

**The Discursive Representation of Islam and Muslims
In British Broadsheet Newspapers**

Volume 1

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*To my Parents,
for everything*

Abstract

This thesis analyses the discursive representation of Islam and Muslims in British broadsheet newspapers. Here, discourse is defined as 'language in use', and therefore discourse analysis is the analysis of 'what people do with language'. By foregrounding the practical functions of language in such a way, this thesis' analysis of broadsheet newspapers illustrates that news discourse can function as action and not merely interaction. That is, broadsheet journalism is viewed not merely as reporting and re-presenting social relationships, but as a social practice instrumental in producing, reproducing and/or resisting (unequal) social relationships between Muslim and non-Muslim.

The thesis employs two methods of data collection and analysis. First, quantitative content analysis was used in order to provide an initial macro exploration of journalistic content *across* the sampled broadsheet newspaper reports. Second, Critical Discourse Analysis was used in order to explore meaning - and the social implications of such meaning - *within* these same journalistic texts. The results were considerably enriched by the combination of these research methods.

The results show that broadsheet newspaper reporting is predominantly characterised by racist representations of Islam and Muslims. This dominant position is based on a two-fold process of 'division and rejection' typical in racist discourse which relies upon a negative other-presentation and a simultaneous positive self-presentation. 'Our' positivity is only explicitly stated when defending against accusations of intolerance and/or discrimination, but is implied throughout via an associative relationship between 'the West' and 'civility'. In contrast, 'Their' negativity is frequently asserted, with journalists drawing upon four archetypal prejudicial strategies which emphasise 'the Muslim threat': a military threat; the threat of extremism and terrorism; despotism and the threat to democracy; and the social threat of gender inequality. The specific articulation of these four prejudicial discourses varies between different reporting topics and across different national reporting contexts, which, I argue, illustrates the importance of adopting a context-sensitive position when analysing journalistic discourse.

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Introduction

Racism, xenophobia and anti-semitism are still widespread in Britain, perpetuating discrimination and disadvantage for the groups whom these (racist) discourses position as inferior and subordinate. Indeed racism is on the increase across the European Union as a whole. During the period of newspaper coverage sampled for this study (October 1997 - January 1998) for example, the stark findings of a European Commission report on xenophobia and racism in the 15 member states were published (reported in both the *Daily Telegraph* and *Guardian*, 20 December 1997). In Britain, 32 percent of respondents openly admitted to being either "very racist" or "quite racist", a proportion which rose to a particularly disturbing 66 per cent when those respondents admitting to being "a little racist" were also included.¹ Further, given the general reticence to racism, it is by no means unthinkable that the level of racist prejudice in Britain is, in fact, much higher.

Racism, moreover, is not restricted to the 'minds' of men and women as prejudiced belief, attitudes and opinions. Rather, as Wieviorka (1995) has suggested, racism connotes

two distinct logics, the one being a logic of inferiorisation, which aims to ensure the racialised group receives unequal treatment, the other a logic of differentiation, which tends to set it apart and, in extreme cases, expel or exterminate it. (p. xv)

Repeated studies indicate the high levels of discrimination and social exclusion suffered by Britain's black and 'Asian' communities. The Parekh Report (Runnymede Trust, 2000), for example, cites a Policy Studies Institute investigation from the mid-1990s which found

overall about one in eight of the people it surveyed - Bangladeshi, Caribbean, Chinese, Indian, Pakistani - had experienced racist insults or abuse during the previous 12 months. It estimated that about 20,000 people suffer a physical assault each year, 40,000 have items of property damaged and 230,000 experience abuse or insults. (from Modood *et al*, 1997; cited in Runnymede Trust, 2000: 57)

The widespread racism evidenced in the EC report (since supported by the Runnymede Trust, 2000), its implicit *acceptance* given the respondents' willingness to admit to being racist, and the inequitable and injurious social conditions endured by 'racial' and ethnic minorities which emanate from such racism, demand immediate and vigorous critique and contestation.

This thesis analyses the discursive representation of Islam and Muslims in British broadsheet newspapers. In accordance with the requirements of PhD research, this study is unique in three principal ways. First, it is a pioneering empirical analysis examining the reporting of a single identified theme within the British broadsheet press. The absence of a dedicated study of broadsheet newspaper coverage on *any* issue is an omission which this thesis aims to rectify. Second, only scant empirical research has been conducted on newspaper representation(s) of Muslims, with the majority of work completed to date relying largely on selective, non-systematic anecdotal evidence to 'illustrate' biases in media coverage. Third, this thesis is based on a novel combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection and analysis in order to highlight both manifest and latent meaning in the sampled items of reporting. The combination of these two research methods is therefore particularly useful in analysing how (predominantly) disempowered sections of society, such as British Muslims, are reported in the élite broadsheet press.

The focus on the broadsheet newspapers, to the exclusion of the 'tabloid' press, reflects an interest in three characteristics of British broadsheet journalism. First, their traditional emphasis on 'objective' and 'balanced' reporting as opposed to tabloid newspaper's tendency towards being sensationalist and partisan. Second, the larger emphasis on 'news' and politics as opposed to gossip, scandal and 'info-tainment', and third the higher proportion of highly educated, middle/upper class readers in the audience/consumer profile of broadsheet newspapers. Consequently broadsheet newspapers are regarded, both by journalists and readers, as the epitome of journalistic excellence, and this status combined with it's affluent audience/consumers provides an interesting example of an élite member-group discourse. Since broadsheet newspapers are "simultaneously

constitutive of [the] social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief" (Wodak, 1995: 208) of the educated, empowered and economically successful sections of society, they represent a particularly important site for the production, reproduction and/or resistance to discourse on and around notions of 'We-dom' and 'They-dom' (Hartley, 1992). The occurrence of prejudice, rejectionist strategies and "everyday racism" in broadsheet newspapers, stands as an indication of the extent to which such racist practices have "become part of what is seen as 'normal' by the dominant group" (Essed, 1991: 288).

The structured and directed manner in which texts achieve their (often persuasive) goals are of central importance in evaluating the power of journalistic discourse, made all the more so when we acknowledge the *discursive* potential of texts to modify power relations in other fields (Bourdieu, 1991). Repeated studies (see Chapter 2 below) show that language in use - *discourse* - has social effect (both intended and unintended) and should therefore be considered and approached as social practice. Racist talk and text therefore not only symbolise, legitimate and support racist social inequalities, they constitute racist social practice *in themselves*. The research is therefore grounded in a clear theoretical framework focusing on the ways in which the discourse structures of the broadsheet press "enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce or challenge relations of power and domination in society" (van Dijk, 1998: 2).

The thesis in outline

Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical and empirical body of work which will be drawn on throughout the remainder of the thesis. Central to this chapter is Norman Fairclough's model of Critical Discourse Analysis, and, following a brief introduction to academic research on and about 'race' and racism, the chapter is structured across three sections which discuss the three conceptual dimensions which should be foregrounded in a successful discourse analysis: social practices; discursive practices, including but not exclusively the practices of news gathering and news reporting; and the linguistic analysis of texts. During the discussion of each of these three

levels of analysis, emphasis is placed on both exploring their inter-related nature and, specifically, how texts - in this case the reporting of British broadsheet newspapers - may produce, reproduce and/or resist 'racialised' social inequalities. The chapter ends with a summary of the relationship which this thesis assumes between discourse, racism and the social exclusion of Muslims.

Chapter 3 provides the methodology for the thesis, and, after providing the rationale for the specific sample of newspapers analysed, discusses the objectives, assumptions and specificities of the research methods which the study employs. The research applied two methods of data collection and analysis: content analysis, drawn from a traditionally quantitative field of media research; and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which, whilst certainly grounded in the empirical and systematic analysis of texts, draws on a much more constructivist, and context sensitive analytic perspective. Broadly speaking, content analysis is indispensable in looking at meaning *across* texts, whilst CDA is particularly useful in the analysis of meaning *within* texts (Deacon *et al*, 1999). The chapter therefore argues that the combined explanatory power of these two research methods in illuminating different aspects of the data is particularly productive in analysing the content and power of (newspaper) texts within their contexts of production and reception.

Following this discussion of the theoretical and methodological bases of this research, Chapters 4 to 7 present the resulting analysis of the recorded items of newspaper coverage. The choice and focus of these chapters are structured in order to reflect prominent patterns in broadsheet reporting of Islam and Muslims. More specifically, prominent reporting patterns were determined across two axes: the numeric frequency of reports on and about certain issues/ topics/ themes/ countries/ etc.; and the (ideological) significance of reporting certain issues/ topics/ themes/ countries/ etc. given the position and performative role of broadsheet newspapers in the(ir) social context(s). Each of these results chapters are divided into two broad sections: in the first, the quantitative results are presented as tables, with data drawn from the summarised frequencies

produced by *coding* the content of the recorded reports. The second section of each results chapter provides more detailed qualitative analyses of the claims, assumptions and arguments of the newspaper articles chosen for each chapter.

Chapter 4 (the first of these results chapters) discusses and analyses the reporting of British Islam and British Muslims in broadsheet newspapers. Following the analysis of quantitative results, the chapter is structured across five major sections, each of which analyse significant aspects of the domestic reporting of Islam and Muslims in accordance with the criteria of 'prominence' referred to above. The first two of these qualitative sections discuss the broad characteristic features of domestic coverage: the first explores the tendency of the press to divide 'Islam' and 'the West' and the implications of such division for both the symbolic and substantive inclusion of Muslims within the (semantic, social, political, etc.) domain 'British'; the second analyses items of recorded coverage which move from such 'strategies of division' to 'strategies of rejection'. Centrally important to such rejection is the 'ideological square' of prejudiced talk and text (see Chapter 2, and van Dijk, 1987; 1991; 1993; 1996; 2000), which structures reporting around a positive 'Self' presentation and a simultaneous negative 'Other' presentation. Three examples are introduced and explored in this second section in relation to this (racist) dichotomisation of reporting. The third section develops the negative representation of British Muslims further, through a more extended analysis of the domestic reporting of 'Muslim terrorism' in broadsheet newspapers. Fourth, the chapter analyses how the sampled newspapers represented 'Muslim education' and Muslim schooling, focusing specifically on the coverage generated by the granting of Voluntary Aided status to two Muslim schools (9 January 1998). The predominant approach of reporting on and around this topic emphasised the 'difficult' nature of British Muslims and the undesirability of Muslim schools, both in terms of their specific 'Muslim-ness' and also their more general outcome teaching Muslim pupils separately from non-Muslim pupils. The fifth section discusses items of recorded coverage which, whilst constituting a very small minority, present a much valued 'positive', or 'open' representation

(Runnymede Trust, 1997) of British Islam and Muslims. The items discussed achieved this 'open' representation through two argumentative strategies: first, by suggesting that the 'differences' between Islam and 'the West' may be imagined or, at the very least, far less significant than presupposed; and second, through the 'normalisation' of (British) Muslim worship. The chapter concludes by suggesting that the predominantly negative representations of British Muslims which characterise the majority of domestic reports studied, are illustrative of the low levels of social identification and solidarity which broadsheet journalists feel towards British Muslims. It is this lack of identification which enables the division between 'Us' and 'Them', upon which the ideological square and its rejection strategies can be built.

Chapter 5, analysing the reporting of Algeria, is the first of three chapters which investigate international reporting and the representation of (predominantly) non-British Muslims. The quantitative section of this chapter shows that the reporting of Algeria during the sample period was linked, seemingly inexorably, to violence and terrorism, to the extent that an increase in the number of Algerian reports resulted in a corresponding rise in reported (Muslim) 'terrorist violence'. This, combined with the thoroughly myopic vision of the broadsheet press, which restricted reporting of the Algerian conflict to an almost exclusively 'Algerian' focus thus ignoring the influences and agenda of not just other nations but also the several international oil companies currently active in 'prospecting' for Algeria oil and gas, led to an especially impoverished account of the conflict. For the most part, journalists reproduced the explanation of the conflict offered by the Algeria Junta: that Muslim terrorists were responsible for the deaths of civilians, deaths which were terrible in both form and frequency. However, as the qualitative section of the chapter shows, the ascribed agency for these deaths varied substantially across the sample period, with journalists mirroring each other's frequent shifts in apportioning blame. In order to illustrate and examine the changes in journalist's argumentative claims, the analysis is divided into three periods of newspaper coverage - October 1997; November to December 1997; and January 1998 - which are presented chronologically. The chapter shows that within each of these

periods, the majority of broadsheet newspapers *reversed* the group they accused of perpetrating such atrocities. Thus, when a period opened with journalists blaming 'Muslims', by the end the majority were insinuating the involvement of Algerian Junta; likewise, when a period opened with journalists insinuating the involvement of the Algerian Junta, by the end the majority were re-blaming 'Muslims'. The chapter concludes by arguing that, whilst the repeated recourse of broadsheet newspapers to the convenient racist stereotypes and misinformation provided by the Algerian Junta were symptomatic of the absence of 'staff journalists' on the ground in Algeria, the reporting of Algeria illustrates a selective amnesia - and, occasionally, selective ignorance - of broadsheet newspapers which is both astonishing and perplexing.

Chapter 6 explores the broadsheet reporting of Iraq, which over the sampled four months was dominated by the issues and activities of UNSCOM weapons inspections. Following the presentation of quantitative results, the qualitative section of the chapter argues that a single discursive strategy, directed at justifying military attacks on Iraq and the removal of President Saddam Hussein from power, predominates across the sampled Iraq articles. This strategy is, in essence, an argument for 'Western' intervention in Iraq which arises from the claims, themes, implications and a number of presuppositions present in the reports. This qualitative analysis is divided into eight sub-sections, the first six of which examine, in detail, the prominent elements of this discursive strategy: the (selective) use of international law as an argumentative resource; the personification of the stand-off and negative representation of Iraqi leaders; the ideological square in reporting Iraq, across different levels of linguistic analysis; the sophistication of 'Our' weaponry; the threat of 'Their' weaponry; and the explicit proposal and discussion of plans to 'remove' Saddam Hussein from power. The seventh sub-section analyses dissenting articles and the arguments they employ in undermining the dominant discursive strategy. Such articles were very much in the minority and tended to be concentrated in columns and readers' letters, yet are an important feature to acknowledge given their contestation of the dominant discursive strategy across all its

levels. The eighth sub-section discusses articles which, at first glance, appear to be only tangentially connected to the issues of the UNSCOM inspections and Saddam Hussein's regime. However, through a more detailed context-sensitive reading, the chapter shows that their argumentative claims and representations of Iraq are functional to the dominant discursive strategy present across most recorded 'Iraq articles'. The chapter concludes with an analysis of two examples of 'travel' writing, in order to illustrate that even journalistic formats conventionally directed at presenting the most attractive aspects of a country were subverted and written from a position in which the 'threat of Iraq' - militarily, civilly and socially - was emphasised.

Chapter 7 provides a summative account of the 'ideological square' in international reports. Focusing predominantly on items of recorded coverage located in Palestine, Israel, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, the chapter argues that the texts analysed are based upon a structuring of presuppositions, themes and arguments indicative of van Dijk's ideological square, and dominated by a twin process of 'division and rejection' of Muslims from 'Us'. The quantitative section of the chapter discusses a range of variables which recorded the evaluation of Muslim social action, the argumentative representation of Islam and Muslims, and the relative occurrence of 'positive' to 'negative' words and phrases, all of which illustrate the extent to which Muslims are associated with negativity in broadsheet newspapers. The remainder of the chapter is structured into two broad sections presenting a much more detailed discourse analysis. The first of these investigates how 'Their' negativity is constructed and maintained, and focuses on four stereotypical topoi: the 'military threat' of Muslim countries; the 'threat of Muslim extremism'; the (internal) 'threat to democracy' posed by Muslim political leaders and parties; and the 'social threat of Muslim gender inequality'. The latter half of this discourse analysis, attending to the simultaneous contraposition of the ideological square, examines selected items of coverage in which 'Our' civilising influence *on* or *over* Muslims is either implicitly assumed or else explicitly stated. Two case studies are discussed in the light of this: the first critiques the framework of 'Islam vs. the

West' which broadsheet newspapers project onto Iranian *internal* politics, to the extent that President Khatami and his supporters are recreated as the personification of 'Western' progress, battling the regressive forces of Islamic government. The second case analyses the normalisation of Israeli aggression in broadsheet newspapers, and shows how the position 'We' is mutable and can be expanded to include individuals, groups and even other nations which in other contexts are represented as 'foreign'. The actions of the Israeli government, specifically their attempted assassination of Khaled Meshal, the head of Hamas' politburo, are discussed in light of this argument.

Notes

¹ This percentage was lower than much of the remaining member states. For example: 83 per cent of Danish respondents identified themselves as "racist"; as did 82 per cent of Belgians; 75 per cent of the French; 74 per cent of Austrians; 77 per cent of the Dutch; and 68 of German respondents.

Chapter 2

Theory and Practice of the Discursive Representation of Islam and Muslims

In this chapter I introduce and discuss the theoretical and empirical academic research considered necessary and relevant to the analysis of British broadsheet newspaper representations of Islam and Muslims in the later chapters. This chapter, and the thesis as a whole, views news as discourse, journalistic output as social practice and discourse analysis as the analysis of 'what people do with language'. I broadly apply Norman Fairclough's (1989, 1992, 1995a, 1995b; 2000; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997) model of Critical Discourse Analysis in discussing these claims. This model rejects any analysis of talk and text outside of the social context in which it is produced, and focuses specifically on the role which discourse plays in producing, reproducing and/or resisting social inequality and the deleterious (and often structural) relations of dominance, discrimination, power and control.

Following a brief introduction to academic research on and about 'race' and racism, the chapter is divided into three sections which discuss, in turn, the three conceptual dimensions which Fairclough considers indispensable to a satisfactory discourse analysis: societal practice; discursive practice; and the (critical) linguistic analysis of newspaper text. The first section introduces the social practices which form a backdrop to contemporary journalistic output and the social 'discourses' available for journalists to draw upon in reporting Islam and Muslims. I first outline the critique which Said (1978) offers of the (disciplinary) discourses of 'Orientalism' and the theoretical response which the thesis provoked, before focusing on the British social context, the claims which two reports written by the Runnymede Trust (1997, 2000) made regarding 'Islamophobia' in Britain, and the effects which such prejudice and racism are having on the socio-economic position(s) of British Muslims.

The second section introduces the discursive practices of British journalism. I discuss the contributions which the Sociology of Journalism has

offered to the greater understanding of journalistic practice, production and products, before focusing in much more detail on past research on the representation of 'race' and ethnicity in journalism. Here I suggest that, due to a shift from explicit racism in the news to more implicit 'coded' references to 'race' - and specifically that social activities can be predicted from, or 'read off', the ascribed ethnic 'essence' of an individual or group - a more nuanced analytic approach to the study of news reporting is needed than the previous emphasis on 'coding and counting' in journalism studies. Such an approach has been developed in the field of linguistics, increasingly supported by the burgeoning field of discourse studies. The third section introduces the principle contributions of discourse analysis to the (linguistic) study of news texts, focusing on lexicon, syntactic structures, semantic structures - of which argumentation forms the principle area discussed - and the pragmatic ability of texts to 'perform actions' and, thus, how meaning and action are related in language. The chapter ends with a summary of the relationship which this thesis assumes between discourse, racism and the social exclusion of Muslims.

2.1 Introduction

Although the focus of this thesis corresponds closely with recent work on 'race', racism and prejudicial representation in general, and whilst I certainly regard my arguments and conclusions to be located with a critical anti-racist paradigm, due to the restrictions on space imposed by the thesis I will only present the briefest of introductions to the complicated and highly contested field of research on and around 'race'. This absence is not an over-sight, nor should it be viewed as a desire to ignore or dismiss an important and extensive body of research, but rather as a calculated decision to introduce and discuss research which focuses specifically on 'anti-Muslim' prejudice, exclusion and rejection.

Hage (1998) argues that whilst 'racism' is generally erroneously considered to be

a system of beliefs, a mode of clarification or a way of thinking [...] this general and dominant tendency to define racism as a mental phenomenon has continually led to an under-theorisation of the relationship between the mental classification involved and the practices in which they are inserted, between what racists are thinking and what racists are doing. (p. 29)

Zubaida (1970) similarly argues that “social psychological and micro-sociological” studies which study “prejudice and discrimination in interpersonal and community contexts [...] do not concern themselves with the social-structural location of groups” and therefore fail to acknowledge how place, space and time “crucially affect the nature of discrimination and prejudice” (p. 2). Billig (1991: 122-141), equally drawing on this critique of the ‘mentalist’ focus of much social-psychological research on prejudice, suggests that the commonly held definition of the word ‘prejudice’ *in itself* supports implications of essentialised, simplified, false, or else irrational conclusions. In this way, by focusing research on the ‘mental origins’ of racism there is the added danger that the very *practical* functions of racism will be sidelined. Donald and Rattansi (1992) have made a similar point, arguing that racism ought to be approached from a position which assumes that it is “rooted in broader economic structures and material interests” (p.3). From such a position:

Meanings and beliefs do not become irrelevant, but the coherence and falsity of racist ideas [are] now ascribed to the function they serve in legitimating social practices that reinforce an unequal distribution of power between groups differentiated in racial and/or ethnic terms. (Ibid.)

Such an approach - foregrounding the social functions of ‘racism’ - forms the argumentative foundation of this thesis and structures the remainder of this chapter. Explicit in this critique of racism is not just an acknowledgement of the differentiation and stratification of ‘racialised’ individuals and groups, but also the very *practical* functions of racism in maintaining: first, inequitable systems of social power; and second, behavioural manifestations of racism such as verbal rejection, avoidance, discrimination, physical attack and extermination (see Allport (1954) for further discussion). The definitional account of racism offered by Anthias (1995) is particularly useful in drawing

together the ideational and practical elements of racism(s). First, Anthias (1995) notes that it is important to acknowledge that

Racisms come in different guises. All are, however, underpinned by a notion of a natural relation between an essence attributed to a human population, whether biological or cultural, and social outcomes that do, will or should flow from this. (p.288)

Central to the above quote is racism's 'fixity' of social action, or the idea that social phenomena - by which I refer not just to social activity but also to human *potential*, be that personal or collective - is irrevocably and indelibly directed, arrested or advanced by a population's identified "essence". Further, and in a similar vein to the previous quote taken from Hage (1998), Anthias (1995) acknowledges "what are referred to as racist practices and outcomes cannot be understood exclusively as outcomes of race categorisation" (Ibid.) since:

Racism is not just about beliefs or statements (discourse in this narrow sense). Racism also involves the ability to impose those beliefs or world views as hegemonic, and as a basis for the denial of rights or equality. Racism is thus embedded in power relations of different types. (p.291)

The strength of this particular account of racism, particularly for the current research, is that it is not restricted to 'biological' racism. Racism's 'biological' heritage has often been a sticking point in past discussion of anti-Muslim racism, necessitating the use of neologisms such as 'Islamophobia' (see discussion below) to account for such practices. Anthias (1995) suggests a more inclusive definition: that racism is "a discourse and a practice whereby ethnic groups are inferiorised" (p.294). Therefore:

Undesirable groups need not be conceptualised in explicit *racial* terms, but as *Others* more generally. [...] For example, anti-Muslim racism in Britain relies on notions of the 'non-civilised', and supposedly inferior and undesirable, character of Islamic religion and way of life, rather than an explicit notion of biological inferiority. However, what allows us to refer to all these discourses and practices as racist is to be found in the attribution of collective features to a given population. This population is endowed with *fixed, unchanging* and *negative* characteristics, and subjected to relations of *inferiorisation* and *exclusion*. (Ibid.; emphases added).

I have two partial objections to Anthias' position above. First, I regard her proposed division of racism into "discourse and practice" as definitionally inadequate. Discourse analysts - 'critical' and otherwise - define discourse as "language in use" (Brown & Yule, 1983: 1; also see Fairclough, 1989; Schiffrin, 1987, 1994; and others) and discourse analysis as the analysis of what people *do* with talk and text. Such an approach views discourse as practice, not separate from it, and therefore regards racist discourse as constitutive of racist practice. Second, I believe that the disadvantage and exclusion suffered by British Muslims is more aggregated and entangled with (more traditionally) racist notions of biological inferiority than Anthias' above quotation suggests.¹ "The essential point to stress", the Runnymede Trust (2000) argues,

is that over the centuries all racisms have had - and continue to have - two separate but intertwining strands. One uses physical or biologically derived signs as a way of recognising difference - skin colour, hair, features, body type, and so on. The other uses cultural features, such as ways of life, customs, language, religion and dress. [...] Most Muslims are recognised by physical features as well as by their culture and religion, and the biological and cultural strands in anti-Muslim racism are often impossible to disentangle. (p.62)

To summarise the position briefly introduced above: racism involves "discriminatory practices, as well as a system of prejudiced ethnic attitudes and ideologies supporting and monitoring such discrimination. It may include discrimination and prejudice against 'racial' minorities as well as other forms of ethnocentrism and xenophobia, such as anti-semitism" (van Dijk *et al*, 1997: 165). 'Discourse', here defined as language in use²,

[...] plays a crucial role in the enactment as well as in the reproduction of this system. Thus, racist talk and text themselves are discriminatory practices, which at the same time influence the acquisition and confirmation of racist prejudices and ideologies. This is especially the case for white elite groups and institutions, such as politics, the media, scholarship and corporate business, whose prestige, power and influence have played a prominent role in the 'preformation' of racism at large. (van Dijk *et al*, 1997: 165)

Racism, like all social phenomena, is discursive: it both constitutes social relations between individuals and groups in society - usually hierarchies of

the sort discussed above - and, at the same time, is constituted by these social relations. The representation of, for example, Muslims in broadsheet newspapers is similarly simultaneously socially constitutive and socially determined - assumptions which are developed and operationalised further in the Critical Discourse Analysis of Norman Fairclough (1989; 1992; 1995a; 1995b; 2000; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). The model which Fairclough proposes, is founded upon the recognition of the discursive dialectical relationship of "structure" and "event" ('agency' in traditional sociological terminology) present in every and all communicative action. This communicative act can be further defined as "a complex of three elements: social practice, discursive practice (text production, distribution and consumption), and text, and the analysis of a specific discourse calls for analysis in each of these three dimensions and their interrelations" (Fairclough, 1995b: 74). Accordingly Fairclough (1995b) claims

language use [is] imbricated in social relations and processes which systematically determine variations in its properties, including the linguistic forms which appear in texts. One aspect of this imbrication in the social which is inherent to the notion of discourse is that language is a material form of ideology, and language is invested by ideology. Also inherent to discourse is the dialectical relation of structure/event [...] : discourse is shaped by structures, but also contributes to shaping and reshaping them, to reproducing and transforming them. (p. 73)

Fairclough's account of a theoretical tension in language use is clearly visible in the above excerpt through his uniting of "structure/event" - aspects of discourse which Fairclough regards as inseparable. Language use is "shaped by structures, but also contributes to shaping and reshaping them" - a constitutive characteristic of language which Fairclough regards to be not just 'conventional' but also 'creative', "denoting social change in accordance with the flexibility of prevailing social circumstances" (Titscher *et al*, 2000: 149). Hence even in its most creative, 'radical' moments, language use cannot be viewed outside of the context of the communicative event - an event which both enables and restricts its (creative) articulation.

For analytic reasons however, it is useful to introduce and discuss separately the three "elements" of (racist) discourse - social practice,

discursive practice and text - before their (re)unification in this thesis' analysis of results. There will, of course, be a certain degree of 'bleed' between the discussion of the three elements given their manifest interrelations, but despite these convergences, three distinct theoretical sections are identifiable:

- *Social Practice*: the social phenomena existing prior to, and hence shaping, impinging upon and accessible to journalistic practice. That is, 'Orientalist' and other prejudicial (re)presentative accounts of Islam and the social exclusion of Islam and Muslims in Britain.
- *Discursive Practice*: the Sociology of Journalism and the newsroom production of news-text in general, moving to a fuller, more detailed account of previous work studying the representation of 'race', racism and 'Othering' in the news.
- *The (critical) analysis of Text*: the analysis of linguistic and discursive strategies (in the more limited sense of discourse as 'structures above the level of sentences') influential in the reproduction of racism.

2.2 Social Practice

2.2.1 Orientalism

In contrast to the vast diversity in Muslim practice across the globe (Asad, 1993; al-Azmeh, 1993; Barakat, 1990; Beinín & Stork, 1997; Esposito, 1998; Haddad & Esposito, 1998; Rodinson, 1978; Said, 1978, 1997), "[t]he orientalist approach to Islam can be summarised as essentialist, empiricist and historicist; it impoverishes the rich diversity of Islam by producing an essentialising caricature" (Sayyid, 1997: 32). It is towards Said's (1978) critique of 'Orientalist' representations of Islam, and a brief account of other theoretical work which his thesis influenced, that this chapter now turns.

For the scholar and political activist Edward Said, 'Orientalism' signifies systems of representation framed by hegemonic political forces which bring 'the Orient' into 'Western' thinking, 'Western' consciousness and Western empires. According to Orientalist ontological schema, 'The Orient' is separate, different, conservative or archaic or barbarian (depending on the

vehemence of the critique), sensual and passive. Accordingly, 'the Orient' tends towards despotism and away from development, and further, its 'progress' is measured in terms of, and in comparison to 'the West', which implicitly and occasionally explicitly maintains its position of the 'inferior Other'. Said suggests that one of the most significant accomplishments of 'Orientalism' is the construction of 'an Orient'. The depiction of a single 'Orient', or a single Muslim 'Middle East' which can be studied as a cohesive whole, works to essentialise an image of an archetypal (and usually male) 'Oriental', unchanging in 'His' primitive, culturally specific beliefs and practices. More specifically,

Said argued that orientalism provides accounts of Islam (and the Orient) which are organised around four main themes: first, there is an 'absolute and systematic difference' between the West and the Orient. Secondly, the representations of the Orient are based on textual exegesis rather than 'modern Oriental realities'. Thirdly, the Orient is unchanging, uniform and incapable of describing itself. Fourthly, the Orient is to be feared or to be mastered. [...] All these narratives rest upon the assumption that Islam is ontologically distinct from the West. (Sayyid, 1997: 32)

However, *Orientalism* is still a vigorously discussed text, producing widely diverging assessment of the contents and implications of Said's arguments. For example, in contrast to Sayyid's above focus on the (re)presentative account of Islam 'provided' by Orientalism, Sardar (1999: 13) suggests that

The history of Orientalism shows that it is not an outward gaze of the West toward a fixed, definite object that is to the east, the Orient. Orientalism is a form of inward reflection, preoccupied with the intellectual concerns, problems, fears and desires of the West that are visited on a fabulated, constructed object by convention called the Orient.

On this subject, Blommaert and Verschueren (1998) argue that in prejudiced discussion of the 'racial' or ethnic other, the 'other' is always "a projection of an intra-European enemy consisting of a complex of features founded upon superstition and stereotypes of immoral and anti-social conduct" (p. 19). Thus

The perceived Arab tendency towards verbosity and antagonistic dispute is the opposite of the *self-ascribed* European norms of negotiation, consensus and rational dialogue. The more and more frequently emphasized Islamic inclination towards fundamentalism is supposed in contrast with Christian tolerance and democratic pluralism. (Ibid.; emphasis added)

Yegenoglu (1998), adopting a distinctively Hegelian position, suggests that Orientalism concerns “the cultural representation of the West to *itself* by way of a detour through the other” (p.1), in which “the [Western] subject is constructed by a mediation through the [Eastern] other” (p.6). In this way,

The subject represents itself to itself through the other and constitutes itself as universal, abstract subject (the I or ego) by signifying the other as a categorical opposite, a radical denial or negation of itself. (Ibid.)

Thus, this signification of categorical opposites simultaneously *supposes* and *sustains* the epistemological and ontological distinction between ‘the West’ and ‘the East’, a strategy by which “the Oriental or non-Western societies are pushed back in time and constructed as primitive or backward” (Ibid.) in contrast to the socio-cultural properties which ‘the West’ is (indubitably) assumed to possess.

A discussion of *Orientalism* would not be complete without a brief summary of Said’s use of Foucault’s power/knowledge nexus, given Orientalism’s construction of a particular form of negativised ‘Otherness’ intended to subordinate and (dis-)possess. Sayyid (1997) suggests that, for Said, Orientalism constitutes “an exercise in power/knowledge by which the ‘non-western’ world is domesticated. [...] He contended that orientalism was made possible by the imperialist expansion into the Muslim world, and, simultaneously, it made such an expansion possible” (p. 31). A great amount of academic ink has been spilt drawing out the implications of this *discursive* (in the Foucauldian sense of the word) nature of ‘Orientalism’, in much the same way as the ‘origins’ of racism have been and are still regularly discussed. Broadly expressed, this debate centres on a ‘which came first’ question: did colonialism *create* these racisms in order to justify the theft of lands and the subjugation of peoples; or was colonialism a *product of* these racisms? in as much as the theft of lands and the subjugation of peoples is

encouraged, or perhaps only possible, following the assumption of 'Their' inferiority. The positions taken in this argument are, of course, essentially contestable. The view adopted throughout this thesis however, which is no doubt traceable in part to my own ontological position, is that racisms - by which I refer not only to essentialised difference and essentialised hierarchies but also to the *disciplinary* and *repressive use* of power - are the product of colonial and imperial incursions into lands occupied by ('racial' and/or ethnic) 'Others'. This is not to say that racial prejudice did not occur prior to such conquest(s) and acquisition; nor do I suggest that modern racism(s) are solely directed against colonised peoples. However, prior to Western imperialism and (later) colonialisation, such 'racial' prejudice existed to a much greater extent as *belief* rather than *practice* - that is, in the minds and writings of (white) people, as 'phobias' and as 'anxieties' rather than racism(s) as defined above.³ A brief discussion of such precolonial prejudice will hopefully illustrate this point.

Daniel (1960) has shown, for example, that prior to the Christian 'Crusades' and the occupation of the 'Holy Lands', Christian polemics were firmly rooted in attacking Muslim *belief* rather than Muslim *people*. Such polemics attempted to illustrate the heretical and irrational nature of *Islam*, usually in the form of attacks on the structure and style of the Qu'ran, as opposed to arguing for the subjugation of Muslims. The prominent argumentative line taken by these polemics in attacking the Qu'ran was often quite simply that "it was too badly written to be of God" (Daniel, 1960: 58). The polemicists' evasion of the living practices of Muslims was *essential* to the 'success' of their argumentative intentions to derogate Islam:

Of Muslim practice there can have been practically no information available. Thus it was the number of wives allowed that was the focus of interest, rather than the number Muslims mostly had; it was generally implied, rather naively, that they would always enjoy in practice as many as they could by law. It was the permission for divorce which was given attention, rather than its actual frequency; it was the very idea of [...] *coitus interruptus*, or, in Spain, of unnatural relations between spouses [sodomy and the marriage of divorcees] rather than any knowledge of the actual occurrence of these things, which gave scandal. (Daniel, 1960: 160-1)

Again displaying 'Islamophobia' as opposed to anti-Muslim racism, Voltaire wrote in his *'Fanatisme ou Mahomet le prophete'*, that Islam is based upon Mohammed's boasting "of being rapt to heaven and of having received there part of this unintelligible book which affronts common sense on every page" (cited in Daniel, 1960: 290). Such prejudice is both insulting and sacrilegious to Muslims. Further, I have no doubt that the readers of such material will have gained (further) prejudicial material with which to derogate both Islam and (therefore) Muslims (see van Dijk (1987) for a discussion of how texts are 'used' in such ways). However, until the colonisation of the near and far East - which the 'Crusades' should be viewed as inaugurating - the anti-Muslim prejudice typical of 'Western' and more accurately Christian texts, was maintained at a level of textual/discursive prejudice; it stopped short of social practices such as discrimination, social exclusion, physical attack and extermination more characteristic of modern racism.

Later in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as the Parekh Report (2000) points out:

[...] European trade enclaves began to develop on a more systematic colonising basis in the East, and territorial sovereignty was gradually established over substantial parts of India and south-east Asia. At both scholarly and popular levels, a set of stereotyped views of how and why the peoples of the Orient were different and inferior developed. [...] Scholars contrasted the development of modern civilisation in the West with the backward and tradition-dominated East, an opposition that persists today. (p. 65)

Working within a context of Western imperialism and colonialism, Western scholarship "served to naturalise, in the most literal sense of the term, oppressive social relations. In doing so they sought to legitimise systems of power and domination" (Cottle, 2000: 4). Gabriel (194: 16) suggests that "[d]ifferent discourses varyingly articulated this. In the 'science' of anthropology, Arabs were held to be inferior, whilst in political discourse, texts were woven around the paternalistic idea that colonial subjugation would not only benefit the West (notably Britain and France) but also the Orient itself." In this way, 'Western' Orientalist scholarship helped *recreate* 'the West' as "the yardstick, as Christendom had earlier, by which Oriental

cultures and civilisations were measured" (Sardar, 1999: 3), thus crystallising the roles and relations of and between the 'uncivilised native' and the 'civilising coloniser', at the heart of which was (and is) "the western assumption that 'our present is your future'" (Gabriel, 1994: 25). The ontological position which this crystallisation produces and supports (an ontology which is, of course, based upon a 'higher order' ontological and epistemological distinction between 'the West' and 'the Orient') can be represented in the global signifying homology, integral to Orientalist discourse:

**'the West' is to civility and modernity
what 'the East' is to under-development and unenlightenment**

The power of this assumed connotative relationship is such that 'Oriental' symbols, metonymy and cultural artefacts are similarly imprinted with 'ignorance' and 'barbarism', as work carried out by scholars such as Leila Ahmad (1992) illustrates:

[...] the reason for thinking that the veil was more repressive than, for example, Victorian corsets had more to do with *the way the veil was used as a marker of [a] particular cultural formation*. When white women of the nineteenth century saw veiled women, they understood it to be *a sign of cultural backwardness and female subordination*. They did not make the same assumptions about their own clothes, which for them did not signify female subordination - because they [themselves] did not signify subordination. (Ahmad (1992), cited in Sayyid, 1997: 10; emphases added)

The analysis above also illustrates the interconnected and reinforcing relationships between 'race', ethnicity and gender which are so frequently sidelined in academic research (see Anthias 1995, 1998; Anthias & Yuval-Davies, 1992). This connectedness between 'race' and gender is illustrated in the twin discourses of racism itself (Lawrence, 1982; Sardar, 1999): one based on the *fear* of the 'ethnic other', primarily but not solely (see J. Daniels, 1997) the fear of the black male; the other based on the *fantasy* of an exoticised 'ethnic other', primarily but not solely (see critiques of Mapplethorpe's photography in Hall, 1997) the promiscuous, seductive and (by 'Western' decree) sexually pathological black female (Gilman, 1986).

Lawrence (1982) shows that “common-sense” views of ‘the Oriental woman’ to be equally racist, wherein

Her very ‘passivity’ is thought to be a reflection of her upbringing, geared to her learning to accommodate and please her future husband. This notion, working in conjunction with the absolute power of the male to elicit her compliance and mediated through the image of the lithe and sinewy gyrations of the ‘belly dancer’, works so as to produce a composite image of a smouldering sexuality - ‘full of Eastern promise’ - waiting only to be fanned into flames by the most potent masculinity. (p.73).

Such imaginings are a regular feature of contemporary culture.⁴ Whilst these co-occurring essentialising discourses of racism - physical threat and sexual allure - may appear to be contradictory, they are, in fact, based on the same presupposition: that ‘racial and ethnic others’ are closer to nature and instinct than to rationality; more ruled by the urges of the body than the thoughts of the mind.

This does not mean, however, that either of these twin discourses, nor racism as a whole - both on a street level nor in more ‘institutionalised’ forms - affect women and men equally, and the issues and relevance of a gendered critique of Orientalism have been taken up most productively in the field of post-colonial feminisms (Alloula, 1986; Kabbani, 1988; Lewis, 1996; Mills, 1991; Mohanty, 1988; Spivak, 1988; Trinh, 1986-7). Yegenoglu (1998) for example, through her examination of the veil as a site of (‘Western’) fantasy, nationalism and discourses of gender identity, has illustrated the implicit imperialism of both traditional male Orientalism and Western feminism in their attempts to ‘liberate’ Muslim women in the name of progress. Yegenoglu (1998) suggests a “homology between the structures of patriarchal/sexist and colonial/imperial discourses” in which “the discourses of cultural and sexual difference are powerfully mapped onto each other” (p.10), in order to construct ‘the Orient’ as “a natural territory ready for the conquest of the ‘rational’ and ‘civilised’ European man” (p.11). The veil is positioned as a central trope in the articulation of this homology, representing

a multi-layered signifier which refers at once to an attire which covers the Muslim woman's face, and to that which hides and conceals the Orient and Oriental women from apprehension; it hides the real Orient and keeps its truth from Western knowledge/apprehension. It is also a metaphor of membrane, serving as a screen around which Western fantasies of penetration revolve. It is this polysemous character of the veil which seems to play a crucial role in the unique articulation of the sexual with cultural difference in Orientalist discourse. (Yeegenoglu, 1998: 47)

As such, an acknowledgement of this textual homology between patriarchal and colonial discourses - both in the Foucauldian sense employed by Yeegenoglu (1998) and in the sense adopted throughout this theses: as language in use - should form a central feature of the analysis of Orientalist discourse.

2.2.2 "*Islamophobia: a challenge for us all*"

The publication of the Runnymede Trust's (1997) report on 'Islamophobia' marked a watershed in the United Kingdom, through its allegation of a "pervasive hatred of Islam and Muslims across all sections of British society" (Nahdi, 1997: 18). Muslims living in Britain are exposed to prejudice and racism on such a frequent basis that it can be conceived of as an 'everyday practice'. Since Essed (1991), "everyday racism" can be defined as

a process in which (a) socialised racist notions are integrated into meanings that make practices immediately definable and manageable, (b) practices with racist implications become in themselves familiar and repetitive, and (c) underlying racial and ethnic relations are actualised and reinforced through these routine or familiar practices in everyday situations. (Essed, 1991: 52)

In this way, "everyday racism can be characterised as the integration of racism into everyday situations through practices (cognitive and behavioural) that activate underlying power relations" (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 7). This current section presents evidence from two reports published by the Runnymede Trust (1997, 2000), illustrating how the (predominantly) discriminated and disempowered status of British Muslims is reinforced through frequent, and seemingly *routinised* anti-Muslim prejudice - defined, for the present, as 'Islamophobia'.

Although the Runnymede Trust did not coin the term 'Islamophobia' - they state that its first recorded usage in print was in the American periodical *Insight* (4 February, 1991) - they certainly popularised its usage in both academic and lay discussion. The term itself is defined in the report (1997: 4) as "unfounded hostility towards Islam. It also refers to the practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities, and to the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political and social affairs." Whilst the Trust acknowledges that the term is not ideal, and that critics suggest "its use panders to what they call political correctness [and] that it stifles legitimate criticism of Islam" (Ibid.), the report chose to adopt the term 'Islamophobia' because "anti-Muslim prejudice has grown so considerably and rapidly in recent years that a new item in the vocabulary is needed so that it can be identified and acted against" (Ibid.).

The Runnymede Trust (1997) also identify that their definition of 'Islamophobia' - "*unfounded* hostility towards Islam" - poses an interpretative problem: how do we establish that such hostility is unfounded, as opposed to justified? Such an argumentative approach was frequently taken in criticising the Trust for adopting 'Islamophobia' as a tool of analysis, alleging that the term stifles both 'legitimate' criticism of Muslim wrong-doing and the undifferentiated - and therefore not strictly 'anti-Islamic' - criticisms of atheists (see Polly Toynbee's 'Islamophobia' column, discussed in Chapter 4). In order to by-pass this terminological difficulty, the Trust suggest eight binary argumentative positions characterising 'closed' and 'open' views of Islam and Muslims, which are available to protagonists to draw upon. These eight binaries are listed below:

Table 2.1: The Runnymede Trust's 'closed' and 'open' views of Islam

| <i>Distinctions</i> | <i>Closed Views</i> | <i>Open Views</i> |
|---|--|---|
| Monolithic/Diverse | Islam seen as a single monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive | Islam seen as diverse and progressive, with internal differences |
| Separate/Interacting | Islam seen as separate and other | Islam seen as interdependent with other faiths and cultures |
| Inferior/Equal | Islam seen as inferior to the West | Islam seen as [...] not deficient, and as equally worthy of respect |
| Enemy/Partner | Islam seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism | Islam seen as an actual or potential partner in joint co-operative enterprises |
| Manipulative/Sincere | Islam seen as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage | Islam seen as a genuine religious faith, practiced sincerely by its adherents |
| Criticism of the West rejected/considered | Criticisms made by Islam of 'the West' rejected out of hand | Criticisms of 'the West' [...] are considered and debated |
| Discrimination defended/criticised | Hostility towards Islam used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims | Disagreements 'with' Islam do not diminish efforts to combat discrimination and exclusion |
| Islamophobia seen as natural/problematic | Anti-Muslim hostility accepted as natural | Critical views of Islam are themselves subjected to critique, lest they're inaccurate |

from Runnymede Trust (1997: 5)

By this model, the more a protagonist draws upon 'closed' views of Islam, the more 'Islamophobic' his/her position can be said to be, and therefore the more his/her opinion is likely to translate into racist action. Further, the last two binaries above suggest a direct move from 'mere' prejudice and into ("everyday") racism, wherein Islamophobic attitudes are "used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims" and this "anti-Muslim hostility [is] accepted as natural" (Ibid.; emphasis added). The impact which such anti-Muslim prejudice may be having on (Muslim) social exclusion is quite disturbing - take the increasing percentage of Muslims in British prisons for example. The Runnymede Trust (1997: 37) show that between 1991 and 1995, the number of Muslims in British prisons increased by 40 percent, from 1,959 to 2,745 prisoners. Muslims now constitute 9 percent of the total prison population, a proportion between 3.5 times and 5.4 times higher than

the percentage of Muslims in the British population as a whole (depending on the estimated population of British Muslims one adopts, see below). Although the report stops short of suggesting that this rise is directly attributable to racism in the criminal justice system, given the recommendations of the Macpherson Report and the fact that 'black' suspects in general "are more likely than white suspects to be dealt with by arrest than summons [...] by prosecution rather than caution [and] are given longer sentences than white people" (Runnymede Trust, 2000: 130), 'institutional' racism in the criminal justice system is certainly a possibility (for further discussion see Runnymede Trust, 2000: 110-141).

In tandem with this increase in the incarceration of (predominantly male) Muslims, 'street racism' targeted against Muslims is also on the increase. Human Rights Watch (1997) concluded that Britain has one of the highest rates of racially motivated crime in Western Europe, attacks which "are not random but rather target particular ethnic groups in orchestrated campaigns" (cited in Runnymede Trust, 1997: 38). Recent racist attacks against asylum seekers serve as a reminder that such 'campaigns' are ongoing and successful ways through which racists intimidate and exclude already marginalised and disempowered individuals and groups.⁵ Indeed the Runnymede Trust (2000) has shown that the number of racist incidents reported to the police in (just) England and Wales "rose from 13,878 in 1997/98 to 23,049 in 1998/99, an increase of 66 per cent" (p.127). It is unclear to what extent this substantial increase is due to the "greater confidence of Asian and black people that their reports will be taken seriously [...] It is, however, known that far more incidents take place than are reported" (Ibid.). In modern Britain, the manifestations of anti-Muslim racism in particular are observable in a number of locations ranging from

discrimination in recruitment and employment practices; [...] widespread negative stereotypes in all sections of the press, including the broadsheets as well as the tabloids; bureaucratic obstruction or inertia in response to Muslim requests for greater cultural sensitivity in education and healthcare; objections and delays to planning permissions to build mosques; and non-recognition of Muslims by the law of the land, since discrimination on grounds of religion is not lawful. (Runnymede Trust, 2000: 62)

The sites of anti-Muslim racism listed above represent predominantly material forms of exclusion, from employment practices, from education and healthcare, and from protection under the law. The social position of British Muslims, the level(s) of Muslim social exclusion and their relation to underlying 'Islamophobia' form the subject of the following section.

2.2.3 British Muslims and (racist) social exclusion

The demography and social background of the British Muslim communities deserves a brief introduction and contextualisation. First, there are no accepted statistics on the number of Muslims in Britain due to, amongst other complications, the previous lack of a 'religious question' in the National Census. As such, the figures quoted often "reflect the fears and aspirations of interested parties" (Rex, 1996: 218) more than they do 'reality', with both 'Islamophobes' and 'Islamists' often inflating numbers in order to back their respective arguments of a 'Muslim threat' or 'substantial Muslim electorate'. Even using the 1991 census data or the more recent Labour Force Survey (1998), the accepted number of Muslims in Britain is usually estimated at between 1 million and 1.5 million (Modood, 1990; Rex, 1996; Runnymede Trust, 1997, 2000) due to the inaccuracy of predicting religion from ethnic/national origin. All estimates show however, that the majority of Muslims living in Britain are from a South Asian background (65-75 per cent), with the Pakistani communities predominant. It is further estimated that "the sizes of the Muslim communities could be up to 20 per cent larger now than shown in the 1991 consensus" (Runnymede Trust, 1997: 65) due to the communities' young age profile and higher birth rates.

Within these British Muslim communities there are significant differences in religious and ideological belief and practice, the detail and sophistication of which are beyond the scope of the present thesis (see Halliday, 1997; Lewis, 1994, 1997). Looking solely at British Muslims of Pakistani origin, a number of divisions are observable: between denominations, with Sunni (Hanafi) Muslims in the majority and the Shia and 'Ahmadiyya' forming small minorities; within denominations, with (sometimes

significant) doctrinal divisions existing in the Sunni majority between Sufi Barelvi Muslims and 'conservative' Deobandis; and within doctrines, for example between the Sufi (Barelvi) followers of the Qadriya and Naqshbandi orders. Such diversity in religious belief and identification suggests that the future "study of Islamic communities [...must] involve a sociology of how religion interacts with other ethnic, cultural and political forces" (Halliday, 1997: 76) in order to give productive insight into the lives of British Muslims.

The socio-economic status of these British Muslim communities is a subject which has become "a highly controversial subject of discussion" due to an alleged 'victim orientation' of the prevailing "deprivationist perspective" (Lewis, 1994: 22). British Muslims are, on the whole, "in a highly disadvantaged position in British society", with their socio-economic status displaying "a strong 'class' and to a certain extent 'underclass' dimension" (Statham, 1999: 622). The main exception to this socio-economic profile are East African Asians, a particularly successful group who enjoy a "higher educational and social status" (Lewis, 1994: 106; also see Alibhai-Brown, 2000). Economic deprivation is particularly prevalent in the majority Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities, where unemployment stood at 28.8 per cent at the time of the 1991 census (compared to 8.8 per cent for white communities), the underlying causes of which "include industrial restructuring and a range of discriminatory practices by employers" (Runnymede Trust, 2000: 193). By 1998 these rates of unemployment had increased across society, but appear to have affected Britain's 'non-white' communities most adversely. The Parekh Report (Runnymede Trust, 2000) shows that by 1998,

the employment rate of white people of working age was 75.1 per cent. The average for all black and Asian people was only 57 per cent. [...Whilst] for people of Bangladeshi and Pakistani backgrounds, the respective figures were 35 per cent and 41 per cent. Rates for women in these communities were lower still. (p.194)

The outcome of such overwhelmingly high percentages of unemployment (or, perhaps more accurately 'non-employment', given the creative and

increasingly exclusive status of 'unemployment') must almost inevitably be a correspondingly high level of social exclusion and deprivation.

An aggregating factor in this economic deprivation may, in the past, have been the educational disadvantage, particularly experienced by the (majority) Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities (see Modood, 1994: 2-3). However, whilst young people of Bangladeshi or Pakistani backgrounds are still "over-represented among school pupils aged 16 with the poorest qualifications", these same communities are "well represented proportionately in terms of entry to university" (Runnymede Trust, 2000: 146). Students from both Indian and African backgrounds are represented in even higher proportions in university admissions. Further, even the suggested poor educational performance at GCSE level is partially misleading given that, although Bangladeshi and Pakistani pupils achieve results below the national average, they "steadily close the gap between themselves and others in the course of their education", and in "some authorities they perform at or above the national average at GCSE" (Ibid.). Therefore, contrary to suggesting that the (predominantly) highly disadvantaged economic position of British Muslims can be ascribed to poor educational qualifications,

Labour force surveys have shown that Asian and black school leavers have less success in gaining employment than white people. That is the case even when all relevant variables, such as educational attainment, are held constant. (Runnymede Trust, 2000: 197)

Similar figures exist for university graduates, where

[...] statistical analysis of census data has shown that Asian and black graduates, including those who appear to be doing well, have worse jobs than white graduates. People of Indian, African and Chinese backgrounds are generally better qualified than white people, but nevertheless have difficulty in gaining access to prestigious jobs. (Runnymede Trust, 2000: 193)

Long-term unemployment, partially attributable to such discrimination, is probably the most serious form of social exclusion, given that it is likely "to lead to low income, low standard of living, poor housing and poor health"

(Runnymede Trust, 1997: 34). A wealth of research evidence demonstrates or implies that these 'racial' inequalities in employment, and hence the economic and social inequalities that blight Britain's Muslim communities, are attributable to discrimination (Commission for Racial Equality, 1996; DfEE, 1999; Modood, 1994; Modood & Berthoud *et al*, 1997; Runnymede Trust, 1997, 2000; Wrench & Modood, 2000). This social exclusion is therefore due, in part, to the ready availability of 'Islamophobic' attitudes to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims. The press and other news producers represent a principle site in which such 'Islamophobic' attitudes can be (re)produced and/or contested and it is towards an account of both the organisation and output of the British broadsheet press that this chapter now turns.

2.3 Discursive Practice

2.3.1 The Sociology of Journalism

The Sociology of Journalism has produced and engaged with a variety of perspectives, distinctive in their theoretical and methodological approaches to the analysis of 'News'. In a wish to keep this section as brief as is commensurate with theoretical clarity, several different perspectives, suggestive of 'levels of analysis', will be introduced and drawn in outline rather than discussed them in detail. This will enable me to also include a discussion of past research on prejudice, discrimination and the representation(s) of 'racial' and ethnic minorities in news.

The theoretical approaches analysed below all assume news to be a product of a variety of social, economic and cultural factors. These factors can be broadly described as 'selection criteria', and vary greatly from the selection criteria of: individual journalists, most notably 'Gatekeeper' personnel (see White, 1950); the norms and values of journalism as a profession (see Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Tuchman, 1972; Wolfsfeld, 1997); the filters imposed by the 'Political Economy' (Herman & Chomsky, 1994); the 'newsroom culture' of specific news organisations (see Eliasoph, 1988); and lastly 'the cultural air which we breathe', selecting that which is culturally resonant (to both journalist and audience alike) and ignoring that which is

not (see Hall, 1973; Hartmann & Husband, 1973; Molotch & Lester, 1974). Common to all these news paradigms is the *social constructed* nature of news, considered at different levels of analysis. These perspectives suggest that although there is a 'range' of variation in both content and structure of the news reports, these are confined within the boundaries of the (individual/ organisational/ professional/ cultural) selection criteria.

Taking news as an individual product first, it should always be borne in mind that news is first and foremost a product of the journalist, and the origins of the sociology of journalism can be traced to the 'gatekeeper studies' of the 1950s (White 1950; Gieber, 1964). Simply put, the role of the Gatekeeper is to filter out and disregard unwanted, uninteresting and/or unimportant information, and attend to information of more importance. White (1950) for example states that the subject of his study, *Mr Gates*, received approximately 12,400 inches of press association news during the week studied. "Of this he used 1,297 column inches of wire news, or about *one tenth* in the seven issues we measured" (White, 1950: 65, emphasis in original). Thus the role of the Gatekeeper is suggested to be quantitative rather than qualitative.

Gieber's (1964) study of sixteen Wisconsin wire editors produced similar findings, yet he attributed wholly different determining factors for the filtering of news. Rather than White's conclusion of "how highly subjective, [and] ...reliant upon value judgements based upon the 'gatekeeper's' own set of experiences, attitudes and expectations the communication of 'news' really is" (White, 1950: 65), Gieber points to the strait jacket of mechanical details (Gieber (1964), cited in Schudson, 1989: 9) which accompanies the editorial process. Gieber suggests that the editors were "concerned with goals of production, bureaucratic routine and interpersonal relations within the newsroom" (Ibid.).

It could be argued that both Gieber and White are in fact studying the same phenomenon, merely at different levels of analysis: White the micro; Gieber the macro. Shoemaker (1991) has (perhaps) taken this notion of micro/macro gatekeeping to it's logical conclusion stating the "the gatekeeping process involves every aspect of message selection, handling

and control, whether the message is communicated through mass media or interpersonal channels” (Shoemaker, 1991: 57). People, institutions and cultures are selective in their perception, recording, remembering and communication of information. Thus a “trinity of gates/gatekeeping” develops involving: social system ideology and culture; intra-organisational routines and characteristics; and intra-individual gatekeeping processes (Ibid.). In this way, it is argued that “One day’s news represents the effects of many gatekeepers at many gates” (Ibid.).

There are three criticisms that I have of research of this sort: first, that of *specificity*. In the ambition to create an all embracing notion of gatekeeping, Shoemaker (1991) demarcates the domains of the individual, the institution and the society, concluding that each act as controls on the flow of information. Yet wasn’t this to the greater extent a ‘given’ when the research was started? After reading the findings we’re left none the wiser with regard to the interaction of the three suggested ‘domains’: do they exist as mutually exclusive entities? If not, what are their relations to each other? Can and do these relations alter at any time, and which - if any - are ‘more important’ with regard to the (re)production of news values and notions of ‘newsworthiness’? Such research seems to raise far more questions than it answers.

Second, although the metaphor of a gatekeeper is an interesting one it lacks clarity in the definition of variables at all stages, namely: what information passes through the gate; what information does not pass through the gate; by way of deduction, the parameters which the gatekeeper uses to distinguish the two; and, perhaps most importantly, do these parameters change?

Lastly, the metaphor seems to suggest a binary opposition between selection and acceptance which glosses over the complexities of the situation. News is not simply selected, but rather constructed through complex interaction between the reporter and source, reporter and sub-editor/editor, editor and owner, newspaper and audience/consumer, all within the social-cultural context. Thus, news is shaped through *direct contact* with others (be they ‘information providers’ or ‘information passers’)

as well as the *perceived criteria of acceptance* at the different stages of production, be they real or imagined. In addition to the process of feedback and debate undertaken in order to pass information (as news) into the public domain, news affects the audience/consumer in such a way as to feedback and impact upon future gatekeeping criteria. Culture is not static, and nor are notions of 'newsworthiness'.

Journalism, as a profession, is directed and constrained by a number of factors loosely defined as 'news values' or criteria of 'newsworthiness'. It has been suggested that since these constraining factors are observable in all television, radio and press newsrooms, they exert a 'standardising' effect upon the work which these journalists produce. Sigal (1973) for example states that "conventions, the customary ways of thinking about news and newsmaking, help to standardise newspaper content" (p. 66). Gans (1979) locates the routinised nature of news production in the use of sources, judged legitimate "if they are 'productive', 'reliable', 'trustworthy', 'authoritative' and 'articulate'" (Eliasoph, 1988: 231). In addition, news is constrained by the endless search for "impact and novelty" (Ibid.), as well as by concerns not to damage the professional position or career prospects of individual journalists, nor offend advertiser sensibilities.

A more structured analysis of the complex set of criteria employed to judge/measure newsworthiness has been attempted by Galtung and Ruge (1965), who, in a study of three international crises in four Norwegian national newspapers, suggested twelve criterial factors employed in establishing a news item/story's 'newsworthiness'. These were, in turn, the event's: frequency, intensity (threshold), unambiguity, meaningfulness (cultural proximity and relevancy), consonance, unexpectedness, continuity, composition, reference with élite peoples and/or nations, personification and negativity. A recent reassessment of Galtung and Ruge's research (Harcup & O'Neill, 2001) suggested an updated list of news values, garnered from an empirical analysis of news published in three British national daily newspapers. The newly suggested news values, which "news stories must generally satisfy one or more of" in order to be printed (Harcup & O'Neill, 2001: 278-9), were: reference to the power élite; celebrity; entertainment;

surprise; good news; bad news; magnitude; relevance; follow-up and the newspaper's individual agenda. Essentially, newspaper reports need to be of interest to the newspapers' target audience(s), and hence these criteria of 'newsworthiness' are an evaluation (or estimation) of a report's potential appeal. It is by no means a trivial point that newspaper publication is an industry and a business, and as such

the activities and the output of the press will be partially determined by considerations related to this fact: by the need to make a profit; by the economic organisation of the industry; by its external relations with other industries; by conventional journalistic practices [...and] by production schedules. (Fowler, 1991: 20)

Indeed it has been argued that the news values themselves are, to an extent, negotiable in light of the need for a report to be 'profitable'. Thus, "when news occurs in places where its production and distribution is cheaper, it is more 'newsworthy' or at least more likely to be transmitted as news" (Ettema, Whitney & Wackman, 1987: 35).

The *Political Economy* models of news production take this notion of the 'capital centric' nature of news media to the next phase of analysis. Under the current conditions of capitalism, the continued existence of a news producer relies upon both selling its product (to its identified audience) and doing so in the most profitable manner possible. Political economic theorists suggest that this profit orientation does not merely *structure* but also *constrains* news production, in ways which are both reflexive and supportive of the wider class-based divisions of capitalism societies (see Bagdikian, 1987; Burton, 1990; Curran & Seaton, 1997; Golding & Murdock, 1973; Herman, 1992, 1995a, 1995b; Herman & Chomsky, 1994; Huffschmid, 1983).

This profit orientation is further complicated when we consider that the vast majority of news media are owned by media corporations or other conglomerates, with profit concerns in other, often wholly unrelated fields of industry. For example, the frequency with which the satellite broadcaster 'BSkyB' is promoted in the pages of Rupert Murdoch's newspaper *The Sun*, often under only the most flimsy of guises, is a well-known secret. More

seriously, the willingness of American broadcaster NBC to use the oil crisis threatened at the start of the 1990-1 conflict with Iraq, as an opportunity to re-promote the 'option of American nuclear power' - thus reflecting the interests of its parent company *General Electric*, who are heavily involved in the nuclear power industry - illustrates the potential influence which corporations may wield on the output of (Their) news media. This relationship also moves 'the other way', into censorial and occasionally authoritarian policing of news companies, either by their parent companies or other corporations providing financial support. Herman and Chomsky (1994) illustrate several examples where programme sponsorship has been removed when the interests of corporate funders were threatened, most notably when *Gulf + Western* removed funding for WNET, following their broadcast of a documentary questioning multinational interference in 'Third world' countries ('Hungry for Profit'). At the time, the programme was described by *G + W* officials as being "anti-corporate" and even "anti-American", inducing the *Economist* to remark that "most people believe that WNET would not make the same mistake again" (Herman & Chomsky 1994: 17).

Ben Bagdikian (1987), in a landmark piece of research, showed that the increasing concentration of conglomerate-owned news media, into the hands of fewer and fewer companies, has particularly negative effects of both the quality of the news produced and the political-democratic life of society as a whole. He argued that, whilst the American news-media of the past acted like "a watchdog over the behaviour of its competing media [...] vigilant against the other industries' lobbying for unfair government concessions", the current 'watchdogs' of journalism "have been cross-bred into an amiable hybrid, with seldom an embarrassing bark" (p.5). Due to the largely accommodatory relationship between government and corporations in modern (capitalist) societies, the expansion of media conglomerates and the acquisition of news companies by other companies therefore brings greater concord between the production of news and the values and interests of government - a consensus in which journalists are willing participants. For example, whilst President Nixon and President Reagan both made severe

attacks on the freedom of the press during their first terms in office, due to the “extraordinary moves” each administration made “to *support corporate expansion* in the media [...] newspaper publishers overwhelmingly endorsed both Nixon and Reagan for re-election” (Bagdikian, 1987: 9; emphasis added). A similar ‘Faustian pact’ appears to have been struck up between New Labour and Rupert Murdoch, where, “[i]n return for his newspapers’ support for New Labour in the 1997 election and the party’s first year in office, Murdoch benefits from the government’s benign media policy” (Franklin, 1998: 7).⁶ Further, with the relaxation of the rules governing media ownership in the Broadcasting Act (1996), the concentration of British news organisations appears to have “received statutory endorsement” (Franklin, 1997: 40).

A defining assumption of political economic theories of news production is therefore that “[m]oney and power will penetrate the media by direct control or indirect influence and will filter out the news thought unfit for most of us to consider” (Herman, 1995a: 81-2). Herman and Chomsky (1994), in perhaps the most significant and in-depth structural analysis of the ‘corporatisation’ of the media, propose five such ‘filters’ on news, each influencing the emphasis, tone and fullness of treatment which the media grants to different ideological perspectives, with the goal of mobilising “support for the special interests that dominate the state and private activity” (p. xi). These are, in turn:

- The size, ownership and profit orientation of the mass media
- Advertising as the primary source of media income
- Journalists’ reliance on Government, Corporate and Military sources
- ‘Flak’ as a method of controlling media dissidence
- Anti-communism as a control ideology, framing media representation

“In aggregate”, Franklin (1997) suggests, “these five filters select and structure the news in ways which mobilise ideological support among the public for the ‘national interest’ - a euphemism for the interests of the powerful among corporate, military and political élites” (p. 44). Thus, in a

recent study of the NATO's bombing of Serbia and Kosovo, Chomsky (2000) shows that dissent was helpfully kept out of the news. Indeed the success of the propaganda campaign was such that when NATO bombed Serbian state TV and radio, "killing sixteen journalists on the grounds that it was 'a facility used for propaganda purposes'", the Western press remained distinctly docile. The acquiescence of Western journalism continued following the end of the conflict, when "The Committee to Protect Journalists refused to list the[se] Serb victims in its annual report of murdered journalists, on grounds that they are propagandists, not journalists" (Chomsky, 2000: 132).

However, in partial contrast to theorists of the political economy model of news - particularly the more stridently polemic among them - news *does* alter between both different media (for example, between television and the press) and different news organisations. The fourth perspective on the analysis of news therefore proposes that the working environment of specific organisations also influences the content and structure of the news. Put another way, theorists look at "how professional and newsroom cultures influence the way that journalists do their job" (Berkowitz, 1997: 169). The reasoning behind such an enterprise becomes clear when the output of different news media are examined. On a structural level for example, Weaver (1975) has illustrated some of the "systematic differences between the inverted-pyramid structure of news print and the 'thematic' structure of television news" (cited in Schudson, 1989: 20).

Regarding print journalism, Fradgley and Niebauer (1995) have shown that there are differences in both press reporting style and content within the British 'Quality' press. Studying four of the five national daily broadsheet newspapers (*The Guardian*, *The Independent*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Times*) Fradgley and Niebauer found significant differences between those "independently" owned (*The Guardian* and *The Independent*) and those owned by "conglomerations" (*The Daily Telegraph* and *The Times*). The independent papers were shown to contain a higher proportion of "conflict stories"; a lower use of "routine" (as opposed to "informal" or "enterprise") sources; and a higher proportion of staff written articles than that of the conglomerate owned papers (Fradgley & Niebauer, 1995: 908-9).

From this, Fradgley and Niebauer (1995) suggest that "London's independently owned ['Quality'] dailies dedicate more reportorial effort, and presumably more economic resources, to their front page coverage than do conglomerately owned dailies" (p.910).

The problem with such profoundly quantitative research such as this, is that it ignores *how* newspapers report. *How*, for example, do the *Guardian* and the *Independent* report conflict? *Who* are in conflict with each other? Is one side consistently represented as being 'correct'? In a newspaper's preference for "informal" (background briefings, leaks, non-governmental proceedings) and "enterprise" sources (interview, 'spontaneous' events, independent research) does one group or opinion receive preferential treatment? The use of such a closed definition of "formal" sources (official proceedings, press releases) ignores the reality of reporter 'beats', where a network of sources are routinely tapped by the journalist for stories, information and comment. Thus, although Fradgley and Niebauer (1995) illustrate 'differences' between the two newspapers types, due to their stripping of all contextual, semantic and syntactic content from the data, the differences appear to be quite hollow.

Eliasoph (1988), in a study of an oppositional radio station argues that "economic and organisational factors [of a newsroom] help determine the news content more than the routines" (Eliasoph, 1988: 233). "Routines theorists" argue that "news routines operate in such a way that no matter who is making the news, as long as it is made in a news organisation, it will be under the sway of these unspoken conventions" (Eliasoph, 1988: 230-1), but Eliasoph show that this is not necessarily the case. Rather, as Tuchman (1972) suggested, most news conventions "can be bent sufficiently to be oppositional, as well as acquiescent, to the dominant ideological framing of questions" (Eliasoph, 1988: 232).

By using data collected over almost two years of participant observation, Eliasoph demonstrates that a news organisation can produce "oppositional news", even through following the (conventional) norms and routines of news production. Thus, the 'event-centric' nature of news can, for example, accommodate the reporting of public anti-government

demonstrations, or the publication of Human Rights Reports, or, in the case of the radio station studied, use the Iran-Contra scandal “as a peg for an interview with John Stockwell [...] about CIA covert tactics in all parts of the globe” (Eliasoph, 1988: 236). Similarly, journalists’ reliance on ‘official’ or ‘expert’ sources can accommodate the quoting of an Islamic Imam, or a Trade Union official, Noam Chomsky, or a host of others, depending on the subject of the report. Other news routines (such as regular production schedule, or the need for balance) are shown to hold a similar potential for “oppositional news”.

Eliasoph thus illustrates that it is not necessarily the routines *on their own* which build an ideologically conformist, or ‘status quo supporting’, news report, but rather a combination of the (mainstream) media’s corporate bureaucracy, the reliance on other corporations for funding (through advertising revenue), and apathetic and career-hungry journalists. The fact that Eliasoph’s study is an analysis of a *single* publicly funded radio station (of which there were only *four* in the US) seems insignificant in the light of such conclusions, since the research is more a critique of the *interpretation* and *application* of news values in mainstream corporate news organisations. As such, Eliasoph’s work skilfully straddles the divide between organisational and professional selection criteria.

Finally for this section, journalism can be approached as a(nother) cultural product, and theorists of this approach to news analysis take as their guiding principle the ‘socially constructed’ nature of the news. The journalist’s preconceptions of ‘the world’, its nations and peoples, inform not only the manner in which articles are written, but also the *gaze* and *selection* of the articles within a given news medium. Although this perspective on the study of news appears to have significant convergence with both the professional and (to a lesser extent) organisational perspectives on news analysis, but it is still theoretically distinct. “Where the organisational view finds interactional determinants of news in the relations between people, the cultural view finds symbolic determinants of news in the relations between ideas and symbols” (Schudson, 1989: 17). Similarly, Wykes (2001) argues:

Journalists are not external analysts reflecting retrospectively on the past but diarists of the culture of the period in which they live and, in the case of news about British events, the community in which they live. (p. 26)

Given the overwhelmingly male, University educated and white nature of British journalists, I have doubts regarding the extent to which journalists are included within the communities they report. However, their position as both a product and producer of a (but not *the*) general British cultural milieu is undeniable.

Given that culturalist theorists view news as determined, what “ideas and symbols” are identified as having such a formative influence? Goffman (1986) argues it is “our understanding of the world [which] precedes these [news] stories, determining which ones reporters will select and how the ones that are selected will be told” (p.14). Van Ginneken has illustrated this through the example of the ‘tragic death’ as reported in the press. Every day around 137,907 people die across the world⁷, of which between only 1 in 1,000 and 1 in 10,000 are ever reported in the news. Taking children’s deaths for example,

Of all these tragic deaths every day, 34,676 are under five years of age. Most die from preventable elementary diseases resulting from undernourishment and vitamin deficiencies, from lack of clean water and hygienic conditions. [...] The major media do not paint this as an acute disaster which warrants immediate foregrounding. (van Ginneken, 1998: 25)

Van Ginneken argues this shows that “the ‘tragic death’ is a highly ‘social’ construction: certain tragic deaths are systematically under-reported, others are systematically over reported” (van Ginneken, 1998: 25), and that such disparities occur according to encultured (ethnocentric) norms and values. Thus, according to the culturological position, “journalists are not obliged to endorse the dominant ideological accounts of reality because of direct pressure from proprietors or others, but because they have internalised the dominant societal values” (Franklin, 1997: 46). Given the widespread existence in Britain of ‘Islamophobia’ and anti-Muslim racism (see earlier section in this chapter), the internalisation of “dominant societal values” which culturalist theorists suggest characterises journalistic output, demands

closer inspection. The following section therefore introduces and critically discusses past academic research on the representation of 'racial' and ethnic minorities in journalism.

2.3.2 Racism and 'Othering' in the News

In their study of the *Guardian*, *The Times*, the *Daily Express* and the *Daily Mirror* between 1963 and 1970, Hartmann *et al* (1974) found that 'race' was frequently combined with 'conflict' or 'violent' words in the headlines of press reports, resulting in an association between 'race' - treated in the press as a synonym for Britain's black communities - and threat, hostility and violence (p.158). Further, Hartmann *et al* (1974) showed that this 'problematization' of Britain's 'racial' minorities - which, of course assumes the existence and suitability of 'race' as a conceptual category - also guides reporting at a thematic level, concluding that

there was a quantitative similarity in the handling of race by the four newspapers and that a number of themes emerge as the most salient. These were: immigration (in particular control of coloured [sic] immigration); relations between black and white (in particular inter-group hostility and discrimination); legislation to control immigration and counter discrimination; and the politician Enoch Powell. (Braham, 1982: 271-2)

Indeed, as Braham (1982) suggests, most academic analyses of press representation of 'race' and 'ethnicity', particularly journalistic output up to and including the 1980s, concludes that

the media have concentrated on the threat perceived by the white majority to be implicit in black immigration and in the black presence; and that they have neglected the extent of discrimination and disadvantage experienced by blacks except in so far as these key conditions seem to contribute towards the supposed threat, for example, by fostering anti-social behaviour. (p.279)

Halloran (1977) indicates that research carried out during the 1970s at Leicester University's Centre for Mass Communications Research, yielded similar results:

[...] as the number of coloured people [*sic*] and the social concern over race relations has increased, so [press] attention has moved away from the relation of coloured people to the major social resources of housing, education and employment [...] towards the hostility itself and its manifestations, including the concern to keep coloured people out of the country and the concern to regulate hostility by the various laws and machinery set up to these ends. (p.12)

Aside from the outmoded language, Halloran's above quotation is important in the way in which it highlights an erroneous presupposition of both the press and successive governments since the 1950s: the 'problem' is the *presence* of black communities 'here' *causing* racist hostility, rather than prevailing racist hostility which problematises the presence of black communities. Similarly, as Troyna (1987) has shown, when the press reported violence between racist supporters of the National Front on a march through Southall and anti-racist counter demonstrators, it was "the aggressive resistance of anti-NF demonstrators to the provocative actions of that racist party, [...] the *protesters* rather than the *cause* of the protest, the NF, which [were] defined as the more immediate threat to the political stability of the nation" (p.286-6; emphasis added). This (*re*)presentation of 'racial disturbances' was made possible via the press

consistently underplay[ing] the question of why the NF decides to hold its demonstrations in areas where local residents are likely to feel threatened by its presence, and focus[ing] its attention instead on the manifest consequences of those decisions: namely, violence between what are seen as two opposing, extremist groups. (Troyna, 1987: 285)

This emphasis on the violence of the demonstrations, without the contextualisation necessary for understanding, enabled *The Daily Telegraph* to conclude: "The disturbances that took place in the streets of Southall this afternoon were unprovoked acts of violence against police and property by groups of people determined to create an atmosphere of tension and hostility" (Ibid.). As Troyna (1987) points out, significantly, *The Daily Telegraph* did not include the NF as one of these "groups" creating "tension and hostility". In this way, "the news framework is constructed around the *problem* of the black presence and within it news values revolve around *conflict* and tension" (Braham, 1982: 285; emphases added).

A similar approach - focusing on the event rather than the causes for the event - is also clearly observable in international reporting, particularly reports covering clashes between Palestinian stone throwing youths and the Israeli army. In such reports, any contextualising information regarding the impoverished, segregated and *ghettoised* status of the Palestinians is subordinate, and to a large degree *deleted*, in favour of an almost exclusive concern with reporting the 'violence' between two protagonists. This, of course, draws an equivalence between the 'two sides', whitewashing over the inestimable disparity between the resources, not least the *weaponry*, at the disposal of each.

Coming to a similar conclusion as Braham (1982), Cottle (1998; 1999) suggests that such prejudicial and misrepresentative reporting of ethnic 'Others' may occur as the 'natural' product of current social formations, and specifically the position and 'news values' of the press. He argues: "News output is generally produced collectively in accordance with a news policy and a shared journalistic understanding of the particular news form produced, its established political orientation, audience appeals and story selections and styles of presentation" (Cottle, 1999: 195). Accordingly, within a predominantly white society, served by predominantly white journalists (Ainley, 1998) working in the predominantly 'white' profession of journalism (see Cottle, 1998), "such an approach [to the manufacture of news] will anticipate that the middle ground of white opinion and interests will be catered for while marginalising minority interests, voices and opinions" (Cottle, 1999: 196; also see Halloran, 1977: 13).

Moving on slightly, a considerable body of research illustrates that journalists recurrently use prejudicial stereotypes to represent and characterise Britain's minority communities - 'racial', ethnic and others (Cottle, 2000; Gabriel, 1994; Hartmann & Husband, 1974; Lawrence, 1982; Twitchen, 1992; van Dijk, 1987, 1991). Fowler (1991) argues that the formation of news events is "a reciprocal, dialectical process in which stereotypes are the currency of exchange" (p. 17). By his definition a stereotype "is a socially-constructed mental pigeon-hole into which events and individuals can be sorted, thereby making such events and individuals

comprehensible: 'mother', 'patriot', 'business man', 'neighbour', [for example] on the one hand, versus 'hooligan', 'terrorist', 'foreigner' on the other" (Ibid.). Developing this argument, Fowler shows that in news discourse, stereotypes and their equally stereotypical antitheses are both constituted and constitutive of the news value of 'meaningfulness', as proposed by Galtung and Ruge (1965):

'Meaningfulness', with its subsections 'cultural proximity' and 'relevance', is founded on an ideology of ethnocentrism, or [...] more inclusively, homocentrism: a preoccupation with countries, societies and individuals perceived to be like oneself; [...] and] with defining groups felt to be *unlike* oneself. (Fowler, 1991: 16, emphasis added)

In this way, the stereotypical representation of 'Others' may be one (negative) feature of news discourse facilitated and maintained through the very values upon which news is constructed.

Further to 'first order' issues of media representation, the salience of 'racial' stereotypes in everyday speech, interaction and argument is well established (Essed, 1991; van Dijk 1987), since, as van Dijk (1999) suggests, "[s]peakers routinely refer to television or the newspaper as their sources (and authority) of knowledge or opinions about ethnic minorities" (p.11). The discursive potential of such 'racialised' - and often racist - knowledge to modify power relations in other social fields is similarly acknowledged (Bourdieu, 1991), the "most benign effect" of which is "to separate people of colour from the white mainstream. The more malignant, lasting effect - in the media and beyond - has been an unfounded but unshakable connection between people of colour and social pathology" (Woods, 2000: 41). Omi (1989: 114) makes a similar point:

Popular culture has been an important realm within which racial ideologies have been created, reproduced and sustained. Such ideologies provide a framework of symbols, concepts and images through which we understand, interpret and represent aspects of our 'racial' existence. (cited in Orbe *et al*, 2001: 119)

The reproduction of "racial ideologies" in broadsheet newspapers is, perhaps, particularly consequential given the educated, empowered and

economically successful status of broadsheet readerships (Jucker, 1992; Worcester, 1998).

The above points regarding 'racial' stereotyping are all important factors to consider when analysing journalistic representation of 'race' and 'ethnicity', and undoubtedly deserve recognition. However, the model of Critical Discourse Analysis which I adopt suggests that analysing 'stereotypes' without giving equal, or perhaps even *greater* emphasis on societal complexes of power, knowledge and ideology, is at best imprudent and at worse myopic. Media theorists are increasingly showing that the active contestation of prejudicial stereotypes in the entertainment and news media may result in unintended negative outcomes for those represented. Entman (1990), Campbell (1995) and Lule (1995) have each separately argued that the attempts of American news producers to portray African-Americans in more positive ways "create an impression of black social advance [that] undermine claims on white resources" (Cottle, 2000: 11). Brian Kleiner (1998), in his discussion of 'racist pseudo-argumentation' for example, shows how (racist?) protagonists support their arguments for reducing or abolishing American affirmative action scholarships for African-American students, by referring to the black communities' apparent economic success. Similarly, Jhally and Lewis (1992) have suggested that the successful black characters in programmes such as *'The Cosby Show'* may promote "enlightened racism" since they "tell us nothing about the structures behind success or failure", and thereby open the way for "white viewers to assume that black people who do not measure up to their television counterparts have only themselves to blame" (p. 138).

On the other hand, should the predominantly deprived status endured by Britain's 'racial' and ethnic communities be represented - and here I refer back to the earlier discussion of the socio-economic status of the British Muslim communities - then the potential for racists to gain evidential material supporting their 'naturalised' hierarchies, based on inherent 'racial' differences, is increased. This inherently problematic status of 'stereotypes' to analytic work has been addressed in Cottle (2000: 9-13), in which a series of pertinent critiques of research on 'stereotypes' are listed and discussed.

In the critique perhaps most significant to the current discussion, Cottle suggests that the concept of a 'stereotype' is limited due to

its competing realist and idealist political premises - should representations portray the 'negative' realities of 'raced' lives and therefore seemingly endorse wider cultural typifications, or portray a more 'positive' imaginary but then be accused of distorting reality? (Cottle, 2000: 12)

Further, Cottle (2000) argues that the concept of 'stereotypes' assume "that meanings are 'contained' within its terms and are not dependent on (differentiated) audience interpretations" and that meanings "are assumed to be confined to, embodied within, and 'read off', depicted characters" (Ibid.). Rather, textual meaning cannot be divorced from the context of social and discursive practice. At a metatheoretical level, this accords with the Wittgensteinian position that "the meaning of an utterance rests in its usage in a specific situation" (Titscher *et al*, 2000: 146) - a communicative context in which 'decoding', and specifically the potential for *racist* 'decoding', represents an indivisible constituent part. On this subject, the 'Parekh Report' (2000) makes the following observation:

Any one news story is interpreted by the reader or viewer within the context of a larger narrative, acting as a kind of filter or template. If the larger narrative is racist - or, more benignly, representative of a 95/5 society - then the story is likely to be interpreted in a racist or majority-biased way, regardless of the conscious intentions of reporters, journalists and headline writers. (p.169)

Given this position, and the insight that "ideological representation is never merely reflective, since objects of knowledge are always culturally constituted within complexes that intertwine meaning and power" (Parker, 1992; Burman & Parker, 1993, cited in Henwood & Pheonix, 1999), any discussion of 'stereotypes' - 'racial' or otherwise - needs to be explicitly drawn from a systematic analysis of the "relationship[s] between the text and its social conditions, ideologies and power-relations" (Titscher *et al*, 2000: 146).

The open expression of explicitly racist opinions in Britain, is now likely to be received with at least disdain and public reproach. While overt

racism, a regular feature of (particularly tabloid) newspaper reporting in the 1970s and 80s, is therefore seen far less regularly in the contemporary press (Allan, 1999; Searle, 1989; van Dijk, 1991), "the force of representations which draw upon concepts of 'normality' in order to give strength to negative representations", so prevalent in 'up market' reporting, remain unscathed (Ferguson, 1998: 130). Hammond and Stirner (1997) argue that it is through such notions of 'normality' and 'cultural difference', that prejudicial (racist) discourses are given a more acceptable gloss. Similarly, Malik (1996) argues that the notion of genetic lineage previously encoded as 'race' has been *recoded* as primordial ethnicity and invariant cultural difference - "natural terms", which ensure that "culture acquires an immutable character, and hence becomes a homologue for race" (p.150). Racism occurring in this way - as 'inferential racism' - is "in many ways more insidious [than overt racism] because it is largely invisible even to those who formulate the world in its terms" (Hall, 1990: 13). Such inferential racism, also present in newspapers' banal discussions of 'nation' and 'nationalism' (Billig, 1995), has

provided a language which has allowed for a coded vicarious discussion of race: what Reeves (1983) has called discursive deracialisation [...] Thus the new racism has acquired a theory and a range of styles of argumentation which are enveloped in a self-evident reasonableness. (Husband, 1987: 321)

Broadsheet newspapers' argumentative structures tend to be based on such "standards of reasonableness" (van Eemeren *et al*, 1997), and as such are particularly adept at providing support for the "expression of delicate or controversial social opinions" whilst simultaneously "protecting the speaker against unwanted [*negative*] inferences about his or her ethnic attitudes" (van Dijk, 1987: 76). This is due, in part, to the style policies of broadsheet newspapers, with news items written in a "moderate, emotionally controlled language, close to the standard register" using "more sophisticated and less explicit mechanisms [...] to control and bias the information given" (Martín-Rojo, 1995: 51). In order to gain the fullest understanding of how broadsheet newspapers achieve this "discursive deracialisation", a theoretical research

framework aimed at “analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control” (Wodak, 1995: 204), is needed. It is my contention that Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) offers one such theoretical research framework, and it is towards an introduction to the theory of CDA that this chapter now turns.

2.4 (Critical) Textual Analysis of Newspaper reporting

Excellent journalism starts with an understanding that language has power.
(Woods, 2000: 41)

Language use, in the form of text and talk, forms the third aspect of Fairclough’s notion of discourse, and is approached, as was suggested above, as being both a direct result of and a formative influence upon social beliefs, values, ideology and power formations. This position is also taken by Fowler (1991), who argues:

Anything that is said or written about the world is articulated from a particular ideological position: language is not a clear window, but a refracting, structuring medium. If we can acknowledge this as a positive, productive principle, we can go on to show by analysis how it operates in texts. (p.10)

Evident from Fowler’s position above is the non-pejorative definition of ‘ideology’ adopted by many critical linguists. By this definition, the notion of ideology as ‘false consciousness’ is rejected in favour of

something more neutral: a society’s implicit theory of what types of object exist in their world (categorisation); of the way that world works (causation); and of the values to be assigned to objects and processes (general propositions or paradigms). These implicit beliefs constitute ‘common sense’ which provides a normative base to discourse. (Fowler, 1996: 10-11)

This neutral definition is by no means shared by all CDA theorists.⁸ Fairclough (1995b) for example, building on the work of Althusser (1971) and Pêcheux (1982), maintains a more traditionally Marxist understanding of ideology and the ideological work which discourse does through the mediation of “political and economic structures, relationships in the market,

gender relations [and] relations within the state”, and “the creation and constant recreation of relations, subjects (as recognised in the Althusserian concept of *interpellation*) and objects which populate the social world” (p.73). In this way, Fairclough (1995b) suggests that, in contrast to Fowler’s (1996) neutral conception above: “Ideologies [*only*] arise in class societies characterised by relations of domination” and therefore discourse is ideological only in so far as it contributes “to sustaining or undermining power relations” (p.82).

However, the notions of ‘ideology as common sense’ and ‘ideology as a vestige of power/knowledge’ are not as antithetical as the above passage suggests. Stuart Hall for example, drawing on Gramsci’s definition of ‘common sense’ and its inter-relation with ideology (see Simon, 1982: 63-4) has suggested that

[Ideologies] work most effectively when we are not aware that how we formulate and construct a statement about the world is underpinned by ideological premises: when our formulations seem to be simply descriptive statements about how things are (i.e. must be), or what we can ‘take-for-granted’. (cited in Lawrence, 1982: 47)

These simple “descriptive statements about *how things are*” are particularly important to consider in relation to racist ‘common sense’ given the fixity of ‘race’ which racism assumes. On this subject, Said (1978) suggests that figures of speech used to represent ‘the Orient’, and ‘Islam’ in particular,

are all declarative and self-evident; the tense they employ is the timeless eternal; they convey a sense of repetition and strength; they are always symmetrical to, but diametrically inferior to, a European equivalent, which is sometimes specified, sometimes not. For all these functions, it is frequently enough to use the simple copula *is*. (p.72)

In order to gain a fuller understanding of the ideological work, maintaining and/or resisting (inequitable, deleterious) power relations, that such ‘common sense’ (racist) representations manage, we must take a step back and discuss discourse and discrimination in much greater depth, and specifically if and how ideological meaning may (or may not) be ‘read off’ the representations of Muslims in text and talk.

Fairclough (1995b) argues:

There are two major aspects of representation in text [...] In logical terminology, the first has to do with the structuring of propositions, the second with the combination and sequencing of propositions. (p.104)

Central to this theoretical position, is the notion of *levels* of textual construction and analysis. Thus, the first aspect of representation concerns the construction of *clauses*, and the representation of processes, events, actions and individuals in (for the most part) single propositions. The second aspect concerns the *organisation* of these single clauses into a coherently structured whole. This coherent whole can be loosely defined as the way the text presents a 'reality' to the audience and the manner in which the audience is positioned in relation to this same 'reality'.

It is therefore assumed that texts can, and perhaps *should*, be analysed at various levels and by focusing on different linguistic dimensions, each of which "may be involved directly or indirectly in discriminatory interaction against minority group members" (van Dijk, 1999: 4). Van Dijk, in a series of studies of the discursive representation of ethnic minorities (1984; 1987; 1991; 1992; 1993; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; van Dijk *et al*, 1997) has developed a conceptual tool called 'the ideological square' which he suggests dominates racist talk and text on and about 'racial' and ethnic others. This ideological square is characterised by a Positive Self-Presentation and a simultaneous Negative Other-Presentation and is observable across all linguistic dimensions of a text from the lexicon and syntactic structures, the meanings of sentences and the coherence relations between sentences, as well as the broader pragmatic - directed and functional - concerns of the text. Further, not only manifest words or other aspects of textual content are studied. Notions such as 'presupposition', 'implicature' (conversational and otherwise) and 'entailment' probe the hidden meanings of discourse, taking as their object of study the values, beliefs and ideological meanings which exist (occasionally necessarily) either 'before' or 'after' the manifest claims of the text.

Taking lexicon first, the selection of words in a text may be more or less negative and hence 'frame' that which is represented - be it an individual, a group, an event, a process, an action, a state, or mental or verbal process - in a more or less negative way. Lexical choice becomes noticeably ideological when we consider familiar noun-pairings such as 'thug vs. demonstrator', 'terrorist vs. freedom fighter' and 'our Army vs. our Boys'; verb-pairings such as 'clash vs. debate' and 'attack vs. defend'; and adjective-pairings such as 'fanatical vs. devout' and 'ruthless vs. resolute' (see Allan, 1999: 178-9). Racist terms of derogation are well known and need no introduction here, particularly since such terms are very rarely used in any but the most virulently racist of publications (see Daniels, 1997). Modern newspapers - particularly the élite broadsheet press - prefer to use either "negative words to describe the properties or actions of immigrants or minorities (for instance, 'illegal')" or else use special code words such as 'welfare mothers' or 'inner city youths' in negativised contexts (van Dijk, 2000: 39; also see Wykes, 2001: 30-60). *The Sunday Times* (3 December 2000) for example, reporting the tragic death of Damilola Taylor, referred to "a community used to violent crime" (Woods & Gadher, p.1), a "**Violent ghetto culture that claimed Damilola**" (Woods *et al*, pp. 14-15), and "a moral, spiritual and emotional vacuum" arising "from rage, rooted in emotional chaos and neglect" which exists amongst "the squalor of the area where the Taylor family was living" (**Children learn to kill in a moral dead zone**, Phillips, p.19). In such instances it appears quite apparent that Britain's black youth - described by one article as dominated by "thugs" attracted to the "culture of violence and greed lauded by rap singers" (**Violent ghetto culture that claimed Damilola**, p.15) - are being blamed for such a tragedy.

In one of the most detailed of recent publications on discourse and discrimination (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001) the ideological importance to racist discourse of 'naming' - "referential strategies" - and the attribution of traits, characteristics and qualities - "predicational strategies" - are discussed at

great length (p. xiii; also pp. 44-69). Taking referential strategies first: Reisigl and Wodak (2001) show that in the act of 'naming',

one constructs and represents social actors: for example, ingroups and outgroups. This is done in a number of ways, such as membership categorisation devices, including reference by tropes, biological, naturalising and depersonalising metaphors and metonymies, as well as by synecdoches in the form of a part standing for a whole (*pars pro toto*) or a whole standing for the part (*totum pro parte*). (p.45)

Adapting van Leeuwen's system network of the representation of social actors (1993; 1996), Reisigl and Wodak (2001) argue that analytical categories such as "'exclusion', 'inclusion', 'suppression', 'backgrounding', 'passivation', [...] 'collectivisation', 'aggregation', 'impersonalisation'" and others,⁹ "are of great help for us in accurately describing some of the more subtle forms of discriminatorily, as well as positive-representatively, constructing, identifying or hiding social actors" (p.46).

Referential strategies also bear the imprint of *predication* - defined by Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 54) as "the very basic process and result of linguistically assigning qualities to persons, animals, objects, events, actions and social phenomena." However, it is through predicational *strategies* that

persons [etc...] are specified and characterised with respect to quality, quantity, space, time and so on. [...] Among other things, predicational strategies are mainly realised by specific forms of *reference* (based on explicit denotation as well as on more or less implicit connotation), by *attributes* (in the form of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctive clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups), by *predicates* or *predicative nouns/adjectives/pronouns*, by *collocations* or explicit *comparisons*, *similes*, *metaphors* and other *rhetorical figures* [...] and by more or less implicit *allusions*, *evocations* and *presuppositions/implications*. (Ibid.)

Thus, the choice of words used in nomination and characterisation of social actors are of particular significance in analysing the positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation integral to the 'ideological square'.

Second, the syntactic structure of sentences is similarly shaped by the ideological square. Of particular relevance is the differential emphasis which can be placed on agency through active, passive or nominalised

construction of transitive action processes (or 'transactive' by some theorists' terminology: see Hodge & Kress, 1993; Kress, 1994; Trew, 1979). For example, in the active construction 'a Jewish extremist killed Yitzhak Rabin', the agent (Jewish extremist) is placed in a foregrounded position which emphasises the role he played in the transitive ('transactive') action represented. In contrast, the passive construction 'Yitzhak Rabin was killed [by a Jewish extremist]' backgrounds the role of the extremist to a prepositional phrase. This phrase is placed within parentheses in order to show that it can be deleted (in a process called 'active agent deletion') leaving a passivised verb without agent: 'Yitzhak Rabin was killed'. Agency can be disavowed in this way "for various reasons - perhaps because they are obvious, but also perhaps as a way of obfuscating agency and responsibility" (Fairclough, 2000: 163). Patterns in such obfuscation are quite revealing of newspaper ideological codes. For example, van Dijk (2000) argues that 'racial' and ethnic minorities tend to be represented in the press "in a passive role (things are being decided or done, for or against them) unless they're agents of negative actions, such as illegal entry, crime, violence or drug abuse. In the latter case their responsible agency will be emphasised" (pp. 39-40). In one study of the Dutch press, van Dijk (1999) "found that of 1,500 headlines on ethnic issues, not a single one was positive when it involved minorities as active, responsible agents" (p.12).

The active agent deletion of passivised transitive verbs can be moved a stage further into nominalisation - the transformation of a process into a noun, a construction which characteristically involves further imprecision and ambiguity. Thus the passive 'Yitzhak Rabin was killed' (which still holds the *potential* to be modified by prepositional phrases invoking time and place: for example, '...killed in 1996') can be represented as 'the killing of Yitzhak Rabin', thus removing all sense of agency, time and location. Fairclough (2000) argues that nominalised constructions involve

abstraction from the diversity of processes going on, no specification of who or what is changing, a backgrounding of the processes of change themselves, and a foregrounding of their effect. In backgrounding the processes themselves, nominalisation also backgrounds questions of agency and causality, of who or what causes change. (p.26)

The (selective) nominalisation of transitive verbs therefore holds enormous ideological potential, since it obfuscates responsibility by backgrounding (or often *deleting*) agency and causality. Hence, the *News on Sunday*, in reporting that the disturbances on the Broadwater Farm estate were “sparked by *the death* of Cynthia Jarrett during a police raid on her home” (13 October 1985, cited in Wykes, 2001: 42; emphasis added), the very active role which the police played in *killing* Ms Jarrett is obscured.

These two linguistic dimensions - lexicon and syntactic structures - are generally combined and referred to as constituting the *style* of a text. Linguistic style is defined by Jucker (1992) as

a comparative concept in that it describes some relevant differences between a text or a discourse and some other texts or discourses; or, in some methodological frameworks, with some kind of explicit or implicit norm. It generally applies to instances of real language, language that has been *produced* by speakers with their beliefs, aims and goals *in specific situations*, and *in particular physical, social and temporal environments*. (p.1, emphasis added)

Explicit in the above quotation, is the recognition that stylistic variation is by no means ‘free’ or ‘arbitrary’, but rather should be regarded as a contingent part of the role that context plays in the formation of text and talk (van Dijk, 1988: 27). Further, it is important not to be “misled by the language of ‘choices’ and ‘options’; [stylistics] is a framework for analysing the variability of language and its social determinants and effects, and *self-conscious* linguistic choice is a relatively marginal aspect of the social processes of text production and interpretation” (Fairclough, 1995a: 18). In this way, stylistic variations should be analysed as an indicator of the

relationship between participants in speech acts who, as individuals, negotiate speech acts and thereby create 'styles' strategically, but who are also exemplars of social roles and have relationships in larger social institutions beyond the frame of dyadic interaction. (Traugott & Romaine (1985: 29), cited in Jucker, 1992: 17)

Thus, through the dialectic - *constructed and constitutive* - relationship between language and context, texts may be used to "indicate personal or social factors of the communicative event" (van Dijk, 1988: 27).

It should also be remembered that "media institutions typically do have explicit policies on at least some aspects of language use. Rules about usage are commonly codified in a 'style sheet' or 'style book' [...] and there is also a more general notion of what constitutes 'good style' which is meant to inform reporting and editing practice" (Cameron, 1996: 315). This is a area of news analysis which has obvious relevance for critical linguistic analysis in general, and lexical/syntactic style in particular, for two principal reasons (Cameron, 1996). "First, when analysts look for ideological effects resulting from lexical and syntactic patterning in news discourse, it needs to be acknowledged that some textual regularities may be the outcome of explicit style rules rather than implicit assumptions about the matter in hand" (Cameron, 1996: 316). This point, quite obviously, cuts to the core of the approach which Critical Discourse Analysis takes with regard to language use: Given that patterns of stylistic variation in a text may not be attributable to its speaker/writer, but rather to the *prescribed* style of the organisation to which the speaker/writer is affiliated, to what extent can we suggest that such patterns are 'common-sensical' and hence ideological? Cameron, giving her second motive for analysing style guides, points out that

style policies [...] are *ideological themselves*. Though they are framed as purely functional or aesthetic judgements, and the commonest criteria offered are 'apolitical' ones such as clarity, brevity, consistency, liveliness and vigour, [...] it turns out that these stylistic values are not timeless and neutral, but have a history and a politics. They play a role in constructing a relationship with a specific imagined audience, and also in sustaining a particular ideology of news reporting. (Ibid.; emphasis added)

Jucker (1992), in a study of stylistic variation in newspapers which broadly concurs with Cameron (1996), argues that linguistic style should "be seen as

a correlate of the addressee(s). Thus, stylistic differences are caused not so much by different amounts of [the speaker's] attention, but by adapting to different audiences" (Jucker, 1992: 8). The corollary of this is, of course, that these lexical terms and syntactic structures do not possess a semantic equivalency with their alternate stylistic 'options', and therefore their use can be analysed as an indication of the ideological presuppositions of the text's producer: the newspaper.

In short, the study of linguistic style should attempt to relate patterns and features of linguistic variation to the larger non-linguistic (and ideological) context in which they occur. Such an approach to the study of language in use found a paradigmatic home in the form of Critical Linguistics, characterised by the work of Gunther Kress (1983; 1994; Fowler, Hodge, Kress & Trew, 1979; Hodge & Kress, 1993). Kress (1983) argues that "[a]s ideological systems exist in and are articulated through language, the ideological system *in itself* can be reached via an analysis of language" (p.124; emphasis added), an argument which he illustrates by showing the effect which specific syntactic processes can (and do) have upon textual meaning. In the sentence "*Telecom* employees are likely to reimpose work bans", taken from an Australian newspaper report, the reporter presents a specific *interpretation* of the reported action to the audience through the use of the verb/adjective pairing "are likely". Kress show that alternatives could have been:

Verb Adjective complement

| | |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| <i>are</i> (certainty) | <i>likely</i> (uncertainty) |
| <i>seems</i> (uncertainty) | <i>certain</i> (certainty) |
| <i>are</i> | <i>certain</i> |
| <i>seems</i> | <i>likely</i> |

These alternatives "differ in that 'seems' establishes the relation as the judgement of some beholder (that is, *it seems to someone*) whereas 'are' establishes the relation as an existential fact" (Kress, 1983: 127). No doubt

the reporter in question would then have provided evidence to back up the claim of certitude, yet the choice and use of the verb 'are' is ideologically important in two ways: it stresses the *certainty* of industrial action by *Telecom* workers, and as such is a product of (and also a productive part of) the general discourse on 'industrial relations'. This is interesting in itself, and further investigation and analysis could perhaps reveal a consistency in the newspaper's portrayal of industrial disputes. The 'existential factuality' of the claim is also important in relation to the discourse on objectivity in journalism. Journalism necessarily makes truth claims through which, it is hoped, the audience will be convinced by the reporter that "his or her description and interpretation is the rational and appropriate one" (Kieran, 1998: 27). The conviction of the reporter (and in turn, *the report*) to the factuality of the particular interpretation presented is instrumental in the degree of reliability placed on the text upon reading. In this sense, the use of "are likely" as opposed to "seems certain" is highly significant.

The fourth aspect of news reporting which needs to be examined are the semantic structures, at both micro (sentential) and macro (textual) levels. At the macro semantic level, van Dijk (1988) argues that the topic of a text "is part of a hierarchical, topical or thematic structure - the semantic macrostructure - which may be expressed by a summary and which defines what is subjectively the most important information, gist, upshot of the text" (p.34). Past content analysis of the representation of 'racial' and ethnic others (discussed earlier in this chapter) has shown that the topics of paragraphs or whole news items are limited to a restricted list of prejudicial images and issues and are presented in an overwhelmingly negative manner. Further, in accordance with the ideological square, there is a preference for topics which emphasise 'Our good actions' and de-emphasise 'Our bad ones' (van Dijk, 2000: 38). Equally, van Dijk (1999) illustrates the importance of developing a more local, micro semantic analysis of news texts, focusing on, amongst other features, the presence of *disclaimers*. These disclaimers are semantic manoeuvres - or "strategies" (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001) - "with a positive part about Us and a negative part about Them" (van Dijk, 1999: 9), and include moves such as:

Apparent Denial: 'I have nothing against Muslims, but...'

Apparent Concession: 'Of course *some* Muslims are tolerant, but generally...'

Apparent Empathy: 'Of course asylum seekers endure hardships, but...'

Apparent Ignorance: 'Now, I don't know all the facts, but...'

Reversal: 'We are the real victims in all this...'

Transfer: 'Of course I have nothing against them; but my customers...'

(adapted from van Dijk, 1999: 9)

These strategies are labelled 'apparent' disclaimers because the structure of their discourse is such that "the negative part of the sentence is spelled out throughout the discourse. The positive part thus especially has the function of avoiding a bad impression [of the protagonist] with the recipients" (van Dijk, 2000: 41).

The dividing line between semantic manoeuvres such as those introduced above and full argumentation is unclear. Indeed, Kleiner (1998) labels van Dijk's 'apparent disclaimers' as 'pseudo-arguments', which participants employ "in an effort to forestall negative inferences by others, and to project an image of rationality, objectivity and fairness" (p. 206). In addition, Schiffrin (1985) suggests that a distinction needs to be made between "rhetorical argument" and "oppositional argument" (p. 45). She defines rhetorical argument as "discourse through which a speaker presents an intact monologue supporting a disputable position" - thus, *making* an argument; whilst oppositional argument is defined as "an interaction in which an opposition between speakers creates an extended polarisation that is negotiated through a conversation" - thus, *having* an argument (Ibid.). Argumentative dialogue (oppositional argument) can itself take the form of a number of different dialogue types: a quarrel; a debate; an inquiry; a negotiation; and others, occurring in isolation or in combination. Each of these dialogue types display differences in their initial setting, their argumentative goals, and the methods employed in pursuit of these argumentative goals (see Walton, 1989: 3-10).

Traditionally, argumentative discourse has been divided into three ideal types, each of which is defined as follows. First, logic, concerning proof via deductively valid argumentation comprised by logical constants and internally verifying propositions. By this approach, if an argument has a valid form¹⁰, and the propositions are true, the conclusion *cannot* be false. Second, dialectic argumentation, which by the Aristotelian definition “is best understood as the art of inquiry through critical discussion. Dialectic is a way of putting ideas to critical test by attempting to expose and eliminate contradictions in a position” (van Eemeren *et al*, 1997: 214). Dialectic forms the normative model of argumentation, and although it represents an ideal type, general definitions of argumentative discourse have a tendency to draw upon dialectic characteristics (see Kopperschmidt, 1985).

There are arguments however, “where the subject matter [does] not lend itself to certain demonstration”, i.e. through using either logical or dialectic methods, hence a third argumentative discourse type: rhetoric. The classical definition of rhetoric “has to do with effective persuasion [...emphasising the] production of effective argumentation for an audience” (van Eemeren *et al* 1997: 213). Contemporary analyses of rhetoric retain this theme, focusing on “the situated quality of argumentation and the importance of orientation to an audience” (van Eemeren *et al* 1997: 215), and, in it’s simplest form, occurs “when someone, who believes some statement, ...[presents] reasons which aim at persuading others to adopt this same point of view” (Thomson, 1996: 6). Here we see how rhetoric differs from the previously defined argument types, in that it appears as the *defence of opinion* as opposed to the pursuit of ‘*truth*’.

Of course, rhetorical argument is still based on the offering of factual reason in support of a conclusion, but rhetorical (persuasive) argumentation operates *through* valid forms of argumentative discourse, appropriating them in order to grant credibility, and hence persuasive weight, to the otherwise questionable propositions expressed in ‘opinion’. In this way, argument represents “opinion statements [...] embedded in argumentation that makes them more or less defensible, reasonable, justifiable or legitimate as conclusions” (van Dijk, 1996: 24). This definition is not offered in any

pejorative sense, but rather to acknowledge the 'laundering' function which valid - dialectic - argumentative forms play in rhetorical argument, lending the appearance of fairness, 'even-handedness' and objectivity, in order to ward off both negative inferences regarding the participants (Kleiner, 1998: 210), and the promotion of the argument in the eyes of the audience.

Thus, a fully formed critical model of argumentation should take account, not only of the form and content of argument, but also the functional and interactive aspects of argument within their discursive context, and their application and effect in the social field. The work of van Eemeren, collaborating with various other theorists (1992; 1993; 1996; 1997; 1999) is extremely useful in such a critical analysis of argumentative discourse. Building upon the work of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), they propose a theoretical framework which attempts a unification of normative and rhetorical theories of argumentation: Pragma-Dialectical theory. This theory

views argumentative discourse as an exchange of verbal moves ideally intended to resolve a difference of opinion. The dialectical angle of the theory is manifested in the maintenance of critical standards of reasonableness, the pragmatic angle in the definition of all argumentative moves as speech acts functioning in a context of disagreement. (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 1999: 480).

Thus, although it is acknowledged that the principle function of argumentative discourse is to persuade or convince with "the aim of securing agreement in views" (van Eemeren *et al*, 1997: 208), this is achieved "according to appropriate procedures of reasonable dialogue" (Walton, 1989: 1). Such appropriate procedures, or 'standards of reasonableness', are manifest structurally (e.g. pertinency, turntaking), interactionally (e.g. rules of cooperativeness), semantically (e.g. avoiding ambiguity, equivocation and prejudicial language) and elsewhere across argumentative discourse. Semantic standards of reasonableness would, for example, include avoiding the expression of socially disapproved (anti-social) ideas, opinions and attitudes. This is not to say that such ideas are not still present in discourse, merely that they have found less obtrusive manifestations. The

ideology of 'Modern' or 'New Racism' (Barker, 1981) is a case in point, wherein "modern racists are said to avoid expressing overtly anti-black opinions, instead preferring to express their views in more subtle, sophisticated ways which may be defended by appeal to seemingly universally accepted egalitarian values and principles" (Kleiner, 1998: 188).

Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999: 480) define the dialectic aspect of argumentation in terms of four stages, crucial to "establishing systematically whether the standpoint advanced by the protagonist of a viewpoint is defensible against doubt or criticism of an antagonist." These stages of argumentation are, in turn:

the confrontation stage, where difference of opinion is defined; the opening stage, where the starting point of the discussion is established; the argumentation stage, where arguments and critical reactions are exchanged; and the concluding stage, where the result of the discussion is determined. (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999: 480-1).

At each stage dialectic rules of argumentation are employed - by participant and analyst - the violation of which "can result in errors, faults and shortcomings of various kinds in argumentation" (Walton, 1989: 16).¹¹

The rhetorical dimensions of the theory are defined as strategies "for influencing the result of a particular dialectical stage to one's own advantage, which manifest themselves in a systematic, co-ordinated and simultaneous exploitation of the opportunities afforded by that stage" (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999: 485-6). This is accomplished, the theory suggests, through three strategic manoeuvres, exploiting: the *topical potential*, wherein "speakers or writers may choose the material they find easiest to handle"; adapting to *audience demand* by choosing "the perspective most agreeable to the audience"; and through *presentational devices* which frame "their contribution in the most effective wordings" (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999: 484). Taking each in turn then: the rhetorical use of topical potential - which, in the case of text and talk on and about 'racial' and ethnic minorities, is dominated by discourses of difference, discord and threat - acts to imply an "importance and pertinence to the discussion" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969: 119), and therefore works

to define the disagreement space to the benefit of the protagonist (van Eemeren *et al*, 1993). The use of topical resources in argumentation, in this case relying so heavily on negative other-presentations, thus provides interesting evidence about the ideological position of the (racist?) protagonist.

Regarding audience demand, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) state that “since argumentation aims at securing the adherence of those to whom it is addressed, it is, in its entirety, relative to the audience to be influenced” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969: 19). Rhetorical argumentation attempts to create empathy or “communion” with an audience (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999: 485), through appeal to the audience’s beliefs or preferences. One manifestation of this, is the recourse to the ‘common sense’ of an audience, either though implicit or explicit assumption, since common sense is founded on “the existence of unquestioned and unquestionable truths” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969: 57). It is here that the model is most receptive to the definitions of ideology given above (Fowler, 1996; Gramsci, 1971).

Presentational devices, such as loaded definitions, figures of speech and rhetorical argumentative structures (e.g. analogy), should also be employed in rhetorical argument in order that “the phrasing of the words [...] be systematically attuned to their discursive and stylistic effectiveness” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999: 485). Since rhetorical figures of speech are one such presentational device, strategically employed as “a way of describing things which makes them present to our mind” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969: 167), their persuasive character in argumentation cannot be denied. Further, since rhetorical figures are non-obligatory structures in both argument and in text in general, their inclusion must be regarded pragmatically, showing “how and in what respects the use of particular figures is explained by the requirements of argumentation” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969: 168). The Pragma-dialectical model reflects such a concern for argumentation, analysing figures of speech “as part of the sequential environment to which they are tied, and [...paying]

attention to their contribution to the local and global coherence of the text” (Ferrara, 1985: 140).

Fifth and finally, a linguistic analysis of news needs to take account of the pragmatic dimensions of media texts. Such a focus has already been touched upon in the preceding section, wherein I showed how the pragma-dialectical model of argumentation foregrounds the function which specific utterances play to the coherence and ultimately the success of an argument. However, pragmatic theory provides additional insights into the practical role(s) which, for example, an argument *in toto* may play at a more macro-pragmatic level, as well as suggesting *how* texts achieve such practical goals. This dimension of analysis therefore aims to not merely examine “the forms or the meaning (or reference) of verbal [and textual] utterances, but rather the social act we accomplish by using such an utterance in a specific situation” (van Dijk, 1988: 26). Beginning with Austin (1962) and later expanded and adapted by Searle (1969, 1979), such utterances are called ‘speech acts’, archetypal examples of which being ‘questions’, ‘assertions’, ‘promises’, ‘accusations’, and ‘threats’. The basic insight of the pragmatic approach to the study of language use is its focus on how meaning and action are related. The utterance itself is split into three ‘speech acts’ by both Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), although these taxonomies differ slightly in their terms of reference. For Searle (1969):

The uttering of words (morphemes and sentences) is an *utterance act*. Referring and predicating are *propositional acts*. Acts like stating, questioning, commanding, and promising are *illocutionary acts*. [...] The consequences of illocutionary acts (the effects on actions, thoughts, beliefs of hearers) are *perlocutionary acts*. (Schiffrin, 1994: 55-6)

Thus, in terms of newspaper reporting, the utterance is the sentential structure of the report itself: the arrangement of words in sentences and paragraphs. The propositional acts which this utterance achieves - primarily concerning “reference and predication” (Schiffrin, 1994: 56) - are the most rooted in these textual structures. Thus, “the propositional content rule for promises, for example, is the prediction of a future act (A) by the speaker [S]” whilst “the preparatory condition for promises [...] concerns H’s [the

hearer's] preference about S's doing of an act (A)" (Ibid.). The perlocutionary act is realised in the change in H's belief which the utterance brings about: in other words, H's (new) belief that S will observe his/her commitment (also see Searle, 1969: 57-62).

The illocutionary act and its relation to the perlocutionary act are the most interesting aspects of an utterance for the current thesis, given the rules and constitutive conditions by which this relationship is created. Essentially, a speaker must have the ability, and moreover, be *perceived* to have the ability, to carry through on the illocutionary act of their utterance. For example, 'S' must be trusted (by 'H') for a promise, or any other commissive, to have any perlocutionary force; authoritative enough for assertions or declarations to have any force; and powerful enough for directives, such as requests or orders 'designed' to get 'H' to do 'A', to have any perlocutionary force. Therefore, in each communicative event - 'utterance' by Searle's terminology - the (differential) power of 'S' and 'H', and the complexes of societal power in general, are foremost concerns. Whilst it should be borne in mind that "[s]ince news discourse nearly exclusively consists of assertions (and not of promises or threats)", and as such "a pragmatic description in the strict sense would not yield much more than *the conditions necessary* for the appropriate *accomplishment* of assertions" (van Dijk, 1988: 26; emphasis added), these conditions are by no means insignificant. Broadsheet newspapers' tradition of respectable, quality journalism, their current staff and standard of writing which justify a position as the epitome of journalistic excellence and the overwhelmingly élite status of their readers, furnish broadsheet reporting with an authority absent from almost all other journalistic forms. Hence, the illocutionary acts intimately associated with, and indeed reliant upon, such authority - for example, statements, descriptions, assertions, allegations, criticisms - are granted extra perlocutionary force in the mind(s) of the reader(s).

The work of Hage (1998) on Australian multiculturalism and Blommaert and Verschueren (1998) on the discussion of ethnic diversity and tolerance in Belgium, are particularly important applications of such a pragmatic approach to language study and the disadvantageous effects

which discourse can have on ethnic minority communities. Blommaert and Verschueren (1998) for example, first show how an exclusive 'otherness' is created in public discourse, primarily by referential and predicational strategies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001), and then *used* in discriminatory practices against Belgium's visible minority communities - particularly citizens of Moroccan or Turkish origin. Such an approach - which Blommaert and Verschueren (1998) label as an 'ethnic management paradigm' - views diversity as a problem, and as such, any "discourse on diversity is [used as] an instrument for the reproduction of social problems, forms of inequality and majority power" (p. 4). Similar results, in which the exclusion of ethnic minorities and 'foreigners' is legitimised through discourse, have been recognised as features of parliamentary discourse in Spain (Martín-Rojo and van Dijk, 1997) Austria (Sedlak, 1999), Britain, France and the USA (van Dijk, 1997).

Hage (1998), adopting a similar argument, suggests that racist talk and text about 'racial' and ethnic others are characterised by "discourses of spatial management" which, whilst they are undoubtedly

'informed' by racist modes of classification [...] are better conceived as nationalist practices: practices which assume, first, an image of a national space; secondly, an image of the nationalist himself or herself as master of this national space and, thirdly, an image of the 'ethnic/racial other' as a mere object within this space. (p. 28)

Accordingly, racist talk and text which draws on concepts such as 'too many' or 'go home', which are themselves "meaningless unless they assume the existence of a specific territorial space [and its 'ontological ethnic status'] against which the evaluation 'too many is arrived at" (Hage, 1998: 37), are subordinate to the very practical function of maintaining (white) domination over a (territorial, cultural or symbolic) space. Such practices are recognisable in a wide variety of social settings, from the systems of exclusion and containment inherent in immigration policy, to readers' letters requesting Muslims prove their loyalty to the nation, to street racism and violent attacks against visible minorities, to the 'emancipatory' goal of certain liberals in their desire to unveil Muslim women: all emanate from an image of

the national space and the agent's fantasy that they occupy a privileged position within this national space as "the enactors of the national will" (Hage, 1998: 47). Such assumed privilege is particularly important to consider in any analysis of élite discourse - of which the broadsheet press is a clear example.

In this way, by approaching (racist) language use pragmatically - as (racist) *practice* - it is possible to 'square the circle' of racism and racist discourse suggested at the outset of this chapter, and reveal the function which racist talk and text has in maintaining racism as social practice.

2.5 Summary

In summary, the above chapter has made the following arguments:

- Racism exists in contemporary British society, and exists in forms which do not (wholly) target 'racial' others. According to contemporary studies of British social divisions, British Muslims are particularly disadvantaged by racist discrimination.
- Racism is reflected in and perpetuated by discourse, particularly the empowered discourse of élites.
- And, in order to fully grasp the (ideological) implications of such discourse, analysis should be directed at examining the complex inter-relationships between text, discursive practice and social practice, observable and all levels of linguistic representation.

For a concise account of this relationship between discourse and racism, it is useful to again draw upon the work of van Dijk *et al* (1997):

From topics to local meanings, style, rhetoric, argumentation, storytelling and conversational strategies, we thus find the implementation of the overall strategy of positive self-presentation of 'us' and negative other-presentation of 'them'. Obviously, such strategies are not merely mental, in that they express such polarised attitudes, or persuasively try to influence the mental modes and attitudes of recipients. They should be understood also as sociocultural and political forms of interaction in a social context of ethnic inequality, that is as the enactment and reproduction of dominant group power. (p.174-5).

The remainder of this thesis represents an attempt to operationalise such a concern, with a specific view to examining: the representation(s) of Islam and Muslims in British broadsheet newspapers; the social origins of such representation(s); and their potential ramifications for the relative inclusion and/or injustice experienced (suffered) by Muslims.

Notes: Chapter 2

¹ I do not want to misrepresent Anthias' argument here. In much of the article, the intertwined relations of biological 'scientific' racisms and cultural 'new' racisms are explicitly drawn out. Indeed the article as a whole is a dedicated investigation of "the demise of old deterministic and unitary conceptions of race phenomena and their related axes of exclusion and subordination" (p.279), "the plurality of racisms as opposed to some unitary system of representations and practices" (ibid.) and the somewhat paradoxical need for "a core of *racism* [which] must lie in any definition of racisms in order for the term to be meaningful" (p.280; emphasis added).

² I acknowledge that the term 'discourse' is a vigorously contested concept, whose conclusive definition is both beyond the scope of this present study and often, it seems, beyond the scope of the discipline of discourse studies itself. Van Dijk (1998a) offers several definitional approaches to the concept. First the "*extended* primary meaning", designating a "specific communicative event" usually involving, for example, "a number of social actors, typically in speaker/writer and hearer/reader roles (but also a number of other roles such as observer or over-hearer), taking part in a communicative act, in a specific setting (time, place, circumstances) and based on other context features" such as power, privilege and other hierarchical constellations (p.194). The adjectivised form 'discursive' - denoting the ability of language to be simultaneously constituted and constitutive of (for example) power, meaning and the "social construction of reality" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) in general - arises from this first meaning of discourse. Second, the "*restricted* primary meaning", designating the abstract "verbal dimension of the spoken or written communicative act" thereby referring to "the accomplished or ongoing 'product' of the communicative act" (ibid.). These are the most commonly adopted referents of the term 'discourse'.

In addition however, van Dijk (1998a) shows that there are at least four other frequently used meanings of the concept discourse. First, a "token" of a *specific* discourse (of the extended or restricted primary meanings) taking place between *these* specific actors in *this* specific setting. By this meaning of discourse, "indefinite or definite articles or demonstratives are applied", referring to 'the discourse', 'that discourse', 'those discourses' (etc.) (van Dijk, 1998a: 194-5). Second, discourse as "type", corresponding with the notion of a genre. Therefore, we can talk about the 'discourse of news reports' in general. Third there is the notion of "social domains" of discourse such as 'medical discourse', 'political discourse' etc. (van Dijk, 1998a: 196). Such domains usually draw upon a number of (discursive) genres - for example 'political discourse' is constituted by genres such as 'political speeches', 'press conferences', 'government legislation' and numerous others. And lastly, there is the more Foucauldian notion of an 'order of discourse', referring to "all the text and talk, or the discourses of a specific period, community or a whole culture" or "the very abstract and general notion of the 'discourse' of that period, community of culture" (ibid.). The usefulness of this

fourth meaning of discourse, given that it almost inevitably collapses into similarly contested subjects such as the 'social order' and 'ideology', is debatable.

As stated, the definition of discourse adopted throughout this thesis is "language in use" (Brown & Yule, 1983). Although this may seem imprecise, particularly given the discussion above, it is sufficiently accurate to locate *language* as the centre of discourse, yet still flexible enough to be able to denote 'language in use' in general (extended primary meaning), 'this particular *example* of language in use' (token) and the written or recorded *text* of language in use (restricted primary meaning).

³ This is not true, of course, of British anti-semitism which, particularly at certain junctures in British history, has been both significant and conspicuous. However, like all racism, British anti-semitism is constituted by both 'thought' and 'deed': constituted by the belief in the innate inferiority of Jews and also in the active discrimination, exclusion, and (often, ultimately) extermination of Jews. These practices are only made possible with the actual, or often only the *threatened* existence of Jews in Britain - a presence which anti-Semites oppose. Therefore, British anti-semitism also fits with the general model of racism proposed: racism, be that against Jews, Muslims, blacks, etc., involves *contact*, or the maintenance of social policy (for example immigration policies) which both regulates and acts as a *proxy* contact, with (the variously inferiorised) 'Others'; short of this contact, 'prejudice' certainly exists, but not racism by the definition which this thesis adopts.

⁴ See Sardar (1999) for detailed, critical and perspicacious analyses of films including David Cronenberg's *M. Butterfly* (1993), Disney's *Aladdin* (1992); popular fiction by writers such as John Updike and Frederick Forsyth; and the work of contemporary Orientalists such as Kenneth Cragg, Daniel Pipes and Patricia Crone and Michael Cook.

⁵ Between April and July 2000 for example, Humberside Police dealt with 35 "racial [*sic*] incidents", the majority of which were attacks on asylum seekers ranging from: verbal harassment in the street; a 26 year-old Kosovan who was blinded in one eye after he answered a knock at his door and someone threw a rock in his face; two Afghanis who were seriously attacked in the street by three men, one brandishing a knife and another with 'knuckle-dusters'; and the activities of Mr Simon Sheppard of Ella Street, recently jailed for inciting racial hatred after admitting to distributing leaflets throughout the 'Avenues' area of the City which referred to a "foreign invasion" and to people of mixed ethnicity being a "mongrel race" who ought to be removed (Kurdistan Report, Winter 2000: 83; previously reported in the *Independent*, 15 August 2000).

⁶ This realigning (or, in the case of *The Sun's* backing of New Labour, the *volte-face*) of editorial principles in light of financial interests is a well-worn approach of Murdoch. Bagdikian (1987) shows that in 1980, "after the staff of the Export-Import Bank of the United States rejected Murdoch's application for a taxpayer-subsidised loan for his Australian airline, Murdoch had lunch at the White House with then president Jimmy Carter and later with the president of the Export-Import Bank. Two days later Murdoch's [*New York*] *Post* endorsed President Carter in the crucial New York presidential primary, and six days after that the bank reversed its decision and awarded Murdoch his loan of \$290 million at 8.1 percent interest" (p.41).

⁷ This average daily rate is calculated through averaging annual figures obtained in the *Bulletin of the World Health Organisation* (1994: 447-80), cited in van Ginneken (1998: 24).

⁸ Nor by much of the theoretical discussion outside of Critical Discourse Analysis in other social scientific disciplines. An in-depth discussion of the literature on and around 'Ideology' is neither the intention nor a realisable goal of this current work.

For excellent introductions and historical summaries of ideology, see Billig (1982; 1991; 1995) Eagleton (1991), Larrain (1979) and Zizek (Ed.) (1994).

⁹ The other analytical categories listed are: 'categorisation', 'specification', 'genericisation', 'assimilation', and 'objectivation' (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 46-7).

¹⁰ Examples of such valid forms of argumentation are: *Modus ponens* (If A, then B; A; therefore B); *Modus Tolens* (If A then B; not B; therefore not A); *Hypothetical Syllogism* (If A then B; If B then C; therefore, if A then C); *Disjunctive Syllogism* (Either A or B; not A; therefore B).

¹¹ Examples of such violations are the *fallacies*, a particularly strong criticism, suggesting that an argument contains "systematically deceptive strategies of argumentation, based on an underlying, systematic error of reasoned dialogue" (Walton, 1989: 16). Classically fallacious arguments involve *post hoc ergo propter hoc* errors, involving an unwarranted move from a relation of correlation to a relation of causality.

Chapter 3

Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses research methods and is divided into three broad sections. The first outlines the sample of newspapers used to provide the data set for this research, detailing: the choice of newspaper titles from the overall 'population' of newspapers; the extent ('x number of months') and identification ('*which* months?') of the sample of newspapers to be used; the 'unit of analysis' used as the basis for the research; and the qualifying criteria which the chosen 'unit' has to satisfy in order to be recorded.

The second section discusses content analysis as the first of two methods to be used in the collection and analysis of the sampled newspapers. I begin by discussing the objectives of content analysis, moving on to the theoretical assumptions which underlie the method before relating these to the foci and requirements of the current research. Following this, I discuss the particular concerns of this content analysis - specifically how to decide upon 'what to count' and the approaches to this quantification. Again, these issues and questions are related explicitly to the current research. This section concludes with a discussion of the limitations of content analysis and the reasons why the results which it produces may not, on their own, provide the fullest account of the content and implications of the sampled newspaper articles.

Third, the second primary research method, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), is introduced and discussed in a format mirroring that of the preceding discussion of content analysis. The assumptions, objectives and principles of CDA are first introduced in relation to the concerns of the current research project. Due to the methodological diversity of different approaches to CDA, I focus this section on the method used by Norman Fairclough before discussing some specific questions which I used to shape my approach to the sampled articles during this second (discursive) stage of data collection and analysis.

3.2 The Sample

This research reflects a desire to study empirically both the form and frequency of the representation of Islam and Muslim communities in broadsheet newspapers. Surprisingly little empirical research has been completed on newspaper representation(s) of Muslims, still fewer British Muslims, with the majority of work so far completed using selective, non-systematic anecdotal evidence to 'illustrate' biases in media coverage (for critiques of such approaches, see Halliday 1999; and Poole 1999, 2000).

This research is informed by a discourse analytic methodology, which views journalistic discourse as social practice, and discourse analysis as the analysis of what people *do* with text and talk. To this end, the thesis aims at "analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control. ...[and] aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, signally, constituted, legitimised, etc. by language use (or in discourse)" (Wodak, 1995: 204).

3.2.1 *Why broadsheet newspapers?*

Broadsheet newspapers were chosen as the object of this research for three reasons. First, the traditional emphasis of the broadsheet press on 'objective' and 'balanced' reporting, as opposed to tabloid newspapers' tendency towards being sensationalist and overtly partisan, has resulted in them being regarded, both by journalists and readers, as the epitome of journalistic excellence. This excellence is reflected in the synonym 'quality newspapers' also being used (although not here) to describe broadsheet newspapers. It has been argued that, "[u]nless inconsistent with ...personal beliefs and experiences, recipients tend to accept beliefs (knowledge and opinions) through discourse from what they see as authoritative, trustworthy or credible sources, such as scholars, experts, professionals or reliable media" (van Dijk, 1998b: 2). It is my contention that broadsheet newspapers are regarded as one such "authoritative, trustworthy or credible source".

Second, the readership profile of broadsheet newspapers is heavily skewed in favour of British society's more powerful middle and upper classes. Worcester (1998) has claimed: "Hardly anything so divides the

British by class as does their newspaper reading habits. ...in 1993 of the middle class households eight in ten (79 per cent) read the so-called 'quality' papers and only one in five (21 per cent) working class adults did" (p. 41). The predominance of middle and upper class readers of British broadsheet newspapers is indicated in *Table 3.1* below:

Table 3.1: Class composition of British broadsheet newspapers' readers

| | | Class | | | | Total |
|-----------|-----------------|-------|----|----|-----|-------|
| | | A/B | C1 | C2 | D/E | |
| Newspaper | Financial Times | 57 | 28 | 9 | 6 | 100 |
| | The Times | 55 | 27 | 9 | 9 | 100 |
| | Telegraph | 47 | 31 | 12 | 10 | 100 |
| | Independent | 45 | 32 | 13 | 10 | 100 |
| | Guardian | 39 | 33 | 13 | 15 | 100 |
| | IoS | 44 | 32 | 14 | 10 | 100 |
| | Sunday Times | 50 | 31 | 12 | 7 | 100 |
| All | | 18 | 23 | 28 | 31 | 100 |

Source: MORI, from Worcester (1998: 42)

The figures in *Table 3.1* above are well known, with similar proportions given in a number of studies of British media (Fradgley & Niebauer, 1995; Jucker, 1992; Negrine, 1994; Sparks, 1999). The audiences of broadsheet newspapers are predominantly educated, professional, economically and politically powerful individuals and groups. It seems reasonable to assume that the content and agenda of broadsheet newspapers will reflect the preferences and politics of this predominantly middle and upper class audience, thereby characterizing an élite discourse genre (see van Dijk, 1991, 1993).

Third, broadsheet newspapers have so far eluded any systematic, empirically based analysis of their reporting output, on *any* subject. This is undoubtedly a blinding omission on the part of academia when the prestige of these newspaper titles and the (economic, political, social) power of their readers are considered. Consequently this research is focused on the reporting style, content and agenda of five daily and two Sunday broadsheet

newspapers. This conscious methodological choice was guided by the ambition to fill at last in part this evident gap in the scholarly literature, but also to make an empirical contribution to the advancement of knowledge in this field.

This research proceeds on the assumption that the journalistic output of broadsheet newspapers is “simultaneously constitutive of [the] social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief” (Wodak, 1995: 208) of the *educated, empowered* and economically *successful* sections of society. Broadsheet newspapers therefore represent important sites for the (re)production and/or resistance of discourse on and around notions of ‘We-dom’ and ‘They-dom’ (Hartley, 1992).

3.2.2 *Sample size and identification*

The sample of broadsheet newspapers analysed needs to be representative in terms of the range and content of primary source material. This aim of analysing representative source material is helped by making the sample as comprehensive or ‘large’ as possible within the limited time available to complete the research. First, since ‘the reporting of British broadsheet newspapers’ was the express focus of the study, the population was defined as the output of all national British broadsheet newspapers, including Sunday broadsheet newspapers. Local newspapers were excluded from the population, since they do not share the characteristics of national broadsheet newspapers favoured for the study: they are not generally thought to display ‘journalistic excellence’; they typically target a far less specific socio-economic audience than national broadsheets; and, of course, their editorial concerns articulate a ‘local’ rather than a ‘national’ agenda. Although Sunday broadsheet newspapers have higher sales figures than dailies, suggesting that they may have different audience profiles than their sister daily newspapers, they were included in this initial population because of similarities (to broadsheet dailies) in editorial tone, style, format and detail. The editorial and stylistic foci of Sunday broadsheet newspapers are different, of course, reflecting their role in providing retrospective summation of the week’s events.

Second, the size of the sample needed to be constructed with regard to the limited time and research resources with which to complete the research. This sample size is constructed across two “vectors” (Deacon *et al*, 1999): how extensively the elements (newspapers) of the population are sampled; and the dates of the sample. Taking the former: all daily broadsheet titles were selected - the *Financial Times*, the *Guardian*, the *Independent*, *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Times* - in order to best represent, and therefore to make inferences about, ‘British broadsheet newspaper representations of Islam and Muslims’. However, the extensive and expansive pagination of Sunday broadsheet newspaper titles suggested a more restricted sample of Sunday titles, with one of the two papers expressing a ‘liberal’ agenda and commitment and a further title with a ‘conservative’ agenda and commitment. The two titles chosen - the *Independent on Sunday* and *The Sunday Times* - were taken from the range of options. A second, almost as compelling sample might have included the *Observer* and *Sunday Telegraph*, but the choice of the *Independent on Sunday* and *The Sunday Times* was made since it allowed comparison of reporting in Sunday titles with their daily sister newspapers. Additionally, a factor which I thought very significant to ensure was that the sampled newspapers should range across the politically partisan commitments expressed in British broadsheets. This seemed to be best achieved by choosing the *Independent on Sunday* and *The Sunday Times*.

The dates of the sample period needed to be decided upon next - both in terms of its length and start date. I decided that a sample covering six months of the chosen newspapers would produce an archive of relevant published items - cases - which would be large enough to be representative of broadsheet newspaper output and yet small enough to be manageable.¹ Implicit in this decision was the desire to collect a data archive of coded articles of a size significant enough to be able to make general “inferences about the processes and politics of representation” operating in the newspapers (Deacon *et al*, 1999: 115). It was thought that a data archive of around 2,500 cases would be sufficient to make such inferences, and, from the results of a pilot study, it was estimated that six months of coverage

would be needed to produce such an archive. In practice, 2,540 cases were generated across only four months of broadsheet newspaper coverage, providing an adequate dataset across almost 15 months of full-time coding.

An element of 'random sampling' was injected into the research in the choice of *which* months of coverage were sampled. In order to explain this, the assumptions and focus of the study need to be considered. The ambitions of this research stress the significance of the comparative size, placement, picture content and overall impact of news stories within the context of the newspaper. When such concerns are being taken into account, the undoubted optimum approach is to analyse and use the full original paper as a source material. Buying every sampled newspaper each day would have proved a costly option beyond the resources of the project. The pragmatic option, without any damage to the project's scholarly ambitions, was to locate an archive of newspapers to study. The development of microfiche and CD-ROM means that the bulky broadsheet newspapers are generally pulped and replaced once they become one year 'old'. This cycle turned out to be blessing for researchers, since each month I was able collect newspapers - now thought to be mere waste - from several identified archives for very little cost.² This is how the 'random element' entered the sampling procedure: when I decided I was ready to start my primary data collection, I went to the chosen newspaper archive and collected the first month of the sample. The sampled months of newspaper coverage therefore started with the month of newspapers printed 12 months beforehand - in October 1997.³ In addition, due to the theoretical assumptions of CDA (see below) and the desire to study the initialisation, development and resolution of 'news stories', I decided to take a continuous sample of newspapers as opposed to other options, such as alternate months, rolling samples, etc.

The constructed sample therefore comprised the output of the *Financial Times*, the *Guardian*, the *Independent*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Times*, the *Independent on Sunday* and the *Sunday Times* over the months of October, November and December 1997 and January 1998.

3.2.3 Unit of analysis

The 'unit of analysis' in media research is typically understood as the object identified as a single 'case', or 'text' under examination. Deacon *et al* (1999) state that "[s]ome quantitative content analysis studies have a very precise focus, taking individual words as their sampling units ... Other studies provide a more generalised analysis of themes in texts" (p. 118). In this study, the unit of analysis was taken to be a 'complete newspaper article'. A complete newspaper article was defined as a 'stand alone text', identifiably distinct due to either an individual authorial reference or by-line, a line demarcating the text from other texts, a margin space demarcating the text from other texts, or a combination of all three. Therefore, when for example a number of articles were written on the same subject and published on the same page, if they were attributed to different authors or by-lines or otherwise distinguishable as separate because of the lines or spaces drawn between them, they were regarded as individual 'units' for analysis. This applied to all editorial formats, whether news reports, columns, readers' letters, book reviews, feature writing and all others. Photographs, cartoons, illustrations and their photocaptions (if applicable) were included and therefore coded as the same 'unit', or 'case' as the article which they accompanied. When a single photograph, cartoon (etc.), was published as a 'stand alone text' - for example, an editorial or political cartoon - it was regarded as a unit of analysis in itself and therefore coded and recorded.

The code sheet (see Appendix 1) developed for this research was originally intended to record 'written', i.e. linguistic, representation. Only single stand alone photographs, cartoons (etc.) were coded, since the coding manual was not sophisticated enough to accurately and comprehensively code two or three caption 'cartoon strips', for example by Steve Bell (of the *Guardian*). In addition, as the coding of materials progressed it became apparent that the codes developed to record the content of visual texts were more inadequate than I had originally assumed. For this reason, all results generated from visual texts have been ignored, pending recoding and analysis of their form, content and function within the context of the newspapers in which they were included.

3.2.4 Qualifying criteria

After deciding that whole articles will be the unit under analysis, a set of criteria were needed to identify systematically *which* units would come under the remit of the study. Broadly speaking, an article should be recorded, coded and analysed if its contents are 'Islam and/or Muslim related', but this is too general and therefore a much more closely specified set of identifying criteria was established. An article was identified as 'Islam and/or Muslim related' if it mentioned:

- 'Islam'
- a 'Muslim' individual
- an organisation, collective, pressure group, etc. identified as a 'Muslim' organisation, collective, pressure group, etc.
- a nation wholly or predominantly populated by Muslims (e.g. Iraq, Indonesia)
- or a nation which, by virtue of history, culture, government or politics could be regarded as a 'Muslim country' (e.g. Lebanon)

in either an article's:

- leader (headline, overheadline, lead-in or extended by-line)
- first two paragraphs
- or throughout the whole of a lower paragraph of the article.

This was intended to exclude passing references to Islam, Muslims, etc., in order to concentrate on more specific, comprehensive, detailed or otherwise 'in-depth' newspaper coverage. Employing these qualifying criteria meant that only articles in which Islam and/or Muslims played a significant role in the reported social action were identified for analysis.

The clear advantages of this qualifying criteria regrettably generate opportunity costs. Since only articles in which Islam and/or Muslims played a significant role in the reported social action were recorded, some of the more

casual negative references which the research intended to examine were missed because the article in which they appeared did not 'qualify'. For example, in an article reporting the 1997 Labour Party Conference (*Independent* 3 October 1997), Cherry Mosteshaer compared her treatment at the hands of Labour Party whips to "the ubiquitous company of bearded security men" in Iran. Missing references and articles such as this is an obvious disappointment to the research, since it elides the very casual way that 'being Muslim', or characteristics thought particularly or thoroughly 'Muslim', can be invoked as an insult *in themselves*. It is hoped that the research can make up for these occasional 'escapees' through the comprehensive and detailed coding and analysis of the more in-depth 'Islamic articles' which are included under the above qualification criteria.

3.3 The Methods

The explanatory power of conventional empirical approaches to research have come under increasing challenge from scholars who believe that central research issues cannot be adequately examined through the kinds of questions posed by hypothetico-deductive methods, and addressed with quantified answers. This is no less true in media research, where until recently "empirical qualitative studies were consigned to the margins of research activity and graduate training" (Delia, 1987, cited in Lindlof, 1995: 8). This view has been steadily challenged, with media research gradually opening up to more interpretative, contextual and constructivist approaches to data collection and analysis. Lindlof (1995) argues that "[o]bjectivist science and quantitative methods have been insufficient to perform these tasks - not because these modes of inquiry are faulty, but because they advocate views of the world that do not value the study of situated, emergent and reflexive human phenomena" (p. 22). There seem to be substantive advantages however, in employing *both* qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis in the investigation of newspaper reporting. Indeed, should such methods illuminate aspects of the data as different as Lindlof suggests, then it is entirely logical that a variety of methods be applied in order to provide a more accurate account of the sample under

investigation. It is with such a methodological position in mind that the methods of data collection and analysis in this current research project were decided upon, implemented and developed.

As Titscher *et al* (2000) have argued, “[t]he routes to be followed in empirical research will be decided initially by the general research questions - and these are to a certain extent, determined by the theoretical approach one has decided to follow” (p. 6). With this in mind:

- The primary aim of the research is to summarise and describe the content of the identified field, through the counting or coding of distinctive features of the texts under analysis.
- A secondary aim of the research is to account for or explain the features and, to a lesser extent, the possible consequences of the texts collected and investigated, using the more heuristic, or interpretative methods of discourse analysis.

The methods employed to satisfy these two primary research aims will now be introduced and discussed with specific reference to their use in the current research project.

3.3.1 *Content Analysis*

As stated above, the first aim of this research is to provide an initial descriptive overview of the contents of the texts under analysis. This aim will be achieved by applying a method of content analysis to the sampled newspaper texts. This choice of method is based on the widely acknowledged objectives of content analysis:

content analysts use a system of categories to classify textual elements as uniformly as possible. (Titscher *et al*, 2000: 9)

The content analyst aims at quantitative classification of a given body of content, in terms of a system of categories devised to yield data relevant to specific hypotheses concerning that content. (Kaplan & Goldsen, 1943: 1, in Berelson, 1952: 261)

The purpose of content analysis is to quantify salient and manifest features of a large number of texts and the statistics are used to make broader inferences about the processes and politics of representation. (Deacon *et al*, 1999: 115)

Berelson, following a discussion of the characteristics ascribed to the methods of content analysis in previous technical literature, offers a definition which has subsequently been widely adopted as *the* definitive description of traditional content analysis:

Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication. (Berelson, 1952: 263)

From this definition, Berelson (1952) outlines four requirements of content analysis, which I feel should be quoted here at length since they specify in the round the requirements needed for the completion of successful content analysis:

The *requirement of objectivity* stipulates that the categories of analysis should be defined so precisely that different analysts can apply them to the same body of content and secure the same results. (p. 263)

The *requirement of system* contains two different meanings. In the first place it states that *all* of the relevant content is to be analysed in terms of *all* the relevant categories...The second meaning of a 'system' is that analyses must be designed to secure data relevant to a scientific problem or hypothesis. (p. 263)

The *requirement of quantification* [is] the single characteristic on which all the definitions agree ...Of primary importance in content analysis is the extent to which the analytic categories appear in the content ...In most applications of content analysis, numerical frequencies have been assigned to occurrence of the analytic categories. (p. 263)

And fourth, Berelson defines the actual content which should be the object of this objective and systematic quantification:

content analysis is ordinarily limited to the manifest content of the communication and is not normally done directly in terms of the latent intentions which the content may express nor the latent responses which it may elicit. Strictly speaking, content analysis proceeds in terms of what-is-said, and not in

terms of why-the-content-is-like-that (e.g. 'motives') or how-people-react (e.g. 'appeals' or 'responses'). (p. 262)

In addition to this definition of the methods of content analysis, Berelson (1952) provides a critical and reflexive account of three assumptions which underpin all studies of content analysis. Again it is helpful to quote him at length:

1. Content analysis assumes that inferences about the relationship between intent and content or between content and effect can validly be made, or the actual relationships established. ...Content analysis is often done to reveal the purposes, motives and other characteristics of the communicators as they are (presumably) 'reflected' in the content; or to identify the (presumable) effects of the content upon the attention, attitudes or acts of readers and listeners (p. 264)

This first assumed principle upon which content analysis is based, fits very well with the stated intention of this research: to analyse the élite news discourse of broadsheet newspapers. This research aim was intended "to reveal the purposes, motives and other characteristics of the [élite] communicators as they are (presumably) 'reflected' in the content" (Ibid.) of their newspapers. In addition, the empowered nature of the newspapers and their intended audiences has particular relevance when considering the (presumed) effect which this content may have on the social position of Muslims in both Britain and the World as a whole. Should these élite newspapers represent (and therefore presumably *regard*) Islam and Muslims negatively - as violent, as threatening, as lascivious, as 'Other' - then this may signal potentially negative effects for Muslims due to the social, political and economic influence possessed by their audiences. These relationships between purposes, content, and effects are, as the quotation suggests, only inferred in content analysis, due to its stated aim in studying "the *manifest* content of communication" in an "objective, systematic and quantitative" manner.

Second, Berelson states:

2. Content analysis assumes that *study of the manifest content is meaningful*. This assumption requires that the content be accepted as a 'common meeting-

ground' for the communicator, the audience and the analyst. That is, the content analyst assumes that the 'meanings' which he ascribes to the content, by assigning it to certain categories, correspond to the 'meanings' intended by the communicator and/or understood by the audience. (p. 264, my emphasis)

This is a controversial assumption of content analysis which Berelson later hedges, stating that such an assumption is only really valid in the case of denotative, as opposed to connotative meaning (see below). For this reason I attempted to keep the categories - *variables* - which I coded, focused on the manifest features of the texts as much as possible. Some questions which I thought would be appropriate for the variables to code were: in what newspaper is the article printed?; on what page is the article printed?; how large (centimetres) is the article?; in what country is the article located?; who is referenced in the text?; are they quoted?; and others, which will be introduced and discussed in detail below.

Despite the apparently 'straightforward' nature of these questions, some will inevitably produce different 'readings' of meaning and therefore potentially different coding. For example: should 'Palestine' be coded as a country? Should a reference to Bethlehem be coded as 'Palestine', 'Israel' or 'Jordan'? Should a reference to Irbil or Rawanduz always be coded as 'Iraq', or could/should it be coded as 'Kurdistan'? These are significant questions, since although the suggested options accurately code articles reporting from same geographical place - in this case, perhaps Hebron or Irbil - they arguably do not 'mean', or connote the same place. Methodological problems such as these highlight the political implications of 'naming', especially in the case of nations and perhaps particularly in the case of the examples mentioned above. Given these inherent problems, the content analyst should make the rules which are applied in coding variables as transparent as possible and, most importantly, make sure that these rules are applied systematically and consistently. From here, other researchers may disagree with the terms employed in summarising the contents of a text, but the existence of the content being summarised - e.g. Bethlehem or Irbil was the location of the coded news article - is beyond question.

The third assumption, which Berelson suggests underpins the methods of content analysis, is:

3. Content analysis assumes that *the quantitative description of communication content is meaningful*. This assumption implies that the frequency of occurrence of various characteristics of the content is itself an important factor in the communication process (p. 265, my emphasis)

This assumption, like the second, is rather controversial and requires further explanation. On first inspection, Berelson's third assumption appears plausible. In the context of the current research: where negative references (e.g. 'violence', 'threat', 'terrorism') are included more frequently in articles that cite Islam as influential than in articles which do not, there may be grounds for arguing that Muslims are being linked, intentionally or otherwise, to negative social action. Tests of statistical independence could be employed to confirm or refute the veracity of this deductive claim: that the semantic domain 'Islam' is persistently co-located with the semantic domain 'violence' in broadsheet newspapers. Similar claims can be made of the frequency of 'negative topics' of news reports, the frequency with which Muslim and non-Muslim actors are included and/or quoted in news reports, and other variables.

Problems exist with this methodology however. First, although textual co-location is both interesting and important, the frequency with which 'negative' words and topics are included in articles foregrounding Islam is perhaps not as important as the *agency* of this negative social action: who is being 'violent'?; who is being 'threatening'?; who is the 'terrorist'? It is entirely possible that articles reporting the conflict in Bosnia and the conflict in Lebanon could mention 'Islam' and 'violence' as frequently as each other, yet in one context Muslims are represented as the victims of violence and in other as the perpetrators of violence. This problem can, to some extent, be alleviated through increasingly detailed coding, but at some point the codes recording exactly 'how' words, phrases, concepts and arguments are employed in texts will be so complex that they become unworkable.

Second, although the “occurrence of certain characteristics of content” may be important, the recording of texts’ manifest content must *necessarily* ignore textual absences, even when these absences are systematically under-used stylistic alternatives to the coded content. The work of critical linguists, such as Fowler *et al* (1979) and in particular Kress (1983; 1994) and Hodge and Kress (1993) discussed in the previous chapter, have revealed the important role which syntactic structures such as passive agent deletion play in the ideological (re)construction of social reality. The importance of such transformations are ignored by content analysis since their importance lies in textual absence.

Third, recording the content - the ‘*who says what to whom and with what effect*’ of Lasswell’s (1949) formula - tends to ignore the very important issues of *context* which surround the formation of *content*. Even when pragmatic, or illocutionary function of text is coded - for example, as an argument, as an accusation, as an order, etc. - the context in which such an illocutionary act is performed often goes uncoded. This is no doubt primarily due to the unsuitability of content analysis in summarising context: context is an extra-linguistic feature and therefore difficult to record and summarise (see van Zoonen, 1994). But, as Gerbner (1958) has stated, “*what* is said by the *who* depends also on his [sic.] *role*” (p. 484). This has been captured in Austin’s (1962) notion of *felicity conditions*: “the conditions that must obtain for an utterance to have force as a certain speech act (accusing etc.). For example, an imperative statement can only be an order if uttered by someone with authority over the hearer” (Woods & Kroger, 2000: 5). Again, ‘the role of the *who*’ *could* be coded and combined with the locutionary meaning of ‘the *what*’ in order to achieve a measure, albeit a strangely disembodied measure, of the illocutionary force of the coded utterance. It is doubtful that codes could be developed which record all the contextual conditions granting an individual or group the power to speak, in addition to recording the conditions which endow their words with the social force of a speech act for all the sampled texts. For this, the intensive qualitative methods of critical discourse analysis are required, and will be applied.

Despite these problems, content analysis is extremely helpful for giving an initial picture of the 'lay of the land', or the broad general features of the sampled archive *across* texts (Deacon *et al*, 1999: 117) and for this reason, in combination with the advantages of the methods identified by Berelson (1952), content analysis will be adopted as a first research method.

3.3.1.1 METHODS OF CONTENT ANALYSIS, OR WHAT TO COUNT?

Despite Berelson's prescriptive account given above, no single method or technique of content analysis actually exists. The conventional wisdom on this subject holds that the methods adopted by content analysts were initially quantitative, and later developed - with the implication, ever present in language, of 'improvement' or 'progress' - into the more conceptual and interpretative approaches of the qualitative methods (see Altheide, 1996; Deacon *et al*, 1999; Lindlof, 1995; Titscher *et al*, 2000). Titscher *et al* (2000) state that "[o]riginally the term referred only to those methods that concentrate on directly and clearly quantifiable aspects of text content" (p. 55). Such "clearly quantifiable aspects of textual content" include the number of words per sentence or text, the number of sentences per paragraph or text, the length of newspaper articles in column inches (now centimetres), the frequency with which actors were mentioned, the length of 'airtime' given to representatives of different political parties or ideological commitments, etc. Subsequently the methods of content analysis were extended to include all methods of textual analysis "which operate with (syntactic, semantic or pragmatic) categories, but which seek at least to *quantify* these categories by means of a frequency survey of classifications" (Ibid., my emphasis).

In fact there has been a vibrant, if dissenting paradigm of 'qualitative' content analysis for quite some considerable time (see Fearing, 1954; Lazarsfeld, 1941; and Lippmann's (1922) work on stereotypes). Gerbner (1958) for example, argued for expanding media analysis from an exclusive focus on formal characteristics of content, towards regarding content "as expressive of social relationship[s] and institutional dynamics, and as formulative of social patterns" (p. 480). Rejecting both of the labels

'quantitative' and 'qualitative' in favour of the term 'critical' media research, Gerbner's contention was

not so much that inherent physical characteristics of media as such, or that elements of style, vocabulary, syntax, are themselves of profound and direct significance. Rather ...that the nature and consequences of these elements and characteristics can be understood best if content is viewed as bearing the imprint of social needs and uses. (p. 481)

From this perspective, "consequential meaning [as opposed to explicit or manifest meaning] is far from being an 'arbitrary' convention" (Gerbner, 1958: 487) as Berelson and other traditional content analysts, such as Lasswell, suggest. Rather, consequential meaning "is the property of a specific event or system of events" (Ibid.) which surround the production of media communication. The coding and quantification of categories does, however, remain central to Gerbner's methods of critical content analysis, serving "as shorthand devices to *label, separate, compile and organise* data" (Charmaz, 1983: 111, cited in Lindlof, 1995: 220) derived from the product of communication: the text. From this starting point, however, Gerbner (1958) argues that further questions need to be asked of the data compiled:

In what ways does this material reflect physical and social qualities of communicating agencies (publishers) and their relationships to other systems such as markets, advertisers, audiences and their world of events? What points of view about life and the world as [the communicator] sees them are implied and facilitated? What social arrangements of ownership and control of communicative means and facilities are revealed by the prevalence of this material? ...What might be the consequences ...of social relationships and points of view mediated through this content as a social event system? (p. 488)

Questions such as those listed above mesh particularly well with the objectives of critical discourse analysts, working over 40 years after the passage was written. The methods of CDA present an opportunity for a detailed and rigorous analysis of the 'consequential', latent or implied meanings in texts and of the relationships between these meanings, the text's producer(s) and the text's effect(s). The assumptions and methods of CDA adopted in the current research are examined in a later section of this chapter.

The most contentious aspect of content analysis concerns how the categories to be coded - *variables* from here on - are first constructed by the researcher(s). The foci and detail of the coding manual developed by the researcher(s), with their decisions on what and how to record and count, essentially *dictates* the findings of the research. Lindlof (1995) states that because coding is "integral to the task of interpreting communicative phenomena", demanding that "the analyst decide what is worth saving, how to divide up the material and how a given incident of talk or behaviour relates to other coded items", the variables chosen for coding should arise from "preliminary" and later "purposeful" readings of the archive in question (p. 219). Similarly, Daniels (1997) states that in order to decide on the coding categories employed in researching white supremacist literature, she first "read the publications and noted the themes which emerged while foregrounding any theoretical questions about the intersection of race, class, gender and sexuality" (Daniels, 1997: 139). In this way, it is argued, the results obtained will be more representative of the sampled material.

By this 'grounded approach' to content analysis, the coded variables arise from the archive under investigation. But previous knowledge of the sampled archive is *necessarily* required before choosing the coded variables and constructing a coding manual in *all* content analysis. Titscher *et al* (2000) state that "[a]ny predetermination of categories presupposes knowledge of events that may possibly occur" (p. 9). In the case of the current research, such 'knowledge of possible events' arose from a variety of sources. First, and perhaps most importantly, from the parameters of the research in question: only broadsheet newspapers are sampled and therefore only codes for broadsheet newspapers needed to be included in the coding manual. Second, the coding manuals of previous research on newspapers provided an invaluable initial framework, particularly regarding the codes for recording the 'Topics' of news articles. And third, my own anecdotal and cultural knowledge of broadsheet newspapers, including knowledge of their layouts, their formats, supplements and contents, informed the selection of categories to be coded.

In addition to the above, Deacon *et al* (1999) warn that content analysis is “an extremely directive method: it give answers to the questions you pose” (p. 117). The questions and categories employed at the start of the research are therefore centrally important in the validity of results produced. In light of this, I adopted three strategies in order to ensure that the categories chosen for coding would give representative summaries of the sampled newspapers: First, both previous books on research methods and empirical work using content analysis were studied in order to provide an initial and informative grounding in how print journalism and ‘representation’ has been previously approached and coded. From this, I wrote a first draft coding manual.

Second, several international scholars in the field of media research and analysis were asked their opinion of my initial coding manual. Jay G. Blumler, David Deacon, Sharon K. Intiaz, David Morrison and Teun A. van Dijk were all very helpful in pointing out any noticeable gaps in my manual. Some of the discrepancies which they suggested were inherent to the choices I have made in this research - print over broadcast journalism; broadsheet over tabloid newspapers. In other cases their suggestions for additions and alterations were gratefully accepted and used to develop a second draft of the coding manual.

Third, and perhaps most significantly, the amended coding manual was applied in a pilot study of one month of broadsheet newspaper output (March 1997). Although the sample used in this pilot study was neither comprehensive (only the *Independent*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Times*, *Independent on Sunday*, and *Sunday Times* were coded) nor complete (the study only sampled alternate days), the exercise highlighted ‘holes’ and inadequacies in both specific codes and complete variables.

The coding manual and the approach to coding were subsequently altered in three ways in light of the difficulties experienced during the pilot study. First, the codes of some variables were expanded significantly. For example, despite the incorporation of the categories of previous academic work and the critical attention and suggestions of the academics listed above, the codes for the variables recording the ‘Topics’ of the sampled

articles were found to be inadequate in certain respects. This was no doubt the result of the 'general' focus of the research which I used to construct the categories in the coding manual. The codes were therefore significantly increased in order to incorporate topics specific to the representation of Islam and Muslims.

Second, and related to the first point, it was decided that this expansion of codes should be allowed to continue during the research in order to record more accurately any emergent or unexpected themes and developments in the sampled articles. This would be particularly important in coding accurately variables which are hard to predetermine - the pilot study showed that 'Topic' was one such variable but others were expected. In the case of the variable coding the 'Page Label' for example, although it was known that each page of the sampled newspapers would *have* a label - 'Home News', 'European News', 'International News', etc. - it was also known that these labels arise from, and are occasionally very specifically *derived* from the ('Topic' of the) reported events in that page's articles. The codes for some variables were therefore left 'open-ended' in light of this expected growth throughout the research (see below).

Third, the codes of some variables, intended to record the location of 'textual features' - of an actor, a quotation, a word, etc. - were 'collapsed' (i.e. they were combined) in light of the pilot study. The initial codes for these variables aimed at recording the exact location of the sampled 'textual feature'. This was, in turn based on the assumed 'pyramid' structure of news discourse whereby 'more important' facts, actors, textual features, etc. are placed in higher positions in the text. The coding of these variables proved problematic however, partly since the variations in the size of the articles meant that the codes were not comparing like with like⁴, and partly due to the difficulty and time involved in coding such variables. The variables were therefore changed.

The final coding manual developed and applied across the sampled newspapers is given in Appendix 1.

3.3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

As suggested above, the benefits of content analysis do come "at a cost. By looking at aggregated meaning-making *across* texts, the method tends to skate over complex and varied processes of meaning-making *within* texts; [their] latent rather than the manifest levels of meanings" (Deacon *et al*, 2000: 117). Further, Titscher *et al* (2000) appear to suggest that a key assumption of content analysis (Berelson 1952, see above), underpinning its sole interest in the manifest content of texts, could be based on an ontological fiction :

Traditional content analysis procedures [...] presuppose that the meaning which can be recovered from particular content corresponds to the meanings that the speakers or writers intended in their texts and to those that the receivers read or hear. These are preconditional assumptions, since a sender-receiver model is presumed to underlie communication. (p. 10)

As suggested previously, the methods of content analysis are based on the assumption that the 'content' of texts can be accessed through recording their manifest features. This downplays or in some cases ignores the important role of *context* in text and talk - the intentions of the 'sender', the prior knowledge and beliefs of the 'receiver', the 'polysemantic' or 'polysemous' nature of language and signification and the *use* to which language and sign are put in communication, including entailment and implication. Latent textual features such as those listed above, along with others, contribute to a certain *degree* of fluidity in meaning and interpretation which the quantification of content analysis cannot fully appreciate. This point is even made by Berelson (1952), where he raises the question of whether "there is such a thing as 'manifest content'" (p. 264) which content analysis is meant to summarise and quantify:

As soon as meanings are attached to the symbols [of language], the psychological predispositions of the reader become involved and to some degree they distort his comprehension of the 'manifest content'. Thus there is no guarantee that the meanings in the 'manifest content' are the same as the meanings actually understood by the different readers or intended by the writer. (p. 264)

Berelson suggests that in order that this “distortion” of the “manifest content” be limited, “content analysis must deal with relatively denotative communication materials and not with relatively connotative materials” (Ibid.). However, by limiting the scope of the research of media texts to such ‘denotative meaning’ - even if this were theoretically possible - the researcher could only produce the most superficial account of the management of meaning and representation in media texts. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is employed as a second method of the current research in order to give a fuller account of the context and implications of the words, sentences, statements and arguments used in the sampled newspaper articles. Eliasoph (1990) suggests that such an approach is similar to “focusing not just on the answers people would leave on a multiple-choice questionnaire, but also on the relationships people display to those answers, on the things they ‘say’ with their forms of speech” (Eliasoph, 1990: 466). I will now provide a little more detail regarding: first, the principles of CDA; and second, the methods of CDA which are employed in this particular research project.

Wood and Kroger (2000) suggest that discourse analysis (DA) should be approached “not just as an object, but as a way of treating language” (p. 3). Broadly speaking, DA assumes that language displays two principle characteristics: first, language is performative, representing both social action and social *interaction*; and second, language is socially constitutive, being produced by, contributing to and representing the (re)production of social reality. In short, discourse analysts view language

as a form of social practice. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it. A dialectical relationship is a two-way relationship: the discursive event is shaped by situations, institutions and social structures, but it also shapes them. (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 55)

Therefore, discourse analysis

enables us to focus not only on the actual uses of language as a form of social interaction, in particular situations and contexts, but also on forms of

representation in which different social categories, different social practices and relations are constructed from and in the interests of a particular point of view, a particular conception of social reality. (Deacon *et al*, 1999: 146)

The 'Critical' aspect of CDA is the product of the discipline's two principle theoretical origins: first "the ideas of the Frankfurt School (in particular the work of Jurgen Harbermas) and the other on a shared tradition with so-called critical linguistics" (Titscher *et al*, 2000: 144). From this origin, CDA has developed into an "shared *perspective* on doing linguistic, semiotic or discourse analysis" as opposed to a homogenous method, school or paradigm (van Dijk, 1993: 131, my emphasis).

Providing more detail on the 'critical' perspective of CDA, Wood and Kroger (2000) state that "CDA is a term that is most often used to identify a set of perspectives that emphasises the relations between language and power and the role of discourse analysis in social and cultural critique" (p. 205). Similarly, Titscher *et al* (2000) suggest that "CDA sees itself as politically involved research with an emancipatory requirement: it seeks to have an effect on social practice and social relationships" (p. 147), particularly relationships of disempowerment, disenfranchisement, dominance, prejudice and/or discrimination. Van Dijk (1993) provides further detail to this theoretical interest in the discursive enactment of dominance, specifically the manner in which both consent and challenge to hegemony are realised in discourse:

Though in different terms, and from different points of view, most of us deal with power, dominance, hegemony, inequality, and the discursive processes of their enactment, concealment, legitimisation and reproduction. And many of us are interested in the subtle means by which text and talk manage the mind and manufacture consent, on the one hand, and articulate and sustain resistance and challenge on the other. (p. 132)

Titscher *et al* (2000), using the work of Wodak (1996), summarise the general principles of CDA as follows:

- CDA is concerned with social problems. It is not concerned with language or language use per se, but with the linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures.

- Power-relations have to do with discourse (Foucault, 1990; Bourdieu, 1987), and CDA studies both power in discourse and power over discourse.
- Society and culture are dialectically related to discourse: society and culture are shaped by discourse, and at the same time constitute discourse. Every single instance of language use reproduces or transforms society and culture, including power relations.
- Language use may be ideological. To determine this it is necessary to analyse texts to investigate their interpretation, reception and social effects.
- Discourses are historical and can only be understood in relation to their context. At a metatheoretical level this corresponds to the approach of Wittgenstein (1984, S7), according to which the meaning of an utterance rests in its usage in a specific situation. [...] (Wodak, 1996: 17-20, cited in Titscher *et al*, 2000: 146)

And, perhaps most importantly from the perspective of the theoretical assumptions of this particular research project:

- Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory. Critical analysis implies a systematic methodology and a relationship between the text and its social conditions, ideologies and power-relations. [...] (Ibid.)

For these reasons, I feel that the perspectives, principles and intentions of CDA are particularly well suited to the current research project, where strategies of exclusion and inclusion in broadsheet newspaper representation(s) of Islam and Muslims are the object of study.

3.3.2.1 METHODS OF CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Methodologically, CDA is much more diffuse than its shared principles suggest (see Deacon *et al*, 1999; Titscher *et al*, 2000; Wood & Kroger, 2000; and the empirical work of Fairclough, 1995a, 1995b; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; van Dijk, 1993, 1997; and Wodak *et al*, 1999). The approach which I feel most drawn to is that of Norman Fairclough (1989, 1993, 1995a, 1995b, 2000) “whose overall aim has been to link linguistic analysis to social analysis” (Wood & Kroger, 2000: 206). For Fairclough, in contrast to the social psychological approach of Wetherell and Potter (1992), the social-cognitive model of van Dijk (1987; 1993; 1998a; 1998b 1999) and the discourse-historic method of the Vienna School (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Wodak 1996; Wodak *et al* 1999), critical discourse analysis means

the analysis of relationships between concrete language use and the wider social cultural structures. ...He attributes three dimensions to every discursive event. It is simultaneously text, discursive practice - which also includes the production and interpretation of texts - and social practice. The analysis is conducted according to these three dimensions. (Titscher *et al*, 2000: 149-50)

Fairclough goes through each of these three dimensions to a "discursive event" - text, discourse practice and social practice - detailing the methods of approaching their analysis. First:

The analysis of texts ...covers traditional forms of linguistic analysis - analysis of vocabulary and semantics, the grammar of sentences and smaller units, and the sound system ('phonology') and writing system. But it also includes analysis of textual organisation above the sentence, including the ways in which sentences are connected together ('cohesion') and things like the organisation of turn-taking in interviews or the overall structure of a newspaper article. (Fairclough, 1995a: 57)

The analysis of texts therefore involves looking at their form, content and function - three elements which CDA treats as essentially indivisible, despite the conventional linguistic approach wherein syntactic and grammatical 'form', semantic 'content' and pragmatic 'function' are separated from each other. Van Dijk (1999), sharing much of Fairclough's theoretical perspective and methods, states that when adopting a 'linguistic' analysis, discourse should "be analysed at various levels or along several dimensions" (p. 4). Of the many different levels of linguistic analysis suggested by van Dijk (1999), those which I applied during the current project focused upon: lexicon; micro (sentence) syntax; local (sentence) meaning; global (topical) meaning; speech acts (accusations, defences); rhetorical devices and figures of speech; and global discourse schema (argument, narrative). "Each of these may be involved directly or indirectly in discriminatory interaction against minority group members or biased discourse against them" (Ibid.).

Second, Fairclough (1995a) states:

The discourse practice dimension of the communicative event involves various aspects of the processes of text production and text consumption. Some of these have a more institutional character [e.g. the editorial procedures of the *Independent* compared to *The Times*] whereas others are discourse processes in a narrower sense [the 'decoding' of texts by the reader/viewer]. (p. 58)

In one sense, this second feature of Fairclough's method appears to approximate Stuart Hall's (1980) model of the encoding and decoding of media texts: the meaning in media texts being 'encoded' by their producer(s) and the reader/viewer 'decoding' a meaning from the intersection of the text itself and the context in which the text is 'read'. But in another sense, Fairclough appears to go a step further than this model, suggesting that the text is the product, not only of the producer but also "the outcome of specific professional practices and techniques, which could be and can be quite different with quite different results" (Fairclough, 1995a: 204). These professional practices are "based in particular social relations, and particular relations of power" (Ibid.), which will inevitably leave their residue in the product of the communicative event, the text.

Third, and following from the acknowledgement of 'social relations of power' mentioned above, Fairclough suggests that a fully rounded critical discourse analysis should involve an analysis of the text's "sociocultural practice", or "the social and cultural goings-on which the communicative event is part of" (Fairclough, 1995a: 57). This level of analysis "may be at different levels of abstraction from the particular event: it may involve its more immediate situational context, the wider context of institutional practices the event is embedded within, or the yet wider frame of the society and the culture" (Fairclough, 1995a: 62). Titscher *et al* (2000) suggest that when tackling this level of analysis, "[q]uestions of power are of central interest; power and ideologies may have an effect on each of the contextual levels" (p. 151). The questions which Gerbner (1958) suggests ought to inform "critical media research" (see p.17 above) would be very helpful to keep in mind during this 'level' of analysis.

From this theoretical approach to the study of (e.g. media) discourse, Fairclough (1995a) suggests questions which should be foregrounded during critical discourse analysis:

1. How is the text designed, why is it designed in this way, and how else could it have been designed?
2. How are texts of this sort produced, and in what ways are they likely to be interpreted and used?
3. What does the text indicate about the media 'order of discourse' [Foucault]?
4. What wider sociocultural processes is this text a part of, what are its wider social conditions, and what are its likely effects? (p. 202)

These questions frame the discursive approach which I took towards the broadsheet newspaper articles in the sample. In addition, and more specific to the analysis of *textual* form, content and function, the suggestions offered by Wood and Kroger (2000: pp. 91-95) on how to adopt a 'discourse-analytic orientation' appear to summarise quite accurately the approach which I took in analysis.⁵ The strategies they suggest which I actually adopted during the analytic process, are (numbered as in the original text):

1. As you read through a text, ask yourself how you are reading it and why you are reading it this way. That is, consider your reaction ...and try to identify the features of the text, the devices that are employed that would produce your reading. (e.g. if an utterance strikes you as insulting, is it because of the specific words or phrases that are used (e.g. form of address)?...
2. Do not ignore the obvious; it may be important ...The point of discourse analysis is not to generate esoteric accounts of interaction, documents and so on, but to show precisely how the features of the discourse make particular readings or reactions possible, plausible and understandable. [...] (pp. 91-92)
4. It is important (although often difficult) to consider what is *not* there (in terms of both 'content' and form). [...] (p. 92)
6. Play with the text. Ask how it would read if a particular item (word, phrase, etc.) were omitted, phrased differently (i.e. consider substitutions) or combined with another item. ...
7. Look carefully at how the text is structured, shaped and ordered in both individual segments and overall, because structures are ways of achieving both content and form. [...] (p. 93)
12. In addition to focusing on variation and adopting a comparative stance, adopt a questioning stance, that is, take nothing for granted. Do this as actively as possible; reverse the taken-for-granted. For example, ask whether a particular sense or reading of a particular word, phrase, or larger segment of text relies on an assumption about gender [or race, or religion, or nationality]. (p. 94)

The points above quite accurately summarise the approach which I took during the analysis of sampled newspaper articles.

Notes: Chapter 3

¹ This estimation was based on the number of cases produced in completion of a 'pilot study'.

² I would like to thank the following for all the help which they gave me in collecting a comprehensive sample of newspapers: Bradford City Library; Dept. of Journalism, University of Sheffield, particularly Dr Maggie Wykes and Jean Brackenberry; Dept. of Social Sciences, Loughborough University, particularly Dr Dominic Wring; Centre for Mass Communication Research, Leicester University, particularly Dr Ralph Negrine; and the Halcyon Café, Sheffield, particularly Harold, Jamie and Raquel. Thank you all very much.

³ Although this 'choice' does not remove any potential distortions in results introduced by exceptional coverage in the sample, it does effectively limit any charge of my intentionally biasing results through selective sampling.

⁴ For example: Actor X is referred to in the fourth paragraph of an article in Newspaper A and the eighth paragraph of an article in Newspaper B. If this continued for the whole sample, then it could be suggested that a pattern exists in the comparative inclusion of Actor X in the two newspapers. But say all the articles in Newspaper A in which Actor X is included were *half the length* of the articles in Newspaper B: what effect does this have on the pattern of inclusion? Is Actor X actually included in the same textual position in both newspapers, comparatively speaking?

Alternatively: Actor X is, on average, referred to in the eighth paragraph of articles in both Newspaper A and Newspaper B. In this case however, all of Newspaper B's articles were only eight paragraphs long, and therefore Actor X was included in the final paragraph. The articles in Newspaper A, on the other hand, were all 16 paragraphs long and therefore Actor X was consistently included in the first half of the text. Does Actor X enjoy the same textual position in the two newspapers now? These are, of course, contextual issues which content analysis is not that well suited to provide answers for, since here I am asking questions about the importance of Actors *within* as opposed to *across* texts. This does not mean however that the codes employed in these variables should not be constructed with a view to being as valid as possible within these limitations. The alterations to these variables were made with such problems in mind.

⁵ Despite appearances, specifically the date of the publication which they are taken from, these are not post hoc strategies, but were approaches used during the original 'coding' stage of data collection and in later analysis. They are quoted here due to the 'fully formed' nature of the suggestions offered by Wood and Kroger (2000) which, when I read them, appeared to accurately reflect strategies which I had adopted quite independently of such specific instructions.

Chapter 4

Reporting British Muslims: difference, discord, and threat in the domestic reporting of Islam

4.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses and discusses broadsheet newspapers' reporting of British Islam and British Muslims. All domestic articles¹ (n= 276) were temporarily separated from the remainder of the data-set (n= 2264) in order to facilitate this analysis.² For the purposes of the chapter, this subset is referred to as the 'domestic sample'.

The chapter summarises the results of both the quantitative and qualitative analyses of the domestic sample. First, the quantitative features of the sample are discussed in order to summarise the general context in which stories about British Islam and British Muslims occur in the broadsheet press. More specifically, the topics of reports are summarised, alongside the editorial properties of the sampled news reports: size, placement, newspaper, etc. The frequency of occurrence and citation of Muslim compared to non-Muslim sources are also analysed. I argue that these results are statistically significant, showing Muslim sources in general - and British Muslims in particular - to be under-represented in domestic news articles. Quantitative summary and analysis continues throughout the remainder of the chapter in order to place the qualitative analysis of particular stories within the broader context of the domestic reporting.

From this initial summary of the broad features of domestic reporting, a more detailed qualitative analysis is adopted, divided into five major sections, chosen in order to best represent the most significant aspects - both numerically and ideologically - of the domestic reporting of Islam. First, the frequent tendency of the press to divide 'Islam' and 'the West', even in the domestic sample, has obvious implications for the social inclusion of British Muslims, resulting in their being divided from the semantic domain 'British'. This I argue is achieved by one of two methods: the proxy split, where 'British' and 'Other' operate as the active referents, with Muslims

being cited (along with others) as an example of the 'Other' category. Here, specific 'Muslims' are identified as 'Other' by virtue of characteristics which they are presumed or perceived to lack: in other words, their lack of 'Britishness' divides 'Them' from 'Us'. The second method of division is an explicit split, where Islam and/or Muslims are identified as the 'Other' by virtue of values or characteristics which they are perceived to have: in short, their 'Islamicness' divides 'Them' from 'Us'. The presuppositions of this first theme set the scene for the subsequent analysis of the chapter.

The second qualitative section shows how some domestic reporting moves from this first stage of 'division', into 'rejection' strategies. Central to this strategy is the 'ideological square' (van Dijk), whereby 'Our' positive traits and 'Their' negative traits are foregrounded, whilst 'Our' negative traits and 'Their' positive traits are backgrounded.³ Three case studies are explored to illustrate this feature of reporting in this section: the negative reporting of British Muslim protest in the public sphere; the reporting of discrimination experienced by British Muslims; and more specifically, the reporting of the (1997) Runnymede report on 'Islamophobia'.

The third section develops this negativisation of British Islam and British Muslims further with an analysis of the domestic reporting of 'Muslim terrorism'. Following the pattern of domestic reporting of Islam observed elsewhere (Poole, 1999, 2000), such stories "usually occur following an international event which provokes press speculation on the Islamic fundamentalist presence in the UK" (Poole, 2000: 5). The murder of 60 tourists at the Egyptian resort of Luxor (19 November 1997) provided a context for such reporting.

Fourth, the reporting of Muslim schools and schooling is analysed and discussed. I argue that the issue of schooling challenges the traditional separation of 'public' and 'private' spheres, since, in its role in the transmission of culture and social values, schooling necessarily spans the divide between the two. This creates a distinctive problem for British multiculturalism, traditionally founded on a philosophy of 'public assimilation/private dissociation', especially when appeals to cultural freedom or even cultural relativism are being made along religious lines.

The final section looks at the ‘positive’ reporting of Islam, arguing that it is still possible to dissent against the overwhelmingly negative representation of Muslims in the broadsheet press. Two argumentative strategies are discussed in the light of this: first, that the presupposed enmity between ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’ is fallacious; second, the ‘normalisation’ of Muslim worship in some articles reporting the Muslim Holy month of Ramadan.

4.2 Quantitative findings of domestic sample

The first interesting finding to emerge is that the portion of the whole dataset which the domestic sample represents is relatively modest: 89.1 per cent of recorded cases were foreign news, leaving only 10.9 per cent remaining to comprise the domestic sample. This results in the images of Muslims in the sampled newspapers being predominantly ‘foreign’.

The ratio of domestic to international focused articles varied greatly across the newspapers sampled in the study, as *Table 4.1* illustrates:

Table 4.1: Crosstabulation of ‘Setting’ to ‘Newspaper’

| | | Setting | | | | Total | |
|-----------|-----------------|----------|-------|---------------|-------|-------|--------|
| | | Domestic | | International | | Count | Row % |
| | | Count | Row % | Count | Row % | | |
| Newspaper | Financial Times | 11 | 2.3% | 463 | 97.7% | 474 | 100.0% |
| | Guardian | 65 | 10.5% | 556 | 89.5% | 621 | 100.0% |
| | Independent | 66 | 15.9% | 348 | 84.1% | 414 | 100.0% |
| | Telegraph | 65 | 15.8% | 346 | 84.2% | 411 | 100.0% |
| | The Times | 47 | 9.5% | 446 | 90.5% | 493 | 100.0% |
| | IoS | 12 | 20.7% | 46 | 79.3% | 58 | 100.0% |
| | Sunday Times | 10 | 14.5% | 59 | 85.5% | 69 | 100.0% |
| Total | | 276 | 10.9% | 2264 | 89.1% | 2540 | 100.0% |

A tentative, initial statement regarding the differing agendas of the newspapers is possible at this stage. The *Financial Times* clearly prefers international news, and this was also reflected in their structuring of news across the newspaper. During the sample period, the *Financial Times* always placed international stories immediately after their ‘front-page’ stories, with

'UK news' following on or around page 8. This created both a symbolic and, as *Table 4.1* shows, a concrete international news agenda in the paper. *Table 4.1* also shows that *The Times* and the *Guardian* give proportionately less attention to domestic news than in the *Independent* and *The Daily Telegraph*. The Sunday papers appear to give more attention to domestic reporting (mean 17.7% of printed items) than the daily newspapers (mean 10.8% of printed items), although the low count precludes making firm conclusions on this emphasis. This is an interesting finding which warrants further research.

Differences between domestic and international items are also apparent when editorial formats are analysed:

Table 4.2: Domestic articles

| | | | Count | Col Valid N % | Mean | Sum | Col Sum % |
|----------------------|----------------------|--------|-------|------------------|------|-------|-----------|
| Format of article | News | C_SIZE | 166 | 60.1% | 223 | 36989 | 64.7% |
| | Editorial | C_SIZE | 4 | 1.4% | 187 | 748 | 1.3% |
| | Column | C_SIZE | 15 | 5.4% | 321 | 4815 | 8.4% |
| | Feature | C_SIZE | 17 | 6.2% | 519 | 8820 | 15.4% |
| | Cartoon/Illustration | C_SIZE | 1 | .4% | 21 | 21 | .0% |
| | Diary | C_SIZE | 1 | .4% | 23 | 23 | .0% |
| | Letter | C_SIZE | 40 | 14.5% | 56 | 2237 | 3.9% |
| | Weekly News summary | C_SIZE | 1 | .4% | 1265 | 1265 | 2.2% |
| | Review | C_SIZE | 4 | 1.4% | 194 | 776 | 1.4% |
| | News in brief | C_SIZE | 25 | 9.1% | 41 | 1034 | 1.8% |
| | Obituary | | 2 | .7% | 223 | 446 | .8% |
| Group Total | | | 276 | 100.0% | 207 | 57174 | 100.0% |

Table 4.3: International articles

| | | | Col Valid N | | | | |
|-------------------|----------------------|--------|-------------|--------|------|--------|-----------|
| | | | Count | % | Mean | Sum | Col Sum % |
| Format of article | News | C_SIZE | 1458 | 64.4% | 203 | 296539 | 71.3% |
| | Editorial | C_SIZE | 65 | 2.9% | 209 | 13574 | 3.3% |
| | Column | C_SIZE | 55 | 2.4% | 391 | 21511 | 5.2% |
| | Feature | C_SIZE | 114 | 5.0% | 504 | 57504 | 13.8% |
| | Cartoon/Illustration | C_SIZE | 3 | .1% | 14 | 42 | .0% |
| | Letter | C_SIZE | 46 | 2.0% | 61 | 2801 | .7% |
| | Weekly News summary | C_SIZE | 22 | 1.0% | 72 | 1580 | .4% |
| | Review | C_SIZE | 10 | .4% | 308 | 3077 | .7% |
| | News in brief | C_SIZE | 488 | 21.6% | 38 | 18721 | 4.5% |
| | Obituary | | 3 | .1% | 227 | 680 | .2% |
| Group Total | | | 2264 | 100.0% | 184 | 416029 | 100.0% |

'Hard news' items (as covered by the labels 'News', 'Editorial', 'Weekly news summary' and 'News in brief') are all slightly less frequent in the domestic sample than in the international news sample: in each of the 'hard news' formats, the domestic percentages are lower than those in the international sample (compare 'Col Valid N %'). Moreover, 'hard news' items are granted less column space in the domestic sample than they are in the International sample: in all except one of the 'hard news' formats the domestic percentages are lower than those in the international sample (compare 'Col Sum %'). When aggregated, 71.0% of the articles in the domestic sample are 'hard news' items (n= 196), compared with 89.9% of articles in the international sample (n= 2033).

Conversely, 'Soft news' (represented by the 'Column', 'Feature' and 'Letter' formats) have proportionally more column space in the domestic sample. Both in terms of the percentages of cases and the percentage of column centimetres, each of these three formats are better represented in the domestic sample. This is especially so for 'letters to the editor', which form 14.5% (n= 40) of articles and 3.9% of the column space for the domestic sample, compared to 2.0% (n= 46) of articles and 0.7% (2,801 cm) of column space for international articles. This high frequency appears to be a reflection of the 'home news focus' frequently seen in readers' letters combined with a specific interest in the influence of Islam and Muslims

'here', in and upon 'Our' public sphere. The argumentation of a sample of readers' letters is analysed in section 4.5.3 of this chapter.

This preference for 'soft news' formats will have effects on both the style and content of the texts representing British Muslims, encouraging a foregrounding of the kind of subjective, opinionated, and occasionally ignorant or prejudicial writing, which tends to survive in these formats. Yasmin Alibhai-Brown (1998), herself ironically a columnist, has argued that "[t]hese voices are immune from responsibility or censure" (p.119), promoting negative representations of 'ethnic others'.

Table 4.4 presents the rank ordered frequencies of the 'parent topics' featured in the sampled coverage. The 'topics' are not shown because of the implications this would involve for the size of the tables. The 276 domestic items analysed covered 88 topics, with 34 topics (12%) only receiving a single mention.

Tables 4.4: Primary parent topics of domestic articles

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Culture/Custom | 45 | 16.3 | 16.3 | 16.3 |
| Policing/Law & Order | 40 | 14.5 | 14.5 | 30.8 |
| Int. Relations/Politics | 34 | 12.3 | 12.3 | 43.1 |
| Crime | 33 | 12.0 | 12.0 | 55.1 |
| Education | 29 | 10.5 | 10.5 | 65.6 |
| Race/Community Relations | 28 | 10.1 | 10.1 | 75.7 |
| Sport | 15 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 81.2 |
| Health | 13 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 85.9 |
| Immigration | 10 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 89.5 |
| Race Legislation | 9 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 92.8 |
| Women | 8 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 95.7 |
| Business | 5 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 97.5 |
| Employment | 4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 98.9 |
| Youth | 3 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 276 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 4.4 shows that domestic reports prominently focused on the 'Culture and Custom' of British Muslims. Such articles emphasised the differences between Muslim and non-Muslim and tended to focus on religious rituals

(birth, marriage, death and burial) and cultural products (literature, art, architecture, food, film and clothing) without reporting the changing, 'lived' culture of Islam and its importance to Muslims. These reports therefore correspond closely to the 'saris, samosas and steel bands' brand of multiculturalism criticised by Massey (1991). The combined frequency of 'Law and Order' and 'Crime' amounts to over a quarter of domestic reports (26.45%; n= 73). The high count of 'Education' items reflects the newsworthiness of Muslim schooling, with two Muslim schools being granted voluntary aided status during the sample period. The topics which comprise the six most frequently reported primary parent topics (combined 75.7% of domestic articles) are given below:

Table 4.5: 'Culture/Custom' primary topics for domestic articles

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------------------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Culture/Custom, Literature | 9 | 20.0 | 20.0 | 20.0 |
| Culture/Custom, Media/Press | 5 | 11.1 | 11.1 | 31.1 |
| Death/burial of Dodi & Diana | 4 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 40.0 |
| Culture/Custom, 'faith' | 4 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 48.9 |
| Culture/Custom, celebrity | 4 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 57.8 |
| Multi-culturalism | 3 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 64.4 |
| Culture/Custom, General | 2 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 68.9 |
| Culture/Custom, Clothing | 2 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 73.3 |
| Culture/Custom, fine art | 2 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 77.8 |
| Culture/Custom, Islamist activities | 2 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 82.2 |
| Fatwa and/or Rushdie | 2 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 86.7 |
| Culture/Custom, Islam/West contrast | 1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 88.9 |
| Culture/Custom, food | 1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 91.1 |
| Culture/Custom, Film industry | 1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 93.3 |
| Marriage and Islam | 1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 95.6 |
| Culture/Custom, 'silly stories' | 1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 97.8 |
| Culture/Custom, architecture | 1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 45 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 4.6: 'Policing/ Law and Order' primary topics for domestic articles

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Court cases | 25 | 62.5 | 62.5 | 62.5 |
| Court rulings | 6 | 15.0 | 15.0 | 77.5 |
| Policing/Law & Order, General | 4 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 87.5 |
| Selective/Target Policing | 1 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 90.0 |
| Policing/Law & Order, negative | 1 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 92.5 |
| Executions/Capital punishment | 1 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 95.0 |
| Police racism | 1 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 97.5 |
| Prisons/Imprisonment | 1 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 100.0 |
| Total | 40 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 4.7: 'Crime' primary topics for domestic articles

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Crime, General | 8 | 24.2 | 24.2 | 24.2 |
| Cash for questions/Corruption | 8 | 24.2 | 24.2 | 48.5 |
| Crime, Violence | 4 | 12.1 | 12.1 | 60.6 |
| Robbery/Theft | 4 | 12.1 | 12.1 | 72.7 |
| Crime, terrorism | 3 | 9.1 | 9.1 | 81.8 |
| Crime, hostages/hijacking | 3 | 9.1 | 9.1 | 90.9 |
| Social security fraud | 1 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 93.9 |
| Crime, General association | 1 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 97.0 |
| Yvonne Gilford murder | 1 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 33 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 4.8: 'Education' primary topics for domestic articles

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Religion and Education | 17 | 58.6 | 58.6 | 58.6 |
| Funding private schools | 9 | 31.0 | 31.0 | 89.7 |
| Education, General | 2 | 6.9 | 6.9 | 96.6 |
| Poor Education services | 1 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 29 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 4.9: 'International Relations/Politics' primary topics for domestic articles

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Int. Relations/Politics, Terrorism | 18 | 52.9 | 52.9 | 52.9 |
| Actions of International leaders | 3 | 8.8 | 8.8 | 61.8 |
| World Court/International trials | 3 | 8.8 | 8.8 | 70.6 |
| UNSCOM standoff | 3 | 8.8 | 8.8 | 79.4 |
| Israel/Palestinian peace process | 2 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 85.3 |
| International Relations/Politics, General | 1 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 88.2 |
| Sanctions | 1 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 91.2 |
| Int. Relations/Politics, Human rights | 1 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 94.1 |
| EU | 1 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 97.1 |
| Int. Relations/Politics, torture | 1 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 100.0 |
| Total | 34 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 4.10: 'Race & Community Relations' primary topics for domestic articles

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Race/Comm. Relations, General | 7 | 25.0 | 25.0 | 25.0 |
| Race/Comm. Problems | 4 | 14.3 | 14.3 | 39.3 |
| Race/Comm. Relations, Positive | 3 | 10.7 | 10.7 | 50.0 |
| Muslims Organisations | 3 | 10.7 | 10.7 | 60.7 |
| Anti-Muslim prejudice | 3 | 10.7 | 10.7 | 71.4 |
| Race discrimination | 3 | 10.7 | 10.7 | 82.1 |
| Muslim prejudice | 2 | 7.1 | 7.1 | 89.3 |
| Race/Comm. Relations, Election issue | 2 | 7.1 | 7.1 | 96.4 |
| Race/Comm. Relations, legislation | 1 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 100.0 |
| Total | 28 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |



Perhaps one of the more surprising findings emerging from this closer look at topics was high count of items which coded 'Court Cases' as a primary

topic (n= 25; see *Table 4.6*). 12 of these articles reported the prosecution of Mohammed Sarwar for election fraud, and 10 of the remainder covered the remarkably litigious activities of Mohammed Fayed, reporting six different civil suits which he was involved in, as either litigant or defendant, during the four month sample.⁴ In other tables, the topics of 'religion and education' and 'funding religious schools' (combined n= 26) and 'terrorism' (n= 18; n= 3) account for a high proportion of domestic published items, which, in part, explains the later sections analysing these reports.

An indication of the broadly negative context in which British Muslims are reported can be surmised from the evaluative tone of the articles coded in the domestic sample. Each sampled article was coded along a 5 point 'Likard' scale, according to the evaluative tone which the journalist took in relation to the articles' Muslim actors.⁵ The frequencies of the evaluation variable were separated according to whether the article cited Islam as an influential factor or not.⁶ The graphs below show that the Muslim actors included in articles in which the journalists argued for 'Islamic agency', experienced a higher level of criticism than the Muslim actors appearing in articles which do not cite Islam as influential.⁷

Graph 4.1: Articles in which Islam is not cited as influential

Graph 4.2: Articles in which Islam is cited as influential



As the graphs illustrate, the distribution of the evaluation variable is skewed towards 'critical' articles when the 'Islamic agency' of the articles is taken

into account. In 48.1 per cent (n= 76) of articles in which an 'Islamic agency' was cited, the journalist was also critical of the articles' Muslim actors, compared with a substantially lower 33.9 per cent (n= 40) of articles in which an 'Islamic agency' was not cited. Similarly, the sampled journalists were neutral towards Muslim actors in only 26.6 per cent (n= 42) of articles which cited 'Islamic agency' compared with 46.6 per cent (n= 55) of articles in which an 'Islamic agency' was not cited. What this shows is that when 'Islam' was cited in the articles as an explanatory or causal factor in the actions of the Muslim actors, these same actors/actions were criticised by the reporters. This criticism, and presumably negative representation, was not observed when the 'Islamicness' of the Muslim actors was backgrounded.

From this initial context, in which 'Islamic agency' is given a largely negative representation, the next step is to analyse the inclusion of Muslim actors in the domestic sample. For this purpose, the results of the variables which recorded the 'nationality' and the 'frequency of quotation of Muslim actors' are interesting and significant. Such analyses do not, of course, provide any detailed indication of how Muslim actors are *used* in reports nor what Muslim actors are cited as doing or saying, so for this we must turn to the later qualitative analysis. They do, however, offer an indication of the quantitative extent to which British Muslim actors are included in the news reports of the domestic sample. *Table 4.11* below gives the frequencies of Muslim and non-Muslim actor inclusion in domestic articles, across primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary actors⁸:

Table 4.11: British Muslim actors in the domestic sample

| | Muslim: non-Muslim % (n) | British Muslim: non-British Muslim % (n) | British Muslim: non-Muslim Briton % (n) |
|---------|-----------------------------|---|--|
| Actor 1 | 40(106): 50.9(135) | 50(53): 50(53) | 28.2(53): 66.5(125) |
| Actor 2 | 37.3(94): 56.7(143) | 51.1(48): 48.9(46) | 26.2(48): 70.5(129) |
| Actor 3 | 21.6(45): 71.6(149) | 53.3(24): 46.7(21) | 14.2(24): 81.7(138) |
| Actor 4 | 18.9(24): 74.0(94) | 70.8(17): 29.2(7) | 16.3(17): 80.8(84) |

Table 4.11 collects the results of the crosstabulations of the four actors in order to illustrate the continuities in the exclusion of British Muslims in the domestic sample. Each cell shows the percentage and frequency of: Muslim to non-Muslim actors; British Muslim to non-British Muslim actors; and British Muslim to non-Muslim British actors, for ease of comparison. Three features of the exclusion of British Muslims in domestic articles are illustrated by *Table 4.11*: First, Muslim actors appear to be under-represented in the news, even in the articles which satisfied the criteria for being recorded for the purposes of this study.⁹ The backgrounding of Muslim actors increases even more the later in the text the source is cited: thus there are progressively less Muslims cited as primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary actors both numerically and proportionately.

Second, the domestic setting of the article provides no guarantee that the (few) Muslim actors who are cited will also be British. *Table 4.11* indicates that if the first actor cited in a domestic news article is a Muslim, it is as likely that s/he will be non-British as it is that s/he will be British. Although the proportion of Muslims who are also British increases as the item progresses, such British Muslims become less frequent and also, by virtue of the lower textual position, more backgrounded as they gain in the ratio with non-British Muslims.

Third, actors who are identified as being British are predominantly non-Muslim (77.0%; n= 476), further compounding this backgrounding of British Muslim sources. The proportion non-Muslim Britons increases between primary (66.5%; n= 125), secondary (70.5%; n= 129) and tertiary sources (81.7%; n= 138), taking a slight decrease in the quaternary sources (80.8%; n= 84).

In combination, these three quantitative observations illustrate the considerable degree to which Muslims, and specifically British Muslims are excluded from the reporting of domestic issues. To establish a quantitative measure of the extent to which Muslims are typically excluded from the *discussion* of domestic issues, we need to crosstabulate the variables which recorded the quotation of the above actors with those which recorded whether the actor was Muslim.¹⁰

Table 4.12: 'Is Actor 1 quoted?' by variable 'Is Actor 1 Muslim?'

| | | Is the Actor Muslim? | | | Total | |
|----------------------|----------------|----------------------|-------|---------|-------|-------|
| | | Yes | No | Unknown | | |
| Is the Actor quoted? | Yes | Count | 37 | 70 | 12 | 119 |
| | | Expected Count | 47.6 | 60.6 | 10.8 | 119.0 |
| | No | Count | 69 | 65 | 12 | 146 |
| | | Expected Count | 58.4 | 74.4 | 13.2 | 146.0 |
| Total | Count | 106 | 135 | 24 | 265 | |
| | Expected Count | 106.0 | 135.0 | 24.0 | 265.0 | |

Table 4.13: 'Is Actor 2 quoted?' by variable 'Is Actor 2 Muslim?'

| | | Is the actor Muslim? | | | Total | |
|----------------------|----------------|----------------------|-------|---------|-------|-------|
| | | Yes | No | Unknown | | |
| Is the Actor quoted? | Yes | Count | 18 | 58 | 5 | 81 |
| | | Expected Count | 30.2 | 46.0 | 4.8 | 81.0 |
| | No | Count | 76 | 85 | 10 | 171 |
| | | Expected Count | 63.8 | 97.0 | 10.2 | 171.0 |
| Total | Count | 94 | 143 | 15 | 252 | |
| | Expected Count | 94.0 | 143.0 | 15.0 | 252.0 | |

Immediately noticeable in both *Table 4.12* and *4.13* is the disparity between observed and expected frequencies. If there were no relationship between the two crosstabulated variables, there would be no difference between the observed and expected counts in the tables. But in both tables there is a lower-than-expected frequency of quoted Muslims and a higher-than-expected frequency of quoted non-Muslims. The 'Unknown' column acts as a control group, albeit a rather small one, illustrating the effect on source quotation which non-identification has. Here, unlike the rest of the tables, the difference between observed and expected frequencies is negligible and in the case of *Table 4.13* the two counts are almost identical. This acts as further evidence that it is the perceived 'Muslim' characteristics of the sources which act to exclude them from quotation.

The chi-square test, the standard statistical test for independence, was performed on the crosstabulations above in order to establish whether

the observed relationship was significant. The function of the chi-square test is to state the probability that an experimental result is due purely to chance or due to unrepresentative sampling. When the chi-square tests were performed (see Appendix 2), the relationship between the two variables in both *Table 4.12* and *4.13* was found to be statistically highly significant. What this means is that being Muslim decreases the likelihood of being quoted in Britain's broadsheet newspapers. But there is another element to this editorial exclusion. The already slim chance of Muslim actors being quoted decreases still further, the lower down in the item's text the Muslim actors are cited, where the correlation between being Muslim and being excluded is even more pronounced.

As part of the coding process, the presence and textual location of 27 words and their synonyms were recorded (see Appendix 1 for full list). The hypothesis here is that negative terminology and references will be used in representing Islam and Muslims more frequently than their positive antonyms.¹¹ These variables were crosstabulated with the variable which recorded 'Is Islam cited as an influential factor?' in order to produce an indication of the extent to which the words were being associated with 'Islamic agency' by journalists. If the usage of these words was independent of Islamic agency, then their percentages in 'Islamic' and 'non-Islamic' articles would be the same as the percentages for the domestic sample as a whole.

Table 4.14: Lexical representation of Islam in domestic articles (1)

| | | Is Islam cited as a factor? | | | | Total | |
|---------------------------|-----|-----------------------------|---------------|-------|--------------|-------|--------|
| | | Yes | | No | | Count | Row % |
| | | Count | Row % | Count | Row % | | |
| Islamophobia included? | Yes | 22 | 91.7% | 2 | 8.3% | 24 | 100.0% |
| | No | 136 | 54.0% | 116 | 46.0% | 252 | 100.0% |
| Total | | 158 | 57.2% | 118 | 42.8% | 276 | 100.0% |
| Human Rights included? | Yes | 30 | 85.7% | 5 | 14.3% | 35 | 100.0% |
| | No | 128 | 53.1% | 113 | 46.9% | 241 | 100.0% |
| Total | | 158 | 57.2% | 118 | 42.8% | 276 | 100.0% |
| Arab Mind included? | Yes | 12 | 85.7% | 2 | 14.3% | 14 | 100.0% |
| | No | 146 | 55.7% | 116 | 44.3% | 262 | 100.0% |
| Total | | 158 | 57.2% | 118 | 42.8% | 276 | 100.0% |
| Westernised/ism included? | Yes | 7 | 58.3% | 5 | 41.7% | 12 | 100.0% |
| | No | 151 | 57.2% | 113 | 42.8% | 264 | 100.0% |
| Total | | 158 | 57.2% | 118 | 42.8% | 276 | 100.0% |
| Jihad included? | Yes | 7 | 77.8% | 2 | 22.2% | 9 | 100.0% |
| | No | 151 | 56.6% | 116 | 43.4% | 267 | 100.0% |
| Total | | 158 | 57.2% | 118 | 42.8% | 276 | 100.0% |
| Fatwa included? | Yes | 13 | 100.0% | | | 13 | 100.0% |
| | No | 145 | 55.1% | 118 | 44.9% | 263 | 100.0% |
| Total | | 158 | 57.2% | 118 | 42.8% | 276 | 100.0% |
| Sharia included? | Yes | 4 | 100.0% | | | 4 | 100.0% |
| | No | 154 | 56.6% | 118 | 43.4% | 272 | 100.0% |
| Total | | 158 | 57.2% | 118 | 42.8% | 276 | 100.0% |
| Hijab included? | Yes | 12 | 100.0% | | | 12 | 100.0% |
| | No | 146 | 55.3% | 118 | 44.7% | 264 | 100.0% |
| Total | | 158 | 57.2% | 118 | 42.8% | 276 | 100.0% |
| Halal included? | Yes | 3 | 100.0% | | | 3 | 100.0% |
| | No | 155 | 56.8% | 118 | 43.2% | 273 | 100.0% |
| Total | | 158 | 57.2% | 118 | 42.8% | 276 | 100.0% |

Looking to the articles in which the recorded words were present, only ‘Westernised/ism’ approximated the percentages of the total distribution (57.2%: 42.8%). This suggests that the textual occurrence of the ‘Westernised/ism’ is independent of the ‘Islamic-ness’ of the report. This finding is interesting in light of contemporary claims which attempt a strict delineation of ‘Western’ and ‘Islamic’ domains (Huntingdon, 1993; Sayyid, 1997), and warrants further analysis.

The words which show the highest disparity between expected and observed percentages are the Arabic words. In this sample, four of the five Arabic words were present only in cases in which Islam was cited as influential: *fatwa*, *shari'a*, *hijab* and *halal*. These words appear to be used to distinguish the 'Islamicness' of the event or action being reported, therefore they are rarely used when 'Islam' is not perceived as being influential. 'Arab/Islamic World/Mind' was employed in much the same way.

'Human Rights' was referred to in 35 articles, amounting to 12.68 per cent of the whole domestic sample (n= 276) - perhaps surprising for an issue and a concept not usually associated with domestic stories. At the outset of this research, it was expected that 'human rights' would be less determined in its use than (for example) the Arabic words, due to the non-specificity of its reference. This hypothesis is refuted by *Table 4.14*, with 'human rights' being mentioned six times more regularly in texts in which Islam was perceived as an influential factor. The variables which coded The Runnymede Trust's (1997) binary representations (monolithic/diverse; etc.) show that negative binaries predominate in the 30 'Human Rights' articles which cite Islam, suggesting that 'human rights' is mentioned in connection to 'closed' views of Islam and Muslims.

Table 4.15: Lexical representation of Islam in domestic articles (2)

| | | Is Islam cited as a factor? | | | | Total | |
|------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------|--------------|-------|--------------|-------|--------|
| | | Yes | | No | | Count | Row % |
| | | Count | Row % | Count | Row % | | |
| Anger included? | Yes | 18 | 69.2% | 8 | 30.8% | 26 | 100.0% |
| | No | 140 | 56.0% | 110 | 44.0% | 250 | 100.0% |
| Total | | 158 | 57.2% | 118 | 42.8% | 276 | 100.0% |
| Calmness/clemency included? | Yes | 10 | 66.7% | 5 | 33.3% | 15 | 100.0% |
| | No | 148 | 56.7% | 113 | 43.3% | 261 | 100.0% |
| Total | | 158 | 57.2% | 118 | 42.8% | 276 | 100.0% |
| Violence included? | Yes | 80 | 75.5% | 26 | 24.5% | 106 | 100.0% |
| | No | 78 | 45.9% | 92 | 54.1% | 170 | 100.0% |
| Total | | 158 | 57.2% | 118 | 42.8% | 276 | 100.0% |
| Peace included? | Yes | 19 | 73.1% | 7 | 26.9% | 26 | 100.0% |
| | No | 139 | 55.6% | 111 | 44.4% | 250 | 100.0% |
| Total | | 158 | 57.2% | 118 | 42.8% | 276 | 100.0% |
| Villainy included? | Yes | 81 | 68.1% | 38 | 31.9% | 119 | 100.0% |
| | No | 77 | 49.0% | 80 | 51.0% | 157 | 100.0% |
| Total | | 158 | 57.2% | 118 | 42.8% | 276 | 100.0% |
| Heroism included? | Yes | 17 | 48.6% | 18 | 51.4% | 35 | 100.0% |
| | No | 141 | 58.5% | 100 | 41.5% | 241 | 100.0% |
| Total | | 158 | 57.2% | 118 | 42.8% | 276 | 100.0% |
| Fundamentalist/ism included? | Yes | 43 | 97.7% | 1 | 2.3% | 44 | 100.0% |
| | No | 115 | 49.6% | 117 | 50.4% | 232 | 100.0% |
| Total | | 158 | 57.2% | 118 | 42.8% | 276 | 100.0% |
| Ambassador/ial included? | Yes | 4 | 50.0% | 4 | 50.0% | 8 | 100.0% |
| | No | 154 | 57.5% | 114 | 42.5% | 268 | 100.0% |
| Total | | 158 | 57.2% | 118 | 42.8% | 276 | 100.0% |
| Terrorist/ism included? | Yes | 37 | 84.1% | 7 | 15.9% | 44 | 100.0% |
| | No | 121 | 52.2% | 111 | 47.8% | 232 | 100.0% |
| Total | | 158 | 57.2% | 118 | 42.8% | 276 | 100.0% |
| Liberal/ism included? | Yes | 15 | 83.3% | 3 | 16.7% | 18 | 100.0% |
| | No | 143 | 55.4% | 115 | 44.6% | 258 | 100.0% |
| Total | | 158 | 57.2% | 118 | 42.8% | 276 | 100.0% |


Immediately evident from *Table 4.15* is the significantly greater number of negative words than those of their antonyms. 'Villainy' has the highest usage, being present in 43.1 per cent of all domestic articles and 51.3 per cent of domestic articles citing Islam as an influential factor. The instances of 'fundamentalist/ism' and 'terrorist/ism' are also high, both present in 15.9

per cent of the total domestic articles, and 27.2 per cent and 23.4 per cent of domestic articles citing Islam as an influential factor, respectively.

Elsewhere, the percentage of every negative word appearing when Islam is cited as being influential, is higher than the percentage of their corresponding antonym. This suggests that each of the negative words are thought to be more befitting an ‘Islamic’ story than their positive antonyms. In the case of the ‘violence/peace’ pairing, the distributions appear remarkably close: 75.5 per cent of texts in which ‘violence’ was mentioned also cited Islam as influential, and similarly, Islam is cited in 73.1 per cent of articles mentioning ‘peace’. It therefore appears that these two recorded words are almost equally suited to an ‘Islamic’ story setting. To arrive at such a conclusion, however, would be tantamount to a wilful distortion of the data in the table. ‘Violence’ is one of only two recorded words - the other being ‘Villainy’ - which appears more often than not when Islam is cited as influential.


It is as important to take account of the context in which these specific words are included in text, as it is to acknowledge their existence. With this in mind, the positions in which the ‘violence’ and ‘peace’ appear in the text were charted on two graphs:

Graph 4.3: Location of the word ‘violence’ in domestic articles



Location of the word ‘violence’

Graph 4.4: Location of the word ‘peace’ in domestic articles



Location of the word ‘peace’

The graphs show that the distribution of 'violence' is far 'flatter' than that of 'peace' and hence, more routine in occurrence. Instances of 'peace' in this domestic sample are predominantly relegated to the second half of the news reports in which they occur. Assuming an 'inverted pyramid' model of news discourse, the inclusion of 'peace' in these domestic articles is considered less 'newsworthy' than the inclusion of 'violence'. Similar patterns of occurrence - emphasising negativity and backgrounding positivity - are also observable in other word/antonym pairings.

4.3 Qualitative results

The remainder of the chapter focuses on the qualitative analysis of the domestic items of recorded coverage. As suggested above, this qualitative analysis is structured across five sections, chosen in order to represent the most significant aspects - both numerically and ideologically - of the domestic reporting of Islam. The first of these sections analyses items of recorded coverage in which an ethnic division between Muslim and non-Muslim Britons is presupposed, (re)produced and substantiated in the framing and representation of the reported action.

4.4 Islam and 'the West'; Muslim and 'Westerner'

In many of the items of published reporting sampled in this study, a split between 'Islam' and 'the West', 'Muslim' and 'Westerner' is presented to the reader, contrasting actors, characteristics, philosophies and political and/or religious views thought to represent these two cultural 'camps'. This not only obviously serves to distance 'Us' British, 'Our' opinions, 'Our' public domain from 'Them' and 'Theirs', it also acts to exclude the opinions of the British Muslims involved. In the sample of newspapers studied, two discriminatory strategies are employed in excluding British Muslims from the positions 'Us' and 'We': 'they are immigrants'; and 'they are Muslim'. In both of these interrelated prejudicial strategies there is a more global form of prejudice, based on the presupposition that 'they are not British', or perhaps 'not British enough'. In the following section it is the first of these (racist) strategies which dominates: actors are divided into the categories 'British' and 'non-

British/immigrant', with (often *British*) Muslims being included within the second of these categories.

4.4.1 *Articles based on a proxy split between British and Other*

Within the broad approach of 'division', there are articles where the split between 'Muslim' and 'Westerner' is made by proxy. The schema adopted is basic but global, and is based on a split between 'British' and 'non-British', the exact boundaries of which are never particularly well drawn - that would, of course, open them up to critique. The British Muslim communities are included within this 'non-British' grouping through either wilful manipulation of evidence, generalisation or ignorance: the impossibility of either 'white-Muslim' or 'non-white Englisher' form central presuppositions of these texts. In a report on the allocation of funding to two Muslim schools for example (*Guardian* 10 January 1998), Ray Honeyford is quoted as saying that he thought it "highly unlikely that these schools will attract non-Muslim children, and that means separating children not only by religion but by race". Whilst such sentiments were rarely written so explicitly, reports frequently drew upon the tangled associations between 'English' and 'white', 'Muslim' and 'non-white', and hence, 'Muslim' and 'non-English'.

A classic example of British Muslims being associated with an ill-defined category of 'foreigner-other' is the article '**You've made us feel so welcome: In praise of Britain**', written by Graham Turner (*Daily Telegraph* 17 January 1998). This news feature was based on a presupposed superiority of Britain, demarcating actors into 'Us' and 'Them' categories from the offset. The headline for example, states that:

Pride, gratitude and sense of belonging typify the thousands of foreigners who have adopted Britain as their home. Their only complaint, amid all the compliments, is that the British themselves tend to run down their own country.

The *prima facie* division of 'Us' and 'Them' is clearly evident in this short statement, with the first sentence identifying the actors in the article as "foreigners". This distinction is extended in the second sentence through the co-location of the noun phrase 'the British' and the possessive-pronoun

'Their', which refers back to the "foreigners". This structuring of expression acts to exclude 'Them' from the in-group 'the British' since 'They' are reported as referring to 'Us' in the third person: 'Their complaint about us...' This presupposed division is continued throughout the text, as illustrated in this short list of examples:

'We often take Britain for granted. They do not.'

"I am from India, and between England and India there is no comparison. If you said the whole world could come to Britain, half of India would immediately climb on a train and come. This is the best country in the world."

' "You have to be born here to feel English, but I do feel British", [said] Saphie Ashtiany'

"I still see myself as slightly foreign, but whereas Germans are totally unteasable ...I do now enjoy both teasing and being teased, just like the English. So maybe I've made it?"

All of the actors referred to and/or quoted in the text were first generation immigrants. In order of appearance, the "foreigners" in the article are referred to as coming from India, Egypt, Germany, Iran, Germany (again), USA, Egypt (again), Jamaica, India (again), Ireland, and Kenya, the only 'English' voice being that of the journalist. It could therefore be said that the division between 'Britain' and 'Foreigner' only exists in the text by virtue of the fact that all the actors introduced are first generation immigrants, all of whom talk about themselves in such a way. But the text is not that benign. It was written, and hence it's function lies, "in praise of Britain", and in order to achieve this Turner adopts a familiar strategic ritual of journalism, locating or concealing his truth claims in the words of the report's sources (see Tuchman, 1972). Although the newspaper is not directly 'responsible' for the divisions presupposed by the report's sources, their inclusion in the article to the absence of any contesting claims signals their assumed pertinence to the 'debate', and reveals the ideological commitment of the journalist. This ideological commitment is observable throughout the article - take the last sentence of the article, for example:

So, we have our faults, which are obvious, and we have made our mistakes, some of them terrible. We also, it seems, have our virtues, though our own dismal jimmies prefer not to recognise them. Is it very un-British to celebrate them occasionally?

Occurring after such extended self congratulation, the idea that it is somehow “un-British” to recognise “our virtues” and “celebrate them occasionally” appears rather ridiculous. Further, the claim that ‘Our’ British history is not celebrated does not stand up to even a cursory examination. In a final irony, this statement acts as the last (proxy) evidence of the ‘un-Britishness’ of the actors presented, since “recognising and occasionally celebrating the virtues of Britain” is all that Graham Turner has allowed ‘Them’ to do throughout the text.

The article also develops contrasts between Britain and ‘Islamic countries’, with the latter presented as inferior. This judgement of the lower status of ‘Islamic countries’ is subservient to the primary function of the text - “In praise of Britain” - as opposed to the explicit condemnation of ‘Islamic countries’. Accordingly the evidence supporting this judgement presents positive elements of ‘Our’ national character - in short, ‘Britishness’ - as opposed to foregrounding negative characteristics which ‘They’ are supposed to possess. The ‘Iranian immigrant’, Saphie Ashtiany, is included referring to the ‘superior British character’ as an even more primordial “nature”:

“I discovered that unspoken warmth and kindness is part of the British nature. There’s also a strong anti-hysteric element in the national character. ...Living here has actually changed my character. I’d have been far more excitable if I had stayed in Iran.”

Zaki Badawi is also quoted ‘in praise of Britain’, but not before he is introduced in an uncharacteristically complementary way as “Dr Zaki Badawi, chairman of the Council of Imams and Mosques and perhaps Britain’s most distinguished Muslim”, adding credibility and authority to his words. His most prominent quote is cited below, numbered for ease of reference:

"[1] As a young man in Egypt, [2]I never thought that I'd end my life in Britain. I wanted with all my heart to get the British out. I thought 'then we will have freedom'. [3] Well, of course the British are out, but freedom did not arrive. [4] Sadly, the Muslim world has not yet learnt the tolerance which you have in abundance here. [5] Islam advocates it, but our people do not live up to that standard." (original emphasis)

In clause [1], Dr Badawi identifies himself as Egyptian, who, in clause [2] is shown to have had a dislike for Britain. This dislike is a result of the British 'being in' Egypt and the lack of freedom associated with their presence. The details of this 'presence' remain conspicuously absent from discussion. This dislike for the British is shown to have been misguided however, since as clause [3] suggests, the freedom thought to have been prevented by the British presence in Egypt was still found to be lacking after 'We' had left. This is explained by clause [4], where it is claimed that "the Muslim world" is a place lacking in 'British tolerance', a deficit which is identified, in clause [5], as being a fault of "our" (Egyptian) Muslim people, contrary to the tolerance advocated by Islam.

To reiterate: the inclusion of sources in this article is illustrative of the newspaper's commitment to a certain interpretation of 'Britain', 'Britishness' and the comparative position of 'Islam' and 'Muslims'. Quoting Zaki Badawi after being introduced as informed ("Dr"), authoritative ("chairman of the Council of Imams and Mosques") and "Britain's most distinguished Muslim" illustrates the 'communion' between Badawi's criticisms and the pragmatic goal of both the text and newspaper. The vagueness of his criticisms adds to the general textual claim of British superiority. - What is meant by 'the Muslim world'? Is this geographically located, or does such a 'world' extend, a la Orientalist methodology, to include all Muslims? Is the whole of the 'Muslim world' meant to be intolerant, or just those who have the power to impose their will upon it? The ambiguity of Dr Badawi's statement and the criticism which it contains, adds breadth to whom it refers, expanding concentrically to include 'the Muslim world' and 'our [Muslim] people', all the while conforming with the text's pragmatic goal: "praising Britain".

4.4.2 Articles based on an explicit Islam/West bifurcation

Although the vast majority of articles in the sample are based on an implicit assumption of difference - either as above, by contrasting 'English' and 'non-English' actors and/or characteristics, or through an implicit contrast between 'Islam' and 'the West' - occasionally such a bifurcation is suggested explicitly in the text. This section aims at presenting the principle manifestations of this schematic approach to domestic stories reporting Islam, and its implications for the representation of the British Muslim communities.

If we first take an article entitled '**May your God go with you**' (*Independent Magazine* 20 December 1997), reporting a high level meeting between influential members and representatives of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The journalist, Paul Vallely, states helpfully that "many of the views which *we in the West* hold about Islam are mythical, outdated or simply ignorant" (emphasis added), but seems to be unaware that such a statement contiguously propagates of one of the central 'myths' held about Islam: the assumption that the West is populated by "Us" non-Muslims and, by default, the East by "Them" Muslims. The division between these two 'worlds', is presented by Vallely as originating in their different 'Moralities', since

Like languages, moralities are not universal, but neither are they the product of private and personal choice. For morality is not one human enterprise among many; it is the base which makes other enterprises possible and the vantage point from which they are judged. (p.21)

Building on this false start, Vallely then presents the same stereotypical ideological conflict. On the one side, "we in the West" who are grounded in "[t]he offspring of the Enlightenment - science, capitalism, individualism and democracy". These constructs, he claims, are "a framework within which values can flourish, but ...do not create those values." Opposing this framework, Vallely suggests, are

contemporary Muslim fundamentalists, [who] react against the modernism of Western culture. ...Muslims throughout the world feel humiliated by Western

culture and, in particular, the economic, military power of the US, which is widely regarded throughout the Arab world as 'the Great Satan'.

The actors are thus identified, and the conflict itself presented as a battle for, or perhaps over, modernity: 'the West' supporting "science, capitalism, individualism and democracy"; and the "Muslims throughout the world feel[ing] humiliated" by this 'modernism'.

Such a statement is, of course, a gross generalisation, but rather than retracting the statement, Valley extends the argument to "the UK, [where] the revival of Islam has similar roots." Here in the UK, Valley suggests that this "revival of Islam" is characterised by "young British Asians ...reading the Koran not just with fresh eyes but against a background of comparative depravation, exclusion, unemployment, low earnings and poor housing." Ignoring the fact that the *growth* of Islam is by no means isolated to young British Asians, this is as close as Valley gets to a criticism of either 'the West' or of a modernity built on the 'valueless' frameworks of capitalism and individualism. Indeed, he describes the communities' reaction to such "alienation and racism" as a "widespread feeling of paranoia". This acts to background, or deny, the well-founded claims to disadvantage and ill-treatment referred to only three sentences before, with 'paranoia' conjuring associations of delusional mental illness.

Explicit divisions between 'Muslim' and 'Briton' are displayed not only in representations of 'Islam' and 'Muslims', but also present in representations of symbols, artefacts and characteristics considered particularly or thoroughly 'Islamic'. The broadsheet press' approach to the *hijab*, or veil, in the sampled coverage suggests that it is thought of in such a manner: as Islam. The veil was mentioned in 7.7% (n= 12) of domestic articles, occurring across the sample in the *Guardian* (n= 3), the *Independent* (n= 4) and *The Daily Telegraph* (n= 5). In each of these 12 articles, 'Islam' was cited as an influential factor, a finding which might have been expected: the veil is an enduring image of the 'Islamic-ness' of Muslim women and therefore 'Islam' - as religion, culture, tradition, or explanation - is necessarily connoted by the *hijab*. The fact that the *hijab* was only

mentioned in 7.7% (n=12) of all the domestic stories which mention Islam as a factor, does not negate the connection drawn between the veil and Islam in the news - there is, after all, more than one way in which to 'represent' Islam. Rather, as Hage (1998) suggests, members of both the political right and left see the *hijab* - as both cultural item and a symbol of certain aspects of Islamic culture and religion - as "a harmful presence that affects their own well-being" (Hage, 1998: 37). The exact manifestation of this 'harmful presence' differs according to the politics of the individual and in this case the newspaper. Therefore, the inclusion of the *hijab* in reporting - perhaps domestic reporting in particular since it is indelibly stamped with nationalised notions of 'We-dom' and 'They-dom' (Hartley, 1992) - highlights its rhetorical use in the text's argumentation, providing an insights into newspapers' differential perceptions of 'Islam'. In order to clarify these differences, it is necessary to quote Hage (1998) at length:

For example, scarves [can be] considered an unacceptable form of subjugating women or, as interviewee B put it: "It pains me to live in a society where such backward forms of subjugation are exhibited." In a more complex manner, to European women, scarves can represent an intolerable, because too visible, mode of subjugation that only serves to render their own subjugation more visible. Because nationalists follow a 'one nation one patriarchy' motto, the veil can also mean the subjugation of women to a non-national patriarchy. The desire to remove it is the desire to ensure that all women within the nation are subjugated to the dominant national patriarchal order. Finally, some non-Muslim migrant women, especially those who have a consciousness of themselves as Third World-looking, express a hatred of the scarf by fear of association. Here it is perceived as a migrant marker that some migrant women see as negatively affecting all migrant women by labelling them as backward. (Hage, 1998: 251)

With a dichotomy established between the veil and modernity, it becomes possible for any political ideologue to imbue the veil with whatever characteristics felt necessary to differentiate 'Them' from 'Us', and then - through the adoption of the Orientalist methodology of gross generalisation - to 'Islam' as a whole. The coverage of the *hijab* in the domestic sample falls well within these conceptions, each story in which the veil is mentioned adopting one or more of these schema.

Sometimes differentiation is as far as the text goes - a simple 'Muslim' and 'British' split - leaving the possibility of rejection strategies based on this

bifurcated allegiance, solely with the audience. On other occasions, the bifurcation is followed by either clearer implications, or else explicit identification, of the 'characteristics' which members of the two 'civilisations' are supposed to hold. Looking first to the headlines and leaders of the 12 domestic articles which mention the veil, its synonyms, or cultural variations on the *hijab*, the centralised status of Islam is clearly noticeable in six of them (headlines are marked in bold, overheadlines and/or leaders are marked in italics throughout):

Straw rejects call for law to protect British Muslims (*Independent*, 23 October 1997)

Taking the veil (twice) (*Daily Telegraph*, 5 December 1997)

Veil and Sails: Navy sets out to recruit Muslim women (*Independent*, 6 January 1998)

Muslim schools get grants (*Guardian*, 10 January 1998)

Job victory for Mecca pilgrim (*Independent*, 15 January 1998)

Three others emphasise problematic relations between 'Muslim' and 'non-Muslim' Britain, at the same time as using Islam as a signifier of differentiation,:

Pronouncing a *fatwa* on extremes (*Guardian*, 20 November 1997)

Veil protest (*Guardian*, 3 December 1997)

Bus driver turns away veiled Muslim (*Daily Telegraph*, 3 December 1997)

Two others choose a reading of relations between 'Muslim' and 'non-Muslim' Britain which moves beyond either differentiation or problematic (inter)relations, to emphasise a supposed exclusivity or opposition between the communities:

Islamic vs. Secular (*Independent*, 25 October 1997)

[overhead] *The doctrine of multiculturalism has gained a firm hold in the educational establishment. Graham Turner hears from its champions and from those observers who feel it is a worrying threat to the country's mainstream culture. How will they know who they are?* (*Daily Telegraph*, 12 December 1997)

In only a single article was the exact nature of the subject matter unclear from reading the headline:

It's fashion, but who are the victims? (*Daily Telegraph*, 2 October 1997)

The 'Islamic-ness' of the actors in the news articles is clear from the use of the *hijab* in the body of news-text:

In the Turkish navy, female ratings do not wear a veil. Their uniforms are similar to those of Western servicewomen. (*Independent* 6 January, 1998)

Robotics technician, Farida Khanum, 21, was bullied by other workers at a Luton car plant, one of whom mockingly put a cloth over his head and referred to her as "Yasser Arafat"...her dismissal stemmed from her decision to wear the *hijab*, a head covering in line with Islamic modesty requirements. (*Independent* 15 January, 1998)

...an Irish-born teacher ...was dressed in full Pakistani Muslim gear - shalwar kameez plus green dupatta, or headscarf. (*Daily Telegraph* 12 December, 1997)

The school, which has 180 pupils, operates a strict Islamic code... Girls wear the Islamic headscarf, the *hijab*, and school stops for midday and afternoon prayers. (*Guardian* 10 January, 1998)

In the *Guardian* article **Muslim schools get grants** (10 January 1998) quoted above for example, the "strict Islamic code" alleged to be in place in the school is distilled and represented by the newspaper in the form of two simple images: the *hijab* and prayer. The use of the adjective "strict", in connection with the *hijab* as manifestation of "Islamic code", ties its representation with enforcement and the subjugation of women. This approach also informs the representation of the *hijab* in the *Independent*, where three very young Muslim girls pictured wearing headscarves, are described as: "Girls in a British Islamic school, learning 'solid morals with discipline and respect'." (Islamic vs. Secular, *Independent* 25 October 1997).

Finally, a stylistic register of repression and constraint is also drawn upon by *The Daily Telegraph* in '**It's fashion, but who are the victims?**' The report, describing a catwalk show by fashion designer Hussein Chalayan, focuses upon the "bondage frocks" worn by the models, which were in fact stylised and in some cases surreal interpretations of female Muslim dress. The article adopts a more ridiculing or sneering tone to that of the two 'liberal' newspapers, describing the women as "stalking down the catwalk with bags on their heads", and dressed in "what looked like chadors,

the black cloaks in which some of the Islamic faith protect the modesty of their women.” Here, in a complex combination of image and inference, the journalist makes rhetorical use of the Muslim veil, comparing the fashion on display to the chador in order to criticise the designer’s work: ‘Bags, how ghastly!’ This in effect transforms the alleged ‘Islamicness’ of the clothing into a term of derogation.

From this, I suggest that the *hijab*, in image and concept, is used by journalists as an indication of the Islamic-ness of either the theme or actors in an article. Wherever the *hijab* is mentioned in these texts, the author is specifically attempting to draw the readers attention to ‘Islam’, using the religion as a explanatory factor in the agency or motivation of the actors in the article, which is presented in contrast, or sometimes opposition, to the supposed normative base of ‘Western/ised agency’. This does not equate to homogeneity in representing ‘Islam’ across the newspapers however, since as Hage (1998) suggests above, the *hijab* (and therefore the connoted ‘Islam’) are differentially perceived by the newspapers. Rather, the *hijab* is used by the newspaper to symbolise their particular ‘Islam’:

For the right, Islam represents barbarism; for the left, medieval theocracy; for the centre, a kind of distasteful exoticism. In all camps, however, there is agreement that even though little enough is known about the Islamic world, there is not much to be approved of there. (Said, 1997: lv)

4.4.3 *Islam/West division: a summary*

Both of these ‘types’ of division are based on two sides of the same coin. In the first, British Muslims are excluded from the semantic position ‘British’ by virtue of the characteristics that they are perceived not to have: the characteristics of ‘Britishness’; whilst in the second, British Muslims are excluded by virtue of the characteristics which they are perceived to have: their ‘Islamicness’. Once this is acknowledged, it becomes particularly easy to brand these claims as racial, or more specifically racist, representations of British Muslims, and to dismiss them as essentialisation, simplification, false or ideological (Hage, 1998: 31). Following Hage, I argue that these acts and others like them, “are better conceived as nationalist practises: practices

which assume, first, an image of a national space; secondly, an image of the nationalist himself or herself as master of this national space and, thirdly, an image of the 'ethnic/racial other' as a mere object within this space." (Hage, 1998: 28). In essence, they are based on a 'White fantasy' regarding the rights and abilities of mainstream 'White' society to regulate the parameters of British society: to include or exclude. Such presuppositions are also present in a great many articles written from a broadly 'multiculturalist' perspective, as I will show in a later section.

4.5 The ideological square in domestic reporting

The negative 'othering' of British Muslims is present in a range of sites across these domestic items of reporting. This, combined with broadsheet newspapers preference for backgrounding or excluding anti-Muslim discrimination and violence (see below) results in what Said (1997) has labelled journalism's "covering of Islam": "a one-sided activity that obscures what 'we' do, and highlights instead what Muslims and Arabs by their very nature are" (p. xxii). Such a pattern is premised on a double strategy contained in argumentative denials of racism, containing a "positive self-presentation, on the one hand, and a strategy of expressing a subtle, indirect ...form of negative other-presentation, on the other hand" (van Dijk, 1992: 89). The "ideological square" (Ibid.) formed by this double strategy and its presence in domestic reporting, are the focus of the next section.

4.5.1 'Fanatical' Muslim violence in the public sphere

'Muslim violence in the public sphere' represents a prominent approach to negativisation, as indicated by the presence of 'violence' in 38.4 per cent of domestic articles (see *Table 4.15*). 'Muslim violence' dominated the reporting of a campaign by Luton Muslims to have the name of a local bingo hall changed from 'Mecca' to something less insulting. Reports were printed on this topic in the *Guardian*, the *Independent* and *The Times* (7 January 1998), with the newspapers picking up the story as the (under-reported) campaign was beginning to be peppered with acts of frustrated violence. The ongoing nature of the campaign is acknowledged in the *Guardian* report (headlined

Muslim ire over Mecca ‘insult’), the first line of which states that “Muslims yesterday *stepped up* their campaign against Mecca, the chain of Bingo halls which they say takes the name of their holy city in vain” (emphasis added).

The articles report a meeting between the Rank Organisation, the owners of the bingo hall, and local Muslim representatives, with the majority of the information in all three of the news reports - identical for the most part - being taken from a press release of this meeting. Despite the meeting, the report in the *Independent* (**Mecca bingo hall outrages Muslims**, 7 January 1998) summarises the actions of the Muslim community as:

violent protest from the town’s Muslim population ...They said it was an insult to Islam for the name of their holiest city to be associated with gambling, and on Christmas Day [no less!], bricks were thrown through the windows of the hall causing £3,000 of damage.

Instead of quoting any Muslims, the *Independent* journalist chooses to quote Councillor Hazel Simmons, the chairwomen of Equal Opportunities at Luton Council as saying “I personally believe this [the name] to be insensitive in what is now a truly multicultural society”.

The all three reports are critical of the Muslim campaign, problematise the Luton Muslim community and ‘Community relations’ as a whole, and present Muslim action as either reactionary and ideological, or else as fanatical violence. This may be a result of the reports being derived from a press release summarising meeting which, judging by the material, was written by the Rank Organisation. Throughout, the actions of the Muslims are referred to as “demands”, “violent protest” and “attacks”, caused by their “anger and irritation”, “ire” and “outrage”. Only once are Muslims described as “asking” the Rank Organisation to “consider” the opinions of the community. Further, the actual “demands” of the community are systematically under-reported. Only in the *Independent* is it reported that the campaign is directed towards changing the name of a single bingo hall *back* to ‘Top Rank’, the name it had two months previously. *The Times* performs significant linguistic labour to conceal this fact from its report. The headline

for example states that '**Muslims want name change for Mecca bingo**', whilst the start of the article is completely misleading:

Muslim community leaders yesterday *asked the owners of a chain of bingo halls to change their name* because it was causing offence. The *arrival* of the Mecca bingo hall in Luton, Bedfordshire, has caused anger and irritation among Muslims... [emphasis added]

The paragraph above not only suggests that it is the whole organisation which Luton Muslims wanted to change, but also conceals the recent renaming of the bingo hall by describing Mecca 'arriving' in Luton.

Similarly, the *Guardian* states that the campaign is "against Mecca, the chain of bingo halls". Further, in the final paragraph of the article, the *Guardian* mentions another, wholly unrelated campaign, organised by completely different Muslims to convince Nike to alter a logo on one their running shoes. The function of this paragraph therefore appears to be: first, that the campaign "against Mecca" should be viewed within the context of a series of Muslim campaigns; and second, that these campaigns are the work of oversensitive Muslims who are objecting either just for the sake of it, or perhaps for political or ideological reasons.

The statements explaining the actions of the Rank Organisation on the other hand are accepted, even when contradicted by the reported facts of the event. In the report by the *Independent* for example, the journalist paraphrases Rank as saying that "the name change was not insensitive, [but] was part of a policy of bringing their nation-wide chain of bingo halls under one name". What this therefore says, is that all Rank bingo halls across the nation were renamed without considering the areas in which they were located. Their own explanation therefore shows that, at the very least, Rank were inconsiderate, or ignorant of community sensitivities, but this is not pointed out by any of the newspapers. Something which all three newspapers *do* refer to, was that the company had been trading since 1884, when "Two enterprising Victorian merchants chose the name Mecca for their new coffee house" (*The Times*). These "enterprising" men, *The Times* continues,

could not have foreseen the trouble it would cause in the multicultural Britain of the 1990s. More than 100 years after the founding of the Mecca Smoking Café in London, it has fallen foul of Luton's 10,000 Muslims.

The process of division/rejection is apparent throughout *The Times'* article, as illustrated in both the quote above and also by the inclusion of "Mary, 55, who has worked in Bury Park [the area in question] for 20 years":

"A couple of years ago *they* wanted to rename a street, where *they* had a mosque, Kashmir Street, but *everyone* objected and *we* put a stop to it. I just hope they don't burn it down while I'm in there" she said. [emphasis added]

Here, the source appears to mean 'everyone' in the sense of 'everyone who is allowed to have influence over the national space', since the name change would presumably not have been objected to by the Muslim community who proposed it. It should also be pointed out that "Mary" was the only person quoted throughout *The Times'* report. Not only does this help structure an understanding of the event being reported, it also suggests that *The Times* felt that her 'reading' of the event was the most appropriate one for its readers.

4.5.2 *Discrimination stories*

The manner in which 'discrimination' stories are reported, is particularly interesting, since it could potentially conflict with the predominant approach in press reporting to background 'Our' negative traits (van Dijk, 1992). In the sample of newspapers studied, articles covering religious discrimination against British Muslim communities, were wholly absent. Where examples of discrimination against Muslim minorities were reported, it was the 'racial' element of such abuse which was marked for reference and not the possible 'religious' motivation. This is by no means a peculiarly 'British' phenomenon. A similar phenomenon was observable in Australia for example during the 1990-1 Persian Gulf Conflict, when 'widespread' attacks on Australian-Muslims and Arab-Australians, including the vandalism of Muslim shop windows, the burning of mosques and tearing veils of Muslim women in the

street, were consistently represented as racial attacks (see Hage, 1998: 27). The foregrounding of the 'racist' prejudice and discrimination is clearly noticeable in an article headlined **English cricket must bring Asians in from the cold** (*Daily Telegraph*, 4 October 1997). The author, Simon Hughes, clearly sets out his stall in the first paragraph of the article:

Racial prejudice is still alive and kicking in English cricket. Thousands of man hours have been spent recently devising ways of improving our game, when one potential answer has been largely ignored for years: the proper integration of British-born Asians into the cricketing infrastructure.

The emphasis on "racial prejudice" continues throughout the article, backgrounding the possible explanation of religion in explaining prejudice and/or discrimination. The only references to religiously motivated discrimination come from either the quoted (Muslim) sources - Ebad Mirza states "Faith plays a major part in their [Muslim boys'] life, so they have to go to mosque and fit in religious studies around school" - or else are couched in references to the 'religious needs' of these "British-born Asians":

the culture of the senior game, orientated round the hop, wards off many players whose religion forbids them entering places serving alcohol. Rifts develop, exacerbated by special Asian food requirements, and many [have] gone off to form their own sides.

Here Hughes suggests: it is the 'culture of the game' which excludes, not intolerance; it is the "special" religious rules and needs of Muslims which are the problem, not the unwillingness of 'Cricket' to accommodate or adapt existing practices; and the 'racial' explanation dominates *despite* citing religious practises as an explanation of the present exclusion of "British-born Asians".

The theme of 'racism' in sport is also central in an article entitled **Clubs urged to fight anti-Asian bias on the pitch** (*Independent*, 31 October 1997), written by Steve Boggan. The report focuses on a commendable scheme to remove racism from sport, specifically football, and this year was extended to include, as the headline suggests, an attempt to remove "anti-Asian bias". "Asian" is the noun of choice throughout, even

though express reference is made to 'Islamophobic' remarks made towards an "Asian player" during a match: "What are you doing down there?" the bigot is reported as saying, "Praying to Allah for a goal?" This remark could, of course, have been motivated by 'racial' as opposed to 'religious' bigotry - the intention being to disparage someone of colour. But, for the reporter to have completely ignored the 'Islamophobic' content of the statement is disheartening, particularly since the article was printed only one week after the publication of the Runnymede Trust's research into British 'Islamophobia'.

'Racial' abuse is not only directed towards 'Asians' in general, but also when attacking Muslims specifically. Referring to research completed with the Moroccan community in London, for example, Ghada Karmi stated that the women of the community told her:

that if they put a scarf on and walked about, they might be set upon. One girl had been set upon by a gang of white youths who were shouting 'Paki, Paki' at this girl, 'Get out, go home Paki'. [...]The girl made the point that she had been out in the same area without the headscarf on and nothing had ever happened to her, but the moment that she put the headscarf on this is what happened.

Karmi (1999)

In this example, it was only when the girl in question looked like a Muslim that she was abused. When she went out dressed in 'western clothes', or even wore 'ethnic' dress such as her shalwar-kameez, no abuse was experienced. Without further complicating an already tangled maze of representations by the reintroduction of (public and journalistic attitudes to) the *hijab*, it seems apparent from these examples that despite its complex and inter-related nature, journalists present the prejudice and discrimination experienced by British Muslims in a surprisingly straightforward way: this discrimination is *racial* discrimination; those who are subject to such abuse are therefore so abused on the grounds of their *race*; and religion is not used as a category of exclusion or abuse. This contemporary 'anti-racist' attitude, that the religion of those who have suffered abuse has little or no direct relevance to the story, is highly significant. Not only does it impact on the reporting itself, it also contributes to the perception of an 'anti-Muslim

bias', or what some have labelled 'Islamophobia', in the press. This problem has been skilfully discussed by Modood (1992) who states that

The root problem is that contemporary anti-racism defines people in terms of their colour; Muslims - suffering all the problems that anti-racists identify - hardly ever think of themselves in terms of their colour. And so, in terms of their own being, Muslims feel most acutely those problems that the anti-racists are blind to; and respond weakly to those challenges that the antiracists want to meet with the most force. And there is no way out of this impasse if we remain wedded to a concept of racism that sees only colour discrimination as a cause and material deprivation as a result. (Modood, 1992: 272)

4.5.3 *The reporting of 'Islamophobia'*

The publication of Runnymede Trust's (1997) report, *Islamophobia: a challenge to us all* (22 October 1997) produced a flurry of news-reports, columns, and, in the wake of such press interest, reader's letters, commenting on both the findings and implications of the report. The manner in which the Runnymede Trust's study was actually reported is very interesting, due to the criticism which the survey levelled at both the press and wider 'British society'. Central to the majority of reporting was a management of this criticism - an observation also made by Roger Hardy (BBC) whilst discussing the effect which the report has had on press reporting of Islam at a recent conference:

I detect, not a tremendous mea culpa and breast-beating by editors and publishers and entrepreneurs in the media business, but a sense of defensiveness, which is something much less but maybe the beginnings of change. (Roger Hardy, 1999)

The reporting of the Runnymede Trust's study was characterised by four management strategies, often occurring in combination in the news-text:

- *deflecting* Runnymede criticism onto others
- subtle *countering* of criticism
- direct *refutation*
- or, on occasion, *ignoring* criticism altogether.

Two daily newspapers from the sample - the *Financial Times* and *The Times* - did not report the publication of the survey at all, thereby adopting the

fourth of the criticism management strategies mentioned above: ignoring criticism. *Table 4.16* below, shows the frequency and format of articles reporting 'Islamophobia', according to newspaper:

Table 4.16: Newspaper reporting of 'Islamophobia' (The Runnymede Trust)

| | | Format of article | | | | Total |
|-----------|-------------|-------------------|--------|---------|--------|-------|
| | | News | Column | Feature | Letter | |
| Newspaper | Guardian | 2 | | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| | Independent | 2 | 2 | | 14 | 18 |
| | Telegraph | 1 | | | 3 | 4 |
| Total | | 5 | 2 | 1 | 18 | 26 |

As *Table 4.16* illustrates, only 8 of the 26 articles printed in the sampled newspapers were written by staff journalists, suggesting a lack of interest in the Runnymede Trust's publication and the wider issue(s) of 'Islamophobia' on the part of the newspapers. By contrast, the Runnymede publication received a high level of attention in the 'Muslim press', an observation which illustrates the complex and shifting relationship between audience and newspaper in 'deciding' the relative importance - 'newsworthiness' - of a story. Moreover, as the *Table 4.16* illustrates, 18 letters were printed responding to either the findings of the Runnymede Trust or the manner in which its findings were reported, contextualised and discussed. Such a response by 'the public' is significant, representing: 45 per cent of the total number of sampled readers' letters written on domestic issues (n = 40); 20.2 per cent of readers' letters across whole the sample (n = 89); 6.5 per cent of the whole domestic stories sample (n = 276); or a massive 21.2 per cent of all domestic articles printed in the *Independent* over the period in question (n= 66). This interest is only matched by two other, similarly contentious subjects: Muslim schools and schooling (n=17); and the advantages and disadvantages of bombing Iraq (n=13).

The headlines of each included article are listed below, in the order in which they appeared in the newspapers (all articles printed in 1997):

- Guardian* (G1) **Straw shelves law on 'Islamophobia'** 23 October
 (G2) **Muslim tykes 'happy here'** 23 October
 (G3) **Islamophobia: the way ahead** (letter) 24 October
 (G4) **Pronouncing a *fatwa* on extremes** (feature) 20 November
- Independent* (In1) **Straw rejects call for law to protect British Muslims**
 23 October
 (In2) **How Pakistani voters help shape Cook's policy** 23 October
 (In3) **In defence of Islamophobia** (column) 23 October
 (In4-10) **Islamic vs. secular** (x7 letters) 25 October
 (In11) **Beware the intolerant certainties of European liberals**
 (column) 25 October
 (In12-14) **Islamophobia** (x3 letters) 27 October
 (In15-18) **Religion in schools** (x4 letters) 28 October
- Daily Telegraph* (T1) **Survey calls for laws to combat 'Islamophobia'** 23 October
 (T2) **Muslims should change radically** (letter) 25 October
 (T3) **Islamophilia** (letter) 28 October
 (T4) **Islam is as British as Christianity** (letter) 29 October

The findings of the Runnymede Trust were reported on 23 October 1997. The news reports in the *Guardian* and *Independent* were accompanied on the same page by other articles (G2 and In2 respectively) which acted to manage the Runnymede report's criticisms, specifically the criticism of the press, through the way in which they were contextualised and discussed. The *Guardian* article, for example, does not directly refute the findings of the report - presumably the wholehearted denial of prejudice would be dismissed by its liberal audience - but does display elements of the other three criticism management strategies mentioned above: the ignoring, countering and deflection of criticism. First, the criticisms of the news media contained in the Runnymede survey, and (briefly) summarised in G1, are completely ignored in G2. Second, the recommendation made by the Runnymede report for legislation combating religious discrimination, is subtly countered through the presentation of contradictory evidence. This evidence is made all the more effective since it is drawn from Bradford, where parts of the survey were conducted: "In an area used by the trust as a testbed, pleasure about a wealth of kind words about Islam was tempered by doubts about further anti-discrimination laws. [...] 'It was a big problem in the 1960s and 70s, but is not a priority now.'" one Muslim man is quoted as saying. Third, the decision to describe discrimination as "racial slights" acknowledges the prejudice

experienced by British Muslims, but deflects it away from the Runnymede's central concern with religious discrimination, and back towards 'race'. A similar approach was also taken in the *Independent*.

The coverage of the story by the *Daily Telegraph* (in *T1*) distorts the focus and findings of the survey even further. The first paragraph, for example, states: "Britain will be home to 2 million Muslims within about 20 years - almost double the number today and easily the largest non-Christian community in the country, according to a study published yesterday." The impression that the demographic growth of the British Muslim communities was one of the principle findings of the report continues for almost the whole of the first half of the article. Amongst other "significant findings", the report tells us that the Runnymede Trust have "...disclosed [not declared or affirmed] that there were now 613 mosques in Britain, compared to only a handful 30 years ago" (emphasis added), and also that:

by 2001, there are likely to be 700,000 people of Pakistani background in Britain, two thirds of whom will have been born in the country, stabilising at around 900,000 in 2020.

What all this has to do with either 'Islamophobia' or the Runnymede report, is unclear until the journalist, Philip Johnston, helpfully informs readers that the building of new mosques, caused by the demands of a growth in the Muslim population, is an "area of cultural tension". Therefore, as the Muslim population increases over the next 20 years the "cultural tension" experienced will also increase. What this clearly represents is the journalistic equivalency of the linkage of 'race relations' with 'immigration': that an increase in the visible black and brown populations is likely "to impair the harmony, strength and cohesion of our public and social life and cause discord and unhappiness among all concerned."¹² The idea that the findings of the Runnymede Trust could be so wilfully misrepresented, drawing on standard xenophobic discourses of cultural and demographic 'swamping', is particularly offensive.

4.5.3.1 POLLY TOYNBEE AND THE 'DEFENCE OF ISLAMOPHOBIA'

The remainder of this section is devoted to the *Independent*, the newspaper in which the majority of the coverage given to the Runnymede report was contained. After the *Independent's* two initial news reports, Polly Toynbee wrote a column - headlined **In defence of Islamophobia** (23 October 1997) - attacking the assumptions and conclusions of the Runnymede report. The column began with Toynbee stating "I am an Islamophobe. [...] I judge Islam not by its words - the teachings of the Koran as interpreted by those Thought-for-a-day moderate Islamic theologians. I judge Islam by the religion's deeds in societies where it dominates. Does that make me a racist?" Toynbee went on to argue that it is not easy to treat Islam (and Muslims) with respect, since they describe "women as of inferior status, placing them one step behind in the divine order of things." The column adopted liberal argumentation - a rights-based discourse with a clear antipathy to religious expression in the public sphere - and applied the stock subjects used by 'liberals' when arguing against Islam: free speech, Rushdie and the *fatwa*; "Racism is the problem, not religion"; women & (in)equality; an alleged lack of Muslims denouncing atrocities in Islamic states; injustices of Saudi *shari'a* law; and a presupposed opposition of Islam and rationality.

In addition to these very stereotypical thematic concerns, Toynbee adopted an especially 'closed' view of Islam, arguing for seven of the eight representations identified by the Runnymede Trust as characterising such a position.¹³ Although Toynbee did not argue that Muslims are 'monolithic', the 'diversity' she suggested was based on the usual bifurcated stereotype quoted above, in which "extremist" was set against "Thought-for-the-day moderate Islamic theologians". She concluded the column by arguing against granting state funding to Muslim schools and therefore against this principle recommendation of the Runnymede report.

Each article on 'Islamophobia' printed in the *Independent* following this column, was written in its wake, providing either congratulation, counter-argument or, eventually, counter-counter-argument in response to the column. This I have attempted to represent in *Table 4.17* below:

Table 4.17: Responses to the Toynbee column, printed in the Independent

| Date | Article | Stance |
|-------------|--|-----------------------|
| 23 October | Polly Toynbee column: 'In defence of Islamophobia' | anti-Runnymede |
| 25 October | Four letters criticising Toynbee | <i>pro-Runnymede</i> |
| | Two letters praising Straw's 'no new discrimination law' | anti-Runnymede |
| | One letter praising Toynbee | anti-Runnymede |
| 25 October | Trevor Phillips' column: criticising Toynbee | <i>pro-Runnymede</i> |
| 27 October | One letter praising Toynbee | anti-Runnymede |
| | Two letters criticising Toynbee | <i>pro-Runnymede</i> |
| 28 October | Two letters criticising Toynbee | <i>pro-Runnymede</i> |
| | Two letters criticising Phillips | anti-Runnymede |

In one sense the time and space devoted by the *Independent* to the discussion of the issues raised by the Runnymede Trust could be interpreted as a promising advance, heralding the start of a new attitude of inclusion. And this could have been possible, were the discussion not based on the familiar, incendiary, reductive, distorted and unrepresentative issues and images around which Islam and Muslims are 'discussed'. In addition to the themes mentioned above, Toynbee's basic position can be summarised as follows:

No doubt some of the racism such [Bangladeshi] women suffer does spring from the fact that they are Muslims. But there is no hard evidence that poor, black, non-English speakers of other faiths are treated any better than Muslims. Racism is the problem, not religion.

There are similarities here with the earlier *Daily Telegraph* article reporting the exclusion of British Muslim cricketers: religious discrimination is denied to exist whilst simultaneously citing religious factors - the Bangladeshi women "are Muslims" - as motivating such prejudice and/or discrimination. Strangely, Toynbee's argument is contradicted in an article printed only 16 pages earlier in the same newspaper. Here it states that "an individual Muslim is more likely to be the victim of racist [sic] violence when he or she

is wearing Islamic dress or symbols. This applies to white Muslims ...as well as to Asians” (**Straw rejects call for law to protect British Muslims**, *Independent*, 23 October 1997).

In addition to propagating inaccuracies and prejudicial representations masquerading as informed ‘rationalist’ criticism, Toynbee’s column also limited the “disagreement space” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999) of the ‘discussion’. This is illustrated in the foci of readers’ letters responding to the column:

Legislation in this and other countries allows educational pluralism which caters for all; it is popular with parents and academically successful. Denying Muslim parents the choice enjoyed by others [...] is unacceptable discrimination. (Ibrahim Hewitt, Development Officer, Association of Muslim Schools of UK and Eire, *Independent*, 25 October 1997)

Polly Toynbee continues the persistent association of Islam with barbaric justice in referring to Saudi Arabian courts. Many Muslims, too, are horrified that justice in Saudi Arabia works as it does; they are equally horrified that this is described as Islamic. It may be Saudi justice, but it is not Islamic, any more than British justice is Christian. (Alex Hall, Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, University of Warwick. 27 October 1997)

Polly Toynbee has profoundly misunderstood the nature of education in her article. Values, religious or philosophical, cannot be separated from education. No school is value free [...] I would reject as strongly ‘Rationalism on the rates’ as I object to a system that excludes Muslim schools from state funding. (Ruth Chenoweth, Co-ordinator Third Sector Schools Alliance, *Independent*, 27 October)

In most of these responding articles, ‘open’ views of Islam predominate - an observation we would expect since they are argumentative responses prompted by the ‘closed’ views in Toynbee’s article. It could, therefore be argued that such letters are beneficial to the British Muslim communities, since they are intended as rejoinders, refinements, corrections or direct criticisms of what are considered as unacceptable, inappropriate or false representations of Islam. It is, however, equally easy to imagine that Muslims may “be made uncomfortable by the relentless insistence - even if it is put in the form of a debate - that her or his faith, culture and people are seen as a source of threat” (Said, 1997: xxi). Such a ‘debate’ informed both Toynbee’s column and its argumentative responses, illustrating the extent to which

derogatory, generalising and/or false representations of Islam and Muslims are still being discussed within the context of 'whether they are true or not'.

4.6 Muslim Terrorism in domestic reporting

The third major section of qualitative analysis looks at perhaps the most resonant topic around which Islam and Muslims are reported: 'Terrorism'. The topic of terrorism is a perpetual feature of press representation and discussion about Islam and Muslims, and unfortunately is therefore an ever present feature of newspaper analysis on the subject. Quantitative analysis earlier revealed: 'terrorist/ism and acts of terrorism' were mentioned in 44 (15.94%) of the 276 articles in the domestic sample; 37 of these references were in articles in which Islam was cited as an influential factor (n= 158), constituting 23.4 per cent of these articles. These findings point to a clear relationship between the reporting of 'Terrorism' and 'Islam' in the broadsheet press - a relationship which was found to be highly statistically significant ($p < 0.000$ across all chi-square tests, see Appendix 3) but does not explain who the 'terrorists' were or the form which the 'terrorism' assumed. For this, a more detailed analysis is needed.

In addition to the 44 articles which included the word(s) 'terrorism/ist', there were 6 other articles associated with terrorism written without actually mentioning the word. These 50 'Terrorism' articles centred around five themes: First, three articles placed within the larger agenda of reporting 'Islamophobia' discussed earlier in the chapter. Second, the longrunning attempts of the British Government to bring two Libyans to trial in Scotland for the Lockerbie bombing produced seven articles. This story became newsworthy on the back of South African President Mandela's suggestion, made during a Commonwealth summit, that the trial ought to take place in a neutral location.

Third, a spat between the writers Salman Rushdie and John le Carré, fought across the letters pages of the *Guardian*, produced four articles arguing that the *fatwa* against Rushdie was an act of 'international terrorism'. The writers' argument was characterised by the deep-felt personal grievance, which could have been started by a review Rushdie wrote

criticising a book by le Carré. The headlines of the articles - **Our dishonourable schoolboys** (21 November 1997); and **Stinking satanic self-righteousness** (25 November 1997) - summarise the 'debate' quite well.

Fourth, a group of 9 miscellaneous articles, usually related to larger stories centred in other areas of the world, for example: **Body may be British hostage** (*The Times* 6 October 1997), covering the occasionally resurfacing story of the British hostages being held in Kashmir; and **Britain bans Iranian leader** (*Guardian* 23 October, 1997), reporting the FCO ban on an 'Iranian opposition leader'. None of these four themes will not be analysed in this chapter due to restricted space.

Lastly, a rolling story sparked by the killing of tourists at the Egyptian tourist resort of Luxor, which continued across 27 domestic articles throughout the sample. This theme developed from the initial reports of the event, through the effects of the event to both the UK and to a lesser extent Egypt, and onto the event consequences, including the post-Luxor accusations of President Mubarek regarding the 'haven' which the UK represents to anti-Egyptian/Islamist terrorists. The remainder of this section will be dedicated to an analysis of the domestic reporting of the Luxor tragedy within the domestic sample.

4.6.1 *The reporting of the Luxor atrocity*

Luxor was a big story, producing 102 articles (4.0% of the whole sample), 63 of which were written in the seven days following the killings. 15,670 centimetres of news reports were published on the subject of 'terrorism and Egypt' over these seven days, representing 45.95 per cent of the total column centimetres reported about Egypt (34,105 cm). It may therefore seem a little unproductive to analyse the events of Luxor as part of the domestic reporting chapter. However, the way in which the events were tied to Britain and British people, and in particular the implications for British Islam and Muslims living in the UK was very interesting, providing insights into press conceptions of 'who and what *We* are', and 'who and what *They* are'.

Across the 27 articles, 99 actors were recorded as appearing as primary (n= 27), secondary (n= 27), tertiary (n= 25) or quaternary (n= 20) sources. Of these, 23 (23.2%) were referred to as being Muslims - less than the proportion for the domestic sample as a whole (n= 269, 31.5%). Of these 23 Muslim actors, only 2 were not either terrorists, terrorist groups or members of illegal opposition groups. These two actors were a generic 'Islamic Pressure Group based in London' and generic 'Middle Eastern and South East Asian students', neither of whom were quoted. This shows the extent to which non-terrorist Muslims were excluded from having their opinions heard in response to the atrocity.

The representation of Islam in the articles was overwhelmingly negative: the 8 representations of Islam said by the Runnymede Trust to characterise an 'open' representation of Islam (see code sheet in Appendix 1), were absent from all 27 reports. The reports predominantly argued that 'Islam vs. the West' is a 'natural' state of affairs (n= 23, 85.2%), Islam is 'separate' (n= 19, 70.4%), 'inferior' (n=24, 88.9%), and an 'enemy' (n=24, 88.9%). 'Fundamentalism' was mentioned in 77.8% (n= 21) of these domestic articles, illustrating very clearly the frame in which the story was reported. By contrast, 'liberal/moderate' were mentioned in 2 articles (7.4%), and seemed to appear in order to further press home the unjustified nature of the attacks, since they were used to describe "President Mubarek's moderate regime" (*The Times*, 18 November, 1997).

There were three themes around which the Luxor atrocity was reported: *tourism*; *security issues*; and *the human costs* of the atrocity, presented in a human interest format. These were the *only* themes used in the domestic reporting of the Luxor atrocity, often appearing together in reports, but always in such a way that a 'primary' theme dominated. A tree-diagram illustrating these thematic priorities is shown below:

Figure 4.1: Thematic development of the Luxor atrocity




Figure 4.1 also attempts to represent a sense of time across the sample, with the later developing stories appearing closer to the bottom of the 'tree'. 'Tourism' was rarely mentioned in domestic reports (n= 3), due to its basic association with overseas activities in general and, in the case of this story, the effects on Egyptian tourism in particular. The third theme, 'the human costs of atrocity', was mentioned more often (n= 9) but was so tightly focused upon tragic narrative - specifically the appalling story of three generations of the Turner family first being killed, then being mis-identified, buried, exhumed and finally reburied in Britain - that it has little relevance regarding the representation of Islam in Britain and therefore little relevance for this chapter. Therefore, only items including the second theme - 'security issues' - will be analysed in this chapter.

4.6.1.1 SECURITY

Security issues were the most frequently reported theme of the Luxor articles, having centralised importance in 15 items and secondary references in the 12 remaining. This agenda was essentially focused on the 'threat' which 'Islamic terrorists' represented to both Egyptian and British societies, and how this threat could be minimised.

The lead editorial of *The Daily Telegraph* entitled 'Islam's fifth column' (19 November 1997) contained remarkable argument concerning the activities of Muslims in the UK - considered threatening by their very presence. The essential "problem" identified by the newspaper was "immigration", specifically the way in which "the United Kingdom has, in recent years, become a safe haven for a diverse array of extremist groups" whose "quarrels often spill over with lethal effect on to our soil, as exemplified by the assassinations of dissident elements here in London." The textual ambivalence of this passage acts to conceal the agency of the actions described, contributing to the generally threatening tone of 'the Muslims' identified in the editorial.

These villains have found their way here, the paper claims, because of "our highly liberal asylum laws". "The truth is", the editorial continues rhetorically, "that there are too many people resident in this country today who use British liberty in order to take liberties." Among these villains are "Middle Eastern and Far East Asian students", here because of the "indiscriminate recruitment" of British Universities which has brought "in its wake a small contingent of subversives" "from countries with terrorist regimes, who specialise in such disciplines as nuclear physics - no prizes for guessing what they're up to." Throughout terms such as "Islam", "the Muslim world", "terrorism", "terrorist regimes", "perilous activities", "threat" and others, are woven together into a prejudicial argument in which Muslims are collectivised under broadly and specifically negative accusations, in order to facilitate the success of the editorial's principle argument - 'We should keep Them out'.

The Security agenda gained in momentum with the introduction of the British government in the debate - as reported in articles such as '**Commons pledges to resist terrorism**' (*The Times* 19 November 1997), '**Anti-terror bill sparks fears of witch-hunt**' (*Guardian* 20 November 1997) and '**New law to combat foreign terrorists in Britain**' (*The Times* 20 November 1997). The involvement of the British government started with "Ministers and MPs speaking in the House of Commons, express[ing] their sympathies and

condolences to the families bereaved by the Luxor massacre" (*The Times*, 19 November 1997), but by the next day had developed into proposed legislation directed at "Foreigners living in Britain who plot terrorist attacks abroad" (*The Times*, 20 November 1997). In the second paragraph of this article, the Home Secretary Jack Straw was paraphrased as saying "The new legislation will end Britain's reputation as a haven for Middle Eastern and other international terrorists", creating a new offence of conspiring "to commit violent outrages abroad" and possibly "making it illegal to raise funds in Britain for terrorist organisations abroad".

Such proposals were met with criticism. The report in *The Times* quoted the director of Liberty, Mr John Wadham, as saying we need "to take a careful look at how we can uphold Britain's place as a safe haven for the persecuted of the world ...Locking up dissidents is not the solution" (*The Times*, 20 November 1997). The *Guardian* on the other hand took the approach of stating that "Muslim charities and groups, in particular, [...] fear the Government's proposal could lead to a witchhunt" (*Guardian*, 20 November 1997) unfortunately suggesting that "Muslim charities and groups" had a "particular" reason for fearing the proposal. A few days later, following another accusation from President Mubarek that Britain was harbouring terrorists, Jack Straw pushed the envelope further by saying:

There is a very serious problem of people from abroad, *particularly from the Middle East*, seeking to use this country as a base, on the whole not for organising terrorism abroad, but for financing it or for seeking support for it.

The Times, 24 November 1997 (emphasis added)

The headline of another report, '**London is not terror haven, say Ministers**', (*The Times*, 24 November 1997) paraphrased the Government as saying they "unreservedly condemned terrorism and took the threat from Muslim radicals very seriously". In a startling example of over-lexicalisation (Fowler et al, 1979), these "Muslim radicals" are also described in the text as "Islamic extremists", "militant Islamists", "Islamic radical exiles", "Islamic exiles", "terrorists", groups involved in "Islamic terrorism" and even "Islamic asylum seekers". From this, it appears that the reporter, Michael Binyon,

thinks the terms referred to above can be used interchangeably. Therefore, “Islamic terrorists” are “Islamic militants” are “Islamic radical exiles” are “Islamic asylum seekers”, who “promote action against friendly governments” and “seek support from British Muslims”. The promotion of such an interpretation is therefore particularly dangerous for the well-being of Muslims - British or otherwise - living in this country.

As before, *The Daily Telegraph* adopted a particularly vitriolic line towards the alleged ‘terrorist threat’ and the activities of (more) radical Islamic groups in the UK. One headline, ‘**Leaders try to curb deadly threat from the world’s Islamic fanatics**’ - it’s letters standing 2 centimetres high, printed across the top of two pages and summarising four articles underneath - presents *The Daily Telegraph* reading of events quite well. In the largest of these four articles underneath, ‘**Law allows dissidents to plot from British bases**’, Phillip Johnston places the presupposed “deadly threat” posed by Muslims firmly in a domestic context (*Daily Telegraph*, 20 November 1997). Muslims are presented not only as a threat to the countries which they are “campaigning to destabilise”, but their activities also threaten to “spill onto the streets of London”. His argument is achieved via a four part structure, illustrated in *Table 4.18*.

Table 4.18: Dichotomised representation of social actors and agendas

| Sympathetic presentation | Unsympathetic presentation |
|--|--|
| <i>Sources</i> | <i>Sources</i> |
| Jack Straw; Mr Straw (x4); Home Office (x3); Security authorities; MI5; Special Branch; British authorities; British citizens; Salman Rushdie; Algerian and French governments; French Security Chiefs; Israeli Security Chiefs. | Kalim Siddiqui, 'who supported the fatwa'; Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman; 'the Blind Sheikh' (x2); Omar Bakri Mohammed (x5); Mohammed al-Massari (x3); terror organisations (x3); terror groups (x2); Islamic groups (x2); Islamic extremists; Islamic fundamentalists; overseas fundamentalists; militants; militant organisations; militant Islamic organisations; extreme British Muslim organisation; dissidents (x2); Hamas (x4); Hizbollah; Algerian GIA; Algeria's FIS; Gama'a al Islamia (Islamic Group); al-Muhajiroun (x3); Islamic Observation Centre; Hizb ut-Tahrir; Arab newspapers; Hamas' monthly magazine Filistine al-Muslima (Islamic Palestine) |
| <i>Quoted sources</i> | <i>Quoted sources</i> |
| Lord Lloyd of Berwick (42 words); Mr Straw (18 words); David Pryce-Jones, 'an authority on Muslim-Arab society' (64 words) | John Wadham, Liberty (33 words) Omar Bakri Mohammed (14 words) |
| <i>Politics/Ideology</i> | <i>Politics/Ideology</i> |
| democracy (x2); liberal democracy; free society | Muslim regime; Islamic militancy; khilafah - an Islamic state |
| <i>'Place as subject'</i> | <i>'Place as subject'</i> |
| Britain (x4); London (x2); Western society (x2) | the Islamic world; Muslim-Arab society; 'their homelands'; 'their own tyrannical country' |

This four part structure fits with what Blommaert and Verschueren (1998) have called a 'management paradigm'. Accordingly, these Muslims

do not only symbolise the intra-European enemy. They *are* the enemy. They seem to have penetrated in our midst, abusing our openness. They seem to form a threat to our society which risks destruction as a result of its own tolerance (Blommaert & Verschueren, 1998: 21)

First the 'threat' of Islam and Muslims is symbolically represented through the seemingly endless list of 'shadowy figures' and groups bent on "the

overthrow of Western society". All cited Muslims are labelled with the negativised descriptive terms and, with the exception of Kalim Siddiqui, are labelled as being either foreign organisations or immigrants. Occasionally, it is only the perceived 'foreign-ness' - or more specifically, 'Middle Eastern-ness' - of these actors which marks them out as threatening. Johnston claims for example that "More Arab newspapers are published in London than anywhere else in the world", implying, through its very inclusion in an article about terrorism, that "Arab newspapers" - or perhaps Arabs in general - are involved in terrorist activities.

These 'Muslim' actors are contrasted in the article with a set of almost universally 'official' actors, suggesting an authority and a legitimacy which the unsympathetic actors lack. The only two sympathetic non-official actors are first, "British citizens" who "fall victim to terrorism abroad", and second Salman Rushdie, himself the victim of a "death sentence" "supported" by some of those on the other side of the table. The extent to which negative action is dichotomised in this article, is therefore quite astonishing.

Second, the sources presented by Johnston in a sympathetic light are disproportionately quoted, weighting the article towards the individuals and groups offering critiques of these "Islamic groups". David Pryce-Jones for example, is first given complimentary introduction as "an authority of Muslim-Arab society", and is then quoted as saying:

They [Muslims?..] show great sophistication in knowing how a Western society operates and *what its weaknesses* are. They can *exploit* the legal system, the human rights and asylum laws and other elements of a democracy *to which they don't themselves subscribe*. (emphasis added)

Whether Mr Pryce-Jones knew that his words were to be used in this way is unclear, but the quote above certainly appears to betray a underlying prejudice towards Muslims. 'Our' presupposed tolerance on the other hand is represented, as Blommaert and Vershueren (1998) suggested above, as a threat to our own society. In contrast to the sympathetic presentation of Pryce-Jones, John Wadham's opinion that "Locking up dissidents is not the solution", identical to the quote in the earlier article printed in *The Times* (20

November 1997), is held up as ridiculous. This again illustrates the functional way in which sources are often used by journalists in order to construct their own (prejudicial) arguments.

Third, through the negativisation of both actions and politics, the 'threat' of the "militant Islamic organisations" is foregrounded to the detriment of more positive work that some of them do in the communities in which they are based. The opinion of Johnston on this matter is made clear in *Table 4.18* above, by the dichotomies he sets up between "democracy" and "Muslim regime", between "liberal democracy" and "Islamic militancy", and most tellingly between "free society" and "Islamic state". Here we see the constructive negativisation of Islam in action, whereby the previously fluid term of "Islamic state" is presented in opposition to "free society" without any further support.

Fourth, in case the reader has not received the message, the "tyrannical countries" of "the Islamic world" are referred to, seemingly as examples of places in which such "Islamic militancy" has a more established hold than the sympathetically represented "British" and "Western society". The "free society" which 'We' enjoy is still represented as threatened however, since, as the concluding paragraph suggests, "there is concern that Britain could be increasingly vulnerable to international terrorism unless additional powers of the sort proposed by Mr Straw are forthcoming."

The extent to which the news agenda of the "deadly threat" of Muslims in Britain developed in the domestic sample, is illustrated in the presence of a 'benefit scrounger' story as a spin-off of the Luxor atrocity. The story was alluded to in *The Daily Telegraph* article analysed above, where the leader of al-Muhajiroun, Omar Bakri Mohammed, is referred to as having "five children and claims income support and disability benefit" despite being "dedicated to the overthrow of Western society". The schematic story received a full hearing in the *Sunday Times* (23 November 1997), in an article headlined '**Convicted Egyptian 'terrorists' living on benefits in Britain**'. This article reports "Three men sentenced to death for terrorist offences in Egypt [who] have been allowed to live in Britain where at least one of them has claimed thousands of pounds in social security

benefits". The article goes on to develop tenuous links between the three men and "Muslim terror organisations" (both Egyptian and not) based on these convictions, despite protestations from one of the men that "The charges against me are based on testimony given under torture" and the admission that the system of justice operating in Egyptian military courts has "been strongly criticised by international human rights organisations". At about two thirds of the way through article, the journalists go into a free-fall 'Muslim association', citing individuals and groups - Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque, the Algerian *GIA*, the *al-Ansar* (Victory) newsletter - only tangentially related to the subject at hand. This builds a similar picture as *The Daily Telegraph* article above: an "underworld" of "Islamic extremists in Britain", whom Scotland Yard's terrorist branch are already having to arrest, seizing their "chemicals for making bombs". The message of the article is clear: 'Us against Them', 'They are terrorists', 'They are already here', and 'We are supporting Them through Social Security benefits'. It is hard to imagine a more negative representation of British Muslims.

4.6.2 *Muslim terrorism in domestic reporting: a summary*

As stated at the outset of this third qualitative section, articles mentioning 'terrorism' represent 18.1 per cent (n= 50) of items in the domestic sample. In addition there is a highly significant statistical relationship ($p < 0.000$) between articles in which Islam is cited as being influential and articles in which 'Terrorism' is mentioned.

The majority of the domestic articles were written on the topic of the Luxor atrocity, and the reports were summarised into one of three broad themes - tourism, security and the human cost - with 'security' being the most significant for the representation of Islam and Muslims in Britain. Of the 99 actors cited in the Luxor articles, 23 were Muslim, only 2 of whom were not terrorists yet were still represented as 'threatening' by implying an ulterior motive for their 'alleged' preference for studying nuclear physics. The exclusion of a 'Muslim voice' on this matter is particularly worrying.

Although *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Times* were undoubtedly most responsible for the prejudicial tone of articles written on terrorism, the

Independent and the *Guardian*, were not wholly blameless. Indeed there was a great deal of shared xenophobia printed across the newspapers on this topic, amounting to an unacceptably negative representation of Islam and British Muslims

4.7 Muslim schooling and Muslim pupils

The theme of Muslim pupils and schooling was an almost constant agenda running throughout the sample: 38 articles were recorded within the parent topic of 'Education' across the four month sample period. Within this parent topic, the topics of 'Religion in Education' and 'Funding religious schools' received the most coverage, being coded as either primary or secondary topics in 11 and 29 articles respectively. These articles reported the campaign for denominational Muslim schools, and the response to such a campaign from Government, journalists and members of the public.

The story took a dramatic turn when voluntary aided status was granted to two Muslim schools on 9 January 1998, signally the end (or just the beginning?) of a long fought campaign for such recognition, and producing a flurry of articles on the subject in broadsheet newspapers. There are connections between this topic and the 'ideological square' previously discussed (specifically the negativisation of Muslim activity in and upon the public sphere), connections which will hopefully be made clear in the following discussion and analysis.

Distinctions exist between the themes of the reports printed before 9 January 1997, when voluntary aided status was granted, and those printed after. The analysis will therefore be in two sections in order to reflect and capture this editorial dimension.

4.7.1 Articles printed before the funding of Muslim schools

18 domestic articles were published on Muslim schooling before 9 January 1998. The majority of these cases occurred as part of the 'Islamophobia' reporting agenda, previously discussed. Accordingly, most of the articles printed, and therefore analysed in this section, were letters to the editor (n= 10), and printed in the *Independent* in response to Polly Toynbee's column

(n= 8). The two principle recommendations of The Runnymede Trust's report - the funding of Muslim schools and new legislation outlawing religious discrimination - were often cited together in these articles, in order to argue that the broader theme of 'multiculturalism' was either a positive or negative philosophy in and for Britain. 'Multiculturalism' was used in these articles as short-hand for the greater visibility, and perceived greater influence, of values and beliefs perceived to be 'non-British' in and upon the British 'public sphere'. Presupposed in these articles was the perception that in its 'natural state', Britain and the British public sphere are 'white' and 'Christian', into which the 'acceptable' values and practices of 'ethnic minorities' are admitted. It was against this frame that the debate on Muslim schools and schooling occurred: essentially, 'Are Muslim schools an acceptable approach to education, here in Britain?'

The debate on denominational Muslim schooling is complex, with arguments for and against such schools drawing on a variety of discourses, for example: rights; citizenship and inclusion; pedagogy; and the perceived 'effects' of Muslim schools on society (usually in the form of 'race relations'). The reporting of British Muslim schooling before the 9 January 1997 was almost wholly structured around such 'for' and 'against' argumentation, often locating arguments at the level of principal as opposed to policy.

Looking first towards the 8 readers' letters, the main argument employed by those who disagree with denominational Muslim schools, was that separate Muslim schools would be socially and racially divisive. Of course, simply citing 'divisions' only succeeds as an argument against Muslim schools when such 'divisions' are thought of as being negative *per se*. The exact nature of this negativity differs according to the (political) assumptions and commitments of the arguments' protagonists. For some, the 'divisions' approximated a religious or ethnic apartheid and hence ran counter to their multicultural principles:

- 1) [...] the segregation of Muslim children would only reinforce the marginalisation which the Runnymede Trust rightly condemns. The provision of good secular schools in which all children are educated together would

surely be the best way to prevent so-called Islamophobia. (Nicholas Walter, Rationalist Press Association. *Guardian*, 24 October 1997)

- 2) [...] a largely integrated education system has been of immeasurable benefit to us all. If you don't believe this, witness [...] the hermetically-sealed Orthodox Jewish community in Stamford Hill (where I live) where there is no social interaction between children or adults of that community with anyone outside their own faith. The Government must do whatever it takes to avoid funding more religious schools. [...] Nothing less than the social fabric of our society is at stake. (Sabrina Aaronovitch, *Independent*, 28 October 1997)

In letters of this sort, the separation of Muslim pupils into denominational schools tended to be expanded out to mean that they would be 'isolated', 'segregated' and 'marginalised' in society as a whole. This argumentative approach was based on two presuppositions: first, the (lack of) interaction between Muslim and non-Muslim in society, whereby schools were thought to provide the last (or in some letters the *only*) situation for social interaction between different faiths and communities. Second, these letters often presupposed that the standard of teaching in Muslim schools was lower than in secular schools, and therefore the attending Muslim children would be socially disadvantaged and marginalised through receiving a poor education.

For a select few, the divisions 'caused' by separate Muslim schools were said to create possible breeding grounds for 'Islamic fundamentalism', isolated from the usual 'checks and balances' of the mainstream culture. More usually, the divisions 'caused' by separate Muslim schools were thought to threaten (the related issues of) 'Muslim integration', Muslim acceptance of 'British values' and perhaps British values and identity themselves. These threatened 'effects' were additionally thought to encourage, or possibly *result*, in future violence between Muslim and non-Muslim communities:

- 3) Having seen the way that sectarian education has reinforced intercommunal violence in Northern Ireland, he [Jack Straw] should be looking at ways to reduce support for Christian schools rather than widening the scope of subsidised religious denominational indoctrination (Eric Thompson, *Independent* 25 October 1997)
- 4) [Criticising Muslim schools...] is not 'Islamophobia', but a reasonable and realistic opposition to the official encouragement of any kind of religious or non-religious divisions in an already dangerously divided society. (Nicolas Walter, Rationalist Press Association, *Independent* 28 October 1997)

Interestingly, the letters which took the firmest argumentative line against the supposedly 'divisive' nature of Muslim schools, also tended to congratulate Jack Straw for "resisting demands to introduce legislation to protect Muslims from religious discrimination" (Eric Thompson, above). The strength of Eric Thompson's objection to Muslims schools is illustrated in the prejudicial language with which he describes religious schools: "subsidised religious denominational indoctrination" (Ibid.). Further, his linkage of the schooling issue with the demands for extending anti-discrimination laws is instructive, since both his positions are essentially based on denying British Muslims the advantages of civil society enjoyed by just about everybody else.

Similarly, Nicolas Walter elsewhere in his letter states that "liberals have the right to criticise objectionable aspects of religious or non-religious systems of belief and behaviour". The 'White fantasy' (Hage, 1998) of this "reasonable" man, regarding 'his' assumed "right" to manage the national space, is exposed by the presuppositions contained in his argument: He implicitly excludes Muslims from the position "liberal", and hence from having "the right" to be included and heard in debate, since criticising "objectionable aspects of non-religious systems of belief and behaviour" was exactly what Muslims were doing in the campaign for denominational schools. His point is, essentially, that such requests should be ignored.

News articles arguing against separate Muslim schooling employed very similar argumentation. '**Farrakhan opens UK blacks-only schools**' (*Independent on Sunday*, 19 October 1997) for example, drew upon the spectre of 'divisions', when it warned in its headline that "The separatist ideas of the controversial Nation of Islam are taking hold in Britain". The article made it clear that these schools not only separated children along religious and racial grounds, but are run by Louis Farrakhan, who "has been accused of anti-Semitism and homophobia". A feature headlined '**How will they know who they are?**' (*Daily Telegraph*, 12 December 1997) presented a complex argument against Muslim schools. The aim of multiculturalism - "to make children from other backgrounds feel at home because their culture is valued and celebrated" - is described as "praiseworthy" and yet also

threatening and dangerous, since it is having negative effects upon “our own national identity and culture”. Terms such as “multicultural swamp”, “contested battleground”, “disintegration”, “the *decay* of our national culture”, “the *advance* of multiculturalism” and Tebbit’s own description of multiculturalism as “a divisive force” illustrate the arguments which the journalist, Graham Turner was presenting. Chris Woodhead, the then Chief Inspector of schools, is paraphrased as saying “there is a real *danger* that *bending over backwards* to pay attention to minority cultures is bound to have a negative effect on white children” (emphasis added). Finally, Turner argues that British schools should be Christian - “our national religion” - and that Muslim children should ‘integrate’. This is evidenced by the praise he lays upon “John Cullis, head of Barclay Junior”, who states “I’m trying to Westernise them [Muslim and Hindu pupils], and unashamedly so ...because if we don’t, they are not going to compete in the world”.

The only news article which did not take an argumentative stance against separate Muslim schools was printed in *The Times* (**‘Muslim school may sue Labour’**, 3 December 1997). Despite the foregrounding of a “Muslim school” in the headline, the report details the possible legal proceedings “threatened” by Islamia Primary School in parallel with similar complaints from both a Seventh Day Adventist Church and “a dozen [others] waiting to hear if they can become grant-maintained before publication tomorrow of the Education Bill, which, when enacted, will abolish the category.” Rather than supporting Muslim schools, the report appears to have been intended more as a critique of the Labour Government, suggesting that their approach to these applications was incompetent (see Poole, 1999 for a similar ‘reading’ of this article).

The campaign *for* separate Muslim schools on the other hand, is based on the deceptively simple idea that the ideal environment for the development of Muslim youth is within a separate school system. This is in turn based on a critique of the present system, and specifically the monocultural and secular biases perceived to permeate modern schooling:

[...] to try to promote multiculturalism after disassociating all faiths from those cultures will not be accepted by Muslims ...Muslims do not expect the curriculum in state schools to be Islamic. What they do expect, however, is that the multicultural, multifaith character of Britain will be reflected in the curriculum and in the school ethos. (Mabud, (1992:91), cited in Parker-Jenkins, 1995:54).

With the present curriculum lacking such a focus on faith, schools are increasingly viewed by Muslims “as institutions intent on providing only a secular interpretation of reality ...[and therefore] in conflict with the overall aim of raising children within a religious context” (Parker-Jenkins, 1995: 40). The themes of ‘Muslim values’, the cultural and/or religious needs of Muslim pupils and the wishes of Muslim parents, appeared frequently in readers’ letters arguing ‘for’ Muslim schools, particularly the letters written in response to the negative argumentation of Polly Toynbee’s column:

- 1) [...] divisions need not be damaging. They can celebrate the diversity of culture within multi-cultural societies. To force all children into secular schools against the wishes of their parents denies multi-culturalism and places Ms Toynbee alongside the Tebbits of the world.” (Ibrahim Hewitt, Development Officer, Association of Muslim Schools of UK and Eire, *Independent*, 25 October 1997)
- 2) [Re GCSE Islamic Studies] As part of their syllabus, the girls are taught to question the assumptions of their religion and to consider the rights and wrongs of other alternative points of view. [...] They are not cut off from mainstream culture” (Samiya Mann, Zakaria Muslim Girls High School, *Independent*, 28 October 1997)

The fluidity of meaning connoted by societal divisions is clearly articulated in the letter written by Ibrahim Hewitt: “divisions need not be damaging”, he argues. Hewitt follows this by making an argument which draws upon a rights-based discourse, previously used by Toynbee and no doubt immediately recognisable to the left-liberal audience of the *Independent*. By contrast, Samiya Mann argues *against* the idea that Muslim schools are culturally divisive, suggesting that the Muslim pupils in her own class are taught to assess critically “the rights and wrongs” of their own and others’ religion, and are therefore “not cut off from mainstream culture”.

Following the Education Act (1944), the law does not pose any impediment to the granting of voluntary aided status to properly staffed and maintained Muslim private schools, since religious affiliation (of the school

applying for funding) was not mentioned in the relevant section of the Act (ch.31). There is therefore an additional argument for equality before the law, whereby independent Muslim schools, of which there were 25 in 1993, should be accorded similar recognition as (for example) the 21 Jewish institutions which were receiving government funding at that time (Parker-Jenkins, 1995: 12).

- 3) To deny parents in a pluralistic society an input into their children's religious and moral education, and to argue for the imposition by the state of one ideology over others, is the exact same approach which Polly Toynbee finds unacceptable in certain Islamic states. (Rev. Peter Trow, *Independent* 28 October 1997)
- 4) Legislation in this and other countries allows educational pluralism which caters for all; it is popular with parents and academically successful. Denying Muslim parents the choice enjoyed by others [...] is unacceptable discrimination (Ibrahim Hewitt, Development Officer, Association of Muslim Schools of UK and Eire, *Independent*, 25 October 1997)

Arguments for equality, such as those above, appear powerful, perhaps particularly to the liberal audience of the *Independent*. By arguing that the 'right' to a "religious and moral education" (the two terms rhetorically tied together by Rev. Trow) is being denied to Muslim children, suggests double standards, which could in turn be interpreted as "discrimination" (as by Hewitt). Letter (3) goes a stage further than arguing for 'equality' by drawing an analogy between Toynbee's scorn at "the same approach" in "Islamic states". In this way, Rev. Trow manages to accuse Toynbee of acting hypocritically at the same time as providing argumentative support for Muslim schools - an argumentative 'double-whammy'.

4.7.2 Articles reporting the funding of Muslim schools

20 articles were written on Muslim schooling between 9 January 1998, when David Blunkett, the Education and Employment Secretary approved grant-maintained status (later changed to voluntary aided status, with a change of law) to two Muslim schools, and the end of the sample (31 January 1998). 10 of these articles were printed on 10 January, with all five daily broadsheet newspapers reporting the story, although with differing prominence and differing slightly in their use of information and argument. Of the remaining

10 articles: six were readers' letters written in both praise (n= 3) and criticism (n= 3) of the decision to grant funding to the two Muslim schools; two were *Guardian* columns, one written by Yasmin Alibhai-Brown and the other by Roy Hattersley; and the remaining two articles were miscellaneous news articles. The *Financial Times*, in their general backgrounding of domestic news, reported the story in a small article (72 centimetres) headlined **Blunkett offers state funding** (10 January, 1997), tucked away in their 'UK News Digest' column. Interestingly, the first line of the article stated that Blunkett's decision "reversed the government's traditional *policy of denying* them [Muslims] equal status with Anglican, Roman Catholic and Jewish schools" (emphasis added) - a claim which was absent or significantly mitigated in the remaining newspapers' reports. This news report was also the *only* article printed following the approval of funding, which did not refer to Yusuf Islam or his two previous incarnations, 'Cat Stevens' and 'Steven Georgiou'.

The *Independent* gave the story more prominence than the *Financial Times*, placing a large colour photograph flagging the story on the front page¹⁴ and choosing to report it across a news item and a column. The news report (**Muslim schools win historic fight for state funding**, 10 January 1998) framed the funding of Muslim schools as an issue of religious and (seemingly) racial equality, made all the more pressing due to the low financial resources of many Muslim parents. The first paragraph read: "For years, Muslims have complained that white middle class parents could send their children to religious schools free while Muslim, often working class [and non-white?] parents had to pay". In addition, the equality of male and female Muslim pupils in these schools is earmarked as important enough to be mentioned three times - most significantly in Blunkett's reassurances "that these new schools will comply with the statutory provisions governing all maintained schools, such as delivering the national curriculum and offering *equal access* to the curriculum *for boys and girls*" (emphasis added). The foregrounding of equality in the *Independent* - both that Muslims should be treated equally and that, 'contrary to what you may think', these Muslim schools *will* treat female pupils equally - suggests a desire to convince its

readership that the decision to fund Muslim schools was the correct one to make.

A similar argumentative line was also taken in the *Independent* column written by Trevor Phillips, printed the same day - '**Hallelujah! At last the Government has seen the light**'. Here, Blunkett's decision is given further argumentative weight through the use of "fairness", "choice" (that most Thatcherite of terms to use in connection with education) and the "vital recognition of diversity" in support of Muslim schools. Phillips argues that these three factors show

why the right to have such schools as the ones now backed by the Government is so important; [they give] a clear signal that in modern Britain being *what you really are* is nothing to be afraid of, that we can live with *real* differences, and that we genuinely embrace the new traditions among us. (my emphases)

Although I disagree with the implied essentialism of the above excerpt ("what you *really are*"), these two articles do represent the *Independent* standing behind the campaign for Muslim schooling in a way not seen across the remainder of the sample in any of the newspapers. This support was not received well by members of the newspaper's readership however, for example:

It may sound reasonable for Muslims to want to maintain their culture and religious differences just as xenophobic whites do [...] It does not however help the integration of communities that is essential if we are to reduce future trouble. We should have no state funded schools based on religion. (M. Jones, *Independent*, 13 January 1998)

Here the issue of Muslim schooling is linked with under-defined "future trouble". By equating "Muslims" with "xenophobic whites" in the first line of the excerpt, the author is suggesting either: Muslims are *per se* "xenophobic" and as such nominal determiners ('xenophobic Muslims') can be dispensed with; or alternatively, the desire of Muslims to "maintain their culture and religious differences" is comparable, in degree or kind, to the corresponding desire of "xenophobic whites". To suggest that the desire of British Muslims to retain their 'Islamic-ness' is "reasonable" on the basis of this analogy

suggests that the argument was chosen “not by selection of premises the [left-liberal] audience is likely to accept, but by selection of premises the audience is almost sure to reject” (van Eemeren *et al*, 1997: 226). This is shown in the second line of the excerpt where, in conclusion, the author associates British Muslims’ abandonment of cultural and religious differences with “integration”, whilst their sustaining or affirming of differences (cultural and religious pluralism by any other name) in Muslim schools is associated with “future trouble”.

The manner in which *The Daily Telegraph* reported the story also appeared to depart from the paper’s usually fierce position of ‘integration’. The story was reported across three articles - a frontpage news report headlined ‘**Muslim schools gain state cash**’ (the only newspaper to foreground the story in such a way) which provided the details and reactions to the decision, and two news-features which followed on page 8. In the first of these news-features (‘**Jewish example helped solve dilemma**’), John Clare, *The Daily Telegraph*’s Education Editor, appears quite critical of the successive decisions to deny funding to Muslim schools, even asking “why denial should even have been considered.” Underlying these rejections, Clare suggests, “was a prevalent view that *immigrants should adjust to the British way of life* rather than vice versa and that, in particular, the children of Asian immigrants should be educated alongside their white peers” (emphasis added). In a newspaper as generally disdainful of multiculturalism as *The Daily Telegraph*, it is entirely possible that its readership would agree with such discrimination against Muslims and the reasons given in its justification (indeed an article written by Graham Turner, discussed above, makes such an argument). However, John Clare seems to have included such information in order to expose the injustice of the repeated rejections and the arrogance of demanding capitulative ‘integration’ rather than suggesting that the previous policy was valid.¹⁵

The second news-feature (‘**Pop star convert wins 15-year fight for cash**’) provided an amiable personal history of Yusuf Islam - a key player in the story due to his involvement in the funded Islamia school - praising him

as “a pillar of Britain’s Muslim community”. The *Guardian* also chose to place Yusuf Islam centre stage in their reporting of the story (**‘Elation breaks over pioneering school set up by former singer’**, 10 January 1998), allowing the inclusion of some gentle ribbing in reference to his former career at the start of the second paragraph - “as morning broke yesterday...” - a reference also picked up in the headline. As suggested above, Yusuf Islam formed the centre of much of the reporting of Muslim schooling, with the manner in which he was treated quite accurately summarising the newspapers’ coverage: the *Financial Times* did not mention him; the *Guardian* appear confused, with commentary shifting between describing the school which he ran as operating “a strict Islamic code”, explaining that Islam was “in Sarajevo accepting a peace prize” and humorous gibes regarding his former career¹⁶; and *The Daily Telegraph* centralised Islam, quoting him in the second paragraph of their (frontpage) news report. Interestingly, what appears to be the same quote from Yusuf Islam was used in a slightly different form in the report printed in *The Times* (**Muslims win right to their own state-funded schools**, 10 January 1998) - a form which reframed the content and implications of Islam’s response in a subtle but threatening way. The quotes analysed in *Table 4.19* adopt the following rules of transcription:

- text with no coloured highlight: identical text in both articles
- text highlighted in **green**: lexical or phrasiological stylistic differences
- text highlighted in **yellow**: textual elements not present in the opposite text

Table 4.19: The comparative use of a quotation from Yusuf Islam

| <i>Daily Telegraph</i> | <i>The Times</i> |
|---|--|
| We must realise that it only affects two Muslim schools in an ocean of thousands of Christian and tens of thousands of secular schools. So the decision does not change the world, but it is certainly an historic one. | It is only two Muslim schools in an ocean of thousands of Christian schools, so it isn't going to change the world, but it will give a great hope to others. |

In both quotes it is the *symbolic* nature of the funding which is picked up on - 'two schools in an ocean of others doesn't change the world' - but the implications of the quotes are quite different. In *The Daily Telegraph*, despite the decision 'not changing the world', it is nonetheless "an historic one", and as such is important *in itself*. In *The Times* however, although the decision "isn't going to change the world", "it will give a *great hope to others*". Here, the journalist uses an elliptical sentence, eliding both who the "others" being referred to are, and what these "others" hope to *do*. However, in the preceding paragraph of *The Times*' report, Zahar Ashraf, the parents' spokesman, is quoted as saying "Now that they know they will receive fair and equal treatment, *other Muslim schools should follow*" (emphasis added). This suggests that *The Times* thought the decision would "give a great hope [of funding] to others [other Muslim schools]", thereby shifting the meaning of the quote substantially. Further, *The Times* is not at all comfortable with the possibility that more Muslim schools will receive state-funding, as illustrated by the paragraph which followed the quote from Yusuf Islam:

The Rev. David Streater, secretary of the Church Society, said that the decision could have *serious consequences*. "Islam is not a quiescent faith - it is probably more evangelistic than Christianity itself - and this will be seen as *just a foot in the door*. We may be in an increasingly secular society, but this is still a generally Christian country and *we have to defend that*." [emphases added]

Here, state-funding for two Muslim schools, and the possibility that such schools will increase in the future, is represented as having possibly "serious consequences" to the 'Christian-ness' of 'Our' country - a 'Christian-ness' which "We" must defend. This threat, specifically to Christianity, is also flagged in *The Times*' removal of the reference to "tens of thousands of *secular* schools" (present in *The Daily Telegraph*'s report) from the quote from Yusuf Islam. From this evidence, it appears that *The Times* manipulated the quote from Yusuf Islam in order to make him 'suggest' that these two schools were only the first of many which would be campaigning for state-funding. Whether or not the quote from Zahar Ashraf was similarly altered is unclear due to the lack of a comparative quote. *The Times* then imbued the possibility that more Muslim schools will become state-funded

with threat, specifically a threat to 'Our' Christian country posed by an "evangelistic" Islam with "a foot in the ['Our'] door". The source making such a claim - the Rev. David Streater - is not criticised or contested, illustrating the ascent given to his opinion by *The Times*. In contrast, *The Daily Telegraph* quote makes no such implication, with Yusuf Islam solely appearing to acknowledge - albeit joyously - the symbolic and historic nature of the decision.

4.8 Positive stories

There were domestic articles in which the bifurcation of 'Islam' and/vs. 'the West' is either not immediately apparent, or in which the dominant negative representation(s) of Islam and Muslims are backgrounded or wholly absent. As suggested in the analysis above, most of the items in which an 'open' representation of Islam was offered were readers' letters. The frequency with which such letters appeared in the domestic sample should not be a matter of wholehearted celebration, due to their function in contesting or correcting the inaccuracies of previous reporting and/or letters. As such, readers' letters will only be included in a backgrounded position in the following analysis.

News reports and columns which foreground 'Open' representative characteristics are unquestionably a minority in the sample, but the fact that they exist not only draws attention to the dubious status of the truth claims of the dominant 'Closed' view, but also suggests a possible future for reporting the British Muslim communities in which a positive view predominates.

4.8.1. *Islam vs. the West: a fallacy?*

On occasion, articles dissented from the dominant representation of 'Islam vs. the West', arguing that such an opposition is erroneous at best. One approach to this dissent, which tended to be printed in the seven days either side of Christmas 1997, compared Islam and Christianity, drawing out the common tradition between the religions. The column '**Why the other lights of the world are not fakes**', printed in the *Independent* (2 January 1998) for example, inclusively referred to "We in the Abrahamic traditions", "the three

great Abrahamic faiths” and the doctrines which Judaism, Islam and Christianity share. In one particularly ‘open’ passage, the author, Reverend Keith Ward, wrote:

These three ways - the way of the people of the covenant, the community of divine law, the way of the ‘body of Christ’ - are all ways of mediating light in the darkness of building beauty from chaos, of incarnating justice and loving-kindness in the world.

The affirmation of the common heritage of the three Levant religions which this column includes hardly appears anywhere else in the whole of the sample. Indeed, in some places it is denied.¹⁷

A particularly interesting example of a positive representation of Islam (as opposed to Muslims) was an editorial, printed in the *Financial Times*, and headlined ‘**The faith of Abraham**’. This article was made all the more interesting for being printed on Christmas Eve, 1997. Here the *Financial Times* which, as the editorial states is “as secular a newspaper as you could find”, succumbs to the same seasonally affected reporting present across the rest of the sample at this time of year. But on this occasion, the editorial comes with a twist: the impending Christian celebrations are connected, and discussed in relation to, the Muslim Holy month of Ramadan which was due to start the following week. Perhaps this linkage was a result of the fact, again acknowledged by the editorial, that the newspaper has “readers around the world of all faiths and none” whose beliefs need accommodating. Or perhaps it is the newspaper’s homogenisation of religious belief - either intentional or presupposed - which facilitates the comparison. Either way, the presentation of the common prophetic tradition of the faiths is refreshing:

While abhorring the suggestion that Jesus or any other man could be God, their [Muslim’s] own faith teaches them to respect both Jesus and Moses as divinely inspired precursors to their own Prophet. So Jews and Christians are “people of the book” sharing with Moslems [sic] the common root of the “religion of Abraham”, and thus assured, in principle, of respect within Moslem society. (*Financial Times* , Editorial, 24 December, 1997)

There are two problematic features of this paragraph: First, some Muslims may take issue with the implication of the text that because Mohammed is

presented as “their own Prophet”, then Moses (Musa) and Jesus (Isa) are somehow ‘not theirs’. This is clearly incorrect. Second, the use of the term ‘Moslem’, is a particularly inappropriate and unfortunate stylistic feature of the *Financial Times*, which is offensive in much the same way as the term ‘Negro’. The sooner this faulty phoneticism and throwback to colonialism is done away with by the *Financial Times*, the better.

The editorial continues into its weakest section, stating that despite the Muslim principles of respect referred to in the paragraph above, “practice often falls short of principle”. The newspaper attempts to show that there are injustices carried out “on all sides” - i.e. by Christians and Muslims - but the manner in which such a comparison is made betrays some very dubious assumptions. First, an historical enmity is proposed wherein “Moslems [sic] and Christians have made war on each other down the ages”. This is, of course true: wars have been fought between Muslims and Christians. What the syntactic structuring of the sentence does is conceal the agency of such wars: who in general has been the aggressor? In addition, by the simple act of expression, the newspaper also implies that this “down the ages” history is important in understanding the present. It is, rather, the most recent violent encounters - colonialism in this case - which most strongly affect the present, and which generally resurface as prejudice in ‘Christian’ and ‘Muslim’ public consciousness and discourse.

Second, the already backgrounded recent past, is further euphemistically referred to as “two centuries [in which] Christians generally had the upper hand”. This past has apparently left “a legacy of resentment among Moslems [sic] which has made life difficult, sometimes dangerous, for Christian minorities in Moslem countries”. This massive overgeneralisation treads worryingly close to the prejudicial writings of American political scientists such as Daniel Pipes, Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington.¹⁸

The final inadequacy of this section results perhaps logically from the other two flaws, in that the intolerance of ‘the West’ tends to be played down or absent. For example, the editorial states without any irony that “Jews perished in the holocaust after centuries of *toleration* in western Europe”

(emphasis added), a reading of history that even Pope John Paul II now disagrees with.

In general however, the beneficial aspects of the editorial outweigh the negative. In addition to the inclusive comparison with Christianity, the editorial also acknowledges that Muslims are “often (as a recent inquiry discovered in Britain) the objects of ill-informed ‘dread and dislike’.” Faced with this prejudice the editorial argues that the “ready-made solution” offered by the West of a neutral public sphere “available to all for self-expression but to none for coercion”, is far from successful in limiting either religiously inspired or religiously directed prejudice. The Archbishop of Canterbury is quoted in support of this conclusion, stating that the “tolerance” of the neutral public sphere “too often ‘equated merely with indifference’”. Minorities that were only tolerated, he said, often ‘end up feeling that they are being allowed to exist on sufferance, but that their existence is by no means secured’.” The editorial concludes by stating:

People of different faiths must go further [than toleration], showing respect for and interest in each other’s traditions. [This means] ...drawing on the values of peace and compassion that are shared by all the great world religions, and remembering, in the words of a British Moslem [sic] author the archbishop quoted, that “both Islam and Christianity are ethical faiths, in which belief cannot be separated from behaviour”.

Even though the editorial includes the flaws already mentioned - some of which are serious, others less so - the concluding paragraph cited above illustrates the generally good intentions of the newspaper. In this editorial, the principle arguments appear to be that Muslims are equal, interacting and sincere partners, and that Islamophobia is therefore being implicitly criticised.

Another approach which some articles took in dissenting from the dominantly ‘closed’ representation of Islam, was to highlight the ‘Britishness’ of British Muslims. This argument most frequently occurred in readers’ letters although was also included in some news reports.¹⁹ An article headlined ‘**Britain’s Muslims join forces to make one voice**’ (*Independent*, 24 November 1997) for example, used the launch of the Muslim Council of

Britain (MCB) as the event upon which a more inclusive representation of British Islam was placed. The article quotes Abdul-Wahid Hamed, spokesman for the MCB, as saying:

The aim [of the MCB] is to highlight the fact that we are an asset to the nation and to celebrate the contribution we have made to society. We are also intent on sending the message that we are a mature community determined to play a full role in the future well-being of our country.

A reader's letter printed in *The Daily Telegraph*, written in response to a previous reader's letter written by Ray Honeyford,²⁰ employed historical supports for the argument that '**Islam is as British as Christianity**' (29 October 1997):

If Mr Honeyford claims that Islamic civilisations have not contributed to the development of British institutions and culture, he betrays a breathtaking ignorance of the history of the British Isles and the extensive interaction between these islands and the Islamic world since Amr ibn al-As conquered Egypt in AD 642.

The majority of articles employing such argumentation were written on the issues and agenda of Muslim pupils and schooling, discussed in the previous section.

4.8.2 '*Normalising*' Muslim worship

The 'favourable comparison to Christianity' approach is also taken in an article printed in the *Guardian* called '**Fast food lessons of Ramadan**' (19 January 1998). The column, written by John Ryle, essentially aims to show the social and spiritual benefits of the abstinence associated with Ramadan, and goes on to draw attention to the very obvious precedent of Lent for fasting in Christianity. Although the article unfortunately starts with the familiar bemoaning of being deprived of sleep in Muslim countries, calling the dawn of the *muezzin* a "loud noise in the early hours", a "pre-dawn racket" and an "early morning din", the fasting itself is described with ringing endorsements. "Hunger affects the meaning of food," Ryle argues, "as well as the taste of it. Abstinence gives you back your appetite; it also gives you

a glimpse of the sacred.” As for the communal meal which breaks the fast at sunset, this “concentrates the mind, it forces you to see food as a blessing.”

Where the article falters slightly is in the journalists’ use of Ramadan in the last two paragraphs. After the compliments above, Ryle goes on to say that fasting

makes you wonder about restaurant critics, people who talk about food all the time. Do they have any idea of what it is like to go without? ...Those who thank Marco Pierre White for their daily bread seem to be uninterested in the very appetite that food satisfies; they are guilty not so much of gluttony, as of superficiality.

The positive representation loaded onto Muslim fasting in the first two thirds of the article therefore appears to have been designed as an argumentative resource with which to attack food writers and restaurant critics. Of course, he is entitled to do this in an ‘opinion column’, but the argument does seem to be based on a presupposition that either: a Muslim wouldn’t (or couldn’t) be either a food writer, or someone who talks about food all the time; or perhaps that the Muslim food writers do not fast at Ramadan. These presuppositions are based on generalisations (albeit intended to be complimentary) of ‘who Muslims are’ and ‘what it is to be Muslim’, and are probably a result of the fact that the evidence he draws from is taken from his own experiences of fasting in Afghanistan.

There is, contrary to the functionally ascetic picture painted by Ryle, a significant tradition of (over)indulgence in Ramadan, both in the nightly meal and especially the *Eid al-Fitr* (feast of breaking fast) at the end of the month. These ‘celebratory’ traditions are checked by, and frequently stand in opposition to the very spiritual character of the month - a dynamic which is placed in a much more central position in an equally positive, but ultimately more successful, second column about fasting and Ramadan printed in the *Guardian*. Written by Humera Khan of the women’s group *an-Nisa* (‘the Women’) and printed near to the *Eid* (*Guardian*, 24 January 1998), the article ‘**Celebrating with British Muslims**’, as the name suggests, covers the British Muslim experience of Ramadan in a way not seen in other

articles. This experience is related to the reader in four ways: First, from an internal, British Muslim perspective, Ramadan is described as

a triumph of the spirit over the mundane, the communal over the individual. After a month of battling with the 'self' through control over mind, body and matter, Eid al-Fitr ...is a day of joy and sharing marked by an Eid prayer performed by the community.

This is of course the standard account of Ramadan, as featured in the Ryle article above. Generally positive in style and content, it does have the tendency to both reify and homogenise the beliefs of Muslims, due to its lack of any contextualisation.

Second, Ms Khan builds upon this conventional, rather static introduction, developing the discussion to show the ways in which the "second or third generation British Muslims" like herself differ from their parents generation in their approach to the celebrations. She states that although the communities

have managed to maintain the values and ethos nurtured by our parents and grandparents, ...where our Eid has changed is mainly to do with our attitude to the 30 days which precede it. Ramadan used to be a time of feasting and fasting with little spiritual reflection. It is now a time when we try to benefit from all the blessings that the holy month has to offer.

Such a representation of Muslim worship illustrates very clearly the inevitability of both continuity and change in the beliefs and practices of the British Muslim communities. The values which the largely immigrant Muslim communities brought with them to this country are still present - although undoubtedly to different degrees - in second and third generation Muslims, but changes in time and context brings changes in attitudes and practices.

Third, mainstream British society is introduced into the discussion in order to show the context in which such developments take place. This again, is an extremely positive step in the press' - and specifically the *Guardian's* - portrayal of the British Muslim communities, highlighting the interaction between the communities' internal attitudes to Ramadan, and the reaction(s) of the external communities:

Bridging the divide between the traditional Eid to an Eid more reflective of our new lives in a new country has not ...been straightforward. How do you perform your religious obligations, maintain the positive values and ethos handed down from generations, and also adjust to a society which is not only ignorant of your way of life, but sees you as some kind of alien?

Continuing, Ms Khan points out that “despite Islam being Britain's second largest religion the general public still do not understand much about us, or our way of life”. This lack of understanding - or perhaps wilful ignorance - often translates to mere toleration, as opposed to celebration of diversity in the public sphere, which, as the Archbishop was quoted earlier as saying, leads to minority communities “feeling that they are being allowed to exist on sufferance, but that their existence is by no means secured”.

Fourth and last, Ms Khan offers a hope for a better, more genuinely multicultural future. This is a future in which

our children can see Eid lights along the high streets, when Blue Peter highlights more of the Muslim calendar, where schools become more imaginative in their presentation of Islam and where our children can talk about their religious celebrations and be fully accepted within the diversity of modern Britain.

Zokeai (n.d.) has argued that societal “inclusion is equivalent to the expression of solidarity and identification with wider groups” (p.3). Although the Muslim exclusion which Ms Khan's column refers to implies that mainstream ‘white’ society lacks this solidarity and identification with British Muslims, the column still ‘feels’ optimistic.

4.9 Covering British Islam and Muslims: a summary

There is, therefore, some distance still left to travel before the inclusion of Islam in British society is celebrated by broadsheet newspapers - a point also made at a recent conference by the ex-journalist, Edward Mortimer:

I think that it is desirable that there should be something, some sort of superego implanted in the journalists, as there is effectively now with Jews and I think there has come to be, more or less, with Blacks. There are certain kinds of things that you just don't write because it is so evidently offensive, and

unfortunately that superego is not yet sufficiently active where Muslims are concerned. (Edward Mortimer 1999)

The features of a better multicultural future, mentioned in the article by Humera Khan discussed in the last section, are all issues of inclusive citizenship. They are a symbol, however small, of a commitment to the creation of a truly inclusive multicultural society: a society in which all Britons - regardless of tradition and identity - have a voice, a voice which is listened to, and moreover a voice which is respected. Despite the overwhelmingly negative representation of British Islam and Muslims, articles such as those discussed in the last section illustrate that (sections of) the British broadsheet press already realise that this 'multi-culture' is the future of Britain.

Notes: Chapter 4

¹ An article was considered 'domestic' if: geographically located in the UK; all actors cited were identified as, or could be construed as being 'British'; or else all reported action was located within the domestic sphere. See Chapter 3 and Appendix 1 for further details on the intricacies of my code sheet.

² This separation was achieved using the data set in the statistics programme SPSS. During coding, the variable SETTING recorded whether the coded article was located in a 'domestic' or 'international' setting. Using the SELECT CASES function in SPSS, it was possible to isolate the articles which were coded as 'domestic'.

³ See Chapters 6 and 7 for detailed applications of the ideological square in international reporting.

⁴ These civil suits involved Fayed being sued by: Neil Hamilton; Diana, Princess of Wales' estate; 'Tiny' Rowland; the Union USDAW for tapping Harrods' phones; an ex-employee for wrongful dismissal; and his own libel suit against Vanity Fair, which he dropped.

⁵ The 5 scalar evaluations coded were: laudatory; favourable; neutral; critical; abrasive.

⁶ This separation was again carried out using the statistics programme SPSS. The variable IS_FACT recorded whether the coded article cited Islam as an influential factor. Using the SELECT CASES function in SPSS, it was possible to isolate the articles which argued for an 'Islamic agency'.

⁷ Readers should note that the Graphs use different scales. This is an unfortunate effect of using the automated statistics package SPSS, which takes unilateral decisions on matters such as the scale a graph uses.

⁸ The primary actor was, simply, the first individual or group (e.g. pressure group, charity) cited in the text; the secondary actor was the second individual or group cited; and so on.

⁹ Articles were recorded if they mentioned Islam or Muslim(s) in a prominent position. This was taken to mean that they cited Islam or Muslim(s) in: the headline;

either of the first two paragraphs; or else had a whole paragraph dedicated to them lower in the text.

¹⁰ Only the results for Actor 1 and Actor 2 were crosstabulated, for two reasons: first, a desire for brevity. The results of the remaining two Actors are comparable to those of the primary and secondary actors, displaying a lower-than-expected frequency of quoted Muslim actors and a corresponding higher-than-expected frequency of quoted non-Muslim actors. Second, for the chi-square statistical tests to retain validity, the cells of the contingency tables need to have a count of 5 or greater. The greater the number of cells in which the count is less than 5, the less valid the results. Such low cell counts increase to an unacceptable level with Actors 3 and 4.

¹¹ This, of course is a complex process often resulting in contradictory associations: we only need compare the (generally) positive light in which Afghan *mujahideen* were represented whilst fighting the Soviet Union, with the almost universally negative representation of *jihad* and those who engage in *jihad* activities. Yet, the two words clearly have an identical etymological root: the *mujahideen* are people engaged in *jihad*. Moreover the *mujahideen* of Afghanistan, with whom the term is predominantly associated, were engaging in the most extreme expression of *jihad* (trans. 'struggle'): a 'holy war'. The positive reporting of their 'holy war' compared with the negative perceptions of 'holy war' in general, illustrates the political functions to which language can be employed.

¹² Labour MP correspondence, written to Clement Atlee on the day the Empire Windrush landed (PRO HO 213/244, 22 June 1948), cited in Alibhai-Brown (2000: 56.).

¹³ In Toynbee's column, Islam and Muslims are represented as separate; inferior; the enemy; and manipulative; criticisms of 'the West' by Muslim sources are not considered; 'Islam' and 'the West' are regarded as incompatible, and in conflict; and Islamophobia is, as the title suggests, defended.

¹⁴ The photograph - of an attractive Muslim girl, wearing a veil and playing what appears to be a 'ring-of-roses' with her school friends - was also used by the *Telegraph* and *The Times* reports of the same day. In addition, the column written by Trevor Phillips in the *Independent* and the news reports in the *Guardian* were also accompanied by two other, different photographs of Muslim girls wearing the veil. Although I regard this as significant, the content and implications of these photographs are not discussed any further in this study, due to the focus of analysis on *lexical* representation.

¹⁵ These conclusions exist side-by-side with a parallel argument suggesting that such schools don't really matter that much anyway since most Muslims want to attend 'mainstream' schools: "Those who prize the clear religious and moral ethos of a faith-oriented school - as very many Catholic parents do - [...] will continue to press for more State support. The majority, however, will continue to want their children to be taught in mainstream classrooms." Here, the granting of funding for those Muslims who desire it still appears to be approved of, through the Muslim schooling being described as "moral" and the rhetorical use of "Catholic parents" in the argument.

¹⁶ Yusuf Islam was even the 'star' of one of the *Guardian's* ongoing 'pass notes' columns (27 January 1998).

¹⁷ For example, see the Robert Fisk article 'Religion - the fundamental problem' (*Independent*, 3 December 1997) analysed later in the thesis.

¹⁸ Pipes (1992) for example, 'blames' Muslim radicalism on childish feelings of envy and "magical thinking" (pp. 41-6), whilst Lewis (1990) in his article 'The Roots of Muslim Rage', suggests that Muslim "resentment" of the West is rooted in

"humiliation - a growing awareness among the heirs of an old, proud, and long dominant civilisation, of having been overtaken, overborne and overwhelmed by those they regarded as their inferiors" (1990: 59).

¹⁹ Of the 37 articles which argued 'Islam vs. the West' is 'problematic' or 'erroneous': 15 were 'letters to the editor'; 8 were 'news reports'; 7 were 'columns'; 4 were 'features'; 2 were 'obituaries'; and 1 was a 'review'.

²⁰ **'Muslims should change radically'**, *Daily Telegraph*, 25 October 1997, p.15.

Chapter 5

Conviction, Truth, Blame and a Shifting Agenda: The Reporting of Algeria

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores broadsheet newspaper reporting of Algeria between October 1997 and January 1998, with discussion divided between quantitative and qualitative results. All 'Algerian articles' (n= 242) were temporarily separated from the remainder of the data-set (n= 2278) in order to facilitate this analysis. Quantitative results are presented first to provide an overall profile of coverage, followed by a more detailed qualitative analysis of the shifting argumentative claims of the reports.

Quantitative results are presented as tables and graphs, with data drawn from summarised frequencies produced by coding the content of the sampled items. In this section I first crosstabulate three variables - newspaper, column size and format - in order to explore the differences in the news coverage of Algeria between newspapers. Second, the topical concerns of reporting are summarised and related to the manner in which broadsheet newspapers represent (Algerian) Islam and Muslims. The reporting of Algeria is dominated by 'violence' and terrorism', begging the questions: 'who is described as being violent?'; and 'who are labelled terrorists?' Quantitative summaries suggest that Algerian 'Muslims' are so identified, although the frequency of such labelling varies across the sample.

From this initial summary of the broad features of domestic reporting, a more detailed qualitative analysis is adopted, focusing primarily on changes in the reports' argumentative claims - particularly with regard to whom journalists represent as responsible for murdering Algerian civilians. Ascribed agency for these atrocities was found to vary substantially across the sample and in order to illustrate and reflect these differences the analysis was structured into three sub-sections which are presented chronologically: October 1997; November to December 1997; and January 1998. With the notable exception of the *Financial Times*, all broadsheets

frequently redesignated who was 'to blame' for the violence in Algeria, both across and even *within* these three sub-sections. I conclude by arguing that these frequent shifts reveal that the newspapers simply *did not know* who was killing Algerian civilians - an ignorance which did not, however, stop them repeatedly declaring that 'Muslims' were guilty.

5.2 Quantitative Results and Discussion

Table 5.1: Format and number of Algerian articles, by newspaper

| | Format of article | | | | | | | | Total |
|-----------------|-------------------|-----------|--------|---------|--------|---------------------|--------|---------------|-------|
| | News | Editorial | Column | Feature | Letter | Weekly News summary | Review | News in brief | |
| Financial Times | 26 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | 1 | 13 | 43 |
| Guardian | 27 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | | 18 | 54 |
| Independent | 27 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | | | 13 | 45 |
| Telegraph | 19 | 2 | | | | | | 11 | 32 |
| The Times | 27 | 2 | | 2 | 5 | | | 18 | 54 |
| IoS | 6 | | | | 1 | | | | 7 |
| Sunday Times | 6 | | | | | | 1 | | 7 |
| Total | 138 | 8 | 4 | 6 | 9 | 3 | 1 | 73 | 242 |

Table 5.1 illustrates that 'news', as opposed to 'commentary' and 'discussion', dominated the reporting of Algeria during the sample period - 87.2 per cent (n= 211) of Algerian articles were either 'news' or 'news in brief', slightly higher than for the sample as a whole (84.0%). The frequencies of news formats differed between newspapers, as illustrated in Table 5.2 below:

Table 5.2: 'Hard' and 'soft' Algerian articles, by newspaper

| | Format: 'hard' or 'soft' news | | | | | | Total | | |
|-----------------|-------------------------------|--------|--------|-------------|-------|--------|-------|--------|--------|
| | 'Hard' news | | | 'Soft' news | | | Count | Row % | Col % |
| | Count | Row % | Col % | Count | Row % | Col % | | | |
| Financial Times | 40 | 93.0% | 18.0% | 3 | 7.0% | 15.0% | 43 | 100.0% | 17.8% |
| Guardian | 49 | 90.7% | 22.1% | 5 | 9.3% | 25.0% | 54 | 100.0% | 22.3% |
| Independent | 41 | 91.1% | 18.5% | 4 | 8.9% | 20.0% | 45 | 100.0% | 18.6% |
| Telegraph | 32 | 100.0% | 14.4% | | | | 32 | 100.0% | 13.2% |
| The Times | 47 | 87.0% | 21.2% | 7 | 13.0% | 35.0% | 54 | 100.0% | 22.3% |
| IoS | 6 | 85.7% | 2.7% | 1 | 14.3% | 5.0% | 7 | 100.0% | 2.9% |
| Sunday Times | 7 | 100.0% | 3.2% | | | | 7 | 100.0% | 2.9% |
| Total | 222 | 91.7% | 100.0% | 20 | 8.3% | 100.0% | 242 | 100.0% | 100.0% |

In calculating the frequencies in *Table 5.2*, 'hard news' formats included news reports, 'news in brief' and editorials, whilst 'soft news' embraced the remaining formats. In total, 91.7 per cent of Algerian articles were 'hard news', slightly higher than the remainder of the sample (87.4%). Of the daily newspapers, the *Telegraph* printed the least articles, 100 per cent of which were 'hard news' (n= 32); *The Times* and the *Guardian* printed equal numbers of articles (n= 54), with *The Times* printing marginally less 'hard news' formats (87.0%).

The average sizes (cm) of the different formats, according to newspaper, are given below.

Table 5.3: Mean column size (cm) of news formats, by newspaper

| C_SIZE | Format of article | | | | | | | Total | |
|-----------------|-------------------|-----------|--------|---------|--------|---------------------|--------|-------|---------------|
| | News | Editorial | Column | Feature | Letter | Weekly News summary | Review | | News in brief |
| | Mean | Mean | Mean | Mean | Mean | Mean | Mean | | Mean |
| Financial Times | 216 | 152 | 490 | 348 | . | . | 280 | 61 | 179 |
| Guardian | 235 | 227 | 294 | 346 | 49 | 39 | . | 33 | 157 |
| Independent | 267 | 330 | 416 | 410 | 104 | . | . | 38 | 208 |
| Telegraph | 171 | 150 | . | . | . | . | . | 31 | 122 |
| The Times | 177 | 224 | . | 331 | 77 | . | . | 32 | 127 |
| IoS | 432 | . | . | . | 46 | . | . | . | 377 |
| Sunday Times | 230 | . | . | . | . | 558 | . | . | 277 |
| Total | 226 | 210 | 374 | 363 | 70 | 212 | 280 | 38 | 169 |

The difference between articles printed in the Sunday and daily papers is striking: articles in the Sunday papers average 327 centimetres whilst those in the daily papers average 158.6 centimetres. This was expected given Sunday newspapers' tendency to summarise and contextualise the events in a week's news (or, the news in a week's events) thereby taking more column space.

The *Telegraph* dedicated less column centimetres than any other newspaper, across all included formats. This, combined with a low frequency of news articles overall (see *Table 5.2*) shows the low priority ('newsworthiness') which the *Telegraph* gave to reporting Algeria. *The Times* also dedicated very few column centimetres to reporting Algeria - a mean

177 centimetres for a 'news report' and a mean 127 centimetres for all articles. In contrast, the *Independent* shows high column centimetres across all formats, with the average size of its 'news' reports (267 centimetres) even surpassing those of its sister Sunday newspaper (230 centimetres).

Finally, and interestingly, the 'news-in-brief' articles printed in the *Financial Times* appear conspicuously larger (61 cms) than those printed in other newspapers (mean 33.5 cms). In addition, the *Financial Times*' news-in-brief included an average 3.31 actors, in contrast to an average 2.87 actors in the remaining newspapers. 16.28 per cent of these actors in the *Financial Times* were also quoted (n= 7), compared to 5.85 per cent of actors quoted in the remaining four dailies (a total of 10 quoted actors). These differences may, of course, be the result of the larger size of the *Financial Times*' news-in-brief. However, a shorter article should not, in itself, pose a obstacle for quoting actors unless, by expanding an article's size, a journalist is not just enabled to include *more* information but is also enabled to include different *types* of information - moving from the factual 'what, where, when and who' to including (informed, authoritative) actors' commentary on 'why' and 'how'. This appears to suggest that the news-in-brief in the *Financial Times* is, in fact, a different format to that included in the remaining newspapers: that the *Financial Times* uses news-in-brief to *do* different things, both in terms of the reports in themselves and in terms of the newspaper as a whole. If this is the case, it strongly supports CDA's argument regarding the essentially indivisible nature of 'form' and 'content' and also suggests that the notion of 'space' should be added to the models of news discourse suggested by van Dijk (1988) and Bell (1991).

To summarise this section, *Table 5.4* below gives the average column centimetres of 'hard' and 'soft' news formats, according to newspaper.


Table 5.4: Mean column size (cm) of 'hard' and 'soft' formats, by newspaper

| C_SIZE | | Format: 'hard' or 'soft' news | | Total |
|-----------|-----------------|-------------------------------|-------------|-------|
| | | 'Hard' news | 'Soft' news | |
| | | Mean | Mean | Mean |
| Newspaper | Financial Times | 164 | 373 | 179 |
| | Guardian | 152 | 206 | 157 |
| | Independent | 196 | 335 | 208 |
| | Telegraph | 122 | . | 122 |
| | The Times | 123 | 150 | 127 |
| | IoS | 432 | 46 | 377 |
| | Sunday Times | 277 | . | 277 |
| Total | | 163 | 229 | 169 |

The features of reporting discussed above - the larger articles in Sunday newspapers; the long 'hard news' articles of the *Independent*; the seeming low interest of the *Telegraph* and *The Times* in reporting Algeria - are clearly observable in this table.


The next section reviews the distribution of articles across the sample.

Graph 5.1: Number of Algerian articles, by date




Graph 5.1 shows that the reporting of Algeria fitted broadly into three sections: the period up to and including the reporting of Algerian municipal elections, which caused a peak in coverage on 23 October 1997; second, a mid-period characterised by steadily decreasing press interest, reporting the ongoing conflict and the deaths of civilians; and third, a rejuvenated interest in the Algerian conflict in January 1998, corresponding roughly with the start of the Muslim Holy month of Ramadan. The column centimetres of articles reporting Algeria also fit this pattern:

Graph 5.2: Algerian articles' daily column centimetres




The two graphs above show that, until Ramadan, the reporting of Algeria was 'tailing off' into occasional and short articles. However, once Ramadan had started, broadsheet newspapers showed a renewed interest in a conflict which was now provided with an explicitly Muslim 'peg', or angle, on which to 'hang' the story. 'Violence' and 'Terrorism' formed integral parts of the broadsheet reporting of Algeria, as illustrated in two further graphs representing the occurrences of the words 'violence (and acts of violence)' and 'terrorism (and acts of terrorism)' across the four month sample:

Graph 5.3: Frequency of 'Violence' in Algerian articles, by date



Graph 5.4: Frequency of 'Terrorism' in Algerian articles, by date



Graphs 5.3 and 5.4 closely mirror the distribution of articles in Graphs 5.1 and 5.2, illustrating the importance of 'violence' and 'terrorism' to broadsheet newspaper reporting of Algeria. As the number of reports or column centimetres increased, so did the occurrence of 'violence' and 'terrorism', in very closely related quantities. Reports referring to 'violence' and 'terrorism' peak during Ramadan, giving an insight into the theme(s) of reporting during the Muslim Holy month.

The by-lined source of an article is an important variable to take into consideration, particularly in the case of Algeria, where visas and access were only granted to certain media organisations:

Table 5.5: By-lined source in Algerian articles

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Staff writer | 160 | 66.1 | 66.1 | 66.1 |
| Reuters | 37 | 15.3 | 15.3 | 81.4 |
| Agence France Presse | 12 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 86.4 |
| Associated Press | 12 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 91.3 |
| No source given | 7 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 94.2 |
| Member of Public | 6 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 96.7 |
| Other Government | 4 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 98.3 |
| 'Agencies' | 3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 99.6 |
| 'Other' | 1 | .4 | .4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 242 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 5.5 shows that 66.1 per cent of Algerian articles were written by Staff journalists - significantly lower than the remainder of the sample (77.1%). Conversely, the percentage of articles sourced to press agencies is higher for these Algerian articles than it is for the remainder of the sample, as illustrated in *Table 5.6* below:

Table 5.6: Summarised by-line for Algerian and 'Other' articles

| | Country | | | | Total | |
|-------------------|---------|--------|---------------------|--------|-------|--------|
| | Algeria | | All other countries | | Count | Col % |
| | Count | Col % | Count | Col % | | |
| Staff Journalist | 160 | 66.1% | 1771 | 77.1% | 1931 | 76.0% |
| Press Agency | 64 | 26.4% | 320 | 13.9% | 384 | 15.1% |
| No source given | 7 | 2.9% | 109 | 4.7% | 116 | 4.6% |
| All other sources | 11 | 4.5% | 98 | 4.3% | 109 | 4.3% |
| Total | 242 | 100.0% | 2298 | 100.0% | 2540 | 100.0% |

Table 5.6 shows that the percentage of Algerian articles sourced to press agencies (26.4%) is almost twice that of the remainder of the sample (13.9%). This high figure is no doubt the result of the difficulties newspapers and journalists had in obtaining access to Algeria. In situations such as Algeria - a 'newsworthy' story which British journalists were unable (or unwilling) to gain physical access to - broadsheets rely upon copy wired from press agencies based where the story is breaking. This was found to be significant when the themes and argumentation of press agency reports were compared to those written by staff journalists - particularly staff journalists writing from Algeria (see the later qualitative analysis).

Table 5.7 shows the percentage of articles by-lined to press agencies in each newspaper:

Table 5.7: Summarised by-line in Algerian articles, by newspaper

| | Proportion of staff to agency articles | | | | | | | | Total | |
|-----------------|--|-------|--------------|-------|-------------------|-------|-----------------|-------|-------|--------|
| | Staff Journalist | | Press Agency | | All other sources | | No source given | | Count | Row % |
| | Count | Row % | Count | Row % | Count | Row % | Count | Row % | | |
| Financial Times | 37 | 86.0% | 5 | 11.6% | 1 | 2.3% | | | 43 | 100.0% |
| Guardian | 36 | 66.7% | 15 | 27.8% | 2 | 3.7% | 1 | 1.9% | 54 | 100.0% |
| Independent | 27 | 60.0% | 11 | 24.4% | 1 | 2.2% | 6 | 13.3% | 45 | 100.0% |
| Telegraph | 19 | 59.4% | 13 | 40.6% | | | | | 32 | 100.0% |
| The Times | 29 | 53.7% | 20 | 37.0% | 5 | 9.3% | | | 54 | 100.0% |
| IoS | 6 | 85.7% | | | 1 | 14.3% | | | 7 | 100.0% |
| Sunday Times | 6 | 85.7% | | | 1 | 14.3% | | | 7 | 100.0% |
| Total | 160 | 66.1% | 64 | 26.4% | 11 | 4.5% | 7 | 2.9% | 242 | 100.0% |

The percentage of articles written by the *Financial Times*' staff journalists (86.0%; n= 37) was substantially higher than that of all other daily newspapers. Only the Sunday broadsheets, who are not under the same daily pressure to 'break a story', showed a comparable percentage of staff written articles (85.7% for both Sunday titles). Both the *Telegraph* (n= 13; 40.6%) and *The Times* (n= 20; 37.0%) showed very high percentages of articles written by press agencies. This corresponds with the previously discussed findings on these papers' low interest in reporting Algeria through their low allocation of resources - staff journalists - to report the story. The percentage of staff written articles in the *Independent* would be larger with the inclusion of the six articles (13.3%) lacking a by-line. These reports probably were written by staff journalists (in much the same way as their leader is written by staff but not given a by-line), but they could not be coded as such because of the commitment to only code 'manifest' content.

The next two tables summarise the location of the reports and, due to the approach to coding these variables (see Appendix 1), the 'countries' which were cited in the reported action.

Table 5.8: Primary country in Algerian articles

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Algeria | 215 | 88.8 | 88.8 | 88.8 |
| France | 15 | 6.2 | 6.2 | 95.0 |
| UK | 3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 96.3 |
| Egypt | 2 | .8 | .8 | 97.1 |
| Afghanistan | 1 | .4 | .4 | 97.5 |
| Israel | 1 | .4 | .4 | 97.9 |
| Turkey | 1 | .4 | .4 | 98.3 |
| Germany | 1 | .4 | .4 | 98.8 |
| China | 1 | .4 | .4 | 99.2 |
| Luxembourg | 1 | .4 | .4 | 99.6 |
| 'EU' | 1 | .4 | .4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 242 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Unsurprisingly, 'Algeria' was the country most cited as the geographical location of these reports. What was more unexpected was intensity of focus on Algeria to the exclusion of other national sites. Only 27 articles (11.2%) were located in a country other than Algeria, which is perhaps remarkable considering the difficulties of British journalists in gaining any access to the country.¹

Table 5.9: Secondary country in Algerian articles

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| 'EU' | 33 | 13.6 | 38.8 | 38.8 |
| Algeria | 25 | 10.3 | 29.4 | 68.2 |
| UK | 10 | 4.1 | 11.8 | 80.0 |
| France | 5 | 2.1 | 5.9 | 85.9 |
| Germany | 4 | 1.7 | 4.7 | 90.6 |
| Saudia Arabia | 2 | .8 | 2.4 | 92.9 |
| 'Western' countries | 2 | .8 | 2.4 | 95.3 |
| Afghanistan | 1 | .4 | 1.2 | 96.5 |
| Iraq | 1 | .4 | 1.2 | 97.6 |
| 'Arab' countries | 1 | .4 | 1.2 | 98.8 |
| USA | 1 | .4 | 1.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 85 | 35.1 | 100.0 | |
| Missing System | 157 | 64.9 | | |
| Total | 242 | 100.0 | | |

The predominance of Algerian located articles is also illustrated in *Table 5.9*, above. Only 85 articles (35.1%) cited more than one country, meaning that for the remaining 157 articles (64.9%) 'Algeria' was the only country considered to have had an influence on the reported action. What this framing of the story inevitably means is that the Algerian conflict will be presented as an 'internal' dispute, thereby backgrounding the influence and interests of both other countries - specifically France - and the oil companies with a stake in Algeria. It is also interesting to compare the infrequency of Algerian articles citing either the USA or the UK as 'countries', with these countries' high presence in Iraqi reports (see Chapter 7). The lack of reports in which the USA or UK were coded as the 'primary country' (the location of the story) illustrates the general silence of 'western' government in response to the deaths of Algerian civilians.

The most frequently cited secondary 'country' was the 'EU' (n= 33; 38.8% of secondary countries), here used to refer to the diplomatic involvement of the European Parliament in general, and the 'troika' of EU officials more specifically, who were sent to Algeria to "look into 'confronting terrorism'" (el-Gammal, 1998). The importance of the UK to this diplomatic mission, through their presidency of the European Parliament at that time, is suggested by the 10 articles which cited the UK as a secondary country (11.8% of secondary countries).

The following section summarises the 'Topics' used in reporting Algeria.

Table 5.10: Primary topic in Algerian articles

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| War and civilian death | 78 | 32.2 | 32.2 | 32.2 |
| Civil War | 49 | 20.2 | 20.2 | 52.5 |
| EU | 34 | 14.0 | 14.0 | 66.5 |
| Int. Relations/Politics, Terrorism | 12 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 71.5 |
| Int. Relations/Politics, demonstrations | 7 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 74.4 |
| Actions of International leaders | 7 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 77.3 |
| Int. Relations/Politics, elections | 5 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 79.3 |
| Int. Relations/Politics, torture | 4 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 81.0 |
| Int. Relations/Politics, Meetings between leaders | 3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 82.2 |
| Int. Relations/Politics, Human rights | 3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 83.5 |
| Selective/Target Policing | 2 | .8 | .8 | 84.3 |
| Court rulings | 2 | .8 | .8 | 85.1 |
| Int. Relations/Politics, History | 2 | .8 | .8 | 86.0 |
| Int. Relations/Politics, Illegal weapons | 2 | .8 | .8 | 86.8 |
| Int. Relations/Politics, Diplomacy | 2 | .8 | .8 | 87.6 |
| Int. Relations/Politics, censorship | 2 | .8 | .8 | 88.4 |
| Culture/Custom, Media/Press | 2 | .8 | .8 | 89.3 |
| Culture/Custom, Islamist activities | 2 | .8 | .8 | 90.1 |
| Business, Oil | 2 | .8 | .8 | 90.9 |
| Culture/Custom, Travel | 1 | .4 | .4 | 91.3 |
| Culture/Custom, Literature | 1 | .4 | .4 | 91.7 |
| Culture/Custom, Music | 1 | .4 | .4 | 92.1 |
| Culture/Custom, 'faith' | 1 | .4 | .4 | 92.6 |
| Psychological Health | 1 | .4 | .4 | 93.0 |
| Court cases | 1 | .4 | .4 | 93.4 |
| World Court/International trials | 1 | .4 | .4 | 93.8 |
| Business, International | 1 | .4 | .4 | 94.2 |
| Business, arms trade | 1 | .4 | .4 | 94.6 |
| 'Democracy' | 1 | .4 | .4 | 95.0 |
| Total | 242 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

The reporting of Algeria was dominated by conflict and death. 139 articles (57.5%) specifically reported the deaths caused by the conflict as a primary topic: 78 focusing on ‘civilian deaths’ (32.2%), 12 on ‘terrorism’ (5.0%) and 49 on ‘civil war’ in general (20.2%). Almost every other article reported Algeria from within a ‘conflict frame’. The EU diplomatic mission to ‘investigate terrorism’ was regularly reported (n= 34; 14.0%); and additionally reported as ‘diplomacy’ (n= 2; 0.8), the ‘actions of international leaders’ (n= 7; 2.9%) or ‘meetings between international leaders’ (n=3; 1.2%). The Algerian municipal ‘elections’ were reported (n= 5; 2.1%) as were the ‘demonstrations’ organised by Algerian citizens following the announcement of the (fraudulent?) election results (n= 7; 2.9%). By contrast, the ‘oil’ industry was only reported as a primary topic in two articles (0.8%), and the ‘cultural’ lives of Algerians received scant coverage in four articles - ‘travel’, ‘literature’, ‘music’ and ‘faith’ (all n= 1; 0.4%).

The dominance of ‘War’ and ‘International Politics’ in these primary topics is also illustrated in the primary parent topics for Algerian reports:

Table 5.11: Primary parent topic in Algerian articles

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| War | 130 | 53.7 | 53.7 | 53.7 |
| Int. Relations/Politics | 88 | 36.4 | 36.4 | 90.1 |
| Culture/Custom | 9 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 93.8 |
| Policing/Law & Order | 5 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 95.9 |
| Business | 5 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 97.9 |
| Race/Community Relations | 2 | .8 | .8 | 98.8 |
| Immigration | 1 | .4 | .4 | 99.2 |
| Crime | 1 | .4 | .4 | 99.6 |
| Health | 1 | .4 | .4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 242 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 5.11 illustrates that 90.1 per cent of Algerian articles (n= 218) reported the conflict in a primary position - either in terms of the actual effects of ‘War’ (deaths, destruction, etc.) or else the ‘Politics’ of the conflict (actions of parties, leaders, politicians, etc.). These foci were also adopted in secondary

topics, here only summarised as parent topics due to the secondary topics' similarities with the results in *Table 5.10*:

Table 5.12: Secondary parent topic in Algerian articles

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| War | 155 | 64.0 | 64.3 | 64.3 |
| Int. Relations/Politics | 64 | 26.4 | 26.6 | 90.9 |
| Culture/Custom | 12 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 95.9 |
| Policing/Law & Order | 3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 97.1 |
| Race/Community Relations | 2 | .8 | .8 | 97.9 |
| Crime | 2 | .8 | .8 | 98.8 |
| Business | 2 | .8 | .8 | 99.6 |
| Women | 1 | .4 | .4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 241 | 99.6 | 100.0 | |
| Missing | 1 | .4 | | |
| Total | 242 | 100.0 | | |

Table 5.12 shows very similar frequencies to those of *Table 5.11*: the vast majority of articles (90.4%) chose to report 'War' (n= 155; 64.0%) or 'International Relations and Politics' (n= 64; 26.4%) as secondary parent topics, with 'Culture and Custom' coming in a distant third (n= 12; 5.0%). When the primary and secondary parent topics were crosstabulated, it emerged that only seven articles (2.9% of all Algerian articles) reported Algeria without referring to the parent topics 'War' and 'International Politics' in either a primary or secondary position.² The supremacy of these parent topics inevitably 'framed' Algeria as a country of simply conflict, death and politics; a stereotypical representation which was then explained with reference to Islam and the activities of Algerian Muslims. In 202 (83.5%) of these articles reporting Algerian conflict, 'Islam' was cited as an influential factor in explaining or accounting for the reported actions. When the variable which coded 'Islamic agency' is crosstabulated with those which coded the representation of Islam and Muslims, the role in which broadsheet newspapers placed 'Muslims' in the conflict - as aggressor or victim - can be inferred:

Table 5.13: Representation of Islam and Muslims, by 'Islamic agency'

| | | Is Islam cited as a factor? | | | | Total | |
|---|-------------|-----------------------------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|
| | | Yes | | No | | | |
| | | Count | Col % | Count | Col % | Count | Col % |
| Represented as: separate/interacting | Separate | 152 | 75.2% | 4 | 10.0% | 156 | 64.5% |
| | Interacting | 6 | 3.0% | | | 6 | 2.5% |
| | No response | 44 | 21.8% | 36 | 90.0% | 80 | 33.1% |
| Total | | 202 | 100.0% | 40 | 100.0% | 242 | 100.0% |
| Represented as: inferior/equal | Inferior | 151 | 74.8% | 5 | 12.5% | 156 | 64.5% |
| | Equal | 18 | 8.9% | 3 | 7.5% | 21 | 8.7% |
| | No response | 33 | 16.3% | 32 | 80.0% | 65 | 26.9% |
| Total | | 202 | 100.0% | 40 | 100.0% | 242 | 100.0% |
| Represented as: enemy/partner | Enemy | 145 | 71.8% | 2 | 5.0% | 147 | 60.7% |
| | Partner | 12 | 5.9% | | | 12 | 5.0% |
| | No response | 45 | 22.3% | 38 | 95.0% | 83 | 34.3% |
| Total | | 202 | 100.0% | 40 | 100.0% | 242 | 100.0% |
| Islam vs the west: natural/problematic | Natural | 128 | 63.4% | 1 | 2.5% | 129 | 53.3% |
| | Problematic | 9 | 4.5% | 1 | 2.5% | 10 | 4.1% |
| | No response | 65 | 32.2% | 38 | 95.0% | 103 | 42.6% |
| Total | | 202 | 100.0% | 40 | 100.0% | 242 | 100.0% |

Table 5.13 shows that the majority of Algerian articles represented Muslims as being 'separate' (n= 156; 64.5%), 'inferior' (n= 156; 64.5%), an 'enemy' (n= 147; 60.7%) and the erroneous enmity between 'Islam' and 'the West' as 'natural' (n= 129; 53.3%). These percentages increase markedly when articles citing 'Islamic agency' are analysed separately. When chi-square tests were performed on the four binary variables in *Table 5.13* and the 'Islamic agency' variable, the results for all four tests were highly significant: in each case, p= 0.000 for all measures, suggesting a high dependency between 'Islamic agency' and negative argumentative representation (see Appendix 4).

Further, *Table 5.13* shows that articles which did not cite 'Islamic agency' disproportionately took neither (binaried) argumentative position regarding Islam: on average, the articles eschewing Islamic agency recorded 'no response' to the argumentative binaries in 90.0% of cases. This suggests that when Islam is not regarded as having an influence on social action, the need to position the reported action in relation to ('positive' and 'negative') stereotypes is almost completely removed.

These findings show that 'Islam' and 'Muslims' were represented in overwhelmingly negative terms when broadsheet newspapers reported Algeria, and also suggest that 'Islam' was used, *in itself*, as an argumentative resource in the derogation of Algeria Muslims. The manner in which this was achieved in the reporting of broadsheet newspapers will now be analysed in greater depth.

5.3 Qualitative Results and Discussion

5.3.1 Introduction

The broadsheet reporting of Algeria was marked by a strikingly consistent topical focus - death, 'terrorism' and 'Islam' - and equally striking shifts in the apportioning of blame for these deaths. As suggested above, the broadsheet coverage of Algeria can be divided into three broad periods, distinctive in the number of sampled items and the total column centimetres which they dedicated to reporting Algeria (see *Graphs 5.1 & 5.2*). These periods are, in turn: the period leading to the Algerian municipal elections (23 October 1997), including the discussion of election results which continued for the remainder of October 1997; second, a mid-period of lower journalistic output; and third, the reporting of Algeria through the Muslim Holy month of Ramadan, from 1 January 1998 onwards. The remainder of this chapter will be divided into three sections analysing, in turn, the reporting across these three periods in the broadsheet coverage of Algeria, in order to explore the changes in content which accompanied the changes in journalistic output.

Second, dividing and analysing broadsheet coverage of Algeria separately and chronologically in this way is interesting from an 'intertextual' or 'dialogical' perspective. Since Bahktin (1981; 1986), dialogicality is regarded as "the idea that any text is a link in a chain, reacting to, drawing in and transforming other [previous] texts" (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 262). This notion seems particularly interesting in the light of the reporting of Algeria given the news media's reliance on the information and *patronage* of the Algerian Junta. Further, although the broadsheets printed the three analysed periods concurrently, the claims regarding who was responsible for killing civilians switched dramatically between, and *within*, the three time

periods in striking ways. As I will show, with the notable exception of the *Financial Times* (predominantly the reporting of the staff writer Roula Khalaf), all broadsheet newspapers made frequent shifts, changes and reverses in identifying the groups they felt were responsible for killing civilians. I argue that a dominant argumentative position, blaming the civilian deaths on either 'Muslim terrorists' or the Algerian Junta, characterises broadsheet coverage at any point in each of the three periods (October 1997; November - December 1997; January 1998). The periods are not separated by clear junctures however, but rather journalists' dominant argumentation gradually shifts within each period until, eventually, the opposing argument becomes dominant. Thus, in the first half of October 1997, journalists blamed 'Muslim terrorists' for killing civilians - a position which had reversed itself by the second half of October and, until the middle of November 1997, broadsheet journalists predominantly (although not as vociferously) blamed the Algerian Junta for civilian deaths. In the final two weeks of November 1997 however, the original argument of the first period (blaming 'Muslim terrorists') was again ascendant - an argument which, at the onset of Ramadan on 30 December 1997, became both ubiquitous and stridently asserted by broadsheet journalists. But, with the entry of broadsheet journalists into Algeria in the final two weeks of January 1998 to cover the visit of an EU investigative 'troika', dominant argumentation was again reversed and civilian deaths were (again) blamed on the Algerian Junta - using almost identical evidence as journalists had employed in reports printed at the end of October 1997. Thus, the coverage of each period ends with newspapers predominantly adopting the opposite argumentative position than they had its the start. Within each period, allegations were made by journalists with a declarative certainty unbecoming the situation, which often belied contradictory claims-to-truth which they had made only days before. Excerpts are numbered throughout in order to facilitate cross referencing.

5.3.2 October 1997: Benthala, Sidi Rais, Elections and Extremists

In total, 67 articles reporting Algeria were printed during October 1997, the majority of which (n= 49) were printed in the latter half of the month, once journalists were allowed to enter Algeria to report the municipal elections. As a result of journalists not being granted access to Algeria, 12 of the 18 articles printed in the first half of October 1997 were by-lined to press agencies. The headlines of reports taken from the start of the month, given below, suggest that these articles were predominantly simplistic, 'single event' reports detailing the (number of) deaths caused by an attack on Algerian civilians:

Algerian carnage continues (*Reuters, Guardian* 1 October)

Baby is beheaded in Algerian slaughter (*AP, Telegraph* 1 October)

Baby beheaded in Algerian massacre (*Reuters, The Times* 1 October)

Each of these reports identify 'Muslims' - either "Muslim rebels", "terrorists" or "extremists" - as the killers of these civilians. The position of the Algerian Junta as the 'identifier' of the killers is either backgrounded to an embedded clause, concealed by suggesting that (government backed) Algerian media identified the killers, or else deleted completely. Excerpts are presented in the same order as the reports above:

- 1) Members of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) killed 40 villagers, including 10 children, on Sunday night in Blida province, South of Algiers, the newspaper *El Watan* said. (*Guardian*, 1 October)
- 2) Islamic extremists have cut the head off a baby and killed 83 other people [...]in five separate attacks in Algeria. [...] No group has claimed responsibility for the outrages. (*Telegraph*, 1 October)
- 3) Algerian newspapers reported that more than 60 civilians were killed in further massacres in Algeria [...] The massacres were blamed on the extremist Armed Islamic Group (GIA). (*The Times*, 1 October)

These excerpts show first that the violence reported in these articles is part of an ongoing story of violence against civilians - in (3) for example, the 60 civilians were "killed in *further* massacres"; and second that 'Muslims' are blamed, or at the very least suspected, of perpetrating this violence. Even in excerpt (2) where "No group has claimed responsibility", "Islamic extremists"

are blamed for the massacres. An editorial printed in *The Times* (**Iron in the Soul: Islam must face and condemn the abomination of Algeria**, 2 October 1997) perfectly summarised these two aspects of reporting, arguing that: "The weekend massacre by Islamist terrorists of 40 villagers included atrocities unspeakable even by the standards of the five-year civil war." Here, the newspaper somehow felt empowered to blame "Islamist terrorists" for these massacres, despite their later acknowledgement that due to "censorship amid a swirl of rumour there is little way to uncover what is happening" in Algeria.

This pattern appeared to develop further in the second week of the month, when, perhaps due to the increasingly forceful claims of the Algerian Junta, 'Muslims' began to be identified as killers in the headlines of reports:

Algerian rebels kill 12 in shell attack (*Reuters, Independent* 6 October)

Children killed by extremists (*AFP, Telegraph*, 6 October)

FIS split will worsen Algerian violence (Victoria Britton, *Guardian*, 8 October)

Algerian rebels slit throats of 43 on bus (*AFP The Times*, 14 October)

Islamists slip Algerian Army to massacre 54 (*Reuters, Independent*, 15 October)

The headlines above indicate that broadsheet newspapers quite uniformly included such allocation of blame in their headlines - only in the *Guardian* report of 8 October is "Algerian violence" implicitly, as opposed to explicitly, connected with Algerian 'Muslim' groups.

In contrast, the *Financial Times* refrained from making such declarations of 'Muslim guilt' - both in its headlines (for example, **Bus passengers massacred**, 15 October 1997) and in the content of its reports. Whilst the other newspapers were confidently blaming 'Muslims' for the deaths of civilians, the *Financial Times* presented a considerably more measured account. In its first report of October for example, the *Financial Times* quotes Lionel Jospin as saying: "We are confronted with a fanatical and violent opposition fighting against a regime which [...] has recourse itself to violence and the power of the state: so we have to be careful [in the allocation of blame]" (**Another 67 die in Algiers**, *AFP* (Algiers), 1 October 1997). In the next report, Roula Khalaf not only develops the suspected

involvement of the Algerian authorities in violence against civilians further, but also includes details notably absent from the reporting of other newspapers:

- 4) The FIS is the first to admit that, since its armed wing is not involved in attacks against civilians, it cannot control the violence in the short term. [...] Its armed wing, the AIS, is present in the east and west of the country, while massacres of civilians have been taking place in the centre, the domain of the extremist Islamic group known as the GIA. [...] The FIS claims that this group has been infiltrated and manipulated by government forces, as many of the victims today are FIS supporters, a claim dismissed by the government. (**Truce offers scant hope for Algeria**, 3 October 1997)

The relationship between the FIS and the AIS is analogous with the (past) relationship between Sinn Fein and the IRA - a status acknowledged here in the separation of the FIS and "its armed wing, the AIS" - but the *Financial Times* was the only newspaper during this time which presented the FIS as a political party and not an 'extremist' or 'rebel group'. In presenting the FIS as a political party, and a party whose public support perturbs or perhaps *endangers* the power of the Algerian Junta (earlier, the report acknowledged that "the [Algerian] crisis was sparked by the cancellation of elections the FIS was set to win"), Khalaf is able to imply that the murder of FIS supporters in Benthala is functional to the interests of the Junta. This, in turn, implies that there may be some weight in the claim that the GIA has been "infiltrated and manipulated" by the Junta.

The presentation of the Algerian conflict changed in the second half of October, when, in anticipation of the forthcoming municipal elections, the Algerian authorities started to admit British journalists to Algeria.³ The first report by-lined to a staff journalist writing from Algeria was published in the *Guardian* (**No squaring the death triangle**, David Hirst, 18 October 1997) and almost immediately the presentation of events offered by the Algerian authorities started to be questioned. For example, the by-line of this first report read: "David Hirst, allowed into Algiers to witness 'democracy' finds the official propaganda hard to reconcile with reality".

The strongest criticisms of Algeria's 'democratic process' came from the pen of Roula Khalaf, writing for the *Financial Times*. On the day of the

election, for example, Khalaf wrote: "Today's election will complete the institutional edifice the government is erecting to legitimise its rule" (**'What elections? Everyone in my family is dead'**, *Financial Times*, 23 October 1997) The report printed the following day referred to complaints from the "legal opposition parties" ranging "from physical aggression to a candidate by security forces to party observers being prevented from inspecting ballot boxes before the vote started" (**Turnout low in Algerian election**, *Financial Times*, 24 October 1997). Although reports in the other papers questioned the particularly dubious majority by which the pro-government parties won the election⁴, Khalaf's reports contained details regarding the highly questionable *systems* of government erected by General Zeroual:

- 5) The elections were the last step in the army-backed government's plan to rebuild elected institutions within a framework that ensures no opposition party can challenge its rule. Two-thirds of the upper house created by a constitution voted in last year will be drawn from the local and provincial councils with the remainder appointed by Liamine Zeroual, the president. The upper chamber will thus be overwhelmingly dominated by pro-government parties, which already dominate the lower house.

In addition to reporting the 'election', by talking to survivors and surveying the locations of the massacres, British journalists 'on the ground' in Algeria seemed suddenly to realise that two significant aspects of the conflict in general, and the murders of civilians in particular, had not been adequately reported. First, the possibility that the Army may have been involved in the massacres was bolstered when reporters saw that Sidi Rais was less than a mile from an army barracks, and Benthala, site of the largest massacre on 22 September, was barely 500 metres from an army barracks. In light of this, and echoing the *Financial Times'* report printed almost three weeks before (excerpt 4), journalists started to ask: "Had government agents with no wish for a cease-fire infiltrated the ranks of the GIA?" (**Brutal killers without faces**, *Independent*, 26 October 1997). Second, after talking to Algerian survivors, the torture and 'disappearances' of significant numbers of civilians by Algerian police and security forces became a lead feature of

reports. These two 'missed' stories were covered in increasing detail across all five broadsheets for the remainder of October.

Taking the 'involvement' of the Algerian army first, some reporters, principally Anthony Loyd of *The Times* and Robert Fox of the *Telegraph*, seemed to find it difficult to believe that the Algerian Army could be actively responsible for murdering civilians. Loyd's repeated claims to this effect sounded remarkably similar, even when he was 'quoting' a source:

- 6) Though it seems unlikely that the army is perpetrating the bulk of the killings themselves, it does little to prevent them. (**Villagers relive terror of night massacres**, *The Times*, 22 October 1997)
- 7) [quoting an ex-ALN officer] "They [the army] do not perpetrate the atrocities themselves, but they do little to stop them" (**Zeroual's zombies can't vote**, *The Times*, 24 October 1997)

This inability to believe - or perhaps the inability to *write* - that the army would be actively involved in murdering civilians was also present in the *Guardian's* reporting, but here the undoubtedly 'functional' nature of the murders of 'Islamists' to the Junta were foregrounded to a much greater extent.⁵

- 8) The rest of the world is beginning to ask the same sinister question that Algerians have been asking themselves for years: *who* is behind these atrocities? Is it simply, according to the regime, religious fanatics, bandits or psychopaths? Or do they enjoy the complicity of others - perhaps of some die-hard faction of the regime itself... ('**This is where they shot my wife. Here they killed my daughter with an axe**', Hirst, *Guardian*, 20 October 1997)
- 9) [...] does this willingness [of the military] to tolerate a massacre almost under their noses suggest a political agenda in which the excesses of extremism strengthen the hand of military hardliners? (**The killing suburbs of Algiers. Unanswered question: why is the military simply standing by?** *Guardian* Editorial, 21 October 1997)

Whilst Robert Fisk, in his reports for the *Independent*, pushed the envelope a little further:

- 10) Why *didn't* the army venture across the fields? [...] And who are the so-called 'Islamists' performing these acts of unparalleled butchery? Why should Islamists murder the very same villagers who voted *en masse* for the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) [...] and who have traditionally opposed the Algerian government? ('I felt the knife at my neck. My wife was so brave. She tried to help. So they cut her throat in front of me', *Independent*, 22 October 1997)

Alongside these 'editorialising' reports there also stood more traditionally structured news reporting. These news reports appeared to support the implications of Algerian government involvement made in the reports written in the field by the 'star reporters'; or perhaps the events they reported simply *seemed* a great deal more sinister viewed in the light of the implications in the larger reports. For example:

- 11) Gunmen yesterday shot dead a candidate for an Islamist-leaning party running in local elections, party sources said. Three supporters of the Movement for a Peaceful Society (MPS) [the only *legal* Islamist party] also died in the shooting inside a mosque (**Four murdered in mosque**, *The Times*, 22 October 1997)

In light of the questions and allegations of the longer, more editorialised reports - principally, why is it that only Islamists are being killed, so close to the municipal elections? - the killing of four politically active 'Islamists' appeared particularly dubious, fuelling journalists' criticisms of the Algerian Junta's 'democratic process' even further.

Just as powerful political and humanitarian questions were also being asked in articles which chose to report the torture and 'disappearances' of Algerian civilians. Although much fewer articles reported these issues (n= 6), the articles in which they did appear often dedicated the whole report to recounting tales from torture victims and their families. The *Independent*, for example, printed three lengthy articles on the subject on one day alone (30 October 1997), the first of which was printed on the front-page and included testimony from Algerian Security personnel to support the argument of 'official involvement' in the death of civilians (**Lost souls of the Algerian night: now their torturers tell the truth**). After presenting the personal cases of four 'missing' Algerian women pictured above the article, and

quoting members of the Algerian army who “spoke of watching officers torture suspected ‘Islamist’ prisoners by boring holes in their legs - and in one case, stomach - with electric drills”, Fisk argues that

- 12) [...] the first hand evidence from its own former security force personnel of torture and secret executions provides unequivocal testimony that the Algerian government has gone beyond the pale of civilised standards of warfare in fighting its enemies.

Fisk’s report stands as damning evidence of the regime’s brutality. Lower down, the article quotes the same Army source, adding more inferential evidence of the Army’s suspected involvement in the reported ‘massacres’ of civilians:

- 13) [...] he had found a false beard amid the clothing of soldiers who had returned from a raid on a village where 28 civilians were later found beheaded; the soldier suspects that his comrades had dressed up as Muslim rebels to carry out the atrocity.

The writing of Roula Khalaf on the torture and ‘disappearance’ of civilians was as insightful as in her previous reports. Khalaf’s first article (**Protesters seek news of missing men of Algeria**, *Financial Times*, 21 October 1997) is located at a public demonstration - a setting which enables it to simultaneously represent the political will and action of Algerian women (the headline reads: ‘Women accuse police of abducting sons and husbands from homes and workplaces’) as well as the repression of the Algerian police. Just as these articulate and highly motivated women - significantly different from the fatigued and emotionally paralysed women of Fisk’s reporting⁶ - were retelling their stories, “the police arrived to break up the protest”. Second, in criticising the Junta, Khalaf cites the opinions of informed and authoritative sources, who are not directly and *personally* involved in the reported action, in a way which draws an implicit comparison between the activities of the ‘terrorists’ and the Algerian government. For example: “Human rights organisations have [both] condemned Islamist killings and accused the government of responsibility for torture, disappearances and extrajudicial executions”. And third, Khalaf takes this

comparison a little further, implying (as Fisk did in excerpts 12 and 13) the involvement of Algerian officials in the deaths of civilians. "El Houass Diabi" for example, is quoted as saying "Our children were not taken by terrorists, they were taken by police". In using the double plural - 'our children' - the article seems to open up the implication of officially sanctioned disappearance and murder to include, not only the personal experiences of these protesting women, but the conflict as a whole: "Our [Algeria's] children".

To summarise this first section: during the first half of October, 'massacres' of civilians dominated the reporting of Algeria. In all newspapers, except the *Financial Times*, these murders were blamed on 'Muslim' terror groups despite the lack of evidence supporting such confident allocation of blame. The Algerian Junta was, for the most part, completely absent from the reported action. This version of events changed with the entry of five broadsheet journalists into Algeria to report the forthcoming municipal elections. Not only did the confidence in blaming 'Islamist extremists' falter, but reports became dominated by suspicions of Algerian Army involvement in the 'massacres', and the involvement of the Algerian police in the torture and murder (usually reported as the more euphemistic 'extrajudicial executions') of civilians. Robert Fisk, in a report printed after his stay in Algeria, summarised the reporting of the conflict in the following way:

14) [...] never before have members of the security forces provided the compelling evidence to prove the brutality of the Algerian regime. And with documentary evidence that thousands - some say as many as 12,000 - men and women have been 'disappeared' by a government that claim to be fighting 'international terrorism', *Algeria's military-backed government will find it hard ever again to win sympathy in the West.* (*Lost souls of the Algerian night...* 30 October 1997; emphasis added)

This summarising passage, particularly the final italicised section, should be borne in mind throughout the next two sections of this chapter.

5.3.3 November - December 1997: Shifting Blame

Following the Algerian municipal elections, the reporting of the Algerian conflict moved into a decline. In total, 51 Algerian articles were published during November and December 1997: 60.8 per cent (n= 31) of which were published in November; 39.2 per cent (n= 20) printed during December. These articles were split almost equally between staff journalists (n= 26) and press agencies (n= 22), suggesting two characteristics. First that the reporting of Algeria was returning to a stage similar to that witnessed at the start of October, with journalists' access to Algeria being more restricted; and second, that the conflict in Algeria was becoming increasingly less newsworthy. These conclusions are given greater weight by the fact that the vast majority of articles by-lined to staff journalists were printed during November (n= 22; 84.6% of staff written articles).

The articles printed during the first week of November (n= 7) were all written by staff journalists and continued the themes developed during the previous month: the suspected role of the military in the deaths of civilians; torture; and, in the case of the *Financial Times*, the civilian protests sparked by the contrived election results. These themes are clearly observable in the following headlines:

- Post-mortem Algeria authorities dread** (Hirst, *Guardian* 1 November 1997)
- Conscript tells of Algeria's torture chambers** (Fisk, *Independent* 3 November 1997)
- Algerian MP's demonstration is broken up** (Khalaf, *Financial Times* 5 November 1997)
- No, Algeria, it's not an internal affair** (Fisk (column), *Independent* 6 November 1997)

These articles suggest that the by-lined journalists felt either a degree of responsibility - or 'Attachment' (Bell, 1998) - towards the affected Algerian civilians, or at least felt that the (Junta's) dirty war in Algeria needed to be reported. This is especially apparent in Robert Fisk's articles, where the sources he used in the reports of 1 and 3 November 1997 were recycled from reports printed in October.⁷ The messy and contested nature of the conflict - particularly in the apportioning of 'blame' - is still very clearly

foregrounded in reports printed during the first week of November 1997, as is the need for an external investigation into the massacres of Algerian civilians:

- 15) "This government has constructed an entirely false schema for the outside world, that of a democratic, secular state doing battle with terrorists. But the real problem is not the GIA [...but] a system of government basically unchanged since independence, which has failed on all levels, abuses human rights no less than the terrorists themselves and uses every conceivable artifice, including the exploitation of these terrible massacres, to stay in power." (Algerian Human Rights lawyer, in *Guardian*, 1 November 1997)
- 16) "We were on a roadblock, stopping anyone we suspected of being a terrorist. If a man had a face like a terrorist, if he had a big beard, he was shot." (Reda, an Algerian army conscript, in *Independent*, 3 November 1997)

Another article, printed during this first week of November and written by Robert Fisk is interesting for its portrayal of the reporting constraints which the Algerian press operates under (**Prized place in history for free spirit who dares to be defiant**, *Independent* (*Eye* tabloid supplement) 3 November 1997). Using the journalist Salima Ghezali's acceptance of the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought as a springboard, Fisk presents ways in which the Algerian Junta covertly and overtly manipulate the Algerian press.⁸ Despite the award, Ghezali had not had any of her work published in Algeria for almost a year, after the newspaper she edited - *La Nation* - was closed by the Algerian authorities. Acknowledging this irony, she wryly states "I am certainly the only journalist who has won an award without a newspaper", and, in explaining why *La Nation* was closed, illustrates the control which the Algerian authorities exert over information in the public sphere:

- 17) "We do have a debt to the [government-owned] printing plant, but there are papers that owe more and which are still printed. [...] We received a fax that we had to pay our debt of six million Algerian dinars (£100,000) right away [...because] we condemned the government for *increasing* the conflict rather than stopping 'terrorism'" Salima recalls.

In addition to the censorship of the newspaper, Ghezali suggests that the government attempts to censor her personally, by making threats on her life⁹

and debasing her reputation as a journalist: "Every time I win a prize people write to the organisations giving the prizes [...] saying that I am an accomplice of the GIA. These are the vulgar methods of our security authorities."

This article is important, not just because it acts to confirm the Algerian Junta's draconian grip on power, but also because of what it reveals of the Algerian newspapers which are *not* closed by the government. The implication of Fisk's article is that since the remaining Algerian newspapers have not had their debt to the government-owned printing plants 'called in', the Junta doesn't regard the news they print as threatening their continued dominion. This is an important observation to make, given the reliance of (first) the press agencies and (second) British newspapers on information taken from 'reports' first printed in Algerian newspapers, exposing the role which the Algerian Junta plays in relaying such information around the world as 'fact'. Unfortunately British broadsheets did not make such a connection, and in the second week of November, the reporting of Algeria started to revert back to relying on the Algerian Junta's version of events, as printed in Algerian dailies and wired from press agency sources (italics, emphases added):

- 18) Gunmen cut the throats of six foreigners, apparently Asians, and dumped their bodies in the sewerage system in Algiers, *a newspaper said*. Their bodies were found near a beach in Bab el Oued, a Muslim fundamentalist district. (**Algeria slaughter**, [no source] *Independent*, 24 November 1997)
- 19) Attackers blew up a bridge and then penetrated an Algerian village in darkness, slitting the throats of 29 people, hospital sources and *newspapers said yesterday*. (**Algerians slit 29 throats**, [AP] *Guardian*, 2 December 1997)
- 20) More than 280 Algerians, mainly suspected extremists opposed to the government, have been killed in clashes between the Islamic Salvation Army and the Armed Islamic Group [...] *according to press reports*. (**Rebel shoot-out**, [Reuters] *The Times*, 4 December 1997)

An Algerian news story which was frequently printed in British broadsheets during this period referred to civilians being killed at 'fake roadblocks':

- 21) Attackers disguised as police slit the throats of 28 civilians and then decapitated some of the victims [...] The attackers stopped cars at a fake roadblock, took the victims out of the cars [...] and executed them. (**Slaughter in Algeria**, [AP] *Independent*, 10 November 1997)
- 22) Armed Islamic Group men disguised as police killed eight motorists after setting up a roadblock in eastern Algeria [...] A dozen assailants dressed in police uniforms stopped motorists and then slit their throats. (**8 killed in Algeria**, [Agencies] *Guardian*, 19 November 1997)
- 23) Ninety-seven Algerians have been killed in massacres at fake roadblocks, in a bomb attack and in raids on remote villages since the weekend the Algerian press reported yesterday. [...] No one has claimed responsibility for the killings, which have yet to be confirmed. (**97 killed in Algerian massacres**, [Susannah Herbert] *Telegraph*, 31 December 1997)

An examination of the reported action in these articles, suggests strong doubts about the veracity of their claims may be appropriate. Why, when the suspicious role of the Algerian Junta had been reported in all broadsheets for a period of about four weeks, were these murders being reported in such a way? How do we *know* that the roadblocks were “fake” (thereby implying ‘Islamist’ or ‘terrorist’ involvement)? How do we *know* that the “dozen assailants dressed in police uniforms” were not actually Algerian policemen, bearing in mind the testimony of torturers repeatedly printed during this time, especially in the *Independent*? In excerpt 23, Susannah Herbert feels able to argue that the roadblocks were “fake”, even though “No one has claimed responsibility for the killings *which have yet to be confirmed*.” Finally (and although it should be acknowledged that this is not exactly comparing like-for-like) it is baffling why the *Independent* printed an article which unproblematically reported “Attackers disguised as police slit the throats of 28 civilians”, when seven days earlier the paper quoted an Algerian Inspector who had participated in a roadblock where police officers had shot anyone who “had a face like a terrorist” (see excerpt 16).

The confusing manner in which Algeria was reported was made all the more confusing by occasional articles, quoting authoritative and credible sources, which should have undermined the factual status of articles such as those quoted in excerpts 18-23. Both the *Independent* and the *Guardian* printed articles based on revelations from the French daily *Le Monde* for example, which quoted senior Algerian officers “accus[ing] Algerian security services of being responsible for the massacre in September of 200 villagers

at Beni Messous” (**Algeria’s dirty secret**, *Independent*, 11 November 1997), and alleged that other massacres “had been carried out by the secret services but blamed on Islamic groups to discredit the opposition” (**Algerian agent verifies atrocities**, *Guardian*, 11 November 1997). The Algerian officers’ allegations were presented as ‘fact’ in both headline and text of these two reports, yet the allegations appear to have been forgotten by their respective papers when they printed the wired reports of Algiers-based press agencies days later.

In addition, the role of actors and interests outside of Algeria were almost completely absent from reporting. Robert Fisk, in an article printed before the shift to ‘Muslim-blaming argumentation’ became predominant once again (**No, Algeria, it’s not an internal affair**, *Independent*, 6 November 1997), argued that “Soon - very soon - the West is going to have to link the purchase of Algerian oil and gas exports to human rights improvements”, but appeared oblivious to the fact that Algerian oil and human rights were *already* linked, but in a relationship opposite to that which he suggested. Algeria’s proximity to Europe makes it especially important in meeting Europe’s need for oil, gas and petroleum. A *Reuters* report, admittedly wired after Fisk’s above article (**Foreign oil firms unmoved in strife-torn Algeria**, Sara el-Gammal, 12 January 1998), linked the economic power of Algerian oil to the apparent apathy of Europe towards the deaths of Algerian civilians:

- 24) “Algeria’s importance to the West is its trump card. Its gas supplies to southern Europe are crucial, and Europe can’t afford to isolate Algeria” said Martin Stone at London-based Control Risks, a political and economic risk assessment company. Spain depends on Algeria for around 60 per cent of its gas imports while Italy relies on it for around 40 per cent of its gas.

Therefore, although Algeria relies on oil and gas exports for around 95 per cent of its foreign earnings and could therefore conceivably be brought to task for the continuing violence, el-Gammal (1998) shows that “there has been no indication of any plans among oil firms to pull out of the country” - quite the reverse in fact:

25) “[...] what would we achieve by pulling out? Would it solve Algeria's political problem? A diplomatic solution is what is needed [...] There's a lot at stake in Algeria, huge investments. Companies would not have made them if they didn't think there was a future in Algeria” [said an oil company official]. (el-Gammal, 1998: 1-2)

Of the sampled broadsheets, only Roula Khalaf in the *Financial Times* reported the conflict in a revelatory way which showed how the business of oil continued unabated in Algeria, despite civilian massacres. On 17 December for example, Khalaf reported that both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were giving their economic and political support to establishing three banks - Citibank, Société Générale and the Arab Banking Corp. - in Algeria (**Three foreign banks to set up in Algeria**, *Financial Times*). Quoting Mr Kelada-Antoun, the World Bank representative for North Africa, Khalaf shows that “the explosion in violence in recent months had not delayed plans for the new banks”. Later in the article Khalaf reports, with characteristic detraction, that “The World Bank and the International monetary Fund [are] strong supporters of economic reforms in Algeria, despite criticism that financial aid has only helped to bolster the army-backed government”. Here, that most flexible euphemism, “economic reform”, is knowingly used in order to draw attention to the wholly ideological agenda of both the IMF and World Bank to open up Algeria and her resources to corporate oil prospectors. The limited nature of Algerian “economic reform” is illustrated lower down the article where Khalaf states that “only the oil and gas sector, sheltered in the well-guarded southern desert, has received significant amounts of foreign investment”.

In a later especially denunciatory article (**Opportunities in Algeria for cynical traders**, *Financial Times*, 22 December 1997), Roula Khalaf goes even further, exposing how the interests of Capital were continually maintained and served whilst - or perhaps *because* - Algerian civilians were dying. The opening paragraph of the article argues that when the violence

26) [...] reaches new highs, traders say some European and Japanese institutions holding Algerian paper tend to dump the bonds, depressing prices. Others - for example several US hedge funds, some of the biggest holders of the [traded commercial] debt - are buyers. They take the view that Algeria's army-backed government is here to stay, whatever the level of violence.

Here Khalaf shows that, despite Fisk's optimistic prediction, the deaths of Algerian civilians do not appear to impede the accumulation of capital based on speculating on Algeria - quite the reverse in fact, with some companies specifically targeting the depreciated prices caused by the massacres of Algerian civilians. Lower down, the article quotes a trader who expresses, with remarkable clarity, the opportunities for profit which the massacres of Algerian civilians offer: "The hedge funds buy Algeria because it's high yield paper. *If there were no massacres, the spread would narrow and they would stop buying*" (emphasis added).

No newspaper other than the *Financial Times* reported the material benefits which the conflict brought to individuals and companies outside of Algeria.¹⁰ By not reporting such information, as both background and explanation to the conflict in Algeria, the readers' understanding of the conflict is limited to a superficial level - a level where the version of events presented by the Algerian Junta (a 'fledgling democracy' fighting 'terrorism') becomes plausible. Although the dubious status of the Junta's version was questioned, both implicitly (excerpt 16) and explicitly (excerpt 15) in articles printed at the start of this mid-period in reporting Algeria, by December only the *Financial Times* had maintained a critical reading of the reported events. The remaining broadsheets, relying predominantly on press agency reports, had returned to reporting (numbers of) civilian deaths from a position which implicated 'extremist' involvement ('fake roadblocks') and elided the mediating role of the Algerian Junta ('newspapers said').

5.3.4 January 1998: Reporting Algeria during Ramadan

As stated above, broadsheet newspapers had been implying that 'Muslims' and 'Muslim terrorists' were responsible for the deaths of Algerian civilians since the second week on November 1997 (and for the first two weeks of

October before that). By the first week of January 1998, which corresponded closely with the first week of Ramadan¹¹, the identification 'Muslims' and 'Muslim terror groups' as the agents responsible for the massacres of civilians in Algeria was explicit, even vociferous, in the majority of British broadsheets:

- 27) **After prayers, the slaughter.** As Islamist militants carry out their biggest massacre, Algeria's army looks increasingly unable to cope, David Hirst reports [...] An upsurge in terrorist violence in Ramadan has become a tradition (*Guardian*, 5 January 1998)
- 28) The carnage coincided with the first day of Ramadan. [...] Up to 600 civilians have died during the fasting month of Ramadan for the past five years when Muslim guerrillas have stepped up attacks in their "holy war". (**Terrorists murder 78 in Algeria as Ramadan begins**, *Telegraph*, 1 January 1998)
- 29) [The violence represented:] the worst slaughter yet by fundamentalist terrorists, coinciding with the start of Islam's holy month of Ramadan. (**Survivors tell of Ramadan massacre**, *The Times*, 5 January 1998)

In excerpt 27, after the *Guardian* placed obviously juxtaposed imagery of the sacred ("prayers") and profane ("slaughter") in the conspicuous position of the article's headline,¹² David Hirst suggests that Ramadan bodes ill for Algeria since it usually brings an "upsurge of terrorist violence" - a noun which presupposes a background level of terrorist violence from which an increase is possible. This presupposition is also present in excerpt 27 (which is taken from the article's lengthy by-line), where the deaths on the first night of Ramadan are described as the "*biggest massacre*" carried out by "Islamic militants", as well as in the remaining excerpts given above: "Muslim guerrillas have *stepped up attacks*" (28); and "*the worst slaughter yet* by fundamentalist terrorists" (29). These reports therefore not only return to confidently placing blame on 'Muslim' terrorists, but also locate the reported action within a continuum of slaughter/attacks/massacres for which these 'Muslims' are responsible - a schema identical to that of the first week of October 1997. The summarising reports of Sunday newspapers printed in this first week were especially liable to such reallocation of blame, particularly the *Independent on Sunday*, which printed a report by-lined to an *Associated Press* journalist named Rachid Khiari (emphases added):

30) Gangs armed with knives, axes, hoes and shovels methodically slaughtered more than 400 peasants in four poor villages in western Algeria, *the worst massacre* in six years of *Muslim fundamentalist insurgency*. [...] Until dawn the next morning *the militants slit people's throats* (*Survivors tell of worst Algeria massacre*, *IoS*, 4 January 1998)

In excerpt 30, the reported violence of 30 December 1997 is presupposed to be part of a "Muslim fundamentalist insurgency". Khiari believes that it was 'Muslim' "militants" who "slit people's throats" (despite disclosing that "No one has claimed responsibility for the attacks") and offers three argumentative supports to substantiate his claim:

- the murders occurred on "the first night of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan";
- "Villagers said the gangs wore baggy grey Afghan-style trousers - the sign of the most violent insurgents";
- and the "militants", specifically the GIA, are "the most militant opponents of President Liamine Zeroual's military-backed government" (with the added presupposition that the murders were motivated by such an opposition to the government).

Argumentation which counters the above conclusion of "militant" involvement was available in articles previously printed in the Independent as well as within Khiari's article itself. If it is assumed, for the sake of argument, that the murders were perpetrated by the Junta - a regime with an almost pathological fear of Islamism and the FIS - then it would be an entirely logical that the 'best time' to murder Muslims would be when they were collected in large groups - for example when "the inhabitants of the hamlets around the town of Relizane[...] were breaking their daily Ramadan fast at sunset" (Khiari, IoS, 4 January 1998). There were similarly large groups of fast-breaking Muslims and, unfortunately, similarly large massacres of Muslims for the remainder of Ramadan.

Second, given that an earlier article written by Robert Fisk contained an Algerian soldier's allegation that he had found a false beard amongst one of his comrade's belongings (excerpt 13), the observation that "the gangs wore baggy grey Afghan-style trousers" should by no means be taken as unequivocal evidence of 'Muslim' involvement. Khiari, working for *AP*, could

not be expected to have known about either this article or its revelations, but the *Independent* should have and should therefore have judged Khiari's claim accordingly.

Third, the murdered Algerians were supporters of the FIS, many of whom, Khiari claims, were now planning "to move to the nearby port of Oran" because of the massacres. Unfortunately Khiari does not explain the significance of such a move of rural peasants nor its benefit to the Junta: by displacing and relocating the (potential) opposition to the city of Oran, they would be easier monitor, or, in the words of the army, 'easier to protect'.¹³ In addition, the plain of Relizane is an area earmarked as a potential oil field which *BP*, amongst others, had been desperate to explore since investing in Algeria in 1995 (el-Gammal, 1998). The depopulation of the area would mean that such exploration could finally go ahead - obviously important to the Algerian Junta, due to the monopoly held by the state-owned oil company Sonatrach and the reliance of the country on oil revenue.¹⁴ These three readily available counter arguments throw doubt on the certitude of Khiari's conclusion of 'Muslim' involvement in the massacre.

Alternatively, the massacres *could* have been committed by 'Islamist' guerrillas - the AIS or more probably the GIA since, as Robert Fisk points out, "The villagers at Ouled Sahnine, Kheraba, El Abadel and Ouled Tayeb were themselves Islamists and had voted in the 1991 elections for the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)" (**Algeria terror touches the world**, *Independent*, 7 January 1998). In addition, the affected hamlets were located particularly close to the oil refinery at Arzew, in an area hitherto untouched by violence on this scale: these villages could therefore have been chosen in order to cause maximum disturbance to the regime through its reliance on oil. However, any evidence 'proving' the involvement of 'Islamists' is just as circumstantial as that 'proving' the involvement of the Junta and, as I have attempted to show above, can be questioned by interpreting the presented evidence from a different ontological position - one which assumes the guilt of the Junta as opposed to the guilt of the 'Islamists'.

Should the relocation of blame in broadsheets' news reports not have influenced their readers' recollection of the Algerian conflict - which had

been reported with such circumspect and hedged accusations of the Junta's culpability only six weeks previously - then the confident and often *strident* accusations of editorials printed during the first week of Ramadan certainly may have done:

- 31) Each year, terrorists have chosen the period of fasting to intensify their "holy war" against the regime. [...] The Western world breathed a sigh of relief when the FIS bid for power was scotched. Six years on it is faced with a country a short distance across the Mediterranean whose instability threatens an exodus of refugees to Europe. (*Holy Terror, Telegraph*, 5 January 1998)
- 32) [...] in Algeria, Ramadan has acquired a new, terrible and alien identity as the season in which armed terror strikes most forcibly. Murdering in the name of Allah by methods of unspeakable deliberate cruelty, the fanatical Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) - the group behind most if not all Algerian atrocities - has butchered as many as 850 people in the week since Ramadan began. (*Algeria's great fear, The Times*, 5 January 1998)

These articles, better than any others printed at this time, illustrate the explanation of the Algerian massacres which the newspapers (as opposed to journalists or the cited sources) felt most accurate. The *Telegraph* editorial is full of bombast and hyperbole so immediately apparent that no further analysis is needed. Lower down they call the GIA "a canker", whose justification of terror "*makes a mockery of a book [the Qu'ran] that begins by invoking a merciful and compassionate God*" (emphasis added), making their position quite clear. The reference to "an exodus of [Algerian] refugees" was revisited in later reporting, as discussed below.

The editorial in *The Times* is much more interesting, since the newspaper felt able to open with ringing declarations of 'Muslim' guilt despite acknowledging further down the article that "the killings continue amid uncertainty about who is behind all of them". In addition, despite making one of the few references during Ramadan of suspected army involvement in the massacres,¹⁵ both excerpt 32 and the conclusion of the editorial - "The GIA is the most murderous fanatical force the world has seen since Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge; it must be stopped" - make it abundantly clear that *The Times* believes the GIA were to blame for the killings. In order to make their argument appear more plausible in the face of as much (or as *little*) evidence

suggesting the involvement of the army, the newspaper employs emotive words and phrases - “fanatical”; butchers (from “butchered”); “terror”; and “unspeakable deliberate cruelty” - in order to draw a *rhetorical* (i.e. not evidential) association between the massacres of Algerian civilians, the GIA, Ramadan and finally Islam.

By way of contrast, the *Financial Times* printed three articles during the first week of Ramadan - a news report; a news feature; and an editorial. The topics reported and argumentation employed reveals the same, ‘alternative’ view of the conflict which the *Financial Times* presented throughout the sample. In the news article, printed on 5 January 1998, Roula Khalaf was the first journalist to report the call for an independent investigation into the massacres in Algeria, and what’s more, to properly identify the initiative as originating with Germany (**Germany calls on EU to act over Algerian killings**; see below for further analysis). This German proposal called for “a diplomatic effort to help end the killings” - killings, which Khalaf illustrates, continued to be a matter of much debate, with “human rights groups” still calling “for independent investigations into responsibility for the massacres” due to their proximity to army barracks.

The news feature continued the topic of the proposed EU involvement in Algeria further, and in doing so exposed: the protected and privileged position enjoyed by international oil and gas companies in Algeria; and these same companies’ worries that the increased interest in the deaths of Algerian civilians “risks disturbing the isolated existence” (**Algerian killings fuel oil groups concern**, Roula Khalaf & Robert Corzine, *Financial Times*, 6 January 1998). With the increase in violence, “confusion over why the killings occur, and lack of independent information, comes criticism of the army-backed government’s human rights record” and concern, from both human rights organisations and others, that oil companies should not be investing in, and therefore supporting, such a regime. The profitable investment opportunities which the massacres in Algeria provide (see 24-26) are drawn out again by Khalaf and Corzine, with a view to criticising the mercenary attitude of the executives and corporations involved:

33) "The big money is in countries whose names end in 'ia' or 'stan' ...places other people don't want to go", said a senior executive of a US oil engineering group active in Algeria.

Another "European oil company executive" is quoted as saying: "It is a concern. There is a feeling opposition groups might be able to capitalise on human rights concerns". This quote alone makes it immediately apparent where 'concerns' of these individuals lie: in *profit* and not *human life*.

The *Financial Times'* editorial (**Algerian horrors**, 6 January 1998), printed on the same day as the news feature discussed above, is a rare and remarkable piece of journalism: objective without being indifferent; exegetical without tripping over itself in an attempt to apportion blame; and critical in the truest sense of the word. In response to the question central to the reporting of Algeria - 'who is killing civilians?' - the *Financial Times* was honest and measured: they simply did not know:

34) No one is sure who to blame, what to demand, or what action to take if demands are ignored. No one wants to reward or encourage such activities by reacting as the perpetrators wish, but even that is hard to avoid so long as it is unclear who the perpetrators really are.

The version offered by the Junta - that the "massacres are the work of Islamic extremist terrorists" - is described as having "the merit of being clear, but is so self-serving that few believe it to be the whole truth". An alternative explanation - that "the regime itself must have a hand in the violence [with the GIA...] widely assumed to have been infiltrated, if not created by the regime's security apparatus" - is "not fully convincing either" since the massacres "make nonsense of its claim to have achieved stability".

In light of the uncertain identification of murderers in Algeria, the editorial argues that the Junta needs to "accede to the growing demand, [...] for impartial external investigators to be given full access so that responsibility for the massacres can be established as clearly as possible". By coincidence, although clearly in response to the German request for a "diplomatic effort to help end the killings" (*Financial Times*, 5 January 1998),

both the topic of an independent investigation and the *Financial Times*' line of argumentation were adopted by the remaining broadsheets the following day when the final 'rolling story' of the sample started to develop: the EU announced its intention to send a diplomatic mission to Algeria. The exact intended purpose of the proposed mission was none too clear from the initial reports, with a "European Official" involved in the formation of the plan appearing as uninformed as the journalists: "We don't know what to do, so we will send a few ministers there and give money to victims, but it will not solve the problem" (**EU ponders Algeria stance**, *Financial Times*, 8 January 1998). The broadsheets tended to place Robin Cook 'centre stage' in these reports, suggesting that the diplomatic mission was his and not the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel's, plan:

- 35) Britain is leading a European Union attempt to intervene in Algeria after reports that hundreds of civilians were killed last weekend [...] (**Cook steers plan to send EU mission to Algiers**, *Guardian*, 7 January 1998)
- 36) Robin Cook, the Foreign Secretary, yesterday said that the European Union was considering sending a delegation of senior officials to Algeria to discuss the situation with the military government [...] Mr Cook said: "I want to record the shock and horror that we are feeling about the reports of the appalling atrocities in Algeria" (**Cook says EU plans to send mission**, *The Times*, 7 January 1998)

A *Telegraph* editorial which discussed the planned mission (**Terror in Algeria**, 9 January 1998) managed to completely reverse an earlier representation of the conflict in Algeria (which was itself a reversal), in order to continue its usual antagonistic position towards the European Union. "The EU", the newspaper argued

- 37) [...] will not address the heart of the problem, which is *the theft of the 1992 elections* by the generals and their subsequent refusal to enter into serious dialogue with *moderate members of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)*. [emphasis added]

The theft of the election in 1992 was an event which the *Telegraph* previously had little complaint about - in fact, as excerpt 31 shows (printed 5 January 1998), they "breathed a sigh of relief when the FIS bid for power was scotched". Within this reversal of argument there remained - indeed the

argument was *based* upon - the presupposed civilising influence of 'the West' and the assumed right of 'the West' (seeming, in this case to mean only Britain) to manage the affairs of other nations:

38) The West should now be urging the government in Algiers to reopen dialogue with the FIS leaders [...] The West's acquiescence in the curtailing of the electoral process six years ago has been cowardly and inconsistent with democratic principle. [...] It is time for a change, and *the West should say so*. [emphasis added]

The arrogance of excerpt 38 is accompanied by the somewhat remarkable ability of the *Telegraph* to implicitly exclude itself from "The West's acquiescence", despite the support they gave to the "cowardly and inconsistent" curtailing of democratic principle in their editorial printed only four days beforehand.

Noticeably underplayed in the reporting of the EU mission to Algeria, was the recognition that the diplomatic initiative had originated in Germany. Following the initial report in the *Financial Times*, and an article in the *Guardian* which actually followed the Ian Black report of 7 January (**Germany proposes Algeria mission**, Ian Traynor, 8 January 1998), the mission was overwhelmingly represented as either Robin Cook's or a British initiative. That Britain would take the baton from Germany in this way is to some extent understandable given that Britain occupied the EU presidency during this time. However, the reports of British journalists showed the relish which they also took in the 'historic opportunity' that Britain appeared to have been given to solve the 'problem of Algeria':

39) Europe is awakening late to this terrible story. Babies with their throats cut, women raped, entire families massacred by bands of bearded men [...] outrage and revulsion at 1,000 killings over the past fortnight now need to be translated into action. (**We need to save lives** [column, Ian Black], *Guardian*, 16 January 1998)

40) The anguish and revulsion are universal, but *nowhere more deeply felt than in Europe*, linked by history and geography to the lands of North Africa [...] Something must be done, the world demands. The question is, what? (**If Algeria cannot be helped, at least let the UN gather the facts**, [editorial] *Independent*, 7 January 1998; emphasis added)

From the representation of the conflict in excerpt 39, it is immediately apparent who Ian Black is implying are responsible for the killings with his reference to “bands of bearded men”. Other reports employed similar imagery: Thierry Oberlé and John Phillips, writing for *The Sunday Times* for example, blamed the massacres on “men with heavy beards and kohled eyes” (**Algeria sees 1,000 die in holy month**, 11 January 1998). Elsewhere reports contained suggestions that throat slitting may be an especially ‘Islamic’ way of killing.¹⁶

In excerpt 40, the *Independent’s* claim appears to be based on the presupposition that ‘We’ in Europe are somehow more ‘civilised’, more ‘caring’ than the rest of the World. How else could the paper claim that Europe feels “anguish and revulsion” “more deeply” than anywhere else, based on its proximity to and colonial ‘history’ (nicely obfuscatory) shared with Algeria? Any country in Northern Africa is similarly linked by ‘geography’, but in addition, may also have social, cultural, linguistic, religious and often *familial* ties to the tragedy in Algeria, therefore making a nonsense of the *Independent’s* argumentative supports.

Running alongside this discourse of Algerian salvation, but in a distinctly backgrounded position to it, other far less noble reasons why Britain and the EU may have a vested interest in ‘solving’ the ‘problem of Algeria’ were being reported: Muslim terrorism and Muslim refugees:

41) [Robin Cook:] “We have learned too often in the past that if we allow terrorism to take root in any one country, it can all too quickly be exported to other countries.” (**Cook seeks to satisfy Algerians after snub**, *Guardian*, 15 January 1998)

42) [...] the Austrian Foreign Minister, Wolfgang Schussel, warned: “We believe this is a European problem and that if we don’t try to stop the killings now, at some point in the future there will be huge waves of refugees coming to Europe.” (**Algeria mission saved as EU reacts to snub**, *Guardian*, 16 January 1998)

The schematic nature of these prejudicial themes are well-known and hardly need further discussion here. But consider this: were the ‘threat’ of “a flood of Algerian refugees” a motivating factor in dispatching the EU diplomatic mission, as the quotes above seem to suggest it was, then all the EU would

have to do in order to stem this threatened 'tide' would be to confirm that the murders were being committed by 'Islamist terrorists' rather than the Algerian Junta. The EU guidelines on asylum operating at this time "took a 'restrictive approach' by recognising as refugees only people who feared persecution at the hands of a state" (no headline [*Reuters*], *The Times*, 21 January 1998). Sure enough, following the 24 hour visit of the 'troika' of EU diplomats, various reports were printed declaring the EU's belief in the complete innocence of the Junta:

- 43) "My personal feeling is that there is no involvement on the part of the government vis-à-vis what is happening; no responsibility at all", Manuel Marin, responsible for EU relations with the southern Mediterranean and Middle East said in Brussels. (**EU official rules out Algiers link to killings**, *Sunday Times*, 17 January 1998)
- 44) Mr Fatchett said no evidence existed to support the perception of government implication in the violence. (**Faint hopes as Algeria mission ends**, *Financial Times*, 22 January 1998)

These conclusions are, again, to a certain degree understandable given that the EU delegation: were not allowed to visit any of the massacre sites; were not allowed to speak to either members of the opposition nor the Algerian public; and, if the statements of Robin Cook to the EU Parliament are anything to go by, had already decided who was the innocent party before they had left:

- 45) [Robin Cook:] *We have seen no evidence to support allegations of involvement by the Algerian Security Authorities [...]* It is in the interests of the Algerian authorities to let the press see for themselves what is going on in their country and *who is responsible for the terrorism*. (*Reuters Press Release*, 14th January 1998; emphasis added)

In addition: the Algerian press were 'leant upon' during the visit of EU delegates, to the extent that several massacres of civilians were not reported by even the larger newspapers; and several opposition leaders were arrested on trumped up or non-existent charges either immediately previous to or during the visit itself. The editor of *Liberté*, for example, said: "it was hard to report yet another atrocity that seemed to show the state is incapable of protecting its citizens" (**Press holed up in no man's land**, *Guardian*, 23

January 1998). In a related incident, AbdelKader Hachani (FIS) was arrested “for giving interviews to two French newspapers” in which he requested the intervention of the UN in Algeria (**Algeria relents over visit from EU team**, *Independent*, 16 January 1998; also reported in **Leader of banned activists arrested**, *The Times*, 15 January 1998). With such suppression of material contesting the Junta’s version of events, the EU delegation found itself quite able to announce they had “come up with no evidence to support allegations of direct government complicity” (**EU uses rights as weapons against Algeria**, *IoS*, 25 January 1998).

Contrary to the EU’s assessment, evidence was in fact mounting against the Algerian Junta. Many of the reports wired from Ian Black (*Guardian*), who had been allowed into Algiers to cover the EU visit, contained accusations of military complicity in civilian massacres similar in style and content to those printed at the end of October 1997. Perhaps more damning however, was the testimony of former Algerian security personnel to Anne Clwyd’s all-party Parliamentary human rights group:

46) Captain ‘Joseph’ Harnoun, described as a former member of the Algerian secret service, told the Commons all-party Parliamentary human rights group that his former colleagues were implicated in “dirty jobs, including the killing of journalists, officers and children” [...] He also claimed that the militant GIA had been infiltrated by the Algerian security forces. This charge was also made by Rashid Messaudi, an Algerian-born journalist [...] (**Security service linked to killings**, *Guardian*, 23 January 1998)

The Times’ report of this same story was even more declarative, placing accusations of the Algerian army’s involvement in the first clause of the first sentence of the article, thereby facilitating a ‘factual reading’:

47) Algeria’s state authorities are behind the torture and murder of civilians, a former member of the Algerian secret service alleged to an all-party group of MPs and peers. (**Zeroual secret agents accused of massacres**, *The Times*, 23 January 1998)

Notice in excerpt 47 the declaration of ‘fact’ in “are”, whilst the ‘allegor’, the “former member of the Algerian secret service”, is placed in a subordinate clause.

Even Tim Butcher, the *Telegraph's* Defence Correspondent, started to seriously doubt the official version of the massacres after he was allowed into Algiers to cover the visit of the EU delegation.¹⁷ After talking to "half a dozen" survivors of a massacre at Sidi Hamed, on the outskirts of Algiers, Butcher wrote:

48) [...] It appears that a group of men dressed in army uniforms knocked on some of the doors and told the villagers to be quiet. Others in baggy clothes, described as "Afghan-style Mudjahideen" then surrounded the hamlet. There was an army outpost about 300 yards away but the survivors said that the soldiers did not emerge until the attack was complete (**EU unable to end the nightmare of Algeria**, *Telegraph*, 21 January 1998)

Although the report does not state as such, the implication again appears to be that since the army "did not emerge until the attack was complete", they had conspired with the killers - perhaps the first group of men *were* the army whilst the "Afghan-style Mudjahideen" were the army wearing disguises. Such an account of the massacre was also implied by the article written from Sidi Hamed by Ian Black¹⁸ (**Blood runs cold in Algeria**, *Guardian*, 21 January 1998); although Anthony Loyd's article in *The Times* (**Algeria massacre village barred to EU visitors**, 21 January 1998) took the opposite view - that the first group were militants disguised in army uniforms - illustrating the possibilities for different interpretations, even amongst journalists working side-by-side, in the same location (Algiers), at the same time. In the absence of 'informed, authoritative and credible' sources it appears that the interpretation of journalists working 'on the ground' is all we are left with.

5.4 Summary

The reporting of Algeria between October 1997 and January 1998 is characterised by conflicting and contradictory shifts in broadsheet newspapers' 'claims-to-truth' - specifically regarding their identification of who is 'to blame' for the deaths of Algerian civilians. In general, during the periods in which broadsheets relied upon the reporting of press agencies based in Algeria, 'Muslims' were blamed for the violence. Needless to say

the influential hand of the Junta in the production of such claims, whereby information is “first produced by the security services in Algeria, passed through the Algeria press and the *AFP*, then reproduced in the Western media” (Slisli, 2000: 53) was backgrounded or deleted in these reports. Broadsheet journalists were only allowed to enter Algeria at such time as an opportunity arose to promote the Junta’s preferred image of a ‘fledgling democracy’ - during the municipal elections and later during the visit of the EU delegation. That journalists did not represent Algeria in such a way is testament to the availability of evidence in Algeria which contradicts the explanation of the Junta.

It could therefore be argued that the improved detail and critical analysis of Algerian reporting during the periods in which broadsheets had sent staff journalists to Algeria, illustrates the importance of having independent journalists ‘at the scene’ of the events being reported. This is unquestionably true, although it is not the most significant argument of this chapter. Both following and, on occasion, *during* the periods in which staff journalists were in Algeria, broadsheet newspapers reverted back to the simplicity and clarity of blaming ‘Muslims’ for murdering (other Muslim) Algerian civilians, despite the veracity of such claims being repeatedly and comprehensively brought into question. The origin of such reports can be traced back to the Algerian Ministry of Internal Affairs - the only source in Algeria allowed to divulge ‘security information’, and a propaganda arm of the Junta which intended to build, “on the basis of western stereotypes, a deliberate campaign of misinformation” (Slisli, 2000: 49). How and why such transparently falsifiable claims were repeatedly printed - especially following the detailed and circumspect reports of staff journalists ‘in the field’ - is mystifying. Roula Khalaf, critical as ever, quoted a French diplomat whose view on Algeria is quite instructive:

- 49) “It has always been that policymakers convinced themselves of the goodwill of the regime, insisting that *it was close to our values and it couldn’t be totally negative*”, says a French diplomat. “This made our policy rational. The worst fear has always been Islamic fundamentalism and the spread of terrorism to France.” (EU ponders Algeria stance, *Financial Times*, 8 January 1998)

It appears that a similar perspective ruled the coverage of Algeria in the broadsheet press: this was, after all, a secular 'government' fighting a war with 'Muslims'. Faced with massacres in a Muslim country; given the 'choice' between apportioning blame for such crimes to 'Muslims' or a military-backed government (Junta by any other name); given that the evidence pointing to the connivance or complicity of the army in such killings was only circumstantial, albeit increasingly persuasive; broadsheet newspapers found the racist stereotypes and misinformation provided by the Algerian Junta were much more convenient to print than the messy and uncomfortable reality: they *did not know* what the truth was. This, combined with the fear of European governments that any meaningful intervention may result in a 'flood of *Muslim* refugees' and the estrangement of their local petroleum provider, has since contributed to the deaths of countless more men, women and children in Algeria.

Notes: Chapter 5

¹ Later in the chapter I argue that the almost exclusively Algerian location of these 242 articles, coupled with journalists' difficulties in gaining access to the country, had significant implications for the reliability of broadsheet reporting of Algeria.

² The 'primary' and 'secondary parent topics', respectively, of these seven articles were: Race and Community Relations--Culture and Custom; Policing and Law & Order--Race and Community Relations; Policing and Law & Order--Policing and Law & Order (twice); Policing and Law & Order--Business; Culture and Custom--Women; and Business--Business.

³ All the British broadsheet dailies sent a journalist to Algeria to cover the municipal elections. In alphabetical order: the *Financial Times* sent Roula Khalaf; the *Guardian* sent David Hirst; the *Independent* sent Robert Fisk; the *Telegraph* sent Robert Fox; and *The Times* sent Anthony Loyd.

⁴ For example: in 'Claims of fraud as ruling party wins Algeria poll' (*Telegraph*, 25 October 1997) Robert Fox wrote that "During the campaign, 10 [opposition] candidates were murdered, allegedly by the GIA." Robert Fisk was a little more polemical, and in 'Algerian election results beggar belief' (*Independent*, 27 October 1997) he wrote that "last week's election results in Algeria suggest that the people's voice was distorted beyond recognition to produce a fraudulent victory for the two pro-government parties [...] an incredible - a truly incredible - 70 per cent of Algerians voted for these two parties."

⁵ Although the reports printed in the *Guardian* did not explicitly allege that the Algerian army were actively involved in killing civilians, the implication that the Army were *culpable* for the deaths of civilians was clear - as evidenced by the angry response their articles provoked from Ahmed Benyamina, Algeria's Ambassador to the United Kingdom. In one letter Mr Benyamina argued: "only the terrorists benefit

from your articles: not only do they commit these massacres, for which they have claimed responsibility [...] but they are assured, thanks to the leniency shown by articles such as yours, that at least part of the responsibility for their acts is pushed onto the shoulders of the government.” (**Murder and conspiracy in Algeria**, *Guardian*, 23 October 1997)

⁶ See Fisk’s report **‘Women who wait for lost souls to come home’** (31 October 1997) and compare his representation of Algerian women with that of a male lawyer in his report **‘One man’s heroic fight against a regime with a taste for torture’** (30 October 1997). Obviously in contrasting Fisk’s representation of (Algerian) gender in these reports we are not comparing like for like: active, educated, emotionally detached male lawyer; and passive, uneducated, female relations of victims. But Roula Khalaf’s reporting illustrates a wealth of contrasting (Algerian) female experience and political *activity*, which neither Fisk nor (to be fair) any other reporter mentioned or appeared to notice when reporting the torture and murder of civilians by the Algerian Army and Security forces.

⁷ The “exiled witness” of Fisk’s 1 November report was also used (albeit not centrally) in **Witness from the front line of a police force bent on brutality** (*Independent*, 30 October 1997); whilst the “Conscript” in his 3 November report was the same conscript quoted in excerpt 13 (**Lost souls of the Algerian night: now their torturers tell the truth**, *Independent*, 30 October 1997). These sources are used by Fisk in order to state and restate his argument regarding the brutality of the Algerian regime.

⁸ Further: in January 1997 Salima Ghezali and the Algerian human rights lawyer Abdennour Ali Yahia were awarded the Oscar Romero Award from the Rothko Chapel in Houston, Texas, presented every alternate year to organisations or persons who distinguish themselves by their courage and dignity; and in March 1997, Ghezali was named “international editor of the year” by the World Press Review.

⁹ These threats occur “whenever she writes freelance articles for the European press. ‘I’ve never been called in by the authorities’, she says. ‘It’s very perverse - friends of friends are told by ‘someone’ that I talk too much, that my body will one day be found in a ditch with my throat slashed’.”

¹⁰ The lack of interest which other broadsheets showed the story is no doubt the result of these newspapers own particular definitions of ‘newsworthiness’ - a concept, in part, the result of audience taste and therefore (arguably) not wholly under the control of the newspapers themselves.

¹¹ Ramadan actually started on the 30 December 1997 but, due to a ‘time-lag’, presumably caused by the New Year and British newspapers printing the reports of Algerian or French newspapers (who had in turn reprinted Algerian newspaper articles), the murder of Algerian civilians on the first night of Ramadan was not reported until 1 January 1998.

¹² The juxtaposition of ‘innocence’ and ‘malevolence’ is a common stylistic feature, of course, particularly when tabloid newspapers report (for example) the murder of mothers and children where it tends to develop to the point of rhetorical parallelism - the presentation of the virtuous home, forever sullied by the degeneracy of murder.

¹³ General Kamel Abderahman, the military commander for western Algeria, had earlier warned that “People must either arm or take refuge in the towns. The state does not have the means to put a soldier outside every front door” (**Algeria terror touches the world**, *Independent*, 7 January 1998).

¹⁴ This depopulation of the Relizane province - by murder and the subsequent exodus of surviving villagers - continued over the next week, and was reported

mainly in small 'news reviews': "Further massacres in Algeria's western province of Relizane have cost the lives of 62 civilians and left 48 wounded, according to state-run radio [...] Hundreds of civilians fled the remote mountainous region after a massacre a week ago and the exodus continued after gunmen attacked two more villages at the weekend" (**Algerian terrorists add to death toll**, *The Times*, 8 January 1998).

¹⁵ The editorial states: "even where army garrisons are close by, troops mysteriously almost never arrive until the killing squads have gone. The army [...] has armed semi-official militias, some of which are themselves suspected of participating in the killings".

¹⁶ For example, two articles reported that Brigitte Bardot had been taken to court (again) for making racist comments - more specifically, she had "made an explicit connection between the slaughter of animals in Islamic rituals and the slaughter of people by fundamentalist groups in Algeria" (**Racist slur puts Brigitte Bardot in court again**, *Independent on Sunday*, 18 January 1998). The 'slur' was made in an article Bardot had written for *Paris Match*, who did not appear to have been reprimanded in any way for printing such bigoted nonsense. Contrary to the triumphalism with which her conviction was treated in a follow-up report (**Bardot guilty of race hate**, *Independent*, 21 January 1998), the allegedly 'Islamic' character of throat slitting was implied in a great many articles reporting civilian massacres.

¹⁷ Previous to visiting Algeria, Tim Butcher (*Telegraph*, Defence Correspondent) blamed 'Muslims' and 'Islamist groups' for the massacres of civilians. Take, for example, the presentation of the Algerian conflict in his report '**EU considers sending mission to Algeria**' (7 January 1998): "When the war began in 1992 these [Islamist] groups attacked police stations, post offices and other totems of the state, but their violence was soon extended to a holy war against any person perceived not to be sufficiently Muslim."

¹⁸ Ian Black did not, however, appear to realise the ideological significance of referring to a massacre at "a *fake roadblock set up by militants disguised as police*" two days beforehand (**British minister urges candour from Algeria**, *Guardian*, 19 January 1998; emphasis added).