The Discursive Representation of Islam and Muslims

In British Broadsheet Newspapers

Volume 2

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Chapter 6

The Iraq Debacle: The reporting of Iraq during the UNSCOM stand-off

6.1 Introduction

This chapter explores broadsheet newspaper reporting of Iraq across the sampled four month period, with discussion divided broadly between quantitative and qualitative results. Quantitative results are presented first to provide an overall profile of coverage, followed by a more detailed qualitative analysis of the claims, assumptions and arguments of the newspaper articles.

Quantitative results are presented as tables, with data drawn from the summarised frequencies produced by *coding* the content of the articles (see Chapter 3). The quantity of data produced by this coding process is substantial and consequently, as with the preceeding chapters, only those variables germane to the reporting of Iraq were included in this section. But, in an effort to present standardised results across the thesis, certain key variables - for example, 'topic', 'actor', 'country' and the physical characteristics of the articles, amongst others - will be presented in order to provide a cogent and coherent profile of press coverage across the various chapters.

The qualitative results explore the detailed and particularly well developed discursive strategy of the story which dominated these Iraq articles over the sampled period of newspapers: the UNSCOM weapons inspections and resulting 'stand-off' between Iraq, the UN and the US. This section argues that a single dominant discursive strategy is present across the sampled Iraq articles, directed at justifying military attacks on Iraq and the removal of President Saddam Hussein from power. The discussion is divided across six sub-sections, analysing the manifest, the implied and the presupposed argumentation of the sampled Iraq articles which support this strategy. Following this: a section analyses the minority of dissenting articles and the arguments they employ in undermining the dominant discursive strategy; and a final eighth section discusses Iraq articles which, at first

glance, appear unconnected to the issues of UNSCOM, war and Saddam Hussein.

6.2 **Quantitative results and discussion**

Table 6.1 below shows the size and frequency of the reports published by the seven newspapers across the four month sample:

Table 6.1: Size and Number of Iraq articles, by newspaper

		Article size (cm)		
		Mean	Sum	Valid N
Newspaper	Financial Times	172	14938	N=87
	Guardian	192	23363	N=122
	Independent	204	15526	N=76
	Telegraph	192	17129	N=89
	The Times	190	22930	N=121
	IoS	244	4147	N=17
	Sunday Times	311	5916	N=19
Total		196	103949	N=531

Table 6.1 shows that 103,949 centimetres of column space were dedicated to covering Iraq over the four month sample, across 531 articles. Distributed across the 123 days of sampled newspaper coverage, this amounts to a average 4.32 articles on Iraq per day covering 845.1 centimetres of column space: a daily mean of 184.9 column centimetres and a little less than one article (n= 0.95) per newspaper. Of the daily newspapers, the *Guardian* and *The Times* printed the highest number of articles on Iraq whilst the *Independent* printed the least. The *Independent on Sunday* and the *Sunday Times*, show totals substantially lower than the daily newspapers (17 and 19 respectively). When their frequencies are multiplied by six, the totals better all but the *Guardian* and *The Times*, illustrating that these low frequencies are due to being published once a week.

Table 6.1 shows that the *Sunday Times* had the highest mean column size (311 cm), followed by the *Independent on Sunday* (mean 244 cm), whilst the *Financial Times* had the lowest (172 cm).

Graph 6.1 below shows the distribution of articles on Iraq across the four month sample:

Graph 6.1: Number of Iraq articles, by date



Three 'peaks' in reporting are discernible: the first starts at the onset of the sample, peaks on the 15 November 1997 with 32 articles and decreases to an average 1.3 articles per day between 29 November and 8 December 1997. The second peak occurred between 9 December and 27 December 1997, with the highest count (7 articles) falling on 16 December. Finally, the quantity of articles reporting Iraq started to increase again on 13 January 1998, peaked on the 19 and 20 January with 15 and 10 articles respectively, and remained high for the remainder of the sample.

Graph 6.2 overleaf shows the total daily centimetres of column space which the newspapers devoted to reporting Iraq.

Graph 6.2: Daily column centimetres of broadsheet Iraq articles



Graph 6.2 indicates that the reporting of Iraq hit a clear peak on 15 November, with the sampled newspapers devoting 6,802 centimetres of column space to reporting Iraq. The combined column centimetres of these Iraq articles for 15 November and the three days either side of this date (i.e. the week between 12 & 18 November 1997) amounted to 24,464 centimetres, or 23.5 per cent of the column centimetres dedicated to reporting Iraq across the whole sample. This peak in reporting was due to an escalation in the inspections crisis following the expulsion of American members of the UNSCOM team and the US threatening 'serious consequences' should this action not be reversed. A deal was brokered and accepted by both sides on 15 November.

The second peak in output occurred on the 13 December 1997 amounting to 1,674 centimetres of column space. This day's high column centimetres appears anomalous to the surrounding coverage and is almost wholly attributable to a single feature article in the *Saturday Times* colour supplement (1,144 centimetres of column).

The column cm started to increase again on 13 January, peaking on 19 January 1998 with 2,630 centimetres of column space. This peak was

due in part to Saddam Hussein reneging on the earlier deal and the threat of hostilities increasing again.

Table 6.2: Format of Iraq articles, by newspaper

		Newspaper							
		Financial Times	Guardian	Independent	Telegraph	The Times	IoS	Sunday Times	Total
News	Count	62	75	65	71	94	10	15	392
	Col %	71.3%	61.5%	85.5%	79.8%	77.7%	58.8%	78.9%	73.8%
Editorial	Count	4	4	2	6	9		1	26
	Col %	4.6%	3.3%	2.6%	6.7%	7.4%		5.3%	4.9%
Column	Count	3	9	1	1	2	1		17
	Col %	3.4%	7.4%	1.3%	1.1%	1.7%	5.9%		3.2%
Feature	Count		1	2	2	1	3	2	11
	Col %		.8%	2.6%	2.2%	.8%	17.6%	10.5%	2.1%
Letter	Count	1	5	1		4	1		12
	Col %	1.1%	4.1%	1.3%		3.3%	5.9%		2.3%
Weekly News summary	Count		3						3
	Col %		2.5%						.6%
Review	Count							1	1
	Col %							5.3%	.2%
News in brief	Count	17	24	5	9	11	2		68
	Col %	19.5%	19.7%	6.6%	10.1%	9.1%	11.8%		12.8%
Obituary	Count		1						1
	Col %		.8%						.2%
Total	Count	87	122	76	89	121	17	19	531
	Col %	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 6.2 shows that the sampled broadsheet newspapers reported Iraq in similar ways over the four months of reporting. 'News' was the format most frequently used: 73.8 per cent of Iraq articles were 'news', significantly higher than the percentage for the sample as a whole (63.9%; n= 1624). Editorials (4.9%; n= 26) were also used to report Iraq more often than in the sample as a whole (2.7%; n= 69) whilst 'news in brief' (12.8%; n= 68) were used significantly less (20.2%; n= 513). These percentages signal the importance which the newspapers gave to reporting Iraq - an interest which their readers did not appear to share since 'readers' letters' on Iraq (2.3%;

n= 12) were printed less often than across the sample as a whole (3.4%; n= 86).

A 'hard news' index was then calculated in order to reveal the (differing) priorities placed on 'hard' and 'soft' news by the seven newspapers. This was achieved through combining the frequencies of the 'hard news' formats: 'news', 'editorial', 'news summary' and 'news in brief'; and comparing them with the combined counts of the 'soft' formats: 'column', 'feature', 'cartoon', 'diary', 'letter', 'review' and 'obituary'. The results for Iraq reporting are shown below:

Table 6.3: 'Hard' and 'soft' Iraq articles, by newspaper

		Format: 'hard' and 'soft' news				Total	
		'Hard' news		'Soft' news			
		Count	Row %	Count	Row %	Count	Row %
	Financial Times	83	95.4%	4	4.6%	87	100.0%
	Guardian	106	86.9%	16	13.1%	122	100.0%
	Independent	72	94.7%	4	5.3%	76	100.0%
	Telegraph	86	96.6%	3	3.4%	89	100.0%
	The Times	114	94.2%	7	5.8%	121	100.0%
	IoS	12	70.6%	5	29.4%	17	100.0%
	Sunday Times	16	84.2%	3	15.8%	19	100.0%
Total		489	92.1%	42	7.9%	531	100.0%

The percentage of 'hard news' for the sample as a whole is 87.8 per cent (n= 2229), illustrating the predominance of 'hard news' when the sampled newspapers reported Iraq: 92.1 per cent (n= 489) of these Iraq articles adopted a 'hard news' format. Only the *Guardian*, the *Independent on Sunday*, and the *Sunday Times* returned a percentage lower than the mean of the sample as a whole. In the case of the *Guardian*, their 86.9 per cent (n= 106) of 'hard news' articles was still higher than the percentage observed across the total sampled *Guardian* articles (83.9%; n= 521).

This high proportion of 'hard news' items inevitably favours the reporting of 'events' as opposed to coverage discussing the importance and effects as experienced and perceived both by the newspapers and the Iraqi people. This hard news focus may also inadvertently favour an 'elite'

representation (for example US, UK and Iraqi elites) of the events reported and of Iraq itself, because of the centrality of 'authoritative' and 'credible' sources to 'hard news' reporting. This is discussed further below (see *Table 6.12*).

Table 6.4: By-lined source in Iraq articles

		Newspaper							
		Financial Times	Guardian	Independent	Telegraph	The Times	IoS	Sunday Times	Total
No source given	Count	3	4	5			2		14
	Col %	3.4%	3.3%	6.6%			11.8%		2.6%
Staff writer	Count	73	89	60	86	106	14	19	447
	Col %	83.9%	73.0%	78.9%	96.6%	87.6%	82.4%	100%	84.2%
Agence France Presse	Count	1			3	3			7
	Col %	1.1%			3.4%	2.5%			1.3%
Associated Press	Count		6	4		2			12
	Col %		4.9%	5.3%		1.7%			2.3%
Reuters	Count	8	13	5		5			31
	Col %	9.2%	10.7%	6.6%		4.1%			5.8%
US newspaper	Count					1			1
	Col %					.8%			.2%
'Agencies'	Count	1	4	1					6
	Col %	1.1%	3.3%	1.3%					1.1%
UK Government	Count	1	2						3
	Col %	1.1%	1.6%						.6%
Member of Public	Count		4	1		4	1		10
	Col %		3.3%	1.3%		3.3%	5.9%		1.9%
Total	Count	87	122	76	89	121	17	19	531
	Col %	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 6.4 above shows that the majority of articles (84.2%; n= 447) written about Iraq were by-lined to staff journalists. Differences between newspapers' use of staff journalists were noticable, ranging from the *Guardian* (73.0%; n= 89) to the *Telegraph* (96.6%; n= 86). By contrast, the *Guardian* showed the highest percentage of articles by-lined to 'agency' sources (18.9%; n= 23) compared with the daily newspapers *The Times* (8.3%; n= 10) and, lowest of all, the *Telegraph* (3.4%; n= 3). The Sunday

broadsheets did not use one press release from the agencies. Articles written by 'Members of the Public' or the 'British Government' were mainly 'letters to the editor'.

As stated in Appendix 1, the variables recording 'Country' aimed at coding not just the geographical location of the reports but also other countries involvement in the reported action. Methodologically, this is particularly important in international reporting, where the 'reported event' is often commentary and explanation offered by élite individuals and nations regarding other individuals, nations and international events.

Table 6.5: Primary country in Iraq articles

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Iraq	317	59.7	59.7	59.7
USA	96	18.1	18.1	77.8
UK	33	6.2	6.2	84.0
Jordan	13	2.4	2.4	86.4
Russia	13	2.4	2.4	88.9
Israel	12	2.3	2.3	91.1
Kurdistan	12	2.3	2.3	93.4
Germany	6	1.1	1.1	94.5
Turkey	4	.8	.8	95.3
Iran	3	.6	.6	95.9
Kuwait	3	.6	.6	96.4
'Arab' countries	3	.6	.6	97.0
Libya	2	.4	.4	97.4
Palestine	2	.4	.4	97.7
France	2	.4	.4	98.1
China	2	.4	.4	98.5
Egypt	1	.2	.2	98.7
Sudan	1	.2	.2	98.9
Syria	1	.2	.2	99.1
Yemen	1	.2	.2	99.2
Canada	1	.2	.2	99.4
Australia	1	.2	.2	99.6
'UN'	1	.2	.2	99.8
'EU'	1	.2	.2	100.0
Total	531	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.5 above shows that the most frequently cited geographical location for these Iraq news articles was 'Iraq' (n= 317; 59.7%). Such a finding was perhaps predictable, given that the articles in question report or regard 'Iraq'. What was perhaps less expected was that Iraq would be cited as the primary country in only 59.7 per cent (n= 317), or less than two-thirds of cases. In 100 of these articles (18.8%), Iraq was the only country cited. The USA (n= 96) and the UK (n= 33) are cited as the primary country in almost a quarter of Iraq articles (24.3%; n= 129), indicating the centrality of American and British action, explanation and commentary in the sampled newspapers' representation of Iraq. By way of contrast, the remaining three permanent members of the UN Security Council - Russia, France and China - are cited as the primary country in only 17 articles (3.2%), despite Russia's important role in negotiating UN access to and in Iraq.

Table 6.6: Secondary country in Iraq articles

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Iraq	178	33.5	41.3	41.3
USA	163	30.7	37.8	79.1
UK	27	5.1	6.3	85.4
Russia	14	2.6	3.2	88.6
Iran	11	2.1	2.6	91.2
'Western' countries	6	1.1	1.4	92.6
Jordan	4	.8	.9	93.5
Turkey	4	.8	.9	94.4
'Arab' countries	4	.8	.9	95.4
'UN'	4	.8	.9	96.3
Kuwait	2	.4	.5	96.8
Kurdistan	2	.4	.5	97.2
China	2	.4	.5	97.7
Iceland	2	.4	.5	98.1
Israel	1	.2	.2	98.4
Libya	1	.2	.2	98.6
Saudia Arabia	1	.2	.2	98.8
Finland	1	.2	.2	99.1
Australia	1	.2	.2	99.3
Croatia	1	.2	.2	99.5
Japan	1	.2	.2	99.8
'EU'	1	.2	.2	100.0
Total	431	81.2	100.0	
Missing	100	18.8		
Total	531	100.0		

Table 6.6 shows that Iraq was the most frequently mentioned secondary country (n= 178; 41.3% of valid cases) being referred to as a secondary country in 33.5 per cent of these 531 Iraq articles. The USA represents the secondary country in the vast majority of the remaining cases (n= 163; 37.8% of valid cases), resulting in the USA being presented as 'primary' or 'secondary country' in almost half of these Iraq articles (n= 259; 48.8% of Iraq articles). The few remaining cases are predominately constituted by: the UK (n= 27; 6.3% of valid cases); Russia (n= 14; 3.2% of valid cases); Iran (n= 11; 2.6% of valid cases); and the generic 'Western Countries' (n= 6; 1.4% of valid cases).

Table 6.7: Tertiary country in Iraq articles

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
USA	41	7.7	27.9	27.9
Iraq	36	6.8	24.5	52.4
UK	30	5.6	20.4	72.8
Turkey	7	1.3	4.8	77.6
Russia	7	1.3	4.8	82.3
'UN'	7	1.3	4.8	87.1
Israel	5	.9	3.4	90.5
Iran	4	.8	2.7	93.2
'Arab' countries	3	.6	2.0	95.2
France	2	.4	1.4	96.6
Algeria	1	.2	.7	97.3
Egypt	1	.2	.7	98.0
Multiple Muslim countries	1	.2	.7	98.6
'EU'	1	.2	.7	99.3
'Western' countries	1	.2	.7	100.0
Total	147	27.7	100.0	
Missing	384	72.3		
Total	531	100.0		

Table 6.7 shows that only a little over a quarter of Iraq articles (27.7%; n= 147) featured more than two countries. The most frequently mentioned tertiary country was the USA followed by Iraq and then the UK. These three countries collectively represent 72.8 per cent (n= 107) of tertiary countries.

Tables 6.8 - 6.11 present summaries of the 'Primary' and 'Secondary Topics' featured in the sampled coverage. The findings were abridged, to include only the 95 per cent of cases, so that the tables were of a manageable size.

Table 6.8: Primary topic in Iraq articles

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
UNSCOM standoff	350	65.9	65.9	65.9
Threat of war	28	5.3	5.3	71.2
Actions of International leaders	25	4.7	4.7	75.9
Int. Relations/Politics, Illegal weapons	15	2.8	2.8	78.7
Civil War	12	2.3	2.3	81.0
Int. Relations/Politics, Terrorism	9	1.7	1.7	82.7
Business, Oil	9	1.7	1.7	84.4
Int. Relations/Politics, Spying	8	1.5	1.5	85.9
Crime, Violence	7	1.3	1.3	87.2
International Relations/Politics, General	7	1.3	1.3	88.5
Sanctions	7	1.3	1.3	89.8
Antagonism between nations	6	1.1	1.1	91.0
Int. Relations/Politics, aid	5	.9	.9	91.9
Executions/Capital punishment	4	.8	.8	92.7
Int. Relations/Politics, Meetings between leaders	4	.8	.8	93.4
Court rulings	3	.6	.6	94.0
UN	3	.6	.6	94.5
Culture/Custom, Travel	3	.6	.6	95.1
Crime, hostages/hijacking	2	.4	.4	95.5

Table 6.8 above summarises the primary topics of 95.5 per cent of the sampled Iraq articles. The remaining 4.5 per cent of cases (n= 26) were spread over 19 variable labels (topics) - a mean count of 1.37 per topic.

Table 6.8 shows that the most frequently cited primary topic of these Iraq articles was the UNSCOM 'stand-off' (n= 350; 65.9%), forming a defining schematic topic against which the majority of the Iraq articles were framed. The second highest count was much lower, and was achieved by the topic 'threat of war'. The 'parent topics' of these primary themes illustrate the limited topical range in which articles 'cover' Iraq:

Table 6.9: Primary Parent Topic in Iraq articles

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Int. Relations/Politics	444	83.6	83.6	83.6
	War	49	9.2	9.2	92.8
	Crime	11	2.1	2.1	94.9
	Business	9	1.7	1.7	96.6
	Policing/Law & Order	8	1.5	1.5	98.1
	Culture/Custom	6	1.1	1.1	99.2
	Health	4	.8	.8	100.0
	Total	531	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.9 above shows that 92.8 per cent of articles reporting Iraq were concerned with 'International Relations/Politics' or 'War' (n= 493). The combined percentage of these two parent topics changes according to which 'Primary country' the article cites: where the UK is cited as the primary country it decreases to 81.8% (n= 27); in articles which cite Iraq as the primary country it increases only slightly to 93.7% (n= 297); but it increases to 99 per cent in articles in which the USA is cited as the primary country (n= 95). In addition, 19.8 per cent (n= 19) of the articles in which the USA is cited as the primary country, cite the parent topic 'War' in a primary position. This simple crosstabulation of 'primary country' and 'primary topic' perhaps serves to illustrate the manner in which the US government - as the primary definer in the articles in which the USA is cited as the primary country - presented war as 'the solution' to the 'problem' of Iraq.

Table 6.10: Secondary topic in Iraq articles

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Threat of war	90	16.9	17.8	17.8
UN	78	14.7	15.4	33.1
UNSCOM standoff	62	11.7	12.2	45.4
Int. Relations/Politics, Illegal weapons	49	9.2	9.7	55.0
Actions of International leaders	45	8.5	8.9	63.9
Sanctions	26	4.9	5.1	69.0
Int. Relations/Politics, Peace deal	18	3.4	3.6	72.6
Antagonism between nations	17	3.2	3.4	75.9
Int. Relations/Politics, Diplomacy	17	3.2	3.4	79.3
Int. Relations/Politics, Spying	7	1.3	1.4	80.7
War between nations	6	1.1	1.2	81.9
Acts of war	6	1.1	1.2	83.0
International Relations/Politics, General	5	.9	1.0	84.0
Int. Relations/Politics, Meetings between leaders	5	.9	1.0	85.0
Israel/Palestinian peace process	5	.9	1.0	86.0
War, General	5	.9	1.0	87.0
Executions/Capital punishment	4	.8	.8	87.8
Peace talks	4	.8	.8	88.6
Crime, hostages/hijacking	3	.6	.6	89.2
Int. Relations/Politics, Cordial relations	3	.6	.6	89.7
'Democracy'	3	.6	.6	90.3
Civil War	3	.6	.6	90.9
War and civilian death	3	.6	.6	91.5
Culture/Custom, 'faith'	3	.6	.6	92.1
Business, arms trade	3	.6	.6	92.7
Business, Oil	3	.6	.6	93.3
Child malnutrition	2	.4	.4	94.1

Table 6.10 shows that the frequencies of secondary topics in these Iraq articles is more diffuse that in the case of the primary topics. The most frequently cited secondary topic, 'threat of war' was cited in only 17.8 per

cent of articles (n= 90). The schematic topic, the UNSCOM 'stand-off', was again mentioned frequently, almost half of which (n= 30) were mentioned in the final 11 days of the sample, as the reporting output was once again on the increase (see *Graph 6.1*) and the pressure to make Iraq and (specifically) President Saddam Hussein conform to the 'international will' was intensifying. The intensification of this period is illustrated in the presence of the topic 'threat of war' as a primary topic in 24.7 per cent (n= 20) of the articles published between 20 January - 31 January 1998 (total Iraq articles = 81 between these dates).

Table 6.11: Secondary Parent Topic in Iraq articles

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Int. Relations/Politics	358	67.4	70.6	70.6
	War	116	21.8	22.9	93.5
	Business	9	1.7	1.8	95.3
	Culture/Custom	7	1.3	1.4	96.6
	Policing/Law & Order	6	1.1	1.2	97.8
	Crime	5	.9	1.0	98.8
	Health	3	.6	.6	99.4
	Immigration	1	.2	.2	99.6
	Employment	1	.2	.2	99.8
	Youth	1	.2	.2	100.0
	Total	507	95.5	100.0	
Missing	System	24	4.5		
Total		531	100.0		

The secondary parent topics of the Iraq articles, again show the centrality of 'International Relations/Politics' and 'War' in reporting Iraq. The combined percentage of these two secondary parent topics (93.5% of valid cases) is higher than their combined percentage as primary parent topics (92.8% of valid cases), resulting in a comparatively reduced proportion of cases for the remaining secondary parent topics. *Table 6.11* shows that these Iraq articles all but completely ignore topics such as 'Culture and Custom', 'Health', 'Employment' and 'Youth' in preference to reporting the actions and effects of government and the 'threat' posed by Iraq.

Table 6.12: Position and Nationality of the Iraq articles' primary actors

	Nationality of source 1							
	Iraq	Israel	Kurdistan	UK	USA	Russia	'UN'	Total
British Prime Minister				8				8
named UK Secretary of State				11				11
named Govt Minister				2				2
generic 'Govt source'				4				4
generic 'Cabinet source'				2	1			3
named Diplomat	1							1
generic 'Diplomat'	1							1
UN					2		59	61
EU/European Parliament	1							1
Int. Govt. Leader	98	2			22	1		123
Int. Govt. Member	10	2			27	13		52
Int. Govt. spokesperson	1							1
unnamed Int. Govt. member	82	5		7	40	12		146
Illegitimate Int. Opposition Leader	1		1					2
unnamed illegitimate Int. Opposition member			7					7
Int. Govt./Military intelligence agency		2			8			10
'Terrorist'	1		1					2
'Terrorist' group	1							1
Former Int. Govt. member					1			1
Int. Diplomat	4							4
Scientist/Scientific centre	3							3
Police/Prisons/Law enforcement				1				1
Armed Forces	1			9	8			18
Media Organisations	1							1
Business sector/Corporate Actors				1				1
Adult citizen	5		1	2	1			9
Child citizen	2							2
Artist					1			1
Criminal	6							6
Charity				1				1
Reporter				1				1
Total	219	11	10	49	111	26	59	485

The 'actors' cited in these Iraq articles provide another measure of their content. *Table 6.12* gives the 'primary actors' referred to in these texts,

crosstabulating the actors' 'job or position' and their 'nationality'. The original table giving all the results of this crosstabulation was far too large to be productive, therefore *Table 6.12* lists only the nations which produced a count of 10 primary actors or more. In limiting the table in this way, 45 primary actors were excluded (8.49% of the cited primary actors), spread across 23 nations.[1] *Table 6.12* illustrates that Iraqi actors are well represented in the text of these articles: 219 of the primary actors cited in these articles were Iraqi (41.3% of primary actors); followed by 111 who were American (20.9% of primary actors); 59 actors who were from the UN (11.1% of primary actors); and 49 actors who were British (9.2% of primary actors).

Actors from government, both domestic and international, received most citation as primary actors (n= 355; 67.0% of primary actors). 'Iraqi government' totalled 194 primary actors (36.6%); 'US government' totalled 92 primary actors (17.4%); 'British government' totalled 34 primary actors (6.4%); and the 'Russian government' totalled 26 primary actors (4.9%). The 'job or position' most referred to was 'unnamed international government member' (n= 146; 27.5% of primary actors), which was the label coded when the texts mentioned a country as an 'active' participant: e.g. "Iraq is doing/ going to do/ thinking/ etc."; The majority of these references were made to 'Iraq' as a primary actor. The most frequently cited primary actor was 'International government leader of Iraq', Saddam Hussein (n= 99), who constituted 18.7% of the text's primary actors. By comparison, the 'American President' was referred to as a primary actor on 22 occasions (4.2% of primary actors) and the 'British Prime Minister' was referred to as primary actor on only eight occasions (1.6% of primary actors).

Table 6.13: Position and Nationality of the Iraq articles' *quoted* primary actors

	Nationality of source 1							
	Iraq	Israel	Kurdistan	UK	USA	Russia	'UN'	Total
British Prime Minister				4				4
named UK Secretary of State				8				8
named Govt Minister				2				2
generic 'Govt source'				1				1
generic 'Cabinet source'				2				2
named Diplomat	1							1
generic Diplomat	1							1
UN					2		22	24
Int. Govt. Leader	9	2			13			24
Int. Govt. Member	4	2			18	9		33
Int. Govt. spokesperson	1							1
unamed Int. Govt. member	14	3			14	7		38
Illegitimate Int. Opposition Leader			1					1
unamed illegitimate Int. Opposition member			2					2
Int. Govt./Military intelligence agency					3			3
Former Int. Govt. member					1			1
Scientist/Scientific centre	1							1
Police/Prisons/Law enforcement				1				1
Armed Forces				4	2			6
Media Organisations	1							1
Business sector/Corporate Actors				1				1
Adult citizen	2			1				3
Artist					1			1
Charity				1				1
Total	34	7	3	25	54	16	22	161

When *Tables 6.12* and *6.13* are compared, it is apparent that being cited as a primary actor in these texts provides no assurance that the actor will also be quoted: the 161 *quoted* primary actors represent 33.2 per cent of primary actors. In addition, quotation appears to be highly dependent on the actor's nationality: only 15.5 per cent (n= 34) of the Iraqi primary actors cited in the text were quoted; compared to 63.6 per cent (n= 7) of cited Israeli primary

actors; 61.5 per cent (n= 16) of cited Russian primary actors; 51.0 per cent (n= 25) of cited British primary actors; and 48.6 per cent (n= 54) of cited American primary actors. Saddam Hussein was quoted in 9.1 per cent (n= 9) of the texts in which he was cited as a primary actor; Bill Clinton was quoted in 59.1 per cent (n= 13); and Tony Blair was quoted in 50.0 per cent (n= 4) of texts in which he was cited as a primary actor.

Similar results were observed across the texts' secondary, tertiary and quaternary actors.

Table 6.14: Representation of Iraq and Iraqi actors, by newspaper (1)

		Newspaper							
		Financial Times	Guardian	Independent	Telegraph	The Times	IoS	Sunday Times	Total
Represented as: monolithic/diverse	Monolithic	1	4		7	4			16
	Diverse		1		1				2
Total		1	5		8	4			18
Represented as: separate/interacting	Separate	24	22	19	20	39	9	7	140
	Interacting					1			1
Total		24	22	19	20	40	9	7	141
Represented as: inferior/equal	Inferior	45	40	35	38	67	12	16	253
	Equal	1	3				1		5
Total		46	43	35	38	67	13	16	258
Represented as: enemy/partner	Enemy	56	60	52	64	98	12	16	358
	Partner		1		1	1			3
Total		56	61	52	65	99	12	16	361
Represented as: manipulative/sincere	Manipulative	16	23	20	22	41	2	4	128
	Sincere		1						1
Total		16	24	20	22	41	2	4	129

Table 6.14 shows the results for five of the coded binaried variables. The remaining three binaried variables, did not produce particularly significant results and were therefore edited out in order to make room for more significant findings. The percentages of 'closed' or 'negative' representations of Iraq and Iraqis differed across the newspapers, as illustrated in *Table*

6.15. The percentages of 'negative' representations are indicated by **bold** type:

Table 6.15: Representation of Iraq and Iraqi actors, by newspaper (2)

		Newspaper							
		Financial Times	Guardian	Independent	Telegraph	The Times	IoS	Sunday Times	Total
Monolithic	Col %	**1.1%**	**3.3%**		**7.9%**	**3.3%**			**3.0%**
Diverse	Col %		.8%		1.1%				.4%
No response	Col %	98.9%	95.9%	100.0%	91.0%	96.7%	100.0%	100.0%	96.6%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Separate	Col %	**27.6%**	**18.0%**	**25.0%**	**22.5%**	**32.2%**	**52.9%**	**36.8%**	**26.4%**
Interacting	Col %					.8%			.2%
No response	Col %	72.4%	82.0%	75.0%	77.5%	66.9%	47.1%	63.2%	73.4%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Inferior	Col %	**51.7%**	**32.8%**	**46.1%**	**42.7%**	**55.4%**	**70.6%**	**84.2%**	**47.6%**
Equal	Col %	1.1%	2.5%				5.9%		.9%
No response	Col %	47.1%	64.8%	53.9%	57.3%	44.6%	23.5%	15.8%	51.4%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Enemy	Col %	**64.4%**	**49.2%**	**68.4%**	**71.9%**	**81.0%**	**70.6%**	**84.2%**	**67.4%**
Partner	Col %		.8%		1.1%	.8%			.6%
No response	Col %	35.6%	50.0%	31.6%	27.0%	18.2%	29.4%	15.8%	32.0%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Manipulative	Col %	**18.4%**	**18.9%**	**26.3%**	**24.7%**	**33.9%**	**11.8%**	**21.1%**	**24.1%**
Sincere	Col %		.8%						.2%
No response	Col %	81.6%	80.3%	73.7%	75.3%	66.1%	88.2%	78.9%	75.7%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Tables 6.14 and *6.15* show that not every text chose one or other of the binary characteristics to represent Iraq and Iraqi actors. Indeed only 18 of the 531 Iraq articles (3.4%) chose to represent Iraqis in terms of the 'monolithic/ diverse' binary. In the overwhelming majority of the articles, regardless of the frequency of their appearance, negative representations are dominant. Articles which expressed a position argued that Iraqis were: 'monolithic' (88.9%; n= 16); 'separate' (99.3; n= 140); 'inferior' (98.1%; n= 253); 'an enemy' (99.2%; n= 358); and 'manipulative' (99.2%; n= 128). Two thirds of *all* the Iraq articles argued that Iraq and Iraqis were 'the enemy' (67.4%; n= 358, see *Table 6.15*). The remaining four variables were cited less frequently, but three - 'separate', 'inferior' and 'manipulative' - were still

cited in significant numbers. These findings indicate a very high level of anti-Iraqi sentiment.

Tables 6.14 and *6.15* and the discussion above illustrate, albeit in a rather disembodied way, the form and frequency of 'negative' newspaper representations of Iraq in the sampled articles. Such representations have argumentative weight in reporting, acting to support themes, attitudes and conclusions regarding both the government and the people of Iraq. Such 'themes' - as distinct from 'topics' - will now be analysed and discussed.

6.3 **Qualitative results and discussion**

6.3.1 *Introduction*

The sampled Iraq articles were dominated by argumentation on the desirability or otherwise of removing President Saddam Hussein from power. The sampled Iraq articles employed strikingly similar supporting arguments for intervention, to the extent that a remarkably schematic *discursive strategy* developed. This strategy is, in essence, an argument for intervention arising from the claims, themes, implications and a number of presuppositions present in the reports. This discursive strategy is illustrated in *Figure 6.1* below: principle

Figure 6.1: Discursive Strategy in the broadsheet reporting of Iraq



The universal theme of the reporting was 'Saddam Hussein's defiance of international law'. This theme ran through the top four coded topics - the 'UNSCOM stand-off', the 'threat of war', 'actions of international leaders', 'illegal weapons' (see *Table 6.8*) - and others less frequently cited (e.g. 'sanctions', 'UN', 'terrorism'), totalling over 90 per cent of sampled Iraq articles. Additional to this theme were the claims that 'Saddam is a bad man', and 'international law should be upheld'. These claims often went unstated in the articles - hence their being labelled as argumentative 'warrants' in *Figure 6.1* - illustrating the extent to which they are taken as 'givens', but more often, evidence and argumentation were presented to back up these two claims. The combination of the 'theme' and claims of the reporting, resulted in the implication that 'We should intervene in Iraq'. However, the form that this proposed intervention was to take appeared to be directed by the presuppositions of the reporting. Necessarily, in order to suggest 'We *should* intervene', it must first be presupposed that 'We *can* intervene'. This presupposed ability takes the form of a *physical* ability and a *moral* ability, which is in turn based on presupposed military sophistication and a just cause - two presuppositions which have come to be practically inseparable, particularly since the development of the rhetoric of "military humanism" (see Chomsky, 1999, 2000; Hammond, 2000). These presuppositions formed not only the backbone to much of the reporting, but were also argued explicitly in articles focusing on topics such as the 'UN', 'international law', 'diplomacy', 'actions of international leaders' and others.

The above discursive strategy informed the *vast* majority of reporting of Iraq and the 1997/8 UNSCOM 'stand-off'. Even when reports did not imply that 'We' - usually the US/UK coalition - *should* intervene in Iraq, they were generally informed by the presuppositions in the lower section of *Figure 6.1* above: that 'We' are both physically and morally *able* to direct military aggression at Iraq. These presuppositions were in turn confirmed, legitimated and reproduced in other, more specialised reports, looking at amongst other subjects, the 'smart' military hardware of 'the Western powers', the precedence for intervention set by international law, the

histories of atrocities by the Iraqi regime, etc. Each element of the above discursive strategy will now be presented and analysed, with a view to discussing how it confirmed or challenged the drive towards military aggression taken by the American and British governments.

6.3.2. *Use of International law as an argumentative resource*

International law was regularly referred to in this sample of Iraq articles, due primarily to the centrality of the UN, and specifically the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), to the story. The main use to which international law was put in these articles, was to show that the actions of Saddam Hussein and/or his government were 'illegal', or a infringement of previous treaties or agreements. In an article printed in the *Telegraph* (14 November 1997: 1) for example, Bill Richardson, the American Ambassador to the UN, was quoted as saying "Baghdad was pushing the crisis 'to the brink' and violating the UN Charter". The *Telegraph* omitted to mention in this article that commentators such as Professor Francis Boyle (Professor of International Law and Arms Control at University of Illinois) thought that America was in violation of the same Charter by threatening to attack Iraq.

The UN was distilled down and referred to in these articles as the 'international will' - a 'will' which Saddam Hussein was consistently referred to as defying despite the fact that the US and the UK were practically alone in demanding Iraq's immediate and total capitulation of sovereignty. British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook was quoted as stating "no option is ruled out by *the world community*" and, in the same article, the then Defence Secretary George Robertson stated that the actions of Saddam Hussein are "simply not acceptable to *the world community*" (*Telegraph* **Invincible sent to the Gulf**, 17 January 1998, emphasis added). Madelaine Albright was quoted in the *Guardian* (17 November 1997: 12) as saying that the 'stand-off' is "not a dispute between Iraq and the US, but between Iraq and the law, Iraq and the world". Similarly, during her attempts to win support for military attacks from European and Gulf States, the *Financial Times* (29 January 1998: 1) quotes her appeal for a "strong *international* response" (emphasis added) to Iraq.

Throughout the crisis, the Americans argued that the decision for military aggression could be made without recourse to further Security Council resolutions. In an article in the *Financial Times* headlined '**UN closer to tougher sanctions on Iraq**' (12 November 1997) for example, William Cohen, US Defence Secretary, "*reiterated* the US contention that there was '*inherent* authority' under existing UN resolutions for a military response" (emphasis added). Another article, headlined '**Defiant Saddam dares US to strike**' and printed in the *Sunday Times* (2 November 1997) reported that "Saddam" had "given Americans working in the UN arms inspection team in Iraq until Wednesday [three days] to leave". The report goes on to state that Richard Butler, the chairman of UNSCOM, considered this latest ultimatum to be "a breach of the 1991 cease-fire that ended the Gulf War". The implications of this are not spelt out by the newspaper, other than to imply that it was a little strong since it "drew a rebuke from the French, who said it was up to the Council to consider it a violation". Should the newspaper have included the implications of Butler's reaction in the report, it could have illustrated his threatening brinkmanship and the extent to which his views supported the American argument for military aggression.[2]

The UN Security Council, a major 'legal' player in the inspection crisis, was only represented by the sampled newspapers as performing a legitimate role when the decisions which it produced conformed with Anglo-American policy. Conversely, countries like France, Russia and China who opposed aggressive Anglo-American policy were criticised by the newspapers and even blamed for the 'stand-off'. The *Financial Times* for example, in an article headlined '**A win on points for Saddam Hussein**' (21 November 1997), suggests that "a damaging split" in the Security Council, produced "when France, Russia and China opposed a US and UK proposal for a small increase in sanctions to punish Baghdad's concealment of its weapons development", initiated the crisis. "It was that split", the newspaper continues, "which tempted the Iraqi dictator into his latest challenge to the sanctions regime". A similar point is made in a report printed the same day in the *Independent* ('**Baghdad claims victory in battle of nerves with US**', 21

November 1997) where "divisions" in "the UN Security Council over what to do about Iraq" were identified as contributing to the crisis.

On the same page as the *Independent* report mentioned above, however, another article headlined '**Crisis over as Saddam lets inspectors back to work**' contained an indication that the US were not adverse to creating 'dis-unity' in the Security Council should the Council's decisions not go their way. In response to a deal brokered in Geneva which ended the current stand-off, Mike McCurry, the White House spokesman is paraphrased as saying: "the US would use its veto on the UN Security Council should there be any alteration to the terms of former UN resolutions". This statement illustrates the commitment of the USA to return the UNSCOM inspections to a situation similar to the recently alleviated 'stand-off' should decisions be made that they do not agree with. This stated intention was allowed to stand by the journalists - Harriet Martin and Rupert Cornwell - without any comment, critique or contention.

Three days after the printing of this article, the *Independent* reported that the US and UK had followed through with their commitment to veto any alterations to the current inspections and sanctions regime which they disagreed with ('**Britain and US spike Saddam's guns over changes to arms inspections**', 24 November 1997). The report stated that "Russia had wanted the commission to certify that Iraq had dismantled its nuclear programme and long-range missiles" which would thereby close the chapter on UNSCOM nuclear inspections. Considering that "the Vienna-based International Agency for Atomic Energy has officially confirmed that Baghdad does not possess atomic weapons, nor the means of manufacturing them" (Rouleau, 23 March 1998, Le Monde Diplomatique) Russia's request does appear acceptable. Not only did the US and UK reject such a proposal, they went above and beyond the requirements of SC Resolution 687 and demanded that Iraq "identify [the] countries which sold it nuclear technology before the invasion of Kuwait". Further, the article reported that the US and UK "were *jubilant* at the rebuff to Iraq and Russia, which failed to win the full endorsement of France and China" (emphasis added). Such celebration in

continuing the sanctions regime again elicited no critical response from the newspapers, either in their news reports or their op./ed. columns, suggesting that the newspapers do not think 'dis-unity' in the Security Council is problematic by when it is 'Our side' who are being obstructive or imperious.

An editorial, headlined '**Seven Year Itch**' and printed in *The Times* (31 October 1997), uses international law in quite an innovative way, arguing that Security Council resolutions had failed to restrict Saddam Hussein's "grip on Iraq" or reduce "the regional threat he poses" and that military intervention was needed. The paper claims that the UN 'miscalculated' the size of Saddam Hussein's arsenal, that the terms of the resolution were "less than draconian" and it was this which resulted in the UN's failure to disarm Iraq. The 'implications' of this failure are given rhetorical prominence where the editorial suggests that "Iraq's *illegal arsenal*" includes "outlawed toxic weapons theoretically sufficient to kill the entire world's population *four times over*" (my emphasis), which adds additional weight to the newspaper's claims that the resolution did not go far enough.

In addition, and following the approach of the 'Western' governments at the time and since, the newspaper not only blames Saddam Hussein for the sanctions regime, but presents the suffering of the Iraqi people as being *engineered* by Hussein:

> By seeing to it that some Iraqis go desperately hungry, Saddam has also succeeded in persuading the world that the people of Iraq, which is quite capable of growing enough food to supply its populace, are starving because of UN sanctions.

This passage not only refutes the claims that the UN sanctions are to blame for the suffering endured by the Iraqi people, but also provides a *humanitarian* pretext for military intervention, in addition to the legal and geopolitical arguments already used. By combining these arguments the newspaper is enabled to state, in a forceful and emotive conclusion, that "[t]he West ...must ensure that retaliation severely damages the military and security apparatus that underpins his [Hussein's] regime".

6.3.3. *Negative depiction of Iraqi leaders*

Personification of the conflict was one of the main ways in which the complexities of the UNSCOM 'stand-off' was managed by broadsheet newspapers. It is far easier to (re)construct 'the enemy' as an individual, or a select group of individuals with a negative image, than it is to make an enemy of a nation. Indeed the argument for intervention on 'humanitarian' grounds is strengthened if 'the nation' - in this case Iraq - is cast as another victim of the enemy's malignancy rather than his supporter or accomplice. With this in mind, we would expect the coverage of Iraqi actors to focus heavily on a few key individuals, with reference to Iraq's citizens only occurring in order to add weight to the central argument for military intervention. Reporting tended to focus argumentation and coverage very closely upon élite individuals in the Iraqi regime: specifically President Saddam Hussein and, to a lesser extent, the Deputy Prime Minister Tarik Aziz. Some of the methods in which these élite Iraqi actors were 'negativised' in the sampled coverage of Iraq will now be discussed.

The 'negativisation' of Saddam Hussein has occurred extensively in the pages of the Press since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Previous studies (Allan, 1999; Keeble, 1997; Mowlana, Gerbner & Schiller, 1992; Walsh, 1995) have shown that nominalisations such as 'the Arab Hitler', 'the Butcher of Baghdad', 'mad dog Hussein' and others are employed so regularly by journalists to describe President Saddam Hussein that they have reached the point of *metonym*. Examples of Saddam Hussein's brutality were provided by the newspapers, often in seemingly inconsonant articles. A classic example of this was included in an article printed in *The Times*, headlined '**Iraq faced threat of nuclear attack**' (22 December, 1997). The article retold the story of the UNSCOM 'stand-off' from the perspective of "Pentagon Planners", who suggested that during the height of the crisis they considered whether a nuclear bomb should be used against Iraq in the event of military aggression. The rhetoric of this article is analysed in much greater depth later in the chapter, but suffice to say the report says the plan to 'nuke Saddam' was dropped. It is against this

background that an example of the brutality of Saddam Hussein is provided, probably intended 'by way of contrast'.[3] The report states:

> Saddam, now 60, consolidated his power at a meeting of the Ba'ath Party in 1979 when he pointed out people he saw as disloyal. After each was escorted from the room, they were shot.

This paragraph illustrates that Saddam Hussein has been a villain from the outset of his rule in Iraq. The next paragraph suggests that this 'consolidation of power' may have had an even more sinister basis, with Saddam Hussein appearing to take perverse delight in fear, pain and death:

> A brief video clip of the scene from CIA archives was shown. Saddam's behaviour was described by Anthony Lake, Mr Clinton's former National Security Advisor, who said: 'With a look on his face like that of a boy tearing the wings off a fly, he took a cigar and moved it around his subordinates, picking out those to be taken away on the grounds of treachery. He was enjoying every minute of it'.

The "video clip" is mentioned in order to provide objective 'proof' that the event being described occurred. The testimony of "Anthony Lake" provides us with a reading of the manner in which Hussein carried out such barbarism: he "was enjoying every minute of it".

It is interesting that the discussed event was meant to have occurred in 1979. Conspicuously absent from the report is the acknowledgement that Saddam Hussein was given political, logistical and financial backing from the USA for an additional decade after this event was meant to have occurred. Presumably this backing continued to be provided despite sections of the American government having full knowledge of this event if, as the report states, the "brief video clip" was taken "from CIA archives".[4] The implications of this are not discussed by the reporter Ian Brodie, Anthony Lake or any other source cited in the article. The possibility that the American government continued to support Iraq (see Frank, 1992) despite knowing that President Saddam Hussein committed murder order to "consolidate power" is a matter which one would have expected any quality journalist to have discussed in light of the material in this article. Instead of providing

such a discussion - which would presumably have 'muddied' who exactly 'we' are meant to be criticising - Ian Brodie opts to uncritically accept the line coming out of the cited "Pentagon planners" and write an 'isn't Saddam evil' piece.

Articles demonising Saddam Hussein were printed frequently across the sample. Less frequent, but no less interesting were articles which directed such animosity towards the Deputy Prime Minister Tarik Aziz. A *Guardian* editorial headlined '**Iraq: diminishing options**' (12 November 1997) for example, appeared particularly belligerent towards Aziz:

> He himself is a liar and worse than a liar, as men have to be to survive in the highest ranks of Saddam's regime, and he is one of the longest serving and most prominent members of that regime. A man in such a position has to prostitute his abilities - and Aziz is an able man - to defend the indefensible, to conceal the inexcusable and to argue the impossible.

To suggest that Tarik Aziz is "an able man", who is "one of the longest serving ...members" of the regime, entails that he is particularly good at the 'prostituting' himself to the "indefensible" aims and interests of the regime. The editorial also describes him as being "*worse* than a liar" and as one of the "most *prominent*" members of the regime which seems to suggest that he, at the very least, collaborates in the regime's aims and interests and is therefore partially responsible for both their content and effects.

The *Telegraph* also printed an article in which Tarik Aziz was the focus of criticism. '**Baghdad's urbane apologist blends charm with fear**' (18 November 1997) was printed six days after the *Guardian* editorial discussed above, appears to be written with a similar critical intent as the editorial, but discards the bellicose criticism of Aziz present in the *Guardian* article. The article, which appeared at the height of newspaper output on Iraq (see *Graph 6.1*) and was printed on the same page as five other UNSCOM articles, is a personal and political profile of Tarik Aziz, apparently written in order to provide 'background' to the other reports.

The article starts by describing Aziz's role in Saddam Hussein's government: he "takes on the thankless task of defending Iraq in the succession of confrontations with the international community". Here, the

newspaper nominalises the transitive verb 'to confront', which acts to remove the exact nature of the "confrontations". This removal is almost certainly due to such information already being known to the readership, through both the co-location of the five other UNSCOM articles on the page and the ongoing nature of the conflict. It is interesting however, that Aziz is described as "defending Iraq" against such "confrontations", suggesting that the "international community" are the attackers in the action process.

The article goes on to suggest the manner in which Aziz performs his designated role: "With his professorial look and mastery of English, Tarik Aziz is the most respectable face of the Iraqi regime ...One former Arab foreign minister described Mr Aziz as 'the most articulate Arab man I have ever met'." Here 'respectability' is defined by the newspaper in a very closed and ethnocentric way: looking "professorial" and having a "mastery of English". His eloquence is referred to again by the unnamed quoted source, where the anomalous status of being an "articulate Arab man" is implied. The article also described Aziz as an unusual feature within the Iraqi regime: he "seems almost too urbane to represent a regime as repressive as that of Saddam", and is "a minority Christian rather than a Sunni Muslim" - a characteristic which the article, in contrast to the above *Guardian* editorial, suggests "may explain his survival through Saddam's bloody purges of party rivals".

The article's depiction of Aziz as an intelligent and erudite man are put to use in the concluding paragraph, in a striking criticism:

> An exile in London said: 'Tarik Aziz bears a double guilt. Most of the Iraqi leaders are ignorant. But Aziz is intelligent, and he still takes part in the crimes of the regime.'

In the light of the argument in this paragraph, the afore-printed article appears like a 'set-up'. The newspaper has constructed an elaborate and subtle argument, wherein, should we accept the initial premises of Aziz being "respectable", "articulate", "urbane" and perhaps most importantly, a "Christian", then confronted with the "crimes of the regime", the conclusion regarding his "double guilt" appears to be indisputable. The article therefore

appears to be warning the *Telegraph*'s readership of this man's dubious character. This is a man who is "reputedly charming to his friends and ruthless with his enemies" and who, despite the possible perceptions of the readership, should be regarded in the same way as Saddam Hussein himself: as a threat to Iraq, to the region and to 'world peace', and therefore should be removed from power.

6.3.4. *The 'ideological square' in reporting Iraq*

In this section I discuss articles and excerpts from articles which are structured in accordance with the 'ideological square'. The term 'ideological square' was proposed by van Dijk (1984; 1987; 1991; 1992; 1993; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; van Dijk *et al*, 1997) in order to describe a discursive process, present in prejudiced talk and text, in which a strategy of negative other-presentation and a simultaneous positive self-presentation is employed. The 'ideological square' in these sampled articles on Iraq, is a particularly important aspect of the dominant discursive strategy since it provides the basis of presumed 'moral' justification for military intervention. The analysed texts concur with and support the dominant reading of the events being described - Iraqi intransigence in contrast to 'Western' civility - and hence favour a reading of the reported events functional to the military aims of the 'Western' governments. Since semantic, rhetorical and argumentative moves are discussed throughout this chapter, this section will focus on key examples of lexical and syntactic structuring of expression. Numerous alternative examples of lexical and syntactic structuring of expression exist, which will be discussed at much greater length in future work.

A report, headlined '**Iraq faces countdown to attack**' and printed in the *Telegraph* (19 January 1998), contains several interesting textual features illustrating the ideological commitments of the journalist and newspaper. First, the article's use of noun phrases is interesting: "Saddam Hussein" is only called by his full name in the first line of the text; is labelled as "dictator" on two occasions (one in the 'overheadline'); as "the Iraqi dictator" on one occasion in the second paragraph; as "the tyrant" in the third

paragraph; as "the Iraqi leader" in the second to last paragraph; and as "Saddam" on ten other occasions. "Iraq" is mentioned as an actor on two occasions. In contrast, the actors positioned in conflict with Iraq and Saddam Hussein are presented more collectively and more positively. The collective nouns cited were: "America", (n= 3); "Britain" (n= 1); "Washington and its allies" (n= 1); "senior government officials" (n= 1); "UN", (n= 1); and "United Nations inspectors" (n= 1). Individuals cited were: "Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State" (n= 1); "Bill Richardson, America's ambassador to the UN" (n= 1); "Britain's Defence Secretary, George Robertson" (n= 1); "Sir Edward Heath" (n= 2); "Richard Butler, head of the UN's compliance team" (n= 1); and the shorter "Mr Butler" (n= 2). The contrast between Iraqi and non-Iraqi actors is striking. Although each 'side' were cited a comparable number of times (n= 19; n= 16), Iraqi actors were dominated by President Saddam Hussein, or more specifically by "Saddam", whilst the non-Iraqis were either collectivised or else were individuals given their full honourific titles. The consequence of these lexical choices is that the conflict appears to be both personalised and justified: the collective efforts of the US, the UK and the UN against "Saddam", "the tyrant" and "Iraqi dictator".

Second, the way in which aggressive transitive actions attributed to the 'non-Iraqi side' are presented is interesting. Throughout the article, the "attack" mentioned in the headline is mitigated, passivised or nominalised (as in the headline), which effectively backgrounds or occasionally removes the agency of the attackers. The closest the report gets to a foregrounding of agency is in the first paragraph, numbered here for ease of reference:

> [1] America warned Saddam Hussein yesterday that [2] it is closer to using *a military attack to end Iraq's efforts to block United Nations inspectors*.

In clause two, the whole of the italicised section represents one single noun phrase - the 'object' which 'it' [America] intends 'to use'. Even here, where the presence of 'aggressive American agency' is strongest, the expression is structured in such a way as to provide the readership with the justification for the "military attack...", qualifying the very noun phrase which proposes it:

"...to end Iraq's efforts to block United Nations inspectors". Elsewhere, the proposed American military aggression is expressed as "military force", "the military option", "military action", "military strikes" and "the military-based response", displaying the kind of over-wording indicative of an "intense ideological preoccupation" (Fowler *et al*, 1979). On two other occasions, the newspaper uses the terms "punitive missile strike" and "punitive cruise missile attacks" which again provide a justification for the military attack in a similar way to the numbered quotation above. The addition of the adjective in this case is therefore highly ideological, providing the reader with an objective for the 'military strike' (i.e. a punishment for "Saddam", "the tyrant"), and moreover, through the *choice* of the adjective, that this objective is a 'just' and 'justifiable' one.

Third, the article employs non-obligatory rhetorical devices such as metaphor in order that certain meanings of the reported action be emphasised in the minds-eye of the reader. The visit to Baghdad by Richard Butler, the head of UNSCOM for example is described in the article as "the final test of whether to unleash American cruise missiles against the tyrant". The choice of the lexical metaphor "unleash" to describe the launching of cruise missiles is attractive since it imbues the bombs with life and taps into the more literary metaphor '[unleashing] the dogs of war'. The attack is further justified through the use of the noun phrase "the tyrant" to describe Saddam Hussein, since the missiles are being 'unleashed against the tyrant' and not Iraq. This very simple structuring of expression acts to limit the possibilities of dissent in much the same way that the classical rhetorical argument 'fighting for peace' does.

Throughout the majority of the articles reporting the UNSCOM 'stand-off', the sampled newspapers metaphorically employ an authoritarian discourse of discipline (Fairclough, 1995a: 95) to describe the reported action, switching between 'parent-to-child' and 'master-to-pet' relations of discipline. Saddam Hussein and Iraq were cast in the relationship's subordinate role and 'Western' (US and UK) actors are represented as dominant. The *Financial Times* (15 November 1997), for example clearly employ this disciplinary metaphor in an article headlined '**The US has a big**

stick, but it can talk softly'. This metaphor is continued through the article in terms such as "punitive strikes" and in the evaluation that previous US air attacks on Iraq (e.g. January 1993, September 1996) were "too lenient". The article uses the 'insolent animal' metaphor most clearly in the claim that the Clinton Administration were wondering "how to bring Iraqi President Saddam Hussein *to heel*", suggesting that Hussein was somehow comparable to a wayward puppy. The same day the *Independent* stated that Iraq had "*defied* the United States" ('**Last superpower defied by friends and enemies alike**', my emphasis). Lower down in the article, where a Pentagon spokesman criticises Iraq's request to limit the number of US weapons inspectors, the disciplinary discourse shifts to a *legal-penitive* metaphor: the Pentagon official is quoted as saying "It is as though an ex-convict were trying to pick its own parole officer". The disciplinary image of the 'big stick' was also used in an article printed in the *Telegraph* (18 November 1997): first in the headline - '**Western ability to wield the big stick at Saddam is slipping away**', and also as "the military stick" later in the article.

Such formulations were built up across the sample, wherein Saddam Hussein was persistently described as a subordinate who has not 'learnt his lesson' and should therefore be 'punished' and 'brought back in line' with the 'international community'. Representing the UNSCOM inspections 'stand-off' in such a way tends to implicitly invoke "an imperialist and indeed racist ideology of relations between nations, which contributes to the continuity of imperialist and neo-colonialist relations in practice" (Fairclough, 1995a: 102). With this in mind, these formulations appear highly functional to the call of the United States and Britain to attack Iraq.

If we next look at lexical style across other sampled articles it becomes apparent that, through the journalist's choices of verb phrase, Iraqi action is presented as 'negative' on a far more regular basis than 'Western' action. For example, in the article '**Iraq faces countdown to attack**' (*Telegraph*, 19 January 1998) discussed above, I showed how President Saddam Hussein was labelled "the tyrant" in contrast to America and Britain being labelled "Washington and its allies" and 'western' actors being

referred to by their full honourific titles. Second, the proposed 'Western' military action is generally euphemised in order to de-emphasise its negative effects. In one edition of *The Times* (14 November 1997) for example, the military attacks proposed by the American and British governments are labelled: "Gulf Action" (in the headline), "grave consequences", and "a military confrontation" in a front page article; and as a "strike", a "strike against Iraq", the "military option" (in a headline, p.19), "military action", "further measures" and the proposal to "punish Iraq militarily" across seven other articles (p.18-19). This not only illustrates the same intense over-wording suggested earlier, but is also highly ideological, since all but two of the above descriptions of 'Western' military violence conceal the 'agents' and 'objects' (the 'affected') of such violence.

A classic example of the dichotomous 'ideological square' developed in the sampled Iraq articles between the verbs 'to warn' and 'to threaten': the actions of Iraq and Iraqi actors being represented as 'threats', whilst the actions of 'the West' and 'Western' actors were represented as 'warnings'. Below are a few select examples of this dichotomous representation, included in chronological order. Iraqi and 'Western' speech acts are italicised throughout:

1. A senior Pentagon official last night gave a *warning* that any Iraqi attempt to shoot down US reconnaissance aircraft would be considered an act of war and be met with a military response. As Iraq renewed its *threats*, America *urged* the United Nations to implement tougher sanctions against Iraq. (*The Times*, 8 November 1997: 16)

2. **Clinton *refuses* to rule out attack after Iraq *threat***. ...Iraq *threatened* to shoot down U-2 spy planes on UN missions. ...James Rubin, State Department Spokesman, *said*: 'We have made it clear that any attempt to shoot them down would be a serious mistake'." (*Telegraph*, 8 November 1997: 12)

3. [...] a senior Iraq official *threatened* to shoot down US spy planes if they resumed flights over his country. A senior Pentagon official *said* yesterday that any Iraqi attempt to shoot down a UN surveillance plane would be considered an act of war (*Guardian*, 8 November 1997: 19)

4. William Cohen *said* that if Iraq acted on its week-old *threat* to shoot down a U2 plane, this would be tantamount to "an act of war". (*Independent*, 10 November 1997: 1)

5. The United States is *proposing* an intensive bombing campaign against Iraq next month... How will Saddam respond to a renewed air war? ...His military options are limited. He could *threaten* Kuwait again, as he did in 1994 (*Independent* 27 January 1998: 7)

In each of the five examples above, American and United Nations (Kofi Annan) actions which could be construed as 'threats' or at the very least 'threaten*ing*' are de-emphasised through the lexical choices of the journalists. In contrast, the actions of Iraq and Iraqi actors *are* labelled as 'threats'.

Moving on to the *syntactic* structuring of expression, the choices of sentence construction made in the sampled Iraq articles further highlight the 'ideological square' discussed above. Mirroring the findings of Kress (1983), the use of the verb/adjective pairing "is/are likely" in the sampled newspapers illustrates the (ideological) presuppositions and commitments of those using it. The first line of an article headlined '**Israel 'threatens nuclear reply' to Iraq germ attack**' and printed in *The Times* (29 January 1998) for example, states:

With tension mounting in the Gulf, the CIA has given a warning that Iraq *is likely* to fire scud missiles armed with non-conventional warheads at Israel if attacked by the Americans, according to a report in *Yediot Aharonot*. (emphasis added)

The excerpt is a complex, multi-layered sentence, containing a number of interesting linguistic dimensions. The 'factuality' of the sentence - and therefore of the threat - is emphasised through the journalists' use of two features: the action of the CIA is labelled "a warning" as opposed to 'a claim'; and the constructive role of the Israeli newspaper *Yediot Aharonot* in the story is backgrounded to the final clause of the sentence. Shahak (1997) describes this newspaper as a "quality paper" but which "tends to include all views in the framework of Zionism" (p.8). The stake of the paper in the story should therefore be viewed from within this ideological commitment. Second, it is interesting to speculate on what the motivations of the CIA were in press releasing such information to Israeli newspapers. What did they expect, or intend *Yediot Aharonot* and their readership would *do* with such information?

Moreover, what were they actually doing with such information in the first place, if UNSCOM is as uncorrupted by espionage and covert operations as the Americans claimed throughout the stand-off? These questions are not broached by *The Times*.

Returning to the verb/adjective pairing "is likely", the usage in this case is a little more complex than the example discussed by Kress (1983). It is unclear whether the syntactic choice "is likely" was made by the CIA, *Yediot Aharonot* or the journalists who wrote the article, and for this reason, I'll sideline the issue of authorial agency and focus on the claim: Through using "is likely", the factual 'existence' of the proposed missile attack is stressed, regardless of onlooker perceptions, in a way which would not be possible with the alternative 'seems certain'. This syntactic choice increases the 'threat' posed to Israel by Iraq. In addition, the use of the culturally consonant phrases "Scud missiles" and "non-conventional warheads", combined with the "warning" speech act, result in the newspaper presenting an especially threatening sequence of events.

By way of comparison, the alternative verb/adjective pairing 'seems certain' was adopted in other Iraq articles.[5] In the *Telegraph* article headlined '**Clinton refuses to rule out attack after Iraq threat**' (8 November 1997) for example, the journalist Hugh Davies wrote:

> Experience has proven that in disputes with UN inspectors, the Iraqis have backed off only when military action *seems certain*. (emphasis added)

Here, through the use of the verb/adjective pairing "seems certain", Hugh Davies suggests that the Iraqis only 'back off' from a dispute when military action seems certain *to them*. This chosen syntactic construction acts to de-emphasise the existential, i.e. very real, threat of (US) military action - a threat that has been carried out on occasions before and since the article was printed. This entailment would have been unavailable should the journalist have adopted the pairing "is likely", for the reasons given above. In this way, Davies using this particular verb/adjective pairing encourages the audience to 'read' the reported event as a symbolic conflict being 'fought' by

diplomats in the rooms of, amongst other places, the UN. Thus, to say that "the Iraqis have backed off only when military action seems certain [to them]" simultaneously suggests that Iraqi perception is the most important aspect of the crisis, whilst presuming that the decision to react militarily has not been already made. As such, the presentation of the reported event contained with the chosen verb/adjective pairing, contributes to the 'ideological square' mentioned above. The military threats of American and British forces are reframed as simple posturing, devoid of any real intent to attack Iraq.

6.3.5 *The sophistication and/or superiority of 'Our' weaponry*

Articles reporting the military vehicles, weaponry, equipment and personnel being sent to the Persian Gulf were common during the sampled newspapers. These articles almost universally focused on American and British military equipment being sent to the Gulf region, with few references to the armed forces of other 'allied' countries. When other armed forces were mentioned, they tended to be in the lower sections of articles. An article headlined **'Invincible' is prepared for Gulf action**' (*The Times*, 14 November) for example, mentions "six Chilean helicopter technicians [who] will be left behind to form a skeleton staff at a UN monitoring centre" in the final paragraph of an article covering 325 column centimetres. The article above this paragraph makes no mistake of informing the readership of exactly who and what will be involved in the majority of the (proposed) attacks: a British "strike force", sent "to the Gulf to support the Americans in any military action against Iraq". The report includes breathless descriptions of "the RAF Harriers", which are "more powerful and have a longer range than the Sea Harriers", and which may be allocated to *HMS Invincible*. These military vehicles and personnel were being sent to the Gulf, with the full backing of the newspaper, to join the "US forces in the Gulf - 2,000 personnel, 17 warships and 200 aircraft", all of whom "were on full alert".

The same day (14 November 1997), in an article headlined '**US fine-tunes its military machine**', the *Guardian* provided a list of the American and British "hardware" stationed in and sent to the Gulf (written here as it appeared):

United States forces have a wide choice of equipment available to do the job, including:

- Tomahawk cruise missiles, both ship- and submarine-launched, which they say are twice as accurate as the ones used during the Gulf War
- Anti-radiation missiles designed to home in on air defence missile radars
- F-117 Stealth fighters and carrier-borne aircraft equipped with various 'smart' weapons, such as laser-guided bombs.

To these can also be added a dozen RAF Tornadoes ...also fitted with the Tiald laser-bombing system.

The list continues for much of the report's remaining 300 column centimetres, although not in the 'bullet points' seen above. The report mentions the "US Naval battle group" including "the [*nuclear*] aircraft carrier Nimitz", "British warships", "US combat aircraft" and the "US ground forces" in Kuwait, "where, *coincidentally*, a British infantry battalion, The King's Regiment, is on manoeuvres ...this weekend" (emphasis added). The central function of the article is to communicate the strength and, above all, the high technological sophistication of the weaponry available to American and (to a lesser extent) British forces to attack Iraq. The excerpt above states that this military hardware is "available to *do the job*", a "job" which the newspaper does not mount serious opposition to, despite the report acknowledging the inevitable "risk of 'collateral damage' - jargon for killing civilians".

The technophilia of weaponry formed a significant thematic approach to these Iraq articles, as it did during the build-up to the bombing of Iraq in 1991. Where the 'star weapon' bombing Iraq in 1991 was undoubtedly the 'smart bomb', during the period of this study the bomb of choice was the B-61 'bunker bomb'. Several articles mentioned the power and sophistication of the 'bunker bomb', one of which was headlined '**Pentagon tests 'bunker buster' for Iraq raids**' and printed in *The Times* (30 January 1998). The leader of this article states: "NEW BOMBS CAN DESTROY SADDAM'S HIDDEN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, WRITES IAN BRODIE", again implying that such bombs do therefore exist. The real interest in analysing this article lies in its rhetoric - directed towards convincing the readership that these bombs *should* be used to "destroy" the "hidden biological weapons" referred to in

the leader. The first paragraph, apparently written without a trace of irony, reads:

> The Pentagon, which unveiled precision-guided 'smart bombs' during the Gulf War, yesterday promised *even smarter bombs* if and when America and Britain launch new raids against President Saddam Hussein's weapons programme in Iraq. (emphasis added)

This first paragraph introduces the premise which the remainder of the article attempts to support: that these new bombs are "smarter" than the largely discredited "smart bombs" used against Iraq in 1991. It is interesting that the Pentagon still felt that the label 'smart' was the best way of mitigating the bomb's destructive capabilities, despite the acknowledged failures of 'smart' technology during the bombing of Iraq in 1991. The new name for the bomb - the "bunker buster" - also supports the conclusion that the bomb will destroy buildings, as opposed to Iraqis. No doubt this name was chosen from a list of options employing the same catchy alliteration guaranteed to secure good copy in the press.

The reason for the bomb's proposed usage is supplied by Brodie, suggesting that "Pentagon officials are *acutely* aware of the moral and political problems that could be created if bombing raids release anthrax and botulism spores or poison gas into the atmosphere where they could kill thousands of civilians" (emphasis added). The US military, in attempting to prevent Iraqi civilian exposure to chemical/biological weapons, have "developed a weapon it is *believed* can vaporise the germ and chemical warfare agents Saddam *is* hiding" (emphasis added). - Note the doubt in the weapon's ability to destroy 'Saddam's weapons' and the accompanying declaration that such weapons do in fact exist. Brodie stating that the Pentagon is "*acutely* aware of the moral and political problems" suggests that they are keen to avoid killing civilians rather than simply acknowledging that such deaths would be 'problematic'. This claim is entirely inconsistent with the attitude of the American State Department towards Iraq during the inspections crisis.[6] Ian Brodie does not treat this specious 'military humanism' (Chomsky, 1999) with such disdain however, suggesting that the

avoidance of civilian deaths was the primary objective of the development of this weapon.

The article states that research and development has occurred in two, seemingly unconnected ways: "*a* bomb filled with rocket fuel has set off a 30 second inferno that rose to several thousand degrees during testing" (emphasis added); and new "5,000lb laser guided penetration bombs or missiles, pencil shaped and with hardened nose cones" have been developed in order to "penetrate reinforced concrete bunkers as many as four floors underground". The article goes on to describe in breathless, pseudo-sexual language, the "*penetration*" of such "bunker busters", which "can scythe through layers of metal and reinforced concrete" and not explode "until it has fully *penetrated* the *bunker*" (emphasis added). This is apparently done through the use of "a *new* delayed fuse" (emphasis added) - the use of the modifier 'new' suggesting an improvement or development in existing delayed fuses. This 'new fuse' is central to the functioning of the bomb since it allows it to "count the number of floors it goes through as the bomb *penetrates* the *bunkers*".

The testing of the bomb has not, however, been particularly successful, with the fallible nature of this new "smarter" weapon being exposed in two ways. The article states:

> As an example, the fuse can be programmed to detonate on the fourth floor. American television viewers saw Pentagon videotape of a 'bunker buster' smashing it's way through four walls of concrete before exploding.

First, the obvious conclusion that we are meant to come to in reading these two sentences, is that they are connected: that the bomb *can* be programmed to explode after 'smashing' through four floors/walls, and that this *is* what happened in the example broadcast to the American people. But the two sentences, and the events they describe, are not necessarily connected by any causal relationship. The excerpt is an example of an "*abbreviated* syllogism", which, through omitting a premise, pushes the audience to create "coherence in the incomplete argument by consciously or unconsciously supplying the 'missing link' from the premises in their own

belief system" (Gill & Whedbee, 1997: 175). The suggested causal relationship between the two sentence does not therefore exist, but is left for us to infer based on the expectations for narrative coherence that we impose upon texts.

Second, and related to the first point above, we must wonder why it is that the "bunker buster" is so fond of the fourth floor of 'the bunker'. If it can indeed be programmed to explode on whatever floor it wishes, why do all the references and examples in the article only refer to the bomb exploding after passing through four levels of concrete? As "Frank Robbins, research director at the Elgin base" is quoted as saying: "the fuse that counts the floors is still being tested". The image that this therefore paints, is of a weapon which *can* penetrate four floors or concrete walls, and, due to the incomplete nature of it's research and development always *does* penetrate four floors or concrete walls. What is therefore being described is a weapon of such blinding technology that it is able - with the help of a reinforced nose-cone and rocket propulsion - to smash through four concrete walls before coming to a stop. These "smarter" bombs therefore appear remarkably similar to the previous, more cerebrally challenged bombs, merely with a hard-hat welded to the front. Despite this, "Mr Robbins said it [the development of the fuse] is far enough along to be fitted on 'bunker busters' already sent to the Gulf". This rather frank admission from the "research director" should have added fuel to the suggestion that this latest American incursion into Iraq is being used as a testing ground for military equipment - an arms fair of a more practical nature. This implication is missed by Ian Brodie.

As mentioned at the start of this section, articles reporting the military vehicles, weaponry, equipment and personnel were common during the sampled newspapers. Through these articles' almost universal focus on American and British military equipment, the presumption that 'we are physically able to intervene due to military superiority' is supported. In addition to this physical ability, the way in which 'Our' weaponry is presented in these articles - "precision-guided", "smart*er* weapons" which "vaporise

[Saddam's] germ and chemical warfare agents" without harming civilians - also supports the presumed 'moral ability to intervene'.

5.3.6 *The threat of 'Their' weaponry*

Accompanying the articles referred to above, in which 'Our' military prowess was emphasised, were the seemingly contradictory articles in which the threat of 'Their' weapons was emphasised. The capability or otherwise of Iraq to produce and launch chemical, biological and nuclear weaponry was, of course, a frequently cited topic of the sampled Iraq articles (n= 134; 25.2% of Iraq articles), since it formed the crux issue of the UNSCOM inspections and resulting 'stand-off'. The existence of these weapons could conceivably be thought of as threatening *per se*, since they are designed to kill in horrific and often indiscriminate ways. Further, it could be argued the presence of these weapons in the Middle East, an area with a particular reputation for 'unrest', could be construed as 'threatening' to the peace or 'stability' (*hegemony*) of the region. But the fact that Israel's nuclear and (possibly) chemical/biological weapons programmes were not treated as '*per se* threatening', casts doubt on both of the arguments given above.

Within the 134 articles which mentioned 'Iraqi illegal weaponry', semantic, linguistic and stylistic features were employed to specifically highlight the threat of these weapons to '*Us*'. Israel was also included in the position 'We', and the possibility that Iraq would launch chemical or biological warheads at Tel Aviv was frequently cited - particularly in the periods of 'peak output' in the weeks before 17 November 1997 and 31 January 1998. The article, headlined '**Israelis prepare for attack**' and printed in *The Times* (17 November 1997) for example reports that, in light of the threat posed by "non-conventional Scuds attacks", "as many as 6,000 [Israeli] people a day are visiting gas mask distribution points". An article on the same page headlined '**Saddam given warning over Scud offensive**', claimed that it was only "Israel's implied threat to use nuclear weapons ...that stopped Saddam from launching Scuds armed with chemical and biological warheads against Tel Aviv" during the 1991 conflict with Iraq.

The head of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, also made reference to the threat Saddam Hussein and Iraqi weapons may pose to Israel, an argument which was reported by all of the sampled newspapers. The *Independent* for example, in an article headlined '**US seeks support for Iraqi airstrikes**' (28 January 1998) suggests that Butler said "Iraq had enough biological weapons to 'blow away *Telegraph* Aviv.'" Earlier, Butler had claimed that "Saddam is hiding about 200 tonnes of VX gas" ('**Children hunger for peace in Iraq crisis**', *Independent*, 27 November 1997), a claim which was later used by America as 'proof' the 'the UN' thought Saddam both held and was concealing chemical weapons.

Elsewhere, articles include rhetorical 'figures of speech' in order to make the argument that 'Saddam poses a threat' even more clear to the audience. The *Sunday Times*, in an article headlined '**Saddam hides secret arsenal behind women and children**' (16 November 1997), claimed that "a warhead containing enough anthrax virus to kill tens of thousand of people, for example, need be *no bigger than a suitcase*" (my emphasis). In a similar move, William Cohen was reported by most of the sampled newspapers holding up a 5lb bag of sugar and claiming that "such a bag filled with anthrax bacteria could kill half Washington's population if it were spread over the city" (*The Times*, 17 November 1997: 13).[7]

The *Financial Times*, based the whole of an article to William Cohen's allegations ('**Iraq 'may have huge nerve gas stockpile'**', 26 November 1997). The first paragraph of the article stated Cohen's claim that "Iraq may possess enough of a nerve gas known as VX to kill the world's entire population". This claim is also rephrased lower down in the article in even more hyperbolic language, where Cohen is cited "stressing the danger posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to *humanity as a whole*". This claimed 'threat to humanity' is supported by two additional claims (all italics, my emphasis): "One *drop* [of VX] on your finger will produce death in a matter of mere moments"; and "the UN believes that Saddam may have produced as much as *200 tonnes* of VX ...theoretically enough to kill *every* man, woman and child *on the face of the earth*". The threat of the nerve gas

in Saddam's hands in driven home even further to the American public by Cohen stating: "The front lines are no longer overseas - it can be in any American city".[8]

Despite British and American claims to the contrary, the actual existence of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons was neither proved nor disproved during the sample period. This inevitably led to the rhetorical use of 'vagueness' in the sampled articles, used in order to produce an ambiguous sense of uneasiness and threat. Despite the accusatory declaration of the headline '**Saddam hides secret arsenal behind women and children**' (discussed above), the article itself could only make reference to "a frightening amount of anthrax" which Iraq "could" produce using pharmaceutical fermenters. On other occasions, the claims being made regarding the 'threat' or Iraq were so couched, hedged and mitigated to be almost devoid of any real content. An article printed in the *Independent* headlined '**Britain warns of Saddam's timebomb**' (19 November 1997) for example, quoted a British "intelligence assessment" which stated:

> Provided it still has key components - and that is unclear - Iraq could within a few months build, with little risk of detection, missiles capable of hitting Israel and key targets in Saudi Arabia. (emphasis added)

What this assessment therefore states is that Iraq *may* be able to produce missiles *providing* it has certain key (i.e. essential) components, the likelihood of which is unclear.

Finally, an article printed in *The Times*, headlined '**Clinton cites Tokyo attack as a warning**' (17 November 1997), combines several of the linguistic features mentioned above in the form of an especially strong rhetorical argument for intervention. As the headline suggests, President Clinton used the deaths of Japanese civilians in the March 1995 gas attack on the Tokyo underground in an analogous argument of 'what can happen when these weapons fall into the wrong hands'. The first paragraph sets the scene of the UNSCOM stand-off in typically hyperbolic language: "The crisis with Iraq is not a replay of the Gulf War but *a battle against organised forces of destruction*, President Clinton said yesterday" (emphasis added). The

pseudo-apocalyptic language drawn upon in the opening paragraph, again written by Ian Brodie, lends a histrionic feel to the article. Casting Iraq as an example of, or perhaps possessed by "organised forces of destruction" negativises Iraqi action and justification. The deaths of the Japanese civilians in Tokyo is referred to "as an omen" of the "battle" suggested in the first paragraph. Clinton continues:

> Think about it in terms of the innocent Japanese who died in the subway and how important it is for every responsible government in the world to do everything possible not to let big stores of chemical or biological weapons fall into the wrong hands.

The reference to "every responsible government in the world" is a barely concealed swipe at the governments of France, China and the Russian Federation who were, for whatever reason, less than enthusiastic about the policy being advocated by America. What Clinton is actually demanding is also interesting to discuss. First, he calls to "responsible governments" to remove "*big* stores of chemical or biological weapons [from] ...the wrong hands". Does this mean that if Saddam Hussein had a *small* store of chemical or biological weapons that would be okay? Second, Clinton is not calling for the total irradication of chemical or biological weapons, merely that large numbers of them should be kept from falling "into the wrong hands". This of course accords exactly with America's long-term policy on chemical and biological weapons, as illustrated by their refusal to ratify the (1986) Declaration on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction (see Shearer, 1994: 413-4).[9] Third, arguing that chemical and biological weapons should not be allowed to "fall into the wrong [i.e. Saddam Hussein's] hands" suggests that this is how Saddam Hussein previously acquired them: they 'fell into his hands'. This of course completely removes the very active role which, amongst others, Britain and the United States played Saddam Hussein's acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

The first two paragraphs of this article therefore structure the "crisis with Iraq" as a battle between the "organised forces of destruction" and

"responsible government". The United States is firmly cast in the of these second positions, despite their 'ambiguous' approach to bacteriological weapons proliferation and very active role in the creation of the 'force of destruction' that is Saddam Hussein.[10]

6.3.7 *President Saddam Hussein's 'removal' from power*

The presuppositions and implications of the dominant discursive strategy supported an argument advocating the removal of President Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. In some articles reporting Iraq and the UNSCOM 'stand-off' this argument was placed in a much more central position. In such articles, journalists either explicitly supported the argument, wrote about the argument in the form of a 'for-and-against debate', or else elliptically and euphemistically advocated military intervention to 'solve the problem of Saddam'. These articles form the focus of this next section.

The arguments for military intervention and the possible removal of Saddam Hussein were presented and discussed as 'options' open to 'Us' in resolving the 'stand-off'. In an editorial headlined '**Iraq: diminishing options**' (12 November 1997), the *Guardian* presents such an argument:

> Sooner or later, the Council will almost certainly have to consider military action, a choice which is far from satisfactory and yet may be necessary, because not to take it would lead to an even worse situation.

Perhaps most interestingly, this editorial attempts to allay the presumed reticence of the *Guardian*-reader to military aggression by describing it as a "far from satisfactory" option, but one which "may well be *necessary*, because not to take it would *lead* to *an even worse situation*" (emphasis added). Here the newspaper adopts a 'consequentialist' view to the "military action", based on a utilitarian principle whereby punishment - in this case the proposed "military action" - is "an intrinsic mischief" whose use can only be justified by its countering "some greater mischief or evil" (Atkin, 2000: 2). In achieving this criterion of justification, the *Guardian* suggests that not punishing Iraq simply would lead to an intentionally ambiguous "even worse situation". The editorial's argument for military intervention closely mirrors

the view of Downing Street at that time. Prime Minister Tony Blair was later quoted presenting an almost identical argument: "if he [Saddam Hussein] isn't stopped - and stopped soon - the effects will be worse for the whole of the region in the long term" ('**Blair joins US in warning Iraq over hidden weapons**', *Financial Times*, 29 January 1998).

The *Financial Times* also summarised the 'options' which may end the 'UNSCOM crisis' in an feature article headlined '**Saddam stand-off**' (20 January 1998) - the overheadline to the article stated 'DAVID GARDNER LOOKS AT THE LIMITED OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH A DEFIANT IRAQI REGIME'. To the journalist's credit, the article argues that all "the limited options" will be limited in success: the American demand for "full compliance" is described as almost unenforceable; previous cruise missile attacks only served to "strengthen Mr Saddam"; and the much discussed "targeted attacks against ...weapons installations" are also dismissed since "there is little guarantee such strikes would hit easily concealable germ and nerve gas agents". The options discussed were, of course 'the limited options of *the US and UK*', presupposing that they were in the position - morally and physically - to take such options. Further, the article suggests another option: "an alternative government-in-exile to Mr Saddam, with a generous programme to reconstruct Iraq built around it." This "option" open to 'the West' is not objected to as strongly as with the others - the journalist merely suggests that it "is unlikely to yield *short-term* results" (emphasis added). This implies that it may not be entirely *un*successful, an implication given further weight in the following sentence: "Mr Saddam is not alone in realising that a lot can happen in six months". The failures of the alternative 'options' suggested appear even more marked in light of this partial criticism. This, along with Gardner describing the deposition of Saddam Hussein as signalling 'the West's' "good intentions" suggests that the long-term removal of the "defiant Iraqi regime" is the "option" which he is endorsing.

Articles that referred to military intervention without explicitly arguing that the assassination or deposition of Saddam Hussein should be a war aim were in the main printed in the more 'liberal' newspapers such as the *Guardian* and the *Independent*. However, due to the personification of the

coverage previously discussed, the proposed aggression still appeared to be directed at Saddam Hussein. Occasionally euphemisms, such as 'the regime' or 'the military', were employed by the sampled newspapers as the target of aggression. The headline of an article printed in the *Independent* (29 January 1998), '**Pentagon hints at blitz on Saddam's military élite**', not only used such a euphemism but also employed the culturally resonant term "blitz" to describe the attack itself. Further, Tony Blair is quoted arguing that "if he [Saddam Hussein] isn't stopped ...the effects will be worse for the whole world".

The 'consequentialist defence' used in a *Guardian* editorial discussed above, is also drawn upon in a column printed by the *Guardian*, headlined '**Still armed and dangerous**' (31 January 1998). The column, written by Martin Woolacott, 'debates' the possible ways in which 'We' are to 'deal with Saddam', with the overheadline of the article illustrating its primary argument: 'DROPPING BOMBS ON IRAQ MAY BE THE LEAST WORST OPTION'. He rightly suggests that "bombing Iraq with the intention of destroying part of the regime's mass-destruction capacity is a risky business that will not bring an easy solution to the problem posed by Saddam". However, his evaluation that bombing "will not bring an *easy* solution" suggests that it will bring 'a solution' nonetheless.

He then goes on to identify further "problems" with destroying "the regime's mass-destruction capacity":

> After four or six or 10 days of bombing, what if Saddam is still defiant? What if the bombing should inadvertently spread chemical or biological stocks? What if the bombing left intact some biological or chemical capacity?

These problems and others are swept aside in the final paragraph however, where Woolacott concludes:

> There is no answer to these questions, except to say that alternative, if it is to let Saddam prevail, is worse. This is a deep game, and it should be played with the intention of denying him the advantage and not with any predisposition to either force or diplomacy, even if it seems likely that force, for all its manifest disadvantages, will in the end be needed.

This, I feel, is one of the most depressing passages of the sampled Iraq articles for three reasons. First, Woolacott is essentially arguing for war: a war on Iraq's WoMD; a war on Saddam Hussein. This war is justified, he feels, despite the appalling possibility of large numbers of Iraqi civilians being killed by the inadvertent "spread [of] chemical and biological stocks", the Iraqis who would inevitably be killed by 'allied' bombs and the Iraqis who would no doubt be killed by Saddam Hussein in predictable massacres of 'treacherous' or rebellious civilians in the north and south of Iraq. Woolacott skips over these very real possibilities - there is, he states "no answer to these questions" - in favour of implying that letting "Saddam prevail" would be 'worse for the world'.

Second, Woolacott suggests that the strategy towards Iraq "is a deep game" which should be played without "any predisposition to either force or diplomacy". Aside from the fact that he appears to show a very clear predisposition towards using "force" to solve the "problem" of Saddam, the very idea that "force" and "diplomacy" should be regarded as equally acceptable courses of action is appalling, showing an incredibly lax regard for Iraqi life. That this disregard can then be labelled a "game", albeit a "deep" one (whatever *that* is meant to mean) I find particularly disturbing. Third, the proposed violence is backed despite Woolacott acknowledging that Saddam Hussein may remain in power and "defiant" at the end of it all. It is undoubtedly the case that Saddam Hussein and his regime are both guilty and capable of despicable and unimaginable acts of cruelty. But it is sad that a columnist in a 'quality' British newspaper found himself able to argue for a course of action which could conceivably result in comparably pernicious effects, yet which also seems to offer little or no possibility of changing the circumstances which precipitated such action.

The assassination of Saddam Hussein was an 'option' which, the sampled newspapers argued, was being backed with some vigour in the United States. Several of the sampled Iraq articles focused centrally upon the arguments being put 'for' and 'against' this course of action by the American 'public', American politicians and American newspapers. The *Guardian* for example printed an article reporting American support for the

assassination of Saddam Hussein, in an article headlined '**Public opinion wants Clinton to 'sock it to Saddam"** (15 November 1997). The *Telegraph* also printed an article, headlined '**Tired of words, Americans want to end the 'Beast of Baghdad"** (13 November 1997), which argued strongly for the assassination of Saddam Hussein. The article opens by employing the openly rhetorical figure "The Average American" (capitals in original), representing an *argumentum ad populum*, or 'appeal to group feeling' in support for the argument in the headline. The article also quotes Thomas Friedman of the *New York Times*, a quite notorious hawk, who wrote:

> Saddam Hussein is the reason God invented cruise missiles... Cruise missiles are simply the only way to deal with him. ...So if and when Saddam pushes beyond the brink, and we get that one good shot, lets make sure its a head shot.

A third article on this subject, headlined '**America considers how to bring about the death of a President**', was printed in *The Times* (18 November 1997). Where this article differs considerably is in the fact that it more accurately locates the 'ASSASSINATION DEBATE', referred to in the leader, with élite political commentators, such as Friedman cited above, and the American government. The journalist - again, Ian Brodie - quotes American notables who back the plan to assassinate Hussein: "George Stephanopoulos, formerly a close aide to President Clinton, said: 'We should kill him.'" To his credit however, Brodie quotes an "Executive Order" of the United States which shows that such a course of action would not only break International laws, but would also contravene American domestic law:

> Execution of foreign leaders by government agents was outlawed by Executive Order 12333 signed by President Reagan, It says: 'No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.'

Unfortunately the importance of this paragraph to the options being 'debated' was de-emphasised through it being placed as the penultimate paragraph of the article. This is, of course, a significant observation. Should it have been placed as the second paragraph - after where the article states "A debate is

growing in the United States over the moral and practical issues of assassinating President Saddam Hussein" - then the article would have given a very strong implication that the assassination of Saddam Hussein should not even be discussed, never mind considered as a 'moral' or 'practical' option. This would clearly undermine the 'ideological square' present across the sampled Iraq articles, previously discussed whereby only Iraqi actions are represented as 'illegal'. Needless to say the "Executive Order" which made it illegal for the United States to "engage in, or conspire to engage in" the assassination of Saddam Hussein, is conspicuously absent from all other sampled Iraq articles, in *The Times* and the other titles, both previous to and following its inclusion in this one article.

Finally in this section, there were articles which did not displace the focus of 'the debate' on whether to assassinate Saddam Hussein to America, and instead argued that Britain should be involved in 'removing' Hussein from power. Articles based on such argumentation were predominantly columns, editorials and features articles, although argumentation of this sort was also present in an abbreviated form in other formats. A letter, written by Ahmad Chalabi and printed in *The Times* for example (14 November 1997), argued: "It is now time for a new Iraq policy, one that will end Saddam's regime". Later, Mr Chalabi states that this policy should be two-fold, first 'removing' Saddam Hussein, then the remainder of his regime:

> Britain should take the lead in taking effective action to remove Saddam. ...This would be followed by concerted support for the democratic Iraqi Opposition to work from its base in northern Iraq to oust the regime and establish a government that respects democracy, human rights and international law.

Presumably Mr Chalabi, as the President of the exiled Iraqi National Congress, already had somebody from the "democratic Iraqi Opposition" (capitals in original) in mind to govern Iraq, when he wrote this letter.

The *Guardian* printed a column headlined '**Weapons and oil set fire to UN sanctions in Iraq**' (8 November 1997) which also argued for the 'removal' of Saddam Hussein, but the most detailed plan was printed in a *Financial Times* editorial, headlined '**Clear goals on Iraq**' (17 November

1997). The plan they proposed had three elements: "First, the US should make absolutely clear that if Iraq complies with UN resolutions, sanctions will be lifted". It is remarkable that the dropping of sanctions actually needed to be suggested as part of 'the plan' as opposed to a natural consequence of Iraqi compliance. The following line mitigates this proposed compliance however: "It is likely Mr Saddam will never comply. But only a clear statement of rewards and punishments can win broad backing [for military aggression]". The 'carrot' of lifting sanctions is therefore proposed as a 'show concession' with which to garner support for bombing Iraq - the real Anglo-American policy.

The proposed '*FT* plan' continued. The third element suggested a "time limit" in which to "rebuild allied cohesion around clearly defined goals", but it is the second aspect of the plan which is most relevant here: "Second, the US and its allies should start thinking about an alternative government-in-exile to Saddam, and design a programme to reconstruct Iraq around it". This is a remarkable statement, which, should it have been adopted, would quite obviously transgress the most basic and fundamental notions of state sovereignty. That the *Financial Times* could actively and openly propose what can only be described as a state-sponsored coup as the 'best option' to adopt, not only shows the extent to which geo-political interests are able to side-step international law when expedient, but also the way that such illegality can be transformed into 'virtue'.

To summarise: the discursive strategy featured in *Figure 6.1* (see page 242) formed the principle thematic feature of the sampled Iraq articles. The presuppositions and implications of this strategy supported an argument which firstly advocated military intervention in Iraq and secondly, but less frequently, advocated the assassination - or the more euphemistic 'removal' - of President Saddam Hussein from power. 'We' can only (metaphorically) 'unleash' this (euphemistic) 'military action', if 'We' are actually able to *do* so. 'Our' physical and moral ability to bomb Iraq is presupposed in most articles and forms a central argumentative claim in others. It appears from the articles discussed, that the reporting of the UNSCOM 'stand-off' constitutes a 'type' - a 'Discourse of Military Intervention' - in which the lexical, syntactic,

semantic and structural choices in the texts are functional to their pragmatic role: justifying bombing Iraq and 'removing' Saddam Hussein.

6.3.8 *Articles contesting the dominant discursive strategy*

There were articles which dissented from the discursive strategy analysed and presented. Such articles were very much in the minority, and tended to be concentrated in columns and readers' letters. They contested the dominant discursive strategy at all levels, but tended to focus on three points. Examples of each will now be discussed.

The first dissenting strategy of the sampled articles, was to argue that Britain and the US do not propose to attack *all* countries which break international law. This entails an inconsistency on the part of Britain and the US, which in turn implies that their actions towards Iraq are unjust. A reader's letter, written by Cathy Aitchison and printed in the *Guardian* (15 November 1997) makes this point quite forcefully. The *whole* of the letter reads:

> How dare the US strut around the world, insisting on complete compliance with UN resolutions which suit it and ignoring those which don't?

Arguments from this strategy were clearly intended to undermine the presupposed 'moral basis' for the attacks.

Israel was the country most frequently referred to as 'escaping' the criticism of the UN and the military wrath of 'the West'. A *Guardian* column, written by Paul Foot and headlined '**State terrorism unpunished by the UN**' (17 November 1997), makes such an argument. The first paragraph sets the scene, purposefully not mentioning the country whose "terrorism" has gone unpunished in order to highlight the hypocrisy of the American position toward Iraq:

> Senior UN officials have looked on helplessly as angry UN resolutions have been repeatedly ignored. Murderous invasions of a neighbouring country, all of them banned by the UN Charter and overwhelmingly condemned by the General Assembly, have been carried out with impunity. At the same time there has been mounting oppression, torture and house-bombing against opposition forces, and secret stockpiling of a nuclear arsenal. The regime concerned in Tel Aviv. No state on earth has shown such cynical disregard for the UN as has Israel.

Much of what is written in the above paragraph is unquestionably correct. It was however referred to only very rarely in these Iraq articles, and nowhere in language as emotive as in Paul Foot's article. The rhetoric is particularly powerful: UN officials are 'helpless'; UN resolutions are "angry" but are "*repeatedly* ignored"; Israel does not just 'invade' but does so 'murderously' and "with impunity" and has used "oppression, torture and house-bombing against opposition forces". In fact, so emotive is the language that the reader may be persuaded into thinking that Foot is 'biased', 'unobjective' or else has an agenda in criticising Israel.

Further down the article he quotes Geoff Simons from his "recent book on the United Nations" where he states: "Israel is currently in violation, to a greater or lesser extent, of UN resolutions 338, 465, 476, 672, 673 and 681." In addition he argues: "In 1996 Israel bombed south Lebanon again, targeting a UN base and killing hundreds of refugees who were sheltering there". This section provides particularly compelling evidence of the extent to which Israel 'defies' international law, and perhaps goes some way to supporting the rhetorical accusation of "State terrorism" in the headline. But in answer to the question "Will the UN go in?", Foot concludes:

> No it won't. ...Ignoring UN resolutions and building up nuclear arsenals only become matters for armed intervention when the regime concerned is (temporarily) hostile to the United States and cheap oil supplies are in peril.

Here not only is the hypocrisy of the proposed anti-Iraqi attacks exposed, but a reason for these attacks is also given: the geo-political and economic interests of America. This accusation of base American self-interest goes a long way to undermining the presupposed 'moral' basis to the military

intervention. As stated above, such arguments were rarely made and never with such ferocity.

Second, some articles questioned the alleged 'precision accuracy' of 'Western' military hardware. These articles based their criticisms on the low success rate of weaponry used in the 1991 attacks on Iraq, and occasionally attempted to derail the claim that such weapons could be used as part of an 'ethical' bombing strategy. One article, headlined '**Can America match its mouth with its muscle?**' and printed in the *Independent* (15 November 1997), presented a wealth of evidence taken from "a highly critical report by the [US] General Accounting Office (GAO)", to support the argument that "American air power was nothing like as accurate or effective in the Gulf War as was claimed by the Pentagon." The report from the GAO, reproduced in part by the *Independent*, "systematically deflates the claims, made by manufacturers and the US Department of Defence alike, for the effectiveness of most weapons systems." For example, the ability of the "air-to-ground Maverick missile, costing $100,000 (£61,000) each, to hit anything was impaired or sometimes made impossible by clouds, haze, smoke and dust." Further, the US-led coalition was only able to hit:

> multi-story buildings and other large immobile targets with accuracy. Thus, US planes hit telecommunications towers, the oil refinery and power station at Doura on the capital's southern outskirts as well as bridges spanning the Tigris. But it could not destroy smaller mobile targets such as tanks and artillery pieces.

What this therefore means is that the "civilian infrastructure is easy to hit, but not the security and military apparatus." This argument enables the reader to infer that Iraqi civilians were not and hence probably *will* not avoid being hurt or killed by the proposed 'Western' attacks.

The third dissenting argumentative strategy argued against the whole basis for military intervention. By this strategy, the claims offered by the dominant strategy were generally accepted - Saddam Hussein *was* defying the international will; He *was* a bad man; and international law *should* be upheld - but the implied conclusion, that we should therefore intervene militarily, was rejected in favour of non-violent action. A series of five

readers' letters, printed in the *Guardian* (17 November 1997) made such an argument, although the headline that they were placed under - '**Let America fight its own battles**' - appeared to suggest that they were actually objecting to *British* involvement in bombing Iraq rather than opposing the bombing of Iraq *per se*. One of these letters even criticised the decision of the *Guardian* to include

> a big picture of an American warplane on the front page... Printing the picture can only arouse the atavistic conviction that war is exciting, which is the last thing the world needs in a time of international tension. This week, please give us a picture of diplomats working hard to keep war at bay.
>
> Leonard Pepper, Oxford

By far the most significant of these five letters, in terms of size (it was the largest), placement (it is positioned first), content and political importance, was written by four Members of Parliament - Tony Benn, Tam Dalyell, Ken Livingstone and John McDonnell - accompanied by Ron Huzzard and Rae Street. The approach taken in this letter is to shift the role of the 'aggressor' towards the American and British governments, which in turn helps to negativise the 'Western' approach to Iraq. This is illustrated in the letter's opening paragraph:

> We note with concern the growing threat by the United States of yet another military attack on Iraq, backed by the British government. ...There is no justification for bombing Iraq yet again, almost seven years since the end of the Gulf War.

Lower down, the letter attacks the stated reason for America's continuing support for military attacks on Iraq, and suggests an alternative theory for this proposed aggression:

> We suspect that Washington's continued belligerence towards Iraq has little to do with saving the world from destruction and much to do with protecting US domination of the world's oil supplies.

Here the mitigation of the claim - "We *suspect*" - is counteracted by the rhetorical strength of the claim itself - "*continued belligerence*" and

"protecting US *domination*". Their dismissal of the US stated war aim is enabled by the letter's use of hyperbole - "saving *the world* from *destruction*" ridicules the US in its self-appointed role of protector.

The derisory tone of the letter is heightened by its claim that perhaps "the safety of the world would be better served if weapons of mass destruction were removed from ...countries like the US and Britain". What this sentence does is quite cleverly redefine the American 'war aim' of "saving the world from destruction" into meaning 'removing weapons of mass destruction'. This definition enables the authors to allege an inconsistency on the part of the US:

> Israel is known to be a nuclear weapons state and has been defying UN resolutions for years. Yet the US does not threaten to bomb it, nor should it. Likewise, Turkey's recent military incursions into the north of Iraq in pursuit of the Kurds have gone unchallenged.

Therefore, the authors are using an example of the first dissenting strategy discussed above - alleged inconsistencies - in order to contest the US argument for military aggression. This constitutes a strategic rhetorical use of the topic potential on offer to the authors of the letter, since to argue inconsistent adherence to a principle does not refute the applicability of the principle in the case discussed. However, the letter aims to show how the arguments offered by the US and Britain - weapons of mass destruction, international law - do not justify bombing Iraq since these same arguments apply in the case of Israel and Turkey. There must therefore be an alternative reason why the US wants to bomb Iraq - which the letter suggests is the US desire to maintain its "domination of the world's oil supplies", an argument which is immoral and therefore unacceptable.

A column, written by Joan Smith and headlined '**Can six slighted Americans be worth a war?**' (*Independent on Sunday*, 16 November 1997), combined the three dissenting strategies introduced above. The first paragraph picks up on the theme of 'military superiority' present in articles reporting the UNSCOM 'stand-off':

> Pictures in newspapers of men carrying missiles. Sketch maps of the Middle East accompanied by lists of weaponry. Agency photos of an American airman, Jamie Downey, washing 'an EA-6B Prowler' aircraft of USS Nimitz in the Gulf. Whether or not the Western allies intend to go to war ...one thing is clear: rampant technophilia has broken out again.

Smith's distaste at journalism's preoccupation with military equipment is clear from this excerpt. This "technophilia", she continues lower down, continues in the pages of newspapers despite the widely acknowledged "truth about the bombardment of Iraq" in 1991 where despite "excited reports of the astonishing accuracy of new weapons systems, ...most of it failed to reach its target". The section concludes by stating:

> Perhaps the technology has improved dramatically in the five-and-a-half years since the war ended. It seems equally likely that the same old propaganda is being pumped out again.

Smith's suggestion that the technology would have to "improve *dramatically*" emphasises her point that the weapons used were incredibly inaccurate. Her use of the term "propaganda" again highlights her great distaste at the use of the newspapers in promoting such material - and indeed the participation of the newspapers in this promotion. Her reference to "five-and-a-half years since the war ended" is itself either widely inaccurate or extremely subversive, since it suggests that the war did not end until March 1992. I suspect this was an error of addition on her part.

In the second section of the column, Smith moves on to ask the question which had seemed to escape discussion for much of the sampled Iraq articles: "Why, in any case, are we considering further military action against Iraq?" The inconsistency of the argument for military attacks when compared with American *in*action over Indonesia and Israel - "only *two* examples [who] have ignored UN resolutions without facing the threat of military action" (my emphasis) - and the seeming insistence of "successive British governments ...to sell arms to the [Indonesian] regime" is exposed. These examples are used in the same way as they are in the letter from Tony Benn *et al* discussed above - as evidence that arguing for aggression on the ground of Iraq breaking international law simply doesn't hold any

water. In its place, Smith offers an alternative argument which had started to gain in popularity:

> This may play well in the United States, where Bill Clinton's troubled presidency requires a series of distractions, but it looks *to me* more like posturing than a principled response by the international community to the long-term problem of how to deal with Saddam's thoroughly unpleasant regime. (emphasis added)

The unfortunate effect that the prepositional *'to me'* has, is to root the claim in the subjective *opinion* of a columnist as opposed to objective *'fact'*. This is true of the vast majority of articles discussed in this last section - indeed only one of these articles is not the 'opinion' of either a reader or a columnist.

As suggested above, the lack of dissent in the sampled Iraq news reports may be partly the result of the space required to support a claim which contests the dominant discursive strategy. On the other hand, should the news reports have been more critical regarding the claims made by US and British officials, not providing column space for them to '*warn* Iraq not to make their *threats*', and approached the proposed military aggression as an intrinsic evil which must be used with restraint and *only* where no other option could bring possible success, then dissent would have been possible in the most abbreviated of reports. The decisions of journalists and newspapers to accept, and in most cases *support*, the argument to direct military aggression at Iraq for the crimes of its government, must be viewed in light of this.

6.3.9 *The importance of UNSCOM to 'unconnected' Iraq articles*

The story of the UNSCOM weapons inspections and 'stand-off' dominated the articles reporting Iraq. There were however a few articles which, on the surface at least, appeared to report Iraq and Iraqi actors from a different frame of reference that that provided by the UNSCOM crisis. One story, reported by the sampled newspapers on 6 November 1997, involving the sentencing of six Iraqi men for the hijack of a civil aircraft appeared to provide an opportunity for archetypal 'crime' reports. In a report headlined '**Lenient sentence for Iraqi hijackers**' printed by the *Guardian*, it was the

hijackers themselves who appeared to be given more sympathy than the victims of the ordeal:

> Acknowledging the *horrors* the men had *suffered* in their homeland, and a *plea* by the jurors for lenience, the judge said the men had carried out an offence of the greatest possible gravity and that he *had* to jail them in order to deter others. (emphasis added)

The journalist, Allison Daniels, appears to feel so strongly that these Iraqi men represent "worthy victims" of an enemy regime (see Herman & Chomsky, 1994: 37-87) that the victims of the crime itself are almost forgotten. The Iraqi men's actions are described as "an offence of the greatest possible gravity"; the third paragraph states that the passengers and crew "had all been *terrified*"; and three paragraphs later it states in an almost cursory way that "an air hostess was taken hostage and a passenger was stabbed". No other mention of the distress or injuries to passengers or crew are made for the remaining 103 centimetres of column space. This, compared with the repeated references made to the "horrors", the "unimaginable torture" and the "20th century hell" experienced by the men in *Saddam Hussein's* Iraq.

One would perhaps expect the *Telegraph*, as a traditionally conservative newspaper, to take a different line on the (lenient) sentencing of these hijackers than that taken by the *Guardian*. And indeed they did, but the sympathies of the newspaper were still firmly placed with the hijackers, to a degree which they were not in, for example, the more recent case of the Afghani jet hijacking at Stansted airport. These sympathies are suggested in the headline to the article: '**Asylum-seekers jailed for jet hijack**' (6 November 1997). This headline foregrounds the 'victimhood' of the Iraqi men in a way which alternative headlines focusing on their criminality, such as 'Muslim hijackers seek asylum', wouldn't. In the fourth paragraph, the report states that the hijackers,

> gave evidence of the *brutality* of Saddam Hussein's regime, the *deaths*, *disappearance*, *torture* and *sexual abuse* of members of their families and friends. Several had been *sentenced to death* for refusing to join the Iraqi army to fight against fellow Shi'ites. (emphasis added)

By contrast, the victims of the hijacking are mentioned in the seventh paragraph, where the judge states that they "must have been 'reduced to *abject terror*' by the threats and were not to know that the men brandishing knives and fake grenades were not fanatical terrorists" (emphasis added). This very effectively acknowledges the distress which the passengers and crew were no doubt in, but at the same time reduces it, by stating that they were never in any 'real' danger since these men "were not fanatical terrorists".

This report, and the previous report from the *Guardian*, are therefore functional to the dominant discursive strategy present across much of the Iraq articles reporting the UNSCOM 'stand-off'. The claims and explanations of the Iraqi hijackers' actions are all related directly to the "horror", the "terror", the "death" and "torture" which is seemingly routine in *Saddam Hussein's* Iraq. The claims of these articles therefore support the argument for military aggression on the grounds of 'humanitarian need' - the Iraqis *want* us to bomb their country and rid them of their dictator - and are perhaps all the more persuasive precisely because they appear, at first reading, to 'be about' a completely different event.

The sampled newspapers displayed a particularly low level of interest in Iraqi civil society, as indicated by the topics of the sampled Iraq articles in *Tables 6.8*, *6.9*, *6.10* and *6.11*. Moreover, most of these articles are written from a position in which the 'threat of Iraq' - militarily, civilly and socially - is emphasised. This can be illustrated quite clearly if we examine, for example, two articles which coded 'travel' as their primary topic. Both of these articles are on the same subject - a British national, Phil Haines, visiting Iraq as a tourist in order to complete his personal ambition to visit every sovereign country on Earth - but interestingly, they are published over two months apart and by different newspapers.

The first story was headlined '**Last stop for the man who has been**

everywhere' and was printed in the *Independent on Sunday* (23 November 1997). The primary aim of the text was to present the actions of Mr Haines as an "achievement". What the text therefore presents throughout is an argument to the effect that:

> 'The travels of Phil Haines form a great achievement'

The journalist provides two supports for this claim:

1. 'Mr Haines has been to all 192 sovereign countries'
2. 'The latest countries read like a list of war zones'

How this story is connected to Iraq is in the textual realisation of the second supporting reason, wherein Iraq is cited as the latest in this "list of war zones: Afghanistan, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and now Iraq". The threat of these war zones to Mr Haines' personal safety must necessarily be emphasised in order for the text to remain coherent. The threat posed by Iraq was achieved via alluding to the familiar, high-profile UNSCOM story. In fact, the audience's familiarity with the ongoing saga of weapons inspections is *relied* upon, since, without either direct reference or explanation, the journalist derives claims of the unaccommodating nature of Iraq *directly* from this recent history. This is noticeable in the first paragraph (numbered here for ease of reference), where both the action and the actors are identified without any further contextualisation of the nature and relevance of the surrounding events:

> [1] Not even the threat of war, nor nuclear attack, [2] could have stopped Phil Haines from going on holiday to Iraq last week. [3] While US and British forces menaced the Gulf, [4] he and a few friends were cheerfully speeding towards the almost deserted Karameh border post [5] - and a remarkable record.

Here, the journalist is simply presenting Iraq as a dangerous place to be. The mention in clause 4 of the "US and British forces menac[ing] the Gulf" must also be read in connection to instrumental aim of the text to represent Iraq as a war zone. Thus, although it is novel to see 'the Allies' represented

as "menac[ing] the Gulf", the sentence supports the argument that the Gulf is 'a generally threatening place to be', and as such remains functional within the text. Indeed, describing the "forces" (interesting that they are not Armies) in such a way, without the luxury of being informed of their motivation, perhaps *increases* the perceived threat, since such threats seem undirected, open-ended and unexplained.

In summary then, in order for the second supporting reason - 'The latest countries read like a list of war zones' - to be accepted, the journalist needs to provide a concise example of a war zone. The easiest way to do this is to provide an archetypal 'war zone' which Mr Haines has visited. Thus, Iraq is offered in such a way, as intellectual shorthand for 'war zone', drawing upon perceptions of the country which it can be assumed were fairly well inscribed in the imagination of the public at that time.

The second article, headlined '**Fancy a trip to Iraq?**' and printed in the *Telegraph* (31 January 1998), prefers to adopt the more familiar travel writing genre. The use of the headline shown above, and the adoption of some of the formal features of travel writing - the recommended company, centred around a 'package deal', suggestions of excursions and sites of interest - so soon after 'the UNSCOM stand-off' had received such a detailed and extended coverage, are clearly intended to be read as ironic. The situation in Iraq with regard to weapons inspections would be well known to anyone with a passing interest in current affairs, and this knowledge is alluded to in the first paragraph of the article:

> [1] With a task force gathering in the Gulf, [2] diplomats shuttling furiously, [3] and Saddam Hussein growling defiance, [4] one man is still determined to take his Easter holiday in Iraq. [5] And for £1,350 you can go, too.

Once again, we see the assumptions of the journalist coming to the fore. The above passage is written on the assumption that the audience will know who the actors referred to are, and the relations between them: who constitutes the 'task force', what the diplomats are attempting to achieve with their 'shuttling', and most importantly who Saddam Hussein is and to whom he is 'growling defiance'. But just in case the reader did not know the exactitudes

of the crisis, the sentence is structured in such a way to imply an unattractive situation regardless of details. The whole of the first three clauses, with the addition of the adverb 'still' in [4], function as a adverbial phrase contingent to the central fourth clause. Other adverbs signalling contingency include 'although', and 'despite', thus an alternative way of writing the sentence could have been:

> [1-3] Despite [this], [4] one man is determined to take his Easter holiday in Iraq.

This alternative version would have functioned adequately, communicating, as it does, that the man in question is determined to holiday in Iraq, regardless of the obstacles placed in front of him. What this stylistic variant doesn't offer, however, is the sense of drama which results from placing such emphasis on the word 'still': thus, "[despite *all this*] one man is *still* determined to take his Easter holiday in Iraq" - an invitation which is extended to the reader in exchange for the rather princely sum of £1,350.

Thus, evidence is provided to show that Iraq is, depending on your point of view, somewhere between a rather dubious choice for a holiday and a potential death-trap. The journalist seems to sense that not enough evidence has been provided to *prove* the undesirable nature of Iraq, and the second paragraph acknowledges this, stating:

> [6] It may not be everybody's idea of the perfect package, [7] but Phil Haines, [8] the director of Live Ltd, [9] a travel company he runs from his home in Twickenham, Middlesex, [10] is determined to go ahead with it.

At this point in the article, the only information provided for the reader on which to base a decision of whether or not this *is* their "perfect [holiday] package", is that which is alluded to regarding the general nature of Iraq: the gathering task force, shuttle diplomacy and the 'canine' (cf. "growling") Saddam Hussein. It is highly doubtful that this would appeal to very many people at all, and hence the use of 'not everybody' (line 6) is clearly intended to be ironic, transgressing, as it does, the Gricean maxim of 'Quality' (1967: 53). But there are some people to whom this holiday - with

it's fair share of adrenaline - may appeal, so it become necessary, in the third paragraph, to further pervert the travel writing genre through citing some of what the journalist calls the 'highlights' of the holiday:

> [11] A gruelling journey overland from Jordan, [12] an Aids test at the border, [13] and a room at a hotel where you are invited to wipe your feet on a mosaic of George Bush [14] are among the highlights.

The choice of the three elements given as "the highlights" (clauses 11-13) is interesting, and deserves further examination. First, the choice of the adjective "gruelling" provides Iraq with a very obviously negative frame of reference from the onset. Second, each of the three cited "highlights" are signifiers of stereotypical representations of the Middle East and, by association, Iraq. Taking each one in turn:

1. "A gruelling journey overland from Jordan": peripheral nation; substandard transportation [cf. gruelling];
2. "an Aids test at the border": unclean/unhealthy; intrusive; suspicious;
3. "wipe your feet on a mosaic of George Bush": grudge-bearing; anti-western

As such, these elements - considered by the journalist to *characterise* the holiday - must be viewed as part of the greater stylistic register from which they are drawn: the Middle East as socially and culturally un(der)developed.

Lastly, the three elements are mentioned as being *among* the highlights, implying that there are others. What this means is that the journalist has played a visibly active role in the choice of what to single out as worthy of particular reference, as opposed to alternate options. Three of these 'other', presumably less illustrious, highlights, are backgrounded in the text, relegated to the latter half of a sentence, two thirds of the way down the article:

> Visas are arranged through an agency in Baghdad, and stops will include the souks in that city, the Hanging Gardens of Babylon and the ziggurat at Ur.

This structuring of information is highly significant, since foregrounding information in this way encourages a reading in which the three stereotypical

elements (in clauses 11-14) are granted a higher significance than that accorded to one of the Wonders of the Ancient World. The mention of these tourist sites appears almost as a *concession* to the main argument of the article, that 'Iraq is an undesirable place to visit'. But the added information cannot be regarded as a concession in the truest sense of the word since despite the introduction of this new contestive material, the article continues along much the same lines as it did previously. In this sense, the information operates as another "show concession", ostensibly providing "evidence that the speaker appreciates the other side's point of view, displaying to listeners that the speaker is not wholly blind to other's positions" (Antaki & Wetherell, 1999: 24). The article gains a sense of 'objectivity' through the inclusion of the concession, and the argument being presented about Iraq being an undesirable place to visit becomes all the more convincing because of it.

To summarise: what function do these texts play? Gill and Whedbee (1997) try to encourage critics to "view texts as pragmatic: a rhetorical text responds to or interacts with societal issues or problems, and it produces some action upon or change in the world" (p.161). Adopting their approach, it is instructive to bear in mind that these texts were originally printed during or immediately following large peaks in the number of articles reporting Iraq - 23 November 1997 and 31 January 1998 (see *Graphs 6.1* and *6.2*). It therefore seems highly suspect that the only two 'travel' articles covering Iraq in the sample, occur in close proximity to these large peaks in reporting. The UNSCOM stand-off is present in the two articles in the form of a assumed threat: it is cited as a reason for not visiting, and hence *learning* about the nation and its peoples. This lack of understanding is highly functional to the interventionist aims of the sampled newspapers' dominant discursive strategy, a point also made by Traber and Davis (1991):

> Ignorance of the affairs of a nation's ordinary people is useful in the construction of the image of an enemy. The less we know of the enemy the easier it is to create the image that we wish. The mass media have built up or, at least, reinforced a social cosmology which divides the world into angels and devils, the good and the bad (Traber & Davis (1991: 9) cited in Keeble, 1997: 59).

Since the research chose to take a comprehensive sample of newspapers within a limited time frame, as opposed to a selective longitudinal sample, I cannot draw any further conclusions regarding the frequency with which this happens. It could be argued that the UNSCOM stand-off was ongoing for the whole of the four month sample, and as such, would form the assumed backdrop to any article regarding travelling within Iraq. However, as I have attempted to show above, the two articles in question can hardly be regarded as conventional examples of the 'travel writing' genre. Rather they seem to be developing a 'stay at home' genre when it comes to travelling to 'threatening Iraq', an agenda which seems highly functional to the broader concerns of reporting the UNSCOM stand-off.

Notes: Chapter 6

[1] The nationalities of primary actors not cited in *Table 6.12* were: Bosnian (n= 1); Egyptian (n= 3); Iranian (n= 1); Jordanian (n= 5); Kuwaiti (n= 2); Libyan (n= 1); Pakistani (n= 1); Turkish (n= 4); Yemeni (n= 1); Palestinian (n= 2); Kashmiri (n= 1); 'Arab' (n= 1); French (n= 3); German (n= 3); Canadian (n= 1); Australian (n= 6); Chinese (n= 1); Irish (n= 1); Icelandic (n= 1); 'EU' (n= 1); 'multiple non-Muslim countries' (n= 1); 'unknown' (n= 2); and 'western' (n= 2).

[2] The seeming concordance of views between the head of UNSCOM and the US drew criticism from some quarters. Eric Rouleau (French Ambassador to Turkey, 1988-1992) for example, said that Richard Butler was at that time acting "less like an official observing proper diplomatic discretion than a spokesman for US views" - views which he "spread ...about in public meetings and the media in alarmist terms which were not borne out in his reports to the Security Council" (*Le Monde Diplomatique* (English Ed.) 23 March 1998). These criticisms became more widespread later in the UNSCOM crisis. After the American bombing of Iraq on 16 December 1998, representatives from the Russian Federation attacked Richard Butler, claiming that he had "artificially created" the crisis which preceded the bombings (UN Security Council Press Release SC/6611, 3955th meeting (night) 16 December 1998). Going further, the Russian representative claimed that "Richard Butler had presented a distorted picture of what was taking place in the country", that he had "grossly abused his authority" and that "his actions led to the sharp deterioration of the situation in the country" (Ibid.). The content of Russian (and to a lesser extent Chinese) criticisms were not published in the press.

[3] By way of aside, I think it is interesting that this article was included for publication during one of the 'lulls' in coverage, when Iraq appeared to be co-operating with the UNSCOM inspections and all seemed well in Iraq.

[4] It is of course 'possible' that the CIA only came into possession of the tape post-1990, when Saddam Hussein became *persona non gratis*.

[5] The analysis which follows is not meant as a direct comparison with the previous article printed in *The Times*. The two articles are not offered as representative examples of the lexical choices made by the two newspapers across the sample and as such, any direct comparison is invalid. Rather, the analyses are meant to

illustrate the effect(s) which syntactic choices have upon representation and therefore understanding of the reported event.

[6] In 1996 for example, during Madelaine Albright's time as US Ambassador to the UN she appeared on the American programme '60 Minutes' and was asked about the child deaths in Iraq. Asked what she felt about the effects which the sanctions were having on Iraq she replied, "I think this is very hard choice, but the price we think is worth it" (quoted in *Washington Post* 17 December 1998). For the record, infant mortality was estimated to have increased six-fold since the onset of sanctions (WHO, March 1996) due in part to "one out of every four Iraqi infants [being] malnourished. ...Chronic malnutrition among [Iraqi] children under five has reached 27.5 per cent" (UNICEF, May 1997). I do not think it unwarranted to presume that Albright would be party to statistics such as these.

[7] This rhetorical strategy in which everyday objects were used to 'illustrate' the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, specifically the ease with which he would apparently be able to kill large numbers of 'Us', reached a peak in the now infamous articles published by the British tabloid newspaper the *Sun* on and around 18 March 1998. The *Sun* reported that the Home Office had given an all-ports warning, claiming that "Iraq may launch chemical and biological attack using material disguised as harmless fluids. Could officers therefore be alert for any items which might contain harmful substances". According to the *Sun*, Iraq planned to target Britain in revenge for any military strikes. Possible containers in which such "harmful substances" could be found were "duty free good, including spirits, cosmetics, cigarette lighters and perfume sprays". The following week however, the alternative news agency *South News* quoted "former UN weapons inspector Col. Terry Taylor" as saying: "If it were really being sent in like this, in bottles, it's quite difficult to keep alive and to get it out in a form that might actually kill somebody. ...It would only affect the person opening the bottle and possibly people nearby. It's not something that would kill hundreds of thousands of people". (*South News* Commentary, 23 March 1998).

[8] In a remarkable denial of US chemical, biological and nuclear weaponry, William Cohen puts Iraq's chemical and biological weapons proliferation down to a "rogue regime" seeking "unconventional ways of countering the vast US preponderance of *conventional* arms". Here, the term "rogue *regime*" is presumably used to indicate a stronger dislike than the usually preferred "rogue *state*". Cohen continues his deception when the Iraqi "rogue regime" is expanded to include North Korea, a country which he describes as being an "unpredictable and increasingly desperate regime armed with a very large chemical arsenal". The fact that America used bubonic plague against North Korea in the 1950s (see *South News* Commentary, 23 March 1998), an episode which would have provided a little context to the article, is absent from his criticisms.

[9] This refusal is possibly due to the criticism which the United States drew from the General Assembly (1968-69) on their use of "defoliants", "non-lethal tear gases" and "other chemical agents" in the Vietnam conflict (see Shearer, 1994: 509).

[10] That Clinton chooses to use the Tokyo sarin gas attack as an analogy is also interesting, since Japan was another member of the Security Council during the UNSCOM crisis who were less than eager to launch military attacks at Iraq.

Chapter 7

Division and Rejection of Muslims: the 'ideological square' in international reporting

7.1 Introduction

This chapter summarises a sub-sample of reports, located in countries other than Britain, Iraq and Algeria. The chapter focuses predominantly on the reporting of Palestine, Israel, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, and draws occasionally on reports from Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. The choice to concentrate on reports from these countries was based on a desire to analyse not only the more frequently reported nations but also a range of reports located both inside and outside of 'the Middle East' in which Islam or Muslims were presented as important factors in the reported action.[1] I argue that these reports are founded upon a structuring of presuppositions, themes and arguments indicative of van Dijk's ideological square, and dominated by a twin process of 'division and rejection' of Muslims. In discussing this conclusion, the chapter is structured in three parts: the first introduces and discusses the quantitative data produced by content analysis of the selected texts. This provides a contextual base for the conclusions offered in the remainder of the chapter.

The second part of the chapter (sections 7.3 - 7.4) analyses how 'Their negativity' is constructed and represented. Four archetypal argumentative *topoi* used to depict 'Their negativity' are then discussed in greater detail: the military threat of Muslim countries; the threat of Muslim extremism; the (internal) threat to democracy posed by Muslim political leaders and parties; and the social threat of Muslim gender inequality. The third part (sections 7.5 - 7.6) analyses selected items of coverage in which 'Our' civilising influence *on* or *over* Muslims is either implicitly assumed or else explicitly stated. The rhetorical conclusions of such articles represent an attendant implication of the ideological square's effect upon reporting: the positive representation of 'Our' social action. I suggest that the position 'We' is mutable, and often expanded to include individuals and nations which in

other contexts are represented as 'foreign'. This expansion of the inclusive 'We' has significant political implications given that, under the ideological square, 'Our' actions are represented as acceptable and/or positive. The actions of the Israeli government, specifically their attempted assassination of Khaled Meshal, the head of Hamas' politburo, are discussed in light of this argument.

7.2 **Quantitative Results**

The geographical locations of recorded items analysed in this chapter are given below[2]:

Table 7.1: Primary Country in the selected international articles

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Israel	238	15.8	15.8	15.8
	Iran	136	9.0	9.0	24.9
	Egypt	125	8.3	8.3	33.2
	Pakistan	119	7.9	7.9	41.1
	Indonesia	100	6.6	6.6	47.7
	USA	82	5.5	5.5	53.2
	Turkey	79	5.3	5.3	58.4
	Saudia Arabia	62	4.1	4.1	62.6
	Palestine	52	3.5	3.5	66.0
	Malaysia	51	3.4	3.4	69.4
	Afghanistan	43	2.9	2.9	72.3
	UK	34	2.3	2.3	74.5
	Jordan	31	2.1	2.1	76.6
	Bosnia	27	1.8	1.8	78.4
	'Arab' countries	25	1.7	1.7	80.1
	Lebanon	21	1.4	1.4	81.4
	Libya	21	1.4	1.4	82.8
	Kashmir	17	1.1	1.1	84.0
	Yemen	16	1.1	1.1	85.0
	France	16	1.1	1.1	86.1
	Bangladesh	15	1.0	1.0	87.1
	Somalia	15	1.0	1.0	88.1
	'EU'	15	1.0	1.0	89.1
	Morrocco	12	.8	.8	89.9
	UAE	12	.8	.8	90.7
					...
	Total	1504	100.0	100.0	

Table 7.1 shows the count of primary countries for the 1504 articles discussed in this chapter.[3] This chapter's qualitative analysis focuses on items of recorded output in which Israel (n= 238; 15.8%), Palestine (n= 52; 3.5%) or Iran (n= 136; 9.0%) are the cited primary countries (i.e. the geographical location of the reported action). In addition, the chapter draws to a lesser extent on items in which Pakistan (n= 119; 7.9%) or Turkey (n= 79; 5.3) are the primary countries; and finally, occasional articles located in Saudi Arabia (n= 62; 4.1%), Afghanistan (n= 43; 2.9%) and Jordan (n= 31; 2.1%) are also drawn upon as illustrative examples. In this way, the later qualitative analysis aims to be representative of both the more frequently cited primary nations as well with a range of nations inside and outside of 'the Middle East'. However, the content of all 1504 international articles will be summarised in the following discussion of quantitative results.

The ratio of 'hard' to 'soft' news formats between the newspapers is shown below:

Table 7.2: 'Hard' and 'soft' international articles, by newspaper

	Format: 'hard' or 'soft' news						Total		
	'Hard' news			'Soft' news					
	Count	Row %	Col %	Count	Row %	Col %	Count	Row %	Col %
Financial Times	307	92.2%	23.0%	26	7.8%	15.3%	333	100.0%	22.1%
Guardian	329	86.1%	24.7%	53	13.9%	31.2%	382	100.0%	25.4%
Independent	196	86.0%	14.7%	32	14.0%	18.8%	228	100.0%	15.2%
Telegraph	211	91.7%	15.8%	19	8.3%	11.2%	230	100.0%	15.3%
The Times	249	90.5%	18.7%	26	9.5%	15.3%	275	100.0%	18.3%
IoS	15	68.2%	1.1%	7	31.8%	4.1%	22	100.0%	1.5%
Sunday Times	27	79.4%	2.0%	7	20.6%	4.1%	34	100.0%	2.3%
Total	1334	88.7%	100.0%	170	11.3%	100.0%	1504	100.0%	100.0%

Table 7.2 illustrates that, despite the differences in *Table 7.2*, the daily broadsheets all produced a similar level of 'hard news' coverage of the countries in *Table 7.1*. Only the two 'liberal' broadsheets, the *Guardian* and the *Independent*, returned a slightly lower proportion of hard news coverage (86.1% and 86.0% respectively). The two Sunday newspapers dedicated a

much higher proportion of their coverage to 'soft news' formats, a finding which was to be expected given the editorial priorities of these publications.

The proportion of articles written by staff journalists varied across the different newspapers to a much greater extent.

Table 7.3: Summarised by-line in the selected international articles, by newspaper

	Proportion of Staff to Agency articles								Total	
	Staff Journalist		Press Agency		No source given		All other sources			
	Count	Row %	Count	Row %	Count	Row %	Count	Row %	Count	Row %
Financial Times	309	92.8%	19	5.7%	4	1.2%	1	.3%	333	100.0%
Guardian	247	64.7%	99	25.9%	22	5.8%	14	3.7%	382	100.0%
Independent	134	58.8%	47	20.6%	35	15.4%	12	5.3%	228	100.0%
Telegraph	185	80.4%	34	14.8%	5	2.2%	6	2.6%	230	100.0%
The Times	202	73.5%	64	23.3%	6	2.2%	3	1.1%	275	100.0%
IoS	19	86.4%	1	4.5%			2	9.1%	22	100.0%
Sunday Times	33	97.1%					1	2.9%	34	100.0%
Total	1129	75.1%	264	17.6%	72	4.8%	39	2.6%	1504	100.0%

The *Financial Times* dedicates significantly more staff journalists to reporting (92.8%; n= 309) than the remaining daily broadsheets, the lowest of which is the *Independent* with only 58.8 per cent (n= 134) of printed items being written by staff. The Sunday papers, presumably less constrained by time pressures, also showed a high proportion of articles written by staff journalists. Discounting 'news in brief', 100 per cent of the 'news' printed in both Sunday papers (*Independent on Sunday*, n= 13; *Sunday Times*, n= 27) was written by staff journalists - the highest proportion in the daily papers was the *Financial Times* with 98.7 per cent (n= 222) and the lowest was the *Independent* with only 73.2 per cent (n= 104) of 'news' reports written by staff journalists.

Moving on to the content of the recorded items of coverage, an important indicator of the inclusion of 'Muslim voices and opinions' is the proportion of Muslim actors who are quoted in broadsheet newspaper articles.[4]

Table 7.4: Crosstabulation of 'Muslim' and 'Quoted' Primary Actors

			Is Actor 1 Muslim?			
			Yes	No	Unknown	Total
Is Actor 1 quoted?	Yes	Count	157	277	70	504
		Expected Count	179.7	243.6	80.7	504.0
	No	Count	377	447	170	994
		Expected Count	354.3	480.4	159.3	994.0
Total		Count	534	724	240	1498
		Expected Count	534.0	724.0	240.0	1498.0

Table 7.5: Crosstabulation of 'Muslim' and 'Quoted' Secondary Actors

			Is Actor 2 Muslim?			
			Yes	No	Unknown	Total
Is Actor 2 quoted?	Yes	Count	92	168	66	326
		Expected Count	122.6	147.4	56.0	326.0
	No	Count	449	482	181	1112
		Expected Count	418.4	502.6	191.0	1112.0
Total		Count	541	650	247	1438
		Expected Count	541.0	650.0	247.0	1438.0

Immediately noticeable from *Tables 7.4* and *7.5* are the differences between the observed and expected values in the cells: in both tables, whilst the observed number of quoted *Muslims* is *lower* than the expected values, the observed number of quoted *non*-Muslim actors is *higher* than expected. The chi-squared test, the standard test for statistical independence, was performed on both crosstabulations and the results were statistically highly significant: $p <= 0.001$ for Actor 1, and $p = 0.000$ for Actor 2, across all statistical measures (see Appendix 5). Crosstabulations for the third and fourth cited actors produced similarly significant results. What this shows is that there is a clear statistical relationship between being Muslim and being quoted in news reports, with quoted Muslims being significantly under-represented.

The argumentative positions of journalists towards Muslim actors are equally important variables when considering the representation of Islam in broadsheet newspapers. *Table 7.6* below crosstabulates the evaluative tone

of the recorded items of coverage, with the variable which recorded whether Islam was presented as an important factor in explaining or understanding the reported Muslim social action.

Table 7.6: The evaluation of Muslim social action in the selected international articles

		Is Islam cited as a factor?				Total	
		Yes		No			
		Count	Col %	Count	Col %	Count	Col %
Article's evaluative tone	Lauditory	2	.2%	6	1.0%	8	.5%
	Favourable	156	17.7%	101	16.2%	257	17.1%
	Neutral	320	36.3%	351	56.3%	671	44.6%
	Critical	393	44.6%	162	26.0%	555	36.9%
	Abrasive	10	1.1%	3	.5%	13	.9%
Total		881	100.0%	623	100.0%	1504	100.0%

Table 7.6 shows that articles in which journalists present Islam as an important factor in understanding the activities of Muslim social actors are predominately more negative than those which do not: 44.6 per cent of articles citing Islam as influential adopt a critical tone, compared with 26.0 per cent of articles in which Islam is regarded as 'uninfluential'. These results are represented graphically below:

Graph 7.1: International articles in which Islam *is not* cited as influential



Graph 7.2: International articles in which Islam *is* cited as influential



As the graphs illustrate, articles in which Islam is regarded as uninfluential

are 'normally' distributed, whilst articles in which Islam is cited as having an influential role are much more skewed towards a critical evaluation of Muslim social actions. Thus when the actions of Muslims are represented as especially 'Islamic', they are subject to a level of criticism which Muslims who keep their religion out of the 'public sphere' are not. In this way the sampled output operates as a 'discourse of spatial management' (Hage, 1998).

The negative representation of Islam in these 1,504 items of recorded output is also revealed in the position the newspapers took with regard to the binaried argumentative positions suggested by the Runnymede Trust (1997).

Table 7.7: The argumentative representation of Islam, by newspaper

Newspaper		Total no. of 'open' representations of Islam	Total no. of 'closed' representations of Islam	Index of 'Islamophobia' (open : closed)
Financial Times	N	333	333	
	Sum	145	354	
	Mean	0.44	1.06	2.41
Guardian	N	382	382	
	Sum	99	650	
	Mean	0.26	1.70	6.54
Independent	N	228	228	
	Sum	82	466	
	Mean	0.36	2.04	5.67
Telegraph	N	230	230	
	Sum	45	522	
	Mean	0.20	2.27	11.35
The Times	N	275	275	
	Sum	111	494	
	Mean	0.40	1.80	4.50
Independent on Sunday	N	22	22	
	Sum	6	44	
	Mean	0.27	2.00	7.41
Sunday Times	N	34	34	
	Sum	10	106	
	Mean	0.29	3.12	10.76
Total	N	1504	1504	
	Sum	498	2636	
	Mean	0.33	1.75	5.30

Table 7.7 shows the total number of 'open' and 'closed' binary representations of Islam and Muslims, and the mean number per article for each newspaper. The table shows that all newspapers' 'closed' means were substantially greater than 'open' means, with items printed in *The Sunday Times* displayed the highest mean number of 'closed' representations of Islam, at an average 3.12 per article. Items with the lowest number of 'closed' representations were printed in the *Financial Times* (mean 1.06 per article), whose articles also included the highest number of 'open' representations (mean 0.44 per article). The prominence of 'closed' representations of Islam and the wide divergence between the mean number of 'open' and 'closed' representations are represented in *Graph 7.3* below:

Graph 7.3: Mean occurrence of the Runnymede Trust's (1997) binary representations of Islam and Muslims



From these means, a ratio of 'open' to 'closed' representations can be calculated: this 'Index of Islamophobia' is listed in the far-right column of *Table 7.7*. On the basis of this ratio, the sampled articles from the *Guardian* and the *Independent* are more prejudicial than those in either *The Times* or the *Financial Times*. The *Telegraph* is significantly more 'Islamophobic' than

the remaining broadsheets, with a ratio of 11.35 'closed' representations of Islam to 1 'open' representation. It is also interesting to note that, by this index, the Sunday newspapers (average 9.08) are more 'Islamophobic' than the daily newspapers (average 6.09). The greater length of articles in Sunday newspapers (the mean length of items in Sunday newspapers was 340cm compared to 173.8cm in daily newspapers) provides little explanation for an increase in this ratio, since increasing the size of newspaper reports could produce equal increases in the number of 'open' and 'closed' representations of Islam. In fact, the average number of 'open' representations is actually slightly *less* in Sunday newspapers (average 0.31) than it is in daily broadsheets (average 0.33), whilst the average number of 'closed' representations is significantly *more* (2.56 and 1.77 respectively). I therefore suggest that the greater degree of anti-Muslim prejudice in Sunday newspapers may be directly attributable to the inability of these journalists to write, at length, about Islam and Muslims without recourse to 'closed' stereotypical representations. Whilst this is a rather disheartening finding, it does appear to suggest that the more objective, 'hard' news formats prevalent in daily broadsheets - and especially the *Financial Times* - provide a more 'open' forum for the representation of Islam. This implication of my findings deserves to be researched in much greater depth at a later date.

Finally for the quantitative section of the chapter, the Recorded Words and their Synonyms (RWS) are summarised. *Table 7.8* below is the first of two tables crosstabulating the occurrence of six RWSs with the variable which recorded whether Islam was represented as a significant factor in understanding the reported Muslim social action.

Table 7.8: Lexical representation of Islam in the selected international articles (1)

		Is Islam cited as a factor?				Total	
		Yes		No			
		Count	Col %	Count	Col %	Count	Col %
Threat included?	Yes	295	**33.5%**	111	**17.8%**	406	**27.0%**
	No	586	66.5%	512	82.2%	1098	73.0%
Total		881	100.0%	623	100.0%	1504	100.0%
Unthreatening included?	Yes	55	**6.2%**	25	**4.0%**	80	**5.3%**
	No	826	93.8%	598	96.0%	1424	94.7%
Total		881	100.0%	623	100.0%	1504	100.0%
Violence included?	Yes	648	**73.6%**	236	**37.9%**	884	**58.8%**
	No	233	26.4%	387	62.1%	620	41.2%
Total		881	100.0%	623	100.0%	1504	100.0%
Peace included?	Yes	260	**29.5%**	150	**24.1%**	410	**27.3%**
	No	621	70.5%	473	75.9%	1094	72.7%
Total		881	100.0%	623	100.0%	1504	100.0%
Villainy included?	Yes	504	**57.2%**	159	**25.5%**	663	**44.1%**
	No	377	42.8%	464	74.5%	841	55.9%
Total		881	100.0%	623	100.0%	1504	100.0%
Heroism included?	Yes	58	**6.6%**	46	**7.4%**	104	**6.9%**
	No	823	93.4%	577	92.6%	1400	93.1%
Total		881	100.0%	623	100.0%	1504	100.0%

Table 7.8 shows that all the negative RWS were included more frequently in reporting and/or representing Islam than their positive antonyms - 'villainy and/or acts of villainy' (n= 663) were referred to over six times more frequently than its recorded antonym 'heroism or acts of heroism' (n= 104; synonyms included 'virtue' and 'justice'). Further, the occurrence of the negative RWSs increases in articles in which Islam is cited as being influential. So, whilst 58.8 per cent of articles mentioned 'violence or acts of violence', this figure rises to 73.6 per cent in items which cited Islam as being influential. This compares with only 29.5 per cent of items citing Islam as influential which also mention 'peace or acts of peace'. *Table 7.8* also shows that 'Heroism' and 'virtue' are perceived to have a *negative* relationship with Islam, being mentioned in proportionately *less* articles

which cite Islam as influential (6.6%; n= 58) than those which do not (7.4%; n=46). The same can be said of 'modernity' in *Table 7.9* below:

Table 7.9: Lexical representation of Islam in the selected international articles (2)

		Is Islam cited as a factor?				Total	
		Yes		No			
		Count	Col %	Count	Col %	Count	Col %
Fundamentalist/ism included?	Yes	326	**37.0%**	23	**3.7%**	349	**23.2%**
	No	555	63.0%	600	96.3%	1155	76.8%
Total		881	100.0%	623	100.0%	1504	100.0%
Liberal/ism included?	Yes	160	**18.2%**	39	**6.3%**	199	**13.2%**
	No	721	81.8%	584	93.7%	1305	86.8%
Total		881	100.0%	623	100.0%	1504	100.0%
Terrorist/ism included?	Yes	285	**32.3%**	68	**10.9%**	353	**23.5%**
	No	596	67.7%	555	89.1%	1151	76.5%
Total		881	100.0%	623	100.0%	1504	100.0%
Ambassador/ial included?	Yes	120	**13.6%**	68	**10.9%**	188	**12.5%**
	No	761	86.4%	555	89.1%	1316	87.5%
Total		881	100.0%	623	100.0%	1504	100.0%
Traditional included?	Yes	158	**17.9%**	23	**3.7%**	181	**12.0%**
	No	723	82.1%	600	96.3%	1323	88.0%
Total		881	100.0%	623	100.0%	1504	100.0%
Modern/ity included?	Yes	57	**6.5%**	64	**10.3%**	121	**8.0%**
	No	824	93.5%	559	89.7%	1383	92.0%
Total		881	100.0%	623	100.0%	1504	100.0%

Table 7.9 shows that 'Modern and/or modernity' are mentioned in less articles which cite Islam as influential (6.5%; n= 57), both numerically and proportionately, than those which do not (10.3%; n= 64). The antonym 'traditional' on the other hand, is mentioned over four times more regularly in articles citing Islam (17.9%; n= 158) than those which do not (3.7%; n= 23). *Table 7.9* also shows that 'terrorism' and 'fundamentalism' are regularly mentioned, being present in 32.3 per cent (n= 285) and 37.0 per cent (n= 326) of articles citing Islam as influential respectively. Their recorded antonyms are included far less regularly.

To summarise the findings of the preceding quantitative section: the way in which broadsheet newspapers represent Islam and Muslims in the sample under review is predominantly both degrading and prejudicial. Muslims are quoted far less - both numerically and proportionately - than non-Muslim actors, a relationship which is shown to be highly statistically significant (see Appendix 5). This removes Muslims from occupying a position as a definer of Muslim social action, and effectively paves the way for the generalising and essentialising argumentative representations of Islam which I argued dominate broadsheet coverage. Although differences do exist between the newspapers, on average, Islam and Muslims are represented as 'diverse' or as 'partners' or 'interacting' or 'sincere' (etc.) only once in every three published items of newspaper coverage. In contrast, over 5 'closed' representations of Islam - 'monolithic', 'the enemy', 'separate', 'manipulative', etc. - were included for every three published items. The form and function of these argumentative stereotypes forms the focus of the remainder of this chapter.

7.3 **Division and Rejection**

The twin process of division and rejection (Martín-Rojo, 1995) runs throughout the reporting of non-British Islam and Muslims. The broadsheet approach to division and rejection suggests that its success is based upon a three part process: first the identification of a 'space' - which can be social or physical - separate from 'Our own' space; second, explaining the workings or composition of this space in contrast to 'Our own'; and third, placing a (negative) social value on both this space and its composition. This third 'stage' in the process often occurs simultaneously with one or other of the preceding 'stages' since value judgements are often implicit in the very process of naming and describing. For example, in a rather derisory article (**Her Majesty the Terminator**, *Independent on Sunday* 12 October 1997), Robert Fisk argues that the "preposterous theory" that Princess Diana was intentionally killed - possibly by the Queen - in order to stop the Royal Family being infiltrated by Islam is directly attributable to its origins "in the Arab world, where the *moamarer* - the plot - is an essential part of all

political discourse". Going further Fisk argued: "my banker friend had no right to transfer *this ruthless way of life* on to the tragedy of the Pont de l'Ama". Here, Fisk suggests a 'space' - "the Arab world" - where he believes such ruthlessness is more characteristic, and perhaps more appropriate.

In an article headlined **Pakistan TV bans the shampoo set** (*Sunday Times*, 9 November 1997), reporting censorship and "modesty requirements" on Pakistani television, 'Islamic values' are presented as culturally backward, illiberal and therefore inferior to 'the West'. In an introduction which suggests authoritarianism and the *imposition* of "Islamic values and culture", the article states that "images of women tossing their hair to promote shampoo and smiling seductively to sell toothpaste have been banned in Pakistan as politicians have bowed to pressure from the mullahs". Further, the article makes it quite clear that the newspaper views a move away from Pakistan's secular values - in place "since its foundation in 1947" - "towards Islamic fundamentalism" as an undesirable shift:

> Some of Pakistan's more liberal thinkers have condemned the restrictions as draconian [...] Some critics have even likened the authorities' attempts to turn back the cultural clock to those of the Taliban regime in neighbouring Afghanistan, where women are banned from public life.

Here 'Islam' is contrasted with 'liberalism', and labelled 'backward' ("turn back the cultural clock"), repressive (from "regime") and sexist through the suggested comparison with the Taliban's repressive (gendered) social practices. This (re)presentation - where 'Pakistani censorship is Islamic' and 'Islamic is repressive' - is expanded lower down the article[5]:

> [...] the limitations imposed in the media reflect a general increase in repression. While women in Pakistan's main cities face pressure to dress modestly, those in the countryside have been confronted by a rise in domestic violence which the authorities seem reluctant or unable to check.

The rise in domestic violence in Pakistan is unquestionable (see Rumsey, 2000); the link between this violence against women and 'Islamic values', which the article suggests, is much more questionable. In the final paragraph, the article finally quotes a source who draws attention to the

questionable link which the journalist, Stephen Grey, is suggesting between the politically inspired actions of the Pakistani government, Islam and repression:

> Shehnaz Bokhari, leader of the Progressive Women's Association which campaigns against domestic violence, said [...]: "Islam says women should be covered but it never said anything about covering the face. In fact, during the pilgrimage to Mecca, women are actually prohibited from wearing the veil. I don't understand what this government is up to."

An argument based upon a schema of 'Islam vs. the West' in which 'the West' is civilised and 'Islam' is repressive, backward and barbaric, forms the gist of an article printed in the *Guardian* (**A deadly divide**, Saturday 'Weekend' supplement, 4 October 1997). This article is ostensibly about the social and ideological divisions between rich, "modernised" Egyptians and poor "Islamic extremists":

> [...] is Egypt in danger of losing it's identity? Is the schism that divides society - on the one side the Islamic extremists, on the other the modernised, Western-influenced Egyptians [...] now so wide that it cannot be repaired?

In discussing this split, the *Guardian* focuses on a district of Cairo called Imbaba, thereby following the first stage of the three part process suggested above - the identification of a 'space'. The journalist suggests that this location, "known as the Islamic Republic of Imbaba [is] a *breeding ground* for Islamic fundamentalists" (emphasis added on the metaphor: animals or germs). The article continues: Imbaba is so Islamic that "Everyone is robed, and all the women are veiled. According to the World Health Organisation, 85 per cent of the women are not only veiled they have undergone genital mutilation". By citing these two WHO pronouncements together, the article appears to be implying that genital mutilation is Islamic in the same way that being veiled is presupposed to be. In doing so, the journalist begins to demarcate the negative ('Muslim') values of the identified space. This negative representation continues throughout. The article suggests that the growing popularity of "Islamic fundamentalists" in Imbaba is due to the leniency which Egyptian ex-President Sadat originally showed the Muslim

Brotherhood - an approach which, in a neat combination of orientalist imagery and the 'force of nature' metaphor, is described as "like opening a bottle and letting a genie out".

Lower down, the article quotes two rich Muslim "non-fanatical" girls who appear to have inadvertently provided the journalist with the metaphorical up-shot of the whole article:

> "Our society is split. One has to choose which way to go - either ahead, forward, into the future and with the West, or backwards in time with the fundamentalists." Oddly she does not see the irony of her own situation [the ignorant native...]: that even though she is dressed in jeans and eating a hamburger, she, too, by entering into an arranged marriage is going backwards in time.

Here the Egyptian girl employs a common 'every day' metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), in which time is treated as a spatial relation: forwards = the future; backwards = the past. This progression through time, in turn, forms a metaphor of *progress* from 'the traditional' - here rhetorically labelled 'the backward' - to 'the modern'. In the excerpt, this progression to 'the modern' is presupposed to entail choosing 'the West', which in turn places 'the non-West' in the pre- or perhaps sub-modern position of 'the backward'. The 'choices' which the quoted Egyptian girl is seen to have taken - "dressed in jeans and eating a hamburger" *yet* "entering into an arranged marriage" - are represented by the journalist as being so incongruous that her Western commodities appear to have been 'trumped' by her planned arranged marriage - an 'Islamic' and therefore backward social practice. The journalist's conclusion that her "going backwards in time" is "*ironic*" is purely the result of this string of metaphors and presuppositions.

Finally for this section, I will analyse an article which attempted to contextualise and comment upon the mass murder of 60 tourists at Luxor on 17 November 1997. The article in question, a news feature entitled **In the name of Allah** (*The Sunday Times*, News Review section, 23 November 1997), was based upon a rhetorical question, posed in its by-line:

> Are the killers of Luxor a lunatic fringe, or a murderous symptom of the inability of Islam to live with the modern world, asks Walter Ellis.

It is interesting to note that the newspaper asks whether Islam can "live *with* the modern world", not *in* the modern world. This suggests that Islam is first, not part of the modern world but rather exists *in parallel* with it (and 'Us') and second, that modernity is something which Islam is (unsuccessfully) attempting to come to terms with. By referring to "Islam" rather than 'Muslims', the question further implies that Muslims are similarly unitary in this "inability" to live with (cope with; reconcile themselves with) modernity.

In the last three paragraphs of the article, a lengthy quotation from David Pryce-Jones fully articulates the implications of the argument which Walter Ellis forwards throughout the article, and in doing so provides the rhetorical upshot of the text:

> "The Arab world - indeed the Muslim world generally - is unable to form pluralist societies" he says. "They claim they are in favour of democracy but the reality is an endless power struggle between competing absolutisms. [...] What does it mean to be Muslim and to be modern? That's what it comes down to. It must be possible but at the moment they have got their wires all crossed. [...] If they do not solve the problem of living with themselves and their neighbours, someone else is going to have to do it for them."

Here we see a single terrorist incident blamed on 'Muslim extremist'; placed within an "endless" historic continuum of Arab-Muslim violence, terror and extremism; (re)presented as *the* history of the 'Arab world'; expanded concentrically to include the 'Muslim world'; and applied as an argumentative warrant to the conclusion that Muslims are "unable to form pluralist societies". The possibility (however unlikely according to Pryce-Jones) of Muslims reconciling themselves with modernity is acknowledged, but only in order to suggest that this is a "problem" which "at the moment" they are unable to solve themselves: "someone else" - i.e. 'not-them', or 'Us' - "is going to have to do it for them." The similarities between this argument and Orientalist paternalism, so characteristic of British justifications for colonial rule, is quite striking (see Said, 1978: 33-4). The implication is that Western democracy is that 'special something' which the 'Muslim world' lacks. This

implication is more explicitly argued in the articles analysed below, in section 7.5.

7.4 **Their negativity**

Often the implicit assumptions of news reports, as opposed to their explicit argumentation, illustrate anti-Muslim prejudice. For example, the negative characteristics which Muslims are presupposed or implicitly argued to possess are clearly indicated in the referential strategies used to represent them. An *Independent* editorial commenting on Iran's successful entry into the finals of football's World Cup 1998 (**All the world's a pitch; the fixture is friendly**, 6 December 1997) for example, argued:

> The idea of a nation peopled entirely by fundamentalist mullahs and women deep in purdah taking to the turf in studded boots, shorts and shirts covered in advertising logos is enough to give the popular imagination pause.

The prejudice is clear in the above excerpt. Further, the newspaper *needs* to draw upon this prejudicial identification of Iranians - "fundamentalist mullahs and women deep in purdah" - in order to ensure the success of its argument, since the idea of Iran "taking to the turf" would not have appeared so discrepant without this representation of 'what Iranians are' and, therefore, 'what Iran is'.

Similarly, in a letter to the editor entitled **Israeli peace with neighbours not answer to Iraq/Iran threat** (Lord Stone of Blackheath, *Financial Times*, 25 November 1997), the author's negative perceptions of a homogenous 'political Islam/Muslims' are illustrated in the choice and description of social actors, illustrated first in the header's unification of Iran and Iraq in common threat. The gist of Lord Stone's argument is: even if Israel "achieved peace with all of its neighbours, the dictators in Iraq would not be transformed into liberal democrats", and neither would "the religious zealots who rule Iran", nor "the fundamentalists who oppose the reforms of Hosni Mubarek [...] by killing tourists". Here, actors are rhetorically positioned in order to achieve the success of the letter's argument: a highly functional "cast of villains"[6] are selected; who are first, presupposedly

villainous, as illustrated in their being labelled "dictators", "fundamentalists" and "zealots"; second, are homogenous - their equivalency implicitly suggested by their being offered in the form of a list (Fairclough, 2000: 161-2); and third, intransigent, since their negativity is maintained despite "peace" being "achieved". This "cast of villains" is then set against Israeli social action - (re)presented here as an attempt to 'achieve peace'. This antithesis works to further emphasise the (presupposed) intransigent threat to Israel posed by the 'Muslim world'.

This negative labelling of 'Muslim' social actors reaches its peak when reporting countries in which the politics and 'policies' of the ruling regime are almost universally decried. Afghanistan is one such country. One article printed in *The Times* (**A kingly gift lost in a war zone**, Saturday Sports section, 29 November 1997) questioned the whereabouts of a luxury Rolls Royce car "given to the King of Afghanistan by George V", now lost in Afghanistan. Following general 'place-setting' rhetoric (Afghanistan as a war zone), the article cites "Taliban militia"; "mad mujahidin driver"; "black bearded Taliban zealots"; "reactionary mullahs"; "tribal revolt"; "fundamentalist"; "wild-eyed Mujahidin fighters"; "mud huts" and other negative references drawn from the lexical style register of 'backwardness, incivility and barbarity' which are then linked, by virtue of their co-location, to Islam.

In other articles, the characteristics which individual Muslim actors are presupposed to possess draw upon similarly negative stereotypes. For example, a feature article written in response to the 50th anniversary of Israel's independence and profiling "the scholar-militant" Edward Said (**Spectre at the feast**, *Independent* Magazine, 24 January 1998), simultaneously disputes *and* draws upon stereotypical representations of 'the Arab' in the contrast it establishes between Said and Yasser Arafat. Following a complementary introduction and discussion of Said's contributions to both literary criticism and political activism, the author, Stephen Howe, argues that Said confounds "those who dislike [him] or his message", since "his very charm and urbanity are [...] far too unlike their stereotypes of 'the Arab'". By contrast, Yasser Arafat - possibly the only

"voice of Palestine [...] better known" than Said - is given a far less complimentary appraisal:

> [...] in many ways Said is the chairman's anathema - elegant as against Arafat's calculatedly bristly unkemptness, massively fluent as against Arafat's inarticulacy in English, a civilised aesthete in contrast to Arafat's bloody past and shifty present.

The contrasts which Howe establishes between Said and Arafat draw, in equal measure, on their faith and their residency: both men are Palestinian Arabs, but where Said is a Christian, Arafat is a Muslim; whereas Said lives, works and *resides* in 'the West', Arafat, with his "bloody past and shifty present", lives (and belongs?) in the 'Muslim world'. The two men therefore become the *embodiment* of their origins and beliefs: Said as the "elegant", "fluent" and "civilised" West; and Arafat as the 'unkempt', 'inarticulate', "bloody" and "shifty" 'Muslim world'. The articulation of such stereotypes in an article which aims at illustrating Said's academic and political influence - loosely defined as the realisation that "almost all contemporary writing about the Middle East, is deeply implicated in the histories of European and US racial arrogance" - is highly ironic.

Articles such as those analysed above are premised on the *presupposed* 'Differences' between Muslim and non-Muslim, Islam and the West. Such presuppositions are not benign however, but instead are usually marked by 'Their' inferiority, negativity and threat. I have shown that the negative characteristics which Muslims are presupposed to possess can be revealed through studying the appellations and adjectives used to represent 'Them', and the figures of contrast used in antithesis to Muslims. In the articles analysed across the remainder of the chapter, 'Our' positive characteristics are positioned more prominently than in the above section, either in the form of a more explicit figure of contrast between 'Us' and 'Them' or, on occasion, as part of an argumentative structure which is both based upon and defends the 'civilising influence of the West' over Muslims.

The following sections of the chapter analyse arguments, based on stereotypical and prejudicial *topoi*, which broadsheet newspapers use to

'divide and reject' Muslims in greater detail (Karim, 1997). Four schematic arguments are discussed: that Muslim pose an external military threat to countries other than their own; the threat of Muslim extremism, and its manifestation as 'Muslim violence' and 'terrorism'; that Muslims pose an internal threat to the democracy of their own countries; and the repression of women in 'Islam' and in 'Muslim countries'. These arguments are used to simultaneously divide and reject the social practices and values which allegedly organise and characterise 'Muslim social space' from 'Our' social space in 'the West'.

7.4.1 *Military threat*

As illustrated in Chapter 6, the military threat posed by 'Muslim' countries is an argumentative strategy which the broadsheet press frequently uses in order to convey a sense of 'Their' negativity. Often, articles employing such arguments are based on barely concealed prejudices, whereby Muslim countries are represented as threatening simply because 'They are Muslim' and 'They have weapons'. The three items analysed in this section are taken from a sub-corpus of recorded items which present the (alleged) non-conventional weapons programme of Iran - the archetypal 'Muslim country' - as inherently threatening.

The first article, printed in the *Sunday Times*, flags the newspaper's negative assessment of Iran's weapons programme in the sub-editor's choice of metaphor in the headline: **Britain at heart of Iran nuclear web** (18 January 1998). The presupposed threat of Iran developing such weapons is also illustrated by the manner in which the gist of the article is presented: "Some Foreign Office officials have *warned* that Iran is becoming a *daunting* military force in the region" (emphasis added). Here, the verb phrase "have warned" is highly ideological, placing a negative frame on the remainder of the predicate in a way which alternative verbs ('have revealed'; 'have suggested'; 'believe') would not. This negativity is continued in the suggestion that Iran's military prowess is "daunting" as opposed to (for example) 'consequential' or 'significant'. The presupposed military threat posed by Iran is continued lower down, where the article suggests that

> Experts fear that with the new technology, Iran may be less than two years from building the first Islamic nuclear bomb.

Here, by labelling Iran's potential nuclear ordnance an "*Islamic* nuclear bomb", the journalist imbues the device with a (Muslim) ideological agenda. And, in case the reader does not automatically associate this 'Muslim nuclear bomb' with 'threat', "a Whitehall official" is quoted as saying that Iran "has become a far bigger threat" to 'the West' than even Iraq.

Returning to the previously discussed reader's letter entitled **Israeli peace with neighbours not answer to Iraq/Iran threat** (*Financial Times*, 25 November 1997), in addition to his prejudicial representation of social actors, Lord Stone argues that even if Israel "achieved peace with all of its neighbours":

> [...] Regional problems would remain the same. Powerful states, driven by hegemonic ambitions, would continue to threaten their weaker neighbours and build up their non-conventional arsenals, while the international community dithered over appeasement.

Exactly which "Powerful states" Lord Stone is referring to here is unclear, but, given the letter's conclusion - that the "arming of Iran and Iraq with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons under any circumstances does not bare thinking about" - we can safely assume that Iran and Iraq are two of them. The ongoing negativity of these (unnamed) states is made clear by Lord Stone asserting that they both "*continue* to threaten" and "*continue* [...] to *build up* their non-conventional *arsenals*" - note these are not 'weapons' but "arsenals", suggesting a variety of non-conventional weapons. Finally "appeasement" is mentioned in order to allude to Britain's initial approach to Nazi Germany and Chamberlain's guarantees of Hitler's benign intentions - 'and we all know what happened there...'.

The growing threat which Iran, and specifically Iranian weaponry represents, forms the central argument of the third and final article of this section - a column headlined **Time to untangle from containment** (*Guardian*, 3 January 1998). As the headline suggests, this column

essentially argued that America should discontinue its economic and political "containment" of Iran - a policy which the column argues is both illogical and unworkable. In such a context, it is possible that a reader may not perceive Iran as threatening, and therefore, with little reference to evidence, David Hirst declares:

> As well as international terrorism and a violent opposition to the peace process [Iran] is taxed with developing the same kind of non-conventional weapons that have earned Iraq its international quarantine.

These presumed crimes of the Iranian regime go unsupported, and rely solely on (prejudicial) 'common-sense' knowledge of Iran to remain coherent: the references to "international terrorism" and "violent [not 'vocal' or 'obstinate'] opposition to the peace process" are cases in point. There is, after all, a significant difference between supporting a defensive guerrilla group, however 'violent' - which is what Hizb Allah, (presumably the terrorists which Hirst has in mind) are - and supporting international terrorism. Secondly, although Iran does 'oppose' the peace process - and that is their right as a sovereign state - there is little evidence to suggest that such opposition is 'violent' in the way suggested.

In contrast to the claims of the three items discussed above, an editorial printed in the *Financial Times* (**Iran comes in from the cold**, 9 December 1997) quite rightly pointed out:

> Tehran is signed up to international treaties on nuclear and chemical weapons proliferation while Israel - possessor of the region's sole nuclear arsenal - is not. As for the peace process, Iran's criticisms are beginning to sound moderate in comparison to those now heard in Egypt and Jordan, which have signed treaties with Israel.

Similarly, a second *Financial Times* editorial (**Talking to Iran**, 12 January 1998) argued that *of course*

> [...] Iran must be dissuaded from supporting terrorism and from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. But terrorism should be distinguished from resistance to Israeli occupation in South Lebanon, and regional arms control efforts cannot ignore Israel's own nuclear weapons. Likewise, Iran should not

> obstruct the Arab-Israeli peace process, but should not be blamed for echoing the same criticisms as Washington's Arab allies.

Such balanced assessment of Iranian foreign policy was notably infrequent: indeed the two editorials quoted above were two of only a handful of recorded items based on such argumentation. They are included in order to illustrate the paucity of the remaining newspapers' (and, to be fair, the majority of the *Financial Times*') coverage.

In light of the above analysis: when viewing the 'military threat' which Iran allegedly represents to the region and to the (Western?) world, it appears that broadsheet journalists base their conclusions more on the presumed 'threat' which 'Islam' poses to 'Us' than the actions and intentions of Iran.

7.4.2 *Extremism and terrorism*

References to religious extremism and acts of terrorism committed by individuals and groups calling themselves 'Muslim' are legion when the broadsheet press 'cover' Islam. As *Table 7.9* illustrated, 'terrorism and/or acts of terrorism' were mentioned in 32.3 per cent of international articles which highlighted an 'Islamic influence' on Muslim social action (n= 285). Despite this preoccupation, this section of the chapter will be brief since broadsheet news items reporting 'Muslim extremism and terrorism' formed part of the analysis in sections 7.3 and 7.4 and significant aspects of both the preceding chapters on the reporting of Algeria and Iraq. I start with a discussion of several interesting articles, before moving to an analysis of two articles, printed just before Christmas 1997, reporting the 'persecution' of Christians in the Palestinian Authority (PA) controlled town of Bethlehem.

Taking extremism first, a report printed in the *Telegraph* (23 January 1998) foregrounded a representation of rural Pakistani Muslims which drew on both social and religious 'backwardness' in order to condemn their violent civil disobedience. This is clearly illustrated in the headline of the report: **Tribesmen threaten holy war over demand to pay power bills**. This rhetorical reference to "holy war" is repeated lower down the report, where

the journalist states "tribal leaders shouted 'Death to WAPDA' [the Water and Power Development Authority] and promised to launch a *jihad* to protect their rights." It is unclear from this account whether the "tribal leaders" were actually calling for a "holy war", or whether "*jihad*" was being (more properly) used to refer to a 'struggle' to protect rights. Regardless, the headline's announcement of a "threaten[ed] holy war" (re-)presents the "promised [...] *jihad*" as a dangerous prospect.

The incivility, perhaps even barbarity, of the protagonists forms the major premise upon which their presumed 'danger' rests. This incivility is flagged in both the naming of the protagonists - as "Pathan tribesmen", "tribal leaders", "bearded tribesmen", and a tribal "Chief" - and the contextualising description - they have "threatened to blow up the Warsak dam" and have already "burnt customs posts, government offices and official vehicles." The second paragraph for example, describes "Hundreds of bearded tribesmen, clad in black turbans and heavily armed". In choosing such a representation - arming and 'darkening' the men ["black turbans"], and the use of "clad", a more forceful and dramatic adjective than alternatives such as 'clothed' or 'dressed' - the journalist employs the historic notion of 'the Muslim horde' in their negativisation.

A news article printed in the *Guardian* headlined **Ripples of fear through the Arab world** (17 November 1997) forwarded a more aggressive argument that the pan-Arab rhetoric of Jordanian Islamist politicians, inspired by the increasingly threatening American policy towards Iraq, posed a threat to the "stability" of the Middle East region. Julian Borger's choice of the Jordanian Islamic Action Front (IAF) to illustrate such an argument is significant since the Party's call for suicide attacks against American targets in Jordan, in the event of American attacks against Iraq, mark "a dramatic departure for the normally placid IAF - one of the most moderate Islamic opposition movements in the region." Borger provides additional material in order to argue that the IAF's previous 'moderatism' now appears to be slipping: the Party

> boycotted this month's elections in protest at electoral and press laws which it claimed were anti-democratic, and Jordanian observers are [now] worried that [this] extra-parliamentary Islamic opposition could be rapidly radicalised by the combination of a failed Israeli-Palestinian peace process, *perceived* US bias towards Israel and the *renewal* of hostilities *between* US-led forces and Iraq. [emphases added]

Aside from the italicised sections of the above quotation[7], the above argumentative reasoning of Borger is interesting since it is based on a single defining principle: the (violent; threatening) political actions of Islamist politicians are wholly explainable in reference to 'Muslim' struggles in the Middle East. This reasoning is then used by Borger, in conjunction with other authoritative sources (the "Crown Prince Hassan" for example, is quoted saying "If there's going to be an attack against Iraq and if there's going to be an outcry, presumably an anti-Western outcry, it's going to be extremely destabilising") to argue against the proposed US bombing of Iraq. The possibility that the actions of the IAF are explainable in relation to internal Jordanian politics - particularly since the IAF is now excluded from a position in parliamentary debate and due political process - is passed up in favour of a homogenised and simplified 'Muslim threat' argument, albeit an argument targeted against the greater evil of bombing Iraq.

The lengths to which broadsheet newspapers occasionally go in order to press home an argument foregrounding the evil of 'Muslim terrorists' is quite remarkable. A frequently used rhetorical method is antithesis - the positioning of individuals, groups, ideologies, etc. in opposition to each other in an argument, in order to highlight their 'differences' for rhetorical effect. A model example of this was included in a three page article headlined **Terror by degree**, (*The Times* Saturday Magazine, 18 October 1997) which profiled "Ramsi Yousef", a suspect in the bombing of the World Trade Centre, and focused in particular on his time spent studying engineering at Swansea Institute of Higher Education. In order that the activities of this "Muslim fundamentalist", "murderer" and "international terrorist" are made even more malign, the article suggests that Yousef, along with Osama Bin Laden, plotted against several "*moderate* governments" in the Middle East - which is

quite a surprising description given that the list was said to include "Algeria" and "Saudi Arabia".

Antithesis forms the very basis of the final article in this section: a review of a book on the Iranian revolution, entitled *'The Priest and the King'* by Desmond Harney, headlined **The Holy Terror** (*Sunday Times* Books supplement, 18 January 1998). The 'Priest' of the book title, and "The Holy Terror" referred to in the headline, "is, of course, the Ayatollah Khomeini, the dour, ruthless cleric whose followers overthrew the Shah of Iran, the hesitant, unhappy autocrat who was one of the most powerful allies of the West in the Middle East for almost four decades". This antithetical representation of the revolution (which, to a certain extent *is* invited by the title of the book) continues to be developed throughout the review: the "ruthless cleric" versus the reluctant, "unhappy autocrat".

As part of this (re-)presentation of the revolution, the Shah is transformed into a beneficent leader who had "tried to give his country *aspects* of 20th century life" (emphasis added). The details of *which* aspects of 20th century life the shah supported - capitalism, cronyism, spiralling economic inequality but without popular or democratic involvement of the Iranian public in the political system - are not included. Further, whilst the review suggests that it was the Shah's attempts at "liberalisation" which had "enabled the first of the demonstrations to start", there is very little about the atrocities and torture committed by the Shah which fermented this popular resentment. Even when the review refers to one 'massacre' of "scores of demonstrators", it is introduced as an exception to the rule and therefore in order to praise the Shah: "It is to the Shah's credit that he was not prepared to suppress the revolution by brute force, killing thousands, as he probably could have done."

Khomeini on the other hand is described as "Grim and unbending", "the intransigent priest" and the bringer of "a most savage revolution".

> Controlled by Khomeini and his exiled helpers, the mullahs in Iran, whom the Shah had hitherto scorned [...] *crept out* and suddenly began to assume more and more power [...] turning the people towards the ayatollah and against everything western [emphases added]

Iranians, in both the excerpt above and elsewhere, are represented as stupid, 'childlike' - swayed by "the professionalism of the propaganda" - "enraged, bitter and vicious". And here, suggests the review, lies "the awful problem posed by autocracy: the *alternative is almost always worse*, if only because of the repressed bitterness and frustration" of the revolutionaries (emphasis added). We do well to remember that similar arguments have been drawn upon to justify repression throughout history - not least in reference to the black communities of apartheid-era South Africa.

The upshot of the review reads:

> the revolution was complete. And deeply brutal and unpleasant it has been too. The abuses of human rights ordered by the mullahs at home or through terrorism abroad have been far, far worse than any that took place under the Shah.

Running through the review, and present most notably above, is an argument for 'the greater good': atrocities under the Shah (for the greater part deleted) were committed with a view to maintaining the western friendly status quo; those under Khomeini (in general cited and directly criticised) were committed in support of Islamic theocracy. The presupposition of the author therefore appears to be that Western-style, or capitalist friendly, societies are just and therefore qualify for the right to commit human rights abuses in their name (for the 'greater good'). On the other hand, the broadly 'Islamic' society brought in by Khomeini is inherently unjust, thus any revolution fought to introduce such a society - even one claiming the majority of public support - could never be for 'the greater good', and therefore "far far worse".

7.4.2.1 Palestinian Authority controlled Bethlehem, at Christmas

Two articles, printed in separate broadsheets within three days of each other, appear intent on illustrating the negative effects which Muslims can have upon 'Western', or in this case Christian lives. The first of these news articles, **Tensions darken festive mood in Bethlehem**, (*The Times*, 22

December 1997) was stridently critical of what it labelled the "unceasing persecution [of Christians] under the Palestinian Authority", occurring at Christmas and in (of all places) "the town at the heart of the story of Christ's birth." The report states that such conclusions were the product of a "report published two months ago by the Israeli Prime Minister's Office" but the journalist, Christopher Walker, does not question the veracity of the report's claims despite the possibility that the Israeli government may be motivated by factors other than either the welfare of Christians or the 'pursuit of truth'.

Throughout, the article makes repeated mention of Bethlehem's demographic profile of Muslim-to-Christian residency. For example, the article quotes

> [...] Ranna Najjar, another Christian housewife in the West Bank town where *the Muslim birth-rate far outstrips that of the Christians*. "The city is not ours anymore. We gave up the city" she said. [emphasis added]

Such a preoccupation with 'numbers' of racial/ethnically defined 'others' - what Hage (1998) has called a "numbering pathology" (p.123) - is a benchmark of white racist talk and text (also see Daniels, 1997). The article also suggests that the majority Muslim population has brought a new sense of 'decay' to Bethlehem, stating that under Muslim rule, houses and streets have become "scarred with intifada slogans", and that some Christians are now scared to openly celebrate Christmas: "I do not dare to go out on Christmas Eve any more. The Muslim boys call me and the other Christian girls whores [...] said Lina Attallah". The possibility that the low numbers of Christians living in Bethlehem may be attributable to their treatment under Jewish rule is backgrounded in order to facilitate the success of the article's principle argument of 'Muslim repression':

> Decimated by emigration and for the past two years living under the Muslim-dominated Palestinian Authority, Bethlehem's Christians now make up less that a third of the 39,000 population, compared with 80% during the period of the British Mandate which ended in 1948.

Here, the proportion of Christian emigration occurring under Israeli rule is notably absent. Indeed, it states lower down that Ms Lina Attallah "regrets *returning* from Texas to Bethlehem after the 1993 peace treaty which ended 27 years of Israeli military rule" (emphasis added), suggesting that it was the Israeli rule which originally forced her to leave.

The article goes on to state that the majority Muslim population has resulted in the greater 'Islamicisation' of Bethlehem, to the disadvantage and even *exclusion* of Christianity. "Manger Square, the area in front of the Church of the Nativity", for example, is now "packed with Muslim worshippers every Friday because there is no longer enough room for all of them to pray inside the *imposing* Mosque of Omar" (emphasis added). Similarly, whereas "Greater Bethlehem, [...] only had 5 mosques in 1970, there are now 72." How this affects Christian worship is unclear. What it suggests however, is that Walker believes that the 'rightful' status of Bethlehem's public space should be Christian. A similar attitude runs through a second article devoted to reporting Bethlehem at Christmas: **Tough and tawdry times in Manger Square** (*Guardian*, 24 December 1997). Here Bethlehem is described as "a city where the wail of the muezzin [now] drowns out the peal of church bells", where "more than half the citizens are unemployed; [and] almost all are Muslims." However, the real focus of the article is on the sorry state of Christmas festivities under the rule of the Palestinian Authorities rather than the religious and cultural demography of the city:

> Two Christmases ago the birth of Jesus Christ was *hijacked* by the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, and turned into a political celebration of new found freedom [...] The nationalistic atmosphere prevailed again last year, with pilgrims *grimacing* in Manger Square when a dance band struck up as Midnight chimed. [emphasis added]

The excerpt above implicitly contrasts the unfavourable 'Palestinian Christmas past' with that experienced under Israeli control: the 'hijacking' (a significant verb for describing Palestinian action) of Christmas under the auspices of Arafat's *PA* is represented as an innovation or a departure from normal practice. The implication that 'things were better' under Israeli rule is reiterated and contextualised lower down the report, where "Salim Lahhamm,

a Christian Arab who organises pilgrim tours to the holy land", is quoted explaining why he believes that "this Christmas is the worst for business since the height of the intifada":

> "It's a double whammy effect", he explains. "Sixty percent of it has to do with what happened in Luxor (in Egypt, where Islamic fundamentalists massacred 60 tourists last month). The other 40 percent is about the peace process and the lack of confidence after the suicide bombs. The irony is that before the peace process we would not really have suffered from Luxor."

To be clear: although Lahhamm does not appear to be supporting a return to Israeli control, his remarks certainly appear to facilitate this argument, given that Christians, and perhaps (given the unemployment rates) even Muslims 'had it better' "before the peace process". Further, it is interesting to note that the poor state of Bethlehem's tourism industry is apparently the worst it has been since "the *height* of the intifada" - another instance when 'Palestinian activities' defined the public space.

The report concludes by stating that this year, following the deficiencies of the past two Christmases, "Bethlehem's Roman Catholic mayor, Hanna Nasser" has decided that "Christmas will get its religion back": "We want only those who are willing to pray to be present in the square this year." The presence of this Palestinian-Authority-backed Christian public figure in the report is significant, since it goes some of the way to refuting the "unceasing persecution [of Christians] under the Palestinian Authority", alleged in *The Times*' report. The contrasting picture of Bethlehem which develops through the *Guardian* report is one of Palestinian incompetence rather than prejudice; of poor motivation rather than Muslim extremism; but overwhelmingly that Bethlehem's "tough and tawdry times" are attributable to Muslim activities - internal *PA* and external "Islamic fundamentalist" - rather than, for example, the hardships characteristic of all the Palestinian bantustans, provoked by Israeli economic blockades and 'border controls'. The silence of the journalist, David Sharrock, on this most elementary of contextualising factors is quite deafening.

7.4.3 *Despotism: threat to democracy*

The following items of broadsheet reporting are all based, to varying degrees, on the assumption that Muslims and, in some cases 'Islam' in general, poses a threat to the internal stability of (Muslim) countries. This assumed threat usually takes the form of a 'threat to democracy', and corresponds closely with the enduring theme of 'Islamic despotism' (see Daniel, 1960, for extensive discussion of this 'heritage').

The reporting of Turkey in broadsheet newspapers draws significantly upon the presupposed 'threat' which Islam poses to democracy. A report headlined **Turkey seeks Blair's backing over EU entry** for example, (*Telegraph* 10 December 1997) argues that Turkey is strategically very important, since it "stands on Nato's front-line, at a time when the threat comes no longer from the Soviet bloc but from militant Islam." In addition, the *Telegraph* suggests that since "Turkey offers the Middle East a unique example of a secular Islamic country that is a democracy" it should be granted EU membership. It is worth noting that the majority mandate given Necmettin Erbakan's Islamic Welfare Party in the Turkish general election, the military coup which ousted this government only months prior to this report being printed, and the ruthless suppression of Kurdish civil rights must *necessarily* be ignored in order to represent Turkey as a "democracy".

Similar information was deleted or (re)presented in reports printed in other broadsheets covering the possibility and desirability of granting Turkey membership to the EU. Robert Cornwell for example, in an *Independent* column headlined **Put diplomatic niceties aside and tell Turkey the truth** (11 December 1997), wrote:

> More serious still [than removing the chance of resolving 'the Cyprus issue'] if Europe spurns it anew, this strategically vital NATO country may turn it's back on the West in favour of the Islamic world. This in turn, it is argued, would weaken it's fragile democracy and offer a fresh opening for theocratic Islam: only six months ago, after all, the Islamic leaning Government of Necmettin Erbakan was eased out, under immense pressure from the Turkish military.

This passage is interesting for three principle reasons. First, the argument that without EU membership Turkey "may turn it's back on the West in favour

of the Islamic world" suggests not only the standard ontological opposition between 'the West' and the 'Islamic world' but also that there is no other option, or 'middle ground' for Turkey. The use of the noun phrase "*strategically vital* NATO country" underlines the argumentation of the piece, illustrating the importance of keeping Turkey 'on our side'.

Second, that Turkey's turn towards "the Islamic world", "*it is argued* would weaken it's *fragile* democracy". This active subject deletion (- argued by whom?) is a standard argumentative strategy, which tends to be adopted when a journalist's own position could not be concealed in the words of a quoted source. The potentially dubious status of the argument is exposed by simply asking: 'Who is this argued by?' It is also interesting to speculate on the use of the term "fragile democracy": what does this term suggest? It should be remembered that 'democracy' is a defining ontology for the majority of Western journalists (see van Ginneken, 1998). Thus a "*fragile* democracy" is one which should be protected - a kind of political china cup which should be shielded from the destructive influence of it's own bovine nemesis. The use of such a term is especially ideologically significant when viewed in the light of the next point.

Third, the excerpt suggests that "the Islamic leaning Government of Necmettin Erbakan was *eased out*, under immense pressure from the Turkish military." This structuring of expression conjures a representation of the event akin to a bed-ridden grandparent helped to his feet by the philanthropic Turkish military rather than the *coup d'etat* which it arguably was. Under circumstances other than those of Turkey - a "*strategically vital* NATO country" - would the actions of the military have aroused more criticism in the broadsheet press? Lower down the column, Cornwell does state that "the *ousting* of Mr Erbakan [was] at basic odds with the civilian, democratic heritage of the EU", yet even this retelling of the event still avoids the term 'coup' and the attendant implication of a military dictatorship.

It is interesting to compare the representation of Turkish 'democracy' with the constitutional crisis which occurred in Pakistan at the end of 1997, developing from tensions between the three centres of political power in Pakistan - President Farooq Leghari; the judiciary, specifically the Chief

Justice Sajjad Ali Shah; and the legislature, under the control of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The 'crisis' can be summarised at three levels: generally, as Nawaz Sharif's attempts to centralise power in the democratically elected Parliament; more specifically, in Sharif's attempts to strengthen the position of the Prime Minster; and particularly in response to two events: the repeal of Article 58(2) of the constitution which enabled the President to fire an elected Prime Minister at will[8], and Prime Minister Sharif's criticisms of the Chief Justice for holding up legislation passed by Parliament, which resulted in him being charged for contempt of court.[9] The right-wing broadsheet press represented the political dispute in a different light:[10]

> That such chaos has come during a government with a record majority has merely hardened the impression that democracy and Pakistan do not mix. (**Pakistan on brink of army rule**, *Telegraph*, 1 December 1997)
> Pakistan has moved a notch closer to becoming a failed state and some argue it already is one. Islamic extremists sense their time may be coming as the nation staggers towards one of its greatest financial crises (**Sharif wins all as Pakistan state crumbles**, *The Times*, 3 December 1997)

And previous to the resolution of the stand-off on 3 December 1997, an editorial printed in *The Times* (2 December 1997) read:

> **Islamabad on the brink: when the military may be the least worst option.** [...The conflict] can only encourage opportunists and embittered tribal factions to violent action under the guise of defending democracy. Pakistan is a country in urgent need of reform, stability and clean government. [...] an army take-over might be the least worst option.

It is interesting to note that democratic "reform" and "stability" were arguably two of Nawaz Sharif's intentions in removing the President's ability to dismiss the Prime Minister: presumably, they were also considerations of the Army, since it did not "take-over" political power.

Central to the conclusion that the crisis 'proved' that Pakistan and democracy do not mix, was the representation of Prime Minister Sharif as dictatorial, authoritarian and motivated by self-interested pursuit of power:

> Though the immediate crisis has passed, Pakistanis will be watchful that Mr Sharif does not try to erode further Presidential and judicial powers and so concentrate power in his own hands. (**Sharif victory as Pakistani president quits**, *Telegraph*, 3 December 1997)
> Mr Sharif now looks unassailable, his authoritarian tendencies well established [...] No elected leader has enjoyed so much power. With so few restraints, there will be overwhelming temptation to move towards a more dictatorial style of government. (**Sharif wins all as Pakistan state crumbles**, *The Times*, 3 December 1997)

Other reports drew upon the specifically 'Muslim' character of Sharif and his party in order to either criticise or derogate his (and their) political influence in Pakistan. One report argued that Sharif was acting like a "Mughal Emperor" (**'Emperor' Sharif savours victory**, *Telegraph*, 4 December 1997), whilst in an earlier report headlined **Sharif supporters riot outside court** (*Telegraph*, 18 November 1997), the alleged impudence or perhaps *illegitimacy* of Sharif's political power is clearly illustrated: "In a *brazen* attempt to demonstrate its political clout, Mr Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League mobilised thousands of supporters outside the white marble Supreme Court building." The 'Muslim-ness' of Sharif's supporters is reiterated in the next sentence of this report, and related directly to notions of fanaticism, threat, and actual violence:

> As Mr Sharif entered the court, women party members read verses from the Koran and chanted *wildly*: "Sharif will win. God is with him". As the hearing dragged on for three hours, the crowd became restless and began to stone the police, who retaliated with baton charges. [emphasis added]

The journalist shows that a 'cult of personality' surrounds Sharif, inspiring a 'wild' fanaticism in his followers which, when unchanelled, can result in acts of violence and civil disobedience which need to be contained by security forces. It is also interesting to note that the 'wild', chanting Muslim party members inside the courtroom are identified as being women. Whether this facilitates the general argumentative line of an 'emotional' Muslim response is unclear.

In both of these brief case studies - Turkey and Pakistan - broadsheet newspapers appear wary or, particularly when reporting Turkey, *scared* of the prospect of Islamic-leaning democratically elected political parties. This

aversion to democratically elected Muslim governments resulted in the backgrounding and, in some cases, the *deletion* of the Turkish *coup d'etat*, and the support for a similar course of action in the case of Pakistan. Whether this antipathy is in response to the expression of 'Muslim values' in the political sphere, the democratic empowerment of (broadly) Muslim populations, the democratic empowerment of 'third world' populations, or some other unidentified cause is unclear. What the brief discussion above has helped to illustrate however, is that broadsheet newspapers - particularly right-wing newspapers - believe 'Muslim government' and the election of 'Muslim political parties' to be disadvantageous to the 'democracy' of Muslim countries.

7.4.4 *Sexism: social threat*

Citing 'sexism' or, more specifically, the subjugation and repression of (often but not exclusively Muslim) women at the hands of either Muslim men or 'Muslim' value/social systems, are argumentative strategies frequently used to disparage 'Islam'. Examples cited in previous sections suggest that 'Islam' and 'illiberal gendered social practice' are tied together by broadsheet newspapers via two principle methods. First, the social position of Muslim women is described in negative terminology, using stylistic registers of repression and constraint, or else simply *labelled* as backward, 'un-Western', illiberal and hence undesirable. The representation of the 'veil' is a case in point, and the input of both Islamic and more broadly Muslim feminism (see Haddad, 1998; Hijab, 1998; Keddie, 2000; Mernissi, 1991; Yegenoglu, 1998) is conspicuously absent because, I believe, they would prove too problematic for the simplistic 'East vs. West', 'Muslim vs. Modernist' dichotomous representation of gender relations chosen in broadsheet reporting.

Second, through fallacious argument from part ('Muslim') to whole ('Islam'), negative acts against women by 'Muslims' are uncontroversially ascribed to being carried out by *Islam* - either 'in the name of...' or 'sanctioned by...'. Although these more prejudicial (racist?) generalisations are observed more frequently in the reporting of the 'conservative'

broadsheet press - in particular the *Daily Telegraph* - they are also recognisable in the reporting of the more 'liberal' broadsheets.

The alleged inferior status which women - Muslim and otherwise - have to endure whilst in 'Muslim' countries formed a presupposition in many of the recorded items of reporting. A news-story printed in the *Independent* for example, reporting the celebrations in Tehran following Iran's successful entry to the 1998 World Cup finals (**Crowds hail hand of God in World Cup Triumph**, 4 December 1997), was based on the same presupposition of "women in deep purdah" present in the editorial discussed earlier in this chapter (**All the world's a pitch; the fixture is friendly**, see section 7.4). The article reads: "As for the people, they went mad for joy. A few ladies, it was said, *even* joined their menfolk in the street" (emphasis added). The perceived discrepancy between how the journalist expects Iranian women to act and their reported celebrations, is illustrated in the use of "even" - a scalar implicature marking the highly deviate nature of the reported action and hence exposing the presupposition upon which such implicature is based: 'Iranian women don't do this kind of thing'.

On other occasions, to adopt and slightly adapt the cliché, journalists did not let the facts get in the way of a good opportunity to associate 'Islam' with 'sexism'. When Lucille McLaughlan, one of the British Nurses found guilty of murdering Australian Nurse Yvonne Gilford, got married whilst in a Saudi Arabian jail, the broadsheets' descriptions of her dress couldn't have been more different:

> The bride is reported to have worn a traditional Arabian dress and veil at the ceremony. (**Nurse weds in 'unforgettable' ceremony**, *Independent*, 1 December 1997)
>
> As two Saudi police officers looked on, McLaughlin, aged 32, exchanged rings with Mr Ferrie, aged 30, a tyre fitter. She wore traditional Arabian dress. (**Nurse weds in Saudi jail**, *Guardian* 1 December 1997)
>
> McLaughlan wore a smart Western-style dress, not the black abeya and veil that women in the *conservative* Islamic kingdom *have to* wear in public. (**Murder case nurse is given Saudi wedding with Western touches**, *Telegraph*, 1 December 1997; emphasis added)

In the *Telegraph* report, the (alleged) actions of McLaughlin - her decision to wear a "*smart* Western-style dress" - are represented as full virtued: an act

of liberty in a land of *Islamic* repression of women. In this way, the *Telegraph*'s representation of the marriage fits with the 'typology of *hijab* representation' suggested by Hage (1998): for the conservative press, the veil often represents "the subjugation of women to a non-national patriarchy. The desire to remove it is the desire to ensure that all women within the nation are subjugated to the dominant national patriarchal order" (p. 251). The *Telegraph*'s removal of the veil from McLaughlin's marriage could therefore illustrate the potentially disruptive influence which (the paper believes) non-national patriarchy represents to the 'Western marriage', and the corresponding ideological importance that the image of the bride is (*re*)presented as one of the "Western touches" mentioned in the report's headline.

The Muslim veil, and the political significance of veiling on and for gender relations, also form the focus of the following two articles, both printed in the *Guardian*. In the first, headlined **'Coffee, tea or a headscarf?'** (5 December 1997) Kathy Evans describes the "austerity aboard the world's most Islamic airline" - IranAir. The first paragraph sets the tone for the remainder of the article:

> "You will please to put on your headscarf" [*sic*], said the matronly, heavily covered air hostess. This was not a request but an order to all women passengers, regardless of nationality, to adopt Islamic dress.

In this excerpt, Evans skilfully combines several of the principle discourses within which the veil is located: the pressure to wear the veil comes solely from 'outside', rather than from the internalised (admittedly *social*) values of Muslim women; women are 'ordered' not 'requested' to wear the veil; and the (Iranian) veil is restrictive and burdensome, since it "heavily" not 'completely' covers the women. These discourses are also drawn upon lower down the article, where the Iranian actresses staring in the inflight films are similarly "heavily covered" and "*IranAir's* regulations are *enforced* even while its aircraft are parked in British airports" (emphases added).

Further, Evans' exact transcription of the "matronly" air hostess' inarticulate "order" is interesting. Here, by (allegedly) recalling exactly what

the hostess said, Evans manages to obfuscate both the meaning and *function* of her statement - here framed as either a "request" or an "order". Once the speech act is made ambiguous in this way, Evans is able to explicitly *dis*ambiguate the meaning of the statement in favour of her own argument: it was "not a request, but an order". However, the air hostess *did* say "please", and the inclusion of this word appears to undermine the certainty in Evans' claim that the statement was an outright "order". Due to the (allegedly) verbatim quotation of the air hostess, Evans produced a statement whose meaning was ambiguous - primarily due to the co-location of the imperative "You will" and the solicitary "please". In this way, the statement could have been presented and interpreted simply as the hostess' inarticulate attempt to politely request Evans to don her headscarf. This more generous interpretation of the statement would not, however, have produced a meaning so functional to, and supportive of, the broader argument of the article: the Iranian airlines' *enforcement* of the veil.

The final article of this section (**Fashion statement lands 'fatwa'**, *Guardian*, 3 December 1997), combines the disparaging discourse of 'sexism and social threat' with that of 'extremism and Muslim violence' previously discussed. The first paragraph reads:

> A young Roman designer who put on a fashion show combining nudity with the Islamic *chador* was last night recovering under police guard from a beating at the hands of unidentified assailants.

The journalist, John Hooper, states that the attack followed "a string of threatening phone calls from callers with *foreign accents*" and "visits at his boutique from *Middle Eastern callers* showing particular interest in his nationality" (emphases added). These contextualising details are interesting, since, while they follow the "global homology" of the news-media - wherein violence will be "presented as ethnic or foreign in its origins" (Hartley & Montgomery, 1985: 244) - they are located in Italy, itself a 'foreign' country, at least to a British readership. The 'angle' of foreign—domestic violence is further highlighted in the excerpt above, through describing the designer,

"Farhan Rahbarzadeh, the Italian born son of Iranian parents", as a "young *Roman* designer".

Rahbarzadeh's "fashion statement" referred to in the headline, designed to create as much publicity as possible at the "opening of his boutique", was certainly incendiary. The designer dressed three models

> in black *chadors*, which [during the show] they let fall to the ground. One of the models turned out to be a man wearing nothing but a chastity belt. The other two were women, one wearing nothing but a live python, the other a skimpy dress held together in such a way as to reveal a padlock at the crotch.

Continuing,

> Mr Rahbarzadeh said he had wanted to make a statement in favour of the liberation of Middle Eastern women. To symbolise their entrapment, he used a special fabric containing leaves and flowers encased in silicon.

Rahbarzadeh's "statement" therefore presupposes that "Middle Eastern women" (note the euphemism: these are not Israelis we're talking about) are both unliberated and trapped, and that the way out of such an entrapped state is to accede to the ('Western') commodification of the female body.

In the upshot of the report, and echoing the reference in the headline, the journalist suggests that Rahbarzadeh's approach "seems to have made him the object of fashion's first *unofficial fatwa*." The use of "*fatwa*" to describe the attack against the designer, illustrates the journalists desire to present the story, and the issues which surround it, in as inflammatory a style as possible. An "unofficial fatwa" is an oxymoron, since a *fatwa* is a wholly official edict: a legal ruling given by a *mojtahed* - an individual qualified to interpret Islamic jurisprudence and if necessary draw new (at times different) understanding from it - something which the reporter is tacitly acknowledging in his use of the modifier "unofficial". The term only makes sense if we adopt the same prejudicial definition of a *fatwa* as that offered by Wynford Hicks (1998): "a death sentence".

The report therefore offers a series of negative argumentative propositions, which suggest that 'Islam', *in extremis*, poses a threat to the enlightenment project of 'the West': Presupposing that (Muslim) "Middle

Eastern women" are unliberated - metonymically represented here as the *chador* - the journalist reports an the event in which a 'Western' man (significantly, an assimilated Iranian) attempted, albeit symbolically, to 'liberate' Muslim women. Faced with this challenge, "foreign" men with "Middle Eastern" accents attacked the designer - an attack which, despite being perpetrated by "unidentified assailants", is tied to 'Islam' through being described as a "fatwa". This in turn grants further support to the designer's original motivation for the 'fashion show': that 'Muslims' and perhaps 'Islam' as a whole, are in desperate need of the civilising influence of 'the West'. This argumentative conclusion is developed further in the analysis of articles included in the next section.

7.5 **The civilising influence of 'the West' and 'Westernisation'**

Van Ginneken (1998) suggests:

> Most citizens of major Western nations - and that includes most journalists - are deeply convinced that their society not only represents the very apex of civilisation, but is also willing to do all it can to help others reach this stage as soon as possible (p. 62)

These convictions are occasionally observable in the casual, rather extraneous editorialising which peppers even the most objective reporting. A model example of this, included in an otherwise rigorously objective report in the *Financial Times* (**Ataturk's legacy**, 20 January, 1998) reporting the banning of Turkey's Islamic Welfare Party, reads:

> Mr Erbakan has appealed to the European Court of Human Rights. Thus *even the most Islamically minded Turks* are discovering the value of European institutions. [emphasis added]

The scalar implicature present in "*even* the most Islamically minded Turks..." illustrates the presupposed cultural distance between European institutions and those who are "Islamically minded". By suggesting that it is the "value" rather than the 'presence' of these institutions which is being 'discovered',

the report further implies that "Islamically minded Turks" are being enlightened by this contact with European politico-legal institutions.

Other reports suggest that the *social* values of Muslims are being improved by contact with 'the West'. An article headlined **Islamic dream wife proves elusive in today's Kuwait** (*Guardian*, 17 December 1997) for example, argues that "bred by decades of exposure to Western culture, travel and television", Kuwaiti women are now convinced by the superiority of the 'western marriage'. The by-line reads: "Western ideals of equality held by Muslim women can make marriage difficult - if not out of the question"; and the journalist, Kathy Evans, holds onto this conclusion despite including material in her article which could result in a different interpretation.

The evidence Evans presents to support her argument is certainly interesting. She states that there are an estimated "40,000 spinsters in Kuwait today, a figure unprecedented in the country's history." A manager of a mosque's marriage committee, is quoted as saying "Kuwaiti men just do not trust the liberated girls", and the only quoted woman of the article, "Miriam, a 26 year old graduate working in a government ministry", says:

> No way am I going to obey my husband or allow him total control in my marriage. I want a western style marriage like you see on television where the responsibilities are shared.

On the basis of this evidence, Evans' conclusion - Western values are raising Kuwaiti women's aspirations for marriage, resulting in their becoming less attractive to Kuwaiti men with their Islamic values - appears quite plausible. Yet the article also includes two observations which cast doubts on the accuracy of this conclusion. First, the article holds up the account which "Mohammed, a young government clerk" gives of his "key requirements of his wife-to-be" to be representative of the problems of organised marriage in Kuwait. Mohammed wants "someone, er, like Cindy Crawford - but of course she must have an Islamic ideology". The photograph which accompanies the article is a photomontage of Cindy Crawford wearing a *hijab*, and the caption suggests Mohammed's "requirements" are representative: "Kuwaiti men want the face of Cindy

Crawford but the ideology and veil of Islam". Evans' choice to focus on (and celebrate) the 'unrealisable' goal of a modern Kuwaiti wife with "an Islamic ideology" down-plays not only her accompanying observation that Kuwaiti men's aspirations for a Muslim Cindy Crawford are unrealistic, but also that they are similarly attributable to "decades of exposure to Western culture, travel and television".

Second, the article includes an observation which suggests that the high number of Kuwaiti spinsters may be attributable to a different set of forces altogether:

> With the majority of Kuwaiti women now working or choosing to study up to graduate level, many delay marriage until their mid-twenties or later.

So perhaps the "unprecedented" number of Kuwaiti spinsters may be attributable to changes in the personal ambitions of Kuwaiti women to work or complete their education and therefore to marry at a later age. Kuwaiti women are unquestionably changing their personal goals and aspirations, but to explain this purely by reference to the influence - and implied *superiority* - of Western values, belies extreme ethnocentrism.

The improving influence which 'Western values' have on the 'Islamic world' also forms a central argument in an news article headlined **Welcome to the new Iran** (*Independent on Sunday*, 7 December 1997). In this article, the by-line announces, "Robert Fisk found Tehran to be an efficient and tolerant city. Until the veil slipped and the old order was revealed". This "old order" is one in which: "Ayatollah Khomeini's massive portrait would glower down"; "Death to America" would ring "throughout the airport's black painted arrivals lounge"; "visitors to the grotty Laleh hotel [...] would have to wipe their shoes on a doormat depicting the American flag"; and Iranian official-dom was characterised by "bearded civil servants, ladies in *chadors* [...] dirty cups on the desks, papers on the floor; no explanations. [...] More bearded men, [and] more dirty cups." Fisk's preoccupation with 'dirt' and particularly the 'amenities' in the "grotty" hotel are commonplace ways to cast aspersions when describing Muslim countries.

In contrast, when Fisk describes the (good) 'new Iran' he uses terms of description which praises the country according its acceptance of values identified as being more 'Western'. It is clean, articulate, deferential, increasingly high-tech and (interestingly) "efficient". Following an afternoon of being passed 'from pillar to post' in search of his press pass, Fisk describes how he "found an office *of spotless hygiene* where a young woman with *immaculate English* apologised effusely for my problems. A brand new govt Mercedes was purring at the door ...[and] more polished young men promised me a press pass in hours" (emphases added). In contrast to its previously austerity, "the arrivals lounge was [now] painted a gleaming white"; "The young man at immigration was clean-shaven and wanted to talk about Iran's 2-2 draw with Australia"; and "gone is the grubby doormat [of the Laleh hotel]; in its place lies a massive, finely stitched Tabriz carpet of crimson and green gardens".

In summarising the report, Fisk asks: are these changes "a sign of the times? Or just *a brief fling with reality* now that Mohamed Khatami [...] is President". The presupposed superiority of Western values is clearly illustrated here in Fisk's 'question': under Khatami, the "new Iran" is coming to its senses and recognising "reality". In this "new Iran", "there is a feeling that President Khatami can present the human face of the revolution, where women's equality and youth are more important than punishment and suspicion". The 'Westernising' position of President Khatami in the reporting of Iran is developed further in the next section

7.5.1 *'Pluralism' in Iran*

This section of the chapter analyses articles taken from a sub-corpus of recorded items which reported the events and declarations of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) conference which took place in Tehran (9 December 1997). Broadsheet newspapers used this occasion to discuss civil and political pluralism in Iran and, in particular, the potential for 'positive change' - described as 'modernisation' by some, or 'Westernisation' by others - which they argued the election of President Khatami represented.

Using the OIC conference as a case study, the broadsheets presented Iranian political life as a power struggle rarifiable between actors representing two polarised political camps: the 'moderates' and the 'conservatives'. Although this 'two party split' does, to some extent, represent current Iranian ideological debate on issues such as civil society, citizen's rights and (in particular) political representation, it is, as Boroumand & Boroumand (2000) have illustrated, a gross simplification "epistemologically based on the 'good guy/bad guy dialectic'", which "precludes an understanding" of Iran (p.307). Within this simplified dialectic, President Khatami is good "moderate", wishing "to liberalise the Islamic regime from within. He enjoys the support of the masses, but is challenged by the conservatives, who are violent, corrupt and unpopular" (Boroumand & Boroumand, 2000: 306-7). In other words, President Khatami is represented as the supporter of people's sovereignty (democratic; 'Western') and the Supreme Leader Khamenei, along with a homogenised corps of 'clerics', are the defenders of the Shari'a (autocratic; 'Islamic'). Accordingly, a perverse mutation occurs whereby the broadsheets report internal Iranian politics according to the recurrent manichean representation of 'Islam vs. the West'.

A *Telegraph* editorial headlined **Ayatollah greets Satan** (18 December 1997), argued that the political ground "is shifting in the hitherto rigidly antagonistic relationship between Iran and the United States", changes which

> stem from the election last May of Mr Khatami, a *moderate* who trounced the candidate favoured by the *conservative clerics*. His support came largely from women and young people, for whom 18 years of an Islamic republic had offered little encouragement. [emphasis added]

The editorial's primary argument is that, since Khatami is someone who the US find easier to deal with, he is closer to a 'Western' way of thinking than the "conservative clerics". This is supported by Khatami's syntactic opposition to the "clerics" who are presupposedly non-Western, by virtue of their 'Islamic-ness'.[11] This opposition is given greater weight by the second sentence of the excerpt which reveals that Khatami's electoral support came

from "women and young people" dissatisfied with "an Islamic republic": a sexist, traditional and parochial country. This not only suggests that Khatami, being a "moderate", intends to move Iran away from being an Islamic Republic, but also implies that he played no part in governing the Islamic Republic - quite a startling suggestion given that President Khatami is a *hojatol-eslam* and served as the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance for more than 10 years.[12]

Similarly, an editorial printed in *The Times* (**Welcome to Tehran**, 9 December 1997) posits another value-laden figure of contrast: the occasion of the OIC conference, it suggests, "provides clues to the continuing struggle between *modernisers* and the *Islamic die-hards* for the soul of the country" (emphasis added). Although Khatami is only described as "the *relatively* reasonable new president" (emphasis added), the newspaper's antipathy towards his opposition - the "anti-Western revolutionary Iran" - is openly declared. The alternative to Khatami, *The Times* suggests, is an "ignorant and corrupt clergy attempting to sabotage cautious moves to liberalise the economy and the social climate". Whereas Khatami has "people power on his side" (democratic; 'good')

> He will not attempt a volte-face over Middle East peace, anti-Americanism or Islamic zealotry [violence; fanaticism; 'bad'] so long as he and his allies are unable to confront the religious police [tyrannical; 'bad'] or question the obscurantist [dubious; unenlightened; 'bad'] legal code.

In a similar way to the *Telegraph*, *The Times* chooses to suggest that Khatami desires to bring about legal change in order to reposition both Iranian foreign policy and (seemingly) diminish the centrality of Islam to Iranian internal politics. This, presumably, is the result of the newspapers' inability to reconcile the notion that Khatami can be both 'moderate' and 'anti-American', someone who supports both the ("ignorant and corrupt") shi'a clergy and the liberalisation of the economy, or, most tellingly, that he can be both 'Muslim' and 'moderniser'.

The presupposed antithesis between Islam and reform is also present in the reporting of the 'liberal' broadsheets. So for example, when Robert

Fisk suggests: "*If* President Khatami does *create* pluralism, his will be the only democratic nation in the Muslim Middle East" he presupposes that pluralism does not currently exist in Iran (**The Iranian political football is passed to the adults**, *Independent*, 9 December 1997; emphasis added). A contrasting, and slightly paradoxical *Guardian* news feature (**After the Shah, an endless dance of revolution**, 3 January 1998) appears to find difficulty in concluding that the landslide election victory of President Khatami suggests that Iran is democratic:

> Iran still falls short of any synthesis between its religious and its liberal traditions, while managing to maintain, it must be said, a system that has a genuine democratic dimension.

The journalist's recognition of Iran's "genuine democratic dimension" appears to be more a grudging admission than a ringing conclusion. Further, the journalist's structuring of the sentence reveals the distance he presupposes between, not only religion and liberalism, but also between religion and democracy - a system which Iran is "managing to maintain" despite its religious and liberal contrariety.

This 'difficulty' in reconciling Islam and liberalism/modernity is cast in a much more confrontational light in another *Guardian* article (**Top clerics enter the fray in the fight for the soul of Iran**, 10 December 1997). Here, Kathy Evans posits "a conflict" between

> the vocal and violent radicals and the silent majority of liberals and modernists struggling to produce a new vision of Islam seemingly at ease with, not threatened by, globalisation and modern technology.

In addition to the usual 'Islamists vs. the Modernists' schema, this passage also contains suggestions of the dictatorial and non-representative nature of Iran's leaders, at clear odds with the democratic nature of the Iranian system. Higher order themes of the *incommensurable* nature of Islam and modernity are also present, since the "liberals and modernists" are said to be "*struggling* to produce a *new* vision of Islam" reconciled with modernity, here represented as technology and the ideology of globalisation. The use of the

adjective "new" implies that such an undertaking has not done before and as such this "vision" of Islam is, in fact, a '*re*vision'. The use of the verb 'to struggle' in its present tense reiterates the ongoing nature of this task, suggesting that such a scheme is perhaps not that straightforward. There is something, this implies, in the nature of 'Islam' and/or 'modernity' that restricts their union.

Further to the suggestion that 'Islamism' and 'modernity' are exclusive, even incommensurable, this *Guardian* article suggests: Iranians can be placed exhaustively in either one of these ideological groupings; that despite the fact that "two thirds of the voters want the government to adopt more liberal social policies", those in the minority, (dogmatically) retaining loyalties to radical Islamism, dominate political debate; and thus whilst 'Liberalism' and 'Modernity' (antithetical to Islam) are the choices of the people, they are repressed by "the vocal and violent [Islamic] radicals". In this way, a global homology is suggested:

Modernity : popular support :: Islam : dictatorship

The actors included in this report are subsequently offered in personification of this homology - the Supreme Leader Khamenei as 'Islam'; President Khatami as 'modernity' - as indicated by the content of their respective speeches to the OIC. The report argues that the speech given by Ayatollah Khamenei "contained echoes of the language of the early days of Iran's Islamic revolution. [...] and urged Muslims to be more united against Western cultural invasions." President Khatami,

> in contrast, spoke about human rights, the need for democracy in Muslim countries, and dialogue with the West. *Muslims*, he said, *had to use the West's scientific and social achievements to advance*. [emphasis added]

As suggested above, political and public debate in Iran is currently dominated by an ideological and social struggle, broadly the result of tensions between 'reformist' and 'conservative' religious coalitions. For British broadsheet newspapers, this contest for political power was variously

interpreted as the efforts of the moderate President Khatami to 'reform' or 'liberalise' or 'modernise' or 'Westernise' Iran, in the face of an illiberal, intransigent Islamic dictatorship. This representation is first, inaccurate, since in contrast to the journalists' inability to conceive of a model of 'development' other than secular western democracy, President Khatami is not attempting to 'Westernise' Iranian democratic politics. In contrast, Khatami suggests Iran

> must wage a war on two fronts: against its own extremists and against the attraction of the humanistic West. To survive, according to Khatami, the Islamic regime needs modern religious thought, capable of attracting the youth and responding to the challenge of Western humanism, and a people ready to participate actively in the social and political life of their country. (Boroumand & Boroumand, 2000: 312).

Second, the dominant (schematic) representation of Iran is unhelpful since it suggests that the only criticisms of theocratic rule in general and of the *Velayet-e faqih* in particular, come from 'liberal' ('Westernised') politicians and scholars. Far reaching social and political critique employing complex and technical Islamic argumentation is regularly printed in the Iranian press - particularly the women's press which has become "both a profession and a rallying point" (Keddie, 2000: 417) for Iranian women. Using gender inequality as a case example, Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut (1999) has argued that the reformist role of the women's press cannot be ignored in any analysis of contemporary political debate in Iran:

> Women's magazines [...] are playing a critical role in [Iran's] transformation. [...] The editors of these publications unanimously maintain that the inequality between men and women springs not from the Qur'an, but from religious authorities' misinterpretation of divine laws. [...] They also highlight contributions from reformist clerics, who are increasingly attentive to women's claims that Islamic laws must be adapted to the realities of contemporary Iranian society, in which women's social, economic, political and cultural activities have become integral. (Kian-Thiébaut, 1999: 15, cited in Keddie, 2000: 424)

It is lamentable that such important sites of social criticism and debate are ignored by the broadsheet press, seemingly because their ontological framework of 'Islam = backward; the West = progress' precludes the

possibility that a 'progressive' argument could originate within and orientate itself towards an 'Islamic' value system.

7.6 **Normalisation of Israeli aggression**

Integral to the 'ideological square' which I suggest characterises broadsheet representations of Islam and Muslims, is the complimentary representation of 'Our' social action in contrast with the negative representation of 'Their' social action. It is worth bearing in mind that the pronouns 'Us' and 'Them', 'Our' and 'Their', and even 'Self' and 'Other' do not have any meaning other than their immediate application: their meaning is constantly negotiated and renegotiated in the context of specific reports, and actors included as 'We' and 'Our' of some reports (for example, the French government whilst bombing Serbia) are positioned as 'They' and 'Theirs' in others (for example, the French government whilst debating the EU or the Euro). When analysing news reports in which it is not immediately clear who are being included in the position 'Us', it is possible to work backwards from this ideological double strategy, identifying whose opinions and social activities are represented positively and whose receive criticism. The negotiated status of the position 'Us' is clear in a number of articles discussed earlier in the chapter, not least in the book review **The Holy Terror** (*Sunday Times* Books supplement, 18 January 1998; see section 7.4.2).

When reporting Israel and Palestine, the sampled broadsheet newspapers predominantly positioned Israel and the Jews as 'We', thereby assuring their positive representation; and conversely, Palestine and Arabs - and not only the *Muslim* Arabs - were positioned as 'They', prefacing a negative representation.[13] This schematic representation of Palestine has been touched upon in the examples discussed earlier in this chapter - specifically the reporting of Bethlehem at Christmas. This final section explores this (*re*)negotiation of 'Us' and 'Them', in the context of reporting Palestine, in greater depth.

The acceptance of Israeli argumentation is clearly noticeable in the symbolic annexation of illegally occupied land. What this means is that 'illegally occupied Arab land' is very rarely so labelled, with the broadsheet

press preferring to label such occupation as 'Israeli settlements'. For example, when Binyamin Netanyahu approved plans to build in Jabul Abu-Ghneim - a move illegal under both the UN convention and the Oslo Accord - the broadsheet press unerringly used the Hebrew name for this area of East Jerusalem: Har Homa. In one report the *Independent* went so far as to describe the annexation as "the Jewish neighbourhood planned for the outskirts of the city" (11 December 1997), providing the kind of euphemistic gloss that the Israeli government would no doubt consider to be very useful.

In other articles, explicit Israeli plans to consolidate lands taken through violent conquest are uncritically accepted. For example, a report headlined **Likud politician calls for Palestinian state** (*The Times*, 28 November 1997), shows a characteristic lack of critical insight into the reported claims of Likud chief whip Meir Sheerit, the Israeli politician central to the story. The opening paragraph of the story, written by Christopher Walker, reads:

> A leading member of Binyamin Netanyahu's ruling Likud party yesterday backed the creation of a limited Palestinian state in a new challenge to the policy of the embattled right-wing Israeli Prime Minister.

This excerpt clearly suggests, through the use of "new challenge", that the proposed "limited Palestinian state" represents a change in direction, or perhaps a move *forward*, for the previously obstructive Likud party. This argumentative line is reiterated in the paragraphs which followed, suggesting, for example, that Netanyahu was stalling the 'peace process' in line with the demands of "extreme right-wing Jews, furious that he plans to hand back more West Bank land to Palestinians". Against this party policy, Sheerit's "challenge" is described as a "surprise conversion" towards the objectives of the Oslo agreement.

On face value, Sheerit's comments do indeed appear to be quite radical. He is quoted as saying: "I think it is possible to achieve peace with the Palestinians"; and that "The most important thing is to initiate the establishment of a Palestinian state while we are still in power." However, lower down the article, details are given which should have cast serious

doubts on the equity of Sheerit's planned "final settlement peace offer". Walker writes: "Under his proposal, Jerusalem would remain under Israeli sovereignty, the Jordan river would remain Israel's border and Israel would annex most of the 144 Jewish settlements." This plan would, of course, result in the legitimised *expansion* of Israel to include most of the land illegally occupied since 1967: East Jerusalem, the whole of the West Bank (in line with a border at the Jordan river) and 144 other 'settlements' which, although unspecified, must logically lie in territory *other* than the West Bank - perhaps in Lebanon. Not only does this plan go unexplained, uncontextualised and uncriticised, by presenting it in contrast to Netanyahu's "uncompromising" stance, Walker's report quite logically implies that it represents a compromise. This in turn supports Israel's claims to being the conciliatory party in the dispute, further undermining the Palestinian objections to the legalised theft of land which would inevitably arise from this proposal.

Violence proposed by Israel against sovereign (Muslim) states often goes similarly uncriticised by the broadsheet press - take the report **Israel steps up plans for air attacks on Iran** (*The Times*, 9 December 1997) for example. As the headline suggests, the article, again written by Christopher Walker, reports the "options" available to Israel in forming their "military contingency plans to neutralise Iran's Russian-backed missile and nuclear weapon programme". The 'need' for such a plan, already hinted at in its description above, was clearly articulated by the Israeli Defence Minister, Yitzhak Mordechai:

> "A country like Iran possessing such long range weaponry - a country that lacks stability, that is characterised by Islamic fundamentalism, by an extremist ideology that is striving to become a superpower in the Middle East - is very dangerous."

Such an accusation represents the classic approach of the propagandist, as illustrated by Ellul (1965: 58): "He who wants to provoke a war not only proclaims his own peaceful intentions but also accuses the other party of provocation. [...] He who wants to establish a dictatorship always insists his

adversaries are bent on dictatorship." Israeli foreign policy, Shahak (1997) suggests, is not driven by "the 'wish for peace', so often assumed as the Israeli aim" (p.3); rather, like all states, Israel has "hegemonic aspirations. A state aspiring to hegemony in an area cannot tolerate other strong states in that area" (Ibid.). Should Iran have made similar argumentative claims about the hegemonic political ambitions of Israel - claims which Israel Shahak (1997) shows would be well founded[14] - they would no doubt be presented as either laughable or another example of Iranian belligerence.

The greater part of the article is dedicated to describing "the two main options" that "Military planners are studying" as part of this anti-Iran plan. Either: "hitting Iranian missile plants in the cities of Shiraz, Kuramabad, Farhin and Semnan with the 'long arm' of its airforce, or targeting foreign scientists at the facilities rather than the buildings themselves." The further details of Walker's breathless descriptions of "advanced F15I fighter planes" and "surgical air strikes" can be skipped over since they are identical to the well trodden rhetoric discussed in Chapter 6. Conspicuously absent from the discussion is any recognition of the intrinsic illegality of the plan, Israel's blind contempt for human life in proposing to bomb another nation without making any consideration for the welfare of Iranians, and the uncritical acceptance of Israel's seeming *right* to act accordingly on the part of Walker. Such a tacit support for the proposed Israeli offensive could only be achieved after Iranian human life is degraded to a point where it is thought to be disposable.

7.6.1 *Attempted assassination of Khaled Meshal*

A similarly nonchalant attitude towards state-sponsored terrorism (at least when it's directed towards Muslims) characterise the last few articles of this section, all of which reported the attempted assassination of the leader of Hamas' politburo, Khaled Meshal, by Mossad. The exact details of the attack are still somewhat obscure, but this much is clear: on 26 September 1997, as Mr Meshal was entering his office building in the Jordanian capital Amman, two men approached him from behind and pressed a device to his ear. Meshal heard a loud noise, fell to the ground and immediately started

shaking uncontrollably. The two men escaped in an awaiting car containing a further two men, but were arrested later in the day by Jordanian police at which point they produced Canadian passports and were identified as Sean Kendall and Barry Beads. However, when the two men refused to see the Canadian diplomat, their passports were discovered to be forgeries and the remaining two assailants took refuge in the Israeli embassy, suspicions gave way to an Israeli admission of guilt. Canada withdrew its ambassador; Israel brokered a deal to release Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, and, in what King Hussein called a "gesture of peace", deport him to Jordan; and Israel was forced to send an antidote to the Jordanian hospital where Meshal was recovering, fuelling speculation that the device was a chemical or biological weapon.

The leniency-verging-on-flippancy with which the broadsheets approached this story is characterised a *Guardian* article headlined **Mossad own goal rebounds on PM** (4 October 1997) - the sporting metaphor of the headline already diminishing the significance of the reported action. The attempt on Meshal's life resulted in hardly a word of criticism: the failed assassination is described as a "bungled attack" which has set "a bizarre new benchmark" in Mossad's "colourful history", the facts of which "are reminiscent of a paperback thriller." The reporter, Julian Borger, preferred to focus on the potentially negative effect which the *failure* of the mission will have on Netanyahu's credibility and political career. For example, a bold, closed captioned quote read "There is a growing feeling this government can't get it right - it just goes from screw-up to screw-up", drawing attention to the *failure* of the attack rather than its *legality*. Any mention of international law, of 'terrorism' or the implications of a sovereign state assassinating its political and/or criminal opponents was carefully avoided. Indeed the attempted assassination is located within a list of Mossad's "*daring* exploits" (emphasis added) such as "the raid on Entebbe and the abduction of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann" thereby minimising the opportunities to object to the attack - these are, after all, the dashing boys of Mossad.

The report in the *Independent*, although arguing that "the attempted assassination" (also described as "zany") showed that Israel was

"responding to political challenges in a very primitive way", also chose to frame the attack as a(nother) failure of Netanyahu's government rather than as a terrorist act (**Bibi flounders in sea of troubles after Hamas fiasco**, 4 October 1997). The *Telegraph* also avoided any suggestion that the "botched assassination attempt" amounted to terrorism, although they did make repeated and extended reference to Meshal's involvement in Hamas' terrorist actions, despite his working for the party politburo rather than its armed wing (**Hamas leader tells how he survived murder attempt**, 4 October 1997). Similarly *The Times* labelled the attack as the "botched Mossad secret service operation in Jordan", and further suggested that "the Israeli public [had] expressed concern that the already fading image of Mossad's invincibility has suffered a severe blow" (**Calls for inquiry over Mossad plot**, 4 October 1997). Somewhere along the line, the fact that a state had attempted to assassinate a man was somehow lost.

The Sunday broadsheets were equally prone to normalising the attack on Meshal. In a report headlined **Netanyahu censored by Hamas truce offer** for example (*The Sunday Times*, 19 October 1997) the assassination attempt received the standard description of a "bungled" operation. In addition, the report lower down stated:

> Netanyahu points to polls showing support for his decision, made after a suicide bombing in Jerusalem on July 30, to eliminate senior Hamas figures. But critics say the risk to the delicate relationship with Jordan should have ruled out carrying out any assassination attempt on Jordanian territory.

Note that it is not the plan to "eliminate senior Hamas figures" which "critics" balked at, but rather Netanyahu's decision to allow it to occur on Jordanian territory. The simple illegality of Netanyahu's plan, not to mention the scandalous possibility that the Israeli government may have developed an explicit 'shoot-to-kill' policy in 'dealing with' its political (albeit terrorist) opponents, are concerns which the journalist neither acknowledges nor criticises.

Finally, in an article providing an epilogue to the attack, the *Sunday Times* reported that an Israeli committee set up "to investigate a *bungled*

attempt by Mossad agents to assassinate one of the leaders of Hamas, the *Islamic fundamentalist group*, is expected to recommend the dismissal of Danny Yatom, the head of the service" (**'Arab hunter' bids to control Mossad**, 9 November 1997; emphases added). The favourite successor to Yatom was Meir Dagan - "a man who knows no fear" who, during the *intifada*, formed two "hit squads, codenamed 'Cherry' and 'Samson', to carry out assassinations in the West Bank and Gaza". Other than this obvious qualification to head Mossad, Dagan is said to have "established a covert death squad called 'Rimon' (grenade)" which "gunned down dozens of terrorists"; "helped to establish a unit of about 30 soldiers acting as a hit squad in southern Lebanon"; and is regarded as "one of the army's leading 'Arab hunters'." The possibility that this man could head Mossad does worry the reporter, Uzi Mahnaimi, who states that his appointment "could seriously threaten Middle East stability" since he "is known to favour an increase in assassinations of those deemed subversive to Israel."

In contrast to the "gifted but uncontrollable" Dagan, Danny Yatom is represented as a reliable choice to lead Mossad, despite "the debacle in Amman". In the only evidence which Mahnaimi provides in support of Yatom, taken from his own testimony "before the security services committee of the Knesset", Mahnaimi suggests that Yatom "opposed the attack on Meshal, *preferring a plan to kill another target* on a different continent." That such arrogant, scant regard for human life could be included in a broadsheet news report, not only without criticism but also in *support* of Yatom's suitability in leading Mossad, is particularly disturbing.

More disturbing is the realisation that the whole episode, reporting the attempted assassination of Khaled Meshal by Mossad, was characterised by an equally low estimation of (Arab-Muslim) life on the part of the broadsheets, and their simultaneous acceptance of Israel acting with such murderous impunity - with some reports implying that Israel were justified in attempting to kill Meshal and other opponents. In this way, the reporting of the attempted assassination represents an archetypal example of the ideological square: whilst the terrorist acts of Hamas ('Meshal's fundamentalist group') are condemned, the equally terrorist act of Israel in

attempting to assassinate him ('or perhaps they should have killed someone else') with a chemical/biological weapon, are implicitly accepted since they attracted no significant criticism.

Notes

[1] Items located in Indonesia and Malaysia focused almost predominantly on the economic collapse of these countries and were characterised by the near complete inattension to 'Islam' and the predominantly Muslim faith of their populations. By these criteria, items reporting Indonesia and Malaysia were therefore excluded from the analysis of this chapter.

[2] The remaining primary countries, representing a total 140 items (9.3%), were removed from this table due to requirements of space. They are: Kosova (n= 11); India (n= 8); Sudan (n= 8); Multiple Muslim countries (n= 8); Germany (n= 8); South Africa (n= 8); Azerbaijan (n= 7); Italy (n= 7); Kurdistan (n= 6); Sri Lanka (n= 5); Kuwait (n= 4); Turkmenistan (n= 4); Cyprus (n= 4); Syria (n= 3); Tunisia (n= 3); Serbia (n= 3); Kazakstan (n= 3); Portugal (n= 3); Russia (n= 3); Philippines (n= 3); Oman (n= 3); Chechnya (n= 2); Netherlands (n= 2); Croatia (n= 2); Japan (n= 2); South Korea (n= 2); 'Unknown' (n= 2); Bahrain (n= 1); Uganda (n= 1); Sierra Leonne (n= 1); Uzbekistan (n= 1); Tajikistan (n= 1); Norway (n= 1); Denmark (n= 1); Singapore (n= 1); Australia (n= 1); Greece (n= 1); Belgium (n= 1); East Timor (n= 1); Luxembourg (n= 1); Hong Kong (n= 1); African countries (n= 1); 'Western' countries (n= 1).

[3] These 1504 articles constitute the remaining sample following the removal of both domestic articles (n= 276; see Chapter 5) and articles citing either Iraq (n= 531; see Chapter 7) or Algeria (n= 242; see Chapter 6) as a primary country. Although these frequencies do not appear to add up (the total sample = 2540 articles) this is because 13 domestic items also constitute part of the Iraqi and Algerian sub-samples due to their being cited as a secondary or tertiary country.

[4] 'Actor' is used here to denote all individuals and groups referenced and/or quoted in the sampled articles. The relationship of the individual/group to the reported event was also coded - as 'Actor'; 'Minor Actor'; 'Commentator'; 'Victim'; etc. - but such findings are irrelevant to the current discussion, which focuses purely on the differential quotation of Muslim and non-Muslim Actors. *Tables 8.5* and *8.6* give the results for Actors 1 and 2, who were quite simply the first two individuals/groups cited in the text.

[5] The 'repression of Muslim women' is also reflected in two photographs which accompany this article which, as stated earlier, will not be analysed in this study. However, I feel they ought to be mentioned here in order to present a more comprehensive account of the article. In the first photo, an attractive, Asian woman (no conclusive evidence she is Muslim) wearing 'Westernised' dress and full make-up looks directly into the camera (and therefore directly at the viewer). She is wide eyed, smiling and confident; the camera has a direct angle, level with the model's face, connoting an equal relation between subject and viewer. In contrast the second photograph shows three conspicuously Muslim women wearing the *hijab* and holding veils across their faces so that only their eyes and the fringe of one woman are visible. They are all looking away from the camera, eyes to the ground; the expression of their eyes is not exactly 'inviting' or friendly, in as much it is non-expressive; the camera is angled down on them, connoting an elevated and therefore empowered (perhaps male) gaze. The contrast between the photographs is striking: the liberated, attractive and seemingly happy Westernised Asian woman

vs. the deferential, unhappy and repressed Muslim women. The juxtaposed meaning of the photos is also reflected in the photocaption: "Restricted viewing: toiletry adverts showing women smiling seductively have been banned as growing fundamentalism demands only the modestly dressed can be portrayed".

Articles which use 'sexism' and 'the repression of women' in derogating Islam are analysed in more detail in a later section of this chapter.

[6] Ironically, this letter was written in response to a column (**The shifting sands**, David Gardner, *Financial Times*, 19 November 1997) in which, Lord Stone suggests, David Gardner had chosen "a convenient cast of villains to blame for US policy 'failures' in the Middle East".

[7] Taking the "perceived US bias towards Israel": based solely upon the wide disparity between (for example) the military and economic aid given to Israel and that given to the PA, Fateh and the PLO, US pro-Israel bias is surely more reality that perception. Regarding the nominalised "renewal of hostilities" between the US and Iraq, this structuring of expression conceals: first, the overwhelmingly one-sided nature of this violence; and second, the fact that this *US* hostility has continued unabated for much of the period since the 'end' of the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict - 'renewal' suggests otherwise.

[8] This power is not merely symbolic - every democratically elected government since 1986 has been dismissed in such a way. The then-President Farooq Leghari had used it to dismiss the Prime Minister immediately prior to Sharif's term in office: Benazir Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan People's Party, of which Leghari was also a member.

[9] Should Sharif have been found guilty of this charge - which was brought following his alleged criticism of the Chief Justice at a press conference - he would have had to stand down from office with no right of appeal.

[10] Surprisingly, the *Independent* did not report the political stand-off at all, whilst the *Guardian* reported the 'events' of the dispute with very little editorial commentary. On only one occasion did the *Guardian* express a position - in a weekly news summary (6 December 1997) where it stated the army has "thankfully" maintained that it is not interested in political power.

[11] It is interesting to speculate on whether the use of the determiner "conservative" is intended to elliptically suggest that Khatami, in opposition, is "a moderate [cleric]"; or to simply provide a slightly pejorative identification of the "clerics". It appears that the *Telegraph* is using 'moderate', not as an adjective determining the elliptical noun "cleric", but as a noun in itself: 'Khatami is a moderate; he is one of the moderates'. With this choice, "a moderate" can be positioned in opposition to 'a cleric', (with, in this case, the added adjective "conservative _") implying that clerics are *per se* non-moderate.

[12] A *hojatol-eslam* is a junior shi'a Muslim cleric, subordinate to the higher ranking Ayatollahs and Grand Ayatollahs (*Ayatollah-ol-ozma*). They are not qualified to practice *ijtihad*, as Ayatollahs are, but have to spend a number of years in religious training in order to qualify - the exact amount depends on their ability and energy. In addition to being *hojatol-eslam*, Khatami also has an MA equivalency in Islamic Theology from Tehran University.

[13] At time of writing, the end of 2000, this schematic representation of Israel/Palestine has undergone a partial shift. Newspapers' positioning Israel as 'We' has become problematic due to the seeming 'shoot to kill' policy of the Israeli army and the growing number of Palestinian children killed by Israeli troops. There is, however, a residual level of identification in the press (in the sense of 'identifying oneself with') illustrated by journalists representing the violence as Palestinian *action* (however ineffectual) and resulting Israeli *re*action. Although this does

represent a significant shift from the framing of the conflict as 'Palestinians/Muslims attack; Israelis defend' shown in this sample, it still provides a defence (however tenuous) for Israeli violence and ignores the ongoing policies of, amongst other things, intimidation, incarceration, house demolition and torture practised by Israel in the occupied territories.

[14] Shahak (1997: 54) argues:

> Since the spring of 1992, public opinion in Israel is being prepared for the prospect of a war with Iran, to be fought to bring about Iran's total military and political defeat. In one version, Israel would attack Iran alone, in another it would 'persuade' the West to do the job. The indoctrination campaign to this effect is gaining in intensity. It is accompanied by what could be called semi-official horror scenarios purporting to detail what Iran could do to Israel, the West and the entire world when it acquires nuclear weapons as it is expected to a few years hence.

Shahak illustrates this point by quoting "respected and influential Israeli experts or commentators on strategic affairs" (1997: 58) whose opinions are regularly included in mainstream Israeli newspapers. Daniel Leshem for example, a member of the Centre for Strategic Research at Tel Aviv University, is quoted proposing to "create the situation which would appear similar to that with Iraq before the Gulf crisis" (1997: 55; originally in *Al Hamishmar*, 19 February 1993). His proposal is as sinister as it sounds:

> "Iran claims sovereignty over three strategically located islands in the Gulf. Domination over those islands is capable of assuring domination not only over all the already active oil-fields of the area, but also over all the natural gas sources not yet exploited. We should hope that, emulating Iraq, Iran would contest the Gulf Emirates and Saudi Arabia over these islands and, repeating Saddam Hussein's mistake in Kuwait, start a war. [...] This prospect is in my view quite likely, because patience plays no part in the Iranian mentality. But if they nevertheless refrain from starting a war, we should take advantage of their involvement in Islamic terrorism which already hurts the entire world." (Ibid.)

The report **Israel steps up plans for air attacks against Iran** should be viewed as part of this belligerent anti-Iranian heritage.

Conclusion

This thesis makes justifiable claims to originality and contributes to knowledge in a number of significant ways. In this brief conclusion I restate the principal argumentative and corroborative claims made in the thesis. First, the thesis employs methods of data collection and analysis which are both highly detailed and methodologically sophisticated. I developed and operationalised a unique and expansive coding manual which allowed me to explore journalistic content *across* the recorded items of broadsheet coverage. In addition, I applied often complex methods of (critical) discourse analysis in order to explore meaning - implicit and explicit, transparent and opaque - *within* journalistic texts. The combination of these quantitative and qualitative methods therefore considerably enriched the ensuing analysis, yielding results which illuminated and enhanced my understanding of both the manifest and latent content of the sampled texts.

Second, the thesis makes a contribution to the development of media theory. Throughout this thesis I have applied a context-sensitive theoretical model of language in use - 'discourse'. That is, I consider and approach journalism as the inseparable combination of 'social practice', 'discursive practice' and the 'text' itself. In doing so, my analysis is able to illuminate the social and ideological meanings which journalistic texts variously presuppose, draw upon, imply and therefore (implicitly and/or explicitly) support. More specifically, by adopting such a theoretical position I am able to contextualise journalistic practice within its historic, political, economic, social, cultural and professional context(s), thereby enabling a critical and precise examination of the salient features of the sampled items of journalistic coverage. Further, such a grounded discursive analytical approach supports inferential conclusions as to how the above contexts exert an influence upon and during the production of journalistic discourse, and how the analysed texts may, in turn, affect these (social, cultural, professional etc.) contexts, particularly in their ability to produce and reproduce racism.

Third, the thesis makes a major empirical contribution to knowledge in a field of research which is both socially consequential and significantly under-researched. In the presentation and discussion of results, I foregrounded the dialectic characteristic of discourse, showed that journalistic texts should be understood as being both socially determined and socially constitutive and, therefore, that journalistic discourse plays a crucial role in the enactment as well as in the reproduction of (racist) social systems. I showed that broadsheet representations of Islam and Muslims predominantly argue that Muslims are 'homogenous', 'separate', 'inferior', 'the enemy', (etc.) and can therefore, by the Runnymede Trust's (1997) suggested binary oppositions, be regarded as 'Islamophobic'. I argued that such an approach is based on a two-fold approach of 'division and rejection' characteristic of prejudiced discourse which, in its application, relies upon negative other-presentation and a simultaneous positive self-presentation. Accordingly, broadsheet newspapers predominantly reframe Muslim cultural *difference* as cultural *deviance*.

However, and in keeping with the theoretical model adopted, the exact forms which such 'Islamophobic' and racist discourses take varies between different reporting contexts and across different reporting topics. In the final results chapter I identified four archetypal prejudicial strategies, or *topoi*, which were predominantly used across the sampled texts to derogate Muslims: the military threat 'They' pose to other countries; the terrorist or extremist threat 'They' pose; the threat 'They' pose to the democratic stability of 'Their' own countries; and the threat 'They' pose to women - both Muslim and non-Muslim. I showed that the national contexts analysed in this final results chapter drew differently on such prejudicial discourses. Thus, the reporting of Iran focused predominantly on the 'military threat' Iran poses to other countries and the threat 'Islam' poses to the democratic stability of Iran, and drew to a lesser extent on Iranian gender inequality. The reporting of Palestine on the other hand focused almost exclusively on the 'terrorist or extremist threat' of Muslims and, to a lesser extent, suggested that Palestinian Muslims pose a military threat to 'other countries' - in this case Israel.

The remaining results chapters, which analysed the coverage and context of broadsheet reporting of the United Kingdom, Algeria and Iraq, also draw upon these prejudicial discourses, although their frequency and combination differed between each national context and (in the case of the United Kingdom) according to the reporting topic. The almost exclusive focus of Algerian articles on the 'internal' nature of its civil and military disturbances emphasises the terrorist or extremist threat 'They' pose in 'Their' own country whilst automatically precluding any suggestion of the military threat 'They' pose to other countries. Conversely, the military threat which 'They' pose to other countries forms the very basis of the UNSCOM stand-off and the 'frame' within which Iraq was reported. Given the ubiquitous nature of this 'single issue reporting' of Algeria and Iraq, the 'threat' of Islam and Muslims to (not exclusively Muslim) women, apparently so considerable in other reporting contexts, was almost completely absent.

The findings of this thesis emphasise the need for any future research on broadsheet journalism to adopt a context-sensitive analytic position, and take into account not merely the product(s) of reporting, but also the ideological, generative and the contextual controls on reporting (specific stories and in general). In embracing such an approach, future research will not only foreground broadsheet newspapers' location *in* the social and political world, but should also illustrate the manipulation of journalists by empowered groups *within* the social and political world.

Appendix 1

Coding Frame

Titscher *et al* (2000) argue that in traditional content analysis, the variables "should be so clearly defined that different coders can achieve the same results" (p. 148). What this means is that the variables recorded during content analysis "must be specifiable by a body of theory and by a set of coding rules which are invariant to the user's interpretation" (Cicourel, 1964: 148, cited in Titscher *et al*, 2000: 9). Although I do not accept that the "user's interpretation" of a text can be wholly divorced from the application of coding rules as the above quotations appear to suggest, I will here introduce and discuss the variables included as part of the initial content analysis. Specifically I explain what the variables were aimed at recording, a reason for inclusion, and, in the case of the more subjective variables, a method for the actual process of coding.

The coding process was completed on the assumption that a 'text' is not simply an object open to coding and classification, but is a "communicative event" borne of "text-internal as well as text-external conditions of meaning" (Titscher *et al*, 2000: 21). I identify myself as one such text-external condition of meaning. The following account of the coding rules which I applied is intended to make my role in the coding and completion of the current research as transparent as possible. I will give the name of a variable (written in CAPITALS) followed by the values of the variable employed in this coding process and a brief description of how this variable was recorded. The variables are divided into four groups of variables:

- 'technical data', recording the more manifest or physical properties of the texts
- the 'topics of reporting'
- variables aimed at recording the 'character and tone of reporting'
- and 'lexicon', recording the presence and textual location of specific words and phrases.

1. **Technical Data**

CASE NUMBER

A consecutive number was given to each article satisfying the qualification criteria. This was intended to make locating the text a great deal easier during analysis.

PAPER: 1= Financial Times; 2= Guardian; 3= Independent; 4= Telegraph; 5= The Times; 6= Sunday Independent; 7= Sunday Times; 11= Saturday Financial Times; 12= Saturday Guardian; 13= Saturday Independent; 14= Saturday Telegraph; 15= The Saturday Times

The paper in which the recorded article appeared was expected to be a particularly important variable. The coding of this variable would enable me to separate and compare the reporting output of the different newspapers during analysis.

DATE:

Recording the date allows the patterns of reporting across the whole sample, or according to a specific variable value - a topic, a country, articles referring to 'terrorism' etc. - to be plotted and analysed. The whole date is recorded.

PAGE:

Recording the page on which the report or article starts is based on the presumption that the news considered the 'most important' by the newspaper will be included on the front page, or in another otherwise conspicuous location in the newspaper. This allows for the crosstabulation of Page, and other variables.

LOCATION: 1= top left quarter; 2= top right quarter; 3= bottom left quarter; 4= bottom right quarter.

In a similar way to Page, the position on the page that the article is located is hypothesised as an indication of 'newsworthiness'. The variable codes the quarter of the page in which the majority of the recorded article resided.

SECTION: 1= main/news; 2= (weekly) news review; 3= financial/money; 4= Saturday colour supplement; 5= Sunday colour supplement; 6= culture/society; 7= style/fashion; 8= media/ IT; 9= education; 10= Travel; 11= Books/ literature; 12= sport; 13= Tabloid section; 14= Leisure; 15= weekend;

The Section of the newspaper in which a coded article is included is a very accurate indication of its agenda and intended audience. After the Newspaper, I hypothesise that the Section should offer the next meta-summary of the content of the recorded article.

PAGE LABEL: 1= News; 2= Home News; 3= European News; 4= International News; 5= Analysis; 6= Comment; 7= Finance/economics; 8= Sport; 9= Policy/politics; 10= Editorial; 11= Television/media; 12= Profile; 13= World trade/Overseas business/Consultancy; 14= News, Asia/Pacific; 15= Travel; 16= Overseas/Foreign news; 17= Focus/ Perspectives; 18= News, Africa; 19= World News; 20= Interview; 21= Gulf/ Middle East; 22= Environment; 23= Despatches; 24= Ethnicity; 25= Censorship; 26= Obituaries; 27= Flashpoints; 28= Kidnapping; 29= Leading stories; 30= Islam; 31= Books; 32= Leader and Letters; 33= Algeria's Terror; 34= Hamilton Report; 35= Iraq; 36= Egypt; 37= Temple Massacre/Egypt killings; 38= Women; 39= Jordan; 40= Middle East terror/turmoil; 41= Features; 42= Commodities & agriculture; 43= Week ahead/preview; 44= Secret war [Iraq]; 45= Oil bonanza; 46= News: Americas; 47= War Criminals; 48= Asia/Far East in Crisis; 49= Architecture; 50= Briefing; 51= Body & Mind; 52= Iran; 53= The Jackal; 54= Rushie's future; 55= Peace on Earth?; 56= Moments that made the year; 57= Cars; 58= The Back Page; 59= Refugees; 60= Indonesia; 61= The Clinton Affair; 62= Lobbyists; 63= Yugoslavia; 64= Society; 65= News review/The Week; 66= Israel's debacle; 67= Crime; 68= Royal visit; 69= Hard life; 70= Commonwealth Conference; 71= Algeria; 72= Yemen; 73= Iraq crisis; 74= Changing Iran; 75= Terrorism; 76= Al Fayed Accused; 77= Food & Drink; 78= Education/Higher education; 79= Saudi Cash Scandal; 99= none

The page labels of newspapers provide a summary to the content of articles appearing on each particular page. The variable Page Label is therefore

hypothesised to play a similar function as the higher order variables Section and Newspaper, summarising the semantic content of the recorded text at a level above the headline. This list of variable values started small (#1-19), and expanded significantly in light of the content of sampled newspapers. The *exact* page label was maintained in the codes due to the potentially ideological significance of a newspaper choosing to label a page 'International News', 'World News', 'Foreign News' or a more specific label such as 'Middle East News'.

FORMAT: 1= news report; 2= editorial; 3= column; 4= feature; 5= cartoon/illustration; 6= diary; 7= letter; 8= weekly news summary; 9= review; 10= 'news in brief'; 11= Obituary;

The format of a recorded article is an important variable, where the relationship between textual 'form' and 'content' is perhaps most clearly visible. In addition, the format of an article is a very important variable to consider when discussing and evaluating the 'function' of textual 'content'.

COLUMN/ARTICLE SIZE

The size of the coded article, measured in centimetres squared, will be an important variable in crosstabulating the coverage of the sampled newspapers and thereby inferring the relative importance which they give to, for example, the reporting of a particular Topic, Primary Country or Representation of Islam (see below).

IS A SOURCE BYLINED?: 1= Yes; 2= No; 9= other

Not all articles are given a by-line. This article codes the existence of a by-line before coding who is cited.

SOURCE BYLINED: 1= no source mentioned; 2= newspaper; 3= Agence France Presse; 4= Associated Press; 5= Press Association; 6= Reuters; 7= United Press International; 8= other UK newspaper; 9= US newspaper; 10= Israeli newspaper; 11= Muslim newspaper; 12= 'agencies; 13= UK Govt; 14= Foreign Govt; 15= Member of public; 16= Business sector; 99= other

This variable codes who is by-lined as the source of an article. In the case of two codes being mentioned - e.g. a house journalist and a news agency - the source presumed to have had *the most recent* authorial input into the article is coded - in the example above, this would have been the journalist.

LOCATION: 1= domestic; 2= international.

This variable coded whether the recorded article was located in a domestic or international setting. An article was considered 'domestic' if geographically located in the UK, all actors cited were identified as, or could be construed as being 'British' or else all reported action was located within the domestic sphere. For example, despite Mohammed Fayed 'being' Egyptian, articles reporting the 'cash for questions' controversy, the burial of Dodi Fayed or former *Harrods* employees accusing Fayed of idiosyncratic or illegal behaviour, were coded as 'domestic' due to being located firmly in the domestic sphere. Articles not displaying such emphasis were coded as 'international' articles.

(if Domestic, then) DOMESTIC AREA: 1= London; 2= South/ S. West England; 3= South East England; 4= East Anglia; 5= East Midlands; 6= West Midlands; 7= Wales; 8= Merseyside/ Lancashire; 9= South Yorkshire; 10= East Yorkshire; 11= West Yorkshire; 12= North Yorkshire; 13= Northumberland/ Cumbria; 14= Scotland; 15= 'Home Counties'; 98= multiple; 99= other

I also imagined that the area of the UK which a domestic article was located may have an effect on the form, content or angle of the article, due to the concentration of Muslim communities in certain metropolitan areas of the country.

PRIMARY COUNTRY CODE: 1= Afghanistan; 2= Albania; 3= Algeria; 4= Bahrain; 5= Bangladesh; 6= Bosnia; 7= Egypt; 8= Ethiopia; 9= India; 10= Indonesia; 11= Iran; 12= Iraq; 13= Israel; 14= Jordan; 15= Kuwait; 16= Lebanon; 17= Libya; 18= Malaysia; 19= Morocco; 20= Oman; 21= Pakistan; 22= Qatar; 23= Saudi Arabia; 24= Somalia; 25= Sudan; 26= Syria; 27= Tunisia; 28= Turkey; 29= United Arab Emirates; 30= Yemen; 31= Palestine; 32= Kashmir; 33= Kosova; 34= Serbia; 35= Kurdistan; 37= Sri Lanka; 38=

Uganda; 39= Turkmenistan; 40= Azerbiajan; 41= Sierra Leone; 42= Uzbekistan; 43= Kazakstan; 44= Tajikistan; 45= Chechnya; 98= 'Arab' countries; 99= Multiple Muslim Countries; etc..

100= UK; 101= USA; 102= France; 103= Germany; 104= Spain; 105= Portugal; 106= Italy; 106= Holland/Netherlands; 107= Canada; 108= Norway; 109= Denmark; 110= Sweden; 111= Finland; 112= Russia; 113= Austria; 114= Switzerland; 115= Singapore; 116= Australia; 117= India; 118= Philippines; 119= South Africa; 120= Greece; 121= Belgium; 122= Croatia; 123= Timor; 124= Cyprus; 125= China; 126= Ireland; 127= Luxembourg; 128= Japan; 129= Argentina; 130= Armenia; 131= Burma; 132= Thailand; 133= S. Korea; 134= Vatican; 135- Hong Kong; 136= Iceland; 137= Kenya; 138= Nigeria; 139= Cuba; 140= Zanzibar; 141= Columbia; 142= Panama; 196= 'African' countries; 197= UN; 198= EU; 199= Multiple Non-Muslim countries; 200= Unknown; 201= 'Western' countries;

The Primary Country Code recorded the country in which the reported action of the coded article was located. This was occasionally a little more difficult to code than the above instruction indicates, for example, in the case of an article in which an American politician criticises the actions of President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, America was coded as the primary country due to the location of the criticis*er* and not the criticis*ed*. However, it was decided in the case of (for example) an article reporting falling Iraqi oil prices, that Iraq would be coded as the primary country, despite the fact that it was the American Dow Jones or the British FTSE exchanges that were recording - or creating? - such a drop in prices. Therefore, this variable coded the country cited in the text as 'the most important country in this article' - this was usually the text's geographical location but could (in the case of the second example above) be the country identified as the *driving agent* in the reported action.

SECONDARY COUNTRY CODE: variable codes are as above for the Primary Country.

Following from the variable recording the Primary Country, this variable is aimed at recording a second country involved in the reported action. On occasion this meant literally 'the country which was mentioned second', but more usually meant the country presented as: secondary actor; minor (as opposed to major)

actor; referent (as opposed to referrer); reactor (as opposed to actor); or as dissenting, contesting or otherwise combating the country in the primary position. In the case on the first example given above (US politician criticising Saddam Hussein) Iraq would be coded as the secondary country. For the second example, the secondary country would be coded as the geographical location of the Stock Exchange reporting the drop in oil prices. This variable enabled me to better record the interactive and international approach to reporting Islam, and also provides the potential to revealing the extent to which 'Western' countries, such as the USA and the UK are involved in report 'covering' Islam.

TERTIARY COUNTRY CODE: variable codes are as above for the Primary Country.

The Tertiary Country provides a third opportunity to record the interactive and international approach to reporting Islam. A Tertiary Country is recorded when a country cited is important to the reported action. Imagine that in the first example cited above, the US politician is criticising Saddam Hussein for threatening Israel: Israel is coded as a tertiary country, a record which may prove to be significant. Conversely, should the second example also mention a drop in price of Saudi oil, then this could potentially change the whole angle of the article: the article could now be a report *from* (e.g.) the Dow Jones exchange (USA = primary country) wherein Iraq and Saudi Arabia are cited as factoral or examples in the larger story of lowering oil prices (secondary and tertiary countries respectively?). The Tertiary Country therefore acts to code the reported action more specifically, and provides a great deal more contextualisation to the recorded article.

As a general note: the variable values above show entries for Chechnya, Kashmir, Kosova, Kurdistan and Palestine. I recognise that some will consider entries such as these a little inappropriate whilst others may feel incensed by their inclusion as 'countries'. These places are coded as countries where I felt that it was appropriate to do so - i.e. where, as suggested above, the place was *identified* as the geographical location of the reported action or was presented as a factor in *understanding* the reported action. Their coding therefore reflects their use by the newspaper. Their inclusion is not an intentionally political act - although it is, no doubt political - but rather, the inclusion of these variable codes

was intended to enable greater recording of the reported action, in much the same way as including 'Cyprus' (code #124) as a country code does.

WHY 'OTHER'? (#1) (string variable)

This 'string' (i.e. written) variable refers to the preceding variables and records why it was necessary to code the variable 'other'. Rarely was this variable needed, due to the method adopted of introducing new codes in order to accurately record the stated variables, and was included as an 'insurance variable'.

2. **Topics in the News**

PRIMARY, SECONDARY, TERTIARY & QUATERNARY TOPICS: same codes, as below:

*Race/Community Relations (0-19): 1= general; 2= ...and legislation; 3= problems of..; 4= positive; 5= demonstrations; 6= violence; 7= Muslim organisations; 8= research; 9= anti-Muslim prejudice; 10= Muslim prejudice directed at whites/Christians/Jews; 11= Muslim/ Sikh relations; 12= election issue; 13= race discrimination; 14= Muslim/Hindu relations; 19= other

*Immigration (20-39): 20= general; 21= numbers entering country; 22= numbers leaving country; 23= immigration controls; 24= future threat of immigration; 25= reunification of families; 26= illegal entry; 27= immigration as an election issue; 28= deportation; 29= asylum; 30= Immigration and citizenship; 39= other

*Crime (40-59): 40= general; 41= violence; 42= sexual crime; 43= robbery/theft; 44= social security fraud; 45= arson; 46= general association; 47= human interest; 48= illegal drug use; 49= drug smuggling; 50= 'terrorism'; 51= gerrymandering; 52= Yvonne Gilford murder; 53= hostages/hijacking; 54= cash for questions/corruption; 55= 'organised crime'; 56= prostitution; 59= other

*Education (60-79): 60= general; 61= funding private schools; 62= religion and..; 63= school leavers; 64= overseas students; 65= language and...; 66= Muslim University Students; 67= poor education services; 79= other

Housing (80-99): 80= general; 81= overcrowding; 82= 'ghetto areas'; 83= benefits; 84= landlords, non-Muslim; 85= landlords, Muslim; 86= orphanages; 99= other

*Employment (100-119): 100= general; 101= unemployment levels; 102= job prospects; 103= cultural differences and...; 104= language differences and...;105= religious differences and...; 106= discrimination; 107= Muslim employers; 108= agriculture; 109= human interest; 110= Muslim women and...; 119= other

*Race Legislation (120-139): 120= general; 121= positive reporting of...; 122= negative reporting of...; 123= ..and religious discrimination; 124= blasphemy laws; 139= other

*Health (140-159): 140= general; 141= health problems?; 142= cosmetic surgery; 143= private health care; 144= private health care in Muslim countries; 145= state health & welfare provision, Muslim countries; 146= natural disaster; 147= rail/ air disaster; 148= ...and fasting; 149= ... and organ/blood donorship; 150= ... and gender; 151= obituaries; 152= child malnutrition; 153= human interest; 154= psychological health; 155= euthanasia; 156= burial; 159= other

*Policing/Law and order (160-179): 160= general; 161= selective/target policing; 162= positive relations; 163= negative relations; 164= demonstrations; 165= rioting; 166= court rulings; 167= recruitment of Muslim officers; 168= execution/capital punishment; 169= Islamic law, negative; 170= Islamic law, positive; 171= Police racism; 172= court cases; 173= child imprisonment; 174= prisons/imprisonment; 179= other

*International Relations/Politics (180-219): 180= general; 181= trade; 182= aid; 183= sport; 184= UN; 185= sanctions; 186= cordial relations; 187= antagonism between nations; 188= 'rogue nations'; 189= demonstrations; 190= 'democracy'; 191= 'dictatorship'; 192= Islam vs. West/Huntingdon; 193= 'naked aggression'; 194= occupied territory; 195= international law; 196= peace talks; 197= meetings between leaders; 198= environmental issues; 199= actions of Int. Leaders; 200= history; 201= terrorism; 202= charity; 203= Govt. incompetence; 204= illegal weaponry; 205= human rights; 206=

Israeli/Pal. peace process; 207= diplomacy; 208= World Court/international trials; 209= spying/covert operations; 210= EU; 211= elections; 212= released prisoners; 213= censorship; 214= torture; 215= Iraq/US/UN stand-off; 216= peace deal; 217= human interest; 218= 'instability'; 219= other

*War (220-239): 220= general; 221= between nations; 222= civil war; 223= 'annexation'; 224= threat of...; 225= acts of...; 226= human interest; 227= ...and civilian deaths; 228= cease-fire(s); 229= war crimes; 239= other

*Culture/Custom (240-269): 240= general; 241= westernisation/imperialism; 242= Islam and...; 243= enforced culture; 244= patriarchy and...; 245= Islam/west contrast; 246= food; 247= travel; 248= clothing; 249= ...and law/Judiciary; 250= film industry; 251= media/ press; 252= cosmetic surgery; 253= marriage and Islam; 254= fine art; 255= multiculturalism; 256= death/burial of Dodi; 257= literature; 258= 'silly stories' concerning Islam; 259= music; 260= Islamist activities; 261= family life; 262= architecture; 263= marriage; 264= 'Faith'; 265= technology; 266= celebrity; 267= fatwa and/or Rushdie; 269= other

*Sport (270-289): 270= general; 271= business interests; 272= advertising; 273= racism in .; 274= ...and Islam; 275= Muslim non-involvement in ...; 276= ...and Muslim countries; 277= ...and Muslim non-involvement; 278= ...and conflict;

*Business (290-309): 290= general; 291= success; 292= failure; 293= shares; 294= international trade; 295= financial crisis, international; 296= financial crisis, domestic; 297= arms trade; 298= privatisation; 299= Govt. budget; 300= oil; 301= economic talks; 302= agriculture; 303= economic reform; 304= take-over/buyout; 309= other

*Women (310-339): 310= general; 311= gender inequality; 312= marriage, arranged; 313= marriage, 'forced'; 314= female conversion; 315= female circumcision; 316= human rights and ...; 317= ... and Islam; 318= hijab; 319= women in Islamic countries; 320= Muslim women in the UK; 321= ...and Islamic culture; 322= human interest; 323= sex/sexuality; 339= other;

*Youth (340-369): 340= general; 341= education attainment; 342= youth and employment; 343= youth and popular culture; 344= youth and tolerance,

racial; 345= youth and intolerance, racial; 346= youth and tolerance, other; 347= youth and intolerance, other; 348= youth in Islamic countries; 349= Muslim youth in the UK; 350= custody; 351= child labour; 369= other

Coding of topics is an interesting aspect of content analysis, since it is based on the perception, knowledge and 'common sense' of the researcher. As such it is, for the most part, a relatively easy activity to perform (particularly with a coding manual as detailed as that which I used) but incredibly difficult to accurately summarise. The coding of topics in this research is prefaced by van Dijk's (1988) work on textual semantic macrostructures, and the idea that through macrorules such as deletion, generalisation and construction, a concept - a *topic* - can be derived from the text. Here, the topic of a text is regard as different to the theme: a theme is not a concept but a macroproposition, similar to the headline of a news report, which *groups* topics into a complex summary or gist of the text.

To complicate matters further, inherent in the coding manual which I adopted are two levels of topical summary - these I refer to as the 'topic' and the 'parent topic'. The parent topics were higher order semantic concepts which group together between 20 and 40 topics: for example, 'Crime' is one such parent topic grouping 20 topics such as 'violent crime', 'sexual crime', 'robbery/theft', 'arson', etc.; 'Race and Community Relations' is another parent topic grouping a further 20 topics. I structured the coding manual in such a way in order to be able to summarise the quite specific and numerous topics into larger and more manageable sections - the parent topics - during analysis.

The coding regime which I adopted allowed me to code four topics to summarise the content of the recorded articles: primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary topics. These four variables were coded according to importance: the most important, or significant topic was coded as the Primary Topic, and so on. The ordering of these topics is significant, often indicating the angle which a newspaper wished to put on a story as opposed to the 'manifest content' of the event itself. In an article reporting weapons inspections in Iraq, for example, the primary topic could be: the UN; the sanctions regime which the inspections were part of; the weapons alleged to exist which UNSCOM were looking for; the threat of war; or a number of other potential topics depending on the emphasis of the report. Similarly, a number of stories could be written from 'within' the primary topic 'Iraq & the UNSCOM crisis' (code #215). The coding of four topics is

therefore an attempt to record both the content of reporting more specifically and also to show, albeit in a superficial way, how newspapers actively construct the actions which they 'report'. The parent topics are marked as '*' in the list above.

WHY 'OTHER'? (#2): (string variable)

Again, this string variable was included in order to record why I had felt it necessary to code a topic as 'other'.

3. **Framing of the News**

In attempting to record the framing of sampled news articles, I first coded eight variables which were applied to the first four individuals or groups (e.g. pressure group, political party, etc.) the article referred to.

ACTOR: Domestic Political Sources (1-100): 1= Prime Minister; 2= named Chief Secretary; 3= named Govt. Minister; 4= named Govt. departmental spokesperson; 5= named Govt. MP; 6= generic 'Govt. source'; 7= generic 'Cabinet source'; 8= generic 'Sources close to the P.M.'; 9= 'Ruling' party councillor; 10= named opposition party leader; 11= named opposition party 'Minister'; 12= named opposition party MP; 14= named opposition party councillor; 15= generic 'opposition party leader'; 16= generic 'opposition party Minister'; 17= generic 'opposition party member'; 18= generic MP; 19= generic Peer; 20= Govt Lord; 21= Opposition Lord; 22= Cross bench Lord; 23= Generic Lord; 24= named Ambassador/Diplomat; 25= Generic Ambassador/Diplomat;

50= named Muslim party leader; 51= named Muslim party minister/cabinet; 52= named Muslim party Member; 53= generic Muslim party 'leader'; 54= generic Muslim party 'official'; 55= generic Muslim party 'representative'; 56= generic Muslim 'party member';

International Political Sources (101-200):101= UN; 102= European Comm./ Parliament/ Politician; 103= NATO; 104= Other Int. body/ committee of Nations; 105= International Govt. Leader; 106= Int. Govt. Member; 107= Int. Govt. Spokesperson; 108= Generic Int. Government spokesperson; 109= Int. (legitimate) Opposition Party Leader; 110= Int. (legitimate) Opposition party

member; 111= Int. (legitimate) Opposition party representative; 112= Generic Int. (legitimate) Opposition party spokesperson; 113= Int. (illegitimate) Opposition. Party leader; 114= Int. (illegitimate) Opposition. party member; 115= Int. (illegitimate) Opposition. Party representative; 116= Generic Int. (illegitimate) opposition party spokesperson: 117= Int. Govt./Military Intelligence agency; 118= terrorist; 119= Terrorist Group; 120= Former Int. Govt Member; 121= Ambassador/Diplomat; 122= 'Arab diplomat';

Other sources (201-300):201= Scientific research centre/scientist; 202= University Academic (where different); 203= Muslim University Academic ('Islamic state'); 204= Other public sector research inst./centre; 205= Religious spokespersons (Non-Muslim); 206= Health Care Professional (Doctor/ Nurse/ Authority); 207= Police/Prisons/Law enforcement; 208= Teachers; 209= Social services; 210= other public sector officials; 211= Armed forces; 212= Trade Unions; 213= Royalty; 214= Celebrity; 215= Media organisations; 216= opinion pollsters; 217= private sector research/market researchers; 218= other business sector/corporate sector actors; 219= members of the public, adult; 220= members of the public, children; 221= Artist; 222= writer; 223= criminal; 224= lawyer/solicitor/barrister; 225= Political Analyst; 226= Religious Spokespersons, Muslim; 227= Pressure Group; 228= Sportsman; 229= actor/actress; 230= 'Tribesman'; 231= student; 232= Musician; 233= charity; 234= reporter; 235= animal; 299= other

The first of these variables recorded the job or social position of the actor. On occasion an individual was referred to in the text who could be coded with more than one value - for example, should Minister Louis Farrakhan of the Nation of Islam be coded as 'Muslim Party Leader' (#50), 'International Oppositional Party Leader' (#109) or 'Muslim religious spokesman' (#226)?. Cases such as these were noted, along with the value chosen to represent them, in order that they could be consistently coded in future appearances. The remaining 8 variables are relatively straightforward, coding the manifest characteristics and descriptions which the actor received in the text.

IS THE SOURCE MUSLIM?: 1= yes; 2= no; 9= unclear

IS THIS SOURCE IDENTIFIED AS BEING MUSLIM?: 1= yes; 2= no; 9= other

POLITICAL/GROUP AFFILIATION OF SOURCE (if applicable): 1= Al Muhajiroun; 2= Nation of Islam; 3= Muslim Council of Britain; 4= Muslim Parliament; 5= UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs; 6= Al Nisa; 7= Islamic Human Rights Commission; 8= Muslim News; 9= Q News; 10= PLO/ PA/ Fatah; 11= Taleban; 12= Hamas; 13= Islamic Jihad; 14= Hizb Allah; 15= GIA (Algeria); 16= Ba'ath; 17= Harakat (Kashmir); 18= Kosova Liberation Army; 19= Shia Clergy; 20= Islamic Welfare Party (Turkey); 21= FIS (Algeria); 22= National Council of Resistance (Iran); 23= Muslim Brotherhood; 24= PKK (Kurdistan); 25= KDP (Kurdistan); 26= Movement for Peaceful Society (Algeria); 27= Sudan Peoples Liberation Army; 28= Al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya; 29= PUK (Kurdistan); 30= Muslim Solidarity Committee; 31= Islamic Action Front (Jordan); 32= Hizb-Wahadat (Afghan); 33= Iran Freedom Movement; 34= mujihadeen (Afghan); 35= PPP (Indonesia); 36= Muhammadiyah (Indonesia); 37= Sipah-e-Sahaba; 38= Nahdlatul Ulama; 39= Warriors of Jhangui (?); 40= Shi'ite Amal Movement (Lebanon); 41= Iraqi National Congress; 42= Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines); 43= PAGAD (S. Africa); 44= Democratic League of Kosova; 99= no group cited

IN WHAT PART OF THE ARTICLE ARE THEY QUOTED? (if applicable): 1= headline/leader; 2= first sentence; 3= first paragraph; 4= second paragraph; 5= upper half of report; 6= text; 7= photocaption; 9= other

IN WHAT PART OF THE ARTICLE ARE THEY FIRST REFERRED TO? 1= headline/leader; 2= first sentence; 3= first paragraph; 4= second paragraph; 5= upper half of report; 6= text; 7= photocaption; 9= other

PROPORTION OF THE ARTICLE CONCERNING THE ACTIONS/ OPINIONS OF SOURCE: 1= all; 2= vast majority; 3= majority; 4= half; 5= less than half; 6= hardly at all; 7= only gets a mention; 8= source used as example of larger trend; 99= other

IS THE SOURCE AN 'ACTOR' OR COMMENTATOR?: 1= actor; 2= minor actor; 3= commentator; 5= neither actor nor commentator, but instrumental to story; 6= neither, and ancillary to story; 7= 'pawn'/victim; 9= other

WHY 'OTHER'? (#3) (string variable)

(B) *Character of Commentary*

This next set of variables attempted to code the tone, or 'character' of the sampled texts.

EVALUATION OF A TEXT'S MUSLIM ACTORS/ACTION

1= laudatory; 2= favourable; 3= neutral; 4= critical; 5= abrasive; 99= other

The first variable coded any 'evaluative' dimension to the journalists' representation of the reported actions. The variable values - laudatory, favourable, neutral, etc. - recorded the journalists' or the report's evaluation of the report's Muslim actors or their evaluation of Islam in general.

The next two variables, recording the primary and secondary stylistic dimensions of the reports were also quite subjective. I will not go into the features which made me code an article as 'crusading' or 'argumentative' other than to say that these reports appeared to have a clear agenda in the construction and presentation of material - the 'crusading' articles doing so to a degree above those coded as 'argumentative'. Categories such as 'cynical', 'humorous' and 'lyrical/loquacious' are similarly highly subjective to code and extremely difficult to describe. The majority of articles were expected to adopt a 'descriptive' (used to code articles describing the 'who, what, where, when and how' of an event) and/or a 'summarising' style of reporting (used to code reports providing background information on the 'who, what, where, when and how' of an event).

PRIMARY STYLISTIC DIMENSION OF THE REPORT: 1= crusading; 2= argumentative; 3= descriptive, 'event based'; 4= summarising or backgrounding; 5= cynical/dismissive; 6= 'humorous'; 7= 'warning'/ 'helpful'; 8= 'lyrical';

SECONDARY STYLISTIC DIMENSION OF THE REPORT (coding as above)

The next eight variables were suggested by the Runnymede Trust (1997) in their report on Islamophobia. I included them in order to empirically test the Think Tank's hypothesis that negative representations of Islam are predominant in the British Press. I treated such representations - both 'positive' and negative' - as non-obligatory argumentation. Only the semantic content of the texts across lexical, sentential or more global levels, were used to evaluate whether or not such argumentation was included. The syntactic structuring of expression was ignored for the purposes of these variables (but is discussed during the later discoursive analysis).

The first variable, recording the representation of Islam across the monolithic/diverse binary, was interpreted and coded in quite a restrictive manner which inevitably coloured the data produced. I decided that the text could only be described as arguing 'Islam is monolithic' or 'Islam is diverse' when more than one 'variety' of Muslim, more than one orthodoxy of Islam, are included in the text and held up - implicitly or explicitly - for comparison. Further, the variable only coded representation(s) within individual texts and not across the sample as a whole. It is therefore possible that only 'one Islam' was included or represented across the sampled newspapers (and therefore a picture of a 'monolithic Islam' was the result) but, because of the coding rules adopted for the variable (coding explicit not implicated content) the results would show that the articles did not argue for one binary nor the other. This strategy needs to be borne in mind when considering the results from this variable.

REPRESENTATION OF ISLAM AS... 1= monolithic; 2= diverse; 9= neither

REPRESENTATION OF ISLAM AS... 1= separate; 2= interacting; 9= neither

REPRESENTATION OF ISLAM AS... 1= inferior; 2= equal; 3= superior; 9= neither

REPRESENTATION OF ISLAM AS... 1= enemy; 2= partner; 3- both; 9= neither

REPRESENTATION OF ISLAM AS... 1= manipulative; 2= sincere; 9= neither

CRITICISM OF 'THE WEST' BY ISLAMIC SOURCES IS... 1= rejected; 2= considered; 9= neither

ISLAMOPHOBIA IS... 1= defended; 2= criticised; 9= neither

ISLAM VS. 'THE WEST' IS SEEN AS... 1= natural; 2= inaccurate; 9= neither

IS ISLAM PRESENTED AS AN INFLUENCIAL FACTOR IN THE REPORTED ACTION? 1= yes; 2= no; 3= unclear; 9= neither

ARE 'ISLAM' AND 'DEMOCRACY' SET AGAINST EACH OTHER? 1= yes; 2= no; 9= neither

WHY 'OTHER'? (#4) (string variable)

4. **Lexicon**

This final section recorded the presence and textual location of particular words. The list of words recorded is shown below:

General words	**Arabic words**
'Islamophobia'	*'jihad'*
'human rights'	*'fatwa'*
'Arab mind/ Arab-ness'	*'sharia'*
'westernised'	*'hijab/veil'*
	'halal'
'Negative' words	**'Positive' Antonyms**
'anger'	*'clemency / calmness'*
'threat'	*'unthreatening'*
'violence' or reference to acts of	*'peaceful' or reference to acts of*

violence	*peace*
'villainy'	*'heroism / virtue'*
'irrational'	*'rational'*
'fundamentalism/ist'	*'liberal / moderate'*
'terrorist'	*'emissary / ambassador'*
'traditionalist / archaic'	*'modernising'*
'sexist/ism or chauvinism/ist'	*'sexual equality'*

Should these words be included in an article, their location was recorded as follows:

1= headline/leader; 2= first sentence; 3= first paragraph; 4= second paragraph; 5= upper half of report; 6= text; 7= photo caption; 9= other

For some words it was particularly difficult to think of an antonym, and therefore the words eventually chosen may appear a little strange - particularly 'ambassador/ial' as the antonym for 'terrorist'. This choice was based on finding a term opposite to the definition which I had adopted of a terrorist - 'one who brings terror'. 'Ambassador' seemed to capture a sense of 'one who makes peace' in addition to its use as a complementary adjective: 'ambassadorial'.

The decision to include these variables was based on the hypothesis that negative terminology and references will be used in representing Islam and Muslims more frequently than their positive antonyms. By recording the location of negative words and their antonyms, I can tentative deduce their importance to the sampled articles and perhaps to the representation of Islam and Muslims as a whole.

Appendix 2

Chi-Square test 1: 'Is Actor 1 quoted?' by variable 'Is Actor 1 Muslim?'

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	7.169[a]	2	.028
Likelihood Ratio	7.242	2	.027
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.166	1	.280
N of Valid Cases	265		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.78.

Directional Measures

			Value	Asymp. Std. Error[a]	Approx. T[b]	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Lambda	Symmetric	.036	.082	.438	.662
		Is the Actor quoted? Dependent	.042	.104	.397	.692
		Is the Actor Muslim? Dependent	.031	.088	.346	.730
	Goodman and Kruskal tau	Is the Actor quoted? Dependent	.027	.020		.028[c]
		Is the Actor Muslim? Dependent	.020	.015		.005[c]
	Uncertainty Coefficient	Symmetric	.017	.012	1.359	.027[d]
		Is the Actor quoted? Dependent	.020	.015	1.359	.027[d]
		Is the Actor Muslim? Dependent	.015	.011	1.359	.027[d]

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

c. Based on chi-square approximation

d. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.164	.028
	Cramer's V	.164	.028
	Contingency Coefficient	.162	.028
N of Valid Cases		265	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Chi-Square test 2: 'Is Actor 2 quoted?' by variable 'Is Actor 2 Muslim?'

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	11.931[a]	2	.003
Likelihood Ratio	12.461	2	.002
Linear-by-Linear Association	.999	1	.318
N of Valid Cases	252		

a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.82.

Directional Measures

			Value	Asymp. Std. Error[a]	Approx. T[b]	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Lambda	Symmetric	.000	.000	.[c]	.[c]
		Is the Actor quoted? Dependent	.000	.000	.[c]	.[c]
		Is the actor Muslim? Dependent	.000	.000	.[c]	.[c]
	Goodman and Kruskal tau	Is the Actor quoted? Dependent	.047	.025		.003[d]
		Is the actor Muslim? Dependent	.040	.021		.000[d]
	Uncertainty Coefficient	Symmetric	.033	.018	1.826	.002[e]
		Is the Actor quoted? Dependent	.039	.021	1.826	.002[e]
		Is the actor Muslim? Dependent	.029	.016	1.826	.002[e]

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

c. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero.

d. Based on chi-square approximation

e. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.218	.003
	Cramer's V	.218	.003
	Contingency Coefficient	.213	.003
N of Valid Cases		252	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Appendix 3

Chi-Square test 3: 'Islamic agency' by the occurrence of 'Terrorism'

Is Islam cited as a factor? * Terrorist/ism included? Crosstabulation

			Terrorist/ism included?		
			Yes	No	Total
Is Islam cited as a factor?	Yes	Count	37	121	158
		Expected Count	25.2	132.8	158.0
	No	Count	7	111	118
		Expected Count	18.8	99.2	118.0
Total		Count	44	232	276
		Expected Count	44.0	232.0	276.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	15.412[b]	1	.000		
Continuity Correction[a]	14.135	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	17.053	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	15.356	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	276				

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table

b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.81.

Directional Measures

			Value	Asymp. Std. Error[a]	Approx. T[b]	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Lambda	Symmetric	.000	.000	.[c]	.[c]
		Is Islam cited as a factor? Dependent	.000	.000	.[c]	.[c]
		Terrorist/ism included? Dependent	.000	.000	.[c]	.[c]
	Goodman and Kruskal tau	Is Islam cited as a factor? Dependent	.056	.022		.000[d]
		Terrorist/ism included? Dependent	.056	.023		.000[d]
	Uncertainty Coefficient	Symmetric	.055	.024	2.239	.000[e]
		Is Islam cited as a factor? Dependent	.045	.020	2.239	.000[e]
		Terrorist/ism included? Dependent	.070	.030	2.239	.000[e]

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

c. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero.

d. Based on chi-square approximation

e. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.236	.000
	Cramer's V	.236	.000
	Contingency Coefficient	.230	.000
N of Valid Cases		276	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Appendix 4

Chi-square test 4: Islam represented as 'separate vs interacting' by variable 'Is Islam cited as a factor?'

			Is Islam cited as a factor?		
			Yes	No	Total
Represented as: separate/interacting	Separate	Count	152	4	156
		Expected Count	130.2	25.8	156.0
	Interacting	Count	6	0	6
		Expected Count	5.0	1.0	6.0
	No response	Count	44	36	80
		Expected Count	66.8	13.2	80.0
Total		Count	202	40	242
		Expected Count	202.0	40.0	242.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	70.241[a]	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	69.688	2	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	67.568	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	242		

a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .99.

Directional Measures

			Value	Asymp. Std. Error[a]	Approx. T[b]	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Lambda	Symmetric	.254	.034	5.351	.000
		Represented as: separate/interacting Dependent	.372	.058	5.351	.000
		Is Islam cited as a factor? Dependent	.000	.000	.[c]	.[c]
	Goodman and Kruskal tau	Represented as: separate/interacting Dependent	.259	.047		.000[d]
		Is Islam cited as a factor? Dependent	.290	.057		.000[d]
	Uncertainty Coefficient	Symmetric	.242	.049	4.637	.000[e]
		Represented as: separate/interacting Dependent	.194	.042	4.637	.000[e]
		Is Islam cited as a factor? Dependent	.321	.060	4.637	.000[e]

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

c. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero.

d. Based on chi-square approximation

e. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.539	.000
	Cramer's V	.539	.000
	Contingency Coefficient	.474	.000
N of Valid Cases		242	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Chi-square test 5: Islam represented as 'inferior vs. equal' by variable 'Is Islam cited as a factor?'

			Is Islam cited as a factor?		
			Yes	No	Total
Represented as: inferior/equal	Inferior	Count	151	5	156
		Expected Count	130.2	25.8	156.0
	Equal	Count	18	3	21
		Expected Count	17.5	3.5	21.0
	No response	Count	33	32	65
		Expected Count	54.3	10.7	65.0
Total		Count	202	40	242
		Expected Count	202.0	40.0	242.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	70.531[a]	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	65.435	2	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	68.303	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	242		

a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.47.

Directional Measures

			Value	Asymp. Std. Error[a]	Approx. T[b]	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Lambda	Symmetric	.214	.036	4.631	.000
		Represented as: inferior/equal Dependent	.314	.059	4.631	.000
		Is Islam cited as a factor? Dependent	.000	.000	.[c]	.[c]
	Goodman and Kruskal tau	Represented as: inferior/equal Dependent	.217	.044		.000[d]
		Is Islam cited as a factor? Dependent	.291	.064		.000[d]
	Uncertainty Coefficient	Symmetric	.209	.047	4.270	.000[e]
		Represented as: inferior/equal Dependent	.159	.038	4.270	.000[e]
		Is Islam cited as a factor? Dependent	.302	.063	4.270	.000[e]

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

c. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero.

d. Based on chi-square approximation

e. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.540	.000
	Cramer's V	.540	.000
	Contingency Coefficient	.475	.000
N of Valid Cases		242	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Chi-square test 6: Islam represented as 'enemy vs. partner' by variable 'Is Islam cited as a factor?'

			Is Islam cited as a factor?		
			Yes	No	Total
Represented as: enemy/partner	Enemy	Count	145	2	147
		Expected Count	122.7	24.3	147.0
	Partner	Count	12	0	12
		Expected Count	10.0	2.0	12.0
	No response	Count	45	38	83
		Expected Count	69.3	13.7	83.0
Total		Count	202	40	242
		Expected Count	202.0	40.0	242.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	78.375[a]	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	81.362	2	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	73.496	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	242		

a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.98.

Directional Measures

			Value	Asymp. Std. Error[a]	Approx. T[b]	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Lambda	Symmetric	.267	.029	6.116	.000
		Represented as: enemy/partner Dependent	.379	.052	6.116	.000
		Is Islam cited as a factor? Dependent	.000	.000	.[c]	.[c]
	Goodman and Kruskal tau	Represented as: enemy/partner Dependent	.264	.039		.000[d]
		Is Islam cited as a factor? Dependent	.324	.055		.000[d]
	Uncertainty Coefficient	Symmetric	.265	.046	5.347	.000[e]
		Represented as: enemy/partner Dependent	.205	.039	5.347	.000[e]
		Is Islam cited as a factor? Dependent	.375	.056	5.347	.000[e]

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

c. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero.

d. Based on chi-square approximation

e. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.569	.000
	Cramer's V	.569	.000
	Contingency Coefficient	.495	.000
N of Valid Cases		242	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Chi-square test 7: 'Islam vs. the West represented as natural or problematic' by variable 'Is Islam cited as a factor?'

			Is Islam cited as a factor?		
			Yes	No	Total
Islam vs the west: natural/problematic	Natural	Count	128	1	129
		Expected Count	107.7	21.3	129.0
	Problematic	Count	9	1	10
		Expected Count	8.3	1.7	10.0
	No response	Count	65	38	103
		Expected Count	86.0	17.0	103.0
Total		Count	202	40	242
		Expected Count	202.0	40.0	242.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	54.473[a]	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	63.155	2	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	53.708	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	242		

a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.65.

Directional Measures

			Value	Asymp. Std. Error[a]	Approx. T[b]	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Lambda	Symmetric	.242	.026	6.408	.000
		Islam vs the west: natural/problematic Dependent	.327	.045	6.408	.000
		Is Islam cited as a factor? Dependent	.000	.000	.[c]	.[c]
	Goodman and Kruskal tau	Islam vs the west: natural/problematic Dependent	.198	.030		.000[d]
		Is Islam cited as a factor? Dependent	.225	.041		.000[d]
	Uncertainty Coefficient	Symmetric	.204	.038	5.059	.000[e]
		Islam vs the west: natural/problematic Dependent	.157	.032	5.059	.000[e]
		Is Islam cited as a factor? Dependent	.291	.047	5.059	.000[e]

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

c. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero.

d. Based on chi-square approximation

e. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.474	.000
	Cramer's V	.474	.000
	Contingency Coefficient	.429	.000
N of Valid Cases		242	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Appendix 5

Chi-square test 8: 'Is Actor 1 quoted?' by variable 'Is Actor 1 Muslim?'

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	13.371[a]	2	.001
Likelihood Ratio	13.381	2	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.084	1	.298
N of Valid Cases	1498		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 80.75.

Directional Measures

			Value	Asymp. Std. Error[a]	Approx. T[b]	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Lambda	Symmetric	.000	.000	.[c]	.[c]
		Is Actor 1 quoted? Dependent	.000	.000	.[c]	.[c]
		Is source 1 Muslim? Dependent	.000	.000	.[c]	.[c]
	Goodman and Kruskal tau	Is Actor 1 quoted? Dependent	.009	.005		.001[d]
		Is source 1 Muslim? Dependent	.006	.003		.000[d]
	Uncertainty Coefficient	Symmetric	.005	.003	1.833	.001[e]
		Is Actor 1 quoted? Dependent	.007	.004	1.833	.001[e]
		Is source 1 Muslim? Dependent	.004	.002	1.833	.001[e]

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

c. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero.

d. Based on chi-square approximation

e. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.094	.001
	Cramer's V	.094	.001
	Contingency Coefficient	.094	.001
N of Valid Cases		1498	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Chi-square test 9: 'Is Actor 2 quoted?' by variable 'Is Actor 2 Muslim?'

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	15.954[a]	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	16.430	2	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.954	1	.026
N of Valid Cases	1438		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 56.00.

Directional Measures

			Value	Asymp. Std. Error[a]	Approx. T[b]	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Lambda	Symmetric	.000	.000	.[c]	.[c]
		Is Actor 2 quoted? Dependent	.000	.000	.[c]	.[c]
		Is source 2 Muslim? Dependent	.000	.000	.[c]	.[c]
	Goodman and Kruskal tau	Is Actor 2 quoted? Dependent	.011	.005		.000[d]
		Is source 2 Muslim? Dependent	.006	.003		.000[d]
	Uncertainty Coefficient	Symmetric	.007	.004	2.064	.000[e]
		Is Actor 2 quoted? Dependent	.011	.005	2.064	.000[e]
		Is source 2 Muslim? Dependent	.006	.003	2.064	.000[e]

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

c. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero.

d. Based on chi-square approximation

e. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.105	.000
	Cramer's V	.105	.000
	Contingency Coefficient	.105	.000
N of Valid Cases		1438	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

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For ease of reference, this bibliography is structured into three sections. The first collects and lists books, book chapters and peer reviewed articles; the second lists articles taken from the Internet (complete with URL and the date they were consulted) and informal sources such as unpublished articles and conference papers; and the third section lists texts included in newspapers and other 'non-reviewed' periodicals. Authors are listed alphabetically throughout and different (academic) works published by the same author in the same year are accompanied with a letter. (In the case of van Dijk (1999a; 1999b), the second article is published on the Internet and hence cited in the second bibliographic section.)

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