

**PAKISTAN SINCE INDEPENDENCE:**

**The Political Role of the *‘Ulamā’***

**(2 Volumes)**

**Volume 1**

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To  
the memory of my father  
'Abdul Majid











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## ABSTRACT

The '*ulamā*' (men of Islamic learning) occupy an important position in the Muslim society. Pakistan is no exception to this general phenomenon. Although they were always on the periphery of political decision-making throughout Muslim rule in South Asia (1206-1857), their influence on the masses was never in question. During the colonial period (1857-1947), however, the development of Islamic thought resulted in a division of Muslim society into two distinct sections: 'Islamic modernists', and orthodox Muslims who were under the influence of the '*ulamā*'. Secularist ideas could not gain ground amongst Muslims on account of their minority status in South Asia. Religion constituted the bedrock of their identity.

At the emergence of Pakistan, it was the 'Islamic modernist' section of Muslim society which held the reins of power, and successfully controlled the institutions of the power-structure. On the related issues of polity and society in Pakistan, it was not a matter of surprise that a conflict of orientation persisted between the 'Islamic modernists' and the orthodox Islam. The '*ulamā*' started from a weaker position and developed the political skills needed to assert their views. The failure of the dominant class to fulfil its promises enabled the '*ulamā*' to expose their true nature.

At the same time, the '*ulamā*' divided amongst themselves on the basis of sects and subsects, could not agree on an alternative political strategy. In actual fact, they were more effective in achieving negative ends (such as help to topple a government) than in capturing the reins of power. Even though their electoral

strength has always been low. Their undoubted skill in manipulating and using the modern paraphernalia of political mobilisation would appear to provide them with the apparatus, albeit in the long term, to consolidate a political alternative to the existing dominant class in control of state power. In the short and medium term, however, it is unlikely that the 'Islamic modernist' elements will be dislodged from power.













SCF	Scheduled Castes Federation
SKMPPMM	<i>Sind-Karachi Muhājir Punjabi Paṭhān Mutahiddah Maḥāz</i>
SPI	Socialist Party of India
TI	<i>Taḥrīk-i-Istiqlāl</i>
TJ	<i>Tablīghī Jamāāt</i>
TNFJ	<i>Taḥrīk-i-Nifāz-i-Fiqh-i-Jāfariyyah</i>
UDF	United Democratic Front
UF	United Front
UIPA	United Indian Patriotic Association



question. Among recent studies Barbra Daly Metcalf's Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 can be justifiably regarded as an important contribution to the history of Islamic religious movements of the 19th century, especially the Deoband movement.

Apart from such specific studies, writers dealing with intellectual and cultural developments in South Asia, and the history of the freedom movement have also touched on the role of the 'ulamā'.

It is a matter of surprise that no thorough study has yet been made of the political role of the 'ulamā' since the emergence of Pakistan. Their role has been touched upon in a peripheral manner by some authors in their writings on state and society in Pakistan. Leonard Binder is the only author who had attempted to study the political role of the 'ulamā', but, his study Religion and Politics in Pakistan covers only the first nine years of Pakistan's history. Binder did not have access to all the material pertinent to the political role of the 'ulamā'. Therefore historical discrepancies marred his otherwise pioneering work in the field. The need for fuller study in the political role of the 'ulamā' has remained unfulfilled. The present study is an attempt to fill this gap in the literature.

At the time this study was originally undertaken, its subject matter was to be the political role of the 'ulamā' during the first thirty years of Pakistan (i.e., 1947-1977). But at the time that the final stage of this study was reached, Muḥammad Ziyā-ul-Ḥaḡ's death occurred, and with it came the end of the most

recent phase of the 'ulamā's political role in Pakistan. The author, therefore, decided to add a chapter dealing with Muḥammad Ziyā-ul-Ḥaq's regime in order to bring the work up to date.

This study is divided into two parts. Part One outlines the position of the 'ulamā' in South Asian society, the divisions among them and their system of education, their contribution in the political arena from the downfall of Muslim rule to the emergence of Pakistan. Part Two focuses on the role of the 'ulamā' in the socio-political milieu of Pakistan.

The approach adopted in this analysis of the role of the 'ulamā' is mainly historical, the dynamics of social and political changes being best understood in an historical perspective. The periodisation of Pakistan's four decades into 1947-1958; the Ayūb Khān regime; the Muḥammad Yaḥyà Khān interregnum; the Bhutto regime; and the Ziyā-ul-Ḥaq regime, would appear to be logical from the perspective of the difference in general attitude of the 'ulamā' towards each of these regimes. However, the fact remains that this periodisation can be questioned on other grounds - namely that the basic power structure was not radically altered even though there was changes of place among power holders united by certain homogeneous socio-economic and political characteristics.

The author would like to draw attention to a specific feature of this work. Whilst Chapters 1-6 were written with the advantage of a vast variety of material that could be consulted, the subsequent two chapters were written on the basis of a more restricted field of published scholarship.

It is natural to use the Islamic calendar in referring to the events of Islamic history. Dates according to the Islamic calendar carry an abbreviation of A.H. (i.e., after the *hijrah* of the Prophet Muḥammad from Makkah to Madīnah). All other dates in the text are in accordance with the Gregorian calendar.

**PART ONE**











believers. In early Islam, it was the place where state policy was declared, and therefore became a centre of political activity. Besides the daily five prayers, Friday prayer at noon is obligatory for every adult male Muslim, preferably to be offered in a single mosque in any locality before a large gathering. Following the tradition of the Prophet, a *khutbah* (address) is made at the gathering. *Khutbah* had been, and is a medium of social and political communication.<sup>17</sup> A mosque generally has an *imām* who is entrusted with the duty of organising the prayers and leading them. The larger mosques may have *khatībs* for delivering Friday *khutbah*.

Pertinent to the growing activism of the 'ulamā' is the revitalisation of the political role of the mosques. They want to revive the mosque as a centre where influence on state politics is exercised. Mosques are also convenient centres for *maktab* (elementary school) where children are taught to recite the *Qurān* and the method of performance of obligatory prayers. The education of Islamic fundamentals is also a part of the *maktab's* curriculum. Through mosques and *maktabs* the 'ulamā' propagate the message of religion.

## 1.2 The 'ulamā' under Muslim rule

Let us turn to a consideration of the 'ulamā's' role in South Asia under Muslim rule.

According to a number of research monographs, tracing the history of Muslim expansion in South Asia, Islam entered this region through Arab traders who settled along the southern coast of India even before the Muslim conquest of Sind in 712 by Muḥammad



































to them, Muḥammad B. Ismā'īl ought to have been the seventh *Imām*.

The main body of the *Shi'āhs* accepted Mūsà Kāzīm as the *Imām* and the chain of hereditary *Imāms* continued down to Muḥammad al-Muntaẓar. He was the last of the *Imāms*, and in accordance with the counting of the mainstream of *Shi'āhs* (including 'Alī B. Abī Ṭālib as the first *Imām*), he became the 12th *Imām*. The last *Imām* was believed to have disappeared rather than died like any other mortal (940) and would reappear as the *Mahdī* before the Day of Judgement. The *Shi'āhs*, believing in the *Imāmah* of the 12 *Imāms* are known as *Imāmiyyah* or *Iṣnā 'Asharīs* (Twelvers).

*Iṣnā 'Asharī*, the largest branch of the *Shi'āhs* throughout the Muslim world remained a minority, lacking political power until the 16th century, when the *Shi'āh* Safvid dynasty (1501-1722) was established in Iran. In the contemporary world, the Islamic Republic of Iran is a country with *Iṣnā 'Asharsī* Shiahism as its state religion.

The *Iṣnā 'Asharīs'* beliefs are as follows:

1. There are twelve *Imāms*. The first *Imām* was 'Alī whom the Prophet himself designated. Every *Imām* deputed his own successor. The twelfth went into occultation, and will reappear before the Day of Judgement.
2. All the *Imāms* are infallible, and to obey them is to obey the Prophet himself.









### 1.5.2 The Relative Importance of the Sub-sects of *Shī'āhs* in Pakistan

Numerically the *Iṣṇā Āsharīs* are important. They are mainly in the Punjab and Sind. There are a few pockets of influence of the *Iṣṇā Āsharīs* where sectarian feelings play a part in the political game. The importance of the *Āghā Khānīs* and *Bohrahs* in Pakistan's commerce and industry is far in excess of the minuscule proportion of the total population that they represent. The *Āghā Khānīs* who constitute only .06 per cent of the total population of Pakistan control 5 per cent of its total industrial wealth.<sup>63</sup> *Bohrahs* control another 5 per cent of Pakistan's industry with an even smaller population (.02 per cent).<sup>64</sup> The industrial houses of Walika and Fanci belong respectively to the *Bohrah* and *Āghā Khānī* sub-sects.

### 1.5.3 The Sub-sects of the *Sunnīs*

The majority of the *ummah* which accepted the theory of *Khilāfah* became known as the *Ahl-us-Sunnah* or *Sunnīs*, the followers of the *Sunnah* of the Prophet. The *Sunnīs* take the first four *Khalīfahs* - namely, Abū Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uṣmān and 'Alī - as the *Khualāfa-ar-Rāshidūn* (rightly guided caliphs) and idealise this period (stretching over 30 years or so) as the best time subsequent to the death of the Prophet. The basic stand of the *Sunnīs* is to follow the *Qurān* and the *Sunnah* of the Prophet. The schism among the *Sunnīs* arose out of differences of interpretation and adaptation of the *Sunnah*.



The vast majority of the Muslims in Pakistan are the followers of Abū Ḥanīfah (i.e., the *Ḥanafīs*). The first conquerors of north-west India (now a part of Pakistan) were the Ghaznavids, who were *Sunnīs* of the *Shāfī* school of thought. But the *Ḥanafī* school of thought had started to gain ground and to replace *Shāfī* influence in the court of Ghazni, under the *Sulṭān* Masūd(1030-1040). The *Shāfī* school of thought remained strong in north-west India until the establishment of the *Sulṭānate* of Delhi (1206).

The *Sulṭāns* of Delhi and the political élite of the *Sulṭānate* adhered to the *Ḥanafī* school. The *Sulṭāns*' code of administration was strongly *Ḥanafī* in character, and the judicial system was based entirely on *Ḥanafī* jurisprudence. It is said that Muḥammad B. Tughlaq had a thorough knowledge of *Hidāyah*, the *Ḥanafī* juristic manual. The 'ulamā', during the *Sulṭānate* period, placed greater emphasis on *fiqh* than on any other branches of Islamic learning. Subsequently, several books of *fiqh* (that is, on *Ḥanafī* *fiqh*, of course), were compiled according to need.<sup>66</sup>

The Mughals were staunch *Ḥanafī* Turks from Central Asia. Under them, the *Ḥanafī* school of thought continued to flourish. *Fatāwā Bāburī*, a *Ḥanafī* manual compiled in 1519, was a token of Babur's attachment to the *Ḥanafī* juristic school of thought.<sup>67</sup> Akbar's eclecticism did not penetrate the legal and judicial practices, in spite of the changes that he introduced in his administration. During Awrangzeb's reign (1658-1707) one of the largest *Ḥanafī* manuals, *Fatāwā Ālamqirī* (known in the Arab world as *Fatāwā Hindīyyah*), was compiled under his direction by a group of leading jurists in the years 1664-1672.













Khān (d.1880), was an opponent of the reformers. Among his writings there exists a refutation of *Taqwiyat-ul-Imān* of Shāh Ismā'īl. He attacked the views of Shāh Ismā'īl on the issue of *imkān-i-nazīr* (possibility of the existence of an equivalent to Muḥammad) in another treatise (published in 1876).<sup>75</sup>

Aḥmad Razā Khān was a prolific writer. A large number of books and tracts on jurisprudence, theology, ethics and other Islamic sciences are to his credit, but his real interest was in strictly adhering to the *Ḥanafī* school of thought and in staunchly opposing the reformers. He did not like to co-operate with the fellow 'ulamā' of other schools of thought, even in matters which were outside the realm of theological controversy. He was among the 'ulamā' who gathered at the platform of *Nadwat-ul-'ulamā'*<sup>76</sup> (April 1894) but soon launched an attack against the movement. The presence of modern educated people in the ranks of the movement provided him with an easy opportunity to discredit it as a political gimmick of the followers of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān. At the same time, he felt uneasy working with the 'ulamā' who were not giving any importance to the differences between the *Ahl-i-ḥadīṣ* and the *Ḥanafīs*.<sup>77</sup> He issued *fatwās* against the reformers, wrote letters, engaged in debates and sent his associates and students to debate as well. He left no stone unturned to discredit the reformers in front of the masses. By the turn of the 19th century, he had gathered a group of adherents around him who made his writings a touchstone for judging whether or not a particular belief or practice was in conformity with the doctrines of Sunnism. The followers of Aḥmad Razā Khān claimed to be so true to Sunnism that they identified themselves as the *Ahl-us-Sunnah-w-Jamā'ah*

















































rulers had by then become too enfeebled to consolidate their position after Durrānī's success. The resulting political vacuum was filled by EIC.

By the end of the 18th century, the collapse of the Mughal rule was almost complete. All the Hindu Rājās had become independent and Shāh Ālam II (d.1806), the Mughal ruler, was a pensioner of the *Marathas*. The Sikhs were the rulers of the Punjab. EIC, with the consolidation of its power in Bengal, moved to expand its territories, and the *Marāthas* were successfully driven out from Delhi (1803). EIC let the name and shadow of Shāh Ālam, the Mughal ruler, continue in existence, but assumed *de facto* control of the Mughal state from 1803 onwards.

Control of EIC over political power made Shāh Ābdul Azīz<sup>2</sup> (1746-1824) issue a *fatwā*, declaring India *dār-ul-ḥarb*, a territory of war.<sup>3</sup> Most of the followers of Shāh Ābdul Azīz sought in the *fatwā* a source of legitimacy for *jihād*<sup>4</sup> against the usurpers with a view to re-establishing Muslim rule, albeit Shāh Ābdul Azīz himself gave no call to military action, or to emigration from the territories under EIC's occupation. He wanted the Muslims to recognise that the political power of the state was no longer in the hands of the Muslim rulers. He did not suggest abandoning the congregational prayers on Friday and *Īds* which were, under the classical juristic interpretation, not obligatory in *dār-ul-ḥarb*. He allowed his co-religionists to learn the English language and to take employment under EIC so long as they did not, thereby, commit '*ma'siyat-i-kubrā*' (grave disobedience), by fighting against their Muslim brethren.





The effects of the Insurrection and its suppression were registered in a strong manner in the ruling circles in Britain. British policy-makers decided to place India directly under the Crown in November 1858. Thenceforward, a Viceroy with an Executive Council was entrusted with the task of administering the country.

## 2.2 The Introduction of English Education

The most effective instrument shaping politics after 1857 was the system of education introduced by the colonial power. The attitude of the Hindu and Muslim communities (and different sections within each) towards English education differed. The diversity of their attitudes and the inequalities between them of their ability to benefit from English education led to sharp conflicts.

During the period when EIC consolidated its power, the Christian missionaries played a major role in introducing English education. They thought that it would provide an effective means of evangelisation. The Danish Lutheran missionaries established two schools in Madras as early as 1717. The activities of William Carey (1761-1834) of the Baptist Missionary Society have been the subject of a number of academic studies.<sup>16</sup> But, in spite of the encouragement given them by the administration, the success of the missionaries was never very great, as the local population was not eager to acquire English education at the expense of its own religion. The Muslims, especially, were apprehensive and the activities of these missionaries were widely believed to be among the causes of the 1857 Insurrection.<sup>17</sup>

Unlike the missionaries, EIC had been engaged in fostering education in the classical languages of Oriental learning, i.e. Arabic, Persian and Sanskrit. From 1823 onwards, the grant for the enhancement of learning was administered by a Committee of Public Instruction, and the issue concerning the appropriate system of education for India was brought under examination. In the beginning, the supporters of classical learning had their way. The situation changed when the advocates of English education gained ascendancy. They held that English education 'would make the Indian people gladly accept the British rule'.<sup>18</sup> Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800-1859) was an ardent protagonist of English education and had pleaded in the House of Commons before he came to India as Law member in 1834. He was responsible for shaping the education policy in his capacity as President of the Committee of Public Instruction in 1835.

We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect.<sup>19</sup>

Subsequently, British educational policy was directed towards promoting western literature and values among the natives of India. This decision was prompted by political, administrative and economic compulsions. The educational institutions in India produced clerks and subordinate officials who cost much less than their English counterparts.

In addition to the efforts of Christian Missions and EIC, the Hindu reformers were also eager to promote English education. The *Vidyāla* or Hindu College of Calcutta (established in 1816) and



Table 2.1

The Number of Students in Educational Institutions by Religion  
 Maintained at Public Cost in 1845

Presidency	Number of Students by Religious Affiliation				
	Christian	Hindu	Muslim	Others	Total
North-Western Provinces & Oudh	82	1,597	507	-	2,186
Lower Provinces (Bengal & Bihar)	154	4,186	907	1,789	7,036
Bombay	-	7,916	222	-	8,138
	236	13,699	1,636	1,789	17,360

[Source: B.B. Misra, The Indian Middle Classes (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978), p.409]



stronghold of the Covenanted Service, or in political agitation, journalism, or the law were, if not Christians, *Brahmo Samajists*.<sup>20</sup>

A similar movement known as the *Prarthanā Samaj* (society for prayer), took root in Bombay, under the guidance of Dr. Atmaram Pandurang (1823-1898), its founder, and M.G. Ranade (1842-1901). The movement was so close to *Brahmo Samāj* in its programme of religious and social reforms that there was a move to name it the *Bombay Brahmo Samāj*.<sup>21</sup>

The second general response to English education consisted, not of trimming popular Hinduism in accordance with Western ideas, but rather to transform it from a passive way of life into an assertive and aggressive missionary religion. A revivalist movement was thus given practical shape by Dayananda Saraswatī (1824-1883), a Gujarātī Brahman. He founded the *Āryā Samāj* (society of the Aryans) in 1875 in Bombay. Its main aim was to revive Hinduism as embodied in the four Vedas. In *Satyārth Prakāsh*,<sup>22</sup> his major work, Saraswatī vehemently attacked Islam and Christianity on the one hand, and Hindu orthodoxy on the other.

*Āryā Samāj* branches were established in different parts of the country, but its main stronghold was the Punjab where the Hindu community had been less caste-ridden and more open-minded due to its co-existence with a number of other socio-religious groups.

The *Āryā Samāj* creed included many of the tenets of *Brahmo Samāj*. Like the latter, it condemned idol worship and Brahman priesthood. The re-marriage of widows was commended and people of other religions were admitted into the fold of the *Samāj*.



These socio-religious movements, along with some other smaller organisations, successfully aroused a feeling, especially among the middle classes, of belonging to a large Hindu community with a pride in its rich past. Despite their diversities, all these movements laid stress on English education, and produced three different sets of political leadership - moderates, extremists and the conservatives respectively.

#### 2.4 Muslim Response to Western Liberalism

The initial response of the Muslims to Western doctrines, as indeed of the British domination which preceded them, was one of total rejection. Their resistance to British domination was reflected in the movements initiated by Sayyid Ahmad Barelwī and Ḥājī Shāriyatullāh. They believed that the only way open to the Muslims to stem the tide of deterioration was to revive the Islamic faith in its pristine form. The leaders of Muslim revivalist movements were, by and large, the 'ulamā', who deeply resented British domination. The 'ulamā' had to suffer a great deal during and after the failure of the 1857 Insurrection. A large number of them were killed during the suppression of the Insurrection. A large number of them were arrested and deported to the Andaman islands. A few of them (e.g., Ḥājī Imdādullāh and Raḥmatullāh Kerānwī), emigrated to Makkah. Those who were fortunate enough not to be arrested carried on their activities in the educational field. The 'ulamā's attitude, just after the suppression of the 1857 Insurrection may be summed up as follows:

1. The 'new' rulers were too strong to be physically defeated by any insurrection.





The donations of persons who want to remain unknown, I believe, is a source of *barakah*. Their sincerity seems a more permanent means of income.<sup>28</sup>

This axiomatic declaration prevented *Deobandī* elders from establishing contacts with neither the vested interests nor the government administration. A network of public donors, who had no expectation of achieving personal fame by making munificent contributions, thus came into existence. According to the annual report of 1289 A.H./1872, the largest monthly donation promised was to a value of 'eight rupees and five annas' by an anonymous giver.<sup>29</sup>

The colonial government did not recognise the certificate of the *Dār-ul-ūlūm*; no-one with this certificate could hope to enter government service; even though the *Dār-ul-ūlūm* curriculum was far more advanced than the syllabus prescribed for such examinations in oriental languages as *Munshī Fāzil* and *Mawlawī Fāzil*. It was much easier for the *fāzils* of Deoband to pass examinations in the oriental languages in order to secure teaching posts in government schools. The *Dār-ul-ūlūm* teachers discouraged such an instrumental attitude on the part of students. They likened their craze for teaching jobs in government schools after receiving a good religious education to using their precious shawls to clean shoes.<sup>30</sup>

The Muslim middle classes, stripped of their privileges, were ready to co-operate with the British rulers, and to welcome English education. In this respect, the *Deobandī 'ulamā'*, who were essentially contra-colonialist, were radically different. A large section of the Muslim middle classes secured employment under EIC

before to the 1857 Insurrection. Realising that the decadent Mughal monarchy was a sinking ship, they looked to their future under EIC. During the Insurrection, they remained loyal to EIC. Sayyid Aḥmad Khān (1817-1898) was the most outstanding representative of this section of the Muslim intelligentsia.

Sayyid Aḥmad Khān was born in an aristocratic family which had long been linked to the Mughal court. He was brought up by Farīd-ud-dīn, his maternal grandfather who was a minister under the Mughal emperor. Sayyid Aḥmad Khān joined EIC's service as a minor officer in a court of *ṣadr-i-amīn* from which he rapidly rose to the position of a judge. His loyalty never wavered during the 1857 Insurrection. He saved many British lives despite threats from Muslim freedom fighters. He persuaded some of the local chieftains to give up their support for the Insurrection. As a mark of recognition of his services, he was awarded, among other honours, a Knighthood.

Not only did Sayyid Aḥmad Khān give his wholehearted co-operation to the 'new' rulers, he also accepted their ideas in the religious sphere. He initiated a movement whose aim was to interpret Islamic teachings in the light of Western ideas. He developed the basic notion that between the word of God (the *Qurān*) and the work of God (nature) there can be no contradiction. He advocated that the *Qurān* should be so interpreted as to be in conformity with the rules of nature. He thus neglected the *ḥadīṡ* literature which did not permit the liberal interpretation of the *Qurān*. He doubted the concept of revelation through *Jibrīl*. He did not believe the accounts of the miracles of the Prophets contained in the *Qurān* and *ḥadīṡ* literature on the grounds that they were in

contradiction with the laws of nature. The concept of *jihād* was totally transformed by Sayyid Aḥmad Khān into a defensive war. The existence of *malā'ikah* (angels) as distinct creatures, endowed with sense perception, was dismissed. Sayyid Aḥmad Khān developed a school of thought commonly known as 'Islamic modernism'.<sup>31</sup>

His ideas were bitterly criticised by the 'ulamā' and his followers were referred to as '*necharīs*' because they gave importance to the role of 'nature' in their interpretation of the *Qurān*.

## 2.5 Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and Aligarh College

In the aftermath of the 1857 Insurrection, British hostility towards the Muslim community was so intense that even the loyalty of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and his followers could not staunch it. It was further strengthened upon the disclosure of the existence of a network of conspiracies against the government. A series of trials against the so-called *Wahhābīs* was started, commencing with the Ambala Trial (1864) and leading to the Patna Trial (1865), the Malda Trial (September 1870), the Rajmahal Trial (October 1870), and yet another trial (1871).<sup>32</sup>

In addition to his official engagements, Sayyid Aḥmad Khān devoted his energies to the spread of English education among the Muslim community. He retired in 1876 and permanently settled down in Aligarh. He was subsequently appointed as a member of the Governor-General's Legislative Council (1878-1883). His career after retirement was aimed at fulfilling two broad purposes:

- 1) the development of cordial relations between the Muslim community and the British government;
- 2) the spread of English education among the Muslim community.

In order to achieve the first end he worked on two fronts. He used the power of his pen [in his writings such as The Loyal Mohammadans of India (1860) and A Rejoinder to W. W. Hunter's 'The Indian Musalmans' (1871)] to defend the Muslims against charges of disloyalty to the colonial government.

He deployed his theological skill and logic in the task of persuading Muslims that it was in their interest to cultivate good relations with the British rulers. Citing Quranic injunctions in Risālah-Ahkām-i-Ta'ām-i-Ahl-i-Kitāb' (1868), he argued that there was no religious reason why Muslims should not dine with the Christian British, provided that there was no food on the table forbidden under Islamic rules. He also argued that meals prepared by Christians were permissible for Muslims to eat, irrespective of the method adopted for the slaughter of the meat-giving animal.

He planned to write a commentary on the Bible with a view to demonstrating that there was no disagreement between the teachings of the *Qurān* and the Bible. He did not complete this project. Only a part of the work, Tabyīn-ul-Kalām, was published.

The Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental High School (established in 1875) was upgraded to the status of a College in 1877. Its foundation stone was laid by Rt. Hon. Lord Lytton, the Viceroy. All members of staff were British. The Muslim youth were expected

to make the best use of their presence and to learn their etiquette, manners and mode of thought.

## 2.6 The 'Ulamā' on the Learning of the English Language

There is a widely held belief that the 'ulamā' were opposed to Sayyid Ahmad Khān's policy of introducing English language education at Aligarh College. In fact, however, the 'ulamā' had ruled that there was no harm in learning any language. Shāh 'Abdul Azīz made such a ruling during the early 19th century. 'Adbur Raḥīm Dahri<sup>33</sup> (1785-1850), one of his students, emphasised the need for the acquisition of Western learning. He spent the last days of his life teaching English at Fort William College Calcutta. He strongly advocated English in a booklet entitled 'Arzdāsht Dar bārah-i-Zarūrat-i-Tarwīj-i-Zubān-i-Angrezī-u-'Ulūm-i-Farang (An appeal for the study and dissemination of English language and the Western Learning).

Nawāb 'Abdul Latīf (1828-1893) founded the Muhammadan Literary Society in Calcutta (April 1863). Its aim was to disseminate English language and the Western learning.<sup>34</sup> Mawlawī Karāmat 'Alī Jawnpurī (d.1873), affiliated with the 'Society' throughout the greater part of his life, implored the Muslims to acquire a knowledge of the English language as well as modern science. Mawlānā 'Abdul Hay Frangi Maḥallī<sup>35</sup> (1848-1886) and Rashīd Ahmad Gangshī,<sup>36</sup> the 'ulamā' among Sayyid Ahmad Khān's contemporaries, held a similar view. The 'ulamā's objection was not to the Muslims learning the English language, but to the cultural impact of Britain on the Muslim people. The wording of the fatwās is explicit on this essential distinction which the 'ulamā' made

between learning the English language and learning the Western ways.

Those 'ulamā' who condemned Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's educational ventures were under the impression that he was using them to propagate his own views which were contrary to their understanding of the *Qurān* and the *Sunnah*. Sayyid Aḥmad Khān tried to placate the 'ulamā' by, for example, appointing Mawlānā 'Abdullāh Anṣārī, the son-in-law of Mawlānā Muḥammad Qāsīm Nānawtwī (the rector of *Dār-ul-'ulūm* of Deoband) as head of the department of theology at Aligarh.

## 2.7 The Early Phase of Development of Indian Nationalism

With the adoption of English education 'a new integrated all-India class' came into existence. Its background was varied but it was linked together by nature of its 'knowledge, ideas and values'.<sup>37</sup> The language that this class shared was English. Members were inspired by the reformist movements and the problems that they reflected. They established organisations for the protection of their class interests. The 'Zamīndārī Association' (1837), Bengal British India society (1843) and the British Indian Association (1851)<sup>38</sup> represented the interests of Bengali landed aristocracy and the newly-emerging middle class in composition as in outlook.

The 'India League' (1875) and the Indian Association (1876) were organised with a view to reflecting the aspirations of middle-class Bengalis. The latter had branches in all major cities of northern India. It voiced the demand of the middle class for a

greater share of higher offices for Indians, and for handsome representation in public bodies. All the government posts with a salary of more than £800 per annum were reserved for the civil servants appointed in Britain. Although Indians were allowed to compete for these jobs, the upper age limit of 19 rendered it almost impossible for them to compete, especially because the examination was conducted in Britain.

The Indian Association campaigned for raising the age limit and for holding the examinations simultaneously in Britain and India.

The Indian Association,<sup>39</sup> was eventually overshadowed when the Indian National Congress was brought into existence.

## 2.8 The Indian National Congress (INC)

The Indian National Congress (INC) was founded on 27 December 1885 in a meeting held at Bombay. The meeting was convened on the initiative of a retired Scotsman, Allan Octavian Hume (1829-1912) with the full blessing of Lord Dufferin, the Governor-General.<sup>40</sup> Among the 72 delegates of the first meeting, presided over by a pioneer Christian Bengali barrister, W.C. Bonnerjee (1844-1906), more than half were principally from English-educated élites. The language adopted by INC was English.

Hume conceived INC as a 'safety valve for the escape of great and growing forces',<sup>41</sup> resulting from English education and the general dissatisfaction of the educated classes with the

conditions prevailing in India. He defined the three main objectives of the organisation as follows:

1. the fusion into one national whole of all the different and till recently discordant elements that constitute the population of India;
2. the gradual regeneration along all lines, mental, moral, social and political, of the nation thus involved; and
3. the consolidation of the union between England and India, by securing the modification of such of its conditions as may be unjust and injurious to the latter country.<sup>42</sup>

Like the Indian Association, its predecessor, INC too demanded that the competitive examination 'be held simultaneously, one in England and one in India', and 'the maximum age limit....be raised to not less than 23 years'. Among the main demands of INC were: 'expansion of the legislative councils by admission of a considerable proportion of elected members'; 'a complete separation of judicial and executive functions', 'reduction of army expenditure and commission for the Indians'.<sup>43</sup>

INC in its early phase was dominated by *zamīndārs* and members of the legal profession.<sup>44</sup> It was committed to achieve its objects through resolutions, deputations and petitions to the Government of India and to the Parliament of Britain.

### 2.9 The Muslims and INC (1885-1888)

With the emergence of INC, the division on a theological basis between the two groups of the Muslim community - the 'ulamā'

and the 'modernists' - came to be reflected in the political arena as well.

#### 2.9.1 Sayyid Ahmad Khān versus INC

Sayyid Ahmad Khān believed that the Muslim community could advance only by remaining on good terms with the British and not by joining INC. In December 1886, the Aligarh Institute Gazette warned the Muslims not to take part in INC activities. Two important Muslim organisations of the time - the Central Mohammedan Association<sup>45</sup> and Mohammedan Literary Society - refused to send delegates to the second session of INC. Sayyid Ahmad publicly attacked INC in his speeches at Lucknow [28 December 1886] and Meerut [14 March 1888].<sup>46</sup> He made three main points: (a) that the Hindus and the Muslims were 'two nations'; (b) representative institutions were unsuited to Indian conditions as this system would end in the subjugation of the Muslims by the Hindus who enjoyed numerical superiority; and (c) the Muslims must depend on the British for the safeguarding of their interests.

In order to keep the Muslims away from 'the Bengalis in their mischievous political proposals' (referring to INC), Sayyid Ahmad founded the Mohammedan Educational Congress (December 1886, changed to Conference in 1890), and 'United Indian Patriotic Association' (UIPA) (August 1888) with the express aim of countering INC activities.

In view of the fact that Sayyid Ahmad Khān mounted a vigorous opposition to INC, special care was taken by INC leaders to stress its non-communal character. Badr-ud-dīn Tyabjī was

elected as President in 1887. The following year (1888), it was decided that no subject should be discussed by the subjects committee or by the President at any session, to which either the Hindu or the Muslim delegates objected unanimously or near unanimously. If after the discussion of any subject, either the Muslim or the Hindu delegates objected to a resolution on it in large enough numbers, it would be dropped.

The number of Muslim delegates in INC sessions during three decades from its inception to 1905 would suggest that the Muslims as a community were not very interested in it.<sup>47</sup> The majority of the Muslim delegates were usually from the city where the session was held. From all over the country, Muslim delegates who attended INC sessions fell into two major groups. The first was composed of the editors of newspapers and lawyers, who through professional ties or because of their interest in politics, joined INC. The second group belonged to the '*ulamā*' who were implacably opposed to Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's religious views.<sup>48</sup> Several booklets, pamphlets and posters were published by middle-class Muslims with the aim of keeping their co-religionists away from INC.<sup>49</sup> The virtual aloofness of the Muslims from INC was 'largely due to the influence of Sir Sayyid Aḥmad'.<sup>50</sup>

#### 2.9.2 The '*Ulamā*', INC and Sayyid Aḥmad Khān

The '*ulamā*' did not like Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's opposition to INC and pro-British stance. Mawlānā Muḥammad and his brothers issued a *fatwā* recommending that Muslims should join INC and refrain from taking part in Sayyid Aḥmad's UIPA. This *fatwā* was signed by about one hundred '*ulamā*' including leading *Deobandīs*. It





*Dār-ul-'ulūm Nadwat-ul-'ulamā'* was conceived as a meeting point between *madrāsah* education and English learning. In the event, however, the experiment was not successful. The graduates of *Nadwat-ul-'ulamā'*, undoubtedly, acquired a better command of Arabic language and literature than the *fāzils* of Deoband; they also knew English, but they could not absorb the spirit of English education. *Nadwat-ul-'ulamā'* developed more or less the same attitude as that which the *Deobandīs* projected.

The emergence of *Nadwat-ul-'ulamā'* was a significant development. It provided for the first time a platform for the interaction between the '*ulamā'* and the English-educated élite. Munshī Athar 'Alī, a leading lawyer of United Provinces (UP), played a leading role in organising the purchase of a building for the *Dār-ul-'ulūm Nadwat-ul-'ulamā'*. The seventh annual session of *Nadwat-ul-'ulamā'* was held at Azimabad, Patna [5-6 November 1900]. It was attended by members of the university-educated élite, as well as the '*ulamā'*. Mawlānā Shibli criticised the concept of dividing Muslim society into 'old' and 'new' sections. The University-educated delegates expressed confidence in the leadership of the '*ulamā'*. The '*ulamā'*, for their part, were much moved by the emotive speeches of the university-educated speakers. The Azimabad session was regarded as an occasion for building bridges between the '*ulamā'* and English-educated élites.<sup>55</sup> The contacts established there further strengthened the interest that the '*ulamā'* had already begun to take in involving university-educated Muslims in their religious aims.

2.11 Militant Hindu Nationalism: Bāl Gangādhār Tilak  
(1856-1920)

The 'Cow Protection Movement' constituted an important aspect of Hindu revivalism. In 1882, Dayānandā Saraswatī formed the first *Gaurakshinī Sabhā* (Cow Protection Society)<sup>56</sup> and wrote a book on the subject. As a sacred symbol, the cow had an appeal that was equally strong in all sections of Hindu society - conservative, revivalist and reformist. The cow protection movement was particularly successful in northern India. In order to prevent cow sacrifice at *Īd-ul-azhā*, one of the two Muslim festivals of rejoicing, the Cow Protection Society organised boycotts of Muslims who were forced by large crowds to sign agreements, promising not to sacrifice cows.<sup>57</sup> The activities of the cow protection movement gave rise to Hindu-Muslim riots (e.g., the Azamgarh riot of June 1893).<sup>58</sup> INC members took part in the cow protection movement.<sup>59</sup>

In 1885, the year in which INC was founded, the Muḥarram festival of the Muslim community (an occasion for public mourning) coincided with the Hindu festival of *Dasahrā* (an occasion for rejoicing). This coincidence between the two festivals was repeated during four consecutive years (1885-1888), the dates of Hindu and Muslim festivals being calculated from two different calendars. Violent street rioting between the rival processions of Muslims and Hindus took place at Lahore and Karnal in 1885, at Delhi in 1886 and at Dera Ghazi Khan in 1889. Hindu-Muslim tension continued in large parts of UP; in the city of Bombay 80 were killed in 1893.<sup>60</sup>

In spite of such Hindu-Muslim antagonism, revivalists in INC such as Aurbindo Ghose (1872-1950) insisted 'that it was through the religion of Mother that the masses could be effectively reached.'<sup>61</sup> Bāl Gangadhar Tilak played a leading role in placing religious emphasis on politics. He was a successful leader of the Hindu masses. Kesari (lit. the lion), a Marathi-language weekly under his editorship, became the mouthpiece of militant Hindu revivalism. He strongly opposed The Age of Consent Bill (1891) and The Compulsory Vaccination Bill (1891), both of which were supported by Hindu reformists.

He was, however, not against social change, but objected to the colonial government's interference in the affairs of the Hindu society. Under his leadership, *Ganesh Chaturthi*<sup>62</sup> came to be celebrated publicly, thus contributing to the political mobilisation of the mass of the Hindu people. Tilak also inaugurated a movement in honour of Shivājī (1627-1680), the well-known Maratha hero.<sup>63</sup> Money was raised for the purpose of repairing Shivājī's tomb in Raigarh. Shivājī's birth anniversary was publicly celebrated. Tilak's followers drew inspiration from Shivaji's life and achievements.

Tilak's bold anti-British stand brought him into the forefront of Congress politics;

'no single individual played a more important role in the history of Congress during the period [1892-1905] than Bal Gangadhar Tilak'.<sup>64</sup>

Sayyid Ahmad Khān's advice to the Muslims, the Hindu-Muslim rioting between 1885 and 1893, and Tilak's 'emphasis on Hinduism bear a share of responsibility for the alienation of

wide sections of Muslim opinion from the national movement' (INC).<sup>65</sup>

## 2.12 Hindu-Muslim Tension and the Emergence of the All-India Muslim League (AIML)

At the turn of the 19th century, the tension between the Muslims and the Hindus increased even further, with the introduction of Hindi in UP in *Devānāgarī* script as the court language (1900). Under the influence of the thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khān, Muslims naturally resented this as they viewed this change as undermining the Urdu language. But Sir Antony MacDonnell, the Lieutenant Governor of UP, ignored them.<sup>66</sup>

In addition to the Urdu-Hindi controversy, the partition of Bengal and the agitation of the *bhadrālok* or upper-class Hindu Bengalis for its re-unification widened the gulf between the two communities.

### 2.12.1 Partition of Bengal

On 16 October 1905, the largest province of British India was partitioned. Lord Curzon, the Viceroy, justified partition on the ground of administrative necessity. Bengal, in his view, was far too unwieldy to be administered effectively by one Lieutenant Governor.<sup>67</sup> The argument did not appeal to the Bengali *bhadrālok*, who launched an agitation for the revocation of the partition. The reaction of the Muslim aristocracy, which had assumed the role of representing the interests of the Muslims, was in sharp contrast to that of the Hindu *bhadrālok*.

From the battle of Plassey (1757) to the 1870s, the British administration had depended upon the collaboration of the *bhadrālok* class which was the chief beneficiary of English education. Its members not only staffed government offices in Bengal, but also penetrated other parts of India as British colonial power spread, securing jobs in offices, teaching in schools and working as lawyers (and magistrates) in courts. On the other hand, the traditional Muslim aristocracy was simply pushed beyond the pale of any preferment with the extinction of Muslim state power. Its members were reluctant to acquire English education, whilst the Muslim masses, under the influence of the *ʿulamā*, joined such resistance movements as the *Jihād* and *Farāʿīzī* movements.

Moreover, the changes, introduced into the revenue system of Bengal under the Permanent Settlement (1793) conferred considerable advantages upon well-off Hindus in rural Bengal. Tax collectors were given proprietorship over large land holdings. In 1905, out of 2237 large land holders, only 358 were Muslim.<sup>68</sup>

The high social status enjoyed by the *bhadrālōks* and the dominant position that they occupied in government service in Bengal caused a feeling of restlessness among the other groups even as early as the 1870s. At that stage, W.W. Hunter (1840-1900), a civil administrator, pleaded in his book, The Indian Musalmans that Muslims should be given greater opportunities for government service. But no concrete steps in this sphere were taken before the emergence of INC. In 1889, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal decreed that recruitment to the Subordinate Executive Service would no longer be through competitive examination. Two-thirds of the

vacancies would henceforward be filled by nomination with the aim of enabling the less educationally-advanced groups (i.e., Biharis, Oriya and the Muslims) to derive some benefit.<sup>69</sup>

The main aim of the government in partitioning Bengal was to encourage the less educationally advanced groups. But partition was also aimed at providing a stimulus to the development of North East India.<sup>70</sup> For nearly a decade, government officials debated 'not whether but where it [the partition line] should be drawn.'<sup>71</sup>

Upon partition, the newly-formed province of 'East Bengal and Assam' had a Muslim majority of 58 per cent (cf. its minority status in united Bengal at 31.3 per cent). The Muslims of East Bengal quickly perceived the advantages of access to higher education and an increased share in the services and administration in the new province. At the same time, the vested interests of the privileged classes of Calcutta were threatened. The new province would come under a separate judiciary beyond the jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court. This meant that Calcutta-based lawyers could no longer hope to monopolise the legal profession in the region. Businessmen based in Calcutta were opposed to the idea of developing a rival port in Chittagong, not far away from Calcutta. Above all, the *bhadrālok* politicians were aware that they would be adversely affected in the legislative council of the new province in which seven out of eight villages had a Muslim majority and the administration had already been encouraging the development of a Muslim counterweight for over two decades.

The Indian Association, a *bhadrālok* dominated organisation, provided the platform for the agitation against the

partition. INC also joined the agitation. The *Swādeshī* (boycott of British-made goods) movement was launched, in the expectation that it would so 'injure British trade as to force the attention of the authorities at home to ....grievances and thus ensure the redress.'<sup>72</sup> Soon the movement assumed a communal colouration. Hindu audiences in villages were told that imported sugar was polluted with the bones of cows in the manufacturing process. Vows were taken in front of the temples against the use of British-made goods. Priests refused to perform religious ceremonies involving the use of British-made goods. The boycott made manufactured goods, especially cloth, scarce and expensive. The agitators insisted that ordinary persons should buy indigenous even though they were more costly than machine-made goods. The Muslim population, by and large, did not sympathise with this stand. Hindu-Muslim riots broke out in different parts of Bengal.

#### 2.12.2 The Simla Deputation (1906)

The *Swādeshī* movement in Bengal coincided with attempts on the part of the government to introduce reform in representative institutions. The Muslims, disillusioned by INC's participation in agitation against the partition of Bengal, followed Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's general line of safeguarding the interest of the community. Nawāb Muhsin-ul-Mulk (1837-1907), who had succeeded Sayyid Aḥmad Khān as Secretary of Aligarh College, organised a deputation to see Lord Minto (1845-1914), the Viceroy. 35 'nobles, *jagīrdārs*, *talukdārs*, lawyers, *zamīndars*, merchants and others',<sup>73</sup> under the leadership of His Highness Sultān Muḥammad Shāh Āghā Khān III (1877-1957) called on Minto [Simla: 1 October 1906]. They said that their purpose was to present 'our claim to a fair share' of

representation in all elections, whether for the legislative councils or for the local bodies. They asserted that the Muslim members to the representative bodies must be separately elected wholly by Muslim electors and the representation of the Muslim community must be

commensurate not merely with their numerical strength, but also with their political importance and the value of the contribution which they make to the defence of the Empire, and .... to the position which they occupied in India a little more than a hundred years ago, and of which the traditions have naturally not faded from their minds....<sup>74</sup>

Minto assured the deputation that 'the political rights and interests of the Muslim community would be safeguarded.'<sup>75</sup>

### 2.12.3 The Formation of AIML

After calling on the Viceroy, the Āghā Khān III and Nawāb Muḥsin-ul-Mulk conceived the idea of setting up a Muslim political organisation for achieving the objectives of the Simla Deputation.<sup>76</sup> But, before taking any concrete steps, they requested the government's approval.<sup>77</sup> In a few months' time, All-India Muslim League (AIML) was formed on the occasion of the annual meeting of the 'Mohammadan Educational Conference' (Dacca: 29-30 December 1906), with the Āghā Khān as its President. AIML's objectives were:

- 1) to promote, among the Musalmans of India, feelings of loyalty to the British Government, and to remove any misconception that may arise as to the intention of the government with regard to any of its measures;
- 2) to protect and advance the political rights and interests of the Musalmans of India, to

respectfully represent their needs and aspirations to the Government;

- 3) to prevent the rise, among the Musalmans of India, of any feeling of hostility towards other communities, without prejudice to the other aforementioned objects of the League.<sup>78</sup>

### 2.13 The Early Phase of AIML (1906-1912)

AIML came into being as an organisation loyal to the British Government. The upper strata of Muslim society joined it. The 'ulamā' and the masses remained aloof from it. AIML's pro-British stance was sufficient to keep the 'ulamā' (especially of Deoband) away. Nor did the Āghā Khān, the living *Imām* of the *Ismā'ilīs* and close friend of the British, carry any appeal for them.

The agitation against the partition of Bengal took a new turn with the rise of terrorism through the activities of secret societies. The agitators successfully undermined the colonial power by seeking the support of the political opposition in Britain, and especially of the Labour Party. J. Keir Hardie, a Labour M.P., observed during his visit to Bengal (1907):

Lord Curzon's autocratic method of forcing his undigested and ill-advised scheme of partition .... had been a great blunder, and that there could be no peace until it had been rectified in one form or another.<sup>79</sup>

The rectification was to await King George V's visit to India (December 1911). In a new administrative arrangement East Bengal and West Bengal were reunited with the exclusion of Bihar and Orissa.



The Ottomans considered themselves the successors of the Abbasid *Khalīfahs*, since they followed the *Sunnī* tradition, and occupied the central Muslim lands. The Mughals in India subscribed to the theory that every independent Muslim monarch was *Khalīfah* within his own territories.<sup>81</sup> With the collapse of Muslim power, the feeling of being a part of the Muslim *ummah* began to develop in India. In 1785, Tipu Sultan of Mysore (1750-1799) reaffirmed his subservience to the Ottomans.

These feelings were augmented during the latter half of the 19th century by the ideas of Pan-Islamism, to which Jamāl-ud-dīn Afghānī (1838-1897) and his associates gave voice. Afghānī had reached the conclusion that none of the Muslim countries by itself could resist European colonialism. Therefore the *ummah*, despite the fact that it was split into definite entities and states, would have to forge a common bond, internal cohesion and unite itself in order to repel external aggressions.

Afghānī visited India on four different occasions during the period 1854-1882. Pan-Islamic ideas met with an encouraging response from a large section of Muslim intelligentsia and from the *ʿulamā*: Sympathetic feelings for the Turkish Muslim brethren were aroused, since they were subjected to severe threats from the European powers. But Afghānī had to face the opposition of Sayyid Aḥmed Khān, who was bent upon securing the goodwill of the British.

The plight of the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the century merits some attention.

Its decline had already started at the turn of the 17th century but its survival for nearly two centuries was rendered possible because of the rivalries between European powers and the martial qualities of Turkish soldiery

The Ottoman Empire consisted of a conglomeration of different ethnic and religious groups. The Ottomans made no attempt to integrate them culturally. They had no policy of proselytising the non-Muslims of the Balkans and Anatolia to Islam. In the long run, the minorities identified themselves as different nationalities. Each of them found a patron from among the European states. These states often interfered in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire under the pretext of securing justice for the minorities. Russia's claim to the right to protect the interests of the Greek Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire was one of the direct causes of the Crimean War (1853). Tsar Nicholas told the British Ambassador that the Ottoman Empire was 'sick' and that Britain and Russia must reach an agreement on its reconstitution when its end came.

By 1856 Greece gained independence from the Ottoman Empire. In the same year, the European powers agreed among themselves (Paris Conference) to observe the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. But, with the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) the principle of non-interference was reduced to a dead letter.

The boundaries of the Ottoman Empire were steadily shrinking. The Muslims in India came to believe that this sad situation was due to the conspiratorial role that the European











At the time of AKK's inception, six members,<sup>95</sup> including Mawlānā ʿAbdul Bārī, the President, were given the responsibility for its organisation throughout the country. Four out of these six members had been university-educated, but AKK had the blessings of the renowned ʿulamāʾ Shiblī Nuʿmānī helped draft its constitution,<sup>96</sup> to which ʿUbaydullāh Sindhī, Shāh Sulaymān P̲hulwārwi and leading *Shīʿāh mujtahids* of Lahore and Lucknow gave their support.

AKK also had a mass appeal. Its membership rose to 9,000 within a short period.<sup>97</sup> The opposition of Mawlānā Aḥmad Razā Khān and some others proved to be futile amidst the strong feelings aroused by the Balkan wars and the publicity that AKK received in Pan-Islamist journals.<sup>98</sup>

AKK was able to collect a large amount of money from its members and sympathisers. The question of how the money should be used became a subject of internal controversy. It is not clear how the money was actually spent, 'although a part of it went to establish Shawkat ʿAlī in business as a pilgrimage broker in Bombay'.<sup>99</sup> AKK lost its reputation as a consequence of such a misuse of public money. From 1916 onwards, only three years after its inception, it degenerated into a mere paper organisation.

Within such a short period, AKK achieved little for a variety of reasons including internment of Muḥammad ʿAlī and Shawkat ʿAlī (May 1915), its leaders; lack of organisational skill among its leaders; the fact that Z̲afar-ul-Ḥasan ʿĀlawī (Office Secretary of AKK) proved to be a secret agent of the colonial government; and the propaganda against it of the pro-British lobby. AKK,

nevertheless, did make a stir in the public arena and attracted the attention of the British government.

#### 2.16 The Kanpur Mosque Incident

The sad incident of the demolition of the Kanpur Mosque brought the 'ulamā' face to face with the government. On 1 July 1913, the Kanpur municipal authorities demolished the washing place of a mosque (located in Maḥhlī Bazar) in order to widen the road. The local Muslims condemned the administration for desecrating their place of worship. The municipal authorities tried to pacify them by offering payment for the land and compensation for the damage caused. But, it was not lawful according to the *fatwā* of the 'ulamā' to sell the mosque as every part of the premises was integral to the mosque and no part could be detached from it. The Muslims demanded that the demolished portion should be restored to its original condition.

Mawlānā 'Abdul Qādir Subḥānī (1873-1957), a local 'ālim and the founder of *Madrasah-i-Ilāhiyāt* (Kanpur), addressed a public meeting at which he appealed to the Muslims to show the genuineness of their emotions by being ready to sacrifice their lives for the cause of the faith. Instead of dispersing after the meeting, the crowd proceeded to the damaged portion of the mosque to rebuild the damaged walls. The armed police opened fire and several persons were killed.

The Pan-Islamic press vehemently attacked the government for its unwarranted interference in religious matters and for its brutality. As a result of the publicity thus given to the incident

in the press and from pulpits, the Kanpur Mosque incident was raised to the level of a major issue involving a direct confrontation between the government and the Muslim community. Lord Harding, the Viceroy, who was of the opinion that the municipal authorities had acted unwisely, paid a visit to Kanpur. A settlement was reached; the damaged portion of the mosque was restored and those detained were set free.<sup>100</sup> The Muslim community, especially the *'ulamā'*, were jubilant.

### 2.17 The *'Ulamā'* during World War I

On the eve of World War I (1914-1918) a strong current of anti-British feeling spread among the Muslims as a result of domestic and international developments. Turkey joined the war on the side of Germany. It was obvious that Britain and its allies would use military force as well as diplomacy against Turkey as an enemy and that Turkey would suffer as a consequence. Muḥammad 'Alī expressed the feelings of the Muslims, in a leading article in the 'Comrade' (Delhi) under the title of The Choice of the Turks,<sup>101</sup> He stressed that British diplomacy had left no option for Turkey but to join Germany. Outstanding Pan-Islamists such as Mawlānā Abul Kalām Āzād (1889-1958) and Muḥammad 'Alī were interned.

British diplomacy helped the Arabs to fight against the Ottoman Empire. In the early 1916, a treaty was signed between the British authorities and Ḥusayn, Sharīf of Makkah. At the instigation of British agents, Husayn led a revolt against the Ottoman authorities (June 1916). This served as a pretext for the occupation of Palestine and Syria by British armed forces. The Muslims in India regarded Ḥusayn's treaty with Britain as an act of

disloyalty towards the sacred institution of *Khilāfat*. In a telegram addressed to the Indian Viceroy, Mawlānā ‘Abdul Bārī, President of AKK, expressed his anger and grief.<sup>102</sup>

Through a pamphlet entitled *Tahqiq-i-Khilāfat* (July 1919) (compiled by Fayz-ul-Karīm and attested by a number of *pīrs* and pro-British ‘ulamā’ of Sind), the British authorities tried to justify Husayn's revolt. But this pamphlet proved to be a futile exercise in view of the *Aḥmadī* origin of its author. It was rejected by the ‘ulamā’. Mawlānā Muḥammad Ibrāhīm, a leading ‘ālim of Sind, exposed Fayz-ul-Karīm, and declared him as *kāfir* on account of his beliefs.<sup>103</sup> A refutation of the pamphlet was produced under the signatures of the mainstream ‘ulamā’ of Sind.<sup>104</sup>

#### 2.17.1 Silk Letter Conspiracy

During the war, the ‘ulamā’ of Deoband had conceived a plan to get rid of the British government. Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan, commonly known as *Shaykh-ul-Hind* believed that the British government was so fully entangled in the war that a popular uprising in India, orchestrated with an attack by Afghan forces and tribes belonging to the NWFP border, would result in the collapse of the colonial administration. To implement such a programme he mobilised the ‘ulamā’ in the NWFP tribal belt through his *Deobandī* disciples and associates. He also dispatched Mawlānā ‘Ubaydullāh *Sindhī* to Afghanistan (July 1915) to establish contacts with the Afghan government of Amīr Ḥabībullah Khān.

Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan himself had left for Makkah in 1914 ostensibly on *hajj*. He met Ghālīb Pāshā, the Ottoman governor of



















these sessions were indicative of the fact that in India at that time there was a coherence in the political demands of different sections of the population. AIML resolved to protect the 'religious' interests of the Muslim community in addition to its political and cultural interests.<sup>125</sup>

The Muslims were in need of the collaboration of the Hindus in order to increase the strength of their agitation. The Hindu leadership from the INC platform gave strong support to the Muslim cause; and the Hindu masses accepted the lead given by Gāndhī in order to ensure that the Hindus felt 'bound to stand by the Musalmans in their demand for the redress of the *Khilāfat* wrong.'<sup>126</sup> The Hindus were equally in need of Muslim participation in the national struggle in order to make it an all-embracing movement. The aims of both the communities coincided within the ambit of the prevailing spirit of co-operation. Hindu-Muslim unity reached its crescendo within a short time. Gandhī played a crucial role in forging Hindu-Muslim unity.

Gāndhī returned from South Africa in 1915, after a 21-year stay. During that period he had a fruitful association with the Muslims. He had been on the payroll of a Memon firm.<sup>127</sup> He worked so closely with the Muslim-dominated 'Natal Indian congress'<sup>128</sup> that it provoked opposition from Hindus.<sup>129</sup> Working with the Muslims, Gāndhī asserted (as early as in September 1909) that his life was devoted to the task of evolving co-operation between Hindus and Muslims in India as an 'indispensable condition of the salvation of India'.<sup>130</sup>







On the matter concerning co-operation with Hindu countrymen, the *fatwā* proclaimed that whilst Muslims could obtain advice from friendly Hindus, they could not accept non-Muslim leadership.

During the *Khilāfat* and Non-co-operation movements, the '*ulamā*'- affiliated to JUH and generally of *Deobandī* and *Ahl-i-Ḥadīṣ* affiliations - took active part in politics. The participation of *Shiāh 'ulamā'* was, however, sporadic, because the *Khilāfat* issue was of relevance only to *Sunnī* schools of thought. Mosques were convenient meeting places and Friday sermons constituted the best medium for rallying support for the cause. The '*ulamā*' were mainly responsible for the victory.

They tried to put the movement in a radical direction... They originated the idea of non-co-operation and put constant pressure on the Central [All-India] *Khilāfat* Committee to adopt it and put it into practice .<sup>139</sup>

The majority of the '*ulamā*' was in line with JUH. Mawlānā Ashraf 'Alī Thānwi<sup>140</sup> (1864-1943), Mawlānā Aḥmad Razā Khān Barelwī<sup>141</sup> and Muftī Muḥammad Mazḥharullāh Dihlawī,<sup>142</sup> however, were discordant voices. The disciples of these figures contributed to theological discussions refuting the JUH *fatwā*.<sup>143</sup> The Quranic verse, upon which JUH's *fatwā* was based, was differently interpreted by the opponents. According to them, the verse prohibits the *mawālāt*, not the *ma'āmalāt*. *Mawālāt* means affection and friendship; *ma'āmalāt* refers to exchange dealings; though friendship with all non-Muslims was prohibited, ordinary day-to-day dealings and transactions affecting social life were allowed. It was also pointed out that if *mawālāt* was wrong for the British, the same should be applied to the Hindus.



revised. The Treaty of Lausanne (July 1923) was accordingly signed. Turkey was declared a Republic (29 October 1923). The dignity of the institution of the *Khilāfat* had no other importance for the new rulers of Turkey than that of 'an historical memory',<sup>146</sup> and the institution of the *Khilāfat* simply disappeared (3 March 1924).

It was the supreme irony of the *Khilāfat* movement that Indian Muslims struggled to preserve an institution over the existence of which they had no direct influence.

#### 2.21.2 *Hijrat (Emigration) Episode*

The Non-co-operation movement was in full swing when the idea of the emigration of Indian Muslims to Afghanistan, the nearest *dār-ul-Islām* (land of peace), was mooted.<sup>147</sup> This idea was given a religious basis by Mawlānā 'Abdul Bārī and Mawlānā Abul Kalām 'Azād through their *fatwās*.<sup>148</sup> Amīr Amānullāh Khān (1892-1960), the ruler of Afghanistan, stirred up the feelings of Indian Muslims by issuing welcoming statements. The Afghanistan Government's pronouncements were meant more to scare the British than to show goodwill to Indian Muslims.

Thousands of Muslims from the NWFP, the Punjab and Sind sold their moveable property. Some of them even divorced their wives who were unwilling to emigrate, arranged their dependents' weddings on the roadside, and headed for the Afghanistan border in the scorching heat of July (1920). The number of emigrants soon reached 30,000. It was beyond the financial resources of the Afghanistan Government to absorb such a huge influx; therefore,



other sections within INC criticised Gāndhī for ignoring Hindu interests for the sake of promoting co-operation between the two communities. They believed that such compromises could only result in larger Muslim demands.<sup>152</sup> The Mappilla Rebellion made the ground fertile for militant Hindu nationalists. V.D. Savarkar, in his treatise *Hindūtvā* (1923), systematically formulated for the first time the creed of the Hindu nation. *Hindūtvā* (Hinduness) was defined as that which embraced 'all the departments of thought and the activity of the whole of our Hindu race'.<sup>153</sup>

The Hindu *Mahāsabhā* held its first important session in 1923 (Belgaum) after almost 16 years of its formation (1907). It specifically dealt with social, cultural and religious questions which had been outside INC's area of concern. The *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (National Volunteer Corps) was formed with the aim of organising the indoctrinated and physically fit among the Hindu youth (Nagpur: 1925).

### 2.22.1 Shuddhī and Sangathan Movements

There is no explicit provision in Hindu orthodoxy for the conversion of an individual or a group of individuals into the Hindu fold. The *Āryā Samāj*, however, introduced the element of proselytisation into Hinduism. The *Āryā Samajists* of the Punjab were the first to respond to the alarm raised by Hindus against alleged conversion during the Mappilla Rebellion. Funds were raised and scholars were sent to Malabar for the reclamation of Hindus alleged to have been forcibly converted into Islam. After his release from jail, Swāmī Shradhānandā (1856-1926) devoted his



riots had taken place in UP alone, resulting in 81 deaths and 2,301 injured.<sup>155</sup> The situation was even worse in the Punjab. During the period 1922-1927, 474 riots were recorded.<sup>156</sup>

The explanation for Hindu-Muslim antagonism during the '20s is generally sought by Indian nationalist writers in terms of the dubious character of Swāmī Sharddhānandā and the evil designs of the (British) Indian government which was bent upon shattering the Hindu-Muslim unity built during the Non-co-operation movement.<sup>157</sup> British writers generally interpreted the antagonism between the two communities as stemming from the Government of India Act, 1919.<sup>158</sup> Under this Act, franchise was considerably enlarged. The Hindus in the Punjab were politically conscious of the power of numbers and the role of the majority. The 1921 census caused alarm among the Hindus because their population had decreased during the inter-censal period leading up to it.<sup>159</sup> The Mappilla outbreak simply added fuel to the already smouldering fire of inter-communal tension. Without doubt there were many sincere religious men on both sides (i.e. adherents of *Shuddhī* and *Tabligh*) who were active only in a purely religious sense (without any political motivation), but behind them were the politicians engaged in planning election strategies.

The Hindu-Muslim antagonism in the Punjab after 1923 can be traced to the enactment of the Municipal Amendment Act, 1923, which was designed to benefit the Muslims. The balance of power in several municipalities was tilted in favour of the Muslims due to the provision of extra Muslim seats. The resentment felt by the urban Hindus on account of this led to an intensification of antagonism between the two communities.<sup>160</sup>







3) In the Punjab and Bengal the proportion of communal representation should be in accordance with the numbers of Hindus and Muslims in the population.

4) In the Central Legislature, Mohammedan representation should be no less than a third.<sup>168</sup>

INC accepted the proposals with two amendments. It made reforms in NWFP conditional on the provision of a suitable judiciary, and the separation of Sind conditional on the separation of Andhra.

#### 2.24 The Nehru Report

In such a prevailing *milieu* of Indian political development, the Conservative Government in Britain appointed the Statutory Commission under the Chairmanship of Sir John Simon with a remit to review the working of the Government of India Act, 1919. The exclusively British composition of the Simon Commission evoked protests from INC and a faction of AIML (led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah). The Simon Commission visited India. Despite some co-operation extended to it by a faction of AIML led by Sir Muhammad Shafi, it was more or less completely boycotted. Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India, explained in the House of Lords why no Indian was included in the Commission. In his view no unanimous report could be expected from a Commission which included Indian representatives!















for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified...

I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind, and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India. The proposal was put forward before the Nehru Committee.<sup>178</sup> They rejected it on the ground that, if carried into effect, it would give a very unwieldy State. This is true in so far as the area is concerned; in point of population the State contemplated by the proposal would be much less than some of the present Indian provinces. The exclusion of Ambala Division and perhaps of some districts [of the Punjab] where non-Muslims predominate, will make it less extensive and more Muslim in population so that the exclusion suggested will enable this consolidated State to give a more effective protection to non-Muslim minorities within its area.<sup>179</sup>

2.27 The *Majlis-i-Ahrār-i-Islām* (Society of the Free People of Islam) (MAI)

Since the days of the Non-co-operation Movement, INC, JUH and AIKC had worked together so closely that leading Muslim figures seemed to occupy the centre of the stage in all three parties. Among such figures were Mawlānā Abul Kalām Azād, Muḥammad Ālī, Ḥakīm Ajmal Khān, Ḥasrat Mohānī, Dr. M.A. Anṣārī and many others. For instance, Mawlānā Abul Kalām Azād, a founder member of JUH, presided over JUH session (1921), INC special session (1923), and the *Khilāfat* Conference (1925). Mawlānā Muḥammad Ālī led a *Khilāfat* delegation to London (1920), presided over an INC session (Coconada: 1923), and served on JUH's appointed committees (1925).

The publication of the Nehrū Report was a turning point in Muslim politics. AIML emerged as a force again. Muslim supporters of the Nehrū Report defected from JUH and AIKC. They either wholeheartedly joined INC or formed new groups/parties. The major defection from AIKC occurred in the Punjab.

The Punjab branch of AIKC was largely dominated by *Ahl-i-Ḥadīṡ* and the *Deobandī 'ulamā'*. They had greater respect for an *'ālim* (e.g., Mawlānā Abul Kalām Azād) than for a modern educated leader (e.g., Mawlānā Muhammad 'Alī). Discontented with the policies of AIKC under Muḥammad 'Alī, the Punjab branch supported the Nehrū Report. The Punjab branch was finally dissolved by the top leadership of AIKC.

After a short spell in the wilderness, the erstwhile members of AIKC Punjab branch organised themselves under the name of *Majlis-i-Aḥrār-i-Islām* (MAI) (29 December 1929). The declared objectives of the newly-founded party included (a) securing 'independence for the country'; (b) fostering 'better relations with other communities'; (c) establishing 'an Islamic system'; and working 'for the uplift of the masses, especially the Muslim masses'.<sup>180</sup>

The leadership was still so intoxicated with the enthusiasm of the Non-co-operation movement that it took MAI into INC's movement of civil disobedience. Its radical religious interpretation of Islam provided MAI with a comparatively substantial base at the level of the masses. It perceived social change in the early history of Islam as consisting of the overthrow

of exploitative classes, the restoration of the honour of the depressed and the poor, and the practice of human equality.<sup>181</sup>

MAI attracted a considerable section of Punjabi poor and lower middle-class Muslims to its rank and file. It came into prominence during the Kashmir Agitation of 1931<sup>182</sup> when a determined band of 100 volunteers, led by Mawlānā Maẓhar Ālī Aẓhar, marched towards Jammu from Sialkot (Punjab). This bold step of interfering with policies of a princely state brought MAI its political reputation.

MAI had an explicitly religious appeal. The leaders, a number of them '*ulamā'*, frequently referred to the *Qurān* and the golden age of Islamic history which was free from oppressive and exploitative classes.

With its strong hatred towards imperialism, MAI developed a feeling of enmity towards the *Aḥmadīs*. Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad Qādiyānī (1839-1908), the founder of *Aḥmadiyyah*, was a supporter of the British and was proud that his father had helped the British against his countrymen in the 1857 Insurrection. He always prayed for the imperialism of the British. When he claimed to be a prophet, the '*ulamā'* issued a *fatwā* declaring him *kāfir*. The grandfather of MAI leader Mawlānā Ḥabībūr Raḥmān Ludhiyanawi, was the first to mobilise the '*ulamā'* against the activities of Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad. Following the religious legacy of the '*ulamā'* and its own anti-imperialist stand, MAI stood against the *Aḥmadīs*. The role of *Aḥmadīs* during the Kashmir Agitation of 1931 increased MAI's bitterness towards them. MAI made one of its policy priorities to counter the missionary activities of the *Aḥmadiyyah*















Table 2.3

## The Result of the 1937 Election for Reserved Muslim Seats in the Legislative Councils

Province	Total Seats	Muslim Seats	AIML	INC	Independents	Others
Madras	46	7	3	-	2	2 (Justice Party)
Bombay	26	5	2	-	3	-
Bengal	30	17	7	-	9	1 (Krishak Proja Party)
United Provinces	52	17	-	-	16	1 (National Agriculturist Party)
Bihar	14	4	-	-	1	3 (United Party 2, No Party 1)
Assam	18	6	-	-	-	6 (Muslim Party 6)
Total	186	56	12	-	31	13

[Source: Return Showing the Results of Elections in India: 1937 (Cmd 5589), (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1937), pp.26-27, 53-54, 70-71, p.91, p.106]













and in the legislatures have done their best to flout the Muslim opinion, to destroy Muslim culture, and have interfered with their religious and social life, and trampled upon their economic and political rights...<sup>208</sup>

According to R. Coupland, a constitutional historian of (British) India,

Indian observers agreed with British officials that Hindu-Muslim relations had never in their experience been so bad [as in 1939].<sup>209</sup>

2.33 The Lahore Resolution (23 March 1940)

This background of fear of INC domination (equated to Hindu domination) in an independent India made AIML think in terms of partition. Several writers and politicians had proposed partition as a solution to the Hindu-Muslim riots and tensions.<sup>210</sup> Muhammad Iqbāl was the first to echo publicly the idea of a Muslim state either within India or without (Annual Session of AIML, Allahabad, December 1930).

Chawdhari Raḥmat Ālī (1897-1951), a Cambridge student, denounced the constitutional schemes of the Indian Federation and urged the creation of a Federation of Pakistan as separate from the Indian Federation. He suggested the name 'Pakistan' in January 1933.<sup>211</sup> In October 1938, the Sind Muslim League Provincial Conference canvassed the idea of 'Federation of Indian Muslims' with a separate constitution to assure 'political self-determination of the two nations, known as Hindus and Muslims'.<sup>212</sup>





of seeking the co-operation of INC and AIML by promising a constitutional scheme. AIML's demand for a separate Muslim homeland was validated in the scheme, by means of a provision to the effect that any province that did not wish to accede to the Indian federation could secede from it.<sup>216</sup> INC, sensing Britain's weakness in its defeat at the hands of Japan in Malaya and Burma, rejected Cripps' offer as a 'postdated cheque on a crashing bank'.<sup>217</sup>

INC took the policy of confrontation to a high pitch with the 'Quit India' resolution (14 July 1942), fully endorsed by the All India Congress Committee (8 August 1942). It demanded the immediate 'withdrawal of the British power from India'; otherwise, 'a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible scale'<sup>218</sup> under the leadership of Gandhi would be launched.

The 'Quit India' movement was crushed, though disturbances were 'serious enough in any circumstances'.<sup>219</sup> INC was outlawed; its most important leaders were put behind bars. The political vacuum created as a result of the failure of the 'Quit India' movement, proved highly beneficial to the growth of AIML. It had called upon the Muslims to have nothing to do with INC; and offered the (British) Indian government its support if only the government would give an undertaking to create an independent State of Pakistan.

Lord Wavell succeeded Lord Linlithgow as Viceroy (October 1943) when the War was still going on. He came out with a proposal to form a 'new Executive Council'. The three main tasks of the proposed Executive Council would be to







Awrangzeb Khān led the AIML ministry for some time (May 1943 - March 1945).

AIML, though not organised on a broad mass basis, especially in Muslim majority provinces, showed a capacity for winning election. Until July 1945, AIML had lost only one of 70 by-elections which it had fought since 1937.<sup>226</sup>

AIML was equipped with all the paraphernalia of a political party. A student wing of AIML was organised under 'All-India Muslim Students' Federation'.<sup>227</sup> A country-wide corps of 'Muslim National Guards' was raised (May 1944), consisting of more than a million persons.<sup>228</sup> A 'Committee of Writers' was formed (1944) which started 'Pakistan Literature Series'<sup>229</sup> 'to dispel misconceptions and help all fair-minded people to make a dispassionate study of the peculiar conditions of India and appreciate the position and viewpoint of the Muslim nation in India'.<sup>230</sup>

AIML rapidly secured a strong voice in the press, either by founding its own newspapers or by winning over established ones and persuading them to publicise AIML's policies.<sup>231</sup> AIML's press was duly aided by the Orient Press, a Muslim news agency, founded in 1942.

The idea of Muslim separatism with potential territorial bases in the northwestern (the Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan) and the northeastern (which now constitutes Bangladesh) zones gained the support of all the influential classes of Muslims within AIML. The overall success of AIML in by-elections and the sharp





Muḥammad Iqbāl, the poet-philosopher, carried on a long controversy with Mawlānā Ḥusayn Ahmad Madanī.<sup>239</sup> The latter, in spite of his scholarship, could not hold his position firm on the issue that Hindus and Muslims in India formed 'one nation'.

Mawlānā Ashraf Ālī Thānwī had resigned from the post of Rector of *Dār-ul-ʿulūm* Deoband. In 1938, he began to side with AIML openly. He advised his adherents to join AIML; and a branch of AIML was organised in Thanah Bhawan; the town where he lived, with his blessing (April 1938).<sup>240</sup> A delegation of his close associates attended the Patna Session of AIML (26-29 December 1938). His message to the leaders of AIML included advice to the effect that they should take part in obligatory worship in their daily life, and a council of 'ulamā' be attached to AIML. The council of 'ulamā' was meant to advise AIML in matters of a purely religious nature; and the close co-operation with the 'ulamā' would increase AIML's strength because the masses, under the influence of the 'ulamā', would be automatically attracted to it.<sup>241</sup>

Mawlānā Ashraf Ālī Thānwī looked on INC as an irreligious party, committed to communism, under the pretext of the socialist utterances of Jawāharlāl Nehrū. He feared the elimination of religion if INC were to come to power.<sup>242</sup> Therefore, he automatically disliked any party sympathetic to the cause of INC. He turned down the invitation of fellow *Deobandī* 'ulamā' to attend the annual session of JUH (Delhi: 3-5 March 1939).

Mawlānā Ḥusayn Ahmad Madanī reached the helm of JUH's affairs in 1940. He replaced Muftī Kifāyatullāh as President; and

relationships between classes &  
state or potential state  
should be clearly drawn  
out & noted over

presided over JUH for three consecutive sessions (i.e. June 1940, March 1942, and May 1945). In January 1940, JUH's Working Committee endorsed the INC stand on World War II and resolved to support its campaign. The glaring difference of opinion between Mawlānā Ḥusayn Aḥmad Madanī (himself a teacher in *Dār-ul-ʿulūm* Deoband) and some teachers with Thānwī connections (e.g., Mawlānā Shabbīr Aḥmad ʿUṣmānī, Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Balyāwī, Muftī Muḥammad Shafī, Mawlānā Zāhūr Aḥmad and Khalīfah Muḥammad ʿĀqil), on the issue of co-operation with INC came to a head; and, the weaker party with the Thānwī connection was forced to resign.

### 2.36 The 'Demand for Pakistan' and the 'Ulamā'

With the passage of the Lahore Resolution (1940) of AIML, the 'ulamā' became divided. JUH, under the leadership of Mawlānā Madanī, opposed the resolution. The 'ulamā', outside JUH, generally upheld the resolution on the basis of the two-nation theory. They were unanimous in opposing Indian nationalism based on the argument of geographical homogeneity, but could not agree that Indian Muslims were a nation, detached from the remaining body of Muslim *ummah*. The 'ulamā', who were fully in accord with AIML, later formed their organisation *Jamīyat-ul-ʿUlamā-i-Islām* (JUI) and worked for the cause of AIML. There was a tiny group of 'ulamā' which neither supported 'Indian Nationalism' nor 'Indian Muslim Nationalism'. The chief ideologue of this group was Mawlānā Abul Ālā Mawdūdī. The group was, however, politically weak at the time; but, its approach was so logical and consistent that it did attract some attention.

It is appropriate to consider the stand of JUH and Mawlānā Mawdūdī on the demand for Pakistan with AIML as its principal exponent.

#### 2.36.1 The Position of JUH

JUH's response to the Lahore Resolution of AIML was hostile. It was the moving spirit behind 'Āzād Muslim Conference' (AMC) (Delhi: 27-30 April 1940) which was attended by splinter groups of nationalist Muslims, namely All India Muslim *Majlis*, MAI, All India *Momin* Conference, *Khudāī Khidmatgār* Party, *Anjuman-i-Waṭan* (Baluchistan) and the All India *Shī'ah* Political Conference. AMC expressed strong opposition to the Lahore Resolution and to the division of India. It urged agreement on a constitutional scheme with appropriate safeguards for the Muslim culture and religion. AMC appointed a Board to make recommendations for securing a lasting settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question. It, however, never met to chalk out a programme. Nevertheless, JUH put forward a formula of its own in 1942. The constitutional scheme proposed by JUH envisaged a federal government with a weak centre, incorporating safeguards which the religious majority could not transgress.<sup>243</sup>

JUH opposed the demand for Pakistan on the following grounds:<sup>244</sup>

- 1) The British Raj was the main enemy of freedom-loving Indians. Muslims, according to their religion, were bound to struggle for freedom. But, they were in no position to drive out the

British without the co-operation of the Hindu majority in a joint struggle.

Pakistan was no more than an aspect of the British policy of 'divide and rule'.

- 2) The realisation of the Pakistan demand and the partition of India would split and weaken the Muslim community. The Muslims left outside Pakistan in Hindu majority provinces would be reduced to the status of an ineffective minority.
  
- 3) The partition of India would hinder the missionary activities of the 'ulamā' (one of the central objectives of JUH being to propagate and spread the message of Islam through peaceful missionary work).
  
- 4) An Islamic state on the pattern of the Rightly Guided Caliphs was a chimera. A strange irony that the very people who neither had an outwardly Islamic appearance nor the character that accorded with Islam should want to build an Islamic state; and to conduct it on the basis of religion. It was quite unbelievable that such people would revive Islam. Their relation to Islam was that of darkness to light or of water to fire.

The leaders of AIML spoke of the Islamic law when they had to address the Muslim audience in order to win popular support. But, in legislatures, they did not care for it. For example, Jinnāh's stand

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on the Shari'at Bill (1935) moved by Ḥāfiẓ 'Abdullāh of Lyallpur was deeply shocking to sensibilities of the 'ulamā'.

The AIML leadership was, however, strong in its viewpoint of asserting the separate nationhood of the Muslim. Even so, it was vulnerable because it was lukewarm in the observance of the fundamentals of Islam in public life. In order to cover their weak position, AIML's leaders depicted the 'ulamā' of JUH as the paid agents of INC, bent upon making their own fortunes.<sup>245</sup> The piety and simple-living of the JUH 'ulamā' was enough to convince their adherents that the AIML propaganda against them was baseless. Nevertheless, the 'ulamā' publicly refuted the allegation with all the vigour at their command. They used to swear: 'God may not be pleased with them if they had ever got any financial help from INC'.<sup>246</sup>

2.36.2 Jam'iyat-ul-'Ulamā-i-Islām (Association of the 'Ulamā' of Islam) (JUI)

The activities of JUH were 'a thorn in the flesh of [All India] Muslim League'<sup>247</sup> and the latter was desperately in need of the support of some or the other among the 'ulamā'.

Mawlānā Shabbīr Aḥmad 'Uṣmānī (1885-1949), among the dissidents within JUH, was, in his own right, a figure as learned and respected as Mawlānā Ḥusayn Aḥmad Madanī. He was the leader most suited to fulfil the role of opposing the activities of JUH.

Mawlānā Rāghib Aḥsan from Calcutta had been a staunch AIML worker for a long time. He called a convention of the 'ulamā' from all over India (Calcutta: 26-29 October 1945). He had AIML's support. More than five hundred 'ulamā' attended. Mawlānā Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Siyālkotī, a pro-AIML 'ālim from the Punjab, highlighted in his address the religious and cultural differences between the Hindu and Muslim communities. He persuaded the 'ulamā' to accept Jinnāḥ's leadership, irrespective of his and his colleagues' life style. He made a reference to Abū Ayūb Anṣārī, a companion of the Prophet, who joined the military campaign against Constantinople under the command of Yazīd B. Mu'āwiyah. The 'ulamā' were in no way better than or equal to Abū Ayūb Anṣārī and Jinnāḥ had not been worse than Yazīd.<sup>248</sup>

At this convention, the *Jamīyat-ul-'Ulamā-i-Islām* (JUI) was launched with the sole purpose of supporting AIML in its struggle to achieve Pakistan. Mawlānā Shabbīr Aḥmad 'Uṣmānī was elected as President *in absentia*.

The core of JUI, like that of JUH, consisted of *Deobandīs* who had parted company with JUH. Mawlānā Shabbīr Aḥmad who had worked side by side with INC during the *Khilāfat* movement, was now in the opposite camp. He justified his stance on the grounds that co-operation with non-Muslims was lawful when Muslims held a dominant position and non-Muslims played a secondary role. In the *Khilāfat* movement, Indian Muslims were holding the banner of struggle and the Hindus joined them. But, after the collapse of the *Khilāfat* movement, INC, under Hindu leadership, became a menace to Muslim culture in India. The struggle of INC would not result

in raising the Islamic Order; it was therefore unlawful for Muslims to join INC during the '40s.<sup>249</sup>

### 2.36.3 The All India *Sunnī* Conference (AISC)

With the emergence of JUI, led by Mawlānā Shabbīr Aḥmad 'Uṣmānī, a *Deobandī 'ālim*, the hard-core *Barelwī 'ulamā'* preferred to revive their own organisation, the All India *Sunnī* Conference (AISC) rather than join JUI. AISC was founded at a convention of the *Barelwī 'ulamā'* [Moradabad: 16-19 March 1925] when Hindu-Muslim antagonism was in full swing and the *Deobandī 'ulamā'* of JUI were blamed for their part in the manifestation of Hindu-Muslim unity during the *Khilāfat* and Non-Co-operation movements. Mawlānā Na'īm-ud-dīn Murādābādī and Mawlānā Ḥāmid Raḥā Khān were the outstanding figures to organise AISC. The former was an ardent disciple and the latter a son of Mawlānā Aḥmad Raḥā Khān. AISC soon became inactive. Its lofty objectives such as the economic uplift of Muslims and giving proper guidance to them in religious matters, proved to be mere paper promises.

AISC was revived during the 1945-46 election. Mawlānā 'Abdul Ḥāmid Badāyūnī, a *Barelwī 'ālim*, was associated with AIML for a long time. As the propaganda secretary of AISC, he managed to get pro-AIML messages from his fellow *Barelwī 'ulamā'*. After the election, AISC held a large gathering [Banaras: 27-30 April 1946] under the presidentship of Pīr Jamā'at 'Alī Shāh 'Alīpurī. It resolved to support AIML in its demand for Pakistan.

The *Ahl-i-Sunnat 'ulamā'* and *mashā'ikh* are prepared to render every possible sacrifice in making the movement for an Islamic State a success. They bind themselves to struggle for a

state, based on the juristic principles in the light of the *Qurān* and the traditions of the Prophet.<sup>250</sup>

AISC constituted a committee of 13 leading *Barelwī* 'ulamā' and *pīrs* to chalk out a framework for the Islamic State.

#### 2.36.4 The Position of Mawlānā Mawdūdī and his Party

A section of the *Deobandīs* under JUI and *Barelwīs* under AISC accepted AIML's stand towards JUI as their own. The stand made by Mawlānā Mawdūdī was different from both the pro- and anti-AIML 'ulamā'.

Before embarking on the delineation of Mawdūdī's position with regard to the demand for Pakistan, it would be appropriate to discuss his career; for, his role during the crucial period of the freedom movement continues to be a matter of controversy even in contemporary Pakistan.

Mawlānā Abul Alā Mawdūdī,<sup>251</sup> of an old Delhi family, was born in Aurangabad (Andhra Pradesh) on 25 September 1903. His father, Mawlawī Ahmad Ḥasan, was among the early students of Aligarh College and adopted the Aligarh Westernised way of living. By profession, he was a lawyer and practised at Meerut (UP) before he moved to the Nizām's dominions. At a late stage in his life he turned to religion to such an extent that he gave up his legal practice fearing that he might have inadvertently saved culprits from legal punishment or pleaded for penalty against innocent persons. He developed a dislike of Western education and nostalgia for the Muslim culture of upper urban classes. Therefore, he did

not send Abul Álá, his youngest son, to school when he was a child lest his language and manners should be spoiled through contact with other children. Arrangements were made for his private schooling. However, his father reluctantly allowed Abul Álá to go to school when he reached the age of 11 to complete his matriculation. He joined *Dār-ul-ʿulūm* (Hyderabad) but his father's sudden illness and death compelled him to leave *Dār-ul-ʿulūm* before he could complete the course.

He started his career as a journalist at the remarkably early age of 15 years. Along with Abul Khayr Mawdūdī, his elder brother, he joined the staff of the religious-political weekly *Madīnah* of Bijnore (UP). In 1919, he went to Jabalpur (Central Provinces) to edit the *Tāj*, a journal started by Tāj-ud-dīn, a Pan-Islamist. It was the time of the *Khilāfat* movement and the young editor of *Tāj* took an active part in the *Khilāfat* activities at the local level.<sup>252</sup> He had translated two pamphlets from English with the aim of mobilising mass moral support for the Ottomans.<sup>253</sup> Later on (from 26 July 1922), he became the editor of the *Muslim* (Delhi), the first organ of JUH. The *Muslim* ceased publication on 8 April 1923 and Mawdūdī returned to Hyderabad where Abul Khayr Mawdūdī, his elder brother, was associated with *Dār-ut-tarjamah* (Usmaniyyah University). He remained busy in scholarly pursuits and translated the second and third sections of 17th century Iranian philosopher Mullā Ṣadrā's famous classic *al-Asfār-ul-Arbāh*. In 1925, JUH started another newspaper *al-Jamīyat*, and Sayyid Mawdūdī was invited to be its editor, a responsibility which he discharged for three years (i.e., until 15 May 1928).<sup>253</sup>

In 1926, Sawāmī Sharaddhānandā, a leading figure of the *Shuddhī* movement, was murdered by a Muslim. The concept of *jihād* in Islam became a point of discussion. The aggressive critics of Islam and the British rulers always looked upon the Muslims as militants. The modernists (e.g., Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and his associates) denied the concept of militancy in Islam, interpreting *jihād* as defensive war. Mirzā Ghulām Ahmad, the founder of *Aḥmadiyyah*, declared *jihād* to be illegal. On account of the various contradictory interpretations that prevailed, the concept of *jihād* was subject to much confusion. The need for an objective study, free from the apologetics of the modernists, was keenly felt.

Mawdūdī started a series of editorials with the aim of clarifying concept of *jihād*, but the columns of a daily were not appropriate for such a lengthy study. He completed the study *al-Jihād fil Islām* (Islamic Law of War and Peace). It was published by *Dār-ul-Muṣaniffīn Azamgarh* (1929). He analysed the teachings of the five major religions - namely Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism and Islam - relating to war. He opined that Hinduism and Judaism allowed war for safeguarding the 'selves' (i.e., the interests), of the followers. Neither religion makes a distinction between right and wrong. Contrary to such a stand, Christianity and Buddhism absolutely forbade the killing of human beings by one another whatever the motivation. Such a concept could not be upheld in the real world. In practice, Christians neglected the teachings of their religion and waged crusades against other nations. As the concept of war in Christianity and Buddhism went against the grain of human nature, it was bound to be repudiated. Islam advocated war in order to depose *kufr*

(infidelity) from the seat of authority. Fighting against oppression and in defence of truth is *jihād*.

*al-Jihād fil Islām* was a serious work. It brought Mawdūdī into the limelight. After leaving *al-Jamīyat*, he settled down in Hyderabad where he was invited to write an Islamic primer for senior students preparing for matriculation. His widely read book *Dīniyāt* (Towards Understanding Islam) thus took shape; this book 'became one of the required texts for Muslim senior matriculation students throughout India'.<sup>255</sup> In 1932, he took over the monthly *Tarjumān-ul-Qurān* (Interpreter of the Qurān).<sup>256</sup> Within five years of its publication, Mawdūdī's powerful pen attracted the admiration of a number of intellectuals. He was regarded as 'a thoughtful and well-informed writer on Islamic subjects'.<sup>257</sup> Chawdhari Niyāz 'Alī Khān,<sup>258</sup> a Muslim devotee, and poet-philosopher Muḥammad Iqbāl persuaded him to move from Hyderabad to Jamalpur, a small village about four miles from Pathankot (Punjab), where he was asked to take up the task of organising and directing *Dār-ul-Islām*, an educational research institution. He gathered a few of his companions and set to work in his own way. After a year and a half, the trustees of the educational research institution started to interfere in his activities. He moved to Lahore where he carried on editing *Tarjumān-ul-Qurān*. At the same time, he served for a year as Dean of the Faculty of Theology in Islamia College, Lahore. In Lahore, he founded *Jamā'at-i-Islāmī* (The Party of Islam) on 26 August 1941, amongst a select gathering of a few hundred persons. 75 of them, from all over the sub-continent, became its founding members.

The trustees of *Dār-ul-Islām* (Jamālpur) were unable to find a person of Mawdūdī's stature to advance the activities which he had initiated at *Dār-ul-Islām*. They again contacted him and assured him that he would be able to work, without any interference, according to his own plans. In June 1942 Mawdūdī returned to *Dār-ul-Islām* which remained the headquarters of *Jamā'at-i-Islāmī* until August 1947.

Mawdūdī took a clear-cut stand with respect to INC and AIML first as an individual, and then as the leader of *Jamā'at-i-Islāmī*. According to him, both INC and AIML were champions of nationalism. INC's nationalism was based on the geographical identity of India, whereas AIML attempted to orchestrate a separate identity for all Muslims in India on the basis of religion. The Muslims in India constituted a nation but the Muslims outside its geographical jurisdiction were not a part of the Muslim nation so conceived.<sup>259</sup> In Mawdūdī's perception of Islamic faith, there is no room for 'nationalism'. His view was best reflected in a booklet entitled *Mas'alah-i-Qawmiyat*<sup>260</sup> (The Question of Nationalism), first published in 1939.

The philosophy of nationalism, in his understanding, 'has made the life of man miserable' and

in their spirit and in their aims Islam and nationalism are diametrically opposed to each other ... the ultimate goal of Islam is a world-state in which the chains of racial and national prejudices would be dismantled and all mankind incorporated in a cultural and political system, with equal rights and equal opportunities for all, and in which hostile competition would give way to a friendly co-operation between peoples so that they might mutually assist and contribute to the material and moral good of one another ... To be a

Muslim and to adopt a non-Islamic viewpoint is only meaningless. Muslim Nationalist and Muslim Communist are as contrary terms as Communist Fascist and Socialist Capitalist, Chaste Prostitute .<sup>261</sup>

Mawdūdī's three-volume analysis of the Indian political situation during the latter half of the '30s is also important. In the first two volumes of this work, Musalmān Awr Mawjūdah Siyāsī Kashmakash<sup>262</sup> (The Muslims and the Present Political Crisis), Mawdūdī criticised and even vehemently condemned the theory of Indian Nationalism as espoused by INC. He believed that if the Muslims were to join INC, the Muslim minority would be assimilated into the Hindu majority, if not annihilated altogether. In the third volume, Mawdūdī criticised Muslim nationalists and AIML. As a conclusion to the whole analysis, Mawdūdī proposed a new and purely Islamic Party which he founded in the name of *Jamā'at-i-Islāmī*.

Mawdūdī's criticism of INC and pro-INC Muslim parties was welcomed by AIML workers who made full use of the theological arguments against 'Indian nationalism', as advanced by Mawdūdī.<sup>263</sup> Mawdūdī's exposition of Islam as 'the way of life, encompassing each and every aspect of human society', won the attention of 'religiously-minded Muslims in the universities of India'.<sup>264</sup>

*Jamā'at-i-Islāmī* was meant

to base and organise the entire human life in all its varied aspects - faith and ideology, religion and ethics, morality and conduct, education and training, social system and culture, economic order and political structure, law and judiciary, war and peace, internal and international affairs - on the principles of submission and obedience to God

Almighty and the guidance and instructions of His Apostles.<sup>265</sup>

Mawdūdī addressed the task of organising a strict ideological party in order to achieve these objectives. For him, the bulk of the Muslim masses lacked the capacity to create and to maintain an Islamic state and society, because they were unaware of the requisites of Islamic faith; whilst their nationalist leaders lacked an Islamic orientation in their work and lives. Against such a perception of the Muslim masses, *Jamā'at-i-Islāmī* was strict in its policy of enrolment of members. Those seeking membership must satisfy the local organisation of the *Jamā'at* that they had fully grasped the aims and objectives of the party policy and programme, and that they not only accepted them, but were also practitioners of the basic teachings of Islam including prayer five times a day, fasting during the month of *Ramāzān*, refraining from drawing their livelihood from sources condemned by Islam (usury, bribery, selling of liquor, gambling, and all the illegal sources).

Due to such a high standard of enrolment, along with strict discipline, *Jamā'at* was, until 1947, a tiny party of 625 members.

*Jamā'at-i-Islāmī* developed and advocated the idea that to serve the government, not established on the principles of the *Qurān*, in any capacity - in its army or civil service, the judiciary or its legislative assemblies - was *ḥarām*.<sup>266</sup> It, therefore, did not enrol those who were attached to the (British) Indian government; and, by the same token, it was not interested in taking part in elections for legislative assemblies.

The reasoning that led Mawdūdī to pursue a line different from the 'ulamā' in league with either INC or AIML, was clear and consistent. In his view, Muslims had an ideology. They were divinely bound to struggle for its implementation, and not to leave an area where they could propagate their ideology. The demand of the Indian Muslims for Pakistan would be quite genuine if they were considered merely as a nation without any mission.<sup>267</sup> Mawdūdī wished to see Indian Muslims' struggle for a state based on Islamic principles. In a speech before the students and teachers of Muslim University, Aligarh, Mawdūdī declared with all his logical vigour that the movement 'under the leadership of the Muslim League did not represent a step towards the creation of an Islamic state, but rather a step in opposite direction'. On another occasion he said:

The basis of this movement is a spirit of nationalism, and nationalism is incompatible with Islam ... what is selfishness in individual life is nationalism in social life.<sup>268</sup>

### 2.37 The 1945-46 Election

The utter failure of the Simla Conference, followed by Japan's surrender (15 August 1945) paved the way for election, which the (British) Indian government had ruled out as impracticable during the War period. Elections were, in fact, long overdue. The Central Assembly had been last elected in 1934 and the Provincial Legislatures in 1937. There was no disagreement that they had long since ceased to represent the electorate.

Contrary to the principle of adult suffrage, only about ten per cent of the population of British India was eligible to

vote in the Provincial elections, under The Government of India Act, 1935. But the election for the Central Assembly was to be held under the Act, 1919, since the federal part of the Act, 1935 could not be put into practice due to the unwillingness of the rulers of the princely states. The voters for the Central Assembly seats constituted less than one per cent of the population.<sup>269</sup>

The two main election issues posed by AIML were: Pakistan; and, AIML's position as the only representative organisation of the Indian Muslims. By contrast, INC sought to prove its claim as a national organisation, i.e., representing Muslims, along with other communities. Its success, in and of itself, was to constitute the irrefutable proof of the negation of the demand for Pakistan.

These elections were crucially important for AIML's future. If it failed to secure the majority of Muslim seats, its demand for Pakistan would go by the board. The election for the Central Assembly took place (December 1945). 31 seats were reserved for Muslims. AIML contested and won all these seats, securing 86.7 per cent of the total Muslim votes. INC could hardly secure 1.3 per cent; nationalist Muslims favoured by the '*ulamā*' 8.9 per cent; and independent candidates 3.1 per cent.<sup>270</sup>

AIML's position in the elections to the Provincial Legislatures is reflected in Table 2.4.

AIML took nearly 89 per cent of the Muslim seats. It secured 74.7 per cent of Muslim votes cast in the elections to the Provincial Legislatures.<sup>271</sup>

Table 2.4

The Number of Muslim Seats Won by AIML in  
the 1946 Election for Provincial Assemblies

Province	Total number of Muslim seats	Number of Seats won by AIML
Madras	29	29
Bombay	30	30
Bengal	119	113
UP	66	55
Punjab	86	79
Bihar	40	34
CP and Berar	14	13
NWFP	38	17
Assam	34	31
Orissa	4	4
Sind	35	35
	495	440

[Source: Return Showing the Results of Elections to the Central Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures in 1945-46  
(New Delhi: Manager of Government Publications, 1948)]

The overwhelming success at polls was a concrete proof of AIML's claims. And this remarkable success was partly due to the participation of the 'ulamā' in AIML's favour.

### 2.38 The Role of the 'Ulamā' in the 1945-46 Election

The 'ulamā' had been sharply divided on the issue of Pakistan. They fully participated in the election campaign, highlighting their differing viewpoints.

JUH in collaboration with MAI, All India *Momin* Conference and All India Muslim *Majlis*, formed the Muslim Parliamentary Board (MPB) under the presidentship of Mawlānā Ḥusayn Aḥmad Madanī. It is appropriate at this point to consider the political characteristics of the collaborators of JUH in MPB.

The 'ulamā' participating in the activities of MAI were largely drawn from the *Ahl-i-Ḥadīṣ* and the *Deobandī* 'ulamā' in the Punjab, though it also included a few *Barelwīs* (e.g. Fayz-ul-Ḥasan Alūmaharwī). It was the most popular party among the religiously inspired lower-middle classes during the early '30s. Its downfall started with the agitation over Shahidganj.<sup>272</sup> In 1937 it could hardly secure a seat in the Punjab. In 1940 when AIML passed the Lahore Resolution, the opposition from MAI was too feeble to pose a threat to AIML. Nevertheless, MAI voiced its opposition to the demand for Pakistan. The 'ulamā' in the rank and file of MAI had no faith in the Islamic pronouncements of AIML leaders. Their doubts resembled those of JUH. The dream of an Islamic state, free from exploitation of the poor by the rich, was a cherished ideal of MAI.

Its working committee accepted a resolution visualising the *Ḥakūmat-i-Ilāhiyyah* (Kingdom of God) (Saharanpur: 26 April 1943).

MAI does not consider it a religious or ultimate obligation of a Muslim to establish certain geographical, ethnic or linguistic barriers or to maintain them. On the contrary the divine measure is to follow the instructions of *Allāh* and His Prophet, to live with piety, to support virtue and to make it prevail. MAI seeks to establish *Ḥakūmat-i-Ilāhiyyah* wherever its feasibility exists. So that it can be propagated how the worldly troubles are remedied through practising the golden principles of Islam; and how salvation can be achieved in worldly life and the life hereafter.

In this respect MAI considers it appropriate to clarify that grasp of power by the Muslim majority or by some Muslim individuals in certain areas, is not synonymous of *Ḥakūmat-i-Ilāhiyyah*. Such personal or communal states, formed for the realisation of personal gains, proved to be a stigma on Islam; and the people disliked it. MAI cannot be satisfied to repeat past experience by handing over the reins of power to a party or group which knows nothing about Islam.<sup>273</sup>

After this resolution was passed, MAI made overtures to AIML with a view to making a deal; but AIML, with rapidly increasing popularity, insisted on unconditional support. As these talks broke down, MAI became, perhaps, AIML's bitterest opponent. Jinnāh was known as the *Qā'id-i-Aẓam* (The Great Leader), Mawlānā Mazhar 'Alī Aẓhar of MAI branded him *Kāfir-i-Aẓam* (The Great Infidel).

The All India *Momin* Conference was led by the middle-class *Anṣārs* (Muslim weavers). The basic idea behind the organisation was to raise the community of *Anṣārs*, 'economically and culturally, and to protect it'.<sup>274</sup> The base of the party was so small that it could not attract much of a following from the

Muslim masses, in spite of its claims to represent the working classes of the Muslim community.

The All India Muslim *Majlis* (organised in May 1944) was a joint front of all the Indian Nationalist Muslims who had gathered together in opposition to the AIML Lahore Resolution (March 1940).

MPB filed its candidates in the election. INC gave support to MPB's candidates. The winds were so changed in favour of AIML's demand for Pakistan that MPB was an electoral failure. It hardly secured 6.4 per cent of the total Muslim votes cast in the elections to the Provincial Legislatures.

JUH's influence was largely neutralised by the pro-AIML appeal of JUI and by the direct participation of the '*ulamā*' in AIML politics. For instance, Mawlānā Jamāl Miyaṅ Farangī Mahallī, the son of Mawlānā 'Abdul Bārī, was very active in AIML's struggle for Pakistan.<sup>275</sup>

The JUI '*ulamā*' condemned INC's policies. They issued a *fatwā* forbidding Muslims to join INC.<sup>276</sup> During the elections they toured extensively in order to mobilise Muslim support for AIML candidates.

UP was considered to be the stronghold of JUH. It made Saharanpar (UP) the venue of its 1945 session, a few months after which an election was held. In an important contest, AIML's Liyāqat 'Alī Khān stood against JUH-supported Muḥammad Aḥmad Kāzīmī for the constituency of Saharanpar and Muzaffarnaqar districts. The latter was defeated. Liyāqat 'Alī Khān acknowledged the

effective role played by Mawlānā Zāfar Aḥmad 'Uṣmānī as a factor contributing to his electoral success.<sup>277</sup>

Along with JUI, the *Barelwī 'ulamā'* and *pīrs*, either in their individual capacity or under the loose organisation of AISC, gave support to AIML. Mawlānā Mawdūdī and his *Jamā'at-i-Islāmī* kept aloof from the election activities. Mawdūdī clarified his stand as follows:

Whatever the importance of the coming election or elections in the future, and howsoever they may affect our nation or the country, it would be impossible for us, as a party of principles, to tolerate the liquidation of the very principles in which we believe, for reason of expediency. Our whole struggle against the existing system is based on the principle of people's sovereignty as the basis of the system; and this principle gives absolute right of legislation to the Assembly, elected by the people, and there is no greater authority. Our belief in the Oneness of God demands that there must be sovereignty of God, not people's sovereignty. God's revealed Book should be taken as the final authority; and, the legislation must be in accordance with the Book ... With such belief in the Oneness of God, how can we take part in elections? Can it be lawful for us that on the one hand we resolve the legislation, not bound by the authority of the Book, *shirk* (polytheism); and on the other hand, we try to elect with our votes persons who want to enter the Assembly in order to usurp the prerogatives of God. If we are true in professing our belief, the only way forward for us is to employ all our strength to get the principle accepted according to which sovereignty belongs to God only; legislation must be based on the authority of the Book. As long as this principle is not accepted, we do not consider any election or voting lawful.<sup>278</sup>

Punjab was recognised as the province of greatest strategic importance in the struggle for Pakistan. It was the Muslim majority province which had disappointed AIML in the 1937 election. Electoral victory in the Punjab would act as a

deterrent against the spread of the influence of the *Khudā'ī Khidmatgār* Party of the NWFP which refused to concede the idea of Pakistan. Pakistan could not be contemplated without NWFP as a part of it.

In the election, AIML had solid support of the 'ulamā' and hereditary *pīrs* of the Punjab. The leading *pīr* families which had staunchly supported the Unionist Party since its inception switched their loyalties to AIML. The response was enthusiastic even from *pīrs* who had previously been politically inactive.<sup>279</sup>

JUI held its All India conference (Lahore: January 1946) which was attended by the 'ulamā' from all over the country. Some of them proceeded to tour the Punjab for propaganda work on behalf of AIML. The 'ulamā' depicted all the anti-AIML Muslim organisations as traitors to Islam who were bent upon destroying the very interests of the Muslim *ummah*. The AIML propaganda gave the widest possible circulation to the religious appeals made by the 'ulamā' and *pīrs* in its support. It is interesting that the Unionist Party, which had no religious basis, tried to imitate AIML's Islamic orientation to no avail.

It is often said that the 'majority of them [the 'ulamā] were at the outset against the establishment of Pakistan'.<sup>280</sup> But this statement is not valid if we look deeply. The anti-AIML 'ulamā' were grouped mainly in JUH, and, to a lesser extent in MAI. JUH, as we have already noted, had become almost exclusively an organisation of the *Deobandī* 'ulamā', which was weakened by the defection of Ashraf 'Alī Thānwī group. In spite of its missionary zeal and intellectual contribution, the *Deobandī* school of thought

remained the creed of a minority among Muslim masses. The majority of the Muslim masses had been under the spell of popular Islam of the *Barelwī* 'ulamā' and of the hereditary *pīrs*. It was, therefore, no surprise that JUH, after its bifurcation, failed to get the support in the name of Islam.

The failure of the JUH 'ulamā' in the 1946 election was partly due to the appeal that they had had during the *Khilāfat* and Non-Co-operation movements. Out of religious obligation, Muslims were supposed to boycott foreign goods, to give up government services, not to send their dependents to government schools. Millions of Muslims suffered economically by accepting the religious call of the 'ulamā'. Thousands of them migrated to Afghanistan for religious reasons. Muslims were repeatedly told that they would get their reward in the life hereafter for every material sacrifice which they made on this earth in the cause of the faith. In 1946, JUH was opposed to the demand for Pakistan because it feared that the Muslims left behind in India as a consequence of partition would suffer. In contrast to JUH, the other 'ulamā' and especially the JUI 'ulamā', continued to uphold the underlying religious approach of the *Khilāfat* and Non-co-operation movements. To them, the formation of a new state, (i.e., Pakistan), represented a step towards the realisation of Islamic ideals.

### 2.39 Transfer of Power

In the aftermath of World War II colonialism had no future. The colonial powers could no longer command the resources that would be needed for the economic reconstruction of the

metropolitan countries and for the control of the colonies. Britain shared the problems of fellow colonial powers. Its coercive state apparatus in India in the form of the civil bureaucracy was understaffed and overburdened. The British soldiers stationed in India were eager to join their families at home. The indigenous garrison, which provided a focus for nationalist infiltration, was no longer as servile as it was before the War. A hunger strike by some ratings of the Royal Indian Navy in Bombay, followed by an open revolt in Bombay and Karachi (18-23 February 1946) was indicative of the prevailing mood. The Indian soldiers, recruited for the needs of the War were to be relieved and would almost certainly take part in political agitation during the post-War period.

Britain was the first among the colonial powers to appreciate the expediency of the post-War period and Attlee, the British Prime Minister, despatched a three-member 'Cabinet Mission' 'with the intention of using their utmost endeavours to help her [India] to attain her freedom as speedily and fully as possible'.<sup>281</sup>

#### 2.39.1 The Cabinet Mission Plan

After its arrival in India (23 March 1946), the Cabinet Mission had prolonged deliberations with politicians of all shades of opinion including the 'ulamā' of JUH. But the two parties which actually mattered were INC and AIML. Their views were poles apart. The Mission recorded its inability to secure agreement between them.

The Mission put forward its own plan to 'ensure a speedy setting up of the new constitution'. The plan had, of course, 'the full approval of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom'. It envisaged an Interim Government to 'carry on the administration of India until such time as a new Constitution be brought into being'. It made the following recommendations:

1. The future Constitution would be based on a three-tiered system, i.e., Provinces, Groups or sub-federations of Provinces, and a Union.
2. Three Groups or sub-federations of Provinces would be formed. Group 'A' would include the Hindu majority provinces (Madras, Bombay, UP, Bihar, Central Provinces, and Orissa). Groups 'B' and 'C' would consist of Muslim majority provinces in North-West India (Punjab, NWFP, Sind) and North-East India (Bengal and Assam).
3. The Union would control three subjects, namely, Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Communications.
4. The Union would have an Executive and a Legislature constituted from the elected representatives of the Provinces of British India and representatives of the princely states. It would have powers necessary to raise the finances required for running the government.

5. A Constituent Assembly would be indirectly elected, through Provincial Legislative Assemblies.
6. The Constitution of the Union and of the Groups would contain a provision whereby any province could call for a reconsideration of the terms of the Constitution after a lapse of ten years.

The Plan was an exercise towards a compromise between AIML's 'separate and fully independent State of Pakistan' and INC's cherished ideal of 'strong and organic centre'. From the day of the announcement of the Cabinet Mission Plan up to its rejection by INC and AIML, a series of statements, counter-statements and clarifications were issued. These sometimes aroused hopes that INC and AIML might after all agree to give it a try. In fact, however, neither was willing to withdraw its fundamental claims.<sup>282</sup>

#### 2.39.2 The Direct Action Day

The Council of AIML rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan without even a single dissension (28 July 1946). Jinnāh accused the British of having 'played into the hands of the [Indian National] Congress'. He announced that 16 August would be observed as 'Direct Action' day and called upon AIML members to renounce all titles awarded by the British government. Jinnāh declared a big shift in the policy of AIML.

What we have done today is the most historic act in our history. Never have we in the whole history of the League done anything, except by constitutional methods and by constitutionalism. But now we are obliged and forced into

this position. This day we bid goodbye to constitutional methods.<sup>283</sup>

Nearly all the meetings under the AIML banner took place in and around the mosques after the obligatory Friday prayer. The 'ulamā' spoke on the grievances of the Muslims and in support of AIML's cause. The 'Direct Action' day passed off smoothly everywhere except in Calcutta where fierce riots took place. In two days nearly 5000 people were killed and some 15,000 were injured. The rioting spread from Calcutta to Noakhali (East Bengal), as well as to Bihar and UP.

### 2.39.3 The Interim Government (2 September 1946-14 August 1947)

Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, had been trying for some time to form an Interim Government exclusively consisting of Indians. Negotiations with Jinnāh had broken down on the issue of whether AIML should have the sole right to nominate all Muslim Ministers. In line with Wavell's thinking, INC was willing to form a government provided that it was given the right to nominate ministers not only from among the Hindus but also from amongst the Muslims and Scheduled Castes. The composition of the 14-member Interim Government was as follows:

Caste Hindu	5
Scheduled Castes	1
Muslim	5
Sikh	1
Indian Christian	1
Parsee	1

Jawāharlāl Nehrū formed the government which included five Caste Hindus (Sardār Vallabhhaī Patēl, Sarat Chandrā Bose, C. Rājagopālachārī, Dr. Rājendrā Prasād, and Nehrū himself), one scheduled caste Hindu (Jagjīwan Rām), three Muslims (Āsif Ālī, Shafāāt Aḥmad Khān, Sayyid Ālī Zāhīr), one Sikh (Sardār Baldev Singh), one Parsee (C.H. Bhabhā) and one Indian Christian (John Matthai).

The Interim Government could not be considered representative, neglecting AIML which had demonstrated its popularity among the Muslims - first in the 1945-46 election, and subsequently, in the election to the Constituent Assembly (July 1946) in which it won all the Muslim seats but five. AIML was again invited to join the Interim Government, and it accepted the invitation on the grounds that it would be folly 'to leave the entire field of administration of the central government in the hands of the Congress'.<sup>284</sup> AIML continued to insist that it alone had the right to nominate all the Muslim members, but INC was not ready to surrender its status as a national organisation representing all Indians including the Muslims. AIML was given the opportunity to nominate five representatives. INC wanted to retain a Muslim, Āsif Ālī, as its representative, therefore three members, including one Hindu (Shafāāt Aḥmad Khān, Sayyid Ālī Zāhīr and Sarat Chandrā Bose) had to resign in order to accommodate new ministers nominated by AIML. Even though AIML could have nominated five Muslim nominees, it in fact chose to include Jogendrā Nāth Mondal, a Scheduled Caste representative, among them. Mondal had previously been a member of the AIML's ministry in Bengal. AIML's nomination of Mondal was in retaliation of INC's retention of Āsif Ālī in the Interim Government. The other four nominees of AIML

were Nawābzāda Liyāqat 'Alī Khān, Rājā Ghazanfar 'Alī Khān, Ismā'īl Ibrāhīm Chundrīgar and Sardār 'Abdur Rab Nishtar.

The Interim Government which now consisted of representatives of INC and AIML, proved unable to prevent the collapse of law and order and the distrust between the Hindus and the Muslims which was already paving the way for a civil war. His Majesty's Government, for its part, announced its intention 'to effect the transference of power to responsible Indian hands' not later than June 1948. It sent Lord Mountbatten to India, with 'plenipotentiary powers',<sup>285</sup> to take over from Lord Wavell as Viceroy (March 1947).

#### 2.39.4 The Final Round

From the 1945-46 election onwards up to the arrival of Lord Mountbatten, the key members of INC who had earlier been adamant in their resistance to AIML's 'two nation theory' gradually came to accept it. After the collapse of the Cabinet Mission Plan (June-July 1946), Sardār Vallabhā'ī Patel was thoroughly convinced that 'Muslims and Hindus could not be united into one nation. There was no alternative except to recognise this fact'.<sup>286</sup> His experience of the Interim Government gave further corroboration to the feeling that collaboration with AIML in administering India would be impossible. The Interim Government remained sharply divided into two mutually hostile (INC and AIML) blocs. The AIML's nominees did not attend the 'daily meetings' of the ministers. They only attended Cabinet meetings called by the Viceroy.<sup>287</sup> The AIML nominees opposed INC members as a matter of course, thus practically rendering the INC members ineffective, and paralyzing

the Government. The budget presented by Liyāqat 'Alī Khān, imposed swingeing taxes on the wealthy and on businessmen and industrialists, from whom INC derived substantial financial support.

After the (British) government's announcement of its withdrawal from India not later than June 1948, AIML was induced to intensify its struggle in Muslim majority provinces. In Bengal and Sind AIML was in the saddle. In the Punjab, a coalition of Akali Sikhs, the Unionists and INC held office. AIML was the largest single party in the Assembly, holding 74 out of a total of 175 seats. But it did not enjoy absolute majority. The leaders of AIML in the Punjab had claimed the support of 88 MLAs, but the Governor favoured inviting Malik Khizār Ḥayāt Khān Tiwānā to form a coalition government (8 March 1946). AIML registered its protest by calling a province-wide *hartāl* (closing of shops) on the following day. AIML started a civil disobedience movement against the Punjab coalition government, and forced Khizār Ḥayāt Khān to resign through its exercise of street power. The Governor took charge of the administration and the Punjab government was dissolved. During this civil disobedience (24 January - 2 March 1947), several 'ulamā' and *pīrs* were arrested.<sup>288</sup> Mawlānā Dāwūd Ghaznawī assumed the leadership of the whole movement when all the Punjab Muslim League members went to jail.

The Lahore Resolution of AIML demanded 'the whole of the Punjab' for Pakistan. INC feared the inclusion of two divisions, Ambala and Jalandhar, in would-be Pakistan. In neither division was there a single district which had a Muslim majority. In Amritsar district, the Hindu-Sikh population, combined together,

outnumbered the Muslim population. The INC working committee demanded a partition of the Punjab.

The demand for the partition of the Punjab made MAI furious. Its working committee resolved to resist such partition, with the assistance of other Muslim organisations and parties (Lahore: 23 March 1947). MAI severed its connections with INC, and made overtures of a co-operative nature to AIML.<sup>289</sup> It was the last of MAI's efforts to seek the attention of the Muslim masses by suddenly espousing the cause of Pakistan.

INC also suggested the partition of Bengal; and, by suggesting the division of the Punjab and Bengal into Hindu and Muslim majority areas, it actually pleaded for the partition of India on a religious basis. The support for India's partition had gained momentum even before Lord Mountbatten arrived (Delhi: 22 March 1947).

Mountbatten's assignment was to wind up the British Raj in India, along lines preferably agreed upon by INC and AIML. After holding interviews with both sides, he made up his mind in favour of partition as the only possible solution. At the same time he realised the necessity for transferring power even before the British Government's deadline of June 1948.

A plan for 'immediate transfer of power' was announced on 3 June 1947.<sup>290</sup> According to it, the wishes of the Muslim majority districts of the Punjab and Bengal, the Provinces of Sind and Baluchistan should be ascertained as to whether their Constitution was to be framed by the sitting Constituent Assembly or by a new

and separate Assembly consisting of their representatives. If the Punjab decided in favour of a separate Assembly, then a referendum in NWFP 'in view of its geographical situation and other considerations' would be held. The referendum would be on the question of whether NWFP would like to join the existing Assembly or elect a new one. Similarly, Bengal's decision in favour of a separate Assembly would pave the way for a referendum in the predominantly Muslim district of Sylhet (Assam) on whether it would wish to join Muslim East Bengal or continue to remain in India's Assam.

AIML and INC accepted the Mountbatten plan on 9 and 15 June respectively; the verdict of the Muslim majority areas was secured speedily, within less than a month during a four week interval (20 June - 17 July).

NWFP was the stronghold of the *Khudāī Khidmatgār* Party, a staunch ally of INC; and Sylhet was considered to be under the influence of JUH. Mawlānā Ḥusayn Aḥmad Madanī, the President of JUH used to stay during the month of *Ramāzān* in Sylhet. AIML depended heavily on the services of the 'ulamā'. The 'ulamā' of JUI extensively toured the areas and turned the voters in favour of AIML. In NWFP, Khān 'Abdul Ghaffār Khān, the *Khudāī Khidmatgār* Party leader, asked his party members to boycott the referendum but his appeal went unheeded. AIML secured a victory in the referenda held in NWFP and in the district of Sylhet.

After this exercise, the Indian Independence Act,<sup>291</sup> intended to transfer power to the two new dominions on 15 August, was duly passed (18 July 1947). It came into effect in due course.

## 2.40 Conclusion

The role of the 'ulamā' during the struggle for freedom, stretching back to the beginning of the 19th century, underwent a number of changes. In the period of the consolidation of colonial rule, they were at the forefront of the resistance movement. They remained at the centre of *Jihād* and *Farā'izī* movements, and played a significant role in the Insurrection of 1857. But, towards the end of colonial rule, their political role was at best peripheral.

With the failure of the armed struggle in 1857, the collapse of Muslim rule in South Asia was complete. The failure of 'ulamā'-led movements resulted in changes in their thinking. By and large, they accepted the harsh reality of colonial rule, and concerned themselves with the task of preserving Muslim identity through religious activities. *Madrasahs* were established. The newly-introduced press power was fully utilised for the propagation of Islamic beliefs and norms of Muslim culture. Until the beginning of the second decade of the present century, the 'ulamā' were more or less indifferent to colonial rule.

While the 'ulamā' were engaged in tasks relating to religious education, the effects of modern English education began to be felt. By the last quarter of the 19th century, a new class of English-educated Indians had come into existence. This aspiring English-educated class, comprised mostly of Hindus, demanded a better share of government jobs and of membership of representative institutions. The Muslim upper class, which in the past had been affiliated to the Mughal state, felt threatened by the emergence of a new class of English-educated Hindus.

Under the leadership of Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, the Muslim upper class devoted itself to the promotion of English education in the Muslim community, and to the task of establishing close links with the colonial rulers. Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's policy of drawing close to the colonial government was not to the liking of the 'ulamā'. Not content with confining their activities to the promotion of English education, Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and his intellectual associates introduced a new interpretation of Islamic beliefs and teachings, which bore the appellation of 'Islamic Modernism'. It contrasted sharply with the theological approach that the 'ulamā' had established in South Asia. Muslim intellectuals in South Asia were thus divided into two main groups - one which adhered to the theological approach of the 'ulamā', and the other, to 'Islamic Modernism'. The mass of the Muslim people remained under the influence of the 'ulamā', whilst a tiny but very effective section of the Muslim community propagated 'Islamic Modernism'.

The 'ulamā's indifference to colonial rule, and the vocal representation of the Muslim cause by Sayyid Aḥmad Khān resulted in the effective removal of the 'ulamā' from the political arena. Muslim politics was dominated by Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and his followers. The 'ulamā' proved irrelevant in the politics of petitions, memoranda and conferences that constituted the bulk of indigenous political life in India after the 1857 Insurrection.

This situation changed when Pan-Islamic ideas penetrated South Asia. The 'ulamā' now had a chance to bridge the gap between them and the modern educated Muslims. Religious-cultural organisations were established, and the 'ulamā' once again entered the arena of the modern educated Muslims. The outbreak of World

War I, and subsequent developments gave rise to the *Khilāfat* and Non-co-operation movements. The purely religious nature of the *Khilāfat* issue projected the *‘ulamā’* as a vital political force. This phase was, however, short-lived. The *Khilāfat* was dissolved in Turkey (1924). Its reverberations in India were immediate and to the detriment of Gāndhī's Non-co-operation Campaign.

The *‘ulamā’* entered Muslim politics when agitation against colonial rule and confrontation had assumed a central position in Indian nationalist politics. They were a strong force in the mobilisation of Muslim masses. But the change in the course taken by politics from confrontation to negotiation, shifted the struggle from the streets and *pandāls* to the assembly halls. Although the *‘ulamā’* were marginalised once again in the delicate constitutional discussions that ensued, they tried to keep their political identity through their own organisations which continued to maintain an agitational posture. During the Pakistan movement (1940-1947), however, the *‘ulamā’s* role assumed new significance, but they were followers of one or other of the two main camps. JUH opposed partition from its position as a supporter of INC. On the other hand, JUI and AISC supported AIML's movement in favour of partition.

During the Pakistan Movement, AIML emphasised the distinctive character of Islam. It claimed that Pakistan would be a laboratory of Islam. And, without partition, the dream of applying Islamic injunctions through state power could not be realised. The *‘ulamā’*, however, were not clear on the issue of whether AIML should be supported. Their attitude was based on how different sections perceived AIML's leadership. JUH and Mawlānā

Mawdūdī (of *Jamā'at-i-Islāmī*) were totally dissatisfied with the standard of 'Islamicity' of AIML's leadership. As far as they were concerned, AIML was unfit to hold office in an Islamic state that might result from partition. JUI and AISC, on the other hand, were willing to trust AIML's leadership.

The internecine divisions among the 'ulamā' during the Pakistan Movement should not be seen as stemming from any differences on the question of establishing an Islamic state. Quite the contrary, all sections of the 'ulamā' highlighted the characteristics of the Islamic state; but, whilst some believed that the political fortunes of an Islamic state could under no circumstances be entrusted to AIML's care, others believed that an Islamic state as a *fait accompli* could be expected to bring out the best in AIML.

Among the three groups of the *Sunnī 'ulamā'*, *Deobandīs* were the most vocal and articulate, in spite of their thinner theological following. On the other hand, the *Barelwīs*, who enjoyed a much larger following, were no match for the *Deobandī 'ulamā'* in the spheres of organisation and propaganda. The third group (*Ahl-i-Hadīṣ*) co-operated with the *Deobandī* organisations, and did not establish an overt political identity of its own.

Although the 'ulamā' were on the periphery of the nationalist political scene, it was expected at partition that they would play an important political role in Pakistan because of its religious character.

## NOTES

1. Nizāmi, Khaliq Ahmad, Shāh Waliullāh Ke Siyāsī Maktūbāt (Lahore: Idārah-i-Islāmiyāt 1978), pp.6-17.
2. The eldest son and successor of Shāh Waliullāh; a leading 'ālim of the time. A great majority of the Sunnī 'ulamā' of South Asia even today traces its academic geneology to him.
3. Dihlawī, Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz, Fatāwā 'Azīzī (Delhi: Maṭba' Muḥtabāī, 1893), Vol. I, pp.17-18. For an English translation of the relevant part of the fatwā in question, see Mujeeb, M., The Indian Muslims (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967), pp.390-391.
4. Faruqi, Ziya-ul-Hasan, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Books, n.d.), p. 2.  
  
A gloss different from the widely-held understanding of the fatwā was given by Mushir-ul-Haq in his M.A. Thesis Indian Muslims' Attitude to the British in the Early Nineteenth Century: A Case Study of Shah Abdul Aziz (Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1964). Haq's article in Urdu entitled Unīswīn Sadi Ke Hinustān Kī Ha'yat-i-Shar'ī [Burhān, 63 (October 1969): 4, pp.221-243], based on the Thesis, shows that Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz's fatwā was actually directed to the British and reflected an attitude of ambivalence rather than outright opposition. But there is in fact no doubt that the Jihād movement did take the initiative from this fatwā. Haq's interpretation is accepted by subsequent writers. For example, Ahmad, Aziz, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan: 1857-1964 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p.20; 'Activism of the Ulama in Pakistan' in Nikki R. Keddie (ed.), Scholars, Saints and Sufis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p.258; Metcalf, B.D., Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband 1860-1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp.50-52; Rizvi, S.A.A., Shah Abdul Aziz: Puritanism, Sectarian Polemics and Jihad (Canberra: Dar-ul-Maarif, 1982), pp.225-244.
5. See Khan, Muin-ud-din, History of the Faraidi Movement in Bengal: 1818-1906 (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1965).
6. Sayyid Ahmad to Yār Muḥammad Khān, Makātīb-i-Sayyid Ahmad Shahīd (Lahore: Maktabah-i-Rashīdiyyah, 1975), p.25, p.25a. Shāh Ismā'īl, the spokesman of the Jihād movement, wrote a book entitled Mansab-i-Imāmat which provides an ideological basis to the movement. He equated the Christian rule in India to the rule of infidels, and hence jihād against the Christian rulers was inevitable. Mansab-i-Imāmat, Muḥammad Ḥusayn 'Alawī (trans.) (Lahore: Ā'inah-i-Adab, 1969).

7. The *Jihād* movement has attracted the attention of a number of historians. Among several studies, the following, due to their depth and insight, are worth mentioning: Ahmad, Qeyam-ud-din, Wahabi Movement in India (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, n.d.); Mihr, Ghulam Rasūl, Sīrat-i-Sayyid Ahmad Shahīd Vols.I and II (Lahore: *Kitāb Manzil*, 1954); Jamā'at-i-Mujāhidīn (Lahore: *Kitāb Manzil*, 1955); Sarguzasht-i-Mujāhidīn (Lahore: *Kitāb Manzil*, 1969); Nadwī, Sayyid Abul Hasan Ali, Sayyid Ahmad Shahīd, Vols.I and II (Karachi: H.M. Saīd and Co., n.d.); Nadwi, Masūd 'Ālam, Hinustan Kī Pehlī Islāmī Tahrik (Rawalpindi: *Maktabah-i-Milliyyah*, 1948).
8. The 1857 Insurrection constituted a landmark in the history of South Asia. Its failure resulted in the final obliteration of Muslim rule which had only nominally existed since 1803. There is a vast literature on the 1857 Insurrection. For an annotated bibliography of the relevant material in the English language, see Ladendorf, Janice M., The Revolt in India, 1857-58 (Zug Switzerland: Inter Documentation Company A.G., 1966).
9. Thompson, Edward and Garrat, G.T., Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India (London: Macmillan, 1934), p.441.
10. *Ibid.*, p.457.
11. A *fatwā* from the 'ulamā' of Delhi was issued in July 1857. For the text of the *fatwā* with the signatures of all those who signed it, see Razwī, Khurshīd Muṣṭafā, Jang-i-Āzādī Atharah saw Satāwan (Delhi: *Maktabah-i-Burhān*, 1959), pp.568-569; Qādiri, Muḥammad Ayūb, Jang-i-Āzādī 1857: Waqi'āt-w-Shakhsiyāt (Karachi: Pak Academy, 1976), pp.404-406.
- Apart from this *fatwā*, reportedly similar rulings were made public by the 'ulamā'.
12. Haq, Muinul, The Great Revolution of 1857 (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1968), p.76, pp.81-82.
13. Gīlānī, Manāzar Aḥsan, Sawānih-i-Qāsīmī (Lahore: *Maktabah-i-Rahmāniyyah*, n.d.), Vol. II, pp.125-137; Merathī, Muḥammad 'Ashiq Ilāhī, Tazkirat-ur-Rashīd (Lahore: *Idārah-i-Islāmiyāt*, 1986), pp.73-87.
14. Mihr, Ghulām Rasūl, 1857 Ke Mujāhid (Lahore: *Kitāb Manzil*, 1957), pp.163-168 and *passim*.
- For a brief account of the 'ulamā's role in the 1857 Insurrection, see also, Qureshi, I.H., Ulema in Politics (Karachi: *Ma'āref Limited*, 1974), pp.182-213.
15. Nehru, Jawaharlal, An Autobiography (London: Bodley Head, 1949), p.460.

For an account of the British authorities' attitude towards the Muslim community, see Hardy, P., The Muslims of British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp.61-91.

16. Potts, E. Daniel, British Baptist Missionaries in India, 1793-1837: The History of Serampore and its Missions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp.114-136; Gupta, K.P. Sen, The Christian Missionaries in Bengal: 1793-1833 (Calcutta: R.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1971).
17. Khayrābādī, Faḏl-i-Ḥaq, al-Sawrat-ul-Hindiyyah [translated into Urdu by 'Abdu-sh-shāhid Khān Sharwānī, under the title of Bāghī Hinustan] (Lahore: Maktabah-i-Qādiriyyah, 1974), pp.254-256; Khan, Sayyid Ahmad, Asbāb-i-Baḡhāwat-i-Hind (Karachi: Urdu Academy Sind, 1957), pp.119-124.
18. Mountstuart Elphinstone quoted in Desai, A.R., Social Background of Indian Nationalism (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1976), p.141.
19. de Bary, Wm. Theodore, Sources of Indian Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p.601.
20. Tinker, Hugh, South Asia: A Short History (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966), p.175.
21. Farquhar, J.N., Modern Religious Movements in India (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1919), pp.76-77.
22. This basic work on Āryā Samāj was translated into English by Dr. Bharadwaja and was widely and frequently published.
23. Jordens, J.F.T., 'Hindu Religious and Social Reforms in British India' in A.L. Basham (ed.), A Cultural History of India (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p.376.
24. De i, A.R., *op.cit.*, p.293.
25. de Bary, Wm. Theodore, *op.cit.*, p.652.
26. See Chapter 1 of this work, pp.34-35.
27. Salīm, Muḥammad 'Abdullāh, 'Dār-ul-Iftā' Dār-ul-ūlūm Deoband, al-Rashīd 4 (February-March 1976): 2-3, p.203.  
  
A selection of the *fatwās*, issued from Deoband's *dār-ul-iftā'*, is being compiled in several volumes. Eight of them have been issued at the time of this writing.
28. Faruqi, Ziya-ul-Hasan, *op.cit.*, p.26. The original document and its print has been published several times. See for example, Ahmad, Hāfiḏ Nazar, Jā'izah-i-Madāris-i-Ārabiyyah Islāmiyyah Maḡhribī Pakistān (Lyallpur: Jāmi'ah Chishtiyyah Trust, 1960).

29. Even this donation was only promised, not actually given. Khān, Sayyid Aḥmad, Maqālāt-i-Sir Sayyid, Shaykh Muhammad Ismā'īl Panīpatī (ed.) (Lahore: Majlis-i-Taraqqi-yi-Adab, 1962), Vol.VII, pp.278-279.
30. Raẓwī, Sayyid Maḥbūb, Dār-ul-'ulum Kī Ta'limī Khusūsiyāt (Delhi: Union Printing Press, n.d.), p.19.
31. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's religious thoughts are discussed, for example, in Baljon, J.M.S., The Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1949); Dar, Bashir Ahmad, Religious Thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khan (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1957); and Hālī, Alṭaf Ḥusayn, Ḥayāt-i-Jawīd (Kanpur: Nami Press, 1901).
32. Nadwi, Masūd 'Ālam, *op.cit.*, pp.127-170; Ahmad, Qeyam-ud-din, *op.cit.*, pp.232-272.
33. On 'Abdur Raḥīm's life and activities, see Malīhābādī, 'Abdur Razzāq, Azād Kī Kahānī Azād Kī Zubānī (Delhi: Hali Publishing House, 1958), p.389; Iṣlāhī, 'Abdur Raḥmān Parwāz, 'Abdur Raḥīm Dahri Kī Khud Nawisht Swānih 'Umri,' Jāmi'ah 72 (April 1975): 3, pp.186-188; Shāhjahānpūrī, Abū Salmān, 'Shāh 'Abdul Azīz Ke Ek Shāgird', ar-Raḥīm 1 (August 1963): 3, pp.37-44.
34. For details of the activities of the 'Muhammadan Literary Society', see Haque, Enamul, Nawab Bahadur Abdul Latif; His Writings and Related Documents (Dacca: Samundra Prokashani, 1968); Abbasi, Muhammad Yusuf, Muslim Politics and Leadership in South Asia, 1876-1892 (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1981), pp.15-18.
35. 'Hay, 'Abdul, Majmū'ah-i-Fatāwā (Lahore: Malik Siraj-ud-din and Sons, 1956), Vol. III, pp.20-21.
36. Gangohī, Rashīd Aḥmad, Fatāwā Rashīdiyyah (Moradabad: Barlas Press, 1323 A.H.), Vol.I, pp.90-91.
37. Spear, Percival, The Oxford History of Modern India (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p.291.
38. The membership of the British Indian Association could never have been more than 300. At the end of the 1880s, it was hardly 100. Seal, Anil, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p.364.
39. For an account of the activities of the Indian Association, see Bagal, J.C., History of the Indian Association: 1876-1951 (Calcutta: The Indian Association, 1953); Seal, Anil, *op.cit.*, pp.214-226.
40. According to W.C. Bonnerjee, the first President of INC,

It will probably be news to many that the  
Indian National Congress, as it was

originally started and as it has since been carried on, is in reality the work of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava when that nobleman was the Governor General of India....Lord Dufferin had made it a condition with Mr. Hume that his name in connection with the scheme of the Congress should not be divulged so long as he remained in the country....

Philips, C.H., The Evolution of India and Pakistan: 1858 to 1947, Select Documents (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp.138-139.

41. Wedderburn, W., Allan Octavian Hume (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1913), p.77.
42. Philips, C.H., *op.cit.*, p.141
43. Seal, Anil, *op.cit.*, p.373; Pandey, B.N., The Break-up of British India (London: Macmillan, 1969), p.43.
44. Ghosh, P.C., The Development of the Indian National Congress: 1892-1909 (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1960), p.11.
45. Sayyid Amir Ali (1849-1928) founded the National Muhammadan Association in 1877 (since 1883, re-named Central). Its objectives were 'to promote good feeling between the Indian races and creeds, ...to protect and safeguard Muhammadan interests and help their political thinking'. Aziz, K.K., Amir Ali: Life and Works (Lahore: Publishers United, 1968); Abbasi, Muhammad Yusuf, *op.cit.*, pp.119-145.
46. Philips, C.H., *op.cit.*, pp.187-189.
47. For Muslim representation at INC annual sessions, see Wasti, Syed Razi, Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1905-1910 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), Appendix I, p.221; The Political Triangle in India, 1858-1924 (Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1976), pp.46-47.
48. Barrier, N.G., 'Muslim Politics in the Punjab: 1870-1890', The Punjab: Past and Present 5 (1971): 1, pp.101-102.
49. For an English translation of two such Urdu tracts, see *ibid.*, pp.104-127.
50. Lovett, Sir Verney, A History of the Indian National Movement (London: John Murray, 1921), p.39.
51. For the family's role in the anti-colonial movement, see Rabbāni, Muḥammad Khalilullah, Jund-i-Hurriyat (Khairpur: Madrasat-ul-Islām, 1978), pp.55-104.
52. Qureshi, I.H., *op.cit.*, p.228.

53. al-Hasanī, Sayyid Muhammad, Sīrat-i-Sayyid Muhammad 'Alī Mongīrī (Lucknow: Idārah-i-Nashriyāt-i-Islām, 1964).
54. For the life and works of Mawlānā Shiblī Nu'mānī, see Nadwī, Sayyid Sulaymān, Hayāt-i-Shiblī (Azamgarh: Dār-ul-Muṣaniffīn, 1943); Ikrām, Shaykh Muḥammad, Shiblī-nāmāh (Bombay: Taj Book Office, n.d.).
55. Nadvi, Syed Habib ul Haq, 'The Role of Resurgent Ulama and *Sufi-Shaikhs* in the Reconstruction of Islamic Education: Foundation of Deoband (1867); and Nadva (1893), Muslim Education Quarterly 3 (1985): 2, p.49.
56. Farquhar, *op.cit.*, p.111.
57. Freitag, Sandria B., 'Sacred Symbol as Mobilizing Ideology: The North Indian Search for a Hindu Community', Comparative Studies of Society and History, 22 (1980): 4, p.610.
58. Ghosh, P.C., *op.cit.*, p.68.
59. *Ibid.*, pp.69-70.
60. Coupland, R., The Indian Problem: 1833-1935 (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), p.29.
61. Jordens, J.F.T., *op.cit.*, p.378.
62. Festival in honour of *Ganesh*, the elephant-headed god of success and wisdom in Hindu mythology.
63. More than two centuries before, Shivaji had successfully revolted against Muslim domination.
64. Ghosh, P.C., *op.cit.*, p.2.
65. Dutt, R.P., India Today: 1940 quoted in Desai, A.R., *op.cit.*, p.332.
66. For a detailed study, see Fatīhpurī, Farmān, Hindī-Urdu Tanāzāh (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1977), pp.154-235.
67. Aziz, K.K., The Making of Pakistan (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967), p.24.
68. Lambert, Richard D., 'Religion, Economics and Violence in Bengal', The Middle East Journal 4 (July 1950): 3, p.330.  
According to the 1911 census, one third of the landholders in East Bengal were *Brahmans* and *Kāyasthās*. Johnson, Gordon, 'Partition, Agitation and Congress: Bengal 1904-1908', Modern Asian Studies 7 (1973): 3, p.356.
69. In Bengal, the Muslim community 'formed 31.3 per cent of the total population but held only 8.5 per cent of the

posts in the judicial and executive services in 1886'.  
 Misra, B.B., The Indian Middle Classes, their Growth in Modern Times (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1961), p.388. As in 1887, Bengali Muslims occupied only five per cent of the posts carrying a salary of Rs. 75/- per month or more. Seal, Anil, *op.cit.*, pp.362.

70. Johnson, Gordon, *op.cit.*, pp.543-544.
71. *Ibid*, p.544.
72. Hardie, J.K., India: Impressions and Suggestions (London: Independent Labour Party, 1909), pp.25-26.
73. Philips, C.H., *op.cit.*, p.190 (from the 'Address to Lord Minto).
74. *Ibid.*, p.191.
75. Wasti, Syed Razi, The Political Triangle, *op.cit.*, p.60.
76. Khan, Aga, The Memoirs of Aga Khan (London: Cassell and Company Limited, 1954), p.95.
77. Agha Khan to Dunlop Smith (Private Secretary to the Viceroy), dated 29 October 1906, in Gilbert, Martin, Servant of India (London: Longmans, 1966), p.57.
78. Pirzada, Sharifuddin, Foundations of Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents, 1906-1947 (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1969), Vol.I, p.(d).
79. Hardie, J.K., *op.cit.*, pp.10-11.
80. Paysah Akhbar, 12 January 1912 quoted in S. Razi Wasti, 'Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk - A Great Political Fighter', Journal of Pakistan Studies 2 (1980): 1, p.97.
81. Qureshi, Ishtiaq Husain, The Administration of the Mughal Empire (Karachi: The University of Karachi, 1966), pp.28-29; Ulema in Politics, *op.cit.*, pp.253-254.
82. al-Qāsim, November 1912, pp.19-20.
83. Mawlānā Muḥammad 'Alī paid the following tribute to Shiblī Nu'mānī, his teacher, after lamenting the poor state of religious education at Aligarh.

Aligarh itself presented one bright spot in all this cimmerian darkness and I must not omit to mention it. This was no other than a college Professor of rare charms and of an entirely new literary outlook whom Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had been able to attract to Aligarh. He was Shibli Nu'mani, Professor of Arabic and Persian, an ardent lover of poetry and Islamic history.

- Ali, Mohamed, My Life: A Fragment, Afzal Iqbal (ed.) (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1966), p.23.
84. Mawlānā Zafar 'Alī Khān was a student and admirer of Shiblī. He translated Shiblī's al-Fārūq [the life of the second *Khalīfah*] into English.
85. Iqbāl, Muhammad, Iqbāl-nāmāh, Shaykh 'Ataullāh (ed.) (Lahore: Shaykh Muhammad Ashraf, 1945), vol.II, p.231.
86. Iqbāl, Muḥammad, Jawīd-nāmāh (Lahore: Shaykh Ghulam Ali and Sons, 1954), pp.63-70.
87. Bhatnagar, S.K., History of the MAO College Aligarh (Lahore: Book Traders, n.d), pp.178-180; Khan, Habibullāh, Ḥayāt-i-Āftāb (Aligarh: Old Boys Association, n.d.), pp.171-172.
88. The exchange of students scheme was soon abandoned after it was discovered that the first two visitors from Aligarh to Deoband were secret service agents of the colonial government.
89. Gīlānī, Manāẓar Aḥsan, *op.cit.*, p.226.
90. For instance, Mawlānā Sindhī was not a critic of Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad of Qadian (1838-1908); he indeed had contacts with Mirzā's followers. Perhaps this was not acceptable to Mawlānā Anwar Shāh Kāshmirī, who refuted the claims of Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad whom he declared *kāfir* and apostate. Anwar Shāh Kashmirī inspired the publication of a considerable amount of anti-*Aḥmadiyyah* literature, through his students.
- The *Deobandī* writers do not indicate in clear terms the religious points on which Mawlānā Sindhī's opinion differed from those of the senior teachers. The *Aḥmadiyyah* issue was perhaps one of them. For a discussion of Mawlānā Sindhī's views, see Aslam, Muḥammad (ed.), Mawlānā Sindhī Ke Siyāsī Maktūbāt (Lahore: *Nadwat-ul-Muṣaniffīn*, 1980), *passim*.
91. Sindhī, 'Ubaydullāh, Khutbāt-w-Maqālāt, Muḥammad Sarwar (ed.) (Lahore: Sind Sagar Academy, 1970), p.73.
92. Even though Mawlānā Sindhī himself could not write any commentary on the *Qurān*, the writings of his students (based on class notes) amply reflected the theme of *jihād* and struggle for liberty. Mawlānā Aḥmad 'Alī Lāhorī, Khawājah 'Abdul 'Hay Fārūqī and Mawlānā Bashīr Aḥmad Ludhiyānwī wrote the commentaries on the whole of the *Qurān* or on selected parts of it. The spirit of political struggle is evident in these commentaries.
93. Robinson, Francis, Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims, 1860-1923 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp.276-277.

94. Author's translation.  
'*Dastūr-ul-Āmal Anjuman-i-Khuddām-i-Ka'bah*', in *Tahrīkat-i-Millī*, Dr. Abū Salman Shāhjahānpurī, Dr. Anṣār Zāhid and Faṣīh-ud-dīn Siddiqī (eds) (Karachi: Government National College, 1983), p.115.
95. Mawlānā 'Abdul Bārī Farangī Mahallī (President) Ḥakīm 'Abdul Wālī Lakhnawī, Dr. Naẓīr-ud-dīn Ḥasan Lakhnawī, Muḥammad 'Alī, Shawkat 'Alī, and Mushīr Ḥasan Qidwā'ī.
96. *Khuddām-ul-Ka'bah*, 1 (December 1914): 7, p.34.
97. Qureshi, I.H., *Ulema in Politics*, *op.cit.*, p.237.
98. In addition to the Pan-Islamic press already in existence, *Anjuman* started a monthly named *Khuddām-ul-Ka'bah* (Delhi: June 1914).
99. Minault, Gail, 'Islam and Mass Politics: the Indian *Ulama* and the *Khilafat* Movement' in D.E. Smith (ed.), *Religion and Political Modernisation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p.17.
100. Ja'farī, Sayyid Ra'īs Aḥmad (ed.), *'Alī Brādrān* (Lahore: Muhammad Ali Academy, 1963), pp.328-412.
101. Jafri, S.R.A. (ed.), *Selections from Mawlana Mohammed Ali's Comrade* (Lahore: Mohammed Ali Academy, 1965), pp.498-524.
102. Iqbal, Afzal, *The Life and Times of Mohamed Ali* (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1974), p.168.
103. Sindhī, Dr. Mayman 'Abdul Majīd, *Sindh Men Tahrīk-i-Khilāfat*, *Barq-i-Gul* (Karachi: Government Urdu College, 1979), p.120.
104. Farrukhābādī, Raḥmat, *Tahrīk-i-Khilāfat Men Musalmānān-i-Sindh Kā Kirdār*, *Barq-i-Gul*, *op.cit.*, p.129.
105. Shāhjahānpurī, Abū Sulmān, *op.cit.*, pp.181-182.
106. In March 1913, a group of Indians living in America formed an organisation known as the 'Hindi Association'. Its sole objective was to work for the liberation of India, if necessary by armed struggle. San Francisco was chosen as the headquarters of the Association. In November 1913, the Association brought out its organ, *Ghadr* (Mutiny) in four languages - Punjabi, Hindi, Urdu and Marathi. The Association subsequently assumed the name of *Ghadr* Party. A large section of the Party's membership was drawn from the Sikhs. But, from the outset, 'it maintained a secular character and at no time did it seek emotional inspiration from Sikh religion' [Singh, Khushwant, *The Sikhs* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1953), p.118].

The *Ghadr* Party advocated the formation of secret societies for the purpose of launching a revolutionary movement within India, removing British colonialism by any means. Hardayāl Virendrānāth Chattopadhyaya, the editor of *Ghadr*, was arrested at the instance of the British government (25 March 1914), but his comrades were able to obtain his release on bail. He left for Germany.

At the outbreak of World War I, the Indian revolutionaries decided to throw their whole weight on the side of Germany. The German government, anxious to exploit anti-British feelings in any quarter, gave them support. Hardayāl and Raja Mahendrā Pratāp formed the 'Indian National Committee'.

In 1915, the *Ghadr* Party was active in India, especially in the Punjab. The British government requested the U.S. government to impose a curb on the activities of the *Ghadr* movement. Subsequently, *Ghadr* activists were arrested and convicted. See Brown, Giles Tyler, 'The Hindu Conspiracy: 1914-1917', *Pacific Historical Review* 17 (1948): 3, pp.299-310; Deol, Gurdev Singh, *The Role of the Ghadr Party in the National Movement* (Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1969); Juergensmeyer, Mark, 'Ghadr Sources: Research on Punjabi Revolutionaries in America', in Harbans Singh and N. Gerald Barrier (eds.), *Punjab Past and Present, Essays in Honour of Dr. Ganda Singh* (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1976), pp.302-321. This article contains a select bibliography on and of *Ghadr* Party's literature.

- 107 For detailed study of the Silk Letter Conspiracy, see Arab Bureau (Cairo), *The Arab Bulletin 1916-1919*, (London: Archives Editions, 1986), Vol. I, pp.427-431; Aybak, Zafar Ḥaṣan, *Āp Bīṭī* Vols. I and II (Lahore: Mansur Book House, n.d.); 'Ubayd-Allah Sindhi in Afghanistan', *Journal of the Regional Cultural Institute* 4 (1973): 3-4, pp.129-136; Madani, Husayn Ahmad, *Naqsh-i-Ḥayāt* (Deoband: *Maktabah-i-Diniyyah*, 1954); Miyan, Muhammad, *Tahrīk-i-Shaykh-ul-Hind* (Lahore: *Maktabah-i-Rashīdiyyah*, 1975); Sindhī, Ubaydullāh, *Kābul Men Sāt Sāl* (Lahore: Sindh Sagar Academy, 1955).
108. Muḥammad 'Alī, Dr. Mukhtār Aḥmad Anṣarī (1860-1936), Ḥakīm Ajmal Khān (1836-1928), Ḥasrat Mohānī (1877-1951), Maḥzar-ul-Ḥaq (1866-1929) and Mawlānā Abul Kalām Azād were the prominent Pan-Islamists.
109. Bolitho, Hector, *Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan* (London: John Murray, 1954), p.58.
110. The sessions in 1915 were held in Bombay and the phenomenon continued until 1919's sessions in Amritsar.
111. For the text of the 'Lucknow Pact', see Allana, G., *Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents* (Lahore: Islamic Book Service, 1977), pp.25-33; Philips, C.H., *op.cit.*, pp.171-173.

112. Hurewitz, J.C. (ed.), Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956), Vol. II, pp.11-12, 18-22.
113. *Jazīrat-ul-Ārab* included Mesopotamia, Arabia, Syria and Palestine.
114. *اخرجوا المشركين من جزيرة العرب*  
The other narration of the *ḥadīṣ* is as follows:  
*اخرجوا اليهود والنصارى من جزيرة العرب*  
(Expel the Jew and the Christian from *Jazīrat-ul-Ārab*)
115. For the development of Arab nationalism, see Hourani, A.H., Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1789-1939 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp.260-323; Landen, Robert G., The Emergence of the Modern Middle East: Selected Writings (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1970), pp.192-196, 227-230; Tibi, Bassam, Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp.47-96.
116. Landen, Robert G., *op.cit.*, pp.94-98, pp.119-125, pp.219-222; Lewis, Bernard, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp.346-352.
117. Prominent among them were Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Mīr Siyālkotī, Ṣanauḷlāh Amritsari, Muftī Kifayatullāh, ʿAbdul Bārī Lukhnawī, Ṣalāmatullāh, Āzād Subhānī and Aḥmad Sāid.
118. Robinson, Francis, *op.cit.*, p.293.
119. Chawdhari Khalīquzzamān named this meeting the 'First *Khilāfat* Conference'. He claimed to be the originator of the idea of this meeting, and according to his claims the 'All India *Khilāfat* Committee' was formed there and he was the person to draft its constitution. Pathway to Pakistan (London: Longmans, 1961), pp.47-49; Mawḍūdiyyat: Aek Āzāb (Karachi: International Press, n.d.), pp.28-29.  
  
The claims made by Khalīquzzamān do not seem to be correct. His name is neither mentioned among the conveners of the Conference nor among its delegates. The Conference was known as the 'All India Muslim Conference'. Manglorī, Sayyid Tufayl Aḥmad, Musal mānon Kā Roshan Mustaqbil (Delhi: Kutub-khānah Āzīziyyah, 1945), p.509.
120. Gandhi, M.K., The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (Delhi: The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1965), Vol. XVI, p.227.
121. According to one narration, Mawlawī Faḥl-ul-Ḥaq (1873-1962) presided over the Conference (Manglorī, *op.cit.*, p.509). Some others say that Gandhī was the President of the Conference. Krishna, Gopal, 'The *Khilāfat* Movement in India: The First Phase, September 1919-August 1920', Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, (1968): 1-2, pp.37-53.

- 122 The 25 'ulamā', present at the meeting were: 'Abdul Bārī F rangī Mahallī, Muḥammad Anīs, Pīr Muḥammad Imām Sindhī, Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Mir Siyālkotī, Qādir Bakhsh Badāyūnī, Khudā Bakhsh Muḥaffarpurī, Muḥammad Akram Khān, Sayyid M ḥammad Dāwūd, Salamātullāh, Asadullah Sindhī, Ghulām Nizāmuddīn Badāyūnī, Hāfiẓ Aḥmad Sa'īd, Tāj Muḥammad, M ilā Bakh h Amritsarī, Muniruzzaman, Sayyid Ismā'īl, Āzād Subḥānī, Abul Wafā Sanāullāh, Muḥammad Fākhir Ilahabādī, Kif'yatullah, Sayyid Kamāluddīn, Muḥammad Ibrāhīm of Darbhanga, 'Abdul Hakim Gayāwī, Muḥammad Sādiq and M ḥammad 'Abdullāh.
123. Author's translation.  
Miyaṅ, Sayyid Muḥammad, Jamīyat-ul-'Ulamā' Kiyā Hay? (Delhi Jamīyat-ul-'Ulamā' Publication Division, 1946), pp.10-11. [The wording of the objects was slightly changed in 1939 but without any real difference.]
- 124 Sa'īd, Aḥmad, Asāsī Usul-w-Aghrāz-w-Maqāsid-w-Zawābit Jamīyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind Kā Zer-i-Tajwīz Musawwadah (Delhi: n.d.), p.3.
- 125 Pirzada, Sharifuddin, *op.cit.*, Vol. I, p.539.
126. Gandhi, M.K., An Autobiography (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1969), p.363.
127. *Ibid.*, p.74.
128. The Natal Indian Congress was founded on 22 August 1894, chiefly through the efforts of Abdullah Haji Adam who was Gandhi's employer. From its inception to 1913, it was continuously presided over by Muslim merchants. It also relied heavily on the financial backing of the Muslim community. *Ibid.*, pp.111-114, p.117, p.147.
129. Brown, Judith M., Gandhi's Rise to Power, Indian Politics: 1915-1922 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1972), pp.9-11.
130. *Ibid.*, p.9.
131. *Ibid.*, p.12.
132. Krishna, Gopal, *op.cit.*, p.50.
133. Aziz, K.K., The Indian Khilafat Movement: 1915-1933 (Karachi: Pak Publishers Ltd., 1972)p. 134.
134. Majlis-i-Khilāfat Punjab, Tahrīk-i-'Adm-i-Ta'āwun Awr Ahkām-i-Dīn-i-Mubīn (Lahore: Majlis-i-Khilāfat Punjab, 1920), pp.1-8.
135. Rozinah, Parwin, Jamīyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind: Dastāwizāt Markazī Ijlāsha-ye-'Ām, 1919-1945 (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1980), Vol.I, pp.67-68.

136. انما ينهائكم عن الذين اتاكم في الدين واخرجوكم من دياركم ولما هروا على اخرجكم ان تولوهم ومن يتولهم فاولئك هم الظالمون  
Arberry, A.J., *op.cit.*, p.578.
- The ideologues of non-co-operation further elaborated their policy in several speeches and statements. See Āzād, Abul Kalām, *Mas'alah-i-Khilāfat-w-Jazīrat-ul-'Arab* (Calcutta: *al-Balāgh* Press, 1920), pp.138-143; Āzād, Abul Kalām, *Khutbāt-i-Āzād*, Mālik Rām (ed.) (Delhi: Sahitah Academy, 1974), p.49.
137. Rozīnah Parwīn, *op.cit.*, pp.76-78.
138. For the text of *fatwā*, see Ja'fari, Ra'īs Ahmad (ed.), *Awraq-i-Gumgashtah* (Lahore: Muhammad Ali Academy, 1968), pp.208-224; Shahjahanpuri, Abū Salmān (ed.), *Tahrīkāt-i-Millī*, *op.cit.*, pp.445-455.
- The first signature on the *fatwā* is of Mawlānā Abul Maḥasin Muḥammad Sajjād (d.1940), perhaps he drafted the *fatwā*.
139. Robinson, Francis, *op.cit.*, p.324.
140. For the views of Mawlānā Ashraf 'Alī Thānwī, see Jāfari, Ra'īs Ahmad (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp.326-331.
141. Khān, Ahmad Razā, *al-Muḥjat-ul-Mu'taminah fī Āyat-il-Mumtahinah* (Bareilly: *Matba' Hasanī*, 1920); Jāfari. Ra'īs Ahmad (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp.225-305. Also see Ahmad, Muḥammad Masūd, *Fāzil Barelwī Awr Tark-i-Mawālāt* (Lahore: *Markazī Majlis-i-Razā*, 1976), pp.27-72.
142. Mazharullāh, Muḥammad, *Fatāwā Mazahri* (Karachi: Madinah Publishing Company, 1970), p.321 and p.329; Jafri, Ra'is Ahmad, *op.cit.*, p.326.
143. Murādābādī, Na'im-ud-dīn, 'Mawālāt' in Na'imī, Ghulām Mu'in-ud-dīn (ed.), *Hayāt-i-Ṣadr-ul-Afāzal* (Lahore: *Maktabah-i-Ṣadr-ul-Afāzal*, n.d.), pp.118-153.
144. Siddīq, Muḥammad, *Professor Mawlawī Hākīm Ālī* (Lahore: *Maktabah-i-Razawiyyah*, 1983), pp.97-113.
145. Resolution of JUH in its annual session (Lahore: 18-20 November 1921), Rozīnah, Parwīn, *op.cit.*, pp.130-131.
146. A telegram from Mustafā Kamāl to 'Iṣmat Pāshā (January 1924) in Landen, Robert G., *op.cit.*, p.232.
147. Ghulām Muḥammad 'Azīz Hindī, an ardent worker for the *Khilāfat* movement, was responsible for floating this idea. He obtained the necessary *fatwā* from Mawlānā 'Abdul Bārī and publicised it. See his narration: 'Tahrīk-i- Hijrat Kī Tārīkh' in Ra'īs Ahmad Ja'fari, (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp.755-934.

148. For the view point of Mawlānā 'Abdul Bāri, see 'Alī, Shaykh Shāhid, Majmū'ah-i-Risālah-i-Hijrat-w-Risālah-i-Qurbānī-yi-Gāw (Lucknow: *Shams-ul-Matabi*, 1920).
- For Mawlānā Abul Kalām Āzād's *fatwā*, see Mihr, Ghulām Rasūl (ed.), Tabarrukāt-i-Āzād (Lahore: *Kitāb Manzil*, 1959), pp.203-206; Malik, Hafeez, Muslim Nationalism in India and Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963), pp.343-344.
149. See Qureshi, M. Naeem, 'The Ulama of British India and the Hijrat of 1920', Modern Asian Studies, 13 (1979): 1, pp.41-59.
150. The Muslims of mixed-Arab descent in Kerala (along the Malabar coast) are known as *Mappillas* (often transliterated as *Moplah*). During the 19th and early 20th centuries, the *Mappillas* (generally agricultural labourers and sharply differentiated economically and socially) had been active in insurrectionary protests against their landlords' repressive policies of eviction. The Rebellion (1921) represented the culmination of 32 recorded outbreaks during the period between 1836 and 1919. See Dale, Stephen Frederic, Islamic Society on the South Asian Frontier: The Mappilas of Malabar, 1498-1922 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Miller, Ronald E., Mappila Muslims of Kerala: A Study in Islamic Trends (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1976); Wood, Conrad, 'Peasant Revolt: An Interpretation of *Moplah* Violence in the 19th and 20th Centuries' in Clive Dewey and A.G. Hopkins (eds.), The Imperial Impact (London: Athlone Press, 1978), pp.132-151.
151. Presidential Address of Mawlānā Abul Kalām Āzād at the Third Annual Session of JUH (Lahore: 18-20 November, 1921) and the resolution passed thereat. Rozinah, Parwin, *op.cit.*, Vol. I, pp.121-126, and p.132.
152. On the general approach of the conservative sections of Hindu society towards INC's policy, see Lalchand, R.B., Self Abnegation in Politics (Lahore: The Central Hindu Yuvak Sabhā, 1938).
153. Keer, Dhananjay, Veer Savarkar (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1966), p.263.
154. For the activities of Swami Shradhānandā, see Jordens, J.T.F., Swami Shradhananda: His Life and Causes (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981).
155. Hardy, Peter, The Muslims of British India, *op.cit.*, p.204.
156. Uprety, Prem Raman, Religion and Politics in Punjab in the 1920s (Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1980), p.2.
157. Faruqi, Ziya-ul-Hasan, *op.cit.*, p.72; Kahaliquzzaman, Choudhry, Pathway to Pakistan, *op.cit.*, p.70.

158. Lawrence, Sir Walter Roper, The India We Served (London: Cassell and Co., 1928), pp.293-294.
159. The Hindu population was 36.28 per cent in 1911, and it reduced to 25.66 per cent in 1921. Uprety, Prem Raman, *op.cit.*, p.71.
160. Page, David, Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control 1920-1932 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp.86-88.
161. Shahnawaz, Begum. Father and Daughter: A Political Autobiography (Lahore: *Nigarshat*, 1971), p.73.
162. Page, David, *op.cit.*, p.99.
163. Rozinah, Parwin, *op.cit.*, Vol. I, pp.181-184.
164. *Ibid.*, p.189.
165. Page, David, *op.cit.*, p.109.
166. Nehru, Jawaharlal (ed.), A Bunch of Old Letters (London: Asia Publishing House, 1960), p.52.
167. Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin, *op.cit.*, Vol. I, p.580.
168. Mujahid, Sharif al, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation (Karachi: *Quaid-i-Azam Academy*, 1981), pp. 466-467.
169. The 11 members of the committee were as follows:  
Pandit Motilāl Nehrū (Chairman), Sir Tej Bahādur Sapru, Sir 'Alī Imām, G.R. Pradhān, Sha'ayb Qurayshī, Subhas Chandrā Bose, M.S. Aney, M.R. Jayakār, N.M. Joshī, Sardār Mangal Singh and Jawaharlāl Nehrū (Secretary).
170. Rozīnah, Parwīn, *op.cit.*, Vol. I, pp.484-500.
171. Aziz, K.K., The All India Muslim Conference (1928-1935): A Documentary Record (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1972), p.24.
172. *Ibid.*, p.11.
173. Page, David, *op.cit.*, p.195.
174. Aziz, K.K., The All India Muslim...., *op.cit.*, pp.56-57.
175. *Ibid.*, pp.53-55.
176. *Ibid.*, pp.56-67.
177. For life and works of Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, see Beg, Abdulla Anwar, The Poet of the East (Lahore: *Quamī Kutub-khānah*, 1938); Khan, Zulfiqar Ali, A Voice from the East (Lahore: The Mercantile Electric Press, 1922); Wahid, S.A., Iqbal: His Art and Thought (Lahore: Shaikh

Mohammad Ashraf, 1944); Vahid, S.A., Introduction to Iqbal (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.).

178. The Nehrū Report made a reference to Dr. Iqbal's proposal, rejecting it in the following words:

A ... proposal was made to us namely that the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind should all be amalgamated together and that there should be no reservation of seats, unless the minority desires in that area. We are unable to entertain this proposal. It would mean the creation of an unwieldy Province sprawling all over the North and North-West.

[Report of the Committee appointed by All Parties Conference 1928, (Allahabad: All India Congress Committee, 1928), pp.37-38].

179. Pirzada, Sharifuddin, Foundations of Pakistan..., *op.cit.*, Vol. II, pp.158-159; Shamloo (ed.), Speeches and Statements of Iqbal (Lahore: *al-Manār* Academy, 1944), pp.11-13.
180. Afzal, M. Rafique, Political Parties in Pakistan: 1947-1958 (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976), p.26.
181. Ch wdharī Afzal Haq was the brain behind MAI. His writings had a radical tinge. See, for example, Haq, Afzal, Din-i-Islām (Lahore: *Qawmī Kutub-khānah*, n.d.).

His pronouncements were refuted by some of the 'ulamā' outside the pale of MAI. They labelled him a socialist. For instance, see Qasimi, Baha-ul-Haq, Ishtarākiyat Awr Islām (Lahore: The Author, n.d.).

182. The Kashmir Agitation was MAI's spontaneous response in order to demonstrate its unity with the Muslims in the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Muslim majority in the princely state started a movement of protest and demonstration against the oppressive rule of the autocratic Maharaja. In some parts of the Jammu province, the administration had completely broken down and British troops had been called in. The strong counter measures taken by the government of the princely state resulted in the displacement and emigration of Kashmiri Muslims into the neighbouring Punjab. MAI took the issue of Kashmiri Muslims and launched a massive campaign in support of their rights. The ruler of the state was approached in vain to sort out Muslim grievances. In order to put pressure on the ruler of the state, MAI started sending batches of volunteers to the state to help the Muslim demonstrators. MAI volunteers were unable to cross the border of the state, and were arrested. But within three months of MAI's appeal, over 40,000 people were reported to have courted arrest. The

MAI-led agitation only subsided with the arrest of MAI leaders in the Punjab and of Kashmiri agitators in the state.

Apart from the MAI campaign, an All-India Kashmir Committee was formed to help Kashmiri Muslims, especially by providing them with legal aid. The President of the All-India Kashmir committee was Mirzā Bashīr-ud-dīn Maḥmūd Ahmad (1889-1965). He was the son of Mirzā Ghulām Ahmad Qādiyānī and the religious head of the larger section of the *Aḥmadī* community. It was reported that the *Aḥmadīs* tried to convert the poor Kashmiri Muslims to their creed in the guise of offering them brotherly help. MAI took it as an affront to the Muslim creed, and with the passage of time, MAI developed a hard attitude towards *Aḥmadīs*. See Ansari, Taj-ud-din, *Jab Ahrār Ne Tahrīk-i-Kashmīr Kā Āghāz Kiyā* (Multan: *Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam*, 1968); Lavan, Spencer, *The Ahmadiyah Movement. A History and Perspective* (Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1974), pp.145-163.

183. H.M.S.O., Government of India Act, 1935 (London: H.M.S.O., 1935).
184. Singh, Anita Inder, The Origins of the Partition of India: 1936-1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), p 2.
185. Phillips, C.H., The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858 to 1947 Select Documents (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p.248.
186. Padda, Sharifuddin, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, p.261.
187. Rizvi, Gowher, Linlithgow and India: A Study of British Policy and the Political Impasse in India, 1936-1943 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978), p.17.
188. Padda, Sharifuddin, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, pp.171-172.
189. Sa'id, Ahmad, Mawlānā Ashraf 'Alī Thānwī Awr Tahrīk-i-Āzādī (Lahore: *Majlis Sayānt-ul-Muslimīn*, 1984).
190. Phillips, C.H., The Partition of India, *op.cit.*, p.11.
191. Batalawi, Ashiq Husayn, 'Iqbāl Awr Tahrīk-i-Pakistān', Journal of Research (Humanities), 2 (1967): 2, p.31.
192. Qurayshī, Nūr-ul-Haq, Swānih Hayāt Qāzī Iḥsān Ahmad Shuj'ād-dī (Multan: *Maktabah-i-Iḥsan*, n.d.), pp.267-268.
193. Mujhid Sharifal, *op.cit.*, p.487.
194. Mawlānā Ahmad Sa'id assured Muhammad 'Alī Jinnāh as follows

I have already written to the members of the *Jamiat-ul-Ulemā-i-Hind* to make effective speeches in support of the Muslim League in public meetings and

appeal to the Moslem voters to reserve their votes for the candidates of the League only.

Zaidi, Z.H., 'Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy, 1937-47' in C.H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright (eds.), The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives, 1933-1947 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970), p.247.

195. Mujahid, Sharifal, *op.cit.*, pp.419-436.
196. Bolitho, Hector, *op.cit.*, p.112.
- 197 'League Parliamentary Board Manifesto, 1936' reproduced in Mujahid, Sharifal, *op.cit.*, pp.482-487.
- 198 Azad, Abul Kalam, India wins Freedom (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1959), pp.160-161; Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad, The Emergence of Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p.27; Coupland, R., Indian Politics: 1936-1942 (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), p.14; Khaliquzzaman, Choudhry, Pathway to Pakistan, *op.cit.*, pp.156-157; and Sayeed, K.B., The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), p.34.
199. Sharma, M.S.M., Peeps into Pakistan (Patna: *Pustak Bhandar*, 1954), p.3.
200. Khaliquzzaman, Choudhry, *op.cit.*, p.161.
201. Azad, Abul Kalam, *op.cit.*, p.161.

Rajendrā Prasād, though incorrectly labelled Ḥāfiẓ Muḥammad Ibrāhīm as an Independent but his inclusion in the INC ministry made the 'other Muslims' disgruntled. Prasād commented: 'Possibly, if the proposed agreement between the Independent Muslims [?] and the Congress had materialised, the communal animosity which the Muslim League whipped up later might never have been brought about'. [Prasad, Rajendra, Autobiography (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1957), p.446.]

There is another view that in fact negotiations broke down not on the number of seats but on personalities. AIML desired to see Nawāb Muḥammad Ismāīl Khān (1886-1958) as its representative which was not acceptable to INC leaders. [Mehrotra, S.R., 'The Congress and the Partition of India' in C.H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright (eds.), *op.cit.*, pp.195-196.]

202. Iqbal, Muhammad, Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1943), p.15.
203. Philips, C.H., The Partition of India, *op.cit.*, pp.14-15.
204. Pirzada, Sharifuddin, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, p.280 and p.274.

205. For the text of Sikandar-Jinnah Pact, see Malik, Iftikhar Haider, Sikandar Hayat Khan: A Political Biography (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1985), p.162.
206. The following reports were produced and published by AIML. Report of the Enquiry Committee Appointed by the Council of All India Muslim League to Enquire into Muslim Grievances in Congress Provinces (Delhi: 1938) [Reprinted in Jafri, Ra'is Ahmad, Rare Documents (Lahore: Mohammed Ali Academy, 1967), pp.151-226]; Report of the Enquiry Committee Appointed by the Working Committee of the Bihar Provincial Muslim League to Enquire into Some Grievances of Muslims in Bihar (Patna: Bihar Provincial Muslim League, n.d.).
207. *Vande Mātaram*, composed by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee (1838-1894) occurs in his novel, Ānand Math, first published in 1882. Chatterjee was among the prominent Hindu writers of the late 19th century who laid great stress on the heroic episodes of Hindus against Muslim rule in order to arouse nationalist sentiment. The historical background surrounding the plot of the novel is unfriendly and hostile to Muslim feelings. In 1896, it was sung for the first time at the annual session of INC. During the *Swadeshī* movement in Bengal, its first two words i.e. *Vande Mātaram*, gradually became a slogan of nationalism. Muslims considered the song to be sectarian in character and not national. Sayyid Ālī Imām (1869-1933) recorded the dislike of this song on the part of the Muslims in his presidential address to the session of AIML Amritsar: 30 December 1908). After expressing de pair and disappointment on the 'sectarian cry' of *Vande Mātaram*, he prayed to INC leaders to 'put before the country such a programme of political advancement as does not demand the sacrifice of the feelings of the Hind or the Mohammedan, the Parsee or the Christian'. No heed was paid to the request of Sayyid Ālī Imām at that time or afterwards.

During the heated controversy on *Vande Mātaram* in 1937, INC urged the Muslims to accept the song in its own right and consider it 'apart from the book' (i.e. Ānand Math). It could not abandon the song altogether and discarded the stanzas referring to Muslim rule. It was left to the discretion of the organisers of any particular gathering to sing *Vande Mātaram* or any other song of an unobjectionable character in addition to *Vande Mātaram* or in its place.

After independence, Fabindranath Tagore's *Janā Ganā Manā* was adopted as the national anthem of India and *Vande Mātaram* was given 'equal status with it'. The objection to *Vande Mātaram* was not confined only to INC's opponents. The Muslims within the fold of INC were not also entirely satisfied with this song. The view of the late Humāyūn Kabir, the well known Muslim intellectual affiliated to INC, was recorded by Kuldip Nayar in his Distant Neighbours as 'very unfair of a secular India to

have adopted *Vande Mātaram*'. Muslim protest against the singing of *Vande Mātaram* can be heard even today. See, for example, Clark, T.W., 'The Role of Bankim Candra in the Development of Nationalism' in C.H. Philips (ed.), Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp.429-455; Nayar, Kuldeep, Distant Neighbours: A Tale of the Sub-Continent (Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1972), p.13; Noorani, A.G., 'Vande Mātaram: A Historical Lesson' Economic and Political Weekly 8 (9 June 1973): 23, pp.1039-1043; Pirzada, Sharifuddin, Foundations of Pakistan, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, pp.51-52.

208. Ahmad, Jamiluddin (ed.), Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1952), Vol. I, pp.110-111.
209. Coupland, R., *op.cit.*, p.132.
210. For details of such proposals see Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin, Evolution of Pakistan (Lahore: the All Pakistan Legal Decisions, 1963), pp.35-260.
211. Chawdhari Rahmat Ālī invented the name Pakistan for the 'combined Indian and Asian homelands' of Muslims. In 1933, he explained the composition of the word Pakistan in the following words:

It is composed of letters taken from the names of all our homelands - 'Indian' and 'Asian'. That is Punjab, Afghania (North-West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Iran, Sind (including Kachch and Kathiawar), Tukharistan [*sic.*], Afghanistan and Baluchistan. It means the land of the Paks - the spiritually pure and clean.

He propounded this idea in a pamphlet Now or Never issued from his private address in Cambridge (28 January 1933). His idea was so novel that it took him 'more than a month to find three young men [Khān Muḥammad Aslam Khān Khaṭṭak, Ṣāhibzādah Shaykh Muḥammad Sādiq and Khān Inayatullah Khān] in London' to sign it with him jointly. After his first pamphlet, he formed a 'Pakistan National Movement' (1933) to propagate his ideas.

In 1937 Chawdhari Rahmat Ālī suggested two other independent regions for Muslims, *Bāng-i-Islām* (Bengal and Assam) and *Oṣmanistan* (Hyderabad-Daccan); and, began to interpret Pakistan as the combination of 'The five north western strongholds' [Punjab, Afghania (NWFP), Kashmir, Sindh and Baluchistan]. See Ali, Choudhari Rahmat, Pakistan: The Fatherland of the Pak Nation (Cambridge: The Pakistan National Movement, 1947), pp.224-227 and pp.252-254.

Chawdhari Rahmat Ālī's scheme made a stir in press and political circles, but it had no appeal for the AIML

leaders who rejected it as 'only a student's scheme, chimerical and unpractical' [*ibid.*, p.231]. In 1934, when Edward Thompson called Muhammad Iqbal as a protagonist of the 'Pakistan scheme', the latter was prompt to tell Edward Thompson that

Pakistan is not my scheme. The one that I suggested in my address is the creation of a Muslim Province - i.e. a province having an overwhelming population of Muslims - in the North West of India. This new province will be, according to my scheme, a part of the proposed Indian Federation. Pakistan scheme proposes a separate federation of Muslim Provinces directly related to England as a separate dominion. This scheme originated in Cambridge. The authors of this scheme believe that we Muslim Round Tablers have sacrificed the Muslim nation on the altar of Hindu or the so-called Indian nationalism.

[Muhammad Iqbal to E. Thompson, 4 March 1934, in Ahmad, S. Has n, Iqbal: His Political Ideas at Crossroads (Aligarh: Printwell Publications, 1979), p.80].

Ch wdhari Rahmat Ali was hailed by the sympathisers of 'Pakistan National Movement' as 'The Founder of P k i t n'. Ahmad, Khan A., The Founder of Pakistan: Through Trial to Triumph (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, 1942).

212. Pirzada, Sharifuddin, Evolution of Pakistan, *op.cit.*, p 149.
213. Pirzada, Sharifuddin, Foundations of Pakistan, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, pp.337-338.
214. *Ibid* , p.341.
215. Resolution of the Council of AIML (adopted on 27-28 August 1939) Allana, *op.cit.*, p.220.
- 216 For the constitutional scheme underlying the Cripps' Mission, see Philips, C.H., The Evolution of India and Pakistan, *op.cit.*, pp.371-372.
- 217 Choudhary, G.W., 'The Cripps Mission' in Mahmud Husain (ed.), A History of the Freedom Movement (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1970), Vol.IV, p.135.
218. Philips, C.H., The Evolution of India and Pakistan, *op.cit.*, p.342.
219. Lumby, E.W.R., The Transfer of Power in India: 1945-7 (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1954), p.33.

220. See Moon, Penderel, Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp.137-158.
221. Ahmad, Jamiluddin (ed.), *op.cit.*, Vol.I, p.575.
222. Ahmad, Jamiluddin (ed.), Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1947), Vol.II, p.89.
223. Nichols, Beverley, Verdict on India (London: Jonathan Cape, 1944), p.190.
224. Ahmad, Jamiluddin, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, p.437.
225. Muhammad Ali Jinnah parted company with INC in December 1920, during the popular *Khilāfat* and Non-Co-operation movements in spite of his concern over the *Khilāfat* issue. The reason behind the parting of the ways can be traced in his letter to Gandhī. He wrote as follows:
- Your extreme programme has for the moment struck imagination mostly of the inexperienced youth and the ignorant and the illiterate...
- [Bolitho, Hector, *op.cit.*, p.84.]
226. Lacey, Patrick, Fascist India (London: Nicholson and Watson, 1946), p.33.
227. For the role of Muslim students in AIML's politics, see Zaman, Makhtar, Students' Role in the Pakistan Movement (Karachi: *Quaid-i-Azam* Academy, 1978).
228. Khān, Siddīq 'Alī, Beteqh Sipāhī (Karachi: Allies Book corporation, 1971), p.235.
229. 13 pamphlets were produced (1945-47) in this series. Each of them contained a statement to the effect that the views expressed in it did not 'necessarily represent the official views of the All India Muslim League'. The 13 pamphlets are compiled in a single volume. See Afzal, Rafique (ed.), The Case for Pakistan (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1979).
- On the same lines, a series of pamphlets in Urdu were published by *Idārah-i-Ṭulū'ī-Islām* Delhi.
230. Ahmad, Jamiluddin (ed.), Preface to 'Pakistan Literature Series No. 1' in Afzal, Rafique (ed.), The Case for Pakistan, *op.cit.*, p.iv.
231. For the role of the press in Pakistan movement, see Niazi, Zamir, Press in Chains (Karachi: Karachi Press Club Publications, 1986), pp.23-24, and the chapter entitled 'Jinnah and the Press', pp.26-40.
232. Lacey, Patrick, *op.cit.*, p.136.

233. Pirzada, Sharifuddin, Evolution of Pakistan, *op.cit.*, pp.217-220.
234. Adhikari, G., Pakistan and National Unity (Bombay: People's Publishing House, 1944), p.29.
235. Rozinah, Parwin, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, pp.632-645.
236. Qureshi, I.H., *op.cit.*, pp.349-350.
237. Madanī, Husayn Ahmad, Mutahiddah Qawmiyat Awr Islām (Delhi: Kutub-khānah Āziziyyah, n.d.).
238. Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Ālā, Masalah-i-Qawmiyat (Lahore: Maktabah-i-Jamā'at-i-Islāmī, 1939).
239. Dār, Bashīr Ahmad (ed.), Anwār-i-Iqbāl (Karachi: Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 1967), pp.166-170; Shamloo, *op.cit.*, pp.223-239.
240. Saīd, Ahmad, *op.cit.*, p.89.
241. *Ibid.*, pp.144-145.
242. *Ibid.*, p.89.
243. Faruqī, Ziya-ul-Hasan, *op.cit.*, pp.96-100.
244. Madanī, Husayn Ahmad, 'Presidential Addresses in JUH Sessions' in Parwīn Rozinah, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, p.8; Madanī, Husayn Ahmad, Muslim League Kiyā Hay? (Delhi: Jamīyat-ul-'Ulamā; 1945); Shari'at Bil A wr League (Delhi: Jamīyat-ul-'Ulamā Hind, n.d.).
245. Ispahanī, M.A. Hasan, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah As I Knew Him (Karachi: Forward Publications Trust, 1976), pp.24-25.
246. Madanī, Husayn Ahmad, 'Presidential Address in JUH Session (1945)' in Parwin Rozinah, *op.cit.*, Vol II, p.792.
247. Smith, W.C. Modern Islam in India, *op.cit.*, p.297.
248. Sīyālkotī, Muhammad Ibrāhīm Kīr, Paygham-i-Hidāyat Dar Tā'id-i-Pākīstan-w-Muslim League (Amritsar: Sarai Press, 1946), pp.70-71.
249. Shafī, Muftī Muhammad, Congress Awr Muslim League Ke Muta'alīq Shar'ī Faylah Deoband. Dār-ul-Isha'at, 1946 , pp.24-25.
250. Author's translation of the resolution passed at the Conference.  
Qādiri Muhammad Jalāl-ud-dīn, Khutbat All India Sunnī Conference 1925-1947 Gujrat. Maktabah i Razwiyyah, 1978 , p 283.
251. There is scarcity of authentic information on Sayyid Abul Ālā Mawdūdī s formative years. He himself did not write in detail on his life experience in spite of consistent

requests from his adherents and critics alike. He always turned down any suggestion, saying:

Biography always remains incomplete before death, and there are many more important projects to be undertaken.

He imparted only scanty information about his early career either in press interviews, or in private letters, or in autobiographical notes. He relied heavily on his memory; therefore, such information as is available from his writings cannot be accepted without thorough scrutiny.

Leonard Binder wrote a life sketch of Sayyid Abul Alā Mawdūdī [Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), pp.78-83] which has since been utilised by writers interested in Sayyid Mawdudi's life and thought. See Āfāq, Abul, Sayyid Abul Alā Mawdūdī, Sawānih, Afkār, Tahrik (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1971); and Bahadur, Kalim, The Jamāāt-i-Islāmī of Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Books, 1978).

Binder's information needs to be corrected in certain respects. For instance

... family that claims descent from Maudud, a relater of traditions of the Prophet, who is said to have come to India with Muhammad bin Qasim (p.78).

Mawdud Chishti was a *ṣūfī* of 12th century. He was neither the relater of the traditions of the Prophet nor did he come to India with Muhammad B. Qāsim.

His [Mawdudi's] father was ... a companion of Sir Saiyid Ahmad Khan (p.79).

Mawlāwī Aḥmad Ḥasan should not be considered a companion of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān on the basis of the former having been a student of Aligarh College for some time.

In 1920 he [Mawdūdī] went to Delhi where he worked as sub-editor of *al-Jamiat*, organ of the *Jamiat-ul-ulama-i-Hind*. He remained at this work until 1927 (p.79).

al-Jamiyat was started on 2 February 1925, and Sayyid Mawdūdī's name appeared on it as its editor starting from the issue of 14 June 1925. He remained the editor until 15 May 1928.

During the *Khilāfat* movement

he is said to have translated from English to Urdu What happened to Samarquand?; The Condition of Christians

in Turkey; and Greek Atrocities in Smyrna  
(p.81).

No such translation of 'What happened to Samarquand?' by Sayyid Mawdūdī exists.

A book was written by one Dayanand Saraswati, a prominent member of the *Arya Samaj* and a follower of Swami Shardanand, in which an insulting reference was made to Muhammad the Prophet. Dayanand was murdered by a Muslim called Abdul Rashid, and a sensational trial followed (p.82).

Not being satisfied with what he wrote, Binder added a footnote:

It is evident that the names and the incident referred to were garbled by my informant ... (p.82).

Dayānandā was the founder of *Āryā Samāj* and Swāmī Sharaddhanandā was his follower. Sharaddhanandā was murdered, not because of writing any book but because he was the foremost leader of the *Shuddhī* movement.

As a result of this work [Towards Understanding Islam] Maududi sprang into prominence as one of the leading theologians in India (p.82).

The book, written in an attractive style for senior matriculation students, highlighting the importance of Islamic faith and its fundamental teachings, had nothing to do with the theological questions in depth. No doubt this work is the most popular one among his writings, and has been translated into 14 languages; but, Sayyid Mawdudi's prominence among the theologians rests on such works as *al-Jihād fil Islām*, *Tafhīmat* and *Pardah*, etc., and not on Towards Understanding Islam.

252. Mawdūdī's letter to Mawlānā 'Abdul Bārī, *Nuqūsh* April-May 1968, no. 109, part II, p.238.
253. The two pamphlets were: *Waqīāt-i-Samarnā Ke Mutā'aliq Ittihādī Commission Kī Report* (Delhi: *Dār-ul-Ishāāt-i-Siyāsiyāt-i-Mashriqiyyah*, 1921); and *Turky Meñ 'Isā'iyyon Kī Hālat* (Delhi: *Dār-ul-Ishāāt-i-Siyāsiyāt-i-Mashriqiyyah*, 1922).
254. H.B. Khan has provided the exact dates of Mawdūdī's joining and leaving JUH's papers, after physically checking the files of the *Muslim* and *al-Jamīyat*. See *Barr-i-Saghīr Pāk-w-Hind Kī Siyāsāt Meñ 'Ulamā' Kā Kirdār: Biswīn Šadī Meñ 1940 Tak* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1985), pp.238-243.
255. Sayeed, K.B., 'The *Jamaat-i-Islami* Movement in Pakistan', *Pacific Affairs* 30 (1951): 1, p.61.

256. Some writers have stated that Mawdūdī was the founder of the Tarjumān-ul-Qurān; see Abbot, Freeland, Islam and Pakistan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), p.172; Abbot, Freeland, 'The Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan', The Middle East Journal 11 (1957): 1, p.38; Sayeed, Khalid B., *op.cit.*, p.61; and Khan, H.B., *op.cit.*, p.246.

In actual fact, however, Tarjumān-ul-Qurān was started by Mawlawī Abū Muḥammad Muṣliḥ, an ‘ālim of Bihar, who was under the spell of Mawlāna Abul Kalām Āzād's Tarjumān-ul-Qurān, a commentary on the Qurān. Muṣliḥ edited the first six issues of the monthly. From the seventh issue onwards Mawdūdī took charge of the organ, and changed it entirely both in appearance and in respect of its contents.

257. Qureshi, I.H., Ulema in Politics, *op.cit.*, p.333.
258. For the correspondence on this subject and on Mawdūdī's thinking at the time, see Gilani, Asād, Iqbāl, Dār-ul-Islām Awr Mawdūdī (Lahore: Islami Academy, 1978), pp.99-207; Yusuf, Muhammad, 'Maudoodi: A Formative Phase', Islamic Order, 1 (1979): 3, pp.33-43.
259. Chawdhari Rahmat ‘Alī objected to this position of AIML:

It is foolish in the name of logic, because, at one and the same time, how can they [the Muslims] be 'half-Indian' and 'half non-Indian'? That is, 'territorially' Indian but 'nationally' non-Indian; again, 'internationally' Indian, but internally non-Indian ...

(Pakistan: The Fatherland of the Pak Nation, *op.cit.*, p.244).

260. A part of it was translated into English as Nationalism and India (Dār-ul-Islām Pathankot: Maktabah-e-Jamāat-e-Islāmī, 1947).
261. Maudoodi, Sayyed Abul Ala, Nationalism and India, *op.cit.*, p.5, pp.9-11.
262. For a revised edition of Musalmān Awr Mawjūdah Siyāsī Kashmakash, including some of his other related writings, see Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Ālā, Tahrīk-i-Āzādi-yi-Hind Awr Musalmān, 2 vols. (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1964).
263. Manzūr-ul-Ḥaq Ṣiddiqī, an AIML worker, has testified to this in his recollections. See Ṣiddiqī, Manzūr-ul-Ḥaq, Ma‘āsar-ul-Ajdād (Lahore: al-Maktabat-us-Salfiyyah, 1964), p.400.

Miṣbah-ul-Islām Farūqī, an Aligarh old-boy, narrated as follows:

I remember how in Aligarh, the University students kept volumes of the above-cited book [Musalman Awr Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmakash] pressed to their bosom together with many other works of him and the copies of the Tarjuman-ul-Quran during the election campaign before partition [of India]. They used to recite pages after pages of this literature in public meetings to refute the stand of the Congress and its Hindu and Muslim leadership and upheld how a free and independent Islamic state was the part of their very faith in Islam and its ideology.

Faruqi, Misbah-ul-Islam, Introducing Maududi (Karachi: Students Publication Bureau, 1968), p.31.

264. Smith, W.C. - Modern Islam in India, *op.cit.*, p.149. In October 1939, Mawdūdī wrote a paper on the political theory of Islam. It was published in English translation in Janaury 1940 in The Awakening, (All India Muslim Students Federation's organ). This organ was pro-AIML in orientation.
265. Faruqi, Misbah-ul-Islam, Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (Lahore: The Author, 1957), pp.7-8.
266. Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Ālā, Aek Nihāyat Aham Istiftā' (Dār-ul-Islām Pathankot: Daftar Tarjumān-ul-Qurān, n.d.), pp.5-11.
267. Tarjumān-ul-Qurān, 25 (July-October 1944): 1-4, p.104.
268. Mawdoodī, Sayyed Abul Ala, Process of Islamic Revolution (Dar-ul-Islam Pathankot: Maktabah-e-Jamaat-e-Islami, 1947), pp.22-23.
269. Lumby, E.W.R., *op.cit.*, p.59.
270. Return Showing the Results of Elections to the Central Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures in 1945-46 (Delhi: Manager of Government Publications, 1948), p.8.
271. *Ibid.*, p.55.
272. A locality in Lahore where Sikhs owned some property including a dilapidated and disused mosque. The Sikhs decided to demolish the mosque in 1935, not long before an election was due to be called. Even though MAI was known for its religious zeal it was faced with a dilemma because of the approaching election. If it started a serious campaign for the recovery of the mosque, its whole leadership would be put behind bars, and it would effectively be prevented from taking part in the election; at the same time, if it did not take notice of the situation, it would be vulnerable to criticism that

it failed to agitate against the demolition of the mosque in Lahore, the heart of the Punjab. In an effort to overcome the dilemma, the MAI leadership adopted a low key approach. This resulted in the defection of a group under Mawlānā Zafar Ālī Khān. This group formed a new party known as the *Ittihād-i-Millat* (Unity of the Community). A bitter struggle took place between MAI and the new party. Zafar Ālī Khān became the champion of the movement for the recovery of the mosque. Appeals were filed in the courts, but the law of property favoured the occupants.

Its half-hearted participation in the Shahidganj incident damaged the image of MAI. It fared badly in the 1937 election.

273. Author's translation.  
Bukhārī, Sayyid Abū Muāwiyah Abū Zar,  
Rūdād-i-Ijtimā'-i-Sahāranpur (Lahore: Maktabah-i-Majlis-i-Ahrār Islām Pakistan, 1978), p.8.
274. Smith, W.C., *op.cit.*, p.228.
275. He was joint secretary of AIML from 1937 to 1947.
276. Shafī', Muftī Muḥammad, *op.cit.*, pp.1-32.
277. 'Usmānī, Zafar Ahmad, Anwār-un-Nazar Fī Āsar-iz-Zafar (Lahore: Markazī Majlis-i-Ṣayānat-ul-Muslimīn, 1978), pp.60-61.
278. Author's translation.  
Tarjumān-ul-Qurān, 27 (1945): 3-4, p.189.
279. For the role played by the *ūlamā'* and *pīrs* in the Punjab election, see Gilmartin, David, 'Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab', Modern Asian Studies, 13 (1979): 3, pp.485-517; Sayeed, Khalīd B., Politics in Pakistan: the Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp.13-16; and Talbot, I.A., 'The 1946 Punjab Elections', Modern Asian Studies, 14 (1980): 1, pp.65-91.
280. Ahmad, Azīz, 'Activism of the *Ulama* in Pakistan' in Nikki R. Keddie (ed.), Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East Since 1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p.257.
281. Statement by the Cabinet Delegation and His Excellency the Viceroy (16 May 1946). Philips, C.H., The Evolution of India and Pakistan, *op.cit.*, p.378; Moon, Penderel, *op.cit.*, p.471.
282. Several studies deal with the Cabinet Mission Plan and the events that followed. See, for example, Campbell-Johnson, A., Mission with Mountbatten (London: Robert Hale, 1951); Hodson, H.V., The Great Divide (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1969), pp.133-398; Lumby, E.W.R., *op.cit.*, pp.71-201; Menon, V.P., The Transfer of

Power in India (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1957); Moon, Penderel, *op.cit.*, pp.226-464; and Pandey, B.N., *op.cit.*, pp.175-211.

283. Ahmad, Jamiluddin (ed.), Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1947), Vol.II, p.419.

284. *Ibid.*, p.467.

285. Hodson, H.V., *op.cit.*, p.201.

A few days after Lord Mountbatten's arrival in India, Pandit Nehru asked him: 'Have you by some miracle got plenipotentiary powers?' 'Why do you ask?' said the Viceroy. Nehru replied: 'You behave quite differently from any former Viceroy. You speak with an air of authority as though you were certain that what you said would never be reversed by HMG in London.' 'Suppose I have plenipotentiary powers. What difference would it make?' Nehru's answer was prophetic: 'Why then you will succeed, where all others have failed.'

286. Azad, Abul Kalam, India Wins Freedom, *op.cit.*, p.217.

287. Prasad, Dr. Rajendra, *op.cit.*, p.597.

288. T lbot, *op.cit.*, p.82.

289. D w , 27 April 1947

290. F r the te t see Philips, C H., *op.cit.*, pp.397-402.

291. *Ibid.*, pp 407-411.