

**THE INTERPLAY OF CHRISTIANITY, ETHNICITY AND POLITICS IN
ANKOLE, UGANDA, 1953-1993.**

GRACE PATRICK KARAMURA

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"The Candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit
has been given where reference has been made to the work of others."

ABSTRACT**THE INTERPLAY OF CHRISTIANITY, ETHNICITY AND POLITICS IN ANKOLE, UGANDA, 1953-1993.**

Christianity was a powerful factor in the re-ordering of the ethno-political events in Ankole. Since its inception at the end of the 19th Century (1877 & 1879, Protestants and Catholics respectively), the Churches, both Protestant and Catholic have played a leading role in the new chapter of Western civilisation. Since then, the churches have been able to impact on people because of their pioneering advantage in social services like schools, hospitals and agriculture.

Because of such advantage, by the mid 1950s, the churches were not only powerful forces in shaping the flow of events in their respective areas, but they were also entangled by various forces which have since been difficult to disentangle from. Ethnicity, religion and politics, forces that were not so pronounced before, became prominent after the introduction of Christianity and especially after the products of missionary schools graduated. Hence, since the 1950s, religious and ethnic polarisation have dictated the kind of politics in Ankole and Uganda generally with the disastrous consequences of religio-political divisionism.

Underlying these forces is the ethnic factor which has hibernated between religion and politics. Thus, whereas it has been possible for the churches to grow in numbers in such a short time (within a century), the same growth factors have not been an advantage in dispelling ethnic and religious disparity. This is the main thesis of this research, that ethnicity more than religion or politics has been the contending factor in Ankole politics.

This thesis is not simply a chronological study of Christianity in Ankole but looks at other wider social issues like the Banyarwanda refugees, the Ankole monarchy and Islam, and how these factors have impacted on the Ankole church.

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I dedicate this thesis to Miss Deirdre Anne Pratt whose love and support has really transformed my life and family in many ways. She is a mother to us and a grand mum to Paul. We love you.

DECLARATION

This thesis is my own work and where I have used secondary sources, I have acknowledged it, as the University regulations require. While registered as a candidate, for which this submission is made, I have not been a registered candidate for another award of any other University.

Signed.....

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AEE	African Evangelistic Enterprise
BCF	Banyankole Cultural Foundation
CA	Constituent Assembly
CMS	Church Missionary Society
COU	Church of Uganda
DC	District Commissioner
DP	Democratic Party
JCP	Joe Church papers
KY	Kabaka Yekka
MP	Member of Parliament
NCC	National Consultative Council
NCT	Nkore Cultural Trust
NRA/M	National Resistance Army/Movement
RC	Roman Catholic Church
RC	Resistance Councils
SRB	State Research Bureau
UCC	Uganda Constitutional Commission
UN	United Nations
UNC	Uganda National Congress
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNLF/A	Uganda National Liberation Front/Army
UPC	Uganda Peoples Congress
UPM	Uganda Patriotic Movement
UPU	Uganda Peoples Union

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ORTHOGRAPHY


The spelling of names of population groups and areas is based on the orthography used in Runyankole, the language of Ankole. In quotations and other references, I have maintained the spelling as used in the original documents.

The prefix *Mu-* (as in *Muhima*, *Muganda*) or *Mw-* (as in *Mwiru*) designates a single person, while *Ba-* (as in *Bahima*, *Bairu*, *Baganda*) signifies the plural. Sometimes an *O* is often added before the singular form (as in *Omugabe*, king) and an *A* before the plural (as in *Abagabe*, kings). Also names for population groups have the prefixes *Munya-* and *Banya* (rather than *Mu-* and *Ba*) for the single and plural respectively (for example *Munyankole* or *Banyankole* for a person or people from/of Ankole. Again, *Ru-* or *Runya-* (as in *Rutooro*, *Runyankole*) identifies the language (of *Toro* and *Ankole* respectively). This contrasts with the *Lu-* used in *Luganda* (the language of Buganda), in the spelling of which the *L* generally takes the place of the *R* used in Runyankole. Finally, *Ki-* and *Kinya-* designate adjectives (as in *Kiganda* and *Kinyankole*)


Please note that *Nkore* and *Nkole* are used interchangeably in this thesis. The later is a Luganda corruption but have since been accepted in Ankole. On the whole Banyankole stress, *R*, instead of *L*.

**TEXT BOUND
INTO
THE SPINE**

MAP 1: UGANDA, 1960 SHOWING THE LOCATION OF ANKOLE



MAP 2: ANKOLE SHOWING THE MAIN PLACES MENTIONED IN THE TEXT.



CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.0. INTRODUCTION

This thesis seeks to address the way in which Christianity, ethnicity and politics have interacted in Ankole since 1953.¹ It addresses the religious and the ethno-political imbalance which was deeply entrenched in Ankole. It attributes this partly to the impact of missionary education and the Church in their ability to change the socio-political power relations from one dominant ethnic group, the Bahima, to the Bairu, who in many ways had been regarded as servants of the Bahima. The argument is that though Bahima and Bairu had lived together for many years they had limited social contact. The Bairu were agriculturists (peasants) and the Bahima were herdsman who held power advantages through the institution of kingship, which they exclusively dominated.

The thesis examines the widely held view that throughout the British rule, they continued to rule through the Bahima. Hence the colonial system accentuated them into a privileged class. Bahima continued to be recruited as chiefs in overwhelming numbers and Bairu were disregarded despite the fact that they formed the majority at the advent of the British rule in Ankole in 1898. The British continued the hypothesis that historical Nkore was an ethnic hierarchical society with Bahima on top and Bairu at the bottom of the social ladder. This as we shall see later resulted in ethnic friction especially after the post war period (1945) when Bairu began to challenge this inequality and called for equal distribution of political privileges.

The study is also concerned with the interplay of Christianity and politics in Ankole. The religio-political events in the colonial setting later affected Ankole's ethno-political balance and hence caused factional alliances between the various interest groups in post independence Ankole. This thesis particularly discusses the factors which helped to propel the "power shift" from Bahima to Bairu. I argue that it was mainly missionary education which brought about this change. The thesis

¹ I take this year as my starting point because it was around that period that religio-political changes began to be visible in Ankole.

examines the divisive element denominational Christianity caused, the effects of which have continued to be felt in Ankole. It explores why, when party politics were introduced in Ankole at the eve of independence (1962), Banyankole identified them with their religious denominations and voted accordingly. The thesis attempts to answer the question why Protestant Bahima became allies with the Catholic Bairu, with whom they had little in common, thus alienating Protestant Bairu.

I argue that factional antagonism did not stop at independence, but has continued in Ankole society until today. In a situation where both Catholic and Protestant churches played a leading role in shaping Ankole society, whether intentionally or not, they failed to curb the religio-political conflicts that plagued Ankole. Their continued involvement in factional politics caused them to fail to be a moral guide to the politicians and the masses.

The study does not attempt to go into a detailed discussion of pre-independence religio-political events. Others have already written about that period.² However, to set the background to the events in Ankole at independence, I picked on those main events in colonial times which influenced and shaped post independence events in Ankole as far as Christianity, ethnicity and politics were concerned.

The thesis is divided into eight chapters as follows: Chapter 1 gives a summary background to pre-independence Ankole and emphasises missionary education as a factor that transformed social relations between Bahima and Bairu both in the Church and in society at large. Chapter 2 deals with the emergence of the Bairu force, their domination of the Eishengyero (kingdom council) of Ankole and the creation of a new Anglican Diocese of Ankole which in many ways became an empowering factor as far as Bairu were concerned. This chapter also discusses the emergence of political parties in Ankole. It analyses the power shift from pre-independence ethnic conflicts and how, with the introduction of a multi-party system in Ankole, people were polarised and voted along religious-denominational lines.

² See Alex Kagame, *Church and Society in Ankole, Uganda, An Analysis of the Impact of Evangelical Christianity on Ethnic and Gender Relations in Ankole, 1901-1961*, PhD dissertation, Trinity College, (affiliated to the University of Bristol) 1993; Peter Kasenene, *Religion and Politics in Nkole, Zomba: Spot Publisher, 1993*; Eliphaz Maari, *The Growth of the Anglican Church in Ankole, 1899-1951*, MPhil. Thesis, Trinity College, Bristol.

It also discusses the fall of Ankole monarchy. Chapter 3 discusses the significant role of the East African Revival movement in trying to bridge the gap between Bairu and Bahima.

Chapter 4 discusses the Amin era and its disastrous consequences while Chapter 5 looks at the re-emergence of the Protestant UPC force after the fall of Amin's regime. The Protestant Bairu hegemony of the 1960s, which Idi Amin had exiled, returned to power and dominated again the politics of Ankole, again marginalising Catholics. This chapter also looks at the role of the Anglican Church in the politics of the eighties. Chapter 6 looks at the Batutsi Banyarwanda refugees in Ankole and analyses the reasons behind their expulsion in 1982. It analyses the role played by various churches as far as the refugees' expulsion was concerned and its effects on the church. Chapter 7 discusses the re-introduction of the kingdoms which the UPC government had abolished in 1967. It analyses why Banyankole resisted the re-introduction of the monarchy in Ankole in 1993. It also argues that the monarchy issue in Ankole was a "vote-catcher", thus a political factor, which was why the government did not want to identify with it.

1.1. Methodology

This thesis relies heavily on primary sources; interviews, newspapers, archival material and participant observation. Secondary material is mainly used in the introduction. Otherwise I have relied on the primary sources.

I conducted my research in three phases; March-September 1996; February-August 1997 and February-March 1998. My primary interviewees were the political and religious leaders, some of whom were eyewitnesses in the post independence drama in Ankole. This was an advantage in that their involvement and participation both in the church and politics determined the degree of accuracy in their accounts. In order to ensure an even greater degree of reliability, I selected informants who were recognised as leader-elders in society because it is they who are perceived as the custodians of the society's memory. They included retired and active Bishops, politicians, women, village elders, refugees, academicians and others relevant for comparison purposes.

Secondly, I relied on the newspaper articles, especially *New Vision*, *The Monitor*, *Weekly Topic* and other local papers like the *Orumuri* (light). Their merit does not lie in their objectivity or accurateness of record, but rather in the fact that they reflected the government version of the incidents reported. I would have preferred to rely more on archival material but much of it was destroyed in 1979 during the war that ousted Idi Amin. Since then not much effort has been made in reorganisation. The available archival material at Kamukuzi-Mbarara was piled in boxes with hardly any identification labels. The same applied to the files at the two Anglican dioceses of West and East Ankole. In the latter, the files were simply heaped in one cupboard regardless of which letter was in which file. I had to abandon my search for files in some places because my efforts were not only frustrated by such disorganisation but dust exposed me to constant bouts of flu.

1.2. Limitations

I interviewed both Catholics and Protestants. While I got useful information from both groups, on the whole Catholics were reluctant to be interviewed especially when they discovered that I was an Anglican priest. At Nyamitanga (Catholic headquarters) despite my persistent visits, the Chancellor denied me access to the diocesan archives. I found it very frustrating especially after waiting on the bench for hours. This contributes to those areas in the thesis where I lack “Catholic” information. However, both Catholic Bishops, John Kakubi and Paul Bakyenga, were extremely helpful for they gave me an open invitation to their homes. I owe a good proportion of the information on Catholics to them.

Another frustrating thing was that many of my interviewees did not keep appointments. I spent a whole month seeking to interview someone. The fact that I conducted the interviews at the time when presidential and local elections were taking place made it even harder to get politicians. But those I managed to get were very receptive. On the whole, the period I spent in the field was very useful. It not only contributed to the bulk of the information for the thesis, it enabled me also to have the opportunity to interact with people from diverse backgrounds.

1.3. Background and the Socio-political setting

The area which we know today as Ankole³ is a colonial creation. The original pre-colonial kingdom of Nkore comprised the present counties of Isingiro, Kashari (Kaaro Karungi) and Nyabushozi.⁴ There were also other relatively independent smaller chieftains in neighbouring Igara, Buhweju and Buzimba. At the advent of British colonialism in 1898 these smaller states were forcefully incorporated into what became known as Ankole with Nkore as the nucleus. The extension of Nkore increased even further the numerical disparity between Bahima and Bairu by a ratio of 1:9⁵ and created what Doornbos calls a "perpetually lopsided balance of power" in favour of a minority, the Bahima.⁶

Present Ankole lies south of the equator and covers an area of 6144 square miles.⁷ To the East it borders Buganda district and to the west it borders Kigezi with River Rwakaberengye and the hills of Rwahi forming the natural borderline. To the south, the River Kagera marks its borders with Rwanda and Tanzania while in the North, it borders Toro and Kasese, with lakes Edward, George, the Kazinga channel and the hills of Kitagwenda forming natural borderlines. Much of western, southern and northern Ankole is mainly hilly: the counties of Igara, Buhweju, Bunyaruguru, Ibanda and to some extent Rwampara and Kajara. These counties have a fair amount of high rainfall and therefore are heavily populated except for Buhweju, which is mountainous. The central and eastern counties form the Ankole plateau, with small rolling hills, which descend into extensive flatlands covering the counties of Kashari, Isingiro and Nyabushozi. These are generally dry areas with seasonal rains, hence sparsely populated. These counties especially Nyabushozi, are pastoral areas occupied mainly by the Bahima.

³ The word "Ankole" is a linguistic misrepresentation of "Nkore" by the British and their Baganda colonial agents who first came to the kingdom of Nkole.

⁴ See H. F. Morris, "The Making of Ankole", *Uganda Journal*, vol. 21, no. 1, March 1957, p. 3.

⁵ D. J. Stenning, 'Salvation in Ankole', in M. Fortes and G. Dieterlen (eds.), *African Systems of Thought*, London: Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 258; For percentages see, H. F. Morris, *A History of Ankole*, Kampala: East Africa Literature Bureau, pp.70-73.

⁶ M. Doornbos, *Not All the Kingsmen: Inequality as a Political Instrument in Ankole, Uganda*, The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1978, p. 25.

In 1974, Ankole was divided into the two districts of East and West Ankole: counties of Rwampara, Isingiro, Ibanda, Nyabushozi and Kashari formed the East, while the West comprised of Igara, Sheema, Kajara, Buhweju and Bunyaruguru. In 1980 these districts were named after their towns, Mbarara and Bushenyi respectively. For the purposes of this thesis therefore, I will generally use Ankole to mean both districts and where Mbarara or Bushenyi is used, it refers to that specific district.

1.3.1. Social-political setting.

This chapter discusses the social relations and the manner in which power was structured between the two ethnic groups, Bahima and Bairu, in pre-colonial Nkore. These two ethnic groups have long been a subject of discussion. One school of thought (mainly emanating from Prof. Samwiri Karugire) has emphasised coexistence and symbiosis despite being two distinct communities. The other school has stressed inequality, subordination and oppression between the two ethnic groups. As Martin Doornbos says, this raises the question of the extent to which "Nkore society was based upon a single system of social and economical production...(and) how the pattern of power relations related to the two main population groups".⁸

The indigenous people of Ankole consisted of the agricultural Bairu and the pastoral Bahima. Bairu formed and still form the majority. They are generally believed to have been the original inhabitants of the area.⁹ Bahima on the other hand are pastoral people who are said to have invaded the region five centuries ago¹⁰, migrating from Somalia or Ethiopia though this is not supported by any evidence. Since colonial times population censuses have reckoned Bahima to be less than ten percent of the total population of Ankole.¹¹

⁷ See the Uganda Atlas.

⁸ Martin Doornbos, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁹ See Turyahikayo-Rugyema, "The cattle complex in Western Uganda: the Bahima/Bairu Relationship reconsidered", paper presented at the annual conference of African Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 1989, p. 1.

¹⁰ M. T. Mushanga, "The clan system among the Banyankole", *Uganda Journal*, vol. 34, no. 1, 1970, p. 29.

¹¹ *ibid.*

Despite being a minority group, Bahima were the traditional rulers of Nkore and all the other chiefdoms and Bairu hardly played any political role but they shared the same religious beliefs¹² and spoke the same language, Runyankole. Both groups also share the same *enganda* (clans, plural) structure: patrilineal, totemic and exogamous.¹³ Mushanga defines *enganda* as reference categories, members of which did not necessarily know one another. Each *oruganda*, (clan, singular) had its own *omuziro* (totem) which worked as a bond for all its members and distinguished them from other clans. Nevertheless, Bairu and Bahima can be easily distinguished by their physical features. The latter tend to be tall and slender while Bairu are generally short and muscular. They also have different accents despite speaking the same language.

1.3.2. Bahima-Bairu relations.

Before and during colonial period the two groups did not enjoy cordial relations. They were characterised by a common "pattern of social stratification"¹⁴ where Bahima dominated Bairu politically, socially, and economically. Such exploitation was not limited to certain sections. The whole social fabric was so ingrained in the political and oral history, that Bairu came to accept their *status quo* as divinely ordained. Significantly, Ankole's oral history indicated that political and economic privileges were for Bahima. Ankole's history was enshrined in myths and legends whose beginnings were ascribed to a divine origin. The Ankole myth recounts how Ruhanga (God) had three sons, Kakama, Kahima and Kairu. Because he wanted to establish the worthiest heir, he gave them as a test full milk pots to hold until morning. When Kakama dozed off at about mid-night and spilled his milk, he wisely asked his brothers to contribute some milk for him and he had a full pot again. Just before dawn, Kairu upset his milk pot and lost all his milk. Basing on their performance, God decreed that Kairu would be the servant of his brothers because he had an empty pot, Kahima would be a herdsman of Kakama to whom he had given his milk while

¹² This is already discussed by both Alex Kagume, *op. cit.*., Peter Kasenene, *op. cit.*., and Martin Doombos, *op. cit.*., in their introductory chapters.

¹³ Mushanga, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

Kakama the youngest son would be the heir and ruler of the land. God returned to heaven and thereafter Kakama (or Rugaba) ruled in his place as Omugabe. He became the father of the Bahima pastoralists while from Kairu descended the Bairu cultivators.¹⁵

The function of such a myth was mainly a legitimising one. The underlying philosophy was that ethnic composition in Ankole was God ordained. It provided an ideological basis for Bairu and Bahima ethnic groups as being distinct "social categories". Hence Bahima were by birthright of higher social status than Bairu.

Beattie says:

In the last resort, what the myth validates is not just this or that particular kind of status differences but rather the "rightness" of all such distinctions based on birth. Although in the myth the original discrimination was based on achievement, what it validates is a system in which statuses are ascribed and not achieved.¹⁶

¹⁴ This phrase is borrowed from Martin Doornbos and will be used throughout the thesis.

¹⁵ See Morris, op. cit., pp. 6-8.; Also Mwambutsya-Ndebesa, "Pre-Capitalist Social Formation: The case of Banyankole of South-western Uganda", in Owen J. M. Kalinga (ed.), *East African Social Science Research and Southern Africa (OSSREA)*, January, 1990, p. 80.

¹⁶ J. H. M. Beattie, J. H. M., "Bunyoro: An African Feudality?", *Journal of African History*, vol. VI, no. 1, 1964, P. 39.

1.3.3. Previous Scholarly Interpretations.

In describing Bahima-Bairu relations, Oberg used the phrase the “premise of inequality” and writes that ‘to the Bahima, “Bairu” signified serfdom, a legal status inferior to that existing between themselves.’ Observing the nature of such exploitation he said:

the exploitation between Bairu and Bahima took the form of tribute in food and labour and for this purpose the Bahima tended to keep them in subjection.¹⁷

Stenning noted that the ‘legal and economic status of “Iru” was inferior to that of “Hima”.’¹⁸ He says:

in general terms, the traditional pattern of administration authority in Ankole was that of a ruling pastoral caste the Hima set in both local and central administration over an inferior caste the Iru”.¹⁹

The alternative view (which I do not accept and which actually stimulated me to write about this particular topic), holds that both Bairu and Bahima were interdependent socially and economically with an open class system which allowed either Mwiru or Muhima to rise or fall on the social ladder. Such a view denies that there was any “premise of inequality” in the system. This is the view, which is put forward by Professor Samwiri Karugire:

The one essential factor, which is the key to the understanding of Nkore class structure..., is that the class system was an open one.²⁰

¹⁷ K. Oberg, "The Kingdom of Ankole in Uganda", in M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (eds.), *African Political Systems*, London, 1966, p. 154.

¹⁸ D. J. Stenning, "The Nyankole" in Taylor (ed.), *The Western Lacustrine Bantu*, London, 1962, pp. 153-155.

¹⁹ Stenning, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

²⁰ See, Karugire, *A History of the Kingdom of Nkore in Western Uganda to 1898*, London, 1971, p. 50; See also H.F. Morris, *The Heroic Recitations of the Bahima of Ankole*, Oxford, 1964, p. 9.

According to Karugire, a Muhima academic and historian, the economic activities of both Bairu and Bahima were complementary and were based on interdependence through mutual exchange. Accordingly, "Nkore was a capitalistic society and the form of capital was cattle..."²¹ Karugire's analysis, however well argued, lacks historical backing and therefore leaves many questions unanswered. It might have been true that "the vital point [was] that the Omugabe was the greatest single source of wealth-cattle for the Bairu as well as for the Bahima" but it is not true that both "the Bairu and the Bahima rendered him...services for which they were similarly rewarded" (ibid. p. 53). Karugire writing after independence swung the pendulum in an opposite direction. He accused people like Oberg, Morris and Stenning, of distorting the history of Ankole as far as Bahima-Bairu relations were concerned. He privileged symbiosis and coexistence as the models under which Bairu and Bahima lived:

It appears fairly certain that the economic relations between Bairu and Bahima were based on mutual exchange of the goods produced by each other and their occupations were made mutually exclusive by the environmental conditions rather than by ethnic superiority or inferiority.²²

He states that Ankole was an open society whose social mobility was based on wealth, measured in terms of cattle ownership, and that some Bairu could acquire cattle, marry Bahima women and after generations become Bahima! That likewise, if a Muhima lost his cows and became poor, he would become a Mwiru. However Professor Y. Elam, who carried out research among the Bahima of Nyabushozi and advanced the theory of social separation between Bairu and Bahima, challenged such a naive view. He dismisses Karugire's theory of coexistence as contradictory to Karugire's own experience:

His own recollections do not deter Karugire from stating categorically that cows milk, among other products of the Hima was in considerable high demand among the Bairu.²³

²¹ Karugire, op. cit., pp. 38, 40-41, 66.

²² ibid., pp. 33-34.

²³ Y. Elam, *The Social and Sexual Roles of the Hima Women*, Manchester, 1973, pp. 36-37.

Elam argued that there was only a limited and temporary exchange of goods between the two groups, and limited contacts. To argue that Nkore was "one society" as Karugire does would pre-suppose that it had one single system of social and political identity. Yet while I agree that there was a general social contact, they were distinct in their way of life and production patterns, "that would normally be associated with a single inclusive social system and a shared ranking pattern." Even today, where both ethnic groups have diversified their economies to incorporate cattle and crops, both Bahima and Bairu still refer to themselves as distinct groups, each proud of its own different traditions. Various behaviour and cultural trends are evident, especially the infrequency of intermarriages and different accents whose expressions and metaphors may make a conversation unintelligible to the one outside the group. Karugire defends a Bahima legitimacy which he himself would have sacrificed anything to keep. He once thanked "God for two things", not creating him "as a woman or a Mwiru".²⁴

If one argues as Karugire does, that Bairu and Bahima were not two distinct groups in their economic, social and ethnic composition, then one wonders how the inequality arose; or alternately if the two groups were based on equal ethnic premises, how could they be seen as distinct and different communities? There are two interpretations to this: one of which is a dominant story among Bairu, which is also recounted by Oberg. Both agree on the persuasive, and institutionalised pattern of ethnic dominance by Bahima over Bairu:

From the stand point of political and legal states, the members of the Banyankole kingdom did not form a homogeneous mass, but were distinguished by a wide range of rights and prohibitions resulting in a stratification of society into classes. At the top was the Bahima State with its growing nucleus centring on Omugabe [king]; below were the subject classes of the Bairu. The caste nature of this stratification was pronounced resting entirely on racial and economic differences.²⁵

Rightly, Oberg sees ethnicity as the underlying factor with which Bahima relegated Bairu to an inferior position subject therefore to be controlled by Bahima

²⁴ Debate between Samwiri Karugire and Prof. Apollo Nsibambi in the late eighties on Uganda Television.

²⁵ Oberg, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

economically, socially and politically. On balance, Kagume and Stenning seem nearer the truth when they state the fact that in pre-colonial Ankole, Bairu interacted amongst themselves and so did Bahima. They had different life styles and diets and what took place was a limited exchange of products in terms of the number of people it concerned and the intervals of its frequency. Such limited economic reciprocity mainly involved Bahima consumption of Bairu products like millet, beer and Bairu consumption of ghee from Bahima though the latter traded with Bairu only if they had a disposable surplus.

Among the scholarly interpretations about Ankole, it is Martin Doornbos who has given a balanced analysis of the ethnic imbalance between Bairu and Bahima. He appreciates those areas, however minimal, which Bairu and Bahima shared in common:

As a result while it would be erroneous to conceive of their relationships as one that was rigidly patterned or as one that placed every single Mwiru in a directly subordinate position to a Muhima, neither can the proposition be held that members of the two groups had equal chances in an open and socially mobile society.²⁶

Within the Bairu-Bahima limited contacts, there were a few instances in which both groups interacted socially. This was mainly in those instances where Bairu were directly in the service of the Bahima. Bairu today still tell, perhaps with gross exaggeration, of how the Omugabe could rest his spear on a Mwiru's feet or spit in his mouth at will and where they were made to carry off their lord's urine or hold Bahima women's thighs whenever they would be having intercourse (many Bahima women are heavily overweight).²⁷ They were prohibited from touching milk pots lest they would turn "unclean" as part of their inferior social status. It might be these people that Karugire writes about when he talks of cultivators who "lived near the kraals of the pastoralists, cultivating short term crops such as vegetables and sweet potatoes which supplemented the dairy products from the kraal", while performing services

²⁶ M. Doornbos, op. cit., p. 35.

²⁷ See for instance, "Adoration and hatred kiss Ankole's Obugabe", in *The New Vision*, 26 March, 1997, and Martin Doornbos, op. cit., p. 39.

and moving on with the pastoralists when they trekked to new pastures.²⁸ It is most likely that it was within that social group that the term "Bairu" first carried its specific meaning not just as cultivators but as servants. Because the early colonial contacts in Ankole were mainly with Bahima, that demeaning word came to embrace all non-Bahima.²⁹

Economically and apart from the "servant" minority, which was in direct Bahima employment, the economic contacts seem to have been more favourable to the Bahima than Bairu. Since Bahima controlled the market monopoly of their imperishable goods like ghee (butter), they left it to the Bairu to carry their heavier products to the Bahima kraals and hence Bahima determined whether or not to trade and at what exchange value. Their products were highly valued nutritionally by Bairu. Also Bairu were liable to pay for "protection" from Bahima chiefs with tribute (*okutoija*) in return for "protection" since Bahima were chiefs.³⁰

The significant visible domination however was political. Nkore's political system was based on territorial chiefs who wielded substantial powers and were exclusively Bahima. Only in very rare circumstances could a Mwiru become a chief. The exception would only be if he distinguished himself as a warlord in the service of the state. But such cases were very rare indeed since it was Bahima who formed the kingdom's "high command". They controlled courts and therefore determined the destiny of justice. The case that came to the Omugabe's court mainly concerned Bahima and where Omwiru and Omuhima were involved in a dispute, the former chances of getting a fair hearing were uncertain. And as Oberg wrote:

Perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of Bairu serfdom was that under no circumstances could a Mwiru kill a Muhima. The right of blood revenge, which was exercised by the extended families of Bairu among themselves, could not be extended to the Bahima. If a Muhima killed a Mwiru, the extended family of the murdered man could not claim blood revenge, although he was sometimes able to exact

²⁸ Karugire, *op. cit.*, pp. 35, 40.

²⁹ See I. M. Lewis, *A Pastoral Democracy*, London, 1961, p. 14.

³⁰ Karugire, pp. 39, 64. At times some compulsion from Bahima was evident as implied in Bairu's anecdotes about Bahima who would be searching for sweet bananas. Bairu would lead them through their plantations, denying they had any such bananas, which their Bahima visitors, unable to tell one tree from another, found difficult to check.

compensation through the agency of the Omugabe. Bahima on the other hand could avenge the death of a kinsman if he were murdered by a Mwiru without consulting the Omugabe.³¹

Where a Muhima's cattle destroyed a Mwiru's crops, the latter would not even bother to seek compensation since "the legal and security system was heavily weighed in favour of Bahima."³² We can argue therefore that Bahima hegemony was more assertive politically than economically. What gave Bahima such an assertive confidence was perhaps the pivotal function of the Omugabe (king) on whom all political matters revolved. To both Bahima and Bairu, Omugabe was a symbol of power, but while he stood as a central figure in the political system there were no ties that linked Bairu to his office. To the Bahima on the other hand, Omugabe was *Rugaba*, the giver, who closely participated in their affairs. He appointed only them as chiefs and judges and rewarded them with cows and other benefits. As Omuhima himself, not only was his way of life similar to theirs, he was the protector of their interests. Hence the Ankole kingship differed greatly from Buganda where the Kabaka (king) was *akasolya* (pinnacle), for all clans. While to Bahima, Omugabe was a political symbol, to Bairu, he was a symbol of inequality, exploitation and despotism, as an essay from Ntare School History Society claimed:

Before the British brought in "democracy" the type of government, which prevailed, was... despotic. The king's powers were unlimited. He could with a word prevent or make a man's fortune.³³

As Oberg says, "the position of the Omugabe was exalted, his authority supreme...power both physical and spiritual was the inherent quality of kingship."³⁴ And Roscoe, the man who described Ankole as a Bahima country, conceded that "the government of the country was autocratic and the power was in the hands of the Omugabe whose rule was absolute and his decision on any matter final."³⁵ Vansina while constructing a typology of African kingdoms characterised Nkore as "a clear

³¹ Oberg K. and F. Pritchard (ed.), *African Political Systems*, London, 1964, p. 126.

³² Interview: Anania Murumba, July 10, 1996, Kafunjo.

³³ See *The Government Institutions in Ankole before the British rule*, mimeo, Mbarara, 1965, p. 1.

³⁴ Oberg, op. cit. pp. 136-137.

case" of a despotic kingdom where "the king appoints all other officials and wields absolute power in practice and in theory."³⁶

The Bahima owned cattle not only as a means of subsistence but also a symbol of wealth, power and prestige.³⁷ Having elevated cattle as their source of economic, social and political power, they monopolised them and prevented the Bairu from owning any. Bahima would not allow Bairu to own reproductive cows³⁸ by giving them only bulls in exchange for their services. Bahima also emphasised the antagonism between cattle ownership and the agricultural way of life. They claimed that vegetable food was dangerous to cattle health and therefore Bairu as vegetable eaters would endanger the productivity and life of cows when they drank their milk.³⁹ As Roscoe wrote;

If a man ate potatoes or beans, he had not only to fast twelve hours but also had to take a purgative to ensure that all contaminating matter had left his system before he drank milk again.⁴⁰

As Turyahikayo-Rugyema says, Bahima made the process through which the Bairu could acquire even unproductive cows and bulls very complicated. The process was overlaid with so many obligations that "when and how a Mwiru obtained the cow depended on the whims of the Muhima".⁴¹ Bairu could get cows through *Okugabisa* (cattle loan) from the Bahima by paying several pots of beer (*amarwa*). The exploitation in this lay in the fact that Bairu were not only given unproductive bulls, but were required to pay several visits with beer before the cow could be given. In addition such cows put Bairu recipients in the power of the Bahima's exploitative process. The Omuhima donor made continual visits to the Mwiru on the pretext of coming to "see his cow." Though he would bring nothing to the Omwiru, he expected Omwiru to entertain him with food and beer. The Mwiru could not resist such

³⁵ John Roscoe, *The Banyankole*, London, 1929, p. 12.

³⁶ See J. Vansina, "A Comparison of African Kingdoms", *Africa*, vol. 32, no. 4, 1962, p. 332.

³⁷ Interview: Mwambutsya-Ndebese, March 26, 1997, Makerere University.

³⁸ C. Murray, "Status conflict: cattle and education in Ankole", *Uganda Journal*, 34, 1, 1970, p. 10.

³⁹ Kagume, op. cit., p. 14.

⁴⁰ Roscoe, op. cit., p. 72.

⁴¹ Turyahikayo-Rugyema, op. cit., p. 14.

exploitation because he desperately wanted the cow either for making marriage arrangements, or for religious ceremonies.⁴² By denying the Bairu access to productive cattle, the only symbol of wealth, Bahima starved them both economically and socially. Because they lacked such wealth, Bahima ranked them second class citizens.

It was not that Bairu were unaware of such subjugation nor were they just passive victims. As a silent protest, Bairu avoided settling in the low plains of central, eastern and south-western Ankole, the main Bahima grazing lands and settlements. F. D. Lugard corroborates this factor. In 1891 he came to Ankole and described it as a "foodless country with few villages and little cultivation".⁴³ They instead settled in the hilly areas where they would not conflict with Bahima over cows destroying crops. Another form of resistance was subtle. If a Mwiru felt "stretched" by the demands of the Muhima, he would either migrate to another area or delay the action without telling Muhima that he did not want to do it. I was told of cases where Bairu, when carrying Bahima loads, pretended to stumble and spill the whole load.

Bairu could not put up active resistance knowing that they lacked the political know-how and organisation. Bahima controlled the political machinery right from the grass roots to the Omugabe. Because the domination was so comprehensive Bairu were unable to mount open rebellion against the Bahima. Karugire contended that their quiescence indicated that they were not suffering any oppression.⁴⁴ But the fact that no open rebellion is recorded in Ankole traditions does not necessarily rule out the possibility of one. It was Bahima who "designed" Ankole's traditions to exalt their glory and success. Prof. Richard Gray agrees that African traditions have this tendency to conceal their past when he writes that:

Rebellious and revolutionaries are difficult to discern in the records of oral tradition on which we depend for so much of our knowledge of pre-colonial Africa. Traditions often provide the charter or justification

⁴² Stenning, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

⁴³ F. D. Lugard, *The Rise of our East African Empire*, vol. II, London: Blackwood, 1893, pp. 155-160.

⁴⁴ Karugire, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

for a political order. So even if the system had originated in revolution, its origins might soon become clothed in respectability and successful rebellions could be glossed over with rapidity.⁴⁵

This brings us to the role of the colonial masters in the Bairu-Bahima relations. The British did not change the *status quo* but preferred to rule through it and confirmed the Bahima chiefs in their respective positions. By 1901 when the Ankole Agreement was signed, the British had placed all the conquered territories under the Omugabe Kahaya of Ankole. Subsequently the incorporated kingdoms became counties and their Bahima kings became their county chiefs. Until the late 1930s, when education became a necessity for civil office-holders like county chiefs, the British did not tamper with the Bahima establishment. Out of the ten county chiefs who signed the 1901 Ankole Agreement with the British, nine were Bahima and only one Mwiru, Ruhara. In 1907, out of the ten county chiefs, six were Bahima, three Baganda and Ruhara.⁴⁶ This report further indicates that the reduction of Bahima dominance had only taken place at the county chief level. At sub-county level Bahima still retained the highest representation. Bairu who constituted more than 90% of the population held only 8 out of the 84 chiefdoms in Ankole. In 1923 after the death of Ruhara, even he was replaced by a Muhima thus bringing the number of Bahima county chiefs to nine and one Muganda.⁴⁷ Far from initiating any significant change, colonial administration in Ankole perpetuated the Bahima oligarchy. This was understandable because it was Bahima as traditional rulers of Nkore who received the British. The British found Ankole as a hierarchical society and chose to leave it as it was. Their policy of "indirect rule", meant that one section of the people continued to be 'set against' the other thus perpetuating long lasting divisions. Ankole could perhaps have emerged as a unified society had the British applied a more inclusive administration.

On the contrary, colonial rule widened fissures between the Bahima and Bairu. So racially obsessed were the Europeans that they attributed the Bahima dominance to their special intelligence and racial superiority over Bairu. As Gerald

⁴⁵ R. Gray, *Black Christians and White Missionaries*, New Haven, 1990, p. 4.

⁴⁶ See Uganda Government, *Systems of Chieftainships of Ankole*, Government Press, Entebbe, Uganda, 1907.

⁴⁷ *ibid.*

Prunier says, Europeans were obsessed with their quest to propound anthropological theories that tagged Bahima and Bairu to different racial stereotypes. An example of this is the Hamitic theory, which was largely based on physical appearance and advanced by men like John Speke, Samuel Baker and John Roscoe. In brief they advanced the fact that whereas Bairu were indigenous Bantu groups in the interlacustrine region, the Bahima were invaders who came from Somalia, Ethiopia, Egypt and even Israel.⁴⁸ Sir Albert Cook for instance while commenting on the Bahima, remarked on "their extraordinary likeness to the old Egyptians" while Alfred R. Tucker described a typical Muhima as "a man the very image you would say of Rameses II".⁴⁹ Therefore the chiefs were recruited along these stereotyped assumptions in early colonial days while the European view of the Bairu was of a lower and inferior status. They display the:

...very typical Bantu features...they are generally short and thick set with a big head, a jovial expression, a wide nose and enormous lips. They are extroverts who like to laugh and lead a simple life.⁵⁰

Consequent of this theory of two races was a sensed inferiority among Bairu but in whom a latent explosive rage nurtured, while the Bahima ego was inflated with pride and aristocratic intransigence that often made reform of the monarchy more difficult.

It was not only the colonial administration which widened the gap between Bairu and Bahima. Christianity also had a role to play. The introduction of Christianity not only strained Bairu-Bahima relations further, but also divided Bairu themselves. It strengthened the position of the Bahima. Christianity and colonialism came to Ankole almost at the same time in 1898. The Church Missionary Society (CMS) missionaries who arrived first concentrated on the Bahima notables at the court and subsequently converted the king and other court royals. This was the CMS African strategy for as Rev. J.J. Willis, one of the first two Protestant missionaries in Ankole and later the Bishop of Uganda, wrote:

⁴⁸ Mwambutsya-Ndebesa, op. cit., p. 202.

⁴⁹ *ibid.*

⁵⁰ See G. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of genocide*, London: Hurst and Company, 1995, p. 6-7.

There must be concentration on the natural leaders. The supreme importance of this will be seen later. It is enough to remind ourselves that the lower the stage of civilisation, the more dependent are the people on their leaders; that where in an African tribe, the chief is friendly every facility is given to the missionary, and where he is unfriendly, the progress of the gospel is slower and immensely more difficult. Native leaders can not always be won but it is always worthwhile making the effort to win them.⁵¹

Though the Omugabe of Ankole, Kahaya, might have accepted Protestantism because CMS came first, evidence shows prestige was a more important factor. All the surrounding kingdoms, Buganda, Toro and Kooki, had already embraced Protestantism. Consequently, the king and nearly all Bahima embraced Protestantism as the religion of the king, (*eky'omugabe*). The Roman Catholics who arrived later in 1902 amidst opposition from the British administrator Racey⁵² and with less favour from court concentrated their efforts on the majority rural Bairu. While CMS first concentrated on the Bahima notables, Catholic missionaries went for the poor masses in rural Bairu areas and, by the time CMS came to evangelise Bairu, many had already been won over by the White Fathers. Although political conditions were against the Catholic Church in the kingdom, several other factors facilitated its growth. In his diary, Father Gorju noted:

The Protestant religion has preceded us here. The Mugabe chose it and Protestantism became the religion of Kahaya. Bahima followed him. The Catholic religion from the beginning was the religion of the poor and the underdog. It is among them that we are sowing the word of the gospel.⁵³

They might have been the poor and the underdog, but, due to the efforts of Catholic Fathers, Catholics later formed the biggest single group in the kingdom. When the CMS missionaries realised this, it opened their eyes to the Bairu. The population figures of 1911 and 1921 support this argument. Though CMS had been over ten years

⁵¹ J. J. Willis, *An African Church in Building*, London, CMS, 1925, p. 36.

⁵² 'I am of the opinion that one religion should be tolerated in Ankole for it is patent that should Roman Catholics be permitted to settle here as well as Protestants there will be trouble beyond anything I can Contemplate'; See Racey to the Commissioner, 18 January 1901, file No. C58, Uganda National Archives, Entebbe.

⁵³ Kagume op. cit., p. 45.

in Ankole by 1911 and the White Fathers had been there only for eight years, the census returns in that year indicated that there were 7,185 Catholics, 6,890 Protestants and 443 Muslims. And in 1921 there were 12,803 Catholics, 10,071 Protestants and 524 Muslims.⁵⁴ Catholic numbers were in the eyes of CMS missionaries due to Catholics' zeal for evangelism as Rev. W. E. Owen wrote:

In the abundance of its missionary zeal, the Roman Catholic Church compels our fervent admiration.⁵⁵

The argument above is not about the growth of Christianity in Ankole, which is dealt with by people like Alex Kagame and Kasenene.⁵⁶ It is about the religio-political implications among the Banyankole. Before the coming of denominational Christianity, chiefdoms were purely for Bahima. But with the coming of Christianity and after the conversion of the king and Bahima notables, administrative positions in Ankole became overwhelmingly Protestant rather than Catholic. Protestantism became "the king's religion" in one way and in another it was the religion of the colonial establishment. Hence without any exception Bahima and Baganda county chiefs during the colonial period were Protestants. What Christianity did was to enhance and strengthen the Bahima hegemony.

Following the pattern of mission stations in Ankole, Protestants occupied the central areas of Sheema, Igara, Kashari, Kajara and Rwampara while Catholics consolidated in the peripheral remote areas of Bunyaruguru, Buhweju, Ibanda and to a less extent Isingiro. The reason for this was that the central areas were closer to the king's palace and were strong counties under influential chiefs like Mbaguta who controlled Sheema and Igara. Secondly though such counties as Sheema and Kajara were predominantly Bairu, they had a significant number of Protestant Bahima who could have influenced Bairu.

⁵⁴ See the "Uganda Census Report" of 1921.

⁵⁵ CMS Archives, Birmingham: Rev. W. W. Owen's annual letter, 1909, (Series G3/A7/1898-1934), (hereafter, CMS Archives).

⁵⁶ Cf. Alex M. Kagame, *op. cit.*

Equally important was the fact that, after the introduction of denominational Christianity, colonial District Commissioners generally supported the Protestant establishment. Rev. Clayton wrote:

Our Collector Mr. Racey seems anxious to help us as much as he can. He has just imported three keen Christian men from Buganda and has given them Chieftainships in different parts of the country, that they may be a good educational influence on the people. They will of course build churches at once at their places and will probably act as teachers without pay, so I hope they will be of great use.⁵⁷

The colonial masters ignored the employment of Catholics in favour of Protestants. Even Bairu Protestants were appointed disproportionately to Bairu Catholics in the lower ranks of the colonial establishment as messengers, Askaris and Bakungu (tribute chiefs). This relegated Bairu Catholics to the cultivation of subsistence crops. These different social developments among the Bairu and Bahima were to have religio-political implications with Protestant Bairu demanding greater and equal participation in an exclusive Bahima establishment.

However the immediate consequence of denominational Christianity is that it produced a pyramidal society with the Bahima elite on top, then Protestant Bairu and the Catholic Bairu on the bottom. This continued as the norm until towards independence when both Bairu groups dominated the Ankole Eishengyero as a result of the direct elections. But after 1930s the situation did not change much. Most chiefs were still Bahima though some Bairu Protestants became sub-county chiefs. Either way Bairu Catholics remained relegated on the fringes of the system.⁵⁸ Such a pyramid was very convenient for Bahima because while denominational Christianity had dissected Bairu into two rival parts, Bahima had remained united both as an ethnic group and as Protestants. The divisions among Bairu reduced and divided any likely potential opposition to Bahima. The fact that Bairu Protestants had the "table remains", however minimal, meant that for a long time, they regarded themselves superior to Bairu Catholics and therefore did not have anything to do with them. While among Bahima Christianity symbolised a unity of interests, among the Bairu it

⁵⁷ Clayton to parents, Annual letter, 2 June 1901, CMS Archives.

⁵⁸ *ibid.*

symbolised divisionism and competition. It is unfortunate but true to say that for many years Christianity did not mitigate ethnic inequality but in many ways nurtured and reinforced it. And as Martin Doornbos says, such arrangements

also served the purposes of British control. It was consistent with a policy of 'franchise' and self-rule that local statuses should also be allocated and arranged as to result in a system which largely rested on its "own" checks and mechanisms of control.⁵⁹

It was such religio-political imbalance in Ankole that led the Catholic Bishop Forbes to express his disgust as early as 1920. He protested about the Omugabe's indiscriminate policy against Catholics in the appointment of chiefs, which were exclusively for Protestants:

It is quite true that the measure applied by government in selecting chiefs is only that of efficiency and character, whatever religion they profess. But what the Omugabe and the Lukiiko are reproached with is their systematic opposition against Catholics' obtaining Chieftainships especially their mode of practically never proposing Catholics for sanction. Hence the striking disproportion between the Protestant and the Catholic chiefs as shown in the following table. The proportion of both Catholics and Protestants in Ankole is fairly equal. However at present, out of 12 counties, Protestants hold ten, Catholics 0. Muslim 1, vacant 1. Out of the 96 sub-counties, Protestants hold 73, Catholics 6, Muslims (Baganda) 15, pagans 2. Unless it is proved that they are unfit for Chieftainships, have not the Catholics the reason to be discontent.⁶⁰

In the response to the Secretary of State concerning the Bishop's letter, the Provincial Commissioner accepted the existence of favouritism on the part of the Omugabe and Eishengyero but reported:

The question of bias on the part of the Omugabe and the Lukiiko is well known, but I think it is not so much because he and his leading chiefs are keen pillars of the church, but they favour men who are Bahima and of their own class.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Doornbos, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

⁶⁰ See Bishop Forbes letter of 23/11/1920, File Class A 15, Entebbe archives.

⁶¹ See same file as above.

I have so far highlighted the role of Christian denominations in propagating ethnic-religious conflicts. But how about Islam? What role if any did Islam play in the emergence of Ankole? In fact Muslims were not key actors in the religio-political events in Ankole until independence. Many of them were Baganda, and kept aloof from the conflicts as a Banyankole issue. Islam had come to Ankole before the two Christian denominations. As it was in Buganda, Muslim traders and chiefs who had come alongside the British colonialists as interpreters, clerks and drivers introduced it in Ankole. Despite such advantage, it never won any significant following in Ankole and up to now has remained a minority religion.

Several reasons explain it. Islam lacked credible missionaries. Foreign Christian missionaries were revered by local people who were proud to identify with them. But Muslims had no missionary groups and lacked full time officials. In addition there were no Whites in it. Banyankole were always astonished at what the whites "could do" which ranged from making a simple wooden chair to giving an injection. Hence they were called *abajungu* (the smart ones). Many people therefore wanted to learn their wisdom and to belong to the religion of these "semi-gods". The first Baganda Muslims in Ankole came in 1889 fleeing from the religious wars in Buganda. However they came through Kabula and settled in Bukanga, a county which is at the extreme end of Ankole. They were not centrally located. According to Bishop Kakubi, whose father almost became a Muslim, the first Mosque in Ankole was built in Bukanga and up to now that area has the highest number of Muslims.⁶²

Islam was propagated by Baganda who were often arrogant and refused to speak Runyankole. The few Banyankole who converted to Islam adopted the *kiganda* culture and language in which Islam expressed itself. So Islam meant detribalisation. Perhaps the most serious reason why Islam did not spread so quickly in Ankole was because, for a long time, it lacked secular schools, which in many ways acted as a vent for denominational evangelisation.⁶³ The adherents of such schools determined the religion they were converted to or to which their parents belonged. The only Muslim High School was Nyamitanga built in 1920. Even then it had few students

⁶² Interview: Bishop John Kakubi, August 25, 1996, Ibanda.

⁶³ Interview: Sheikh Kaduyu, June 12, 1996, Mbarara.

and insufficient funds to sustain it. This explains in many ways the lack of Muslim political leaders in the post independence Ankole. Besides, Banyankole abhorred the custom of being circumcised before being accepted into Islam. According to Banyankole, circumcision was a shameful thing. After all Islam did not have much to offer, as did the Christian denominations.

1.3.4. Church and the Bairu ministry.

By 1914, Bahima were not showing much interest in Christian work. Encouraged by the results of the White Fathers among the Bairu, CMS also directed its attention to them. The results of the Bairu's response to the Anglican gospel had motivated the Rev. Boulton Landbury to write in 1922:

The hope of the Church there seems to be in the despised peasants, the Bairu. These respond to the preaching of the gospel; and it is from their ranks that ninety nine percent of the Church's workers are to be found.⁶⁴

Despite the fact that the first clergyman, Yoweri Buningwire, was a Muhima (ordained 1916), there was to remain a big gap before another Muhima, Eric Sabiiti, was ordained in 1933. However the Bairu's response to the gospel had encouraged missionaries to put forward a Mwiru, Semei Kashinya, for ordination in 1924.⁶⁵ The two Bahima, Buningwire and Sabiiti, would be the last to be ordained until the fifties.

Why did Bahima lose interest in the institution which they had first embraced and why were they not as keen for church ministry as Bairu later became? Church records in Ankole show mainly Bairu ordinations: for instance of Lazaro Tibesasa (1931), Sezi Gunura (1933), E. Kamujanduzi (1945). It seems Bahima could not bend to the demands involved in church ministry. From the beginning, Bahima had realised that church work was a servant-oriented job, which they could not associate themselves with. Bairu on the other hand, found church work to be an immediate source of salaried employment. They also embraced Christianity as a way

⁶⁴ CMS Archives: Rev. Boulton Landbury Annual Letter 1922.

towards equality. Bahima seemed content to let Bairu take over in church leadership since apart from offering social prestige, Church ministry did not offer high economic incentives which Bahima were interested in. They were interested in government jobs, which were a continuation of their traditional role as chiefs. Actually they objected to people among their own like Sabiiti joining church ministry and instead argued him into the civil service:

From time to time since he [Sabiiti] left Buddo, the government have wanted him in their service; and his brother [Katungi] who is one of the big chiefs here had tried to persuade him many times to give up mission work and to accept a chieftainship.⁶⁶

It is not clear why Bahima readily accepted Bairu's leadership in the church. It may be due to the fact that, even before the advent of Christianity, they had accepted Bairu as traditional priests. Bairu monopolised traditional religious offices as diviners and healers.⁶⁷ While such parallels may have been of some influence, it is vital to note that Christianity in Ankole was introduced as a completely new religion, which did not build on the traditional order.⁶⁸ Bahima despised church work and odd as it was for them, they were not surprised that Bairu went for it. This is true for the missionaries' efforts to make the Ugandan Church self-reliant was lop-sided. Secure as they were, with their provisions supplied mainly from home, missionaries emphasised sacrificial service at the expense of sacrificial giving and did little to alleviate the appalling financial situation of the African co-workers whose pay depended on the amount raised by their churches. The stipends of the clergy in Ankole and the Uganda mission were miserable in the missionary times and still are. The salaries were raised on the principle defined in the 1913 Synod that:

Voluntary contributions support the personnel and the involuntary contributions support the material.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ CMS Archives: CMS Annual Report, 1924-25.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*

⁶⁷ Interview: E. Mukaira, July 24, 1996, Bushenyi.

⁶⁸ Yoramu Bamunoba, "The Confrontation between Christianity and African traditional Religion in Ankole since 1899", *Occasional Research papers*, 2, Makerere University, 1971.

⁶⁹ CMS Archives: Resolutions of the Synod of the Church of Uganda, 8-10 July 1913.

For example the stipend of a local clergyman in 1930 was 40 Shillings (£2), a month while the local Catechists received 1.3 Shillings (£0.0625) and they did not always receive their stipends regularly as congregations often failed to raise the money.⁷⁰

On the surface, Bairu leadership in the Church might seem a perpetuation of their traditional role, which confined them to the religious sphere. But on more fundamental level, it signified a tremendous change in Bahima-Bairu relations. Though Church work was poorly paid, it conferred a high social status originating in the reverence traditional Ankole conferred upon traditional priests and more significantly, the prestige European missionaries enjoyed. As one elderly man confided, he could never be convinced that missionaries whom most Banyankole respected as such ever "visited a toilet".

And indeed they "did not" for the life style of some of them promoted this "super-human image" among the Banyankole. For instance in 1902, when Clayton was returning from leave, his colleague Willis asked all the chiefs to be present in their best Sunday clothes. He borrowed a mule from the British Collector for Clayton "to ride in state".⁷¹ Missionaries also kept numerous African domestic servants and at one time Clayton boasted of having:

...8 boys...At present 2 cook, 2 do our bedroom washing and ironing and boot cleaning, 2 are table boys and cream the milk and do lamps and 2 wash up and do a variety of odd jobs.⁷²

It is true that the African clergy did not inherit such pomp, but they were invested with sufficient amount of it to enable them to be treated with considerable respect in Ankole society. They were not believed to be super-human but they were the local experts of the *kijungu dini* (European religion) as they were able to read, write and put on those "godly" robes, the mechanics of which fascinated the poor peasants. Bairu clergy ceased to be called by their names and became *abarisa* or *abakadde*, both titles signifying the high respect they acquired.⁷³

⁷⁰ Interview: Canon Semei Rwabushaija, August 28, 1996.

⁷¹ CMS Archives: Clayton letter to Parents, 22 November 1902.

⁷² *ibid.*, 14 February 1904.

⁷³ Interview: Dr. Adonia Tiberondwa, August 4, 1997, Kampala.

Another significant development was that through the church, Bairu clergy and Catechists entered into a new relationship with Bahima chiefs. Since Anglican Christianity was the "religion of the king", Bahima chiefs were expected to support church workers and to mobilise people to build churches. Though Bahima did not do it as enthusiastically as Baganda chiefs did, on the whole, with Bairu initiative, more pastorates were opened up in the counties where Bahima County chiefs were. These were: Sheema-Kitojo, 1913 (Nuwa Mbaguta), Ibanda, 1918 (Julia Kibubura), Igara-Bweranyangi, 1926 (Tophas Togo), and Kajara-Kitunga, 1939, (Semei Ndyazarwa).⁷⁴

By incorporating Bairu and Bahima in one church, Christianity created a new group of believers who were distinct from non-Christians. They were largely exposed to the ideals of the Christian faith, but due to the social-political imbalance this unity remained artificial. The argument here is that Protestantism which had initially exalted Bahima later became a stepping stone for Bairu development and emancipation. By embracing it, Bairu overwhelmed Bahima in church membership and hence capitalised on their numerical strength to use the Church for their "liberation". And as we shall be arguing in the next chapters, Bairu's commitment and involvement in church work was very significant in the power shift in post independence politics.

⁷⁴ *Ekitabo ky'Eishengyero Ry'Ekanisa Kagamba*, minutes for 2 September 1938, Kitunga Archdeaconary.

1.4. MISSIONARY SCHOOLS AND LOCAL POLITICS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE.

We now examine the role played by the church mission schools in the spread of Christianity and in the local politics in Ankole before independence. For the spread of Christianity in Ankole went hand in hand with establishment of missionary education.⁷⁵ Indeed that is why African scholars have generally viewed missionary education as being another form of imperialism. Such scholars are so obsessed with the awful excesses of missionaries that they tend to gloss over the fact that missionary education was a necessary factor if remote areas of Uganda were to develop. As Bishop Kivengere has said, we are not ashamed of what the missionaries imparted to us, but of our failure to improve on it.⁷⁶

Missionary schools were not only established as catchment areas for converts but also as entry ports in the struggle to "civilise" what Europeans then considered "a Dark Continent". Seeing the impact of these schools, the White Fathers were quick to declare that:

...the School is undoubtedly the most important and indispensable feature of Catholic missionary activity. From the very beginning we understood that in a country like Uganda where all children were dependent on pagan parents, or masters, it was only by means of schools, that the missionaries could get hold on the people.⁷⁷

This was true indeed for education helped to influence the body, mind and soul of the African! The teacher captured the mind; the church catered for the soul, while the dispensary healed the body. This is why the early Sunday school chants composed by the local Catechists carried strong images about the value of education:

⁷⁵ See for instance, Adrian Hastings, *A History of African Christianity, 1950-1975*, Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 48-49; 109-110; 150-151; 188-189.

⁷⁶ I was present at his address on the golden anniversary of the Revival movement in Ankole in 1987.

⁷⁷ Kakubi, J. B., "Missionary Education and Catholic Church in Uganda", A Paper delivered at Gaba National Seminary, 1995, p. 3.

Hariho omuhigo omuhigo gwerigyenda mushongore ekaramu tugurwanise, [there is a hunt, a hunt for education, sharpen your pencils for they are your spears].

And at the end of the morning classes the infants would sing:

Imwe abataregire mukaferwa bingi kuturiba twizire turyabategyeka, [You who do not go to school, you are missing a lot. After we have graduated we shall rule you].⁷⁸

The missionaries knew that the best way to civilise natives was to use education to liberate them from the superstitions and retrogressive customs. This is why Bishop Tucker saw education as serving holistic functions of the church:

If the term "evangelisation" simply implies the base proclamation of the great fundamentals of Christianity and nothing more, then I grant that the communication (between education and evangelism) is not apparent. But if we take the term to mean in its highest - and I can not but think its truest sense that the good news of the gospel has to do with the body, mind and spirit, then the relationship of intellectual and physical training to the great end and object of all missionary effort becomes very apparent...The gospel of Christ is for the whole man. To develop all the physical, mental and spiritual powers in the full stature of a manhood is, or should be, the lowest idea the missionary sets before himself in his world-wide crusade of righteousness.⁷⁹

The Catholic Archbishop Hinsley in the 1920s had an even more radical view in his advice to Catholic priests:

Advance all your projects to the fullest extent, but where it is impossible to carry on both the immediate task of evangelisation and educational work, neglect your churches in order to perfect your schools.⁸⁰

With this background we can then assess the impact of missionary education on the people of Ankole, and how this in turn influenced the local politics thereafter.

⁷⁸ Interview: E. Turihamwe, August 12, 1998, Nyamiko.

⁷⁹ Alfred Tucker, *Eighteen Years in Uganda and East Africa*, vol. 1, London: Edward Arnold, 1908, p. 236.

⁸⁰ John Waliggo, "Education in Uganda", in *The New Vision*, 12 September 1992, p. 16.

As we have pointed out, the CMS missionaries tended to concentrate their efforts at the king's court, which in effect meant that they dealt more with Bahima notables, the king and his chiefs and their children. Their interest was targeting leaders and their goal in education was: to train future leaders of Ankole just as they had done in Buganda. They had established schools like Mengo, Buddo, and Gayaza in Buganda specifically for the education of chiefs' sons and daughters. It was on the same premise that they founded Mbarara High School in Ankole in 1911 to educate the children of Bahima chiefs.⁸¹ The school largely served the interests of the Bahima until the 1950s when the colonial government set up Ntare School. Hence Mbarara High School right from the onset served a dual purpose; to produce Bahima leaders and clerks to the colonial government and secondly to produce leaders who would influence the future generation with Christian ideals. The Revd. S. R. Skeens alluded to this when he wrote:

...Schools...are bonds and discipline is fairly strict and the hope is intertwined that under the good Christian influence, these young nobility of the country may learn the very needful lessons of self denial, self control and self discipline which will be of inestimable value to their future positions of wide spreading influence.⁸²

Schools like Mbarara High School were meant to serve, *inter alia*, as channels through which evangelistic strategies could easily be transmitted from the top to the bottom of the monarchy state structure. The chiefs would be the political agents in the chain of change: hence the need for the CMS to make them its first target for education. Bishop Willis outlined the anticipated benefits:

The chiefs touch the political side of the tribal life. Christian chiefs secure a Christian legislature, and the ultimate settlement of all questions on Christian principles. Even though many years pass before practice

⁸¹ A. Tiberondwa, *Missionary Teachers as Agents of Colonialism*, Lusaka: National Education of Zambia, 1978, p. 57.

⁸² S. R. Skeens, "Impressions of Missionary work in Uganda", in *Uganda Notes*, 1906, Makerere University Library.

corresponds to enactment, it means much that an ideal should have been accepted, and that ideal embodied in formal legislation.⁸³

By the 1940s however, Bairu children had been enrolled thanks to the coffee growing, which had boosted Bairu income. Cotton growing never took off in Ankole, because it is alleged chiefs would roast cottonseeds before they were distributed for planting and the whole scheme flopped.⁸⁴ Whether or not this widespread story is true, it does appear that the Bahima chiefs were not really in support of a cash crop economy because it was drastically revolutionising the economic and social relations of production in favour of the Bairu. It will also be recalled that by the 1930s, the British colonial government had realised the need to encourage peasant crop production rather than migrant labour which the people of Ankole, Kigezi and Rwanda had "exported" to Buganda. The colonialists preferred the cash economy because it provided a better and new form of trade than the cattle economy. That meant therefore that the Bahima traditional cattle monopoly of wealth and power was for the first time being threatened.

The Bairu's newly acquired wealth from cash crops was more transferable into school fees than cattle wealth. Though cattle were a guaranteed source of wealth, the wealth derived from crops was a viable cash income. Bahima were not willing to sell their cattle for fees as Bairu were willing to sell coffee. The former aimed at increasing their herds and persistently resisted offers to sell or kill their cattle. By 1942, we therefore witness increased Bairu enrolment in Mbarara High School of which the Headmaster in his report noted:

In primary V and VI some Bairu boys joined the school and again more in secondary one, often helped by scholarships and bursaries. Nevertheless the top class, secondary III had only ten boys, of whom 3 or 4 came from Buganda and the others were about equally divided between Bairu and Bahima.⁸⁵

⁸³ J. J Willis, *An African Church in Building*, London, 1925, p. 84.

⁸⁴ Interview: Edward Ruranganga, August 7, 1996, Ishaka.

⁸⁵ A. C. Pain, *Mbarara High School*, p. 8.

The Bairu enrolment in School was not only boosted by the cash economy. As the Headmaster's report highlights, the Ankole District Council had started granting bursaries to pupils who had excelled in performance. In 1938, the Ankole Deanery also started providing free education for children of Catechists many of whom were Bairu, after the latter started resigning from church ministry to raise school fees for their children. The Deanery launched a scholarship grant that tremendously helped to encourage Bairu education.⁸⁶

Another factor increased the number of Bairu boys at Mbarara High School. Many more primary schools were founded in 1928 in exclusively Bairu areas at Kabwohe, Bweranyangi, Ruyonza, Ibanda, Kinoni and Kyamate. Mention ought to be made also of Mbaguta's⁸⁷ contribution to the education of Bairu children. For Mbaguta was a liberal Muhima and a keen supporter of CMS work, who went to great pains to pay for Bairu children's fees from his own savings. Unlike many Bahima, Mbaguta did not discriminate against or shun Bairu, perhaps because of his early experiences with the Baganda. His attitude had changed because, as chief of Kabula, where Baganda exiles fled in 1888 (fleeing from religious wars in Buganda), the interaction he had with non-Bahima for a long time had widened his social horizon, making him less parochial. Mbaguta had for instance enlisted some of the exiles into his administration, learnt Kiganda culture and language.⁸⁸ On his first visit to Ankole in 1899, Bishop Tucker described him as "a progressive and his house and his surroundings were after the Baganda pattern".⁸⁹ Mbaguta also forced parents to send their children to school. Because the Bahima needed their sons to look after their cattle herds, which they cherished more than education, they sent their Bairu servant boys instead. Bahima felt they needed no education to look after their cows or to be

⁸⁶ Interview: S. Rwabushaija April 9, 1996, Ruharo.

⁸⁷ He was the Enganzi (Prime minister) of Ankole. Apart from the Omugabe (king), he was, politically, the most powerful man in Ankole from the beginning of the century to the 1940s when he died.

⁸⁸ See for instance, I. I. Steinhart, *Conflict and Collaboration: The Kingdoms of Western Uganda 1890-1907*, Princeton, 1977, p. 150. In fact Mbaguta's generosity had been turned into a joke by the Banyankole, "Kworabe noyenda ebyabusha, oze owa Mbaguta" (if you want free things go to Mbaguta).

⁸⁹ Tucker, op. cit., p. 275.

chiefs because it was their birthright. Mbaguta remained a powerful force until 1945 when he died.

Mbaguta's interest in educating Bairu boys was partly as result of the alienation he had been subjected to by the Bahima. Though a Muhima, he was not from the *Bahinda* clan (the ruling clan among the Bahima). Instead, he belonged to the *Abashambo* clan, which was the ruling clan of the neighbouring Mpororo⁹⁰ (the present day Rukungiri and part of Ntungamo Districts). Being an outsider, he was always a victim of the *Bahinda-Bashambo* strife and rivalry which Martin Doornbos discusses at length.⁹¹ It is likely that these differences and conflicts with the Bahinda chiefs influenced his relations not only with Bairu, but also with the British colonialists and missionaries. As Doornbos observes:

Basically, therefore, the Bahinda-Bashambo strife could be regarded as one, which accelerated processes of colonial formation.⁹²

But also the ethnic divide between the Bahororo pastoralists and the Bakiga agriculturists was not as distinct as that between the Bahima and the Bairu in Ankole.⁹³

In 1934, the Governor of Uganda, Sir Bernard Bourdillon, issued an instruction that "more attention should be paid towards the appointment of chiefs of a higher moral standard as well as more efficiency".⁹⁴ Henceforth, formal education became a major consideration in the selection of chiefs. And in the same year, all the illiterate Bahima chiefs were retired and replaced by Bahima who had acquired some education.⁹⁵ As a result Mbaguta was retired in 1937. Though Bahima insisted that his replacement

⁹⁰ F. Lukyn Williams, "Nuwa Mbaguta, Nganzi of Ankole", *Uganda Journal*, vol. 10, no. 2, 1946, p. 124.

⁹¹ Doornbos, *op. cit.* p. 73.

⁹² *ibid.*

⁹³ P. Mwambutsya, "Colonialism and the Development of peripheral capitalism: A Case Study of Ankole of South Western Uganda", MA Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1987, p. 4.

⁹⁴ Sir Bernard Bourdillon, Governor of the Uganda Protectorate; letter to all Provincial and District Commissioners, Uganda Protectorate, 1 July 1934. Uganda Government Archives, Entebbe.

⁹⁵ See Kasenene Peter, *African traditional Religion and Political Leadership in Ankole*, MA Thesis, Makerere University, 1977, p. 242.

must be Omuhima, no suitable candidate could be found. Williams, the District Commissioner, had stressed that the new Enganzi of Ankole must have attained a certain degree of education either from Mengo, Buddo or Makerere. A compromise candidate, Kamugungunu⁹⁶ was agreed on, but the consequent *Enganzi* from the 1940s were to be all Bairu because they had the necessary qualifications.

Though it was never intended, it was rather ironical that mission schools were among the factors that tilted the Bahima-Bairu relations to the advantage of the latter. The schools were meant for Bahima but since they did not grab the opportunity, they contributed to the demise of their domination. Bairu products of Mbarara High School aspired to professionalism. And since by the 1940s chiefly positions were still dominated by Bahima, many Bairu went into the teaching profession, which widened their social horizons, and they began to aspire for equality and equal representation with the Bahima.

By the 1950s a Bairu elite had emerged with egalitarian ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity which they read about in books and which the religion they had embraced preached. They began to agitate for political representation in the administration for by now the number of educated Bairu had increased beyond that of the Bahima especially when more schools were opened in Bairu concentrated areas such as Ruyonza in Igara county, Kabwohe in Sheema, Ibanda in Ibanda and Kinoni and Kyamate in Rwampara county. Above all, the "Hamitic myth" of European anthropologists (which we discussed in our introduction) had made Bairu students resentful of the hegemony of the Bahima-Bahinda "foreigners". In short by the time of independence, the Bairu had gained the capacity, both economic and intellectual, to overturn the Bahima hegemony.

However missionary education and religion mitigated the Bairu-Bahima tension by introducing another more volatile factor: religious sectarianism.

⁹⁶ It is believed that he was a Tutsi-Munyarwanda whose parents came to Ankole at the end of the 19th Century (see chapter six). Son of Rwakashegu who fled to Buganda after the death of Mutambuka during the succession wars. Rwakashegu was running away from Ntare V. After the death of Ntare V, Mukwenda was installed as king and that is when Kamugungunu returned to Ankole. Kamugungunu's clan was Omukurungu. Apart from holding jobs such as sub-chief, County Chief of Bunyaruguru and Kashari, he succeeded Mbaguta as Kihimba when the later was promoted to Enganzi. Died in 1944.

By independence, the Bairu-Bahima friction had in fact become less "ethnic" and more "religious". Thus the emergence of the Protestant and Catholic conflicts. It is therefore imperative that we also briefly look at the way the work of Catholic missionaries especially through education, contributed to this scenario in Ankole's politics.

If there is any mission group that highly regarded the value of education, it was the Catholics. Their mission was holistic in approach. Bishop Streicher had instructed Fathers Gorju and Varangot upon their arrival in Mbarara:

The first two things you are asked to do after you arrive at Mbarara are: (a) To open a dispensary in order to help the sick and all those who are in need of medicine. (b) To start grouping up children in classes and give them instruction. By so doing, you will show your charity in a practical way, make a good impression on the people and make yourselves known rapidly.⁹⁷

Despite the hostility from the British colonial administration, by the 1920s Catholic schools had attracted many children, because they provided free education. This was also partly because Catholics had concentrated on highly populated Bairu areas like Buhweju, Bunyaruguru, Ibanda and Isingiro, which tended to be polygamous as they needed much labour for cultivation.⁹⁸ By 1925, the Catholic Church had some aid from Italy which helped them to expand their schools and to build High Schools⁹⁹ because Catholic students were not admitted to Mbarara High School, the CMS institution. With this aid, schools like Lugazi in Bunyaruguru, Kitabi in Igara, Kagamba in Kajara and Ibanda were set up. Effort was also made to stop relying on Baganda Catechists. The Bishop preached self-reliance:

You should gradually replace Baganda Catechists by teachers from Nkore. It will inspire confidence to do so...forget Luganda, study the language.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Nyamitanga Archives: Bishop Streicher's instruction to Fathers Gorju and Verangot, 1905.

⁹⁸ Interview: Bonefasi Byanyima, September 6, 1996, Ruti-Mbarara.

⁹⁹ Interview: Bishop Kakubi, May 18, 1996, Kagongo-Ibanda.

¹⁰⁰ Bishop Streicher, *op. cit.*

However, unlike CMS mission education, which was tailored towards the British colonial administration needs for manpower, Catholic Seminary education sought to combine training for secular vocations and priesthood.¹⁰¹ They imparted the virtues of obedience, prayer and hard work, which they regarded as necessary for shaping the individual for priesthood. Seminary education trained Catholics to be disciplined as loyal priests, carpenters, artists and masons. And they are still unequalled today in these skills since the best Technical schools like Kisubi in Buganda and Nyamitanga in Ankole belong exclusively to them. This goal was counter-productive in two ways: first it was a disincentive to many students who wanted to join white-collar jobs in the civil service. Secondly, it "shut out" Catholics from the administration and politics of Ankole for a long time, leaving it a monopoly of the more liberal minded, aggressive and shrewd Protestants who were trained and even told, to be the leaders.

One lasting effect of mission education was the permanent religious polarisation it introduced into the politics of Ankole. This division especially affected the Bairu, who, in addition to their historical stand off with the Bahima, now suffered Catholic-Protestant rivalry and animosity. For the first time in the history of Ankole, religion had divided people who had been one for centuries. They were divided between Bairu Catholics and Bairu Protestants whose future relations were based on religion. In mission schools, seeds of hatred for "the others" were sown. I was told of cases where teachers told their pupils to excel and be cleaner than their counter-parts on the "opposite hill".¹⁰² Catholic pupils were derogatorily referred to as *abarofa*, dirty ones, or *endaho*, castrated bulls because celibate priests taught them! These poisonous seeds of religious hatred still bedevil Ankole. And this hatred translated into political partiality by Bahima Protestant chiefs in the colonial administration who neglected or undermined Catholic efforts. In a long letter to the new Protestant chief of Rwampara, Catholics had once complained:

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¹⁰¹ Interview: Bishop Kakubi.

¹⁰² Interview: Yoramu Gucwamaingi, April 15, 1996, Ruharo, Mbarara.

If we start a school or church, there must be an opposition of the Protestant chief. You will see that this is a custom in this county of Rwampara that a Protestant chief must not permit Catholics to start a school or church in his area and to use all means to prevent them to do so.¹⁰³

In a nutshell, since these schools and churches became the breeding ground for future leaders in Ankole, we see a dangerous sectarian precedent created in Ankole politics with bitter fruits for the Banyankole. When political parties emerged during the run up to independence, they were nurtured in churches and one's political ideology depended on the school and church one had attended.

1.5. ETHNIC DOMINATION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR IDENTITY: THE KUMANYANA MOVEMENT.

Missionary education revolutionised Ankole society. In the post war period, the crumbling of traditional, socio-political structures was a result of the wind of change caused by growing enlightenment and a new cash economy. Traditional relations based on inequality, class and birth rather than merit were being tilted in favour of the Bairu, who began to challenge the Bahima hegemony through what came to be known as the Kumanyana Movement, or getting to know one another.

The Kumanyana movement, which grew at Mbarara High School in the 1940s, was an underground protest by the growing Bairu elite, seeking to redress the ethnic domination of the Bahima over Bairu. It was therefore a movement against social inequality and segregation, championing equal representation in the political establishment. As Doornbos puts it the:

Protest was in principle concerned with redefining the political framework and the changing distribution of power, with enlarging social and economic opportunities and with a search for and assertion of new dignity and social identity.¹⁰⁴

Kumanyana did not arouse any revolutionary fears in the colonial administration because it stuck to its agenda of agitating for Bairu rights. Though its membership

¹⁰³ Welcome speech by Catholics of Rwampara to the new Saza chief E. Cook, 1954.

¹⁰⁴ Martin Doornbos, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

was mainly Bairu Protestants who were graduates of Mbarara High School, it had included some Catholics and a Muslim. Political offices in the Ankole government Kumanyana said were not equitably distributed. For instance in 1946, all the Saza chiefs, except one, were Bahima Protestants as the following table illustrates:¹⁰⁵

Table 1: Saza chiefs in Ankole, 1946.¹⁰⁶

County	Name	Religion	Ethnicity.
Sheema	Y. Mugyenye	Protestant	Muhima
Rwampara	C. Cook	"	"
Kashari	E. Mugooha	"	"
Nyabushozi	K. Mworozzi	"	"
Buhweju	D. Ndibarema	"	"
Ibanda	Y. Mpiira	"	"
Kajara	C. Kafureka	"	"
Isingiro	Y. Ntungwerisho	"	"
Igara	Z. C. K. Mungonya ¹⁰⁷	"	Mwiru

¹⁰⁵ Interviews: Murumba, July 10, 1996, Rurangaranga, August 2, 1996, and Gaharubungo, July 2, 1996.

¹⁰⁶ See Omugabe's File, Kamukuzi archives. As to who was Omuhima or Omwiru, the list was interpreted to me by Anania Murumba at his home Kafunjo, Mbarara, May 4, 1997.

¹⁰⁷ Mungonya of the Abasingo clan was born in 1900 (baptised in 1905) to Rutaba son of Muyaga. During the succession wars between Ntare and Mukwenda, Muyaga, a Mwiru, demonstrated his heroism in support for Ntare. As a result, Muyaga was rewarded with cattle and that is how he came to gain favour with the King. Mungonya's mother was a Munyarwanda. However Mungonya's birth was surrounded with controversy as the question of the legitimate father arose. Two men Kahuha and Rutaba conflicted on the fatherhood of Mungonya. However Mbaguta ruled in favour of Rutaba on the grounds that Mungonya's feet resembled Rutaba's. Afterwards Mungonya's grandmother Merinde brought him to Mbaguta's court from where he gained court tutelage and was later sent to School. At the death of Rutaba, he left all his property to Mungonya. He married Catherine Bujangari, a Munyarwanda, around 1930; she was also brought up by Mbaguta right from her childhood. Jobs; Taught at Buddo after Makerere College; Headmaster of Mbarara High School; Treasurer of Ankole; County Chief Igara and Ibanda; became Enganzi of Ankole in 1953; Minister of Lands in the colonial government; Retired in 1960 and died in August 1981; his wife died in 1982. He also served as the Provincial Head of Laity Church of Uganda. During his service in the colonial government he won the MBE & CBE.

All this was regardless of the fact, that apart from Nyabushozi, which was at the time exclusively Bahima, the rest were Bairu dominated counties. Coupled with this was the failure of the Bahima royalists to accommodate the growing number of Bairu elite. The appointment of Mungonya, a Mwiru, to the highest office of the Enganzi in 1949 for instance, infuriated many monarchists for they regarded it as an insult to *Bagyendamwa*, the royal drum. Bahima students at Mbarara High School who wrote a protest letter to the colonial office supported them.¹⁰⁸

According to tradition, if any Mwiru were to be promoted to that office, it could not have been Mungonya for he belonged to the Abasingo clan whose ancestors were believed to be the cause of the existence of death! At the Omugabe's court, they could only carry out menial work but would never be considered even for the lowest leadership position of *Omukungu*, tribute collector. Yet people like Mungonya no doubt merited the appointment. He was the first Mwiru to graduate from Makerere College in 1936 and had worked in the District Commissioner's Office for four years before being appointed County chief of Igara. The colonial office dismissed the protests and reminded the monarchists of the Ankole Administration 1947 Secretary of States' decree which stressed the importance of appointing educated chiefs in the respective offices.¹⁰⁹ This protest by parochial Bahima to the first appointment of a Mwiru Enganzi fanned the Bairu Kumanyana cause and increased their demand for more representation. Kumanyana marked the beginning of the Bairu revolution against the Bahima hold onto Ankole politics. The movement was reinforced by the 1955 *Uganda Local Government Ordinance*, which provided for the expansion of local administrative units. Hence this gave the Bairu bargaining ground because they were the majority. In the local elections that followed, the Bairu inevitably returned the majority in the Eishengyero, winning 56 out of the 75 seats.¹¹⁰ Once the Bairu had the majority in the Eishengyero, they could easily influence the appointment and transfer of chiefs and other civil servants in the administration and that is why they

¹⁰⁸ Interview: Ezra Kikuri, July 24, 1996, Bushenyi.

¹⁰⁹ Mbarara Archives: The Governor's letter to the Omugabe, 12 March 1948, File Administration, 6/2.

¹¹⁰ Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, May 28, 1996, Ishaka-Bushenyi; see, Mbarara Archives: Minutes of the Eishengyero.

were able to achieve the appointment of Kesi Nganwa¹¹¹ as the second Mwiru Enganzi in 1955 after Mungonya had become minister of Lands in the Central Government.

The Anglican Church was involved in the Kumanyana movement right from the start. Most of Kumanyana members were Bairu educated in the Anglican mission schools. Apart from lay people like Mungonya and Nganwa, there were churchmen like Rev. Eliakim Kamujanduzi (see his biography in chapter two) who was then a Vicar at St. James cathedral Ruharo. The fact that it was the Protestant, not the Roman Catholic Bairu who led the protest is perhaps due to their educational background. The influence of the church therefore was significant: the movement's pioneers were also pioneers of the church schools. Hence the church became the platform for the movement's meetings. Various churches provided venues for local Kumanyana meetings. When the movement started to mobilise people for the election of the councils, it usually did so after church services when the rest of the "un wanted" members of the congregation had gone. Mainly the church provided the moral justification for the movement. Although the membership of priests like Kamujanduzi, Laban Tibekinga and Andereya Rushegye was not officially on behalf of the church, it reflected its support and presence. These were senior pastors who commanded respect among the Bairu. This spiritual element characterised the movement throughout its years of activity.

¹¹¹ Kesi K. Nganwa (his real name was K. K. Muha) originated from Bunyaruguru but lived in Sheema where he was adopted by Kamugungunu. He attended Makerere College, 1933-1935. Jobs; Teacher Mbarara High School, Ibanda and Kabwohe. He was appointed Schools Supervisor in 1952. He became Enganzi in 1955-1961.

CHAPTER TWO

2. THE CHURCH AND POLITICS IN ANKOLE

2.0. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I will discuss the religio-political issues that affected Ankole. I will look at the politics and the church in two sections. One, for the period between 1955-1961, and the other for the period 1962-1970. In the first section I will discuss the Catholic-Protestant relations in the Eishengyero, the emergence of political parties and the creation of the diocese of Ankole. In the second section, I will discuss the UPC split in the post independence Ankole, the collapse of the Ankole monarchy and the church and politics after independence.

2.1. PROTESTANTS AND CATHOLICS IN THE EISHENGYERO POLITICS.

I have argued that the Kumanyana movement had not only boosted the Bairu Protestant's socio-political state, it included and "enlightened" Catholics by making them members. I call this enlightenment because Catholics had been at the bottom of the ethno-social ladder. With a combined force, Bairu became a force to contend with thanks to the Missionary education and the cash crop economy, which boosted their income and catapulted some to the same social status as some Bahima. Thus among the achievements of the Kumanyana movement was the election of two successive Protestant Bairu as the Enganzi of Ankole: Z. C. K. Mungonya (1949) and Kesi Nganwa in 1955.

The election of Nganwa became known as the 1955 Ankole crisis following the 1953 Buganda crisis in which Governor Andrew Cohen deported their Kabaka Muteesa II to Britain. If the Bahima had tolerated the election of Mungonya, they were not prepared to see the election of another Mwiru for the post of Enganzi, which traditionally had been theirs. What saved the situation was the entente between Protestant and Catholic Bairu, which resulted in a political alliance that defused the Bahima agitation. According to the 1949 *African Local Government Ordinance*, the subsequent Enganzi were to be appointed in consultation with the Omugabe, the

incumbent Enganzi and the District Commissioner.¹¹² Apart from the District Commissioner, the rest had divergent interests in the 1955 crisis. The Omugabe backed by Bahima had preferred E. Cook¹¹³, an illiterate Muhima and county chief of Rwampara; but since education had become a factor in the appointments, Nganwa who was then supervisor of the Anglican Native Schools was the obvious candidate. He was elected the Enganzi and a new era in the politics of Ankole began.

Nganwa's tenure of office worsened Catholic-Protestant relations. The year 1955 was not only a crisis because of the Bahima-Bairu antagonism, it became a new crisis between Protestant and Catholic Bairu. The reasons were simple. Both Catholics and Protestants had "hunted the animal and were supposedly to equally share the spoils".¹¹⁴ Instead Nganwa's political action narrowed towards acquiring political positions for the Protestants. Their desire to be rewarded with sinecures was, however, thwarted by two conditions. One was that the tenure of posts held by Bahima was protected by the civil service regulations and therefore they could only be replaced at retirement or some impediment. The other was that Catholics expressed an increasing interest in having a share in the political spoils. They had become a third political force in Ankole. And through the Eishengyero, however few they were, they had been exposed to "modern" political machinations. That is why they had considered it in their interest to support Protestant Bairu in the Nganwa election, thus bringing the first ever joint Bairu alignment against Bahima. They were disenchanted though when they felt that Protestant Bairu had not been "faithful" and were gaining political advantage over Catholics despite their support. Protestants argued that they had borne the brunt of the struggle for Bairu emancipation and had more qualified people to occupy the limited chiefly positions,¹¹⁵ which justified allocating such posts among themselves.¹¹⁶ Political estrangement and greed, especially from the

¹¹² Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, June 19, 1997, Mbarara.

¹¹³ Probably born when Dr. Cook was visiting Ankole.

¹¹⁴ Interview: Bishop John Baptist Kakubi, June 22, 1996, Ibanda.

¹¹⁵ Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, March 20, 1996, Kampala.

¹¹⁶ After 1955, the changes in the religious background of the higher ranks of chiefs are indicated below-based on the Ankole Kingdom government's Establishment Lists which comprise county and sub-county chiefs:

Protestants, undermined the alliance. The choice of Nganwa as the Enganzi would have enhanced ethnic unity among Bairu since he had their combined support. Had Nganwa and his Protestant clique heeded the Catholic plea, it is likely that the Protestant Bahima-Catholic Bairu alliance would not have emerged.

The division between Protestant and Catholic Bairu was underlined by another factor: the election of the Legislative Council (Legco) members in 1958.¹¹⁷ It became the starting point for the Protestant Bahima-Catholic Bairu alliance in Ankole which has remained till today. Until 1957, it was the Protestant-dominated Eishengyero, which elected Ankole's representatives to Legco. To understand the emergence of this new situation, we need to go back to 1953 when on 15 October the Ankole Eishengyero was to elect its Legco representatives. Among the five names proposed¹¹⁸ the first two

	1961	1963	1966
Protestants	50	52	34
Catholics	12	14	9

The 1966 figure includes two catholic county chiefs, as against one in 1963. In Ankole the increase at this level tended to be looked upon as strengthening of the catholic representation in government. But such perception appears to have obscured the apparent decline of the catholic element among the two higher ranks taken together. For Senior officers other than chiefs, the religious distribution during the same interval was roughly as follows:

	1961	1963	1966
Protestants	27	27	27
Catholics	4	4	2

The nature of this table should be kept in mind throughout the decade. It suggests a further weakening of the Catholic component. Generally, data on the religious background of chiefs and other senior officers in the Ankole administration up till 1966 continued to show a considerable over representation of Protestants. If this data is an insufficient basis to conclude that an actual regression took place in the proportion of posts held by Catholics, they nonetheless warrant the deduction that little change was initiated since 1955 to modify their under-representation in official positions. (I owe this data to Martin Doornbos, 1978, *Not All the King's men Inequality as a political Instrument in Ankole, Uganda*, The Hague: Mouton Publishers, p.216.

¹¹⁷ The Eishengyero came as a result of the post war British policy in Uganda, when the colonial administration issued the 1949 *African Local Government Ordinance*, which directed that councils be the base for local government and thus be formed from *Miruka* level to the District level. In Ankole, the local councils came to be known as *Enkiiko z'Engabo*, (Peoples Councils) and the kingdom council was *Eishengyero* (Kingdom Parliament). Cf. See Minutes of the first Eishengyero meeting of July 1952, Mbarara Archives.

¹¹⁸ C. B. Katiiti, Z. C. K. Mungonya, E. S. Kapa, A. G. Katate and A. B. Mutashwera. Interview: Rwetsiba, March 21, 1998, Kampala.

were Bairu, Kapa¹¹⁹ was a Munyarwanda, Mutashwera, Omuhima and apart from Katate who was a Mwiru Catholic, the rest were all Protestant. The Protestant-dominated Eishengyero nominated C. B. Katiiti to Legco and Mungonya until 1955 when he was appointed Minister of Land Tenure in the Central Government. In 1955, Ankole was to have two representatives. Despite the Catholic efforts to send Katate to the Legco, they were once again thwarted and instead E. S. Kapa, a Munyarwanda-Muhima¹²⁰ Protestant, was sent to represent Ankole East as Katiiti represented Ankole West.¹²¹

In 1957, the Central government gave districts and kingdoms the option of choosing their representatives either by nomination in their Councils as before or through direct elections. Catholics preferred the latter method as a chance to secure a Catholic majority. The Protestants afraid of the Catholic majority¹²² preferred to nominate Legco members directly since it would ensure their control of the results. Since it was the Councils to decide which method to use in the elections, "it gave Protestants an advantage to decide which method would favour them."¹²³ Consequently the Eishengyero sessions between 29-31 October 1957 were characterised by a tug of war which method to use. On 29 October, after a debate that lasted for an hour and twenty minutes, the issue was put to the vote. 51 members voted for the "present method" while 35 voted for the "Direct elections".¹²⁴ The Catholic leader, Bazilio Bataringaya, and those who opposed the Eishengyero resolution against direct elections walked out in protest.¹²⁵

¹¹⁹ Kapa was the Son of Kitende who came running away from the King of Rwanda and sought refuge in Ankole. They however found favour with the Omugabe Kahaya who gave him cows and settled him in Ankole. Education; Mbarara High School. Jobs; Treasurer to the Eishengyero; Became Gombolola chief but was retired after Independence due to heavy drinking. Married to the daughter of Canon Buningwire.

¹²⁰ Though he came from Rwanda, he had been assimilated as Muhima.

¹²¹ Interview: William Rwetsiba.

¹²² According to the 1959 Census, the Roman Catholics outnumbered the Protestants in Ankole, being 170.000 to 160.000 respectively, Cf. Stenning, "Salvation in Ankole", p. 261.

¹²³ Interview: Boniface Byanyima, July 19, 1997, Ruti-Mbarara.

¹²⁴ Mbarara Archives: Eishengyero File, minute 43/57, on direct elections, 29-31 October 1957.

¹²⁵ The following walked out: B. K. Bataringaya, who was the leader of the group, a school teacher and a Catholic. He had lost to Katiiti in the Eishengyero election of Ankole's representative to Legco in 1955. Later he became the President of the Democratic Party, DP, District branch in Ankole, Speaker of the Eishengyero in 1960-63, became the opposition leader after Independence, and a Minister in both DP and UPC governments.

The composition of the opposition to the Eishengyero resolution revealed a new factor. It was not only Bairu Catholics who protested but they were joined and supported by Bahima Protestants. That day marked the beginning of the Bahima Protestant-Catholic Bairu alliance in Ankole. It became a historical event because for the first time an organised opposition in the Eishengyero boycotted its proceedings. In a way the Bahima-Catholic alliance reveals how shrewd Protestant Bahima were at grasping any opportunity to divide the Bairu. For all the period Bahima dominated the political scene in Ankole, they had neglected Catholics. Actually the first time for Bahima to mix with Catholic Bairu was in the 1950s when the Eishengyero was expanded by direct elections which brought in Bairu as sub-county representatives. Otherwise they had hardly met; they did not attend the same schools or churches. Since by 1957, Bahima were under pressure from the combined effort of Bairu, they were looking for any cracks among the Bairu in which Bahima could wedge their axe to crack down their solidarity. Bahima were increasingly vexed at the emerging Bairu power. And as the Bahima saying goes, *Omuguha gukoma Omwiru n'omwiru mugyenzi we*, (Bairu are easily manipulated against their fellow Bairu by Bahima), Bahima found the desired opportunity in the Legco controversy. Despite the fact that previously a Protestant Munyarwanda-Muhima, Kapa, had been favoured against a Catholic, Katate, Catholics welcomed the alliance because:

What we were after was a force that could enforce us to defeat Protestants. We knew we did not have much in common with Bahima as they had with the Protestant Bairu for example, but to have Bahima on our side was a great advantage.¹²⁶

Apart from the fact that Catholics had opposed election by council, they protested because not all the members of the Eishengyero had been summoned to attend the proceedings in which the "method" to use was to be debated. Out of the 91 Eishengyero members at the time, 24 members mostly from Bunyaruguru, a Catholic dominated county, were excluded. It seems that the Chairman of the Eishengyero, who was at the same time the Enganzi, did not summon them because, since they

¹²⁶ Interview: Pulitazio Rwabushongo, May 10, 1996, Omunsikye-Nyamitanga.

were mainly Catholics, they would swell the opposition vote. The Kamukuzi Archives are full of letters from Bunyaruguru Eishengyero members complaining to the chairman why they were never invited. One such letter came from P. Ikazire reads:

As a member of the Eishengyero I am very sorry to see that you did not invite me to attend the District Council. Did you do it on purpose or not? It is a pity to see that the Eishengyero rejected direct elections.¹²⁷

Other letters came from P. Kamugasha, M. Bitarakwate and Kanyamaishwa, which the Enganzi denied. The Enganzi replied, with a copy of the letter to the Saza chief of Bunyaruguru and the District Commissioner:

Ref: NOTICES FOR THE EISHENGYERO SESSION ON 29.10.57.

I refer to your letter on the above subject and wish to inform you that there was no any intention whatsoever for refusing to send you notices to attend the Eishengyero meetings as you are alleging. Honestly notices were sent to you in good time. I noticed however that they were delayed in Kitunzi's office (Saza chief of Bunyaruguru). I had already written to him on this subject, and I was informed that they were sent to you as soon as they were found but rather late.¹²⁸

The controversy lay in the fact that the County chief of Bunyaruguru, instead of replying to the Enganzi, wrote to all parties affected and copied the letter to the Enganzi and the District Commissioner. He rejected claims that any letters to the effect were sent to his office and wondered why the Enganzi had not actually summoned Bunyaruguru representatives. He retorted:

Checking in the dispatch box, in which all letters received are entered, I did not find any of these notices, not even one calling the acting Saza chief to attend this meeting, there I proved that you were not called.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ Mbarara Archives: County Chiefs File, letter from P. Ikazire to Enganzi.

¹²⁸ *ibid.*: letter from Enganzi to Bunyaruguru members of the Eishengyero.

¹²⁹ *ibid.*: letter from Saza Chief Bunyaruguru to the members.

On 31 October the “opposition” appealed in vain to the Minister of Local Government in Entebbe protesting against the Eishengyero’s decision on the grounds that:

1. 8 out of the 10 Saza chiefs plus one Minister supported direct elections.
2. There was no member from Bunyaruguru County except the Saza chief
3. The chairman did not give ample time to the Councillors to debate the motion. He closed the debate when most people still wanted to talk on it
4. The General Purpose Committee supported direct elections
5. Most Banyankole supported direct elections¹³⁰

Interestingly part of that struggle was the involvement of Catholic women as a political pressure group, the first ever in the history of Ankole. On 16 December 1957, Catholic women wrote a memorandum to the Omugabe protesting against the Eishengyero’s decision to block universal suffrage, which would have given them a chance to vote. They wrote:

We, your people present to you here below our suffering, sorrow and grief. We are like a herd of cattle wandering about during the dry season devoid of pasture and water and in such a period they have nothing to do but simply to look at the herdsmen... Your people outside are cursing. They want to elect their own representatives to the Legco. This is really terrible, it is really horrible... as you are the head of all people in Ankole, we have every hope that you will do whatever you can in order that we may have direct election in Ankole in 1958 because that is what most of your people are after.¹³¹

Despite the cow imagery which they were sure would draw the Omugabe’s sympathy especially in a “dry season”, the Omugabe could not respond to their appeal because by then the Bairu, through the Eishengyero, had weakened his position. He could only rubber-stamp what the Eishengyero passed. However the Catholics’ agitation produced results. The Eishengyero redressed the issue and consequently debated “the method” again on 16 January 1958. It was put to vote and Protestants won with a majority of 50 and 38 against.¹³² In the next session, two Protestants, C. B. Katiiti and W. W. Rwetsiba were elected to the Legco for 1958. They were Omwiru and

¹³⁰ *ibid*: letter to the Minister of Local Government.

¹³¹ *ibid*: letter from Miss C. Bonabana to the Omugabe.

Omuhima respectively.¹³³ Rwetsiba was replacing Kapa a Munyarwanda-Muhima¹³⁴ who had died the previous year.

2.2. POLITICAL PARTIES IN ANKOLE.

Parties in Uganda started as far back as 1952 when the Uganda National Congress, UNC, was formed under the leadership of Ignatious K. Musazi. UNC had actually started in the late 1940s as a movement to mobilise farmers in Buganda to encourage them into the productive sector, which had been monopolised by the Indians.¹³⁵ Apart from its predominately Baganda leadership, it was largely a Protestant party reflecting the colonial legacy and the Baganda religio-political establishment. In similar circumstances, the Democratic Party, DP, was formed in 1954 with an exclusive Catholic Baganda executive to counteract the Baganda Protestant establishment at Mengo.¹³⁶ It was a power protest and discontent against Mengo's denial of the appointment of Mattias Mugwanya, a Catholic, and Katikiro of Buganda. So, DP in Buganda started as a party to fight for Catholic interests as Prof. Karugire agrees:

The fact that should surprise us is not that DP was overwhelmingly Catholic in inception and following but it took so long to be formed since the genuine grievances of the Catholics were of long standing over the whole Protectorate.¹³⁷

In 1958, the Uganda People's Union (UPU) party was formed. Its founders were prominent district representatives in Legco.¹³⁸ It was formed as a non-Baganda party

¹³² Eishengyero File: Minutes, 16-17 January 1958.

¹³³ Interview: W. W. Rwetsiba, March 16, 1998.

¹³⁴ Bahima and Banyarwanda are ethnically related.

¹³⁵ Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, March 15, 1998.

¹³⁶ Mengo was the Headquarters of the Kabaka, king of Buganda. Because of the British colonial legacy, the monarchy was Protestant.

¹³⁷ Cf. R. S. Karugire, 1980, *A Political History of Uganda*, Nairobi: Heinemann Educational Books, (Chapter five).

¹³⁸ They were: W. W. Rwetsiba, C. B. Katiiti (Protestants-Ankole), W. W. Nadiope, M. M. Ngobi (Protestant & Muslim-Busoga), G. B. K. Magezi (Protestant-Bunyoro), J. K. Babiha (Catholic-Toro), C. J. Obwangor (Catholic-Teso), Y. B. Mungoma (Protestant-Bugisu) and A. Bazanyamaso (Protestant-Kigezi), interview: Edward Rurangaranga.

to oppose Buganda's political demands of a *special status* based on the 1900 Agreement in an Independent Uganda. According to W. W. Rwetsiba who became UPU's president in 1958:

We formed it because we wanted a party that would unite and lead Ugandans to Independence. We had realised the divisions that were in the UNC, which was largely tribalistic. In order to confront the Baganda monopoly in UNC, we formed a representative party that embraced many tribes and all religions.¹³⁹

However, though UNC was largely a Baganda party, by 1957 it had spread beyond Buganda borders and had gained some following especially in the northern and eastern regions of Uganda. That was how people like Milton Obote from Lango district came to be attracted to it. As a party, which championed *Africanisation*, it attracted Obote especially because he had been in Kenya and participated in the Unions' agitation for workers rights in the colonial government.¹⁴⁰ UNC never gained much influence in Ankole mainly because Banyankole leaders like Katiiti, Rwetsiba, who were members of Legco, and Mungonya, a Minister in the Central government, had not embraced it. Banyankole in the fifties were trying to restrict the Baganda sub-imperialism and therefore any party that was Baganda led was unlikely to have much impact. According to Rurangaranga, the only Banyankole who subscribed to UNC were

Chiefs who had been dismissed from their jobs and therefore were redundant such as Christopher Kafureka (county chief of Sheema) who disobeyed Omugabe, Clement Ryangombe, a former Gombolola chief and a certain Kakuru. So as you can see they were not credible people to entice a following.¹⁴¹

In addition the Catholic Church was hostile to UNC even before the dawn of DP in Ankole because:

¹³⁹ Interview: W. W. Rwetsiba, March 28, 1998, Kampala.

¹⁴⁰ *ibid.*

¹⁴¹ Interview: Edward Rurangaranga.

We suspected it to have some communistic links and to us Catholics that was unacceptable. Though the Catholic Bishop was cautious about our involvement in politics, he on several occasions warned us Priests to be on the guard against the penetration of Communism which at the time was no other than UNC.¹⁴²

Due to the UNC's failure to integrate tribally and religiously, it split in 1958 into two wings; the Musazi wing which was mainly Baganda and the Obote wing. In 1959, the Obote wing merged with UPU and formed the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) with William Rwetsiba as its first President. This merger was intended to neutralise Buganda, which had till then refused to integrate itself in the new emerging Uganda.¹⁴³ In addition to UNC's tribal conservatism, Musazi himself was not a shrewd politician, unlike Obote, and therefore could not provide the type of leadership the emerging nationalists were looking for. He was not a member of the Legco and therefore could not speak about legislative issues.¹⁴⁴ In 1960, Rwetsiba was appointed Parliamentary Secretary because the colonial government needed experienced officers to prepare them for independence. Subsequently he relinquished the party Presidency to Milton Obote. Rwetsiba remained as the chairman, National Council of UPC. The merging of UPU and UNC had in a way cut across ethnic, tribal and religious divisions but as Doornbos rightly says:

Their membership was too small and their leadership was too impermanent to be able to attract any particular significance to this fact.¹⁴⁵

It was against this background that parties were introduced in Ankole, DP in 1956 and UPC in 1960. Since DP in Buganda had started as a disenchanting, marginalised group, it found a fertile ground in Ankole. Since Rubaga (Catholic National Headquarters) had direct links with the party, DP was able to use the Catholic Church's network of communications. Thus Catholics saw DP as their party, although

¹⁴² Interview: Bishop John Kakubi, April 2, 1997, Ibanda. By then he was a priest.

¹⁴³ Interview: Rwetsiba, March 28, 1998, Kampala.

¹⁴⁴ Musazi could not be nominated in the Legco because Buganda nominated its members through its Lukiiko cf. Edward Rurangaranga.

¹⁴⁵ Martin Doornbos, 1978, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

in Ankole after 1960 Protestant Bahima were joining it as a protest against Bairu Protestants.¹⁴⁶

Mainly former UPU members, Rwetsiba, Katiiti and Mungonya, all Protestant Legco representatives introduced UPC in Ankole. It is not surprising therefore that at its inception, UPC became largely Protestant since Catholics had already joined DP *en masse*. Secondly UPC in Ankole attracted the Protestant elite, many of whom were teachers and former Kumanyana movement leaders. Indeed UPC in Ankole took over the Kumanyana organisational framework and its characteristics. Both parties UPC and DP entered Ankole's political arena using a Christian denominational affiliation to attract membership.¹⁴⁷ As Welbourn put it:

In so far as the counter-charge could be made, that the UPC was Protestant, it was true probably only in the sense that, having dubbed the DP Catholics, the UPC became by definition anti Catholic and therefore (in the negative sense which has so long characterised the religious and political differences of Uganda) Protestant.¹⁴⁸

But Bishop Kakubi challenged this view:

It was true as far as Welbourn was referring to UPC nationally. While the UPC national executive comprised of prominent Catholics mainly from the North and Northeast, the Ankole case was different. The two religious groups had fallen out of each other even before the introduction of parties. That is why Protestant Bairu in Ankole did not actually join DP despite the fact that it was the only party [in Ankole] between 1957 and 1960.

At the time when UPC was introduced in Ankole, another development had taken place. Due to the pressure from Catholic DP, Ankole Eishengyero had for the first time allowed direct elections in which various sub-counties were to elect representatives to the Eishengyero. The 1960 elections were very important for both parties because they would forecast the performance of each party in the 1961 Self-Government elections. The campaigns for the 1960 Eishengyero elections were

¹⁴⁶ Interview: Bonefasi Byanyima, April 2, 1997, Ruti-Mbarara.

¹⁴⁷ Interview: Sezi Busasi, one of the pioneer members of UPC in Ankole, July 12, 1997, Nkokonjeru.

consequently characterised by counter accusations and confrontations as each party tried to justify itself. The campaigns according to their coverage in the local newspapers did not really have any policy on which they based their local manifestos but like the British in the comedy "Yes Minister", they spent most of the time "rubbishing the French"! Various parties promised religious toleration, an indication that the religious question was a big issue at the time. Catholics were worried about Communism, with which they identified the UPC. And Muslims¹⁴⁹ too were anxious for the future of Islam in an independent Ankole.¹⁵⁰

The Bahima vote was touted and canvassed for by various parties for two reasons. Bahima generally were experienced politicians. Secondly their vote would definitely swell a party's results. That is what gave DP the confidence. Bahima alliance was strengthened in the Democratic Party because they were worried about the progressive Bairu Protestants whom they believed were working towards abolishing the Ankole monarchy and Bahima power.¹⁵¹ DP, though it was opposed to the Protestant Mengo establishment in Buganda, (of which the Kabaka was part) in Ankole, played "double politics" and presented itself as the champion and supporter of the monarchy. Any party that came to Ankole on that ticket was likely to attract Bahima. And as Kikuri said:

DP was allying with Bahima claiming to support Obugabe (monarchy). They were not really supporting it since in Buganda where DP hailed from, it started as a party opposed to the monarchy. So Bairu

¹⁴⁸ See F. B. Welbourn, *Religion and Politics in Uganda, 1949-1962*, Nairobi, 1965, p. 21.

¹⁴⁹ The religious factor seems to have been more pronounced in Christian denominations. Muslims were mainly spectators, waiting to cast their vote for whichever side would promise a better business atmosphere. Most of my informants were not sure on which side Muslims voted. It was the first direct elections in Ankole and campaigns had taken too short a time to take note of "scattered Muslims who were on the whole not interested in politics". I do not really think it was lack of interest in politics other than the feeling that they were not as strongly represented as the Christian denominations. Though there were some few Muslims who had contested the Eishengyero elections, it was what Sheikh Kaduyu called *okushendekyereza abandi*, a waste of time. It was later in the 1962 elections, as we shall discuss later, that Muslims participated actively and caused a great difference. But here we can say that the Muslim floating vote was divided according to the individual interest in either party.

¹⁵⁰ See *Ageteraine* of 9 January 1960.

¹⁵¹ See Uganda Government, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Ankole District Council and District Administration, mimeo, 1969.

Catholics only wooed Bahima as a political tactic to defeat Bairu Protestants whom at the time had been very opposed to the monarchy.¹⁵²

With this alliance DP won the first direct Eishengyero elections in 1960 and formed the Ankole Local Government.¹⁵³ As Catholics had demanded before, direct elections became the means through which they were able to break the Protestant monopoly in the Eishengyero. DP embarked on the programme of “catholicisation” and demanded the installation of a Catholic Enganzi. But they could not remove Nganwa, since that post had since 1955 been under the Appointments Board. However, DP won the National elections in 1961 and Bataringaya, the DP leader in Ankole, became the minister of Local Government in the Central Government. His first reform was to give Councils and the Eishengyero power to choose their own Enganzi.¹⁵⁴ Hence, on 28 August 1961, the Eishengyero with a Catholic majority elected John Kabaireho as the first Catholic Enganzi:

Table 2, Religious composition in the Eishengyero, 1960-1962.¹⁵⁵

<u>Religion</u>	<u>U P C</u>			<u>D P</u>			
	<u>C</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>HP</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>BP</u>
<u>1960 Eishengyero</u>	1	56	3	59	5	1	-
<u>1963 Eishengyero</u>	2	48	5	46	6	4	-
<u>1961 N. Assembly</u>	-	5	1	4	2	-	-
<u>1962 N. Assembly</u>	-	5	4	4	2	-	-

¹⁵² Interview: Ezra Kikuri, March 15, 1998, Ishaka.

¹⁵³ Interview: Francis Butagira, July 19, 1996, Mbarara.

¹⁵⁴ See, legal notice, no. 169 of 1961, amendment in the District Council’s procedure of 1955.

¹⁵⁵ See Peter Kasenene, *op. cit.*, p. 148. C- Catholics, P- Protestants, M- Muslims, HP Bahima Protestants, BP, Protestant Bairu.

2.2.1. PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 1961 & 1962.

At national level, Uganda was preparing for the Self-Government for which parties had been formed.¹⁵⁶ The first national elections were held in 1961. DP won and formed the Government with Benedicto Kiwanuka, a Catholic, as the Chief Minister and leader of Government in Parliament.¹⁵⁷

In Ankole, DP also won the national Assembly elections. Why? First, was the time factor. DP in Ankole was still on its honeymoon after winning the 1960 local elections. The period was too short for UPC to reorganise. DP had been in Ankole as far back as 1957, which was an advantage. UPC came to Ankole in 1960 just less than a year before the National Assembly elections. DP was seen as a Catholic party, with the support of the Catholic Church which through its local newspaper *Ageteraine* became its mouthpiece. And according to Dr. Tiberondwa,

there could have been some Protestants who could have voted DP because they had not discovered its strategy. This was so in rural areas where people had not been politicised enough or even reached because UPC had just been introduced in Ankole. In addition, political baptisms had not yet been as effective as they later became in 1962. It is likely that "pagans" as they called them could have voted DP since they were mostly in rural areas. And of course DP had Bahima on their side.¹⁵⁸

Table 3 illustrates this:

¹⁵⁶ See Low, Karugire, and Tiberondwa.

¹⁵⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, May 22, 1997, Kampala.

Table 3, Successful candidates, constituencies and ethnic composition in 1961.¹⁵⁹

NAME	CONSTITUENCY	RELIGION	PARTY	ETHNICITY
Byanyima	Nyabushozi/Kashari	Protestant	DP	Muhima
Kangaho	Ntungamo/Rubare	Protestant	DP	Muhima
Bataringaya	Buhweju/Bunyaruguru	Catholic	DP	Mwiru
Kareba	Isingiro	Catholic	DP	Mwiru
Katiiti	Igara/Sheema	Protestant	UPC	Mwiru
Ibingira	Kajara/Ruhinda	Protestant	UPC	Muhima

However, the tide changed in 1962. UPC was able to win nationally because of its alliance with a Protestant Baganda Kabaka Yekka party (KY) in order to defeat DP. The strategy was that Buganda would nominate its representatives directly from the Lukiiko (council) which guaranteed the UPC-KY alliance 21 seats even before the elections.¹⁶⁰ Interestingly the go-between for this alliance was Grace Ibingira, a Muhima, whose choice had both political and religious implications. Apart from his shrewdness as a politician, he was a member of the Ankole royal family and Protestant. In the eyes of the Kabaka therefore, Ibingira was received as a well-intentioned aristocrat. Yet apart from their desire to defeat DP and perhaps both being Protestants, UPC and KY did not really have anything else in common. In October 1961, Obote's progressive UPC wedded with the traditionalist conservative KY. In the April 1962 elections, the coalition edged DP out of the race with these seats: UPC 37, KY 21 and DP 24.¹⁶¹ This alliance demoralised the Catholic DP nationally. In Ankole, there were other reasons why DP was defeated. UPC was boosted by that psychological assurance that it was going to win nationally with the KY-UPC

¹⁵⁹ Note that Ibanda county is not included. I did not manage to find information about who the candidate was then.

¹⁶⁰ Interview: Rwetsiba, March 12, 1998, Kampala.

¹⁶¹ See Leys Colin, *Politicians and Policies: An Essay on Politics in Acholi, Uganda 1962-65*. East African Publishing House, 1967, p. 6.

alliance. By 1962 UPC had spread all over Ankole especially when the Anglican Church offered active support, as we shall see later. It had:

Woken up to the fact that it was a race against religions. DP victory had woken up the Protestant hierarchies to the possibility that once Catholics were in power, they would introduce reforms, as they did, which would suffocate Protestants thereby altering a system of conducting public affairs that had existed unperturbed for many years.¹⁶²

The contribution of Muslims was important for UPC. After the KY-UPC alliance, Muslims led by Prince Badru Kakunguru “converted” *en masse* to UPC. Muslims had had a closer relationship with Protestant Bairu than with Catholics. Despite their radicalism, Protestant Bairu tended to be liberal and tolerant to Muslims. As we argued in Chapter one, most prominent Muslims in the country like Abu Mayanja had passed through Protestant schools. And as one anonymous Sheikh said:

Catholics did not like Muslims. One time I took one of my brothers to ask for a vacancy in a Catholic school but when they found out that I was a Muslim, they refused. But Protestants would not mind whether we were Muslims or not. Catholics emphasised religion and wanted to convert everybody. But Protestants emphasised politics and administration.

Another Muslim reported that Catholics could not allow Muslims to cross through their church compounds with their caps on. This was not the official Catholic stand and could have been an isolated incident, nonetheless, it counted against them. The fact that Catholics generally liked drinking did not attract Muslims to them. By 1962, Muslims had a UPC candidate, Abasi Balinda, who made it to parliament. It is also generally held that UPC rigged elections in some places especially by gerrymandering constituencies. As Tiberondwa said:

UPC/KY alliance had a hand in the selection of the electoral commissioners. In a way the Protestant conditions towards independence were conducive. And the demarcations of constituencies tended to favour UPC.¹⁶³

¹⁶² Interview with John Bikangaga, June 6, 1996, Makindye.

¹⁶³ Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, May 22, 1997, Kampala.

One of the results of DP's victory in 1961 is that there was a purge of Protestant chiefs but they had not been entirely eliminated since they had dominated the civil service. So when the 1962 elections were due, these chiefs influenced the electorate as Returning Officers. And as Kikuri, then UPC, said:

UPC somehow rigged elections. You see by then, Residing Officers were Protestants and were in charge of the elections. Around that time, some Protestant chiefs were still in office.¹⁶⁴

Even then DP did not perform badly. Indeed it won more seats in Ankole than UPC. DP returned four MPs against three for UPC. Rwetsiba confirmed that DP won because of the Protestant Bahima votes. For instance Rwetsiba lost to Byanyima in Kashari/Nyabushozi constituency though both candidates were Bahima Protestants competing in Bahima dominated counties. Rwetsiba says:

I lost because of the Catholic-Bahima alliance. Bahima could not vote for me despite being the son of Canon Buningwire the first clergyman in Ankole. The Omugabe had become DP and so Bahima looked up to him than people like us. Secondly Bahima could not vote me in UPC because there were people like Bananuka and Nganwa in UPC who represented Bairu emancipation and which Bahima did not like at the time.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁴ Interview: Ezra Kikuri, July 25, 1996, Bushenyi.

¹⁶⁵ Interview: W. Rwetsiba, March 12, 1998, Kampala.

Table 4: Successful candidates in 1962 elections.

NAME	CONSTITUENCY	RELIGION	PARTY	ETHNICITY
Byanyima	Nyabushozi/Kashari	Protestant	DP	Muhima
Kangaho	Ntungamo/Rushenyi	Protestant	DP	Muhima
Bataringaya	Bunyaruguru/Buhweju	Catholic	DP	Mwiru
Kangwamu	Ibanda	Catholic	DP	Mwiru
Ibingira	Kajara/Ruhinda	Protestant	UPC	Muhima
Katiiti	Igara/Sheema	Protestant	UPC	Mwiru
Balinda	Isingiro	Muslim	UPC	Mwiru

UPC did not attract Bahima votes even if some influential Bahima such as Ibingira and Rwetsiba were among its leaders. Despite past efforts by Bairu to block Bahima, it was interesting that a substantial number of leaders in both the Ankole DP and UPC in the 1960s were Bahima. In 1962 as we have seen in the table above, Bahima obtained nearly half of the Ankole seats in the National Assembly, thus controlling three of the seven elective constituencies (UPC 1, DP 2), and enjoyed an influence in each party's executive. Actually there was a popular opinion among Bairu that Bahima deliberately stirred up Catholics and Protestants, DP and UPC rivalries, to keep Bairu divided, and then distributed themselves over the two parties, to control both, and therefore assert their political influence once again.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁶ See Doornbos, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

2.3. THE CREATION OF THE ANGLICAN DIOCESE OF ANKOLE.

In 1957 another important development took place in the life of the church in Ankole. A new diocese, comprising of Ankole and Kigezi was created from the Rwenzori diocese. The creation of a diocese was timely because in the circumstances that ensued, Christians needed a figure like a Bishop for guidance in the uncertain political storms of the kingdom although this was not the reason why the Ankole diocese was created. By 1950s the church in Uganda, especially in the western region, had grown because of the influence of the Revival movement (see chapter three). Through Revival, many people were converted and became active members of Church of Uganda. Also many people, especially Bairu, had offered themselves for church work. Thus as far manpower was concerned, the church in those two regions was well covered.¹⁶⁷ The only obstacle, however, was that many of the Bairu who had joined church ministry lacked formal education and were not eligible for election as bishop.

The diocese was asked to nominate two names to the Bishop of Uganda.¹⁶⁸ This became a point of contention between CMS missionaries, Christians and the clergy. Canon Bawtree, the Archdeacon for Ankole, and other missionaries preferred Eric Sabiiti, a highly educated Muhima and the pioneer member of the Revival movement. The majority of Christian representatives and the pastors of Ankole and Kigezi turned down Sabiiti in favour of Kosiya Shalita, a Munyarwanda.

Eric Sabiiti was the first Munyankole to graduate from Makerere in 1926. A brother of Ernest Katungi (the last Muhima Enganzi of Ankole), Sabiiti was by 1956 the only Munyankole senior priest with western education. Ordained in 1933, he served as a Curate at Ruharo (1933-38), as a Parish priest at Kinoni (1939-50) and as the Rural Dean at Bweranyangi (1951-57). In addition, Sabiiti was a key figure in the spread of the Revival movement which he had joined in 1936. If the office of Bishop required such qualifications, then Sabiiti was the man. Despite his qualifications, which would have guaranteed him a decent job in the civil service, he preferred to

¹⁶⁷ Interview: Canon Rwabushaija, May 29, 1996, Ruharo.

¹⁶⁸ Interview: Canon Blasio Itima, May 7, 1996, Nshongi-Sheema.

serve God in a lowly and humble capacity as a rural priest in Ankole. When I asked why he did not take up government jobs when offered, his wife said:

He was always haunted and challenged by a voice asking him what he had done for the Lord. When he was at Buddo as a student, there were three inscriptions on their chapel windows: one had the picture of the martyrs, another of Jesus and another of Apollo Kivebulaya, on which were written, "I did this for you, what did you do for me". These words continued haunting him throughout his career until later when he decided to respond to that voice and join church ministry.¹⁶⁹

Despite such sacrificial obedience to God's voice and his career as the pioneer of educated clergy in the Church of Uganda, Sabiiti's nomination was turned down by the diocesan electoral college. Most interviewees emphasised ethnicity as one of the leading reasons why he was not considered. The Electoral College felt that, being a Muhima, he would not advance the socio-political, ethnic equality between Bahima and Bairu at a time when divisions were sharp.¹⁷⁰ There were other unjustified accusations against him. In the 1940s he and his brother Katungi (then the Enganzi) supported only Bahima advancement in the local government. It is further alleged by Bairu that he discriminated against them in favour of Bahima in education. For instance, as one anonymous interviewee said, Sabiiti advised:

The late Kosiya Korutaro, who was the best student in Ankole Primary Leaving exams and had qualified to go to Buddo, to go to Nyakasura for the vernacular teachers course. Instead a Muhima, Kirindi, took Korutaro's place at Buddo. Such a record could not allow Sabiiti to become a bishop in Ankole.¹⁷¹

It is also alleged that Sabiiti discouraged the growing of cash crops like coffee since 'they did not take people to heaven'. Coffee was the main cash crop for the Bairu. It was taken that Sabiiti's preaching was trying to discourage coffee growing in order to reduce Bairu's economic progress. The zeal with which he preached against cash crops was not proportional to the way he preached against the rearing of cows which was a Bahima occupation. Consequently some Banyankole saw Revival as a

¹⁶⁹ Interview: Gerladine Sabiiti, July 11, 1996, Kinoni.

¹⁷⁰ Interview: Kirindi, March 11, 1998, Mbarara

diabolical movement being used to perpetuate conditions of inequality among the people. While some were encouraged to own property, others were being told to invest in heaven. Many Bairu held this negative opinion about Sabiiti. For instance Joseph Bekunda said:

While Bahima owned property, they advised others not to. They preached against coffee for it would not take anyone to heaven. Yet on the other side they preached about good stewardship and good management of cows.¹⁷²

Although a popular Bairu response, it was perhaps unfair to Sabiiti. By 1940s when Sabiiti is said to have colluded with fellow Bahima, there were fewer Bahima converts to Revival than Bairu. It is true those who shaped Revival and gave it organisational leadership were Bahima like Sabiiti and Mugimba, but these were few. Assuming the accusation that Sabiiti discouraged economic activity to be true, it could have been out of the enthusiasm of faith, which characterised that period. People like Sabiiti and Mugimba on various occasions turned down chiefly privilege as worldly.¹⁷³ Canon Semei Rwabushaija gives an objective analysis of that period:

It was a time of heresy (*obuhabe*) which almost eroded the movement. Like in the Early church when Christians sold their belongings, many Revivalists in Ankole cut and uprooted their coffee plantations, sold cows on the assumption that their home was in heaven. It was called being on the highest. It was borne by both Bahima and Bairu Revivalists. The difference was only that there were many more Bairu in the movement than there were Bahima so the impact could easily be felt among them.¹⁷⁴

What might be true therefore was that Sabiiti was rejected in Ankole because of his "*rulokolism*"¹⁷⁵ (Puritanism). It was not Bairu only who rejected Sabiiti: even Bahima like Canon Buningwire, a senior priest in Ankole and a member of the Electoral College, did not support him. Though Revival had indeed influenced many people in

¹⁷¹ Interview anonymous, May 19, 1996.

¹⁷² Interview: Joseph Bekunda, September 12, 1996, Ibanda.

¹⁷³ Interview: Gerladine Sabiiti. See the chapter on Revival.

¹⁷⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ A hybrid anglicised term deriving from Balokole. Interview: Mukaira August 2, 1996, Bushenyi.

Ankole, the senior clergy both African and missionaries had kept aloof from it and often held its followers as heretics. Quite apart from these, it is unlikely that the Electoral College of 'unsaved people' like Mungonya, Nganwa, Katiiti, Bananuka, and Revd. Kamujanduzi and Canon Buningwire¹⁷⁶ would have preferred a "saved" bishop. Mrs Sabiiti confirmed this as true:

There was a group of people including Buningwire, which preferred Shalita to us because Buningwire did not believe that saved people should lead the church. He really detested open confession, which Balokole stressed.¹⁷⁷

Instead the Electoral College nominated Kosiya Shalita as the first Bishop of Ankole/Kigezi. Though he was born and brought up in Ankole, he was indeed a Munyarwanda. His parents came to Ankole from Rwanda in search of grazing lands just before Shalita was born in 1903. He later went to Mbarara High School (1918-1920) and Buddo (1921-23) where he studied and made friends with Eric Sabiiti. From Buddo, he went to teach at Kigezi High School (1921-25) after which he pioneered a mission station at Gahini in Rwanda his country of origin. After he was ordained together with Sabiiti in 1933, he went for pioneer work in Burundi and opened a mission station at Matana in 1935. Until 1957, when Shalita was nominated Bishop, his church ministry oscillated between Rwanda and Burundi.¹⁷⁸ Shalita was preferred to Sabiiti because:

At the time we wanted a leader who would hold us together. So we chose Shalita though a Munyarwanda because he was neither Omuhima nor Omwiru. Even if he had grown up and studied in Ankole, he spent most of his service years outside Ankole and therefore had not been influenced by our divisions. We wanted some one who would be a bridge between Bairu and Bahima.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ Source: Canon Rwabushajja and Mzee Murumba.

¹⁷⁷ Interview: Gerladine Sabiiti, July 11, 1996. Even if Buningwire, Omuhima would have preferred Sabiiti, which he did not, he could not influence his nomination because influence needed a majority, which he lacked in the Electoral College.

¹⁷⁸ Shalita's biography read at his funeral.

¹⁷⁹ Interview: Anania Murumba, April 14, 1996, Kafunjo-Mbarara.

In Shalita, Banyankole saw a non-aligned person. The diocese consisted of the two districts of Ankole and Kigezi, and though Shalita did not belong to either, he had been brought up in Ankole and worked in Kigezi. So he was not only a “bridge” between Bairu and Bahima in Ankole, but also between Ankole and Kigezi. But Banyankole’s expectations of Shalita were not met. The period between 1957 and 1969 when he retired, Bishop Shalita faced one of the hardest times in his ministry. I shall discuss this in the next sections but what I can say now is that he fell victim to Ankole politics. He was entangled in the Bairu-Bahima wrangles that had begun long before but were reinforced with the political developments.

2.4. THE UPC SPLIT: ENKOMBA VS. OMUFUNGURO.

Even though UPC had won the 1962 National Assembly elections, DP in Ankole still controlled the Eishengyero until 1963. In February 1963 UPC won the Local Government elections and controlled the Eishengyero until January 1971. Since DP had previously bent the law to suit its political agenda (see p. 54), UPC used the same law of simple majority to remove the Catholic Enganzi John Kabaireho in favour of the Protestant one. By constitution the chairman of the prevailing political party would automatically be the Enganzi. In this case it would have meant Grace Ibingira, the UPC chairman, a Muhima, would be the Enganzi. But he could not because he was already a minister in the Central government.¹⁸⁰ Bananuka, Vice chairman of UPC, would have been the alternative candidate for the office but he was thought to be too radical against Catholics and Bahima. Protestant Bairu were aware of the DP majority which had been strengthened by the Bahima vote. In order to win Bahima back, UPC needed a moderate person other than Bananuka. Even then, according to Tiberondwa, Bananuka won marginally in the Eishengyero elections and should have become the Enganzi. But his nomination was manipulated by Grace Ibingira, then Minister of Justice and UPC Secretary General. According to Dr. Tiberondwa who was then UPC secretary Ankole:

¹⁸⁰ Interview: Ezra Kikuri, July 25, 1996, Bushenyi. I was told that there was a law-limiting officials to one office. But I could not get any archival information about it since most of the files were

We voted for Bananuka but Grace Ibingira who was Secretary General of UPC and Omuhima, and who would have liked to have a softer UPC, supported Kahigiriza. Later there was a political move. Instead of announcing Bananuka, Grace Ibingira announced on the radio that Kahigiriza was elected unopposed because those who had elected Bananuka had withdrawn their nomination. But that was not so. Ibingira simply put it on the air well knowing that it would send out signals, which he himself would not have been brave enough to say.¹⁸¹

Difficult to grasp though, there were reasons for Ibingira's intervention. However committed to UPC Ibingira may have been, he was still a Muhima. Rather than give power to the radical Bananuka, Ibingira preferred to associate with moderate Bairu like James Kahigiriza who would not pose a challenge to the Bahima. Secondly as early as 1963, UPC had already had internal wrangles. Ibingira had opposed John Kakonge for the post of Secretary General and Bananuka is believed to have supported Kakonge. Because the divisions at the top of the party permeated into Ankole politics, it was unlikely that Ibingira would support Bananuka. Also, it seems that Ibingira's support for Kahigiriza was a reward for the support Kahigiriza had given him over the years. According to Kahigiriza:

We were friends. I was the one who put Ibingira in politics. When Rwetsiba became Parliamentary Secretary, Mungonya and I supported Ibingira against Bataringaya for Legco in 1960. As we were coming towards independence, I saw him as a tool not only in the politics of Ankole but also Uganda because he was educated. Secondly when he returned from UK in 1959 where he studied law, I was one of those who convinced him into UPC. We hastened to take him on our side because we did not want Omugabe to influence him into DP.¹⁸²

Even if the majority of Protestants had preferred Bananuka, they accepted Kahigiriza, then County chief of Nyabushozi, as a compromise. He was preferred because of his ability to accommodate other ethnic groups, an attitude that could have resulted from the fact that as a county chief he had worked in various places including Nyabushozi. His background also contributed. His ancestors came from Buganda¹⁸³ and that

destroyed during the war.

¹⁸¹ Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, July 24, 1996, Kampala.

¹⁸² Interview: James Kahigiriza, May 22, 1996, Kyamugorani.

¹⁸³ *ibid.*

distanced him in the ethnic wars and possibly made him moderate towards other ethnic groups. The election of Kahigiriza as Enganzi of Ankole in 1963 marked the beginning of the Omufunguro-Enkomba, (moderate vs. conservative) controversy. Whereas it had been Catholics vs. Protestants or Bairu vs. Bahima, after 1963, it was divisions among the UPC Protestants.

As a consolation Bananuka was appointed minister of Health and Works in the Ankole government.¹⁸⁴ Since the ministry enabled Bananuka to travel extensively, he used the opportunity to stir up feeling against Kahigiriza all over Ankole. As early as 1964, the opposition to Kahigiriza accused him of "selling" UPC to the DP and Bahima. According to Kahigiriza, the only true accusation was that he had refused to reshuffle or demote Catholic and Bahima chiefs who still held political and civil offices in Ankole:

When I became Enganzi, my hope was to unite Ankole and one could not do so unless one compromised in one way or another. The extent, at which divisions in Ankole were, to heal them, it had to be a matter of give and take, which the Bananuka group could not accept. I refused to discriminate against Bahima and Catholics and these raised sentiments from some UPC circles that did not want others to join them. For instance I made Kasapuri, a Catholic, a county chief and reinstated 400 sub-parish chiefs who had been dismissed because they were Catholic DP.¹⁸⁵

It was his inclusiveness that infuriated UPC intransigents as one of them said:

Yes Kahigiriza was accommodative and tolerant, but he was doing it at the expense of UPC. He brought in DP and allowed them to have equal opportunities with UPC, which they did not do to UPC when they were in power.¹⁸⁶

It seems ironical that UPC was satisfied with its exclusive membership, after it had championed the struggle for equality and Bairu emancipation and later been opposed to political inclusiveness. The Kahigiriza-Bananuka saga climaxed when in 1965

¹⁸⁴ The local government in kingdom areas differed from other districts. Where they had kings, those councils were allowed to have ministers mainly for their local social-economic development.

¹⁸⁵ Interview: James Kahigiriza, July 18, 1996, Kyamugorani.

¹⁸⁶ Interview: anonymous, July 12, 1996.

Kahigiriza transferred Bananuka from Works and Health to Finance. With his increasing campaigns against the Enganzi, his leadership was at stake, so he transferred Bananuka to give him a less popular role, *okumwiha omubantu*. Kahigiriza confirmed that:

As a minister of Health and Works, it gave him more access to the people and therefore chances to decampaign me all over the kingdom. He used to disclose important secrets and at one time he almost staged a strike against me. So I made him minister of Finance to limit him.¹⁸⁷

The two factions had intra-government coalitions, with frequent secret meetings and separate cliques being built up by each group. They were not really based on any constructive ideology. The Enkomba group (radicals) tended to be the Kumanyana strand whose radicalism was inherited from their struggle against the Bahima oligarchy. That is why they had opposed accommodating alternative ideologies.¹⁸⁸ The Omufunguro (moderates) ethnic liberalism may have been because many of them were new entrants who had not participated in the past ethnic confrontations. There was nothing spectacular about their associations in UPC or other factions except that they were drawn together by political interests. But the Enkomba faction was different: not only were they opposed to DP and Bahima, many of them had been schoolmates either at Mbarara High School or in Teacher Training Colleges. The Enkomba were members of the Anglican Church and opinion leaders in their respective counties. While UPC Enkomba recommended non-accommodation, the Omufunguro maintained that times had changed. Omufunguro represented the UPC dual perspective towards the Ankole monarchy and the Omugabe and, whether or not the party should woo the support of the politically influential Protestant Bahima and Bairu who had joined DP. Although Bahima were a minority, they still wielded considerable political influence through people like Rwetsiba, Ibingira, Byanyima and Bahima county chiefs like Rwakanuma and Rutehenda. That was why Omufunguro

¹⁸⁷ Interview: Kahigiriza.

¹⁸⁸ They included people like E. Laki, N. Bananuka, P. Kaseeta, A. Rubashoka, B. Ntundubaire, W. Muguta, E. Rurangaranga, A. Tiberondwa, Katundu, Katagira, Kweyamba, Makaru, Mutembeya, K. Korutaro and Rev. Kamujanduzi. The Omufunguro included people like Kahigiriza, Ezra Kikuri, Makaru, Mukaira, Kacooni and DPs who had been converted to UPC.

maintained that co-operation and understanding between various factions in Ankole was necessary and possible.

Bananuka's transfer to Finance did not solve the problem and in 1965, he was dismissed for "undermining the government". Bananuka's dismissal was seen as a grand plan to eliminate the Enkomba, which further alienated them from the Kahigiriza group. The former had the upper hand because they were not only strong political characters, they also had a strong relationship with the church. They dominated church councils and formed a big number on the Diocesan synod. That is why they could easily influence Protestants.

Since Protestants had been divided along those fissures, the period 1966-1967 was spent in the struggle to gain majority in the Eishengyero to gain future votes, hoping that it was going to determine the choice of the electorate. Such competition had a double effect. There was an opposition within UPC which forgot about the real opposition DP. But there was no longer any formidable DP opposition in the Eishengyero since it was already weakened by "floor crossings" in Obote's move to weaken Buganda and to establish a one party system in Uganda. In 1964 most DPs in Ankole had crossed with Bataringaya, not because they were convinced about UPC policies, but because they had been silenced as Bukabeba observed:

After UPC had become the only party, many people converted to it without necessarily having the good will to serve the party. This was mainly because they had been denied any other political platform. So the original UPCs called themselves enkomba and the liberals omufunguro as if it was a creed. But on the whole, it was an attempt to accommodate alternative thinking.¹⁸⁹

Both groups began to take a softer stand towards DP and Bahima who they tried to entice to join their groups in UPC. The strength of the two factions in the Eishengyero was increasingly becoming 50-50 with about 21 elected members on either side until the change of administration after the new republican constitution of 1967.

However, in 1967, the political wind changed in favour of Bananuka. The new republican constitution, which was adopted after the abolition of kingdoms in

¹⁸⁹ Interview: Emmy Bukabeba, June 17, 1996, Kakyeka.

Uganda, stipulated that only directly elected members would qualify for leadership in their respective District administrations.¹⁹⁰ This eliminated James Kahigiriza as Enganzi since he had been specially elected at the time of his appointment. He had not been a member of the Eishengyero, though he had been a county chief. Bananuka, who seemed to have had Obote's support, was elected as the Secretary-General (a post which replaced the Enganzi title) of Ankole District. Unfortunately for Kahigiriza, Ibingira and other five ministers had been arrested in 1965 on suspicion of a coup against the government. It was not really a coup but they had supported a motion of no confidence against Obote after the gold scandal in which he together with Colonel Idi Amin and Felix Onama had been implicated.¹⁹¹

2.5. THE COLLAPSE OF THE ANKOLE MONARCHY.

The events of 1966 in Buganda changed the political face of Uganda. The clash between government forces and the Buganda government resulted in the storming of the Lubiri (palace) under the command of Idi Amin and the subsequent escape and exile of Kabaka Muteesa. From 1966, Buganda some of whose ministers had already been imprisoned in 1965 endured the state of emergency until 1971. The abolition of Buganda's monarchy led to the abolition of the kingdoms of Toro, Bunyoro and Ankole.

The monarchy in Ankole was abolished on 8 September 1967 after the ratification by parliament of the 1967 constitution, which made Uganda a republic under article 118 (1) of the 1967 constitution, which read thus:

The institution of king or Ruler of a kingdom or constitutional head of a district, by whatever name called, existing immediately before the commencement of this constitution under the law then in force, is hereby abolished.

¹⁹⁰ Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, April 15, 1997, Mbarara.

¹⁹¹ See M. G. Carter, "Uganda's New Constitution", *East African Journal*, vol. III, no. 4, pp. 23-32.

This meant that all kingdoms lost the federal and semi-federal status, enjoyed since the dawn of colonialism. According to James Kahigiriza who was at the time the Enganzi of Ankole, “we received a phone call from the head office about the abolition of the kingdom and that was it.” Whatever symbolised the monarchy was immediately removed or changed; office labels, headed paper, and any titles that related to the monarchy were discarded. From 8 September 1967, Ankole ceased to be a kingdom. The Omugabe was given a month to vacate the palace.¹⁹² And according to Martin Doornbos:

When at the end of September 1967, the Ankole’s royal drum, *Bagyendanawa* [sic], was unceremoniously loaded onto a lorry to be taken to storage in government warehouse, the last major visible attribute of Ankole kingship was officially consigned to oblivion.¹⁹³

The speed with which monarchical symbols were removed from Ankole should not surprise us. Since the 1950s, the Bairu were fighting for emancipation and, as long as the monarchy existed, they still felt that they were under the Bahima oligarchy. Actually one interviewee confessed:

We removed them so fast because the independence of Bairu did not start on 9 October 1962 when Uganda attained its independence from the British. It started on 8 September 1967 when Milton Obote abolished the monarchy.¹⁹⁴

The “speed” signified the atmosphere at the time. Throughout the sixties, the Eishengyero had been under Bairu domination, which was why they were quick to respond to the government’s call and were brave enough to load *Bagyendanwa* on the lorry to the museum. By 1967, the UPC Enkomba were preparing to come into office and hastened to obey government instructions. It was mainly the Enkomba that was working towards the abolition of the monarchy, thus the 1967 pronouncement was a

¹⁹² *ibid.*

¹⁹³ Doornbos, *op. cit.*, p. 157

¹⁹⁴ Interview: anonymous, June 11, 1997.

dream come true. This therefore answers Doornbos' surprise why there were no emotional clash of values when the monarchy was abolished. He wonders:

After all, few things are more powerfully symbolic of corporate existence.... Kingship has been often the object of deeply affective values and in many instances has played a crucial role in shaping common political identities. Removing this capstone from a political structure might as well leave an emotional vacuum not easily filled by alternative secular symbols. On the surface, the abolition of Ankole's kingship might have seemed just another illustration of these conditions.¹⁹⁵

Whereas Doornbos' observation could have been true for the Buganda monarchy, it was hardly true because the Ankole monarchy had not "played a crucial role in shaping common political identities". The Ankole monarchy had been exclusive. That was why Bairu did not mind replacing the monarchy symbols:

The monarchy symbols had never been our own. We had never identified with them. The monarchy culture was quite different from the Bairu culture and that is why Bairu did not feel orphaned at all when the royal drum was sent to the museum.¹⁹⁶

Despite the claim that Bairu got their independence then, the abolition of kingship did not necessarily attract much excitement.¹⁹⁷ The indifference was symbolic of the fact that by 1960, the Omugabe had lost his powers to the Eishengyero and the central government, and had become a figurehead. Banyankole were no longer concerned with taking the king's tribute, *okutoija*, as they were to paying government tax. With UPC as their platform, many Bairu questioned the monarchy's usefulness

as far as monetary terms were concerned. The money, which was always set aside for the upkeep of the royal family, was wasteful expenditure. The Omugabe, apart from being a ceremonial figure, was not developmental at all.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵ Doornbos op. cit., p. 158.

¹⁹⁶ The interviewee wishes to remain anonymous, April 14, 1996.

¹⁹⁷ See *The People and Uganda Argus*, June through September, 1967.

¹⁹⁸ Interview: Jackson Byamugisha, teacher, April 12, 1997, Bujaga.

On the other hand Bahima's silence was not a sign of indifference or surrender other than retreat. They had lost their symbol. They would have liked to demonstrate against the action, as the Baganda, but their numbers were too few. Baganda had managed an active resistance against Obote because they were not only centrally located, they were also the biggest single tribal group in the country. The abolition of the monarchy was a political act and any resistance would have resulted in political consequences as Obote had done to the Baganda. Even the circles close to the king responded with similar restraint. The ministers and officials of the kingdom were concerned about the loss of their offices and privileges they had enjoyed, but that was all. As Kahigiriza said:

However much I hated the abolition of the monarchy, I expected it to happen any time since the sixties. I was therefore thankful that it had persisted thus far.

For the Omugabe, 'if the government and the people have found it right that I should go, then I will. All that I am anxiously waiting for is an instruction from the government on what to do next.'¹⁹⁹ Those differing opinions from various groups indicate that the monarchy had become too weak to be of any significance. For the Bairu, kingship was a symbol of the "Egyptian days" (slavery). Despite the Omugabe's repeated claims that all Banyankole were equally his subjects,²⁰⁰ actual inequalities persisted. The irony is that while Gasyonga was talking of *omuguha gw'enyabushatu*, it was actually in his reign that Bairu were increasingly alienated. Both Bairu and liberal Bahima like Murumba and Mrs Sabiiti agreed:

¹⁹⁹ See *The People*, 17 June 1967

²⁰⁰ For example, after the visit to Rwanda, the Omugabe expressed the unity he expected of the Banyankole thus, "In Rwanda there are three types of people, namely Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa. They work together in co-operation and...their motto is *omuguha gw'enyabushatu*, (a rope with three strands) representing these classes of people in Rwanda. You will agree with me that no country should expect progress if there is lack of co-operation and disunity. Division and hatred engineered by subversive elements in a country exhibit a gloomy picture and their ends are fatal. I should like you to be *omuguha gw'enyabushatu*. That is when we shall achieve Ankole's will as a nation". See the speech by Rubambansi the Omugabe at the opening ceremony of the Eishengyero of Ankole, 17 January 1956.

Since Gasyonga had become king at a relatively young age, his advisors had *akarwara k'obuhima*, (racism). Such people like Kirindi, Kabazaire, Mutembeya and Katungi, had built a wall against the Bairu and that is when the gulf between the two groups widened. Yet the king was supposed to be for all people.²⁰¹

So in Ankole, it was mainly Bahima who regretted the end of kingship. However weak it had become, it was still their symbol politically speaking. It symbolised and legitimised their unity and identity. This was not an illusion: the retention of the monarchy till 1967 had a positive impact for them. Though the king had outlived his usefulness, he was still able to give Bahima a unified leadership which enabled them to think politically and make constructive alliances by which they were able to maintain the majority of candidates in both parties.

This leads us to the role of the church over the monarchy. The issue was challenging for both Churches, Catholic and Protestant. They had Bairu congregations opposed to the monarchy and Bahima who were for it. It was easier for the Catholics because Bahima were not part of their congregations. Apart from their alliance in DP, the monarchy had been a symbol of Catholic retrogression since the Omugabe never appointed them to any chiefly positions. Their silence could therefore be construed as approval.

The Protestant Church as an institution did not come out openly to challenge the monarchy, but individual Protestants helped its fall. By 1967, the Bairu leaders who were working for UPC dominated the Protestant Church. Since most UPC councillors were on Church councils and Synod representatives, we can say that the church was involved. One of the reasons Bishop Shalita was hated by the Protestant Bairu in Ankole was the fact that he identified himself with the monarchy and forgot about those who elected him. On one of his confirmation tours, at Kyeizoba parish in 1968, the Bishop asked why people did not react when the monarchy was abolished.

²⁰¹ Interviewed at various dates.

A Christian, Nyamwiragura, responded that ‘we had waited for the people of Mbarara to start so that we could join them.’²⁰² The people of Mbarara referred to being the Bishop.

2.6. CHURCH AND POLITICS AT INDEPENDENCE.

The involvement of the Church in active politics began with the arrival of parties. It is true that religious antagonism between Catholics and Protestants had existed before but it was limited to the Eishengyero. Even here the Churches had not been involved as institutions in any active way. The Catholic Bishop being French was always “cautious of antagonising the British establishment” and the Anglican Church was still under CMS leadership until 1957.²⁰³ However, with the creation of the new diocese of Ankole/Kigezi and the consecration of Bishop Shalita, things changed. The new Anglican diocese was created at a time when parties were descending on Ankole, dividing people along religious lines. Bishop Shalita’s first challenge as Bishop was how to relate to such new forces of which he had no past experience, and how to shepherd a divided church where Protestant Bahima and Bairu Protestants had diverged in politics, despite belonging to the same church.

I will concentrate on the Anglican Church because after Independence and the consequent defeat of DP, the Catholic Church kept a low profile in a rather hostile Protestant UPC-dominated regime and concentrated its efforts on self-reliance and survival.²⁰⁴

One of the reasons Shalita had been preferred was that he would be a “bridge” bishop. That in itself was a challenge: how to bridge two ethnic groups which were increasingly torn apart by political divisions. Inevitably Bishop Shalita became a victim of an identity crisis. What Bairu had not considered in preferring Shalita to Sabiiti was that Batutsi Banyarwanda and Bahima are “cousins”. They are not only united in physical characteristics, they are all pastoralists whose symbol of identity is

²⁰² Interview: Canon Lazaro Njunwoha, May 26, 1996, Bujaga.

²⁰³ Interview: Bishop Amos Betungura, July 2, 1996, Ruharo.

²⁰⁴ Interview: Bishop John Kakubi, July 17, 1997. The officer in charge of the archives for reasons

cows. So was Shalita going to promote Bairu interests, with which he had nothing in common, against his Bahima "cousins" who at the time were being driven against a political "cliff"? The first test according to Canon Njunwoha came in 1960 when Bairu and Bahima elders met at the Bishop's house for an evening visit:

After a while the visit turned into a Bairu-Bahima parliament with our host, the Bishop, looking on uncertain of what to say. We started abusing each other in front of the bishop bringing back historical scores. The late Gunura asserted that Buningwire, a Muhima, had said that even if ten Bairu acquired education, one Muhima would rule them. Others referred to the previous period during Mbarara High School days when Bahima boys used to pierce Bairu boys with forks.²⁰⁵

That was an indication of what was to characterise Shalita's term of office. When DP won the Eishengyero elections in 1960, Shalita invited both UPC and DP Protestant councillors (UPC Protestant Bairu and DP Protestant Bahima) who had been successful in the elections for a thanksgiving service at Ruharo cathedral. This was interpreted as the Bishop's siding with DP and marked the beginning of the Protestant Bairu UPC opposition to the Bishop. Things went wrong even at that very service in the cathedral by a prayer led by Rev. Kashinya, one of the pioneer Bairu Protestants famously nicknamed *Rurangira Rwa Bweranyangi*, the thunderous voice of Bweranyangi. To show disgust for the Bishop's invitation of DP Bahima councillors, Kashinya prayed:

Ai Ruhanga okubatizibwa kwaitu, nokutebwaho kwaitu, nenyikiriza nibimwe. Kwonka mbwenu reeba nabakuru abukutwebembeire bayambuka baza seri. Kwonka iwe Ruhanga totsigaho abashobirwe. Obunaku obu Musa yaza aha Rushozi akastigaho aba Isirairi, okataho Aroni yarinda abantu bawe. Mbwenu otuhereze Aroni omubunaku obutusigirweho (Oh God, our baptism, confirmation and creed is one. But unfortunately even our leaders [Shalita] who should be guiding us [politically] have crossed to the other side [DP]. But you never abandon the helpless. Just as you provided Aaron to take care of your people after Moses had gone to the mountain, we pray that you provide us with Aaron to take care of us).²⁰⁶

known to him, denied me access to Nyamitanga archives.

²⁰⁵ Interview: Canon Lazaro Njunwoha.

²⁰⁶ Both Tiberondwa and Rurangaranga repeated this prayer to me at different times. The wording altered a bit but there was a general agreement on most of the words.

Because Rev. Kashinya was an elder in Ankole (due to his office and age) his prayer was symbolically interpreted as Bairu being orphaned because a Protestant Bishop had identified with a Catholic DP victory by including Protestant Bahima DP councillors in the thanksgiving service. From then onwards most senior Protestant clergy openly supported UPC as a Protestant party fighting for the Bairu cause.

When Shalita had been consecrated Bishop in 1957, the Omugabe nominated him key advisor together with Canon Buningwire. For the Anglican Bishop to be the Omugabe's right hand, was probably right at the time. Whatever Shalita's political implications might have been, the fact that the Omugabe nominated him as his advisor was enough for Shalita to be identified with DP which the Omugabe was. The Omugabe and Canon Buningwire were indeed DP because when DP Catholics walked out of the Eishengyero in 1958, Canon Buningwire and all the Omugabe's special nominees in the Eishengyero walked out with them. For Shalita to be nominated Omugabe's advisor was anathema to the Bairu. At worst it indicated that the Bishop was no longer "a bridge".

Another incident was in 1962 after the UPC victory. In the Synod, which sat at Bishop Stuart Teachers College, the Bishop, in his charge, congratulated all those who had won the election and made it to parliament. Among them was Bonefasi Byanyima, a Protestant Muhima, who had won the DP seat for Nyabushozi and Kashari constituency. The Synod criticised the Bishop for congratulating Byanyima because he was DP.²⁰⁷ Rev. Kamujanduzi, who likened DP to a certain bird, *rukunga* (that shouts in the wilderness but is never seen) diverted the probable attack against the Bishop. He said DP was like that bird and time would come when DP will be no more. The synod clapped and the session, which had been stalled for a whole morning resumed its agenda in the afternoon. In a way the Bishop had a pastoral obligation to congratulate the candidates including Byanyima who was not only a Protestant, but also the cathedral organist. But in a Synod that had become the Protestant UPC party at prayer, the Bishop was misunderstood. Actually nearly all the UPC councillors in the Eishengyero and National Assembly, apart from Balinda, a Muslim, were members of the Ankole Diocesan Synod. So whenever the Synod was in session there

was not much difference from being in the Eishengyero except that the DP members were missing:

Just as they represented various sub-counties in the Eishengyero, they represented their parishes in the Synod. They were the elite of the time and by all means people elected them. Despite being die-hard politicians, they were keen Christians. They had all passed through missionary schools where Sunday attendance was compulsory. They were also able and eloquent people in all ways, which the church needed too. They happened to be the same people playing both games.²⁰⁸

Shalita was also opposed to “mass baptisms” which had been popularised by politicians because they increased votes. In their desire to compete, DP and UPC politicians turned church pulpits into political rostrums. As Francis Bwengye said:

It made it very easy to mobilise people from inside. The church people are the nearest group one can go to and organise very quickly and they respond. Secondly because they come from different areas, they would transmit the message to other people. The church was the most effective way of publicity.²⁰⁹

The reason UPC had advanced for its poor performance in both the 1960 Eishengyero and the 1961 national elections was that the Catholic Church, unlike the Church of Uganda had supported its politicians. UPC politicians, who were often heads of Laity in their respective parishes, were determined to use the Church in the same way. This marked the beginning of what came to be known as the period of “mass baptism” in both Catholic²¹⁰ and Protestant churches. It was an effort to increase votes especially from the unbaptised people referred to as *abakafiri*, “pagans”.²¹¹ According to Rev. Katikuzi, UPC politicians, led by Katiiti and Nganwa,²¹² held a rally in Kabwohe,

²⁰⁷ Interview: Canon Rwabushaija who was in that very Synod.

²⁰⁸ Interview: Yowasi Makaru, March 19, 1998, at his home Butsiho.

²⁰⁹ Interview: Francis Bwengye, May 22, 1997, Kampala.

²¹⁰ I am concentrating on the Anglican Church because on the whole Catholics were unwilling to give me detailed information on this issue. However there is evidence that they too were involved because when UPC won in 1962, it is said that a catholic priest lamented, “Nkabatiza n’abakrisatayo babatiza mbwenu bansinga”, we all baptised but we have been defeated.

²¹¹ A missionary expression of people without second names preferably-English names like Hebblethwaite which meaning I do not even know!

²¹² See *Busesire* local newspaper, 8th April 1962, Ruharo cathedral Vestry.

Sheema, which was well attended by priests, lay readers, Protestant chiefs, teachers and other notable people in the area.²¹³ Apart from emphasising the obvious: that parties were the road to development and leadership in independent Uganda, they also repeated the reasons why DP had defeated them in the previous elections. Unless the Anglican priests demonstrated their support for UPC as Catholic priests had done for DP, they were likely to lose again.²¹⁴

In response to the politicians' challenge, the meeting resolved that they should return and tell their church members that UPC was indeed their party and they should support it. And in order to raise the Protestant membership in Ankole, they resolved to try and convert many more people who still followed traditional religions.²¹⁵ The strategy was that the rural Deans and Parish priests were to cut short the period of catechism, so that many more people could be baptised. According to Kikuri others were simply baptised with no instruction:

There was a move to convert people into the church by baptising them without teaching them. Formerly out of wedlock children were not baptised, but during that period everybody was baptised to increase the number of Protestants so that they could defeat DP. So did the Catholics. Even second wives were baptised and there was no testing them. You see there were many pagans in those days and therefore to win them on your side was more advantageous. Of course that later added on the numbers of the churches and from that time what we used to call "pagans"-people without second names disappeared.²¹⁶

The chiefs used their influence in "religio-political evangelism." By June 1962, this conversion plan was already in operation all over the district. Working together with priests and other lay leaders, chiefs prompted "pagan families" into baptism. Their target was heads of families who would influence the rest of the family. In some cases the more zealous chiefs exerted a compulsion by either "starving" the hesitant economically or denying them common justice: refusing them permits to take their

²¹³ *Busesire*, 16th April 1962.

²¹⁴ *ibid.*

²¹⁵ In the 1959 census the number of traditionalist adherents in Ankole was 460,000. See, Stenning, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

²¹⁶ Interview: Ezra Kikuri, March 13, 1997, Ishaka.

livestock to public markets or to intervene on their behalf in case of a dispute. The strategy worked. People started flocking to the churches for baptism. For example in Sheema, in one month, (March 1962) Rev. Laban Tibekinga baptised 896 people at Kabwohe parish church.²¹⁷ In the following months, Rev. F. Begumisa baptised 769 people in Rubare-Kajara, while at the same time Rev. S. Katikuzi baptised 1000 people in Ibanda, a Catholic stronghold.²¹⁸ The numerical increase determined an increased party membership:

People baptised by a particular denomination meant that they would vote for that particular party. Secondly those coming for instruction had previously taken 12 months because they needed to be taught how to read and write. But in 1962 numbers mattered because they determined power.²¹⁹

While mass baptisms meant that church numbers grew, it created a situation where people simply became church goers without having the commitment or faith in the religion in which they were baptised:

Such baptisms had effects on the church. They strengthened UPC and DP for those baptised became automatically party members. Secondly by 1970 there was no longer what we used to call *abakafire*, pagans. Sadly people only acquired a name but did not necessarily grasp the essentials of Christianity as those who had been instructed before. This could be partly the reason the Protestant Church members are always swayed by whichever religions that come.²²⁰

Had it not been for the Revival movement which rekindled their faith and challenged them into a second commitment, it is likely that the church in Ankole would have declined after the party excitement had cooled down. One of the effects of mass baptisms was that the Bishop was presented with half-baked catechumens for confirmation whom he would reject if they failed to answer the simple biblical and doctrinal questions such as the Lord's Prayer, the Creed and the Ten Commandments. However genuine the Bishop was, this was interpreted as opposing UPC. As protest

²¹⁷ See *Ekyababatize* (Baptism register book for Kabwohe parish, 1962, Kabwohe Parish office.

²¹⁸ Interview: Rev. Katikuzi, July 31, 1996, Kyagaju-Kabwohe. See also Baptism Register at Ibanda Archdeaconary Office.

²¹⁹ Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, July 12, 1996, Ishaka.

against the Bishop's action, in 1963-64, he was denied entry on his annual visit to churches like Kabwohe, Masheruka and Kitunga. People told him bluntly to go to Nyamitanga, the Catholic headquarters, where his heart was. For instance at Kabwohe, when the Bishop arrived, there were no people to meet him except a few brave ones who after telling him why they had closed the church, left.²²¹

Such was the atmosphere in which Bishop Shalita worked. Priests who supported him were isolated and branded DP. Rev. Rwabihaiga who was alleged to be the bishop's supporter was refused entry at Kitunga parish where he had been posted in 1964. Instead parishioners ordered the lorry driver to return him to the bishop and preferred Canon Kakuma a known UPC supporter. The situation did not improve even after UPC had won the elections. It was aggravated by the fact that the Bishop became antagonistic to Rev. Kamujanduzi who the Bairu had nicknamed, *Rutigita mugara rw'Ankole*, (the strong lion of Ankole) and *Ishenkuru Abairu*, (the grandfather of Bairu). The conflict originated in Kamujanduzi's political involvement and active participation in mass baptism, which the Bishop opposed. It seems also that Kamujanduzi as *Ishenkuru Abairu* ignored the Bishop and often overrode his decisions.

Born of poor parents at the beginning of the century, Eriakim Kamujanduzi was brought up by a certain county chief Yubu Ntungwerisho who adopted him as a servant. But shortly the chief died and a certain man Kemandwa introduced Kamujanduzi to Mbaguta. Mbaguta adopted him and sent him to Mbarara High School, a dominantly Bahima institution. It was there that Kamujanduzi came to confront Bahima hatred and mistreatment of the few Bairu boys at Mbarara High School. Kenneth Kakuru, in his father's biography, talks of an incident when Kamujanduzi almost killed a Muhima at Mbarara High School in self-defence. He had been beaten and in response, he dug a fork into a Muhima boy's stomach. Since then Bahima boys at Mbarara High School feared him. Kakuru writes:

²²⁰ Interview: Yowasi Makaru, March 29, 1997, Bushenyi.

²²¹ Interview: Rev. Katikuzi.

The first days at Mbarara High School were real hell. Every day he was beaten and abused not only by the boys senior to him but also by his fellow new comers. The Bahima boys subjected him to all sorts of inhumane treatment. Reason he was a Mwiru and the overwhelming majority of the boys were Bahima. He could not understand why they hated him and had never seen such hatred in his life. That year he had been admitted together with three other Bairu boys who had to run away and abandoned school because they could not stand the Bahima hostility. One was from Ibanda and another from Igara. The bullying included carrying Bahima boys on one's back, fetching them water and washing their clothes. Such harassment was directed to Bairu only.²²²

Even when Kamujanduzi graduated from Mbarara High School in the early thirties and served briefly as a teacher and later joined church ministry, he was confronted again by Bahima leadership. Canon Buningwire who came second in authority to the CMS missionaries was the rural Dean of Ankole. After his ordination on 24 January 1945, Kamujanduzi was posted to Buhweju, a very remote area, which according to his wife Rose,

was a way of trying to send us to a forgotten country. People like Buningwire had really overshadowed us and did not want to see us near them. It was Bahima regime and they determined our destiny whether we wanted it or not.²²³

After six years in Buhweju, Kamujanduzi was posted to Ruharo-Mbarara in 1950, succeeding Buningwire who had retired. This was possible, so Mrs Kamujanduzi continued, because:

By then the church council had expanded and people like Nyakatukura (Ibanda), Katukura (Igara), and Kaseta (Rwampara) all Bairu had come on the Ankole Deanery Council. They became our spokesmen because they realised that we were being segregated.

That was the background that contributed to Kamujanduzi's extreme impatience with Bahima. As his wife said, it was not that he hated them, but if he did not stand up to the Bahima, no one else would. By Independence therefore, Kamujanduzi was a senior figure in the Ankole church, and a voice which represented emancipated Bairu.

²²² See Kenneth Kakuru's biography of his father, "The Life of Rev. Eliakim Kamujanduzi 1905-1990, unpublished paper, 1997, p. 7.

²²³ Interview: Mrs Rose Kamujanduzi, July 31, 1996, Kyamugorani.

His character was demonstrated by his ability to use poetic imagery and proverbs to inspire or control an uprising. His sermons were always full of self-esteem illuminated by riddles and proverbs. For instance people still remember the sermon he preached in 1955 at Ruharo cathedral at a thanksgiving service for Kesi Nganwa who had just been appointed the second Mwiru Enganzi in Ankole. His theme was the living hope. After marvelling what the power of God in Christ could achieve, he assured his audience that all things were possible for those who persistently keep their hope in God. He illustrated his point by a story. While he was driving to church that morning, another motorist who was driving a big lorry (ekimotoka) in front of him and raising dust obstructed him. But Kamujanduzi concentrated on steering, slowed down, closed the windows and drove steadily until he reached the junction where the lorry continued. He then relaxed and resumed his speed. This was taken as a warning to the Bahima that they were frustrating Bairu development, and a call to Bairu to take the necessary precautions and struggle on firmly and peacefully.²²⁴

That was the kind of man Bishop Shalita had to work with. In the absence of a "Bishop" to give Bairu political guidance, they turned to Rev. Kamujanduzi. The two became so antagonistic in the meetings they both attended that in one of them in 1965, things were so difficult that the Bishop raised his hand up until someone reminded him that he was the chairman!²²⁵ Because Kamujanduzi openly opposed the Bishop, he demoted him in 1965 from the office of Rural Dean to a lesser position, the equivalent of a sub-parish church in Mbarara town.²²⁶ In protest, Kamujanduzi resigned. His resignation sparked off two incidents in the diocese. Christians from Rwampara, Kamujanduzi's former deanery, seceded from the diocese and withheld their diocesan financial contributions. The situation was saved by Archbishop Brown, who, after a series of meetings with Kamujanduzi and his church and Bishop Shalita, agreed that Rwampara church should return to the diocese and pay the diocesan quota

²²⁴ Interview: Canon Rwabushaija and Njumwoha.

²²⁵ Canon George Tibesigwa, a story he told us in his Sociology of Religion lecture at Bishop Tucker Theological College, Mukono, 1991.

²²⁶ It is the current All Saints church and has since expanded due to the growth of the town. Actually it is now the most active church in the Diocese of East Ankole. It is an Archdeaconry centre too.

they withheld.²²⁷ In return the diocesan council treated Kamujanduzi's case as a retirement not resignation and rewarded him with the appropriate retirement benefits.²²⁸

The second consequence of Rev. Kamujanduzi's resignation was a hastily convened meeting of UPC supporters at Kakyeka stadium in Mbarara to protest against the Bishop's decision to demote Kamujanduzi. The circumstances under which it was held and who actually mobilised people are not clear but as Rurangaranga said:

The Kakyeka meeting was meant to cast a vote of no confidence in Bishop Shalita. People had interpreted his dismissal of Kamujanduzi as hatred for Bairu cause. So the meeting was not only to demonstrate Bairu support to Kamujanduzi, it was also to show Shalita that it was UPC which was in power and not DP.²²⁹

The meeting was to find means to reinstate Kamujanduzi. It consisted of some members of the diocesan council and Synod who were UPC councillors and supporters. Rurangaranga continues:

Well, you could not distinguish UPC from the Protestant Church. The intention was to call the Synod but we did not have those powers. But we had powers to disguise it as a UPC meeting. Either way they were the same people. Just like Catholics, when they call a church meeting, it's DP Catholics who turn up.

However the Kakyeka meeting could not reverse the Bishop's decision because they had no power to do so. Secondly the Bishop had not dismissed Rev. K. Kamujanduzi but had demoted him. The Bishop by constitution had a right to transfer clergy anywhere and Kamujanduzi had resigned voluntarily. Nevertheless this group became a formidable opposition which four years later resulted in the Bishop's retirement. In 1968, the diocesan Synod moved a vote of no confidence in the Bishop on a very trivial issue that he did not respect his priests. Rev. Keith Katakanya was silenced by the Bishop at a Diocesan meeting on a motion about church stewardship and clergy

²²⁷ Interview: Mzee Muguta, who was at the time the Treasurer, May 21, 1996, at Kinoni-Rwampara.

²²⁸ See Minute 10/67 (e) of the Diocesan Council meeting of 1967, p. 5.

salaries on which Katakanya had dwelt for too long. Had the Revs. Rwabushaija and Itima not opposed the motion, the Bishop might have been compelled to resign.²³⁰ However that Synod resulted in the formation of a committee of inquiry known as *Kakuma*²³¹ Committee to look into: why Christians were against the Bishop, why there was no development in the diocese and the cause of decline in church stewardship and clergy salaries.²³² It is understandable that the Church had declined in giving because Christians and clergy had put more effort in advertising UPC than they had revitalising of the church. The Bishop's whole reign had been fraught with opposition that he had little time to plan for development.

Was Shalita anti development? In the hostile environment that characterised his reign he could not "deliver". Canon Rwabushaija, one of Shalita's few Bairu supporters, who stood by him admitted:

Shalita did not have the gift of work. He was not a mover. Actually we used to complain why most things were not done as meetings had asked. It is not that he would refuse, but that was his nature.²³³

There are no tangible achievements to point at but those were also the times when developmental projects were regarded as "worldly" due to the influence of the Revival movement. This could have contributed to the Bishop's general lack of interest in development well aware of the general feeling in the Church of Uganda.

In May 1969, the Committee's report was published and indicated that "the Bishop was the sole cause of the general decline of the church; that he was not politically motivated and did not give the church the political leadership they wanted; because he was not Omwiru, he did not know and appreciate their problems".²³⁴ Where some churches had closed down and some withheld money, the situation was

²²⁹ Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, July 21, 1997, Ishaka.

²³⁰ Interview: Canon Rwabushaija, July 24, 1997, Ruharo.

²³¹ Canon Kakuma was the Archdeacon of Kitunga. According to Rwabushaija, "Kakuma had worked in Tanzania with Kivengere and Mugimba. He was a good man, very UPC but objective. He was impartial but point blank."

²³² Interview: Bishop Yoramu Bamunoba, May 18, 1997, Kyamugorani.

²³³ Interview: Canon Rwabushaija.

²³⁴ *ibid.*

bound to deteriorate. Rather than face a vote of no confidence from a hostile Synod, Bishop Shalita, in the synod of August 1969, announced his retirement at the age of 66:

...nimbamanyisa nkoku entwaza y'ekanisa eri, mpikize emyaka eragirwe, kandi mpaire archbishop okuragiiza kwangye, naimwe nimbamanyisa...kundikwenda kuhumura...[I do inform you as is the church custom that at the end of this year, I intend to retire].²³⁵

Because they had no opportunity to throw the Bishop out of office, some Synod members wrote to the Archbishop to hasten Shalita's retirement. They wrote:

The Bishop of Ankole Diocese...Kosiya Shalita, officially informed the Synod of the diocese sitting at Ruharo from 11-15 August 1969 that he had submitted to you his application to retire...Realising that what he said was the bare truth...for this reason before the Synod adjourned, a committee was selected to appoint a new Bishop in accordance with the regulations of the church. Your Grace, we are therefore writing to request you to give a speedy confirmation of Bishop Shalita's application to retire, in order that the selected committee may embark on its task of choosing his successor.²³⁶

However the Archbishop would not be rushed and reminded them of the constitutional procedure:

As you know, according to the constitution, representations concerning the appointment of a new Bishop must be considered by the archbishop with the House of Bishops. The next sitting of the House of Bishops will be in October and I do not think that I shall be at that meeting for I shall either be in hospital or on sick leave. I therefore propose to bring this matter up at the sitting of the House of Bishops in January and it will be after January when Bishop Shalita's retirement is accepted by the House that I will write to the diocese to tell them that there is a vacancy and then the diocese will start thinking about suggesting names to the House of Bishops from whom the man to be your next Bishop will be chosen. Your Bishop who has served you for such a long time will no doubt be able to serve for some more months and I trust that you will bear with him.²³⁷

²³⁵ See the Bishop's speech, "Okugamba kw'omureberezi omuri Sinodi August 1969" in East Ankole Archives, p. 3.

²³⁶ See letter from some members of the synod Messrs P. Kaseeta, E. Laki, A. Rubashoka, B. Ntundubeire, W. Muguta to the Archbishop of the Church of Uganda, dated 16th August 1969. The same synod had elected the following to form the Electoral College; N. Bananuka, E. Muntuyera, Canon S. Kakuma, Rev. F. Karyawhari, Z. Mungonya, and E. Rurangaranga.

²³⁷ See letter from Archbishop Eric Sabiiti to Messrs, Kaseeta, Laki, Rubashoka, Ntundubaire &

In order to reassure Bishop Shalita, the Archbishop wrote a personal note to him:

Now about your retirement, you will have had a copy of the letter I wrote last week to some members of your Synod who were hurrying your retirement. I told them that I shall not be at the House of bishops...[The Archbishop added in vernacular] Haza orekye kubatina abo mpurire okuruga omunshonda ezirikwesigwa ngu nobubariho tibaruh. Mukama aturwanirire, [do not fear them for I have heard from all corners that those characters are simply men of straw].²³⁸

The Archbishop probably called them “men of straw” to reassure Shalita. In fact they were very influential men from the Kumanyana movement. As strong members of the Enkomba UPC, they had taken up the Ankole leadership with Bananuka as their leader. Whether or not the archbishop was to wait for January, in Ankole the Enkomba group started looking around for a candidate who would support UPC interests. In June 1970, Rev Amos Betungura, a Mwiru, was nominated Bishop of Ankole and consecrated on 12 December 1970. Whereas Shalita had not enjoyed state support, the new Bishop’s consecration ceremony was heavily subsidised by the UPC government including tarmacking the six hundred-yard road to the cathedral. In addition the occasion was honoured by the presence of the Vice President and UPC executive, which implied that the new Bishop was “one of us”. Unfortunately for Bishop Betungura, within less than two months of his consecration, Idi Amin overthrew the UPC government. If Bishop Shalita fought a war with UPC radicals, Bishop Betungura had a more sinister one, the “war” with Amin’s regime.

Muguta dated 26th August 1969. Though Sabiiti had been rejected in Ankole for the see, he was later made the Bishop of Tooro from where he later became an Archbishop of Uganda after the retirement of Archbishop L. Brown in 1966.

²³⁸ See Archbishop’s letter to Bishop Shalita of 30th August 1969.

CHAPTER THREE²³⁹

3. THE REVIVAL MOVEMENT, ETHNICITY AND POLITICS.

3.0. INTRODUCTION.

If we are looking at the church in Ankole in the sixties, in the context of ecclesiastical and political power struggles, one of the most important movements to look at is the Revival movement. One cannot understand either the development of the church or its relation to politics without understanding this movement. Revival became a very important social-religious movement for Bairu and Bahima especially (whether or not they were "saved") because it transformed their culture in a way missionary Christianity had not. Through "kraal evangelism", mainly by Bairu evangelists like Kakudidi,²⁴⁰ Bahima came to know about the gospel and have interest in the church.

The East African Revival Movement (sometimes referred to as the Balokole²⁴¹ Revival) is a large-scale movement of renewal, which has operated within the Protestant churches of East Africa since 1936. It developed in reaction to the superficiality, nominalism and backsliding that had engulfed the church in East Africa. At the beginning of this century, western civilisation was beginning to make way in Uganda and a formal Christianity became the way of life.

Revival's beginning appeared insignificant at Mengo in Uganda, where in 1929 two men, Joe Church and Simoni Nsibambi, deeply conscious of their spiritual defeat, prayed together for two days in search of a new beginning for their own spiritual edification and for the church. They were from different background and

²³⁹ I wish to acknowledge that the first three sections of this chapter are a summary of my MPhil. dissertation, *Revival and Repentance: A Historical and Theological analysis of the East African Revival movement in Uganda*, Cambridge University, 1995.

²⁴⁰ He was born in 1905 and saved in 1936. After 1941, he worked as a Catechist in Nyabushozi where he remained as a free evangelist with special ministry among the Bahima cattle keepers who were formerly marginally touched by the gospel. He was later ordained in 1960 and died in 1992.

²⁴¹ Balokole or Abalokole, means literally the saved ones, an illusion to the assurance of their own redemption expressed by the revival brethren. Balokole, technically less correct than Abalokole, is more widely used. The word was initially used as a *pejorative epithet* by those outside the movement though it is no longer used like that now.

race, European and African respectively, but with a similar conviction. They longed to see a revived people and a revived church.²⁴² The significance of their meeting was that a European missionary and an African were meeting on equal terms and on common ground. Since then the Revivalists have regarded the fellowship between Africans and the Europeans as the black and white notes of the piano, "the best harmony being obtained only when the black and white notes are played together".²⁴³ Through their preaching and life style and the consequent movement, many people in Uganda became committed Christians and from among them some have become church leaders.

3.1. WHAT IS THE EAST AFRICAN REVIVAL MOVEMENT?

The Balokole Revival is a movement of renewal and reform which originated from African Protestants of Uganda, Rwanda-Burundi²⁴⁴, Kenya and Tanzania, influenced by members of the Rwanda mission, a small conservative Evangelical mission body founded in reaction to the more liberal policy of the Church Missionary Society.²⁴⁵ Unlike most comparable African movements (independent Churches) or the American and European revivals to which it is historically and theologically linked, the East African Revival movement has remained within the establishment of the Church in Uganda avoiding schism while losing little of its doctrinal identity. The movement did not become another church but preferred to remain within the already

²⁴² Lindsay Guillebaud, *A grain of Mustard Seed: The Growth of the Ruanda Mission of CMS*, London, 1959, pp. 49-53.

²⁴³ Adrian Hastings, *The Church in Africa 1450 - 1942*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, pp. 596, 604.

²⁴⁴ From 1919 to 1962, Rwanda-Burundi was under the League of Nations mandate and then a United Nations Trust administered as a single unit by Belgium. The two are now separate Independent countries.

²⁴⁵ The Church Missionary Society is Evangelical but not strictly fundamentalist, thus the controversy which split CMS, cf. Gordon 1971, pp. 461 - 474. Here the term *fundamentalism* in a purely descriptive sense to characterise the mission's understanding of the Bible as being literally true and wholly of divine inspiration. It does not refer to the doctrinal position which for instance arose from the American Protestants in reaction against biblical scholarship and modern theology; See also, Alan Richardson, et al, *A New Dictionary of Christian Theology*, London: SCM Press, 1983, p. 2.

established Church in which they longed to bring a spiritual transformation.²⁴⁶ During the sixty or more years of its existence, it has spread to neighbouring countries and through many different languages and mission organisations.²⁴⁷ Its characteristic hymns, greetings, teachings and a disciplined, even rigid, life style²⁴⁸ are familiar not only to the Protestants with whom they identify but also to the Roman Catholics and non-Christians. Revival fellowships²⁴⁹ have been able to carry on their distinctive way of life and convictions within the established Protestant congregations, usually maintaining a coexistence with the *unrevived clergy* and laity. Believing themselves to be the leaven of the large body of Christians, their uncompromising standards (which they term as *being on the highest*) and personal piety are sometimes resented by the nominal Christians who are the targets of their mission field.²⁵⁰

To the outsider, the Balokole do not seem particularly attractive. It is only when one has known the movement from the inside that one can admire that treasure that has enabled them to grow from strength to strength. They have no codified teaching, form no leadership structure and are opposed to bureaucracy, though men and women have emerged whose authority is clearly acknowledged by those in the fellowship. They do not talk of members or membership lists and write no laws or charters.²⁵¹ They have produced no literature beyond the texts of vernacular hymns often taught orally among the brethren. They have no formalised criteria for membership although formal and uniform standards all over the country, notably the ability to provide an authentic testimony to conversion and repentance, exist for

²⁴⁶ John V. Taylor, *The Growth of the Church in Buganda, an Attempt at Understanding*, London: SCM Press, 1957, pp. 95-99. I personally have been involved in their evangelistic missions as a speaker and participant.

²⁴⁷ Uganda alone has more than twenty languages and tribes but Revival has managed to penetrate them without finding tribal barriers. Mission organisations in Uganda are mainly African Evangelistic Enterprise (A. E. E), Fellowship of Christian Unions (FOCUS), Church Missionary Society and Scripture Union (SU).

²⁴⁸ Joe Church, *Quest for the Highest. An Autobiographical Account of the East African Revival*, Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1981, pp. 128, 143, 255; cf. Bengt Sundkler, *Bantu Prophets in South Africa*, London: Oxford University Press, 1961, pp. 65, 113, 129, 192-193.

²⁴⁹ I use the word fellowship to mean the small groups of the Revival movement which meet regularly for prayer, bible study and mutual confession. They usually meet twice a week.

²⁵⁰ Cf. Mabel Ensor, "Some plain reasons why the movement called, "Balokole" is injurious and Retrograde", *Pamphlet 1935*; Church's title, *Quest for the Highest*; Max Warren, *Revival: An Inquiry*, London: SCM Press, 1954, pp. 81-90.

participation in the circle like fellowship groups where Balokole meet for prayer and open confession. Speaking from a "narrow theological" view, the continuities are more obvious than the differences. The doctrine centring on the cross and the atonement of sin and eschatology feature as strongly as it did during the missionary period. *Okujunwa*, salvation, is the key word of the movement and is embodied in most of the African names for Revival.²⁵² They believe that the new experience in Jesus Christ can only be obtained through repentance which is why they stress public confession and daily repentance.

But unlike other African Christian groups, Revival brethren do little to distinguish themselves from those among whom they live. They wear no uniform and stage no public demonstrations apart from the open air preaching with which they are particularly identified.²⁵³ A famous greeting is used in the first line of their letters, usually, "I greet you in the name of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ", and they conclude with the phrase, *Yours in Christ*, and the hymn *Tukutendereza Yesu*²⁵⁴, which they do not mind singing even in market places as a form of greeting, is always used when brethren meet. Balokole are identified by their practice of giving testimony, "a deeply personal account of conversion with strong evangelical overtones"²⁵⁵, in which one narrates "every sin" one can remember to have committed.²⁵⁶ It is here that Europeans, unfamiliar with the movement or with evangelical Christianity, often believe that they have been victims of isolated instances of religious zeal when confronted by the Revivalists anxious to testify to them.²⁵⁷

²⁵¹ Robins, op. cit., p. 7.

²⁵² Kevin Ward, *The Development of Protestant Christianity in Kenya 1910-1940*, Cambridge University, PhD, dissertation, 1976, pp. 353-354.

²⁵³ See colourful costumes and public marching preferred by Independent Churches in, David Barret, *Schism and Renewal: An Analysis of Six Thousand Contemporary Religious Movements*, Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 42-43, 74-75, 170; Sundkler, op. cit., pp. 208-209, 273-274, 288-289.

²⁵⁴ Means, "We praise you Jesus", Cf. Warren, 1954, pp. 63, 65.

²⁵⁵ Robins, op. cit., p. 6.

²⁵⁶ See a well-modified testimony of Bishop Festo Kivengere in, Church 1981, p. 13; Warren, op. cit., pp. 63-65, 72-73.

²⁵⁷ Some Europeans are not taken seriously as saved people because they never repent openly and because some of them are known to take alcoholic drinks.

The movement does not represent an attempt to combine long held African practices such as polygamy, ancestral worship or traditional healing with Christianity. It has in most cases rejected indigenous belief and traditional customs more strongly than the demands of mission teaching. Yet a closer look at the movement reveals traces of African heritage. John V. Taylor agrees strongly on their African charismatic, which make it more deeply held than any mission that went before it in the history of Uganda:

Signs like the dreaming of dreams, seeing of visions and ecstatic phenomena, such as trembling and the repetition of the gospel hymn *Tukutendereze* and public confession of sins all emanate from the hilarious joy of an African liberated by a supernatural power.²⁵⁸

The ordeal by confession, which is demanded by new converts or renewed Christians as a test of the reality of their salvation and an initiation into fellowship, is indeed the African equivalent of traditional initiation. It is therefore possible to say that the movement is a genuine African expression of worship in contrast to institutionalised Christianity²⁵⁹ that does not necessarily edify the African in freedom of worship and expression. Their theology is explicitly orthodox, biblical and christocentric. Their emphasis on the necessity for a conversion experience following the evangelical paradigm of intense guilt relieved by open confession and acceptance of Jesus as personal saviour is largely consistent with the evangelical wing of the African church in whose traditions the movement is historically rooted. Their teaching and practices are sufficiently consistent with mainline Protestant emphasis. This enables them to function within a wide variety of Protestant denominations throughout East Africa. The degree to which formal participation in the life of the Church is emphasised depends upon the good relations between them and the Church leadership but on the whole they are staunch supporters of their local churches and are good at stewardship. Unlike nationalist movements such as Mau Mau in Kenya, the Revival movement did not arise because of the anti-colonial desire to take control of the church. In spite of

²⁵⁸ Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 101; Hastings, 1994, p. 596.

²⁵⁹ Ward *op. cit.*, p. 352.

its largely African leadership and a history of tensions between Revival leaders and European church authorities, the conflicts were more concerned with nominalism rather than racial prejudice. More importantly, opposition to racial, ethnic and clan based prejudices has become a basic article of Revival teaching with a self-description as a people of one clan, *abaishemwe*.²⁶⁰ Revival then is a renewing and reforming movement in the Church of Uganda with a call for action, reaffirmation of commitment, and a resuscitation of worship and conscience both for the church and the individual. Revival as it is in Uganda is not a new cult or doctrine. It is not schismatic or subversive ecclesiastically or politically, nor is it founded merely on emotionalism or enthusiasm. Revival in Uganda is a return to the simplicity of apostolic faith in the time of apostasy, for they believe the church had lapsed into dead formalism and nominalism.²⁶¹

3.2. REVIVAL AS AN AFRICAN EXPRESSION OF FAITH.

Some Europeans dissociate Revival from African-ness but see it as the offspring of western Revivalism following in the footsteps of the Pilkington revival²⁶² and the Keswick convention. Revivalists themselves hardly admit that Revival is an African form of worship and expression. Western Christianity with which they have since identified was opposed to African forms of religious expression as demonic! Revivalists as a people running away from their past do not want to share in that past. But a closer look at the movement indicates the evidence that Revival is an African movement expressing the richness of an African culture. The Banyankole for instance used open confession as a means of initiation in traditional religious practice.²⁶³

²⁶⁰ See Kevin Ward, "Obedient Rebels", The relationship between the early Balokole and the Church of Uganda: the Mukono crisis of 1941, in *Journal of Religion in Africa* vol. XIX, (3), 1989, pp. 194-227; Taylor, op. cit., p. 98; T. F. C. Bewes, *Kikuyu Conflict: Mau Mau and the Christian Witness*, London: The High Way Press, 1953.

²⁶¹ Cf. Adrian Hastings, *A History of African Christianity 1950-1975*, London: Cambridge University, 1979, pp. 52-53, 155, 231-232, 257; Taylor, op. cit., 269; Langford-Smith, "Revival in East Africa", *International Review of Missions*, vol. 43, London: 1954, pp. 77-81.

²⁶² Cf. Kevin Ward, op. cit.

²⁶³ Cf. Derrick Stenning, J, *Salvation in Ankole. African Systems of Thought*, International African Institute, London: Oxford University, 1965, pp. 258-275. See also, Welbourn & Ogot, B. A., "Some

In traditional Ankole, in local cult groups, entering into which was effected by an initiation ceremony, the initiate had to confess the alleged infringements of sexual prohibitions and worshipped the tutelary spirits. The initiate went through a ritual of being killed and brought back to life before being accepted into the cult. Revival usage and traditional practice can therefore be paralleled in terms of ritual confession in traditional religious practice.²⁶⁴

Public confessions was also an important way by which the African Christian declared his severance from traditional society and his commitment to the new society of the revival fellowship. In Kenya, there are similarities too. According to John Karanja, public confession "was administered to remove thahu (taboo), to effect physical healing".²⁶⁵ The Revival movement recovered this important dimension of African religious experience. Within the movement, public confession serves to strengthen the Revivalists' resolve to live in accordance with the demands of their new faith. The importance of public confession as far as the subject under discussion is concerned, is that it helped Bairu and Bahima to confess their deep-seated hatred and prejudices between each other. This broke the social and cultural barriers between them and gave way for trust between the two groups.

J. V. Taylor agrees these African characteristics make the movement more deeply indigenous than any mission:

There is further use in the movement, which may be peculiarly African, which might be called "ordeal by confession", which is demanded of new converts or renewed Christians as a test of the reality of their salvation and as an initiation in the fellowship. On these accessions, it seems as though the element of "brokenness", humiliation and abandonment to the group is more important than penitence or faith.²⁶⁶

Problems of African Christianity: Guilt and Shame", in C. B. Baeta, (eds.), *Christianity in Tropical Africa*, London: OUP for the International Institute, 1968, pp. 182 - 194.

²⁶⁴ Peter Kasenene seems to infer that the content and form of the confession and testimony in the Revival were quite different from that of the traditional religious rituals. In such rituals, Kasenene argues, the initiate made his confession and testimony called *okwata eibanga*, divulging secrets, and their publicity was strictly to those who were presiding over the ritual; and the latter were not allowed to disclose any of the contents of their initiate's utterances, cf. "African traditional religion in Ankole", in *Occasional Research Papers*, 2, 1970, Makerere University, p. 42.

²⁶⁵ John Karanja, *The Growth of the Anglican Church in Central Kenya*, Cambridge University, PhD, Dissertation, 1992, p. 268.

²⁶⁶ Taylor, op. cit., p. 101.

In confession in African cultures, there is an efficacy not only in the word that is spoken, but also in the word that is heard. The diabolical contest is thus vital. Both speaker and hearer embody a circle of functions, whether theistically, magically or both to consume the sin confessed. Revival therefore is an African expression of Christianity in contrast to the institutionalised church and its doctrines. In fact open confession is not only common with the Revival movement, but with the African Independent Churches where repentance is purgative in its spiritual sense. Bengt Sundkler in his book, *The Bantu Prophets in South Africa*, describes how:

around the pool...the Zionist church arranges its rite, all being essentially purgative. Baptism or purification can not take place without being preceded by confession of sins. The objection of infant baptism is that children can not confess sins. The confession must be complete, nothing may be hidden.²⁶⁷

And one difference between the Revival and the Christianity which preceded it, is that while the missionaries inspired the latter, Revival was organised by Africans and had no close European supervision. Until late seventies, the Revival movement had condemned most traditional and indigenous practice. It expressed, according to Adrian Hastings, "an uncompromising rejection of the sort of assimilation of church and world, of Christianity and African custom". It is common that for a movement, he goes on:

which from one point of view is the solidest proof of Africanisation, something which missionaries could not assuredly control and of which many were not unreasonably suspicious, was at the same time a movement to reject the Africanising symbiosis which was inevitably growing momentum in a third generation church.²⁶⁸

This is probably the reason Hastings says:

²⁶⁷ Sundkler, op. cit., p. 126; Hastings, 1994, op. cit., pp. 600-602.

²⁶⁸ Hastings, 1979, op. cit., p. 53.

If the Revival brought a much needed new outburst of commitment to the confession of faith and high moral standards, and an intense personal loyalty to Christ it also brought conflict, narrowness, spiritual arrogance and near schism.²⁶⁹

The refusal of African symbols perhaps was through ignorance or missionary teaching. The Revivalists had embraced Christianity without being taught how to relate it to their own situations. Everything was taken at surface value, including alcohol drinking, though I do not think that the African church should regret this having seen its effects in Western societies.

3.3. REVIVAL IN ANKOLE.

Okulokoka or *okujunwa* as it is known in Ankole became a factor in changing the ethnic tensions between Bairu and Bahima. In the first chapter, I traced the emergence of Bairu to positions of influence through the Kumanyana movement. Inevitably such a change caused more rivalry between the two ethnic groups. The Kumanyana movement now dominating political power did not only sideline its former allies the Catholics, it was also determined to fight what it termed as the *kihima* influence. By 1960, the Revival movement, which was born in 1936, was already well established in Ankole, not as a political pressure group but as a movement of spiritual renewal and a revolutionary force advocating a brotherhood that transcended ethnic and religious differences. The period between 1950-1970 when religio-political confrontation was at its worst, the Revivalists in Ankole demonstrated their faith by creating what they termed as *abaishemwe* "a family" in which Bairu and Bahima met on equal terms. They stood on the same platform and challenged the traditional rivalry between Bairu and Bahima. They distanced themselves from the politics of the sixties because it was divisive. The beginning of Revival is not within the framework of this thesis, but it is important that we consider its beginnings in Ankole to enable us to appreciate the contribution of this Revival in the ethno-political struggles in Ankole.

²⁶⁹ *ibid.*

As Christianity was championed by Baganda evangelists, Blasio Kigozi, a Muganda Revivalist, with Yosiya Kinuka, a Munyankole, and Paul Gahindi, a Munyarwanda, brought it to Ankole. Arthur Clarke, the CMS Rural Dean of Ankole, had invited them.²⁷⁰ Clarke was concerned about the declining spiritual commitment in the Ankole Church and in 1936 he invited these men to lead a week of prayer and bible study for the clergy and evangelists. Revival dates its beginnings in Ankole from that week when Mbarara Deanery became "a hill set ablaze". Instead of Bible study, the team concentrated on preaching and giving their testimonies about the saving power of Christ. During that first meeting many people were revived. Eliaezer Mugimba²⁷¹ mentions four men who were to be instrumental in spreading Revival in Ankole. These were Edward Kakudidi, Andereya Katebaka, Erisa Mutegaya and Anania Murumba, all Bairu.²⁷² Six months later, the Rural Dean invited the group again for follow up.²⁷³ Unlike before when the team consisted of African Evangelists, this time the follow up team included Joe Church, a *Muzungu*.²⁷⁴ Joe Church records the remarkable response as those who were revived began to experience the equivalent of the 1997 Toronto blessing:

Many had gathered to meet us...and a gathering had been arranged in the church for 5 p.m. We all spoke and made an appeal when a thing happened that I had never experienced before. A man began to cry out...at the top his voice... He said that he had seen a vision of Christ in the church and he saw the awful state of the lost and was overcome with grief for his own past. He asked his friends to help him but he could not stop crying.²⁷⁵

²⁷⁰ Church, op. cit., p. 121.

²⁷¹ Born 1908-1993, he was the son of a sub-county chief in Buhweju. He attended Mbarara High School, Buddo (1928-1929), Makerere College (1930-1932) where he trained as a teacher and later taught at Mbarara High School. He was saved in 1936 and after being expelled from Bishop Tucker Theological College in 1941, he taught at Katoke in Bukoba, Tanzania, which was then a centre for Revival (in Tanzania). After his missionary work in Bukoba, he returned to Ankole and remained a lay evangelist. He translated the Bible into Runyankole/Rukiga together with Stanley Smith.

²⁷² Interview: Eliaezer Mugimba, August 1990.

²⁷³ *ibid.*

²⁷⁴ Joe Church and Nsibambi had been pioneers in the movement. The word *Muzungu* is a Swahili means a European.

²⁷⁵ Church, op. cit., p. 127.

Neighbouring Mbarara High School caught the infection. Twenty students and their teacher Mugimba were converted. They started confessing and returning stolen books and dining cutlery. Among the converted students was Zablon Kabaza, a Mwiru student, who latter became an international preacher and Missions Co-ordinator for the Anglican Province of Uganda.²⁷⁶ But the spread of Revival at Mbarara High School met some resistance from teachers because of the wrong approach by the young converts. In their zeal to witness to their teachers, these converts violated school rules until the Headmaster, A. C. Pain, complained to the chairman of Board of Governors:

disgusted of their extravagant confessions and....spiritual exhibitionism...if this happens again the matter will have to go to the local board of Governors and either they or I will have to go.²⁷⁷

Like the Harmattan wind, by 1950, Revival had spread to many parts of Ankole. Often travelling on foot, the teams of *abaishemwe* preached from one Anglican station to another calling people to repentance. Like St Paul, they established fellowship groups whenever they won converts and ensured that new groups were nurtured until they were strong enough to stand on their own. Ankole was continually strengthened by the Balokole from Kampala which had become the central base. By the 1950s Revival in Ankole had attracted a formidable following and Clarke reported "a growing number of people who are making a new discovery of the saving power of Jesus Christ".²⁷⁸ That the movement was growing rapidly is supported by the fact that as early as 1941, Revival had already sent some of its converts to Bishop Tucker College training for ordination, five of whom were from Ankole.²⁷⁹ Unfortunately they never finished their training for they were expelled for defying College rules; holding prayer meetings and preaching at dawn.²⁸⁰ Apart from Kakudidi who later went back to

²⁷⁶ Interview: Zab Kabaza, retired Missioner, August 8, 1994, Kansanga-Kampala.

²⁷⁷ C. P. Pain, *Mbarara High School files*.

²⁷⁸ Joe Church papers. His son David Church, in Richmond, London, keeps these. (Hereafter now, JCP).

²⁷⁹ See Table 3, "The Subsequent careers of the rebels" in Kevin Ward, 1989, op. cit., p. 218. Ward also discusses the Mukono crisis at length.

²⁸⁰ Ward, op. cit., pp. 204-206. These were Eliaezer Mugimba, a Muhima, Edward Kakudidi, Zakayo

finish his ordination course in 1960, the rest remained lay preachers. Perhaps this was God's design. As lay people they could travel extensively without impoverishing their Sunday congregations.

By 1960 Revival's impact in Ankole was threefold. The movement had converted many adherents of traditional religion to the benefit of the Anglican Church. Secondly the movement had managed to bridge the gap between Bairu and Bahima. Through the unreserved work of a Mwiru, lay Evangelist Kakudidi, the gospel penetrated Bahima grazing fields.²⁸¹ Bahima who had lapsed from Christianity at the beginning of the century were won back into the Anglican Church. Thirdly, Revival released ethnic tensions in Ankole and challenged European pride and superiority complex. Many missionaries had indeed suffered from racial prejudice and pride. As Alex Kagume rightly says, before Revival which called for a radical social transformation, Europeans had taken:

their own Christian commitment for granted but closely watched the African Christian regardless of the period and intensity of his Christian experience to ensure that his devotion was on the right track.²⁸²

Such challenge was overdue. Though they were missionaries, some mixed little and had little social contact apart from routine church work and administration. It was a kind of apartheid²⁸³ when as early 1925, the missionaries had a rule that:

Native classes must not be held in, and natives must not sleep in, CMS houses without special permission of the standing committee.²⁸⁴

J. V. Taylor was in the 1950s appalled at this social seclusion of the missionaries from the natives:

Kagumire, Andereya Rushegye and Enock Begyira all Bairu.

²⁸¹ Interview: Lugimbirwa Enock; see also Kevin Ward, "Tukutendereza Yesu. The Balokole Revival in Uganda", in Z. Nthamburi (ed.), *From Mission to Church: A handbook of Christian Christianity in East Africa*, Nairobi, 1991.

²⁸² Alex Kagume, op. cit., p. 48.

²⁸³ Robins, op. cit., p. 205.

²⁸⁴ Taylor op. cit., p. 89.

The fact that a great deal of this was news to me after ten years work as a missionary is only an indication of my own shameful ignorance during that time and the remoteness of the *ivory castle* in which most missionaries in Uganda at any rate, were, and are mostly still confined.²⁸⁵

It was this superiority that Revivalists challenged. They called for the same Christian standards from all and confronted the missionaries where they failed.

3.4. REVIVAL AND ETHNICITY.

Karugire and Tiberondwa seem to suggest that religion was the sole cause of Ankole's problems. In my view, religion was also integrated in the ethnic factor thus making the whole system complicated. Religion reinforced the already existing divisions and therefore should not be taken as the only single factor that polluted Ankole society. When Revival came to Ankole, it did not discriminate but spread among both the Bairu and Bahima. It challenged social stratification. Since then Bahima and Bairu Revivalists have met on equal terms. The converts from both groups confessed what they termed as *obwiru* and *obuhima*.²⁸⁶ Thus my interest in Revival is its ability to neutralise ethnic tensions and its success in creating a new clan from those ethnically and politically polluted. Drawing its membership from the two ethnic groups, it provided a platform of equality on which both groups met in mutual respect and love. The human barriers, which might have crippled the movement, were openly confessed.²⁸⁷ Church wrote:

The fellowship is becoming aware of the marked results of the blessing that we have had. Tribal distinctions are being swept away in a way we have never seen before.²⁸⁸

It came to be accepted that to be *Omukokole* meant much more than belonging to an ethnic group. As one Revivalist told me, to have joined Revival and failed to confess

²⁸⁵ John Taylor, "The Ugandan Church Today", in IRM, XLVI, April 1957, p. 136.

²⁸⁶ The quality of being Omwiru or Omuhima.

²⁸⁷ Interview: Enoch Lugimbirwa, May 22, 1996, Ruharo.

²⁸⁸ Church, op. cit., p. 135.

ethnic prejudice led to not being taken seriously in the fellowship.²⁸⁹ There might have been an element of prudence in confessing such prejudices to gain trust and acceptance within the fellowship. But we need to consider the extent and gravity of ethnic tension in the period 1950-1970. The Bahima had lost power to the Bairu who through the UPC were working to abolish the monarchy. It was the Revivalists' cohesion which enabled them to remain united when the issue of the monarchy was tearing the rest apart. They were not entirely successful but they did a great deal towards political reconciliation for harmonious development. They saw Revival as an:

empowering factor over the ethnic bitterness and the differences [as] Revival was undermining the ideological and moral foundations of ethnic inequalities in Ankole [where it] had traditionally been held that inequalities were willed and instituted by *Ruhanga* (God).²⁹⁰

Instead of being obsessed with the evils of social inequality, Revival aimed to bring everyone into the movement. This was based on their theology that only those who confessed their sins would inherit *amagara agatahwaho*, eternal life. This helped to neutralise ethnic conflicts and social imbalances for to be *saved* meant to be liberated not only from sin but also from cultural limitations and superstitions. Hence Bahima Revivalists began to eat such food as chicken, which formerly they had held as taboo. Mixed marriages remained limited, but were now acceptable. That is how people like Amos Betungura (later Bishop of Ankole) and his brother Butukaine married Bahima women although they are real Bairu from Buhanama, the Rwampara hills. It was after the coming of Revival that we could accept Karugire's theory of a symbiotic relationship when Bahima and Bairu Revivalists accepted ethnic diversity. The Bairu learnt the cattle culture and Bahima learnt to diversify and were no longer victims of famine whenever catastrophe hit their herds. One Muhima told me how Bairu Revivalists taught him how to put on trousers and showed him the importance of living a settled life.²⁹¹ The nomadic life style:

²⁸⁹ Interview: Canon Kituna, August 12, 1996.

²⁹⁰ Kagume, op. cit., p. 159.

²⁹¹ Interview: G. Rwankuba, April 30, 1996, Kashenyi.

would not fit into the civilised model of the *abaishemwe* which followed some aspects of western life style...in dress...tea drinking instead of milk...clothed in imported cloth rather than local garments [and] sending children to school to learn in the western style and not in that of their own community.²⁹²

However while Revival in the Anglican Church influenced social behaviour, the Catholic Church was not as effective in bridging the gap between Bairu and Bahima simply because there were no Bahima Catholics.

3.5. REVIVAL AND POLITICS.

It is something of a paradox that Ankole, where the Revival movement has had such a profound impact, should have been the arena of the greatest acute Catholic-Protestant tensions, and the throne of sectarianism. From the start Revival had disassociated itself from active political involvement and concentrated on converting people for *eternal life*. Balokole considered politics to be "this-worldly" and discouraged committed Christians from politics. Another reason for their indifference could be their "withdrawal" from what had become a sort of quasi-establishment, with privileged position. Protestantism continued to enjoy this position since most of the post independence leaders were Anglicans. The Balokole were conscious that power corrupts and preferred to concentrate on evangelism.

But also Revival converts were not the kind of people attracted to politics. Many came from humble backgrounds where politics was not considered. Many of them were not educated and could not therefore stand up to the third generation post independence leaders. This applied to Bairu and Bahima, even if the later had been leaders, because pre-colonial politics was quite different from the politics of the sixties. In any case not all Bahima had enjoyed exposure to politics. The ruling class was from the minority *Bahinda* distinct from the rest of the Bahima and hardly any *Muhinda* became a *Mulokole*. Revival attracted ordinary Bahima and Bairu who had nothing to do with *Orurembo*, palace. The Bahinda remained aloof to *okujunwa* and seemed content with the baptismal Christianity. Revival demanded its followers to

²⁹² Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, May 29, 1997, Kampala.

deny the world and worldly possessions, a theology of self-denial, which the ruling Bahima found difficult to embrace.

When the Bairu embraced Revival, like Christianity, it gave them a social identity and raised them to equality where they could preach and speak on the same standing as Bahima. For the Bairu, that was enough politics. In Bairu testimonies, words of self-pity are frequent. Words like *ninye oha* (who am I) signify satisfaction with what has been achieved and no addition is needed.

Mainly the speed of the pre-independence changes was too sudden and left the Revivalists rather confused about how to react to the new political situation. The sudden speed with which the events occurred between 1957 and 1961 when the first national elections were held was too short. It prevented the Balokole from developing a mature response.

Uneducated as many Revivalists were, such people do not attract social emulation, and are less interested in political issues. This was different in Buganda where Revival attracted educated monarchists like Nagenda and his brother Kigozi, both of whom were Buddo and Makerere graduates. On the contrary in Ankole graduates from mission schools, like Grace Ibingira, Rwetsiba, Adonia Tiberondwa, Ephraim Kamuntu and others, moved to politics rather than Revival movement. This educated class rather saw Revival as a lower social class with which they could not easily interact. Until the end of the sixties, when Scripture Union and University Christian Unions emerged, influenced by western and American evangelicalism, there were hardly any professionals among the Revivalists except for the few teachers like Mugimba and Phenehas Nyenda. The Revivalists' literalism and their evangelistic approach often deterred educated people who might have been otherwise interested. Their emphasis on open confession and their demand for testimony did a lot to bar educated people from Revival membership. But they did a tremendous job in the field of evangelism especially when there were so few clergy in the thirties and forties.²⁹³ However while I acknowledge their contribution to the life of the church in Ankole, I regret that they made little emphasis on the need for better-educated clergy. It is a

²⁹³ I am using the word elite in the sense that, though they were not highly educated, they knew how to read and write amidst an illiterate society.

generation conflict because it happened to be at a time when hardly any people expected to go on and take degrees through the church.

On the other hand by 1960, there were some educated Revivalists who probably, if they had not been Revivalists, would have participated in political activities and were qualified enough to take up political office. These were men like Eliaezer Mugimba, Eric Sabiiti and Zablun Kabaza. But their evangelistic zeal was "too hot" to consider any other vocation than the pulpit. And those who remained in the teaching profession like Kabaza and Festo Kivengere (both had been CMS Schools supervisors), found those offices enabled them to find enough time for mission work. The schools contacts provided an atmosphere in which Revivalists could congregate and students be influenced. They were perhaps justified in not joining other professions. Few as they were, people like Mugimba, Sabiiti and Kabaza were the hope for the movement and if they had had other work would have crippled the movement.

According to Enock Lugimbirwa, after political parties were introduced in Ankole, Revivalists held a meeting at Ruharo in 1961 to discuss whether to participate in politics or not. They agreed that members could join parties and vote, yet many refrained from political party membership because they suspected that they were likely to be implicated in political "sins".²⁹⁴ However, it is not really, as Kasenene says, that Balokole's principle of truth and justice "coincided with the motto [peace, unity and justice] of the Democratic Party, DP, and so most of them, especially the Bahima joined and voted for the Democratic Party".²⁹⁵ Had it been so then the more zealous Revivalists would have been staunch supporters of DP which they were not. Bahima joined DP as protest against the Bairu Protestants who were then political rivals.

But consideration of Revival political participation depends on how we define politics. If politics is the art of organising and managing society, social action and the desire for a harmonious society is part of political development. If this is the case, then Balokole were indeed political for they participated in the shaping and improvement of a society. Through their sermons, moral values were enforced.

²⁹⁴ Interview: Enock Lugimbirwa, May 22, 1996, Ruharo.

²⁹⁵ Peter Kasenene, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

Alcoholic bars complained of a fall in the number of customers. Local chiefs reported that social vices like fighting and rape decreased.²⁹⁶ We should perhaps add that their impartiality in party politics later proved a blessing to the Anglican Church especially during Amin's period. As I hope to indicate in chapter four, Ankole became the target for Amin's sword simply because it was in Ankole that religio-political confrontation was more pronounced. The Revivalists who had taken up the leadership of the church gave it cover amidst the political storms that threatened to wreck it. Since most of the political activists and religious leaders were either dead or in exile, the Balokole faithfully steered the Anglican Church and gave people hope amidst the hopeless military administration.

There is little written material on the subject but some of the interviewees confirmed my own conviction that Revivalists did not completely ignore politics. Bairu Revivalists were inwardly UPC sympathisers while Bahima Revivalists were generally DP. It was unlikely that Bairu Revivalists would have voted DP. They hardly had any social contact with the Catholics, who tended to dismiss Revival as heretical and a Protestant strategy to convert them.²⁹⁷ Actually the Catholic Bishop Kakubi, who admitted that people like Alfred Mutashwera, a renowned Muhima Mulokole, represented the Bahima Protestants on the Ankole Catholic Council (whose objective was to enhance the interests of the Democratic Party), confirmed the Bahima Revivalists support for DP.²⁹⁸

While Revivalists did not form a viable political platform, as individuals they joined the interested parties that formed the backbone of their different political identities. I say back bone in the sense that they were part of the congregations especially in the Anglican church where political baptisms was equally encouraged.

²⁹⁶ This seems to have been the representative view of some of the post independence chiefs in Ankole. Some of them, now converts to the movement, admitted that despite its aggressiveness in its approach, there was relatively fewer cases for the chiefs to deal with than those areas where Revival was not so strong, cf. Murumba, Rwakanuma, Gaharubungo, Kamomo and Kahigiriza. All these were former county chiefs in the fifties and sixties.

²⁹⁷ Interview: John Kakubi, September 21, 1997, Ibanda.

²⁹⁸ *ibid.*

3.6. REVIVAL: AN ASSESSMENT.

As I analyse Revival's impact, I do not intend to limit myself to the post independence period but will look at the movement's evolution. I agree with Alex Kagame that Revival in Ankole and elsewhere was a supplement to education and an alternative means of civilisation especially for the converts who had not enjoyed the benefits of western education.²⁹⁹ Revival's "civilisation" replaced the traditional education. Instead of sitting around the evening fire for instruction and story telling, the fellowship groups, often arranged in a similar pattern, provided an alternative to a practice which was unfortunately being replaced by the western classroom. In the fellowship Balokole did not only concentrate on the Bible, they also spared time to emphasise hygiene, good stewardship, family relations and counselling. One Revivalist told me that the reason they emphasised hygiene was because they believed that "cleanliness was next to godliness".³⁰⁰ Revivalists were among the first people to accept western medicine though at the expense and "death" of traditional medicinal herbs. Had such herbs been promoted alongside western medicine, they could have been an alternative supplement. I do not hold this against the Revivalists any more than I do against the missionaries whose teaching shunned as bad most African values!

On the whole Revival signified spiritual commitment and emphasised hard work:

The disconcerting fact is that evangelical Christianity, with its gospel of individual conversion, the good news of rescue and the power to be different, not only appeals to, but also creates a *bourgeoisie*. The Revival movement for example calls peasant and herdsmen to rise above the rack, morally and spiritually. In a very short time they have inevitably risen above it socially. Money that was spent on drink or women or divination is put in the home. In a few years husband and wife are justifiably proud of their house, of their children, and of their reputation. Even the simple old village women have a new outlook; in relation to the peasant society, they are the evolues of society. A new class is being created, fashioned by the gospel in alliance with modern alignment.³⁰¹

²⁹⁹ Kagame op. cit., p. 165.

³⁰⁰ Interview: Yuda Nyondo, retired, September 6, 1996, Ruharo.

³⁰¹ Mark Winter, "The Balokole and the Protestant Ethic-A Critique", *Journal of religion in Africa*, vol. XIV, Leiden, 1983, p. 61.

Generally Revival encouraged its members to think of laziness as sinful. As a result work was taken as part of their spirituality. They believed in self-sufficiency because *oweishemwe tashega*, (brethren do not beg). Such upward social mobility of most Balokole in Ankole is a testimony of their hard work. The association between hard work, laziness and Christian keenness is evident in Joe Church's notes, some of which testify to the efforts of the Revivalists known to me:

I wish you could see everyone, from Kosiya Shalita downwards, hard at work cultivating the soil. [And in the usual European egoism], We had a great deal of difficulty about getting this started when we first came here as the African is, left to his own, bone lazy and those in receipt of mission, they wanted to be exempted and did not cultivate as they should. But now we are getting splendid fruits [enjoying without working] and they are enjoying the results of the sweat of their brows, and are all the better for it in every way...³⁰²

Of course the Revivalists had the advantage of associating with the missionaries who were sparing with their resources. The Revivalists adopted the practice of not being "wasteful and extravagant". The 1950s and the 1960s were years of economic boom in Uganda from increased coffee and cotton production. In addition, Revivalists' children who had gone to school were in the sixties graduating from colleges as the country's elite and taking up jobs in independent Uganda. Most leading post independence leaders in Ankole and in Uganda were sons of the Revivalists or church workers. William Rwetsiba's father was the first clergyman in Ankole, Adonia Tiberondwa's mother was a renowned evangelist, Yoweri Museveni, the current President of Uganda, Grace Ibingira and Milton Obote (the first executive Prime Minister in a post independent Uganda) came from a similar background.

It is not as Kikuri claims that Revivalists were able to educate their children because Balokole children were given priority in admissions to mission controlled schools.³⁰³ The Balokole were quick to take the advantage of the available educational opportunities, perceiving their first obligation to be their children's education. It was a cause of rapid social transformation in colonial Uganda and the Balokole were among

³⁰² See Mrs Sharp letters in Kagume op. cit., p. 171.

³⁰³ Interview: Ezra Kikuri, June 12, 1997, Bushenyi.

those who grasped the opportunity. They regarded education more highly than most other social groups in Uganda and so were in the vanguard. Catherine Robins agrees. In her

survey of students in one of the two formerly Protestant schools...provided additional indirect confirmation of the effects of the "progressive" economic and social ethic of the brethren particularly as it relates to education...Among a sample including all students in the first two years, 65 percent reported that one or both of their parents were Balokole. As there is no evidence to suggest systematic over selection of children from such families for the available places in the secondary school this...must be taken as further evidence of the extraordinary importance attached by the brethren to education. In a population where Balokole comprise no more than 5 -10 percent of the baptised church members, the prevalence of their children in secondary schools, which still serve as a major channel of mobility, suggest that revival community as a whole is experiencing a process of rapid transformation.³⁰⁴

Lastly and perhaps equally important was Revival's ability to raise the social status of women. Ankole culture before the coming of Christianity and Revival was so oppressive to women that they were not allowed talking amidst men, or eating foods such as goat meat and chicken. One informant told me how his father was opposed to his mother's membership in the Revival because he was worried that she would be "uncontrollable". He said to her, *naiwe noyenda kuba kyeyombekire*, an expression that applies to unmarried women because they determine their own pace in the absence of a man to do it for them. Thus commenting on the Revival's attitude to women, Sundkler asserted:

Revival has lifted hundreds of women and given them a new role, a new sense of personal worth. I do not know of any factor in East Africa, which to that extent has served to emphasise equality between sexes.³⁰⁵

Monica Wilson also observed of Christianity generally:

³⁰⁴ Robins, op. cit. P. 362.

³⁰⁵ Bengt Sundkler, "Worship and Spirituality", in Gray, Fashole-Luke, et al, (eds.), *Christianity in Independent Africa*, London: Rex Collings, p. 551.

If the change in social relationships between men and women is to be the greatest world revolution of the twentieth century, altering the nature of human relationships more profoundly than the Russian or Chinese revolutions or even the emergence of the Third World, then the Churches in Africa are uniquely placed to take over a major part in this.³⁰⁶

However, whereas as seen above Revival went along away to bridge the ethno-political tensions between Bairu and Bahima, for example through the former's hard work and education for their children, both of which raised their socio-economic status and even through such other teachings as "walking in light" and public confessions, it may be argued that the ethnicity element never died in both groups. For example, one of the signs that would have indicated that the ethno-centrism element especially among the Bahima died, as a result of their total commitment to the gospel of Revival, would have been intermarriage. However as far as the researcher is aware, there were no Bahima men Revivalists who married Revivalist Bairu women even when Bairu would have been more than ready to marry Bahima for socio-economic status reasons. A further proof of the point in question is that even when by the sixties marriages between Revivalists were arranged by the Revival fellowship meetings and not individuals, few Bahima women accepted Bairu men.

Another proof that Revival never completely eradicated ethno-centrism in each of the Bairu and Bahima camps, is the fact that with the advent of party politics, the majority of Bahima Protestants allied with Catholics to vote DP and in order to alienate Bairu Protestants. As far as Bahima were concerned, the Catholic Bairu were not a threat to the Bahima because, having used them as ladders to achieve their ethnic interests, the former would be thrown back to join fellow Protestant Bairu under the latter's subjugation. The tactic was that by joining the Catholics, the Bahima would reduce Protestant numbers thereby increasing the Catholic numbers to defeat the Protestant Bairu. This kihima political manoeuvre made the Protestant Bairu Revivalists fall back to their fellow Protestant UPC Bairu in order to defend themselves against the said alliance.

³⁰⁶ Monica Wilson, "Co-operation and Conflict: The Eastern Cape Frontier", in M. Wilson and L. Thompson (eds.), *South Africa to 1870*, Oxford, 1969, p. 266.

A recent indication that confirms the failure of Revival to uproot the ethno-political centrism from the two ethnic groups is when in 1992 during the Synod, the Bahima, minority as they are, demanded for a separate diocese in the Northeast of Ankole diocese. True the majority of the inhabitants in this part of Ankole are not Bahima. However on the pretext that this area comprising two counties of Kazo and Nyabushozi is traditionally known to be a Bahima area, the later hoped they would gain an upper hand in the administration of the new diocese. The thinking behind this was that such a new diocese would be a forerunner of their own civic/political district in which they would be free from the Bairu majority dominance.

It may be observed therefore that Revival has not entirely succeeded in bridging the ethnic differences between the Bairu and the Bahima mainly because each of the two groups has a distinct culture from the other and is proud to preserve it. Having argued thus, the ethnic differences in Ankole have not been as grave as it is in Rwanda mainly because of two reasons; the positive influence of the church and Revival in particular and the upward social mobility of Bairu thanks to the cash economy. In a way they no longer see Bahima as a privileged class. In fact Bairu see themselves as having superseded Bahima economically and this has neutralised what would have been otherwise an explosive situation of the 1940s.

CHAPTER FOUR

4. DISASTER FOR THE CHURCH IN ANKOLE: THE AMIN PERIOD

1971 - 1979.

4.0. INTRODUCTION.

Amin's regime had a lasting impact on the politics of the country, and Ankole in particular. Political opponents, both real and imagined, were eliminated, especially prominent UPC and some DP supporters while others fled into exile. Though initially populist and received with widespread jubilation, Amin soon showed his true colours. Perhaps that is why in Ankole, Amin was received with mixed feelings, for, as Ezra Kikuri³⁰⁷ comments, the people of Ankole were already too divided to choose between Obote and Amin: there were political party (UPC-DP) divisions, UPC liberals vs. UPC radicals, as well as the Bairu-Bahima power struggles.

Amin's rule stifled the religious, ethnic and political party bickering that had characterised the Obote era. For Amin soon began to surround himself with his own Kakwa, Madi and Lugbara tribesmen, in the army and government, as well as Muslims, and Sudanese-Nubian mercenaries. For the first time in the history of Christianity in Ankole, Catholics and Protestants were united against a common *enemy*. Political conflicts and party loyalties were forgotten and the Bairu-Bahima conflict in Ankole was shelved in Amin's massacres by the dreaded State Research Bureau which was carrying out political, ethnic and religious (Christian) persecution.

In this chapter therefore, I argue that whereas initially various forces had welcomed Amin in Ankole, as early as 1972, they began to withdraw after many Banyankole were killed. Secondly, contrary to the popular view that the Catholic Church welcomed Amin due to its DP inclinations, it was as reserved about Amin as the Anglican church. The two Churches were uncertain how the Muslim leader was likely to treat Christianity. The Anglican Church had more reason to be sceptical of Amin for he had toppled an establishment of which they had been a part. And though

Muslims welcomed and supported Amin, this does not mean that all Muslims in Ankole consequently participated in the murder of Amin's opponents. It is true that Amin persecuted political opponents who happened to be Christians, but by 1974, Amin had identified the Christian church, as being against his regime. Consequently he charged against it and the collision resulted in the death of the Anglican Archbishop Luwum. Hence Amin's indiscriminate persecution of people in Ankole brought down religio-political and ethnic antagonisms and brought all the vulnerable groups into a strong opposition to the regime.

4.0.1. THE PERILOUS ASCENT TO POWER.

What caused Amin's usurpation of power in Uganda? Four major factors can be cited. The role of the military in the 1966 crisis which brought the army to the fore. In his bid to subdue Buganda and other opponents, Obote had arrested Grace Ibingira and four other ministers because Daudi Ochieng (Member of Parliament) sought a vote of no confidence against Obote's government after the gold scandal. Obote had hastily promoted Colonel Amin, his most trusted Officer, to Army Chief of Staff in direct command.³⁰⁸ When Idi Amin and the army engaged in the bloody attack on the Kabaka's Lubiri (Palace) on May 24, 1966, massacred loyalists and overthrew the Mengo government by force of arms, Obote created a dangerous precedent. He taught the army the means of repression which they later applied against him. It gave Idi Amin (then promoted to Major General) power to challenge Obote when occasion offered. His policies, particularly his 1969 "move to the left", a socialist manifesto which resulted in the "Common Man's Charter" met with great suspicion from the local middle class, his political opponents and the international community that was already sensitive to the cold war Soviet-Western tensions. As Garth Glentworth notes, the Army was quick to exploit these suspicions:

³⁰⁷ Interview: Ezra Kikuri.

³⁰⁸ See for instance; Campbell Horace, *Four Essays on neo-colonialism in Uganda: The military Dictatorship of Amin*, CNTU, Ontario, 1975; S. Karugire, *A Political History of Uganda*, Nairobi: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980; James Mittleman, *Ideology and Politics in Uganda: From Obote to Amin*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Amin and his friends in the army, Cabinet Ministers like Felix Onama in Defence, Senior Public Servants, politicians and party officials - all of them saw the "move to the left" as a strategy to exclude them from access to power, wealth and status, as a threat to their personal safety and as a series of steps to increase the domination of Obote's own tribe, the Langi, and to a lesser extent the Acholi, over other tribes....³⁰⁹

Obote's divide and rule tactics promoted tribal hostility between the Langi and the Acholi and the other groups, both in the army and civil service. Similar sectarian scheming had brought Amin, an illiterate non-commissioned officer, to a position in which he influenced the chain of command. Because of Amin's threat, Obote promoted his tribesmen. In the end, supporters of Amin and Obote were headed for bloody confrontation. In his testimony to the *Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Violation in Uganda*, Adimola reports that after 1966, both Obote and Amin started recruiting clansmen into the national army, which created conflicting camps. He asserts that it was this division that led to the military coup of 1971.³¹⁰ Major General Francis Nyangweso and General Mustafa Adrisi (who was Amin's Vice President in 1977) confirm the existence of this division in the army, and that Amin's faction architected the coup.³¹¹ Mustafa Adrisi in his testimony says:

Amin had been sent to Cairo to represent government at the burial of Nasser. During his absence, Obote convened a meeting of Langi and Acholi officers where Amin was accused of killing Okaya. It was therefore resolved that Amin should be killed.... We were informed of such a meeting by the late Oboth Ofumbi. We rang Amin in Cairo. When he returned we waited for, and received him at Entebbe Airport and escorted him to the Command Post.... So, when Obote was going to Singapore, he left orders that he wanted to find Amin dead. So a plot was hatched by Langis and Acholis in the Army to have Amin arrested and killed but Amin had his own intelligence and discovered the plot on time. Only Langi and the Acholis were armed and they started secret meetings. We became suspicious. West Nilers started beating up those in meetings and dispersing them.... West Nile boys went and used nails to start the

³⁰⁹ Garth Glentworth and Ian Hancock, "Obote and Amin: Change and Continuity in Modern Uganda Politics", in *African Affairs*, October 1973, p. 247.

³¹⁰ *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violation of Human Rights*, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Kampala, 1994, pp. 23-24, (Hereafter Commission of Inquiry).

³¹¹ *ibid.*

engines of APCs for breaking the door to the armoury. So we got armed and that marked the end of Obote's government.³¹²

Finally, it can be noted from the above testimony that Amin's coup was also a bid to save his neck. It was not only because of his factional intrigues that he felt threatened but also because of his dubious deals and the stealing of the army funds. The Auditor-General's report had unearthed the embezzlement of 30-40 million shillings from army funds and Amin and Felix Onama were required to account for the money upon Obote's return from the Commonwealth conference in Singapore.³¹³ On 24 January 1971, Obote's plan to have Amin arrested failed. The following day, on 25 January 1971, Amin took power and issued 18 reasons for the coup d'etat. The long list accused Milton Obote of abuse of human rights, biased tribal promotions, disappearance of people, abolition of kingdoms, detention without trial and many others. It is ironical that none of the remedies promised were fulfilled. Amin capitalised on Obote's unpopularity and hoped to be accepted on that ground. But the 18 reasons seen from now appear to have been Amin's manifesto for his dictatorship. The only purpose they served throughout his rule was to provide a yardstick by which his crimes against humanity could be judged.

4.0.2. MIXED REACTION IN ANKOLE.

Amin's take over was received with widespread jubilation especially in Buganda. The Baganda had every reason to celebrate the ousting of a man who not long ago had attacked their Kabaka's palace, massacred royalty, abolished their kingdom, erased their privileges, subjected Buganda to a state of emergency and condemned their king to exile in London where he later died.³¹⁴ No doubt Obote had desecrated their kingdom and Amin, the man who had led the palace attack, was now their Messiah. The Anglican Bishop of West Buganda was quick to describe Amin as a "redeemer"

³¹² *ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

³¹³ E. Muhima, *The Fellowship of Suffering: A Theological Interpretation of Christian Suffering under Amin*, PhD dissertation, Northwestern University, 1981, p. 15.

³¹⁴ See Kirunda-Kivejinja, 1995, *Uganda: The Crisis of Confidence*, Kampala: Progressive Publishing

and "the light of God."³¹⁵ Perhaps to make the Baganda forget his own role in the demise of their Kingdom, Amin ended the six-year martial law in Buganda, and in May 1971³¹⁶, returned the body of Kabaka Muteesa II for burial with full honours and a lot of pomp; five days of national mourning were declared. As Judith Listowel has put it, Amin knew he had to appease the Baganda, so "the Kabaka's funeral was very important and his personal prestige depended not only on its taking place but also on its being done well."³¹⁷

In Ankole, however, the population was apparently so divided that Amin was received more with mixed feelings than outright celebration, especially among the elite who had been very active in the partisan politics of the sixties. I stress the elite because of the nature of politics in Ankole then. Though the Protestant elite in Buganda had been thoroughly alienated by 1971, there was a substantial group of Protestant politicians, especially the Bairu, in Ankole who still supported Obote. And one of the reasons why the history of the two areas is different is that Amin seemed to have had a problem with what to do with that big, powerful influential group of people with many followers. While there was ready-made support in Buganda, Amin needed to work hard to gain similar support in Ankole. Amin's mixed reception was the result of the religio-political cleavages that had divided the Ankole society.

Certainly DP members in Ankole, mainly Bairu Catholics and Bahima Protestants, had cause to celebrate the ascent of Amin for they had been suppressed in Ankole politics. As one anonymous DP supporter said, DP as a party quietly welcomed Amin's coup as its opportunity to return to the political forum. While UPC in Ankole was going underground for fear of political repression, DP had resurfaced with a hope that it would start influencing political events.³¹⁸ But this was a short-lived expectation. Amin soon banned all political parties. The UPC liberals (*Omufunguro*) had also celebrated Obote's exit, for by the time of the Amin coup they

House.

³¹⁵ See, *The New Day* newspaper of 27 January 1971, quoted in Muhima op. cit., p. 27.

³¹⁶ See Adam, Seftel, 1994, *Uganda: The Bloodstained Pearl of Africa and its Struggle for Peace*, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, pp. 94-95.

³¹⁷ Judith Listowel, 1973, *Amin*, New York: IUP Books, p. 85.

³¹⁸ Interview: Anonymous, June 12, 1997, Ruti-Mbarara.

had almost become another "opposition party" within a party. This therefore explains why certain groups welcomed Amin's coup in Ankole on one hand and why the reaction of the Banyankole can be described as "mixed". Dr. Tiberondwa recounts the scenario after the coup:

When Amin took over, the militant UPC led by Bananuka was associated with Obote who was overthrown. The Kahigiriza group, which had been more dilute UPC, tended to be closer to Amin and he was closer to them because Amin had overthrown Obote who had leaned more towards the UPC Enkomba in Ankole. The Kahigiriza group tended to support Amin's coup.³¹⁹

Actually Bahima pastoralists gave Idi Amin 700 cattle as a sign of appreciation when he visited Ankole in August 1971.³²⁰ The Ankole elders (a newly coined category of hand-picked notables assumed to represent public opinion) in their memorandum to Idi Amin on 23 August 1971 in Mbarara, talked of an even grander reception for the take over:

Your Excellency, permit us also to take this opportunity on behalf of the people of Ankole to thank you for the honour you did us and the love you showed us by visiting our district only a few days ago. Your visit, which had been long and anxiously awaited, was hailed by thousands of people in Ankole, as it enabled you to see for yourself the undoubted support that your Excellency commands in the district.³²¹

The magnitude of the "undoubted support" seems to be exaggerated. This is not surprising. Some of the Elders question the authenticity of this memorandum.³²² "The undoubted support" gives the impression that Amin was overwhelmingly welcomed in Ankole. Though the various groups may have welcomed him as an alternative to UPC and Protestantism, they were also aware that Amin had never been in their camp. He was never DP, a Catholic, a Muhima or even a UPC *Omufunguro*.

³¹⁹ Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, June 25, 1997, Kampala.

³²⁰ Interviews: Yowasi Makaru, 29 March 1997 and Ezra Kikuri. See also Rev Aaron Mwesigye's, (then a primary school boy) poem praising Amin's heroism when the later visited Kazo Primary School in 1971.

³²¹ *Uganda News*, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Kampala, 24 August 1971. Quoted from M. Doombos, *Regalia Galore: The Decline and Eclipse of Ankole Kingship*, Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975, p. 141.

³²² It is thought that Amin influenced the authorship of these Elders' Memoranda to "decampain" the Buganda demands for the monarchy restoration.

4.1. AMIN, THE MONARCHY AND POLITICAL PARTIES.

One of the things on Amin's agenda was to suspend political party activities.³²³ He specifically targeted political parties and the renewed agitation of Baganda monarchists for the restoration of the abolished Kingdoms. It was clear from the outset that Amin neither supported the monarchists nor any multi-party system although he was quick to arrange, for public relations purposes, a grandiose funeral for the Kabaka of Buganda. He declared that the people would be '...free to join any political party and will be free to vote for the people they want.'³²⁴ In their memorandum to General Idi Amin Dada on 24 August 1971, the elders, *Bataka*, of Buganda, boldly pointed out that:

Baganda had never known what independence is until you liberated us on 25th January 1971. This is why we went wild with joy and jubilation.³²⁵

They pointed out their major grievances against Obote. He had abolished their Kingdom and "ordered us not to mourn over our dead king and used guns to disperse those who had gone to pray for the dead at Namirembe."³²⁶ The Baganda resented Obote so much that they hailed Idi Amin as a saviour, and Amin, well knowing that he had been the chief agent of Obote's aggression on Mengo, had to appease them. Bishop Yoramu Bamunoba says:

The Baganda were excited because they expected the return of the monarchy. That is why Amin returned the Kabaka's body immediately. The Baganda had thought that the return of the Kabaka's body was a sign of good will for the monarchy. But Amin was foresighted enough and disassociated himself from it. In any case he had been behind the destruction of the Lubiri.³²⁷

³²³ See M. Doombos, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

³²⁴ See point No. 4, in his 18 points; see also Muhima, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

³²⁵ *Uganda News*, Ministry of Information and broadcasting, Kampala: 24 August 1971. Quoted in Martin Doombos, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

³²⁶ *ibid.*, p. 145.

³²⁷ Yoramu Bamunoba, Interview, 24 June 1997.

That is why the Baganda had expressed concern in August 1971, over:

...the very important issue being spoken about, almost in a propaganda form, particularly in our two English daily papers, over the radio and UTV, against the restoration of kingship in Buganda.³²⁸

It seems to me that Amin was mobilising for anti-monarchy sentiments to eclipse Buganda's demands as a national issue versus parochial nationalism. He got the support he needed: the elders of Kigezi in their strongly worded memorandum completely disassociated themselves from Buganda's desire to restore the monarchy, calling it "a retrogressive step."³²⁹ In Ankole, the elders³³⁰ (1971) were quick to repudiate the Baganda plea for the monarchy:

Your Excellency, in our view, the question concerning the restoration of kingdoms is one of those crucial matters, which we feel should not be raised or even discussed in the second Republic of Uganda because of the following reasons:

(a) It is your declared policy that all political activities are suspended at the present time. The restoration of the kingdoms would most likely revive political divisions and factionalism contrary to the declared policy of government. It is our view that if Uganda is to develop as a strong united sovereign nation, any divisive tendencies must not be allowed to emerge. (b) The country at the moment faces a very heavy deficit, the country's financial position can not therefore sustain any expenditure connected with the restoration of the kingdoms. In addition, the kingship imposes all sorts of indirect taxation, all of which are undesirable.

(c) Present circumstances demand that all our efforts and resources in the second Republic of Uganda should be concentrated on the economic and social reforms of the country for the benefit of many, instead of being used to enhance the prestige of a few individuals. (d) The people in district kingdoms have in the past shown a tendency of divide and rule loyalty between their former rulers and central government. For the military Government to consolidate its programme of re-organising unimpeded a situation which tends to create divided loyalty among the people must be avoided at all costs. (e) The 18 points declared by the soldiers on the take over of government included the statement that Uganda will continue to be a Republic. This was further repeated at the State House, Entebbe, where the

³²⁸ See M. Doombos, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

³²⁹ *ibid*, p. 150.

³³⁰ We need to note that the idea of Elders in Ankole is rather a vague term because it can be a changing combination of different groups according to the political situation at the time. For instance the elders surrounding the Omugabe were different from the elders who are involved in modern politics.

representatives of the royal families were present. It would be going back on the soldier's word if we started talking about the restoration of kingdoms. Government must not give in to pressures of this kind.³³¹

Whether or not the above strong worded message represented popular will, or was purely sponsored by Amin for propagandist purposes against Buganda, is hard to establish, but what is clear from its signatories is that it was representative of Ankole's political leadership; Bairu and Bahima, Protestants, Catholics, and Muslims as well as various party functionaries. Significant is the fact that the former Omugabe of Ankole gave it his blessing. To quote Doornbos:

...the Ankole memorandum's greatest significance lay perhaps not in argumentation or even its endorsement, but in the fact that the representatives who submitted it to General Amin included Ankole's ex-Omugabe, Gasyonga II. This rather unique fact - an ex-king requesting the non-restoration of kingship - appears important no matter which of two possible motives might have been at play: whether it was Gasyonga's own will and initiative to be included among the party, or whether others had pressed him to lend his name on it.³³²

The king could have acted out of fear, for Idi Amin had been to visit him at his home and had reportedly offered him some unspecified assistance, before he denounced the monarchy.³³³ It may therefore be a political gimmick from Amin. He was like President Kongi, in Wole Soyinka's *Kongi's Harvest*, who wanted the traditional king, Oba Danlola, to hand over the symbolic Yam to him after the harvest as a sign of political submission.

As in Buganda, Idi Amin made gestures to appease the Ankole monarchists who hated the previous regime. He was often reported in the press courting the company of Omugabe Gasyonga and he appointed Prince Barigye, the Omugabe's son, as an Ambassador though barely a year later, the latter quit the diplomatic service when

³³¹ *Uganda News*, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Kampala, Uganda, 24th August 1971, quoted in Doornbos, op. cit., pp. 195-197. Some of these elders are still living but were not ready to comment about the authenticity of this quotation. Rather than deny it, many simply said that they did not remember it.

³³² *ibid*, pp. 193-194.

³³³ Interview: Yowasi Makaru, June 16, 1997, Butsibo.

Amin murdered his younger brother, Ruhinda, a lawyer, in 1972.³³⁴ James Kahigiriza, the ex-Enganzi and a die-hard monarchist, was made the Chairman of Uganda Land Board. These gestures to monarchists were sheer political opportunism, for Amin had declared in the press that he would never restore the kingdoms as long as he was President of Uganda.³³⁵ Although he courted the Omugabe, it is clear that he expected an anti-monarchy response from Ankole. Unlike Buganda, Amin knew that Ankole needed no convincing. He was aware of the Bairu Protestants' hatred for the monarchy and, since they formed the majority of the Ankole society, Amin was prepared to use it for his own political advantage. Therefore, when Amin sought to subject Buganda's monarchy demands to a nation-wide democratic debate, and urged Buganda to lobby for support in District Councils of the former kingdoms, he was already sure of success in his plan to thwart Buganda's hopes and abolish the Kabakaship.

Amin summoned all the former traditional rulers and elders from all parts of the country to State House Entebbe. Many went with their traditional drums ready for a celebration, expecting that he had called them to announce the restoration of their old glories. After a very lavish meal, monarchists had the rude shock of hearing Lt. Col. Ocima read a statement, allegedly on behalf of soldiers in the Uganda armed forces, giving full power to General Amin to rule for at least five years and spelling out clearly that there would be no return of Kings and Kingdoms. According to Bukabeba, "their drums which had come sounding to State House, went back as heavy loads on their backs or as chairs in the lorries and Vans in which they travelled."³³⁶ From then on, enthusiasm began to wane among the monarchists.

We need not be surprised that Amin had no interest in restoring the monarchies. He hailed from a district where traditional chiefs did not have the same influence and power as kings. If Amin were to restore the monarchy, then he would have been undermining his own political base. It is unlikely that monarchists would have given him the same respect as they would their king. Amin had courted monarchists when in

³³⁴ James H. Mittleman, *Ideology and Politics in Uganda: From Obote to Amin*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, p. 237.

³³⁵ *Uganda Argus*, 11 October 1971.

need of support. They had been oppressed under the previous regime and if he could identify with them, then in return they would support him. But after he had established himself, Amin realised that he no longer needed them. His power base now was his tribe, his religion and to a large extent his mentors, the Arab world.

We now turn our attention to a brief discussion of Idi Amin's attitude to political parties, notably UPC and DP. In a meeting with all Permanent Secretaries and Heads of Security two days after his take over, Amin had initially promised that he would restore those political parties which Obote had banned, and that Obote's UPC would be allowed to participate. Even ex-President Obote was free to return home as a private citizen.³³⁷ Consequently, 55 political detainees of the previous regime, including the five former ministers, were all released. The significance of this release lies in the fact that Grace Ibingira, a Munyankole monarchist and a very close relation of the Omugabe of Ankole, was one of them. However, at the time of his arrest in 1965 Ibingira's political manoeuvres to install Kahigiriza as the *Enganzi* of Ankole against the popular wish had made him unpopular, and therefore his release was greeted with little enthusiasm especially among the UPC radicals. But for the Bahima, the release of Ibingira was a sign of good will from Amin and consolidated their trust in him. Ibingira was immediately appointed Uganda's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Though Amin might have appointed seasoned politicians like Ibingira or Ben Kiwanuka³³⁸ on their own merit, it was true that he did it in order to keep them within his shooting range, for, as events were to prove soon, Amin would vouchsafe no form of dissension.

On 15 March 1971, he issued the Suspension of Political Activities Decree, which went against the 18 reasons in which he had accused Obote of, "the lack of freedom in the airing of different views on political and social matters."³³⁹ On the whole people

³³⁶ Interview: Emmy Bukabeba, May 22, 1997, Kakyeka.

³³⁷ See Muhima, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19.

³³⁸ Kiwanuka who Amin had appointed the Chief Justice of Uganda immediately after his release was killed on Friday 22 September 1972, a week after the abortive guerrilla invasion from Tanzania. See his biography by Albert Bade, *Benedicto Kiwanuka: The Man and his Politics*, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, p. 160.

³³⁹ See Jan Jelmert Jorgensen, *Uganda: A Modern History*, London: Billing and Sons, 1981, Chapter 6.

in Ankole were rather indifferent to the ban on political parties.³⁴⁰ The fear and force of the previous regime and the conflicts between the parties had left them uninterested.³⁴¹ When parties were banned, in Ankole, Amin was hailed as a champion of unity by a society exhausted by the political skirmishes of the past. With the UPC ruling party in hiding, DP had no cause to protest since it was already powerless. According to Bonefasi Byanyima:

We hailed Amin the more when he banned parties for we, as DP had nothing to lose, at least for the time being. We welcomed it as an opportunity to reorganise in the hope that we would later emerge in a strong position.³⁴²

That opportune moment never came. The ban remained in effect until 1980 when fresh elections were held under a new regime. Instead of seeing the ban imposed on parties as Amin's move to suffocate freedom of expression, people in Ankole welcomed it as a positive alternative to what they had been subjected to. Under the new law, not more than three people were to be seen together at any one given time except of course if they were a family. The banning of parties in Ankole created two positive results. One was that people shelved their political differences and got on well together. Secondly, people who had previously been politicians and who had not gone into exile or been killed began to be actively involved in church activities.³⁴³ Such were politicians like Yowasi Makaru and Francis Bagarukayo (later ordained).

³⁴⁰ Interview: Joram Kahenano, July 22, 1997, Kampala.

³⁴¹ Interview: Rev. George Nkoba, May 4, 1997, Ibanda.

³⁴² Interview: Bonefasi Byanyima, June 16, 1997, Ruti-Mbarara.

³⁴³ Interview: Bishop William Magambo, August 15, 1997, Bweranyangi.

4.2. AMIN AND THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

When we were analysing the various forces that did or did not welcome Amin's regime in Ankole, we said that DP welcomed it. Since DP was associated with the Catholic Church, we might assume that the Catholic Church³⁴⁴ in Ankole also welcomed Amin. But both the Catholic and Anglican churches were apprehensive of a Muslim leader of 'what we had come to take for granted as a Christian country' as one Bishop put it. On the other hand, Amin's ascent to power was not a surprise to the church. According to Bishop John Kakubi, it had received so many shocks over political antagonisms that nothing Amin could do would surprise them. However, the church seemed to have given Amin the benefit of the doubt especially when he advertised himself as a "God fearing man"³⁴⁵ and when five days after his coup, he held a conference at which he urged the religious leaders to admonish him if he went wrong. Bishop Amos Betungura, the Anglican Bishop at the time, said that though the church was initially reserved about Amin and doubtful about his usurpation of power:

We were consoled by the fact that, that Muslim leader unlike others did not shy away from confirming to the country that he believed in God. This was rare of leaders we had in the past.³⁴⁶

Even Bishop Kivengere, a man who later became Amin's stern critic, could not hide his admiration of the optimism he found in the country on his return from his Evangelistic mission in Papua, New Guinea:

The Anglican Archbishop told me with some amazement that the new Muslim President had urged all Ugandans to be faithful in worship at their churches or Mosque. He said to the archbishop with a thumb

³⁴⁴ DP and the Catholic Church have often been seen to be the same thing but this is wrong. The Catholic Church is an institution whose followers happen to identify with DP. Thus the distinction in this case is a structural one since the two are governed differently.

³⁴⁵ See Louise M. Pirouet, "Religion in Uganda under Amin", in *Journal of Religion in Africa XI*, 1980, p.17; See also Garth Glentworth and Ian Hancock, "Obote and Amin: Change and Continuity in Modern Uganda Politics", in *African Affairs*, October, 1973, p. 247; and "Speech by HE, The president Idi Amin Dada, on the Occasion of Meeting religious Leaders of Church of Uganda at Namirembe", 26 April, 1971; Also in Akena Adoko, *From Obote to Obote*, New Delhi: Vicas Publishing House, 1983, p. 142.

³⁴⁶ Interview: Bishop Betungura, August 12, 1997, Ruharo.

on the back, "Archbishop, I want your help and advice. If you see anything wrong, come to me at once."
We were astonished and pleased.³⁴⁷

Perhaps surprisingly, it was the Anglican Church in Ankole which was first to send a congratulatory message to the new regime:

At the meeting of the Diocesan Council Executive Committee of the Ankole Diocese sitting at St. James' Cathedral, Ruharo, on 5th, April, 1971; and acting in the name of the Diocese, and on behalf of the Diocesan Council, we, the members of the Executive, passed a unanimous resolution congratulating your Excellency,...on your successful take-over of the government of Uganda. The Committee recorded, with sincere loyalty to your Excellency, a vote of humble and deep appreciation of your God-fearing spirit, which is very predominant in your philosophy of life and administration. The Committee noted, with respect, Your Excellency's love of God in your life and practice, and your Excellency's principles of non-victimisation and forgiveness.³⁴⁸

And another local Parish in Bushenyi went on to liken Idi Amin to Moses who had rescued the Israelites from bondage:

I Rev. W. Tibategyeza together with the Christians of this Parish, Kyanyakatura, congratulate and welcomes [*sic*] you with your Armed forces for having taken over the government of Uganda. In Scripture it says, "When God saw that his people of Israel were suffering during the reign of Pharaoh, He sent Moses to save them." Now you are the one who is sent by God to save the people of Uganda from slavery. Indeed you Dada has saved us. Thanks be to God.³⁴⁹

One would have expected the Catholic Church to respond first because of its association with DP. In any case the Catholic Cardinal at Rubaga had already praised Amin:

³⁴⁷ Festo Kivengere, (Bishop), *I Love Idi Amin*, London: Cox & Wyman Ltd., 1977, p. 18.

³⁴⁸ See, 'Ankole Diocese Executive Committee Back the New Government, in Government File GND/R12, EAD, Mbarara.

³⁴⁹ Same File as above. By then Ankole Diocese had not been divided into two. This Parish now belongs to West Ankole Diocese - Bushenyi (created in January 1977 just two weeks before the death of Archbishop Luwum).

The Major General has saved us and he has forgiven all people who wronged him and nothing like bloodshed has taken place ever since the take over.³⁵⁰

In fact in this regard the Cardinal was deceived: there were many people especially the Langi and the Acholi who lost their lives immediately after the coup. But the Cardinal could have meant the blood of the Baganda who had been subjected to a state of emergency in the previous regime. According to Bishop Kakubi, the Catholic Church in Ankole sent no congratulation because:

the Cardinal had already sent it so I did not see the need to send another one. Catholics usually speak with one voice especially when it comes to political issues and when the Cardinal speaks he speaks for the whole Catholic Church.³⁵¹

It is true that Catholic solidarity is a fact but it may be also true that Bishop Kakubi did not fall for Amin. Perhaps Catholic hesitancy to recognise Amin could have been because Catholics had seen Muslims as allies with Protestants and were not certain how Amin would act. On the other hand the Anglican congratulation of the President did not really signify support to his regime. According to Rev. Yoramu Bamunoba, who was the Synod Secretary at the time:

We had to be seen doing something otherwise we would have been misunderstood that we did not support the President. We did it out of courtesy rather than out of conviction.³⁵²

That was indeed the case since the Anglican Church especially in Ankole had been part of the UPC establishment. Whereas the Anglican diocese of West Buganda (which never supported Obote) had praised Amin immediately after the coup,³⁵³ the Anglican Church in Ankole responded in April, two months later, an expression of its hesitation to accept Amin as the President of the country. But Amin's achievements in

³⁵⁰ See *Uganda Argus*, 2 February 1971.

³⁵¹ Interview: Bishop Kakubi.

³⁵² Interview: Bishop Yoramu Bamunoba, September 19, 1997, Kyamugorani.

³⁵³ See *Uganda Argus*, op. cit.

the first year of his reign brought him closer to the church's front pews though he was never admitted in the sanctuary.³⁵⁴ Within his first year, Amin had achieved what his predecessor had failed to do. His countrywide tours not only brought him closer to the people; they were an opportunity to visit religious institutions whose support he needed. On his tour to Ankole in August 1971, Amin made a point of attending services at Nyamitanga and Ruharo, the Catholic and Protestant cathedrals. In Ankole Amin needed to win the support of these churches which were known to support DP and UPC respectively. At Nyamitanga Cathedral Amin solicited the support of the Catholics by condemning Obote's abuse of human rights, and imprisoning gallant Ugandans such as Ben Kiwanuka. Part of his speech in the Cathedral read:

I do not need to remind you how Milton Obote harassed Ugandans and denied them their born-right freedom. He imprisoned many of our people including Ben Kiwanuka who you very well know. My rule will not allow such actions again. We are all God's people and therefore should not be harassed because we chose differently.³⁵⁵

The phrases "our people" could have been intended to remind the Catholics of their relationship with Ben Kiwanuka, first Prime Minister and DP president in the country. By stressing that people had the right to choose differently, Amin was reminding Catholics how the UPC had subjected them to a one party state. The speech appealed to Catholic feelings in Ankole. He repeated his famous dictum:

Our new Republic of Uganda will be guided by a firm belief in the equality and brotherhood of man and in peace and good will to all. Therefore, our new Republic will allow total religious freedom to everybody without any fear or favour.³⁵⁶

³⁵⁴ The sanctuary is used metaphorically that Amin was never really loved by the Christian Churches. Asked why that was the case, Bishop Betungura simply said something to the effect that "a Muslim does not take Holy Communion"!

³⁵⁵ See Bishop's File, 'Political Affairs', P/3, 1970-1977. This file is with Bishop Kakubi at his retirement home in Ibanda.

³⁵⁶ *Uganda Argus*, 25 August 1971. This is a statement Amin had made on 30 January 1971 when he addressed religious leaders just five days after the coup. He seems to have continuously used it as a catch word especially on religious functions

Amin used such religious occasions to advertise his religious convictions for he was sure of the strength of religion here. Ankole is generally a religious society, and Amin thought he could attract it to himself by rehearsing his religious commitment. Indeed the above quotation is very revealing. Equality, peace and brotherhood are the virtues which DP had been promoting and which had been appropriated by Catholics. Amin's use of similar words suggested he was the champion of similar virtues. Even then Amin's speech did not attract the same response from the Catholic Bishop in Ankole as it had done in Buganda. In his welcome speech to the President, Bishop Kakubi chose a neutral stance:

Your Excellency, within this short time since you took over the leadership of this country, you have demonstrated your desire to know and talk to your people. We pray for you that this will continue to be the case in the years that God will give you to rule this country. Your desire for unity and impartiality is the desire for the church too.³⁵⁷

Asked why Bishop Kakubi's speech did not have the same tone as the Cardinal's, Kakubi expressed his suspicion about Amin's genuine religious convictions. The Bishop was afraid that as a Muslim leader Amin was unlikely to tolerate freedom of worship. Islam was a minority religion and the Bishop thought it was likely that Amin would want to promote it unduly. What seemed to have scared him was the way Amin was interfering in religious internal matters to the extent of setting up a Department of Religious Affairs as early as May 1971. The "affairs" in question was the Kabale conference, which Amin organised to solve the likely schism threatening the Anglican Church. Two dioceses of Namirembe and West Buganda were threatening to secede from the rest of the Province.³⁵⁸ According to Bishop Kakubi that was an indicator of what was to come:

³⁵⁷ See Bishop's File, op. cit.

³⁵⁸ See Amin's Speech, *Conference of Religious Leaders - Kabale*, 19th. May 1971, in Government File No. V. EAD. Mbarara. The participants from Ankole were; Bishop Amos Betungura, Rev. Bamutungire, Venerable. Eliphaz Muhoozi, Mr. Z. C. Mungonya, A. R. Mutashwera and Rev. J. Bamunoba from COU, and the Catholics were: Rev. Fathers; B. Kamugyene, E. Nkaijanabwo, G. Loire, S. Lea, J. Rajmans and Mgr. Hillary Tibanyenda. Source, Religious File MNS, 115, Kamukuzi Archives, Mbarara.

Even before his atrocities, we began to be cautious of Amin especially when he began organising religion. He held a religious conference in Kabale, which ended up in Kampala. That to me did not augur well. For a Head of State to come to organise religion is scaring. What scared me most as we were in the International Conference centre, behind me were Sheikhs who thought I did not understand Luganda, and I over heard them talking among themselves, *Muleke kutya, eno government yaffe*, [do not be worried this is our government]. It scared me to see people identifying themselves as Muslims. We were not surprised when later Christians started changing over to Islam.³⁵⁹

Despite the Bishop's reservations, it is likely that Amin's desire to arbitrate between the two warring dioceses of Buganda and the rest of the Anglican Province was genuine. The internal wrangles within the Anglican Church if left unsolved could have spread and perhaps be exploited by the anti-government forces to create instability. It was a calculated move to win the support of the religious groups for a president who cherished unity. However, the Bishop's fears were justified. As early as February 1971, it appears that Amin had calculated that the creation of the Department of Religious Affairs would bring religious bodies under his control. In the same month, Bishop Kakubi wrote to the Ministerial Committee that was responsible for setting up this department expressing his indignation:

If a Ministry were set up, it might create misunderstanding that the religious groups were in some sense established and therefore might expect direct maintenance. This would also be likely to create misapprehension with regard to the authority of the government over the religious bodies. The obvious difficulty with this ministry...is that it might easily open the door to direct government intervention in the internal business of the churches.... It might also end in favouritism being shown to one religious group, i.e. that of the Minister whoever he may be.³⁶⁰

Few realised the implications of such a department and that is why people like Prof. John Mbiti welcomed the idea. Writing to the Secretary of the Ministerial Committee, Ministry of Religious Affairs in February 1971, Mbiti said:

³⁵⁹ Interview: Bishop John Kakubi, August 16, 1997, Ibanda.

³⁶⁰ See, Bishop's File, Government Correspondences, B/GC, This file is with Bishop Kakubi at Kagongo, Ibanda.

I see this Ministry as providing an exciting platform where the religious heritage, values, commitments and sacrifices of the different religious traditions, can be pooled together and better utilised for the good of the nation. It also provides an opportunity for closer co-operation and understanding between government and the religious communities, in the service of this country. We are very fortunate in that our leaders are religious people, and Africans are not embarrassed about expressing their religious life in practical terms. It is consistent with that heritage, therefore, to have a Ministry of Religious Affairs.³⁶¹

The speech, which President Amin gave at the Anglican cathedral at Ruharo that same day, carried a different message. Unlike in Nyamitanga, the Roman Catholic cathedral, where he repeated his religious dictum, at Ruharo, he warned the Protestants against involvement in acts of sabotage. The Anglican Church had sent him a congratulatory message, but that did not erase Amin's fears of the church as a silent force whose loyalty lay elsewhere. As Yoweri Museveni came to reveal later there were some Protestants in Ankole who had already started an underground opposition to Amin's regime. That is why Amin warned of being,

Most regrettably aware that there are a few people who have sought to cover up certain unreligious activities with nothing in mind but the promotion of their own personal, political, tribal or sectional ends, under the umbrella of religion. Government will not tolerate such activities.³⁶²

Such a strong warning from the Head of State, on his first tour, was an indicator of the reception he expected from the Protestant Church. Amin knew how closely linked to UPC it had been. Thus the "few people" he talked about made him suspicious that the Ankole Church had not severed those ties with Obote but was encouraging his return, as evidenced by the rebel invasion in Ankole in 1972. Amin was suspicious of Bishop Amos Betungura whose consecration had been supported by Ankole UPC branch two months before the coup. The fact that UPC had identified with him and been overthrown, put the new Bishop in difficulty.³⁶³ If we bear in mind that Amin's visit to Ankole was just eight months after the Bishop's consecration, then we can

³⁶¹ Prof. John Mbiti, 'Uganda Government Proposal to set up a Ministry of Religious Affairs', File JPM/5 Namirembe Archives.

³⁶² See 'Speech by H. E. The President, General Idi Amin Dada, 25 August. 1971, in Bishop's File, Government Correspondences, East Ankole Diocese, Ruharo, GC/2/34.

appreciate why Amin spoke inside the cathedral like that. Actually, throughout the Amin regime, the government suspected Bishop Betungura for his UPC connections.

We may argue therefore that, though the Churches in Ankole seemed to have welcomed Amin, they were suspicious of his regime. We could say that the churches and the government were mutually suspicious; the churches suspecting a Muslim leader and his attitude to Christianity and the Muslim leader uncertain of being accepted within the Christian circles in Ankole. But the period between January 1971 to August 1972 seems to have been a relaxed one in Ankole without much political activity taking place. Things had settled down, political parties had been banned and the monarchists had given up. There were no reported killings or abductions of people. It is the September 1972 guerrilla invasion that ended the honeymoon.

4.3. MUSLIMS IN ANKOLE.³⁶⁴

Understandably, Muslims in Ankole welcomed Amin. There were ecstatic celebrations in many Muslim centres, some of which lasted for a week. Muslim-concentrated areas like Itendero, Ishaka (Bushenyi) and Kakoba (Mbarara) demonstrated their support for the regime by singing *matali*. They were the only group that was conspicuous in identifying with Amin. Though other groups like DP or Bahima monarchists were happy to see Obote overthrown, the *new man* whom the coup had returned had less in common with them. In addition Banyankole are generally not as excitable as the Baganda, and many of the Ankole Muslims are Baganda. The Muslims had cause to celebrate. They welcomed Amin in the hope that

³⁶³ Interview: Yoramu Gucwamaingi, July 18, 1997, Ruharo.

³⁶⁴ The writer regrets to say that this section relies mainly on the interviews conducted more than on any other primary material one would have expected. There is hardly any primary material related to Muslims in Ankole. The religious files I managed to get mainly contained letters between the Christian Bishops (Betungura and Kakubi) and Governor Bashir. The lack of any written information on Muslims is due to the fact that though they were in power and had taken up all the Local Government positions, they had not been used to the information culture and therefore did not see any need to keep records. In any case nearly all of them including the Governor were illiterates who were catapulted into those offices on the basis of their religion. Secondly they had no cause to write since they were enjoying State patronage. The Christian Bishops only wrote because they were protesting against the mistreatment their followers were being subjected to.

their underdog position would at last be remedied. When Amin took power, there was hardly a Muslim in any of the local government offices, in spite of the fact that Muslims had been Protestant allies since independence. As Dixon Kamukama put it, they had only been "kingmakers"³⁶⁵ always allying with Protestants to beat Catholics so that Protestants could continue ruling.

Chapter two explained this alliance. What we can add is that though historical disadvantages militated against the spread of Islam in Ankole, they were easily accepted in Protestant Schools, but not in Catholic institutions. Despite this alliance, they were too few to make any meaningful political impact. The best they could do was to ally with the Protestants. To see this situation change with Amin, a Muslim, delighted them all the more because he was not a member of the small Muslim elite educated in Christian schools.³⁶⁶ Amin represented the crude Muslim who had received basic koranic instructions on their knees and on the veranda of a village *Mullah*. That is why they rejoiced with enthusiasm following the coup. They saw in Amin's regime a chance to advance in Ankole politics, no longer in limbo. This could be the reason why Amin did not arrest Muslims for political offences in Ankole even though they had supported UPC. In fact the District Khadi's speech on August 1971, when Amin visited Ankole, not only welcomed him, it also hinted that it was now their time to come to the forefront. The speech, which was read in Luganda, Islam's lingua franca in Ankole, went thus:

Tulina essanyu lingi okulaba nti naffe tusobola kuweleza speech kumukolo ngagunno. Omubiro ebyenyuma, twatulanga mabega netuwuliliza, nayye olwalelo twebaza katonda nti ffena tutude wamu, [We are very grateful to see that even we can give a speech on such occasion. In the past we used to sit behind in the crowd as observers but now we thank God that we are all seated together].³⁶⁷

³⁶⁵ Interview: Dixon Kamukama, May 15, 1997, Makerere University. This does not in any way mean that Muslims had any veto in who was to be made a king in Ankole. Kamukama uses the phrase rather metaphorically to mean that Muslims only swelled up the Protestant votes whenever there was to be an election.

³⁶⁶ Interview with Bishop Bakyenga, August 16, 1996, Nyamitanga.

³⁶⁷ Speech by the District Khadi, Ankole District on the visit of President Amin, in, Religious Affairs File, RA, R/2, 1971, Kamukuzi Archives, Mbarara.

Even then their hopes of political favours were only realised after the September 1972 guerrilla invasion when Amin brandished his sword at many Banyankole and expelled Asians. It was those two events that enabled Amin to sway the religious balance in favour of Muslims. After that Muslims were identified with the hated regime and suspected as informers and collaborators to a regime which killed many people. Since Amin doubted the support of Christians, he turned to Muslims. Consequently many of them were catapulted into positions of responsibility without the relevant qualifications. Many of them did not know even how to write their names. They assumed office because of their religion and allegiance to Amin. The only sector they never controlled was education. They could become county chiefs despite their illiteracy, but they could not conduct a science lesson in a classroom. In any case there were very few Muslim teachers. The teaching profession had never appealed to Muslims because it is not business oriented. Until 1979, when Amin was overthrown, Muslims occupied all local government positions except the one county of Bunyaruguru, which remained under the leadership of F. Ford, a Catholic Munyarwanda as the table below illustrates.

Table 5: A LIST OF COUNTY CHIEFS IN ANKOLE 1973-1979. ³⁶⁸

County	Majority Religion	County chief before 1971	County Chiefs after 1972
Igara	Protestants	Protestant	Muslim
Sheema	Protestants	Protestant	Muslim
Buhweju	Catholics	Catholic	Muslim
Kajara	Protestants	Protestant	Muslim
Bunyaruguru	Catholics	Catholic	Catholic
Rwampara	Protestants	Protestant	Muslim
Ibanda	Catholics	Protestant	Muslim
Kashari	Catholics	Protestant	Muslim
Nyabushozi	Protestants	Protestant	Muslim
Isingiro	Protestants	Protestant	Muslim

Nearly all these chiefs were picked from petty *ddukas* (shops) and had no relevant background. Muslim dominance could be seen as simply a reflection of what had happened before. Hence we are not blaming Amin for initiating the process since according to Gingyera-Pinycwa:

...religion and politics were [already] like Siamese twins that saw the light of day at the same time...the two had not been really separated even when independence came some eighty years later.³⁶⁹

The difference was that Protestants had not been indiscriminately appointed. They had made their way through education. Many Local Government Officials were professionals, mainly teachers, who later joined politics after independence.

³⁶⁸ Interview: Ezra Kikuri. I have not tabulated the over eighty sub-counties for they were all controlled by Muslims. Unfortunately I could not establish the names of the various County chiefs due to lack of records. Interviewees gave conflicting information so that the writer decided to leave them altogether.

³⁶⁹ *Apollo Milton Obote and his Times*, London: NOK Publishers, 1978, p. 23.

The expulsion of Asians in August 1972, became a factor in the elevation of Muslims in Ankole. After the expulsion (which Amin said was a revelation from God), most of their business was distributed to either soldiers or Muslims, who were already small-scale traders. The expulsion of Asians was welcomed by many people for, as Amin had said, local businessmen got the opportunity to take over in real business previously an Asian monopoly.³⁷⁰ As a result Muslims found themselves in well-stocked shops without the knowledge to manage them. They had become the *Mafuta mingis*³⁷¹, in a society which was beginning to feel the pangs of the economic problems the regime was creating. To be a Muslim in Ankole in the seventies carried not only political favour but also social and economic benefits, as having easy access to the essential commodities like sugar, soap, salt and fuel which were rationed. Phrases like *Haji ndiwano*, (a way of identifying oneself to a fellow Muslim distributing the rations) came to signify the extent to which they had made themselves felt. As early as 1972, Muslims could order a government official to act on their behalf as a letter from the District Commissioner to Eliphaz Laki, the County Chief of Rwampara, indicates:

I have been asked by the Chief of Ankole Muslims Haji Ruhinda to thank you for the good work and co-operation you rendered to them during the course of their meeting in your County on 19th. May 1972. I personally was happy to hear a good report of you and your subordinates and I want you to keep up with this spirit.³⁷²

In another similar incident, the District Commissioner had to write a letter to the Town Clerk Mbarara, on 20 May 1976, copied to the Commanding Officer, reprimanding him because the entrance to the main Mosque in Mbarara town was not yet repaired:

³⁷⁰ Interview: Joseph Mugisha, June, 13, 1997, Bujaga.

³⁷¹ Literally meaning 'much fat'. In this case it was a sarcastic nickname referring to the wealth of the businessmen and the opportunity to get fat.

³⁷² Mbarara Archives: Letter from the District Commissioner to Mr. Laki, in, County Chiefs File, MSN, 5/2.

I have been made to understand that the entrance of the main Mosque has for a very long time been a state of disrepair. That the Mosque authorities have been approaching you but all in vain. This letter therefore serves to direct you to respond to that Mosque as soon as you can. I hope you will take this as a matter of urgency.³⁷³

These issues became the cause of resentment from the rest of the society for they saw Muslims as conniving with Amin's regime. Many Christians in Ankole disappeared under a regime in which Muslims controlled most of the local government offices and so Muslims were seen as part of a wider group in Amin's notorious State Research Bureau. Of course in such an uncertain regime, people killed their enemies just for personal vengeance. And as Ezra Kikuri said, a quarrel over a wife or over a piece of land with a neighbour could result in one's disappearance which would all be blamed on Amin's soldiers.

Also Muslims used State patronage to propagate the Islamic faith. I am stressing the State patronage because Amin behaved as if Islam was the official religion in the country. At many of their Islamic functions, Amin would send greeting cards to all Islamic centres to be distributed to prominent Muslims as a letter from Amin's Principal Private Secretary to the District Commissioner, Mbarara confirms:

I am sending you ten (10) greeting cards on this EL-FITR day from his Excellency, for distribution to prominent Muslims in your district. You might need the help of the District Khadi in your area.³⁷⁴

It is true they did not coerce converts into Islam, though they used the State benefits to convert Christians. The glamorous Maulidis where Muslims usually meet socially and to hear Islamic teaching came to be synonymous with such conversions. Such occasions were celebrated with a lot of feasting especially on food like rice and chicken which were rare treats in those days. Hence the converts were bribed by material benefits. Indeed there were some individual conversions due to Muslim businessmen and chiefs, but Maulidis remained the main occasions. Yoramun Bamunoba confirms this:

³⁷³Mbarara Archives: Religious File, letter No. 14.

at one time a general feast was held at Mitooma (part of Igara County then), at which Mawlid was led by Sheikh Masudi. About 150 Banyankole were circumcised on the spot.³⁷⁵

The Maulidis that were held in Simba barracks, Mbarara, in December 1973, 455 people converted to Islam.³⁷⁶ The political atmosphere was so favourable that Muslims capitalised on it to win adherents. Others converted to gain political office. Force may not have been used though some situations came close to it. For instance, a letter written by J. K. Hitler, Officer in Charge of Nyabuhikye Prisons (Ibanda), to the District Khadi, and copied to the District Commissioner, Mbarara, joyfully announced the conversion of six men to Islam after an Islamic crusade in the Prison:

Nina esanyu kukutegeza nti wetwali kuwulila ekigambo kya katonda...abantu 6 (mukaga) mukomela lyafe basazewo...okuyingira edini yobu ISILAMU [I am happy to tell you that while on our evangelistic crusades here in the prison, six people accepted to become Muslims].³⁷⁷

Some of those prisoners could have been under duress or hoping they would be released if they converted to Islam. Having said that, not many Christians were converted to Islam, for Banyankole have always been prejudiced against it. Those who converted to Islam were termed as the *alefulefu*, people on the edge of society. Actually many of those converts to Islam had lapsed from Christianity and were no longer committed Christians. Islam was resisted and did not have much influence in Ankole partly because of the influence of the Revival movement and also because Islam has always been associated with Baganda. Nearly all Muslims speak Luganda which in Ankole was associated with *abayaye* or petty thieves and 'lumpen proletariat'. And circumcision, which Islam emphasises, is repugnant to Banyankole culture.

³⁷⁴ Kamukuzi Archives, Mbarara: Religious File No. MSN, 2/2, letter No. 119.

³⁷⁵ Quoted in, Abdu Kasozi, *The Spread of Islam in Uganda*, Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 91.

³⁷⁶ *ibid.*, p. 117.

³⁷⁷ Kamukuzi Archives: Letter to the District Khadi, Converts to Islam, Religious File, Ref. No. MSN. 1.

But Sheikh Kaduyu, who became District Khadi in 1972, seemed to have had close relations with the Christian Bishops. He fought hard to disassociate Islam from State entanglement. The Bishops' files at Nyamitanga and Ruharo are full of jointly written letters, with the District Khadi to the Provincial Governor, condemning:

the increasing insecurity which has led to the death of many people... There seems to be some sort of indiscriminate death all over the district and as religious leaders we are rather concerned. We hope and pray that this is your concern too and will advise ways to protect people whose lives are threatened.³⁷⁸

Actually the two Bishops confirmed that the District Khadi was a source of encouragement and worked hard to defend them when they were accused of sabotage and sending money to Tanzania to support the guerrilla activity. In the tribunal which Governor Bashir had chaired implicating Bishop Betungura in an attempt to topple the government (he was accused of importing guns, which were actually bicycles for the priests), Sheikh Kaduyu wrote a moving letter to the Governor describing the Bishop as one Kaduyu had:

known [him] from my early school days. He is a man I am not afraid of defending even in such a very sensitive issue that involves the security of our country. Mr Governor, I stand to be charged with the Bishop if at any time you have cause to doubt my testimony. I implore you, do not hurt him.³⁷⁹

Whatever could have moved the Islamic Sheikh to defend the Bishop in a case of the alleged conspiracy against the state is not known. Perhaps the Sheikh's Protestant background still "linked me with the Christian church."³⁸⁰

³⁷⁸ See Bishop's File, letter No. 6/1/1, East Ankole Diocese, 1975.

³⁷⁹ Same file as above, letter No. 22.

³⁸⁰ Interview with Sheikh Kaduyu, May 12, 1997. Though his name sounds a *kiganda* one, Kaduyu is a Munyankole from Kyeizoba, Igara, a country well known for its Protestantism. His grand parents were and some of his uncles are Christians. His father was converted to Islam as a young boy when he worked for a Muslim driver as a turn boy on a lorry, which transported Matooke from Mbarara to Kampala. The name Kaduyu was a nickname which he acquired during his school days, otherwise his real name was, Mpabaiti. But the nickname later proved to have a good omen especially in Islamic circles and he therefore chose to keep it. Its Kiganda identity opened for him chances to climb up the Islamic ladder for he was always mistaken as a Muganda.

Whereas it is true that Muslims identified with Amin's regime, they did not all participate in his machinations. Those who did were a few ruthless opportunists, who took advantage of the regime to satisfy their vices. There were many Muslims like Kaduyu who were as concerned about the district as Christians were. Amin's henchmen, who mainly came from Northern Uganda and worked in Mbarara especially as army officers could have given a false impression that all Muslims were equally to blame for Amin's actions, a conclusion that is definitely wrong.

4.4. THE 1972 GUERRILLA WAR IN ANKOLE.

If the Churches had suspected Amin, or Amin suspected the churches in Ankole, the September 17, 1972, guerrilla invasion marked a new era in which both parties waged a "cold war" against the other. I am not concerned with the details of this war for Yoweri Museveni discusses them in his book *Sowing the Mustard Seed*. My concern is the devastating effect the war left on Ankole when Amin killed people under the pretext that they had supported the guerrillas. This war, a landmark in the history of Ankole, was a guerrilla counter attack from some of Obote's men with whom he had escaped into exile in Tanzania. Though the invaders were mainly from the Langi and Acholi tribes, there were also among them UPC Bairu Protestants who had gone into exile.

After the guerrillas failed to capture Mbarara town, and their consequent repulsion by the government forces, Amin took vengeance on Ankole. It was a massacre that left many orphans and widows and soured the relationship between the Church and government. If Amin was looking for an excuse the invasion provided him a scapegoat on which to vent malevolence against the UPC. Amin had rounded up and imprisoned some Banyankole immediately after the coup, but that was simply a political "scare crow" as Ezra Kikuri put it. But the number of people who were killed after the invasion left Ankole helpless. The guerrillas provoked his wrath, for indeed they represented Obote, and moreover Yoweri Museveni, a Munyankole, was one of the guerrilla Commanders. Amin who had always doubted the Banyankole loyalty linked the invasion with the resurrection of UPC. That is why it was mainly Protestant Bairu who became victims after the failure of the September 1972 invasion. It is difficult to understand why the Tanzanian government allowed such a

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dangerous scheme to be launched from their territory when they were not sure of its success. Museveni alleges that Obote had assured the Tanzanian government that Ugandans would support him:

My understanding was that Obote fed them with wrong information, which gave the impression that there was a large fifth column of his supporters within Ugandan population at large, as well as within the army. According to this interpretation, a limited attack from outside would precipitate an internal uprising that would overthrow Amin.³⁸¹

Following the failure of the invasion, Amin's soldiers murdered people including prominent politicians, Churchmen and businessmen.³⁸² Others fled into exile. In Ankole the prime target was the UPC *Enkomba* faction, mainly Bairu Protestants. These were young radicals who had pioneered the Kumanyana movement at Mbarara High School in the 1940s and had championed the struggle against the Bahima oligarchy. Prominent Catholic politicians like Francis Tibayungwa,³⁸³ the former Administrative Secretary of Ankole District Administration, and Bazilio Bataringaya who had crossed to UPC and been made Minister of Internal Affairs by Obote, were also murdered. As the Minister of Internal Affairs, it is said that Bataringaya had chaired meetings planning to stop Amin's coup in 1971. He was dismembered alive outside Mbarara and his severed head was displayed on a pole. His wife too was

³⁸¹ Y. K. Museveni, *Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda*, London: Macmillan, pp. 57, 67.

³⁸² Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, A. Tiberondwa, Y. Bamunoba and Y. Makaru. They were Nekemia Bananuka, the first Secretary General of Ankole District Administration, Eliphaz Laki, County Chief of Rwampara, Blasio Ntundubeire, County Chief of Kajara, Alfred Rubashoka, Gombolola Chief of Bumbaire-Bushenyi, Revd. Rwabatabazi, a priest of Kabingo, Jonasani Mutembeya of Sheema and Yuda Katundu, Education Officer.

³⁸³ It is alleged that he was killed because the guerrillas captured as a result of the Mbarara invasion in 1972 were found with Ankole graduated tax tickets. Tibayungwa as the Chief Executive Officer of Ankole District Administration was the one responsible for issuing them. So he was suspected as the one who issued them out! Others say that the conflict over land between the Church of Uganda (Ankole) and the Muslims was the cause of Tibayungwa's death. As the Administrative Secretary, Tibayungwa had ruled the case in favour of the Christians, for they were the rightful owners. Muslims held it against him and when opportunity struck, they falsely accused him, (See for instance, the Administrative Secretary's letter, Ref. No. MSN. 5 to M/S Abdu Rwaheru & Co., 18 May 1972.

killed soon after allegedly, by Lt. Colonel Juma Bashir, the Muslim Governor of Southern Province whose Headquarters were at Mbarara.³⁸⁴

When he was massacring people in Ankole and elsewhere, very few people believed that those who died were actually involved in political sabotage. Many thought they died because they were Protestant UPC.³⁸⁵ But Museveni confirms that some prominent UPC in Ankole had opposed Amin's dictatorship:

I was joined by four comrades, Eliphaz Laki, the Saza Chief of Rwampara county, Ankole,...[and] Yuda Katundu. We crossed into Tanzania at Murongo on 27 January [1971]. We travelled in Laki's Volkswagen. We were driven to State House, Dar es Salaam, where we found Milton Obote and briefed him on the situation. He appeared pleased that we had come..."³⁸⁶

Many of these were rounded up and subsequently killed immediately after the abortive coup. While Eliphaz Laki and Nekemiya Bananuka were conspirators with the rebels, it is also true that Kahigiriza's Omufunguro were their chief conspirators. Museveni confirms this, as one of the major impediment to their early anti-Amin struggle:

We, who were mainly working underground in 1971 and 1972, soon discovered how dangerous it was for us as there were plenty of informers around. Our political opposition to Amin, because it was on matters of principle, was misunderstood by many to mean that we were pro-Obote. Consequently, the anti-Obote forces also opposed us until quite late in the struggle against Amin. In Ankole, for instance, during 1971 and 1972, I had to be careful of both DP supporters and the supporters of Kahigiriza's faction of the UPC called the Omufunguro - meaning a dilute UPC.³⁸⁷

Museveni continues:

At the time the political situation in Ankole, and indeed the whole of Uganda, was very difficult for underground workers like us. Because of the confusion that Obote had sown in the country, creating and

³⁸⁴ Interview: E. Rurangaranga, July 9, 1997, Ishaka.

³⁸⁵ Interview: S. Katwire, retired teacher, May 4, 1996, Bushenyi.

³⁸⁶ Y. K. Museveni, op. cit., pp. 48-48.

³⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 42.

perpetuating factional and sectarian politics, Amin's take over had been popular... not so much because people liked him, but because many had resented Obote bitterly especially in Buganda. Since the public was not properly informed, anyone who opposed Amin was thought to be an Obote supporter and this created problems for us in any areas including Ankole, Buganda and Busoga. In Ankole all the former DP supporters and Kahigiriza faction of UPC welcomed the take-over and regarded us as enemies. Operating in some of these areas was, therefore, very dangerous.³⁸⁸

Mwambutsya-Ndebesa corroborates this when he recalls that in Ntungamo, for instance, it was the DP strongman Kazoora who introduced Amin to the people.³⁸⁹ This explains why Amin initially did not persecute the Protestant Bahima and Bairu Catholics. This alliance was short lived for Amin soon killed people in Ankole indiscriminately. Amin's machinery threatened the unarmed and life became cheap. An unfavourable opinion from his forces was enough to take away a human life. This should not surprise us because most of the army had been recruited on an ethnic and tribal bias. They had joined the forces not to make sacrifices for the country, but in order to protect their ethnic or tribal interests or to make money and drive expensive cars.

Why did the guerrillas invade through Ankole? Ankole is a society of contradictions where the interplay of religio-political forces is stronger than any other part of Uganda. Whereas other areas take time for opposition to mount, in Ankole opposition is always there.³⁹⁰ The guerrillas knew they would find some support in such a district. Museveni and Muntuyera who were Banyankole led the guerrillas though the bulk of the fighters were from northern Uganda. Men like Museveni had been collaborating with the UPC in Ankole. That is why many Protestant UPC Banyankole were killed after that invasion. The guerrillas went to an area where they expected support since the alternative Lango or Acholi were far north. In any case there was the hostile Masaka-Buganda which they could not easily have penetrated by 1972. The Baganda still held Idi Amin dearly and only began to change after the death of Ben Kiwanuka in 1972. Ankole UPC although underground was still a force to

³⁸⁸ *ibid*, pp. 50-51.

³⁸⁹ Interview: Ndebesa-Mwambutsya, 26 March 1997, Makerere University.

³⁹⁰ Interview: Emmy Bukabeba, August 29, 1996, Kakyeka.

reckon with. The guerrillas hoped UPC would stage an uprising against Amin. The invasion failed and resulted in the annihilation of many Banyankole. Many people were publicly executed in their hometowns "as a lesson to those who might have harboured similar sentiments of sabotage."³⁹¹ In March 1973, James Karuhanga³⁹² was publicly executed in front of his parents in Mbarara, although he had been captured in Kyambogo, near Kampala.

The invasion failed because the guerrillas over-estimated their support in Ankole. It was too early for the invasion. The UPC contradictions and divisions were still alive and people still held bitter grievances towards the UPC *Enkomba*. That was why the populace reported most of the guerrillas that had scattered. Apart from Yoweri Museveni who scouted the area during the 18 months before the invasion³⁹³, no other guerrillas are known to have attempted to alert the people. Ezra Kikuri says that the guerrillas struck without warning or preparation:

That kind of welcome would have been there if they had organised it. But they did not prepare the ground properly so they came in unexpectedly. Their supporters did not know about them and even if they did they had not been facilitated. With that lacking many of the guerrillas were actually tracked by the people and reported to the government soldiers.³⁹⁴

Bishop Kakubi, asked whether the churches would have supported the guerrillas, said that they had not known about the invasion but if the Churches had known, they might have supported them since by 1972 Amin had alienated the Churches:

³⁹¹ Interview: Yowasi Makaru, March 24, 1997, Bushenyi.

³⁹² James Karuhanga was Munyankole UPC Youth Winger and a Lecturer at National teachers College, Kyambogo. He was also a relative of Edward Rurangaranga, himself a victim of Amin's torture. Museveni talks well of him as one of the first intellectuals with whom they were planning a guerrilla war against Amin.

³⁹³ See Yoweri Museveni's book, *The Mustard Seed*. He gives an account of how he used to scout the Southern parts of Ankole from Tanzania in the early days of Amin.

³⁹⁴ Interview: Ezra Kikuri, March 24, 1997, Bushenyi.

You see as early as 1972 we were already suspected of collecting money to send to Tanzania. Both churches no longer used words like Israel. We were not allowed to visit parishes without notifying the Governor. So that is why we would probably have welcomed the guerrillas.³⁹⁵

Apart from Bataringaya and Tibayungwa who were Catholics, the rest killed were prominent Bairu Protestants. The Anglican Church felt the persecution more than the Catholics. They had embraced UPC and been in leadership and therefore threatened opposition to Idi Amin. The Catholic Bishop said:

It was the Protestants who had long necks and when Amin's machete came levelling, it could not miss them. Catholics were like the under growth in a densely populated forest. And as you know the storm falls fast on the tall trees before the short ones are affected. That is what happened.³⁹⁶

But according to Dr. Adonia Tiberondwa the people killed

were prominent Christians and experienced government officials. Usually when the church is looking for councillors, it considers people who are eloquent, outstanding who will support the church. These people had been brought up in missionary schools where Sunday attendance was a part of the school curriculum.³⁹⁷

Amin's killings in Ankole made one major impact: people united as Banyankole against a common enemy; Amin and his regime.³⁹⁸ Amin could intimidate people into submission but the conditions he created as a result generated resolve among the people and hatred for what Museveni called a 'gang of ignoramuses...'³⁹⁹ But also such killings deprived the church of its rich Christian pillars and therefore affected the Anglican Church especially, economically. These were the elite of the time and their elimination left a big gap, which the church was not prepared to fill soon.

³⁹⁵ Interview: Bishop John Kakubi, March 22, 1997, Ibanda.

³⁹⁶ *ibid.*

³⁹⁷ Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa July 18, 1997, Kampala.

³⁹⁸ Interview: Mzee Murumba, July 10, 1996, Kafunjo.

³⁹⁸ Interview: Tiberondwa March 14, 1997. Murumba, June 11, 1997.

³⁹⁹ Museveni, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

4.5. THE BANNING OF PROTESTANT SECTS.

On 11 June, 1973, Amin's government issued the Penal (Unlawful Societies) Order, 1973, Statutory instrument No. 63, banning 12 religious organisations declared "societies dangerous to peace and order in Uganda."⁴⁰⁰ Later, on 21 February 1975, Statutory instrument No. II increased the banned religious Societies to 14.⁴⁰¹ Only the traditional churches: the Anglican Church of Uganda, the Roman Catholic Church and the Greek Orthodox Church, were allowed to operate. The small independent and Pentecostal groups were regarded with suspicion because of their foreign connections. On one occasion, the Muslim county Chief of Kashari, Ankole, arrested a Pentecostal congregation and after much interrogation, he released them to 'go back and do your work, but do not be confused by this religion brought in by the CIA'.⁴⁰² The traditional churches were feared for a different reason; the fact that they were deeply indigenous, popular institutions which commanded the loyalty of many Ugandans. But when Amin took over, they, especially the Anglican Church, had been weakened by internal factionalism and a failure to confront what Ezra Kikuri calls 'the erosion of human rights during Obote's regime.'⁴⁰³ Religious rivalries, the impact of the Catholic-Protestant tensions on party politics, helped to create the very conditions which somehow led to the military coup. Even then, the strength of the churches threatened Amin with that immovable presence when all other institutions; political parties, judiciary, monarchy, had collapsed.⁴⁰⁴ The churches were the embodiment of people's discontent with Amin's arbitrary rule. Hence Amin accused them, (Anglican

⁴⁰⁰ See *Penal (Unlawful Societies) Order, 1973, Statutory Instrument, No. 63, 11 June 1973.*

⁴⁰¹ See *Penal (unlawful Societies) Order, 1975, Statutory Instrument No. II, 21 February 1975.* The schedule of the penal order included the following: United Pentecostal Churches, Elim Pentecostal Evangelistic fellowship of Uganda; Elim Pentecostal Evangelistic fellowship of Africa; Pentecostal Assemblies of God; Uganda Church of Christ, Campus Crusade for Christ, International Bible Students Association; the navigators of Colorado; The Uganda-East African yearly meeting (Quakers), Child Evangelism of Uganda; Emmaus Bible School; Legio Maria of Africa; Jehovah's Witnesses, Conseil National De Liberation Front Commun populaire (National Council for Popular Liberation Movement or Lumumba Liberation Movement).

⁴⁰² Interview: Pastor James Mukasa, June 27, 1997, Mbarara.

⁴⁰³ Interview: Ezra Kikuri, July 14, 1997, Mbarara.

⁴⁰⁴ Interview: John Bikangaga, August 3, 1997, Makindye.

and Catholic) of using their Sunday collections to support the guerrillas.⁴⁰⁵ The two Bishops complained about this accusation to the Provincial Governor Bashir expressing:

surprise to hear that our places of worship were being used as political platforms. We would like to know whether this is specifically true or it is a suspicion, or misunderstanding, or if there are some pockets thereof and where?⁴⁰⁶

The independent Churches in Ankole were very scattered institutions with no significant impact on society. Those easily identified were in towns like Mbarara. These churches like the Full Gospel Church and Deliverance churches are rather similar in organisation and teaching which is why in Ankole, they are all called *Mungumwema*, a Swahili word which means, "God is good". All Christians saw themselves as vulnerable and united. Moreover many of the Pentecostals were lapsed Anglicans who opposed traditionalism and its inability to appeal to the youth. Not all of the banned sects rejoined the Anglican Church though. Some went underground and continued recruiting while others welcomed the ban as a test of their faith and hence a source of their strength. Pastor Nowe confirmed:

We never used a word of advertising, yet we continued to grow. The only promotion was by word of mouth. What was very interesting to us was that some of those soldiers from the Mbarara barracks who had pulled our churches down would come to our prayer meetings at night to pray with us. So even during the time of the ban we felt we were able to have a Christian witness ministry...⁴⁰⁷

In urban centres like Mbarara, which is surrounded by various institutions, the District Commissioner warned the authorities to ensure that:

⁴⁰⁵ Interview: Canon Semei Rwabushaija, September 9, 1997, Ruharo.

⁴⁰⁶ See 'A Joint Letter to the Provincial Governor, Southern Province,' Government Correspondences, BP, EA/GC/2/34, Mbarara.

⁴⁰⁷ Interview: Pastor Nowe, June 12, 1997.

...these societies do not continue to operate in your areas. We are aware that some of the groups are working underground. May I remind you that it is your responsibility to arrest those people and to punish them according to the law.⁴⁰⁸

Since nearly all the local government officers were Muslims, the persecution was indiscriminate because they could not distinguish the difference between Pentecostal groups and Anglican small congregations.⁴⁰⁹ The Church of Uganda, however, did not protest against the banning of these free churches for the ban was now sending back people to their communion. Some Bishops even praised the government for having done a good thing to ban them. The government's decision had shown the Anglican Church ought to have been strict with its followers and deterred them from joining such sects.

Idi Amin banned Pentecostal sects not as Protestants, but from fear. One might under-estimate such churches as fragmented fellowships but the fact was that they had no traceable leadership and therefore any one who had intentions of political organisations could operate under them. That is why Amin actually left these churches which were structurally organised and whose leadership he could trace for accountability. By 1974, religious organisations were required to submit programmes of activities to the District Commissioners and Governors for permission. A case is when the District Commissioner, East Ankole, protested to the Anglican and Catholic bishops of Ankole and Mbarara Dioceses that they had not notified his office about the Martyrs Day celebrations of 3 June, 1974, in order 'to enable some government Officials to attend the historic religious festivals.'⁴¹⁰ Martyrs Day had not been especially important but in the 70s it became a symbol of persecution of the church. The churches identified with those Martyrs killed by the State. That is why the government was so anxious about such occasions. The two Bishops responded to the Governor educating him on church procedure:

⁴⁰⁸ See Circular Ref. No MSN. 1/1 by the District Commissioner, East Ankole, 20 March 1975.

⁴⁰⁹ Interview: Y. Bamunoba, 23 July 1997. See also circular Ref. No. MSM 1/1 by the District Commissioner, East Ankole, to all County and Gombolola chiefs, clarifying the fate of members of the Gospel Mission to Uganda, 11 April, 1975.

⁴¹⁰ General Circular, Ref. No. 1/1 by the District Commissioner, East Ankole, 4 June 1974.

For the celebrations this martyr's [sic] day every year we do not (as for other Christian Festivals) have to issue official programmes inviting Government officials to attend the service. The Government officials and other Christians, and other people, who are interested, come to church on their own initiative to share in the worship of God in a normal way. It was in this understanding that we took the celebration of this Day on 3rd June...⁴¹¹

In the same tone the Catholic Bishop also wrote to the Governor:

I took it, as it has always been in the past, that the initiative for government representation to our religious services on such big events would have come from your side. It has, moreover, not been our custom to invite people for our religious services, as such, in Church.⁴¹²

Amin's government wanted to keep a close watch over the activities of the Church because of the fear that they were raising money for the anti-government rebels in Tanzania. Amin's ban on Protestant denominations was not intended to create converts for Islam. There are no known Pentecostals in Ankole who converted to Islam. Their doctrinal and literal interpretation of the Bible makes them to see people of the other faiths as "unspiritual". They already likened Amin to the beast in the book of Revelation. The Catholic Church was not affected by the ban. The banned groups were breakaway groups from the Anglican Church and it was to them that some returned. It is very rare for Catholics to turn to a different denomination. Their doctrinal teaching and emphasis on obedience to the church hierarchy produces this. Catholics associated Pentecostal denominations with Protestantism with which they were at odds. It is true that Pentecostal groups may have contributed to the growth of the Anglican Church in Ankole though we can not say the same of the Catholic church whose factors of growth were discussed in chapter one.

⁴¹¹ See Religious File, Protestants, MSN, Kamukuzi Archives, Mbarara.

⁴¹² Kamukuzi Archives: See Religious File, (Catholics), MSN 1/1.

4.6. THE CREATION OF A NEW ANGLICAN DIOCESE - 1977.

On 30 January 1977, just two weeks before the death of Luwum, a new Anglican Diocese of West Ankole was created from the former Ankole Diocese. Unfortunately I could not get the minute on which this Diocese was created, (most files in Ankole were destroyed during the 1979 war) but I interviewed the very people that were on the Ankole Church Council responsible for the creation of this new Diocese.⁴¹³ According to Bishop Betungura, the need for a new diocese coincided with the creation of the District in 1974 whose Headquarters was in Bushenyi-West Ankole. For Amin to control Ankole (and other districts) whose political support he was not sure of, he reduced its geographical influence by creating a new district where he planted either his own tribesmen or Muslim henchmen. According to Bishop Betungura, the establishment of the district necessitated the creation of a new diocese, a colonial pattern where most parishes would be adjacent to the county or sub-county Headquarters. The Catholic Church did not operate in this way and the Catholic Diocese still covers the whole of Ankole. Asked why, Bishop Kakubi said:

You see if we divided our forces, then we would never have been able to do anything. The Anglican Church could afford to create many parishes because it had the support of the government officials, which would always contribute on their fund-raising. We depend on our numbers to boost us if we are to make any meaningful developments.⁴¹⁴

But whether or not the creation of a new diocese during Amin's regime would have increased income is doubtful. Maybe the Church of Uganda's House of Bishops was rejuvenated by the new members and a new Bishop in West Ankole supported Bishop Betungura who was harassed by the Muslim Governor in Mbarara.

Canon Rwabushaija emphasised the factor that the church was growing and needed another diocese. By 1977, Ankole Diocese had grown from 30 parishes and three

⁴¹³ These included; Bishop Amos Betungura, Canon Rwabushaija, Canon Blasio Itima, and Canon Muhoozi.

⁴¹⁴ Interview: Bishop Kakubi, March 22, 1997, Ibanda.

Archdeaconaries in 1970 to sixty parishes and six Archdeaconries.⁴¹⁵ Parishes were too large. The Canon quoted cases where a parish covered a whole sub-county or where an Archdeaconry covered three counties. He himself was responsible for the counties of Rwampara, Isingiro and Kajara. Also the political mass baptisms of the sixties meant that people, who had been coerced into being baptised, had by mid seventies become strong Christians, especially because of the influence of the Revival movement. A positive result of the politically motivated baptisms was the increased numbers of Christians and by the seventies the church was beginning to embrace society rather than just being a minority within society. People gradually got acculturated into it.

Also western Ankole is a densely populated area. The two main counties, Igara and Sheema, are heavily populated⁴¹⁶ and form the core of Protestantism in Ankole. In the following the synod, Bishop Betungura was concerned about the weak

⁴¹⁵ Interview: Canon S. Rwabushaija, September 9, 1997, Ruharo.

⁴¹⁶ Ankole's (Bushenyi & Mbarara districts) Population Growth 1959-1980.

County	1959	1969	1980	% increase 1959-1980
Sheema	79,680	115,301	151,009	90
Igara	107,859	139,924	146,799	36
Buhweju	20,114	25,401	34,929	74
Bunyaruguru	14,305	26,946	52,161	267
Kajara	81,331	103,111	139,771	72
Bushenyi Total	303,289	410,683	524,669	73
Ibanda	38,944	80,799	127,782	228
Kashari	41,744	85,869	118,017	183
Rwampara	107,859	147,826	188,165	74
Isingiro	34,985	98,774	176,351	404
Nyabushozi	12,665	37,224	77,838	515
Mbarara total	236,197	450,462	688,152	191
Ankole total	539,486	861,145	1212821	125

Igara's population declined by the 1980 Census because many people had migrated to Sheema in the seventies in search for fertile lands. On the contrary, the counties of Kashari, Nyabushozi and Isingiro which used to be sparsely populated realised a higher percentage in population growth due to the influx of Banyarwanda since the sixties. For purposes of comparison, Mbarara municipality has been added to the 1980 total for Kashari county in which it lies. The population of Mbarara Municipality was 16,078 in 1969 and 23,255 in 1980. See Nelson Kasfir, "Land and peasants in western Uganda: Bushenyi and Mbarara districts", in H. B. Hansen and M. Twaddle (eds.), *Uganda Now: Between Decay and Development*, London: James Currey Ltd, 1988, p. 163.

financial situation in which the diocese was left and called for extra giving since his diocese could no longer depend on the rich Protestant concentrated counties of West Ankole. He said:

...we of East Ankole have very few people compared to West Ankole. There are few people in Kashari since people have migrated to Buganda, you know Nyabushozi is always sparsely populated, Ibanda and Isingiro are mainly Catholics, Rwampara is simply mountainous with few people. Therefore I urge you to improve your giving so that we are not left behind.⁴¹⁷

Political conditions were also in favour of a new Diocese. By 1974, the International Community had imposed an economic embargo on Uganda and the consequent *olutalo lwenfuna* (economic war) affected the church. Essential commodities especially fuel were rationed and the Anglican bishop was finding it very hard to cover that massive diocese with rationed fuel. The Catholic bishop who covered a similar area did not see the need for a new diocese. He had fewer well-financed parishes because of big congregations and donations from abroad.⁴¹⁸ Counties like Sheema and Igara, UPC concentration areas, where middle ranking politicians lived, agitated for a new diocese on the grounds that it would protect them from Amin. That is why the creation of this Diocese in the very heartland of UPC was very sensitive to the government.

The consecration of Bishop Bamunoba in January 30 also became a landmark in the history of the Church of Uganda. It was the last official engagement at which Luwum as the Primate of C.O.U officiated. What were these events? 1977 was the year in which the Church of Uganda celebrated its Centenary. Preparations, which had started as early as 1975, worried the government. Fund-raising events and Centenary preparations were monitored and the wearing of Centenary badges was frowned upon by government agents who thought that they were some kind of a "Passover sign" with an underground political motive.⁴¹⁹ In West Ankole, wearing the

⁴¹⁷ See the Bishop's Charge, in *Sinodi Y'Obureberezi Bwa East Ankole Church of Uganda*, August 1977.

⁴¹⁸ Interview: Bishop Kakubi, March 22, 1997, Ibanda

⁴¹⁹ Interview: Bishop Betungura, September 9, 1997, Ruharo.

Centenary badges was the cause of harassment which prompted Bishop Amos Betungura to write to encourage priests:

As Christians we might be having such enemies who would like to intimidate us by saying that we should not go ahead preparing for the Centenary celebrations and as such there are feelings of insecurity, uncertainty, and distrust and the fear of what might happen later. If these sorts of feelings ramify among our Christian communities in our towns and villages, then our plans for the Centenary celebrations are likely to be thwarted.... go ahead with all your plans and call upon your Christians to do the same.⁴²⁰

The consecration also attracted local support from Christians who had not had cause to celebrate for seven years. The consecration became an occasion for Christians to express their solidarity and satisfaction of having achieved something.

Another factor was the political identity of the new Bishop. Rev. Bamunoba as the Principal of Bishop Stuart College, the Anglican founded Teacher Training College in Mbarara, had been suspected of anti-government activities by 1972 and harassed:

It was one of the reasons why I had to leave Mbarara and go for further training at Makerere. At least that protected me for not many people knew my whereabouts. Actually there was a rumour that I had gone into exile.⁴²¹

The cause of contention on the consecration day though was Bishop Kivengere's sermon. He had by 1977 become a source of inspiration to the Christian church in Uganda. He was one of the few bishops who dared confront Amin. The fact that he was the preacher at the consecration of Bishop Bamunoba was an act of defiance. Kivengere, a renowned evangelist, had based his sermon on Acts 20: 22-28 the designated epistle for Sunday January 30, 1977. The Bishop's sermon had warned:

government officials of their accountability before God for their deeds and calling attention to the robbery, violence and killings, which seemed to have official sanction.⁴²²

⁴²⁰ A Circular letter to all Priests, 27th. November 1976, Bishop's File, East Ankole Diocese.

⁴²¹ Interview: Bishop Y. Bamunoba, June 20, 1997.

He castigated those who had misused their:

authority, taking things by force...If you misuse the authority God gave you, God is going to judge you, because he is the one who gave it to you. Some use their authority to get things for themselves. Some use it to grow fat, then they need more room and push others around.⁴²³

There was a military man with a big tummy in the front row, who also rocked with laughter at the mention of growing fat and the need for more room. Obviously the Bishop was not attacking particular individuals:

...it was not an attack on anyone. I was preaching in freedom and afterwards the government people were very warm, even soldiers spoke to me very warmly. My Governor Muslim friend said, 'Thank you for your speech'.⁴²⁴

Though Bishop Kivengere was not attacking personalities at the occasion, he was aware of the fact that the seventies were a period of the economic war and the scarcity of commodities had led Muslims to be a privileged class and therefore were in many ways the "only people" capable of growing fat. The consecration attracted people of many faiths though not many people from abroad. As Bishop Kivengere said:

...there in front of me were military men, policemen, government administrators...Muslim Sheikhs, my friend the Muslim Governor, Intelligence officers, and a special representative of President Amin, who had given greetings.⁴²⁵

The content of the Bishop's sermon may have influenced Amin's reaction but this was less significant than the fact that it happened in Bushenyi a UPC stronghold. Also there had been a failed coup of 25 January (1977) that week and all events could be

⁴²² Kevin Ward, *Church of Uganda amidst Conflict: The Interplay between Church and politics in Uganda since 1962*, in Holger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle (eds.), *Religion and Politics in East Africa*, London: James Currey, 1995, p. 86.

⁴²³ Part of Kivengere's sermon in his book, *I Love Idi Amin*, p. 44.

⁴²⁴ *ibid*, p. 45.

⁴²⁵ *ibid*. The Muslim friend was Governor Juma Bashir, who on several occasions had clashed with Bishop Kivengere. The Bishop uses "Muslim friend" rather sarcastically.

misinterpreted.⁴²⁶ The Special President's representative referred to by Bishop Kivengere was also a problem. Amin had by 1977 ceased attending church functions and therefore had delegated Hon. Katagira, then Minister of Labour, to represent him. Amin would not have attended the function because of the already mentioned coup attempt in Kampala. The President's representative was not programmed to give a speech but merely to give greetings before the Archbishop's speech. This was seen as a breach of protocol. According to the Governor, the Minister represented the President and should have spoken last. Governor Juma Bashir of Southern Province whose Headquarters were at Mbarara later accused Bishop Betungura of "a deliberate plan" to show contempt to the President. It means, the Governor wrote:

...that the Archbishop is higher than the Hon. Minister who was representing His Excellency. So it means that even if it was His Excellency himself you would ask him to address first and then the Archbishop later....⁴²⁷

In a similar strongly worded letter Bishop Betungura reminded the Governor that he had indeed followed the correct procedure since:

at a Church function the Archbishop was the guest of Honour. Our mind was that as it was a religious ceremony we needed not use formal way of doing things.⁴²⁸

Betungura was held responsible because he was the *father* of the new diocese. Who should have spoken last or first at a church function was not the issue. It was that the two institutions were at odds. By ignoring protocol the Bishop was making a passive protest since at no church function has the Archbishop spoken after the President. The Governor's letter complained of the Bishops' disrespect to the Minister even at lunch time:

⁴²⁶ Adam Seftel (ed.) *Uganda: The Bloodstained Pearl of Africa And its Struggle for peace*, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1994, pp. 72ff.

⁴²⁷ See letter by the Governor, Southern Province, ref. No. C. SP. MIS. 1 to the Bishop, East Ankole Diocese and All Religious Leaders, Southern province, 21 February 1977.

⁴²⁸ Kamukuzi Archives: 'Consecration of the Bishop of West Ankole and Inauguration of West Ankole Diocese,' Religious File, NO. 11. K/COU.

How can a Presidential representative go in the dining room to wait for a Bishop or Archbishop and they go on changing their robes while chatting and then the representative of his Excellency is waiting in the dining room without being served...even when the Minister was being served after the Archbishop and Bishops came in, you find (*sic*) some Bishops standing on (*sic*) the Minister when he is having a meal and others asking him to help them with salt.... I do not call this ignorance, but is a deliberate plan.⁴²⁹

The relationship between the Church and the State was so strained that such trivial issues became important.

4.7. THE DEATH OF LUWUM AND THE GROWTH OF THE CHURCH IN ANKOLE.

Sunday 30 January 1977, the day on which Yoramu Bamunoba was consecrated first Bishop of West Ankole was later described by Bishop Kivengere in his book *I Love Idi Amin*, as the "Palm Sunday"⁴³⁰ for Janan Luwum. Two weeks later, the Archbishop was murdered in mysterious circumstances. Janan Luwum became the Anglican Primate in 1974. Many interviewees agree that as the successor of Eric Sabiiti, Luwum was elected with the whole support of the Anglican Church, something very unusual in the COU which tends to elect archbishops who are popular with the regime.⁴³¹ But according to Kevin Ward:

whatever the general assessment, it does not apply to the election of Janan Luwum as archbishop of Uganda in 1974. In fact here the church set itself firmly against the stream,⁴³²

though they did not realise what a torrent the stream would become. Luwum came from an Acholi tribe that Amin had persecuted as early as 1971. Though it was good for the church not to think in political terms, the election of Luwum suggested the COU was demonstrating its solidarity with Acholi. Well, Luwum was elected because

⁴²⁹ *ibid*: Letter by Governor Bashir Juma.

⁴³⁰ Margaret Ford in her book, *Janan Luwum*, also uses the same metaphor.

⁴³¹ See *Weekly Topic*, 8 April 1987.

⁴³² Kevin Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

he was felt to be spiritually and intellectually, the most competent person⁴³³, but Amin could interpret Luwum's election as the COU's choosing a man to lead an opposition against him. The choice of Luwum reveals that the church did not forecast the political climate for by 1974 when Luwum was elected, Amin was already showing enmity. According to Gerladine Sabiiti, the wife of Luwum's predecessor:

that is why we decided to retire. Amin's unpredictable character forced us to make an earlier decision. He would ring us at night and blame us for certain things, which we really had no knowledge about. At one time he tried to force us not to use the word Israel but we resisted. So when we realised the kind of man he was likely to be, I advised my husband that it was high time that we retired.⁴³⁴

From the first week of the coup, Acholi and Langi had been massacred and the 1972 guerrilla invasion made it worse. Maybe if the COU elected a different figure, like Dunstan Nsubuga, a Muganda and a senior Bishop, the situation might have been different. But Luwum's qualities made him a spiritual leader and according to Bishop Betungura, "one who we all looked up to, to steer us in the right direction."⁴³⁵ By 1974, Amin had already warned the Church against using biblical words like Israel, Churches had been accused of collecting money to support the guerrilla movement. The three years of Luwum's office were nothing but a tug of war between him and the government. When he died, the nation was shocked, but not surprised. Both Phares Mutibwa and Kevin Ward agree that the 25 January 1977 plot may have been part of the reason. It was a conspiracy in which many Langi and Acholi were involved. Though Luwum was not personally involved, he could have been informed by his fellow tribesmen. According to Mutibwa:

When the Archbishop was asked to join the group, he declined, saying that as a churchman, his concern was with preaching and not fighting.... What led to Luwum's death was the fact that he did not tell Amin of this plot... Amin then personally accused Luwum of failing to warn him of the danger...which meant that the archbishop wanted to see him overthrown.⁴³⁶

⁴³³ *ibid.*

⁴³⁴ Interview: Gerladine Sabiiti, July 11, 1996, Kinoni.

⁴³⁵ Betungura, September 9, 1997, Ruharo.

⁴³⁶ P. Mutibwa, *Uganda since Independence*, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, p. 112.

Ward concurs about Luwum's possible knowledge:

It seems certain that there was a plot to overthrow Idi Amin and that the Acholi were involved. As an Acholi elder, Luwum may have known something about what was going on, though as a Church leader, he is unlikely to have been directly involved.⁴³⁷

It is unlikely that Archbishop Luwum had arms as Idi Amin alleged. As a spokesman for the church he pleaded for people Amin had arrested. He was active in asking government and intelligence officials to try and trace the victims so that they did not simply "disappear."⁴³⁸ Luwum was acting on behalf of the victims from all parts of Uganda, but his protecting of Langi and Acholi was central.⁴³⁹ Hence, Luwum as an Acholi was falsely identified with the Acholi opposition to Amin. It is unlikely that he was ever involved in any plot against the government. His strong 'Bulokole' (spirituality) commitment, undoubtedly the mainstay of his spiritual life, makes it unlikely that he would involve himself in conspiracy.⁴⁴⁰ The archbishop's response to the soldiers who searched his house in the early morning of February 5, 1977, is the testimony of a man of peace:

I did not come to Namirembe for the Acholi or the Langi but I was the archbishop of Uganda...Our house was God's house. We pray for the President. We preach the Gospel and pray for others. That is our work, not keeping arms.⁴⁴¹

By 1977, Amin had identified the Christian church:

as an uncompromising force against him. Not that it was fighting him politically, but because it was concerned with the abuse of human rights, that is why he persecuted it. Indeed Idi Amin was persecuting the church.⁴⁴²

⁴³⁷ Kevin Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

⁴³⁸ Interview: John Bikangaga, June 7, 1997; See also Kevin Ward, *op. cit.*

⁴³⁹ Kevin Ward, "Church of Uganda Amidst Conflict", in Holger Hansen and Michael Twaddle, *Religion and Politics in East Africa*, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1995, p. 83.

⁴⁴⁰ *ibid.*

⁴⁴¹ 'Report of a very serious incident at the archbishop's house in the early hours of Saturday, 5th February, 1977,' *AACC Newsletter* 3, 3, 23 February (1977) Special Edition: The Churches mourn the loss of Archbishop Janan Luwum, (Quoted in Kevin. *op. cit.* p. 84.)

It is not for this thesis to say whether or not Luwum was as a religious martyr. What it can say is that he stood up and did not compromise his faith. We could perhaps call him both a religious and political martyr because he did not shrink from the values he stood for and his death focused International attention. His death strengthened the church and awakened the conscience of the civilised world to what was going on in Uganda. Having said that, Luwum's death caught the church off guard. Since his death most Bishops were scared of taking that office to the effect that Luwum's successor was not necessarily the best qualified for the job. He was chosen because of his relation with Amin that he could protect the church. Consequently the Anglican Church was weakened administratively and has not come to grips with the leadership question as yet.

⁴⁴² Interview: Bishop John Kakubi, March 22, 1997, Ibanda.

4.7.1 THE GROWTH OF THE CHURCH.

The irony of Amin's actions is that the Church emerged stronger. As Dr. Tom Tuma says, persecution does not kill a religious movement:

It is common in church history. When there is persecution, people's commitment to the faith strengthens. The reason is that where there is danger, they rally to their God. It is the danger they see outside that drives them to God for protection. It is part of human behaviour. Persecution does not kill a religious movement.⁴⁴³

The first effect was that people streamed to their churches. Since the death of the Archbishop the only source of comfort was the church. After the Archbishop's death, Ankole was full of fear of who would die next. Preachers began to preach eschatological sermons. People shelved their differences realising how vulnerable they were. Bishop Kakubi testifies to this Protestant-Catholic bond:

It helped us to strengthen our relationship. We had never been so close...We became very good neighbours. Our ecumenism was strong. Indeed persecution became our bond.⁴⁴⁴

Bishop Kakubi says that the Catholic Church increased in numbers. The Catholic parish church in Mbarara town opened all night for prayers. A new 1 o'clock Service started because the normal morning service could not accommodate the numbers. The Centenary celebrations of June 1977 (Anglican) and February 1979 (Catholic) provided more opportunities for evangelism. Churches were flooded with worshipers. Many people felt the call to ministry. Perhaps as a demonstration against Amin, people offered themselves for training and the number of church ministers did not drop. This was more quickly felt in the Anglican Church, which does not require a long and rigorous Seminary training. The Church of Uganda's open system of recruitment helped to keep the numbers of entrants up.

⁴⁴³ Interview: Rev. Dr. Tom Tuma, March 25, 1997, Kampala.

⁴⁴⁴ Interview: Bishop Kakubi, March 22, 1997.

There was the economic factor too. Many of those who became ministers in the 70's were primary school teachers. They were already trained and only needed a short theological course to initiate them. But also the teaching profession was badly affected. Teachers resigned to go into petty business. But the clergy stipends became attractive as the church expanded. And donations such as bicycles, second hand clothes from abroad, attracted some to "feel the call for ministry."⁴⁴⁵

4.8. THE CHURCH ON THE EVE OF THE 1979 LIBERATION WAR.

By 1979, the Christian church in Ankole was under suspicion of collusion with the invading forces. The invading force from Tanzania began by liberating the Southern parts of Ankole, which border Tanzania. Idi Amin had always accused the churches of aiding guerrillas. Now it had to choose between Amin and the invading army, still a long way from Mbarara. Well, they hoped he would fall since there were resignations in the army, which were losing to the invading forces. Government officials in Mbarara and Bushenyi, many of who were Muslim, Nubians or Kakwa, had by January 1979 abandoned their offices and fled. But they left a strong and ruthless army in Mbarara, which terrorised people and looted property. The invading Tanzanian forces captured Mbarara in February 1979 and Ankole was liberated. According to Museveni:

we captured it easily because there was no resistance. Amin's soldiers had been intimidated by our own weight of fire and the noise of our guns, which they sought, were powerful.⁴⁴⁶

The liberators had learnt from the lessons of September 1972 and were well equipped and did not need to rely on the general uprising. Amin had no longer support from Uganda, including Buganda. After the capture and liberation of Kampala the south-west was secure. 1979 was seen in Ankole, as heralding a new era of peace and tranquillity. Kampala had fallen on 11 April 1979, on a Good Friday. It was natural

⁴⁴⁵ Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa and Emmy Bukabeba.

⁴⁴⁶ Museveni, op. cit. p. 95.

for Christians and preachers on Easter day to link the liberating power of the risen Lord with the momentous events at the time.

However, two issues worried the Church. According to Bishop Betungura, one was the rate at which Christians, both Catholics and Protestants, looted towns and institutions; and how Christians were now attacking Muslims. Christians were looting property not only in towns but also in institutions such as churches. Both Bishops Kakubi and Betungura lamented this moral degeneration.⁴⁴⁷ This looting did not involve Muslims since many of them had fled into hiding, and their homes were the first targets. It was a dramatic enactment of how people celebrated liberation from oppression. As a philosopher quoted by Mutibwa said:

What is valuable is a certain ordering of things, and civilisation has to do not with things but with the invisible ties that join one thing to another.⁴⁴⁸

What linked Idi Amin's regime to the liberated church was a continued vicious circle of chaos, a permanent "disordering of things." Amin's regime had caused such degeneration that it affected people's values. What came to be valued was how quickly one could become rich. It was not a period of decency but of decadence and decay. Money was valued more than education. The young generation had learned to devalue education and it was no longer the passport to success. Once, it was the ambition of young people to acquire University education. Now what was valued instead was money regardless of how it was made. New slang like *okugwa omubintu* (falling into things without much effort) appeared as school dropouts reached positions of influence often through bribery. University graduates became a laughing stock. A typical remark was; 'our friend will never make it in life, she is marrying a University graduate.' An editorial in the Star Newspaper of July 6 July 1987 explains:

the professionals are not entirely to blame for this aberration. Unprofessionalism in most professions is a result of the emergence of the *mafuta mingi* culture in the 1970s, which stressed more the acquisition of material wealth than the means through which that wealth was acquired. The principle guiding was 'the

⁴⁴⁷ Interview: Amos Betungura, September 9, 1997, Ruharo.

end justifies the means.' This culture and the economic hardships that afflicted the salary-earners systematically led to the erosion of professional ethics. Everyone's concern was to try desperately to beat the inflation. Out of all this also came frustration among the salaried people who resorted to excessive drinking and shabbiness; and of course, the ten per cent commission became a normal thing. The total sum of all this has been the erosion of the pride of the work of professionals in the country.

This was behind the looting in Ankole, the desire to acquire wealth and to sit comfortably on chairs, even if looted. What worried the Church was the excitement enjoyed by the looters. They were as *unconcerned* as the children who had got so used to seeing human corpses around that it became normal for them to jump over them. Looting became the first obstacle, which the church had to face. The revenge inflicted on Muslims was also a concern. For a church which had taken pride of being built on the foundations of the Revival movement, looting and the killing of Muslims in Itendero-Sheema, was a blow to its reputation.

4.9. THE ITENDERO MUSLIM KILLINGS.

The fall of Idi Amin's regime meant the fall of Muslims. It was a common sight in Ankole (and the writer witnessed it) to see slashed banana plantations, burnt down houses and animal corpses which belonged to Muslims. Itendero and Ishaka were centres of Muslims in Ankole and suffered more than any other part.

According to Yusufu Mubiru, the people of Kiziba parish (Itendero) led by two men Muchungu and Rwenzire, both Christians, organised a meeting at Kiziba Primary School to which about sixty Muslims were invited. They were told that if they were to stay in the area, certain named Muslims must pay a fine of a cow and two jerry-cans of local beer within two weeks or they would suffer. Muslims complied. But those who did not comply were attacked and their property was destroyed. According to Y. Kabazi, the killing of Muslims at Itendero happened after a group of Muslims had taken revenge for the malicious damage to their property by attacking and brutally injuring Kamisha (just a local resident), a Christian and resident of Kiziba village. He died shortly after being admitted to Mbarara Hospital.

⁴⁴⁸ Quoted in Mutibwa, op. cit. p. 125.

In retaliation, a group of Christian villagers went around Kiziba armed with spears, machetes, ropes, and arrested Muslims, including women and children. They were arrested and they were to be taken to prison. But they were instead tied and led to the river Rwizi where many of them were killed. Those who survived were forced to drink alcohol, eat pork or pay heavy fines to avenge the death of Kamisha. To Haji Magezi:

the two punishments were equally the same. Those killed and those who were forced to eat pork or take alcohol were equally brutalised. For a Muslim to be forced to eat pork, taboo, is the same as being killed.⁴⁴⁹

Those who were forced to eat pork at least survived to tell the story, but his bitterness shows how Muslims viewed the situation.⁴⁵⁰ After the killings at River Rwizi, Muslims in Sheema and elsewhere lived in perpetual fear. More than 200 Muslims were imprisoned between May and July 1979.⁴⁵¹ Acts of cruelty such as ripping a woman's womb and rape are mentioned in a letter written by a one Mohammed Sebbada to the World Islamic Society in 1986. It gives a tragic account of the hardships and suffering experienced by Muslims in Itendero and the whole of that sub-county.⁴⁵²

What caused this violence to a people that had been neighbours? Itendero, unlike elsewhere in Ankole, is a multi-cultural society. Its population is mainly of immigrants from other counties like Igara and Rwampara who migrated in search of fertile land. Sheema County is fertile and favours the growing of *Matooke* (bananas). At the peak of the economic war many immigrants made banana growing their main source of income. Itendero was also a centre for Muslims who originally came from

⁴⁴⁹ Interview: Magezi, businessman, July 31, 1996, Kabwohe.

⁴⁵⁰ *ibid.*

⁴⁵¹ See *The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights: Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations, June 1986-October 1994*, p. 94.

⁴⁵² The letter is appended in Abasi Kiyimba's booklet; *Is the 1979 Muslim Blood-Bath in Bushenyi History: A Review of the Genocide that was called Liberation*. We must stress though that the writer found that booklet very controversial and most of its information exaggerated. A more balanced report was Alex Kagame's, *The Confrontation of Christians and Muslims in Itendero, 1979*, but it was unfortunately lost and the author can not trace it.

Buganda originally as administrators, clerks and interpreters in colonial days. They retained Luganda as their language and did not integrate culturally which alienated them from the rest of the society. People still refer to them as *abasilamu ba Itendero*, (Muslims of Itendero) showing their separateness. The Christian inhabitants of the area saw Muslims as allies of Amin and responsible for the disappearance of many Christians. The Muslims were also a fairly well-to-do minority group. This affluence was attributed to the favourable treatment they had received from Idi Amin's regime.⁴⁵³

Also the returning exiles who took over the government told the horror stories of torture and brutality and their miraculous escape from Amin which in a way revived people's desire for revenge. Edward Rurangaranga for instance tells how in 1972, he was tortured and shot in the leg as he tried to escape from Amin's captors. He fell into the river Rwizi and was washed off shore and ran into exile. Rurangaranga was not personally involved in the killing but his experiences empowered the inhabitants of Itendero. It is said that at a public rally held at Kibingo sub-county Headquarters on 11 April 1979, the day on which Kampala was captured, Rurangaranga, then one of the members of the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), and Assistant District Commissioner of Bushenyi, addressed a rally where he told the gathering of the experience he and others had had under Amin and "his people" (which was interpreted to mean Muslims). At the end of the rally, in his usual metaphorical language, Rurangaranga said, *tutemire omuti kiri aharimwe kukongora amatagi*, (we have felled the tree and it is up to you people to cut off the branches), which was taken to mean that Amin was the tree and the Muslims were the branches. Rurangaranga says that he was quoted out of context. According to him:

⁴⁵³ This is not to say that it was only the Muslims who were rich. There were Christians who had equally acquired wealth opportunistically and had become part of the pot-bellied generation. They too used to be referred to as "Hajis". During Amin's time it was fashionable to put on excess weight as a sign of wealth.

the tree was Amin and the branches were Aminism - corruption, murder, stealing which I was calling on people to resist and fight. All these were vices, which had polluted Ankole society and were due to Amin's influence. My statement did not mean Muslims at all. It was misquoted.⁴⁵⁴

It is not my intention to exonerate politicians but when the Kiziba massacres were committed Rurangaranga had returned to Tanzania to see his family. This is confirmed by Commander Frank Guma, then one of the "Liberators" in 1979, and now an Officer in NRA:

I was dispatched to arrest Rurangaranga but the latter had escaped to Tanzania and when he returned, his apprehension was made difficult by his strong connections with the government in power, which had turned the issue political.⁴⁵⁵

Yoweri Museveni and Yowasi Makaru were also implicated. According to Abdallah Katende, a witness to the *Commission of Inquiry*:

Yowasi Makaru had gone around fining Muslims by asking for cows and goats and was made County Chief of Sheema and later allocated buses though he had no sound economic base.⁴⁵⁶

But many interviewees in Kabwohe and Itendero (both towns in the area) exonerated Makaru for any involvement in the Itendero killings, including a Muslim, Abasi Balinda, who spoke highly of Makaru's protection of the Muslims. He said Makaru was:

a true Mulokole and an elder in our community and would never have been involved in such dirty activities.⁴⁵⁷

Makaru is a well-respected Mulokole all over Ankole. For many years he had been returned unopposed as the Head of Laity for West Ankole Diocese. Recently he was elected as the District Local Council Chairman of Bushenyi in Museveni's

⁴⁵⁴ Interview: Rurangaranga.

⁴⁵⁵ *Commission*, op. cit.

⁴⁵⁶ *Commission*, op. cit. p. 96.

⁴⁵⁷ Interview: Abasi Balinda, July 31, 1996, Kabwohe.

government. Had Makaru been as ruthless as the witness said, it is unlikely that the people of Bushenyi and above all Museveni would have supported him. Makaru has never been County Chief of Sheema. He has an established Dairy farm and is above the poverty line. So he would not need pork or beer from the Muslims which he himself does not drink. The Commission of Inquiry exonerated Museveni as a man who for many years fought against oppression. According to Museveni:

I fought in Ankole and if I were against Muslims, my soldiers would have purged them during the height of the war rather than send villagers later to do the dirty job.⁴⁵⁸

Indeed Museveni headed a delegation of six Ministers including the Attorney General to assess the situation in Itendero where he repeated the need for reconciliation.⁴⁵⁹

What is not clear is what happened to the victims and whether the government protected them or the perpetrators were arrested. In the same week, Kaboggoza-Musoke, then DC of Ankole, met many Muslims who were still fleeing from the area:

While on my way from Mbarara to Bushenyi, I came across several Muslim families running away on foot with children and luggage from Bushenyi for Ruharo Mission in Mbarara.⁴⁶⁰

Muslims property, especially land, which is highly prized in such a densely populated banana growing area like Itendero might have been an incentive. Muslims abandoned or sold their *bibanja* (land held under customary tenure) at give away prices and fled to areas like Kyazanga and Kampala. One interviewee who preferred to remain anonymous told how:

following the months of the massacres many of us flew to Masaka and Kyazanga. Starvation was our common experience. Fear and despair was our routine. At home agitators of the killings were busy acquiring our land and houses. Most of us sold our property under duress.

⁴⁵⁸ *Commission*, op. cit. p. 91.

⁴⁵⁹ Interview: Abasi Balinda.

⁴⁶⁰ Interview: Kaboggoza-Musoke, March 27, 1997, Kampala.

It is very easy to ask why the government at the time hesitated to take decisive action against the perpetrators. In all my interviews, there was no mention of any intervention from the Christian churches, which had formerly championed the fight for human rights. Did the church and the government sanction or give a silent support to such atrocities? The period between April-July 1979 was a period of anarchy. The "liberation excitement" was a factor in itself. Even if the government or the Church had wanted to protect Muslims it would have been difficult because there was no credible and effective government to take action:

there was no government to talk of. The government in Kampala had its own problems and in Ankole, the war was still going on. There was no effective communication and army trucks were the only means of transport.⁴⁶¹

⁴⁶¹ Interview: Yowasi Makaru, April 29, 1997, Bushenyi.

4.10. CONCLUSION.

I agree with Kasozi that 'Amin was Muslim, but it is wrong to assume that Islam guided his activities or that the whole of the Muslim community participated in formulating his policies.'⁴⁶² It is possible that some of the victims in Itendero had terrorised people during Amin's time. But the Itendero incident was a sad reflection on the Christian community especially when among the victims were women, children and the elderly. Some of these victims of mob justice were ordinary Muslims, poor peasants, who may not have benefited from Amin's regime any more than Christians. The killing and displacement of these people was political revenge and sectarianism, unleashed unjustly on a group of people who had suffered because of Amin. Such killings have far-reaching consequences. They create suspicion between people who fear the next political eruption might make them victims. People taking the law into their hands set a dangerous precedent and poison a society. It also calls for an honest and careful synthesis of the extent to which Christianity has really penetrated Ankole society and to what extent it has influenced its actions.

Lastly, though persecuted, the Christian church emerged stronger, singing "Onward Christian soldiers." Amin had tried to make Christianity a minor religion but Uganda remained predominantly a Christian country, with less than 10% Muslims.⁴⁶³ The historical antagonism and hatred between Catholics and Protestants had given way to unity. The church grew militant and when beaten into silence supported the guerrilla forces at least in prayer.⁴⁶⁴ But, while some Muslims exploited their

⁴⁶² Abdu Kasozi, *The Spread of Islam in Uganda*, Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 115, (Kasozi quotes *Uganda Argus* of 1 October 1968 as the source of his information).

⁴⁶³ *ibid.*, p. 14. The actual number of Muslims in Uganda is not known. Arye Oded, *Islam in Uganda*, (1974). (Jerusalem, p. 315-316) suggests that there was a substantial increase in the number of Muslims in Uganda during Amin's rule. But the 3 Million he suggests is exaggerated. Though there were conversions in Amin's regime, Islam also had lost many of its followers after the expulsion of Asians. Many of them were Muslims. The Uganda Muslim Supreme Council is currently making preparations for a Muslim Census throughout the country. Until the results of this census are known, their Percentage will remain a speculation. See, Ali Kettani, *Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 4, 1984; Abasi Kiyimba, 'The Problem of Muslim Education in Uganda,' in *JIMMA*, vol. 7, no. 1, London, 1986, p. 252.

⁴⁶⁴ Interview: Bishop Kakubi, March 22, 1997, Ibanda.

favourable position under Amin, their religion ought not to be blamed. The ordinary Muslim was not responsible and the violence continued in the succeeding regimes. It is true the ethnic factor was shelved during Amin's regime, but Muslims who traditionally are Baganda have never integrated in Kinyankole culture and therefore have always been seen as outsiders. In light of this therefore, as far as ethno-political relations are concerned, the Christians are still suspicious about Muslim involvement in politics due to Amin's experience.

CHAPTER FIVE**5. THE OBOTE II REGIME (1980-1985) AND THE EARLY YEARS OF NRM:
THEIR EFFECTS ON THE RELIGIO-POLITICAL LIFE IN ANKOLE.****5.0. INTRODUCTION.**

The post liberation spirit was the optimism that Uganda, and Ankole in particular, would learn from past experience. Persecution had resulted in unity when various religious and ethnic groups *shelved* their differences. This was demonstrated by the spirit in which people welcomed the liberators regardless of their past alliances. Catholics and Protestants encouraged their sons to join the liberation war. Obviously among the liberators who came to Ankole were Banyankole like Yoweri Museveni, Adonia Tiberondwa, Edward Rurangaranga, and Kabogorwa whom Amin had exiled. What many of these exiles did not realise was the extent to which society had changed due to the effects of the past regime: moral decadence shattered economy and the devaluation of life. They hoped to make a new beginning despite the enormous task ahead. I remember the very first rally and speech Kabogorwa gave in July 1979 at Bwizibwera, Kashari. He condemned sectarian politics and taught us a song: *Zahuka, zahuka Uganda, Uganda zahuka osime Nyakusinga*, (Arise, arise Uganda and thank God who has liberated you). However, such optimism did not reflect the returnees' real plans on the ground especially when it came to electing chiefs to replace the previous regime. It was largely the returnees who were responsible for the reintroduction of sectarian politics which Amin's regime had contained. Without a fault of their own nearly all the prominent leaders in the liberation war were Protestants. Understandably, it was mainly the UPC Bairu Protestants in Ankole who had fallen victim of Amin's regime. Even then, their domination of the liberation force worried Catholics:

In a way we were a bit scared by this Protestant composition because if you remember they were the same people who had given DP hard time in the 1960s. The sight of people like Rurangaranga and others did not augur well for us. Even at that very early stage, we began to be scared of another Protestant hegemony once again.⁴⁶⁵

But for Bishop Kakubi:

Personally I did not mind about the Protestant composition since I knew its history. I was only optimistic that we had all drawn lessons from Amin's regime and were ready to start afresh.⁴⁶⁶

But the political events in Kampala and the consequent fall of President Yusufu Lule within sixty-eight days showed the lack of unity among the liberators. In Ankole old sectarian identities began to surface in the very first months of the liberation. As Kafureka had feared, the very first chiefs to replace Muslims were either Protestants or former UPC or both.⁴⁶⁷ Kafureka added:

This, as far as we were concerned, was their first test. If they had passed it then Ankole would have been different from what it became in the 1980s. But they did not.⁴⁶⁸

This was mainly in Bushenyi district as the table below illustrates:

⁴⁶⁵ Interview: Dononsio Kafureka, February 8, 1998, Nyamitanga.

⁴⁶⁶ Interview: Bishop John Kakubi, February 16, 1998, Ibanda.

⁴⁶⁷ Interview: Dononsio Kafureka.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

Table 6: County chiefs after the fall of Amin, mid 1979. ⁴⁶⁹

County	Name	Religion.	Party
Igara	Evan Katafire	Protestant	UPC
Sheema	Byakyaro	Protestant	UPC
Kajara	Erica Kubiriba	Protestant	UPC
Bunyaruguru	Tibunyebire	Catholic	DP
Rushenyi	Obadia Nkabahita	Protestant	UPC

Tiberondwa justifies such appointments because

the fighting group was basically UPC. You will find that the wave of chiefs was former UPC and mostly Protestants. Though Amin had suppressed parties people had kept their party identity. Actually for us in UPC we were determined to take over power so that whatever was being done, it was a strategy for the future.⁴⁷⁰

Political appointments once again marked the divisions where Catholics conceived the liberation as a Protestant affair. Edward Rurangaranga who was the District Commissioner and responsible for appointments said:

Because we had to put up a caretaker structure before we could think of balancing the equation. In any case we had to give such offices to people whom we knew very well. Coincidentally, they happened to be Protestants and former UPCs. I agree that we should have acted otherwise, but it was due to the urgency at the time.⁴⁷¹

“Before we could think of balancing the equation” is symbolic. In Ankole, it meant religious and ethnic inclusiveness. Surely, he needed to balance the equation at the very beginning. And this was where the opportunity was lost. The Anglican Church in

⁴⁶⁹ This list is compiled from the recollections of an Interview with Sam Turihamwe, March 12, 1998, Nyamiko. These were the immediate appointments for the period June 1979-December 1980.

⁴⁷⁰ Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, September 12, 1997, Kampala.

Ankole also gave the impression that they had been part of the armed struggle to oust Idi Amin. Some liberators like Rurangaranga were accompanying the Bishop on his Diocesan tours. As Francis Bwengye observed:

Even in that short period, some of these Protestant returnees started touring with the Bishop of West Ankole in order to greet the people. Whereas this was good, it gave an impression that it was a Protestant monopoly since they never had any opportunity to visit the Catholic Church.⁴⁷²

But Bishop Bamunoba claimed they were not taken around the diocese because they were politicians. Rather they were former Synod members returned from exile:

Whatever interpretation it was given my own objective to take some of them with me during my tours in 1979 was a testimony to many Banyankole that God had protected these exiles. People needed to see them since they had only heard about them. People were eager to hear their stories.⁴⁷³

But as Adonia Tiberondwa put it, such stories could be used as propaganda:

Churches organised thanksgiving ceremonies for us after our return where we really got platform to tell our experiences in exile. You know such stories are good weapons to play on people's instincts. We easily won peoples' sympathies. With the Church's support we had an advantage over others because we had that ready made sympathetic audience.⁴⁷⁴

Indeed at the elections a year later, many successful candidates had church backing. The Dean of St. James Cathedral Mbarara, in a letter dated January 12, 1980 to the District Commissioner Mbarara (DC), invited the DC to take part in the thanksgiving service in honour of Edward Rurangaranga who had returned from exile. The Dean wrote:

...Major Edward Rurangaranga had been almost killed in Mbarara by bandits of Amin and God saved him, also having been a member of our Synod and our teacher at Ruharo in the past. There arose a

⁴⁷¹ Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, September 8, 1997, Ishaka.

⁴⁷² Interview: Francis Bwengye, July 29, 1997, Kampala.

⁴⁷³ Interview: Bishop Yoramu Bamunoba, February 21, 1998, Kyamugorani.

⁴⁷⁴ Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, March 12, 1998, Kampala.

desire to hold a simple thanksgiving ceremony organised by the Cathedral chapter and the Bishop. You are cordially invited to come and participate with us in this noble cause.⁴⁷⁵

The Dean also explained that people such as Rurangaranga had been Synod members and therefore the church could not ignore them. He said, they were “our children” whom we were obliged to receive back. The dilemma though was the motive behind those open hands. The church “was sure that the return of men such as Tiberondwa and others meant good will for the church,”⁴⁷⁶ the resumption of official recognition. Although such people were welcomed as “our children”, within Protestant circles, it is likely that among the Bahima, they were received with suspicion. These were largely Bairu Protestants who had indeed participated in the abolition of the monarchy in the sixties. While their return could have been welcomed as a liberation from a murderous regime, on the other hand it could have meant complete loss of hope in the return of their cherished monarchy. No wonder during Obote's regime, Bahima and Banyarwanda were always suspected of being anti-government especially when the guerrilla movement broke out.

5.1. OBOTE'S RETURN AND THE 1980 ELECTIONS.

It was the declared policy of the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) to ban parties for two years. The National Consultative Council (NCC) under the UNLF leadership favoured the holding of elections under the UNLF rather than a return to political parties. Reviving political parties, they argued, would jeopardise unity and lead to the resurgence of sectarian politics. Consequently in April 1980, the Secretary of the Political and Diplomatic Commission released a Government statement:

The decision by the NCC that all elections be held under the umbrella of the UNLF provided that all legally qualified Ugandans are free to stand for election to all public offices means that no political party will be permitted. All Ugandans including supporters of former political parties are free to stand...but

⁴⁷⁵ See letter from Dean of St James Cathedral to the District Commissioner, Mbarara in Government file, No. 116, East Ankole Archives.

⁴⁷⁶ Interview: Bishop John Kakubi, February 17, 1998, Ibanda.

only as individuals. They will not be permitted to stand on their party platforms or manifestos [other than] the manifesto of UNLF...⁴⁷⁷

Both DP and UPC had opposed the umbrella politics (Omutaka gwa UNLF) and wanted to contest the elections as parties.⁴⁷⁸ UPC in particular insisted that political parties be re-instituted. Otherwise, apart from parties, there was no way in which Obote would have returned and contested the elections. UPC, which had the majority in the NCC and the army, deposed Godfrey Binaisa as President in May 1980 and instituted a Military Commission headed by a UPC stalwart Paul Muwanga. As Tiberondwa said:

Without that strategy, we would never have succeeded in bringing Obote back. President Binaisa was determined to block him. But you see blocking Obote meant blocking UPC and that would have been chaos for Uganda. So we decided to topple him peacefully and institute a UPC establishment through the Military Commission.⁴⁷⁹

With the institution of the Military Commission in May 1980, the idea of holding elections under the UNLF was dropped and on May 27, 1980, Obote returned to Uganda through Ankole.

Why did Milton Obote choose to land in Bushenyi and not in Buganda or Lango his home area? It was a political statement of symbolic power with symbolic resonance. Obote used his return as a campaign tool, declaring candidature and rousing public sentiments at his “heroic second-coming” as a liberator. That explains the massive Press coverage he received. *The Uganda Times*, the official mouthpiece of the government then, reported:

In an emotional landing at Mbarara airstrip, Obote donned in a UPC black, red, blue short sleeved shirt, kissed the ground and shed tears...⁴⁸⁰

⁴⁷⁷ Kamukuzi Archives: See Government Statement of 30th. April. 1980, in UNLF File, letter No. 96.

⁴⁷⁸ Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, March 12, 1998, Kampala.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁰ See, *The Uganda Times*, 28 May 1980, p.1.

Obote knew that Bushenyi had been UPC's stronghold. It was mainly Bushenyi people who almost single-handed organised Obote's return. According to Adonia Tiberondwa:

I was directly involved in that exercise. We wanted Obote to return and I led the mission. With the late Kosia Korutaro the former UPC Chairman in the sixties, Bashasha and Ruhombe, we flew to Tanzania and we gave an open invitation to Obote to come to Bushenyi. You see the Tanzanian forces were in full support and we had Paul Muwanga on our side.⁴⁸¹

It was mainly returnees from exile who championed the return of Obote. Obote knew that whereas support for him was guaranteed in Northern Uganda, his homeland, Buganda and much of the Western Uganda had to be wooed. He knew the hatred of Buganda for having abolished their monarchy and could not set his first foot on its land, which he desecrated.⁴⁸² Obote chose to return to Uganda through Ankole because by doing so he alienated Buganda and made it appear insignificant.⁴⁸³ Thus the return to Uganda through Ankole was a political strategy to show the entire world the kind of support Obote had as opposed to Buganda's opposition. As Ezra Kikuri says:

Obote's return had a great impact because even on the very day of 27 May 1980, the function attracted the entire nation and the international media. If I can remember very well, I do not remember having seen any bigger crowd than that since.⁴⁸⁴

In a way the horrors of Amin's regime were so bad that people were looking for an alternative to Amin. That is why when Obote returned to Ankole, the "whole nation" received him. In any case by the time Obote was overthrown in 1971, things in Uganda had not deteriorated as badly as they did during Amin's regime. But not everyone who came supported Obote. There were those who came out of curiosity

⁴⁸¹ Interview: with Adonia Tiberondwa.

⁴⁸² Interview: Joram Kahenano, July 22, 1997, Kampala.

⁴⁸³ Cf. Holger B. Hansen and Michael Twaddle, *Uganda Now: Between Decay and Development*, London: James Currey, 1998, p. 284.

⁴⁸⁴ Interview: Ezra Kikuri, July 14, 1997, Bushenyi.

especially the youths who had heard about Obote as a legend. To many of these, the politics of UPC or DP did not mean much because they grew up during Amin's regime. To some of these youths however, they were soon to get their political education as UPC Youth Wingers. There were those who were his former opponents like the DP but who like the biblical Thomas had come to confirm whether it was really Obote. To their dismay he was! Anyway, 27 May 1980 became the launching pad for the resurrection of the UPC party. As part of the crowd then, I have a vivid recollection of the day's events. Obote was not only received as the Party President, but on that day:

John Babiha who had been the Vice President of UPC formally handed over to Obote the UPC constitution to take over the leadership of the party from where he had left it.

Obote had left not only as a Party President, but also the President of Uganda. So, they saw him as President again. But to have said that Obote would start from where he had left off was unfortunate. He had left a divided country, torn apart by religious and party loyalties which many people did not want to see again.

It is not easy though to assess the role of the church in Obote's return. We can only draw conclusions based on the interviews and the way different churches received the liberators. And this we have already discussed. Of course the vast majority of the members of the Anglican Church seemed delighted that Obote had returned because, as it were, he represented a cause. And this is supported by a letter from the Anglican Bishop of East Ankole Diocese who in reply to the invitation to attend the 27 May 1980 occasion, regretted his absence:

I am so very sorry that this welcoming day for Doctor Obote A.M. was arranged to be on the same day as that when the Archbishop of Uganda had arranged for us all Bishops of the Province for a House of Bishop's meeting at Namirembe, Kampala. I shall miss this great opportunity of meeting our old friend and former President.⁴⁸⁵

⁴⁸⁵ See letter from Bishop Amos Betungura to Edward Rurangaranga, in Government File, letter No.118, East Ankole Diocese.

Indeed Obote was “our old friend” for whom the Bishop had suffered during Amin’s period. Apart from that the churches were not part of the occasion officially though it was Protestant UPC politicians who were at the centre of it all. This could be the only parallel that can be drawn. As far as Ankole Catholics were concerned, they were only part of the crowd but not represented in the higher echelons of the occasion.⁴⁸⁶ The arrival of Obote marked another chapter in the history of Ankole. It was the launching day for UPC as a Party and shortly afterwards in June, multiparty campaigns began.

5.2. THE 1980 MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS: A LAPSE TO THE FORMER ETHNO-POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS FACTIONALISM.

The Military Commission declared in June 1980 that party politics was the only way to democracy. Consequently Ankole and Uganda generally revived traditional parties based on the old religious base. Ankole once again was a microcosm of the national scene: ethnic and religious fissures re-emerged letting out the historical magma of pent-up hatred and idiosyncrasies. Bairu Catholics and Bahima Protestants joined forces again in DP, while the Protestant Bairu joined UPC. The political scene during and after the campaigns was a reflection of the 1960s. This meant that the very reason people joined or rejected UPC or DP in the 1960s was the same they were likely to embrace twenty years later. Obote had hinted on a similar thing when in Bushenyi he said, *we shall start from where we stopped*, which was only too true

Campaigns in Ankole took on a religious complexion with UPC Protestant candidates seeking favour with the Anglican Church while DP went for the Catholic Church. Both churches became platforms for politicians *to come and greet the people*. In comparison the Anglican priests seem to have held a stronger hand than the Catholics because of the Protestant membership in the government. And as Francis Bwengye, a Catholic politician, observed:

⁴⁸⁶ Please note that were high ranking Catholics in the UPC party like the late John Babiha (UPC Vice President) but these were from outside Ankole.

Anglican clergy are more politicised because most of them had been lay people unlike the Catholics who right from their childhood go through the life of a Seminary and are not supposed to look outside. The Anglican Priest either had been a teacher, even a businessman or has been politicised through the society. Some of them even had been chiefs, so when they join the church, they definitely keep their political beliefs.⁴⁸⁷

The difference between the politics of the 1960s and 1980 was that the members of the former Omufunguro Protestant UPC either joined DP or UPM after having been fed up with Obote's divisive politics. William Mukaira said:

Our philosophy had not changed at all. In the sixties we called for party accommodation failure of which we were about to defect had the coup not taken place. Since UPC was not ready to reform in the 1980 elections, all we could do was to join other parties, which were ready to receive us.

Though UPC members dismissed Mukaira's group as defecting because they could not compete in the UPC of the 1980s, there were genuine former UPC members whose desire was unity in Ankole. But as it turned out, UPC in Ankole became predominantly a party of the old guards and former Enkomba of the 1960s. The Omufunguro alliance with DP and UPM marked the divisions within the UPC even at this stage. The fact that none of the Omufunguro was exiled meant that UPC returnees suspected they had collaborated with Amin. Whereas their defection to DP was a demonstration against UPC, they may have also felt guilt for their welcome to Amin. By joining DP and other parties, they hoped to weaken UPC and demonstrate their dissatisfaction with it though this was not effective. The UPC returnees were not only backed by the army, they became powerful and exercised their influence in the church's establishment. The Omufunguro therefore crossed as individuals only, seen as disgruntled individuals selling out to the Catholics and DP.

The Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) was formed in June 1980. We shall not go into the details of its formation at the national level. But what is of interest to this thesis is that its leader, Yoweri Museveni, a Muhima Protestant, was from Ankole. He

⁴⁸⁷ Interview: Francis Bwengye, July 29, 1997, Kampala.

had been one of the key commanders of the *liberation* war and had participated in the campaign against Idi Amin since 1971.⁴⁸⁸ Museveni said:

We formed UPM not because we wanted to form a party for its own sake or because we wanted to lead a political party, but because it was a necessity imposed on us by those elements that worked for the disintegration of UNLF.⁴⁸⁹

UPC and DP members believed that Museveni formed UPM because he was ambitious to rule. According to Tiberondwa and Francis Bwengye, Museveni had in exile disassociated himself from Obote and formed his own Military wing FRONASA:

And whenever Museveni was not elected chairman of any of our committees, he was not satisfied. So when we returned from exile, he could not be accommodated under DP for there was no way he could have led DP or UPC. So he formed something of his own which he led. He knew that it would not take him very far but at least he was its leader.⁴⁹⁰

My attempts to interview Museveni failed. However I was able to read his book, *The Mustard Seed*, which together with interviews was the source of my information on UPM. Museveni could not lead DP, traditionally a Baganda and Catholic party, both of which Museveni was not. UPM was in a way a protest party of mainly the young UPC Protestants and DP Catholics who were disenchanted with UPC and DP parochialism. Many like Museveni and Kategaya had been educated at Dar es Salaam University. They had liberal views and no religious bias which contributed to UPM's poor performance in Ankole where people voted according to their religious affiliation. Also people like Museveni, Kategaya, Rugunda and others had been UPC Youth Wingers who had fallen out of favour with the leadership. They realised that their chances to reach leadership roles were limited because of UPC's failure to groom the youth for leadership.⁴⁹¹ Because Museveni wished for a non-aligned party, UPM

⁴⁸⁸ See his book, *The Mustard Seed*.

⁴⁸⁹ *Uganda Times*, 17 June 1980, p. 4.

⁴⁹⁰ Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa.

⁴⁹¹ Interview: Ndiwa-Ndikora, July 23, 1997, Mbarara.

did not have much impact in Ankole. UPC and DP had started in the fifties while UPM only had three months to impress itself upon Banyankole. As Hon. Eriya Kategaya said, time was not long enough.⁴⁹²

Banyankole could not identify with UPM because they were already linked to their highly organised traditional parties. Catholics and Protestant Bahima identified with DP and therefore Museveni would have to work extremely hard if he was to have any impact. Though he was an Army Commander in the liberation war, he was not well known in Ankole. People used to refer to him as *Akashaija kokucwa efumu*, (the small man of proverbs) in a sense despising him. Even if Museveni was a Muhima, he was not from a traditional prestigious ruling family. He was seen as an in-comer and therefore regarded as a nonentity in Ankole politics. And Catholics might see him as a former UPC Protestant who would not preserve their interests.⁴⁹³ As Kategaya said:

Some of those old parties like UPC and DP had their foundations in religions. I remember in Rukungiri where I attended one of the rallies and an old man asked us, 'UPC is for Protestants, DP is for Catholics, what is your religion?,' asking about UPM.⁴⁹⁴

On religious and ethnic considerations, one might have expected Bahima to support Museveni, but they were entrenched in DP, and disregarded Museveni. And as Ndiwa-Ndikora reflected:

In Nyabushozi, Bahima also have their own problems. They used to think that for anybody to lead, he had to come from a prominent family, a kind of *Mwana wani* (son of so and so). They think it should be the son of a former chief who should lead. So Museveni lost on that ticket.⁴⁹⁵

The DP candidate in Nyabushozi was Sam Kuteesa, a member of the ruling Bahinda clan while most UPM candidates in Ankole were mainly Bairu Protestants like Kategaya, Mushega, Mwebesa and others who were former UPC members and did not

⁴⁹² Interview: Hon. Eriya Kategaya, February 9, 1998, Kampala.

⁴⁹³ Interview: Francis Bwengye, July 29, 1997, Kampala.

⁴⁹⁴ Interview: Hon Eriya Kategaya, February 9, 1998, Kampala.

attract Bahima notables who were already entrenched in DP. Though its leader Museveni was Omuhima, UPM was not a party based on ethno-religious politics, at least on the surface. Its objectives were to:

Change the status quo of the sixties. We thought that UPM would appeal to all those nationalists whose desire was to seek the unity of our country. We knew that it would take time, but we were determined to press on and we did.⁴⁹⁶

These three, UPC, DP and UPM, were the parties that battled it out in the December 1980 elections. At this time what became known as the *Seven Diocesan Schools* were opened in West Ankole Diocese. The idea had been planned by Bishop Bamunoba but not possible under Amin. Now these schools: Ruyonza, Kyeizoba, Masheruka, Ruhinda, Rugarama, Kitagata and Rubare were opened in every county in Bushenyi district. Because these schools had to raise money, they became another excuse for UPC Protestant candidates to advertise themselves. The church and politicians had a symbiotic relationship as Bishop Bamunoba said:

UPC supported my schools because they also needed church support. You see if they were invited as guest of honour to a school fund-raising during the campaigns, it really meant a lot. Politicians could not refuse to organise our fund-raising because through that way, they also attracted parents for votes.⁴⁹⁷

In 1980, Ankole had less than eight secondary schools which could not absorb primary school leavers. Their foundation reduced the number of school dropouts affected by the stiff competition for the few vacancies. The good will of politicians to support these schools was also part and parcel of their strategy to attract votes.

⁴⁹⁵ Interview: Ndiwa-Ndikora, July 23, 1997, Mbarara.

⁴⁹⁶ Interview: Hon. Kategaya, February 9, 1997, Mbarara.

⁴⁹⁷ Interview: Bishop Yoramu Bamunoba, September 7, 1997, Kyamugorani.

5.3. THE ELECTIONS.

Despite the intimidation that characterised the campaigns in some parts of Ankole, the polls attracted many people. UPC claimed a significant victory and sent a bigger number of representatives to parliament. The question that I shall attempt to answer is whether UPC really won the 1980 elections in Ankole. The popular view is that UPC rigged the elections. This was put forward by DP, UPM and some liberal UPC although the Commonwealth observers declared it “a valid expression of the people’s choice” and a “free and fair” exercise.⁴⁹⁸ How could the UPC rig the elections?

First was the gerrymandering of the electoral constituencies to make it hard for other parties to win in areas where they had obvious majority support. The pro-UPC electoral commission demarcated the constituencies in such a way that areas of DP and UPM concentration could be added onto predominantly UPC areas to neutralise them. Nyabushozi where Museveni (UPM) lost is an intriguing example for it is a predominantly Bahima Protestant area. Given that Museveni was not an enthusiastic supporter of the monarchy, and he was contending with a more establishment Muhima, Sam Kuteesa of DP, still the gerrymandering of Nyabushozi (Mbarara North constituency) was a key factor. Museveni writes:

My own constituency in Nyabushozi was gerrymandered. Taking advantage of the fact that voting was likely to be on a religious basis, the sub-counties of Nyakasharara, Sanga and Kashongi were removed from Nyabushozi and made part of another constituency. These sub-counties were mainly Protestant...and were exchanged for Ibanda which is occupied by Catholics. Both UPC and DP were involved in these practices in my area as both parties had an interest in making it difficult for me to win.⁴⁹⁹

Despite Museveni's claims though, it is unlikely that he would have won even if there was no rigging because of the factors already analysed. Actually the results shown below are plus for him given the fact that he was contesting with two impeccable personalities who represented the two ethnic groups in Nyabushozi. Sam Kuteesa

⁴⁹⁸ See *The Uganda Times*, 15 December 1980, p. 1.

⁴⁹⁹ Y. K. Museveni, op. cit., p. 119.

obviously drew the Bahima votes because of his "accident of birth" while Yoramu Gucwamaingi drew the Bairu migrant votes in Nyabushozi. Museveni as the middleman drew the stray votes so to say and it was indeed an achievement on his part that he scored thus: DP (Sam Kuteesa), 15,657, UPC (Yoramu Gucwamaingi), 12,747, UPM (Yoweri Museveni), 12,682.⁵⁰⁰ The rigging in this case could only arise in the fact that the sub-counties name above, which were Protestant dominated, were added to Mbarara Central Constituency in order to strengthen the UPC candidate, Dr. Edward Rubaihayo who was likely to be threatened by Catholic DPs in Mbarara. Of course the transfer of these sub-counties denied Museveni of the migrant votes. But these migrants to Nyabushozi were mainly Bairu who originally hailed from UPC counties like Igara, Sheema, Rwampara and some Bakiga due to land shortage and therefore were unlikely to vote Museveni. That is actually the reason UPC polled second to DP in Nyabushozi thus relegating Museveni to the last position. Bunyaruguru (Bushenyi North Constituency) was another fraudulent case. Despite being a Catholic dominated area, a UPC and moreover, a little known, candidate, Dr. Joseph Muhangi won because of the fraudulent importation of people from other districts. Although Dr. Tiberondwa claims it was partly because UPC had concentrated a lot of energy against Francis Bwengye, the DP candidate, still he confesses:

Even then there were some irregularities. Actually when you look at the number of votes cast in Bunyaruguru for UPC, they seem to be much more than the Protestants who could possibly be in that area.⁵⁰¹

The total votes for Bunyaruguru were: UPC (Dr. Joseph Muhangi), 22,744, DP (Francis Bwengye), 19,383, UPM (Victor Bigirwenda), 593. Francis Bwengye also added:

⁵⁰⁰ See Results of the 1980 Electoral Commission, p. 149.

⁵⁰¹ Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa.

In areas like Sheema, Rwampara and Igara, UPC could have won but not in Bunyaruguru and Ibanda because they were Catholic concentrations and yet UPC won in Bunyaruguru.⁵⁰²

Bwengye goes on to summarise the methods which UPC used to win the elections:

Doctoring the voters' registers and putting in under-age people, registering dead people so that others could vote for them, exchanging ballot boxes depending on which one was heavier. I really witnessed this. People suspected of being Catholics were rubbed off from the registers and all Polling Assistants and chiefs were UPC. In some of the stations the total votes exceeded the total number of people in the registers. DP was not allowed to have observers.

All electoral officials were UPC; the electoral Commission, the Returning Officers, Polling Assistants and even chiefs who had been appointed by the returning Protestant exiles. According to the directive from the Ministry of Public Service and Cabinet Affairs⁵⁰³ chiefs were required to be impartial in the exercise. But instead many of them participated in favour of UPC against DP supporters. Writing a petition to the District Commissioner, Mbarara, the DP chairman, Mbarara branch, Mr. P. Kavuma complained:

I have received some reports that some of your chiefs... have not been impartial in dealing with political parties. Chiefs are deeply involved in harassing DP supporters and some have actually been imprisoned. If need be, we can actually quote incidents.⁵⁰⁴

This is not surprising for as Ndiwa-Ndikora, retired District Commissioner, Mbarara District, says:

County chiefs in Ankole were mainly Protestants, apart from Bunyaruguru, which was traditionally for a Catholic Mwiru.⁵⁰⁵

⁵⁰² Interview: Francis Bwengye.

⁵⁰³ See Circular Standing Instruction No.1 of 1980 issued by the Ministry of Public Service and Cabinet Affairs, dated 30 June 1980, and the Directive (C.10486) issued by the Minister Mr. W. Okwenje on 5 September 1980 barring civil servants from involvement in partisan politics.

⁵⁰⁴ See a letter from the Chairman, Democratic Party Office, Mbarara Branch to the District Commissioner, Mbarara, 18 August 1980.

⁵⁰⁵ Interview: Ndiwa-Ndikora, July 23, 1997, Mbarara.

The Electoral Commission Report records cases of intimidation of voters and opposition candidates being held and delayed at army roadblocks.⁵⁰⁶ Of course not all results were rigged. There were some constituencies where UPC won comfortably such as Bushenyi Central (Tiberondwa), Kanyomozi and Francis Butagira in Rwampara, Mbarara. Whatever it was, UPC formed the government that lead the country from December 1980 until July 1985 when it was once again toppled by its own army.

5.4. THE CHURCH AND POLITICS IN ANKOLE.

We have already alluded to the frenzy the Anglican Church fell into at the arrival of its exiled heavyweights who had been members of Synods and church councils at different levels. The majority of the returnees were Anglicans and therefore the Catholic Church could see a return to the UPC reign of the sixties of which Catholics had only bitter memories. Secondly the activities of the Catholic Church were severely frustrated, even curtailed, while the UPC politicians favoured the Anglican Church. This was very apparent when it came to fund-raising. Whereas all churches were required to seek legal permission before holding any function, for the Anglican Church it was only a theoretical requirement. As Bishop Bamunoba put it quite frankly:

If you were in Bushenyi, for instance, one did not need permission from a Protestant District Commissioner. After all, these people wanted platform and therefore such fund-raising were opportune moments. Yet for the Catholics, they had to apply because they did not have sympathisers in the higher hierarchy.⁵⁰⁷

Consequently church functions served UPC's propaganda with explicit church support. You could not draw the line between the individual Christian and the

⁵⁰⁶ See Report on the Results of the 1980 elections by the Electoral Commission, p. 72. Mr Ndiwa-Ndikora in an interview also said that in Kasese, for example, a DP candidate was reported to have been killed before he reached a polling station.

⁵⁰⁷ Interview: Bishop Y. Bamunoba, September 7, 1997, Kyamugorani.

politician. Francis Bwengye recalls a case when he was embarrassed at a church fund-raising for Ruhinda Secondary School in Bushenyi:

I remember when I went to a fund-raising at a Protestant School and offered a cheque equivalent to about 20 bicycles. But then Rurangaranga stood up and asked people if they accepted a DP cheque. People kept quiet because money is money. Kamuntu stood up and cooled the situation saying that money is money whether it is from DP or UPC. But Rurangaranga made a disparaging statement, that since when did people of "the other side" [*abaseri*, meaning Catholics] help us to build?⁵⁰⁸

The two churches not only gave their politicians a forum in churches to "preach" but also church leaders "campaigned" for their parties and guided their flock for whom to vote and which party to support. Some politicians could get *saved* in order to win the trust of the church and Christians. That explains why a party like UPM, which had no religious appendage, was suspect. As Tiberondwa said:

You see we were Protestants and naturally we found ourselves participating willingly on church councils. And we can not rule out the fact that we used the church platform to get votes. If you are involved in church activities and members of your local church know you, naturally they tend to prefer you when it comes to the time of voting.⁵⁰⁹

Furthermore the Anglican Church and UPC politicians used building schools and churches as a vote-catcher. Fund-raising functions as we have seen provided the forum for politicians to campaign. Later on politicians would "give" Secondary Schools to their localities by converting Primary Schools and would ensure that these Schools got government grants. The church might have been moved and motivated by the need for funds to build schools for which the UPC politicians readily provided, but it certainly did not mind giving a hand in building the UPC political kingdom on earth. Asked in which way did the politicians woo the church for votes, Tiberondwa replied:

⁵⁰⁸ Interview: Francis Bwengye, July 29, 1997, Kampala.

⁵⁰⁹ Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, August 4, 1997, Kampala.

You go for church functions, fund-raising for schools, which are church founded. In that way you are pulling the church closer to you. You invite church leaders to your home; you buy a door or window for the church. It was actually through monetary connections that politicians tended to identify with the church.⁵¹⁰

That was the relationship between the Anglican Church and the politicians. Politicians got votes through church support while they were able to meet its financial obligations in return. Tiberondwa asserts that during the UPC period in the eighties, there were more churches and schools built than ever before. The same cannot be said of the Catholic Church in the same period. Catholics developed, built schools and churches at their own pace without any prompting force. Thus a comparison between the two institution reveals two factors. Whereas the Anglican Church had what we could term as a quantitative development, the Catholics had a qualitative one as Bishop Bakyenga said:

You see we Catholics are not like you Anglicans. Since we lacked that political privilege, we learnt to live by ourselves and to use the means available to us. Through qualitative planning, we were able to achieve much without waiting for politicians to come and do it for us. You could say that the Anglican Church was more active than we were. But it is mainly due to the character of the two churches because the Catholic Church is generally very gentle and not as shouty of what it does as the Anglican Church does.⁵¹¹

I have dwelt on the Anglican Church because the Catholic Church was not an active actor in politics especially after the elections. With most of the Catholic candidates defeated, it concentrated on giving pastoral leadership to its flock leaving the political platform to the Anglican Church.

The UPC victory of December 1980 had been followed by the emergence of the guerrilla war as early as February 1981. This put the Catholic Church in Ankole in a very difficult position. Because its followers were largely DP, they were suspected of collaboration. Consequently, there was harassment of Catholics by UPC chiefs in their zeal to combat the rebel activity (not prominent in Ankole anyway). From 1981-

⁵¹⁰ *ibid.*

1985 when the UPC government was overthrown, there was a tug of war between UPC Protestant chiefs and Catholics. In a letter from the Parish Priest of Butare-Buhweju to the District Commissioner, Bushenyi, Fr. B. Clechet complained:

Some Catholics [are] obliged to build the Protestant churches. Even when Bishop Kakubi came to visit the parish, he asked the chiefs to stop to do so. But they are still obliged. People are threaten [sic] if they are not married or baptised in the Protestant church even if they are Catholics. This happen [sic] mainly in Bihanga Gomborora. These...are contrary to the freedom of religion which citizen [sic] of Uganda should have.⁵¹²

Indeed that was contrary to the 1967 Constitution article 16 (1) that stipulated that:

Except in his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of conscience, and for the purposes of this article, the said freedom includes freedom of thought and of religion, freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom to either alone or in the community with others and both in public and private to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

The priest's concern necessitated an emergency meeting between the UPC MP for Buhweju (Bushenyi East), Chris Rwakasisi, religious leaders from both Christian churches in the area and party functionaries. The meeting's revelations in which both Catholics and Protestants were represented were interesting. Contrary to the postulations that Catholics were forced to convert to Protestantism and build Protestant schools, according to Paul Babishisha:

People were crossing voluntarily although there were some misguided people who erroneously equated UPC with the Church of Uganda [Anglican] and that in order not to remain suspects, they had to change their religion in order to conform to their erroneous belief.⁵¹³

⁵¹¹ Interview: Bishop Paul Bakyenga, February 14, 1998, Nyamitanga.

⁵¹² See letter from Rev. Father of Butare Parish Buhweju to the District Commissioner Bushenyi dated 8th. October 1981, in Religious File, letter No. 69, Bushenyi District Administration Archives.

⁵¹³ See minutes of the Joint meeting held at Kashenyi-Buhweju on 20th December 1981 at 7.30 p.m. by Hon. Chris Rwakasisi MP to probe into the allegations of forced baptisms.

A very difficult quotation to analyse indeed! Buhweju County is a very densely Catholic populated area where crossing to Protestantism should not have been necessary or even attractive. However the phrase “in order not to remain suspects” reveals that there was a political misunderstanding between the UPC chiefs and Catholics in the area as early as 1981. I do not really think that Catholics had already identified with the guerrilla movement then. But their vote for DP was the only evidence to connect them with subversive activities. With continuous harassment from chiefs, it might have forced Catholics to sympathise with the rebels. The correspondence between the Catholic Church and the government officials continues to implicate the Catholic Church in subversive activities. In a letter from the Minister of State in the President’s Office to Fr. Lemmey of Mushanga Parish- Sheema, dated 19 April 1982, the Minister warned:

I would like to advise that your activities should be confined within spiritual limitations and leave party of government machinery to operate without religious leaders' interference. I am taking exception of your running around to secure release of suspects and your utterances in UPC offices. Kindly be advised that all matters related to security of this nation is paramount.⁵¹⁴

The suspects might or might not have been guerrilla sympathisers. Organising occasions such as a wedding party or baptism service could be seen as anti-government. And since many accused were Catholic DPs, their priests had a pastoral obligation to plead for them. But as the guerrilla movement intensified in Buganda, minor incidents in Ankole were magnified. Such confrontation with the state hampered the church's activities. It had to seek permission for any of its functions otherwise it could easily be suspected of collaboration with the guerrillas. Of course the Anglican Church was not exempted, but as Ndiwa-Ndikora said:

It was something that people took for granted but otherwise it was a rule that all churches apply for permission. But tell me, if Dr. Tiberondwa is the head of Laity for the Diocese, how can that church apply for permission. After all he would be the MP for the area initiating the fund-raising.⁵¹⁵

⁵¹⁴ Bushenyi District Administration Archive: letter No. 68 by Chris Rwakasisi, in Religious File.

⁵¹⁵ Interview: Ndiwa-Ndikora, February 16, 1998, Mbarara.

A letter from the parish priest of Kitabi-Igara to the District Commissioner, Bushenyi, reveals the kind of tension. He complained of similar harassment by chiefs:

I have to complain against the county chief of Igara Mr. W. Nkwitsana talking badly about the parish work of Kitabi in front of the chiefs of Bumbaire sub-county at a meeting held on 15th May 1982. The chief was against certain issues in the Parish-collecting money and foodstuffs for building a new church.⁵¹⁶

In the Religious Correspondence File Bushenyi District Administration Archives, there are several similar letters about the confrontation of the Catholic Church and District authorities, each side accusing the other of interfering in state-church relations. Yet the patronage between the Anglican Church and District authorities in Ankole was different. In a letter from the office of the District Commissioner, Bushenyi, to the County Chief of Igara, entitled: THE VISIT OF THE BISHOP OF OKLAHOMA, USA, TO WEST ANKOLE DIOCESE, he writes:

This is to inform you that the Bishop of Oklahoma, USA will be paying a visit to West Ankole Diocese from 17 May 1982 to 28 May 1982. In order to give him a rousing and warm welcome, I am asking you to ask your chiefs around to mobilise people to build one or two arches along Katungu-Bweranyangi road. I know the chiefs are busy preparing for May 27 Anniversary celebrations, 1982, but let us assist the Bishop of West Ankole also.⁵¹⁷

To share in the 'rousing' district benefits depended on which side either church was. While one church had warm partnership, the other was accused of subversive activities. And while there was no longer any Catholic DP MPs to talk of in Ankole (for many had been exiled)⁵¹⁸, the Anglican Bishop of East Ankole Diocese, Ruharo, was inviting the MP Bushenyi Central Constituency to preach a sermon in the cathedral. He writes:

⁵¹⁶ Bushenyi District Administration Archives: letter from Fr. Franz Pgaff, Kitabi parish to the District Commissioner Bushenyi dated 22 May 1982, in Religious File.

⁵¹⁷ See letter in the Religious Correspondence File, Bushenyi.

⁵¹⁸ Francis Bwengye, in his book, *The Agony of Uganda*, (Regency Press, London, 1985), gives a long list of exiled people, see pp. 357-373.

Although we divided the old Diocese of Ankole into East and West Dioceses, we have now realised that we should create ways of some uniting factors by asking some Christians from the Diocese of West Ankole especially lay men like Hon. Dr. Adonia Tiberondwa to preach a sermon for us on 2nd January 1983.⁵¹⁹

Table 7: Candidates for the various constituencies in Bushenyi and Mbarara. The ** means candidates are Protestants and # means Catholics.

Constituency	UPC	DP	UPM ⁵²⁰
Bushenyi North	Dr. Joseph Muhangi**	A.F Bwengye#	V. Bigirwenda#
West	E. Rurangaranga**	J. Kabaireho#	Otafiire-Kahinda#
Central	Dr. A. Tiberondwa**	A. Baryaruha**	Jason Mwebesa**
East	Chris Rwakasisi**	Prof. Kabwegyere#	Dr. Mushanga**
South	Y. Kanyomozi**	D. Muterere#	K. Ruhemba**
Mbarara N. West	G.K. Kahangi**	B. Buzabo#	A. Kabyama#
North	Y. Gucwamaingi**	Sam Kuteesa**	Y. Museveni**
Central	Dr. P. Rubaihayo**	H. Katembeko#	F. Kamugira**
West	Francis Butagira**	F. Mwebesa#	J. Katatumba#
South-West	R. Kagurusi**	V.K. Baguma#	E. Kategaya**
South-East	E. Gumisiriza**	I. Katetegirwe#	Deo Tinako#

Such a line up widened the gap between Bairu Protestants, Bairu Catholics and DP Bahima Protestants. It was not only a religio-political issue but also an ethnic problem. Bahima saw the re-emergence of Bairu UPC Protestants as a continuation of the sixties, a period with which they only remembered with bitter memories. For the Muslims many of them kept a low profile because they were still being associated

⁵¹⁹ See invitation letters refs. EA/GC/2/37 to Hon. Francis Butagira, MP Mbarara West Constituency and to the District Commissioner to come and listen to Tiberondwa's sermon!

⁵²⁰ Source "Results of the 1980 Electoral Commission", booklet.

with the defacant Idi Amin's regime. In any case prominent Muslims were still in exile.

5.5. THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT AND ITS IMPACT.

The main argument of this chapter has been that the period 1980-1985, which came to be famously known as Obote II regime, had many parallels with the sixties in Ankole. And the main reason that I have advanced was that it was mainly the same actors that controlled the political stage in the drama and politics of the 1980s. After the elections chiefs right from the *Omutongole* to the District Commissioner had to be UPC and mainly Protestants. A look at the list of county chiefs in both Bushenyi and Mbarara Districts confirms it:

Table 8: County chiefs in Bushenyi and Mbarara districts

Bushenyi District. ⁵²¹			
County	Name	Religion	Party
Igara	W. Nkwitsana	Protestant	UPC
Kajara	O. Nkabahita	Protestant	UPC
Sheema	E. Byakyaro	Protestant	UPC
Buhweju	Kerere	Catholic	UPC
Bunyaruguru	Turyamureba	Protestant	UPC
Ruhinda	Bamutina	Catholic	UPC
Mbarara District			
Kashari	E. Mpambara	Protestant	UPC
Nyabushozi	E. Katabarwa	Protestant	UPC
Ibanda	Kahonda	Protestant	UPC
Isingiro	Kupa	Muslim	UPC
Rwampara	-----	-----	
Ruhama	-----	-----	

Anyone suspected of DP sympathies like Katafire, former county chief Igara, was dropped. Yet these were Civil Service positions which should have had nothing to do with political appointments. Even if it was intended to strengthen UPC in the District, it also alienated the Catholic DP who conceived of the whole alignment as a continuation of the Protestant hegemony. The period after the elections until when UPC was deposed, unless one was UPC, one could not get a job. What such

⁵²¹ Source Yowasi Makaru who was on the District Administration Committee.

discrimination caused was the emergence of the guerrilla war just two months after the elections. Museveni discusses the reasons why he waged a guerrilla war in his book *The Mustard Seed* but this kind of discrimination increased support.

The guerrilla movement started on 26 February 1981 less than two months after the elections. Museveni had always hinted at it during UPM rallies that 'UPC kweribe obururu nituza omukishaka' (if UPC rigs the elections we shall go to the bush). UPC rigged the elections and Museveni went to the bush. The question we want to attempt here is why Museveni, a Munyankole, did not stage his war against the UPC government in Ankole but rather chose to start from Buganda in what came to be infamously known as the Luwero triangle. The reasons were historical, as they were political and geographical. Baganda hated Obote and demonstrated their hatred by voting as a block for DP. The guerrillas knew that Buganda was a very fertile ground for sustaining a war. Ankole's bonds with UPC could not be severed for, as we have argued in chapter two, UPC was seen as a liberator for the Bairu and that is why Bahima had joined DP and some UPM when it was formed in June 1980. Therefore when UPM went to the bush after faring so miserably in the elections, Ankole did not take it seriously. For the Bairu, it was an affair of the minority Bahima-Banyarwanda and frustrated UPC Omufunguro, who could soon be pursued, crushed in the bush and left there as Obote had promised during one of his campaign rallies. Politically therefore Ankole was a dangerous ground. Not even Nyabushozi, Museveni's home, was safe since DP sentiments were still strong. And as Kikuri said:

There was no way the guerrilla movement could have started in Ankole and succeeded. UPC in Ankole was highly mobilised. It was everywhere; civil servants, police, schools and even children were singing UPC. So to start a guerrilla war in such an area would have been like committing suicide. There was no good will and it was unlikely that DP would have provided the cover because UPC in Ankole was indeed stronger and sharper than DP.⁵²²

Yet in Buganda which was politically disenchanting and bitter about UPC's rigging of the elections which DP had hoped to win, the political climate was ripe for the guerrillas to exploit. Geographically, Buganda housed the capital city and seat of

government: the proximity factor. The fertile soil and thick forests in Luwero and Mpigi gave Buganda an added advantage. Also Luwero's climate and plenty of grazing land in Bululi and Bulemezi had attracted large populations of Bahima and Banyarwanda pastoralists from Ankole, a potential source of food (milk and meat) and protection for the guerrillas. Undoubtedly therefore, the National Resistance guerrillas had made a major strategic decision which soon paid dividends.

Even if the war did not begin from Ankole, its effects were felt there, though not as badly as in Buganda. Once the war began in 1981, UPC immediately became aggressive, arresting its opponents. And that is how DP Catholics in Ankole came to be identified with the guerrilla movement. Such political blunders played in the guerrillas' favour. First they persecuted DP supporters (who happened to be Catholics) on suspicion that they were sympathising with and even giving material support to the NRA rebels. Intimidation and harassment were one of the immediate effects to be felt by non-UPC supporters. Youth vigilantes could not distinguish between church functions and rebel activities. The case of Kagamba, a Catholic parish in Bushenyi, is a typical example. The Parish Priest, R. Grandmaison, even after seeking Police permission for their Church Jubilee fund-raising activities, reported that their people had been imprisoned in spite of the official permission:

After Easter Kagamba will have its jubilee of twenty-five years, and also there will be Ordination of the Priesthood of Reverend George-William Mbangira...For this reason we kindly ask you to allow us to organise a collection in our Parish to that effect. To avoid any misunderstanding regarding the collection and the use of that money, I will be grateful if you could give us permission in writing...⁵²³

"To avoid misunderstanding" was indeed a pregnant and poignant expression of the suspicion between the Catholic Church and the District authorities. Although the letter was copied to the Administrative Secretary and the District Commissioner, Bushenyi, they did not restrain their chief who later imprisoned some of those who participated in the fund-raising. When the parish priest wrote a petition, the Administrative Secretary instead sought to know from the chief the circumstances

⁵²² Interview: Ezra Kikuri, February 18, 1998, Bushenyi.

surrounding the arrest and the action that had been taken. Grandmaison's petition addressed to the Gombolola chief Rubare and copied to high authorities read:

I am very much surprised to hear that people who were collecting money for the jubilee of Kagamba Parish...with permission of Police (copy attached) had been arrested and put in jail...Each Saza Chief and each Gombolola chief have received a copy of these I send to you now. And also each collector had been during the collection in possession of a special identification card issued by us. I hope that these people will be released immediately without further intervention.⁵²⁴

In November 1981, DP executives of Mbarara District complained to the UPC chairman, Mbarara, of the unwarranted interference in their office by UPC Youth Wingers who had broken into the DP office, ransacked it, damaged property and on another occasion occupied it claiming they had taken it over. The DP chairman complained:

Apart from the widespread harassment and intimidation perpetrated on the DP supporters, some members of the UPC particularly the Youth have persistently and violently attacked the DP office on the High Street Mbarara and damaged some property belonging to the party. Sometime in October 1981, a group of UPC Youth broke into the back room of the said office, and occupied it claiming that they had taken it over.... Again on the 9th. November 1981...came back and broke the door of the front entrance, entered the office, smashed our cupboard and tore a number of files. We think that the Democratic Party has also a role to play and it is because of this consideration that at National level and in other Districts any authority has not hampered the activities of our party. There is no reason why Mbarara should be an exception.⁵²⁵

In response the UPC chairman wrote:

I understand that, that office was not serving its intended purpose. Instead it was used as a store of inflammable substances like Diesel, oils and petrol which were dangerous to the building. In view of this

⁵²³ See a letter from Rev. Fr. R. Grandmaison to the O.C Police Bushenyi dated 1 February 1983.

⁵²⁴ Bushenyi District Administration Archives: letter from Rev. Fr. Grandmaison's to the Gomborora chief of Rubare in Religious File No. 16.

⁵²⁵ See Memorandum to the Chairman UPC Mbarara District from the Democratic Party office, signed by M. Tubwebire, H. Katembeko, Mrs. G. Byanyima and other on 14 November 1981.

very reason, the Youths felt very concerned and took such action as a rescue operation... You are therefore, advised to use it as an office but not anything else contrary to the intended purpose.⁵²⁶

It was not that DP was well treated at the national level. Political events in Kampala were more traumatic than in Ankole. But the difference was that at the national scene, UPC had very strong Catholics on its executive, people like Kalule-Settala and Prof. Ojok, then Minister of Education. Even in the North, many Catholics supported Obote. In Ankole the Catholic Church was unlikely to support Obote, because, as Bwengye said:

The Catholic Church in Uganda looks up to its national leadership for guidance. And because Baganda had solidly blocked Obote, the Catholic Church in Ankole would only give UPC a cosmetic welcome.⁵²⁷

Such harassment of DP supporters in Ankole aroused opposition from the Catholic Church and hastened them to the government's opposition. There was a double effect in such persecution. As far as the security officials in Ankole were concerned, they were not persecuting Catholics, rather as they argued, they were apprehending DP guerrilla sympathisers. Actually Ndiwa-Ndikora who was the District Commissioner alluded to such harassment. He attributed DP and Catholic intimidation to overzealous Youth Wingers who would fabricate accusations:

There was a very strong UPC wing. We knew that when some of these people had nothing to report they concocted such incidents. In most cases they were lies and it was always up to the leader to assess it. That is the challenge we face in leadership.⁵²⁸

The Kamukuzi Archives are full of letters from the UPC Office Mbarara accusing the Youth Wingers of misconduct. One of such letters reads:

⁵²⁶ Kamukuzi Archives: letter from Francis Buringa, UPC District Chairman Mbarara to the Chairman Democratic Party Mbarara dated 20 December 1982.

⁵²⁷ Interview: Francis Bwengye, July 29, 1997, Kampala.

⁵²⁸ Interview: Ndiwa-Ndikora, July 23, 1997, Mbarara.

Being a Youth Winger or having trained as a Police Constabulary, is not Passport to harassment and mistreating people and taking away their property. Your role as you were told is to become the “eyes” and “ears” of the government but not to override and boss the existing authority in the area whatever cadre. You are therefore directed to repent, reform and live to the standards expected of a Youth Winger.⁵²⁹

DP harassment was intensified by another factor; the indiscriminate expulsion and persecution of the Banyarwanda. I hope to discuss in detail the history of this anti-Banyarwanda xenophobia in the next chapter. Suffice it to mention here that because the Banyarwanda migrants and refugees who settled in Ankole had tended to identify with the Bahima and therefore with the DP, UPC harboured grievances against it.⁵³⁰ Worse still several of their sons had run to the bush with Museveni to fight government.

What then were the overall effects of the guerrilla war on Ankole? Ankole was less affected by the war than Buganda. But there was unwarranted persecution of DP supporters, Catholics, Bahima and Banyarwanda. In fact, some people like Kananura, Mbiringi and Rutehenda's sons suspected as guerrillas were killed.⁵³¹ The Banyarwanda were expelled while DP Catholics were alienated and suspected of supporting rebels especially when Andrew Kayiira's Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) started recruiting from Isingiro and Buhweju both Catholic populated areas.⁵³² Many were imprisoned without trial like James Kahigiriza, a former UPC Omufunguro in the sixties who had joined DP in the 1980 elections. He was detained between February-March 1982 for allegedly holding a meeting to overthrow the government and train guerrillas.⁵³³ The “treasonable” meeting they referred to was to arrange for his daughter's wedding! The other major development was the demise of UPC and the collapse of Obote's government as a result of the split, which divided UPC between “Science” and “Syndicate” which we now turn to.

⁵²⁹ Kamukuzi Archives: Refugees file, letter No. 23 from Baineomugisha to Youth Wingers Mugyenyi and Mugisha.

⁵³⁰ See Report of the Commission of the Inquiry into Violation of Human Rights, p. 504.

⁵³¹ Interview: Yorokamu Gucwamaingi, February 22, 1998, Ruharo.

⁵³² Interview: Bishop John Kakubi, February, March 22, 1997, Ibanda.

⁵³³ See Kahigiriza's testimony to the *Commission of Inquiry*, p. 106-7.

5.6. THE “SCIENCE” AND “SYNDICATE” CONTROVERSY.

Dr Adonia Tiberondwa put it quite honestly that “politicians never learn”. When a political organisation has silenced its opposition, the tendency is for it to start fighting itself. So with UPC. Its usual internal feuding was up again. In the 1960s it was the Enkomba vs. Omufunguro, and now in the 1980s it became UPC “Science” vs. UPC “Syndicate”. What was all this renewed factionalisation about and how did it all begin in Ankole again? As we discussed in chapter two, in the sixties UPC had split up into radicals and liberals basically on policy issues. On the one hand was the question of how to relate to the Obugabe, the Omugabe and the Bahima monarchists, while on the other was UPC policy towards DP Catholic converts to UPC. The former, the Enkomba, wanted UPC as a party only for UPC while the latter wanted an inclusive brand for all interested Banyankole regardless of their creed. That was a more legitimate political disagreement. But not so in the 1980s. The division between UPC Science and Syndicate was purely a symptom of a Party whose absolute thirst for power was corrupting it absolutely. What we see is a rivalry for power tearing the party apart. And this time it was the UPC Enkomba of the 1960s tearing itself up further, since the Omufunguro faction had mainly cast its lot with DP and UPM in the 1980 elections.

According to Dr. Adonia Tiberondwa the split in UPC was based on whether or not education should be the key qualification for leadership. That is why “Science” was for the educated UPCs like Prof. Kamuntu, Dr. Tiberondwa, Kanyomozi, Butagira and others while “Syndicate” was composed of radicals, less educated, mainly old timers like Rurangaranga, Rwakasisi and others.⁵³⁴ What sparked off the fresh factionalisation was the conflict between Professor Ephraim Kamuntu and Rurangaranga in 1982 as Tiberondwa says:

Rurangaranga was trying to sideline Kamuntu so that he does not surface as a political leader. Kamuntu was also alleged to have had some UPM connections from the beginning. So Rurangaranga did not want Kamuntu to surface for he would be a dangerous rival since they came from the same constituency. Yet

⁵³⁴ Interviews: Adonia Tiberondwa and Bishop Yoramu Bamunoba.

some of us felt that Kamuntu was a very brilliant man whom we could not afford to throw away like that and think that we were building Ankole. That is how the saga started.⁵³⁵

So why Science and Syndicate? According to Bishop Bamunoba, the word “Syndicate” came from one of the UPC academicians who said uneducated people whose education is limited to “Syndicate papers”⁵³⁶ confuse politics.⁵³⁷ It seems the incompetence of some half-baked UPC leaders in handling and analysing issues “scientifically” was increasingly vexing the UPC learned intellectuals. And yet they were not willing to surrender power. For instance the Syndicate group could not give a job to a non-UPC. They could not tolerate opposition. They were adamant and wanted UPC and government for UPC only. Hence the talk of “twarire”, (we have already eaten), became a UPC cliché in Ankole. The “Science” group called for political accommodation and respect for others despite their creed or political inclinations. Their desire according to Francis Butagira,

was to show the difference between Amin’s regime and us who had overthrown him. So that is why we called for accommodation regardless of whether one voted DP or UPC. In any case that is what political pluralism is all about.⁵³⁸

In Ankole, the divisions increased and people began to dissent. In Mbarara Central Constituency Makatu, who was chairman UPC for Mbarara District engineered a vote of no confidence in Rubaihayo, the MP, accusing him of associating with DP supporters like Kahigiriza and selling the Party to the opposition. During a meeting convened by L. R. Makatu, which Rubaihayo did not attend, the UPC Mbarara Central Constituency Conference in its Resolution No. 1B declared:

⁵³⁵ Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, September 20, 1997, Kampala.

⁵³⁶ The Bishop does not use the word syndicate as a bombastic language to mean Mafia or a gang but rather people with low education but are good manipulators which is perhaps typical of the UPC Syndicate group in the 1980s. Syndicate papers does not really mean anything else other than low qualifications and should not therefore be confused with some of the American newspapers.

⁵³⁷ Interview: Bishop Bamunoba, February 23, 1998, Kyamugorani.

⁵³⁸ Interview: Francis Butagira, July 31, 1996, Mbarara.

We the members of the UPC Mbarara Central Parliamentary Constituency Conference assembled at Bwizibwera on this first day of December, 1984, having reviewed the activities that have been taking place in our constituency since October 1980 we do hereby, condemn and disassociate ourselves from the Chairman's activities that have been outlined in the review presented by the Youth Leader. We further reject any activities that are likely to cause or foster divisions hence endangering our great Party, the Uganda People's Congress in this Constituency. We therefore resolve and it is hereby resolved that the vote of no confidence in Dr. Patrick Rutimbanzugu Rubaihayo, Chairman Mbarara Central Constituency, which has been moved by the branch be adopted and thus...Rubaihayo immediately ceases to be the chairman of UPC in this constituency.

We further resolve that Dr. Patrick Rutimbanzugu Rubaihayo immediately hands over the office of the constituency and all the official documents and property attached to that office, including a proper account of all the funds (including the Constituency Development Fund) that have been received by that Office since 1980.⁵³⁹

At the same meeting L. R. Makatu was elected Chairman Mbarara Central Constituency. This was the result of a long-standing power struggle between the two leaders. A strong document had earlier been circulated by "patriotic observers", James Bakamwanga and Patrick Habwomugisha, listing nine accusations against Rubaihayo as "proof" that he had sold out to the DP. Therefore:

All the above activities show who Rubaihayo is. The fact is that he is not with UPC or Government... he is against both.⁵⁴⁰

Dr. Rubaihayo in April 1984 had unilaterally sacked Makatu accusing him of divisive politics. The strongly worded letter dated 12 April 1984 reads in part:

I am writing to inform you that I have in my capacity as Chairman, reluctantly have to relieve you of your duties as Vice Chairman of the Constituency with immediate effect. I have been forced to come to this decision because of the divisive politics that you have introduced into the Constituency...⁵⁴¹

⁵³⁹ Quoted from the Report of the Proceedings of the Parliamentary Constituency Conference for Mbarara Central, 1 December 1984.

⁵⁴⁰ Quoted from a joint letter signed by James Bakamwanga and Patrick Habwomugisha to the Secretary General of the Uganda People's Congress, Kampala, 1 December 1984.

⁵⁴¹ Rubaihayo's letter to Lazaro Makatu, 12 April 1984.

Things became so difficult that some "Science" members were thinking of exile to avoid worse penalties. When the Science group was calling for accommodation, the Syndicate group accused it of conniving with DP and the guerrillas. The science group was not really undermining its own party. It opposed UPC arbitrary arrests, discrimination for jobs and disrespect for human rights. The DP and UPM, welcomed the "Science/Syndicate" schism because; as Francis Bwengye said, 'UPC spent much of the time fighting itself' that "Science/Syndicate" was more dangerous to fellow UPCs than they were to DP'. Such intra-party divisions had adverse effects. People identified themselves with their MPs group and their division became worse than they were in the party executive. Before people had collectively worked for UPC as a party, but they were no longer one. Obote, the UPC national leader, could not stop these fissure and consequently they spread nationally thus dividing the UPC executive and MPs. But as Tiberondwa observed:

Despite our divisions none of us were really against him. He appeared indifferent and that is how he could manage to keep all of us hooked onto him. Of course in the end that led to bitterness among the ministers, a situation which began to be exploited by the opponents of the party.⁵⁴²

This hastened the disintegration of UPC and its demise. Obote tended to sympathise with the Syndicate while Paul Muwanga supported Science. In effect it meant that Muwanga sympathised with Obote's enemies and those who sought to undermine him. No wonder when Tito Okello toppled Obote in July 1985, Muwanga joined the new government.

How was the church involved? Did it intervene? Bishop Bamunoba confesses that the church showed divisions. The clergy took sides although they kept quiet about it. Church councils could not maintain unity when UPC politicians were members. In Bushenyi for instance the Science group were closer to the church as committed Christians, earning themselves another name of *Ab'ekanisa*, (people of the church) by the Syndicate UPC who in consequence stood apart. The Anglican Church

⁵⁴² Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, September 20, 1997, Kampala.

played a passive role and feared to speak against the conflicts. Observers like Yoramu Gucwamaingi felt the Anglican Church could have played a more uniting role:

It could have united those parties concerned and settled their differences. But you see even the church leaders themselves were not united. The two Protestant Bishops were not well organised and the Catholic Bishop could only watch what he assumed was a UPC-Protestant wrangle, which it was really.⁵⁴³

Francis Bwengye too agreed that the Catholic Bishop stood aloof in the conflict since it was a 'Protestant affair'. Bishop Betungura was suspected of being pro-Museveni since his wife was a Muhima and Bishop Bamunoba was thought to identify with 'Science'.⁵⁴⁴ The church that had become militant under Amin was now numbed by the in-house war that was dividing up its flock. What was more, the politicians started fighting in church projects with each faction wanting to own and use them for their propaganda. For instance Bishop Betungura's Bwizibwera-Rutooma Gravity Water project was stalled by the Rubaihayo-Kabogorwa conflict, to the extent that Rubaihayo wrote to donors to withhold the aid.⁵⁴⁵ These conflicts strengthened the guerrilla movement and the Democratic Party. If the elections of 1985 had taken place as scheduled, DP might have won. But UPC was overthrown by its own army. This time the faction in the army that staged the coup in July 1985 had a strong Catholic element and chanted DP slogans. That could indicate the Catholic Church's support for the guerrilla war of Yoweri Museveni in the Luwero Triangle.

⁵⁴³ Interview: Yoramamu Gucwamaingi, February 22, 1998, Ruharo.

⁵⁴⁴ Interview: Francis Bwengye, July 29, 1997, Kampala.

⁵⁴⁵ See Report of the Proceedings of the Parliamentary Constituency Conference for Mbarara Central.

5.7. NRM AND THE CHURCH IN ANKOLE.

Our analysis of the religio-political events in Ankole show repetitive mistakes which UPC should have learnt from. But since it did not, they led to its downfall. The Museveni guerrillas overthrew General Tito Okello in turn in February 1986. The various guerrilla factions that participated in these actions are not relevant here. What we are concerned with is what was happening in Ankole.

The forces that jubilated at the fall of Milton Obote in 1971 rejoiced again in July 1985. The forces at play in 1985/6 were Catholic-DP, Protestant UPC (which had split into Science/Syndicate) and Bahima-Banyarwanda. Apart from the UPC Protestants, the rest welcomed the victory of Museveni in 1985. DP found the fall of the UPC a relief. Bahima-Banyarwanda who had voted DP and UPM suffered when Museveni went to the bush. Many had supported him and consequently drew the wrath of the UPC Youth Wingers! The UPC Science group was already exhausted by the internal fissures and was glad of change.

Thus, when the NRM forces took over the government in February 1986, all these forces welcomed them, especially in Mbarara district which had a large number of Bahima-Banyarwanda population and Catholics. Among the issues which needed urgent attention, was the question of Banyarwanda property which people had acquired under the previous regime. Banyarwanda had been designated refugees but now they had returned not only as “masters” in Ankole, but also dominating the national army and government. Catholics in Ibanda and Buhweju counties attacked and destroyed Protestant property, hacking down banana plantations and cows of the known Protestant UPC supporters. Others defecated in Protestant churches which was shocking.

Secondly, was the question of the NRM relationship with the church in Ankole. Initially NRM was cynical and anti-church in all its rhetoric. As we argued before, the traditional churches had not supported UPM during the 1980 elections. NRM, whose political cadres were predominantly UPM and DP, connected the Anglican Church with UPC which it was fighting. In any case the Anglican Church had continued steadfastly without condemning the “evils” which gave an impression that it condoned them. In Nyabushozi where many of the Bahima-Banyarwanda NRM cadres hailed from, the Anglican church declined in the initial period of the NRM

regime. Their ideology preached against giving church dues on the pretext that the church leaders would embezzle them and referred to Church leaders as abashuma, (thieves). They did not see the need for going to church since God could be worshipped anywhere.

With such an attitude towards the Anglican Church, it also adopted a let's-wait-and-see- kind of reception to NRM. The irony was that most of NRM cadres and high-ranking officers were Protestants. But some of them were Protestant only because they had been baptised in the Anglican Church and kept the name without the faith. To many especially the Youths those formative years in the bush alienated them further away from the church. As a result Protestant UPCs who were mainly Bairu withdrew and kept askance as far as the NRM initial period in Ankole was concerned. That explains why after 1986, the DPs, Catholics, the Bahima and Banyarwanda tended to "own" the NRM revolution and dominated the first Resistance Councils in Ankole. Minorities like Bahima-Banyarwanda who were silenced by UPC regime suddenly rose into the political limelight as their turn to 'eat'. This caused concern among the Protestants and resulted in a meeting between the Minister of State in the President's Office, Eriya Kategaya, and the Mbarara District Elders where the relationship between the Catholics and the Protestants, Bairu and Bahima in Ankole was discussed:

This has very seriously affected local NRM Committees propaganda that UPC members are not allowed to stand for an election on the committees, thus eliminating all Protestants who were in UPC...out of these committees.⁵⁴⁶

Though NRM ushered in a new era of peace especially in the Western and Central Uganda, people returned to their old ways. The same minutes discussed "Tribal issues in Political Involvement", "Bairu and Bahima hatred has come back".⁵⁴⁷ But these were quickly condemned by NRM cadres for obvious reasons. NRM would have started on a wrong note if it were seen to condone ethnic differences. As a group

⁵⁴⁶ Kamukuzi Archives, Mbarara See minutes of the meeting between the Minister of State in the President's office and Mbarara Elders (undated, but could have been 1986 since that was when Eriya Kategaya held that position) in NRM file.

without religious or ethnic connections in the 80's, it could not be claimed by any of the factions. That helped to neutralise religio-political sentiments that had surfaced. Protestant UPC as expected had to be alienated by some of those forces that we have mentioned before because of the role some of them played in the previous regime. But UPC Protestants were called *ebipinga*, and thought to support Force Obote Back (FOBA), a pro-Obote movement in Kenya. However unlikely, they were so accused because of their UPC connections. In a letter dated 16 December 1986, protesting against allegations of FOBA association, the Rev. E. Rwebyambu, from Nyabuhikye parish, Bwengure, wrote to the Catholic District Administrator, Sarapio Karashani:

Okungwisiza akagwe kunyeta FOBA

Sebo nakuhandikira nyine obusasi bwingyi ahabwenshonga eyagambwaho aharuguru. Omubaruha iwe eyoyine omu office yawe erikuruga omugomborora ya Rubindi erukugamba ebitakwatirine tinyine kakwate na FOBA kandi tindimuba...Ruhanga akakutaho kuba omurinzi w'amagara g'abantu ba Mbarara District...Kandi kundabe ninturwa ediini yangye, Mukama asiimwe. (I am sorry to write to you because of the above reason. The letter, which you have from Rubindi Sub-county, is accusing me of being a member of FOBA. I write to disassociate myself from such accusations. I have never been and never will be a FOBA...If I am being accused because of my religion, then praise the lord).⁵⁴⁸

He says that he was being harassed because of his religion. Rubindi sub-county is a Catholic area and vengeance for the hard times they suffered was likely protest.

There was also the need to return Banyarwanda property confiscated in 1982. Some UPC members had benefited and in some instances even churches were incriminated. In 1986 the District Commissioner, Mbarara, wrote to the Bishop of East Ankole:

You will remember my Lord Bishop that during the visit of H.E the president of the Republic of Uganda to Mbarara District, the Elders presented to him a memorandum. In...other things they raised the issue of expropriated property belonging to such displaced persons. It was further said that some of that property had either been sold and proceeds donated...The purpose of this letter is to find out from your Lordship if there are such cases involving the Church of Uganda and whatever measures you

⁵⁴⁷ *ibid*, p. 1.

⁵⁴⁸ Letter from Rev. E. Rwebyambu to the District Administrator, Mbarara.

contemplate in amicably restoring such property to the former owners or paying compensation for value transferred.⁵⁴⁹

And the bishop replied:

As far as this office of the Diocese of East Ankole, Church of Uganda is concerned and as far as I am concerned as the Bishop of this Diocese, I did disassociate myself and the Diocesan office from taking over, or accepting any offer of land, property etc....from any person whatsoever, nor from the Rwandese refugees...If at all there were property or land given to any parish church, the recipient should have acted in disobedience to my order and should be the only one to meet the consequences, with his congregation...Therefore, again I state that my diocesan office has nothing to do with matter concerned.⁵⁵⁰

Indeed the Bishop had been distrusted by the UPC because he would not have anything to do with the alienation of Banyarwanda property.

However, by 1988, the relationship between NRM and the COU eased. The church realised that while NRM leaders had generally exhibited a 'Marxist' anti-church attitude, the government was not necessarily "pro-Catholics" either. The Kategaya-Mbarara Elders meeting which discussed Protestant discrimination had an impact. As a result Protestants joined in NRM programmes in the district. Moreover the Catholic-DP excitement had cooled down especially when they realised that the top NRM brass at national level were not only Banyankole, but were also Protestants such as Kategaya, Mushega, Mugisha-Muntu and others. Thus we see the Anglican Church coming out of its cocoon and trying to seek a common ground in the NRM politics. In a confidential letter of 2 July 1987 from the Bishop of East Ankole, inviting the President to come and attend the Ankole Church jubilee convention of 12-16 August 1987, the Bishop wrote:

I am writing this letter to you, as a letter from a church leader of your mother church, in Ankole, you as a Christian who knows very well the East African Revival and its coming to Ankole...Secondly, I am

⁵⁴⁹ Kamukuzi Archives, Mbarara Letter from the District Commissioner to the Bishop of East Ankole Diocese, Ref. MIG.2.

⁵⁵⁰ Reply from Bishop Betungura to the District Commissioner, Mbarara dated, 22 May 1986.

inviting your Excellency to come at anytime during the convention meetings...at any time you arrive, the programme would be halted and you give a word to a congregation of about 10.000 persons.⁵⁵¹

On the other hand NRM realised that it needed the support of the church which was so entrenched among the people. The experience of the 1989 Resistance Council and NRC elections made them realise that the church still had much influence. In the NRC elections for instance, Mbarara district voted in people who were either MPs in Obote regime or were UPC and DP as the table below indicates:

Table 9: Mbarara NRC members 1989.⁵⁵²

Name	Constituency	Religion	Former Party
John Ntimba	Mbarara municipality	Catholic	DP
Francis Butagira	Rwampara	Protestant	UPC
Kijaji	Isingiro	Catholic	DP
John Barigye	Kashari	Protestant	---
John Nasasira	Kazo	Protestant	NRM/UPM ⁵⁵³
Elly Karuhanga	Nyabushozi	Protestant	NRM/UPM
Dr. Mugenyi	Bukanga	Catholic	DP

NRM's gradual thaw was marked by their softness of tongue towards the church. As a gesture of good will, the President started giving newly enthroned Bishops gifts of cars and attended church functions. NRM had under-rated the impact of the Christian church in Ankole and Uganda. Since the introduction of Christianity in the last

⁵⁵¹ Letter from Bishop Betungura to His Excellency, the president of Uganda, Mr. Yoweri Museveni, in Government File, East Ankole Diocesan.

⁵⁵² Interview: Y. Gucwamaingi, June 19, 1997, Nkokonjeru.

⁵⁵³ Please note that the 1989 elections were held under the umbrella of NRM and so there were no parties to talk of. Secondly, I could not establish which party Barigye was because he spent most of his time in exile since 1973 (see chapter 7). To say that he might have been DP because he was Omuhima, would simply be an assumption. Note also that NRM was not a party, so people like Nasasira and Karuhanga are indicated thus because they did not contest in the 1980 parties and were not known at all. Since both are Bahima, we can probably assume that they were UPM but

century, the church had played a leading role in shaping Ugandan society. It pioneered schools, hospitals and agriculture. It was the first institution to “civilise” Banyankole, and such a bond could not be broken by NRM in such a short period. This is what it realised and hence redefined its approach. The Directorate of Information and Mass Mobilisation, NRM Secretariat, wrote in May 1989:

We have also noted with great appreciation your contributions in the struggles for return to sanity to our ailing society. .. To speed up the process in order to achieve total peace, we feel there is need to harmonise the working relationship of the state and the religious organisations in this country. For this reason, the NRM Secretariat would like to convene 4 day national Seminar for religious leaders in the country, to give the government leaders and religious leaders an opportunity for intimate discussions and frank exchange of opinions on various matters...

As Museveni often said, what was important was to separate the misleading from the misled. The Anglican Church and UPC were not synonymous. NRM also realised that the church exercises closer control on the people than the government because of its daily contact with people and the value placed on sacraments like baptism and marriage, which are still highly cherished in Ankole society.

5.8. CONCLUSION.

The period 1980-1989 was in some ways a reflection of the politics of the 1960s. Intrigues, factions, manoeuvres and persecution of opponents was the old creed of the UPC era. Once again the Anglican Church was soiled by UPC sins, ethnic divisions were again harped on, but these were almost over-ridden by party and religious affiliations. In Ankole for example, when the UPC won the elections and took power, it was not as if Bairu had defeated Bahima but UPC Protestant had once again trounced the DP Catholics.

CHAPTER SIX

6. THE BANYARWANDA REFUGEES AND THE ETHNO-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CHURCH (1959-1985).

6.0. THE WAVES AND PATTERNS OF BANYARWANDA SETTLEMENT.

The Banyarwanda trek to Ankole, and Uganda in general, came in waves: there are pre-colonial settlers who came as a result of the wars of territorial conquest in the late 19th century. During the reign of *Umwami* Ruganzu Bwimba and Kigeri Mukubanga, several small chiefdoms were brought under one unified kingdom with Rwanda-Rwa-Gasabo as the nucleus of the Abanyiginya State, which was finally consolidated by Ruganzu Ndori.⁵⁵⁴ Wars of territorial conquest and cattle raiding were common between Rwanda and Mpororo and Umwami Rwabugiri made considerable territorial gains from Mpororo in the late 19th century and many Banyarwanda subsequently settled in present Ntungamo district.⁵⁵⁵ Yet there were others who ran away from forced labour during the colonial period⁵⁵⁶; others were migrant labourers who came in the 1920's to 1940's; the Revivalists who came in the 1940s; and the refugees who ran away from Rwanda because of the Bahutu uprising of 1959. In addition the Banyarwanda from Bufumbira in Kisoro district became Ugandans in 1910 after the Anglo-German boundary agreement.

In the case of the first category, it is certainly true that they had no contact with Christianity which had not even been introduced into Ankole society when they arrived. They would have brought their traditional religions with them. But they could also have acquired the local traditions of the people that they found in the area.⁵⁵⁷ These Banyarwanda herders still occupy the area neighbouring the border with

⁵⁵⁴ G. Prunier, op. cit., pp. 14n., 15-16, 20-24, 45, 85, 245, 370.

⁵⁵⁵ For a detailed account of the Banyiginya state expansionism, see Dixon Kamukama, 1993, *The Rwanda Conflict: Its Roots and Regional Implications*, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, pp. 9-11.

⁵⁵⁶ See Audrey Richards, *Economic development and Tribal Change: A Study of immigrant labour in Buganda*, Cambridge: Heffer, 1959.

⁵⁵⁷ Interview: J. Bara, May 18, 1996, Mbarara.

Rwanda. As early as 1907, these Batutsi were already part of the Ankole elite, along with other foreigners like Banyakaragwe from Bukoba, Baganda and Batooro (Babiito).⁵⁵⁸ With time many Batutsi migrated to areas like Rukungiri where they became known as the Abahororo. In the sixties, they migrated to Nyabushozi as part of the Bahima clique although with a Rwanda origin.

The Bahutu economic immigrants came to Uganda from early 1920's to the 1950's in search of employment on cash crop plantations. During this period, Uganda's economic strength was being boosted by the number of plantations of tea at Kyamuhunga (Bushenyi), sugar in Busoga and coffee growing in Ankole and Buganda. Since the colonial government needed cheap labour there were few restrictions. Some settled in Ankole but the majority settled in Buganda and these were largely Bahutu. It is estimated that by 1995 these immigrants and their descendants had reached about 700,000.⁵⁵⁹ as the table below illustrates.

⁵⁵⁸ M. Doornbos, *op. cit.*, p. 75; also interview: A. Murumba, Bishop Amos Betungura.

⁵⁵⁹ G. Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

Table 10: Rwandese entering Uganda via Kagitumba bridge⁵⁶⁰

Year	Arrivals	Departure
1927	30,000	-
1929	40,000	-
1930	23,000	-
1935	15,000	-
1939	13,331	2,912
1940	71,682	20,708
1943	38,572	22,451
1945	41,509	17,365
1946	38,113	24,501

What religion these Banyarwanda were is hard to tell. They could have had no contact with Christianity or they may have been Catholics because of the Belgium Rwanda background. Actually areas like Isingiro and Kikagate where they first settled are Catholic strongholds. But generally these immigrants did not make much impact on the churches because they were sojourners who were expected to return home once their labour contract was over. After independence they seem to have settled and were absorbed in society. These Bahutu settled mainly in Buganda because, in the pre-independence Uganda, Buganda was emerging as the economic giant due to its central position, which favoured industrialisation and the plantation economy. This was the

⁵⁶⁰ Cf. Source, Jason W. Clay, "The Eviction of Banyarwanda. The Story behind the refugees crises in Southwestern Uganda", *Cultural Survival*, August Vol. 14, Cambridge, MA, USA, p.12. These figures are mainly of Banyarwanda who proceeded to Buganda. While similar figures are not available for Ankole area, it is likely that since some Rwandese crossed the border at the Kagitumba bridge, they probably began to settle in Southern Ankole areas. We should also note that the figures given are for one of the border crossing points between Rwanda and Uganda, the others being Katuna and Kyanika. The last two entry points whose figures are not given are densely populated areas as opposed to Kagitumba, which had a sparsely populated hinterland (before the refugees) of Mutara and Kagera National Park. Hence the figures of Banyarwanda entering Uganda generally must have been about 3 or 4 times the number given in the table.

main difference between Banyarwanda who settled in Ankole and those in Buganda for the latter were largely Bahutu who tended gradually to merge in Buganda clans.

I do not know why the dynamics of Bahutu in Buganda often identified with the Buffalo clan but it could be that Buffalo clan in Buganda is quite an important and big clan. It is also typical of that kind of clientage where minorities tend to identify with strong groups in a new society. As for the Batutsi in Ankole, they did not need to "buy" themselves in because they were already accepted and were part of the Ankole society. In any case clans in Ankole are less important.

The third group to come to Uganda in the early forties were converted at Gahini in the East African Revival movement. They were mainly Protestants from North Rwanda where CMS was trying to open mission stations. Most of these Revivalists settled at Namutamba in Buganda. They were attracted to that area because the pioneers of the Revival movement such as Nagenda and Nsibambi offered land to the new converts.⁵⁶¹

Lastly was the Bahutu revolution in Rwanda which forced many Batutsi into exile in 1959. Many of these exiles were victims of the hostilities that had emerged between the colonial Belgians and the Batutsi monarchy on the one hand and the Batutsi and the Bahutu intelligentsia on the other. During the post war period, there was a drastic change in the policy of the colonial government and the Catholic Church increased favouritism of the Bahutu elite in education and administration. Batutsi were the victims of the hostilities that had emerged between the two ethnic groups. We can not tell exactly how many refugees escaped the 1959 crisis apart from taking the UNHCR estimates. It only counted those who were in camps yet according to the accounts of the refugees then, many simply moved over the border dispersing to different places. Between 1959 and 1964 it is estimated that there were 336.000 refugees distributed as follows.⁵⁶²

⁵⁶¹ Interview: Zab Kabaza, August 28, 1994, Kampala.

⁵⁶² Prunier, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-63; See also Virginia Bond, *Identity Crisis: Banyarwanda Refugees in Uganda*, MA Dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1988, p. 2.

Burundi	200,000
Uganda	78,000
Tanzania	36,000
Zaire	22,000

By 1990, the number of Banyarwanda who still identified themselves as "refugees" had risen to 600,000-700,000⁵⁶³, and Uganda probably had about 200,000-300,000⁵⁶⁴. By 1990, the Banyarwanda in Uganda were estimated to be over 1 million constituting the fourth of the five largest ethnic groups.⁵⁶⁵ This is an estimation for no census has been daring enough to include ethnic affiliation in its range of questions. What makes us come to these estimates is the fact that Ankole borders Rwanda and many refugees came here. They already had ties with the Ankole Banyarwanda in the counties of Isingiro, Ruhama and Kikagate. Therefore it would have been nearer for the refugees to occupy Ankole rather than to continue to other districts.

The refugees were confined in camps under a camp commandant, and were subjected to strict control. The first camps were at Orukinga and Nakivale settlements in Mbarara.⁵⁶⁶ But following the increasing influx of refugees from Rwanda, and the population pressure their cattle herds exerted on the land, other camps were opened in Kahungye, Kyangwali, Kyaka I and Kyaka II and Rwamwanja in Toro and Ibuga in Kasese. Who moved where appears to have been determined by their date of arrival in Uganda, the whereabouts of their close kin and the number of cattle they came with. The UNHCR which was involved in settling the refugees appear not to have taken account of the fact that the majority of the refugees were pastoralists, and therefore handed each *family* or perhaps a group of persons, agricultural tools and seeds and encouraged them to clear the land.⁵⁶⁷ As cattle multiplied, many moved in search of

⁵⁶³ Prunier, op. cit., pp. 61-63.

⁵⁶⁴ D. Kamukama, op. cit., p. 3; See also M. Mamdani, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

⁵⁶⁵ Virginia Bond, op. cit., p. 13. Of the Ugandan figure, Ankole probably could claim to have absorbed at least three-quarters of the total figure.

⁵⁶⁶ Interview: Sezi Busasi, May 6, 1997, Nkokonjeru.

⁵⁶⁷ Interview: John Mugasa, May 12, 1997, Kampala. Until 1974, he lived in the Oruchinga camp,

pasture and water. Many finally settled as far away as Ntungamo, Kashari and Nyabushozi counties in Ankole and others continued up to Luwero, Mubende, Lira, Apac, Soroti and Kumi districts.⁵⁶⁸ Educated refugees found jobs as low rank civil servants, while others were employed as labourers or herdsman on farms.

Ankole was preferred because it was sparsely populated which accounted for the camps. The government thought that it would be appropriate and perhaps accessible if the refugees were to return home.⁵⁶⁹ It seems to me that many Banyankole and even the Uganda government had thought that the refuge problem was just a temporary issue. The Banyarwanda refugees did not, however, achieve as high a degree of integration as did the migrants. Once the latter had accumulated capital from the farm plantations and factories, they settled among locals, acquired land and were assimilated through marriage. They acquired local names and clan affiliations.⁵⁷⁰ Moreover, many of the economic migrants were Bahutu who had much in common with the local people. Tiberondwa says:

They simply came and integrated. You see many of these Bahutu did not have any political experience. All they needed were jobs. Secondly they did not come in masses but only trickled into the country and that was unlikely to cause any impact.⁵⁷¹

Not so for the Batutsi refugees who, despite being very exclusive in their relationships, had profound influence and impact on the locals. They had been political leaders and had a programme to return to their mother country. They remained a consolidated group venerating their King Kigeli even in exile.⁵⁷² Nevertheless, the destiny of Banyarwanda immigrants, refugees and assimilated alike,

when his son, who was employed in Amin's government, bought him a piece of land away from the camp.

⁵⁶⁸ Bond op. cit.

⁵⁶⁹ Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa.

⁵⁷⁰ Note that clan identity is not as important in Ankole as it is in Buganda. While a big number of Bahutu settled in Buganda, some settled in Ankole especially in Kikagata and the Southern parts of Isingiro on their return from Buganda.

⁵⁷¹ Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, September 20, 1997, Kampala.

⁵⁷² *ibid.*

did not turn out to be different, as Mamdani suggests.⁵⁷³ For instance when the government of Obote turned against the refugees in Ankole, in 1982-83, as we shall see, the immigrants including those who settled in Mpororo during King Rwabugiri's raids on Ankole, and the Bafumbira of Uganda, were all bundled on the same truck. That is why in the 1995 Ugandan Constitution, the Ugandan Banyarwanda of Bafumbira resolved to be identified as a distinct tribe of Bafumbira and their language as Rufumbira lest they be indiscriminately persecuted in future.

6.1. THE BATUTSI: LIFE IN EXILE.

When in 1959 Batutsi refugees first arrived in Ankole, they were welcomed because of various factors. Firstly, the Batutsi refugees evoked sympathy from the local people because of the horrific pogrom they had been subjected to in Rwanda. They thought the refugee problem was temporary. As Kamukama said:

...the local populace often rendered a hospitable hand in food and other items. This was through local state functionaries or through individual efforts. This generosity came after the realisation that the refugees were politically, socially and economically helpless. The local people also thought that the refugees were likely to return home in a short time.⁵⁷⁴

Besides Ankole had more available land in the sixties than neighbouring Districts in South Western Uganda. Also, the refugees found many migrant and indigenous Ugandan Banyarwanda whom they were either related to or could easily identify with. The Batutsi kingship ties with the Bahima and the connections between Bairu and Bahutu agriculturists made for easy integration.⁵⁷⁵ Many of these Batutsi were well versed with the cattle culture of Ankole and therefore were competitively absorbed as farm labourers. This also tallied with the Banyarwanda's ability to learn Runyankole language. Language had the effect of reducing the cultural distance between the two

⁵⁷³ M. Mamdani, *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda*, London: 1976, pp. 26-27.

⁵⁷⁴ Interview: D. Kamukama, July 12, 1996, Makerere University.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid, See also V. Bond, op. cit., p. 15. See also Martin R. Doornbos, "Ankole", in Rene Lemarchand (ed.), *African Kingships in Perspective*, London: 1977, p. 209, Footnote. 23.

groups and accelerated the refugees' assimilation into the wider social structure of Ankole. Both Runyankole and Runyarwanda are Bantu languages, which are linguistically interrelated. Whereas in Buganda, Banyarwanda acquired kiganda names (to disguise themselves though their accent often betrayed them. This applied to the first generation immigrants), in Ankole they kept kinyarwanda names with which they could easily be distinguished. Many coffee, tea and sugar plantations in Ankole, Buganda and Eastern Uganda needed Banyarwanda labour. Wealthy banana plantation farmers (especially in Buganda) and cattle owners employed Banyarwanda in Ankole, Lango Teso (where they became known as balalo), Buganda and Karamoja. Bairu and Bahima had also flocked to these regions for employment, so local people could not distinguish between the Banyarwanda and Banyankole. That explains why in Buganda, Northern and North Eastern parts of Uganda, up till this day people from south-western Uganda are referred to as "Banyarwanda".

Through UNHCR and Ugandan government scholarships, the refugees were able to educate their children. They enjoyed a degree of protection. The Alien Refugee Act of 1963 (Section 22 of the Uganda Citizenship Act), for instance, had introduced Runyarwanda into the official language list. It was therefore relatively easy for them to find schools and jobs which encouraged a new wave of Batutsi immigrants in 1970's who were denied education in Rwanda by the "Ten Percent rule" quota system. This based school and University enrolment on the size of a particular ethnic group.⁵⁷⁶ Unlike the pre-independence immigrants, the Batutsi refugees arrived at a time when Uganda was facing new challenges, in which these refugees were later to be entangled. This was especially true of the acute conflicts in Ankole.⁵⁷⁷

It seems that by 1967, the refugees were seen as identifying with their kinsmen the Bahima and the Catholic Church, and were consequently regarded as a political liability by the UPC government. Refugees were seen as likely to swell the Bahima and Catholic numbers in future elections. It could be due to these reasons that

⁵⁷⁶ This law was popularly known as the "Ten percent rule," that is, Batutsi employees or students should not account for more than ten percent of the total number because they accounted for Ten percent of the population at independence.

⁵⁷⁷ Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, September 20, 1997, Kampala.

Obote attempted a refugee census in 1969.⁵⁷⁸ But this never materialised partly because of the insecurity that surrounded that period and also because he was overthrown in January 1971.

The refugees were indeed mostly Catholics. Their king Kigeri was Catholic and in Rwanda the Catholic Church was part of the quasi-establishment. Though Catholics, I suspect that for many Batutsi religion was not really important. If we think of Bahima in Ankole at the same time, many were Anglicans though on the whole in the 1960s religion was not a major force apart from the few Bahima Revivalists. Equally the Batutsi alliance to Catholicism may have been weak. Therefore, it could be that a lot of their formative influence Christian-wise was in Uganda rather than Rwanda. Even in Uganda, Batutsi did not for a long time show enthusiasm for either Anglicanism or Roman Catholicism.

What was the contribution of the Christian churches to the refugees? Both churches in the sixties received and welcomed refugees when they first arrived in Ankole. The Catholic Church especially welcomed them as likely to boost their numbers and hoping perhaps that they swell the DP vote.⁵⁷⁹ In short there was genuine desire to help but it had perhaps side advantages.

At the time the refugees arrived in Ankole, the Anglican Bishop was Shalita, himself a Mututsi but already under suspicion from the Protestant Bairu for allegedly sympathising with DP. And the Ankole King, though he was a Protestant, was under Protestant Bairu pressure because of his DP inclinations. The Omugabe could not give the support the Bishop needed in order to influence the Bairu who were a force in the Eishengyero and on church councils. The Catholic Church's quick response to the refugees may have discouraged the Protestant Church. The general feeling was they were Catholics therefore likely to sympathise with DP. Having said this, the Anglican Church was not indifferent to the refugees' plight. With in its ever-limited resources, it extended a humanitarian hand. Canon Rwabushaija confirms:

⁵⁷⁸ *ibid.*

⁵⁷⁹ Interview: Bishop Bakyenga, June 6, 1997, Nyamitanga.

We did not look at the Banyarwanda from their religious perspective. We had a moral obligation to assist the refugees and within our means and limits we provided what we could afford though it was not much anyway.⁵⁸⁰

Unfortunately Bishop Shalita died a month before my fieldwork and I was not able to interview him on this issue. However, Canon Rwabushaija and Canon Njunwoha agree that the Anglican Church provided some relief items especially food, though they were quick to stress the resistance from the forces already mentioned. The Protestant church, having realised its inability to provide much tangible support to the refugees, encouraged its congregations to render individual support.

By and large the refugees who settled in Ankole were not interested in religion. The circumstances from which the refugees had escaped might have been a cause of their disinterest in religious matters. One Mututsi, who fled to Uganda after the 1959 bloodshed, said the refugees detested the Belgians and the Catholic religion which they regarded as their enemy and traitor to their monarchy. When they crossed to Uganda, some of them threw away their rosaries, withdrew their allegiance to the faith and since the Protestant Church was the 'King's religion' both in Ankole and Buganda they allied with it.⁵⁸¹ Perhaps this may explain why many Banyarwanda did not wholly embrace Revival whose message emphasised equality and forgiveness. Kevin Ward says:

What I would have imagined is that those cattle keepers of Tutsi origin once they began to see that Christianity was an important thing would tend to go to the Anglican church rather than the Catholic church which was probably for Bairu rather than Bahima.⁵⁸²

While Batutsi refugees in Buganda may have become Anglicans, it was not the case with the Batutsi refugees of Ankole. At the time the refugees arrived in Ankole, the Anglican Church had been tarnished by ethnic and political conflicts between Bairu and Bahima. It is very unlikely therefore that the Bahima would have convinced their

⁵⁸⁰ Interview: Semei Rwabushaija, September 7, 1997, Ruharo.

⁵⁸¹ Interview: Mzee Paulo Kayongo, September 19, 1996, Nakasongola.

⁵⁸² Interview: Kevin Ward, December 15, 1997, Leeds.

kinsmen, the Batutsi refugees, to convert to an establishment that was edging them out of their positions of influence. As we have argued in chapter two, the refugees arrived at a time when Protestant Bahima had already allied with Bairu Catholics. Importantly, Bahima could not influence Banyarwanda into Protestantism because they already had another unifying factor: ethnicity which was thicker than religion. Bahima saw the refugees as likely to support DP which Protestant Bahima were supporting. It could be here that Bahima influenced the refugees, if they were to exert any impressive political pressure against the Protestant Bairu. Nevertheless this is not to ignore completely the fact that there were some Banyarwanda who converted to Protestantism. Some of them like Kareeba and Kapa (who became the Treasurer of Ankole) did.⁵⁸³ But these were a few ambitious individuals with the desire to become prominent in the Ankole kingdom administration. As Catholics could not become chiefs in a Protestant establishment, so some converted to Protestantism.⁵⁸⁴ These few tended to give a false impression that there were as many Banyarwanda Protestants as Catholics. This is because the few Protestants who had taken on political offices tended to distort the picture proportionally since one man loomed higher over many. Such conversion reduced drastically after 1967 when the monarchy was abolished for the Protestant Bairu were unlikely to favour Banyarwanda in the political alignment that emerged. And during the whole of Idi Amin's regime, Banyarwanda did not need to identify with any religion since Amin had given them a blanket cover.

This also raises a question why Banyarwanda refugees were not attracted to church ministry in Ankole. Many of them were nominal Catholics but could not be priested since in the Catholic Church priesthood is through Seminary training. They were already older than the church would admit. Priesthood in the Catholic Church is not a calling that comes after retirement, as is sometimes the case with the Anglican Church. It is a process in which individuals are identified and prepared at an early age through the various seminary stages.⁵⁸⁵ As for the Anglican Church the Banyarwanda

⁵⁸³ Interview: Edward Rurangaranga.

⁵⁸⁴ Interview: Mzee Murumba, July 10, 1996, Kafunjo.

⁵⁸⁵ Interview: Bishop Bakyenga, June 6, 1997, Nyamitanga.

had arrived at a time when Shalita was the Bishop of Ankole but unlikely to recruit them into ministry because of Bairu opposition. In a period of "political baptisms" the Anglican Church was careful not to recruit candidates who might support DP. The Anglican Church receives its recruits for priesthood through the recommendation of Parish councils, or through churchmen who suggest candidates, *mwana wani*, to the Bishop. Banyarwanda were in camps and it was not easy to identify possible candidates. On the contrary, in Buganda, Banyarwanda were enthusiastic towards church ministry for quite a number of Anglican Catechists in Buganda have a Rwandan origin.⁵⁸⁶ This could be that the Dioceses of Mukono and West Buganda in which many of these Banyarwanda are, were largely not pastoralist areas and therefore the Church provided a different occupation and identity in ministry. Also it is often true immigrant communities feel that because they do not have the same advantages as the local people in terms of employment into the civil service, they should tend to shift their focus to church ministry.

The point is that, once their pastoral way of life was untenable, they often join the ministry of the Church with great enthusiasm as in Buganda. But this did not apply in Ankole. Like Bahima, they had been rulers and regarded ministry with low esteem. The refugees preferred working in a greater social status where they could remain aloof while planning their return. This explains why they were not easily influenced by the Revival movement as were the rest of Banyankole although Revival began in Gahini Rwanda (see chapter 3). The Batutsi who came to Ankole did not have any Revival contact because it broke out in Gahini, the northern part of Rwanda, mainly inhabited by the Bahutu. The Batutsi were largely from the south where British CMS missionaries and Baganda evangelists did not really concentrate perhaps due to the French Catholic missionaries' presence.⁵⁸⁷ Therefore Batutsi refugees' first experience of Revival could have been during their exile in Uganda. The Catholic Church especially in the sixties was rather hostile to the Revival movement which they saw as essentially a Protestant affair and therefore disassociated its followers

⁵⁸⁶ Interview: Kevin Ward, December 15, 1997, Leeds.

⁵⁸⁷ Cf. Grace P'Karamura, *Revival and Repentance: A Historical and Theological Significance of the Revival Movement in Uganda*, MPhil. Dissertation, Cambridge University, 1995.

from it. Catholics did not only regard Revival as a heretical movement, but it was also held sceptically as a political movement whose hidden intentions were to recruit membership for the Anglican church.⁵⁸⁸ We need also to note that apart from the Catholic factor many of the Batutsi in Rwanda were rulers and such a people tend to hold in scepticism new ideas and refrain from any outside influence. It is the disadvantaged groups like the Bairu or Bahutu who embraced Revival as a platform of social equality, identity and integrity. Yet for the Batutsi they had already that inherited social status and were rather more concerned with how to maintain it.

All these factors led to increasingly hostile relations with Obote's government. However at the climax of Obote's hostility, he was toppled. No wonder then that many Banyarwanda registered their loyalty to Amin's regime where they were massively recruited into the notorious State Research Bureau (SRB), and various high positions in government establishment. Though their involvement with Amin's regime later became a scapegoat for their expulsion in Ankole, one can say that their support for Amin was largely out of their desire to survive. And as Bukabeba said:

The Banyarwanda's support to Amin's regime could have been done by any other group in similar circumstances. They had been alienated by UPC and did not have any bonds that linked them to people that Amin was killing. Their motive was survival and since Amin could give it they had to go for it.⁵⁸⁹

Amin's regime gave them opportunities for education and to live normally. That was when many refugees began leaving the camps for better opportunities. Their daughters married politicians and army officers in government who gave them the much needed patronage and protection. Consequently, they managed to spread to many parts of Uganda generally. This encouraged more migrant Banyarwanda in search of education and better living standards. Thus by the end of Amin's regime, Banyarwanda had become a strong force to reckon with in the politics of Uganda and Ankole in particular.

⁵⁸⁸ Interview: Dononsio Kaganda, July 13, 1997, Nyamitanga.

⁵⁸⁹ Interview: Emmy Bukabeba, February 13, 1998, Kakyeka.

6.2. THE 1981-84 BANYARWANDA CRISIS IN ANKOLE AND ITS AFTERMATH.

It was clear by the early 1980s that the Banyarwanda question was an increasing problem. And for Obote's second regime which thrived on divide and rule politics, the issue was bound to be explosive, especially after Banyarwanda were accused of supporting DP and UPM in the 1980 elections.⁵⁹⁰ There was no proof that they had, merely the assumption that as Catholics they voted DP. And their situation was worsened when Museveni and the 26 fighters (who included some Banyarwanda) declared a guerrilla war against Obote in 1981. This was one of the reasons why the UPC political structures especially National State Agency (NASA) led a campaign to expel Banyarwanda.

There are several factors that led to the rise of xenophobia against Banyarwanda. After two decades, it was clear that the refugees were there to stay. On the contrary, the Rwanda government disowned them on the pretext that Rwanda was already overpopulated. Habyalimana's (Rwandan president) famous analogy was: "If the glass is full, where do you put more water?"⁵⁹¹ On meeting Paul Muwanga, the Vice President of Uganda, on the refugee question, Habyarimana sarcastically commented that the so-called refugees were Banyankole who had occupied Rwanda through the early wars of conquest and when Rwanda gained its independence they chose to return home. The Vice President responded:

If you are talking about Uganda, be careful with your words. I told him [Habyarimana] that we had more than one million Banyarwanda here and if we were to send them back, he would have a problem.⁵⁹²

⁵⁹⁰ Interview: Ezra Kikuri, July 14, 1997, Bushenyi.

⁵⁹¹ Kevin Aliro Ogen, "After 30 Years it was time to go home", in *The Monitor*, Kampala: 15 April, 1994, p. 16.

⁵⁹² See "Record of the Meeting between HE. The Vice President/Minister of Defence, Hon. Paulo Muwanga and the Bishops of the Church of Uganda, at the Request of the Bishops, Held in the Vice President's Office at State Lodge, Nakasero, on Friday 22nd October 1982.

Besides, whereas in Tanzania they were granted citizenship, and in Zaire citizenship could be granted and withdrawn the next day, in Uganda no attempt at all was made to give them nationality. Though many of them thought that they had become citizens of Uganda at Independence in 1962 because they had lived in Uganda for a long time, this was not so. The provisions of article 7(1) of the Independence Constitution stipulated that, "any citizen of the United Kingdom or its colonies or any British protected person having been born in Uganda on or before the 8th. October 1962 and either of whose parents was born in Uganda" became a citizen of Uganda on 9th October 1962. Banyarwanda in this case came from a Belgian colony and were therefore not British protected persons but 'aliens'.⁵⁹³ It was, to borrow Professor Mamdani's analogy, a typical case of social seclusion:

set apart, treated apart, remaining apart...once a refugee, always a refugee hence the child and grand child of a refugee in Uganda was also a refugee...⁵⁹⁴

Chris Rwakasisi was asked during his anti-Banyarwanda crusades in Ankole in 1982-83 whether it was fair to expel all the early immigrants and the refugees who came in 1959 who were *bonafide* residents. In his characteristic rhetoric, he retorted:

If a dog produces a puppy in a cattle kraal, does it become a cow or does it remain a dog?⁵⁹⁵

That explains why Banyarwanda both disguised themselves as Baganda, Banyankole, and Batooro. Either way they 'bribed' their way to go to school and also benefited

⁵⁹³ Section 8 of the 1962 Constitution gave a chance to any person who had been living in Uganda but who had not become a Ugandan citizen by virtue of Section 7 to become one by lodging an application before 9th October 1964, (within two years of Independence). Section 9 stipulated that every person born in Uganda after the 8th October 1962 shall become a citizen of Uganda at the date of his birth only if either of any of his parents is a citizen of Uganda. This section, stringent as it may look, was even incorporated within the 1967 Constitution. Section 12 of the 1962 Constitution and Section 6 of the 1967 Constitution prohibited dual citizenship. Therefore an interpretation of these Constitutional provisions on the citizenship is that an alien and his children and grand children living in Uganda continuously remained alien in perpetuity unless there was intermarriage with a Ugandan citizen somewhere along the line or unless an application for registration for Ugandan citizenship was lodged and accepted.

⁵⁹⁴ M. Mamdani, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

⁵⁹⁵ Interview: Mzee Bara, Mbarara, August 8, 1996, Nkokonjeru.

from the government and UNHCR scholarships. This, in a country where many local people could not afford school fees for their children's education, attracted envy. Nevertheless the success of the refugees though true for some individuals, should not be exaggerated because:

...being excluded from the local labour market, which was monopolised by the nationals, pushed the refugees to try new professional paths where the characteristics of their communities (dissemination in various countries, high mobility, strong ties to solidarity) could be helpful. A limited number of individuals acquired a reputation for professional and financial success, which was often quite exaggeratedly extended to the whole community... But one should point out that many people remained in precarious social and economic situations: widows and families with a single female parent, lone young adults, people left behind in the camps and groups in conflict situations with the local populations.⁵⁹⁶

Secondly, was the land issue in Ankole. Batutsi had settled on the free lands in Ankole, often bought off the local people's *bibanja* (free hold land) and established themselves which roused envy among the locals,⁵⁹⁷ as one said:

You cannot trust a Munyarwanda. He would come seeking and begging for a small plot on which to camp. You give it to him and after two years, he takes you to court claiming that all your land is his.⁵⁹⁸

The Ankole population had increased naturally and with the influx of Banyarwanda and Bakiga, there was land shortage. This left Banyankole with less land to cultivate and they hoped to gain more land by driving out the Banyarwanda. Muhuta M. Akintore, himself a Munyarwanda, says that it is not true that Banyarwanda could not own land in Uganda. The restriction was on non-Africans but the refugees, being Africans, could lawfully purchase, lease and occupy land without the need of any

⁵⁹⁶ André Guichaoua, quoted in Prunier, op. cit., p. 65.

⁵⁹⁷ See also Nelson Kasfir, "Lands and Peasants in Western Uganda: Bushenyi and Mbarara Districts", in H. B. Hansen and M. Twaddle, *Uganda Now: Between Decay and Development*, London: James Currey, 1988, pp. 158-174. Kasfir gives a very good analysis of the land situation in Ankole and the various factors that have risen due to the uneven distribution of land since the 1901 Ankole Agreement. See also Martin Doornbos, "Land Tenure and Political Conflict in Ankole, Uganda", *Journal of Developing Studies*, 12, 1, 1975, pp. 62-65.

⁵⁹⁸ Interview: Timothy Banduhoo, April 18, 1997, Nyakajojo.

ministerial consent.⁵⁹⁹ This however is entirely wrong in that by "aliens", the government meant all those who came to Uganda for business such as investment and not refugees who came seeking asylum. When the refugees moved out of their settlements to occupy land, it was not because the government allowed them.⁶⁰⁰ It was because of the general laxity in Amin's administration. Their only legal area was in the gazetted settlements. In the seventies and eighties corruption affected every department and the refugees acquired land by bribery. The government could not distinguish who was and was not a refugee and the local chiefs could be bribed to endorse application forms.⁶⁰¹

The refugees soon got deeply entangled in local partisan politics in Ankole. They were seen as part of a Bahima plot to increase numbers. So they were being sent away partly because:

of that historical animosity. For a Munyarwanda being associated with a Muhima who was an oppressor, given the opportunity the Bairu would have loved to send Banyarwanda away in order to isolate Bahima.⁶⁰²

In the 1980s, the Banyarwanda (mainly the Batutsi refugees) were seen to take sides in local conflicts. This excluded the Bahutu because they trekked in Ankole one by one and they were easily absorbed. Also, they were not skilled or politically exposed to leadership so they kept a low profile in politics. Besides that, their being predominantly Catholic was also a disincentive, for Bairu Catholics had little political influence in Ankole. The case of the Batutsi refugees, however, was different. These had been traditionally rulers and wealthy lords like their Bahima colleagues, and

⁵⁹⁹ Muhuta Akintore, *Human Rights Violation in Uganda: A case Study of Expulsion of people of the Rwandese Ethnicity from Mbarara District in 1982*, dissertation for the Diploma in Public Administration, Makerere University, 1995, pp. 17-18.

⁶⁰⁰ Interview: James Kahigiriza, March 16, 1996. Kahigiriza from Mbarara, was the Chairman of Uganda Lands Commission during Amin's regime.

⁶⁰¹ Interview: Ndiwa Ndikora, July 23, 1997, Mbarara.

⁶⁰² Interview: Mwambutsya, March 26, 1997, Makerere University.

could not be subservient. They influenced Ankole politics through an alliance with Bahima, which alienated them further from the Banyankole.⁶⁰³

As for Milton Obote, he knew ever since he returned from the exile in 1980 that the Banyarwanda refugees were for all intents and purposes a political liability. In 1980, he tried to stop them from voting in the general elections without success.⁶⁰⁴ Edward Rurangaranga said:

Those who had been affected by boundaries definitely voted. But the latter Banyarwanda refugees because they were Catholics voted DP especially in the 1980 elections. It was rather hard to stop them because we had just come from Tanzania and we had not enough resources leave alone a well organised government system constituted to look into the issue of Banyarwanda's voting. In any case many of these had already gone out of their camps and it was very difficult to identify them.⁶⁰⁵

Obote saw them as opponents either as against UPC or actively supporting the NRM guerrilla war which started after the elections. Yoweri Museveni, the guerrilla leader, was associated with the Banyarwanda and, on several occasions the UPC propaganda accused him of being a foreigner meddling in Uganda's affairs.⁶⁰⁶ But as it turned out, Banyarwanda were not only meddling in Uganda's affairs but they were actually involved in the bush war which toppled the UPC government. Some of them rose to high rank in the NRA, like the late Major General Fred Rwigyema⁶⁰⁷ who became Deputy Army Commander, and Major General Paul Kagame who served as deputy Director of Military Intelligence in the NRM government before leading the attack on Rwanda where he is now Vice President. Some Banyarwanda had been part of Museveni's FRONASA, the guerrilla group which he had created in 1973, and fought alongside the Tanzanian forces to oust Amin in 1979.⁶⁰⁸

⁶⁰³ Interview: Dixon. Kamukama, May 15, 1996, Makerere University.

⁶⁰⁴ Interview: Francis Bwengye, July 29, 1997, Kampala.

⁶⁰⁵ Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, July 12, 1997, Ishaka.

⁶⁰⁶ Cf. Louise Pirouet, "Refugees in and from Uganda in the post colonial period", in H. B. Hansen and M. Twaddle, *Uganda Now: Between Decay and Development*, London: James Currey, 1988, p. 243. See also, Clay, op. cit., pp. 28-34; *Oxfam Bulletin*, 1, November 1982.

⁶⁰⁷ He was killed on the second day of RPF's (Rwandese Patriotic Front) invasion of Rwanda in October 1990 by his own rivals in the RPF. See Prunier. op. cit., pp. 93-95.

⁶⁰⁸ Interview: Emmy Bukabeba, August 29, 1996, Kakyeka.

The expulsion was indiscriminate. Feeling that the UPC Youth Wingers had government support, they even attacked local Bahima or Bafumbira who were not refugees. There was much looting, stealing cattle and land grabbing. The Youth Wingers were fanatical, often uneducated, with no money, who were only recruited because they were UPC supporters or vice versa. This explains the speed with which they effected their assignments. Little did UPC realise that by persecuting refugees in Ankole in 1982-83 and expelling them to Rwanda, they were forcing many young men and women to join Museveni's guerrilla fighters.

The UPC government got the much needed pretext to expel Banyarwanda when in October 1982 government officials investigating cattle raiding in the South of Ankole were killed. UPC Youth Wingers attacked Banyarwanda, killing, destroying homes and crops and looting property and cattle. Not all rounded up were refugees as Bishop Kakubi said:

Feeling they had government support, they even went after the local Banyarwanda, the Banyankole and even some Bakiga. The point was to loot, steal cattle and illegally occupy land. There were some killings and many rapes. Heads of cattle were stolen and people went to the old settlements where they found themselves in quasi detention conditions. Others fled towards the border in an attempt to get back into Rwanda. Those who managed to cross were interned in camps on the other side. But those who fared the worst were those who got caught up at the border of Uganda and Rwanda.⁶⁰⁹

In 1982, there was an increase in cattle theft in Ankole in the counties of Isingiro, Ruhama and Ntungamo where there was a significant number of Banyarwanda. Many families lost cattle and the Banyarwanda were accused of stealing them, (it was Banyankole's cattle, not Banyarwanda's that disappeared).⁶¹⁰ The Kamukuzi Archives are full of implicating letters from the concerned county chiefs to the DC complaining of cattle thefts in those areas. For example:

Further to my reporting cattle thefts in my county more thefts took place as indicated below.

⁶⁰⁹ Interview: Bishop John Baptist Kakubi, March 22, 1997, Ibanda. Bishop Kakubi read me this quotation from a book whose reference I unfortunately misplaced and cannot quote from it directly.

⁶¹⁰ Interview: Ndiwa-Ndikora, July 23, 1997, Mbarara.

9 - 12 - 82 L. Banyenzaki's heads of cattle taken by armed smugglers.

15 - 12- 82 Mrs. Keti Baryamwijuka's 9 heads of cattle taken by armed smugglers

Sir, cattle smuggling exercise has tremendously increased...since the Banyarwanda resettled in the refugee camps of Orushingi [sic. Orukinga] and Nakivale. It is confirmed that all smugglers engaged in the exercise are Banyarwanda...⁶¹¹

It is believed that the stolen cattle reached unspecified markets in Rwanda and Tanzania and the money from the sales supported the bush war.⁶¹²

The wrath against Banyarwanda was activated in 1982 when two Youth Wingers, Matsiko and Wazarwahi, and a policeman, were killed during the exercise against the cattle thefts. It was said that Banyarwanda told the soldiers that the advancing constabulary was actually guerrillas.⁶¹³ Their death sparked off the subsequent acts of revenge against Banyarwanda. Bishop Betungura who conducted the funeral service of these Youth Wingers recalls how politicians were telling and instigating mourners in inflammatory language to the effect that the Banyarwanda had killed Wazarwahi and must be punished.⁶¹⁴ After this incident the Youth Wingers attacked not only Banyarwanda but also Bahima. Consequently, many Banyarwanda and Bahima joined NRA "for survival to escape harassment and incrimination by the Obote regime."⁶¹⁵ It was from this experience of the guerrilla struggle that Banyarwanda were helped to form and consolidate the vision for their eventual return home using military skills if that became necessary, as it did on 1st October 1990. This attack on Rwanda was indeed a matter of time, considering that when the NRA came into power in January 1986, it had about 3000 Banyarwanda fighters among its 14,000 strong force and the number had grown to 8000 out of 80,000 - 100,000 NRA soldiers by 1990.⁶¹⁶

⁶¹¹ See A letter from the County Chief of Isingiro, in Refugees File, G/CR1, letter No. 6. See also similar letters dated, 20th. November 1982, 15 May 1983 and many others reporting on cattle theft and the security situation in the areas mentioned above, Kamukuzi archives Mbarara.

⁶¹² Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, February 15, 1998, Ishaka.

⁶¹³ *ibid.*

⁶¹⁴ Interview: Amos Betungura, September 9, 1997, Ruharo.

⁶¹⁵ Kevin Aliro Ogen, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁶¹⁶ Prunier, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71. I tried unsuccessfully to ascertain these figures with the Ministry of Defence, Kampala and therefore had to adopt them as Prunier has them.

6.3. WAS THE EXPULSION A GOVERNMENT POLICY?

Were the Banyankole responsible for the expulsion or was it a government policy? Both Banyarwanda and Banyankole interviewed agree that the expulsion of Banyarwanda was government policy. For Milton Obote often made inflammatory speeches, which implicated Banyarwanda as a liability. In the government owned Paper, the *Uganda Times*, of January 11, 1982, Milton Obote is quoted as saying Banyarwanda committed most atrocities during Amin's era. Obviously such utterances by the Head of State would fuel local hostility. And what activated the government's hostility was the fact that Banyarwanda supported and fought in the bush war. So their expulsion was political. By expelling Banyarwanda, the government hoped to suffocate the NRM source of recruitment but in fact it fuelled it.

Government officials understood Banyarwanda expulsion as government backed. The District Commissioner of Mbarara, Ndiwa Ndikora, understood the whole exercise of the expulsion of Banyarwanda to be a government policy which he had dutifully implemented:

Yes it was and I had reasons to believe so. Nearly all the MPs in the areas where the expulsion was being carried out did not protest against it. None of the MPs concerned ever came to me or wrote to me advising against the Banyarwanda expulsion. In any case the Minister of State in the President's Office was busy fencing land from where Banyarwanda had been evicted.⁶¹⁷

The former MP for Rwampara, Francis Butagira, and a former Speaker of the National Assembly, concurs that the MP for Mbarara Central Constituency stated in a public meeting in Mbarara that it was government directive to push all Banyarwanda into gazetted camps from where "genuine citizens" could be sorted out.⁶¹⁸ So local authorities carried out the exercise vigorously since some MPs had blessed it. A letter from the Youth League, UPC branch Ankole, of 20 October 1982, written through the District Commissioner and the Administrative Secretary, Mbarara District, to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government, stressed the importance of the

⁶¹⁷ Interview: Nuwa-Ndikora, July 17, 1997, Mbarara.

previous District Council's minutes in which the motion to expel the refugees had been unanimously passed:

In its meeting held on 24 to 25 August 1982. Ref. of Min, 17/82 of second session of Mbarara District Council which was held on 13th to 16th July 1982 under motions and requests the Council unanimously resolved that the refugees should be forced to go back into their camps and that their movements should be checked and restricted. It was passed unanimously.⁶¹⁹

Another letter from the MP for Mbarara Central Constituency to the District Police Commander (and copied to other relevant district officials but mainly to the Youth leader, Stephen Musiime) reads:

RE: REVENUE FROM CONFISCATED GOODS.

I wish to remind you of our discussion (DPC/Dr. Rubaihayo, MP for Mbarara Central Constituency) about the above subject. The Vice President decided that all monies from any sales of goods confiscated from smugglers must go into a special account to be opened and run by the Youth League. This directive operates irrespective of which group apprehends the smugglers. Vehicles should be handed over to the military who will pay for them, and the proceeds banked on the Youth Account.⁶²⁰

It is from such evidence that we can assert that the government was involved in instigating and implementing the anti-Banyarwanda attacks. Banyarwanda may have been involved in smuggling and stealing cattle, though this did not apply to them all. Culprits should have been individually arrested. In any case why should the Youth League who eventually became active in the whole exercise have been beneficiaries of the money that accrued from the confiscated property? By all intents they were being financially motivated to carry out the otherwise difficult exercise as Mukaira observed:

The Youth were the right force to use. They are strong and have the desire to accomplish a task which others would be hesitant to attempt. They think after their actions. Many of them wanted to be seen as

⁶¹⁸ See *Commission of Inquiry*, p. 498.

⁶¹⁹ Kamukuzi Archives: The Banyarwanda File, B/1.

⁶²⁰ *ibid.*

loyal to the government which they thought was behind the whole exercise. In any case they were being paid for the job done well.⁶²¹

In fact a letter from the Secretary Youth League, Mbarara, to the District Commissioner confirms that all funds from the refugees were used to run the UPC Youth Wing office:

RE: Claim of Shs. 42,070/=

This money was spent on Youths when on their struggle in Isingiro [the refugee area]. Another part was spent when taking information to Kampala and Masaka.⁶²²

The fact that the Secretary's claim mentions that the money was spent on their struggle in the refugee area, is an expression of what went on in the camps. And since they were promised rewards from the confiscated properties, it is easy to understand the speed and cruelty with which the exercise was executed. There is evidence that the government was involved right from the Vice President. Dr. Rubaihayo's letter to the District Commissioner and other UPC functionaries in Ankole like the army, police and the local chiefs indicates this. When MPs like Tiberondwa and Butagira resisted, they were branded guerrilla sympathisers, which was a very serious allegation at the time.⁶²³ Butagira was sent abroad on official duty to minimise his interference.⁶²⁴

What also implicates the government was the low profile it maintained over a sensitive issue, which had at the time attracted international attention. The Minister of Internal Affairs called it 'a local matter' which Banyankole could handle themselves,⁶²⁵ while the Vice President said it was 'an unfortunate incident' in which Banyankole took the law into their hands.⁶²⁶ On 19 October 1982⁶²⁷, a Government

⁶²¹ Interview with Mukaira, July 17, 1997, Bushenyi.

⁶²² Kamukuzi Archives: Youth/DC File, YD/C1.

⁶²³ Interview with Adonia Tiberondwa, May 26, 1996, Bushenyi.

⁶²⁴ Interview with Francis Butagira, April 12, 1996, Mbarara.

⁶²⁵ *Uganda Times*, 27 October 1982.

⁶²⁶ *Commission of Inquiry*, op. cit., p. 502.

⁶²⁷ See *Uganda Times*.

spokesman announced that the Rwandese refugees had panicked and fled after a minor shooting incident. The Prime Minister Otema Allimadi said Rwandese refugees had voluntarily repatriated themselves. The President was in Italy when it happened but he remained silent on the issue for a whole month after he had returned. Addressing the District Council at Mbarara later, he stated that the refugees had fled on mere rumours:

I am extremely concerned about the recent developments on that subject. I am concerned because the recent developments constituted violation of the laws of Uganda and the citizenship rights of some of the persons who fled from their homes. Secondly, I am concerned that aliens, including Rwandese refugees, who left their homes because of rumours of various kinds, did so in circumstances, which gave the impression that, they were actually forced to flee.⁶²⁸

And as if to resurrect old scores, Obote went on to remind the Councillors about the:

...unhappy events which can be cited against well known non citizens within your districts. Some of these events led to loss of lives and loss of property including cattle. The recent events are accepted to have been occasioned by stealing of cattle, which led to the loss of lives and which in turn led to the large number of non-Ugandans taking flight into Rwanda and others going into the refugee settlements. These events were extremely unfortunate. What must be done is to reassert the authority and majesty of the law.⁶²⁹

What is not clear though was whether the re-assertion of the law was meant to protect the refugees or the politicians. But from the tone of the President's speech, he seemed to have been sympathetic with the latter as the loss of lives the President is referring to is not Banyarwanda's but the lives of the two Youth Wingers and a policeman who were killed during the expulsion. In a six-page speech, it was only on the last page and in one paragraph that he dissociated the government from the Banyarwanda issue. In order to mollify international concern, he concluded:

⁶²⁸ See Obote's speech, "Communication from the President to the District Councils of Bushenyi, Kabale, Kabalore, Kasese, Mbarara and Rukungiri, assembled in Mbarara town on Friday, 29th October, 1982", in Government File, A/DC, No. 14, Kamukuzi Archives, Mbarara.

⁶²⁹ *ibid*, p. 5.

I want to assure the Chairman, Councillors, Ugandans and the rest of the world that there was no governmental approval, scheme or decision for persons of Rwandese origin to be uprooted from amidst the Ugandan population. I want also to assure all that [sic] the rest of the country as well as the whole world, that the government of Uganda will not pursue any such policy.⁶³⁰

Having said that, the President appointed Lazaro Makatu a UPC stalwart in Ankole, as Chairman of the Committee, to sort out Rwandese refugees from citizens⁶³¹, an appointment which was a contradiction of Banyarwanda harassment. The newly appointed Chairman declared the Rwandese were dangerous criminals, killers, smugglers and saboteurs in spite of the generosity of the locals.⁶³² Six days later the same Chairman is said to have thanked the Youth Wingers for a job well done and asked them to be patient till the District Council worked out the best way of dividing the Banyarwanda properties:

I summoned you to inform you that the battle to collect and return the refugees to their places is over, and to thank you for the work you have done... What remains now is to scrutinise refugees that might have stayed behind and rid villages of refugees... I am glad to tell you that the exercise was performed perfectly well even if there were sporadic incidents, which did not please us, e.g. our two youths and one policeman were killed... This is not negligible. The good thing is that we won the battle through the blood of our friends above... Go and preach the gospel and inform the people that we have won the battle. Let them follow as we know our destination and we have already started seeing sunshine there... I am warning everyone to avoid the property of the Banyarwanda. Be patient and the District Council will determine a way for you to share these properties. To dispel all rumours and loose talk, the President's speech from the start to the end does not state anywhere that refugees and aliens should return to the lands they occupied.⁶³³

The government knew it was not a mere local issue. It knew its sensitivity and kept quiet. Obote knew how to exploit ethnic differences. If he could keep them occupied with their local differences, then he would have time for other things. UPC divisions

⁶³⁰ *ibid*, p. 6

⁶³¹ *Commission of Inquiry*, *op. cit.*, p. 509.

⁶³² *ibid*.

⁶³³ See Government File No. 2, G/CM, letter no. 16, Kamukuzi Archives, Mbarara; See also Louise Pirouet, "Refugees in and from Uganda in the post-colonial period", in Holger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle, 1988, *Uganda Now: Between Decay and Development*, London: James Currey, pp. 244-245.

in Ankole were threatening to wreck the party and Obote therefore saw the Banyarwanda issue as something that would distract them.⁶³⁴ Instead of punishing Bahima and Banyarwanda for not having supported him, he used the local functionaries. And indeed when the Minister of State in the President's office met religious leaders, he hinted:

What has happened in Mbarara is a matter of historical concern. People like Archbishop Sabiiti were in a position to ease this situation 50 years ago. People like you Bishop Shalita and Kivengere should have done it 20 years ago. On the contrary, it has been led to build up as I have bluntly spoken in my public rallies, that had it not been for good Protectorate Government and subsequently the UPC Government, the Bahima would have been chased to Rwanda before the Banyarwanda. I hope I am wrong but I am convinced I am right that what is obtaining in Ankole today can not be solved in Kampala.⁶³⁵

For the State Minister to have referred to Sabiiti or Shalita and even Bishop Festo Kivengere, often accused of being DP and NRM supporters, showed that the Minister was suggesting both Bahima and Banyarwanda were the same lot and deserved to be 'sent back' to Rwanda, refugees or not.

Importantly the underlying factor was ethnic but political interests magnified this. Bahima are not Banyarwanda but are true Ugandan nationals who did not in any way deserve to have "been chased to Rwanda". Though the Minister is emphasising the Bishops' failure to reconcile Banyankole ethnic groups, UPC government never did anything about it. If the UPC had advanced itself as a non-partisan party, these ethnic conflicts would have ended. Banyarwanda were expelled because their political interests clashed with the interests of the UPC government, their involvement in the guerrilla war, their stealing of cattle and the greed of those who wanted to grab their property. For instance in the area known as Akashanda, Kashari County, a government Minister established a big dairy farm on the lands

⁶³⁴ Interview with John Bikangaga, June 28, 1997, Makindye.

⁶³⁵ See "Record of the meeting between HE. the Vice president/Minister of Defence, Hon. Paul Muwanga and some Bishops of the Church of Uganda, at the request of the Bishops, held in the Vice President's Office at State Lodge, Nakasero, on Friday 22nd October 1982", in Government File, op. cit., p. 4.

where Banyarwanda had been evicted. His animals were later destroyed and the land repossessed by the former occupants after the fall of the UPC government in 1985.

6.4. THE CHURCH AND THE BANYARWANDA QUESTION.

What then was the role of the churches during the Banyarwanda expulsion in 1982? Like in the sixties, the 1982 period was rather a complex one for both churches in Ankole. They were caught between the two forces; the government and their moral obligation. The Anglican Church is still being blamed for the indifference with which it handled the Banyarwanda expulsion. Bishop Betungura admitted:

we did not do what was expected of us though we tried what we could. The 1980s were a difficult period for me as a bishop in Ankole for there were many forces that were pulling me apart. For that matter, I was given no room enough in which I could exercise my freedom and authority as a Bishop.⁶³⁶

At the time the refugees were expelled from Ankole in 1982, the Anglican Church had resumed its quasi-establishment picture reminiscent of what it was like in the 1960s. It could not condemn the unfair expulsion when it enjoyed government patronage. Rather like the Baganda who do not "talk when they are eating", the Anglican Church could not speak for the refugees because it had been stuffed with political spoils. The refugees had not won the church's sympathy since UPC propaganda had alienated them from the rest of the society because of their role in the guerrilla war. Priests like Bishop Kakubi and Revd Canon Elisha Kyamugambi who would have defended the refugees had lost many cows with evidence implicating Banyarwanda. The County chief of Gayaza, Isingiro writing to the District Commissioner says:

⁶³⁶ Interview: Amos Betungura, July 16, 1996, Ruharo.

This is to report to you that Banyarwanda cattle smugglers...crossed to our district and a number of animals stolen from Rugaaga and Kashumba sub-county as stated below.... [Also] Unknown numbers of heads of cattle from Bishop Kakubi...were taken.⁶³⁷

Perhaps this explains the view many priests interviewed take about the expulsion. They did not particularly like the way in which it was done, but say:

I think the element was right though the method was wrong. You see the Banyarwanda who came to Ankole were mainly Batutsi and many allied with Bahima and they were part of the notorious Amin's Research Bureau. Also they were so secretive and could not easily mix with the people they found. They stole other people's land and always conflicted with their neighbours.⁶³⁸

Bishop Betungura was identified with Banyarwanda when he tried to condemn the expulsion and the inhuman manner in which the refugees were treated. He was accused, *nitumanya ahozi nabo aborikukwatsiza* (we know where you belong and those that you support) by the Youth Wingers.⁶³⁹ This limited the Bishop's support for the refugees. Nevertheless he was able to stand against any usurpation of Banyarwanda property by his churches and schools. Some of these institutions may have accepted Banyarwanda property such as iron sheets and doors from politicians and chiefs. But the Bishop's circular letter to all Priests in the Diocese warned them against accepting such property:

It has already been brought to my attention that some of you have accepted iron sheets, doors etc. from your local chiefs. I am writing to warn you against any property that belongs to the Banyarwanda. If there is any priest who has accepted such things, he must return them immediately.⁶⁴⁰

⁶³⁷ See Government File/ County Chiefs, letter N. 16, Kamukuzi Archives, Mbarara. This should not be misunderstood that both Kakubi and Kyamugambi supported the expulsion. On the contrary, Bishop Kakubi was known to have supported Banyarwanda when they were being expelled. As for Revd. Eliasha Kyamugambi, now Bishop, he was a student at Ridley Hall Cambridge at the time of the expulsion.

⁶³⁸ The Interviewee is still active in Church ministry therefore we shall not mention his name.

⁶³⁹ Interview: Bishop Betungura, May 21, 1996, Ruharo.

⁶⁴⁰ Refugees File, EAD/6, letter no. 6, East Ankole Diocese.

Bishop Betungura did not join the three Bishops Kivengere, Ruhindi and Shalita (by then retired) in their delegation to the Vice President about the refugees. These Bishops had on their own initiative requested an audience with government officials to resolve the Banyarwanda question. Unlike other Bishops in the region, they were closely linked with the refugees. They were Banyarwanda or Bahima and Bishop Shalita was among the victims who were harassed, though he had lived in Ankole for many years and was in fact the first Bishop of Ankole. Asked why such an elderly Bishop should have been victimised, Edward Rurangaranga then Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office stated:

You see people posed as Bahima whereas they were Banyarwanda. But people like Shalita and Kivengere were affected because they were accommodating and harbouring bandits. I remember when as a Minister, I went to visit Bishop Kivengere at his AEE house in Nairobi. As we neared his house, he all over a sudden changed his mind and took me to a hotel instead. Reason there were guerrillas in his house.⁶⁴¹

Chris Rwakasisi, Minister of State, asked why it was those Bishops, and from Dioceses where the refugee situation was not as serious as it was in Ankole, who decided to seek audience with the Vice President:

I just wanted to know all these are religious leaders. There are Bishops from the area affected-Kivengere is from Kabale. He says he had a spill-over. Was Bishop Betungura sick or anything? Is he keeping a blind eye? Bishop Kakubi-does he never possess a human heart? Bishop Bernabas [Catholic Bishop of Kabale diocese]- those should also be affected by the spill-over, why are you not with them?⁶⁴²

The Minister wished to imply that if the problem was so great as these Bishops were saying, why were Religious leaders from the affected areas not complaining. It was rather an indirect way of identifying the Bishops with the Banyarwanda and the guerrilla war. Throughout the whole meeting, the Vice President continued to remind

⁶⁴¹ Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, July 12, 1996, Mbarara.

⁶⁴² See Record of the meeting between HE. The Vice President/Minister of Defence, Hon. Paulo Muwanga and some Bishops of the Church of Uganda, at the request of the Bishops, held in the Vice president's Office at the State Lodge Nakasero, on Friday 22nd October 1982, in Refugees File,

the three Bishops that they should not take the occasion for propaganda, perhaps referring to Bishop Kivengere who had an international evangelistic ministry and could influence the international community. It was not that the other Bishops did not want to be part of the delegation. The Catholic Bishops had already issued a Pastoral letter condemning the inhuman treatment of the refugees.⁶⁴³ Bishop Kakubi and the Catholic Church had already identified with the refugees plight and there was nothing else it could have done to halt the expulsion. The Catholic Church was concerned because the refugees formed the bulk of its congregation. May be that was why it was effective in supplying relief aid to them. Though it preferred to do more, it was under pressure from the government because of DP connections. The Catholic Bishop therefore was inhibited from being too outspoken. Also the regional Bishops who were confronted with the refugees' question did not speak as one voice. Each Bishop handled the Banyarwanda issue individually and with different interests, hence scattered efforts which could not impress any impact on the government.

What effects did the Banyarwanda expulsion have on the Churches in Ankole? Congregations dropped drastically especially in Catholic churches.⁶⁴⁴ In places like Isingiro, Kikagate and Rubare where Banyarwanda were many, Anglican and Catholic churches almost closed⁶⁴⁵ since the strength of these parishes was drawn largely from Banyarwanda population.⁶⁴⁶ There was also a drastic fall in Church income. The Churches' moral and prophetic voice was tested more than ever. They should have spoken for the voiceless and the oppressed but on the whole they did not. Some evicted people congregated at church centres, hoping that it would be a sanctuary. But church leaders seem to have been afraid that the government would not

GC/BF, document No. 6, Kamukuzi Archives, Mbarara.

⁶⁴³ Interview: Bishop Bakyenga, May 3, 1996. Unfortunately I could not get access to this letter due to the reasons already stated in the archival analysis.

⁶⁴⁴ Interview: Bishop Kakubi, May 21, 1997, Ibanda.

⁶⁴⁵ This by any means does not contradict my argument all along that the refugees (Batutsi) were indifferent to religion. These were the first generation refugees who preferred to keep their identity political-wise. But as I argued also, these counties of Isingiro, Kikagate and Rubare had been occupied by Banyarwanda migrants years before the refugee problem. It is these that had integrated in society and embraced Christianity. However, the architects of the expulsion could not distinguish the refugees from the migrants - they were all expelled. That is how the Churches in those areas came to be affected.

⁶⁴⁶ See Mugisha Samuel, 1987, *The Impact of Political Conflict on the Church in Kazo Sub-County*,

restrain the local UPC fanatics. Even local people were afraid that if they showed concern they too would be accused.

6.5. CONCLUSION.

The expulsion of Banyarwanda not only tarnished the government's image, but also implicated the Christian church questioning its ability to defend human rights. Banyarwanda in the sixties had been looked at as a liability to the UPC government and their situation was not made any safer when in 1980 they were identified with DP, the guerrilla war, and the stealing of cattle in Ankole. They were victimised because they were closely identified with the Bahima. This was only a secondary element reactivated by the political factor. Obote was confident he could find a political reason in favour of Banyankole who had helped his second coming. It was a national issue prompted by national leaders only that the programme was executed locally. Banyarwanda's failure to integrate into the Ankole culture contributed to their plight. They were right to be proud of their heritage and wish to keep their culture and language, as Gad Gasatura urges⁶⁴⁷, but, as Francis Mwesigwa said, African culture has no room for social seclusion. It would have also paid dividends if they had been more cautious of the circumstances that surrounded them. On the other hand Banyarwanda were caught between two ethnic cultures: Bairu and Bahima, and they naturally aligned with the latter because of their cultural links. Had the Banyarwanda not entered a divided Ankole, they might have embraced the Banyankole culture and perhaps their situation would have been very different from that of 1982.

⁶⁴⁷ See *Commission of Inquiry*, op. cit., p. 501.

CHAPTER SEVEN

7. THE KINGSHIP (OBUGABE) AS A FACTOR IN ETHNICITY, POLITICS AND RELIGION IN ANKOLE, 1990-1993.

7.0. THE POLITICS OF KING MAKING IN UGANDA.

The restoration of monarchies by the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government was undoubtedly a landmark in Uganda's history. Kingdoms were abolished under the republican constitution of 1967. Between 1993 and 1994, many districts had their kingdoms restored including Buganda, Bunyoro and Toro. Even Busoga in 1996 regained its 'Kyabazinga', the titular head of the Basoga chiefs. While these kingdoms especially Buganda were restored with relative ease and support from the government, it proved impossible to restore the Ankole monarchy because of the opposition it encountered from within Ankole itself and among ministers in the central government.

In this chapter therefore, I intend to discuss the factors that hindered the restoration of the Ankole monarchy. I argue that ethnicity and politics were the contending forces in the politics of king-making in Ankole as discussed in chapter one. Uganda was coming towards the 1994 Constituent Assembly (CA) elections after which the elected members were to debate the Odoki Commission's Draft Constitution. Since the Constitution was to determine the nature of government in Uganda, monarchists especially from Buganda used it as a bargaining factor. If Museveni would restore the Buganda monarchy before the CA elections in 1994, then Baganda would in turn elect pro-NRM Constituent Assembly delegates. In Ankole it was the reverse. What was going to determine NRM government's success was the extent it disassociated itself from the restoration of the Ankole monarchy. Museveni did not want to antagonise the Banyankole so NRM supported the restoration of the monarchy in Buganda but opposed it in Ankole.

7.1. THE ODOKI COMMISSION IN ANKOLE.

In discussing the Ankole monarchy, we need to consider the background under which the monarchies in Uganda were to be reinstated. At the end of 1988, the National Resistance Council (NRC) set up a Commission of experts whose objective was to ascertain how people wanted to be governed. Its membership and tenure of office was established under sections 1 and 2 of the Uganda Constitutional Commission Statute (No. 5 of 1988). Its members were chosen from a wide variety of interests and backgrounds. They included judges, lawyers, a priest, historians, political scientists, a medical doctor, financial and military experts.⁶⁴⁸ On 4 March 1989, they were sworn in as the “Uganda Constitutional Commission” (UCC) to review the Constitution, make proposals for a new Constitution and prepare a Draft Constitution. It became known as the Odoki Commission, after its chairman Justice Benjamin J. Odoki.⁶⁴⁹

This thesis does not intend to discuss the initial procedures and arrangements of UCC. It is only interested in its findings in Ankole. By the time the Commission went into the field in 1989, the NRM government had set up the Resistance Councils (RC) infrastructure at village, parish, sub-county and district level. They had become the means through which people elected their leaders from village level up to the NRC. The Odoki Commission was not only looking at the monarchy question, because that was a minor issue. It was commissioned mainly to draft a Constitution, which would be acceptable to all ranges of opinion throughout Uganda. What the monarchists wanted was to put the monarchy question on the agenda. This was largely a kiganda issue, but having been raised, it became an issue for other societies, as the Odoki Commission observed:

From subsequent seminars at sub-county level, in educational institutions and for professional as well as interest groups, the topic of traditional rulers appeared to us to be a national issue which people wanted to be determined as part of the constitution-making process. The reasons given for this view included the fact that traditional rulers were enshrined in the 1962 and 1966 constitutions. They were abolished by the 1967 Constitution. The new constitution could not leave this issue out. Besides, the overall

⁶⁴⁸ See *Uganda Constitutional Commission Report*, p. 3, hereafter UCC.

⁶⁴⁹ Interview: Justice Odoki, March 12, 1998, Kampala.

motive for the making of the new constitution was to give Ugandans a rare opportunity to express themselves freely on any issue connected with creation of a better society for all. Since a cross-section of society were deeply concerned about traditional rulers whether for their restoration or their continued abolition, it was important that the topic became a constitutional issue.⁶⁵⁰

Just as it became a constitutional issue, so it became a controversial one. According to Justice Odoki, wherever the Commission went, people were sharply divided. Those for it argued that its inclusion in the constitution was essential to its permanent existence as the experience of the 1967 (when Obote abolished kingdoms) had shown. To avoid such a thing happening again, they preferred generally to include the issue of the traditional rulers as part of the fundamental right to culture. It would ensure the permanency of such institution and its distancing from constitutional politics. Others thought that traditional rulers should be left out of the new constitution because they were no longer useful nor relevant.⁶⁵¹ The Odoki Commission found this latter view mainly in Ankole in 1991. They met RC officials, elders, professionals, students and individuals. Unlike in districts of Buganda where people had expressed “love and interest” in the restoration of the monarchy, it met “hostile” reactions whenever they asked about the restoration of the monarchy. According to Odoki, the general view from both districts of Bushenyi and Mbarara was that:

Traditional rulers were dictatorial and oppressive in the past. They exercised absolute rule before the advent of colonialism, having power over life, which they often abused. Their rule has no place in the modern world, which craves for democracy and respect for life.⁶⁵²

Hence the two districts of Bushenyi and Mbarara, through their RC5 (district) councils, submitted their resolutions to the Commission. The Bushenyi one read:

All Councillors while contributing to the above... argued that the restoration of the Omugabe would create sectarianism of having one group of the minority suppressing the majority, which would

⁶⁵⁰ UCC, p. 540.

⁶⁵¹ Interview: Justice Odoki, March 12, 1998, Kampala.

⁶⁵² *ibid.*

undermine the social and economic development of Ankole. It would disrupt the present unity and peace...and it would not be economically bearable by the people....⁶⁵³

The Mbarara District memo simply stated:

Uganda should not at all have traditional rulers because the institution is divisive and outmoded.⁶⁵⁴

Because of such views against the monarchy, the Odoki Commission concluded:

It is our considered view that the question as to whether a particular region, ethnic group or district should or should not have a traditional institution is of legitimate concern to all Ugandans if its existence would have implications for national politics or national resources. Otherwise we believe that the people concerned are the best judges on the issue, either because they have had a long history of association with the institution or they believe the institution has still an important role to play for them.⁶⁵⁵

However the Commission warned that, although there was overwhelming evidence that Buganda wanted their monarchy restored, in Ankole it was the opposite:

Judging by the seminar reports, our own observation, and the memoranda from these Districts (Mbarara and Bushenyi) there appears to be a dominant view that kingship has no further role in those areas. In the seminars and public debates we noticed that, when compared to Buganda, there were far fewer people who supported the restoration of kingship. Even those few who supported it did not speak with the same love and commitment to it as their Baganda counterparts. The memoranda of the two RCVs in Ankole did not favour the institution. The majority of the RC3s and RC2s were also opposed to it. It is significant that all who opposed the restoration of the monarchy did not even see any role for it as a purely cultural institution.⁶⁵⁶

⁶⁵³ See Minute 29/93 Nkole Cultural trust and Monarchy, in Chairman's file, Bushenyi District Council File, BD/PM. The following people were elected at the same meeting to draft a resolution to read at Rwakitura meeting on behalf of Bushenyi District: L. Ndyanado, F. Rutaro, E. Kyabakama, K. Kanyogonya, Dr. D. Rwakishaya (now deceased).

⁶⁵⁴ Proposals on the New Constitution by Mbarara District Resistance Council, 2 September, 1991.

⁶⁵⁵ UCC, p. 548.

⁶⁵⁶ UCC, p. 544.

On the other hand, Baganda had never ceased to agitate for the restoration of the monarchy arguing that:

The institution of traditional leaders is part and parcel of the cultural heritage of some Ugandans. As such those who want it and respect it should be able to have it as an essential part of their fundamental heritage to culture. The institution is intimately linked to the clan system, which forms the essence of all social relations. Without Ssabataka (head of clans) in the case of Buganda, the entire clan system and social development is seriously affected.⁶⁵⁷

Consequently the NRM government in 1993, in a closed session, passed the constitutional (Amendment) Statute 1993⁶⁵⁸ and the Traditional Rulers (Restoration of Assets) statute 1993⁶⁵⁹ under pressure from Baganda monarchists who asked for the coronation of Prince Ronald Muwanda Mutebi II as Kabaka of Buganda.⁶⁶⁰ The institution of traditional rulers was included in the Odoki Constitution draft under chapter 18, Article 279, and in the final Uganda Constitution of 1995 under article 246 (1) which states:

Subject to the provision of this constitution, the institution of the traditional leaders may exist in any area of Uganda in accordance with the culture, customs and traditions or wishes and aspirations of the people to whom it applies.⁶⁶¹

The Ankole representatives in the NRC, especially the Bairu, were resilient about the monarchy.⁶⁶² The Baganda could have a king but they would oppose the return of Obugabe in Ankole. Hon. Amanywa Mushega's views represented the views of many Bairu NRC members. In a debate about the monarchies in Uganda, he said:

⁶⁵⁷ See the memorandum submitted by the *Ssabataka-Ssabasajja's* Supreme Council and clan leaders, p. 7.

⁶⁵⁸ See *The Constitution of Uganda* (1967), Statute No. 7/ 1993.

⁶⁵⁹ Statute No. 8/ 1993.

⁶⁶⁰ Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa and Hon. Eriya Kategaya. See the newspapers between March-July 1993, especially the *New Vision* and *The Monitor*.

⁶⁶¹ See *The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda*, 1995.

⁶⁶² This refers to the Ankole delegates' view of restoring the monarchy elsewhere.

Although I am a republican, I support the restoration of the monarchy in Buganda provided it will enhance unity and development. And although my support for Buganda is unreserved, I will be talking a different language when it comes to the restoration of the kingdom in Ankole.⁶⁶³

The debate on the Constitutional Amendment Bill 1993 became a controversial issue when the NRC, according to *Weekly Topic* of July 23, 1993:

turned into a tribal war between peoples of former kingdoms of Ankole and Toro. All Bairu from Ankole vehemently opposed the restoration of *ebyaffe* [a coined short hand for the Buganda monarchy]...The outbursts of high profile politicians notably Amanywa Mushega, Adonia Tiberondwa, Richard Kaijuka, Bart Katurebe...against prince John Barigye's *dreams* of becoming the Omugabe of Ankole were clear indicators of the divisions that characterised the relationship between Bairu and Bahima since time immemorial.⁶⁶⁴

7.2. PRINCE JOHN BARIGYE AND THE NRM POLITICS.

Prince John Barigye was the centre figure in the Obugabe controversy in 1993. As the presumed heir to the Ankole monarchy (his father Sir Godfrey Rutahaba Gasyonga died in July 1982), Barigye was installed as Ntare VI in a controversial coronation on Saturday 20 November 1993⁶⁶⁵ annulled by the government the day after.

Barigye was born on 10 January 1940. At the age of six, he went to Buddo Junior School and King's College Buddo (1946-1952). He was later sent to Britain where he completed his secondary education (1953-1959) before joining Cambridge University (1959-1962) for a degree in economics. He returned to Uganda after independence and worked in the ministry of Foreign Affairs (1963) and the Uganda High Commission Embassy in UK as Secretary for Economic and political matters (1964-66). Between 1967-1970, he worked in Uganda in the ministry of Foreign Affairs as Chief of Protocol and Political Development and later permanent Secretary (1970). After Amin's coup in 1971, Barigye was appointed Ambassador to Germany and the Vatican, a post from which he resigned in 1973 in protest after Amin killed

⁶⁶³ See *Weekly Topic*, July 23, 1993, "Prince Barigye battles his 'rebel Bairu' in NRC", P. 26.

⁶⁶⁴ *ibid*, p. 1.

Barigye's brother Patrick Ruhinda in 1972. Between 1973-1982, Barigye was in exile working for various organisations, including the United Nations. From 1983-1985 he was self-employed in Lesotho as a Computer distributor. He did not return to Uganda after the fall of Amin, but only in 1986, after the fall of the UPC regime. He was appointed Managing Director of a private company, Computer Applications Ltd. He returned to Uganda as NRM had come to power. The government offered him a political job either as an ambassador or Permanent Secretary in Foreign Affairs which he turned down:

I had been in exile for almost 13 years and I did not want to return abroad as an ambassador. I wanted to stay in my country and rehabilitate family and myself. I was not keen to be Permanent Secretary either because that was an office I held before in 1970. To be back at the same rank was not feasible for me.⁶⁶⁶

Asked whether he would have accepted a ministerial appointment, he said 'mostly likely I would have accepted it or some other senior post, which would have kept me in the country'. Why he was not offered such a post is not known but most interviewees imply that the government wanted to keep him out of Ugandan politics by appointing him an ambassador. Despite Barigye's long experience as a Civil Servant and moreover a Prince, Museveni's government could not appoint him to a senior job in 1986. At such an early stage, NRM was rewarding its supporters and Barigye had not been a guerrilla.

However, his career in the NRM was revived in 1989 when he won the Kashari county seat in the NRC, standing against Mutabazi, a regional Agricultural Officer and former UPC. In theory there was no party vote though people tended to vote according to their former party identities. In Bushenyi for instance, in the 1989 NRC elections nearly all the NRC representatives like Tiberondwa, Kanyomozi, Kaijuka were former UPC MPs and ministers in the Obote government. Barigye won the Kashari seat because the former UPC Kashari MPs, Rubaihayo and Kabogorwa, had been tarnished by Science/Syndicate divisions and Rubaihayo's involvement in the Banyarwanda expulsion in the 1980's. Barigye had not lived in Ankole, but he

⁶⁶⁵ Interview: James Kahigiriza, Canon Semei Rwabushaija, Bishop Betungura and Sheikh Kaduyu.

was the son of the former king of Ankole, so those who had never seen him had heard about him. He seemed appropriate:

We thought that as a person who had not lived among us, he would be neutral. Kashari people had diverse political and religious views and therefore we needed a person who was not one of us. He had not lived among us and therefore had not been tarnished by our politics.⁶⁶⁷

If Barigye's impartiality became a ticket on which he was elected, it became a different story in 1992 when he stood for the RC5 chairmanship for Mbarara district. Local district councils were to be autonomous and responsible for their own development plans. To be the RC5 chairman in the district meant that he would be both the accounting officer and ultimate administrator. This attracted him to stand for the position. According to the law, he need not resign his position as NRC representative. He said:

Many people from Ankole requested me to stand to be the Mbarara RC5 chairman because they trusted me. Mbarara district had been messed up with corruption and that was why people asked me. It was people who approached me because they had confidence in me due to the corruption and malpractices that were apparent in Mbarara at the time.

The two contending candidates were both Bahima, Barigye vs. Sabiiti, two impeccable Protestants and very much part of the elite of Protestantism in different ways. Barigye was of the royal family which obviously was Protestant and Sabiiti was the son of the former Anglican Archbishop Eric Sabiiti. However, it was not this factor that amazed people but rather the fact that Sabiiti beat Barigye in the elections on 9 March 1992. Sabiiti had aligned with Catholic councillors giving in to their demands for certain posts on the RC5 executive.⁶⁶⁸ Asked why he lost to Sabiiti, Barigye said:

⁶⁶⁶ Interview: Prince John Barigye, March 12, 1998, Kampala.

⁶⁶⁷ Interview: George Baruga, February 23, 1998, Karuyenje-Kashari.

⁶⁶⁸ See "Mbarara rejects crown prince, Barigye", in the *Weekly Topic*, March 20, 1992, p. 12.

My honest view is I lost because my opponent used money to buy votes. Prior to the election day his group went around buying people to vote for them.⁶⁶⁹

Many interviewees agreed that Sabiiti used money and religion to win votes. The chairman was not elected by universal suffrage. An Electoral College of eighty District RC5 councillors from the 40 sub-counties in Mbarara district voted on behalf of the district. The system was that they would line behind the candidates of their choice, which made it very easy for councillors to be bribed. Barigye says:

Two days before the elections, a group of Catholic councillors approached both me and my opponent separately and asked us what if I won and were elected, how many Catholic councillors would be put on the RC5 executive. Because of my belief in fairness, I gave them a formula, which would have ensured that every religious group would be fairly represented proportionate to their strength. But in the case of my opponent, he told them that his only interest was to be elected chairman and they could take as many executive offices as they wanted as long as they ensured his victory. So in block Catholics voted for him and that was how I lost.

Asked why he did not accept Catholic demands Barigye said:

I do not believe in the end justifying the means. I believe that if you use the wrong means eventually they are bound to distort and corrupt your end. It is wrong that for one to achieve a political goal, you must use every means possible. I believe that in everything that one does, he must be guided by some principles, which are important in one's ultimate goal.

NRM government had attracted Catholics because UPC Protestants were held at arms-length by the new regime. Catholics and Bahima dominated the District Council and the District Administrator was Sarapio Karashani, an ardent Catholic who promoted Catholic interests.⁶⁷⁰ Though Sabiiti was Protestant, he rewarded Catholics for their support. Though the Councillors below seem to be equally distributed between Catholics and Protestants, the Catholics' strength lies in the fact that they took the influential offices:

⁶⁶⁹ Interview: John Barigye, February 23, 1998, Kampala.

⁶⁷⁰ Interviewee anonymous, March 19, 1997.

Table 11: Membership of Councillors in the District Council, 1992.⁶⁷¹

NAME	RELIGION	OFFICE
Sabiiti Justine	Protestant	Chairman
Zombeire Frederick	Catholic	Vice Chairman
Kagombe Charles	Catholic	Secretary for Finance
Nyakwenegura Grace	Catholic	Secretary for Women
Kashundo	Catholic	Secretary for Security
Gucwamaingi Yoramu	Protestant	Secretary for Education
Katafire John	Protestant	Secretary, Mobilisation
Katwire	Protestant	Secretary for Youth
Muvure	Muslim	Secretary, Information

Sabiiti may have bribed some of them, but there were eighty councillors in forty sub-counties who substituted for the electorate. Barigye's defeat showed the fear that if he were elected RC5 chairman, he might go on to the monarchy and many Banyankole did not wish him put in a favourable position.

7.3. WHY MUSEVENI SUPPORTED THE BUGANDA MONARCHY.

On 31 July 1993, Ssabasajja Mutebi was crowned Kabaka of Buganda.⁶⁷² Other kingdoms soon followed. Prince Kaboyo of Toro was crowned Solomon Iguru of Bunyoro on 11 June 1994, and Wako Mulozi of Busoga in January 1996. Museveni thought that it was better to recreate all the kingdoms because he did not wish Buganda to stand alone. But he would not give similar support to the Ankole monarchy, because, while popular enthusiasm in other kingdom areas had made the issue a political vote catcher, the Ankole case would be politically counter productive in the run up to the CA elections (1994) and the presidential elections in 1996.

⁶⁷¹ Interview: Y. Guwamaingi, February 22, 1998.

Why were the monarchies restored? Was government morally obliged to "repay" Buganda's "debts" during the guerrilla war as often alleged in the press? The five-year guerrilla war was fought in Luwero District on Buganda's soil and the Baganda suffered most.⁶⁷³ Indeed the events after the liberation war point towards that understanding. The first signal was the return to Uganda from UK of prince Ronald Mutebi supported by the NRM government. There were monarchists like Ssabalangira Besweri Mulondo in the NRM who played a pivotal role. Political negotiators in Buganda were ready to support NRM if only they were assured that the restoration of their Kabaka (whom they now referred to as *Ebyaffe*) would be a priority.⁶⁷⁴ Some of the praise songs sung in honour of Museveni at the coronation implied that the NRM had finally settled the Baganda debt:

Ssebo Museveni ossassude byonna. Teri bbanja.⁶⁷⁵ (Museveni you have paid all. There is no more debt).

This was a clear indication that the monarchy question had remained a major issue on the political agenda ever since the 1966 crisis. In any case the Baganda, unlike the monarchists in Ankole, had never hidden their disenchantment over this issue and no government would appease them fully without addressing the monarchy question. Thus they saw Museveni as a man who would listen to them since they had fought with him against Obote. But in Ankole, the Bahima monarchists knew that they were a minority. Probably they hoped to achieve a restoration with the help of Muhima President and Bahima army officers.

⁶⁷² See the National and local newspapers of 1st. August 1993.

⁶⁷³ Olaka-Onyango, "Thirty Years After the (B) Uganda Crisis: Are we heading for another?", A Paper presented at the Annual Faculty of Law Symposium, Makerere University, Kampala, 26 April 1996, p. 6.

⁶⁷⁴ M. Doornbos and F. Mwesigye, 1994, "The New Politics of King Making", in Hansen and Michael Twaddle, *From Chaos to Order. The Politics of Constitution-Making in Uganda*, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, p. 62.

⁶⁷⁵ See *The New Vision*, 1 August 1993.

7.4. NKOLE CULTURAL TRUST (NCT).

The idea of forming a cultural trust came to James Kahigiriza when he compared Ankole culture with Buganda. Some of Ankole's symbols had been taken to the Uganda Museum in 1967 but they could be returned. In 1992, he and the District Administrator (Mbarara) convened a meeting with others including Bishop Betungura, Kirindi, and others. This committee asked the president for permission to return Ankole's cultural symbols.⁶⁷⁶ In January 1993, they met the President who agreed but suggested they form a cultural trust in which they should include Prince John Barigye since the cultural symbols were from the Ankole monarchy.

On 27 January 1993, the Nkore Cultural Trust (NCT) Constitution was inaugurated with Barigye as its patron. It comprised of 15 Bahima and 13 Bairu. 22 were Protestants, 1 Catholic, and 3 Muslims. I am unaware of the religious affiliation of two.⁶⁷⁷ The interesting thing about NCT membership was that nearly all the 28 members were above 65 years old (apart from Barigye). These were the people who had the time and the interest to value their culture while the younger generation was not interested. The NCT constitution stipulated Barigye as the patron of the Trust:

The fact that most of the important traditional sites, Relics and Regalia were made and belonged to his forefathers, the kings of Ankole and therefore rightly should belong to him, as the heir of the last king of Nkore.⁶⁷⁸

The constitution stipulates that membership of the Trust is open to all Banyankole. Those that formed NCT were from different backgrounds, but all wanted the revival of Ankole culture. However if we consider the period 1992-1993 in which NCT was formed, then we raise questions as to whether it was not a ploy by people like Barigye and other monarchists to get a platform on which to push for the restoration of the monarchy. Asked what groups formed NCT, Barigye said:

⁶⁷⁶ James Kahigiriza narrated this plot to me, February 6, 1998.

⁶⁷⁷ Many of them are known to me personally and that was how I could determine their ethnic and religious composition.

⁶⁷⁸ See NCT constitution, Article III, 3.1.(c).

...in short all those interested in the preservation and development of Ankole Culture and who believe in the Ankole monarchy as the integral part of our culture.⁶⁷⁹

NCT did not only attract people like Bahima who had close links with the former monarchy, it was also composed of people like Bishop Betungura and James Kahigiriza, who, though Bairu, valued the monarchy. The choice of James Kahigiriza and the retired Bishop Amos Betungura was a political ruse to give NCT a good ethnic complexion and therefore to legitimise the NCT monarchical or "cultural" agenda. Kahigiriza was regarded as associating more with Bahima and therefore the monarchy than with Bairu. The latter regard him and Amos Betungura as turn-coats.⁶⁸⁰

However by July 1993, NCT changed from being a cultural group to a monarchical pressure group, pushing for the restoration of the monarchy in Ankole. James Kahigiriza felt that after Buganda's success, they should 'ask for our monarchy also'. Indeed Barigye started to fight for the restoration of the Ankole monarchy. In *Weekly Topic* of July 23, 1993, he was reported battling it out with Bairu in the NRC when they called for a referendum on the Obugabe. The paper reported:

Round one of the constitutional amendment was fought and won in Buganda but later shifted to Ankole where Kashari representative, prince John Barigye (heir to the throne) battled with his "rebel Bairu" subjects in the NRC who had made it very clear to him that they are not prepared to support anything near to the monarchy in Ankole.⁶⁸¹

Since NCT had identified itself as a monarchical pressure group, some of its members like Omwana W'omuntu who had been its Secretary opted out. He had suspected NCT from the beginning. He said:

⁶⁷⁹ Interview: Barigye, March 12, 1998, Kampala.

⁶⁸⁰ Interview anonymous, June 19, 1997.

⁶⁸¹ *Weekly Topic*, newspaper, July 23, 1993, p. 26.

After we would meet thinking that we all had common interest of reviving our culture, and after we would adjourn our meetings, Bahima and James Kahigiriza would stay behind and start new meetings in which they did not want us to be involved, and of which agenda and destiny we did not know.⁶⁸²

So promoting Banyankole culture was a launching pad for the restoration of Obugabe. Barigye was the chief campaigner of the monarchy and in July 1993, he led a foiled attempt to recover the Royal Drum, Bagyendanwa, from the Uganda Museum. He claimed that he wanted to regain the drums because they were a cultural artefact.⁶⁸³ But the government⁶⁸⁴ could not take his action lightly because Bagyendanwa is fundamental regalia in the coronation of Omugabe, without which the whole ceremony lacks legitimacy.

NCT at the beginning of August 1993 invited religious leaders and members of the western region Joint Christian Council to a meeting at the Catholic Social Centre in Mbarara. They wanted to enlist the support of religious leaders, but church leaders dissociated themselves from the monarchy. Members of the Joint Christian Council told the bishops, *kumurazeyo mugumeyo* (if you identify with monarchists stay with them).⁶⁸⁵ Republican Banyankole both Catholics and Protestants dominated the council.

Following these failures, the President convened a meeting between the NCT and NRC members from Mbarara and Bushenyi on 23 August 1993 and urged the need to seek the people's mandate before any further moves towards a restoration of the monarchy.⁶⁸⁶ Subjecting the Obugabe issue in Ankole to a referendum, the government capitalised on the Constitutional Commission Report which held that despite Buganda's support for the monarchy, things were different in Ankole. President Museveni would only support the restoration of traditional rulers where

⁶⁸² Interview: Omwana W'omuntu, July 21, 1997, Mbarara. He defected from the NCT because the Bahima used to by-pass him and hold meetings which were geared towards the restoration of the monarchy but which they did not want to discuss with him because he was Omwiru. They thought that he would leak their information that was very vital at those initial beginnings of the group.

⁶⁸³ See "Barigye demands drums", in *The New Vision*, Saturday July 10, 1993.

⁶⁸⁴ This could have been really a deliberate sabotage by government for reasons already given.

⁶⁸⁵ Interview with Bishop Bakyenga, May 12, 1996, Nyamitanga.

⁶⁸⁶ See Statement by Nkole Cultural Trust signed by their Legal Advisor, R. Matsiko on 25. 11. 1993; see also, *Orumuri*, 25-31 October 1993, p. 4.

people showed overwhelming support for it. Hence his emphasis on the need to consult people of Ankole:

The role of the government as far as the issue of monarchies is concerned, is to implement what the majority of the people want because a monarchy comes from the people, not government.⁶⁸⁷

The referendum was a political move to prevent the restoration of the unpopular monarchy. The President was backed by the Constitutional provision that the institution of a traditional ruler could only exist in areas where "people so wish".⁶⁸⁸ Museveni knowing the complexities that kingship would provoke in Ankole wisely put the referendum puzzle to the monarchists. The government was sure that it would be a big task to consult the people through the RC structure. NCT opposed the idea of a referendum on the moral grounds that Obote had no referendum before he abolished the kingdoms in 1967 and there was no need for one now.⁶⁸⁹ Barigye claimed, "you can never hold a referendum to know whether one wants his culture".⁶⁹⁰ Hence NCT tried to open branches and held seminars in several counties though there was resistance in the densely populated Bairu areas.⁶⁹¹

Spearheading the restoration campaign was crown Prince Barigye, the claimant to the throne. By engaging in the Obugabe campaign and canvassing for support, Barigye weakened his position. By tradition, Omugabe did not campaign for his "cultural right." *Weekly Topic* of August 20, 1993 reported him trying to arouse people in one of the seminars he held in Kampala when he asked them, "Are you with me?" According to the paper, "the reply was a resounding Yes!" In an undertone Barigye commented, "I hope they have heard", referring to all those who were opposed to the monarchy especially in the NRC. Barigye had earlier contested the

⁶⁸⁷ See "Museveni advises Ankole Monarchists", in *The new Vision*, 2 October 1997, pp. 1-2; and "I am no Yes man, says Museveni", in *The Monitor*, 2 October 1997, pp. 1-2.

⁶⁸⁸ See Article 118 of the constitution (amendment), Statute 1993.

⁶⁸⁹ See 'Tindikwesimba ahabwa CA - Barigye', in the Weekly Newspaper, *Orumuri*, 23-29 August 1993, p. 16.

⁶⁹⁰ See *Weekly Topic*, 20 August 1993, p. 4; See also *The New Vision*, "Barigye Rules out referendum", Friday August, 13, 1993.

⁶⁹¹ See for example *The New Vision*, Thursday September 23, 1993, "Igara Rejects Barigye", p. 1.

Kashari county NRC seat (which he won), and the Mbarara District RC5 Chairmanship (which he lost to Justin Sabiiti). But as traditional ruler, he was supposed to be apolitical. To create his public image through competing with his subjects compromised his position. He had made enemies in the campaigns, and this was counter-productive when the monarchy issue came up.

Had Barigye followed the example of the Kabaka in not interfering he might have won sympathisers. The Kabaka of Buganda simply let the thing naturally bubble up, but of course Barigye could not afford that because it would never bubble up under any circumstances. But by campaigning for himself he served to alienate himself further from the people and the government. It put to question the declared objectives of the NCT: activating clan activities, teaching custom, enhancing research and making of handicraft.⁶⁹² The "cultural agenda" was simply a cover for the restoration of kingship. The Trust was seen as a minority monarchist agency, and in areas like Kajara, Igara and Sheema, NCT members were booed and chased away.⁶⁹³

Barigye also was the victim of a hostile press.⁶⁹⁴ It alleged that he was UPC in the sixties and during the NRC campaigns in the 1989, he associated with UPC supporters like Dr. Adonia Tiberondwa.⁶⁹⁵ This association with UPC created a negative image for him, for the 1990s were a period when UPC was pitted against NRM. The general mood in Ankole was pro-NRM and Barigye's contacts with UPC, which had a tainted record of human rights abuse in Ankole politics, served to isolate him. But Tiberondwa and Rurangaranga, both UPC, deny Barigye's connection with UPC. They said, unlike some Bahima, Barigye makes friends without considering ethnic or political alliances. Barigye said:

⁶⁹² See NCT constitution Article II, pp. 1-2.

⁶⁹³ Interview: Bishop Amos Betungura, April 10, 1996, Ruharo.

⁶⁹⁴ This was largely a press taunt.

⁶⁹⁵ For instance Barigye was the Guest of Honour during a Fund raising function at a Primary School in Bushenyi District in January 1992 and he later spent a night at Dr. Adonia Tiberondwa's residence where he is reported to have met several UPC activists. See, Henry Tumwine, *The New Vision*, 24 February 1992.

I have never had UPC sympathies or for that matter antipathy. It was true that I conducted a fund-raising in Bushenyi. But the local people of the area through their MP Dr. Adonia Tiberondwa invited me. He invited me to spend a night at his place from where we proceeded to the fund-raising the next morning. Tiberondwa is purely a friend because both of us were in exile together in Zambia. But by identifying me with UPC they were only after smearing my name.⁶⁹⁶

His education accounted for this. As an intellectual, educated at Cambridge, he was above Bahima chauvinism. He had refused to be bribed to win the Mbarara RC5 elections in 1992. Perhaps that is why Bairu Catholics opposed his attempts to popularise the revival of the monarchy.

NCT tried to hide the coronation details but in an article entitled, "Barigye to be Ntare VI", *New Vision* revealed that the coronation committee was already instituted to organise the celebrations.⁶⁹⁷ The paper's speculation helped the government, the church leaders and Ankole elders opposed to the coronation to keep aloof of the occasion. It seems to me that NCT had been working up in the last hour trying to coax support from the seemingly unimpressed Banyankole. NCT was still holding meetings even on the eve of the coronation. But the coronation was not to be spectacular. The only visible symbols were the canvas shades NCT put up on the early morning of 20 November 1993. They were not in a position to proclaim the restoration of the monarchy, so they did it by subterfuge.

NCT leaders and members of the executive committees of branches of NCT covering the whole of Ankole met on 19 November 1993 and passed the proclamation to crown prince Barigye, as the heir of the late Omugabe of Ankole, Sir Charles Godfrey Gasyonga and Omugabe of Ankole, to be known as Rubambansi (His majesty) Ntare VI of Ankole. They asked the Board of Trustees of the Nkore Cultural Trust to make immediate arrangements for the installation and coronation of Omugabe Ntare VI.⁶⁹⁸

However, Barigye's coronation was also beset by claims that he was a usurper. His father Gasyonga was not a bona-fide heir. The Rev. William Muchakumba Mirindi, who claims to be the son of the late Prince Absolom Mirindi

⁶⁹⁶ Interview: John Barigye, February 12, 1998, Kampala.

⁶⁹⁷ See *The New Vision*, Monday, October 4, 1993; See also "Barigye takes the Ankole Monarchy tomorrow", in the *Weekly Topic*, November 26, 1996, 3, p. 22.

and grandson of Kahaya II, alleges that Barigye has no claim because his father, Gasyonga II, was not a son of Kahaya II.⁶⁹⁹ There were those internal divisions among the monarchists. But these were likely to be underplayed had NCT succeeded in convincing Banyankole to accept the monarchy.

7.5. THE BANYANKOLE CULTURAL FOUNDATION (BCF).

The activities of the Nkole Cultural Trust provoked a majority rejection of the restoration of the monarchy. One major expression of this reaction was the founding of the Banyankole Cultural Foundation (BCF) in July 1993. Its legal advisor, Dr. J. J. Barya, claimed it is a republican organisation, founded among other things to, 'oppose the restoration of the Ankole monarchy'.⁷⁰⁰ The Foundation drew its support from the educated urban elite but also relied heavily on the large Bairu membership. The composition of BCF seemed to revive the Kumanyana movement. Though its leaders were recent graduates their actions and philosophy reflect the writings and history of the Kumanyana movement. They were the intellectuals who had been largely through Protestant schools and like the Kumanyana of the old with a Catholic component (for instance Asiimwe).

The BCF argued that much of greater Ankole did not have a tradition of monarchy.⁷⁰¹ It was imposed on them when they were annexed to Nkore. It also argued that culture is not synonymous with the monarchy, stressing that Kinyankole culture could flourish without having the Obugabe. There can be culture without kingship. The BCF drawing support from radical Bairu intellectuals at Makerere University used the favourable press and public debates to discredit the NCT:

⁶⁹⁸ See, Statement by Nkore Cultural Trust.

⁶⁹⁹ Rev. Mirindi made these claims in the local media on several occasions. See for instance *The Monitor*, 23 December 1993, p. 18.

⁷⁰⁰ See, J.J. Barya, "The Ankole Monarchy Controversy: Testing Democratisation and Cultural Revivalism", A paper presented at the NARRU General Assembly, Kabale, 27-28, February 1997.

⁷⁰¹ Interview: Mwambutsya-Ndebesa, May 15, 1996, Makerere University.

We are very disappointed in that notwithstanding the fact that God used Moses to deliver his children from slavery in Egypt, much as he used Obote to remove the Obugabe that had submerged us for a long time, opportunists under the cover of NCT, in their bid to fill their stomachs want us to carry their burden again, something very sad indeed.⁷⁰²

Consequently, the ambiguities surrounding the restoration caused a debate as to whether culture and kingship can be considered synonymous. Pro-restoration argued that kingship was the essence of Nkore culture and that its restoration was vital. BCF argued there was no relation between kingship and culture, citing the example of the French culture that kept thriving even though the monarchy was terminated.⁷⁰³ Honourable Eriya Kategaya while responding to a motion from Hon. Elly Karuhanga who had argued that if the Omugabe was installed in Ankole he would provide a central power, refuted the argument:

We do not need a central power through monarchism because power is already there through the RCs.⁷⁰⁴

Monarchism in Ankole revived centuries of oppression and domination by the Bahima over the Bairu. Many still see kingship as a sign of past ethnic subordination to be resisted.⁷⁰⁵ BCF used all this in its opposition to restoring what it considered an obsolete kingdom which had enhanced the position of the Bahima and encouraged the exploitation of Bairu.⁷⁰⁶

the Bairu tilling the land and carrying their excess loads of produce to the Bahima pastoralists to barter for milk, ghee, skins or a bull, usually in quantities that were not proportionally commensurate.⁷⁰⁷

⁷⁰² See *Orumuri*, 6-12 September 1993.

⁷⁰³ See "Kategaya blasts Barigye" in *The New Vision*, Friday October 1993, during the Karugire Memorial Lecture at Makerere University, 14 October 1993.

⁷⁰⁴ *ibid.*

⁷⁰⁵ See *The Monitor*, 3 September 1993, p. 3

⁷⁰⁶ See Barya J. J., *op. cit.*

⁷⁰⁷ For a detailed Study, see Ndebesa Mwambutsya, "Pre-Capitalist Social Formation: The Case of Banyankole of south-western Uganda", in Owen J. Kalinga (ed.), *East African Social Science Research Review*, Rome: OSSREA, January 1990, pp. 80ff.

BCF harped on the past misdeeds of the king towards his Bairu subjects:

In the Ankole kingdom lived and still lives two ethnic groups - the Bairu and Bahima. The Bahima constitute 6 to 10 percent of the population. The Bahima were pastoralists. The Bairu were agriculturists and occupied a lower status in the pre-colonial social relations of Ankole...These relations were compounded by colonial rule. In allocating chiefly posts, the Bahima took the lion's share. In 1901, when the British made an agreement with Ankole monarchy, out of ten county chiefly posts, only one was given to the Bairu.⁷⁰⁸

BCF accused the past kings of forced labour and unfair taxation policies exacted on the Bairu. During the colonial period, it was the Bairu who were made to do all the hard work of digging and grading roads, building bridges and clearing swamps. Bahima as chiefs lorded it over the Bairu.⁷⁰⁹ These historical differences still carry a class division which has aggravated problems of ethnic integration. And this is what distinguishes the Ankole monarchy from Buganda monarchy. The latter has remained popular because of its embracing mechanisms, which unite the Baganda. For example, whereas commoners in Buganda have a patrilineal system, their princes have a matrilineal system which is not the case in Ankole. In Buganda a king takes the clan of his mother which ensures that every clan has a chance of producing a king. This makes him the king of all clans and therefore each clan has a special role regarding the king.

⁷⁰⁸ Mwambutsya-Ndebesa, "Kingship and political Development in Uganda", a paper presented at Makerere University, 22 April 1994.

⁷⁰⁹ See Asiimwe-Berinde G, *Orumuri*, 30 August 1993, p. 6.

7.6. THE ISLAMIC CORONATION.

The Nkole Cultural Trust attempted the coronation of Prince John Barigye on 20 November 1993, at the Abagabe burial grounds in Nkokonjeru, Mbarara. It was disguised as a memorial function installing Barigye as heir to his father (*Omusika*). Kahigiriza says:

We had to do it that way because most institutions were against us. The government, people, police. So we had no other way out. Of course it would have been better if the occasion was officially honoured, but you have to play politics as it comes.⁷¹⁰

Barigye was crowned with traditional ritual, which the church in Ankole would regard as pagan. Dressed in bark cloth, Barigye emerged from a traditional grass thatched hut to be installed on his father's throne, placed near a stuffed lion to symbolise the strength and shrewdness with which he was to rule.⁷¹¹ He was made to drink from the royal gourd, *endeku*, smoked the royal pipe and received an arrow and a bow 'to fight off his enemies and to defend the royal drum'. He also sowed a few seeds of millet, a traditional Bairu crop, to symbolise the ethnic inclusiveness of his kingdom and received a royal axe, traditionally nicknamed, *Kaitabagomi*, which was used to hack off the king's opponents' heads. And after sitting on the throne and swearing to lead his people in truth and honest, he signed the oath with the new signature reading Ntare VI.⁷¹² The Omugabe was crowned at the burial grounds *Igashani*, which in traditional Ankole was where the spirits of the kingship was supposed to abide. This was incompatible with the teaching of the church, which for many years has preached against spirit worship.⁷¹³

There was a further religious factor in the coronation saga. A Muslim, Sheikh A. Kaduyu, the District Khadi of Mbarara, performed the ceremony in the presence of Canon John Rujoki, a Muhima, and archdeacon of Rushere, in Nyabushozi county.

⁷¹⁰ Interview: James Kahigiriza, March 12, 1998, Mbarara.

⁷¹¹ Interview: Sezi Busasi, June 12, 1997, Nkokonjeru.

⁷¹² See *The New Vision* 22 November 1993, p. 2.

⁷¹³ Presumably also not the usual place in any case: it was not only offensive to the tradition of kings

That a Muslim crowned a Protestant king became a controversial issue. But Sheikh Kaduyu was a member of the NCT and had participated in the meetings that decided on the coronation, from which the Christian Bishops had distanced themselves. I suppose that Kaduyu took the occasion to raise the profile of Islam in the politics of Ankole. But as Kahigiriza confessed, the decision to ask Kaduyu to crown the king 'was a last resort because we did not have any other Bishop around.' Though Bishop Betungura may have been present, he could not officiate because he was already retired. If Betungura had crowned Barigye, it would have been seen as an attempt to repossess his Bishop's authority. The decision to use Kaduyu may have been on the spur of the moment.

Kaduyu's action could have been intended to cultivate a new link with the Muslims and the Bahima. It was the first time that Muslims in Ankole participated in the affairs of the Ankole monarchy. Kaduyu hails from the Protestant Bairu county of Igara, but Islam linked him with Baganda culture. Many Muslims in Ankole hail from Buganda and as Baganda they would be expected to be predisposed in favour of the monarchy. Kaduyu said:

Before I participated in the occasion, I had to seek the consent of some of my elders in Islam. Since many of them are Baganda, I knew that they would support the monarchy and therefore I had no fear of any opposition from them. But had I been a Christian bishop, I would not have even bothered to seek their opinion for they would not have given it.⁷¹⁴

The Anglican Bishop, Elisha Kyamugambi, did not officiate or even be present at the coronation because 'I had sensed that the coronation had no government blessing.'⁷¹⁵ Apparently his invitation letter stressed the memorial service. But because of the earlier media speculations, the Bishop did not attend. Importantly, he was a new Bishop just one year in office and would have started badly if he were to identify with what the government and the majority of Banyankole opposed.⁷¹⁶ Bishop Yoramu

crowned in Isingiro, it also underlied the 'hole in the corner' nature of the whole ceremony.

⁷¹⁴ Interview: Sheikh Kaduyu July 9, 1996, Mbarara.

⁷¹⁵ Interview: Bishop Kyamugambi, September 17, 1996, Ruharo-Mbarara.

⁷¹⁶ Interview: Bishop Betungura, April 10, 1996, Ruharo.

Bamunoba of West Ankole could not officiate because he belonged to another diocese and needed special permission and invitation from the host diocese. Bishop Bamunoba said:

We were invited on a general letter as Bishops. A letter written by a lay man Kirindi and addressed to Bishops, Kyamugambi, Bamunoba and Bakyenga was sent to us. But you see Kirindi had not any right to invite Bishops for a coronation. The invitation to other Bishops should have come from the diocesan Bishop Kyamugambi, not a lay man.⁷¹⁷

Catholics had warned Bishop Bakyenga against any involvement. Under normal circumstances, the monarchists should have preferred even a Catholic Bishop to a Muslim Khadi. For since the history of Christianity and politics in Ankole, Protestant Bahima many of whom are monarchists had forged an alliance with Catholics. But things are changing. With recent NRM politicisation people have shifted away from voting according to ethnic and religious ties. Bahima could have realised that the alliance factor was no longer an issue which they needed to hold on to the Catholic Bairu. On the other hand, Catholics could have woken up to the fact that despite the alliance, it was always Bahima who took over prominent political offices mainly because it was they who had the necessary political experience. Thus when the monarchy issue surfaced again, Catholics realised that they had never gained much whether from Bairu Protestants or Bahima.

Whether or not the Muslim should have crowned a Protestant king, the function was performed. Applause and ululation punctuated the king's speech. *New Vision* of November 22, 1993, reported that, in a moving speech, the king of Ankole abolished forthwith the use of the words, "Bairu" and "Bahima" because they had outlived their usefulness and were dividing people. Barigye said, 'today we all have cows and also cultivate'. Among other people who spoke was Elly Karuhanga, the NRC member for Nyabushozi who, though happy that Barigye had become a king, regretted the fact that he was no longer a NRC member. On the very day Barigye was crowned he signed his resignation to the NRC Vice Chairman:

⁷¹⁷ Interview: Bishop Bamunoba, April 11, 1996, Kyamugorani.

On my being installed and proclaimed today as Ntare VI Omugabe of Ankole, I wish to hereby tender my resignation as NRC member for Kashari county with effect from today.⁷¹⁸

The NCT chairman's speech outlined the history of the Ankole monarchy since its first king Ruhinda 500 years ago. To impress the occasion upon the audience and to belittle the opposition from the government and Banyankole, Kahigiriza went on to justify how inclusive the former monarchy had been. He explained how Bairu had been part of the monarchy because the mother of Ruhinda, the first king of Ankole, was a Mwiru woman, Njunaki, from the Bayangwe clan:

Obugabe bwa Nkole niburuga enyima emyaka 500. Bukatandika na Ruhinda. Ishe akaba ari omucwezi Wamala yamuzara aha muzana Njunaki, (The monarchy of Ankole is 500 years old. It started with Ruhinda whose father Wamala was from the Bachwezi dynasty. Wamala produced Ruhinda from Njunaki, a Mwiru woman).⁷¹⁹

Most interviewees were doubtful of this lineage. They felt that he was only trying to find ground to prove that the monarchy was not just for Bahima. Kahigiriza's speech claimed Bairu involvement in the politics of Ankole during the monarchy. For instance it states that of the eight known Ankole Enganzi, six were Bairu. But four of these were Enganzi during the colonial period and especially after the emergence of Kumanyana movement from the late forties. The other two whom Kahigiriza alleges were Bairu are Mbaguta and Muhigo whom he lists as the first Enganzi of Ankole.⁷²⁰ Muhigo is unknown as far as Bairu are concerned. Mbaguta was not a Mwiru. Bahima only regarded him so because he was an impartial leader who helped the Bairu and because he was an outsider from Mpororo.

The speech was inappropriate for the occasion. One might have expected a reconciliatory speech in which the chairman outlined a new agenda for the monarchy. I say a new programme for the monarchy because one of the arguments against its

⁷¹⁸ See the *New Vision*, Friday, December 17, 1993, p. 2.

⁷¹⁹ See Okugamba Kwa Chairman Nkore Cultural Trust kandi Enganzi y'Ankole, ahaizooba ryokuta Omwinginya John Patrick Barigye ahakiteebe kya Ishe nkomuhunguzi kandi Omugabe W'Ankole Ntare VI Rutashajuka ahakya 20-11-1993, p. 1, (NCT Chairman's speech on the coronation of John Patrick Barigye as heir and King of Ankole on 20-11-1993.

restoration was that it was a waste of resources. Instead Kahigiriza accused two influential Bairu counties of Igara and Sheema of having helped to abolish the monarchy in 1967. Attacking their MPs, Adonia Tiberondwa and Richard Kaijuka in particular, the NCT chairman said:

Abantu aba bakaba bahikire kuhakanisa ekintu ky'Obugabe ahakuba nibo bashangirwe babwihireho. Nimumanya ngu okushenya nikirahuka kwonka okwombeka kugumire.⁷²¹ (These people were right to oppose the restoration of the monarchy for it was they who had abolished it in 1967. You know it is easy to destroy though it is not as easy to restore).

These MPs in particular were not prominent in national politics in 1960s but were Bairu who opposed its restoration in the 1990s.⁷²²

The irony of the Islamic coronation was that, after the king was crowned, instead of going to the mosque for a final blessing, NCT took him to the Anglican cathedral. This watered down Kaduyu's expectations of an Islamic profile among the Protestant Bahima. Apparently the monarchists wanted to hold the service at the traditional burial ground of the kings. But the Dean of the Anglican cathedral refused to conduct a memorial service at the tombs because Gasyonga II, Barigye's father, had been a devout Christian whose memorial service deserved a more honourable venue than the tombs. He suggested that the organisers of the "memorial service" go to the cathedral or to the former Omugabe's house at Nkokonjeru.⁷²³ Retired Bishop Betungura failed to persuade the Dean. Canon Rwabushaija described the dramatic scene that followed. He had prepared for a memorial service:

At around 11 O'clock when the service was due to start, heaven opened its doors. We saw horses and chariots leading the king to the cathedral. I needed to think fast for I guessed they had planned to surprise me and catch me unawares. I could not believe what my eyes saw at the cathedral entrance.

⁷²⁰ *ibid*, p. 2.

⁷²¹ *ibid*, p. 1.

⁷²² See "Igara rejects Barigye", in the *New Vision*, Thursday September 23, 1993.

⁷²³ Interview: Canon S. Rwabushaija, July 10, 1996, Ruharo.

Barigye was dressed exactly as the king Rubambansi of Ankole. Eyes from either side were turned on to me to see what I would do next.⁷²⁴

Bishop Kyamugambi had said he had flu,⁷²⁵ and had delegated the service to the Dean. The presence of a Bishop might have signified the Church's approval and hence conflict with the government. The former Omugabe's chair, on which he used to sit whenever he attended church, had been removed in 1967 and taken to the Museum. The monarchists asked the Dean to show them where the King was to sit. They wanted a special Chair at that spot. But the Dean sat Barigye on the Bishop's unofficial Chair. It was a memorial service, so the Dean amidst a packed cathedral of Bahima and monarchists said it was a memorial to Barigye's father, whom "Ankole still remembers for his ardent and exemplary leadership and commitment to the Christian values".⁷²⁶ In his sermon and prayers, he avoided any word related to Omugabe but stressed Gasyonga's role in Ankole and urged Barigye whom he constantly referred to as *mwana we* to emulate his father's example. The *mwana we* (my child) is a demeaning expression which was meant to humble the self-exalted king and to emphasise the fact that, though Barigye had been crowned, the church had no hand in it. The Dean's refusal to recognise Barigye as king did not carry any ethnic connotations. Canon Rwabushaija is known and respected by both ethnic groups for his impartiality and has never been implicated in Ankole's differences. Canon Njunwoha described him:

It is hard to know where he belongs. You will never know whether he hates you or loves you. He keeps you at a distance. I guess this has helped him to be seen as impartial for both sides respect him and always go to him whenever they have disputes.⁷²⁷

⁷²⁴ *ibid.*

⁷²⁵ The Bishop knew about the coronation before hand, so the flu could have been a real relief and at best a divine providence.

⁷²⁶ *ibid.*

⁷²⁷ Interview: Canon Njunwoha, March 11, 1996, Bujaga.

The Dean was prudent since the restoration of kingship was controversial. Bishop Kyamugambi said:

I had already sent my feelers, which warned me that the government was not in for it. And where voices conflicted, I had to listen to the government rather than the monarchists for when I was consecrated I vowed to respect and obey the Head of state and the Archbishop.⁷²⁸

The majority of Christians were opposed to the "Islamic coronation". As far as they were concerned, it was not spiritually blessed, because all Abagabe (kings) of Ankole were Protestants. A king could only be crowned by a religious leader of the denomination to which he belonged. The crowning of Prince John Barigye by a Muslim Sheikh was an insult to the Christians and the monarchy. Although retired Bishop Amos Betungura grudgingly supported Sheikh Kaduyu's action, because Omugabe was everybody's leader regardless of religious affiliation, he said that if government allowed a real coronation, a Muslim Sheikh should not be allowed to perform the ceremony.⁷²⁹ Bishop Bamunoba said, "we shall first wash the king's head"⁷³⁰ presumably to efface what the Muslims had done.

The second snag was that Sheikh Kaduyu had been a signatory to the memorandum submitted to Amin in August 1971, by Ankole elders rejecting the restoration of monarchies that Obote had abolished in 1967.⁷³¹ He may have signed it under duress but it raises questions about his role in the coronation. Was the Sheikh used by die-hard monarchists to give the coronation a religious face? It is hard to say. But his involvement only served to make the monarchists and Prince Barigye himself less popular. To the Christians, Barigye had crowned himself like Napoleon Bonaparte of France. The Government responded speedily and negatively:

The government has learnt with great surprise that some people last Saturday purportedly carried out the coronation of Prince John Barigye as the Omugabe of Ankole. The Government wishes the public to

⁷²⁸ Interview: Bishop Kyamugambi, July 15, 1996, Mbarara.

⁷²⁹ Interview: Bishop Betungura, April 10, 1996, Ruharo.

⁷³⁰ Interview: Bishop Yoramu Bamunoba, July 18, 1997, Kyamugorani.

⁷³¹ See Chapter two. Cf. M. Doornbos, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

know that it had no advance knowledge or information on this matter and is not a party to the purported coronation.⁷³²

The Ankole RC leaders also disassociated themselves and the entire coronation was discredited.

In August that year, the NCT had held a meeting with the President and other political leaders from Ankole to discuss the monarchy, and the monarchists had been advised to seek people's consensus on the matter. It was clearly politically sensitive and called for a popular mandate which Barigye had rejected three months before the coronation:

I will not accept any referendum for Ankole and I urge you to fight with me for the freedom and unity of Ankole. Banyankole should unite and develop their area.⁷³³

Yet three months later, prince Barigye chose to defy government and his would-be subjects, to crown himself. An exercise that imposed a king on the people and was bound to complicate the politics of Ankole and resurrect intra-ethnic confrontations could only be condemned⁷³⁴ when NRM was seeking a majority in the March 1994 Constituency Assembly elections. The new Parliamentary and presidential elections that would follow the promulgation of a new constitution would give NRM another five-year term of office. Supporting a coronation by a small clique would have been a political blunder costing the Bairu vote. In the elections that followed Banyankole voted *en masse* for the NRM and the multi-party threat subsided.

The secrecy with which the coronation was done alienated the little sympathy that they might have got. It was published as the last funeral rites of the late Omugabe of Ankole, Sir Charles Gasyonga II. When the District Administrator, Mbarara, Sikubwabo Kyeyune, sent security officers to stop the coronation, they were simply overwhelmed by the presence of a heavy deployment of military under Major-Generals Tinyefuza and Elly Tumwine, the top Bahima NRM brass, who supported the coronation. This constituted a serious question at a time when the monarchy issue

⁷³² See *New Vision*, Tuesday November 23, 1993, p. 1.

⁷³³ See "Barigye rules out referendum", in the *New Vision*, Friday August 13, 1993.

⁷³⁴ See "Coronation nullified", in the *New Vision*, Tuesday November 23, 1993, pp. 1-2.

had clearly divided the Ankole politicians in government into the Museveni-Kategaya camp and the Tinyefuza-Tumwine (Major-Generals) monarchist supporters. That a function of top army officers were now turning "rebels" in support of a minority, partisan cause was indeed a serious affront that government had to take steps to eliminate.⁷³⁵

A few days after the coronation, NCT filed a court case against itself.⁷³⁶ It was clever of the NCT, to ask its supporter, and the usher at the coronation, a royalist Kampala businessman, Ernest Mbaka, to file a civil suit against the Omugabe claims as the king of Ankole. While the case was in court, no Munyankole would discuss it because the case would be sub-judice. The court of law would find Mbaka lacking in evidence of his *locus standi* (status) and therefore throw out the case. Mbaka had to prove that, being a potential subject of the king, he would suffer injuries and his rights would be breached by the exercise of the king's authority. He would have to call people to testify as breach of their alleged rights. NCT knew very well that Mbaka would "fail in all these" and therefore this would infer the legality of the coronation.

⁷³⁵ Interview: Mzee Murumba, July 19, 1997, Kafunjo.

⁷³⁶ See the *Weekly Topic*, December 3, 1993, p. 3.

7.7. THE RWAKITURA DEBATE.

After the coronation fiasco, the President summoned Ankole leaders to a meeting at his Rwakitura country home on 4 December 1993 to discuss the monarchy. In attendance were ministers, NRC members, and RC III-V councillors from the three districts of Bushenyi, Mbarara and Ntungamo, Army Commanders, leading religious leaders in Ankole and members of NCT and BCF. The object was for the NRM to throw back the decision on the people.⁷³⁷ Museveni had called the meeting to discuss the issues of the purported coronation. He summarised prevalent opinions into three: those who wanted to revive and strengthen the culture of the Banyankole; those who wanted both the monarchy and culture and those who did not care whether or not the culture was revived.⁷³⁸ Elly Karuhanga, NRC member for Nyabushozi County and a monarchy supporter, challenged the President on procedure:

Your Excellency, this matter is before courts of law and it is prejudice for this meeting to deliberate on the matter, let us leave the courts to handle [it].⁷³⁹

But the President was quick to outwit and interrupt Karuhanga:

...Honourable Karuhanga, the law is like butter which you put on bread to soften it but not just to eat the butter. Otherwise you could eat bread without it. We are not here only to discuss the coronation but all the other issues related to Ankole culture, and that is where politics comes in.⁷⁴⁰

The President called on the RC5 chairmen of the three districts of Mbarara, Bushenyi and Ntungamo to give memoranda from their people regarding their stand on the monarchy restoration issue. The RC5 chairman for Bushenyi, Yowasi Makaru, asserted that the people of Bushenyi unanimously rejected Obugabe and would not

⁷³⁷ Interview: George Nkoba May 12, 1996, Ibanda.

⁷³⁸ See *The New Vision*, Wednesday, December 15, 1993, p. 18.

⁷³⁹ See *The Sunday Vision*, Sunday, December 12, 1993, p. 9, and *The Uganda Confidential*; See also "Government lacks legal competence to nullify Barigye's coronation", in *Weekly Topic*, December 3, 1993, p. 3.

⁷⁴⁰ See *The Sunday Vision*, Sunday, December 12, 1993, p. 9

allow the king to cross the Bushenyi-Mbarara border at river Koga. Should the people of Bushenyi ever want a king, they would raise the issue themselves. Yowasi Makaru evoked the Bushenyi RC5 resolution of 1991, which opposed the restoration of Obugabe, stressing that the current Council had no powers to reverse that stand.⁷⁴¹

The RC5 chairman Justin Sabiiti of Mbarara did not support it either although he is a Muhima. The Mbarara District Council's resolution said that the consultations carried out by the Nkore Cultural Trust were extremely limited and the District Council disassociated itself from the coronation. The District Council's resolution of 1991 had said that traditional rulers should not be reinstated.⁷⁴² Sabiiti would not support the monarchy because he is often ridiculed in Bahima circles as *Omushongora*, 'half-caste', and even as Munyarwanda. At the Rwakitura meeting, he was reportedly insulted by Bahima, when he read the memorandum. But as Chairman of RC5 this had to be his stance. Though Bahima may appear united, they have internal divisions among themselves. The Bahima of Nyabushozi despise the migrant Bahima from other areas like Mpororo, Rujumbura, and Igara as not "originals". That is why migrants like Museveni are not keen on the monarchy issue, among other reasons.⁷⁴³ "Original" Bahima of former Nkore in Nyabushozi despise such migrants as "Abairu" because they are not segregative and monarchy die-hards.

John Karazarwe RC5 chairman of Ntungamo did not present any memorandum on the pretext that Ntungamo was still a new district. NCT said it was a cultural body. But when:

the government brought back Obugabe [using the word in general sense of restoring monarchies] in the country, the Cultural Trust which happens to agree with the restoration of monarchies, also took it up and coronated Barigye thus killing two birds with one stone,⁷⁴⁴

though it turned out killing one king with two stones! Asked why NCT did not consult people as agreed with the government, it argued that it did not need to and compared

⁷⁴¹ See *The New Vision*, 3 November 1993, p. 14.

⁷⁴² See *The New Vision*, Wednesday, December 15, 1993, p. 18.

⁷⁴³ Interviewee anonymous, April 12, 1997.

⁷⁴⁴ *The New Vision*, Wednesday, December 15, 1993, p. 19.

their decision with the government's which did not consult the NRC on the formation of the new constitution in 1992.⁷⁴⁵ Although it did not consult the NRC, it asked people to elect another body, the Constituent Assembly, to represent them in the constitutional debate. If NCT did not wish to use RCs on the Obugabe issue, on the grounds that they are political organs, and since the Trust wanted "cultural" people, NCT should have registered and organised Ankole clans to either discuss the issue or choose representatives to do so.

The Bishops of Ankole, Yoramu Bamunoba, Elisha Kyamugambi, and Paul Bakyenga, had prepared a short memorandum about the monarchy. In a statement read by Bishop Bamunoba, they gave three major reasons why the Churches in Ankole did not need to debate the monarchy issue. One was that restoring and not restoring Obugabe has no connection with Canon law that governs the church. The Church has Synods through which its representatives discuss issues and pass resolutions and laws governing and guiding the churches' decisions but the Obugabe issue had never been tabled for discussion. As Church leaders, they had no business with issues outside the church, which have not been handled by those committees that advise and guide the Church. The Bishops said the monarchy issue was a topic for the NRC not for the church.⁷⁴⁶

The Rwakitura result was that the RCs from the three districts voted on the issue with 162 against, 2 for it and 1 abstention. Their statement read:

The National Resistance Council members, District Council members and Religious leaders of Mbarara, Bushenyi and Ntungamo districts and members of the Cultural Trust sat in a meeting called by President Museveni on Saturday at Rwakitura in Mbarara District, and deliberated on the question of traditional rulers: All the three District Resistance Councils read their memoranda rejecting the purported coronation of prince John Barigye as Omugabe of Ankole on 20 November 1993. The Chairman of the Nkore Cultural Trust, Mr James Kahigiriza also made a statement defending the circumstances that led

⁷⁴⁵ Interview: Sheikh Kaduyu, July 16, 1996, Mbarara.

⁷⁴⁶ Interview: Bishop Yoramu Bamunoba, May 12, 1997. See also, "Ekihandiko kyaba Bishops Elisha Kyamugambi, Y. Bamunoba and Paul Bakyenga, (Memorandum for the three Bishop), in *Orumuri*, 29 November-5 December, 1993, pp. 1-2.

to the purported coronation. The meeting expressed the desire to continue searching for a formula to revive and strengthen the culture of the Banyankole liaising with sister people of similar culture.⁷⁴⁷

The Rwakitura meeting resolved that the monarchy remain suspended in Ankole and unity be achieved some other way; that culture is important and should be upheld; that prince Barigye's coronation was null and void and finally that monarchists should consult people through a referendum about the restoration of the Obugabe in Ankole. That is where the matter rests.⁷⁴⁸

7.8. AN ANALYSIS OF THE RWAKITURA DEBATE.

Museveni's influence on the monarchy is obvious. In an article by Denye Kalebo, "Why the referendum now? Key plot to tame Barigye Parties", President Museveni is quoted to have vowed that even if courts of law ruled in favour of either parties or the clandestine coronation of Barigye, politics would take precedence.⁷⁴⁹ Kalebo's article recalled that in 1989, long before the coronation, in an NRC seminar, Museveni asked, "Mr. Barigye, did I go to the bush to make you a king?"⁷⁵⁰ Despite being a Muhima, Museveni was not ready to lose an election to crown an unpopular king. Barigye's coronation was an affront to Museveni's political power as President. He had to prove who was who. For example in the *Uganda Confidential*⁷⁵¹, he ridiculed the coronation as brewing "amarwa gataine permit", (brewing local beer without government permission). And as he has often said, he has to remain the "Ssabagabe"⁷⁵² (the king of kings)! Perhaps this was what prince Barigye referred to when he said:

⁷⁴⁷ This version is adopted from the *New Vision*, Wednesday, December 15, 1993, p. 19. I could not easily get the official version from the government due to "political reasons" as one official put it to me.

⁷⁴⁸ Interview: Ezra Kikuri, March 13, 1997, Bushenyi.

⁷⁴⁹ See *Weekly Topic*, Year-End 1993.

⁷⁵⁰ *Weekly Topic*, July 23, 1993, p. 26.

⁷⁵¹ See *Uganda Confidential*, 13-20 December 1993.

⁷⁵² A joke with a sting in the tail?

What I believe is that there are some powerful political forces or leaders from Ankole who do not support the monarchy. Those who reject the Obugabe in Ankole have various reasons. Some are politicians who feel that if Obugabe is restored, another centre of power will be created apart from themselves.⁷⁵³

When Museveni opposed the restoration of the monarchy it was related with a fund-raising occasion where he portrayed himself the "new king in Ankole". *New Vision* of 10 September 1989 ran a story which captured the interest of many Banyankole. Kaaro High School in Nyabushozi had held a fund-raising in which it raised more than 47 Million shillings and Museveni who was the guest of honour had contributed US \$ 20.000. The school had started as a "Third World School" in 1983 by the UPC candidate, who had lost to the Democratic Party (DP), in the controversial 1980 elections. It was first named Rwamasha Secondary School. In Runyankole, Rwamasha means a place where there is a lot of cow dung. Nyabushozi being a cattle-keeping area, the naming gave it a humble position. After the fall of UPC, it was changed to Kaaro derived from Kaaro-Karungi, a name that indicated where the king of Ankole built his palace or pitched camp. When the kingdom was abolished, Kaaro was at Kamukuzi-Mbarara. The changing of the school name from Rwamasha to Kaaro suggested that the king's seat had been moved from Mbarara to Nyabushozi. But who was this king?

Was Museveni staking his claim⁷⁵⁴ as the new king of Ankole by endowing the school with such generosity? The problem is that the Bahima considered him a usurper since he is from the *abasita*, a Bahima clan that did not traditionally provide the Omugabe.⁷⁵⁵ That was why Bahima had felt particularly slighted because an earlier fund-raising in Mbarara by prince Barigye, who was then an NRC member for Kashari county, had failed dismally. He had raised only 1.7 millions, a shameful amount for a Prince.

⁷⁵³ Interview: Prince John Barigye, March 12, 1998, Kampala.

⁷⁵⁴ Many interviewees on this issue did not wish their names written down therefore the whole drama will remain anonymous.

⁷⁵⁵ It is not so much the fact that it could not provide the Omugabe, for no other clans did, than the fact that it had a lowly status in the Bahima clans. So Museveni is regarded as a usurper among the Bahima not because he belongs to a clan that does not provide the Omugabe, but he is a member of a clan, which is regarded as an outsider.

For the Bairu, the renaming of the school was an insult. Their "cow-dung" school became restored to an aristocratic enclave and the old order, which they had defeated. They too saw Museveni as posing as the over-lord in Nyabushozi with his Kaaro close by on the site of their precious outpost. One NCT member said:

it is not that Museveni is opposed to kinship in Ankole. It is simply that he wants to be the only king, both in Ankole and Uganda.

His new palatial home at Rwakitura is seen as his castle. And he certainly treats it like one. He makes a point of inviting foreign royalty, while they are visiting Uganda, to meet him there.

However, another important issue came out during the Kaaro fund-raising. On 12 September 1989, *New Vision* ran a front-page picture of Museveni carrying a string of gourds, which he had bought at the fund-raising. The caption in capital letters described his smile as "the smile of a winner". The string of gourds or *Omugamba* is the only thing a traditional Muhima cattle-keeper carries from his home when he is moving with his cows, indicating that he has moved house. The symbolic significance of the photograph therefore lies in the fact that Kaaro may not have only moved from Mbarara to Nyabushozi, but it also moved from the royalists to the *abasita*. Museveni was subjected to a challenge before he took the *Omugamba* at the fund-raising. Kuteesa, who is a Muhinda (ruling clan among the Bahima) and who had beaten Museveni in the 1980 polls challenged Museveni. During the auction of the *Omugamba*, Kuteesa named a price to the applause from the Bahinda and Museveni would counter to the applause from the *abasita*. Each raised the stakes until finally Museveni ruled that the *Omugamba* was his.⁷⁵⁶ This was part of the festivity fun, but perhaps there was more at stake than a few ornamental gourds: the kingship of Ankole.

The Rwakitura meeting showed again ethnic rifts. NRM claimed that ethnic distinctions of the past had been overcome. But Ankole's kingship once again was a source of contention between those two ethnic forces. Apart from a few Bahima like

⁷⁵⁶ See *The New Vision*, 12 September 1989.

Museveni who opposed the monarchy and a few Bairu like Kahigiriza and Betungura who supported it, it was an ethnic struggle between Bairu and Bahima. The Bairu are still confident about being a majority and a middle class strong force. They were well represented at Rwakitura for they had a majority of the NRC members like Amanywa Mushega, Adonia Tiberondwa, Miria Matembe, Kahinda Otafiire and Richard Kaijuka who had opposed the monarchy issue in the NRC. Bahima monarchists had hoped that since the government was predominantly Bahima, it would rule in their favour.⁷⁵⁷

The meeting also revealed who were who in Ankole and some hidden intentions among some monarchists. One Major General Tinyefuza, a lawyer, who married into the royal family, lamented Museveni's blocking the restoration of the monarchy, *hoona Museveni watwima omuhanda*, (Museveni you have blocked our way), to which Museveni responded, "if you have the power, you can open it".⁷⁵⁸ Whatever the Major General meant by "our way" remains his secret, though it was interpreted to mean that the Bahima had an agenda which Banyankole have up to now not known. The abusive language from both groups was symptomatic. One Muhima woman, a priest's wife, Verinah Rujoki, is said to have abused the anti-monarchy group as *Imwe Bairu mwe* after she had confessed that, when she heard that the monarchy had been nullified, she got her periods again despite the fact that she was beyond menopause!⁷⁵⁹ "Imwe Bairu mwe" is a strong derogatory term, suggesting that Bahima still despise Bairu. A Mwiru minister of Education responded angrily to a Muhima CA:

President nobasa ota kureka embuzi nka Karuhanga kuhebebera aha mpaha,⁷⁶⁰ (President, how can you leave a goat like Karuhanga to murmur here),

⁷⁵⁷ Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, June 9, 1997, Kampala.

⁷⁵⁸ Interview: William Mukaira, May 14, 1996, Bushenyi.

⁷⁵⁹ See *The Uganda Confidential*, December, 13-20, 1993, p. 9.

⁷⁶⁰ *ibid.*

and referred to Verinah Rujoki's words as, *abamwe baine ebigambo birikunuka nkebinyampo*⁷⁶¹, (others have words that smell like shit). As long as the two groups smelt badly there was little chance for the monarchy.

7.9. THE FUTURE FOR THE OBUGABE IN ANKOLE.

The Obugabe is still highly controversial. Social inequality, minority domination over the majority and the exploitative social and economic relations of production which were built on to the detriment of the majority Banyankole are still strong emotional issues. Reviving the monarchy therefore would cause a rift between the Bairu and Bahima. The other point to consider is the constitutional requirement for issues of traditional rulers being subjected to the democratic will of the people. Whereas general consensus existed in other kingdom areas favouring their kings, an absolute minority fronted the Ankole case. Hence, for many even the issue of a referendum would be a waste of time. It is clear how the referendum would go.

There is an argument that those (even if a minority) who want a king should have one since kings are hereditary. They quote article 37 of the Uganda constitution, which provides that:

Every person has a right, as applicable, to belong to, enjoy, practice, profess, maintain and promote culture, cultural institution, language, tradition, creed or religion in community with others.⁷⁶²

However constitutional it may sound, the idea of a minority king is unsustainable because, although the king would be apolitical, he will still be a leader of all the people. And as Museveni said:

You can not equate kingship with a religious sect...because both are sections, but kingship long ago used to be inclusive; it is like in maths, you can not put like and unlike terms together... A king has never been for a few, one who had more spears ruled then, which is equivalent to today's vote.⁷⁶³

⁷⁶¹ See *Orumuri*, December 20-27, 1993, p. 11.

⁷⁶² The Constitution of the republic of Uganda, 1995.

⁷⁶³ See *The Monitor*, 2 October 1997.

Republicans see it as impossible and according to J. J. Barya:

This argument fails to see that kingship is a historical construct attributable to a given people in an individual way. Unlike religion to which people subscribe on an individual basis, kingship is ascriptive in relation to a nationality, a people. Without this, it becomes a religion.⁷⁶⁴

This also raises the extent to which "if people so wish" is meant to cover the case of a minority amidst the majority. The bill did not provide for territorial boundaries but left it open that people concerned could practise their culture and pay homage to their particular king, whenever and wherever they wanted. If monarchists had not been overwhelmed by government and Banyankole majority, they might have been justified to ask that Barigye be crowned for those "who so wish". But when the kingdoms were abolished, they had certain geographical reference and boundaries. They were distinct units of government, each symbolically headed by a monarchical institution under which everybody was a subject. Barigye could not be a king of a minority for it could not be called a kingdom. The kingdom and district that was once Ankole no longer exists.

Under the 1901 Ankole Agreement, the Omugabe was given 54 square miles of land as a private estate, while a further sixteen miles of land was given to the monarchy as an institution. The counties then controlled by the monarchy and Bahima contained 100 square miles.⁷⁶⁵ If the monarchy were restored, these lands have to be returned as was the case of Buganda. This would deprive all those currently settled as customary tenants or leaseholders from the state. The people of Buhweju are particularly concerned about the fate of peasants on the king's land.

The challenge is also how to resolve internal contradictions that arise as a result of changing situations. In Ankole, a king did not only embody religio-political and cultural powers, he was the richest man in the kingdom. His political legitimacy and relevance were linked to class domination. But things have changed and economic conditions have restructured the Ankole society to the extent that the

⁷⁶⁴ J. J. Barya, op. cit., p. 40.

⁷⁶⁵ *ibid*, See also Barya J.J. "CA Rejects Fraudulent Restoration of Ankole Monarchy", in *National*

traditional ruler is no longer *Rugaba*, (one who gives) or the richest man in society. Barigye failed to gain support because the Bahima-Bairu divide no longer coincides with class divisions. Without economic power to attract the poor, then it becomes questionable whether Barigye would have commanded political or social legitimacy in cases where his subjects are even economically stronger.

It is true the monarchy issue was mainly an ethno-political problem and did not really involve the churches in their official capacities. Either way there are religious implications for both the Catholic and Protestant church especially now that the future of the monarchy is uncertain. Its uncertainty lies in the fact that since the monarchy issue in Ankole was mainly a political challenge, the political circumstances could change, as was the case of Buganda. The religious implications lie in how the church will relate to two divergent groups, and yet play a neutral role. Bairu as I have argued in this thesis have never fallen for the monarchy yet it is they who still form the majority in the church membership. The monarchy issue remains a challenge for the Anglican Church in a sense that it has a congregation, which is politically divided. It is likely that should the monarchy issue be reconsidered, it might resurrect the old scores which the church has tried to minimise.

Interesting is the question of the Protestant Bahima and Bairu Catholics alliance. In Ankole Catholic DP had advertised itself as the monarchy champion in order to woo the Bahima to their side. But the 1993 monarchy controversy confirmed the fact that Catholics have never really supported the monarchy. As we have seen, it is the Catholics who were vehement in the campaign against the institution of the monarchy as was evidenced in the meeting between NCT and the Christian Joint Council (south-western) meeting held at the Catholic Social Centre. The question is whether from this experience, the Bahima-Bairu Catholic alliance still holds. It might not because, with the recent NRM's inclusive politics, either group might have realised that religion and ethnicity are having a lesser role and therefore not useful for either party. But also Catholic rejection of the restoration of the monarchy could have been due to the realisation of their insignificant participation and role even if the monarchy were restored since it was historically a Protestant affair.

A deeper question is to what extent Bahima really still see the role of the Protestant church as a "quasi-established" institution in its relation to the monarchy. Though the Anglican Church was established through the monarchy in Ankole, Bahima lost its grip to the Bairu Protestants. It could be partly the reason the monarchists did not mind which religious leader crowned the king. Bahima no longer see the Protestant church as an institution that enhances their interests. This probably justifies Bahima's recent agitation for the creation of their own diocese in Nyabushozi.

7.10. CONCLUSION: THE OBUGABE CONTROVERSY IN ANKOLE.

The kingship had always been in question because it kept Bairu in a subordinate position. They had succeeded in reducing its power before it was abolished and Banyankole had not asked for its restoration. If there had been no revival of the monarchy in Buganda, there probably would have been no one particularly concerned about it in Ankole and other kingdoms.⁷⁶⁶ Importantly due to the attention and glamour which the government put on the coronation of Buganda's Kabaka, it attracted an enormous gesture from other districts and began to demand for the same, though they had not been involved during the intense negotiations between Buganda and the government.⁷⁶⁷ There had been no demand for it especially in Ankole, where District Resistance Committees of Mbarara and Bushenyi had opposed the idea.⁷⁶⁸ The sum total of this, as Doornbos and Mwesigye have expressed it, is that the restoration of Obugabe in Ankole:

would have entailed the reinstatement of a monarchical institution derived from a historical premise of ethnically determined hierarchical status. Thus recognising the kingship would somehow have implied recognising an idea of ethnic inequality, with all the profound social and institutional consequences this might entail. It is not surprising therefore that representatives of the vast 'non aristocratic' majority of the former kingdom should have put forward (the view) that Kinyankole culture is not per definition a monarchical oriented culture, and that the equation of monarchy and culture is a far too narrowly conceived construct.⁷⁶⁹

Barya says⁷⁷⁰, up till 1967 when kingdoms were abolished by the UPC government, the Ankole monarchy was remembered for its old-age coercive instruments against the majority Bairu, its ideological tools such as the myths that justified and legitimised the minority rule by presenting it as a divinely-ordained order of class,

⁷⁶⁶ Interview: Ezra Kikuri, May 19, 1997, Bushenyi.

⁷⁶⁷ See *The Monitor*, 23 July 1993.

⁷⁶⁸ Interview: William Mukaira, May 19, 1997, Bushenyi.

⁷⁶⁹ M. Doornbos and F. Mwesigye, op. cit., p. 17.

⁷⁷⁰ See J. J. Barya, "The Ankole Monarchy Controversy: Testing Democratisation and Cultural Revivalism", A paper presented at the NARRU general Assembly, Kabale, 27-28, February 1997,

social relations and power balance; the attributes the agricultural Bairu were paying through the king's lords; the alleged atrocious rituals by the old kings, such as spitting in the mouth of a Musingo clansman, staking the king's spear in a Mwiru's foot, cutting off Bairu's ears, having a Mwiru hold the thighs of a woman while a Muhima was having sex or sleeping with Bairu's wives while Bahima chiefs were on tour (Bahima coined a crude saying out of it that, *owacuga omuzana niwe amanya emigyenzo ye*), etcetera. When the monarchy issue surfaced again in 1993, the Bairu did not want to see an institution that symbolised their unfortunate history of "slavery". To suggest the monarchy could be restored for those "who so wish" as the constitution stipulated, would have equated to saying that we restore apartheid in South Africa "for those who want it"! So ethnic division was clear again. It is obvious that the majority of the people could manage without what a king represented then. Probably the best thing that can happen for the good of Ankole is to relegate the institution to history.

CHAPTER EIGHT

8.0. CONCLUSION.

This study has sought to find out the way in which Christianity, ethnicity and politics have influenced each other in Ankole since the fifties and the consequences that have resulted from their interaction, given the apparent power struggles between the Bairu and Bahima, and between the Protestant Bairu on the one hand, and Catholic Bairu and Protestant Bahima on the other. The findings would seem to uphold the thesis that ethnicity and religion have been major determinant factors in the civic/political and economic power imbalance in Ankole, and that, although the Bairu and Bahima have lived together for centuries now, their relations, far from being symbiotic, have largely remained strained and exclusive and may even have been exacerbated due to the dynamics of inequality and the shift of power.

As discussed in Chapter one, before Christian and western political contact, the Bahima had the monopoly of economic and civic/political power. The Bairu were an entity of serfs under the kihima rule. Because the Bairu hardly had any forum through which they could air their grievances or express their interests, they seemed content to leave the alleviation of their plight to their rulers and brainworkers, the Bahima. However, the findings of this study reveal that with the introduction of Christianity, with its stipendiary church ministry, western education and the introduction of cash crops (all of which the Bahima did not enthusiastically embrace), the Bairu gradually became economically empowered, giving them a new sense of identity and worth. Through movements such as the Kumanyana, Bairu started to "fight" for their rights and privileges. Bahima saw this as a threat because it sought to redress the political and economic imbalance from which they had hitherto benefited.

While the introduction of Christianity was to the advantage of the Bairu, in many respects, it was also a disadvantage because it divided them denominationally into Catholics and Protestants which weakened their common stand against Bahima domination. On a different note, Christianity worked to the advantage of the Bahima; not least precisely because it divided and therefore weakened the Bairu common front. Second, missionaries and later colonial administrators ruled through the Bahima reinforcing their social, political and economic hold over the Bairu. Moreover

the Bahima were never divided denominationally since with the conversion of the Omugabe to Protestantism, Bahima, when they became Christians, automatically followed suit. Thus one can conclude that the Protestant-Catholic, Bahima-Bairu antagonisms which to date characterise the religio-political landscape of Ankole, have their origin in missionary Christianity which was imported with its differences of Catholicism and Protestantism from Europe.

In many respects, the Bairu Catholic-Protestant Bahima alliance against the Bairu Protestants during the political party politics period, was a religio-political tactic to address the ethno-political and economic power shift that threatened the two groups. The minority Protestant Bahima thought they could maintain themselves in power by an alliance with the majority Bairu Catholics whom they did not see as a political threat because their party, DP, promised to promote the monarchy (at least in Ankole). Thus, while party politics widened the gap between the Catholic and Protestant denominations, it did contribute to the bridging of an ethnic gap. In spite of the fact that Protestant Bairu have come into power, the Bahima have remained a power to reckon with especially in politics because they have their feet in both camps: UPC/Protestant and DP/Catholic.

Further, whereas religion is seen as the surface cause of the religio-political power struggles, ethnicity, more than religion, has been the major cause of the economic-political power imbalance in Ankole. This can be seen in the fact that in 1963 a UPC Protestant Muhima, Grace Ibingira, preferred the election of Kahigiriza (a mediocre Mwiru) as the Enganzi of Ankole, to Bananuka, a defender of the Bairu emancipation. Yet all of them were Protestants. Ibingira's concern was to protect the interests of Bahima even at the expense of his party colleagues. That ethnicity remained an important factor is further sustained by the fact that even Revival movement, profound as it has been in Ankole, has not eradicated ethnic sentiments even among its own fellowship. Thus we saw that in 1992 during a Diocesan Synod meeting at Ruharo cathedral (East Ankole Diocese), Bahima, both clergy and lay, the majority of whom were Revivalists, agitated for a separate diocese of their own,

alleging discrimination (which President Museveni called *okugabura kubi*⁷⁷¹, favouritism, at the consecration of Bishop Kyamugambi in August 1992) in the church. Of course the alliance with the DP Catholics had at its centre the protection and advancement of Bahima.

The ethnic impact on both Bairu and Bahima can be seen in the fact that while for the Bahima Uganda got its independence in 1962, for the Bairu, real independence came only in 1967 after the abolition of the monarchy in Uganda. Furthermore, although Catholic Bairu had always allied with Bahima in party politics, when it came to debates about the revival of the monarchy at the local councils and at Rwakitura, where Museveni was presiding, Bairu Catholics supported their traditional rivals the Bairu Protestants and not their Bahima allies. Catholics, as much as other Bairu, saw the restoration of the monarchy as political and religious bondage. In practice Catholics have always played second fiddle both to Protestant Bahima and Protestant Bairu: a double disadvantage. They have always been under the UPC Protestant Bairu politically and of course under the Protestant Bahima aristocrats. This may explain why only one out of the 28 members of the NCT was a Catholic. The abolition of the monarchy in Ankole did not solve but only shelved the ethnic differences and prejudices between Bairu and Bahima. Nor did it solve the denominational prejudices between Catholics and Protestants. The recent Bahima agitation for the restoration of the monarchy (1993) supports this conclusion.

The churches in Ankole have suffered and may continue to suffer political setbacks as a result of allowing themselves to be manipulated by politicians. They have, in consequence, lost authority, ceased to be unbiased and their religious role has been damaged. And yet it is difficult to see how religious institutions could extricate themselves from politics in practice. There is a certain inevitability about their involvement. First, religions got involved due to the traditional and ethnic dynamics

⁷⁷¹ Many interviewees in Ankole thought that it was an unfair remark from the President since Bahima priests were not at all discriminated against by their Bairu counterparts. The first Bishop of Ankole, Kosia Shalita (1957-1969) was a Mututsi/Muhima. Even Bishop Amos Betungura, though he was a Mwiru, he did not discriminate against them. Actually in his term of office (1970-1992) there were more Bahima Archdeacons proportionally than there were Bairu. It was indeed during Betungura's period that many Bahima joined Church ministry. The consequence of Museveni's comment led the present Bishop to exaggerate the appointment of Bahima in senior Church offices without necessarily qualifying for them.

of the "power shift" between Bairu and Bahima and other ethnic minorities. Connected with this is the western imported religions and econo-political power craved for by each faction. Second, given the unpredictable econo-political situations of Uganda governments and especially since the Amin era, the churches and in particular the Bishops have become both an ecclesiastical and a political focus of unity and conscience for their adherents. Thirdly, the almost non-existent presence of Bahima converts in the Catholic Church and in Islam and the small Bahima numbers in the Church of Uganda ordained ministry (due to their preference for political and military power) makes it difficult to envisage in the near future, a bridging of the existing ethnic, religious and political hostilities. Fourthly, the recent restoration of monarchism in Uganda by the Museveni government, and the majority Bairu rejection of it in Ankole, leaves the religious institutions and in particular the Anglican church, with the religious and political dilemma of a divided constituency of Bairu and Bahima, each of whom seems to cherish their ethnic origins more than the Christian faith.

The study also reveals that the abolition of political parties by Amin and his indiscriminate killing brought all the former rival factions, UPC-DP, Bairu-Bahima and Catholics and Protestants together. Not that their historical differences and hatred were forgotten, but because Amin became a common enemy. However, Amin's regime widened the gap between the Muslims and the other factions. Although Islam had been in the country for more than a century, it was not until Amin's regime that it surfaced prominently as a religion which had aspirations to influence the country's economic, political and ethnic destiny. Whether or not this was a viable aim, what is clear is that Islam and Amin were seen as synonymous. This impression has left Islam and Muslims suspect. Although Muslims had been allies of the Protestants, they had not been adequately rewarded and perhaps this accounts for their treatment and discrimination of Protestants during Amin's regime. The later's better education could also have been seen as a threat to the former.

On the other hand the Protestant establishment in church and government had not mistreated Muslims and Catholics to the extent the Muslim government did to the Protestants and Catholics in the seventies. Maybe Muslims seized an opportunity while they had it and determined to exploit power as others had done before. It was "a tit for tat" not in terms of the killings, but in terms of "the winner takes it all"

principle. The Itendero Muslim massacres, however, were "a tit for a tat" that had reference to what were perceived as Amin's targeted killing of prominent Christian academics, politicians and Ankole's cream who were strong supporters of their respective churches. The killings claimed many influential middle class people who were the pillars of their respective churches and this (as far as the economy of the church is concerned) left a lasting generation gap (those killed were between 30-50 years old) from which the churches in Ankole have not recovered.

In light of all this, the return of Milton Obote to be president in 1980 was not a liberation for the Muslims nor indeed for the Bahima. For the Muslims, they were still identified with the hated Amin's regime and its atrocities. It could be further argued that neither was it a liberation politically for the Bahima, DP and Catholics. These were the forces which had jubilated at Obote's downfall in 1971. They were apprehensive and rather dreaded his return in 1980. To the Bahima, Obote had abolished their cherished monarchy and it was unlikely that he could ever be persuaded to restore it again. To the Catholics and DP, they had not enjoyed the best of peace in the 1960s. They had not been persecuted as individuals but their party DP had been marginalised, a situation to which it was to return in 1980. The fact that these forces dreaded Obote's regime can be further illustrated by the activities that followed the 1985 coup d'etat. When Bazilio Okello, a top military official and a Catholic, announced the coup and the consequent fall of the UPC government, in places where Catholics had a majority like Ibanda, Rubindi and Buhweju, Protestant houses were burnt down, plantations destroyed and cows slaughtered, including those of Bishop Yoramu Bamunoba.

As a result of its close association with UPC, the Anglican Church (COU) met a cold welcome from the NRM government which brought the former DP Catholics, Bahima, Banyarwanda and Muslims to the fore in the NRM's programmes. The *chakamuchaka* (politicisation) seminars were for example intended to "dechristianise" the stalwart supporters of the churches and in particular those of the church that had close links with UPC. This is supported by the findings that the Resistance Council (RCs) executives from local to district levels, were predominantly former DP Catholics and Bahima. However, in some way the COU gained from this cold reception because many of the prominent former UPC supporters who had not fled the country began to direct their efforts into church work, to some extent bridging

the gap left by Amin's killings. For example the former stalwart UPC and Kihimba (Administrative Secretary) of Mbarara district, George Nkoba, offered himself for ordination and Yoramu Gucwamaingi who had contested with Museveni in the 1980 elections became the Head of Laity for East Ankole diocese. The same can be said of Dr. Adonia Tiberondwa, who became the Head of Laity in West Ankole diocese. Soon however, government softened its attitude to the COU when it realised how entrenched in society the churches were and also that the elections of local and national councillors was mostly based on ethno-religious sentiments.

The expulsion of the Banyarwanda refugees from Ankole by the UPC Youth Wingers had government backing and was, among other things, triggered by their ethno-religious affiliations which had inclined them towards Catholics and Bahima. As we saw in Chapter six, the majority of Banyarwanda refugees were pastoralists and Catholics by religious affiliation. Although other reasons contributed to their expulsion (for instance their alleged collaboration with Museveni in the bush war and the stealing of cattle), the central issue concerned their ethnic and religious affiliation which linked them to the opponents of the UPC government.

Whereas the monarchy had been for centuries part and parcel of Kinyankole culture, five things equally account for the rejection of the restoration of kingship in 1993. First the kihima and the monarchical culture was/is different from the Bairu culture in many ways including language dialect. Second, Bairu maintain that Kinyankole culture can and has continued to survive without the monarchy. Thirdly, the former Ankole kingdom was a creation of the colonial powers who amalgamated the different and independent small kingdoms and chiefdoms that more or less followed the present day county boundaries. In addition the former Ankole kingdom, then one district, now comprises three independent and decentralised districts which by the virtue of the financial and ethnic implications involved, may not easily come under one monarch, especially as the majority of the population in these districts are Bairu. In rejecting Barigye as RC5 chairman people saw this as a step to the throne as the chief administrator of the district. His standing for political office side by side with his would-be subjects and being defeated, seriously impaired his claims to the throne. His defeat, regardless of other factors, could have been a rejection of his kingship. This obviously eroded the long cherished kihima mythology that their kingship was divinely instituted. Barigye's defeat could account for why he and his

supporters opposed the idea of a referendum: they knew it would not favour them. By rejecting a referendum, they hoped they would eventually manoeuvre their way through. In light of this and given the fact that most of the 28 members of the NCT were above 65 years old, it may be concluded that these were people who had in one way or another benefited from the monarchy, and who because they were now retired and rather felt behind by the modern political currents, wanted the monarchy revived to accord them their diminishing dignity in society.

Turning to Barigye's nugatory coronation, the refusal of the Bishops and their clergy to attend the coronation was both ecclesiastically and politically calculated. The majority of the Christians did not want the monarchy restored nor did the government. For the clerics to have given it a blessing would have been easily seen as a sell out of the church and sabotage to the government. Besides, the coronation of a Mugabe of Ankole by a Muslim, instead of the traditional Protestant ceremony, may have far reaching implications for Barigye's future monarchical claims and raises many unanswered questions. For example, did by so doing, Barigye declare his dislike for the COU? Did he imply he could be crowned by any religious leader no matter what were the religious connections with the monarchy and the public opinion? Was he thereby defying his forefathers' acknowledgement that it was the missionary Anglican Church that had consolidated the monarchy in Ankole? Was he declaring Islam an equally acceptable religion, although none of his Bahima tribesmen have ever embraced it? Whatever Barigye thought, this incident not only caused mixed feelings among Banyankole but also implied that Barigye was imposing himself on the people. This belied his claims that his rule would not follow in the footsteps of his forefathers. However, it could be argued that Omugabe being a man of all people no matter what other ethnic background and beliefs could be crowned by a leader of any religion in his kingdom.

From the findings of this study the researcher is also led to agree with the advocates of the monarchy who argue that Barigye's rule would not be as dictatorial as his forefathers had been given the democratic rights people have now. But this is not to overlook the fact that kingship is an institution which only needs time to grow to a strength people had not imagined. According to the Rwakitura debate, one is led to conclude that any attempts to restore the monarchy in Ankole by force is likely to lead to serious confrontation between Bairu and Bahima. From that perspective therefore,

it may be concluded that President Museveni whose future political career (in Ankole) depended on the votes of the majority Bairu was right to side with them both for his own good and the democratic rights of Banyankole.

To what extent then should the church be involved in politics? The church certainly has a vital role to play in the politics of a nation. The church in Ankole, and Uganda at large, has always championed social action. It pioneered social services like schools and hospitals, roads and agriculture, and hence shaped Uganda as a nation. The church has been and should continue being a partner with the state in fighting ignorance, disease and poverty among the masses. But above all, the Christian church should continue to be the 'conscience' of the state; it should not abdicate its cardinal mission of providing spiritual and moral guidance to the politicians and the people. The church should continue to lead and guide the state rather than the other way round. This, the church can do if it maintains a neutral stand in partisan and sectarian politics that divide its flock.

However the concept of 'conscience' may be a vague term especially in a country like Uganda where there is religious pluralism. Amos Kasibante criticises it.⁷⁷² He argues that for the church to conceive itself as the conscience of the state excludes other religious traditions like Muslims and is only relevant in those countries where the church is a 'state church'. Whereas Kasibante might be right, it is still relevant for the church to take a guiding role in a country like Uganda where more than 80% are Christians. This does not mean courtship with the civic authorities. The church needs to be concerned with the need to defend human rights, speak against corruption and grieve for unemployment, street children; support women's emancipation and be in partnership with the state for development.

So far it has not achieved this. First, because it has compromised its mission and vision for temporary political patronage from the powers that be, especially for financial and material support from politicians. Secondly, the church leaders putting their personal interests before those of the church. Church leaders should not openly

⁷⁷² See Amos Kasibante, 'Beyond Revival: a proposal for mission in the Church of Uganda into the third millennium', in A. Wingate and others (eds.), *Anglicanism: A Global Communion*, Mowbray, 1988, pp. 363-368.

identify with or campaign for a political group or leader. This ultimately divides their flock and undermines their impartiality. Where ethnic differences are still strong and seem to underlie religious and political alliances from time to time, the church should take up the challenge to unite its followers rather than encouraging any political bias. Only then will the church avoid its past mistakes and reassert its mission, credibility and relevance in the twenty-first century.

8.1. REFLECTIONS ON THE FUTURE OF RELIGION IN ANKOLE

In the light of the findings, discussion and the conclusions made, the researcher recommends that:

- (i) Religious and civic institutions and cultural trusts encourage intermarriage between Bairu and Bahima so that in the long run there is a bridging of the gaps between the two groups.
- (ii) Open academic debates about ethnicity in Ankole be organised at local levels to dispel prejudices between the two groups.
- (iii) The church identifies and uses its members who have been thoroughly influenced by the Revival movement in both camps to reach and influence those who still value their ethnic roots rather than their Christianity.
- (iv) In consultations with the United Nations, a code of practice be drafted for handling and helping refugees and society be educated about their rights and privileges.
- (v) That ecumenical contacts to enhance cordial relations between Catholics and Protestants be initiated and strengthened right from the local church level and that similar arrangements for dialogue between Islam and Christianity be initiated to dispel fears and prejudices between the two.
- (vi) That if the churches/religions are to be involved in politics, they should do so as a united front rather than as individual denominations.
- (vii) That the restoration of the monarchy in Ankole if it is wanted at all be left to evolve naturally.

8.2. REFLECTIONS ON FUTURE RESEARCH.

This research was exploratory although exhaustive and conclusive. In view of this and the fact that there is insufficient literature on the subject, the researcher suggests that further research be carried out on the now listed aspects.

- (i) The findings of the study reveal that there has been ethno-political antagonism between Bairu and Bahima. This suggests a need for healthy ethno-cultural relations.
- (ii) The findings also reveal that the expulsion of the Banyarwanda refugees was due to their ethno-religious and political affiliations. This suggests a need for an understanding of the refugees' activities before and after the NRM take-over.
- (iii) Further research into the major problems of refugees is needed (possibly a full-blown thesis) with special concentration on the western borders of Uganda and the political problems of neighbouring countries.
- (iv) The findings further reveal that there was confrontation between Christians and Muslims during the seventies. This suggests a need for dialogue between Islam and Christianity.
- (v) There is need for research into government reservations about kingship in Ankole.

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND A LIST OF SOURCES

ORAL INFORMANTS.

Not all my informants appear in this list because for one reason or other, some did not wish to be quoted, not even to be mentioned by name. My apologies to those informants who did not object to their names being mentioned but do not appear in this list. Below are the names of only the major informants who I consulted several times or whose information was basic to the understanding of this study.

Bakyenga, Paul, Bishop, (born 1944).

Interviewed at his house at Nyamitanga on 6 June 1997. Priest 1971, Headmaster Kitabi Seminary 1971, Rector Gaba National Seminary 1982 and Bishop 1989.

Balinda, Abasi, Haji, (no year given).

Interviewed at his home at Kabwohe on 12 June 1997. Was active in the politics of the sixties and also a Member of Parliament.

Bamunoba, Yoram, Bishop, (born 1931)

Interviewed at his home Kakiika Mbarara on 22 July 1997. Graduated in 1953 as a teacher trainer; ordained in 1969, Principal Teachers College Kakoba and University Chaplain, Makerere 1974-76, elected Bishop of West Ankole Diocese in 1976, retired 1996.

Bamutungire, William, Rev. Canon, aged 78.

Interviewed him at his home Rwentanga on 31 July 1996. He trained as a primary teacher before joining church ministry in 1954. He worked in different parts of Ankole. He retired as the Dean of St. James Cathedral Ruharo Mbarara in 1983.

Barigye, John (born 1940).

Interviewed at his office Kampala on 12 March 1998.

Betungura, Amos, Bishop (born 1921).

Interviewed at his home Ruharo on 31 July 1996. Primary teacher, 1950-52, ordained 1959, Principal Bishop Tucker Theological College, elected Bishop of Ankole Diocese 1970, retired 1992.

Bikangaga, John (year not given).

Interviewed at his home Makindye Kampala on 18 July 1997. Former teacher and king of Kigezi. Served in various capacities in the civil service after the abolition of kingdoms in 1966.

Bukabeba, Emmy (born 1951).

Interviewed at his home at Kakyeka Mbarara on 30 July 1996. Former Lecturer Makerere University.

Butagira, Francis (born 1941).

Interviewed at his office Mbarara on 31 July 1996. Former Attorney General and Speaker to the National Assembly and Member of Parliament for Rwampara in 1980.

Bwengye, Francis, (born 1942).

Interviewed at his home in Kampala on 29 July 1997. Lawyer and former Secretary General for the Democratic Party. He is currently self employed in Kampala.

Byanyima, Bonefasi (no year given).

Interviewed at his home Ruti Mbarara on 29 March 1997. Founder member of the Democratic Party in Ankole. He was a Member of Parliament for Kashari and Nyabushozi in the sixties. Still active in party politics.

Gucwamaingi, Yoram, (born 1936).

Interviewed at his home Ruharo Mbarara on 6 August 1996. Teacher and later joined politics in 1980. He is now the Head of Laity for East Ankole Diocese.

Itima, Blasio, Rev. Canon (born about 1913).

Interviewed at his home Nshongi, Kigarama on 7 May 1996. Catechist 1939, joined Revival 1944, lay reader 1949, deacon 1960, priest 1962, archdeacon 1978. Retired 1984.

Kabaza, Zab (born 1921).

Interviewed at Namirembe Provincial Offices on 28 June 1996. School Supervisor in the Native Anglican Schools. Joined Revival in 1936 and retired Provincial Missioner Church of Uganda.

Kaduyu, Sheikh (born 1931).

Interviewed at his Office Mbarara on 12 June 1996. Kaduyu is the head of the Muslims in Ankole.

Kahenano, Joram (born 1948).

Interviewed at his home Mbuya, Kampala on 22 July 1997.

Kahigiriza, James (born 1921).

Interviewed at his home Kakiika Mbarara on 18 July 1996. Graduated in 1948, joined politics in 1957, Assistant Enganzi 1957-1960, County chief, Enganzi 1963-1967.

Kakubi, John Baptist, Bishop (born 1929).

Interviewed at his retirement home in Ibanda on 25 August 1996. After Seminary training 1961, worked as Curate Nyamitanga Cathedral, Education Secretary and Headmaster Kitabi Seminary, 1967-69. Became Bishop of Ankole in 1969. Retired 1989.

Kamujanduzi, Rose, Mrs (born 1911).

Interviewed at her home Kakiika Mbarara on 31 July 1996. She married in 1936 and with her husband Rev. Eliakim Kamujanduzi, served in Buhweju, Ruharo and Rwampara parishes.

Kamukama, Dixon, (born 1957).

Interviewed at his office at Makerere University on 15 May 1996. He is a lecturer in the Department of History.

Kategaya, Eriya, Honourable, (born 1943).

Interviewed at his office Kampala on 13 March 1998. Graduated as a Lawyer in 1970, lecturer Institute of Public Administration, Advocate 1972-1973, exile 1973-79, Minister of Commerce 1980, guerrilla war 1981-86, and now Minister of Foreign Affairs and First Deputy Prime Minister in the Uganda Government.

Kikuri, Ezra (born 1934).

Interviewed at his office in Bushenyi on 25 July 1996. Started teaching in 1953, joined politics in 1960 as Councillor for Kyeizoba sub-county in the Eishengyero until 1970.

Kituna, Eliasaph, Rev. Canon (born about 1920).

Interviewed at his home Rwentondo Kashaka on 14 April 1997. Catechist 1938, deacon 1965, priest 1967, archdeacon 1981. Retired 1987.

Kyamugambi, Elisha, (born 1942).

Interviewed at his home, Ruharo on 15 July 1996. Primary teacher, ordained in 1976, worked as Diocesan Treasurer and Archdeacon. Consecrated Bishop in August 1992.

Lugimbirwa, Enock, (born about 1932).

Interviewed at his home Ruharo on 10 April 1996. Active member of the Revival movement.

Magezi, Is'haq (born 1939).

Interviewed at his home at Kabwohe. He served in various places as the District Commissioner during Idi Amin's regime. He is now a local businessman.

Makaru, Yowasi, (born 1930).

Interviewed at his home Butsibo on 29 March 1997. Joined Revival movement in 1962. Primary teacher from 1955 to 1967. Member of the Ankole Eishengyero 1961 to 1971. He is currently Chairman RC5 for Bushenyi District.

Mugimba, Eliaezer (born 1908).

Interviewed at his home Ruharo, Mbarara in 1990. Grandson of Omukama Ndagara of Buhweju who was murdered in battle against the British. Teacher, Mbarara High School; joined Revival in 1936. One of the Balokole students expelled from Mukono in 1941. Leader of Revival in Ankole. Bible translator into Runyankole Rukiga with Stanley Smith in 1957. Died in 1993.

Muhoozi, Eliphaz, Rev. Canon (born 1928).

Interviewed at his home Komukyera Mushanga on 31 July 1996. Ex-teacher lay reader 1959, deacon 1963, priest 1965, archdeacon 1971, and bible translator 1981. Now retired.

Mukaira, William, (born 1932).

Interviewed at his farm Nyaruzinga Bushenyi on 24 July 1996. Formerly a primary teacher and Minister of Education in the Ankole Local government. He is a progressive farmer and knowledgeable about Ankole politics.

Murumba, Anania, (born 1910).

Interviewed at his home Kafunjo on 10 July 1996. Worked in the Omugabe's government as a county chief and retired towards independence.

Mwambutsya-Ndebecsa, (year not given)

Interviewed at his office Makerere University on 26 March 1997. Lecturer, Makerere University.

Ndiwa-Ndikora (born 1940).

Interviewed at his home Mbarara on 23 July 1997. Graduated in 1968, worked as District Commissioner in various parts of the country including Bushenyi (1982-85) and Mbarara Districts 1986-88. He was knowledgeable in the party politics of the eighties.

Njunwoha, Lazaro, Rev. Canon (born 1923).

Interviewed at his home Bujaga, Rwampara on 16 July 1996. Worked as a Catechist, lay reader and priest.

Odoki, Justice (born 1940).

Interviewed at his chambers Kampala on 12 March 1998. He served in various capacities in the legal profession and is now the Chairman, Uganda Constitutional Commission.

Rurangaranga, Edward (born 1932)

Interviewed at his home Ishaka-Bushenyi on 2 August 1996. Graduated as a teacher in 1959, elected in the Eishengyero in 1960, Deputy Speaker to the Eishengyero in 1967, exile 1972-79, Minister of State 1981.

Rwabushaija, Semei, Rev. Canon (born 1929).

Interviewed at his home Ruharo Mbarara on 28 August 1996. Worked as Lay reader 1945-60, priested 1964, retired as Dean of St. James Cathedral in 1994. Active member in the Revival movement and the affairs of the Anglican Church in Ankole.

Rwabushongo, Pulitazio, (born 1940)

Interviewed at his home Omunsikye Nyamitanga on 10 May 1996.

Rwetsiba, William, (born 1922).

Interviewed at his Hotel Kampala on 21 March 1998. Graduated in 1944, taught at Buddo and Ntare School until 1958 when he joined politics representing Ankole in Legco. He is the founder member of UPU and the first President of UPC.

Sabiiti, Gerladine, Mrs (born 1912).

Interviewed at her home Kinoni Rwampara on 11 July 1996. Former teacher, she married Eric Sabiiti who later became the archbishop of the Church of Uganda. She is a prominent member and pioneer of the Revival movement.

Tiberondwa, Adonia, Dr. (born 1936).

Interviewed at his home in Kampala on 4 August 1997. Graduated in 1955, taught at Ntare School and Teso College, joined politics in 1960 as a special nominee to the Eishengyero and UPC Secretary, Ankole branch. Director of Kyambogo Teachers College, exile 1973-79, Minister of Industry and Technology in the eighties. He is now Senior Lecturer at Makerere University.

Tuma, Tom, (no year given).

Interviewed at Namirembe offices on 2 August 1997. Former lecturer Makerere University. He is now Co-ordinator for the Planning, Development and Rehabilitation in the Church of Uganda.

Turihamwe, Sam (born 1936).

Interviewed at his home Nyamiko, Bushenyi on 12 August 1998. Primary teacher 1959-1981, Sub-county chief 1981-1986, County Chief 1987-1993.

ARCHIVAL SOURCES.

UGANDA

Church Archives

A. Church of Uganda.

1. Ruharo Archives.

Located at Ruharo, East Ankole Diocesan Headquarters. They consist of mainly of letters to and from the government, Bishop's correspondence to parishes and letters from abroad. They provide a useful study and understanding of the tension between Amin's regime and the Anglican Church. Unfortunately they are heaped in one box and it is really not easy to know which letter belongs to which file. Some of the files are not labelled. But in particular see files:

The Refugees file, EAD/6 which consists information about Banyarwanda refugees during their expulsion in 1982-84.

The Diocesan Council file - with Diocesan business and minutes of the various meetings.

Government file GNDR/R12 and Political Affairs file: consist of Government correspondence with the Church on various issues: refugees, Church invitation letters to government officials to visit the diocese, Church/Government conflict especially during Amin's period.

Bishop's files, EAD/GC/2/23 and in particular file BP. No. 6/1/1 which holds very sensitive letters from Governor Juma Bashir to Bishop Amos during Amin's regime.

2. Parish Archives (East Ankole Diocese).

These are located at the oldest parishes (now Archdeaconry centres) in the diocese especially at Ibanda, Kinoni, Ruharo cathedral, Kitunga and Kabwohe (the last two Archdeaconries are in West Ankole Diocese). They contain records of the local churches such as church councils and committee minutes, teachers' records, baptism registers, preachers registers and marriage registers.

3. West Ankole Diocese Archives.

These are held at Bweranyangi cathedral. They do not contain much useful information and not much effort and interest has been put in to organise them. Despite being a recent diocese (created in 1977) there were no relevant files to look at.

4. Namirembe Archives.

These are being restored at the Provincial Headquarters Namirembe, Church of Uganda. In particular the files below were useful. They contain correspondence between Archbishops, Brown, Eric Sabiiti and Janan Luwum to other diocesan Bishops or Government officials:

Bishop of Ankole A6 (a), 1960-1969/Leslie Brown and Eric Sabiiti - 160/12.

Conference for ministers C/10 1970-1973/ Eric Sabiiti and Janani Luwum - 1970/12.

Archbishop's personal letters 1974-75/Janani Luwum - 25/2.

Anglican Church - Central Administration, A/4, 1975-77/Janani Luwum - 149/11.

B. Roman Catholic Church.

1. Mbarara Diocese Archives.

Located at the Ageteraine office, Nyamitanga, Mbarara. Unfortunately the Diocesan Chancellor denied me access.

Government Archives.

1. Kamukuzi Archives.

Located at the District Commissioner's office, Kamukuzi. Most of the material was destroyed during the 1979 war. Only a few files survived. See Religious Affairs files:

Catholics, RA, R/2 1971 and MNS 2/2 and in particular file No. MSN 1.

These contain correspondence letters with the governments since 1960. Some of these files were not labelled and could only be identified by the dates of the letters inside and the signatures.

Protestants: Only one file, MNS/6/4, could be identified.

Others files: see UNLF/A (197-1980) file which contains information about the initial beginnings of the Uganda National Front/Army; UPC file, contains party correspondence and in particular see the Youth File, Youth/DC, YD/C1 which contains information on Banyarwanda and their expulsion in 1982-1984.

Note that at the time of research the Kamukuzi archives were under rehabilitation, so it is likely that some of the information given above might have changed.

2. Bushenyi Archives.

Located at the District Commissioner's office, Bushenyi. Many files were destroyed during the 1979 war and those, which survived, are not organised. Useful files are:

Catholic file: It contains useful correspondence between the Catholic Church and the UPC District Officials during the 1980s. This file is particularly important in that it reveals the tension between the Catholic Church and the UPC government especially in Bushenyi.

Protestant file: Contains mainly various invitation letters from the Bishop of West Ankole Diocese to the District Official/ MPs either to a fund-raising or to a particular Church Service.

3. Uganda Government Archives, Entebbe.

Archival series: Class A 24 and A 15. Consists of material about the British colonial administration in Ankole. I visited these archives but again they were not relevant for my period of study. Most of the files closed in the sixties and not much progress has gone since then.

UNITED KINGDOM

1. Church Missionary Archives (CMSA), Birmingham University Library, Heslop Room.

Archival series G.3 A7 (1898-1934), consisting of correspondence between Uganda CMS mission and the CMS headquarters in London and of original annual letters of individual European missionaries who worked in Ankole and elsewhere in Uganda. Apart from looking at these archives, I did not particularly use them. They did not contain useful information as far as my research period was concerned.

2. International Missionary Council Archives (IMCA): Africa 1910-45.

Located at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Archives Box 259 on East Africa, Uganda, consisting of correspondence about education in Uganda. Again this was not relevant my period of study, thus the reason I do not provide detailed file information.

3. The Clayton family letters.

A collection of private letters written in Ankole by the Rev. Herbert Clayton (one of the CMS missionary pioneers in Ankole) and his wife Hilda to their families in England. They are now kept by their families Enid, Margaret and Muriel at their home at Kendal in Cumbria, England.

NEWS PAPERS

Busesire

This was a local newspaper in the sixties. It means enlightenment, perhaps reminding Bahima that times are gone when Bairu were instruments of exploitation. It reported on the 'mass baptisms' of 1962.

See articles: 8 April 1962, 16 April 1962.

New Vision

A government paper which started in 1986 after the NRM take over. However it is not strictly censored by the government as was the case with the previous regimes. On the whole its reports tend to be balanced.

Articles referred to: 12 September 1989, 1 August 1993, 10 July 1993, 13 August 1993, 23 September 1993, 14 October 1993, 22 November 1993, 23 November 1993, 12 December 1993, 15 December 1993, 17 December 1993, 2 October 1997,

Orumuri

A weekly local vernacular paper in Ankole.

See articles especially about the Obugabe: 23-29 August 1993, 6-12 September 1993, 25-31 October 1993, 29 November-5 December 1993, 20-27 December 1993

The People

A UPC newspaper. It reported favourably about the government. It was very active in the sixties and obviously was banned during Amin's time. It contains scattered information on the debate about the monarchy in Ankole in the sixties. See especially newspapers of June-September 1967.

The Monitor

An independent paper which started in the early years of the NRM regime. It is a very good paper which provides an alternative to the government view. It is widely read.

Articles referred to: 23 July 1993, 3 September 1993, 15 April 1994, 2 October 1997,

The Uganda Times

A Government paper during the UPC regime in the eighties.

Articles consulted: 28 May 1980, 17 June 1980, 15 June 1980, 27 October 1982

Uganda Argus

It was the main government paper in the sixties and part of the seventies.

Articles referred to: 2 February 1971, 25 August 1971, 11 October 1971

Uganda Confidential

A weekly independent and controversial paper. Its readership is still limited to the urban centres. It refers itself as 'a paper that splits the atom' in its campaign against corruption:

See article: 13-20 December 1993

Weekly Topic

A weekly independent paper which started in the early years of NRM's regime.

Articles referred to: 8 April 1987, 20 March 1992, 23 July 1993, 3 December 1993, Year-Enders 1993, 26 November 1996.

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