

language in Costa Rica. As such, education diplomacy is one of the most explicit methods of performing public diplomacy given the considerable rhetoric that such organisations attract. Indeed the PRC's diplomats around the world appear eager to discuss these institutes when relaying their local public diplomacy. Furthermore, the strategic decision to make the Institute at UCR as visible as possible on campus fits well with analysis of the choice of location for the new stadium, for the PRC has an interest in being as visible as possible in the activities it is conducting in Costa Rica.

The increasing number of students enrolled can also be considered a positive indication of civic interest in the PRC, with the institute's affiliation to Renmin University in Beijing only adding to that prestige. However, that the two nations remain largely unfamiliar with each other is apparent in the statement of Professor Rodriguez that there would be issues housing Chinese students with local families should the ties extend. As a source of explicit public diplomacy therefore the PRC has gone beyond the Taiwanese in Costa Rica both in terms of opportunity for international exchange that they have delivered and the opportunities to promote cultural and linguistic understanding between the two people. However, whether the opportunities presented by the PRC in Costa Rica have been noticed elsewhere in Central America remains unclear.

Engagement with Costa Rica's Domestic Media

A foreign government's use of domestic media to further their own ends developed alongside the growth of mass literacy and mass circulation newspapers. For example, Bourne comments on how, in 1840 when Britain and France were involved in a power struggle over what is now known as the Middle East, Lord Palmerston, the British Prime Minister at the time, directed the British Minister in Stuttgart to use newspaper *Allgemeine Zeitung* to 'keep the Germans right' (Bourne, 1982: 481). Indeed, history provides us with stories of media being clandestinely funded by foreign governments in search of domestic mouthpieces. One example of

pertinence to this research is the US government's channelling of funds through its National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to support Nicaragua's *La Prensa* newspaper during the so-called 'Contra' War of the 1980s (see Kinzer, 1991; North, 1985). Thus, the use of their domestic media to communicate with the public of a foreign country is one of the most explicit forms of public diplomacy, although in many cases it has existed outwith the remit of public diplomacy institutions in the source country.

Since 2007 the PRC has sought to use the domestic media of Costa Rica to communicate objectives and promote understanding to their audience. This strategy has added importance for the PRC given the lack of impact being made by China Central Television, Xinhua News Agency, China Radio International (CRI), and other Chinese international broadcasting organisations (see Rawnsley, 2009).³⁹ The PRC's engagement with the domestic media has clearly been orchestrated from within the PRC embassy in San Jose, using predominantly radio and print thus far as part of a strategy to highlight four agendas to the Costa Rican people, namely that the PRC: is a peaceful international actor; who stands up for under-developed states like themselves; has a rich cultural history; and wants to be a friend to Costa Rica. Thus, we see an attempt by the PRC to create empathy with their audience, one of the central emotions of sentiment and a key theme of public diplomacy. As such, this section will provide critical analysis of two case studies from instances when the PRC has utilised the Costa Rican media as part of its public diplomacy approach. Representing radio and print the two studies aim to demonstrate the variety of the PRC's approach. However, in keeping with the structure of previous sections, contextual discussion of Taiwan during its incumbency will be provided first.

³⁹ In 2007 Xinhua opened a small bureau in San Jose. However this appears to be for the reporting the 'progress' being made in Costa Rica to audiences in the PRC. When I asked Armando Mayorga about Xinhua's local presence he was surprised as he was not aware such an office existed and certainly no approach had been made by either the news agency or *Nacion* to work closer together (Mayorga, 2011). For more on Xinhua bureau expansion, see Xin (2009 and 2010).

Taiwan has also sought close ties with Central American journalists and did so in Costa Rica until the break in diplomatic ties between the two nations in 2007. I conducted an interview on this subject with Armando Mayorga (2011), the long-standing Editor-in-Chief of Costa Rica's highest circulating daily newspaper *Nacion* (Rockwell and Janus, 2003). Given his long service to *Nacion*, Mayorga offered interesting comparisons to Chinese and Taiwanese approaches to the Costa Rican media:⁴⁰

[The Taiwanese] used to send us gifts all the time, for example, calendars, and they used to invite us to parties and so on. Now, with China, both we and they stand-off. We have said to them that they must understand that this is how we work and that the relationship between the countries is very new. But with Taiwan we needed to say to them, 'please respect that we have an ethics code'. For example, we must report and log all gifts that we receive which cost more than 3,000 Colones (\$7). For example, about two months ago the Japanese embassy gave me this pen, which is fine, but with Taiwan, we had to say to them to stop (Mayorga, 2011).

Mayorga confirmed that Taiwan had attempted to win favour with Costa Rican journalists through the use of strong interpersonal relationships and that on occasion the team at *Nacion* had been approached to stop a story being published. He was also aware that such relations could compromise journalistic integrity and was keen to highlight the measures that had been put in place to protect against such accusations. Mayorga also confirmed that the press office of the Taiwan embassy had regularly sent *Nacion* ready-prepared copy of stories involving Taiwan but that a lack of relevance to Costa Rica meant that they were rarely published. *Nacion* had from time-to-time covered stories involving Taiwan's contribution to development assistance in Costa Rica, but Mayorga confirmed that the Taiwanese did not put

⁴⁰ Mayorga has first-hand experience in dealing with both the Taiwanese and the PRC as both a journalist and then editor for Costa Rica's most reputable media organisation. (Mayorga, 2011)

pressure on the newspaper to publish (Mayorga, 2011). However, that the Costa Rican media were quick to label the bridge over the Tempisque river 'the backstab bridge' goes some way to emphasising that Taiwan did have a degree of sympathy from some corners of the establishment.

Thus, Taiwan's cultivation of Costa Rican journalists had very limited impact on the media coverage of Taiwan. Indeed, there is a consistency between the interview with Mayorga and a search of the *Nacion* online archives, namely that coverage of Taiwan primarily followed three related and overwhelmingly negative frames: Costa Rica's diplomatic relationship with Taiwan as unusual in the international context; Taiwan's use of dollar diplomacy (and Costa Rica's readiness to accept monies); and Costa Rica's behaviour at the UN on the issue of Taiwan participation (Mayorga, 2011). Thus, given Mayorga's claim that the stories sent by the Taiwanese lacked relevance to Costa Rica, it is logical to conclude that a more bespoke approach to the content by embassy staff would have improved uptake. This is further indicative of Taiwan's prioritisation of maintaining interpersonal relationships with Costa Rica's establishment and social elite, in this case editors and journalists, and their neglect of positive public sentiment. Contrasting this, the following sections on radio and print will demonstrate the PRC's intention to forge more of a relationship with the Costa Rican people.

Radio: 'Que Conoce de China?'

China Radio International (CRI), founded in 1941 and run by the state, is the sole overseas radio broadcaster of the PRC (CRI, 2011). It broadcasts music and also provides information programmes about the PRC and its international engagement. Prior to 2007 when diplomatic ties were announced, CRI had no bandwidth in Costa Rica. That said, Costa Ricans would have been free to listen on the internet to the Spanish sister-station to CRI, known as '*Radio InterNacional de China*' before 2007.

However, as Rawnsley (2009) has noted, while CRI may have been broadcasting since 1941, its international audience figures remain speculative.⁴¹

In September 2009 the PRC's embassy in Costa Rica offered the prize of an all-expenses paid trip to the PRC for two winners of a radio station competition called 'Que conoce de China?' [What do you know about China?].⁴² Both *Radio Nacional* and *Radio IQ*, who ran the competition, are spoken-word stations delivered by the public-owned National Radio and Television System of Costa Rica (SINARTA) and both, since 2007, have carried content from China Radio International (CRI) (Gonzalez Vargas, 2009). The final of the competition, which received approximately 300 entries between its opening on 25th June and its closure on 31st August, was held on the 18th September 2009, when sixteen top scoring entries were asked questions during a broadcast from the PRC embassy in San Jose. Mauricio Delgado was one of the sixteen finalists at the embassy that day and confirmed that while embassy staff and affiliates watched the competition, it was only Costa Rican voices on the airwaves. As an international research contributor to an anthropological study of indigenous populations being conducted by SOAS, Delgado has lived in the PRC, Vietnam and Cambodia, and said that he entered the competition as he felt that this experience made him well placed to answer questions on the PRC (Delgado, 2011). His synopsis of the event at the embassy is of interest:

The questions were so blatant in terms of their agenda. For example, they asked one guy, 'how long has Tibet been part of China?' And the answer was, I can't remember, but the "correct" answer, the answer they wanted, was something like 1500 years. This happened a few times during the competition, they'd ask questions that had debateable answers (Delgado, 2011).

⁴¹ Wang Yuqing, a journalist from CRI, in a personal communication with the author said that the anticipated audience for CRI programming in Latin America was around 500,000 (Wang, 2010). How CRI have established this number remains unexplained.

⁴² Four second place contestants won a digital camera and ten third place contestants received an MP3 player (Gonzalez Vargas, 2009).

Delgado's description of the political agenda confirms statements made by Alan Pendleton, Vice-president of New World Media Inc. in the USA. Radio stations owned by Pendleton's company were the first to broadcast CRI content in the USA in 1993. He notes:

The first broadcasts were translations of domestic Chinese programmes that were heavy on statistics. It was like listening to the crop report. The Chinese have since grown more sophisticated in their business acumen and their broadcasting. One of the first things they learned was that blatant propaganda doesn't work. CRI has a point of view, but doesn't resort to fabrications. (Pendleton, cited in Rice, 2010)

Given that one requires an educated ear to separate the subtle propaganda from their broadcasts in Costa Rica, Delgado's statement goes some way to confirming the level of contemporary sophistication of PRC international broadcasting.

Thus, the hosting of this radio competition demonstrates reciprocal engagement with Costa Rica's intellectual elite and is thus a major achievement for PRC public diplomacy in Costa Rica. Moreover, that public radio stations in Costa Rica are broadcasting PRC content demonstrates both the influence of the PRC at the executive level of the Costa Rican government, and also a perceived market for these programmes among Costa Ricans, the decision to run a competition called 'What do you know about China?' on Radio *Nacional* and Radio IQ, stations with predominantly educational content, being indicative of an attempt to engage with a highly-educated demographic. Of greatest interest however, is the use of Costa Ricans to tell the PRC story to the listeners. For, as studies on source authority and credibility explain, one of the factors improving audience reaction is cultural similitude between orator and audience. This is part of what Kelman and Hamilton

(1989: 151) call the orator's 'aura of legitimacy', a concept underpinned by Aristotle's notion of 'ethos' (Aristotle [c350BC], cited in Erickson, 1974).

Newspapers: The Ambassador Addresses the Nation

Given the focus of Central American television on entertainment, and radio's regurgitation of stories from other media (Rockwell and Janus, 2003), academic studies of political reportage from the region have tended to focus on the print media (for example, Jones, 2002; Kodrich, 2002; Alexander, 2009). Therefore, both Taiwan and the PRC during their respective diplomatic incumbencies in Costa Rica have sought to maintain cordial relations with journalists from the print media, in particular, the country's most widely read and authoritative newspaper, *Nacion*.

Whereas the Taiwanese limited their engagement with the domestic print journalists of Costa Rica to small gifts, dinners, press releases and correcting perceived bias or untruths in reporting, the PRC has developed a considerably more advanced press engagement strategy since 2007. A noticeable advance occurred following the appointment of Li Changhua as Chinese Ambassador to Costa Rica on 6th January 2010. Li came from the post of Ambassador to Colombia, and had held the same post in Chile from 2003 to 2007 during which time the two governments had signed an FTA (Murillo, 2010a). Beginning on 27th July 2010, Li, through arrangement with *Nacion*,⁴³ began to write a quarterly article in the newspaper in which he addressed the Costa Rican people directly. Until then, the media's engagement with the ambassador or other embassy officials had been through face-to-face interviews, telephone and email conversations or interaction with the embassy press department (Mayorga, 2011). However, there is a direct correlation between Li's arrival in Costa Rica and *Nacion* beginning to publish unedited copy from the PRC embassy.

⁴³ Editor of *Nacion*, Armando Mayorga, did not reveal how the arrangement had been reached (Mayorga, 2011). However, in early 2012 it was revealed that similar content carried by the Washington Post and New York Times on the PRC had been paid for by the PRC's American Embassy (see Powell, 2012).

The appointment of a seasoned Chinese diplomat with experience in Latin America as ambassador highlights the prestige held by the PRC for its relations with Costa Rica. What is more, given that FTA talks were to begin in Costa Rica in 2010, it is clear that Li was brought in for his credentials in handling negotiations of this nature to their successful conclusion. This tactic of addressing the people directly represents a departure from Li's engagement with the Chilean and Colombian publics (he did not have a column in either *El Mercurio* (Chile) or *El Tiempo* (Colombia)), although more research is required as to whether this was a result of lack of opportunity rather than strategy. However, while it cannot be known whether Li wrote the columns in *Nacion* himself or whether they were produced by script writers in the embassy press office, given his fluency in Spanish the former should be suspected.

At the time of writing Li had published in *Nacion* six times, with each article addressing issues of both general and specific importance to Costa Rica (see Appendix D). Therefore, to understand this method of conducting public diplomacy, it is worthwhile conducting a thematic analysis of the language used by Li in these articles. What follows is a discussion of the various inter-related themes of the PRC's wider foreign policy as found in the six articles. These include: the PRC as a peaceful international actor; the PRC as leader of the global south or undeveloped world; and the promotion of greater understanding of the PRC. Each of these will now be discussed in turn.

On 1st October 2010, Li entitled his address to the Costa Rican people 'Desarrollo pacifico' [peaceful development], as the PRC sought to explain to the readers of *Nacion* that, "The China of today ties closely to the interest of the larger world, it is an important participant and entrepreneur in the international system, and it has become a significant force in the safe-guarding of world peace and promotion of joint development" (Li, 2010b). This theme of peaceful development is prevalent in most of the articles written by Li, and further examples include, "the

Nation Stadium of Costa Rica, donated by China, is an obvious expression of diplomacy, the ideal of peaceful development and the construction of a harmonious world” (Li, 2011b); and, “the ascent of China is being carried out peacefully, and instead of implying a threat to the world, generates opportunities for its economic development.” (Li, 2011d)⁴⁴

That the PRC affirms its peaceful intentions within the rhetoric of public diplomacy on a regular basis suggests a number of points. First of all, and most importantly, it shows that there is a need to counter the perceived Western bias regarding the PRC’s rise being dangerous to the stability of the international system. Related to this, but more specific to Costa Rica, the PRC’s claims of having peaceful intentions reflects Costa Rica’s tendency to ‘look north’ with the sources of their international newswires being in North America and Western Europe, not Asia.⁴⁵ Finally, content of this nature is a reminder that the diplomatic relationship between the PRC and Costa Rica is still in its infancy and that reassurances of the well-intended nature of the relationship may assist in the construction of mutual understanding and friendship.

An interesting albeit controversial way to gauge response to Ambassador Li’s theme of peaceful development is to read the commentaries that readers can post on *Nacion*’s website having read the articles online. Two readers posted sizeable passages of feedback having read the ‘desarrollo pacifico’ [peaceful development] article (Li, 2010b) Both were sceptical but for different reasons; one focused on the PRC’s growing need for natural resources as the overriding reason for the

⁴⁴ The phrases ‘peaceful development and ‘peaceful rise’ have both been used to describe the PRC’s intent as it moves up the global ladder. The latter was coined by Zheng Bijian the then Deputy Head of the Central Party School and subsequently received official sanction after being used by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. The phrase has since fallen out of favour and been replaced by ‘peaceful development’ after leaders, worried that critics would see the word ‘rise’ as threatening, changed the wording to ‘development’. (Zakaria, 2009)

⁴⁵ Armando Mayorga confirmed that *Nacion* has contractual relationships with AP, AFP, Reuters and EFE but not with the likes of Xinhua. Furthermore, to confirm the assertion of Waisbord (2000) that Latin American journalists ‘look north’ for examples of quality reportage, Mayorga stated that those publications most regaled at *Nacion* included the New York Times (USA), El Pais (Spain), CNN (USA), and the BBC (UK) (Mayorga, 2011).

development of their international relations; and the other following a more political line of criticism for the PRC's authoritarian government and his own government's eagerness to partner with the PRC. He signs off by saying, "Caution. Think. Do not let ourselves be deceived as easily as the politicians in power" (Aadrianov Castro, cited in Li, 2010b).

The second theme to highlight is the notion of the PRC as leader of the global south. This approach is reminiscent of Chinese attempts to foster relations with non-aligned countries during the Cold War where the PRC sought to offer an alternative to the neo-liberal policies proscribed by US hegemony but also to Soviet expansionism. As such, while the PRC has enjoyed accolades for becoming the second largest economy in the world, it has been keen to emphasise to the states of Asia, Latin America and Africa that it remains an under-developed country, albeit one advancing quickly. This demonstration of what is widely described as 'south-south' solidarity has been discussed by the likes of Le Pere (2008) and Strauss (2009) when analysing the PRC's relations with Africa. Indeed, on China – Africa relations, Le Pere writes:

This refrain often takes the form of a shared historical experience with other developing countries [vis-à-vis Western Imperialism], but there is also frequent reference to the importance of solidarity, self-reliance, shared purpose, and cooperation with other developing countries as foundational elements of its foreign policy. These values, in turn, are locked in a dialectical interplay with China's definition of its self-image, national interest and world view (Le Pere, 2008: 20).

Thus, we see the PRC using itself as a reference point for nation-states in Africa to encourage reverence from the underdeveloped world. This is also found in Li's articles in Costa Rica's *Nacion*. The following are some selected quotations from Li.

Being developing countries and lovers of peace, China and Costa Rica face the same task of promoting economic development and improving the people's standard of living (Li, 2010b).

In the course of sixty years since the foundation of the People's Republic, the Chinese government has forged cooperation between developing countries. In helping them to develop their economies and improve the living conditions of the people, this has deepened the friendship between China and these countries, and promoted south-south cooperation (Li, 2011b).

Focusing on issues that are hoped will create empathy between the source and the target audience is a basic and well-known tactic of persuasion (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989). Indeed, on the specific issue of climate change, Li goes a little further, criticising the irresponsible behaviour of developed states since the advent of industrialism, and in so doing, affirms the PRC's status as a fellow underdeveloped country. In addition, given that the promotion of environmental issues has become Costa Rica's 'niche diplomacy'⁴⁶ and that it desires to be the world's first carbon neutral country (Lean and Kay, 2008), this aspect of Chinese public diplomacy seeks to build upon the national stereotype of Costa Ricans being conscientious environmentalists: "The accumulated emissions of China are only 9% of the world and its emissions per capita are not even a quarter of that of the United States. The developing countries, including China, are very conscious of not committing the great errors of developed countries of irresponsibly not limiting their emissions" (Li, 2011a).⁴⁷

The PRC has been required to demonstrate multiple international personalities in its public diplomacy. While still classified as an underdeveloped state, in the

⁴⁶ Foreign Minister Rene Castro Salazar indicated this commitment to environmental diplomacy in a talk at the LSE in January 2011 (Castro Salazar, 2011). For more on niche diplomacy see Henrikson (2004).

⁴⁷ The timing of the Ambassador's engagement with Costa Rica on this issue is also interesting given the accusations of Chinese sabotage after the Copenhagen (2009) and Cancun (2010) rounds of the United Nations Climate Change Conferences (see Lynas, 2009).

coming years it will come under increasing scrutiny as its development continues. That it should be considered outside this group of developed states is therefore essential to its ability to invoke south-south compassion and thus the overall credibility of this public diplomacy strategy. Indeed, while there will always be those who consider this policy lacks credibility, the longer the PRC can pressure developed states on their environmental record and deflect criticism of its own contemporary issues the longer their empathy with the underdeveloped world will remain credible.

The third purpose of Li's articles has been to generate understanding of the PRC. This is partially due to the perceived negative bias that the PRC believes to be prevalent in western media discourse (Paradise, 2009; Zhang, 2009), but also reflects an independent public diplomacy strategy to raise awareness of the PRC. As such, Li Changhua has sought to encapsulate the PRC to audiences that may consider the PRC to be a relatively unknown or worrisome entity. Given the infancy of relations between Costa Rica and the PRC therefore, Costa Ricans can be included in this description. What is more, from analysis of Li's articles, there are three agendas running through his approach to increase understanding of the PRC: to legitimise the political sovereignty of the CCP; to alleviate scepticism surrounding the PRC's international enterprise; and to highlight the rich culture of the PRC. What follows are examples which emphasise each of these themes.

Thanks to its capacity to include all social forces in the political system, this system [of governance] totally reflects public opinion and the interests of different social sectors, so as to guarantee popular democracy and freedom of expression [...] It puts emphasis on the democratic consultation between the governing party and the participant parties [...] eliminating the instability of frequent political changes and minimising internal friction to combine fairness and effectiveness, while avoiding the defects of dictatorship. (Li, 2011c)

This quotation discusses what Naisbitt and Naisbitt (2010) call 'vertical democracy': where political society is structured by layers, each layer voting for their representative at the layer above. As such, this is a good example of Li trying to legitimise the political sovereignty of the CCP. However, given that Costa Rica operates a representative democracy, use of the term 'democracy' to describe the PRC's political structure is unhelpful for audience comprehension. Li's usage of familiar terms such as 'popular democracy' and 'freedom of expression' should therefore be considered an attempt to legitimise the PRC's government in the eyes of the Costa Rican public. However, the credibility of this approach remains to be seen.

Scepticism of the long-term sustainability of the PRC's economic rise after the reforms of the Deng administration has been well documented (Naisbitt and Naisbitt, 2010; Leonard, 2008; Garrison, 2005; Medvedev, 1986). The PRC's rise has received criticism from media across the world on issues such as poor working conditions, unpaid or low wages, corrupt practices, and competition from cheap Chinese made goods in the domestic market.⁴⁸ As a consequence, the PRC's public diplomacy has sought to frame its growing international footprint as positive for the world economy. For example, on the issue of the PRC's \$1.5 billion dollar investment in the Costa Rican state-owned oil company RECOPE, Li wrote that investment in the refinery, "will be a highly advanced and environmentally friendly project of bilateral cooperation in the region. While it will generate extra [oil] availability for

⁴⁸ In late 2009 the *New York Times* ran a ten article series called 'Uneasy Engagement' which examined issues surrounding the emergence of the PRC as a world power (see Wines et al., 2009). The articles that focused on PRC investment in under-developed countries focused on Africa and Asia, however, the issues discussed are of pertinence to Latin America given that they highlighted how the people's initial feelings of anticipation from the investment forthcoming soon changed to frustration and bitterness. In addition, during my time in Costa Rica, *Nacion* ran a large feature article from a Senegalese journalist entitled, 'China's African Front: In the style of Apartheid, Chinese managers impose atrocious conditions on African workers' (Mbaye, 2011). This article is representative of the unease many Costa Ricans feel towards PRC investment. Issues such as these have considerable history. For example, during the 1891-1892 the Silver Bow Trades and Labor Assembly, in coalition with the Butte Miners' Union in Montana, USA launched a boycott of all Chinese and Japanese businesses over what it called the 'fight against the lowering Asiatic standards of living and of morals' (cited in Flaherty, 2003:394). Awareness of negative publicity such as this most likely plays a role in PRC need to apply positive rhetoric to its international activities.

the country, the exchange and cooperation between our peoples will be extended incessantly" (Li, 2011b).

This quotation demonstrates the commitment of the PRC to reassuring Costa Ricans that PRC investments are a cooperative act for the betterment of both countries. Therefore, in the case of the RECOPE deal, while one is able to argue that the primary concern of the PRC, and that of any other country in this situation, is the security of access to natural resources, Li's linkage of foreign economic investment to an opportunity for international social interaction is indicative of an attempt to frame such activities as acts of public diplomacy under the rhetoric of 'mutual benefit'. Consequently, it can be deduced that the PRC, in awareness of the debate over their rise, has sought to alleviate fears that its investment in Costa Rica will replicate the apparent confrontations that have occurred elsewhere.

Finally, although Li's public diplomacy regarding the richness of Chinese culture and heritage has been somewhat marginalised in Costa Rica by the greater prevalence of the themes discussed above, this theme can still be seen in some of Li's articles. For example,

China is one of the ancient civilisations of the world. With more than 5,000 years of history and an extremely numerous population, it has undergone transformations as complicated as they are winding, from a poor and economically enclosed country with a political system of feudal monarchy, to a modern, open, democratic and friendly one (Li, 2011d).

The giant knot located above the entrance to the [national] stadium implies union, luck, and affection. Demonstrating a rich cultural content, it constitutes a traditional cultural sign of the Chinese nation (Li, 2011b).

That these statements appear less regularly in the Costa Rican media than the other themes of PRC public diplomacy discourse is not surprising. Given that few

Costa Ricans could afford the substantial costs of travel to the PRC,⁴⁹ the likelihood of independent travel is slim. Hence Li has strategically given greater attention to the PRC's political and economic priorities in the region.

In concluding this section there is, first of all, a need to acknowledge that while limitations exist in the capacity of all countries' international broadcasting institutions to engage with foreign audiences, the PRC's institutions appear less capable of reaching foreign publics than their equivalents in Western nation-states.⁵⁰ Indeed, while the rhetoric of those working for the PRC's international broadcasters tends to be positive towards the performance of CCTV, CRI and Xinhua on the international stage (Wang, 2010), the reality is that the PRC depends more on agreements with domestic broadcasters if they are to reach a significant audience for their messages. Therefore, while officials from the PRC might try to skew information by providing figures of 'estimated' or 'potential' audience size, the embassy staff's elusiveness on the issue is indicative of their recognition of the limitations of the PRC's international broadcasting.

In addition, it may be argued that the PRC has pursued a considerably more professional relationship with the media in Costa Rica than Taiwan did during its incumbency. Indeed, that the editor-in-chief of the most important media organisation in Costa Rica was required to tell Taiwan of the need to respect the impartiality of journalists is evidence of discomfort with the informal approach used by the Taiwanese. Furthermore, if anything was gained from this approach it was nullified by the provision of largely non-newsworthy material. It is difficult to deduce whether this was a consequence of negligence, ignorance or apathy on the part of the Taiwanese. However, given previous discussions of Taiwan's prioritising of the audience back home and of relationships with executive officials in its formal allies, one is tempted towards the latter. In stark contrast, the PRC has established a

⁴⁹ A return airfare costs around US\$1600, approximately a quarter of the average annual wage in Costa Rica.

⁵⁰ For example, Rawnsley (1996) has documented the remarkable success and lasting legacy of the BBC World Service and Voice of America in its broadcasting over the 'iron curtain' to Eastern Europe during the Cold War.

process of strategic engagement with the Costa Rican public in what is a considerable attempt to generate empathy and knowledge of their version of Chinese history. What is more, through strategic engagement with the domestic media they have been able to attract an audience, a crucial component in effective public diplomacy.

Chinese Diaspora in Costa Rica

Researchers such as Rawnsley (2009) and Zhu (2010) have discussed Beijing's intention to build positive sentiment with the considerable Chinese Diaspora around the world. However, this has proved somewhat difficult with the PRC encountering anti-Beijing sentiment, as Asian economics commentator Dan Biers notes on Panama:

The community typically have been pro-Taiwan because of its allegiance to the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party, which ruled until Chen's opposition victory last year. That support is fading now, partly because of the fall of the KMT and an influx of new immigrants from the Chinese mainland. Beijing's representative in Panama is working hard to win the community over and Taiwan diplomats say they are concerned. (Biers, 2001: 18)

Given the age of Biers comments it is not unreasonable to suggest that the formal diplomatic presence of the PRC in Costa Rica from 2007 onwards will have strengthened the PRC's ability to engage with the Chinese Diaspora in Costa Rica and perhaps elsewhere in the region. However, no academic research has been conducted into the Chinese Diaspora in Costa Rica and so we must turn to the work of Siu Lok (2005), an academic from the Chinese community in Panama to improve our clarity of this situation in Central America. On the Chinese community in Panama, she wrote in 2005 that they, "range in generational, class, religious, occupational, linguistic, and regional backgrounds, not to mention their extremely diverse racial-ethnic make-up and cultural identifications, attitudes and behaviours. Despite this diversity, they maintain a collective identification with being culturally

Chinese, broadly defined, and at the same time they feel deeply connected to Panama” (Siu, 2005: 33).

Chinese migration to Central America occurred in waves following four historical events which should be considered as push and pull factors: the California Gold Rush (1848); The Chinese Exclusion Act in the USA (1882); the victory of the CCP in the Chinese civil war (1949); and, Deng Xiaoping’s reforms (1978). While Siu’s comments are also correct for Costa Rica in that the Chinese Diaspora do range in regional heritage, most are southern Chinese from coastal regions such as Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (Lin, 2011). These are the regions with greatest exposure to the colonial powers and international mercantilism, and where Beijing governments have traditionally lacked influence (Pye, 1992; Siu, 2005).

Hence, almost all mass-migration from the Chinese mainland has been as a consequence of political upheaval or economic destitution. Consequently, engagement with these groups presents a challenge for the PRC in Costa Rica as such movement since 1949 has been ultimately symbolic of a rejection of the CCP’s rule. Moreover, that the majority of Diaspora originate from regions towards the periphery of Beijing’s influence has made them unlikely to uncritically accept the contemporary presence and public diplomacy exploits of the PRC in Costa Rica. Recognising this, part of Beijing’s strategy in Costa Rica has been to at the very least nullify the threat of backlash but potentially to win the hearts and minds of this important social group. However, the influx of a new generation of Chinese Diaspora who have arrived in countries not as refugees but at the encouragement of Beijing has weakened this dynamic.

On Panama Siu (2005) explained that, “many expressed a sense of connection with the Taiwanese government based on memories of their family’s experience with Communist China. Others feel a deep indebtedness to the Taiwanese for their

many years of support and collaboration. I must emphasise however that the concern lay not in what would happen to Taiwan per se [if Panama were to recognise the PRC], but rather Chinese state representation in Panama” (Siu, 2005: 182). As such, the Chinese Diaspora is as much a threat as they are an asset to the PRC in Central America. However, if the same trajectory is retained then it can reasonably be said that there will be growing empathy for the PRC in years to come.

Competition for influence over the Chinese Diaspora is therefore an area of increasing importance for both the PRC and Taiwan in Central America. As a result, one of the focuses of this research was to understand the extent of this allegiance following Taiwan’s departure in 2007. I asked the manager of the China Association of Costa Rica, Lin Hsiao, about the relationship between the PRC and the Chinese Diaspora:

The China Association does not include or exclude anyone, Chinese or Taiwanese. We are all Chinese here. Before 2007, when Taiwan had the embassy, they provided lots of assistance to the Association. For example, when there was a party they would always ask how they can help. But now it has changed and China is here and they do not help.

We invited them to have a party when they arrived but they did not want to come. They said that they would only provide assistance and come to the party if we put a Chinese flag on the building. [...] We are an independent organisation including all people with Chinese heritage, the Chinese embassy wanted to make a political statement. (Lin, 2011b)

Additionally, in 2009 the mayor of Beijing, Guo Jinlong, and Costa Rican President Oscar Arias laid the founding stone of a proposed China Town in San Jose. However the Diaspora perceived this to be a hollow gesture given that a large proportion of San Jose’s Chinese population already live around the area of Paseo de los Estudiantes (*Inside Costa Rica*, 2009; Lin, 2011b), there businesses and community

making it a China Town by default. Thus, the PRC have attempted to politicise that which already was a working entity.

It should also be remembered that the PRC's embassy in Costa Rica is involved in a legal battle over the term 'Instituto Confucio' with the China Association who have been using the term to head the language and cultural courses that are run from the Association's headquarters. Additionally, there has been the docking of the Peace Ark in Puntarenas where the Chinese Diaspora have a sizeable community. Therefore, given the research by Siu and additions made by this research in Costa Rica, it can be determined that the scepticism discussed by the Diaspora community surrounding a PRC incumbency has been validated by the reality of China's engagement in Costa Rica. It can therefore be said that, as of writing, the Chinese Diaspora cannot be considered a public diplomacy asset of the PRC in Costa Rica. Indeed, it is arguable that such public diplomacy events as the docking of the Peace Ark in Puntarenas are as much a demonstration of the PRC's intended compassion towards the Chinese Diaspora as they are to the people of Costa Rica.

Challenges for the PRC's Public Diplomacy

While most of those studying the PRC's modern diplomacy agree that positive inroads have been made across the world (for example, Brautigam, 2009; D'Hooge, 2005 and 2007; Rawnsley, 2009; Wang, 2008; Zhu, 2010), for greater understanding of the success of their public diplomacy in Costa Rica it is worthwhile developing a discussion of the context within which the projects analysed above have occurred. This is because, as Wang notes: "The positive image China hopes to project is constantly overshadowed and undermined by negative headlines of the country's policies and governance. Just recently the expose of yet another spate of food safety scandals prompted Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to lament in the Chinese media that without strengthening culture and morality, "China will never become a truly strong

and respected nation"" (Wang, 2011).⁵¹ Yet, despite the criticisms of the PRC's domestic and international conduct, Taiwan has not been seen to engage on issues like democracy, human rights, or working conditions, where its example has significantly more respect than that of Beijing. This section therefore feeds the main argument of the thesis as it emphasises the extent to which Taiwan is constrained by its diplomatic isolation and the policies of its KMT government.

Consistent with the ethnographic case study approach, this research selected two heavily publicised negative events that have occurred between the PRC and Costa Rica. The first is the visit of Hu Jintao to Costa Rica in November 2008, the first PRC President to come to any Central American country, and the second is the eventual ratification of an FTA between the PRC and Costa Rica in August 2011. While almost certainly intended to be positive and to benefit public diplomacy, both events were overshadowed by blunders which have arguably detracted from whatever positive public sentiment they were intended to generate.

President Hu Jintao comes to Costa Rica

The US Charge d'Affairs in Costa Rica at the time, Peter Brennan, introduced the state visit of Hu Jintao to Costa Rica between 16th and 17th November 2008 in a diplomatic cable to Washington D.C. by saying, "Chinese President arrives like Santa Claus with FTA, balls and bicycles" (Brennan, 2008b). It was the first time a PRC President had ever been to Costa Rica and the historic event received considerably more media attention than the revolving door of visits by Taiwanese Presidents and cabinet ministers to the region.⁵² Indeed, while Hu's distribution of

⁵¹ When the PRC and Costa Rica announced diplomatic relations in summer 2007 a number of stories appeared in *Nacion* discussing the poor quality of Chinese made goods. Stories included sickness and vomiting from toothpaste, food products, and lead poisoning from toys, although the toys had come from US company Mattel's factory in the PRC (see Avalos, 2007a and 2007b; Metzler, 2007).

⁵² With considerably less media coverage due, in part, to the frequency of the visits, President of Taiwan Chen Shui-bian (2000 – 2008) made yearly state visits to Central America during his tenure and attended almost all of the swearing in sessions for new Central American Presidents. For example, following the loss of Costa Rica as a diplomatic ally in June 2007, Chen made trips to Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador in August 2007 and

gifts for young Costa Ricans upon his arrival should be seen as an act of public diplomacy (Murillo, 2008a), Hu made no public address while in the country nor did he attend a press conference, choosing instead to allow embassy staff to issue a statement describing the importance of the FTA that was being discussed during his visit (see Murillo, 2008b and 2008c). Thus, we can deduce that Hu's arrival in Costa Rica was primarily for intergovernmental discussion of economic ties, with public diplomacy as a secondary motive.

However, of greater interest for this research are revelations regarding the Dalai Lama because they help to contextualise Hu's visit to Costa Rica, and the dynamics of the PRC's international affairs more generally. The Dalai Lama had been due to visit Costa Rica in September 2008 at the invite of the *Asociacion Cultural Tibetano – Costarricense* (Tibetan – Costa Rican Cultural Association). His visa was initially granted by the Costa Rican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the visa was withdrawn after a request from the PRC Ambassador to Costa Rica at the time, Wang Xiaoyuan (*Inside Costa Rica*, 2008; Mayorga, 2011; Cerdas, 2008). When interviewed, Mayorga (2011), Delgado (2011), and Holtz (2011) all considered the rejection of the Nobel Peace Prize laureate and spiritual leader to be internationally embarrassing for Costa Rica because Arias himself is a Nobel Peace Prize winner (1987), and denying the Dalai Lama a visa contradicted Costa Rica's projection of pacifism and religious tolerance.⁵³ Hence, the story of the Dalai Lama framed much of the Costa Rican media's reporting of Hu's visit, especially when journalists discovered that President Arias himself had decided to rescind the visa. Maritza Pacheco, President of the Tibetan – Costa Rican Cultural Association, told the media about her telephone conversation with President Arias: "What he said to me exactly was that if the Dalai Lama comes, Hu will not come and that is not convenient for Costa Rica at this time" (Pacheco, cited in *Inside Costa Rica*, 2008).

then to Guatemala and St. Lucia in January 2008, with the purpose of securing diplomatic support (see Luxner, 2007; Office of President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), 2011).

⁵³ Costa Rica's state religion is Catholicism but the constitution speaks of respect for all religions.

The Dalai Lama incident lays bare that appeasement of the PRC must now come before some of the principles Costa Rica has been renowned for. While much of the criticism for the decision was levelled at the Arias administration for causing considerable embarrassment to Costa Rica's international image, the issue raised a number of questions regarding the domestic and international conduct of the PRC and what may be asked of a nation-state so reliant on PRC investment. In particular, it raises questions regarding the PRC's principle of non-interference over issues of sovereignty in the underdeveloped world. Indeed, the PRC has been accused of propping up unsavoury regimes in Sudan and Zimbabwe, although Large (2008) has noted how the PRC has become more of a mediator in recent years. However, at the other end of the spectrum the PRC has been accused of meddling in Presidential elections in Zambia (see Ndulo, 2008). Thus, the incident with the Dalai Lama here must surely sit somewhere between these two extremes. Armando Mayorga also commented on the incident:

Mayorga: Oscar Arias has said to the world that he is a defender of human rights, but when the Dalai Lama tried to come to Costa Rica Arias blocked this due to pressure from China.

Question: Is denying someone entry to a country a human rights issue?

Mayorga: For me it is, it involves freedom, and the Dalai Lama wanted to be here, he wanted to give his message to the people in Costa Rica, but he could not.

Question: But freedom of movement is not always a human rights issue because many countries have strict visa requirements.

Mayorga: But he is a spiritual leader and his mission is to speak to the world about the occupation of Tibet. (Mayorga, 2011)

Thus, the Dalai Lama incident laid bare some of the potential issues of political and economic engagement with the PRC. It also raises questions about the credibility of public diplomacy by such individuals as Ambassador Li Changhua in *Nacion*. Indeed, while the PRC might not apply explicit pressure, the reality is that a government like Costa Rica's may be required to make decisions that are consistent with the PRC's worldview, but which diverge from the core beliefs of their people and traditional allies, if they wish the levels of investment to continue. Thus, this incident demonstrates that the PRC remains somewhat at odds with overwhelming international opinion on some issues, but of equal importance, it highlights contradictions in the PRC's policy of respect for internal sovereignty. Taiwan's views on this matter received no publicity in El Salvador or Guatemala.⁵⁴

The Free Trade Agreement

Although the PRC lacks diplomatic relations with most of Central America, the region has not been immune to its rise as an economic force. Indeed, the opportunities presented by the Chinese economy have been the main focus of the PRC's efforts to create desire for stronger ties amongst Taiwan's diplomatic allies, and this research has argued that it was growing ties with the countries of APEC that was Costa Rica's primary objective for establishing relations with the PRC. The most notable demonstration of the primacy of economics for Costa Rica occurred on 1st August 2011 when, after six rounds of negotiations, the PRC and Costa Rica signed an FTA. However, in similar respects to the negotiation and signing of the Central American and Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) with the USA, public opinion has been divided over the merits of such a strategy. That this had become a national debate was made clear by a close reading of *Nacion*. While the vast majority of Costa Rican politicians and PRC officials addressed the

⁵⁴ This can be said after a close search of the online archives of the two countries mainstream media organisations. The following chapters have more detailed of what these are.

positives of the negotiations (for example Arias, 2007; Li, 2010b),⁵⁵ notable lawyers, economists and academics criticised their actions in *Nacion*, focusing their arguments on issues these include the size difference between the PRC and Costa Rica (Margery, 2007), and the difference in economic growth rate (Sobrado, 2010). However, of particular note was Prof. Patricia Rodriguez Holkemeyer. Rodriguez Holkemeyer's central argument was not with the Chinese in particular or with the theory behind FTAs but that as a small nation-state, Costa Rica should be wary of signing FTAs with countries much larger. She based her critique on Costa Rica's experience of the CAFTA-DR negotiations with the USA. When I interviewed Rodriguez Holkemeyer, I asked her about this:

You know what happened here in Costa Rica, one candidate for the [Costa Rican] Presidency who was against the treaty brought two [Republican] congressmen here from the US about three days before the Presidential elections. They held a press conference explaining how terrible it would be for our countries to subscribe to an FTA [...] I wrote to the paper stating that '[the candidate for the Presidency] should apologise to all Costa Ricans because these two congressmen have said x, y and z in the US. They contradicted themselves because they said that the USA should not allow these FTAs because all the good jobs go to South America (Rodriguez Holkemeyer, 2011).

Thus, for Rodriguez Holkemeyer, Costa Rica should approach any such negotiations with pragmatic caution and be alert to political double-speak.

Given the desire to manage public perceptions through this process, it is not surprising that Beijing moved Li Changhua, their Ambassador to Chile, to Costa Rica in January 2010 (Murillo, 2010a). Li had the experience of working with the Chilean government and managing public perceptions during the negotiations and signing of the PRC - Chile FTA in 2006. However, whereas in Chile the motivation

⁵⁵ In terms of political voices in opposition to the signing of the FTA with the PRC, Mata and Barquero (2011) limit it to just 13 notable politicians, mostly from smaller political parties.

for an FTA was more obvious given the amount of natural resources being imported by the PRC, motivation for a Costa Rica FTA was not so clear. Other than bananas, a small amount of coffee and even less oil, Costa Rica has little to contribute to the PRC's domestic consumption (Zhu, 2010), and cheaper produced products from the PRC would arguably be in free competition with Costa Rican goods which incur greater overheads (*Siglo Veintiuno*, 2011; Zhu, 2010: 105). Costa Rica's motivation for signing an FTA is therefore consistent with its economic strategy towards the countries of the Pacific, and that it should be seen as a willing candidate to join APEC (Leff, 2011). However, the most obvious immediate beneficiary of an FTA between the two is the US owned microchip company *Intel* who will now pay no tax on imports of their semiconductors when they are shipped from their assembly factory in Costa Rica to the PRC for installation into various IT hardware (World Bank Report, 2006).

The FTA will only make the PRC a more appealing entity for those Costa Ricans who look upon it as a business opportunity. Moreover, the FTA highlights the benefit of a wider perspective on such activities, because negotiations with the PRC brought similar divisions within Costa Rican society to the surface as the CAFTA-DR agreement had done in years previous. Therefore, if the Costa Rican people and the media believe that their interests have been damaged by, or are at risk from the Costa Rica – PRC FTA, the credibility of the PRC in conducting other activities within the country may diminish. However, the people's frustration may lie more with their own politicians for failing to do what is best for Costa Rica, as opposed to the PRC who are merely looking after theirs, as occurred in the case of the Dalai Lama's visit.

Conclusion

The PRC has shown itself to be adept at public diplomacy in Costa Rica since it began diplomatic relations with the country in 2007. Indeed, while Costa Rica has

little strategic influence outside of Central America and the Caribbean, its decision to ally with the PRC has increased the international isolation of Taiwan in the region, making it an important part of Beijing's foreign policy in this regard (Zhu, 2010: 6). At the same time, Costa Rica has been eager to expand its ties with Asian markets and to move away from its traditional reliance on the economically stagnant USA and Europe as export markets. Thus, there has been incentive for both parties to make this relationship work.

The public diplomacy activities displayed by the PRC in Costa Rica originate from centrally orchestrated policies in Beijing and we see various other examples of these in other regions of the world. This is what Lieberthal and Lampton (1992) call Beijing's "fragmented authoritarianism" in its diplomacy, where, as Taylor describes, "policy made at the centre becomes ever more malleable to the organizational and political goals of the different parochial and regional agencies entrusted with enforcing [it]" (Taylor, 2009: 5). Thus, we find evidence in Costa Rica of the PRC's embassy being given considerable innovative leeway to devise public diplomacy policy, but within centrally formulated directives. These have been in a combination of implicit and explicit communications styles, their main objective being to strengthen political and economic relations with Costa Rica and Central America generally, but also to demonstrate the PRC's international strength to a domestic audience. Thus, by working around this notion of fragmented authoritarianism conclusions can be drawn that improve general understanding of the PRC's public diplomacy, but also ones that are unique to Costa Rica.

What is more, inspiring the performance of any kind of diplomacy are macro objectives, actions to be taken in best and worst case scenarios, and general strategic planning by government departments. Therefore, if a nation-state is to perform public diplomacy, one prerequisite is the predetermination of a communications strategy that will engage with a foreign and perhaps a domestic public in the manner that is desired. What the message is, how implicit or explicit it is, and the

resulting reception that the message receives will vary, but crucial to its classification as an act of diplomacy is that there is a message being projected in the first place (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995; Zhu, 2010). However, for Taiwan in Costa Rica, neither an explicit nor an implicit message for the Costa Rican public could be identified. For example, Taiwan provided education scholarships for Costa Ricans to study in Taiwan but appeared apathetic towards their uptake and to ensuring positive future relations with the scholarship holders after they returned to Costa Rica. This is illustrative of a disinterest in public engagement and a disregard for public diplomacy as an effective tool of international relations beyond it influencing political decision-makers. More than anything therefore, this represents a failure on the part of Taiwan to understand and accommodate the changing socio-political dynamics of Central America. For if greater concern had been given towards public sentiment in Costa Rica then greater effort would have been made to induce competition for the scholarships and to ensure what social capital the scholarships created was built upon in years to come.

This conclusion feeds into a wider deduction that Taiwan had no real interest in Costa Rica beyond the confirmation of the independent sovereignty its government conferred on Taipei. Thus, the main public audience for Taiwan's public diplomacy in Costa Rica was its domestic public at home. Indeed, while Taiwan maintains trade offices and de-facto embassies in numerous countries around the world, 2007 signified Taiwan's disappearance from the country, and there has been little gesture or rhetoric since.

In contrast, the PRC has out-performed Taiwan in its engagement with Costa Rica since 2007, and has tried to encourage maximum exposure of its policies and interests. This is largely because it does not bear the weight of diplomatic isolation in its international conduct. As such, the PRC has made a genuine attempt to engage with the Costa Rican public both within and out with the political sphere, and has integrated Costa Rica into its centrally strategized approach to public diplomacy.

Thus, similar public diplomacy activities to those discussed in the text above are seen in other regions of the underdeveloped world where Beijing also has political and economic interests. However, the diversity of the activities and the speed with which they have been brought to fruition infers that the PRC has awarded high precedence to this small country because of the considerable regional symbolism the relationship represents.

Most analysts would agree that the PRC's international image has improved since beginning its reforms in 1978 and then again after the backsliding of the Tiananmen incident in 1989 (for example, Bell, 2008; Ellis, 2009; Kent, 2007; Kurlantzick, 2007; Wang, 2008; Zhu, 2010). However, the PRC's public diplomacy will continue to suffer if its behaviour in political, economic and social spheres continues to receive negative publicity. As such, Costa Rica has provided an interesting case study of how the PRC has attempted to overcome such problems. The PRC embassy has used the country's domestic media to communicate with the Costa Rican public, thus overcoming the limitations of its country's own international broadcasting. Indeed, to bring about greater understanding of the PRC and its aims in Costa Rica, Ambassador Li Changhua has utilised the most widely read and most respected newspaper in the country to act as a communication platform for the PRC message. Neither his predecessor Wang Xiaoyuank nor the Ambassadors of other countries in Costa Rica have broadcast in this way and so the approach should be considered somewhat innovative on his part, although instances of this have occurred in other countries where the PRC has substantial interests, the USA for example. The significance of this is threefold; first, it is an indirect admission by the PRC that their international broadcasting continues to lack penetration; second, it reflects the prioritisation given to controlling the content of media spaces regarding the image of the PRC; and finally, it highlights the limitations of the institutional approach to public diplomacy research because such relationships tend to be beyond the influence of central government agencies.

Nevertheless, it remains that without the presence of Taiwan in Central America, Costa Rica would not be the recipient of the multitude of public diplomacy activities in which the PRC has engaged since 2007. Such quantity may dissipate in the coming years depending on the political circumstances involving Taiwan. However, Costa Rica has been a willing recipient of PRC 'gifts' while Taiwan's influence persists in the region. Indeed, while the price of these gifts has only been hinted at thus far, being in the PRC's sphere of influence has required some uncomfortable shifts in strategic posture, the refusal of a visa to the Dalai Lama being the most prolific to date. Thus, the extent of the PRC's public diplomacy is such that it must improve public sentiment towards Beijing, but also induce certain behaviour from the Costa Rican government by creating a degree of dependency on their market.

The decision to recognise the PRC was undoubtedly a personal one for Oscar Arias and his closest advisors, and while one could speculate that Taiwanese public diplomacy surrounding its successful transition to democracy and respect for human rights could have made the decision more publically confrontational for the Arias administration, in all likelihood the outcome would have been the same. It can therefore be argued that Costa Rica was an atypical contemporary ally for Taiwan, given that diplomatic support for Taiwan tends to come from countries with a history of ideological sympathy at the elite level and a lack of professionalism within the civil and diplomatic service. Consequently, Taiwan's public diplomacy was largely insignificant in preventing Costa Rica from approaching the PRC. Costa Rica's decision is indicative of an increase in technocratic positioning by the President, and the culmination of efforts to move the civil and diplomatic service away from politically motivated appointments (Saborio, 2011). Thus, it is arguable that a country making such adjustments is less likely to be an ally of Taiwan. Moreover, as Taiwan is also going through a similar process of diplomatic reform as

it becomes a competitive multi-party democracy, it remains to be seen how this will impact its future diplomatic relations.

Accordingly, while public diplomacy played no role in the acquisition of Costa Rica by the PRC, it has played a major role in consolidating the PRC's influence in Costa Rica, and it is these activities, designed for maximum exposure, that have brought greater public understanding of the PRC. Indeed, where the PRC has arguably met with greatest resistance – its relationship with the Diaspora and the incidents with the Dalai Lama and Torres del Lago after the stadium was completed – dissatisfaction has largely been contained to those in the immediate vicinity, for example, the construction industry.

That the public are of the general opinion that Costa Rica has benefitted from its move to the PRC has therefore been central to this process, as it has largely prevented public backlash to the abandonment of long-term ally Taiwan. Therefore, it can be argued that public diplomacy has only a minor part to play in the actual decision of which entity to diplomatically recognise, but that public diplomacy has a fundamental role to play in consolidating the relationship forthwith.

El Salvador

Introduction

El Salvador, the smallest and most densely populated of the Central American Republics, advances our understanding of public diplomacy in the context of China – Taiwan relations. El Salvador exists in political and ideological disparity, with the centre-left *Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional* (FMLN) competing against the right-wing *Alianza Republica Nacionalista* or ‘ARENA’ party in national elections. As a result, each side of El Salvador’s political divide has clearly favoured either the PRC or Taiwan based on their traditional ideological allegiances (Anderson and Anderson, 1986; Lauria-Santiago and Binford, 2004; Wood, 2003). When contrasting this situation with other Central American states, only Nicaragua offers their electorate a similarly broad spectrum of political options, for in the other countries either the political right continues to dominate or, in the case of Costa Rica, both main parties now occupy the central ground. For the majority of states, this tends to make politics an inter-elite competition between liberals and conservatives lacking in socialist alternatives. What is more, as a result of the left-wing challenge from the FMLN, the ARENA party remains ideologically entrenched towards the extreme right. This is shown clearly in cables written by H. Douglas Barclay, the US Ambassador to El Salvador (2003 – 2006), which were published by *Wikileaks* and reveal the anti-socialist sentiment of former President of El Salvador Elias Antonio Saca (2004 – 2009):

Saca has a visceral dislike for Communism (FMLN, Castro, Chavez), which he blames for having destroyed the country's infrastructure and overall economy during the war years. Saca is proud to say that he smokes only Padron cigars, made by Miami Cubans, and would never smoke a Cohiba. He also vows never to establish formal relations with Cuba so long as Castro is in power (Barclay, cited in *El Faro*, 2011).

Such a principled mind-set towards Cuba would no doubt have comforted the Taiwanese at the time. Indeed, Saca's political and economic outlook is common among much of the region's right-wing capitalists who, as Chasteen (2011) notes, see themselves more as part of an international capitalist class than belonging to one or another small Central American Republic. Thus, allegiances towards the PRC and Taiwan remain firmly divided by political party in El Salvador, with the ARENA party the underwriter of Taiwan's incumbency and the FMLN traditionally more inclined towards the PRC. Consequently, it can be argued that the affection these political parties have with Beijing and Taipei respectively has persisted, particularly in the case of the PRC and the FMLN, because of similar reforms made at similar times in all three countries. This will be discussed in more detail a little later.

Therefore, while the election of Mauricio Funes of the FMLN as President in 2009 was a landmark for El Salvadoran society, it also brought the weaknesses and strengths of the country's relations with Taiwan into focus. Indeed, one of the first acts of the new FMLN government was to announce the resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba, which had been broken after Cuba's socialist revolution in 1959 (AFP, 2009). This led to questions of whether an attempt would be made to split from Taiwan as well (Shih, 2010). As it transpired, El Salvador approached the PRC sometime in mid-2009. However, the current diplomatic truce prevented the switch from occurring (*China Post*, 2009a; DPA, 2009; Stephenson, 2010). This indicates the priority that the ECFA has for the PRC. Thus, while the defection of El Salvador would have been a significant coup for Beijing in Central America, improving relations with Taiwan was clearly of much greater importance. Finally, this demonstrates the extent to which the competition for allies is now only concerned with small nation-states that are and strategically trivial to wider international power politics.

Beyond the concern that Taiwan would have had when the matter came to light (see Young, 2007a), it can be argued that the diplomatic truce offered Taiwan an opportunity to perform public diplomacy without the question of diplomatic security preoccupying its efforts. Thus, with the knowledge that diplomatic relations would not be rescinded at little notice, Taiwan could attempt to build positive sentiment with the Salvadoran public and hopefully win over the new government in the process. However, this chapter will argue that Taiwan's public diplomacy in El Salvador fails to engage in such a way; to the detriment of the Salvadoran public, its primary concern continues to be the support of government officials and the domestic audience in Taiwan.

This chapter begins by summarising relevant contemporary history. Thereafter, the discussion will separate public diplomacy by the different resources being used by Taiwan including infrastructure, medical diplomacy, education diplomacy, domestic media relations and engagement with the Chinese Diaspora. Following this, the PRC's role in El Salvador will be discussed. This has focused around commercial diplomacy. A conclusion addressing some of the key questions set out in the introduction to thesis will complete the chapter.

Taiwan in El Salvador: Its Controversial Past

Two areas immediately stand out when discussing the history of Taiwan's relations with El Salvador: first, its technical assistance to El Salvador; and second, its engagement with right-wing politicians and the El Salvadoran military, what Zhu (2010: 91) calls 'military diplomacy'. Taiwan announced full diplomatic relations with El Salvador in 1961 and established its technical mission in 1971 (Huang, 2011). Until 1979 El Salvador was governed by a military dictatorship and after 1979 by a civilian head of government, although the influence of the military did not

diminish.⁵⁶ Thus, it is as a result of ideological similarities and gratitude for their assistance during the armed conflict that the political right of El Salvador, and the *Alianza Republicana Nacionalista* (ARENA) party in particular, continues to diplomatically support Taiwan.

Furthermore, based on information from other nation-states who have switched their diplomatic recognition across the Taiwan Strait (see Chance, 2012; Chirombo, 2010, Taylor, 2002), it can be argued that the FMLN would have wanted to marginalise Taiwan upon gaining office in 2009 as part of their bid to consolidate political power. After all, this was the first democratic turnover of power from right to left in El Salvador's history. However, the Taiwanese have been saved from de-recognition as a result of the current ECFA between the PRC and Taiwan which guarantees a 'diplomatic truce' (*China Post*, 2008; *Taiwan Today*, 2010). Without the ECFA El Salvador would almost certainly now have a diplomatic relationship with the PRC.

During the 1950s and 1960s both the PRC and Taiwan prioritised the diplomatic allegiance of the newly-independent states of Africa over other underdeveloped states in Latin America and elsewhere (Cooper, 1976; Gilbert, 1963; Hsieh, 1985; Strauss, 2009; Taylor, 2002; Yu, 1963). As a result of El Salvador's allegiance to Washington and its lack of natural resources neither side paid it much attention. Thus, Taiwan's recognition of El Salvador in 1961 was merely symbolic of the empathy between their ideological preferences, rather than a reflection of any growing bi-national trade or other such integration (Anderson and Anderson, 1986). It would not be until the early 1970s when Taiwan's formal international

⁵⁶ El Salvador's right-wing military dictatorship had been imposed on the people following socialist uprisings across Central America in the late 1920s and early 1930s; events from which the likes of Farabundo Marti and Augusto Sandino (Nicaragua) have received political martyrdom (Dunkerley, 1988). As such, according to Karl (1988), the movement from a martial head-of-state back to a civilian one in 1978 after national elections had been held to appoint a constituent assembly, was a key component of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations advice to El Salvador. Aware of the stigma attached to military rule, Washington advised El Salvador that appointing a civilian President would greatly improve the international image of El Salvador, damage the legitimacy of the FMLN fighting against the government, and crucially, make it easier for the US Congress to back proposals for financial and military assistance (Karl, 1998: 174).

relationships had significantly deteriorated in number that the likes of El Salvador and other Central American and Caribbean states would first see an increase in attention.⁵⁷

The inauguration of a technical mission to El Salvador 1971 reflected changes involving both countries. These included the increasing prominence of socialist guerrilla factions operating under the umbrella of the FMLN in El Salvador, and Taiwan's expulsion from the UN in October 1971, the latter being one of the main causes of the deterioration in the number of formal allies that Taiwan could claim.

Operation Vanguard was inaugurated by Taiwan in 1961 and in 1971 a mission was sent to El Salvador. Operation Vanguard sought to teach the peasantry free market economics and how to get the most from the poor land they had been forcibly moved to. Taiwan was therefore assisting El Salvador's right-wing government to consolidate its oligarchy by subduing the communist leanings that might be developing amongst the peasantry.⁵⁸

In addition to technical assistance projects, Taiwan supported and trained El Salvador's military throughout the 1970s and during the country's armed conflict (1980-1992) (Anderson and Anderson, 1986).⁵⁹ From the mid-1970s onwards a

⁵⁷ While the PRC is the 4th largest exporter to El Salvador, trade between El Salvador and Asia as a whole remains minimal (Ministerio de Economía El Salvador, 2012). El Salvador remains heavily reliant on the rest of the Americas to purchase its goods, and this is despite the signing of an FTA between El Salvador and Taiwan in 2008. In 2009, raw sugar was the main product to be exported from El Salvador to Taiwan, the 55,000 tons shipped amounting to around US\$15 million (Central America Data, 2009). This small quantity was put into perspective by the Taipei Representative Office in London who stated that, "nearly 99% of [Taiwan's] trade, cultural, economic and people to people relations are carried out between Taiwan and countries that do not recognise us" (Lin, 2011a).

⁵⁸ Baloyra (1983) notes how El Salvador's particular model of agro-export was based on coerced labour. Like many social, economic and political issues in Central America, the roots of this model of land-holding and the popular disgruntlement that came from it were largely the product of the political crisis in the region during the late 1920s and early 1930s, although it can arguably be traced-back further (see Dunkerley, 1988). What is more, since the end of World War II, land concentration had intensified with the expansion of coffee production and the introduction of non-traditional crops such as cotton, sugar and beef cattle, which were being farmed almost entirely for export. This resulted in the forced migration of more and more peasantry to land less suitable for subsistence farming, and a growing sense of injustice towards the authorities (Bulmer-Thomas, 1987; Williams and Walter, 1997).

⁵⁹ This continues today but on a smaller and arguably less controversial scale, after both countries made improvements to their human rights records (see Chang, 2010).

plethora of senior personnel from politics, the El Salvadoran military and the national defence forces (frequently referred to as 'death squads') would attend the Political Warfare Cadres Academy (PWCA) in Taiwan, and Taiwan would also provide advice and training on the ground in El Salvador. Indeed, according to Anderson and Anderson, Taiwan structured the largely "inefficient" government forces to "infiltrate, expose and liquidate any opposition that may be suspected to exist at any level of society, even down to the family level" (Anderson and Anderson, 1986: 56).

An undisclosed number of military officers and right-wing politicians enjoyed all expenses paid trips to Taiwan to study political and psychological warfare during this period (Anderson and Anderson, 1986: 214). The regard for which Taiwan was held within military and right-wing political circles was epitomised by Lieutenant Colonel Domingo Monterrosa of the Atlacatl battalion. To some Monterrosa was an influential military hero and anti-Communist martyr, and would surely have been a future President of the country, if not for his assassination in 1984. To others his legacy is one of barbarity and war criminality. What is clear however is that in November 1978 Monterrosa returned to El Salvador after completing the 31st political warfare course at the PWCA enthused by his training (Danner, 2005). Monterrosa often talked of his time in Taiwan to Western journalists covering the armed conflict and his graduation certificate from the academy takes pride of place in the room dedicated to him at the Museum of Military History in San Salvador.

Western journalists in the country during the armed conflict called the El Salvador military's approach to the peasantry 'hammer and anvil', a strategy Monterrosa attributed to Taiwan when interviewed by reporter Mark Danner in 1983 (Danner, 2005). Jon Lee Anderson, a US reporter embedded with Monterrosa for a time during 1983, provides some interesting clarity on this tactic:

For several hours, sitting behind a table and using a hand-held microphone, Monterrosa gave the villagers a lesson in consciousness-raising.

“We are your true brothers,” Monterrosa told the peasants. “We’re not caretakers of the rich. Do you see any rich among us? We give our blood to the soil, but it’s up to you to make it fertile.”

Those gathered, however, seemed more interested in the soccer balls that were still in their original grey Spaulding cartons and in the boxes of children’s clothing that the soldiers had stacked beside the table.

One by one, the people stepped forward. As they did, the soldiers distributed clothing and threw out soccer balls.

“Is this Taiwanese?” [Anderson] asked as Monterrosa wrote down the testimonies of the villagers. “This is it.” (Anderson and Anderson, 1986: 215)

Anderson’s observations are interesting on many levels. They demonstrate the astuteness and depth of importance that the El Salvador, and by default Taiwanese, military attached to communications. But more generally they are indicative of the importance of gesture as a method of implicit communications in diplomacy. Thus, while discourse can often be overlooked or seen as hollow, a gift, even as small as a football, can go a long way. We also saw this tactic in Costa Rica where President Hu Jintao handed out footballs to Costa Rican children upon his arrival.

Officially, the authorities referred to 'hammer and anvil' as first the National Campaign Plan and after 1986 as UPR (Unidos para Reconstruir/Unity for Reconstruction). These were three-stage strategies, as Williams and Walter write:

First, the military was to eliminate the guerrillas and suspected sympathisers from designated areas. Next came the consolidation phase, when the military was to establish permanent control in the zones. And third

was the resettlement and reconstruction phase. (Williams and Walter, 1997: 119)

Therefore, in December 1981, in the same locality where Monterrosa would hand out footballs in 1983, his Atlacatl battalion had been responsible for what is widely regarded as the worst atrocity of the armed conflict, an incident popularly known as the 'Massacre at El Mozote' (Danner, 2005). I visited this region in February 2011 as part of my research in El Salvador. The hamlet of El Mozote is approximately ten miles from the site at Perquin where the incident described by Anderson took place, and both hamlets are within Morazan Province, a region still referred to as 'zona rosa' (the red zone) in reference to its supposed communist sympathies. Thus, the military first used brutality to gain control of the region before courting the local people with apparent generosity; Monterrosa admitting that this had been learned from Taiwan. Zhu refers to this type of tactic as 'military diplomacy' on the part of Taiwan (Zhu, 2010: 91). As such, it is clear that Taiwan understood the power of the army in El Salvadoran politics (see Williams and Walter, 1997) and considered its allegiance a way of consolidating the political powerbase of an ideologically favourable regime and therefore guaranteeing diplomatic relations with El Salvador.

Taiwan has managed to keep its controversial role in the armed conflict largely out of the public eye mainly because there has been a shortfall in academic or journalistic investigation into it. This is partly the result of the distraction caused by the very public US role in the conflict, but it also reflects the reality that Taiwan's military diplomacy was carried out in Taiwan, far away from the theatre of war, and without public transparency. Instead, what documentation there has been of Taiwan's formal diplomatic relations has tended to be of their humanitarian and community-based projects (see Alexander, 2011d; Hsieh, 1985; Springer, 2012; Taylor, 2002). The encouragement for this perspective has come from their diplomats who cite that because Taiwan was the recipient of aid and international assistance

until the 1970s it is their duty to reciprocate now that they are in a position to do so. In the words of Sun Yat-sen, that having achieved its own emancipation, Taiwan should, “rescue the weak and lift the fallen” (cited in Ansprenger, 1989). Nevertheless, while Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation is limiting to its international relations and thus public diplomacy, their diplomats should take heed that what international image the country has does not focus on Taiwan’s heritage of close association with the unsavoury regimes of latter 20th century Central America. However, it remains that Taiwan’s previous strategy for survival in the region has the potential to hinder the prosperity of its current relations.

Both Taiwan and El Salvador have made internal changes since the period of armed conflict in El Salvador (see Hickey, 2007; Lauria-Santiago and Binford, 2004; Mattlin, 2011; Williams and Walter, 1997). In particular, both have become competitive multiparty democracies that have experienced turnovers of power without disruption on any grand scale. Both have also made considerable reforms to their diplomatic corps vis-à-vis political patronage. However, like all post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies, consciousness of the social traumas of recent history unavoidably shapes the political landscape (see Halbwachs, 1992; Pennebaker et al, 1997). This is the case in both El Salvador and Taiwan. The election of the FMLN in 2009 was therefore a milestone in El Salvador’s national reconciliation, as it brought an end to the monopoly that the military and their civilian right-wing counterparts held over the Presidential office since El Salvador gained independence from Spain in 1821. What is more, with a stated commitment to pragmatic rather than ideologically based policy (Chang, 2009), the FMLN have taken a lead role in how El Salvador and Central America as a whole can conduct relations with one time foes on the political left.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ While he was President-elect in early 2009, Mauricio Funes met with the Taiwanese Foreign Minister Francisco Ou. Ou remarked that Funes had, “stressed that his government [would] give top priority to the welfare of El Salvador’s people, and that its diplomacy [would] be based on national interests instead of

During his election campaign for the Presidency of El Salvador, Mauricio Funes stated that switching diplomatic recognition to the PRC would be a high priority should he be elected (*El Diario de Hoy*, 2008). The PRC had solid relations with national liberation movements like the FMLN during the Cold War because of their ideological similarities (see Xu, 1994). Indeed, the rockets that were launched at the US Embassy in San Salvador by guerrillas on two separate occasions during 1980 had been clandestinely imported from the PRC (O'Brien Steinfelds, 2001). Manuel Flores, a politician who has been with the FMLN since its days as a guerrilla group, confirmed the reality of the ideological bond between the FMLN and the PRC:

My colleagues and I found inspiration from the Chinese, partly because of their struggle but also in the reforms that they made [after the death of Mao]. From such incidents as the Cultural Revolution and the suppression of academics we gained greater understanding of what not to do, along with what we should do if given the chance. For me and many of my colleagues Deng Xiaoping is the true hero for his economic reforms, he brought a degree of regulated capitalism to China and this is something that the FMLN has wanted to emulate. (Flores, 2011)

Some journalists interpreted the electoral success of the FMLN to be the end of Taiwan's period of diplomatic privilege in El Salvador and the beginning of the process towards PRC recognition (for example, Chan, 2009; Urquilla, 2010). Indeed, cables released by Wikileaks, written by US diplomats in Central America and Taiwan, reveal Taiwan's apprehension at the so-called 'pink tide' occurring across the region (for example Keegan, 2006b; Stephenson, 2010; Young, 2007a), which, if correct, demonstrates the extent to which Taiwan still sees the region through a Cold War gaze. However, the FMLN's path towards PRC recognition was closed by the announcement of a diplomatic truce between the PRC and Taiwan in 2008. The

ideology" (Ou, cited in Chan, 2009). This marks a change from the ideologically based politics of the ARENA party.

mandate of the truce became apparent in March 2010 when Chang Kao, vice-Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan, told a seminar that El Salvador had tried to recognise the PRC at some point after the election of President Funes in 2009, but that Beijing had turned them down stating that they, “did not want to hurt the cross-strait reconciliation” (Chang, cited in DPA, 2010). As will be discussed later, this has not stopped the FMLN government pursuing greater economic engagement with the PRC.⁶¹

The incident provides clarification on a number of wider issues, most importantly that policy-making where under circumstances of diminished ideology may result in attempts to discontinue diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This was one of the reasons for Costa Rica’s recognition of the PRC in 2007. Secondly, this incident demonstrates that the diplomatic truce is the key factor in maintaining Taiwan’s relationship with El Salvador; and finally, that the FMLN’s attempt to recognise the PRC demonstrates their desire to consolidate political power, and acknowledges that Taiwan, while stating its willingness to work with whichever party is in power, would clearly prefer an ARENA government.⁶² Given the circumstances therefore, the FMLN have discussed a desire to build a relationship with both the PRC and Taiwan (Urquilla, 2010), using the diplomatic truce to the advantage of El Salvador.⁶³

⁶¹ In a batch of classified Wikileaks cables published in May 2011 originating from the US Embassy in Panama, the US Ambassador to the country Barbara Stephenson (2010) documents how the government of Panama approached the PRC regarding formal recognition in January 2009 but were told that it was not possible due to the diplomatic truce. However, crucially they were also told to ‘remain calm’, insinuating that if things were to change that it would be possible.

⁶² Evidence of this can be found on the Caribbean island of St. Lucia where Taiwan is also diplomatically recognised. St. Lucia is a ‘swing state’ and support for the PRC and Taiwan is firmly divided along party lines, where the ruling St. Lucia Labour Party favour relations with the PRC and the opposition United Workers Party (UWP) favour Taiwan. Support for both is therefore more pronounced than in some other formal allies. Indeed, there have been accusations of political interference levelled at Ambassador Thomas Chou after he apparently supported the opposition right-wing United Workers Party (UWP) during the 2011 general election (see Springer, 2012) Thus, while Taiwan will work with the FMLN in El Salvador, it is clear that they would rather it be the ARENA party.

⁶³ A similar scenario unfolded in Nicaragua after the election of FSLN candidate Daniel Ortega in 2007 (Young, 2007a). His pre-election rhetoric included diplomatic recognition of the PRC. However, once in office, this was reduced to building ties with both (La Prensa, 2007).

There is a final factor to be discussed in the relationship between Taiwan and its Central American allies. PARLACEN was established in 1991 and is headquartered in Guatemala City. It is the second supranational regional parliament to be established in the world after the European Parliament (PARLACEN, 2012). It was mandated by the Declaration of Esquipulas in 1986, which was signed by the Presidents of Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras and Costa Rica mainly in a bid to prevent the Republics of Central America acting against one another in times of war. In this regard, it was developed on a similar philosophy to that of the European Union and its precursors after World War II. However, although PARLACEN played a major role in brokering the initial talks, Costa Rica did not become a member. This may be one of the reasons for Costa Rica being called the Switzerland of Central America.

The Honduran and Costa Rican jungle had been used by the USA and others (most notably Argentina), as major training and arming facilities for so-called 'Contra' troops engaged in conflict with the FSLN government of Nicaragua (see Kinzer, 1991), while, at the same time the Nicaraguan government had been sending weapons to the FMLN in El Salvador (Anderson and Anderson, 1986; Booth, 1982; Kinzer, 1991).⁶⁴ Taiwan enjoys 'permanent observer' status to PARLACEN, and moreover has funded the construction of many PARLACEN buildings across Central America. Indeed, at the time of writing, Taiwan was the sole funder of the soon-to-be-complete Central American Integration System (SICA) building opposite the El Salvador Ministry of Foreign Affairs in San Salvador.⁶⁵ While one cannot definitively measure Taiwan's influence within PARLACEN and its member states, it is significant that all member states of this supranational body continue to

⁶⁴ The Declaration of Esquipulas contains the following statement in reference to the creation of PARLACEN. "It is necessary to establish and complement activities that support understanding and cooperation through institutional structures. These shall strengthen the dialogue, the common development, democracy and pluralism as fundamental elements for peace in the area and for the integration of Central America. Therefore, the creation of the PARLACEN is necessary. Its members will be elected freely by universal and direct elections with special regard to the principle of participatory political pluralism." (PARLACEN, 2012)

⁶⁵ This was documented on a visit to the site by the author in February 2011.

recognise the island diplomatically. Indeed, as a large financier of the physical assets belonging to the parliament and its subsidiary agencies, Taiwan will have considerable influence over parliamentary decisions, yet much of this is beyond public scrutiny. Therefore, it is logical that PARALACEN's apparent reliance on Taiwanese funds for edificial construction is a factor in the continued diplomatic recognition of Taiwan by its member states.

Taiwanese interest in performing public diplomacy in El Salvador has increased as El Salvador has democratised and as the PRC has gained regional prominence. Moreover, the evidence presented in the following section suggests that Taiwan's public diplomacy is more concerned with convincing El Salvador's political elite that Taiwan is deserving of diplomatic recognition, than of any real interest or commitment to communicating with normal citizens. This enhances the central argument that those senior personnel deciding Taiwan's diplomatic strategy continue to consider the publics of their formal diplomatic allies to be of secondary importance, and reflects the reality that this is a nation-state conducting public diplomacy primarily to secure its sovereignty. Thus, the forthcoming evidence suggests that Taiwan has an apathy towards these people that is the result of a failure to adapt to the changing socio-political dynamics of modern Central America. The research found considerable reliance on minimally trained volunteers and junior diplomats working without clear strategy. This was surprising, given that Taiwan's history in El Salvador has been very strategic, and that it is seen internationally as a shrewd diplomatic operator. Part of the following section is therefore an attempt to answer why such lapses have occurred.

Taiwan's Public Diplomacy in El Salvador

When asked the question, "how important is public diplomacy to securing the overall diplomatic relationship?" Lin Kuo-chung from the Taipei Representative Office in London replied: "It is important in a democracy as the government is

elected by the people and their views are therefore represented. In a non-democracy public diplomacy is less important. [...] President Ma decided to focus on public diplomacy and he understood the importance of it on top of the economy etc” (Lin, 2011a). This quotation is an explicit declaration from the Taiwanese that the use of public diplomacy is subservient to Taiwan’s foreign policy goals, and is implemented selectively where it can be of benefit to its international relations.

The quotation also provides two main themes for the following section on El Salvador. First of all, it indicates that the method and volume of Taiwan’s public diplomacy is apparently linked to the foreign public’s inclusion in the selection of political leaders, thus confirming that the maintenance of good inter-governmental relations is the main motivation behind Taiwan’s public diplomacy. In this sense, public diplomacy has elevated importance beyond the manufacture of positive public sentiment. Secondly, it asserts that the timing of the increase in public diplomacy activity by Taiwan is the result of a combination of the appearance of the PRC in the region, El Salvador’s movement to competitive multiparty democracy, and the central manifesto of the KMT in Taiwan vis-à-vis furthering ties with the mainland. As such, public diplomacy has become an increasingly prolific method of engagement for Taiwan.

The way in which the PRC and Taiwan perform public diplomacy towards their respective allies is similar, with both using a combination of implicit and explicit communications to engage with domestic and foreign audiences. Thus, development assistance, medical diplomacy, education diplomacy, domestic media in Central America, and the Chinese Diaspora have all been used as foreign policy tools. However, while infrastructure diplomacy has been used by the PRC in Costa Rica and elsewhere in the underdeveloped world, and is used by Taiwan in some of its other diplomatic allies, this research found little evidence of this method in El Salvador. Indeed, the only Taiwanese infrastructure projects that could be found in El Salvador were the aforementioned SICA building and Taiwanese assistance to the

reconstruction of a bridge, completed in November 2010, that had been washed away by flooding in the town of Melara, La Libertad, the previous year (Wu, 2011). However, as this is an ethnographic research project in the phenomenological sense, we must not rule out Taiwan's utilisation of this in the future as this is a known tactic of theirs.⁶⁶

Development Assistance

In 1971 Taiwan established a technical mission in El Salvador, and, from the observations of this research, this has been the method of public diplomacy most keenly emphasised by Taiwan's public diplomats. As the Head of Opinion at the national daily newspaper *El Diario de Hoy* in San Salvador, Rolando Monterrosa, confirmed: "the relationship with Taiwan is based largely around aid, all kinds of aid, and, for example, the assistance they have given El Salvador in agriculture, which has been invaluable and very successful" (Monterrosa, 2011).

Three projects make up the technical mission in El Salvador: agriculture, aquaculture and handcrafts. Carlos Lee, Head of the Taiwan ICDF in El Salvador, highlighted the specifics of their engagement with the people of El Salvador,

[The Taiwan ICDF] have eight people including myself in El Salvador and we have three main projects. The first one is an agricultural project, and the second is aquaculture – improving the productivity of freshwater fish. For example, in Lake Ilopango we have a project for aquaculture in a cage (Interjection - fish farming?). Yes, so we provide such things as feed to the fish farmers there, and we also help them to sell fish to the market. We also have a centre at Zapotitan which is a demonstration farm, and we show [farmers] different techniques for cultivation. We also have a conference office and each

⁶⁶ Taiwan has however been prolific in the design, construction and financing of power stations in Nicaragua and Honduras, however it withdrew from a tender to build a dam on the Patuca river in Honduras leaving Sinohydro, the firm responsible for the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze river in the PRC, to move forward with planning. (Eidt, 2011)

month we do classes for the people in agriculture. We have introduced a variety of vegetables and fruit to the farmers (Lee, 2011).⁶⁷

Whereas Operation Vanguard was mostly engaged with the displaced peasantry, the modern Taiwan ICDF assistance programme largely abandoned this practice in El Salvador as the armed conflict drew to a close. We can argue that this change in policy came from the nullification of the communist threat as the Cold War came to a close. However, while several other high-profile country donors (Spain, for example (Huang, 2011)) tend to engage through outsourced organisations, charities, or by training local people to implement policy, the face-to-face approach of the Taiwanese and the permanency of its mission put it on the frontline of its public diplomacy in El Salvador. However, Taiwan's lack of ability or desire to monitor the success or failure of these projects must be questioned.

The annual report of the Taiwan ICDF states that, in 2011, it helped 30 fruit and vegetable farmers and 10 fish farmers, all of whom reside in low lying areas (Taiwan ICDF, 2012). These were not small cooperative farms run by the peasantry, but much larger commercial farms operating for supply to the international market. Carlos Lee attested that:

For the technical operation we have an agreement with the government [of El Salvador] and every two or three years we review the content of the agreement and assess the quality of the work. If this is satisfactory then the agreement will be continued, we have never had a situation where it has not been continued [...] every month we have to make a report for Taipei and every three months we report to the agricultural ministry of El Salvador what we are doing and the success of the programmes we have. [...] every month we have to report whether we have got to a certain point. Each year we

⁶⁷ The eight people referred to include three agricultural engineers, three engineers in aquaculture, one marketer who works across the three projects (also focused on the sale of locally made handcrafts) and Carlos Lee as Head of the Taiwan ICDF in El Salvador (Lee, 2011).

separate our targets into twelve months and then we have a progress report every month. Then in the final month of the year it should reach 100%. (Lee, 2011)

Copies of the documents mentioned were unavailable. However, if one consults the progress report of the Taiwan ICDF in El Salvador to the end of 2011, neither the statements nor the statistics bear reference to public opinion about Taiwan (Taiwan ICDF, 2012). Moreover, Lee's preference to discuss when questioned the satisfaction of government authorities for Taiwan's contribution indicates that the solidifying of the diplomatic relationship is the primary motivation for Taiwan's public diplomacy (Lee, 2011). Thus, while public diplomacy always tries to influence a foreign government's decision-making mechanisms, what differentiates it from inter-governmental diplomacy is its understanding of the necessity to court public opinion. However, for a country as diplomatically isolated as Taiwan, the emphasis on government influence is considerably more than is typical in other countries.

A second point concerning Taiwan's assistance in El Salvador surrounds the somewhat controversial introduction of non-native agricultural crops. As Gustavo Huang explained:

We have also introduced different varieties of vegetable or fruit to the farmers [...] First of all we have to do some research to see if this fruit or vegetable is adept to this environment here, and also that it requires a short time to harvest, because high yield is a priority. The people can adapt easily, for example with guava. (Huang, 2011)

Gustavo Huang was the member of Taiwan's diplomatic corps responsible for implementing these strategies in El Salvador. Of interest here is his remark that high yields are a priority, and given the somewhat familiar coverage of high yielding varieties of alien food produce being unpalatable to local populations, for example

high yield rice in Asia (see Mukherjee, 2011), there was a need to pursue this line of questioning.

Yes, we've faced problems like this here. The Taiwanese like the fruit but the El Salvadorans do not like it. But we try to present to them how healthy the fruit is and how profitable it will be to sell. But if they don't like it then they don't like it. But we've changed this type of work now, we now find out what type of fruit makes a high price in the market and what the people are willing to pay high prices for and what kinds of variety they are interested in, and we change accordingly. (Huang, 2011)

Therefore, to the detriment of domestic concerns regarding food preferences, Taiwan's 'development' assistance has taken steps towards making El Salvador a more efficient producer to international markets. In doing so, the motivation of Taiwan's development assistance is not to disentangle El Salvador from the agricultural subservience of its economy and the dangers associated with such a role, but to further their vulnerability to the forces of the international market.⁶⁸ Taiwan has therefore been complicit in the consolidation of El Salvador's agro-exporter status, as this policy reflects both the economic policies of a right-wing political party such as ARENA and Taiwan's desire to assist them in their aims. At the same time however, this also offers evidence as to why the FMLN and Taiwan are likely to clash, given the differences in economic outlook (for an overview of FMLN economic policy, see Funes, cited in Whitehouse.gov, 2011⁶⁹). Thus, we see that Taiwan's public diplomacy is more concerned with the manufacture of elite relationships than acquiring positive sentiment from the average citizen. However, as the case of El

⁶⁸ Beyond the danger of fluctuations in international markets, there is a strong argument that weather extremes do not cause famine but that a country allowing its most fertile land to be reserved for agricultural export leads to overpopulation of lands that are vulnerable to drought or other adverse conditions. The introductory chapter detailed how in El Salvador and Guatemala the government has a history of moving the peasantry off fertile land to make way for commercial farming, and that Taiwan was involved in teaching these refugees how to farm the less tenable land as effectively as possible.

⁶⁹ For an overview of FMLN economic policy, see(Funes, cited in Whitehouse.gov, 2011).

Salvador demonstrates, this approach leaves diplomatic relations with Taiwan vulnerable when changes of government occur.

Confirmation of Taiwan's policy was found in Morazan, a mountainous province of El Salvador close to the border with Honduras. This was the heart of the so-called 'red zone' during the armed conflict and was where the majority of the civilian casualties of war occurred, caused mainly by government forces (UNVCS, 1993). It is also El Salvador's poorest province and a place where subsistence farming remains a prominent way of life. Taiwan has no presence here; instead Taiwan's development assistance is provided to the provinces in the lowlands towards the Pacific coast with land more appropriate to the harvest of products that can be sold on the international market. Decisions about the location of Taiwan's assistance are made in coordination with the government of El Salvador who are responsible for the coordination of all development assistance projects from international sources (Lee, 2011). However, Taiwan's ICDF has strategically pursued such development assistance throughout its formal allies in recent years (see Taiwan ICDF, 2012), indicating that it prioritises engagement with the landowning factions of these societies. El Salvador's FMLN government has made no comments on this so far.

Therefore, it is essential when discussing public diplomacy to understand who is, and crucially who is not, being assisted, as it is not those most in need of assistance that are being helped by Taiwan in El Salvador but a select few large employers. Given what is known of Taiwan's legacy in El Salvador, its continuing close relations with the ARENA party and its desire to satisfy the political establishment, the most obvious conclusion is that political patronage played a significant role in the selectivity of its public diplomacy in El Salvador and that this has not been consigned to history. As such, we can argue that Taiwan's policy of doing as the government asks shows little in the way of independent public strategy. This is risky for Taiwan as turnovers of political power in this polarised country may lead to Taiwan's insignificance in this area should the government decide to pursue

other directions. Moreover, it demonstrates the extent of Taiwan's apathy towards actual public need, and in a country where the public having increasing political influence we must conclude that this is rather short-sighted.

Medical Diplomacy

Without a floating hospital like the PRC's Peace Ark the Taiwan ICDF provide smaller land-based medical clinics which travel to their diplomatic allies offering free medical care, normally for about two weeks at a time, before moving to another country or region. These roving clinics, known as Mobile Medical Missions (MMMs), only function in Taiwan's formal diplomatic allies (Taiwan ICDF, 2010), and give Taiwan a more regular medical presence in Central America. However, such continuity reduces the media attention that is bestowed on a single large event such as the arrival of the Peace Ark in Costa Rica in November 2011.

MMM focus tends to be on rural villages, although clinical assistance at city hospitals has also occurred.⁷⁰ Given the awkward terrain in which they tend to travel, MMMs number around 30 personnel and carry only easily transportable equipment and supplies. In El Salvador, as elsewhere in Central America, MMM's focus on treating simple ailments and conducting simple procedures. For example, the provision of antibiotics against Chagas disease, extracting decayed teeth and other dental issues, pregnancy screenings, and issuing education leaflets and advice.

MMMs were established by the Taiwan ICDF in 2006. Before this the ICDF partnered with Taiwanese international non-governmental organisations such as the Tzu Chi Foundation and the Taiwan Root Medical Peace Corps (TRMPC) to perform medical diplomacy to its allies. Thus, by linking with the Taiwan ICDF and by flying the flag of the ROC when doing so (for example Tzu Chi Foundation, 2009), these

⁷⁰ Prior to arriving in El Salvador, I was informed that the Taiwan ICDF would deliver an MMM in a hospital in the city of Santa Ana and that I could attend the clinic as an observer. However it was delayed until May 2011, preventing the materialisation of valuable ethnographic research. Delays such as this are a result of the Taiwan ICDF focusing much of its resources over the past two years to assisting Haiti following the earthquake of 12th January 2010. Haiti is one of the 23 nation-states worldwide who diplomatically recognise Taiwan.

organisations are demonstrating consciousness of the political significance of their role and have become part of the public diplomacy apparatus. The symbolism of the flag, and sensitivities to it, will be reinvestigated in the coming section on the PRC's presence in El Salvador. These organisations now continue their work in Central America and elsewhere in tandem with MMMs.

The TRMPC is a non-governmental, non-profit organisation set-up by an individual to assist the needy around the world (Taiwan Government Information Office, 2002), and the Tzu Chi Foundation is an internationally registered Buddhist charity based in Taipei. Thus, those favouring the institutional or resource-based approach to public diplomacy research would probably think these to be outside of the realm of public diplomacy. However, this research has made it clear that it favours the objective-based approach and by this logic must emphasise that these organisations are clearly public diplomacy resources being directed by the Taiwan ICDF towards a foreign public with the intention of assisting Taiwan's foreign policy goals. Lin Kuo-chung from the Taipei Representative Office in London discussed this during his interview:

There is a trend of more money being spent on public diplomacy and in this the private sector also has a big role to play. For example, the Taiwan government tries to persuade people to volunteer and also engages with charities such as the Tzu Chi Foundation. Our medical corps are a combination of charities and government run schemes. (Lin 2011a)

Therefore, since 2006 medical missions in Taiwan's Central American allies have partly been provided directly by the Taiwan ICDF and at other times through non-profit, non-governmental organisations linked to the ICDF. For example, a Taiwan ICDF MMM visited a hospital in the city of Santa Ana for several days in May 2011. However, in November 2011, following extensive flooding in El Salvador, the TRMPC arrived with a 23 person team to treat some of those affected (Huang

and Liu, 2011). But in November 2009 it was the Tzu Chi Foundation who came to assist those in El Salvador affected by Hurricane Ida (Tzu Chi Foundation, 2009).

Medical diplomacy is an area somewhat different from other public diplomacy initiatives in that it mainly relies on outsourced staff and organisations, with doctors, nurses, and dentists taking time away from their regular jobs to participate in missions. Medical diplomacy is also one of the clearest examples of the perception of the recipient being more important than the institution delivering the performance. However, there is a fundamental need to be careful not to document certain activities as public diplomacy when, for example, a medical mission is made up of multiple nationalities, or when it does not declare allegiance to a government mission. However, in El Salvador Taiwan outsourced all of its medical diplomacy until 2006 when Taiwan ICDF MMMs were first introduced, yet the ICDF has coordinated all of these missions both pre and post 2006 (Lee, 2011). What is more, most, if not all, have flown the Taiwan flag as a statement of their country of origin but also of their support for Taiwan's right to self-rule. Consequently, while not as much of a media spectacle as the arrival of the PRC's Peace Ark in Costa Rica, Taiwan's use of MMMs to visit rural communities coupled with support in the aftermath of the natural disasters thus prioritises medical assistance to those who need it most.

Education Diplomacy

Europe has engaged in education diplomacy for centuries. For example, the Holy Roman Empire provided students from across Europe with bursaries to attend Rome, with the era of Emperor Charlemagne (800 – 814AD) being particularly renowned for educational scholarships, as he sought to manufacture a pan-European identity (see McKitterick, 2008). Indeed, the performance of education diplomacy has always been tied to variables such as the quality of the diplomatic relationship between two nation-states, the strategic importance of the relationship, and

competition from rival powers (see Eide, 1970; Waller, 2007). In the modern era, the likes of France (Alliance Francaise) and the United Kingdom (The British Council), and more recently Spain (Instituto Cervantes), the PRC (Confucius Institutes) and Taiwan (Taiwan Academies) have established education and cultural offices around the world to complement international scholarships and increase their presence within target countries (Leonard et al, 2005; Paradise, 2009; Rawnsley, 2011). At the institutional level, this two-pronged education diplomacy tactic is a balancing act between rewarding receptive regimes and publics, and attempting to improve the national image among those who are indifferent or even hostile.

Taylor (2008) states that education as a tool of public diplomacy derives from a faith in the phrase 'to know us is to love us', meaning that a foreigner who spends considerable time in a foreign country, making local friends and adapting to the lifestyle, will favour that country in the future should they gain a position of economic or political power.⁷¹ Yet the potential also exists for that foreigner to dislike the experience ('familiarity breeds contempt'). On Taiwan in Central America, one interviewee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in San Salvador expressed scepticism about this education diplomacy strategy:

I think it is a good theory but I think that the people of poor countries do not have the same perspective. Because in El Salvador there are a lot of people who have studied abroad, but when you come back to El Salvador you do not have the same opportunities. Also, here the people who will be able to gain these scholarships are from a small elite class, in a way they are already successful and even if they do not go on international scholarship they will still be leaders in the future [...] (Anonymous, 2011a)

⁷¹ One of the best examples of this is Mikheil Saakashvili, President of Georgia, who studied at both Columbia Law School and George Washington University School of Law in 1994 and 1995 under the Edmund S. Muskie Graduate Fellowship Programme. This scholarship is aimed at the countries occupied by the Soviet Union until its collapse in 1991 and was established by the US government in 1992 (see IREX, 2012). Since taking office Saakashvili has led Georgia on a pro-NATO path, much to the irritation of neighbouring Russia.

With this new government (the FMLN) we try to be more transparent, but before, the only people who had the opportunity to have a scholarship are the best friends of the ministers etc. But now we try to give the opportunity to the common people, and maybe in the future these people can form a leadership, but it is not the case during this time. (Anonymous, 2011a)

These quotations re-emphasise the extent political patronage has played in Taiwan's public diplomacy, and apparently continues to play. Thus, we see the widespread exclusion of society's non-elite from the public diplomacy process. This highlights the extent to which nation-states, Taiwan included, try to recycle relations with the offspring of those who already favour them in a bid to guarantee generational inter-elite partnerships. However, as social mobility increases in El Salvador as it makes political reforms, we must question whether Taiwan is wise to persist with such a strategy, as it is essential that Taiwan's diplomats in El Salvador are flexible enough to adapt to changing socio-political dynamics, because if they do not it runs the risk of political and public backlash.

International Scholarships

International scholarships tend to flow either between developed countries or from developed to under-developed countries. Moreover, the governments who provide scholarships have seemingly standardised this approach, with the provision of similar monthly allowances and a return air ticket being standard. In 2010 Taiwan provided El Salvador with 46 education scholarships for students to go to Taiwan. This was an increase on previous years – 34 in 2009, 38 in 2008 and 30 in 2007 (Anonymous, 2011a). This is in contrast to the PRC who do not provide the government of El Salvador with any scholarships. Taiwan's scholarships account for approximately 10-15 percent of all that are received by the Department of Scholarships at El Salvador's Ministry of Foreign Affairs each year (Anonymous, 2011a). Taiwan offers a combination of undergraduate and postgraduate

opportunities, as well as shorter courses for Mandarin study. Competency in English is a prerequisite.

The other notable providers of international scholarships to El Salvador – South Korea, Japan and Israel – are all 'ideological allies' from the Cold War (Anonymous, 2011a).⁷² Powerful members of the economic and political elite of these countries were brought together by the WACL, which while officially an NGO, facilitated intergovernmental debate de-facto (Anderson and Anderson, 1986). However, this is not to say that they continue to perform education diplomacy on the basis of ideological solidarity, but it does signify a legacy of friendly relations. Moreover, as Zhu (2010) rightly points out, South Korea and Japan's on-going assistance to Latin America is part of their bid to maintain region influence in light of the PRC's growing presence. As such, we must remember that while there is little doubt the isolation of Taiwan is the most important foreign policy issue for the PRC in Central America, the Japan issue also shadows and motivates their engagement with the underdeveloped world.

It should be noted that while El Salvador and the PRC have no formal diplomatic relations, this does not exclude an El Salvadoran from gaining a scholarship to study in the PRC, for the PRC provides the Organisation of American States (OAS) with a number of scholarships each year (OAS, 2011).⁷³ A national from any member state is permitted to apply for these and the Department of Scholarships clarified that the OAS was one of the top ten providers to El Salvador,

⁷² The source did not disclose numbers for these other countries but indicated in descending order which countries were most prolific in their provision of scholarships. These three were in the top 5 alongside Taiwan (Anonymous, 2011a).

⁷³ The PRC has official observer status at the OAS (Committee on Foreign Relations of the US Senate, 2010: 62). In March 2011 the OAS stated that it was not at liberty to publish the numbers of students who took up scholarships in the PRC or the countries from which they originated, and only reiterated that the scholarship was available to citizens of all member states.

although the extent to which the uptake of China scholarships was from El Salvador remained unclear (Anonymous, 2011a).⁷⁴

The accurate documentation of international scholarships is dependent on both transparency and good statistical housekeeping by the governments involved. To this end, the provision of accurate data is the largest issue when investigating this aspect of public diplomacy. Indeed, El Salvador's Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that in documenting scholarship provision and feedback they regularly fell short when trying to secure accurate statistics for reasons including differences in the way scholarships are provided from country to country, incomplete visibility of all scholarships coming into El Salvador and their own lack of departmental focus and budget (Anonymous, 2011a). These circumstances thus hamper the stock-take of a nation-state's social capital and only serve to reinforce issues concerning our inability to quantify public diplomacy.

While the central issue for most governments including that of El Salvador is cost versus benefit (Anonymous, 2011a), the extent to which Taiwan monitors its provision of scholarships and seeks to maintain the positive sentiment created by their activities is dependent on the importance it attaches to positive public opinion. However, Taiwan's interest in doing this should be minimal given claims discussed earlier as to Taiwan's priority being foreign elites and the audience at home. This was proved after informally speaking on Facebook to a number of ex-Taiwan scholarship holders from El Salvador, all of whom attested that the Taiwanese authorities had sought no contact in the months and years after their return from Taiwan. That said, in neighbouring Guatemala the Taiwan Embassy has begun post-scholarship groups for former holders (Sanchez, 2011), leading to conclusions that

⁷⁴ El Salvadorans can also apply for scholarships with private organisations such as the Beijing Center, a Christian organisation offering degree level education. However this is beyond the periphery of public diplomacy as it lacks government involvement. In fact, given what is known of the PRC's contempt for many religious denominations, it can be argued that the organisation such as the Beijing Center may serve to critique their country of residence.

such actions are not the result of central government directives but are locally made decisions. All of this must be positioned in contrast to Costa Rica where the PRC has attempted to ring-fence and even expand upon the goodwill generated by their international scholarships, the obvious example being the Association of Ex-scholarship holders Costa Rica – China.

The failure to consolidate support from those accepting scholarships in Taiwan suggests that Taipei prizes the act of negotiating the scholarships with civil servants to their satisfaction, more than student experience. Therefore, their disinterest in consolidating positive public sentiment in El Salvador inevitably results in a loss of control over the sentiment building process. However, as Taiwan's foreign policy is prioritised towards the upkeep of the diplomatic relationship, this way of performing public diplomacy fits the current requirements of Taiwan's foreign policy in the region. What is more, some at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in El Salvador are sceptical as to whether any positive sentiment is actually created at all given that invariably these scholarships are given to the social elite. As such, while there is scepticism over whether this helps Taiwan to recycle personal relations with the elites, the continuation of such a policy does nothing to advance Taiwan's cause amongst the general public and highlights a consistency in Taiwan's education diplomacy policy since before El Salvador's political reforms.

Taiwan's Education Presence in El Salvador

In terms of education and cultural centres, Taiwan does not have a flagship entity in El Salvador like the PRC's Confucius Institute in Costa Rica. However, all of the major universities in San Salvador have at least one Mandarin teacher provided by the Taiwan ICDF. This is the same in Taiwan's other Central American allies. The majority of these teachers are recent female university graduates from Taiwan who are eager to travel the world after finishing their university studies in their home

country (Hu, 2011a; Wang, 2011). They are volunteers who are paid minimal wages, and are given return flights, accommodation and living expenses.

Normal residency for one of these teachers is between one and three years in the country to which they are allocated, although there is no barrier to staying longer. In February 2011 there were six Taiwanese Mandarin teachers working for the ICDF, and according to Carlos Lee, Head of the Taiwan ICDF in the country, the government of El Salvador had been requesting more (Lee, 2011). The provision of Taiwan ICDF Mandarin teachers to El Salvador has little heritage; indeed, the first intake was only in 2008. In early 2011 I separately interviewed Wang Yi-fei and Hu Jing-yun, Taiwanese women who had come to El Salvador in the first intake of four teachers in September 2008 (Hu, 2011a). They discussed the growing demand for Mandarin competency in the country:

Most students [who I teach] are university age, so about 18-22 years old. However there are also people who work who come to my Saturday classes. Many of these people are doing business with China, or may want to do business with China in the future. While they haven't said this directly, I think this insinuates a wider reflection of the economic rise of China and that Mandarin is a language of the future if you like. Learning Mandarin is therefore providing them with the equipment for success (Wang, 2011).

It is a result of China's growing presence in the world. Basically, the El Salvador government asked for more people to teach Mandarin as they considered there to be more demand for it. The Taiwan government then agreed to provide more teachers, it was very simple. (Hu, 2011a)

Taiwan's efforts in this field are therefore a contribution to the growing interest in Chinese studies around the world, from which, both the PRC and Taiwan are set to benefit (Dumbaugh, 2010; Ellis, 2009; Li, 2009; Taylor, 2009; Zhu, 2010). Taiwanese ICDF teachers receive six weeks of training in Taipei prior to their departure for El

Salvador, or to whichever ally they are assigned. Wang explained the details of the training:

[The training] consisted of three hours in the morning of Spanish tuition, and then we had Mandarin teacher training in the afternoon for two or three weeks. We also received lectures on why volunteering for projects such as this is important. The ICDF used the US Peace Corps and JICA as examples of good practice. They also brought in people who had volunteered before to share their experiences. This helped to give us some teaching ideas and gave us an inclination as to what was going on in these countries.

Question: Why is volunteering important, what did they tell you?

They said that Taiwan at one point received a lot of international assistance and that this helped us to become the successful country that we are now. It is therefore our duty to do the same for other countries now that we are in a strong position to do so. (Wang, 2011)

This final statement by Wang is one of the clearest examples of the Taiwan government's propaganda towards their own people as it tries to construct a favourable domestic persona of its international relations. Thus, many of Taiwan's diplomatic corps, including several of those interviewed for this research, consider international compassion to be the motivating factor behind their career choice. However, it is also clear that it is Taiwan's preference not to use career diplomats but rather to favour citizen to citizen engagement in education diplomacy.

Enquiries were also made into the structure of teaching by the Taiwan ICDF given that Taiwan had shown little interest in building positive public sentiment. When questioned as to Taiwan's commitment to teaching quality, Wang and Hu's responses were unsurprising:

Question: Have you been set teaching performance targets by your government or embassy?

No there haven't been any targets. When I arrived there was no text book on teaching Mandarin to Spanish speakers so I had to ask the embassy for money to buy them. I think that the Taiwan government uses us a diplomacy tool; they aren't really interested in the results, just in their relationship with the local government here in El Salvador. They are not really focused on the teaching itself. (Wang, 2011)

I was not set any targets by the government. They basically told me to go there and see what you can do. If you get one or two students then it's ok, if you get 100 then great. I designed the course myself so I had virtually complete control over what I taught them and how I taught them. (Hu, 2011a)

The lack of uniformity in course content, the disorganisation in the provision of adequate teaching materials, and the disinterest in maximising student uptake, all highlight the extent of the Taiwan government's apathy towards the consolidation of positive public sentiment. To be sure, this is not a question of budget or resources but reflects apathy towards training and to the overall importance of public diplomacy in these countries from senior diplomatic personnel. Indeed, that the students cannot work towards a recognised qualification in Mandarin with a fully qualified languages teacher demonstrates Taiwanese apathy towards the growth of El Salvador's overall human capital, and its own agency's development as a public diplomacy institution. As such, if El Salvador had not asked Taiwan to provide Mandarin teachers there must be some doubt as to whether the volunteers would be in the country at all. However, at the root of this issue is the use of volunteers and not professional teachers, who, while probably well intentioned, lack the technical experience of language tuition. Thus, while Taiwanese officials may state that, "Taiwan, before China opened up, used to be the only place to learn Mandarin. We

therefore have more experience and better quality teaching than anywhere else” (Lin, 2011a), the fact of the matter is that the PRC is outperforming Taiwan both in quality of teaching and the opportunities for formal language qualifications available in Central America. Thus, while constructing their education diplomacy in this way may once have satisfied Taiwan’s foreign policy of keeping officials and elites happy (their actual education of citizens being of secondary concern), bringing the PRC’s work in Costa Rica into the analysis reveals the vulnerability of such an approach. As such, we really must question how this serves Taiwan’s wider interests, and why Taiwan has approached education diplomacy in such a way. The only real answer is that senior diplomatic personnel and policymakers do not prioritise public diplomacy in El Salvador as this research believes they ought to.

To further this argument, one can look beyond El Salvador to the USA where Taiwan has opened Taiwan Academies in New York, Houston and Los Angeles in October 2011 offering altogether more formal education packages (Taiwan Academy, 2011). Leaving aside debates as to their political objectives in the USA and in Taiwan’s relationship with the PRC (see Rawnsley, 2011), the creation of Taiwan Academies sends the message to the governments and civil societies of its formal allies that despite their support in the face of international pressure, they receive only amateur Mandarin teaching, whereas non-recognising countries receive a far more professional education mission. What is more, there is little doubt that the problems encountered by Mandarin teachers in El Salvador would not occur at the Taiwan Academies. This allows us to position the importance of Taiwan’s Central American allies on its political hierarchy. However, it is also indicative of the balancing act that public diplomacy must perform between rewarding loyalty and incentivising policy change within foreign government. Thus, while Taiwan must try to secure its formal diplomatic relationships, of greater importance is its relations with the USA as its protectorate. This thesis does not seek to make many recommendations of how the PRC or Taiwan should be performing public

diplomacy. However, in the evidence presented here clearly indicates that Taiwan should pursue a more professional approach to its Mandarin teaching in Central America with perhaps the Taiwan Academies as a model for replication.

The final point to be made on the conduct of Taiwan's education and cultural mission in El Salvador concerns their annual Mandarin Singing and Speaking Competition at the Sheraton Presidente Hotel in San Salvador held in 2011 on 17th February.⁷⁵ The event, which the Taiwan embassy considers to be one of the social events of the year, was well attended with an estimated 300 – 400 people in the audience. Seemingly all of the Taiwanese diplomatic staff in El Salvador were there, and they were joined by family members of the El Salvadorans performing, and some local Chinese Diaspora. However, only one local media organisation was visible (local newspaper *Diario Co Latino*) and in the days following media coverage was minimal.⁷⁶

In addition, it was interesting to note the participation of students from 'Centro Chino' at the event, as it offered stark contrast to the poor relations between the PRC and the Chinese Diaspora in Costa Rica, where there has been a legal battle over the name 'Instituto Confucio'. The involvement of Centro Chino, the hub for the Chinese Diaspora in El Salvador which has been providing language classes for longer than the Taiwan ICDF (Wang, 2011), indicates a stronger relationship between the Diaspora and the diplomatic corps than has been achieved by the PRC in Costa Rica. This adds weight to Siu's argument that the Taiwanese have made considerable efforts to ensure healthy relations with the Chinese Diaspora in their diplomatic allies (see Siu, 2005).

⁷⁵ The venue of the Sheraton Presidente is significant. During the armed conflict of the 1980s and early 1990s, the Taiwan Ambassador was always head of the diplomatic core in El Salvador and the annual dinner was always held at the hotel with Taiwan at the head of the table (Anderson and Anderson, 1986). In addition, Lt. Col. Domingo Monterrosa and subsequent military and civilian presidents of El Salvador normally held their press conferences for the international media here during the armed conflict (Danner, 2005).

⁷⁶ *Diario Co Latino* was the only national newspaper seen at the event. However, the article that was published afterwards (see Meza, 2011) did not refer to the competition as such but to the welcome speech of Ambassador Carlos Liao, during which he discussed the state of Taiwan – El Salvador relations. This was the only reference to the competition found in the mainstream press of El Salvador in the days following.

In conclusion, while the PRC operates Confucius Institutes which offers professional teaching and the opportunity for further Mandarin study in China, the Taiwan ICDF is considerably less professional and offers students no formal qualification. This is epitomised by the use of volunteers with six weeks of basic training instead of university lecturers and a lack of centralisation in its course content. While this may be somewhat the result of a lack of resources, this strategy lacks real commitment to the building of civic bonds with the El Salvadorans on the part of Taiwan, and reflects a focus on political relations rather than public opinion.

Engagement with El Salvador's Domestic Media

When asked what the best way for Taiwan to engage with foreign publics was, Lin Kuo-chung from the Taipei Representative Office in London responded:

For us the best and most effective approach to public diplomacy is to engage via the media in the respective country. This allows us to reach the most people with our message. The international media of Taiwan does a job too but it is related to the government, not in its content but its budget is provided by the government. (Lin, 2011a)

That Taiwan considers the domestic media to be such a central component to its public diplomacy policy makes its analysis particularly worthwhile. Indeed, it is enlightening in itself that focus is on domestic media rather than Taiwan's own international broadcasting, as it reflects the wider predicament that many countries have in attracting audiences to their product. Indeed, at the time of writing none of the mainstream domestic media in El Salvador appeared to subscribe to newswires from either Taiwanese or PRC sources. However, they do have relationships with *Reuters*, *Associated Press* (AP), *EFE*, and other familiar European and North American news agencies (Monterrosa, 2011; Wu, 2011). Therefore, while it is important to note the existence of Taiwan's government funded international broadcasting organisations such as *Radio Taiwan International* (RTI), *Taiwan Today* (*Taiwan Hoy* for

the Spanish language), and the *Central News Agency* (CNA), their lack of penetration into El Salvador's domestic market limits the audience of these broadcasters to Chinese Diaspora, those with specific interests, academics studying China, and unintended contact.

This section will now discuss Taiwan's relationship with the domestic media of El Salvador as part of the public diplomacy strategy. Academic studies of political reportage from the region have rightly focused on the print media (for example, Jones, 2002; Kodrich, 2002; Alexander, 2009), as television tends to focus on entertainment in Central America, and radio regurgitates articles from other sources as it lacks a budget for original journalism (Rockwell and Janus, 2003). This section will therefore continue this legacy of research. However, first it is important to understand El Salvador's media history.

El Salvador's media is entangled with the political right-wing. However, while the likes of Guatemala have experienced considerable media reform since the mid 1990s – highlighted by the widening of political affiliations, the professionalisation of journalism, and the introduction of new newspapers (see Rockwell and Janus, 2003) – in El Salvador the media are largely untransformed from the days of the armed conflict where publications not aligned to the right-wing incumbents, including *Diario Co Latino*, were either banned or harangued by the national guard (Rockwell and Janus, 2003). For example, while Taiwan has been involved in a number of contemporary Central American Presidential corruption scandals, most notably in Guatemala and Costa Rica (*El Nuevo Diario*, 2005; *Nacion*, 2006), the lack of media reform in El Salvador goes some way to explaining the absence of revelations about the bribery of government officials by the Taiwanese, for there is no reason to believe that El Salvador has been immune to such behaviour.

When interviewed for this project, Monica Wu, the Head of the Press Office at the Taiwan Embassy in El Salvador, discussed the overall purpose of her department:

Effectively our mission as a press office or the purpose if you like is to provide information about Taiwan to the people of El Salvador. However we also organise all kinds of activities especially cultural activities in order to increase mutual understanding and increase our standing with the people of El Salvador [...]

Question: When you contact the local media, how do you do this?

We send a press release every week which summarises our main jobs. Besides this, we also make contact with [journalists and editors] over dinners or we go to their offices to talk to them to get a better understanding between us and the media. (Wu, 2011)

It is this concept of providing the local media with information on Taiwan that is the central purpose of the press offices of Taiwan embassies around the world.⁷⁷ In addition, Wu confirmed that the press office is invariably tasked with responding to challenges to Taiwan's diplomatic relationship by the El Salvador media (Wu, 2011). As such, it is important to assess the content of press releases and also evaluate the impact of the other tasks of the press office.

Appendices E and F are copies of two Spanish language press releases from Taiwan's Embassy in El Salvador that were sent to mainstream local media in February and March 2011. Each contains two stories on Taiwan. Translated, the four headlines read: 'Taiwan donates US\$100,000 to New Zealand', 'President Ma insists

⁷⁷ Lin Kuo-chung from the Taipei Representative Office in London stated that the press offices, "deal with the local media whether it be newspaper, television, radio etc. Our purpose is to raise the profile of Taiwan, to boost Taiwan's visibility, because a lot of British people do not know what Taiwan is. They think it is either part of China or even Thailand. So we try to provide them with information on our various policies and activities." (Lin, 2011a) This was also confirmed by Rosa Hu at the Taiwan embassy press office in Guatemala. (Hu, 2011b)

that political reform in China be quicker', 'Taipei in list of underestimated tourist cities', and 'President Ma and his wife will unite to collect funds for Japan'.

There are four points that can be made about their content. The first is that two of the stories re-emphasise the compassion-based image of the Taiwan diplomatic corps in El Salvador. Secondly, the stories had nothing to do with El Salvador. Third, none of El Salvador's three largest newspapers ran any of the stories, which makes Wu's statement that the primary purpose of the press office is to 'provide information on Taiwan to the people of El Salvador' seem like a rather fruitless exercise on their part. However, it may be that their lack of relevance to El Salvador goes a considerable way to explaining the lack of interest in their being published. The final point concerns the fact that Taiwan is attempting to broadcast its similar treatment of PRC allies, and wealthy allies at that. This arguably diminishes the distinction of the relationship in the eyes of both the public and the elite in the likes of El Salvador. For the sake of their public diplomacy therefore, perhaps it is not a bad thing that these press releases tend not to be published.

Collectively this demonstrates a shortfall in the understanding of editorial priorities of news organisations by the Taiwanese. However, the extent to which these are errors on the part of the local embassy press office is unclear. For these press releases are unedited copy produced by CNA in Taipei, and it may be that their dispatch is the result of a mandate by the Government Information Office (GIO) in Taipei rather than poor selectivity by the Press Office in El Salvador. That said, it is clear that instead of merely forwarding copy designed for mass distribution, the Press Office needs to begin providing more relevant press releases if they are to improve the volume that are published.

The second job of the Press Office is to respond to what they deem to be negative or inaccurate reporting of Taiwan and thus that which is potentially harmful to the diplomatic relationship (Wu, 2011). Issues of this nature are not

particularly prevalent in El Salvador given the dominance of conservatism in the media. However, it is worthwhile analysing the public response of the Press Office to instances that have occurred. The most pertinent example of the last two years occurred in November 2010 when the ASAC organised a business exhibition for 50 Chinese companies in San Salvador (*Diario Co Latino*, 2010), the largest for Chinese companies in the history of El Salvador (Flores, 2011). Wu (2011) claims that it was the quotation on page three of *Diario Co Latino* from El Salvador's attending President Mauricio Funes that caused alarm. The translation is as follows:

If it is agreeable to the country to open diplomatic relations with China - because China has thousands of millions of capital in the world - if it is agreeable for the country, we will move to do this. (Funes, cited in *Diario Co Latino*, 2010)

Wu said that the newspaper called Taiwan's embassy and asked for reaction to Funes's speech; and given the perceived gravity of the situation it was decided that Carlos Liao, Taiwan Ambassador to El Salvador, would give an interview to *Diario Co Latino* because this would ensure that Taiwan's point-of-view was clearly presented (Wu, 2011). This resulted in the 23rd November 2010 edition of *Diario Co Latino* being presented as follows: the first page gave headline coverage to the exhibition and included a photograph of FMLN politician Manuel Flores shaking hands with Yu Ping, Vice Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT, 2011), following their signing of an agreement; the second page provided coverage of the interview with Ambassador Liao; and the third page had two articles about El Salvador's relationships with Taiwan and the PRC, one of which included the quotation from President Funes (see *Diario Co Latino*, 2010).

In light of the fact that the Chinese Ambassador to Costa Rica provides a quarterly column to *Nacion*, for comparative purposes it is worthwhile conducting a

thematic analysis of Ambassador Liao's interview with *Diario Co Latino*. However, before this the context that induced the interview and the nature of interviewing itself must be discussed.

It is clear that the interview with Ambassador Liao was a reaction to the negative reportage of Taiwan. The basis for the interview was therefore to override negativity and this naturally preoccupied the discussion. In this regard, the agenda of the interview had been set by an event that required discussion, thus giving the Ambassador little opportunity to discuss the merits of Taiwan more generally. This is in comparison to the quarterly statements issued by the PRC's Ambassador to Costa Rica in *Nacion*, which have proactively sought to communicate with the Costa Rican public. While clearly there is a need to pre-empt topical concerns – Ambassador Li's statement regarding the PRC's environmental record in the aftermath of an international environmental summit is a good example, (Li, 2011a) – it is fair to say that the PRC are communicating proactively rather than as part of crisis management. Instead, Wu stated that the Press Office, "approached the editor-in-chief of [Diario] Co Latino about interviewing our ambassador" (Wu, 2011). To their detriment, Taiwan makes less effort to communicate proactively with the El Salvadoran public, and is therefore sacrificing much of the control over content to the media, rather than seeking a platform from which to present themselves without the same restrictions.

In providing a thematic analysis of the interview, the script can be separated into two sections. In the first half Ambassador Liao is asked about Taiwanese relations with the new FMLN government of El Salvador, and he responds by explaining the year-on-year increase in Taiwanese funding to government ministries, such as that of Justice and Security, as well as Taiwan's assistance in training police cadets in the fight against national security problems such as drug trafficking. The second half of the interview is a discussion of Taiwanese cooperation

in other areas, focusing on activities such as their contribution to education, agriculture and healthcare.

The ambassador's interview highlights the prioritisation of political goals in Taiwanese public diplomacy. For, it appears to be more conciliatory towards government officials than engagement with the public. This is demonstrated by Liao not focusing on the public benefit in any of his answers but on the government of El Salvador's apparent satisfaction with Taiwan's efforts, although those in the public reading the article will also digest Taiwan's contribution. A good example of this is when Ambassador Liao discusses healthcare: after highlighting Taiwan's contribution to the purchase of laboratory equipment, he states that, "[t]he subject of health is an important agenda for the government so for that reason we are supporting it" (Liao, cited in *Diario Co Latino*, 2010). There can be little doubt that a country without the diplomatic preoccupations of Taiwan would have phrased this with more emphasis on the needs of the people rather than of the government. Thus, Liao's emphasis clearly shows that Taiwan's public diplomacy priorities are strongly attached to the country's wider foreign policy regarding diplomatic recognition, and therefore builds evidence in support of the central argument of the thesis.

In conclusion, Taiwan appears to be underperforming in its communication with the domestic media and thus to the public of El Salvador because it operates on a reactive rather than a proactive basis. This is despite the claims of those in the Taiwan Embassy Press Office that their engagement with the public is one of the most fundamental parts of Taiwan's diplomatic mission in El Salvador. Thus, while the motivation to conduct public diplomacy is always about the satisfaction of a foreign government to some extent, when conducting media related activities there is an opportunity to communicate with the foreign civil society without requirement to ensure the appreciation of the authorities. There appears however, to be an imbalance where instead of speaking directly to the people, and communicating Taiwan's ideology and the potential benefits the Taiwanese can bring, there

continues to be a preoccupation with governmental relations. What is more, through apparent ignorance of media systems and practices, the Press Office's weekly press releases lack penetration. Indeed, while some will have been published over the years, that I asked Wu to send some good examples of the content that they offer the domestic media, would insinuate that the copy received was considered good practice by the Press Office, thus indicating considerable strategic ignorance.

Indeed, given the right-wing leanings of much of El Salvador's media, it is surprising that Taiwan's Ambassador does not directly address the people of El Salvador proactively and more regularly. For this would be an ideal way to promote pro-Taiwan sentiment and also to highlight the potential problems and incompatibilities El Salvador could encounter if it further integrates with the PRC. Moreover, this could create considerable empathy for Taiwan given that the timing of political reforms in El Salvador and Taiwan have somewhat mirrored one another, and many of the social issues that have been addressed are similar. Thus, that it does not do this adds weight to our argument regarding Taiwan's prioritising of relations with the PRC ahead of those with El Salvador.

All things considered therefore, the only real conclusion is that Taiwan's media diplomats need more incorporation of Taiwan's larger international strategy into their output, and that they must become more proactive, particularly now that the PRC has a presence in the region. The reasons why they do not do this are down to training on two levels: firstly, that working at the embassy in San Salvador is quite a junior position for members of the press office, where as the Taipei Representative Offices of Europe and North America are much more prestigious. Thus, staff are still very much still learning the particulars of the role; and secondly, because these individuals are media scholars first and foremost, and lack understanding of international relations and diplomacy. Thus, while for many countries employing media strategists to work in the press offices of embassies is suitable, given Taiwan's

precarious diplomatic situation these individuals are frontline diplomats and must be trained accordingly.

The Chinese Diaspora in El Salvador

While animosity has existed between the Costa Rican Chinese Diaspora and the PRC mission in that country (see chapter on Costa Rica), no such situation exists in El Salvador. Indeed, the Taiwan embassy participates in, and financially assists, cultural celebrations such as dragon parades at Chinese New Year, and the diaspora attend embassy social events. Diplomats also use Centro Chino to socialise with other Mandarin speakers while stationed there (Wang, 2011). The extent of the goodwill between the Taiwan embassy and the local Diaspora was evident in the participation of Mandarin students from Centro Chino – the premises in San Salvador collectively owned by the Diaspora – at the embassy’s Mandarin speaking and singing competition at the Sheraton Presidente on 17th February 2011. Those from the Diaspora community also sat in the audience and chatted happily with embassy staff at intervals.

Although Wang could not be specific, Centro Chino has offered Mandarin classes for many years. Indeed, with the embassy only beginning its provision of Mandarin teachers in 2008 (Hu, 2011a, Wang, 2011), Centro Chino was the only formal place to learn Mandarin in El Salvador before this. As Wang said:

The only place to learn [before 2008] was at Centro Chino in San Salvador, however this was not really for local people. Their policy was to teach Mandarin to the second and third generation Chinese descendants in El Salvador. So kids with Chinese parents, or parent, who wanted them to keep their language tradition alive. However now, about 90% of the people who learn at Centro Chino are local El Salvadorans. (Wang, 2011)

Therefore, similar to the China Association in Costa Rica, Centro Chino is a centre for all Chinese Diaspora, and those connected to it were keen to point out that

it held an apolitical position and sought to include “all Chinese”, whether originally from the Chinese mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau or further afield (Wang, 2011). Furthermore, Hu asserted that Centro Chino’s change in focus occurred in 2005 and was the result of demand for lessons as a consequence of “China’s growing presence in the world” (Hu, 2011a).

The majority of the Chinese Diaspora in Central America, and in the Americas as a whole, originate from southern coastal regions such as Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, and therefore from regions either at the extremities or beyond Beijing’s political control (Romero, 2010). Furthermore, the majority of Diaspora are Christians (Johnson, 2006; Romero, 2010; Suryadinata, 2007), and as Siu’s (2005: 182) work on the Chinese Diaspora in Panama previously indicated, the loyalty towards Taiwan comes more from the embassy’s willingness to support them rather than a concern for the future of Taiwan.

Given the similar collective experience of the Diaspora in El Salvador, there is no reason to believe that this would not be the case here. Furthermore, Wu confirmed Siu’s claim that maintaining good relations with the Chinese Diaspora had been a key public diplomacy strategy of Taiwan’s embassy in El Salvador (Siu, 2005: 183; Wu, 2011). Crucially however, it appears that the concern of the Diaspora is less to do with Taiwan loyalty and more about self and cultural preservation. This is problematic for Taiwan because it is clear that they would like this social group to act as political lobbyists in their favour. However, the strength of the pressure they could potentially apply is not so much related to Taiwan’s actions but to the desirability (or not) of the PRC. As such, while Diaspora can be used in the performance of public diplomacy and to gain political leverage, it must always be remembered that the vast majority of Diaspora reside in another country because of the push and pull factors that govern human migration. Thus, to some extent, those who originally made the decision to leave did so due to dissatisfaction, making any relationship between the two prone to volatility, as was seen in the Costa Rica

chapter. However, the specifics of the situation regarding the PRC and Taiwan mean that Taiwan has an opportunity to use this group as an anti-PRC lobby in Central America, given that most of this group originally left China because of deep political and economic dissatisfaction. That said, as second, third and fourth generation Diaspora emerge such hostility is bound to dissipate, especially as the PRC develops into a modern, successful economy. Therefore, to optimise the benefit of this group, Taiwan needs to exploit the weaknesses in the PRC's international image. However, there is little likelihood of this occurring because to do so would conflict and potentially harm the KMT government's policy of reconciliation with the mainland.

Conclusions about Taiwan's public diplomacy in El Salvador must revolve around its failure to engage effectively with the local civil society. This is particularly the case in its interaction with the domestic media, but applies in lesser amounts to its education diplomacy and development assistance. In addition, its relations with the Diaspora have never really been politically tested, and thus remain inconclusive. Whereas Taiwan's medical diplomacy, particularly the work of the MMMs, is arguably too removed to be of political benefit. Thus, while Taiwan is justifiably preoccupied with its diplomatic relationship with El Salvador's government, public diplomacy which is overly-focused on winning political support but which fails to make a reasonable attempt to consolidate positive public sentiment, is at considerable risk of being ineffective at influencing both public and political elite in El Salvador. It is therefore logical that we look towards Taiwan's domestic audience for explanation of Taiwan's conduct here. However, like any other nation-state, Taiwan must try and achieve a balance, seeking to engage more with the El Salvador public, yet also ensuring that political goals are met.

Challenges to Taiwanese Diplomatic Incumbency

In response to questions about threats to Taiwan's position in El Salvador, the Taiwan embassy Press Office said, "Our challenge is always from China" (Wu, 2011).

Given this statement and the progression of the PRC as a world power, any critique of Taiwanese public diplomacy must be positioned against the activities of their rival within the country in question. This is all the more important given that, while El Salvador and the PRC do not have formal diplomatic relations, in 2011 the PRC ranked as the fourth most prevalent import partner, with US\$443 million worth of product entering the country: only the USA, Guatemala and Mexico were higher (Ministerio de Economía El Salvador, 2012). As was noted earlier, Taiwan has an FTA with El Salvador, yet neither country maximises its potential. What is more, the PRC's use of economic diplomacy has precedence. For example, Brautigam notes the case of Swaziland, a country that has never had diplomatic ties with the PRC, yet Chinese-state owned companies have been winning contracts in the country since the early 1990s (Brautigam, 2009: 69).

On the topic of the PRC's economic diplomacy to El Salvador, Manuel Flores, the founder and Chairman of the ASAC, remarked: "China is practically recognised anyway in Central America, it is the second economy of the world, so to deny its existence is incorrect. Also, for Central America to miss these opportunities is crazy, so there is mutual interest in building friendship and commercial ties" (Flores, 2011). Therefore, it is economic integration that defines the level of interest in the PRC there is in El Salvador. As a result, this section will discuss the growth of El Salvador's economic relations with the PRC, and explain the effect of these developments to Taiwan's public diplomacy and diplomatic incumbency overall.

As noted in the introduction, the FMLN has had friendly relations with the PRC since its days as a guerrilla group. However, the relationship was more a consequence of the PRCs support for anti-imperialist guerrilla groups than any tendency towards the development of international trade. In 2005, Manuel Flores, the mayor of the Quezaltepeque, established the ASAC following the trip he had made to the PRC in 2004 to attend the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) conference where he met Li Xiaolin, an academic

and business leader within the ranks of the CCP, and the daughter of former Premier Li Peng (Flores, 2011).⁷⁸ According to Flores,

For Li [Xiaolin], expanding mainland China's influence in Latin America and the Caribbean was very important. So in 2005 I was inspired to found the ASAC. Similar agencies were set up in Nicaragua and Costa Rica and other countries of Central America and the Caribbean which had no diplomatic relations. We all speak regularly. When Costa Rica recognised China in 2007 the organisation there was a great help in ensuring the smooth changeover. It meant that the ruling party were not completely alien to the functioning of the Chinese as they already had friends within the government. (Flores, 2011)

What is more, Flores should be viewed as an ideal choice as mediator between the two countries. He has been a member of the FMLN since its period as a guerrilla group, and as Mayor of Quezaltepeque he sits on the periphery of high-profile politics in El Salvador, yet can easily access those in the cabinet or the Head-of-State. This permits the FMLN government to publicly indulge El Salvador's diplomatic relations with Taiwan while simultaneously facilitating channels of dialogue with the PRC.

It is clear that the focus of China's public diplomacy in El Salvador is on promoting the apparent economic opportunity that the PRC presents. Indeed, while paragraph one of the agreement, signed in November 2010 by Flores and Yu Ping, Vice Chairman of the CCPIT, states that, "Both parties will, within their respective responsibilities, keep regular contact and actively promote the friendship between China and El Salvador as well as the economic ties",⁷⁹ it is clear that emphasis is on economics rather than the rather vague term of 'cooperation'. Flores was asked

⁷⁸ The CPAFFC is mandated by the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and permits non-recognised nation-states such as El Salvador to participate. Therefore, it is through this organisation that the likes of El Salvador interact with the PRC government. A framed A2 formal photograph of all representatives at the 2004 conference (including Flores) adorns the wall of the reception to Flores' office in Quezaltepeque. This hangs next to an enormous photograph of the Birds Nest Stadium in Beijing.

⁷⁹ A copy of this document is in the author's possession.

about the reality of what the ASAC wanted to do: “We have talked about creating a CA4 (Central America Four – Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador) agreement with China where a commercial link will be established and where the government of each country can officialise these friendship associations as the referral point for the Chinese” (Flores, 2011).

This approach has been epitomised by the establishment of Chambers of Commerce for the PRC across Central America, San Salvador’s being opened on 25th October 2010 (EFE, 2010). Beyond this, the ASAC, with Flores as its figurehead, provides the most obvious example of PRC’s growing political influence within one of Taiwan’s Central American diplomatic allies. Flores (2011) confirmed that he is the self-appointed, “political reference point for China in the region.” In this regard, the ASAC works of behalf of the PRC to promote perceived mutual interests in El Salvador.

The most significant event was the PRC Trade Exhibition organised by the ASAC in November 2010. It was the result of 18 months planning and gained the participation of 50 companies that Flores claimed were from the PRC. However, at least one of those in attendance was in fact Taiwanese (although they have offices on both sides of the Taiwan Strait), thus demonstrating the need for care when classifying non-governmental actors as part of a nation-state’s public diplomacy apparatus.⁸⁰ It should finally be noted that in Yu Ping, the event was attended by the highest ranked CCP official to ever to visit El Salvador (Flores, 2010).⁸¹

The first thing to note about the trade exhibition is Taiwan’s unhappiness at its occurrence. Flores stated:

⁸⁰ The products on show included a number of PRC ‘fairtrade’ organisations selling herbal medicine and traditional Chinese handcrafts. Additionally, there were PRC brands including H&O Jewellery, Geosofia (manufacturer of domestic appliances such as irons and sewing machines), and Golden Will Industrial, which will be discussed in more detail later. Most interesting however, was the attendance of Pollux Lighting, a Taiwanese company whose production line is in Shanghai (Pollux Lighting, 2012). Their participation in the PRC exhibition raised no eyebrows, which may well be the result of a lack of journalistic enquiry, nevertheless it demonstrates the need for academic prudence when events are categorised as public diplomacy.

⁸¹ Photographs of the trade exhibition are available on the ASAC’s Facebook page. (Facebook, 2012)

During the development of the expo last November I had big pressure from Taiwan, first, to stop developing it, and second, to not put the Chinese flag in a commercial and cultural event. The symbol of the country is the flag and the fact that there is no diplomatic relationship should not stop me from flying the Chinese flag. In any case, I was the one who was developing the expo and the companies coming were from the People's Republic of China. It was clear that Taiwan was motivated by ideological matters, by politics. They did not want me to fly the Chinese flag because they said that this would politicize the expo. So I said to them that in that case, every time you fly the Taiwanese flag at an event, you are therefore politicizing the event. To fly the flag is not to politicize an event; the flag is a demonstration of the nationality of the event (Flores, 2011).

We must question Flores's claim that a flag does not politicise an event, because both the PRC and Taiwan have great emphasis on gesture and that which is implied in their diplomacy. Thus, the PRC flag sharing the stage with that of El Salvador should be seen as a symbolic statement intended to provoke the Taiwanese.

Due diligence ensured I also asked the Taiwan Embassy about the PRC's economic presence in El Salvador:

China is getting stronger everyday so this presents pressure for us because especially economically China is strong and here we often hear or read in the newspaper, on the television or from some government official that El Salvador is talking about how important China is. They have begun to form a relationship with China, not diplomatically but economically, so it presents to us more pressure and we need to explain to the people of El Salvador why it is important to maintain a relationship with Taiwan (Wu, 2011).

It is not surprising that Wu gave such a diplomatic answer to the question because it would be hypocritical for Taiwan to impede their allies' development of trade relations with the PRC when cross-strait trade has been multiplying in recent years. Clearly, this is a face-saving exercise by the Taiwanese. Indeed, Taiwan is forced into the adoption a neutral position on El Salvador–PRC trade, merely emphasising the separation of economic and diplomatic issues. However, when the President of El Salvador shared a stage at this event with both the El Salvador and PRC flags, the lack of differentiation between the two was noticeable.

In keeping with their left-leaning editorial policy, *Diario Co Latino* (2010) gave the PRC trade exhibition a somewhat more positive write-up than the right-leaning newspaper *El Diario de Hoy*, focusing not on the merits of the exhibition but on the failure of President Funes to give a definitive answer on the question of El Salvador's diplomatic recognition of Taiwan (see *El Diario de Hoy*, 2010b). Thus, it can be argued that the exhibition served its political purpose by staging Funes against the backdrop of a PRC flag and ensuring media focus on this rather than the products on show. The symbolism of a flag was also discussed in the section on medical diplomacy, and it is clear that the appearance of the PRC flag crossed with the flag of El Salvador on a public stage with Funes standing in front of it is an intentional act designed to antagonise the Taiwanese. Yet Wu's comments show the extent to which Taiwan remains placid. As such, in keeping with the central argument, Taiwan's diplomacy is severely restricted by its own government's reconciliation with the PRC.

The exhibition's political rather than economic purpose was further highlighted by Rolando Monterrosa, Head of Opinion at *El Diario de Hoy*, who stated that:

[The exhibition] was very poorly attended by the El Salvadoran business community. Moreover, the people who were pitching did not appear to really know the products and could not answer the simple questions people asked. Also, there were very few samples for the people to take away and try. I go

back to this notion of quality, it was almost as though they didn't want to give samples because they knew the quality was poor⁸² (Monterrosa, 2011).

Perhaps the main reason behind the lack of knowledge of those on the stands at the exhibition was that they were Latin Americans and not Chinese, many of whom we can assume were promotional staff on temporary contracts and not regular employees of the companies in attendance. This lack of staff training and investment in products further enhances the argument that the event had more of a political purpose than an economic one. Furthermore, it shows the value of the objective-based approach to public diplomacy research, as it is important for activities such as these to be evaluated on the extent of their interpersonal communications between the source and recipient. Such analysis would not have been compatible with the institutional or resource-based approaches.

Despite the motivation for the exhibition being largely political, it was still important to understand more about the goods being promoted by the PRC in El Salvador. This was because several commentators had claimed that the PRC's integration with the underdeveloped world would lead to countries being awash with cheap (read: shoddy) Chinese products, which would compete with, and most likely undercut, those locally made (see Ellis, 2009; Santiso, 2007; Taylor, 2009). I asked Rolando Monterrosa for his organisation's opinion on this.

Monterrosa: You know a few years ago the local council of San Salvador bought some garbage trucks from China but they lasted about a year before they fell apart [...].

Question: Was it the problem that there were no spare parts to fix the trucks and no mechanics with knowledge?

⁸² There is no evidence to suggest that the event was poorly attended. On the contrary the event appears to have been very busy, however a breakdown of figures from different social sectors is unavailable.

Monterrosa: Yes, but it was also just a general issue of poor quality regarding the steel the trucks were made with. They now sit in a yard and their parts are being sold off here and there or for scrap [...] You know that the same company the government bought the garbage trucks from has begun importing Chinese made motorcycles and it's the same scenario – poor, poor quality [...] We import quite a lot of goods from Taiwan, they cost more than they would do from China but the quality is far superior. In a way, by buying the more expensive goods you probably save money. (Monterrosa, 2011)

The Chinese company responsible for the import of these bin lorries, Golden Will Inc., was one of the 50 companies to attend the PRC trade exhibition despite the negative media coverage they had already received in El Salvador (*El Diario de Hoy*, 2011). According to their website, Golden Will Inc. is a part-public part-private exporter of industrial vehicles based in Beijing and focusing specifically on Taiwan's diplomatic allies in Central America. However, more importantly, the company's President Wang Guangquan is a CCP official and Vice-President for Enterprise of the CPAFFC (Golden Will, 2012), the association Manuel Flores attended the conference of in 2004. This strategic positioning of industry for the purpose of political gain has been documented by Dumbaugh (2010) when discussing the PRC's international soft power.

Therefore, in coordination with the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Golden Will Inc. has strategically targeted Taiwan's diplomatic allies and sought to win contracts for the PRC – in particular, government contracts such as San Salvador City Council – in an apparent attempt to dilute Taiwan's civic stronghold. That said, success has been hard to come by, and given the issue with the bin lorries, one can easily argue that all the PRC has done is confirm much of the Western scepticism that it is an exporter of substandard products.

Conclusion

El Salvador is undoubtedly a key nation-state in the competition for allies as both the PRC and Taiwan devote resources to this country. This research has sought to analyse Taiwan's public diplomacy in El Salvador, and the PRC's attempts to dilute Taiwan's influence in its diplomatic allies. Thus, to gain such perspective it was essential that an objectives-based approach be adopted from public diplomacy's point of delivery in the target country. Isolating the research in Taipei or Beijing would have lacked the necessary perspective to make linkages to Taiwan's performance and to the overall competition for diplomatic allies that both countries are a part of.

The central findings of this chapter are that Taiwan conducts public diplomacy in El Salvador more to ensure generous appraisal from the political elite of the country than out of a desire to promote positive public sentiment from El Salvadoran civil society. Thus, Taiwan's public diplomacy is part of a larger diplomatic structure whose political agenda is decisively geared towards the maintenance of formal diplomatic relations. However, as El Salvador becomes a vibrant young democracy, we must question the sustainability and therefore the sensibility of such an approach. For if El Salvador continues on the same trajectory that it has followed for two decades now then Taiwan's diplomatic policies risk redundancy at best and public and political backlash at worst.

Despite this, Taiwan's diplomatic corps maintain the rhetoric that their intentions towards El Salvador are charitable rather than political. That the mainly younger diplomats are saying this and are being told this in training is concerning, because more than anything it reveals tensions in Taiwan's diplomatic corps between older and younger generations that reflect Taiwan's recent socio-political history and uncertainty surrounding its national identity. These issues can be overcome but only if the training becomes more frank about the political emphasis of Taiwan's work in countries like El Salvador.

On top of this, achieving the goals of Taiwan's diplomacy has been made more difficult in recent years by a turnover of political power to the FMLN, as the party would rather relations with the PRC. More than anything, this has exposed the vulnerability of an approach that is too intent on winning political influence, as the new political incumbents will want to consolidate their position after gaining office, and this may mean ridding the establishment of those who favour their adversaries. Therefore, it can be concluded that El Salvador's transition to multiparty democracy has not been favourable to Taiwan's style of conducting diplomacy, and that diplomatic relations with El Salvador continue only as a result of the diplomatic truce. This can be seen as an opportunity for Taiwan to experiment with new public strategies, yet its lack of proactivity and overall interest in public diplomacy beyond the political relationship means that this would require a complete refocus.

On the aspect of the PRC's economic diplomacy in El Salvador, this should be of grave concern to Taiwan's diplomatic mission. For now the PRC do not seem overly concerned with the manufacture of positive public sentiment. Instead, their presence is primarily to unsettle the Taiwanese, given that isolation of Taiwan is dominant foreign policy in this region. This was most evident at the Chinese trade exhibition in San Salvador in November 2010 which became an overwhelmingly political affair. Economically, the strategic use of industrial companies to win contracts in Taiwan's allies is an interesting development in Central America. We see examples of this in Africa, and it is a tactic that the PRC has been able to use as a result of the political control exerted over their international economic output. Such a tactic would arguably not be available to Western governments who cannot manoeuvre the international investment of their industries to such an extent. However, thus far the approach has had only limited success in El Salvador, as the products of Golden Will Inc. In particular have been sub-standard and staff at the trade exhibition in San Salvador could not provide the attendees with satisfactory information.

Finally, the emerging professional diplomatic service in El Salvador makes the prospect of policies devised by technocrats rather than political appointees a future reality. There is high chance that this will hamper the long-term prospects of Taiwan in El Salvador should their diplomatic mission maintain the same approach. Indeed, it is surprising that Taiwan has demonstrated so little capacity to change in El Salvador given that its domestic political culture has been through similar changes over similar timeframes to that of El Salvador. As such, if Taiwan is to stabilise its diplomatic relations with El Salvador it must rebalance its focus to incorporate genuine attempts to consolidate positive public sentiment in this emerging democracy. Without this, it can be replaced by the PRC without much discontent, should the opportunity arise.

At its crux public diplomacy wants to ensure or induce human behaviour from its audience that is desirable to the source. Admitting to this would involve a degree of controversy and this has made governments unwilling to be transparent over their grand strategy and intentions. In addition, given that sentimentality is a human emotion that is highly vulnerable to fluctuations, public diplomacy research tends not to come to decisive conclusions over its impact, with analysis dependent more on speculation than science. As a result, judgement from a variety of viewpoints is required. However, due to the shortfall in objectives-based research at public diplomacy's point of delivery, there appears to be little desire to overcome these weaknesses.

What transparency there is from public diplomacy departments usually comes from the reality that they must compete with other divisions of government for funding and so may choose to publish reports to assist their budgetary prospects. This was best illustrated in the text by the annual reports of the Taiwan ICDF, which fail to make any comment on El Salvadoran sentiment, preferring instead to discuss, for example, the number of farmers assisted by the mission during the year gone by (Taiwan ICDF, 2012). However, this does not discuss what the desired human

behaviour is and whether it has occurred as a result of the public diplomacy. That said, whether El Salvador's public in this case, is actually the main audience remains sceptical.

Taiwan's objectives in El Salvador revolve around the continuation of its formal diplomatic relationship with the government. Everything that it does in the country, whether it is governmental diplomacy, incentivising greater economic relations, or other public diplomacy areas, contributes to this overall aspiration. The PRC's objectives in El Salvador appear to be both political and economic. By breaking Taiwan's political monopoly in the country through the growth of relations with the governing FMLN party, and also increasing the availability of Chinese products on the El Salvador market. In regards to the latter, this is not necessarily an attempt to marginalise Taiwan but reflects the PRC's wider public diplomacy strategy of growing its economic footprint around the world. However, the exceptions to this are the likes of Golden Will Inc. who have been strategically positioned by the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs to compete in the domestic markets of Taiwan's allies.

Thus, given the lack of specific criteria to base decisions regarding the fulfilment of these objectives, any critique is easily contestable. However, that Taiwan and El Salvador remain diplomatic partners indicates that Taiwan's main political goal in the country continues to prosper. That said, the maintenance of the status quo may be more to do with factors out with Taiwan's sole control, namely the continuation of the ECFA between the PRC and Taiwan, and the limited success of Chinese companies attempting to enter the El Salvador market.

Finally, one must highlight that Taiwan, with or without its repertoire of public diplomacy activities, will in all likelihood continue to find favour with the ARENA party, although their chances of winning the next Presidential elections look slim. Public diplomacy therefore allows those who already favour diplomatic relations

with Taiwan to provide justifiable evidence of their preference. That said, as memory of the armed conflict fades amongst the ARENA party as that generation leaves frontline politics, the evaluation of public diplomacy will become increasingly relevant to these people as well.

Thus, the role of Taiwan's public diplomacy in justifying its continued diplomatic incumbency has been brought into sharp focus in El Salvador with the ARENA party in opposition since 2009. This turnover of power to the FMLN has resulted in the expansion of Taiwan's public diplomacy activities, but greater quantity does not mean greater quality. Winning the hearts and minds of FMLN politicians and the public must now become the overriding goal for Taiwan in El Salvador should it not want to be dependent on a diplomatic truce for the continuation of its diplomatic relationship.

Guatemala

Introduction

Speculation of defection to the PRC has persisted in all of the Central American Republics except Guatemala where diplomatic loyalty to Taiwan has remained steadfast (Keegan, 2006b; Stephenson, 2010; Young, 2007a). This interesting situation was the primary reason for Guatemala's selection as a case study, and it was felt that this country would bring further clarity to our understanding of the competition for allies between the PRC and Taiwan, and the role of public diplomacy within it. In the case of Guatemala the main question was whether Taiwan had been and was continuing to neglect the importance of public sentiment, as had been the case in Costa Rica and El Salvador. If this was so then it would indicate that there was no correlation between the security of a diplomatic relationship and the delivery style of Taiwan's public diplomacy across the Central American isthmus. However, if it was found that Taiwan's public diplomacy had greater public focus in Guatemala then explanations for this would have to be uncovered.

Ultimately, it was found that Taiwan is largely preoccupied with the satisfaction of government officials in Guatemala too, with limited emphasis on creating or maintaining positive public sentiment. However the appointment of Adolfo Sun as Taiwan Ambassador to Guatemala in June 2008 has somewhat altered the extent of this statement. Ambassador Sun has tried to guide a change in the mind-set of those practicing public diplomacy, which includes a more public focus in his country of ambassadorship. That said, several senior members of Taiwan's public diplomatic corps in Guatemala remain largely focused on political rather than public goals. This was best illustrated by Roberto Pan, Head of the Taiwan ICDF in Guatemala, who continues to consider 'success' for Taiwan to be judged on the state of the diplomatic relationship and not the virtues of public sentiment: "the opportunities generated by the work and finance of Taiwan's projects are

indispensable to the government of Guatemala, so every year is considered to be successful” (Pan, 2011). As we will see, this is all very well in Guatemala’s current political climate, but given that this is a region in change it is essential that the focus of Taiwan’s diplomacy can adapt accordingly.

This chapter moves towards the conclusion that Taiwan’s public diplomacy is primarily concerned with securing diplomatic relationships, and that this is systematic across all of Taiwan’s remaining formal allies. This public diplomacy practice reflects Taiwan’s international isolation, and the subtle changes that are documented from country-to-country are the result of individual emphasis and decision-making rather than central policy. This chapter will therefore discuss Taiwan’s public diplomacy in Guatemala, but also the growing albeit limited footprint of the PRC in the country. First however, it is necessary to understand why Guatemala has bestowed a level of loyalty on Taiwan beyond that of its neighbours.

Taiwan and Guatemala: Still a Strong Diplomatic Relationship

While the Central American Republics of Nicaragua, El Salvador and Panama have somewhat distanced themselves from Taiwan despite their countries’ continuing formal diplomatic recognition of the ROC over the PRC, Taiwan has publicly and privately exuded confidence over its relationship with Guatemala (*China Post*, 2009b; Eaton, 2006; Keegan, 2006b). Typical of this rhetoric is this summary extract from a US diplomatic cable published by *Wikileaks*, which originates from the American Institute in Taipei:

Although Paraguay did not support the UN initiative [to reinstate Taiwan to the UN General Assembly], it still has been working with Taiwan on cooperation projects, which demonstrates an intention to continue relations. The new Paraguayan government wants to use the funds provided by Taiwan for new projects, he added. [Foreign Minister] Ou said that Nicaragua had been very quiet up to now. Guatemala, where he served as

Ambassador, is not a problem, although it does want to have economic and commercial relations with China, which is alright. (Young, 2008)

The increase in commercial relations between Guatemala and the PRC will be discussed in greater depth later in this chapter. The immediate question arising from this quotation however is why Guatemala is considered to be 'not a problem' as Foreign Minister Ou claims. The answer to this can be found in the legacy of internal instability in Guatemala, the tumultuous political landscape and the structure of its diplomatic corps. Epitomising the final factor is the appointment of Francisco Bermudez as Guatemalan Ambassador to Taiwan in 2007. Bermudez had significant involvement with Taiwan during the Guatemalan armed conflict (1960 – 1996), because of his various senior roles in the Guatemalan military. However, of greater contemporary significance is that Bermudez was Minister for Defence prior to his appointment as Ambassador to Taiwan (Wang, 2007; Taiwan Government Entry Point, 2007). Indeed, Chen Shui-bian of the DPP, while President of Taiwan (2000 – 2008), stated that Bermudez was the "perfect choice for the position", and that the appointment symbolised, "the importance President Berger [of Guatemala] has placed on the alliance between the two countries" (Chen, cited in Taiwan Government Entry Point, 2007). This demonstrates the extent to which Guatemala – Taiwan relations are based on ideological harmony and a system of historical patronage between the two countries. This was clear from one of Bermudez's first press releases following his move to Taipei:

Taiwan 40 years ago had an economy and social situation that is very similar to Guatemala's today. In terms of social development, I see similarities between both our peoples. Even though we profess different religions, we both respect tradition and adhere to cultural values. [...] International relations must be based on principles and values, and we share that with Taiwan. We think that the political system in Taiwan is very much the same as the one in Guatemala. Guatemala has been a friend of Taiwan's because we

share principles and values. It has cost us to build democracy, just as it has cost Taiwan to build its democracy. That's why we value and support Taiwan's effort to be fully recognized as a democratic state. Guatemala will continue its relations with democratic countries. And we believe that our relationship with Taiwan is completely fortified (Bermudez, cited in Wang, 2007).⁸³

It is not uncommon for Ambassadors to say nice things about the countries to which they have been commissioned. However, Bermudez epitomises the system of patronage and the Guatemalan political establishment's positive outlook towards Taiwan. To be sure, many of the public figures and political parties – albeit often under different guises – from the period of armed conflict still hold political office. For example, the new Guatemalan President, appointed in January 2012, Otto Perez Molina, was head of the Guatemalan military when the peace accords were signed in 1996 (*BBC News*, 2012a). These individuals and organisations have been loyal to Taiwan for their counterinsurgency training against guerrilla groups intent on destabilising the government. Zhu (2010) refers to such activities as 'military diplomacy'.

Contemporary Guatemala is what Marxists would call a 'bourgeois democracy', where, despite universal suffrage, mainstream politics reflects inter-elite competition for political advantage rather than an approximate reflection of social opinion (see Miliband, 1977). In countries like this left-wing political options are typically marginalised. Indeed, while the likes of El Salvador and Nicaragua have strong and politically competitive socialist movements, Guatemala's lacks organisation and has never challenged for the top political honours (Colburn and

⁸³In addition, the current Ambassador of Taiwan to Guatemala, Adolfo Sun (June 2008 – Present), was quoted by the Guatemalan media last year as saying, "Guatemala has been a faithful friend for over 60 years, and that friendship translates not only to the consolidation of economic relations and trade, investment and cooperation, but also to affection, admiration and support." (Sun, 2011a)

Cruz, 2007; Howard and Vasquez, 2011; Rockwell and Janus, 2003).⁸⁴ Much of this is a consequence of Guatemala's armed conflict having different dynamics and lasting for much longer than respective conflicts elsewhere on the Central American isthmus (Alpirez, 2011; Rasch, 2011).

The differences between the conflicts were highlighted by Ana Carolina Alpirez, Editor of the Guatemalan daily newspaper *El Periodico*: "We did not have the same dynamic in Guatemala as there was in El Salvador in terms of the rebels' relationship with the Russians. They say that in Nicaragua and El Salvador the war was different to Guatemala and that this is why the peace process has had a different rhythm in Guatemala" (Alpirez, 2011). The 'different rhythm' that she refers to involves the lack of an organised and at times combative social movement in Guatemala, but it is also the result of the added dynamic of a racially motivated conflict. Evidence of the latter can be found in the different conclusions reached by the UN Commissions for Historical Clarification in the aftermath of the conflicts in El Salvador and Guatemala. The conclusion of the Commission for Guatemala was that the state apparatus was responsible for acts of 'genocide' against the indigenous Mayan population, which accounts for around 60% of Guatemala's total population (Rasch, 2011: 81), while there were no such findings in El Salvador (UNCEH, 1999; UNVCS, 1993).⁸⁵

⁸⁴ Madrid (2005: 702) has calculated that leftist parties on average have won 15% of the vote in indigenous municipalities and 8.5% in non-indigenous municipalities in Guatemala.

⁸⁵ Paragraph 122 of the United Nations' Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala states that, "In consequence, the CEH concludes that agents of the State of Guatemala, within the framework of counterinsurgency operations carried out between 1981 and 1983, committed acts of genocide against groups of Mayan people which lived in the four regions analysed. This conclusion is based on the evidence that, in light of Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the killing of members of Mayan groups occurred (Article II.a), serious bodily or mental harm was inflicted (Article II.b) and the group was deliberately subjected to living conditions calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part (Article II.c). The conclusion is also based on the evidence that all these acts were committed "with intent to destroy, in whole or in part" groups identified by their common ethnicity, by reason thereof, whatever the cause, motive or final objective of these acts may have been (Article II, first paragraph)" (UNCEH, 1999). The late 1970s and early 1980s was the period when Taiwan was most active in its counterinsurgency training in Central America (Anderson and Anderson, 1986).

Guatemalan society has clear ideological and ethnic divides, both of which have caused violence during Guatemala's troubled past (Rasch, 2011; Grandin, 2000). Indeed, at the heart of Guatemala's most recent armed conflict (1960 – 1996) was a purge on the indigenous peasantry who were accused of having communist leanings.⁸⁶ However, what was dressed up as a Cold War dichotomy was, in reality, a resistance to cultural imperialism amongst the indigenous population that had existed in one form or another since the early period of colonialism (Chasteen, 2011).

While some anthropologists and sociologists have highlighted increased social mobility and political participation in recent years (for example, Little-Siebold, 2001; Rasch, 2011), those applying a more economic approach stress the continued exclusion of the indigenous community from decision-making in Guatemala (for example, Dougherty, 2011; Van de Sandt, 2009). Either way, it remains that Guatemalan society is extremely divided, and this inevitably guides the conduct of foreign governments in the country.

The governments of Guatemala and the ROC (then governing from Beijing) began formal relations in 1933, and in 1935 a small consulate opened in Guatemala City (Sun, 2011b). In 1954 a diplomatic mission began to operate in the country and in 1960 a full embassy was opened (Chen, 2011). However, throughout the 1950s and 1960s the primary focus of both the PRC and Taiwan was the alignment of the newly-independent states of Africa (Gilbert, 1963; Hsieh, 1985; Strauss, 2009; Taylor, 2002; Yu, 1963). What is more, Guatemala's strong relations with the United States (and its preference of relations with Taiwan rather than the PRC) during this period meant that neither the PRC nor Taiwan paid it much attention (Taylor, 2002; Yu, 1963). However, Guatemala steadily increased in priority for the Taiwan government during and after the 1960s as Taiwan became more diplomatically

⁸⁶ The armed conflict also reflected inter-elite jockeying for advantage, in so much as political opponents and rival businesses were the subject of assassination attempts and intimidation by each other (see Grandin, 2000).

isolated and the government of Guatemala sought support from ideological allies to counter Communist sympathy (Anderson and Anderson, 1986).

What is more, the ROC's early establishment of an embassy and full diplomatic mission in Guatemala in comparison to other Central American Republics (for example, an embassy was opened in El Salvador in 1961 and a mission began in 1971), reflects the prominence and importance of Guatemala regionally. This early relationship building proved to be a shrewd decision on the part of the ROC as Guatemala subsequently took the lead role to ensure that diplomatic support continued from other Central American Republics in the aftermath of Taiwan's exclusion from the UN in October 1971 (Anderson and Anderson, 1986). At the centre of this effort was Mario Sandoval Alarcon, the then speaker of the Guatemalan Congress. After the ROC's withdrawal from the UN on 26th October 1971, Sandoval arrived in Taiwan on 28th October for a week-long strategic planning visit (Taiwan GIO, 2012).⁸⁷ Anderson and Anderson's investigations provide interesting perspective on Sandoval's Taiwan connections:

It was also during Sandoval's tenure as vice-president [of Guatemala] that closer ties to Taiwan were forged. "Sandoval went to Taiwan while he was vice-president," a former government minister said, "and he brought them in. If you want to trace Taiwanese presence here, you can begin in 1974 [when Sandoval was vice-president]."

Through his leadership role in the Latin American Anti-Communist Confederation and the WACL, Sandoval made numerous trips to Taiwan, where he was feted by Kuomintang leaders. Quietly, Guatemalan officers, an estimated fifty to seventy, were sent to Taiwan to receive training in political warfare.

⁸⁷ Other Central American Republics would follow suit soon after. For example, Walter Beneke Medina, Foreign Minister of El Salvador, would arrive on 10th November 1971 (Taiwan GIO, 2012).

The courses at Peitou, which were taught in Spanish, met Guatemalan educational requirements for military advancement; majors that went to Taiwan returned as Lieutenant Colonels. Even as their Guatemalan armed forces salaries continued, Taiwan picked up most, if not all, of the air fare and living expenses while they were in Taiwan (Anderson and Anderson, 1986: 170).

Taiwan's military diplomacy towards Guatemala was also attractive to other Central American Republics, particularly El Salvador who sought training in counterinsurgency as their own armed conflict escalated (Anderson and Anderson, 1986: 178). Much of Taiwan's latter 20th century military mandate on the Central American isthmus therefore stemmed from Sandoval's activities during the early 1970s.

What is more, similar to El Salvador, assistance by the Taiwanese during the latter part of the armed conflict can be separated into two parts: publicity-seeking development assistance in the form of Operation Vanguard, and the more secretive training of the Guatemalan military. This quotation from a State Department official in Guatemala during the 1980s reflects Taiwan's dual-task.

The Taiwanese have agricultural projects throughout the country, including a model village where they are teaching displaced Indians how to grow soya beans. Their political warfare training has reached an advanced stage; there are now Taiwanese advisers training officers and soldiers in political warfare throughout Guatemala. "You can't go very far", one State Department Official said, "without seeing one of their political warfare manuals. They're everywhere" (Anderson and Anderson, 1986: 183).

This quotation further emphasises Taiwan's involvement with the Guatemalan military in a period from which they would later be accused of genocide. More than 400 indigenous villages were destroyed by the Guatemalan military during the

armed conflict, and this violence against indigenous groups stemmed from the centuries old prejudice of the Spanish *conquistadors* (Rockwell and Janus, 2003: 92). What is more, Taiwan's market-oriented development assistance was part of a larger strategy to prevent Communist sentiment developing amongst the peasantry of underdeveloped countries.

As the introductory chapter discussed, Operation Vanguard's concept of 'development' was very much in the mould of neo-liberalism, as the peasantry were taught not just how to manipulate their farming practices for greater yield but also basic free market economics. In doing so, Taiwan was attempting to assist the Guatemalan government in the suppression of supposedly communist leanings, and thus in the consolidation of the establishment's oligarchic domination.

Much has been written (for example, Gleijeses, 1991; Kinzer and Schlesinger, 1999) on the role of the United Fruit Company (UFC) as the largest landholder in Guatemala and its influence over Guatemalan politics, the CIA coup to remove President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 being the most obvious example. The UFC owned approximately 550,000 acres of the most fertile land in Guatemala, yet always left around 60% of this land uncultivated, frustrating the peasantry and giving those opposing the government considerable ammunition (Kinzer and Schlesinger, 1999: 75). Taiwan's role after 1971 was therefore to make habitable what poor quality land remained available to the peasants for part-subsistence part-commercial cultivation. As such, Operation Vanguard was designed as a stopgap to potential insurrection, but which fundamentally failed to address the root cause of such predicament.

Taiwan held considerable influence in Guatemala during the latter years of the Cold War, which resulted in the almost complete exclusion of the PRC from the country (Anderson and Anderson, 1986). When I interviewed Jose Lisandro Sanchez, a lecturer at Universidad Rafael Landivar in Guatemala City and former Taiwan scholarship holder, he illustrated how Taiwan conducted diplomacy during this

period: “My father was a military attaché and he had a lot of contact with the Taiwanese during the 1980s. For example, he used to tell me about senior officers being invited to the houses of Taiwanese diplomats for extravagant dinners where [the military officers] would make assurances of political favour” (Sanchez, 2011). The outcome of these ‘extravagant dinners’ becomes clear when one considers the difficulty the government had in trying to forge even minimal economic ties with the PRC during the latter half of the 20th century. As this quotation from Francisco Villagran-Kramer, former Guatemalan Vice-President (1978 – 1980), attests:

Negotiations were going well. We had a commitment from the mainland Chinese on the particulars of the trade deal and then, all of a sudden, it was killed. I checked around why and I found that a lot of the Generals had voiced disapproval about it. They did not want to do anything that might offend the Taiwanese (Villagran – Kramer, 1985, cited in Anderson and Anderson, 1986: 171).

This is an early example of the dichotomy faced by previous governments of Guatemala who on the one hand wanted unrestricted participation in an international market, yet on the other hand felt obliged to uphold ideological values, keep intergovernmental friendships and honour patronage. However, even in a period of armed conflict when foreign policy tends to become more clinical, it demonstrates the limitations of Taiwan’s political influence within the government. Thus, we can conclude from this quotation that it was the Guatemalan military that Taiwan turned to for the security of its political favouritism in the country. However, while still very powerful, the influence of the military has been weakening in Guatemala in the 21st century. As such, contemporary Guatemala continues to bestow diplomatic support upon Taiwan, while also trying to develop economic opportunities with the PRC. That Guatemala is now able to do this reflects the changes that have occurred within the political elite since the 1980s.

From the Taiwan perspective, Daniel Chen, the Third Secretary at the Taiwan Embassy in Guatemala City, stated that, “Guatemala is the most important strategic country in Central America for us, arguably the most important in the world. It has the largest population of the Central American countries and possesses trade road routes to Mexico and into the USA for the rest of mainland Latin America” (Chen, 2011). As a result, the size of the Guatemalan economy in comparison to the other countries bestowing diplomatic recognition on Taiwan results in Taiwan's focus being more towards economics than arguably any of its other formal allies. Indeed, as Ambassador to Guatemala, Adolfo Sun, has publicly stated:

In 2010 the amount of bilateral trade between Guatemala and Taiwan was US\$153.3million, a 44.1% increase in comparison to 2009. During the year 2010 Guatemalan exports to Taiwan went up to US\$71.6million, a 76.9% increase against the exports to Taiwan in 2009. On the other side, Guatemalan imports from Taiwan during 2010 were US\$81.7million, 24% more than 2009 (Sun, 2011).

Third Secretary Chen places much of the acclaim for the development of Taiwan's economic relations with Guatemala on Ambassador Sun:

[Ambassador Sun] looked at what else we could buy from Guatemala as most of our purchases had been coffee and sugar. We have a ship called the Evergreen and we take it around the Caribbean filling it up with products from our allies. It can carry about 1000 containers. We decided that we could also start importing wood and also steak meat from Guatemala. We were already doing this in Panama and Nicaragua so why not Guatemala? (Chen, 2011)⁸⁸

⁸⁸ The prioritisation of the purchase of goods from diplomatic allies has long been a policy of the Taiwanese government. In his biography of General Wang Sheng, Thomas Marks discusses how Wang, as Ambassador to Paraguay (1983 - 1991), had a constant battle to find things that Taiwan could buy from the country (Marks, 1998)

It must first be noted just how small all of these figures are in comparison to the size of the economies of both Taiwan and Guatemala. Thus, that Taiwan can have a 76.9% increase really shows how little economic interest there was in trading with this important formal ally until Ambassador Sun arrived in Central America. This is surprising and appears to show disinterest, poor diplomatic practice and/or chronic short-term and narrow-minded thinking on the part of the Taiwanese. However, it is much clearer that it is the formal diplomatic presence of the PRC in the region from 2007 onwards that has spurred Taiwan's diplomats into economic action. Yet, one cannot help but wonder whether Taiwan's failure to pre-empt this has left them trailing behind a surging PRC.

What is more, while Ambassador Sun may be trying to raise the economic profile of Taiwan in Guatemala, economics has not been the dominant story of Taiwan's diplomatic incumbency in recent years. This has belonged to the bribery scandal which developed in early 2005 as a result of a story first published by *El Periodico* newspaper that Taiwan had given former Guatemalan President Alfonso Portillo (2000 – 2004) a personal cheque for US\$1.5million, and in so doing had purchased Guatemala's continued diplomatic support (Alpirez, 2011; Arriaza, 2005; *El Nuevo Diario*, 2005; *The Guatemala Times*, 2010). This story has been lingering in the Guatemalan media ever since, due in part to the continuing legal proceedings against Portillo. The result is that it has been in the background to coverage of most of Taiwan's other contemporary activities in Guatemala. What is more, on the day of Portillo's extradition from the USA in January 2010 to stand trial in Guatemala on corruption charges, the Guatemalan newspaper *La Hora* ran a headline editorial titled 'Para mandarlos al diablo' ('Send them to the devil'), which among other commentaries of the Portillo case stated that the time had come for diplomatic ties between Guatemala and Taiwan to be renounced in favour of the PRC (see *La Hora*, 2010).

Guatemala's English language newspaper, *The Guatemala Times*, did not give such outright opinion, but explained that:

[...] when the Taiwanese Government learned of the existence of money, they came up with a lame explanation that it was money for charity, for education programs. But the pure and simple truth is it was a bribe paid by Taiwan to maintain the recognition of the Guatemalan government.

Portillo was neither the first nor the last of the politicians of the countries with which Taiwan maintains diplomatic relations in receiving these dirty bribes. In Costa Rica, the press has reported on money given by Taiwan to Costa Rican leaders to be used for their own purposes, either as individuals or through foundations.

In Guatemala it has never been a secret that the Taiwanese embassy has been compensating generously the Presidents that decide not to establish diplomatic relationships with China, one of the world powers, and maintain the recognition of Taipei (*The Guatemala Times*, 2010).

La Hora's 'send them to the devil' headline is an extreme example of the scepticism some of the most notable organisations of Guatemala's post-conflict media have displayed towards the Guatemalan government's continuing strong diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Consequently, there can be little doubt that the negativity of this case has somewhat overshadowed what positive public sentiment Taiwan has created in Guatemala, and any study of Taiwan's public diplomacy in the country must be conducted with this perspective in mind. Ana Carolina Alpirez, the Editor-in-Chief of *El Periodico* the newspaper that first uncovered the Portillo bribery scandal, was asked about the impact this episode had on public sentiment towards Taiwan, she replied:

I think if you ask them to discuss Portillo's case they will never formally recognise that it is corruption. They will say no, that the President asked us to

give the cheque in his name and that is all. But we know the truth. Perhaps an admission and an apology would help repair the damage done (Alpirez, 2011).⁸⁹

Alpirez also confirmed that since 2005 the issue of recognising Taiwan had become a “national discussion”, whereas before it had been only peripheral (Alpirez, 2011). However, given Taiwan’s preoccupation with political relationships in its diplomatic allies, and this being the primary motivation for conducting public diplomacy, it is important to understand how the episode has affected Taiwan’s political relations with Guatemalan politicians. A Guatemalan political journalist who followed the story closely, gave some interesting insights on the influence the Taiwanese continue to wield on Guatemalan politics:

So after the Vice-President of Taiwan came to Guatemala and we repeatedly asked the government and the embassy to give us the documentation [of the bribery cheque]. You see the problem is that you need to look at the back of the cheque to see which account it was processed to, but they did not want to give us this information. So when the Vice-President came she gave a press conference and the President [of Guatemala, Alvaro Colom] told the press they could not ask her about the cheque. This is a classic example of the strength and also the problem of the relationship between the Guatemalan and Taiwan governments. (Anonymous, 2011c)

From this it can be concluded that Taiwan is still seen as a valued friend by the Guatemalan establishment, and that both side wish to protect this relationship. The

⁸⁹ Daniel Chen from Taiwan’s Embassy was asked to explain this situation from the Taiwanese point-of-view. He said, “I don’t think it has been too bad because we have had good crisis management. The project that the money was for was the Presidential Library for Peace. It was an education project to buy maps and books for schools. Now obviously Portillo took a portion of the money for himself but our intention was for all the money to be used for the project. We explained this many times to the press. This is also the reason why [President] Ma directed us to change the policy on giving money. It is to protect ourselves from another situation like this” (Chen, 2011). A Guatemalan journalist from newspaper *Siglo Veintiuno* who wanted to remain anonymous, also said that, “At election time in Central America we have heard that Taiwan still gives money to the candidates, not to the parties, but as individual presents” (Anonymous, 2011c).

journalist indeed confirmed that Taiwan's diplomatic relationship with Guatemala remains strong. However, he concurred with Alpirez (2011) that the scandal had raised the profile of Taiwan's diplomatic recognition in Guatemala, that this remained the overwhelming public memory of Taiwan at the moment, and that, in time, the episode might be a significant component in the relinquishing of ties between the two countries (Anonymous, 2011c).

The chapter on Costa Rica discussed how the Arias administration had sought greater economic and political relations with the APEC countries, and the PRC in particular, to reduce Costa Rica's trade dependency on their traditional markets (see chapter on Costa Rica). However, it was the similar corruption scandal that developed regarding personal payments from Taiwan to consecutive Costa Rican Presidents that offered Arias his best reason to develop relations with the PRC, as it allowed him to publicly demonstrate his opposition to corruption. This move culminated in him calling Taiwan 'muy pinche' [very cheap] as a parting shot in June 2007. In Guatemala however, there appears to be no such reform by recent Presidents and therefore less desire to drop Taiwan in favour of the PRC. That said, President Perez has stated that he will look to Asia for international investment, but it remains to be seen where his emphasis will be. Thus, for now it remains that the bribery scandal offers the Guatemalan political establishment a strong public alibi should they want to approach the PRC in the future.

From the evidence above it seems clear that, in Central America at least, Guatemala's political sphere is that most closely resembling Taiwan's. The absence of clear socialist options and a focus on liberalism versus conservatism is reminiscent of the political spectrum in Taiwan where the DPP and KMT are the main contenders. This ensures that while issues in regards to direction and emphasis are hotly contested, there is little debate over ideology, and much of the indigenous and/or poor are excluded from the political process. Consequently, there is less

chance of an impetus for changing coming from Guatemala given that most politicians will see much of Guatemala in Taiwan.

Taiwan's Public Diplomacy in Guatemala

According to Daniel Chen (2011), Taiwan's public diplomacy in Guatemala can be divided into five areas: improvement of the country's infrastructure; development assistance focused on agriculture and technology; medical diplomacy; education, in the form of cultural exchange and scholarship provision; and interaction with the domestic media. These public diplomacy activities are similar to those discussed in Costa Rica and El Salvador. However, as will become apparent, Taiwan has performed a greater variety of public diplomacy activities in Guatemala than it has done in either of the other Central American republics focused on in this thesis.

Chen was asked what the overall objective was for Taiwan's public diplomacy in Guatemala. He responded: "Other countries have more of an agenda. They want to promote democracy or human rights, for example. We don't have that kind of agenda. We just provide assistance and do what the government and people want" (Chen, 2011). Thus, Chen provided one of the clearest indications of the purpose of Taiwan's public diplomacy in its diplomatic allies. Namely, that Taiwan must be looked upon favourably by the host government, and, since the appointment of Ambassador Sun at least, be more attentive to improving positive public sentiment. Much of the evidence that will be discussed in the following section reflects this.

Infrastructure Improvement

Infrastructure improvement is a diplomacy tactic developed by Taiwan in its diplomatic allies that implicitly aims to satisfy both the government and the public. Indeed, the largest Taiwan project in operation in Guatemala at the time of writing is the expansion of the CA-9 highway which runs from Guatemala City to Puerto Barrios, the country's main Caribbean port (see Alvarado, 2008). Starting in 2010, the Taiwan financed and engineered project will upgrade what is the main artery for the

movement of containers arriving at the port. In early 2011 the project was in the second of three phases which will expand the highway to three vehicle lanes in each direction, beginning in Puerto Barrios and working its way to Guatemala City (Chen, 2011). The expansion of the CA-9 highway provides much needed repair to this overused road and will dramatically reduce journey time between the east and west of the country.

Given what is known of Taiwan's style of performing public diplomacy, the project is intended to be viewed positively by the Guatemalan government and employees of companies dependent on exports and imports from Puerto Barrios. In addition, Guatemala's densely populated southern belt will have improved travel and employment opportunities (Chen, 2011). This is the largest and most expensive project that Taiwan has ever completed in Central America, and reflects not only Taiwan's commitment to the economic development of the region, but also the recognition of Guatemala's importance to the prosperity of Taiwan's diplomatic incumbency around the Caribbean basin.

However, while road construction is no doubt practical and of great benefit to the government and people of Guatemala, the project lacks the visual symbolism of a definitive object. In comparison, the PRC have built a new national stadium in Costa Rica, and, prior to their departure in 2007, Taiwan built a suspension bridge across the Tempesque river. As this thesis has already documented, both of these infrastructure investments have come to embody the incumbencies of Taiwan and the PRC in Costa Rica. The bridge, for example, was nicknamed 'el puente de la apuñalada' (the backstab bridge) in the aftermath of Costa Rica's diplomatic recognition of the PRC, which indicates its distinction and symbolism of Taiwan's diplomatic relationship with the country. The upgrade of the 300km CA-9 highway is costing far more money than either the stadium or the bridge in Costa Rica, yet without a focal point its public diplomacy returns, in terms of government and public positive sentiment, may be significantly less due to the lack of an explicit

reference point.⁹⁰ Therefore, while albeit crucial to the infrastructure needs of Guatemala, Taiwan's classification of their investment in the CA-9 highway upgrade as public diplomacy highlights the need for balance between the political needs of the source and the satisfaction of requests from the target nation-state. However, the reality is that, while this project is the most expensive, it lacks the public diplomacy prestige of other Taiwanese activities. Indeed, given Guatemala's high mountains and vulnerability to tropical storms, a road of this length will require a considerable maintenance budget. After all, a highway has not been built through this terrain until now largely for this very reason. Thus, Taiwan needs to ensure that they are not associated with or blamed for a hazardous project.

Development Assistance

The Taiwan ICDF is the primary provider of Taiwan's development assistance in Guatemala, with the technical mission's seven fulltime staff focusing on three areas: agriculture, aquaculture (fish farming) and housing (Pan, 2011). Roberto Pan, Head of the Taiwan ICDF in Guatemala, highlighted the purpose of the mission as the, "supply and transfer of appropriate technology, to support the non-traditional product diversification programme, and any other line of technical assistance required by the government of Guatemala that can possibly be provided by the ROC" (Pan, 2011). Thus, Taiwan's development assistance to Guatemala is part of its implicit communications, with much of its emphasis on the satisfaction of the Guatemalan political elite rather than the Guatemalan public.

In agriculture, Taiwan has focused much of its attention on the agro-export industry. For example, the Taiwan ICDF is the driving force behind the production of papaya in Peten department in the north of the country. The main market for this

⁹⁰ In December 2011 Taiwan announced that it had agreed to build a maximum security prison in Guatemala. The project will begin planning and construction in 2012 (Central America Data, 2011; *La Hora*, 2011). This is part of Taiwan's assistance to the Guatemalan police force in tackling narco-trafficking, which is particularly prevalent along the Mexican border as shipments move north towards the USA and Canada (Perez and Villagran, 2011). In comparison to highway construction, a single edifice offers far more public symbology.

is North America (Chen, 2011; Pan, 2011). Additionally, Taiwan has helped farmers to produce peas, carrots, mulberries, zucchini and onions across the country, assisting with growing techniques, disease prevention and the marketing of products. In terms of aquaculture, the Taiwan ICDF works with small commercial producers at Lake Peten Itza in Peten department, lending their expertise to the farming of Tilapia fish, a popular food in the Central American diet. However, it has also worked with households in Remate, Escuintla department, to assist in the part-subsistence part-commercial farming of Whitefish (Pan, 2011; Taiwan ICDF, 2012). Both Chen and Pan say that these project are dual-purpose, seeking to produce desirable food stuffs for export but also to expand the Guatemalan diet:

In Chimaltenango department we have an oriental vegetable plantation as we try to vary the diet of the Guatemalans, as most of their traditional vegetables involve some type of beans. There are therefore certain food groups absent from their diet. (Chen, 2011)

The production of basic grain has always been the base of the family economy along with corn and kidney beans as sustenance. However, it is necessary to change this production and focus on other cultivations that can improve the international purchasing power of the population of Guatemala (Pan, 2011).

Hence we can argue that Taiwan's interest in expanding the Guatemalan diet is part of a campaign to imply concern for the public health of Guatemala. The reality however is that by streamlining the Guatemalan diet with food stuffs that are profitable internationally is to pressurise culinary tradition, but also consolidates Guatemala's agro-exporter status. If this policy is successful then it places peasant farmers into direct competition with large commercial farmers who will more than likely edge out their smaller competitors from the industry, thus making the

peasantry more dependent on mass producers for food rather than their own produce.

At the time of writing, the Taiwan ICDF Export Crops Development Project had assisted 14 farm groups in the past two years, while the Aquaculture and Farm Processing Technology Improvement Project had provided services for 35 farm groups since 2010, some of this being part of the Food for the Poor project of the Guatemalan government. Additionally, in this time the Taiwan ICDF has held six aquaculture workshops and trained 319 students in the commercial management of fish farms (Taiwan ICDF, 2012).

Also of interest is Taiwan's cultivation of bamboo in Guatemala. This is part of Taiwan's relief mission for the people made homeless by hurricane Stan in 2005 (Miza, 2007). As Daniel Chen explained,

We are building 600 houses from bamboo, and by doing this we are using our knowledge of bamboo technology and its resistance to earthquakes and tropical storms due to its flexibility. This project should be finished by May 2011. It is also very cooling during hot weather (Chen, 2011).

The employment of bamboo technology is an interesting concept and reflects the similar vulnerabilities Taiwan and Guatemala have to tropical storms and earthquakes. The farming of bamboo and the provision of housing from the plant has been received positively in Guatemala (see Miza, 2007), and in this instance Taiwan has helped those most in need. This sharing of knowledge on technology helps to build affinity and empathy between the two countries and is discussed in greater detail in the section on education diplomacy. Therefore, as a public diplomacy spectacle, the provision of housing is a deeply sentimental act on the part of Taiwan and there is little doubt that it invokes considerable gratitude from those affected by natural disaster. This assistance to displaced peasantry, while in contemporary times the consequence of natural disaster, is reminiscent of its

activities during the armed conflict when it assisted those forced to move from conflict zones with agricultural knowhow (see Anderson and Anderson, 1986; Hsieh, 1985). However, given the change in emphasis of Taiwan's development assistance from subsistence to commercial producers, bamboo technology is one of the few remaining interactions that Taiwan has with Guatemala's indigenous population.

While Taiwan's development assistance in Guatemala does provide a degree of assistance to subsistence farmers, especially in Remate in Escuintla department, most of the Taiwan ICDF's focus is on production for export. In this regard, Taiwan's development assistance is primed towards larger commercial landowners rather than smaller holders with more modest ambitions. This reflects Taiwan's preference to build relationships with the economic and political elite (often the same people in Guatemala), rather than the masses, who it is perceived lack the influence over political decision-making to make them relevant to Taiwan's diplomatic objectives in the country.⁹¹

That said, we must also consider that it is the Guatemalan government's preference for Taiwan to engage in such a way (Chen, 2011). Thus, how and to whom Taiwan provides assistance is the result of inter-government negotiation. This reflects the prioritisation of the satisfaction of the Guatemalan authorities above that of optimum public response. However, it is not unreasonable to suggest that considerable uniformity will exist in the two governments' preferred approaches to development assistance, given the affinity that continues to be held between them, and their traditional right-wing stances on issues of economy. Yet for public diplomacy, Taiwan's policy excludes swaths of the Guatemalan population. Thus, while perhaps working for Taiwan now, such an approach is vulnerable to changes in the socio-political environment.

⁹¹ This is not to say that Taiwan should operate against the Guatemalan government's wishes, just that the degree to which it consults them is notable when compared to other non-profits working in the country. WeGuatemala.org (2012) lists all non-profit organisations in Guatemala (114 in total) and the vast majority of these have little or no government contact other than to register their presence in the country.

Medical Diplomacy

Taiwan's medical diplomacy in Guatemala has been developed around three factors: responding to specific medical necessities originating from natural disasters; bespoke projects resulting from negotiations between the Taiwan Embassy and the Guatemalan Ministry of Public Health; and finally, the Taiwan ICDF's central public diplomacy medical programme which involves all of Taiwan's formal diplomatic allies. The following subsection therefore provides critical analysis of Taiwan's most conspicuous medical diplomacy programmes in Guatemala in recent years. In particular, it will highlight the recent upsurge in the variety of programmes since the arrival of Ambassador Adolfo Sun in 2008.

Guatemala's annual wet season often leads to structural damage from flooding and tropical storms, and this is usually met with Taiwanese medical aid for some of those affected. The storms of October 2011 proved to be particularly devastating across Central America, and Taiwan donated US\$300,000 in aid to Guatemala, and provided basic medical assistance to those in need through the Tzu Chi Foundation (*Radio Taiwan International*, 2011). Taiwan Ambassador Adolfo Sun attended the Tzu Chi Foundation's clinic in the town of Chiquimulilla, Santa Rosa department, to assist in the distribution of supplies. This type of medical diplomacy has been typical of Taiwan over the decades, another such example is Taiwan's provision of one million vaccines against 'Swine' flu in late 2009, the H1N1 virus pandemic having originated in Mexico and Central America and caused widespread health issues (*La Prensa Libre*, 2009).

However, Taiwan has also conducted bespoke medical diplomacy to Guatemala. For example, between 2008 and 2011, the Taiwan ICDF donated 100 ambulances to the Guatemalan Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Chen, 2011; Ramirez, 2011; Villatoro, 2009). These vehicles have been designed by South Korean automobile manufacturer Kia specifically to endure the rough terrain

of rural unpaved roads and have been sent to small medical outposts in the departments of Suchitepequez and Huehuetenango (Ramirez, 2011). The ambulances project is unique to Guatemala in Central America at least and it is no coincidence that it began in 2008 after the arrival of new Ambassador Adolfo Sun. Chen (2011) confirmed that the Ambassador had taken a lead role in the delivery of this project, and that he had made speeches at many of the ceremonies to mark the handover of these ambulances. By doing so, Ambassador Sun has appeared conscious of the necessity to generate publicity if one is to receive positive public sentiment. In addition, the sides of the ambulances are emblazoned with the Taiwan flag, allowing those who see them to link Taiwan with Guatemala's public health.

Finally, the Taiwan ICDF coordinates medical diplomacy to Guatemala as part of its public healthcare mandate towards all of Taiwan's diplomatic allies. This is a combination of assistance provided directly by the Taiwan ICDF and that performed by Taiwanese non-profit organisations which coordinate with the priorities of the Taiwan government. The ICDF's MMMs work in Guatemala as they do in Taiwan's other diplomatic allies (Taiwan ICDF, 2012). MMM focus is almost entirely away from urban areas, and they tend to number around 30 personnel. This is because the inaccessibility of the areas in which they travel. MMMs therefore only carry easily transportable equipment and supplies, and treat simple medical problems, for example, providing antibiotics for tropical diseases, and performing simple medical procedures such as the extraction of decayed teeth or pregnancy screenings. Clinics are arranged in different areas of the country two or three times a year and normally last between one and two weeks (Chen, 2011).⁹²

MMMs were established by the Taiwan ICDF in 2006 (Taiwan ICDF, 2012). Before this the ICDF partnered with Taiwanese non-profit organisations such as the Tzu Chi Foundation and the TRMPC to perform medical diplomacy in its diplomatic

⁹² In December 2009, MMMs visited the departments of Zacapa, Chiquimula and El Progreso. In August 2010 they visited Jalapa (Chen, 2011).

allies. The TRMPC were in Guatemala in December 2009 and August 2010 conducting five day long clinics, and as was mentioned earlier, the Tzu Chi Foundation were present in the country after extensive flooding in October 2011 (*Radio Taiwan International*, 2011). Given Taiwan's overall goal of maintaining their diplomatic incumbency, the presence of these groups in Guatemala, or any other ally for that matter, allows the Taiwan Embassy to contact the Ministry of Public Health for advice on where they would like these groups to go during their time in the country. This allows the Embassy to imply Taiwan's commitment to Guatemalan public health and hopefully build positive sentiment.

The final part of Taiwan's medical diplomacy is the training of Guatemalan doctors by Taiwanese health professionals. This has been coordinated by the embassy after consultation with the Guatemalan Ministry for Public Health as to what specific medical knowledge deficits exist in Guatemala (Chen, 2011). The best contemporary examples of this are the 20 doctors from Chang Gung Hospital in Kaoshiung who came to Guatemala from 11 – 24th September 2010 to perform operations and in the process train Guatemalans in the treatment of cleft palate, liver disease and liver transplant (Chen, 2011; Guzman, 2011).

On Taiwan's medical diplomacy in Guatemala, Daniel Chen said: "We fully cooperate with the Ministry of Health and the First Lady's Office on these projects. We go on their advice and directions as to where to go, even which towns and villages etc. We provide all the equipment and they provide security and part of the transport" (Chen, 2011).⁹³

⁹³ The wife of the Guatemalan President has often taken up a compassionate role, where her office will seek to assist those in poverty in the country. Sandra Torres, the wife of Alvaro Colom (2008 – 2012), was a strong presence in the field of public health. For example, it was her office that coordinated the ambulances that Taiwan donated (see Cereser, 2009). It remains to be seen how the wife of the new incumbent Otto Perez Molina will spend her incumbency as First Lady. However, Rosa Maria Leal visited Taiwan as an official envoy on her husband's behalf in March 2012 so we can be inclined to believe that little will change (see *Siglo Veintiuno*, 2012).

This statement confirms that Taiwan's preoccupation with governmental relations above that of the public extends to the field of medical diplomacy. The result of this is that instead of Taiwan employing a public diplomacy strategy that optimises its relationship with the Guatemalan public, it follows whatever strategy the incumbent administration in Guatemala wants to follow, which may or may not be viewed positively by public opinion. Indeed, that Taiwan lacks an agenda of its own towards the public is a public diplomacy strategy reflective of Taiwan's international isolation.

The local result is that, by following the recommendations of the Guatemalan government, Taiwan does not necessarily assist those most in need. This applies not just to its medical diplomacy but to education diplomacy and development assistance as well, indeed anytime that Taiwan has taken the lead from the Guatemalan authorities. This is best demonstrated through an examination of the locations that the Taiwan ICDF and its subsidiaries have carried out medical clinics in recent years. What is most apparent is the lack of presence in the poorest regions of Guatemala. Indeed, Taiwan's contemporary work is almost entirely in majority Spanish-speaking departments which have little in the way of indigenous ethnicities and are statistically some of the wealthiest departments of the country, for example, Zacapa, Escuintla, and Jalapa. Speculation will persist about the extent that Guatemalan authorities have directed Taiwan to work in these regions and why they have done so; but what can be said is that work in these regions is conducive to Taiwan's public diplomacy policy of maximising government influence. The sizeable non-Spanish speaking factions of Guatemalan society are therefore largely ignored by Taiwan's public diplomacy. However, given the relative lack of political power of these social groups, it can be argued that Taiwan's ignorance of them is inconsequential to its mainly political objectives.

Ambassador Adolfo Sun's prolific presence in the area of medical diplomacy is worth final consideration. For it is no coincidence that 2008 was the year when focus

on medical diplomacy increased and of Ambassador Sun's arrival in Guatemala. He was the catalyst to a number of bespoke medical projects in the country, the provision of 100 off-road ambulances being easily the most notorious. Ambassador Sun's leadership and publicity work around this and other projects therefore marks a departure from Taiwan's preoccupation with the satisfaction of politicians towards a greater appreciation for the value of positive public sentiment. Indeed, while Ambassador Sun's strategy continues Taiwan's engagement with important political allies, it also creates the publicity that only such innovative ways of engaging can do, and takes Taiwan's medical diplomacy in Guatemala beyond the regular aid-based relief to which the population have become accustomed. Thus, it can be said that Ambassador Sun understands the symbolic significance that both the government and public will attach to Taiwan's innovative commitment to the long-term improvement of Guatemalan public health. However, he also appears to understand the balance that it will bring to Taiwan's public diplomacy strategy, and the security it can bring to the overall diplomatic relationship.

Education Diplomacy

Taiwan's education diplomacy in Guatemala can be separated into two distinct sections: its work in Guatemala; and the provision of international scholarships for Guatemalans to study in Taiwan. Indeed, as was noted earlier, Taiwan has offered the Guatemalan military tactical training at their academy in Peitou since the 1970s (Chang, 2010). Thus, education diplomacy works across a range of vocations including the military, engineering, economics, journalism and language competency, and in Guatemala involves both university students and skilled professionals. This more explicit style of public diplomacy comes from the 'to know us is to love us' theory, where increased familiarity with a foreign country is believed to bring about positive sentiment for that country and influence the future decisions of the participant (Taylor, 2008). This was discussed by Esmeralda Sanchez, Director of Support for Human Resource Training at the Secretariat of

Planning and Programming at the Office of the President of Guatemala (SEGEPLAN). The international scholarships fall under her control.

What the countries [providing scholarships] want is that the Guatemalan people who study abroad return to this country and, using the knowledge they have acquired, find jobs in prominent industries. This might be in industry, the public sector or even academia. What [these countries] are looking for is to get friendship links between themselves and other countries, and that when this person gets back to their country they will encourage people to do the same (Sanchez, 2011b).

Sanchez's last point is remains highly contested given the lack of quantifiable evidence, and difference of opinions. This was discussed at length in the chapter on El Salvador and does not require revision here. However, the discussion in the introduction to this chapter highlighted that positive sentiment towards Taiwan on the part of right-wing politicians and the military, provides much of the reason for Guatemala's positivity around keeping Taiwan as a diplomatic ally. Thus, while always vulnerable to the subjectivity of human emotion, this analysis has been approached from the basis that such policies do create greater positivity overall.

International Scholarships

Public diplomacy, and international scholarships in particular, can be used by policymakers as part of a reward to a recipient nation-state for agreeable behaviour, as part of a cultural relations policy, or as a persuasive or subversive tool when a nation-state has behaviour that displeases. Taiwan offers Guatemala more scholarships than any other nation-state or international body, and so it is a persuasive tool to assist the prevention of the loss of diplomatic allies.

Taiwan's international scholarships can be divided into vocational courses for skilled professionals that normally last between one and two weeks, and longer academic scholarships for university students. Responsible for the latter is the

Department of Scholarships at SEGEPLAN. In 2010 SEGEPLAN placed 32 Guatemalans into full scholarships in Taiwan for at least one year in duration. This was in comparison to 23 students in 2009 and 16 in 2008. Each year there are an additional number of students who travel to Taiwan for shorter periods of time for what are predominantly Mandarin language courses. In 2010 this numbered 50 students, making the total number of Guatemalans studying in Taiwan on government scholarships 82. The full scholarships provided by Taiwan's Ministry of Education paid for a return airfare to Taiwan, tuition fees and provided living expenses of around US\$900 per month during their stay (Perez, 2011). Evelyn Perez, the Cooperation Consultant at SEGEPLAN who deals with Taiwan, when asked about the significance of these scholarships to Guatemala, replied:

The government of the Republic of Taiwan has for many years offered scholarships to Guatemalans, and for that Guatemalans are able to study for undergraduate degrees, Masters' and technical courses, as well as understanding the Mandarin language. This has enabled good diplomatic relations and interlaced ties of friendship between both countries (Perez, 2011).

Guatemalans are therefore offered a number of scholarships by Taiwan that befits its importance as a diplomatic ally, and Taiwan is the largest provider of academic scholarships to Guatemala (Perez, 2011). What is more, just like in El Salvador, it is Guatemala's traditional ideological allies from the Cold War who dominate the list of providers, including Taiwan, South Korea, Israel, the USA and Japan (Perez, 2011). However, Cuba also provides scholarships, which is different from El Salvador as they only re-established diplomatic relations with the island on 1st June 2009. It was one of the first acts of the then new Funes FMLN government (see AFP, 2009).

Taiwan also provides scholarships for professional Guatemalans to attend short term courses in Taiwan in various tertiary, commercial and engineering industries (Chen, 2011). These courses tend to last one or two weeks and are not administered by SEGEPLAN but are the result of an invitation to attend from the Taiwan Embassy.⁹⁴ Jose Lisandro Sanchez, a Lecturer in Architecture at the Universidad Rafael Landivar in Guatemala City, attended a course on Seismic Design Technology (SDT) in Taipei in 2010:

One day I got a call from the Dean. You see, we have a relationship with the Taiwan ICDF at this university. [The Dean] said that [the Taiwan ICDF] wanted to invite a member of the faculty of architecture to the NCREE (National Centre for Research on Earthquake Engineering) in Taipei for one week as part of an international seminar. I think they also invited faculties from Mexico, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Peru. In the end though it was only me and people from Honduras, the Dominican Republic and Peru, Mexico and Costa Rica did not attend. Then from Asia, there were people from Thailand, Singapore, Cambodia, India, and Mongolia.

I was told I had to buy my ticket and then have it refunded once I arrived in Taiwan but in the end the Taiwan Embassy here paid for it. They also paid my hotel, my meals and transport to and from the NCREE and around Taiwan to certain sites (Sanchez, 2011a).

In terms of his experience of Taiwan, Sanchez made several enthusiastic and complimentary statements regarding what Guatemala could learn. For example:

I felt a little ashamed to be Guatemalan because they have maybe 40% of the landmass we have yet they have 10 million more people and have

⁹⁴ Chen was keen to highlight that it was the Taiwan ICDF coordinating these short-term courses (Chen, 2011). In this regard, he clearly sought to disassociate the short-term military and also police training courses that continue in tandem to Taiwan ICDF projects but which are administered elsewhere, these having a considerably more controversial history. The reality however is that all of these activities sit under the umbrella of attempts to create positive sentiment towards Taiwan.

preserved 70% of their forest. I think the phrase in English is 'sustainable development'. We could learn from that (Sanchez, 2011a).

Ana Carolina Alpirez, the Editor-in-Chief of *El Periodico* newspaper, also went to Taiwan for an international journalism course:

There were also journalists from El Salvador, Peru, Costa Rica and Chile. So we went to Taiwan and were taken to newspapers and radio stations to understand how they do things. It was interesting because they gave favour to the countries that were 'friends' of Taiwan. I remember one of the journalists from Peru complaining that they'd only got two seats. I was there in September 2004 and at the end of the year they were opening the Taipei 101 tower so I was shown round before it was opened and I obligingly wrote some stories about the tower. [...] Every year or so the Taiwanese have this sort of course I went on (Alpirez, 2011).

However, Alpirez's story demonstrates the limitations of international scholarships as a form of public diplomacy. In February 2005, only five months after Alpirez had returned from her Taiwan trip, *El Periodico* broke the story of Taiwan's apparent bribery of Guatemalan President Alfonso Portillo (see Arriaza, 2005). Alpirez as Editor-in-Chief received considerable flak from the Taiwan Embassy and the Ambassador (Francisco Ou, now Taiwan's Foreign Minister) as the story went to print (Alpirez, 2011). She insisted that her expenses paid trip to Taiwan did not cloud her professional judgement, and that the story went ahead on the front page with the originally planned content (Alpirez, 2011). Thus, international scholarships can incentivise the human behaviour desired by the source but have little means to influence beyond this.

It must finally be noted that, while Guatemala and the PRC have no formal diplomatic relations, this does not necessarily exclude Guatemalans from scholarship opportunities to study in the PRC. This can occur through supranational

and non-state actors. For example, the PRC provides the OAS, of which Guatemala is a member, with a number of scholarships each year (OAS, 2011).⁹⁵ A national from any member state is permitted to apply for these and SEGEPLAN confirmed that the OAS PRC scholarship had been advertised to Guatemalan students. They could not however state whether any Guatemalans had been successful as administration is handled by the OAS (Perez, 2011).⁹⁶

That said, Dinora Rosales, the Coordinator of International Exchanges at the Universidad Rafael Landívar, a Jesuit University in Guatemala City, confirmed however that students had gone to the PRC on non-governmental scholarships.

Most of [the university's private] scholarships come from Spain, the USA or Mexico. As we are a Jesuit university we have lots of connections with other Jesuit universities in other parts of the world, for example, the University of San Francisco in California, which is another Jesuit college. [...] but we also have a small relationship with the Beijing Center which is a Jesuit centre in China. Students can go to China to study Mandarin if they want. I think the scholarship for that is six months. The prerequisite for going on these courses however is that the students must be able to speak English as the tuition is Chinese to English. (Rosales, 2011)⁹⁷

Rosales confirmed that only approximately five students from the university attend the Beijing Center per year (Rosales, 2011). However, while it is useful to provide perspective to the study of education diplomacy, this interaction between

⁹⁵ Upon contacting the OAS in March 2011 they stated that they were not at liberty to publish the numbers of students who took up scholarships in the PRC or the countries from which they originated, and only reiterated that the scholarship was available to citizens of all member states.

⁹⁶ The lack of ability to track the human capital accrued by international scholarships was a common complaint throughout the interviews conducted in Central America. As the interviewees attested, this is the result of a lack of transparency amongst the participating nation-states, a lack of administrative prioritisation, and a lack of investment in a database to hold such information.

⁹⁷ The website of the Beijing Center for Chinese Studies does not explicitly declare itself to be a religious-based institution (Beijing Center, 2012), but Rosales assured me that it was. This caution may well be due to the CCP's apprehension regarding religious freedom in the PRC and its views towards the Catholic church in particular. The Vatican has diplomatic ties with Taiwan but not the PRC.

Guatemalans and non-state institutions within the PRC should not be classified as public diplomacy. This is because tensions exist between religious institutions like the Beijing Center and the PRC authorities (see Wilfred et al, 2008) making it more likely to highlight a continuing lack of religious tolerance within the PRC and breed contempt for the establishment.

Taiwan's Education Presence in Guatemala

While countries such as Spain (Instituto Cervantes), United Kingdom (The British Council), Germany (Goethe Institute) and even the PRC (Confucius Institute) centre their education and cultural presence within a country around a single institution, Taiwan has no such facility within its diplomatic allies. However, it did open Taiwan Academies in 2011 in New York, Houston, Los Angeles and London, which reflects the importance of the US and UK as trading partners and informal allies. The chapter on El Salvador gave considerable debate to the sensibility of this approach by Taiwan, and so there is no reason to repeat such debate here. What is more, Pedro Lai (2011) – a Taiwanese Mandarin teacher for the Taiwan ICDF who has worked in Guatemala – confirmed that the situation regarding Mandarin teaching is the same in Guatemala, as it is elsewhere in Central America. Therefore, the focus of this section will be on the education activities of Taiwan that are unique to Guatemala.

Since 2008 there has been a marked increase in the range of Taiwan's public diplomacy activities in Guatemala and it is in the realm of education diplomacy on the ground that some of the starkest increases have been seen. Globally, this has been the result of directives from Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou who began his presidency that year (Rockower, 2011). However, more locally, Taiwan's Guatemala Ambassador Adolfo Sun's personal conviction in the importance of public diplomacy has also encouraged its development (Chen, 2011).

Since Ambassador Sun's arrival, Taiwan has built seven new schools in Guatemala, the final one in the town of Santa Maria, near the city of Antigua, being opened in April 2011. Additionally, the Tzu Chi Foundation, in coordination with the Taiwan ICDF, also opened a school in the town of Palencia to the north-east of Guatemala City in 2010 (Chen, 2011). These schools provide a visual reference for teachers, pupils, parents and towns as a whole, of Taiwan's implied commitment to the betterment of Guatemala's youth, and are therefore long-standing visual gestures of goodwill from the Taiwanese.

What is more, 2011 was a significant year in the histories of both Central America and Taiwan, with Central America celebrating 190 years of independence from Spain and Taiwan celebrating 100 years since the founding of the ROC. This led to Ambassador Sun's conviction that Taiwan should not celebrate alone (Chen, 2011). Daniel Chen was therefore asked what this meant for Taiwan's public diplomacy:

Yes we are making increased effort this year, but I think that it is part of an effort to be more public generally and it will not diminish in following years. This year the Ambassador told us that we should not celebrate our centenary alone so from the 9th September to 10th October [2011] we are putting on a joint exhibition at the National Palace. This will include photographs of our relationship over the years and other historical artefacts. Guatemala on 15th September will celebrate 190 years and we will celebrate our centenary on Oct 10th so it makes sense (Chen, 2011).⁹⁸

The exhibition and double celebration are a clear attempt by Taiwan to create empathy and affinity for a shared and similar history with Guatemala. Indeed, both the founding of the Republic of Guatemala in 1821 and the Republic of China in 1911 are the result of similar fractures in the socio-political histories of these countries,

⁹⁸ In October 2011 Ambassador Sun gave an interview on Taiwan's centenary to newspaper *La Prensa Libre* (see Sun, 2011b).

which remain at the heart of attempts to inspire nationalism (see Grandin, 2000; Makeham, 2005; Marks, 1998). However, the controversy that surrounds the recent political history of both countries will make the selection of exhibition content somewhat modest.⁹⁹

In 2011 Taiwan also began to engage with their ex-scholarship holders to an extent not seen before. Prior to this Taiwan had spent little effort trying to consolidate or expand upon the positive sentiment that the scholarship holders may have felt after their time in Taiwan. Jose Lisandro Sanchez, a Lecturer in Architecture at Universidad Rafael Landivar, explained the change in 2011:

Once I completed my scholarship I automatically became a member of an 'exbecarios' (ex-scholarship holders) club for Guatemala. I went to a few poorly attended meetings and at one [the Taiwan Embassy] asked us to think of an event to host, so I suggested a student lecture [...]. I understood that this was the first time the embassy had asked this of the *exbecarios*. Things basically snowballed from there, first of all it was a few people from the ICDF who would attend, then the Ambassador was attending, then he was also making a speech [...] (Sanchez, 2011a).

In all, four men and two women from the Taiwan Embassy attended, including Ambassador Sun. They sat in the front row in business dress and listened attentively for the hour or so while Sanchez spoke. Behind them sat 50-60 Guatemalan students of architecture and structural engineering and some members of staff.

The lecture began with Sanchez explaining that he had been the benefactor of a short-term scholarship to study SDT in Taipei, that it had been paid for by the Taiwanese government, and that he had learned a lot and was very grateful for the

⁹⁹ The Museum of National History in Guatemala City near to the National Palace offers some comparative insight into what the authorities are prepared to disclose in an exhibition. The museum takes the viewer through the different epochs of Guatemala's political history from independence to the present day, none of which offers critical reflection on the social, economic or political issues of these periods. Moreover, there is not a single reference in the whole museum to Guatemala's indigenous population (correct as of March 2011).

experience. He then began by discussing the similar problems experienced by Taiwan and Guatemala as both sit of major seismic faults, stating that buildings, especially taller ones, needed to be designed to withstand strong earthquakes. He provided the case study of Taipei 101 and its 'earthquake trauma protection system'. Taiwan, Sanchez insisted, was an expert in the field of SDT and Guatemala could learn a lot from them, especially as the Guatemalan government was increasingly looking to build higher buildings due to Guatemala City's space restrictions, but also because many Guatemalan buildings are vulnerable to earthquakes due to a lack of government policy on structural requirements. There was a necessity therefore to ensure that strict structural criteria were upheld to prevent future damage or collapse. The lecture then progressed to the intricacies of architecture and structural engineering.

At the end Sanchez invited Ambassador Adolfo Sun to make a closing speech. Ambassador Sun spoke for about ten minutes in fluent Spanish stating Taiwan's continuing commitment to the safety of Guatemala's buildings and the education of Guatemalans generally. He also encouraged the students to apply for the various scholarship opportunities available. The conclusion of his speech was met with a round of applause. He was then presented with a gift as a token of the university's appreciation, which once again met with applause. Thus, that the initial testimony of Taiwan's dedication to Guatemala's education came from Sanchez himself, a well-respected and well-liked member of the faculty, added considerable authority to the Ambassador's words.

Sanchez's lecture is therefore a positive example of Taiwan trying to consolidate and further its initial investment in scholarship holders, by ensuring a continued relationship beyond the initial scholarship period. Furthermore, the lecture exemplifies the building of sentiment through sharing knowledge and expertise on issues of mutual concern. Finally, in using Sanchez as the medium through which the information passes, it adds to the 'aura of legitimacy'

surrounding the message, as studies show that audiences are typically more receptive when the orator comes from a similar cultural background (see Kelman and Hamilton, 1989: 151). This theory was also mentioned in the chapter on Costa Rica when discussing the PRC's use of radio.

Education diplomacy, whether it is through the provision of opportunities to travel to another country or by educating people in their own country, is a simple and relatively inexpensive way to manufacture positive public sentiment for the source country. That said, the case of Ana Alpirez attests that there are limitations to such sentiment and an expectation that it buys influence can lead to a backlash from the participant. However, the case of Lisandro Sanchez demonstrates that this method of public diplomacy can be successful and that those being provided scholarships do return enthusiastic and are willing to become informal emissaries for their host country.

When judging Taiwan's performance in Guatemala specifically, the beginning of Adolfo Sun's tenure as Ambassador in June 2008 can be seen as a watershed for Taiwan's education diplomacy. What is more, in the case of SDT and other industries, Taiwan has presented itself as an icon in the field, and through respected experts has been trying to show sameness between the two countries. This emphasis on tackling similar problems together is a crucial part of public diplomacy as it can build unity between peoples. Thus, after 2008, in addition to concerns with the satisfaction of government officials, Taiwan increased its interest in the sentiment of the Guatemalan public. There is little doubt that retaining its diplomatic status in Guatemala remains the overall goal for Taiwan's mission. However, by building schools, developing areas of mutual interest in industry, nurturing relations with former scholarship holders, and being generally more public facing, Ambassador Sun has given a clear indication that increased public attention need not negate political attention.

Engagement with Guatemala's Domestic Media

Before a discussion of Taiwan's engagement with the domestic media in Guatemala can begin it is essential to first provide some information about the media landscape there. Of Guatemala's 12 million people around 7 million declare themselves to be of Mayan indigenous origin, and this means that for more than half of the Guatemalan population their first language is not Spanish, the indigenous dialect of K'ichee being the most popular of several (World Bank, 2010). One must go to considerable lengths in Guatemala to find non-Spanish national media however, *Radio Nuevo Mundo's* intermittent K'ichee broadcasts being one of only a handful of programmes available across the country (Rockwell and Janus, 2003). On this exclusion of Mayan voices and script from mainstream media Rockwell and Janus have noted: "Perhaps the greatest threat to Guatemala's uneasy peace and the further development of this nascent democracy lies in a broadcast spectrum increasingly closed to alternative voices and the growing dominance of media chains. These chains either reinforce the power of the country's long time business families or represent outside forces in collusion with the Guatemalan government of military" (Rockwell and Janus, 2003: 93).

Indeed, Rockwell and Janus (2003) also document the threats, intimidation and attacks made on *Radio Nuevo Mundo's* editors in the early 1990s as they began to broadcast K'ichee programmes from their Guatemala City offices, and claim that such behaviour comes from the ingrained vilification of the indigenous community by the Spanish speaking city dwellers. This was discussed at length in the introduction to the chapter.

Both television and radio in Guatemala carry little in the way of news content, and much of what is carried does not criticise the political establishment. This is down to the policies of Mexican media tycoon Angel Gonzalez Gonzalez whose

television stations have a virtual monopoly in Guatemala, attracting approximately 96% of the audience (Rockwell and Janus, 2003: 95):

His stations' news and information programs carry bland items that either pose no challenge to the President or favour whichever party holds power. The amateurish local news programs are some of the worst in Central America. These low-cost efforts at information programming often appear designed to keep the Guatemalan audience uninterested in politics. (Rockwell and Janus, 2003: 95)

So, as in other Central American Republics, one must turn to the printed press for investigative journalism. Leading the way in recent years has been the newspaper *Siglo Veintiuno* (21st Century). Using Anglo-American or North Atlantic journalism (see Hallin and Mancini, 2004) as their theoretical framework, Rockwell and Janus (2003) see *Siglo Veintiuno* as the most authoritative source of journalism in Guatemala. A claim they attach to its stance against the censorship measures imposed by President Jorge Serrano Elias (1991 – 1993). Serrano was eventually forced into exile by popular backlash securing *Siglo Veintiuno's* reputation for reliable reporting. Other sources of news that Rockwell and Janus maintain are reliable in Guatemala are *La Hora* Guatemala's oldest newspaper, and *El Periodico*, one of the newest newspaper in the country. *La Hora* enjoys considerable prestige as it was seen as one of the few voices of protest during the period of armed conflict and was periodically closed down. *El Periodico* was established by Zamora Marroquin, the editor of *Siglo Veintiuno*, in 1996 after a rather public dispute with the newspaper's owners (Rockwell and Janus, 2003).

The reality however is that these publications originate and continue to be owned by wealthy families of Spanish heritage based in Guatemala City, and while they have exposed corruption and misdemeanour, this reflects more the inter-elite jostling for power than any pledge from the media to position themselves as the

fourth estate. One of the best indicators of this is the subtle neglect of indigenous stories in favour of exposes involving political opponents. This media environment should suit Taiwan's diplomatic priorities, especially given that the military and right-wing political parties exert considerable influence over these publications. However, the contemporary expansion of the press in the post-conflict era has proved problematic for the Taiwanese as various parts of their diplomatic mission continue to operate in a style that is non-conducive to public transparency, their bribery of Portillo being a case in point.

Rosa Hu, Press Council at the Taiwan Embassy, stated that the Taiwan press office in Guatemala has four functions:

First, to disseminate all kinds of information about Taiwan and Taiwan's economic assistance to local media and the people of Guatemala; second, to reflect what is happening in Guatemala, and the opinions of Guatemalan media back to the Taiwanese government; third, to clarify our position if there is erroneous reporting; and lastly, to advance cultural and media interflows between the two sides. (Hu, 2011b)

Given the considerations that this research makes for the domestic audience as part of public diplomacy's outreach, cases can be made for all these points being public diplomacy. However, what is interesting for our central argument is that the role of the press office does not include advancing Taiwan's position vis-à-vis the weaknesses of the PRC. For one would expect emphasis on topics such as Taiwan's democratic transition or its contemporary human rights record. These are topics that would resonate well with the Guatemalan people but which move the topic of debate to areas where the PRC receives considerable international criticism. This, we can say, is the result of the ECFA and KMT government directives as it seeks reconciliation with the PRC.

Of further interest is Hu's assertion that the press office was trying to focus on Taiwan's economic assistance. By economic assistance I took it that she meant the recent increase in trade and also Taiwan's development and financial assistance to the country. As will be discussed later in this chapter, this puts it into competition with the PRC on a topic that gives it little chance of being able to compete. Hu was asked to provide examples of what information she sent to the domestic media in Guatemala and she produced similar generic CNA copy to that which Monica Wu had produced during her interview at the Taiwan Embassy in El Salvador (see Appendices E and F). The research in El Salvador found that newsworthiness was the main issue for the lack of uptake by domestic media organisations, and criticism was aimed at the Press Office for not understanding editorial priorities. The same can be said of the Press Office at the embassy in Guatemala.

On the issue of erroneous reporting, I asked Hu to provide further details of the work done by her department. She produced an article from the 8th February 2011 issue of *Siglo Veintiuno* that the Press Office had recently worked on, and confirmed that this was an extreme version of what they encounter. The front page headline read: 'They ask for the removal of obstacles to Chinese Investors' and referred to an article in the issue by Lix and Larios (2011). The same edition also had an editorial on page eight entitled 'The dilemma of the two Chinas' (*Siglo Veintiuno*, 2011). Hu talked me through the various issues that Taiwan had with the articles, and explained that the embassy decided that it would be best if Ambassador Sun wrote a response to *Siglo Veintiuno*, given the seriousness of what had been said (Hu, 2011). To Hu's recall, this was the only time that Sun had written a response himself, the creation of media flak normally being carried out by the press office staff. It was printed on page eight of the 19th February 2011 edition, and was entitled 'Taiwan's Desire' (Sun, 2011a).

Ambassador Sun is regularly cited in the press in Guatemala.¹⁰⁰ However, almost all of his appearances have come in the form of interviews or as part of reports by journalists from press conferences. This gives a clear indication of the level of concern that Taiwan's embassy had for *Siglo Veintiuno's* comments. The article from the 8th February edition compared Guatemala's commercial relations with the PRC to that of Costa Rica, and through some well-chosen financial experts insinuated that it was the lack of diplomatic relations between the two countries that prevented Guatemala from optimising the economic opportunities of the PRC's economy. In particular, the article established that it was a lack of visa flexibility that prevented investors from the PRC coming to Guatemala, despite it having a larger economy than Costa Rica. The editorial that followed this article stated that, "since the time of military rule and into the democratic era, the Chinese island (of Taiwan) has remained faithful to Guatemala." However, it noted that the FTA signed between Taiwan and Guatemala in 2005 was largely symbolic and had seen minimal increases in commerce. The editorial concluded that, "the Taiwanese have significant amounts of investment in our country, but they cannot compete with their Chinese counterparts whose expansion is starting to be evident across the globe." (*Siglo Veintiuno*, 2011)

The articles thereby insinuated that continuing diplomatic relations with Taiwan was hampering the economic progression of Guatemala and inferred that Guatemala would be better served if the alliance were to end. The articles did not directly criticise Taiwan, however Hu (2011b) confirmed that it was necessary to respond to such publications quickly, and that it be done by high authority because the continuation of diplomatic relations was fundamental to Taiwan. Ambassador Sun's article the following week contained information about the work done by the Taiwanese in Guatemala and provided some impressive figures of bilateral trade

¹⁰⁰ Content analysis of Guatemala's four main newspapers between 2008 and 2012 reveals that Ambassador Sun has been cited in 50 separate *El Periodico* articles, 54 from *La Hora*, 57 from *Siglo Veintiuno*, and 84 from *La Prensa Libre*.

growth. The editors of *Siglo Veintiuno* however doctored the Ambassador's prose when creating their subheading, "It has not been our spirit to impose obstacles to countries wishing to establish relations with China." If one reads to the final paragraph of the article, what the Ambassador actually said is, "It has not been our spirit to impose obstacles to countries wishing to establish commercial relations with China." (*Siglo Veintiuno*, 2011) The omission of the word 'commercial' is clearly intentional by the editors as they seek to consolidate their own agenda. This change turns the emphasis of Ambassador's article from economics to politics, Taiwan's greatest vulnerability and area of overriding concern.

Despite giving regular coverage of Taiwan's public diplomacy activities in Guatemala, the cases of *El Periodico* and *Siglo Veintiuno* demonstrate how little influence Taiwan has within Guatemala's contemporary news media who appear intent on pursuing an agenda more favourable to PRC integration. Guatemalan editors have turned down requests to publish stories about Taiwan sent by the Press Office at the Embassy presumably because of a lack of newsworthiness, and they have refused to back down when publishing stories of considerable negativity regarding Taiwan. Most blatantly however, they have deliberately manipulated copy to suit their agenda.

For public diplomacy therefore, Taiwan's attempt to manufacture positive public sentiment through the Guatemalan media has been blighted by problems since the end of the armed conflict and the movement to fledgling democracy. While praise has tended to come in smaller inconspicuous articles, the biggest news stories have been wholly negative. This has been mostly due to the general waning of political and military influence over media content (Rockwell and Janus, 2003), a movement that has resulted in greater critical appraisal of the political establishment. Given that Taiwan's public diplomacy preoccupation remains with the satisfaction of politicians in Guatemala, such negative attention is not critical to Taiwan's diplomatic incumbency. However, as democracy consolidates in the

country, politicians may be more inclined to listen to public opinion, but whether this impacts the diplomatic relationship depends on the role and power of the media in years to come.

The Challenge to Taiwan's Diplomatic Incumbency

Despite agreeing a diplomatic truce in 2008, the PRC continues to apply pressure to Taiwan's diplomatic relationship with Guatemala. This has primarily taken the form of commercial diplomacy. The Bank of Guatemala reports that imports from the PRC in 2011 reached US\$1.1 billion. This, in comparison to the US\$28.8 million exported to the PRC, gave the PRC a 97.5% total trade surplus (Munoz, 2012). The main products being imported from the PRC are manufactured goods such as cars, music players and telephones, where as the main exports to the PRC are coffee beans, sugar, fish and other food products. Indeed, it is the economic potential of the PRC that dominates its coverage in the Guatemalan domestic media. Although some media organisations are more sceptical than others, newspapers *Siglo Veintiuno* and *La Hora* have both appeared keen to stress how Guatemala's lack of formal diplomatic relationship fundamentally hinders Guatemala's ability to export to the PRC's growing domestic market.

Since early 2010 a group of wealthy Guatemalans who are set to profit from greater engagement with the PRC and its representative organisations have targeted the Guatemalan media through a publicity campaign. The campaign has sought to portray Guatemala as being economically restrained by its diplomatic relationship with Taiwan. This has been directed by the *Camara de Cooperacion y Comercio China – Guatemala* (4CG; China – Guatemala Chamber of Cooperation and Commerce), a non-governmental organisation established in 2006 to facilitate economic and cultural interaction between the two countries (4CG, 2012). Economic interests dominate the focus of this private organisation, and their website focuses on the forthcoming Third Commercial Exhibition of PRC companies in Guatemala City in

September 2012 (the first being in 2009 and the second in 2011). It also highlights Guatemala's delegation to the Shanghai Expo 2010 (4CG, 2012). One of the most frequently quoted names in the Guatemalan media on this topic in the past three years has been Pedro Barnoya, the former Secretary General and now Vice-President of the 4CG.¹⁰¹

At present the President of the 4CG is Rodrigo Barrios Colom, the nephew of former President of Guatemala Alvaro Colom (2008 – 2012) (Flores, 2011). This was discussed by Manuel Flores, the FMLN politician in El Salvador who mediated between the PRC and the FMLN government there. Thus, while the ASAC in El Salvador is under political stewardship, the 4CG is a non-governmental organisation, although it has direct links to high government. This is a crucial symbolic difference between Guatemala and El Salvador, and one that demonstrates the continuing influence of Taiwan within Guatemalan political life. Furthermore, given Taiwan's anxiety that greater economic relations with the PRC should not result in political affiliation, this set-up allows both the PRC and Taiwan to continue the face-saving facade that politics and economics can be kept separate.

At the time of writing it remained to be seen how new Guatemalan President Otto Perez Molina would engage with the 4CG. However, he did state while President-elect that growing trade relations with the PRC would be one of his priorities as President (see Orozco, 2011). However, Perez Molina is a retired army General, and a right-wing conservative in his political outlook. Thus, it is unsurprising that he also added the caveat that Taiwan had not remonstrated against Guatemala's establishing these new business relationships with the PRC, and that Taiwanese Foreign Minister Timothy Yang would be arriving in the coming days to meet him (cited in Orozco, 2011).

¹⁰¹ Between 2010 and February 2012 Barnoya was interviewed 12 times by *Siglo Veintiuno* on PRC trade issues.

The PRC performs no public diplomacy in Guatemala that corresponds to its activities elsewhere. For example, it has no infrastructure, development assistance, education or medical diplomacy in the country. However, what it has done is allow a trade surplus to develop through its control of Chinese imports and exports, placing tariffs on Guatemalan goods yet mandating its CCPIT to engage with Guatemalan trade representatives. This commercial diplomacy tactic has ensured a sizable amount of Chinese goods have entered the Guatemalan market yet starved the Guatemalan export-focused business community of opportunities to export to the PRC, thus creating desire amongst influential business owners for improved ties with the PRC (see Lix and Larios, 2011; Munoz, 2012; *Siglo Veintiuno*, 2011). What is more, it has ensured that debate regarding diplomatic recognition of the PRC and Taiwan has been firmly focused on economic positives and negatives rather than political suitability.

To counter growing trade relations with the PRC, the Taiwan Embassy has increased its trade relations with Guatemala too. Chen addressed the shortcomings of Guatemala-Taiwan trade, and explained how the Embassy planned to improve the situation.

When we got a new Ambassador to Guatemala [in 2008], he realised that although we signed a Free Trade Agreement in 2005 there had not been much improvement in trade, so the ambassador decided that we should also have a Chamber of Commerce for Taiwan. This was inaugurated in Aug 2010 (Chen, 2011).

Therefore, since 2008 the Taiwan Embassy has sought to counter growing Chinese commercial activity by staging events for Taiwanese companies in Guatemala. Indeed, in spring 2012, four Taiwanese companies will visit Guatemala for talks with the Vice-Minister of Economy around investment opportunities (Ancheyta, 2012). However, the reality is that being drawn into an economic

competition with the PRC is an insurmountable task given the comparative resources at the two governments' disposal. Furthermore, it has the potential to deflect government and public attention away from Taiwan's public diplomacy, the fact that Taiwan is a democracy and the PRC is not, and instead reduce the debate on diplomatic recognition to quantifiable economics.

Conclusion

The loyalty of the Guatemalan political establishment to Taiwan has been greater than that of its Central American neighbours and this chapter has demonstrated a number of social and political reasons for why this has been so. Thus, while El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama have all at least investigated switching relations to the PRC in recent years (see *China Post*, 2009; Eaton, 2006; Keegan, 2006b), there is no evidence to suggest that Guatemala has undertaken such a process. Indeed, it remains 'Taiwan's friend'. As such, while other Central American Republics have consolidated competitive multiparty democracy with powerful options on the left and right of the political spectrum, socialist and indigenous issues remain substantially under-represented on Guatemala's political landscape where the system is more reflective of inter-elite battles for power (Rockwell and Janus, 2003). Thus, it appears that it is a political system like Guatemala's that is most suiting to the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.

Both the PRC and Taiwan recognise Guatemala's regional importance. It has the largest economy of any of the Central American Republics (World Bank, 2010), it is a crucial trade route into North America, and in Guatemala City it has the region's largest urban conglomeration and administrative centre. By this criterion, Guatemala is Taiwan's most formidable remaining formal diplomatic ally, yet Taiwan has displayed remarkable naivety towards Guatemala, which is also a country making socio-political changes, albeit ones less distinguished from its Central American neighbours. Indeed, it almost seems as though Taiwan was resting on its laurels

until Costa Rica recognised the PRC and Ambassador Sun subsequently kick-started some focus. This had been typified by Taiwan's almost disregard for trade relations until the PRC's arrival on the continent. As such, to fully understand Taiwan's public diplomacy in Guatemala it was important to consider the activities of the PRC as well, and to employ an objectives-based approach to the research, rather than a resources-based approach from Taipei or Beijing. This provided the perspective needed to discuss the reality of Taiwan's diplomatic relationship with Guatemala.

Ultimately this research found that Taiwan's public diplomacy and its diplomatic mission as a whole has historically been preoccupied with the satisfaction of Guatemala's government officials. As in El Salvador, the consolidation of positive public sentiment has at best a limited history. Lin puts this down to public diplomacy being, "more important [to Taiwan] in a democracy, as the government is elected by the people and so their views are therefore represented" (Lin, 2011a). Here we can see the explicit political purpose of Taiwan's public diplomacy. Thus, Taiwan's commitment to public diplomacy has risen in Guatemala as elsewhere partly in response to the expansion of democracy and civic participation in political processes in Central America (see Colburn and Cruz, 2008), but also Costa Rica's recognition of Beijing. That said, all the chapters in this thesis have concluded that Taiwan has performed its public diplomacy in such a manner that its main concern remains not with public opinion.

However, in appointing Adolfo Sun as Taiwan Ambassador to Guatemala in June 2008, there has been an attempt to redress this balance somewhat. Through the direction of Ambassador Sun, and by following his example, Taiwan's public diplomacy has become more focused on building positive public sentiment in Guatemala. This was most apparent in the conduct of Ambassador Sun himself who has appeared more eager to be public-facing than his predecessors, his speeches at education and medical diplomacy events being the most apparent.

It is essential however that in addressing this deficit of public focus, Taiwan does not lose sight of the reality that keeping good relations with foreign governments must remain its priority. For the neglecting of this risks the collapse of its traditional political support and increases the potential of PRC favouritism among influential social groups. In short, while it is interesting that Taiwan is instigating measures to normalise its style of public diplomacy, one's public diplomacy output must be a consequence of one's political requirements. Thus, it is the very fact that Taiwan is an abnormal nation-state that must determine its focus when engaging. What is more, Taiwan, and Ambassador Sun in particular, face an internal struggle if they are ensure the correct balance, for it appears that many of those in senior diplomatic roles are not recognising the extent to which Central America is a region going through considerable political and social change.

Guatemala's growing albeit still small economic relationship with the PRC must also be addressed. Indeed, while military leaders vetoed attempts to develop trade links with the PRC during the armed conflict, the reduction of the military's political power in the post-conflict era has relaxed these barriers. The result has been an influx of Chinese products into the Guatemalan market, yet the Chinese market, barring snippets of trade, remains closed to Guatemalan produce. This is a strategic ploy by the CCPIT (and therefore its parent governmental organisation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to create a desire for closer relations with the PRC in the Guatemalan business community through the creation of anxiety that Guatemala's political relations with Taiwan deny an opportunity that most other countries have the benefit of. To be sure, this is the same social group that Taiwan focuses much of its public diplomacy towards – agro-exporters, for example – and so the limiting of this group's opportunities has the potential to trigger negative sentiment towards their government's relations with Taiwan and arguably Taiwan itself. However, this focus on economics distracts from Taiwan's other work in the country and reduces

the public debate over Guatemala's diplomatic recognition to financial statistics. This may be the PRC's intention though.

This research posed the question of whether the style in which Taiwan performed public diplomacy was related to how secure its diplomatic relations with a country were. Or whether Taiwan's public diplomacy towards its formal diplomatic allies was systematically similar no matter the political environment in which it was performing. Comparing evidence from El Salvador, where the diplomatic relationship with the FMLN government is stretched, Taiwan is less focused on public sentiment there than in Guatemala. However, this is mainly the result of differences in interpretation by key individuals, namely Ambassadors Carlos Liao and Adolfo Sun. Therefore, these two case studies indicate that Taiwan's international isolation is the overriding factor in explaining its approach to public diplomacy but that the system is such that senior individuals can make hugely positive impacts.

Conclusion

This thesis has used the public diplomacy framework to understand the extent to which Taiwan convinces its small group of formal allies to maintain diplomatic relations in the face of growing competition from the PRC. Much of existing scholarship focuses on cross-strait relations or Taiwan's informal relations with the world's major powers (for example, Cooper, 2003; Henckaerts, 1996; Hickey, 2007; Rawnsley, 2000 and 2005; Tsang, 2004; Tunsjo, 2008). Meanwhile, research into Taiwan's formal relations and its presence in the underdeveloped world has a far more niche following (see Hsieh, 1985; Taylor, 1998 and 2002; Rich, 2009). What is more, much of the research on both sides has asserted that Taiwan's formal relationships continue largely as a result of state bribery and dollar or chequebook diplomacy on the part of the Taiwanese. There is some truth in this. Indeed, the bribery of Presidents in return for diplomatic recognition has been documented in two of the three case studies covered here (Arriaza, 2005; *El Nuevo Diario*, 2005; *Guatemala Times*, 2010; Segnini and Herrera, 2006; *Tico Times*, 2004). However, as Taiwan and many of its allies consolidate their young democracies, political transparency and a less restricted media environment have resulted in greater scrutiny of political leaders, making it more difficult to have a relationship based on private financial incentives. Thus, while older research by the likes of Gilbert (1963), Hsieh (1985), and Yu (1963) tells us that Taiwan's use of public diplomacy in its diplomatic allies has considerable history, it has arguably never been so vital to its international interests as it is today, given that diplomatic bribery incurs far more risk than before.

Public diplomacy, which is commonly associated with efforts by a country to create positive sentiment for itself within foreign publics and elites, is a term originally devised by the United States government to overcome the negative connotations associated with the word 'propaganda' after World War II (Cull, 2008a; Taylor, 2003; Tuch, 1990). As such, the advent of public diplomacy was an act of

propaganda in itself, such was the perceived need to manage the image of US international communications during the Cold War. However, this research has argued through its case studies that the phrase has grown to encompass more than just propaganda. One crucial expansion that has been highlighted by this research is the conceptual enlargement of public diplomacy beyond merely explicit styles of communication like international broadcasting, to include more implicit activities, which were initially considered beyond the sphere of public diplomacy, and that have since served to stretch the distance between the term and its conceptual roots. However, much of the public diplomacy of Western nation-states, and the United States in particular, still revolves around the more explicit techniques like international broadcasting and education and cultural diplomacy. This reflects the term's history with propaganda but it can also be associated with cultural divisions between Western and non-Western norms in communication (see Cohen, 1997; Hall, 1989). However, what is fundamentally important for this researcher is that public diplomacy is an act of diplomacy, and diplomacy is as much about gesture and deed as it is about word. Accordingly, this research rightfully documented the likes of development assistance, medical diplomacy and other forms of more implicit communications as public diplomacy.

It is worth reemphasising the approach taken to public diplomacy research. As the introduction to the thesis explained, an objective-based, ethnographic approach was taken, which meant that the research focus was determined by visibility on the ground, rather than the profile and remit of political institutions in the source country. Thus, fieldwork was conducted at public diplomacy's 'point of reception' in target countries rather than the more historically familiar method of 'point of conception'. Beyond, the limitations that institutionally based point of conception research can bring to our understanding of public diplomacy, the approach of this research crucially allowed its subjects, the diplomats of the PRC and Taiwan, to be observed at the same time, and with the focus being on Central America it meant

adequate focus on the competition for allies and changing dynamics within the region as a whole. As such, this research chose three neighbouring Central American Republics, two of which have relations with Taipei and one that has recently changed its diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing, and using an objective-based approach from within the country to which the public diplomacy is directed, sought to understand the growing political and economic presence of the PRC in a region where Taiwan has traditionally enjoyed diplomatic superiority.

The central argument of this thesis attested that public diplomacy is not an equaliser between nation-states with vastly different resource pools when the smaller nation-state is constrained by a lack of widespread diplomatic recognition. As such, analysis claiming that public diplomacy allows the PRC and Taiwan to compete, fails to understand the constraints that Taiwan's diplomatic situation puts it under. Thus, Taiwan's public diplomacy output is severely restricted by the diplomatic squeeze that it encounters abroad. This was most apparent when we saw a nullification on the part of Taiwan's diplomats to exploit perceived PRC weaknesses. This can be explained through the KMT's current trajectory of improving relations with the PRC; the legacy of a PRC diplomatic offensive during the DPP's administration (2000 – 2008); and the domestic socio-political reality of modern Taiwan.

The KMT's favouring of closer ties with the PRC and the signing of the ECFA are critical moments for both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Thus, for the KMT to highlight differences between the two countries to its formal diplomatic allies, is counterproductive to its fundamental policy of reconciliation with the mainland, as there is little doubt such attempts would antagonise the PRC and put the ECFA at risk. Moreover, to do so would go against the ideology of the party vis-à-vis China relations, for the KMT fundamentally see themselves as a Chinese political party on Taiwan. There is also the added recent history of DPP rule where attempts to differentiate Taiwan from the mainland led to a diplomatic offensive from the PRC

and the loss of several of Taiwan's formal diplomatic allies. This included Costa Rica, although as that chapter documented, San Jose's approach to Beijing was as much proactive on their part as it was PRC willingness to cooperate. As such, Taiwan's foreign policy, including its public diplomacy output, is severely restricted whatever direction it takes, meaning that the maintenance of a status-quo is probably the least damaging option.

Finally, the attempted disguise of Taiwan's wholly political motives for engaging with these countries reflects domestic socio-political tensions in Taiwan. Primarily, that Taiwan conducts its international relations as a country with a highly contested national identity vis-à-vis Chinese-ness or Taiwan-ness, and with significant portions of the KMT's authoritarian rule still classified. We therefore see what appears to be hesitancy from within the diplomatic profession over how to create allegiance to Taiwan's diplomatic cause within their modern corps. The result is a widespread failure to be frank with junior diplomats and diplomatic volunteers alike about the political emphasis of these relationships, leading to a seemingly awkward and unspecific execution of diplomatic policy.

Therefore, just like in Central America where this research documented increasing technocracy in the diplomatic profession as democracy consolidated, so to do we see this in Taiwan, where a younger generation of diplomats have appeared that are invariably not the product of KMT patronage. However, those older diplomats who began their careers in the period of martial law and who continue to occupy more senior roles are not yet of retirement age. This tension within Taiwan's diplomatic corps was evident in both Central American case studies, and is one of the key deductions of the thesis. As such, many of Taiwan's senior diplomats remain overly-fixated on political relationships in Central America and largely fail to understand the importance of public diplomacy as socio-political dynamics change in the region. While understandable, given that for decades this was an elite relationship between authoritarian regimes, the modern reality is increasing

redundancy for Taiwan's engagement model. Thus, the most comprehensive understanding of the need for a clear public diplomacy strategy came from the junior diplomatic corps, and those invariably younger in age: the agricultural engineers and Mandarin teachers. However, their lack of seniority meant that they have little say in strategy. Thus, the relationship remains built around Taiwan giving Central American governments what they want, rather than Taiwan executing a range of strategic public objectives of their own inline with Central American considerations. The reality is that no evidence was found of Taiwan having any real overarching public objectives in Central America. As such, it seems that Taiwan has been slow to realise the extent of the socio-political changes that have been underway in Central America since the end of the various armed conflicts, as its senior diplomatic corps have largely failed to adapt to the public's heightened role in political life.

Therefore, it is not enough to perform public diplomacy activities with one eye on the political establishment. Taiwan must develop a distinct strategy for its public diplomacy that seeks to deliver on public-oriented goals, for if it does not, it risks being a redundant force, with or without formal diplomatic relations, in these countries as they consolidate into competitive multi-party democracies. As such, this research sees the presence of the likes of Ambassador Sun in Guatemala as a rare breed of senior diplomat for Taiwan and one that the rest of the corps should seek to emulate.

This research also wanted to provide a clear picture of events occurring in Central America and so we must incorporate the PRC's relations with Costa Rica and its economic diplomacy with El Salvador into our analysis. Both the PRC and Taiwan conduct themselves in remarkably similar ways, and the introduction to the thesis explaining the reasons for this. However, the PRC performs public diplomacy in Costa Rica with security in regards to its international diplomatic status. This allows it to focus on building positive public sentiment in the country, rather than

being concerned with diplomatic security. However, beyond this, we see the extent of the PRC's public diplomacy projects as far beyond that which Taiwan provided to Costa Rica before relinquishing its incumbency and that which it continues to provide to its remaining incumbents. However, as the evidence on Africa also highlighted, the PRC's public investments roughly follow its foreign policy priorities, and it is the presence of Taiwan in Central America that primarily motivates the PRC's work in Costa Rica and its neighbours. However, if Taiwan continues on its current path then it may become immaterial as Central America makes socio-political changes, and the region may slip back into obscurity for the PRC, given that it can provide little of the natural resources or foreign markets that the PRC requires to continue its growth trajectory, and is not particularly important to Japan or the USA either.

The conclusion will now address more particular issues raised by the thesis. On the question of the PRC's aim to use Costa Rica as a platform to the rest of the region: there is little evidence from the other case studies that an enlarged PRC presence has changed either Taiwan's already intense preoccupation with the security of its diplomatic relations or the conduct of the Central American governments vis-à-vis Taiwan. Indeed, while Ambassador Sun in Guatemala has tried to stimulate economic relations between the two countries, trade remains minimal and incentivised by the political situation. This is somewhat the result of a lack of compatibility between the products on offer at both ends. However, it remains that the PRC is targeting the business communities of Taiwan's allies through economic diplomacy and that this social group have on the whole been willing to engage despite the policy still being in relative infancy. Thus, while the agreement of the diplomatic truce in 2008 has abated pressure on Taiwan's diplomatic relationships from the political elite, the possibility of a loss of support from underneath has grown. This is a new and challenging threat to Taiwan in

Central America, and one that a focused public diplomacy strategy could help to repel.

What is more, the PRC's relationship, and its economic diplomacy in particular, with Costa Rica has given those in favour of further integration of the PRC in other Central American republics a local case study from which to base their argument. This was best demonstrated in Guatemala by financial newspaper *Siglo Veintiuno* which emphasised the comparative disparity between Costa Rican and Guatemalan access to the developing PRC market, and thus partially blaming Guatemala's economic issues on its failure to recognise the PRC. Hence, an attempt was being made to move the debate on diplomatic relations to away from the realm of politics where the PRC image is weaker and more towards economic issues. Nevertheless, forces hostile to Taiwan have existed in Central American politics and society since the Cold War and will continue to do so. As such, it is inconclusive whether a fundamental shift in the political landscape of Central America has occurred as a result of the PRC's increased political and economic presence in the region.

The introduction to the thesis noted the extent to which the public diplomacy of the PRC and Taiwan seeks to engage with its domestic audience. This is something that is rarely considered by public diplomacy analysis. As such, the 'public' to which public diplomacy refers need not necessarily be in the recipient country but back home. This represents a break from conventional ways of thinking about public diplomacy, which tend to emphasise its use overseas (for example Melissen, 2005; Taylor, 2006 and 2008).

In the cases of the PRC and Taiwan, public diplomacy forms not an insignificant part of their governments' bids for sovereign legitimacy both domestically and internationally. Domestically, both governments have awkward social contracts with their citizens, the reasons for which come primarily from the continuation of authoritarian rule in the case of the PRC or unresolved issues

regarding the period of martial law in Taiwan. Thus, public diplomacy offers both countries an opportunity to demonstrate that they are responsible and compassionate international actors who represent the values of their publics accurately, without having to directly address issues of repression from their not so distant pasts.

This thesis has contributed to our critical understanding of how the PRC and Taiwan use public diplomacy in Central America inline with their wider foreign and domestic policy goals. As the only remaining region of the world where Taiwan is the diplomatic incumbent in the majority of nation-states, Central America represents the last opportunity for academia to provide on-going assessment of the dynamics of such diplomatic relationships. In addition, this study has contributed to the field of strategic communications, and our understanding of public diplomacy in particular, documenting how the strategy is utilised by international actors in line with their interests. While the past five years have witnessed an intensification of the PRC's interest in the region, Taiwan has also tried to extend its diplomatic mission, and the result has been public diplomacy activity reaching a level never before seen by either country in this part of the world.

Opportunities for Further Research

This PhD has created a number of opportunities for further academic pursuit. These can be split into three sections: areas of this study with the potential for expansion; the enlarging of the framework to address other issues; and, the expansion of this framework to other case studies.

The first opportunity is to conduct a comparative content analysis of the media in different Central American countries vis-a-vis the representation of the PRC and

Taiwan. This was briefly investigated as a possible additional methodology for this project but was dropped after a pilot was run in Costa Rica using the framework of De Vreese et al (2001) to assess the manner in which the Costa Rican daily newspaper *Nacion* represented the PRC in the six months before and after diplomatic recognition in June 2007. Ultimately, it was decided that content analysis was more suited to the resource-based approach to public diplomacy research, and that objective-based research like what has occurred here would not receive significant extra input from undertaking such a project. This is because conclusions would have been speculative as it is not possible to confirm a direct link between the content of the media and the objectives of a nation-state.

In any case, the results of the pilot were inconclusive as the PRC was the subject of a disproportionate number of political, economic and social stories in the latter half of 2007 in comparison to the first half as a result of the lead-up to the Beijing Olympics of 2008; and while this is of interest, it skewed the study from its original intention of assessing the impact of diplomatic recognition and subsequent public diplomacy on media content. Not necessarily related to the Beijing Olympics but related to the decision not to use content analysis, was that there was no way to deduce whether a positive or negative result was the consequence of the Costa Rican government's decision to diplomatically recognise Beijing, resulting in any conclusions being speculative. That said, content analysis remains a valuable research tool, and under a different theoretical framework and criteria may make a worthwhile contribution to our understanding of the PRC and Taiwan in Central America.

Secondly, this research has offered comparisons between the country case studies. However, the opportunity exists to do so in a more rigorous capacity. This thesis compared the activities of Taiwan in El Salvador and Guatemala and highlighted a number of differences including the relative security of the diplomatic relationship, the priorities and styles of the different ambassadors and the attempt to

consolidate public sentiment by public diplomats. What is more, the actions of Taiwan and the PRC in Central America and the reasons for this were offered in conclusions. However, it would be interesting for direct comparisons to be made between the public diplomacy conducted by Taiwan across its remaining formal diplomatic allies, and even between its formal diplomatic allies and those Western countries that it counts as informal allies. In this instance, the study could be enlarged to include other Central American Republics, the case study of Panama being of particular interest given its connection to world trade as a result of the Panama Canal. This would probably involve relinquishing the case study approach and taking a look at the activities of the PRC and Taiwan through a more policy-based structure.

Furthermore, how the PRC engages in public diplomacy with countries after they have renounced diplomatic ties with Taiwan is also of interest. Beyond Costa Rica, one can list the Caribbean Islands of Dominica and Grenada as potential case studies along with a host of African Republics, the most pertinent of which being Malawi – who announced ties with Beijing in 2008 but which had been a loyal ally of Taiwan since the country's independence (see Chirombo, 2010) – because of their appearance not to be swing state. All of this would further enhance the depth and quality of research being conducted in a field that remains considerably under-examined.

Finally, this moves the discussion to the issue of swing states, and the extent to which they do or do not receive a different style of diplomatic engagement from the PRC and Taiwan. Given that this research concluded that the PRC performs public diplomacy towards Costa Rica in a style befitting a country without continual preoccupations over the security of its diplomatic relationship, it remains to be seen whether the same can be said for the PRC in Grenada and Dominica, or in a variety of African Republics, where there is a history of 'swinging' between Taiwan and the PRC. What is more, there is the seemingly unique case of Haiti, an ally of Taiwan,

which has received substantial aid from both Taiwan and the PRC after the large earthquake in 2010, despite it being an ally of Taiwan. Therefore, while the PRC has appeared principled on non-involvement in Taiwan's allies it appears as though there is a limit to such a principle, and that this limit is based on international image. Thus, it may be that the modern and more pragmatic PRC's keenness to keep domestic and international criticism to a minimum, and legitimise its international behaviour, is in the process of usurping the One China principle which has been a mainstay of its policy since 1949.

Appendix A: Questions for Costa Rican Ambassador to the United Kingdom

Questions for Her Excellency Ms Pilar Saborio, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the United Kingdom. Tuesday 5th April 2011, 11am, Costa Rican Embassy, 14 Lancaster Gate, London.

Q1 – Can you provide me with a brief history of your time in the Costa Rican diplomatic service?

Q2 – Within the Costa Rican diplomatic service what is the general feeling towards China and Taiwan?

Q3 – Costa Rica stopped its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in 2007 in favour of recognising the People's Republic of China (PRC). What were the reasons for this change?

Q4 – How is the movement of Costa Rica's embassy in Israel from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv related to the recognition of China?

Q5 – In what capacity does Costa Rica continue an informal relationship with Taiwan?

Q6 – Has the Costa Rican government received criticism from other Central American states for recognising China?

Q7 – A recently released *wikileaks* cable states that China has lavished gifts on Costa Rica in an attempt to gain a larger profile in the region. To what extent is this true?

Q8 – When Costa Rica recognised China, Taiwan had a technical mission (the ICDF) in your country with a number of on-going projects. China said it would continue these, what is the reality of this situation?

Q9 – To what extent does ideological sentiment play a role in the status quo regarding diplomatic recognition of China and Taiwan in Central America?

Q10 – Does recognising Taiwan represent an immaturity in foreign policy?

Q11 – What is the potential of Costa Rica or any other Central American Republic being a 'swing state'?

Appendix B: Information about Interviewees

Bibliography Reference	Interviewer's Location	Date of Interview	Name of Interviewee	Nationality	Position	Organisation	Location	Language
Rojas, 2010	UK	14/12/2010	Rojas, Pablo	Costa Rican	Head of Association	Association of Ex-scholarship holders Costa Rica- China	[by email]	E
Hu, 2011a	UK	09/01/2011	Hu, Ariel	Taiwanese	Mandarin Teacher at Universidad Nacional de El Salvador	Taiwan ICDF	[By telephone]	E
Lin, 2011a	UK	14/01/2011	Lin, Kuo-chung	Taiwanese	Head of Press Office	Taipei Representative Office UK	London	E
Holtz, 2011	CR	02/02/2011	Holtz, John	USA	Journalist	Inside Costa Rica	Escazu	E
Claramunt, 2011	CR	03/02/2011	Claramunt, Carmen	Costa Rican	Department of Scholarships	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica	San Jose	E/S
Vargas, 2011	CR	03/02/2011	Vargas, Esteban	Costa Rican	Conservationist	Sun Sun Lodge	Sarapiquí	E
Rodriguez Holkemeyer, 2011	CR	04/02/2011	Rodriguez Holkemeyer, Patricia	Costa Rican	Professor of Asian Studies	(UCR) Universidad de Costa Rica	Escazu	E
Delgado, 2011	CR	05/02/2011	Delgado, Mauricio	Costa Rican	Anthropologist	School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)	Puerto Viejo	E
Lin, 2011b	CR	07/02/2011	Lin, Hsiao	Taiwanese	Manager	China Association of Costa Rica	San Jose	E/S
Rivero, 2011	CR	07/02/2011	Rivero, Sergio	Costa Rican	Student	Renmin University	[by telephone]	E
Castro Fernandez, 2011	CR	09/02/2011	Castro Fernandez, Ronald	Costa Rican	Historian	UPeace (United Nations Universidad por la Paz)	Ciudad Colon	E
Achio, 2011	CR	09/02/2011	Achio, Mayra	Costa Rican	Head of Confucius Institute	UCR	San Jose	E/S
Mayorga, 2011	CR	09/02/2011	Mayorga, Armando	Costa Rican	Editor in Chief	<i>Nacion</i>	San Jose	E/S
Rodriguez, 2011	CR	10/02/2011	Rodriguez, Saskia	Costa Rican	International Cooperation Coordinator	(MIDEPLAN) Ministerio de Planificacion Nacional y Politica Economica de Costa Rica	San Jose	E
Monterrosa, 2011	ES	14/02/2011	Monterrosa, Rolando	El Salvadoran	Head of Opinion	El Diario de Hoy	San Salvador	E
Wu, 2011	ES	15/02/2011	Wu, Monica	Taiwanese	Head of Press Office	Taiwan Embassy	San Salvador	E
Lee, 2011	ES	15/02/2011	Lee, Carlos	Taiwanese	Head of Taiwan ICDF El Salvador	Taiwan ICDF	San Salvador	E
Huang, 2011	ES	15/02/2011	Huang, Gustavo	Taiwanese	Agricultural Engineer	Taiwan ICDF	San Salvador	E
Flores, 2011	ES	16/02/2011	Flores, Manuel	El Salvadoran	Mayor of Quezaltepeque	(FMLN) Frente Farabundo Marti por la Liberacion Nacional	Quezaltepeque	S
Wang, 2011	ES	17/02/2011	Wang, Yi-fei	Taiwanese	Mandarin Teacher	(UEES) Universidad Evangelica de El Salvador and Taiwan ICDF	San Salvador	E/S

Anonymous, 2011a	ES	17/02/2011	anonymous	El Salvadoran	Head of Department	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	San Salvador	E
Anonymous, 2011b	ES	19/02/2011	anonymous	El Salvadoran		Museo de la Historia de Guerra Civil Salvadoreña	Perquin	S
Rosales, 2011	GT	23/02/2011	Rosales, Dinora	Guatemalan	Coordinator of International Exchange	Universidad Rafael Landivar	Guatemala City	E
Sanchez, 2011a	GT	24/02/2011	Sanchez, Lisandro	Guatemalan	Lecturer in Architecture	Universidad Rafael Landivar	Guatemala City	E
Alpirez, 2011	GT	24/02/2011	Alpirez, Ana Carolina	Guatemalan	Editor in Chief	El Periodico	Guatemala City	E
Anonymous, 2011c	GT	25/02/2011	anonymous	Guatemalan	Journalist		Guatemala City	E
Chen, 2011	GT	02/03/2011	Chen, Daniel	Taiwanese	Third Secretary	Taiwan Embassy	Guatemala City	E
Hu, 2011b	GT	02/03/2011	Hu, Rosa	Taiwanese	Head of Press Office	Taiwan Embassy Guatemala	Guatemala City	E
Sanchez, 2011b	GT	08/03/2011	Sanchez, Esmeralda	Guatemalan	Director of Policy Formation	(SEGEPLAN) Secretaría de Planificación y Programación de la Presidencia	Guatemala City	S
Pan, 2011	GT	15/03/2011	Pan, Roberto	Taiwanese	Head of Taiwan ICDF Guatemala	Taiwan ICDF	Guatemala City	E/S
Vasquez, 2011	UK	18/03/2011	Vasquez, Luis	El Salvadoran	Director	Catholic Relief Services (CRS) El Salvador	[By email]	S
Saborio, 2011	UK	05/04/2011	Saborio, Pilar	Costa Rican	Ambassador to UK	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica	London	E

Participant Consent Form

Title of Research Project: Public Diplomacy in Central America: The Rise of the People's Republic of China.

Name of Researcher: Mr. Colin R. Alexander

Please initial the box if you agree with the statement to the left

- | | | |
|---|--|--------------------------|
| 1 | I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet explaining the above research project and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2 | I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without any negative consequences for my decision. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3 | I understand that the information I provide during my participation in this research may be used in an academic publication and that my name may be attributed to it.
OR | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4 | I understand that I reserve the right to remain anonymous for all or part of my participation in this research. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5 | I agree to take part in the above research project and will inform the principal investigator should my contact details change. | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Name of participant <i>(or legal representative)</i>	Date	Signature

Name of person taking consent <i>(if different from lead researcher)</i>	Date	Signature
<i>To be signed and dated in presence of the participant</i>		

Lead researcher	Date	Signature
<i>To be signed and dated in presence of the participant</i>		

Copies:

Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed and dated participant consent form, the information sheet and any other written information provided to the participants. A copy of the signed and dated consent form should be kept with the project's main documents which must be kept in a secure location.

Appendix D: Details of PRC Ambassador Li Changhua's Quarterly Addresses in *Nacion*

(correct as of 24th November 2011).

Harvard Reference	Date of Appearance	Title (in English)
(Li, 2010a)	27 th July 2010	Sino – Costa Rica Relations
(Li, 2010b)	1 st Oct 2010	Passive Development
(Li, 2011a)	4 th Jan 2011	United on the Challenges of Climate Change
(Li, 2011b)	23 rd Mar 2011	A New Period for the Sino – Costa Rican Friendship
(Li, 2011c)	12 th July 2011	Successes of the Chinese Communist Party
(Li, 2011d)	31 st Oct 2011	An Open, Democratic and Friendly China

Appendix E: Taiwan Embassy in El Salvador Press Release, week beginning Monday 21st February 2011

Taiwan dona US\$100.000 a Nueva Zelandia [Taiwan donates US\$100,000 to New Zealand]

Taipei, (CNA) En representación del gobierno de la República de China (Taiwan), el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Timothy C.T. Yang, donó el miércoles 23 la cantidad de US\$100.000 a Nueva Zelandia para ayudar a los damnificados de un devastador terremoto que azotó el previo día a ese país oceánico.

La donación fue recibido por el director de la Oficina de Comercio e Industria de Nueva Zelandia en Taipei, Sr. Stephen Payton, quien agradeció profundamente al gobierno de Taiwan por la generosa donación, así como por el rápido envío de un grupo de rescate por parte del gobierno de Taiwan a su país para participar en las operaciones de rescate de emergencia.

El Sr. Payton reveló que transferiría el dinero donado a la Sociedad de la Cruz Roja de su país a la brevedad posible para ayudar a los damnificados del seísmo, que ha clamado la vida de unas 70 personas, además de dejar a otras 200 personas desaparecidas.

Por su parte, el canciller Yang le manifestó al Sr. Payton la solidaridad del gobierno y pueblo de Taiwan a los victimas Nuevo zelandeses del aterrador cataclismo.

Un grupo de rescate de la Agencia *Nacional* de Bomberos de Taiwan, integrado por 24 experimentados rescatadores, partió en horas de la noche del martes 22 rumbo a Nueva Zelandia para participar en las operaciones de rescate de emergencia en ese país insular en el Océano Pacífico Sur.

Pdte. Ma insta a más rápida reforma política en China [President Ma insists that political reform in China be quicker]

Taipei, (CNA) El presidente Ma Ying-jeou ha expresado su deseo de que China acelere su paso para realizar la reforma política basada en la democracia y el imperio de la ley y proteger los derechos humanos, al momento de mantener su prosperidad económica, según un informe de prensa dado a conocer por el Palacio Presidencial el lunes 21.

El Primer Mandatario hizo dicho llamamiento en un momento en que el mundo está viendo cómo se están originando las olas de protestas clamando por reformas políticas en países árabes, denominadas por la prensa como la "Revolución del Jazmín", que se está extendiendo también a China.

"El presidente Ma cree que la democracia y los derechos humanos son los valores comunes del mundo, la extensión de una idea de la cultura china basada en el bienestar del pueblo, y un indicador importante para medir las relaciones entre los dos lados del Estrecho de Taiwan", dijo Chen Yung-feng, director encargado de los asuntos públicos del Palacio Presidencial, en una conferencia de prensa.

"Ante la nueva era de democratización en el mundo, se debe tartar bien a los activistas prodemocracia con una nueva mente y con clemencia, y debemos convertir a la democracia y a los derechos humanos en el único lenguaje para los pueblos de los dos lados del Estrecho para siempre", fue citado Ma.

Mientras tanto, Tsai Ing-wen, la presidenta del opositor Partido Democrático Progresista (PDP), también expresó el mismo día su interés y su apoyo a la "Revolución del Jazmín", que ya se está extendiendo a China.

En una asamblea del comité de dirigentes del PDP en la legislatura, Tsai dijo que las evoluciones en el Medio Oriente y los movimientos de democracia en China eran cambios importantes tanto para la tendencia inter*Nacional* como para su partido.

"Ante una fuerte China, la promoción de la democracia y de los derechos humanos es equivalente a la protección de los valores de Taiwan", indicó Tsai.

"Ahora, tales valores (de democracia) están siendo propagados al Medio Oriente y China, por lo que creo que el PDP debe expresar su interés y apoyo", puntualizó Tsai.

Appendix F: Taiwan Embassy in El Salvador Press Release, week beginning Monday 14th March 2011

Taipei en lista de ciudades turísticas potenciales [*Taipei in list of underestimated tourist cities*]

Taipei, (CNA) Taipei figura entre las ciudades más subestimadas del mundo en términos de viajes, según un artículo publicado en el sitio web de Yahoo! Travel.

El artículo, titulado "las Ciudades Más Subestimadas del Mundo", dijo que Taipei ya no es una ciudad sofocada por el aire contaminado como en las décadas de los 80 y los 90.

"Hoy en día, Taipei es una de las capitales más agradables de Asia, con acres de espacio verde y sistemas de conveniente transporte público", dijo el artículo en el sitio web de viajes del motor de búsqueda.

Para los entusiastas de las actividades al aire libre, hay mucho que ver en Taiwan, por ejemplo, el excelente Parque *Nacional* de Yangmingshan, las famosas fuentes termales en Beitou, los agradables senderos que rodean las montañas, y las cómodas y seguras rutas ribereñas para los ciclistas, dijo Jennifer Chen, autora del artículo.

Sin embargo, añadió Chen, la mayor atracción de Taipei sigue siendo sus exquisitas comidas.

"En Taipei uno puede encontrar unas de las mejores comidas chinas del mundo, desde los puestos callejeros hasta los restaurantes de lujo. No tengan miedo si no hablan el mandarín, pues los amables ciudadanos de Taipei están siempre ansiosos de ayudar a todos los visitantes", indicó Chen.

Otras ciudades en la lista incluyeron también a Detroit, Tucson, Providence, Filadelfia y Denver en Estados Unidos, Nara en Japón, Antwerp en Bélgica, Bolgna en Italia, Galway en Irlanda, Glasgow en Escocia, Adelaide en Australia, Valparaíso en Chile, Kotor en Montenegro, Mérida en México y Bratislava en Eslovaquia.

El artículo dijo que estas ciudades eran especialmente interesantes para los viajeros que les gusta explorar nuevos lugares.

También en la lista estuvieron Hangzhou en China, Calgary en Canadá, Bordeaux en Francia, Durban en Sudáfrica, Montevideo en Uruguay, Dusseldorf en Alemania, Valencia en España y Granada en Nicaragua.

Pdte. Ma y su esposa se unirán a recaudación de fondos para Japón [*President Ma and his wife will unite to collect funds for Japan*]

Taipei, (CNA) El presidente Ma Ying-jeou adelantó el jueves 17 que tanto él como su esposa participarán el viernes 18 en un programa de televisión de call-in con el objetivo de recaudar fondos para ayudar a los ciudadanos nipones que resultaron damnificados por el

super-fuerte seísmo y el masivo tsunami subsecuente que azotaron implacablemente a Japón el 11 de marzo.

La primera dama Mei-ching Chow de Ma, quien se encuentra actualmente de vista en Nueva Zelanda, acortará su visita a fin de tomar parte en el mencionado evento caritativo que tendrá lugar bajo los auspicios conjuntos de la Sociedad de la Cruz Roja de Taiwan y las tres empresas de televisión del país, a saber: la CTS, la CTV y la PTS, dijo Ma al momento de recibir en audiencia a una delegación del capítulo de Taiwan de los Clubes de Leones InterNacionales.

El Primer Mandatario aprovechó la ocasión para hacer un llamado a todos sus compatriotas para que realicen llamadas telefónicas al referido programa de televisión para hacer sus respectivas doNaciones a la población japonesa víctima de uno de los terremotos más cataclísmicos en la historia de su país.

"Espero que el público en general pueda demostrar su espíritu de compasión y solidaridad y ayudar a Japón a superar sus momentos más difíciles", manifestó el presidente Ma.

Inmediatamente después de que Japón fue azotado por el terremoto de magnitud 9,0 y el maremoto subsecuente el 11 de marzo, Taiwan se ofreció a enviar a un equipo de rescate a las zonas de desastre y a donar 100 millones de dólares taiwaneses (unos 3,44 millones de dólares americanos) para ayudar a ese país vecino a realizar sus operaciones de rescate, puntualizó Ma.

Refiriéndose al desastre nuclear generado por el devastador sismo y el tsunami subsecuente, Ma recalcó que Taiwan tendrá que adoptar todas las medidas de precaución aunque todas las evaluaciones basadas en las informaciones meteorológicas demuestran que es imposible que la contaminación radioactiva vaya a llegar a Taiwan.

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