Security knowledge and terrorism research:

Filling the gaps with Lombroso

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Chi ha paura muore ogni giorno, chi non ha paura muore una volta sola

~

Judge Paolo Borsellino

The world is a fine place and worth fighting for

~

Ernest Hemingway

Abstract

This thesis explores the knowledge-base of security policy in Europe, particularly, the potential contribution of social science. It makes a theoretical contribution to the study of security through the translation into English of material from nineteenth-century Italian texts, and makes an empirical contribution by means of interviews with policymakers, security professionals and academics currently engaged in the response to terrorism. The theoretical framework examines the theories of nineteenth-century thinker Cesare Lombroso. Although Lombroso is much better known for his claims concerning the origins of criminal behaviour, he was the first to propose social science as a route to knowledge of anarchist violence. In his books on anarchists and political criminals, which are virtually unknown, he proposed that the reasons behind anarchist violence would be found in social conditions, psychological states and religious grievances. He developed techniques to study these links, such as combining information from maps and statistical data over time to examine the likelihood of revolts occurring in particular regions of the country and to develop specific counter-measures. The empirical study develops seven themes from interviews with twenty experts involved in security policy and counterterrorism. Four themes concern policy issues: definition of terrorism, security and terrorism risk management, counterterrorism and policymaking, imprisonment and rehabilitation of offenders. The other three themes concern terrorism research: sources of data gathering, best practices of research methods, and the construction of terrorist profiles. An additional interview was conducted with 'Charles', a contemporary extremist linked to a terrorist actor. Salient points from this interview are discussed in two postscripts that portray Charles's extremist perspectives. Overall, this thesis identifies and examines the potential of social science to contribute knowledge for the creation of security policy, and of pursuing social science research into terrorism, which resonate with similar approaches in Lombroso.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

At the start of the twenty-first century, reactions to the terrorist incidents in the United States and later on in Spain and Britain spread a veil over the world marked 'war on terrorism'. The term 'war' was used to encourage public support and create an extensive reaction against such violent behaviour leaving no room for compromise. Following the war on organized crime and the war on drugs, the war on terrorism is the ultimate struggle (LaFree, 2009). Though there may be similarities in approaching these pressing issues, 'academic criminology was far more engaged in the wars on crime and drugs than it has been in the war on terrorism' (LaFree, 2009: 431). Lagging behind in this research sector since the '70s and '80s, criminologists interested in the research on terrorism have flourished in the last decade after an increase in funds by governments, first in the United States (LaFree, 2009) and then in Europe (Eder & Senn, 2008, as cited in LaFree, 2009). However, questions about this development arise and prompt one to ask: how do those responsible for drawing security policy reach the state of 'knowing' the level of the terrorist threat? Do they rely on 'intelligence' provided by security services? Do they make use of social science findings? Is objective social science knowledge of terrorism possible to achieve without any form of political bias, governmental intrusion and consequential terminological confusion?

This research presents the contemporary perceptions of academics, security professionals and policymakers and how they learn and understand the phenomenon of terrorism in order to react adequately without creating further unrest. This study also investigates the interconnections and interactions, or the lack of, that exist among these three different professional spheres. The study draws on the theoretical framework of Lombroso; specifically, his unknown texts on anarchists and political crime. The knowledge gathered from twenty experts from different parts of the world was compared and contrasted with *Gli Anarchici* (*The Anarchists*), one of the works of Cesare Lombroso. This work was published for the first time in 1894. Its second edition, which included additional material, was published in 1895, a few months after the first publication. *Gli Anarchici* consists of a study of anarchist actors, their social and psychological background, and their methods of attack around the world against the backdrop of the Italian political context of the late nineteenth century.

This work has rarely been referred to by academics because it was not translated into English. Accordingly, I set about translating this work from Italian to contemporary English, a

task which took almost a year, and I found it highly relevant to the objectives of this study. As it turned out, the two main approaches I employed in my research – the translation and analysis of Lombroso's work on one hand, and the interviews with contemporary experts on the other – created an interface of two 'mentalities' on the subject that were separated by a time-gap of more than a century. This study also filled a number of gaps in the studies of political violence and terrorist behaviour expressed by anti-despotic anarchists at the end of the nineteenth century.

1.1 Security

Over the course of history security has cumulatively acquired layers of knowledge that are relevant to today's world. The concept of security was an integral part of war and the defence of society which developed into military and defensive policies. These security strategies were the core elements that brought about the development of practical military innovations such as fortifications and military strategies. Security stratagems aimed at creating rules and preserving life are found in texts that are centuries old. Such texts include the Hammurabi Code (c. 2,000 B.C.), the Book of the Deuteronomy in the Bible, as well as others from other parts of the world, for example, Sun Tzu, Miyamoto Musashi and Yagyu Munenori (Manunta, 1997). Zedner (2009) also recalled the discourse on security of Hobbes, Locke, Smith, Bentham and Mill that contributed to the better understanding of the multi-faceted nature of security and securitization.

Security measures have to acclimatize continually to contextual threats. In fact security professionals have to implement policies to eliminate or reduce the detected perils, like international terrorism. Europe's struggle to control terrorism has a long history (Monaco, 1995; Peek, 1994; Rauchs & Koenig, 2001; Richardot, 2002, as cited in Deflem, 2006). International political policing was first witnessed in the nineteenth century (Deflem, 2005). It was later seen in action in the modern world through the international cooperation within Europe in the mid-1970s, when European Union (EU) Ministers of the Interior, police forces and intelligence services developed mechanisms for discussion and concrete multilateral cooperation, such as the TREVI (International Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and Violence) group (Deflem, 2006; Wilkinson, 2006). TREVI was a structure that facilitated the exchange of intelligence and helped to coordinate the fight against organized crime and terrorism. Apart from TREVI, there were other cooperative arrangements to combat terrorism, such as Police

Working Group on Terrorism (formed in 1979), and the Counter Terrorist Group (formed shortly after 9/11) (Deflem, 2006). The establishment of EUROPOL was agreed upon in the Treaty on the European Union (known as the Maastricht Treaty) in 1992 but it was only in 1998 that this European police force was authorised to investigate terrorism. Conversely, Interpol contributed to a lesser extent in enhancing police cooperation. Its role in combating terrorism is a modest one because its constitution excludes investigation of political matters (Wilkinson, 2006).

The 'most ambitious attempt at European cooperation at the judicial level is the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism' (Wilkinson, 2006: 162). This convention, now ratified by all EU member states, excluded major terrorist offences (for instance, assassinations, hijackings, hostage taking and bomb attacks) from political exceptions that justified refusal of extradition and treated such offences as common crimes. It was also made mandatory to assist in investigations of such criminal offences. The 9/11 attacks brought about a series of counterterrorism action plans in and among EU countries. These action plans included police and judicial cooperation; diplomatic activity and peace processes; humanitarian aid; enhanced airport security; improved cooperation in suppressing the financing of terrorism; and the sharing of expertise in emergency planning and in dealing with terrorist attacks that involve CBRN[1] materials (Wilkinson, 2006).

These supranational security responses to global terrorist networking were aimed at enhancing security cooperation, while lowering European internal borders, easing freedom of movement across the Schengen countries, and implementing 'protective security' on external borders (Cabinet Office, 2007: 6) in order to create 'Fortress Europe' (Loader, 2002). After 9/11, the securitization of Europe increased to the extent that Loader (2002: 125) asked: 'is Europe today being governed through security and, if so, with what effects?' This created a dilemma because countries needed to find equilibrium between effective security measures that countered organized crime and terrorism while preserving the free flow of commuters (Zedner, 2009). Criminologists devoted themselves to identify, inquire, outline and analyse the motivations and the rationale of violent acts of terrorism to find the most relevant answers to questions posed by the security community and to recommend policies and strategies that adequately defended the nation and society at large. However, security strategies are non-productive and extremely costly to install, monitor and maintain (Manunta, 1997). Although criminology and studies of security and terrorism aim at finding the reasons why people offend and also at preventing, controlling and reducing crime, there is 'lack of research evidence on

[1] Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear.

each of these factors, and therefore policies are likely, at best, to be only partially successful' (Gill, 1994: 9). These studies aim to achieve what Sun Tzu described to 'win without fighting'.

Being persistently part of our existence, security needs to be continuously refreshed, and reviewed every time there are changes in the relevant contexts. Andersson, Brattberg, Häggqvist, Ojanen and Rhinard (2011: 28) stated that European security strategy (ESS) 'was never meant to be preserved for eternity, but rather to be a living document that would evolve and develop as the EU developed and as its strategic environment and the challenges associated with it evolved'. In proposing country-specific strategies, updates on the threats faced by Europe, and grand strategies as pathways to the future, Adersson *et al.* (2011: 33) concluded:

> The EU's power to influence international affairs depends on its ability to overcome divergent national interests through the shaping of common positions. The reinvention of the ESS into a comprehensive European external action strategy would strengthen the EU's efforts to achieve greater coordination in order to speak with one voice.

1.2 Terrorism: myth and history

What do we mean by *terrorism*? There is no definition of terrorism that is universally accepted (Schmid, 2011). Nietzsche's statement in the *Genealogy of Moral* comes to mind; 'only that which has no history can be defined'. There have been numerous attempts to find a definition but none that has been universally accepted. Schmid and Jongman (1988) consulted numerous experts in the field and extracted 109 definitions but there were unaddressed politico-diplomatic discussions on what this definition should or should not include; for instance, whether extreme actions by state-actors should be considered as terrorism or otherwise.

Terrorism as a strategy uses violence to spread panic through violent attacks while aiming to manipulate ideologies. However, the interpretation of this term depends on who is using violence and the just cause principles, who is labelling it as terrorism, and who is taking the responsibility for the attacks (Friedman, 2008). Lenin stated 'we have never rejected terrorism on principle, nor can we do so' (Hornung & O'Mahony, 2010: 2) because it was considered a valuable tool against the government. In the nineteenth century, Europe experienced various socio-economic changes such as the industrial revolution, new ideologies, ingenious technologies and inventions like nitro-glycerine. The revolutionary movements in

this period laid the revolutionary path for today's movements and factions. Carlo Pisacane, an Italian republican extremist, is recognized as 'the chief progenitor' (Hoffman, 2006: 5) of the theory of 'propaganda by deed'. Revolutionaries and terrorists were influenced by Pisacane's words that stated 'the idea of propaganda is a chimera… Ideas result from deeds, not the latter from the former, and the people will not be free when they are educated, but educated when they are free' (Woodcock, 1977, as cited in Hoffman, 2006: 43-44). Pisacane venerated the use of violence as a kind of incomparable publicity and it was perceived as the ultimate means to attract attention and to publicise the acts of revolutionary groups.

In this period, revolutions and political violence spread all over Europe. The Russian Narodnaya Volya[2] put into practice Pisacane's dictum 'propaganda by deed' and confronted the tyrannical ruling methods of the czar and the senior officials creating terror and horror (Hoffman, 2006: 5). After numerous attempts the czar was blown up in the streets of St Petersburg in a suicide attack (Hoffman, 2006). The assassination of Czar Alexander II led directly to the annihilation of this group because subsequently the police arrested most of its conspirators, executing some of them. In a few years, Russia saw the extinction of Narodnaya Volya, but soon after other revolutionary groups succeeded this movement and spread across most of Europe and America. These groups were anarchists and used individualistic and fractionalized methods of terrorism (Hoffman, 2006).

Early anarchist, and later, radical Marxist ideologies constituted a major driving force in modern organized forms of political violence during the '60s, '70s and '80s. By the mid-80s and early '90s most groups, for instance the German Red Army Faction (commonly known as Baader-Meinhof Group) and the Italian Red Brigades, were dissolved, eliminated or severely weakened. Other forms of political violence, including nationalist terrorism (such as that followed by the Spanish ETA and the Irish IRA), adopted a radical-socialist discourse combined with the central nationalist ideal. Yet, pure, consistent and popularized (and systematically lethal) forms of organized anarchic-terrorist violence show an evident retreat in campaigning activity. Multiple minor groups, with limited operational capacities and mostly *ad hoc* activity, continued to spring up (Hoffman, 2006).

Jean-Jacques Rousseau's aspirations for a new political doctrine made him a forerunner of anarchism. Joll (1979: 15) described Rousseau as 'the forerunner of "totalitarian democracy" and the ancestor of the most extreme libertarianism'. Rousseau's famous statement, 'man was born free and is everywhere in chains', is one of the primary principles

[2] Narodnaya Volya means 'People's Will' or 'People's Freedom'. This was a group of Russian constitutionalists founded in the late nineteenth century.

acclaimed by anarchists. Anarchist ideologies seemed to concentrate more on an anti-hierarchical, self-regulatory and self-sufficient reorganization of society. While in agreement with Rousseau's ideas about human nature, institutions were considered the generators of corrupt human ideas, though good by nature (Joll, 1979). The revolutionary temperament and ideas exposed by anarchist thinkers over Europe and the Americas blossomed into an anarchist movement, evoking fear and inducing 'propaganda by deed' (Gearson, 2002: 15). A conference by radical anarchists established the 'Anarchist International' (or 'Black International') and spread the 'myth of global revolutionary pretensions and thereby stimulated fears and suspicions disproportionate to its actual impact or political achievements' (Hoffman, 2006: 7). This movement moved from tyrannicide to terrorism, from the dagger to the bomb (Rapoport, 1971) and indiscriminate victimisation and the use of fear became more of a political tool, making nineteenth-century anarchism the progenitor of modern-day terrorism.

It is believed that anarchists had networks in different countries, making anarchism the antecedent of today's terrorist webs. Karl Heinzen, a journalist of the nineteenth century, wrote fictitious violent accounts on terrorism that were significantly modern for his times (Miller, 1995). These writings described diverse methods of attacks that aimed at inspiring anarchists to use violence and murder as 'the only means for the attainment of this objective' (Heinzen, 1881, as cited in Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2004). Anarchists turned bombs into a 'propaganda favouring violence, [creating] the impression of a giant international conspiracy … which in actual fact never existed' (Laqueur, 1987: 18).

1.3 Lombroso: laying the first stones

Terrorism and political violence are not novel phenomena. Since ancient times fear and menace have been a leverage tool in politics, a tool that was labelled as 'terrorism' during the French Revolution. Through the centuries terrorist organisations have used and abused technology to find more 'effective' ways to disrupt the ordinary process of life and to reach their ideological purpose. Simultaneously, governments and related authorities adopted more proactive stances in countering and controlling these sudden blasts of violence. Fuelled by political objectives, these extremely aggressive actions are not committed to serve as an end but as a way of exerting political influence to create the 'ideal world'. Terrorism incorporates a myriad of criminal acts such as bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, kidnappings, hijackings and embassy seizures, among others. Such multifaceted deviant behaviour

represents a scourge to the modern world and researchers keep on looking for methods and measures to control and possibly prevent future incidents (Balayogi, 2002).

While looking at pioneer criminological studies in political violence and terrorist behaviour, I came across *Gli Anarchici*, written by Ezechia Marco Lombroso, better known as Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909). After developing the *antropologia criminale* (criminal anthropology), forming the basis of criminological studies, Lombroso was acknowledged as one of the founding fathers of criminology. However, Lombroso was and still is a controversial character because of the methodologies used in his studies, particularly in *L'Uomo Delinquente* (*Criminal Man*). In this work he explained the degenerative theory, which was sustained by physical evidence of regression and atavism in the born criminal (*il reo nato*). Yet, Lombroso explored and studied various criminogenic issues in his lifetime, such as how car and bicycle mobility facilitated the commission of particular crimes. He also attempted to explore the use of psychic powers such as thought transmission. These are just some of the numerous issues inquired by Lombroso, as evident in the bibliography of *Crime: Its Causes and Remedies* (Lombroso & Horton, 1912).

Considering his many interests in the criminal field, Lombroso could not be indifferent to the socio-political events that affected unified Italy, including the deleterious torment of anarchist insurgencies across both sides of the Atlantic. Anarchists and anarchism were the subjects of a number of articles that Lombroso published in different languages. However, the main piece of work on the matter was *Gli Anarchici* (*The Anarchists*) with a number of references to *Il Delitto Politico e le Revoluzioni* (*The Political Crime and Revolutions*). *Gli Anarchici* incorporated Lombroso's theories on the anarchist principles, ideologies and characters of the nineteenth century in different parts of Europe. In this study Lombroso explored the physiognomic, psychological and sociological aspects of these deviant actors. He also examined the surrounding political contexts and the implemented penal policies that fuelled more violence rather than creating a controlling mind-set.

Published in the late years of the nineteenth century, *Gli Anarchici* was published in German[3] and in French[4] within a few years, but not in English. Therefore, I took in hand the English translation. This translation was crucial for this thesis because it stands both as a finding and a resource. Every translated extract used in this study is footnoted with the original text (the text is in *italics* since it is in Italian). This ensures that whoever is reading this work can compare the translation with Lombroso's original text. Subsequently, the translated

[3] Kurella, H. (translator), (1895), *Die Anarchisten*, Verlagsantalt und Druckerei: Hamburg.
[4] Hamel, M. and Marie, A. (translators), (1896), *Les anarchistes*, Flammarion: Paris.

material together with contemporary terrorism research provided the basis on which to design the principal interview guide of this thesis.

In his study on anarchists, Lombroso explored the political world, the catalytic issues behind political violence, and the *modus operandi*, using information he obtained on anarcho-terrorism of the nineteenth century from different contacts around the world. In historiography Lombroso is recognized as a scholar and founder of *la scuola positiva* (the positivist school) that is symbolic in the history of criminology, in the praxis of the criminal justice system, and in the thorough examination of criminal behaviour.

Although Lombroso investigated various aspects of the criminal's life from a medico-anthropological perspective, he was never considered as a scholar that contributed to the study of terrorism and political violence. Political crime and anarchism were among Lombroso's interests as they appeared frequently in his list of works from 1863 to 1909[5]. Contrary to classical thinkers, Lombroso did not focus solely on issues of crime and punishment, but also explored how social retribution deterred rational and educated individuals from committing further crimes. In seeking an answer to the question, 'why does a person commit violent crimes for political ideologies?' Lombroso did not limit himself only to exploring the physical anomalies in anarchists, but also investigated the mental and social milieus that could characterize 'the political criminal'.

Lombroso aimed to protect society from the occurrence of further violent crimes, thus fulfilling the axiom 'prevention is better than cure', and to help the offenders rehabilitate themselves in mental institutions rather than imposing excessive punishment. These scientific outcomes intended to change policies and judicial practices based on the 'classical school', which presumed that every person has the 'free will' to choose to commit good rather than evil, and consequently the punishment should fit the crime. However, Lombroso's multi-layered research methodology was so unique for the nineteenth century that his scientific experiments and outcomes, research methods, and narrative presentations were frequently the cause of academic and scientific disputes. 'The historical record suggests that it took several decades for officials to accept that the Lombrosian search for the causes of crime had any relevance to their administrative tasks… Lombroso's criminology had to be extensively modified before it could be of service to policy-makers and state authorities' (Garland, 1997: 12).

[5] Find the bibliography prepared by Gina Lombroso-Ferrero, Professor Lombroso's daughter, in Lombroso and Horton (1912), p. 453-464.

Distancing himself from Lombroso's criminal anthropology, Garland inquired on the history of criminology and the lack of understanding of the historical context during the development of the first criminology theories. Nonetheless, Garland (1997: 16) recognized that the work from the 'positivist era' (1870s to the 1960s) and the *scuola positiva* had an 'empiricist framework… [and] has been a source of great confusion in the discipline'. Together with the over-criticism of Lombroso's theories, language boundaries hindered researchers from studying the material published by this Italian researcher. Most criticism was focused on the first issues of *L'Uomo Delinquente,* in which Lombroso indicated his perspectives on atavism, epilepsy and the born criminal (*il delinquente nato*). During the holocaust of World War II the degenerative theory was used to eliminate thousands of people. Consequently, numerous scholars stigmatized and rejected Lombroso's research, scientific methods and theories as they were considered unethical, extreme, primitive and dangerous (Rafter, 2009).

The cumbersome milestone of positivist criminology and the superficial cognisance of Lombroso's works are being revamped by contemporary researchers. Rafter and Gibson (2004), Gibson and Rafter (2006) and Rafter (2008) respectively translated afresh, studied and republished works like *Criminal Man* (five editions in one book), *Criminal Woman, the Prostitute, and the Normal Woman*, and *The Criminal Brain: Understanding Biological Theories of Crime*. Horton and Rich (2004) collected some of Lombroso's articles and papers originally written in English. According to Ystehede (2006), Lombroso could be an interest to various scholars apart from criminologists and historians. This wave of revived interest in Lombroso's studies is demonstrated in Knepper and Ystehede (2013) where numerous authors discussed a chain of arguments in connection with the Italian scientist. These scholarly works do not only revive some of Lombroso's works but respond to widespread misunderstandings, augmented by abbreviated and unfaithful translations that rendered his work a ridiculed pseudoscience (Rafter & Gibson, 2004).

Thus, it is intellectually captivating and stimulating to investigate whether Lombroso's studies successfully explored different methods of identifying 'the political criminal' and if these methods could be applied to contemporary 'terrorist' afflictions. Additionally, it would also be interesting to find out what Lombroso recommended as forms of counterterrorism prophylaxis and how different these are from those proposed today by academics in this field. If Lombroso's studies and findings on anarchism overlap with today's research on terrorism, could *Gli Anarchici* be considered a pioneering criminological study on terrorism and political violence?

1.4 Contribution to knowledge

After the translation and analysis of *Gli Anarchici*, a number of queries emerged that posed the following questions: the effectiveness of Lombroso's scientific analysis of the anarchists, the potential academic contribution of this study, and the applicability of this research to the understanding of current waves of terrorism and other forms of organized violent activities. To evaluate the validity of this nineteenth-century study on anarchists, the outcomes will be contrasted with contemporary perspectives on studies and preventive policies aimed at countering terrorism. In order to inquire on the knowledge that determines the application of security provisions, scientific research and analysis of terrorism, the interviews that form part of this research focused on a purposive sample of policymakers, academics and security professionals that are well established in the fields of counterterrorism and terrorism research around the world. The questions this research sought to answer were:

1. Does the policymaking process for security policy rely on intelligence, academic research, or other sources of knowledge?
2. What research methods considered by professionals, are social-scientific suited to a better understanding of terrorism?
3. Is it possible to develop a criminology of terrorism?
4. What can we learn from Lombroso?
5. What have we learned since Lombroso?

Thus the revamping of an unacknowledged piece of work like *Gli Anarchici*, in parallel contrasts with contemporary perspectives of security issues and an interview with an extremist (here called 'Charles', not his real name), provides a three-pronged contribution to theoretical development and empirical knowledge. This thesis contributes to the field by presenting:

1. Lombroso's theory of political crime and anarchist terrorism expounded in *Gli Anarchici*. This work has been fully translated and developed from original Italian sources, and introduces Lombroso's theory to the English-speaking world while keeping as faithful as possible to the original material.
2. An empirical study of twenty interviews with a purposive sample of elite interviewees that included six policymakers, seven security professionals and seven academics.

These interviews provide a first-hand insight into how sources of knowledge are used to establish security policy and identify the issues related to them.

3. An interview with an extremist and a personalized commentary on how he became attracted to and adopted extreme ideologies.

The faithful translation of *Gli Anarchici* is the first contribution of this project. This unique translation demonstrates Lombroso's studies on nineteenth-century anarchism and political crimes. It also describes the use of diverse research methodologies used by Lombroso aiming to study empirically and also theorize on the root causes of fanatical political ideologies and anarchist actors. Among the issues investigated in *Gli Anarchici* there are social conditions; political issues; particular personal traits in people that increased the probability that they engaged in anarchist terrorism; and also the methods anarchists used to attract sympathizers and persuade them to commit serious crimes, including murder.

The interviews held with policymakers, security professionals and academics are the second source of data in this research study. I inquired on how knowledge on terrorism is gathered to bring about improvements in security policies and best practices in terrorism research. The data collected from these interviews contributed to seven key thematic discussions. These discussions included three essential standpoints: the practical viewpoint of security practitioners; the theoretical point of view of academics; and the view of policymakers. Comparing these exclusive perspectives of a group of elite respondents of the present day with Lombroso's findings across space and time resulted in what could be considered as unexpected similarities.

The third source of data came from the unexpected interview with an extremist. As explained in detail later when the methods of research are discussed (Chapter 4), there were a number of attempts to interview active and former terrorists but to no avail. After this part of the project was discarded, there was an unexpected opportunity to interview Charles, an extreme ideologist who was linked to a lone-wolf terrorist actor. Although the two main foci of the thesis were the translation of *Gli Anarchici* and the elite interviews, the interview with Charles added another dimension which made this research more complete. Since this contribution is secondary to the previous two, the findings are given much less prominence. In fact, they are presented and discussed only as 'postscripts' of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.

It is worth pointing out that this three-way study does not aim to test, assess or measure the concepts and theories found in Lombroso's *Gli Anarchici*. This thesis juxtaposes Lombroso's ideas on anarchists with the perspectives of contemporary security, policy and academic

experts in the field of terrorism and the ideologies of an existing extremist. Finding and examining points of convergence from this multilateral approach is aimed at developing social science knowledge and at guiding policies in responding adequately to political violence and terrorism.

1.5 Chapters map

Chapter 1 contextualizes the study. Chapter 2 and 3 offer a critical overview of relevant literature and Lombroso's thinking respectively. This provides the intellectual framework for the study which is then operationalized in Chapter 4 (Methodology). Chapters 5 and 6 present the findings and discussions on the views of the elite respondents together with references to the work of Lombroso and the data obtained from the interview with an extremist. The three perspectives are considered in light of each other and also in relation to the literature review. Chapter 7 presents a summary of the findings, the contributions to new knowledge, and suggestions for further research.

Figure 1.1: Thesis structure



As shown in Figure 1.1 this thematically driven thesis follows a traditional format, where the material in the literature review chapters (Chapters 2 and 3) is reflected in the data analysis chapters (Chapters 5 and 6). In fact, Chapter 2 reviews the main topical issues found on the research of terrorism. This chapter commences with a review of the various academic attempts to define terrorism, and moves on to present the most prominent political, economic, psychological and sociological theories. These theories indicate that the focus of terrorism research lies on models of the terrorists' rationale, radicalization and recruitment processes, and economic, developmental, political and social indices that condition terrorist

activities. This chapter concludes by outlining the difficulties found in accessing primary sources when researching terrorism. Restricted opportunities to gather primary data and increased government funding jeopardise the result of academic research. Consequently, interviewing elite respondents contributes to the acquisition of more insight and to strengthen terrorism research and future countermeasures.

Chapter 3 introduces Lombroso and his positivist approach to criminology. After describing the Italian political context and the various political forces that unified Italy, this chapter moves on to the positivist analytical approach of political crime and the criminal. Lombroso was probably the first to offer a political theory of terrorism and to use social science techniques to study anarchists. His studies observed the political and social context, their methods of attack and indoctrination. This approach accentuated the notion that anarchism was a reaction to the imposition of unfair policies and corruption in government, which brought poverty and disease. Lombroso considered religion an enthralling factor that aggregated fanatical individuals who, after being indoctrinated, carried out the assassinations of monarchs (regicides) and later on of government deputies (deputicides[6]) (Lombroso, 1895: 133). Among the research methods employed in *Gli Anarchici*, Lombroso included mapping, interviews, statistical analysis and content analysis.

Chapter 4 delineates my methods for investigating knowledge-sharing among policymakers, academics and security professionals and how they proposed to improve research on terrorism. This chapter traces the three steps of the strategy employed in the methodology of this study. The first step goes through the translation process and related difficulties. The second step outlines the interview approach with the twenty elite interviewees, why they were chosen, and how they were contacted and recruited in this study. The third step provides a description of a number of failed attempts to interview extremist actors. This part also includes an account of how the opportunity to interview a radical ideologist linked to the Oslo attacks of 2011 materialized unexpectedly. Further on this chapter discusses the ethics, confidentiality and anonymity issues encountered while interviewing the elite interviewees, who were the primary respondents of this research. This section also explains how the contemporary literature on terrorism and the translation of *Gli Anarchici* were important factors in the design of the interview questions. After discussing the data collection strategies of over twenty interviewing hours, this chapter concludes with an exhaustive explanation of the use of thematic analysis in the presentation of findings.

[6] *Deputaticidio.*

The data collected from the principal interviewees was subsequently separated into two main themes and these formed the foundations of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. These chapters present in-depth discussions on the findings in light of contemporary academic literature (from Chapter 2) and Lombroso's research on anarchists (from Chapter 3). Chapter 5 discusses four main themes on terrorism and security policy. The first thematic discussion of this chapter explores the difficulties hindering a universally accepted definition of terrorism. The second explores how the three interviewed groups plan security and terrorism risk management. The third examines security and social policies that should be implemented to counterterrorism and extremist ideologies. The fourth discusses the imprisonment and possibilities of rehabilitation of terrorists during their incarceration. On a similar format, the three main sections of Chapter 6 focus on aspects of terrorism research. The first section of this chapter debates terrorism research and root causes of terrorism. The second section goes through the best practices in researching terrorism and the third part presents the respondents' views on profiling terrorists. Both chapters end with postscripts on striking experiences and commentaries extracted from Charles's extremist perspective.

Chapter 7 starts with a summary of the main findings of this thesis. The summary highlights the key outcomes obtained from Lombroso and the elite interviewees. Since Charles's comments and experiences were treated only as an addendum to the main findings, they were included only when appropriate. This chapter draws together the three dimensions of this study into two distinct levels of contribution. The first contribution is to the improvement in the gathering of knowledge that informs the implementation of counterterrorism security policies. The second contribution is more related to academia and branches off into two elements: ideas on research methods that would contribute to better terrorism research; and the complete translation into English of Lombroso' *Gli Anarchici*. These conclusions should also encourage a reappraisal of past criminology studies and bring about an improvement in current social and security policies.

Chapter 2: Researching research on terrorism

Following the tragic 9/11 events in the USA in 2001, the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and the London bombings in 2005, considerable attention was focused on terrorism in an effort to mitigate it. This chapter starts by exploring studies seeking to define terrorism and presents some of the impracticalities encountered in finding a precise explanation even with the help of social sciences (Nørgaard, 2008). An extensive part of this chapter looks at a series of theories that are related to terrorism. The first sequence of theories consists of the different political notions that are linked to the causes of terrorism. The second group of theories demonstrates the way social sciences analyse the sociological and psychological influences when studying this phenomenon. Another section of this chapter explains the constraining issues found in researching terrorism particularly an 'almost total reliance on secondary and tertiary sources material' (Horgan, 2004: 30). The final part briefly overviews Schmid's (2011) questionnaire and outlines some similarities with the current research even though this research pre-dates Schmid's publication. The analytic theories approach of this chapter becomes an instrumental platform for the research methods (Chapter 4) and the discussion of the findings in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.

2.1 Defining terrorism

The quest for a suitable and acceptable definition of terrorism is still open. The veil of uncertainty seems to shield from sight the ideal perspective from where a definition could be generated that suits everyone's agenda (whether they are academics, law enforcers or policymakers). A clear definition would prevent experts from taking on a 'we-know-it-when-we-see-it' approach (Schmid & Jongman, 1988: 1). The consequence of this lack of a suitable definition, stemming from insufficient research in social sciences, has resulted in the lack of a standardised approach when implementing policies (Schmid & Jongman, 1988).

Originating from the Latin word *terrere*, that means 'to frighten', the word 'terrorism' was used for the first time by the French during the political insurgencies of the fourteenth century. The word was used for the first time in English in 1528 (Schmid, 1997, as cited in Young, 2006). Political connotations flourished during the French Revolution when the *regime de la terreur* wielded this threat to intimidate counterrevolutionaries, who were considered

'enemies of the people' (Hoffman, 2006: 3). Maximilien Robespierre declared 'terror is nothing but justice, prompt, server and inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue' (Palmer, 1970, as cited in Hoffman, 2006: 3).

The first attempt to define this phenomenon came about between 1934 and 1937 after the assassination of the king of Yugoslavia and a French minister (Saul, 2006). The League of Nations attempted to define terrorism comprising 'legal, political, ideological and rhetorical disputes' (Saul, 2006: 78) that overwhelmed the communities in the first few decades of the twentieth century and still does today. Remarkably, this intervention predicted numerous legal issues that affected the response to terrorism more than 70 years later, namely:

> political and technical difficulties of definition; the problem of 'freedom fighters' and self-determination; 'state terrorism' and the duty of non-intervention; state criminality and applicability to armed forces; the scope of the political offence exception to extradition; the impact on freedom of expression; and the relationship between terrorism and asylum (Saul, 2006: 79).

'There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. It remains the subject of continuing debate in international bodies' (Lord Carlile of Berriew, 2007: 3) which continue to produce many definitions. Schmid and Jongman (1988) collected 109 definitions of terrorism. Two decades later, Schmid (2011) gathered 250 definitions that were in use and explained that these definitions accentuated characteristics and effects of terrorism on civilians, public security and order. Yet, 'listing of frequent and similar elements of terrorism is in itself not a definition' (Schmid, 2011b: 39). A definition explains what a word means but its meanings change through the years and the surrounding contexts, but in the case of terrorism the definition turned into a pejorative connotation (Hoffman, 2006; Young, 2006).

As a politicized term, terrorism negatively labels political opponents, and demonizes and de-legitimizes their conduct (Schmid, 2011). In fact, Schmid (2011) insisted that the use and abuse of this term is comparable with words like 'racist', 'fascist' and 'imperialist'. Whether to apply this label to an enemy or opponent depends on a particular perspective and the 'use of the term implies a moral judgement; and if one party can successfully attach the label 'terrorist' to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint' (Jenkins, 1980, as cited in Hoffman, 2006: 23). Political agendas guide the definitions of terrorism which appositively fit one's needs (Jackson, 2011). 'Definitions tend to reflect the political interests and the moral judgement (or lack thereof) of those who do the defining' (Schmid, 2004: 384). This subjectivity in labelling the causes of terrorism continues to spark numerous discussions fuelled by what Hoffman (2006) calls 'associational logic'. This posits

that if one sympathises with the victim of violence then the act is considered as terrorism. However, if one identifies with the perpetrator then the act is not considered as terrorism. Disputes on this kind of political violence pointed at grievances like 'misery, frustration, grievance and despair' (Hoffman, 2006: 24). Meanwhile Mauritanians explained that the term 'terrorism' could 'hardly be held to apply to persons who were denied the most elementary human rights, dignity, freedom and independence, and whose countries objected to foreign occupation' (Sofaer, 1986, as cited in Hoffman, 2006: 24).

Extremist factions do not carry names that include the terms 'terrorist' or 'terrorism'. Both Schmid (2011b) and Hoffman (2006) agreed that such splinter groups shroud themselves with military terminologies such as '"revolutionary", "freedom fighter", "martyr", "urban guerrilla", "resistance fighter" or even "soldier"' (Schmid, 2011b: 40). These terminologies are directly linked to political violence (Hoffman, 2006; Wilkinson, 2012). Underground extremists justify their rudimentary violent acts on grounds of the lack of monetary, military and human resources and limited ways of affecting the *status quo*. This brings us to the famous quip 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' that President Ronald Reagan (1986) described as 'misleading'. Such double standards do not satisfy the ethical and intellectual perspectives of academics that seek 'logic and truth' (Schmid, 2011b: 40).

Schmid (2011) opined that few express the desirability to obtain a common meaning and understanding of the violent behaviour engaged in terrorism. Terrorism and its definition are both a creation of humans and both are subject to the understanding and the interests of who is issuing the definition. To reflect the 'enormous range of attempts to define terrorism' Bryan (2012: 21) recalled a number of researchers that recorded this challenge (English, 2009; Gupta, 2008; Hoffman, 1998, 2006; Jackson, 2011, as cited in Bryan, 2012; Townsend, 2002; Wilkinson, 2001, 2006, 2006a, 2011). 'A successful definition sets the parameters for the public debate and can shape the agenda of the community' (Schmid, 2011b: 40). Normally, the government is the main defining entity as it holds the power to be such. However, politics have their own agendas to label these evil-doings in the most politically suitable way, resulting in the use and abuse of a term like 'terrorism'. Ideally terrorism is defined 'by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause' (Jenkins, 1980, as cited in Hoffman, 2006: 25). Academics are the ideal candidates to produce a detached and objective definition of terrorism (Schmid, 2011).

The quest for this definition created considerable anxieties in the academic field. For instance, in 1984 R. P. Hoffman conducted a doctoral research interviewing terrorist experts with the aim of finding a universal definition of terrorism (Schmid, 1988, 2011). Malik (2002)

discussed various political, legal and philosophical conundrums in his endeavours to create a universal definition. Finally Malik (2002: 60) listed a series of criminal acts that are somehow associated with terrorism (such as 'mass killing' and 'use of weapons of mass destruction') and benchmarked various types of damages and harms (such as 'death and injury' to 'damage to democratic processes'). Schmid (2011b: 42) concluded that though 'a "perfect" definition might be beyond reach, there is plenty of room for improvement of many widely used existing definitions. We should try to reach at least a "good enough" definition'. Hoffman (2006) solved this Bermuda Triangle of terrorism (Dedeoglu, 2003) by distinguishing terrorists from guerrillas, ordinary criminals and lunatic assassins, even though the last may portray similar characteristics. On distinguishing and classifying terrorists from those who are not, Hoffman (2006: 37) described the terrorist as 'fundamentally an altruist [sic] ... [the terrorist] believes that he is serving a "good" cause designed to achieve a greater good for a wider constituency – whether real or imagined – that the terrorist and his organization purport to represent'. In a parallel line of thought, Kellen (1982: 10) stressed that a 'terrorist without a cause (at least in his own mind) is not a terrorist'.

Most definitions of terrorism focus on the notoriety of sub-national, non-state, minority groups. Schmid (2011) reported that the US government has more than twenty definitions of terrorism and between 1984 and 2004 the definition issued by the State Department was modified seven times. These definitions do not satisfy the purpose of social sciences because of various reasons, namely, changes in the wording while the circumstances are still the same; changes in the interpretation of the word 'non-combatant'; too much focus on 'political violence' and much less on 'violence'; the exclusion of the elements of 'fear', 'threat' and 'intimidation'; and the exclusion of state terrorism and domestic terrorism committed by organs of the state (Schmid, 2011b: 49).

Unilateral politico-legal stances adopted by different states hampered the creation of a commonly-agreed-upon definition of terrorism, despite the fact that a definition is fundamental to the understanding of the meaning and the scope of the word (Banks, 2013). Disputes continued to arise on 'which persons or groups are terrorists and whether particular actions are genuine incidents of terrorism or merely domestic crimes' (Saul, 2006a, as cited in May, 2008: 205). Consequently, the reaction of states should be to define precisely the violent actions that are classified as terrorist acts for which people are arraigned, judged and punished. However, one has to establish whether terrorism is considered as a crime like any other under criminal law, or as an aggravating factor where the inclusion of this term in the list of offences will increment an overriding motivation for harsher punishments. 'A good working

definition will be relatively complete in covering the features that characterize clear-cut cases while also excluding features that characterize cases of violence or political action that are not terrorist' (Friedman, 2008: 205). Friedman (2008) explained that to define terrorism precisely it is important to distinguish terrorist acts from other political violent acts, committed by state actors, since such regime actions are not considered as terrorism.

In general terms terrorism is 'a type of means that is employed for political ends' (Friedman, 2008: 205; see also Banks, 2013). Different methods to define and identify terrorism led to the development of a new branch of research called 'critical terrorism studies' (Jackson, Smyth and Gunning, 2009). This new wave of studies adopted an even more pragmatic approach to the methodologies used to research terrorism (Jackson, 2011). These definitions, or non-definitions, led to the conclusion that terrorists are different from other kinds of criminals as their actions fundamentally involve political endeavours and they resort to violence to transmit the psychological repercussions of fear and terror that extend far beyond the immediate victim. These inconclusive definitions of terrorism do not always keep in consideration the fact that the terrorist could be a lone wolf, a cell, a faction, an extended organization or a state entity (Smyth, 2009). For instance, Friedman (2008: 212) questioned:

> If people are suffering from oppression, colonization, occupation, or some other forcible violation of their right to self-determination, is it justifiable for them to use terrorism, especially terrorism that intentionally targets innocent persons with lethal force, in order to gain their liberation?

In pursuit of a better recognition of this violent behaviour, researchers have used different methods and created various inconclusive theories which left numerous questions unanswered. Existing definitions of terrorism and research on this matter do not provide satisfying results. The term 'terrorism' remains so complex and its definition so uncertain that academics in critical terrorism studies considered abandoning its use to avoid contesting the controversial discussions raised by its many definitions (Wilkinson, 2012).

Blurred and confusing boundaries surround the term 'terrorism'. Consequently, this word is abused and misused, though consistently associated with the threat of or with actual violent behaviour. Haphazard labelling of actions as terrorism and personalities or organizations as terrorists dilutes its meaning. Since the concept and philosophy of terrorism is so ideologically and politically influenced, its definition evokes numerous contestations. 'Thus, the determination of the "right" definition of terrorism is subjective and not likely to be reached by consensus' (Mahan & Griset, 2013: 3). An acceptable political definition of this phenomenon would have to address numerous elements that would create inconveniently

bulky definitions, and these would have to be changed through time (Mahan & Griset, 2013: 3). As for the academic sphere, Hoffman (1998; 2006), Stern (2003), Laqueur (2001) and Carr (2002) look at different ways of how to define terrorism and their approaches have a number of similarities, as well as divergencies. Schmid (2011: 73) explains that 'the art of making a good definition is to include as few elements as possible but also as many as necessary.' Shortcomings and relative challenges cannot be avoided in conceptualizing terrorism, as stated in Schmid and Jongman (1988, 2008) and Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler (2004). Weinberg *et al.* (2004: 787) stated

> The cost of achieving consensus among academic analysts of terrorism is a definition which has climbed too high on the ladder of abstraction to discriminate among different types of politically driven violence aimed at achieving publicity. Thus, unless we are willing to label as terrorism a very wide range of violent activities, we may be better off finding another governing concepts or looking elsewhere for a definition.

I realized therefore that no single definition will satistfy everyone, and the aim of this study is not to provide a meaningful, comprehensible and apolitical definition that is applicable to all the different situations where terrorism occurs, or to identify associated actors as terrorists. The purpose of this thesis is to shed light on potential security policies and research that address the phenomenon and the criminal actions of terrorism. To fulfil these objectives I have created a working definition, presented below, which in my view captures the essential nature of terrorism. My definition intentionally does not identify the terrorist as a person or a group. Also, this conceptualization of terrorism does not specify what kind of role the actor might have in its enactment. This role could be in terms of a financial contribution, strategic planning, the actual execution of violent acts, or instigating others to follow extremist ideologies, among other actions related to terrorism. This definition also does not identify the victims, and the perpetrators, as they could be both non-state and state actors, such as those in despotic regimes. The targets of terrorism in this definition can be interpreted to be civilians as well as public figures, or security and law-enforcement agencies. My definition of terrorism is as follows: 'the intentional generation of fear through threats and premeditated violent criminal actions for the purpose of securing control over politics and the population.'

2.2 Theories of terrorism

Various academic fields have shown interest in researching terrorism and created theories on the core issues that motivate the extremist perspectives of terrorism (Borgeson & Valeri, 2007). Understanding the rationale, behaviour and motivation of the individual and the surrounding social and political context facilitates the creation of more tailor-made responses that constrain terrorism with minimal collateral damage. This section explores the input of international relations, diplomatic studies and political sciences in the study of terrorism, and progresses to an emphatic analysis of how studies in sociology, psychology, criminology and other social sciences saliently contribute to the creation of theories, concepts, and models that help in the understanding of terrorism and the identification of catalyst factors that indicate opportunities to outsmart future terrorist acts (Calafato, 2006, 2013; Schmid, 2011).

Figure 2.1: Typologies of terrorism research



Note. Adapted from *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories & Literature*, (p. 178), by A. P. Schmid and A.J Jongman, 1988, 2008, London: Transaction Publishers.

The increased interest in terrorism led to a mushrooming of studies and theories, but confrontations with practitioners, uncertainties, detachment from the real thing and diverse

scholar backgrounds spurred numerous academic arguments (Schmid, 2011). The different forms of terrorism stimulated researchers to explore terrorism from diverse viewpoints (as illustrated in Figure 2.1, adapted from Schmid, 2008: 178). Deductively, these reactions emerged from different backgrounds but pursued the same objective – that of understanding the terrorism phenomenon. A meta-disciplinary analysis is advantageous because different fields conjoin forces to identify weak points and create better theory-relevant data (Schmid, 2011; Wilkinson, 2006). Past hypotheses formulated from secondary data rather than a new, crude and untested data corpus inhibited academic understanding from creating well-founded and reliable research that sustained policy best practices (Silke, 2004).

> Theories of terrorism should, on the one hand, be general enough to address the range of terrorisms, broadly conceived, and narrow enough to usefully analyse a specific aspect of the subject. This complexity is related to the need for a multidisciplinary approach to the study of terrorism (McAllister & Schmid, 2011: 202).

2.2.1 Politically oriented theories

Conceptualizing what constitutes a terrorist group is not an easy task. Most research focuses on the insurgent, underground terrorism, at the expense of state or regime terrorism, which thus ends up being less researched even though it has a longer history that has resulted in the cost of numerous human lives (Jackson, Murphy & Poynting, 2009). McAllister and Schmid (2011: 206) stated 'the classical theory of state terrorism was formulated in the early 1970s by Dallin and Breslauer'. Dallin and Breslauer (1970) studied the use of terrorism by communist governments. In politicizing the definition of terrorism, the process will classify insurgent terrorism according to the political agenda while cloaking state terrorism in a manner that is more difficult to identify and define. In studying and understanding regime terrorism, scholars faced the problem of distinguishing what could be considered as the threshold that delimits the state's 'legitimate use of force [from] illegitimate state violence' (McAllister & Schmid, 2011: 203).

Research on regime terrorism are rarely conducted by scholars living in oppressive societies and are hardly ever funded by the government, in contrast with research on insurgent or anti-state violence. 'Many scholars consider state terrorism as something *sui generis*, not comparable to the small-scale terrorism of revolutionary cells acting from the underground' (McAllister & Schmid, 2011: 203). The main difference between state terrorism and that of insurgent groups is that the repertoire of the government is broader (Claridge,

1996). Claridge (1996) agreed with Lopez and Stohl (1992) that regime terrorism employs local security forces to methodically disseminate terror. Though regime terrorism further complicates the possibility of understanding the nature of terrorism, it is important to understand that not all forms of state authoritarianism are illegal or of a terrorist nature. The infliction of harsh punishments on innocent people can escalate a popular reaction from a legitimate action into a terrorist one (Wilkinson, 2006). With regards to a conflict between the elite that claim sovereign power and control over the non-elite, Gurr (1986) explained that such internal terror is supported by legal and security structures.

Another understudied aspect is the role of terrorism in civil and international wars. In times of war numerous crimes and atrocities take place and their overwhelming aura deplete the effects of any terrorist act (Jackson, Murphy & Poynting, 2009) even if these acts are forbidden by international laws (Schmid, 2011). Other theories that explored state-sponsored terrorism and studies undertaken during the Cold War were driven by three main schools of thought. The first school considered the Soviet Union as almost fully responsible for sponsoring international terrorism. The second school blamed the Kremlin, sustaining that 'all roads lead to Moscow', and the third school claimed that Western governments were involved in supporting insurgent groups (Schmid 2011). Byman (2005, as cited in McAllister & Schmid, 2011: 209-10) stated:

> a state may be driven to come to the aid of a foreign insurgent movement by strategic concerns, ideology, and/or domestic politics. Strategic concerns include efforts to destabilize neighbours, attempts to project power beyond what the state is conventionally capable of, efforts to provoke regime change abroad, and a desire to have a hand in shaping the opposition to hostile regimes.

Other scholars researched the radicalisation of young people and how youths adopted ideologies that aim at changing politics through violent tactics. Sprinzak (1991, as cited in McAllister & Schmid, 2011: 217) described radicalization as a 'human transformation, of a psycho-political passage in time from normal to extra-normal behaviour'. Moghadam (2005) theorised that violent radicalization occurred in a six-step process and portrayed it as a six-storey building. The ground floor of this fictitious building represented a thorough analysis of the circumstances, progressing onto exploring possible remedies, blaming 'others', marginalisation and engagement in a terrorist group, and coalition in the faction, while the sixth and final floor is the actual engagement in violent terrorist action. This process was depicted as a pyramid by McCauley and Moskalenko (2008), where the width of the base of the pyramid represented the number of sympathizers. The extreme interpretation of the

expressed ideologies and interpretation of reality shrinks the number of followers, leading to isolation and extreme conflicts with authorities. The tip of the pyramid represented the very few followers that commit a terrorist act. The Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security (DG JLS) of the European Commission, appointed a number of academic experts to examine the correlation between radicalization and terrorism. Between 2007 and 2008, four studies[7] investigated radicalisation, recruitment in terrorist groups and the best practices to prevent and respond to violent radicalisation.

Other potential motivations and possible political responses are created by the same terrorists. Such theories may not be considered as reliable and academically valuable since they lack objectivity, but terrorist leaders or intellectual sympathizers theorize and publish thoughts, beliefs, declarations and future agendas, like Bin Laden's fatwa and Zawahiri's communiqués and messages (Lawrence, 2005; Mansfield, 2006). Writings by extremist actors are important when one studies behaviour to understand the reasons why they reacted so violently (Schmid, 2011). Among these authors there are the nineteenth century anarchist teachings, such as Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker, Tolstoi/Tolstoy (Eltzbacher, 2004), Proudhon (2004) and Heinzen (1881).

Heinzen was a nineteenth-century journalist. He wrote on various aspects of violence, moving from tyrannicide to terrorism (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2004). Heinzen's thoughts were so modern for his times that Miller (1995, as cited in Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2004: 99) described him as a 'quantum leap into the modern age of terrorist theory'. As a German immigrant in the USA, Heinzen followed the mid-nineteenth century revolutions in Europe. Engels (1847, as cited in Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2004) described in detail how Heinzen turned into a revolutionary urging extreme political violence[8]. Heinzen's terrorist ideologies justified murders for a 'just cause'

[7]Study 1: Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe: A study carried out by King's College London for the European Commission (Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security) October 2008.
Study 2: Studies into violent radicalisation; Lot 2, The beliefs ideologies and narratives. A study carried out by the Change Institute for the European Commission (Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security) February 2008.
Study 3: Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism: A Concise Report prepared by the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, Submitted to the European Commission on 15 May 2008.
Study 4: Study on the best practices in cooperation between authorities and civil society with a view to the prevention and response to violent radicalisation. The Change Institute July 2008. A study commissioned by DG JLS of the European Commission, retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu, accessed 14th April, 2009.

[8]'Herr Heinzen is a former liberal, lower-ranking civil servant who in 1844 was still enthusiastic about legitimate progress and the wretched German Constitution, and who at best confessed in a confidential whisper that a republic might be desirable and possible, of course in the far distant future. Herr Heinzen was wrong, however, about the possibility of legal resistance in Prussia. The bad book he wrote on

and a better world. In *Der Mord* (*Murder*), Heinzen (ND, as cited in Laqueur and Alexander, 1987: 54) opined 'murder is the principal agent of historical progress'. In *Murder and Liberty*, Heinzen (1881: 2, as cited in Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2004) maintained, 'as long as murder offers the only means for the attainment of this object, Humanity [sic] is also compelled to draw the sword and to become the murderess of murderers'.

In the late nineteenth century, in the name of *Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will), Morozov (1880, as cited in Gross, 1972: 106) considered terrorism as the ideal form of revolution since 'terroristic struggle has exactly the advantage that it can act unexpectedly and find means and ways which no one anticipates. All that the terroristic struggle really needs is a small number of people and large material means'. Rapoport (2001: 136) stated that Morozov 'described himself as "terrorist" at his trial'. Morozov spoke of 'terrorism as a form of collective jujitsu, using the strength of the state … to the advantage of the revolutionary' (McAllister & Schmid, 2011: 223). Heinzen's innovative perception encouraged revolutionaries to stop using the dagger, and move on with technology and used it to reduce martyrs while eliminating tyrants. Indiscriminate victimisation and the use of fear as a political tool by anarchists became the progenitor of modern-day terrorism, even though anarchism 'made little tangible impact on [both] the domestic and the international politics of the countries affected' (Hoffman, 2006: 7).

Conflicts between non-state terrorist groups and states are often asymmetric but 'many theorists of terrorism neglect the relationship between terrorism and other forms of political violence' (McAllister & Schmid, 2011: 241). Such unevenness is investigated through economic theories. For instance, Gurr's (1970) theory on 'relative deprivation' analysed the correlation between political violence and economic marginalization. This theory considered political frustrations caused by the differences between individual expectations and a reality that continuously presents hurdles when it comes to achieving goals societies impose on its members. The outcome of such frustration is expressed in rebellious movements where 'two asymmetrically privileged groups coexist under the same national umbrella' (McAllister & Schmid, 2011: 249). After analysing 335 biographies of Palestinian suicide bombers, Berrebi (2007) challenged Gurr's theory. Berrebi (2007: 17) stated:

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bureaucracy (even Jacob Venedey wrote a far better book about Prussia years ago) compelled him to flee the country. Now the truth dawned on him. He declared legal resistance to be impossible, became a revolutionary and naturally a republican as well. In Switzerland he made the acquaintance of the savant serieux Ruge, who taught him the little philosophy he had, consisting of a confused hotchpotch of Feuerbachian atheism and humanism, reminiscences of Hegel and rhetorical phrases from Stirner. Thus equipped, Herr Heinzen considered himself mature and inaugurated his revolutionary propaganda, leaning on Ruge to the right and Freiligrath to the left' (Engels, 1847, as cited in Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2004: 100-101).

> Only 16 per cent of the terrorists were characterized as poor. Second, out of 208 observations in which information about the terrorist's education was available, 96 per cent (200) have at least a high school education and 65 per cent (135) have some kind of higher education.

Closely linked with the socio-economic aspect, there are theories that focus on the lack of development resulting in an inability to achieve economic growth. Incompetence, corruption and ineffective government will domino into poverty and consequently, reflect in non-state terrorism (McAllister & Schmid, 2011). While inquiring the effect of globalization on transnational terrorism, Li and Shaub (2004: 234) hypothesized that 'economic globalization to reduce transnational terrorism ... has to be able to promote economic development and reduce poverty'. Li and Shaub's (2004) statistical findings showed that the integration of a country into global markets is not associated with a rise in transnational terrorist incidents within the country. Economic integration is a disincentive for foreign terrorists from partner countries to attack targets within the country. On a negative note, as previously noted by Eubank and Weinberg (1994, 2001), Li and Schaub (2004: 249) showed that democratic countries provide 'terrorist groups more freedom in association, reducing the costs of their engaging in terrorist activities'. Economic globalization broadens asymmetries between countries, luring marginalized groups to resort to terrorist actions. Li and Schaub (2004: 251) stated that 'the benefits and costs of globalization are often asymmetrically distributed, generating winners and losers and widening the gap between the rich and the poor in societies'.

Vicarious deprivation is another prominent discourse found under the umbrella of economic theories on terrorism. Poverty issues and destitution do not always correlate to engagement in terrorism. Empathizing with the deprived groups encourages persons from different strata of society (including middle- and upper-class members of Western radical leftist groups) to engage in terrorist violent actions or the 'jihad' (Sageman, 2008: 48). McAllister and Schmid (2011: 250) asserted that 'while Sageman's theory is plausible and even compelling, it still lacks broader social scientific testing' and measuring feelings like 'empathy' is not an easy task. Eubank and Weinberg (1994, 2001) believed that democracies and authoritarian regimes facilitated terrorism by increasing grievances in radical groups that motivated potential terrorist activities. Democratic principles reflect generic wants and bring suffered grievances to an independent justice system even when the elite are not interested or disapprove. Such principles should reduce the occurrence of violent reactions like terrorism (Gurr, 1986). Freedom of movement, freedom of association, infrastructural facilities and legal restrictions on law enforcement personnel in western democracies are used by terrorists to

their advantage, as they target the weaknesses of democratic regimes and point out state failures (Schmid, 1993). The US counter-response to the 9/11 attacks shed light on how Al Qaeda used Sudan and Afghanistan as breeding grounds. Taking advantage of these countries' collapsed governance and of underground enterprises, such as black markets, in replacement of the licit ones, terrorists found fertile grounds where to expand their activities and impose political control. Strong states provide security, protection to private property, rule of law and political participation, among other social goods. Failed states are incapable of guaranteeing any security and perform poorly in all other services (Rotberg, 2003).

Politics are considered to be of great influence on the level of threat posed by terrorism. 'Governments have frequently argued that terrorism constitutes a grave threat to national security' (Lutz & Lutz, 2012: 61). The danger posed by terrorists should not be undermined or ignored as this could become an even more serious problem that would endanger the future of nations. The number of indicted and detained people for terrorist activities does not necessarily indicate a rise in the terrorist threat, but serves as a justification to increase the funds of law enforcement agencies that are responsible in detecting and curbing terrorism (Jackson, 2011). As Lustick (2012: 68) explained, 'the public assumes that an arrest reflects a judgment about a danger that existed to the public, the reality is that … [it] is not determined by the seriousness of the crime committed or the threat posed'. As a result, others suggested that the terrorist threat is purposely inflated to suit political agendas because it is not a serious threat to life when compared to more frequent causes of fatalities (Jackson, 2011; Lustick, 2012; Mueller, 2006). Notwithstanding the fact the terrorist threat is much lower than it is in reality, there is no guarantee that our worst fears cannot be realized.

Together with politics, it is important to understand the cultural context. 'Cultural theories of terrorism are ... among the weakest of the structural theories of terrorism' (McAllister & Schmid, 2011: 253). McAllister and Schmid (2011: 253) considered Laqueur (1977) the first researcher who described terrorism as intrinsically communal and questioned 'how some of the early nihilists and anarchist terrorists, who operated with little, if any, popular support, fit into the framework'. Political science channelled terrorist actions into political acts without taking in consideration the social phenomena but 'terrorism that has an authentically popular base is never a purely political phenomenon' (Tololyan, 1988: 219).

Terrorists thrive on attention, particularly through the media. Borowitz (2005: xi-xii) refers to this as the 'Herostratos syndrome'. In 356 BC Herostratos, an arsonist, destroyed the Temple of Artemis, one of the ancient Seven Wonders. Herostratos was 'a shadowy figure of whose life nothing is known before he was apprehended, tortured, and executed' (Borowitz,

2005: xi) and was considered to be 'the first terrorist who entered history' (Ego-net, 2001, as cited in Borowitz, 2005: 162). A trait associated with the Herostratos syndrome was the enduring desire of notoriety through the publicity of the criminal's name or by the committed act. The Roman writer Valerius explained that attacks like Herostratos's arson absorb the symbol of the targeted victim or infrastructure, while generating 'self-glorification' (of the perpetrator) and feelings of insecurity among the public (Borowitz, 2005). Another issue that emerged from this incident was the distinction between social classes, where the subcultures use any means and manifest destructive desires in order to achieve the desired goals. Craving for fame, with personal or ideological motivations, Herostratos attacked a religious icon and in so doing his act acquired a sacrilegious dimension. In a Herostratic approach, contemporary terrorist sympathisers worship suicide bombers as martyrs and as something they aspire to be (Leung, 2009). In fact, 'each act of terrorism is performed with an eye to sending a specific [set of] message[s]' (McAllister & Schmid, 2011: 246) and violence is the right channel to attract attention and aim at future modifications to the *status quo*.

Other politically oriented theories focus on the counterterrorism aspect, dealing for instance, with prevention, detection, management and response to terrorism. 'Many, perhaps even most, theories of terrorism do not approach the phenomenon in terms of interactions between terrorists and their opponents' (McAllister & Schmid, 2011: 255). Crenshaw (2006, 2010) tackled the consequences of counterterrorism, exploring how states responded to insurgent terrorism. Focusing on western liberal democracies, Crenshaw (2010: 1) questioned:

> What are the political consequences of counterterrorism measures taken by liberal democracies and the international institutions that link them? And how severe are the negative effects of counterterrorism on civil liberties, the rule of law, and patterns of democratic governance?

Researching the prevention or countering of terrorism explores ways of mitigating the commission of violent actions through defensive measures and apposite policies. Terrorism can never be prevented completely, but as explained by Bremer (1993: 259), the 'tactical objective is to confound and thwart terrorists – to reduce their options and make their operations more complicated and perilous'. Defensive measures create a cumulative effect that deter and defend against terrorist manoeuvres (Crenshaw, 1988). Considering terrorist actors as rational operatives, (Bremer, 1993; Clarke & Newman, 2006; Crenshaw, 1988; Silke, 2003) requires both the overt use of force and passive situational preventive measures (such as target hardening and access control) to reduce the possibility of a successful completion of a terrorist action. Deterrent methods increase the risks of violent actors but policymakers consider retaliation against terrorist factions as the main strategy (Schmid, 2011). 'There is a

widespread misconception that using terror to defeat terror will ultimately work. On the contrary, the evidence is that this policy is counter-productive' (Wilkinson, 2001: 115). Hoffman (1998: 61) also stated, 'attempts by the ruling regime to deter further violence with a particularly harsh exemplary punishment backfire catastrophically'. In a similar vein, researchers indicated that extremely tough procedures against terrorists have a propensity to create a 'boomerang effect' in terrorist attacks (Addicott, 2012; Banks, 2013; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997; Ganor, 2012; Hoffman, 2006; Hooks & Mosher, 2005; McAdam, 1982; Wilkinson, 2006, 2006a).

Retaliation is favoured over other strategies because results are more immediate, even though the situation risks backfiring. Frey (2004) compared the pre-emptive and/or deterrence approach with the use of either the 'stick' or the 'carrot'. The 'stick' method refers to forcible negative sanctions that control and punish terrorists through imprisonment, torture and even capital punishment. Deterrence aims at discouraging potential offenders from committing any wrongdoing by imposing heavy sanctions on captured terrorists. However, such deterrence will not necessary eradicate extremist ideologies. 'Abundant evidence ... shows that repressive overreaction plays into the hands of terrorists and, if prolonged, become totally counterproductive' (Wilkinson, 2000: 115). Endlers and Sandler (1993) insisted that long-term effects of castigatory policies resulted in a substitution in the targets of terrorists and, though deterrence is considered ideal, they do not necessarily lead to peaceful endings. Effective counterterrorism strategies do not come from situational crime prevention, but by tackling the root problems avoiding the use of violence and the 'us vs them' paradigms, particularly within minority groups (Audenaert, 2008; Fraihi, 2008; Ramadan, 2006). In turn this creates a 'carrot' approach that is supported by the community (Jenkins, 2000, as cited in Frey, 2004).

In the effort to target actual and prospective terrorist actors, governments need long-term reforms that address the grievances suffered by terrorists, and encourage non-violent alternatives that promote better management of terrorist threats. However, governments allocate higher budgetary costs for deterrent strategies than they do for pre-emptive measures (Frey, 2004). Pre-emptive strategies involve managing alternatives for terrorism that are financially cheaper, but with high political costs, because the general public considers it a 'cowardly' response. This approach in countering terrorism is rarely considered as a managerial response, but is associated with practical aspects of responding to crisis management caused by a terrorist attack (Schmid, 2011). For instance, von Hippel (2007) sustained that terrorism was to be beaten through long-term multilateral responses by

identifying and addressing the roots of terrorism such as, education on radicalization and social and economic marginalization.

Gompert and Gordon (2008) explored three possible strategies: 'stick and carrot', 'hearts and minds' and 'transformation'. The 'stick and carrot' approach rewards pro-government behaviour and punishes pro-insurgency behaviour. The second strategy aims at reaching the 'hearts and minds' by providing public services showing that the government cares, helping to gain popular support. The third strategy, the 'transformation' phase, weakens insurgencies and hinders jihadism, while it provides job training and placements, efficient and fair criminal justice systems and better education management (Gompert & Gordon, 2008). Crelinsten (2002) considered countering terrorism through a communication-driven framework between the state, law enforcement and terrorist organizations, hindering violent ideologies and channelling them into destructive politics. Jenkins (2006) looked at forty years of research and concluded that if the authorities did not understand the perceptions of the insurgent factions, the state could actually play into the terrorists' game. Different political strategies affect how terrorist sympathisers perceive counter-terrorist policies. Rules on law enforcement impose limitations on the force employed by regimes and constrain these activities to forms of responses that are accepted by society, because the regime's retaliation could instigate further terrorist actions (Crenshaw, 2006).

2.2.2 Social sciences theories

In contrast to state terrorism, insurgent terrorism absorbs most of the attention of the media, policymakers and researchers. When studying non-state terrorism, one needs to consider diverse issues, such as the psychology of lone-wolf or group terrorism, the *modus operandi* used in attacks, and potential situational measures that hinder future terrorist acts. McAllister and Schmid (2011: 213) identified three kinds of insurgent terrorism and described them as 'stand-alone or peacetime terrorism', 'embedded terrorism' and 'global terrorism'. Though non-state terrorism is the most prevalent and researched, no theory has ever provided a holistic perspective to explain the root causes or personality characteristics of those involved in this form of terrorism.

Identifying and profiling the personality and the psyche of the individual terrorist actor is prominent in terrorism studies. Some theories were poorly 'based on individual personality and even physiognomic traits allegedly typical of terrorist criminals' (McAllister & Schmid,

2011: 214; see also Laqueur, 1977). It is difficult to accept a sudden burst of violence targeting innocent people and it is almost natural that studies label such behaviour as abnormal, intolerable, incomprehensible and mad. According to Victoroff (2005) the major deficiencies of psychological theories of terrorism was the over-dependence on theoretical rumours or unreliable empirical data. Silke (1998: 60) explained how Pearce (1977) highlighted psychopathic traits on 'secondary sources such as terrorist autobiographies, biographies and media interviews. In one case, Pearce made a diagnosis of psychopathy based mainly on an individual having tattoos on his torso'.

While going through the psychological research of terrorist personalities, researchers like Horgan (2003), Silke (2003) and Taylor (1988) dismissed the notion that terrorists exhibit abnormal traits because of direct contact with terrorists or with former ones. Taylor and Quayle (1994: 107) recorded a remark from a terrorist leader in Northern Ireland who stated that 'psychopaths ... stand out like a sore thumb and everyone would know them'. Echoing a number of researchers (Corrado, 1981; Lyons & Harbinson, 1986; McCauley, 1991; Morf, 1970) Horgan (2003) stressed that terrorists are not clinical cases. For instance, Cooper (1977, as cited in Silke, 2003: 7) stated 'few terrorists seem to derive a real satisfaction from the harm they cause', while Kellen (1982, as cited in Silke, 2003: 7) indicated that 'some terrorists do experience remorse, and we have proof of it'. Terrorists are considered as clinically normal without any 'aberrant personalities' (McAllister & Schmid, 2011: 214) and aim at collective goals rather than fulfilling an egoist fantasy. While researching Italian left-wing terrorists, Della Porta (1988) recorded a social concern and empathy in members of the studied violent factions.

Some post-9/11 studies still label terrorists as insane even though the data for such diagnosis is extracted from second-hand sources rather than from primary or official ones (Silke, 2003). Attaching labels of mental illnesses to terrorists was only accepted in the 1970s. For instance, Cooper (1977, as cited in Silke, 2003: 31) described Andreas Baader as a 'sociopath ... extremely manipulative ... a pathological liar ... Baader displays characteristics of a marked psychopathic order'. A few months after Baader committed suicide, German psychiatrist Rasch (1979, as cited in Silke, 2003: 31) documented that there was no evidence to classify Baader and other Red Army Faction members 'as psychotics, neurotics, fanatics or psychopaths ... [or] paranoid'. A few weeks after the September 2001 attacks, Laqueur (2001: 80, as cited in Silke, 2003: 30) wrote:

> Madness, especially paranoia, plays a role in contemporary terrorism. Not all paranoiacs are terrorists, but all terrorists believe in conspiracies by the powerful, hostile forces and suffer from some form of delusion and

> persecution mania ... The element of ... madness plays an important role [in terrorism][9], even if many are reluctant to acknowledge it.

Silke (2003) acclaimed studies (see Corrado, 1981; Crenshaw, 1983; Silke, 1998) that indicate how psychologists and psychiatrists that write on terrorism ignore academic works and fall in the same trap of identifying terrorists as mentally disordered deviants. For example, Pomerantz (2001: 2-3, as cited in Silke, 2003: 32-33) depicted the psychology of Al Qaeda leaders after the 9/11 incidents as:

> Whatever the diagnosis, we should not minimise terrorist leaders' disordered thinking. Although it may be tempting to normalise terrorist behaviour by trying to understand terrorist grievances and follow their logic, there is a danger in such an approach as well. Mental disorders such as paranoia, and certainly character disorders, such as pathologic narcissism and sociopathy, do not yield to logic and placation. [Terrorism is] the by-product of a group mental disorder - an extreme example of destructive cult behaviour in which paranoid/narcissistic/sociopathic leaders convince vulnerable individuals to follow their megalomaniac 'logic' ... My vote [in explaining terrorism] is clearly for ... emphasising mental difficulties as opposed to legitimate economic, political, and religious grievances.

'The vast majority of terrorists are not crazy or abnormal, [but] a number of psychologists have persisted in saying otherwise and yet have failed ... to support their claims' (Silke, 2003: 33). That terrorists are not wired differently was established by various studies (see Gupta, 2012; Horgan, 2005a, 2005b; McCauley, 2007; Merari, 2005; Merari & Friedland, 1985; Post, 1984, 1990; Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2003; Silke, 2003a; Taylor, 1988; Taylor & Quayle, 1994). However, overviews like Laqueur's (2001) and Pomerantz's (2001) will hardly cease to exist because it is hard for human beings, including academics, not to label or categorise an indefinable phenomenon like terrorism. Biological and genetic factors were also considered to identify any potential correlation as to how an individual becomes a terrorist. Hubbard (1978) found that ninety per cent of eighty imprisoned terrorists in eleven countries had inner ear malfunctions that caused poor balance and coordination. Hubbard associated this defect to antisocial behaviour and inability to relate with other people to the extent that eventually there was a turn to terrorism. Serious doubts clouded the soundness and consistency of Hubbard's argument because 'he never released detailed descriptions of the data he gathered or of his analysis procedures, and there have been no replications of his very unusual findings since' (Silke, 2003: 35). Applied theories only identify specific issues, ignoring a combination of pronounced factors that would trigger a person to engage in a terrorist trajectory (Silke, 2003).

[9] The square brackets were part of the original (quoted) text.

Figure 2.2: A diagrammatic model of terrorist involvement



Note. Adapted from 'A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of Terrorist', by M. Taylor and J. Horgan, 2006, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 18, (p. 585-601), UK: Taylor and Francis Group.

Taylor and Horgan (2006) studied the psychological processes that led to the eventual development of terrorists and attempted to develop practical and efficient counterterrorism measures. Taylor and Horgan (2006: 585) stated '… if we think of terrorism as something conducted by evil people whose intention is to destroy "our" way of life, we are vulnerable to making serious errors of analysis that may consequently deflect policy down flawed paths'. In understanding the reasons why a person participates in terrorism one has to understand the social, political, historical and cultural contexts surrounding the individual. Besides choices and opportunities, the answer why a person becomes implicated in terrorism while other compatriots in similar contexts step back 'lies within the psychological emotional context of the individual on which the bigger and essentially non-psychological forces of opportunity and context operate' (Taylor & Horgan, 2006: 588). The burst of violence committed by terrorists is rare and generally disapproved of, like other aggressive behaviours found in other crimes (Schmid, 1996). Attractors and motivators behind terrorist acts remain instrumental in order to understand engagement into terrorism (Taylor & Horgan, 2006). Criminological literature

addressed the understanding and development of criminal behaviour from various angles. Some of these theories were applied to the terrorist. Taylor and Horgan (2006) applied the criminal trajectory concept to outline the pathway to terrorism. Sampson and Laub (1993: 8) described trajectories and transitions as follows:

> Trajectories refer to long-term patterns of behaviour and are marked by a sequence of transitions. Transitions are marked by life events (such as first job or first marriage) that are embedded in trajectories that evolve over shorter time spans… Some transitions are age-graded and some are not; hence what is often assumed to be important are the normative timing and sequencing of role transitions… The interlocking nature of trajectories and transitions may generate turning points as a change in the life course.

Life presents transitions that create different trajectories for every individual and these redirect one's life-path. Terrorist organisations, like other social institutions, modify the trajectory of the lives of their members. Every trajectory has three main points: the entry point, the success point and the element of timing. In the course of this trajectory, there are transitions, which entail abrupt critical points or a long-term process. Taylor and Horgan (2006) explained that 'trajectories' can be predisposing influences that develop criminal behaviour, as shown in Figure 2.2.

Silke (2003) also considered: the age, the social identification, and the psychology of vengeance as influencing factors and noticed that persons attracted to extremism tend to be male, ranging from teenage to the early twenties. Although it is believed that it is not possible to profile terrorists, Sageman (2004) and Horgan (2007) stated that profiling is a conspicuous interest in researchers (Jacques & Taylor, 2012; Leiken & Brooke, 2006; Russell & Miller, 1977; Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Meanwhile, Cotton and Li (2012) indicated that profiling practices from law enforcers referred only 'to the use an individual's race, ethnicity, or other observable characteristics'. This racial profiling created more opportunities for abuse and labelling of particular ethnic communities, which could increase inequities and possibilities of resorting to terrorism (Anwar & Fang, 2006; Cotton & Li, 2012; Monahan, 2011, 2012).

Alternatively, it is possible to identify common patterns among different terrorist groups (Mullins, 2007). Silke (2003: 36) noted that similarities between the attraction for violent behaviour and terrorism vanish along the years. For instance, in an examination of eighty-nine paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, the youngest were found to be in charge of bombings and assassinations (Silke, 1999, as cited in Silke, 2003). These youths identified themselves with marginalized groups that supported their anxieties and injustices. Terrorist groups support such causes to lure recruits for their 'just cause'. Post and Denny (2002, as cited in Silke, 2003:

37) quoted a Palestinian terrorist stating: 'My motivation in joining Fatah was both ideological and personal. It was a question of self-fulfilment, of honour and a feeling of independence... The goal of every young Palestinian was to be a fighter'. Examples of similar cases are, for example, those of the Irish Gerry Adams (Sharrok & Devenport, 1977) and the West German terrorist Michael Baumman (Taylor, 1988).

On entering terrorist factions and becoming more marginalised from conventional society, some of the politically committed members are fuelled to act violently by stimulating the instinct of vengeance. Silke (2003; see also Schmid & Jongman, 1988) considered the psychology of vengeance as fundamental to comprehend affiliations with terrorist organizations and aggressive behaviours. Vengeance is linked to the experience of suffering a sensational injustice. The 'desire for revenge and the willingness to carry it out violently are tied both to the self-worth of the originally offended individual but also to a deterrent role against future unjust treatment' (Silke, 2003: 41). Vengeful tendencies are more common in young men (Cota-McKinely, Woody & Bell, 2001) and religious beliefs hype this revengeful mind-set (Silke, 2003).

Horgan (2003a) explained the psychology of terrorism as a three step process. The first step is the gradual socialization into a terrorist group. Secondly, faithfulness and submission to the conformities of the underground group strengthens this union so that one remains a member. The third and final step is the disengagement from the group on a psychological and physical level. The individual questions the obligations towards the faction, as these obstruct the normal family-seeking process (for instance marriage and child rearing). 'Psychological disengagement may or may not be followed by physical disengagement, which in turn refers to the process by which individuals actually leave a terrorist organization' (McAllister & Schmid, 2011: 216). For instance, Horgan (2009) examined the personal accounts of twenty-nine former terrorists individuals involved in terrorist groups and studied the distinct issues of de-radicalisation and disengagement.

On similar terms, evolutionary psychology developed the Terror Management Theory (TMT) (Pyszczynski, 2004). TMT explains the root of human needs and maintains that one's own concept of reality coexists with cultural human problems. Humans are intellectually predisposed for survival and avoid anything that could endanger their life, whether natural, human or otherwise (Pyszczynski, Motyl & Abdollahi, 2009). When explaining the meaning of life and death, cultural worldviews modify these intellectual abilities 'to manage the potential for terror' (Pyszczynski, 2004: 830). The understandings of this reality emerge also as conceptions conveyed by extremist ideologies through conveying agents, like religion. Due to

encumbrance, degradation and marginalization, predisposed people become committed to their group and this commitment fuels hostility towards different affiliations resulting in a 'lethal cocktail' (Pyszczynski *et al.*, 2009: 15).

Groupthink and interlinked pressures led academics to inquire the rationale involved in terrorist actions. The utilitarian belief associated with rational choices is that during decision making, a person weighs the benefits and costs. Crenshaw (1988) considered terrorism as an instrumental form of violence based on reasonable strategies aimed at affecting the policymakers and manipulating political behaviour. The *status quo* is unbearable for the terrorists, so they 'engage in the production of terror as a vehicle for political change' (McAllister & Schmid, 2011: 222). This perspective could not overpass the hurdle of associating altruist behaviour with extremist ventures and states of akrasia of suicide terrorists. Silke (2003: 93) noted that suicidal terrorism was deeply embedded in human history, bringing examples from more than two thousand years ago of attacks by assassins (known as *Hashiyan*), as well as Jewish Zealots and Sicarii in the first century AD, among others (Bloom, 2005: 4). However, studies like Pedahzur and Perliger (2006: 1) failed to look at history and considered violent suicide terrorist actions only in the modern world and implied that suicide terrorism began in the 1980s.

In his work, Silke (2003) added that, though Westerners believe that suicide terrorism was a characteristic of Islamic terrorists, Hindu terrorists committed more suicide attacks than any other religious extremists. Also, Merari (2000, as cited in Silke, 2003: 102) stated that 'suicide terrorism is an organisational phenomenon ... it was an organisation that decided to use this tactic, found the person or persons to carry it out, trained them, and sent them on the mission at the time and place that the organisation chose'. Silke (2003) found suicide terrorism to be a fascinating phenomenon to study, understand and control because it proved to be difficult to defend against. From the terrorist perspective, suicide terrorism is significantly expensive as it costs the lives of members but it is remarkably precise and lethal. The suicide bomber is the equivalent of a guided missile that is self-controlled and can decide when and where to explode, causing a significant number of casualties especially when vehicles or planes are used to enhance the impact (Pedhazur, 2006). Adopting the terrorist point-of-view, Bunker (2006) denoted a number of advantages of suicide bombing, including the fact that; it was difficult for the suicide bomber to miss the target, it was hard to identify the bomber, to prevent this person from exploding and to keep the person at a safe distance. Bunker (2006) also explained that suicide terrorists do not need a safe place before detonation or to prepare getaway plans and the authorities cannot arrest or interrogate them. These strategic

advantages substantiate the disturbing increase of terrorist factions experimenting with suicide attacks in different countries (Silke, 2003). In addition, Pedahzur and Perliger (2006) claimed that at least thirty-two known terrorist groups across twenty-eight countries used suicide terrorism while Pape (2003) considered suicide terrorism as the most devastating, demonstrative and destructive form of terrorist weapons.

Table 2.1: Rapoport's (2004) The four waves of terrorism

Focus	Primary strategy	Target identity	Precipitant	Special characteristics
Anarchists 1870–1910s	Elite assassinations Bank robberies	Primarily European states	Failure/ slowness of political reform	Developed basic terrorism strategies and rationales
Nationalist 1920s–1960s	Guerrilla attacks on police and military	European empires	Post-1919 delegitimization of empire	Increased international support (UN and diasporas)
New Left/ Marxist 1960s–1980s	Hijackings, kidnappings, assassination	Governments in general; increasing focus on U.S.	Viet Cong successes	Increased international training/ cooperation/ sponsorship
Religious 1970s–2020s	Suicide bombings	U.S., Israel, and secular regimes with Muslim populations	Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan	Casualty escalation, Decline in the number of terrorist groups

Note. Adapted from 'The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism', by D. C. Rapoport, 2004, as cited in A. K. Cronin and J. M. Ludes, (Eds.), *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press), (p. 46-73), as cited in K. Rasler and W. R. Thompson, 2009, 'Looking for Waves of Terrorism', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21, p. 28–41.

In a historical analysis of terrorist insurgencies that occurred in different periods, Rapoport (2004) identified 'four waves' of non-state terrorism. McAllister and Schmid (2011: 233) described this theory as 'the closest to a general theory of terrorism found in the current literature'. Rasler and Thompson (2009: 30) commented that 'certain groups stand out as particularly salient in some respect, and that what is salient in one wave is not likely to be equally salient in preceding and following waves'. Similar to other aspects of literature on terrorism, researchers have different propositions on how many waves of violence there have been, and these amount to a maximum of eight (Bergesen & Lizardo, 2004; see also Rapoport, 2004; Rasler & Thompson, 2009; Sedgwick, 2007; Thompson, 2006).

The waves of terrorism as conceived by Rapoport (see Table 2.1) examined different epochs in history. The first wave started in the last decades of the nineteenth century and each wave is expected to last around forty years. This means that the present wave should end in the coming years. The four waves covered by this theory included the anarchists' wave,

followed by the nationalists' movement after World War I, then the red wave of Marxist left-wing groups and finally the present one, referred to as the religious wave. 'Rapoport observed that very few organizations were able to outlive their epoch, each of which proved to last roughly a generation' (McAllister & Schmid, 2011: 229). Focusing on the most acclaimed movements through history and being able to exemplify the correlations between the motives of grievances and the violent *modus operandi* of the various waves, as well as being empirically supported by ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) statistics in the case of the last two waves, Rapoport's theory prevailed in the studies on terrorism. However, the wave theory lacks accuracy because, as McAllister and Schmid (2011: 233) stated:

> The same Marxist thought that drove the first wave informed much of the anti-colonial movements. And a strong argument could be made that the poster children for left-wing radicalism in the 1960s and 1970s (the Viet Cong and PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization), respectively were in fact (also) anti-colonial.

Kaplan (2008) noticed that the *zeitgeist* of international terrorism captured in Rapoport's (2004) 'wave theory' did not consider international influence in terms of factors such as foreign patrons, education, ideology or religious beliefs. By excluding these international ties, Rapoport created a utopian vision of a restricted society that is totally isolated from the rest of the world and its influences that was remote from today's globalised world. Also, Kaplan (2008) identified the fifth wave of modern terrorism, one which entailed a process of 'ethnic cleansing' motivated by radicalism (McAllister & Schmid, 2011). Byman's (1998) 'logic of ethnic terrorism' maintained that ethnic groups were not analogous to religious terrorist factions because such groups tended to portray a nationalist ideology related to a particular minority of people rather than a more universalist ideology, as found in religious terrorist organizations.

In summary, theories on terrorism showed that researchers approach terrorism through various methods and create numerous theories. The absence of a general theory of terrorism is marked by the absence of an acceptable definition of what is considered terrorism. The blinding veil of politics influences social theories and research hypotheses investigating the 'root causes' (Bjørgo, 2005). 'Most theorizing ... is even negligent of the obvious link between non-state terrorism and governmental counter-actions' (McAllister & Schmid, 2011: 261). Thus, the understanding of the phenomenon by policymakers, security practitioners and academics is hindered by the respective different agendas that determine prevention, deterrence, control, elimination or understanding of the terrorist threat. The only common agreement among researchers is that there are different forms of terrorism which elicit

distinct theories on potential causes and generators. For instance, Bjørgo (2005) considered 'naive' the notion of removing the root causes and end terrorism because:

> The more deep-rooted a cause (as with 'poverty' or 'modernization'), the more general it becomes, and the less directly it is related to terrorism. Such causes act to produce all kinds of social outcomes, of which terrorism is just one (Bjørgo, 2005: 2).

On a positive note, the continuously growing number of theories and the more professional approaches adopted by researchers around the world, demonstrate that terrorism is being studied more thoroughly in various academic fields. In the last decades continuous theory formation has led to considerable maturity and development in the studies of terrorism (Schmid, 2011). Thus, researchers need to keep aiming at higher levels of understanding of this phenomenon by recording and mapping their research methods in order to address the identified weaknesses.

2.3 Issues in researching terrorism

The theories discussed above demonstrate how problematic it is to explore and analyse the phenomenon of terrorism. Additionally, the research methods used in researching terrorism have been consistently criticized due to a lack of focus on state violence, inadequate research methodologies, and bias. The infrequent occurrence of terrorist acts, the lack of research subjects to be studied, and insufficient and inadequate research data marginalized terrorism studies (Stampnitzky, 2008). Consequently, terrorism studies tended to be more descriptive than analytic, as noted by numerous academics (see Chen, Reid, Sinai, Silke & Ganor, 2008; Crenshaw, 1992; Ranstorp, 2007; Schmid, 2011; Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Silke, 2001, 2004). Schmid and Jongman (1988: 177) extensively analysed the existing terrorism literature and described it as 'impressionistic, superficial, and at the same time often also pretentious, venturing far-reaching generalizations on the basis of episodal evidence'. Echoing Kennedy and Lum (2003), Dugan (2012) sustained that the situation has not changed much.

'Terrorism literature can be found mostly in the social sciences, especially political science, international relations, sociology, communication studies and law. It also draws from military science but, strangely, hardly at all from criminology until recently' (Schmid, 2011c: 458). Yet criminology aims 'to deepen our knowledge about the causes, patterns and consequences of law-breaking, including extra-legal violence, which certainly characterizes

terrorism' through empirical and objective research (Dugan, 2012: 175). In the last decade there has been a significant increase in researching non-state terrorism using empirical methodology. According to Kennedy and Lum (2003, as cited in Dugan, 2012) ninety-six per cent of articles from academic journals between 1975 and 2002 were 'thought pieces' lacking pragmatism and empiricism, and around fifty-four per cent of all articles were published post-9/11. Silke (2004) also explored this aspect and exposed the lack of focus on root causes, trends and patterns of terrorists, as well as the lack of effort in obtaining primary data for more valuable, reliable and original information.

Silke (2007) also highlighted the different methodologies used in post-9/11 studies, marking a new era in this field. The Bush administration facilitated terrorism studies and international and domestic security studies as part of the 'global war on terror' (Schmid, 2011). This new wave of terrorism research lacked the study of primary documents produced by terrorists in their original format, interviews with terrorists, former actors, close friends and/or families, as well as research in conflict zones (Dolnik, 2011). Shivani (2007) noticed a collapse of objectivity in recent studies, which undermines other pragmatic and ground-breaking research. Schmid (2011c: 460) described this sudden hype in terrorism research as:

> Superficial and crudely agenda-driven – politically by neo-conservatives, commercially by those close to a fast-growing homeland security counter-terrorism industry and individually by personal opportunism, responding to the availability of major government funding and the lure of being interviewed as an 'expert' by the news media.

Lum, Kennedy and Sherley (2006) pointed out that of almost five thousand peer-reviewed articles on terrorism, only three per cent were based on empirical research and one per cent were case studies. The rest of the articles were thought-pieces of writing, which demonstrates the fact that empirical research in this field is still very rare. Terrorism research is different from other social research because both the terrorist factions and the countering forces are often not accessible to the public. As reported by NCTC (National Counterterrorism Center) (2011: v), 'details about victims, damage, perpetrators, and other incident elements are frequently not fully reported in open-source information'. Furthermore, gaining access to terrorists or former extremist actors is dangerous; the military or enforcement agents involved in the field are elusive and the open sources are often misinformed or have incomplete data. Researching terrorism is in itself an arduous assignment, and 'many academic researchers have often preferred to do their research on the basis of media news stories or reports released by governments – both often not very reliable sources' (Schmid, 2011c: 461-2). Consequently, this makes empirical research in terrorism and ancillary subjects an unusual singularity. 'Probably

few areas in the social sciences literature in which so much is written on the basis of so little research. Perhaps as much as eighty per cent of the literature is not research-based in any rigorous sense' (Schmid & Jongman, 1988: 179). The limited and distorted sources that are available make it difficult for research on terrorism to be apolitical, amoral and neutral – characteristics that would produce quality research containing valuable recommendations in dealing with this violent phenomenon.

Academics and outsiders tended more to criticize rather than praise the principles and methodologies used in researching terrorism. Some academics developed this criticism into a new school called Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS), where the 'orthodox' scholars (or 'terrorologists') ignore aspects of terrorism because they are funded by the government and/or have a history in some government or military authority (Abraham, 1993). Schmid (2011c: 463) indicated Jackson (2009) as 'one of the principal advocates' of CTS that aimed at obtaining a more impartial research and more practical recommendations. In fact, later on Schmid (2011c: 470) stated that 'a great deal of self-criticism within the field, and additional criticism from CTS is welcome'. Jackson (2009: 66) sustained that terrorism research:

> … was once a relatively minor specialist subfield of security studies and international relations. Today, it exhibits all the characteristics of a major stand-alone academic field, having its own: dedicated scholarly journals ... graduate and post-graduate teaching and research programme at most major universities... It is, in many ways, comparable to fields like criminology.

However, not all academics agree with Jackson's view. Gordon (2007, as cited in Schmid, 2011: 463) stated 'terrorism as a research field lacks constancy and the commitment of researchers to the field ... [resulting in a] large amount of discontinued research in this area'. In a similar vein Stampitzky (2010: 2) opined 'terrorism expertise has been characterized by disagreements ranging from the question of what counts as legitimate knowledge, to how to define its main concept'. Additionally Stampitzky (2010: 2) explained that 'from an analytical point of view, terrorism studies fail to conform to the most common sociological notions of what a field of intellectual production ought to look like'. In a methodical view of the intellectual structure sustaining terrorism research, Reid and Chen (2006: 53) concluded that several subfields of research hindered the recognition of terrorism as a research topic and limited a deeper understanding of the research principles and of the research subject.

The rise in terrorism research in the last decades consolidated pieces of knowledge that contributed to the better understanding of the different characteristics of terrorism. Criticism of principles, research methodologies and other shortcomings of past research are being

addressed and worked upon, creating more reliable and objective research. Researchers like Silke (2004) and Dolnik (2011) showed the importance of gathering data from primary sources rather than reusing other researchers' data, whilst Taylor and Quayle (1994) and Horgan (2004) showed that interviews with terrorists or former activists outside government authority are possible. Meanwhile, Jackson (2005, as cited in Schmid, 2011c: 470) emphasised that researchers should ask 'who is the terrorism research for and how does terrorism knowledge support particular interests?' whereas Dolnik (2011) expounded on the precautions and the kind of training academics should undergo before conducting terrorism field research. All these different contributions are constantly refining terrorism research and it is evident that 'terrorism studies have never been in better shape than now' (Schmid, 2011c: 470).

2.4 Schmid's questionnaire

After exploring the difficulties in defining, theorizing and researching terrorism, it is opportune to look at Schmid's (2011) questionnaire. Schmid's results do not provide any key material for this thesis. However, it is important to note that though this research study was conducted in 2010, pre-dating Schmid's publication by a year, there are some similarities. Even though the methods employed in this research and the sample size are completely different, there are similarities in the chosen sample and themes, and also in some of the findings. However, Schmid's questionnaire did not involve a threefold approach as employed in this research (as explained in detail in Chapter 4).

Schmid's (2011a: 34) sample of 91 respondents involved different professionals, such as academics, intelligence analysts, government official/civil servants, and law enforcement and military officers, among others. The questionnaire covered themes like trends of terrorism, categories of political violence that are labelled as terrorism, identification of issues of terrorism that ought to be studied, advice on study methods and the nature of the root causes. The answers collected in this questionnaire presented a variety of observations and perspectives in terrorism research, but 'it would be wrong to generalize such "trends"' (Schmid, 2011a: 5).

One of the similarities indicated how the broadness and continuously changing definition of terrorism is a constant obstacle in terrorism studies. The lack of definition provides more room for abuse and labelling of individuals and groups as 'terrorists' (Schmid, 2011). Other parallel observations were that terrorism is a socio-political phenomenon and cannot be

studied in isolation without exploring the surrounding context; and that the respondents' focus was mainly on non-state terrorism and did not include state-terrorism (Schmid, 2011a: 9). In an answer to the question 'how to study terrorism?' Schmid (2011) noted that the respondents showed a particular preference for qualitative methodologies. The answers indicated that potential sources for collecting qualitative data included government officials, imprisoned terrorists, victims, supporters of terrorism, witnesses, researchers, journalists, and members of the general public (Schmid, 2011).

Among the series of indicators that affect the increase or decrease of terrorist campaigns, Schmid's (2011) results indicated policies, governance and related reactions as the main catalysts of terrorism, though the root causes are not clearly identified. While investigating counterterrorism measures, Schmid (2011a: 29) highlighted intelligence and intelligence sharing and the respect for human rights. In fact Schmid (2011) recommended that authorities should not overreact when using military force or extra-legal practices and to invest more in community policing when dealing with terrorism.

2.5 Concluding comments

An overview of these terrorism studies highlighted the difficulties encountered in seeking a workable universal definition of terrorism without creating uncertainties. This chapter also explained how the subject of terrorism is of interest to multiple disciplines and academic fields ranging from political to social sciences. Theories also explored how politics are intricately intertwined with terrorism even though regime terrorism is not at the centre of attention, in contrast to the case of non-state terrorism. Aspects like radicalization, violent counterterrorism strategies and socio-economic issues are some of the political inequities that are associated with and researched in terrorism. Social sciences theories observed other complementing aspects. For instance, the mental health of terrorists, the effects of profiling and labelling, and theories that depicted terrorism in terms of periodical waves aimed at understanding this phenomenon from different angles. Finally, this chapter also looked at the issues that affect terrorism research. This discussion indicated how vital is data derived from first-hand sources in this particular area of studies.

The abovementioned themes together with Lombroso (discussed in the next chapter) constitute the intellectual foundation for the research instruments explained in the methods (Chapter 4). Themes that were more politically oriented, such as the effect of political agendas,

the politicized definitions of terrorism, and the political conflicts with non-state actors were instrumental in the thematic analysis and discussions of Chapter 5. Subsequently, Chapter 6 focuses on themes derived from social sciences theories, the obstacles that hinder a more evidence-based approach to terrorism research and the profiling of terrorists.

Chapter 3: Lombroso

The purpose of this chapter is to examine Lombroso's theory of anarchist outrage within his overall theory of political crime. While presenting a holistic picture of the theories and influences that affected Lombroso's development of criminology, this chapter briefly examines some of the issues that Lombroso considered to be at the roots of criminality and violence expressed by anarchist militants. Cesare Lombroso's *opus magnum* is considered to be *L'Uomo Delinquente* (*Criminal Man*). However, the surrounding socio-political struggles and insurgencies inspired the writing of *Gli Anarchici* (*The Anarchists*) and even before it *Il Delitto Politico* (*The Political Crime*), which is copiously referred to in *Gli Anarchici*. In fact, though the focus of this chapter and research is specifically on *Gli Anarchici*, parts of *Il Delitto Politico* proved indispensable when it came to conducting a comprehensive analysis of Lombroso's work. Among the issues associated with the causes of anarchy, Lombroso delved into politics and anarchist philosophy, physiognomic traits, mental disorders like epilepsy and hysteria, and also overviewed social, geographic and political patterns that led him to provide a series of prophylactic measures. These issues are presented with detailed examples of cases of anarchist ideologists or actors pertaining to the nineteenth century or before.

Lombroso's *Gli Anarchici* was never completely translated into English before this present research. By exposing Lombroso's work in almost its entirety, this chapter can be considered as new knowledge in its own right. Besides this contribution to the academic world, this chapter also serves as a benchmark against which to assess the thematic discussions in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, in addition to the research themes identified in Chapter 2.

3.1 Lombroso's criminology

Lombroso is mostly recognised for contributing to the classification of criminals in the very beginning of criminological theories, in particular, the 'born criminal' (*il delinquente /reo nato*). However, Lombroso had multiple interests apart from the study of criminal actors. These included research in pathological anatomies, diseases like pellagra, psychiatric problems and paranormal phenomena. Lombroso's ideas developed throughout his life. Of all his works (about thirty books and a thousand articles) only a few were translated and when that happened the meaning of these works was often drastically changed into what Gibson (2006:

137) called a 'reductionist view of Lombroso's criminal anthropology'. Besides difficulties in locating numerous editions of Lombroso's works, even for scholars that read Italian, Gibson (2006: 137) explained that, Lombroso's science is often 'discussed in a vacuum' rather than in terms of the Italian socio-political context, which at the time was dominated by numerous revolts. Thus, scholars applied 'double standards' with regards to Lombroso and his works, particularly when compared to the contributions of other thinkers in the late nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth.

The issues on criminal studies were contested between medicine and law. Lombroso studied medicine at the universities of Padua, Vienna and Pavia and graduated in 1858 (Bollone, 1992). In 1863 he volunteered to and served in the medical service (Wolfgang, 1961). The empirical approach in this revolutionary period of the *Risorgimento* was considered by Lombroso (as well as other young doctors) as the key to enlightenment in the new united Italy (Gibson, 2006). During peacetime, Lombroso carried out the systematic observation and measurement of 3,000 soldiers, identifying physical differences among the inhabitants of the different areas of Italy. During these observations, Lombroso targeted tattoo infractions that he labelled as criminal (Wolfgang, 1961). Auguste Comte, Ernst Haeckel, Franz Joseph Gall, Benedict-Augustin Morel and Paolo Marzolo[10] were some of the personalities that influenced Lombroso and his work (Gibson, 2006).

Lombroso's theories on criminal issues and their focus on physical characteristics and the brain influenced fields like medicine, penology, history and international literature like Tolstoy, Bram Stoker and Conan Doyle (Garland, 2002). Led by positivist principles, Lombroso's research aimed at obtaining objective results that contributed to the development of criminology. Lombroso influenced scientific interest in the culture and the concept of crime. These criminal characteristics were considered a violation of the moral law and juridical norms, and helped to identify the criminal personality following an analysis of their nature and the related causes. Lombroso showed a humanitarian pathway to the judiciary that included the understanding of the irresponsible and the sick before punishment (Garland, 1985; Wiener, 1990). This line of thought opposed the armchair theories of the classical school, which focused specifically on scales of punishment in accordance with the crime committed, rather than investigating why a person became criminal. Lombroso noted experiments, measurements, autopsies and observations in his books, which he illustrated with tables, maps, photographs and diagrams of detected abnormalities. He published five editions of

[10] In, *Il deviante*, 92-102, Villa mentioned that Lombroso named his first daughter Paola Marzola after Paolo Marzolo (Gibson, 2006: 140).

L'Uomo Delinquente (*Criminal Man*). Each edition was a further development of the previous ones, starting from the 'born criminal' and moving towards the 'habitual criminal', the 'insane criminal', the 'criminal by passion', the 'alcoholic criminal', the 'hysterical criminal', the 'mattoid', and the 'occasional criminal' (Gibson & Rafter, 2006). 'Yet, as early as the first edition of *Criminal Man* [Lombroso argued that] there is no crime that is not rooted in multiple causes, including education, hunger, and urbanisation' (Gibson, 2006: 144). Lombroso and Horton (1912: 153) estimated that the *reo nato* (born criminal) constituted only thirty-three per cent of all criminals, rather than fifty per cent as initially stated in the first edition of *Criminal Man* (Gibson & Rafter, 2006). The kinds of punishment given were also tackled in this work. The belief that born criminals were insensitive to pain convinced Lombroso that capital punishment was not an effective deterrent. Lombroso advocated the death penalty when the born criminals committed gory crimes and threatened the security of the state, while those who committed less heinous crimes were to be segregated from society or perpetually incarcerated (Gibson, 2006).

The English translation of *L'Uomo Delinquente,* published by Lombroso's daughter Gina Lombroso Ferrero in 1911, presented a synopsis of her father's work but excluded most of the continuous development and evolution of Lombroso's thoughts and theories in the five published editions (Gibson, 2006). The first English version was not very faithful to the original text, especially when compared to Gibson's and Rafter's (2006) work, which includes the translation of all five editions of *Criminal Man*. A defective system of spreading research material hindered a constant and systematic development of criminology and explains how numerous works (among which Lombroso's) had never been translated and were consequently ignored by scholars. For instance, it is believed that if Lombroso's *La Donna Delinquent* (*The Female Offender*) had been translated during the nineteenth century without any deletions or alterations, he would have been considered as a pioneer of sexology (Rafter & Gibson, 2004).

Lombroso's works were at the centre of numerous scientific polemics and were extensively challenged by French scientists. The interpretation of different physical characteristics and brain structures (that vary according to the identified criminals) contributed to the diffusion of *lombrosismo* (Lombrosianism) (Bollone, 1992: 210). These crimino-anthropological scientific theories were presented in Rome at the *Congressi Internazionali di Antropoligia Criminale* (International Congress of Criminal Anthropology) of 1885. At the second congress, which took place in Paris in 1889, Lombroso was attacked for asserting typical criminal traits. It was only after encountering harsh criticism in this congress that

Lombroso started to include social factors in his work (Wolfgang, 1961). Italians were not present for the third reunion of 1893 in Brussels. In the fourth congress in Geneva (1896) and the following in Amsterdam (1901), the Italian positivists were present and the Lombrosian theories prevailed (Bollone, 1992).

L'Uomo Delinquente is just one of Lombroso's works even though it is considered as his major contribution to criminology. Criminology was created through the studies of researchers coming from different fields and countries. Language, customs and nomenclatures influenced the emergence of criminology and the way particular works were more referenced than others. Most criminologists were incapable of reading publications published by their foreign colleagues, hindering the blending of studies carried out in different countries (Rafter, 2009). French was the *lingua franca* in the nineteenth century. Consequently, most publications were translated into French to be accessible to well-educated individuals. This explains how potentially significant texts were only partially (or not) translated into English and other languages. For instance, Lombroso's *L'Uomo Delinquente* was first published in Italian in 1876 but was only translated into French almost ten years later (Rafter, 2009).

Skilled in reading English, French and German, Lombroso was one of the very few that could correspond with people from South America and Russia (Rafter, 2009: xv). Apart from enabling him to benefit from publications in different languages, this communication dexterity helped Lombroso to keep abreast of research from around the world. Lombroso also published works about crimes in America and Australia (such as in *Delitti Vecchi e Delitti Nuovi*[11] (1902)) and explored various aspects of criminology, including the spiritual or paranormal perspective. However, Lombroso's extensive studies did not save him from being considered by criminology textbooks as 'a silly Italian ... who believed that criminals have crossed eyes and the gait of a gorilla' (Rafter, 2009: xxii).

'Presenting [Lombroso's] ideas in a congealed and artificial form ... [was] of limited use for scholars attempting to trace the origins of criminology' (Gibson & Rafter, 2006: 4), deceiving students and researchers in criminology as well as mislabelling and ridiculing the founder of criminology as simplistic. Gibson and Rafter (2006) also pointed out that English readers were not knowledgeable about the Italian political context and of the goals envisaged in reforming the police, courts and punishment. Furthermore, scholars abhorred this eugenic and degeneration theory in consequence of the way Nazism and Fascism used race studies to support their diabolical plans. For instance, Italy passed a decree in April 1937 that made it a crime for an Italian citizen to have a 'conjugal relationship' with an African subject so as to

[11] It is translated as *Old Crimes and New Crimes.*

'defend the prestige of the race' (Duggan, 2008: 511). Though one has to acknowledge that Lombroso's work was influential in the faculties of sciences even forty years after his death, scholars failed to notice that 'Lombroso himself was Jewish and that his ideas ... were not analogous to those of Nazi – or even Italian Fascist – anti-Semitic ideologues' (Gibson & Rafter, 2006: 5). Thus, due to numerous hindering factors, Lombroso failed to be recognised and appreciated for his contributions. In the five editions of *Criminal Man*, Lombroso researched various criminological aspects and considered crime as a 'natural' product which would always remain part of the human character, rather than a matter of free choice (Gibson & Rafter, 2006).

In the latest translation and publication of *Criminal Man*, Gibson and Rafter (2006) demonstrated how Lombroso progressed in criminology studies through the years and issued five editions of this work. In the first edition, Lombroso compared the criminals' physiognomic features with those of non-criminals. Prisoners' tattoos, jargon, poetry and other forms of expression were also analysed to find points of degeneration or atavism. In the second edition, Lombroso presented a system of criminal classification, for instance, the 'criminals of passion' whose motives for committing a crime were different from those of other criminals. The term 'born criminal' was mentioned for the first time in the third edition. This edition also explored mental illness and moral insanity that hindered the individual from differentiating between good and evil. According to Lombroso, moral insanity was particularly common among prisoners. The third edition is also synonymous with Lombroso's criticism of the practice of using the degeneration theory to explain social problems like alcoholism. Consequently, Lombroso took into consideration a series of diseases to explain anomalies, rather than attributing them to traits of atavism. The fourth edition added new concepts and categories of criminals. Among the new concepts, there were epilepsy and 'hidden epilepsy' (*epilessia larvata*); three subcategories of the insane criminal (the alcoholic criminal, the hysterical criminal and the mattoid); and the occasional criminal (which included the pseudo-criminal, criminaloids, habitual criminals and latent criminals) (Gibson & Rafter, 2006). The fifth and last edition focused more on sociological factors and argued that 'there is no crime which is not rooted in multiple causes' (Gibson & Rafter, 2006: 12) including the milieu and the biological make-up of the individual.

Though Lombroso's work included statistical tables, modern researchers considered the methodology that was used as 'unscientific and even laughable' (Gibson & Rafter, 2006: 8). Bollone (1992: 213) explained that the Achilles heel of Lombroso's theories lay in the various methodologies used to collect and process data. Lombroso used dissimilar and inconsistent

data from different sources, and mixed proverbs, historical anecdotes, paintings and fictional literature to support his arguments without considering the disparate and less objective nature of the diverse sources (Bollone, 1992; Gibson & Rafter, 2006).

Echoing Niceforo (1911), Bollone (1992) describes how criminologists seek the social links that influence the quantity or quality of crimes across space and time and the manifestations of pathological lives. However, Garland (2002) outlined two different theoretical assumptions that underpinned the development of criminology through the decades. Modern criminology is the product of the convergence of two separate schemes: 'the Lombrosian project' and 'the governmental project' (Garland, 2002: 8). The Lombrosian project, which goes back to the nineteenth century, aimed at inquiring, explaining and understanding etiological agents that distinguish criminals from non-criminals. Decades later, the governmental project studied improved management practices for police and prisons (Knepper, 2007). The Lombrosian scientific wave is still rolling nowadays, though 'most etiological studies of the twentieth century de-emphasized the biological determinants which Lombroso took to be fundamental' (Garland, 2002: 8). As Knepper (2007: 5) explicated, '[Lombroso] failed in his specific programme ... [but] did manage to popularise criminology as the scientific study of criminal behaviour'. The competitiveness and convergences of these two projects support and continue to evolve criminology, though this depends on the criminologists' interests of either influencing policies or creating an objective and uncontaminated science. Garland (2002) explained that administrators considered Lombroso's research on the causes of crime only after extensive alterations had occurred in the course of time. However, the eclectic nature of this criminal justice area of study allowed the inclusion of thoughts and theories from various other social sciences rendering its creation practically inevitable. Lombroso baptised this new field of study as 'criminology' (Gibson & Rafter, 2006).

The history of criminology began when thoughts, actions and writings addressed the issue of law-breaking. However, a simplistic overview of the history of criminology begins with the works of Beccaria, Bentham and other contributors to the 'classical school' of criminology. The classical school focused mainly on the reform of criminal law because its proponents considered the offender to be an individual in possession of a free will that can calculate the advantages and disadvantages before committing a crime. Eighteenth-century thinkers did not make distinctions between criminals and non-criminals and did not conceive methods to research crime and criminals. Lombroso and '*la scuola positiva*' (the positivist school) confronted the 'classical school' (Garland, 2002). Stressing on measurements, objectivity and theory-neutral research, the positivists adopted 'a more empirical, scientific approach to the

subject, and investigated "the criminal" using the techniques of psychiatry, physical anthropology, anthropometry and other new human sciences' (Garland, 2002: 11). Research favoured the classical school, putting Lombroso's scientific methods aside, but this did not hinder the research methods founded by Lombroso from being developed and used in diverse ways. However, 'the myth of an emergent criminological science, progressing from ancient error to modern truth, does little to improve our understanding of the past or of the present' (Garland, 2002: 13). Nowadays, criminology remains multidisciplinary but it is a recognised academic field that provides systematic methods of research and techniques that convey scientific and theoretical knowledge that continue to reflect the Lombrosian and the governmental projects. Amid the constant intellectual development and political pressures exerted on scholars to research new aspects of criminology, one always finds similar projects that were conducted decades before, as Garland (2002: 24) stated:

> Each time a new element is added to the criminological armoury – be it radical criminology, ecological surveys, sociological theory, or situational crime prevention – someone sooner or later discovers that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century writers were doing something similar, and that this new approach should therefore be considered a central feature of the criminological tradition, albeit one that was temporarily (and inexplicably) forgotten.

The book *Criminal Woman, the Prostitute, and the Normal Woman* translated by Rafter and Gibson (2004) is an example of the few translated works authored by Lombroso. This was the only criminological study that was translated into English during Lombroso's lifetime and was the vehicle that brought Lombroso's thoughts to the English-speaking world (Gibson & Rafter, 2006). With the help of Guglielmo Ferrero, Lombroso published *La Donna Delinquente* in 1893, which had a particular impact on the research of female crime. By 1895 La *Donna Delinquente* had been translated into English and titled *The Female Offender* (Rafter & Gibson, 2004). However, the Victorian style influenced this translation and there were a series of omissions of salient comments on prostitutes, 'normal' women and female sexual pathologies, which changed the meaning of Lombroso's rationale on the inferiority of women to men (Gibson & Rafter, 2006; Rafter & Gibson, 2004). The theories found in *The Female Offender* had a more expansive effect when compared to those found in *Criminal Man*, to the extent that they influenced studies on female crime until the 1970s (Rafter & Gibson, 2004).

As in *Criminal Man*, Lombroso wanted to identify physiognomic deficiencies that delineated the criminal nature of female offenders. Lombroso concluded that 'almost all anomalies occur more frequently in prostitutes than in female criminals, and both classes have more degenerative characteristics than do normal women' (Rafter & Gibson, 2004: 134). The

criminal tendencies of female born criminals were considered more acute and malicious than those of male counterparts, but statistics already showed that the frequency of arrests and convictions of women tended to be far less than that of men. Lombroso opined that women had lower arrest rates because they were less atavistic, which contradicted his argument that women were inferior to men. In order to create a solid piece of research, Lombroso used a control group of what he considered normal women, together with data from gynaecologists and other experts, to identify the criminal inclinations of female offenders (Rafter & Gibson, 2004). In the introduction, the editors mentioned more than once that the principle of 'female inferiority' was a common attitude towards women 'among men of [Lombroso's] social class and time' (Rafter & Gibson, 2004: 13). However, they also pointed out Lombroso's apologies for the harsh words used against women and encouraged women's participation in society as this 'would raise women's intelligence' (Rafter & Gibson, 2004: 88). Lombroso (1893) showed his appreciation of women's intelligence and initiative in the preface of this work, where he mentioned by name all the female researchers that helped by sharing thoughts and information in the compilation of that study (Rafter & Gibson, 2004).

Lombroso emphasised the evolution of and the natural differences between men and women and the systematic distinctions of criminals from non-criminals. Monogenism prompted Lombroso to hypothesize an evolution from native African blacks to European whites, placing the latter at the top of the ladder. Thus abnormal criminal physical and psychological traits found in European whites were considered normal in 'lower' races. This 'scientific racism' is evident in the works mentioned above, but also in Lombroso and Horton's (1912) *Crime: Its Causes and Remedies* (in which Chapter III of Part One is called 'Influence of Race'). This work presents how various races (among them Italians from different parts of the peninsula, Greeks, Jews and gypsies) are correlated with particular criminal aspects (Knepper, 1996). Hereditarianism and evolutionary views were later adopted and became popular in Weimar, Germany, and criminal-biology gained recognition in the Third Reich, even though Lombroso was dead. 'The *eugenics* [*sic*] project aimed at improving the quality of the "race" ... proposed to prevent the reproduction of *everyone* [*sic*] with hereditary defects' (Rafter, 2008: 184) transforming scientific racism into 'racial hygiene'. When Lombroso's methods for identifying the criminal were used by Nazi science, scholars associated Lombroso's work with the holocaust but they did not take into consideration the fact that Lombroso was a Jew (Rafter, 2008; see also Gibson & Rafter, 2006). As Levi (1987, as cited in Rafter, 2008: 197) stressed, 'we cannot understand [what happened in Nazi Germany] but we can and must understand where it springs'.

The above mentioned works are just a small fraction of Lombroso's works when compared to the whole list of his publications found at the back of *Crime: Its Causes and Remedies*. This list stretches from 1863 to the time of his death in 1909. However, one can deduce that Lombroso's criminology was misinterpreted, simplified, ignored and even vilified. Only recently has Lombroso increasingly attracted the attention of researchers. Scholars like Rafter and Gibson (2004) and Rock (2007) recognised the fact that Lombroso's enlightened scientific contributions and penal reforms were penalised because of the lack of standardised methods of research and conditioned by the social, cultural, scientific and political context in the post-*Risorgimento*. The English translations of Lombroso's work formed, and are forming new generations of scholarship, where Lombroso is:

> … becoming a basic reference point for historians of gender, race, law and science. He is being recognized as one of the most fertile, if uncritical, thinkers in nineteenth-century Europe, and a man whose work marked a turning point in conceiving of the body as a sign of human worth (Rafter & Gibson, 2004: 3-4).

In retranslating the *Criminal Woman*, Rafter and Gibson (2004) aimed at two particular goals: to provide an adequate English translation of Lombroso's research on female criminology, and to formulate the basis of a new generation of Lombrosian scholars. In the forewords to both *Criminal Man* (Gibson & Rafter, 2006) and the *Criminal Woman* (Rafter & Gibson, 2004), these authors explained how they had experienced difficulties when they tried to find the original work written in nineteenth-century Italian and had to depend on its incorrect, incomplete and simplistic translations. Rafter and Gibson (2004: 5) deduced that 'misunderstandings of Lombroso's work are so widespread as to constitute a distinct mythology [and some researchers] ridiculed Lombroso's work as a pseudoscience; others, misled by abbreviated editions, have mistakenly assumed that Lombroso was a political reactionary'. Goring and Gould were only two of the numerous researchers that failed to explore thoroughly Lombroso's complex work as such misapprehension continued for much of the twentieth century (Rafter & Gibson, 2004).

This series of negative factors associated with Lombroso and the positivist school have remained a subject of debate and criticism in the historiography of criminology because 'the huge and diverse range of criminological work which has been carried out within an empiricist framework … has been a source of great confusion in the discipline' (Garland, 1997: 16). This discriminatory perspective baffled researchers and they consequently excluded Lombroso from their research instead of exploring it in more depth. Durkheim, Marx and Weber are just three of the names that are praised for their work in explaining the changes in post-industrial

societies while Lombroso keeps on being ridiculed (Rafter & Gibson, 2004; Lanier & Henry, 2004). Nonetheless, Lombroso served as a source of inspiration for people like Durkheim, who read Lombroso's work (Ystehede, 2013: 91). Thus, researchers need to eliminate this discrimination that is associated with Lombroso in order to start appreciating his work like they do in the case of other nineteenth- and early twentieth-century thinkers. This new way of appreciating his pioneering work has generated a revisionist wave in recent criminology literature that is enticing more researchers to translate, inquire and examine Lombroso.

Through revisionist scholarships, Lombroso's ideas became the focus of numerous recent studies. Besides several articles, one finds a list of researchers such as Rafter (1997), *Creating Born Criminals*; Gibson (2002), *Born to Crime: Cesare Lombroso and the Origins of Biological Criminology*; Wetzell (2000), *Inventing the Criminal: A History of German Criminology, 1880–1945*; Becker and Wetzell (2006), *Criminals and their scientists: the history of criminology in international perspective*; Ystehede (2008), *In the twilight of Good and Evil: Cesare Lombroso and the Criminological Imagination;* and Knepper and Ystehede (2013), *The Cesare Lombroso Handbook*. 'Between 1975 and 2000, ten books on Lombroso were published in Italian and another six in languages other than Italian and English' (Rafter & Gibson, 2004: 6). This shows a *crescendo* of international interest in Lombroso's thoughts, works and theories. New translations and exposures of past works provide future scholars with adequate tools to point out how and when Lombroso led the way in various fields, such as anthropology, law and medicine.

> While these new translations provide material for new research in criminology and the history of science, future Lombroso studies are likely to branch out in other directions as well. Lombroso was a multifaceted and exceptionally innovative thinker, and his work proves relevant to a wide range of fields (Rafter & Gibson, 2004: 6).

The present study continues to develop the more recent revisionist tradition, specifically drawing on material that was untranslated and unpublished in English. The eventual publication of the translation of *Gli Anarchici* will serve as a reference point not only for Lombrosian scholars, but also for criminologists and researchers in political violence and terrorism.

3.2 Lombroso's political context and political crime theory

Lombroso lived through drastic changes in the Italian socio-political context. The unification of Italy is a remarkable achievement of the nineteenth century. The Italian peninsula was made up of principalities, some of which were under foreign rule. The story of how Italy achieved independence is of great importance because the *Risorgimento* ('Resurrection' – the word is often applied to the whole movement that worked for Italian unification) represented the unification of these principalities into one state. There were several forces engaged in these battles and this brutally short overview is intended to outline the political forces that influenced Lombroso's life, career and research interests. Lombroso's research was triggered by the intention to distinguish the born criminal from the non-criminal, but eventually his study evolved to include the search for the political criminal and the passionate motivation that stimulated such extremist offenders.

Radical changes occurred in the Italian political context and these go back to the Napoleonic wars. Napoleon kindled the enthusiasm of many Italians with his promises of reform and freedom. This regime introduced modern ideas and improvements, such as the removal of relics of feudalism, the breaking down of church monopolies, the establishment of the enlightened French legal codes, as well as the building of roads and bridges. While this administration simplified the political arrangement of Italy, the islands of Sardinia and Sicily, protected by the British navy, remained out of reach. The mainland was divided into three parts: the Papal States, the so-called Kingdom of Italy, and the Kingdom of Naples. However, repressive police measures, taxation, conscription and the theft of works of art fuelled hostility among the inhabitants (Richards, 1977).

After the fall of Napoleon, Italy was reorganised and old political divisions reappeared. The Austrian Empire ruled Veneto and Lombardy, the province where Lombroso was born and spent his youth. After the Congress of Vienna, varied secret societies, among them the *Carbonari* (literally 'charcoal-burners'), were formed and aimed at reforming politics and ending foreign rule. The *Carbonari* were the catalyst of various revolutionary tremors in Italy. Three great names stood behind the story of Italian unification. These were Mazzini, Cavour and Garibaldi. Mazzini was a revolutionary; Cavour was a statesman; and Garibaldi was a soldier. In 1848, there were a number of revolts in Sicily, and the rebels took control of most of the island within a few days. The agitations soon spread through the rest of Italy. In 1849,

some Sicilian towns suffered intense and cruel bombardment by the King of Naples, who took advantage of the riots to restore his authority (Duggan, 2008).

This period was also marked by the exploits of the heroic Giuseppe Garibaldi. Garibaldi had a career in the navy and military experience in South America, where he learned the arts of horsemanship and guerrilla warfare. He returned to Italy in 1848 and entered the struggles against the Austrians and the French with all his enthusiasm. Meanwhile, Mazzini's ideas focused on the progress that would transition Italian society from individualism to more collective actions (Duggan, 2008: 129). Unlike Mazzini and Garibaldi, Cavour was born an aristocrat. Cavour was a great student of British affairs, hailed Catholic Emancipation, and was familiar with parliamentary practice and government. Above all, he studied economic subjects like the Poor Law, Free Trade and Railways. By 1847, Cavour helped in the founding of a newspaper in Piedmont called *Il Risorgimento*. This paper advocated constitutional government and the independence of all Italy from foreign rule (Duggan, 2008).

It was only in 1861 that a new parliament for the entire realm met at Turin and the constitutional kingdom of Italy was proclaimed. By 1870, Italy was united and free. However, there still existed disputes on areas beyond the north-eastern frontiers, mismanagement of parliamentary affairs, and problems of beggary and brigandage. Anti-ecclesiastical laws in the south and the former Papal States caused great distress. To make matters worse, the northerners tended to dominate the south and turned events according to their own interests, causing bitterness, ill-feelings and rebellion in the new state (Richards, 1977). When compared to the Paris Commune of 1871, which was a mixture of socialism and insurrections that shocked the International Working Men's Association (known as 'First International' and founded in London in 1864), Italy was less susceptible to socialism (Duggan, 2008). Illiteracy, poverty and a rural economy were the result of an immature state that was not ready to accept Marxist theories, unlike more industrialised countries. After the unification, parliamentary deputies hindered attempts to implement fair tax systems and constrained employers to act responsibly towards their workers to protect their own interests. Fiscal burdens and political resentment soon ignited anarchist agitations among the peasantry, such as in Romagna in 1874 (Duggan, 2008). In 1873, Crispi went to some mountainous parts of Basilicata and was shocked by the poverty he saw; peasants lived on a diet of beans and barley (Duggan, 2008). The fact that only some north-western regions experienced an improved quality of life, leaving the rest of Italy in poor conditions, contrasted with other countries in Europe that were experiencing industrial expansion and a slight increase in prosperity. In this context, banditry was a constant problem but the government and the academics focused

more on the backwardness and poverty of southern regions. The southern provinces were also affected by the mafia, which was brought to international attention only in 1875. Soon, it was noticed that the mafia was so integrated within society that even authority figures were somehow implicated (Duggan, 2008).

'One man who was rather more confident that he had the answer to Sicily's – and indeed humanity's – problems was a young Jewish doctor from Verona called Cesare Lombroso' (Duggan, 2008: 267). Like others, Lombroso was inspired by the *Risorgimento* to believe in secular states, individual rights and the elimination of discrimination (Rafter & Gibson, 2004). Lombroso received his degree in medicine from the University of Pavia in 1858 and that of surgery in 1859 from the University of Genoa (Rafter & Gibson, 2004; Wolfgang, 1961). Lombroso also showed interest in psychology and psychiatry and during his student days he was continuously in disagreement with theories of free will. In 1859, the results of his first research that comprised his doctoral thesis focusing on cretinism were published. In the same year, he volunteered as an army physician until 1863. The period spent in Calabria proved interesting for Lombroso because he began noting the physical measurements of soldiers and the inhabitants, as well as observing tattoos (Wolfgang, 1961). It was also in this period that Lombroso learned about poverty, illiteracy and malnutrition. Lombroso's criminal anthropology classified different sorts of criminals and deviant behaviour, categorising them among other variables, according to race and geographical origins. According to Duggan (2008: 269),

> criminal statistics only began to be collected systematically from 1879, the overwhelming impression given by the south from 1860 was of a region beset by crime, especially violent crime – banditry, kidnapping, feuding and armed robberies ... [and these were considered] a good indicator of barbarism, and barbarism of racial degeneracy.

However, political criminals always posed a different problem for Lombroso (Di Re, 1982, as cited in Ferracuti, 1996; Ferracuti & Cortellessa, 1988). Political criminals committed atrocious crimes out of their political passion and they were the 'antithesis of born criminals' (Ferracuti, 1996: 142). Lombroso also stressed that the Italian judicial system needed to move away from the classical concern of the offence and to start questioning the reasons behind the delinquent behaviour of offenders.

To support his theories on political criminals, Lombroso prolifically wrote on the historical, social and psychological background of particular cases that occurred in Europe in the nineteenth century. The existence of political criminals had not been recognised by many penologists of the nineteenth century; it was considered non-existent (Zimmern, 1891: 202).

Conjointly, Lombroso and Laschi identified the existence of such crimes and in *Il Delitto Politico* they remarked that political criminals 'have always been prosecuted' though punishment changed dramatically over time (Daly, 2002: 63). Political crime was perceived as one of the gravest crimes that attacked the governing monarchy and became a particular type of crime for which the political criminals deserved compelling treatments (Papadatos, 1954, as cited in Daly, 2002). This crime was a breach in the trust and faith people had in their monarchs, who were considered as the primary targets of such political ideology (Lombroso & Laschi, 1890). Only between the late eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, prominent intellectuals in Europe agreed that any minority group with particular political, social and religious ideas and institutions that opposed the institutions of the state did not necessarily construe a threat to society and its politics (Daly, 2002: 68).

Guizot and Bentham also studied the political criminal (Daly, 2002). Guizot argued that a political act could be perceived as legitimate since every individual has a right to express their political will and this explains how some actors were glorified for their fight against tyranny. On his part, Bentham opposed laws that banned political activities because he considered such laws as ineffective. The Napoleonic penal code of 1810 considered political crimes as among the gravest transgressions and established peculiar penalties as punishment (Daly, 2002: 66). However, through changes in mentality, there was also a change in the penal codes of continental Europe and the punishments that applied for political crimes. For instance, in 1837 in England the penalty for failing to disperse during riots was reduced from capital punishment to a sentence of transportation or imprisonment. Among the numerous legislative amendments that occurred over Europe, in 1815 England announced the principle of non-extradition of political criminals. In the 1830s, France and Belgium introduced the concept of political crime (*infraction politique*) and subsequently acknowledged a more lenient treatment for political offenders, including non-extradition (Daly, 2002: 67).

In the 1880s, European jurists discussed the definition of political crime and whether its description should be the intention of the perpetrator or the result of the actions. In synchrony with these legislative acts in the 1890s, France implemented the *lois scélérates* (villainous laws) aiming to control the freedom of the press after Auguste Vaillant used the press as a medium for his anarchist ideology. Lombroso and Laschi defined political crime as 'any violent harm caused to laws established by the majority to preserve the political, economic or social system that it desires' (Daly, 2002: 68). Daly (2002: 74) quoted Lombroso and Laschi (1892) stating:

> The harshness of punishments against political crime must depend on the local conditions. Where revolts and rebelliousness are frequent but not generally destructive, [such as in] France, such punishments should be less

> severe. In more primitive polities where people venerate the sovereign ruler, *lèse majesté* must be considered differently than in more modern, civilised countries.

In the prosecution of 'state crimes', the jury was not given permission to attend as a precaution because state crimes were considered as more dangerous than other crimes. State crimes did not always cause repulsion and dislike in society, and the courts and the authorities wanted to avoid having people sympathising with the perpetrators (Troitskii, N.A., as cited in Daly, 2002: 75). This problem was also linked to the use of courts as forums. Political defendants used their trial to broadcast their views, motivations and criticisms of governments and their administrations, aiming at winning the sympathy of the public and the judges. To avoid such situations, conservative government officials prosecuted cases of political crimes in military courts or administratively, which increased the tendency of harsher punishments (Daly, 2002: 76-77). The governments adopted this stance to avoid revolutionaries and revolutionary causes to be dignified. In *Gli Anarchici*, Lombroso (1895) produced parts of the defence speeches of Ravachol (1892) and of Émile Henry (1894).

Lombroso discussed the issues of the political criminal in numerous works. Some of these works include: *L'Uomo Delinquente* (Edition 2) (*Criminal Man*, 1878); *Delitti Vecchi e Delitti Nuovi* (1902); *Crime, its Causes and Remedies* (1912); *L'uomo di genio* (*Man of Genius*) (1894); and *Il Delitto Politico* (1890). Lombroso linked the political criminal to fanaticism, gender and age, altruism, love for innovations, minimal repentance and madness. Economic and social fanaticisms were considered as the two major catalysts of the political criminal. The passion of political criminals transmitted a desire to suffer for a 'just cause'. Lombroso indicated that women were more frequent in political crimes than in other crimes and their ages varied between eighteen and twenty-five years. Another characteristic associated with political criminals was an exaggerated sense of altruism and sensitivity to the pain of others (Lombroso, 1894). Lombroso also associated hysterics, loss of sensitivity, intense self-centredness and extreme altruism to the commission of violent deeds. Other aspects associated with the personality of the political criminal were the love of novelty in contrast with the misoneistic attitude of society, and congenital traits in children of suicidal parents that suffer from epilepsy. Lombroso noted that the great dedication of political criminals caused them fearlessness, minimal repentance and absence of regret when committing violent acts.

In *Il Delitto Politico*, Lombroso described political criminals as criminaloids, degenerates and the mentally-disordered protagonists of political disturbances. He also investigated

historical revolutions and revolts, giving a thorough etiological explanation. Nonetheless, Lombroso failed to adequately criticize the sources of information when compiling statistics of political disturbances in the ancient world, regicides that occurred in Paris, and insurgencies in Russia (Kurella, 1910). The superfluous material in the study of the aetiology and psychology of these revolutions and the anecdotal form of writings induced harsh criticism of Lombroso's methods. However, Lombroso was a pioneer in the study of the origins of the violent tendencies that are deeply rooted in human nature, such as the hatred for novelty, among other topics (Kurella, 1910; Rafter & Gibson, 2004).

Lombroso considered revolution as an expression of evolution, and portrayed it as 'the chicken that has outgrown the embryonic stage, and is ready for life in the open, breaking through the shell' (Kurella, 1910: 70). He did not consider revolutions as crimes but people's expression of development and their desire to change the governing bodies. According to Lombroso in this period there was no clear distinction between progressive movements like the socialists, and violent insurgent groups (Zimmern, 1891: 203). Similar to De Amicis and Loria, Lombroso was a famous socialist supporter from the educated middle class (Levy, 2001). Lombroso considered rebellions as the product of a limited group that could come from any social class. He also stated that rebels were influenced by climate and alcohol. The success or failure of rebellions and revolutions was determined by the perception of legitimacy or illegitimacy of the act and the milieu that surrounded the agitations, which provided fertile grounds for political criminals. Thus, it was crucial for Lombroso to show the drastic differences that existed between socialism and anarchism.

Lombroso 'boosted the prestige of socialism among the middle class [because he] differentiated between "sane" moderate socialism and "criminally inspired" anarchism' (Levy, 2002: 173). Lombroso used criminal anthropology to analyse anarchists arrested during the May Day agitations of Turin in 1891. Other socialists, including Filippo Turati, the Milanese lawyer and future leader of the Italian Socialist Party, did not agree completely with the genetic and physiognomic dimension of Lombroso's approach. Turati shared similar beliefs in modernity, socialism and industrialization but the proletariat class was not educated and motivated enough to rise against the suffered injustices. Thus socialist leaders had to become a 'superior race, mingle with the masses, animate them, incite them and help them clarify their ideas' (Monteleone, 1987: 146-7, as cited in Duggan, 2008: 359).

Socialists used public meetings, debates, conferences and lectures in various places and disseminated pamphlets and socialist newspapers to spread socialist politics. Socialism spread so rapidly among the peasantry that it mystified Turati and other socialists because 'according

to “scientific” Marxism a revolution was only supposed to take place following the breakdown of capitalism’ (Duggan, 2008: 361). Russian émigré Anna Kuliscioff, Turati’s companion, sent a letter to Frederick Engels explaining that in Italy a revolution was unthinkable because the rural population was morally and materially impoverished (Duggan, 2008: 361). Turati and Kuliscioff were very close to Lombroso and his family. In fact, Kuliscioff, who was a leading feminist, spent a lot of time with Lombroso’s family. She gave Lombroso’s daughters a copy of J. S. Mill’s *The Subjection of Women* and converted this family to socialism (Rafter & Gibson, 2004).

This element of socialism is also found in the second part of the *Il Delitto Politico* where Lombroso discussed how penal repression, the economy, unemployment and different political measures could help in dealing with political crimes and anarchism at national and international levels. Thus these recommendations intended to affect measures taken against political criminals and also to become the foundation for understanding the nature and the social aspect of political criminals. This reveals Lombroso’s socialist political orientation as one that opposed Crispi’s policies against anarchism and socialism (Duggan, 1997, as cited in Levy, 2001).

3.3 Lombroso’s political concepts in *Gli Anarchici*

Uniquely in the English language, this section presents the main concepts Lombroso discussed in the two editions of *Gli Anarchici*. In little more than a hundred pages, Lombroso managed to develop various concepts that influence, attract and motivate males and females, born criminals or not, to engage in the anarchist ideology and commit acts of extreme violence. Lombroso engaged himself in a thorough analysis of anarchism and inquired the anarchist issue by examining various factors including the founding ideologies, the political contexts that surround and affect these principles, the criminal aspects of anarchist actors, various mental illnesses that potentially influence these violent actors, the power of indoctrination, personality traits, and topographical and climatic correlations. He finally recommends potential preventive measures and counter measures. Though *Gli Anarchici* was written in Italian, Lombroso published some journal articles on anarchism around the world in other languages, among them English. Some of these short works were ‘The Physiognomy of the Anarchists’ (1890a), ‘Anarchistic Crimes and Their Causes’ (1898), ‘A Study of Luigi Luccheni: Assassin of the Empress of Austria’ (1899) and ‘Some Aspects of Crime’ (1901)

(Horton & Rich, 2004). Some of the issues raised in these articles are incorporated in the overview of *Gli Anarchici* found in this chapter.

The second edition of *Gli Anarchici*, an edited version of the first issue, included numerous amendments and additional material[12]. In the preface of the first edition (also included in the second edition) Lombroso declared that the inspiration to do that work, the *Tre Tribuni* (1887)*, Antisemitismo* (1894a), and *Il Delitto Politico* (1890) came from the political parties that divided unified Italy. Lombroso expected this work to influence the anarchists' bad intent, stopping their dagger from challenging the authorities and stopping the authorities from using capital punishment as an arbiter of justice in political cases. As from the preface of the first edition Lombroso explained that:

> The best prize that I might wish is the application of an all experimental impartiality of the psychiatric-anthropological method to the most current hot issues, that I have tried to follow here as in my other works, of which I would like to remain a reference point, high above those outrageous political concerns, that time and interest often dispersed[13] (Lombroso, 1895: 4).

In September 1894, two months after the first edition, Lombroso wrote the preface of the second edition and addressed the criticism received on the first edition. Lombroso retorted to Professor Angelo Majorana[14], who had asked 'how and why does a person, who in another time and space would be a brigand, a pirate or a good person, is now an anarchist in the worst sense of the word?'[15] (Lombroso, 1895: 6). In the first chapter, Lombroso expounded on the conditions that societies lived in, surrounded with lies and economic problems, where delirium was the only outcome. Lombroso explained how the insane and criminals existed in every era, but they used to be controlled by religion and, for example, were declared martyrs during the crusades, rather than become rebels engaged in antimonarchic factions. Since 'these altruistic fanatics, especially in the Latin races, arise because they do not find any possible channels to

[12]The two additional chapters discussed *Mattoidi* (*Mattoids*) and *Altre influenze: meteoriche, etniche, economiche* (*Other influences: meteorological, ethnicity and economic*). The appendices also included additional material on Caserio's case and the mapping of the revolutions that occurred in the European continent between 1791 and 1880 (see Appendix 2 and 2.1).

[13]*'Il miglior premio che io possa desiderare, come quello che suggellerà in modo fin troppo sperimentale l'imparzialità del metodo psichiatrico-antropologico applicato alle più ardenti questioni attuali, ch'io ho tentato seguire qui come nelle altre opere, e che vorrei restasse come un faro elevato al di sopra di quelle caduche sempre e spesso ignobilissime preoccupazioni politiche, che il tempo e gli interessi d' un tratto disperdono'.*

[14]Author of *'Teoria sociologica della costituzione politica'* (*Sociological theory of the political constitution*).

[15] *'Come e perché accade che colui il quale in alter condizioni di tempo e di spazio sarebbe stato brigante o pirata o bravo, diventa oggi anarchico, nel senso peggiore della parola?'*

express themselves in their world, they find this passage in the social and economic issues'[16] (Lombroso, 1895: 8). In the *Liberal Idea*[17], Ferrero stated 'religion recruits thousands of fanatics, who under diverse theories react feverishly to save human souls from the perdition of bad habit'[18] (Lombroso, 1895: 8). Ferrero deduced that religion provided activities and venues for purposes of recruitment. Lombroso (1895: 8) described religion as a 'lightning conductor of fanaticism'[19] as in the case of the religious and disciplined Sante Geronimo Caserio who turned into an active political fanatic. Lombroso considered London as the capital of philanthropic fanatics, where men and women from different social strata aimed at curing the social disease of misery by writing journals, delivering speeches and urging humanitarian reforms, rather than instigating political fanaticism and violence.

Anarchist factions made people believe that their radical movements were the key to overcome misery. 'If an energetic fanatic is part of this group and participates in this fight, this individual will be involved with such an intense and extraordinary passion that s/he can bring love or hate to the most extreme consequences'[20] (Lombroso, 1895: 11). Extreme behaviour occurred even in religious factions where people turned to be assassins but if an 'epileptic has a predisposition [to extreme violence], this predisposition is magnified thanks to … classical education which makes of violence the most heroic dowry'[21] (Lombroso, 1895: 11). Lombroso (1895: 13) opined that the inheritance of epilepsy and the disease of pellagra 'predisposed the brains to the most excessive tendencies raising the ordinary feelings to an exponential threshold, concentrating and polarising it in a special direction'[22]. This was an explanation of how a farmer could become a 'violent sectarian'[23]. Consequently, Lombroso stressed that punishment should be tailor-made for those involved in anarchism rather than treating them like common criminals. Lombroso (1895: 14) ridiculed the journalists that simplified this study and accused the positivists of 'declaring all anarchists epileptics'[24].

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[16] *'Questi altruisti fanatici sorgono, specie nella razza latina, non trovano altro sfogo possibile, nel mondo, ben s'intende, normale, che quello sociale od economico'.*

[17] *Idea Liberale.*

[18] *'La religione recluta migliaia di fanatici, che sotto i nomi e le teorie più diverse si agitano febbrilmente per salvare le anime umane dalla perdizione del vizio'.*

[19] *'La religione non può che molto meno essere un parafulmine del fanatismo'.*

[20] *'Se un fanatico energico prende parte e si mescola a questa lotta, egli fatalmente vi si appassiona con una intensita straordinaria ed ha il coraggio di portare il suo odio e il suo amore fino alle conseguenze più estreme'.*

[21] *'S'ingigantisce in un epilettico ed anche in un predisposto, grazie all'educazione classica nostra che ci fa della violenza la dote più eroica, virtuosa'.*

[22] *'Predispongono il cervello alle tendenze più eccessive, innalzano, direi, l'esponente del sentimento ordinario, concentrandolo, polarizzandolo in una speciale direzione'.*

[23] '*Violento settario'.*

[24] *'Che noi in questo libro dichiariamo epilettici tutti gli anarchici'.*

Before Lombroso (1895: 15) discussed any aspect of the anarchists, he reflected on the situation and causes of anarchy[25] encapsulating the social, historical and political issues leading to decadence and the consequential rise of this anarchist wave with the natural science dictum *multa renascentur quae jam caeciderunt* (sic)[26]. The socio-politico-economic situation and legislation favoured the privileged classes who ignored the poverty problems of the majority of the population. Anarchists were not poor people but they wanted to voice the protests of the poor. Lombroso (1895) found that in Paris anarchist actors occupied various employments, such as journalists, printers, and proof readers, all carrying out propaganda. Anarchist sympathisers worked as tailors, shoemakers, labourers in food factories, cabinet makers, barbers, mechanics, masons, and also professions like architects and stock brokers.

Lombroso opined that violence was so much ingrained in culture that it was praised and glorified in history. For example, clerics praised the stabbings of Ravaillac, the conservatives eulogized the mass shooting of the communards, while the republicans lauded the bombings of Orsini. Thus, it is normal that violence emerged from time to time, since society was imbibed in it and considered it 'sacred'. Inspired by Machiavelli, Lombroso stressed that dishonesty and profiteering were the seeds of destruction in the Italian Government. He also criticized the authorities that use brutal measures against anarchists because 'violence is always immoral, even when it is directed to counter violence'[27] (Lombroso, 1895: 23).

While condemning the anarchists' brutal *modus operandi* Lombroso analysed some of the anarchist ideas. The despotism in unified Italy set the context for protests against the government as explained by anarchist theoreticians Merlino and Kropotkin. Violence was the outcry of poverty and frustration against the government that wanted to control and deter protest using brutal force. In these circumstances, Lombroso (1895: 27) deduced that 'a police force that has no crimes to investigate and no criminals to arrest will invent crimes and criminals, or the police will cease to exist'[28]. On parallel thoughts, Durkheim (1964: 100) stated that in a 'society of saints' where there would be no form of crime:

> [F]aults which appear venial to the layman will create there the same scandal that the ordinary offense does in ordinary consciousness. If, then, this society has the power to judge and punish, it will define these acts as criminal and will treat them as such.

[25] *Posizione e cause dell'anarchia* - Chapter 1, of Lombroso, C., (1895)*, Gli Anarchici: seconda edizione con aggiunte*, Torino: Bocca.

[26] This Latin phrase was expressed by Horace (65-8 B.C.), a famous Roman poet, and it can be translated as follows: '*many that have fallen into decadence or were slain will be reborn'.*

[27] *'La violenza è sempre immorale, anche quando è rivolta a respingere la violenza'.*

[28] *'Una polizia dove non ci sieno delitti da scoprire e delinquenti da arrestare, provocherà, inventerà i delitti ed i delinquenti, o cesserà di esistere'.*

The government controlled intelligence and free-will by making people believe that they lived thanks to such restrains. Consequently people were taught to fear change. Workers believed that they could not live without their masters, and that revolutions against the government and the prevailing classes jeopardised their existence. The most comprehensible ideological theories of anarchists concluded that 'all extrinsic impediments imposed by society or intrinsic moral hurdles should be considered fictitious and the cause of our unhappiness and sorrow'[29] (Lombroso, 1895: 30).

Only a few anarchist ideologies aimed at attainable objectives, since their aspiration was to create a kind of utopia. Among the anarchist ideas that offered unattainable goals, Lombroso (1895: 32) presented Kropotkin's principles that 'people should be left free to organise themselves jumping on a heap, like a pack of wolves over a prey'[30] as this led to crime. Such detachment from reality led Lombroso to consider some anarchist ideologies inapplicable. Lombroso stressed that social reforms should take place gradually so that previous work would not be destroyed and would not induce misoneism, that is, fear and hatred of what is new or what will bring change. Violence against the *status quo* is perceived as a crime because it hurts the 'collective conscience or representation' (Durkheim, 1964). A political crime constitutes 'any violent act that breaks the right to maintain and respect the political, social and economic organization, which is sought by the majority'[31] (Lombroso, 1890: 435).

In a chapter[32] that discusses neophelia, Lombroso (1895: 33) stated, 'misoneism rules over everyone and everywhere, in customs and in religion, in morality and science, in art and politics.'[33] Even geniuses that fight for their ideas resist change. Echoing English sociologist Spencer, Lombroso stated that any progress is an obstacle for progress to overcome and some actors resort to aggressive means to impose their revolutionary reforms. However, this perspective varies according to who the actor of the violent attack is. When an antisocial act is done by the minority it is a crime but when the majority of the people approve it, these actions

[29] *'Tutti i freni estrinseci o sociali, intrinseci o morali, sono fittizi, e devono essere considerati come la causa della infelicità e tristizia umana'.*
[30] *'Lasciare al popolo libertà di fare le divisioni di quanto gli occorre, di gettarsi sul mucchio, così come un branco di lupi sulla preda'.*
[31] *'Ogni lesione violenta del diritto costituito della maggioranza, al mantenimento e al rispetto dell'organizzazione politica, sociale, economica, da essa volute'.*
[32] *Neofilia – Chapter 9* of Lombroso, C., (1895)*, Gli Anarchici: seconda edizione con aggiunte*, Torino: Bocca.
[33] *'Il misoneismo impera su tutti e dovunque, nei costumi e nella religione, nella morale e nella scienza, nell'arte e nella politica'.*

become normal[34] (Lombroso, 1895: 34). Political crimes and insurgencies become unpopular when innocent victims suffer, and consequently new recruits are repelled from joining their 'just cause'. Conversely a gradual revolutionary movement led by a mastermind guarantees success; Lombroso (1895: 35) stated that 'revolution is the historical expression of evolution'[35]. This evolution through revolution was considered a natural process for humankind, like the turbulent and inevitable period of adolescence.

The second chapter of *Gli Anarchici* discusses the criminal traits in anarchists that are reflected in physiognomy, jargon, tattoos and lyrics. These traits were similar to those mentioned in *L'Uomo Delinquente*. Lombroso speculated that some anarchists were criminals or lunatics, or sometimes both, though Ibsen, Reclus and Kropotkin were exceptions. Lombroso indicated that the physiognomy of the revolutionaries Corday, Mirabeau, Cavour and the nihilists Ossinski and Michailoff[36] was normal and sometimes even more beautiful than the normal type. Lombroso (1895: 37) stated that anarchists of the criminal type were also marked by certain physical features. He sustained this argument by quoting Spingardi, an esteemed lawyer and judge, who stated 'I never saw an anarchist who was not debilitated or lame or hunchback or without an asymmetric face'[37]. Moreover, Lombroso presented the ratio of criminal actors in anarchist and revolutionary groups around the world, and showed that the presence of born criminals in these groups is quite low. The percentages of criminal actors in anarchist groups were as follows: 31% of the 41 anarchists in Paris; 40% of the 43 anarchists in Chicago; and 34% of the 100 anarchists in Turin. Of 320 revolutionaries, the criminal type was reduced to 0.57% less than the normal (2%) and 6.7% of the Russian nihilists (Lombroso, 1895: 37-38). Similar to other instances, Lombroso did not specify the methodology used to derive these percentages.

In the article 'The Physiognomy of the Anarchists', Lombroso (1890a) highlighted differences between the political criminal and the born criminal and with reference to *Il Delitto Politico*, he indicated that founders and leaders of revolutionary movements had great scientific intellect that 'brings about a true progress in humanity', such as Garibaldi, Mazzini and Pisacane (Lombroso, 1890a: 25). Though the violent and hereditary traits of 'the anarchists of Turin and of Chicago ... [showed] the criminal type' (Lombroso, 1890a: 28), anarchists were

[34] *'Prima perchè un atto sia antisociale, vale a dire un delitto, è ch'esso sia l'opera d'una minoranza. Quando la maggioranza lo approva esso diviene un'azione normale'.*
[35] *'La rivoluzione è l'espressione storica dell'evoluzione'.*
[36] It is important to note that the names are copied exactly from the book and reflect the names as they were spelt in Italian of the late nineteenth century. This does not exclude the possibility that some names are misspelt.
[37] *'Per me non ho mai visto un anarchico che non fosse segnato o zoppo, o gobbo, con faccia asimmetrica'.*

not common criminals and Lombroso (1890a: 30) referred to them as 'innovators [and] apostles of progress' that were overwhelmed by misery and rebellion. Lombroso considered these extreme political actors as more valuable than law-abiding men as they examined and questioned the governing system and its weaknesses and they contributed to improving it.

Lombroso (1895: 38) also examined the jargon and the lyrics of songs used by anarchists that included words like *copain* instead of *compagnons* (comrade) as well as tattoos of skulls and crossed bones on anarchist actors in London. Lombroso (1895: 42) considered Ravachol[38] and Pini 'the most comprehensive type of a born criminal'[39] because of their lack of moral sense, facial characteristics, pleasure in evil-doings, and hatred of the family and human life. Ravachol was a case of degeneration that indicated a morbid inheritance from his grandfather Koenigstein and his great-grandfather who were hanged for arson and brigandage. Pini did not boast about being an anarchist though at thirty-seven years of age, he became one of the anarchist leaders in Paris and considered stealing from the bourgeoisie 'a legitimate expropriation of the expropriated'[40] (Lombroso, 1895: 44). However, these criminal acts marked changes in politics, as happened in different epochs. For instance, the Clephts (thieves in peace time) helped Greece to obtain independence, and in Sicily, the mafia joined Garibaldi (Lombroso, 1895).

Apart from physiognomic anomalies, Lombroso studied mental anomalies like congenital *epilepsy*[41] and *political hysteria*[42], insanity[43], mattoids[44] and indirect suicides[45] in anarchist actors. Vanity, religiosity, hallucinations, megalomania and intermittent geniality were traits of an innovative person. For instance, he believed that Muhammad and Felico[46] (Felix) exhibited some of these traits (Lombroso, 1895: 48). Gori (a lawyer) referred to some anarchists as the

[38] The real name of Ravachol was François Claudius Koenigstein but he adopted the name of his mother (Marie Ravachol) after the father abandoned the family when he was only eight years, (Retrieved from http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/ravachol/biography.htm, accessed on 8th August, 2011).
[39] '*Il tipo più completo del criminale-nato'.*
[40] '*Espropriazione legittima degli espropriati'.*
[41] *Epilessia ed isteria,* Chapter 3, of Lombroso, C., (1895)*, Gli Anarchici: seconda edizione con aggiunte*, Torino: Bocca.
[42] 'Epilepsy' and 'political hysteria' were italicised in the original text (Lombroso, 1895:48). The meanings of these words do not necessarily reflect the contemporary meanings found in dictionaries and medical literature. These terms were the closest translation of terms used by Lombroso when identifying the traits of the anarchists he examined. These issues were examined in more detail in *L'Uomo Delinquente*, Vol. II, Part I and *Il Delitto Politico*, Part III.
[43] *Pazzi*, Chapter 4*,* of Lombroso, C., (1895), *Gli Anarchici: seconda edizione con aggiunte*, Torino: Bocca.
[44] *Mattoidi,* Chapter 5, of Lombroso, C., (1895)*, Gli Anarchici: seconda edizione con aggiunte*, Torino: Bocca.
[45] *Suicidi indiretti,* Chapter 6, of Lombroso, C., (1895)*, Gli Anarchici: seconda edizione con aggiunte*, Torino: Bocca.
[46] Felico was a member of a group of anarchists in Naples. He was charged with twelve counts of attempted murder, strike, defamation, and epilepsy.

bisognisti[47] (the 'needists'). The *bisognisti* were anarchists that felt the 'need' to steal or kill and claimed their actions as legitimate or that 'had to be done'. According to Lombroso, Caserio (discussed below) was a *bisognista* like the Spanish anarchist Santiago Salvador who killed twenty people with a bomb and stated 'I was dominated by a force that drove me with a desire that I could not repress'[48] (Lombroso, 1895: 54).

Auguste Vaillant was a hysteric and was 'a true fanatic enthusiast'[49] (Lombroso, 1895: 53) without any physiognomic features that recalled the born criminal. According to Lombroso, fanaticism was the product of degenerate parents, unhappiness caused by social issues, poverty and poor education. Valliant's anarchist personality was the combined result of education provided by priests and fanatic socialists, together with vanity and exaggerated altruism. Vaillant stated (in French) 'society forced me to do it. I found myself in a miserable state. I was hungry. I regret only one thing: my mockery. But it doesn't matter, I am happy, it is good I'll go under the guillotine; I will start again in about eight days'[50] (Lombroso, 1895: 53). In this case, Lombroso (1895: 123) showed how important the press was for anarchists like Vaillant and described the press as 'the Proteus of modern life'[51]. Vaillant attacked the French Chamber of Deputies in 1893 by planting a bomb to avenge the execution of Ravachol. He took photos of himself in front of the building before the explosion and distributed these photos to the journals to be published. After this event, the French authorities issued the *lois scélérates* restricting freedom of the press in order to foil the anarchist 'propaganda by deed' strategy. However, Vaillant's execution instigated the subsequent actions of Émile Henry and Caserio.

Mattoids[52] emerged during revolutions and insurgencies. According to Lombroso, mattoids did not have any physiognomic or intelligence anomalies but were remarkably cunning and possessed various abilities. They had the potential to become doctors, congressmen or teachers and were prolific writers with exaggerated ideas. For instance, Passanante was a cook that became a lawmaker and his writings filled reams of paper for publications in anarchists' manuscripts and journals. Mattoids 'expressed less evil and minor energies when compared to those committed by born criminals, as they lacked completely the

[47] The word *bisognisti* is derived from the word *bisogno* that means 'need' or 'necessity'. For the purpose of this research this word will be used in its original Italian form. The closest translation would be the 'needists'.
[48] '*Spinto da una forza che mi dominava, per un desiderio elle non potei reprimere*'.
[49] '*Un vero fanatico appassionato*'.
[50] '*La société m'a forcé à le faire. J'étais dans une situation misérable. J'avais faim. Je ne regrette qu'une chose: ma gausse. Mais c'est égal, je suis content, et on fera bien de me guillotiner; je recommencerais dans huit jours*'.
[51] '*La stampa è oggi il vero Proteo della vita moderna*'.
[52] This chapter on mattoids was added in the second edition of *Gli Anarchici*, 1895.

practice and the evil shrewdness'[53] (Lombroso, 1895: 61). Their acts were committed in public without premeditation, alibi or accomplices. Their methods of attack were non-lethal, as they used kitchen knives, stones or boxes with harmless liquids rather than explosives. The most important factor was that their actions were prominently reported in newspapers. Mattoids had a moral sense but did not feel guilty for their actions and believed they were helping humankind.

Figure 3.1: Photo of a man attempting suicide

Note. Adapted from *Gli Anarchici*, (p. 68), by C. Lombroso, 1895, Torino: Bocca.

While examining regicides and attempted assassinations of heads of states, which were punished by capital punishment, Lombroso theorized that the actors became assassins because they did not have the courage to commit suicide, which was actually their real intention. This theory of 'indirect suicide' echoed the theories of Maudsley, Esquirol and Krafft-Ebing concerning the case of Karl Nobiling. In 1878, Nobiling shot the emperor and then tried to commit suicide with the same weapon. Similarly, Frattini threw a bomb in a square injuring a number of people to protest against the feudal *status quo*. In court, Frattini stated 'indeed take my life (sic) it would be the greatest benefit for me'[54] (Lombroso, 1895: 67). On indirect suicide, Lombroso included the research of the queen of Romania, Carmen Sylva, who investigated the latent suicide issue in political assassinations. Sylva described the case of a thirty-year-old man who attempted to kill the king by shooting from the street at the lit windows. During the search of his room, photographs of him armed like a bandit, and another photo [see Figure 3.1] showing him in the act of committing suicide while being stopped by his

[53] '*Vi spiegano minore crudeltà e minore energia dei rei-nati, mancando completamente in loro la pratica e l'astuzia nel male'.*

[54] '*Che anzi togliermi questa (sic) sarebbe il più gran benefizio che farmi si potesse'.*

lover were found. Lombroso also associated crimes of passion with violent anarchist actions. This violence emerged from fanatical political and economic ideals and social turmoil.

Political actors that sustain radical beliefs in their cause and ideologies could find martyrdom alluring. Interpreting the French philosopher Rénan, Lombroso showed that suffering for a cause can make people consider martyrdom as a way to realise their beliefs. 'Though years have passed [from The Bab's martyrdom in Persia] one can notice that feelings of admiration and horror are still attached to these mishaps when people speak of it'[55] in Tehran[56] (Lombroso, 1895: 73). Crimes of passion make actors so strong that they become fearless of torture and execution. Moreover, Lombroso (1895: 74) indicated that hereditary neurosis[57] facilitated this escalation of fanaticism and passion for ideals.

Lombroso considered the case of Sante Geronimo Caserio as a unique case in *Gli Anarchici*. Caserio was brought up in a region where people suffered from pellagra[58] and the 'standard of living was worse than that of Roman slaves'[59] (Lombroso, 1895: 78). Caserio was a gentle person with a beautifully shaped skull and body and he never had any criminal tendencies, apart from those vented by politics and his 'dream was to enter the seminary and become a priest … [and] he would be angry if his friends stole an apple from the fields'[60] (Lombroso, 1895: 76). Caserio was interested in reading and debating rather than alcohol, women or gambling. The vocation towards anarchism grew after Caserio 'received the germs of anarchism'[61] from a workmate (Lombroso, 1895: 76). Caserio became a fervent reader of books and papers on anarchy and promulgated anarchist teachings among the rough peasantry. Caserio was arrested for distributing anarchist leaflets and in court he admitted being active in anarchism.

Caserio's extreme fanaticism moved from religion onto politics. Lombroso also compared Caserio's behaviour as reported in the newspapers with the conduct of the prisoners he studied in the *Prison Palimpsests* (Lombroso, 1888). Contrary to born criminals' indifference to the pain of others and their own, Caserio wanted to avoid his execution and

[55] '*Quando il discorso, oggidì ancora, cade su quel fatto, si può giudicare dall' ammirazione mista ad orrore che la folla provò e che gli anni non hanno scemata'.*

[56] The martyrdom of the Bab took place at noon on Sunday, the twenty-eighth of Sha'ban, in the year 1266 A.H., July 9, 1850 A.D., retrieved from: http://bahai-library.com/books/dawnbreakers/chapters/23.html (accessed on 3rd August, 2011)(see also Momen, 2005; Mottahedeh, 1998).

[57] '*Nevrosi ereditaria'.*

[58] Pellagra is a disease resulting from malnutrition, indicating poverty.

[59] '*Dove il proletario è in peggior condizione degli schiavi romani'.*

[60] '*Sognava d'entrare ín seminario e diventare un prete, un apostolo. S'irritava coi compagni se rubavano anche una mela pei campi*'.

[61] '*I germi dell'anarchismo li ricevesse'.*

trembled and cried like anyone facing a premature death. Yet Caserio's ideology was strong enough to help him overcome fear and he did not confess, repent or mention any accomplices. Lombroso methodically examined Caserio's handwriting in a letter[62] written to his mother after he had been sentenced to death. Lombroso deduced that Caserio was not a proud person and showed affection towards his family, especially his mother. In a few lines Caserio declared that he had adopted the anarchist ideology and assassinated the French president because he was tired of living in a world where people could not find work and where children and peasants died of hunger and pellagra while the elite lived in luxury.

The circumstances surrounding Caserio's case led Lombroso to query whether the punishment given to political criminals fitted the actions committed. The intensity of the punishment for a political crime varied according to the context and Caserio's assassination of the French President was considered an outrageous act that deserved capital punishment. Lombroso disagreed with Caserio's death sentence because as a religious fanatic, circumstances had lured him into extreme anarchism. Lombroso believed that Caserio could have been rehabilitated, that his ideology could have been remoulded in a different way, and that his punishment was less justified than that of Pini and Ravachol. Lombroso (1895: 79) compared Caserio's indoctrination and transformation into a fanatic extremist and assassin to the indoctrination of the Nizari Isma'ilis, called 'assassins' by the crusaders. The assassins were devoted followers of the Old Man of the Mountain (Daftary, 2008) that 'rushed with an overwhelming momentum to obtain the perceived goal without thinking of the probable obstacles'[63] (Lombroso, 1895: 79).

Contrary to the selfishness of the ordinary born criminal (*delinquente nato*) the anarchist political criminal showed exaggerated altruism (Lombroso, 1895). Vaillant, Henry, Caserio, Palla, Stepniak[64] and Hamon were some of the personalities Lombroso mentioned as examples of exaggerated altruism and morbid sensitivity to the troubles of others. Following the announcement of their executions, anarchist actors delivered their last defence speech.

[62] Caserio's letter to his mother: *Lione, 3 agosto 1894, «Cara madre, Vi scrivo queste poche righe per farvi sapere la mia condanna è la pena di morte. Non pensate (s'intende: non pensate male) o mia cara madre di me? Ma pensate che se io corressi questo fatto non è che sono divenuto (s'intende: un birbante) e pure molto vi dirano che sono un assassino un malfattore.*
'No perchè voi conosciete il mio buon quore, la mia dolcezza che avevo quando mi trovavo presso di voi? Ebbene anche oggi è il medesimo quore: se ò comesso questo mio fatto è precisamente perchè ero stanco di vedere un Mondo così infame' (Lombroso, 1895: 141).

[63] '*Assassini del Vecchio della Montagna Sira, agli ipnotici sotto la suggestione monoideizzante che corrono alla meta loro indetta con slancio irresistibile non pensando ad ostacoli di sorta'.*

[64] Sergius Michaelovitch Kravchinski, known in nineteenth century London revolutionary circles as Stepniak or Sergius Stepniak. He killed the chief of the Russian secret police with a dagger in the streets of St Petersburg in 1878.

Lombroso analysed some of these speeches and concluded that these were the product of pure enthusiasm and fanaticism and made the most ignorant and uneducated man an orator, as in the case of Ravachol.

Ravachol justified his criminal acts and revealed his born-criminal traits in his political passion. On the contrary, Henry (1894) recognised his responsibility in the bombings. Henry (1894; Lombroso, 1895: 92) explained, 'I was told that life was easy and that it was wide open to those who were intelligent and energetic'[65] but reality disproved this belief. Inequalities in social institutions and social misery drew Henry first to socialism and subsequently to anarchism and 'the voice of dynamite' (Henry, 1894). Authorities considered anarchism 'a ferocious animal that had to be exterminated'[66] (Lombroso, 1895: 93) but it was difficult to destroy anarchy because it 'was born in the heart of a rotting and deteriorating society'[67] (Henry, 1892; Lombroso, 1895: 94).

Table 3.1: Correlating seasons, the number of revolts and different eras

	Evo antico	Evo medio	Evo moderno America	Evo moderno Europa (2)
Primavera . .	31	14	76	142
Estate	44	28	92	167
Autunno . . .	20	18	54	94
Inverno . . .	20	16	61	92

(1) Vedi *Il delitto politico e le rivoluzioni*, di Lombroso e Laschi, Parte I, 1890.

(2)	Spagna	Italia	Portogallo	Turchia d'Europa	Grecia	Francia	Belgio e Paesi Bassi	Svizzera	Bosnia, Erz., Serbia e Bulg.	Irlanda	Inghilterra e Scozia	Germania	Austria-Ungheria	Svezia, Norv. e Danimarca	Polonia	Russia d'Europa
Primavera	23	27	7	9	6	16	7	6	**7**	**6**	5	7	3	**4**	**6**	**3**
Estate	**38**	**29**	**12**	**11**	**7**	**20**	**8**	5	3	3	**9**	**11**	6	**4**	1	0
Autunno	18	14	4	5	3	15	6	3	1	3	5	4	**7**	2	2	2
Inverno	20	18	6	3	3	10	2	**10**	4	3	4	3	2	2	1	1

Note. Adapted from *Gli Anarchici*, (p. 104), by C. Lombroso, 1895, Torino: Bocca, and from *Il Delitto Politico*, (p. 49), by C. Lombroso and R. Laschi, 1890, Torino: Bocca.

The ingredients that sustained violent anarchist actions were vengeance, injustices, classical education that appraised bloodthirsty political assassins, and religious and political fanaticism. 'The more bizarre and absurd an idea is, the more mad, mattoids and hysterics drag behind it'[68] (Lombroso, 1895: 98). Political criminals killed in pursuit of their just cause or

[65] '*Mi si era detto che la vita era facile e largamente aperta alle intelligenze ed alle energie'.*
[66] '*L'anarchico non era più un uomo, era una bestia feroce alla quale si dava la caccia da ogni parte e della quale la stampa borghese, vile schiava della forza, domandava in tutti i toni lo sterminio'.*
[67] '*Essa è nata nel seno di una società putrescente e che si sfascia'.*
[68] '*Quanto più strana e assurda è un'idea, tanto più trascina dietro a sè matti, mattoidi e isterici'.*

ideology, demanding vengeance every time the *lex talionis* was applied against them. Considering the mental instability of political criminals, Lombroso advised the authorities to evaluate these issues when creating new policies to deal with anarchist terrorism.

Regarding the elaborate work of *Il Delitto Politico*, Lombroso correlated past revolts to meteorological, geographical, ethnical and economic matters. For instance, from this data Lombroso deduced that the number of revolts and related crimes was higher in hot seasons especially in July, particularly in southern countries (see Table 3.1 or Appendix 1 for more detail). Lombroso mapped out and correlated the geographical and climatic influences with the riots in Europe between 1791 and 1880 (see Appendix 2). In this inquiry, Lombroso split Italy into three regions (*media, meridionale e insulare*[69]) and found that southern Italy had almost five times more revolutions than the north (see Appendix 2.1). Lombroso also pointed out difficulties in collecting data from Switzerland and Ireland[70].

Lombroso theorised that topographical tendencies determined the reasons why people meet in particular places and their mentalities. Lombroso traced examples of topographical tendencies of people living in mountainous regions, like the Tibetans and the Afghan Yusuf, who are more inclined to be rebellious and progressive than others. Other geographical features, for instance valleys, make populations converge in the same place, creating a concoction of different moral, political and industrial needs. Such mixtures of ethnic groups created niches for innovative, revolutionary and liberal ideologies that fuelled revolts.

Apart from socio-evolutionary aspects, Lombroso observed governments' bad administration. Citing Machiavelli and Franklin, Lombroso explained how government mismanagement was another factor that led to violent political actions. Machiavelli stressed that 'a government causes revolts and revolutions when it neglects the public welfare and persecutes the honest people. Persecutions transmute ideas into feelings'[71] (Lombroso, 1895: 111). Franklin's rules explained how a great empire may be reduced to a small one[72] and described how government mismanagement brought seditions in America (Lombroso, 1895: 111). Lombroso stressed that political reforms reduced the number of riots by fulfilling people's aspirations and desires. In *Tre Tribuni* (1887) and *Troppo Presto* (1888), Lombroso

[69] Middle, southern and insular.
[70] Switzerland was going through changes in the constitutions and was evolving from aristocracy to democracy while in Ireland the socio-political conditions were so dire that the only way out for the people was emigration or suicide (Lombroso, 1895: 106).
[71] '*Un Governo, in cui il benessere pubblico sia negletto e gli onesti perseguitati, è causa di rivolte e di rivoluzioni. Le persecuzioni vi mutano le idee in sentimenti*'.
[72] *'Regole per fare di un grande impero uno piccolo'.*

explained how the unification of Italy marked undeniable progress but did not affect the customs of the different Italian regions.

Following his exploration of the various elements that influence and lure a person to adopt an anarchist ideology, Lombroso drew a number of preventive policies that recommended an enhanced control of anarchist terrorists. Vigorous violent reactions against anarchists were ineffective and caused further repercussions. So he suggested that anarchists should be cured in asylums, rather than imprisoned or given the death sentence. Capital punishment was 'rendering a service'[73] to actors that intended indirect suicide and increased the praise of violent actors rather than 'smothering the idea of martyrdom'[74] (Lombroso, 1895: 114). Advocating examples from neighbouring countries, Lombroso described how extreme provisions against anarchists in Spain and France resulted in an increase in attacks and created more fanaticism and a stronger attraction towards martyrdom. Anarchist actors like Ravachol and Vaillant were portrayed as gods or demigods inspiring hymns like *La Ravachole* and their deaths lured more sympathisers. Lombroso (1895: 116) called this phenomenon 'anarchist hydra'[75] because when heads are cut, new ones emerge, as similarly explained by more recent researchers (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001). Alternatively, England and Switzerland hampered these extremist factions without extravagant damage by repudiating violent penalties against political criminals. Lombroso (1895: 116) also highlighted a purification process among the anarchist recruits where *'*anarchy used to recruit its heroes among prison candidates, but later heroes were recruited among honest individuals'[76]. This explained the transition from the criminal type of recruit like Ravachol, to more law-abiding militants like Caserio.

Changes in the type of recruits resulted in changes in the *modus operandi*. The anonymous commission of a crime changed into the bartering of the actor's life with that of the target. Lombroso brought the examples of Ravachol who placed the bombs but left enough time to flee, and compared it with Vaillant and Henry who did not attempt to escape or prevent being identified. Lombroso believed these changes were a natural process of the continuous persecution of anarchism. The rationale of this hypothesis was that when politics are in conflict with personal morality people react violently and born criminals are among the first to react because honest individuals are reluctant to react with such ferociousness.

[73] '*Non facciamo che rendere un servizio ai nostri nemici'.*
[74] '*E poi, un'idea non si soffoca colla morte dei suoi autori: spesso essa vi guadagna, anzi, coll'aureola del martirio; mentre se è sterile cadrebbe egualmente'.*
[75] '*Idra anarchica'.*
[76]'*Tutti i Governi d'Europa, si trovano innanzi a questo risultato meraviglioso e consolante davvero: che mentre prima l'anarchia reclutava i suoi eroi tra i candidati alla galera, ora li trova tra gli individui onesti'.*

Lombroso (1895) pointed out that extreme reactions by authorities that were aimed at the extermination of every anarchist actor and publication vented more rage. This explanation justified the attempts to assassinate Italian Prime Minister Francesco Crispi, who permitted the employment of violent methods. On the contrary politicians that avoided violent and despotic methods like Depretis, Cavour and Gladstone were never targeted (Lombroso, 1895). The government is a powerful, rich and educated institution that should set an example of calm and reasonable decision-making. Employing the guillotine against extremist actors created martyrs and urged the spirit of struggle, creating a vicious cycle of violence where the government blamed the anarchists and the anarchists blamed the government and the upper classes.

These studies on the distinctive traits and contexts surrounding the political criminal made Lombroso propose punishments that fit the circumstances of every individual case. He proposed that every punishment had to vary according to the seriousness of the crime committed. He considered a lower penalty for minors, people under the influence of alcohol and those who regretted their revolt or attack. With reference to *Il Delitto Politico*, Lombroso (1890: 459) proposed pertinent punishments for twelve distinct eventualities related to political crimes, such as (1) murder or serious injury of the head of state of Italy or any other country; (2) treason and espionage; (3) formation of insurgent armed gangs against the government; (4) criminal or conspiratorial acts against the political, social or religious structures of the State; (5) slight injury to a head of State; (6) participation in insurrections or armed revolts that did not instigate attack; (7) revelation of state secrets; (8) insults to the King and parliamentarians through the press; and (9) offences against religion. The last three recommendations required legal amendments intended to (10) authorize strike actions if these were unarmed; (11) punish parliamentary deputies that commit common crimes like other citizens; and (12) punish political crimes that attacked the freedom to vote. The list of punishments for these particular circumstances included deportation, exile, imprisonment and imprisonment with solitary confinement. He also recommended that offenders that were public officers had to be suspended from their office and given pecuniary penalties. In *Gli Anarchici*, Lombroso specified that the punishment of political criminals should be temporary and revocable every five years after a parliamentary vote and changes in public opinion. Thus, these provisions did not apply to insane and born criminals.

Positivists opposed trials by jury in case of common crimes but favoured this provision in political crimes because the jury represented the general public. According to Lombroso (1895), anarchists did not have a hub to target. This made it more difficult for policymakers to

create appropriate international laws, and for the police to arrest dangerous political actors. Government administration varied in every country and countries that enforced milder laws and enjoyed a good administration were less likely to be targeted by anarchists. Such countries avoided associations with countries that implemented draconian laws to avoid risks of political insurgencies. These so-called 'superior civilizations or societies'[77] (Lombroso, 1895: 123) managed to control violence without engaging in violent tactics. The Gladstone administration set a good example of how the English government healed ethnic, social and economic wounds by trusting the people's moral strength, avoiding the use of aggressive methods to suppress hostilities. Lombroso acknowledged that this example of government administration should be reflected in all Europe. Lombroso (1895: 121) also encouraged collaboration among different countries to hinder anarchism through non-violent methods such as taking photographs of militants; reporting the whereabouts of dangerous persons; sending anarchist epileptics and mattoids into asylums; and using transportation to isolate the most dangerous individuals[78].

Lombroso aspired to cure the malaise of anarchism from its roots and to control the facilitators that created a fertile ground for this ideology. Thus, Lombroso held that the parts of classical education that promoted violence should be replaced with science and languages. Decentralization of property, wealth and power were necessary to eradicate political, religious and economic fanaticism and the consequent violent actions. Lombroso (1895: 129) believed that socialism constituted the key to defeat anarchy, even though numerous politicians speculated that socialism was an ally of anarchism[79]. Lombroso stressed how the anarchist press ferociously attacked socialism and that anarchy disappeared from Germany, Austria and England after the spread of socialism. This socialist rationale was based on positivist studies of society and history showed that this phenomenon was created by the economic system and not by the elite classes. Solutions would be achieved through gradual changes in the system and modifying the constitution without the use of bombs and daggers (Lombroso, 1895).

[77] '*La civiltà e le società superiori saranno quelle che sapranno reprimere la violenza senza opporre loro la violenza*'.

[78] '*Tutti però potrebbero accordarsi in alcune misure di polizia comune, non violenti. Tale sarebbe la fotografia generale di tutti gli addetti all'anarchia militante, l'obbligo internazionale di denunciare i traslochi delle persone più pericolose, l'invio ai manicomi di tutti gli epilettici monomani e mattoidi infetti d'anarchismo — misura molto più seria che non si crederebbe sulle prime — la sequestrazione perpetua degli individui più pericolosi, appena abbiano commesso un grave delitto comune'*.

[79] '*Il socialismo si crede dai politici balordi (e nón son pochi) il fido alleato dell'anarchia ne è invece il più grande nemico ed il miglior preventivo'*.

3.4 Significance of Lombroso's work on anarchists

In the book *Gli Anarchici* Lombroso presented various aspects of the anarchist, the political criminal and the different social, political, economic and religious contexts that could attract a person to engage in atrocious actions in persuit of an ideology. This section presents a succinct overview of the various sources he used in researching and creating this work and whether the policies recommended in *Gli Anarchici* had any effect on politics and anarchism. Similar to other works in Lombroso's repertoire, the methods of research used in *Gli Anarchici* is varied. Data was gathered from various sources and this could question their reliability. However, this discussion aims to look at the significance of Lombroso's research and his recommended preventions to mitigate anarchist terrorism.

Lombroso's inventory of sources for data collection also included a number of his past works, studies and publications by other researchers, anarchist speeches, newspapers and historical documents, among others. In *Gli Anarchici* Lombroso mentioned a number of his own works and these included different parts of *Il Delitto Politico* (1890), *L'Uomo Delinquente* (Edition 2) (*Criminal Man*, 1878), *Tre Tribune*, *L'uomo di genio* (*Man of Genius*) (1894), *Troppo Presto* (1888) and a chapter from *I Palimsesti del carcere* (*Prison Palimpsests*) (1888a). Of all these works *Il Delitto Politico* was the most mentioned and referred to because of interlinked politico-criminal issues. The work of *Gli Anarchici* did not focus primarily and specifically on the physical characteristics of the anarchist actor but took into consideration the social and political environment, the economic status, the psychology, education and personality of the individual and the features of political passion that attracted people to indoctrination and the commission of violent acts. Lombroso mentioned *L'Uomo Delinquente* Vol. I and II only twice while discussing epilepsy and political hysteria. The second chapter described the criminal characteristics of the *reo nato* (born criminal) as discussed in *L'Uomo Delinquente* and reflected on these physiognomies in anarchists. This chapter also explored characteristics like the physiognomy, jargon, tattoos, sense of ethics and the cynical lyrics of their songs. Lombroso considered Ravachol and Pini as the ultimate representation of the born criminal among anarchist actors on account of their physical features, inherited criminal traits and criminal associations. However, Ravachol and Pini were among the very few anarchists with a series of criminal traits because anarchism attracted more law-abiding persons and started a purification process ('*purificazione dell'anarchia*') (Lombroso, 1895: 116). Comparative studies between anarchist actors and born criminals highlighted the distinctiveness between the two and justified Lombroso's proposal for tailor-made policies.

Alongside his own works, Lombroso consulted, referred and quoted various other published and non-published sources. Among these sources there were works published by his students such as Ferrero's *La Riforma sociale* (1894) and *Nuova Rassegna* (1894a) and Ferri's *Socialismo e scienza sociale* (1894a) and *Discorso parlamentare* (1894). Lombroso did not restrict himself to positivist researchers that sustained his research philosophy. In fact, in *Gli Anarchici*, he drew in any other source that was considered valuable to sustain his arguments. Beside the Italian sources, he included French, German, English, American, Argentinian, Russian, Romanian and Scandinavian connections and publications. Considering the limitations in communication and travel in the nineteenth century, Lombroso had an impressive number of contacts from around the world and he was able to read English, French and German. As a result, he was cognizant of the latest American theories, developments and practices (Rafter, 2009).

Lombroso critically observed that the statistics 'from Parisian authorities were not very accurate and objective'[80]. *Le perile anarchiste* (Dubois, 1893); *L'idee anarchiste* (Desjardins, 1893)*; Der Anarchismus und seine Frage: Enthullungen aus dem Lager der Anarchisten* (1890)*; L'ordre par l'anarchie* (Saurin, 1893); and *Le crime social* (Zablet, 1894) were some of the sources Lombroso (1895) cited while exploring the potential causes and enthralling factors of anarchism. Other sources mentioned in *Gli Anarchici* that sustained other aspects of Lombroso's research included Bonvecchiato's (1884) *A proposito di un processo scandoloso*. Bonvecchiato discussed Guiteau's death sentence for shooting the American President Garfield (who died of the severe infections caused by non-sterile medical care).

Lombroso's research on anarchist characteristics was sustained by numerous research. In discussing indirect suicides, Lombroso referred to the contribution of Carmen Sylva, researcher and queen of Romania, who in her attempts to absorb new scientific advances forwarded a unique psychological document to Lombroso, which included photographs (one of them is Figure 3.1) of an alleged indirect suicide activist. While describing the potential anarchist activist, Lombroso consulted the historical testimonials of French police called *Témoignages historiques ou quinze ans de haute police sous Napoléon* in order to consolidate an overall profile of the individuals involved in regicides caught during a fifteen-year period. Another challenging aspect that Lombroso inquired in *Gli Anarchici* was how the weather, seasons and different topography might affect the number of revolts, revolutions and the insurgent characters that emerged from such distinct spots. Lombroso sustained his argument on how temperature influenced the number of revolts by referring to Rossi and Lombroso

[80] '*Da una statistica, per certo poco esatta e poco imparziale della prefettura di Parigi'.*

(1837), *Influenza della temperatura sulle rivoluzioni* and *Revue des Deux Mondes* (1885). While discussing how the topography influenced the different kinds of personalities in mountains or islands, Lombroso mentioned *Risorgimento della Grecia* (Gervinus, 1864) and *L'évolution des peuples de l'extrème Orient* (Lanessan, 1888), respectively.

These references reflect how Lombroso thoroughly researched and sustained his arguments using different sources from around the world, but he also included sources of dubious and debatable reliability. In other instances, Lombroso consulted books and other publications with improper referencing. These include, for example, Bonwich's interview with an Australian aborigine; Merlin and Kropotkin's anarchist literature and ideologies; and the archives of the *Archivio Giuridico*. Other sources that are referred to were documents issued by the courts, such as the defence speeches by Ravachol and Henry. When it was not possible to access such documents Lombroso consulted 'trustworthy journals such as *La Neue Freie Presse*'[81] and *Journal des Débats* (Lombroso, 1895: 138). In support of his arguments Lombroso (1895) included excerpts of direct speeches from Caserio's brother (p. 76), lawyer Spingnardi (p. 37), Caserio's letter to his mother (p. 141), and statements of Caserio's lawyer Gori (p. 19, 50, 139 and 142). However, Lombroso never mentioned how he managed to get this information or gain access to specific individuals as sources of first-hand information. Apart from these dubious sources, one could also question how anarchist characters could be compared to fictitious ones found in literature, such as Don Quixote (p. 60), political heroes in Dostoyevsky's novels (p. 72) and in the Iliad (p. 101). However, referring to fictitious novels to help in real life situations was not so uncommon in the field of security of those days. For example, the English police used Conrad's *The Secret Agent* to help them better understand the terrorist perspective (Ystehede, 2006).

Gli Anarchici depicted issues and concepts that are still discussed in contemporary terrorism research. Questions raised by Lombroso's methods of research still probe the reliability of the present research on terrorists (Silke, 2004). *Gli Anarchici* also presented aspects of political violence that are not commonly depicted in contemporary terrorism research, such as vengeance for suffered injustices. Silke (2003) considered the psychology of vengeance a cause of political violence and terrorism. Lombroso (1895: 116) compared the phenomenon of anarchist terrorism to an 'anarchist hydra'[82]. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001: 9) also described terrorism as an 'acephalous (headless) and polycephalous (hydra-headed)' phenomenon. Apart from these congruencies with contemporary research, Lombroso's

[81] '*Autorevoli giornali fra cui La Neue Freie Presse'.*
[82] '*Idra anarchica'.*

criminal anthropology had an impact on the control of anarchist terrorism in Italy at the end of the nineteenth century. 'Considerable evidence shows that the Italian government and many members of the judicial and legal professions adopted a policy towards miscreant anarchists that was congenial to that advocated by such criminal anthropologists as Lombroso' (Jensen, 2001: 31). The Italian government and society were open to consider the anarchism issue from a 'reformulated' viewpoint and to understand better 'the deeds of the mentally unbalanced, juvenile delinquents, and common criminals ... [and consequently] anarchist assassins had little impact on Italian politics or social life' (Jensen, 2001: 32). Thus Jensen (2001: 32) asked, 'could adopting a positivist criminological approach to anarchism, if systematically implemented by the Spanish authorities, resolve or at least provide an anodyne for the troubling problem of virulent anarchist terrorism?'

3.5 Concluding comments

This chapter overviewed Lombroso's contribution to the foundation of criminology. His studies commenced with studies on the physiognomic aspects of criminals and developed into more intricate explorations. Lombroso was also unique in his approach of analysing women in the criminal world. However, this exceptionality was not acknowledged and appreciated by fellow scholars around the world due to various limitations. Language barriers, misinterpretations of translated works, and abhorrence of the degeneration theory after its association with Nazism and Fascism led researchers to ignore and vilify Lombroso and his work.

Following a more recent research tradition of scholarship on Lombroso, this thesis identified the project of translating Lombroso's *Gli Anarchici* as a contribution to academic knowledge and also as a benchmark of the current research in this field. Though there may be questions about some unknown sources that Lombroso referred to in his work on anarchists, he aimed at collecting valuable and reliable data, and highlighted those occasions where he considered that the data was not accurate or truthful. Laqueur (1977: 2) stated, 'Lombroso saw a connection between bomb throwing and pellagra and other vitamin deficiencies among the maize-eating people'. However, in *Gli Anarchici* Lombroso considered various contextual, political, economic, social and religious issues that affected anarchists. He researched various mental states and diseases that affected militants. Lombroso also highlighted how some

anarchists had good education levels and prominent occupations, and aimed to change the *status quo* only to protect the poor.

While studying governments and authorities that favoured and administered capital punishment, Lombroso concluded that capital punishment was only helping anarchists. When states adopted draconian methods to suppress anarchists it only served to idolise dead actors as martyrs and this attracted and motivated more recruits. Laqueur (1977: 2) misinterpreted this work when stating 'Lombroso had doubts from the beginning about the efficacity of international cooperation against anarchist terrorism'. On the contrary, Lombroso proposed international cooperation, standardised punishments and treatments, and the monitoring of cross-border movements of political criminals. In *Gli Anarchici*, it was specified that countries should employ similar administrations, policies and tactics to control anarchism as this would influence the severity of the anarchist attacks at a national and international level.

Gli Anarchici proved that we can have a body of social science knowledge on which to strategize counterterrorism responses. Similar to and in conjunction with the intellectual grounding provided by the literature explored in Chapter 2, the thematic analysis approach induced by Lombroso's work served as a basis for the research methods employed in this thesis (Chapter 4). This work also forms part of the thematic analysis in the following two chapters. In Chapter 5, Lombroso contributed to the analysis of security policies. In Chapter 6, this translation helped in the comparison of Lombroso's theories and methods with those employed by current researchers as well as the interviewees' standpoints on terrorism research. Thus, this leaves us with an unfathomable question: would our studies on terrorism and political violence be different if researchers did not judge *Gli Anarchici* simply by the fact that the name 'Cesare Lombroso' was on its spine?

Chapter 4: Methods of research

This chapter explains the methods of research used in this thesis. It starts by presenting the threefold research strategy (Section 4.1): translating Lombroso's *Gli Anarchici*, interviewing the elite respondents (policymakers, academics and security professionals), and interviewing an extremist. As explained in the previous chapter, the translation of Lombroso was crucial in providing the intellectual foundation for these research methods, besides being *per se* a contribution to knowledge. Consequently, it is important to describe how this translation was realized and what the difficulties in translating this work into English were. The interviews with twenty elite respondents were the second principal source of this research. These interviews were aimed at obtaining an understanding of the kind of knowledge that is used in implementing security policies to counter terrorism, and learning about the possibility of creating a social science that studies terrorism in an empirical manner. The third source of this study was an interview with an extremist that was realized only by pure chance and after it had been discarded from this study due to the experienced difficulties. Though this interview added another dimension to this scholarship, it is considered and treated only as additional material that is secondary both to Lombroso and the elite interviews.

Section 4.2 of this chapter discusses how the interview questions were structured with reference to contemporary terrorism research and Lombroso's studies. The methods used to gain access to elite respondents are discussed in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 provides reflections on ethics, confidentiality and anonymity that affected the research. Section 4.5 focuses on data collection strategies, which varied from face-to-face to telephone interviews. Section 4.6 discusses thematic analysis and the presentation of findings. Section 4.7 gives a brief summary of this chapter.

4.1 Research strategy

The research strategy of this thesis was threefold. First it was necessary to translate Lombroso's *Gli Anarchici* into English. The second step entailed gaining access to and interviewing elite respondents with distinct expertise that could reveal current perspectives on security knowledge and terrorism research. The last, and perhaps the hardest, step was to interview an extremist. After numerous attempts to interview terrorist actors, there was only

one positive opportunity. This interview served to depict the idiosyncratic perspectives and reasons that attracted this individual to extreme ideologies.

4.1.1 Translating Lombroso's *Gli Anarchici*

Before discussing Lombroso's study as benchmark material in the interviews, it was essential to translate *Gli Anarchici* in its entirety. This book describes how Lombroso explored, inquired and examined the phenomenon of anarchist terrorism in Europe in the late nineteenth century. The first edition of this book was published in July 1894, while the second edition was published in September of the same year. The latter edition was slightly revised and included additional material. This work was translated into French and German in the following years. For unknown reasons it was not published into English. I managed to find both the first and the second edition published in the original Italian. I translated both editions into English to obtain a full understanding of their contents and properly appreciate the changes applied in the second version. The translation of *Gli Anarchici* took me almost a year (from April 2009 to March 2010).

To find an online copy of *Gli Anarchici* was neither hard nor expensive. However, to safeguard the integrity of this research and make sure that all the material in the original books was covered in the translation, it was important for me to obtain a copy of both editions. Gaining access to the original scripts made it easier to verify that all the information, including pictures and diagrams, which Lombroso was so keen about, had not been altered in any possible way. For instance, in online scanned copies some words and pictures were not clear and diagrams or maps were scanned when still folded. I looked for different ways of how I could acquire these books. After a few weeks I managed to get into contact with an Italian psychiatrist who informed me about an Italian antiquarian. I eventually managed to obtain the two editions of *Gli Anarchici* for around six hundred euros. In these books Lombroso referred numerous times to his work in *Il Delitto Politico e le Rivoluzioni*. Lombroso published the latter work together with Laschi in 1890. Since this work was not of primary importance I tried to find an online copy or a reprint. Recently a photocopied version was published by Kessinger Publishing (in 2009). However, even in this case extensive relevant material was omitted. As a result I ended up buying an original copy for several hundred euros.

Being in possession of these publications meant that I was not restricted by particular access issues, time periods or logistics. These conditions facilitated the translation of the texts

which I could carry out in my office at any time of the day. Doing this translation was particularly taxing because of its nineteenth century Italian which included some archaic expressions. Lombroso employed 'language and metaphors of the Italian Renaissance men of medicine' (Ystehede, 2013: 82). In fact, he combined knowledge from medicine, history and Greek mythology, among other fields of knowledge. In addition, Lombroso 'regarded folk sayings and proverbs as "evidence" on a par with physiological and behavioural observations' (Valverde, 2013: 202). In fact, Lombroso's works were often a concoction of diverse data that did not permit an emphatic understanding of the scientific methods that were used, making him a junk dealer of bits of knowledge (Valverde, 2013). Thus, while translating *Gli Anarchici* it was imperative to ensure that the translated material reflected the meaning of the original text and that it was not corrupted by incorrectly used terms that would change the meaning of the original source.

It was also difficult because I wanted the translation to reflect faithfully the original text. Being Maltese helped in this translation. Maltese are brought up in a bilingual community and speak both Maltese and English. At secondary school we learn and study a third language and one of the options is Italian, which I took. However, to ensure a good quality translation I asked a colleague from the University of Malta to review and correct my draft translation. On some occasions I also consulted some Italian colleagues to verify that I understood some phrases correctly. Translating *Gli Anarchici* helped me to investigate Lombroso's work in more depth. Direct engagement with this work helped me to understand and visualise events and realities experienced by the original author (Brooks, 1969: 2). Personalities, terminologies and experiments mentioned by Lombroso indicated the knowledge and research paradigms of nineteenth-century Italy. Separated by a gap of more than a century, one does not expect many similarities between Lombrosian thoughts on anarchists and studies on present-day terrorism. Also as explained in detail in the previous chapter, the research models found in Lombroso's *Gli Anarchici* moved beyond the notorious physiognomic studies and looked more at the root causes of anarchism. This looked similar to studies by current researchers, as in Taylor and Horgan (2006).

After more than a hundred years, Lombroso is still negatively labelled by numerous researchers. This research is not aimed at disproving these beliefs but to examine if Lombroso's *Gli Anarchici* could still contribute to the knowledge base of the present day. Aligning Lombroso's thoughts with the data gleaned from the interviews of elite respondents and also with the extremist's commentary was essential to identify whether Lombroso is still a valuable contributor to current scholarship. As John Wesley Powell states, 'it may be wrong to

take another man's purse, but it is always right to take another man's knowledge, and it is the highest virtue to promote another man's investigation' (Brooks, 1969:17). In this case, Lombroso created a platform for studies in anarchist political violence and a valuable academic contribution which I believe should be considered, promoted and published further.

4.1.2 Interviewing elite respondents

The issue of terrorism and associated threats influence policies that safeguard the economic and political powers of the Western nations. The purpose of this research was to fathom how the main parties involved in mitigating the occurrence of terrorist acts managed to collect information and evaluate the threat posed by terrorism, and ultimately to contribute academia as well as to improve counterterrorism strategies. Both qualitative and quantitative methods are legitimate methods in terrorism research and the main distinctive feature between the two is the kind of data collected (Maxfield & Babbie, 2011). Since the aim was to gather particularly rich data, while still reserving the opportunity to explore particular themes in more depth, a qualitative method was considered more suitable. Employing semi-structured interviews, this research inquired generic aspects like the definition of terrorism and theoretical security matters, and moved on to more specific issues like intelligence, counterterrorism policies and methods of studying terrorism.

This research method determined the criteria of the purposive sample of respondents. A purposive sample of elite professionals determined a 'non-random [sample] … because individuals are selected deliberately and with some particular purpose in mind' (Jupp, 1989: 37). In this research, the selected interviewees had to be proficient and experienced in security provisions and research on terrorism. As a result the respondents chosen were academics, policymakers and security professionals (including law enforcers, army officers, intelligence analysts and other government officials). The three different categories of personnel observed terrorism from unique perspectives. They provided first-hand and reliable information on responding, curbing and researching terrorism. Policymakers provided a legalistic and administrative perspective; security professionals expressed a practical standpoint; while the academics portrayed a theoretical outlook on the matter. As described in Chapter 2, Schmid (2011: 34) chose a similar cohort of experts to respond to his questionnaire and their professional backgrounds were mainly academia, intelligence, government administration, law enforcement and the military. Such respondents are also referred to as 'elite' since they are

leaders, experts or top individuals in the government or other sectors like the military (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Putnam, 1976, as cited in Jupp, 2006; Scott, 1990, as cited in Jupp, 2006).

Textbooks assume that the interviewer and the interviewee are anonymous to each other and belong to different groups or organizations. For instance, Platt (1981) claimed that it was unlikely that the interviewer and the respondents met again after the interview, and that the respondents lacked technical knowledge to judge research and the offered questions. These assumptions were not applicable in this research. Although I had never met some of the interviewees, we belonged to similar research areas and had common acquaintances, and it was reasonable to assume that we could meet again. Before contacting the potential interviewees it was imperative to take into consideration their office or position and their role vis-à-vis the phenomenon of terrorism and how they contributed in mitigating terrorism. Pre-established acquaintances within the criminal justice system helped me in identifying the purposive sample of interviewing candidates in the sectors of security and policymaking. These contacts also acted as sponsors and facilitated access, increasing the number of positive responses (Maxfield & Babbie, 2011). Academic interviewees were chosen according to their published material on terrorism. This approach intended to secure 'an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question' (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008: 7), which emphasised the practical, theoretical and policy differences besides validating the data (Mason, 2001). Discussing the interview results in the light of contemporary terrorism research and Lombroso created a 'combination of multiple methodological practices, empirical materials [and] perspectives … [adding] rigour, breadth, complexity richness, and depth' (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008: 7) to the inquiry and results (Flick, 2002).

Table 4.1: Table of contacts

No.	Name & Surname	Entity	email	Tel. & Fax No.	Status	Comments

Table 4.2: Status of contacts

Status	Colour
Contacted	**Yellow**
Pending – Interview Date not Confirmed	**Orange**
Interviewed	**Green**
Refused / No answer	**Black**
Not contacted yet	**No Colour**

I originally identified fifty potential interviewees from the three targeted sectors. To keep record of those contacted and interviewed, and those who refused to be interviewed or still had to be contacted, I used a Microsoft Excel table. This table contained details of the potential interviewees, such as name, email address, contact numbers, represented entity,

status, and comments (Table 4.1). These records were colour coded and every colour helped me to keep track of the status of every interviewee (Table 4.2). During the interviews continuous updates were necessary to avoid making mistakes like contacting the same respondent twice.

Through snowballing, twenty-two more potential interviewees were added to the original list of fifty prospective respondents. Thus the final list was that of seventy-two potential elite respondents. Horgan (2004: 39) showed the successful use of the process of 'snowballing' or 'snowball sampling', in which contacted respondents identified and referred the researcher to other potential interview subjects (Maxfield & Babbie, 2011). Of the seventy-two potential respondents only sixty-five elite subjects replied when contacted. Out of these sixty-five potential interviewees I managed to interview only twenty because some declined to participate and others did not answer my emails and telephone calls. Around a hundred and fifty emails were sent, and these included first-contact emails, reminders, and those confirming appointments for the actual interviews. The final group of respondents consisted of six policymakers, seven academics and seven security professionals. The last group included police, military and prison officials. A similar response rate was experienced by Schmid who, in preparation for his book *Handbook of Terrorism Research*, sent out 'a questionnaire to hundreds of experts, [and only] 90 of them answered it' (Schmid, 2007: 16).

During the upgrade of this study from MPhil to PhD, interviews with a range from eight to thirteen elite respondents were recommended. Between May and July 2010, I managed to interview fifteen subjects. I had contacted these respondents in the previous months when I was still exploring the possibility of making these interviews. However, it took more than two months to conduct the last five interviews with subjects recommended during the interviews. Considering that the maximum recommended number of interviewees had been surpassed by seven interviewees and the fact that 'obtaining access to interviewees is a key problem when studying elites' (Hertz & Imber, 1995, as cited in Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009: 147) it was decided to stop holding more interviews at that point.

Those who initially accepted to be interviewed were not all successfully interviewed because of different reasons. Horgan (2011, 2012) discussed this issue in his reflections on fieldwork. For example, a representative of a law enforcement entity did not want to proceed with the interview after going through my list of questions. At first, the same officer confirmed his participation in the research project (see Appendix 4: Letter 1). It is important to note that this law enforcement entity accepted to participate in this project only after conducting a number of security checks on my background and potential criminal history. These security

checks took around six months from when this law enforcement entity had been initially contacted (Appendix 4: Letter 2 acknowledges receipt of my letter dated 19th January, 2009). However, upon forwarding the questions to the indicated representative, the response was, 'I am afraid that due to my current role it is no longer going to be appropriate for me to participate in an interview and assist with your studies. I apologise however, [sic] I am afraid it is unavoidable'.

Another instance was when counterterrorism intelligence entities refused to be interviewed and instructed me to consult their website for information available to the public (Appendix 4: Letters 3 and 4). In a different occasion another entity replied by email which stated 'many of the questions you ask, [sic] seek opinions and therefore these may be better suited at [sic] some of the numerous counter-terrorism and security experts within private [sic] industry, the academic world or from [sic] their website'. Other experts that were used to be interviewed used this opportunity to promote their perspectives (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). For instance, one of the academic respondents remarked, 'Are you sure you want to interview me? My ideas on security and terrorism issues go against the conventional view'. In this case my reply was, 'that makes you a perfect candidate for the interview'.

These elite respondents came from different parts of Europe, including England and Wales, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malta and the Netherlands. One of the academics was from the United States. Some of these respondents were representatives of particular European entities, such as the Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security (DGJLS) and Europol. These respondents provided a holistic European overview on the researched phenomenon, as well as specific details related to their countries where they were operating. Thus, since the counterterrorism niche is very limited, these elite interviewees were key-respondents that reflected European security policy in countering terrorism and represented leading current thinking in terrorism research. During the interviews some academic respondents also reported on their involvement in working groups engaged in structuring European security policies. However, as often happens to researchers in terrorism, this purposive sample was also determined by opportunity, which carries frustrating constraints when it comes to generalizing the findings (Horgan, 2011, 2012; Silke, 2001).

4.1.3 Interviewing an extremist

When I started my PhD, I had hoped to interview active or former terrorist actors. However, as described in this section, access proved to be too difficult to obtain and consequently this part of the research was discarded. By pure serendipity I had an unplanned opportunity to interview 'Charles'. A lone-wolf terrorist had described Charles as his 'mentor'. Though the focus of this research remained security knowledge and terrorism research, interviewing Charles helped to illustrate an idiosyncratic perspective of the attraction to extremist ideologies. Unexpectedly, this interview also added a personalised extremist dimension to the material gathered from the principal elite interviewees. It also indicated that Charles would have been an interesting case study for Lombroso, as argued in the next two chapters.

After the 9/11 events there was a systematic increase in terrorism studies that aimed to create solid research from first-hand data sources (Dolnik, 2011; Horgan, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2012). Dolnik (2011: 3) stated, 'while a new book on terrorism comes out roughly every six hours, only three books [Ranstrop, 2007; Schmid, 2011; Silke, 2004] evaluating the state of the field and its future directions have been published in the last ten years'. Crenshaw (2000: 416) stated that terrorism research lacks pragmatic fundamentals that are gained from 'primary data based on interviews and life histories' of those engaged in terrorism'. This section presents a short description of the various attempts to interview activists or former activists involved in political violence. 'Research on terrorist behaviour is not only viable, but represents a research tool which we need to seriously exploit' (Horgan, 2008: 73) despite the presumed and concrete difficulties and dangers (Dolnik, 2011; Horgan, 2011, 2012; Silke, 2004; Smyth, 2009).

Sir Francis Bacon's statement 'if we are to achieve results never before accomplished, we must employ methods never before attempted' seems to answer the question 'how can one find an extremist actor to be interviewed?' Interviewing persons involved in extremist factions could help in the understanding of the morale and rationale of terrorist actors. For instance, Berko, Wolf and Addad (2005) and Horgan (2009) are just a few of the growing number of authors that have explored radical terrorist mentality through direct contact with active and/or former terrorists (for further studies see Horgan, 2004; 2008; 2011, 2012; Smyth, 2009). Berko *et al*. (2005) explored the world of five recruiters of suicide terrorism serving a life prison sentence. Horgan's (2009) psychological stance explored reasons that make a person induce terrorism, as well as motivations for disengaging from radical movements.

Getting in contact with people responsible for managing and administering security policies was a hard task, but setting up interviews with persons suspected, accused or convicted of terrorism was even harder (Maxfield & Babbie, 2011). Considering that there is no accepted definition of 'terrorism' or 'terrorist', the issue in this case was 'who would be the ideal candidate to represent a "terrorist" or "extremist" character or personality?' Thus the potential respondent had to be currently or formerly connected to an extremist group or ideology that was linked to political violence or a recognized act of terror. Throughout this research there were three major attempts to interview extremist non-state actors. The first attempt was to interview persons convicted of terrorist acts in European prisons.

Horgan (2008: 76) considered prisons 'an obvious avenue … to contact imprisoned terrorists'. Since at the time of the data collection in Malta there were no inmates imprisoned for terrorist acts I aimed at interviewing persons convicted of terrorist acts in prisons in the UK. In October 2008 I sent a letter to the UK Ministry of Justice requesting to interview prisoners convicted of terrorist offences. In January 2009, I received a letter (Appendix 4: Letter 5) informing me that my request had been forwarded to the Extremism Unit within HM Prison Service for further consideration. However, no further correspondence was received. At the same time I made direct contact with the 'Guantanamo of the United Kingdom' (Winterman, 2004), HM Belmarsh Prison (London), where high-risk prisoners were hosted. On the 26th April 2009, I received a letter (Appendix 4: Letter 6) from the security governor of Belmarsh prison stating that no permission was being granted to carry out interviews with prisoners convicted under the UK Terrorism Act because of security reasons.

A similar response was later received from a penitentiary in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Beckford, Joly and Khosrokhavar (2005) experienced similar reluctance from prison authorities when doing a cross-national comparison of Muslims in prison. Beckford *et al.* (2005) carried out their study with the help of three researchers that worked in prisons who conducted the investigations on their behalf. While reading for his PhD, John Horgan (2004, 2008) tried to contact members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and experienced similar difficulties. Being desperate on this matter, I emailed Dr John Horgan to provide some valuable recommendations on how to access extremist actors. Dr Horgan emphatically stressed the impossibility of interviewing prisoners convicted on terrorist acts. He suggested I should contact community or faith leaders, such as *imams* that helped with de-radicalisation to act as sponsor for my interviews. However, I did not manage to find a faith leader to act as a sponsor.

The second attempt aimed at interviewing individuals who participated in de-radicalisation rehabilitation programmes. After becoming aware of the fact that the European

Commission had appointed The Change Institute in London to study extremism and radicalisation (Schmid, 2011), I contacted this institution. The Change Institute offered to act as a mediator between me and persons who were or had been members of radical Muslim communities in the UK and were willing to be interviewed. Although I contacted this institution a number of times no interviews materialized from this direction. Another potential opportunity for interviewing former terrorists or extremists occurred after reading a newspaper article that dealt with the de-radicalization of former prisoners from Guantanamo Bay in a rehabilitation programme in Saudi Arabia. After emailing the news agency, the journalist author of the article contacted me and helped me to get in touch with the Saudi Arabian authorities that managed the rehabilitation programme. The programme manager explained that to interview the programme graduates I had to travel to Saudi Arabia. I was willing to travel to such a remote country even though a 'researcher is much better off travelling to destinations like London, Istanbul or Dubai, where interviews can be arranged in a safe environment' (Dolnik, 2011: 16). However, operating in a relatively safe country does not necessarily protect a researcher from attempts of intimidation by interviewees, as described by Horgan (2004, 2008). Unfortunately this institution never communicated with me again even though I tried several times to maintain contact.

The final and only successful attempt was to contact an extremist directly through his own website. After failing to contact a former or active extremist for almost a year this part of the research had been discarded. However, after a widely reported terrorist attack by a lone-wolf actor, media sources said that the 'mentor' of this terrorist was a right-wing extremist who was hiding in Malta. Open sources provide valuable details about the ideology of groups or particular individuals (Horgan, 2004, 2008). In this case the media spread the contact details of this individual providing me with the possibility of an opportunistic interview, as commonly happens in terrorism research (Dolnik, 2011; Silke, 2001). After informing the University of Sheffield about the possibility of obtaining an interview with 'Charles' (not his real name), it was imperative to check that all ethical and potential safety issues were tackled appropriately. 'Terrorism research raises many questions from the human research ethics perspective, and this frequently becomes the biggest challenge of the entire process of terrorism field research' (Dolnik, 2011: 7). Ethical norms place the burden on the researcher. However, when interviewing extremist individuals the researcher could also be in serious danger (Dolnik, 2011; Smyth, 2009).

On confirmation of the ethical approval I emailed Charles and explained that I was a criminology student and wished to discuss the motivations of those who became extremists

and resorted to violence. After a few hours Charles emailed back and we set up a meeting. The meeting was set at around noon at the end of July, 2011. Since I contacted Charles from my email account at the University of Malta, it made sense to meet on campus. I found a bench that provided some shade from the scorching summer sun and some privacy. Yet, this meeting place was visible by people passing by just a few meters away. The conspicuous setting of this meeting place created a safe environment. Offering Charles a cold drink in the heat of summer helped to break the ice.

In his email Charles had told me to bring along the voice recorder, but when we met I asked again whether he still agreed to be recorded, and he did. 'It is unlikely that the researcher will acquire exceptional pieces of information when meeting the research subject for the first time' (Dolnik, 2011: 24). However, when Charles wanted to reveal some sensitive information, he requested me to switch off the recorder. It was possible that Charles disclosed certain details because he was 'more relaxed and more open than in [his] home country' (Dolnik, 2011: 16). When the recorder was switched off I still scribbled down notes that helped me to reconstruct a good part of the unrecorded data from memory. Trying to recall all the data from memory would have yielded a limited amount of information and made it subject to interpretation (Horgan, 2004). Exceptionally in this case, I guaranteed Charles that upon transcription the recordings would be destroyed. The questions were open-ended and I used a loose style of probing and active listening that included paraphrasing and clarifications (Slatkin, 2005, as cited in Dolnik, 2011). The questions were completely different from the ones asked to the three groups of elite respondents. However, as with the elite respondents, the initial questions were quite general and moved on to more specific issues. The whole interview lasted about two hours of which around twenty minutes were not voice recorded.

Together with the importance of secrecy and the classification of the information conveyed during interviews, Dolnik (2013: 227) mentions 'the importance of reputation, credibility and trustworthiness in the field' of terrorism research. While interviewing Charles, it was imperative to protect his identity and remove any potential links that could lead to the identification of this interviewee. However, the issues of reputation, credibility and trustworthiness could not be easily dealt with. Unlike the elite respondents, Charles was not representing any form of entity and did not have a reputation to protect. Yet, Charles had written about his personal experiences and expressed his extremist thoughts over his blog and also spoke to different media organizations. This was the only possible way to verify the credibility and trustworthiness of what was said during Charles's interview. On his blog and with local and international media, Charles had discussed illegal activities and extremist

thoughts. This permitted me to discuss these issues with him with a reasonable degree of confidence where no ethical principles were at risk. As Dolnik (2013: 228) stated,

> '… researchers will rarely speak to anyone who has not been already interviewed by local and international media, they are extremely unlikely to end up in a situation where they have exclusive access to incriminating details about specific criminal activity … [or] to learn about any new specific threats for the future.'

Following Dolnik's (2011) advice I aimed to minimize my influence on Charles's mind-set, but as soon as I thanked him for his time and for being so willing to meet in such a short time Charles asked me, 'by any chance, did you study psychology?' After I replied in the positive, Charles continued 'because the way you asked questions showed you have such background'. However, I did not reveal that as a former probation officer, I was experienced in posing similar questions to offenders. As Horgan (2008: 77) stated, 'the academic discipline of the researcher may bring its own baggage regarding how the researcher may be perceived'. It took me around fourteen hours to transcribe the interview. While processing the interview I followed Horgan's (2004: 45; 2008: 88) advice to eliminate 'any recognizable marks such as names, dates, places etc. … to avoid accidentally compromising the identity' of Charles.

In April 2012, Charles sent me an email requesting my help to get him into contact with the Maltese intelligence services as he had some information to forward to them. I emailed back explaining that he should contact the police and that they could help him contact the intelligence services. A few hours later Charles emailed back stating 'no worries I just thought I would ask you as I thought that was what you were involved in'. Such an unexpected email shows how extremist subjects are very suspicious of the people they talk to and researchers could be considered spies and as a result they are exposed to dangerous situations (Dolnik, 2011; Horgan, 2011, 2012; Smyth, 2009).

This section explained how terrorism research 'involves idleness … myriads of phone calls to contacts … endless hours and days of waiting for a return call that may or may not come' (Dolnik, 2011: 31). Successful interviews with terrorists or extremist actors demonstrate only an 'idiosyncratic and personalized experience' (Horgan, 2011: 5) but promote the accumulation of new empirical data and knowledge on extremist actors and groups. Such information could help delineate political and cultural biases leading to better understanding of potential government, intelligence or media misinterpretations (Horgan, 2011, 2012). Facing realities experienced by wrongdoers, sympathizers and victims changes and shapes the researchers' perspectives in recognizing potential risks and acknowledging ethical issues and

dangerous contexts. This should be more conducive to solid research in terrorism while advocating greater transparency in the interviewing process (Dolnik, 2011; Horgan, 2011, 2012; Smyth, 2009).

Since the interview with Charles was completely unexpected and unforeseen, it was a problem to integrate it with the analyses of the elite interviews and with Lombroso. Initially this material was planned to be included only as an addition at the end of the data analysis (at the end of Chapter 6). However, there were two main problems. If the analysis of Charles's interview was to be placed only in Chapter 6 it was going to look as one of the thematic discussions of this chapter rather than as an addendum. Secondly, though Charles does not enter into much detail on policy-related issues, there were some issues that were more in line with the themes discussed in Chapter 5 rather than in Chapter 6. Eventually, I decided that Charles should be somehow included as a postscript in both Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. These postscripts were intended to show Charles's personal extremist reflections on themes that were more thoroughly explored by the main respondents – the elite interviewees. This created a symbiotic format in between the two data analyses chapters. These postscripts also permitted an analysis of Charles's interview in relation to the findings obtained from the main interviewees as well as with Lombroso. This layout was similar to that used in the analyses of the data obtained from the elite interviews.

4.2 Interview questions

Once the elite target sample had been established, the next step was to design the interview guide for the interviews, which may be considered an easy task (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Shuy, 2003). 'A qualitative interview … is based on a set of topics to be discussed in depth rather than based on the use of standardized questions' (Maxfield & Babbie, 2011: 300). In this study, interviews were considered ideal to exploit as much as possible this unique opportunity to interact with experts on terrorism and 'see the research topic from the perspective of the interviewee, and to understand how and why they come to have this particular perspective' (King, 2006: 11).

To meet this objective, interviews were based on semi-structured questions, an adequate tool to do factual and conceptual interviews in such professional settings (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). The interviews provided me with the opportunity to hear the answers and interpret their relevance to the research, and also to structure additional questions that

explored particular themes more thoroughly (Maxfield & Babbie, 2011). Additional questions also helped to redirect the respondent's focus on subjects relevant to this study. A simultaneous application of listening, thinking and probing evoked an incredible amount of data without causing excessive pressure on the interview subjects.

The structure of the interviews followed a guiding script of seventeen open-ended questions, covering different themes (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009: 130). These themes were extracted from contemporary terrorism research (Chapter 2) and Lombroso's work (Chapter 3). For instance, since the definition of terrorism is a main topic of discussion in contemporary studies, and Lombroso was among the first to attempt to define political crime (Daly, 2002), the respondents were asked 'How would you describe a terrorist?' Also, the profiling of terrorists in current studies resonated with the profiling of anarchists in Lombroso's work. Therefore, it was considered legitimate to ask 'How is the profile of "the terrorist" created?'

The semi-structured approach allowed questions to be added, deleted, or altered even though the main questions were standardized (Carley-Baxter, 2008). Additional sub-questions accompanied the main questions only to ensure that the themes were thoroughly explored (as explained in 4.5 Data collection strategies). The interview guide explored themes in policymaking and others in terrorism research. During these interviews the respondents were not deceived in anyway. However, given that anti-Lombrosian bias could have jeopardized the given answers, it was important not to mention Lombroso and his work with the interviewees. In fact, themes extracted from Lombroso were slightly modified to correspond to current issues. Instead of mentioning 'anarchists' or 'positivist science', the questions mentioned 'terrorists' or 'social sciences'. Generic questions probed concrete situations in an open manner, and were decisive in making respondents disclose details and discuss the subject at length (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Horgan, 2011, 2012).

'Standardized questions do not bring standardized answers, for the same question means different things to different people' (Kinsey, Pomeroy & Martin, 1948, as cited in Kvale & Brinkman, 2009: 52; see also Shaffer & Elkins, 2004). The questions inquired the unique perspectives and competences of policymakers, academics and security professionals in counterterrorism and security issues, and terrorism research. The prepared interview questions ensured that all the interviewees answered the same questions. This reduced the risk of respondents deviating from the scope of the interview, especially when time and opportunities for these interviews were very limited. These focal points facilitated the subsequent thematic analysis of the collected data (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).

Follow-up questions helped in the meticulous exploration of unknown topics, issues or jargon especially when these were not implicit in the prepared questions. For instance, SP4 used the term 'self-combustors'. When asked further, the respondent explained that the expression meant 'self-indoctrinated terrorists'. Overly rigid interview structures would hinder respondents from expanding particular topics, delimiting the thoroughness achieved through a less structured method (Horgan, 2011, 2012; Kleinmuntz, 1982; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). In order to test the quality of the interview questions, I forwarded them to a number of police officers who voluntarily offered to overview them and pass on their feedback. 'Questions … can change over the life-cycle of the project' (Rapley, 2007: 39). Piloting the interview guide guaranteed that the questions were not excessively inquisitive, which would hinder the respondents' disclosure in a sensitive field like terrorism and national security.

'Elite interviewees may be used to being interviewed, and may have prepared "talk tracks" to promote their viewpoints' establishing a powerful and secure position (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009: 147). However, challenging the experts' conceptions may help to achieve more thorough dialogues – what Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) called a sense of Socratic episteme. This challenging attitude also shows that the researcher knows the subject (Zuckerman, 1972, as cited in Harvey, 2011). King (2006) advised that the interviewer needs to be skilled and careful not to be over-familiar and show-off one's knowledge as this could be offensive. Conversely, one should not be submissive or too nervous because professionals tend to be patronizing. Finding equilibrium between being respectful and confident, while showing one's expertise, enables the interviewer to probe further the elite respondents. To ensure the fielding of in-depth answers without influencing the responses, I had to be a good listener and had to keep control of the conversation even when using a flexible research method (King, 2006; Maxfield & Babbie, 2011). Though interviewers manage to adapt to various contexts, they necessitate time to carry out the interviews, transcribing and analysing the data (King, 2006).

A similar pattern was also followed in the open-ended questions that guided the interview with Charles (Appendix 5). This interview intended to analyse his perspectives on themes, such as the factors that attracted him to extremism, how he was introduced to extremist groups and how his behaviour changed in the course of time. These themes were not intended to create a psychological profile or to create a generalized perspective, as advised by Post, Sprinzak and Denny (2003). The additional interview with Charles gave a new dimension to the study and served as a link between its two main data sources. Charles added an unforeseen yet distinctive connection between Lombroso's theories on anarchists and the

perspectives of the elite respondents. In his interview, Charles provided an idiosyncratic perspective of some of the mechanics that exist behind an extremist viewpoint and how different interpretations can inspire different behaviours. Thus, it is important to note that the fact that Charles followed an extreme right-wing ideology, rather than an extreme left-wing one (as in the anarchists' case) did not affect the purpose of the interview.

4.3 Access

'Any research on a criminal justice institution, or on persons who work either in or under the supervision of an institution, normally requires a formal request and approval' (Maxfield & Babbie, 2011: 302). Obtaining approval to access designated representatives from their respective organizations was indispensable. The approvals had to be arranged with security practitioners and in some cases also with policymakers before any interview could take place. The process to gain approval can be frustrating, complex and confusing, because hierarchical formalities and informal internal cultures hamper a smoother progression and practical approach (Maxfield & Babbie, 2011). Gaining formal access can take months and yet it does not guarantee that the chosen candidate/s will accept or agree to be interviewed (see Horgan, 2011). According to Maxfield and Babbie (2011: 302), 'the best strategy in gaining access to virtually any … formal criminal justice organization is to use a four-step procedure: sponsor, letter, phone-call, and meeting'. This four-step procedure guided the methodologies used in gaining access to the twenty interviewees. Finding sponsors in highly ranked positions was fundamental to gain access to a number of interviewees. Sponsors advised on who to contact and in some cases introduced me to other key officials, avoiding being subject to excessive gatekeeping (Jupp, 2003; Maxfield & Babbie, 2011).

Gaining access to these sponsors was not particularly difficult because of my background within the criminal justice system. Before I continue discussing the methods used in gaining access it is imperative to provide a brief description of my career and education as both influenced how I gained access to most of my interviewees. My adventure in the criminal justice system started as a Probation Officer (PO) within the Maltese Correctional Services. I was a PO for almost seven years. Here I developed good relations with various law enforcement members and agencies. While working as a PO, I read for an MSc in security and risk management with the University of Leicester (UK), and also followed an online certificate course in terrorism studies at the University of St Andrews, Scotland. These academic

endeavours provided the right settings for me to meet researchers interested in security, terrorism and political violence. Opportunities to meet more researchers and experts in these sectors grew further after being employed at the University of Malta as an assistant lecturer in criminology. These acquaintances proved indispensable in obtaining contact details or in being introduced to potential respondents from all three professional sectors.

My MSc dissertation tackled the subject of security and risk management in case of a terrorist attack. This was the first time I experienced how hard it was to gain access to persons involved in controlling terrorism and in national security since they are gatekeepers themselves. Gatekeepers provide or withhold the official permissions that enable 'access to subjects or to other sources of data' (Jupp, 2003: 134). Sponsors in the police forces, correctional facilities and academia were crucial in finding and accessing key respondents in counterterrorism and researchers on terrorism around Europe. For instance, acquaintances in the Malta police force contacted their European counterparts on my behalf, which rendered gaining access smoother. Another example is that a former Interpol agent, whom I had met during the MSc study schools, helped me establish contact with the DGJLS. These sponsors came along as they became aware that I was looking for persons and entities that would be interested to partake in this research. My search for elite respondents started in October 2008, that is, when I started the MPhil. As it turned out, having contacts in well-established positions helped me approach certain elites (Pahl, 1996).

When no sponsors were available to help me find access, I started by sending emails and letters. Following Maxfield and Babbie's (2011) propositions, my letters contained three main parts: an introduction, a brief description of the research, and the request to interview a representative knowledgeable on counterterrorism. The email title read: 'Research Reflecting on Security Policies'. In cases when there was no reply to the first email, I sent two reminders within fifteen days from the previous email. If after three emails there was still no reply, respondents were removed from the list. Negative responses created difficult moments and generated doubts on whether the necessary number of interviewees would be secured in time. Without sponsors to bypass the extensive gatekeeping of security and law enforcement entities, only five respondents wrote back. This result shows the problems of gaining access to certain police agencies (Holdaway, 1983, as cited in Jupp 2003: 59). Getting into contact with academics researching terrorism and related security matters was less demanding. Academic journals like *Behavioural sciences of terrorism and political aggression* and *Critical studies on terrorism* helped me to target potential respondents. Contact details of distinguished contributors from this sector were found in academic journals or university websites.

Continuous access to the internet and emails proved to be indispensable to contact elite respondents. These are very busy persons and are frequent travellers, which make interviews almost elusive (Moyser, 2006). Wireless technology and uninterrupted access to email accounts facilitated communication via electronic messages whether from the office or outside. For instance, on one occasion a respondent emailed me via smartphone to report that he was stuck in an airport due to some delays. Arranging meetings with elite respondents was very difficult, and sometimes there was a continuous exchange of emails to find a convenient date and time for the interviews (Maxfield and Babbie, 2011).

My first contacts with potential interviewees took place in the first few months (October 2008 to April 2009) when I was exploring the possibility of access. Around a year later (April 2010) I emailed to confirm date and time when to meet or call and hold the interview. A good number of respondents replied immediately and this resulted in an average of two interviews each week. This rhythm slowed down from August to October 2010 because no sponsors could help in establishing contact with the last five respondents.

4.4 Ethics, confidentiality and anonymity

Ethical problems arise when 'researching private lives and placing accounts in the public arena' (Birch, Miller, Mauthner & Jessop, 2002: 1, as cited in Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009: 62). Probing policymakers, security professionals and academics on their expertise, opinions and experiences did not pose any ethical dilemmas. However, interviewing elite respondents on notions of terrorism and security raised confidentiality and anonymity issues among the respondents, particularly among those holding unique offices in responding to terrorism. Even more, going in the field and interviewing Charles on his personal involvement in extremism, and the fact that a terrorist had referred to him as his 'mentor' raised ethical considerations to a higher level of sensitivity. Following Kvale and Brinkmann's (2009) research stages, when the participants, including Charles, were debriefed about the aims of the investigation, they were assured that they would not be exposed to any risk by participating in this research. I also informed all the respondents that they had the right to withdraw from the interview at any time.

To secure confidentiality and avoid any potential identification of the participants, the information that describes briefly every single respondent was kept generic. Additionally, every interviewee was given a code. The key to these codes is kept in a secure place and will

be destroyed at the end of the project. The code marked interviewees as follows: PM (PolicyMakers), SP (Security Professionals or Security Practitioners) or AC (ACademics). These abbreviated codes helped to distinguish the sector of every respondent. However, the numbers of the respondents were randomly allocated. Most academic interviewees gave me permission to mention their full name but the seniority of the respondents from the other two sectors made anonymity and confidentiality all the more important. While safeguarding all interview subjects from any potentially harmful consequences, these codes facilitated the constant reference to the individual interviewees when presenting the collected data. Short and broadly general biographies of each interviewee gave a profile of the respondents' background and expertise (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). The brief biographies of the twenty interviewees are the following:

PM1 was an experienced representative of the EU, Directorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security (DGJLS).

PM2 was highly involved in justice and home affairs, with expertise in European and national security measures and policies.

PM3 was specialised in the creation and implementation of aviation, maritime and critical infrastructure security policies.

PM4 had over twenty years' experience in aviation security and was constantly involved in assessing and improving airport security in different airports around the world.

PM5 was a representative of the customs office, in charge of issuing policies and control measures on the transportation of military weapons and equipment, including weapons of mass destruction.

PM6 was a senior research associate in a university, with expertise on maritime security policy issues that tackle piracy, organized crime and maritime terrorism.

SP1 was a high ranking officer in the military with extensive expertise in counterterrorism strategies and intelligence analysis.

SP2 was a prison director responsible for a particular section of a prison that held inmates incarcerated for terrorist acts.

SP3 was a high ranking police officer in charge of intelligence, training and investigation of the anti-terrorism section.

SP4 was a counterterrorism coordinator, forming part of an intelligence council, and liaised with European and non-European counterterrorism coordinators.

SP5 was also responsible for prisons that held persons accused of committing terrorist acts.

SP6 represented a European law enforcement agency that is designed to prevent and combat terrorism, among other serious and organised crime.

SP7 was involved in police training in countering terrorism.

AC1 researched the Northern Ireland conflict and published articles on politics and armed and religious conflicts in different parts around the world.

AC2 was involved in the study of terrorism and responses to terrorism in the U.S. AC2 researched domestic terrorism as well as criminological theories, and built a database of crimes committed by extremists recorded on open sources.

AC3 was a professor in political science and sociology, and researched social movements, political violence, terrorism, corruption, police forces and policies of public order in different parts of Europe.

AC4 specialised in security studies, conflict resolution and critical terrorism studies. AC4 also researched contemporary discourses of terrorism, the causes of war and processes of international conflict resolution.

AC5 researched the use of state violence and state terrorism, particularly by liberal democratic states. Among the fields of interest of this interviewee there were critical security studies and critical terrorism studies.

AC6 was a political psychologist and researched extremists of Irish Republican movements, and published numerous articles on de-radicalization and motives of disengagement from terrorist movements.

AC7 was an academic and a psychologist whose principal research interests included terrorism, political violence, internet crime, crime prevention, and behavioural criminology.

Academic studies on terrorism raise many ethical questions, making the field research process more difficult. Dolnik (2013: 225) highlighted how hard it is to follow regulations in terrorism research where 'all subjects are treated as equally and as justly as possible during the research'. People who are interviewed in the field are involved in conflicts and protecting all these individuals is impossible (Jackson, 2007: 122). Dolnik (2013) addressed a number of ethical factors in order to help researchers overcome ethical issues that are frequently encountered in terrorism research. In the interview with Charles, I was also careful not to raise any emotional distress. Though Charles expressed extremist ideologies, I could not exclude the possibility that he had also experienced psychological traumas. As explained by Dolnik (2013: 227-8), 'whether at the giving or the receiving end of political violence, or both' researchers need to be sensitive to the traumas experienced by their interviewees. Another important issue discussed by Dolnik (2013) was the researcher's own protection. Ethics tend to protect the research subjects, but in case of terrorism, researchers tend to become equally vulnerable (Gallaher, 2009). In light of this knowledge, for my own security, I met Charles in a public space frequented by numerous people.

Another ethical issue discussed by Dolnik (2013: 228-9) is 'the possibility of interviewees gaining a false impression that agreeing to an interview will somehow lead to direct improvement of their *personal* [sic] situation'. Charles was reputed to be the mentor of a terrorist actor and he wanted to use any possible means to show that he was not involved in a particular terrorist act. Thus, when I told him about the interview, he accepted immediately but he had not expected that a number of questions would inquire about how he had become involved in extremism. During the interview, I refrained from expressing my personal views on Charles's experiences and ideologies and adopted an empathic approach that helped me to explore the grievances behind his extremism while avoiding a dangerous exchange of views (Dolnik, 2013: 229).

4.5 Data collection strategies

Originally this study was designed entirely on face-to-face interviews but fieldwork exigencies, such as costs, tight schedules and location constraints it was inevitable to resort to

telephone interviews (Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004). As costs of telephone interviews keep on decreasing, it was the next most feasible and cost-effective method to collect the data and with minimal waste of time. In fact, slightly more than half of the interviews (eleven of twenty) took place over the phone. The rest of the interviews were face-to-face. Whether over the phone or face-to-face, the respondents were ready to discuss outstanding experiences and knowledge that would have been hard to acquire through other channels (Moyser, 2006).

Telephone interviews are mostly associated with surveys or polls, which would be economically impractical to do in person (Shuy, 2003). This tool proved effective in interviewing respondents from overseas. Telephone interviewing helped to save money, meet deadlines and overcome geographical limitations. Interviewing using the telephone was cost-effective and faster than face-to-face interviews (Groves, 1988). When conducting interviews over the phone, I was able to stay in a safe place and simultaneously access respondents that were difficult to contact or reluctant to meet in-person (Shuy, 2003; Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004). A disadvantage of telephone interviews was that I was unable to observe the respondents' non-verbal reactions (Stephens, 2007). Considering that the research respondents had almost constant access to the internet, it was possible to use software programs like Skype. Using Skype would have included a visual contact, which is a good substitute to the traditional face-to-face approach (Adema & Roehl, 2010; O'Connor, Madge, Shaw & Wellens, 2008). However, when I proposed this possibility the respondents preferred the telephone to Skype. Before starting my interviews over the telephone, I always asked the participants for permission to record the interview because naturally they could not see the voice recorder as in a face-to-face interview.

Face-to-face interviewing was used with nine interviewees. This approach also included travelling overseas since the interviewees were from different countries (Maxfield & Babbie, 2011). Generally, the interviews took place in offices, cafés or during conferences. Face-to-face interviews increase the costs and the interviewer lacks control on situational variables (Shuy, 2003). However, considering the strenuous daily agendas of elite respondents, it was fascinating to discover how policymakers and security professionals preferred to meet in person. Face-to-face interaction is more natural and could lead to further disclosure, though it also 'compels more small talk, politeness routines, joking … [and] nonverbal communication' (Shuy, 2003: 179). In-person interviews reduced the asymmetry of power between the researcher and the respondents. These interviews seemed like a natural everyday conversation and cracking the occasional joke made both of us feel more at ease. When interviewing academics the general ice-breaker was an appreciation of their works (Shipley &

Wood, 1996). They were 'flattered that their work, ideas, and knowledge' were known and this helped to create a rapport (Maxfield & Babbie, 2011: 304). In the case of security specialists and policymakers where little was known about their background, subtle jokes or funny comments helped to break down the serious atmosphere. Ice-breaking remarks were also made by respondents. For instance, after quite a lengthy and serious argumentation on security policy implementation, one of the PM interviewees spontaneously asked, 'So did I convince you? Would you vote for me?' and we both laughed about it.

Lavrakas (1993, as cited in Shuy, 2003) opined that in-person interviews create less fatigue when compared to a twenty- to thirty-minute telephone interview. On their part, Sykes and Collins (1988, as cited in Holstein & Gubrium, 2003) hold the view that the fast pace of telephone interviews hinder the expression of thoughtful responses. In this research, telephone interviews turned out to be more concise and to-the-point than face-to-face interviews. It was also noticeable that the respondents were aware that telephone interviews saved money and time to both parties. Being elite interviewees, they were used to be interviewed. In fact, one of the respondents spent over two-and-a-half hours over the phone discussing the questions (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Contrary to Shuy's (2003) beliefs, telephone interviews did not increase my control (as interviewer) on situational variables. Some respondents were disturbed while being interviewed. These interruptions consisted of people knocking at the door or secretaries calling the respondent for some urgent issues. On average, every interview took about an hour. This was enough time to gather thoughtful responses to all the seventeen questions. This significant period of time also showed that these elite interviewees were willing to talk to somebody interested in their field of work, and to share their experiences and knowledge (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Maxfield & Babbie, 2011).

Sellitz and Jahoda (1962, as cited in Gilbert, 2001) discussed how interviewers and social scientists subject data sources to errors and biases. In order to elicit information with minimal biases the major points were summarised in brief statements. It was also ensured that the themes to be discussed were clear and unambiguous to avoid potential misinterpretations (Maxfield & Babbie, 2011; Shipley & Wood, 1996). The brief statement presenting this project was formulated as follows: 'the aim of this research is to collect a general perception on the research and security applied in the prevention of terrorism and how it can be improved'. It was imperative not to mention 'Cesare Lombroso' or to reveal that their answers would be compared to his work. Revealing the full intent behind this research could have affected their answers and jeopardized the conveyed knowledge (Platt, 1981).

Carson, Gilmore, Perry and Gronhaug (2001: 79-80) provided a list of measures that interviewers should take to ensure a flowing interview. These steps entailed that interviewers should:

1) not interrupt the flow of the interviewee's response regardless of relevance;

2) stay silent as much as possible;

3) not to engage in conversations of agreement or disagreement;

4) remain detached but receptive, for example nodding frequently;

5) maintain eye contact as often as possible; and

6) use encouraging or querying phrases that encourage further disclosure, such as: 'Can you tell me more about …'.

Following these recommendations was not easy but as a researcher one needs to learn to be an assiduous listener and let the interviewee break the conversation (Maxfield & Babbie, 2011). During the interviews there were very few interventions so as not to influence the respondents' discussions. In fact, my interventions consisted of brief utterances like 'yes', 'right' or 'aha'. This feedback was particularly important in telephone interviews since in such contexts there was no physical or visual contact. In fact, during my first telephone interview I kept silent for a while and the respondent suddenly stopped and asked 'hello, are you still there?'

As instructed by the same respondents, before the interviews I sent them the key questions (those in bold in Appendix 3: Guiding interview questions to elite respondents). The interview guide helped the interviewees to prepare themselves, and also helped them to tackle the questions sequentially. In order to gather elaborate answers, together with the main seventeen questions, I reserved a number of sub-questions (those not in bold in Appendix 3). I put these sub-questions only in cases were the respondents were not so talkative and their answers were very short or when they went out of context. These questions also helped further understanding. However, the answers to the main questions of some respondents were so elaborate that the sub-questions became superfluous.

Meeting and interviewing academics and other elite professionals that are usually encountered only as the names of authors of scholarly publications, created an unexpected anxiety. The list of questions helped me to control my anxieties by being focused, methodical, and pragmatic. When the respondents asked for my opinion, I always stressed that I would express my viewpoint at the end of the interview to avoid influencing their responses (King, 2006). The 'playing dumb' tactic was an effective method to elicit information from the respondents and encouraged further disclosure (Harvey, 2011; Smith, 2006). Hathaway and

Atkinson (2003: 174-5) echoed Becker (1954) when stating, 'playing dumb or putting obvious questions to informants at the risk of sounding naive or uninformed, is another tactic … used to elaborate a commonly implied understanding'.

Both face-to-face and telephone interviews were documented using a digital voice recorder (DVR) together with note-taking. Voice recorders are among the most common ways of recording interviews. Since these interviews were exceptional occasions the DVR was an essential tool. This tool also helped me to focus more on topical discussions and interview dynamics (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Rapley, 2007). During this project a number of respondents (from all three sectors) expected and stressed that they had to be recorded because they did not want to waste time repeating themselves. For instance SP6 stated 'the questions are pretty tough to discuss and it will take quite some time to discuss them, so note-taking would simply waste time to write and recall what was stated'. This reflected Fielding and Thomas (2001), who opined that the open use of recording devices showed the respondents the seriousness of the research. Only some respondents who held face-to-face interviews felt intimidated by the DVR even if Bloor and Wood (2006) opined that such reactions could be neutralised by an unconcealed, unobtrusive recording device. However, I decided to use a DVR only after piloting a face-to-face and a telephone interview during which I tested my note-taking skills.

A colleague helped me to test my skills in recording interviews by note-taking, which depends a lot on memory. Piloting interviews helped me to spot difficulties that could have endangered the integrity of the real interviews. While pilot-testing face-to-face interviews I noticed that my presence and non-verbal behaviour (while jotting down notes) influenced my colleague's speech pace. Even without aiming to write down every spoken word, there were moments when I could not manage to take note of salient points of discussion. As soon as my colleague saw me struggling to jot down notes, she asked 'do you want me to repeat?' This interrupted the flow of the conversation (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). When piloting the telephone interviews, my colleague and I stayed in two separate offices. As soon as she started to discuss the interview questions, I was not able to jot down notes fast enough to keep up with her and could not even remember the salient point of the discussion. If that had been an interview with one of the research respondents, I would have wasted a unique interview and a substantial amount of irreplaceable data.

Piloting interviews saved me from jeopardising the integrity of the real interviews and also the consequent loss of salient parts of the collected data. Such a deficit would have marred the integrity of the entire research project. Also, it is worth mentioning that the use of

the audio-recording device facilitated the interaction with the participants and the elaboration of the topics, improved the trustworthiness of the data, and provided the possibility of replaying the recordings numerous times for accurate transcriptions (Bloor & Wood, 2006; Rapley, 2007). Digital voice recorders (DVRs) provide 'high acoustic quality and can record for many hours without interruption. The recordings can be transferred directly to a computer where they can be stored, played for analysis, and transcribed with the use of a word processor' (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009: 179; Rapley, 2007).

To record the telephone conversations I connected the DVR to an in-line recorder that was connected between the telephone and the wall socket (Stephens, 2007). However, scribbling key points and phrases during the interviews was still imperative to enhance the understanding of the encounter because it helped me to record the initial stages before the DVR was switched on, and in particular instances during which the recorder was or had to be switched off (Rapley, 2007). 'Adding field notes about the setting, the conduct of the interview, the interviewee, and so on, will help to bring back the context of the interview later in analysis' (Fielding & Thomas, 2001: 137).

On completion of an interview the next step was transcribing the material so that it could be subsequently analysed. Converting oral speech into written text is 'the solid rock-bottom of an interview project' (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009: 178). However, transcripts are not able to show the tone of voice, non-verbal expressions or a mixture of both such as irony, which like other euphemisms are 'lost in transcription' impoverishing the real discussions (Bourdieu et al., 1999: 622, as cited in Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009: 178). Kvale and Brinkmann (2009: 180) stated that 'the amount and form of transcribing depends on such factors as the nature of the material and the purpose of the investigation, the time and money available, and … the availability of a reliable and patient typist'. Transcription time is subject to the clarity of the recording and the quantities of interview hours which result in a tedious and stressful assignment. An hour-long interview takes from five hours (Atkinson, 1998; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009) to eight hours (Rapley, 2007) to type, resulting in '20 to 25 single-spaced pages' (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009: 180). Such approximations were substantiated in my research which required a hundred and twenty-nine hours of transcription (see Table 4.3), resulting in twenty documents of around thirty pages each.

Table 4.3: Interviews and transcription details

Interviewee	**Policy Makers (PM)** (Interviews in minutes)	**Security Professionals (SP)** (Interviews in minutes)	**Academics (AC)** (Interviews in minutes)
1	75	50	60
2	75	60	30
3	120	60	60
4	70	90	60
5	150	60	30
6	60	60	40
7		30	50
Total No. Interviewing Minutes	550	410	330
Net No. Interviewing Minutes	1,290 minutes = 21.5 hours		
1 hour interview approximately translates in 6 hours of transcription	Total hours of transcription 7,740 minutes = 129 hours		
Total hours of Interviews & Transcription	150.5 hours = 3.7 weeks (based on 40-hour working week)		

Though not necessary, I preferred to transcribe the interviews myself in their entirety, despite the fact that it was very time consuming. As Oakley (1981: 41, as cited in Holstein & Gubrium, 2003: 273) stated, 'interviewing is rather like a marriage: everybody knows what it is, an awful lot of people do it, and yet behind each closed door there is a world of secrets'. This quote perfectly describes why I chose to transcribe every interview myself, because no one knows the 'secrets' that lay behind each of the twenty interviews better than me, whether this relates to the physical setting, facial expressions or the context. Thus, to reduce any risk of reinterpretation, I transcribed all the 21.5 hours of interviews, taking the roles of 'interviewer, transcriber, analyst and primary author' (Poland, 2003: 278).

In most cases the transcriptions were prepared a few hours after the interview. However, the role of the DVR proved decisive when I stopped transcribing for around ten days to travel abroad and interview other participants. When I returned, I had five interviews to transcribe, yet no data had been lost. All transcriptions were made in the language spoken during the interviews, that is, English. Subsequently, the transcripts were reviewed twice to make up for any errors committed due to fatigue or other factors such as the accent, speed and clarity of the recorded speech (Atkinson, 1998; Poland, 2003). In order to establish credibility, Guba and Lincoln (1989, as cited in Holstein & Gubrium, 2003) believed that respondents could assist by checking the transcribed material and validate the trustworthiness

of the data. However, this corroborating measure was not considered to avoid incurring alterations, such as revoking chunks from the original material, as well as delaying the start of the data analysis (Poland, 2003).

Audio-recording devices carry ethical disadvantages, as they reproduce the respondents' words and also the voice, which can reveal the interviewee's identity. Thus, the audio-recordings are to be destroyed on completion of this research project. If the recordings were destroyed upon transcription they would be irretrievable in case they were needed before the end of the project. The only instance when the audio-recording was destroyed upon transcription was Charles's interview, as had been promised to the interviewee. After transcribing all the interviews, I had to skilfully edit the transcribed interview material taking care not to alter the gist of the discourse that would be useful for the thematic analysis. To create impact quotes 'some transcription details [were] omitted in the interest of readability' (Poland, 2003, in Holstein & Gubrium, 2003: 272).

4.6 Thematic analysis and presentation of findings

Completing the interviews and gathering the data is not an easy task but 'there is as much work, or more, to do after the interview as there was before' (Atkinson, 1998: 54). Good organization and planning were essential to proceed smoothly to the post-interview stages of transcribing, interpreting and analysing (Phelps, Fisher & Ellis, 2007). Successful analysis requires a thorough familiarity with the data that enables a rigorous comparison (Fielding & Thomas, 2001). Data from interviews is 'voluminous, unwieldy and time-consuming to organize and analyse' (Phelps *et al.*, 2007: 209). Once the data was transcribed, the interview answers were first separated according to the respective professional background (i.e. policymaking, security and academia), and then listed under every specific question (see Figure 4.1). This method required only a simple cut-and-paste technique. This produced a general, quick and easy analysis of the answers given to a particular question by the respective elite groups (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). This simple and effective method helped to identify and evoke themes that would be analysed, interpreted and discussed (Fielding & Thomas, 2001). After dissecting the gathered data the key question was: 'how should all the data be analysed?' In fact, there is no right way or formula to examine qualitative data but it is the outcome of intellectual craftsmanship (Phelps *et al.*, 2007).

The process by which sense was made of the verbal input was the foundational method of qualitative data analysis, the so-called thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis is a flexible method that pays attention to the qualitative aspects of the material being analysed (Joffe & Yardley, 2004). This method indicates similar or contrasting views and themes within the same group as well as in-between groups. Thematic analysis offers the possibility to identify manifested patterns in the gathered data and also allows the researcher to interpret latent themes that are implicit in the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Daly, Kellehear & Gliksman, 1997; Fereday, 2006; Joffe & Yardley, 2004; Rice & Ezzy, 1999).

For the purpose of organizing a systematic thematic analysis, the transcribed material was separated into two main themes (Braun & Wilkinson, 2003). These two themes were 'terrorism and security policy' and 'research and terrorism'. The individual quotes were given a 'code' or a 'theme', terms that are interchangeably used in thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998). However, in this thesis they are referred to only as 'themes'. Extracting these themes involves noting distinct patterns and labelling them with codes. This process 'is taxing and time-consuming because there are generally no standardized categories' (Joffe & Yardley, 2004: 59). Figure 4.1 illustrates how the answers to Question 1 by AC (Academics) respondents were collated. The column on the right-hand side points out the themes extracted from the raw data.

More in-depth analysis of the data corpus led me to 'discover themes and concepts embedded throughout [my] interviews' (Rubin & Rubin, 1995: 226). 'Once the codes have been developed, refined and clearly described … the researcher may determine the reliability with which the codes can be applied' (Joffe & Yardley, 2004: 62). The two main emerging themes, 'security policies' and 'terrorism research', were inter-related to sub-themes that determined the thematic groupings. These two thematic discussions were necessary to form the foundations of the next two chapters and the individual thematic discussions.

The reliability of the themes was gained when the same theme appeared in different parts of the text (Joffe & Yardley, 2004). For instance, Figure 4.1 shows that in answering the question AC respondents highlighted three different themes 'violence', 'political interest, judgement and agenda', and 'labelling'. The distinct recurrence of 'violence' showed a consistent reliability of this theme among the respondents. In some cases the codes were clearly determined by specific terms that appeared in the quotes. In other cases, to identify the themes I had to dissect the data material, particularly when the extracts described attitudes expressed by the respondents or where it was not possible to quantify the 'keyness' of a theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 82; see also Stenner, 1993). However, in cases of

interpretation it was imperative to provide explicit and specific themes that rationally and reliably coded the transcriptions (Joffe & Yardley, 2004: 63).

Figure 4.1: Process of thematic analysis

1. How would you describe a "terrorist" without using words deriving from the word 'terror'?

Respondent	Raw data	Theme
AC1	I never use the word 'terrorist' because this word is in itself a political act. But I do use the word 'terrorism'. Terrorism is a violent act that terrorises the broader constituency of population mostly civilians.	Violence
	It is difficult to find a definition because it is a political judgement not an analytical term.	Political judgment
AC2	The terrorist is someone who has an extreme political ideology and commits acts to further that ideology whether directly or indirectly.	Violence
	Too many countries and institutions have a particular subjective interest in creating this definition, so it makes it hard to create a definition with objective criteria as it will be hard to apply them. People and countries have their own agenda.	Political interest and agenda
	Criteria that label a group as terrorist is the use of violence but not in war or combat situation.	Labelling
AC3	I prefer not to use the word terrorist at all. In my work I spoke about activists or militants of underground organisations that were using forms of violence. If I was [illegible] to use a [illegible] of terrorism [illegible] refer to [illegible]	Violence

When the data was categorized, the analysis could begin. When codes were easy to identify they were used in a quantitative manner and also illustrated in tables (see Table 5.1, Table 5.2 and Table 6.1) (Joffe & Yardley, 2004). Alternatively, when themes were of a qualitative nature the focus tended to emphasize verbal patterns (Joffe & Yardley, 2004). However, when presenting qualitative outcomes, this work quantified the commonality or the rarity of a tendency by using numbers (for example: 16 of 20 respondents), or descriptors like 'almost all' and 'the majority of' (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 83). To sustain the prevalence of specific themes, a number of direct (but edited) quotes are presented. Next to each quote there is the code of the respective interviewee, for instance AC1, SP5, PM6 and so on.

Methodical thematic analysis allowed emphatic discussions that progressed from describing patterns from the collected data, to interpreting them in a way that elicited theory-building and contributed to knowledge (Patton, 1990). 'Thematizing meanings' is not a specific

method but a generic tool (Holloway & Todres, 2003: 347). Braun and Clarke (2006: 79) refer to thematic analysis as 'a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data.' This malleable characteristic and the absence of fixed parameters of analysis make it possible to use thematic analysis for different research topics (Attride-Stirling, 2001; Boyatzis, 1998; Tuckett, 2005). In this project I first compared the patterns and themes elicited by the interviewees with contemporary theories and the literature on terrorism. Following that, I looked for similarities or contrasting themes in Lombroso's theories in *Gli Anarchici*. The views of Charles were brought up in the thematic discussions only when appropriate.

The simple and effective method of data analysis of this research project did not require any Qualitative Data Analysis Software (QDAS or QDA software) or Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) (Phelps *et al.*, 2007). Though the development of CAQDAS software goes back to the late 1980s (Lewins, 2001), some researchers still prefer to analyse qualitative data without using any particular technology. These alternative methods involve printing the transcripts, reading them closely, cutting up extracts related to themes, and sorting the pieces of paper (Phelps *et al.*, 2007). After transcribing the interviews, I used a word processor to copy, paste and section textual data according to the two main themes and related sub-themes (Lewins, 2001). This method saved paper, money and time because rather than printing hundreds of pages and risk losing printed material, no paper was used.

This method of analysis was adopted only after looking closely into the use of a QDAS. QDAS programs are designed to meet the needs of qualitative researchers. Such software progams support coding, categorization, organization and retrieval of data (Phelps *et al.*, 2007). There are various software packages used in qualitative data analysis, such as AnSWR, ATLAS.ti, NVivo and XSight, to mention a few. These packages aim at facilitating data interpretation, codification and management, while envisaging theory creation (Fielding, 2001; Lee & Fielding, 2010). However, when searching for the 'best' or 'most suitable' software it emerged that this is a very subjective opinion and that it depends on the singular needs, style of analysis and the researcher's individual perspective (Lewins, 2001).

In exploring the possibility of employing a QDAS program, I downloaded a thirty-day trial version of ATLAS.ti6[83]. After a week trying to employ applications suitable for my data analysis it was evident that learning to use this software efficiently required more time because of its multiple functions. Phelps *et al.* (2007) presented a series of arguments for and against the use of QDAS, and explained that 'the time spent on conceptual analysis is not likely to be significantly different' (Phelps *et al.*, 2007: 217). The time spent trying to understand and learn

[83] http://www.atlasti.com

how to use this software properly would have affected the time scheduled for data analysis. Consequently, data was analysed employing a simple word processor which I had available and with which I was familiar. Going through the interviews and transcripts a number of times helped me to become more accustomed to and knowledgeable about the gathered data, and also ensured adherence to the deadlines set for data analysis. To use QDAS skilfully I would have needed more time and that would have required me to temporarily shelve the data analysis (Lewins, 2001).

With regards to the presentation of findings and related discussions there is no rigid demarcation in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. To facilitate the presentation and the discussion of data and to save on the word count, the questions are referred to as 'Q'. So when the reader finds, for instance 'Q1' in the data presentation and analysis, it means 'Question 1'. This applies to all remaining chapters. Following the rules of thumb of reporting interview quotes, as proposed by Kvale & Brinkmann (2009: 279-280), it was made sure that the quotes were related to the general text; contextualized with the topic of the question; and interpreted in a way to prove or disprove a thematic outcome. Other rules entailed that the quotes were balanced with the text and that an interview quote was not more than half a page long (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). In the interest of readability and comprehension, the overwhelming amount of interview material collected in the original transcripts was edited down. As a result, only salient parts of the transcribed data are presented (Poland, 2003). This also entailed that only the best quotes were used, and repetitions, digressions and pauses were edited down and marked with three consecutive dots '…' (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009: 280-281). However, in cases where the quotes provided close yet diverse dimensions, key excerpts from all respondents (of a particular sector) were presented to support the theme under analysis. For instance, in Chapter 5 (Section 5.2), the data presents quotes from all the SP respondents when replying to Q6 (Question 6).

The data corpus discussed in the next two chapters was obtained from only twelve of the seventeen questions put to the elite respondents. Seven questions were presented and analysed in Chapter 5 and five other questions in Chapter 6. Questions 4, 8, 9, 13 and 14 were not discussed in either of the two chapters. This happened because either the respondents did not answer, or because when answering earlier questions, the respondents unintentionally replied to questions that were yet to come. In the former eventuality, the interviewees did not know how to answer, or they refused to answer and simply skipped the questions. In the latter case, interviewees simply replied, 'I answered this in the previous questions'.

4.7 Concluding comments

This chapter illustrated how analysis of contemporary terrorism research and the translation of Lombroso's research on anarchist terrorism determined the querying issues that were highlighted in the methodological process of this research project. This reflected on the requirement of very specific capabilities and knowledge of the purposive sample of elite respondents whose in-depth responses revealed unique aspects of security policies and the nature of terrorism research. This chapter also served to illustrate the difficulties encountered in the attempt to interview active or former activists in political violence. Chance, persistence and exploited opportunities determined the outcome of this research when securing interviews with both the elite respondents and Charles.

Ethical issues did not prove to be a problem for this study. However, finding and accessing a sample with expertise on counterterrorism was one of the main difficulties in fulfilling the aims of this research. Matters of confidentiality and anonymity of the interviewees together with the sensitivity of information on terrorism affected the issues investigated in the study. This chapter also pointed out the various limitations, mainly financial, geographical and time, that determined the strategies used during data collection.

This methodological rigour determined the two emergent themes: the acquisition of knowledge to create security policies, and the methods used in terrorism research. These two themes are thoroughly explored in the next two chapters. Chapter 5 presents and discusses the elites' perspectives on security policies, the factors that influence the dynamics of intelligence gathering, and the potential improvement of the implemented policies. Chapter 6 explores the contributions of terrorism research and which methods endow this academic field with new empirical and pragmatic research. Both discussions examine the analysed themes in light of contemporary academic research and Lombroso's studies. These findings are then confronted with Charles's experiences and commentaries in two postscripts at the end of Chapter 5 and 6.

Chapter 5: Terrorism and security policies

This chapter discusses security policies in countering terrorism based on the data collected from twenty interviewees. This data analysis explores the perspectives of the policymakers (PM), security professionals or practitioners (SP) and academics (AC) involved in understanding, counteracting and curbing terrorism. This chapter discusses seven of the seventeen questions under four related themes: definition of terrorism (Q1); security and terrorism management (Q2 and Q6); counterterrorism and policymaking (Q7, Q5 and Q16); and imprisonment and rehabilitation (Q17). The discussion around each theme follows the same format and sequence: presentation of interview findings, followed by references to the literature, and finally, discussion and analysis drawing on the work of Lombroso. Following these thematic discussions, the chapter ends with a postscript on the additional interview with the extremist Charles. This epilogue presents Charles's reflections on extremism and first-hand experiences and compares them with both the results obtained from the main interviews of the three groups of respondents and also with Lombroso's findings in his research on anarchists.

5.1 Definition of terrorism

The majority of acknowledged authorities in the field of terrorism struggle with its definition (English, 2009; Gupta, 2008; Hoffman, 1998, 2006; Jackson, 2011, as cited in Bryan, 2012; Townsend, 2002; Wilkinson, 2001, 2006, 2006a, 2011). As Banks (2013: 220) stated, the 'fundamental to any discussion of terrorism is an understanding of the meaning and scope of the term'. The definition of terrorism is a multifaceted political issue. For example, some researchers dismiss or ignore the existence of state terrorism and consider terrorism as solely a crime by non-state actors (Banks, 2013). The data presented below confirms that defining terrorism is a contested territory (Hoffman, 2006), something that I refer to as 'knowledgeable incoherence'. Question 1 asked 'How would you describe a "terrorist"?' It is important to note that respondents were specifically asked to define the term 'terrorist' without, using the word 'terror' or its derivatives. This question was designed to gather definitions that did not over-rely on this term (Hoffman, 2006; Jackson, 2011).

The respondents were asked to offer their personal perspectives rather than the official definitions of their respective agencies or organizations. However, PM1 and SP3 avoided any interpretation of the term 'terrorist' and both mentioned that the official European Union definition of terrorism is found in the Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism of 13th June 2002. They justified their reluctance to give a definition of this term by claiming that 'this interpretation of terrorism solved the problem of finding a common definition of this phenomenon that suits the rule of law and justice' (PM1); and managed 'to define what scholars were incapable of defining' (SP3). The majority of policymakers highlighted the use of violence:

> Terrorists are sympathizers that use violence for political purposes, violence against non-military targets and violence in relation [to] a political objective. (PM4)

> A terrorist is a person that is ready to do any act with any possible means to get to his final end. The damage caused is considered as a need for a 'just cause'. (PM5)

> I cannot see a non-violent terrorist … the terrorist uses violence or threatens to use violence against civilians in order to influence the behaviour of others. (PM6)

> A person that uses illicit means and criminal acts for a 'just cause', targeting the general public indiscriminately. But these perspectives vary according to the person, country and time. 'Who is the terrorist' varies according to who is committing the act and who is suffering the consequences. (PM2)

> A terrorist is a person or a group of persons who would have an objective in mind whether religious, political or even for monetary gain intend[ing] to destroy planes or ships or harm, kill or injure people. (PM3)

Interestingly, the answers of PM5 and PM6 focused more on the underlying motivation and extremist ideologies that underpin terrorist individuals and groups.

> Terrorism can be committed by non-state actors, such as underground groups that are practically invisible until they commit an attack. (PM5)

> If they are single-issue groups … it is hard to say across the board what kind of objective they have as it depends on their ideology. Groups like Earth Liberation Front (ELF), do something that is called 'ecotage'[84] … but these groups do not intend to murder anyone. (PM6)

In the same manner, slightly more than half of the academic respondents answered this question by referring to the use of violence for political objectives and by regularly associating

[84] A hybrid word consisting of the prefix 'eco' and the end part of the word 'sabotage'.

it with non-state actors. They also highlighted the political judgement and labelling associated with the use of this term:

> The terrorist is someone who has an extreme political ideology and commits violent acts to further that ideology through actions. (AC2)

> Terrorists have problematic behaviours … are emotionally disruptive, and come from upset environments. They don't fall in the clinical notions of abnormality but are trapped in their ideologies. (AC7)

> The terrorist is someone who uses or promotes the use of violence to achieve some kind of political objective. They generally tend to be non-state actors that try to subvert, overthrow or de-legitimise the authority of the state … target[ing] that violence towards non-combatants or civilians. (AC6)

> An individual who carries threats or acts of violence intended to instil fear in a wide audience, apart from the direct victim, so that, that audience is ... changing its behaviour in some way. Terrorists can be state actors as well as non-state actors. (AC5)

However, the other three AC respondents were more conscious of the conceptualisation and overly politicized label of 'terrorism', and they preferred to use the terms 'activists' or 'militants', while also highlighting their violent activities:

> I never use the word 'terrorist' because this word is in itself a political act. But I do use the word 'terrorism'. Terrorism is a violent act that terrorises the broader constituency of population, mostly civilians. It is difficult to find a definition because it is a political judgement not an analytical term, that transposes political consequences. (AC1)

> I prefer not to use the word terrorist at all. In my work I spoke about activists or militants of underground organisations that were using forms of violence. Using terms like terrorist in order to define individuals is dangerous because it tends to hide some parts of their motivations. If I was forced to use a definition of terrorism, I would refer to international law which defines forms of terrorism as violence against civilians. (AC3)

> It is not useful at all to talk about terrorists. Terrorism is a label that de-legitimises people. I would call them militants, members of an extremist organization, soldiers or guerrillas. However, terrorists might also be state officials or policemen. The point is what they do. Characteristics of acts of terrorism are the threat or actual use of violence intended to cause harm … targeting an audience, which is aimed at sending a political message. (AC4)

It is worth noting that the larger part of security practitioners (5 of 7) also focused their descriptions on the behaviour of non-state terrorists:

> The terrorist is an individual who threatens to disrupt or actually disrupts

> society with violent activity for an ideological goal. (SP6)
>
> Terrorists are willing to go very far in their actions, using violent acts to convince other people of their principles. (SP2)
>
> The terrorist is a person who tries to achieve an objective, deriving from his strong ideological convictions, by using unconventional methods … [and] impose his ideology on the majority, knowing that there are no ways of convincing others through dialogue that his ideology is better than theirs. (SP4)
>
> Terrorists use violence for their own ideals. So people using violence for their ideologies explains what terrorism is. (SP5)
>
> A terrorist is an individual who creates fear beyond the immediate impact of the incident … to achieve political, religious objectives. It is difficult to define terrorism or find a common definition because groups make use of terror to achieve their objectives … [which] might have legal, political, religious or any other recognitions within a society or at international level. (SP1)

The three respondent groups were mindful of the complexities in defining terrorism and there was something of a consensus regarding the problematic definitional contours. However, having to avoid the use of the word 'terror', the respondents resorted primarily to the term 'violence'. This applied to all three groups. Policymakers and security professionals were very inclined to use the term 'violence', particularly with regards to non-state actors. The academics' perspectives also highlighted the labelling that is inherent in the word 'terrorism', together with the political objectives that motivated this violence. In these definitions, the word 'violence' was used 55 times. In the 13 responses of policymakers and academics, the word 'violence' was used 44 times (policymakers - 13 times; academics - 31 times). In contrast, 6 of 7 security professionals used this term only 11 times. To a greater extent, the respondents considered non-state actors as the 'terrorists'. Only AC4 took a rather different perspective and focused more on the possibility of terrorism being carried out by state actors.

Similarly, Schmid and Jongman (1988: 76-77, as cited in Schmid, 2011) oberved that from the identified 109 definitions of 'terrorism', 83.5 per cent used the terms 'violence' and 'force'. The overall results reflected Wilkinson's (2001: 12-13, as cited in Banks, 2013) description of terrorism as 'the systematic use of coercive intimidation, usually to service political ends'. The term 'systematic' highlights the deliberate actions of terrorists (Wilkinson, 2012) where 'violence is used for political purposes or in relation to a political objective' (PM4). As Banks (2013: 220) stated, 'terrorism is a method or means of achieving an objective'. Terrorism encompasses a myriad of phenomena that necessitates individualized analytical tools to differentiate between regime terror and non-state actors that make up domestic or

international terrorism (Wilkinson, 2012). For instance, single-issue terrorists like the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) carry out 'ecotage', while ethnical groups want to overturn the state. Since every faction commits criminal acts according to their idiosyncratic ideologies (Horgan, 2008a), it is more difficult to find 'a clear line of action' (PM5) that fits different terrorist groups. The reason why the latest academic research is focused mainly on gruesome non-state terrorist acts is Al Qaeda (Wilkinson, 2012).

Terrorist groups and individuals believe their struggle is legitimate. Consequently, terrorist violence and political motivations cannot be understood unless the surrounding context is taken in consideration (Bryan, 2012). 'Terrorism varies according to the country, time, and who is the terrorist' (PM2). This conforms to Hoffman's (2006: 37) portrayal of the terrorist as 'fundamentally an altruist' as well as to Kellen's (1982: 10) belief that a 'terrorist without a cause (at least in his own mind) is not a terrorist'. Nonetheless, the term 'terrorism' creates a demonization of the actor without any distinction with regards to motivations, *modus operandi* and regime policies, provoking a counter-terror impetus of violence (Banks, 2013; Bryan, 2012; Hoffman, 2006; Schmid, 2011; Wilkinson, 2012). The results from AC respondents indicated that labelling terrorists as dangerous individuals tends to render vague their political motivations, and also hinders the possibility of understanding their ideologies. 'Rejectionists argue that the term [terrorism] should be abandoned in academic research because it is now too ideologically tainted to be used as the basis for objective or rigorous research' (Jackson, 2011: 117). In fact critical terrorism studies argue in favour of abandoning the concept of terrorism (Wilkinson, 2012).

Politics influence the description of terrorism and the identification of the terrorist. As a result this stimulus also affects terrorism studies. Research tends to focus predominantly on non-state violence and actors (Hoffman, 2006). However, the legitimacy of terrorist acts tends to bifurcate in state and non-state violence (English, 2009). As AC5 stated, 'terrorists can be state actors as well as non-state actors'. Consequently, more research should be conducted using in-depth empirical and historical approaches that elicits significant knowledge on non-state and regime terrorism (Wilkinson, 2012). Critical terrorism studies also call for less partisan research – wherein researchers avoid becoming spokespersons for the governments that fund their studies (Schmid, 2011; Smyth, 2009). AC4 and AC5 conceived terrorism as an action by non-state actors, which excludes also state representatives like the armed forces or secret services. However, AC4 maintained that 'governments would oppose a definition that labels state-actors the same as non-state actors'.

The results obtained from academics showed the potential usefulness and difficulties of finding a suitable definition of 'terrorism' (Schmid, 1997, 2004, 2011). These responses

contrasted with the vague and slippery perceptions of the five security practitioners that focused mainly on the terrorist as a non-state individual. On encountering difficulties of definition, SP7 declined to give an answer and SP3 deferred to both official and academic interpretations of the definition of 'terrorism'. The other SP respondents mentioned potential ways of how a person was attracted to participate in violent terrorist activities. These respondents also considered 'the terrorist' as an individual who looked for ways and opportunities to get into contact with extremist factions that reinforced and manipulated particular beliefs and ideologies. However, as SP1 stated, 'the concept of terrorism is continuously evolving and any definition of what constitutes a group or practices of that group varies according to the surrounding circumstances'. Political violence exposes a 'specific political, social, economic and cultural background to a terrorist conflict' (Wilkinson, 2012: 17). In general, the results obtained highlight the fact that terrorism is seen as synonymous with the justified (from the actor's perspective) use of violence to achieve political changes. However, the demonization and politicization of the term 'terrorism' labels individuals and groups but exonerates governments from being called terrorists. These political issues interfere with achieving a neutral definition hindering the possibility of finding a common definition of terrorism that suits policymakers, security practitioners and academics.

Given the importance and difficulties associated with the definition of terrorism, the interviewees seemed quite quick in finding words that expressed their perception of terrorism. In the nineteenth century, Cesare Lombroso was among the first researchers that attempted to define and understand political violence, its underlying ideologies and the individual actors specifically involved in anarchist terrorism. Penologists at the time were reluctant to recognize the existence of political crime but Lombroso and Laschi (1892, as cited in Daly, 2002: 68) defined it as 'any violent harm caused to laws established by the majority to preserve the political, economic or social system that it desires'. Moreover, Daly (2002: 74) argued that 'the harshness of punishments against political crime should be attenuated according to the local conditions'. *Gli Anarchici* showed that finding a definition of terrorism was taken lightly by Lombroso, whose main intention was to understand the causes, motivations and ideologies of anarchists. Lombroso (1895) concluded that the anarchists' use of violence was a reaction to political, economic and social grievances. The main focus of the interviewees' definition was on the individual, non-state perpetrator. Contrary to these results, when studying anarchists Lombroso did not avoid exploring the terror imposed by the state, because his ambition was to stop the use of violence in order to reclaim justice. Thus, he pursued the understanding of both anarchist actors and state actors, as was the case in the academic responses.

While Wilkinson (2012) focused on a contextual inquiry, Lombroso (1895: 6-8) aimed at identifying those social and economic conditions that attracted what he called 'altruistic fanatics' to engage in extremely violent behaviour to overcome their difficulties. In agreement with Ferrero, Lombroso (1895: 8) considered religion as one of the main attractions for extremists to engage in violence and described it as a 'lightning conductor of fanaticism'. When exploring the influencing factors that motivated non-born criminals to commit violent acts, Lombroso (1895: 111) also considered Nicolo Machiavelli's and Benjamin Franklin's writings to explain that government mismanagement brought seditions that enforced extremist ideologies, such as anarchism. However, these struggles and grievances were ignored by politicians and the privileged classes. Consequently, he claimed that in order to better understand the internal struggle faced by society, one would need to refer to 'highly conscientious people like Tolstoi, Richet, Sergi, Hugo, Zola, Nordau, De Amicis, who will tell you that it seems that the end of our century has indeed a sad outlook'[85] (Lombroso, 1895: 16).

5.2 Security and terrorism risk management

Terrorism is an action or a weapon system used by regimes, governments and non-state factions (Wilkinson, 2006a; Wilkinson & Stewart, 1987). Non-state group terrorism emerged as the type that was most commonly referred to by respondents as only two AC interviewees discussed terrorism by state actors. Consequently, the results obtained from Q2 and Q6 discuss security and terrorism risk management in terms of non-state terrorism as the main threat. The discussion evolved around the concept of security provisions and the level of terrorist threat.

'Security is by nature a very broad concept that comprises several dimensions' (Biscop, 2005: 1), and it was important to find what the respondents understand by this term. The four examples below taken from SP respondents considered security as a form of protection from threats that range from the individual level to a global scale:

> Security is that situation where citizens have the freedom to do whatever is legally abiding without interference from any external force, actor or situation that instils fear and hinders them from their freedoms. (SP1)

> Security is the implementation of all the necessary measures that prevent people from carrying out criminal acts. (SP2)

[85] '*Uomini d'alta coscienza, Tolstoi, p. es., Richet, Sergi, Hugo, Zola, Nordau, De Amicis, essi vi diranno che la nostra fine di secolo appare ben triste*'.

> Security is a state of protection needed to safeguard interests or persons, whether individually or globally. Security protects people from potential danger. (SP4)

> There are two parts of security: the first is to keep the threats away and the second to protect against potential dangers. (SP5).

Meanwhile, the majority of academics (6 of 7) characterized security in parallel to the security practitioners but widened the scope of the term and included concepts of safeguarding social aspects and general well-being.

> Security safeguards the well-being, safety and quality of life of citizens (AC1)

> Security is public safety and aims to create security and minimise public fear. (AC2)

> Security is defending people's life including the social aspect and social security. Security is not only lack of violence but also lack of unjust and unfair limitations at an individual level. (AC3)

> Security is about the psychological feeling of being safe from harm and it is based on perceptions, a condition that is not necessarily related to hard material or external factors. (AC4)

> Security is the perception of safety and vulnerability to threats. (AC6)

> Security might mean several things: protecting the government against victimization; and protecting citizens from victimization. So our sense of security might change in time. (AC7)

Conversely, the policymakers tended to take a broad diplomatic stance that supports democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Security was understood more in terms of intelligence and military power, as shown in the following examples taken from the four PM interviewees:

> Security allows people to pursue their fundamental rights. In a democracy, security is closely related to the monopoly of power of government … balanced fundamental rights and political contracts. (PM1)

> Security is law and order that establishes norms that safeguard the peace of mind of whoever lives in that particular society. In case of terrorism … security is tightly linked with intelligence-gathering and sharing. (PM2)

> Security is to secure as much as possible the health and safety of persons and infrastructures, and to instil peace of mind in civilians. (PM3)

> Security is simply the absence of threat or in a broader sense the absence of coercion. Security is military security ... the aim is all about defence

policies. (PM6)

As a result, the policymakers' responses express the pursuit of an ideal of stability through the use of intelligence and military powers. The results obtained from the policymakers fall somewhere in between the socially oriented perceptions of academics and the protection-from-threat preoccupations of security practitioners. These overlaps in the perceptions of security are illustrated in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1: Perceptions of security



These perceptions show that security does not necessarily relate to impartial external realities. 'Feelings influence our perceptions in relation to various threats, including terrorism, even though the probability is similar to that of being struck by lightning' (AC4). As argued by Manunta and Manunta (2006: 633), 'security is a product of human rationality … [determined] by perceptions, wills, needs, interests, capabilities and intentions'. Thus, before exploring potential security provisions that address the threat of terrorism, it was important to explore the assessed levels of the terrorist threat to the security of the European Union, and find out who decides these threat levels (Q6).

All seven security professionals answered this question and when compared to the other two respondent groups, SPs were the most comfortable to talk about the threat level. However, this willingness did not provide more consistent information on the threat levels because SP6 considered the threat level as high, SP5 indicated that the threat as low, and SP2 was unable to specify a level. The other three respondents believed that the level of threat varied according to the individual member state, the kind of terrorist organizations and the intelligence available.

> The threat levels for Europe are high because of EU and NATO activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen and Kenya. (SP6)
>
> The threat level is relatively low at the moment. The National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism decides the threat level. (SP5)
>
> I don't know what the threat level to the security of EU is. In the Netherlands, the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism decides the national level of threat. (SP2)
>
> The threat is low as major attacks have not happened and some incidents have been prevented. We need to maintain certain ongoing measures and develop cooperation between societies and nation-states. (SP7)
>
> The threat varies and most of the time it is classified information that is spread on a 'need-to-know' basis. Europol provides only the police perspective but there other institutions that participate in this exercise that cannot be identified. (SP1)
>
> Threat levels in the EU vary according to the member state … as evident through the intelligence of the respective member states and abroad … [and] how terrorist organizations behaved in the past. The EU SITCEN (Joint Situation Centre) provides early warnings and assists in policy development. (SP3)
>
> It is impossible to assess the current threat level to security in the whole EU because it varies according to the different member state. (SP4)

These results show that threat levels vary according to individual member states. However, since Europe is involved in various military activities, the overall threat level is considered as high. Though these security professionals contended different perspectives of the threat level, they were the only respondents that pointed out a number of entities that were involved in assessing the level of the terrorist threat. The identified entities included: Europol (SP1), the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism in the Netherlands (SP2; SP4), and the EU SITCEN (Joint Situation Centre) (SP3). These centres provide early warnings, situational awareness and intelligence analysis to assist in policy development and

counterterrorism. Other institutions that contribute towards identifying official levels of threat could not be mentioned because, as SP6 highlighted:

> The strength of democracy is in its transparency but intelligence services work from the principle of source protection in order to obtain the most reliable information. (SP6)

The academics' responses to this question did not clarify the potential terrorist threat level but the majority (6 of 7) of the AC respondents indicated that their perception of the threat level was inclined towards 'low' or 'not higher than usual'. Three academics (AC1, AC3 and AC4) stated that the terrorism threat was in general 'quite low'. In this group of interviewees, only AC6 and AC7 considered the threat as 'elevated' and 'quite high', respectively. Additionally, AC5 gave a vague answer that could not precisely indicate whether the level was high or low. In contrast, AC2 did not want to comment on the current terrorist threat level because the methods of measuring it were not reliable and neutral. Hence, AC2 argued that 'threat levels need to be based on empirical research to maintain objectivity'. The results from the six academic respondents indicate the following:

> The threat in the EU is different from country to country but I think it is elevated. Security and intelligence decide this threat level. Knowing the current level of threat does not cause alarm, heighten anxiety or increase worries ... [because] terrorism is part of everyday talk. (AC6)

> The threat level is quite high but I don't know who decides it. The threat level is pretty high according to intelligence sources. (AC7)

> Compared to road accidents or domestic accidents as a threat to life, terrorism is relatively of low risk. International intelligence will assess the risk. There are certain domestic entities that determine the threat level but there is also information that governments pass at an international level. (AC1)

> The alarm among the general public depends on the different levels of attention. At the moment the threat level is not high. If recently there was terrorist activity people would pay more attention. (AC3)
> According to all available evidence the level of threat is extremely low. It is a myth that terrorism presents a serious threat to the security of any country. In the last year the number of people killed in terrorist attacks in the EU is zero … in the last ten years it is probably the same as people killed by lightning. (AC4)

> I don't think that the level of threat is any higher now than it has ever been in the EU. Security actors in the EU corroborate and decide the threat level. People should be made aware of the threat to become more vigilant [and] the implemented security measures would appear justified. (AC5)

The four answers from the policymakers focused more on how the threat level is used for political advantages. The other two PM respondents stated that they preferred not to answer since there was no official stance by the European Union. However, PM3 stressed that 'the public does not need to know of this threat level otherwise alarm is caused'. The four reactions were the following:

> The threat level is still severe as the intelligence services and police say, but I think at the moment it is in a recession. Sometimes it is a political game. For example, when you have a security package going to parliament you raise the threat level and you come up with new policing schemes. Threat levels do not cause alarm. People are unaware of what the threat level is, even if this is available on certain websites. (PM6)

> The current level of threat has diminished. The threat level is decided by the authorities but one has to be careful not to raise unnecessary alarm among the general public. (PM2)

> There is no official answer as the Commission does not gather such intelligence information. Only Europol can answer this but it is not the whole picture. Police and security services have their own interests and agendas and want to secure their own budget. A certain level of threat secures the law enforcement agencies' future resources. (PM1)

> The level of threat depends a lot on the current situation that changes according to the perceived threats making it almost impossible to say what it actually is. The Home Office or the intelligence services generally decide this threat level. Most of the time the public is not knowledgeable of certain aspects… Thus, if certain information is made public it could cause alarm and panic and will do more harm than good. (PM5)

The policymakers' responses indicate that whereas the threat level depended on the contextual situation, it seems that it was quite low or in decline. Table 5.1 indicates that four of the overall responses perceived that the threat was either elevated or extremely high. Seven responses considered the threat level in the middle-to-low range. The other respondents did not comment on the particular level of threat since it varied according to numerous variables, or they did not know, or gave vague answers. Similarly, six academic respondents and four policymakers claimed that intelligence and security services were the main responsible entities that decided the threat levels and generally they considered this threat as elevated and severe.

Table 5.1: Perception of terrorist threat level

Respondents	Answers		
	High to extremely high level of threat	Low level of threat (Not higher than usual)	Other
SP	1	2	4
AC	2	4	/
PM	1	1	2
Total	**4**	**7**	**6**

'Modelling approaches for assessing terrorism risk have been an outgrowth' (Chatterjee & Abkowitz, 2011: 1133). Assessing the risk of terrorism by analysing arrests and convictions does not produce the actual threat level. The lack of transparency from the security services becomes the subject of discussions that contemplate the real threat of terrorism from two opposing ends. At one end there are speculations that the terrorist threat level is exaggerated or inflated to suit political agendas and gain more funds (Mueller, 2006; Jackson, 2011). For instance, like Mueller (2006) and Lustick (2012), AC1 and AC4 highlighted the improbability of being hit by a terrorist attack by comparing it to the much higher probability of becoming victims of traffic accidents. At the opposite end, authorities cannot underestimate the terrorist threat to state security as this could result in serious future repercussions (Lutz & Lutz, 2012).

The majority of the responses indicate that the terrorist threat is close to low range. However, it is difficult to predict how the public would react to a real terrorist threat. The responses indicated three possibilities of how the public would react. These were increased vigilance, panic, or complete ignorance of the threat levels. However, these reactions would vary again according to public sensitivity, experiences and psychological distress caused by recent terrorist events (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small & Fischhoff, 2003; Schuster *et al.*, 2001). All these aspects make the management of security and the risk of terrorism more difficult to assess (Kunreuther, 2002). The results show that even security personnel and law enforcers tend to react differently. In some cases, the security entities were more secretive, while others tended to be more transparent with the general public. When being more transparent the intention was to encourage the public to assume a more active role in 'singling out individuals or groups that are more at risk of becoming terrorist actors' (AC3). However, the way these entities behave varies with geographical and sociological differences because, as SP6 stated, 'Dutch persons are policed in different ways than Spanish society is policed'.

The book *Gli Anarchici* did not describe the term 'security' but explored the main harms and abuses that created insecurity. In this work Lombroso identified the main sufferings and

how anarchist ideologies interpreted them to inspire fanatics to get involved in extremist actions. Similarly, the interviewees associated 'security' with the social security, general well-being, and the use of intelligence and military power to secure balanced fundamental rights and law and order. In order to understand anarchists and design adequate countermeasures, Lombroso consulted sources from around the world that provided overviews of who were the anarchist actors, and described their background and potentialities. To sustain this argument, Lombroso referred to statistics from the Parisian police force that recorded the different employments and offices held by anarchist actors. However, Lombroso (1895: 19) criticized these statistics as they were 'not very accurate and neutral'[86]. The economic grievances suffered by the majority of the people were a main catalyst of anarchist violence. Lombroso explained how this political violence was a protest against the superior classes. In his work Lombroso explored various case studies to show that these violent actions were undertaken by anarchists that were educated individuals and professionally employed with a high economic status rather than by poor people.

As a result Lombroso proposed that, when governments did not respect the rule of law and human rights, they stimulated violent reactions. Lombroso pointed out that the lack of protection and social well-being were consequences of despotic and dishonest governments that used public money for personal interests. With the phrase 'the money of the municipality is nobody's money'[87] Lombroso (1895: 24-5) described the administrative financial abuses by which governments increased the hardship of poor citizens. Moreover, to keep this dominion over political and economic privileges, governments used brutal military force.

Though using different terminologies, Lombroso also discussed that authorities used the threat posed by anarchists for their purposes and agendas. This is another significant similarity with the results obtained from the interviews. The results showed that the lack of transparency on how the security services gauge, assess and decide the terrorist threat became the focus of a number of debates in critical terrorism studies. In fact, extremely high threat levels were perceived to be part of a political game that sustained new policing schemes (PM6) and secured future resources for prescribed agendas (PM1). According to Jackson (2011), inflated levels of the terrorist threat induced governments to gain more power with the premise of safeguarding their countries. While Lombroso stressed that the existence of policing and military entities would be in danger if major threats were to be extinguished. In *Gli Anarchici* this is explained as follows:

[86] *'Da una statistica, per certo poco esatta e poco imparziale della prefettura di Parigi'.*
[87] '*Denaro del Comune, denaro di nessuno'.*

> Let us imagine an army in a country where there are no reasons, or fear, of civil or external war. The army will either provoke war or, if this does not succeed, the army will disband. A police force that has no crimes to investigate and no criminals to arrest will invent crimes and criminals, or the police will cease to exist[88] (Lombroso, 1895: 27)

Thus, according to some interviewees, the critical terrorism studies and Lombroso, security entities need to keep the struggle against threats like terrorism alive and the threat levels elevated as if it is only a question of *when* and not *if* there is a next attack. However, whether the threat levels are a political game or a reality, terrorism remains difficult to assess and manage and so security entities should aim to be prepared for the worst case scenarios even when the threat is not considered as elevated (Kunreuther, 2002). From the AC respondents' viewpoint, it is important to keep neutral perspectives and assess the situation using empirical research. Unbiased results reflect the countries' socio-political issues rather than gut instincts, common sense or political passions (Lustick, 2012). Lombroso also aimed to assess the anarchist threat at the individual level, within the social context and in the political administration. The outcomes of this assessment did not provide a gauging tool that identified how high the anarchist threat is. However, Lombroso achieved empirically-based results that helped him to provide a series of recommendations that facilitated the management of anarchist terrorism and security without resorting to violence.

5.3 Counterterrorism and policymaking

Implementing counterterrorism policies demands an elaborate risk assessment process which includes a thorough understanding of the threat through intelligence, and followed by timely and effectively coordinated actions (Garrick *et al*., 2004). To counter terrorism, Garrick *et al*. (2004) recommended a series of steps that led to the implementation of security measures. These steps start with intelligence gathering and coherent analysis of the potential threats and vulnerabilities, and move on to the identification of potential attack scenarios. The final phases entail the decision-making in countering terrorist attacks and their implementation.

[88] '*Mettete un esercito in un paese in cui non ci sieno ne ragioni né paure di guerra interna od esterna, ed esso provocherâ la guerra, o, se non ci riesce, si disfarà. Una polizia dove non ci sieno delitti da scoprire e delinquenti da arrestare, provochera, inventera i delitti ed i delinquenti, o cessera di esistere'.*

Question 7 enquired about the type of information necessary to create meaningful security policies. The answers of all seven security interviewees suggested the gathering of all possible information or intelligence from different sources, including the community.

> Intelligence collection, corroboration, assessment, dissemination, updating and feedback are important to have the appropriate security and policies in place. (SP1)
>
> Situational awareness and intelligence analysis are needed to assist policy development. (SP3)
>
> Good intelligence coming from reliable sources, knowledge of cultures and cultural issues are the key. (SP4)
>
> The basic things for security is to have intelligence on the developments in society and what is happening in the world, such as changes in people's opinion, group forming, groups splitting and new political groups. (SP2)
>
> You need information from the entire society: the governmental level, the private sector level, the administration level, law enforcement level and intelligence service level. (SP6)
>
> There must be a comprehensive understanding of all sectors because terrorism is not only a matter of the police or the military. (SP7)
>
> When we see something suspicious, strange or unusual then we pass on the information to the police. (SP5)

Analogously, almost all academics (6 of 7) considered the use of intelligence in combination with empirical-based information on social and political grievances.

> Intelligence sources should be there but there needs to be also understanding of the political context in which the political violence occurs. (AC1)
>
> Objective empirical information is needed most. A lot of information is not based on actual facts as they are occurring. Security policies may be the product of fear or just public opinion as opposed to that based on objective criteria. (AC2)
>
> Security policies cannot be isolated from knowledge about social conflicts and about different actors that participate in this conflict. (AC3)
>
> All you need is accurate statistics on the threat. How many terrorists are there, how many attacks are they capable of launching every year, how many people die regularly from terrorism? Proper information means meaningful security policy. (AC4)
>
> Most policies on security issues tend to be driven by the latest drama or crisis. It is important to have security policies drawn on multiple

> constituents, multiple actors, and multiple levels to be able to give everybody a role in responding to terrorism. (AC6)
>
> The necessary information is gathered from an effective intelligence system and analytical studies. Meaningful security policy requires environmental design of the situational context. (AC7)

Again almost all policymakers (5 of 6) cited a list of sources of information that could be conveniently used in creating meaningful security policies. These sources included academic studies, intelligence, case-law, legislation and case studies.

> Sociological and social information will surely help. There is also the psychological impact of crime on citizens. (PM1)
>
> The most important is intelligence coordination through security services, but every country tends to be very possessive over intelligence. (PM2)
>
> Valuable information would include case-law, local and international legislation, sources of security, and academic books and articles on security. (PM3)
>
> Accurate information is built on properly analysed facts. By understanding the criminal activity to be countered, in hindsight, one can avoid copycats. This is the key tool to stop international terrorism. (PM4)
>
> Meaningful security policies need good intelligence. Intelligence gives you an idea of what might happen, what the threats are and who the actors are. Without properly functioning intelligence you are blind. (PM6)

Though information from diverse sources is necessary to create meaningful and effective security policies, intelligence remains a key element in counterterrorism. Lack of and out-dated intelligence databases create 'data holes' that jeopardise the accuracy, reliability and completeness of data. Misinformation spread by terrorists creates overestimations of the perceived risks and inter-agency barriers can hinder information sharing (Garrick *et al*., 2004). Also, as AC1 emphasised, 'there is good intelligence in relation to jihad attacks (the Al Qaeda front), but authorities lack information on other extremist groups in the community'. Intelligence aims at increasing the predictability of threats. However, intelligence is subject to failures and is often riddled with ambiguities and uncertainties that affect policymaking (Betts, 2009). The '9/11 Commission Report' blamed intelligence analysis in failing to prevent Al Qaeda's multiple attacks. Marrin (2011) challenged this report and cited Immerman (2008) who argued that intelligence analysis was never implied in US national security policies. Presumably, intelligence could influence policymakers in implementing policies but decision-

makers cannot implement the strategic policies that address potential threats without reading intelligence material (Betts, 2009; Marrin, 2011).

At this point it was imperative to find out who the respondents considered to be responsible when it came to responding to and preventing terrorist attacks (Q5). The larger part of security respondents (6 of 7) stressed the importance of a combined multi-agency approach. This approach would comprise the contribution of the government and also the community in the prevention and control of terrorism.

> Everybody is responsible in countering terrorism. Neighbours might report something suspicious. It is everybody's responsibility to help. Multiple sources guarantee more reliable intelligence. (SP2)
>
> What is needed is intergovernmental and private sector cooperation. (SP7)
>
> The prevention of terrorism is a multi-agency approach. Each agency has its own remit within different stages of prevention. (SP4)
>
> A whole myriad of assets, tools and capabilities are at the disposal of governments and security services in dealing with terrorism. But the community is the biggest source of intelligence to curb crime and terrorism and can bring any suspicious activity to the attention of security forces. (SP1)
>
> The government, police and the citizens are responsible. Every citizen has a role in protecting the country. Professionals can help in other ways. Psychologists and sociologists share perspectives that are very important to find the reasons why this happens … [and] compliment hands-on experiences. (SP5)
>
> Security services have a central role but the responsibility has to be liaised at the governmental, administrative, and law enforcement levels. Security and intelligence services also have to liaise with the private sector. Thus, we need all elements inside society to be wary and more resilient. (SP6).

Nearly all policymakers (5 of 6) acknowledged the need of communication and tight networking between the security services *per se* and other entities, creating a multi-agency approach that ensures effective counterterrorism. Only PM3 showed reluctance to the use of academic research in this field.

> When it comes to fight terrorism you will need a whole spectrum of civilians and professionals moving in. I would involve psychologists and a wide range of people, also engineers building streets and schools, teachers etc. (PM6)
>
> Security services are definitely not the only responsible entities in the prevention of terrorist attacks. Intelligence collected from one source has to be corroborated by other entities that can verify the reliability of the

information. (PM5)

> Preventing terrorist attacks is a multi-agency approach. Every law-enforcement entity has its own part to play in preventing terrorism and in collecting information. If information goes missing, there will be a missing link in the whole chain of events. Every entity is connected with its counter-parts around the world and they exchange relevant information within their networks. (PM4)

> Security services are on the front line in combating terrorism but everyone needs to be conscious of this threat. Politics and the general public can help in giving more prompt action when needed. Among the wide range of professionals involved there are the army, police, customs, civil protection, health departments (in case of CBRN[89] attacks), psychologists and other academics. (PM2)

> The police are responsible for tackling terrorism as it is a crime. Intelligence services are involved to gather information though they do not have executive powers. Academic research should help in identifying involvement in international groups like Al Qaeda. Social workers, teachers, prison guards and social scientists can help by identifying attitudinal and behavioural changes in case of radicalisation. (PM1)

> The prevention of terrorist attacks should involve a whole process and a conglomeration of people such as, experts in technologies that find new ways to restrict access. But academic research does not have a say in such sectors. (PM3)

While envisaging more cohesion, collaboration and communication between authorities and the public, all seven academic respondents recommended the use of research to change the mind-set of law enforcers and policymakers, which would eventually bring about changes in policies.

> Security services have increasingly isolated themselves from communities. They rely on gathering intelligence and look at their duties alone. Security to prevent terrorism is the responsibility of us all. Police don't listen to counterterrorism experts because they are not telling things police want to hear. The relationship between the community and the police needs to be redesigned by replacing current policies with new ones. (AC1)

> Evidence-based research indicates which policies are efficient, the causes of terrorism and how to stop it. For instance; bringing the troops back from Afghanistan and encouraging Israel to settle things with Palestine are correlated with reducing terrorism. (AC4)

> There should be cooperation between the government, the private sector, local and federal police, security entities and academics. (AC2)

[89] Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear.

> Various branches of policies and politics should be responsible for peaceful resolutions … of conflicts that could be social, religious or ethnic. Civil society and non-governmental organisations play an important part. Academic knowledge brings more understanding of the conflict, which helps to find peaceful solutions of conflict. (AC3)

> Security services are not alone in being responsible for preventing terrorist attacks. A broader aspect of the government has that responsibility. However, academic analysis can help change policies. (AC5)

> Most say that the intelligence services alone are responsible for the prevention of terrorism, but everybody has a role in being alert to suspicious behaviour and responding to counter-radicalisation. For example, the community has a role in extinguishing the virus of radicalisation and terrorism. The role of academics is to make terrorism known and to provide evidence-based research. (AC6)

> Security services are not the only responsible entities. The civil society is part of the management of security. Society and academics need to be included more. We need to think about resilience. (AC7)

The success of law enforcers in obtaining, preserving and enhancing information depends on the respect of law limitations; the ability to acquire information from well-functioning networks; the collaboration of different government entities; and maintaining good relationships with society. Interventions from the private sector help to identify vulnerabilities and protect them from potential attacks (Garrick *et al*., 2004). To curb terrorism, security entities need to act according to 'authentic, transparent, open-minded, legal and trustworthy' strategies and policies (Audenaert, 2008: 142). The state is subject to the perceptions of decision-makers who need to evaluate the characteristics of the military and criminal justice models, which respectively categorize the terrorist as 'enemy' or 'offender'. In countering terrorism, Wilkinson (2001; as cited in Banks, 2013: 226) preferred to apply the criminal justice model when dealing with terrorism because it offered numerous advantages such as familiarity with the law, investigation techniques, access to international assistance and cooperation with other law-enforcing agencies. When gaining the public's respect for authority, security services remain the frontline of counterterrorism but all citizens could help the authorities to perform more timely actions. As Audenaert (2008: 142) stated, 'policy against jihadi terrorism can only be successful if and when [it is] supported by the entire community it affects'.

Understanding and addressing grievances is essential to counter terrorism and to encourage de-radicalisation. While answering Q5, AC4 explained, 'counterterrorism campaigns in any country committed terrible human rights abuses, such as: torture; assassinations; made people disappear; shot innocent civilians; treated people harshly; or wrongly imprisoned

people making innocents suffer'. Counterterrorism policies are controversial because in their attempts to strengthen the response against terrorism to prevent disastrous attacks, governments implement security measures that undermine basic democratic rights and freedoms. These disproportionate reactions undervalue the consequential long-term effects (Crenshaw, 2010). Policies based on 'moral panics' sometimes are considered political manipulations to expand political powers (Jackson, 2011). Governments and law enforcers need to provide and guarantee security. However, authorities also need to understand what stimulates terrorist behaviour to counter the 'us versus them' mentality, encourage de-radicalization and provide ways to abandon terrorism (Audenaert, 2008).

As regards finding ways of controlling terrorism in its origins, Q16 asked the respondents to indicate policies and provisions that help people to move away from terrorism. Six security practitioners suggested political, legal and social policies that facilitate the integration of potential violent actors in society and the consequential disinterest of extremist ideologies and activities.

> Political, legal, educational and religious provisions are important because … terrorism is a learning process. (SP1)

> It is hard to try to do something with terrorists even while in prison because it is hard to get in touch with them. Once a contact is established, they would be more open to behavioural training and to the possibility of changing their mind-set. (SP2)

> Policy drafting should avoid any reference to religion, but should keep in mind that currently religion is used as a recruitment tool. Finally, policy should also encourage integration programmes. (SP4)

> Creating the necessary communication channels that facilitate dialogue while respecting the counterparts help to understand what is going on and to create efficient preventive systems. (SP5)

> Increase public resilience and decrease incitement to violence in every aspect of life. (SP6)

> Social and global policies ... are ways to get into contact with and be more understanding towards those more prone to terrorism. (SP7)

A solid base of understanding helps the police to define and develop long-term strategies and co-operation with communities and academia (Audenaert, 2008: 144). This approach opens communication channels and develops understanding between ethnic minority groups and law-enforcement officials. To open channels of communication, authorities need to adapt to the kind of terrorists being dealt with. For instance, SP2

recommended that 'in the case of Muslim extremists, Imams are the ideal channel of communication but one still needs to find the right person to approach left-wing or right-wing terrorists'. Cultural understanding and integration programmes could counter extremist ideologies and lead to the eradication of the common roots causes of engagement in terrorism (see Chapter 2, Figure 2.2) (Taylor & Horgan, 2006: see also Audenaert, 2008). SP3 focused completely on policing matters, namely, 'intelligence-led policing, community policing, the integration of immigrant communities and the protection of vulnerable targets'. This policing approach endeavoured to:

> … understand better the posed threat, treat terrorism as a crime, differentiate between the different forms of terrorism, analyse the attractiveness of targets and potential displacements and formulate plans that aim at long-term targets. (SP3)

In answering Q16 the academics recommended different policies that would help people defend their rights and ideologies without resorting to terrorism. Two AC respondents focused mainly on foreign policies and considered terrorism as a reaction to military activities in the Middle-East and Afghanistan.

> The most important policies are those trying to deal with the underlined political grievances and causes of terrorism. The simple way to stop terrorism is to just bring troops back from the Middle East and stop discrimination against Muslims. (AC4)

> British foreign policy reflects in our problems with terrorism. Our involvement in Afghanistan for example is a factor. If we were not in Afghanistan it will not stop terrorism in the UK but it will change the way in which it is shaped. (AC7)

AC3 expressed concerns about discrimination and inequalities experienced by ethnic minorities:

> When there is discrimination, economic inequalities … because of one's religion or ethnic background there is a risk of escalation in conflicts. To avoid conflicts we must introduce policies that reduce discrimination and avoid isolating groups of population. (AC3)

Two other AC respondents delved into how education and the community could provide effective and prompt responses to deal with terrorism and counter-radicalization. AC1 explored the possibility of creating comprehensive violence education programmes in schools and youth clubs that:

1. Show how different kinds of violence affect victims;
2. Provide proper political education in schools, youth clubs and

communities, demonstrating practical ways to change the *status quo* by organising petitions and political campaigns without the need of underground factions;

3. Help communities turn on to policing policies to stop the very small number of people that are a risk to our society. (AC1)

AC6 noted that counter-radicalization policies and the local community could help in curbing terrorism:

> Effective counter-radicalization policies and the community at local level probably are the most important at preventing enrolment with terrorist groups. (AC6)

The other two academic respondents focused on other different aspects. AC2 ignored social interventions and aimed to 'focus on situational provisions'. While AC5 expressed the need for more provisions against state actors:

> There need to be more legal provisions that can be enacted against terrorist attacks by state actors who should be held more accountable for their practices and violations. (AC5)

Only four policymakers spoke about the kind of provisions that were important to deal with terrorism. Two respondents (PM1 and PM3) focused on social provisions that removed discrimination and recommended educational provisions that shielded youths from extremist mentalities and legal provisions that curbed terrorism.

> Social and educational provisions are important. Education sensitizes its personnel to the dangers of radicalisation that can lead to terrorism. Attacking grievances, promoting social integration of minorities, reducing discrimination and providing equal opportunities, managing conflict in societies and difficult areas are all very important. (PM1)

> One has to focus on social provisions, especially families. There should be a stable political environment and serious legal provisions. Punishment should be a form of deterrence. (PM3)

The other two respondents suggested networking as a means to combat terrorism. Prevention was not considered a reliable solution because there would always be attacks that could not be prevented. However, PM6 emphasised the importance of resilience and trust between citizen and police, especially in Muslim neighbourhoods. Meanwhile, PM5 stressed on creating a harmonious network of trust and cooperation in between entities that worked in curbing terrorism even at EU level.

> A lot of money has been spent in prevention but now it is changing to preparation. It is impossible to prevent everything… The key to solve this is

> more resilience and more realistic perspectives. There are police officers working with neighbourhoods, especially with Muslim neighbourhoods, to show that the police are not an enemy but a force that they can trust. (PM6)

> Cooperation between entities that are involved in combating terrorism demands creating a structure that helps the different entities to work in harmony (this includes information sharing). There is still lot of work to be done to further improve such networks, also at EU level. (PM5)

Hostilities limit constitutional rights and freedoms, and erode democracies. Identifying erroneous and misguided policies, and amending the mistakes without demonizing the 'others', reduces the feelings of isolation experienced by minority groups and minimizes the possibility of conflicts (Fraihi, 2008). 'While the West sees a threatening Islam looming, large majorities in Muslim countries are convinced the West has declared war on them and has decided to keep them in a permanent position of subordination' (Coolseat & de Swielande, 2008: 167). Dividing the world into 'Us' defending ourselves against a threatening 'Them' eliminates the possibility of nuance or tolerance (Ramadan, 2006). Communities that perceive the police as the enemy do not trust law enforcers. This creates extensive lacunae in intelligence on underlying grievances and trends of self-radicalization, self-recruitment as well as the politicisation of extremist agendas (Coolseat & de Swielande, 2008; Sageman, 2004; Taarnby, 2005). In fact the European Commission commissioned a number of academic experts to investigate the correlation between radicalization and terrorism in search of best practices in preventing and responding to violent radicalisation (Schmid, 2011).

The results obtained on countering terrorism and controlling radicalization revealed what the respondents considered to be key features of new policies and who they considered responsible for preventing terrorist attacks. They also proposed various ideas to be integrated into policies that would tackle the problem of terrorism at its roots by addressing underlying grievances. Intelligence, empirical data, contextual knowledge, case-law and case studies were identified as indispensable sources of information for new policies to be drafted. In his day, Lombroso did not have access to all these sources, but being a polyglot with numerous connections around the world, he could present a number of anarchist case studies. Though Lombroso never mentioned radicalization in his work, he described influences that triggered the process of the groupthink, and the pressures on a person's thoughts and behaviour that eventually led to an engagement in anarchist terrorism (McAllister & Schmid, 2011; Silke, 2003). One of the case studies mentioned in *Gli Anarchici* was that of the French anarchist Émile Henry. Henry defended his attacks on cafés frequented by bourgeois by stating, 'there is no such thing as an innocent bourgeois' (Coolsaet & de Swieland, 2008: 157-8).

While collecting knowledge on anarchists Lombroso examined the contextual hardships, family and criminal history, and documented individual experiences, behaviours, mental illnesses, speeches and writings of anarchists. Eventually Lombroso (1895: 116) concluded that anarchism passed through a gradual *purificazione* (purification). The first heroes of this extremist ideology were born criminals that were thirsty for blood, like Ravachol. But characters like Valliant and Henry were of a different kind and did not exhibit born-criminal characteristics. The fulcrum of Lombroso's study in *Gli Anarchici* was Caserio, who changed from an honest person into the fanatical anarchist that assassinated French President Carnot. Anticipating some of the latest radicalisation studies, Lombroso (1895) was fascinated by how honest and law-abiding youths like Caserio could be attracted to extremist ideologies and become indoctrinated. He compared this fanatic extremism to the assassins in the Middle-East that became devoted followers of the Old Man of the Mountain (Daftary, 2008).

The answers elicited by Q5 indicate that there is no entity that is solely responsible for countering terrorism. National government entities appear to be on the front line, but when it comes to control terrorism, it is necessary to have a multi-agency network. Results show that the ideal network should involve different law enforcement and security entities, non-governmental organizations, academics and the general public. Lombroso did not specifically mention a multi-agency approach but wrote about governmental, law enforcement and the social context that would result in a harmonious network that would defy extremist anarchist ideologies. After considering the governmental administrations of different countries, Lombroso concluded that government-implemented draconian methods were not successful in controlling the polycephalus beast of anarchism. Violent methods created more martyrs and these attracted more people to the anarchist cause. Lombroso recommended more non-violent policing cooperation and counter-measures. Quoting Desmarets (1833), Lombroso (1895: 70) found that the Napoleonic police were keeping youths between the ages of eighteen and twenty under surveillance. However, Lombroso (1895: 121) proposed that the police should take pictures of anarchist militants; report the movement of dangerous individuals; and to lock anarchist mattoids in asylums or perpetually imprison them on distant islands. To make the public abandon anarchist ideas, Lombroso proposed giving the public the possibility to protest against anarchist violence and create an anti-anarchist movement that represented the majority of the populace. However, these socialist methods went against the

belief of '(quite a few) political thugs that believe[d] that socialism [was] the faithful ally of anarchy; it [was] instead the greatest enemy and the best prevention'[90] (Lombroso, 1895: 129).

Some of the interviewees mentioned to implement policy changes in the education and other social provisions to improve the sense of integration and resilience. The purpose of these recommendations was to provide alternative ways to achieve one's goals without using terrorism. In *Gli Anarchici*, Lombroso contended changes in religious and particularly classical education because these lauded violence and revolutionary individuals[91] (Lombroso, 1895: 22). Lombroso (1895: 125) indicated that religion was the stimulus behind the crusades and did not exclude the possibility that anarchist ideologies and concepts were derived from religious writings like those of Saint Thomas Aquinas and Father Juan de Mariana. In curing the anarchist 'virus' Lombroso (1895: 128) targeted classical education that justified violence and made it an ideal that encouraged anarchism. Consequently, Lombroso (1895: 128) recommended replacing classical education with manual labour, the study of positivist sciences and the study of languages, rather than imposing repressive laws[92].

5.4 Imprisonment and rehabilitation

The 9/11 events shocked the United States and the rest of the world, including Europe. As a reaction there were changes in legal frameworks and how the western states treated prisoners and suspects of terrorism (Wilkinson, 2006a). Crushing military procedures that killed and tortured prisoners, devastated democratic principles, and forfeited human rights created a 'boomerang effect' in terrorist attacks, which employed innovative *modus operandi* (Addicott, 2012; Banks, 2013; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997; Ganor, 2012; Hoffman, 2006; Hooks & Mosher, 2005; McAdam, 1982; Wilkinson, 2006, 2006a). Question 17 queried how the respondents would sanction terrorist actors. This question provided the interviewees with an opportunity to reflect on imprisonment, deterrence, rehabilitation or a combination of all these and decide which was the most effective measure in the case of terrorism.

[90] '*Mentre il socialismo si crede dai politici balordi (e nón son pochi) il fido alleato dell'anarchia ne è invece il gita grande nemico ed il miglior preventivo'.*
[91] '*E da quell'educazione dipende quell'adorazione della violenza che fu il punto di partenza di tutti i nostri rivoluzionari'.*
[92] '*Sostituire il lavoro manuale e lo studio delle scienze positive e delle lingue vive alla pretensiosa e vuota educazione classica sarà una valvola contro l'anarchia, ben superiore a tutte le leggi repressive'.*

The policymakers' answers for Q17 were split in three parts. Two PM respondents considered imprisonment as a good part of the solution in dealing with apprehended terrorist actors. They emphasised that the punishment should fit the committed offence and follow the rule of law without any excessive measures that could turn these terrorists into martyrs of their cause.

> Punishment should fit the crime. Short prison sentences are not likely to stop re-offending. A resolute terrorist cannot be reintegrated in society within a relatively short period (if ever). Unreasonably weak sentences for serious crimes undermine society. It is envisaged that terrorists are treated accordingly and that the punishment fits the crime. (PM4)

> Some of these people are fighting for ideals that for them make sense, and some are indoctrinated. The response to extremism should not be extremism. From the justice point of view the person should be given the just desert for the crime committed while society should be safeguarded. (PM5)

Another two PM respondents considered locking these individuals in prison for the rest of their lives as the best option because they were a threat to society.

> If terrorists are proven guilty by a fair trial, the best option is to lock them in prison and throw away the keys to reduce the risk. I don't think that rehabilitation works, especially in such cases. (PM2)

> Lock the person in prison and reduce the risk. An exemplary court sentence is the life imprisonment of Calvin Reid, the 'shoe bomber'. (PM3)

The last two PM respondents considered prison sentences together with a possibility of rehabilitation. However, due to the risks involved, they insisted that these solutions should be subject to reviews that would monitor their efficacy.

> Provide a fairly short prison sentence (e.g. five years) and help the person reintegrate in society. People can change, though it sounds a bit too optimistic. Any solution is always problematic and mechanisms of review should assess the risks of reintegrating. (PM1)

> Re-socialising and reintegrating people into society are important. However, it depends on what the role of that individual was in the terrorist organisation. Those who did kill should get long prison sentences, just like any other criminal, but there should be at least a slight chance of rehabilitation and reintegration in society, even if they are already ninety years old then. (PM6)

Prisons maintain a 'barrier to social intercourse with the outside' (Goffman, 1961: 15-16). Sykes (1999: xiv) described prisons as 'a social system in which an attempt is made to

create and maintain total or almost total social control'. When answering Q17 three of the academic respondents highlighted concerns on the after-effects of prison on these individuals. Not all terrorist actors would have committed atrocious crimes. In fact, these respondents brought up the problem that inmates tend to come out of prison worse persons than before.

> Prisons are known as the 'universities of terrorism'. People who went to prison were indoctrinated, learnt the skills and got motivated. Prisons are not a good answer to terrorism or to other crimes either. Thus detention should be a programme of re-education and reintegration into communities, similar to the Saudi model. (AC1)

> Punishment depends a lot on what crime they committed. There is a wide spectrum of terrorist crimes and only some of [the convicted terrorists] have killed. Terrorism studies in Italy showed that 90% of the people never killed and 70% had never used a gun. So when crimes are mainly of participation in terrorist organisations it is wise to try to reintegrate the person in society very quickly. (AC3)

> Prison is often a university of crime. When people are locked up, they come out worse than when they went in. The argument is that if you lock somebody up, that person is not a risk anymore, but they remain a risk in prison that is not being controlled. (AC7)

Two other academic respondents emphasised their view that the punishment should be proportional to the crime to avoid creating further tensions and grievances.

> The issue is that governments give very long sentences to people convicted of terrorist crimes. This continues to add to the grievances of the targeted communities. Society has to treat terrorism as a normal crime and not as an exceptional one. (AC4)

> I am all in favour of rehabilitation and reconciliation but not at the expense of short prison sentences. We ought to do a lot more to reintegrate former terrorists into the community but never at the expense of a meaningful prison sentence. Otherwise there would be no deterrence and no effective means of punishing terrorists and it is also an affront to the relatives of victims of terrorist attacks. (AC6)

In contrast with the rest of the academics that highlighted the importance of rehabilitation and reintegration in society, and also the notion that terrorist acts should not be treated differently from others, AC2 was the only academic that did not acknowledge any value of providing any form of treatment to the offender. AC2 focused 'on the situation and prevention as there is not much to be gained to focus on the offender'. Hindering terrorist activity and decreasing the potential of future violent acts is based on the understanding of the dynamic character of extremist organizations (Freilich, Chermak & Simone, 2010; Sageman, 2008; Smith, 1994, as cited in Freilich & Newman, 2009).

Almost the entire group of security respondents (6 of 7) claimed that imprisonment alone is not a sustainable solution over long periods. Only SP7 did not mention rehabilitation but stressed that 'terrorism is a criminal issue and we need to follow the rule of law without any extra measures, no martyrs needed'.

> The most important thing is to educate and reform the person. I would consider reform over punishment because that is the only way to reduce the risk. The duration of the punishment is the deterrent. The most important thing is to reform the person in order not to be a threat to society. (SP1)

> To lock them in prison forever does not work. If they are given a long sentence but nothing is happening while being imprisoned they will come out from prison with more hate than before. This makes them a bigger risk to society. So ideally they are given a prison sentence and they are helped to reintegrate in society. (SP2)

> A long prison sentence, if well deserved. However, it is important that prisons offer some form of rehabilitation so that they will not commit similar actions once out of prison. (SP3)

> It is very difficult to reverse the radicalisation process … separatists have a very different way of acting and it is easier to communicate with them. In case of religious extremism, people need to be knowledgeable about their religion as that is the only way to counter-act. (SP4)

> A long punishment induces prevention but only when serious crimes (like murder) are committed and this can't be changed. Rehabilitation is important so that their mind-set can be changed and to reintegrate them in society. (SP5)

> Reintegration in society is important because terrorism is a kind of temporary mental condition. Mental conditions cannot be cured but changed. Putting people in prison will only increase the feeling of social deprivation. (SP6)

Almost all (19 of 20) interviewees considered imprisonment as a form of deterrence and slightly more than half (11 of 20) considered the possibility of rehabilitation to de-radicalize the inmates (Table 5.2). The answers point to the importance of incapacitation and the need to instil a sense of deterrence. However, eleven respondents expressed the need for rehabilitation together with incapacitation as a joint measure to prevent future terrorist threats and to transform these so-called 'universities of terrorism' into rehabilitation centres. They also stressed the need of a fair trial in cases involving terrorism to minimise the instigations of future terrorist actions.

Table 5.2: Punishing terrorist acts

Respondents	Answers		
	Imprisonment together with rehabilitation	Punishment should fit the crime	Imprisonment for life
PM	2	2	2
AC	3	3	/
SP	6	1	/
Total	**11**	**6**	**2**

Deterring terrorists is no easy task. In most terrorist cases, one has to deal with groups or communities that share 'a common purpose that binds [the terrorist group] together and requires the development of social learning to further its goals' (Horgan, 2009: 146). Gunaratna (2011: 66) stated that there were 'over 100,000 convicted and suspected terrorists languishing in penitentiary and detention centres from Europe to the Middle East and Asia'. In 2011, 484 individuals were arrested in Europe for terrorist-related offences and 316 individuals (of whom forty were women) were handed down a verdict (Europol, 2012). In 2010 (when the interviews took place) 'in the Netherlands only around ten prisoners [were] convicted of terrorist acts' (SP2). The crimes committed by these individuals 'vary from planning an attack to killing[93]' (SP5). Transparency and proportionality are fundamental when it comes to sentencing terrorists and designing counterterrorism policies (Finn, 2010). To increase transparency, AC5 proposed 'an international criminal justice [system] to prosecute state actors for complicity in terrorism'. The results showed the importance of the notion that the punishment should fit the crime. Considering pressing political issues that are linked to terrorism, Wattad (2006) explained that terrorism was not considered a crime *per se* but an aggravation. However, this 'increases the grievances of the targeted communities' (AC4).

Results showed that most respondents believed that once someone was convicted of committing a terrorist act, one should not exclude the possibility that this person could later be reintegrated in society. Long detention periods and never-ending prison sentences render these institutions universities of terrorism. In prisons, people are indoctrinated, motivated and taught the necessary skills to do more grievous attacks. 'Prisons have long been places where extremist ideology and calls to violence could find a willing ear and conditions are often conducive to radicalization' (Cilluffo & Saathoff, 2006: i). Neumann (2010: 7) claimed that prisons 'played an enormous role in the narratives of every radical and militant movement in the modern period'. However, on other occasions, prisons were '*incubators for peaceful*

[93] Only one of these inmates was involved in murder. This was the killer of Dutch film director Theodoor van Gogh killed in 2004.

change and transformation [sic] … reversing the process of radicalization and undermining terrorist campaigns on the outside' (Neumann, 2010: 8).

The above results also show that more than half of the interviewees regarded terrorist rehabilitation, de-radicalization, counter-radicalization and integration as the solutions to reduce and control terrorism, especially since a good number of terrorist actors were not strong devotees (McGarrel, Freilich & Chermak, 2007). Recognizing these weaknesses, 'Europe is looking at de-radicalization programmes in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, which proved to be quite successful, especially the Indonesian programme' (SP6). Together with 'the UN model of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration), new detention programmes could include re-education and reintegration into communities' (AC7). Decades before, Singapore and Malaysia instituted rehabilitation to counter communist ideology; in Egypt they attempted to de-radicalize detainees through religious rehabilitation (Gunaratna, 2011). This wave of inmate rehabilitation has gained momentum and popularity, creating a new counterterrorism approach.

'Terrorist rehabilitation is based on the theory that mere punishment through imprisonment is not enough to permanently reform and facilitate their reintegration into society upon release' (Gunaratna, 2011: 67). Imprisonment should focus on education and reform. Interminable prison sentences are not a solution. Instead, designed rehabilitations are a proven solution to reverse radicalized ideologies. 'Unless a terrorist is rehabilitated before his release from custody, he is likely to pose a security threat … upon his return' (Gunaratna, 2011: 65). De-radicalization depends on a variety of factors, such as the kind of terrorist ideology. 'Terrorists with a secular motivation and goal are more likely to be reformed in prisons than terrorists that are driven by religious grievances' (Pluchinsky, 2008: 187). De-radicalization of prisoners and disengagement from terrorism are frequently discussed yet empirical data is scarce (Horgan, 2009; Useem & Clayton, 2009). This is similarly reflected in research on gang activities (Decker & Van Winkle, 1996). Disengagement can occur physically and psychologically, and for various reasons (Horgan, 2009). Movements like Al Qaeda depend on their ability to continue attracting to their ranks young Muslims who emulate their predecessors (Sageman, 2008). The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security (8-11 March, 2005) produced proposals for potential interventions to reduce sympathy towards extremist groups and the eventual recruitment of new members. Some of these potential interventions were intended to inhibit recruitment of new elements in terrorist groups; create discordance in present factions; and simplify abandoning such factions (Horgan, 2009).

Authorities have to avoid overreacting to provocations and to treat religious extremists as ordinary criminals. Ideological debates and counselling stimulate the understanding of inappropriate and misguided criminal behaviour and encourage desertion from violence and penitence in the captured terrorist (Gunaratna, 2011). Resorting to repentance would be the first step towards rehabilitation and reintegration in society. If rehabilitation does not take place while being contained, there is the risk that extremist ideologies would infect others and this would eventually result in violence (Cilluffo & Saathoff, 2006; Gunaratna, 2011). A successful rehabilitation programme should include religious, psychological, social and vocational rehabilitation (Gunaratna, 2011). However, as PM6 claimed, 'a panel needs to reassess the terrorists after a period of imprisonment. But as from the beginning, they must be informed that they still have possibilities to gain freedom back'.

Imprisonment, minimal use of harsh treatment and rehabilitation were the main arguments of the respondents. However, these ideas reflect only a part of the treatment of political criminals discussed in *Gli Anarchici*. In fact, Lombroso discussed the matter of punishment of political criminals even in *Il Delitto Politico*, published about five years before the second edition of *Gli Anarchici*. In the nineteenth century, regicides (killings of kings) and deputicides (*deputaticidio*) (killings of government deputies) were considered among the gravest political crimes (Lombroso, 1895: 133). To counter these political crimes, some states adopted harsh legislative punishments. Political offenders that were 'found guilty of committing grave regular crimes were often punished more harshly than regular criminals committing the same crimes' (Daly, 2002: 68). However, Lombroso explained how excessive force served as gratuitous help to anarchists because this response created 'martyrs' that were idolised by sympathizers. Examples that were mentioned include the case of Ravachol (Lombroso, 1895: 114). Another example is the massacre of the Babi movement in Persia in the mid-1800s, which showed how such extremism was used to attract more recruits (Lombroso, 1895: 73; see also Momen, 2005; Mottahedeh, 1998).

In his works (*Il Delitto Politico* and *Gli Anarchici*) Lombroso recommended to punish anarchists and political criminals using non-violent methods. These punishments entailed: deportation; solitary confinement; exile; pecuniary penalties; suspension from or loss of offices (in case of public officers); and removal of political rights. These punishments had to be imposed for crimes that range from murder, treason and espionage to injuries to head of states, armed revolts, labour strikes and insults to a monarch or members of parliament (Calafato, 2013a). Lombroso wanted to indicate that there are other ways to treat anarchists without resorting to special treatments and capital punishment. Lombroso's liberal perspective

aimed at the implementation of non-violent methods and recommended rehabilitation from fanaticism. This brings Lombroso's conclusions close to the responses of the academics and the security professionals, who favoured punishment and rehabilitation rather than the use of coercive methods.

The removal of draconian laws restrained the 'anarchist hydra'[94], as happened under the administration of British Prime Minister Gladstone (Lombroso, 1895: 116). In fact, Lombroso described non-violent countries as superior civilizations and indicated good government administration as a key element to mitigate the grievances experienced by some communities. 'The only remedy against the anarchists … is to cure the chronic malaise of countries, which forms the basis of anarchy'[95] (Lombroso, 1895: 128). From his investigations Lombroso concluded that anarchism tended to occur where there was bad government administration, in the same way cholera tended to be more frequent in poor and dirty neighbourhoods:

> *Come si vede il colera colpire di preferenza i quartieri più poveri e più sudici della città, e quindi indicarci ove debbansi più portare le nostre cure profilattiche, così l'anarchia infierisce nei paesi meno ben governati, e perciò la sua comparsa potrebbe essere, in mezzo all'apatia delle masse o degli uomini politici, indizio di cattivo governo - e stimolo vivo a migliorarlo*[96] (Lombroso, 1895: 135-6).

5.5 Postscript: An extremist perspective

The additional conversation with the extremist Charles produced useful insights into some of the themes that were discussed during the interviews. This allowed interesting comparisons with the views of the three primary respondent groups. Although Charles was forthcoming about his concepts of violence and about his introduction to extremism, he was less so about policy. Consequently, Charles's reflections on the discussions presented in this chapter are rather limited. As for Lombroso's *Gli Anarchici,* policies are mainly discussed in the introductory and the concluding chapters. In the introduction to his work, Lombroso presented the main causes of anarchism, while in the concluding chapter he recommended a series of preventive measures that entailed changes in policies. These recommendations were based on

[94] '*Idra anarchica*'.
[95] '*Solo rimedio contro gli anarchici … curare il malessere cronico dei paesi che dà all'anarchia la vera base d'azione*'.
[96] It is observed that cholera is more inclined to hit the poorest and filthiest neighbourhoods in the city, indicating where to concentrate preventive treatment. Similarly, anarchy attacks in less well-governed countries. Therefore anarchy could be the result of apathy or a sign of bad government that stimulates improvement.

his in-depth study on anarchists. The postscript of Chapter 6 (Section 6.4) is more focused on examining Charles's criminal history and behaviour in light of the achieved results as well as in contrast with Lombroso's perspective.

Charles did not provide a definition of terrorism but explained that the reason which attracted him to an extreme right ideology was the opportunity to counter the fear imposed by the Muslim communities in his neighbourhood. He was threatened by Muslims that were involved in drug trafficking and terrorism, and he believed that these people intended to kill him.

> They got an organised army on the street funded by millions of pounds worth of heroin money. It's serious. The 7/7 bombings in London was set off from where I lived … The biggest anti-terrorist operation in British history, called Operation Crevice, started in my community and a taxi driver from my community was the bomb maker that would have blown the Ministry of Sound, a night club, and the Bluewater shopping centre … a suicide bomber who blew himself up in a car bomb in Sweden in 2010.

The ambition to control Muslim extremism and its related links to terrorism sustained Charles's extremist ideologies. Charles believed that common citizens did not know what was happening and what the real threats were. He explained that joining these right-wing extremists and expressing his radical ideologies on his blog were the only options. Charles also stressed that exposing the misdeeds of these communities made law enforcers react rather than simply sit on the fence. Charles portrays this threat of Muslim extremism and terrorism as quite serious and stressed that the police should have a more active role.

> My involvement in this movement helped to educate my community and forced the police to act. The police were letting stuff happen. So I have been able to force this issue … [and] no one in my community can read my stuff and tell me that I am wrong. When they read my stuff, they see how serious the issues are out there and they did not know about it. Police knew about it and they don't act.

In the results of Q2 and Q6 the respondents discussed the management of security and terrorism and delineated the protection measures that should be undertaken because of menaces that jeopardize the social wellbeing. As one may have expected, the perspectives of these elite respondents were different from Charles's. In fact, the results showed that the responsible authorities did not consider terrorist threats higher than usual. However, some respondents claimed that these threat levels were influenced by political agendas and the desire to attract funds. This topic was also explored by researchers (Jackson, 2011; Mueller,

2006), some of whom argued that the terrorist threat should not be under-estimated or it could result in major problems in the future (Lutz & Lutz, 2012).

The exaggeration or inflation of a potential threat was also treated in *Gli Anarchici*. Lombroso (1895: 27) explained that without crimes and wars the police and the army had no reason to exist. Thus, these services would have to invent crime and create wars to ensure their existence. A similar train of thought is also followed by Charles. To aliment his extremist ideologies he inflated the imminence of the threats posed by radical Muslims. In order to understand these radical thoughts, Charles explained that one had to look at the aftermath of the past attacks committed by radical Islamist actors. The seriousness of this threat was emphasized further when Charles explained that the groups that sustained anti-jihadist ideologies were ready to act and to use extreme measures:

> They [Muslim extremists] are attacking us in the name of jihad, so we attack them. As a Christian this is a kind of motivating force in my life for some reason. It is just two forces against each other, so it is natural. I can't pinpoint that group or that group. But I know there are [anti-jihadist] groups out there and there will be violence, and now this terrorist attack is showing that.

These reactions recall the issues presented by the respondents in the results of Q7, Q5 and Q16 where it was indicated that everyone in the community, and not only designated entities, should have an active role in curbing terrorism. This network of social and political knowledge that combines intelligence and academic research would create a holistic picture of the grievances suffered by particular communities and help in the understanding of the motivations of extremist actors before designing appropriate policies. However, in this case, the community's involvement took a different turn from that described by the main interviewees. Rather than supporting the relevant authorities, personalities like Charles decided that it was more effective to follow radical ideologies and maybe even commit violent actions in order to counter the attacks of other extremists.

Similar to the interview respondents, Lombroso also aimed to create a holistic picture of the grievances that motivated anarchists. He achieved knowledge about anarchists by collecting various anarchist speeches and writings through different sources and contacts. In *Gli Anarchici*, Lombroso considers different anarchist ideas (some of which he describes as good and others as wrong), court defence speeches, letters written by anarchists (examining even their handwriting), and also photographs of these anarchists. Lombroso resorted to all these different sources in order to comprehend their anarchist rationale and suggest appropriate solutions without resorting to violence. When investigating political criminals and

anarchists, Lombroso explained that the political, social and economic grievances suffered by the majority of people were ignored by the bourgeoisie, who committed several injustices to stay in power and gain more control over the poor. When describing how Vaillant became an anarchist actor, Lombroso (1895) explained that this individual had tried different jobs in order to move out of poverty. This was also reflected in his political ideologies, where he first tried socialism and then moved on to radical anarchism. Blaming his situation on society, Vaillant placed a bomb in the French Chamber of Deputies. This example is reflected in the behaviour of both Charles and the terrorist actor with whom he is reputedly connected, who after being unsuccessful in changing the surrounding contexts, they resorted to more radical ideologies in order to change policies and government administrations.

After Charles expressed his certainty that there were people that followed his extremist ideology, and who were even ready to use violence to sustain their ideologies, it was very surprising to learn that Charles condemned the lone-wolf actor that had called him 'mentor' and denied any form of association between the two. Charles's interview revealed a number of contradictions because he justified the actions of this lone-wolf. Charles stated that 'in his situation there was no alternative but to do what he did'. Charles's argument was that no punishment could deter this terrorist from doing those acts, and that the government was not going to enact any recommendations or amend the immigration policies as proposed by this extremist actor. However, Charles still described him as 'the child of the devil' and 'a cold-blooded murderer', and contemplated the infliction of an extreme punishment like capital punishment even though he claimed to be a fervent Christian.

> I would pass a death sentence ... Failing that, a life sentence should mean life with him, where he never gets out … They should execute him, for what he did is a crime against humanity. Murdering nearly a hundred children in the name of politics and as a cold blooded murder is not a normal political activism. It's atrocious.

Reflecting retrospectively on the fourth theme, the respondents' viewpoints in response to Q17 stressed that punishment should not be an over-reaction but one that follows the rule of law. Exaggerated reactions like capital punishment created martyrs and these attracted more sympathizers to the cause, encouraging even more violent reactions in the future (Hoffman, 2006; Wilkinson, 2001, 2006, 2011). Consequently, the respondents emphasised that to avoid generating stronger violent reactions, the punishment should reflect the crime and that transparent and proportional prison sentences were an effective deterrent. However, both the literature on terrorism research (Cilluffo & Saathoff, 2006; Neumann, 2010) and the interview data indicated that prisons were not considered as the ideal place to de-radicalize

terrorists. On the other hand, rehabilitation from radicalization was considered to be an essential step towards drastically reducing the risk posed by these individuals before they were reintegrated in society (Gunaratna, 2011). Meanwhile, Charles did not support the possibility of de-radicalizing and rehabilitating this extremist actor because this would go against Charles's own ideology. Yet, when Charles stated the he would condemn to death an extremist actor that followed the same ideology, one could not but ask why? In his interview, Charles explained that the actions of this actor were purely criminal and not 'normal political activism'. Consequently, one could not exclude the possibility of unknown agendas. A question that will remain unanswered is: was it possible that Charles stated that he would condemn this terrorist to death as part of an orchestrated plan to make him a 'martyr of the anti-jihadist ideology' and consequently to attract more sympathizers to join their cause?

The concept that extremists used the state's drastic reactions to create 'martyrs' that would be idolized by fellow and prospective sympathizers, was also discussed in the theme of indirect suicides (*suicide indiretti*) in *Gli Anarchici*. Rather than committing suicide, these individuals assassinated heads of state or monarchs for which the punishment was a mandatory death sentence. Lombroso referred to theories by Maudsley, Esquirol and Krafft-Ebing when studying this phenomenon and concluded that the purpose of these individuals was to commit suicide. But fanatical ideologies gave more valuable reasons to commit such actions. Lombroso also elaborated on how political actors that died for their cause became iconic personas that sympathizers admired and copied. In fact, Lombroso (1895: 98) explained that 'the more bizarre and absurd an idea is, the more mad, mattoids and hysterics drag behind it'[97]. As an example, Lombroso (1895: 114) brought the case of Ravachol who was idolized by his sympathizers when he was still alive to the extent that they even dedicated anthems to him. The death of Ravachol served as propaganda to attract more sympathizers towards the anarchist cause. Thus, one could only suppose that Charles would have imposed the capital punishment on his follower not to make him pay for his atrocious crimes, but to make a martyr of him in the name of their extreme-right ideology.

This rationale would justify Lombroso's standpoint, opposing the use of violence and particularly over-reactions, like the use of capital punishment to control political violence like that committed by anarchists. It was explained that the use of violence by the state provided further incentives for future recruits because the dead actors become martyrs. This led Lombroso to represent these attributes in anarchism with the image of the hydra, like Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) did when writing about terrorism. Consequently, Lombroso recommended

[97] '*Quanto più strana e assurda è un'idea, tanto più trascina dietro a sè matti, mattoidi e isterici'.*

a number of non-violent policing measures, for instance, intelligence sharing among law enforcers at an international level. He also suggested different forms of punishments that strictly avoided the use of violence both from anarchists and government officials. In fact, *Gli Anarchici* ends with a note soliciting the authorities not to imitate extremists because that would generate more violent attacks. Instead, Lombroso (1895: 137) recommended investing in research to identify and cure the root causes of fanaticism.

5.6 Summary

This chapter examined some of the main problematic issues faced by policymakers when implementing security policies in response to terrorism. Terrorism remains an undefined phenomenon because of numerous political implications. The second section of this chapter discussed how terrorism risk is assessed and managed to provide a safe environment, both at domestic and international levels. This section explained how information on underground terrorist factions is gathered, analysed and treated to provide a coherent threat evaluation to those entities that need to know this information. The threat level varies in each country. However, lack of knowledge on the real threat level raises suspicions that authorities take this approach to gain more power and resources by exploiting a phantom risk.

The third theme highlights the increasing need to understand the grievances that lead to terrorism. Intelligence remains a key element in understanding non-state terrorism but solid networks between law enforcers and the community guarantees more influx of information that facilitates a more emphatic understanding of the roots of violent behaviour. Knowledge could not only be used to stop potential offenders from committing terrorist attacks but also to create social policies that address the problems at their origin, providing potential sympathizers with a different trajectory from that of terrorism. The last theme examined the punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation of terrorist actors. The answers vociferously expressed the view that the principle that punishment should fit the crime should also apply to terrorism. However, rehabilitation was the most commonly recommended method to treat these individuals in order to provide them with opportunities to move away from extremist ideologies, and thus reducing the risks to society.

After discussing security and counterterrorism policies, this chapter ended with an afterthought that presented some of the discussed issues from the standpoint of an extremist. This outlook was rendered interesting through Charles's personal anecdotes. These showed

how particular experiences of violence induced Charles to adopt an extremist ideology that sustained his stand against jihad and radical Muslims. This postscript also indicated how parts of the community are attracted to these extremist ideologies and how they are ready to engage in violent acts to fulfil their expectations, particularly if they feel that authorities and policymakers failed to provide support. Charles considered the terrorist that called him 'mentor', a clear example of how an extremist actor would react when it is perceived that no alternatives exist other than violence. Yet Charles unexpectedly stated that he would condemn this extremist actor to death for his atrocities. This raised a number of issues about the possibility of secret agendas and of attempts to make a 'martyr' of this terrorist.

The following chapter examines salient considerations in researching terrorism and its root causes, the best disciplines and methods to research terrorism, and the possibility of profiling terrorists. Chapter 6 also ends with a postscript that shows how Charles's views that were expressed in the interview reflect on the themes discussed in the same chapter.

Chapter 6: Research and terrorism

After a discussion on the best possible policies that could be adopted to deal with terrorism, this chapter examines terrorism research and considers the best methods to understand this phenomenon. After the 9/11 incidents, there was a drastic increase in the demand for more realistic and practical approaches to understand terrorism (Silke, 2004; Wilkinson, 2007; Zubkora, 2005). The data collected from the views of the policymakers (PM), security professionals or practitioners (SP) and academics (AC) explores the answers to five questions under three themes: identifying terrorism research and root causes (Q10 and Q3), researching methods in terrorism (Q12 and Q11), and profiling terrorists (Q15). The discussion of each theme follows the same procedure of the previous chapter: presentation of interview findings, followed by references to the literature, and finally, discussion and analysis in light of Lombroso's work. The comparison of the views expressed in these three sections with those of Lombroso's (1895) *Gli Anarchici* makes it possible to answer the question 'what do we know now that Lombroso did not say then?' As with Chapter 5, this chapter concludes with a postscript containing the views of the extremist Charles.

6.1 Identifying terrorism research

Terrorism research is characterised by 'a persistent set of weaknesses [and] an increasing number of theoretically rigorous and critically oriented studies' (Jackson, 2009: 171). This section presents the responses of the three groups of respondents to Q10, which explores the possibility of creating a science of terrorism prevention. Though all respondents categorically eliminated the possibility of preventing terrorism, they did not exclude the possibility of using research to identify patterns of terrorism and to find potential ways to comprehend it. The view of the entire academic group was that a social science of terrorism is possible. Four AC respondents expressed vigorous optimism in using social sciences to understand patterns that tend to cause terrorism.

> Science can identify the conditions when terrorism is more likely to happen. (AC4)

> Social science is about understanding the dimensions involved in the social learning of terrorist actors and is not good at predicting. (AC3)

> You need to study individual organisations … [and] detect a cycle between terrorism and counterterrorism. (AC1)

> By focusing on patterns, we can uncover common opportunities, and find ways to reduce terrorism. Some cycles shows spatial and temporal patterns in terrorist activities. (AC2)

In comparison, the three other academics were more cautious but still endorsed the potential for a science of terrorism. AC5 looked at the actions of state actors, because their actions are more externalised than those of underground groups. Whereas AC7 referred to Rapoport's (2004) research to describe the waves of non-state terrorist violence in history (see Chapter 2, Table 2.1), AC6 expounded the need to base academic theories on reality for more consistent results.

> State terrorism is much more predictable. With a dictatorial government in power, certain indications are more likely to lead to terrorism. (AC5)

> Rapoport talks about cycles in terrorist attacks and waves of terrorism … the argument is compelling, but I am not sure why it occurs. (AC7)

> Terrorism studies are primarily descriptive but most academics see it as explanatory. We need to get a lot better at accurately, reliably and validly describing it before we have a science in terrorism prevention. (AC6)

Almost all security professionals (6 of 7) indicated that unbiased research is necessary to understand the underlying causes that motivate terrorism, monitor the problems experienced by particular groups, and provide results that help to mitigate terrorism. This is illustrated in the following examples:

> Terrorism studies can possibly mitigate and reduce the likelihood but not completely eliminate the possibility of terrorism. (SP1)

> It is possible to create a science of terrorism prevention through sociological studies. (SP2)

> When dealing with terrorism you are dealing with the unknown and prevention depends on various factors. In-depth terrorism research may identify trends in the development of this phenomenon. (SP3)

> Science can offer some explanations and predictions … [but] no one can really predict what will happen in the future. This also depends on the influence of politicians or attacks. (SP5)

> Science of terrorist prevention would be possible, but it can't be an absolute knowledge, as it is a living thing. Problems in the Basque region will be different from those in Northern Ireland. Scientists need to get out of their habitat to do something. (SP6)

First-hand research enriches knowledge and helps researchers to deduce 'why some individuals are more susceptible to engage in trajectories that lead to terrorism' (SP1). PM1 and PM5 were the only policymakers that believed that research could contribute to controlling terrorism.

> Social sciences are necessary to prevent terrorism by discovering trends that can lead to more concrete threats. (PM1)

> Science of terrorism prevention is possible. However, it is impossible to eliminate terrorism forever, so the only possibility is to create some form of control. (PM5)

The other three policymakers showed scepticism in their answers. The unpredictability of human nature made these respondents doubt the effectiveness of terrorism research in curbing terrorism.

> Humans are irrational by nature. Though science is essential, intelligence should make up for science deficiencies. (PM2)

> Science cannot predict or eradicate terrorism. But prevention is not there to foil the threat completely, but to reduce its risk. (PM3)

> Cycles in terrorist attacks are not always visible or easy to interpret … [with] groups like Al Qaeda it is difficult to define a kind of pattern. (PM6)

All the academics and security professionals as well as two policymakers considered research as a valuable contributor to understand terrorism and to formulate patterns of behaviour. Such research increases the likelihood that terrorism would be prevented. However, the results also indicated inaccuracies that affect both data collection and the results of terrorism research. The academics and security practitioners expressed concerns on data collection inaccuracies. These included, for instance, the academics' lack of experience on the ground; the exclusion of state violence from the studies; and the biases that influence terrorism research. These anxieties in terrorism studies are very much in line with those expressed by Silke (2004), Stampnitzky (2008) and Schmid (2011). To improve research on this subject, the academic respondents recommended the use of pragmatic methodologies. These methodologies tend to be more analytical and less descriptive, and that reflect the underground nature of terrorism as advocated by numerous researchers (see Chen, Reid, Sinai, Silke & Ganor, 2008; Crenshaw, 1992; Ranstorp, 2007; Schmid, 2011; Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Silke, 2001, 2004).

The scepticism towards the effectiveness of terrorism research expressed by policymakers focused on the volatility of human behaviour and on the limited volume of data

available for the study of this phenomenon. These limitations in gathering data and the randomness of terrorists and incidents make it harder to explore and to study this topic (Sinai, 2007). Schmid (2011c: 458) pointed out that, 'much of the scholarship in the field of Terrorism Studies has in recent decades followed cycles of (non-state) terrorism'. Consequently, it is difficult to have 'theories based on reality [and] not simply thought pieces' (AC6). Lum, Kennedy and Sherley (2006) showed that 96 per cent of 4,458 peer-reviewed articles on terrorism were thought pieces. When compared to other social sciences, empirical research is a rarity in terrorism research (Lum *et al.*, 2006). Similarly, AC6 explained that 'what is said and written on terrorism is not based on more evidence than what we are speaking of'. Furthermore, Schmid and Jongman (1988: 179) explained that few areas in social sciences have so much written based on such little research. However, researchers are not restricted when it comes to descending in the field and getting first-hand data, as proven by Horgan (2009) and investigative journalists Ahmed Rashid and Jason Burke (Schmid, 2011). Academics expressed optimistic responses, clearly believing in the possibility to scientifically understand and prevent terrorism. However, there is an evident inability to accurately predict future incidents (Silke, 2001: 2). This was confirmed by SP3: 'when dealing with terrorism you are dealing with the unknown'. Studies on political conflicts, economic depressions and other social difficulties are indispensable when one seeks to understand the trajectories and the roots of terrorist behaviour (see Chapter 2, Figure 2.2) (Taylor & Horgan, 2006; see also Horgan, 2007).

'Root causes form the initial components driving the terrorist life cycle … why terrorist groups are formed, how they are led and organized, the nature of their grievances, motivations, strategies and demands' (Sinai, 2008: 101). Q3 explored the kind of information academics need to improve terrorism studies. Nearly all academics (6 of 7) agree that the community, intelligence, the authorities and the state are valuable sources of information when it comes to studying terrorism in a more thorough and holistic manner.

> To make progress we need both data and intelligence. (AC7)
>
> We don't need more theories! We need more empirical research so that money and resources are spent more wisely on prevention as opposed to creating more weapons. Prevention reduces opportunities. (AC2)
>
> Effective intelligence-gathering and effective intelligence-sharing are really the key to respond to terrorism and depend on the state security services, intelligence and the community. Different actors play multiple roles. (AC6)
>
> To make progress in preventing terrorism we need to see the problem not as Islam or Muslims, we need to radically rethink what we are doing in preventing terrorism … [and] provide democratic arenas for people to express their political views non-violently and target specifically violent

behaviour. (AC1)

> We need to pay more attention to what states are doing that involves threats or acts of violence that have terrorizing effects ... [and] to think about the reasons why persons get involved in non-state terrorism. (AC5)

> The only way is to identify and deal with the root causes, the actual injustices and the lack of political opportunities, or later generations will just come along and do the same things. (AC4)

In addition, four security respondents emphasised the usefulness of networking, reviewing past academic works, reaching a common understanding of the problem and restructuring policies that facilitate the reintegration in society.

> Treat terrorism as a crime and not some strange phenomenon. No wheels should be reinvented, and brushing dust off some old criminology books should be a good starting point. We are too busy looking at these 'new' forms of terrorism as a new phenomenon. (SP4)

> National and international partnerships between countries, connections with police, prisons and universities all seek to explain why these things are happening, what the culture is and what those people are thinking. These are all important to do the right moves. (SP5)

> To prevent terrorism we need a common understanding of the phenomenon, the word 'terrorism', and what we mean with prevention, to have a common approach. (SP6)

> On a global scale we need to restructure political and economic structures, and the integration of immigrants. (SP7)

> We need to understand why people adopt this kind of behaviour so that we can intervene. It is important to get in touch with these groups to make them see that other people have their right of opinion as well. (SP2)

Distinctly, the other two security interviewees favoured combining academic knowledge with intelligence in an attempt to trace, combat and prevent terrorism.

> Terrorism is primarily fought underground through intelligence. Academics gather data, write papers and create new perspectives. (SP1)

> Intelligence-led policing is a way of combining discrete pieces of information about possible threats. (SP3)

Similarly, the entire group of policymakers held that combining intelligence with academic knowledge would help to improve terrorism studies and understand the roots and social contexts that lead to terrorism.

> Both data and theory from academics and intelligence from security services (respectively called 'soft intelligence' and 'hard intelligence') are important to explore tendencies, trajectories and social contexts. (PM1)
>
> Both data and theories from academics (to explore the roots of terrorism and the psychology behind it) and intelligence from security services are important. (PM2)
>
> The information from any intelligence and research must be current and accurate … to make the necessary assessments and implement the necessary security measures. (PM4)
>
> To make progress in the prevention of terrorism we need intelligence and advances in unaddressed political grievances … [but] there is a certain reluctance to take a closer look at and study the root causes. (PM6)
>
> Data is important to analyse and to create statistics and see patterns ... [and] to teach the basics of what terrorism is and how it works. (PM3)
>
> The most important are intelligence and information sharing. Security services have to try to get inside the mind of the terrorist and implement measures that stop them. (PM5)

The results obtained from the former question (Q10) show that three policymakers (PM2, PM3 and PM6) were sceptical on the use of research to mitigate terrorism because of the unpredictability of human nature. Whereas in answering Q3 the same three policymakers explained that combining intelligence with academic research was the key to understanding the structural imbalances that attracted individuals towards terrorism. The three groups of respondents emphasized the need to understand inequities at the roots of terrorism. Grievances caused by humiliation, social and economic issues, psychological matters and lack of political freedom instigate small groups of people to use violence in order to shake politics. This was also pointed out by numerous studies (Berrebi & Klor, 2006; Gupta & Mundra, 2005; Hafez, 2007, as cited in Gupta, 2012; Kydd & Walter, 2006; Pape, 2003).

Echoing Pyszczynski's (2004) Terror Management Theory, the security respondents and academics indicate that when growing problems are not dealt with properly, they will remain motivations for terrorism for future generations. Thus, the academic respondents insisted that the way forward was to empower these individuals to express ideologies, frustrations and anger in democratic ways. The security professionals and policymakers also stressed the use of empirical research to 'explain why these things are happening, what the culture is and what those people are thinking' (SP5), as in Krueger and Malečková (2003). Terrorism is a confluence of factors and causes and the respondents emphatically stressed the need for all and sundry to understanding this phenomenon. Terrorism does not exist in a vacuum and studies on root

causes determine adequate counteractions (Bjørgo, 2005; see also Gurr, 1970; Reich, 1998; Sinai, 2008; Smelser & Mitchell, 2002). However, according to Silke (2004) and Schmid, (2011) researchers tend not to focus on root causes, trends and patterns of terrorists.

Perhaps surprisingly, to an extent, the findings show that no one of the twenty respondents considered terrorist actors as insane or psychologically wired differently from the rest of the population. This was also attested by a number of studies (Gupta, 2012; Horgan, 2005a, 2005b; McCauley, 2007; Merari, 2005; Merari & Friedland, 1985; Post, 1984, 1990; Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2003; Silke, 2003a; Taylor, 1988; Taylor & Quayle, 1994). But the lack of understanding of this phenomenon keeps on encumbering terrorism studies and some researchers still conceive terrorism as a form of madness. For instance, Silke (2004a) reported that after 9/11 Laqueur stated:

> Madness, especially paranoia, plays a role in contemporary terrorism. Not all paranoiacs are terrorists, but all terrorists believe in conspiracies by the powerful, hostile forces and suffer from some form of delusion and persecution mania ... The element of ... madness plays an important role [in terrorism], even if many are reluctant to acknowledge it (Laqueur, 2001: 80).

In relation to the results from Q10, where the respondents discussed the possibilities of using social sciences to mitigate terrorism, it was possible to observe that Lombroso considered social sciences as significant contributors to the understanding of anarchism and to formulating significant recommendations. During the twentieth century, the social sciences did not produce voluminous studies on violent political disorders (Eckstein, 1964). And 'social scientists, at this time in history, had precious little to say about terrorism' (Gupta, 2012: 109). In contrast, almost a century before, Lombroso considered numerous factors when studying anarchists and politically motivated crimes. The respondents of this study called for unbiased results and contextual analysis as necessary requirements in order to reflect the reality experienced by particular communities that support extremist ideologies. By studying various anarchist personalities and their contextual backgrounds, Lombroso explored potential motivators that could have impelled these personalities to embrace anarchist ideologies and cause a rampage of violence.

The respondents expressed concern about the lack of objectivity that created uncertainties in terrorism research and related methodological and epistemological discussions. Lombroso aimed at producing unbiased results by holding a wide scope on events and research produced in different parts of the world (Rafter, 2009). In *Gli Anarchici*, Lombroso presented diverse methods of data collection on extremist anarchist actors and political crimes

in the nineteenth century and before. However, as happened with other works, Lombroso did not explain clearly the methods used to get the data discussed in his work and this had adverse consequences on the reliability and validity of his results. In fact, Lombroso and the positivists were at the centre of numerous discussions on research methodologies because of the empirical research methods applied by *la scuola positiva* (the positivist school) to investigate different crimes and criminals (Garland, 2002).

The results showed that when it came to understanding terrorism through the social sciences and to explain and perhaps predict it, the respondents considered collating information from different sources and combining intelligence with academic research and theories. All the respondents spoke of a sociological type of science that would reflect the contemporary paradigms of terrorism research. In contrast, Lombroso used a more eclectic approach to assemble a holistic picture of the root causes of anarchism. This reflected a nineteenth-century model and was used to categorize the injustices and inequalities in society, particularly those caused by state institutions, such as poverty, insecurity and ignorance. Anarchism was a consequent reaction to these 'profound evils that corrode our vital organs such as the pellagra, alcoholism, superstition, regulated injustice and ignorance in school subjects'[98] (Lombroso, 1895: 20).

The responses highlight the root causes that modify the trajectory of an individual before becoming engaged in terrorist activities (Taylor & Horgan, 2006). Together with political conflicts, economic depressions and social difficulties, Lombroso studied anarchist personalities, their backgrounds and psycho-behavioural reactions. He identified different anarchist behaviours and mental conditions, as the chapter titles imply: epilepsy and hysteria[99], crazy individuals[100], mattoids[101], indirect suicides[102], crimes of passion[103], altruism[104] and neophilia[105]. Lombroso theorized that anarchist reactions were also determined by

[98] '*Ai mali profondi che ci rodono gli organi più vitali, alla pellagra, all'alcoolismo, alla superstizione, alla regolamentata ingiustizia, alla ignoranza scolastica'.*

[99] *Epilessia ed isteria,* Chapter 3, of Lombroso, C., (1895)*, Gli Anarchici: seconda edizione con aggiunte*, Torino: Bocca.

[100] *Pazzi*, Chapter 4, of Lombroso, C. (1895)*, Gli Anarchici: seconda edizione con aggiunte*, Torino: Bocca.

[101] *Mattoidi,* Chapter 5, of Lombroso, C. (1895), *Gli Anarchici: seconda edizione con aggiunte*, Torino: Bocca.

[102] *Suicidi indiretti,* Chapter 6, of Lombroso, C. (1895), *Gli Anarchici: seconda edizione con aggiunte*, Torino: Bocca.

[103] *Rei per passion,* Chapter 7, of Lombroso, C. (1895), *Gli Anarchici: seconda edizione con aggiunte*, Torino: Bocca.

[104] *Altruismo,* Chapter 8, of Lombroso, C. (1895), *Gli Anarchici: seconda edizione con aggiunte*, Torino: Bocca.

[105] *Neofilia,* Chapter 9, of Lombroso, C. (1895), *Gli Anarchici: seconda edizione con aggiunte*, Torino: Bocca.

individual traits, attitudes and behaviours. For instance, mattoids 'expressed less evil and minor energies when compared to born criminals, as they completely lacked evil practice and shrewdness' [106] (Lombroso, 1895: 61).

In the case study of Caserio, Lombroso also wanted to show that not only born criminals were attracted to the anarchist ideology. The progression from a criminal personality like Ravachol to an honest fanatic like Caserio highlighted the central role of indoctrination in political crimes of passion (Lombroso, 1895: 72). Lombroso associated anarchists with mental conditions, diseases and mental dysfunctions, and studied the environments they lived in. The government used brutal force and violence to take over all means of survival and it imposed laws that seemed to serve only the privileged classes. For instance, though Caserio did not suffer directly from pellagra, a vitamin deficiency disease, he witnessed the poor conditions experienced by peasants in the north of Italy, who were associated with the spread of this disease. Together with the sense of revenge created by the killing of previous anarchists, these poor conditions motivated Caserio to adopt an anarchist ideology and also to commit a murderous act.

In *Gli Anarchici* Lombroso (1895: 7) intended to answer the question 'how and why would an individual who, in a different time and space, would have been a robber or a pirate or a good person, has now become an anarchist, in the worst sense of the word?'[107] Apart from considering economic fanaticism, extreme altruistic tendencies and manipulated religious beliefs, Lombroso also underlined the excessive reactions by authorities and the unjust treatment by social institutions. Excessively violent reactions against innocent victims and anarchists were stronger than any form of propaganda. As a result Lombroso (1895: 23) demanded that modern man renounced to the use of violence and abided by the principle, 'violence is always immoral, even when it is directed to reject other violence'[108]. To be effective in countering terrorism, the interviewees supported adopting a common approach to manage terrorism, both at national and international levels. Similarly, to mitigate actions by anarchist terrorism, Lombroso (1895: 121) recommended that 'everyone [different nations] could agree on common non-violent policing practices'[109]. Similar to the interview results, Lombroso claimed that countries that were not involved in coercive actions were less affected by anarchism and similar political crimes.

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[106] '*Vi spiegano minore crudeltà e minore energia dei rei-nati, mancando completamente in loro la pratica e l'astuzia nel male'.*

[107] '*Come e perché accade che colui il quale in alter condizioni di tempo e di spazio sarebbe stato brigante o pirata o bravo, diventa oggi anarchico, nel senso peggiore della parola?*'

[108] '*La violenza è sempre immorale, anche quando è rivolta a respingere la violenza'.*

[109] '*Tutti però potrebbero accordarsi in alcune misure di polizia comune, non violenti'.*

6.2 Researching methods in terrorism

After discussing the interviewees' opinions on the subject of creating a science of terrorism and the kind of information required when conducting research, this section will now explore two questions that deal with three aspects in the study of this phenomenon. The first discussion sheds light on the academic disciplines that use possibly the best approach to terrorism research. The other two discussions revolve around the limited use of statistics and the controversies associated with the use of interviews when researching terrorism.

Researching terrorism is characterized by the interests of different academic fields (Gordon, 2010; Schmid & Jongman, 1988). Q12 queried the progress in terrorism studies in recent years and the academic disciplines that possibly provide the most comprehensive understanding of terrorism. According to almost all respondents (16 of 20) the best approach to study terrorism is to combine different academic disciplines. Most of the academics (6 of 7) supported a multidisciplinary approach in terrorism studies and stated:

> A lot of past [terrorism research] material is not very useful. If I had to choose a discipline to study terrorism, I would take anthropology, but a multidisciplinary approach is ideal. (AC1)

> Now you have good research out there. Ten years ago most terrorism studies were more like newspaper articles and were not using data systematically. Sociology, criminology, psychology, political science, and economics are disciplines that should be involved in terrorism studies, not just political science, creating a multidisciplinary approach. (AC2)

> Security and terrorism studies have been criticised by academics because pressures to produce relevant policy results reduced academic standards. It is important to combine an understanding of violence in a multidisciplinary approach. (AC3)

> Terrorism research is a multidisciplinary thing but the best research comes from anthropology. Like any other criminal, you have to understand the person holistically. (AC4)

> We need to be careful not to engage in stereotyping. A multidisciplinary approach is the most beneficial to understand terrorism. We need to be analytic rather than descriptive [and] we need to invest in evidence using a multidisciplinary approach to understand better terrorism. (AC7)

> Extensive knowledge has been developed in terrorism research. Political sciences would be the most commonly associated with terrorism. However, criminology also has much more to offer than political science particularly in terms of methodology. (AC6)

AC5 displayed a more unique approach. This interviewee vociferously expressed concern on the effects of government funding on scholars, and the consequent effects on research objectives, methodologies, outcomes and theories.

> There is an unhealthy level of very close cooperation between government and scholars that research non-state terrorism. This makes me question the scholars' critical decision-making from the people who are funding them. Good quality methodology needs to be at a sufficient critical distance from the state, and its interests. Rigorous methodology does not rely on secondary sources. (AC5)

Echoing most of the academics, four of the security respondents welcomed a multidisciplinary approach to terrorism research. They claimed that this method would create a path to a more thorough understanding of terrorism.

> Terrorism is so vast that it would be ideal to have a multidisciplinary approach rather than indicating a particular field. If one focuses on one particular approach, some important aspects are being left out. (SP1)

> We know more about terrorism than 10 years ago. We know more about their behaviour and how to control these problems. I would take a multidisciplinary approach - taking different fields to understand terrorism further. (SP5)

> We have lots of paperwork with in-depth knowledge and historical views about how things developed over the years. I associate terrorism research with psychology, political science, sociology with terrorism and a combination of all three. (SP6)

> A combination of data and knowledge from different [academic] fields produces the most comprehensive understanding of the terrorist phenomenon. (SP7)

Similarly, every policymaker opted for a multidisciplinary approach that would, according to them, improve the understanding of terrorism. Their perceptions were as follows:

> Research helps us to think differently and consequently react differently to terrorism. Criminology and political sciences suit best terrorism studies, but a multidisciplinary approach produces boundless and more concrete results. (PM5)

> Research contributed to a better understanding of what is happening such as terrorism inspired by abusive interpretations of Islam. A multidisciplinary approach stimulates the knowledge of different experts and academics on the issue. (PM1)

> The academic subjects that help in studying terrorism are social sciences like psychology, sociology and criminology. However, it is ideal to have a multidisciplinary approach. (PM2)

> More knowledge helps us to become aware of the current terrorist situation. A multidisciplinary approach is ideal to provide a more holistic terrorism research. (PM3)
>
> Studies from different disciplines influenced the progress of terrorism research but I cannot point out a particular one. (PM4)
>
> Terrorism research is not a real discipline but cobbles together political science, sociological studies, history, psychology and others. After 9/11, there was a flourish of terrorism studies, but it will die away again because terrorism studies are not a discipline. (PM6)

Like Wilkinson (2007), most respondents (16 of 20) subscribed to a multidisciplinary approach to the study of terrorism. Table 6.1 (below) shows the academic fields and the number of times they were mentioned by the respondents when answering Q12. Sociology and political sciences scored high among the respondents, but multidisciplinary approach had the highest score as it was mentioned sixteen times.

Table 6.1: The preferred approach to terrorism research

Academic fields mentioned by interviewees (The interviewer provided no suggestions)	**Responses**			**Total**
	AC	**PM**	**SP**	
Sociology	4	1	2	7
Psychology	1	1	1	3
Criminology	2	1	/	3
Anthropology	2	/	/	2
Political Sciences	2	2	1	5
History	1	1	1	3
International Relations	1	/	/	1
Security Studies	1	/	/	1
Economics	1	/	/	1
Multidisciplinary Approach	6	6	4	16

'Problems in understanding terrorism bring us to adopt a multidisciplinary approach, which provides us with better understanding' (AC7). As Gordon (2010: 440) explicated, the fragmented character of terrorism created the foundation for 'a cohesive discipline'. The findings from the interviews portrayed terrorism studies not as a discipline but as a subject consisting of research from different academic fields. Schmid and Jongman (2008) discussed some of the main typologies and academic disciplines that studied different aspects of terrorism (see Chapter 2, Figure 2.1). Likewise, Borgeson and Valeri (2007) characterized terrorism studies as an elaboration or a branch of other academic fields targeting terrorism (see Baum & Dougall, 2002; Borum, 2004; Crenshaw, 2000; Moeckli, 2008; Nichols, 2004;

Resnyansy, 2008; Shapira & Cole, 2006; Spariosu 2004; Tillema, 2002; Turk, 2004). The respondents considered this multidisciplinary approach as the key to overcome some of the numerous obstacles encountered in researching terrorism, making it more academic and less journalese. Moving away from the over-dependence of secondary-sourced terrorism research (Crenshaw, 2001; Horgan, 2007; Silke, 2004), and to more sophisticated research techniques, promoted desk-based terrorism research to evidence-based studies, which provide more in-depth details about the terrorism phenomena (Berko, 2007; Horgan, 2009).

The 9/11 catastrophe continued to intensify the interest-focus of different academic studies on terrorism, particularly because it became a priority for governments and universities (Silke, 2004; Wilkinson, 2007; Zubkora, 2005). However, the issue of government funding raised a number of arguments on the amplified risk of bias for researchers and increased governmental control on publications and results (Jackson, Smyth & Gunning, 2009; Smyth, 2009). These methodological, theoretical and epistemological matters hinder terrorism studies from being recognized as a scientific discipline (Gordon, 2010; Sinai, 2007) and expose this subject to numerous challenges and criticism (Gunning, 2007; Stump & Dixit, 2013). After all, even the history of terrorism research is uncertain, as Gordon (2010) dates it back to 1965, but Bonanate, Oldeni and Miglioriono (1979) recorded the first two books on terrorism three decades before, namely Sottile (1938) and Waciorski (1939).

After prompting the discussion on the multidisciplinary approach respondents would adopt in studying terrorism, Q11 explored the contributions of different research methodologies when it came to researching terrorism and identifying potential future attacks. The answers to this question were divided in two discussions. The first one presented the respondents' perceptions on the uses and limitations of statistics when researching terrorism and predicting future attacks. The second discussion evaluated the use of interviews and the weaknesses associated with interviewing inmates accused of terrorist acts.

Most respondents (17 of 20) highlighted uncertainties associated with the use of statistics in terrorism studies. Perhaps unexpectedly, the results from SPs supported the use of statistics, particularly when combined with intelligence, history or other contextual knowledge on terrorist groups. Five academic interviewees outstandingly excluded the use of statistical analysis as predictors of future terrorist attacks.

> Statistical analyses of past patterns do not predict future attacks. (AC1)

> Statistics can't predict, but can come up with greater and lesser likelihoods, so it is probabilistic. When uncovering patterns you can conclude on what types of places and occasions are more likely to suffer future attacks. (AC2)

> Statistics cannot predict terrorist attacks. Trying to predict terrorist attacks is foolish and impossible. (AC5)
>
> A lot of people believe that statistics can predict terrorist attacks ... [but] terrorist attacks can be predicted only through specific intelligence coming from informers. (AC6)
>
> It is not possible to predict future terrorist attacks using statistics ... [but] in situations of extreme injustice or highly unpopular policies there can be violent resistance to them. We can't predict actual attacks but make broad predictions. (AC4)

The majority of policymakers (5 of 6) were also sceptical about the use of statistics to predict future terrorist attacks. They explained that unreliable sources, incomplete data-gathering, and lack of intelligence were the main weaknesses that consequently resulted in scarce statistical analysis. These information inaccuracies hindered the possibility of creating adequate formulas that indicated probabilistic approximations of future terrorist attacks.

> Researchers will not access the information collected by the security services … [and] cannot find a formula that fits terrorism because the collected information does not contain all the necessary details to produce accurate statistical analysis and indicate particular patterns. (PM4)
>
> Statistical analysis will not help in preventing future attacks. Only intelligence can give the necessary clues. (PM1)
>
> It is not possible to predict future terrorist attacks from statistics because the human element is unpredictable. (PM2)
>
> Statistical analysis of past patterns cannot give enough clues of what may happen in the future. (PM6)
>
> Using statistical analyses to find patterns of past terrorist attacks and predict future ones is highly unlikely. Statistics don't enter in more detail than intelligence. Elements such as history can help to picture terrorists and understand better their thoughts. (PM5)

In contrast, perhaps surprisingly, the whole SP group considered statistical patterns of past terrorist incidents as moderately useful when it came to indicating past terrorist trends and adopting a realistic approach to predicting future terrorist actions. This is echoed in the following sample of responses:

> Statistics can do some predictions but there are always unpredicted incidents, attacks or accidents. (SP7)
>
> Statistical analyses look at the past and try to guess what will happen in the future. It is very difficult to predict what different influences will affect

> terrorism from statistical analyses. (SP5)
>
> Statistical analyses may be indicative but are subject to various interpretations and variables. (SP3)
>
> Statistics give indications of possibilities or capabilities or both. But from the analyses of past patterns you can't predict the terrorists' moves because terrorists learn very well how to look for vulnerable points. (SP6)
>
> Past patterns do not necessarily predict the future. Statistical analysis is there but one needs a wider perspective and intelligence. This means you need to be so knowledgeable that you practically enter in the terrorist line of thought. (SP1)

The other viable method to research terrorism, as indicated by nine respondents when answering Q11, was interviewing. The respondents explained that interviews with terrorists, former members of terrorist factions, or persons close to them provided unique opportunities to gather first-hand information. As Horgan (2011) points out, the use of interviews in terrorism studies is not immune from controversy. When discussing interviews as a research tool, three academics emphatically highlighted the lack of reliable and valuable data collected because the information would be gained from unpredictable and unreliable terrorist-interviewees that put researchers in potentially life-threatening situations.

> I would not interview people who are involved in a terrorist faction but those who worked close to the organization. Often I didn't want to know people who worked in the organization for my own security. Authorities keep these people for themselves, and won't let you access them. (AC1)
>
> Interviews with people are interesting to get to know the individuals and learn about the internal processes. Interviews with people in factions or ex-members are a bit problematic because they often tell you something that you already know. (AC7)
>
> I am always suspicious of information obtained from interviews with individuals in custody. My questions would be: 'how did you get that information from a person in custody?' and 'did you use enhanced interrogation techniques or torture to get that information?' So that kind of information does not better information. (AC5)

Similarly, the only two policymakers that discussed the use of interviews as research tools when studying terrorists doubted the credibility of the gathered data and the very effectiveness of this method of research. The lack of frankness was particularly emphasised in cases where the researcher could not understand the context surrounding the terrorist actors, particularly when they came from different social backgrounds.

> I would be careful in interviewing these people as one has to be cunning enough to examine thoroughly what is being said to find out if it is the truth. (PM5)

> I am not sure that interviews are really helpful. Why are they answering you in the first place? Do they want to justify and rationalise their past actions? Do they think they will receive any incentive from the prison administration? Interviewing incarcerated people is not reliable. John Horgan gets quite good results but he only operates with certain groups. For example, I would accept his findings with regards to the IRA as that is his social comfort zone, but if he is interviewing activists of Jemaah Islamiah … he doesn't know the culture and he can't even interpret that because they exist in a different cultural setting. (PM6)

In marked contrast to the scepticism expressed by AC and PM respondents about the use of interviews, four security professionals considered the use of interviews as an effective research method to enhance the knowledge on terrorism. Furthermore, SPs advised researchers to be careful about the quality of information gathered and also about manipulation techniques used by these extremist personalities to acquire knowledge from the researchers and also perhaps the academics' sympathy.

> To know what inspires people to get into terrorism you have to be in touch with and interview the terrorists. A team of people coming from different fields should interview these people, and analyse every aspect from different angles such as psychology, sociology, politics, etc. (SP6)

> Talking to inmates [accused or convicted of terrorist acts] gives a good perceptive of how they think, work and what their systems are. (SP5)

> Interviews can help to understand [the terrorists] better but it is difficult to get in contact with them. Very often governments do not permit people to make contact with convicted terrorists. They are isolated from other inmates to stop them from spreading their ideas. (SP2)

> One has to be careful about interviewing incarcerated terrorists or members of factions as terrorists may acquire knowledge on which are the feared attacks and are provided with new ideas for future attacks. (SP4)

> I would use interviews but the information depends on the role that person had in the terrorist organization (being an operator or a mastermind). When interviewing present or former faction members, everything has to be treated with particular caution. Academics must be aware of the 'Stockholm syndrome', which turns the terrorists into their heroes and they [the academics] will identify themselves with the terrorists and cross the line. (SP1)

Scepticism about statistics was a dominant characteristic in the results and reflected the idea that 'social science researchers typically have to work with very "noisy" data where there

are potentially a vast number of factors exerting an influence on any one behaviour, event or trend' (Silke, 2008a: 35). While still showing scepticism, SP respondents pointed out that statistical analysis could be used to discover probabilistic likelihoods and patterns of attacks. Authors like LaFree, Dugan, Xie and Singh (2012), as well as Greenbaum, Dugan and LaFree (2007), used statistics to show how terrorism impacted provinces and business activities in Spain and Italy. While Silke (2008a) pointed out key works by Clarke and Newman (2006), Pape (2005) and Sageman (2004), which also used statistics. Thus, statistics should not be avoided because 'looking at the past is clearly an important part for terrorism research' (AC7).

The respondents considered interviews as another viable research tool which enabled researchers to know more about terrorism and associated internal processes. Nevertheless, distrust in extremist actors was a main controversial issue (Horgan, 2011). Another striking feature is that the AC and PM respondents questioned the veracity or lack of 'truthfulness' of interviews. Terrorists give unreliable information and academics have to assess the dangers linked with this research method. First-hand interviews do not essentially lead to make 'predictions' or to identify capabilities of terrorist factions but to provide insights into specific groups or personal experiences, as sustained by McAdams (1993, 2001). Kellen (1982a: 126) also explained that the interpretations of terrorist actors 'may or may not be accurate [and] lack general applicability'. However, as Horgan (2011: 7) explained, 'finding "reality" may be less important than acknowledging the significance of its meaning for the interviewee'.

In contrast, the group of the security professionals considered the valuable contribution of interviewing terrorists. However, these interviewees cautioned about the possibility that 'academics get [much] involved with the research subjects and picture terrorists as heroes, and identify themselves with their research subjects' (SP1). Numerous academics value the use of first-hand interviews with terrorists (e.g. Alonso, 2006; Baeyer-Kaette, von Classens, Feger & Neihardt, 1982; Berko & Wolf, 2005; Berko, 2007; Bloom, 2005; Dolnik, 2011; Horgan, 2008, 2009; Jager, Schmidtchen & Sulllwold, 1981; Jamieson, 1990; Jürgensmeyer, 2000; Post *et al*., 2003; Stern, 1999; Taylor & Quayle, 1994). Zulaika (1996) also expressed a willingness to join terrorists to gain a more thorough perception of underground organizations. However, the outcomes also show that AC respondents were conscious of the fact that research could be affected by different biases and stressed the importance of more neutral research. For instance, AC1 declared 'I know that authorities think that if you interview terrorists you are sympathising with them. But that is ignorance and short-sightedness from the authorities'. To overcome these obstacles and for their own safety, academics look for alternatives rather than

get into direct contact with activists, as shown in Smyth (2009) and Speckhard, Jacuch & Vanrompay (2012).

The results also showed that when it came to interviewing terrorist actors, another recurring issue was gaining access to terrorists or former terrorist actors and interviewing them about their life in underground terrorist organizations. 'It is difficult to get into contact with terrorists and even when in prison they are not always willing to talk' (SP2). Results from the academics also pointed out that if the terrorist interviewees experienced enhanced or coercive interrogation techniques, this could jeopardize the information obtained from their interviews. These difficulties are also delineated in Silke (2008a) and Horgan (2011), while highly challenging experiences of accessing imprisoned terrorist actors is recorded by numerous other researchers (see Horgan, 2004, 2008, 2011; Post *et al.*, 2003; Schmid, 2011).

When comparing the responses to Q12 with Lombroso's reflections in his book *Gli Anarchici*, one notes that he did not list and discuss the ideal academic disciplines that should be involved in the research of political crimes, anarchist characteristics and characters. However, the multidisciplinary approach is the most compelling correlation between the respondents and Lombroso. In his work, Lombroso (1895: 5) explained how the psychiatric-anthropological method was applied to the study of the hottest issues with empirical impartiality[110]. The three groups of respondents interpreted this psychiatric-anthropological method as the use of a multidisciplinary approach. Apart from this, a brief overview of the issues tackled in the eleven chapters of his work clearly indicated that Lombroso used various academic disciplines to sustain his arguments. Political science, anthropology, medicine, sociology, psychology, psychiatry and history are among the disciplines that could be easily identified in his criminological analysis of anarchism.

After perusing and combining data obtained from different fields, Lombroso was in a position to assess (Italian) contemporary politics by comparing them to other countries from various parts of the world. This combination of political sciences and anthropology was essential for him to identify countries and localities where particular contexts made people more prone to resort to revolutionary activities and political violence. Among the recurring issues in *Gli Anarchici* was the corruption and abuse inflicted by government deputies, which led to poverty, malnutrition and disease. For instance, Lombroso (1895: 78) described the economic difficulties experienced in the Lombard region as worse than those of Roman slaves.

[110] '*In modo fin troppo sperimentale l'imparzialità del metodo psichiatrico-antropologico applicato alle più ardenti questioni attuali*'.

Fields like sociology, psychology and psychiatry were fundamental in Lombroso's analysis of the sociological contexts as well as the individual characteristics that motivated a person to endorse anarchist ideologies and to become involved in violent attacks on its behalf. For instance, when presenting cases of extreme altruism, Lombroso (1895: 87) explained that Hamon decided to resort to anarchism only for solidarity with hospital patients that were in need. On the individual level, Lombroso looked for traits that facilitated one's attraction to anarchism and political violence for instance, epilepsy, altruism and neophilia. Delineating these different traits formed the major part of the chapters of *Gli Anarchici*.

The unequivocal concern expressed by academic respondents on the effect of political funding and consequent bias on researchers and their studies was also noticed in the book *Gli Anarchici*. Lombroso intended to use this book to create a platform of understanding between the anarchists and policymakers which would address the injustices without the use of violence. However, Lombroso was not immune from political biases. His socialist beliefs and strong socialist connections (particularly with Turati, eventual leader of the socialist party) created predispositions that influenced his conclusions. For instance, he considered socialism to be 'the biggest enemy of and best preventive'[111] against anarchism (Lombroso, 1895: 129). In order to justify this viewpoint he highlighted the differences between anarchism and socialism in different parts of *Gli Anarchici*. Also when discussing anarchists Vaillant and Henry, Lombroso explained that they were initially attracted to socialism but it did not satisfy their fanaticism.

The results obtained from Q11 showed that the three groups of respondents considered the use of statistics as having a limited value, and considered the outcomes derived from interviews with terrorist actors as unreliable. In contrast, Lombroso did not abide by particular research standards and did not discuss the research methodologies used by him or other researchers. This created serious doubts and weaknesses in his research methods (Gibson & Rafter, 2006). To sustain his arguments, Lombroso used results obtained from both quantitative and qualitative approaches. However, when Lombroso (1895: 19) referred to the statistics originally published by Dubois (1893), he described them as 'not very accurate and objective'[112]. In the penultimate chapter of the second edition of *Gli Anarchici*, Lombroso referred to other statistical analyses that were originally included in his work *Il Delitto Politico*. These numerical outcomes closely recorded the effect of high temperatures in different seasons in relation to the number of revolutions over different time periods and countries, as

[111] '*Ne è invece il piu grande nemico ed il miglior preventivo*'.
[112] *'Poco esatta e poco imparziale'.*

indicated in Table 3.1 (Lombroso, 1890, as cited in Lombroso, 1895: 105). Another statistical analysis presented a geo-spatial distribution of revolutions in Europe between 1791 and 1880 on a map (Appendix 2). The three-column legend of this table (enlarged in Appendix 2.1) described the number of revolutions, the proportion of revolutions per 10 million inhabitants, and the population density per square kilometre. Lombroso did not include much detail as from where and how the data was collected, but only declared experiencing difficulties in gathering information from Switzerland and Ireland due to changes in governments and constitutions. The results showed that 'apart from some rare exceptions the highest number of revolutions occurred in warm months'[113] particularly in southern European countries (Lombroso, 1895: 105-6).

Some of the sources used for qualitative analyses in *Gli Anarchici* included anarchist literature, speeches, newspapers and historical documents, and some results from Lombroso's previous works (as described in Chapter 3 of this thesis). Discourse analysis was used to analyse the jargon used in the lyrics of the anarchist songs and the defence speeches of Ravachol and Henry. The discourse analysis of Ravachol's and Henry's speeches served to distinguish the egoistic and born-criminal nature of Ravachol from the more altruistic ideologies of Henry (Lombroso, 1895: 88-94). To further expose the anarchist ideologies, Lombroso (1895: 26) analysed writings of anarchists like Merlino and Kropotkin, asking 'what is the raison d'être of the government?'[114] When Lombroso (1895: 26) exposed the 'good ideas of some anarchists'[115] he pointed out that persons in government were not exceptionally endowed, infallible or incorruptible. He explained that when politicians induced unequal political rights and imposed poverty on the majority of people, it instigated the killings of government deputies (*deputaticidio*) (Lombroso, 1895: 133).

> Today and throughout the course of history the Government brutally and violently dominated the crowds ensuring control and privileges by force, shrewdness or through inheritance taking over all the means of life, primarily land, which is used to enslave people and to make them work on their behalf [116] (Lombroso, 1895: 27).

In this work there are numerous quotes from different anarchist characters. Some of these quotes state the motivations behind the violent attacks. Lombroso did not elaborate on

[113] '*Troviamo ancora il maggior numero di rivoluzioni nei mesi caldi, salvo rare eccezioni'.*
[114] '*Qual'è la ragione d'essere del Governo?*'
[115] '*Idee giuste di alcuni anarchici*'.
[116] '*In tutto il corso della storia, così come nell'epoca attuale, il Governo o è la dominazione brutale, violenta, arbitraria di pochi sulle masse, o è uno strumento ordinato ad assicurare il dominio ed il privilegio a coloro che, per forza, o per astuzia, o per eredità, hanno accaparrato tutti i mezzi di vita, primo tra essi il suolo, e se ne servono per tenere il popolo in servitù e farlo lavorare per loro conto'.*

the methods used to obtain these direct quotes or information on the personal history of anarchists. He used court defence speeches and newspapers like *La Neue Freie Presse* (Lombroso, 1895: 138). However, Lombroso (1896: 76) never revealed the sources of the quotes, like that of Caserio's brother when describing Caserio's childhood behaviour. Truthfulness and veracity were never questioned by Lombroso. This indeed is in line with Horgan (2011), who favours finding the significance of what is said rather than the 'reality'.

As pointed out by the respondents, interviews do not necessarily express the truth and provide consistent information. It is even harder to evaluate the reliability of the quotes in Lombroso's work since he did not always explain how, when and in what ways he obtained these quotes. Despite establishing considerable progress in terrorism research, the results still indicate that doubts and controversies plague this area of study. Similarly, uncertainties and debates will keep on probing Lombroso's research methods. However, researchers have to appreciate that Lombroso's *avant-garde* rationale exploited different disciplines, numerous sources and multiple research methods in the exploration, analysis and understanding of this wave of anarchist terrorism (Rapoport, 2004).

6.3 Profiling terrorists

The risks posed by the threat of terrorism remains a major concern and keeps on creating anxieties (Suttmoeller, Chermak, Freilich & Fitzgerald, 2011). After exploring methods and disciplines that could be applied to terrorism research, Q15 queried the possibility of profiling terrorists according to age, gender, race, religion and other characteristics in order to create the image of the 'typical terrorist'.

Most respondents (18 of 20) opined that profiling terrorists had limited value. They explained that the context of political conflicts and certain behavioural trends may indicate potential terrorist activity but they believed that no profile could perfectly fit a terrorist individual or group. All the academics explained that there was no 'terrorist profile' and if one was attempted it would only be a stereotypical image. The AC respondents explained that profiling is a kind of labelling that could only worsen the situation and recommended the authorities to focus more on the situational context and political conflicts instead.

> I don't think there is or ever was a terrorist profile. There is an assumption among the general public that there is a terrorist profile dependent on specific groups. (AC6)

> You cannot create a profile. There are so few terrorists and they are very mixed, that they don't fit into any particular kind of category, so we cannot have a profile. (AC7)
>
> In today's world you just have to look like a Muslim. All I have to do is put on a headscarf so that I fit their stereotypical profile. People at airports … stop and search people that are targeted up-front. (AC1)
>
> To create a profile of a terrorist is a highly political process. Profiling is problematic because the whole circumstances currently go round Al Qaeda. (AC5)
>
> Research by John Horgan and Tore Bjørgo, which is more psychology- and criminology-oriented, stresses that profiling tends to develop labelling, which produces terrorist results in a reversed effect. The number of terrorists is so small that to single out a terrorist is extremely difficult … [and] there is the danger of escalating the situation. (AC3)
>
> There is no terrorist profile. Terrorists can be of almost any age, gender, class, religion, political orientation, rich, poor, criminal or law-abiding. Terrorists usually emerge from political conflicts. I would be very surprised if there was a New Zealand terrorist but I wouldn't be surprised if there was an Israeli, American, Spanish or British terrorist. It depends on where the conflict is and the context. (AC4)
>
> I don't think you need to profile to capture all the terrorists. I would focus more on situations and less on offenders. (AC2)

Similarly, most of the security professionals (6 of 7) excluded the possibility of profiling terrorists. SP6 also comprehensively explained that profiling was removed from their security practices. These results, however, highlighted an interest in profiling behaviours and tendencies that are common among terrorist groups. Again, the SPs emphasized the use of intelligence to profile these behavioural tendencies.

> We stopped profiling. We look at the *modus operandi* and identify human behaviour that is similar to the behaviour observed before in other terrorist organizations or individuals. A profile should not be attempted. Particular *modus operandi* gives indications that an individual might have turned into a terrorist or has terrorist aspirations, but profiling is very difficult. (SP6)
>
> It is difficult to create a profile that fits all the terrorists. Some aspects terrorists have in common are: being obsessed with their ideas, strong extreme ideologies … they are not open to discuss or debate their opinion and they use violence to convince other people to follow their ideology. (SP2)
>
> I would rather go to tell-tale signs because profiling *per se* is not that easy. Particular tendencies (traits, ethnicity, religion or skin colour) could be considered indicators of a higher probability, but intelligence-driven terrorism profiling is more reliable. (SP1)

> I think that there is not a well-functioning profile for this purpose. (SP7)
>
> Terrorists are categorised according to their sources of motivation. But, it is very difficult to create a main terrorist profile considering that Islamist, ethno-nationalist, separatist, left-wing and right-wing groups are all present in European countries. (SP3)
>
> I don't know if you can create a profile of a terrorist but they have some similar characteristics, e.g. extreme ideals, which are not always religious and the use of violence. Every person can somehow fit in this profile but it changes through the years. Thirty years ago we had a totally different group of terrorists to what we have now. (SP5)

Only SP4 believed that profiling terrorists was possible. However, the profiling methods described were not different from the behavioural trends mentioned by the other security respondents.

> Yes, we can create a terrorist profile and religion is one of the main identifiers. There are many other factors which compile the profile such as age, social conditions etc. (SP4)

The majority of the policymakers (5 of 6) also insisted that terrorists could not fit into a profile. Similar to the responses from the SP group, the policymakers explored the possibility of behavioural profiling and included the use of intelligence to identify these behavioural trends. Resonating the views of the academic respondents, the policymakers also explained that terrorist profiling tended to be based on ethnical profiling.

> A profile for terrorists cannot be created because different types of terrorism exist. (PM5)
>
> If terrorism was restricted to one particular country or cause, it would be fairly easy to identify who is the terrorist. Since terrorism went global it is much more difficult. (PM2)
>
> You can rely on behavioural profiling but not on physical profiling. Some techniques are to follow communication patterns, to commit crimes like financing terrorist groups ... [or] factors like prison populations with extreme religious beliefs, could be indicators of terrorism. So intelligence is very important. (PM1)
>
> When profiling people at airports one looks at the country of origin, religion, behaviour at the airport and what they are carrying in their luggage. (PM3)
>
> Profiling doesn't really work as it is always about ethnicity, religion, skin colour and it is also about your name. An Arabic name causes more alarm than a German name. So, parts of the population are more targeted than others. I would rather trust technology such as facial recognition. (PM6)

The majority of the respondents agree that terrorist profiling does not exist and do not consider it a viable option to mitigate terrorism. Pre-conceived ethnical profiles and stereotypes label people with particular characteristics as terrorists or potential ones. These results indicate that this labelling can increase the discrimination of particular ethnic groups and consequently escalate terrorist behaviour. The suggested alternative options were behavioural and intelligence-led profiling based on observations of extremist groups. However, it is understandable that every terrorist group should be tackled on its own merits. As SP6 explained, 'the contextual situation of Northern Ireland is completely different from the Spanish situation with ETA, even though both cases deal with separatism issues'. Isolating opportunities and conditions help one to understand the likelihoods and manifestations of terrorism (Elias, 1996; Vertigans, 2011).

Theories that profile terrorist actors are among the most problematic in terrorism studies because they are poor, unempirical and obtained from secondary sources (Post, 1987, as cited in Horgan, 2003). When discussing theories that profile terrorists, McAllister and Schmid (2011: 214) referred to 'ill-founded theories of terrorism based on individual personality and even physiognomic traits allegedly typical of terrorist criminals'. The ineptness of these theories is highlighted further when 'many home-grown terrorists have never been picked up by national security screening' (AC7). Though there is no specific terrorist profile, the respondents indicated characteristics that are common in terrorist groups, such as their firm convictions, the fact that they are not open to discuss or debate their ideologies and their use of violence. Mullins (2007) also states that 'groups of terrorists do seem to share common patterns of development as individuals come together, radicalise and decide to take action but there appears to be considerable variations both within and between these groups'. While citing Taarnby (2006) and the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Agency (AIVD, 2006), Mullins (2007) sustains that terrorists in Western countries are getting younger (aged between sixteen and twenty-five) and that women are having increasingly more important roles.

The results also show that terrorist profiling should be more than ethnical profiling. After Al Qaeda's attacks in Western countries, the terrorist profile is synonymous with someone that 'looks like a Muslim' (AC1). Also because of the past attacks by Irish militants AC7 explained, 'just a few years ago the stereotype of a terrorist looked like a leprechaun and in the future it might be something else, as it changes through time'. Sageman (2004) and Horgan (2007) also point out that researchers are still looking for common social, demographic and political backgrounds that distinguish myths from realities (see also Jacques & Taylor, 2012; Leiken & Brooke, 2006; Russell & Miller, 1977; Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

When considering the practices of profiling in law enforcement, Cotton & Li (2012: 2) explained that profiling 'refers to the use of an individual's race, ethnicity, or other observable characteristics by officers when determining whether to stop, search, screen, or otherwise engage in law enforcement'. Identifying prospective terrorists consequently results in racial profiling that affects police intelligence because of racial biases that create opportunities for abuse (Anwar & Fang, 2006; Cotton & Li, 2012; Monahan, 2011, 2012). This stereotypical profiling increases the political naming of communities as 'terrorists' in conflict discourse (Bhatia, 2005; Hoffman, 2006). As the academic results demonstrate, political labelling can reverse effects and can thus produce more terrorists (Bjørgo, 2005; Horgan, 2005b). Therefore, researchers need to be sensitive to the ontological statuses, particular ethnic values and political standpoints that stimulate home-grown terrorists in Western countries and the consequent scrutiny by authorities (Jackson, 2008).

The strong scepticism expressed by the respondents with regards to the usefulness of terrorist profiling deeply contrasted with Lombroso's obsession with profiling anarchist terrorists. Lombroso was keen on creating both a physical profile and a behavioural one by studying a series of ideological passions, and the relevant political, social and economic contexts.

> Economic or social fanaticism plays a major role in crimes of violent passion, which could be exceptionally confused with criminality, which is often isolated and pure. However, as I have shown in *Il Delitto Politico*, due to their pure passion and honesty these criminals are the antithesis of the born criminal[117] (Lombroso, 1895: 69).

Lombroso presented his profile of the typical anarchist in a chapter titled *Rei per passione — Caserio*[118]. The first part of this chapter describes the age, gender and other physiognomic aspects. The interviewees disagreed with the idea of creating any form of physical description of a terrorist because they thought that it would create more opportunities for abuse, which in turn, would incite further violence. On the contrary, Lombroso aimed at creating a physical profile of anarchist actors, particularly to prove that political criminals were different from the born criminals. When describing the appearance of Russian nihilists, French rebels and Italian revolutionaries, Lombroso (1895: 69) called the

[117] '*Ma una parte pur grande in questi delitti l'ha il fanatismo economico, o sociale, la violenta passione che può per eccezione innestarsie confondersi alla criminalità — ma che spesso è isolate e pura; anzi io ho dimostrato nel mio Delitto politico, che questi rei per pura passione sono, per la loro onestà, l'opposto, l'antitesi dei criminali-nati'.*

[118] Crimes of passion – Caserio, Chapter 7, of Lombroso, C. (1895), *Gli Anarchici: seconda edizione con aggiunte*, Torino: Bocca.

good-looking physiognomy of these individuals as 'almost anti-criminal'[119]. As regards gender and age, Lombroso (1895: 70) echoed Régis (1890), and affirmed that 'women, especially those aged between 18 and 25, who are proportionately less represented in general crimes are more dominant in this kind of [political] crime'[120]. In this age bracket, enthusiasm and selflessness were among the factors that increased the attractiveness to crime, resulting in young revolutionaries (Desmarets, 1833, as cited by Lombroso, 1895).

When describing behavioural tendencies, Lombroso focuses on various points that mirror the different contextual aspects identified in the results. Among these different behavioural aspects, Lombroso indicated observations that were common among anarchist actors. For example, he highlighted that passionate political criminals typically had an inherited political fanaticism and an exaggerated honesty. Also according to Lombroso, political criminals driven by passion tended not to have accomplices during their criminal act. In support of his argument, Lombroso mentioned Charlotte Corday. Corday was an honest young woman who studied history and philosophy, and was later enlightened with the literature of Plutarch, Montesquieu and Rousseau. Imbibed by the Girondists' ideology, Corday murdered Jean-Paul Marat, a leading member of the Jacobin faction. Quoting D'Abrantés (1838), Lombroso (1895: 71) explained that when Corday was asked 'how such a weak and inexperienced woman could possibly kill Marat without any help from some accomplices', she answered, 'anger (indication of the violent passion), had inflamed my heart and taught me the way to pierce his heart'.[121]

Lombroso mentioned numerous other examples of individuals who had committed serious political crimes and suffered or died for their ideals. However, in his description of political criminals, Lombroso did not hesitate to combine Dostoyevsky's fictitious political heroes to the trial of fifty Muscovite Socialist Revolutionaries in St. Petersburg. To show that these individuals did not hesitate when it came to sacrificing themselves for their cause, Lombroso quoted a female adherent of the Muscovite socialist movement who in the St. Petersburg trial stated 'I will resist any sentence you may impose, because I have a faith that you do not have, I believe in the accomplishment of my ideals'[122]. Lombroso also compared

[119] *'Quasi anti-criminale'.*

[120] *'Sono le femmine, qui, relativamente alla scarsa quota che prende nei delitti, più numerose. Vi preponderano i giovani dai 18 ai 25 anni'*.

[121] '*Richiesta come donna gracile, inesercitata, avesse potuto, senza complici, colpire a morte Marat: "L'ira, rispose (e così indicava la violenta passione), aveva gonfiato il mio cuore e mi insegnò la via per giungere fino al suo"'.*

[122] *'Io sono inaccessibile a qualunque pena, perchè io ho una fede, che voi non avete, nel trionfo delle mie idee'.*

this principle of sacrificing oneself to the passionate martyrdom of Christ's followers and the massacre of Babi in Persia.

Lombroso's various examples show that it is difficult to identify who will become a political criminal and commit atrocious acts. This discussion on the passionate impetus of political criminals culminated in the case of Caserio. Lombroso studied Caserio's family background, the context in which he had been brought up, and described what he considered to be the loyal and honest character of this individual. Besides his innate epileptic nature and hyperesthesia, the only potentially criminal tendencies in Caserio were vagrancy and the fact that he ran away from home at a young age when a man was traditionally attached to his land. Caserio started to work as a baker and at seventeen years of age he 'received the germs of anarchism'[123]. He was indoctrinated to the extent that he killed French President Carnot (Lombroso, 1895: 76).

Echoing the responses of this research, *Gli Anarchici* shows that no specific indicators can accurately build a terrorist profile. In fact, both the interviewees and Lombroso insisted that both men or women, offenders or honest individuals, could be attracted by extremist ideals to commit political crimes, particularly when influenced by the collective identity (Post, 2005) and group processes (Taylor, 2010). To sustain this argument Lombroso quoted other researchers (Desmarets, 1833; Régis, 1890) and brought up the examples of Ravachol and Pini as anarchists with criminal traits, while Henry, Corday and Caserio were examples of anarchists with more honest characteristics.

6.4 Postscript: An extremist perspective

This section compares and contrasts Charles's personal experiences and opinions with the research issues discussed in this chapter. Charles's induction into extremism and subsequent activities are discussed in terms of the results obtained from the interviews and from Lombroso's work. The results from Q10 showed that the social sciences aim to understand terrorism using different scientific perspectives. However, it was shown that terrorism is so clandestine and political that the policymakers were quite sceptical of terrorism studies, and the researchers were very much aware of the lack of impartial research on the different driving forces that led to terrorism.

[123] '*I germi dell'anarchismo'.*

Charles's experience also shows that it is difficult to identify who will be involved in extremism and who will eventually get into terrorism. Charles's involvement in an anti-jihad movement was unexpected. At 15 years of age, he was kicked out of home and 'ended up involved in drugs and incurred great debts'. From his teenage years until his early twenties, Charles was in and out of prison several times. At 21, Charles experienced 'a very powerful spiritual conversion that changed [his] life'. Charles described this experience as 'angelic and a big testimony of God's powers', which changed him from an underworld criminal into a fervent Christian. As a Christian and a law-abiding person, Charles thought it was his duty to report the misdeeds of the Muslim community in his neighbourhood.

> There were Muslims selling heroin and crack cocaine next door from where I was living. So I went to the police. They were arrested … [but] they found out that it was me who gave the information. They threatened me and from then on, I had the choice of hiding and running away from these people or of standing up to them. So I stood up to them and started speaking out.

Following this experience, Charles became 'an extreme Muslim hater'. He left his shop and home, and travelled to Israel and the United States. He met people that supported his extremist ideas and encouraged him to document the threats he suffered. Charles set up an internet blog and started to write profusely about his anti-jihadist ideologies, which he described as 'relevant, real and personal'. Charles called himself a 'keyboard warrior'. Charles explained that he wanted the world to be knowledgeable about these coercive forces. Soon he became involved in a movement whose members shared the same principles. He described this movement as:

> A large group of people across the whole world who share the same belief about the threat we face. So I got involved in it.

Charles was involved in the foundation of a right-wing extremist group and his role was that of a spiritual leader. He explained that this extremist movement keeps on growing and it is affiliated with other groups around the world.

> The movement as a whole is made up from different organisations around the world. In Europe it is evolving and what happened now [the terrorist attack] is going to separate the good from the bad. The fundamentals of the movement as a whole are right and nobody can deny the rights of those people to say what they say and believe what they believe because it is true and they can justify it, stand by it and prove it.

The social networks that support similar extremist ideologies reminded the importance of understanding the root causes of terrorism, as mentioned in the responses to Q3. Also as

indicated by the respondents, security entities should widen their monitoring scope and start observing other extremist groups besides extremist Muslim factions. Furthermore, the interviewees emphasized that academics needed to be more in touch with reality and be on the alert of any emerging extremist groups. Hence, in reaction to Q12 the respondents recommended the use of a multidisciplinary approach in order to focus on numerous contextual issues, which would help in recognizing what triggered violent terrorist actions, both by non-state and state actors. Statistics of terrorist incidents and interviews with members of extremist groups were the two methods mentioned in response to Q11 in order to monitor any present or emergent extremist and violent behaviour. These research tools do not involve making use of stereotypical images or the profiling of a typical terrorist but provide a thorough understanding of the surrounding influences and potential motivations that could help the reactions of security entities, as well as policymakers.

A case in point would have been to monitor and attempt to understand the terrorist who declared to be the mentee of Charles. According to Charles, this sympathizer was motivated by problems created by the mass immigration of Muslims that angered right-wing extremism, and some actors 'channelled this rage into murderous acts'. Even though Charles was identified as 'mentor' by this terrorist, he denied any connection with any terrorist actors. He declared that his role was to defend Christianity and he could only inspire the killing of radical Islamists:

> I looked at [this terrorist's] hidden inspiration ... but then I took a step back afterwards and said no there is no way this could relate to me. What [this actor] did was a devilish act but dressed up in Christianity. He murdered children in the name of Jesus Christ but Jesus Christ is not going to sit back and explain why this happened. I have been placed in this situation to defend Christianity, to defend the name of Jesus Christ. Maybe I was his inspiration or I wasn't. If he had killed lots of Islamic fundamentalists I could imagine and understand that I was his inspiration, but he killed lots of innocent children.

It was not possible to explore further the link between Charles and this terrorist, but the fact that the latter mentioned Charles in his manifesto and described him as his 'mentor' clearly showed that whether directly or indirectly Charles was an influential and inspiring figure. Another linking factor between Charles and this extremist actor was the use of the same symbols. The Templars were Charles's role model in the defence of Europe against the Muslim jihad. In fact, Charles wore tattoos of a Templar cross and the Star of David on his wrists, revealing the importance these symbols have for him:

> These tattoos represent my bit of solidarity with Israel and the Jewish people. The whole Islamic world is against Israel; the birthplace of Christianity and that part of the world and the holocaust almost destroyed

> the Jewish race. It's like kind of my position on that issue. Similarly, the Templar cross shows my position on the same issue.

The results of Q15 reflected the respondents' general views that the terrorist profile *per se* is elusive and probably non-existent, and this is reflected in the case of both Charles and the lone-wolf terrorist that followed him. Only after experiencing death-threats from Muslims in his neighbourhood was Charles attracted to extremist ideas and became an extreme Muslim hater. However, these radical ideologies stimulated the 'mentored' terrorist to a more extreme point and he chose to become a lone-wolf actor that committed atrocious violent acts. 'Acts of terrorism carried out by single individuals can be found, for instance, in nineteenth-century anarchism, with some proponents considering individual acts of violence to be an important part of revolutionary activity' (Spaaij, 2012: 23). In exploring the how, why, and what made these individuals become lone wolf terrorists, Della Porta (1995), Wieviorka (2003), Post (1990, 1998) and Horgan (2005b) explored the sociological and psychological aspects of what made an individual react with such violence. 'Lone wolf terrorism results from solitary action during which the direct support or command of others is absent, such action and its justification does not take place in a vacuum' (Spaaij, 2012: 49). Lombroso pioneered these sociological, anthropological, psychological and political studies in *Gli Anarchici* and before that in *Il Delitto Politico*. Following Lombroso's thematic issues, this section assessed Charles's behaviour, criminal history, prolific writing, his need to get his message to the general public, as well as his influence he exerted as a 'mentor'.

When one notes the constant references to the struggle between Christians and Muslims in Charles's account and in the motivations of his extreme-right connections, one brings to mind Lombroso's (1895: 8) portrayal of religion as a 'lightning conductor of fanaticism'[124]. Although the reactions of Charles and his 'mentored' terrorist actor to the Islamification of their country were extremely diverse, they both aimed to draw the general public's and the government's attention to their religious and political ideologies against Muslims. Thus, even without considering any physiognomic aspects, Charles's 'profile' would have been of immense interest to Lombroso, particularly with regards to his tattoos, lack of education, history of juvenile delinquency, abuse of drugs and the fact that he had left home in his teenage years. Tattoos do not make a person a criminal, but 'one cannot miss the frequent sign of the born criminal - the tattoo'[125] (Lombroso, 1895: 38). Charles's tattoos of the Templar

[124] '*La religione non può che molto meno essere un parafulmine del fanatismo*'.
[125] '*Nè vi manca quel segno così frequente del reo nato, che è il tatuaggio'.*

cross and the Star of David were not simply decorative. They were directly linked to his anti-jihadist ideology – a clear sign of how the Templars inspired his fight against Muslims.

Another interesting aspect that would have drawn Lombroso's attention to Charles's case is his 'angelic experience'. Following his alleged supernatural experience with angels, Charles suddenly converted from a criminal into an ardent Christian. Lombroso (1895: 48) delineated how 'the presence of vanity, religiosity, realistic hallucinations, megalomania, intermittent geniality together with the impulsiveness of epileptics and hysterics, create innovative religious persons and politicians'[126]. Lombroso quoted the British psychiatrist Maudsley, who believed that 'Mohammed had an attack of epilepsy during his first vision or revelation, and deceived by it or deceitfully he used his illness to pretend he was inspired from heaven'[127] (Lombroso, 1895: 48). Lombroso considered these epileptic episodes as congenital and as a side effect of alcohol abuse. In Charles's case, Lombroso would have inquired whether his parents had had similar experiences and whether Charles had been under the effect of drugs when this happened.

Charles met different persons who influenced his trajectory towards right-wing extremism and who directed him to write down his experiences and thoughts about the subject in his online blog. Charles became a prolific writer on the subject. Among the different categories of anarchists, Lombroso described *i mattoidi* (mattoids) as inexhaustible writers. For example, Passanante consumed reams of paper to publish his thoughts, which he considered more important than his own life. Similarly, Charles used the internet to spread his message and even called himself 'the keyboard warrior'. Publishing thoughts on his blog did not cost Charles anything and this medium made his works immediately available to the public.

Similarly, Lombroso inquired how anarchists allured sympathizers using journals and books. Caserio was Lombroso's (1895: 76) key example of how an honest and law-abiding person, whose main interests were reading and debating, became contaminated with 'the germs of anarchism'.[128] Lombroso also noted how newspapers influenced the general public. For example, Vaillant ensured that the newspapers published a photo of the French parliament chamber before the explosion of his bomb. Lombroso was conscious of the synergistic effect that the media and anarchist terrorists had on each other and asserted:

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[126] '*Invero, la vanitâ, la religiosità, le allucinazioni vivissime e frequenti, la megalomania, la genialita intermittente, insieme alla grande impulsivitâ degli epilettici e degli isterici, ne fanno dei novatori religiosi e politici'.*

[127] '*Maometto abbia dovuto ad un attacco d'epilessia la sua prima visione o rivelazione, e che, ingannato o ingannatore, siasi valso di questa sua malattia per spacciarsi inspirato dal cielo*'.

[128] '*I germi dell'anarchismo*'.

> … it is not wise to believe that it is possible and very easy to subdue the press because it is the Proteus of modern life. The press became too fine, agile and powerful to control; it is the same like trying to put the wind in chains particularly for a Government without an immense coercive power like the Russian Government. Other than that, even if the anarchist press is suppressed, propaganda will equally contribute because propaganda is mostly spread orally rather than using the press and addresses an ignorant and gross public[129] (Lombroso, 1895: 123).

In today's world, ideological influences are still passed orally in training grounds like universities or prisons (Taylor, 1988) as well as through books and manifestos. However, this and more material is passed on to sympathizers using the internet. Sageman (2008) and Weinmann (2006) researched how the internet is becoming increasingly instrumental in the mushrooming of small terrorist cells and individual terrorists. The internet provides access and connections to individuals and communities with similar ideologies that help to instigate and guide them to carry out activities without the need to meet in person (Pantucci, 2011a). Charles's work served as an inspiration to the terrorist actor. This projects Charles as a sort of modern 'Old Man of the Mountain' that contributed to the propagation of extremist ideas.

Features like the use of symbols, the strong connections with religion, the 'angelic experience', the criminal history and his being a prolific writer that influenced people, would have rendered Charles a perfect specimen for a study by Lombroso. This also demonstrates that though the unorthodox methods used by Lombroso may be attacked on different fronts, he aimed to understand political crime and anarchism in their totality and to sustain his arguments with 'empirical data'. Thus, though contemporary research paradigms are different from those followed by Lombroso, he could still be considered as a forerunner in the research of political violence and terrorism.

6.5 Summary

This chapter highlighted the perceptions and reflections of the three groups of professionals on terrorism research. The first theme dealt with the possibility of creating a

[129] '*Anzitutto è ingenuo credere che la cosa sia possibile o almeno molto facile: la stampa è oggi il vero Proteo della vita moderna; è diventata uno strumento così fine, così agile, così potente che voler regolarne la vita è un voler mettere in catena il vento, per un Governo che non possieda il potere coercitivo immenso 'del Governo russo. Eppoi, anche ammesso che tutta la stampa anarchica fosse soppressa, la propaganda continuerebbe egualmente; perchè anche adesso essa è fatta molto più oralmente. che per mezzo della stampa, come tutte le propagande che si rivolgono a un pubblico ignorante e grossolano'.*

science that prevents terrorism. The academics and security professionals were optimistic about this possibility as it would increase the likelihood of understanding terrorism, though this contrasted with the policymakers' sceptical perspective. Combining a sustainable scientific approach with intelligence was considered essential in order to identify the roots of this violent phenomenon and to address social grievances and inequities without the need of coercive stratagems. The second theme focused on gaining a holistic understanding of terrorism. Here, most respondents opted to adopt a multidisciplinary approach to study terrorism. However, the results showed a series of doubts and uncertainties as regards the data obtained from statistics and interviews, and their eventual interpretation. The third discussion pivoted on the viability of profiling terrorists. Almost unanimously, the respondents claimed that profiling was not possible and when it was attempted it was based on ethnical characteristics. Profiling labels particular ethnic groups and increases the tendencies for these groups to be unfairly associated with extremist ideologies and eventually to terrorism.

When comparing all these themes to Lombroso's work, it was noted that like the interviewees, he studied the root causes of anarchists in order to make proposals on how to mitigate their violent attacks. His series of studies helped him to recommend feasible and non-violent strategies to curb anarchism. To achieve his objective, Lombroso looked at the social and political contexts, but also took into consideration any mental dysfunctions or criminal traits that he identified in anarchist personalities. Interestingly, Lombroso advocated a multidisciplinary approach to research political violence. To sustain his arguments in *Gli Anarchici*, Lombroso used numerous academic fields and also simultaneously combined results obtained through quantitative and qualitative methods. The lack of a description of the methods used remains one of Lombroso's main weaknesses, as also documented by other researchers (Gibson & Rafter, 2006). On the profiling of anarchists, Lombroso was keen to demonstrate that the persona of anarchists and political criminals was different from that of the born criminal. In his work, Lombroso also observed that political criminals and revolutionaries showed less atavistic traits than the *reo nato* (born criminal). Apart from this, consonant with the interviewees' suggestions, Lombroso considered the economic and social fanaticism that attracted vulnerable personalities to this fervent ideology.

The last section of this chapter discussed the results obtained from the interviews and Lombroso's work in light of Charles's personal experiences. Although targeting the root causes of terrorism emerged as an essential goal when dealing with this phenomenon, Charles's account showed that it was very difficult to deduce what would induce a person to to an extremist ideology. After Charles became attracted to extremism and became a 'keyboard

warrior', he expressed his extremist ideologies and hatred of Muslims on his blog. Although it was not possible to identify a direct link between Charles and the terrorist that called him 'mentor', Charles's ideas and writings served as inspirational motivators. This would change Charles's role from that of a 'keyboard warrior' to 'mentor'. Lombroso would have surely noticed Charles's tattoos and criminal history, but more significantly Lombroso would have observed Charles's role in spreading the 'germs' of extremism through his blog. Within Lombroso's model, Charles would be considered as a modern 'Old Man of the Mountain', a dominant force that influenced sympathizers to the extent of making them sacrifice themselves for their fanatical ideals.

In answering the question 'what do we know that Lombroso didn't say then?' one can conclude that the interviewees were more aware of the weaknesses in terrorism studies. They also showed to be knowledgeable about what kind of information is required to curb terrorism without the use of armed oppressions. Nonetheless, one cannot deny the numerous similarities, particularly in the research methods, between present-day research and Lombroso. Admittedly, doubts are cast on how Lombroso obtained the information used in his research and on his approach in the study of anarchists. However, it is possible to affirm that though researchers keep on refining their studies to produce more reliable and valuable results, Lombroso may well be considered a pioneer in terrorism research.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

This chapter draws the thesis to a close. After returning to the research questions posed at the beginning of the study, this chapter highlights the main findings and moves on to the threefold contribution of this thesis. Firstly, it delineates Lombroso's contribution to the study of political crime and terrorism. Secondly, it presents the current knowledge acquired on counterterrorism policies and terrorism research through the results obtained from interviews held with the purposive sample of twenty elite respondents. A third contribution, though minor to the previous two, outlines how an individual becomes attracted to extreme ideologies. The synopses of the contributions are followed by a consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of this thesis. Finally, this chapter presents a series of recommendations for further research.

7.1 Research questions

The purpose of this research was mainly to investigate how knowledge on terrorism is gathered in order to implement appropriate security measures and to sustain valuable research in this field. Terrorism is often considered to be a contemporary ubiquitous scourge that can target any country. At the end of the nineteenth century Cesare Lombroso had already pointed out a number of political, social and legal issues as root causes of terrorist violence. Following the extraction of Lombroso's research methods, outcomes and recommended counter-terrorist measures, this research compared these results with the expertise of twenty current elite interviewees from different parts of the world. All the participants were involved in counterterrorism policymaking, security and research. An unexpected interview with an extremist, nicknamed 'Charles', complemented this research. Charles provided a distinctively idiosyncratic perspective on how he was attracted to an extremist ideology and on how he managed to attract further sympathizers to the same cause.

This threefold research process sought to answer the questions posed at the beginning of this research (cf. p.10), which are:

1. Does the policymaking process for security policy rely on intelligence, academic research, or other sources of knowledge?

2. What research methods are considered by professionals to be social-scientifically suited to a better understanding of terrorism?

3. Is it possible to develop a criminology of terrorism?

4. What can we learn from Lombroso?

5. And what have we learned since Lombroso?

The answers to these questions entail both 'positive' and 'negative' lessons to be learned, and provide ideas for further improvement. The answer to Question 1 is that the drafting of security policies requires the combination of intelligence, academic research and other relevant sources. However, numerous policies are implemented as a reaction to terrorist attacks, and these often lack consultation with intelligence experts and academics. This may indicate why particular policies violate fundamental human rights and are considered catalysts of future political violence and terrorism. The answer to Question 2 is that a myriad of research methods are applied to the understanding of terrorism. Terrorism is researched by various fields and, besides the different academic perspectives that are in play, the research methods employed in understanding terrorism vary according to the individual researcher. As a result, qualitative, quantitative or a combination of both approaches provide inconsistent results on the phenomenon of terrorism.

As for the possibility of developing a criminology of terrorism (Question 3), this research showed that criminology is one of the major contributors to the study of terrorism together with sociology, psychology and political sciences. However, this study indicates that a multidisciplinary approach would be the most appropriate to the understanding of terrorism. This overlaps Question 4 because Lombroso gave a practical demonstration of the application of multiple sources and research methods to the understanding of the phenomenon of anarchist terrorism. Alongside with this, this work shows that Lombroso needs to be researched more; though his research model does not follow current paradigms, Lombroso could help us increase our academic knowledge and also serve as an inspiration to policymaking. For example, in this work it was shown how Lombroso insisted on adopting a non-violent approach to terrorists and recommended the rehabilitation of extremist actors. Compared with Lombroso (as an answer to Question 5), current researchers are certainly more thorough in their research. However, as pointed out in this work, in terrorism research this improvement occurred only in recent years after scholars started to invest more time in field research and to gather data from first-hand sources. Results obtained from authentic and unique souces produce reliable and realistic results that eventually help in policymaking.

Revamping the unacknowledged work of *Gli Anarchici*, interviewing twenty elite professionals with expertise in counterterrorism, and the interview with an extremist were the three main sources that contributed to this thesis. Each one of these three sources has its own independent value in the quest for new knowledge but the contribution is even greater when all three are combined together. The three contributions to new knowledge were:

1. A study, in terms of a first-ever translation into English, of Lombroso's theory of political crime and anarchist terrorism;
2. An empirical study based on twenty interviews with a purposive sample of elite candidates that provided first-hand insights on how sources of knowledge are used to form appropriate security policies and to conduct adequate terrorism research; and
3. An interview with an extremist on his experiences in becoming attracted to extreme ideologies to attain declared objectives and attract more sympathizers to the same extremist beliefs.

The findings produced seven themes. The first set of discussions tackled four terrorism and security policy issues, namely, definition of terrorism, security and terrorism risk management, counterterrorism and policymaking, and imprisonment and rehabilitation. The second set tackled three topics related to research and terrorism; these were: identifying terrorism research, researching methods in terrorism, and profiling terrorists. Comparing these seven current themes on terrorism with Lombroso's work created a juxtaposition of concepts, practices and ideas originating from two mindsets, separated by a span of more than a century. The outcomes from Charles's interviews were discussed in two postscripts. These results showed the extremist's point of view and added further knowledge to the results obtained from the two main sources. A brief summary of these findings is found below.

7.2 Summary of findings

This summary of findings draws the threads together and encapsulates the salient findings obtained from Lombroso's *Gli Anarchici*, the interviews with the three elite groups, and from Charles's interview. A short summary of Lombroso's findings is explained in the following section (Section 7.2.1). Subsequently, one finds a résumé of the seven themes extracted from the main interviews (Section 7.2.2). The first set of themes sheds light on the difficulty of defining, assessing and managing terrorism. These findings proposed

improvements in education and rehabilitation policies that aim to mitigate extremist ideologies and eventual terrorism. The second set of themes considered issues in terrorism research. The outcomes of these discussions highlighted controversial matters and potential ameliorations that would provide an increase in evidence-based studies and pragmatic results in these studies. This section also included points that converged with Lombroso's thoughts and theories. Charles's comments and experiences were discussed only when they contributed an added dimension to Lombroso's thinking and to the views of the research subjects.

7.2.1 Summary of Lombroso's contributions

Lombroso's interests and contributions in the study of political crime were shown in *Il Delitto Politico* and later on in *Gli Anarchici*. In the former work, Lombroso, together with Laschi, extensively studied various aspects of political crimes. *Gli Anarchici* provided the main contribution to this thesis. Lombroso produced a complete etiological study that comprised social, political, economic and cultural influences of anarchists.

After acquiring information from different parts of the world, Lombroso configured the risks posed by anarchist actors and formulated theories on the social, economic and political contexts that instigated anarchism. Though anarchists attacked the upper classes, Lombroso found French statistics indicating that anarchists tended to be rich or professionally employed. According to Lombroso, this attraction to violence and extremism was the product of an education that lauded violence and revolutionaries. However, he believed that these fanatical ideologies evolved into political violence because of despotic and dishonest governments that induced hardship and poverty. Lombroso explained that these governments abused of their political and economic privileges and used brutal force to control their dominion. He also claimed that policing and military entities could inflate a potential threat to justify their existence and avoid being disbanded.

In *Gli Anarchici*, Lombroso discussed a number of alternatives to deal with extreme fanatics. Considering different eventualities of political crimes Lombroso recommended different punishments that might be imposed on anarchists and political criminals while abrogating draconian treatments and death sentences. The proposed forms of punishments included deportation, confinement, exile, imprisonment and pecuniary penalties. This non-violent approach aimed at preventing the regeneration of future heads of the anarchist hydra. Because of capital punishment, figures like Ravachol were idolized and became 'martyrs' that

would be remembered through the years, as happened in the case of the Bab's martyrdom in Persia. In fact, Lombroso explained how anarchism first attracted born criminals like Ravachol but then soon enticed law-abiding individuals like Caserio. He considered this a gradual *purificazione* (purification). Caserio's anarchist indoctrination was so significant for Lombroso that he compared it to the influence of the 'Old Man of the Mountain' on the assassins in the Middle-East. Lombroso also recommended non-violent policing measures, such as international police cooperation, reporting the movement of dangerous individuals, and taking their pictures. Additionally, Lombroso also proposed changes in the teaching of religion, general education and politics to control the stimuli that encouraged political and anarchist violence.

This thesis also illustrated how Lombroso used and referred to different research methodologies and academic fields that investigated anarchist actors and political crimes in the late 1800s. Being a polyglot, with contacts in different parts of the world, Lombroso gathered information on a global scale and used empirical methods to investigate a myriad of criminal issues (Garland, 2002). *Gli Anarchici* was a study that aimed at understanding the political repression suffered by the public that fomented violent anarchist reactions. In this study Lombroso also examined improper policymakers' administration and responses through a psychiatric-anthropological method. However, Lombroso was not immune from political biases and his study on anarchists displayed how Lombroso (1895: 122) depicted socialism to be 'the biggest enemy of and best preventive'[130] against anarchism.

7.2.2 Summary of interview data

The first four arguments reflect the themes discussed in Chapter 5. The first discussion tackled the definition of the term 'terrorist'. This question instructed the respondents to avoid using the word 'terror' in their answers. The findings showed a high frequency of the term 'violence'. It was also interesting to note that the majority of respondents focused on non-state terrorists and barely mentioned state actors. It was established that the use of *terrorist* is a political judgement and leads to abusive connotations that de-legitimize people and that stifle the possibilities of understanding their motivations (Banks, 2013; Jackson, 2011; Wilkinson, 2012). Academics demanded a more critical perspective that included both non-state and state terrorism. This is also reflected in their desire for more objective research

[130] '*Ne è invece il piu grande nemico ed il miglior preventivo*'.

without any form of restrictions or biases that sometimes emerge when the research is commissioned by governments.

Lombroso was among the first researchers that tried to define and understand political violence. As the title of *Gli Anarchici* implies, his interest in this work was specifically anarchists. He conducted a contextual inquiry that studied the struggles and the grievances that motivated their violent actions. Similar to the interviewees, Lombroso sought to stop the use of violent practices committed both by anarchists and state actors. He expressed the view that extreme violent actions against anarchists only served to fulfil their purposes and attract more sympathizers to their fanatical ideologies. Charles's experience and induction into extremism was the result of a series of unexpected events that also portray the difficulties in defining this term and the underlying motivations.

The second discussion revolved around security and terrorism risk management. The concept of 'security' that emerged from the interviews indicated how each group of respondents associated specific concepts with this term. The security professionals understood the term to mean protection against any form of threat. Meanwhile, the majority of academics understood it more as the general well-being and social inclusion, while policymakers interpreted it to mean the rule of law and respect for human rights through democracy. These viewpoints of security (see Figure 5.1) reveal how broad the concept of security is and how this varies with one's perception and concept of risk (Biscop, 2005; Manunta & Manunta, 2006). The findings also reflect an eclectic set of perceptions on the threat level of terrorism. There was complete discord with regards the threat level, but the most compelling response was that seven of the twenty respondents considered the terrorist threat level 'low' or 'not higher than usual' (see Table 5.1). A major outcome was that the perceived risk of terrorist attacks varied from country to country and that recognized security institutions were responsible when it came to identifying and monitoring the real threat level. The policymakers and academics showed a high propensity towards uncertainty and speculated that sometimes the terrorist threat was inflated to suit political agendas or ensure more funds for law enforcers. However, the ability to gauge the terrorist threat does not reveal the whole picture and does not guarantee better security management.

Back in the nineteenth century, Lombroso consulted sources around the world to learn about and understand common grievances. Understanding these inequities led him to find the causes of the motivations that inspired fanaticism. A common view among the interviewees and Lombroso concerned the issue of an inflated perception of the threat level. Lombroso noted that crimes and wars were the main *raison d'être* of the police and army, respectively.

Similarly, the respondents claimed that though security forces were extremely cautious about revealing the terrorist threats, providing an exaggerated threat level served to ensure more funds and constituted a wise political move. This rationale was reflected in Charles's extremist point of view. He also strove to inflate the potential threat of extremist Muslims to sustain his anti-jihadist ideology.

The third analytic argument explored counterterrorism and policymaking. The most frequent answers as to what kind of information was necessary to counteract terrorism were intelligence and effective intelligence sharing. The findings also pointed at how intelligence could complement empirically-based studies, case-law, legislation and case studies in addressing social and political grievances. This reflects Garrick *et al*. (2004) who stressed that the first steps in counterterrorism entailed intelligence gathering, and the processing of the acquired information. The results showed that intelligence should determine the counterterrorism policies that are implemented. However, the respondents explained that out-dated databases or 'data holes' jeopardised the accuracy, reliability and completeness of the data, which also affected intelligence on cultural conflicts, internal political issues and terrorist groups. Consequently, counteractions do not necessarily occur in a timely, orderly and tailor-made fashion. The findings also showed that for more than a decade, authorities focused their attention on radical Islam and jihad and the value and reliability of intelligence on other extremist groups found in the community was unsound. In conclusion, there were also doubts about whether policymakers consulted intelligence material before implementing policies, particularly in the case of security (Betts, 2009; Marrin, 2011).

Most results showed that society as a whole was considered responsible when it came to countering terrorism. The battle against terrorism requires a multi-agency approach that involves the government and related authorities, as well as the community. Expertise in specific areas such as psychology, sociology and pedagogy were considered essential when it came to identifying who might be at risk of being introduced to terrorism. Though the responses hinted that security services and police held the main onus of counterterrorism, the findings also indicated that these services were isolated from the communities. The academic group argued that the police did not listen to experienced researchers on this subject, even though this group of respondents remarked that research in this field lacked evidence-based studies. The AC group also explained that identifying weaknesses helps to change the attitudes of law enforcers and policymakers and consequently minimize the implementation of controversial security policies that undermine democratic rights and freedoms (Crenshaw, 2010). Among the suggested policy changes, there were those in political, legal and social

provisions. From a more hands-on perspective, it was suggested that law enforcers should be more open to understanding and communicating with ethnic minority groups. This form of understanding mitigates radical ideologies and benefits intelligence-led policing (Audenaert, 2008). Other suggested changes focused on foreign policies and abuses of state actors and how these were connected to terrorism. Further changes targeted education and counter-radicalization. All these suggestions aimed at removing discrimination, inducing disinterest in extremism and controlling terrorism in its very origins. Such changes would open channels of communication that would bring the community closer to authorities and would remove discriminations and hostilities of the 'us against them' mentality (Coolseat & de Swielande, 2008; Fraihi, 2008; Ramadan, 2006).

To counter terrorism, the interviewees suggested combining intelligence with various other sources of information, including academic research. To counter anarchism, Lombroso did not access intelligence but tapped into numerous sources to understand anarchists. He considered the hardships, families, criminal history, documented experiences and behaviours, mental illnesses and also speeches and writings. The fulcrum of *Gli Anarchici* remained Caserio, who interested Lombroso because he was an honest, law-abiding and educated young man that became an assassin. Like the interviewees, Lombroso also considered the involvement of society as fundamental in mitigating political violence and he recommended giving the populace the right to protest, particularly against the anarchists. Also in accordance with the interviewees, Lombroso recommended changes in the violent and corrupt practices of policymakers and law enforcers so that anarchism would not be considered a solution. He also recommended replacing classical education because it lauded violence and revolutionaries. Instead Lombroso proposed to focus on manual labour, positivist sciences and language studies. Charles also conceived his writings as being educational. He was convinced that the world needed to know about the threat posed by extremist Muslims. Charles emphatically believed that the community had to react and did not exclude the possibility that there were sympathizers who were ready to use extreme violence.

The last thematic discussion in Chapter 5 tackled imprisonment and rehabilitation for the purpose of the de-radicalization of terrorists. The axiom that kept being repeated by the research participants was that 'the punishment should fit the crime' as in the case of other crimes. The respondents stressed that imprisonment was the right deterrent but excluded the use of any coercive measures that would create martyrs and support for future terrorists. The results, however, included the notion of inflicting life-imprisonment for terrorist acts. The only concern was that prisons would serve as 'universities of terrorism' and increase the risk to

society (Cilluffo & Saathoff, 2006; Neumann, 2010; Taylor, 1988). What may be considered as an unexpected result was that almost the entire group of security respondents claimed that imprisonment alone was not a solution and recommended de-radicalization through rehabilitation programmes. This showed that more than half of the respondents perceived rehabilitation, de-radicalization and reintegration into society as important steps to curb future terrorism. The respondents insisted that more efforts should be made towards transparency and proportionality of sentencing and the rehabilitation of terrorists.

Again, there was an astonishing congruence between the research participants' and Lombroso as both stressed to stop the use of violence and to discontinue the use of harsh treatments and capital punishments. Lombroso showed how sentencing fanatics to death made them become idols and models for other sympathizers, who would engage in further violence. Consequently, he proposed a series of recommendations that favoured the removal of draconian punishments and the introduction of treatment of anarchists in asylums. At the opposite end, Charles was firmly convinced that capital punishment was the ideal penalty for serious crimes such as those committed by the terrorist with whom he was associated. Charles's reaction raised serious doubts that prompted one to question whether his intention was to make of this actor a martyr of his anti-jihadist ideology so that more sympathizers would be attracted to his ideas and beliefs.

While the previous four themes explored best policy practices, the remaining three themes reflect the discussions on research and terrorism carried out in Chapter 6. The first discussion revolved around the possibilities of creating a science of terrorism prevention. Though the possibility of the total prevention of terrorism was completely rejected by all the respondents, the academics and security practitioners optimistically believed in the use of a scientific approach and considered it a necessity. The academic respondents considered social sciences to be the key when it came to understanding terrorism and perhaps delineating patterns that would outline particular likelihoods of terrorism. Likewise, almost all the security professionals held that terrorism research was necessary to enrich their knowledge on this phenomenon. In contrast, the unpredictability of human nature made policymakers dubious about the use of science in terrorism studies. The findings point out concerns about factors that affect the results of terrorism studies, including the following: inaccurate data collection; the academics' lack of field research; the exclusion of state violence from studies; and biases that influence these studies (see Schmid, 2011; Silke, 2004; Stamonitzky, 2008).

To make progress in terrorism studies, researchers need to overcome their limitations and adopt more pragmatic approaches to analyse in depth the underground nature of

terrorism. The results obtained show that information about the root causes is essential to make these improvements and to understand the inequities at the roots of terrorism. It was found that combining information from past academic works, social settings and intelligence are the basic measures that could bring about an understanding of the grievances that instigate terrorism, such as humiliation, effects of social and economic issues, and lack of political freedom. Inequities that are not properly addressed tend to become potential motivations of terrorism for the coming generations (Pyszczynski, 2004). Remarkably, the respondents viewed the inequities and grievances that derive from perceptions of injustice, discrimination and inequalities as the main motivations of terrorism and, not one of the respondents considered the possibility that terrorism was instigated by some form of madness.

The research participants' thoughts on the use of terrorism studies to prevent terrorism fluctuated from optimism and a sense of necessity (among the academics and security practitioners), to scepticism (among policymakers). More than a century before, Lombroso was firmly convinced of the use of empirical studies to research anarchists. In line with the interviewees' focus on the root causes, Lombroso studied commonalities among social contexts, mental disorders, attitudes and tendencies that led to fanatical anarchism. He also mentioned multiple cases to sustain his hypothesis. Following the paradigms of *la scuola positiva* (the positivist school), Lombroso aimed to obtain empirical evidence that provided neutral results, even though this entailed numerous methodological weaknesses and biases. It proved useful to compare Charles's experience with both the interviewees' perspective and Lombroso's studies because it showed the idiosyncratic combination of unexpected events that introduced Charles to extremism. After allegedly having an 'angelic experience' and being threatened by extremist Muslims, Charles became a Muslim-hater and a 'keyboard warrior', spreading his anti-jihadist ideas over the internet. Charles did not exclude the danger that his activities could be interpreted in different ways, but he rejected the idea that he could have served as an inspiration to the terrorist action committed by the lone wolf who named him as his 'mentor' in his manifesto.

The second thematic discussion first addressed the best approach to the study of terrorism and secondly it discussed the limited use of statistics and the controversial use of interviews in researching terrorism. The results show that political science and sociology are the two academic disciplines that mostly contribute to terrorism studies. However, the majority of the research participants believed that a multidisciplinary approach best suited the fragmented character of terrorism. The combination of disciplines that are applied to the field

shows that terrorism is not an academic discipline but a subject that interests various academic disciplines. A multidisciplinary approach is perceived as the path that should be taken to overcome some of the numerous obstacles in terrorism studies and develop more evidence-based studies on this phenomenon (Silke, 2004; Wilkinson, 2007; Zubkora, 2005).

These results also reveal that nearly all the respondents were uncertain about the usefulness of statistical analysis in the study and prediction of future terrorist attacks, because in their view statistics only provided probabilistic likelihoods. The interviewees held that since researchers did not have access to intelligence material, their statistical outcomes were jeopardized by unreliable sources and incomplete data. Only the SP group supported this research method but they still aimed to combine statistical outcomes with intelligence, history and other contextual knowledge. As for the use of interviews in terrorism research, besides the fact that information is acquired at the risk of the researcher's life and limb, this research method provokes numerous controversial discussions (Dolnik, 2011; Horgan, 2011; Stump & Dixit, 2013). The lack of reliable, valuable and truthful information was the main concerns of the AC and PM respondents. Surprisingly, only the SP respondents acknowledged the value of interviewing terrorist actors. This respondent group also gave precautionary recommendations for researchers; for instance, not to get involved with their research subjects or sympathize with their ideas. The findings show that the respondents expressed concern about the use of inaccurate data in statistical analysis, described by Silke (2008a) as 'noisy' data. They also considered 'truthfulness' and 'credibility' to be dubious factors when researchers used interviews as a research method. However, in a counter-argument on the verisimilitude of interviewed extremist subjects, Horgan (2011) and McAdams (1993, 2001) explained that researchers aimed at understanding the perspective of the interviewees and not at finding the truth or reality. However, on top of these concerns, a recurring issue that hampers terrorism studies from providing more evidence-based results is the difficulty of gaining access to data about terrorist attacks and active or former terrorist actors. Some of the reasons why access is not gained include authorities that impede researchers from gaining access to incarcerated terrorists (Horgan, 2004, 2008, 2011; Post *et al.*, 2003; Schmid, 2011); research subjects that refuse to be interviewed (Stump & Dixit, 2013); and the fact that non-state terrorists form part of underground organizations and seclude themselves (Taylor & Horgan, 2006).

In his work, Lombroso described the application of the psychiatric-anthropological method to study the hottest issues. This approach is synonymous with the multi-disciplinary approach acclaimed by the interviewees. Additionally, *Gli Anarchici* is a manifestation of how Lombroso purposely combined different disciplines to provide pragmatic results. In contrast

with the sobriety expressed by the interviewees on the use of statistics, Lombroso used statistics to study political violence. He also combined statistics with geo-spatial information to indicate specific trends and behaviours on maps. As for the use of interviews and quotations from direct speech, Lombroso did not question their truthfulness, but focused on the contextual significance and relevance (Horgan, 2011). In fact, Lombroso included quoted material both from unidentified sources and also from court speeches and trusted newspapers.

The third and ultimate thematic discussion of Chapter 6 revolved around profiling terrorists. A clear majority of the respondents indicated that profiling a terrorist was impossible. Profiling was generally perceived as a stereotypical portraying of the fictitious 'typical' terrorist that would result in racial discrimination of particular individuals or minority groups. The results also show that the fixation with the 'looks-like-a-Muslim' terrorist is influenced by the Al Qaeda's attacks in Western countries of the last decade. This stereotypical image changes through time and this illustrates how the terrorist image is indeed very volatile. The findings also indicate that physiognomic profiling is being less used by security agencies because categorizing potential terrorists results in racial profiling, which creates opportunities for abuse (Anwar & Fang, 2006; Cotton & Li, 2012; Monahan, 2011, 2012). Such ethnical profiling generates labelling, leading to an increase in political conflicts which, in turn, could escalate into terrorism. The respondents proposed a focus on behavioural profiling particularly when this was intelligence-led. Physiognomic profiling is considered impractical because in modern times 'many home-grown terrorists have never been picked up by national security screening' (AC7). Profiling patterns of behaviour that are common among terrorists provides a more solid profiling framework for outlining potential terrorist activity groups (Mullins, 2007).

In contrast with the objections expressed by the majority of the interviewees to the notion of profiling terrorists, Lombroso was keen about the idea. While observing their physical characteristics, Lombroso explained that political criminals were the antithesis of the born criminal. Besides the physical characteristics, he also observed behavioural characteristics that were common among different anarchists. The method of observing common behavioural characteristics resonates with the findings obtained from the main interviews. Another similarity is that both the interviewees and Lombroso provided no specific profile of the fanatical extremist. For instance, Lombroso claimed that anarchism attracted individuals with criminal traits like Ravachol and Pini, but also honest people like Caserio and Corday. Also in *Gli Anarchici*, Lombroso indicated that women were more prominently involved in political crimes when compared to other crimes. If it were possible for Lombroso to test his set of traits on

Charles, one can only conclude that Charles would have been of great interest to him. Characteristics like tattoos, lack of education, an 'angelic experience', a criminal history, extreme religious ideas and prolific writing would have made Charles a perfect specimen of a fanatical political criminal for Lombroso. For instance, since Charles served as an inspiration or as a 'mentor', Lombroso would describe him as a modern version of the 'Old Man of the Mountain' that indoctrinates sympathizers through his blog (Daftary, 2008).

7.3 Contribution to new knowledge

This thesis contributed to new knowledge on two distinct levels: policymaking and theoretical debates. The numerous obstacles in accessing knowledge on terrorist actors, factions and incidents hinder the possibilities of having more tailor-made policies and effective security practices that stifle terrorism in its origins. On a theoretical level, this thesis identified how terrorism research can produce a more thorough understanding of the root causes of terrorism when employing a multidisciplinary approach. This work also contributed to the recognition of the difficulties found in providing empirical-based research on this subject. Another important academic contribution to criminology and terrorism studies was the translation into English of *Gli Anarchici*. This thesis explored the characteristics Lombroso observed when studying anarchists and indicated the commonalities and differences when compared with current perspectives, even though they represent two different research paradigms.

7.3.1 Contribution to security knowledge and policymaking

In the investigation on the policymaking processes this research explored the usage and applicability of intelligence, academic research, and other sources of knowledge in formulating counterterrorism and security policies. A major obstacle encountered by counterterrorism is the apparent impossibility to define terrorism. The first contribution of this work is the revelation that political matters and abusive connotations of this term still hinder the creation of a widely accepted definition of terrorism. Terrorism is a labelling term that demonizes groups or individuals. This political label delegitimizes the labelled individuals and hinders a thorough understanding of their motivations. As shown in this thesis, most of the time this

label will turn the focus on non-state actors and sympathizers because this label is generally produced by governments. Meanwhile, state actors tend not to be labelled as terrorists, even though their actions are violent and intend to deter the opposing party using terror. This attitude led some respondents, particularly academics, to query the neutrality and ensuing validity of research projects when governments fund these studies, since the results could be designed to fit the governments' agendas.

Secondly, this research showed that terrorism, risk management and contemplated security measures vary according to individual countries. Being involved in numerous military activities in the Middle-East and Afghanistan, European countries have a higher risk of terrorist attacks. Information on terrorist threats is released on a need-to-know basis not to cause unnecessary panic among the public. However, this study also demonstrated the need for transparency from policymakers and authorities, and indicated that occasionally information about potential threats is inflated as a political tactic. Law enforcers, intelligence agencies and policymakers magnify the threat to ensure more funding and justify the need to increase their capabilities. This research also contributed by identifying weaknesses in the link between the police and communities. Police isolate themselves from the community, particularly from minor ethnic groups. This finding highlights the increasing need for society to promote, engage in and sustain more community policing, because the more the general public trusts the police, the higher the probability that the public reports suspicious actions of individuals in their communities.

Thirdly, this research attested that knowledge used to curb terrorism at a domestic and international level is mainly derived from intelligence. Acquiring, validating, distributing and acting upon such knowledge does not seem to be a smooth process and terrorists exploit these irregularities and use them in their favour. Another important issue is that in recent years, authorities focused mainly on attacks by radical Muslim groups. This wave of incidents drew the attention of security services on extreme Muslim factions, leaving other groups with different extremist ideologies unmonitored. This study also revealed that policymakers have limited knowledge, experience and time to dedicate to intelligence material and this could influence the kind of implemented security policies. Furthermore, in reaction to attacks, governments often implement security policies, which might transgress human and democratic rights. This study indicated that the lack of reference to empirical and evidence-based research leads both law enforcers and policymakers to demand disproportionate measures when incidents occur. Also, this thesis pointed out the use of empirical studies to find ways of reducing discrimination and hostilities that would provide smoother

counterterrorism processes. To achieve these results, law enforcers and policymakers need to be more aware that violent reactions from state authorities increase the risk of future terrorist reactions from current or later generations, and that opening channels of communication facilitates the rectification of inequities at the root of fanatical ideas.

The fourth outcome showed the necessity of changing policies and the treatment of selected terrorist inmates. On the basis of the interviewed experts this study found that the majority of those incarcerated for terrorism do not commit very serious crimes and are released within a few years. Following Beccaria's principle that 'the punishment should fit the crime', this study highlighted the need for terrorism to be treated as a crime and not as an aggravation that should attract harsher sentences or indeterminate prison detention. This study indicates that for society to achieve more successful results, rehabilitation policies are necessary to combat the appeal of extremist ideologies and to promote de-radicalization among terrorist inmates. This 'soft' counterterrorism strategy can be found in Saudi Arabia and focuses on prevention, rehabilitation and aftercare (Boucek, 2008). In Europe, de-radicalization programmes are still in their initial stages, but research on other continents shows that rehabilitation policies are possible and results show that extremist actors do disengage from radical factions and renounce extremist ideologies. Rehabilitation policies do not only help reintegration in society but also assist in improving the management of the terrorist threat.

7.3.2 Contribution to terrorism research and criminology theories

The study has expanded criminology studies in two ways. In the first instance, the interview results point out different ways of how to improve terrorism research and reveal the difficulties encountered in conducting such studies. The second contribution derives from the translation of Lombroso's *Gli Anarchici*. This work was fundamental to this research as it provided the possibility of comparing Lombroso's thoughts and theories with the views of contemporary policymakers, security professionals and academics. This comparison bridges two different research paradigms and shows past and existing gaps in drafting policies and researching political crime and terrorism. Integrating the translation of Lombroso's original work into this thesis contributes to the ideal of increasing the academic repertoire of criminologists and sheds light on how Lombroso contributed to the research of terrorism and political violence. This also indicates that terrorism and other political crimes were already under the academic microscope as from the origins of criminology.

Besides attempting to enhance and improve policies, this thesis contributes by identifying methods to improve the understanding of terrorism that is scientific-based, with minimal subjectivity and more unbiased outcomes. To study terrorism, researchers need to follow unique standards of research to understand terrorism holistically; standards that produce accurate, reliable, and empirical results. Research in this subject is more difficult than other social sciences. Terrorism studies are plagued by obstacles and gatekeepers that hinder the flow of research. Researchers continuously face these strenuous struggles in trying to study what happens in the real world and accessing primary sourced data, rather than producing desk-based studies. This work also contributes by highlighting the adversities encountered when interviewing an extremist, where unique opportunities and chance play major roles – factors that were evident in my meeting with Charles. However, this thesis emphasizes the importance of compiling evidence-based terrorism research that is not influenced by governments. This issue underlines the necessity of having independent researchers that aim to understand terrorism in its totality even though this is often obfuscated by bureaucratic gatekeeping and the clandestine nature of terrorism. However, this work also shows that first-hand data is highly appreciated even by security professionals, particularly if it helps to improve countering measures and to create policies that minimize exaggerated retaliation. To achieve more successful results, this thesis recommends the use of a multi-disciplinary approach. Comprising data from different disciplines ensures research improvements and theoretical formation that keep studies on the subject of terrorism alive and stimulating. Additionally, this thesis shows that profiling does not work in terrorism and no research can produce profiles of potential terrorists because it only induces discrimination and abuses, which foment more hate and grievances.

The second contribution to academic studies entailed a revamping of one of Lombroso's works. Researchers discarded Lombroso for numerous years, but this research provides evidence that his pioneer studies in criminology go beyond the study of the physiognomy of criminals. Translating and analysing *Gli Anarchici* contributed to a re-consideration of Lombroso's thoughts, research methods and theoretical contributions to criminology and political studies. Lombroso's research paradigm portrays the research model of *la scuola positiva* (the positivist school) in the nineteenth century. Yet, his research on anarchists attests its potential contribution to the study of various areas in this field: the effect of oppressive policies; the main root catalysts of terrorist attacks in contemporary terrorism studies; common behaviours among fanatical extremists; and how violent attitudes, like anarchist terrorism, cannot be adequately managed through the application of violent measures.

Lombroso researched anarchism in great depth and to do this he analysed data originating from different sources. He evaluated the content of anarchist ideologies and appraised how revolutions and seditions were important for human evolution and compared them to the turbulent puberty stage of a child. Lombroso considered anarchist actors as being different from the *reo nato* (born criminal), not only in their physiognomy but also in their criminal intent. *Gli Anarchici* shows how Lombroso was not bound solely to superficial physiognomic characteristics but was ready to study social contexts, family backgrounds, and psychological influences. These were all factors that determined the trajectories that led sympathizers to become violent fanatics. Using elements from different academic disciplines, Lombroso observed and brought to light examples of different anarchist traits. In his observations, Lombroso identified characteristics that varied from geniality, religiosity, and extreme altruism, to epilepsy, hysteria, indirect suicides and crimes of passion. According to Lombroso, these behavioural attitudes determined the different ways in which fanatics reacted to political oppression and explained why not every anarchist resorted to violence. For instance, mattoids externalised these oppressions in prolific writing, while passionate ones would resort to more violent methods. However, to have a more complete perspective of the causes of anarchism, Lombroso used statistics. Statistics were an important tool by which he correlated the number of insurgencies with seasons, geographical regions and epochs.

The last chapter of *Gli Anarchici* presented a series of prophylactic measures to avoid the use of extremely oppressive measures and capital punishment when dealing with anarchists. Lombroso explained that the death penalty was rendering a service to anarchists, transforming them into legendary martyrs that attracted more sympathizers and recruits. As a response, Lombroso recommended to curb anarchists by using deportation, exile, imprisonment and pecuniary punishment. As regards policing measures, he appealed for international cooperation among law enforcers. This cooperation comprised the distribution of photos and the sharing of information on the movement of anarchists to police counterparts in other countries. Alongside these provisions, Lombroso proposed policies that supported the citizens' freedom of expression and the right to strike, besides anti-corruption regulations that controlled government deputies and public officers.

7.3.3 Drawing threads together

The above-mentioned contributions highlight the unique approach of this research in its effort to expand studies on security knowledge and terrorism research. Firstly, it revealed the various difficulties encountered in gathering the necessary knowledge on terrorism and in adequately recalibrating the security policies, avoiding the use of violence. Secondly, it investigated the various possibilities to research and study terrorism and identified the numerous obstacles that hinder the fulfilment of achieving pragmatic, evidence-based research. I would draw together these different contributions as in Figure 7.1 (below).

Figure 7.1: Terrorism research rose window & Lombroso's contribution



This diagram displays five main boxes. The box in the middle shows the main subjects of this research (that is, security knowledge and terrorism research). The four boxes, around the central box, indicate the main parties that were involved in this research and how their input is important for the acquisition of comprehensive security knowledge and primary data for terrorism research. The viewpoints of these groups provide unique perspectives that would contribute to understand and effectively manage the terrorist threat and without using unnecessary violence. However, to reach these acceptable results, it is important to maintain good levels of communication between these parties so that knowledge flows without hindrance. The arrows among these boxes represent the ideal channels of communication between the different parties, creating what I call a 'terrorism research rose window'.

In the ideal conditions academic researchers would have more access to data and with minimal obstructions and gatekeeping. At the opposite end, if extremist actors would be more open to dialogue, it would be possibile to understand the reasons that attracted them to terrorism. Research outcomes based on such kind of knowledge would eventually influence policymakers and security practitioners more convincingly. Being better informed, policymakers would be able to design policies that facilitate integration rather than impose policies that provoke violence, break people's rights and undermine democracy. Additionally, security practitioners should be less isolated from the community and more open to research results. At the same time, they would minimize violent reprisals by providing more integration schemes and reducing the opportunities that emarginated groups use to resort to terrorism.

The five boxes forming a rose-shaped sphere are enclosed in a bigger box. This box represents Lombroso and his theories on political crime and anarchists. It indicates that Lombroso took into consideration the practices and perspectives of the four parties (anarchist extremist, policymakers, researchers and security practitioners) in *Gli Anarchici.* As discussed in different parts of this work, Lombroso was heavily criticized on various issues. For instance, he was criticized for his atavistic theories on the born criminal that later on influenced Nazism, for being racist, and also for his lack of clarity in his methodologies and data sources (Gibson & Rafter, 2006; Rafter, 2009). Yet, few researchers acknowledge the fact that some of these issues reflect the research paradigms that Lombroso worked in and which are no longer accepted these days. Unfortunately, this continues to stigmatize Lombroso, impeding him from being appropriately acknowledged for his innovative studies, and for his immense and laborious work in the early days of criminology, which even today still contributes to knowledge. Therefore, the present study provides a unique and exclusive opportunity to

identify congruent points between Lombroso and contemporary viewpoints on policies and research, namely:

- the political influences in defining and assessing political crime (nowadays referred to as 'terrorism');
- the policy changes in education, religion and politics;
- the rehabilitation from radicalization of fanatics (extremists);
- the significance of studying the root causes that instigate extremist thoughts;
- the contribution of a multi-disciplinary approach in researching this amorphous subject; and
- the impossibility of profiling potential fanatics ('terrorists').

These similarities bring together all the loose threads and harmoniously indicate how Lombroso's study of the potential causes of anarchism resonates with contemporary thoughts and terrorism research. Thus, the major finding of this research is that Lombroso is still a valuable element to fill in the gaps in our studies.

7.4 Strengths, weaknesses and future research

This research consisted of a translation and in-depth analysis of Lombroso's second edition of *Gli Anarchici*, a series of interviews with elite respondents in the field of terrorism, and an interview with an extremist ideologist. These three distinct projects provided unique opportunities to explore how security knowledge is gathered; what obstacles hinder a more thorough analysis of the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures; and why terrorism research retains a unique academic approach.

Lombroso's theories on criminality influenced fields like medicine, penology and history but were hardly mentioned in terrorism research (Garland, 2002). This lack of academic recognition of Lombroso's work derives from language barriers that are reflected in mistranslations and misinterpretations that vilified and eventually stigmatized Lombroso (Gibson & Rafter, 2006; Rafter, 2009). However, recently academics started to re-evaluate his works and academic contributions (see Becker & Wetzell, 2006; Gibson & Rafter, 2006; Knepper & Ystehede, 2013; Ystehede, 2008). Lombroso's perspectives were in themselves a contribution to knowledge, but they also permitted a comparative study with contemporary perspectives, research and theories.

This method of comparing Lombroso with contemporary discourses on political criminality proved to be unique. The general view on Lombroso remains that he is unreliable and a racist, that his main theory is that of atavism, and that he is mainly associated with measuring skulls. An objective analysis of Lombroso's theories and his work on political criminals would provide an opportunity for his theories to be compared and contrasted with contemporary perspectives without the stigma with which he is associated, and which has persisted through the years. Ideally, such an analysis should be carried out without identifying Lombroso as the author of the works. If the name 'Lombroso' was mentioned in such research, the respondents would have been distracted by his reputation. Thus, to evaluate the relevance and similarities of Lombroso's theories with those of contemporary discourses, there was no other way but to avoid mentioning his name and to concentrate only on his work. An objective study would provide the opportunity for one to understand the similarities that exist between Lombroso's ideas and the different realities and contexts of contemporary discourses.

The main research method of this thesis included interviews with a purposive sample of elite respondents, namely, policymakers, security professionals and academics. These respondents enjoyed expertise in counterterrorism policies, security matters and terrorism research. Of the initial purposive sample of seventy-two interview candidates, only twenty contributed to this research in a period of around eight months. The number of interviewees was limited due to gatekeeping issues, financial constraints, logistics and time restrictions. Gatekeeping was a main obstacle in gaining access to these elite research subjects, particularly to those involved in intelligence analysis, government offices, law enforcement and the military. On the contrary, academic respondents were the easiest to contact, access and interview. Since the respondents were from different parts of the world (for instance Italy, Netherlands, England, and the United States) these limitations determined whether the interviews were face-to-face or via telephone.

An additional interview with Charles supplemented a different dimension to the perspectives of the twenty elite candidates. Interviewing extremists remains seriously unexploited (Dolnik, 2011; Horgan, 2011; Silke, 2004; Smyth, 2009), hence interviewing Charles came as a unique opportunity. Charles revealed how he had been first attracted to an extremist ideology. He also discussed how the writings that expressed his extremist ideas attracted more sympathizers to the same ideology, and how they could serve as a potential motivation for a terrorist attack, though Charles repeatedly denied his involvement in any terrorist attack. However, as explained by Horgan (2009), a weakness of such an interview is that it provides an individualized viewpoint that excludes the possibility of generalizing any

findings. Another flaw that could be noted in such interviews with extremists is that the researcher's background may influence the collection of data and jeopardize the neutrality of the results obtained (Horgan, 2008). Another limitation is that this interview is not easily replicated because there is no guarantee that Charles would be willing to be interviewed again.

In relation to future terrorism studies, 'the basic principle is to treat terrorism as a crime and not some strange phenomenon. No wheels should be reinvented and brushing dust off some old criminology books should be a good starting point' (SP4). Translating and making available *Gli Anarchici* to a more widespread audience has contributed to academic knowledge in criminology and terrorism studies. This knowledge would help contemporary researchers to value more the contributions of earlier researchers like Lombroso, because their material could fill in the gaps in the knowledge base even though their research paradigms were different from the current ones. Getting old criminology books off the shelf, translating them and understanding them within the contexts in which they were written is a challenging task. However, these works can provide more opportunities for future research and contribute to more academic knowledge.

In this thesis, Lombroso's *Gli Anarchici* is seen to demonstrate that terrorism and related security and political issues are not a modern phenomenon and its recommended countermeasures are still pertinent in contemporary times. Some scholars might look at Lombroso as the cause of endless debates on misused and unreliable research methodologies. However, this study shows that in terrorism research scholars still engage in discourses about which methodologies provide the most reliable results in dealing with this criminal phenomenon. Thus, why not consider Lombroso, since he served as an inspiration for iconic scholars like Durkheim? Rather than discarding Lombroso completely because of a reputation based on misinterpretations of his work, I would consider his theories on political crime a catalystic factor that could project not only the context in which he explored political crime but also provide ideas for research on political crimes in late-modern times.

Each of the seven themes (presented in Chapters 5 and 6) can be developed further in future research projects. By using different methods from various disciplines and also with the help of researchers from different academic backgrounds, these themes could evolve in studies that explore terrorism through multidisciplinary perspectives (Wilkinson, 2007). Further research could also explore the reasons why there is so much distrust between law enforcement agencies at a national level and those at an international level. More studies could also investigate different ways to improve the trust between security entities and communities to defeat threats like terrorism. Research on rehabilitation and de-radicalization

programmes is still in its infancy. Even though a number of countries around the world have set up different rehabilitation programmes that help extremists integrate in society, their results are still not known and recognised. Researchers should help policymakers be more conscious of the different methods that facilitate the reintegration of these individuals. Then again, policymakers should be ready to change policies that cause violent revolts rather than being 'hard' on terrorism.

Finally terrorism research should invest more in overcoming the encountered shortcomings. For instance, the lack of empirical data and understanding of the terrorist motivations result in impractical academic theories (Schmid, 2011). Terrorism studies that employ rigorous research methods will produce results that are more empirical, pragmatic and impartial. Once this happens, there will be more likelihood of terrorism studies being recognized as a field of social sciences. Present difficulties hinder the flow of information as displayed in Figure 7.1. The reality faced by terrorism studies is that they are dogged by vagueness, uncertainties and obstacles. This creates a more complicated 'rose window' of terrorism research as shown in Figure 7.2. This study has indicated that there are numerous difficulties encountered in accessing and gathering the data on this subject, as corroborated by the literature (Horgan, 2011).

Future researchers on this subject should be aware of the adversities and frustrations that are encountered when trying to obtain a partial understanding of a complex phenomenon like terrorism. Security practitioners and intelligence agencies have strict directives and are very careful about what kind of information they disseminate, to whom and for what reasons. They are also selective in the information they provide to policymakers and other security professionals. These stringent policies limit the possibility of exploring the effectiveness of security measures. Policymakers do not necessarily consider intelligence when implementing security policies. In response to serious terrorist incidents policymakers tend to resort to violent countermeasures and impose policies that go against democratic rights. On their part, non-state terrorist actors are affected by imposed policies and the reactions of security agencies and law enforcers. Different terrorist groups follow diverse extremist ideologies and security professionals need to follow the evolution of these groups and their ideologies. However, underground factions are difficult to uncover, particularly since the increasing use of the internet facilitates the possibility of self-radicalization.

Figure 7.2: Terrorism research rose window: Reflecting reality



Consequently, future scholars should be aware of these obstacles in the quest for more evidence-based research. Researchers should be aware that the possibility of approaching non-state extremist factions involves serious risks. If the aim is to access individuals imprisoned for terrorist acts, scholars should be aware that the authorities tend to act as

gatekeepers making this option virtually unattainable. Politics are particularly influential on characterizing, curbing and studying terrorism. Government-funded studies exclude the possibility of analysing terrorism in a holistic way. In these instances, researchers are instructed to investigate particular issues related to non-state actors and to exclude state actors and state-funded terrorism (Jackson, Smyth & Gunning, 2009). Researchers need to give a neutral picture with limited or no biases even though this might be hindered by numerous obstacles and gatekeepers. In this way, scholarship would overcome major impediments that create uncertainties on the accuracy, reliability and value of terrorism research.

7.5 Final thoughts

'Terrorism is a *method* that can be used for an infinite variety of goals' (Wilkinson, 2006: 193). These goals aim to achieve a 'legitimate' result after an experience of perceived grave injustice. Besides the description of terrorism as a menace to life and a challenge to the rule of law, political implications make it difficult to define, counter, control and also research this phenomenon (Wilkinson, 2006). Terrorism remains a political dilemma because its management brings along the risk of abusing the term, associated fears, and the imposition of counterterrorism policies (Crenshaw, 2010). Dealing with terrorism through law enforcement and judicial proceedings proves to be more successful even though this needs some legal modifications to adequately address the terrorist challenge (Wilkinson, 2006, 2006a).

Education, rehabilitation and de-radicalization are essential elements in countering the causes that sustain terrorist ideologies. Social institutions need to envisage pathways that are more attractive rather than promoting violent reactions. Rehabilitating terrorists in de-radicalization programmes eases withdrawal from extremism and manages the risk of terrorism from its roots. Education should not only focus on the terrorist actors *per se*, but should also change the mind-set of policymakers, security professionals and scholars. Policymakers need to be more open to what people in the field are saying. Security professionals and intelligence agencies should learn to lower their guard and trust each other more and be less isolated from the community. Being more transparent with the community increases trust and eventually increases support of security forces. Finally, researchers need to be independent scholars and to do their utmost to produce neutral studies based on hard evidence. Scholars of terrorism need to be in contact with the real world and use multi-

disciplinary approaches that give a more complete perspective rather than conjecture theories on terrorism.

Meanwhile, *Gli Anarchici* proved to be a good example of why researchers should appreciate more Lombroso's work and its academic contributions. Though Lombroso followed a different research paradigm, he managed to integrate research results from different parts of the world; elaborate on non-state and state terrorism; and provide practical prophylactic recommendations. Despite the numerous debates on Lombroso and his works, and the continuous controversy on the best practices of security policies and terrorism research, it is hoped that this study has enhanced criminology studies by exposing the contribution of discarded works of pioneers like Lombroso, providing suitable guidelines to improve terrorism research, and recommending feasible best practices in curbing terrorism. Perhaps in deference to the way in which Lombroso's thinking still has an enormous relevance in today's terrorist environment we should leave the very last words to *Gli Anarchici*:

> *Per carità, non imitiamoli, non siamo ciechi al par di questi; popolo che in mezzo a tante vergogne, a tanti vizi, non abbiamo avuto mai quello dell'intemperanza politica, non guastiamo le nostre buone tradizioni, non incrudeliamo fanciullescamente contro il fenomeno dell'anarchia, a rischio d'ingrandirla e renderla più feroce invece di ricercarne e curarne radicalmente le cause (Lombroso, 1895: 137)*.
>
> Please, we should not imitate them and be blind like them. In the midst of much shame and so many vices we never had that political intemperance to degrade our good traditions and face the phenomenon of anarchy with childish incredulity at the risk of magnifying it, making it more ferocious and violent. Instead we have to invest in research and radically cure its causes (Lombroso, 1895: 137).

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Monthly distribution of revolts in the old and modern world.



TAV. I E II. — DISTRIBUZIONE PER MESI DELLE RIVOLTE NEL MONDO ANTICO E MODERNO.

	Gennaio	Febbraio	Marzo	Aprile	Maggio	Giugno	Luglio	Agosto	Settembre	Ottobre	Novembre	Dicembre	Totale
Grecia antica	1	1	1	3	1	3	9	2	4	0	0	2	27
Roma e Bisanzio	8	4	10	11	5	10	10	10	8	5	3	4	88
Mondo antico	9	5	11	14	6	13	19	12	12	5	3	6	115
Toscana (1248-1879)	4	2	3	0	3	2	8	5	4	5	5	5	46
Altre rivolte (500-1550)	3	1	2	5	1	6	3	4	2	1	1	1	30
Medio Evo	7	3	5	5	4	8	11	9	6	6	6	6	76
Europa (1550-1791)	1	0	3	1	6	4	6	4	1	2	0	3	31
Europa (1791-1835)	17	17	30	26	23	20	34	27	17	16	14	11	252
Id. (1836-1880)	19	18	23	17	23	27	35	24	20	21	6	10	243
Totale	36	35	53	43	46	47	69	51	37	37	20	21	495
America (temperat. Meridionale)	24°,32	23°,25	29°,25	16°,61	11°,79	9°,28	9°,35	14°,13	14°,27	16°,30	20°,17	22°,35	
Rivolte (1791-1835)	15	11	9	9	3	6	11	11	9	14	10	19	127
Id. (1836-1880)	25	11	13	9	11	5	17	11	11	15	17	11	156
Totale	40	22	22	18	14	11	28	22	20	29	27	30	283
Asia (1791-1880)	1	2	1	0	1	5	8	2	1	8	3	6	33
Africa »	1	1	0	2	2	1	5	0	2	2	1	3	20
Oceania »	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	5

	Gennaio	Febbraio	Marzo	Aprile	Maggio	Giugno	Luglio	Agosto	Settembre	Ottobre	Novembre	Dicembre	Totale	Popolazione su 10 milioni d'abitanti	Rivolte nella capitale	Popolazione in milioni d'abit. (dall'Almanacco di Gotha 1887).	Popolazione per chil. q. (dall'Almanacco di Gotha 1887).
Spagna	8	7	9	7	7	8	16	14	5	8	5	5	99	55	26	17,266	33
Italia	10	6	10	8	9	10	14	5	8	4	2	2	88	30	—	29,699	100
Portogallo	1	2	2	2	3	3	6	3	0	2	2	3	29	58	13	4,708	51
Turchia d'Europa	1	2	2	3	4	3	3	5	1	1	3	0	28	46	10	5,475	27
Grecia	2	1	3	1	2	2	2	3	2	1	0	0	19	96	—	1,979	30
Francia	2	5	7	3	6	6	10	4	7	7	1	3	61	16	31	37,672	71
Belgio e Paesi Bassi	0	2	3	2	2	2	3	3	1	4	1	0	23	20	—	10,189	146
Svizzera	5	3	1	2	3	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	24	80	—	2,846	69
Bosnia, Erzegovina, Serbia, Bulgaria	1	1	1	3	3	2	1	0	0	1	0	2	15	25	—	5,295	32
Irlanda	2	1	5	0	1	1	2	0	3	0	0	0	15	30	—	4,887	112
Inghilterra e Scozia	0	3	0	3	2	2	3	4	3	2	1	1	23	7	—	31,819	112
Germania	2	0	3	2	2	3	4	5	2	2	0	1	25	5	—	46,844	86
Austria-Ungheria	1	0	1	2	0	2	3	1	5	2	0	1	18	5	—	37,844	61
Svezia, Norvegia e Danimarca	1	1	3	0	1	1	1	2	0	0	2	0	12	13	—	8,403	33
Polonia	0	1	2	3	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	10	12	—	7,416	66
Russia d'Europa	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	6	0,8	—	77,579	18

Note. Adapted from *Il Delitto Politico*, (p. 556), by C. Lombroso and R. Laschi, 1890, Torino: Bocca.

Appendix 2: Mapping the distribution of revolutions in Europe (1791 to 1880).



Note. Adapted from *Il Delitto Politico*, (p. 558), by C. Lombroso and R. Laschi, 1890, Torino: Bocca.

Appendix 2.1: Enlarged distribution and legend of mapped revolutions.



Note. Adapted from *Il Delitto Politico*, (p. 558), by C. Lombroso and R. Laschi, 1890, Torino: Bocca.

Appendix 3: Guiding interview questions to elite respondents.

Elite Interview – Questions

No Names mentioned No possible ways you are identified

1. **How would you describe a "terrorist" without using words deriving from the word 'terror'?**
    a. **What are the hopes of finding a common definition of 'terrorism'?**
    b. What criteria make a particular group being labelled as 'terrorist'?
        i. Why is it difficult to find a definition?
        ii. Do we really need a definition?

2. **How do you describe 'security'?**
    a. What do you understand by 'security policies'?
    b. What do 'security policies' aim at?
    c. How do we know that the present 'security policies' are efficient in preventing terrorism?

3. **To make progress in the prevention of terrorism what do we need?**
        - data,
        - theory,
        - or both (from academics)?
    a. Or is intelligence (from security services) all that matters?

4. **Can terrorist attacks be prevented?**
    a. If NO, what is the point of security policy?
    b. If YES, how is this to be achieved?

5. **Are the security services alone responsible for preventing terrorist attacks?**
    a. Which other entities are responsible?
        i. How do we know we can rely on their intelligence?
        ii. What are their sources of information?
    b. Who are the other professionals involved in the implementation of security policies?
        i. What about academic research?

6. **What is the current level of threat to the security of the EU?**
    a. Who decides this threat level?
        i. Doesn't this alarm the general public?
    b. Are you confident the EU has an appropriate security policy in place?
        i. What is the basis for this confidence or lack of confidence?

7. **What sort of information is needed to formulate meaningful security policy?**

8. **Should policymakers responsible for security policy pay attention to media reports about issues, priorities?**
    a. How do you think can media biases and distortion of facts influence the perception of the real threat and the implementation of security policies?

9. **How are government officials responsible for EU security policy able to judge the accuracy of information supplied by police and security services?**

10. **'Good science is all about prediction'. Is a science of 'terrorism prevention' possible? If Yes, how? If No, why?**
    a. Would you consider it an objective social science?
    b. In April 2010, The EUobserver stated 'terrorist attacks decrease in Europe'; would you identify some kind form of cycle in terrorist attacks?

11. **Is it possible to predict future terrorist attacks from statistical analyses of past patterns?**
    a. knowledge of past techniques?
    b. interviews with persons in custody for terrorist-related offences?
    c. geographic knowledge of world hot spots?
    d. historical knowledge of terrorist groups and their ambitions?
    e. Interviews with people involved in factions or ex-members?

12. **During the past decades, governments and universities invested lots of money in research on security policies and terrorist studies. What, if anything, has been achieved?**
    a. To which discipline does the study of terrorism belong to: political science, sociology, psychology, criminology, other? Why do you think so?
        i. What about a multidisciplinary approach?

13. **How does research attempt to understand the phenomenon of 'terrorism'?**
    a. Would such research be perceived as sympathising with terrorism?
    b. How do you think does research help to indicate an adequate response to terrorism?
        i. Countering terrorist attacks?
        ii. Creating appropriate punishment?

14. **Terrorism research has existed for over 30 years. What difference has it made?**
    a. What sort of research do you think is the most reliable and ideal for this sector?
    b. Can you point out up to THREE examples of academic research or commentaries on terrorism that have affected the way we deal with terrorism?
    c. How can we improve these research methods and security policies?

15. **Since terrorism has gone global and the terrorist can be of any nationality, ethnicity, religion, skin colour, etc.**
    a. **How is the profile of 'the terrorist' created?**
        i. Who identifies the particular characteristic, such as age, sex, race, religion, etc?

b. How do we know this profile is correct? Or that it is helpful in finding terrorists?
c. How do security policies filter out the terrorist?
d. Where would you look to obtain information on terrorists?
e. Which particular issues would you associate with the worst attacks of terrorism? (Religious, political, etc.)

16. What kind of preventive provisions / policies would you think is the most important to implement in mitigating terrorist acts?

a. Social provisions (schools, families)
b. Political provisions
c. Legal provisions (specific legislation in case of terrorists)
d. Educational provisions
e. Religious provisions

17. Three different ways in which society can react to terrorism are:

i. to give a long prison sentence when it is well deserved,
ii. to lock the person in prison and throw away the keys and reduce the risk, or
iii. to provide a fairly short prison sentence (e.g. 5 years) and help the person reintegrate in society.

Which of the above would you opt for and why?

Note:

Would you like to be informed about the results of this research?

Would you like to indicate a colleague that would be willing to participate in this research?

Appendix 4: Letter 1



METROPOLITAN POLICE Working together for a safer London

SPECIALIST OPERATIONS

SO15 - Counter Terrorism Command

Trevor Calafato
[redacted]
Malta

New Scotland Yard
10 Broadway
London
SW1H 0BG
Telephone [redacted]
Facsimile:
Email: [redacted]@met.police.uk
www.met.police.uk

Your ref:
Our ref:
8th July 2009

Dear Mr Calafato

I have been passed your letter dated the 19th January 2009 in which you request assistance in accessing certain material relevant to your studies.

May I firstly apologise for the length of time it has taken for you to receive a response. I believe it would be most helpful if you could provide me with further information as to exactly what material to wish to have access. Upon receipt of that information I could accurately assess whether we can meet your needs and if not, I may be able to provide some explanation to reasons for any restrictions.

I look forward to hearing from you, I can be contacted most easily via the email address [redacted]@met.police.uk

Yours sincerely,

[redacted]
Detective Inspector

Appendix 4: Letter 2



METROPOLITAN POLICE — Working together for a safer London

1016 COUNTER TERRORISM COMMAND

Commander [redacted]
Counter Terrorism Command
Room 1513
New Scotland Yard
Broadway
London
SW1A OBH

Tel: 0207-230-2302

Trevor Calafato M.Sc
[redacted]
Malta

20th February 2009

Dear Mr Calafato

I acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 19th January 2009. Whilst I am extremely supportive of your research endeavour, I believe it most unlikely that the Counter Terrorism Command would be able to assist you in any detailed intelligence. Nevertheless, I am most conscious that there is always potential for some discussion, which may provide some context for matters already within the public domain.

In the first instance I would ask your forbearance in order that I can consult with colleagues as to how we may be able to assist you with matters already within the public domain. I will ensure that you are contacted in the foreseeable future.

Yours sincerely

[redacted]

Commander [redacted]

Appendix 4: Letter 3

SECURITY SERVICE
MI5

Mr Trevor Calafato
[redacted]
Malta

08 January 2009

Dear Mr Calafato

Thank you for your recent letter. All information available to the public on the work of the Security Service can be found at our website, www.mi5.gov.uk.

Thank you for showing an interest in the Service and best of luck with your studies.

Yours sincerely

[redacted]

[redacted]
For the Director General

Freedom of Information:
This information is supplied in confidence and may not be disclosed other than to the agreed readership, without prior reference to the Security Service. Within the UK, this material is exempt from disclosure under the relevant Freedom of Information Acts and may be subject to exemption under the Environmental Information Regulations and the Data Protection Act 1998.

Please address correspondence to the following:

The Secretary
The Security Service
PO Box 3255
London SW1P 1AE

Tel: 020 7930 9000
www.mi5.gov.uk

Appendix 4: Letter 4



P O Box 1300
London SE1 1BD

27 January 2009

Mr Trevor Calafato M.Sc.
[redacted]
Malta

Dear Mr Calafato

Thank you for your recent letter to the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, also sometimes known as MI6).

I have read with interest about your PhD proposal. However, as a secret organisation SIS is unable to enter into any dialogue over specific aspects of its policies or operations. May I suggest that you contact the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, specifically the Counter-Terrorism Department, where you may find the information you require? Contact details can be found on the following website:

www.fco.gov.uk

The SIS website can also provide some background information on the framework of the intelligence machinery in the UK.

www.sis.gov.uk

I hope you find this helpful and wish you every success with your research.

Yours sincerely

[redacted]

Appendix 4: Letter 5



Ministry of JUSTICE

[redacted]
National Offender Management Service
[redacted]

Telephone: [redacted]
Fax: [redacted]
Email: [redacted]noms.gsi.gov.uk

Mr T Calafato
[redacted]
Malta

13 January 2009

Dear Mr Calafato,

Thank you very much for your letter regarding the research plan for your thesis. I have forwarded your letter on to the Extremism Unit within HM Prison Service headquarters for their consideration. They will provide you with a more complete response once they have had a chance to review your request in full.

Yours sincerely

[redacted]

Appendix 4: Letter 6

HMP Belmarsh
[redacted]

HM PRISON SERVICE
Public Sector Prisons

Mr Trevor Calafato M.Sc
[redacted]
Malta

24th April 2009

Dear Mr Calafato

Thank you for your recent letter detailing your request to interview prisoners convicted under the UK Terrorism Act.

Whilst I understand the reasons for your request, I am not able to grant permission for you to carry out research interviews.

Yours Sincerely,

[redacted]
Security Governor

Appendix 5: Interview questions to extremist actor.

Interview questions

Age: Level of education: Occupation: Country of Origin:

1. In which group/s or movement/s were you involved?
    a. What are/were the aims of the movement, you were involved in?
    b. Why did you join this movement? What attracted you?
    c. How did you get into contact and become involved with this/these movement/s?

2. How long have you been involved in this movement? How old were you?

3. Why did you get involved?

4. What were your motivations when you got involved? How did these motivations change through time?

5. Who introduced you to the movement? (family, friends, literature or any particular experience or grievances?)

6. How do you describe yourself before joining this movement?
    a. Did you have any particular qualities? (E.g. you liked risk)
    b. Have you ever been arrested / imprisoned before entering the movement? At what age and why? How did the authorities treat you?

7. What roles did you have in the group? (the path you went through). Was there a kind of role migration?
    a. From one role to the next there was trust involved. How did you gain that trust? (Criminal acts?)
    b. What were the consequences? Have you been arrested / imprisoned for them? How did the authorities treat you?

8. What did it mean to become involved?
    a. Why did other members join the group?

9. How did you (as a group) want to make your people know and understand your motivations?
    a. Did you publish any material? How did you disseminate it?
    b. In your blog there are videos of masked individuals carrying guns, etc. Were extreme measures, violent acts ever used for your 'cause'?
    c. What was the effect on: 1. the media, 2. the authorities and government and 3.the group?
    d. What could have stopped you from becoming part of this movement?

10. Did you disengage from the group? Why did you walk away? How old were you?
    a. Were there other members that left the group?
    b. If you are no longer active, why do you keep the blog?
        i. Are you still in contact with members of the group?
        ii. Do you think they would be interested in being interviewed?

The terrorist case

1. What leads one to engage in violence?
2. Why, do you think, did the terrorist that called you ‘mentor’ commit those acts?
3. What kind of punishment would you give to this terrorist?
4. How could this terrorist have been deterred from committing these violent acts?