to Pakistan to marry women of Pakistani heritage. This trend is a reflection of general attitudes held by the Pakistani Muslim population of Britain, within which inter-ethnic marriages are viewed as problematic and are exceptions to the norm (Baumann, 2000).

In 1961 the estimated[12] number of Pakistanis in Britain was 24,900, the majority of whom were considered to be economic migrants By 1971 this figure had increased to 127,565, 44,430 of whom were thought to be 'dependent' Pakistanis who mainly arrived between the years of 1962 and 1967 (Rose, 1969, *quoted in*, Ballard, 1994) These trends are reflected in the sample, as all but two accounts speak to pre-1962 migration and post-1967 sponsored migration

Britain saw the onset of a political backlash against 'alien immigration' as early as the 1850's, spurred by the large scale expansion of the British shipping industry (Spencer, 1997; see also Mann, 1992) and increasing numbers of Irish and Jewish immigration (Rees, 1982, see also Anthias and Yuval Davis, 1992). Following post World War II migration this backlash took on a new vigour resultant, to a large degree, from the political desire to 'appease' the perceived 'racialist' attitudes of the British public (Dummet and Dummet, 1982). Racialist tendencies within and without politics were met by calls for 'integration' from the centre and the right and concepts of 'multiculturalism' by those on the left (Brah, 1996) Notwithstanding increasingly restrictive 'border controls', legislation affecting social life within Britain was amenable to such calls for toleration and harmony. As Hansen observes, a large part of the Asian migration to Britain occurred immediately before and after

---

[11] It is worth noting that in many instances migration could not have taken place without economic support from kin already present in the UK (Ahmed, 1996). See also Ilahi and Jafarey (1998) for a discussion on the financial costs of such migration.
[12] It is difficult to reference exact numbers as the British Census did not begin to record specifics relating to ethnicity until 1991 (Ballard, 1994, Anwar, 1990). Prior to the 1991 Census the number of immigrants was calculated on the basis of heads of

enactment of the 1965 Race Relations Act which gave "ethnic minorities a weapon against discrimination" (2000b· 47). This does not consider the day to day experience of migrants in Britain Nor does it allow for socio-economic constraints that would prevent migrant workers taking advantage of such legislation. This is reflected in statistical evidence which shows that "between 1970 and 1989, 74 people died as a result of racially motivated attacks" (Anwar, 1998b· 86; *quoting* Gordon, 1990)

Within the empirical data, experiences of racism following migration are expressed as every day occurrences (see also Ballard, 1987; Krausz, 1971). Respondents' articulations suggest that racism was not seen as something to be actively fought and subdued. It was a fact of life, one that had to be lived with and worked around. Experiences of racism were mediated, to some degree, by the presence of pre-existing community and kinship networks (Shaw, 2000)

> "At that time the English, of course, didn't give you the day jobs" (Naim, 1st, UK male. 23).

> "My mum, the first job she got was as a solicitor's secretary in [town] Now this was in the late 60's, politically incorrect days, blatant racism, sexism etc. etc. She only lasted, I think, 34 days and then she handed her resignation, why? Her boss asked her to wear a skirt and take her head scarf off" (Ijaz, 2[nd13], UK male: 14).

> "When my father first came here I think he had designs on joining the police force. In the, in 1967 he sat the exams and he wanted to join the mounted police service in, in [city]. Unfortunately at that time there was a lot of racism about and there still is, and when the local newspaper got to hear that there were 3 Asian, I think they were all Pakistani's that wanted to join the police force there were protests organised with you know 'Blacks out', people marching up and down, they found out the street that we lived in and they were marching up and down the street with placards saying 'Blacks out of the police force' and 'we do not want any Asians in the police force' and because of that, predominantly because of that, my mother felt really scared and she did not want my father to go through with it. So instead he joined the public transport service and became a bus driver" (Safa, 2nd, UK female: 2).

> "I lived in [city], Scotland for about three years and then I came back to [city] Because there was a community here and I felt safe" (Najm, 1st, UK female: 1).

---

families being from commonwealth countries (inspite of a significant number of second generation migrants having been born in Britain) (Mason, 1995)
[13] Refers to 2nd generation migrant.

5.2.2 *The German Context*

The process of Pakistani migration to Germany was much more complicated and prolonged than its British counterpart This is partly due to the intricate web of German [14] immigration legislation, which requires greater explanation and elucidation than that of Britain Immigration legislation in Germany has been further complicated by the country's changing legal and political dynamics. Germany has traditionally conceived of itself as a 'non-immigration' country', *Einwanderungsland* (Green, 2002). This notwithstanding, the number of non-German residents[15] in Germany (*Auslander*, foreigners) is far higher than in any other Western European country[16], standing at 7 3 million in December 1999 (Green, 2001b). In the 1950's Germany saw a 9 per cent annual rise in gainful employment This period, known as *Wirtschaftswunder*, the economic boom (Bendix, 1990), resulted in widespread economic migration to Germany. The majority of the *Ausländer* population in Germany today is made up of purposefully recruited economic migrants from Mediterranean countries, especially Turkey.

Known as *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers), people entering Germany through formal labour recruitment channels have been subject to a number of complex laws governing their entry and stay. *Gastarbeiter* were subject to a system of rotation (*Rotationspinzip*), whereby they worked for a period of time and were then obliged to return to their country of origin in favour of a new set of employees (Green, 2001a; Bommes *et al*, 1999). The recruitment of *Gastarbeiter* was aimed at alleviating labour shortages in specific sectors (Booth, 1992). Although initial recruitment was slow, following the construction of the Berlin wall in 1961, and the consequent cessation of the refugee flow, it sharply increased (Green 2001b). Pressure from employers requiring continuity of trained labour (Bendix, 1990) led to the governing coalition[17] of the day to introduce the *Anwerbestopp*, which prevented any further recruitment. The *Anwerbestopp* allowed employers to hire and retain foreigners only after they had proved no 'native' could do the job (Theil, 2003). The revocation of rotating labour provided many *Gastarbeiter*, already in Germany

---

[14] The discussion here only refers to policies of the former West Germany and post-unification Germany.

[15] Not including ethnic Germans who, whether they were born and bought up inside Germany or not, are considered to be 'German'.

[16] According to Eurostat (2002), the number of non-European Union nationals in Germany is comparable to that in Austria.

[17] Made up of the Social Democrat Party and the Free Democratic Party.

(many of whom did not initially intend to stay (Nonneman, 1996, Nielsen, 1995)), with an incentive to remain and bring their families to join them (Green, 2001b) Consequently, in 1973, the number of foreign workers stood at 2.6 million, and the resident population of *Gastarbeiter* spouse and children stood at 4 0 million (Alber, 2001).

During the *Wirtschaftswunder* Pakistan's government entered talks with Germany with the hope of forming bi-lateral labour agreements (*Garstarbeitnehmer*) such as those formed with Turkey and numerous other Mediterranean countries, but the terms of agreement could not be reached. Schönwalder observes that the prevalence of labour agreements with largely 'European' countries was reflective of "[e]xclusion based on racial stereotypes" (2004 249) During the course of the talks, agents in Pakistan had begun to recruit people willing to migrate to Germany, but these migrations fell through along with the inter-governmental agreements (Benedix, 1990). 14% of the male sample in Germany had been recruited by agents but were unable to migrate through this channel

In contrast to the British sample, 79%[18] of male respondents entered Germany as political asylum seekers These respondents fled Pakistan following the 1977 military coup which resulted in the removal of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as Prime Minister (Aziz, 2001). The sample in Germany also differs from that in Britain as 64% of male respondents class themselves as being from urban cities rather than rural village areas of Pakistan. Significantly involved in the politics of Pakistan, these respondents were 'white collar' workers, rather than, as with many of their British counterparts, manual or farm workers. In correlation with the more urban based migration of this group 86% of German male respondents and 67% of female respondents define themselves as 'educated' to degree level.

> "We [Pakistani Muslims] had this advantage [over Turkish Muslims].
> The work that we started in [building] our communities ...because
> this work was by students, in Universities. When students started
> this in Universities they had intellectuals. They had education as
> well, they had knowledge as well and then they wanted to study as
> well. That is why our communities are less in number but better in
> quality" (Latif, 1st, German male 4)
>
> "I used to study in university" (Ulfath, 1st, German female: 2)

---

[18] All percentage breakdowns are rounded up to the nearest whole number For a breakdown of Base Data see Appendix 4

"I'm from [major city] in Pakistan, my father is Vice President of [Company]" (Bilal, 1ˢᵗ, German male. 1).

Their migration as political asylum seekers saw the majority of the male German sample group (79%) subject to a variety of different legislative frameworks The asylum process in Germany is long and protracted, and "large numbers of asylum seekers find themselves spending long years in the Federal Republic's asylum determination system, with uncertain status, or as rejected applicants who cannot be removed" (Anderson, 2001· 188). The right to political asylum has been laid down in Article 16 of the Basic Law (Germany's constitution – *Grundgesetz*; Tschentscher, 2003). Following Germany's re-constitution after World War II, its asylum policies were extremely generous in comparison to its European counterparts Asylum seekers were able to work whilst their applications were being processed and were granted substantial welfare rights. Influenced by the Cold War, increasing numbers of asylum seekers between 1976 and 1980, compounded by a growing backlash against 'foreign labour', resulted in more restrictive policies being put into place (Green, 2001b). In 1993, alongside reforms that regulated the distribution of asylum seekers, and introduced fingerprinting, Article 16a of the Basic Law was amended to exclude those asylum applicants who had passed through a 'safe third country' or come from a 'safe country of origin'. This amendment also made arrangements for 'airport procedures' whereby individual claims could be dealt with at the airports where claimants had arrived, in order to ease deportation should the claim be denied (FO, 2003; Anderson, 2001)

Amongst the respondent sample, dates of migration to Germany range from 1963 to 2002. The earliest migration for the purposes of asylum was in 1975. Between the years of 1975 and 1981 the right of asylum seekers to work, welfare and education were restricted, initially for the period of one year, and later-extended to the time it took to make a decision (on average 4-6 years) (Alber, 2001)[19]. Stringent application of asylum conditions by the German courts and asylum agencies (*Bundesdienststelle für die Anerkennung auslandischer Flüchlinge*) meant most asylum applicants were denied stay permits (Bos and Wenzel, 1996) Of the sample, only 36% of those who claimed political asylum had their claim granted. The remaining 64% married women of German citizenship and were granted right of residence. Of these, only 2

---

[19] Basic provisions were made which allowed for the receipt of benefits in kind, in the form of vouchers and credit

of the respondents (29%[20]) are still married to their German wives. The remainder have all been divorced and, without exception, are married to women from Pakistan

Inter-ethnic marriage patterns often coincided with the imminent failure of asylum claims. Their marriage to German woman upon likelihood of deportation can lead to the inference that migration amongst this group was motivated by economic, as opposed to asylum rationale. As Faist suggests, to "apply for political asylum was, for many migrants, the only way of entering one of the richest countries in the world" (1993. 6; see also Hansen, 2002). Similar reasoning has been applied by some to asylum seekers in Britain (Sales, 2002) Many of the German respondents strenuously a ssert that t his i s n ot the c ase a nd t heir marriages t o G erman w omen were not ones of ' convenience'. 71% have children from their first marriage and tried, for a number of years, to make their marriages work

> "Once you have got married you think well now I have got married for real, the people at home [Pakistan] say now that you have got married, if you have got married then you have to stay together forever. You shouldn't leave someone after, they shouldn't think that you just got married for your own benefit" (Raees, 1st, German male: 1).

> "The day it was my wedding my father was sat in London He did not come to my wedding...[Father said] we are not happy but now that you are doing it then okay. But when my wife went over there [Pakistan] they w ere v ery h appy, v ery h appy...My wife is a g ood woman. I am not a good man but my wife is a good woman, very good woman" (Usmaan, German male· 7).

Initially, Pakistani Muslim female migration to Germany was minimal. After 1973 it increased to a similar rate as that of men (Booth, 1992) On the whole, family reunification within the sample group did not take place until the 1990's, with the exception of Atiya who migrated to Germany with her husband in 1964. This trend is directly related to the large percentage of German/Pakistani marriages during the first decade of male migration. 58% of the female respondents are second wives. Of the remaining, 17% migrated following the educational migration of their husbands, 17% following his accepted status as a political refugee, and only 8% following economic migration. The empirical data suggests that patterns of family re-unification continued irrespective of ever more restrictive asylum and labour migration laws (Reitz et al., 1998).

---

[20] This percentage refers to 29% of the 64% who married German women (2 of the 7 men).

Throughout the 1970's and 1980's legislative policy in Germany was aimed at the assimilation or return of its foreign population (Wilpert, 1992). It was not until the late 1980's that terminology of 'foreign worker' was perceived to have the potential to marginalize, and was replaced at a local level with that of *auslaendische Mitbuerger* (foreign co-citizen). More direct forms of discrimination are evident on a daily basis and, studies of both the former East Germany and West Germany have found that incidents of violent and non-violent racism and xenophobia are rife (Wilpert, 1992). 50% of the German respondents cite having been subjected to differential treatment as a result of their colour, ethnicity or religion. In particular, this differentiation is thought to be negative for the 'next generation' as respondents feel they are not, or will not be, accepted as Pakistani Muslims.

Respondents express the fear that their children will have to forego their Pakistani and/or Muslim identities in favour of 'being German' in order to 'succeed'. Such concerns are compounded by institutional measures such as the 1998 re-introduction of classroom quotas to ensure no more than 20 per cent of children in any one class are 'foreigners'. Such quotas were justified with the argument that they would "improve the language competency" (Cağler, 2001: 603) of all children. Underlying such policies is the subtext of needing to maintain German 'culture' (Scönwälder, 2004). Further, many German states, including the one where respondents reside, have adopted 'dispersal' policies to prevent areas of concentrated 'foreigners'. Such areas, labelled cultural enclaves "are considered to be the ultimate expression of this [migrant] refusal and/or the German state's failure to manage cultural diversity so that it would not pose a threat to the solidarity of imagined community" (Cağler, 2001: 604). Through these measures, "even politically active naturalised immigrants still experience discrimination and marginalisation" (Bauböck, 1996. 116)

> "Sometimes I think maybe the teachers will mind, that why are they [parents] making the children keep *Roze* [fasts during the holy month of Ramadan]" (Yusra, 1st, German female: 4).

> "[I don't want my son to get] shunted from pillar to post, people ask did you grow up in a home? Who is your father? Is he Pakistani? They are foreigners, they are not good people, the children are not good" (Raees, 1st, German male: 14).

The policy of dispersal adopted by the German government sits in contrast to the 'densely populated' communities of Britain. Policies of dispersal have implications for the creation and sustenance of Pakistani Muslim communities and the

development o f Islam a t a n institutional l evel. Minority g roups a re u nlikely t o b e able to gather the strength in numbers, or take advantage of extended family or community based networks to mobilise at a political level. This has implications for the degree to which elders are able to rely on informal familial care[21] In practice, once asylum or right to residency has been gained, 'foreigners' in Germany are relatively free to move as they please

The German census does not include the category of Pakistani, or even South Asian heritage (FSO, 2003). Government estimates suggest that of the 7.3 million foreign residents only 842,000 are of South Asian nationality (Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung Für Auslander Fragen, 2002). The official statistics which relate to the German city from whence the German sample was generated do not recognise a Pakistani contingent to the populous. The small number of estimated South Asian residents in all of Germany, and the corresponding omission within local statistics of a Pakistani/South Asian category suggests that the Pakistani presence in the fieldwork city is, at best, negligible. Such restricted numbers, combined with national and local policies of dispersal, make geographically situated communities difficult to observe. The absence of geographically proximate communities of 'us'[22], is a tangible part of the everyday experiences of German respondents.

> "Here [in city, Pakistani] people are scattered. Like maybe you observe in England, you will not find communities like that here. Here we only meet once a week and even then for only two or three hours in some Mosque...And then, the Pakistani Muslims that have come here in the last two decades, the last 15 or 20 years...First we came here and our visas, in trying to make them permanent people spent 10 or 15 years" (Jamal, 1st, German male. 4)

> "In this entire block of flats there are no Pakistanis that live near me" (Mariya, 1st, German female: 5).

> "It is difficult, isn't it, to find Pakistanis here [in city], there are very few Pakistanis here. They live very far away" (Leila, 1st, German female: 1).

In his observations about the British community, Nielsen (1988) suggests that their secure settlement status enabled Muslim migrants in Britain to invest in their stay. The uncertain status and protracted process of political asylum, by comparison, left many German respondents feeling dislocated and uncertain which intruded upon

---

[21] See Chapter 7
[22] See Chapters 2 and 6.

their economic and personal life. During the course of their asylum applications, a period that lasted between 4 to 6 years, respondents were prevented from taking formal paid employment. In addition to this many felt the need to marry women of German descent in order to secure residency status as it became evident that their applications w ere g oing t o b e r ejected[23]. T his uncertainty, a nd t he c orresponding effects upon other areas of a respondent's life has led to a notable lack of 'rootedness' (Nielsen, 1988)

"The people who had come over here under political asylum, almost all other paths were closed to us ..And that was a long process. And then the worst thing that we faced is that we were always worried that we would be deported at any time" (Jamal, 1st, German male: 1).

"I was under protection, asylum My case for asylum was underway. In 1980 that would run for 2 or 3 years If they rejected you and you appealed another 3 years would go by. It was in this that 6 years passed. Then I got married and revoked my application for asylum and then I was granted stay on the basis of marriage" (Shabaz, 1st, German male 2)

"A man who marries a German worries about his children more because he knows that my wife is of this society. And I should work hard so my children are saved from this [society]. And those who are Pakistani families or you can call them Muslim families they think what shall we do, I am a Muslim, my wife is a Muslim, my children will automatically be Muslims. They become the target of *khushfemi* (blissful ignorance)" (Usman, 1st, German male: 6).

5.2.3 *The British/German Migration Comparative*

Notwithstanding their diverging migratory experiences and trends, the two groups of respondents, German and British, share a number of similarities In spite of the different legislative approaches to immigration, policies pertaining to labour migration in both Britain and Germany have been primarily spurred by political, rather than economic, concerns (Büchel and Frick, 2003). Both countries have aimed to restrict and qualify migration, with a view to regulating their borders, policies that stand in apparent contradiction to the then prevalent need for economic labour.

Consideration of the migratory experience allows "us to distinguish between the impact of migration, first on objective factors (for example the family of the older ethnic migrant may be split across two countries), and second on subjective

---

[23] Although as highlighted earlier residency status was not the sole reason for such marriages.

perception" (Brockmann, 2002: 292). As suggested in Chapter 2, Pakistani Muslim communities are premised upon shared norms and values, as well as ethnic affiliation (Dwyer, 1999; Mohammed, 1999). Factors such as the greater number of Pakistani Muslims in Britain, stable and consistent migratory processes and the length of time 'Pakistani' Muslim families have been re-united and resident, all suggest that Pakistani Muslim communities in Britain will be more established than those in Germany (Nielsen, 1988)[24].

5.3 A Question of Citizenship?

The degree to which an individual is formally established within a particular country is to some extent belied by his or her citizenship[25] status. Rummery and Glendinning contend that "[t]heories of citizenship are concerned with the relationship between individuals, their rights and entitlements, and the policies and practices which dictate whether and how individuals can claim those rights and entitlements against the state" (2000. 531). There are increasing trends for debates relating to citizenship to consider issues of responsibilities, as well as rights (Dwyer, 2002, 1998). The extent to which such rights and responsibilities are translated into formal citizenship statuses h ave t he p otential t o b ecome i nclusionary/exclusionary m echanisms. T his can, in turn, affect an individual's access to the welfare state (Bos and Wenzel, 1996). Such mechanisms can also heighten distinctions between 'them' and 'us', and influence the degree to which individuals feel, or are able to 'integrate'.

5.3.1 *British Citizenship*   (

British citizenship was not a formal legal status until the 1940's. Prior to this, those born on 'British territory' were considered to be British subjects. In 1948 the Labour government enacted legislation which granted two forms of British citizenship, citizenship of the United Kingdom and colonies, and citizenship of independent Commonwealth countries (Hansen, 2000b). In contrast to the British concept, the German notion is based upon ethnicity (Hansen, 2000b)

Due to the broad definition of citizenship in the UK, the naturalisation of immigrants "has always been a low-key affair, with few formal requirements and a liberal

---

[24] This does not, however, imply that such communities are any more cohesive, as a greater period of residence in Britain has the potential to loosen ties based on ethnic and religious affiliation just as much as it may strengthen them. See Chapter 6
[25] The concept of citizenship is a contested one, and has been debated by many scholars For a comprehensive overview of these debates see Dwyer (2004)

tolerance of dual citizenship" (Green, 2002: 13) The British acceptance of dual citizenship has been attributed to the view that citizenship enables the integration of migrants (Hansen, 2000b). Having gained formal inclusion through mechanisms such as citizenship, it was felt that migrant communities would be better equipped, and more willing, to participate in and be accepting of British society and culture. Almost all Pakistani migrants, economic or otherwise, applied for, and were granted, British citizenship[26] (Ballard, 1987) Second and third generation migrants were considered British citizens where born in the British Isles (The Immigration Act 1971, IND, 2003). The right to citizenship by virtue of birth was qualified by the British Nationality Act 1981 (according to the principles of *ius soli*), to be held by those born to parents, or a parent, 'settled' in the British Isles (IND, 2001)[27]. This Act promoted sexual equality by reducing the privileges held by women and children. In making men and women subject to the same entitlements, the right of women to citizenship following marriage, and the automatic right of children born in the UK to be considered British citizens was removed (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1996) The relative ease with which British citizenship can be obtained is reflected in the British sample as all the respondents, including Haider, who was the last to migrate in 1992, are British citizens.

Recently, British citizenship laws have been restricted and qualified. In 2002, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act came into force. Whilst making many changes to the procedures of immigration and asylum, this Act also has implications for the process of naturalisation. Applicants seeking British citizenship are now required to take an oath of allegiance to Britain, have 'sufficient' command of the English language, and, demonstrate 'sufficient knowledge of life in the United Kingdom' (HO, 2003). Whereas citizenship was initially thought to promote integration, recent trends in legislation require a degree of integration prior to the acquisition of citizenship. This approach to citizenship status and procedures is more comparable to German policies than earlier legislation was.

In spite of the widespread possession of full citizenship rights, there is concern over the political participation of Britain's black and minority ethnic communities. A 1998 study by Anwar (1998b) concluded that, at a national level, Asians were as

---

[26] Only 4 per cent of the ethnic minorities living in Britain do not hold British citizenship (Green, 2002).
[27] Under such legislation, there is the potential for children, who are born in Britain, to parents not of British nationality, to be stateless (Sassen, 1999)

likely to vote as their white counterparts. There has also been a trend among all major political parties in recent decades, to actively seek votes from minority ethnic communities[28]. This notwithstanding, their remains an obvious deficit in ethnic minority representation at a national political level.

In his 2001 study, Anwar estimated that there are 125 parliamentary constituencies in Britain with an ethnic minority population of over 10 per cent. According to the 2001 British census, 3.1% of the British population is Muslim[29].   1.3% of the population gave their ethnic heritage as being Pakistani (ONS, 2003). In spite of these statistics, in 1999 only 9 out of 659 Ministers of Parliament in the House of Commons were from ethnic minority backgrounds (OBV, 1999). It has been estimated that a true representation of ethnic minority populations would require this number to increase to over 60 (OBV, 1999)   Such under representation is not restricted to 'ethnic minority' groups, rather, it extends to many 'disadvantaged' groups such as women, the disabled and the 'working' classes. Figures, such as those of the OBV suggest that, "however relatively easy it is to acquire British citizenship formally, becoming a citizen in some fuller sense is difficult" (Hansen, 2000b· 46). Structural discrimination preventing 'immigrants' from enjoying citizenship rights to their full extent were, and to some degree still are, in existence (Gladstone, 1995)

5.3.2 *German Citizenship*

In Germany, the area of immigration, asylum and refugees is one littered with legislation. Different legal statuses, residential permits and conditions of settlement, all speak to a hierarchical structure of different groups, and categories within groups (Liedtke, 2002). German citizenship laws remain embodied in the *Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz* (RuStAG) of July 1913, and are based on principles of *ius sanguine* (blood ties and ethnic affiliation rather than residence or birth (*ius soli*)) (Preuss, 2003) The principle of *ius sanguine* in the RuStAG meant "effectively institutionalising the ethnocultural inflexions" (Green, 2001b: 86) of German citizenship.

---

[28] Polls have shown that such active recruitment has not cost parties their White votes, a concern that endured among political parties as late as the 1980's (Anwar, 2001).

[29] As Mortimore (2001) observes, the question of religious affiliation was not compulsory and was left blank by 4,011,000 people (ONS, 2003). Furthermore, 0.7 per cent gave their religion as 'Jedi Knight' (ONS, 2003) Thus the figures relating to this category are at best, a fairly accurate estimation.

The RuStAG remained substantively unaltered until the 1977 Guidelines on Naturalisation (*Einbürgerungsrichtlinien* (EinbRili)). These guidelines laid down criteria for second and third generation migrants to become eligible for German nationality Conditions of naturalisation included a minimum ten year residence, language proficiency and renunciation of previous nationality. These "set a standard of cultural integration into German society as a benchmark for naturalisation" (Green, 2001a: 31). In contrast to the British system of citizenship, migrants had to demonstrate a "high degree of formal integration" (Green, 2001a 13) as a condition of citizenship, rather than acquiring citizenship as a means of becoming more integrated.

The requirements of the 1977 guidelines were relaxed following the *Auslandergesetz* [30] (The Foreigners Act [31]) reforms in 1991 These reforms conditioned citizenship upon legal competence, no legal charge warranting expulsion, adequate living space and ability to support dependants, and renunciation of previous nationality, if resident in Germany for a period of 15 years (AusIG 1991: Para 86 sec. 1, Die Beauftragte, 2000)[32]. The naturalisation of the spouse and dependants of such an applicant was discretionary. If the applicant was aged between 16 and 23, he or she was required to give up previous nationality, be resident in Germany for 8 years or more, of which six were to have been spent in education, and not have been convicted of any criminal offence (AusIG 1991: para. 85, Die Beauftragte, 2000) Naturalisation pre-supposed a high level of formal integration (Green, 2002). Recent attempts to relax the principle of *ius sanguine* have only been partially successful. Following the 1999 rejection of dual nationality by the Bundesrat[33] (Green, 2001a· 46), a revised proposal was submitted by the SDP. This proposal, based on the principle of *ius soli* and restricted to those under the age of 18, was approved (Bös, 2003; Green, 2001b)[34]. Such measures suggest that the ethnocentric focus of German citizenship is being gradually, albeit minutely, permeated.

---

[30] AusIG.

[31] This Act regulates the rights of all people entering or living on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany who are not German citizens (Liedtke, 2002).

[32] These measures were temporally limited to those eligible for application pre-1995 However, in 1993, they were "turned into an unlimited legal right" (Green, 2001b: 95).

[33] The legislative body representing the provinces at the Federal level.

[34] Only those born in Germany, to parents/parent who has been resident in Germany for eight years or more and has held an unlimited resident permit for 3 years or more are eligible for German citizenship under this legislation.

The varying levels and entitlements conferred by this array of citizenship legislation has a bearing upon different rights of residence and 'stay' that respondents were able to obtain Male respondents within the German sample, were granted residency status under three categories, the residence permit[35] (usually issued for 1 year), the right of residence[36] (issued for an unrestricted time period (Bos and Wenzel, 1996)) and political asylum (also issued for an unrestricted time period[37]) Spouses of permanent residents in Germany are granted stay under a limited residence permit, which can be transformed to a permanent residence permit if certain conditions are fulfilled[38]. Spouses are required to have resided in Germany for 5 years, unaided by the welfare state, and show that they can continue to "make a living independently of social assistance or other welfare provisions" (Liedtke, 2002: 480) All female respondents in Germany obtained right of residence on these grounds Only one, Ishrat, is in regular employment, working alongside her husband on a market stall. All the other female respondents are financially dependent on their spouses Following the reforms of AusIG 1991, all but two of the male respondents within the sample became eligible for German citizenship Upon having obtained the right of residence none of the respondents, male or female, submitted such an application.

Klopp (2002) has argued that political right of residence in Germany equates to a form of denizenship. The notion of 'denizenship' has "provided a platform on which non-citizens have gradually acquired the distributive goods of social membership" (Klopp, 2002: 241). Notwithstanding the very small percentage who have acquired citizenship status[39], Booth's (1992) study shows that the migrant population of Germany is decidedly political, at both a local and regional level Through such political activism, they demonstrate that "contrary to their temporary dejure status, the majority of the migrant population in . Germany today are behaving demographically as if they were permanent" (Booth, 1992· 6), even though they are unable to vote (Klopp, 2002) This participation is becoming formally institutionalised as mechanisms are put into place to accommodate and represent

---

[35] *Aufenthaltserlaubnis*, § § 15, 17 AusIG.

[36] *Aufenthaltsberechtigung* § 27 AusIG.

[37] Although such status does, in many instances, and for a time, retain conditions relating to the individual and the country from which that individual has fled.

[38] There is a conspicuous gap within literature in the English language, academic and otherwise, relating to the prevalence of Pakistani asylum cases and citizenship through marriage. This discrepancy needs to be addressed if the problems and benefits of having a Pakistani migrant community in Germany are to be addressed

[39] Morris observes of the 2 2 million Turks, by far the largest group of foreigners residing in Germany, "only 220,000 had naturalised" (2000· 227)

resident non-citizens. Foreigners are represented at a federal level by the Commissioner for Matters relating to Aliens, whose responsibility it is to represent foreigner interests in processes of collective bargaining and other social institutions and structures In addition, all the main political parties are increasingly seeking to encourage membership from Germany's foreign population (Klopp, 2002) It is with reference to such participation and the political recognition it incites that Bos and Wenzel have argued, "the *statuses of immigration cannot be reduced* to the formal dichotomy of citizenship versus non-citizenship" (1996 35, *original emphasis*).

The degree to which foreigners are able to participate in political institutions at a local level is discretionary. Notwithstanding the visible presence of foreigners at political forums in many cities, including the one from which the empirical data was generated, they are prevented from participating in local government elections (Berger *et al.*, 2002). Whilst a stratified system of rights based on different citizenship and residence statuses speaks to gradual, but increasing, levels of integration, the German policy toward foreigners remains motivated by concerns of "job protection, welfare surveillance and deterrence" (Morris, 2000. 237), as perhaps, does that of the UK.

In spite of attempts at the federal level to reduce the ethno-centric character of political participation, at a local level "the task of integration...is [still] seen as the systematic co-ordination, regulation and modification of cultural diversity in the public domain so as not to endanger civil society" (Cağler, 2001: 604). 'Foreigners', irrespective of the length of time they have been resident in Germany, continue to be seen as a 'danger' to civil society and German 'culture' (Schönwälder, 2004) Within some cities, including that of the fieldwork, such regulation of cultural diversity follows strict systems of quotas and dispersal policies. These policies are justified with reference to the persistent ideology of ethno-cultural heritage and civic cohesion (Berger *et al*, 2002). As a result, migrants continue to struggle in many arenas of civic participation. Among the German sample, political participation was only mentioned within the context of education.

> "The Islamic Foundation has put in a case since '83 to give religious education in normal schools as well. And after about 20 years, having been passed through one court and another they have won" (Faiz, 1st, German male: 3).

Contrary to assertions that permanent residence equates to 'denizenship' (Klopp, 2002), the persistent label of 'foreigner', albeit palliated through terms such as

auslandische Mitbuerger (foreign co-citizen), continues to play a large role in influencing the 'integration' of ethnic minorities (Fassman *et al*, 1999). Brubaker (1992) observes that formal rights of citizenship are not the sole, or even the most significant indicators of individual participation, particularly in the light of social and other substantive rights (see also, Dwyer, 2004). In some instances however, social and substantive participation can be an indication of the exclusion faced by some groups. The active struggle for particular rights can be more an attempt to combat exclusion, rather than a sign that a group is taking advantage of inclusion into host societies (Berger *et al*, 2002, Geddes, 2001) In apparent agreement respondents themselves view their political aspirations for the education system as a struggle to maintain their Islamic identities.

> "The Muslim population in [city] have struggled with the government and finally got accepted a Muslim school here in [city]" (Anis, 1st, German male: 26).

> "In order to save their faith [Islam] people are, I mean in spiritual terms…For this you need authority, you need institutions for this. That will tell children, that will tell the whole community that religious thought is like this" (Jamal, 1st, German male: 4).

5.3.3 *The British/German Citizenship Comparative*

As Morris observes, "in the case of migration, there are two salient dimensions to citizenship, the civic and the ethnic, the former concerned with rights and the latter with identity or 'belonging'" (2000. 224). Political participation has been argued by some, such as Klopp (2002), to constitute an expression of identity. As the likes of Berger *et al* (2002) observe however, political participation can be more a struggle for identity politics[40], whereby individuals or groups fight to maintain, and have respected, their differences rather than as a means to denote their belonging. Whether the possession of British citizenship, or the participation in German politics, speaks to feelings of belonging among the British and German samples respectively, remains an open question. What can be observed, is that the differential statuses of citizen, denizen or foreign co-citizen form different backdrops against which respondents in Britain and Germany construct, experience and give importance to 'their' community. Further, questions of whether migrants are, and feel as though they are citizens, denizens or foreigners all speak to the rights they possess, and take up, vis-à-vis the welfare state. As such, the citizenship debate continues to have

---

[40] The right to have one's identity recognised and respected is particularly important in the context of care relationships (Williams, 2000; see also Chapter 3)

relevance for all welfare, particularly that relating to 'older' people.

5.4 *Social Security Provisions in Old Age and Ethnic Minorities of Britain and Germany*

In order to understand the way in which informal care relationships are constructed and experienced it is necessary to engage with the macro-level structural contexts in which they are embedded Although formal provisions do not play a major role in the negotiation of respondent care relationships their existence does provide a backdrop against which family and kinship relations are perceived and valued. The aim in the proceeding sub-sections is not to put forth a comprehensive review of social security provisions in old age, but to give an indication of the way in which pensions are perceived from the lay perspective of the respondents.

5.4.1 *Social Security Provisions in Old Age and South Asian Communities in Britain*

The British pension system is made up of four interdependent strands At the most elementary level all British residents are entitled to the means tested Pension Credit, which guarantees a basic level of income Subject to assessment of an individual's alternative resources this Pension Credit is perceived to be a form of social welfare (Titmuss, 1958) and as such, is exposed to much the same stigma (Mann, 1992). This Pension Credit can be used to supplement the basic state pension, the second strand of social security in old age. Levels of the basic state pension are determined by an individual's National Insurance contributions throughout his or her working life. The third strand of pensions is made up of occupational pension schemes, contributed to by both employer and employee Very common in the public sector, but decreasingly so in the private sector, occupational pension schemes offer defined benefits which provide individuals with pension rates proportional to their wages (Mann, 2001).

The fourth strand is made up of defined contributions and can be further divided into categories of private, stakeholder and purchased Private pensions are usually available to those in high paid white collar occupations, and as such, inaccessible to many first generation Pakistani Muslim migrants. Some private pensions are made up of contributions from employers as well as employees and some are not Invested into financial markets, the earnings from such pensions vary. Theses investment strategies can rely on income generated from usury and thus may be considered

inaccessible by Muslims and people from other faith based groups[41]. Stakeholder pensions run along much the same model as private pensions but their administration charges are set by the state. Their running costs are very low as are contribution rates Private purchased pensions are the final strand and can be bought independently of employment from the pensions market. Although earnings are usually not as high as from occupational pensions, private purchase pensions have the advantage of being available to all who can afford to pay into them and of being unrestricted to any employer

The kind of pension to which an individual has access is dependent to a large degree upon his or her labour market participation and location. Racial discrimination leading to limited opportunities, combined with the purposive recruitment of labour migrants for specific industries meant, for the most part, migrant labourers entered the "market on disadvantageous terms" (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992: 77) Many of these terms were contextualised by the geographical area in which migration was taking place. In the north of England the decline of manufacturing industries in the late 1970s and early 1980s saw high levels of unemployment among many migrant labourers (Dale, 2002). Workers in less severely hit areas and industries such as the transport industry were able to negotiate relatively better pension arrangements than those based in for example the textile industry. Even in public sector industries where pension rates were relatively more lucrative South Asian migrants may have been prevented from accessing such schemes. Commentators such as Samje (1995) have suggested that access to, and take up of, social security provisions in old age are hampered by direct and indirect discrimination. Many of the post war labour migrants to Britain were specifically recruited for the purposes of nightshift work within factories. During negotiations for better pension provisions the remit of these benefits was often restricted to full time non-shift workers, a restriction Mann (1992) observes to be blatantly discriminatory as it disproportionately excluded members of ethnic minorities.

In spite of the multi-level pension system, the Department of Health (1998) found that over a third of 'Asian' older people in Britain are not in receipt of a pension, or of state benefits[42]. The lack of pension provision for this group can be attributed to a

---

[41] To give or receive usury has been forbidden in the Holy *Qur'an* (3.275-281).
[42] Household means tested benefits indirectly discriminate against multi-generational household, relatively common amongst Pakistani and Bangladeshi families in Britain (Berthoud, 2000).

number of factors. One significant factor is the limited understanding and knowledge of the pension system amongst certain South Asian communities. In a study for the DWP[43], Barnard and Pettigrew found that "many older Bangladeshi and Pakistani respondents h ad l ittle o r no idea of whether they had contributed t o occupational pension schemes during their years of employment" (2003. 18)   In addition to this the limited acquisition o f pension r ights amongst these g roups h as b een l inked to high rates of unemployment and low paid jobs, which leave little financial capability for future savings (Bowes and Wilkinson, 2001). The antipathy toward investing in a pension and the difficulties of doing so whilst in a low paid job is reflected within the empirical data.

> "In truth, I haven't got a pension, my wife does have quite a good
> one. But we were talking about it just the other day. But it just
> keeps getting put off" (Haidar, 2nd, UK male. 5).

Nesbitt and Neary (2001) found that the limited knowledge and procurement of pension rights among first and second generation Pakistani migrants in Oldham, was directly linked to the view, within these groups, that the intergenerational contract obliged children to financially provide for their elders. It was felt that such financial obligation leaves little need for formal pension provisions In apparent endorsement Büchel and Frick (2003) found Pakistani migrants in Britain enjoy a disproportionately higher percentage of private financial transfers than the 'indigenous' population. However, these transfers are thought to be a consequence of limited pension provisions, rather than a cause of such limitation, and form "an important alternative to public transfers in a liberal welfare system, helping prevent low-income families from falling into poverty"[44] (Büchel and Frick, 2003 12).

The lack of pension provision and corresponding financial insecurities among Pakistani Muslim elders has the potential to be compounded by policies that seek to make h igher r ates of pension c ontributions compulsory (Hill, 1998) A s G uanglia and Markose o bserve, recent pension p olicies h ave s een " a s ignificant shift away from public pay-as-you-go towards private funded premium provisions" (2000 469). Where contribution to such private schemes is compulsory it reduces the amount of

---

[43] The Department for Work and Pensions.
[44] Private transfers extend to trans-national kin, as many first and second generation migrants continue to send money 'back home' Such transfers are often directly responsible for the rise in 'status' attributed to migrants in their country of origin, irrespective of their living conditions in the host country (Shah and Menon, 1999, Nadvi, 1999, Shaw, 1988)

financial resources available to younger generation Pakistani Muslims with which to make inter-generational transfers. There are also concerns that such contributions will go towards s chemes that r ely on usury and are t hus r eligiously unacceptable (Mann, 2003, 2001)

The situation of ethnic minority women is further weakened as a result of past trends in British pension policies. Thus far "the British policy toward the labour participation of women has been one of individual choice where the cost must be borne by the individual" (Windebank, 2001 273). In general female employment trajectories are punctuated by breaks in employment and part-time work, both of which make access, and contribution to many pension plans difficult. Women were particularly affected by the changes made to pensions systems during Mrs Thatcher's terms as Prime Minister, especially the reform of ŞERPs[45], which effectively reduced their value by half in 1986 This disadvantaged women, whose disjointed work histories meant their benefit rates were dramatically reduced. Amongst women of South Asian heritage, particularly first generation migrants, employment rates are significantly low, with few making any formal pension contributions at all (Ahmad *et al*, 2003, Dale, 2002). The relative decline in state pensions vis-à-vis wages further disadvantaged those who followed such employment paths. As Naegele and Walker observe, "the failure of the British pension system to provide for those in low-paid, part time or discontinuous employment" (2002: 22), means older people from many ethnic minorities, especially women, are more likely to be poor in their old age than their white counterparts.

5.4.2 *Social Security Provisions in Old Age and 'Foreigners' in Germany*

Accessibility to welfare provisions in Germany is directly related to an individual's legal status as well as ability and/or length of employment (Schulz, 2000). The basic means t ested s ocial a ssistance (*Bundessozialhilfegesetz* § 1 20)[46] is a vailable to all, although its receipt may affect the renewal of residence permits (Brockmann, 2002). Whilst programmes financed by contributors, such as social insurance schemes and occupational pensions are, for the most part, open to all, regardless of citizenship or immigration status (Bòs and Wenzel, 1996), there remains a hierarchy of eligibility that significantly impacts upon migrant workers and their families. Differential residential statuses are directly linked to the type of work permit an individual is able

---

[45] State Earnings Related Pension.
[46] Eligibility of asylum seekers is restricted to instances where they are in danger of their lives (Bòs and Wenzel 1996).

to get (Bommes *et al.* 1999) This in turn affects the jobs an individual is able to access and the length of time he or she is able to remain in employment. Thus, different positions within the political and legal framework of the German state lead to "a hierarchy of welfare receivers mirrored in their different residential statuses" (Leidtke, 2002· 480)

Such a policy model has been described as 'differential exclusion'[47], whereby "migrants have access to certain areas of society (above all the labour market), but are excluded from others (citizenship, political participation, certain welfare services)" (Brockmann, 2002. 288). Foreigners who have unlimited residence permits (as the majority of the respondents in this study do) are not significantly disadvantaged with regard to social rights (Faist, 1993, Heinelt, 1993) A permanent right of residence in Germany[48] means an individual is "entitled to almost all rights although they are not German citizens" (Bos and Wenzel 1996: 31). Such entitlements have led commentators such as Hammer (1990) to proclaim foreigners in Germany enjoy the status of denizen, a status obtained primarily through their interaction with the welfare state. Foreigners employed in Germany automatically become active participants in the German welfare state through their participation in statutory insurance schemes (Liedtke, 2002). As a result of such participation, "an individual's citizenship and economic status are seen to be peripheral to his or her status as a person 'in gainful employment'" (Offe, 2000· 13). This has led commentators such as Brubaker to observe that, "citizenship is in fact relatively insignificant as a basis of access to social services.. the main line of division in both cases is not between citizens and non-citizens, but between permanent residents...and others" (1989: 155-156).

---

[47] Much of the political wrangling to which such differential exclusion gives rise has been termed "the symbolic politics of asylum", which includes, "the politics of 'welfare chauvinism', describing the unwillingness of natives to share welfare state benefits with certain immigrant groups and asylum seekers that are perceived as 'intruders'" (Faist, 1993. 14). However, the comprehensive politics of welfare state exclusion with regard to asylum seekers is mirrored by a successive restructuring of the community of legitimate welfare recipients over the last decades. As Bommes (2000) points out, the German welfare state has become more and more inclusive, so that belonging to the nation is no longer the only crucial criterion of welfare receipt (see also, Liedtke, 2002).

[48] This situation is not standard throughout Germany. As Bos & Wenzel (1996) observe federal states are able to exercise discretion in the design and implementation of welfare policies Thus, "one state may provide benefits to a certain category of aliens, whereas another state may be more rigid in its policies" (Bos & Wenzel, 1996 30) The city from which the respondent sample is generated has significantly restrictive policies towards its 'foreigner' population.

The German welfare state is dominated by work related social insurance schemes (Alber, 2001). Social insurance, in the guise of statutory pension schemes, is mandatory upon those that are in employment in order to ensure protection for all (Schmähl, 1998). Only the self employed, and until 1998, those earning below the official minimum earnings threshold were exempt from contributions. Employers and employees pay a fixed sum into "statutory but independent self-governing sickness funds; this money is used to pay for services to patients, delivered by a mix of public, not for profit and commercial providers" (Pick, 2003. 2). The German welfare state thus, is split into two independent, but interlocking arenas of the labour market and a system of public transfer This demarcation serves to alter issues of social policy from emotive topics to technical details, "because it direct[s] the welfare claims of the population towards separate actors in differentiated systems of distribution" (Alber, 2001 17). The federal government subsidises the financing of pension schemes (which, along with sickness insurance, represents approximately half of the social budget) and unemployment insurance, as a means to fund Pension Credits for the unemployed, carers of young children and voluntary care workers.

Germany's pension and retirement policies are constructed around the aim of maintaining an individual's standard of living when he or she retires (Borsch-Supan and Wilke, 2003) State regulated pension schemes work on the premise of "equivalence between contributions and benefits" (Naegele and Walker, 2002· 4). Through the principle of equivalence the state aims to redistribute funds along a person's life course, rather than between generations. The principle of equivalence is also applied to the surviving dependants of an individual that is insured This has significant implications for female migrants, many of whom migrated for the purposes of family re-unification, and made little or no insurance contributions of their own Their access to welfare and pension provisions is governed through that of their spouse, and thus retains a high degree of dependence upon the male breadwinner model

As insurance schemes are linked to individual earnings throughout the life course, pension levels are directly affected by breaks in employment. This is particularly disadvantageous for migrants due to restricted access to the labour market, enforced breaks in labour as a result of the 'rotation system' and/or family ' commitments' (Börsch-Supan, 2000). Migrant women are doubly disadvantaged. As a system which still relies on the 'male breadwinner model' to support women and old people,

the German welfare state is increasingly witness to growing numbers of older (migrant) women who "may never have worked, [and] are reliant on the income from their husband's contributions to provide a pension income . this is no longer providing security and many are finding they must rely on reduced incomes" (Bulpett, 2003: 142).

Notwithstanding the high emphasis on individual contributions, German policy toward pension and retirement provisions is becoming increasingly restrictive Since the late 1980's "Germany has been struggling with rising costs of health care" (Pike, 2003. 2). As a result of the combined affects of a shrinking population, a rising distribution ratio, the perceived demographic time bomb, and re-unification (Flockton, 1998) the Federal government of Germany has begun to implement a number of policy initiatives to reduce the financial burden of pensions and retirement upon the state Initially, these measures have been concerned with raising the retirement age to 65 for both men and women, and abolishing schemes for flexible early retirement (Guillemard, 1999) However, even with the retirement age increased to 65, the old-age ratio is predicted to increase, from 100 people of working age to every 44 in retirement in 2001, to 100 workers to 55 retirees in 2020 (FSO, 2003). Additional measures such as penalties for those who take pensions between the ages of 62 and 65 were introduced and contribution credits have been reduced in relation to time spent "unemployed or in higher education" (Taylor-Gooby, 1999: 9) Finally, pensions have been uprated to net rather than gross wages, thereby reducing their value Certain reforms such as "improved contribution credits for years spent in child-rearing (up from 2 to 3) and upgrading of pensions for low earners will increase spending somewhat" (Taylor-Gooby, 1999. 9). Whilst these pension reforms are universally applicable to all those resident and employed in Germany they have resulted in an underlying subtext of concern amongst the German sample, located specifically in their persistent status as foreigners.

> "What is going to happen, only Allah knows, whether we even get a pension, who knows after 20 or 30 years what the situation of Europe will be, they could turn around and say we will not give you any money, we do not have any. What will we do?" (Usman, 1st, German male 9)

Although occupational pension schemes exist, traditionally they have played a minor role in Germany's social security provisions in old age. Occupational pensions are non-mandatory and often supplement statutory pension schemes. Their availability is

restricted to some private sector employees and civil servants. Civil servants also enjoy a separate pension scheme, the benefits of which are "considerably more generous" then those of the social insurance scheme (Börsch-Supan and Wilke, 2003 19). Civil servants have a lower 'gross' wage than other public sector employees but do not pay contributions into this pension scheme. Given their labour market positions, both occupational pension schemes and civil servant pension schemes are inaccessible forms of social security in old age for all respondents in Germany.

5.4.3 *The British/German Social Security in Old Age Comparative*

The principle of individual responsibility underpins much of the pension structure in both Britain and Germany (Borsch-Supan and Wilke, 2003; Naegele and Walker, 2002). By transferring or increasing levels of individual responsibility, British and German pension policies reduce or limit the financial burden of an ageing population on the state. All residents in Britain, including those from South Asian communities, are entitled to the formal provisions of Pension Credits and basic state pensions However, take up of such provisions by members of South Asian communities is significantly low due to a combination of factors such as limited knowledge, limited income and perceptions of the intergenerational contract. Similarly, all permanent residents in Germany are entitled to pension provisions through the social assistance and insurance scheme. The level of benefits accrued from these schemes, even at a basic level are significantly more generous than the minimum income guarantee of Pension Credits in Britain.

A significant similarity between the position of both British and German samples vis-à-vis pension entitlements is the effects of their labour market participation and location. The prohibition of certain categories from public funds, higher unemployment, residence abroad and other interruptions in work history combined with the progressive weakening of state earnings related pensions, in Britain, disproportionately reduces the amount of benefits that can be claimed by people from many ethnic minority populations. Similar to their British counterparts, low paid employment trajectories, breaks in employment, or a large degree of unemployment amongst female respondents, and restricted access to higher subsidised occupational pension schemes limits many of the ethnic minorities resident in Germany to the lower echelons of the pension hierarchy. This is compounded by recent changes in pension policies, which, combined with reductions in state entitlements, have led to a degree of uncertainty and concern amongst respondents about future provisions and entitlements.

Within both Britain and Germany the system of pension contributions negatively affects m any w omen, p articularly t hose f rom c ertain e thnic m inority c ommunities due to low income positions and reduced periods of paid employment in the formal labour market. Comparatively speaking circumstances for women are slightly better in Germany than in Britain. The German welfare state's emphasis on family is currently accompanied by financial incentives for individual and familial responsibility. Historically the system of the 'male breadwinner model', and reliance on s ocial i nsurance h as negatively a ffected w omen, l eaving t hem d ependant u pon their spouse, and/or, with restricted access to pension resources Current German policies of extending contribution credits for undertaking the role of carer however, provides a greater degree of financial security and independence for women who do experience breaks in employment. The principle of equivalence further strengthens the position of women as they are able to claim equal pension rates to that of their spouse in the event of his death.

5.5 *Welfare State Policies and Presumptions of Social Capital*

Welfare policies governing the provision of 'formal' care to elders compliment those of pensions. The extent to which these policies are guided or informed by notions of social capital affect the balance of formal and informal provisions of care. Whilst respondents were not asked and did not elucidate upon their experiences and expectations of formal provision of care it is necessary to provide a brief overview of these policies here. This is particularly so as such provision may be called upon should familial care not be provided, or require augmentation

5.5.1 *The Social Capital of 'Ethnicity': South Asian Communities in Britain*

Termed the "privatisation of responsibility" the New Labour strategy of "opportunity instead of dependence" (DSS, 1998: 19) has been dubbed by Rodger as "the axial principle around which the new moral economy of welfare will revolve" (2000. 3, see also Jessop, 1999). The theoretical underpinnings of social capital strengthen and reinforce the p resumed b enefits associated w ith t he privatisation o f responsibility. The ascription of social capital suggests communities are able, and indeed better placed, to promote their own wellbeing. This assumption has been extended to ethnic minority communities, particularly those of South Asian heritage (Golbourne and Solomos, 2003) on the basis of stereotyped notions such as "they look after their own" (Lal, 2001: 16). This notion suggests that South Asian communities are significantly endowed with social capital The prevalence of this supposition at an

institutional level directly influences the way ethnic minority service users are treated, as "many health and social care professionals have stereotyped ideas of the extent and nature of family support among people from minority ethnic groups" (Moriarty *et al.*, 2001· 9).

Compared to the majority White community the ratio between the number of South Asian young people to that of their 'elders' is far higher. This ratio gives the impression that there exists a large pool of potential carers for the elders of this community. Blakemore (2000) suggests that such a ratio gives rise to the presumption that places elders of South Asian origin in a better position than any other ethnic minority to be looked after by their family. There is not however, such a directly correlative relationship between numbers of potential carers and the ability to care Financial, physical and structural constraints faced by members of the South Asian community, such as unemployment, poor housing and changing family structures, can all impede the ability of potential carers (Bowes and Wilkinson, 2001)[49]. In contrast the suggestion made by some that family structures are being eroded, leaving elderly South Asians neglected and alone, is as much of a myth as 'they all look after themselves' (Blakemore and Boneham, 1994).

The stereotyped possession/ascription of social capital to South Asian elders can have the potential to further weaken the position of ethnic minority elders vis-à-vis the welfare state. Stereotypes of 'they look after their own' permit the government 'justifiable' excuse to further remove itself from the provision of services. Attaching terms such as 'social capital' to this retreat allows the government to suggest that care of one's elders within the family, rather than through the state, is a positive move toward a more cohesive and responsible society Familial care relationships are significantly more complex than such an understanding would suggest. As Butt and Mirza (1996) observe, the prevalence of multi-generational households among Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities can be a reflection of disadvantaged socio-economic conditions. Further, social relations within such multi-generational households are not always amicable and beneficial, and do not foster the generation of social capital (Phillipson, 2001).

Within the wider debates of formal and informal welfare provisions there have been

---

[49] This is particularly important given the 'costs of care' (see Chapter 3) on both the carers and the cared for, as will be discussed with reference to the empirical data in Chapter 7.

arguments to suggest that the degree to which the extended family is held responsible for care of elders should be at least diminished, if not wholly dispelled. Such arguments are particularly prevalent within gender politics where it is recognised that responsibilities of familial care fall, for the most part, on women (Hill, 1993) These arguments are accentuated by pan-European studies that show the gendered model of care is, by far, still the norm in European countries (Kroger, 2003).

In their study Trifiletti *et al.* (2003) suggest a better way to conceptualise the formal/informal dynamic of welfare is as a 'synergy of care'. Such a synergy would involve the accumulation of resources available within the family, other informal sources and those available from formal provisions, to co-ordinate the best possible economy of welfare for the care recipient and main caregivers. Such a synergy is prevented by the structural bias within formal provisions that places the family, with little reservation, as the central site of care. This compromise is further prevented by what Wall and José (2003) observe to be the "unquestionable obligation" among 'immigrant' families in the UK that elders will be looked after by their families (2003. 170).

Wall and José's (2003) findings would appear to be supported by statistics that show members of ethnic minority communities in general, and Pakistani Muslims in particular, exhibit a low take up of health service provisions in Britain (Lancashire County Council (LCC), 2003). This low take up of services is thought to be directly linked to the stigma attached to the receipt of service provision within Pakistani Muslim communities (LCC, 2002). As well as the Pakistani cultural and religious connotations attached to the receipt of formal provisions, the perceived shame of welfare receipt can be linked to the widespread stigma attached to persistent debates of "benefit dependency" in British welfare politics (Mann, 1992; Naxman, 1977).

When exploring ethnic minority take up of social services, Bowes and Wilkinson (2001) suggest that issues of self-worth and identity are considered incompatible with asking for help from social services. This is contrary to the findings of Temple *et al.* which assert that "in India and Pakistan, many services to support older members of the family were bought in...certain tasks were regarded as only to be carried out by members of low-level castes" (2002: 182) Temple *et al*'s findings suggest that the use of external support services in the care of elders is not negative *per se* Their take up within a non-Muslim, non-Pakistani cultural environment

however means the weight attached to such provisions, which may not be culturally or religiously sensitive, is significantly different. Furthermore, Temple *et al.*'s findings also speak to the appeal of certain forms of welfare provision, such as home help, in comparison to others, such as residential services

Baldock and Hadlow (2003) found that amongst older people in general the initial difficulty in accepting help from social services gradually dissipated as individual social contact grew. This may be mirrored within ethnic minority communities, particularly first generation migrants, amongst whom a lack of knowledge makes navigating the complex system of welfare provision in the UK difficult, daunting and considerably reduces accessibility (Trifiletti *et al*, 2003). A limited understanding of the intricate systems of welfare can diminish the confidence of ethnic minority individuals to approach service providers. This is particularly significant in relation to pension provisions as Mann (2003) observes, "[t]rying to plan for retirement has become increasingly complex and not surprisingly only a minority in the UK feel able to do so with confidence" (2003: 221). The complexity of the social security system in old age hinders accessibility for all ethnic groups, and is likely to raise even greater barriers for those whose first language may not be English.

In addition to advocating familial responsibility, the New Labour government advocates greater partnership between ethnic minorities and service providers This is yet another means of transferring welfare responsibility and attempting to build networks of social capital (Social Exclusion Unit, 2000). Such partnerships increase the burden of responsibility on local or community based initiatives, who are thought to have a greater level of awareness and appreciation of the people they serve. This may well result in further limited services available to ethnic minorities as "mainstream services use the existence of specialist services to absolve themselves of responsibility for ensuring access and appropriateness of services" (Ahmad and Atkin, 1996: 3). In so doing, the retreat of New Labour from welfare provisions in the name of social capital can result in an increased vulnerability to the processes of social exclusion for certain groups[50].

The restructuring of welfare so as to make provisions for ethnic minority welfare 'specialist' rather than mainstream areas is accompanied by a lack of resolve to improve services Instances where low take up of service provision have been linked

---

[50] See Chapter 3

to inadequate or culturally insensitive services are generally met with suggestions of best practice, rather than firm commitment or strategies aimed at dealing with these shortfalls (LCC, 2003, 2002) According to the Department of Health (1998), despite some good examples, social services departments are still providing 'limited and ethnocentric services'. Where attempts are made to improve services, the strategies utilised are not always appropriate or affective

In its National Service Framework for Older people the Department of Health stated one of its primary aims was to recognise the different needs of different communities (DoH, 2001) Such recognition is often understood in terms of additional requirements and the necessity for cultural and religious understanding with regard to such things as prayer and ritual (Henley, 1982). Gunaratnam (2001) has termed such specific boxes of cultural and/or religious sensitivity as 'categorical thinking'. Rather than approaching 'individual' needs, people are placed under particular categories and approached with specific views as to what appropriate cultural services are. Gunaratnam has argued that service providers, in their attempt to implement the principles of multi-culturalism, do so "around a celebratory politics of acknowledgement and inclusion" (2001: 293). Such categorical responses mask, on the one hand, issues of racism and discrimination (Stubbs, 1993), and, on the other, difficulties of intercultural 'care' and "intercultural power relations" (Gunaratnam, 2001: 293, see also Gunaratnam, 1997).

The actions and views of service providers are particularly important as they form the gatekeepers to social services. As Rummery and Glendinning observe "welfare professionals must undertake rationing on behalf of the state ...we characterize this as *professional gate keeping*" (2000: 542, *original emphasis*). Experience of discriminatory welfare services can affect an individual's willingness to take-up services in the future. As Barnard and Pettigrew found, "staff attitudes, how they [ethnic minority elders] were treated by staff...all affected older peoples overall attitude to claiming and to having further services" (2003 1) Discrimination in the welfare state in general runs across class as well as race boundaries as "well-to-do patients had a higher degree of access to doctors and hospitals and enjoyed a higher quality of medical care[51] (Fazeli, 1996. 94).

---

[51] As Barry observes, this may be an indirect consequence of social insurance, which, "as it operates in almost all welfare states, is the contribution and benefits are both proportional to earnings" (1990. 75).

The place of ethnic minorities vis-à-vis the British welfare state has been described as 'triple jeopardy', "as these groups are subject to, the disadvantages of getting older, racist discrimination, and failure of health and social services to meet their needs" (Temple *et al* 2002: 179, see also Turkington and Dixon, 1998) This is compounded by class differentials as most ethnic minorities are likely to have access to less material resources than their White counterparts (Nazroo, 2001) 'Categorical thinking' can itself become the source of discrimination and differentiation, as Gerrish *et al* observe, in relation to food, it becomes "what they eat" (1996 43) In this way 'categorical thinking' "can serve to heighten inequalities by fabricating specific, ethnicised and culturalized 'problems'" (Gunaratnam, 2001· 304-305) In addition to this, a lack of understanding, coupled with stigmatisation of culture and way of life often means the people from minority ethnic communities are blamed for their own ill-health (Mason, 1995).

5.5.2 *Accessibility of Welfare: The Social Capital of 'Foreigners' in Germany*

Based on a residual welfare model the German welfare state only intervenes when an individual's family is no longer a recourse (Esping Andersen, 1990) This model poses several difficulties for ethnic minorities resident in Germany. Studies have found that "migrant families in Germany experience a transformation of the generational contract from private direct [financial] support to public, indirect support through the social insurance system" (Weddell, 1999, *cited in* Brockmann 2002: 301). Although predominantly based upon data from Turkish migrants, shifts in the intergenerational 'contract' of migrants are particularly salient for the Pakistani Muslim respondent groups. The diminutive number of Pakistani Muslims resident in the city from which the sample was generated, combined with legislative policies of dispersal and relatively young family structures means that Pakistani Muslim family networks are significantly restricted and young in age This said, upon reaching 'old age' it is likely that respondent families will have developed and as young children grow older first generation migrants will have established networks of potential care providers.

The circumstances of the Pakistani Muslim community are further complicated by a lack of monetary resources. Büchel and Frick (2003) observe that immigrant families in Germany are only half as likely as their German counterparts to engage in private financial transfers within families. Moreover, they also note that "[e]thnic networks providing mutual support seem to be much more common in the UK than in Germany" (Buchel and Frick, 2003: 14). Interfamilial and intergenerational transfers

are all the more difficult in Germany because of the relatively recent migration and the socio-economic conditions of Pakistani immigrant families. Many first generation migrants are still participants of formal paid employment. As such, a large bulk of financial resources continues to be sent back to the country of origin as a means of caring for trans-national kin. In addition to this migrant workers have punctuated employment histories, and remain, for the most part, in blue-collar, and, in most instances, low paid employment. Consequently the social insurance to which they are eligible is at the lower end of the scale. Their finances are further divided as a result of Germany's restrictive immigration laws, which mean they are often solely responsible for f inancially s upporting t heir s pouses w ho a re u nable t o w ork f or a minimum period of a year upon migration.

Another significant factor that influences the availability of welfare provisions for ethnic minorities in Germany is the role of the German charitable welfare system (CWS). The CWS is responsible for the provision of many social services outside the remit of social insurance schemes Thus, the "recipient of assistance possesses, as a general rule, a social insurance policy from the public cost-bearer, or a legally backed *right to a benefit* from a local municipality" (Meyer, 2001: 114 *original emphasis*). The CWS acts as an intermediary between the state and the citizen, and is responsible for a total of 35.2 per cent share of "total net expenditure on social welfare assistance (Meyer, 2001: 106). However, "older people belonging to weaker social and economic groups (e g. Migrants...) benefit less from such services" (Naegele and Walker, 2002: 10) The nominal and disparate presence of Pakistani Muslims in the city from which the sample was generated makes it difficult for them to accumulate the social capital required to partake in the activities of the CWS[52]. As a result, the availability of welfare in old age for Pakistani Muslims may well be restricted to informal familial networks, which have yet to mature, or formal state based provisions to which access is limited.

Where formal welfare provisions are available, from, for instance, social insurance schemes, lack of awareness with regard to their availability may restrict access for certain ethnic minority communities. As Brockmann points out, through the work of the CWS "within ethnic communities vital information about majority services and other institutions is passed on" (2002: 297). The restricted participation of Pakistani Muslims within the CWS impedes this flow of information.

---

[52] See Chapter 3.

5.5.3 *British and German Welfare Policies: Presumptions of Social Capital*

The most significant comparable feature of both British and German welfare policies and their affects on South Asian communities in diaspora is the way in which presumptions of social capital affect the levels of welfare provisions and the degree to which individuals are able to, and do, make use of them Within Britain the presence of family and extended kinship networks in the South Asian communities results in the presumption of social capital that may not exist In contrast, South Asian migrants in Germany are yet to establish extended kinship networks As a result general presumptions of social capital that form the underlying subtext of German welfare provision are not accurate representations of the circumstances of the South Asian diaspora. Consequently there is the potential for welfare policies of both Britain and Germany to fall short of the needs of the South Asian community, particularly as members of this community may not be aware of the provisions available for them. In addition the Pakistani Muslim population of both countries is subject to a number of financial, physical and geographical constraints which affect the level and degree of care that the family is able to provide. Thus, limited provision of care in the family is as much, if not more, a direct consequence of state policy as it is of "deficient family support" (Warnes, 2003. 15).

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has set out three macro-social considerations; migration, citizenship and social security provisions in old age of Britain and Germany. These contextualise and inform the norms of obligations and responsibility of care within the family (Sevenhuijsen, 2000). The active recruitment, ready employment and chain migration of respondents to Britain all resulted in a degree of security and certainty. In contrast, the German experience was coloured by uncertain legal status (which in some cases lasted for up to 6 years) legislative changes, dispersal policies, and the stringent application of asylum laws. The migration experience of these respondents was further shaped by the trend of inter-ethnic marriages.

In addition to divergent migration experiences the two samples also experienced different naturalisation and integration policies Naturalisation in Britain was relatively simple and in many instances problem free. All of the sample from Britain are British citizens. In contrast, German citizenship requires numerous conditions to be fulfilled, the majority of which rest on assumptions of cultural acceptance and integration Despite being eligible to apply for German citizenship, none of the

respondents in the German sample have done so, choosing to remain 'permanent residents'. The degree to which respondents in Britain and Germany feel they are integrated into the host society raises important implications for the importance of citizenship to feelings of integration and belonging Migrants in Britain, although actively recruited, perceive their acceptance in the host society to be one of duress and a question of 'needs must'. Despite the relative ease of naturalisation and, on the whole, the political acceptance of their presence, many of the first generation respondents speak of day-to-day experiences of racism German respondents, on the other hand, became integrated much quicker, in spite of historically documented racial tensions and explicitly exclusionary legislation Their migratory experiences, marital and settlement patterns all contribute to a greater degree of integration, participation and acceptance.

Chapter two advanced the argument that there exists an indetractable relationship between community boundaries and individual identity. The differences between the British and German experiences of migration and the corresponding racial tension, or lack thereof have significant implications for the distinctions respondents make between 'them' and 'us'. The existence of geographical proximity, the ease with which Pakistani kinship networks were established and the secure settlement patterns will all inform the construction and participation of 'Pakistani Muslim communities' in Britain and Germany, discussed in Chapter 6.

The experience and expectation of informal familial care can be contextualised by the social security provisions in old age of the British and German welfare state and the underlying subtext of social capital that informs welfare provisions. Whilst all respondents are eligible for pension and formal welfare provisions in Britain and Germany, the extent to which they will constitute adequate income levels and service delivery is questionable. In particular these levels will be affected by labour market positioning and participation, assumptions of social capital and gender differentials In light of this precarious position vis-à-vis the formal welfare state respondent articulations of experience and expectation of informal familial care is explored in Chapter 7.

Chapter 6

Community: Navigating the Boundaries of 'Us' and 'Them'

6.1 *Introduction*

This chapter engages with the empirical data to provide an understanding of the way in which community boundaries are constructed and where. In so doing it contextualises respondent conceptualisations and experiences of social exclusion. Section 6 2 begins the chapter with an analysis of respondent articulations of 'our', 'mine', and 'their' communities. Respondents articulate membership of, and exclusion from, communities, using the language of 'us' and 'them' Such language provides a means to differentiate between Muslims and non-Muslims, as well as between Muslims of different ethnicities, explicated through varying interpretations and practices of Islam. At any one time respondents are part of, and participate in, a web of communities that intersect, interact and overlap with one another. Thus, the dichotomy of 'us' and 'them' is intrinsically false as these boundaries are in a constant state of flux. The use of this terminology to differentiate between that which individuals feel a part of, and that which they do not, and the contexts in which such differentiations are made, inform the way in which thresholds of exclusion are constructed and conceived

Labels of 'them' and 'us' are elucidated with reference to the norms and values that are indicative of what it means to be 'us' and not 'them'. Section 6 3 explores the symbolic experience of community through consideration of 'our' and 'their' norms and values. In particular, clothing, separation of the sexes (*purdah*) and lack of *izzat* are given as examples of how 'they' (non-Muslim Britons and Germans) differ from 'us' Symbols of 'our' community do not always correspond to the way in which respondents would like to conceive of 'us'. This section goes onto explore how the distinctions between Islam and Pakistani culture affect the values respondents place upon community and the degree to which they own it as 'mine'.

Respondents express a need to perpetuate Islamic, and to a lesser extent, Pakistani cultural, norms and values, as a means to maintain their own, and their children's', 'Pakistani' and 'Muslim' identities. Section 6.4 explores the way in which rituals of Islam and culture influence, and play a part, in the perpetuation of community boundaries. This section also explicates the role of Islamic education in the reconstitution of community boundaries and what is meant by 'our' community. The

relationship between the norms and values of the community and the perpetuation of it's boundaries gives rise to compelling commitments (Etzioni, 1998, 1997, 1995; see also Durkheim, 2002, 1984) The final subsection of 6.4 considers the relationship between individual *izzat*, the compulsion to conform to a community's norms and values, and an individual's participation in the community.

The chapter concludes in Section 6 5 by suggesting that whilst community boundaries are fluctuating and negotiable, when being perpetuated, and/or defended, they are conceived of in the unequivocal terms of 'us' and 'them'. Symbols which are thought to be representative of distinctions between 'us' and 'them' form compelling commitments, conformity to which influences degrees of inclusion. Chapter 7 follows with an exploration of the structural framework provided by compelling c ommitments, w ith s pecific r eference t o the c are relationship between elders and their kin.

6.2 *Ambiguities of Community*

Whilst there is unsystematic usage of the term community throughout the empirical data, it is almost always used by respondents to distinguish between 'us' and 'them' The positioning of such difference, and whom it is thought to demarcate, vary depending upon the individual concerned, and the context to which he or she is referring. As a result definitions of what constitute 'boundaries' of respondent communities are noticeably fluid and changing during the course of any one interview Analysis of the empirical data yields a number of common factors upon which respondent boundaries are constructed and the characteristics on which they are anchored

6.2.1 *Negotiations and Proclamations of 'Our' and 'Their' Community*

In many instances (74%), community is used as a broad and globally inclusive term, which encapsulates all Muslims (the *Umm'ah*)[1]. This usage is geared toward drawing distinctions between respondents, geographically close and distant Muslims, and the wider non-Islamic host societies of Britain and Germany More frequent (86%) use of the term community is in the context of ethnic affiliation and differentiation within the Muslim *Umm'ah*, as respondents draw upon particular facets of their own identities and perceived distinctions between 'Pakistani', 'Indian', 'Turkish', 'Arabic' and so forth. Such boundary construction is indicative of instances where

---

[1] See Chapter 2.

respondents seek greater precision in what they mean by 'our', or 'my' community In this sense these references are more accurate reflections of multi-layered dimensions of individual identities

Asked to talk about 'their' community, the initial boundary constructed by respondents is that between 'us' the Pakistani Muslims, and 'them', the non-Muslim, White[2] British and German host society. Very few of the respondents speak of this distinction in any great length. The majority draw attention to the perception that the norms and values of Britain and Germany differ from, and in some instances, diametrically oppose their own Respondents do not consider it necessary to labour upon the actual distinction between 'them' (White British and Germans) and 'us', as such differences are considered to be self-evident.

> "It [promiscuity] is not bad for them [Germans] but we [Pakistani Muslims] have come from such a culture or such an environment where we have not seen these things When we see these things we are not able to tolerate them" (Yusra, 1st German female· 6).

> "The way they [Germans] dress in the summer, in Islam that is totally wrong but for the children here it is normal" (Ulfath, 1st, German female: 3).

This is also true of second generation respondents, 47% of whom describe themselves as British[3], but in whose transcripts it is implicitly, and at times explicitly, evident that the distinction between them and the White, Non-Muslim population is plain. In such instances, there is a significant structural influence on boundary construction. Thus, despite shared norms, values and geographical locations, the structural constraints of ethnicity and many Islamic values[4], mean that there remains a clear and distinct difference between 'us' and 'them'.

> "It is very hard to keep both cultures, and because our Islam is a culture, you know, and the White culture .I do feel like I am part of the British community" (Dilshad, 2nd, UK female: 12).

Respondent reference to the distinction between 'them' (the host society) and 'us' is accentuated yet further by discrimination, a lack of understanding, acceptance and

---

[2] All but one reference, by respondents, to the racial characteristics of the British or German 'them' is termed 'White'.
[3] No second-generation German respondents were interviewed (see Chapters 4 and 5)
[4] Islamic values are not necessarily perceived as structural, see discussion of the moral voice of the self in Chapter 8

'integration'[5]. 60% of respondents in Britain and Germany (76% of males to 45% of females) experience a variety of different forms of discrimination, direct and indirect, intentional and otherwise. The significant gender differentials may be attributed to the considerably lower rates of formal paid employment among female respondents. Experiences of direct discrimination range from overt hostility to respondent presence in the host country, to their subjection to prejudice based on stereotypes Respondents' experience of a lack of cultural and religious understanding perpetuates their perceptions of difference, and prevents 'integration'.

> "Now, ok, I am a stereotypical Muslim man...but even when I was
> clean shaved and I had a more, a different outlook on life, not as
> religious I still came across a lot of clever forms of discrimination.
> Interviewer: such as?
> I think they fall across the whole spectrum. You know job
> opportunities, generally your interaction with agencies and
> institutions, being in an environment, in a typically Anglo-centric
> environment and you would be forced to kind of fit in" (Ijaz, 2nd,
> UK male: 4)

> "There is one [Muslim] school in [city] ..There is often propaganda
> against it on television. T hey s how y oung girls w earing s carves,
> young boys reading *Qur'an* It is a normal school, the only thing is
> boys and girls are in separate classes and they are taught a little
> *Qur'an* and a little religious education" (Faiz, 1st, German male 3).

In articulating how such discrimination is countered, respondents speak of symbolic competition (Cohen, 1985) as a means to re-assert, re-affirm and re-constitute their own identities, as well as defend against the perceived encroachment of 'Western' norms and values. Through such symbolic competition, the symbols of the majority community are rejected in favour of ones' own (Khan, 2000; Mohammed, 1999) The renewed exercise of community symbols, in the face of discrimination, serves as a means to perpetuate 'Pakistani Muslim' identities of individual and community Further, as suggested in Chapter 2, through this process of re-assertion, symbols are reconstructed in light of the traditions and myths respondents seek to continue (Cohen 1985).

> "This is a little the fault of the media as well, in that the hatred that
> has been sowed about the Muslim faith in the West and in the
> media, that has backfired on to them [British society] because our
> younger generation they feel that these people view them as beneath
> themselves, and feel that our children are somehow below them and
> because of our colour and our faith they hate us, and this has kept
> them away from integrating further in to the Western culture"
> (Mubin, 1st, UK male: 6)

---

[5] A term used by respondents.

Amongst the British respondents 47% utilise the term 'our' to refer to people of Muslim and South Asian heritage 76% specify their affiliation with 'Pakistani' ethnicity, as opposed to simply 'Asian' In contrast, respondents from the German sample reserve the use of 'our' for Muslims as a whole, and/or people of Pakistani descent. Thus, many in the British sample affiliate themselves with Muslims, Pakistanis and 'Asians', whereas those in the German sample only affiliate themselves with other ethnic groups on the basis of religious, but not ethnic, racial or geographic affiliation

Amongst both samples the distinction made between themselves and different ethnic Muslims is done on the basis of Islamic practice, rather than just geographical and/or racial origins. Whilst respondents in the British sample highlight factions within the *Umm'ah* on the basis of religious sectarianism, only one respondent does so in terms of her own affiliation. Where such distinctions are observed, respondents are keen to highlight their negative effect, which centre around the construction and administration of mosques and cause discord within the Muslim community, as mosques become embroiled in sectarian politics "that creates problems, if a mosque is no longer for every single Muslim but only for a particular group" (Mubin, 1st, UK Male. 5)

Much more common in the British data are the distinctions made between 'us', the Pakistani Muslims, and 'them', the Gujarati[6] or Indian Muslims. The Gujarati community is conceived of as being more Islamic than its Pakistani counterpart, more knowledgeable of Islam, and more adherent to its practice. The greater focus of the Gujarati community toward Islam acts as a spur to respondents' own adherence. This said, there is a dissenting voice within the data (11%) that perceives the practice of Islam by the Gujarati community as verging on the negative due to its form and extent It is felt that whilst the Gujarati community may be more knowledgeable, its practice of Islam is at times taken too literally, to the detriment of other aspects of life, such as education, and in some cases, childhood. Although the Gujarati/Indian community's practice of Islam may be more 'sacred' in the Durkheimian sense (1984, 1964), it is not considered the ideal approach, as it can hinder education and 'success' in Britain.

---

[6] Gujarati refers to people that originate from the Gujrath region of India, and who generally speak Gujarati. Respondents refer to 'Gujaratis' and 'Indians' interchangeably.

> "They've [Gujarati children] been bought up more stricter,
> negatively stricter, as in they have been forced to go to mosque at
> two and three...So I think negatively they've got to that stage
> [higher level of knowledge] but in the long run I don't know
> whether it holds them in good stead" (Zoe, 2nd, UK female 3-4).

The Turkish community forms a more prominent benchmark for the religious practice of the Pakistani community in Germany, than the Gujarati community does for its British counterpart. The majority of the members of the Turkish community are predominantly seen to have lost sight of their Islamic roots The dynamic between the Pakistanis and the Turks, expressed by respondents, has significant implications for the construction and identities of the Pakistani Muslim community in Germany. The distinction between 'us' the Pakistani Muslims, and 'them' the Turkish Muslims, is made much more strenuously than that between 'us' and 'Germans', (85% to 65%) Because the Turkish community has the potential to be affiliated with the Pakistani one, due to their common faith, it is considered to be more of a threat to the perpetuation of Islam This threat is thought to be all the more ominous when respondents consider the Islamic practice and identities of their children.

> "Now, here, there is the Turkish community they have their own
> culture, the Arabic community they have their own culture, their
> own system and they walk within that. Us people [Pakistanis], we,
> we do not have any clash with them" (Wahid, 1st, German male 19).

> "I think the biggest danger for my children is, this, their own
> [Muslims], because when they grow up they will look at them
> [Turks and Arabs] and they will say that look Turkish people and
> Arabic people, they are Muslim as well, and when you are stopping
> me from German people, that you are not to do what you see them
> [Germans] doing, then he is a Muslim as well, why is he doing it?"
> (Mariya, 1st, German female: 13).

Antagonistic perceptions of the Turks can be attributed to what Durkheim (2002, 1984, 1964) perceives as ownership of the sacred It is felt by 56% of respondents that the Turkish community has adopted many 'German' norms and values, considered to be un-Islamic. The practice of un-Islamic norms by the Turkish community is thought to provide a Muslim point of reference for second and third generation Pakistani heritage Muslim children By observing Muslims behaving in a non-Islamic way it is feared that Pakistani heritage Muslim children will normalise, and thus justify, much activity contrary to the Islamic interpretations that respondents hold sacred. Further, the perceived lack of Islamic practice among the

Turkish community spurs many German respondents to adhere to Islamic prescriptions. This is in contrast to Britain it is the greater Islamic practice of the Gujarati community which acts as a spur The renewed vigour with which Islam is practised and taught to future generations in Germany further illustrates the use of symbolic competition to maintain and perpetuate ones' own identities (Cohen, 1985) Through their increased practice of Islam, respondents are able to retain their own perceptions of what it means to be a real Muslim, and show the non-Muslim German society what real Muslims, and Islam, are like

> "I have seen that the Turkish here ..90 per cent of them are not full
> Muslims, what I have seen They dress or their way of life and then
> to tell a child you tell by giving somebody's example, that is how a
> child understands...for them [Turks] it [*purdah*] makes no
> difference. And when it doesn't make a difference when you are a
> child then they grow up and children say that it doesn't make a
> difference. When these people do it then what harm does it do if we
> do it?" (Ulfath, 1st, German female· 4)

> "In my opinion, we too have started this work [Islamic organisations
> and lectures] very late. I wish that we had started this 20 to 25 years
> ago and then maybe we would have been successful Our [Muslim]
> largest community here is that of the Turks...You will have seen to
> what extent the next generation has become bad [Muslims]" (Faiz,
> 1st, German male: 5).

The overtly antagonistic dynamic between respondents in Germany and the Turkish community is a very clear demonstration of the way in which perceived threats to community boundaries are conceived and tackled. In some circumstances, their categorisation as Muslims enables Pakistanis and Turks to be perceived of as being from one and the same community. Such a uniform categorisation implies homogeneity of theological beliefs and practices This conflation negates the boundary between 'us' the Pakistani Muslims, and 'them' the Turkish Muslims, threatening many of the symbols that shape, and are shaped by, respondent Pakistani Muslim identities. 56% of German respondents react to such threats by making absolute distinctions between 'us' the Pakistani Muslims and 'them' the Turkish Muslims. Similarities such as faith are abandoned in favour of essentialist interpretations of the way in which Muslims ought to behave. This reaction illustrates how moralising assertions can lead to individuals becoming subject to processes of social exclusion. Views of how one should behave are utilised as

yardsticks by which to measure whether one is worthy of being included into the boundary of 'us'[7] (Colley and Hodkinson, 2001; Vobruba, 2000)

The stress placed upon practicing symbols in a particular way illustrates the non-negotiable interpretations attributed to a community's symbols when its boundaries are threatened. In such instances Islamic guidelines, and the community boundaries they give rise to, are perceived to be static and immutable This perception does not reflect the fluctuating processes of negotiations to which Islamic guidelines are otherwise subject Respondent perceptions and reactions to the Turkish community demonstrate the ways in which static expression of community boundaries inform identities By being so definitive of the distinction between 'them' and 'us', respondents in Germany inform their own Islamic identities with solid and rigid definitions of what it means to be a Muslim (Taylor, 1998, Hall, 1993)

Whilst there is agreement among the German respondents as to the importance of retaining a united Pakistani Muslim community, divisions on grounds of sectarian interests are evident. Respondents stress that such divisions are adverse to the 'survival' of the Pakistani Muslim community, and bear significant negative impact on the potential for their children to continue to identify as 'Pakistani Muslims'. There is however, a dissenting voice within this sample (35%), which suggests that future generations of Pakistani Muslims in Germany will not be hampered by differentiations on the basis of ethnicity or religious sectarianism. This voice suggests that second and third generation Pakistani heritage Muslims will consider themselves German Muslims, and as long as their affiliation with Islam remains strong, they will not distinguish between one Muslim and another on the basis of ethnicity or religious sect. This is demonstrative of the distinctions respondents make between culture and Islam In no longer conflating their Islamic faith with their Pakistani identities, respondents feel that their children will be stronger Muslims, and this will hold them in good stead in a non-Muslim country (Giddens, 1991a).

> "They [children] are neither German nor are they Pakistani They
> are a neutral product from here, and that neutral product is very
> good, it is better than us, and will be better Because.. the basic
> knowledge that we got of the religion, in that we had
> prejudice.. *Shi'a*, *Sunni* are one then further on there is the
> *Barailavi*, then *Deobandi*, then *Ailai'hadees* and so on and so on
> What happens from this is that we suffer a lot from this community
> wise" (Latif, 1st, German male. 5).

---

[7] See Chapters 3 and 8.

> "Now the new generation, like you, these children are growing up here. They are very far away from these problems [of factionalism and sectarianism] . And it is right as well" (Usman, 1st, German Male: 4).

> "[W]e should make our children better Muslims rather than better Pakistani's, which ever country they are in" (Wahid, 1st, German male· 25).

6.2.2 *Divisions and Diversities Within 'Our' Community*

There are a number of notable diversities within 'our' community that both British and German respondents draw attention to, of which the most numerous are age and education Amongst 13% of the British sample there are further demarcations made on the basis of regional origins in Pakistan, a distinction that is not raised by any German interviewee. Those that make the distinction within Britain do so as a means to distinguish themselves from the behaviour of particular groups, or in the context of suitable marriage partners, either for themselves, or their children (Shaw, 2000, 1994, 1988). These distinctions however do not constitute differentiations of 'us' and 'them'; rather they are significant of diversities within 'us' (Mason, 1995).

In Britain and Germany 40% of respondents highlight a considerable generation 'gap', particularly evident when it comes to the issue of marriage. It is felt by these respondents that many Pakistani Muslim parents continue the practice of taking their children to Pakistan and arranging their marriage with partners who have been born and bred there. The continuation of such practices is thought to stem from a lack of Islamic knowledge and a lack of understanding between parent and child This leads to conflict between the generations, exacerbated by instances where marriages fail Further, this conflict is thought to result in a breakdown of parent-child relationships as children whose choices and wishes are not given due consideration, especially in relation to such important decisions, harbour considerable feelings of animosity and 'disrespect' toward their parents Such antagonism, between the generations, has the potential to impact upon the character and negotiations of the care relationship.

> "There is a big gap between the first and second generation" (Naim, 1st, UK male· 26).

> "Like this whole marriage issue, in every house we have created this problem. As soon as the son or daughter gets to a certain age, the family back home [in Pakistan] they have also got an eye on the situation, and even the mum and dad are constantly trying . This is the reason that families have problems within themselves, and

disrespect occurs, because we are making mistakes in the decision-making. We are making wrong decisions" (Mubin, 1st, UK Male: 5)

"Here the parents to not focus on [Islam] . What they do is that as soon as the child grows up they want him/her to go to Pakistan, get the child married, set up someone else in their family. This too is wrong. When they come from over there the girls way of thinking is different, the boys way of thinking is different They have children, and then the couple divorce, and the children go bad when there is no one to bring them up (*sarparasthi*)" (Anis, 1st German male. 14-15).

Respondents also differentiate between people within the boundaries of 'our' or 'my' community on the basis of education. The level of education attained is considered by 58% of respondents to have a significant impact on the way in which Islam is practised, and on individual behaviour in general. Observations that distinguish between levels of educational attainment are often made in the context of judgements with regard to individual worth Specifically, these judgements refer to people considered to be worthy, or not as the case may be, of espousing and/or representing the norms and values, and thus identities, of the community. The levels of worth and status, bestowed upon individuals as a result of their educational attainments are discussed, with reference to the moral voices of the community in Chapter 8.

"My mother told some people [Pakistani Muslims] that lived on the same r oad that ' oh m y d aughters are g oing t o s tudy a fter s chool' and they sort of found this a little apprehensive, that 'oh do you know what goes on in colleges?' But they did not come from a strong background of believing that education is important whereas my parents did" (Safa, 2nd, UK female· 2).

6.2.3 *Ambiguities and Absolutisms*

The data reveals that respondent engagements with community are inherently ambiguous and fluctuating, but at times are portrayed as absolute. Community is used as a means to identify who 'we' are, specifically Pakistani Muslims In this sense community boundaries inform individual identities of what it means to be a Pakistani Muslim in diaspora, whilst in turn being informed by respondent interpretations of the same. Further the use of commonalties as a means to conceptualise 'us' is indicative of what Cohen (1985) refers to as the 'common form' of symbols. In the expression of such commonalties, individuals are able to pinpoint the differences between 'them' and 'us' without compromising the diversity within 'us'. Respondent articulations of diversity within us in the form of religious sectarianism, education and the way Islam is understood by different generations, is further expression of how respondents conceive of their identities Thus, the

structural constraints of labels such as 'Muslim' are qualified by the ways and degrees to which one practices Islam. So the extent to which one is pious, adherent to the guidelines of Islam, respectful of its etiquettes and practising of its rituals all inform the kind of Muslim one is. It is the nuances of 'Muslim' identities that forms the character of distinctions made between different ethnicities within the *Umm'ah*, and diversity of individuals within 'us'.

Whilst the simplistic dichotomy of 'us' and 'them' is misleading, given the fluid character of individual identities and community boundaries, when respondents define who they are and the groups to which they affiliate, it is a dichotomy that they rely on as a means of differentiation Although respondents recognise similarities between 'us' and 'them', and daily negotiation of identities bears witness to this, when articulating what they understand to constitute 'us', and therefore 'them', respondents do so in unequivocal terms with little or no regard for any similarity. This apparently absolute distinction made by respondents is particularly significant for the exploration of processes of social exclusion, as, in the language used to define the boundaries, and thus thresholds of exclusion, such distinctions are indicative of essentialist positions on what it means to be 'us'[8]. These concepts of difference and diversity, applied inside and outside the boundaries of Pakistani Muslim communities, have considerable implications for individual identities and their feelings of belonging

6.3 *Identities, Belonging and Boundaries*

Although community boundaries may appear to be non-negotiable in particular contexts, and with reference to particular 'them', they are not static Rather, they continually relocate as they are constructed and re-constructed by different community members in a variety of circumstances, and used to differentiate between 'us' and innumerable 'them'. Shifts of community boundaries are subject to identity, defence and transitory values. Where these boundaries are constructed by respondents is anchored by two interrelated factors; firstly, the structural constraints of the community itself, such as ethnicity, religion and so forth, and, secondly, by the symbols that denote such boundaries

---

[8] See discussion in Chapter 3 on the experience of social exclusion and decisive situations (Vobruba, 2000)

Whilst respondents elucidate perceptions of 'their' community using objectively identifiable terms such as 'Pakistani' and 'Muslim', they go on to qualify such statements with reference to cultural and Islamic norms and values. The expression of these norms and values signifies the way in which individuals demonstrate the boundaries of 'their' community These norms and values symbolise the essence of what distinguishes 'us' from 'them'. It is in this sense that community boundaries are experienced as symbolic (Cohen, 1985). The boundaries of the community (the demarcation between 'them' and 'us') is made when respondents talk of what it means to be a Pakistani Muslim. Furthermore what it means to be a Pakistani Muslim is often defined with reference to what it means to not be a Pakistani Muslim (Husain and O'Brien, 2000) Many of the distinctions made between 'them' and 'us' within the Muslim *Umm'ah* are based upon the ways in which Islam is practised, and manifest themselves as differentiations between different ethnic groups. When distinguishing themselves from the wider non-Muslim host society however, the majority of respondents assert "the biggest difference is of Islam" (Usman, 1st, German male: 5). British and German cultures are perceived to be inherently un-Islamic, with "sin at every corner" (Bilal, 1st, German male: 5) and many of their norms considered to lead to "evil" consequences (Safa, 2nd, UK female 4)

6.3.1 *Contradictory Norms and Values of 'Us' and 'Them'*

The un-Islamic character of British and German culture is thought to be markedly apparent in the perceived sexual freedom given to children and young adults 67% of all respondents argue that the sexually liberated 'freedom' given to children is diametrically opposed to the norms and values of Islam and is labelled *be-hayaai* (shamelessness and indecency)[9]. The German and, to a lesser extent British respondents, feel that there is a permissive attitude toward the free mixing of the sexes and relationships of 'boyfriends' and 'girlfriends', which is not only contrary to Islam but is also deemed to be detrimental to the 'family'. Many of the German respondents articulate this sexual liberation as resulting from, and directly related to, forms of dress. The cultural acceptability of wearing revealing clothes, particularly in Germany is thought to lead towards freer relations between the two sexes and optimises the lack of differentiation between men and women This is thought to be incompatible to the concept of *purdah* and *hayaa* (a concept which combines shame

---

[9] *Bai 'hayaai* is also equated to *ba-yzzati*, as one who has no shame or decency is also considered to have no honour or respect

and decency) central to Islam

> "Children are so easily influenced, and I think it is important that
> they do have an Islamic environment, because they are not going to
> know what is different then [from White non-Muslim
> culture/society]. Because if they are going to see people outside and
> think mum's telling me this but it is not happening out here so
> maybe she is telling me wrong and maybe they are right" (Zahra,
> 2nd, UK female: 3).

> "Dress here is a very big problem. And then *hayaa*, dress comes
> into *hayaa* and a person's way of thinking comes into it Their way
> of thinking is different in matters of *hayaa* and ours is different. I
> mean they don't have this thing in them They probably don't even
> know this word" (Taj, 1st, German female: 4).

> "There are too many difference's ..Here a woman can have children
> to 8 different men without a *nikaah* (marriage), it is forbidden
> among us. Here the law is a 13 year old girl can have a child but
> cannot get married ok? We have *purdah*, a joint family, here there
> isn't that at all ..There are a great many difference's among us and
> them ..[in our society] men and women have different
> departments...The woman says she will look after the home and the
> children and the man says that I will look after and solve all the
> financial problems outside" (Shabaz, 1st, German Male. 5)

At a more general level it is felt that there is no respect, no *izzat*, within the British or German society. Hierarchical structures based on gerontocratic principles hold no weight and elders are not respected and given *izzat* simply for being elders Respondents strenuously lament the absence of respect and link it to the breakdown of family structures and a potential decline in Islamic practice. This absence of respect is often articulated as selfishness, which, in Britain, is thought to be exhibited by the younger generation of Pakistani heritage Muslims, who do not 'listen' to their elders and hold individualistic views. Respondents stress that the principle of *izzat* is embedded within both Islam and the Pakistani culture, and is expressly and implicitly linked to the principle of caring for ones elders, a link discussed in greater depth in Chapter 7. The perceived absence of *izzat* in British and German cultures is thought to constitute the greatest threat to the authority of parents, the integrity of family and the perpetuation of Islamic and cultural norms and values.

> "Whilst they [children] will respect me as a parent I don't think it
> will be to the degree that I am submissive to my father" (Amir, 2nd,
> UK male· 7).

> "These people [Germans] don't give their parents *izzat* When do
> they give each other *izzat*? No one does They do everything out of
> selfishness" (Nabeel, 1st, German male: 6).

"The children here are selfish. Like us, in Pakistan we always
thought about others, we helped others, family, brothers, sisters"
(Najm, 1ˢᵗ, UK female: 2)

"When there is not that love and care in the family and there is not
respect then the family does not come together" (Faiz, 1ˢᵗ, German
male. 8).

Respondents consider the perceived differences between (some of) the norms of
Britain and Germany and those of Islam and Pakistani culture as important because
the values that underpin them directly contradict the norms and values respondents
choose to live by. Issues such as clothing, separation of the sexes/*purdah*, and lack of
respect, are thought to bear relevance to, and impact upon the majority of social
relations. Such contradicting norms and values permeate into every aspect of an
individual's life In light of this, respondents fear that alternative and unacceptable
values will come to be viewed as the norm by their children. The values that
underpin these norms pose a potential threat to the values respondents hold
themselves and are trying to pass on to their children. They constitute a threat in so
far as the Islamic and cultural teachings contrary to the norms of Britain and
Germany that their children may come to accept, have the potential to be negated

"Still there is that fear inside of me, that my children are going to,
well they are going to be like all the White children who do not
associate with their parents, when they get to a certain age" (Zahra,
2ⁿᵈ, UK female: 8).

"Because if we leave them [children] now they will speak German,
when they grow up they will be German they will not be ours"
(Tahir, 1ˢᵗ, German male: 6)

"All us parents that have come here, because they were bought up in
that [Pakistani] environment .they will at least get to their graves
[as Muslims] But the children that have been born here, that have
opened their eyes in this environment, you know your self you were
born here, bought up here, that here there is an environment on all
four sides, it is a satanic environment" (Wahid, 1ˢᵗ, German male 6).

The inconsistencies between Islamic and host society norms are made all the more
difficult for respondents with the recognition that it is their children, rather than
them, that are under greater pressure to reconcile these contradictions 53% of the
respondents feel that as adults they are secure in themselves and their Islamic
identities, and, they understand the difference between right and wrong Children, on
the other hand, are faced with the differences posed by the contrary norms of
British/German society as they are in the process of learning the boundaries of such

right/wrong dichotomies This view is especially pronounced amongst the German female sample, who as housewives[10], have limited interaction with German society/culture, and are rarely required to compromise upon their principles Only one female respondent from Germany alludes to the possibility that the cultural norms of Germany may be reconciled with an Islamic way of life without children becoming non-Muslims. The majority feel that, in the face of contradictory values, the potential for children to accept the norms of the host society, rather than those they are being taught by their parents, threatens the perpetuation of Islamic ideals. Respondents also feel that Muslim parents have no control over British/German norms. In order to live, progress and succeed in British/German societies, these parents feel they have to allow their children certain freedoms they otherwise would not. Such a forced compromise is something many find difficult to come to terms with.

> "I am in the home aren't I? I will sit in the home and say son do this,
> do it like this and like this, but it is him that has to go to school He
> is the one that will have friends [male], he will have friends [female],
> it will be him who will have classes, teachers He is the one that will
> have to endure it won't he?...That my Mamma is saying one thing to
> me and here it is another" (Ulfath, 1st, German female: 4).
>   \
> "It is very hard...because at the end of the day you have to study in
> their [White] schools and everything You can't move away from it,
> you can't say completely, that no, they are not right '(Dilshad, 2nd,
> UK female: 12)
>
> "The German environment, for anyone, for us Muslims it is very
> difficult...We cannot even stop them [children]" (Tahir, 1st, German
> male: 3-4).
>
> "What [freedom] they [children] achieve in schools etc we cannot do
> anything about that" (Nabeel, 1st, German male: 4).

6.3.2 *Islam Versus Pakistani Culture*

In addition to the critical perspectives held with regard to British and German norms and values, 63% of the respondents are overtly disparaging of many values they feel to be embedded within the Pakistani Muslim community itself. They suggest that the Pakistani Muslim community in both Britain and Germany has remained rooted in Pakistani cultural norms and values. The changing trajectory of individual identity toward a more Islamic focus sits uneasily with this cultural subversion (Husain and O'Brien, 2000; Modood *et al*, 1994) Further, the influence of perceived 'British' and 'German' cultures on the construct and development of individual identities

---

[10] Only one of the German females, Ishrat, works in the paid labour market

renders a community still rooted in Pakistani culture out-dated as a source of identification

> "I think there is a bit of conflict between people like myself who have a bit of Pakistani influence, a bit of British influence, working as a professional ..That's my view of Pakistani culture . culture has got nothing to do with Islam" (Deen, 2nd, UK male. 4).

It is felt by 60% of respondents that Pakistani culture is often misrepresentative of Islam. Throughout the course of Pakistan's creation and development as a Muslim country, Islamic values have become embedded in cultural practices, inextricably linking the two under the overarching legitimacy provided by Islamic guidance This interwoven relationship often results, according to respondents, in Islam and culture being confused. Respondents highlight that in many instances the values of Islam are taught through cultural practices, becoming the very reasons for the cultural practice For many of the respondents the religious education they received from their parents was limited in comparison to that which they give their own children One of the reasons for this limitation is that they were expected to learn from the Pakistani environment (they were expected to learn Islam through the culture in which it was practised) instead of the values behind the cultural practice.

> "Our parents thought they were bringing us up Islamically, but they were bringing us up culturally. I'd say that we make our children *more* aware, because we understand Islam and we read about Islam ..whereas our parents never taught us Islam, and what Islam means. So they did not bring us up Islamically, but they bought us up traditionally. But aside from tradition, we teach our children what Islam really means" (Zahra, 2nd, UK female 5 *original emphasis*).

> "I mean my father...he is very religious ..when he was bringing us up he did not think that every little thing he should teach us himself. Maybe he was more relaxed because we will get something from the [Pakistani] environment, something from schools.. Now I do feel that, like there are gaps left in life" (Taj, 1st, German female· 6)

This is similar to the conflation of Islamic principles and cultural practice made by Stone (2002) As suggested in Chapter 2, the use of *shalwar kameez*[11] as a school uniform is a means to ensure young girls abide by the Islamic principle of *purdah* through the use of Pakistani cultural tools, and not definitive of Islamic identity (Shaw, 2000). Respondents also observe that many normative practices considered to be symbolic of Pakistani Muslim community identity are cultural, but are substituted as being Islamic (Dale *et al*, 2002). A prime example of this is the

---

[11] A Pakistani form of dress.

perception held by many people of Muslim females being restricted from getting an education or going to work Respondents suggest that Islam does not expressly deny either to women. In many instances the requirement of *purdah* is interpreted and implemented to mean women are forbidden education and employment. Such interpretations are often gendered, favouring the man These patriarchal interpretations maintain gender inequality and perpetuate the view that women ought to occupy particular roles, such as mother, wife and carer.

> "Culture and religion are very closely tied aren't they? People get them mixed up. I do think being a woman and having a career people often say 'oh women are not supposed to do this' but I say 'hang on women are, you've got it wrong, culturally you don't want them to'" (Zoe, 2nd, UK female. 6).

There is a dissenting voice (35%) within the data that considers such gendered interpretations to be inaccurate, and result in the weakening of Islam. These interpretations create a negative picture of Islam, which are then thought to be exploited by British and German media to demonise the Islamic faith Such interpretations are thought to be particularly detrimental to the faith of young Muslim women who are being born and bred in Britain and Germany, and are asserting their equality, only to be faced with cultural opposition in the name of Islam. Respondents feel that many restrictions placed on women stem from the common cultural practice of male domination, and do not consider the Islamic duties of men as well as those of women. Respondents provide examples where Islam has been used as a means to argue against such gendered interpretations

> "Now *it is not* in that either like people have made the common view that Islam says the woman is smaller or she should stay fallen down...*No, not like that* Because in that what we have to see is what Islam is saying, not just about women, but what it is saying about men as well" (Mariya, 1st, German female. 2-3 *emphasis added*).

> "Whereas actually in our society it is a different thing, in the Pakistani society and elsewhere, but in Islam for woman, the freedom that there is for women is very great But us eastern men, you could say, we punish women...that is the worry. We do not give them the rights that Allah (SWT) gave them And that is why we have all these problems in our societies" (Faiz, 1st, German male 3).

Respondents also distinguish between cultural and Islamic practices on the basis of their origin. Informed fundamentally by the geography within which it originates Pakistani culture is thought to be ethnic in character, reflecting influences from all the different religions common to the South Asian region, as well as historical events such as colonialism. Islam on the other hand originates from two written texts, the

Qur'an which sets out the will of Allah (SWT) and the *Hadith,* which sets out the guidelines by which to interpret the *Qur'an*, as demonstrated by the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) in his daily life This distinction is articulated by many respondents through the use of marriage practices and ceremonies, which are thought to be heavily influenced by Hindu culture resulting from Pakistan's roots in India, rather than Islam.

> "We are Muslim, but our wedding ceremonies, and I say this in my own family arena as well, that where have the traditions of *Mehndi*[12] and *Maya*[13] come from? Where are they included in Islam? They are not ..these are all Hindus, there is no difference, if you go to a Hindu wedding and take a look at them, now they do this in Pakistan" (Naim, 1st, UK male 18-19).

> "And the culture which we try and teach our children as well, we do not look to see if this is an Islamic culture or simply one of geography. We just keep circling that culture" (Wahid, 1st, German male: 15)

6.3.3 *Reconstituting the Relationship Between Islam, Pakistani Culture and Community Boundaries*

Respondent conceptualisations of the relationships between Islam, Pakistani culture and identities are related to the construction and character of community boundaries In Chapter 2 the meanings attached to symbols representative of the community were said to change over time, developing different meanings and connotations depending upon changes to individual identities, perceptions and values. The correlative shifts in community boundaries are not instantaneous Whilst members of a community are able to interpret and allocate meaning to symbols, such interpretations are contextualised by the symbol itself (Parekh, 2000). Further, such symbols do not necessarily reflect respondent identities

Respondents do not always claim ownership of the community to which they would otherwise affiliate. In some instances respondent articulations of the Pakistani Muslim community are expressive of a distance between themselves and its perceived norms, values and structures. Articulation of this distance is reflective of the shifting identities of community members. Many academic studies have witnessed an increasingly prevalent trend among Muslims in Britain toward Islamic

---

[12] The ceremony and celebrations of painting the bride's hands and feet with Henna
[13] The ceremony and celebrations of giving sweets and applying scented oil to the bride and groom

identity, rather than one based upon ethno-cultural heritage (Husain and O'Brien, 2000, Dwyer, 1999, Modood *et al*, 1994) This trend is supported in the empirical data as respondent identity negotiations are expressly rooted in Islamic symbols of identification. Notwithstanding the perceived negativities of British and German societies by the majority of participants, 47% recognise that the identities of many Pakistanis, including themselves and their children, are being influenced by, and incorporating 'Western' characteristics.

54% of the German respondents talk about becoming more Islamic, or having discovered 'true' Islam after having come to Germany. They attribute this change to several different factors. As suggested, the biggest factor in this increased practice is the presence of the Turkish community. Respondents are also supported and encouraged by the presence of other (Pakistani) Muslims who exhibit a passionate belief and practice of Islam the likes of which were not witnessed in Pakistan Respondents in both Britain and Germany suggest the relaxed practice of Islam by friends and family in Pakistan allowed them to justify their own negligence, as other Muslims are used as a benchmark for ones' own limited adherence.

The non-Muslim societies of Britain and Germany are seen to be the alternative to Islamic practice. The negative way in which the norms of British and German society are conceived by respondents is a spur for individuals to continue to be, or become, adherent to Islamic practices. Further, respondents who are parents express a greater need to ensure their own practice of Islam in order to make certain their children understand, and respect the guidelines of Islam as a means to prevent them from 'straying'. Such a conscious drive toward Islamic norms and values, and express rejection of Pakistani norms and values is indicative of the increasing Islamic affiliation of individual identities. British respondents, observe a trend, particularly amongst the 'younger' generation, of increasing Islamic identities and practice. This trend is connected to their experiences within a hostile British culture and global events that are seen to persecute Muslims, and is further illustration of symbolic competition (Cohen, 1985)

> "When I came here [to England], I think I learnt a lot more, because
> I was on my own" (Hana, 1st, UK female· 8)

"We were born in Pakistan, we learnt how to read the *Qur'an* in Pakistan, everything happened to us there, we used to pray *namaaz*[14] there a nd e verything, b ut i n r eality w e h ave b ecome f amiliar w ith Islam after having come to Europe   The reason for this in Pakistan...there, there was just one thing, our environment was Islamic. But we did not know what Islam was, because we were yet to experience it, to see it, that this is good and this is bad   So it is when we came to Europe we interacted with them [German], and we compared it with them and we saw that our religion Islam is very good   Living here we have a great need for it as well" (Yasir, 1st, German male. 3).

"So the environment is important because especially for our children, we have to keep our children, especially those whose wives are European, they have to give a great deal of attention. For that it is very important, not that I say to my son, son it is time for *namaaz* pray *namaaz* and do not pray it myself, that will never have an affect will it?" (Bilal, 1st, German male: 5).

"I think there is an area for conflict especially after September 11th, I think a lot of Muslims have redefined their identity, and perhaps some who were not t hat s trongly religious before have now, after September 11th, turned round and said well I am proud of my identity as a Muslim. And I need to belong somewhere and I think they have a much stronger identity now" (Safa, 2nd, UK female: 6).

Islam is integral to the identity of respondents, forming the guidelines by which they live their daily lives and the reasoning they attribute to their actions Notwithstanding the distinctions between Islam and culture, in practice, Islam and the Pakistani culture do influence one another, and, often substitute one another in meaning and/or expression. Islamic values are often practised through cultural norms, and as such, interpretations of Islam develop a geographical location. It is because such a geographical attachment has occurred that respondents express such a strong need to separate the two

6.3.4 *Membership Versus Ownership of 'Our' Community*

Although respondents may identify with a community as 'our', they do not necessarily claim ownership of it as 'mine'. The ambiguities of such references correlate with instances where the symbols of community boundaries do not relate to individual identities   Where respondents refer to the community, but do so as distinct from that with which they identify, it is indicative of instances where the symbolic boundaries of the community no longer represent the identities of the individual concerned. This is particularly significant, as it suggests, contrary to

---

[14] The Islamic ritual of prayer which conforms to the pillar of *Salat*, and is performed five times a day.

Cohen's (1985) thesis, that symbols are not able to be all things to all people Rather, in similar vain to Parekh's argument (2000), community boundaries can be negotiated in order to reflect individual identities, but such negotiation is only affective within the constraints of what that community is.

The construction of community boundaries, and their perceived relationship with Islam, raises some important distinctions between the British and German samples Whilst 58% of all respondents express the need for Islam to be distinguished from Pakistani culture, this distinction is far more evident in the German affiliation to community than in the British. The German sample is overtly conscious of the drive to separate Islam from its cultural interpretations, especially in the context of Islamic teachings and future generations of Pakistani heritage Muslims in Germany

When discussing the Pakistani Muslim community, 47% of the British respondents talk about it as a step removed from themselves Respondent identification to the community is qualified by internal diversities of education and religious sectoral politics. Further, the Pakistani Muslim community is not considered to reflect Islamic symbols to the degree that respondents would have. German respondents on the other hand, talk about community as the group of people of which they are members. British respondents talk about the community in terms of what 'it' does, how 'it' perceives Islam, whereas German respondents talk of it in terms of what 'we' do and how 'we' perceive Islam. Although German respondents share the concerns of their British counterparts, they are more actively involved in ensuring that the Pakistani Muslim community remains connected more to its Islamic symbols than those of its ethno-cultural heritage.

> "The community does not really influence our family life, but used to when we were younger When we were younger *they* did because we lived in an area where the girls were not educated and what you lived in was a very strict 'who's doing what?' 'Daughter shouldn't be allowed to do anything'. So my dad was influenced when he was working and everything very much by the community" (Zoe, 2nd, UK female: 2, *emphasis added*).

> "What I mean is if you look at it against, *our* people that come here, they know these things are bad but they still try to do them, especially drink, they drink alcohol they go to disco's and this and that We know that these are all sins but still *we* do them" (Bilal, 1st, German male. 3, *emphasis added*).

A significant difference between the British and German respondents is the importance accorded to the community of 'us'. The varying degrees of importance

respondents attach to the presence of a Pakistani Muslim community correlate with their ownership of it   The lack of extended family within Germany due to recent, and limited, migration[15], means many respondents fear the amount of cultural and religious understanding their children will be able to obtain   This in turn leads to the fear of how open children will be to the negatively perceived influences of the German environment in which they are growing up. Such susceptibility threatens the perpetuation of community norms and values and thus the integrity of community boundaries.

69% of German respondents, compared to just 24% of British respondents, feel a need for the presence of a Pakistani Muslim community   Small numbers of Pakistani Muslims, and the absence of extended family is exacerbated by the extent to which Islam is clouded by inaccurate cultural representations. It is felt that unless Islam is taught as a religion in its own right, Muslim children of Pakistani heritage, who are born and bought up in Germany will not perceive it to be a worthwhile set of values to follow. To this end many of the respondents are actively involved in Islamic rituals and practices, with 58% saying they visit the mosque at least once a week.

The language of 'us' and 'them', used to define community boundaries, is bound up in the feeling of security. The character of this security differs among the different groups. In Germany this security points to the religious upbringing and practice of the next generation. In contrast British respondents tend not to equate the presence of the community with ease of establishing and maintaining religious practice. Rather, 65% of respondents favour the community's presence for the safety equated with numbers and the ease of life in terms of facilities. Negative perceptions of different factions within the *Umm'ah*, as well as the lack of education, are superseded by the religious and cultural understanding and therefore acceptance other Pakistani Muslims offer.

The degree to which respondents identify with, and choose to be a part of, the Pakistani Muslim community is particularly salient given the focus of this study   In order to explore the degree to which an individual is subject to the processes of social exclusion it is necessary to determine whether or not an individual chooses to be included, and therefore subject to the authority of those community structures, from which he or she is being excluded in the first instance[16]. The extent to which

---

[15] See Chapter 5.
[16] See Chapter 8.

respondents affiliate with the Pakistani Muslim community will affect the degrees, and ways in which, its boundaries are perpetuated.

6.4 *Perpetuation of Community Boundaries: Static Versus Fluid Interpretations*

There is a trend within the empirical data that suggests, in order to perpetuate the Muslim and Pakistani identities of respondents and the community, it is necessary to continue the practice of Islamic and cultural symbols and rituals. These findings are consistent with Cohen's (1985) thesis on the perpetuation of symbolic boundaries There are strong sentiments within the data on the importance of ensuring that the rituals of Islam are practised as a means to abide by the values they represent, rather than for the sake of practice alone. The perpetuation of Islamic and cultural norms and values is integrally linked to the way and means by which Islam is taught to future Pakistani heritage Muslims. To this end, many of the respondents focus upon the way in which they are instilling the importance of Islam, and to a lesser extent Pakistani culture, into their children.

6.4.1 *Perpetuating Boundaries Through Ritual*

54% of respondents suggest that their migration affected their perspectives of Islam, and bought about two predominant changes to their approach and practice The first change is in the approach to education. 51% of respondents in both Germany and Britain believe the way in which Islam is taught to the younger generations needs to change in order to persuade them of its viability and inherent value The need for this change is attributed to different factors related to the biography of the respondent For the most part respondents advocate change as a consequence of the ways in which their understanding and practice of Islam has developed over time. This advocacy is also conditioned by the length of time respondents have been resident in the host country, the extent to which they feel the Islamic education they received adequately equipped them to live in a non-Muslim country, and the degree to which they know about or have integrated into the educational systems of Britain or Germany.

Notwithstanding the numerous reasons for advocating a change in the method of Islamic teaching, there are a number of common views as to what changes ought to take place. Many of the respondents argue that Islam is applicable in every age, not limited to the era of the Prophet (PBUH) As such the interpretation and education of Islam ought to recognise, and take into consideration, the present day context Whilst respondents d o n ot m ake any o vert c laims a s t o w hich p rinciples o ught t o b e r e-

interpreted and how, their suggestion that Islam ought to be practised and taught in light of its contemporary setting is illustrative of the flexibilities they associate with it This suggests that Islamic prescriptions ought to be considered as guidelines and/or principles rather than immutable rules or orders (King, 2 000; F inch, 1 989; Grimshaw, 1986, Giddens, 1984, Douglas, 1971, see Chapter 3).

Given the fluidity of guidelines, it is difficult for respondents to exclude people as 'non-Muslims' for simply differing in their interpretations This is significant given the stark distinction made between Pakistani Muslims and Turks, by 58% of respondents in Germany. Such a distinction indicates that whilst Islam may be a set of guidelines, which are open to interpretation, respondents perceive there to be constraints as to the way in which they can be interpreted (Parekh, 2000). One such constraint is provided by the boundary between 'us' (Muslims) and 'them' (non-Muslims). It is the participation of the Turks, in what are conceived of as German, and therefore non-Muslim, norms, which are given as the reason the Turks are perceived in a negative way. Whilst there is a drive to re-interpret Islam so that it is applicable to the daily lives of people living and growing up in Britain and Germany this re-interpretation remains subject to an essentialist perspective of what it means to be within the bounds of the sacred and what is profane

> "We say, don't we, that this [Islam] is a heavenly (*afakqi*) religion, and is w orthy o f a cceptance t hrough till judgement day, b ut w hen they [children] learn the religion from the *Maulvi saab* [Islamic priest], when they compare that with other religions, other sects then they feel that maybe it does not meet the requirements of this era" (Wahid, 1st, German male: 5).

> "I went and said to them, *Maulvi saab* [Islamic priest] look you have some responsibilities other than teaching them, these children go to schools, they go to an English school and they are not beaten And they study here if you hit them they will become distant from Islam, they will have a bad impression of Islam, that when they study over there they are taught gently, but when they come to the mosque we are hit for every little thing" (Naim, 1st, UK male 16)

> "Our *Ullemah* [Muslim clerics] have not discussed [problems faced today] to any great length and presented a good solution to people So there are many problems like this [issues of contraception] stuck in the minds of people" (Mariya, 1st German female· 5).

> "They [Turks] have started to wear the same dress as these people [Germans] have...we [Pakistani Muslims] do not like this" (Yusra, 1st, German female: 6).

Another form of change to Islamic teaching thought to be necessary is related to the perceived (disproportionate) importance placed on the ritualistic aspect of Islam by members of the community The ritualistic aspects of Islam are considered to be the things a Muslim does on a regular basis, praying *namaaz* 5 times a day, fasting in the month of Ramadan, giving *zikaath* to the poor and so forth Rituals provide a form of defence, n ot o nly in t heir practice, b ut a lso, through t hose a spects o f t he r eligion associated with the ritual. The very act of prayer, of ritual, is deemed to protect people from sin because it is considered to draw individuals closer to their faith and further away from those activities considered to be profane (Durkheim, 2002, 1984)

One form of ritualistic practice exercised by 75% of female respondents in Germany is *purdah* in the form of *hijab* In Islam *purdah* advocates against the interaction of men and women who are not directly related by blood or marital relations (El Guindi, 1999). It is often visibly practised through the *hijab*, the manner of clothing that covers women. The extent to which *hijab* is practised differs, ranging from the simple covering of one's hair, to a full length gown which includes the covering of the face (*nikaab*) leaving only the eyes unveiled with which to see. *Purdah* as a practice of Islam is the only point at which some of the female respondents in Germany affiliate with members of the Turkish community The female respondents in Germany, and some of the males give *purdah* a great deal of importance In particular this is because of the connotations of promiscuity attached to women who do not 'cover' themselves appropriately.

> "*Purdah* is a very big problem for girls here, dress. *Purdah* comes in to dress doesn't it? So then they [children] meet children there [in German schools] because when they go to school there, everything is totally different isn't it" (Taj, 1st, German female. 2).

> "He [husband] will say look how nicely she [Turkish woman] has bound that scarf, it should be like that" (Shifa, 1st, German female: 2)

> "The environment here, the school environment it is open, it is totally open We, we are different to our daughter, different to our wife, different to our mother. Our mind is like that, for them [Germans] it [*purdah* and gender differentials] is nothing, for them everyone is equal, you study, you live for yourself" (Tahir, 1st, German male· 4).

Notwithstanding the importance given to *purdah*, 56% of respondents, in both Britain and Germany, feel that Islam has come to be reduced to ritual alone, and is no longer observed in spiritual terms. The exercise of *purdah* itself is considered to be pointless, if one's deeds and intentions do not reflect the spiritual significance of

the ritual In reducing Islam to particular practices, the rituals are considered to lose meaning, performed simply for the sake of performance Islam is described by some of the respondents as 'a way of life' (*nizam 'ai 'hayath*). It is conceptualised as an all-encompassing religion, related not only to an individual's practice of particular rituals, such as the daily prayers (*namaaz*), but as spiritual guidelines applicable to all aspects of his or her life

Practice of these Islamic guidelines is conceptualised in terms of defence and reward. Defence of an individual from all that is profane, especially in the host societies of Britain and Germany, and reward, for one self and one's family as Allah (SWT) is pleased with ones good deeds, and the family's efforts at ensuring one's good character. In addition to ritual, respondents stress it is important to ensure that the guidelines of the Islamic faith continue to be practised in everyday life, to portray what real Islam is to future generations and the wider non-Muslim societies of Britain and Germany, and as a means to perpetuate the values of Islam Islam is not only a part of an individual's daily life, but plays a central role in the choices that they make. Such strenuous effort at ensuring rituals remain representative of particular values reflects respondent attempts to maintain the manner in which Islam is currently interpreted. However, the fact that many of the women who practice *purdah* in Germany did not do so in Pakistan is illustrative of shifting connotations attached to the ritual of *purdah*, if not a change in the values it is underpinned by. So respondents articulate a desire to retain an idealised understanding of Islam, but what that idealised understanding is, is itself changing

> "I think parents don't want their children to be religious for the sake of being religious. There is a whole hidden reason behind it You know the kids, they are not going to night-clubs, they are not getting into trouble, they are not hanging around with the wrong sort, they are not doing this, they are not doing that. And being religious, certainly in the ritual aspect, gives a lot of parents that piece of mind But I don't think they specifically want the whole family to be religious scholars, but just to get enough out of your faith to give you that moral code, accountability for your actions, a bit of consciousness around what you do." (Ijaz, 2nd, UK male. 6)

> "We, only up until worship, we are exercising Islam at that level, we pray *namaaz*, we keep *Roze* (fast)…But Islam has just been reduced to a ritual The real soul/spirit within it has disappeared" (Wahid, 1st, German male: 4).

> "I think other people sometimes do things for show, you know they will go to the mosque or they'll put a scarf on or whatever really. Whatever it is they do it's like they say you know I've made a

statement, y ou k now I a m a p erson o f d evout b elief o r w hatever"
(Beena, 2nd, UK female: 4).

6.4.2 Perpetuating Boundaries through Education

In spite of the negative perceptions held with regard to German culture and society, 54% of respondents feel they are able to practice Islam, and convey it to their children, to a greater degree then if they were resident in Pakistan. The amalgamation of culture and Islam in the Pakistani mindset is thought to be particularly harmful in the German context because it gives the impression of Islam as being a restrictive and intolerant religion, where alternative ways of life and religious practices are not acceptable. Many of the German male respondents feel that it is important to lay such differences aside, in favour of Islamic unity as the only means to survive in a non-Islamic country. This, again, is in contradiction to the negative way in which Turks are perceived In Germany respondents consider it possible to convey Islam to their children independently of the cultural inflexions with which it is taught in Pakistan. In order to do so respondents feel the need for the creation of formal institutions in which Islam can be taught This is especially so given the context of limited kinship a nd community networks, and an un-Islamic environment.

The shared norms and values upon which the Pakistani Muslim community is formed give rise to compelling commitments that children learn as a matter of course (Etzioni, 1995). M any of the respondents i n Germany express t he fear that their children, away from the influences of a Muslim environment, as well as away from extended kinship networks, will grow up without having attained as tight a grasp of these compelling commitments as they would have done were they to have grown up in Pakistan. Thus, 41% of respondents give details of the drive toward establishing institutional frameworks for the perpetuation and sustenance of Islam Within such institutions Islam is taught in German rather than Urdu. This is a conscious decision in order to ensure that Islam is conveyed in the language that children are most likely to understand, as well as being aimed at bringing together children of different ethnicities so as to further the unity of the Muslim *Umm'ah* There is also an underlying subtext within the data that suggests the provision of Islamic education to Turkish children is a means to reform their lapsed practice of Islam. This education is also used as a means of ensuring Pakistani Muslim youth growing up in Germany do not stray from Islam as the Pakistani Muslim youth in Britain are perceived to have.

> "Because those people that are attached to a religious organisation (*marquaz*)...they retain an Islamic environment, themselves and their children...They remain saved [from un-Islamic behaviour]. But there are plenty of families that have no connection with any religious organisation (*marquaz*).. their children are also growing apart from religion" (Anis, 1st, German male: 3).

> "And we [Islamic organisation which runs a weekend school] do most of our work in the German language. Urdu as well, our school, on Saturdays we teach how to read and write Urdu, but other than that we do most of our work in the German language Because our children's language is German. Like the problems that are in England, we do not want to have the problems here that are in England From the start we are giving them religious teachings in German, so that our children can stay Muslim ..Whether they speak Urdu or not as long as they stay Muslim" (Faiz, 1st, German male: 2).

The migration of Pakistani Muslims to Germany took place relatively recently. In contrast to their British counterparts, Pakistani Muslims in Germany are actively seeking to establish and better themselves as a 'Muslim' community. This activity is especially fervent where members of the community view the 'problems' of Pakistani Muslims in England and aim to ensure they are not repeated. These problems are perceived as having their roots in the lack of parental attention directed toward the next generation, the inaccurate conflation of Islam and culture, and the influences of the host society itself, which, left unhindered, has led many young Muslim children astray. It is felt by German respondents that the presence of a Muslim community allows for norms to be established which are informed by Islamic values. These norms enable parents to counter alternative influences, thus providing religious security. Further, the establishment of Islamic institutions and mosques provides a venue through which such community relations can be fostered and maintained.

> "The situation in England is different to this, we get the news from there on occasion...Over there, there are such Mosques, here as well, that between themselves, the environment is just as it is in Pakistan [influenced by ethnic and sectoral factionalism rather than Islamic unity] Here we have come to hear that over there the police go into mosques with their shoes and with dogs, and doors are padlocked shut. This is all the doing of our own people" (Wahid, 1st, German male: 19-20)

6.4.3 *Measuring Conformity*

The degree to which individuals are considered to be successful in exercising Islamic and cultural norms and values is considered to be a direct reflection upon his or her good character, which is quantified by *izzat* An abstract concept, *izzat* is an

intangible p ossession t hat people ' have' a nd a re a ble t o 'lose'. *Izzat* is something which individuals are able to 'give', although this is not at the expense of one's own Rather, to give *izzat* is often considered as a means by which to increase one's own. In the same instance the *izzat* people give to an individual is reflective of the emotions they hold for that individual. So to receive *izzat* from someone is indicative of the respect and reverence he or she feels for you In the context of an individual's behaviour, *izzat* is increased the more an individual is thought to conform to the norms and values of the community, thereby perpetuating their own, and the community's Pakistani Muslim identities. In this manner *izzat* becomes a social capital resource.

> "When you are respecting others you are respecting yourself. You are making your self good will....like money is saved at a bank .. *Izzat* is something which a person feels" (Shabaz, 1st, German male: 7-8).

> "Obviously if you do good things, then not only is that good for your *izzat*, but also for your community" (Haidar, 2nd, UK male: 3)

> "Why do we give them [parents] this *izzat*? Because we understand what they have done. What didn't they do for us?" (Ishrat, 1st, German female: 5).

Izzat can be 'possessed' by an individual, a family, or a community at large. The majority of references made to *izzat*, within the interview data, are in terms of an individual's own *izzat* or that of their family Where the *izzat* of the community is explicated it is done so most often in the context of the way in which the Pakistani Muslim community is represented to the wider British or German host society Thus, at any one time an individual can be in receipt of *izzat* reflective of views held toward him or her, views held toward his or her family or views held toward the community he or she is thought to represent.

> "What is it [*izzat*]?...What am I? It is just that. Telling others this, making them except what I am and that I am okay, as a Muslim And if someone is saying to me are you a Muslim? You do not look like one Then that is *ba-yzzati* [loss of *izzat*] I am a Muslim. I should tell people through my actions...For example the Turkish, it is their *ba-yzzati* isn't it? .it is the *ba-yzzati* of all Muslims ..We are embarrassed, ashamed The Germans make jokes Are these Muslims? These Turkish?...When y ou s ay y ou a re a M uslim t hen you should look that way as well Physically and mentally through your actions as well. These three things together make up your *izzat*" (Ulfath, 1st, German female: 7-8).

As well as being the measure for the way in which an individual is perceived in the community, *izzat* also forms one of the principle ethics upon which social relations within the Pakistani Muslim community are negotiated *Izzat* is at once the way in which people 'ought' to be treated and the reason they ought to be treated that way *Izzat* both informs the way in which people treat one another as a matter of course and can signify the value individuals place on certain relationships, people and themselves Given and received in different contexts *izzat* can denote formality, reflect reverence and respect, represent honour and standing within the community and that of the community itself, facilitate a feeling of belonging and represent self-esteem. Respondents find *izzat* difficult to define due its intangible and abstract character Respondents also highlight that *izzat* can mean different things to different people and be accorded different value

> "In our family, a lot, we respect each other a lot" (Raees, 1ˢᵗ, German male. 6)

> "If you look at this broadly [what *izzat* is] you can say that the person that gives human rights back he has *izzat*" (Latif, 1ˢᵗ, German male: 13).

> "If you look at it Islamically you know respect, everybody respects you. Respect is *izzat* that is it" (Deen, 2ⁿᵈ, UK male· 6)

> "I think it [*izzat*] is something which is quite personal for people. My values may be very different, probably are very different to what an older persons are, it may be that I have you know what I mean. Its different, I mean people in Pakistan and India have different values and morals to what we have here. So I think it is something which is very personal but I think it is important value to have" (Beena, 2ⁿᵈ, UK female· 3).

As the ethic upon which social relations are constructed, an individual's *izzat* facilitates participation within the Pakistani Muslim community. The more *izzat* one is thought to possess the greater access he or she has to participate at different levels within the community. Where respondents give examples of *izzat* having been lost, they do so in terms of having lost 'face' or being shamed Often, an individual is considered to be *bai 'izzat* (shamed) where he or she has failed to abide by the norms and values of the community. The more significant the norms and values are to the Pakistani Muslims identities of the community, the more *izzat* an individual stands to lose As discussed a fundamental difference between 'us' (Pakistani Muslims) and 'them' (the British/German host society) is considered to be the permissive attitude toward sexual 'freedom'. As an example of the importance accorded to *izzat* with relation to the norms and values of *purdah*, respondents cite instances where the loss

to *izzat* is so great that lives have been taken where boys and girls, although it is more often girls who are so severely punished (Faqir, 2001, Afshar, 1994), are considered to have been sexually promiscuous

> "*Izzat* is that dot which is an individual's standing. It is his status ..
> if the same thing [running off with a boy] was done by the
> landowner's (*zamindhar*) daughter they go to kill her, that why have
> you done something like that, you have ruined our *izzat*, we had a
> standing in the society...there are different ways people handle this,
> some kill her, some speak about her" (Yusra, 1st, German female.
> 15-16)

> "Over there [Pakistan] *izzat* always meant that if somebody so much
> as looked or said something to your daughter, your sister or your
> mother you went and thrashed them That was *izzat*, my personal
> family honour, my honour is collective with my family" (Hana, 1st,
> UK female 6).

> "If Allah (SWT) forbid our daughters situation goes in any way
> wrong we make that into a question of life or death. And if a son
> carries on right in front of our own eyes we do not take it seriously,
> we just think he is a son, he will be ok ..whereas a person's *izzat*
> and focus, whether it is a daughter or a son should be equal on both
> counts" (Wahid, 1st, German male· 15)

An individual's *izzat* is not only accumulated through his or her own actions, but also through those of his or her kin. This is especially the case where the individual in question has been, or is considered to be, responsible for imparting the norms and values to kin. Thus, parental *izzat* is often measured and given in consideration of the way in which their children behave. In particular women are considered the vehicle for the *izzat* of the men in their families (Afshar, 1994). The continued practice of Islamic and cultural norms and values is a means whereby respondents re-affirm community boundaries that distinguish between 'us' and 'them'. The overt drive to ensure such re-affirmation is nowhere more evident within the data than when respondents speak of the upbringing they are giving to their children The empirical data explored at length the ways in which the norms and values of the community are being imparted to Pakistani heritage Muslim children in Britain and Germany. The form and extent to which these norms and values are being taught to future generations is justified with reference to the need to perpetuate the Pakistani, and more frequently, Islamic identities of the children themselves and community at large, as well as a means of maintaining parental *izzat* in the community.

The loss of *izzat* due to what is perceived to be an individual's lack of conformity or those of his or her kin, results in what respondents' term, being viewed in a 'bad light'. Further, an individual's participation in the structures of the community is made all the more difficult as they lose their standing and honour within the community The exploration of Etzioni's (1998, 1997, 1995, see also Durkheim, 2002, 1984, 1964) thesis in Chapter 2 drew attention to the role of compelling commitments in structuring individual agency Respondent articulations of the importance of norms and values in the perpetuation of their own identities, and those of the community, and therefore its boundaries, are indicative of just such compelling commitments. Further, the relationship between *izzat* and the norms and values of the community, suggests that *izzat* forms a significant part of that compulsion. This relationship will be discussed further in Chapter 8, with specific reference to the care of elders

6.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, an individual's membership within a particular community is ambiguous, in that demarcations on the basis of religion, religious sect, ethnicity and region all represent a web of identifications (Bauman, 2000) which traverse and interconnect with one another Notwithstanding the contradiction between such a 'web' of community membership and the dichotomy of 'us' and 'them', this apparently unequivocal distinction informs the ways in which boundaries come to be seen in non-negotiable terms. These essentialist distinctions are given credence by the perceived contradiction between the norms and values of different communities.

The symbols which represent the norms and values of a community, and the content/value judgement made with regard to them, is indicative of the way in which individuals experience and influence the communities in which they live. Where the cultural symbols of a community do not correspond to the Islamic identities of an individual, respondents are reluctant to take ownership of the community as 'mine', even where they recognise their membership to it. In such instances respondents, particularly in Germany, are actively seeking to realign community symbols with individual identities through the practice and reconstitution of Islamic values, rituals and education. Such a perpetuation also serves as a defence against the perceived encroachment of Western norms and values.

Individual conformity to the norms and values of the community, and therefore their contribution to the defence of its boundaries, is rewarded through the accumulation

of *izzat*. Where an individual does not conform, his or her *izzat* is lost. As a form of social capital which facilitates an individual's participation within the community, the loss of *izzat* also has the potential to contribute to an individual's exclusion, or vulnerability to exclusionary processes. Identifying familial care of elders in their old age as a symbol of the Pakistani Muslim community, used by respondents to distinguish between 'us' and 'them' (the non-Muslim British/German host society the next chapter (7) explores the extent to which familial care of elders forms a compelling commitment

Chapter 7

Experiences and Expectations of Informal Familial Care

7.1 *Introduction*

This chapter engages in depth with respondents' perceptions and participation within the care relationship. Many of the values that inform and arise from individual 'Pakistani' and 'Muslim' identities, and symbolise respondent affiliation with 'us', guide the construction, conceptualisation and understanding of care relationships. Of these guidelines, *izzat* is the most prominent. Section 7 2 explores the concepts of *izzat* and *khidmat,* which play a large part in the ethical framework against which respondents negotiate care relationships. As the motivation for care relationships, the means by which care ought to be provided, and what is expressed via care relationships, the value of *izzat* permeates through respondent articulations of care. In addition, as a symbol that denotes respect and honour, the *izzat* of the carer and care recipient is a form of social capital that provides power, ownership and voice within the care relationship (Williams, 2000)

Khidmat, translated literally, means to serve, and is used by respondents to encapsulate the four categories of care outlined in Chapter 3; financial, emotional, physical and practical. The data reveal that in its practice, care in the form of *khidmat* remains gendered. Whilst the majority of respondents articulate their expectations as resting upon their sons, it is daughter in laws that, for the most part, are the recognised c are p roviders. The importance a ttributed t o different f acets o f *khidmat* are shifting in light of respondent experiences of informal care, their understanding of formal social security provisions in old age, and their residence in Britain or Germany Respondents feel the provision of financial care by their children is no longer as important as emotional care given the potential to access formal pension provisions[1].

The norms and values of Islam and Pakistani culture also influence the construction of the care relationship in terms of obligations/duties (*farz*) to care, and the right to receive it In Islam parents are considered the rightful recipients of care from their children. The provision of such care is an Islamic duty on all children. This duty to care is supplemented by the principle of reciprocity. The upbringing given to children b y t heir elders, and t he care they r eceived throughout t heir c hildhood, i s

---

[1] See Chapter 5.

thought to place a responsibility on children to reciprocate, and thus repay, their parents The importance attributed to reciprocity is illustrative of an interdependent care relationship (Williams, 2001, 2000)

Respondent articulations of care are illustrative of relationships constructed through processes o f n egotiation. Many o f t hese n egotiations, e xplored i n S ection 7.3, a re influenced by the voice of the elder (the care recipient) Listening to the voice of an elder is itself thought to constitute a form of emotional care as it reflects the giving of *izzat* The normative value of care and the social capital of *izzat* can result in care being statically defined as positive and 'good' and, therefore, 'given' even where the elder does not wish to receive it Negotiations of the care relationship are also influenced by structural constraints upon the carer such as level of activity in the paid labour market, and the etiquette requirements of Islam and Pakistani culture In the absence of such structural constraints the duty to give and reciprocate care can enforce its provision upon the carer even where he or she is unable, or unwilling, to provide it

Islam a nd P akistani c ulture f orm t he b asis u pon w hich t he d uty t o c are for o nes' elders is understood This duty has come to be perceived as an integral symbol of what distinguishes 'us' from 'them' Section 7 4 explores the symbolic elements of caring for ones elders Diaspora Pakistani Muslims in Germany and in Britain considered providing care for one another within the Pakistani Muslim community as essential to maintaining unity and establishing a sense of belonging Throughout the data it is clear that respondents perceive there to be a distinct lack of care for elders, from within the family, amongst British and German host societies This perceived absence encourages distinctions between 'them' and 'us', as care of elders within the family, becomes a symbol of differentiation Caring for ones elders is also seen as a testament to an individual's character as a 'good' Muslim. This is epitomised b y r espondents' b elief t hat they h ave a ' right' t o c are f or their elders This right is particularly important as to care for ones elders is to strive toward attaining spiritual rewards from Allah (SWT)

The chapter is concluded, in Section 7.5, with the suggestion that the value of care takes on a prescriptive element which constrains the power, ownership and voice of the carer, and to a lesser degree the care recipient, and has significant implications for the sincerity of the care relationship Further, as a symbol of distinctions between

'us' and 'them', the care relationship has the potential to become a question of inclusion and exclusion, a possibility discussed at length in Chapter 8

7.2 *Caring for Elders: Giving Them Izzat and Doing Their Khidmat*

32 to 34 respondents' articulations of care are centred around, or linked to, the concept of *izzat*. In particular, respondents stress that Pakistani culture and Islam require children to give their parents *izzat* This requirement is located in the gerontocratic structures of family (Weber, 1965). By virtue of their age, and their status as parents, 'elders' are considered entitled to be given *izzat* by all those younger than them, and in particular their own children This is supported by Afshar *et al* (2001), who found that in contrast to non-migrant older women, migrant women did not feel invisible as they got older, rather, they enjoyed the respect commanded by age

> "In our culture, in Pakistan you are instructed, we were taught and
> what we learnt is that whoever the elder is in the home, what he said
> is what we are to do" (Yusra, 1st, German female 6)

Respondents verbalise the ethics of care through the concept of *izzat* (Williams, 2001, 2000). As the reason care ought to be provided, and as the means by which this care is provided, *izzat* (respect for the individual), forms the lynchpin upon which the ideal Pakistani Muslim care relationship is grounded. The quotes below are indicative of this as respondents answer the question about how they care for their elders.

> "As much as I can, as well as I can I have tried to the best of my
> abilities that they are not negatively affected by anything that I do"
> (Haidar, 2nd, UK male 4).

> "I have respected my elders, always. Because it is, it is something
> that makes them happy...care in the family yes, if somebody is older
> than you, you look after them I work with older people now and I
> carry that same respect with them...Even if they say something
> wrong, don't answer back" (Hana, 1st, UK female: 2)

> "This is respect . It is embedded in our minds that it is our mother,
> brother, this, and that I have to give it [care] to them" (Tahir, 1st,
> German male· 6).

The relationship between care and *izzat* affects individual actions outside of the care relationship, as respondents describe 'to care for ones elders' as acting in a way which does not bring shame on them. Respondent understandings of what is meant by caring for one's elders occupy a three-fold perspective Firstly, to care for one's

elders is to act in a way which does not damage their *izzat* in the eyes of others
Secondly, it is to give them *izzat*, and thirdly, it is to behave in a manner toward
them that is indicative and mindful of their *izzat* Thus, *izzat* is at once considered to
be care as well as the reason to give care

Notwithstanding the ability of individuals to give, receive and possess *izzat*, its
articulation within the data remains an intangible abstraction Respondents find *izzat*
difficult to define, and verbalise their understandings of it with specific reference to
particular contexts, activities or relationships. In order to understand the role played
by *izzat* in the care relationship it is important to consider it within the context of the
actions it gives rise to, is a part of, or is absent from When asked to elaborate upon
' the exercise of care through, or as a result of *izzat*, 79% of respondents do so via the
concept of *khidmat*. Translated literally, and in its most basic sense, *khidmat* means
'to serve'. To do the *khidmat* of somebody is considered to be illustrative of the
izzat one holds for that person Respondents utilise *khidmat* as an inclusive term,
which incorporates all aspects of care. To do somebody's *khidmat* and the way in
which it is done, are both considered to be demonstrative of *izzat*[2]

> "I respect her [mother in law] completely and I look out for all her
> needs...And what I did [cared for her], I totally did in the spirit of
> Islam because in Islam there is a lot of *izzat* and care for elders ..The
> Prophet (PBUH) stated that that is your mother, that is your father,
> do their *khidmat* completely" (Bilal, 1st, German male· 3).

When scrutinized in greater depth, *khidmat* can be bracketed together under the four
overlapping and interdependent categories outlined in Chapter 3, financial,
emotional, physical and practical. The character of care encapsulated within each
category, and the importance attributed to it are reflective of a grounded
understanding of each categorisation, taken from the data.

7.2.1 *Financial Care*

Financial care refers not only to cash sums, but also gifts in kind, and help given as a
means to allow further material gain. Respondent articulations of financial care range
from direct financial help with marriage, and house building costs, to schooling and
paying for someone to go on Hajj[3]. Respondents also speak of helping people with
air-fares in order to facilitate economic migration, thus allowing them to financially

---

[2] As a form of social capital, this is similar to Putnam's assertion of "them as has,
gets" (1993. 3). See also, Chapter 2.
[3] The Holy pilgrimage to Mecca, obligatory upon Muslims who are able to afford it.

help themselves and their own families (Finch, 1989). The provision of financial care to family in Pakistan is considered to be particularly characteristic of the *izzat* given to family members, and that with which they are regarded. Upon migration to Britain and Germany, were such financial care not to be provided, family members in Pakistan are not able to exercise any tangible compulsion[4] upon respondents. The provision of financial care is motivated by a respondents own notions of duty and obligation, a large part of which stems from, and is thought to be illustrative of, the *izzat* he or she has for parents and/or family members. Such care is not a result of community compulsion, but ones' own feelings of *izzat* towards ones' parents In this sense financial care is illustrative of transnational welfare particularly relevant in the context of migrant experiences (Williams, 2000)

> "After that [father dying] our mother did everything, we are, what do they say, what ever they say, if they say we want money we give them money, what you were saying about respect, this is respect If we say no what can they do, nothing" (Tahir, 1st, German male· 6)

For the most part financial care is seen to be a male responsibility, consistent with the male breadwinner model. The empirical data revels that respondents expect care in old age to be provided by their sons. When asked to elaborate upon this, respondents highlight that daughters, once married, are considered to go to their 'own' homes. Once their sons are married however, the expectation is that their daughter in laws will come and take care of them. Despite a superficial expectation on men to provide care, its provision remains a gendered issue, with women bearing the brunt of responsibility (McKie *et al.*, 2001; Daly and Lewis, 2000) Financial care is the only form of *khidmat* that sons are expected to provide, as it is not considered a daughter in laws' responsibility to go out and earn 21 respondents acknowledge that female support and care makes financial care by men possible

15 female respondents recognise that the care they provide within the home, whether of children and family within the country of migration, or of parents and other family members in Pakistan, enables the economic migration and activity, in the formal employment market, of their partners. This recognition is echoed by 6 male respondents. Such care has been labelled the trans-national work of women, which although not paid, ought to be recognised as 'work' because of the role that it plays in facilitating economic activity The following quote from Najm, in response to the question of how she has cared for her family, illustrates how she perceives her active

---

[4] Intangible compulsion in the form of the moral voice is discussed in Chapter 8.

contribution to providing financial care, despite not having 'earned' the money in the labour market.

> "*We* have given them [family in Pakistan] financial help whenever the opportunity has arisen, like someone's house is being built or someone's child is getting married" (Najm, 1ˢᵗ, UK female: 10, *emphasis added*).

> "Especially w hen, look, w hen m y f ather passed away, o bviously I had children as well, but to fulfil my responsibilities [of financial care to his mother and siblings], if my wife had not stood by me, I alone was nothing" (Bilal, 1ˢᵗ, German male: 8).

16 of the respondents, of whom 15 are first generation migrants to Britain and Germany, speak of financial care in a despondent manner The provision of financial care is something respondents have resigned themselves to as the only form of care they are able to provide their family in Pakistan, due to geographical constraints Regardless of gender, respondents express a certain degree of remorse at being unable to care for their elders in more than financial terms This suggests that the transnational ethic of care can be detrimental to the carer, even where an explicit choice was made in order to provide it. Changing circumstances and the dissipation of the myth of return (Shaw, 1994) restrict an individual's ability to participate in the care relationship in other ways.

Notably there is a shift in the way financial care is perceived by second generation British[5] respondents Among this group the provision of financial care is not something which ought to be lamented To be capable of providing such care is considered to be a positive attribute, especially by the women There are dissenting voices within the data that suggest the gendered breadwinner model is changing, as 21% of respondents expect their daughters to provide financial care for them in their old age. When asked to elaborate upon why they expect their daughters to care for them when their parents did not expect it from them or their wives, respondents point out that in Britain or Germany women are able to go out and get employment, and as such, are as capable as their sons of providing financial care

> "Whatever we could do we helped, but after that, in terms of duties (*farz*), I f elt t hat I, o n m y o wn b ehalf, I f eel t hat I h ave n ot done enough for my parents. To be honest I should have done more for them. Now the main reason for this is not that I have overlooked or I

---

[5] No second generation German respondents were interviewed (see Chapters 4 and 5).

have not realised what their rights (*haq*) are the reason is that I have
been away That is the main reason" (Naim, 1st, UK male: 31).

"I'm one of the main wage earners of the family between my brother
and my sister. They look after the children and I pay the bills that's
how we work, they being my sister in law, my mum and my sister,
perhaps" (Zoe, 2nd, UK female 12)

37% of respondents include *zikaath*[6] as a form of financial care, but then
differentiate between it and care in general This differentiation is made because
zikaath is an obligatory tax upon Muslims, which also doubles as a form of charity
(Al-Krenawi and Graham, 2000, Azmi, 1991). As a definitive obligation, *zikaath* is
not a matter of choice, and as such, is not considered to be 'care'. This is significant,
in that it suggests participation in the care relationship, as a carer and care recipient,
requires an element of choice. It is also indicative of different forms of obligation
This distinction also suggests that *zikaath* is not defined as 'care', because to give
zikaath does not require the giving of *izzat* Rather, those in receipt of *zikaath* are
often perceived in negative terms, as they are 'incapable'[7] of taking responsibility for
their own financial and material well-being Such perceptions have parallels with
notions of welfare dependency and the underclass that have pervaded much of the
political and academic debates in relation to the welfare state[8] (Murray, 1995, 1988,
Mann, 1992; Bagguley and Mann, 1992; Mead, 1986).

"If you take the Muslim community as a whole, every year, when it
comes to the month of *zikaath*, these Islamic organisations like
Muslim Aid or Islamic Relief, we send at least £1000 to them, £200
here, £200 there, because there are poor people, orphan children.
But that is something else [not financial care], that is *zikaath* isn't
it?" (Kamil, 1st, UK male. 8-9).

"If we were in our own country [Pakistan], we feel a little hatred
toward him who takes *zikaath*, if, it is only the right of the person
who is the rightful recipient" (Raees, 1st, German male 4)

7.2.2 *Emotional Care*

Emotional care is more likely to be spoken of by women (91%) but is also widely
articulated by men (71%) It is discussed in a variety of contexts, ranging from
general day to day support, to the giving and receipt of *izzat*, to religious guidance

---

[6] Obligatory tax on liquid assets, considered to be the right of the poor and the
religious duty of the wealthy, purifying their earnings. It is one of the five pillars of
Islam
[7] To be legitimately eligible for *zikaath* an individual has to be incapable of
providing for him or herself
[8] See Chapter 3.

Emotional care i s the only category of *khidmat* i n w hich respondents specifically incorporate the giving of *izzat* Emotional care is thought to facilitate a feeling of belonging among respondents and other members of the Pakistani Muslim diaspora, as well as enable the retention and maintenance of trans-national familial links The maintenance of such links is particularly gendered, as Shaw (2000, 1988) observes Her study of Pakistani Muslims in Oxford found that women were involved in formal and informal activities and mutual support as a means to build and maintain familial networks between geographically proximate and distant kin An important element to emotional care has its basis in spiritual belief. 39% of respondents conceptualise having been prayed for, or receiving religious guidance, as a form of emotional care.

> "My family that are here, yes we have very good relations with them all. I don't feel that I am in a foreign country.. We are always phoning ..We understand each other's feelings, so we have a very good family system" (Deeba, 1st, UK female 3)

> "I think that [emotional care] is more important [than any other form of care] I think you need to have more then a house or a place to live whatever it is going to be You need to have somebody dealing with your emotional needs you know what I mean? Somebody who you can talk to, somebody who you can have a conversation with discussing, you know, issues that are important to you, you know, with your family and friends" (Beena, 2nd, UK female 10).

> "After I'd done so much [for] people they would say now what shall we do for you? All I said was pray for me. I don't want anything else" (Naim, 1st, UK male: 33).

Whilst respondents do not specifically link emotional care to *khidmat*, it is spoken of in the same context. The practice of emotional care during the exercise of *khidmat* is considered to be inevitable. To provide financial care is also to take care of an individual's emotional well being, as it may bring with it peace of mind, or fulfil a long held desire, such as going on Hajj. Emotional care is thought to go above and beyond the bounds of *khidmat*. Emotional care is not only given to elders, loved ones and others who are close to respondents, and whom they may want to do *khidmat* for. It is also exercised on a daily basis and may be given to relative strangers, not as an act of *khidmat*, but as a matter of course and part of social relations. In this manner emotional care is indicative of the role of intimacy within daily care relationships (Williams, 2000) The distinction between emotional care and other categories of *khidmat* has been characterised by Ackers and Stalford (2004) as the difference between caring about somebody and caring for them Caring about

someone allows for care to be practised across geographical distances, whereas "caring for family.. refers to the concrete, 'hands-on' care giving" (2004 136) This said, Ackers and Stalford's research shows that in some instances geographical distance does not hamper individual ability to 'care for', as migrants, in many cases, return to countries of origin to care for their loved ones This is supported by the empirical data this research draws upon.

7.2.3 *Physical Care*

Khidmat in the form of physical care is most commonly defined by respondents as taking care of someone during a period of illness, and doing for them what they are unable to do for themselves, akin to one aspect of what Ackers and Stalford (2004) term caring 'for'. In the way in which it is conceptualised and in the way it is practised physical care is heavily gendered Physical care is predominantly provided by female respondents (55% of women to 38% of men) Where it is provided by male respondents they qualify this provision by highlighting that in such instances women are 'unable to'. Reasons for the male provision of physical care centre around matters of cultural and/or religious etiquette, and physical ability The physical care provided by male respondents is of a personal nature, and, in all but one case, where the care recipient is male. Such care is again a matter of *izzat*, as for a male to provide personal care to a female or vica versa, unless absolutely necessary, would be considered indecent (*be-hayaa*) and therefore a matter of *ba-yzzati* (a loss of *izzat*). In such instances ethics of bodily integrity and identity as conceptualised by Williams (2000) are influenced by ethno-cultural religious inflexions. Male respondents justify the care that they provide, or have provided, by emphasising that the care needed was physically demanding and they were, therefore, better placed than their female counterparts to provide it.

> "Girls look after elders. Men just fulfil their [financial and emotional] needs" (Latif, 1st, German male. 7)

> "His [brother's] wife she could not do everything could she? So I would go, if he [brother] needed a bath, picking him up, taking him Because a man mostly helps a man" (Kamil, 1st, UK male· 11)

Only two of the respondents, both female, are responsible for providing long term physical care. The remaining respondents speak of long term physical care not having been needed, or, provided for by other members of the family in Pakistan For the most part physical care is provided for short periods of time, in response to sudden, and/or, short term needs. Such short term physical care can also come

following a long term illness where respondents have been told that their loved ones are close to death. The majority of short term care is provided in Pakistan. 51% of the respondents, upon the illness of a parent have travelled to Pakistan, or will do in the future, in order to care for their parents, as much as they can, in the time that they have. The provision of this physical care is considered by respondents to be particularly important as it provides them with an opportunity to bodily participate in the care of (to care 'for' (Ackers and Stalford, 2004)) their elders The role of this provision s eems t o b e c onciliatory t o the f act t hat r espondents a re n ot a ble t o do more in physical or practical terms due to geographical distance This guilt persists irrespective of the realisation that the migration of many respondents occurred specifically for the purposes of financially improving the situation of family in Pakistan. ,

> "When my mother in-law was ill...She was in hospital ..basically me and him [husband] would stay there for the whole day. We went [to Pakistan] for three weeks and about, we, we did not stay at night because you cannot sleep there...we would go after breakfast straight to the hospital ..we would feed her, give her water ..We tried that as many days we were there we do her *khidmat* as much as we can. If he was massaging her legs I would be massaging her head...Because he felt, obviously what with his work we could not stay longer than three weeks ..his heart was reassured that at least I have seen my mum, done her *khidmat, however little*" (Shifa, 1st, German female 8, *emphasis added*).

Of the second generation British respondents only one provided short term physical care for his grandmother as he was travelling through Pakistan. Two of these respondents provide physical care in the form of health check ups, and as the first point of contact for family and community members in the case of a health problem. Calls for such care from these respondents is a result of their employment as nurses Of the remaining second generation respondents, all acknowledge that they may be called upon to provide physical care as their parents and/or relatives begin to get older

> "I think they [family] bypass the doctor and come straight to me, 'what shall we do next?' I think sometimes if I wasn't in a nursing background then it wouldn't be [like that]" (Zoe, 2nd, UK female. 8)

> "Well people know that I am a nurse, and also I have a couple of patients that live on my street which doesn't really help. So every one [family, neighbours and community] sometimes call upon me to you know knock-on my door in the middle of the night you know what I mean . bandaging peoples' fingers, arms and legs (Beena, 2nd, UK female: 8).

> "Certainly I would be expected to do that [physical care] in the future say for example if my dad gets older and older, you know, physical support for him, and any other member of my family" (Amir, 2nd, UK male: 13).

The ethics of *izzat* underpin the practice of physical care more so than any other category of *khidmat* As a motivating factor for the provision of care, the principle of *izzat* suggests that recipients of care in their old age are not perceived as 'dependants'. As *izzat* is based on gerontocratic, thus hierarchical structures, older care recipients own a significant amount of power within the care relationship. As the principle that guides the provision of care, *izzat* accommodates principles of intimacy, bodily integrity and identity as understood by Williams (2001, 2000)

7.2.4 Practical Care

The final and most commonly exercised form of *khidmat* is practical care Practical care can range from childcare, to helping with chores around the house, to translation and help with official matters such as Visa applications. It is most commonly thought of as day-to-day care and is as much a means by which to enable the continuance of routine everyday life, as it is a form of *khidmat*, spurred by the gerontocratic structures of the Pakistani Muslim family. In this sense practical care is the most explicit demonstration of the interdependent character of everyday life, and is indicative of the practice and receipt of care by all members of a social group (Shakespeare, 2000, Williams, 2000; Tronto, 1993) Most predominantly exercised in the form of housework, the following quote typifies the way in which practical care is carried out by first generation female respondents in Britain and Germany.

> "I have just looked after my husband a little Just giving him his dinner on time, keeping his clothes ready, washing them, ironing them, keeping the home clean. Just these Other than that what is looking after? It is just this" (Ulfath, 1st, German female: 9).

This trend does not continue with second generation British female respondents, who often provide practical care beyond housework, participating in activities outside of the home.

> "I am the only driver in the house so I help my mum out, take her about, just as a dutiful daughter. Even though I've got my own house to think about, they [parents] still expect things from me really. To help out in the house, to help doing her [mother's] chores, or help out doing things that she wants to do" (Zahra, 2nd, UK female· 4)

Male respondent articulations of practical care centre around their role as breadwinner, as many stress their duty to care extends to ensuring all financial and material n eeds o f t heir f amily members a re m et, t hrough f or i nstance, p urchasing necessary equipment for education or supervising the building of a house In the cases of both male and female respondents it is evident that the onus is on the middle generation to care for their elders and their young (Trifiletti, *et al* , 2003) Given the gendered roles within the care relationship female respondents often carry much of the *khidmat* burden This is especially evident in cases of practical care 95% of female respondents cite examples of giving practical care in comparison to just 48% of males. Only 2 British second generation female respondents perceive these gender biases within the care relationship to be negative. The remainder of the female respondents positively adopt the role of carer within the family as a position accorded to them by Allah (SWT). Many actively propagate the perpetuation of such gendered roles by expecting their daughters to undertake the role of carers when they are older.

> "On the whole I feel men look down on women and culturally and religiously that's not accepted they've got it wrong in their heads...But in all my other families the women are expected to cook, clean, not to have an education, not even to tap into community initiatives you know flower-arranging classes or exercise classes that we encourage my sister in law to go to" (Zoe, 2nd, UK female· 7)

> "What I will be asked [by Allah (SWT) on judgement day] is how I bought up my children and what training I gave them. I will not be asked how much I learnt and what part I played in the house finances. T hat cannot b e asked of me and that is why this is my husband's duty" (Taj, 1st, German female. 8)

> "As far as I have seen daughters are more concerned [about their parents], they are more sensitive, they have more ability and desire to care. Maybe because they stay close to their mothers and mothers too share everything with their daughters rather than their sons...because your son's life is outside in a way. Totally separate. He comes in from school goes out to play and sleep Daughters are not like that at ours She comes home from school and she will stay at home for the rest of the day, with her mother in the kitchen She will help her mother or if a guest has come, if the mother is with the guest she will serve (Ulfath, 1st, German female: 13)

Throughout the empirical data the conceptualisation of care recipients is also gendered. Many of the respondents highlight that there is limited need for them to provide care for the males in their family, because fathers, father-in-laws, brothers and husbands have participated in the paid labour market and this, especially in

Britain and Germany, equips them to live a fulfilled life without needing practical care from anyone, including their children As Pakistani Muslim women who have spent most of their time in the home as care-givers, mothers however, are considered to be unfamiliar with structures of the host society and unable to converse in English or German As a result they are considered to be unable to survive in Britain or Germany without help from their children As a result, the role of carer itself becomes a disabling process (Barnes, 1990). This view is illustrated by the fact that 58% of respondents' mothers in comparison to 30% of respondents' fathers expect care from their children.

> "I think the difference between my mum and my dad is that my dad is e ducated...more i ndependent simply b ecause h e was t he sort o f male breadwinner in the family when we were younger. So he is quite, y ou k now h e c an take c are of himself q uite well W hereas with my mother she does s peak English but her English is not a s fluent as we speak English, but she can manage on a day to day level" (Safa, 2nd, UK female: 10).

> "[M]y husband, his mother. Because she is our, I mean she lives there in Pakistan but it is that we support her [and not respondent's father in law] ..because her everything we have to do Whether she lives over there, but it is that everything is attached to us, it is linked with us. We, despite living here we have to think about her, is she ill or healthy? Does she have money or not? Or any problem that she does have, we have to solve it for her" (Mariya, 1st, German female: 1).

> "I don't think my dad would ever want any help from us [respondent and his wife], because he is very much, he is very much independent, he can survive. My mum will still go off, my mum wanted to, you know, she is very traditional, she expects that if she need any help and support her children will provide" (Deen, 2nd, UK male. 7).

7.2.5 *The Changing Face of Care*

Although respondent articulations of their experiences and expectations of care reflect the multi-dimensional aspects of *khidmat*, the importance they accord to the different facets vary. The onus placed on different aspects of *khidmat* are significantly influenced by their own experiences of care, both formal and informal. Whilst respondent definitions of 'what is meant by care/*khidmat*' share common characteristics, the nuances of these definitions differ from respondent to respondent This is particularly evident in the degree to which expectation, for any form of care, is reduced 65% of respondents reveal that they do not expect their children to care for them to the same degree their parents expected them to This reduction in expectation is attributed to a variety of factors, the most commonly cited of which is

the influence of British or German society Respondents feel the perceived lack of familial care o f elders a nd t he n on-Islamic e nvironment, o f B ritain and G ermany, which does not promote family or respect of elders will influence their children

> "I think it has come to the stage where children do not actually take on the social responsibility that is taken back home [in Pakistan] because the way of life is quite different here . their influences are very much like the people here" (Hana, 1ˢᵗ, UK female: 13-14)

> "We have to take that into mind, that they [children] are a product of a different environment. We cannot have, I cannot have the same expectations from them that my father had from me. Because I lived in Pakistan and first I lived in India, in an Islamic environment" (Naim, 1ˢᵗ, UK male 20).

> "Expectations? (laugh) there are no expectations [from children] in this country [Germany] When the country in which we are sat is like that what expectations can we keep?" (Tahir, 1ˢᵗ, German male 4).

The reduction in expectation is also attributed, in part, to the inability of respondents to provide care, beyond the financial, to their own parents This suggests that the lack of care they themselves provided negates the option of being able to expect care from their children The degree to which respondents participate in care relationships is perceived to result in the accumulation of social capital which they can then use in their relationships with their own children to claim the right to be cared for (Putnam, 2000, 1993; Bourdieu, 1997 (1986), 1977).

> "So I try not to be selfish (laugh). So I suppose I am not there looking after my parents am I? So why should I expect that totally of my c hildren to d o that? My l ife and m y s ituation has m oved me totally away from my parents. I only go to see them for a holiday basically or phone them now and then" (Hana, 1ˢᵗ, UK female 13)

> "If the circumstances are such then they will be near me because they are my children, they are my arms. What I mean is I do not expect from them, I do not have any materialistic expectations, but if they stay close to me then I will be happy, I will feel good. I will then get strength (*taqviyath*), I will get strength, because I see that I am not close to my mother [who is in Pakistan] but when I go to her, her s ituation c hanges. H owever l ong I s tay w ith m y mother, *A mi* [mum] becomes like, she becomes fit, when I come back [to Germany] she goes just back to normal [weak and frail], even though I telephone twice a week" (Bilal, 1ˢᵗ, German male· 4).

51% of respondents suggest that the provision of formal welfare such as pensions[9] means there is no longer a need for children to provide financial care. This opinion is most frequently cited by German male respondents The decline in parental expectation of financial care does not equate to reduced expectation for other forms of care. Respondents who do not expect financial care from their children qualify this by placing a strong onus on the receipt of emotional care There is, however, a stigma attached to publicly/state provided services, reflective of the way they are viewed in Pakistan. It is important to note that there are strict views as to what services people are able to utilise as of right (Islamic and legal), and the use of which services is considered illegitimate This is especially the case in Germany, where in order to qualify for state help in the form of non contributory social assistance (*Bundessozialhilfegesetz*) a person must be bereft of financial and liquefiable assets (Annesley, 2002) This stigma stems from the perceptions held with regard to *zikaath* and *zikaath* recipients.

> "[I] just [have] the expectation that they [children] are loyal, they do our *izzat*, they come in use to us [parents] at the time of problems, what else, it is not like we want some estate off them or anything, we will be giving them that, not taking it from them (Azra, 1st, UK female. 6)

> "I have no expectations [of son] ..I just say that he should stay a Muslim Not like our parents, in our society there is that thing that my son will grow up and be a doctor or an engineer and he will earn money and give it to us" (Usman, 1st, German male· 3)

> "Firstly in that society [Pakistan], there was no [welfare] state involved, not looking after the children, not looking after the elders People had to look after each other. So you were backed into a corner Here it is different, when people get old there is provisions, they can go into a home, or the government can give them money So you are not dependent upon your children" (Mubin, 1st, UK Male. 13).

> "I think sometimes, especially with our people [Asians] they are not aware of these [welfare] services [in Britain] that are available for them and they are not aware of the agencies that can help them and therefore they tend to look toward members of their own family, simply because traditionally that is simply the way it has been done because obviously in India and Pakistan and Bangladesh you don't have a welfare state system, you do not have those agencies around. So I think it is sort of a more traditional barrier that needs to be overcome rather than anything else" (Safa, 2nd, UK female. 12).

---

[9] See Chapter 5.

> "When someone falls ill here [Germany] they go to hospital. There is no need there [for physical care], in the hospital there are staff there for this kind of help" (Faiz, 1ˢᵗ, German male· 12).

Shifts in the way *khidmat* is conceived are also affected by structural constraints located in British or German host societies. 60% of respondents feel that labour market requirements, financial constraints and housing structures make much of the care their children would otherwise provide unviable.

> "That's a big problem here [in Britain], people have their own jobs, they are so busy with their own lives that who has the time to look after their parents? And also the houses here aren't big enough for sons to accommodate their parents, and then old people need downstairs bathrooms and bedrooms, they can't keep going up and down stairs" (Najm, 1ˢᵗ, UK female. 1).

In order to understand the complexities of the negotiations that take place in determining what forms of *khidmat* ought to be provided, to what extent and by whom, the exercise of *khidmat* needs to be contextualised within the care relationships in which it is practised. An in depth analysis of the care relationship, provides a more nuanced understanding of the interdependencies of the care relationship and the role played by *izzat* in its negotiations.

7.3 *Constructions and Negotiations of the Care Relationship*

Many of the care relationships respondents are engaged in are governed by gerontocratic structures, which, by definition are hierarchical. The *izzat* that such structures give rise to provides an ethical framework upon which the care relationship is founded. Respondent articulations of the care relationship are also illustrative of negotiations resulting from the structural context within which such care relationships are constructed.

7.3.1 *The 'Obligation' to Care*

The gerontocratic structures, which give rise to the importance of caring for ones elders, are premised upon notions of obligation/duty (*farz*) and reciprocity Based around *Haqq'Allah* (rights of Allah (SWT)), *Haqq al'abad* (rights of the individual) and *Haqq al-sultanah* (collective rights of individuals or communities) Islam sets out guidelines in terms of the rights one has and the duties one owes[10] The duty to care for ones' elders is reflective of the cultural and religious status attributed to certain

---

[10] See Chapters 2 and 6.

relationships In support of this respondents give primacy to the 'duty' to care for their parents and children before anyone else. The significance of relationships, familial and otherwise, are informed by Islam Thus, Islam influences the care relationship both in terms of the concepts and ethics of *izzat* and *khidmat*, as well as which relationships ought to be given primacy.

> "It is the family life I suppose. It is the way we are bought up We find support within our family. If we cannot then we get a circle, a wider circle of friends and then we get the support there...So I always had the support of the family and that is why I didn't feel the need to go out much and look for support elsewhere" (Hana, 1st, UK female 12).

> "That is what Islam teaches us. First you should look into your own house and if not then you should look outside your own home" (Nabeel, 1st, German male· 5)

> "First you should help people in your own home and then those close by and then those distant" (Shabaz, 1st, German male· 10).

In addition to the Islamic connotations attached to the care relationship, the question of 'who else is going to do it' pervades much of respondent experiences and expectations of care, and influences the role of children in the care of their parents. 58% of respondents state the belief that in old age care should only be received and expected from ones own children. To be cared for in old age by one's children is also cited as one of the reasons for bringing up children. Where children are unable to care, either because of geography, inability or a lack of children, expectation is considered to fall on the shoulders of other relatives or neighbours, but there is no recourse or disappointment should this expectation not be met. 67% of respondents speak of the care given to their own parents by third parties within their family, such as siblings or cousins. In cases where respondents do not have children there is the recognition that, despite expectations of care from other family members, there is a lack o f c ertainty a nd a ccountability. W here care i s n ot p rovided, r espondents feel unable to complain or hold someone to the provision of that care.

> "Because he [brother] did not have a grown son, there was just man and wife, the two of them. There was no one else in his home" (Kamil, 1st, UK male: 11, *in response to why he provided physical care for his brother*)

> "If their children are not doing it...who else is going to do it? Who is going to help?" (Nabeel, 1st, German male 6).

> "I do not do it [care] for my children, I do it for her [marital aunt] Because she does not have children, who will do it for her?" (Azra,

> 1st, UK female. 8, speaking of the long-term care she provides for her marital aunt)

> "Now parents, the very reason they have bought us up, because after they will bear us fruit, when they become old, when they no longer have any life left in their hands and feet. We are responsible for them" (Shabaz, 1st, German male: 12).

> "I don't have any children, who will look after me? I even know such people who put their real mothers in hospital or home saying they can't look after her. I don't even have any children. If someone puts me in a home then maybe I won't even feel hurt because there is no choice, who will do it?" (Deeba, 1st, UK female: 5).

In spite of the emphasis on children caring for their parents, the presence of other family members in Pakistan, who are able to care for a parent, means 67% of respondents feel their own responsibility to be the care provider (at least in physical terms) is, to some extent, alleviated Interestingly, the provision of care by a third party is only acceptable where that third party is a member of the family. Formal welfare provisions are not considered to be acceptable alternatives to the provision of care by a child or relative. In Pakistan the lack of a welfare state, from whence such formal care could be provided, precludes its consideration as a possibility. 51% of respondents highlight that in the absence of those family members who are currently providing care to their elders, they would have to make arrangements to migrate back to Pakistan, or bring their elders to Britain/Germany so that they could be cared for by kin.

> "Actually because two of my brothers are in Pakistan, that is why there is no need for me to go over there To go and accompany them, but if my parents demand it of me then it is necessary If for example two of my brothers were not there then either I should call my parents here or I should go there. One out of two But *Alhumdullilah* (thank Allah (SWT)) to this date no instance such as this has arisen in my home. This is a responsibility" (Faiz, 1st, German male 12)

7.3.2 The Reciprocity of Care

Much (74%) of the care giving respondents highlight is explicitly or implicitly linked to care they are in receipt of, or care they received in the past This connection draws attention to the importance of reciprocity and interdependency in the care relationship. Ahmad (1996) argues that there is a breakdown, in migrant relationships, between care and the principle of reciprocity as those who facilitated

chain migration[11] by providing sponsorship and economic support to others did not have any kinship support available to them. This overlooks the support such migrants received in their own migration, as many families went into debt to fund their relatives' migrations (Shaw, 1994) The majority of respondents speak of a duty to reciprocate care. The framework of reciprocity is seen as an addition to the guidelines derived from gerontocratic structures Respondents attribute the care they give to their parents as a duty to reciprocate care, rather than as a result of the relationship they share No respondent speaks of the reciprocal duty to care for anyone to whom they are not related. Respondents who acknowledge the role of family members, other than their parents in their upbringing, do not express the same degree of reciprocity as they do toward their parents This suggests that, whilst the principle of reciprocity evokes a duty to care across generations where care has been received, this reciprocity is accentuated by the parent/child relationship.

> "Because it was duty (*farz*), not because of the relationship When we were young they [parents] looked after us as well didn't they? That came under their duty (*farz*) and when they become elderly it is our duty (*farz*) to look after them" (Nabeel, 1st, German male: 5)

> "Then it was a burden, not now. Now I say that was my duty (*farz*) because if my mum looked after me, if she became ill then, I cannot pay my mother back for even one night" (Nuzhat, 1st, German female· 11).

The duty to reciprocate is not necessarily considered to mean equivalent care or care of the same material value. In all instances where reciprocity plays a role in the care relationship, it is the act of care, not the form or extent, which fulfils the duty. This said, respondents talk of the care they provide, and that which they expect, in terms of a direct repayment

> "It [practical, emotional and financial care] is expected of me sometimes, because of what they [parents] do, and without them we [respondent and husband] would not be working. So if it wasn't for them, I could not afford child care for 3 children and work full-time. So they help practically, in a lot of ways. And I know that I can rely on them most of the time...I get annoyed sometimes, but I feel obliged to do it because I am the oldest, and because they to look after the kids at the end of the day" (Zahra, 2nd, UK female. 6).

> "I still think my children will look after me, why wouldn't they? After all I have spent so long looking after my children, I am their mother, I gave birth to them and bought them up, and now I am

---

[11] See Ballard (1994).

> looking after their children, why wouldn't they look after me?"
> (Najm, 1ˢᵗ, UK female 2).

> "But w hat I mean i s t hat, i n y our c hildren, t hat t here s hould b e a
> realisation that these are my parents, now they are old, they looked
> after us, bought us up and they now need us to look after them"
> (Mubin, 1ˢᵗ, UK male· 14)

The duty that is thought to arise out of the principle of reciprocity is not confined to a particular relationship This duty can be performed within the context of a network of relationships in which the particular care relationship from whence that duty arose is a part This dynamic is most often cited by respondents in the context of the care relationship between siblings and that of in-laws. Much of the care provided to siblings, in the absence, or following the death of a parent, is seen as a repayment for the care provided by the parent to the carer Similarly, care provided to in-laws is attributed to the care they have given to the spouse.

> "Because they [siblings] are my fathers children and that is their
> right, because I was the eldest brother and as their eldest brother...I
> had seen this thing, my father had never said to me that you do not
> do anything, you take money and spend it, buy clothes and things,
> you eat it away, drink it away, go out all day, my father fulfilled all
> of my needs. What was his right?. [If] my father had been alive he
> would have fulfilled all of my needs I have no doubt about it. That
> is why it was my responsibility [to provide financial, emotional and
> practical care to his siblings]" (Bilal, 1ˢᵗ, German male 7-8).

> "I would look after them [parents-in-law] because all their life, no
> matter what happened, whatever our ups and downs were, at the end
> of the day, my husband was their son, they bought him up" (Dilshad,
> 2ⁿᵈ, UK female: 7)

Perceptions of duty arising from the principle of reciprocity are contingent upon the honesty and integrity with which care is received. In order for respondents to feel the duty to reciprocate care it is felt that the care they receive must have conformed to the principle of *izzat*. German respondents in particular, stress that care ought to have been provided for the sake of care itself, motivated by love and respect rather than out o f selfishness o r g reed. T his i s p articularly i mportant i n t hat i t f undamentally informs the weight attached to the duty to reciprocate. Whilst the principle of reciprocity is itself an ethic of the Pakistani Muslim care relationship, pertaining to notions of equality and fairness[12], it is contingent upon the ethics of *izzat* and intimacy having been fulfilled. The question that remains to be answered is the degree to which the principle of reciprocity is evoked as a result of care relationships

---

[12] See also Titmuss (1970).

motivated by normative assertions of the right thing to do, rather than out of love or trust (Daly and Lewis, 2000). The affect such assertions have on the care relationship are explored further in Chapter 8

> "Allah (SWT) has given you your own hands, your own feet, you should work yourself, feed these children good food so that tomorrow they pay you some attention They will know that our parents worked so hard, he worked hard and saved money for us and kept the house running. But when, in front of them they are finding out that w e a re g etting m oney f rom t he s ocial, w e are g etting o ur clothes from the social then there will be no love on them for you. All there will be is your name that this is our father, but that love and that *izzat* and that respect will no longer remain" (Raees, 1st, German male. 4)

The giving of care itself, is considered to be tantamount to the accumulation of social capital. The duty that arises out of the receipt of care, as a consequence of the principle of reciprocity, is indicative of the link between rights and responsibilities within the care relationship. The emphasis placed on love and mutual respect, as opposed to selfishness and personal gain, suggests that respondent conceptualisations are inclined toward Bourdieu's (1986) notion of social capital rather than Putnam's (1993)[13]. Further, the emphasis placed upon the reciprocity of care as the way individuals ought to behave is in agreement with Etzioni's (1998, 1997, 1995) position of uniting rights and responsibilities

Notwithstanding the degree to which the principle of reciprocity informs it, respondent articulations of the care relationship suggest it is subject to constant negotiations, which take into consideration factors above and beyond the 'duty' to care Further, respondents reveal that *izzat* is no longer primarily accumulated through one's position in gerontocratic structures. Rather, the ethic of *izzat* is itself beginning to take on more reciprocal connotations. Presence and upbringing in Britain and Germany is considered by some respondents to be eroding the authoritarian control of gerontocratic hierarchies, as second and third generation Pakistani heritage Muslims expect to be given *izzat*, in order for it to be returned to anyone, including their elders

> "People of my generation are thinking now that this is respect, that we get respect back I think you know people like my mum, my parents' generation, they have followed this tradition where no questions are asked If my mum said something I would do it. I think what is happening is, possibly what is happening here,

---

[13] See Chapter 3

because there are so many other influences, that we need to prioritise" (Deen, 2nd, UK male· 13)

> "Some people do think that the new generation do not respect their elders, they are disrespectful and they do not listen to their parents It is there and I think it is very important, and I still believe that our youngsters do give respect to their elders There are some differences, when some elders who are very traditional type people, who still believe in very strong family values and hierarchy, and patriarchy and these things do make problems But if you give children respect ..we can't treat them like that, like may be our parents treated us" (Mubin, 1st, UK male 7)

> "In our culture, in Pakistan you are instructed, we were taught and what we learnt is that whoever the elder is in the home, what he said is what we are to do. If they are our parents then as long as we are children we listen to and do what they say, after them if any of our brother's or sister's are older than us we listen to and do what they say If there is an elder in the family we respect them, whatever they say we think yes we are not to answer them back we are to do what they say. Children here I will say pick the other's [siblings shoes] up as well and he will say they are not mine, they are his why doesn't he do it himself?" (Yusra, 1st, German female. 7)

7.3.3 *Negotiating the Care Relationship*

The Islamic or reciprocal duties to care for one's parents do not prescribe the form in which care ought to be provided In differentiating between the duties to care and the negotiation of the way in which these duties are to be performed, the data reveal that to care for ones parents, by giving them *izzat*, and to express this *izzat* through care, are interlinked, yet distinct facets of the care relationship. To give one's parents *izzat*, to respect them, to listen to what they have to say, does not equate to caring for them in, for instance, a physical manner. Rather, where one performs physical care as a consequence of the *izzat* he or she feels for their parents, such care is expressive of that *izzat*.

> "If three of us brothers are sat together, in the evening we will sit with our father, we will ask *aba ji* (dad), how are you? Are you well? Is your health ok? He is old he cannot do anything, but when we ask him, we want to buy this shop what do you think? He will think that even now my children listen to what I say ..They will think that yes I too have some power, I too have some status...If he says no and they go outside and think our father is elderly, this is not appropriate for us then they will do what they were going to do. They will do it themselves, but when they ask him, when they sit next to him and ask him, that look this is the situation, this is what we want to do then he will think I am something, even now I am something" (Yasir, 1st, German male 26)

The practice of care, which is demonstrative of the *izzat* a child has for his or her parents, is subject to respondent negotiations In particular, the data reveals that what is negotiated is the way in which care, *khidmat*, is constructed. Negotiation of the form of care practised within the care relationship is subject to the voice of the elder (Williams, 2001, 2000) The gerontocratic structures upon which care of elders is premised, and the consequent importance attributed to *izzat* by such structures, influence the degree to which the voice of care recipients is heard and listened to. A number of respondents highlight the importance of listening to elders, as a means to determine what care ought to be provided, how and by whom The importance of voice allows for the retention of ownership and power within the care relationship

Through the exercise of voice an individual is an active agent involved in the care process, rather than a passive recipient. In this sense the affects of *izzat* are twofold On the one hand it provides the impetus for kin to care for their elders On the other, it requires due consideration to be given to the voice of the care recipient as their authority is to be respected. This does however, raise important concerns with regard to the voice, and thus power, of a care recipient who does not occupy a higher level in the hierarchy of gerontocracy than the care provider, such as a child The value ascribed to the voice of care recipients by respondents transcends age, gender and host country, although there are considerably less instances (35% to 76%) of this recognition among the German respondents than there is among the British

> "[Formal provision of welfare] would depend on the type of care [needed]. And also what mum is comfortable with and what dad is comfortable with...We would have to talk really, if they are in a position to talk. We can sort that, and I have to talk to the other members of the family as well and say look what needs to be done, core elements such as what things need to be done and who is going to do them" (Zoe, 2nd, UK female· 12).

> "[The care that I provided was] what they [parents] wanted, to send them on Hajj [the Holy Pilgrimage to Mecca] or all the little desires that they had, get them a house in which they could sit in peace, it not be a rental house, there was a big family. Their house to be, in their last moments, theirs" (Idris, 1st, German male 6).

> "It depends on the elders as well though Banu, it depends on what kind of, or what kind of thinking they have, you know. There are some elders they would prefer for their daughters or sons, or for their daughter in-laws, to come and look after them But some come to that stage and they prefer it to be on their own don't they? But I think sometimes even if you want to do something for them, maybe they don't want you to be there or something" (Dilshad, 2nd, UK female. 5).

Notwithstanding the importance of an elder's *izzat*, and in turn his or her voice, the empirical data (98%) reveals a distinct presumption that care from kin is both favourable and preferred. This presumption is based on the degree to which 'care of elders' is embedded within the cultural and Islamic values of the Pakistani Muslim community, a nd t he d egree t o w hich its p rovision i s a r esult o f the s ocial c apital accumulated by the elder Such assumptions are exacerbated by the values taught to children during their upbringing

Much of the expectation that care will be provided in old age stems from the degree to which the duty to care has been embedded in a child's mind throughout the course of his or her upbringing. Care of elders has become an established norm, which ought to be propagated if the boundary of the community is to be perpetuated with a similar i dentity (more inclined toward 'us' rather than 'them')[14] as it is currently thought to possess. There are dissenting voices (47%) within the empirical data that suggest not all forms of *khidmat* are welcomed Yet, the presence of an unspoken norm can preclude the degree to which the care recipient is able to express his or her voice. The presumption that care is wanted can prevent the care recipient from choosing Not only does the social capital accumulated through the practice of care have the potential to exclude those who are unable to provide care or who do not have the requisite care providers, it also has the potential to dis-empower those within a care relationship by reducing the perceived need to listen to their voice.

> "When we have bought them up in such a way, because of that upbringing, I am not saying it of all children, I am just talking about my own children. Because the upbringing we have given them, we expect from that they will do it [care for their elders in old age] But that is not all children, I am just talking about myself. Because of the upbringing that I have given them I believe, I expect that in return for that they will do it because this is in their minds" (Kamil, 1st, UK male: 6).

> "Because what they are getting in the home, because of the environment they have seen up till now that we, when we go over there we give our elders so much *izzat* If an elder is there we will sit on the floor If we teach children this then I expect that as time goes by they will give us *izzat* as well and be our support" (Nabeel, 1st, German male· 6).

> "It is all about the upbringing. If the parents are Muslim, if you are born into a Muslim household, you are being cared for in the way that Islam requires, not from their own part, but what Islam requires,

---

[14] See Chapters 2 and 6

if you are being bought up in that way then in their old age you will keep your parents with you" (Yasir, 1st, German male: 30)

"But p ersonally I mean s ome o f their c ases w here I h ave a ctually spoke to people what they are saying is, what ever it [care] is they have t o l earn t o c ope w ith it... it is v ery v ery d ifficult, v ery v ery extremely difficult to, even if you are not happy with the care it is very very difficult to get out of it Because you have got a lot of emotional blackmail, emotional things going on. Every move that you are going to make is going to have some sort of an effect on your environment On your son, your daughter in law, your extended family, community, the Muslim culture everything you know. I think, I think in most cases there is a lot of pretend, we say things a lot but do very little" (Deen, 2nd, UK male. 11).

Negotiations of the care relationship are also subject to the ability of the carer The degree to which respondents are willing, or able, to participate in care relationships as carers is conditioned by a number of factors. The most frequent allowance made for an individual's lack of participation in the care relationship is his or her participation in the paid labour market. Negotiations of the care relationship are also influenced by Pakistani cultural and religious issues, as well as other practicalities, such as time, space, and geography.

"I mean up until two years ago before I started work I used to take my mother in law every where...Because she did not have the language skill at all...I only take her out now once a week when I take her to the group...But I see her a lot less and the reason is that I am working. But she has got others that she can rely on, which puts my mind at rest" (Hana, 1st, UK female. 11).

"As I mentioned to you when I was younger I never had much time to spend with my father, I was so busy When he was dying I was working for the government at that time I was planning on visiting another city at that time, I came home for three days, I was so busy at that time, before his death. I never had much time to spend with him, I was so busy, but I understood him very well from my youth" (Mubin, 1st, UK male: 9)

"I didn't get the opportunity to look after anyone in Pakistan. Because I worked, when I got married I worked then as well" (Taj, 1st, German female: 8)

"I have helped someone bodily yes I have. Not here, I have done it over there. We had a neighbour, he was ill, over there you know that nobody can pick you up and take you, his wife was weak herself and his c hildren were young And then our culture [and religion] says that a father cannot go with his daughter. I would take him to the toilet, I would bring him back from the toilet, I would bathe him. I have done things like that" (Nabeel, 1st, German male: 5).

> "I do not think it is a sense of duty, I think it is more about practicalities, that who is closer to my mother to help her with her day to day chores and maybe who is best equipped to deal with another problem she is facing. There are more the practical things that come into focus first rather than you know a sense of duty to do something" (Safa, 2nd, UK female· 12)

Whilst the data suggests that the role of the carer is negotiable, such negotiations only take place in light of structural constraints. Given the gerontocratic hierarchy which structure much of the care relationship, and the social capital of reciprocity, where there are no external constraints upon the carer he or she is expected to provide care to the full extent it is required The care relationship, whilst subject to negotiation, is weighted in favour of the care recipient and the voice of the carer is rarely heard, or listened to. In such instances respondents provide examples where the duty to care supersedes the ability of the carer to provide it Further, given the male breadwinner model which pervades much of respondent experiences of care, men are much more likely to be able to negotiate their role in the care relationship through their employment in the labour market. The voice of women carers, on the other hand, is less likely to be heard, as their role is perceived to be within the home, and as such, they are not conceived of as having much structural constraint on their ability to participate in the care relationship. Of the female respondents that did work, their participation in the paid labour market is seen as a structural constraint on their role as carer. Where female respondents are working, their paid employment is considered a justifiable structural constraint on their ability to care.

> "I feel like running away from the house, I am fed up, I have no freedom...you escape for an hour from the house and then you have to go straight back there, if this hand tires you start with this one Cook, clean, this and that, then sat again. There is no outing, no going out, no nothing Now these people [day care centre] are going to the sea side, they said to me come with us, but why am I not going? Because of *masi* [marital aunt[15]].. I want to go but I have this burden [of care] what can I do? I am very tired of it, truthfully. Because I feel alone myself because I cannot go out I can just cook food in the home and sit on the sofa like this drink tea and chat This is not life is it?" (Azra, 1st, UK female: 8).

> "In our [culture] it is that the women.. she has to care for everyone else, nobody has to care for her. So she has to look after her husband, she also has to look after her children, she has to do the families [*khidmat*] as well so she feels happy simply in the fact that the family is happy with me. Even if she has to kill herself to make them happy That will make them appreciate her, that she is very

---

[15] Although masi can be translated to mean mother's sister, Azra, refers to her husband's aunt as masi.

good, she will become happy in just that" (Yusra, 1st, German
female. 25).

7.4 'We Look After Our Own...Don't We?'

The restrictions on the degree to which the care relationship can be negotiated and
the degree to which the carer can express his or her voice are derived to a large
extent from the pressures bought to bear by the Pakistani Muslim community[16]
Whilst the care relationship is thought to be grounded in Islamic and cultural norms
and values, in the context of British and German host societies it takes on mythical
connotations derived from its position as a significant marker of difference between
'us' and 'them'[17] (Cohen, 1985). As such a stark means of differentiation, care of
elders by kin, becomes a definitive emblem of what it means to be a Pakistani
Muslim in Britain or Germany

7.4.1 *The Symbolic Act of Care*

Through their articulations of the care relationship it is evident that respondents are
in the process of re-negotiating their identities as a result of contextual pressures
bought to bear through their residence in Britain or Germany The presumption that
British and German host societies do not comprise the norm of caring for ones elders
influences the way in which respondents bring up their own children, and how they
themselves behave as Pakistani Muslim parents. Respondents often state where
parents do not practice Islam correctly nor will the children. This results in a lack of
izzat and respect for their elders, and thus, a lack of care. Further, as a form of ritual
that requires *izzat*, obedience and the exercise of *purdah*, care of elders also becomes
honorific of the values which distinguish 'us' from 'them'.

79% of respondents cite their own provision of care as being a yardstick by which
their children will measure the care that they give. Respondents highlight that, as
parents, they need to be more in tune with, and performative of, cultural and Islamic
practices, especially in relation to care This is especially so as, growing up in British
or German society, their children are not going to witness, and therefore learn, the
normative value of caring for one's elders if they do not see it from their parents.

> "Actually, what it is, is theory is not enough...when we say alcohol
> is a very bad thing the children reply then why does my father drink?
> So obviously we too have the advantage that because of the children
> we have to control our own personal life a lot We cannot lie, nor

---

[16] See Chapter 8.
[17] See Chapters 2 and 6.

can we con anyone, nor can we steal, nor can we mislead anyone, nor can we behave with someone in a rude (*baukhlaqi*) way, nor will we be disrespectful (*gusthakh*) to anyone, nor will we swear at anyone" (Latif, 1ˢᵗ, German male. 6)

"Interviewer· have you never thought of a nursing home [for marital aunt for whom respondent provides long term physical care]?
No
Interviewer. why not?
Because I am afraid of Allah Talah[18], because the children nowadays they are selfish as well, they will say that ok, Ma did this we will do the same with Ma as well. You do not know what the future will be like. That is why" (Azra, 1ˢᵗ, UK female. 5)

"He [son] knows that I send money home. I have told him as well that I came here [to Germany] for this purpose I did not come here to rest. He knows I send money home, I send money to my mother, to my father, sometimes to others If I can tell him I do I feel my sister has a greater right on me It is likely that all of these things may one day be of use to him" (Usman, 1ˢᵗ, German male. 9).

Notwithstanding the positive connotations attached to care, 42% of respondents express the desire that they die without getting to the stage where they need to rely on anyone, including their children. This is in part linked to the fear that they will not be cared for by their children, or will be cared for in a manner that is not in tune with the principles of *izzat*. In such circumstances, to be cared for without *izzat* is worse than not to be cared for at all. The desire to remain independent also stems from changing perspectives on the way in which the care relationship is, and ought to be, structured In spite of community pressures to look after ones elders, a number of respondents b elieve that their children w ill not, o r w ill b e u nable t o l ook a fter them in their old age. The desire to be independent also speaks to a negative conception of the care relationship, contrary to Afshar *et al* 's (2001) findings that the ageing experience of migrants is comparatively positive. In contradiction to the positive connotations attached to the principle of care, this voice within the data suggests that the reluctance to become a care recipient after having been 'independent' is because it is perceived to be a comparatively dis-empowered and weak position

"I don't want them [children] to stay on my head. I want to be a free person" (Mubin, 1ˢᵗ, UK male: 14).

"I hope that doesn't happen to me [to have to be cared for]. It would be nice if they [children] did, but I wouldn't expect them to.

---

[18] As caring for ones' elders is considered an Islamic obligation, failure to do so is considered to elicit divine punishment

> Because at that point you do become a burden and children become,
> they come to resent it don't they? And resentment, you never really
> want resentment from your children Because resentment equals
> burden doesn't it" (Zahra, 2ⁿᵈ, UK female. 10).

> "Look, if a mother is living in a £50,000 house and decides to sell it,
> puts that £50,000 into a house which her son gets a £50,000
> mortgage out on and so she gets a £100,000 house then he gets
> married and the daughter in law will treat it as her house. I mean it
> is obvious that she would, her husband is paying the mortgage, and
> so she will tell her mother-in-law won't she. Why should I do that
> just so I can be in a better house, I am happy where I am" (Najm, 1ˢᵗ,
> UK female. 2).

7.4.2 *Care: A Principle of Community*

The care relationship not only forms a marker of distinction between 'us' and
'them', but it also provides a means whereby the Pakistani Muslim community can
retain a degree of unity, and maintain the integrity of 'us', and therefore of
community boundaries. It is evident from the empirical data that the care relationship
itself forms an underlying subtext to the social relations of members in the Pakistani
Muslim community. 72% of respondents speak of providing care for members of
the, geographically proximate, Pakistani Muslim community in emotional, practical
and physical terms, and to the wider Muslim *Umm'ah* in financial terms. Such care
is not defined in terms of *khidmat*. The care of members in the community is
considered more in terms of mutual support than *khidmat* Respondents that have
participated in care with other members of the community attribute this provision to
the matter of sustenance. Without looking after one another the community will be
unable to survive.

> "Mostly, I think I rely on people as well. I think that in Asian
> community we rely on each other and we are each other's
> councillors. I call, I call my sister in laws my councillors .And this
> is how we sort of survive in this country" (Hana, 1ˢᵗ, UK female: 11)

> "No one person can live on their own can they? Obviously by
> helping one another, that is when a healthy society is created"
> (Najm, 1ˢᵗ, UK female· 12)

Respondents in Germany speak of caring for members of the community much more
so than their British counterparts (77% to 53%). Such care is expressly related to the
lack of extended family members to whom people are able to turn in their time of
need. A study conducted by Burholt *et al* (2000) found that support networks in
Bangladeshi families were based on a number of factors such as marriage, fertility
patterns, migration history, extended family and community Different individuals

could call upon different networks of support depending on availability, levels of interaction with family, friends and neighbours and level of involvement in religious and community groups. Similarly British respondents talk of giving and receiving care from members of the community during early years of migration German respondents on the other hand talk of a strong and sustained practice of emotional and practical care with other members of the community.

> "There are many instances of this [practical care], there will be about 2 a week, but because I have never boasted about this, I do it as a good deed and so I never remember it There are a great many people [I have helped], I have been here for the last 20 years and there are a great many people" (Shabaz, 1st, German male: 10).

> "Obviously small problems always arise and I often go to peoples homes. I have read thousands of wedding sermons (*nikah*). I will have read thousands of funerals as well (laugh). So I often go to peoples' homes. Whenever such problems arise I do go.. They are just small problems but sometimes you need the help of an outsider and that is when I go and try to help" (Faiz, 1st, German male: 12)

> "It is a foreign land, we are in a foreign land. In foreign lands it is us that are one another's brothers and sisters" (Wafa, 1st, German female· 1).

> "Brother's and sister's? Here [Germany], we have no one here We have one support, we are Muslim, we will go to that Muslim's house, sit, go there, keep good relations with him [other members of the community] and sit together" (Tahir, 1st, German male· 3).

> "Obviously we did not have any close relatives living near us to come and look after us [during early years of migration], so when she [mother] went into hospital and my father was working that meant that I was the eldest in the house, I was 7 with 3 other brother's and sister's in the house and my youngest sister was only 3 at that time. So I remember one of my mum's friends coming over to cook a curry for us" (Safa, 2nd, UK female: 9).

One form of care exercised within the wider community follows the death of someone. There is a generational difference between first and second generation British respondents with regard to community cohesion and emotional support following the death of a member of the community. A common point of reference and perceived show of solidarity, among first generation respondents in both Britain and Germany is the tradition of going to the family house of someone who has died or is seriously ill to offer prayer, condolences and help. There is a reluctance amongst second generation respondents to continue this ritual of visiting the home of a community member simply because he or she is a Pakistani and/or Muslim. Second generation respondents in Britain illustrate a trend among future generations

to place the emphasis more on the nuclear and extended family, rather than community. Care, which is provided to members of the community by this group, is given on the basis of a first hand relationship between the community member and the respondent. This suggests a more particularist concept of 'my' community, which is not simply based on the shared norms and values of Pakistani culture and Islam that characterise definitions of 'our' community This dissenting voice among second generation respondents, suggests that it is necessary for people of 'my' community to have some sort of individual affiliation with one another

> "Here [in Germany] there is the tradition that if Allah (SWT) forbid anyone becomes ill in the home and we find out then everyone will go and visit him to pray for him to get better, this is a very good tradition, whether his association is with any faction [of Islam]" (Anis, 1st, German male. 19).

> "The girl whose mother died I mean we know the family quite well. So at least when you go there you generally talk about it But sometimes I g o into these you know post-death gatherings (*afsos*), and I don't even know who the person is who has died So you don't look at any body and you just give commiseration's to the person sat next to you. I have no idea who has died or anything and a lot of people do that. But I think traditionally it is good I'm mean I am not knocking that, but they shouldn't, you should know who you are giving condolences (*afsos*) to" (Deen, 2nd, UK male: 8).

7.4.3 *The Right to Care*

Another factor which pervades negotiations of the care relationship is the perception amongst 42% of respondents, that caring for ones elders is not only a duty, but a right. Respondents conceptualise rights in a two-dimensional way. On the one hand a right is seen as something which ought to be fulfilled, on the other, it is seen as the right to fulfil a duty. The right to care is not only significant of an individual's entitlement to a particular provision but also denotes the right to perform a religious duty and to gain the spiritual benefits such acts accrue The rights of parents are thought by respondents to arise out of three factors, their status as the parent, their fulfilment of the child's rights during his/her upbringing and the rights bestowed upon them as parents by Allah (SWT).

> "It is a parents right (*haq*) that they be given respect, they be given strength (*thaqviyath*)" (Bilal, 1st, German male: 4)

> "I think it is my, as a Muslim it is my right, because it is one of, the *Qur'an*, Allah (SWT) says that the eldest son should look after his parents and perform the last rites of their deaths" (Hana, 1st, UK female: 13).

> "It is my right, it is absolutely my right (*haq*)   And it is their [childrens] duty (*farz*). I gained the right (*haq*) because I am their mother. Just like when they were growing up, I bought them into this world and it was their right (*haq*) to be looked after by me, it is my right (*haq*) to be looked after by them when I get older" (Najm, 1st, UK female 3).

Children are also considered to have a right to care for their parents   In this sense the Islamic influence on the care relationship is evident   Care is not only seen as a duty, but is also seen as a good deed   The spiritual gains from the act of care are, in and of themselves, a spur to fulfil the duty of care   This reasoning is applied by the majority of first generation respondents in Britain and Germany   Furthermore, the ability of the carer to provide care is viewed as a blessing from Allah (SWT)   Whilst recognising this link between duty and relationship, second generation respondents in Britain, cite the actual relationship as the reason they provide care rather than the Islamic duty to care, which that relationship invokes   This suggests that, notwithstanding the emphasis placed on Islamic identities, negotiations of the care relationship are as much a result of the relationship itself, as the structural constraints to which they are subject.

> "It is in the spirit of Islam that they [children] do their parents *khidmat*, look after them. Islam gives us the guidance/command (*thalqueen*), not only that but it forces us that children, that you should care for your parents, focus your attention onto them" (Yasir, 1st, German male 28).

> "According to the spirit of Islam as well bestowing favours on parents is a child's right (*haq*). And secondly they bought us up, and they indebted us and we had to repay that. So from the spirit of the Quran as well, from the view that it's a child's right (*haq*) to bestow favours on parents as well, because they say that heaven is under your mother's feet so i f y ou d o y our m other a nd father's *khidmat* you will get your reward for that. So from that spirit and more so from that spirit that they are our mother and father and if we look after them Allah (SWT) will reward as for that" (Kamil, 1st, UK male: 8-9).

> "Children are much closer to their parents, it is their right (*haq*). That is the system Allah Talah has created, he has given them that relationship" (Shabaz, 1st, German male. 12).

> "Because I have hope that Allah T alah is pleased by this and the money [financial care to family and *Umm'ah*] that we are giving *Inshallah* (Allah (SWT) willing) will be collected on judgement day and will face us in the form of good deeds (*naiki*) *Inshallah* ..And that is why we try to deposit something in the 'next' account" (Faiz, 1st, German male: 11)

"I thank Allah (SWT) that I was that able that I helped someone" (Najm, 1st, UK female. 13).

"The biggest thing was that Allah Talah made me capable enough, I was in a position here that I could meet that responsibility and this is, I mean it was very important to me in terms of religion" (Bilal, 1st, German male: 7-8)

"I do not think, we, when we are thinking of helping each other I do not think religion really plays a part in that It is more a natural feeling and wanting to be able to do it rather than you know thinking well, you know, thinking that in Islam it says that we must you know offer care and support to our family members or our parents I think it is more of a personal thing rather than a religious, rather than having more of a religious element to it" (Safa, 2nd, UK female: 12)

7.5 Conclusion: Care of Elders, Structural Imposition or Exercise of Agency?

Izzat forms an essential part of the ethical framework against which the ideal Pakistani Muslim care relationship in British and Germany is negotiated. It forms the basis for *khidmat* and is itself expressed through it. It also supplements and underpins the seven ethics of care identified by Williams (2000)[19] All four categories of *khidmat* (financial, emotional, physical and practical), remain gendered The remit of female respondents is extending as respondent expectations suggest that, contrary to the male breadwinner model, financial care is increasingly seen to be possible from women and men, as upbringing and residency in Britain and Germany make female employment in the formal labour market a possibility This said, the nuances of *khidmat*, and the importance attached to receiving financial care from ones children, is changing, in the face of respondent migration itself, and residency in countries such as Britain and Germany where alternative provisions such as pensions are available. Respondent migration is particularly influential on the care relationship as respondents feel the degree and form of care they gave to their own elders, and thus their accumulated social capital, affects the degree and form of care they can expect from their children.

Notwithstanding the ethics upon which the care relationship is grounded, there remains an unequal power distribution between carer and cared for The importance of *izzat*, duty, and gerontocratic structures are evident in the negotiation of the care relationship as the voice of the elder is heeded, both as a form of care itself, and as instrumental in the definition and exercise of care. However, the voice of the carer, especially female carers, does not receive the same degree of importance as aside

---

[19] See Chapter 3

from structural considerations, notions of Islamic, cultural and reciprocal duty are given primacy over individual choice and ability. There are also concerns that the voice of care recipients not higher in gerontocratic structures, such as children will not be given due consideration.

Restraints on the control, power and voice of both carer and, to a lesser degree care recipient, are further resultant from the symbolic value of the care relationship to the Pakistani Muslim identity of the community and the individual As a symbol that enables, and is considered itself, to, differentiate between 'us' and 'them', familial care of elders forms a compelling commitment (Etzioni 1998, 1997, 1995), which has the potential to supersede the voice of those within the care relationship. Such normative constraints upon care raise questions as to the integrity of the care relationship itself, and the degree to which those who do, or do not participate in it, are included or excluded from the Pakistani Muslim community. The potential of this exclusion is discussed further in the next chapter (8).

Chapter 8

Redefining Moral Voices: The Case of Intergenerational Care

8.1 *Introduction*

Through the course of daily life, individuals are influenced by, and can take, numerous moral positions. This chapter explores the effects different moral pulls have on individual negotiations within the care relationship and on thresholds of inclusion/exclusion. Respondents articulate a number of moral pulls through the moral voices of the self, and/or those of the community (Etzioni, 1998, 1997, 1995) Section 8.2 explores the ways in which respondents understand and engage with these moral voices of self and community. Moral voices of the self give expression to those values and beliefs a respondent holds to be true, and purports to hold as 'mine'. Moral voices of the community, on the other hand, reflect the values held by wider members of the Pakistani Muslim community, and, upon which community boundaries are thought to be based Articulated through overt expressions of approval/disapproval, and/or, through projected frames o f reference s uch as 'what will people think?', moral voices of the community are thought to represent the expectations that individuals will conform to the norms and values which embody the identities of the community.

The moral voices of the Pakistani Muslim community are thought to be built around its Islamic and cultural values. As such these voices gain authority through the over-arching legitimacy of a supreme being, Allah (SWT), and the wisdom that is thought to come from traditions, re-invested with mythical significance. Section 8.3 explores the role of moral voices of the community in ensuring the continuity of the community, and its norms and values, through attempted authoritative regulation of individual behaviour. This continuity is generated by maintaining perceived distinctions of the sacred and the profane (Durkheim, 2002) By attempting to ensure individual behaviour continues to remain within the domain of all that is considered sacred, moral voices of the community are able to perpetuate the exercise of norms and values that play an integral role in the construction, maintenance and perpetuation of 'Pakistani' and 'Muslim' community boundaries

Whilst the moral voices of the community may gain their legitimacy from their Islamic and cultural roots, their authority is derived from the use of control mechanisms, specifically, through the use of *izzat* Section 8 4 explores the role of

social bonds in securing individual conformity in the context of *izzat*. As a multi-level concept, *izzat* measures the public 'honour' of the individual, his or her family, and the community at large. Moral voices of the community utilise the threat of exclusion through *ba-yzzati* (the loss of *izzat*) As the *izzat* of an individual is also linked to that of his or her kinship networks, the family can become the mechanism through which conformity is ensured, as families try to make sure their *izzat* is maintained, or is not lost, through the actions of individual members.

The empirical data reveal that the mechanisms whereby an individual or family's *izzat* is lost or diminished take the form of 'gossip', and/or, 'talk'. An individual's actions cause occasion for gossip where he or she is deemed to have behaved in contravention to the moral voices of the community, and therefore the norms and values upon which that community is based. Section 8 5 explores the implicit, and at times explicit, relationship between community, gossip and the perceived 'bad' or 'immoral' character of the individual, and/or, family concerned. In particular, this section focuses upon individual participation within the care relationship and the implications this has for his or her standing, and therefore inclusion, into the Pakistani Muslim community (Colley and Hodkinson, 2001, Vobruba, 2000)

'Failure' to care for one's elders causes the loss of a child's *izzat*, who is deemed to be bad, and the loss of parents' *izzat* who, as well as being pitied for having such children, are also thought to have caused the breakdown of the care relationship by not adequately grounding Pakistani and Islamic norms and values in their children Equally, an individual's participation in the care relationship, to the approval of community moral voices, is met with an increase in his, her and/or their family's, *izzat*, as their conformity to the norms and values of the community are thought to signify their 'good' and 'moral' character.

Normative assertions of community moral voices as to the 'good' and 'moral' way to behave are not, however, "beyond debate and dispute" (Etzioni, 1995.24) Throughout the data, respondents reveal disagreement and discord between moral voices of the self and those of the community. In Section 8.6 the chapter provides empirical accounts of respondent negotiations with moral voices of the community These negotiations relate to four main considerations The first is the authority of community moral voices to intervene at micro-level decision making The second is the authority of those expressing and enforcing these voices. The third is the extent to which these voices are representative of the 'moral', and 'good' way to behave,

and the fourth is the consideration of alternative moral positions, which may not negate the moral standing of community voices, but are considered, in some instances, to supersede them. The degree to which respondents are able, or willing, to negotiate with the moral voices of the community is directly related to alternative resources available to them.

In conclusion, Section 8 7 suggests that the negotiations that take place between individual moral voices and those of the community are illustrative of fluid thresholds of exclusion. Such fluidity demonstrates the importance of recognising individual thresholds of exclusion, constructed in light of an individual's own moral positioning, and alternative resources that he or she has available to them, and that enable, or facilitate participation into the community By considering, and giving recognition to an individual's threshold of inclusion/exclusion, labels of 'excluded' are not imposed upon the individual, rather his or her agency, within the processes that make up social reality are given due consideration.

8.2 *Articulations of Morality and its Voices*

The empirical data are saturated with a multiplicity of moral values and guidelines that structure, influence, and are themselves, expressed through, the exercise of individual agency. Within the empirical data it is evident that many of these moralities are given voice through two conduits: the self and the community These voices are highlighted as influencing, or attempting to influence, individual actions and behaviour on the basis of moral judgements or thresholds, set by the self, or the community.

8.2.1 *Moral Voices of the Self*

Moral voices of the self are articulated by 70% of respondents through expression of their own values. Respondents express their moral voices in terms of what they believe ought to be done when providing moral justification for action that has been taken, or when explaining a course of action that may be taken in the future Moral voices of the self are applied, by respondents, to their own actions, or to actions of others. As voices which individuals interact with during the course of their daily lives, moral voices of the self give expression to the values that an individual holds most dear, because they are what he or she believes to be 'right', 'good' and 'moral'. As such, moral voices of the self are utilised by individuals to determine what the 'right' thing to do is, in any given situation, according to one's own standards of behaviour

> "To be a person of high moral values if you will, I think you have got to look at. within If you set yourself high standards in what ever you do then I think as long as you, you know, be true to yourself, I think that's important" (Beena, 2nd, UK female 4)

> "If you go out on the right path, and do the right things, then it does not matter what other people are saying" (Zahra, 2nd, UK female. 3).

> "We [husband a nd w ife] go a nd meet w ith o ur P akistani families and every house has its own environment doesn't it? We try to ensure that environment has minimum effect upon us and our own environment, a religious environment, that has as much influence as possible" (Faiz, 1st, German male. 4).

Amongst 58% of the respondents the authenticity and moral authority of their own voices are located in, and derived from, the roles they occupy in a social context, different facets of their identities and their cultural (Pakistani and/or British or German), and, Islamic values Moral voices of the self are given a forum, and, are informed, by an individual's role as, for instance, a parent or as a son or daughter By articulating their own morality in this way, respondents illustrate the internalisation o f m oral p ositions t hey a ssociate w ith, a nd feel a re appropriate for roles such as parent hood.

> "We [husband and wife] didn't want to move out, we wanted to live together [with in laws] like a *proper* family should" (Dilshad, 2nd, UK female· 6, *emphasis added*).

> "A man sees that my mother is this, my father is that, my sister is this, these thoughts develop into a person automatically that I should help my sister, mother or brother" (Usman, 1st, German male: 8).

With reference to the care relationship, the multiplicity of individual identities and social roles give rise, in the empirical data, to instances where alternative moral positions are applicable to a particular scenario or decision. In such instances respondents engage in implicit, and at times explicit, negotiations[1]. These negotiations are influenced by numerous considerations, which in themselves, are not always 'moral' in character As suggested in Chapter 7, the provision of care may be determined as much by the 'moral' considerations of religious etiquette as the 'practical' considerations of who is best placed to provide that care.

---

[1] See Chapter 3

Much of the negotiations that respondents speak of when articulating their own moral voices are also reflective of renegotiations and reconstructions of their identities in particular contexts. As suggested in Chapter 2, the 'I' that is projected to the world at any one moment in time, whilst an accurate reflection of particular dimensions of an individual's identities, does not reflect the individual in his or her entirety (Taylor, 1998). Parallels can be drawn between these negotiations and those that take place between an individual's moral voices, especially where these voices are located in, and justified through, individual social roles Negotiations of an individual's moral voices of the self are illustrative of different priorities and different content/value judgements (Breakwell, 1987) made about particular moral positions at any given time.

> "For somebody like me, I mean, I am in that position, you are trapped between, where you have your own children and you have your own parents. And sometimes the priority goes to your children, my children have the priority for me at the moment because they are at this stage, this is happening every day" (Deen, 2nd, UK male 13).

> "When she [daughter] was about 7 or 8 years old ..I used to focus a lot of attention towards the religion [because this is a fathers role], made her read quite a lot of books as well . Now since I have been separated...my focus on her has lessened a lot" (Shabaz, 1st, German male: 3)

> "Our mother did not have enough time that she give her children...Sit with him, look at his school work, ready him for school, her routine is she gets up in the morning and makes *roti* (chapattis) for 10 other people, gives it to the child as well, not looking to see if he has eaten it or not. She was thought worthy of *izzat* because she dedicated a lot of time to the family (Laugh), the joint family...Not on purpose but she thought in the house my responsibilities are these" (Yusra, 1st, German female: 20)

Negotiations of respondent moral voices are further informed by what is perceived to be the comprehensive applicability of Islamic beliefs. Whilst particular moral positions are accorded varying degrees of applicability in any given situation, some respondents speak about over arching frameworks of moralities in which their voices are grounded For 29 respondents this framework is provided by, and located in Islam and a respondent's 'Muslim' identities. Articulation of Islam as this central frame of reference is illustrated, by respondents, through its use as a set of guiding principles that inform the construction and negotiation of alternative, and additional identities and personas. Conflicts between different moral voices of the self, are resolved, by 32 respondents, through reference to Islamic principles and guidelines

The degree to which the moral voices of the self are located in Islamic belief, differ between the British and German samples

The moral voices of 67% of German respondents, especially men (81% to 55%), are focused toward an overt attempt to speak to morality driven by Islamic beliefs. This is particularly evident when respondents speak of the upbringing they are giving to their children Islam is not perceived by respondents to be an external set of values which structure individual agency. Rather, it is seen as morality which, when internalised through the acceptance of the Islamic faith, becomes integral to an individual's own belief systems. These respondents suggest that to occupy the 'good' and 'moral' position with respect to any social role one simply has to become a 'good Muslim'. As a way of life Islam is considered to provide signposts as to what it is to be of 'good moral standing'. These signposts are considered applicable to any and all scenarios and social roles In this sense, amongst many of the German sample, individual morality is mediated through Islam, with reference to the moral authority of a supreme being.

> "What ever area of life/profession (*shoba*) we are in ...Islam gives us the guidance to stay within those bounds, that Islam has given" (Faiz, 1st, German male: 2).

> "My only expectation is that they [children] follow the path of Islam. And all the things that Islam says, then, in that, lots of things come into that don't they? So our expectations are very big from them. So then, just that they become good Muslims" (Taj, 1st, German female· 4)

> "If every person started to meet the duties and obligations apportioned to him [by Islam] then every other person would receive his or her rights. But the misfortune is that we focus on our rights and abstain from our duties" (Wahid, 1st, German male 34).

Whilst there can be seen a focus among the British sample, across gender and age cohorts[2], to develop moral voices of the self orientated toward Islam, there is also greater acceptance that this Islamic morality is negotiated, and conditioned, by other facets of an individual's life. In this sense the morality derived from Islamic prescriptions runs parallel to, and in conjunction with, but does not necessarily guide or supercede, that which is grounded in the alternative identities and roles of an individual Thus, in contrast to the German sample, the moral voices of British

---

[2] 6 women (4 first generation, 2 second generation) and 7 men (3 first generation, 4 second generation).

respondents see Islamic morality mediated through that of the individual.

> "Because of, for example, if I have gone into a council meeting and it is time for *namaaz* then I cannot pray *namaaz* can I? But if I am home then I will try my best, my son is like that as well" (Kamil, 1st, UK male. 4).

> "They [children] are so careless that when I tell them they say mum you mind your own business we will do our own [Islamic practice]. I say Allah Talah gets angry, they say it does not matter, we will do it, we are not at that age yet. That is the truth. But I try to do what I can myself, one it is my age now" (Azra, 1st, UK female 1).

> "Obviously being a Muslim, Islam is a way of life, so you know you are encouraged not to smoke, you are encouraged not to drink, you are encouraged not to enter into extra marital affairs before you are married and those are the sort of principles that I would want to bring my children up on [But] obviously I do not pray 5 times a day, I wouldn't say I am a fully practising Muslim, but I do keep all of my fasts and I pray as regularly as I can and I would expect my children to do the same" (Safa, 2nd, UK female 7)

8.2.2 *Moral Voices of the Community*

In addition to moral voices of the self, respondents speak about the moral voices of the community, which form the context of, and condition, individual agency Moral voices of the community are articulated in two different ways, those that are overtly expressed by the community itself (84%), and, those that are projected onto the community by respondents (23%) No one person in the community is the designated proponent, owner, or inventor of community moral voices. These voices are the expression of those values that are considered, by respondents, to be sacred to the community and definitive of its boundaries.

It is as representatives of the sacred that these voices are considered to be moral. The values of a community, of which these voices are representative, are conveyed to successive generations through the practice of community symbols such as rituals and traditions during the course of daily social interactions[3]. Respondents illustrate that these voices represent the morality of the community through articulations of thresholds that determine what it means to be 'good', and/or 'bad'. These thresholds are set in accordance to conformity with the normative symbols of community boundaries. As individuals exercise the symbols representative of the norms and values upon which the boundaries of the community are constructed, the community, through expression of moral voices, conveys its approval at what is perceived to be

---

[3] See Section 8 3.

their 'good' behaviour. Much more prevalent within the empirical data are examples of instances where moral voices express disapproval at the apparent 'bad' character of those individuals who do not exercise, or conform to, such symbols Such overt expressions of the community's moral voices are illustrated by respondents through narratives of community reactions to their own behaviour or that of others.

> "Many people that do not agree with us [respondent and husband] on this, they say 'what is that meant to mean, they [children] will just learn the language [Urdu]? It is important to teach them the *Qur'an'ai 'Pak'*" (Yusra, 1st, German female: 3).

> "I get quite a lot of abuse from the community that I am a working mum" (Zahra, 2nd, UK female. 2)

> "[Some people believe she does not have a right to *zikaath*] They say the estate that you have put in that man's name .when you have thought of him as a son, then he has thought of you as a mother then why does he not give you money?...You should explain to him that this is not a good thing...it is that when she has a right somewhere else and [in taking *zikaath*] she is eating the right of someone else, she should get it there. A fourth man says that yes this is actually right, she should get her own right, she shouldn't be eating that of someone else" (Raees, 1st, German male· 16; *speaking of a situation where a woman he knows gave her estate to an adopted son, who now does not look after her*)

> "Some people say that women should not go to cemeteries, this is forbidden in our religion" (Najm, 1st, UK female. 7).

Through their representation of Islamic and Pakistani cultural norms and values community moral voices come to speak for all that 'we' do, and significantly, ought to continue to do Much of the behaviour that moral voices of the community seek to regulate relates to the appropriate way to behave given an individual's social roles and the relationship of this role to Islamic and cultural norms and values. Moral voices of the community expect individuals to behave in accordance to the norms and values associated with particular social relations, such as parenthood and the way respondents should behave toward other individuals, given the relationship they share This is often contextualised by, and takes place in the performance of rituals and other such symbols (Cohen, 1985)[4], and is especially evident in the context of care. As shown in Chapter 7, the ritual of caring for ones elders has come to symbolise Pakistani Muslim identities in diaspora. Moral voices of the community seek to regulate individuals through their relationships of parent/child, according them the status of carer or care recipient. With these statuses come corresponding

---

[4] See Chapter 2.

rights and responsibilities. The attribution of carer, and/or care recipient status is dependent, to a large degree, upon what stage of the life course an individual is at.

> "*We* respect each other a lot ..if someone in the neighbourhood has passed by me, an uncle (*chacha*) or someone and I have referred to him using his name ..then the person next to me will say 'oi what are you doing? Have your parents not explained anything to you?'.. In *our* environment there is a lot of respect" (Raees, 1st, German male 5, *emphasis added*).

> "I only have one brother, and he is married for him to get his own house that it would be uproar, because people in the community would be saying oh she [mother] has only got one son, and why is he moving out of the house?" (Zahra, 2nd, UK female 6).

> "The environment [in Pakistan], from the Mosque, the *Molana* [Islamic teacher] would say give your mother and father *izzat*, or respect them, look after them, heaven is below your mother's feet" (Idris, 1st, German male. 9)

In addition to the overtly articulated accounts of community moral voices, 23% of respondents, in both Britain and Germany, speak to an internalised account of reflexively negotiated morality (Giddens, 1991b). This morality is projected onto the community and regulates individual behaviour as actions are taken in light of 'what will people say?' By citing the importance of the norms and values of the community in the mould of 'what people will think', individuals internalise external moral voices This internalised expression of community voices is used by individuals to police their own behaviour through a self-constructed, albeit externally referenced, moral voice. Such instances are overt illustrations of the ways in which the moral voices of the community influence, shape and regulate the moral voices of the self Furthermore, through reference to the norms and values of the community, respondents are able to cite the existence of community moral voices as the reasons for ensuring conformity

> "You think, 'what will they think'?" (Dilshad, 2nd, UK female: 4).

> "I think, so far as my family members in Pakistan are concerned yes it is a major major issue, especially for my mother She lives by herself, with her daughter in law So anything that we do here [in England], even 5000 miles away, if that is sort of sent back, even wrong information then it has implications, major major implications.. he [father] doesn't really give too much importance to just anybody If people want to talk then let them talk" (Amir, 2nd, UK male: 9).

"But yes obviously it makes a difference. What will people say?"
(Ulfath, 1ˢᵗ, German female: 9)

This internalised familiarity and practice of external morality is akin to what Wallwork perceives as Durkheim's notion of "transcendent aspect of moral experience" (Wallwork, 1972. 38). Individual perceptions of 'what will people think' have echoes within what Durkheim contends to be 'symbolic representations' of the conscience collective This transcendent experience is an individual belief, or assumption, that moral positions of the community "derive from, and are enforced by, some power, real or ideal, which is superior to us" (Wallwork, 1972 38) Through reference to such real or ideal power, individuals are able to police their own behaviour while attributing such policing to the community. Thus, moral voices of the community, when experienced in such a manner, are but "symbolic representations of the real moral forces which act upon individual members of society, namely, those exercised by public opinion" (Wallwork, 1972· 39).

8.3 *Origins and Anchors of Moral Voices: Continuity of Community*

By attempting to compel individuals to behave in accordance with, and exercise the norms and values of community boundaries, the moral voices of the community seek to ensure their continuity by ensuring their perpetuation and defending against the encroachment of 'other' values. In so doing these moral voices represent the thresholds that differentiate 'us' from 'them'. As defence of community boundaries, these moral voices re-invest the symbols of community with perceived 'shared values' (Cohen, 1985). In emphasising the importance of particular norms and values, in the face of perceived threats to the identities of the community, these voices are considered to protect and perpetuate the myths, traditions and rituals of 'us'.

8.3.1 *Perpetuating What it Means to be 'Us'*

The moral voices of the community express the community's values, often as they are enacted through the norms of that community. 84% of the overt expression of community moral voices in the empirical data is illustrative of instances where respondent behaviour is governed, or guided, by community expectations that they conduct themselves in a manner acceptable to Pakistani culture and Islam in relation to these rituals, traditions and myths. Such behaviour is not only expected to be acceptable, but also visibly demonstrative of Pakistani and Islamic identities. Much of the importance attached to the exercise of rituals, traditions and myths is located

in their role in re-asserting and re-constituting community identities. They perpetuate what it means to be 'us'.

> "My father was very adamant that we all wore Asian clothes at home, and you know maintained our sort of identity and really conformed to what the neighbours you know thought we should be doing (laugh)" (Safa, 2nd, UK female· 3)

> "We live within a very close-knit community, where girls who become westernised are not considered good" (Mubin, 1st, UK male 6)

> "Now you look that that woman who puts her *dupatta* (scarf) on her head and goes outside she is looked at [by the community] in a good way. A woman who has a *dupatta* around her neck and is going people would just look at her, okay it's okay she is just like that, it does not matter" (Nuzhat, 1st, German female 8)

As suggested in Chapter 6 the norms and values of the Pakistani Muslim community are considered to be the essence of 'us'. As one of the norms and values that represents what distinguishes 'us' from 'them', familial care of elders is emphasised as encapsulating values of *izzat* and family[5]. The moral voices of the community represent its boundaries, and in so doing provide guidance and in many instances compulsion for what 'we' do, and what 'they' do not In the context of care, 'we' are considered to care for our elders because 'we' respect the values associated with traditional concepts of nuclear and extended families, and the ethics of *izzat* that underpin such hierarchical and gerontocratic structures

> "*They* [Germans] have made what do you call them, those houses ..old people's homes. They take them there and leave them. But if *we* bring that child up well, in an Islamic environment, well, like *we* look after our father with a lot of *izzat*, and when they grow older...they are in their own homes, they are being looked after" (Yasir, 1st, German male: 24, *emphasis added*)

> "[In Germany] 16 year old children are kicked out of homes, they are wandering around with boyfriends. Then obviously when their parents are old...here old women have been dead for 10 days . when [pets] start to make noises, [pets] are not seen outside then neighbours say that we haven't seen [their] dog, what is the matter? There have been cases where bodies are decomposing for months, how bad is that? And we should be scared that Allah Miah does not bring such a time on us, at least in Muslim families that we put our parents in old people's homes and they agonise over us there" (Atiya, 1st, German female· 6).

---

[5] See Chapters 6 and 7

"[The English culture] ruins this realisation [in children that they should care for their elders], it ruins it They say she [mother] is old, I am going Their own mother has left her parents, so then her daughter does the same thing *Our* [the older generation of Pakistani Muslims] eyes are always on the ground [out of *izzat*] when you go to your in-laws" (Azra, 1st, UK female· 11)

By encouraging members of the community to abide by the rituals, myths and traditions attached to the 'sacred' practice of Islamic and cultural norms and values, moral voices facilitate and precipitate the perpetuation of community boundaries Certain religious and cultural norms and values are perceived to be so integral to the establishment and defence of community boundaries (Andersen, 1991, Cohen, 1984) that actions contrary to them are seen as profane and beyond the pale (Durkheim 2002, Etzioni, 1998, 1997, 1995). It is fear of this profanity permeating the membrane of the community and diminishing its integrity that leads to the enforcement of community moral voices. Rooted in the myth, traditions and rituals of the past, moral voices are resistant to change, which is deemed to be inherently negative, as it threatens the status quo and the mythical past.

As shown in Chapter 6, respondents fear that a s their children b ecome more and more 'integrated' into Western secular society, those things deemed to be profane will be normalised in their daily lives, and they will begin to reject 'our' beliefs and values in favour of 'theirs'. Members of a community come together to prevent actions that oppose the norms and values of a community, thereby continually re-asserting the importance and commonality of them. In so doing, these voices re-invest 'our' symbols with shared value, and re-locate 'our' norms in myths of better times or shared traditions. Where individuals exercise the symbols of 'our' community, they are considered to be 'good' and where they do not, to be 'bad'.

As representative of community identities, moral voices of the community carry with them enforcement endorsed by the whole community. In such instances the threat of community disapproval and gossip is utilised as a means to be prescriptive, and regulatory, of individual behaviour. By upholding community values, an individual's behaviour is considered a testament to his or her character, as well as a means of ensuring the perpetuation of a way of life, central to the survival of the 'Pakistani Muslim community'. Without the perpetuation of this way of life there is a fear that both the 'Pakistani' and the 'Muslim' elements of the community will disappear, leaving only the existence of a British or German 'minority' community, with no clear distinction between them and the host society, other than the colour of skin.

"Here in Europe or America, or even if they live in Pakistan, their [some Pakistanis] morality has become so dirty that they are absolutely, nor are they Muslims, nor are they Whites" (Mariya, 1ˢᵗ, German female· 7)

"[Friend of his father] said one thing to me, you are going to Europe, and in Europe there is no limit to the degree of indecency...I will give you one piece of advice . maintain relations with the mosque .There is a quote from Iqbal, 'It is the death of a people, when they grow distant from their centre'...the mosque is the centre of Islam . So what I mean to say is that it is very important to maintain connections with Islam or make connections with Islam or have an influence over children in this way" (Naim, 1ˢᵗ, UK male: 17).

"As a minority to keep your faith safe from the majority you need to keep practising it and so in this group [of friends] we read up on Islam as well, we discuss it and we practise it and teach it to others" (Jamal, 1ˢᵗ, German male 3)

8.3.2 The Effects of Perpetuating 'Us' Through Care

88% of respondents suggest the norm of familial care of elders pervades societal life in Pakistan. As shown in Chapter 7 there is a relative decline in the degree to which first generation migrants to Britain and Germany can, or are willing to expect care from their children The absence of 'elders' amongst the Pakistani Muslim communities of Britain[6], and especially Germany, means second and third generation children are not witness to the 'norm' of providing familial care for one's parents. Respondent accounts of community moral voices do not suggest that the value attributed to such care, by the community at large, has abated, with 93% of respondents saying community moral voices expect elders to be cared for by their kin.

"In Pakistan children look after their parents, then that is difficult, actually impossible that that will be in these children [in Germany]
Interviewer: why?
Because they are not seeing it" (Ishrat, 1ˢᵗ, German female 3)

"The community expect your children to look after you" (Haidar, 2ⁿᵈ, UK male 5).

"If I have found out that there is such a man that needs it [physical care] I have gone and told his family that you should look after him like this, if you will not do it then who will?" (Kamil, 1ˢᵗ, UK male· 11)

---

[6] Nazroo's (2001) analysis of the Fourth National Survey found the White population in Britain had a three times greater proportion of people aged between 65 and 74 and seven times greater population of people aged over 75

56 % of respondents, 92 % of whom are those that suggest the principle of caring for ones elders permeates through Pakistan, give examples of instances where elders are not, or were not, cared for by members of their kin, in Pakistan. Such contradiction within the data suggests that the importance accorded to caring for ones elders is a means to anchor the identities of the community, and the symbols of what it means to be 'us' in constructed traditions and myths of the past. Notwithstanding the absence of elderly care within the family in Pakistan, the majority of the respondents (98%[7]) maintain the necessity for their children to care for them, and the significance such care has to their 'good' character. This suggests that the negotiations and reconciliations between the importance of being seen to care for ones elders and shifts in what it means to care, may be resulting in a reconstitution of the symbolic value of caring for ones elders This re-negotiation is given added importance due to respondent migration, as in the non-Islamic countries of Britain and Germany the values of *izzat* and family are not in daily evidence. In this way familial care of elders becomes a condensation symbol (Cohen, 1985)[8].

> "If you look at Pakistan you see that one [son] gets married and runs off, the other gets married and runs off over there, we [respondent and his brothers] didn't have that. All five of us are together [have houses on the same street in Pakistan]" (Tahir, 1st, German male· 1)

> "From a very young age its embedded in you, and maybe as I've said it, that I expect [daughter] to do this, and do that That's a subtle way of perhaps in the future saying you will look after me when I am older. And that's always been you know religiously and culturally the young look after our old (Zoe, 2nd, UK female 9)

> "But it is a matter of regret that this is happening and I have even heard that it is starting in Pakistan as well. Where sons and daughter-in-law's leave their parents in their old age. It is a fact in India there are many old people's homes ..We are so unfortunate, we are giving them [White people] our good things and [taking] their bad things, we feel very proud that we have become English[9]" (Atiya, 1st, German female. 6)

> "What's happened I think is that when people came from Pakistan and India they bought with them old values. Now Pakistan and India have moved on, they have developed But the people that came from there they have not developed. They are holding on to those values because they think those are important" (Hana, 1st, UK female 14).

---

[7] See Appendix 5b.

[8] See Chapters 2 and 7.

[9] Atiya's reference here to the 'English' is an example of the way the term 'English' is often used synonymously with White Europeans

Throughout the empirical data there is an acceptance amongst all respondents, irrespective of age and gender that children ought to care for their elders As discussed in Chapter 7, 'care' is defined by respondents as the giving, and maintaining, of parental *izzat* and the exercise of *khidmat* Community moral voices that assert children ought to care for their elders exhibit little consideration for the inherent ambiguities of the multi-dimensional notions of *izzat* and *khidmat*. The empirical data reveals that moral voices of the community have the potential to compel individuals to care for their elders.

The extent to which individuals practice the norms and values of the community is seen as a measure of how much he or she identifies with its boundaries Given the diversity within communities, the boundaries represented by particular symbols are constructed across differences (Dwyer, 1999; Hall, 1996, Massey: 1994) Individual members share community symbols but ascribe to them different meanings and significance (Cohen, 1985). Respondents can share the value of caring for ones' elders with each other, and the rest of the community, whilst attributing to it different definitions, as shown in Chapter 7. The ability to maintain such difference allows individuals to negotiate their way between different cultures and community boundaries, a negotiation conducted alongside the concept of *izzat*

In addition to facilitating the continuity of the community, compulsions associated with caring for one's elders can have negative consequences for individuals, families and the wider community Compelling individuals to participate in the care relationship can undermine the very ethics such relationships are thought to be founded upon. Although perceived duties to care for one's elders are, in and of themselves, considered positive for all concerned, where they are forced upon an individual rather than taken up and performed as a matter of choice their effects are perceived to be negative. 36% of respondents suggest that the role of the care recipient shifts from esteemed elder, cared for in demonstration of the love and *izzat* he or she engenders, to a burden, whose responsibility is being forced upon unwilling children. Such enmity within the care relationship can arise even where children would have taken up the role of carer in the absence of imposed duty. In so doing, principles of intimacy, bodily integrity and voice are suppressed (Williams, 2000). Thus, participation within social relationships as a result of normative assertions, can devalue the social bonds.

"In Pakistan there is this concept that the in-laws kind of bind them, [daughter-in-laws]...So there are a little difficulties, and...problems are created. That she [daughter in law] is not doing it [*khidmat*] like this or like this...So that comes down to binding them Not teaching them...So you should not expect. People begin to expect too much" (Ulfath, 1st, German female 12)

"I think it depends on individual cases more or l ess you know. I mean if...children want to look after [their elders] out of love that is fine. And I think that won't be a burden. But it is a burden when it has been expected...everything we do we are not doing it for the prayer we are doing it for the whole community, to please everybody else in the whole neighbourhood ..Even if they [his children] want to show all my family and every body else, that is not right. Because then, I think it is becoming a burden now in a lot of families who generally can't cope with it. But at the same time they do everything to m ake sure that they are looking after [their elders]. A nd t hey a re d oing i t b ecause in t he family i t i s p erhaps expectation from their own parents, expectations from their extended family, expectation from their Pakistani culture, the environment that they live in. And that is what, they don't think there is a choice, they are doing it, but they are pretending it, pretending to please.. The problems are that when you, when you visit them they are not doing it [caring] properly, they are lax, every body else says they are doing it" (Deen, 2nd, UK male· 9)

The effects of such compulsion can also dis-empower and disenfranchise both the would-be carer and care recipient Compelling an individual to participate within a care relationship, as carer or care recipient, removes much of the power, ownership and voice which would otherwise enable negotiations of such a bond Further, compelling individuals to participate in care relationships where they may be unable to provide, or indeed ask for, the form and/or extent of care required can do more harm than good, as the carer may try and provide care he or she ought not to, and/or, the care recipient may not receive the care he or she needs.

"He [friend] worked he had a job, when his father was diagnosed [with schizophrenia] he was in his mid to late 20's, his mother had passed away and really he was left to look after his father . he found it very very difficult, because especially when his father failed to recognise him and he was forced to look for specialist help because he simply couldn't cope by himself looking after his father because he needed 24 hour specialist care and when his father was put in a residential home I know that member's of his family . just didn't understand...they [family] were bad mouthing them [friend and his siblings] and basically didn't want to communicate with them because they thought that they'd betrayed him [their father]" (Safa, 2nd, UK female: 13)

"The p eople t hat a re s at b ack h ome [Pakistan], they d o n ot t hink that the one that is working here [in Germany] how hard he is working.. [they think] you can work hard over there [in Germany]

and earn more, I said it is not about earning more, we were working hard and earning before over there, and we will do so in the future as well, but what is fair, it is important for things to be fair as well" (Raees, 1st, German male 10).

"Now in front of them [their children] the elderly would not say any thing, there have been some elderly that would come to me and say very quietly please don't tell my family but I am very distressed, please do something. I would like somewhere to live, but close by, I wouldn't like to go far ..they were not being properly looked after ..But still generally I think generally that the people still care for their old parents. Not maybe the same level but saying this is wrong. Maybe one or two of them have gone the opposite they don't care at all but I don't know about that Some [just] needed home help" (Naim, 1st, UK male· 30)

8.4 *A Question of Izzat...*

Moral voices of the community utilise *izzat* as the tool with which to ensure conformity Any breach of the community's moral prescriptions is met with moral outrage and shame-based strategies that have a direct affect on an individual's *izzat* (Etzioni, 1997, 1995; Durkheim, 1984). As suggested in Chapter 6, respondents perceive *izzat* to be indicative of the way in which an individual, family or the community at large, is perceived by others 70% of respondents articulate instances where the possession of *izzat* is treated as a form of social capital, which enables participation in Pakistani Muslim communities. Moreover, as alluded to in Chapter 7, the underlying subtext of *izzat* within the care relationship itself, suggests that to care for ones elders, and as an elder, to be cared for by ones kin, is a means of accumulating *izzat*, and thus, social capital

Conformity to the expectations of community moral voices is considered, by 91% of respondents, to be deemed by the community at large, as illustrative of one's 'good' character, in both Islamic and cultural terms. Such conformity leads to an individual as being deemed worthy of increasing degrees of *izzat*, and provides a safeguard against the decline of *izzat*. Where an individual does not conform, their behaviour, and/or character, is thought to be 'bad' and consequently their *izzat* is diminished. An individual's conformity, or lack of thereof, also has implications for the *izzat* of his/her kin, and in some instances, the community at large.

"*Izzat* is all about doing good things and then you will have *izzat*. People will look at you in a good light, they will look at you with *izzat*...If you have *izzat* then you have some sort of status in the community" (Haidar, 2nd, UK male· 3)

> "*Izzat* is important isn't it If we do something wrong and people find out about it then obviously the extended family's (*khandan's*) *izzat* will be diminished, people will not say good things then will they, so that is what they say that we not do anything bad by which we too feel low/beneath (*neechai*) That is what *izzat* is isn't it? That a person not feel low, that they are confident" (Najm, 1st, UK female: 7).

> "My father would say to my mother that say to her [respondent] that your father has said that [uncle's] daughter has *izzat* in the whole family, that there has been no talk in the family, we have not heard anything. And so yours [behaviour] should be the same. Your *izzat* should be like their's is. Not like you go to your in-laws and fight and the whole neighbourhood is saying that which dog *khandan* (extended family) is she from? Nobody should say that They should say that she is from a good *khandan*" (Nuzhat, 1st, German female: 9).

The domino affect upon the *izzat* of those present within an individual's kinship networks is particularly evident when respondents speak of female participation in the education system. Whilst education is not considered to be negative in and of itself, it does carry with it the potential for individuals to behave in a manner which is contrary to the norms and values of the Pakistani Muslim community Co-ed schooling at colleges and universities (in Pakistan, as well as in Britain and Germany), and the comparatively relaxed demeanour of teachers at further/higher education establishments provides opportunity for young adults to transcend the restrictions imposed by values of *purdah* Parents that send their children to college or university are not thought to have done anything wrong *per se* If, once at college or university, their child behaves in a way that contravenes the principles of community moral voices then the parents *izzat* is diminished on the grounds that, had they not sent their child to university in the first place, had they not given their child that much 'freedom', then such a situation would not have arisen.

In this manner, many scenarios made possible due to the more 'liberal' environment of Britain and Germany are observed, by 81% of respondents, as potential threats to *izzat*. Respondents highlight how Pakistani parents often restrict their children from integrating excessively into British and German society for fear of them acting upon the freedoms they are given in such a society, and reducing the distinction between 'them' and 'us', thus blurring the distinction between the sacred and the profane Observations such as those made by Werbner (2002), Faqir (2001) and Afshar (1994) suggest that the task of protecting and defending a family's *izzat* is often left to the women. These observations are supported by the empirical data as none of the

respondents cite instances where men are restricted from education as a means of defending the *izzat* of the family This said, men are deemed to be responsible for a family's *izzat* alongside women where the care relationship is in question

> "I got more 'well where's it heading to?...Are you going to run off and leave us? It's a big decision for me [father] and your mum to make to let you go to college . if you do something, if you bring shame on us we can't cope with that.. he was just frightened that I would be influenced by the Western society and I would like boys, I would go off and wouldn't really think of him, and the religion and his *izzat* in the community" (Zoe, 2nd, UK female. 2)

> "When she [eldest daughter] got older my wife wouldn't agree [to sending her to University]. I agreed but my wife said No. We should not send our daughter, but my daughters said that *Ami* (mother), those girls that are going to go bad go bad at school. You should trust me...After that my wife understood a little" (Kamil, 1st, UK male: 4).

> "The boys would get educated on the thinking that they have to go and get a job so get them educated. But girls, [parents in Pakistan think] it's not as if they are going to get a job, so what is the need to have them educated? So why spend money on them?...Some girls have started to progress. Now in Pakistan a lot of girls are studying ..maybe only 10 or 20%...When College begins then many girls there ..very intelligent. their family did not send them because the reputation of college is that they think if our girls go they will be [morally] ruined" (Mariya, 1st, German female 12)

> "My husband didn't want to send my eldest daughter to college, at that time all his friends would say to him that the environment here [in England] is not good, you shouldn't send daughters to college, so he didn't let the eldest go. We wanted our sons to go but neither of them were interested. Then my husband realised that you need to get the girls educated so the middle one is going She is still studying. The youngest she has no interest either, and so she has stopped" (Jasmin, 1st, UK female: 1).

As shown in Chapter 5, there are much less Pakistani migrants resident in Germany then in Britain. Only one of the respondents in the German sample has extended family networks in Germany. The family unit is a key proponent of the moral voices of the community In particular, the zealous application of these voices arises out of the desire to maintain the family's *izzat* through regulating the behaviour of individual family members. The absence of family networks in Germany correlates with a much weaker set of community moral voices than those found amongst their British counterparts. The absence of extended family networks, and limited number of Pakistani Muslims in Germany, can be attributed as one of the primary reasons for weakened or absent community moral voices.

"I think what really matters is what is in your family. I don't think the community matters that much but what is in, you know, your family, your own relatives, your *biradiri* (extended kinship networks), I think that affects. You know more or less, I think those things leave an effect" (Dilshad, 2nd, UK female· 4)

"Family has more of an affect on me than anything else really" (Zahra, 2nd, UK female· 2)

"[*izzat* is affected in Pakistan because] in that society, because we know each other and there is the *biradari* system and so when people sit in the *biradari* system people talk that such and such's son is not good and such and such, his son is good. He does this and he does not and he looks after his parents and he does not. But here [in Germany] everyone has their own environment. What ever situation you are in is fine. If we do meet then you just show your problems, you talk about it, you give each other mental support You feel it [community moral voices] in that society but not here" (Jamal, 1st, German male: 7)

Where the parameters of the sacred and the profane (the 'us' versus the 'them') are breached, Etzioni's (1997, 1995) reading of Durkheim (2002, 1995) would suggest that the conscience collective and/or community moral voices ought to respond with moral outrage and/or suasion In the case of the empirical data failure to abide by the prescriptions of community moral voices, is considered by 88% of respondents, to elicit 'talk' and gossip from the community. Such 'talk' and/or gossip takes the form of moral judgement, and occurs where an individual's behaviour is thought to be 'below' acceptable standards/thresholds. Individual behaviour and character becomes the subject of 'talk' and/or 'gossip' when it is considered to be in some way contrary to, or conflictual with, the norms and values upon which diasporic Pakistani Muslim communities are founded. The 'bad' behaviour of one individual negatively influences the *izzat* of another where their relationship is such that one is considered to have had some part to play in the communication of values, or the regulation of the other's behaviour.

"Yes it [*izzat*] is affected. Obviously then people talk as well" (Maha, 1st, German female: 7).

"The point of *izzat* close to us is that we not do anything which results in anyone being able to raise a finger to us, and we do not have to spread our hands in front of any one [beg]. That is what we feel *izzat* is. That is the greatest wealth that we do not do anything which is against the spirit of Islam, and people point a finger. That he stole this or he did that" (Kamil, 1st, UK male: 7).

> "If my children do something bad then people will say look he has
> done this, but they will also say he's so and so's son" (Haidar, 2nd,
> UK male. 5)

56% of respondents believe that in not caring for their parents the *izzat* of the offspring is reduced In such instances children are seen to have a disregard for Islam and Pakistani culture, and thus behave in a manner that is contrary to the norms and values of the community. Such offspring are considered to be 'bad' in character. In addition, they are thought to be answerable to Allah (SWT) for their derogation of duty. Respondents also suggest that they will be further 'punished' as their children will not care for them, just as they did not do so for their parents. Such a 'punishment' is partially spiritual, as they are deemed to have received their just deserts, and partially a reflection of the direct result of limited social capital. As they did not care for their elders, such children are considered not to have accumulated the *izzat* which would facilitate their care by their own offspring.

> "They (children) do not fulfil their parents right and then Allah
> Talah is angry isn't he? And in the community as well because other
> people look at you with dirty looks then, that mother is ill and this
> fool is wandering here, he has left his parents in an old people's
> home, our culture is like that isn't it? People do talk don't they?"
> (Azra, 1st, UK female: 11).

> "It does not affect the mother and fathers *izzat* Those children, they
> do something for themselves Because the children that do not do
> their parents *khidmat* it will not make a difference to the parents
> *izzat*. And when the children grow up in the future their children
> will behave in this way toward them ..And it is then that they cry,
> that our children are like this And then there are people that will say
> it to them, or their own minds will work and they will think that yes
> we did this ourselves as well" (Wafa, 1st, German female· 6)

> "[he is *bai 'izzat*] because his children do not look after him That is
> why...It affects your *izzat* a lot, if I have a son and I am being
> disgraced and humiliated (*zaleel*) over there and he is here they
> [members of the community] will come and say it to him won't
> they? ...He [the father] will live out what is left of his life, it is a
> matter of shame for the children isn't it" (Tahir, 1st, German male:
> 9).

In the specific instance of care in the family, 51% of respondents feel that the parenting skills and ability of the elder is itself called into question. Moral voices of the community question the extent to which parents themselves bought about a circumstance where they are not looked after by their children In some instances parents are thought to have failed to teach their children the true worth of a parent as set by Allah (SWT), or the values of *izzat* and family, required to have spurred them

onto care for their parents. In many instances this arises out of the view that parents have allowed their children to become 'Western'. Elders are considered not to have fulfilled their own duties as parents They are blamed for not having parented their children in a manner which taught them how to give their elders *izzat*, and in doing so live in accordance to the prescriptions of Islam whilst perpetuating community boundaries by caring for their parents. Thus, the elder is seen to be the keeper of his or her own fate

> "Children do go astray (*bagee*). They do not care. But this depends on parents, the extent to which they train their children (*tharbiyath*)" (Anis, 1ˢᵗ, German male: 30).

> "Now who does not give *izzat* [to his parents], he will answer to Allah (SWT), he will, that is a separate thing. But if you look in your society then yes, these children who, some even do their parents *ba-yzzati* or don't look after them, if they do not look after them then that comes into *ba-yzzati* because Allah (SWT) says do not even say '*uf*' (sigh/grimace) to them. Saying '*uf*' isn't anything, but in our society we have seen, close by to us, in our neighbourhoods we have seen that children say many many things to their parents so it is that their [parents] *izzat* is reduced, it is diminished in wider society as well" (Taj, 1ˢᵗ, German female: 12)

The moral outrage, and/or shaming, to which moral voices subject individuals, are performed through the medium of gossip, and what is referred to as people 'talking'. In such instances an individual's *izzat* is reduced. This has the potential to affect an individual's inclusion into the Pakistani Muslim community. The power to maintain access to, or ones inclusion in[10], the community can be gained through *izzat*, which, as a result of the social capital it engenders, provides an individual with the capacity to act in the face of exclusionary forces.

> "Everyone says that our family is quite *izzatdhar* (has *izzat*) I think people talk very highly of us, especially my father...He's a very good person who would not do wrong to anybody. And I believe that that's the way he has brought us up as well, not to do wrong, not to back bite, not to say bad things about anybody. That's what *izzat* is about in our family. That sort of thing is what we call *izzatdhar* people" (Zahra, 2ⁿᵈ, UK female: 4).

> "Something like that [when you have not conformed to community moral voices] in the community spreads everywhere doesn't it? And he who is a little mature he will accept that reaction a little ..There are very few that say let the community say what it says....In the majority what the community says does have an influence.....it [talk in the community] affects it [status] ...Take for example if it was

---

[10] See Chapter 2.

> me, I have been a Councillor for a long time now, next time when I go to the elections people will say he is a bad person he is not there for his father how will he be there for us? So in this way it definitely does have an influence." (Kamil, 1ˢᵗ, UK male: 12-13)

Where a child does not care for his or her parents (and thus does not give his or her parents the *izzat* that they deserve by virtue of being parents) the community also denies that parent *izzat*. Standards of behaviour expected by the moral voices of the community suggest that an individual ought to command enough authority and have accumulated enough social capital, to ensure his or her children continue to treat him or her with *izzat* Where a parent is not given *izzat* by his or her children, it is deemed to speak to a character flaw within the parent, and constitutes a reason for sympathy or pity. This sympathy or pity, more so than an individual's perceived failure as a parent is attributed as the reasons why an individual's *izzat* is diminished Gossip and 'talk' also serve as constant reminders of the failed parent-child relationship. Such reminders and judgements progressively weaken and breakdown an individual's social bonds as he or she is repeatedly shamed Where the *izzat* of parents is diminished as a consequence of a lack of familial care they feel a 'loss of face' and consequent isolation. In this manner, community gossip or 'talk' serve as processes of exclusion.

> "Their [parents] *izzat* falls as well. They have nothing left. They become disgraced (*zaleel*) in the world" (Tahir, 1ˢᵗ, German male· 9).

> "I think they [elders] may feel themselves that they have had a loss of face in the fact that they have been left by, you know, their kids or what ever, for whatever reason it is. I suppose they can feel socially isolated too and because they feel isolated they feel it is because of the community" (Beena, 2ⁿᵈ, UK female: 11)

> "Many parents, even if their children are bad they will not tell others. [they feel this is a] great insult, that if our children are not focused toward us, they do not listen to what we say, are not looking after us, are not giving us money, what will people say to us? That look at their children. And it is exactly this that our uncle here [in Germany] thinks as well. He too says that I do not tell people that my son does not live with me, that he is living separately, he says in this there is a lot of *ba-yzzati* (loss of *izzat*) for me. That my son, despite me being here, why is he living separately from me? And he is not looking after me, he is not fulfilling my needs or he does not come and do any of my jobs or nothing" (Yusra, 1ˢᵗ, German female· 26)

> "There are many people in the community that are not looked after by their children, and it does affect their status in the community They feel more isolated. People will say oh look they have children

but nobody is looking after them But sometimes mothers also act unjustly But the sons get married and the daughter-in-laws don't like to be burdened with the mother and then she gets treated badly and these sorts of things affect the community" (Najm, 1st, UK female. 2).

Moral voices of the community can also serve as inclusionary mechanisms 88% of respondents speak of the positive way in which they are perceived by the community where they abide by its norms and values, for instance, in caring for their elders In a small number of cases, 37% of respondents attribute the care they give their elders, in part, to the *izzat* that they gain from the wider community by doing so. In providing the care that is perceived to be their duty they are considered to be morally 'good' people. Their actions are seen as testament to their conformity and character In this sense regulation of individual behaviour through expression or standards of morality, occurs both as an incentive and as a deterrent.

"In our society what happens is the child that looks after his parents is the one that is given *izzat* " (Najm, 1st, UK female· 14).

"What I do [in terms of caring for his family] I do for my own home. That is what they say don't they? So what do they, you get approval from others (*shabash*) This man is very good, he is helping his own, no one has a problem" (Tahir, 1st, German male: 8).

"But if they [children] become good human beings then people will say that look their parents have bought them up well. They have instilled good characteristics in them, they have given them the recognition of good and bad" (Yusra, 1st, German female· 15).

8.5 *Resource, Identity and Social Capital: Negotiating with Morality*

The authority of the community's moral voices and the affects of their moral outrage/suasion on the *izzat* of different individuals and families are not uniform. Respondent articulations of community moral voices, and the degrees to which these shape an individual's decision making and agency, vary considerably. Fluctuations in the authority attributed to moral voices can be located, in part, to shifts in content/value balancing during the course of individual identity negotiations (Breakwell, 1987) Shifting identities are simultaneously informed by, and give rise to, alternative resources that individuals are able to utilise during the course of their reconciliation with community moral voices. Pre-existing resources and social capital in the form of *izzat*, education and money also have a bearing on the degree to which the moral voices of the community are given credence. Finally, and the most significant with regard to the construction and re-construction of community

boundaries, is that moral voices are attributed authority in accordance to the Islamic and Pakistani cultural norms and values they are considered to represent.

Moral voices of the community are representative of the collective conscience in a manner that suggests individual members lack any single distinctive feature For respondents themselves, collective identities are utilised as a tool kit of different narratives, rituals and symbols, to which they can identify, without necessarily attaching the same meaning As suggested in Chapter 2, historically shifting contexts give rise to, and are the scenes of, perpetually fluctuating identities and sense of self, as individuals constantly traverse any number of boundaries and differences (Phillips, 2002; Werbner, 2002, Parekh, 2000; Husain and O'Brien, 2000, Taylor, 1998; Brah, 1996; Hall, 1996, 1993, 1992, Baumann, 1996, Modood *et al*, 1994, Breakwell, 1987) The sheer number of differences in the ways, means and extent to which individuals identify with a particular community becomes a resource through which respondents bargain with the values espoused by community moral voices. For instance, respondents are able to use their roles within the labour market, and the social capital this generates within the informal networks of community, as a resource with which to negotiate with the moral pulls community voices place upon their role as, for example, a parent. 81% of respondents cite instances of such negotiations.

> "When we were living in an Asian area and obviously being surrounded by other Asians there is a lot of pressure, from your peers at that stage. Although my parents were very independent, they knew what they wanted for their children, they tried not to be influenced by those outside pressures, and I think to a certain extent there was pressure on us to conform. But the majority of people who lived near us were from Kashmir, from Azad Kashmir, whereas our family isn't So our parents had, they sort of had a completely different upbringing and different ideals and different sort of career aspirations for their children than the parents that lived near us So I don't think the influence was that strong because we still got to do what we wanted to do" (Safa, 2nd, UK female: 2).

Instances of such explicit bargaining are less frequent where the moral voices of the community are internalised and adopted as ones' own moral voice of self. In such instances, difference is no longer an external conflict, rather, it is something an individual must negotiate with internally. Such 'conflicts' become embedded in, and add to, individual content/value negotiations between different facets of his or her identities. Where this conflict remains external to the individual it is evident that respondents have multiple moral pulls which are not always conducive to the

perpetuation of community boundaries as anchored in tradition and myth and espoused by the moral voices of the community. This is particularly manifest in the context of care, where the obligations and duties towards one's elders are conditioned on the basis of one's role and duties as a parent.

> "It is a cruel thing to say but it is difficult to say at what point I would say to people yes, thank you, sorry, but I can't do this because I have other priorities and at this point in time my only priority is my children" (Amir, 2nd, UK male· 13)

> "My father [who is ill] himself does not want me to come [to Pakistan]...[He thinks] you will spend your money, you should spend that money on your children. You have just been, don't come again so soon. Concentrate on bringing up your children up" (Ishrat, 1st, German female. 10).

> "Brothers and sisters also expect you will do something for them but when you are in this position and you have children it becomes very difficult to do anything especially in this environment It becomes almost impossible to do anything because looking after children is a parent's first duty" (Idris, 1st, German male 6).

> "I believe that once you're married you should be in charge of your own house and not have to run back to your parents and do things for them. But I don't think my mum feels like that. My dad he just follows what ever my mum thinks really" (Zahra, 2nd, UK female 4).

Amongst the German sample there is little explicit negotiation with moral voices of the community. Where there is a perceived conflict between the moral voices of the self and those of the community, 74% of respondents, in both Britain and Germany favour the pull of their own moral voices outright. The open dismissal of community moral voices is attributed, for the most part, to the perception that community moral voices require overt and, at times, superficial practice of morality, and more specifically Islam. In a study of Sikh youth, Ballard and Ballard (1979) found similar results, as often actions of young men were over-looked as long as an appearance of respect and conformity was maintained within the family. To this end, they concluded that the significance of *izzat* is, in many instances, superficial. The degree to which the moral voices of the community elicit insincere conformity to Islamic norms and values is used to question the authority, legitimacy and indeed, usefulness of them by 56% of respondents.

> "*Izzat* is what you make yourself If you go out on the right path, and do the right things then it does not matter what other people are saying. According to some people it is wrong to be driving, for a woman to drive, or for a woman to work. I do not see anything

wrong in that. Because I'm not doing anything that is wrong. So sometimes, I think *izzat* is what you make it really. As long as you are a good person, and you don't swear and do totally wrong things there is nothing wrong with that person" (Zahra, 2nd, UK female: 3).

"I do not want, for example there are some Muslim who, look at a girl and think well she didn't have a scarf on her head. No, I don't think that, I think a scarf should b e h ere (pointing a t the h eart). I have seen many children, many girls, who are wearing the full *hijaab*, where only their eyes are showing and yet they are doing wrong things outside of the house But I think that those girls have hidden their faces so that they are not recognised" (Kamil, 1st, UK male: 3).

"The traditions that we [Pakistani Muslims] have adopted they too have negative influences on our children. It is our misfortune that, when we come to the *Masjid* (Mosque), we try to bring the children with us. The children come with us. When we sit and there we begin a conversation, even in *namaaz* we think when will this *namaaz* end so we can sit and have our conversations ..What we should do is practically prove what we say in front of our children, not just sit and converse. So children sit and instinctively learn from watching you, not from listening to you" (Wahid, 1st, German male: 11).

Within the empirical data the resource of education is utilised by 60% of respondents to directly negotiate with, or disregard completely, the authority of community moral voices. Where they do not agree with the values being depicted, respondents in both Britain and Germany argue that proponents of community moral voices are uneducated, and as such community morality bares no relevance to their daily lives. The criterion that proponents of community moral voices are expected to meet before such voices are granted authority and legitimacy also extend to h is o r h er moral character. 35% of respondents cite the importance of having good moral standing if one is to be taken seriously expressing the moral voices of the community.

"My neighbours really who are purely rural background. very little education sort of attainment, achievement...So our family is a little different because my parents were educated before they came to this country" (Ijaz, 2nd, UK male: 3).

"I feel that until a person is not educated, without that he is an animal...the people in our community...there is not so much danger for me from their [lack of education] because...I know.. that I am to do this, I am not to do this" (Mariya, 1st, German female: 14).

"They [people from Mirpur] are all Muslim, it is quite strong but it is one thing inside and another outside.. I mean, they will tell you that you should do this, you should do that and they themselves will do what they want. They will take dodgy things, do dodgy things, I

do not, I do not like these things about them" (Azra, 1st, UK female. 1).

As respondents' identities change, so too do the subtle nuances of the community and t he p oints a t w hich the b oundaries a re d rawn. F ormed o n t he b asis o f w here boundary lines are constructed, such shifts affect the expectations of the 'good' and 'moral' w ay t o b ehave, a s c onveyed t hrough t he m oral v oices o f t he c ommunity. Moral voices, of both the individual and the community are integral to the perpetuation of the community, because through their exercise and enforcement, the community is able to continually rejuvenate its own foundations.

As a structure, moral voices of the community are subject to the influences of agency. They are not a static body of rules, but fluid in both their basis and application. Throughout the i nterview d ata t here a re i nstances o f d iscord b etween individual identities, values and those of the community and its moral voices. This suggests that shifts in individual identities are not translated to the precepts of community moral v oices instantaneously. F urther, g iven t hat individual i dentities are constantly negotiated in light of the content/value judgements made by an individual, and the social contexts in which he or she is in, it is unlikely that the values thought to be important by an individual will correspond, wholly to the moral voices which represent the shared norms and values of the community as a collective. This is made nowhere more evident, by respondents, than in the conflicts between Pakistani culture and Islam.

As shown in Chapter 6, respondent definitions of community and their construction of boundaries are fundamentally informed by shared norms and values. Whilst claiming legitimacy through Islam, community moral voices, in both Britain and Germany, are often informed to a large degree by Pakistani culture. This does not reflect the prevalence respondents' attribute to Islamic, as opposed to Pakistani cultural, identity. A s a r epresentation o f t he c ommunity's 'conscience', instances where values of its moral voices are no longer synchronised with those of individual members, call into question the legitimacy of boundaries that are drawn upon such presumed congruence

Where moral voices are influenced by culture, regional politics and different theological inflexions, they are perceived by many respondents as un-Islamic, often antiquated, failing to meet the theological challenges posed by daily life in the 'secular' West. In light of this, there is a conscious and overtly collective drive,

amongst the majority of respondents (58%)[11], to gain distance from ethnic differentiations in favour of more Islamically orientated identities and outlooks. Justifications for a more 'modern' way of thinking are made with Islamic reference Thus, respondents are able to allow the integration of perceived Western norms, such as female participation in the paid labour market, or choosing a marriage partner, in the daily lives of themselves, their children and other community members by grounding them in Islamic values. Islam is utilised in this manner by 74% of respondents, as a resource with which to negotiate the reduction of Pakistani cultural identities, and corresponding denials of those moral voices based upon cultural norms and values.

> "I asked all of my sister, my mother fixed all of the *rishtai* (marriage partners) but I still asked all of them independently If you have any objection tell me. Even though there was a lot of, my cousin baulked at this a lot, what has happened to you.. your mind has become European I said no my mind has not become European, I have studied Islam. I said your minds are traditional, Islam gives total permission" (Bilal, 1st, German male. 7).

> "And I think, I think that really puts me off some times you know, being a part of the [Pakistani] culture Because a lot of people, they get so confused with this culture and tradition and enforcement and every thing and they probably think that it is part and parcel of it [Islam]" (Deen, 2nd, UK male: 5)

This trend is also evident amongst those respondents who have been born, and/or raised, in Britain. Many of these respondents, (56%) have the view that the perspectives of the 'older' generation, and the moral voices of the community are 'traditional', steeped in cultural rather than religious maxims Not only are the moral voices of the community, where influenced by culture thought to be defunct in Britain and Germany, but in many instances they are also considered to provide an inaccurate interpretation of Islam. Such re-interpretations of Islam suggest fluidity in Islamic prescriptions themselves Whilst Islam may put forward normative guidelines, the ways in which these guidelines are, or can be, applied to the daily life of an individual differ significantly.

> "I think our community latches on to that word [*izzat*] too strongly, I don't think we really know the meaning of it. Sometimes they will lose their family and their loved ones for the sake of *izzat* They'll lose everything for *izzat*. But at the end of the day are they being good Muslims? No They don't question that. They get stuck on the

---

[11] See Appendix 5a

word *izzat* and then some will not move on at all" (Zoe, 2nd, UK female: 5).

"It is not really that there are religious pressures, pressures about religion, but really pressures about cultural attitudes" (Safa, 2nd, UK female. 2).

"The unfortunate thing is what we call our culture, that is not Islamic. We have put a curse on ourselves, the culture that we have made is often totally unrelated, it is just related to the area in which we live. Often many things in this are un-Islamic" (Wahid, 1st, German male: 15).

"What I mean to say is that Islam was so flexible, so flexible, so broad minded, it is us, sometimes people blame the *Ullemah* [religious clerics], that the *Ullemah* are too rigid, they are not open-minded, that could be a possibility.. Islam has come for all ages, and we have to rethink about how in today's world we can practise Islam correctly. How Islam is to be implemented.. Islam should be acted upon in accordance to the circumstances. They should be changed according to the circumstances You do not change the basis of Islam, that is very important" (Naim, 1st, UK male 15).

The authority of community moral voices are also negotiated by individuals in light of different perspectives on *izzat* and how it ought to be constituted. If an individual does not share the same concept of *izzat*, or values that affect *izzat*, then being judged against such values is perceived to be inconsequential. Where moral voices are considered to represent specific Pakistani cultural, rather than Islamic, norms and values, respondents stress that these voices can have no bearing on his or her *izzat*

"Personally culture is not really an issue. I mean if I see that something is stupid that is the end of that. Just because it is culture doesn't mean that I will do it. If it makes sense either scientifically or religiously then of course you do it but if it is just for the sake of culture then it is just a waste of time" (Amir, 2nd, UK male· 7)

"But the *izzat* of both is ruined. If they [parent or child] understand then. The person that does not understand he would kill 10 men and think himself big for it. Look at Bush, the Muslims around the world are cursing him, but for his race he is a hero isn't he? Now he is doing the right thing, his *izzat* is increasing, but really it is decreasing isn't it?" (Shabaz, 1st, German male: 14).

Individuals negotiate which norms and values they feel are relevant, worthy or acceptable yardsticks by which their *izzat* ought to be measured If they are not then respondents disregard the sanctions of moral outrage, exercised to enforce these norms and values, as being unimportant or irrelevant to *izzat* In such instances it is often felt (by 63% of respondents) that *izzat* is used too readily as a mechanism of

control. In particular, moral voices of the community apply macro-level guidelines of 'sacred' and 'profane' to issues, respondents feel, are completely unrelated As such, the lack of conformity to such 'misdirected' thresholds of 'us' and 'them', or 'sacred' and 'profane' values, are considered to be inapplicable to an individual's *izzat* and therefore inclusion in the community

> "My parents definition of me bringing shame on them is different from what I would expect or think bringing shame on me is I mean for my parents me wearing trousers in the community might be a knock against their *izzat*, but I don't mind that For [daughter] to wear trousers for me that wouldn't even harm my *izzat*" (Zoe, 2nd, UK female· 6)

> "*Izzat* is a concept of control and conformity within the Muslim community, and with most communities. And so I think it is quite a strong part of you know Muslim and Asian life at the moment. Interviewer: why do you say control? It is used to make sure people conform to the norms, the given norms of society really You know people are expected to do certain things and expected to behave in a good way and become a good role model in society and not somebody who is doing bad things. So I think it is used as a sort of control mechanism in that sense" (Safa, 2nd, UK female: 7).

> "[Community control] too is part of [Pakistani] culture, whether your child is a son or a daughter, a persons *izzat* is *mushtariq* (attached/fused) with that [his or her behaviour]. We take it far too seriously... we make that into a question of life or death" (Wahid, 1st, German male· 15).

The degree to which individuals participate within the community can have the affect of both mitigating, and of compounding, the exclusionary forces of moral voices. Where individuals have a great deal of *izzat*, through extensive social networks they have a pre-established balance of social capital As a result the loss of *izzat*, whilst potentially detrimental, may not be so significant as to be exclusionary In the same instance, the more social capital an individual has the more he or she has to lose Some respondents provide anecdotal accounts of individual's who possessed abundant social capital, but, where the care relationship was not honoured, and they were held to be responsible for this, the effects of moral voices were such that they were severely excluded.

> "His father was very rich . and now there is nothing left. That man cannot even talk to anyone, he cannot even sit in someone's gathering...because his children do not look after him" (Tahir, 1st, German male· 9).

Respondents are in a process of negotiation with community moral voices, as their identities and roles come into conflict with the 'traditional' norms and values of the Pakistani Muslim community. As individual views of what 'their' community symbols ought to be and represent, differ from community voices' perceptions of the way symbols are, individuals negotiate within the parameters of power, voice and ownership. These negotiations are bringing about subtle shifts in community boundaries as the distinctions between 'them' and 'us', and the symbols representing such distinctions, change. As such, thresholds of inclusion and exclusion are also seeing a corresponding shift

8.6 *Conclusion: Care of Elders - The Crux of Exclusion?*

As shown in Chapter 7, respondent perceptions and expectations of the care relationship in old age are in a process of flux In arguing in favour of diminished expectations of care on the grounds that in countries such as Britain and Germany, one's old age is provided for to a much greater degree, respondents, in all age categories, express a shift in the boundaries of 'Pakistani Muslim' identities. The empirical data reveals an express desire to maintain and perpetuate 'Pakistani Muslim', and in some cases just 'Muslim', identity. Respondents re-assert their own identifications with labels such as 'Pakistani' and 'Muslim'. This said, at the same time they suggest a more 'Western' future in terms of their care in old age. The empirical data is illustrative of a potential decline in the familial care of elders forming such an integral symbol of what it means to be a 'Pakistani Muslim'. The values that underpin such care of elders remain what 'we' do, and 'they' do not. In light of changing roles, socio-economic circumstances, and identities, there is beginning to develop a more reciprocal definition of what caring for ones elders is thought to mean, no longer pre-conditioned, in unqualified terms, by patriarchal and gerontocratic structures of age. This re-negotiation is occurring through the positive use of Islam to combat 'cultural' expectations of children, as more educated and consciously reflective Muslims are exploring the rights of all parties within the care relationship.

Failure to abide by the pronouncements of the community's moral voices elicits a degree of moral outrage/suasion. *Izzat* is held to ransom over an offspring's exercise of care for his or her elder. As such, it is possible that care for the elderly is carried out as a result of moral compulsion and the threat of social exclusion, rather than choice. However, as individuals reconcile their own views on what it means to have honour and standing (*izzat*) within the community, and question the authority,

legitimacy and indeed accuracy of voices based on traditions and rituals which no longer conform to their understanding of Pakistani Muslim boundaries, they re-negotiate the thresholds of exclusion/inclusion

In conclusion, whilst the duties and obligations of children within the care relationship may be normatively defined, the roles and responsibilities of both elders and their kin in such relationships are in a constant process of negotiation. As respondents provide reflexive accounts of the moral voice of the self, it is evident that this morality is conditioned, at any given moment, by the social relations in which an individual is participating, his or her own views and beliefs as to these relationships, as well as moral voices external to the self, in particular those that arise from social relations such as those of the community Thus, the moral voices of the community, whilst undoubtedly present (and in many instances a principal influence upon the agency of an individual) do not exert authoritarian control over community members. Rather they are conditioned and mediated by the situated morality of social relations as well as an individual's own morality

Conclusion – Pakistani Muslim Communities in Britain and Germany:
Familial Care of Elders and Processes of Social Exclusion

This thesis has explored processes of social exclusion from the perspective of individual Pakistani Muslims in Britain and Germany. It has focused specifically upon the care relationship between elders and their kin as one site where processes of exclusion are experienced and contested. The outcomes of this exploration offer theoretical and policy contributions to the debates around community, care and social exclusion This chapter will provide a synthesised account of the aims and outcomes of this thesis, with specific references to the research questions laid out in Chapters 1 and 4.

The principal aim of this thesis was to explore whether individuals within Pakistani Muslim communities experience processes of social exclusion where the care relationship between elders and their kin breakdown, are absent or discarded Through this exploration this thesis sought to engage with processes of social exclusion from a micro-level perspective (see Chapter 4) This principal aim was divided into four research questions, the first of which asked how, and why, is the care relationship between Pakistani Muslim elders and their offspring and/or kin, relevant to their (elder and offspring/kin) inclusion into the Pakistani Muslim community?

This thesis has offered a typology of care that concurs with and augments the ethics of care as understood by Williams (2000; see also Chapter 3). Discussion of this typology in Chapter 7 identified the ethics of *izzat, khidmat* and reciprocity as underpinning the ideal care relationship between Pakistani Muslim elders and their kin. By understanding the care relationship through the conceptual tools, and ethics, of *izzat* and *khidmat*, this thesis contextualises Williams' (2000) ethics of care within the Pakistani Muslim diaspora The ethic of *izzat* empowers the position of both carer and care recipient facilitating their exercise of bodily integrity, identity and voice. In addition the central role played by *khidmat* and reciprocity in negotiations of care speak to an interdependent conceptualisation of care as a relationship.

As well as an ethic of the care relationship, Chapter 6 showed that *izzat* plays an important role in social relations in the wider Pakistani Muslim community,

facilitating and supporting an individual's participation, or that of his or her family In this setting *izzat* denotes conformity to Islamic and Pakistani cultural norms and values. This conformity is thought to be indicative of an individual or family's good moral c haracter, a s w ell a s, a nd perhaps m ore significantly, t heir c ommitment t o 'us'. This thesis has found that the care relationship between elders and their kin has come to form a symbol of Pakistani Muslim identity, used to differentiate between 'us' (Pakistani Muslims), and 'them' (non-Muslim White British or German population). The symbolism of familial care of elders, located in the traditions and myths of a community's Pakistani heritage as well as their Islamic beliefs, echoes Cohen's (1985) understanding of condensation symbols discussed in Chapter 2. As a symbol of Pakistani Muslim identity, participation within the care relationship is considered emblematic of an individual, or family's, continual affiliation with 'our' norms, values and community

In answer to the first research question it has been shown that the care relationship is linked to an individual or family's inclusion into the Pakistani Muslim community i n t wo w ays. F irstly, c are r elationships constructed and n egotiated i n accordance to the principle of *izzat* empower care recipients, and to a lesser degree carers, and challenge traditional understandings of dependency (Shakespeare, 2000, Tronto, 1993, see also Chapter 3). Reflecting the underlying principle of *izzat*, familial care of elders is indicative of an elder's power and voice The receipt of care from one's kin is not considered a negative or dis-empowering experience, rather, signifies the importance and status of an elder within the family

Secondly, representative of norms and values that denote affiliation with 'us', care relationships between elders and their kin come to symbolise Pakistani Muslim identities and are imbued with nostalgic references to the past In reflection of such symbolism it has been shown in Chapter 7 that participation within the care relationship s ignifies success o n t he p art o f t he p arent, w ho i s p erceived t o h ave given his or her child a good Islamic and Pakistani cultural upbringing Elder care recipients are further considered to have been good parents as their children's participation in the care relationship is perceived as reciprocated social capital accumulated by the parent during a child's upbringing Similarly the role of carer has been identified as inferring an individual's good moral character and spiritual wellbeing. In locating its roots in Islam, the practice of caring for one's elders is also defined by some as the right of the carer, reflecting the importance attached to spiritual benefits.

This care relationship can result in the dis-empowerment of both carer and care recipient. The effects of familial hierarchies based on age and the accumulation of *izzat* in old age can disproportionately weaken the position of carer as the balance of power is weighted towards the elder care recipient. In the same instance positive connotations attached to understandings of interdependency and reciprocity can silence the voice of the elder, who may wish to remain 'independent' within his or her familial networks. These connotations can lead to the presumed desirability of care even where the care recipient may not want it. This thesis has also raised concerns with regard to the power and voice of care recipients who are children, particularly in reflection of the importance ascribed to the respect and *izzat* one should give to elders whilst practising the ethics of care in the Pakistani Muslim diaspora.

The negative effects (upon carer and care recipient) of conceptualising care in wholly positive terms are, to some extent, also illustrative of the outcomes relating to the second and third research questions The second research question asked, what influence does the Pakistani Muslim community have on care relationships between Pakistani Muslim elders and their kin, and why? This was complemented by the third research question posed, is there a relationship between the influence of the community on this care relationship and processes of social exclusion, and if so what? (See Chapter 4). It has been shown in Chapter 7 that where Islamic guidelines are thought to promote care of ones' elders (Finch, 1989, see also Chapters 3 and 8) this provides the condensation symbol of care with sacred connotations

In Chapter 2 it was argued that faith based communities in diaspora are able to use the sacred/profane dichotomy (Durkheim, 2002, 1984, 1964) to distinguish their boundaries from those who are of a different faith Analysis of the empirical data in Chapter 6 demonstrated that sacred/profane distinctions of community boundaries are made between Muslim communities of different ethno-cultural heritage as well as between Muslim and non-Muslim communities. The sacred/profane distinctions made by Pakistani Muslim communities in diaspora represent different interpretations of Islam and, as such, play a significant role in perpetuating community identities. The analysis shows that community boundaries are fluid, reflecting the daily content/value negotiations of individual community members (Parekh, 2000; Husain & O'Brien, 2000; Taylor, 1998; Breakwell, 1987; see also Chapter 2). However, these boundaries take on static definitions when there is a

perceived threat. In such instances the community's ownership of the sacred is defended much more ardently against those who are perceived to interpret Islam differently

Chapter 2 discussed Cohen's (1985) understanding of symbolic competition, whereby communities exercise and reassert symbolic norms and values as a means to sustain the status quo and prevent change In Chapter 6 it was argued that change in boundary construction is not always deemed to be negative. Changes are considered acceptable where perceived to be more Islamic, rather than culturally inclined. For the most part Islam is seen to be more important than culture for two reasons. Firstly, as the shared faith of the community Islam is seen to be more 'legitimate' than Pakistani culture. Secondly, Islam is also seen to be more sustainable because it transcends culture. The retention of Islam in diaspora enables identities to be perpetuated through anchors that go beyond geographical or ethno-cultural boundaries. This is particularly salient for the 'next' generation of Pakistani heritage Muslim children, whose upbringing in Britain or Germany means large parts of their identities may not be located in their ethno-cultural origins.

The trend toward the use of Islam as a central self-identifier (Husain and O'Brien, 2000) is accompanied by re-interpretations of Islam, as individuals seek to remove Pakistani cultural inflections that have resulted from Islam's interpretation in, and implementation through, cultural practices Changes to community boundaries that are consistent with these re-interpretations are considered to remain within the bounds of the sacred and therefore deemed to be legitimate. Thus, amongst British respondents the way in which the Gujarati community follows Islamic guidelines acts as an incentive for respondent religious practice, albeit in moderation Whilst acquiescence to change is demonstrative of the perception of Islam as guidelines (see Chapters 3 and 8) rather than absolute rules, the dynamics between Turkish and Pakistani Muslims demonstrates, in Chapter 6, that the scope of this change is restricted to that which is considered sacred

Changes in boundary construction are deemed to be negative where they mimic the 'other', even where the 'other' is Muslim Such changes are associated with the profane and considered a threat to the integrity of Islamic community boundaries The Turkish community, whilst being recognised as being part of the global *Umm'ah* by the Pakistani Muslim community in Germany, is rarely defined as part of 'us'. In concurring with Cohen it was demonstrated in Chapter 6 that the

Pakistani Muslim community is able to defend the integrity of its boundaries from profane influences of the 'other' through symbolic competition In addition, in Chapter 8 it was found that processes of exclusion become a means of maintaining continuity through defending the sanctity of 'us'. In the context of diasporic faith based communities exclusion of all those who do not correspond to the common understanding of who can be admitted to 'our' boundaries is an important part of maintaining the sacred. Failure to do so will affect what 'we' are and who 'we' will become in the future.

These changes challenge the location of diasporic identities in the traditions and myths of the past, and pre-empt the loss of 'a way of life'. More importantly individuals that may be considered a part of us due to their affiliation with the sacred, such as Turkish Muslims in Germany, are more of a threat because they are able to permeate the boundaries of a community. Differences in the implementation and interpretations of Islam threaten sacred practices of the Pakistani Muslim community and are thus particularly harmful to the continuity of community boundaries and identities In contrast, that which is different (such as non-Muslim Germans) is so clearly profane it cannot possibly be considered sacred

Notwithstanding the attempts to retain the status quo it has been argued in Chapter 6 that processes of symbolic competition result in shifting understandings of symbols, and the community boundaries they represent, as the values they are underpinned by are re-invested with contextual significance. In concurring with Hall (1996, 1993) it was found that such shifts also reflect changes in individuals identities as the re-assertion of symbols that denote ones' identities of who 'we' are is also a process of becoming who we are developing in to (see also Chapter 2).

Chapter 2 elaborated upon Etzioni's (1998, 1997, 1995) vision of 'communitarian' communities, that he advocates to be good and wholesome structures, and the rightful site of moral control. In this thesis, Etzioni's understandings have been used to conceptualise the internal mechanisms of Pakistani Muslim communities in diaspora. In particular moral voices of the self and community have been identified within the empirical data as attempting to exercise control over, and shape, individual agency. As found in Chapters 7 and 8, moral voices of the community exert moral and social pressure on individuals to care for their elders, or to ensure one's children care for oneself, as a means of denoting conformity and defending 'our' community boundaries These moral voices promote the continuity of values

such as *izzat* and family, considered, alongside care of elders, to be integral to the identities of the Pakistani Muslim diaspora. The continued exercise of condensation symbols such as care of elders influence and re-negotiate differentiations of 'them' and 'us' as separations between what 'we' do, and what 'they' do not, are perpetuated and re-constituted

Chapter 8 demonstrated that actions contrary to the social rules represented by moral voices of the Pakistani Muslim community incur shame upon an individual, decreasing his or her *izzat*, and/or, that of his/her family. This is consistent with Etzioni's (1997, 1995) thesis Sanctions of shame are facilitated through the perceived and actual moral outrage of the community, which takes the form of 'gossip' or 'talk' and varies in degrees and scope. In concurring with Werbner (2002) this thesis has found that community influences upon the care relationship between elders and their kin utilise the mechanism of *izzat* in a politics of "honour and shame" (2002. 27). Where elders are not cared for by their children, or the care that they receive does not meet the standards that moral voices of the community expect, the *izzat* of the would be carer is diminished. The *izzat* of the elder is also diminished (although not to the same degree), as he or she becomes the subject of speculation and sympathy. This leads to conjecture, within the community, as to what degree parents will have cared for their own children, and their ability to adequately convey the Islamic and Pakistani cultural importance of caring for ones elders to their children. Consequently, the consideration of care in the context of boundary construction and defence results in the overarching principles, to which it is subject, becoming rigid. This detracts from the experience of care as a daily relationship, the very character of which necessitates fluidity and comprise

Where an individual's actions, or lack thereof, within the care relationship come to be the subject of gossip or talk, his or her conformity to the norms and values of the community are called into question. As a measure of conformity, the care relationship between elders and their kin becomes a yardstick by which to determine the degree to which an individual conforms to the community's values and, as such, is worthy of participating within the community. In answer to the second research question this thesis has argued that the Islamic and ethno-cultural underpinnings of Pakistani Muslim communities in diaspora provide many of the guidelines that shape and influence negotiations of care relationships between elders and their kin These guidelines have particular salience for diasporic communities as they are

located in the Pakistani cultural myths and traditions, and, Islamic values that anchor their Pakistani Muslim identities.

In relation to the third research question it has been demonstrated that moral voices of the community seek to enforce shared norms and values emblematic of a community's boundaries through regulating individual agency, ensuring their participation within the care relationship. In so doing these moral voices have a bearing upon an individual or family's *izzat* within the wider community, affecting the degree to which he, she or they are included. It was shown in Chapter 7 that as the primary and predominant carer, women shoulder much of the responsibility, as daughters and daughter in laws, to behave in a manner that conforms to the moral values espoused by these voices. In addition, constraints such as participation in the labour market are more readily accepted and justified in the case of men than women. Women are also perceived as requiring more care than men and consequently experience a loss of *izzat* disproportionate to their male counterparts Although as shown in Chapter 8 an individual's *izzat* is affected by numerous factors. This said, in contrast to women, instances where men do not receive care from their kin may be attributed to lack of need or requirement for the receipt of such care, rather than an indication of unmet rights and/or unfulfilled obligations The perception that men do not require care does not consider the interdependencies of the care relationship, nor its practice in daily life in the form of practical, emotional, financial and emotional care (see Chapter 3).

Outcomes of the fourth research question mediate those of the second and the third, and inform the way in which social exclusion is conceptualised. The fourth question asked, how and why do individuals differentially experience processes of social exclusion? The discussion in Chapter 3 concluded that macro-level understandings of social exclusion superimpose perceptions of what it means to participate in society. In seeking to engage and develop such theorisations the fourth research question focused upon individual interactions with processes of social exclusion as a means to understand the different resource negotiations that take place when experiencing and contesting thresholds of inclusion/exclusion.

Processes of social exclusion within Pakistani Muslim communities use shame based strategies to weaken the social bonds between individual members It was demonstrated in Chapter 8 that processes of social exclusion are initiated through the moral voices of the community in order to prevent 'contamination' of

community norms and values, thus maintaining the integrity of community boundaries It is argued that whilst these moral voices may seek to impose value-laden understandings of what it means, in morally acceptable terms, to participate in Pakistani Muslim communities, the thresholds of exclusion they give rise to are not generalisable. Exclusion, through the reduction or withdrawal of *izzat* is primarily dependent upon three interrelated factors The first is the degree to which the guidelines espoused by moral voices of the community are in agreement with an individual's own moral reckoning. The second is the degree to which community moral voices correspond to an individual's overarching discourse of honour and shame. The third and most significant factor is the degree to which conflicts between the cultural and Islamic influences on community moral voices can be, or are, resolved

Analysis of the data throughout Chapter 8 ascertained that individuals continuously negotiate with the applicability and authority of moral voices. Individuals utilise a series of resources such as level of education, alternative obligations such as participation in the paid labour market, and different moral pulls arising from social roles or Islamic interpretations to negotiate with community moral voices In reflection of these negotiations this thesis shows that thresholds of exclusion are fluid, subject to individual agency and recourse to alternative resources and social capital. In certain instances individuals choose not to be a part of the Pakistani Muslim community. This choice is particularly evident where membership requires the fulfilment of criteria that an individual's moral perspective does not agree with. In this context individuals feel that the values they hold are 'better' than those espoused by moral voices representative of the community from which they are being excluded This thesis demonstrates that processes of exclusion that rely on value based judgements require, at least to some extent, over arching frameworks of shared values. In the absence of such shared values, if individuals choose not to be included, processes of exclusion through community moral voices are ineffective

Negotiations with exclusionary processes also relate to the remit of their authority In particular macro-level perspectives on right and wrong are not wholly translatable to micro-level decision making. This is reconciled through the understanding of Islam as a set of guidelines rather than starkly defined rules In Chapter 8 it was found that, through such an understanding, individuals are able to negotiate between those moral values they feel are applicable to their *izzat* in a particular context, and those that are not The most prominent alternative moral

perspective utilised in individual negotiations with community moral voices is that derived from Islam. Where the Islamic and cultural origins of community moral voices give rise to contradictions, however slight, the legitimacy of these voices is challenged

It was argued in Chapter 2 that moral voices of the community are authoritative platforms of governance because their morality is beyond debate and dispute (Etzioni, 1995). Where the values represented by community moral voices relate to issues that can be approached from conflicting Islamic and cultural perspectives the moral authority of such voices, and those who they are exercised by, is no longer indisputable Challenges to community moral voices resulting from their representation of cultural practices that contradict, or no longer align with the Islamic values they are thought to represent, questions the foundation of diasporic communities based upon shared norms and values. As shown in Chapter 8, in such instances Islam is used as a tool to re-moralise and negotiate with exclusionary forces whilst at the same time being used as a means to differentiate between the subtleties of Muslim ethno-cultural identities. This is particularly evident amongst the Pakistani Muslim community in Germany, which, in the presence of Turkish Muslims is seeking to establish Islam in a more overt manner than its British counterpart. Amongst this community there is little tolerance for prescriptions of moral voices that originate from the community's Pakistani cultural heritage. These processes of negotiation are also illustrative of the manner in which values of community moral voices are shifting, as are the community boundaries they represent.

In Chapter 8 the thesis contends that moral voices of the Pakistani Muslim community in Germany do not pervade individual life to the same degree as their British counterparts In addition to their weakening due to Islamic and cultural conflicts, this is attributable, in Germany, to an absence of extended family networks and widely dispersed Pakistani Muslim communities This is in part due to differences in migration and settlement trajectories of Pakistani Muslim communities in Britain and Germany. The relative absence of familial networks, and the small number of Pakistani Muslims settled in Germany contribute to diluted moral voices. The absence of extended family networks also reduce the number of advocates community moral voices enjoy. In Britain the relationship between individual and familial *izzat* results in the family, through the exercise of community moral voices, becoming a primary site of control Wider family

members aim to ensure individuals, and women in particular, conform to moral voices of the community in order to maintain, and increase, familial *izzat* and community identities (see Chapter 2). As shown in Chapter 6 the absence of kinship networks amongst Pakistani Muslims in Germany leads to a greater interdependency within the Pakistani Muslim community. This interdependence gives rise to more discerning and tolerant moral voices, which are accommodating to individual circumstances. In the absence of family, exclusion of community members does not facilitate the continuity of community, rather, it contributes to its dissolution. Finally, the widespread geographical dispersal of Pakistani Muslims in Germany means the moral outrage through which the moral voices sanction are considerably weakened

The experiences and expectations of familial care of elders can also lead to exclusion from wider societal structures. This thesis has argued in Chapters 5 and 7 that the principle of *izzat*, understood in terms of social capital, may become a barrier to accessing formal provisions of state welfare, or exacerbating vulnerability to processes of social exclusion. Within the context of the British welfare state a reconfiguration of welfare policies in favour of social capital may be misleading and detrimental to the care relationship. Presumptions of the formal welfare state that the presence of extended kinship networks equate to a level of social capital where individuals will care for one another suggest that social capital can be created even where none may exist Notwithstanding the British welfare states' reliance on his work, such a view contradicts Putnam (2000) who observes that social capital is generated where reciprocal relationships exist, not simply where people live together sharing common values As shown in Chapter 7, care relationships between elders and their kin in Pakistani Muslim communities are subject to negotiations Sweeping presumptions that the ethics underpinning the ideal Pakistani care relationship will, or can, be practised, are inaccurate

Similarly the presumption of social capital in Germany, at this stage of the Pakistani Muslim settlement trajectory, is idealistic and unwarranted. As established in Chapter 5 the migration history of this group has not taken place over a long enough period of time for such presumptions to be justifiable. Migrant communities are already in a relatively weak positions vis-à-vis the welfare state, the paid labour market, and as a result of their citizenship and residential status are further disadvantaged by policies based on family, because they do not have pre-established familial networks to call upon as and when informal care is required. Where

members of the Pakistani Muslim community are not protected by social insurance schemes the absence of family leaves them reliant on non-contributory provisions such as social assistance, which, as shown in Chapter 5 may result in the non-renewal of residence permits

Networks of social capital cannot by superimposed, or even fostered through the use of policy intervention or withdrawal. It has been demonstrated in Chapters 7 and 8 that individual accumulation and ownership of *izzat* is not simply a matter of established familial networks An individual's ability to capitalise upon the resource of *izzat* is dependent upon daily negotiations. A nuanced understanding of the fluidity of care relationships, with reference to the principle of *izzat*, particularly in the context of welfare state policies relating to Pakistani Muslim service users in Britain and Germany, would lead to more appropriate service delivery and implementation that does not superimpose normative assertions of familial support

In answer to the fourth research question this thesis has argued that individuals are not passive recipients of structural exclusionary forces, rather they are active agents involved in the processes of exclusion through value based negotiations. The negotiations undertaken by Pakistani Muslims in diaspora with structural influences of Pakistani culture, Islam and community moral voices result in fluid and subjective thresholds of inclusion/exclusion as individuals navigate through and mediate with the norms and values represented The outcomes and conclusions of this thesis have considerable significance for policy and policy makers Policies based upon, and presumptive of, means of participation and inclusion, have the potential to be ineffectual where they impose labels of exclusion. Such policies need to be sensitive to individual diversity and alternative value systems which do not necessarily prioritise participation in pervading structures such as the labour market or the welfare state.

Through the exploration of individual understandings and negotiations with processes of social exclusion this research reveals the need for conceptualisations of social exclusion to undertake more holistic considerations of the actors involved and the resources available to them, including their moral perspectives. This thesis has also demonstrated that current emphasis within welfare policies on notions of social capital can themselves lead to, and exacerbate, exclusion, not only from formal structures such as the welfare state, but also informal networks of community, family and care relationships The construction and implementation of such policies

requires an equitable balance between the micro-level considerations of social capital, familial ties, intergenerational negotiations and individually constructed thresholds of social exclusion with more macro-level considerations of exclusionary forces, formal provisions of welfare and structurally constructed thresholds of exclusion

This research points to two potential avenues of further study and academic interest. The first is the dynamic relationship between Pakistani Muslim and Turkish Muslim communities in Germany. This relationship offers the opportunity to explore the way different migration trajectories, understandings of Islam and of ethno-cultural heritage impact upon the construction of community boundaries, within the same legislative frameworks. The second potential avenue of research focuses specifically upon the gendered dimension of care relationships At a time when much academic and political attention is being directed toward dispelling traditional perceptions, and socially constructed roles of woman carers, care relationships of Pakistani Muslims are becoming weighted even further toward such gendered models Presence in 'Western' societies such as Britain and Germany is being used to extend the female remit of care from the physical, emotional and practical to the financial, providing important and timely subjects of research.

It was beyond the remit of this study to extend to these avenues of research However, in answering the research questions this thesis provides a number of insights. As one of the first studies to explore Pakistani Muslim communities in Britain and Germany comparatively, this thesis has shown that communities in diaspora have the potential to exclude their own members, even as they seek to maintain their identities and defend the integrity of their boundaries. The comparative aspect provides a discerning perspective on the way in which such defence is constructed and the resultant mechanisms of exclusion as influenced by different trajectories of community formation, size and Islamic interpretation. Such processes of exclusion occur where communities superimpose, upon their members, moral values of what it means to participate and what degree of participation is considered acceptable. This thesis offers insights into the fluidity of exclusionary processes and thresholds, which are subject to continual negotiations with individual agency. In addition it provides a nuanced understanding of ageing and familial care within non-Islamic 'Western' societies and in the context of 'our' community.

Appendix 1a

Pilot Study Questions and Prompts

Introduction

- Asalam'o'alykum
- I am interviewing you today for my PhD which is looking at Muslim families in Britain and Germany, and care in the family
- These interviews are part of a pilot study, and I am hoping improve the way I conduct the interview, and the questions that I ask Please give me your opinions and any suggestions you have for these improvements. I am particularly interested in suggestions you may have for different questions, or changes to the questions I ask you, and the way I ask them
- In the interview I will be asking you how you have cared for members of your family, how members of your family care for you and what care you expect from members of your family and why.
- If at any time you feel you don't want to answer a question, for whatever reason, just say that, is not a problem. Secondly if at any point during the interview you would like to stop the interview, that is also fine. It is absolutely your choice to participate in this interview, and the extent you wish to participate. Please do not hesitate if at any point you no longer wish to do so. Just let me know.
- It is also important for you to know that the interview is totally confidential. Anything that you say to me during the course of this interview/focus group will remain between us. Your name will not be mentioned in the PhD All names will be replaced with pseudonyms.
- Do you have any questions for me? If through out the interview you think of any, please feel free to stop me and ask.

Base Data

Family structure
1. How many people are in your family?
2. How many children do you have?
3. How many brothers and sisters do you have?
4. How old are they?
5. How many of your family members live in England/Germany?

Migration Patterns
1. Which member of your family moved to England/Germany first?
2. What was the purpose of migration?
3. Were they/you invited to come by someone you know?
4. Were you sponsored by anyone, and if so who?
5. Are you or other members of your family still in touch with this/these people?
6. Where in England/Germany did you first move to?
7. Have you moved since then and if so why?
8. Have the community/people you initially moved into also moved to where you now live?

Question Frame

Question Is there a strong community in the area in which you live?
   Prompt Does the community influence your family? If so how?

Prompt   Do you think it is important for there to be a Muslim community around you?

Prompt   In your opinion do you see any internal conflicts/problems/factions within the Muslim community?

Question   How important do you think Islam is to your home life?

Prompt   Do your children learn about Islam?

Prompt   Were you bought up more Islamically than your kids?

Prompt   Do you think your culture is still influential on your family life?

Prompt   Do your children learn about culture?

Question   How much has England's/Germany's environment/culture influenced your children?

Prompt   In your opinion how much influence does the environment have upon the next generation?

Prompt   How important do you think a child's environment is?

Prompt   For the moment, aside from care, what sorts of expectations do you have of your children?

Prompt   Do you think these expectations are cultural/religious/both?

Prompt   Is there a difference in the way you were bought up and the way your children are being bought up? What sorts of differences are these?

Prompt   Have you given your children more freedom because they have been born in Britain/Germany?

Prompt   What sorts of freedom have you given them?

Prompt   What sorts of expectations did/do your parents hold of you?

Question   How have you looked after your family members?

Prompt   Who did/do you look after?

Prompt   Did anybody help you in looking after this/these people?

Prompt   Who looks after you?

Prompt   When you looked after somebody was it easy?

Prompt   Why did you look after that person?

Prompt   Did you want to look after that person?

Prompt   Did you need help in looking after that person?

Question   Do you expect to be looked after in your old age?

Prompt   In your opinion who will look after you?

Prompt   Who do you want to look after you?

Prompt   Why this/these people?

Prompt   How do you want them to look after you?

Prompt   If you have a problem, who is the first person you turn to?

Prompt   Do you ever feel lonely?

Prompt   Do you think being cared for in your old age is a right?

Prompt   How do you think you got this right?

Prompt   Would you think it fair for me to say that you should look after yourself when your old?

Prompt   Would you think it fair for me to say that if you are unable to look after yourself then the government should do it?

Prompt   Would you think it fair for me to say you should not be a burden on your children when you become old?

Prompt   Do you have faith in your future? Are you worried about getting older? Do you have confidence in your old age?

Question   What role would you say '*Izzath*' plays in the life of you and your family?

 Prompt   Is your status linked to your *izzath*?

 Prompt   How important is *izzath*?

 Prompt   What is your status in your family?

 Prompt   What is your status in the community?

 Prompt   How does status in family change with age?

Question   If your children behave badly toward you do you think it affects your *izzath* in the community?

 Prompt   Does the community know what goes on in your house?

 Prompt   Do you know of people in the community who are not looked after by their children?

 Prompt   How do you think they feel about this?

 Prompt   How do you think the community treat them?

 Prompt   Do you think their status in the community has changed because of this?

Changes to Question Frame

Suggested Revisions	Implemented Revisions
When Asking about family, specify who?	Prompt inserted stating all those respondents consider family
Be less specific about the community in which people live	Initial question relating to community changed to ask 'Who do you consider part of your community?'
When asking about Islam ask how many times people go to mosque	Prompt regarding frequency of mosque attendance inserted
Ask about mother tongue	Prompt regarding importance of teaching mother tongue to children inserted
When asking about care ask why respondents looked after that person	Prompt inserted
Need to help define care, difficult to think of things on the spot	Prompts inserted categorising care under financial, emotional, practical and physical
You shouldn't need to ask about *izzath*, it should be obvious	Question retained, explanation for asking given where required

Interview Questions and Prompts

Introduction

- Asalam'o'alykum.
- Before we begin I think it is important for me to tell you why I have asked to interview you today and what it is that I am hoping to learn from this interview. This interview is one of many that I am doing for my PhD.
- The PhD is looking at Muslim families in Britain and Germany, and particularly care in the family.
- In the interview I will be asking you how you have cared for members of your family, how members of your family care for you and what care you expect from members of your family and why.
- If at any time you feel you don't want to answer a question, for whatever reason, just say, that is not a problem. Secondly if at any point during the interview you would like to stop the interview, that is also fine. It is absolutely your choice to participate in this interview, and the extent you wish to participate. Please do not hesitate if at any point you no longer wish to do so. Just let me know.
- It is also important for you to know that the interview is totally confidential Anything that you say to me during the course of this interview will remain between the two of us. Your name will not be mentioned in the PhD. All names will be replaced with pseudonyms.
- Do you have any questions for me? If through out the interview you think of any, please feel free to stop me and ask.

Base Data

Family structure
1. How many people are in your family – all those you consider family, where ever they may live and how ever they are related to you?
2. How many children do you have?
3. How many brothers and sisters do you have?
4. How old are they?
5. How many of your family members live in England/Germany?

Migration Patterns
1. Which member of your family moved to England/Germany first?
2. What was the purpose of migration?
3. Were they/you invited to come by someone you know?
4. Were you sponsored by anyone, and if so who?
5. Are you or other members of your family still in touch with this/these people?
6. Where in England/Germany did you first move to?
7. Have you moved since then and if so why?
8. Have the community/people you initially moved into also moved to where you now live?

Question Frame

Question Who do you consider part of your community?
   Prompt Is there a strong community in the area in which you live?
   Prompt Does the community influence your family? If so how?

Prompt Do you think it is important for there to be a Muslim community around you?

Prompt In your opinion do you see any internal conflicts/problems/factions within the Muslim community?

Question How important do you think Islam is to your home life?

Prompt Do you, or any member of your family go to the mosque on a regular basis? Approximately how many times a day/week?

Prompt Have you bought your kids up in an Islamic way?

Prompt Do your children learn about Islam?

Prompt Were you bought up more Islamically than your kids?

Prompt Do you think your culture is still influential on your family life?

Prompt How important do you think your mother tongue is? Why?

Prompt Do your children learn about culture?

Question How much has England's/Germany's environment/culture influenced your children?

Prompt In your opinion how much influence does the environment have upon the next generation?

Prompt How important do you think a child's environment is?

Prompt For the moment, aside from care, what sorts of expectations do you have of your children?

Prompt Do you think these expectations are cultural/religious/both?

Prompt Is there a difference in the way you were bought up and the way your children are being bought up? What sorts of differences are these?

Prompt Have you given your children more freedom because they have been born in Britain/Germany?

Prompt What sorts of freedom have you given them?

Prompt What sorts of expectations did/do your parents hold of you?

Question How have you looked after your family members?

Prompt Who did/do you look after?

Prompt Did anybody help you in looking after this/these people?

Prompt Why did/do you look after them?

Prompt Who looks after you?

Prompt Why this person?

Prompt Have you helped anybody financially?

Prompt Have you helped anybody emotionally?

Prompt Have you helped anybody practically?

Prompt Have you helped anybody personally?

Prompt When you looked after somebody was it easy?

Prompt Why did you look after that person?

Prompt Did you want to look after that person?

Prompt Did you need help in looking after that person?

Question Do you expect to be looked after in your old age?

Prompt In your opinion who will look after you?

Prompt Who do you want to look after you?

Prompt Why this/these people?

Prompt How do you want them to look after you?

Prompt What sort of care do you think this will be? Financial? Practical? Personal? Emotional?

Prompt   If you have a problem, who is the first person you turn to?

Prompt   Do you ever feel lonely?

Prompt   Are you financially secure? What about in the future?

Prompt   Do you think being cared for in your old age is a right?

Prompt   How do you think you got this right?

Prompt   Would you think it fair for me to say that you should look after yourself when your old?

Prompt   Would you think it fair for me to say that if you are unable to look after yourself then the government should do it?

Prompt   Would you think it fair for me to say you should not be a burden on your children when you become old?

Prompt   Do you have faith in your future? Are you worried about getting older? Do you have confidence in your old age?

Question   What role would you say 'Izzath' plays in the life of you and your family?

Prompt   Is your status linked to your izzath?

Prompt   How important is izzath?

Prompt   What is your status in your family?

Prompt   What is your status in the community?

Prompt   How does status in family change with age?

Question   If your children behave badly toward you do you think it affects your *izzath* in the community?

Prompt   Does the community know what goes on in your house?

Prompt   Do you know of people in the community who are not looked after by their children?

Prompt   How do you think they feel about this?

Prompt   How do you think the community treat them?

Prompt   Do you think their status in the community has changed because of this?

Translation Exercise

Extract from Deen, UK male.

مـرے حال سـے ہر بدے کے اوپر منر ہے ۔ مرا
مطلب ہے اگر بچے پیار سے دیکھ بھال کرنا چاہتے
ہں پھر ہے ٹھیق ہے ۔ لیکن بوجھ بن جانا ہے جب
سب کی امید رکھی جانی ہے ۔ پھر ہم دعاؤں کے
لیے نہں کمیوٹی کے لیے کرتے ہے ۔ پڑوسیوں کو
خوش رکھنے کے لیے ۔

"I think it depends on each person. I mean if children want to look after [their elders] with love than that's ok. I don't think that will be a burden. But it becomes a burden when you expect everything. Then we don't do it for prayers we do it for the community, to keep our neighbours happy".

مـرے حال سـے بفریان نفریان ہر بندے کے حالات
کے اوپر منر ہے ۔ اگر بچے پیار سے دیکھ بھال کرنا
چاہتے ہں پھر ہے ٹھیق ہے ۔ مں نہں سوچتا ہے
بوجھ ہے ۔ لیکن بوجھ تب ہے جب امید رکھی جانی
ہے ۔ ہم پھر سب کچھ جو کر رہں ہں دعاؤں کے
لیے نہں ساری کمیوٹی کے لیے کرتے ہے ۔
پڑوسیوں کو خوش کدنے کے لیے ۔

"I think it depends on individual cases more or less you know. I mean if...children want to look after [their elders] out of love that is fine. And I think that won't be a burden. But it is a burden when it has been expected...everything we do we are not doing it for the prayer we are doing it for the whole community, to please every body else in the whole neighbourhood" (Deen, UK male: 9)

Appendix 4

Base Data

Name	Year[1]	A[2]	Family in host country	Family in Pakistan	Migration history
Female/Britain					
Deeba	1963	55 1st[3]	Husband in Morocco. Cousins. Her brothers are dead, but their families live nearby	One older sister and two brothers. Parents are both dead.	Husband came to work. She followed. He has now moved to Morocco. She has remarried in Britain.
Hana	1975	44 1st	3 daughters 21, 10, 6, son in law, husband 2 sons	Parents	Husband came in 1968 with his parents. She came as his fiancé at the age of 16
Azra	1984	63 1st	2 daughters 30, 38, aunt, husband. 1 daughter 43, 2 sons 45, 47, 1 brother, 2 sister in laws and their families	Large family spread out in Pakistan 4 brothers, 1 sister. All siblings in Pakistan	She got married at 16 in Pakistan and moved to Kenya. Came to Britain following Africanisation policies in Kenya. Her aunt followed after a few years. Husband joined her later, he had difficulties as he was of Pakistani descent but was born in Kenya so held a Kenyan passport. First husband passed away in 1974. She remarried in 1994
Jasmin	1969	53 1st	2 sons 31, 26, 3 daughters 33, 21, 19	Does not say.	Husband came to work in 1961. She followed a few years later.
Najm	1968	55 1st	3 daughters 32, 30, 28, 2 sons 25, 20. 2 grandsons, 1 grand daughter	6 brothers all younger then her.	Husband came initially to work. She joined him after marriage.
Beena	1969	37 2nd[4]	1 son 12, 1 daughter 10. 2 brothers, and their families. Mother	Mother and father in law	Father came to work. Her mother followed when respondents was about 4.

[1] Of Migration
[2] Age
[3] Refers to first generation

Page 261

Name	Year[1]	A[2]	Family in host country	Family in Pakistan	Migration history
Safa	1963	34 2nd	Parents 55, 64, brother 31, 1 sister 33.	1 sister, 28.	Father came to work in 1963 Mother joined him in 1965
Zoe	Don't know	35 2nd	Parents, brother 41, sister in law, sister 31, brother in law, niece, husband, 2 daughters 6, 2	In-Laws.	Father came to work. Bought a house then called his family to join him.
Zahra	40 – 50 years ago	30 2nd	2 daughters 9, 5, 1 son 18mths, husband, parents, 3 sister, 28, 29, 12, 1 brother, 25.	In-Laws	Father came to work Went back to Pakistan to marry and then family joined him a few years later.
Dilshad	1979	33 2nd	Parents, 4 sisters, 2 brothers 4 daughters 9, 7, 4, 2, 1 son 10, husband	Extended family such as uncles and aunts	Father came to work. Family joined him after he went back and got married. Respondent was 6 months old when came to England with her mother Father called his brother over
Male/Britain					
Amir	1982	36 2nd	Wife, 2 daughters, 6 ½, 4 ½, 1 son, 1. Father, 1 brother	Mother, 2 sisters	Father came to work Respondent and his family remained in Pakistan until he was 16. He then migrated to Britain to join his father
Deen	1980	38 2nd	Mum, dad, 1 sister. 3 children 4 ½, 2 ½, 2 mths	Extended family such as uncles and aunts.	Father came to work. Respondent and his family remained in Pakistan, and migrated to Britain when he was a teenager.
Haider	1989, 1992	35 2nd	Parents in law, children, wife,	1 sister 35, 2 brothers 25, 19, father.	Uncle/father in law came to work. Respondent initially came to Britain as a visitor, then when he got married in 1992
Ijaz	Late 50's	32 2nd	Parents, 3 brothers 23, 29, 46, 1 sister 25.	Does not say	Father came for financial reasons in late 50's. Mother joined him in mid-60's
Kamil	1960	62 1st	4 daughters, 31, 25, 23, 22, son 18, wife and sister in law that lives with him.	2 sisters, 74, 46. 3 brothers, 71, 65, 56.	Migrated to work. Called his brothers and brothers-in-laws over.

---

[4] Refers to second generation

Name	Year[1]	A[2]	Family in host country	Family in Pakistan	Migration history
Mubin	1981	50 1st	1 granddaughter.	1 brother, 4 sisters Eldest brother died.	Oldest brother came in 1962, then sister. Respondent came as refugee Was called over by his brother before, but did not want to come
Naim	1954, 1966	76 1st	1 daughter 18, 2 sons, 17, 12, wife 1 sister	1 daughter 52, 2 sons, 44 40, wife, 1 granddaughter, 5 grandsons 1 daughter 48 (bought up in England but married and emigrated) 3 granddaughters	Came to Britain initially to study Lived and worked in Iraq. Went back to Pakistan and then migrated with family and studied more
Male/Germany					
Bilal	1978	44 1st	2 sons 11, 7, 2 daughters 17, 5, wife, mother in law	4 sisters, 1 younger brother, mother. 1 younger brother in England	Migrated in 1978 as a political asylum seeker. Married a German lady in 1981 Still with her
Faiz	Late 70's	37 1st	Wife, 1 son.	2 brothers 40, 30, 1 brother lives in Canada, 1 in Italy	Came to study information studies Then began working
Idris	1981	41 1st	2 sons 9, 6, 1 daughter 8, wife	Mother, 1 brother 47. 2 brothers in America 42, 39 2 sisters 56, 36.	Brother came in 1974/75. Then brother in America came to Germany and called respondent who came to work
Jamal	1979	47 1st	2 daughters 9, 7, 1 son 18, wife.	1 daughter 22, 1 son 24. Very big family.	Migrated due to membership of political party. Claimed political asylum. Was already married with 2 children when migrated. Family migrated first in 1991, they all went back on 1993 Respondent migrated back to Germany in 1997, family joined him in 2002
Latif	1963	60 1st	3 daughters 21, 16, 13, 1 son 19, wife	1 brother.	Came as a student, wife followed him.
Nabeel	1973	47 1st	2 daughters 10, 6, one son 8, wife.	4 brothers, (3 older, 1 younger).	Came sightseeing, ended up staying Granted stay on the basis of political asylum Married a German lady and got permanent stay Now married to a Pakistani lady No children from first marriage.
Raees	1981	45 1st	1 son from previous marriage, 16, wife.	2 sisters, 2 brothers, 1 sister is younger than him, the rest are older, mother.	Respondent migrated to Germany for economic reasons. He applied for political asylum. Married German lady, had a son, didn't work out, wanted to stay together. Divorced and married Pakistani lady
Shabaz	1978	44 1st	Wife, nephew, 1 daughter from previous marriage.	2 brothers 55, 50, 1 sister, all married with children, 30/40 people	Migrated to Germany for economic reasons. He intended to go to Saudi Arabia but was defrauded. Then came to Germany. Applied for political asylum

263

Name	Year[1]	A[2]	Family in host country	Family in Pakistan	Migration history
Tahr	1975	52 1st	2 sons, 1 daughter about to be born, wife.	20/30 members of family 7 brothers and sisters. 2 older brothers, 2 younger. 2 sisters, 1 died.	Married a German lady in 1986, granted stay on the basis of marriage, divorced in 98 Married Pakistani lady in 2001
Usman	1976	46 1st	Wife, son 19.	3 brothers (2 older, 1 younger), 4 sisters (2 older, 2 younger).	Father died when young. Respondent migrated to Germany to earn money asylum. Went to Saudi Arabia first and then came to Germany. Applied for political asylum. Got married to German lady and got visa Now married to a Pakistani lady No children from first marriage
Sharif	1977	48 1st	1 son, wife.	9 brothers and sisters.	Initially intended to go to the middle east, but came to Germany after hearing uncle's stories. Applied for political asylum, Married German lady in 1983, who he is still with
Anis	2002	27 1st	Wife	5 brothers (1 older), 3 sisters (2 older).	Set out sight seeing. Claimed political asylum when he got to Germany. Spent 3 ½ years in Denmark, then came to Germany.
Yasir	1977	49 1st	2 sons 10, 4 ½, 2 daughters 12, 9, wife.	2 brothers, 1 sister.	Migrated to Germany for economic reasons, claimed political asylum
Wahid,	1995	29 1st	No family in Germany	4 brothers, 2 sisters.	Economic migration but works mainly for the mosque
Female/Germany					
Gulshan	2001	26 1st	2 daughters, 5 ½, 3, 1 son 7 mths Husband	5 sisters, 2 brothers, parents.	Husband migrated for financial reasons. Was previously married to a German lady. She migrated 4 years after marriage
Ishrat	1990	31 1st	2 sons 9, 6, 1 daughter 8, husband	Husband has 2 sisters 3 brothers	Husband migrated for financial reasons She migrated after marriage Her and her husband work on a market stall.
Leila	1998	32 1st	2 daughters 10 & 6, 1 son, 8, husband	3 brothers, 2 sister in laws, 3 sisters, parents, 2 nieces, 1 nephew.	Husband migrated for financial reasons He claimed asylum in Germany Married a German lady. Respondent migrated 11 years after marriage
Maha	1999	25 1st	2 sons 6,4, husband (heavily pregnant)	Brother in law, 3 brothers, 1 sisters.	Husband migrated for economic reasons. He claimed political asylum, married a German lady and was divorced Respondent migrated 1 year after marriage
Atiya	1965	46	3 daughters 13, 16, 21, 1 Does not say	About 30/40 members in in-laws and own family.	Husband came over as a student She migrated after marriage.

264

Name	Year[1]	A[2]	Family in host country	Family in Pakistan	Migration history
Nuzhat	1996	34 1st	son, 19, husband	Step son 16, husband	Includes all *khandan* in this Husband migrated for economic reasons He claimed political asylum Married a German lady and has one son from his first marriage Respondent migrated shortly after her marriage.
Taj	1990	35 1st	1 son 11, 3 daughters 10, 6, 2, husband	2 sisters, 1 brother. 2 brother in laws, 3 sister in laws	Husband migrated for economic reasons Respondent came following marriage
Ulfath	2001	26 1st	1 Son, husband	2 sister 32, 30, 2 brothers 28, 22, parents. 3 brother in laws, 3 sister in laws, parents in law	Husband came to study in 1996. Came with the intention of settling Respondent migrated 2 years after marriage
Shifa	2000	26 1st	Husband, husband's nephew	Parents, 4 sisters, 3 brothers (one older sister and one older brother) 2 brother in laws (& their wives)	Husband migrated for economic reasons. Applied for political asylum Married a German lady. Divorced Has one daughter from previous marriage.
Wafa	1996	29 1st	Husband	2 older brothers, 1 older sister, father	Husband migrated for economic reasons Respondent migrated following marriage.
Yusra	1992	33 1st	Husband, 4 sons 12, 11, 8 & 6, uncle, his children Sister.	Very big *khandan*. 5 brother in laws, 1 sister in law. 3 brothers & 1 sister.	Husband claimed political asylum in 1977. Had to go back to Pakistan because mother ill so got married to a German lady and got visa. Now divorced Respondents came following marriage
Mariya	1998	25 1st	2 sons (twins) 7 mths, husband, German mother in law.	Mother in law, parents, 3 brothers 50, 35, 23, 1 sister 30	Father in law migrated with his young son (her husband) for economic reasons Father in law married a German lady. They are no longer together, but German mother in law is part of respondent's family Respondent came after marriage

Community: Navigating the Boundaries of 'Us' & 'Them' - Grid Analysis

Opinion expressed	German Male		German female		German Total		British Male		British Female		British Total		Male Total		Female Total		Overall Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Definitions of 'us' and 'them'																		
'Community' used to define *all* Muslims	9	64	8	67	17	65	6	86	9	90	15	88	15	71	17	77	32	74
'Community' used to refer to ethnic differentiations within the *Umm'ah*	12	86	10	83	22	85	6	86	9	90	15	88	18	86	19	86	37	86
Number of second generation British respondents who consider themselves British but still distinguish between 'us' and 'them' of host society	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	3	43	5	50	8	47	3	43	5	50	8	47
Number of respondents who have experienced discrimination and/or lack of integration	11	79	6	50	17	65	5	71	4	40	9	53	16	76	10	45	26	60
'Us' defines all Asians	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	71	3	30	8	47	5	24	3	14	8	19
'Us' defines Pakistani	12	86	10	83	22	85	6	86	7	70	13	76	18	86	17	77	35	81
Distinction made between different sects of Islam	10	71	6	50	16	62	5	71	4	40	9	53	15	71	10	45	25	58
Distinctions made between Pakistani and Gujrathi/Indian community	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	3	43	3	30	6	35	3	43	3	30	6	35
Distinctions within Pakistani Muslim *Umm'ah* made on the basis of regional origins	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	43	3	30	6	35	3	14	3	14	6	14
Level of education used as a means to differentiate between people in the Muslim community	8	57	4	33	12	46	7	100	5	50	12	71	15	71	9	41	25	58

Consensus among respondents

266

Opinion expressed	Consensus among respondents																
	German Male		German female		German Total		British Male		British Female		British Total		Male Total		Female Total		Overall Total
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Contrary norms and values of host society more of a problem for children and future generations of Pakistani heritage Muslims than for respondents	8	57	7	58	15	58	6	29	6	60	8	47	10	48	13	59	23	53
Overt acknowledgement that identity (positively) influenced by British/German norms	6	43	3	25	9	35	5	71	6	60	11	65	11	52	9	41	20	47
Islam, Culture and Community Boundaries																		
Greater Islamic practice of Gujrathi community considered to be detrimental to future Gujrathi heritage generations	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	14	1	10	2	12	1	14	1	10	2	11
Behaviour of Turkish community perceived to by contrary to, or, un-Islamic	8	57	7	58	15	58	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	8	57	7	58	15	56
Turkish community referred to as a primary reason for the greater practice of Islam	8	57	5	42	13	50	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	8	57	5	42	13	50
Gendered interpretation of Islam resulting from patriarchal and/or cultural understanding considered to be inaccurate	6	43	2	17	8	31	3	43	4	40	7	41	9	43	6	27	15	35
Need to establish Islam independently of ethnic/cultural inflexions and/or affiliations	10	71	5	42	15	58	6	86	4	40	10	59	16	76	9	41	25	58
Negative generational 'gap' resulting from traditional marriage arrangements	8	57	0	0	8	31	6	86	3	30	9	53	14	67	3	14	17	40
Sexual 'freedom' in Britain and Germany expressly stated as negative and contrary to Islam and Pakistan culture	10	71	9	75	19	73	3	43	7	70	10	59	13	62	16	73	29	67

267

Opinion expressed	Consensus among respondents																
	German Male		German female		German Total		British Male		British Female		British Total		Male Total		Female Total		Overall Total
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Majority of norms and values of Pakistani community perceived (negatively) to originate from culture rather than Islam	10	71	5	42	15	58	6	86	6	60	12	71	16	76	11	50	27	63
Respondents taught much of Islam through Pakistan culture and environment	9	64	9	75	18	69	5	71	5	50	10	59	14	67	14	63	28	65
Cultural norms and values inaccurately represented as Islamic ones by Pakistani Muslim community	9	64	4	33	13	50	6	86	7	70	13	76	15	71	11	50	26	60
Islam, Identity and Community Boundaries																		
Pakistani Muslim community referred to as removed from respondent – 'it' rather than 'we'	2	14	2	17	4	15	4	57	4	40	8	47	6	29	6	27	12	28
Individual identity expressed in Islamic rather than, more frequently then, or in favour of, ethno-cultural heritage	10	71	4	33	14	54	5	71	6	60	11	65	15	71	10	45	25	58
Mosque attended at least once a week	10	71	5	42	15	58	4	57	0	0	4	24	14	67	5	23	19	44
'Our' community needed for religious upbringing of children	11	79	7	58	18	69	1	14	3	30	4	24	12	57	10	45	22	51
'Our' community needed for security and amenities	1	7	3	25	4	15	6	86	5	50	11	65	7	33	8	36	15	35
Actively involved in establishing institutional frameworks for Islamic education	6	43	1	8	7	30	1	14	0	0	1	6	7	33	1	5	8	19
Islamic education and guidelines need to be re-interpreted or expressed differently in order to take into consideration present day context	8	57	5	42	13	50	6	86	3	30	9	53	14	67	8	36	22	51
Islam has been reduced to ritual and needs to be re-understood as a 'way of life'	9	64	5	42	14	54	7	100	3	30	10	59	16	76	8	36	24	56

Appendix 5a Chapter 6 Grid Analysis

Consensus among respondents

Opinion expressed	German Male		German female		German Total		British Male		British Female		British Total		Male Total		Female Total		Overall Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Islam needs to be taught through parental practice	12	86	6	50	18	69	7	100	3	30	10	59	19	90	9	41	28	65
'True' Islam discovered after migration to Germany	10	71	4	33	14	54	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	10	71	4	33	14	54
Younger generation becoming more Islamic in face of hostile British society and negative media	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	6	86	3	30	9	53	6	86	3	30	9	53
Izzath and Community																		
Lack of *izzath*/respect for elders amongst White non-Muslim host society	11	79	8	67	19	73	4	57	6	60	10	59	15	71	14	63	29	67
Individual conformity to norms and values of community measured by *izzath*	7	50	7	58	14	54	6	86	8	80	14	82	13	62	15	68	28	65
Izzath facilitates participation in the Pakistani Muslim community	9	64	10	83	19	73	7	100	8	80	15	88	16	76	18	82	34	79
Individual *izzath* affected by actions of kin	6	43	7	58	13	50	7	100	5	50	13	76	14	67	12	55	25	58

269

Appendix 5b

Experiences and Expectations of Informal Familial Care – Grid Analysis

Opinion expressed	Consensus among respondents																	
	German Male		German female		German Total		British Male		British Female		British Total		Male Total		Female Total		Overall Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Definition of Care																		
To give them *izzath* is to care for one's elders	10	71	9	75	19	73	7	100	6	60	13	76	17	81	15	68	32	74
To care for ones' elders is an expression of the *izzath* one has for them	13	93	10	83	23	88	6	86	5	50	11	65	19	90	15	68	34	79
Izzath is the reason one cares for ones' elders	13	93	8	64	21	81	5	71	8	80	13	76	18	86	16	73	34	79
Khidmath used to describe ones' 'activities' within the care relationship	10	71	8	64	18	69	7	100	9	90	16	94	17	81	17	77	34	79
Zikaath defined as financial care but differentiated from caring for ones' family	6	43	5	42	11	42	4	57	1	10	5	29	10	48	6	27	16	37
Spiritual care defined as emotional care and/or caring for ones' emotional well being	7	50	5	42	12	46	2	29	3	30	5	29	9	43	8	36	17	39
Participation in the Care Relationship																		
Feelings of guilt and/or remorse at having been unable to provide any other care apart from financial to parents and other family in Pakistan	5	36	6	50	11	42	2	29	3	30	5	29	7	33	9	41	16	37
Those who take *zikaath*, or formal welfare provisions perceived in negative terms by community	6	43	5	42	11	42	5	71	7	70	12	71	11	52	12	55	23	53
Respondents have/will return to Pakistan to care for family	7	50	9	75	18	69	4	57	2	20	6	35	11	52	11	50	22	51
Provides/has provided financial care	10	71	6	50	16	62	7	100	9	90	16	94	17	81	15	68	32	74

270

Appendix 5b Chapter 7 Grid Analysis

Consensus among respondents

Opinion expressed	German Male #	German Male %	German female #	German female %	German Total #	German Total %	British Male #	British Male %	British Female #	British Female %	British Total #	British Total %	Male Total #	Male Total %	Female Total #	Female Total %	Overall Total #	Overall Total %
Provides/has provided emotional care	9	64	11	92	20	77	7	100	9	90	16	94	16	76	20	91	36	84
Provides/has provided physical care	4	29	7	58	11	42	4	57	5	50	9	53	8	38	12	55	20	47
Provides/has provided practical care	4	29	11	92	15	58	6	86	10	100	16	94	10	48	21	95	31	72
Respondents parents cared for by sibling or third party in family	8	57	10	83	18	69	4	57	7	70	11	65	12	57	17	77	29	67
Care provided for members of the (geographically proximate) community	13	93	7	58	20	77	3	43	6	60	9	53	16	76	15	68	31	72
Gendered Dimensions of Care																		
Care provided by women makes financial care possible or women provide financial care	2	14	6	50	8	31	4	57	9	90	13	76	6	29	15	68	21	49
Expectation for care in old age rests on son and daughter in law rather than daughter	5	36	5	42	10	38	3	43	4	40	7	41	8	38	9	41	17	39
Respondents mother/mother in law expects him or her to care for her	8	57	6	50	14	54	6	86	5	50	11	65	14	67	11	50	25	58
Respondents father/father in law expects him or her to care for him	6	43	3	25	9	35	3	43	1	10	4	24	9	43	4	18	13	30
Expects daughter to provide as much financial care as sons because in England/Germany women can work and earn	1	4	2	17	3	12	2	29	4	40	6	35	3	14	6	27	9	21
Shifting Expectations																		
Cannot expect children to care for us as much as our parents expected from us	7	50	7	58	14	54	5	71	9	90	14	82	12	57	16	73	28	65
Formal provisions such as pensions reduce the need for children to provide financial care to their elders	7	50	3	25	10	38	6	86	6	60	12	71	13	62	9	41	22	51

271

Consensus among respondents

Opinion expressed	German Male		German female		German Total		British Male		British Female		British Total		Male Total		Female Total		Overall Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Structural constraints of Britain or Germany make caring for ones' elders difficult or impossible	6	43	6	50	12	46	4	57	10	100	14	82	10	48	16	73	26	60
Care should only be received and/or expected from ones' children	7	50	9	75	16	62	4	57	5	50	9	53	11	52	14	64	25	58
Overarching Principles of the Care Relationship – Gerontocracy, Reciprocity and Islam																		
Care giving linked to care received by respondent, or care respondent is receiving	10	71	9	75	19	73	7	100	6	60	13	76	17	81	15	68	32	74
Duty derived from reciprocity can be performed in 'other' care relationships	7	50	4	33	11	42	4	57	3	30	7	41	11	52	7	32	18	42
Duty to reciprocate contingent upon care received being honest and unselfish	7	50	5	42	12	46	4	57	5	50	9	53	11	52	10	45	21	49
Care relationship between parent/child governed by gerontocratically influenced hierarchy	8	57	8	67	16	62	6	86	6	60	12	71	14	67	14	64	28	65
Care their children exercise will depend on the way they see respondents behave and care they give	13	93	7	58	20	77	7	100	7	70	14	82	20	95	14	64	34	79
Negotiations of the Care Relationships																		
To care for one's elders is a right	6	43	5	42	11	42	3	43	4	40	7	41	9	43	9	41	18	42
Voice of care recipient ought to be/is taken into consideration in the construction or negotiation of the care relationship	5	36	4	33	9	35	5	71	8	80	13	76	10	48	12	55	22	51
Presumption that familial care of elders is preferred and favourable	14	100	12	100	26	100	6	86	10	100	16	94	20	95	22	100	42	98

Opinion expressed	Consensus among respondents																	
	German Male		German female		German Total		British Male		British Female		British Total		Male Total		Female Total		Overall Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Not all forms of *khidmath* are welcome or wanted	3	21	3	25	6	23	7	100	7	70	14	82	10	48	10	45	20	47
Carers participation in the care relationship conditioned by his or her role in the formal labour market	8	57	2	17	10	38	6	86	6	60	12	71	14	67	8	36	22	51
Carers participation in the care relationship subject to cultural and religious 'etiquette' or gendered roles	10	71	10	83	20	77	5	71	5	50	10	59	15	71	15	68	30	70
Carers participation in the care relationship subject to practicalities	8	57	8	67	16	62	5	71	8	80	13	76	13	62	16	73	29	67
Wish to stay independent in old age rather than get to a stage where they have to depend on children for care	2	14	4	33	6	23	5	71	7	70	12	71	7	33	11	50	18	42

Redefining Moral Voices: The Case for Intergenerational Care – Grid Analysis

Opinion expressed	Consensus among respondents																	
	German Male		German female		German total		British Male		British Female		British total		Male Total		Female Total		Overall total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Medium and Anchors of Moral Voices																		
Articulations of moral voices of the self	10	71	6	50	16	62	7	100	7	70	14	82	17	81	13	59	30	70
Authenticity and authority of moral voices of the self located in social roles	8	57	6	50	14	54	5	71	6	60	11	65	13	62	12	55	25	58
Moral voices of the self ultimately grounded in Islam	10	71	6	50	16	62	7	100	6	60	13	76	17	81	12	55	29	67
Moral voices of the community condition and contextualise individual agency	9	64	10	83	19	73	7	100	10	100	17	100	16	76	20	90	36	84
Accounts of internalised community moral voices articulated as 'what will people think'	2	14	3	25	5	42	2	29	3	30	5	29	4	19	6	27	10	23
Moral Voices and the Regulation of Individual Action																		
Moral voices of community express approval of an individuals actions	7	50	5	42	12	46	5	71	4	40	9	53	12	57	9	41	21	49
Community moral voices express disapproval of an individuals actions	10	71	9	75	19	73	7	100	9	90	16	64	17	81	18	82	35	81
Community moral voices speak to the way individuals should behave in the context of particular social roles and rituals	10	71	10	83	20	77	6	86	10	100	16	64	16	76	20	90	36	84
Community moral voices cite importance of individuals behaving in culturally and Islamically acceptable way	12	86	12	100	24	92	6	86	10	100	16	94	18	86	22	100	40	93
Conformity to prescriptions of community moral voices perceived as 'good' moral character	12	86	11	92	23	88	7	100	9	90	16	94	19	90	20	90	39	91

274

Opinion expressed	Consensus among respondents																	
	German Male		German female		German total		British Male		British Female		British total		Male Total		Female Total		Overall total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Threat of loss of *izzath* used to enforce community moral voices	11	79	10	83	21	81	7	100	9	90	16	94	18	86	19	86	37	86
Gossip and people 'talking' used as a means to compel individual agency	11	79	11	92	22	85	7	100	9	90	16	94	18	86	20	91	38	88
An individual's 'good' moral character considered to deem him/her worthy of *izzath*	12	86	10	83	22	85	7	100	9	90	16	94	19	90	19	86	38	88
An individual's 'bad' moral character considered to deem him/her unworthy of *izzath* (*bat-izzathi*)	11	79	12	100	23	88	7	100	9	90	16	94	18	86	21	95	39	91
Scenarios made possible due to more liberal environment of Britain and Germany considered to pose a threat to individual/familial *izzath*	10	71	10	83	20	77	6	86	9	90	15	88	16	76	19	86	35	81
Moral Voices and Care of Elders																		
Norms of familial care pervade societal life in Pakistan	12	86	11	92	23	88	8	100	8	80	15	88	19	90	19	86	38	88
Examples given of elders not being cared for by kin in Pakistan	8	57	6	50	14	54	4	57	6	60	10	59	12	57	12	55	24	56
Respondents who stress care of elders is norm in Pakistan and then cite instances where such care has not been provided	8	57	6	50	14	54	4	57	4	40	8	47	12	57	10	45	22	51
Moral voices of community expect children to care for their elders	13	93	11	92	24	92	6	86	10	100	16	94	19	90	21	95	40	93
Elders perceived of as burdens rather than honoured members of family as a result of community moral voices' compulsion	5	36	5	42	10	38	3	43	4	40	7	41	8	38	9	41	17	36
Izzath of children diminished as a result of not caring for ther elders	6	43	7	58	13	50	6	86	5	50	11	65	12	57	12	55	24	56

275

Opinion expressed	German Male #	German Male %	German female #	German female %	German total #	German total %	British Male #	British Male %	British Female #	British Female %	British total #	British total %	Male Total #	Male Total %	Female Total #	Female Total %	Overall total #	Overall total %
							Consensus among respondents											
Izzath of elders diminished where they are not cared for by their children	6	43	5	42	11	42	6	86	6	60	12	71	12	57	11	50	22	51
Parenting skills of elder called into question where they are not cared for by their children	8	57	6	50	14	54	5	71	2	20	7	41	13	62	8	36	21	51
Elders cared for because of the positive way in which community moral voices perceive individual	5	36	3	25	8	31	3	43	3	30	6	35	8	38	6	27	16	37
Negotiations With Moral Voices																		
Izzath is used as a form of social capital which enables/facilitates participation in society	8	57	10	83	18	69	6	86	6	60	12	71	14	67	16	73	30	70
Alternative resources used to negotiate between different moral pulls including those of community moral voices	13	93	7	58	20	77	7	100	9	90	16	94	20	95	16	73	36	84
Alternative roles used to negotiate between different moral pulls, including those of community moral voices	14	100	8	67	22	85	6	86	7	70	13	76	20	95	15	68	35	81
Where moral voices of self and those of community conflict, moral voices of self favoured	12	86	6	50	18	69	7	100	7	70	14	82	19	90	13	59	32	74
Community moral voices require superficial practice of Islam	8	57	7	58	15	58	5	71	4	40	9	53	13	62	11	50	24	56
Level of education utilised as a resource to question the authority and/or legitimacy of community moral voices	9	64	7	58	16	67	5	71	5	50	10	59	14	82	12	57	26	60
Legitimacy of community moral voices depends on those espousing it having 'good' moral standing in the community	2	14	5	42	7	30	4	57	4	40	8	47	6	23	9	41	15	35
Islam used as a resource to negotiate between different moral pulls of community moral voices	10	71	6	50	16	62	7	100	9	90	16	94	17	81	15	68	32	74

Opinion expressed	Consensus among respondents																
	German Male		German female		German total		British Male		British Female		British total		Male Total		Female Total		Overall total
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Moral perspectives of 'older generation' perceived to be steeped in cultural, rather than Islamic maxims	7	50	5	42	12	46	7	100	5	50	12	71	14	67	10	45	24	56
Community moral voices thought to inaccurately represent Islam[1]	8	57	6	50	14	54	7	100	8	80	15	88	15	71	14	64	29	60
Izzath is too readily utilised as a mechanism of control	7	50	6	50	13	50	7	100	7	70	14	82	14	67	13	59	27	63
Community moral voices are affective where there are people who know you to gossip. If they don't know you their gossip does not affect your *izzath*	8	57	9	75	17	65	7	100	8	80	15	88	15	71	17	77	32	74

---

[1] This indexing differs from the code 'Cultural norms and values inaccurately represented as Islamic ones' in Appendix 5a, in that it relates to explicit articulations of community moral voices rather than perceptions of daily Islamic/cultural practices

Bibliography

Abu-Lughod, L (1991) Writing Against Culture. In Fox, R. G (Ed) *Recapturing Anthropology Working in the Present.* Santa Fe. School of American Research, pp. 137-162.

Ackers, L. & Stalford, H. (2004) *A Community for Children? Children, Citizenship and Internal Migration in the EU.* Aldershot. Ashgate

Afshar, H (1994) Muslim Women in West Yorkshire: Growing Up with Real and Imagined Values Amidst Conflicting Views of Self and Society In Afshar H. & Maynard, M. (Eds) *The Dynamics of 'Race' and Gender· Some Feminist Interventions.* London Taylor & Francis, pp. 127-150.

Afshar, H , Franks, M., Maynard, M. & Wray, S. (2001) Empowerment, Disempowerment and Quality of Life for Older Women *Generations Review*, Vol. 11(4), December, pp. 12-13.

Ahmad, F., Modood, T. & Lissenburgh, S. (2003) *South Asian Women And Employment in Britain The Interaction of Gender and Ethnicity.* London· Policy Studies Institute.

Ahmad, W. I. U. & Craig, G. (1999) 'Race' and Social Welfare In Alcock, P., Erskine, A & May, M. (Eds) *The Students Companion to Social Policy* Oxford. Blackwell & SPA, pp. 91-97

Ahmad, W.I.U. (1996) Family Obligations and Social Change Among Asian Communities. In Ahmad, W.I.U. & Atkin, K. (Eds.) *Race and Community Care* Bristol: Open University Press, pp

Ahmad, W. I. U. & Atkin, K. (1996) 'Race' and Community Care An Introduction. In Ahmad, W.I. U. & Atkin, K (Eds) *'Race' and Community Care* Buckingham. Open University Press, pp. 1-11.

Ahmad, W. I. U. & Husband, C. (1993) Religious Identity, Citizenship and Welfare The Case of Muslims in Britain. *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* Vol. 10(2), Summer, pp 217-233

Ahmed, A. S. (1988) *Discovering Islam Making Sense of Muslim History and Society.* London· Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Al-Krenawi, A. & Graham, J (2000) Islamic Theology and Prayer· Relevance for Social Work Practice. *International Social Work* Vol 43(3), pp. 289-304.

Alber, J. (2001) Recent Developments of the German Welfare State· Basic Continuity or Paradigm Shift. *Zes-Arbeitspaper* 6/2001. Universitat Bremen. Zentrum für Sozialpolitik

Ali, Y. (1992) Muslim Women and the Politics of Ethnicity and Culture in Northern England. In Sahgal, G & Yuval-Davis, N. (Eds.) *Refusing Holy Orders· Women and Fundamentalism in Britain* London Virago Press, pp 101-123

Anderson, B (1991) *Imagined Communities* Revised Edition London Verso

Anderson, B (1983) *Imagined Communities* London: Verso

Anderson, M. (1971) *Family structure in Nineteenth Century Lancashire* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Anderson, P. (2001) Research Note, 'You Don't Belong Here in Germany....'. On the Social Situation of Refugee Children in Germany. *Journal of Refugee Studies* Vol. 14(2), pp. 187-199.

Annesley, C. (2002) Reconfiguring Women's Social Citizenship in Germany. The Right to *Sozialhilfe*, The Responsibility to Work *German Politics* Vol. 11(1), April, pp 81-96.

Anthias, F. & Yuval-Davis, N in association with Cain, H. (1996) *Racialized Boundaries· Race, Nation, Gender, Colour and Class and the Anti-Racist Struggle.* London Routledge

Anwar, M. (2001) The Participation of Ethnic Minorities in British Politics *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* Vol. 27(3), July, pp. 533-549

Anwar, M (1998a) *Ethnic Minorities and the British Electoral System* London Operation Black Vote & Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations.

Anwar, M. (1998b) *Between Cultures· Continuity and Change in the Lives of Young Asians* London. Routledge.

Anwar, M. (1996) *British Pakistanis Demographic, Social and Economic Position* Coventry. University of Warwick, Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations.

Anwar, M (1990) Ethnic Classification, Ethnic Monitoring and the 1991 Census *New Community* Vol 16(4), pp. 607-616

Araki, H. (2000) Ideas and Welfare The Conservative Transformation of the British Pension Regime. *Journal of Social Policy* Vol. 29(4), pp 599-621.

Argyle, M. & Henderson, M. (1985) *The Anatomy of Relationships* Harmondsworth· Penguin Books.

Arksey, H. & Knight P. (1999) *Interviewing for Social Scientists An Introductory Resource with examples* London. Sage Publications

Armstrong, D. (1993) Public Health Spaces and the Fabrication of Identity. *Sociology*. No 27, pp. 393 – 410

Askham, J. (1984) *Identity and Stability in Marriage*. Cambridge Cambridge University Press.

Aziz, K. K. (2001) *Pakistan's Political Culture Essays in Historical and Social Origins* Islamabad: Vanguard.

Azmi, S. H (1991) Traditional Islamic Social Welfare: Its Meaning, History and Contemporary Relevance. *Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. 35(3), pp 165-180.

Babbie, E. (1995) *The Practice of Social Research*. Seventh Edition London Wadsworth Publishing Company

Bagguley, P. & Mann, K (1992) Idle Thieving Bastards? Scholarly Representations of the 'Underclass'. *Work, Employment & Society* Vol. 6(1), pp 113-126

Baldock, J. & Hadlow, J. (2003) How Older People Adapt to Becoming Housebound. *Nursing and Residential Care* Vol 5(7), pp 346-348.

Ballard, R. & Ballard, C. (1979) The Sikhs. The Development of South Asian Settlements in Britain. In Watson, J. (Ed) *Between Two Cultures* Oxford· Blackwell, pp. 21-56.

Ballard, R (1994) The Emergence of Desh Pardesh In Ballard, R (Ed) *Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain* London: Hurst Company, pp 1-34.

Ballard, R. (1987) The Political Economy of Migration: Pakistan, Britain, and the Middle East In Eades, J (Ed) *Migrants, Workers and the Social Order* London Tavistock, pp. 17-41.

Barnard, H & Pettigrew, N. (2003) *Delivering Benefits and Services for Black and Minority Ethnic Older People* Research Report No. 201, Leeds· Department for Work and Pensions, Stationary Office.

Barnes, C. (1990) *Cabbage Syndrome: The Social Construction of Dependence* Lewes· Falmer Press.

Barry, B. (1990) The Welfare State Versus the Relief of Poverty. In Ware, A & Goodin, R. (Eds) *Needs and Welfare* London: Sage, pp. 73-103.

Barth, F. (1969) *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* Boston: Little, Brown & Co

Batsleer, J. & Humphries, B (2000) Welfare, Exclusion and Political Agency. In Batsleer, J. & Humphries, B. (Eds) *Welfare Exclusion and Political Agency*. London: Routledge, pp. 1-21.

Baubock, R (1996) Social and Cultural Integration in a Civil Society. In Baubock, R , Heller, A. & Zolberg, A. (Eds) *The Challenge of Diversity· Integration and Pluralism in Societies of Immigration*. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp. 67-132.

Bauman, Z (1996) From Pilgrim to Tourist – or a Short History of Identity. In Hall, S. & du Gay, P. (Eds.) *Questions of Cultural Identity* London: Thousand Oaks, pp. 273-276.

Baumann, G. (2000) *Contesting Culture Discourses of Identity in Multi-Ethnic London* Cambridge Cambridge University Press.

Ba-Yunas, (2002) Ideological Dimensions of Islam. A Critical Paradigm In Donnan H. (Ed) *Interpreting Islam* London Sage Publications, pp 99-109

Beck U. & Ritter, M. (Eds) (1992) *Risk Society Towards a New Modernity.* London. Sage Publications

Benedix, J. (1990) *Importing Foreign Workers· A Comparison of German and American Policy.* New York· Peter Lang Publishing.

Berger, M , Galonska, C. & Koopmans, R. (2002) Not a Zero-Sum Game. Ethnic Communities and Political Integration of Migrants in Berlin. Paper presented at; *Political Participation of Immigrants and their Descendants in Post-War Western Europe.* Turin: ECPR, 22-27 March

Berghman, J. (1995) Social Exclusion in Europe: Policy Context and Analytical Framework. In Room, G. (Ed) *Beyond the Threshold The Measurement and Analysis of Social Exclusion* Bristol· The Policy Press, pp. 10-28.

Berik, G. (1996) Understanding the Gender System in Rural Turkey· Fieldwork Dilemmas of Conformity and Intervention. In Wolf, D. (Ed) *Feminist Dilemmas in Fieldwork* Oxford: Westview Press, pp. 56-71.

Bernardes, J. (1988) Founding the New 'Family Studies'. *Sociological Review* Vol 34(1), pp. 57-86.

Bhopal, K. (2001) Researching South Asian Women: Issues of Sameness and Difference in the Research Process. *Journal of Gender Studies* Vol 10(3), pp 279-286.

Bhopal, K. (1997) *Gender, 'Race' and Patriarchy A Study of South Asian Women* Aldershot: Ashgate.

Bin Hamzah, M & Harrison, M (2002) Islamic Housing Values and Perspectives Insights from Influentials in Malaysia *Islamic Values, Human Agency and Social Policies.* University of Leeds· RAPP Research Working Papers, pp. 1-30.

Birbili, M. (2000) Translating From One Language to Another. *Social Research Update* Issue 31, Winter Available at: http·//www soc surrey ac uk/sru/SRU31 html

Blair, T. (2002) New Labour and Community. *Renewal* Vol. 10(2), pp 9-14

Blair, T. (1999) Beveridge Revisited A Welfare State for the 21st Century *The Beveridge Lectures*

Blakemore, K. & Boneham, M. (1994) *Age, Race and Ethnicity A Comparative Approach* Buckingham: Open University Press.

Boeije, H (2002) A Purposeful Approach to the Constant Comparative Method in the Analysis of Qualitative Interviews. *Quality and Quantity* Vol. 36, pp. 391-409

Bommes, M. (2000) Welfare State, Biography and Migration· Labour Migrants, Ethnic Germans and the Re-ascription of Welfare State Membership. In Bommes, M & Geddes, A. (Eds) *Immigration and Welfare Challenging the Borders of the Welfare State* London· Routledge, pp 99-108.

Bommes, M., Castles, S. & Wintol de Wenden, C. (1999) *Migration and Social Change in Australia, France and Germany*, Special Issue Universitat Osnabruck: Institut für Migrationsforschung und Interkulturelle Studien, Vol 7(13), December.

Boon, J. A. (1982) *Other Tribes, Other Scribes Symbolic Anthropology in the Comparative Study of Cultures, Histories, Religions and Texts.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Booth, H. (1992) *The Migration Process in Britain and West Germany Two Demographic Studies of Migrant Populations.* Research in Ethnic Relations Series Avebury. Aldershot.

Bornat, J., Dimmock, B , Jones, D & Peace, S. (2000) Researching the Implications for Family Change for Older People In Chamberlayne, P , Bornat, J & Wengraf, T. (Eds.) *The Turn to Biographical Methods in Social Science Comparative Issues and Examples.* London· Routledge, pp 244-260.

Borsch-Supan, A & Wilke, C. B (2003) *The German Public Pension System· How it Was, How it Will Be.* Michigan· Michigan Retirement Research Centre

Borsch-Supan, A (2000) A Model Under Siege: A Case Study of the German Retirement Insurance System. *The Economic Journal* Vol. 110, February, pp 24-45.

Bos, M & Wenzel, U. (1996) Immigration and the Structure of Membership in the Modern Welfare State. *ZENAF Arbeits – und Forschungsbericht (ZAF)*, Nr 1/Juni 1996.

Bos, M (2003) The Legal Construction of Membership Nationality Law in Germany and the United States. *Program for the Study of Germany and Europe Working Paper* Series No 00 5

Bott, E. (1957) *The Family and Social Network* London· Tavistock

Bourdieu, P. (1986) (1997) The Forms of Capital. Translated by Richard Nice. In Richardson, J. E. (Ed.) Handbook of Theory of Research for the Sociology of Education. Reprinted in Halsey, A., Lauder, H , Brown, P , & Wells, A S (Eds) *Education Culture, Economy and Society* Oxford Oxford University Press, pp 46-58

Bourdieu, P. (1977) *Outline of a Theory of Practice.* Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Bowes, A. M. & Dar, N. (2000) Researching Social Care for Minority Ethnic Older People· Implications of Some Scottish Research *British Journal of Social Work* Vol. 30, pp. 305-332

Bowes, A. M. & Wilkinson, H A (2001) Researching The Views and Experiences of South Asian People With Dementia In Tester, S., Archibald, C., Rowlings, C. & Turner, S (Eds) *Quality in Later Life Rights, Rhetoric and Reality* Proceedings of the British Society of Gerontology 30th Annual Conference 31st August 2001 to 2nd September 2001 Sterling· University of Sterling, pp 149-153.

Bowie, C., Richardson, A. & Sykes, W. (1995) Consulting the Public About Priorities *British Medical Journal* Vol. 311, pp. 1155-1158.

Bowring, F. (2000) Social Exclusion. Limitations of the Debate. *Critical Social Policy.* Vol. 20(3), pp. 307-330

Bowring, F. (1997) Communitarianism and Morality In Search of the Subject *New Left Review.* No 222, pp 93-113

Brah, A. (1996) *Cartographies of Diaspora Contesting Identities* London· Routledge.

Brannen, J. & Collard, J. (1982) *Marriages in Trouble The Process of Seeking Help* London· Tavistock.

Breakwell, G. M (1987) *Coping with Threatened Identities.* London· Methuen.

Brockmann, M. (2002) Towards a Model of Quality of Life for Older Ethnic Minority Migrants in Germany, Austria and the UK. *European Societies* Vol 4(3), pp 285-306.

Brubaker, R (1992) *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany.* Cambridge· Harvard University Press.

Brubaker, R. (1989) Membership Without Citizenship: The Economic and Social Rights of Non-Citizens. In Brubaker, W. R. & Lanham, M. D (Eds) *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America* University Press of America· German Marshall Fund of the US, pp. 145-162.

Bruegel, I. & Warren, S (2003) Family Resources and Community Social Capital *Social Policy and Society.* Vol. 2(4), October, pp. 319-328.

Buchel, F. & Frick, J. R. (2003) *Immigrants in the UK and in West Germany Relative Income Position, Income Portfolio, and Redistribution Effects* June. Bonn. Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit.

Bulpett, C. (2002) Regimes of Exclusion *European Urban and Regional Studies* Vol. 9(2), pp. 137-149.

Bunting, M. (2001) Can Islam Liberate Women? Muslim Women and Scholars Think it Does – Spiritually and Sexually *The Guardian* 8 December

Burholt, V , Wenger, C , Scott, A , Yahya, B & Roy, S (2000) Bangladeshi Immigration to the UK. Older Peoples Support Networks in the Sending and Receiving Countries. *Quality in Ageing Policy, Practice and Research* Vol. V(2), December.

Burns, R. (2000) *Introduction to Research Methods* London. Sager Publications

Butt, J. & Mirza, K. (1996) *Social Care and Black Communities A Review of Recent Research Studies*. London. HMSO

Byrne, D. (1999) *Social Exclusion* Buckingham. Open University Press.

Cabinet Office, (2000) *Social Capital A Discussion Paper* London· Performance and Innovation Unit

Cağler, A S. (2001) Constraining Metaphors and the Transnationalisation of Spaces in Berlin. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. Vol 27(4), pp 601-613.

Calhoun, C (1994) Preface. In Calhoun, C (Ed) *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity* Massachusetts· Blackwell, pp. 1-8.

Capps, L. & Ochs, E (1995) Out of Place· Narrative Insights into Agoraphobia. *Discourse Processes* Vol. 19, pp 407-439.

Castles, S. (1995) How Nation States Respond to Immigration and Ethnic Diversity. *New Community* Vol. 21(3), pp. 293-308

Charmaz, K. (2000) Grounded Theory: Objectivist and Constructivist Methods. In Denzin, N. K. & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds) *Handbook of Qualitative Research* Second Edition. London: Sage Publications, pp. 509-535

Christians, C. G. (2000) Ethics and Politics in Qualitative Research. In Denzin, N. K. & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds) *Handbook of Qualitative Research* Second Edition. London: Sage Publications, pp. 133-156.

Clark, F. C. & Laurie, N. (2000) Gender, Age and Exclusion· A Challenge to Community Organisations in Lima, Peru. *Gender and Development*. Vol 8(2), July, pp. 80-88.

Clifford, J. (1986) On Ethnographic Allegory. In Clifford, J. & Marcus, G E (Eds) *Writing Culture· The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography* Berkeley· University of California Press, pp. 98-121.

Cohen, A. (1985) *The Symbolic Construction of Community* Chichester: Ellis Horwood Limited Publishers.

Coleman, J. S. (1988) (1997) Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. In Halsey, A. H., Lauder, H., Brown, P. & Wells, A. S (Eds) *Education Culture, Economy and Society* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 80-95.

Coleman, J (1993) The Rational Reconstruction of Society. *American Sociological Review* Vol. 58(1), pp. 1-15.

Colley, H & Hodkinson, P. (2001) Problems with *Bridging the Gap*: The Reversal of Structure and Agency in Addressing Social Exclusion. *Critical Social Policy* Vol 21(3), pp. 335-359.

Cooley, C. (1902) *Human Nature and Social Order* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Cornwell, J. (1984) *Hard-Earned Lives Accounts of Health and Illness from East London*. London: Tavistock.

Crow, G , Allan, G. & Summers, M. (2002) Neither Busybodies nor Nobodies. Managing Proximity and Distance in Neighbourly Relations *Sociology* Vol. 36(1), pp. 127-147.

Crow, G. & Allan, G. (1994) *Community Life· An Introduction to Local Social Relationships*. London. Harvester Wheatsheaf

Cunnigham-Burley, S (1985) Constructing Grandparenthood Anticipating Appropriate Action. *Sociology* Vol. 19(3), pp. 421-436

D'Alisera, J (2001) I ♥ Islam: Popular Religious Commodities, Sites of Inscription and Transnational Sierra Leonean Identity. *Journal of Material Culture* Vol 6(1), pp 91-110.

Dahrendorf, R (1979) *Life Chances· Approaches to Social and Political Theory* London Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Dahya, B (1974) The Nature of Pakistani Ethnicity in Industrial cities in Britain. In Cohen, A. (Ed) *Urban Ethnicity* London Tavistock, pp 77-118

Dale, A. (2002) Social Exclusion of Pakistani and Bangladeshi Women. *Sociological Research Online*. Vol 7(3). Available at: http://www socresonline org uk/7/3/dale html

Daly, M. & Lewis, J. (2000) The Concept of Social Care and the Analysis of Contemporary Welfare States. *British Journal of Sociology* Vol. 51(2), pp 281-298.

David, E. (1998) Editor's Introduction. In David, M E (Ed) *The Fragmentation of Family Does it Matter?* London. IEA Health and Welfare Unit, pp 1-8

De Andrade, L. L. (2000) Negotiating From the Inside. Constructing Racial and Ethnic Identity in Qualitative Research *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*. June, Vol. 29(3), pp 268-290.

Deacon, A. (2002) *Perspectives on Welfare Ideas, Ideologies and Policy Debates* Buckingham· Open University Press

Deacon, A. (2000) Learning from the US? The Influence of American Ideas upon 'New Labour' Thinking on Welfare Reform. *The Policy Press*. Vol 28(1), pp. 5-18.

Dean, H (2002) Business Versus Families· Whose Side is New Labour on? *Social Policy and Society* Vol. 1(1), pp. 3-10.

Dean, H. (1991) In Search of the Underclass. In Brown, P. & Scase, R (Eds) *Poor Work, Disadvantage and the Division of Labour*. Milton Keynes. Open University Press, pp 23-39.

Dennis, N. (1997) *The Invention of Permanent Poverty* London. IEA Health and Welfare Unit.

Denzin, N. K. (1997) *Interpretive Ethnography: Ethnographic Practices for the 21st Century*. Thousand Oaks. Sage Publications.

Denzin, N. K. (1989) *Interpretive Biography* Newbury Park· Sage Publications

Department of Health, (2001) *The National Service Framework for Older People* London: The Stationary Office.

Department of Health, (1998) '*They Look After Their Own, Don't They?*' Inspection *of Community Care for Black and Ethnic Minority Older People*. London· Official Publications, HMSO

Department of Social Security, (1998) *New Ambitions for Our Country A New Contract for Welfare*. Cm 3805, London: The Stationary Office.

Dewilde, C. (2003) A Life course Perspective on Social Exclusion and Poverty *British Journal of Sociology*. Vol 54(1), March, pp. 109-128

Die Beauftragte, (2000) *Gesetzubur die Einreise und den Anfenthalt von Auslandern im Bundesgebiet (Auslandergesetz – AusIG)*. (BGBI 15.1618), BGBI 111 26-6. Available at· http //www bundesauslaenderbeauftragte de/download/ausIg htm

Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung Fur Auslanderfragen, (2002) (Ed) *Daten and Fakten zur Auslandersituation*. 20th Edition. Bonn.

Die Bundesregierung, (2001) *Legal Foundation for Immigration* Available at. http://eng bundesregerung de/frameset/index jsp

Dixon, J. (2001) Contact and Boundaries: Locating the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations *Theory and Psychology*. Vol. 11(5), pp. 587-608

Donnan, H & Stokes, M. (2002) Interpreting Interpretations of Islam. In Donnan, H (Ed) *Interpreting Islam* London Sage Publications, pp. 1-19.

Dossa, P. A (1999) (Re)Imagining Ageing Lives; Ethnographic Narratives of Muslim Women in Diaspora *Journal of Cross-Cultural Gerontology.* Vol 14, pp. 245-272

Douglas, J. (1971) *American Social Order.* New York: Free Press

Doyal, L. & Gough, I. (1991) *A Theory of Human Needs* Basingstoke. MacMillan.

Dummet, M. & Dummet, A. (1982) The Role of Government in Britain's Racial Crisis In Husband, C (Ed) *'Race' in Britain Continuity and Change* London Hutchinson, pp 97-127

Duncan, S. & Edwards, R. (1999) *Lone Mothers, Paid Work and Gendered Moral Rationalities.* London. MacMillan Press

Durkheim, E. (2002) The Elementary Forms of Religious Life In Calhoun, C. Gerteis, J. Moody, J. Pfaff, S. Schmidt, K. & Virk, I (Eds) *Classical Sociology* Oxford· Blackwell, pp. 150-164.

Durkheim, E. (1995) *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* New York· Free Press

Durkheim, E. (1984) *The Division of Labour in Society* London. MacMillan Publishers Ltd.

Durkheim, E. (1938) (1964) *The Rules of Sociological Method* Eighth Edition. New York· The Free Press

Dwyer, C. (1999) Contradictions of Community· Questions of Identity for Young British Muslim Women *Environment and Planning A* Vol. 31, pp. 53-68.

Dwyer, P. (2004) *Understanding Social Citizenship Themes and Perspectives for Policy and Practice.* Bristol: Policy Press.

Dwyer, P. (2002) Making Sense of Social Citizenship. Some User Views on Welfare Rights and Responsibilities. *Critical Social Policy* Vol. 22, No 2(71), May, pp. 273-299.

Dwyer, P. (2000) British Muslims, Welfare Citizenship and Conditionality Some Empirical Findings. *Islamic Values, Human Agency and Social Policies* University of Leeds· RAPP Research Working Papers, pp 31-53.

Dwyer, P. (1998) Conditional Citizens? Welfare Rights and Responsibilities in the Late 1990s. *Critical Social Policy.* Vol 18, No. 4(57), November, pp 493-518

Edmondson, R (2003) Social Capital: A Strategy for Enhancing Health? *Social Science and Medicine* Vol. 57(9), November, pp. 1723-1733.

Edwards, R (2003) Introduction: Themed Section on Social Capital, Families and Welfare Policy *Social Policy and Society.* Vol. 2(4), pp 305-308.

Edwards, R., Franklin, J. & Holland, J. (2003) Families and Social Capital: Exploring the Issues *Families and Social Capital, ESRC Research Group* February. London: South Bank University.

El Guindi, F. (1999) Veiling Resistance *Fashion Theory* Vol. 3(I), pp 51-80

Ercikan, K. (1998) Translation Effects in International Assessments *International Journal of Educational Research* Vol. 29, pp 543-553.

Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Esposito, J. L. (1992) *The Islamic Threat. Myth or Reality?* Oxford Oxford University Press.

Esposito, N. (2001) From Meaning to Meaning· The Influence of Translation Techniques on Non-English Focus Group Research. *Qualitative Health Research.* July, Vol. 11(4), pp 568-579.

Etzioni, A. (Ed) (1998) *The Essential Communitarian Reader.* Oxford Roman & Littlefield Publishers Inc

Etzioni, A. (1997) *The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society* London: Profile Bus Ltd

Etzioni, A. (1995) *The Spirit of Community· Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda* London· Fontana Press

European Commission (1996) *Demography: 113 5 million people over 60 years by 2025, an increase of almost 50%*

Eurostat, (2002) *People in Europe.* Eurostat Yearbook

Eurostat, (1997) *Non-Monetary Indicators of Poverty and Social Exclusion Final Report*

Faist, T. (1993) How to Define a Foreigner? The Symbolic Politics of Immigration in German Partisan Discourse, 1978 – 1992. *Zes-Arbeitspaper* Nr. 12/1993. Universität Bremen: Zentrum för Sozialpolitik.

Faqir, F. (2001) Intrafamily Femicide in Defence of Honour: The Case of Jordan. *Third World Quarterly.* Vol. 22(1), pp. 65-82.

Farmer, M. (1970) *The Family* London Longmans

Faruki, K. A. (1987) Pakistan· Islamic Government and Society. In Esposito, J L. (Ed) *Islam in Asia. Religion, Politics and Society.* Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 53-79.

Fassmann, H., Münz, R & Selfert, W. (1999) Auslandische Arbeitskrte in Deutschland und Osterreich. In Fassmann, H , Matuschek, H. & Menasere, E. (Eds) *Abgrenzen, Ausgreuzen, Aufnehmen – Empirische Befunde zu Fremden – Feindlichkeit und Integraton* Klagenfurt: Drava Verlag.

Fazeli, R. (1996) *The Economic Impact of the Welfare State and Social Wage The British Experience.* Aldershot: Avebury Publications Ltd.

Federal Office, (2003) *Reform of the Asylum Legislation.* Bundesamt Available at: http //www bafl de/template/englisch/index-englisch-asylrecht htm

Federal Statistics Office Germany (2003) *In 2050 Every Third Person Will be 60 or Older in Germany* Press Release 6 June 2003. Available at· http //www destatis de/presse/englische/pm2003/p2300022 htm

Finch, J. & Mason, J (2000) *Passing On, Kinship and Inheritance in England.* London: University of Central London Press.

Finch, J. & Mason, J (1993) *Negotiating Family Responsibilities.* London: Routledge.

Finch, J. & Mason, J. (1991) Obligations of Kinship in Contemporary Britain Is Their Normative Agreement? *British Journal of Sociology* Vol. 42(3), pp. 345-367.

Finch, J. (1989) *Family Obligations and Social Change* Oxford: Polity Press

Fine, M., Weis, L., Weseen, S. & Wong, L. (2000) FOR WHOM? Qualitative Research, Representations, and Social Responsibilities. In Denzin, N K & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.). *Handbook of Qualitative Research.* Second Edition. London: Sage Publications, pp. 107-133.

Firth, R., Hubert, J. & Forge, R. (1970) *Families and their Relatives Kinship in a Middle Class Sector of London.* London· Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Fisher, B. & Tronto, J. (1990) Toward a Feminist Theory of Caring In Abel, E. & Nelson, M. (Eds.) *Circles of Care. Work and Identity in Women's Lives* Albany: New York Press, pp. 35-62

Flick, U. (2002) Qualitative Research – State of the Art. *Social Science Information.* Vol. 41(1), pp. 5-24.

Flockton, C. (1998) Employment, Welfare Support and Income Distribution in East Germany *German Politics.* Vol. 7(3), December, pp. 33-51.

Fontana, A. and Frey, J. H. (2000) The Interview: From Structured Questions to Negotiated Text. In Denzin, N. K. & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.) *Handbook of Qualitative Research* Second Edition. London: Sage Publications, pp. 645-673.

Ford, J. & Kadushin, C. (2002) Between Sacred Belief and Moral Community: A Multi-dimensional Approach to the Relationship Between Religion and

Alcohol Among Whites and Blacks *Sociological Forum* Vol 17(2), June, pp 255-279

Forward, M. (1997) *Mohammed· A Short Biography* Oxford Oneworld Publishers

Foster, D. H. (1997) Space, Place and 'Race'. *Journal of Community and Health Sciences*. Vol. 4, pp. 1-10

Fountain, J , Bashford, J., Patel, K. & Winters, M. (2003) *Black and Minority Ethnic Communities in England A Review of Drug Use and Related Service Provision*. London. NTA.

Franklin, J. (1998) *Social Policy and Social Justice The IPPR Reader* Maiden Polity Press

Gailbraith, J. K. (1992) *The Culture of Contentment* London. Houghton Mifflin Co.

Gaille, D (1994) Are the Unemployed an Underclass? Some Evidence from the Social Change and Economic Life Initiative. *Sociology* Vol. 28(3), August, pp 737-757.

Gardiner, J. (2000) Rethinking Self Sufficiency· Employment, Families and Welfare. *Cambridge Journal of Economics* Vol. 24, pp 671-689

Gardner, K. (2002) *Age, Narrative and Migration: The Life Course and Life Histories of Bengali Elders in London* Oxford: Berg Publishers.

Geddes, A. (2001) Ethnic Minorities in the Labour Market Comparative Policy Approaches (Western Europe) Background Papers. *Ethnic Minorities in the Labour Market Project* London. Cabinet Office, Performance and Innovation Unit.

Gelles, R. J. (1995) *Contemporary Families A Sociological View* London: Sage Publications.

Gerrish, K., Husband, C. & MacKenzie, J (1996) *Nursing for a Multi-Ethnic Society*. Buckingham· Open University Press

Giddens, A (1998) *The Third Way A Renewal of Social Democracy* Cambridge Polity Press.

Giddens, A. (1994) *Beyond Left and Right* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giddens, A. (1992) *The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies* Cambridge. Polity Press.

Giddens, A (1991a) Structuration Theory – Past, Present and Future In Bryant, C. G. A. & Jary, D. (Eds) *Giddens' Theory of Structuration· A Critical Appreciation* London. Routledge, pp. 19-36.

Giddens, A. (1991b) *Modernity and Self-Identity Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* Cambridge· Polity Press.

Giddens, A. (1984) *The Constitution of Society* Cambridge· Cambridge University Press & Polity Press.

Giddens, A. (1979) *Central Problems in Social Theory*. London: Macmillan Press

Gillies, V. (2003) Family and Intimate Relationships· A Review of Sociological Research. *Families and Social Capital ESRC Research Group*. June 2003, London: South Bank University

Gilligan, C. (1987) Moral Orientation and Moral Development. In Kittay, E. F. & Meyers, D. T. (Eds) *Women and Moral Theory* Ottowa: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 19-36

Gilligan, C. (1982) *In a Different Voice*. Cambridge· Harvard University Press.

Gitlin, A., Peck, M , Aposhian, S , Hadley, S & Porter, A (2002) Looking Again at Insider Knowledge: A Relational Approach to Knowledge Production and Assessment. *Journal of Teacher Education* Vol 53(4), September/October, pp. 303-315.

Gladstone, D. (1995) The Welfare State and the State of Welfare In Gladstone, D. (Ed) *British Social Welfare. Past, Present and Future*. London: University College London Press, pp. 1-27.

Glendinning, F. (Ed) (1983) *The Elders in Ethnic Minorities* Keele. Beth Johnson Foundation.

Gordan, P. (1990) *Racial Harassment.* London: Runnymede Trust.

Gottschall, K. & Bird, K. (2003) Family Leave Policies and Labour Market Segregation in Germany· Reinvention or Reform of the Male Breadwinner Model? *The Review of Policy Research* Vol. 20(1), pp. 115-134.

Gough, I. (2001) Social Assistance Regimes: A Cluster Analysis *Journal of European Social Policy.* Vol. 11(2), pp 165-70.

Goulbourne, H. & Solomos, J. (2003) Families, Ethnicity and Social Capital. *Social Policy and Society* Vol. 2(4), October, pp 329-339

Goulbourne, H. (1998) *Race Relations in Britain Since 1945* London: MacMillan.

Green, S (2002) *Immigration, Asylum and Citizenship· Towards and Agenda for Policy Learning Between Britain and Germany* London. Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of International Society.

Green, S. (2001a) Citizenship Policy in Germany. In Hansen R & Weil, P (Eds) *Towards European Nationality.* Hampshire· Palgrave, pp. 24-51

Green, S (2001b) Immigration, Asylum and Citizenship in Germany: The Impact of Unification and the Berlin Republic. *West European Politics* Vol 24(4), October, pp. 82-104.

Grimshaw, J. (1986) *Feminist Philosophers. Women's Perspectives on Philosophical Traditions.* Brighton: Harvester.

Grundy, E. & Sloggett, A. (2003) Health Inequalities in the Older Population: The Role of Personal Capital, Social Resources and Socio-Economic Circumstances. *Social Science & Medicine* Vol. 56(5), March, pp 935-947.

Guarigha, A. & Markose, S. (2000) Voluntary Contributions to Personal Pension Plans: Evidence from the British Household Panel Survey. *Fiscal Studies.* Vol. 21(4), pp. 469-488.

Guillemard, A. (1999) Equity and Redistribution between Germans: A Challenge for the Future of Pensions and all Social Protection Schemes. *International Social Security Review.* Vol. 52(3/99), pp 69-92.

Gunaratnam, Y. (2003) *Researching Race and Ethnicity: Methods, Knowledge and Power.* London: Sage Publications.

Gunaratnam, Y. (2001) Eating into Multiculturalism: Hospice Staff and Service Users Talk Food, 'Race', Ethnicity, Culture and Identity *Critical Social Policy.* Vol. 21(3), pp. 287-310.

Gunaratnam, Y. (1997) Culture is not Enough. A Critique of Multiculturalism in Palliative Care. In Field, D., Hockey, J. & Small, N. (Eds) *Death, Gender and Ethnicity.* London: Routledge, pp. 166-186.

Hague, E. Thomas, C. & Williams, S. (2001) Exclusive Visions? Representations of Family, Work and Gender in the Work of the British Social Exclusion Unit. *Gender, Place and Culture* Vol. 8(1), March, pp. 73-82.

Hall, S. (1996) The Question of Cultural Identity In Hall, S. & du Gay, P (Eds) *Questions of Cultural Identity* London: Sage Publications, pp. 273-325.

Hall, S. (1993) Cultural Identity and Diaspora. In Williams, P. & Chrisman, L. (Eds) *Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory: A Reader.* London Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 392-403.

Hall, S (1992) New Ethnicities In Donald, J. & Rattansi, A. (Eds) *'Race', Culture and Difference.* London. Open University & Sage Publications, pp. 252-259.

Hallar, M. (2003) Europe and the Arab-Islamic World A Sociological Perspective on the Socio-cultural Differences and Mutual (Mis)Perceptions between Two Neighbouring Cultural Areas. *Innovation* Vol. 16(3), pp. 227-252.

Hammer, T. (1990) *Democracy and the Nation State. Aliens, Denizens and Citizens in the World of International Migration.* Ashgate. Aldershot.

Handler, R. (1994) Is 'Identity' a Useful Cross-Cultural Concept? In Gillis, J. (Ed.) *Commemorations· The Politics of National Identity.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 27-40.

Hansen, R (2003) Globalization, Embedded Realism, and Path Dependence The Other Immigrants to Europe *Comparative Political Studies.* Vol 35(3), April, pp. 259-283.

Hansen, R. (2000a) *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain* Oxford Oxford University Press.

Hansen, R. (2000b) British Citizenship After Empire. A Defence *The Political Quarterly,* pp. 42-49

Hansen, R. & King, D. (2000) Illiberalism and the New Politics of Asylum Liberalism's Dark Side. *The Political Quarterly,* pp. 396-403

Hantris, L. (1999) Comparing Family Policies in Europe In Clasen, L. (Ed) *Comparative Social Policy· Concepts, Theories and Methods.* Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 95-113.

Hareven, T. (1978) Family Time and Historical Time. In Ross, A , Kagen, J. & Hareven, T. (Eds) *The Family* London: Norton Press

Harris, C. C. (1983) *The Family and Industrial Society* London. George Allen & Unwin

Haskey, J. (1998) Families. Their Historical Context and Recent Trends in the Factors Influencing Their Formation and Dissolution. In David, M E (Ed) *The Fragmentation of Family· Does it Matter?* London: IEA Health and Welfare Unit, pp. 1-45.

Headey, B., Goodin, R. E., Muffels, R. & Dirven, H (2000) Is There a Trade-off Between Economic Efficiency and a Generous Welfare State? A Comparison of Best Cases of 'The Three Worlds of Capitalism'. *Social Indicators Research* Vol. 50, pp. 115-157.

Heinelt, H. (1993) Immigration and the Welfare State in Germany. *German Politics* Vol. 5, pp. 78-96.

Henley, A. (1982) *Asians in Britain, Caring for Muslims and Their Families· Religious Aspects of Care.* Cambridge· National Extension College for the DHSS and the King Edwards Hospital Fund of London.

Henry, M G. (2003) 'Where Are You Really from?': Representation, Identity and Power in the Fieldwork Experiences of a South Asian Diasporic *Qualitative Research* Vol. 3(2), pp 229-242.

Henwood, K. L. & Pidgeon, N F. (1993) Qualitative Research and Psychological Theorising. In Hammersley, M (Ed) *Social Research Philosophy, Politics and Practice* London· Sage Publications, pp 14-32.

Heron, E. & Dwyer, P (1999) Doing the Right Thing: Labour's Attempt to Forge a New Welfare Deal Between the Individual and the State *Social Policy and Administration* Vol. 33(1), March, pp. 94-104.

Hill, H. (1985) *Black Labour and the American Legal System Race, Work and the Law.* Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.

Hills, J. (1998) *Thatcherism, New Labour and the Welfare State* CASE paper. August. London Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion

Hills, J. (1996) Does Britain Have a Welfare Generation? In Walker, A (Ed), *The New Generational Contract Intergenerational Relations Old Age and Welfare* London: University of Central London Press, pp 56-80.

Hill, M. (1993) *The Welfare State in Britain A Political History Since 1945.* Aldershot· Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

Hirchmann, N. (1997) Revisioning Freedom: Relationships, Context and the Politics of Enforcement. In Hirchmann, N. & DeStefano, C. (Eds) *Revisioning the Political Feminists: Reconsideration of Traditional Concepts in Western Political Theory* Boulder: Westview Press, pp 51-74.

Hollway, W. & Jefferson, T (2001) Free Association, Narrative Analysis and the Defended Subject. The Case of Ivy. *Narrative Inquiry* Vol. 11(1), pp. 103-122.

Home Office, (2003) *Secure Borders, Safe Haven. Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain.* CM 5387. London. HMSO.

Home Office, (2002) *Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002* London Official Publications, HMSO Available at·
http·//www hmso gov uk/acts/acts2002/20020041 htm

Husain, F. & O'Brien, M (2000) Muslim Communities in Europe· Reconstruction and Transformation *Current Sociology.* Vol. 48(4), October, pp. 1-13

Hutton, W. (1996) *The State We're In.* London. Vintage

Ilahi, N & Jafarey, S. (1998) Guestworker Migration, Remittances and the Extended Family: Evidence from Pakistan. *Journal of Development Economics.* Vol 58, pp. 485-512.

Immigration and Nationality Directorate (2003) *Immigration Act 1971* Available at http //www ind homeoffice gov uk

Immigration and Nationality Directorate (2001) *General Information Section The British Nationality Act 1981.* Available at:
http·//www ind homeoffice gov uk/default asp?PageId=2525

Info Point. Available at. http·//www the-voyage com/e/infopoint/countryfacts/germany/berlin htp

Jacobson, J. (1997) Religion and Ethnicity: Dual and Alternative Sources of Identity Among Young British Pakistani's *Ethnic and Racial Studies.* Vol 20(2), pp 234-256.

Jenks, C. (1996) *The Two Rules of Sociological Method. Durkheim's Epistemologies,* London· Goldsmiths, University of London

Jerome, D. (1996) Ties that Bind In Walker, A (Ed) *The New Generational Contract Intergenerational Relations Old Age and Welfare* London· University of Central London Press, pp. 81-99.

Jessop, B (1999) The Changing Governance of Welfare. Recent Trends in its Primary Functions, Scales and Modes of Co-ordination *Social Policy and Administration.* Vol. 33(4), December, pp 348-359.

Johnson, N (1990) Problems for the Mixed Economy of Welfare In Ware, A & Goodin R. (Eds) *Needs and Welfare* London: Sage Publications, pp. 145-164

Jones, C. & Rupp, S (2000) Understanding the Carers' World. In Chamberlayne, P., Bornat, J. & Wengraf, T. (Eds) *The Turn to Biographical Methods in Social Science. Comparative Issues and Examples* London: Routledge, pp 276-289.

Jones, C., Pepperman, L. & Wilson, S. (1995) *The Futures of the Family* New Jersey: Prentice Hall

Jones, S. (2004) Muslim Pupil Loses Legal Battle to Wear Jilbab. *The Guardian* 16 June

Jordan, B. (1998) *The New Politics of Welfare Social Justice in a Global Context.* London: Sage Publications.

Jordan, B. (1996) *A Theory of Poverty and Social Exclusion.* Oxford Polity Press

Kahani-Hopkins, V. & Hopkins, N. (2002) 'Representing' British Muslims The Strategic Dimension to Identity Construction *Ethnic and Racial Studies.* Vol. 25(2), March, pp. 288-309.

Karakasoglu, Y. & Nonneman, G. (1996) Muslims in Germany. In Nonneman, G Niblock T. & Szajowski, B. (Eds) *Muslim Communities in the New Europe* Reading· Ithaca Press, pp. 241-268

Kenan, R. (1999) *Walking on Water· Black American Lives at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century* London: Little Brown and Company.

Khalifa, R (2000) (Translator) *Quran The Final Testament· (Authorised English With The Arabic Text.* Revised Edition. Fremont· Universal Unity.

Khan, Z (2000) Muslim Presence in Europe. The British Dimension – Identity, Integration and Community Activism. *Current Sociology* Vol. 48(4), October, pp. 29-34.

Khanum, S (1992) Education and the Muslim Girl. In Sahgal, G & Yuval-Davis, N. (Eds) *Refusing Holy Orders· Women and Fundamentalism in Britain.* London Virago Press, pp. 124-140.

Kiernan, (1998) Family Change: Issues and Implications. In David, M E. (Ed) *The Fragmentation of Family: Does it Matter?* London IEA Health and Welfare Unit, pp. 51-64.

King, A (2000) The Accidental Derogation of the Lay Actor A Critique of Giddens Concept of Structure. *Philosophy of Social Science* Vol. 30(3), September, pp 362-383

Klopp, B (2002) The Political Incorporation of EU Foreigners Before and After Maastricht The New Local Politics in Germany *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies.* Vol 28(2), April, pp 239-257.

Knott, K. & Khokher, S. (1993) Religious and Ethnic Identity Among Young Muslim Women in Bradford *New Community* Vol. 19(4), July, pp. 593-610

Kolinsky, E. (1993) *Women in Contemporary Germany: Life, Work and Politics* Bremen: Providence.

Krausz, E. (1971) *Ethnic Minorities in Britain* London· Granada Publishing Ltd.

Kroger, T. (Ed) (2003) *Families, Work and Social Care in Europe A Qualitative Study of Care Arrangements in Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and the UK* SOCCARE Project Report 6. Published at·
http //www uta fi/laitokset/sospol/soccare/

Kvale, S (1996) *Interviews· An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing* London: Sage Publications.

Labour Party, (1997) *Labour Party Annual Conference Report 1997* London: Labour Party.

Ladbury, S. (1979) The Turkish Cypriots Ethnic relations in London and Cyprus. In Watson, J. (Ed) *Between Two Cultures* Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 301-331

Lal, S. (2002) Members of Black and Minority Elders Group. In Tester, S , Archibald, C., Rowlings, C. & Turner, S (Eds) *Quality in Later Life· Rights, Rhetoric and Reality* Proceedings of the British Society of Gerontology 30th Annual Conference. 31st August 2001 to 2nd September 2001 Sterling University of Sterling, pp 16-17.

Lapidus, I. M. (2001) Between Universalism and Particularism· The Historical Bases of Muslim Communal, National and Global Identities *Global Networks* Vol 1(1) pp. 37-55.

Lee, S. (2001) Elderly Chinese in Sheltered Housing in the UK: A 'Face-Saving' Move. In Tester, S., Archibald, C., Rowlings, C. & Turner, S (Eds) *Quality in Later Life· Rights, Rhetoric and Reality* Proceedings of the British Society of Gerontology 30th Annual Conference 31st August 2001 to 2nd September 2001 Sterling· University of Sterling, pp. 127-129.

Leisering, L & Leibfried, S. (Eds.) (1999) *Time and Poverty in Western Welfare States. United Germany in Perspective* Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.

Leonard, D & Hood-Williams, J. (1988) *Families* London MacMillan Education

Leonard, D (1980) *Sex and Generation.* London: Tavistock.

Levitas, R (1998) *The Inclusive Society· Social Exclusion and New Labour.* Basingstoke· MacMillan.

Lewis, J. (2000) Gender and Welfare Regimes. In Lewis, G., Gewirtz, S. & Clarke, J. (Eds) *Rethinking Social Policy.* London: Sage Publications, pp. 37-51.

Lewis, J (1992) Gender and the Development of Welfare Regimes *Journal of European Social Policy.* Vol. 11(2), pp. 99-115.

Lewis, P. (1994) Being Muslim and Being British· The Dynamics of Islamic Reconstruction in Bradford. In Ballard, R. (Ed) *Desh Pardesh The South Asian Presence in Britain* London· Hurst & Co., pp 58-88.

Liedtke, M (2002) National Welfare and Asylum in Germany *Critical Social Policy*. Vol. 22(3), pp. 479-497.

Linde, C. (1993) *Life Stories The Creation of Coherence* Oxford· Oxford University Press.

Lister, R. (2000) Gender and the Analysis of Social Policy. In Lewis, G , Gewirtz, S & Clarke, J (Eds) *Rethinking Social Policy* London. Sage Publications, pp. 22-36

Lister, R. (1999) Principles of Welfare. In Alcock, P , Erskine, A & May, M (Eds) *The Students Companion to Social Policy* Oxford. Blackwell & SPA, pp. 214-. 220

Lister, R. (Ed) (1996) *Charles Murray and the Underclass· The Developing Debate* London: IEA Health and Welfare Unit

Lister, R. (1990) *The Exclusive Society: Citizenship and the Poor* London: CPAG.

Lockwood, D. (1999) Civil Integration and Social Cohesion. In Gough, I. & Olofsson, C. (Eds) *Capitalism and Social Cohesion Essays on Exclusion and Integration* New York· St Martin's Press, pp 63-84.

Lund, B. (1999) 'Ask Not What Your Community Can Do For You': Obligations, New Labour and Welfare Reform. *Critical Social Policy* Vol 19(4), pp 447-462.

Maclean, M. & Eekelaar, J. (1997) *The Parental Obligation. A Study of Parenthood Across Households* Oxford. Hart Publishing

Mandaville, P. (2001) Reimagining Islam in Diaspora· The Politics of Mediated Community. *Gazette.* Vol. 63(2-3), pp. 169-186.

Mann, K. (2001) *Approaching Retirement Social Divisions, Welfare and Exclusion.* Bristol. Policy Press.

Mann, K. (1992) *The Making of an English Underclass? The Social Divisions of Welfare and Labour* Milton Keynes: Open University Press

Marshall, D. A. (2002) Behaviour, Belonging, and Belief. A Theory of Ritual Practice. *Sociological Theory* Vol. 20(3), November, pp 360-380.

Marshall, T. (2000) Citizenship and Social Change. In Pierson, C. & Castles, F. G. (Eds.) *The Welfare State A Reader* Cambridge: Polity Press & Blackwell, pp 34-42

Marshall, T. H. (1950) (1992) Citizenship and Social Class. Essay reproduced in Marshall T. H & Bottomore, T. (Eds) *Citizenship and Social Class* London Pluto Press, pp 1-54.

Marx, K. (1849) (2000) Wage Labour and Capital. Reproduced in McLellan, D. (Ed.) *Karl Marx Selected Writings* Oxford Oxford University Press, pp. 273-294.

Mason, A. & Wilkinson, H (2001) Preparing for a Shift in Family Relationships· Capacity and Legislation. In Tester, S., Archibald, C., Rowlings, C. & Turner, S. (Eds.) *Quality in Later Life· Rights, Rhetoric and Reality* Proceedings of the British Society of Gerontology 30th Annual Conference. 31st August 2001 to 2nd September 2001. Sterling· University of Sterling, pp. 258-259

Mason, D. (1995) *Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain* Oxford: Oxford University Press

Mason, J (2002) *Qualitative Researching.* Second Edition. London· Sage Publications.

Mason, J (1996) *Qualitative Researching* London: Sage Publications

McKie, L , Bowlby, S. & Gregory, S. (2001) Gender, Caring and Employment in Britain. *Journal of Social Policy* Vol 30(2), pp. 233-258.

Mead, C. M. (1986) *Beyond Entitlement.* New York: The Free Press

Mead, G H (1967) *Mind, Self and Society* Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Meijering, L. & van Hoven, B. (2003) Imagining Difference: The Experiences of 'Transnational' Indian IT Professionals in Germany. *Area* Vol. 35(2), pp 174-182.

Meis, M. (1983) Towards a Methodology for Feminist Research. In Bowles, G & Duelli Klein, R (Eds) *Theories of Women's Studies*. London. Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp 117-139.

Metcalf, B D (1996) *Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe* Berkeley. University of California Press

Meywer, D. (2001) The German Charitable Welfare System. A Criticism from the Viewpoint of *Ordnungspolitik Annals of Public and Co-operative Economics* Vol. 72(1), pp. 103-133.

Miles, D. & Iben, A. (1999) The Reform of Pension Systems Winners and Losers Across Generations in the United Kingdom and Germany. *Economica* Vol 67, pp. 203-228.

Millar, J. (2003) Gender, Poverty and Social Exclusion. *Social Policy and Society* Vol. 2(3), July, pp. 181-188.

Miller, T. & Bell, L. (2002) Consenting to What? Issues of Access, Gate-keeping and 'Informed' Consent In Mauthner, M, Birch, M., Jessop, J & Miller, T. (Eds) *Ethics in Qualitative Research* London· Sage Publications, pp 53-70.

Mingioni, E. (1997) Enterprise and Exclusion *The Wealth and Poverty of Networks Tackling Social Exclusion* Demos Collection. Vol 12, pp. 10-12.

Minogue, D. (1997) Etzioni's Communitarianism· Old (Communion) Wine in New Bottles. *Politics* Vol. 17(3), pp. 161-168

Mirza, M. (1998) 'Same Voices, Same Lives?'· Revisiting Black Feminist Standpoint Epistemology. In Connolly, P. & Troyna, B (Eds.) *Researching Racism in Education* Philadelphia Open University Press, pp. 79-94

Modood, T, Beishon, S & Virdee, S. (1994) *Changing Ethnic Identities* London. Policy Studies Institute.

Mohammad, R. (1999) Marginalisation, Islamism and the Production of the 'Other's' 'Other'. *Gender, Place and Culture* Vol 6(3), pp. 221-240

Moriarty, J., Sin, C. H, Brockmann, M., Butt, J & Fisher, M. (2001) Quality of Life and Social Support Among People from Different Ethnic Groups. *Generations Review*. Vol. 11(4), December, pp. 8-9.

Morris, D. (1968) *The Naked Ape*. London: Corgi

Morris, L. & Irwin, S (1992) Employment Histories and the Concept of the Underclass. *Sociology* Vol. 26(3), August, pp. 401-420.

Morris, L. (2000) Rights and Controls in the Management of Migration: The Case of Germany. *The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review* pp 224-240.

Morrison, K. (1995) *Marx, Durkheim, Weber Formations of Modern Social Thought*. London. Sage Publications

Mortimore, R (2001) Polling British Muslims. In *Mori. Commentary Column*, 16 November. Available at· http //www mori com/digest/2001/c011116 shtml

Mouzelis, N. (1997) Restructuring Social Theory. *Sociological Review* Vol. 37(4), pp. 613-615

Mowat, H. (2001) Older People's Experienced Journeying Into Old Age - Towards Successful Ageing. *Gerontologist*. Vol. 41. Special Issue, October, pp 28-29

Mulhall, S. & Swift, A. (1996) *Liberals and Communitarians* Second Edition. Oxford. Blackwell.

Muncie, J. & Langan, M (1997) Introduction· Public Definitions and Private Lives In Muncie, J. et al (Eds) *Understanding the Family*. London Sage Publications & Open University Press, pp. 1-4.

Murray, C. (1995) The Next British Revolution. *The Public Interest*, No 118, Winter, pp. 3-29.

Murray, C. (1988) *In Pursuit of Happiness and Good Government* New York: Simon & Schuster.

Nadvi, K. (1999) Shifting Ties: Social Networks in the Surgical Instrument Cluster of Sialkot, Pakistan. *Development and Change*. Vol. 30, pp 141-175.

Naegele, G. & Walker, A. (2002) *Ageing and Social Policy· Towards an Agenda for Policy Learning Between Britain and Germany.* London: Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society.

Napolitano, M., McCauley, L., Beltran, M & Philips, J. (2002) The Dynamic Process of Focus Groups with Migrant Farmworkers The Oregon Experience. *Journal of Immigrant Health.* Vol. 4(4), October, pp. 177-182.

Naxman, I (1977) *The Stigma of Poverty· A Critique of Poverty, Theories and Policies* Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Nazroo, J. Y. (2001) *Ethnicity, Class and Health* London· Policy Studies Institute

Nesbitt, S. & Neary, D (2001) *Ethnic Minorities and Their Pension Decisions. A Study of Pakistani, Bangladeshi and White Men in Oldham.* York. Joseph Rowntree Foundation

Ney, S (2000) Are You Sitting Comfortably . Then We'll Begin· Three Gripping Policy Stories about Pension reform. *Innovations The European Journal of Social Sciences* Vol. 13(4), December, pp 341-371

Nielsen, J (1995) *Muslims in Western Europe.* Second Edition Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press

Nielsen, J. (1988) Muslims in Britain and Local Authority Responses In Greholm, T., & Lithman, Y. G. (Eds) *The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe* London: Mansell, pp. 53-77.

Nonneman, G. (1996) Muslim Communities in the New Europe Themes and Puzzles. In Nonneman, G., Niblock T & Szajowski, B. (Eds) *Muslim Communities in the New Europe* Reading· Ithaca Press, pp. 3-24

Nyazee, I. A. K. (2000) *Islamic Jurisprudence.* Islamabad: International Institute of Islamic Thought

Nyazee, I A K. (1994) *Theories of Islamic Law The Methodology of* Ijtihād. Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute & International Institute of Islamic Thought.

Nye, F. I. & Berardo, F. M. (1973) *The Family Its Structure and Interaction* New York. The MacMillan Co.

Oakley, A. (1998) Gender, Methodology and People's Way of Knowing· Some Problems with Feminism and the Paradigm Debate in Social Science. *Sociology* Vol. 32(4), pp 707-731

Oakley, A (1982) Conventional Families. In Rapoport, R. N , Fogarty, M P & Rapoport, R (Eds) *Families in Britain British Family Research Committee.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 123-137.

Offe, C. (2000) The German Welfare State· Principles, Performance and Prospects After Unification. *Thesis Eleven* No. 63, November, pp 11-37.

Office of National Statistics, (2002) *Census 2001.* Available at: http·//www statistics gov uk

Operation Black Vote, (1999) Black Participation in the UK· More than Just a Drop in the Ocean *The Journal,* October.

Oppenheim, C. (1998) An Overview of Poverty and Social Exclusion In Oppenheim, C. (Ed.) *An Inclusive Society Strategies for Tackling Poverty* Summary Compiled by Choitz, V. London: Institute for Public Policy Research, pp. 11-28.

Pahl, R. E. (1984) *Divisions of Labour.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell

Parekh, B. (2000) Defining British National Identity. *The Political Quarterly,* pp. 1-14.

Paugman, S (1995) The Spiral of Precariousness· A Multidimensional Approach to the Process of Social Disqualification in France. In Room, G (Ed) *Beyond the Threshold· The Measurement and Analysis of Social Exclusion* Bristol. The Policy Press, pp. 49-79.

Perri, B (1997) Social Exclusion. Time to be Optimistic. *The Wealth and Poverty of Networks. Tackling Social Exclusion,* Demos Collection Vol 12, pp. 3-9.

Phillips, T (2002) Imagined Communities and Self-Identity· An Exploratory
    Quantitative Analysis *Sociology* Vol 36(3), August, pp. 597-619.

Phillipson, C. (2001) *The Family and Community Life of Older People Social
    Networks and Social Support in Three Urban Areas.* London· Routledge.

Pick, C. (2003) *Current Themes in UK Health Care· How Are They Approached in
    Germany* Conference Report. April. London· Anglo-German Foundation for
    the Study of Industrial Society and the King's Fund.

Pickthall, M. M. (1999) (Translator) *The Glorious Qur'an.* Second U S. Edition.
    Watford. Tahrike Tarsile *Qur'an.*

Poggi, G (2000) *Durkheim.* Oxford. Oxford University Press.

Power, A & Wilson, W. (2000) *Social Exclusion and the Future of Cities* Case
    Paper February. London: London School of Economics.

Preuss, U K (2003) Citizenship and the German Nation. *Citizenship Studies* Vol.
    7(1), pp 37-55

Price, B (2002) Methodological Issues in Nursing Research Laddered Questions
    and Qualitative Data Research Interviews. *Journal of Advanced Nursing* Vol
    37(3), pp. 273-281.

Prideaux, S. (2002) From Organisational Theory to the New Communitarianism of
    Amitai Etzioni. *Canadian Journal of Sociology* Vol. 27(1), pp. 69-81

Prideaux, S. (2001) New Labour, Old Functionalism· The Underlying Contradictions
    of Welfare Reform in the US and the UK *Social Policy and Administration*
    Vol 35(1), March, pp. 85-115.

Punch, M. (1994) Politics and Ethics in Qualitative Research. In Denzin, N. K &
    Lincoln, Y. S (Eds) *Handbook of Qualitative Research.* Thousand Oaks. Sage
    Publications, pp. 83-97

Putnam, R. D. (2000) *Bowling Alone The Collapse and Revival of American
    Community.* New York Simon Schuster.

Putnam, R. D. (1993) The Prosperous Community. Social Capital and Public Life.
    The American Prospect. Vol. 4(13), March, Archived Pages.

Qureshi, H (1996) Obligations and Support Within Families. In Walker, A (Ed),
    *The New Generational Contract Intergenerational Relations Old Age and
    Welfare* London· University of Central London Press, pp. 100-119

Qureshi, H. & Simons, K. (1987), 'Resources Within Families Caring for Elderly
    People', in Brannen, J. & Wilson, G. (Eds) *Give and Take in Families.*
    London: Allen & Unwin, pp. 117-135.

Rahman, A. (Ed) (1988) *Muhammad (PBUH) Encyclopaedia of Seerah: Sunnah,
    Da'wah and Islam.* London: Seerah Foundation.

Rake, K. (2000). Into the Mainstream? Why Gender Audit is an Essential Tool for
    Policymakers *New Economy* Vol 7, pp. 107-110.

Rawls, J. (1967) Two Concepts of Rules. In Foot, P. (Ed.) *Theories of Ethics.*
    Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 144-170.

Rees, T. (1982) Immigration Policies in the United Kingdom In Husband, C. (Ed)
    'Race' in Britain Continuity and Change. London: Hutchinson, pp. 75-96.

Reitz, J., Frick, T., Calabrese, T. & Wagner, G (1998) *The Institutional Framework
    of Ethnic Inclusion and Exclusion A Cross National Analysis of the Earnings
    of Foreigners in Germany and Immigrants in Canada* Berlin· German Institute
    for Economic Research.

Roberts J M. & Devine, F (2003) The Hollowing Out of the Welfare State and
    Social Capital. *Social Policy and Society* Vol. 2(4), October, pp 309-319.

Roche, M (1997) Citizenship and Exclusion Restructuring the European Union In
    Roche, M. & Berkel, R. (Eds) *European Citizenship and Social Exclusion*
    Ashgate: Aldershot Press Ltd, pp. 3-22

Rodger, J. J. (2000) *A Welfare State to a Welfare Society. The Changing Context of
    Social Policy in a Post-Modern Era* London: MacMillan Press Ltd.

Room, G. (1995) Poverty and Social Exclusion: The New European Agenda for Policy and Research. In Room, G. (Ed) *Beyond the Threshold The Measurement and Analysis of Social Exclusion* Bristol. The Policy Press, pp 1-9.

Root, M. (1993) *Philosophy of Social Science. The Methods, Ideals and Politics of Social Inquiry* Oxford Blackwell

Rose, E J. B (1969) *Colour and Citizenship*. Oxford· Oxford University Press.

Rose, H (1981) Re-Reading Titmuss The Sexual Divisions of Welfare. *Journal of Social Policy* Vol. 10(4), pp. 521-538

Roseneil, S. (1993) Greenham Revisited. Researching Myself and My Sisters. In Hobbs, D. & May, T. (Eds) *Interpreting the Field Accounts of Ethnography*. Oxford. Oxford University Press, pp. 177-208.

Ross, E (1983) Survival networks. Women's neighbourhood sharing in London before World War 1 *History Workshop*. Vol 15, pp. 4-27.

Rummery, K & Glendinning, C. (2000) Access to Services as a Civil and Social Rights Issue: The Role of Welfare Professionals in Regulating Access to and Commissioning Services for Disabled and Older People Under New Labour. *Social Policy and Administration*. Vol 34(5), December, pp. 529-550.

Runciman, W. (1990) How Many Classes are There in Contemporary British Society? *Sociology* Vol. 24(3), August, pp. 377-396.

Rupp, S. (1999) Living in Two Cultures British National Report in Ethnic Minorities and Migrants *SOSTRIS Working Paper 4· Social Strategies in Risk Societies*

Ryan, K. E. (1995) Evaluation Ethics and Issues of Social Justice: Contributions from Female Moral Thinking. In Denzin, N K (Ed.) *Studies in Symbolic Interaction A Research Annual* Vol. 19, pp. 143-151.

Saifullah Khan, V. (1982) The Role of the Culture of Dominance in Structuring the Experience of Ethnic Minorities In Husband, C (Ed) *'Race' in Britain Continuity and Change* London· Hutchinson, pp. 197-215.

Saifullah Khan, V. (1977) The Pakistani's Mirpuri Villagers at Home in Bradford. In Watson, J L. (Ed) *Between Two Cultures*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp 57-89.

Saint-Blancat, C. (2002) Islam in Diaspora· Between Reterritorialization and Extraterritoriality. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*. Vol. 26(1), March, pp. 138-151.

Sales, R. (2002) The Deserving and the Undeserving? Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Welfare in Britain *Critical Social Policy*. Vol. 22(3), pp 456-478.

Samje, C. (1995) *Health, Race and Ethnicity· Making Sense of the Evidence* London. Kings Fund Institute

Sassen, S. (1999) *Guests and Aliens* New York: The New York Press

Sayer, A. (1992) *Method in Social Science· A Realist Approach* Second Edition London: Routledge.

Scantlebury, E. (1995) Muslims in Manchester: The Depiction of Religious Community. *New Community* Vol. 21(3), pp. 425-435

Scheff, T. J. (2000) Shame and the Social Bond. A Sociological Theory. *Sociological Theory*. Vol. 18(1), March, pp. 84-99

Scheiwe, K. (2000) Equal Opportunities Policies and the Management of Care in Germany In Hantrais, L. (Ed) *Gendered Policies in Europe· Reconciling Employment and Family Life*. London. MacMillan, pp. 89-107.

Schmahl, W. (1998) Recent Developments of Pension Schemes in Germany: Present and Future Tasks in Conflict *Labour* Vol. 12(1), pp. 143-168.

Schofield, B (2002) Partners in Power· Governing the Self-Sustaining Community. *Sociology*. Vol 36(3), August, pp. 663-685.

Schönwälder, K. (2004) Why Germany's Guestworkers Were Largely Europeans· The Selective Principles of Post-War Labour Recruitment Policy *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. Vol. 27(2), pp. 248-265.

Schulz, B. (2000) Globalisation, Unification, and the German Welfare State. *UNESCO*, pp. 39-50

Schwimmer, E. (1972) Symbolic Competition. *Anthropologica*. Vol. XIV(2), pp 117-155.

Seale, C. (1999) *The Quality of Qualitative Research* London· Sage Publications

Seeleib-Kaiser, M (2002) The Dual Transformation of the German Welfare State *West European Politics* Vol 25(4), October, pp. 25-48

Sevenhuijsen, S (2000) Caring in the Third Way: The Relation Between Obligations, Responsibility and Care in Third Way Discourse *Critical Social Policy* Vol. 20(1), pp. 5-37.

Sevenhuijsen, S. (1998) *Citizenship and the Ethics of Care*. London. Routledge.

Shah, N & Menon, I. (1999) Chain Migration Through the Social Network: Experience of Labour Migrants in Kuwait. *International Migration* Vol 37(2), pp. 361-382

Shakespeare, T. (2000) The Social Relations of Care In Lewis, G., Gewirtz, S & Clarke, J. (Eds) *Rethinking Social Policy* London: Sage Publications, pp 52-65.

Shakir, M H (1999) (Translator) *The Qur'an Translation*. English Only. Watford Tahrike Tarsile Qur'an.

Shaw, A. (2000) *Kinship and Continuity Pakistani Families in Britain* Amsterdam· Harwood Academic Publishers.

Shaw, A. (1994) The Pakistani Community in Oxford In Ballard, R (Ed) *Desh Pardesh The South Asian Presence in Britain* London Hurst Company, pp 35-57.

Shaw, A. (1988) *A Pakistani Community in Britain* London. Basil Blackwell Ltd.

Sheffield City Council, (2003) *Reporting on Creating Successful Neighbourhoods Closing the Gap* 8th September. Available at: http·//www sheffield gov uk/your-city-council/council-meetings/scrutiny-boards/neighbourhoods/agenda-15th-september-2003/successful-neighbourhoods

Sherif, B. (2001) The Ambiguity of Boundaries in the Fieldwork Experience. Establishing Rapport and Negotiating Insider/Outsider Status. *Qualitative Inquiry*. Vol. 7(4), pp. 436-447.

Sibley, D. (1995) *Geographies of Exclusion Society and Difference in the West*. London: Routledge

Siddique, M. (1993) *Moral Spotlight on Bradford* Bradford. M S Press

Silva, E. & Smart, C (1999) The Transformation of Mothering In Silva, E. & Smart, C. (Eds) *The New Family*. London. Sage Publications, pp. 10-36.

Silva, (1996) *Good Enough Mothering: Feminist Perspectives on Lone Motherhood*. London. Routledge

Social Exclusion Unit, (2000). *Minority Ethnic Issues in Social Exclusion and Neighbourhood Renewal* London: Cabinet Office.

Social Exclusion Unit, (1999) *Bridging the Gap*. London· Official Publications.

Social Exclusion Unit, (1998) *Bringing Britain Together A National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal*. London: Official Publications

Social Services Directorate, (2003) *District Commissioning Plans 2003/4 West Lancashire* Lancashire Lancashire County Council.

Social Services Directorate, (2002) *Culturally Appropriate Care· Commissioning Strategy for Minority Ethnic Groups*. Lancashire. Lancashire County Council.

Southall Black Sisters, (1990) *Against The Grain· A Celebration of Survival and Struggle*. Nottingham: Russell Press Ltd.

Speier, M. (1976) The Child as a Conversationalist: Some Culture Contact Features of Conversational Interactions Between Adults and Children In Hammersley, M & Woods, P. (Eds.) *The Process of Schooling· A Sociological Reader* London. Routledge & Kegan Paul with Open University Press, pp. 98-103

Spencer, I R G (1997) *British Immigration Policy Since 1939. The Making of Multi-Racial Britain* London. Routledge.

Stack, C B (1975) *All Our Kin Strategies for Survival in a Black community* New York Harper & Row

Stark, R (2001) Gods, Rituals, and the Moral Order. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* Vol. 40(4), pp 619-636.

Stone, L. (2002) The Islamic Crescent· Islam, Culture and Globalization'. *Innovation* Vol. 15(2), pp 121-131

Stubbs, P (1993) "Ethnically Sensitive" or "Anti-Racist"? Models for Health Research and Service Delivery. In Ahmad, W. A. (Ed) *'Race' and Health in Contemporary Britain* Buckingham Open University Press, pp 34-50.

Sudbury, J. (2001) (Re)constructing Multiracial Blackness: Women's Activism, Difference and Collective Identity in Britain *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol 24(1), January, pp. 29-49.

Taylor, D. (1998) Social Identity and Social Policy· Engagements with Postmodern Theory *Journal of Social Policy* Vol 27(3), pp 329-350

Taylor-Gooby, P. (1999) Policy Change at a Time of Retrenchment· Recent Pension Reform in France, Germany, Italy and the UK *Social Policy and Administration.* Vol 33(1), March, pp 1-19

Tayob, A. (1999) *Islam A Short Introduction Signs, Symbols and Values.* Oxford One World.

Tempelman, S (1999) Constructions of Cultural Identity: Multiculturalism and Exclusion. *Political Studies* XLVII, pp 17-31

Temple, B. (1997) Watch your Tongue· Issues in Translation and Cross-Cultural Research *Sociology,* Vol. 31(3), pp. 607-618.

Temple, B , Glennister, C. & Raynes, N. (2002) Prioritising Home Care Needs. Research with Older People from Three Ethnic Minority Community Groups. *Health and Social Care in the Community.* Vol. 10(3), pp 179-186

Theil, S. (2003) Germany – A Country of Immigration After All. *American Institute for Contemporary German Studies* 3 June. Available at. http·//www aicgs org/c/theilc3 shtml

Thompson, K. (1996) Wedded to the Sacred In Pickering, W. S. F & Millar, W. W (Eds) *Individualism and Human Rights in the Durkheimian Tradition* Oxford British Centre for Durkheimian Studies, pp. 77-81.

Tilly, L. (1984) Linen was Their Life: Family Survival Strategies and Parent-Child Relations in Nineteenth Century France. In Medick, H & Sabean, D W. (Eds) *Interest and Emotions: Essays on the Study of Family and Kinship* Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Titmuss, R M (1970) *The Gift Relationship· From Human Blood to Social Policy* London. Allen Unwin.

Titmuss, R. M. (1963) *Essays on the Welfare State.* London. Unwin University Books

Trifiletti, R., Simoni, S & Pratesi, A (2003) *Work and Care in Double Front Carer Families· A Qualitative Comparison of Care Arrangements in Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and the UK.* SOCCARE Project: Workpackage 5. Published at: http //www uta fi/laitokset/sospol/soccare

Tronto, J (1993) *Moral Boundaries. A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care.* London: Routledge

Trotter, J. (2003) Researching, Studying or Jumping Through Hoops? Reflections on a PhD. *Social Word Education* Vol. 22(1), pp. 59-70.

Tschentscher, A. (2003) *The Basic Law (Grundgesetz) The Constitution of Federal Republic of Germany.* (May 23rd, 1949). Translated by Axel Tschentscher, Jurisprudentia Verlag Würzburg.

Turkington, R. & Dixon, A (1998) *Thinking Ahead Housing, Care and the Future for Black Elders.* Birmingham· School of Housing, University of Central England

Turner, V. (1969) *The Ritual Process Structure and Anti-Structure* Ithaca Cornell University Press

Turner, V. (1967) *The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual* London· Cornell University Press.

Van Dyke, V. (1977) The Individual, the State and Ethnic Communities in Political theory *World Politics.* Vol. 29(3), April, pp. 343-369.

Van Kerbergen, K. (1995) *A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State.* New York Routledge

Vertovec, S. (1997) Young Muslims in Keighley, West Yorkshire. Cultural Identity, Context and 'Community'. *Migration.* No. 32-33-34

Vobruba G. (2000) Actors in Process of Inclusion and Exclusion· Towards a Dynamic Approach *Social Policy and Administration* Vol 34(5), December, pp. 601-613.

Vogt, A. & Zwingel, S. (2003) Asking Fathers and Employers to Volunteer. A (De)Tour of Reconciliation Policy in Germany? *Review of Policy Research* Vol. 20(3), September, pp 459-478

Walker, A. (1999) Older People. In Alcock, P., Erskine, A. & May, M (Eds) *The Students Companion to Social Policy* Oxford· Blackwell & SPA, pp 249-256.

Walker, A (1996) Introduction The New Generational Contract In Walker, A (Ed) *The New Generational Contract Intergenerational Relations Old Age and Welfare* London: University of Central London Press, pp 1-9.

Walker, A. (1996b) Intergenerational Relations and the Provision of Welfare In Walker, A (Ed) *The New Generational Contract: Intergenerational Relations: Old Age and Welfare* London: University of Central London Press, pp 10-36

Walker, R. (1995) The Dynamics of Poverty and Social Exclusion In Room, G (Ed) *Beyond the Threshold The Measurement and Analysis of Social Exclusion* Bristol: The Policy Press, pp. 102-128

Wall, K. & José, J S. (2003) *Immigrant Families, Work and Social Care· A Qualitative Comparison of Care Arrangements in Finland, Italy, the UK, France and Portugal.* SOCCARE Project: Workpackage 4 Published at. http·//www uta fi/laitokset/sospol/soccare/

Wallace, G & Walker, A. D. M. (1970) Introduction In Wallace, G. & Walker, A D. M. (Eds.) *The Definition of Morality* London Methuen, pp 1-20

Wallwork, E. (1972) *Durkheim Morality and Milieu* Massachusetts Harvard University Press

Warnes, T (2003) Older International Migrants in Europe· Groups, Kinship Networks and Needs for Support and Care *Migration and Caring The Impact of Migration on Kinship and Care.* September, pp. 18-19.

Warnock, G. J. (1971) *The Object of Morality* London· Methuen.

Watson, J. (1979) Introduction· Immigration, Ethnicity and Class in Britain In Watson, J (Ed.) *Between Two Cultures.* Oxford· Blackwell, pp 1-20.

Weber, M. (1965) *Theory of Social and Economic Organization* Translated by Henderson, A. M. & Parsons, T. New York· Free Press

Wedell, M. (1999) Angeworben – eingewandert – altgeworden Sichtweisen alterer turkischer ArbeitsmigrantInnen. In Dominik, K., Jungemann, M., Motte, J. & Reinecke, A (Eds) *Angeworben – eingewandert – abgeschoben Einwanderungsgesellschaft Bundesrepublik Deutschland* Munster· Westf, Dampfboot, pp 131-149

Weekes, D. (2003) Keeping it in the Community· Creating Safe Spaces for Black Girlhood *Community, Work and Family.* Vol 6(1), pp. 47-61.

Weller, P (1990) The Rushdie Controversy and Inter-faith Relations. In Cohn-Sherbok, D. (Ed) *The Salman Rushdie Controversy in Interreligious Perspective* Dyfed. Edwin Mellen Press, pp. 37-59.

Wenger, G. C. (1984) *The Supportive Network* London. Allen & Unwin

Wengraf, T. (2000) Uncovering the General From Within the Particular In Chamberlayne, P., Bornat, J. & Wengraf, T. (Eds) *The Turn to Biographical Methods in Social Science. Comparative Issues and Examples* London· Routledge, pp 140-164.

Werbner, P. (2002) *Imagined Diasporas Among Manchester Muslims The Public Performance of Pakistani Transnational Identity Politics*. Oxford. James Currey.

Westergaard, J. (1992) Above and Beyond the 'Underclass'. Some Notes on Influences of Social Climate on British Sociology Today. *Sociology* Vol. 26(4), November, pp. 575-587.

Whelan, B. J , & Whelan, C. T. (1995) In What Sense is Poverty Multidimensional In Room, G (Ed) *Beyond the Threshold The Measurement and Analysis of Social Exclusion* Bristol. The Policy Press, pp 29-48.

Wieviorka, M. (1998) Is Multiculturalism the Solution? *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. Vol 21, pp. 881-910.

Willgerodt, A. M. (2003) Using Focus Groups to Develop Culturally Relevant Instruments. *Western Journal of Nursing Research* Vol. 27(7), pp 789-814.

Williams, F. (2001) In and Beyond New Labour. Towards a New Political Ethic of Care *Critical Social Policy* Vol 21(4), November, pp. 467-493.

Williams, F. (2000) Principles of Recognition and Respect in Welfare. In Lewis, G , Gewirtz, S & Clarke, J (Eds) *Rethinking Social Policy*. London· Sage Publications, pp. 338-352.

Williams, F. (1996) Race, Welfare and Community Care: A Historical Perspective. In Ahmed, W. I U. & Atkin, K (Eds) *Race and Community Care*. Bristol· Open University Press, pp

Wilpert, C. (1992) *The Use of Social Networks in Turkish Migration to Germany*. Oxford· Clarendon Press.

Wilson, E. O. (1975) *Socio-biology· The New Synthesis* Harvard. Harvard University Press.

Windebank, J. (2001) Dual-Earner Couples in Britain and France Gender Divisions of Domestic Labour and Parenting Work in Different Welfare States. *Work, Employment and Society* Vol 15(2), pp. 269-290

Woods, P. Bagley, C. & Glatter, R. (1998) *School, Choice and Competition Markets in the Public Interest*. London. Routledge.

Wray, S (2003) Women Growing Older: Agency, Ethnicity and Culture *Sociology* Vol. 37(3), pp. 511-527.

Yar, M (2003) Honneth and the Communitarians· Towards a Recognitive Critical Theory of Community. *Res Publica*. Vol 9, pp 101-125.

Yusuf Ali, A (1987) (Translator) *The Holy Qur'an. Text, Translation and Commentary* Watford: Tahrike Tarsile Qur'an

Young, M. & Willmott, P. (1957) *Family and Kinship in East London* London. Routledge.

Zokaei, S. & Phillips, D (2000) Altruism and Intergenerational Relations Among Muslims in Britain. *Current Sociology* Vol. 48(4), October, pp 45-58