

**Violent Crime and Fragility:**

*A Study On Violent Offending Among Children and Young People in Yemen*

Alexandra Lewis  
PhD in Post-war Recovery Studies  
Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit  
Department of Politics  
University of York  
December 2012



## **Abstract**

This thesis examines the relationship between violent young offending that has no clear political motive and state fragility. It does so by conducting an in-depth evaluation of crime, underdevelopment and crime control systems in Yemen, using existing theories of criminology and international development to suggest new ways of understanding and responding to violent criminal behaviour in that country and elsewhere. While one of the stated goals of this thesis is to generate new theoretical understandings of criminal violence in Yemen, its main contribution to knowledge is that it brings criminological theory into the discourse on international socio-economic underdevelopment in order to open up a new conduit for the academic analysis of fragility. In so doing, it merges criminological theory with the study of international development and state fragility, where the two academic disciplines have previously remained quite separate.

The above aims are achieved through an extensive study of the Yemeni development context, based upon a combination of field research interviews conducted with prominent stakeholders in Yemen, distance research by phone and online conducted with Yemeni stakeholders, and expert consultations conducted with important analysts working either on Yemen directly or more broadly in the area of security and justice reform. The research itself, meanwhile, also provides a detailed overview of relevant theory and literature on criminology, justice reform and state fragility, while being supported by Yemeni criminal justice statistics.

In light of the theoretical emphasis of this investigation, the findings of this thesis are suggestive rather than empirical. The author argues that the absence of state services, legitimate opportunities and socialising activities for young people, along with their exposure to significant levels of violence, produces extreme economic, psychological and socio-cultural stresses that lead to their increased aggression and rejection of state legitimacy, all of which combine to raise the likelihood of violent young offending in Yemen. It is argued that these trends yield a coherent analytical framework with relevant lessons for other fragile states, notwithstanding that Yemen's cultural specificities and tribal communities have produced unique influences that distinguish it from other fragile settings.

## Table of Contents

Abstract.....	1
Table of Contents.....	2
List of Illustrations .....	7
Acknowledgements .....	10
Declaration.....	11
Introduction.....	12
i. The Operational Context of Fragile States.....	18
ii. Problem Statement.....	21
iii. Purpose of the Investigation.....	23
iv. Research Questions .....	24
iv.1. Question 1 .....	24
iv.2. Question 2 .....	24
iv.3 Question 3 .....	25
iv.4 Question 4 .....	25
iv.5 Question 5 .....	25
v. Research Strategy and Methods .....	26
vi. Case Study Selection.....	30
vii. Key Findings .....	32
viii. Important Terms .....	33
viii.1. Children and Young People .....	33
viii.2. Fragile State .....	35
viii.3. Violent Crime and Offences Against the Person .....	37
ix. Overview .....	39
Chapter 1: Methodology.....	40
1.1 Introduction.....	40
1.2 Theoretical Framework.....	41
1.2.1 Aim .....	42
1.2.2 Objectives.....	42

1.2.2 Research Questions and Hypothesis.....	43
1.2.3 Case Study Selection .....	46
1.2.4 Research Methods .....	46
1.2.5 Analytical Structure .....	46
1.3 Theoretical Approach .....	47
1.3.1 Principle Theories Used to Produce the Hypothesis .....	47
1.3.2 Supplementary Theoretical Approaches.....	51
1.4 Literature Reviews and Desk-Based Research .....	52
1.5 Data Sources .....	55
1.5.1 Data Coverage.....	56
1.5.2 Reporting .....	57
1.5.3 Data Limitations .....	58
1.6 Field Work .....	58
1.6.1 Ethical Framework for Field Work Conducted .....	59
1.6.2 Training and Preparation, Including Research into Crime Causation .....	59
1.6.3 Yemen Field Work.....	61
1.7 Expert Consultations.....	64
1.8 Distance Research .....	67
1.7.1 Ethical Framework for Distance Research Conducted.....	68
1.7.2 Telephone Interviews and Online Surveys .....	69
1.9 Peer Review .....	76
1.10 Methodological Limitations and Conclusions.....	77
 Chapter 2: The Yemeni Context.....	 78
2.1 Introduction.....	78
2.2 The Evolution of the Contemporary Yemeni State Through Unity and Civil War.....	79
2.3 Geographic Characteristics and Demographic Composition .....	84
2.4 War and Conflict in Yemen .....	87
2.4.1 The Sa'ada Wars .....	87
2.4.2 The Secessionist Movement .....	94
2.4.3 Regional Security, Piracy and Terrorism.....	96
2.4.4 The Arab Spring.....	98
2.5 Resource Competition and Poverty .....	105
2.6 Social Inequality and Lack of Access to Basic Services .....	110

2.7 Conclusion.....	113
Chapter 3: Crime in Yemen.....	115
3.1 Introduction.....	115
3.2 Data Sources .....	117
3.3 Defining Crime in Yemen .....	118
3.4 The Extent of Crime in Yemen.....	119
3.5 Trends in Crime.....	122
3.6 Characteristics of Offenders .....	125
3.7 Young Offending.....	126
3.8 Gender-Based Violence .....	129
3.9 The Proliferation of Criminogenic Commodities .....	130
3.10 Organised Crime.....	131
3.11 Corruption .....	134
3.12 Summary of Important Findings.....	135
Chapter 4: Existing Theories of Crime and Social Control and Their Relevance for Fragile States .....	137
4.1 Introduction.....	137
4.2 Crime Causation .....	142
4.2.1 Substance Abuse and Exposure to Addictive Substances .....	142
4.2.2 Community Causes.....	147
4.2.3 Family-Based Causes.....	151
4.2.4 School-Based Causes.....	154
4.2.5 Economic and Labour Market Causes.....	157
4.2.6 Judicial and Law Enforcement Causes.....	161
4.3 Social Control.....	164
4.3.1 Theories of Social Constructionism and Social Control .....	164
4.3.2 Social Learning Theory .....	167
4.3.3 Theories of Legitimacy and Cooperation .....	169
4.4 Conclusion.....	173
Chapter 5: Yemeni Systems of Crime Prevention and Control .....	175
5.1 Introduction.....	175

5.2 The Yemeni Justice System.....	176
5.2.1 Laws .....	177
5.2.2 Judicial Structures .....	181
5.2.3 The Justice Process.....	184
5.2.4 Law Enforcement .....	188
5.2.5 The Prison System.....	190
5.3 Tribalism and Self-Administration .....	192
5.6 Conclusion.....	194
Chapter 6: Understanding Violent Young Offending in Yemen and Other Fragile States.....	196
6.1 Introduction.....	196
6.2 Conflict Causation.....	196
6.3 State Fragility.....	204
6.4 The Impact of Conflict and State Fragility on Children and Young People .....	211
6.5 The Situation of Children and Young People in Yemen.....	214
6.6 Violent Young Offending in Fragile States.....	218
6.7 Peripheral Causes of Criminality in Fragile States .....	229
6.7.1 Youth Isolation .....	229
6.7.2 Violent Socialisation.....	230
6.7.3 State Infrastructural Weakness.....	231
6.8 Conclusion.....	232
Chapter 7: Current and Recommended Pathways for the Improvement of Crime Prevention and Social Control in Yemen .....	234
7.1 Introduction.....	234
7.2 Implications and Recommendations for Alternative Systems of Social Control.....	235
7.2.1 Education and Employment .....	236
7.2.2 Social Welfare and Psychosocial Support Structures.....	239
7.2.3 Community-Building, Leisure and Recreation.....	241
7.3 Recommendations for Improved Crime Control .....	243
7.4 Recommendations for State Building and Bilateral Aid.....	245
7.4 Conclusion.....	246
Chapter 8: Conclusion .....	248

8.1 Introduction.....	248
8.2 Answering the Five Research Questions .....	250
8.3 Main Contribution .....	255
8.4 Emerging Challenges and Concerns.....	256
8.5 Policy Recommendations .....	259
8.6 Recommendations for Researchers of International Development and Post-war Recovery Studies.....	261
8.7 Key Challenges and Limitations of the Investigation .....	261
8.8 Suggestions for Further Work.....	262
Annex 1: Reported Global Crime Rates.....	264
Annex 2: Table of Important Data .....	265
Bibliography .....	271

## List of Illustrations

### Figures

Figure 1 Offence Incidence Rates and Their Relationship with Human Development Index Rankings	13
Figure 2 Middle to Low Income Countries, Ranked According to Their Human Development Index Rankings	15
Figure 3 State Fragility and Social Cohesion	18
Figure 4 The Historical Approach to Development	26
Figure 5 The Indicator-Based Approach to Development	26
Figure 6 The Post-Modern Approach to Development	27
Figure 7 Approaches to Development Studies	28
Figure 8 View Over Sana'a's Historic City Centre	31
Figure 9 Young Yemeni merchants pack up their stalls at the end of a market day	34
Figure 10 Theoretical Framework	42
Figure 11 View of Sana'a City Centre, Yemen	43
Figure 12 Principal Theoretical Approach Used	47
Figure 13 Integrated Theoretical Approach	51
Figure 14 The Narrowing of The Research Focus Through Consecutive Literature Reviews	53
Figure 15 Systematic Literature Review and Desk-Based Research Phases	55
Figure 16 Security Sector Reform and Urban Violence Expert Consultation Question Clusters	67
Figure 17 Distance Research Respondent Ages	72
Figure 18 Demographics and Important Information Given by the 61 Survey and Telephone Interview Respondents	76
Figure 19 The Division Between North and South Yemen	80
Figure 20 1993 Election Results	82
Figure 21 Yemen and Its Geographic Position	84
Figure 22 Yemen's Twenty-One Governorates	85
Figure 23 Actual and Estimated Population Growth in Yemen, 1994-2014	86
Figure 24 Areas Affected by Fighting During the Sa'ada Wars	88
Figure 25 Timeline of the Sa'ada Conflict	92
Figure 26 Areas Affected by Secessionist Protests Since 2007	95
Figure 27 Areas Suspected to Contain AQAP and Ansar al Sharia Fighters in 2012	97
Figure 28 2011 Arab Spring Affected Countries, Highlighting Tunisia as the Point of Origin, and Yemen as the Case-Study Country	99
Figure 29 View Over Sana'a City Centre	102
Figure 30 The Al Saleh Mosque - Yemen's Largest Mosque, Built on the Outskirts of Sana'a by President Saleh in 2008 and Named After His Family	105
Figure 31 Yemeni woman carries grain from market in Sana'a	108
Figure 32 Yemeni girl works a vegetable garden in Sana'a	111

Figure 33 Yemeni boy minds a stall in the centre of Sana'a .....	112
Figure 34 Jambiyah - Curved knives worn by Yemeni men as a symbol of male honour .....	115
Figure 35 Registered Crimes Against the Person as a Percentage of the Total Number of Registered Crime in Yemen.....	119
Figure 36 Crime in Yemeni Governorates for 2009 .....	120
Figure 37 Reported Violent Crime in Yemen for 2009.....	121
Figure 38 All Offences Reported in 2009 .....	123
Figure 39 Recorded Morality Offences in 2009 .....	124
Figure 40 Recorded Crimes Against Public Interest for 2009 .....	125
Figure 41 Yemeni Prison Population Demographics in 2009.....	126
Figure 42 Criminal Cases Where Culprits Were Tried as Juveniles and Adults.....	127
Figure 43 Reported Juvenile Offending in Yemen, 2009 .....	128
Figure 44 Irregular Migration Into and Out of Yemen .....	133
Figure 45 Theories of Crime and Social Control, and How They Analyse Influences on Human Behaviour .....	138
Figure 46 Levels of Explanation Adopted by Theories of Crime Causation .....	141
Figure 47 Causes of Crime and Offending, as Identified by the Inmates of Hydebank Wood .....	143
Figure 48 Economic Explanations of Substance Abuse-Based Criminogenic Risk Factors .....	145
Figure 49 Physiological/Psychological Explanations of Substance Abuse-Based Criminogenic Risk Factors.....	146
Figure 50 Community-Based Risk Factors for Criminal Activity.....	148
Figure 51 The Impact of Family Life on Juvenile Delinquency .....	151
Figure 52 Socialisation-Founded Explanations of Family-Based Criminogenic Risk Factors .....	152
Figure 53 The Impact of Childhood Experiences and Behaviour on Future Criminal Activity .....	154
Figure 54 Positive and Negative School-Based Influences on Child Development.....	156
Figure 55 Positive Labour Market Social Influences .....	159
Figure 56 Negative Labour Market Social Influences .....	160
Figure 57 The Process of Deviance Construction Through Social Grouping and Blocked Social Integration .....	164
Figure 58 Social Learning Theory and the Learning of Violent Behaviour Through Observation.....	168
Figure 59 Instrumental Factors and Social Norms Necessary to Generate Cooperation with Law Enforcement Services at the Community Level .....	172
Figure 60 Yemeni Police Officers Patrolling Busy Market Square, Sana'a, Historic City Centre.....	176
Figure 61 The Yemeni Prosecution Process .....	187
Figure 62 Market Scene, Sana'a City Centre.....	188
Figure 63 Traffic Officer Working in Central Sana'a.....	189
Figure 64 Tribal Composition of Yemen.....	192
Figure 65 Yemeni Man Wearing Tribal Clothes .....	193
Figure 66 State Fragility as a Measure of Capacity and Political Will .....	206
Figure 67 State Fragility and Social Cohesion .....	209
Figure 68 State Fragility as a Measure of Capacity and Political Will .....	210
Figure 69 State Fragility as a Product of Poor State Capacity, High Social Fragmentation and Poor Political Integration.....	210
Figure 70 Two Young Street Vendors, Sana'a City Centre .....	214

Figure 71 World Health Organisation Yemen Health Profile Table of Under-5 Mortality Causes for 2011 .....	215
Figure 72 Causes of Crime Versus Causes of Conflict in Fragile States.....	218
Figure 73 Countries Listed According to Their Multidimensional Poverty Index Value .....	221
Figure 74 Countries Listed According to Their GDP per Capita in Purchasing Power Parity .....	221
Figure 75 Countries Listed According to Income Inequality .....	223
Figure 76 Map of Reported Violent Crime in Yemen for 2009. ....	224
Figure 77 Young Yemeni Merchant, Sana'a City Centre .....	225
Figure 78 State Fragility and Youth Aggression .....	227
Figure 79 Central and Peripheral Causes of Criminality and Violent Young Offending in Fragile States .....	229
Figure 80 A Balanced Way Forward For The Yemeni State .....	235
Figure 81 Yemeni Merchants Working in Central Sana'a .....	238
Figure 82 Yemeni Youth Wearing an Arsenal Football T-Shirt.....	242
Figure 83 Anatomy of Theory of Violent Young Offending in Fragile States Put Forward By This Thesis .....	256
Figure 84 The Youth Crime Curve .....	257

## Tables

Table 1 Key human development indicators in the Western world .....	20
Table 2 Key human development indicators in fragile states.....	21
Table 3 Source Evaluation Processes .....	54
Table 4 Stakeholders Consulted in Sana'a, Yemen, During the Field Research Stage .....	62
Table 5 Standardised Research Questions Used for Foreign Expert Consultations .....	65
Table 6 Standardised Research Questions Used for Yemeni Expert Consultations.....	66
Table 7 Standardised Research Questions Used in Distance Research .....	74
Table 8 Credited and Discredited Survey Data, Translated From Arabic.....	75
Table 9 The Distribution by Governorate of Aggregate Urban and Rural Poverty Rates and Offences Against the Person as a Percentage of Total Recorded Crime in 2009.....	122
Table 10 Ratification Status of Human Rights Conventions in Yemen .....	178
Table 11 Under 5 Mortality Rates in Fragile States and Most Developed Countries .....	212
Table 12 Child Welfare and Development Indicators for Yemen .....	216
Table 13 Important Criminological Dynamics in Fragile States .....	220

## **Acknowledgements**

This thesis is the product of almost four years of work that would not have been possible without the help and support of certain key individuals. I would like to take this opportunity to thank them for all of their efforts and assistance. Firstly, I would like to acknowledge the assistance of my supervisors, Professors Sultan Barakat and Matt Matravers. Secondly, I would like to thank Mr Steven Zyck, Dr Timothy Stanton and Dr David Connolly who helped me to reach my academic and research goals.

Professor Barakat also proved instrumental in allowing me to gain access to Yemen for my field work. To this end, I would, thirdly, like to thank the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit for including me in their research team and enabling me to gain access to high level dignitaries of the Yemeni Government, and I would like to thank Miss Rana Arafat, my translator, for enabling me to gain access to my grass-roots level interviewees and survey respondents, along with the Network of Yemeni Scholars. Other people who deserve special credit for facilitating expert consultations in 2011 and 2012 include Kate Nevens of Chatham House and Georgina Yeates of the British Department for International Development.

To everybody who participated in my research and who gave up their time to help me, I would also like to say thank you. Special thanks here go to Nicholas Hopton, British Ambassador to Yemen, Danniell Shimmin, Yemen Governance Advisor for the Department of International Development, Atiaf Alwazir of Woman in Yemen, and Husam al-Shurjabi of the Yemen Civic Coalition of Revolutionary Youth.

Finally, I would like to thank my peers for their support on this project, particularly Katherine Bishop, Anna Larson and Kathryn Rzeszut. I would also like to distinguish Jane Boyle, my primary proof-reader. Above all, I would like to acknowledge my family, my parents, Julian and Yelena Lewis, and my partner, Philip Gamlin, without whose continuous belief in this project and support I would never have succeeded.

## **Declaration**

I hereby declare that I have read and understood the University of York's regulations on plagiarism and academic misconduct. I undertake that all of the material presented for examination within this thesis is my own work, and that it has not been written in whole or in part by any other person but myself. I also confirm that any references to other published or unpublished works by any other person or people have been acknowledged and dully credited within this study.

---

Alexandra Lewis

## Introduction

Recent years have seen the emergence of multiple of analytical frameworks within the field of international development, aimed at understanding and classifying countries according to the economic, social and political challenges that they face. They have underscored the severe development gaps that have emerged between the world's richest and poorest states. The World Bank's *Country Policy and Institutional Assessment*, Carleton University's *Country Indicators for Foreign Policy*, and the American Political Science Association's *Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability* are but some examples. Yet while many of these tools highlight economic indicators and country progress towards meeting the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, for instance, international attention to state fragility and complex emergencies has also demonstrated a growing interest in international security, whereby Western fears of terrorism in particular have prompted a broad "securitisation" of development assistance packages in line with the objectives set out by the American-led War on Terror (Mark Duffield, 2002).

The 2011 *World Development Report* summarises that the "global system" of international aid is centred on a "paradigm of conflict", whereby both national and international actors – in development, diplomacy and humanitarianism – have become chiefly concerned with providing states with the means and capabilities to overcome civil war through increased prosperity and dispute resolution (World Bank, p. 2). This view, writes the World Bank, prioritises violence and conflict as an inherent cause of underdevelopment, but does not take into account the reality that such an approach is no longer suited to addressing a new mould of "21st century violence".


The 2000s and early 2010s have thus far proven to be a fluctuating and continuously evolving period in which, due to "successes in reducing interstate war, the remaining forms of conflict and violence do not fit neatly either into 'war' or 'peace,' or into 'criminal violence' or 'political violence'" (World Bank, 2011, p. 2). In particular, a prioritisation of political violence, insurgency and terrorism in international development and stabilisation strategies (a prioritisation that has emerged due to the very important role that these phenomena play in prolonging complex emergencies in accordance with Paul Collier's "conflict trap" model (2003)) has meant that more common forms of social and criminal violence have been overlooked in multiple fragile contexts, as they have been in Yemen – the primary case study of this thesis.

Yet even a brief examination of global comparative criminologies reveals statistical trends that ought to prove interesting to researchers of international development. The seventh *United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems* indicates that, on average, economically stable and developed countries seem to suffer from significantly higher recorded rates of crime per capita than so-termed "fragile states" (2005). Countries like New Zealand, Finland, Denmark, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Netherlands, in particular, showed the highest rates of total crime per capita among surveyed countries. In 2005, New Zealand occupied second place on the list with a rate of 105,881 offences committed per 1,000 people, while the United States had, at 11,877,218, the highest number of total recorded offences.

Meanwhile, Yemen, an extremely poor country with multiple conflicts and dwindling natural resources, ranked bottom of the list with allegedly only 1.16109 crimes per 1,000 people, or approximately 24,000 offences committed yearly.

These statistics<sup>1</sup> are misleading, however, because they offer a better picture of the comparative effectiveness of crime detection capacities and positive police-community relations than they do of comparative criminologies. Countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, which are mired in a crisis of chronic insecurity and are known to have extremely high rates of kidnapping, banditry and smuggling, are not featured on the list at all due to a lack of available data (Phil Williams, 2009; Gretchen Peters and Don Rassler, 2010), while countries like New Zealand and the United States of America have much higher law enforcement capacities than Yemen, leading to a higher rate of crime reporting, detection and recording. As Rodrigo R. Soares summarises: “Reporting rates of crimes are strongly related to development” and “the positive correlation between crime and development sometimes reported is entirely caused by the use of official records” (2002, p. 156). Development itself, Soares concludes, is, therefore, “not criminogenic”.

What is more interesting to note is that, if we run a comparison through the same survey data of global homicide rates, incidence frequency related trends are instantly reversed. Relatively developed countries with otherwise very high rates of total crime per capita, like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Japan, New Zealand, Denmark and the United Kingdom are all ranked near the bottom of the list, while less prosperous states like Columbia, South Africa and Jamaica come top, Columbia having a murder rate of 0.617847 deaths per 1,000 people and Yemen moving up the chart to the 27th out of 60 positions (see Annex 1). Violent crime in general, including battery, assault and sexual abuse, tends to represent a proportionally larger percentage of total recorded offences in least developed countries than it does in developed ones. While records show crime rates to be lower in fragile states, the severity of the crimes that they do exhibit is substantially higher than elsewhere.



**Figure 1 Offence Incidence Rates and Their Relationship with Human Development Index Rankings**

<sup>1</sup> For a complete breakdown of rates of offending per country per capita, please see Annex 1.


In charting crime trends against development through each country's official data, a more-or-less consistent positive correlation emerges, with only a few deviations. However, a correlation of violent crime trends as a percentage of total crime against development (approximated from the same survey) would yield a directly opposite result, so that total recorded general offences would increase in number as economic development increases, while violent offences would decrease<sup>2</sup>. The chart above (Figure 1) does just that, using the 2005 *Human Development Index* to rank countries according to their position in the index, with 1 being most developed and 57<sup>3</sup> being least developed.

The linear regressions of total recorded crime and violent offences follow the anticipated pattern. The graph illustrates not only that violent offending is high in least developed countries but also that crime detection and reporting are low, leading to an inescapable conclusion about the reliability of available data, namely: the inflated rates of violent offending in fragile states made visible by police records and surveys are likely to be masking an even greater volume of undetected violent offences, the total number of which is, logically, higher than that displayed by official statistics. This is often true of stable and developed countries where much violent offending takes place in the home and is left unreported. However, poor institutions, low rates of birth registration, lack of access to basic services, low school attendance, high unemployment and mass displacement all impact upon the ability of fragile states to monitor the well-being and survival of their citizens. This leads to a lack of detection of non-domestic crimes against the person, including murders and disappearances. Not only do fragile states tend to suffer from all of these conditions at once, but their policing capacities are often additionally undermined through negative police-community relations that diminish public confidence in official law enforcement channels and thereby lower the public reporting of offences to authorities.

---

<sup>2</sup> See lists attached in Annexes 1 and 2.

<sup>3</sup> Although the Human Development Index actually contains data for 177 countries, United Nations crime statistics are only available for 57 of them.



**Figure 2 Middle to Low Income Countries, Ranked According to Their Human Development Index Rankings**

Taking only those middle and low development status states from the *Human Development Index* with available data on murder and crime rates, Figure 2<sup>4</sup> illustrates that, with the exception of a high South African spike in homicides (as likely caused by racial violence (Michael Neocosmos, 2008)), there is a continuous increase in murder rates in least developed states, as can be correlated with a slight but steady decrease in GDP per capita in purchasing power parity<sup>5</sup>. This continuous increase in murder represents a steady proportional increase of homicide as a percentage of total recorded offences.

Those few statistics that fragile states are able to make available show a much higher incidence rate of social violence and political violence than that exhibited by more economically developed or stable countries. As the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development notes: “homicidal violence and violent crime” as well as “armed violence disproportionately [affect] low- and middle-income countries”, whereby “The human costs of armed violence” include the destruction of “lives and livelihoods, ... education, health and social services, ... social and human capital”, resulting in “high economic costs owing to years of lost productivity” (2009, pp. 28-29). What is interesting is that a large proportion of this violence is classed as “mindless”<sup>6</sup>, in that it is committed without a clearly discernible economic or political motive. Yet what is more disturbing is the reality that much of this mindless violence is committed by children and young people under the age of 18, suggesting that something is impacting their cognitive development in a way that makes

<sup>4</sup> Values used to compile this graph are taken from the *Human Development Index* values for 2008.

<sup>5</sup> For more statistical comparisons between crime and socio-economic development trends, please see Chapter 5 and Annex 2.

<sup>6</sup> As argued in section viii.3, the word “mindless” is used here, not to imply that violence occurs as an eruption of pure irrationality, but to engage more broadly with incidents of repeat violent offending, domestic violence, violence relating to social power negotiation on a small scale, or violence that has not been categorised by judicial systems. Above all, it is not to be used to negate the autonomy or integrity of those who commit acts of so-termed mindless violence.

criminal violence seem like an appropriate, or at least a necessary, means of communication. This has been found to be the case in Yemen, as will be argued in Chapter 3, but is also true of other states, as discussed in section ii below.

If fragile states are affected by conflict, these trends can have additional consequences by embodying the potential to disrupt peace processes, to (re-)ignite political violence, or to plunge countries into a perpetual spiral of escalating insecurity, feeding back into the causes of fragility, stalling development and regenerating violence. In many contexts, as in Iraq, Columbia and Tajikistan, the threat of violent crime has come to heavily outweigh the threat of conflict as a security challenge for both governments and their people. It has been observed that, in Guatemala and El Salvador, “the rate of killings” related to drug trafficking and drug-related violence greatly exceeds the death tolls of both countries' previous civil wars, highlighting the destabilising nature of high levels of interaction between “apolitical” violence, “mindless” violence and criminality (The Economist, 2011, p. 26). It is posited in this thesis that something about the social environment created by fragile states encourages violent behaviour among people (with young people emerging as an important demographic group among them, the average age of fragile states being generally much younger than that of the developed world) and that violence instigating risk factors are likely to have severe consequences for the long-term peaceful development of affected countries.

Despite the relevance of this subject, the impact of criminal violence on state fragility and the impact of state fragility on criminal violence have not yet been studied in sufficient detail within criminological or developmental literature, though much research is available upon the interactions between war and fragility and between poverty and crime. One issue here is definitional in nature<sup>7</sup>, whereby it is extremely difficult to analyse criminal violence, mindless violence and social violence separately from broader political violence-related phenomena in conflict-affected fragile states. The statistical challenges alone emerging from this problem have been addressed in part in this thesis through the selection of Yemen as the primary case study, because Yemen's Government already disaggregates its judicial data according to three categories of “criminal”, “political” and “moral” offences, though this system is not without its limitations<sup>8</sup>. However, other difficulties relating to the isolation of criminal behaviour in fragile contexts abound<sup>9</sup>.

Another issue that has hindered research is to do with the emergence of a seemingly untested assumption that elevated violent crime rates in fragile states can be explained by existing economic theories of crime (Soares, 2002), or by poor law-enforcement capacities, as determined by low expenditures on police services (Bourguignon, 1999, p. 15). An obvious limitation of these explanations is that they are more appropriate for an analysis of property-related, rather than violent offences or, at the very least, violent offences that are committed in the course of completing an economically-motivated crime. Using these explanations obscures the causality of social violence, increased levels of mindless or “motiveless” youth aggression, and multi-level

---

<sup>7</sup> This is argued in more detail in section vii.3

<sup>8</sup> The reliability of the Yemeni Government's system of data segregation is dealt with in more detail in section 1.5 of Chapter 1, and again in Chapter 3.

<sup>9</sup> These challenges include difficulties relating to attributing meaning to the actions of individuals on a nationwide level, as well as problems relating to the legitimacy of the researcher as an unbiased or impartial observer in this process. Some of these issues are addressed in greater detail in section v, though, ultimately, they also form a recurring theme throughout the thesis as a whole.

physical abuse in fragile states. Beyond this, the literature indicates a lack of integration of criminological theory into the development sector in general. It points to a lack of adaptation of criminological theory to the specific environment of fragile states. Criminological theory remains predominantly targeted towards more politically and economically stable environments, while international development narratives touch upon crime only with relation to insecurity and specific programming areas that include security sector reform and combatant disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.

The main contribution to knowledge that this thesis makes is to merge the two disciplines of criminology and international development in order to test the adaptability of criminological theories to fragile states, and thereby, potentially, to expand the way that youth violence is perceived within the international development sector and to add to the set of tools which are used by development practitioners to analyse and respond to this problem. This is achieved in a number of different ways, the most central of which is the process of testing existing analytical approaches within previously under-explored contexts like Yemen.

Although numerous investigations have been made by notable researchers into crime generation within given case studies (which have included violence in South Africa (Michael Neocosmos, 2008), policing in Northern Ireland (Ronald Weitzer, 1995) and narcotics cultivation and trafficking in Afghanistan (David MacDonald, 2007)), there is yet to be an attempt made to create a single unifying theory of criminology that would explain violent young offending in fragile state contexts, and that would correlate the causes of offending with the reality of state fragility.

Both fields of criminology and development have much to bring to bear upon one another within fragile states. To continue to fail to integrate the two is no longer practical, given the weight of evidence to suggest that the degree of social violence present in fragile states may be having serious consequences for the healthy cognitive development and social integration of children and young people therein. This thesis will strive to fill the void by providing an overview of existing literature and by applying it to Yemen, a least developed fragile state, in order to suggest an explanatory causal theory of violent offending among young people that may, in time, be made generalizable and exported to other fragile state contexts.

Based upon academic literature, rather than pure data, this causal theory and the claims that it contains will be suggestive rather than empirical. Seeking above all to apply existing theoretical frameworks from the fields of criminology and international development in new ways that have not been utilised before, this application and testing of existing theoretical frameworks is the primary purpose of the thesis. The main output of the study will be to experiment with the adaptability of two academic disciplines in order to pave the way for new investigations into violence and fragility.

The remainder of this introduction will now set out the parameters of this research project, explaining the operational context of fragile states more thoroughly, outlining the problem statement and research purpose, providing the work's principle research questions, explaining the case study selection process, flagging key findings, defining important terms and giving an overview of the completed document.

## i. The Operational Context of Fragile States

State fragility remains a loosely conceptualised and highly contested framework for analysing countries facing a range of institutional and political challenges<sup>10</sup>. The term has been selected for use in this thesis due to its focus upon governance, infrastructures and institutions, which allows for an analysis of nation-wide contributors to criminological environments, and potentially for development-based solutions to the problem of violent young offending in least developed countries. Yet because authors like Nick Grono contend that state fragility is consistently correlated with conflict (2010), the concept needs to be understood as a sociological phenomenon: one that is both affecting and being affected by an absence of positive relationships between communities, as well as between communities and their governments.

Sultan Barakat argues that the socio-political composition of any one functioning state can be loosely contextualised according to four main categories (*Supervisor Consultation, 19 May, 2011*), as illustrated in the graph below. He argues that while state fragility is symptomatic of state infrastructure limitations or failures, social indicators can prove equally important. According to this model, state fragility only begins to overrun countries in cases where social cohesion is weak and societies are heavily fragmented. The high level of competition for services and resources between communities and between individuals that is generated by state incapacity is likely a key determining factor for this, because governmental failures to maintain the welfare and well-being of their citizens often push them towards conflict or disagreements with each other and towards a rejection of the state, both as a service provider and as a symbol of authority. It is for these reasons that very few examples of weak states with socially cohesive societies can be found today.




Figure 3 State Fragility and Social Cohesion

It should be noted that this thesis will operate upon a fairly strict definition of state fragility, whereby only countries with weak infrastructures and fragmented societies will be considered, despite the prevalence of other frameworks<sup>11</sup>. Working on the basis of this definition, this section will offer an overview of the operational context of fragile states in order to better frame the

<sup>10</sup> This term, including the variety of definitions put forward for it in policy and academia, is analysed more extensively in Chapter 6, where the author presents their own typology of fragility as a method of analysing countries facing key development challenges that are relevant to increasing rates of violent young offending. See section 6.3 for more details.

<sup>11</sup> As above, see section 6.3.

argument of this thesis, relying upon simple descriptions of the realities faced by practitioners working in countries affected by fragility.

Fragile states provide unique operational contexts for theorists and practitioners working in the areas of justice, security and crime control because, as John Mueller writes:

When governments become weak, it is likely (almost by definition) that criminal activity will increase - not the least because prisons become insecure. And sometimes the resulting criminality will be organised enough to look like war. ... Often the government itself, or even one from a neighbouring country, can essentially become one of the criminal or warlord bands. (2004, p. 101)

Multiple studies have associated crime with development and state strength, in which governance and state authority are normally highlighted as key determining factors for the prevalence of various forms of criminal activity. For instance, Angélica Durán Martínez writes with specific relation to organised crime in Central America and the Caribbean that:

... a state that controls the monopoly on the use of force while respecting individual and collective rights is better able to deter and prevent organized crime. Such a state can control its territory, guarantee the security of its citizens, uphold its internal legal order and deliver public services to the population. (2007, p. 1)

Conversely, a state that is unable to retain a “monopoly on violence” and the use of force (as defined originally by Max Weber (1918)) while also respecting individual and collective rights will be unable to deter organised crime. “[A]ny strategy to address crime requires discussion on the roots of state crisis and on how to build state capacities” (Martínez, p. 1).

Fragility is generally considered to originate within a lack of administrative capacity, which in turn leads to an inability by the state to deliver basic services evenly and equitably to its citizens (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2008, p. 14). Such basic services include but are not limited to; education, healthcare, water and sanitation provision, social welfare and social protection, and a reasonable level of public safety, maintained through either military or law enforcement services. Under such circumstances, fragile states can experience elevated levels of social and political violence, especially when these result from conflicts over resources or from an inability by the state to respond to its citizens' demands for change. Beyond this, violence itself produces heightened levels of insecurity and disrupts service provision further, feeding back into a seemingly endless cycle of underdevelopment, a process for which Paul Collier has coined the term of “conflict trap”<sup>12</sup> (2003).

A quick overview of some key human development indicators reveals the impact of such prolonged insecurity and absences in basic services on demographics and life expectancies in fragile states. Within the developed world life expectancies at birth for a handful of countries scattered across their *Human Development Index* values range between 79 and 82 years (see Table 1). Meanwhile, their under-5 mortality rates are representative of recent advances in modern day

---

<sup>12</sup> Paul Collier's theories on the “conflict trap” are outlined in detail in Chapter 6, section 6.2. They suggest that countries that are affected by chronic conflict and underdevelopment will continually generate the conditions necessary to re-ignite fighting.

medicine and healthcare services, with only between 4 and 8 out of every 1000 children dying prematurely.

<b>Human Development Indicator</b>	<b>America</b>	<b>Canada</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Life expectancy (years) for 2010	79.6	81	81.6	80.2	79.8
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1000 people) for 2008	8	6	4	4	6
Adult literacy percentage for 2010	-	-	-	-	-
GDP per capita in US\$ for 2010	46653	39035	33103	34743	34342
Homicide rate (per 100,000 people) for 2008	5.2	1.7	1.4	0.8	4.8
Human Development Ranking for 2010	4	8	14	10	26

**Table 1 Key human development indicators in the Western world**

Within fragile states, the figures paint a very different picture (see Table 2).

<b>Human Development Indicator</b>	<b>Afghanistan</b>	<b>Somalia</b>	<b>Iraq</b>	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>Yemen</b>
Life expectancy (years) for 2010	44.6	51.2	68.5	52	63.9
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1000 people) for 2008	257	180	44	67	69
Adult literacy percentage for 2010	28	-	74.1	89.3	63.2
GDP per capita in US\$ for 2010	1419	-	-	10140	2595

Homicide rate (per 100,000 people) for 2008	-	-	-	36.5	4
Human Development Ranking for 2010	155	-	-	110	133

**Table 2 Key human development indicators in fragile states**

Here, life expectancies fall between 44 and 73 years, depending upon the context, while the under-5 mortality rate ranges between 20 and 257 deaths per 1000 children. GDP per capita in the poorest country represented, Afghanistan, amounts to only 3.04% of that recorded in the richest country featured in the previous table, America. These contrasts are startling, though they are to be expected in countries like Yemen, for instance, where roughly 60% of the population was believed to be living below the poverty line in 2011, many of whom were cut off from food, fuel and fresh water supplies as the Arab Spring hit the country (Sadeq Al-Wesabi, 2011). It is for these reasons and others that fragile states are to be treated differently from countries within the developed world, so that a unique theory of crime causation within such contexts has become necessary in the quest to generate solutions to their specific challenges.

## **ii. Problem Statement**

While the elevated crime rates exhibited by fragile states are not in and of themselves surprising within such backgrounds of conflict and extreme underdevelopment (contexts that are usually marked by a breakdown of governmental law enforcement services and a resulting escalation of opportunistic behaviour): the high incidence rate of violent crime among populations experiencing fragility and the high rate of violent crime committed by children and young people within such contexts is unsettling. Social control theories pertaining to legitimacy and cooperation<sup>13</sup> suggest that even after policing services are removed from most cultural settings, certain social constraints<sup>14</sup> usually serve to keep crime rates low. It is speculated, for instance, that most normally socialised community members would not immediately commit murder or deliberately harm their neighbours purely because they had no reasonable expectation of getting caught and being punished for their actions. The desire to cause others harm through mere opportunism would ordinarily be associated with psychopathy or other similar psychological disorders that are not common in the general population<sup>15</sup>, where, in actuality, even “the majority of psychopaths are not criminals” (Paul Babiak *et al*, 2010). Morality, ethics, a sense of community and simple empathy help to reduce violent behaviour in most contexts even when policing is absent. A necessary conclusion is that fragile states produce other conditions, distinct from low law-enforcement capacity, which promote criminal behaviour and encourage violent criminal behaviour in particular.

<sup>13</sup> These theories will be outlined in detail and analysed in terms of their relevance to fragile states in Chapter 4.

<sup>14</sup> See Chapter 4, section 4.3.1. Elements of social control include an individual’s attachment to society, their commitment to their own investments in society, their involvement in activities that include labour or education, and their belief in common social and moral values.

<sup>15</sup> Paul Babiak *et al* argue that psychopathy disorders themselves are prevalent in only approximately 1% of Western civilisations (2010).

If social violence is to be discouraged and the rule of law is to be restored for the positive development of fragile states, then it is necessary to start thinking about potential theoretical explanations for crime causation in fragile state contexts. Even if such explanations are only suggestive at this stage, these theories need to be mapped onto existing law enforcement, social control and judicial structures to determine whether it is possible to improve their efficiency. More importantly, it is necessary to look at existing theoretical frameworks developed in other sectors, like that of criminology, which are geared towards explaining violent criminal behaviour among children and young people, in order to test whether these modes of explanation can help us to address serious social challenges in fragile contexts that have largely been neglected by development policies.

While much violence within fragile states can be linked to political, religious or ethnic antagonisms, and some violence can be analysed as a by-product of other forms of criminal opportunism, such as banditry, racketeering, armed robbery and theft; the root causes of a lot of other forms of social and mindless violence within such contexts are far more difficult to determine. They seem to originate from the mere positioning of children within a context of protracted insecurity. A recent video of Afghan or Pakistani children playing 'Suicide bomber', for instance, which has taken YouTube, Facebook and other websites by storm, offers one example of the degree to which such contexts of insecurity have become integrated within the everyday reality of children living in fragile states (Huffington Post, 2011). The video shows one child solemnly bidding his friends farewell before rushing to a group of boys pretending to be soldiers, jumping up and throwing dust into the air to simulate the visual effect of an explosion. When the dust clears, the video reveals the boys to be lying down on the ground, trying not to smile or laugh as they pretend to be dead. A far more harmful version of such 'war games' is played by young children in Iraq, who, as Ray Jennings summarised when interviewed by Charles Ferguson, amuse themselves by purchasing grenades at the local market and throwing them off buildings into supposedly empty alley-ways in order to witness the explosions caused, where they sometimes either inadvertently or deliberately hit people (Ferguson, 2008, p.237).

Both in Kashmir and in Iraq, playing with grenades has left several children injured or dead, often through handling defective trigger mechanisms (ABC News, 2011 and Frank, 2003). Meanwhile, in Yemen, gun misuse is a common phenomenon, whereby many children are reported to flee their homes after accidentally killing family members every year in the course of playing with guns (Integrated Regional Information Network, 2010). In South Africa, on the other hand, children are often seen to emulate gang leaders and the heads of organised crime syndicates in the course of such games, be they playing with real or toy guns.

While many of these games do not result in immediate physical harm to anybody, they indicate an inherent idealisation of violence, practitioners of violence and instruments of violence by children and young people in fragile environments, which can result in a greater reliance on violence as a means of social communication and conflict resolution later in life. What is even more troubling is when physical harm is inflicted by children upon others on purpose, which usually occurs in fragile states through fighting, bullying and more general participation in crime and conflict. It is not that fragile states are unique in facing problems of violence idealisation and escalation, but that the scale of social violence committed by young people is proportionally much greater in such countries than it is in more prosperous ones.

There are many conditions present in fragile states that could be contributing to increased violence. Existing theories of crime, fragility and conflict imply that weak governance, underdevelopment, resource competition and broad social inequality might prove to be relevant. However, such theories are poorly integrated and require extensive re-evaluation if they are to be relied upon for analysing emerging trends in criminal activity. This will form the main subject of investigation in this thesis. Political violence, which is distinct from children and young people naturally falling into aggressive and violent processes of social interaction, will not be analysed.

### **iii. Purpose of the Investigation**

The purpose of this investigation is to combine the two academic disciplines of international development and criminology and to apply them to the under-researched terrain of Yemen as a fragile state in order to generate new insights into the relationship between violent young offending and state underdevelopment.

The main contribution to knowledge made by this thesis emerges from its process of analysis, through which a wide range of theories of crime causation and social control are applied to Yemen, and contrasted with theories of conflict and fragility in order to test their applicability and to reveal their potential to expand the range of analytical tools used to understand and respond to youth violence in fragile states.

The investigation starts with the notion that international development literature and policy have been overly concerned with political violence in conflict-affected fragile states. This has resulted in a neglecting in international development literature of useful advances that have been made in other academic disciplines to address the issue of youth violence, which includes, just as importantly (if not more so), violent young offending committed without a clearly discernible political objective. Based predominantly within theoretical rather than statistical and evidentiary research, the findings of this thesis are intended to be suggestive rather than empirical. They have been collated with the aim of generating a new theoretical framework that might shed some light on the reasons for the emergence of elevated levels of apolitical youth violence and violent criminality within such contexts. Adopting a single case study approach, this thesis aims to analyse the processes of violent crime causation in Yemen, and to test established academic theories within a complex and continuously fluctuating context.

The indirect secondary purpose of this investigation is to generate a theory of violent crime causation in fragile states, a process through which the author will be able to combine and apply theoretical approaches from the fields of criminology and international development. This task is a very large one, though it is made somewhat easier by a narrower focus on offending among children and young people. This is because, as children and young people enter into various key formative periods in their lives (Anna Aszmann *et al*, 2012), the impact of fragility upon their behaviour becomes more immediately visible than it would be in fully-matured adults.

## iv. Research Questions

In order to isolate important criminogenic risk factors that are relevant to fragile states, this thesis poses five research questions relating to the development context of the countries in which children and young people offend and to the context of Yemen more specifically. The focus of these questions is intended to draw attention to the nation-wide macro-level impact of underdevelopment and fragility on crime rates, rather than to analyse the personal motivations of offenders at a micro-level through in-depth research with individuals.

### iv.1. Question 1

*How appropriate a concept is state fragility for providing a unifying framework through which low-ranking countries in the Human Development Index might be analysed in the context of similar patterns of criminality?*

At the outset of the investigation, this was the very first question that the author posed when establishing the parameters of the thesis. A number of different frameworks<sup>16</sup> were considered in terms of their benefits for framing the analysis. State fragility, due to its focus on governance processes and capacities, was deemed to be the most appropriate tool available, though its definition has been refined by the author to better suit the analysis<sup>17</sup>.

Nevertheless, the appropriateness of the state fragility framework as a tool through which to generate theories of violent young offending will form a recurring theme in this thesis, because state fragility is a hugely contested concept within the academic world, as well as in development programming. While it is true that the correlation between development and criminality is an observable phenomenon, whereby a number of socio-economic indicators within the *Human Development Index* clearly have much to bring to bear upon the nature and scale of emerging criminal activity within given contexts, there is an argument to be made that the lack of specificity within the state fragility framework and its broadly debated and varied definitions mean that any attempt to produce a comparative analysis of crime in fragile states would be extremely vulnerable to similar accusations and to an oversimplification of the emerging issues. These challenges are addressed in Chapters 5 and 8.

### iv.2. Question 2

*In what ways are fragile states different from more stable ones?*

Taking the state fragility framework as the basis of comparison for underdeveloped countries facing similar patterns of criminal activity, this question is intended to help the author to better define and frame the argument of the thesis. It is intended to provide a basis for narrowing the analysis by identifying relevant influences on nation-wide patterns of criminal behaviour in fragile states, as well as for prioritising selected influences on criminal behaviour that will be

---

<sup>16</sup> Frameworks included the World Bank's *Country Policy and Institutional Assessment*, Carleton University's *Country Indicators for Foreign Policy*, and the American Political Science Association's *Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability*, among others.

<sup>17</sup> See section viii.2 for the author's definition of fragility.

identified in the Yemeni context more specifically. Examining the common features of fragile states and using these to distinguish them from more stable or more developed countries will also allow the author to broaden the implications of the thesis' major findings, using implications for criminological and development literature gleaned from the Yemeni case study to consider more generally how governance failures impact rates of violent young offending in other fragile states.

### **iv.3 Question 3**

*What are the main causes of criminal violence in Yemen, and to what extent are these causes related to state fragility?*

This question deals with the heart of the analysis of this thesis, generating an exploratory case study of crime patterns in Yemen, and prompting an analysis of their evolution over time. In answering this question, the author strives to generate an understanding of the causes of crime in a fragile setting. This analysis will be integrated within the answers to several other research questions and will incorporate descriptive elements that will present an overview of both criminality and development in Yemen for the reader.

### **iv.4 Question 4**

*Which (if any) specific attributes of fragile states promote criminality and violent criminal behaviour among children and young people?*

Building upon the answers to questions 2 and 3, question 4 will be used to extract relevant indicators from both the Yemeni context and the state fragility framework in order to determine whether or not a unifying theory of violent young offending in fragile states is possible, and to produce the groundwork for such a theory if it is deemed to be possible. While this question could produce a broad range of answers that might be based upon the research biases of the author to varying degrees, numerous efforts have been taken in order to ensure the reliability of the emerging analysis, which will be at all times supported both by existing academic and practitioner research (produced by international organisations, think tanks, donors and local government agencies), field work, statistical data and analysis of theoretical frameworks taken from the fields of criminology and international development alike.

### **iv.5 Question 5**

*How, if at all, are the identified criminogenic attributes of fragile states mitigated by existing youth justice systems, and how can youth justice systems be better used to advance the cause of peace?*

This question will be addressed only on the basis of the findings generated by previous analyses and will also be conditional upon an exploration of the Yemeni context. Answering this question is important for both testing the applicability of any theories to emerge from the thesis and for assessing their usefulness: after all, if it is found that existing justice systems in fragile states already engage with identified risk factors successfully, then such risk factors may not in the end


prove to be as important in determining crime rates as originally assumed. If, on the other hand, justice systems have no way of engaging with identified risk factors, then the emerging theory of crime causation in fragile states will not prove useful in assisting practitioners to tackle the underlying problem. In both instances, the purpose of the theory will be heavily undermined.

The five research questions reflect within themselves the nature of the investigation. This is based within a realm of theoretical analysis and comparative study, rather than statistical evidence, though such data will be relied upon to reinforce claims and suggestions put forward in the work. The five questions will remain at the centre of the thesis throughout, and have been used in turn to generate sub-questions that were needed in order to further define chapterisation and structure. Such sub-questions are listed in the overview section of the introduction and are further expanded upon within each individual chapter of the work.

## v. Research Strategy and Methods


Although this thesis draws upon criminological theory and other bodies of literature, it is ultimately submitted as a political investigation, grounded in the discipline of post-war recovery and international development studies. Though the thesis has remained trans-disciplinary in nature, it is worth clarifying here how its strong connection to the political sciences has influenced the construction of its research strategy, and how this in turn has determined the selection of research methods.

Andy Sumner and Michael Tribe write that international development studies are largely constructed around three fundamental conceptions of change: the historical; indicator-based; and post-modern perspectives (2008). These three positions can be adapted and represented diagrammatically (*See Figures 4, 5 and 6*).




**Figure 4 The Historical Approach to Development**

The historical perspective views development as a process of long-term structural change, in which the purpose of development research is to document natural socio-economic, cultural and political evolution. Such research is ultimately non-judgemental: it is neither associated with normative valuation systems nor interested in distinguishing “good change” from “bad change”. It is, at its core, more concerned with establishing how and why changes to society occur over time.



**Figure 5 The Indicator-Based Approach to Development**

Conversely, the policy-based or indicator-based perspective is far more heavily value-laden. This is an approach adopted by international organisations like the United Nations, whereby “good change” and “bad change” is evaluated over short- to medium-term periods according to measurable progress towards development indicators like the Millennium Development Goals. Charles Gore refers to these kind of development studies as “performance assessment” research (2000), while Sumner and Tribe call this perspective “technocratic and instrumental”, where the purpose of development research is to identify the outcomes of change (2008).



**Figure 6 The Post-Modern Approach to Development**

Rejecting the legitimacy of the other two positions, the post-modern perspective situates the development researcher as a participant in the development process, whereby development influences the observer's understanding of change, and where the observer's categorisation of “good change” versus “bad change” ultimately influences the course of development. The post-modern perspective integrates the architecture of development and international intervention into conceptualisations of development, and reads development studies as a subjective discipline that heavily influences policy and practice within the world that it analyses. This view, write Sumner and Tribe, is extremely critical of what is perceived as a “dominant 'discourse' of Western modernity”, through which “Western ethnocentric notions of development” are imposed “upon the Third World” (2008, p. 14).

All three positions must be acknowledged in any study of international development, though priority needs to be given to one above the others in order to ensure logical consistency in any one research project. In this thesis, the author has prioritised the indicator-based perspective: the purpose of this thesis is not to look at the development of a fragile-state as a whole over a long period of time, but to examine the development of specific negative outcomes – the emergence of harmful anti-social behaviour patterns among children and young people over medium periods – and to deliberate upon new pathways through which these changes can be understood and addressed by the international community and within the academic world.

While maintaining this position, the author will make reference to the others, by using the impact of long-term historical development changes in order to complement her research, and by being mindful of the dangers posed by the potential impact of development research and the imposition of artificial research perspectives upon foreign cultures. The incorporation of these two strands will be evidenced by a historical analysis of Yemen in Chapter 2 and an overall commitment throughout the thesis to emphasise the importance of contextualisation in the application of theory to diverse development contexts. These adjustments form an attempt to navigate beyond an overly narrow view of state fragility, which is cited by Sumner and Tribe as a common danger of the indicator-based perspective.

These three views of international development and international development studies are translated within the political sciences into three contradictory ontological and epistemological positions, so that the prioritisation of the policy-based or indicator-based perspective by this thesis has been translated into a clear research strategy (see Figure 7).




Figure 7 Approaches to Development Studies

As indicated above, the perspective adopted by the author necessitates a realist analysis, in which, as Cassandra Bergstrøm and Elisabeth Molteberg argue, knowledge is a social construction that is influenced by the observer's perspective, but in which the aim of knowledge acquisition is to explain a single physical reality (2000). While strands of historical and post-modern analyses will be used at various junctions throughout the thesis, this reasoning will not extend to alternative ontological and epistemological positions, so that both positivist and relativist arguments are excluded from the research initiative. This approach is supported by John Martinussen's requirement that research in the social sciences must always state explicitly its ontological and epistemological background, which is the basic way in which a research project frames the confines of the reality in which it is designed to operate (1997, p. 346). Such distinctions are important, explains Peter Preston, because:

If the social world is construed as essentially a realm of material facts then enquiry can appropriately be descriptive and explanatory. ... If, on the other hand, the social world is construed as essentially a realm of cultural meanings and understandings then enquiry can appropriately be interpretive and critical (1996, p. 6).

Taking the middle view, the realist position allows for exploratory and explanatory research, while remaining conscious and critical of standardised normative positions. Accordingly, as Figure 7 demonstrates, the realist position allows for both quantitative and qualitative data to be used to enhance knowledge, with quantitative data aiming to accurately describe a physical reality, and qualitative data aiming to capture and appraise competing perspectives of that reality in order to produce a more informed analysis.

Chapter 1 will offer a far more coherent overview of the methodological structure and approaches of this thesis. In particular, it will offer a detailed account of the theoretical framework, which is a product of the ontological and epistemological positions. It is important to note here that the overall research strategy of this thesis has necessitated the use of a number of research methods. In particular, quantitative data has been used in order to document patterns of criminal activity and underdevelopment in Yemen in Chapters 2, 3 and 5. Such data has been taken from secondary sources that have included United Nations data and Government of Yemen statistics on criminal justice and security, among others. Primary statistical data was not gathered by the author in this case because: "Quantitative work rests on the observation and measurement of repeated incidences of a political phenomenon ... . By observing variables over a large number of cases, it is possible to make inferences about a class of political behaviour" (Peter John, 2002, pp. 268-269). In this case, "Statistical theory shows that the larger the number of cases (or the greater number in proportion to the whole population), the surer the data analysts can be that what they observe is not a random occurrence" (p. 269). As an independent researcher working in the confines of a three-year doctoral research project, it was simply not feasible for the author to gather a sufficiently large range of primary statistical information that would warrant a nationally-located analysis of crime in Yemen.

As noted by Sumner and Tribe, an over-reliance on secondary quantitative data in international development studies can result in the transfer of organisational biases to new research, as well as in the reproduction of errors, although the impact of such limitations can be mitigated through reliance upon a wider range of data sources. In order to combat these obstacles, a range of quantitative data sources have been combined with qualitative data, acquired through field work, expert consultations and distance research. In practice, qualitative approaches to research will be prioritised above quantitative ones, owing to their flexibility and adaptability. This method of blending different data collection methods is drawn in part from Julia Brannen's methodological guide, according to which "mixed methods research is an opportunity that deflects attention away from theoretical work that is often specific to particular disciplines", which fits well with this thesis' ambition to integrate criminological and development research: "Thus [mixed methods research] may encourage thinking 'outside the box', ... bringing together researchers across disciplinary boundaries" (2005, p. 5).

Elite stakeholder consultations were conducted in Yemen in 2010 in order to help bridge these two methodological approaches, whereby members of the international community and the Yemeni Government were questioned about their interpretations of data implications and about their priorities for Yemen's development. A secondary field research phase was also planned in order to gather additional qualitative data at the ground level directly from Yemeni communities. However, this plan was abandoned due to the emergence of the Arab Spring and the significant destabilisation of the country as a whole in 2011, as is discussed in Chapter 1, so that the author

relied instead upon online data collection tools and distance research in order to supplement resulting gaps in the research strategy.

Ultimately, despite the use of supporting quantitative and qualitative evidence, the research strategy of this thesis has relied primarily upon literature reviews, which have been used in order to engage with existing debates on criminology and underdevelopment in line with Bob Hancké's guide to research design (2010, p. 237). Its sphere of applicability is specifically to fragile states, with additional context-specific applications to Yemen.

## **vi. Case Study Selection**

Yemen was selected as the primary case study for this thesis in line with Robert K. Yin's *Case Study Research* methodology (2004). This requires an in-depth examination of a so-called "typical instance" of a phenomenon being investigated – the phenomenon being, in this example, conflict-affected state fragility, – so as to allow for detailed exploratory research of specific contexts. As Martyn Descombe outlines in his guide to *Good Research*:

The logic being invoked here is that the particular case is similar in crucial respects with the others that might have been chosen, and that the findings from the case study are therefore likely to apply elsewhere. Because the case study is like most of the rest, the findings can be generalised to the whole class of the thing. (1998, p. 33)

Yemen, as a least developed country affected by prolonged humanitarian crisis, provides a solid case study for generating a theory of crime causation in fragile states and for creating a set of exportable findings. The country is positioned midway between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, and is affected by the political and social fluctuations of both regions. It holds implications and lessons to be learned that may prove effective and relevant within a very large territory.

The author first became interested in Yemen while working under contract for the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit in 2010 (*see Chapter 1*). Up until this point, Iraq and Afghanistan had also been considered as important examples of fragile states that were affected by acute deprivation. It was in studying these countries that the author found a gap in policy coverage where criminal activity was significantly side-lined in conflict-affected countries in favour of peace-building programming. Yemen was prioritised as a case study because, unlike Iraq, it was a more generalizable example of naturally evolving conflict: more specifically, the war in Iraq was an unusual consequence of foreign intervention and, it might be argued, de-Ba'athification, so that state fragility was a fairly new social dynamic for the country. Similarly, Yemen was considered to be more accessible than Afghanistan, where decades of international intervention had contributed to increasing hostility against foreigners, and to respondent fatigue, both of which have been identified as serious structural issues inhibiting contemporary research efforts there (Samy Ahmar and Christine Kolbe, 2011, p. 10). As a chronically underdeveloped state with a relatively under-explored research environment, Yemen presented a solid and convincing case-study.



**Figure 8 View Over Sana'a's Historic City Centre**

As the investigation continued, the timing for conducting an in-depth evaluation of under-researched forms of insecurity in Yemen became more urgent. With the 2011 Arab Spring and the 2012 Revolution of Institutions having pushed the Yemeni Government and the international community to begin planning for a severe restructuring of military, police and judicial services in the country, there is a danger that a lack of understanding of- and information about- more mainstream criminal violence in Yemen could lead to an overly enthusiastic side-lining of conventional law enforcement spending needs. This danger emerges more specifically from a recent assertion by the British Government – which is taking the lead in police training in Yemen as part of a broader European Union commitment to security sector reform post-2012 – that restructured police services in the country will likely take on a “paramilitary” identity, as part of which Yemeni police will above all be tasked with reinstating territorial control of their state (*Expert Consultation, Nicholas Hopton, 20 July, 2012*). As will be argued in Chapters 5 and 7, the author is convinced that there is a need to support international policy-makers at this critical juncture by making available additional information on violence and instability that has not been considered as part of this new security strategy.

Yemen is also an appropriate representative example of fragility because it is a country battling with multiple conflicts and a crisis of state legitimacy, while maintaining a basic infrastructure and a strict and visible legal system. Yemen was found to have a middling incident rate of violent crime when compared to the broader Middle-East and North Africa area in 2010, as substantiated by the *Global Peace Index*, while ranking 129th out of 149 countries with available data for its general stability. In 2007, Yemen was also shown by the International Centre for Prison Studies' *World Prison Population List* to have, at 14,000 inmates, one of the highest prison populations in the Middle East within its government managed prisons alone. Since then, while accurate data specific to Yemen has been difficult to come by, the rest of the region has experienced a significant increase in detentions (as documented by the *World Prison Population List* in 2009), with strong indications of similar trends in Yemen.

Yemen is thereby deemed to fit the requirements of the case study approach through both its political situation and crime rates, offering a relevant context within which to work towards answering the research questions while also providing a generalizable example of conflict and fragility. More importantly, it offered some degree of infrastructure at the time of case-study selection in 2010, particularly with regard to its justice sector, through which the extent of crime

became, if not fully measurable, then at least more visible. Furthermore, unlike other countries experiencing similar trends, including Afghanistan and Iraq, Yemen provided at the time a relatively safe environment within which to carry out field work.

However, while lessons drawn from the Yemeni context have far-reaching implications for other contexts, the country itself is also unique in its cultural, religious, tribal and social identity. The country's history has further produced a very distinctive system of governance<sup>18</sup>. Therefore, while findings produced from this investigation of the Yemeni case study will be presented according to an analysis that is intended to be exportable, this thesis will remain sensitive to local particularities in its reading of crime and fragility in Yemen, and future comparative analyses that might emerge from this thesis will need also to be catered to their specific contexts.

## **vii. Key Findings**

This thesis has generated findings that are connected to the Yemeni development context, its emerging patterns of criminal activity and associated judicial structures, as well as to the applicability of theoretical criminological and fragility literature in assessing these challenges, and finally to the unifying characteristics of fragility and criminality. Most crucially, it has been found that existing criminological literature and theories of international development are separately insufficient for producing a fully contextualised theory of violent young offending in fragile states: a theory that takes the nuances and complexities of least developed countries into account. Through careful integration, these two academic disciplines are significantly strengthened in their suitability for analysing violent young offending in fragile states. By analysing the Yemeni context more specifically and by looking at Yemen's commonalities with other fragile states, it has been possible to generate a number of important socio-economic and political trends that could form the foundations of a rigorous unifying theory of crime and fragility (though such a theory would require further investigation if it could be said to be empirically validated).

These trends, which have been left suggestive within this thesis, include: a deterioration of state legitimacy; a breakdown of social services; poor communal integration of children and young people; and a widespread socialisation to violence. Based upon independent research and existing theories, an appreciation for these trends yields a coherent analytical framework, which argues that the absence of state services, legitimate opportunities and socialising activities for young people in fragile states, along with their exposure to significant levels of violence, produces extreme economic, psychological and socio-cultural stresses that lead to their increased aggression and rejection of state legitimacy, all of which combine to raise the likelihood of violent young offending in Yemen and other fragile states.

It has furthermore been found that the cultural specificities of individual contexts can produce important mitigating circumstances that are lost in comparative studies that seek to merge multiple fragile contexts together. Explanatory theories pertaining to violent young offending in all fragile states therefore require a certain degree of adaptation and customisation when analysed within specific cultural and religious backgrounds.

---

<sup>18</sup> The history and evolution of the Yemeni state will be overviewed in Chapter 2.

## viii. Important Terms

Three concepts frame the analysis of this thesis, and these are; childhood, violent criminality and state fragility. While each of these terms is fairly self-explanatory, this section will address each one individually in order to avoid later confusion through clear definitions.

### viii.1. Children and Young People

Children and young people are defined within this thesis as individuals who have reached the age of legal capacity but are nevertheless protected by the Yemeni justice system as a result of their extreme youth. The author is primarily interested here in children above the age of 10 as individuals who are entering into a key developmental period of their lives, where opinions on ethics and morality are being formed, and important lifetime decisions are beginning to be made. Nevertheless, the criteria established by this definition encompass all those under the age of 18, although it is extremely rare for children under the age of seven to be arrested in Yemen (so that the Yemeni Central Statistical Organisation tends to separate juvenile offenders into groups of 7 to 14 and 15 to 18 year old people<sup>19</sup>).

Yemen's laws contravene the 1990 United Nations *Convention on the Rights of the Child*, which stipulates that young people who have not reached an age of full maturity should not be placed under the weight of full legal responsibility, either because they do not yet have the capacity to infringe the criminal law, or because they are more vulnerable within the judicial process than adults<sup>20</sup>. Without condoning this reality, the definition of childhood and youth adopted by this thesis recognises children and young people as individuals who can be and are arrested and tried on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence. Owing to the difficulty of identifying children in fragile states, as children often operate without documentation and are frequently miss-classified as adults, the parameters of this thesis' definition will also be extended, wherever clearly stated, to encompass young people up to the age of 25. The definition used acknowledges that perceptions of childhood vary from country to country across the world, and is therefore adapted for better application to the Yemeni context.

Childhood is a culturally sensitive concept, with the age of criminal capacity varying from country to country<sup>21</sup>. In her study on culturally-based integrative approaches to childhood, Kathleen Kostelny writes that:

While childhood is defined by the *Convention on the Rights of the Child* as the period from birth through eighteen years of age, many non-Western cultures view the period quite differently. ... In addition to having different conceptualisations of when a child

---

<sup>19</sup> This data sorting method can be seen in the Central Statistical Organisation's *Statistical Yearbook of 2003 to 2008*.


<sup>20</sup> Article 40 of the *Convention on the Rights of the Child* deals with the appropriate legal process for prosecuting a young offender (under the age of 18), while subsection 3(a) requires that countries establish a minimum age below which children "shall be presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal law" (1990).

<sup>21</sup> Example minimal ages of criminal capacity, according to Gregor Urbas, are; 10 for the United Kingdom and Australia; 12 for Canada, Greece and the Netherlands; 13 for France, Israel and New Zealand; 14 for Austria, Germany and Italy; 15 for Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden; 16 for Japan, Portugal and Spain; and 18 for Belgium and Luxembourg (2000, p. 2).

becomes an adult, many developing societies diverge from industrialised societies in their views of children's roles, responsibilities and expected behaviours. In these societies young boys are expected to contribute to the household resources by tending animals, farming, or working outside the home, and young girls are expected to spend much of their day doing domestic chores such as cleaning, cooking, and caring for younger children. (2006, pp. 20-21)

In some societies, as in Yemen, where legislation aimed at prohibiting child marriages has been slow in being developed and implemented, children are also parents and primary bread-winners, with girls as young as nine years marrying and starting families of their own (*Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations Population Fund, 14 August, 2010*). Children of all ages fail to attend school and become separated from parents and loved ones through either choice or circumstance (*Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, 15 August, 2010*). They can also be soldiers and combatants, bearing witness to potentially traumatising events and taking part in armed violence against others.

With the adoption of social roles that can be thought of as being beyond their level of maturity, it is difficult to talk about many young people within such settings as children. Thus, while the *Convention on the Rights of the Child* strictly prohibits child labour by insisting upon a minimum age for entry into employment (article 32.a), many countries across the world take the stance that their children work to survive and form an integral part of their domestic economies. The 1990 *African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child* formalises this assertion for participating African states by stating that: "Every child shall be protected from all forms of economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's physical, mental, spiritual, moral, or social development", but failing to ban children from working entirely (article 15.1). Not only would placing a ban on child labour be virtually unenforceable in many countries (like Somalia, for instance, where there is no functioning state to speak of that could regulate employment), but preventing children from taking on important employment and social roles could rob them of their only means of survival.



**Figure 9** Young Yemeni merchants pack up their stalls at the end of a market day

Conceptions of childhood and adulthood in Yemen will emerge as a reoccurring theme within this thesis. For further ease of discussion, the resulting group has been conceptually sub-compartmentalised according to the *Health Behaviour in School-Aged Children* (HBSC) study framework, which disaggregates age groups according to known stages in human cognitive development, rather than exclusively according to cultural and legal formulations of childhood and adulthood. The HBSC study, conducted by the World Health Organisation and described by Anna Aszmann *et al* in their analysis of 'Multiple Risk Behaviour and Injury', separates young people into three age-groups that are deemed to be cross-nationally relevant, extending to multiple global settings. These sub-groups represent three key formative stages in the lives of children that have been identified as: “the onset of adolescence” at age 11; “the challenge of physical and emotional changes” at age 13; and “the middle years when very important life and career decisions are beginning to be made” at age 15 (2002, p. 122). This classification method allows for the exportability of research findings. However, as Naile Berberoglu summarises, the danger of such classifications lies in that:

the way developmental psychology has approached children as biological beings going through different pre-determined life stages, which in turn are used to describe and define childhood, can be seen as another example of how children were being studied as unified and passive beings in a state of becoming. (2011, p. 42)

Thus, in much developmental psychology, “the child” is conceptualised “as ‘an empty vessel’ who is innocent, vulnerable and predictable”. Owing to the exposure of children and young people to great social hardships and significant levels of violence in fragile states, it is tempting to view them as victims of circumstance, rather than free-moving agents. While this thesis will lean heavily upon arguments relating to cognitive development, it will strive to posit children and young people as fully autonomous, yet vulnerable individuals.

### **viii.2. Fragile State**

As has already been asserted, state fragility is a broad and fluid concept that has been adopted by donors, practitioners and academics working in the area of international development to group together a number of countries that have “been associated with various combinations of the following dysfunctions: inability to provide basic services and meet vital needs, unstable and weak governance, persistent and extreme poverty, lack of territorial control, and high propensity to conflict and civil war” (Graziella Bertocchi and Andrea Guerzoni, 2011, p. 2). Many donors, like the British Department for International Development, define state fragility as characteristic of countries that are incapable of independently initiating progress towards the eight Millennium Development Goals enshrined within the United Nations 2000 *Millennium Declaration* (2006). Yet fragile states are also defined by their successes in that they are distinct from failed states, which are countries whose governments have ceased to perform all basic functions. Thus, it should be noted that Graham Brown and Frances Stewart define fragile states as “failing,” or being “at risk of failing”, but not as being “failed” or “collapsed” states (2010). A necessary criterion of fragile states is that they retain a minimal amount of institutional capacity that allows them to continue to exert a concrete influence over their citizens and their territories, so that the label of fragile states is often used by the United

Nations and other international bodies to justify immediate assistance to governments in order to avoid state collapse and the humanitarian emergencies associated with state collapse.

The language of state fragility is politically loaded, however, and has been rejected by those who:

[deny] the existence of a set of 'fragile states' that, when their economic aggregates are compared to governance aggregates, would be basically identical to the group of [least developed countries]. This doctrine holds that each individual case of 'fragility' is absolutely unique, as impoverished but peaceful countries ... should not be treated in the same way as potentially rich states that are ravaged by civil war ... or regional crossroads with complex histories. (Jean-Marc Châtaigner and François Gaulme, 2005, p. 5)

Equally contentious is the association of the word “fragility” with notions of weakness and powerlessness. This thesis links state fragility primarily to extreme poverty, lack of institutional capacity and an inability by governments to streamline conflicts into the mainstream political process, placing them at a greater risk of war. In this sense, the labels of “state fragility” and “least developed country” will be used almost interchangeably, although the language of “least developed countries” will be more strongly associated with weak economies, and that of state fragility with poor governance. It is important to note here that, as Châtaigner and Gaulme explain, the danger of using the concept of state fragility is in that it frequently fails to take into consideration regional stress factors that may be weakening the ability of states to exert their authority (p. 6). Thus, while definitions of state fragility vary, almost all of them consider the phenomenon at a national level, so that understandings of fragility are bordered within a country's territories instead of taking regional and global influences into account. This thesis rejects this view and will instead analyse the causes of Yemen's fragility from a multilevel perspective.

The investigation presented here recognises that state fragility, due to the huge variety of frameworks and indices that have been produced by competing institutions<sup>22</sup>, can be a confusing and continuously fluctuating concept within academic research, practitioner policy and practice. This thesis has had to narrow its definition of fragility for purposes of analytical clarity<sup>23</sup>, and in order to pin down fragility to a single concrete typology that is more strictly defined. Fragility has been understood here as the intersection of three major conditions, which include: poor state capacity, as generated by a lack of authority and ability to control state territories, and as evidenced by a lack of effective state service provision; high social fragmentation, accompanied by a history of conflict, community isolation and conflicting localised identities; and poor political integration, leading to low levels of community access to political processes, reinforced by a perceived lack of political will to reflect popular demands in policy changes. This definition rules out cases of “weak” and “strong” state fragility where fragility is read as a “spectrum” (World Bank, 2005). Fragility is viewed instead as a condition encapsulating a multitude of social and structural challenges, rather than as a scale

---

<sup>22</sup> Notable examples that will be returned to in later Chapters include the United States Agency for International Development's *Fragile States Assessment Framework*, the Fund for Peace's *Fragile States Index*, or the World Bank's *Country Policy and Institutional Assessments* tool, among others.

<sup>23</sup> See Chapter 6, section 6.3 for details relating to the process through which the definition has been refined by the author.

where countries can be ranked according to their degree of instability. It excludes from its analysis a large variety of recovering states facing only low priority development challenges.

### **viii.3. Violent Crime and Offences Against the Person**

For the purposes of this thesis, violent crime and offences against the person are taken to refer to all forms of social violence prohibited by law, not including actions taken by the state or by its citizens to fulfil a political objective, such as acts of terrorism and warfare where victims are chosen for their political affiliation, ethnic or religious identity, or to strike fear into the hearts of a population, as part of broader movement to effect regional or national change<sup>24</sup>.

Beyond this, this thesis is primarily interested in mindless violence, which incorporates all physical acts of violence committed by a person or a group of people against another person or group of people without any clearly discernible economic or political motive. While the connotations of the word “mindless” imply that violence occurs as an eruption of irrationality, sometimes caused by trauma or severe psychological stress, the term is also used to analyse repeat violent offending, domestic violence, violence relating to social power negotiation on a small scale, or violence that has not been categorised by judicial systems. In short, it is important to note that every act of violence, including every act of mindless violence, is committed by a thinking individual or group. This understanding of violence is behavioural, not psychological, being grounded within behavioural theories, where violence is seen as an externalised physical gesture resulting in a negative physical impact upon another person. Under this definition, the author supports Richard Mizen's proposal “that the term ‘violence’, at least in a clinical context, be reserved for ‘action’ ... which fulfils a particular psychological function”, such as “the ridding of unwanted mental contents”, thoughts, worries and pressures (2003, p. 293-294). In this sense, Mizen believes that “Violent acts are attempts not to have violent feelings (or be subject to violent affects)” (p. 300), so that the term “violence” is different from the term “aggression”, which is often considered, according to Mizen, to be either an instinctual or an emotional impulse to commit violence, sometimes failing to manifest itself in a physical action.

The term “aggression”, evoking psychological stress factors that result in increased violent behaviour, will be drawn upon to better analyse the environment of violent young offending in Yemen and other fragile states<sup>25</sup>. This use of terminology is taken from Felicity De Zulueta's *From Pain to Violence*, in which she argues that violence should always be read as being distinct from aggression, and not to be used as an interchangeable term for aggression (2006). While aggression is a trait of most human beings, De Zulueta argues that violence is the physical manifestation of heightened or elevated aggression in a particular form, or “transformed aggression”, but that:

it is often far from clear when aggression ceases to be seen as 'normal', to become 'transformed' or 'malignant'.

---

<sup>24</sup> The concepts of violent crime and offences against the person will be further defined within the confines of Yemeni law in chapters 1 and 6, which will offer a more in-depth analysis of offending patterns in that country.

<sup>25</sup> Aggression will mainly be investigated in Chapters 6 and 7, which will look more closely at stress factors impacting children and young people in Yemen.

In fact, the confusion cannot be avoided, because aggression is a form of social behaviour studied by ethologists, biologists and psychologists, whereas violence is more about the interpretation that is given to a form of social behaviour, an interpretation that is essentially determined by the social context in which we live. (p. 3)

To be perceived as criminally or socially violent, a physical manifestation of aggression needs to be seen, within the context of the society and legal system in which it is committed, as a violation of the personal integrity of the victim, recognised as such by both “its victims” and “by those who witness it, particularly as the perpetrators of violence often fail to do just that” (De Zulueta, p. 6). In Chapter 5, the author will explore the fact that violence committed in Yemen can be seen by its perpetrators as a form of retributive street justice, an attempt to equalise a wrong. Nonetheless, Yemeni police officers will often arrest perpetrators, because the families of their victims will rarely see such retributive actions as being legitimate, threatening to escalate retributive street justice into full-blown blood feuds. According to this social pattern, while violence may be perceived as being legitimate by communities, it requires state-based intervention for the sake of national well-being and future social cohesion, which is the point at which violence becomes criminalised. Yet this example illustrates that tensions always remain between state and community perceptions of criminal and social violence, with these tensions also impacting the distinctions between social, criminal and political violence. An understanding of violence based upon social and national perception is an extremely challenging definition to maintain, especially as a foreign analyst, because acts of violence perceived as acts of brutality within one locality (such as the nation home of the author or the reader) may not necessarily be perceived as being aggressive beyond the confines of normative behaviour within another (such as the country being studied).

The definitions of social and criminal violence put forward incorporate all violent offences committed by young people as individuals, community members, co-workers, families or friends, but not as political representatives acting to demonstrate a political opinion or achieve a political objective. Here, a focus is placed on physical violence more than verbal violence, though the threat of violence and the use of verbal coercion in fragile states are nevertheless identified as important elements of Yemen's criminological environment, with their own set of causes and social impact.

While fairly rigid, these definitional parameters have been difficult to implement, because separating political and apolitical actions with any degree of accuracy when examining statistical data is extremely problematic, particularly within fragile states, which are often beset by conflict or strong political unrest. This challenge is addressed in part through a focus on Yemen, where the sorting process has already been initiated by the state. Concerns about the legitimacy and validity of this mode of data analysis, as well as measures taken to address these issues, are reviewed in section 1.5. To better frame these concerns here, it is useful to ask at what point within a country's recovery from conflict the unlawful killing of a human being ceases to be read as an act of war in order to become a straightforward murder? That there is no easy answer here lays testimony to the fluidity and interaction between the concepts of crime and conflict. The only workable solution is to treat each case-study individually. A religiously-motivated attack may be analysed as a criminal action in the United Kingdom, but as a political one in Iraq, where the incident is unlikely to be an isolated one and instead forms part of a greater political movement. Even taking such precautions, complexities abound on a case-by-case basis, where violent offenders can be influenced by complex and overlapping economic, political, social and physical motives for their actions.

## **ix. Overview**

The introduction of this thesis has established why violent crime and violent crime committed by children and young people in fragile states is important, justifying the reasons why a theory of crime causation has become necessary so as to better engage with the problem. The chapters which follow also revolve around their own set questions. Chapter 1 will outline how the subject of crime causation will be approached within this thesis by describing the researcher's methodology. Chapter 2 will then begin to engage with the main research questions of the thesis by identifying the specific characteristics of Yemen, as a fragile state, that may be proving most relevant in understanding its emerging crime patterns. In this sense, it will ask how Yemen is unique from more stable countries and what the root causes of its fragility are. Chapter 3 will then set about determining the extent of the problem of violent young offending in Yemen by providing an in depth analysis of the country's crime rates. Once the problem has been quantified, Chapter 4 will build upon the analysis of Chapter 3 by evaluating existing criminological theory and determining whether such theory is suitable and sufficient for adequately explaining the causal relationship between state fragility and violent offending. Chapter 5 will add another analytical layer to this discussion by examining Yemen's existing crime prevention systems and assessing the extent to which they are effectively engaging manifestations of social chaos. Following on from this evaluation, Chapter 6 will explore theories of social development, conflict causation and state fragility in order to extract a unifying theory of violent offending in fragile states. Chapter 7 will test whether or not the resulting theory of crime causation is helpful in engaging with the problem of violent offending by testing whether there are any points of interaction between the two within Yemeni crime and social control systems. Finally, Chapter 7 and the Conclusion will also strive to identify any potential areas for reform within Yemeni crime control systems, keeping cultural and capacity issues in mind. Additionally, the Conclusion will answer the five research questions set out in section iv.

# Chapter 1: Methodology

## 1.1 Introduction

In Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich's guide to *Empirical Political Research*, the authors identify three forms of political investigation: exploratory; descriptive; and explanatory research projects. Exploratory research aims to generate “greater familiarity” with a given phenomenon or phenomena. Descriptive research aims to provide an accurate representation of that phenomenon. Explanatory research aims to test a causal hypothesis relating to an identified phenomenon (1991, p. 73). This thesis adopts elements of all three approaches to suit its purposes, though it is primarily an exploratory piece aimed at generating greater familiarity with the relationship between youth violence and fragility in Yemen.

While operating within the confines of a realist epistemological perspective<sup>26</sup>, this thesis engages with an existing debate on security and underdevelopment in line with Bob Hancké's guide to research design, and uses a case study research strategy to identify Yemen as a country “which simultaneously address[es]” the investigation's research questions “and the others in the debate”<sup>27</sup> (2010, p. 238). The argument begins by highlighting a phenomenon (the high prevalence of violent young offending in fragile states), then proceeds by exploring that phenomenon through a detailed contextual analysis (aimed at determining the manifestations of crime in Yemen) while surveying and describing the conditions that may be impacting the development of that phenomenon (by examining the Yemeni development context), and consequently moves on to identifying possible causes of the phenomenon (by producing a suggestive theory of crime causation based on existing literature and testing the usefulness of that theory in terms of overcoming the challenge of violent young offending in fragile states).

The primary purpose of this thesis is to explore and to understand, though it cannot achieve that purpose without describing and attempting to explain. It is for this reason that the author has adopted a wide array of tools and methods to suit different stages of research. The political nature of the analysis has also led to the necessity of adapting such methods to constantly fluctuating political realities, brought about by Yemen's processes of governance reform and transition. The mixed methods approach selected through the research strategy<sup>28</sup> has been instrumental in creating an adaptable methodology in this sense. This approach is drawn from the epistemological and ontological positioning of this thesis within a single-reality realist perspective that is open to a blending of quantitative and qualitative research techniques.

---

<sup>26</sup> See section v of the Introduction on ‘Research Strategy and Methods’.

<sup>27</sup> The Yemeni case study will be used to engage existing theories of criminology and development in Chapters 4 and 6.

<sup>28</sup> Again, see section v of the Introduction on ‘Research Strategy and Methods’.

While both types of technique have been used in this thesis, an overall emphasis has been placed on qualitative approaches, which Ariande Vromen writes are centred around four core attributes (2010). These attributes include:

1. "Inductive analysis" where the purpose of research is to discover categories by "being exploratory with open questions, rather than only testing theoretically derived hypotheses through deduction" (2010, p. 257);
2. "Holistic perspectives" in which the researcher intends to understand the entirety of the phenomenon being studied and in which contextualisation of research is key to generating relevant knowledge (p. 257);
3. "Qualitative and adaptive data collection based on detailed thick description and depth", where methodological flexibility is essential to paving the way for "new paths of discovery as they emerge" (p. 257); and
4. "Empathetic neutrality", according to which, under a realist perspective, due to the inability of a researcher to be truly objective within the political sciences, it is essential for research methodologies to be structured around a principle of neutral and "non-judgemental" investigation (p. 257).

This qualitative philosophy is supported by a selection of quantitative methods that have used summary descriptive statistics<sup>29</sup> in accordance with Peter John's model of quantitative analysis, where "descriptive measures allow the observer to split observations and to examine proportions" so that "Judgements about these proportions [can] form an essential part of the interpretation of data" (2010, p. 271). This type of supporting quantitative analysis will feature in later Chapters<sup>30</sup>.

The research project itself has been implemented and completed through a period of three years, wherein the theoretical framework and approaches used have remained constant, though data collection strategies have been continuously redesigned in order to respond to unanticipated political changes, like the Arab Spring, that have occurred in the field since the project was initiated in October 2009. These strategic changes are reflected in the following sections, which establish the theoretical framework, theoretical approaches, field work and distance research methods that have been used. The limitations of this methodology are also detailed.

## **1.2 Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical framework of this thesis establishes its structure and research strategy, as well as the reasons for the selection of these methods. It offers the simplest means of engaging with the investigative process of this research project. The development of this framework has followed a logical course, where the purpose of the investigation has determined the choice of research methods and has shaped the analysis (*see Figure 10*). The following subsections establish the aims and objectives of this investigation, as well as further outlining the research questions and hypothesis, including the case study selection strategy, the research methods used and the analytical structure. It shall not touch upon the justification of the theoretical approaches used, which will be outlined in their own section.

---

<sup>29</sup> Summary descriptive statistics are used predominantly in Chapter 3 to illustrate patterns of crime in Yemen over time.

<sup>30</sup> In particular, Chapters 2 and 6 will rely on graphical regressions, as well as on tables and inferential statistics.




Figure 10 Theoretical Framework

### 1.2.1 Aim

The central aim of this thesis is to combine the two academic disciplines of international development and criminology and to apply them to the under-researched terrain of Yemen as a fragile state in order to generate new insights into the relationship between violent young offending and state underdevelopment. Based predominantly within theoretical rather than statistical and evidentiary research, the findings of this thesis are suggestive rather than empirical, and they have been collated with the aim of generating a new theoretical framework that might shed some light on the reasons for the emergence of elevated levels of apolitical youth violence and violent criminality within such contexts. This thesis aims to integrate and test the validity of criminological and fragility literature for understanding the relationship between violent crime and underdevelopment.

This will be accomplished through an in-depth analysis of Yemen, which aims to produce an informed and holistic appreciation for violence and weak state capacity in one fragile state. Thus, the overall purpose of this thesis, a collective product of these aims, has become to understand the processes of violent crime causation in Yemen, and to test established academic theories within a complex and continuously fluctuating context, in order to suggest new ways of understanding apolitical violence, or mindless criminal violence committed by children and young people in fragile states.

### 1.2.2 Objectives

To accomplish the above aims, this thesis has adopted multiple objectives. Firstly, it seeks to bring criminological theory into the discourse on socio-economic underdevelopment in order to open up a new conduit for the academic analysis of fragile states. Secondly, in order to blend these

two literary fields together and to test their applicability to new contexts, it will provide an analysis of violent young offending as a factor of state fragility in Yemen, introducing the reader to the Yemeni development context and to the country's complex justice system. In doing so, it will use a broad theoretical analysis of the principles of youth justice, conflict and fragility theory to provide an in-depth exploration of the Yemeni case study.



**Figure 11** View of Sana'a City Centre, Yemen

Finally, while remaining heavily grounded within Yemen, the main argument will strive to produce theories and recommendations that may be exported to other settings with similar contexts. It will do so by evaluating the staple theories of state fragility and criminology, and testing their limitations within new settings and new applications.

### **1.2.2 Research Questions and Hypothesis**

As has been set out in the introduction, this thesis adopts five central research questions within its investigation. In order to isolate the relevant aspects of state fragility that may be impacting rates of violent young offending in Yemen and elsewhere, it asks:

- 1. How appropriate a concept is state fragility for providing a unifying framework through which low-ranking countries in the Human Development Index might be analysed in the context of similar patterns of criminality?*
- 2. In what ways are fragile states different from more stable ones?*
- 3. What are the main causes of criminal violence in Yemen, and to what extent are these causes related to state fragility?*
- 4. Which (if any) specific attributes of fragile states promote criminality and violent criminal behaviour among children and young people?*
- 5. How, if at all, are these criminogenic attributes mitigated by existing youth justice systems, and how can youth justice systems be better used to advance the cause of peace?*

In asking these questions, the author will endeavour to create a unifying theory of crime causation. That theory will emerge from an overview of the literature, an in-depth analysis of Yemen, and an integration of development and criminological literature.

Throughout the completion of this thesis, the author has endeavoured to use the research questions to guide her analysis, rather than relying upon a single hypothesis. The broad range of data and theoretical approaches to be analysed meant that any attempt to generate a hypothesis could serve to create a research bias, whereby only information relevant to proving or disproving the

main hypothesis would be considered. Nevertheless, at the completion of the initial desk research phase, the author did begin to prioritise certain existing theories over others, due to their relevance to the case study, and to formulate predictions in the pursuit of answers to the five research questions. These predictions formed the basis of a hypothesis that would eventually provide the foundations of the theoretical framework generated by this thesis.

At the outset, based on existing literature, it was determined that countries that are affected by state fragility are prone to exhibit a set of specific criminogenic risk factors, which create significant developmental challenges for governments striving to secure internal stability. Existing theories indicated that key trends, such as economic inequality, proved important as potential drivers of increased criminality<sup>31</sup>. These theories read offenders to be “goal-driven” but reactive agents who responded to perceived opportunities for illicit activity in order to achieve criminal objectives. Such analytical slants proved disturbingly unsatisfying as explanations for increased tendencies towards so-called “mindless” violence, or the propensity for everyday violent and aggressive behaviour<sup>32</sup>. These restrictions within the literature on criminogenic risk factors led to a prioritisation of other readings in the end analysis of the criminological environments of fragile states.

When criminogenic risk factors proved increasingly unsatisfying for determining the broad causes of youth aggression, the author began to pursue alternative avenues of explanation within criminological theory, identifying the rich theoretical body of social controls on human behaviour<sup>33</sup> as a potential key to determining the stark difference in criminal activity evidenced between fragile and stable states. According to these theories, it was found that criminal behaviour in the developed world was mitigated by strong social forces and positive socialisation processes. The next question that the author asked, in line with the second research question which strove to understand the uniqueness of fragile environments, was whether or not these social dynamics of interactions within the developed world were also present in fragile states. It was found that many of these were missing due to a lack of socialising opportunities made available through schooling and the employment sector. While common perceptions of right and wrong and social stigma for criminal behaviour were present in fragile states, the integration of young people into communities was found to be weak in many places, and fear of prosecution, as well as respect for state bodies of law enforcement were generally very low<sup>34</sup>.

An initial hypothesis, produced as a result of these observations, concluded that three risk factors, emerging from common social control theories, might prove especially relevant for generating a unifying theory of violent young offending in fragile states. These included:

- pervasive violence;
- a breakdown of governmental legitimacy;

---

<sup>31</sup> See Chapter 4, section 4.2.5, on ‘Economic and Labour Market Causes’ of crime.

<sup>32</sup> See the Introduction, including section ii, which outlines the ‘Problem Statement’. These factors will also be analysed in more depth in Chapter 4, so that the reader may be guided through the process of theory elimination by the author.

<sup>33</sup> See Chapter 4, section 4.3, for a detailed overview and evaluation of theories of social control and their relevance to fragile states.

<sup>34</sup> See Chapter 6, sections 6.6 and 6.7 on ‘Violent Young Offending in Fragile States’ and ‘Peripheral Causes of Criminality in Fragile States’.

- and, an erosion of traditional norms of socialisation<sup>35</sup>.

It should be understood that the author considered that fragile states, particularly those affected by conflict, are subjected to multi-level, pervasive social and military violence. This impacts the norms of social interaction within countries by establishing a culture in which violence becomes inherently linked to authority and social dominance. Children growing up within such environments are more likely to perceive violence and physical abuse as an effective means of gaining social standing and credibility. This emerging culture of violence is made more volatile by the fact that fragile states are frequently marked by reduced border control capacity, which leads to the influx of criminogenic commodities like narcotics and firearms that have in turn been linked to the rising severity of violent offending<sup>36</sup>.

At the same time, fragile states, which are intrinsically defined as countries suffering from weak governance, experience a breakdown of government legitimacy. This leads to a lack of respect for government authority, a lack of respect for the government's laws and a lack of faith in the government's law enforcement capacities. Many forms of crime become more socially acceptable, while there is little expectation among perpetrators that they will be held to account for their actions by the state. Once again, children are more prone to suffer the effects of these environmental conditions upon their development: a failure by the state to establish a positive relationship with young people early on can lead to their aggressive rejection of such formal institutions later in life.

Lastly, fragility leads to the erosion of traditional norms of socialisation. This inhibits the formation of positive social bonds that would encourage people to ascribe value to communal relations and to empathise with other members of society when they fall victim to crime. According to the initial hypothesis of this thesis, a combination of these three risk factors could create the conditions necessary to produce high rates of violent offending, becoming more dangerous in times of political unrest when they might lead to the gradual radicalisation of societies and the prolonging and escalation of conflict. It was considered that this hypothesis could offer a unifying theory of crime causation in both Yemen and other fragile states.

However, this thesis has at all times been guided by its research questions first, rather than this hypothesis. Upon application of these theories to the Yemeni context, it was found that existing theoretical frameworks within criminology and its more specialised branch of social control were quite limited in their capacity to adapt to fluctuating fragile state settings whose trends did not follow anticipated patterns. As shall be argued further in Chapter 6, this initial hypothesis was altered when generating the fragility-sensitive theory of violent young offending in Yemen, which required the incorporation of local cultural and tribal dynamics in order to reflect the development realities of that chosen setting.

---

<sup>35</sup> The reasoning behind the selection of these risk factors will be outlined further in section 1.3.

<sup>36</sup> Chapter 4, section 4.2.1 on 'Substance Abuse and Exposure to Addictive Substances' will look in more detail at theories that link crime to narcotics, while section 8.2 will highlight the impact of weapons distribution in Yemen upon crime rates.

### **1.2.3 Case Study Selection**

The case study selection process has already been outlined in the Introduction, as has the justification for the implementation of a single case study approach. Yemen was selected for its long-term fragile status and prolonged conflicts, but also for its relative stability, which allowed for limited field work and for the author to rely upon nation-wide governmental and non-governmental statistics. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the situation in Yemen turned dramatically more volatile, restricting ease of travel two years into the research project. Nevertheless, soaring levels of violence in Yemen highlighted the importance and urgency of the investigation.

### **1.2.4 Research Methods**

A combination of literature reviews, field work and desk based research has been used in order to gather the data necessary to complete this investigation. To begin with, Yemen was studied holistically in order to give the author a full understanding of the research context. Broad criminological, peace-building and development theories were read extensively, allowing the author to position her arguments within a wider dialogue on youth justice systems, displacement and child development. Then, the research focus was narrowed in order to answer the research questions and to test the parameters of the hypothesis, and both desk based and field research methods were refined to suit this purpose.

### **1.2.5 Analytical Structure**

The analysis contained in this work links theory and practice within an envelope structure<sup>37</sup>. The beginning of the text examines offending patterns and the development context within Yemen, The middle chapters provide an overview and analysis of existing criminological and developmental theory in order to extract a new unifying approach. The final sections apply this approach to Yemeni judicial systems in order to identify a possible way forward.

---

<sup>37</sup> See the Introduction to this thesis, and especially section ix, which provides the 'Overview'.

## 1.3 Theoretical Approach

### 1.3.1 Principle Theories Used to Produce the Hypothesis




Figure 12 Principal Theoretical Approach Used

The hypothesis used within this thesis to launch the development of a theoretical framework stems from three broad theoretical approaches towards human behaviour. The first of these theories is drawn from Jeffrey Fagan and Tom R. Tyler's work on 'Legitimacy and Cooperation', in which the authors try to determine why people in peaceful communities will often help their local police forces to fight crime within their neighbourhoods (2008). They argue that cooperation between communities and law enforcement personnel is motivated by social control and institutional legitimacy, that "people's actions are governed by their self-interest either in the form of sanctions or incentives" (p. 233) and that, where such examples of social control fail, people often continue to obey the law if they perceive the law and its bodies of enforcement to be legitimate. Such perceptions of legitimacy are a logical consequence of laws that are in line with local customs, morals and social norms, but are strengthened significantly by law enforcement and judicial systems that appear to be procedurally fair so that perceived legitimacy becomes:

a feeling of obligation to obey the law and to defer to decisions made by legal authorities. Legitimacy, therefore, reflects an important social value, distinct from self-interest, to which social authorities can appeal to gain public deference and cooperation (p. 235).

In other words, people obey the law in most situations because they do not object strongly to the principles upon which the law is founded, do not disrespect the authority of their law-makers and have a certain degree of confidence in the ability of law enforcement services to identify and punish transgressors.

Looking to fragile state contexts, it is easy to see from the outset how this first body of theory would be appealing to analysts striving to understand the propensity for violent crime in

countries suffering from weak state capacity and institutional legitimacy. After all, this argument dictates that societal feelings of obligation to obey the law will suffer if governments, law makers and their associated bodies of law enforcement are not: generally perceived to be legitimate; seen to act in a way that is procedurally fair; or believed to have the capacity to detect and punish offenders adequately. Where this theory begins to show its limitations is in those cases where it is applied to countries with strong alternative forms of communal self-regulation, brought about, for instance, through tribal or religious structures.

In Yemen, tribal affiliations vary quite substantially within different parts of the country so that it is difficult to assess their national legitimacy<sup>38</sup>. They differ significantly in the degree to which they are successful in both discouraging and encouraging local levels of violent offending among children and young people. The reliance of tribal leaders in Yemen upon informal methods of conflict mediation and dispute resolution would seem to indicate that they are committed to operating as a law-enforcement service, dedicated to preserving local community values in some cases, and authoritarian structures in others<sup>39</sup>. Either way, this has positioned tribes within the law-making and law-enforcing tapestry of Yemeni society, so that their authority and legitimacy should form an influential force in the behaviour of young people, particularly under a legitimacy and cooperation-based model of analysis. There is a question of whether or not this framework is sufficiently flexible to be applied to a de-legitimised state with semi-legitimate systems of alternative social control<sup>40</sup>.

The second theoretical dimension upon which the hypothesis is founded is based upon Albert Bandura's social learning theory (or social cognitive theory) (1977), which states that children learn about social interaction through their observation of others. This process is particularly important in infants and very young children, but plays a significant role in the development of young people during the key formative years<sup>41</sup>. Here, young people begin to fall into set patterns of behaviour and social interaction, which are heavily influenced by their communities and peers but also, according to David Howitt's theory of elite social constructionism (1992), by authority figures and prominent institutions, particularly with regard to social conceptions of crime. Bandura and Howitt's works are used today to explain "minor forms of juvenile offending and substance abuse" (Stephen W. Verill, 2008, p. 2) because they speculate that the perceived norms of behaviour of others will alter the way in which people act, with an especially telling influence upon the behaviour and development of children and young people. Michael D. Berzonsky writes that social learning will dictate biases and influence reasoning about moral situations and dilemmas (2002). In practice, these theories imply that positive networks of socialisation developed in schools and in after-school programmes, for instance, can prove effective in breaking patterns of harmful behaviour among teenagers, while association with delinquent peers and other negative influences may conversely help to reinforce such patterns.

While social learning theory has become a staple of development psychology and undoubtedly contains many hidden lessons for analysts of fragile states, the fact that it has predominantly been applied to individuals living in the Western world has meant that any assumptions made as to corresponding linkages with Yemen, for instance, remain untested. In

---

<sup>38</sup> See Chapter 5.

<sup>39</sup> Yemeni tribalism is described in relation to processes of self-administration in Chapter 5, section 5.3.

<sup>40</sup> This question will be revisited in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

<sup>41</sup> Key formative years occur when children pass into the 10 to 12, 13 to 14 or 15 to 17 age groups especially.

particular, while it might be fairly clear that conflict, displacement, and an absence of socialising activities brought about by a lack of schooling and employment opportunities could negatively impact the social development of children, it is not at all obvious how integration within strong tribal structures or exposure to strict Islamic values would affect the propensity for young people to display enhanced or diminished behavioural aggression.

Although much work has been done lately on the role of Islam in youth radicalisation and gender-based violence across the Middle East and North Africa, as well as in the wider world, this has largely focused upon extreme examples of youth recruitment into terrorist or insurgent groups<sup>42</sup> and upon feminist theory integration<sup>43</sup>, with little investigation into the impact of Islam upon every day so-called “mindless” violence. Interestingly, many of the lessons contained within the Holy Qur'an and other Islamic texts incorporate a strong abhorrence for social violence and other forms of criminal activity so that it has been found that crime is actually very heavily stigmatised within many Islamic countries. In interviews conducted as part of this thesis in 2011, while many protesters admitted to being the victims or witnesses of violence, only a select few admitted to the presence of looting in their country, while the majority asserted quite vehemently that “we have no crime in Yemen” despite then referring to high levels of institutional corruption (March, 2011). One prominent Yemeni activist, Husam al Sharjabi, also noted in interview that “considering the fact that there was no government, no police, and many many guns” in some geographic areas of the country in 2011, it is extremely surprising that, while instances of theft and other petty crime did increase during the Arab Spring, they did not increase substantially (*Interview conducted March 20th, 2012*). The shameful nature of criminal activity in this sense is an important theme when striving to understand processes of socialisation to behavioural standards and normative values in Yemen, as in many other Islamic fragile state contexts.

The third theory upon which the hypothesis is founded emerges from the works of multiple psychologists who have attempted to analyse the effect of violence upon the emotional development of young people. Much of this body of research documents exposure to violence when it impacts very early on in childhood, though its application to children and young people of all ages who are directly affected by conflict or social violence during such formative stages is obvious. Betsy McAlister Groves explains that exposure to violence during childhood results in two important changes for the child: that, firstly, it “changes the emotional landscape for children by distorting their emerging view of the world and their place in it”, and that, secondly, it alters “young children's understanding of events”, which is foremost “shaped by their cognitive development” (2002, p. 31). Of greater consequence to this thesis is the idea voiced by Karl E. Bauman *et al* that violence can have an impact on the social learning process, because “Social learning theory posits that aggression is learned by observing the behaviour of others and its positive consequences” (1999, p. 331). In other words, children and young people who observe the effect of violence on others or on themselves as a dominating force and method of social control, and who are not exposed to other more peaceful means of conflict resolution and mediation, are more likely to adopt aggressive modes of behaviour as they grow older.

---

<sup>42</sup> One example is Jonathan Githens-Mazer's work on 'The Blowback of Repression and the Dynamics of North African Radicalisation' (2009).

<sup>43</sup> E.g. Suzanne Brenner's 'Private Moralities in the Public Sphere' (2011).

David P. Farrington surmises that conduct disorder, aggression and delinquency are often “transmitted from parents to children” (2004, p. 640). In particular, he writes that child victimisation has a strong causal link to adolescent antisocial behaviour, and argues that:

First, childhood victimization may have both immediate and long-lasting consequences (e.g., shaking may cause brain injury). Second, childhood victimization may cause bodily changes (e.g., desensitization to pain) that encourage later aggression. Third, child abuse may lead to impulsive or dissociative coping styles that in turn lead to poor problem-solving skills or poor school performance. Fourth, victimization may cause changes in self-esteem or in social information-processing patterns that encourage later aggression. Fifth, child abuse may lead to changed family environments (e.g., being placed in foster care) that have deleterious effects. Sixth, juvenile justice practices may label victims, isolate them from prosocial peers, and encourage them to associate with delinquent peers. (p. 640-641)

While Farrington is writing here specifically about peaceful contexts, where child abuse stems mainly from the home or the community and falls within the remits of the state to interfere, his arguments are easily extended to conflict-affected countries and fragile states where children and young people are affected by military and social violence, and where they are easily separated from their families by displacement, economic migration and numerous other trends.

If it is found that this theory holds true in fragile states, it could mean that violence and young offending are self-perpetuating cycles. This argument is supported by much of the literature on conflict and development, with Paul Collier *et al*, among other theorists<sup>44</sup>, arguing that many fragile states are in danger of falling into a “conflict trap”, where violence, once initiated, becomes very difficult to overcome (2003). A key issue for investigation here would be the extent to which violence is perceived by children and young people to be a natural phenomenon in Yemen and other fragile states, as well as the extent to which violence is glorified or idealised. This will form an important theme in Chapter 6, which will endeavour to determine the validity of all three theoretical branches that have informed the development of the hypothesis.

If they are found to be accurate when combined with characteristics of state fragility like poverty, underdevelopment, and widespread social and political violence, then these three theoretical outlooks will come together to form a disturbing picture of the situation in which young people must live their lives in conflict affected fragile states. Firstly, conflict emerges as a direct threat to state legitimacy. Groups of combatants challenge the authority of the government so that the population at large begins to question (often with good reason) the ability of the state to protect them from harm. Throughout such periods, law enforcement institutions are usually painted with the same brush as the authorities that they serve, often being used as tools of political control or even coercion rather than as units for social protection (John Casey, 2010, p. 63). Secondly, the reduced availability of educational facilities and employment opportunities within fragile states, coupled with displacement and the break-up of communities that accompanies conflict and natural disaster, leads to the obliteration of any positive networks of social interaction for young people that would otherwise have protected their cognitive development. Thirdly, prolonged exposure to

---

<sup>44</sup> Other notable writers who have discussed the idea that conflict is self-propagating include Robert Zoellick (2009) and Mary Kaldor (2000). The works of these theorists will be revisited in Chapter 6, sections 6.2 and 6.3.

violence or the constant threat of violence, as is common in fragile contexts, can lead to the build-up of significant emotional pressure that pushes young people into adopting anti-social modes of behaviour. Such behaviour is reinforced by the lessons taught to young people by their social experiences.

Combined, these three theoretical dimensions lead to the conclusion that pervasive violence, a breakdown of government legitimacy and an erosion of traditional norms of socialisation create favourable conditions for increased violent offending among young people within fragile states, as well as to the secondary conclusion that such problem behaviour will likely continue or mutate into political radicalisation if it is not interrupted by positive interventions. It is clear, even within this short overview of existing criminological theories, that any attempt to extract a unifying theory of crime causation at a nation-wide level in Yemen, let alone at a fragile-states based global level, will be severely hampered by a tendency for over-generalisation that could obstruct the interaction of these theories with the less observable nuances of the local setting. By focusing upon principles of legitimacy and authority, socio-economic phenomena and other universally recognisable dynamics that might be measured and analysed in multiple countries, these theories risk obscuring the cultural factor, whereby local community structures can be incredibly important for determining criminal behaviour. While these theories have heavily informed the theoretical approaches of this thesis they have also been subsidised by additional research and other bodies of literature, while the author has strived at all times to continue to question both their reliability and their applicability within Yemen.

### 1.3.2 Supplementary Theoretical Approaches

While the hypothesis put forward by this thesis emerges from the triple-theory approach detailed above, other theoretical modes of analysis have played an important role. Additional theories relating to fragility, conflict causation and criminology are analysed in order to limit the biases of the overarching approach. In discussing these, the author will avoid references to criminal insanity along with other psychiatric disorders, and will adopt arguments that are more suited to the thin rational choice model of human behaviour.




Figure 13 Integrated Theoretical Approach

Far from making the case that all criminal behaviour is rational, this thesis strives to analyse behaviour in terms of opportunity; the availability of resources; necessity; and social values. Individual actors are as self-interested agents who make cost-benefit decisions every day that dictate the way in which they interact with one another, even within a “mindless violence” context. The extent to which trauma and stress impact their ability to make such decisions effectively is a

crucial point that will deserve some analysis, with stress emerging as an important determinant for violence in fragile states<sup>45</sup>.

The rational choice approach provides a unifying method of analysing behaviour under multiple theoretical dimensions, allowing for a coherent analytical framework that does not jump significantly in its discourse on crime as it manoeuvres between different arguments and subject areas. This mode of analysis is used primarily to help the thesis to meet Stephen M. Walt's criterion that all social science must aim "to develop knowledge that is relevant to understanding important social problems" in a way that is above all "logically consistent", but also "precise ... original, and empirically valid" (1999). Logical consistency, as strengthened through a particular understanding of behaviour that analyses people as being self-interested, has been deemed an important basis of this thesis' theoretical approach because: "without logical consistency, neither the originality of a theory nor its empirical validity can be judged" (Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and James D. Morrow, 1999, p. 45).

This approach fits well with the thin rational choice model, which assumes that all participants in the research and other agents are rational actors, "positing the individual as a strategic actor who makes choices according to rational criteria" (Geoff Cooper, 2001, p. 5). According to Daniel Little, under the rational choice theory:

Individuals are assumed to have a set of interests against which they evaluate alternative courses of action; they assign costs and benefits to various possible choices and choose an action after surveying the pros and cons of each. (1991, p.41)

By understanding the behaviour of children and young people according to this model, rather than according to a model that analyses them as purely opportunistic delinquents, it is easier to find entry points for intervention and to establish a productive dialogue with young offenders.

The obvious danger of using this model for the explanation of human behaviour is that rational choice theory involves a great deal of assumption to be made on the part of the author, including the assumption that an agent's choices can be predictable for outsiders that have sufficient access to data. However, the rational choice theory is not the sole theory utilised within this thesis and the author has attempted, wherever possible, to substantiate her arguments with empirical evidence. The merger of these different theoretical approaches has been used to limit assumptions and to provide an accurate portrayal of the situation faced by children and young people in Yemen. This methodology is not without its limitations and potential dangers, which the author has strived to limit through constant observation and self-evaluation.

## **1.4 Literature Reviews and Desk-Based Research**


Using Bob Hancké's guidelines for research design (2010), this thesis is built on a foundation of extensive theme-based literature reviews that are intended in Chapters 4 and 6 especially to engage with the principal theorists working in the fields of criminology and state fragility. Such reviews are based upon the theoretical framework outlined in this Chapter and are supported by the

---

<sup>45</sup> Stress will emerge as an important factor in violent young offending during the analysis that will take place in Chapter 6, sections 6.6 and 6.7.

author's theoretical approaches. Literature has been reviewed using qualitative methods, where an emphasis on discourse-based and historical analysis are encouraged alongside the in-depth investigation of only a single or a very small number of case studies (Ariande Vromen, 2010).

At the initial research stage, a comprehensive literature review was undertaken in order to document theories relating to the causes of crime and conflict, and the interaction between these two areas. It was found that few academic works intersected both criminological theory and the study of state fragility, and the author was determined to marry the two disciplines within her thesis. Upon further reading, it was found that the scope of such an undertaking was too wide for the confines of this project, and the research focus was narrowed to encompass one single case study with a more specific exploration of violent young offending – a form of offending that was deemed to be over-represented in fragile states.



**Figure 14 The Narrowing of The Research Focus Through Consecutive Literature Reviews**

Once the case study and sample group had been selected, a second literature review was initiated in order to analyse and interpret theories of displacement; cognitive development; young offending; and, youth justice. At the same time, the author began to read extensively on the subject of Yemen, its history and development. Once field work was initiated, the author was able to gain access to a comprehensive array of unpublished project documents and reports written by international organisations, research institutions and government bodies in Yemen. This spurred a separate desk-based research phase, during which a qualitative research technique, adapted from Ariande Vromen's guide to qualitative methods, was used to categories project texts and documents on Yemen, and to analyse them according to their status as primary and secondary sources using an interpretive discourse-analysis method (2010).

According to this method, original documents that were produced “by political actors ranging from executive, parliamentary or judicial arms of government, policy-making agencies or non-government organisations” were considered primary sources that reflected the normative values, development priorities and financial interests of the authors (Vromen, 2010). Scholarly journal articles, on the other hand, were classed as secondary sources whose intended purpose was “unbiased” analysis (though these could be assessed according to their ability to achieve this goal). In accordance with Vromen's guide, which builds upon the work of John Scott (1990), the reliability of primary sources was assessed according to four criteria, which included: authenticity; credibility (accuracy); representativeness (assessed according to whether a document offered a “typical”

interpretation of an event); and, meaning (clarity and comprehensiveness) (2010, pp. 262-263) (See Table 3).

<b>Document Type</b>	<b>Primary</b>	<b>Primary</b>	<b>Secondary</b>
	<i>The authors are active participants in the events described</i>	<i>The authors are active participants in the events described</i>	<i>The authors are not actively involved in the events described</i>
<b>Example Document</b>	Republic of Yemen, <i>National Environment Summary</i> , 2010	Food and Agriculture Organisation with the World Food Programme, <i>FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to Yemen</i> , 2009	Gerhard Lichtenhäler, <i>Political Economy and the Role of Water: Environment, Society and Economy in Northern Yemen</i> , 2003
<b>Is it Authentic?</b>	Yes, this is an authentic report produced by the Government of Yemen	Yes, this is an authentic report produced by the FAO and the WFP	N/A
<b>Is it Accurate and Credible?</b>	Yes, the document provides an accurate account of environmental challenges, but over-emphasises progress made through policy changes	Yes	Yes, though the account is out of date
<b>Does it Represent a “Typical” Interpretation of the Environmental Challenges in Yemen?</b>	Yes.	Yes	Yes
<b>Is it Clear and Comprehensive?</b>	Yes.	Yes	Yes

**Table 3 Source Evaluation Processes**

After the completion of the field research stage, the author took some time to consolidate data gathered with the literature she had read, undertaking new investigations into specific theories or development programmes. A final literature review was carried out as the foundation of Chapter 5, through which the author was able to carry out an in-depth examination of formal and informal justice systems in Yemen.



**Figure 15 Systematic Literature Review and Desk-Based Research Phases**

Throughout the lifetime of the three year project, the author has made substantial efforts to keep her thesis up to date with new occurrences documented within local and international media broadcasts. The need for such additional research was increased once the Arab Spring began in 2011, as this brought with it a series of rapid changes and violent escalations within the Yemeni context that required some alteration of the overall research methodology.

### **1.5 Data Sources**

A number of different data sources have been used in the production of this thesis. For theoretical background research, the author has looked to academic journals and textbooks on state fragility, criminology, child development and political organisation, including governance and law enforcement. In addition, Yemen's history has been studied extensively through anthropological, historic and political accounts of the territory's evolution and the emergence of the contemporary country. By undertaking contractual research with the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit of the University of York, the author has further been able to gain access to a wealth of project documents provided by United Nations organisations as well as by the Yemeni Government, including monthly and annual Ministry reports. These have been complemented by independent assessments of the country's development status published by research institutes like the RAND Organisation and Chatham House.

In terms of gathering the statistical data necessary to provide an account of Yemen's crime patterns, the author has had to rely heavily upon national statistics published by the Government of Yemen's Central Statistical Organisation. Primary data sources used for this purpose have included the Organisation's *Statistical Yearbooks* of 2005 to 2010 and *Security and Justice Statistics* of 2003 to 2009. In order to resolve issues of bias arising from an over-reliance upon Governmental data sources, the author has striven wherever possible to verify trends emerging from Government reports with United Nations data, made available by *Undata*, as well as with trends identified by the *Global Peace Index* and the *World Prison Population List*. For a more impartial take on the reliability of Government data, the author has relied heavily upon Dennis Jay Kenney's report on *Public Perceptions of the Police in Yemen*, which deals with reporting and other issues that may have impacted the ability of the state to gather statistical data in the country.

Finally, all research has been complemented by stakeholder interviews with high-level Governmental representatives and representatives of the international community, as well as grass-roots level interviews and surveys. These were used primarily to verify identified trends, rather than to gain new lines of investigation.

### 1.5.1 Data Coverage

Statistical analyses of crime patterns are problematic by nature because crime itself is an activity that is designed to occur undetected. While it is obvious that law-breakers usually have a vested interest in ensuring that their actions remain unreported, victims of crime may also have an endless array of reasons not to bring the offences committed against them to the attention of official law enforcement services. To make matters more complicated, justice systems are not perfect, and those who are accused or even convicted of crime are not necessarily guilty, while those who are acquitted are not always innocent. Statistical records have no way of reflecting these ambiguities. Institutional corruption, both before and after a crime is reported, further obscures the reality hidden behind the numbers. It is fairly safe to assume that no country's statistical records, no matter how well kept, can be said to provide an accurate portrait of its criminal life. In *Crime in England and Wales*, Chris Kershaw *et al* emphasise that the *British Crime Survey*, a tool used by the British Home Office to canvass victims of crime across the United Kingdom, was never intended to "provide a total count of crime, but to provide robust trends in crime over time" (p. 7). Robust trends are the best for which researchers and practitioners in the field can hope.

Statistical records in Yemen are less reliable than those kept in England and Wales, with large areas of the country isolated from the state by conflict or natural disaster, and other rural settings lacking the infrastructure necessary to detect and process offences through official channels. Associated discrepancies in data trends are evident from the fact that certain governorates in Yemen, like Al-Jawf, have consistently shown a significantly lower rate of reporting than their neighbours<sup>46</sup>. While certain parts of Yemen, particularly in the capital where reporting is substantially higher than elsewhere, may be said to provide a more detailed survey area than Al-Jawf; data availability in Yemen as a whole is relatively high when compared to other fragile states.

---

<sup>46</sup> As will be argued in Chapter 3, this likely denotes a failure on the part of the state to detect offences because Al Jawf is otherwise considered to be at heightened risk of exposure to criminogenic influences like the high availability of weapons and elevated levels of poverty. See section 3.4.

Although Government statistics may provide uneven coverage of crime rates in different governorates, they nonetheless provide a continuous and consistent portrait of each governorate individually over time, allowing for the extrapolation of country-wide and area-specific trends.

From 2003 to 2010, these statistics have been relatively comprehensive, allowing the author to gain a genuine glimpse of patterns of offending across the country. As of 2011, with the advent of the Arab Spring, the Government of Yemen has experienced a significant deterioration of its administrative capacities, limiting the reliability of official statistics. The author has therefore substituted for official data by running detailed online surveys and telephone interviews with Yemeni people demonstrating in favour of and against President Saleh's regime. These participants have been asked to comment on perceived changes in criminality that have emerged as a result of the protests. This data has been used to estimate changes in patterns of offending up to December 2011, which was determined as the cut-off point for the admission of new information into this thesis (though some expert consultations continued to be carried out in 2012, in order to verify and validate existing findings).

While surveys and interviews offered an important way of maintaining access to wide portions of the country, as of August and September 2011 respondents tended increasingly to represent inhabitants of the Sana'a governorate. This change in data coverage probably occurred as massive power cuts throughout Yemen began to heavily disrupt access to online survey tools. It remained possible to identify important changes in patterns of offending after 2011 despite these restrictions, and these changes have been reflected in the analysis and arguments of this thesis.

### **1.5.2 Reporting**

The validity of the Central Statistical Organisation's records falls somewhat into question when rates of reporting are taken into account. Although Dennis Kenney has demonstrated that more than 64% of his 6,000 Yemeni interviewees across the country who have admitted to falling victim to crime also said that they reported the offence to the police, the author of this thesis has proven unable to reproduce his findings. Approximately 90% of the 61 Yemenis interviewed and surveyed asserted that they would not report an offence to the police if they fell victim to crime. Instead, interviewees claimed that they would seek assistance from hospitals if they were injured in the course of an offence, from community leaders, families, tribes or non-governmental organisations if they required assistance, and from lawyers if they required legal representation in securing reparations. When asked why they would not seek police assistance, those interviewed, including supporters of President Saleh's regime and protesters against it, claimed that law enforcement services would do nothing to help them, indicating a significant break in community-police relations.

The discrepancy between these findings and Kenney's can be attributed to the Arab Spring. In this sense, Kenney's findings may still speak to the reliability of Government statistics gathered prior to 2008. In 2011, when the author endeavoured to reproduce his experiment, most law enforcement services had been redirected towards containing public demonstrations and many were accused of corruption and human rights abuses. It is not surprising that public confidence in law enforcement services should have diminished throughout this time. It should be noted that Dennis Kenney had access to a larger sampling group. Both surveys would indicate that there has

been a decrease in the reporting of offences in Yemen. This means that offending rates shown in Government statistics can be assumed to be an underestimation of the true rate. Certain types of offences remain generally under-reported in the country due to cultural and religious stigmatisation. In particular, sexual offences committed against men and women, as well as domestic abuses, are generally denied by victims before both law enforcement services and independent researchers in order to avoid shaming their families (*Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations Population Fund, 14 August, 2010*).

### **1.5.3 Data Limitations**

While project reports and documents provide detailed and useful accounts of Yemen's development context, one of the principal limitations of Yemen's national statistics and the United Nation's data collection services is that they are disaggregated by year, rather than by month. Unfortunately, it is not possible to correlate Yemeni patterns of offending against peaks in political unrest, conflict, poverty, unemployment, or other key indicators. Nevertheless, a triangulation of data findings through the use of multiple data sources has helped in the extraction of useful and telling trends. In particular, interviews conducted with Yemeni nationals throughout 2011 have assisted the author in finding anecdotal evidence connecting violent offending to a nationwide dissatisfaction with the current political order. Beyond this, background reading, elite stakeholder interviews conducted in 2010, and expert consultations run throughout 2011 and 2012 have allowed the author to gain an in-depth understanding of the Yemeni development context.

## **1.6 Field Work**

Yemen is a country with a fluctuating security situation, which offers researchers only limited windows of opportunity to carry out field work safely. The author of this thesis chose to undertake fieldwork in phases, first testing theories of crime causation in safer locations, such as England and Northern Ireland, before travelling to Yemen in 2010 to conduct a series of elite stakeholder interviews to gain a better understanding of the country's development context. In 2011, before it was possible to conduct field research at the grass-roots level, the window of opportunity closed as the Arab Spring rendered the security situation in the country too unstable for independent travel. In particular, a dramatic increase in hostility against foreigners, and Western academics among them, was observed<sup>47</sup>. Throughout the year, airports in the country began to cancel international flights, while in August of 2011 Sana'a Airport was closed down entirely due to nearby Government clashes with Hashed tribesmen (Yemen Post, 2011). In light of these socio-political changes, the author was only able to complete two probing field research phases, while more specialised research was undertaken at a distance through telephone interviews and online surveys<sup>48</sup>. Field work conducted both within the United Kingdom and in Yemen was developed in line with strict ethical guidelines.

---

<sup>47</sup> This will be detailed further in Chapter 2. See section 2.4 for a full overview of conflicts and political crises in Yemen.

<sup>48</sup> See section 1.8 for a full account of distance research methods used.

### **1.6.1 Ethical Framework for Field Work Conducted**

A wealth of ethical implications accompanies social research and particularly any research that seeks to document the experiences of children and young people, and conflict-affected communities because “Research with human participants is an intrusive process” (Geoff Lindsay, 2000, p. 3). To minimise any potentially harmful consequences for all field research conducted, the author took care to operate within a set of strict ethical parameters, loosely adapted from the British Educational Research Association's (BERA) *Revised Ethical Guidelines for Educational Research* (2004), in order to manage the expectations of all participants. In particular, the author committed herself to conducting her studies according to the BERA principle of voluntary informed consent, which dictates:

Researchers must take the steps necessary to ensure that all participants in the research understand the process in which they are to be engaged, including why their participation is necessary, how it will be used and how and to whom it will be reported.  
(p. 6)

Such consent includes the absolute right of all participants to withdraw their consent at any time in the research process and for any reason, without the obligation to inform the author of such reasons. This principle of informed consent was merged within this thesis with the ideals developed and espoused by Lindsay in his overview of the European Federation of Professional Psychologists Association's codes of practice. These ideals are:

- that researchers must at all times maintain respect for the rights and dignity of their participants;
- that researchers “should be competent, know when to increase their competence by training, and when to seek the support of another skilled or knowledgeable researcher” (p. 19);
- that researchers should at all times “have regard to scientific professional responsibility, and have a sense of social responsibility” (p, 19);
- and that researchers should conduct their studies with a sense of integrity.

To protect young participants in particular, the author undertook to act in accordance with the BERA guideline that “in all actions concerning children, the best interests of the child must be the primary consideration”, while “children who are capable of forming their own views should be granted the right to express their views freely in all matters affecting them, commensurate with their age and maturity” (p. 7). These last two principles stem from the United Nations 1990 *Convention on the Rights of the Child* (articles 3 and 12). In the application of the field research methodology, these principles were taken to mean specifically that children and young people were not to be pushed into discussing their experiences of conflict, violence or trauma with the author, who had not at the time of interview received sufficient training to address such issues in a way that maintained and protected their psychological well-being. Questioning was designed specifically to avoid all foreseeable harm to participants.

### **1.6.2 Training and Preparation, Including Research into Crime Causation**

Prior to entry into the field, the author undertook specialised training and experimented with various data gathering techniques, in order to build competence and to act in as much of a

scientifically professional and socially responsible manner as possible. This training and preparation represented the first research stage and was used to test the reliability of crime causation theories in general and in conflict-affected countries more specifically.

The author had some previous experience of running interviews and surveys among refugee communities, law enforcement professionals, high ranking members of international organisations and government officials before undertaking this research project. This was gained by: running healthcare appraisals among Iraqi refugees in Jordan with the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit (2008); participating in the training of Iraqi, Jordanian and Russian law enforcement officials from all levels with the International Organisation for Migration (2009); interviewing high-level dignitaries at the first annual West Asia North Africa Forum on Reconstruction and Development (2009); and, participating in other similar field research exercises. Owing to the specific challenges of researching children and young people, as combined with the sensitivity of crime and young offending as a cultural issue across the world, the author opted to undertake additional specialised training with the York Youth Offending Team and spent the 2009 to 2011 period volunteering part-time with the North Yorkshire Police and the Youth Offending Team in York, England, as an “appropriate adult”. This role involved ensuring the welfare of young people during police interviews.

Working with young people aged 10 to 17 in custody, the author was able not only to gain experience of talking with young offenders about their backgrounds and aspirations but also to establish a baseline of their responses against which to contrast the Yemeni development context, correlating violence in the home and economic deprivation with offender backgrounds. It was found that young offenders, and particularly violent young offenders, faced extreme difficulties in thinking about their futures, and that few had considered possible positive methods of contributing to society, such as gaining legal employment. Most had ceased attending school and retained virtually no contact with their parents. Many lived in Government facilities. In addition, very few of them were able to successfully take responsibility for their offences, exhibiting an inherent disconnection between their decisions to take action and their ability to anticipate the consequences of those actions. Invariably, their actions were always seen to be the product of someone else's behaviour or someone else's mistakes (thus, in one instance, a child had struck a social worker because the latter had told him to go back to his room, while, in another, a young offender had assaulted a police officer because they had grabbed his wrist too tightly).

This process of working with young offenders (during which a little under 50 young offenders were interviewed) was deemed sufficient for testing theories of violent crime causation. It was not sufficient for establishing a causal link between young offending and development or conflict, though some economic-based observations were inevitable when virtually all offenders came from relatively impoverished backgrounds. The author therefore also determined that it was necessary to test basic assumptions about young offending within conflict-affected environments safely, before travelling to Yemen. The author was able to test and refine her survey techniques thanks to the cooperation of Hydebank Wood, a young offender's centre and prison in South Belfast, where 56 inmates participated in surveys in February 2010. Their identities were strictly protected, though their key demographics were recorded, including their ages and genders. They were asked to state whether they had felt safe in their neighbourhoods prior to being incarcerated, as well as whether they had felt safe in their homes. They were also encouraged to state the nature of their

offences. It was found, overall, that those who had committed the most violent offences, including grievous bodily harm, manslaughter, and in one case murder, had felt intimidated either within their homes or within their communities, indicating a positive correlation between broad social violence and the tendency towards violent offending. Those who had committed so-called “petty” crimes tended to have felt relatively safer.

It was hoped that these experiences of working with young offenders, coupled with the experience of working in other Middle Eastern contexts, would provide the author with the skills and sensitivity necessary to conduct her field work, while providing an effective means of testing the reliability of accepted criminological theories.

### **1.6.3 Yemen Field Work**

The author was able to travel to Yemen through the invitation of her primary supervisor, Professor Sultan Barakat, to perform a rapid appraisal of the Yemeni context, or a Common Country Assessment (CCA), as part of a research team. This allowed her to implement an exploratory field research stage in order to build a holistic understanding of the country's development status. The research was conducted in Yemen by Alexandra Lewis and three senior research staff members from the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) including: Professor Sultan Barakat; Dr David Connolly; and, Dr Sean Deely. Mr. Sam Milton, a doctoral candidate at the PRDU, provided research support throughout this time from his post at the University of York in England. The CCA, written by these members of the PRDU, represented an investigation commissioned by the United Nations Development Project as part of the United Nations Yemen Country Team in June 2010. Participation in this project offered the author the opportunity to sit in on and contribute to interviews with high-level Government and non-governmental representatives, integrating her own doctoral questions within these, with the permission of her supervisor and the interviewees.

Perhaps most importantly, the author was able to secure an interview with the Yemeni Minister of Justice for 2010, Ismail Ahmad al-Wazir, and his cabinet, including his Deputy Ministers and heads of Juvenile Justice. The author was able to take the lead in these interviews, and to gain access to Ministry of Justice data and internal documents, as well as to establish a line of communication with Ministry of Justice Liaisons from the United Nations Development Project. Interviews conducted at the Ministry of Justice centred upon their judicial reform programmes, their priorities for development, their capacities (including their geographic service delivery capacities), their integration with alternative dispute resolution processes, and ground-level perceptions and utilisation of state justice processes. These interviews were extremely detailed and comprehensive, representing approximately two hours of direct interaction (with Minister al-Wazir leaving the room roughly an hour into the interviews due to other engagements), succeeded by follow-up questions and communications by e-mail.

Equally informative were meetings held at the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Education, though these were led by Dr Sean Deely and Dr David Connolly respectively. Here, findings relating to corruption and youth integration within employment and education sectors were very informative, and have been referenced extensively with regard to their relation to established

criminological theories throughout this thesis<sup>49</sup>. The validity of these findings was verified through parallel interviews with country directors of the UN International Children's Emergency Fund, the UN Development Project, the International Organisation for Migration and the International Labour Organisation, among others (see Table 4). While the author did not individually interview each of these, her thesis-related questions were integrated into interviews wherever relevant, and the author had access to all interview transcripts.

The wide range of stakeholders interviewed is indicative of the broad research and analytical parameters of the CCA project that the PRDU was commissioned to write, which represented the implementation of a standard analytical tool of the UN system. The purpose of the CCA model is to document and evaluate a country's development progress from a human rights based approach and over a five year period (in this case, 2005-2010). It measures the extent to which a country has moved towards the international goals enshrined within the *Millennium Declaration* of 2000 and outlines the corresponding steps taken by local governments to meet national priorities within the given time frame. The broad nature of the CCA framework allowed the author to participate within a multi-sectoral analysis of Yemen that enabled her to study its politics, economy, infrastructure, business markets, education levels, health systems and resources, along with many other indicators that form a major influence on the country's young people today.

Stakeholder Type	Consulted Stakeholders	Consultation Date
International Government Organisations	United Nations Resident Coordinator*; United Nations Country Team*; United Nations Development Project*; United Nations Population Fund*; World Food Programme*; Food and Agriculture Organisation*	14 August, 2010
	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund*; World Health Organisation; International Fund for Agricultural Development*; International Labour Organisation*; Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	15 August, 2010
	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; International Organisation for Migration*; World Bank	16 August, 2010
Yemeni Government Ministries	Ministry of Health and Population; Ministry of Human Rights; Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation	15 August, 2010
	Ministry of Fish Wealth; Ministry of Social and Labour Affairs*; Ministry of State for Parliamentary and Shura Affairs; Ministry for Strategic Planning; Social Fund for Development; Supervising Committee for Relieving IDPs, Operational Unit for IDPs Camps	16 August, 2010
	Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation; Women's National Committee; Ministry of Water and Environment; Ministry of Education*; Ministry of Justice*; Ministry of Local Administration	17 August, 2010
International Donors	United States Agency for International Development; European Union Delegation	17 August, 2010
	United Kingdom Department for International Development	18 August, 2010

Table 4 Stakeholders Consulted in Sana'a, Yemen, During the Field Research Stage<sup>50</sup>

<sup>49</sup> The findings of these meetings have been integrated into Chapters 2, 3, 5 and 8.

<sup>50</sup> Starred stakeholders denote interviews in which the author was either present or took the lead.

The CCA research process offered opportunities to gain access to a wide range of elite stakeholders who not only represented members of the Yemeni state, but also included the heads of international government organisations and foreign donors. Each stakeholder was consulted within a semi-structured in-depth interview format, the aim of which was to extract their understandings of the development context in Yemen and to capture their priorities for the future. Their interviews were used to determine the reliability of available literature on state fragility in Yemen, and to identify trends in recent socio-political and economic development. In other words, the purpose of each interview at this stage followed Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman's guidelines for *Designing Qualitative Research*, which require the exploration of “a few general topics to help uncover how the participant[s] fram[e] and structur[e their] responses” (2006, p. 101).

Marshall and Rossman argue that the appropriate use of in-depth interview techniques allows the “participant's perspective on the phenomenon of interest” to “unfold as the participant views it (the emic perspective), not as the author views it (the etic perspective)” (p. 105). Certainly, this tool proved very useful in the interview of elite stakeholders in Yemen, who are “considered to be influential, prominent and/ or well-informed” members of their organisations or communities that were “selected [for interview] on the basis of their expertise in areas relevant to the research” (Marshall and Rossman, 2006, p. 105). In particular, interviewees offered an insight into the structures and operations of influential organisations working to fulfil set agendas in Yemen and allowed the author to get a better grasp of the challenges barring progress away from Yemen's state of fragility, as well as to identify opportunities for change.

The nature of the elite stakeholders consulted was such that they often represented multiple parties, both local and international, working in the same sectors of development. This allowed the author and the research team to triangulate their findings prior to drawing decisive conclusions from them. Finally, because the CCA is meant to stem from a collaborative research process, the author, as part of the research team, was able to present important findings back to the stakeholders, and particularly to the United Nations Country Team, for further comment in order to test various interpretations of the available data. This allowed stakeholders to maintain their active participation in the research process and to draw attention to any gaps or areas of concern within the final CCA document. The resulting network of communication that the research project produced allowed the author not only to gain access to governmental and non-governmental documents, project reports and unpublished data, but also to establish the important connections that would facilitate distance research after the advent of the Arab Spring. Unfortunately, having been part of a team contracted by the UN in this project, the author was not necessarily viewed as an impartial party by all stakeholders. However, without the facilitation of the UN Country Team in this and other research areas, it would not have been possible for the author to gain the same degree of access to participants and their opinions.

As part of the research conducted by the PRDU, it was found that an inherent disconnection existed between UN and Government of Yemen development priorities, which triggered a conflict of competing narratives whereby participants often held contradictory interpretations of the same social phenomena, calling their arguments into question. Emerging issues of particular relevance were the preservation of Yemeni tribal customs, cultural practices and religious beliefs, as manipulated by the state to foster territorial control and legitimacy, versus the prioritisation of counter-terrorism and counter-Islamic radicalisation programming by large donors and the defence

of human rights by international organisations. These competing priorities no doubt contributed in some way to the social pressures that led to a nation-wide backlash against the Yemeni state in 2011<sup>51</sup>.

One immediate unfortunate implication of the Arab Spring protests that followed in Yemen was that many statistical data findings gathered as a result of this field work became rapidly outdated by the completion of this thesis. However, it has been determined that the strategies and opinions of major stakeholders, particularly international stakeholders, have remained constant throughout this time, while security and justice initiatives launched by the Yemeni state prior to 2011, especially as they concerned juvenile crime, have not been altered or withdrawn. This has been confirmed through the expert consultations detailed below. Therefore, the benefits of fieldwork conducted in 2010 have remained extremely relevant to the completion of this study.

## 1.7 Expert Consultations

Throughout the completion of this thesis, the author verified the validity of her findings through expert consultations conducted in England in 2011 and 2012. Key organisations with strong research presences in Yemen were contacted, and interviews with experts on the Yemeni development context were requested with their staff members. Such interviews were successfully arranged with Chatham House, the Department for International Development and Islamic Relief. Likewise, interviews were held with experts on urban violence and Middle Eastern security sector reform in order to help validate suggestions put forward in Chapters 7 and 8. Each of these interviews served a dual function, with data collection being their primary purpose, and networking being their secondary purpose. In other words, they served as conduits for establishing new contacts through a snow-balling effect, whereby interviews with one specialist would lead to contact details for additional interviewees and so on, with many of those interviewed being based in Yemen. The author also used specialist events, such as the 2012 Chatam House public presentation on *Yemen: A Way Forward*<sup>52</sup>, to gain access to additional people working in or researching Yemen.

Key experts interviewed as part of this research stage included: Nicholas Hopton, British Ambassador to Yemen; Kate Nevens, Middle East and North Africa Programme Manager for Chatham House; Danniell Shimmin, Yemen Governance Advisor for the Department for International Development; Kerrin Smith, North Yorkshire Police Officer and Security Sector Reform Consultant; Martin Baines, former Police Inspector and founding Director of Pacalis Associates and MDB Coaching Associates; Letta Taylor from the Human Rights Watch in Yemen; Erinma Bell, urban gun violence expert and founding member of Charisma, Manchester; Khaled Almulad, Country Director for Islamic Relief in Yemen; James Firebrace, Director of JFA Consulting; Husam al-Sharjabi of the Yemeni Civic Coalition of Revolutionary Youth; Rafat al Akhali of Resonate Yemen; Maysaa Shujaaldeen, a prominent Yemeni journalist; Nadwa al Dawsari of the Partners for Sustainable Leadership programme in Yemen; and, Atiaf Alwazir, a major Yemeni activist and author of the Woman in Yemen blog. Upon the request of several participants, interview transcripts have not been included in this thesis.

---

<sup>51</sup> See Chapter 2, sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.4, as well as Chapter 7, section 7.4 to learn more about the impact of donorship on conflict in Yemen and the impact of aid on state legitimacy, respectively.

<sup>52</sup> This was held in London on March 7, 2012.

Depending on the identity and background of the participants, interviews generally followed one of two structures aimed at foreign experts and Yemeni nationals respectively. In both instances, the author's primary interest was youth violence, aggression and isolation. Some questions about the events of 2011 were also asked in order to help the author to keep up-to-date with political changes in Yemen. Either way, these were always linked back to youth participation and youth engagement, so as to entice the experts into talking about the situation of young people in Yemen. However, questions of youth engagement were always asked after questions relating to demographics, so that the author would not unintentionally lead the interviewees.

Foreign expert consultations loosely followed the interview outlined below, with more person-specific questions integrated into this structure in order to reflect the knowledge and background of interviewees.

<b>Foreign Expert Consultation Questions</b>	
1	Could you start by telling me about your own background, your work and your organisation?
2	What is your assessment of the current situation in Yemen? What would you say were the main causes of the instability we witnessed in 2011?
3	How would you categorise the demographics of protesters who participated in the Arab Spring in Yemen?
4	Why do you think the Arab Spring has proved to be so appealing to young people in Yemen?
5	Do you believe that patterns of violence have changed in Yemen over the past five to ten years? If so, would you say that violence, including social and political violence, is increasing or decreasing?
6	What do you think are the main forms of violence in Yemen? Is violence social, political, tribal, or discriminatory, for instance?
7	Who would you say are the main perpetrators of violence in Yemen?
8	Do you believe that the appointment of the new president will help to stem violence in 2012?
9	How much of a relationship would you say that young people have with their Government in Yemen today?
10	Do you think that under the new regime young people will be encouraged to play a bigger role in the political process?

**Table 5 Standardised Research Questions Used for Foreign Expert Consultations**

Interviews conducted with Yemeni nationals were aimed at extracting more specific information about the overall behaviour of young people throughout this time, including their commitment to stated principles of non-violence.

<b>Yemeni Expert Consultation Questions</b>	
1	Could you start by telling me about your own background, your work and your organisation.
2	What is your assessment of the current situation in Yemen? What would you say were the main causes of the instability we witnessed in 2011?
3	How important would you say that social media and the internet were for facilitating the Arab Spring in Yemen?
4	At what point did you become involved in the protests and why did you join them?

5	One of the stated themes of the 2011 protests was change through non-violent reform. How effective do you think protest organisers were in sticking to this goal?
6	What methods did protest organisers use to keep violence low?
7	How difficult was it for you to keep those around you/ members of your movement from resorting to violence?
8	What methods were used by protest organisers to keep protesters safe from harm?
9	Were there instances of skirmishes or physical confrontations between demonstrators?
10	What was the overall demographic make-up of those demonstrators who tended to resort to violent forms of expression?
11	How safe were protesters from petty crime? How serious was crime as a problem during this time?
12	Who did protesters turn to when they fell victim to violence or crime?
13	Who were the main perpetrators of violence in 2011?
14	What do you think is needed in the country now to keep violence from re-emerging in 2012?

**Table 6 Standardised Research Questions Used for Yemeni Expert Consultations**

General questions relating to the tools used by protest organisers were asked, in order to attempt to extract lessons on youth engagement for Chapters 7 and 8, as well as to test the penetration of social media in Yemeni society so as to better inform the methodological design of this thesis.

Interviews with experts on security sector reform and urban violence were less rigidly structured and centred more on clusters of subject areas and the conversations that they generated. Much like the stakeholder interviews carried out at the Yemeni field research stage, these consultations were substantially longer than other expert consultations, lasting between an hour and an hour and thirty minutes.




Figure 16 Security Sector Reform and Urban Violence Expert Consultation Question Clusters

The biggest surprise for the author came from interviews with Yemeni experts and activists, in which participants were extremely candid about the difficulties that they had experienced in trying to keep demonstrators peaceful. Husam Al-Sharjabi, the head of one of the largest youth movements in Yemen, for instance, openly referred to the challenges of keeping demonstrators from “provoking” security forces and inciting violence, where “kids and teenagers” proved the hardest to control in this regard. He stated that this challenge was so difficult that it forced the Civil Coalition for Revolutionary Youth and other like-minded organisations to institute training programmes aimed at teaching demonstrators to communicate with Yemeni security forces in a respectful manner so as to minimise the risk to their own lives (*Interview conducted March 20th, 2012*).<sup>53</sup>

## 1.8 Distance Research

In 2011, it became apparent that the security situation in Yemen was spiralling out of control and that the window of opportunity for independent travel and field research had largely closed. From February of that year onwards, Yemen grew steadily more unstable, with large-scale demonstrations, armed violence, brutal and almost daily reprisals against pro-change protesters, and an escalating threat of terrorist activity, rendered all the more threatening by a resurgence of Al Qaeda in the South of the country, seemingly unaffected by the death of Osama bin Laden earlier that same year. As of late February and early March, Western Governments, of which the United States and Italy proved the most vocal, began to evacuate their citizens from the country, while in

<sup>53</sup> Other findings from these interviews are integrated within Chapters 5 and 6.

late June Yemen officially became one of only four countries<sup>54</sup> to which the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) advised against all travel.

In July, the FCO issued a statement that if those British nationals remaining in Yemen failed to leave the country immediately by commercial means, it would be “extremely unlikely” that the British Government would be able to evacuate them, or even to provide them with access to consular assistance (2011). It became clear at this stage that additional fieldwork would be infeasible within the allotted time-scale for this research project, as a stabilisation of the security situation in the near future was exceedingly unlikely. While these dynamics were steadily unfolding, it also became apparent that field work was no longer the only medium through which it was possible to interact with the Yemeni people at a grass-roots level. In this regard, the importance of social networking websites like Facebook and Twitter in shaping political events and mobilising young people was becoming readily observable. In addition, the anonymity offered by such internet-based methods of communication allowed for potential access to a wide range of Yemeni members of the public, while limiting the dangers for both the author and the respondents – who retained the option to protect their identities at all times. The research methodology was adapted to include elements of distance interview and surveying techniques, accompanied by their own ethical framework and considerations.

### **1.7.1 Ethical Framework for Distance Research Conducted**

As of 2011, not only did it become extremely dangerous for independent researchers to conduct field work in Yemen, but it also became more dangerous for potential Yemeni respondents to answer questions relating to politics and security as reprisals against those who openly criticised the regime were on the increase. From February, high ranking and high profile opposition leaders began to disappear in the country, some of them even taken from hospital beds, as noted by Sarah Leah Whitson of the Human Rights Watch (2011), while Yemenis began to report the arbitrary detention of family members with growing frequency, with many of those missing said to be under the age of 18. While the author strived to conduct distance research in accordance with the BERA guidelines as she had conducted her field work, a supplementary ethical framework was necessary in order to ensure that every precaution had been taken in order to protect respondents from any potential harm arising from their communications. These steps were drawn from the principles of anonymity and confidentiality, as outlined within Vikki Charles *et al*'s paper on the subject (2006).

Seemingly quite similar, the principles of anonymity and confidentiality are fairly distinct from one another and hold various different implications and restrictions for both researchers and respondents. Anonymity is read as a method of protecting identities, while confidentiality is treated as a means of safeguarding privileged information. Both hold implications for data collection and distribution. Yet Charles *et al* argue that confidentiality is by far the more problematic framework for researchers to adopt, since “researchers have a duty to report on the findings of their research and they cannot do so if the data they collect is confidential (i.e. cannot be revealed)” (2006, p. 3).

Although key pieces of information collected during the field research stage were treated with confidentiality due to the contracting restrictions of working within the United Nations system,

---

<sup>54</sup> Other countries included Libya, Somalia and Syria.

these were not directly related to the central themes and issues of this thesis and did not pose significant ethical constraints to the author. Where distance research was concerned, confidentiality was used rather as a masking system, designed to restrict information that could lead to the detection or identification of respondents. Such information, collected in the telephone interview phase, included demographic details, respondent names and locations. In order to work in line with a confidentiality framework, such responses were averaged out to be used to chart trends in data, rather than as specific examples of individuals. This method allows for the reader to gain an understanding of the author's methodology and findings, without revealing information that may have placed respondents in danger.

While confidentiality was used as a general blanket system for protecting sensitive data throughout the distance research phase; as the intensity of public violence increased throughout the Arab Spring so rates of responses began to decrease, indicating a reluctance by participants to come forward in light of new security threats. This led to further alterations to the research methodology and its ethical framework, in order to provide respondents with additional guarantees of full anonymity.

The distance research phase was divided into two parts, and after May 2011 information about Yemeni nationals and their perceptions of crime and insecurity was gathered solely through completely anonymous online surveys. This new data analysis tool offered respondents the ultimate guarantee that the author would not reveal their identities to third parties, as the author chose not to collect such revealing data. This ethical framework allowed for this thesis to respond to a complex and rapidly changing political reality in Yemen, without compromising opportunities for continuing data collection. Meanwhile, any information on named respondents was secured in an encrypted database.

### **1.7.2 Telephone Interviews and Online Surveys**

In their study of *MySpace.com* – one of the first online social networking websites to move into popular usage by young people interested in forming internet-based communities on a global scale – Carpenter *et al* write that: “The internet has enabled social interactions to go beyond the traditional venues of one's community, work and home settings. The internet has created new societies based upon niche interests such as auctions, literature and hobbies” (2006, p. 1). While this statement very much holds the origins of online social networking as we understand it today, it does not take into consideration the fact that the internet has now taken “traditional venues” of social interaction, like community, work and home settings, and has translated those relationships into digital ties developed through websites like Facebook and Twitter, which fuse real world and online networking groups together. Thus, as Sonia Livingstone writes:

In terms of their affordances, social networking sites enable communication among ever-widening circles of contacts, inviting convergence among the hitherto separate activities of e-mail, messaging, website creation, diaries, photo albums and music or video uploading and downloading (2008, p. 394).

Beyond this, social networking sites have provided new points of contact in the sharing of ideas and beliefs for the purposes of developing friendships, business relations and increasing one's international fame.

The usefulness of social networking sites for stimulating communication at a local, national, regional and international level is self-evident. While these tools have always arguably held a phenomenal potential for social mobilisation, it is now, through the Arab Spring, that the Internet's power and influence – even over countries with sporadic access to electricity and connectivity – has become genuinely apparent (though the use of social networking sites in shaping and spurring revolutions is not unprecedented).

The Dubai School of Government note in their annual *Arab Social Media Report* that social networking sites have begun increasingly to “merg[e] online and offline identities” across the Middle East and North Africa regions and that internet-based communication has played a pivotal role in shaping the Arab Spring (2011). The emphasis of these sites on user-created content, rather than on news media or state-controlled information distribution, has played a pivotal role in generating their popularity. This is because people in countries like Yemen began steadily to lose confidence in information provided by governments as well as opposition parties, with one bystander reporting: “We hear the sounds of fighting on a regular basis but we never know what is actually going on because the power is always off ... Even if the power is on we cannot trust the information we get from television, all the news channels have their own agenda.” (Shatha al-Harazi, 2011). In short, the confidence of the people in more traditional forms of social media became substituted by a stronger reliance on online content generated through social networking sites.

Though multiple tools for online networking exist today, including Friendster, Bebo, LiveJournal and others, those sites that have proven particularly dominant within the Middle East and North Africa according to the *Arab Social Media Report* are Facebook and Twitter, with Husam Al-Sharjabi, head of the Civil Coalition for Revolutionary Youth, highlighting in interview that “if you want to reach the young people of Yemen today, you do it through Facebook, even if they are outside of Sana'a. Yemeni youth have become very internet savvy” (interview conducted March 20th, 2012). Twitter and Facebook have been used to keep local communities informed of news about public demonstrations, government crackdowns and violent hotspots; they have been used by those affected by demonstrations to vent their frustrations over political stalemates or disruptions to daily life; and they have been used by organisers of public protests to mobilise support and organise participants. YouTube has also proven to be an important tool in this regard. These services have been so heavily incorporated into the tapestry of current events that manifestations of the Arab Spring across the region have variously been termed as “Facebook” and “Twitter Revolutions”. It is for these reasons that social networking sites were identified as a massive store-hold of valuable data for the analysis of social changes in the criminal and security situation in Yemen since the advent of the Arab Spring, through which Yemenis at the grass-roots level proved more readily accessible than through fieldwork, particularly when an Arabic to English translator was used.

While Albrecht Hofheinz notes that, in 2007, only 10 of every 100 people in Yemen had regular internet access, 35.5 of every 100 were said to have access to mobile phones. It has been estimated that the use of communication technologies has since increased in the country, while connections between internet and mobile phone communication have expanded considerably, with

many internet users updating their circles of contacts about current events through mobile phone networks. By December 2011, internet usage had increased to 2,609,698 access points, many of which included internet cafés<sup>55</sup> that allowed for multiple users to log onto the internet from a single access point (Internet World Stats, 2012). In telephone interviews conducted in 2012, both Husam al Sharjabi and Atiaf Alwazir highlighted the importance of these internet cafés and their high popularity during the Arab Spring. These cafés were considered to be so important that they were often supplied with independent generators and satellites by protesters in order to get around state triggered black-outs.

Social Bakers wrote in 2012 that 436,080 Facebook user accounts were registered in Yemen, representing an increase of 188,160 accounts (or 36.99%) over a six month period and placing Yemen at 103 of 213 countries with Facebook access. This figure did not include those users who had kept their geographic locations confidential. Atiaf Alwazir noted that throughout this time, secret Facebook groups and hidden events pages were often used to plan protests or to increase participation at demonstrations, while Yemenis tended to use Twitter – due to its more public nature – to communicate with foreign members of the media and to spread news and information about Yemen to the outside world.

Alex Comminos writes that, while internet-based research conducted across the region during the Arab Spring has been limited by the fact that emerging sample groups are predominantly representative of urbanised and literate people, user-generated content on Facebook and Twitter has nevertheless come “to represent popular demands”, so that there are “clearly demonstrated linkages between mobilising demonstrators by social media and the mobilisation of demonstrators on the streets” (2011, p. 6). Thus, online and distance research has emerged as the preferred method for individuals and large research organisations for monitoring the Arab revolutions of 2011. In order to limit the influence of potential biases, distance research was not relied upon to extract new information, but rather, was predominantly used to verify criminological trends previously identified through elite stakeholder interviews, field work and statistical data, as well as to map changes in the criminal make-up of Yemen after the beginning of significant political unrest.

Distance research methods were used to reach a total of 61 Yemeni respondents. From February 2011 onwards, the author joined various Yemen-based interest groups through Facebook and Twitter, and distributed a request for telephone interviews in English. Participants were asked to anonymously message the author a contact number and to provide the author with a convenient contact time. The conduit of telephone interviews offered three important and immediate benefits:


1. they allowed the author to talk directly to interviewees and to utilise a broad and adaptive research technique;

---

<sup>55</sup> Although it is not now possible to uncover the exact number of internet cafés in the country due to the high prevalence of tax evasion among small businesses in Yemen, as far back as 2003 Mohammed Goath wrote of the increased prevalence of such facilities and its important impact upon Yemeni social lives. He described the popularity of internet cafés at this time as “spreading through the streets of the main cities like fire in hay”. In interviews with internet café owners, he was able to link this phenomenon with the relatively “inexpensive” price of computers, and the “great appeal of the internet to youths, students and researchers” who “can't afford their own internet at home”. The spread of internet cafés is also evident in most tourism information websites, which describe them as being “all over the place” and costing between 1 and 2 Riyals per minute (Talibiddeen Jr, 2009).

2. they allowed the author to extract detailed information about people, places and events in Yemen; and
3. they allowed the author to verify the identity of interviewees by checking that all dialled phone numbers were located in Yemen.

These calls for participants in telephone interviews were, of course, on occasion met with intense hostility, suspicion and accusations of governmental espionage. Overall respondents proved fairly cooperative and most gave their names though they were not asked to do so.



**Figure 17 Distance Research Respondent Ages**

This process yielded 21 telephone interviews ranging from 25 to 40 minutes in length, depending upon the willingness of respondents to engage with various questions. Some also provided telephone contact details for their English-speaking friends, resulting in an additional 7 interviews. Respondents lived in multiple governorates, were aged mainly between 18 and 27 years, and were equally divided between pro-government and pro-change protesters, and people who did not take part in the demonstrations. At later stages of distance research, respondents between the ages of 28 and 35 also began to participate, though the majority were still comprised of younger people. This age distribution roughly reflected the overall Yemen Facebook usage statistics, as captured by Social Bakers, according to which 45% of users are aged between 18 and 24, and 28% are aged between 25 and 34 (2012).

At later stages in these initial telephone interviews, the author contacted the Network of Yemeni Scholars, an independent social networking site, and was able to secure an additional 9 telephone interviews in Yemen. Participants in telephone interviews were kept engaged through a discussion of the Arab Spring, during which they were directed to answer a series of questions relating to their perceptions of crime, safety, and law enforcement services and their roles in 2011. These interviews began as informal and loosely structured, and were then refined and perfected. In all cases, a set of standardised questions was included in order to generate findings that were easily comparable to one another. The interview questions were shortened and simplified over time, after which the author contracted and trained a native Arabic speaker to redistribute the same request for interviews across Arabic-language groups on Facebook and Twitter. The translator had already undertaken training on interview techniques as part of her graduate-level studies at the Post-war

Reconstruction and Development Unit, and received strict additional guidance from the author. She proceeded to conduct telephone interviews in Arabic on behalf of the author, translating the interview transcripts back into English. In doing so, she completed 11 telephone interviews in April 2011.

Calls for interviews in Arabic proved remarkably unsuccessful, with the translator reporting similar outbursts of aggression, with some Facebook members accusing her of being a Mujahideen – a Muslim worshipper who has strayed away from the path of God. It was clear that interview responses significantly petered out by May 2011, indicating a growing reluctance to engage with foreign researchers. At the same time, while only 11 people came forward to take part in the Arabic telephone interviews, over 50 'liked' the call for interviews on Facebook, indicating a positive reaction from the majority of Yemeni account holders. Many potential respondents wrote in stating that, while they were unwilling to provide their telephone contact details, they would answer any relevant questions by e-mail. Through this written process, an additional set of 5 responses was obtained. Here, the immediate danger emerged that without verifying the dialling codes of respondents, it became more difficult to ensure that respondents were currently situated within Yemen. However, the geographically-specific nature of their responses, as well as their detailed awareness of localised political events and activities of Government forces prior to the emergence of media reports (with many discussing issues of state attacks on protesters or night-raids that they had witnessed) meant that it was extremely unlikely that any were not being honest about their situations or identities.

It became apparent that the primary issue generating a reluctance to participate in the research process was a fear of being identified. The author deemed it necessary to digitise her interview questions and transform them into an online survey, available on kwiksurvey.com, which could be completed entirely anonymously. This survey was provided both in English and Arabic, and included a link to the author's University profile page in order to help dissuade any potential concerns about the purposes of the questionnaire. It was based upon a set of standardised questions that had been previously incorporated into all telephone interviews and sent out to respondents to complete by e-mail. In keeping with the research method, these questions were left fairly broad, giving participants the opportunity to expand upon questions and to provide additional information. The emphasis here was placed upon allowing participants to assess in their own words the security-based changes that had occurred in Yemen as a result of the Arab Spring.

	<b>Survey Question</b>
1	Please state your occupation, whether you are employed or unemployed, and whether you are in full-time education
2	Please state your age
3	Please state your gender
4	Please state your marital status and whether you have any children.
5	Which area of Yemen do you live in?

6	Do you currently participate in public demonstrations? If yes, are you a pro-government or pro-change protester?
7	Why do you choose to participate or not to participate in public demonstrations?
8	How have the protests affected your daily life?
9	Has your work or education been disrupted by the protests? If so, how?
10	Do you feel as though your safety has been in any way affected by the protests? Have you noticed an increase in looting or violent crime in 2011?
11	Has there been a strong military/police presence on the streets throughout this time?
12	If you were to fall victim to a crime, who would you go to for help?
13	Would you ask police services for assistance if you were to fall victim to crime?
14	What do you believe the future holds for Yemen?

**Table 7 Standardised Research Questions Used in Distance Research**

Within its first launch week, the online survey generated an extra 9 responses, though interest dropped substantially thereafter, so that only another 5 respondents completed the survey in the weeks that followed. Here, due to the fact that many of those surveyed relied upon very brief responses in the survey's open questions, it was less easy to guarantee the identity of respondents, so that 6 surveys had to be discounted due to the fact that those who answered them may not have been Yemeni nationals or current residents of Yemen.

The table below illustrates examples of surveys that were discredited, versus surveys that were added to overall data collected.

Survey Question	Included Results	Excluded Results
Please state your occupation, whether you are employed or unemployed, and whether you are in full-time education	Student	Private business owner
Please state your age	19	25
Please state your gender	Female	Male
Please state your marital status and whether you have any children.	Single	Married with 2 children
Which area of Yemen do you live in?	Sana'a	Ta'ez
Do you currently participate in public demonstrations? If yes, are you a pro-government or pro-change protester?	Pro-government protester	I am with the revolution
Why do you choose to participate or not to participate in public demonstrations?	I joined the protests so that they could hear my voice	I want a free Yemen
How have the protests affected your daily life?	Protests have no influence, it is the strikes that have had the bad influence	In Ta'ez there is no effect for protests
Has your work or education been disrupted by the protests? If so, how?	Yes. Strikes at the University of Sana'a have affected education	Protests affect life a little but we are accepting it in hope for a better Yemen

Do you feel as though your safety has been in any way affected by the protests? Have you noticed an increase in looting or violent crime in 2011?	Yes	No
Has there been a strong military/police presence on the streets throughout this time?	Yes	No
If you were to fall victim to a crime, who would you go to for help?	Police, the brave police	I don't know
Would you ask police services for assistance if you were to fall victim to crime?	Yes	No
What do you believe the future holds for Yemen?	If strikes continue especially in universities I don't think there will be a future for Yemen.	I hope for a better future

**Table 8 Credited and Discredited Survey Data, Translated From Arabic**

Also included above is an illustration of more comprehensive data collected through surveys, where certain key answers have been obscured in order to protect the identity of the respondents.

The distance research phase, when telephone, e-mail and survey data were totalled, produced 61 fairly reliable and rigorous accounts of 2011. While this did not represent a statistically relevant portion of the Yemeni population, it did provide substantial anecdotal trends, allowing the author to verify socio-political changes in the absence of Government statistics collected after the emergence of the Arab Spring. Respondent demographics and important details about their perceptions of changes in public safety levels in 2011 can be found in Figure 18<sup>56</sup>. This illustrates that Yemeni perceptions of public safety diminished in 2011 (with 49 people saying that their safety had decreased), but that only 13 respondents willingly linked this to increased criminality in the form of looting, theft and other property-related offences.

---

<sup>56</sup> These findings are also integrated throughout the thesis, though they are particularly prominent in subsections 2.4.4, 5.2.4 and 6.5.

Employment Status of Respondents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 31 Employed; 12 Unemployed; 18 Students</li> </ul>
Age of Respondents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 6 respondents were aged between 18 and 20; 15 respondents were aged between 21 and 25; 20 respondents were aged between 26 and 30; 20 respondents were aged between 31 and 35</li> </ul>
Marital Status of Respondents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 38 Single; 6 Married; 17 Married with children</li> </ul>
Involvement in Arab Spring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 31 pro-change protesters; 19 pro-government protesters; 8 respondents with no involvement in protests; 3 respondents who participated in protests in early 2011 and then stopped, due to concerns about personal safety</li> </ul>
Impact of Arab Spring on Daily Life	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 17 respondents stated that there had been no impact on their daily lives; 19 stated that there had been some impact; 25 stated that there had been a major impact</li> </ul>
Public Safety in 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 12 respondents state that 2011 brought no change to their sense of safety on the streets; 15 said that their sense of safety had diminished; 34 said that they now felt extremely unsafe because of the Arab Spring</li> </ul>
Perceptions of Crime in 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 24 respondents said that they did not witness and did not hear about looting or theft taking place in Yemen during the Arab Spring; 24 said that they had heard about some instances of looting or property damage (especially to government offices); 13 said that looting and theft during the Arab Spring had become a major problem</li> </ul>
Where Respondents Would Go To In Order to Seek Assistance After a Crime	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2 would post information about the crime online; 2 would tell the media about the crime; 5 would seek assistance from committees established by protest organisers; 7 would seek help from NGOs; 2 would speak to a lawyer; 6 would go to the police; 2 would ask their tribe for help; 12 would ask their family or friends for help; 12 would take matters into their own hands; 9 would do nothing; and 2 wouldn't know what to do</li> </ul>
Would Respondents Ever Seek Help From the Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 6 said yes; 55 said no</li> </ul>

Figure 18 Demographics and Important Information Given by the 61 Survey and Telephone Interview Respondents

## 1.9 Peer Review

In order to test the validity of data obtained throughout the course of this thesis, the author took steps to obtain regular feedback from her peers, both locally and around the world. In doing so, she took part in regular consultations both with her two academic supervisors and her wider circle of professional contacts within the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit of the University of York. As part of her research with the Unit, she was able to participate in an extensive research feedback session for the Common Country Assessment report, with feedback provided by the Yemen Country Team and main international stakeholders at an initial findings presentation in Sana'a in August, 2010. The author also took care to release regular publications and to participate in conferences on international development issues in order to gain feedback from the broader academic community. This feedback has been carefully integrated into the structure of this thesis. Publications were released through Atlantic Community, *Parliamentary Brief*, the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit and elsewhere. Conferences and specialist seminar series included; the University of York's '4x4 Seminar Series', its 'International and Comparative Research

Cluster' Conference on 'Ideas, Institutions and International Politics', and the Sheffield International Development Network's 3rd Annual Postgraduate Conference on the 'Challenges for Development Studies'<sup>57</sup>.

### **1.10 Methodological Limitations and Conclusions**

While the author feels that she has collected and processed a substantial amount of data throughout the three-year life-time of this project, one key methodological limitation in the production of this thesis is that it was simply not feasible for its author to return to Yemen after the commencement of public demonstrations in 2011. While the author compensated significantly for this shortfall through distance research, the thesis itself and its analysis would have benefited significantly from interviews with younger participants, aged between 10 and 18 years, as well as from interviews with a broader spectrum of people, including poorer members of Yemeni society who are suspected of being illiterate and without internet access. As the information gathered through distance interviews was used solely to complement statistical data and to anticipate changes in pre-2011 trends that had already been identified and verified, this methodological limitation did not inhibit the completion of this thesis.

Another limitation that this thesis has suffered from has been a lack of access to hospital statistics which, revealing the injuries suffered by the victims of crime, might have painted a more accurate picture of the true extent of violent offending in the country.

These limitations have meant that the author has maintained that most claims produced as part of the research initiative are suggestive rather than empirical. Seeing that this thesis' primary aim is to apply and evaluate criminological and development theories, this lack of empirical data has not negated the contribution of the suggestive claims put forward throughout the analysis. The data gathered throughout this methodological framework has proved sufficient to meet the aims and objectives of the research project, leading to the production of a workable theory of violent young offending in Yemen that might be exportable to other fragile contexts.

---

<sup>57</sup> A full list of such publications and activities is available at: <http://york.academia.edu/AlexandraLewis>

## Chapter 2: The Yemeni Context

### 2.1 Introduction

Based on Ariande Vromen's mixed methods research strategy for research with a qualitative approaches core (2010)<sup>58</sup>, this Chapter has been designed to offer an in-depth analysis of the Yemeni case study, supported by a full historical analysis and an indicator-based assessment of the country's underdevelopment. It fits into the wider structure of the thesis by providing a holistic, multi-sectoral overview of the Yemeni context, founded within a fragile states theoretical framework that seeks to understand the extent of Governmental authority, legitimacy and capacity, and the ways in which these manifestations of Government influence and strength have changed over time. It reads Yemen as a classic fragile state under the definition provided in section viii.2, where state fragility is symptomatic: of poor state capacity, as generated by a lack of authority and ability to control state territories, and as evidenced by a lack of effective state service provision; of high social fragmentation, accompanied by a history of conflict, community isolation and conflicting localised identities; and of poor political integration, leading to low levels of community access to political processes, reinforced by a perceived lack of political will to reflect popular demands in policy changes.

The aim of this Chapter is not so much to contribute to the main argument of the thesis, but to provide the reader with a coherent, in-depth understanding of Yemen and the sources of its fragility, creating the knowledge base necessary to appropriately contextualise the implications of criminological and development theories that will be presented in later chapters<sup>59</sup>. It paves the way for the overview of criminal activity in Yemen that will be put forward in Chapter 3 by providing another layer of data about the context being analysed<sup>60</sup>.

The Yemeni case study necessitates an in-depth evaluation because it is relatively complex from an international developmental perspective, with multiple political crises that have manifested themselves over a prolonged period of time. The 2010 *Failed States Index* classes Yemen as a country in danger of imminent state failure, ranking it at number 15 of its 60 long list of fragile states. It is easy for external observers unfamiliar with the context to be overwhelmed by the range of overlapping conflicts and humanitarian emergencies that impact the country. In order to simplify the analysis, this Chapter will chart these crises as they have emerged naturally over the course of the evolution of the Yemeni state by providing a historical account of the country's formation and the emergence of its various political challenges. Taking important indicators like government legitimacy, social inequality and lack of access to basic services, the Chapter will proceed by

---

<sup>58</sup> These principles state that qualitative research must utilise inductive analysis, holistic perspectives, qualitative and adaptive methodologies, and emphatic neutrality.

<sup>59</sup> In particular, these theories include works relating to criminology and international development. They will be overviewed in Chapters 4 and 6.

<sup>60</sup> In Chapters 4 and 6, existing theories of criminology and international development will be used to knit together the findings of Chapters 2 and 3 to provide a causal analysis of how state fragility in Yemen shapes violent young offending. In line with this aim, this Chapter will provide as open and detailed an investigation of the Yemeni context as possible, given the confines of this doctoral thesis (see section 8.6).

distinguishing key outcomes of Yemen's history that have presented obstacles to its development. The Chapter will conclude by outlining the implications of this analysis for the country's overall security; linking it to the more targeted analysis of Yemen's justice and law enforcement systems that will be carried out in Chapter 5.

## **2.2 The Evolution of the Contemporary Yemeni State Through Unity and Civil War**

The state that is known today as the Republic of Yemen has only existed as a single administrative unit since May 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1990. It emerged from a history of disunity and fragmentation, through which the citizens of a vastly contested and disputed territory were able to realise their aspirations for national unification only briefly before calls for federalism or renewed separatism began to spread through the country once more. This social fragmentation is connected to an extended period of domination over Yemeni society by competing colonial interests and locally-based elite power struggles. Thus, “Yemen – almost throughout its history – lacked the kind of single, centralised control that would qualify it to be described as a unified state” (Brain Whitaker, 2009, p. 5). Although it eventually succeeded in forming one government to preside over all of its people: Yemen may be “a land with a long history”, but it remains “a state with a short one” (p. 5). An understanding of -, as well as an appreciation for -, this basic truth is key to acquiring an insight into the causes of Yemen's fragility and the challenges with which the country is faced.

While Yemen lacked unity for the majority of its history, one of the single most important determining factors in its contemporary development was its formal partitioning by the British and Ottoman Empires in the late 1800s and early 1900s. War over the Yemeni territories saw them segregated according to an arbitrary line into two countries, North and South Yemen (*See Figure 19*). Their division continues to dominate national politics. In North Yemen, a long, costly and ultimately futile struggle to enforce control over Yemeni tribesmen eventually led the Ottoman Empire to retreat from the area, establishing an imamate in its place in 1918 (Paul Dresch, 1993). This legacy was overthrown in 1962, when the Yemen Arab Republic was formed. In South Yemen, British rule continued until 1967, when the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen was created in its stead, under a communist leadership with strong economic ties to the Soviet Union (Fred Halliday, 1990).




Figure 19 The Division Between North and South Yemen

Inspired by growing regional pan-Arabic sentiment, the Yemeni people retained a strong sense of national unity throughout this time, many believing that unification would bring back a “golden age” in their history (Brain Whitaker, 2009, p. 15). By this time, both Yemens had evolved according to radically opposing ideological models – the communist and Islamic republic models respectively, as influenced by a rejection of British and Ottoman colonialism – and both had radically different visions of their shared futures. The boundaries between them would prove almost impossible to erase so that Yemen today continues to “[reflect] a series of nested divides – geographic, demographic, political and ideological” (Bryce Loidolt *et al*, 2010, p. 19).


While Yemen was free to pursue its dreams of unification from 1967 onwards, with both governments openly advocating for the principle with the popular backing of their people, dialogues aimed at increasing unity were of a more ideological than a practical nature. Few politicians on either side seriously weighed the full implications of unification, and both states recognised unification as an outright threat to their existence. Both wanted to shape a new Yemen in their own image, preserving their own authority and leadership. South Yemen was at a significant disadvantage here because of its substantially smaller population, which could have meant that any form of unification would see the country dominated by Northern interests. In 2012 the North outnumbered the South approximately 20 million to 4 million, with similar differences in proportions being present in the 1960s when both populations were much smaller (*Expert Consultation with Nicholas Hopton, July 19th, 2012*). Thus, prior to unifying, the two countries went through twenty years of political competition, each striving to bolster their own legitimacy as future leaders while undermining the credibility of the other, triggering open warfare in 1972 and again in 1979.

From 1988 onwards, a string of not entirely unrelated domestic and international political failures and economic downturns pushed both countries to explore the issue of unity more fervently, if only to distract their nationals from their own internal crises. For the Yemen Arab

Republic, these crises stemmed from the ruling Government's over-valuation of their developing oil industry, leading to widespread discontent at the failure of the state to generate promised revenues. For the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen, internal crises emerged from increased marginalisation from the Soviet Union, which had previously acted as a major donor. As North and South began to relax border controls and Yemenis began to travel between the two, Southern citizens became aware of their relative poverty compared to the North so that their regime was left with few excuses to avoid unification any longer, despite the fear that unity might represent the "annexation" of their sovereignty (Whitaker, 2009, p. 26).

The unification process itself was rushed. While North and South had agreed upon a unification period of a year, the process was pushed forward in 1990 in order to avoid the growth of new oppositional movements in both countries, who threatened to cause a revolt if the unification plan went ahead. In practice, while the unification process succeeded in merging the Yemeni territories, it failed to marry the leading General People's Congress (GPC) in the North with the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) in the South, effectively leaving two administrative units bidding for internal dominance. Provisionally, the two parties adopted a pluralist political system that maintained rival ideologies and offered representation to discontented groups. In 1990, Yemen became the first democratic country in the Arab World, a legacy for which it is seldom remembered. The fragile peace created by this democratic system was not to last. It is the belief of the author that democratic politics accentuated existing rivalries by fostering direct political competition, eventually triggering conflict.

While Yemen was ruled by a coalition of the GPC and the YSP for its first three years of union, forming the country's constitution and developing its administrative core in Sana'a, the electoral process would reveal the fragility of their union. National elections, which took place in Yemen for the first time in 1993, were seen as a mechanism through which to legitimise the existing state (Whitaker, 2009, p. 129). However, both parties, which had retained their own independent military forces after unification, exercised considerable financial and military resources to undermine each other's positions in the polls, just as they had undermined each other across their shared border prior to 1990. An unintended side-effect of this was that several new parties and independents were able to move in and secure a large percentage of the national vote. One new competitor, the Yemeni Alliance for Reform, or Islah, emerged throughout this time as a prominent rival to both ruling parties, securing 62 of 302 seats in the election, the GPC and the YSP winning 123 and 56 seats respectively (p. 130). These results occurred largely as a result of the short-sightedness of the GPC and the YSP, who had utilised considerable military and financial resources to secure their victories over each other during the election, rather than considering other parties as a potential threat to their united leadership. Whitaker summarises that "with 47 independents and 12 representatives of smaller parties, no party had a clear mandate to govern alone" after 1993 (p. 130).



**Figure 20 1993 Election Results**

The GPC and YSP were faced with an unanticipated political crisis, which, though it accentuated the need for a union of their two parties, failed to bring about such a merger. After all, to the YSP a union would have represented an absorption into the larger GPC party and the disappearance of their hitherto separate military forces, owing to their proportionally lower representativeness. Rather than merging with the YSP or handing leadership of the country over to Islah, the GPC, under the authority of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, chose simply to integrate Islah into the existing coalition, which vested power above all in the GPC, followed by the YSP, irrespective of election results. The positions of Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister were awarded to the YSP and Islah respectively to reflect this chain of command, much to the anger of Islah's many supporters. To this day, national confidence and participation in Yemen's electoral processes has dramatically diminished as a result of this move. In December 2010, the *Yemen Times* reported that one Minister of Parliament, Ali Al-Ansi of the Islah Party, recognised wide-spread disillusion among Yemeni voters. He claimed that Yemen “suffer[s] from a severe crisis of confidence in government. Most Yemenis are depressed and down in the dumps, but they will rage against the government if this bad situation continues” (Sadeq Al-Wesabi). In the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring, his prophecy has proved more accurate than many external analysts had anticipated.

The GPC's republicanism, the YSP's socialism and Islah's Islamic revivalism did not blend together well in the new coalition, crippling the state's decision-making capacity and stalling development across the country. Although numerous efforts were made by the GPC to produce legislative requirements on all parties to act in union, the YSP began to act as a voice of opposition, despite its position of authority; perhaps to ensure its own continuing status as a key player in Yemeni politics, or in protest against its diminishing legitimacy in the new political order (*Stakeholder Consultation, Supervising Committee for Relieving IDPs, 16 August, 2010, Interview Conducted by Sultan Barakat*). It was not long after that Prime Minister Ali Salim al-Baid deserted his post entirely and retreated to Aden, the former Southern capital, leaving the newly-formed government in a state of suspended animation, unable to swear in a Presidential Council or to pass

any meaningful legislative reform. This open show of hostility was soon to be accompanied by calls for separatism, eventually leading to civil war in 1994.

In May of that year, the South of Yemen broke away from the North once more to form the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. This country was not recognised by the international community as independent (Global Security, 2010). Furthermore, while limited air and missile strikes were launched against North Yemen's cities, most of the actual fighting took place in the South, which was quickly overrun by Northern forces and some defected Southern military units, lead by General Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi (later to become President Saleh's Vice President and then President himself) (*Expert Consultation, Rafat al Akhali, 7 March, 2012*). By July of that year, the YSP had surrendered to total Northern control, and this time unification was imposed upon them. It was a devastating blow from which the South never truly recovered. While the YSP survived the war as a political party, its position within the Yemeni political sphere was severely weakened. Meanwhile, President Saleh was elected by his new Parliament to serve another five year term in October 1994, remaining largely uncontested in his seat of power until the Arab Spring of 2011.

The effect of this short history upon the evolution of the Yemeni state was such that its Government had to develop in a very careful way in order to avoid annihilation from the very beginning. Money ear-marked for the creation of one single state was funnelled instead into the military expenses of two parties that continued to see each other more as rivals than as allies post-unification. After the 1993 election, the GPC, perhaps sensing the threat of renewed separatism from the South, made certain to retain crucial control over Yemen's Ministry of Finance and began developing newly discovered oil reserves in the territory of the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, exacerbating complaints in the South that Northerners were sapping their resources dry to develop their half of the country (*Expert Consultation, Danniell Shimmin, 3 June, 2012*). At the same time, these resources failed to bring about any significant benefit to the rural Northern poor, pushing them to arrive at the opposite conclusion.

Accusations of rampant corruption within the central administration only worsened nation-wide hostilities. As President Saleh's regime fought to develop its seat of power, it failed to bring about substantive change for the people of Yemen, who quickly lost confidence in the power of unity and democracy to improve their social circumstances. The belief began to spread throughout the South that a return to separatism would at least grant them sovereignty over their own limited resources, while the far North began to shrink from centralised rule all together. The result was the emergence of a very weak state with an over-developed military and a people without a vested interest in its survival. It is not surprising that this unstable combination brought about war and conflict, almost from the moment of its inception.

## 2.3 Geographic Characteristics and Demographic Composition



Figure 21 Yemen and Its Geographic Position

Due to its geographic location and development status, the Republic of Yemen is affected by the political and economic fluctuations of both the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. The country shares a land boundary with Saudi Arabia and Oman, and overlooks Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia across the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea (See Figure 21<sup>61</sup>). As a result of this location and due to its comparative stability and weak border management capacities, Yemen has attracted numerous refugees and labour migrants from the North-East of Africa through shipping and sailing lanes, the majority of whom arrive from Somalia and Ethiopia<sup>62</sup>. Meanwhile, unemployed Yemenis tend to look to their wealthier Middle Eastern neighbours for employment opportunities, travelling to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and other places, often illegally, in search of work (*Stakeholder Consultation, International Organisation for Migration, 16 August, 2010*).

Relations with its immediate neighbours have historically proven to be of crucial importance to Yemen. Many of its recent governmental development priorities, as listed in the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation's *National Reform Agenda (2010)* and *10-Point Plan (2009)*, have involved building stronger regional relations within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in order to boost Yemen's struggling economy and business sector.

<sup>61</sup> This map was taken from <http://stpeteforpeace.org> on November 12th, 2010, but was subsequently amended by the author.

<sup>62</sup> See Chapter 3, section 3.10 on 'Organised Crime', for more details on how migrants use smuggling routes to get in and out of Yemen.



**Figure 22 Yemen's Twenty-One Governorates**

Development across Yemen has always been uneven, with the North benefiting from trade routes with Saudi Arabia (particularly during the 1980s) and the South receiving strong material backing from the Soviet Union in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Fred Halliday, 1990). Regardless of fluctuations in inequality, governmental development programmes traditionally favoured the centre over the peripheries, both before and after the formation of what is today the Republic of Yemen. Yemen is divided into 21 governorates (See Figure 22<sup>63</sup>). Infrastructure is strongest in Sana'a and its immediate surrounding areas, while the peripheral regions, which are mainly comprised of rural areas, are extremely poor.

Although 42.8% of the population in Yemen was classed as living below the poverty line in 2010, 29.9% of the country's urban population was considered to be poor, as compared to 47.6% of the rural population, with 'Amran, Abyan, Ad Dali, Al Jawf, Al-Bayda', Hajjah, Lahij and Shabwah reporting a poverty prevalence rate of over 50%, 'Amran reaching 66.4% (World Food Programme, 2010, p. 25). Only 31% of the population of the country is urbanised and the vast majority of the rest live in small rural communities with little access to government services (*CIA World Factbook*, 2012). In 2011, the overall rate of poverty across Yemen was said to increase to 60%, due to widespread disruptions in the labour market and government services, as well as the cessation of donor assistance and the withdrawal of humanitarian agencies (Sadeq al Wasabi, 2011).

<sup>63</sup> This map was developed by Wikimedia Commons (2007) and can be found at: <http://commons.wikimedia.org/>




Figure 23 Actual and Estimated Population Growth in Yemen, 1994-2014

Yemen's extreme poverty and underdevelopment are exacerbated by increasing competition for resources and employment opportunities, which emerges as a result of nation-wide resource mismanagement and more directly because of the country's rapid population growth. According to the Yemeni Central Statistical Organisation's *Statistical Yearbooks* of 2003 to 2010, the population of Yemen has grown from 14.59 million in 1995 to 22.49 million in 2010. The population is expected to grow further to approximately 25.96 million by 2014 (See Figure 23), although the estimated total fertility rate has recently fallen due to massive governmental awareness raising campaigns from an average of 8.7 children being born per woman between 1985 and 1990 to 5.3 per woman being born between 2005 and 2010, according to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (though the accuracy of such data is difficult to assess in light of Yemen's very weak rate of birth registration). The chief demographic implication of Yemen's rapid population growth is an emerging youth bulge: the median population age in 2010 was 17.9 years and 43.9% of Yemenis were aged under 14 years (*CIA World Factbook*).

The vast majority of Yemenis are ethnic Arabs who fall into either the Shaf'i Sunni or Zaydi Shia religious groupings, though a small number can be found who are members of the Jewish, Christian or Hindu faiths. Yemeni society is also extremely tribalised, so that tribal allegiances often take precedence over ethnic and religious identities<sup>64</sup>. The strength of these tribal structures has offered a communal support net to those living in hard-to-reach areas of the country in times when government infrastructure has proven inaccessible. However, these same tribal structures have proven remarkably resistant to centralisation, leading to repeated incidents of conflict between state authority and tribal legitimacy which have held important implications for Yemen's history and progress.

<sup>64</sup> Chapter 5, section 5.3, will outline more thoroughly the details of Yemeni tribal divisions.

It is tempting to think of the country's strong tribal system as one of the primary obstacles for the Government in its quest to secure legitimacy and sovereignty. In reality, the relationship between tribes and the state is not so clear cut. In *Tribes, Government and History in Yemen*, Paul Dresch writes:

the tribes themselves are the basis of what power most governments have ever held. Not only have many prominent figures in recent national politics been of tribal background, but the tribes themselves remain important, and one cannot follow the events of the last few decades, any more than those of preceding centuries, without some grasp of what the tribes amount to. In the midst of which the assumption is widespread that they will all one day disappear. (1993, pp. 28 – 29)

The tribal system in Yemen has been used by Yemeni governments as an administrative tool, particularly in more isolated areas that have proven difficult for state forces and bureaucracies to access. Where local reliance upon such systems has been very high for a protracted period of time, tribal identities have solidified and tribal structures have become entrenched. Conversely, where local reliance has shifted toward governmental services, tribal identities have gradually been eroded.

As Barbara Bodine observed in an interview conducted by Riz Khan, tribes in Yemen are not organised into one collective social unit that can be easily appealed to or accessed (2010). They do not have similar aspirations, goals, customs or philosophies, though they do have limited organisational sub-structures<sup>65</sup>. Depending upon where a tribe is located, tribal allegiances and intra-tribal connections become either trivial or hugely relevant, while tribes themselves are either broadly socially intermixed or isolated from one another.

## **2.4 War and Conflict in Yemen**

Yemen is currently experiencing no less than four distinct security crises, which means that, according to an interview conducted with Nicholas Hopton, British Ambassador to Yemen, the Yemeni Government currently controls no more than 30% of its territory (*Expert Consultation, July 20th, 2012*). The four main political challenges that the state faces today are: an on-going conflict against localised combatant groups in the far North; rising separatist sentiment in the South; a growing terrorist insurgency from within its borders; and, threats to its very survival under the impact of the 2011 Arab Spring. War and conflict are products and causes of continuing fragility, resulting from a historical Government mismanagement of local grievances and disrupting the ability of the state to intervene so as to return order to the lives of its citizens.

### **2.4.1 The Sa'ada Wars**

Economic competition between North and South Yemen before and after unification, culminating in the 1994 civil war and followed immediately by a need to consolidate a new government leadership, meant that for a prolonged space in Yemen's history the Northern peripheries of the country were marginalised by state development programmes in favour of

---

<sup>65</sup> These structures include the Hashid and Bakil Federations in the North, and the Himiar and Madhhij Federations in the South. See section 5.3 for more details.

building a strong capital city with a solid administrative base. The resulting situation of chronic underdevelopment that emerged in the North, particularly along the areas that bordered the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, contributed to overall increases in levels of hostility among local communities towards President Saleh's Government (Christopher Boucek, 2010). When combined with historic grievances, the formation of new identities, and increased social mobility, all of which came to the fore in the late 1990s and early 2000s, such hostility eventually sparked mass protests. Once the Government of Yemen intervened to subdue public outcry in 2004, a wave of military clashes began between the state and emerging groups of combatants known as the Houthis and the Believing Youth. Since then, six consecutive wars have enveloped Sa'ada and its surrounding governorates, Hajja, Amran and Al Jawf (See Figure 24).




Figure 24 Areas Affected by Fighting During the Sa'ada Wars

While the Houthis and the Believing Youth are followers of the Zaydi Shia faith (the same religion as that of former President Saleh, though an under-represented religion in Government as a whole), and while they have adopted a strong Zaydi Revivalist narrative, the conflict in the North was not initially thought of as a religiously motivated one (Boucek, 2010). However, in recent years, the conflict has begun to move away from its roots to become more ideological in nature. This development has occurred mainly as the conflict has spilled over Saudi Arabian borders, becoming embroiled in an alleged regional cold war between a predominantly Sunni Saudi Arabia and a Shia Iran<sup>66</sup>, and furthermore gaining an international dimension through the involvement of the United States of America. In this regard, Saudi Arabia has openly provided military assistance to President Saleh's regime, while Oxford Analytica, among other organisations, note that there is an unverified "suspicion, encouraged by the regime, that Iran and perhaps Hizbollah are assisting the Huthis" in

<sup>66</sup> This view is supported by the International Crisis Group Report, Yemen: Diffusing the Sa'ada Time Bomb (2009, p. 5).

the fulfilment of what they perceive to be common Shia interests (2009, p. 8). The conflict in Sa'ada is entrenched and multi-faceted, leading to a state of protracted emergency in Yemen.

The International Crisis Group write that:

The Saada war ... can be traced back to the decline of the social stratum led by Hashemites and legitimised by Zaydism (a branch of Shiism), failed management of religious pluralism, lack of investment in Zaydi strongholds like Saada after 1962, permeability to external influences and the emergence of new political and religious actors, in particular Salafis. As a result, it has variously and at times simultaneously taken the shape of a sectarian, political or tribal conflict, rooted in historical grievances and endemic under-development. (2009, p. 5)

The social environment of Sa'ada and Northern Yemen is heavily influenced by religious constraints on behaviour and by tribal allegiances, dictated by *qabyala* – the ethical code of tribalism in the North (Lisa Wedeen, 2008). The evolution of its culture is linked to administrative attitudes towards the North and its geographic location, while the resultant uniquely “Northern” identity of the Sa'ada-Hajja-Amran-Al Jawf area has emerged as an important contributing factor to the conflict there.

Bryce Loidolt *et al* note that, prior to the outbreak of war, the region had been allowed to function fairly autonomously, both before and after unification, leading to a strong local sense of independence (2010, p. 3). There are multiple reasons for this. Firstly, Northern preference for tribal identities over national ones has meant that many Yemeni communities exist on both sides of the Saudi Arabian border, prioritising tribal divisions of the land over state ones. Through leaked American diplomatic cables, the Wikileaks website confirmed in 2010 that contested border areas like Jebel al-Dukhan may officially be part of Saudi Arabia, but they cut through territories that were traditionally used by Zaydi Yemeni tribes. The cable outlines that:

because “tribal territories transcend international borders,” the tribes living in that area consider it Yemeni even if it is officially Saudi. Furthermore, while the members of the tribe whose territory straddles the two countries identify first and foremost with their tribe, they identify secondly as Yemenis, not Saudis - regardless of which side of the border they live on. Adding to the confusion about whether Jebel al-Dukhan falls in Yemeni or Saudi territory is the fact that [Republic of Yemen Government] forces continue to fight throughout the area. (November, 2010)

This has rendered some Northern tribes very difficult to administer, as government attempts to control them on both sides of the border have always held the potential to trigger accusations of encroachment upon another state's sovereignty. For many decades, such communities were left to manage their own affairs.

A second contributing factor to the independence of the Northern peripheries is their extremely harsh geographic make-up. Communities are small and insular, scattered between deserts and mountain ranges, and kept small by natural obstacles and limited resources (*Expert Consultation, Danniell Shimmin, 3 June, 2012*). They are difficult to access and even more difficult to police, leading to a convention whereby governments have in the past sought to secure their loyalty through material negotiations with their leaders, rather than through direct administration. Thirdly,

the dominance of the Zaydi faith in the North has fostered a sense of common Northern identity distinct from Yemeni nationalism, whereby the descendants of the Prophet Mohammed's family, Sayyids or Hashimis, are seen as the legitimate rulers of Islamic states, contrary to the composition of the current Yemeni Government (Loidolt *et al*, 2010, p. 5). This identity and the ideals accompanying it provide an explicit challenge to the sovereignty of the state, although in practice Zaydis have historically coexisted relatively peacefully with their Sunni neighbours.

Finally, it is argued that the political struggles faced by North Yemen over time, including its struggle against colonialism and its wars with the South have, right up through the aftermath of the 1994 war for separatism, kept the focus of most administrations away from the reformation of the tribalised Northern peripheries. The Northern tribes have historically provided various incarnations of the Sana'a Government with a source of direct military support, and proved especially effective in Yemen's struggle against Ottoman Imperialism. These and other reasons convinced most Yemeni Governments not to interfere in the customs and leadership of the Northern territories prior to the 1960s.

After 1962, when the leading Imam of North Yemen was overthrown in an Egypt-backed military coup, government attitudes towards the Northern peripheries began to change. Whether or not Zaydiism presented an actual threat to the state, government propaganda campaigns began to portray the people of the Sa'ada-Hajja-Amran-Al Jawf area as "atavistic and backward", according to Loidolt *et al*. They write that:

This perception gained greater weight after the 1990 unification with the previously socialist People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY)—and, along with Saleh's political approach of neopatrimonial cooptation, has worked against the integration of the Zaydi heartland with the rest of the state. (2010, p. 4)

By the 1980s, dissatisfaction with the Government's confrontational stance began to solidify into real and actionable grievances as increased social mobility, facilitated through the construction of new roads between the centre and the peripheries, as well as by advances in communication capacities, allowed Northern Yemenis increased access to information and to each other.

Improved literacy and the widening of trading roots exposed the area to broader political and ideological trends affecting the Middle East (Whitaker, 2009). Ideas such as pan-Arabism and Zaydi Revivalism offered new points of self-definition, while the emerging regional impact of increased Wahabi and Salafi influence appeared a looming threat on the horizon towards their way of life, standing, as such belief systems did, in direct opposition to the elitism enshrined by the Zaydi faith. After the 1993 election, this threat became a lot more tangible to many Zaydi Shias with the rising popularity of the Islah party, a firm supporter of Wahabiism. Long before the Sa'ada conflict began in 2004, the 1990s saw a wave of clashes between tribes and sects in Northern Yemen, motivated by competition for resources and influence.

In response to these conflicts and the emergence of Islah, Badr al-Din al-Houthi and his sons began to establish a network of political parties, clubs and social programmes under the all-encompassing title of the Believing Youth in order to mobilise the Zaydis in Sa'ada and to give them an organised political voice. What was initially perceived and funded by the state as a means of quieting the local population later became seen as a political threat, particularly, because President

Saleh began to view al-Houthi's son, Husayn al-Houthi, "as a political threat — a plausible prospect, since the latter's local prestige exceeded that of [Government] representatives in the governorate" (Loidolt *et al*, 2010, p. 7).

In 2001, President Saleh allied his Government with the United States in their global War on Terror in exchange for military assistance in the fight against terrorist cells in Yemen. America's reciprocal support of Saleh's Regime had two direct and immediate consequences:


1. It boosted the Yemeni Government's confidence in its own ability to exert its authority across the country through the application of military force, with the help of its new-found ally;
2. It provided Husayn al-Houthi with a lightning rod through which to attract multitudes of new supporters to his cause by painting President Saleh as a pawn of American foreign policy (Bouceck, 2010).

The American-led war in Afghanistan was at this time and remains to this day incredibly unpopular in Yemen, with countless Yemeni insurgents moving to Afghanistan specifically to assist the Taliban in their struggle for power, chief among them the late Osama bin Laden. This communal sense of hostility towards the United States was compounded in 2003 by the Coalition's overthrowing of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the escalation of their campaign there, which was seen to be severely anti-Islamic and angered pro-Iraqi Yemeni Ba'athists among others (the Ba'athists having gained a sizeable following in Yemen since unification, espousing a socialist pan-Arabic political narrative (Whitaker, 2009, p. 130)). This propelled anti-state sentiment way beyond the remits of the Northern peripheries.

In June of 2004, the Government responded to emerging hostilities by sending its forces to arrest Husayn al-Houthi. This move bypassed both the autonomy of the Northern peripheries and the obligations of *qabyala* that all socio-political disagreements be mitigated by tribal mediation prior to the utilisation of physical force by any party. It sparked a wave of clashes between Government forces and al-Houthi's supporters, who now emerged as a group of armed combatants named after their leader. As the Yemeni Government strove to recruit loyal tribes to assist them in containing the crisis, they inadvertently radicalised the region further by forcing Northern communities to take sides in the conflict. Since that day, the state has been unable to restore real and lasting peace to the Northern peripheries, despite the numerous ceasefires that have broken the conflict up into six separate wars.

The first phase of the conflict lasted until September, 2004 (*See Figure 25*), when, after over three months of fighting and approximately 480 casualties, Government forces declared that they had killed Husayn al-Houthi, allegedly bringing an end to the crisis (Loidolt, 2010, p. 134).

The death of the Houthi leader failed to resolve the root causes of the first war, and no effective peace agreement was reached between the two fighting sides. The following five stages of the conflict followed similar patterns, each marked by an arrest or the death of an important stakeholder at its end. Each time, the Yemeni state declared an end to the fighting, minor skirmishes would continue, eventually re-triggering all-out war.



**Figure 25 Timeline of the Sa'ada Conflict**

By the time the fourth war in Sa'ada began in February 2007, the Government of Yemen had considerably escalated its military campaign in the region, showing a distinct policy shift from targeting Houthi leaders to eradicating the Houthi threat as a whole (Human Rights Watch, 2010). This time, the entire Sa'ada governorate was enveloped in war and reports showed that numerous tribes from Hajja, Amran and Al Jawf had migrated North to offer their support to the Government's troops. Suspected Houthi strongholds were exposed to continuous bombings and heavy artillery strikes, with casualties rising to an estimated 3,035 people (Loidolt, 2010, p. 144). The Houthis responded to the Government's onslaught by skilfully and effectively utilising guerrilla tactics against military convoys, stealing equipment to arm their forces.

Both sides were accused by the Human Rights Watch and other international actors of committing significant human rights violations in the pursuit of their goals, which included the targeting of civilians and the use of child soldiers (Human Rights Watch, 2010). In May 2007, Yemen's distant neighbour, Qatar, stepped in to mediate an end to the conflict, offering to resolve one of the Houthi's primary grievances (underdevelopment) by pledging financial aid to Yemen to

initiate the rapid reconstruction and development of the far North upon the restoration of peace (International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 21). This intervention significantly dampened fighting on the ground for a time, illustrating that poverty remained the root cause of the conflict, despite its religious and tribal overtones. By February 2008, both sides had agreed to sign a peace settlement to bring about a permanent end to hostilities.

The period following the fourth Sa'ada war was probably the most peaceful that the region had witnessed since the conflict began in 2004.

It was not to last. Continued violence has been blamed on the general instability of the area and strong tribal notions of revenge, though it is unclear to what extent this assessment has been influenced by the official government line<sup>67</sup>. Another two full-blown conflicts followed, the last of which took place in 2009. During the build-up to the sixth phase of the conflict, President Saleh's regime began actively to liken the Houthis to a terrorist movement in the hope of enlisting international support for the Government's war effort. Their case was strengthened in June 2009 by the kidnapping of seven Germans, one British national and one South Korean in the Sa'ada area, three of whom were killed immediately (Al Jazeera, 2009a).

Internal political pressure on Saleh's Regime and the President's growing unpopularity led to the need for a decisive victory in the North, while continued violations of the ceasefire agreement gave the Government a solid reason to send forces to the region at any time. In August 2009, President Saleh famously called together a meeting of the High Security Committee and concluded that the Houthis needed to be struck down "with an iron fist" (Al Jazeera, 2009b). Government forces were able to realise this goal to some extent when the sixth war began, as they received considerable backing from Saudi Arabia. Fighting between Saudi border guards and Houthi rebels had really begun the year before, when Saudi Arabia issued permission to the Yemeni Government to attack the Houthis from their territory.

From November 2009 onwards, the Saudi Arabian military launched a full campaign in the Northern peripheries of Yemen, bombarding the area with devastating air strikes (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Bryce Loidolt *et al* note that: "It is unclear whether Saudi-initiated ground engagements have occurred on sovereign Yemeni territory, although its military build-up along its southern border reportedly constituted the largest deployment of Saudi ground troops since the 1990–1991 Gulf War" (2010, p. 156).

Despite Saudi Arabian backing, the Government of Yemen was unable to bring about a decisive victory against the Houthi movement during the sixth war, which came to an end in February 2010. Nor is it likely that future military interventions will bring an end to the conflict. The casualties of the sixth war are currently unknown, while the total number of deaths caused by the Sa'ada conflict are still to be tallied. Yet thus far, the Houthis have weathered the obliteration of their homes and bases of operations, the mass arrests of their members and the deaths of many of their leaders, and they are still a strong fighting force. Their grievances remain valid. The chief issue

---

<sup>67</sup> Revenge killings and street justice will form a recurring theme in this thesis, and will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 5 in terms of its relation to justice prevention, and more specifically in terms of tribalism in section 5.3.

here is extreme underdevelopment, which not only extends the lifetime of the conflict but also compounds the economic and humanitarian crises faced by the country as a whole.

In 2011 and 2012, the Houthis took advantage of the power vacuums generated by the Arab Spring in Yemen and elsewhere to regroup and establish a semi-federal system of self-administration in the far North. It is not yet clear how this new system of governance will be incorporated into Yemen's post-Arab Spring national political transition more broadly.

#### **2.4.2 The Secessionist Movement**

The origins of the Southern Yemeni secessionist movement have already been alluded to<sup>68</sup>: to summarise, it is important to note that the first three years of Yemeni union did not bring much material benefit to the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. On the contrary, in the aftermath of their democratisation, Southern communist government structures were slowly dismantled, privatising services and bringing an end to severely subsidised healthcare and education in that half of the country, among other funding cuts. These cuts only reinforced rumours spreading among the local population that Southern resources, and Southern oil and gas, were being siphoned by Sana'a to promote Northern interests. Together with the gradual reduction of the Yemeni Socialist Party's authority and influence across the country, this growing Southern dissatisfaction with the new *status quo* eventually led to the 1994 Civil War for separatism, in which Southern forces were quickly overwhelmed by the North, despite military assistance from countries like Saudi Arabia (which saw at the time a unified Yemen on its border to be a potential strategic threat).

The aftermath of that war has not yet been fully analysed, but following the unquestionable victory of the North of Yemen over the South, President Saleh's regime set about a process of purging YSP leaders from key positions in the South and replacing them with Northern officials, in order to ensure that a second war would never occur. Simultaneously, "an estimated 100,000 military and civil employees" were also "forcibly retired" (Human Rights Watch, 2009b, p. 15). While President Saleh succeeded in crushing the ability of the former Southern leadership to mobilise any significant forces against the Sana'a Government by integrating the Southern and Northern armies, he failed to effectively address Southern grievances, leading to prolonged and continuing hostility towards his regime after 1994. In the ten years that followed, Southern Yemenis for the most part found few outlets in mainstream politics for voicing their discontent, pushing them to protest frequently against the Yemeni state. Ever fearful of budding revolutions, the Government of Yemen responded to these protests with brutal reprisals, inadvertently sowing the seeds of what would become a flourishing secessionist movement.


The Southern Yemeni secessionist movement today, sometimes referred to as the *Hiraak* (or Southern Mobility Movement), is most commonly connected to groups of disaffected military personnel, known as the Society of Retired Military Officers, who put together a large public demonstration campaign in 2007 (Small Arms Survey, 2010, p. 5), decrying their unfair dismissal and poor pension arrangements. Due to the popularity of thematic linkages in their protests to issues of unemployment and extreme poverty, their movement served to radicalise the local population, drawing new participants to public demonstrations from all sectors of Yemeni society, many of them

---

<sup>68</sup> See section 2.2 of this chapter.

from the Yemeni Socialist Party, but some also from other parties, including Islah. By 2009, calls for increased Governmental development of the South had merged with demands for outright separation from the North, and these have only grown in intensity and popularity in recent years. Oxford Analytica explain that “Demonstrations have since taken place in many major cities in the South, including Aden, Zingibar and Mukalla” (2009, p. 5).

Due perhaps to their significant defeat in the 1994 Civil War, representatives of the Southern secessionist movement have at all times maintained a passivist narrative, heralding dialogue and understanding as the keys to achieving their goals. Recently, unfortunately, they have been linked to growing terrorist activity and armed combatant movements, but, as with the Houthis, their ties to terrorist groups are yet to be confirmed<sup>69</sup>. Oxford Analytica report that clashes between armed combatants and Government forces have thus far occurred in the governorates of Lahej, Dhala and Abyan, with Dhala, they argue, being the point of origin of the 2007 protests (p. 5).



**Figure 26 Areas Affected by Secessionist Protests Since 2007**

The map above indicates that the secessionist movement has had wide-ranging appeal in the South of the country. Yet while Southern anger at the Sana'a Government is steadily rising, with the slow resolution of their grievances in the aftermath of the Arab Spring gradually turning the population against the new regime as well, it is by no means true that all Southerners favour secessionism as the only viable solution to their problems. Furthermore, the danger that the *Hiraak* poses to the unified Yemeni state has traditionally been mitigated by the movement's significant internal divisions and lack of organised leadership.

The Human Rights Watch notes that:

<sup>69</sup> See section 2.4.3 for more details on terrorism in Yemen.

There appear to be many competing bodies and persons portraying themselves as the leadership of the Southern Movement, and it is unlikely that there is a single overarching leadership body, but rather various locally and regionally organized groups that loosely coordinate their activities, but often act independently of one another (p. 16).

The involvement of multiple parties within the *Hiraak* has led to on-going struggles for control over it, while the ideologies and political positions of many of these parties themselves are antithetical to one another. Writing in 2009, Oxford Analytica add that the *Hiraak's* chances for success have been traditionally limited by the reality that “Many prominent Southerners serve in the Government and have vested interests in the current regime” (p. 6), although temporarily this ceased to be the case after the Arab Spring of 2011, when many abandoned President Saleh in order to voice their outrage at his targeting of civilian protesters with military and police forces.

The Yemeni Government's responses to Southern protests have been immediate and violent. In this sense, President Saleh's regime has viewed the Southern separatist movement, almost from its origins, as a significant threat to Yemen's integrity, though it is not yet clear what President Hadi's position will be on this. Christopher Boucek writes that such fears have been reinforced by the growing popularity of the movement, and he argues that:


The potential scope of the separatist challenge to the Saleh regime was made evident in spring 2009 when an important regime supporter defected to the southern movement. Tariq al-Fadhli, a former mujahid who had fought in Afghanistan, has family roots in the South including claims to hereditary lands. According to some analyses, the withdrawal of al-Fadhli's support for the government is symptomatic of the southern issue's propensity to challenge the status quo (2009, p. 16).

Certainly, despite the Yemeni Government's harsh response to Southern protests, or perhaps in answer to it, the secessionist movement has continued to draw in new members, including entire tribes, with varying degrees of influence. A further area of concern is that the secessionist movement is growing increasingly violent, and the Human Rights Watch note that there have been frequent reports of attacks on Northerners in the South, some of them fatal (2009b, p. 23). Meanwhile, continued shelling of the South in the war against Al Qaeda, is contributing to rising hostilities.

### **2.4.3 Regional Security, Piracy and Terrorism**

As a buffer between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, Yemen plays an important role in regional security, which is affected by a number of strategic issues that include an on-going regional struggle between Shia and Sunni domination, increased Islamic radicalisation and terrorism, and rising levels of organised crime and piracy. Most famously, Yemen is the nation home of the late Osama bin Laden, founder of the Al Qaeda terrorist movement, and the new operational centre of the Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) movement – a group that easily rivals its parent organisation in scale and operational capacity. In recent years, AQAP has probably proved to be the most important of these regional dimensions in determining national and international policy frameworks for development in the country, which have reflected an alarming shift towards the securitisation of foreign aid under the auspices of so-called “stabilisation” programmes that favour a

risk-containment philosophy over a humanitarian one (Roger Mac Ginty, 2012). The US \$150 million stabilisation strategy launched for Yemen in 2009 is a key example of this trend in programming priorities (Sultan Barakat *et al*, 2011b).



**Figure 27 Areas Suspected to Contain AQAP and Ansar al Sharia Fighters in 2012**

In practice, the threat of AQAP and Ansar al-Sharia (which has been suspected of ties with AQAP) in Yemen, has acted as one of the main determining factors for continuing American and Saudi Arabian support for the Yemeni government, which has proved crucial for President Saleh's regime in determining domestic military policy, particularly in relation to the war against the Houthis, and is currently proving equally important for President Hadi. American intervention in Yemen on this basis is now over a decade old: an American missile strike that resulted in the death of Abu Ali al Harithi in November 2002, for instance, the then-leader of Al Qaeda's Yemen offshoot, effectively crippled the movement (Sarah Phillips, 2010). However, after a prison break in February 2006 allowed Nasser al Wahayshi and Qasim al Raymi to reform the organisation, AQAP once again grew to constitute a significant threat in Yemen (Barakat *et al*, 2011b, p. 71).

In reality, rumours of Al Qaeda's movements in Yemen are often greatly exaggerated by the state among others, who have traditionally relied upon predominantly American security concerns to rally financial and military support to the Government from abroad in times of heightened conflict and political unrest. Thus, during the Arab Spring of 2011, both President Saleh's regime and the opposing Joint Meetings Party played upon the theme of a resurgent AQAP to enlist foreign support for their causes: President Saleh claiming that his departure would see Yemen overrun by terrorists, and Abdel Rahman Ba Fadel of the Islah party claiming that Saleh was secretly supporting AQAP in order to increase their profile and justify his argument in the eyes of the international press (Al Jazeera, 2011). Likewise, the regional Sunni-Shia divide has been used by President Saleh to allege that Iran may be the main financial backer of the Shia Houthi movement in order to gain military aid from a Sunni Saudi Arabia.

Due to the wide-scale manipulation of these issues by multiple actors in Yemen, it is often difficult to assess their physical impact on the country and its implications for regional security, particularly in light of evidence presented by leading experts on the situation, including Sarah Phillips, who cast doubt on the assertions of actors like Ba Fadel by stating that AQAP's mission in Yemen has always been “to destroy the existing political system and establish its own” (2010, p. 3). In 2011, AQAP moved one step closer to this goal by seizing important cities in the South of the country and establishing emirates in their place with the hope of forming a caliphate<sup>70</sup>. Thus, 2012 has seen a considerable military effort by the Yemeni state under President Hadi to take back these areas with international support. While many cities seized have been liberated by the Yemeni military, bolstering support for the Yemeni Government among more mainstream Yemeni community members, the AQAP and Ansar Al Sharia movements have not been fully eradicated, with Nicholas Hopton estimating in interview that 1000 fighters remain in the country – some of them hard-line ideologues, but others being new recruits interested in a steady income or simply “looking for trouble” (*Expert Consultation, 19 July, 2012*).

Quite possibly the only regional dynamic that has not been manipulated and over-inflated in media and Government reports for political reasons is the piracy phenomenon, potentially because: “no state wants to be known for having a piracy problem”, as this compromises maritime economic development and trade, so that “consequently there is considerable temptation to discourage incident reporting by demanding of any master and crew that reports an incident that they remain as witnesses while subjecting the ship to a long and expensive delay” (Martin N. Murphy, 2010, p. 18). Furthermore, piracy off the Yemeni coastline is analysed as a Somali issue, and whenever it is seen to affect Yemen directly it is often blurred with the theme of maritime terrorism, which saw the attempted destruction of the French *Limberg* oil tanker and the *USS Cole* by Al Qaeda bombers in 2002 and 2000 respectively, leading to the vast withdrawal of shippers from Yemeni ports at a significant cost to the country's economy. Having said this, Al Qaeda and other regional stress factors do continue to pose a substantial challenge to the integrity of the Yemeni state. It has been noted that, after the attack on the *USS Cole* and the 2001 September 11th destruction of the American Twin Towers and Pentagon, Yemen experienced a severe crackdown on terrorist activities in the country, with President Saleh vowing to join the United States as a key ally in its global War on Terror. Few questions are asked, however, about the role that Yemen should play in helping to reduce piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

#### **2.4.4 The Arab Spring**

The Arab Spring that originated in Tunisia in 2010 before spreading elsewhere across the region left virtually no country in the Middle East and North Africa untouched by mass protests (*See Figure 28*). It arrived in Yemen in late January 2011, when thousands of demonstrators took to the streets, demanding a change of leadership, with the removal of President Saleh as the head of the Yemeni Government a central and non-negotiable demand for most participants. Such removal, pro-change protesters insisted, needed to be immediate, without allowing for “a phased transition that would defer [the President's] departure until the end of an interim period in which constitutional changes would be agreed” (Hill *et al*, 2011, p. 3).

---

<sup>70</sup> See section 2.4.4.

While President Saleh is generally acknowledged to have been consistently democratically elected within the country, the demand for his immediate resignation stemmed not only from a popular desire for political change emanating from a wave of sudden pan-Arabic revolutionary fever, but also from a loss of faith in the Yemeni democratic system. This call for his removal from power was accentuated by a history of unrepresentative politics, allegations of multi-level corruption and growing public suspicions that the President would institute a policy of hereditary rule in light of his ailing health, passing leadership of the country down to his son (*Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations Population Fund, 14 August, 2010*). In an anonymous online survey conducted in May 2011, one Yemeni citizen commented: “I participate in protests because the situation in Yemen is hopeless, corruption is everywhere. Siblings of officials have lots of benefits other citizens do not have”, summarising the growing levels of frustration among Yemeni youth which had spread throughout the country by this point, contributing to an emerging civil war.




Figure 28 2011 Arab Spring Affected Countries, Highlighting Tunisia as the Point of Origin, and Yemen as the Case-Study Country

As a non-negotiable issue, the theme of President Saleh's immediate departure proved extremely contentious, with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and Qatar especially, striving from the outset to broker a deal for a phased transfer of power. Though the agreement has now been signed, with Saleh officially handing over leadership of the country to President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi in February 2012, power transfer negotiations in 2011 and 2012 were left lacking legitimacy and have remained largely contested throughout the country in the aftermath of the Arab Spring for a number of reasons (*Expert Consultation, Rafat al Akhali, 7 March, 2012*).

Firstly, they were extremely slow in securing President Saleh's departure from power, a process that was only successfully negotiated eleven months after protests began, while negotiated peace settlements also left Saleh's family members in key positions of control over military and state

infrastructures (*Expert Consultation, Atiaf Alwazir, 5 June, 2012*). This remaining network of allies and contacts, experts argue, may mean that Saleh could, in theory, continue to influence the country's politics long after his resignation (*Expert Consultation, Nicholas Hopton, 20, July, 2012*).

Secondly, the agreement granted the President and key members of the Yemeni Government, including the ruling party, immunity from prosecution by the International Criminal Court, despite the use of hugely oppressive tactics to disband and punish protesters.

Thirdly, negotiations largely took place between the Yemeni state and the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), who were not considered to be representative of the majority of demonstrators.

Fourthly, the single-candidate election process signalled by the agreement was largely read on the ground as an attempt to prolong Yemen's emerging system of electoral authoritarianism, failing to bring about democratic reform and being, as a result, boycotted by both Southern and Northern opposition groups alike (*Expert Consultation, Rafat al Akhali, 7 March, 2012*).

Finally, the continued strength of President Saleh's local support base and the prevalence of pro-Saleh demonstrations in early 2011, highlighted the extremely questionable position of external interventions in Yemeni politics, particularly as protests were combined with the overall rejection of negotiated peace agreements by both sides in the Arab Spring conflict. Ultimately, the agreement left many unanswered questions as to the scale of democratic reform to follow and, having failed to assuage fears of continuing governmental corruption, eventually lead to the somewhat less glamorous Revolution of Institutions in 2012 that has largely been ignored by Western media (*Expert Consultation, Atiaf Alwazir, 5 June, 2012*).

This issue of external intervention (as aggravated by current American military support for President Hadi's counter-terrorism initiatives) has been rendered more important by Yemen's historically reinforced suspicion of foreign intervention, which, in the case of the GCC, is enhanced by Saudi Arabia's dual role as a leading player in the Council and a great supporter of former-President Saleh's regime. The agreement for President Saleh's removal that was eventually signed in 2012 had its roots in these challenges. While President Saleh left the country temporarily after the signing to seek medical treatment in the United States of America, the suspicion expressed by many Yemeni citizens upon his return to the country in February 2012 highlighted considerable remaining concerns about the long-term prospects for real regime change and governance reform in Yemen (Al Jazeera, 2012).

At a local level, there is considerable suspicion of the international community's future role in the country, with America having proven to be an important ally of President Saleh's regime in the struggle against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and the United Nations Security Council having taken almost an entire year to issue a formal statement decrying violence against protesters in Yemen, while actively protecting protesters in Libya.

To better understand these legitimacy-based concerns, it is useful to look at the progression of the Arab Spring in Yemen as a whole, which began very much as a youth movement, with university students and graduates playing a central role in organising and mobilising protesters. Though they were bypassed quite significantly within peace negotiations in 2011 and 2012, protest organisers inspired by the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution developed a relatively sophisticated

administrative and welfare structure for themselves from the onset of demonstrations, particularly in Sana'a, in order to form a collective and unified front in their call for regime change. Independent online surveys and telephone interviews conducted by the author revealed that, between February and April 2011, student movements established special zones for securing peaceful demonstrations by removing weapons and arms from all participants upon entry. They established links with the press in order to ensure the monitoring of human rights violations by state and non-state actors, and created medical and legal assistance centres for those injured or harmed during demonstrations. These welfare services proved especially important at the beginning of the Arab Spring as Yemeni hospitals were generally seen by protesters to be compromised and insecure areas, where those injured in the course of demonstrations could easily be identified by the state, arrested and removed without notice.

As Government reprisals against protesters increased, those Yemenis interviewed as part of this thesis reported that these unofficial medical centres became steadily less relevant and less active, due to their significant lack of resources and capacity. When asked why these original members of the pro-change movement had taken to the streets in February and March 2011 and why they remained on the streets in April after it became apparent that their involvement in the movement was extremely dangerous, one participant answered: "We went to the streets because we believe in a better future for Yemen. This will not happen, though, unless we get rid of all members of the corrupted regime". Another argued: "We need change as the situation in Yemen is bad, we need to have better living conditions, economics, etc". Meanwhile, a pro-government protester argued that: "We need a change, but not through the destruction of the current system. Yemeni people are not like Egyptian or Tunisian people. They are poor, they have war, and there are 50 million guns" in the country, leading to a heightened risk of civil war.

In February 2011, protests in Yemen remained fairly small and self-contained, with non-violence being one of the key principles held by demonstration organisers, including Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Tawakkul Karman.

It was not long before the pro-change movement exploded in popularity and therefore began to generate real reprisals by supporters of the state. Violence increased dramatically and casualties began to soar. Participants began to report increased levels of hostility and aggression, specifically on the streets outside demonstration hotspots. One pro-change protester reported at the time that: "We don't have trouble getting to protests, but the street has been affected. Clashes of opinions turn violent. There is a real passion".



**Figure 29 View Over Sana'a City Centre**

One protest organiser, Husam Al-Sharjabi, the head of the Civil Coalition for Revolutionary Youth (one of the largest youth movements in Yemen), commented in interview that he felt throughout this time that governmental violence was manipulated by President Saleh as a tool for provoking demonstrators into breaking their commitment to non-violence, thereby losing the popular support of foreign observers (*Expert Consultation, March 20th, 2012*). He commented quite candidly, that, while his movement made a concerted effort to institute training programmes aimed at teaching demonstrators to communicate with Yemeni security forces in a respectful manner so as to minimise the risk to their own lives, many “kids and teenagers” in particular began entering into deliberate violent confrontations with state officials. Meanwhile Yemeni bloggers and independent journalists began to refer increasingly to “martyrs of the revolution” and “revenge killings”, indicating a steady increase in the glorification of violence flowing just beneath the surface of a more mainstream peaceful narrative, with the continuous tension between these two facets being an extremely important element of the 2011 Yemeni Arab Spring experience.

The mass appeal of the Arab Spring to young people in Yemen, and to young people in Yemen's major cities, resulted from the country's growing rate of unemployment, as well as from the high prevalence of unemployment among university graduates (which was estimated as being at 54% in 2008 by the International Labour Organisation). It is important to note here, as confirmed in an interview with Kate Nevens of Chatham House, that many youth joined the protests stating that they had come to Sana'a, for the period of the Arab Spring, as independent citizens, rather than as representatives of their tribes, putting minor tribal conflicts on hold for the duration of the demonstrations (*Expert Consultation, February 29<sup>th</sup>, 2012*). However, they were soon joined by various other factions as demonstrations gained in momentum.

The Arab Spring represented the opportunity for various actors who had been in conflict with the Government for the past decade to advance their own individual agendas. In the far North of Yemen, insecurity generated by protests across the country offered the chance for the Houthis

insurgency movement to reorganise and secure an operational stronghold, establishing a virtually self-contained and separate governance system in the Sa'ada area that may have begun to spread its influence into neighbouring governorates (Horton, 2011). The Arab Spring and its explicit call for a change of leadership and, therefore, a change in the structures of government also reinvigorated the Southern Separatist Movement, who used protests to vocalise their own grievances (though secessionism itself remained a fairly concealed element of their political narrative in 2011) (Ginny Hill, 2011). At the same time, the diversion of security forces towards containing public demonstrations led to the escalation of Al Qaeda's activities in the country, with rumours of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) seizing control of important cities and strongholds in the South (Sarah Phillips, 2011).

From April 2011 onwards, the Arab Spring in Yemen took on a notably different character, as high ranking members of the existing political system began to adopt more overtly anti-Government stances along with popular protesters, so that one interviewee noted at this time that: "every day a lot of military are joining us, even high ranking personnel, but especially soldiers". The JMP, with Islah and the Yemeni Socialist Party as two of its foundational sub-structures, began to appoint themselves as the official spokesmen for the pro-change movement, despite the clear cultural, religious and ideological divisions between different groups that had joined in demonstrations.

The JMP's critics, including April Longley Alley, have observed that the JMP's "deep personal, financial, and political connections with the current regime ... raise questions about the ability or desire of the JMP to faithfully negotiate on behalf of those protesting on the streets", though they were nevertheless treated as the voice of the Arab Spring in Yemen in negotiations organised by the GCC and other parties (2011). Some of these political connections were severed through the mass resignation of JMP officials from the Yemeni Government out of protest against the state's use of military violence against demonstrators in 2011. However, personal and financial connections remained for many of the JMP's members. Cynical observers of the situation might have concluded at the time that the JMP's actions represented, if anything, only a last bid attempt to distance themselves from a collapsing state in order to ensure their own survival.

Similar accusations have been directed toward some of Saleh's previous supporters, who included powerful tribal leaders and military stakeholders. Chief among these are the Al-Ahmar Family, head of the Hashid tribal federation (Horton, 2011), and General Ali Al Mohsen, who defected from the military along with several of his units in March 2011, allegedly to protect protesters from state violence (*Expert Consultation, Atiaf Alwazir, 5 June, 2012*). While the Al-Ahmar family eventually opted for all-out war against the Government, with tensions lessening only with the removal of President Saleh from power, General Mohsen and his men were known to have shied away from military confrontation in 2011. This, as Michael Horton summarises, was likely because the General knew that his troops lacked the manpower and capacity to engage the Yemeni army directly, as headed by President Saleh's son, Ahmed al Saleh (2011).

The roles of the Al-Ahmar family and General Mohsen in the Arab Spring soon came to dominate media reports on Yemen with good reason. Sarah Phillips writes that:

The tribes are the most pervasive social forces in Yemen but their level of influence at the national level varies greatly depending on their proximity to the regime. Saleh's tribe (the Sanhan), for example, is small but enjoys tremendous access to state resources. ...

The Sanhan are members of the Hashid tribal confederation, which is the smaller but more internally cohesive of the two major northern tribal confederations ... Both the Hashid and the Bakil (to a lesser extent) have disproportionate influence at the elite level, and at the lower levels of the tribal hierarchy (2011, p. 51)

The Yemeni Government has been based since its formation on extensive systems of patronage that are designed to ensure tribal loyalties to the existing regime. The Hashid and Bakil Federations have previously acted as a major support structure for the Yemeni state and have maintained a vested interest in the state's survival<sup>71</sup>.

These allegiances, supported, as Phillips claims, by financial stipends paid through “the Department of Tribal Affairs, an opaque organisation that is officially attached to the Ministry of Local Affairs” (2011, pp. 52-53), function to all effects and purposes as a shadow state, whose undemocratic foundations have been a central motivating factor of general unrest in Yemen for several years, as well as a prominent element of the early 2011 protests. It is a system that various tribal groupings are said to have a direct vested interest in maintaining. Yet in May 2011, the al-Ahmar family, headed by Sheik Sadiq al-Ahmar, openly ended its alliance with President Saleh, representing a break of the Hashid Federation from the Government for reasons that are largely unknown. In June, the Government of Yemen began a direct military campaign against the al-Ahmar family in Sana’a (Johnson, 2011), sparking what historians will likely come to refer to as a second Yemeni civil war.

The abandonment of the Saleh regime by the al-Ahmar family has not been directly correlated with the defection of General Mohsen from the Yemeni army, though the two are cited as being next door neighbours in Sana’a as well as close allies (Johnson, 2011).

General Mohsen was originally tipped as a likely candidate to take over after President Saleh’s departure from power. He quickly gained in popularity, particularly in the capital, though he never quite succeeded in living up to his promise of offering physical protection to Yemeni civilians. Ahmed al Saleh remained a favourite of pro-Government supporters to take over leadership from his father after a bomb attack on President Saleh forced him to leave Yemen between June and September 2011 to seek medical treatment in Saudi Arabia. While both of these figures have been bypassed by the February 2012 election process, along with all other party leaders, to make way for the ascension of Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi to power, any one of them could reignite a military confrontation in a bid to take over leadership of the country.

---

<sup>71</sup> See Chapter 5, section 5.3, for more details on the relationship between tribal and state structures.



**Figure 30 The Al Saleh Mosque - Yemen's Largest Mosque, Built on the Outskirts of Sana'a by President Saleh in 2008 and Named After His Family**

Ahmed al Saleh and other Saleh family loyalists continue to lead their own military units in the country, sabotaging key infrastructure sites, and effectively splitting the Yemeni army into two rival factions according to interviews conducted with Nicholas Hopton and other key stakeholders. At the same time, Saleh's participation in President Hadi's inauguration ceremony has led to concerns by some, including Prime Minister Mohammed Basindawa, that Hadi's rule will be delegitimised by Saleh's continued influence over the new President. Such suspicions have been aggravated by Saleh's power-handover speech itself, in which he famously concluded that: "The responsibilities on the shoulders of the new president are immense, but we are confident that with our support he will succeed" (Al Jazeera, 2012). Of primary concern here is that the struggle between these and other elite stakeholders has overshadowed the youth movement that began the Arab Spring in Yemen, leading to the strong possibility that their grievances will once again be overlooked.

## **2.5 Resource Competition and Poverty**

While previous subsections of this chapter have concentrated on the political and historical causes of Yemen's fragility, what is instrumental to understanding the challenges that the country faces today is an appreciation for the significant resource competition generated by its rapid resource depletion and extreme poverty. In 2010, 42.8% of the population of Yemen lived below the poverty line on less than \$2 per day, and poverty is said to have increased to over 60% in 2011 due

to the disruption of industry and employment during the Arab Spring (Sadeq Al-Wesabi, 2011)<sup>72</sup>. This trend risks being aggravated further by rapid population growth – the product of Yemen's high fertility rate. Additional stresses on Yemen's socio-economic environment stem from its continuously shrinking resource base, with food, fertile land, water and oil being consumed at a rate that dramatically exceeds their realistically sustainable usage. Weak resource management and wasteful resource extraction practices compound these challenges, resulting in nationwide conflicts over resource distribution between North and South Yemen, increased intra-tribal competition and violence, uneven development between urban and rural areas, and physical confrontations between and within families.

Oxford Analytica write that “the most pressing issues that Yemen will have to deal with in the near future are the loss of oil reserves and the depletion of its water table”, with underground water reserves shrinking by a total of eight metres per year in some parts of the country (2009, p. 16). This high rate of water depletion stems from Yemen's lack of surface water, with the CIA World Factbook writing that the country's 527,968km<sup>2</sup> of land contain 0km<sup>2</sup> of surface water, leaving the 24,133,400 large population of Yemen vastly dependent upon underground reservoirs for their water needs (2011). While the Government of Yemen is exploring other viable alternatives to non-renewable water usage, such as constructing desalination plants along the Southern coastline, such projects have proven far too costly for the fragile state to implement on a sufficiently large scale to supply the entire country. Furthermore, unreliable rainfall patterns and the increasing availability of water mining technologies in Yemen has pushed many farmers to abandon the terracing of their fields (a traditional practice for collecting rainwater), and to switch to using underground water for their irrigation needs (*Stakeholder Consultation, Food and Agriculture Organisation, 14 August, 2010*).

A lack of coordination between farmers and others using the same underground water supplies, poor mining practices and a lack of legal infrastructure to protect underground reservoirs has led to the frequent collapse of underground caverns, contaminating water supplies. The World Bank summarises that:

Yemen's water resources depend on rainfall, almost all of which is rapidly lost to evapotranspiration (ET). About 6% of rainfall runs off as surface water and flows into stream beds, often as violent spate torrents. Occasionally, very large rainfall events occur outside of normal patterns and cause destructive floods, as in Hadramout and al-Mahra in October 2008. ... Agriculture is estimated to use 93% of available surface and groundwater. However, rapid increases in water abstraction and use have affected the water balance. The rate of groundwater overdraft is currently twice the recharge rate, and is increasing, bringing depletion of water reserves, inequity, and shortages, with negative socio-economic consequences. Reforms to tackle water problems have been under-way for a decade but no headway has been made in reining in the rate of overdraft. (2010a, p. xii)

---

<sup>72</sup> These facts are already mentioned in section 2.3, which outlined Yemen's key demographics and geographic characteristics. They are repeated here because this section will go into the reasons for their prevalence more thoroughly.

A lack of capacity to deal with rainfall effectively, and a lack of built and maintained rainwater collection systems, has left Yemen extremely vulnerable to both flooding and drought. It is considered one of the most water starved countries in the world, with a water deficit of one billion cubic metres per year (Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2010).

The Yemeni oil sector – the backbone of Yemen's struggling economy – is facing similar challenges that have been aggravated by ineffectual domestic policies and destructive external economic trends. Oxford Analytica write that Yemen's:

oil exports ... have declined steadily over the past five years. The 75% drop in oil revenues in the first half of 2009 was a devastating blow. Though international oil prices have largely recovered from their initial decline following the global financial crisis, it is the decline in output in Yemen that is of most concern. Most experts believe that oil will run out by 2017, but the 2009 figures suggest this could happen sooner. (2009, p. 16)

Interviews with Yemeni members of state conducted in July 2011 indicated a strong reluctance among Government officials to admit to this claim, many stating that of yet unexplored areas of Yemeni terrain may reveal new, previously undetected oil supplies.

Liquid natural gas extraction has been listed as a potential replacement for the oil sector. However, what has become clear in recent years is that Yemen's single export-based economy model is unsustainable. This realisation has led both the Yemeni Government and its international and regional donors to channel their combined efforts into moving the country away from its oil dependency by focusing on the development of three other so-termed 'promising sectors'; those of agriculture, tourism and fisheries (*Stakeholder Consultation, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 15 August, 2010, Interview Led by Sultan Barakat*). It is worth noting that prospects for tourism enhancement in Yemen are limited by the country's international reputation for conflict, violence and terrorism, while the agricultural and fisheries sectors are extremely vulnerable to resource scarcity and increased competition.

Diminishing oil production in Yemen, which has coincided with high points in oil market prices, has meant that the Yemeni Government has failed to capitalise on opportunities to turn around sufficient profits from this resource to generate development in other sectors. Across the board, all ministries interviewed<sup>73</sup> reported that their existing budgets are barely sufficient to maintain staffing requirements, let alone to launch new development projects. The inability of the Yemeni state to capitalise on oil revenues is linked to its internal policy of oil subsidies, whereby Yemenis are able to purchase oil at an extremely low rate in order to maintain their businesses. The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation states that these "Fuel subsidies absorbed on average 27% of the total [public] expenditures during 2006-08" (2009b, p. 7). Attempts to reverse this policy have traditionally been derailed by mass protests and rioting by Yemen's people – many of whom depend on oil subsidies to stave off poverty and starvation.

Although limited reductions to subsidies were made in 2010, leading to increased prices for diesel, Liquefied Petroleum Gas, kerosene, and gasoline; prices for these products in Yemen today remain on average 50% lower than global market rates.

---

<sup>73</sup> See Chapter 1, section 1.6.3 for a full list of consulted Ministries.



**Figure 31 Yemeni woman carries grain from market in Sana'a**

The need to cultivate Yemen's oil and non-oil exports is compounded by two other large inter-connected resource deficits; those of food and arable land. Yemen's climate is extremely changeable and prone to desertification. According to the CIA World Factbook, arable land accounts for only 2.91% of land in Yemen (2011). The Government of Yemen writes that:

Land problems are considered one of the most difficult challenges facing Yemen, as land has significant social and economic value in traditional Yemeni society. Land problems are a constant challenge to the rule of law, government authority, and social peace. In fact, land disputes directly account for 30 percent of all court cases and indirectly account for an additional 10-15 percent (through correlated issues such as land theft, forgery and related assaults). (2009, p. 7)

Land and water resources are a leading cause of violence and conflict in Yemen. For the Government, "modernizing ownership and proprietorship rights, improving dispute resolution procedures, and ensuring appropriate issuance of land titles in order for land to be used as collateral in lending" are top priorities, not only for stabilising the country, but also for developing its economy and virtually non-existent banking sector (2009, p. 7).

Such changes need to be implemented quickly, as Yemen's already limited availability of arable land is currently shrinking, due to "Increased drought frequency, increased temperatures, and changes in precipitation patterns" (Environment Protection Authority, 2009, p. 1). The quality of arable land is also deteriorating due to over-use and poor agricultural practices. This simultaneously contributes to all of Yemen's other resource-related problems, including those concerning water, oil and food.

Qat farming accounts for the vast majority of agricultural production in the country. This is because qat is a relatively hardy, easy to grow cash-crop, which also happens to be the only legal narcotic available in Yemen, the use of which is unrestricted by most interpretations of Islamic law. The Government of Yemen and the World Bank Group write that:

Qat chewing is pervasive in Yemen, affecting every demographic group to varying degrees. Currently, it accounts for 6% of GDP, 10% of consumption, 1/3 of agricultural GDP and provides greater employment than the public sector, employing about 500,000 people (or 1 of every 7 Yemenis). Despite the significant economic opportunities for qat producers and suppliers, the net effect of qat consumption is negative for Yemen's economic development. (2007, p. 43)

Qat farming is gradually replacing all forms of food production in Yemen, leading to an unfortunate paradox, whereby a predominantly agricultural society has grown entirely reliant upon food imports in order to stave off starvation. Yemen has become a net importer, with oil remaining one of its sole export commodities, the production of which was entirely disrupted in 2011 due to the Arab Spring. Ghazi Abdul-Rahman Al-Samia'y writes that "the percentage of people unable to meet their daily food requirements has increased to 20%", and most have grown entirely reliant upon governmental and non-governmental handouts for their needs, leading to a crisis of protracted relief across the country (2009, p. 19). In 2010, the World Bank wrote: "Yemen has one of the highest malnutrition rates in the world. Data from the Family Health Survey (FHS) of 2003 indicate that 53.1% of children under 5 are stunted, 45.6 per cent are underweight, and 12.4 per cent are wasted." (2010b, p. 14). These rates are likely to increase dramatically in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, which severely disrupted economic production and development in 2011.

Aside from reducing food production, qat impacts water, land and oil scarcity. Christopher Boucek explains that:

Because qat is more productive as it is given more water, there are no incentives to conserve water in irrigation. Farmers will therefore often over-irrigate their fields with little consideration given to the environmental after effects, including soil degradation caused by exhausting soil nutrients. (2009, p. 8)

Qat is considered by many analysts to be the leading cause of Yemen's sky-rocketing rate of water depletion. However, because water for irrigation is drawn primarily from underground, qat also requires considerable oil expenditures to run water-pumps and pipelines, contributing to high usage of Yemen's already scarce resources and placing tremendous strain on Government budgets by exploiting oil subsidies.

The Yemeni Government and its people have become locked into a pattern of resource depletion, whereby reversing high rates of resource use will require significant external investment over a prolonged period of time. Thus far, the Yemeni state has managed to avoid economic collapse only through continuing external support and oil production. However, donor support has tended towards extreme inconsistency in recent years, undermined by accusations of Government corruption, so that money pledged by international and regional donors is often reduced in practice and consistently fails to match funds eventually delivered and disbursed throughout the country. For instance, of the US \$5.7bn pledged to Yemen at the 2006 London Consultative Group meeting, only

10% had been disbursed in 2010 according to interviews conducted at the Ministry of International Planning and Cooperation, which has not been sufficient to reverse the country's fragility. Such funding is not adequate enough to develop Yemen's "promising" sectors in order to move the country away from its oil dependency.

Yemen's growing reputation for insecurity is causing the withdrawal of domestic and foreign investors to more financially stable climates, removing other forms of potential state income (*Stakeholder Consultation, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 15 August, 2010, Interview Led by Sultan Barakat*). Taxation is equally weak, and tax evasion, as well as low levels of contribution to government income, renders any existing investment socially sub-optimal in developmental terms (Chatham House, 2010). Within this socio-economic context, it is not surprising that poverty and resource scarcity are generating significant competition, which accounts for a large portion of violence, conflict and offences against the person committed in the country. Meanwhile the state remains both financially and physically unable to restore balance and equality to its people.

## **2.6 Social Inequality and Lack of Access to Basic Services**

Extreme poverty and lack of state capacity negatively impact the ability of Yemeni citizens to access basic services. These are further restricted by severe social inequalities: between the rich and the poor; between urban and rural, as well as central and peripheral areas; between landless people, nomads and land owners; between different groups of migrants; between tribal and religious groups; and between genders (*Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations Population Fund, 14 August, 2010*). Since basic services include healthcare, education, social welfare and protection, these social inequalities have serious implications for maintaining poverty levels and prolonging uneven development conditions, which are a primary source of conflict and political unrest in Yemen. Pervasive social inequalities and poor service provision prevent marginalised groups from lifting themselves out of poverty by denying them various forms of social opportunity. As Rodrigo R. Soares asserts in his analysis of international differences in crime rates, social and economic inequality has proven to be one of the variables "most consistently related to crime rates", particularly when it comes to "theft and contact crime", as well as burglary (2002, p. 175). Yet, while healthcare and education are unevenly distributed across the country, social welfare and protection services are almost entirely absent everywhere, with unemployment benefits and child protection remaining the largest policy gap areas (*Stakeholder Consultation, International Labour Organisation, 15 August, 2010, Interview Led by Sean Deely*).

Yemen was ranked 133rd out of 169 countries in the 2010 *Human Development Index* (HDI). While it has shown some level of improvement in its development indicators over the past decade, rising from its 2007 position of 140, it continues to be undermined by poor healthcare, education and welfare service levels. In 2010, the *HDI* classified 32% of the country as being "undernourished", which accounted for the greatest health risk in the country. Yet while the under-five mortality rate in Yemen was at 69 registered deaths for every 1,000 people that year, public health expenditure in the country accounted for only 1.5% of gross domestic product (GDP), while education represented 5.2%. This followed on from a prolonged period of deteriorating security, which saw the diversion of funds for public spending towards the development and supply of the country's military while the

global economic crisis saw a significant reduction in donor aid to the country. In practice, it meant that hospitals and other healthcare providers were ill-equipped to handle the sheer volume of injuries and related cases generated by crackdowns against protesters in 2011, leading many mosques and other public buildings to double up as care givers for those in need. This trend is anticipated to have had the potential to reverse recent advances in health in Yemen, linked to the containment of various diseases, such as measles, tuberculosis and malaria. These are also affected by the uneven distribution of potable water across the country, which is known to heavily impact health and sanitation (*Stakeholder Consultation, World Health Organisation, 15 August, 2010*).



**Figure 32 Yemeni girl works a vegetable garden in Sana'a**

Although some advances have been made in public school systems, total school registration and student retention numbers remain incredibly low (*Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, 15 August, 2010, Interview Led by David Connolly*). Poor retention rates are linked to the reality that the education sector in Yemen has failed to attract quality professionals, leading to very poor levels of student engagement in the classroom (*Stakeholder Consultation, Ministry of Education, 17 August, 2010*). Extreme levels of poverty<sup>74</sup> mean that many children are made to work to support their families rather than attend school.

Yemen's high fertility rate (another lead cause of poor general health levels and high child and maternal mortality rates), as well as the influx of foreign migrants from Iraq, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and other areas, have meant that the country's labour force has expanded considerably faster in recent years than the job market can accommodate. The Minister of Labour and Social Affairs noted in interview that he received 175,000 applicants for 1,000 new low-level positions created in 2009 to stem the impact of mass unemployment, a figure indicative of the severe

---

<sup>74</sup> According to the Central Statistical Organisation, unemployment rates rose from 16% in 2005 to 35% in 2008, before the global economic crisis also triggered the vast return of labour migrant to Yemeni soil, removing remittances as one of the country's economic support systems (2008). Poverty has since been on the increase.

overcrowding of the Yemeni labour market (*Stakeholder Consultation, 16 August, 2010*). Travelling through Sana'a, it is easy to observe large groups of Yemeni men sitting by the side of the road, waiting for work, many of whom are qualified electricians, mechanics and traders, while women and children crowd around passing cars, begging for food and money.



**Figure 33** Yemeni boy minds a stall in the centre of Sana'a

The World Bank estimates that every person in Yemen between the ages of 15 and 65 who is in employment actually supports at least four others who are not, meaning that employment is no longer a valid means of overcoming poverty, as salaries are often not sufficient to raise a single individual out of deprivation (2007). In practice, this means that, rather than attending school, young girls often stay home to help their families by attending to farms, collecting water and caring for younger siblings, while school-age boys go out in search of work (*Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, 15 August, 2010, Interview Led by David Connolly*).

Despite these significant restrictions, Government efforts to lower the cost of education through subsidies – particularly for young girls who are often denied such services due to engrained gender inequalities – have succeeded in raising net enrolment rates, which, according to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, increased from 52.7% in 1990 to 75.3% in 2008 (2008, p. 3). Barakat *et al* write that these increases are attributable to parallel development projects, so that:

Water projects, for example, have allowed more girls to attend school by reducing one major labour burden in their lives. Consequently, the female to male ratio in basic education increased from 44.6 per cent in 1990 to ... 74.8 per cent in 2008, with evidence of increasing community awareness and acceptance of the importance of girls' primary education among traditional communities. These rising levels of acceptance are also largely the product of a 2006 decree that eliminated user fees for girls in grades 1 - 6 and for boys in grades 1 - 3 in order to reduce the gender gap within the country. However, gender-specific education needs continue to be neglected so that health

education and reproductive health education have been sidelined in schools, reflecting a discrepancy between policy and gender-based needs in Yemen (2011b, p. 32)

However, a parental preference for boys' education remains across the country, with many girls dropping out of school early in order to marry and have children, with no legally set age limit for marriage in the country (*Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, 14 August, 2010*). Meanwhile boys' education continues to be limited by the necessities of employment, whereby 10% of the known labour force in Yemen in 2009 was made up of predominantly male children, 12% of whom were aged between 6 and 14 years old (United Nations Development Project, 2010).

## 2.7 Conclusion

Mark Shaw notes that sovereign states have historically been defined as enclosed or "bordered" political organisations with exclusive ownership over legitimate (or simply internally legalised) violence within their territories (1997, p. 500). However, as Graham Brown and Frances Stewart note, fragile states are frequently defined as suffering from authority, services and legitimacy-based failures in tandem. Authority failures occur when a state "lacks the authority to protect its citizens from violence of various kinds"; service failures occur when a state fails to "ensure that all citizens have access to basic services"; and legitimacy failures occur when the state enjoys "only limited support among the people" and is "typically not democratic" (2010, p. 10). As a fragile state, Yemen today falls short of Shaw's criteria, whereby authority and legitimacy failures inhibit its Government from fully and effectively maintaining its territory in accordance with a bordered conception of statehood. The legitimacy and legality of violence committed by the Yemeni Government within its territory is often questioned by its citizens and the international community, while insurgents and foreign powers continue to use violence to bid for control of various governorates within the country, both with the Government's approval and without it. Even Yemen's challenges are not enclosed within its territory – with piracy, terrorism and (as the next Chapter argues) organised crime emerging as cross-regional phenomena and tribal divisions failing to recognise official state lines.

Yemen's severely limited infrastructure, which has had a telling influence on resource competition, service delivery, social inequality and poverty, almost calls for new definitions of statehood to be developed, although the fragile states framework, which is a comparatively recent innovation, is sufficiently flexible to remain pertinent in this context. Yemen's unique socio-political reality reflects its unusual evolution, and its context will prove extremely important for shaping theoretical analyses of criminal and political violence in this thesis.

The United Nations Development Project writes that:

Overlaying a modern state upon Yemen's traditional governance system has proved difficult, and both state formation and nation building remain works-in-progress. Meanwhile, to ensure its survival, the government has created informal political alliances with traditional shaiks, religious leaders, and powerful interest groups through intensive patronage networks outside the formal state structures – which has given rise to the so-called 'parallel state'. (2010b, p. 11)

The existence of the Yemeni parallel state has worked both to secure the Government's position of authority prior to 2011 and to severely limit the extent of its power. While the parallel state quantifies the informal institutions that might be called upon to enhance the Government's decision-implementing capacity, it actually serves to undermine official structures. Many manifestations of Yemen's fragility are intrinsically connected to weak governance, whereby the state remains incapable of monopolising control over legitimate violence and lacks the institutional capacity to exercise significant positive change in the lives of its citizens.

More importantly, Yemen's severe lack of institutional capacity renders it incapable of securing law and order throughout its territories, pushing it to use military violence against its citizens in order to maintain its integrity and sovereignty, thereby diminishing its claims to good and effective governance. The legality and legitimacy of such violence is brought into question by organisations like the Human Rights Watch, which make frequent reference to strikes against predominantly civilian targets (2010), arbitrary arrests (2008) and harsh responses to protests (2009) that are a violation of the country's international commitments under human rights conventions<sup>75</sup>.

James Turner Johnson writes that such conventions operate according to the principle that:

Concern for protection of human rights has come to occupy a central place in contemporary understandings of the justification – or nonjustification – of resort to violent force and limitations on such force. Such understandings assume not only that violence can be justified – as opposed to the position that it is always wrong in itself – but also that it must be justified and, if justified, used in a manner consistent with its justifications. (1998, p. 319)

Looking to the analysis that will unfold over the remainder of this thesis, it needs to be noted that not only are local perceptions of the state's use of violence as being “unwelcome” or “illegitimate” damaging to relations between law-enforcement members and Yemeni communities, but that the Government's current system of territorial control is not working. This system will be outlined far more thoroughly in Chapter 5, which, together with Chapters 7 and 8, will therefore put forward the argument that new models of security are likely needed in fragile states, where governments do not have the infrastructure or the institutional capacity necessary to approach policing in the same way as the developed world.

---

<sup>75</sup> These are listed in Chapter 5, section 5.2.1.

## Chapter 3: Crime in Yemen




Figure 34 Jambiyah - Curved knives worn by Yemeni men as a symbol of male honour

### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an in depth analysis of crime in Yemen in order to document the extent of the problem. The country offers a fairly typical example of crime and young offending within a fragile state context. While its statistically recorded rate of total crime is very low, its homicide rate is high, as is its rate of violent offending. Thus, according to the United Nations *Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems*, Yemen registered a rate of 0.0336276 homicides per 1,000 people in 2004, placing it at the 27th position out of 62 countries with available data (2005). In 2008, this number went up to approximately 0.04, according to the *Human Development Index*, indicating a steady and consistent increase (2010). Its rate of violent crime has since escalated further, yet the causes of these increases have not yet been made fully apparent.

The extent of the problem is significant, leading to a high rate of social violence, particularly against women and children. Here, uprooted communities seem to be especially vulnerable, and the United Nations Country Team's Child Protection Sub-Cluster has reported that 67.5% of displaced people under the age of 18 show evidence of being subjected to domestic violence, of which only 33.4% may be attributed to the exercise of corporal punishment (2010, p. 5). Violence against children in schools and on the streets has additionally been proven to be very common (*Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations Population Fund, 14 August, 2010*). Likewise, however, adult men are also found to be at risk of grievous bodily harm and fatality, usually as a result of revenge killings or of violent disagreements over natural resources. The Small Arms Survey estimates that arguments relating specifically to water and land currently account for approximately 4,000 deaths per year in

rural Yemen alone (2010). Poor reliance on official state justice mechanisms, particularly in the peripheries, which are isolated from centralised rule, means that people tend to take justice into their own hands, turning personal confrontations into family, tribal or religious ones that affect a much larger populous.

These and other related trends stem from the fact that Yemen is today considered one of the most heavily armed countries in the world, which is a result of both the important cultural symbolism of weapons within Yemeni culture and of the country's very low border control capacity, which allows for the relatively easy trafficking of small arms into and out of its borders. Curved blades named *jambiyah* that are worn on the belt (see Figure 34) have traditionally symbolised male honour and tribal affiliation, and are especially prominent in the North. However, these are now increasingly being replaced with or kept company by illegal firearms. In 2003, Derek B. Miller wrote that there were approximately 50 million small arms in the country – or roughly 2.5 firearms per person, if the 2003 population estimates are to be used – and many of these weapons are yet to be accounted for by the Government (p. 10).

Due to the importance of weapons in Yemeni customs and cultural practices, any official efforts to enforce control over weapons distribution and possession have in the past been met with great hostility, while those policies that are passed successfully are made redundant by a lack of implementation capacity. Limited progress was achieved in 2008 when the Ministry of Interior reportedly seized 92,028 weapons from the general population (Al-Zaidi, 2008). Yet the significant civilian gun violence that distinguished Yemeni demonstrations from broader public protests that swept across the Middle East and parts of Africa in early 2011<sup>76</sup> is testimony that these efforts have not proven sufficient in restoring law and order to the country.

Within this context of widespread social violence and the escalation of violence through the availability of weapons, there has emerged a growing trend towards violent behaviour among children and young people under the age of eighteen, attributed to the socialisation of children to violence. The United Nations Country Team summarise that the use of child combatants in the Northern conflicts<sup>77</sup> of Yemen is creating a generation of young people “who perceive violent opportunism to be a normal aspect of life” (2010, p. 25), but the same link can be made for those children who are growing up in areas of high social violence that have not been exposed to war<sup>78</sup>. The visible effects of this growing culture of violence are an increased occurrence of young offending and a growing rate of violent offending among young people.

Building on the context analysis put forward in Chapter 2, this chapter will examine each of these developments in turn, starting with an overview of the extent of crime in Yemen, which will document rates of offending over time and trends in offending according to geographic distribution, with a particular emphasis on the difference between rural and urban areas. Next, this chapter will provide an evaluation of offender characteristics, followed by a more detailed examination of young offending and gender-based violence. It will continue its discussion of weapons proliferation within

---

<sup>76</sup> See Chapter 2, section 2.4.4, for a full analysis of the 2011 Arab Spring's impact on Yemen.

<sup>77</sup> These conflicts in the North refer to the six Sa'ada wars that are outlined in Chapter 2, section 2.4.1.

<sup>78</sup> The connection between exposure to violence and the propensity to commit violence will be discussed in more detail throughout Chapter 4, and particularly in sections 4.2.3 and 4.3, when theories that analyse the impact of violence on the development of children and young people will be presented.

the broader context of the more general availability of criminogenic commodities in the country, based upon an analysis of organised crime and corruption. Finally, the findings of these sections will be reviewed holistically in order to build a more comprehensive portrait of crime in Yemen. This Chapter's methodology is drawn loosely from Chris Kershaw *et al's Crime in England and Wales* study (2007) and Richard Boreham *et al's Arrestee Survey* (2007), though its analytical structure has been adapted to suit the parameters of a fragile state<sup>79</sup>.

### 3.2 Data Sources

The purpose of this chapter requires a country-wide analysis of changing patterns of offending. The author has relied here primarily upon national statistics published by the Government of Yemen's Central Statistical Organisation, rather than upon independent field work. The chief data sources used within this chapter have been Yemen's *Statistical Yearbooks* of 2005 to 2010 and *Security and Justice Statistics* of 2003 to 2009, unless otherwise stated. Prior to 2005, Yemen's *Statistical Yearbooks* are incomplete while *Security and Justice Statistics* documents dating back before 2003 are unavailable, so that research has been supplemented by other publications of the Central Statistical Organisation. In this regard, while patterns in offences over time have been monitored through multiple publications, specific breakdowns of offences by severity and type have been drawn predominantly from the 2009 records period, a year offering the most recent reliable statistics made available by the Yemeni state before the Arab Spring significantly shifted the political environment to a more violent condition, where the line between political offences and all other crimes became extremely blurred, and where many protesters were deliberately misfiled as insurgents or terrorists to boost international support for President Saleh's waning regime (Alkarama, 2011).

An over-reliance upon one organisation for information necessarily leads to research bias. To overcome this problem, the researcher has strived wherever possible to verify trends emerging from Government reports with United Nations data, made available by *UNdata*, as well as with trends identified by the *Global Peace Index* and the *World Prison Population List*. For further analysis of emerging trends and their implications, the researcher has conducted detailed interviews with high-ranking members of the Yemeni Ministry of Justice, informal interviews with international staff working in the country, and telephone interviews with Yemeni citizens in multiple governorates<sup>80</sup>. Finally, for a more impartial take on the reliability of Government data, the author has also relied upon Dennis Jay Kenney's independent report on *Public Perceptions of the Police in Yemen*, which deals with reporting and other issues that may have impacted the ability of the state to gather statistical data in the country (2008). It is hoped that a combination of these and other sources will serve to provide reliable information that may be comprehensively analysed to formulate an accurate picture of offending patterns in Yemen<sup>81</sup>.

---

<sup>79</sup> This has been accomplished mainly by expanding the degree of attention paid to infrastructure-related offences, such as corruption and organised crime.

<sup>80</sup> The full Methodology has already been outlined in Chapter 1.

<sup>81</sup> The reliability and coverage of this data has also been discussed in Chapter 1.

### 3.3 Defining Crime in Yemen

Yemen is a country currently suffering the effects of multiple crises. Among these crises are serious conflicts, intra-tribal confrontations, widespread popular protests, a growing separatist movement and terrorism. When talking about violent offending in Yemen, it is important to distinguish between criminal behaviour and the manifestation of genuine political grievances – one is to be judged as a contravention of the law, while the other is a deliberate affront on the state, the alleged righteousness and justification of which is not for this thesis to determine. The 2011 Arab Spring protests, for instance, can be interpreted as a legitimate expression of popular will. When these protests came to Yemen, violent clashes broke out between pro-government supporters and anti-government revolutionaries, which ought to be read primarily as political events. Yet limited looting began to take place<sup>82</sup> – a sign of opportunistic behaviour motivated primarily by economic interests. Each of these forms of potentially harmful social behaviour may be dealt with through different means, so that protests are best resolved through increased national dialogue, while looting and crime are minimised through the up-scaling of law-enforcement and security services. The highly oppositional nature of these two types of intervention help to highlight the need for a separation of politically motivated violence from violent crime in any analysis of the subject. These arguments are further reinforced when we begin to look at terrorism or war alongside violent offending.

While there can be no doubt that the arbitrary killing of civilians should be outlawed, filing “casualties of war” under the label of “murder victims” or *vice versa* conceals the extent of both problems, not only insulting the memories of both sets of victims but also confusing any relevant policy objectives. Thus, researchers of violence tend to choose to distinguish between political and so-called “apolitical” behaviour. Michael Kenney does so in his study of *Crime, Insurgency and Political Violence*, where he plays with the boundaries of political and apolitical behaviour through a comparison of terrorism and organised crime. He writes that:

One of the defining attributes of “organized crime,” ... is that it is apolitical. Organized crime occurs when three or more participants, who together form part of a cohesive, hierarchical group, coordinate illicit activities in pursuit of “profit and power,” without due consideration for “social doctrine, political beliefs, or ideological concerns.” One of the defining attributes of terrorism, in contrast, is precisely its political orientation. While ... terrorism is a method or tactic of political violence and intimidation ... The instrumental use of violence and intimidation is also a hallmark of organized crime. ...The difference with organized crime is that violence is applied in pursuit of allegedly “economic” rather than “political” ends. (2008, p. 2)

While all crime, regardless of its motivation, is essentially a challenge to the state's ability to exert its authority and may hold significant political implications, the distinction between politically motivated behaviour and criminal behaviour is key to understanding and responding to both phenomena.

---

<sup>82</sup> According to telephone interviews conducted on the 9th and 10th of March, 2011, with local Yemenis living in Sana'a and Houdaidah: looting and theft were minimal throughout this time, but were nevertheless higher than normal.

The Yemeni legal system makes this very distinction, separating out criminal, political and morality offences in the disaggregation of its statistical data. While the reality that Yemen has sufficient political and morality offences to justify three separate bodies of law may speak very strongly against the functionality of the State and the overall governance of the country, it also renders statistical analyses of Yemeni crime rates easier by listing casualties of war or terrorism as victims of political violence. As it is to the benefit of the Yemeni Government to link as many deaths as possible to political violence in order to justify its internal policies and its bids for foreign military aid<sup>83</sup>, analysts are left with the reasonable assumption that remaining records of violent behaviour offer an accurate portrayal of offending behaviour, subject to crime detection capacity.

Keeping these distinctions in mind, this thesis defines crime as any action that is against the laws of a state but cannot be linked immediately to political motivations. Within the context of this chapter, crime in Yemen is also analysed according to the definitions already established by the Yemeni state.

### 3.4 The Extent of Crime in Yemen




Figure 35 Registered Crimes Against the Person as a Percentage of the Total Number of Registered Crime in Yemen

Figure 35 illustrates the growth of violent crime in Yemen as a percentage of the total rate of registered crime, based upon those statistics made available by the Central Statistical Organisation between 2003 and 2010. Throughout the time of their publication, the Government of Yemen has made significant efforts to increase its own operational capacity. Following the initiation of hostilities in the North of Yemen in 2004, as well as the breakdown of the security situation across the country as a whole, the Government's capacity for law enforcement has significantly diminished in many governorates, while much of its operational budget has been siphoned towards its military

<sup>83</sup> As outlined in Chapter 2, political justifications have been especially important for the Yemeni Government in bidding for aid from Western powers and from Saudi Arabia.

priorities. Although Dr A. Al-Momen Shoga'a al'Deen of the Ministry of Justice stated in interview that civil courts have since seen an increase in case loads during this period due to a growing national reliance on official conflict resolution channels (*Stakeholder Consultation, 17 August, 2010*), a corresponding increase in pressure on the criminal courts cannot now be attributed to increased national confidence in the justice system.

In actuality, discrepancies between Kenney's findings and telephone interviews conducted as part of this thesis indicate that the rate of reporting of offences by civilians to law enforcement services has greatly diminished in Yemen since the publication of his study in 2008 and the collection of data for this work in 2010-2012<sup>84</sup>. Overall decreases in budgeting capacity and security indicate that the rising crime rate pictured above is connected to broader social conditions, rather than increased reporting, and no evidence of increased reporting has been documented. Meanwhile crime detection capacities have actually diminished throughout this time.

The proportional growth of violent crime, which has risen from 42.08% to 48.04% of total registered crimes in the country, is equally troubling in its consistency, falling only in 2004 and 2005 when the Houthi conflict in the North, accompanied by mass protests and unanticipated violence, rendered effective data recording infeasible in many governorates. There is evidence to suggest that violent offending increased dramatically in late 2010 and early 2011, when popular unrest triggered a wave of anger against President al Abdullah Al Saleh's Government, leading to increased street violence and opportunistic crime. This trend has not yet been confirmed by official data.




Figure 36 Crime in Yemeni Governorates for 2009

Crime itself is distributed across the country with a concentration on urban, rather than rural areas, as is to be reasonably expected in light of issues relating to population density and police capacity in different regions. Yemen's largest cities, Sana'a, Aden, Taizz, Hudaydah, Mukalla, Ibb and

<sup>84</sup> See Chapter 1, section 1.2.2.

Dhamar are located in Sana'a, Aden, Al Hudaydah, Hadramaut, Ibb and Dharmar governorates respectively, and those governorates in turn demonstrate the highest rates of recorded crime (See Figure 36<sup>85</sup>).




Figure 37 Reported Violent Crime in Yemen for 2009

Violent crime is particularly concentrated in those governorates that have most strongly been affected by conflict, including Sa'ada, Al Jawf, Amran and Hajjah (See Figure 37<sup>86</sup>). The biggest discrepancy in these findings is that Hadramaut's recorded crime rate remains considerably lower than those of more central administrative areas, despite containing a big city. This perfectly illustrates one factor that has significantly diminished the reliability of available data: namely, the uneven law-enforcement capacities of central and peripheral areas of the country. Hadramaut remains today one of the poorest governorates in the country and its level of policing is very low. Poverty itself, however, may also be a determining factor for raising incidents of violent crime as a percentage of total recorded offences (See Table 9<sup>87</sup>).

District	Offences Against the Person as a Percentage (%) of Total Registered Crime	Aggregate Percentage (%) of Poor
Ibb	50.78	23.086-34.691
Abyan	48.91	37.136-48.378
Sana'a City	45.07	7.976-17.504
Al Baida	80.87	51.431-70.395

<sup>85</sup> This map is drawn from data published in the Central Statistical Organisation's *Security and Justice Statistics* for 2009 (2010).

<sup>86</sup> As above, this map is drawn from data published in the Central Statistical Organisation's *Security and Justice Statistics* for 2009 (2010).

<sup>87</sup> This table is compiled from the Central Statistical Organisation's *Security and Justice Statistics* for 2009 (2010) and *Statistical Yearbook* for 2009 (2010).

Taiz	48.86	37.136-48.378
Al Jawf	78.23	37.136-48.378
Hajjah	61.6	51.431-70.395
Al Hodaydah	38.82	37.136-48.378
Hadramout	24.64	37.136-48.378
Dhamar	55.74	23.086-34.691
Shabwa	35.58	51.431-70.395
Sa'ada	72.35	-
Sana'a	56.2	23.086-34.691
Aden	31.48	23.086-34.691
Lahij	39.86	37.136-48.378
Mareb	53.16	37.136-48.378
Al Mahweet	64.71	23.086-34.691
Al Maharah	32.00	7.976-17.504
Amran	85.79	51.431-70.395
Al Daleh	56.62	23.086-34.691
Reymah	65.12	23.086-34.691

**Table 9 The Distribution by Governorate of Aggregate Urban and Rural Poverty Rates and Offences Against the Person as a Percentage of Total Recorded Crime in 2009.**


Across Yemen, offences against the person continue to represent a considerable percentage of total registered crime. Despite a higher statistically recorded level of crime in governorates containing large urban areas, rural governorates retain a proportionally higher rate of violent offending that has been attributed to conflicts over land and resources, made manifest by frequent gun violence. Overall, violent crime is particularly high in Northern Yemen, where government control is limited and war is frequent. An exception to this trend is Al Baida, where, while centrally located, the governorate's violent crime rate represented, 80.87% of total registered crime in 2009. This overwhelming tendency for violent offending can be attributed to the governorate's rigid reliance on tribal structures and high rate of weapons circulation<sup>88</sup>.

### 3.5 Trends in Crime

As has already been stated, trends in crime in Yemen have revealed a continual increase in the number of offences committed over the past decade, as well as a proportional increase in violent offences, which have grown both in total and as a percentage of all other offences. In this regard, Dennis Jay Kenney asserts that "Yemenis are at somewhat greater risk of most crimes – especially crimes of violence – than are citizens of many other countries throughout the world" (2008, p. 10). Furthermore, although Yemen's Central Statistical Organisation notes a fairly low rate of offences committed against public officials, Kenney argues that his survey of crime trends revealed those with friends and family members in the police to be at a greater risk of victimisation in violent crimes than other people. Kenney clarifies that among those people with no association with police services, the most common form of victimisation is through burglary. This trend is

<sup>88</sup> It is interesting to note, however, that in 2011, despite the governorate's propensity for violence, anti-government protests in al-Baida remained non-violent for considerably longer than they did in other areas, with many tribesmen handing in their weapons to authorities before entering public demonstrations (Yemen Rights Monitor, 2011).

supported by official Government data, which shows violent crime and property offences to occur with the highest frequency in Yemen (See Figure 38<sup>89</sup>). Interestingly, international employees working for governmental and non-governmental agencies unrelated to the security sector showed a low awareness in interview of property offences in Yemen and did not seem overly concerned for their safety with regards to crime, showing a low rate of victimisation of foreigners in all crime, apart from kidnapping.



**Figure 38 All Offences Reported in 2009**

A correlation between relations with the police and violent crime, may be partially attributed to poor police-community relations, where, not only are the police services targeted by violent offenders, but those without connections to law enforcement are unlikely to report violent offences committed against them due to a lack of confidence in state justice systems. Most Yemeni citizens interviewed as part of this thesis's research reported that they would not ever seek assistance from the police because they either did not know if the police would help them, or frankly believed the police would not help them<sup>90</sup>. Many even found the suggestion that they would report an offence to the police fairly humorous. At the same time, a higher rate of burglary reporting among those without family or friends in the police could be attributed to a desire to have property returned to them if found, potentially yielding a direct financial benefit to the victims where reporting violence would not. To this end, Kenney writes that the risk of murder rises among Yemenis with no connection to police services, supporting the theory that they are just as likely to fall victim to violent crime, but less likely to report such offences to the state (murder being more easily detectable without reporting by the victim than assault or battery).

<sup>89</sup> This graph is compiled from data published in the Central Statistical Organisation's *Security and Justice Statistics for 2009* (2010).

<sup>90</sup> As established in Chapter 1, section 1.7.2, when asked whether they would seek help from the police if they fell victim to crime, 6 survey respondents said yes and 55 said no.





Figure 39 Recorded Morality Offences in 2009

Another prominent area of offending is constituted by morality crimes, among which alcohol consumption was the most commonly detected type of offence in 2009. However, more serious offences were also listed in this category, including rape, “adultery by force” and sexual assault (See Figure 39<sup>91</sup>). This data highlights sexual violence as appearing to be extremely low, and Yemen is actually listed by the United Nations *Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems* as being 63rd out of 65 countries with available data for rape frequency (2003) (See Annex 1). This trend may be due in part to the very low social mobility of women in Yemen, where many women are closely guarded by their families and thus are not exposed to the same degree of risk as women in other countries across the world, where women are either targeted by offenders more often or are more likely to report rape than male victims and children. This low trend of offending is also associated with the extreme stigmatisation of sexual relations in Yemen, rendering victims of sexual abuse across the boards highly unlikely to seek assistance through either official or unofficial channels. These ideas will be explored further later in this chapter, under the section on gender-based violence.

<sup>91</sup> This graph is compiled from data published in the Central Statistical Organisation’s *Security and Justice Statistics* for 2009 (2010).



**Figure 40 Recorded Crimes Against Public Interest for 2009**

Finally, a prominent area of offending worthy of note is crimes against public interest, which can be particularly harmful to both Government infrastructure and the Yemeni people. Among these, arson and the detonation of explosive devices are particularly prominent (See Figure 40<sup>92</sup>), which is unsurprising in a country affected by prolonged political crisis and conflict.

### 3.6 Characteristics of Offenders

Most offenders in Yemen are identified and processed as male adults, above the age of 18. As shall be discussed further in section 1.7 of this chapter, many of these offenders include young males who are misclassified as being older than 18 due to a lack of appropriate documentation to prove their entitlement to processing under specialised youth justice systems<sup>93</sup>. Overall, the demographic composition of offenders is extremely gender weighted, so that Yemeni men represented 93.64%<sup>94</sup> of all offenders in 2009. These demographics are most evident in the make-up of Yemeni prison populations, which displays the make-up of convicted felons, rather than that of arrestees (See Figure 41<sup>95</sup>). It ought here to be noted that these statistics only represent public correctional facilities, and that there exists a high concentration of privately-run informal prisons in Yemen, usually characterised by tribal or religious leadership and severe human rights violations<sup>96</sup>. The make-up of these facilities is not generally reported, but IRIN believes that many of the so-called

<sup>92</sup> As above, this graph is compiled from data published in the Central Statistical Organisation's *Security and Justice Statistics for 2009* (2010).

<sup>93</sup> See Chapter 5 for further details of Yemeni justice processes.

<sup>94</sup> These statistics may have been skewed by a tendency by male relatives to opt to go to prison in place of women, but rates of female offending are nonetheless very low in Yemen.

<sup>95</sup> This chart is compiled from data published in the Central Statistical Organisation's *Security and Justice Statistics for 2009* (2010).

<sup>96</sup> See Chapter 5, 5.2.5, for more information on the Yemeni prison system.

offenders that they imprison are incarcerated for political or religious reasons (as in challenging local authority figures), rather than official criminal offences (2007). They have been discounted from the analysis in this Chapter.




Figure 41 Yemeni Prison Population Demographics in 2009

Due to the sheer number of male arrestees in Yemen, the offences for which men are generally arrested are relatively representative of the broad trends in crime outlined in the preceding sections, with violent and property offences featuring most prominently. Women, who are hugely under-represented among prison populations, are most commonly brought in for offences against the person with varying degrees of severity, adultery-related offences and public indecency. Meanwhile, foreign nationals, who represent only 3.48% of the prison population, are predominantly arrested for immigration-related offences. Ali Saeed notes that a deliberate targeting of foreign nationals by police in theft and property investigations has been documented in Yemen, particularly in those areas with prominent Somali refugee populations (2011). The degree to which harassment of Somali suspects by police officers occurs in the course of legitimate investigations is not apparent.

### 3.7 Young Offending

Young offenders comprise a very small percentage of statistically recorded crime rates in Yemen. However, the number of documented offences committed by young people under the age of 18 has shown a continual increase from the year 2003 onwards (See Figure 42<sup>97</sup>). There are many possible explanations for this trend. Firstly, as the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the Yemeni Ministry of Health and Population assert, only 22.3% of children were registered at the time of their birth in 2006, leaving another estimated 77.7% without any proof of age or identity. UNICEF *et al* write that, while "There is no variation in birth registration between male and female children", "Children living in the rural households ... are less likely to have their births registered than children living in urban areas (16.4 percent versus 38.2 percent)", as are

<sup>97</sup> This graph is compiled from data published in the Central Statistical Organisation's *Security and Justice Statistics* for 2009 (2010).

children born to impoverished households when compared to those born in wealthier ones (where “birth registration took place in only 5 percent of the poorest households compared to 50.4 percent in the richest households”) (2006, p. 54).





Figure 42 Criminal Cases Where Culprits Were Tried as Juveniles and Adults

As a result, it is extremely “difficult for many juvenile offenders to prove their age at the time of the offence, and in these situations courts sometimes sentence to death persons under age 18 at the time of the crime” (Human Rights Watch, 2008, p. 16) or incorrectly process minors as adults through the criminal court system. The Human Rights Watch observes that in “February 2007, Yemen executed Adil Muhammad Saif al-Ma'amari for a crime allegedly committed when he was 16” and that “At least 18 other juvenile offenders are believed to be on death row”, despite Yemen's stated stance against the death penalty in cases where children and young people under the age of 18 are the suspected culprits (p. 16). On the one hand, the low rate of identification of children and young people in Yemen has led directly to a low rate of identification of young offenders and to an under-representation of young offenders in official statistics. On the other hand, Government concern for young people, as well as steady donor funding to the Ministries of Justice and Health and Population, has led to a push to increase birth registration through awareness-raising and to increase funding for medical age-identification processes, leading to some minimal growth in the number of young offenders correctly identified as children over the past few years (although it should be several more years before newly registered children grow old enough for the effect of policies aimed at promoting birth registration to have a visible impact upon youth justice statistics). These realities account for a low rate of recorded offences committed by young people, and for a gradual increase in those figures.

Secondly, low identification of young offenders can be attributed to displacement, where large-scale population movements caused by conflicts and natural disasters in Yemen have resulted in the loss of any existing documentation, as well as the separation of children and young people from their parents and families, so that many of them are no longer aware of their own ages and fail to question authority figures who process them as adult offenders.

Finally, cultural conceptions of childhood differ substantially in Yemen to those adopted by the Western world, so that many young people under the age of 18 consider themselves – and are generally perceived – to be adults, remaining unaware of their entitlement to more lenient judicial processes. A combination of these three factors means that it is virtually impossible to produce an accurate estimate of the actual number of young offenders in Yemen, though it is relatively safe to assume that their number greatly exceeds that which is documented. Interestingly, this means that many children and young people are also classified as adults when they are found to be the victims of crime.



**Figure 43 Reported Juvenile Offending in Yemen, 2009**

Although it is not possible to document fully the extent of the young offending problem in Yemen, it is possible to extrapolate a picture of offending patterns among children and young people, taking detected and recognised young offenders as a representative sample group of the

greater undetected or misclassified whole. Figure 43 provides a breakdown of recorded offences committed by children and young people. It reveals a strong tendency among young offenders towards violent crime, which represented, in 2009, 53.81% of offences committed specifically by young people, as opposed to 48.40% of all offences committed by everyone that year. This indicates a disproportional trend towards violent behaviour among people under the age of 18.

While it is not unusual for juvenile offending records in most countries to display a high percentage of crimes against the person (ranging from assault with no injury to robbery and assault with injury), it is extremely rare for such rates to represent over 50% of juvenile offences – and rarer still for crimes like murder, attempted murder or even manslaughter to be listed among them. In Yemen, in 2009, crimes against the person, including violent and sexual crimes, rose above this percentage, while murder, attempted murder and manslaughter accounted for 10.08% of their offences. The figure is staggering, particularly in light of the Yemeni Government's separation of criminal and so-termed "political" violence in official data. While mistakes are certainly possible under their classification system, it is relatively safe to assume that a significant portion of the 363 murder, attempted murder and manslaughter cases detected in 2009 cannot be related to on-going conflicts in the country.

There is also a higher general tendency towards female offending among young offenders in Yemen than there is among the general population. Thus, in 2009, young women accounted for 209 of the 4,060 young offenders detected by the state, representing 5.15% of offenders under the age of 18, as opposed to the national average of 1.50%. This trend could be associated with increasing social mobility among younger generations of women in Yemen, promoted through increased access to education<sup>98</sup>. In general, young offending among women in Yemen is predominantly grouped around adultery-related offences, violations of immigration laws and cases of light assault, leaving boys and young men as the main body of violent offenders among under 18 year old people in the country.

### **3.8 Gender-Based Violence**

Governmental criminological statistics made available by the Central Statistical Organisation and the Ministry of Justice do not provide a breakdown of victim demographics and are not very helpful in determining the extent of gender-based violence in the country. Furthermore, the extremely low rate of social mobility among women and girls in Yemen means that those who are exposed to violence or abuse generally do not seek assistance from the Government or its law enforcement services. This tendency is made most visible through official rape statistics, which show sexual offences to be virtually non-existent in the country, with only 0.004 offences committed per 1000 people in Yemen (as opposed to, for instance, 0.778 offences per capita in Australia). It is also made evident through testimonies given by Yemeni women in telephone interviews, who reported specifically that they did not at any stage during the Arab Spring seek assistance from law enforcement services, even after they had been physically attacked by street thugs and Government loyalists.

---

<sup>98</sup> Increased social mobility for young women has likely come about as a result of the education policies detailed in Chapter 2, section 2.6.

Information on gender-based violence is mainly acquired through other means, including governmental analyses of public health and welfare, reports by international actors and local non-governmental organisations concerned with women's issues, and interviews with interested parties, such as employees of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), UNICEF and others. Through these means, it has been determined that, while gender-based violence (the deliberate targeting of women by agents of physical, sexual or psychological abuse) may be very high in the country, awareness of the issue, particularly among state employees and policy makers, is very low. International staff in particular, specifically those working for the UNFPA, complained in interview of a strong reluctance by their counterparts in the Yemeni Government to discuss the issue of violence against women, due to the extreme cultural sensitivity of the subject. Public denial of the extent of gender-based violence in Yemen is supported by the large percentage of violence committed against women that is perpetrated by family members, leading to a strong reluctance by women to admit to the existence of the problem. The Ministry of Health and Population's 2004 *Yemen Family Health Survey*, indicated that only 5% of Yemeni women admitted to being beaten by their husbands, mostly for refusing to obey their commands, while the vast majority denied any such accusations entirely (p. 155).

Violence against female minors is reported to be high and on the increase. The Women's National Committee reports that 1256 girls under the age of 18 had been recorded as falling victim to gender-based violence in 2008, as compared to only 167 girls in 2007 (2008, p. 60). This increase cannot be attributed to increased detection capacities, which would not have shown such a substantial increase in offences over such a short period of time. Of those violent crimes committed against young girls, battery, murder and attempted rape were listed as the most prominent, likely owing at least partially to reluctance by victims to confirm actual rape allegations.

### **3.9 The Proliferation of Criminogenic Commodities**

Criminogenic commodities are defined as those items which may, through their very presence, either trigger criminal activity or escalate rates of offending within given contexts according to frequency or severity. Such commodities are usually comprised of two categories, namely; weapons and narcotics. Since the very purpose of this thesis is to determine precisely which conditions are key to explaining the development of violent criminal behaviour among children and young people in fragile states, it has proven necessary to provide a full account of criminological theories relating to the effect of criminogenic commodities at a later stage in the argument. This has required, in particular, an in-depth analysis of narcotics proliferation in Yemen and its effect on the country's socio-economic environment. This analysis takes place during a broader investigation of existing criminological theory in Chapter 4 (section 4.2.1), and the overview of key findings provided in this section will remain relatively limited in relation to its coverage of narcotics proliferation. It is sufficient here to state that the most prevalent form of narcotics consumption in Yemen is the chewing of qat, which is a semi-narcotic plant, the production and consumption of which is perfectly legal within the country. While the effects of qat consumption will be debated further in Chapter 4, it is important to note that the plant is very popular among the general population. Other forms of drug use remain fairly minimal, among which alcohol consumption is the most frequently detected form of illegal intoxication. Most of this alcohol is illegally smuggled into the country, while qat is

sometimes transported illegally out of Yemen, most often into Somalia, but also across Yemen's land borders.

Weapons, as has already been stated, are widely available. Firstly, it is a matter of pride for many Yemeni men who have reached adulthood to carry a *jambiyyah* blade about their person whenever they leave the house. There has been no suggestion of criminalising this practice, nor would it be possible to enforce such a restriction, given the social dominance of the practice itself and the weak law enforcement capacity of the state. Small arms are also in common circulation, chief among them old assault rifles developed by the Soviet Union prior to its dissolution. The Small Arms Survey explains that:

Weapons are an ordinary feature of Yemeni life, and personal weapons can range from small daggers to artillery. Weapons play a role as actual instruments used in conflict, but also as a statement about identity. The ordinary Yemeni man views his dagger and his automatic rifle as items of personal apparel. High-quality weapons give prestige to the owner. The capacity to purchase such items and to reward followers with weapons is both a form of power and a statement about power. The fact that the weapons are actually used to resolve conflicts should not obscure their social role. A weapon is a statement about the capacity and willingness to protect one's family, clan, and tribe. As such, it is a statement about personal identity, self-worth, and one's role in the community. To understand the desire for weapons is to understand the way life is organized in Yemen. (2001, p. 179)

Weapons play an important role in tribal structures and social organisation, leading not only to an extreme reluctance by individuals to surrender illegal arms to the state, but also to a consistent demand for further weapons imports into the country, making estimates about the total number of arms in the country extremely difficult to extrapolate. Apart from their role in social customs and conflict resolution, weapons play an important role in escalating violence committed in the course of criminal activity. In this sense, carrying weapons is positively correlated with increased harm to bystanders resulting from, for instance, property offences like theft or burglary. Quite simply, the more weapons that are present at the sight of criminal activity, the greater the probability that weapons will be used in the course of said criminal activity. Furthermore, as Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan write, "the particular weapon used" in such instances "is irrelevant except to the extent that it increases the risk or increases the risk's duration" (2009, p. 280). With estimates of small arms numbers in Yemen holding at approximately 2.5 arms per person, the risk of physical harm from criminal activity is extremely high.

### **3.10 Organised Crime**

In 2010, the Government of Yemen and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime identified "the two predominant threats to Yemen's security, stability and development" to be "illicit trafficking (particularly of drugs)" and "criminal networks (including terrorism and its financing)". While these themes are aspects of the broader organised crime problem in Yemen, they are also intricately connected to sections 3.9 and 3.11, which deal with the proliferation of criminogenic commodities in the country and corruption. The separation of these three areas into independent

subsections may seem somewhat arbitrary at first, but while organised crime is often a root cause of weapons and narcotics circulation, and is facilitated by corruption, these sections are kept separate because not all weapons and narcotics in Yemen can be linked to organised crime networks, and because not all corruption contributes to organised crime.

Many of Yemen's weapons are left-overs of previous conflicts, and its primary source of narcotics consumption is legal, so much of the evidence linking organised crime to mainstream criminogenic commodities is circumstantial. There is evidence linking organised crime to the trafficking of specialised weaponry (like valuable antiques) and alcohol, but it is unknown whether alcohol trafficking (which is strictly against Al Qaeda's belief system) finances terrorism in Yemen like other forms of organised crime often do in fragile states. While some alcohol (including Baladi, a vodka-like liqueur) is brewed in Yemen, most is smuggled into the country from Ethiopia and Djibouti (*Stakeholder Consultation, International Organisation for Migration, 16 August, 2010*). Considering the high number of people arrested for drunkenness in the country<sup>99</sup>, alcohol availability must be fairly widespread.

Other forms of organised crime include banditry and kidnapping, whereby a relatively small group of people are able to win quick financial profits by harassing and intimidating communities and individuals. With long roads, large desert and mountain terrains, and low levels of police and law enforcement outside the major cities; Yemen lends itself perfectly to such criminal opportunism.

Ultimately, organised crime in Yemen is mainly linked to human smuggling and trafficking, as well as to the smuggling of agricultural and fishing produce – including qat – out of the country without passing through customs (*Stakeholder Consultation, International Organisation for Migration, 16 August, 2010*). In this sense, human smuggling is understood as the deliberate facilitation of an illegal border crossing by an intermediary for a financial or material benefit, while human trafficking is tantamount to modern day slavery, whereby the migrant is either: deceived about their destination point; deceived about the nature of the work they will be undertaking upon arrival at their destination point; made to work without pay during transit or at arrival; or, sold to a third party for their labour or internal organs (*Stakeholder Consultation, International Organisation for Migration, 16 August, 2010*).

---

<sup>99</sup> According to the Central Statistical Organisation's *Security and Justice Statistics* for 2009, 1,862 people were arrested for drunkenness in Yemen in 2009 alone (2010).



Figure 44 Irregular Migration Into and Out of Yemen

Yemen's weak state capacity, which is manifested in its poor control of both its land and sea boundaries, renders the country extremely vulnerable to organised criminal networks. Meanwhile, its strategic location as a buffer zone between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa make Yemen particularly appealing to smugglers and traffickers from the North African states, who use the country as a preferred transit root for irregular migrants. They are aided in this regard by the growing insecurity of the Gulf of Aden as a whole<sup>100</sup>.

Most irregular migrants come to Yemen from the Horn of Africa, though a minority originate in Iraq (See Figure 44). Many of those coming from Africa strive to move on elsewhere to countries with greater economic opportunities, including Saudi Arabia and Oman, and sometimes to Europe. At the same time, Yemenis themselves, and especially Yemeni children, are frequently trafficked to oil-rich Gulf states like Saudi Arabia to work as beggars, domestic help and camel-jockeys (Stakeholder Consultation, International Organisation for Migration, 16 August, 2010).

While many of the irregular migrants travelling into and out of Yemen are voluntary migrants, a large portion of them fall victim to slave labour and are made to do unpaid manual chores or to work in the sex trade. The vast majority are placed in considerable danger during their transit into-, through-, and out of Yemen. Sultan Barakat *et al* note that "Migrants are often forced by traffickers to swim ashore through shark-infested waters in the Gulf of Aden, and some die in the process" (2011b, p. 24). Once they reach Yemen, Somali migrants are offered some degree of protection by the state *via de-facto* refugee status, but representatives of other nationalities continue to evade authorities for fear of deportation, which means that they are extremely unlikely to seek assistance if they are abused by their smugglers or traffickers.

<sup>100</sup> As argued in Chapter 2, section 2.4.3, security in the Gulf of Aden is compromised by regional terrorism and by piracy allegedly originating in Somalia.

The recent global growth in popularity of human trafficking can be attributed to its status as an extremely profitable trade, and Louise Shelley notes that while the drug trade remains the “most lucrative aspect of transnational crime”:

Many criminals have switched to [human trafficking] because of high profits and low risks. Others, not previously involved in transnational crime have entered this trade because of the low initial costs of entry and the large demand for smuggled and trafficked people. ... Moreover, drug traffickers can sell their commodity once, while human traffickers can sell trafficked people repeatedly, thereby deriving extensive profits. (2007, pp. 116-117)

More worryingly, trafficking victims can be sold on as combatants and insurgents, contributing to general levels of insecurity within any given context, while smuggling routes allow for willing recruits to journey into a country undetected. In terms of financing and supplying terrorist activities in Yemen, human trafficking and smuggling, as well as the smuggling of other licit and illicit commodities has tremendous potential for destabilising the state and is treated as an important social problem.

### **3.11 Corruption**

When discussing challenges to Yemen's stable development and governance improvement, it is all too easy to centre upon the issue of corruption. While analyses of corruption can be unreliable due to their over-reliance upon anecdotal evidence, it is widely acknowledged that for many Yemeni citizens corruption has come to form part of daily reality (United States Agency for International Development, 2006, p. 55). Some international donors have shown a reluctance to provide bilateral aid to the Yemeni state for this very reason, according to interviews conducted at the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation in 2010, because they are afraid that the funds will evaporate. Corruption fosters weak state capacity, while weak capacity generates the very resource competition that fuels corruption (*Stakeholder Consultation, Ministry of Local Administration, 17 August 2010*).

In Yemen, corruption is found at every level of society. One explanation for this is that the state's limited ability to exercise its authority has meant that it relies on patronage systems and tribal allegiances that inspire loyalty through give-and-take relationships. Another reason is that Yemen's very poor law enforcement system allows for a high incidence rate of criminal opportunism, while poor salaries of low level public officials encourage them to take additional payments on the side from those who aspire to cheat the system.

In 2010, Yemen remained locked in at 146th place out of 178 countries in the *Perceptions of Corruption Index*, despite having launched several governance reform strategies. This is a challenge that feeds into multiple other areas of offending, because, as Angélica Durán Martínez writes: “Corruption is essential for the survival of criminal organizations. It facilitates the movement of goods and persons, influences the rules of the game in favour of criminals, facilitates the financial operations necessary to launder illegal proceeds, and guarantees impunity” (2007, p. 7). More importantly, corruption discredits the rule of law by helping to ensure that citizens of the state are

treated neither fairly nor consistently, thereby discrediting both Yemen's judiciary and its legal system.

The United States Agency for International Development identifies two main forms of corruption in Yemen – petty or administrative corruption, and grand corruption. They write that: “grand corruption in Yemen is a by-product of the combination of weak state institutions and fragmented elites”, whereby, “In effect, a predatory relationship between elites and state resources has been encouraged” (2006, p. 7). Meanwhile, petty or administrative corruption involves either the bribing of public officials or the hiring of “ghost workers”. Here it is noted that “Petty corruption has become so ingrained in popular culture that it is no longer shameful for individuals to prosper as a result of corrupt practices” (p. 7). Mohamed Abdo Moghram adds the cross-cutting areas of embezzlement, theft, fraud, extortion, abuse of public office position, favouritism, and improper political contributions influencing public policy to these lists with regard to the Yemeni case study (2004, pp. 9-10). Both grand and petty corruption are equally important when it comes to establishing perceptions of the criminal justice system, the state and law enforcement services among the general public, and both contribute heavily to the criminogenic environment in Yemen. Both will be discussed further in Chapter 5, where corruption will form an important theme.

### **3.12 Summary of Important Findings**

The extent of crime in Yemen is not fully visible in the statistics made available by the Yemeni Government's Central Statistical Organisation. However, such data does allow for the extraction of specific trends and patterns in offending over time, confirmed through telephone interviews with Yemeni citizens and face-to-face interviews with heads of Government Ministries and international government organisations. These trends reveal that there is a strong tendency towards violent crime among the general population, and particularly among children and young people under the age of 18. Such violence may be attributed to the widespread availability of weapons in the country. This triggers and escalates violence committed in the course of other offences, including property-related offences, which are also fairly prominent in the country. While overall incidents of criminal behaviour occur with greater frequency in central governorates with large urban areas, peripheral governorates and rural areas with weak Government infrastructure show a higher propensity for violent crime, presumably associated with a high rate of retributive violence emerging from the low reliability of law enforcement services<sup>101</sup>.

Women and young girls are shown to have minimal involvement with criminal activity due to their extremely limited social mobility. The data suggests that they may be frequently victimised in violent and sexual offences that are left largely unreported for reasons relating to socio-cultural stigmatisation of their victimisation in such offences. Their vulnerability is increased by the presence of abusive organised crime networks and low nation-wide law enforcement capacity, which is further undermined by high levels of institutional corruption.

Ultimately, the findings of this Chapter indicate that it is possible to put together a good overview of patterns of offending in fragile states despite limitations on data availability. Yet even

---

<sup>101</sup> These trends will be assessed in more detail in Chapter 5, but it is worth noting that this means that men in particular are prone to commit or fall victim to significant acts of violence resulting from unresolved conflicts.


this brief overview indicates that gaps in understanding remain. More specifically, it is not possible to understand the causality of criminal activity in Yemen (or indeed elsewhere) without using existing theories of criminology and state fragility to connect these trends to the country's culture, justice environment and broader development context, as shall be done in the next Chapter.

## **Chapter 4: Existing Theories of Crime and Social Control and Their Relevance for Fragile States**

### **4.1 Introduction**

While a large percentage of criminological literature has been written for and within the developed world, many of the theories that have emerged from these explorations may hold far-reaching applications for fragile states, dealing, as many of them do, with multifaceted causes of youth aggression and violent offending. However, because fragile states offer a unique set of contexts that differ substantially to those presented by the developed world: it remains to be determined whether such existing theories of crime are suitable for adequately explaining the relationship between underdevelopment and violent young offending. This question will form the central theme of the following three chapters, Chapter 4 providing a brief overview of existing criminological theories and their potential relevance to this thesis, Chapter 5 using these theories to better understand Yemen's crime prevention and control systems, and Chapter 6 merging such theories with state development literature in order to strive to better understand the propensity for violent young offending in Yemen and other fragile states. Throughout these analyses, the emphasis will be placed as always on theories relating to young people and delinquency, within which violence will be an important overarching theme.

The analysis of these theories of crime, justice and development has been divided between three chapters to reflect the very broad, complex and contradictory nature of these academic fields, whose integration is by no means easy. Specific difficulties emerge from the lack of engagement of criminological theories with key cultural, religious and tribal dynamics that can prove central to determining the social structure of Yemen. However, these constraints will be explored as they emerge from the analyses conducted in all three chapters, while Chapter 4 will prioritise testing the application of criminological theories on fragile contexts first, before delving too deeply into the socio-economic dynamics that seem to be left out of their explanations.



**Figure 45 Theories of Crime and Social Control, and How They Analyse Influences on Human Behaviour**

Within contemporary criminology, two analytical systems developed so as to better understand human behaviour dominate: those that strive to determine why people break the law, and those that strive to determine why people obey the law (See Figure 45). These two systems, which are reflected in the two subdivisions of this chapter, are comprised of crime causation theories and theories of social control. Both narratives are superseded by the implied principle that most crime is opportunistic by nature, whereby offenders are largely thought of as reactive agents that respond to circumstance in order to achieve a criminal objective, usually without much forethought. Despite the opportunistic nature of crime, key determining factors have been pivotal in predicting where crimes are most likely to occur in Central Europe, America and elsewhere. Shawn Bushway and Peter Reuter summarise that crime “is the outcome of the intersection between the propensity to commit a crime and the opportunity to commit a crime” (1996, p. 6-1), and it is the propensity to commit a crime that has been the most important point of interest for this thesis because acts of so-called “mindless” violence are rarely a product of opportunity alone.

This is not an obvious starting point in the case of fragile states. After all, fragile states, which suffer the breakdown of government and law enforcement control throughout the vast majority of their territories, are arguably overrun with opportunities for offending behaviour. In 'Doing Well Out of War', Paul Collier paints a bleak picture of the reality of state fragility and particularly of the reality faced by conflict-affected countries. He argues that the lack of predictability in life that is generated by conflict changes the very nature of societies and the way in which individuals and communities interact with each other. Collier writes that, as political environments shift, Government and individual spending is altered and economic behaviour, like crime, becomes steadily more opportunistic. Governments, Collier argues, decrease their spending on police services in times of conflict in order to increase spending on the military, thereby decreasing the effectiveness of law enforcement systems (2000, p. 102). As the threat of detection and punishment decreases, criminal activity increases, and people and their possessions become less secure within the country as a whole. Added to this is the continued threat of violence and

unpredictability. Within this type of social environment, people begin to sell their assets or to move them abroad.

This was seen in the Yemeni instance when it was reported by the staff of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation in interview that Yemeni nationals very seldom if ever kept funds in Yemeni banks and that threats of terrorist action, in particular, had pushed both local and international investors to move their businesses out of the country (*Stakeholder Consultation, Interview Conducted by Professor Sultan Barakat, August 15, 2010*). Collier adds that, within such contexts, people gradually become less concerned with savings, with preserving good business relations and with abiding by the law, which might explain Yemen's high tendency towards multilevel corruption, though this seems to be more of an entrenched crisis within the patronage networks inherent to Yemeni culture. Markets are disrupted during conflict so that products and services available one day may not necessarily be available the next. Meanwhile, trade is increasingly monopolised by powerful stakeholders, who raise the consumer-price index in order to maximise their profits at a significant cost for local communities (pp. 101-102). The disruption of societal norms of behaviour and the breakdown of infrastructure not only represent a breakdown of basic services, but also a suspension of livelihoods and legitimate money-making opportunities.

It is easily argued that all of these factors combine to create a society of angry, frightened, desperate and, above all, hungry people (be they hungry for food, water, shelter, safety, medicine or the right to live with dignity), so that, as Richard Caplan notes, "War itself creates opportunities, if not imperatives, for criminal economic activity" (2005, p.154). It is precisely this emphasis upon socio-political chaos that shifts – one might argue – unjustly the analytical lens of policy makers and academics interested in the study of security in fragile states away from attempts to understand the increased propensity of youth to commit violent crime and towards efforts to document opportunistic or politically-motivated offences.

The imperatives and opportunities for criminal behaviour implicit in explorations of fragile states and conflict-affected countries overshadow investigations into the propensity to commit crime in fragile states, but they are at times deeply misleading. The state fragility framework is used to group together a wide variety of countries affected by structural and governmental weaknesses that range from minor to severe crises of authority, capacity and legitimacy, and it is yet to be determined how useful this paradigm is for generating a real appreciation for criminological environments<sup>102</sup>. Fragile states that are affected by conflict are by no means affected uniformly by such dynamics, with insecurity being heightened in affected regions. Bubbles of safety and relative prosperity diminish the applicability of social chaos as a relevant analytical dimension at a national level, though the regional analysis of violent offending in Yemen conducted in Chapter 3 indicates that it might be much more easily correlated with violent young offending at a local level.

It can be argued that Collier's analysis is more important to understanding economically motivated criminal behaviour, like burglary and theft, rather than violent offending. Violent offending in and of itself is rarely motivated by economic opportunity alone and is in those cases where it is motivated by financial considerations associated with other forms of criminal activity, usually consisting of property offences, but also including kidnapping and human trafficking. The need to commit physical violence outside of clear economic motives is not adequately explained

---


<sup>102</sup> The state fragility framework will be explored in more detail in Chapter 6, section 6.3.

simply by the reality that economies have shifted and police presences have decreased. It is also unclear whether a more satisfying explanation may be contained within existing crime causation theories or theories of social control, which are for the most part unused to dealing with environments generated by an almost complete absence of state control structures, leading to the need to conduct such an investigation within this chapter and this thesis more broadly.

The underlying principle of investigations into the propensity to commit crime within the field of criminology seems to stem from Henry Thomas Buckle's observation that "society prepares the crime, the criminal commits it" (1857). If this observation is accurate, then culture and society may be the most important factors for determining how criminal environments operate. Under these parameters, criminological theories that are adaptive to different cultural structures should prove extendible to fragile contexts, although they may be insufficiently targeted and specialised to generate real insights into state fragility. If, in accordance to Collier's view, economic and structural risk factors are more important, then broad criminological theories that address these issues may prove to be more rigorous and informative, particularly if they are applied at a local and regional level.

Within the study of crime causation, numerous notable criminologists have strived to identify the root and proximate causes of crime, among whom writers like Lawrence W. Sherman point to several aggravating risk factors (1996). Of these, community based influences are seen by theorists and practitioners alike to be a top priority. Other influences are listed as exposure to addictive substances, family backgrounds, school environments and the labour market. Represented visually, these influences can be organised according to different levels of explanation, at which analysts are invited to examine either society-wide or individually-based risk factors (*See Figure 46*). Wide-ranging theories of crime causation have been developed at each of these levels in a number of fields, including those of psychology, sociology, economics, politics and even biology.

Within the realm of forensic and criminal psychology alone, as Dennis Howitt explains, several theories of crime causation are put forward at various levels of explanation. At an individual level, some of these arguments deal with the cognitive processes of individuals, others examine degrees of learning and social background, while others still look at the broader influence of society upon potential offenders. For instance, Howitt writes that neuropsychological theories of crime causation have linked the absence of an enzyme platelet called "monoamine oxidase" with psychopathic behaviour, and closed head injuries (particularly to the frontal lobe of the brain) with "dis-inhibition – a lack of response to the social niceties that makes behaviour acceptable in most people" (2009, p.64). Other theories, Howitt continues, have strived to document connections between crime and intelligence (pp.66-67), have postulated whether addiction to crime is at all possible (pp.70-73), and have even strived to incorporate Freudian psychoanalysis into the study of criminality (pp.69-70).



**Figure 46 Levels of Explanation Adopted by Theories of Crime Causation**

This thesis is grounded within a more socio-politically based area of analysis, which deals less with individual-oriented theories of crime causation and more with the macro and community levels because the nature of state fragility is such that it derives from governmental incapacity and requires nation-wide and regional solutions. However, two such theories stand out in particular, and will be considered to be important for analysing crime rates in fragile states, especially in regard to their potential adaptability to diverse cultural settings. These are Albert Bandura's social learning theory (1977) and Howitt's theory relating to the social construction of crime or "elite social constructionism" (1992). Both will be analysed as social control theories, rather than crime causation theories, within this chapter. Through these theories, Bandura describes the way in which children learn vicariously from the actions of others, and Howitt details the way in which authority figures and prominent institutions influence social conceptualisations of crime.

The following section and its subsections will analyse some of those theories of crime causation that are linked to broader societal influences. The section after it will deal with theories of social control, including theories of social constructionism, social learning, and legitimacy and cooperation.

## 4.2 Crime Causation

### 4.2.1 Substance Abuse and Exposure to Addictive Substances

Criminological theories relating to substance abuse and exposure to addictive substances vary considerably, as do cultural and state responses to drug use. While it is certainly not true that all problem drug users and people who drink alcohol excessively go on to commit crime, a strong correlation between substance abuse and criminal activity has been established. Richard Dembo *et al* have documented that among young offenders in particular, for instance:

Higher levels of involvement with substance use increase the rate of offending, the severity of the committed offence, and the duration of antisocial behaviour. Further, the earlier the age of onset of substance use, the greater the likelihood of severe and chronic offending (2007).

What is not at all clear is the nature of the relationship between crime and substance abuse, and namely whether substance abuse is a root cause of crime or yet another symptom of broader societal problems, commonly faced by offenders and problem drug users alike. In short, does substance abuse cause offending, or are people who are likely to offend also likely to abuse substances? Is substance abuse to be read as a crime, the causality of which needs to be analysed and understood, or as a cause of crime? Though various studies into this area have been made, writers like Dawn Moore continue to call their findings into question (2007).

To suit the purposes of this thesis, existing criminological theories of drug use must be addressed and analysed not only in terms of their validity but also with regard to their applicability to Yemen and other fragile states. It should be noted that the lack of definitive answers to these questions makes substance-abuse-based theories of crime causality fairly weak at explaining criminological environments. It is the author's belief that substance abuse complicates the motivations behind criminal activity and prolongs or increases its severity wherever relevant, but does not cause those motivations to manifest – that it is, like the presence of any criminogenic commodity, an aggravating risk factor or a contributor, but not a pure source of criminality. Nevertheless, while the relationship between substance abuse and offending has not been adequately explained, a positive correlation between the two is virtually indisputable.


In February 2010, the inmates of Hydebank Wood, a prison for women and young offenders in South Belfast (Northern Ireland), were asked by the author to complete an exploratory survey in which they were left to freely express their views as to the primary causes of crime<sup>103</sup>. The facility provided an interesting surveying ground, due both to Northern Ireland's status as a country recovering from conflict and to its relative stability, which allowed for comparatively easy access to its correctional facilities and showed minimal literacy levels among its inmates<sup>104</sup>. Copies of the survey were left in recreational facilities and inmates were given a choice as to whether or not to complete them. There was no deliberate sampling method used and the 56 respondents who

---

<sup>103</sup> See section 1.6.2.

<sup>104</sup> A number of the offenders had only basic reading and writing skills, and others were clearly unable to participate in the survey format.

completed the survey ranged from 15 to 45 years of age, and had been incarcerated for a multitude of different offences ranging from breach of probation to murder.



**Figure 47 Causes of Crime and Offending, as Identified by the Inmates of Hydebank Wood**

An overwhelming 64% of respondents identified substance abuse as the leading cause of crime, with some offenders sighting alcoholism and others either identifying “drugs” in general or naming specific substances such as cocaine (See Figure 47). Younger respondents aged under 25 years showed a much higher propensity to cite substance abuse as a leading cause of crime. Although the survey was not distributed to a sufficiently large sampling field to extrapolate real trends, the implications of these initial results are fairly serious. Firstly, they indicate a high rate of substance abuse among the offending population of South Belfast and a particularly high rate of substance abuse among young offenders. Secondly, they indicate that many offenders consider the effect of substance abuse to be strong enough to impact individual behaviour patterns, pushing people to either commit crime while under the influence of narcotics or to commit crime in order to pay for narcotics.

These findings, which are congruent with contemporary criminological theory, are common to multiple cultural contexts and are particularly relevant to countries affected by conflict and fragility. Such countries often either show high rates of narcotics production, as in the case of Afghanistan with its opium and heroin, Columbia with its cocaine, and Yemen with its qat; or experience a breakdown of their border control mechanisms, leading to the high influx of illegal narcotics, as has occurred in the cases of Iraq, Somalia and Tajikistan. When combined with the stresses of persistent social violence and the hazards of displacement, this high availability of potentially addictive substances leads to high rates of drug use among populations affected by state fragility, which consider drug use as either a relaxation tool or as a means of managing pain after physical or psychological trauma.

Children and young people, who are exposed to all types of social abuse in such contexts (especially where conflict is present), are particularly prone to start using substances early, being socially isolated through homelessness or displacement from those communities and families that would have otherwise attached for them an intense social stigma towards serious drug dependency. What is obscured by unifying theories of substance abuse in crime, is the degree to which substance abuse is influenced by broader socio-cultural perceptions of narcotics, with many Islamic societies heavily penalising narcotics users through social exclusion and “othering”. Here, the degree of penalisation seems to depend largely upon the substance consumed, with alcohol consumption representing both a criminal and moral transgression in some nations, and other narcotics, like qat, being seen as having virtually no detrimental impact on those who use them.

The term “substance abuse” refers to the use of both licit and illicit substances, including alcohol, solvents and inhalants, chemical and natural products, drugs and narcotics. In Yemen, qat is the most highly used of such substances and is a perfectly legal narcotic.

While the use of qat is itself not a criminal act, the plant is associated with criminal behaviour. Firstly, the mass production of qat leads to the illegal extraction of underground water reserves, greatly adding to the rate of depletion of Yemen's water table. Qat farming produces better yields if fields are flooded with water. Secondly, the transportation of qat across Yemen's borders and into places like Somalia and elsewhere is, if not directly illegal, accomplished through illegal means and smuggling routes, contributing to the black market and war economies of both countries. Thirdly, high rates of family dependency mean that between 7 and 9.4% of household budgets are spent upon the acquisition of qat, which sidelines budgeting for other necessary items like food and medicine, leading to increased offending among family members through necessity (Republic of Yemen *et al*, 2007, p. 43). Finally, mass qat production has virtually obliterated the production of food and other products in Yemen, rendering the predominantly agricultural country entirely dependent upon imports.

This reality has wreaked havoc upon Yemen's economy, contributing to the poverty and desperation of the general population and rendering the environment highly criminogenic. Unlike the Hydebank Wood inmates, however, Yemeni communities tend to be reluctant to acknowledge the negative social and medical impacts of qat, the chewing of which is a much more socially acceptable practice. While substance abuse clearly affects both criminogenic environments, it is perceived extremely differently in each context.

Qat is a class C drug or light psychoactive substance, though it is thought only to be mildly addictive if at all so. When dealing with class C narcotics specifically, the term “substance abuse” becomes a very difficult one to use, with many states, including Yemen, refusing to legislate against drug use due to apparent low rates of addiction, despite high rates of problem drug use. It is important to note here that words like “addiction” and “abuse” are loaded with political and diagnostic implications which seek to comment upon the mental health and well-being of the drug user. Elizabeth Connell Henderson writes that:


Addiction is a complicated condition, with biological, physiological, psychological, behavioural, and spiritual aspects. For this reason it is best to think of alcoholism and drug addiction as multifaceted disorders, only one of which is the compulsive use of the addicting substance. (2001, p. 3)

Accusing people of having such disorders can taint them with significant social stigmas, particularly in Islamic countries where heavy drug use and the use of class A or B drugs and alcohol can compromise religious and tribal doctrines. Although such terms will be utilised throughout this thesis in the absence of a politically neutral language, Kathleen M. Carroll and William R. Miller remind us quite rightly that the “names used to describe phenomena affect the ways in which one thinks about a problem and what to do about it” (2006, p. 5).

The Yemeni case study reveals that heavy drug use can be inherently linked to a country's culture and to that culture's rules on social interaction, much like alcohol consumption in Europe. Institutionalised substance abuse can create a highly criminogenic environment for young people by, for instance, restricting their ability to hold steady employment or to complete basic education programmes, with the Government of Yemen *et al* estimating that approximately 25% of its people's work hours are lost to qat (2007, p. 43). Such drug use does not necessarily call for the construction of narcotics rehabilitation centres, however it does clearly require some sort of intervention if the Yemeni economy is to be placed back on track and young offending to be minimised.

The prevalence of substance abuse among offenders greatly complicates the discussion of crime, and theories on this produced in the developed world are often insufficiently flexible to accommodate alternative cultural positions. As Tammy Anderson notes specifically of women drug users; substance abuse has traditionally been linked to “pathology and powerlessness”, so that “today's discussion about women substance abusers classifies them as either villains or victims” (2008, p. 1). The same is largely true of other problem drug users, with a general tendency among Western policy makers to view men as being more culpable and so-called “vulnerable” groups (which include people with mental health disorders and children under the age of seventeen) as being more innocent. This means that a large portion of young offenders are perceived in Europe and elsewhere as having diminished responsibility for their actions on two counts: on the one hand, as problem drug users that are victims of social circumstances and of their own dependence, and on the other hand, because the very influence of alcohol and other substances is known to remove social inhibitions.

Criminological theories of substance abuse take two distinct stances on the relationship between drugs and crime. They either adopt the position that substance addiction stretches limited financial resources so that drug users are tempted to look towards property offences (like theft) to support their habits (*See Figure 48*):



**Figure 48 Economic Explanations of Substance Abuse-Based Criminogenic Risk Factors**

Or, that substance abuse inhibits the capacity of drug users to make rational decisions, or to cope with conflicts or complex challenges in a reasonable or a lawful way (See Figure 49).




Figure 49 Physiological/Psychological Explanations of Substance Abuse-Based Criminogenic Risk Factors

The two stances are not necessarily considered to be mutually exclusive.

Herschel Prins explains that in the United Kingdom alone:

It is not uncommon in criminal cases, particularly those involving serious violence against persons or property, for a plea to be made by the accused that their liability should be diminished because of the effects of taking alcohol and/or other substances. (1995, p. 20)

That it is comparatively rare for such pleas to be accepted does not change the validity of the argument: after all, those reported to be “under the influence” of certain substances are less in control of their actions than those who are not.

This position does not translate well to Islamic countries. In Yemen, the use of any mood-altering substance other than qat is considered a “morality crime” and such defences are not applicable, though the philosophy behind them is still worth thinking about. In this sense, Yemen can be said to fit an exaggerated version of David MacDonald’s interpretation of Afghanistan, because it “holds up a mirror to the developed world and the anomalies and paradoxes inherent in its drug policies”, whereby “For the better part of a century international drug control has been dominated by a western model based on prohibition and the criminalisation of drugs and those who use them” (2007, pp. 12-13).

As Louise B. Antoine summarises, the discussion of substance abuse is complex, although:

The global drug problem has three major themes, which are clearly discernible in most countries around the world: concern about young people and drugs; concern about addiction; and concern about the effects of the illegal production, trafficking, and selling of drugs. (2002, p. ix)

That it is not possible now to discuss substance abuse without considering these three themes more broadly speaks to the limitations of substance abuse-based theories of crime causation: problem drug use and particularly the use of illicit substances are symptomatic of a much wider challenge – namely, the proliferation of such substances among societies. The use of illegal substances implies a

certain level of crime within a given area, which allows for those substances to be produced, transported and sold to local communities. Setting aside the question of why young people and others use drugs from a psychological perspective, they are, above all, able to use them because such substances are readily available, despite stringent legislation. Furthermore, concerns about the exposure of young people to such substances coupled with concerns about the full effects and implications of addiction colour the discussion of substance abuse in general and the processing of offenders more specifically.

In certain fragile states, like Yemen, where substance abuse can also be read as a coping mechanism in a context of extreme violence and underdevelopment, and where mainstream drug use is a source of cultural identity not to be criminalised while other drug use is extremely stigmatised: the discussion becomes even more complex, leading to distinct concerns about the generalisation of criminological theory across multiple cultural contexts. In this context, theories on the relationship between substance abuse and criminality leave too many unanswered questions because “the behaviour of drug use is not isolated, but it is intimately intertwined with a range of common, long-standing human issues and societal problems” (Carroll and Miller, 2006, p. 6) which are probably quite heavily case-specific. It is virtually impossible to disentangle these issues from criminal behaviour that is discovered to have been motivated or influenced by addiction or substance abuse. Rather than looking at substance abuse as a cause of crime, it is more helpful to examine crime and substance abuse in parallel as symptoms of broader social, familial, school and labour-based risk factors, though this answer in itself is mildly unsatisfying.

#### **4.2.2 Community Causes**

In contrast to theories of substance abuse, community-based explanations of crime causation form a fairly comprehensive framework for assessing the impact of a number of risk factors. Offering in-depth analyses of communal influences upon criminal behaviour, they form a strong theoretical body in and of themselves that works independently as well as in association with alternative theoretical positions. In particular, they intersect effectively with theories of conflict and state fragility that prioritise social cohesion as a key determining factor in peace- and state-building. Their main shortfall is that they are relatively simplistic, reading, at times, like a list of components of criminogenic environments, rather than as an appraisal of the processes of crime causation.


Theories of crime causation that are based on community-level explanations can be effectively epitomised by the stereotype conveyed in the title of Amanda Elliott *et al's Good Kids from Bad Neighbourhoods* (2006). In distinguishing “good kids” from their backgrounds, they support the idea that “bad neighbourhoods” impact the psychological development of children and young people in such a way that makes them more likely to offend. This is not to say that there is such a thing as a typical offender background or a typical offender, but that the right combination of communal and other influences can serve to increase or decrease the probability of offending behaviour in both children and adults.

It is an unfortunate stereotype that “bad neighbourhoods” are associated with economic deprivation, though the relationship between poverty and crime is extremely complex<sup>105</sup>. Don

---

<sup>105</sup> See section 4.2.5.

Wetherburn and Bronwyn Lind write that although it must be acknowledged that a relationship exists between “disadvantage and crime”, “empirical anomalies” tend to disrupt most theories relating to the nature of that relationship (2001, pp. 6-28). However, several neighbourhood traits or community-based risk factors have come to be positively correlated with the proliferation of crime in studies conducted in the United States, the United Kingdom and elsewhere.



**Figure 50 Community-Based Risk Factors for Criminal Activity**

Lawrence W. Sherman's *Preventing Crime* lists these criminogenic risk factors to be: community composition; the nature of local social structures; the presence of oppositional cultures; the pervasiveness of criminogenic commodities; the availability of legitimate opportunities; and, the rate of social and physical disorder (See Figure 50).

Community composition is taken to refer to the type of people that make up a community. Sherman finds that a prevalence of unmarried or divorced males, teenage males, non-working adults, poor people, single parents and people with prior offence records is likely to increase crime rates in any given area (p. 3-5). Such community composition is mitigated or exacerbated by the nature of local community social structures, a concept that refers to the net of interactions that take place between those people who comprise a community.

In this regard, Sherman argues that while:

Children of single parents, for example, may not be at greater risk of crime because of their family structure ... a community with a high percentage of single parent households may put all its children at greater risk of delinquency by reducing the capacity of a community to maintain adult networks of informal control of children. (p. 3-5)

Although a community's composition and the presence of at-risk community members may not influence local crime rates directly, the density of that composition and the interactions of those members will significantly increase the likelihood of criminal activity, according to this theoretical framework. Similarly, community-based explanations of crime argue that the presence of an “oppositional culture”, “arising from a lack of participation in mainstream economic and social life”

can aggravate other risk factors, as can the presence of criminogenic commodities like weapons and narcotics (p. 3-6), although these influences should, perhaps, be read as symptoms of other more deep-seated problems.

Sherman believes that once all these factors have come into play, the mere appearance of social or physical disorder can tip a neighbourhood beyond safety limits. Quite simply, the same phenomenon that occurs in conflict zones (referred to as the “brain drain” or in this case the “peace drain”) also occurs in so-called “bad” neighbourhoods. Law-abiding citizens who have traditionally acted as stabilising influences over communities begin to move away. Those who cannot afford to do so remain. Neighbourhoods that have fallen into disrepair gain reputations for criminal activity, reinforcing studies that correlate poverty with crime.

Where this discussion of community-based risk factors becomes more complex is where criminological theory, which has been grounded predominantly in more politically stable countries, is brought into the discourse of state fragility and development, though community-based risk factors interact well with theories of development. What is not entirely clear from the literature is how oppositional cultures affect criminogenic environments when they exceed so-called “mainstream” cultural elements<sup>106</sup>.

The theory is also untested in fragile contexts where social chaos and the disruption of socialising activities is more common than in the developed world, though notable criminologists and development theorists have written about the interplay of community composition-based risk factors in specific case-studies like South Africa<sup>107</sup> and Northern Ireland<sup>108</sup>, where fragility has not yet taken root.

This gap in the literature is mitigated because theories relating to community risk factors are not that different to those pertaining to the causes of ethnic conflict, where it is believed by many researchers, like Daniel G. Abele *et al*, that:

Structural variables, such as ethnic composition of a community or the size of the minority and majority populations in the country, have been linked to attitudes toward ethnic relations and prejudice. Some argue that the greater the density of a minority population in a certain area, the higher the degree of prejudice. This reasoning assumes that a perception of threat from the minority group increases with minority group density, since increased casual contact increases opportunities to confirm stereotypes. In stark contrast, others assert that majority group members who live in close proximity to or who work in equal-status occupations with minority group members are less prejudiced than those who are without this kind of contact. (1996, p. 47)

---

<sup>106</sup> One example of when oppositional narratives were seen to be more prominent than mainstream government rhetoric in particular is the 2011 Arab Spring, which led many Middle Eastern and North African countries to experience the cessation of employment activities, the collapse of welfare services and the wide-scale rejection of government legitimacy alongside the rise of aggressively oppositional movements.

<sup>107</sup> See Michael Neocosmos' 'The Politics of Fear and the Fear of Politics: Reflections on Xenophobic Violence in South Africa' (2008).

<sup>108</sup> See Jonathon Byrne and John Topping's 'Policing, Terrorism and the Conundrum of Community: A Northern Ireland Perspective' (2012).

“Urbanicity”, write Abele *et al*, age and gender are also important contributing factors, whereby urban populations, young people and men have all been found to be more tolerant towards other ethnicities than rural populations, middle aged and elderly people, and women. However, large numbers of unemployed men and young people have been found to prolong active conflicts, once these have been initiated, by providing a viable recruitment base for fighting forces.

Both crime and conflict causation theory readily accept community composition and social structure as sound areas from which to extract real and meaningful risk factors, while the presence of criminogenic commodities, and particularly of weapons, has time and again been proven to increase the likelihood of violent conflict, thereby prolonging state fragility. The trouble with conflict-affected fragile states is that while community composition may act as an initial cause of fighting, such compositions are invariably shuffled and reorganised in times of extreme political instability. Researchers are yet to fully understand the impact of such reorganisations upon the criminogenic environment.

Within fragile state contexts, the rate at which social and physical disorder infiltrate communities is accelerated by weak state capacity and conflict: homes and public buildings are devastated by fighting, and people are exposed to significant levels of violence. Reconstruction is inhibited by poverty and lack of institutional capacity, so that, even where conflict is not present, urban and rural areas in fragile states fall into disrepair. It is only natural for otherwise stabilising members of the community to move away from affected areas regardless of whether they can afford to do so.

This is not an unusual occurrence for conflict-affected fragile states like Yemen, and conflicts in other parts of the world have actually been motivated by the desire to instigate forced migration, as evidenced by the ethnic cleansing of Rwanda (1994) and of the Former Palestinian Territories (1948). What is unique to the Yemeni context is that the country is also estimated by the UNHCR to be host to 191,500 Somali refugees, along with 4,700 Ethiopians, 4,200 Iraqis and 1,600 others (2011). The interaction of these communities with the host population is another dimension that must be taken into account in any assessment of the criminogenic environment, leaving Yemen a country with a high rate of weapons proliferation and unemployment, experiencing an exaggerated crisis of social and physical disorder (brought about by the wanton destruction of public and private property, as well as by the mass movement of people).

As has been reflected in the criminal statistics listed in Chapter 3, the growing disorder of the social environment in Yemen since the outbreak of war in 2005 has resulted in a corresponding increase in crime, and particularly in violent crime, which, it now seems, may be associated with the conflict-induced changes incurred by Yemen's community-based risk factors. While criminological theories relating to community-based risk factors will likely be relatively informative in this sense therefore, it is yet to be determined whether or not they can be effectively adapted to contexts where such large social devastation has occurred. There is also an argument to be made that, while community-based risk factors offer a fairly rigorous theoretical framework, due to their similarity and overlap with much conflict and fragility literature, their integration into this sector may not bring an altogether new contribution to the study of international development.

### 4.2.3 Family-Based Causes

In 1996, Chris Coughlin and Samuel Vuchinich conducted a study on the effect of family experiences in preadolescence upon the development of male delinquency, interviewing 194 ten-year-old males that had been predicted to be arrested by their late teens. They found that while “An association between childhood experiences in the family and juvenile delinquency has long been recognised”, that association can now be broken down into three particular aspects of family life, which include:

- “an absence of parent-child attachment that inhibits a child's acceptance of norms and values”;
- “inept parenting practices that promote impulsive, antisocial behaviour”; and,
- “family structures such as step-families and single-parent families that involve transitions that can interrupt the socialisation process” (1996, p. 491).

In this regard, Wei Chao *et al* concur that “parents who engage in inept parenting increase the chances that their children will affiliate with deviant peers” (2001, p. 66) (See Figure 51).




Figure 51 The Impact of Family Life on Juvenile Delinquency

Family-based risk factors can affect all dimensions of human development, from early childhood through to adult life, pushing people to fall into criminal modes of behaviour. More specifically, Lind McKie argues that “Families and familial relationships are focal points for the transmission of knowledge and the formation of ideas on violence” (2005, p. 24). Many researchers tend to focus upon youth offending in particular in the study of family-based risk factors, because early interventions in the course of human development have not only proven to be quite vital but also more successful than interventions targeted at adults, which usually strive to limit or control domestic violence<sup>109</sup>. The body of criminological theory relating to family-based risk factors tends to

<sup>109</sup> See Hirokazu Yoshikawa’s 'Prevention as cumulative protection: Effects of early family support and education on chronic delinquency and its risks' (1994).

focus upon these two problem areas of youth crime and domestic abuse, with varying levels of success, which makes it extremely pertinent to this thesis.

However, because family life is, in effect, private life, it has been difficult for researchers to pinpoint specific criminogenic risk factors within family settings. Many governments have traditionally been reluctant to interfere in or even to probe into issues relating to their citizens' homes.

Yet the connection between family life and crime is emphasised in criminological literature. Sherman, for instance, argues that:

While serious crime is geographically concentrated in a small number of high crime communities, it is individually concentrated in families with anti-social parents, rejecting parents, parents in conflict, parents imposing inconsistent punishment, and parents who supervise their children loosely (1996, p. 4-2).

The most prominent family-based risk factor for youth delinquency is inappropriate parenting.




Figure 52 Socialisation-Founded Explanations of Family-Based Criminogenic Risk Factors

It is argued that most children tend to learn how to socialise with others vicariously at home and at school, so that if they are not provided with adequate training in this process or are frequently exposed to violence and abuse, they are at greater risk of falling into antisocial and eventually criminal modes of behaviour (See Figure 52). As has been indicated by Hedy Cleaver *et al* in their study of *Child Protection, Domestic Violence and Parental Substance Misuse* (2007), family risk factors are gravely aggravated by both legal and illegal substance use. They write that parental “substance misuse [and] domestic violence ... impact on their capacity to safeguard and promote the welfare of the children”, which logically stifles the social development of those children (p. 13).

Like illegal substance abuse, it is difficult to classify domestic violence as a family-based risk factor for crime because domestic violence is considered to be a form of crime in itself by many cultures with its own set of social, psychological and economic causes. Lind McKie writes that gender-based violence, and particularly violence that is targeted against women by their husbands and partners, is profoundly influenced by social conceptions of gender roles. She believes that “patriarchy”, or “The broad system of social and economic relations that offers and reaffirms men a dominant position”, “creates and promotes myriad dimensions of inequalities”. McKie argues that,

while triggers for violence may vary between relationships, it is these inequalities that allow for abuse to take place within the home by making violence against women seem more socially excusable as an affirmation of their subservience to their husbands/partners/sons (2005, p. 41). Even when violence is targeted against men or children, McKie believes that domestic abuse is, above all, an affirmation of family power structures.

This argument would seem to be partially justified by the James Bulger case of 1990, when two eleven-year-old boys abducted and murdered a two-year-old child. One of the boys, Robert Thompson, was the fifth of seven siblings living in a single parent household in which the chain of violence and abuse was passed down along the generations, escalating in severity as each younger child would strive to reaffirm their social standing within the family by assaulting the next (verbally, physically and sometimes sexually). There is also evidence to suggest that the other culprit in James Bulger's murder, Jon Vernables, expressed an unusual level of fear of his mother, an indicative warning sign of potential abuses in the family (Audrey Gillan, 2000). The incident would appear to be an extreme example of the old proverb that "violence begets violence", particularly when violence is used to subjugate and subdue within family-based settings.

The extension of family-based criminogenic risk factors that have been identified in the developed world to fragile states is somewhat problematic, because state fragility is often accompanied by conflict and displacement, which results in the forceful disruption of the traditional family unit. However, it has been observed that conflict and fragility are positively correlated with domestic abuse in particular, due to the high levels of emotional pressure experienced by impoverished and war-affected communities under such circumstances.

In 2007, the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children reported that most of the Iraqi refugee women whom they had consulted in Jordan reported suffering from domestic violence and marital rape (p. 6). They attributed this increase in violence to the stresses of living in cramped conditions with no legal means of earning an income. This argument falls in line with contemporary psychosocial criminological theory, which David Gadd and Tony Jefferson use to argue that "Domestic violence ... often occurs when perpetrators are unable to contain threatening anxieties" that could easily include conflict-related stress (2007, p. 146).

High levels of domestic violence are reported in many fragile states like Yemen, which can be classed as extremely patriarchal societies, marked, as Eva Engelhardt-Wendt and Julian Poluda believe, by "perpetuating male dominance and a general lack of awareness of gender rights" (2008, p. 5), whereby the authority of the mother in the home is diminished through the use of violence by fathers and/or sons. Legislation aimed at protecting women from violence in Yemen has been slow in development due to a general lack of political will in this area and has been widely dismissed as unenforceable, especially within the peripheries. Those mechanisms that are already in place have been negatively associated with foreign agendas due to their backing by the international community. In practice, they can be rejected at the grass-roots level (*Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations Population Fund, 15 August 2010*).

These gender inequalities are sometimes translated into contrasting parental roles, whereby one parent is clearly dominant within the household while the other is subservient not only to their partner but sometimes to their children. Such uneven parenting practices lead in the first instance to inconsistent rules of social interaction for children, and sometimes to other broader inept parenting

practices in the second instance. Of more importance, is that fragile states are also marked by an absence of formal support structures for parents so that, even when displacement and conflict are not factors, the capacities of parents to form constructive relationships with their children are hampered by the need to seek out employment for parents and children alike, as well as by the general absence of institutions to monitor children in single-parent situations or to remove children from abusive settings. Finally, fragile states are very poorly equipped to assist children who are entirely separated from their families, so that these are forced to fend for themselves on the streets, falling into patterns of criminal behaviour in order to survive.

#### 4.2.4 School-Based Causes

A lot of attention is paid to early childhood in the study of criminology. This is because, as Wei Chao *et al* concede in their analysis of delinquency growth curves:

One of the most widely accepted findings in criminology is that childhood conduct problems are a strong predictor of subsequent involvement in antisocial behaviour. ... And although only about 50% of antisocial children become antisocial adults, almost all antisocial adults displayed antisocial tendencies as children. (2001, pp. 63-64)

Even a cursory glance at the literature on this subject will reveal a fairly wide range of arguments relating to the reasons for this trend, yet all of them tend to gravitate towards two camps. Most theorists will either support the idea that “antisocial” behaviour which develops into criminality is the manifestation of a character trait, or that antisocial behaviour is a product of the social learning process. Under both eventualities, childhood experiences and childhood behaviour patterns are thought to be strong indicators of future lawful or unlawful activity.




Figure 53 The Impact of Childhood Experiences and Behaviour on Future Criminal Activity

Under both types of explanation, it is of little wonder that so many researchers have focused upon the family unit and the school environment (as well as the classroom environment more

specifically) in their effort to either stem the development of antisocial character traits or to monitor and control the social learning process through effective social bonding initiatives. After all, in the developed world:

Given the amount of time spent in the academic setting, aside from the family, the institution of education becomes the primary instrument of socialization for youth. In other words, the school is responsible for teaching not only substantive information, but also the norms and values of society (Christine A. Eith, 2005, p. 2).

It is commonly believed that a process of social bonding between schools and their students can help children to learn self-control, to understand the consequences of their actions and to reduce antisocial or criminal behaviour. This idea is drawn from Travis Hirschi's theory of social control, made famous by his ground-breaking work on the *Causes of Delinquency* (2002).

The trouble here is that school registration and student retention in fragile states tends to be extremely poor, so that many school-based risk factors cease to apply. In Yemen, for instance, the net primary school attendance rate for 2009 was only 68%, leaving 32% of children in situations that are not covered by theories of crime causation relating to school environments (United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and Government of Yemen, 2009). Furthermore, in 2011 and beyond, it is likely that the percentage of children out of schools increased due to diminishing levels of safety and the disruption of multiple governmental employment sectors, including that of education.

Theories relating to school-based risk factors tend to be catered to school-aged children in the developed world, ranging from age 3 to 18, depending on the country. It has been found that few children in Yemen and other fragile states complete primary school at all and fewer still move on to secondary education, so that school-aged children are overly represented by 5 to 10-year-olds (*Stakeholder Interview, Ministry of Education, 15 August 2010*). Nevertheless, because this body of literature deals directly with the interaction of children and young people with their social environment, identified risk factors may still be pertinent.

It has been found that multiple risk factors can affect the development of children and adolescents within schools, which are, after all, institutions that have been established specifically for the fast promotion of such development. Many of these risk factors are similar to those already covered under the community and family-based risk sections of this thesis. Most schools act as microcosms of the community, and many children bring aspects of their family lives with them into school.

For example, risk factors that relate to community composition will be reflected in the composition of students in schools, whereas problems related to community social structures will be mirrored in the associations and interactions of school children. Equally, where normal patterns of socialisation and social learning have been disrupted for children within their families, the school's grounds will provide a conduit for any resulting antisocial behaviour and broader delinquency. At the same time, a large presence of criminogenic commodities within the community will impact the school environment, particularly if weapons and narcotics are trafficked through the playground and classrooms.

Schools form a useful and telling micro-study of the broader criminogenic influences that may be impacting a society and its young people. In fragile states, they can illustrate the conditions with which most children are faced on a daily basis – such as violence, poverty and malnutrition. Whether or not children attend school is determined by overall communal perceptions of safety (children do not go to school if they fear leaving their homes), access to water (if children have to collect water from a faraway source on a daily basis, this may prevent them from engaging in other activities), general levels of prosperity (if poverty is rampant, children may have to seek out employment opportunities rather than going to school), agricultural cycles (particularly during harvest and planting cycles, children may need to work farms during the day), and many other conditions, including hunger and disease. In Yemen, it has been found that gender is an equally important factor in the restriction of education, so that the female to male ratio in basic education remained 74.8 per cent in 2008, making the school environment semi-indicative of broader gender inequalities (United Nations Development Project, 2010a).




Figure 54 Positive and Negative School-Based Influences on Child Development

Beyond these arguments, however, Denise C. Gottfredson identifies several aspects of school life and school administration which can adversely or positively influence crime rates. These include: “characteristics of school and classroom environments as well as individual-level school-related experiences and attitudes, peer group experiences, and personal values, attitudes and beliefs” (1996, p. 5-1). These risk factors are harder to pin down than others because a lot of them operate at the micro rather than the macro level of crime causation and are to do with emotional well-being (see Figure 54). Gottfredson goes on to explain that classroom characteristics and the social construction of the school has a lot to do with its “academic mission”, and many adverse school-based experiences can be mitigated by a strong structure of emotional support (p. 5-1). Problems relating to bad school experiences can be flagged by poor performance in homework and testing or low rates of school attendance, although these could be symptomatic of problems experienced by the child elsewhere or at home.

Peer-related risk factors include both a lack of socialisation and problems of association with delinquent peers. As has been stated during the analysis of family-based causes of crime, such associations can prove to be the product of inept parenting rather than of a high risk school environment.

It is found that while these factors can be extremely useful for understanding why children and young people go on to commit crime and violent crime in particular – they are virtually undetectable in fragile states where teacher training tends to be extremely poor and schools lack the capacity to monitor their students. In Yemen more specifically, it has been found that this lack of capacity is linked to a fundamental inability of the state to attract high quality graduates into the education sector, so that only those with the lowest results and most basic education levels choose to become teachers (*Stakeholder Interview, Ministry of Education, 15 August 2010*). This poor staff qualification level has not only led to ineffectual relationships between students and teachers, but also to a poor rate of retention of children in schools so that most Yemenis today do not see education as a necessary component for building a career. Their views are reinforced by the reality that the unemployed population of Yemen is disproportionately represented by university graduates, looking for a better quality of life, so that 44% of those with an intermediate level of education and 54% of university graduates were unemployed in 2008 (International Labour Organisation, 2008).

#### **4.2.5 Economic and Labour Market Causes**

Struggling economies and over-saturated labour markets are key components of state fragility, and they exert an extraordinary hold over societies and crime rates, exacerbating virtually all other risk factors listed thus far. For instance, cheaper housing in one area and the availability of low-skill labour opportunities can affect community composition by prompting an influx of low-income labourers and thereby generating community-based risk factors. Economic stress factors can increase pressure upon families, raising the risk of domestic violence and separation, leading to more single-parent households and disrupting the social learning process for children, thereby creating family-based risk factors. A lack of school funding can reduce the effectiveness of structures developed for the emotional well-being of children, increasing classroom sizes and reducing the school-to-student bonding process, paving the way for school-based risk factors.

Economic and labour market stress factors can feed into the causes of conflict by aggravating resource competition and inter-community tensions<sup>110</sup>. At the same time, as overall levels of well-being decline and economic stress levels continue to rise within communities, the demands for mood-altering substances increase, leading to increased substance use and addiction among the general population, thereby allowing for criminogenic commodity-related risk factors to take hold.

In short, economics and labour markets influence all aspects of society, with implications that economic risk factors related to poverty and unemployment that have been identified in the developed world (where GDP per capita in the richest country, Liechtenstein, is US \$94,569) may

---

<sup>110</sup> See Chapter 6, section 6.2 on 'Conflict Causation', for more details on the relationship between resource competition and conflict generation.

have huge implications for fragile states, where GDP can be as low as US \$187 per capita, as it was in Zimbabwe in 2010 (United Nations Development Project, 2010). However, applying these risk factors to fragile states is not as straightforward as it seems, due largely to the extremely complex relationship between economics, labour market conditions and crime rates.

Discussions of economic and labour market risk factors in the study of crime tend, as Weatherburn and Lind surmise, to refer to the “economic stress-induced offender motivation paradigm”, which, rather than referring to the psychological impacts of economic pressures, “mediates the relationship between economic factors and crime” (2001, p. 6). Weatherburn and Lind argue that within this context:

The term 'economic stress' is used ... as a shorthand way of denoting the psychological condition or conditions which putatively mediate the link between factors such as unemployment (or poverty) and the individual motivation to offend. (2001, pp. 6-7)

While this concept of “economic stress” is widely acknowledged, it remains unclear how exactly economic stress influences individuals to commit crime and why certain people are susceptible to its effects while others are not.

Weatherburn and Lind identify four theories that strive to explain this connection. They are:


- strain theory, which suggests that poorer members of society “experience a significant gap” between their social aspirations (which are predetermined by socio-cultural and commercial perceptions of worth-while goals and pursuits) and their economic capacity to achieve those aspirations through legal means. The theory is used to set out the relationship between economic disadvantage and acquisitive crime (2001, p. 7) because, as Kerry Carrington argues “Strain ... produces deprivation” (2009, p. 43);
- social opportunity theory, which posits that crime (and particularly youth delinquency) is in itself “an act of rebellion against blocked social opportunities rather than ... a means of achieving culturally approved goals” (Lind et al, 2001, p. 7). According to social opportunity theory, if illegitimate opportunities are present when legitimate ones are either not available or unsatisfactory, the desire to rebel will increase illegal activity in terms of both acquisitive and non-acquisitive crime<sup>111</sup>;
- expected utility theory, which argues that offenders calculate the likelihood of their successful completion of a criminal act according to a cost-to-benefit analysis, taking account of perceived risk factors so that they may determine whether to pursue licit or illicit pathways by anticipating the expected utility of both outcomes. (p. 8) This is also sometimes known as economic choice theory; and
- early Marxism, which views criminal activity as a product of capitalism-generated economic competition. (p. 9)

While these explanations go some way towards detailing the impact of economic pressures on crime rates, they fall short of describing why so few people are affected by them in a criminogenic way within societies at large.

---

<sup>111</sup> This theory shall be referenced further in section 4.3.

By analysing behaviour as a product of economic push and pull factors, this body of theory can either omit other important stabilising and aggravating social forces, or break all offending down into economically-motivated activities. Due to their reluctance to engage with violent crime as a potential product of economic stress factors, it has been found that these theories require significant adaptation if they are to be made relevant to the main argument of this thesis<sup>112</sup>. To this end, Bushway and Reuter write in their analysis of 'Labour Markets and Crime Risk Factors' (1996) that labour markets and economic risk factors must always be analysed in tandem with one another in order to better understand how their interactions can either enhance or mitigate the effect of economic pressures on individuals.




**Figure 55 Positive Labour Market Social Influences**

Employment in times of economic difficulty can exert a controlling influence over people by generating a social bond between individuals and the society in which they live, much like the school-to-student bond described previously<sup>113</sup>. This phenomenon is generally described under social control theory, according to which a lack of steady employment leads to a breakdown of social bonds and an increased likelihood of offending. In this sense, employment is thought of as a distraction to a certain degree, whereby people who are occupied by work are less likely to find time for criminal behaviour (see *Figure 55*). To this extent, Bushway and Reuter state that under the constraints of anomie theory – which deals with lack of job satisfaction – employment itself is not sufficient to deter crime in individuals unless it meets the conditions necessary to steer people away from antisocial tendencies. Income inequalities and other problems relating to job satisfaction or boredom at work can push people to offend even if they earn a steady and regular wage (p. 6-4) (see *Figure 56*).

---

<sup>112</sup> Due to the extreme poverty exhibited by fragile states, these theories will nonetheless be analysed more thoroughly in Chapter 6.

<sup>113</sup> Section 4.3 will discuss employment as a form of social control in more detail.



**Figure 56 Negative Labour Market Social Influences**

This issue is pivotal to understanding high crime rates in fragile states, where unemployment is rampant while the monitoring of employment sectors is quite poor, so that equal work very rarely means equal pay. In Yemen, where the unemployment rate was estimated at 35% in 2010, for every person in formal employment – three more were thought to be working in the informal sectors, with 460,000 known informal businesses working outside the remits of labour and tax laws (*Stakeholder Interview, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 16 August 2010*). Without recourse to labour laws and employment tribunals, the potential for employees to suffer as a result of corruption and human rights violations while at work are relatively high, and a lack of access to welfare and benefits, as well as a lack of potential for career advancement, can easily prove sufficient to convince people to search for other more illicit means of economic achievement.

Overall, as François Bourguignon notes:

it is important to keep in mind that the preceding economic argument fits better crimes against property or illegal activity like drug dealing, illegal gambling or managing prostitution, which offer some economic gain, than crimes against the person. It cannot be ruled out that homicides, international or not, are more frequent among poor and less educated people and in areas where police is little present. Also part of international homicides and physical violence is directly linked to property crime or illegal activity. So, the homicide rate in a given area may be determined very much by the same variables as the rate of property crime. However, given the exceptional character of this type of crime the relationship with these variables is most likely to be weaker than for property crime. (1999, p. 13)

While it is tempting to read crime in fragile states as a product of their most obvious character trait – their economic deprivation – economic and labour market risk factors are insufficient in and of themselves for determining the high rate of violent young offending in such contexts, though it may be the case that psychological pressure generated by economic stress could be more relevant<sup>114</sup>.

It can be argued that the significant economic underdevelopment of fragile states serves to aggravate other relevant risk factors and increase the emotional strain on young people, leading to a greater potential for violence and aggression. In Yemen, this aggression and growing general dissatisfaction can further be used to explain the appeal of the Arab Spring in 2011, during which unemployment and poverty were chief among popular complaints.

<sup>114</sup> See Chapter 6.

#### 4.2.6 Judicial and Law Enforcement Causes

A founding principle of good governance is the commitment of any state towards observing and maintaining the rule of law. This is not only because the rule of law provides the foundational principle of effective legal systems, but also because public safety from crime and violence is considered to be one of the most important measures of a state's effectiveness, not to mention a key determining factor for a government's popularity. A starting definition of state fragility is when a government is no longer capable of maintaining a monopoly over legitimate violence within its territories, leading to parallel reductions in justice administration and law enforcement capacities. With levels of public safety resources being directly correlated with rates of offending in the developed world, it could be (and often is) assumed that the diversion of spending in fragile states away from conventional community protection mechanisms has caused a rise in opportunistic behaviour necessary to promote increased offending. However, when it comes to criminological theories relating to judicial and law enforcement causes of offending, significant divergences between fragile states and the developed world become apparent with broad theoretical contradictions.

Working in America, William K. Niskanen has found that an increase in police street presence “appears to have no significant effect on the rate of actual violent crime and a roughly proportionate negative effect on the actual rate of property crime” (1994). Niskanen argues that within the developed world it is extremely difficult to establish the relationship between policing figures and crime rates, because: firstly, police forces dedicate greater resources to areas with higher crime rates; secondly, police presence is correlated with other economic factors that include local government spending budgets; and, thirdly, because a higher police presence leads to a greater rate of detection of criminal activity. Each of these conditions leads to a skewing of crime statistics that can, in turn, generate faulty assumptions about the nature of the crime-policing relationship. Nevertheless, as George L. Kelling *et al* argue, “The prospect of police arriving at a crime in progress as a result of a call or a chance observation is thought to deter crimes”, despite these statistical discrepancies, so that a visible police presence can prove to be an effective deterrent for most forms of criminal activity (1988, p.2).

While these arguments shall be discussed further in section 4.3 as social control theories, it has contrastingly been strongly asserted that high levels of crime and insecurity in fragile states are directly connected to poor policing capacities, as has been argued by Paul Collier among others (2000, p.102). Of equal importance have been the capacities and conduct of other elements of law enforcement services, including those of judicial and penal bodies.

In this last aspect, theories of crime causation that are aimed at understanding criminogenic risk factors in the developed world and in fragile states alike have strongly coincided, with both sides acknowledging the radicalising impact of correctional institutions like prisons on adults and young people. In developed countries, these arguments relate to the hardening of criminals in prison, whereby petty offenders are pushed into more extreme forms of antisocial behaviour through prolonged association with other deviant members of society within confined environments. In fragile states, and particularly in conflict-affected Islamic countries, there is a similar concern that detention facilities have come to form a rich recruitment ground for future insurgents.

In her study of 'Arab Prisons', Nicole Stracke writes that Arab states have long acknowledged that “prisons and detention centres could be breeding grounds for hard-liners and recruitment centres for terrorist groups”, whereby it has generally been accepted that this is “not a new phenomenon” (2007). This was also a key finding to emerge from the Yemeni case study, where interaction with prison environments was identified by young people in Yemen as an important cause of increased youth aggression in the country<sup>115</sup>. While criminological theories in the developed world tend to focus on prison environments and prison cultures as the primary criminogenic influences within penal systems, analyses of the Middle East in particular tend rather to focus on law enforcement practices, with Stracke noting that Islamic radicalisation in prisons has been strongly associated with “the alleged cruel treatment of Islamist prisoners and the harsh interrogation methods used inside prisons”. This is a strong point of diversion between criminological literature and theories of fragility, with criminological theory that has been produced in the developed world remaining fairly limited in its capacity to conceptualise the extremely poor living conditions that are characteristic of prison facilities in least developed countries and even in more prosperous Middle Eastern ones.

In Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the realisation that prison management could contribute to increased community radicalisation triggered vast reformations of prison systems in the early- and mid-2000s. In fragile states, such reforms have proven much more logistically difficult to implement<sup>116</sup>. It is sufficient to note here that prison reforms in Yemen have thus far been stalled by weak state capacities, a lack of political will, a lack of funding and, above all, by the fact that many prisons are privately owned by powerful stakeholders who are known to have little respect for human rights. Freedom House claim that the Yemeni Government has failed time and again “to investigate hundreds of disappearances since the late 1960s in both north and south Yemen” that are linked to the private prison system (2002), with IRIN reporting incidents of torture in private detention facilities even in cases of petty offences (2007).

IRIN write that:

The issue of private prisons in Yemen has only once before been raised in parliament - after more than 400 residents of Raash village in the southern Ibb province were displaced from their land in January 2007 by their local tribal leader, Sheikh Mohammed Mansour, who allegedly has four private prisons. “But parliament can’t do anything about the issue as some MPs have their own private prisons,” MP Shawqi al-Qadhi, a member of the parliamentary Rights and Freedoms Committee, told IRIN (2007).

According to this article, Government-owned prisons, including the Central Prison in Sana'a, also include private cells that are leased by sheikhs and other prominent community members, indicating an institutional acceptance of existing practices. Overall, conditions in Yemeni prisons remain dire regardless of ownership, with Freedom House sighting the prevalence of “poor sanitary conditions, overcrowding, inadequate food, and torture” in governmental detention facilities, all of which may be correlated with increased levels of aggression among inmates who survive long enough to see their release dates.

---

<sup>115</sup> See section 6.5 for further details.

<sup>116</sup> Prison reform in Yemen will be analysed in more depth in Chapter 5, section 5.2.5.

Prison-based criminogenic risk factors in fragile states are rendered all the more dangerous by inconsistent judicial and law enforcement practices<sup>117</sup>. Just as privately owned prisons are beyond the reach of the Yemeni Government's control, so too are private security and informal judicial systems largely unmonitored. It has been found that powerful tribal leaders in Yemen often administer their own forms of justice, arresting and imprisoning without trial those who are thought to pose a threat to their authority or to violate their beliefs. These members of society are generally thought to be beyond the reach of the law and remain under-investigated by state law enforcement institutions.

Yemeni police officers and members of the judiciary themselves are also thought to operate in a way that is inconsistent with international human rights principles. Of the highest priority here is that the Yemeni justice system fails to segregate offenders according to the severity of their crimes, so that prison populations are comprised of various types of offenders who should not necessarily be placed in the same environment, leading to an increased probability of socialisation to negative and harmful behaviour patterns for petty criminals. This means that Islamic radicals, insurgents, murderers and rapists are imprisoned with irregular migrants, children and other vulnerable groups, including the mentally handicapped. It has been found that Yemeni police officers engage in intimidating and discriminatory practices, whereby migrants and Somali refugees especially can be deliberately targeted at the investigation phase without cause, leading to their over-representation at the sentencing stage (Ali Saeed, 2011). Meanwhile, it has been observed that the Yemeni judiciary fails to take into account mental handicaps and other illnesses when sentencing and imprisoning offenders, with Maan A. Barri Qasem and Ahmed Mohamed Makki recommending that at the very least patients suffering from mental illnesses should always be separated from general prison populations (2008, p. 91). As has been outlined in the introduction of this thesis, judicial processes established to protect children from imprisonment with adult offenders fail to identify those in need of aid due to a lack of birth registration, so that the Yemeni Government has virtually no capacity to determine the ages of suspected minors (*Stakeholder Interview, United Nations Population Fund, 14 August 2010*).

Such practices, when combined with the state's reputation for institutional corruption at the elite and grass-roots levels, have led to a distancing of the community and individual from law enforcement services, leading to a general lack of detection of criminal activity and a corresponding rise in offences that might have been deterred by police presence. Ultimately, long processing times and a failure to address grievances has meant that, of those Yemenis interviewed and surveyed in 2011, virtually all said that they would not engage with the police or the criminal courts if they fell victim to crime, though some acknowledged that they might strive to initiate civil proceedings if their property was stolen. These findings would seem to imply that even a drastic effort to reform the law enforcement and judicial systems of Yemen would fail to immediately reverse criminogenic risk factors, due to an overwhelming lack of faith in state services and capabilities.

---

<sup>117</sup> See section 5.2.5 for more information on how these risk factors apply to Yemen.

## 4.3 Social Control

### 4.3.1 Theories of Social Constructionism and Social Control

Criminological theories of social constructionism and social control are associated with one another in the discussion of the composition of legal frameworks and their origins. In particular, social control theories outline the reasons why conformity to standards of lawful behaviour appeals to most individuals, while elite social constructionism reveals how governments help to enforce conformity by punishing deviants. While constructionism is thought of as an extension of labelling theory, which, according to Frank Tannenbaum, is a process of social reaction to the behaviour of individuals through which some people become “labelled” as deviants from the norm (1938): constructionism and elite constructionism help to outline why, though some crimes are prosecuted to the full letter of the law, others are ignored entirely by governments, law enforcement services and community members. For example, theft is considered to be a serious offence by many people while the theft of a chocolate bar by a child inspires less concern.

If contrasted with one another, social control theories can be understood as explanations of why individuals choose not to break the law, while social constructionism illustrates why societies reject individuals who do break the law. Both sets of theories are intrinsically tied into notions of conformity, and, because they have much to teach us about why most people tend to obey the law in the developed world, they may also hold the key to understanding why fragile states conversely experience such great difficulties in law enforcement. Interestingly, social control and social constructionism also need to be understood alongside theories of deviance, which posit that: “Social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance”, whereby elite social constructionism, which codifies “norms into laws”, “thus determine[s] what constitutes acceptable and deviant behaviour” (Carrington, 2009, p. 45).




Figure 57 The Process of Deviance Construction Through Social Grouping and Blocked Social Integration

According to classical theories of social control originating, for instance, within the works of Albert J. Reiss (1951), Jackson Toby (1957) and F. Ivan Nye (1958); crime begins to occur when offenders cease to have a strong stake in conformity, so that non-criminal pathways of achieving desired objectives become less appealing than criminal ones that offer short-cuts to success. Travis Hirschi summarises that “Control theories assume that delinquent acts result when an individual's bond to society is weak or broken” (2002, p. 251).

Hirschi writes that such bonds are divisible according to four types of relationship that include:

- attachment; described as a conventional bond to society, the attachment of individuals to one another is said to be an element of internal control, through which people are said to restrain their own behaviour for the benefit of other members of their communities with whom they empathise. This bond is variously referred to as an “internal” or “informal” system of social control (p. 252);
- commitment; often thought of as the “rational component in conformity”, commitment is the term used to encompass the idea that people cherish the investments that they have made into their positions in society, including furthering their educations and careers. The commitment bond allegedly dictates that individuals who are committed to maintaining such investments are less likely to indulge in criminal behaviour for fear of losing the benefits that they have worked for, such as their jobs or even their freedoms. Hirschi argues that “To the person committed to conventional lines of action, risking one to ten years in prison for a ten-dollar holdup is stupidity, because to the committed person the costs and risks obviously exceed ten dollars in value”, so that “The concept of commitment assumes that the organisation of society is such that the interests of most persons would be endangered if they were to engage in criminal acts” (p. 253);
- involvement; the argument that states that most individuals are simply too busy with other activities to take part in crime, involvement is an essential element of contemporary control theory. According to this theory, the individual who is involved in the conventional activities of daily life, including employment, education and leisure activities, has too little time to think about or take part in criminal behaviour; and
- belief; the final of the four social bonds, belief is the most commonly cited aspect of control theory. It dictates that societies are united through a common value system, and that most citizens will not act against the dominant narrative of right and wrong. According to this argument, people do not ordinarily act against the belief system within which they have been socialised unless other external criminogenic risk factors come into play.

Within the context of social control theories, it becomes relatively easy to speculate that fragile states are more prone to exhibiting high rates of offending because individuals generally have less stake in conformity.

Fragile states tend to be overrun with the conditions necessary to break people's bonds with society. Such conditions generally include high rates of unemployment, a general lack of participation in education, displacement and a lack of opportunities for career advancement based on skills and duration of commitment. These aspects of state fragility generally lead to a lack of engagement in normalising social and political processes, and thereby hold significant potential for generating deviance, particularly among young people who do not yet have strong social

responsibilities such as children of their own. This view is helpful in aiding conceptualisations of state fragility, but is also relatively superficial and can be inapplicable to those fragile states that are heavily influenced by the prevalence of strong, uniform cultural and religious valuation systems.

While it is true that Yemen is a country in which levels of involvement are probably genuinely quite low, the role that attachment, commitment and belief play in forming the identities of young people and the general population should not be underestimated. This was seen during the Arab Spring of 2011 in the very high level of participation in protests by young people who felt as though they had a stake in the country's future, as well as by the lesser participation of older members of society with children of their own, who had a responsibility to care for their families rather than risk their lives in public demonstrations<sup>118</sup>. This was also seen most strongly in the relatively low rate of petty offending that took place during the Arab Spring despite the high prevalence of opportunities for criminal activity, a reflection of the strong socio-cultural rejection of property-related crime based on Islamic principles<sup>119</sup>. While social control and social constructionism are likely to hold important insights into criminological investigations of fragility, their impact on criminal activity is unlikely to be very straightforward, indicating a strong need to cater theoretical frameworks to cultural phenomena, not just structural and economic ones as the theories themselves would imply upon a first reading.

Kerry Carrington argues that, within the context of young offending, social controls and social constructionism result in two forms of deviance in the developed world. Primary deviance might be thought of to comprise behaviour that results in the commission of a criminal offence. Secondary deviance “occurs if the young person adopts a delinquent identity as a self-defence mechanism to the social reaction to his or her behaviour” (2009, p. 45). In this sense, Carrington believes that “Young people who are stigmatised by labelling of their deviant behaviour can become socially ostracised, reinforcing and amplifying their initial deviance” (p. 45).

This argument holds disturbing consequences, which are that children and young people who engage in criminal activity, perhaps in response to the various criminogenic risk factors that have already been identified, will then continue to engage in criminal activity in order to justify their resulting sense of social exclusion from what is perceived as a generally law-abiding society. It is also foreseeable that, due to the inconsistent law enforcement practices identified in section 4.2.6, such a sense of exclusion among children and young people in fragile states might be thought of as externally implemented and unjustified, leading to a greater need for a rejection of normative values and the formation of a new criminal identity.

Interestingly, the same phenomenon is observable in times of conflict particularly in mainland Africa, when children and young people are pushed into participating in armed violence. Here, it is found that even after the cessation of hostilities, child soldiers face extreme difficulties in reintegrating into society due to their perceived rejection by host communities, so that many fall into patterns of criminal activity or other forms of harmful behaviour, whereby it becomes “hardly possible to speak of reintegration” (Douglas *et al*, 2004, p. 89). Likewise, it has been observed that, among many children and young people in Yemeni cases of accidental violence, similar effects

---

<sup>118</sup> Kate Nevens of Chatham House confirmed in interview that young people under the age of 25 were much more likely to participate in protests than “those with families” (interview conducted on February 29th, 2012).

<sup>119</sup> See Chapter 1, section 1.3.1.

prevail, whereby children who unintentionally injured or killed family members while playing with firearms subsequently fled their homes and created new criminal identities for themselves out of a fear of returning home and facing the social and emotional repercussions of their actions (IRIN, 2010). In cases where community identities are strengthened through tribalism, this social isolation may be more severe, though this assumption needs more testing and investigation.

Carrington writes that “Defining and labelling crime and deviance assumes a social consensus and collective agreement about what is normal” (p. 46), which is not necessarily applicable to fragile states where social constructionism and the pressures of elite social constructionism may be fundamentally misaligned. It ought to be noted that the Arab Spring has been a clear manifestation of this misalignment. In particular, it is evident that the Yemeni Government’s rejection and criminalisation of pro-change protesters is not reflective of broader social constructions of right and wrong.

Deviance theory, nonetheless, applies to more traditional conceptualisations of crime in Yemen, whereby acts of violence and sexual deviance in particular can lead to the rejection of individuals by their communities. Such broad rejection of social deviancy is traditionally associated within criminal literature with moral panics – the demonisation within law, cultures and the media of individuals or groups who act in contradiction to dominant moral values.

In Yemen, such values can be found to differ substantially depending upon the region in which communities are located, their tribal and religious identities, political affiliations and economic prosperity. These radical distinctions make Yemen an extremely difficult state to police and administer, with individual areas of the country implementing and administering their own alternative laws and justice proceedings<sup>120</sup>. Under such circumstances, it is extremely easy for young people, migrants and other vulnerable groups to become mislabelled as social deviants and locked into patterns of criminal behaviour, though the regional specificity of their interactions with communities and state officials would seem to imply that it is difficult to generalise about the applicability of broad social control theories within the country as a whole.

#### **4.3.2 Social Learning Theory**


Social learning theory posits that, particularly during childhood, individuals can learn new information and new modes of behaviour by watching other people interact with their environments. As Stephen W. Verrill summarises, the theory is used to explain “minor forms of juvenile offending and substance use” in the developed world, though it has partially accounted for broader offences, including “illegal computer behaviour”, “intimate partner violence” and “digital piracy” (2008, p. 2). Social learning has applications for violent offending, particularly among children and young people, and could be used to help to generate theories of violent young offending in fragile states.

While its foundational concept seems relatively straightforward, social learning theory provides the backbone of much criminological study, in terms of understanding both criminogenic risk factors and elements of social control. It establishes that children and young people learn about

---

<sup>120</sup> See Chapter 5.

drug use and other commodities through association with peers, that children learn aggression and violent modes of behaviour from their families, communities and school environments, and that people learn to conceptualise morality and “right and wrong” from general modes of behaviour common to their societies.



**Figure 58 Social Learning Theory and the Learning of Violent Behaviour Through Observation**

Such theories of social learning are associated with Albert Bandura, who officially pioneered the idea in 1973. In its contemporary form, social learning theory is also connected with Ronald L. Akers's theory of differential reinforcement and association (1977). This theory posits that “The primary learning mechanism in social behaviour is operant (instrumental) conditioning in which behaviour is shaped by the stimuli which follow, or are consequences of the behaviour”, rather than by behaviour itself (Akers *et al*, 1979, p. 637-638). Social learning is a type of mimicry, whereby behaviour is observed and copied by onlookers based upon its consequences, rather than upon the actions of which that behaviour is comprised. It is the combined observation of action and consequence that determines the type of behaviour learned by the observer (See Figure 58).

In this way, “Social behaviour is acquired both through direct conditioning and through imitation or modelling of others' behaviour” so that “Behaviour is strengthened through reward (positive reinforcement) and avoidance of punishment (negative reinforcement) or weakened by aversive stimuli (positive punishment) and loss of reward (negative punishment)” (p. 638).

This thesis argues that, within fragile states where both social and military violence are generally widespread, children and young people readily observe the reward of violent behaviour committed by those who are more socially and physically powerful than they are, without witnessing those individuals receiving any immediate punishment because state and law enforcement capacities are too weak to detect such offences. This has led to the emergence of a new glorification

of violence within Yemeni society among young people and new generations in particular<sup>121</sup>. In this way, children are pressured into learning aggressive and antisocial modes of behaviour through the observation of such behaviour in adults and other children without any negative consequences, whereby the perpetrators of violence are readily and frequently rewarded for their actions with physical and economic gains. As Akers summarises: “Whether deviant or conforming behaviour is acquired and persists depends on past and present rewards or punishments for the behaviour and the rewards and punishments attached to alternative behaviour” – a statement that provides the entire basis of differential reinforcement.

Social learning also ties into other forms of social control. In particular, it has been proposed that social learning is strongly reinforced by communal constructions of right and wrong, so that if important individuals who exert a strong social influence on children and young people openly and directly reject a form of antisocial behaviour, this may, in some cases, be sufficient to stem delinquency in individuals, despite the perceived benefits of aggressive behaviour models. Likewise, delinquent peers who perceive criminal behaviour patterns as necessary or positive can reinforce the negative effects of social learning by providing another form of reward for antisocial behaviour – increased social standing for individuals within groups.

This method of entrenching harmful behaviour patterns is most commonly observed in the developed world within gang culture, where criminal activity is used by children and young people to generate “street cred” and rise to higher organisational levels within criminal networks (Simon Harding, 2011). In Yemen, it may also be associated with protecting tribal interests, defending property rights, or protecting family reputations, as it is in cases of violence committed against the state, violence committed through the resolution of land and water disputes, and violence committed in the pursuit of justice and honour killings respectively. It is found that retributive violence in Yemen is highly prevalent, where revenge killings are seen as socially acceptable in a range of criminal circumstances (*Stakeholder Interview, Ministry of Justice, 17 August 2011*). In this way, “Behaviour is said to be reinforced when repeated episodes are met with a response by others that influences the actor to engage in the behaviour again under similar circumstances” (Teresa Vigil Bäckström *et al*, 1994, p. 149). Social learning theory may be viewed as contradicting deviance theory, however both theories actually work relatively nicely in tandem. It should be noted that, while deviance theory analyses criminal behaviour patterns and the construction of criminal identities as a product of the broad social rejection of offenders through labelling, social learning refers to the acceptance of such individuals within criminal sub-groups or oppositional cultures buried inside larger societies.

### **4.3.3 Theories of Legitimacy and Cooperation**

Theories of legitimacy and cooperation within social control stem largely from the works of Jeffrey Fagan and Tom R. Tyler<sup>122</sup>, in which the authors argue that perceptions of state and law enforcement legitimacy strongly impact the extent to which individuals are willing to cooperate with and obey the law. Equally, it is argued that civilian cooperation with law enforcement is a basic pre-

---

<sup>121</sup> See section 6.5 on ‘The Situation of Children and Young People in Yemen’.

<sup>122</sup> See Chapter 1, section 1.3 on this thesis’ ‘Theoretical Approach’, for a more extensive overview of Fagan and Tyler’s work.

requisite of effective crime control systems. In the context of fragile states, this line of reasoning stands to have huge implications for the criminological environment because fragile states are generally defined specifically by their lack of authority and legitimacy<sup>123</sup>, and many are affected by a severe distrust of police forces<sup>124</sup>.

Lack of faith in law enforcement services in Yemen is characterised by an outright refusal to report criminal offences to the police, a tendency that dominated among both pro-change and pro-government supporters alike in interviews and surveys conducted in 2011 and 2012<sup>125</sup>. If the goal of this thesis is “normative” – as defined by John Baylis *et al*, whereby the object of political study is to put forward solutions to political problems (2011), – then it could be argued that increasing police legitimacy should be seen as a top priority in the study of crime in fragile states, because, as Fagan and Tyler argue:

To be effective in lowering crime and creating secure communities, the police must be able to elicit cooperation from community residents. Security cannot be produced by either the police or community residents acting alone – it requires cooperation. Such cooperation potentially involves, on the part of the public, both obeying the law and working with the police or others in the community to help combat crime in the community. (2008, p. 231)

The purpose of legitimacy and cooperation theories is to identify and address the social, political and economic factors that impact perceptions of law enforcement services among communities, so that it might be possible to identify conduits for the improvement of police-community relations.

The greatest limitation of such theories in fragile contexts is not their lack of applicability but rather their low potential for physical impact, whereby the reinstatement of the kind of community-police relationship that they recommend would require such a massive expansion of policing capacity and such an extensive reform of law enforcement services that it would be impossible to implement any meaningful initiative without a phenomenal financial contribution by foreign donors. This would be extremely difficult to organise, bearing in mind that from a multi-sectoral perspective, fragile states tend to be hugely “under-funded” overall (David Carment *et al*, 2008), leading to a prioritisation of development assistance to other, more immediate, structural needs over policing ones. Aid provision to police forces tends to be limited to personnel training or personnel substitution with international forces, rather than addressing capacity expansion. Having said this, it is worth spending some time understanding theories of legitimacy and cooperation in order to gain a more accurate picture of criminological environments in fragile states.

Fagan and Tyler argue that there are two distinct branches of legitimacy and cooperation theory, which are embodied by the social control or instrumental model and the legitimacy or social norms model respectively. Both are inherently concerned with the behaviour and motivations of the individual in society.

---

<sup>123</sup> For a more extensive overview of definitions of state fragility, see Chapter 6, section 6.3.

<sup>124</sup> Police-community distrust is particularly visible in Yemen, as will be argued in Chapter 5, section 5.2.4.

<sup>125</sup> See Chapters 1 and 2, sections 1.5 and 3.2 on ‘Data Sources’, and section 1.7.2 on ‘Telephone Interviews and Online Surveys’, for an overview of crime reporting and recording restrictions in Yemen.

The instrumental model draws heavily from theories of social control in reading the individual as a self-interested actor who makes value-based decisions while determining the methods through which they will strive to achieve an objective. Therefore, the instrumental model reads the individual as a rational and self-interested actor, who chooses to cooperate with the police only if the police are able to demonstrate their effectiveness as a crime-fighting organisation. This model posits that the individual cooperates with the police if cooperation offers “greater personal utility” than a failure to cooperate (p. 231). It fits nicely with survey and interview data presented in Chapter 1, where the majority of Yemenis who said that they would not turn to the police for assistance if they fell victim to crime also justified their answers by stating that the police would likely fail to help them even if they did ask for aid. In other words, those Yemenis interviewed tended not to expect any personal utility from cooperation with the police and thus chose not to cooperate at all.

This analysis falls in line with Fagan and Tyler's framework, through which they argue that: “Unfortunately, from the instrumental perspective, it is in some people's short-term self-interest to break rather than obey the law”, and that “Cooperation with law enforcement agencies and other legal actors follows suit” (pp. 231-232). A tendency towards non-cooperation, they theorise, is only natural in any context where “some people may see little immediate personal utility in supporting police efforts to control crime, reporting crimes and criminals, or helping in community efforts to fight crime” (p. 232). This is found to be the case in Yemen, where corruption within police structures is speculated to be rampant, where tribal structures can be found to be far more powerful than state ones, and where regular revenge killings and incidents of street justice demonstrate that individuals consider formal justice systems to be virtually irrelevant<sup>126</sup>.

It is for these reasons that Fagan and Tyler add a secondary control dimension, the social norms model, which serves to explain the prevalence of at least some police-community cooperation in the developed world and other contexts.

The social norms model of legitimacy and cooperation theory, similarly to those social control theories that strive to document the connection between belief and behaviour, argues that people obey the law because they perceive the law to be representative of dominant moral and social norms, and therefore view the law as being legitimate. Yet Fagan and Tyler speculate that legitimacy not only produces a sense of obligation to obey the law, but also a duty to “defer to decisions made by legal authorities” (p. 233), and it is this control aspect that is largely missing in fragile states because, although some laws may compliment dominant belief systems, there is little acceptance of the law's official enforcers among Yemeni communities, particularly in the South and in Northern peripheries.

This lack of acceptance is most likely linked not only to the poor capacity of police services and allegations of police corruption in Yemen, but also to the politicisation of police services through their absorption of additional government-support roles that go far beyond the remits of controlling crime. The police have been used as a repressive tool to stem the expression of oppositional politics, where they have been made to arrest opposition leaders and disband protesters, and where they have been instructed to deny family members access to information about political prisoners. However, this lack of acceptance is also linked to the severe de-legitimisation of the police through

---

<sup>126</sup> See Chapter 5.

rampant corruption, with one Yemeni survey respondent writing that he does not cooperate with security services because: “You need to pay the police money to get them to do anything for you so unless you have the money it would be useless to try to approach them for anything” (May, 2011).




Figure 59 Instrumental Factors and Social Norms Necessary to Generate Cooperation with Law Enforcement Services at the Community Level

It has been found through interviews and surveys conducted by the author that there is confusion on the ground in Yemen about the separation of military and policing services, with the police frequently observed as losing their impartiality by working towards military objectives rather than merely striving to protect civilians. This disruption of traditional police roles can be connected directly to the loss of legitimacy of law enforcement services, as well as to a corresponding loss of legitimacy by the state, and a reduction in police-community cooperation. Within this context, it is important to note that this phenomenon is equally attributable to Yemen's very poor history of policing, where many of the peripheral areas of the country have had virtually no contact with police services since the formation of the state and have rather come to associate armed personnel in uniform with the threat of military conflict<sup>127</sup>.

<sup>127</sup> These issues shall be expanded upon further in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, where the issue of law enforcement and law enforcement in Yemen will become a central theme of the main argument of this thesis, so that theories of legitimacy and cooperation will form one of the key analytical tools for discussing crime in fragile states. For the time being, it is sufficient to note that while these theories are normally used to explain why people obey the law and cooperate with police services in the developed world, it is their clear lack of applicability to fragile states as social control mechanisms that offers the biggest clue about why law enforcement services in fragile states tend to fail so remarkably to ensure even the most basic level of public safety.

## 4.4 Conclusion

While the theories of crime causation and social control analysed within this chapter have far reaching applications for fragile states, it is clear that some element of adaptation is required of them in such contexts and that some theories have proven themselves to be significantly more adaptable than others, with cultural and tribal dynamics proving to be particularly difficult to integrate. However, several other conditions of criminological theories and their interactions with state fragility are extremely important to keep in mind in this regard.

To begin with, criminogenic risk factors that have been identified as influential within the developed world are significantly more common in fragile states and it is not at all clear what the theoretical implications of their high availability and interactions may be. Of further consideration is that, being based within the developed world, some criminogenic risk factors identified by crime causation literature, including school, labour market, judicial and policing risk factors, make far too many assumptions about the stability of the local environment, so that it is expected by such theories that most children are in school, that labour markets are generally legislated and that law enforcement services hold at least some limited control over society.

While these risk factors still have much to bear on the socio-political environment of fragile states, the comparatively more abstract nature of social control theories renders them more flexible within diverse developmental contexts than theories of crime causation. This body of literature fits more broadly into theories of social disintegration, which target a readily observable phenomenon present in both fragile states and economically deprived areas of the developed world to varying degrees – the effect of the disintegration of communities and the built environment on crime. Yet the overly general nature of social control theories fails to take into account the specific tensions that exist between elite and communal constructions of crime, as well as the importance of localised value systems that prioritise religious ethics or tribal affiliations, for instance, over national and state-based conceptions of morality.

Social disintegration theory, when combined with understandings of social control, may hold the key to understanding the relationship between crime and fragility. As Kerry Carrington argues:

Like strain theory, social disintegration theory views crime largely as a product of social processes, specifically within a context of social disorder, inequality and change. This perspective expands the idea ... that rapid social change is associated with increases in crime, due to a break down of social controls (2009, p. 43).

According to Carrington, within the developed world, social disintegration theory is used to explain why high rates of delinquency are associated with geographic areas that are “characterised by transient populations of immigrant settlement, severe economic hardship, physical deterioration of housing stock, high levels of poverty and high rates of crime and delinquency” (p. 43).

Yet while social disintegration theory has logically been associated with urbanised areas within the developed world – as these are the areas that experience the most rapid levels of social change in countries that are not affected by internal war – it is easy to see how its implications might be applied to fragile states both in urban and rural settings. After all, fragile states experience social disintegration on a prolonged and sustained basis, aggravated by sudden and unanticipated events

that include man-made and natural disasters. It is within periods of social disintegration that other criminogenic risk factors are normally aggravated and that social controls become eroded.

These are issues that will be analysed and further contextualised in the next Chapter, which will provide more information on Yemeni systems of crime prevention and social control. What has begun to emerge as a very strong issue in Chapter 4, is the degree to which localised phenomena are important in determining the development of criminological environments in fragile states, and particularly in Yemen, which will lead to a broader investigation of whether or not it is possible at all to use fragility to link contexts together in order to produce unifying theoretical approaches to youth aggression. A key theme of this exploration is the degree to which cultural specificities should be analysed as an additional dynamic within studies of crime.

## Chapter 5: Yemeni Systems of Crime Prevention and Control

### 5.1 Introduction

The criminological theories over-viewed in Chapter 4 suggest that crime prevention and control systems may be contributing to the criminological environment of Yemen. These observations and their implications for intervention necessitate further questions in order to build a more complete picture of crime causation in this particular context. In the case of Yemen, it is necessary to ask what the existent crime prevention and crime control systems are, and what their impact upon the offending population is with regards to whether or not they serve as controls or contributors for violent criminal behaviour. Placing an emphasis on justice and judicial processes, and based upon the theoretical framework established in this thesis, Chapter 5 will look at existing interventions into young offending in Yemen in order to evaluate the capacity and effectiveness of Yemen's crime control and crime response systems, and to get a better insight into the crime-control-based challenges that may be affecting fragile states.

Generally speaking, there are three systems of crime control and social intervention that are worth noting in Yemen from a youth offending perspective. These include: official state crime response services that fall under the control of the Yemeni justice system; informal tribal justice processes and communal self-administration; and, facilities and activities designed to increase the social integration and socialisation of would-be offenders. As part of the evaluation of Yemeni justice systems, it is important to understand the Yemeni legal system as the operational language of justice in the country, as well as Yemeni justice structures and court systems, and justice processes, including the provisions set in place for the prosecution of vulnerable offenders like children and young people. Law enforcement services and local perceptions of law enforcement services will be analysed here to assess procedural fairness and the legitimacy of existing justice systems.

As representatives of the state, it is necessary to determine the role that police services play in either affirming or negating the authority and legitimacy of the state. Any conclusions drawn about communal perceptions of law enforcement services will be supported not only by extensive reading and research, but also by telephone interviews and the anonymous surveys circulated online in 2011<sup>128</sup>.

The Yemeni prison system will also bear evaluation. It should be noted here that such an assessment will likely be fairly limited due to the poor accessibility of state prisons in Yemen to outsiders and the even more problematic accessibility of private detention facilities run by wealthy individuals, and by tribal and religious leaders. These issues will be outlined to some extent in section 5.2.5.

---

<sup>128</sup> See Chapter 1, section 1.7.2, for an overview of survey and distance research findings.



**Figure 60 Yemeni Police Officers Patrolling Busy Market Square, Sana'a, Historic City Centre**

The assessment of state justice processes will be supplemented by a parallel assessment of tribalism and self-administration. These are judged to be important structures that both contribute towards and inhibit the course of the rule of law and the implementation of security in Yemen. Yemen's tribes have acted as a support network for the state<sup>129</sup>, and their hierarchies and organisational subdivisions will be explored in more detail here. The tribes have also frequently contested the authority of the state and many have developed their own approaches to justice and criminality through centuries of cultural evolution. These customary laws and traditional mediation processes or informal justice systems are at times subsidised and encouraged, and at others actively disparaged by the Yemeni state, depending on their origins, or on shifts in national political climates. Though confusing at the best of times, these systems remain central to the Yemeni way of life, particularly in the North of the country where they are more prominent than official judicial services. It should be noted here that the Yemeni justice system does not exist or operate in isolation, and that patronage networks abound here as they do in all other sectors of Yemeni society.

## **5.2 The Yemeni Justice System**

Representing a merger of conflicting legal systems, brought about through years of partition and occupation, the Yemeni justice system is extremely complex, offering a challenge for legal practitioners, as well as for outsiders seeking to understand its inner workings. This section will attempt to shed some light upon these nuances. By focusing on the structure and operation of Yemeni judicial structures, it may inadvertently obscure the reality that these structures have extremely little physical impact on the country. Yemen's justice system, much like the rest of the state's infrastructure, is a victim of the state's fragility, so that its capacities have remained extremely weak since the country's formation in 1990.

---

<sup>129</sup> This has already been outlined in Chapter 2, which provided an in-depth context analysis of Yemen.

Over the past decade, and particularly since 2005, the United Nations Development Project, working with a wide variety of international donors and with the Yemeni Government itself, has made an extensive consolidated effort to improve the country's justice system in an attempt to increase or restore governmental legitimacy through a restoration of the rule of law (*Stakeholder Consultations, United Nations Development Project, 14 August, 2010, and Ministry of Justice, 17 August, 2010*).

In practice, many Yemeni people remain beyond the reach of official law enforcement systems, possessing little knowledge or awareness of such services. Nevertheless, the Yemeni Ministry of Justice and corresponding law enforcement services are rapidly expanding organisations that bear close monitoring and analysis from both a criminological and a development perspective. This expansion has been undercut and disrupted in light of the political events of 2011 and 2012, though it is a continuing priority to the Friends of Yemen Group and large international donors, meaning that it will, no doubt, emerge as a significant policy objective in the coming years (*Expert Consultation, Nicholas Hopton, 20 July, 2012*).

### **5.2.1 Laws**

The body of Yemen's state laws is referred to as *qânûn* – a word that is understood to represent a system of laws administered by a Muslim sovereign, or a body of laws that is distinct from Sharia or Islamic law though mindful of these principles (*Stakeholder Consultation, Ministry of Justice, 17 August, 2010*). Today, *qânûn*-based legal systems are most commonly associated with the Ottoman Empire, where they were largely used to supplement Islamic law and to legitimise the position of Ottoman administrative structures in various geographic territories. These systems of justice and administration were introduced to North Yemen under Ottoman leadership and have remained, in a large part, the foundation of contemporary justice procedures in the country. The International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) note that Yemen's "legal framework for delivering justice and security is based on an array of English common law, Turkish law, and Sharia law", whereby legal gaps emerging from the unification of North and South Yemen in 1990 have been supplemented by Egyptian laws (2010, p. 10). Yemen's contemporary *qânûn* system is, therefore, quite distinct from those that came before it, displaying an odd synthesis of pre-existing judicial structures emerging from the dissolution of an Islamic republic in the North and a communist state in the South of the country. As a result, ISSAT write that Yemeni laws are poorly catered overall to the specific needs of the local context, sidestepping important local values or being misinterpreted by implementers of the law.

Scholars are known to disagree on the degree to which these contradictions inhibit the functionality of the Yemeni judicial system, though there is regular recorded confusion among legal practitioners over the jurisprudence of competing systems, as noted by Elobaid Ahmed Elobaid (2010). In Yemen today, significant tensions remain between state, customary, and Islamic legal frameworks based on Sharia law. In particular, there exists considerable confusion over the incorporation of human rights-based legislation into existing legal systems, at the request and insistence of the international community, which is easily observable in interviews, even at the elite level. At the practitioner level, Noha el-Mikawi reports that even at Universities, legal professors are

not always clear about whether or not international conventions supersede national and Islamic laws in rulings (2005, p. 42).

Yemen has ratified over fifty international law-making conventions, including seven of the nine major human rights conventions recognised by the international community (*see Table 10*) (Elobaid, 2010, p. 6). Each of these conventions is meant to occupy a supreme position in the domestic legal systems of any state that recognises them. They are intended to create positive legal rights, which are protected by law.

<b>Human Rights Convention</b>	<b>Date of Global Entry into Force</b>	<b>Date of Ratification by Yemen</b>
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination	04/01/1969	18/10/1972
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	03/01/1976	09/02/1987
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	23/03/1976	09/02/1987
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women	03/09/1981	30/05/1984
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	26/01/1987	05/11/1991
Convention on the Rights of the Child	02/09/1990	01/05/1991
Convention on Migrant Workers	01/07/2003	Not a state party
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	03/05/2008	26/03/2009
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance	Not yet in force	Not yet a state party

**Table 10 Ratification Status of Human Rights Conventions in Yemen**

In conjunction with these documents, Yemen's constitution, as drafted in 1990, guarantees equal rights to all citizens. However, it explicitly states in Article 3 that Islamic law is to remain the highest body of regulation in the country, which means in practice that women's rights are significantly undermined in the course of legal proceedings, particularly with regard to family rights and property law (ISSAT, 2010, p. 10).

Issues of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments are often ignored in practice, while instances of forced labour and child recruitment into the armed forces continue to undermine Yemen's commitment to human rights principles (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Yemeni laws and legislation are frequently riddled with contradictions, which are, thanks to a legacy of

British common law systems in the South, left to the discretion of judges to resolve. The legally-binding decisions of judges in the North and South of the country are sometimes quite different from one another, based on competing tribal and religious values, leading to poor consistency and reliability within legal frameworks throughout the country (*Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations Development Project, 14 August, 2010*).

Yemen's laws are divided into four bodies, which deal with criminal, morality, political and civil matters separately (though it is worth noting that morality offences are often tried as criminal actions) (Central Statistical Organisation, 2010).

Criminal law deals specifically with criminal offences, including property offences and violent crimes, which are the focus of this thesis.

Morality law, which overlaps with criminal law, is more concerned with public order and decency, including offences against religious or cultural values. This body of law is drawn most closely from Sharia law and is used to prosecute minor incidents of misconduct (such as public drunkenness) or more serious family offences, including adultery. It is worth noting here that despite the incorporation of morality offences into the Yemeni legal system, the Yemeni Government does not officially condone the more extreme forms of punishment enshrined in Islamic law, such as honour killings, though these are often implemented nonetheless within families or tribal structures (*Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations Population Fund, 14 August, 2010*).

Political laws are those to which proponents of human rights in Yemen object most strongly. They are used not only to prosecute acts of insurgency and terrorism, but also to pressure opposition groups and inhibit the functionality of a free press in Yemen (*Expert Consultation, Maysaa Shujaaldeen, 7 March, 2012*). Offences committed against public officials, including attacks on members of law enforcement and military services are dealt with under the umbrella of political offences.

Finally, the civil law systems are left to deal with all remaining grievances and disputes relating to property, land, family rights, business and so on. This is the most rapidly growing branch of Yemeni law<sup>130</sup>.

According to the author's observations and anonymous expert consultations, the incorporation of tribal values and common law practices into the legal system tends to mean that all four bodies of law are treated more as informal guidelines for behaviour management than as strict legal systems, and they can be ignored by both average citizens and public officials in favour of generating or maintaining patronage networks. Corruption remains a huge problem in this sense, as does a lack of even coverage and awareness of different rights and protection systems.

The Ministry of Human Rights, among other government institutions, has been tasked with harmonising Yemeni legislation. Their work is impeded because: "Yemen does not have a designated institution tasked with overall law reform activities", while its Ministry of Legal Affairs is charged

---

<sup>130</sup> The Yemeni Government has prioritised the development of a legal framework to protect and encourage foreign and local investment in the country over the past five years, in order to improve their ranking in the World Bank's annual *Doing Business* report series, along with other similar indexes and publications (*Stakeholder Consultation, Ministry of Justice, 17 August, 2010*).

only with: “ensuring that laws are properly revised and modernized” so that “many reform activities are reduced to simplistic attempts at drafting new codes and/or alternative positions” (Elobaid, 2010, p. 8). Though these and other reform-based activities are judged to be an extremely positive move for addressing inconsistencies within Yemeni laws, the basic challenge for Yemen's legal system is implementation. There is a great need for capacity building in the Ministry of Justice, increased monitoring and evaluation of judicial staff, and better and more rigorous training programmes for legal professionals (*Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations Development Project, 14 August, 2010*).

From a criminogenic perspective, the design of Yemen's legal system may be causing some serious challenges in terms of violent crime prevention. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, confusion over the legal system and uncertainty over the way in which it is applied mean that Yemeni laws are inherently difficult to follow. Issues relating to accidental transgression are likely to be relatively common, particularly when it comes to violent behaviour within homes or communities, whereby a lack of awareness and education on the illegality of physical abuse could mean that low-level confrontations with the potential for serious escalation would not be perceived as being punishable by the law, removing the preventive impact of criminal laws.

Secondly, a lack of uniform application of the laws throughout the country allows emphasis to be placed on different elements of criminal law, depending upon the implementing governorate. This confusion is compounded both within given areas where multiple judges preside, for instance, and at a national level when individuals begin to move from area to area.

Thirdly, and more importantly, the laws of Yemen, due in part to the country's extremely wide variety of tribal, cultural, religious and localised identities, do not reflect the value systems of those whose behaviour they strive to regulate. The integration of human rights principles into Yemeni legal codes often conflicts with local understandings of morality or is insufficient to reflect liberal principles adopted by proponents of equality.

Where dispute resolution and familial relationships are concerned, blood feuds and revenge and honour killings that are made illegal by the law tend to be considered by communities to be outside the remits of the state's interference. They represent personal matters that necessitate a violent course of action, even if such actions risk incurring formal sanctions. The state's involvement in such cases succeeds only in alienating local communities and contributes to the regeneration of on-going civil conflicts.

To return briefly to the social control and legitimacy and cooperation theories outlined in Chapter 4, there can be little expectation that a community will obey the law if there is a high probability that transgressions will not be punished and if the laws themselves are not representative of people's belief systems. The Yemeni legal system, while it may eventually become part of the solution, currently represents part of the problem. This is an observation likely to be applicable to all other fragile states where legal education is either low or uneven, where social fragmentation represents conflicting moral valuation systems, and where the state's capacity to raise awareness on fundamental legal principles at a community level is lacking. These challenges trickle down to the implementation level, where they are compounded by problems relating to law enforcement capacities or create new challenges that affect the overall functioning of the Ministry of Justice as shall be argued in the following subsections.

### 5.2.2 Judicial Structures

Yemen's processes of governance are divided between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. All three bodies are overseen by the Yemeni president to varying degrees, leading to significant concerns by international observers over issues relating to the separation of powers. John Locke theorised as far back as 1690 in his *Second Treaties on Civil Government* that a separation of powers is an essential element of democracy. To this day, it is called for in any state seeking to ensure procedural fairness, so that those who make the law ought not to be the same parties who implement the law and judge transgressors of the law within an accountable system.

The Yemeni legislature, the law-making branch of the Yemeni Government, is comprised on paper of the ruling parties, including all members of any coalitions. From 1990 through to 2011, it was overseen by the General People's Congress, as headed by President Saleh, with many other relevant stakeholders, like the Yemeni Socialist Party and Islah, being relegated to a subservient position (*Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations Development Project, 14 August, 2010*). This ruling order was reflected likewise in the other two branches of governance, leading observers to label Yemen as an authoritarian, rather than a democratic regime.

According to ISSAT, the legislature comprises the Presidium (that is, four members of Parliament elected by an absolute majority within the House of Representatives), the executive secretariat (led by the Secretary General, a position that is selected directly by the Yemeni President), twenty standing committees, and a consultative Shura Council, which is also a member of the executive, reflecting a balance of political and tribal governing bodies (2010, pp. 14-15). It is charged with creating the laws that govern the lives of Yemeni citizens. The implementation and interpretation of those laws is, allegedly, left to the executive and the judiciary.

While the latter forms the focus of this section, Yemen's judiciary is rarely able to operate as independently as this division should allow. In practice, neither the legislature nor the judiciary are fully independent from the executive, with all three branches being tightly controlled by Yemen's ruling elite. In particular, no analysis of the judiciary in Yemen is complete without an appraisal of its strong connection to the executive, which has proven to be a major point of contention for both citizens and implementers of the law in the 2011-2012 revolutionary period (*Expert Consultation, Atiaf Alwazir, 5 June, 2012*).

Generally, the executive is understood to form the administrative and operating face of the Yemeni government. In this sense, it is responsible for implementing Yemeni laws. From a judicial and law enforcement standpoint, ISSAT see the most relevant members of the Yemeni executive to comprise the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Human Rights (sometimes referred to in Government reports as the Council of Human Rights), and the Ministry of Finance. The presence of the Ministry of Justice on this list is problematic within a democratic system from a "separation of powers" point of view, as the executive, like the legislature, is ultimately under the control of the Presidium.

In practice, the Ministry of Justice is directly responsible for supervising judges (*Stakeholder Consultation, Ministry of Justice, 17 August, 2010*). According to ISSAT, it is also responsible for creating laws pertaining to the operations and management of the judicial system, meaning that the

Ministry of Justice at times holds triple legislative, executive and judiciary roles within the governance system: not an altogether uncommon phenomenon among global judicial institutions.

Causes for concern stem from the fact that the Judicial Inspection Authority, which is responsible for evaluating the performance of judicial structures like Yemen's court system, is based within the Ministry of Justice. Although ISSAT write that the Inspection Authority is not involved in assessing what they term to be “disciplinary matters”, these are administered by the Supreme Judicial Council, which is also based within the Ministry of Justice.

These and other concerns have led to the formation of the Justice, Rule of Law and Security Working Group of the Friends of Yemen, who have worked in close contact with the United Nations Development Project and the Government of Yemen to reform the Yemeni justice system in order to ensure the independence of both the judiciary and the Ministry of Justice (*Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations Development Project, 14 August, 2010*). Much of this work was put on hold during the Arab Spring protests in 2011, when international aid programmes designed to provide direct support to the Yemeni state were frozen (Eyder Peralta, 2011). In 2013, the main obstacles preventing real reform revolve around a significant lack of finances. Corruption and resulting donor reluctance to invest in the Ministry of Justice have led to a prioritisation of personnel-training-oriented programming by international stakeholders above capacity enhancement and personnel recruitment. Additionally, the absence of a single agency tasked with the reform of Yemen's laws and judicial structures leads to bureaucratic stalling and confusion for any programmes that encapsulate more ambitious aims, impeding the conversion of available funds into useful and visible outputs.

Bureaucratic obstacles to reform stem from the extremely complex and confusing composition of Yemen's legislative, judiciary and executive branches of state, which comprise multiple and conflicting roles when it comes to justice design and implementation<sup>131</sup>. Ideological divides are visible in the application of justice in central *versus* peripheral regions of Yemen; in urban *versus* rural areas; and, in sectors under the control of competing tribal interests. Some of these difficulties emerge from the continuing political divide between North and South Yemen, with the two territories yet to be successfully unified in their perceptions of different cultural value systems. The conflict between these two rose to the fore in 2011 and again in 2012, so that much judicial reform was put on hold while overall control over the state was restored. A failure to instigate reforms immediately after the 2011 Arab Spring led to the rise of Yemen's “Revolution of the Institutions” in 2012, where slow processes of reform and a governmental failure to address accusations of top-level corruption effectively led to nation-wide strikes in military, healthcare, education, and judicial sectors, with judges' strikes closing down many of Yemen's courts completely in May of that year (Ahmed Dawood, 2012).

Much like Yemen's laws, Yemen's court system retains signs that it once operated within two different states. The country's two pre-existing court systems were integrated through the 1990 Law on Judicial Power. New structures retain elements of both systems. However, it can be argued that they were integrated more thoroughly than Yemen's laws in this sense, with clashes and contradictions seemingly less apparent. These competing systems are observable in descriptions offered by authors like Nathan J. Brown, who writes that:

---

<sup>131</sup> This has already been outlined in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 of this Chapter.

Yemen's judicial structure is unusual (though not unique) in three respects: first, Islamic jurisprudence plays a larger role in legal and judicial training than in most other Arab states. Second, the judiciary is unusually unified; Yemen does not have the series of specialized courts that has arisen in many Arab countries. Third, the executive branch has a strong presence in the Supreme Judicial Council, though there has been some promise of reform to enhance judicial independence. (2010)

While portraying the judicial system as being highly integrated, his assessment of the judiciary as being “unusually unified” speaks to the artificiality of the system and, in this sense, to its youth. Its reliance upon Islamic jurisprudence as well as the strong interest that the executive retains over its internal processes are indicative of the level of Northern cultural and political dominance over the higher organisational levels of Yemeni justice systems.

Stated reliance upon Islamic principles in judicial training above socialist or liberal values form a rejection of the South's communist history, creating a barrier against the proliferation of Western rights-based values despite Yemen's stated commitment to these goals. The executive's continued interference in judicial processes (the executive itself having been comprised of, until 2011, primarily Northern representatives) indicates the presence of a strong institutional paranoia relating to who has ultimate control over judging and sentencing transgressors of the law, and controlling the labelling and punishing of social and political deviance. This meant that, in 2012, judicial independence from the executive was a central theme of judicial strikes. Given Yemen's complex history and cultural identity, the characteristics described by Brown become less random in appearance and more purposeful.

While Brown writes that Yemen has few specialised court structures, the country retains the primary expected subdivisions within its judicial organisation. The Yemeni court system is divided between three tiers according to superiority. First instance or *ibtida'iyya* courts operate at the local level (though they are quite scarce due to infrastructure and capacity limitations), appeals courts operate at the district or governorate level, and the Supreme Court operates at a national level (*Stakeholder Consultation, Ministry of Justice, 17 August, 2010*).

The first instance courts provide a first point of contact for Yemeni citizens who enter the court system, while the appeals court has the power to overrule disputed cases and the Supreme Court has a final say on all judgements. In parallel to this, according to Brown, the Supreme Court is also responsible for trying high officials, passing judgement on interpretations of the constitution, determining the outcome of jurisdictional disputes in the justice system, and adjudicating election disputes – each of which has been used as a justification for increased independence of the judiciary from the executive.

Following on from this, it should be understood that Yemen has no strictly defined specialised courts that are separated according to trial types or bodies of law. Such a court system is prohibited by the Yemeni constitution due to its potential for political abuse. The Yemeni judiciary deals with issues pertaining to juvenile offending and other targeted areas through specialised chambers within the established court system.

No understanding of the Yemeni judicial sector is complete without an appreciation for the fact that the Government of Yemen also allows for “other forms of dispute resolution” to run in

parallel to this central system<sup>132</sup> (Laila al-Zwaini, 2006, p. 2). Thus Yemen's tribal tapestry is informally integrated into judicial processes, though allegedly “only insofar as these are consistent with the officially prescribed rules and procedures” of the Yemeni courts (2006, p. 2). Such informal justice systems often fail to follow procedural restrictions and are poorly administered by the state.

Evidence from stakeholder interviews conducted at the Ministry of Justice (17 August, 2010) indicates that Yemeni citizens were beginning to rely on civil courts as a tool for dispute resolution through official channels in mid-2010. However, the state's traditional manipulation of the judiciary as a tool for political repression, as well as the Ministry's heavy integration into the political tapestry of Yemeni governance, has led to a compromising of its independence and of its appearance of neutrality. The constitutional prohibition of specialised courts has inadvertently meant that the entire court system is implicated in the sentencing of political criminals in specialised chambers. Allegations of corruption and prolonged trial processing times caused by poor capacity and – most recently – protracted strikes have led to increased frustration with the judiciary among the general population. These concerns bring doubt about the general legitimacy and accountability of judicial structures in the country, so that instances of Yemeni citizens taking justice into their own hands and regenerating cycles of conflict in land, water and honour disputes might suggest linkages to the overall failure of judicial systems to inspire confidence as a tool for mainstream peaceful dispute resolution.

### 5.2.3 The Justice Process

The poor capacity and low level of personnel in judicial structures in Yemen are reflected in the functionality of the country's justice process, which can prove to be slow and confusing for those who enter into it. For violent young offending, this has meant that the country has been slow in developing effective protection mechanisms for juvenile delinquents (though these have repeatedly been highlighted by the Ministry of Justice as a priority area for future service expansion). High fertility rates, an emerging youth bulge, and poor levels of birth registration make this task more difficult. The Ministry currently has neither the capacity nor the capability to properly identify and process this largest segment of society in specialised chambers and through targeted justice processes. The difficulty of proving one's age, combined with the huge incentive of diminished sentencing for doing so (with harsher penalties like the death penalty being prohibited for minors), adds to the general stress and lack of accessibility of the justice process for young people (*Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, 15 August, 2010*).

As the Interagency Panel on Juvenile Justice (IPJJ) summarise, an absence of targeted response capacity within juvenile justice sectors leads to a corresponding lack of data that is:

relevant to the administration of juvenile justice, and necessary for the development, implementation and evaluation of policies and programmes aiming at the prevention and effective responses to juvenile delinquency (2011).

---

<sup>132</sup> This will be outlined in more detail in section 5.3, which deals specifically with ‘Tribalism and Self-Administration’ in Yemen.

A lack of identification of minors has led to a lack of information on the scale of the youth offending problem<sup>133</sup>, so that: “Failure to record and strategically make use of juvenile justice related information contributes to a failure to ensure the protection of children in conflict with the law”, and this is an assessment that most likely holds true in all fragile states affected, by their very definition, by a lack of judicial capacity (IPJJ, 2011). While the Ministry of Justice has procedures in place to process young offenders, these are rarely utilised effectively, so that most are processed as adults.

This section and this chapter are targeted towards an analysis of the operation of the criminal, rather than the civil law-based justice system in Yemen. This selection is reflective of the largest point of interaction with the Ministry of Justice for Yemeni citizens, because, as Hesham Nasr *et al* write in their appraisal of Arab justice systems:

For many citizens of the Arab world, it is the criminal justice system that imposes itself most directly. Civil disputes require at least one party to initiate legal action; the criminal justice system assigns initiation to a state official (2004, p. 1).

As a result of the poor level of reliance of Yemeni citizens upon the civil court system, criminal justice processes tend to play a more prominent role in the everyday lives of citizens. Being involuntary participants in the justice system, young offenders who enter the criminal justice process are at their most vulnerable at all three stages of prosecution, which include: arrest, trial and – if relevant – incarceration<sup>134</sup>.

Yemen operates under a *niyaba* system of justice, with prosecutors also possessing investigatory powers (Nasr, 2006). Brinkley Messick writes that the *niyaba* system was introduced in North Yemen in 1977, prior to which criminal and other cases were considered to be matters for private prosecution, rather than public affairs in need of administration by state institutions (1983). The Yemeni tradition, before the introduction of the *niyaba*, was thus one of self-administration and tribal law, whereby the onus for reporting has always been on the victim. The external imposition of justice is a relatively new and misunderstood phenomenon for many Yemeni communities to this day, who consider crime to be an issue that they either deal with directly or choose to bring to the attention of higher institutions.

Before the *niyaba* system was officially adopted in North Yemen: “The right to private retaliation [was] guaranteed in Islamic law”, so that “the plaintiffs in the cited case demanded 'legal retaliation'”, which, in the case of homicides, usually ended in some form of public execution whereby “retaliation [was] frequently direct, without the prior legitimation of a sharia court” (Messick, 1983, p. 509).

This assumption that bypassing state institutions in the pursuit of retributive justice is an acceptable social norm has persisted, causing three important judicial challenges for the Yemeni state. Firstly, under tribal law, official intrusions represent an obstruction of local justice processes

---

<sup>133</sup> See Chapter 3.

<sup>134</sup> Arrest and incarceration will be discussed further in sections 5.2.4 and 5.2.5, being two of the most commonly cited problem areas for child rights violations, particularly keeping in mind that Yemen does not have a segregated prison system for vulnerable and serious offenders. Yet the trial stage, which shall be outlined more fully here, is likewise a challenging area when it comes to child protection, albeit an area that is less glamorous than the other two and thereby overlooked by human rights supporters and international media.

and are therefore illegitimate. Secondly, cooperation with state judicial authorities is not a natural part of Yemeni life throughout the country, so that victims and witnesses may not choose to assist prosecutors and investigators in putting together cases against potential suspects, and may be overwhelmed by the complexity of the judicial process. Thirdly, those tried and convicted of grievous violent offences and homicide may, in the eyes of their communities, have had the right to commit their crimes under the confines of retributive justice. Conversely, there is no stop-gap, without a state trial, to ensure that those who are executed through tribal processes or retributive justice have been convicted through the reasonable interpretation of evidence beforehand. In particular, due to different conceptualisations of childhood and adulthood, and due to an absence of lenient sentencing for minors under tribal customs, children and young people are exposed to significant risk under tribal prosecution systems.

Despite the investigative powers awarded to both the police and the public prosecution service in Yemen, most criminal trials are still initiated upon the submission of an event report by a private citizen (who is normally but not necessarily either the victim in the case, or a member of the injured party's family). Notable exceptions to this rule occur if: crimes are committed within sight of a police officer (usually within an urban centre); crimes are political and constitute an apparent threat or challenge to the ruling regime: and, a murder occurs and the victim's family have not themselves demanded an investigation. This indicates that the vast majority of offences remain uninvestigated, regardless of severity. The United Nations Programme Office on Governance in the Arab Region write that, once initiated, the trial process operates according to the following schematic (2010), taking place either in a regular or specialised chamber, as required by the nature of the offence and the identities of the defendant(s) and victim(s):




Figure 61 The Yemeni Prosecution Process

The identity of offenders in terms of status as adults or young people is normally determined at the arrest phase, though it is on very rare occasions reassessed if the prosecutor is also the lead investigator in the case.

Due to the high case volume-to-court-capacity ratio, however, arrestee trial and processing is accomplished extremely quickly, though defendants may spend months waiting for an actual trial date. This prolonged waiting period is considered one of the main reasons why Yemeni citizens are reluctant to bring incident reports to state justice services, so that private justice and tribal mediation systems remain the preferred methods of dispute resolution in many regions of the country (*Stakeholder Consultation, Ministry of Justice, 17 August, 2010*). These systems can result either in a miscarriage of justice or corruption because of their lack of accountability. From a criminological perspective, this may have created the social reality where certain forms of physical violence become perceived as being acceptable constructions by community members and community leaders, so that they are eventually learned by children and young people.

## 5.2.4 Law Enforcement



Figure 62 Market Scene, Sana'a City Centre

The complex interaction of state fragility, lack of state capacity and entrenched communal values of self-reliance, which have led to the diminished importance of judicial processes, have impacted Yemeni perceptions of both civil and military law enforcement. The use of police services to arrest dissidents of the state, as well as the use of the military to enforce law and order, has led to a distinct confusion of the roles of these two bodies at an institutional level, a service implementation level, and, most importantly, at a community level.

In an anonymous online survey conducted in April of 2011, one 23 year old male Yemeni student, when asked about whether or not he thought police services were important, replied that:

I think we all can protect ourselves and we don't need any help from anyone. With a backward country like ours we don't wait for the army to protect us. Each house, as you are aware is armed [Translated from Arabic].

This statement highlights three very serious tensions within Yemeni law enforcement services. Firstly, it advocates a general rejection of state law enforcement systems by the population at large, indicating a severe breakdown in the relationship between police forces and the community. Secondly, it illustrates the high level of confusion within the Yemeni population when it comes to distinguishing between members of the police and members of the army, with both services adopting dual and overlapping roles, leading to the obstruction of the police force's primary role as an instrument for the protection of civilians from crime. Thirdly, it suggests that Yemeni communities have reached a point where they are so dissatisfied with law enforcement services that they have taken the enforcement of the rule of law into their own hands, with the threat of armed violence, aggravated by the huge prevalence of guns in the country, risking at any moment to ignite a very serious violent crisis.

Each of these trends is made all the more disturbing by the severe tension and aggression implicit in the construction of this statement. This emerged as an important issue in Chapter 1, when Husam al Sharjabi spoke quite openly about the difficulty of containing youth hostility against the police and military as a civil society leader during the Arab Spring. Sharjabi's account offers an example of young people equating law enforcement services with unpopular political regimes, evidencing the extreme politicisation of these institutions in Yemen.



Figure 63 Traffic Officer Working in Central Sana'a

The precarious position of policing services in Yemeni society is influenced by its relatively brief history, whereby protracted colonization meant that North and South Yemen established their own security systems only after the achievement of independence. These differed remarkably between the two countries, with “The Aden Police” force maintaining a very clear role in its division between the three services of Armed, Riot and Security Police in the South, and the Northern police, according to Nathan Brown *et al*, emerging as a much more passive, “less centralized” and “less pervasive” institution that aimed to strike a balance between state and tribal authority (2004, p. 6). Thus a far stronger tradition of tribal autonomy and self-administration evolved in the North than in the South of the country, where a prioritization of tribal affiliations was categorized by the state as being backwards and archaic<sup>135</sup>.

When these competing institutions and values were merged together under the management of the Ministry of Interior upon Yemen's unification in 1990, they were broken into three new branches, which comprised a regular police service, a central security organisation, and a political security organisation. This process implies that police services from that point onwards ought to have had greater standing and more legitimacy in the South than they did in the North, but, in practice, the formation of a political security organisation was seen by Southerners as a way of containing separatist ideologies.

According to Brown:

---

<sup>135</sup> The parallel development of different administrative systems in North and South Yemen is outlined in Chapter 2.

Southerners ... complained about this new force, as well as the army, which they held directly responsible for increased banditry. They also accused the largely northern security forces of attacks on socialists and their supporters (p. 6).

Since Brown *et al* first wrote this assessment in 2004, a wealth of evidence has been produced by the Human Rights Watch among other organisations that shows that the Government of Yemen has repeatedly used the police force as a tool of political repression in the South, and the military as such in the North, with both services also being forced to adopt compromising positions nation-wide during the Arab Spring<sup>136</sup>.

These issues have seriously undermined the role of law-enforcement agencies in Yemen so that, from a social-control perspective, communities are left with little to no incentive to cooperate with institutions that they do not perceive as being legitimate. This lack of trust is both a cause and an effect of the privatisation of security in Yemen, with powerful and wealthy individuals hiring body-guards and security organisations, and tribal communities maintaining their own policing services. These parallel organisations are virtually impossible to monitor, and serious human rights violations occur with some frequency. At the same time, both official and unofficial organisations are reportedly beset by corruption<sup>137</sup>. Individual Yemeni citizens, particularly those living below the poverty line, see few services available for their assistance if they fall victim to crime<sup>138</sup>.

Independent surveys conducted by the author have documented that tensions between law enforcement personnel and communities were particularly high over 2011, though surveys conducted by the Yemen Polling Centre indicate that relations are improving in 2013 in the aftermath of President Saleh's departure. In particular, the Yemen Polling Centre have successfully shown a demand for higher levels of police community protection, though 19.6% of people surveyed nationally still said that they would feel less secure if police presences were increased in their areas. 41.1% of people surveyed by the Centre believed that, at present, they were alone in protecting their own security, while 22.9% believed that security was mainly provided by tribal shaykhs (2013). Thus, while the Yemeni people want to see change, most currently believe that informal, tribal or street justice occupies a more important role in security provision than state services.

### 5.2.5 The Prison System

Little is really known about the Yemeni prison system today, due in part to a continued reliance by powerful and wealthy members of Yemeni society upon private prisons and holding cells, as well as a low rate of monitoring of state and private gaols (*Stakeholder Consultation, International Organisation for Migration, 16 August, 2010*). It is not currently possible for outsiders to generate a reliable or even a realistic estimate of the number of prisons in Yemen, let alone of the potential number of people now in detention in the country. Not only are state facilities poorly documented, with private citizens and government officials being given the option to rent spaces in public institutions, but notable community leaders have also established their own detention facilities, either within their cities, villages or within their homes (Human Rights Watch, 2009). What was once

---

<sup>136</sup> See Chapter 2 for full conflict analyses.

<sup>137</sup> See section 3.11, which analyses corruption in Yemen.

<sup>138</sup> This has also been argued in more detail in section 1.5.2.

thought of as a tribal tradition is also practised by prominent political figures, with Atiaf Alwazir – an important citizen journalist and activist – reporting in interview that General Ali Mohsen kept a private prison for the detention of Yemeni citizens during the Arab Spring, failing to release detainees after the revolution had officially come to an end in 2012 (*Interview conducted on the 4th of June, 2012*)<sup>139</sup>.

In *Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes*, Victoria Clark writes that in the:

north's era of the imams and Ottomans, it was accepted that if someone wanted a malefactor arrested he had to pay for the service, but, equally, it was understood that if the malefactor wanted to escape imprisonment he would have to pay even more. (2010, p. 243)

It is not entirely clear whether or not such systems were purely a symptom of entrenched networks of patronage associated with dominant tribal values in the North, or whether they prevailed in the South of the country as well, keeping in mind that tribalism was less pervasive in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen than it was in the Yemen Arab Republic<sup>140</sup>.

What is clear is that this largely Northern attitude towards service delivery eventually permeated through the South due to the dominance of Northern administration over Southern governance processes, which occurred as a result of the unification of the two countries in 1990 and of the failed war for separatism in 1993.

Today, writes Clark, patronage and corruption within the prison system are seen by Southerners as symptoms of Northern cultural intrusion into their power relations, though in actuality both sides of the former border are guilty of obstructing the course of what is thought of by the international community as being “justice” and “due process”. In the South of Yemen, these concerns have been severely aggravated by the formation of the Political Security Organisation. This organisation has largely been seen by Southerners as abusing its position in order to detain members of formal and informal opposition groups.

In reality, many Northerners have also been imprisoned by this organisation and by other bodies within the police, military and judiciary. Members of “troublesome” tribal factions, journalists, and critics of the ruling regime have been disproportionately targeted in this sense (*Expert Consultation, Atiaf Alwazir, 5 June, 2012*). This tradition continued in 2012 long after the removal of President Saleh, as evidenced by Muaad al-Maqtari's article, in which he writes of the imprisonment of Majed Karoot (2012). Karoot was jailed in June of that year for having criticised members of the Communication Corporation of Al-Baida on his Facebook page, in a move that the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate referred to as having broken their faith in state justice systems, so that “Journalists no longer trust the judiciary system”.

---

<sup>139</sup> The criminological implications of such private use of detention facilities in Yemen, as well as the many human rights violations that occur as a result of the lack of accessibility to these facilities by external monitors, have already been outlined to some extent in section 4.2.6, so that 5.2.5 will be aimed primarily at filling in some of the gaps left by this theory-based overview within the more description and case-specific context of this Chapter.

<sup>140</sup> See Chapter 2.

Less public forms of arrest are also prevalent. In 2009, the Human Rights Watch wrote that “Estimates of the numbers of persons” who “disappeared” in the North during the Sa'ada wars “vary”, so that:

Yemeni rights organizations have documented dozens of cases of persons who have “disappeared,” most of whom eventually reappeared at the facilities of the Political Security Organization. ... In August 2008 officials stated that there were approximately 1,200 political prisoners still detained, with plans to release 130 of these. The government has taken no steps to investigate or hold accountable those responsible for enforced disappearances.

Relatives of those who are imprisoned have little access to information about their loved ones, so that arbitrary arrests and an absence of fair trials motivated a series of protests by the families of arrestees in February of 2011 (Alkarama, 2011).

The United States Agency for International Development write that Yemeni prisons can be read as “violence academies” where low level opposition members and regular citizens are turned into hard-line radicals through torture and association with other political prisoners in Yemen's jails (2008, p. 35). The assumption here is that those who had no strong feelings against the state going into gaol will turn against the ruling regime once they have been through the Yemeni prison system.

### 5.3 Tribalism and Self-Administration





Figure 64 Tribal Composition of Yemen

Elobaid Ahmed Elobaid writes that: “The formal Yemeni legal system is still in a state of flux” and that “One of the factors influencing the pace of legal modernization is the existence of other competing normative systems, especially the tribal one.” (2010, p. 10). Yemenis are comprised of

different peoples, who identify themselves according to ethnic and tribal affiliations (see Figure 64<sup>141</sup>). These identities transcend geographic boundaries and are deeply intertwined with established systems of patronage<sup>142</sup>. As one onlooker has observed, Yemeni tribes have strong internal social structures and have historically proven extremely self-reliant, so that, today, while it is possible for tribes to function effectively without the state – it is not possible for the state to function without the tribes (Alexander Knysh, 2011). Prior to 2011, various rulers of Yemen, both before and after unification, had maintained control over their territories through co-opting and bargaining with powerful tribal leaders. These tactics have proven instrumental in stalling human rights based legislation and reforms, particularly within the justice sector.



**Figure 65 Yemeni Man Wearing Tribal Clothes**

The tribes themselves form entrenched social networks that have shifted their composition mildly over the past two decades in response to changes in Yemen's power structures, but that have largely remained the same in their internal groupings. They are united according to overarching organisational structures, the most prominent of which have been the Hashid Federation and the Bakil Federation respectively, though independent tribes are not entirely uncommon. In particular, tribes that have crossed over into Saudi Arabian territory in the far North of the country have been able to maintain some independence through their isolation from central administration. These tribesmen identify themselves primarily as Yemenis, though they are geographically located beyond the reach of the Yemeni state. Nevertheless, North Yemen, and particularly the mountainous regions across the Saudi Arabian border have historically been dominated by the Hashid Federation. Here, the Hashid tribe has been able to gain sympathy and influence through shared Zaydi belief systems and common grievances.

---

<sup>141</sup> Map based on information taken from <http://cartpioneers.org/> [accessed 13 October, 2011].

<sup>142</sup> The lack of tribal respect for state lines has been evidenced in Chapters 2, 3 and 5.

The Bakil Federation have also established a strong foothold within this region. While the Bakil Federation seems to be far more organisationally sophisticated, the Hashid Federation, run by the Al-Ahmar family, is by far the more powerful and strategically important of the two structures, particularly because of its strong presence within Sana'a, the capital of Yemen. It has been noted that the Hashid Federation incorporates the Sanhaan tribe, to which both President Ali Abdullah Saleh and General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar – key players in Yemeni politics – belong, though Sanhaan actually remains subordinate to the Hashid tribe within the Federation (Michael Horton, 2011).

In South Yemen, while both tribal federations still hold some influence, cross-tribal organisation is less pronounced, due largely to the region's history of socialist rule, during which tribal systems were heavily repressed by the state. Elham M. Manea writes that the most dominant tribes in the South belong to the Himiar and Madhhij Federations, which have proven far less politically active than their Northern counterparts (1996). These tribes have historically been easier to dominate due to their high reliance on agricultural land. As farmers, they remained largely settled in one locality and tethered to their lands with little room for geographic movement, so that they became exceedingly vulnerable to military pressure from the state (Horton, 2011).

There has been less mention of these tribes in recent news because they have traditionally shown themselves to be far less violent than their Northern equivalents, whose members have been involved in fighting in both the Sa'ada wars and elsewhere. Increasing economic pressures on the South and growing calls for separatism might serve to reverse this trend, and evidence suggests that some Southern tribes have begun harbouring and supporting Al Qaeda fighters, though this is a hugely contested issue<sup>143</sup>. Finally, it should be noted that North and South Yemen are also home to the Tihami, Soqotri and Mahri tribal groupings, which have been known to transcend federal divisions in the past. Encompassing a huge geographic terrain but lacking in organisation, these groups are identifiable by their distinctive languages and belief systems (Miranda Morris, 2007). They contribute to observations that tribes in Yemen have no singular political voice.

While some level of organisational sophistication and power structuring can be identified within the visible tribal composition of Yemen, these structures remain extremely difficult to pin down, because their alliances are based within patronage systems that have been deliberately obscured by the state. Linked to allegations of corruption, insurgencies and human rights violations, these tribal structures have remained deliberately hidden from outsiders, though they are crucial to determining and shaping political realities in Yemen.

## 5.6 Conclusion

A major challenge for re-establishing the rule of law in Yemen is the significant lack of faith between the citizens of Yemen and the state's law enforcement and judicial services, which are insufficiently accessible, unrepresentative of pre-existing conflict mediation services, and uneven in their distribution, as well as in their implementation. When asked what his priorities for the reform of the Yemeni state were at a Chatham House event entitled *Yemen: A Way Forward*, Husam al-Sharjabi, Head of the Yemeni Civic Coalition of Revolutionary Youth, reflected a common consensus among young people in the country today when he replied that: "What we want is a state where

---

<sup>143</sup> See Chapter 2, section 2.4.3 for more details.

everybody is equal under the law” (March 7, 2012). This statement reflects not only that selected tribes and communities are seen to be treated differently in different regions, but also that elite stakeholders are seen to escape prosecution, with corruption ensuring that the wealthy and the powerful have more recourse to protection from justice than others.

As Danniell Shimmin summarises, security services in Yemen could some day be made to be more legitimate in the eyes of the Yemeni people, but “Overcoming rumour and mistrust” will be a lot “more difficult than just ensuring transparency” - an age old priority of foreign interventions into Yemen (*Expert Consultation, 2012*). Establishing an effective relationship between Yemeni citizens and the justice sector will require genuine reform.

## **Chapter 6: Understanding Violent Young Offending in Yemen and Other Fragile States**

### **6.1 Introduction**

As the previous chapters have evidenced, criminological theory, which can be loosely divided between theories of crime causation and theories of social control, has largely been pioneered within the developed world (though it has been used in the past in emerging democracies with relatively strong infrastructures, like South Africa and Columbia) to analyse the prevalence of elevated criminal activity. While criminological theory has clear benefits for analysts of least developed countries, it has generally not been integrated into political development literature and has not been designed to explain criminal behaviour patterns in fragile states or been used to do so by development practitioners.

In order to effectively integrate criminological and development literature, this chapter will begin by presenting an overview of contemporary literature on conflict and state fragility, with particular reference to how these phenomena impact children and young people. Three bodies of theory will be explored here, – those pertaining to conflict causation, state fragility, and the impact of conflict and fragility on children and young people from a psychosocial welfare perspective. It has been found that while conflict is not a necessary condition of fragility, there is barely a single fragile state today that has not been at some point affected by war, so that conflict and fragility are strongly correlated. In 2008, twenty-eight fragile states were actively engaged in conflict, according to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). Therefore, it has been determined that any overview of contemporary development literature would be severely lacking if it did not incorporate theories of conflict causation, specifically as they apply to civil wars.

Each of these areas will be reviewed in its own subsection in order to provide the building blocks of a new criminological theory of violent young offending that takes state fragility and its effects into account. To ensure the relevance and workability of this theoretical framework, it shall be developed alongside an in-depth analysis of the actual socio-economic situation of children and young people in Yemen, building upon the analyses of Yemen's context, justice sector and criminal environment provided in Chapters 2, 3 and 5.

### **6.2 Conflict Causation**

Theories of international politics have been obsessed with the notion of inter-state war and its inevitability since the end of the Second World War and, most likely, before that time as well. Theories of realism, liberalism, Marxism, constructivism, and so on, have provided the analytical framework for those striving to understand humanity's propensity for violence in a world that has proven increasingly uni-polar since the conclusion of the Cold War, but that threatens at any moment to reveal the emergence of new superpowers and new agendas in global geopolitics. While these theories continue to maintain their relevance in the contemporary world order, another

branch of political theory has emerged in recent years that deals almost exclusively with violence experienced by those countries that have not traditionally been seen as key players in international politics. It centres around the paradigm of 'new wars' – the idea that, over the past five decades, conflict has featured a unique set of characteristics that renders it markedly different to the wars of the past and therefore less likely to occur among the leading world powers.

Siniša Malešević summarises that:

the argument is that these new wars differ in terms of scope (civil rather than inter-state conflicts), methods, models of financing (external rather than internal), and are characterised by low intensity coupled with high levels of brutality and with the deliberate targeting of civilians. ... Furthermore, unlike the 'old wars' these new violent conflicts are premised on different fighting tactics (terror and guerilla tactics actions instead of conventional battlefields), different military strategies (population control rather than capturing new territory), utilise different combatants (private armies, criminal gangs and warlords instead of professional soldiers or conscripts), and are highly decentralised (2008, p. 98).

While it is still to be determined whether or not this new paradigm has been validated and whether we are beginning to witness the end of large-scale inter-state violence of the kind that defined the World Wars, this increased tendency towards civil war particularly in weak states or underdeveloped countries was well documented in the 1990s, which registered a significant spike in armed violence that has arguably diminished in the 2000s (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). While its participants have advocated peaceful demonstrations, the Arab Spring has highlighted the potential vulnerability of even more politically and economically stable states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia to internal conflict, while the collapse of ruling regimes elsewhere in 2011 and 2012 may well foreshadow further increases in levels of violence over the twenty-first century.

Due to this thesis' concern with fragile states, which are commonly marked by civil wars, this section and those that follow it will analyse conflict and conflict causation theory only in as far as they relate to this paradigm of new wars, rather than looking at broader international relations theories that might have addressed the issue of conflict on a more global scale. This selection has been made not only to limit the scope of the research initiative, but also because low income and underdevelopment have themselves come to form key determining factors for civil war, with least developed countries facing a significantly greater risk of violence than middle and high income states.

It is important to note that while the new wars paradigm is extremely useful, it remains highly contested within development literature, whereby one of the central issues to emerge from contemporary debate on the subject is conceptual. While it is clear to many theorists that new wars are fairly different to large-scale inter-state conflicts, they have occurred in such a variety of different contexts that their characteristics remain fairly difficult to quantify. Jacob Mundy points out that:

Not long into its prolific and influential career, the new school of civil war studies began to claim that there existed a degree of 'consensus' among the various models used to determine the trigger causes, sustaining conditions and intensifying factors of civil wars.

Surprisingly, however, this consensus has been achieved without the use of a consistent conception of civil war. One of the most visible effects of the use of varying criteria to identify and measure civil wars has been the production of significantly different lists of civil wars. According to one survey, the proposed number of civil wars between 1960 and 1993 ranges from 58 to 116 depending on the criteria followed. (2011)

The plethora of frameworks and understandings of new wars that have emerged in the field since the paradigm's inception reflects the equally diverse range of actors who have chosen to engage with this area, with academics, development agencies, donors and governments aligned to different interventionist agendas ranging from democratisation and stabilisation to transactional development each adopting their own slant upon this challenging subject.

Definitions of civil war have become politicised, which is to be expected in a field where authors and analysts are able to make choices about whether or not to use words like “uprising”, “genocide” or “conflict”, and likewise “combatants”, “insurgents”, “freedom fighters” or “terrorists” when describing new wars and their participants. Causality is also a huge point of disagreement among observers of the new wars phenomenon. In particular, questions about what spurs on or discourages conflict reflect the priorities of different agencies: with the United States Agency for International Development being chiefly concerned with the causes of Islamic and other forms of radicalisation; the United Nations and its many off-shoots adopting a primarily rights-based narrative; non-democratically aligned states like China adopting an economically-based perception of civil unrest; and, regional movements like the West Asia North Africa Forum prioritising understandings of conflict causality that are based upon state capacities and infrastructure limitations to encourage bilateral aid responses.

Within this setting, the potential for analytical biases to emerge from research is extremely high, which is one of the main reasons why this thesis has chosen to include conflict as a dimension of fragility only in terms of its effects upon populations. However, even having taken these challenges into account, there are several trends in conflict causation that are generally agreed upon and that tend to be valued above others. Key among these is the central component that led to the emergence of the new wars paradigm in the first place, which is the observation that several underdeveloped states have experienced extremely violent civil wars, leading to the notion that underdevelopment is an important dimension of contemporary conflicts.

This idea has yet to be disputed with any degree of real empirical certainty, though it should be noted that underdeveloped states are also frequently associated with histories of colonialism, where imposed cultural, religious and ethnic segregations have severely impacted the social cohesion of societies, pointing to other parallel underlying causes of rising hostilities (as evidenced by the Yemeni case study where both underdevelopment and a history of geographic and religious antagonism have played a part in sparking violence).

The main danger here is that, as Paul Collier *et al* argue, while development tends to reduce the risk of civil war, fragile states have generally “not shared in development” so that if this situation persists: “the global incidence of conflict will not continue to rise indefinitely, but neither will development secure global peace”, and “The world will find itself stuck with a self-sustaining incidence of civil war, determined by the large and persistent pool of nondeveloping, low income countries” (2003, pp. 5-6). With the growing entrenchment of protracted unrest in fragile states that

fall victim to Collier's self-sustaining "conflict trap", his prediction does not seem unreasonable in our latest century of global development.

While Malešević and others have stated that one of the new wars paradigm's greatest limitations is buried within its attempt to anticipate the future behaviour of states in the global political sphere, the new wars paradigm may still be used to access relevant theories relating to a specifically defined body of contemporary conflicts that tend to impact fragile states. This can be achieved without assessing the potential long-term applicability of the paradigm itself, by prioritising the present behaviour of conflict-affected fragile states in order to understand the legitimacy and authority-based challenges that they are seen to be facing.

It is necessary to understand that the new wars paradigm is, above all, a definitional framework, whose terminology has been left overly vague and malleable by those who make reference to it, but that it is open to more rigorous and clear-cut interpretations. Despite its limitations in this sense, new wars are commonly accepted within academic literature to be conflicts that are characterised by six traits, which include:

1. The actors that take part in them. New wars tend not to be fought between states, but rather between state and non-state actors, as well as public, private, terrorist and warlord groups;
2. The motivations of their protagonists. New wars tend to be fought for ideological and material reasons rather than purely over territorial control (though, in practice, these ideals are often achieved through the enhancement of geographic influence);
3. Their "spatial context". New wars are normally civil wars that can spill into neighbouring countries, rather than wars started between states themselves;
4. Their methods. New wars tend to be characterised by specific technological and physical methods of achieving violence, where strategists tend to target civilian populations, employ terrorist and guerrilla tactics, and rely on all technologies made available to them, with states possessing far more sophisticated weaponry than insurgents and combatants;
5. Their impact. New wars tend to result in significant human victimisation and displacement, as caused by the violation of human rights legislation and resulting in significant social and material costs; and,
6. Their political economies. New wars are "driven by globalisation and liberal economic forces" that generate a deligitimisation of the state, followed by state failure and increased competition for resources (Newman, 2004, pp. 174-175).

The very definition of new wars alludes to the root causes of contemporary conflict. They are driven by weak state capacities and an inability by governments in underdeveloped countries to safely weather global economic pull factors. Growing material and economic grievances at the local level are streamlined into nationwide discontent until they generate conflicting and anti-establishment

narratives that provide a lightning rod for the recruitment of new and emerging combatant groups<sup>144</sup>.

David Keen writes that “the idea that a conflict is bi-polar – in other words, that conflict is 'really' about government troops fighting rebel troops ... – has proven extremely useful to elites protecting their own privileges”, but has ultimately proven to be misleading and counter-productive for theorists and external observers striving to understand the actual causes of war (2007, p. 6). While it is tempting to analyse the narratives and motivations of individual actors in times of conflict, these confuse the deeper issues behind violence and serve to obscure genuine root causes of political unrest and military action.

Frances Stewart extends this argument to the ethnic or cultural dimension of conflicts. Although “Many groups of people who fight together perceive themselves as belonging to a common culture (ethnic or religious), and part of the reason that they are fighting may be to maintain their cultural autonomy”: it has been found by analysts in most contexts that any “tendency to attribute wars to 'primordial' ethnic passions” that make them “seem intractable ... is not correct” because such tendencies “diver[t] attention from important underlying economic and political factors” (2002, p. 342). The limits of these observations are that they downplay ideological, ethnic and religious narratives of war, which are extremely important to understand if effective dialogue between warring parties is ever to be established. This has been seen in the Middle East within the regional Sunni-Shia divide, in Rwanda during its ethnic genocide, and in Kashmir within its intra-state religious and national identity-based conflict.

The new wars paradigm was originally designed to integrate these narrative-based and deeper causal tensions within one analytical framework. The term was coined by Mary Kaldor in her ground-breaking work on *New and Old Wars*, in which she began to read contemporary conflict as being more akin to “organised violence” than traditional warfare, placing the alleged uniqueness of the economic environments and funding mechanisms behind new wars at the forefront of her analysis.

In her development of the new wars conceptual framework, Kaldor used the word “new” specifically so as to “distinguish” contemporary conflict from “prevailing perceptions of war drawn from an earlier era”, and the word “war” in order to strongly:

emphasise the political nature of this new type violence, even though ... the new wars involve a blurring of the distinctions between war (usually defined as violence between states or organised political groups for political motives), organised crime (violence undertaken by private organised groups for private purposes, usually financial gain) and large-scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by states or politically organised groups against individuals). (1999, pp. 1-2)

Since then, numerous theoretical readings have been put forward in striving to understand the reasons behind the contemporary prevalence for civil war in underdeveloped countries. With many of these theories continuing to be founded within economic modes of analysis and concentrating on the financing of conflict and insurgency; they exhibit strong overlaps with criminology, particularly as

---

<sup>144</sup> This was evidenced in Chapter 2 with specific reference to the Yemeni context.

this discipline addresses criminogenic risk factors within labour markets and community composition. It is found that, even in Kaldor's work, the emergence of new wars is strongly connected to the thematic discussion of globalisation and similar frameworks of increased internationalisation, interconnectedness, and – more importantly – economic competitiveness in the world, so that these frameworks remain to this day virtually inseparable from conflict-causation theory.

Malešević argues that the very positioning of fragile states in a new, increasingly globalised world order is central to the development of conflict-generating socio-economic conditions, whereby the:

inability to compete at the global level weakens the state's economy and simultaneously its capacity to extract revenue, thus opening the door to systemic corruption, criminality and consequently for the general privatisation of violence. State failure creates a new Hobbesian environment where armed warlords control the remnants of state structures, and relying on foreign remittances and international aid invoke identity politics to spread terror among those deemed a threat to their religious or ethnic group. (2008, p. 100)

Malešević's interpretation of the new wars phenomenon suggests that the inability of weak and fragile states to engage with world markets is directly connected to the breakdown of state capacities, which is a precondition of state failure<sup>145</sup>. State failure opens the door to the privatisation of violence and the generation of conflict.

Malešević's jump from struggling economies to the development of warlordism and the spread of terrorist tactics is both sudden and severe: but the move remains a logical one that is emulated by many other writers in the development field.

Other prominent theoretical works on conflict causation focus on economic methods of analysis, with the most famous of these, the "greed versus grievance" theory of conflict generation put forward by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, seeking to explore the relationship between financial motivation and other social factors in the creation and sustenance of contemporary civil war. Containing prominent ideological overlaps with the theories put forward in Chapter 4, the "greed versus grievance" model draws strong distinctions between the stated goals of protagonists in conflict and the underlying opportunities for financial gain that war and insecurity generate. Collier and Hoeffler write that narratives that might incite rebellion are present in almost every country, demonstrating the universality of certain common social grievances. While "all countries might have groups with a sufficiently strong sense of grievance to wish to launch a rebellion," rebellions will only occur "where they are viable", or where constraints on rebellion are particularly weak, or where economic and development indicators are particularly relevant (2002, p. 6). In addition, for key stakeholders, including rebel leaders, the economic incentives to continue conflict once it has been initiated can be significantly stronger than those associated with peace, whereby war represents the continuation of criminal flows, while peace represents demobilisation and unemployment, imprisonment or execution.

---

<sup>145</sup> See section 6.3 on 'State Fragility'.

The most common criticism of the “greed versus grievance” framework is that it paints an extremely limited “either/or” picture of conflict causality, which obscures the nuances and complexities of the interactions between genuine grievance-based motivations for conflict and the economic conditionalities for fighting. While economic predictors of new wars are undoubtedly hugely important, the Global Economic Crisis of 2007/2008 highlights that a lack of economic growth, rapid economic shifts and unemployment are not sufficient in themselves to cause violent conflict, or we would have seen civil wars hit virtually every major power by 2012. Granted, it is true that poverty and unemployment figures in the developed world remained only a fraction of what they were in fragile states throughout this time, but the distinct lack of civil war in developed countries during the late 2000s is worth noting in this sense, while many least developed countries continued to be mired in political crises.

As Kaldor highlights, it is important to dwell on further implications of the increasing global interconnectedness of the current world order as a potential element of conflict-causation. Kaldor writes that “new wars arise in the context of the erosion of the autonomy of the state and in some extreme cases the disintegration of the state. ... they occur in the context of the erosion of the monopoly of legitimate organised violence” (p. 4). While the European Union, NATO, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and other networks for international cooperation serve today as the best examples that there has been a gradual decline of states as bordered entities<sup>146</sup> that are the primary actors in international politics with some very positive results: it has been found that the erosion of state sovereignty in countries without a pre-dating history of strong governance<sup>147</sup> can have a significant negative impact upon areas where governmental infrastructure and capacities are already either weak or absent.


A loss of autonomy has made fragile states particularly vulnerable to regional and global geopolitical shifts, leaving them unable to weather regional population movements, market fluctuations, cross-national radicalising political movements, and many other external forces. Their vulnerability in this sense fosters their over-reliance on international humanitarian and developmental aid, pushing them to become intertwined with the unpopular foreign policies of donor countries<sup>148</sup>. Each of these stresses has been found to be a strong contributing factor to the emergence of new wars, strengthening existing socio-cultural divisions among communities, decreasing state capacity for effective service provision, and increasing nationwide social inequalities.

---

<sup>146</sup> North Korea is a possible exception to this trend.

<sup>147</sup> Yemen is a good example of this, as seen in Chapter 2.

<sup>148</sup> President Saleh's support of the American-led War on Terror triggered conflict in the North and significantly delegitimised the Yemeni state



**Figure 66 The Heavily Barricaded American Embassy in Sana'a**

Stewart concludes that the major root causes of contemporary civil conflicts are diverse, but have included; “political, economic and social inequalities; extreme poverty; economic stagnation; poor government services; high unemployment; environmental degradation; and individual (economic) incentives to fight” (p. 342). According to Stewart, these causes can be compartmentalised according to group and individual motivational forces. Thus, groups within conflicts can be divided according to various cultural, religious, ethnic or geographic characteristics. These distinctions will only become a source of conflict where strong contrasts exist relating to the deprivation of economic or political power, where “political redress is not possible”, and where these distinctions amount to severe “horizontal inequalities” (p. 343).

As to individual or “private” motivational forces, Stewart writes that conflict creates employment opportunities for combatants, and allows for looting, theft and other considerable economic incentives, so that poverty becomes an important determining factor. In practice, private motivational forces are seen as dynamics that prolong, rather than instigate, conflict.

The World Bank's Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit adds to Stewart's analysis with an extensive list of risk screening indicators that are said to determine whether a country is likely to experience conflict. These overlap with Stewart's but are designed to be more measurable in order to aid practitioners in the field to produce comparative assessments of development contexts (though it is debatable to what extent they achieve this purpose). They include: a history of conflict; low income per capita; dependency upon primary commodity exports; political instability; the denial of political rights; militarisation; ethnic dominance; active regional conflicts; and, youth unemployment (2002, p. 2). Interestingly, the dependency on primary commodity exports actually means that countries with natural resources of value are more likely to descend into conflict than countries that seem to possess no resources of value, with some notable exceptions like Somalia.

Of biggest concern here is the “history of conflict” dimension of conflict causality. Johnie Christian *et al* write that although:

It has become abundantly clear that since the end of World War II civil war – revolutions, secessionist wars, and other forms of armed conflict within nations – has replaced interstate war as the dominant conflict modality in the international system ... What is less widely recognised is that most of the civil wars that have occurred in the last half century have recurred in a nation that previously experienced a civil war. (2007, p. 1)

They argue that this is likely to be because conflicts that end through negotiated peace settlements rather than clear-cut military victories allow “both sides to retain the organisational capacity to renew war in future” (p. 2), though in Yemen, even where the North's victory over the South in the 1994 Civil War remains uncontested, hostility continues to this day.

This summary is linked to Collier's conflict trap, and is of all the more concern in relation to this thesis because it has been found that even a brief examination of conflict causation theory and the new wars paradigm indicates that these factors are deeply interconnected. Most, if not all, tend to be present in fragile states, leading to an increased tendency towards civil war that has been validated by empirical evidence from the field. It is found that state fragility itself feeds into conflict, while conflict aggravates and feeds back into state fragility, locking countries into underdevelopment and further compromising state infrastructures. Beyond this, it remains extremely difficult to understand what might really be the full extent of the relationship between conflict and fragility.

### 6.3 State Fragility

State fragility is a fluid and loosely defined concept that is used by donors, international organisations and academics to group together a diverse set of cultural and political contexts according to the governance and infrastructure challenges that they face<sup>149</sup>. The term has been deliberately broadened by those who use it and, while many analytical frameworks have been put forward by the World Bank and others that have strived to measure fragility (including the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) and the *Failed States Index*), there remains, according to Alina Rochal Menocal, “no firm consensus within the international community on exactly what constitutes a ‘fragile’ state or situation” (2010, p. 1).

To avoid becoming entangled in theoretical or ideological biases, this thesis uses a single definition of “state fragility”, which prioritises poor state capacity, high social fragmentation and poor political integration. This section will cover in more detail how that definition emerged from a merging of existing academic and practitioner literature on the subject.

---

<sup>149</sup> From the onset, therefore, as has been set out in the research questions outlined in sections iii and 1.2.2, there are immediate issues and concerns that surround the use of the state fragility framework as a tool for grouping together least developed countries, and some of these arguments will be addressed and resolved within this section. However, with the overall aim of this thesis being to find a new way to discuss and think about the connections between violent young offending and underdevelopment, this section's primary purpose will be merely to provide an overview of key literary works that address the features and characteristics of state fragility, as well as the main causes of fragility, as these have already been referenced to some extent in section 6.2. The usefulness of the state fragility framework itself will also form an overarching theme for this chapter, which shall be commented upon further in its conclusion, as well as in Chapter 8.

As Menocal argues, despite the absence of unifying approaches to fragility “there is general agreement on some key characteristics”, which include weak institutions and poor state capacity as the core features that brought about a need for this separate terminology in the first place. The Department for International Development (DFID), defines fragile states as those countries where “the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to its people”, whereby the lowest countries on the CPIA are “sometimes used as a proxy for fragile states” (2006). This distinction between political capacity and political will is problematic, as it allows for the integration of sufficiently developed countries with oppressive political regimes into the state fragility framework, where this thesis has chosen instead to focus upon those countries that are suffering from severe infrastructure and capacity-based limitations.

Due to the broad nature of the state fragility framework, the concept is understood by development practitioners to encompass different characteristics, with many actors placing different levels of emphasis on each of these. Fragility is defined as an inability by the state to perform basic functions<sup>150</sup>, including service provision, whereby, as Lisa Chauvet *et al* summarise, “The most basic role of the state is to provide physical security to its citizens” (2007, p. 1), because, as Robert Rotberg concludes: “The delivery of a range of other desirable political goods becomes possible when a reasonable measure of security has been sustained” (2004, p. 3).

It is this security-based focus that has led to the securitisation of international aid, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, when the severe lack of security in fragile states was finally acknowledged by policy makers as having far-reaching consequences for even the world's most developed countries. Yet security is not the only state service of relevance in determining state fragility. International conventions have come to place an equal emphasis on human security, a far broader, rights-based measure of state effectiveness.

Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart write that there are seven other state functions that are particularly relevant for maintaining public safety and ensuring a minimum standard of human rights protection. These functions include: (1) a duty to maintain the rule of law - “a glue that binds all aspects of the state, economy and society” (2008, p. 125); (2) an ability to hold a monopoly over the legitimate implementation of violence; (3) administrative control (including taxation); (4) “sound” management of public finances, ensuring efficient budgeting and minimising institutional corruption; (5) a certain degree of investment in human capital through educational services, the creation of livelihood opportunities and pathways for career development; (6) the creation and protection of citizenship rights through social policy and legal instruments; and, (7) the provision of infrastructure services. These include: power provision; healthcare and welfare services; water provision; and, waste disposal, among other services.


These seven dimensions are prioritised within this thesis' institutional understanding of fragility. It is interesting to note that, while they seek to incorporate a relatively broad understanding of state roles, their conception of fragility encapsulates two general trends that have emerged strongly from the literature on fragility: it is foremost a security-centred understanding of fragility, with the first three-to-four conditions (depending upon the reader's interpretation) being aimed at reducing crime and violence while increasing state authority. It is also an understanding that is located at a national level of explanation, where fragility is not commonly thought of to be a product

---

<sup>150</sup> See section viii.2 of the Introduction for a full definition of fragility.

of community-level, regional or global political forces. Through their analytical focus, these understandings of fragility place the blame for underdevelopment and insecurity squarely on the shoulders of the ruling regime, failing to take into account cross-border or internal sources of weakness. Having said this, an absence of any one of the seven functions identified by Ghani and Lockhart can have severe destabilising consequences and lead to the conditions necessary for state fragility, even where a country has previously maintained a balance of development indicators above crisis levels.

In order to avoid black and white conceptions of underdevelopment, Michael Anderson and Magui Moreno Torres write that there are varying degrees of state fragility, which require different levels of international intervention. Similarly to Sultan Barakat's reading of the fragility framework, in which he posits fragility as a cross-over point between poor governance and social fragmentation, Anderson and Torres read fragility as an intersection of weak political will and weak capacity (see *Figure 67*).



**Figure 67 State Fragility as a Measure of Capacity and Political Will**

Anderson and Torres believe that state fragility can be categorised according to all four of the situations pictured above (*Figure 67*). The author of this thesis takes a more restrictive view, where fragile states are primarily analysed as lacking in infrastructure and state capacity. To do otherwise would create too wide a variety of nations upon which to overlap theories of violent young offending, compromising the relevance of any potential emerging insights into the relationship between violent crime and underdevelopment.

Nevertheless, Anderson and Torres' critique remains hugely relevant to any analysis of fragility. In particular, they write that the “features of weakness” – poor institutional capacity and a lack of political will to instigate change – combine and interact with one another in multiple and dynamic ways, producing results that are largely dependent upon context, demands for reform and the degree of infrastructure development present in a country.

Most prominently, according to Anderson and Torres, state fragility can result in the following six consequences:

1. State collapse: The most urgent and dramatic risk associated with state fragility is that of state failure or state collapse, when the government ceases to function entirely. As

evidenced by Somalia, once a state has moved from fragility to failure, reversing underdevelopment and political instability can prove virtually impossible without a substantial, costly and long-term external intervention.

2. Loss of territorial control: Many theorists define state fragility as a condition which inherently leads to a loss of territorial control, whereby the state's authority and administrative capacity does not extend much further than the capital of the country if at all, Anderson and Torres note that "Incomplete control of the territory may have a long history, or be a sign of a low level of state penetration linked to the enduring power of local or intermediary authorities" (p. 5).

3. Low administrative capacities: Lack of administrative capacity is reflected in the inability of states to monitor their citizens or implement new policies, due to budgeting, resource-based or staffing shortfalls. As seen in Yemen, a lack of operational capacity, as resulting from poor governmental administration, was a key feature of growing political instability and resentment against state infrastructures particularly in the peripheral governorates.

4. Political instability: Due to administrative and authority-based weaknesses, fragile states are often marked by significant political unrest, including civil war. This unrest stems from a failure by the state to manage grievances and to deal effectively with conflict, and is aggravated by severe social inequalities, as outlined in the previous section.

5. Neopatrimonial politics: Fragile states are prone to exhibit strong signs of neopatrimonial politics, shown through high rates of corruption and entrenched patronage systems. Poor state capacity leads government stakeholders to negotiate with outside parties for assistance in supplementing state roles, such as the maintenance of security and the rule of law. Anderson and Torres argue that: "In such cases of pervasive clientelism, the political logic of the system diverts state authority from the stated policy goals to the pursuit of private wealth and power", as has become apparent in Yemen through the emergence of strong, protracted internal power struggles within a demi-shadow state (p. 6).

6. Repressive polities: While many theorists read state fragility as being the product of an infrastructural failure, Anderson and Torres expand the term to include issues relating to bad governance as well. They hold to the view that a state may be considered fragile where it has a strong administrative base and repressive regime that has little desire to reform for the better protection of human rights. This thesis takes the view that fragile states are necessarily characterised by poor governmental capacity. This has been seen in numerous fragile states, but also in the far North and South of Yemen where government crack-downs on protesters and insurgents led to significant casualties in 1994, and between 2005 and 2011.

Anderson and Torres' list, as outlined above, is extensive. It serves to highlight the potential consequences of fragility and to explain why it is that policy-makers and members of the international community have proven increasingly concerned with fragility in recent years.

The primary worry is that, as Robert Zoellick confirms, "fragile states can create fragile regions" (2009, p. 69), so that if, as Chauvet *et al* conclude: "state failure produces large spillover

costs to neighbours”, then “there may be good reason to rethink the conceptual foundations of sovereignty, shifting some sovereignty from the nation to the region, and in the process empowering international intervention” (2007, p. 1). However, the diversion of sovereignty can create cycles of protracted relief and severe aid dependency in fragile states on the one hand, and justify aggressive foreign policies on the other, both of which can serve to further undermine the local authority.

As has already been argued, both Zoellick and Chauvet's economic and almost strategic readings of fragility are problematic. They passively acknowledge a dominant theoretical view within both policy and academia that, while fragile states can negatively impact the development of the regions within which they are located, regional and global forces are not to blame for the conditions that initially generated the underdevelopment of those fragile states. Regionalism in the study of fragility only cuts one way. The fragility framework, with its focus upon national infrastructure and national willpower, only ever undertakes a localised analysis of the main causes of underdevelopment while acknowledging the potential for its international effects. This reality is reflected in the loaded terminology adopted by organisations like the British Department for International Development and the United States Agency for International Development, which highlight the political willpower of countries to reform as a key component for analysis in instances of fragility. Such readings push analysts to begin their investigations by determining the degree to which affected governments are to blame for not reforming themselves effectively.

Overall, while the fragile states framework has enabled the growth of comparative research of underdevelopment within the realm of international politics, and while that framework has at all times striven to be all-inclusive in its understanding of states and state roles, it has also acted in an extremely restrictive manner, adopting a very country-based and often security-oriented conception of underdevelopment.

Despite the vast advances that have been made in development literature since the innovation of the fragile states framework (and particularly in terms of the theoretical conceptualisations of that framework), it is important to keep in mind that, as the Overseas Development Institute write: “Neat categorisations such as fragile/resilient or conflict/post-conflict obscure more than they reveal, defining contexts according to what they are not rather than what they are” (2011, p. 1). Defining fragile states as simply lacking in capacity, political will or social cohesion can lead to an unproductive colouring of the real issues at hand<sup>151</sup>.

However, the fragile states framework nonetheless remains extremely useful when it comes to producing a shorthand terminology that instantly evokes a set of key conditions in the mind of the reader and allows for the generation of exportable findings precisely because of its flexibility. Furthermore, understandings of state fragility have led to greater insight and collaboration on the causes of underdevelopment. As Rotberg asserts, it is generally acknowledged that:

Nation-states fail when they are consumed by internal violence and cease delivering positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose credibility, and the

---

<sup>151</sup> This is why this thesis has relied at all times upon an extensive and in-depth case study of the Yemeni context in order to draw out a theory pertaining to patterns of violent offending among children and young people, rather than setting out at the offset with a comparative analysis based on this framework.

continuing nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes questionable and illegitimate in the hearts and minds of its citizens (p. 1)

Never has state fragility been higher on the international agenda for this reason. In light of increasing crises across the world, as well as growing resource scarcity and economic competition, never has it been more important to understand the root causes of violence and instability in fragile contexts.

Unfortunately, what is evident is that, while the state fragility framework offers one of the best and most comprehensive approaches to underdevelopment produced within the sector, it is beset, like all tools for comparative analysis, with limitations and complications, which emerge in particular when the literature that has been produced on the subject is scrutinised at more than a merely superficial level. There remains a very valid question about the suitability of this framework for providing a baseline for comparative criminological analysis.

This thesis argues that because of the specific patterns of violent criminal behaviour that have emerged from countries that score poorly on the United Nations Development Project's *Human Development Index*, there is a need to better understand the correlation between country-wide underdevelopment and youth aggression. Furthermore, it has been observed that underdevelopment is heightened by a lack of institutional capacity, resulting in authority, services and legitimacy-based failures that are characteristic of fragility, as argued by Stewart and Brown, and evidenced in Chapter 2. It is for these reasons that this thesis has generated and maintained its own typology of state fragility from the outset, which has been needed in order to restrict the variety of cases that can be compared with one another, by adopting a more narrowly defined conception of fragility that examines cases of extreme underdevelopment, like Yemen, only.




Figure 68 State Fragility and Social Cohesion

Comparing Barakat's reading of fragility (Figure 68) with that of Anderson and Torres (Figure 69), this thesis reads fragility as a nexus of both frameworks.




Figure 69 State Fragility as a Measure of Capacity and Political Will

According to this nexus, weak state capacity and a corresponding high level of social fragmentation or social disorder are seen as key defining features of fragility (see Figure 70).




Figure 70 State Fragility as a Product of Poor State Capacity, High Social Fragmentation and Poor Political Integration

This reading of state fragility is symptom-focused, taking the more prominent features and characteristics of so-termed fragile states and using these to identify countries for comparative analysis.

Here, Anderson and Torres' criterion that fragile states are characterised by a lack of political will to reform has been substituted with lack of political integration. The emphasis is shifted away from the political intent of the ruling regime towards community perceptions of state willingness to change, to incorporate oppositional voices and to grant access to mainstream calls for reform.

It is argued that under this typology, notions of “weak” and “strong” instances of state fragility are removed from the analytical framework, so that only countries experiencing all three

categories of poor state capacity, high social fragmentation and poor political integration are considered to be fragile. Contrary to much of the literature on fragility, this typology is not particularly concerned with the causes of fragility, but rather with its manifestations and effects, which include the inability of fragile states to weather regional and global socio-economic changes safely.

With a focus on the manifestations of fragility, the author has chosen to add another dimension of conflict to the analysis, so that fragile states without any history of civil war are not considered in the end criminological analysis employed by this thesis. The typology is therefore primarily used to better understand the impact that country-wide underdevelopment, prolonged insecurity and a lack of service provision have on societies from a specifically crime-based perspective.

Whether or not such restrictions of the state fragility framework will allow for the generation of a unifying theory of crime causation is a theme that will be discussed throughout this Chapter and addressed more specifically in Chapter 8. It is important to note here that a feature that makes this process of comparison easier is that the typology continues to distinguish between fragile and failing states, so that all countries analysed, like Yemen, must maintain a functioning, if extremely weak, government, thereby excluding states like Somalia.

#### **6.4 The Impact of Conflict and State Fragility on Children and Young People**

The two previous sections of this chapter have outlined to some extent contemporary theories of conflict and fragility. Even a brief examination of these issues reveals that conflict and fragility have a huge potential to harm vulnerable members of society like children and young people in particular, especially given the emergence of new wars in which civilians have proven to be the primary targets.

It has been found in the United Nations World Youth Report of 2003 that young people are at risk of being singled out for recruitment into armed violence and criminal organisations, so that:

Young people's participation in armed hostilities is facilitated through the trade of small arms and light weapons. The dearth of opportunities in their communities often leads them to gravitate towards violent conflict and acts of terrorism. Many are successfully mobilized through the ideologies of war. As victims and witnesses, they cannot help but be affected by the grim realities surrounding them. (p. 371)

Beyond the effects of direct violence, children and young people are at risk of feeling the brunt of indirect consequences of war and displacement, which are equally important. Thus the spread of common communicable diseases, which may prove easily treatable in peace time, can prove deadly to children even where they may be relatively safe for adults to endure. Likewise, the economic effect of fragility, which results in unemployment, poverty, malnutrition and starvation, can be devastating.

Edward Goldson writes that, where conflict takes place in underdeveloped countries, "children are maimed and killed", but they also die of "outright famine", as well as of "measles, diphtheria, polio, malaria, cholera, meningitis, and dysentery, which, by and large, are preventable

and certainly treatable illnesses” (1993, pp. 18-19), where diarrhoea remains the greatest killer to this day. The effects of fragility are therefore easily made visible through child mortality rates, with child mortality being heavily correlated with state fragility (see Table 11).

<b>Human Development Indicator</b>	<b>America</b>	<b>Canada</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1000 people) for 2008	8	6	4	4	6
<b>Human Development Indicator</b>	<b>Afghanistan</b>	<b>Somalia</b>	<b>Iraq</b>	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>Yemen</b>
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1000 people) for 2008	257	180	44	67	69

**Table 11 Under 5 Mortality Rates in Fragile States and Most Developed Countries**

Even where conflict is not a factor, state fragility leads to a significant escalation of under 5 mortality rates.

If we are to take a strict view of fragility as being symptomatic of poor institutional capacity, then the impact of conflict and state fragility on children and young people can be analysed as being directly related to the absence of corresponding state services. A lack of state capacity to deliver education leads to poor education levels among children in fragile contexts. A lack of healthcare services leads to increased rates of disease contraction, as well as higher physical consequences of illness and injury, including death. A lack of welfare services leads to the rise of poverty and hunger. A lack of public safety leads to increased vulnerability to crime and violence. Thus, in contexts affected by fragility as well as by conflict, it is found in the *World Youth Report* that “Young people have much at stake, yet they have little say in the policies and activities that pertain to their lives” (2003, p. 373): in Yemen youth groups have been excluded from peace negotiations, despite their strong involvement in pro-change movements.

Apart from having a real physical impact on the safety and integrity of children, these factors also produce important psychological effects in young people that can strongly alter their psychosocial development with corresponding criminogenic influences. It is found that the vast majority of children and young people who have been directly exposed to conflict and insecurity have experienced traumatic events as strictly defined in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the emergence of post-traumatic stress disorder in the late 1970s, where “the concept of trauma was confined to catastrophic events falling outside the perimeter of everyday experience” (Richard McNally, 2004, p. 1). Such experiences, where they do lead to psychological scarring or post-traumatic disorders can manifest themselves through several “signs and symptoms” that include; “repeatedly re-experiencing the trauma”, “avoidance of activities and stimuli associated with the trauma and emotional numbing”, and “heightened arousal” - defined here as heightened “irritability” or as an “exaggerated startle reflex” (p. 2).

Adding to these risks, the *World Youth Report* states that “During warfare, girls ... encounter threats of rape, sexual mutilation and exploitation, trafficking and humiliation”, so that “Many are beaten regardless of their level of compliance with the demands of their attackers” (2003, p. 374).

Boys are forcefully recruited into gangs and armed groups as child soldiers or low-level criminals, where they face enormous pressures to commit significant acts of violence (often being held themselves quite literally at gunpoint) in order to advance their social standing within these “emotive” or “antisocial” organisations. These gender vulnerabilities are frequently reversed as well, with boys falling victim to rape and girls being pushed into violent behaviour, but these reversals are less widely talked about and seem to be largely absent in most literature on child soldiers, as they are absent from the *World Youth Report*. In both cases, the nature of state fragility is such that boys and girls alike are unlikely to gain access to the kind of social services that would allow them to overcome their traumas. In practice, they are more likely to meet severe social and cultural stigmatisation from local communities that can severely hamper their effective reintegration into peaceful and law abiding societies, maintaining and reinforcing their “deviant”<sup>152</sup> identities.

Displacement, caused by either conflict or natural disaster, is another dimension that increases child vulnerability in this sense. In 2011, it was reported that “the number of forcibly displaced people around the world [had] reached a 15-year high”, with “43.7 million refugees and people displaced within their country”, of which “more than half of the total” were children (Shiv Malik). Displaced children and young people are not only often separated from their families and therefore placed at far greater risk of suffering the traumas detailed above, but they are also usually out of school and employment, while sometimes facing the resentments of local community members who see them to be a drain on local resources.

This was found to be the case in Yemen among Somali refugees in particular, who were seen to be an unwelcome criminal element by host communities and local law enforcement services<sup>153</sup>. Such perceptions are aggravated across the world, write the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, because: “Adolescents from disadvantaged groups, including ethnic minorities and migrants, are disproportionately likely to offend”, while “Adolescents who spend periods of pre-trial detention or serve prison sentences alongside adults are much less likely to be reintegrated into society when they are released and much more likely to revert to criminal behaviour” - leading to self-perpetuating cycles of criminality among migrants and displaced children and young people (2011, p. 55).

To make matters more complicated, Jon Pederson and Tone Sommerfelt contend that children in conflict-affected countries can be understood to occupy “three states”: “children may be in danger of getting involved, they may be in conflict, and they may occupy a post-conflict state” (2007, p. 253). The authors argue that each such state needs to be analysed separately, so that children become either “exposed” to violence or “participants” in violence. This thesis is primarily concerned with children and young people who “participate” in violence, but participation does not negate exposure, and, as Chapter 4 has demonstrated, exposure to violence can be an important determining factor for future aggressive behaviour.

Peterson and Sommerfelt quantify their argument by stating that children who are exposed or affected by conflict include those who live “in an area under occupation, where armed combat occurs or where the use of arms or the threat of use of arms disrupts normal provision of means of livelihood, health, security and/or other basic rights of the child” (p. 254). Likewise, it is argued here

---

<sup>152</sup> The concept of deviance is used here according to the definition put forward in section 4.3.1.

<sup>153</sup> See Chapter 2.

that children and young people who are affected by state fragility are equally those who feel the brunt of a lack of effective state services most strongly, where such services include healthcare, education, welfare, potable water, electricity, fuel, justice and security, so that the risk of exposure to social and political violence is greatly increased.

Peterson and Sommerfelt conclude that in countries where significant governance failures have occurred, it is relatively easy to determine the number of children and young people exposed to conflict (or, in this case, fragility). However, it is virtually impossible to know how many are participants in violence, precisely because their participation, as combatants, criminals or deviants, is deliberately concealed either by themselves or by the organisations and groups within which they are involved. Thus, “Children who participate” in conflict and violence “are considerably more difficult to study than those that are simply 'exposed'” to these phenomena, though both groups are equally vulnerable to the effects of conflict and fragility (p. 256). This only complicates the nature of the challenges faced by children and young people who participate in violence by leading to a lack of investigation into, and a lack of understanding of, their aggressive behaviour modes by academics, governments and development practitioners.

## 6.5 The Situation of Children and Young People in Yemen




Figure 71 Two Young Street Vendors, Sana'a City Centre

All of the conditions outlined that are faced by children and young people in conflict-affected fragile states can be found in the Yemeni context. These impact the development of Yemeni children in multiple ways, which can be correlated with the criminological theories outlined in Chapter 4 and used to gain an insight into the patterns of violent young offending illustrated in Chapter 3. Children and young people in Yemen are at a heightened risk of malnutrition, starvation and premature death<sup>154</sup>. With an under-5 mortality rate of 69 deaths per 1000 people in 2008, the

---

<sup>154</sup> See sections 2.5 and 2.6 of Chapter 2.

most common causes of death among Yemeni children are: diarrhoea, contracted through the consumption of unsafe drinking water; exposure to common and often treatable communicable diseases; poor hygiene; bad eating habits; and, a number of other associated illnesses.



**Figure 72 World Health Organisation Yemen Health Profile Table of Under-5 Mortality Causes for 2011**

As Figure 72, taken from the World Health Organisation's Yemen Health Profile for 2011, indicates, other causes of child mortality include conditions associated with bad birthing procedures, maternal malnutrition during pregnancy and poor living conditions. Abdulkarim Ismail Al-Arhabi, Mohamed Ahmed Al-Hawri and Abdulmajeed Al-Shaikh Ali Al-Batuly write that 53.1% of “under five children are dwarfed while 46% are underweight (mild and severe) and 12.4% are thin (severely underweight)” owing to severe malnutrition, whereby “These percentages increase in rural areas more than the urban ones” (2010, p. 26). They find that the “proportion of underweight under-5 children in the poorest performing governorates” in Yemen reached 71% in Al-Dhaleah, was 64.4% in Amran and 63.4% in Al-Hodeidah in 2010, while even “the better performing governorates” of “Al-Maharah (11.8%), Hajja (20.8%) and Aden (23.4%)” were not untouched by undernourishment (p. 6).

Young people are at risk of contracting sexually transmitted diseases, particularly in coastal areas where there is elevated population movement and migration. With the high stigmatisation of sexual activity and poor rates of sex education coverage on a national level, they are extremely unlikely to seek medical treatment if they are affected by such illnesses. Girls and boys who fall victim to sexual violence are also unlikely to seek any kind of medical or psychological assistance (as is made evident by Yemen's negligible rate of rape reporting<sup>155</sup>), resulting in a high probability of physical harm, prolonged depression and trauma among victims.

Other factors compound the effects of poverty, hunger and violence on children and young people in Yemen, compromising their healthy development. These are made evident by Yemen's poor performance in the *Human Development Index* (see Table 12).

<sup>155</sup> See Annex 1: Yemen had a rate of 0.0038597 rapes recorded for every 1,000 people in 2005, which is extremely low, compared to other countries.

Indicator	2011 Value
Expected years of schooling (of children under 7) (years)	8.6
Adult literacy rate, both sexes (% aged 15 and above)	62.4
Mean years of schooling (of adults over 25) (years)	2.5
Combined gross enrolment in education (both sexes) (%)	54.4
Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women aged 15-19)	78.8

**Table 12 Child Welfare and Development Indicators for Yemen**

While overall levels of student enrolment in schools in Yemen have increased dramatically over the past decade, owing, in part, to the reduction and even the eradication of school fees in some areas in 2006 (Ministry of Education et al, 2010); there remain real constraints inhibiting the long-term retention of school-aged children in education, so that adults above the age of 25 tend to have only completed 2.5 years of schooling on average within their lifetimes.

In 2011, despite the abolition of school fees “for girls attending grades 1-6 and boys in grades 1-3” (p. 3), the combined gross enrolment in education for both sexes stood at only 54.4%, with huge numbers of young women leaving school particularly after marriage or early pregnancy and many other children kept out of school due to the general insecurity brought about by the Arab Spring.

Adding to population growth, the high fertility rate among young girls and women contributes to resource competition and unemployment<sup>156</sup>, increasing the stresses of daily life for children and young people across Yemen. Growing pressure to secure income, nutrition and standing within communities leads not only to significant emotional pressure at a young age, but also to increased threat of exposure to violence and criminality.

In their comprehensive and multi-sectoral assessment of youth in Yemen, the Education Development Centre (EDC) of the United States Agency for International Development write that: “Youth violence is a growing problem in Yemen”, where “youth” are defined for the purposes of their survey as people between the ages of 15 and 25 (2008, p. 31). The EDC posit that a number of dynamics in Yemen, as identified by Yemeni youth themselves, have led to the mass radicalisation of young people, which can be understood as eleven interlinking phenomena. While these phenomena are frequently associated with political violence, they are nonetheless important for conceptualising the unique living conditions of children and young people in the country.

The EDC write that (1) poor family communication and high isolation within families is a strong precursor for violent behaviour in Yemen: “young people are under pressure because they feel their families and communities do not value and appreciate them, which leads to isolation. According to the participants, this pushes them to the streets where they mix with the 'wrong peers' and become vulnerable to recruitment by extremist groups” (p. 32). The effect of this absence of

<sup>156</sup> See sections 2.5 and 2.6 of Chapter 2.

positive home environments is compounded by (2) a general lack of safe spaces for social interaction, so that children and young people are at risk of social violence and other negative influences as soon as they are out on the streets. With a lack of community and leisure centres, there is nowhere else for young people to go. Displaced, runaway and homeless children are at a heightened risk of harm in this sense.

The lack of safe spaces for children and young people ties into another significant factor for youth frustration, which is (3) a general dissatisfaction with educational services and facilities resulting in an overall reluctance to go to school. It has been found by the EDC among others that there exists a significant discrepancy between education needs and education, whereby secondary school does not prepare students with the sufficient skills necessary to face common day-to-day challenges in life. This issue also emerged from interviews conducted with the Ministry of Education (17 August 2010) and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (15 August 2010), where it was noted that the Government of Yemen simply could not offer sufficiently appealing working conditions to attract high calibre graduates to teaching in schools, so that teachers, in practice, represented the least qualified school-finishers of Yemeni society. The lack of commitment and dedication of educational staff to their students was considered by key stakeholders to be a priority factor behind Yemen's extremely poor student retention rates, so that many children and young people no longer see participation in school to be conducive towards future career enhancement.

Of greater concern here are (4) the high levels of violence in schools reported by the EDC between students and between students and teachers, as identified by young people themselves. This speaks to both the high level of student dissatisfaction with educational environments and the overall socialisation of young people to violence. Such socialisation, young people implied, occurred through their interaction with several crucial social dynamics in their communities: (5) the idealisation of aggressive behaviour models through popular media; (6) uneven access to political representation and the mainstream political sphere; (7) perceived international, regional and national injustices that marginalise religious groupings; and, (8) the pervasiveness of religious extremists and manipulative political parties or tribal leaders in positions of high social influence. It is particularly interesting to note that the idealisation of violence, as combined with a lack of effective avenues for interaction with the state, have been identified as central themes of aggression by children and young people in Yemen, supporting the hypothesis of this thesis<sup>157</sup>.

The marginalisation of young people from political processes, as combined with broad social inequalities, makes them prime targets for recruitment by violent social groups, including insurgents, terrorists and criminal organisations. These social factors are aggravated, according to young people themselves, by economic stresses that include: (9) low access to financial resources, including employment opportunities, lending agencies and social welfare funds; and, (10) inflation, including escalating wedding and dowry prices. Solutions to the violence and heightened aggression generated by these dynamics have also proven to be ineffectual, with young people citing the final contributor to their violent behaviour as being (11) an interaction with prison environments, whereby young offenders are integrated with political extremists in prison communities. This last

---

<sup>157</sup> The hypothesis is laid out in section 1.2.2.

point formed a priority for analysis in Chapter 5, emerging as it did as a secondary effect of criminal behaviour and punitive interventions.

## 6.6 Violent Young Offending in Fragile States

As the 2011 *World Development Report* summarises, there are many overlaps between the causes of violence and the causes of conflict: “Internal causes of conflict arise from political, security, and economic dynamics”, and “it is difficult to disentangle causes and effects of violence”. Key factors such as “Lower GDP per capita”, “youth violence”, “political exclusion” and a need to feel “more secure and powerful” are “robustly associated with both large-scale political conflict and high rates of homicide” (p. 6). Each of these factors is necessarily present in fragile states, where many countries experience the significant victimisation of children and young people who tend to be isolated from political processes and social services alike, so that young people begin to emerge as both the victims and perpetrators of violent crime.

Mapping these points against each other, along with theories of crime and conflict, important socio-economic and political risk factors of state fragility begin to emerge (see Figure 73).




Figure 73 Causes of Crime Versus Causes of Conflict in Fragile States

It becomes apparent that certain defining features of fragility emerge as predictors for violent criminal behaviour among children and young people, with key cross-over points including economic stress factors and socialisation to violence. Issues of social and physical disorder, as associated with property damage and degradation, weapons and narcotics proliferation, poverty and ineffective policing all seem to be especially important in this sense, and ought to be prioritised by any relevant interventions that seek to reduce youth aggression.

As these conditions offer merely a list of relevant indicators, rather than a coherent theoretical framework, they remain somewhat unsatisfying as an academic answer to the problem of youth violence in fragile states. It seems that they offer more of an end snapshot of the conditions that result after social degradation has taken place, as opposed to revealing the process through which such degradation occurs and impacts child development.

There is a need to conduct a two-part analysis, which seeks to understand why children and young people resort to apolitical violence in Yemen in the first instance and whether or not this same explanation can be applied to all fragile states in the second instance.

In an attempt to address these issues and to prioritise emerging dynamics effectively, Table 13 maps theories of crime and fragility against the priority indicators for aggressive behaviour identified by young Yemeni people in the United States Agency for International Development's Education Development Centre (EDC) survey. It lists a number of socio-economic and political dynamics identified as relevant by development practitioners and criminologists for understanding the propensity for states to display characteristics of fragility or high criminal violence (explored in Chapters 4 and 6). It seeks to identify which of these dynamics are equally important for producing state fragility and high levels of criminal activity, but also, which of these are furthermore prioritised by Yemeni young people as challenges that have led them to adopt aggressive behaviour patterns when overcoming the obstacles in their own lives.

<b>Socio-economic or political dynamic</b>	<b>Is it a defining feature of state fragility?</b>	<b>Is it prioritised by criminological theory?</b>	<b>Is it identified by Yemeni young people as a cause of violence?</b>
Poverty	√Yes	√Yes	√Yes
Unemployment	✗No	√Yes	√Yes
An absence of security and a lack of government control over legitimate violence	√Yes	✗No	✗No
A lack of state administrative capacity and service delivery	√Yes	✗No	√Yes
Political instability	√Yes	✗No	√Yes
Repressive polities, lack of political representation, loss of state legitimacy	√Yes	<i>It is prioritised by theories of legitimacy and cooperation</i>	√Yes
Poor family communication	✗No	√Yes	√Yes
A lack of safe spaces for children and young people, association with social deviants	<i>This is a defining feature of conflict-affected fragile states more specifically</i>	√Yes	√Yes

Poor education services	√Yes	√Yes	√Yes
Socialisation to violence, idealisation of aggressive behaviour	<i>No, though it is often an implied feature of fragility and is a defining feature of conflict-affected fragile states</i>	√Yes	√Yes
Weapons and narcotics proliferation	√Yes	√Yes	✗No
Ineffective or illegitimate policing and judicial services	√Yes	√Yes	✗No
Social isolation of young people	✗No	√Yes	√Yes

**Table 13 Important Criminological Dynamics in Fragile States**

Those dynamics that are identified in all three categories are those to be prioritised by any emerging analytical framework of violent young offending in fragile states or, at the very least, being classed as important in all three areas, warrant further investigation. While only suggestive in nature, the findings of this analysis help to open up the debate on the relationship between state fragility and violent crime, allowing those interested in international development to consider the causes and consequences of youth violence and aggression without having to work exclusively within the over-analysed framework of youth radicalisation. The problem of youth violence can be considered within its social, cultural, criminal and economic context, rather than from the purely political focus that seems to have been adopted by the international development sector.

It has been found here that: poverty; repressive polities and a loss of state legitimacy; a lack of safe spaces for children and young people; poor education services; and, socialisation to violence, are cross-cutting themes that are generally associated with a rejection of social norms and increased violence and hostility in Yemen. However, are these factors sufficiently important to play a part in generating aggression in other fragile states? Poverty seems here to be a particularly prominent indicator, but while the community-based risk factors outlined in Chapter 4 imply that a high prevalence of poor people can elevate crime rates – economic and labour market risk factors would indicate that the relationship between poverty and crime should not necessarily be considered to be so straight forward.

Indeed, although the findings of this thesis are based predominantly theoretical rather than statistical research, and though its claims are therefore intended to be read as suggestive, rather than empirical, a comparative analysis of global development and homicide statistics shifts the priorities established in Table 13 in order to corroborate the behaviour anticipated by criminological theory in this sense on a global level. If, therefore, the world's countries are listed according to their *Multidimensional Poverty Index* (MPI) values, as listed in the *Human Development Index* for 2011, no clear correlation between poverty as defined by the international community and homicide rates emerges (see Figure 74).




Figure 74 Countries Listed According to Their Multidimensional Poverty Index Value

This may be because countries in the developed world are not given an MPI rating, whereas within the developing world, fluctuating rates of poverty that are already comparatively quite high are not sufficient to generate large fluctuations in rates of homicide.

A different story begins to emerge, however, when states are listed according to their GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (see Figure 75).




Figure 75 Countries Listed According to Their GDP per Capita in Purchasing Power Parity

Here, while countries with high levels of gang violence generated by international narcotics smuggling rings and organised crime networks represent high peaks in homicide rates, as evidenced in the cases of Colombia, Mexico and the Russian Federation, there is an overall mild rate of increase in murders as correlated with a decrease in GDP values. Also of interest is that this increase in homicide seems to be correlated with incidents of income inequality, so that the homicide trend line exhibited follows the same peaks and dips as the trend line indicating national percentages of loss of income due to inequality (see *Figure 75*). This finding is interesting as it supports economic social opportunity theories<sup>158</sup>, which are used to argue that crime emerges as a reaction to blocked social and economic opportunities.

Other poverty indicators, like a decrease in national gross rates of enrolment in education for both sexes, are associated with an increase in homicide rates, which is fairly interesting given the picture painted by Table 13, which lists poor education services and a lack of safe spaces for children and young people as important indicators for youth aggression. Thus, while criminological theories pertaining to the behaviour of school-aged children tend to be overly concerned with school environments to acknowledge the influences of state fragility, social control theories might argue that the lack of social involvement generated by children being left out of education, along with the alienation of young people from their schools and homes, diminishes their sense of attachment to, and involvement in, communities.

School-based criminogenic risk factors<sup>159</sup> can be used to argue that those children who do attend school are affected by an absence of positive school-to-student bonds, which are undermined by poor teacher training and violence between students and teachers<sup>160</sup>.


The influence of these trends becomes more obvious when countries are listed according to their rates of income inequality (see *Figure 76*). The higher the levels of socio-economic inequality, the higher the probability of violent offending, where the global correlation is weak but present. While poverty emerges as an important global trend associated with violent crime, economic disparity and inequality at a national level, as combined with other broad social inequalities, seem to be more important promoters of criminal violence and aggression among children and young people.

---

<sup>158</sup> See Chapter 4, section 4.2.5, on 'Economic and Labour Market Causes' of crime.

<sup>159</sup> Likewise, the family-based risk factors pertaining to delinquency and youth violence that were detailed in Chapter 4 indicate that an absence of child attachment to positive adult role models may also lead to inhibited socialisation or a lack of acceptance of social norms, values and beliefs, leading to an increased rate of young offending. In Yemen, however, where religious value systems are extremely prominent, leading to a demonisation of theft and other property offences, it makes sense that child rebellion against social and state rules might take on more overtly violent forms, particularly when social learning theories are considered in light of Yemen's emerging culture of violence.

<sup>160</sup> See Chapter 7.



**Figure 76 Countries Listed According to Income Inequality**

This seems to hold true at the national level in Yemen, where violent crime is positively associated with impoverished governorates, and particularly so in Northern areas where communities perceive their state as exercising a high level of religious discrimination against them.

There are potentially important lessons to be drawn here from theories of legitimacy and cooperation, where violent crime is positively correlated with geographic areas where government legitimacy is perceived as being low due to discriminatory policies and a lack of integration and representation of diverse cultural and religious groupings within mainstream political processes (see *Figure 77*).




Figure 77 Map of Reported Violent Crime in Yemen for 2009.

These findings also seem to hold true at a global level, so that it is not entirely unreasonable that the prevalence of income inequality, and other forms of social injustice, are likely to be key determining factors for criminal behaviour in fragile states. Yemen's national statistics in this sense confirm another finding from the Table 13, where a socialisation to violence was identified as an implied feature of fragility, a priority for Yemeni youth, and a key influence within criminological theory: those governorates in Yemen that are found to be the most affected by violent offending are also those that have been exposed to protracted conflict, where the continual exposure of children and young people to political violence seems to make them more likely to adopt modes of behaviour that are either criminally or mindlessly violent.

From a criminological perspective, the high prevalence of income inequality and physical violence in fragile states (if they are impacting the rate of violent young offending within these countries) must be adding to rates of physical and psychological stress for young people by increasing the level of everyday obstacles that they face to achieving their social and economic goals, and by diminishing their stake in society and social conformity<sup>161</sup>, where social conformity implies an acceptance of socio-economic inequality. This argument is supported by strain theory, which views crime as a reaction to emerging gaps between social ambitions and social capacity.

It can be speculated that the importance of these stress factors must increase with state fragility, whereby the general lack of support structures, socialising activities and social services made available to children and young people undermines their ability to deal with and move past the pressures of facing daily socio-economic barriers to their integration within community, tribal, economic and national hierarchies. These priority areas are highlighted by the selection by Yemeni young people of poverty and the payment of important socio-cultural expenses like dowries and

<sup>161</sup> See section 4.3.1.

weddings as primary factors leading to their increased stress and violence. They indicate that children and young people in Yemen have a strong desire to be integrated into mainstream social and communal structures, to start families, and to succeed economically, but that the lack of avenues for them to do so legitimately is generating a sense of hostility towards the norms of Yemeni society, raising frustrations that are likely to accumulate and erupt through violent means of self-expression.

It is posited that, as children and young people are isolated from social activities like employment and education, and placed at the bottom of the country's income generating population (children, young people and university graduates in Yemen show the highest combined levels of unemployment in the country), their aggression and propensity to commit violence naturally increases.

Those children and young people who are able to secure livelihood opportunities in Yemen, meanwhile, face continual fears of losing such income, as well as poor working conditions and a lack of income stability. Most do not pay income tax and are employed in businesses that are deliberately hidden from the state, as has been confirmed in interviews conducted with both the Yemeni Ministry of Social and Labour Affairs (*August 16th, 2010*) and the International Labour Organisation (*August 15th, 2010*), so that young people are generally extremely limited when accessing official sources of assistance if they are mistreated at work.



**Figure 78** Young Yemeni Merchant, Sana'a City Centre

Added to this is the stress of continual exposure to violence or the threat of violence that many Yemeni young people face at home, on the street and in schools, and as a result of either social, criminal or political risk factors. To understand this as a linear process correlated with the degree of state fragility, it is suggested that it might be more conceptually helpful to visualise violence committed by children and young people as being the product of a build-up of aggression and frustration over time. Within the context of Yemen, the socio-economic and political conditions generated by state fragility place young people under enormous psychological and physical pressure to survive in the first instance (depending on their location and social identity) and to achieve some sort of income and sense of social standing in the second.

Combined with a general lack of public safety and safe public spaces for children and young people, it is suggested that these issues can lead to growing psychological fatigue, depression or irritability, with aggression and violence increasing as natural bi-products of these conditions. In Yemen, the pressures generated by each of these social and economic dimensions are aggravated by cultural, religious and tribal factors, where the constraints of tribal and religious valuation systems prevent young people from committing petty theft and property-related offences while also creating very high social pressures to conform to particular cultural standards – like owning land or paying high dowry prices – which are simply beyond the reach of the country's poor. Meanwhile, tribal affiliations and cultural principles have led to a gradual rejection of state services, state representatives and state bodies of law enforcement, leading to a lack of access by young people to the state, and by the state to young people.

While the economic and social pressures experienced by young people in Yemen are likely to be translatable to other fragile states, it is not immediately evident to what extent these cultural aspects are equally universal, and to what extent they are central to elevating youth aggression beyond safety limits in Yemen specifically. This one point of contention could bar the formation of a unifying theory of violent young offending in fragile states or, rather, it could mean that any unifying theory would always have to be catered to local environments when applied to new cultural settings (though universal trends would remain important). The analysis carried out thus far indicates that key cross-over points between criminological theories and development literature contain pertinent observations about the way in which state fragility impacts violent young offending, generating exportable conclusions.

To return to Michael Anderson and Magui Moreno Torres' reading of the dimensions of state development: state fragility is frequently understood to be a measure of a lack of institutional capacity and a lack of political willpower to reform state infrastructure and governmental representativeness. While it has been found that a lack of institutional capacity is a key element for increasing psychosocial pressure on young people, it is a lack of visible or perceived political willpower to reform and improve service provision by the state that seems to have emerged as a crucial cause of frustration among children and young people in Yemen, culminating in their violent rejection of the ruling regime during the Arab Spring of 2011. This has meant that even peaceful protest organisers have been unable to keep young people from venting their frustrations through violent forms of expression that include criminal violence, as emerged from interviews with Husam Al-Sharjabi in 2012.

At a fundamental level, fragile states are defined as those that do not hold a monopoly over legitimate violence and have only loose territorial control over their countries. It can be argued that, while the Yemeni state retained some element of authority prior to 2011, its general inability to distribute services and resources evenly across the country led to calls for political reform, heightened national hostility and radicalisation, and a deterioration of the security situation and the further collapse of state capacities that resulted from the diversion of funding towards military expenses.

The dissatisfaction of Yemeni children and young people with this status quo and with the continual disintegration of the security situation is made evident by their identification of uneven access to political processes and repressive political procedures as a main cause of their increased

aggression. While the violent criminal behaviour analysed in this thesis can be referred to as “mindless” violence, that is – violence committed, for the most part, without a clear political or economic objective, violent young offending in Yemen can nonetheless be read as the product of political risk factors and the stagnation of political deadlocks, whose lack of effective resolution has led to significant levels of general frustration, stress and aggression among children and young people. Due to the definitional parameters of state fragility, where state fragility is read by Frances Stewart and Graham Brown (2010) as a cross-over of legitimacy, authority and services failures, similar challenges are likely to abound across other least developed contexts, where apolitical violence may occasionally require political solutions, with a strengthening of state capacity and a widening of state service delivery being potentially vital to reducing criminal violence<sup>162</sup>.

Due to a lack of authority generation by fragile states, least developed countries face a gradual breakdown of their security situations, particularly where conflict is a factor, paving the road for criminal opportunists and aggressive movements to take hold and increase general levels of violence. Widespread violence not only results in the closure of social services, but also in diminished access and accessibility of important institutions, including educational facilities and healthcare centres. Basic security is necessary to ensure all other state functions<sup>163</sup>. The more violence increases, the more state capacities are affected and weathered away by insecurity.

As the security situation and the capacity of the state deteriorates, socio-economic pressures on young people begin to accumulate, as aggravated by the overall stresses of continual exposure to multilevel violence, leading to a gradual build-up in youth aggression, aggravated by a lack of socialising activities like education or gainful employment (see Figure 79).




Figure 79 State Fragility and Youth Aggression

Frances Stewart notes that existing theories of conflict causation state that “social stability is based on a hypothetical social contract between the people and the government”, whereby “People accept state authority so long as the state delivers services and provides reasonable economic conditions”. With clear links to theories of legitimacy and cooperation within criminology, as well as theories of socialisation and social learning, Stewart explains that as “economic stagnation or

<sup>162</sup> See Chapter 7.

<sup>163</sup> See section 6.3.

decline” increases and state services worsen, “the social contract breaks down, and violence results” (2002, p.343). What is more apparent now is that it is not necessary for such violence to be of a political character, so discussions of youth radicalisation can obscure a much wider problem where violence resulting from political crises is not always linked to social causes but can be far more mindless, spontaneous and unpredictable in nature. The challenge of youth violence, particularly when it emerges as criminal violence without a clear political objective, is likely to outlive the social causes that generated increased insecurity in the first place.

To contrast these findings against the original theoretical dimensions identified as part of the hypothesis, it is now possible to see how, while many of these observations remain important, some require amendment or re-prioritisation. It was anticipated that a theory of violent young offending in fragile states would end up focusing on: (1) pervasive violence, (2) a breakdown of governmental legitimacy, and (3) an erosion of traditional norms of socialisation, with (4) the distribution of weapons and narcotics emerging as a potential supplementary condition for violent activity. It is now argued that (4) is an aggravating risk factor, which likely increases the severity of criminal violence in fragile states but is not in itself a cause of violent young offending within such contexts.

The three remaining dimensions are still very pertinent, though it has become possible as a result of the research initiative to form a clearer understanding of their interactions. Upon re-evaluation of criminological and development literature, it is now argued that (1) the absence of state services, legitimate opportunities and socialising activities for young people in fragile states, along with (2) their exposure to significant levels of violence, produces (3) extreme economic, psychological and socio-cultural stresses that lead to their increased aggression and (4) rejection of state legitimacy, combine to raise the likelihood of violent young offending in Yemen and other fragile states.

Included in the absence of state services and legitimate opportunities are a lack of good quality primary, secondary and higher level education facilities, as well as a lack of employment pathways, leading to diminished processes of socialisation and the erosion of corresponding social control mechanisms, whereby young people do not feel that they are involved or have a stake in mainstream society, and do not develop important connections that generate empathy with their fellow citizens. Meanwhile, exposure to violence incorporates both the stress factors associated with a perpetual fear for personal safety as well as a diminished sensitivity to the shock value of strong violence, so that violence against others becomes an almost acceptable behavioural norm. This re-assessment and the dimensions it comprises forms the theoretical framework of violent young offending in fragile states for this thesis, which is informed more specifically by the Yemeni case study<sup>164</sup>.

---

<sup>164</sup> The extent to which this framework is applicable to all fragile states, not just to Yemen, is an issue that will be further debated in Chapter 8.

## 6.7 Peripheral Causes of Criminality in Fragile States

Peripheral causes<sup>165</sup> of violent young offending in Yemen and other fragile states are taken to refer to aggravating risk factors that are likely to increase rather than trigger youth aggression (see Figure 80).




Figure 80 Central and Peripheral Causes of Criminality and Violent Young Offending in Fragile States

This section will look at each of these influences in more detail, grouping them together thematically within its overview. Social isolation, lack of effective family communication and unemployment will be grouped together under the umbrella category of “youth isolation”, pertaining as they do to a lack of effective integration of young people within society. Violence escalation, lack of stigma associated with violence and gender-based violence, weapons proliferation and imprisonment will be addressed under the category of “violent socialisation”. Poor administrative capacity, illegitimate or ineffective law enforcement systems, and substance abuse will be analysed as aspects of “weak state infrastructures”. Adding to the list of indicators provided in Chapter 4, each of these should be read as criminogenic risk factors that emerge specifically from the context of state fragility.

### 6.7.1 Youth Isolation

Three risk factors identified in section 6.6 (Table 13) but not prioritised within the framework include; social isolation, lack of effective family communication and unemployment. All

<sup>165</sup> While the previous section sought to prioritise facets of crime causation in fragile states as a process, this section is more interested in resulting criminogenic risk factors that can be extrapolated from the criminological literature surveyed in Chapter 4 and adapted to Yemen and other fragile state contexts. The theory outlined in section 6.6 has been deliberately selective in its analysis in order to understand socio-economic pressures to offend and their linkages to international development. As such, it has prioritised key criminogenic conditions above other peripheral dynamics that also acts as contributors to criminal environments. Thus, the framework should be read as a causal analysis, rather than as an exhaustive list of criminogenic influences.

three of these influences diminish the effectiveness of the four elements of social control outlined in section 4.3.1, in that each of these contributes to the isolation of children and young people from community, social, economic and cultural life in fragile states. It has been found within the Yemeni case study, as summarised by Kate Nevens, Middle East and North Africa Programme Manager for Chatham House, that “there is no access for young people” to community or tribal decision-making processes, which are left to the administration of community elders (*Interview conducted 29 February, 2012*). Likewise, there has been very little access to political processes offered to young people within traditional Yemeni political systems, a trend that is likely to continue even after the strong involvement of young people within the Arab Spring in 2011.

Combined with a lack of employment opportunities in the country, this means that development conditions in Yemen are geared towards inhibiting the attachment, commitment and involvement of young people to society, under a social control model of criminological theory. When the lack of family communication highlighted by Yemeni youth is taken into account, it is also suspected that belief-based systems of crime control may be undermined. While family, educational, state and tribal involvement in the lives of children and young people are relatively low in Yemen, the strong commitment of young people to religious principles and conceptions of morality likely serve to mitigate the absence of other belief-based mechanisms for instilling social constructions of right and wrong, compensating for this last aspect of youth isolation within Yemeni homes. However, due to the integration of religious and tribal systems of valuation in Yemen, these belief systems are not necessarily used to prioritise violence reduction, being focused more prominently upon other behavioural norms. This has led to an acceptance of certain forms of violent behaviour within Yemeni society in particular<sup>166</sup>.

These distinctions may speak to the uniqueness of the Yemeni context, but the high prevalence of youth isolation, particularly in work environments and homes, is a criminogenic risk factor that is likely to be present in all fragile states, due to the very nature of the conditions that generate state fragility.

### **6.7.2 Violent Socialisation**

Violence escalation, a lack of stigma associated with violence and gender-based violence, weapons proliferation and imprisonment are a very diverse set of indicators that seem to impact the probability of violent young offending in fragile states as part of the broader background of the socialisation of children and young people to violence and violent modes of behaviour. These risk factors influence the propensity of young people to commit violence in many ways, some of which have already been discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.9, which dealt with the effect of the proliferation of small arms and other criminogenic commodities on Yemen; sections 2.4, 3.5 and 3.7, which have tracked the escalation of criminal and political violence in Yemen since its formation in 1990; sections 3.8 and 4.2.3, which have addressed the vulnerability of women to violence in Yemen and the social acceptance of gender-based violence in many fragile state cultures; and section 4.2.6,

---

<sup>166</sup> See section 6.7.2.

which has considered the theoretical impact of imprisonment on minors as well as the actual criminogenic impact of imprisonment on young people in Yemen<sup>167</sup>.

While these issues have been dealt with separately throughout this thesis due to their overlap with other thematic areas, they also combine and interact with one another in such a way that significantly increases the daily exposure to violence and acceptance of violent behaviour for children and young people.

From a social learning perspective, young people in Yemen are pressured through an interaction of these conditions from an early age to accept violence as a normative reality of Yemeni society, while imprisonment serves to radically accelerate this process of socialisation to violence. Although some of the risk factors associated with each of these elements can be argued to be culturally or historically specific to the Yemeni context, if only conflict-affected fragile states are considered within an analysis of the interaction between criminological and international development literature, then these conditions become fairly easily translatable to many other least developed countries.

One rogue element within these observations is the severe gender inequality evidenced by Yemen, which significantly increases the likelihood of gender-based violence, as well as the social acceptance of violence against women. Owing to the extreme vulnerability of women in times of conflict, particularly so when state fragility results in an absence of services for their protection, similar conditions are likely to impact the way in which young people perceive the acceptability of violence in multiple contexts.

### **6.7.3 State Infrastructural Weakness**

The conditions associated with infrastructural weakness as a pre-requisite of state fragility have a vast criminogenic impact, which is made visible within the interaction of three specific risk factors: poor administrative capacity; illegitimate or ineffective systems of crime control and law enforcement; and, increased smuggling and proliferation of criminogenic commodities that include licit and illicit substances<sup>168</sup>.

Important criminogenic risk factors to emerge from the interaction of these weaknesses with Yemen's lack of administrative capacity are the extremely low rate of crime detection and citizen welfare monitoring capabilities of the Yemeni state. Researchers are currently extremely limited by the poor availability of data on criminal offences, on breakdowns of offending patterns, and on identities of offenders. It is also extremely difficult to gain access to young people in custody in order to develop a fuller picture of their backgrounds, characteristics and motivations. Likewise, it is difficult to paint an accurate portrait of the "typical" Yemeni victim of crime.

These limitations impact the criminological environment in Yemen by creating dangerous gaps in information, which have led to poor awareness of the problem of violent offending and a reluctance to engage with this challenge on the part of the Yemeni state, the international community and influential humanitarian assistance and development aid donors. There is therefore

---

<sup>167</sup> Chapter 5 also expanded on this theme in section 5.2.5.

<sup>168</sup> See Chapter 3.

also a severe gap in the availability of information to do with welfare needs associated with the conditions generated by criminality in Yemen and other fragile states. This lack of information and resulting lack of state capacity for intervention, both of which stem from administrative and infrastructural weakness, compound the challenges associated with youth isolation within fragile state-based societies<sup>169</sup>.

It can be argued that, while all criminal activity is difficult to analyse because crime is generally intended to be hidden from external observers, crime in fragile states is even less visible than crime in developed countries. This is an extremely dangerous observation. Criminogenic risk factors that have been identified through decades of advancement in criminological theory within the developed world are noted to be significantly more prevalent in most cases within fragile states. In particular, fragile states, through their weak capacity to patrol borders, their high incidence rate of institutional corruption, and their low law-enforcement capabilities, tend to be particularly vulnerable to the proliferation of criminogenic commodities. These commodities include weapons and narcotics which, as the Yemeni case study has demonstrated, can also be entirely legal and socially acceptable. Due to the inability of researchers to gain sufficient information upon their availability, usage and effect on consumers, it is not possible to fully establish their impact upon the welfare of children and young people, so that it is also not possible to identify high priority cases for future violent behaviour.

## 6.8 Conclusion

Upon a close evaluation of criminological and development theory, it has become evident that criminological literature can prove extremely useful for understanding the socio-economic living conditions of fragile states and their impact on children and young people. However, crime causation theory that has emerged from the developed world fails to take into account the pervasive and widespread nature of criminogenic risk factors in fragile states, with an under-appreciation for the huge psychosocial stresses that they produce for children and young people. Social control theories, therefore, tend to prove more informative when analysing fragile states, particularly because fragile states, which show a much higher rate of criminal behaviour, also show a diminished availability of socialising activities. Ultimately, it is only through an integration with development and fragility literature that these theories truly become applicable to the context.

Through detailed case studies of fragile states, it is possible to use the predictions contained in all of these theories to produce more informed assessments of the pressures faced by children and young people within such contexts. It is worth noting that neither set of theories alone is able to produce an effective portrait of violent young offending in fragile states, while many questions about the implications of the theoretical framework developed within this thesis remain unanswered. In particular, while it is evident that psychosocial and economic stress factors lead to heightened aggression within children and young people in the short term, further research is required to determine the long term effects of the continuing social pressures associated with state fragility on the cognitive development of young Yemenis as they progress into adulthood. Likewise, it remains unclear to what extent cultural, religious and tribal dynamics that are unique to Yemen may

---

<sup>169</sup> This has been outlined in section 6.7.1.

inhibit the extraction of state-fragility-based generalisations in the study of criminal behaviour. These two questions will form an important theme in remaining chapters, which will analyse alternative ways in which Yemen has chosen and may yet in future choose to respond to the problem of violent young offending from a state-based, tribal and religious perspective.

## **Chapter 7: Current and Recommended Pathways for the Improvement of Crime Prevention and Social Control in Yemen**

### **7.1 Introduction**

The theory of violent young offending in fragile states put forward in Chapter 6 suggests that heightened levels of psychosocial and economic pressure are placed upon children and young people in Yemen, which act as a primary cause of increased aggression and violent criminal behaviour. The overlap of theories and understandings showcased in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 also suggest that, without adequate intervention or offender reintegration into society, such patterns of violent behaviour risk continuing into adulthood or escalating in severity, as evidenced by the high rate of serious violent offences like murder and attempted murder committed by young people in Yemen and in other fragile states. It is clear from the theoretical implications of Chapters 4 and 6 that while such interventions may stem from law enforcement and judicial services, there is an urgent need to build capacity in these areas, as well as to look to other social control systems, in order to improve the situation.

In particular, as explicitly stated in this thesis' theory of violent young offending and implicitly evident from the challenges of poor governance and weak institutional capacity that are rooted in the very analytical framework of state fragility: deteriorations of state authority and state legitimacy are key factors in determining the propensity for criminal behaviour among communities and individuals. From a crime causation and social control perspective, as informed by criminological theory, two aspects of fragility are particularly important here, specifically as they relate to the relationship between the citizen and the state. One is to do with the relevance of the state for its citizens, whereby individuals will have little positive relationship with their government if they are not provided with state services, cannot access relevant infrastructures, or are not protected by the state's authority. The other is to do with the state's ability to maintain the rule of law and procedural fairness, particularly in judicial processes. Beyond this, however, where the state encounters serious structural challenges to fulfilling these roles, there is a need to provide citizens and young people especially with a conduit through which to vent their grievances, where a degree of political integration or participation in community-level decision-making processes is essential to restoring positive relationships between states and their citizens. These need necessarily to show citizens that their views have an impact on policy making, even if such policy is not always effectively implemented.



**Figure 81 A Balanced Way Forward For The Yemeni State**

Four pathways for reducing violent criminal tendencies among children and young people in Yemen can be identified. These include: providing access to state services for young people and raising awareness of these services, even where young people may choose not to use them; providing avenues for political participation to young people in both local and national governance; creating a system of community policing that is relevant to community values and respectful of community structures; and, prioritising visible anti-corruption strategies within police and judicial services while ensuring that young people have recourse to protection from community leaders if they are threatened or mistreated by them.

## **7.2 Implications and Recommendations for Alternative Systems of Social Control**

Judicial services, as well as formal and informal methods of law enforcement, are not the only tools at society's disposal for reducing rates of violence and violent offending<sup>170</sup>. Patterns of crime across the world can be heavily influenced by the characteristics of local employment and education sectors, the effectiveness of social welfare and psychosocial support structures, and the prevalence of community-building, leisure and recreation activities, linked to community centres and sports clubs, for instance. These systems of social control operate on a principle of decreasing social deviance by increasing the engagement of community members in society, thereby increasing their stake in social compliance. Related efforts offer “simple solutions” to the problem of crime. However, these solutions can also prove extremely costly. It is not sufficient to provide everybody with employment and education to generate social cohesion – such education must be perceived to

<sup>170</sup> This was evidenced by Chapter 4, which outlined theories of crime causation and social control.

be beneficial by those who undertake it, while employment must incorporate the potential for career advancement and pay equality<sup>171</sup>.

### **7.2.1 Education and Employment**

The limitations of the education and employment sectors in Yemen are outlined in Chapters 2, 4 and 6. The registration and retention of school-aged children in primary and secondary education is extremely low in Yemen, and especially so within rural communities. There is also a high discrepancy between male and female registration in education, though both groups are adversely affected by poverty and entrenched gender roles, where boys and girls have been found to be responsible for a number of tasks outside of school (e.g. earning money, looking after younger siblings or assisting their families). These keep them from completing even elementary studies. In October 2011, the Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) reported that: “With poverty being a key factor in child labour in Yemen, many more families are sending their children to work to boost family income amid increasing food prices caused by the unrest”<sup>172</sup>.

Equally important is the reality that many children and young people in Yemen do not associate education with long-term gains or career progression, a development that is most likely associated with the high unemployment percentage among university graduates in the country, the poor training and capacity of educators, and the absence of effective relationships between students and their teachers (*Stakeholder Consultation, Ministry of Education, 17 August, 2010*).

In an article by Jeffrey Fleishman, Salah Rashed Alhanshali, a former public school principal, is cited as summarising that in Yemeni schools:

Students are learning, but their minds don't change ... They graduate with a little knowledge, but they don't aspire to be scientists. They yearn to be tribal sheiks. It's the stigma of our history. Teachers are belittled and scrimp by, and students who want to succeed are discouraged by nepotism and corruption. (2009)

The low operational budget of the Ministry of Education has been cited by the Ministry as a key reason for this emerging contempt for teachers (*Stakeholder Consultation, 17th of August 2010*). A lack of capacity to offer competitive salaries has led to a governmental inability to attract and retain qualified teaching personnel in the sector. Only the lowest scoring school and university graduates tend to investigate teaching as a viable career pathway. Most receive little to no training prior to taking on the role, and programmes like Britain's “Teach First” (that aim to place “exceptional” graduates in “challenging” or impoverished school environments by offering incentives) are deemed to be unrealistic in Yemen's case, where a complete overhaul of primary, secondary and higher education is urgently needed. Within this context, it is difficult to talk about early warning systems for young offending.

Priorities for school reform in Yemen among both the Ministry of Education and the international community have included outreach and advertising aimed at getting children back into schools, as well as capacity building, which has been slow to trickle down from a policy to a grass-

---

<sup>171</sup> These conclusions are drawn from Chapter 4, section 4.2.

<sup>172</sup> This factor was aggravated during the Arab Spring by the widespread closure of schools

roots level, or from the centre of Yemen to the peripheries. “Decentralisation” has been a popular buzz word among the international community in this sense (United Nations Capital Development Fund, 2008). It aims to provide an effective solution to the bureaucratic stalling of governance and service reform.

In light of Yemen's weak infrastructure and violent history, it is difficult to see how decentralisation might be successfully implemented without first establishing some degree of centralisation in the Yemeni Government. In any event, these reforms have side-stepped the debate as to whether or not schools should also be seen as hubs for further potential socialising clubs and activities. With teachers earning only minimum salaries, and students staying in their class rooms only for a bare minimum of time, there has been little to no discussion of the potential for after-school programmes, community-building events, or projects aimed at fostering team-building or creativity within the education sector.

An integration of international development and criminological literature in Yemen also indicates that measures to be taken in fragile states in order to increase the socialisation of children and young people need to look holistically at homes, schools, jobs and community environments. Large-scale interventions of the type needed in this instance may be infeasible in fragile contexts due to the limits of international aid delivered to affected countries. “When measured in terms of aid per capita” and population needs, “fragile states are” found to be “under-funded”, particularly “relative to the ... volatility of aid flows”, which have “also increased over time” (David Carment *et al*, 2008, p. 12). Socialising mechanisms in Yemen and other fragile states tend to be extremely limited, with key challenges for increasing youth integration into societies not only including provisions to drastically enhance the education sector, putting a school in every community no matter how isolated, but also dramatic service reforms aimed at increasing teacher training, luring more qualified individuals into the education sector, and improving student-teacher relations.

A positive sign here is that both the international community and the Government of Yemen have shown a strong commitment towards these principles, working towards increasing student registration in schools, under the requirements of the Millennium Development Goals. Yet as a result of the inability or unwillingness of both sides to address the issue of quality assurance in the education sector in Yemen, it will likely take decades before these advances begin to show real positive impact upon the rate of youth socialisation.

Cheaper solutions aimed at increasing the relevance of educational bodies in communities and increasing the local profile of schools might generate smaller but faster outputs here. Pushing schools to adopt dual roles as houses of education and community centres might be an effective long-term strategy. Simple projects like organising sports days for all community children, even those out of education, hosting special events open to the public on national children's days, or putting together sports teams for children and young people, given that Yemeni children are increasingly attracted to football and various forms of street dancing, might prove extremely popular. Offering school space to young people to run their own projects after hours might also help to provide them with safe spaces and creative outlets when they are unable or unwilling to go home, due to family difficulties. In this way, small, simple projects may be able to achieve what larger ones will not be able to do for some time: they may be able to increase the relevance and integration of

schools within communities, allowing for community-building and socialising networks to develop around them.



**Figure 82 Yemeni Merchants Working in Central Sana'a**

Reform in the employment sector is undermined by a severe lack of documentation, where a lack of taxation and an absence of paper trails for small businesses has made it impossible for the Government of Yemen to effectively regulate minimum wages or to ensure labour rights. Existing patronage networks that support the status quo have undermined the implementation of established legal frameworks for employee protection. It is in the interests of business owners, law enforcement officers and employees to conceal violations of rights principles from the state. At the same time, the severe shortage of employment opportunities in Yemen, combined with a booming population and rising poverty levels, mean that few who are in active employment are willing to risk complaining about abuses of authority in the employment sector. Likewise, Yemeni citizens are more likely to take on work that may be inappropriate for their age, gender or health status. IRIN have found that “Since 2001, the Child Labour Combating Unit - in conjunction with the ILO - has managed to rescue 4,200 children from dangerous jobs”, which mainly involved jobs in the agricultural sector associated with operating heavy machinery or working with pesticides.

While these issues are important, the Yemeni Government's priorities for improving the labour sector have focused upon expansion and economic development for the past decade, in an effort to improve their ratings in the World Bank's annual *Doing Business* country review series and to boost foreign investment. This approach is largely reactive, stemming from an urgent need to forestall the country's economic collapse. The criminological position that employment is not sufficient to deter crime without some degree of employee welfare and job satisfaction is not explored as an issue that should influence policy at this emergency stage, where job provision is deemed more important than job quality. This attitude is probably incorrect.

### 7.2.2 Social Welfare and Psychosocial Support Structures

Governmental social welfare and psychosocial support structures, particularly as they are targeted at increasing the well-being of children and young people, aim to address the main areas of socio-economic harm for this age group in Yemen, which include: physical and emotional abuse; poverty; malnutrition; and, starvation. The harmful effects of these dynamics are normally compounded in Yemen by early marriage and early pregnancies, poor child retention in schools, high rates of unemployment among young labourers and young professionals, and the spread of dangerous diseases. Each of these dimensions is a major cause of psychological stress among children and young people, and should not be ruled out as a potential cause of increased aggression and violent behaviour.

Yemen is a signatory of the 1990 *Convention on the Rights of the Child*<sup>173</sup> and as such has a responsibility to protect people under the age of eighteen from enduring unfair treatment and harassment. Governmental and non-governmental institutions have launched a *National Action Plan for Children* in order to reduce the negative influences of these socio-economic dynamics, supplemented by increased social welfare provision for the poorest of Yemeni families<sup>174</sup>.

The Government's *Action Plan* divides its programming in order to meet the needs of three segregated age groups, which include; children aged between 0 and 5 years, children between the ages of 6 and 14 years, and young people aged 15 to 24 years. This last expanded age band recognises that young people under the age of 25 face unique challenges in Yemen and are extremely vulnerable to economic shifts, and also that Yemen's poor age detection capacities mean that expanded searches for young people are necessary if all members of this vulnerable group are to receive assistance.

The Yemeni *National Action Plan for Children* aimed at the 0 to 5 age groups focuses primarily on healthcare and nutrition. Comprised of four components, this policy aims to close Yemen's significant shortfalls in terms of achieving the Millennium Development Goals of the *Millennium Declaration*.

The first component deals with policies that have been designed to strengthen the *Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses*, a plan which comprises the treatment and vaccination of children against common diseases<sup>175</sup> as the biggest contributors to Yemen's under-5 mortality rate. Linked to this, the second component is concerned with increasing child access to immunisation across the country, while the third component seeks to develop a comprehensive national nutrition plan. The fourth component is perhaps the one that is most closely linked to welfare strategies that can be said to reduce criminal activity and build upon an environment of social control. It comprises comprehensive care for children, which is designed to impact early childhood development.

The *National Early Childhood Development Plan* aimed, between the years of 2006 and 2010, to establish a pre-school programme that would get children ready for school either through educational facilities or through training and information provided to parents and care-givers. A

---

<sup>173</sup> See section 5.2.

<sup>174</sup> This was discussed in consultations in 2010 with the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and the Government of Yemen.

<sup>175</sup> See Chapter 6.

reform of birth registration services was integrated into these initiatives, so that children in need of special attention might be more readily identifiable. Unfortunately, this component remained relatively underfunded throughout its implementation, receiving by 2010 only US \$382,000 of the \$854,000 estimated cost of running it effectively. The distribution of resulting services proved geographically limited to the centre, with many war-affected regions failing to reap the benefits of these policy changes.

The *National Action Plan for Children* aged 6 to 14 took on a whole different approach, adopting a multi-sectoral perspective of the in-school environment that aimed to enhance inclusive education by piloting disadvantaged children into both formal and informal education (component 1); strengthening school-based health and nutrition packages designed to protect children and to provide an incentive for them to complete their studies (component 2); diminishing the gender gap by providing better qualified female teachers in rural areas (component 3); and, protecting disadvantaged children by creating a legislative framework to ensure their rights, and by running targeted reintegration programmes for displaced and war-affected young people (component 4). The immediate drawback of this policy is that only the fourth component deals directly in its design with the needs of children outside of school. Its policies, however, are relatively comprehensive, establishing protocols for the community-based monitoring of children in conflict. They are established within legal parameters, representing, as such, a foundational framework and operating language for future interventions, rather than a social welfare scheme in itself.

The third segment of the *National Action Plan*, which deals with the needs of young people aged 15 to 24, is aimed at reducing early pregnancy and substantially diminishing the risks associated with reproductive health for young Yemenis, by increasing girls' access to secondary education and raising the legal marriage age. Other components of the plan also involve improving national identity through youth inclusion in political processes, increasing leisure options and incorporating youth activities in urban development planning, and creating a national youth employment plan. At least on paper, the Yemeni Government has striven to develop an integrative approach to child welfare. The trouble remains in the arbitrary segregation of groups of young people who face many of the overlapping challenges addressed by all three sections of the *National Action Plan*. Added to this is the significant absence of psychosocial support structures for children who continue to experience psychological stress, physical abuse, or trauma, despite the launching of these new policies.

UNICEF write that:

the Yemeni Mental Health Association indicated – through data of the hotline for psychological assistance in 2003 – that 37 cases of the age group 3-15 experienced abuse in its different forms in the period April–June 2002. The rate of physical abuse was higher with males (63.15%) than females (16.7%). Emotional abuse, however, was higher with females (44.4%) than males (21%). Concerning sexual abuse, 38.8% of females and 15.7% of males indicated their exposure to this kind of abuse. (2008, p. 52)

What is evident from these figures<sup>176</sup> is that Yemen continues to face high rates of under-reporting when it comes to all forms of abuse and social violence, especially where such abuse includes acts of

---

<sup>176</sup> See also the research conducted in Chapters 1, 3 and elsewhere.

a sexual nature. While the Yemeni Government, alongside international organisations, has worked to improve rates of abuse reporting and mechanisms for child protection; these have largely come to form legislative interventions and awareness raising campaigns with only limited institutions for providing protective shelters or the treatment of trauma for the victims of these crimes.

What is particularly promising in the social welfare and psychosocial support sectors is that remarkable commitments are being made by the Yemeni Government and the international community to address important causes of social isolation, resentment and delinquency among young people. Unlike reform in the education and employment sectors, the potential difficulties of, and obstacles to, implementation have not prevented the exploration of policy development.

### **7.2.3 Community-Building, Leisure and Recreation**

While the study of criminology has been divided relatively evenly between investigations into why people either break or obey the law, it can be argued that theories of conflict and fragility founded within the international development sector have been disproportionately focused upon identifying and mitigating the causes of political and economic violence in least developed countries. However, a recent shift in the literature focus onto the notion of “community resilience” has generated interest not only in how individual governments and the collective international community might help to prevent violence, but also in why certain communities have been more resistant to conflict than others.

Yemen is a priority case study in this sense, because, as Danniell Shimmin – Governance Advisor for the British Department of International Development – explains: “Yemen has always confounded outsiders” through its continuing position on the edge of state failure (*Expert Consultation, 3 June, 2012*). That Yemen is not yet a failed state, despite its “governance trends pointing downwards”, and that Yemen faces the potential to undergo a transition that could place it on a “positive trajectory”, has deeply perplexed both foreign and national analysts.

Part of Yemen's on-going stability is a product of the main causes of its fragility: namely, its strong tribal values and community isolation. These have insulated tribal groupings from state interference, while also helping to propagate the social inequalities and underdevelopment that have generated the conditions necessary for state fragility to take root. Danniell Shimmin argues that a very delicate balance exists in Yemen between competing factions, a balance that risks being upset by escalating causes of conflict, with 2012 seeing a “greater intensity” of resource competition, as well as a diminishing “security capacity to deal with conflict”. Paradoxically, powerful tribes do not necessarily mean stronger communities in this sense, as a long history of political manipulation of tribal systems in Yemen has meant that many tribal leaders, according to Shimmin, have been “incentivised to support patronage”, and not necessarily to support communities. Social cohesion is a very complicated topic for analysis in Yemen, though there is a growing recognition that community based organisations, community centres and civil society organisations may hold the key to stabilising the country. These arguments fall in line with theories of social control, which state that strong communities and socialising, community-building activities can decrease social deviance and criminal behaviour.

Drawing on the work of James Taylor on transformation and development in South Africa (1998), Erica Fraser and Lyndsay McLean Hilker differentiate between strong and weak communities in the study of violence, fragility and conflict. They write that: “‘strong communities’ that can monitor individual behaviour and bring to bear a variety of social incentives and sanctions are key to limiting participation in violence”, and that likewise “The youth and development literature also stresses the importance of decision-making mechanisms that empower young people by giving them voice and allowing them to exercise agency” (2009, p. 34).



**Figure 83 Yemeni Youth Wearing an Arsenal Football T-Shirt**

These arguments suggest that limiting violence, be it political, economic or mindless, requires an extensive community-building strategy that incorporates socialising activities, political integration and inclusion in local governance and decision-making processes. While Yemeni communities have had significant government support in this first area of socialisation, President Saleh's regime, failed while he was in power, to bring about real political inclusion, particularly for young people, women and marginalised groups. Yet as the history of Sa'ada illustrates, community centres, leisure, recreation and civil society movements have always been, through various different forms and incarnations, a strong part of Yemeni social life – with the original al-Houthi movement and the Believing Youth being two of the most famous community-based organisations to rise up and gain a significant following (albeit an often violent one). The al-Houthi movement demonstrates that a part of Yemen's limited Government budget has traditionally been set aside for encouraging such activities, particularly in the arena of supporting the formation of sports clubs and societies, among which football has emerged as a favourite national pastime. Small-scale leisure and recreation activities with no clear political motive have thrived in given communities, but larger scale civil organisation and community-building initiatives remained underfunded and quite heavily restricted until the Arab Spring of 2011.

While recent events reversed this trend, raising the demand for community participation in government processes, there is a significant risk of such advances being negated as the political situation in the country stabilises. Atiaf Alwazir, as one of Yemen's most prominent activists, summarises the current situation in the country by arguing that: “People have realised for the first time that their voice matters”, but by supplementing this statement by acknowledging that “I don't think we will continue seeing this forever” (*Expert Consultation, 5 June, 2012*).

### 7.3 Recommendations for Improved Crime Control

Due to allegations of corruption launched against the police in countries like Yemen, along with the reality that police services are often militarised by governments in times of conflict, as combined with the sensationalism associated with stories about police brutality within such contexts, – it is often forgotten that, as Kerrin Smith<sup>177</sup> summarises: “you have to be very brave to work for the police” as a local national within a conflict-affected fragile state (*Expert Consultation, 28 June, 2012*). Despite the shortage of livelihood opportunities and the attractions of a steady income, working as a ground level member of police services within fragile states is not a glamorous occupation. Often, it turns employees and their families into valid targets for terrorists and insurgents, or into targets for random violence committed by community members who see law enforcement personnel to be representative of corrupt and illegitimate regimes. This was seen in Yemen in 2011 and 2012 in the targeting of police and members of security forces by terrorist cells (Ghaida Al-Ariqi, 2012), as well as in the random acts of violence committed by children and young people against the police during the Arab Spring<sup>178</sup>.

Anger at the state can be displaced into anger against state officials, and the dangers for law enforcement personnel are very real. There are naturally many reasons for this, but a central issue found in Yemen, Iraq and other fragile contexts is precisely the nature of police roles within societies, whereby police services are made to act like police forces, and where a duty to restore security has led those who plan policing strategies to neglect community policing – that is the policing of the everyday community level. The immediate consequence of these policies is that communities cease to consider the police as a conduit for controlling crime and start to see the police as a tool for reducing political violence, so that members of the community do not consider the police to be a potential source of help if they fall victim to crime.

A second consequence is that police services have little to no relationship with communities, are not offered community support in their actions, and are not seen to reflect local community values or priorities<sup>179</sup>. Key to reversing this trend in Yemen is a recognition of this problem by governments, the international community, and policy-makers, while solutions would involve creating a system of community policing that is relevant to community values and respectful of community structures, including tribal and religious structures.

Due to rising threats of terrorism in Yemen, there has been little interest in exploring the concept of community policing. It has been found in interviews conducted with Nicholas Hopton, the British Ambassador to Yemen, that while the European Union is taking point on judicial and security sector reform in Yemen as the largest donor in this field, resulting expansions of the police services will likely maintain a “paramilitary” focus (*Expert Consultation, 22 July, 2012*).

The problem here, as Kerrin Smith summarises, is that the police cannot reduce crime without a secure environment, where “immediate risk to life is the highest threat” that police officers should deal with. Counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency are extremely important in

---

<sup>177</sup> Kerrin Smith is a Police Training Officer who has worked with police services in Iraq and elsewhere.

<sup>178</sup> See section 1.8.

<sup>179</sup> See Chapter 5.

conflict-affected fragile states because the police “have to ensure that the environment that they're living in is a safe environment” (*Expert Consultation, 28 June, 2012*). However, having acknowledged this fundamental principle, the “police should ultimately be a service to the community and should reflect community values”, and it is this aspect of policing that is commonly absent from fragile state policing services, while also being fairly low down on the international agenda (*Kerrin Smith, Expert Consultation, 28 June, 2012*). One obstacle seen in Yemen is the self-reliance of communities from a law-enforcement point of view, where many have little to no history of police administration, and where the police are perceived as a governmental tool for repression. An important first step to overcoming this barrier would likely be acknowledging the importance of tribal structures within Yemeni society and learning to work with tribal leaders and communities both separately and together. A cooperative community-based system might be the only way forward within the Yemeni context, and while there is huge potential for corruption within such a system, there is also huge potential for increased security, if the system is executed and monitored effectively.

This system would be limited to participation in law enforcement. It would not mean allowing tribes to take part in military action. It also would not mean continuing to allow tribes to act as sole distributors of security. A recent study by Ibrahim Sharqieh demonstrates that many tribes in Yemen would like to see the state take on a bigger role in security provision, so that they might exit the “vicious arms race” that they currently wage against each other and spend more time securing their “children’s food and education” (2013). The notion that this thesis puts forward is that tribes should be involved in the decision-making processes that determine security distribution within the context of law enforcement and integrative community policing.

So what would an integrative community policing strategy look like in Yemen? Firstly, it would involve making sure that police, while remaining strictly and exclusively under government control, worked with and consulted tribal organisation structures when planning patrols, choosing to prioritise prominent forms of offending, and investigating offences. Communities and tribal leaders should also be informed of arrest and prosecution procedures before arrests are made, in order to minimise the threat of diplomatic incidents that could irreparably damage relationships in the short term. After all, it is important to remember here that, as Danniell Shimmin argues, “An ongoing source of tension in Yemen occurs where tribal values around criminality conflict with those of the modern state”, and in particular, the police should strive to investigate and acknowledge whether the crimes in which they are intervening are viewed by communities as an attempt to resolve a previous conflict, even if the police are duty bound to control those offences in order to prevent them from escalating into blood feuds (*Expert Consultation, 20 June, 2012*). Again, it is not that the police should sanction criminal behaviour committed by communities or tribes, but that there is a need for dialogue on these issues between police services and their constituencies. As Nicholas Hopton has explained in interview, “Its not a case of creating a new police force: part of it is about training, part of it is about recruitment, but part of it is about trying to instil in the population the idea that there is a rule of law and that its not just tribal” (2012). The inclusion of tribal organisations in security will, of course, bring with it ethical challenges and dilemmas, particularly in terms of exposing tribes to harm by portraying them as state collaborators: but as long their consultative role is limited to law enforcement, excluding military activity, risks to participants should be minimised.

Secondly, integrative community policing would involve increasing police relevance for communities, both by getting young people involved in security planning according to an open-

source security model, and by encouraging police to adopt additional community-support roles. These ideas will be explored further in Chapter 8.

Finally, where these initiatives failed, adequate complaints procedures would have to be installed, particularly in light of the elevated potential for tribal allegiances to corrupt law enforcement services in Yemen. Here, communities need viable third party options to turn to if they are in need of protection from abusive tribal leaders, and if police services fail to grant them such protection. In these instances, it is of the highest priority that the Government of Yemen be seen as siding with its citizens in cases where personal freedoms are violated, even if the Government itself lacks the capacity to intervene. There is a very delicate balance to be struck here, and it certainly would not be easily achieved. However, in light of Yemen's current process of transition, the Government has a real opportunity, the likes of which it has never seen before, to strike out a new relationship with its people, and the international community would be extremely foolish not to move on this window before it shuts. There is also a strong incentive to make police services more demographically representative of their constituencies, though this would be a far more costly, long-term strategy.

Each of the recommendations outlined above are targeted towards improving the relationship between the Yemeni state and its citizens. However, it is posited that none of these recommendations are likely to reach their full potential if the state does not also work to improve the image of the elite members of its ruling parties by taking a stand against multi-level corruption. There is a strong need for the Government of Yemen to resume judicial reform processes initiated prior to the Arab Spring and for the international community to foster monitoring and evaluation within priority areas that include local councils (which act as representatives of the state on the ground), law enforcement and judicial services, and larger Government bodies that administer finance and state budgeting, like the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. A good starting point for this would be the increased monitoring and review of bilateral aid – that is development and humanitarian assistance that is channelled directly through the Yemeni state.

#### **7.4 Recommendations for State Building and Bilateral Aid**

The process of generating state service provision for communities in Yemen seems to be an enormous, daunting and overwhelming task. Obstacles abound, where weak capacity, bureaucratic stalling and corruption emerged from stakeholder interviews as the main reasons why state services were seen to be failing in Yemen in 2010 by the international community, donors and some Government officials as well. Overwhelmingly, aid organisations have responded to these challenges with capacity building activities that generally involve building new Government structures for Yemen, and providing Government employees with training opportunities. Direct financial assistance towards escalating Government budgets was highly limited under President Saleh's regime due to concerns about potential fund misappropriation, and were fully discontinued for the duration of the 2011 Arab Spring, while more direct assistance to the Yemeni people was delivered through international governmental and non-governmental organisations, as well as through local community-based organisations and private individuals.

These policies have done little to reverse Yemen's poor rate of Government-based service distribution, because few are geared towards increasing the state's financial capacity to deliver those services, so that for many Yemenis state services are either not worth using or have been supplanted with alternative sources. What assistance the Yemeni state is able to provide is often channelled through tribal structures, so that the prevalence of third party service providers in the country negates the possibility of constructing any mutually dependant relationship between the Yemeni Government and its citizens. The same observation can be made in many other fragile states where tribal structures and international aid abound, including, most notably, Afghanistan.

It is suggested that there is a need here for donors and the international community more broadly to re-examine policy objectives in international development if citizens in Yemen are to form more constructive relationships with their state and thereby increase their stake in society under a criminological model of social control. From the point of view of intervention planning, as Kerrin Smith notes, development practitioners need to ask themselves: "Is it about making us [the international community] look good, or is it about making them [the local Government] look good?" (*Expert Consultation, 28 June, 2012.*) For example, strong concerns voiced by the Yemeni Government, as emerged from interviews conducted at the Ministry of Justice in 2010, revolved around the perception of their aid absorption practices among Yemeni citizens. It was noted by the Ministry of Justice in particular, but also by other Ministries as well, that the tendency of local newspapers to publish the international community's pledges to deliver aid to Yemen led Yemeni citizens to equate money pledged with money received. In reality, although the London Consultative Group meeting pledged US \$5.7 billion in assistance packages in 2006, for instance, only 10% had been disbursed by 2010, while Yemenis on the ground tended to expect immediate visible changes as a result of this commitment, leading to growing frustration with state bodies and increased allegations of corruption at the ground level (*Stakeholder interview conducted by Sultan Barakat, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 15 August, 2010*). In this case, by delivering small short-term gains, such as capacity building assistance, donor contributions that are operationally limited in scope by anti-corruption policies, poor donor-recipient relations or bureaucratic stalling may have ultimately done more harm than good by lowering instead of improving local acceptance of state institutions.

It is posited that challenges to state legitimacy that emerge from supplemented service delivery can be mitigated by working more directly within the structures of the Yemeni Government to provide Yemeni citizens with international aid. However, improving state capacity ultimately necessitates offering direct assistance to the Yemeni state. In order to avoid dangers of corruption, this would require a considerable expansion of monitoring and evaluation programming, with strict requirements for the Yemeni state to report regularly upon aid utilisation.

## **7.4 Conclusion**

As the previous chapters have demonstrated, a wide range of criminogenic risk factors currently impact the Yemeni development context, elevating patterns of criminal activity and, of primary interest to this thesis, patterns of violent young offending. Yet the role of these criminogenic risk factors is enhanced substantially by the erosion of Yemen's social control mechanisms by decades of state fragility, conflict and insecurity. This Chapter has endeavoured to look at some of

these social control mechanisms in more detail, particularly by examining formal and informal systems of law enforcement, but also by assessing the status of alternative services aimed at enhancing community socialisation.

In the absence of more effective systems for law enforcement, there is scope for some enhancement of other systems of social control in Yemen, based on education and labour sector reform, increased community participation in governance processes, more transparent integration of tribal structures into local government services, increased opportunities for socialisation, community policing and state capacity building. However, the way forward for crime reduction in Yemen will likely be a very long and costly process.

## Chapter 8: Conclusion

### 8.1 Introduction

The end of the Cold War brought the emergence of the “new wars” paradigm, which was developed in response to the rise of intra-state conflict and genocidal warfare that defined the 1990s. The past twenty years have seen huge advances in international development literature, with a steadily increasing dedication among practitioners and academics towards acknowledging the realities associated with state fragility and finding pathways to the elimination of instability. Yet while violence has come to form a central theme of such research, contemporary readings of fragile environments continue to interpret criminal activity as an implied product of political instability, more akin to a force of nature than a sociological phenomenon. This has led other parallel advances in the social sciences, including advances in criminology, to be swept aside in analyses of fragile contexts, where youth radicalisation and recruitment into armed forces have generated significantly more media and international attention than broader social violence.

As David Carment *et al* write:

A focus on the security-instability nexus is legitimate, of course, if the underlying purpose is to develop policies on armed conflict in the most egregious cases of [state] failure; however, to the extent that conflict is a symptom and not a cause of fragility and failure, it does not enhance our understanding of the phenomenon. (p. 44)

Likewise, a focus on youth radicalisation offers only a very limited view of the complex tapestry of violence in Yemen and other fragile states, obscuring the impact of violence upon children and young people while failing to address the root causes of why young people turn to violence themselves.

A focus on the security-instability nexus has meant that policy responses to youth violence, where youth violence is equated with insurgency and warfare – or at the very least with the chaos of fragile political environments, – have acted as reactive instruments whose primary purpose is to punish offenders. There have been few attempts made by practitioners and academics to develop real analyses of crime patterns that would strive to understand the root causes of criminal behaviour.

The security-instability nexus that Carment *et al* refer to has produced an ironic contradiction, whereby offenders are treated as being responsible for their own behaviour but are robbed of any sense of identity or agency in the literature, which tends, rather, to make reference to shadowy “opportunists” and “vulnerable” child participants: neither parties' behaviour motivations are analysed in great depth. This has led many prominent academics, including Michael Humphrey, to the conclusion that it is not possible to analyse offender motivations in cases of criminal violence in fragile states, the implication of which is that researchers can only currently study the characteristics of this phenomenon, rather than its causes (2011). This thesis has rejected this

position while endeavouring to determine whether or not the causes of violence can be better understood by reaching out to other disciplines, like criminology.

It has been found within this thesis that dominant attitudes towards violent young offending obscure the reality that so-called “vulnerable” children and young people are rarely treated as such within the judicial systems of fragile states, which, as the Yemeni case study indicates, have virtually no provisions set in place for separating them from broader offending populations. Thus, as the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund find:

Whatever the circumstances, effective social work with youthful offenders and victims is generally lacking in many national and local settings. Worldwide, UNICEF estimates that at any given moment more than 1 million children are detained by law enforcement officials. And this is likely an underestimate. In the 44 countries with available data, around 59 per cent of detained children had not been sentenced. ... In prisons and institutions across the world, adolescents are often denied the right to medical care, education and opportunities for individual development. Detention also exposes children to serious forms of violence, such as torture, brutality, sexual abuse and rape, as well as poor conditions. (2011, p. 55)

Part of this problem stems from poor judicial practices, capacities and procedures, so that children and young people are either incorrectly processed by law enforcement services, inappropriately treated by law enforcement practitioners, or inadequately protected by legislative protocols.

Greater challenges stem from a lack of understanding of the reasons why young people offend and a failure to mitigate these reasons wherever they are apparent. This is not a problem that is limited to fragile states, because developed countries are often equally guilty of negligent policy making or policy implementation in this sense. Yet the overall sense of discouragement and apathy that surrounds the issue of apolitical youth violence in conflict-affected fragile states, particularly at the international onlooker level, is no longer excusable given the scope of this phenomenon and its implications for child welfare.

This thesis was designed to investigate whether or not it would be possible to produce a unifying theoretical framework of violent young offending in fragile states by conducting an in-depth analysis of the Yemeni development context and its emerging patterns of crime and youth aggression. The thesis and its investigation were geared towards integrating and testing the validity of criminological and fragility literature for understanding the relationship between crime and underdevelopment, while generating more awareness of the processes of violent crime causation in fragile states. It endeavoured to achieve these purposes by asking five research questions.

Now that this research initiative has come to an end, it has become apparent that while some progress has been made in achieving these goals, significant further work remains to be done and that, at this stage, the field of international development, at its intersection with criminology, still only provides a partial picture of the interaction between violence and fragility in Yemen today. While answering the five research questions, this chapter shall examine more closely the main contributions and important findings that this thesis has generated, the key challenges and limitations emerging from this investigation, further work remaining to be conducted, and the main recommendations for donors and members of the international community that can be drawn from

an overlap of international development and criminological literature, as it has been and can yet be applied to Yemen and other fragile states.

## 8.2 Answering the Five Research Questions

### 1. How appropriate a concept is state fragility for providing a unifying framework through which low-ranking countries in the *Human Development Index* might be analysed in the context of similar patterns of criminality?

State fragility, as the term is used by the international community, is too broad in its inclusion and exclusion of development indicators and too varied in its application to provide a solid foundation for a rigorous and relevant comparative study of the relationship between criminality and state underdevelopment<sup>180</sup>.

However, the more targeted and specific the application of the state fragility framework to limited environments, the more relevant the application of criminological theory becomes to underdeveloped contexts. It is therefore possible to test theoretical frameworks and to extract policy implications that are more useful for helping practitioners to identify localised aggravating criminogenic influences in the first instance and to learn from them in the second. Taking structural factors as central aspects of fragility, the definition of the term put forward in this thesis<sup>181</sup> describes a condition associated with ineffective governance and weak state infrastructure. It is sufficiently limited to draw out “like” cases<sup>182</sup>.

Under this theoretical approach the fragile states framework put forward in Chapter 6 is adequate for grouping together low-ranking countries in the *Human Development Index*, as long as they share a set of common indicators that can be connected to parallel important socio-economic and political conditions identified within the field of criminology. There is a subtle difference between the adequacy of the fragile states framework here and its appropriateness to the task: with its associations of institutional weakness, state fragility is still a highly politicised term.

State fragility has been selected over the labels of “least developed countries”, “conflict-affected environments”, “complex emergencies” and “failed states” because of the specific set of circumstances that the term encapsulates and because of its focus upon governance based indicators. It is possible within the fragile states framework to study only those countries with

---

<sup>180</sup> For instance, when the definition put forward by the Peace Fund's *Fragile States Index* is adopted, fragility becomes a development rating rather than a specific condition, whose inclusion of a range of countries provides too wide a spectrum to identify “similar” patterns of criminality. See Chapter 6.

<sup>181</sup> This thesis defines fragility as the point of intersection between three major conditions that include; (1) poor state capacity, as generated by a lack of authority and ability to control state territories, and as evidenced by a lack of effective state service provision; (2) high social fragmentation, accompanied by a history of conflict, community isolation and conflicting localised identities; and (3) poor political integration, leading to low levels of community access to political processes, reinforced by a perceived lack of political will to reflect popular demands in policy changes.

<sup>182</sup> Secondary socio-political realities are added to the definition only because, as David Carment *et al* write, “Single or limited factor analyses are inappropriate for complex fragile environments” where “A wide survey of performance indicators” that accounts for social, political and economic trends might provide “a sound basis for cross-state strategic-level comparative analysis” (2011, p. 47).

functioning governments that are affected by conflict while facing other specific infrastructural challenges.

## 2. In what ways are fragile states different from more stable ones?

Fragile states differ from more economically developed countries mainly in their inability to reach all of their citizens, their limited administration of their territories, and their lack of access to sufficient budgetary and structural resources to be able to effect any real (and particularly any positive) change upon their constituencies<sup>183</sup>. Other development based indicators relating to mortality, fertility, literacy, employment and social equity have already been addressed. However, these function as symptoms, rather than root causes of fragility. At their core, fragile states generate these distinguishing characteristics because of their institutional weaknesses, which render effective service distribution across the entirety of their administrative areas infeasible.

## 3. What are the main causes of criminal violence in Yemen, and to what extent are these causes related to state fragility?

- **Weapons Proliferation:** Violence in Yemen is aggravated and rapidly escalated by the widespread proliferation of weapons in the country<sup>184</sup>. The higher the capacity and the faster the potential for a weapon carried by a perpetrator of violence to be used to cause physical harm to a person, the more severe the injuries inflicted upon victims tend to be. With Yemen being one of the most heavily armed countries in the world, all violent crime committed there in which weapons are used is indirectly connected to the Government's inability and unwillingness to confiscate small arms, as well as to its inability to control its own borders and to stop the inflow of new guns and ammunitions into Yemen. While all violent crime might not be related to state capacity and the development context; virtually all violent crime is escalated in severity by these structural characteristics.
- **Tribal violence:** Tribal violence in Yemen can be read as being directly associated with the historical evolution of the Yemeni state, the Government's over-reliance upon tribal structures and patronage networks, the limited reach of law enforcement within hard-to-access geographic areas, and the lack of basic services that has pushed Yemeni communities in the North especially to look to tribal structures as a tool for self-administration.
  - Tribal violence in Yemen tends to be violence between tribes or between tribes and the state. It also incorporates economically motivated violence aimed at achieving a tribal objective, which can take the form of banditry kidnapping, racketeering,

---

<sup>183</sup> See Chapters 2 and 6.

<sup>184</sup> Jason Roach and Ken Pease have found that in criminological studies conducted in multiple settings "weapon characteristics" are "relevant to the degree of harm inflicted", with knives, bottles, broken glass and guns – particularly easily concealable guns – being generally associated with the escalation of fights and brawls, as well as of gender-based, social and economic violence (2011, p. 394). Known as "the firearm effect", they write that this phenomenon "consists in escalating consequences" of violence, for example, with "altercations involving knives" resulting "far less often ... in death" than those involving guns (p. 395).

robbery or burglary as long as the economic outputs of these crimes are intended to be channelled back into a tribal unit or sub-unit.

- While it incorporates political power relations, tribal violence is different from conflict because it tends to be limited in its scope and impact, however tribal tensions are also played upon and escalated by the state in the Sa'ada wars and the North-South divide.
  - Triggered by resource competition, as well as by land and water disputes, tribal violence is a direct product of the state's lack of service delivery, both in terms of basic services and security, where a tribe's need to fend for itself, to compete with other tribes for political power and representation, and to protect itself from outside threats are instrumental in increasing tribal reliance upon violence.
  - Emerging systems of patronage that have developed as a result of the state's reliance upon tribalism to administer its territories have helped strengthen the grass-roots, institutional and elite corruption levels that are necessary for organised crime and banditry to take hold. Therefore tribal violence is also a contributor to other forms of crime.
- **Gender-Based Violence:** Cultural and religious influences impact gender-based and sexual violence, which are encouraged in Yemen by an extremely low rate of reporting. In a culture where the victims of sexual violence risk being severely discriminated against or dishonoured by coming forward, perpetrators are encouraged to commit acts of sexual violence because they have little to no fear of getting caught, which removes a strong social constraint on their behaviour. Gender-based violence is also aggravated by gender inequality on multiple fronts, including economic, political and cultural organisation systems, and within families.
  - **Family Violence:** Family violence escalates youth violence; firstly by increasing youth exposure to violence; and secondly by making children and young people more reluctant to spend too much time at home, forcing them out onto the street where there is a lack of safe spaces outside the reach of either politically or criminally violent influences.
  - **Economically Motivated Violent Offending:** Economic criminal activity is generally motivated in Yemen by economic stress factors caused by extreme underdevelopment. It is made visible through statistical records of burglary, theft, robbery, racketeering, fraud, banditry, and a number of other associated offences that have turned violent. While property related offences remain fairly low in Yemen – and while all countries suffer from mild rates of theft and burglary so that the Yemeni development context cannot be held as being especially to blame for these – incidents of kidnapping and banditry are likely to be attributable to the state's general levels of insecurity, as well as to a lack of targeted policing of these offences. It has additionally emerged from stakeholder interviews that kidnapping is occasionally used by tribes (and possibly by Yemeni police officers) as a means of dispute resolution, where one community's perceived wrongful seizure of land or resources, for instance, can result in the forced detainment of one of their members by another community until such a time as the wrong is made right.

- **Insecurity**: Each of the criminogenic risk factors identified above contributes to the overall insecurity of Yemen, exposing the population to heightened levels of violence that are interlinked with political conflict, protests and war. A lack of resolution of these issues by the Yemeni Government, combined with the inaccessibility of the Yemeni political system and the under-representation of non-ruling political groups in Government, have led to growing rates of frustration among Yemeni citizens, and particularly among Yemeni youth, causing heightened aggression that can trigger increased outbursts of both mindless and social criminalised violence. The pressure to commit social criminalised violence, is increased by: poverty; unemployment; poor family relations; an absence of safe spaces for children; poor education services; a socialisation to violence and an idealisation within media of violent behaviour; and, the social isolation of youth.
- **Culture and Religion**: Yemen's culture, tribal values and religious make-up serve to impact rates of violent and non-violent offending, but more comparative research is needed to determine the extent of these influences. They serve at once to raise and lower different patterns of crime. Crime in Yemen remains heavily stigmatised as un-Islamic and un-Yemeni, so that victims and perpetrators can be unwilling to report on or discuss their experiences with officials. This leads to diminished rates of punishment of offences and removes important social controls<sup>185</sup>. At the same time, "Islam develops a strong sense of moral community, where religion is an influential social force generating social sanctions ... and ... this contributes to a low crime rate" overall, where property offences are especially frowned upon (Seyed Hossein Serajzadeh, 2002). Yet a lack of stigmatisation of gender-based and retributive violence within some interpretations of Islam, depending upon context, heightens the risk of exposure to harm for key demographic groups, like women and children.

#### **4. Which (if any) specific attributes of fragile states promote criminality and violent criminal behaviour among children and young people?**

The relationship between violent young offending and state fragility is likely to be such that; the absence of state services, legitimate opportunities and socialising activities for young people in fragile states, along with their exposure to significant levels of violence, produces extreme economic, psychological and socio-cultural stresses that lead to their increased aggression and rejection of state legitimacy, all of which combine to raise the likelihood of violent young offending in Yemen and other fragile states. Included in the absence of state services and legitimate opportunities are a lack of good quality primary, secondary and higher level education facilities, as well as a lack of employment opportunities. This leads to diminished processes of socialisation and the erosion of corresponding social control mechanisms, whereby young people do not feel like they are involved or have a stake in mainstream society and do not develop important connections that generate empathy with their fellow citizens. Exposure to violence incorporates both the stress factors associated with a perpetual fear for personal safety as well as a diminished sensitivity to the

---

<sup>185</sup> See Chapters 1 and 4.

shock value of strong violence, so that violence against others becomes an almost acceptable behavioural norm.

The specific attributes of state fragility that result in increased violent young offending include a lack of structural capacity to deliver basic services like quality education and psychosocial assistance packages, which would otherwise fulfil socialising and stress mitigating functions. Other absences are evident in a lack of community-building activities and limited employment generation.

Further dimensions associated with the definition of fragility include a history of conflict and social fragmentation, which create a situation of prolonged community exposure to violence that is attributed to the state's lack of capacity to generate security; to hold a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence; and, to maintain the rule of law.

The impact of these attributes is strengthened by a general lack of administrative capacity in fragile states, which decreases their ability to monitor children and young people who fall off the radar and are exposed to multiple unknown or immeasurable risks that the state is unable to mitigate.

Any resulting sense of youth isolation becomes a source of hostility towards the state when it is combined with a lack of political integration, which is associated with fragility in instances where the state fails to address popular political grievances or to be seen to be addressing these.

**5. How, if at all, are these criminogenic attributes mitigated by existing youth justice systems, and how can youth justice systems be better used to advance the cause of peace?**

Few of the criminogenic attributes identified are mitigated by existing youth justice systems in Yemen, which suffer from extremely poor administrative capacity that limits their ability to access large portions of the country, leaving many communities without the protection of state-based law enforcement and judicial services. The impact of law enforcement and policing services is diminished by poor police-community relations and the unapproachable air of law enforcement personnel, which is generated by their paramilitary mandate and their use by the Yemeni Government as an oppressive political force.

Increasing the credibility of law enforcement services by making them more legitimate in the eyes of the communities that they police should be a top security priority.

There is also a need to integrate other judicial processes into the everyday reality of the community level, though this would require a significant and costly expansion of the judicial sector. A major obstacle to this is that the responsibility to bring cases to the attention of the court system remains with the victims of crime in Yemen, and not with the justice or law enforcement sectors. There is little incentive for the average Yemeni citizen to initiate this process, which is significantly more complicated and time consuming than using tribal mediation or taking matters into their own hands.

Imprisonment seems to expose low-level criminal offenders to radicalising elements, so that prisons in Yemen create more hard-line extremists than they reform. There is an immediate need, therefore, to segregate prison populations, at least in terms of separating low-level transgressors,

such as property-related offenders or irregular migrants, from political radicals and serious life-time criminals.

### **8.3 Main Contribution**

The main contribution of this thesis is that it has demonstrated that criminological theory can be effectively integrated with international development literature in order to generate more informed analyses of multiple forms of violence and their relationship with state fragility. A brief overview of the theories outlined in Chapters 4 and 6 indicates that criminological literature is fairly flexible when it comes to extending risk screening indicators to fragile contexts, though further research needs to be conducted in order to determine in more detail how a variety of frameworks would cope in a multitude of underdeveloped localities, and not just in Yemen.

Even a brief endeavour to integrate criminological theory into the international development sector reveals important lessons for practitioners and academics working to understand the situation of children and young people in fragile states. The most important of these is that violence in fragile states emerges in a multitude of forms, some of them criminal, the causality of which can and should be analysed by existing frameworks. Criminal violence in particular is not a problem that will simply go away if insurgencies are contained and conflicts are averted: it is a challenge in its own right that requires further investigation and more recognition by donors and the international community.

The theoretical framework put forward by this thesis has its limitations and is of secondary importance to the main contribution. In order to gain full use of this theoretical framework in future research, it is useful to assess its values and challenges in accordance with John Martinussen's "minimum requirements of a good social science theory" (1997, p. 346), which are its ontology, epistemology, normative premises, sphere of applicability, logical consistency, and ability to survive falsification (*see Figure 84*).





Figure 84 Anatomy of Theory of Violent Young Offending in Fragile States Put Forward By This Thesis

## 8.4 Emerging Challenges and Concerns

Several concerns emerge from the analysis conducted over the past seven chapters. These are to do with the nature of violent young offending observed in Yemen, and the state's capacity to effectively respond to this growing challenge. As has been outlined in the introduction to this thesis, part of the problem stems from a lack of research and a lack of appreciation for the severity of apolitical violence as an obstacle to stability and development. Another stems from a lack of policy adaptation and targeted strategies to deal with youth violence, which is easily dismissed as too big an issue for any fragile government to address. The roots of this problem go back not only to approaches in international development literature that prioritise the containment of radicalisation over criminality, but also to assumptions made within criminology about the socialising impact of growing up, for instance, - assumptions that do not hold true in fragile states.

One example of this is the youth crime curve (*see Figure 85*). The youth crime curve has become a staple of contemporary criminological literature. It states that young offenders broadly begin to indulge in criminal behaviour between the ages of 10 and 16, depending upon gender, background and geographic location to hit a peak in criminal activity between the ages of 17 and 21, and then to diminish in their rate of offending. By the age of 25, most have re-entered society as law abiding citizens. Only a very small minority of young people will continue to offend into adulthood,

usually displaying an increase in the frequency and severity of criminal activity, becoming “lifetime” criminals. Darrell J. Steffensmeier, Emilie Andersen Allan, Miles D. Harer and Cathy Streifel write that “the proposition that involvement in crime diminishes with age is one of the oldest and most widely accepted in criminology”, even though “there is disagreement about the strength and the universality of the age-crime relation” among experts (1989).



**Figure 85 The Youth Crime Curve**

The immediate limitations of the youth crime curve in the context of fragile states are self-evident. Firstly, the youth crime curve is a measurable phenomenon that has been detected and recorded by criminologists in the developed world, and there is little to no evidence that it holds true in fragile states where it is much more difficult to monitor young offenders over time.

Secondly, the youth crime curve is said to work on the principle that antisocial children become socialised through increased involvement in society as they grow older, form families and gain livelihoods. While these socialising activities can be limited in developed countries, they are nowhere near as diminished as they are in fragile states, where families and children often only increase the economic pressures placed on young parents who are left without access to social welfare services.

Thirdly, as applied most commonly to Western countries with ageing populations, the youth crime curve trivialises the importance of youth offending, while peak offending ages of 17 to 21 may represent an epidemic of violence and criminal activity in fragile states that experience high fertility rates and protracted youth bulges. Under this crime curve, the mean population age in Yemen is also a peak risk age for committing criminal violence.

Finally, one last issue for consideration is that, while violent behaviour and criminal activity is sometimes extended for young people in the developed world through participation in gang culture or association with delinquent peers; the 10 to 25 age span is also a period when children and young people in fragile states are at heightened risk of recruitment into radical organisations and insurgencies.

These clear discrepancies highlight the need for targeted research and theorisation in fragile states, as well as revealing many of the limitations of existing criminological theories that work in isolation from international development literature and vice versa. With no clear indications about the applicability of the youth crime curve in countries like Yemen, however, there is a need for urgent preventative intervention into young offending in order to avoid a worst case scenario of perpetually increasing violence and insecurity across the country.

Within the context of Yemen's judicial and law enforcement systems, there are very real and pressing concerns about the way in which interventions into violent young offending should be framed in fragile states, where the detention and arrest of offenders can have an extremely negative impact upon rates of offending – increasing rather than reducing the scope and severity of the problem<sup>186</sup>. Important questions about whether or not societies should continue to criminalise certain forms of behaviour, thus placing the state in a position of direct responsibility to administer offenders, are extremely important in this sense. Questions relating to the way in which states should respond to violent young offending are equally problematic.

It is the position held by the author that a failure to criminalise and respond effectively to violent behaviour is akin to sanctioning this kind of conduct, and furthermore that many of the challenges experienced by Yemen and other fragile states can be attributed to a lack of intervention and policing at a community level, rather than to an over-involvement by states into the private lives of their citizens. Andrew Ashworth summarises that:

The idea of a crime is that it is something that rightly concerns the State, and not just the person(s) affected by the wrongdoing. Many crimes are civil wrongs as well (torts or breaches of contract, for example), and it is for the injured party to decide whether or not to sue for damages. But the decision to make conduct into a crime implies that there is a public interest in ensuring that such conduct does not happen and that, when it does, there is the possibility of State punishment. (2006, p. 2)

In an ideal system, State punishment eliminates (or at least reduces) retributive violence and prevents crime from turning into conflict. It lowers crime rates by generating a fear of being caught among potential perpetrators, and it protects potential victims of crime while also helping actual victims to gain a sense of justice. However, it has become evident that in the case of fragile states, there is a need to think beyond exclusively security-centred responses to offending behaviour.

---

<sup>186</sup> See Chapter 5.

## 8.5 Policy Recommendations

The analysis of the Yemeni development context and justice systems provided in Chapters 3 and 6 leads to one inescapable conclusion: as a fragile state Yemen is virtually ungovernable according to Western models of state-provided security, given current levels of international aid and Government budgetary resources. A focus on the security-instability nexus in Yemen has failed in this sense to secure positive change in the country, by treating insecurity and radicalisation as a cause of instability, rather than as a symptom of instability. While building state capacity through police training and equipment provision, Ministry expansion and finances will likely continue to prove important, particularly over the next decade of Yemen's development. Such reactive security-building strategies are unlikely on their own to offer viable solutions to the problem of violence in fragile states. As James Stavridis argues, these “20th Century tools” - including sophisticated weaponry, defensive perimeters, and closed security precautions based on force, secrecy or defensibility - “are not going to work” in a 21st Century context of terrorism, organised crime, conflict and underdevelopment (2012).

Donors, fragile governments and members of the international community need to accept that, in the context of state fragility: “we cannot deliver security solely from the barrel of a gun. We will need the application of military force, and when we do it we must do it well and competently”, however such traditional tools and approaches will not succeed in reversing instability or insecurity (Stavridis, 2012). Alternative solutions may begin to emerge from Stavridis' vision of open source security, that is – security, as Andy Salmon summarises, based on increased openness, communication and designed “networks of stability” (2012).

As Stavridis explains, open source security is about strategic communication, as he envisages it, between “international, inter-agency, private, public” bodies, whereby “Open source security means connecting in ways that create longer-lasting security effects” (2012). In the context of reducing violence and youth violence in Yemen, there is a need to extend this vision much further to include those individuals who are at risk of becoming either victims or perpetrators of the behaviour targeted by the security strategy, within emerging networks of stability and communication.

What this means in terms of practical recommendations is that there is a need for the Government of Yemen to talk to its citizens directly about security and to involve them in security planning and programming. As Chapter 6 argued, from a security-implementation perspective, this means increasing community policing and police-integration at the community level. Yet more fundamentally, at a policy level, this may also mean rethinking the segregation of police and tribal structures, as well as the purpose of policing strategies in fragile states. In particular, given the social isolation of police officers in Yemeni social and cultural life, it is worthwhile for the Yemeni Government and the international donors working to restructure security in the aftermath of the Arab Spring of 2011 to ask whether they envisage future security in Yemen to be supported by a police *service* or a police *force*.

It is the fundamental belief of the author that establishing a paramilitary police force in Yemen without community participation will not work. Nowhere in Yemen have any members of the country's diverse cultural and tribal tapestry readily accepted the imposition of centralised law enforcement regimes upon their communities in the past, and this is likely to remain the case if Yemen continues to operate on a closed and socially isolated mechanism of security delivery in

future. The author strongly recommends that Yemen pursue the creation of a police service based on an open-source security model now that President Saleh has resigned his position.

One potentially empowering and integrative initiative for members of Yemeni society in this sense would be the formation of community watch organisations that would work in collaboration with state police and report offences to them. Another would be voluntary programmes aimed at children and young people specifically, based on scouts-type models, in which they could participate to identify threats to the communities that they lived in and pathways for building community resilience. In line with theories put forward by Sultan Barakat, threats to the community here would be defined under a human security-based, rather than a physical security-based, umbrella, including environmental threats, threats emerging from accidents or emergencies, poor security precautions, and so on (*Private Consultation, September, 2012*). By being involved in a Government-sponsored, or Government-controlled scouts programme, children and young people could help to build awareness of security challenges among families and communities, while gaining access to positive socialising activities, and receive practical training and guidance to challenges that they are likely to encounter in the future, equipping them with skills and learning experiences that could help them to contribute positively to Yemen's development.

In the spirit of openness, as Stavridis mentions in the context of training security personnel in Afghanistan, any open security programming in Yemen would have to be based on a principle of improving literacy among children, young people, community members and law enforcement. This is because literacy – as a means of opening local, national, regional and global pathways of communication for individuals – is the ultimate tool for creating stability and integration, as well as the fastest way of bringing public grievances to the attention of policy-makers.

Existing comparative models for project design in terms of generating community watch groups and scouts organisations in Yemen could be drawn from the Afghanistan National Solidarity Programme or the British scouts system, though key thematic adaptations would have to be made to the local cultural context in both cases. These adjustments are particularly necessary in terms of the spectrum of activities that would be made available to scout members, and in terms of the focus of scout programmes, which would have to be shifted towards principles of endurance, survival and community protection.

While a scout-based model of youth engagement in Yemen might be difficult to develop in the short term, restricted financial resources are not the main obstacle to success for such a programme – human resources are. More than money, what Yemen needs now is a system of recognising and rewarding passionate individuals in communities: these are individuals with a keen interest in improving the lives of young people. While Yemeni schools are notorious for engaging under-qualified staff members, some such individuals can be found within the existing education system. Others can be found among qualified university graduates, many of whom are currently unemployed and actively engaged in asking the Yemeni Government for work. These individuals are not difficult to find – they can be easily picked out in Yemen through targeted job advertising campaigns. However, they will require training and support, as well as opportunities to design and implement scouts-based activities for young people in the country.

These and other initiatives aimed at integrating communities in open-source security and networks of stability are not necessarily costly endeavours. However, they will require

experimentation, as well as significant research on implementation, in order to make Yemen a safer place for children and young people, as well as a more stable environment for their development.

## **8.6 Recommendations for Researchers of International Development and Post-war Recovery Studies**

Apart from opening up new pathways for the analysis of crime in fragile states through interdisciplinary approaches, this thesis has demonstrated that there is a need to consider more seriously the multi-faceted nature of violence in fragile states. As section 8.1 of this Chapter has argued, this involves moving away from the security-instability nexus. There is a need for greater clarification of key terminology used to describe environments affected by social chaos and social disintegration. In particular, there is a need to distinguish more rigorously between different forms of violence, including political and apolitical behaviour, in order to encourage better-targeted responses to these challenges and more holistic understandings of these phenomena.

## **8.7 Key Challenges and Limitations of the Investigation**

“Children who participate” in conflict and violence within fragile states “are considerably more difficult to study than those that are simply 'exposed'” to these phenomena, though both groups are equally vulnerable to the effects of conflict and fragility<sup>187</sup> (Pederson and Sommerfelt, 2007, p. 256). This is because it is relatively easy to gage how many children are affected by the realities associated with conflict and fragility by identifying a conflict-affected area, estimating the population density of that area, and then assuming that all children contained within it are in some way victims of these circumstances. This victimisation does not preclude children and young people from holding dual and conflicting roles as aggressors and as the aggressed within societies where “victims can be victims and not be innocent” (Rieff, 2002.p. 53).

With the breakdown of law enforcement and judicial services that is characteristic of state fragility, and with the growth of self-reliance and community isolation in fragile environments, it is extremely difficult for outsiders to discover the number, let alone the identity of children and young people who participate in violent criminal behaviour within such contexts, and it is even more difficult to gain access to such people for research purposes. This reality proved to be an important limitation in this investigation, emerging as a major reason why findings produced by this thesis remained suggestive rather than empirical. It is extremely difficult to provide empirical analyses of criminal environments in any political setting, but challenges to obtaining accurate data multiply exponentially in fragile settings, particularly as conflict and political violence increase.

These challenges are complicated in Yemen by: the severe cultural and religious stigmatisation of crime; the difficulty of separating violent offending from political violence; and, the isolation of children and young people within Yemeni society, which makes them hard to reach for interview and commentary. A lack of access to police detention cells, prisons and hospitals provided for independent researchers interested in interviewing victims and perpetrators of crime in Yemen is another barrier.

---

<sup>187</sup> Again, see Chapter 5.

These challenges are most likely to prevail in other fragile contexts where the severe isolation of children and young people, coupled with the inaccessibility and poor legitimacy of law enforcement services, would obstruct the completion of research conducted directly with violent young offenders. The author has attempted to counteract these challenges by prioritising the Yemeni case study in her analysis, working to interview a wide range of Yemeni civilians, elite stakeholders and experts to provide as complete a picture as possible of this one development context. Another limitation of the theoretical framework established in Chapter 5 is that, although it contains lessons that are easily translatable to other fragile states, it is firmly grounded in Yemen and has not been tested in other contexts. This is not overly problematic in itself because the main contribution of this thesis has been to open up the discussion of violent young offending in fragile states by integrating criminological and international development literature, rather than providing a definitive solution to this challenge. However, it does reveal avenues for future work.

## **8.8 Suggestions for Further Work**

The relational theory of violent young offending and state fragility put forward by this thesis is drawn from the unique development and socio-cultural environment of Yemen. A number of problems need to be addressed if this theory is to be transformed into a truly general purpose tool for understanding the pressures on young people to use criminal violence within these settings. These problems suggest a number of directions for future investigations.

Firstly, in order to address the limitations of this thesis, there is a need for further research to be conducted in different fragile states, aimed at investigating whether or not international development literature can be integrated with criminological theory just as effectively in other fragile contexts as it can be in Yemen. Such research falls beyond the scope of this thesis but would help to significantly improve our understanding of violent environments in fragile states, including how violence is generated, why children and young people in fragile states turn to violence, and what the characteristics of the social environments of violence in fragile states are, beyond violence that is associated with conflict or political motivation. It would require additional specific localised analyses of crime patterns and their interaction with underdevelopment on a case by case basis, following a similar method to that which has been showcased in this thesis.

Secondly, there is a need to conduct comparative analysis of similar case studies identified using the fragile states typology put forward in Chapter 6 and the criminological theories overviewed in Chapter 4. It is speculated that such comparative analysis would be more informative if countries were also broken down according to similar cultural traits or religious make-ups, which might generate greater specificity within the theoretical framework.

Thirdly, there is a greater need to consider issues of crime and social chaos in fragile environments, where researchers need to assess more critically how “natural” a bi-product of social chaos and degradation different forms of offending are, particularly in terms of crime that is not associated with property offences<sup>188</sup>.

---

<sup>188</sup> See Chapter 4.

Fourthly, understandings of crime in Yemen would benefit from greater investigation of religion and tribalism as a system of social control. Such an investigation fell regrettably beyond the scope of this thesis. Other areas for research expansion include a comparative analysis of crime in urban versus rural communities in Yemen, as well as a more in-depth exploration of gender-based discrepancies in criminal behaviour among children and young people.

Finally, in terms of the application of the theory put forward, there is a need for greater integration of alternative tools for analysis within international development research that strives to interpret issues relating to young people, security, security sector reform, violence and community welfare, with a particular need to be more inclusive of other disciplines, such as those of criminology and psychology. This thesis has looked most closely at the overlaps between criminology and international development. It has pointed out a greater need for similar studies to be conducted, based on greater research with communities, on the integration of advances made in the field of psychology and psychosocial health with international development theories relating to state fragility.

## Annex 1: Reported Global Crime Rates<sup>189</sup>

	Total Crimes per 1,000 people		Murders per 1,000 people		Rapes per 1,000 people			
1	Dominica:	113.822	1	Colombia:	0.617847	1	South Africa:	1.19538
2	New Zealand:	105.881	2	South Africa:	0.496008	2	Seychelles:	0.788294
3	Finland:	101.526	3	Jamaica:	0.324196	3	Australia:	0.777999
4	Denmark:	92.8277	4	Venezuela:	0.316138	4	Montserrat:	0.749384
5	Chile:	88.226	5	Russia:	0.201534	5	Canada:	0.733089
6	United Kingdom:	85.5517	6	Mexico:	0.130213	6	Jamaica:	0.476608
7	Montserrat:	80.3982	7	Estonia:	0.107277	7	Zimbabwe:	0.457775
8	United States:	80.0645	8	Latvia:	0.10393	8	Dominica:	0.34768
9	Netherlands:	79.5779	9	Lithuania:	0.102863	9	United States:	0.301318
10	South Africa:	77.1862	10	Belarus:	0.0983495	10	Iceland:	0.246009
11	Germany:	75.9996	11	Ukraine:	0.094006	11	Papua New Guinea:	0.233544
12	Canada:	75.4921	12	Papua New Guinea:	0.0838593	12	New Zealand:	0.213383
13	Norway:	71.8639	13	Kyrgyzstan:	0.0802565	13	United Kingdom:	0.142172
14	France:	62.1843	14	Thailand:	0.0800798	14	Spain:	0.140403
15	Seychelles:	52.9265	15	Moldova:	0.0781145	15	France:	0.139442
16	Hungary:	44.9763	16	Zimbabwe:	0.0749938	16	Korea, South:	0.12621
17	Estonia:	43.3601	17	Seychelles:	0.0739025	17	Mexico:	0.122981
18	Czech Republic:	38.2257	18	Zambia:	0.070769	18	Norway:	0.120836
19	Italy:	37.9633	19	Costa Rica:	0.061006	19	Costa Rica:	0.118277
20	Switzerland:	36.1864	20	Poland:	0.0562789	20	Venezuela:	0.115507
21	Portugal:	34.3833	21	Georgia:	0.0511011	21	Finland:	0.110856
22	Slovenia:	33.6236	22	Uruguay:	0.045082	22	Netherlands:	0.100445
23	Poland:	32.8573	23	Bulgaria:	0.0445638	23	Denmark:	0.0914948
24	Korea, South:	31.7267	24	United States:	0.042802	24	Germany:	0.0909731
25	Mauritius:	29.1982	25	Armenia:	0.0425746	25	Bulgaria:	0.0795973
26	Zimbabwe:	28.8753	26	India:	0.0344083	26	Chile:	0.0782179
27	Lithuania:	22.8996	<b>27</b>	<b>Yemen:</b>	<b>0.0336276</b>	27	Thailand:	0.0626305
28	Spain:	22.8867	28	Dominica:	0.0289733	28	Kyrgyzstan:	0.0623785
29	Latvia:	21.921	29	Azerbaijan:	0.0285642	29	Poland:	0.062218
30	Uruguay:	21.7017	30	Finland:	0.0283362	30	Sri Lanka:	0.0599053
31	Russia:	20.5855	31	Slovakia:	0.0263303	31	Hungary:	0.0588588
32	Ireland:	20.2376	32	Romania:	0.0250784	32	Estonia:	0.0547637
33	Bulgaria:	19.9886	33	Portugal:	0.0233769	33	Ireland:	0.0542829
34	Japan:	19.177	34	Malaysia:	0.0230034	34	Switzerland:	0.0539458
35	Romania:	16.4812	35	Macedonia:	0.0229829	35	Belarus:	0.0514563
36	Slovakia:	16.3537	36	Mauritius:	0.021121	36	Uruguay:	0.0512295
37	Jamaica:	14.3231	37	Hungary:	0.0204857	37	Lithuania:	0.0508757
38	Belarus:	13.1592	38	Korea, South:	0.0196336	38	Malaysia:	0.0505156
39	Mexico:	12.8406	39	Slovenia:	0.0179015	39	Romania:	0.0497089
40	Tunisia:	12.5634	40	France:	0.0173272	40	Czech Republic:	0.0488234
41	Costa Rica:	11.9788	41	Czech Republic:	0.0169905	41	Russia:	0.0486543
42	Ukraine:	11.7793	42	Iceland:	0.0168499	42	Latvia:	0.0454148
43	Hong Kong:	11.6817	43	Australia:	0.0150324	43	Moldova:	0.0448934
44	Macedonia:	9.689	44	Canada:	0.0149063	44	Colombia:	0.0433254
45	Greece:	9.6347	45	Chile:	0.014705	45	Slovenia:	0.0427648
46	Venezuela:	9.307	46	United Kingdom:	0.0140633	46	Italy:	0.0402045
47	Thailand:	8.80422	47	Italy:	0.0128393	47	Portugal:	0.0364376
48	Moldova:	8.58967	48	Spain:	0.0122456	48	Tunisia:	0.0331514
49	Kyrgyzstan:	7.50486	49	Germany:	0.0116461	49	Zambia:	0.0266383
50	Malaysia:	6.97921	50	Tunisia:	0.0112159	50	Ukraine:	0.0244909
51	Qatar:	6.76437	51	Netherlands:	0.0111538	51	Slovakia:	0.0237525
52	Zambia:	5.27668	52	New Zealand:	0.0111524	52	Mauritius:	0.0219334
53	Colombia:	4.98654	53	Denmark:	0.0106775	53	Turkey:	0.0180876
54	Turkey:	4.11252	54	Norway:	0.0106684	54	Japan:	0.017737
55	Armenia:	4.03889	55	Ireland:	0.00946215	55	Hong Kong:	0.0150746
56	Georgia:	3.21338	56	Switzerland:	0.00921351	56	India:	0.0143187
57	Papua New Guinea:	2.39711	57	Indonesia:	0.00910842	57	Qatar:	0.0139042
58	Azerbaijan:	1.76416	58	Greece:	0.0075928	58	Macedonia:	0.0132029
59	India:	1.63352	59	Hong Kong:	0.00550804	59	Greece:	0.0106862
<b>60</b>	<b>Yemen:</b>	<b>1.16109</b>	60	Japan:	0.00499933	60	Georgia:	0.0100492
			61	Saudi Arabia:	0.00397456	61	Armenia:	0.00938652
			62	Qatar:	0.00115868	62	Indonesia:	0.00567003
						<b>63</b>	<b>Yemen:</b>	<b>0.0038597</b>
						64	Azerbaijan:	0.00379171
						65	Saudi Arabia:	0.00329321

<sup>189</sup> These statistics are drawn from the seventh United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, which covers the period of 1998 to 2000 and represents the most accurate and comprehensive analysis thus far of global comparative criminologies (2005).

## Annex 2: Table of Important Data

HDI Rank	Country	2005 GDP per capita in purchasing power parity	2005 Murders per 1000 people	2005 Combined gross enrolment in education % (both sexes)	2011 Multi-dimensional Poverty Index	2011 % Loss of income due to inequality	2011 Loss of education due to inequality
1	Norway	47,305	0.010668	98.4	..	10.6	2.2
2	Australia	32,698	0.015032	112.5	..	16.6	1.7
3	Netherlands	35,105	0.011154	97.4	..	12.5	3.9
4	United States	42,534	0.042802	92.2	..	32.4	3.7
5	New Zealand	25,305	0.011152	106.8	..	..	..
6	Canada	35,033	0.014906	..	..	17.1	3.2
7	Ireland	38,578	0.009462	98	..	13.8	3.2
8	Liechtenstein	..		..	..	..	..
9	Germany	31,364	0.011646	..	..	14.5	1.8
10	Sweden	32,723		95.1	..	10.3	3.9
11	Switzerland	35,784	0.009214	85	..	14.3	2
12	Japan	30,310	0.004999	86	..	..	..
13	Hong Kong, China	35,678	0.005508	74.5	..	..	..
14	Iceland	34,921	0.016991	95.5	..	11.8	2.6
15	Korea (Republic of)	22,783	0.019634	96.8	..	18.4	25.5
16	Denmark	33,214	0.010678	102.8	..	10.2	3.1
17	Israel	23,390		90	..	23.7	7.9
18	Belgium	32,127		94	..	11.7	6.5
19	Austria	33,377		88.9	..	15.1	2.4
20	France	29,809	0.017327	94.9	..	13.9	9.1
21	Slovenia	23,498	0.017902	91.3	0	8.5	3.1
22	Finland	30,684	0.028336	101.4	..	10.6	2.1
23	Spain	27,377	0.012246	95.5	..	16.7	5.5
24	Italy	28,144	0.012839	90	..	16.8	11.4
25	Luxembourg	68,319		..	..	13.5	6.2
26	Singapore	45,374		..	..	..	..
27	Czech Republic	20,362	0.016850	82.8	0.01	9.6	1.3
28	United Kingdom	32,731	0.014063	92.8	..	17.3	2.2
29	Greece	24,640	0.007593	99.7	..	17.1	14.3
30	United Arab Emirates	48,992		..	0.002	..	..
31	Cyprus	24,403		77.6	..	10.9	15
32	Andorra	..		60.3	..	..	..

33	Brunei Darussalam	47,468		77.6	..	..	..
34	Estonia	16,548		92.2	0.026	14.5	2.7
35	Slovakia	16,164	0.026330	77.8	0	9.6	1.6
36	Malta	20,958		81.2	..	..	..
37	Qatar	64,452	0.001159	71.7	..	..	..
38	Hungary	16,955	0.020486	89.3	0.016	11.2	4
39	Poland	13,784	0.056279	87.6	..	16.3	6.6
40	Lithuania	14,194	0.102863	93.2	..	17.5	4.1
41	Portugal	21,294	0.023377	89.3	..	19.3	5.6
42	Bahrain	27,962		..	..	..	..
43	Latvia	13,038	0.103930	91.1	0.006	21	3.8
44	Chile	12,172	0.014705	82.9	..	34.1	13.7
45	Argentina	10,819		89.7	0.011	34.4	12.1
46	Croatia	15,329		77.8	0.016	27.8	10.4
47	Barbados	19,189		..	..	..	..
48	Uruguay	9,683	0.045082	..	0.006	27.8	10.8
49	Palau	..		..	..	..	..
50	Romania	9,359	0.025078	77	..	22.2	5
51	Cuba	..		87.5	..	..	..
52	Seychelles	17,352	0.073903	82.1	..	..	..
53	Bahamas	..		72	..	24.5	7.9
54	Montenegro	8,265		..	0.006	11.3	2.5
55	Bulgaria	9,807	0.044564	76.4	..	19.9	5.9
56	Saudi Arabia	21,220	0.003975	78.6	..	..	..
57	Mexico	12,593	0.130213	77.9	0.015	35.6	21.9
58	Panama	9,186		79.5	..	40.5	17.8
59	Serbia	8,515		..	0.003	10.3	9.9
60	Antigua and Barbuda	15,792		..	..	..	..
61	Malaysia	11,755	0.023003	71.4	..	0	..
62	Trinidad and Tobago	20,014		62	0.02	21.9	6.6
63	Kuwait	43,560		..	..	..	..
64	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	13,653		..	..	..	..
65	Belarus	8,541	0.098350	88.7	0	12.1	5.4
66	Russian Federation	11,853	0.201534	82	0.005	11.9	11.2
67	Grenada	7,985		..	..	..	..
68	Kazakhstan	8,699		91.1	0.002	13.8	5.3
69	Costa Rica	9,002	0.061006	73	..	33.7	17.7
70	Albania	6,162		..	0.005	18.3	11.9

71	Lebanon	9,517		..	..	30	24.1
72	Saint Kitts and Nevis	13,158		..	..	..	..
73	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	9,924	0.316138	..	..	44.9	18.1
74	Bosnia and Herzegovina	6,232		..	0.003	19.3	5.2
75	Georgia	3,610	0.051101	76.4	0.003	22.7	3.3
76	Ukraine	5,583	0.094006	87.7	0.008	10.9	6.1
77	Mauritius	10,158	0.021121	75.2	..	16.6	13.5
78	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	7,656	0.022983	69.9	0.008	21.8	17.5
79	Jamaica	7,027	0.324196	..	..	24.1	8.3
80	Peru	6,323		80.9	0.086	30	24
81	Dominica	7,205	0.028973	..	..	..	..
82	Saint Lucia	8,683		73.1	..	..	..
83	Ecuador	6,736		..	0.009	38.8	22.1
84	Brazil	8,505		87.2	0.011	40.7	25.7
85	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	7,155		..	..	..	..
86	Armenia	4,098	0.042575	71.2	0.004	10.8	6.5
87	Colombia	7,305	0.617847	79	0.022	53.9	22.8
88	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	9,314		67.4	..	..	..
89	Oman	19,533		..	..	..	..
90	Tonga	4,098		..	..	..	..
91	Azerbaijan	4,496	0.028564	71.9	0.021	4.5	8.3
92	Turkey	10,977		70	0.028	26.5	27.4
93	Belize	6,254		76.9	0.024	..	..
94	Tunisia	6,445	0.011216	77.8	0.01	21.8	38.7
95	Jordan	4,334		76.8	0.008	21.1	22.4
96	Algeria	7,176		74	..	..	..
97	Sri Lanka	3,546		..	0.021	20.8	17.9
98	Dominican Republic	6,200		..	0.018	33.8	26.8
99	Samoa	3,858		73.7	..	..	..
100	Fiji	4,295		73.6	..	..	..
101	China	4,115		..	0.056	29.5	23.2
102	Turkmenistan	4,668		..	..	..	..
103	Thailand	6,751	0.080080	71.8	0.006	34	18
104	Suriname	6,067		69.9	0.039	34.9	20.1

105	El Salvador	5,687		75.4	..	31.1	32.4
106	Gabon	13,029		..	0.161	22.1	7.3
107	Paraguay	3,897		72.1	0.064	33.4	19.8
108	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	3,757		..	0.089	47.2	27.6
109	Maldives	4,035		73.1	0.018	23.2	41.2
110	Mongolia	2,613		78.3	0.065	16.4	5.8
111	Moldova (Republic of)	2,362	0.078115	71.1	0.007	18.9	6.1
112	Philippines	2,927		78.9	0.064	30	13.5
113	Egypt	4,319		..	0.024	14.2	40.9
114	Occupied Palestinian Territory	..		80	0.005	..	..
115	Uzbekistan	2,001		74	0.008	17.9	1.4
116	Micronesia (Federated States of)	2,972		..	..	63.1	22.4
117	Guyana	2,478		83.7	0.053	32.1	11.7
118	Botswana	11,772		72.8	..	..	..
119	Syrian Arab Republic	3,954		64.9	0.021	18.3	31.5
120	Namibia	5,389		71.4	0.187	68.3	27.8
121	Honduras	3,270		..	0.159	43.4	31.8
122	Kiribati	2,341		76.2	..	..	..
123	South Africa	8,597	0.496008	..	0.057	..	20.8
124	Indonesia	3,217	0.009108	69.3	0.095	17.7	20.4
125	Vanuatu	3,529		..	0.129	..	..
126	Kyrgyzstan	1,728	0.080257	77.3	0.019	12.2	11.1
127	Tajikistan	1,480		70.9	0.068	15.3	9.4
128	Viet Nam	2,143		..	0.084	11.4	17.1
129	Nicaragua	2,322		..	0.128	33.6	33.3
130	Morocco	3,497		58.8	0.048	23	45.8
131	Guatemala	4,064		67	0.127	38.5	36.1
132	Iraq	2,897		..	0.059	..	..
133	Cape Verde	2,676		..	..	..	30.7
134	India	2,300	0.034408	60.8	0.283	14.7	40.6
135	Ghana	1,193		52.6	0.144	27.2	40.9
136	Equatorial Guinea	24,770		..	..	..	29.2
137	Congo	3,497		..	0.208	30.3	25.4

138	Lao People's Democratic Republic	1,651		58.8	0.267	15.5	30.5
139	Cambodia	1,453		..	0.251	21.4	31.1
140	Swaziland	4,335		60	0.184	40.9	29.8
141	Bhutan	3,471		54.3	0.119	..	44.8
142	Solomon Islands	2,055		49.6	..	..	..
143	Kenya	1,339		58.8	0.229	36	30.7
144	Sao Tome and Principe	1,416		65.9	0.154	44.2	19.1
145	Pakistan	2,184		39.5	0.264	11	46.4
146	Bangladesh	1,069		47.8	0.292	17.7	39.4
147	Timor-Leste	713		..	0.36	17.8	47.4
148	Angola	3,611		..	0.452	50	..
149	Myanmar	..		..	0.154	..	..
150	Cameroon	1,956		52.4	0.287	19.9	35.3
151	Madagascar	882		62.5	0.357	36.1	30.1
152	Tanzania (United Republic of)	1,065		51.3	0.367	20.6	32.8
153	Papua New Guinea	1,859	0.083859	..	..	..	..
154	Yemen	2,194	0.033638	54.4	0.283	17.6	49.8
155	Senegal	1,614		41	0.384	23.9	45.1
156	Nigeria	1,737		54.7	0.31	28.8	44.2
157	Nepal	956		..	0.35	37.4	43.6
158	Haiti	1,016		..	0.299	47.9	40.7
159	Mauritania	1,672		47.7	0.352	21.5	43.2
160	Lesotho	1,201		61.5	0.156	47	24.3
161	Uganda	901		63.3	0.367	29.1	32.2
162	Togo	772		57.5	0.284	20	41.5
163	Comoros	1,127		61	0.408	..	47.4
164	Zambia	1,127	0.070769	..	0.328	20.8	23.8
165	Djibouti	1,848		24.8	0.139	21.3	47
166	Rwanda	860		56.3	0.426	34.5	30.7
167	Benin	1,309		56.7	0.412	23.6	42
168	Gambia	1,142		..	0.324	..	..
169	Sudan*	1,601		34.1	..	..	..
170	Côte d'Ivoire	1,560		..	0.353	34.4	43.2
171	Malawi	606		61	0.381	19.7	34.7
172	Afghanistan	835		51.4	..	..	39.3
173	Zimbabwe	..	0.074994	..	0.18	34.5	20.1
174	Ethiopia	633		44.2	0.562	20.8	38.2
175	Mali	985		42	0.558	..	36.9

176	Guinea-Bissau	973		62	..	32.5	40.3
177	Eritrea	638		34.5	..	..	..
178	Guinea	952		45.3	0.506	31.1	42
179	Central African Republic	658		30.3	0.512	28.1	45.9
180	Sierra Leone	653		..	0.439	31	47.4
181	Burkina Faso	1,040		28.9	0.536	25.3	37.3
182	Liberia	323		..	0.485	19	46.4
183	Chad	1,342		37.1	0.344	21	43.4
184	Mozambique	667		52.5	0.512	25.8	18.2
185	Burundi	340		38.3	0.53	..	..
186	Niger	605		24.9	0.642	17.9	39.5
187	Congo (Democratic Republic of the)	266		..	0.393	36.8	31.2
..	Tuvalu	..		..	..	..	..
..	Somalia	..		..	0.514	..	..
..	San Marino	..		..	..	..	..
..	Nauru	..		64.9	..	..	..
..	Monaco	..		..	..	..	..
..	Marshall Islands	..		..	..	..	..
..	Korea (Democratic People's Rep. of)	..		..	..	..	..

## Bibliography

ABC News, 2011. 'Brother, sister killed while playing with grenade', February 14<sup>th</sup>, 2011. Sydney: ABC News. Available at: <http://www.abcnews.net/au/> [accessed 15 April 2011].

Abele, Daniele G; Maclever, Martha Abele; McIntosh, Mary E. and Nolle, David B., 1996. 'Minority Rights and Majority Rule'. In Drobizheva, Leokadia; Gottemoeller, Rose; McArdle Kelleher, Catherine and Walker, Lee (eds), 1996. *Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Soviet World: Case Studies and Analysis*. London: M.E. Shape.

Ahmar, Salmy and Kolbe, Christine, 2011. *Innovative Approaches to Evaluating Interventions in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: The Case of Helmand*, Working Paper. Brisbane: Coffey International Development.

Akers, Ronald L.; Krohn, Marvin D.; Lanza-Kaduce, Lonni; and Radosevich, Marcia, 1979. 'Social Learning and Deviant Behaviour: A Specific Test of a General Theory'. In American Sociological Association, 1979. *American Sociology Review*, vol. 44, no. 4, August 1979. Washington D.C: American Sociological Association.

Al-Arhabi, Abdulkarim Ismail; Al-Hawri, Mohamed Ahmed; and Al-Shaikh Ali Al-Batuly, Abdulmajeed, 2010. *Yemen Report: Millennium Development Goals, 2010*. Sana'a: United Nations Development Project with the Republic of Yemen.

Al-Ariqi, Ghaida, 2012. 'Al Qaeda's New Fighting Strategy'. *Yemen Times*, 18 June, 2012. Sana'a: The Yemen Times. Available at: <http://www.yementimes.com/> [accessed 26 June 2012].

Al-Harazi, Shatha, 2011. 'Confusion, desperation surround fuel and power shortages'. *Yemen Times*, 1502, 12 September, 2011. Sana'a: The Yemen Times. Available at: <http://www.yementimes.com/> [accessed 12 September 2011].

Al Jazeera, 2009a. 'Foreigners kidnapped in Yemen', June 24<sup>th</sup>, 2009. Al Jazeera. Available at: <http://english.aljazeera.net/> [accessed 27 January 2011].

--, 2012. 'Saleh hands over Yemen reigns to successor', February 27<sup>th</sup>, 2012. Available at: <http://english.aljazeera.net/> [accessed 27 February 2012].

--, 2011. 'Yemen opposition "willing to tackle al-Qaeda"', May 29<sup>th</sup>, 2011. Available at: <http://english.aljazeera.net/> [accessed 31 May 2011].

--, 2009b. 'Yemen targets Northern fighters', August 12<sup>th</sup>, 2009. Al Jazeera. Available at: <http://english.aljazeera.net/> [accessed 27 January 2011].

Al-Kamim, Abd al-Aziz Muhammad; al-Mikhlaifi, Mohammad Ahmad and Mashhur, Huriya, 2003. *Building Democracy in Yemen: Women's Political Participation, Political Party Life and Democratic Elections*. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance with the Arab NGO Network for Development.

Al-Maqtari, Muaad, 2012. 'Yemeni Journalist's Facebook Comment Lands Him in Prison'. *Yemen Times*, 7 June, 2012. Sana'a: The Yemen Times. Available at: <http://www.yementimes.com/> [accessed 8 June 2012].

Al-Samia'y, Ghazi Abdul-Rahman (ed.), 2009. *State of Local Democracy in Yemen*. Taiz: Human Rights Information and Training Centre.

Al-Wesabi, Sadeq, 2011. 'More economic woes in waiting for Yemen'. *Yemen Times*, 1502, 12 September, 2011. Sana'a: The Yemen Times. Available at: <http://www.yementimes.com/> [accessed 12 September 2011].

--, 2010. 'Yemenis lost confidence in State'. *Yemen Times*, 1410, 20 December, 2010. Sana'a: The Yemen Times. Available at: <http://www.yementimes.com/> [accessed 20 December 2010].

Al-Zaidi, Hasan, 2008. 'Ministry of Interior Manages to Control Arms-Bearing: Tribal Figures ask for State Protection in Return', March 17<sup>th</sup>, 2008. Sana'a: The Yemen Post. Available at: <http://www.yemenpost.net/> [accessed 25 February 2011].

Al-Zwaini, Laila, 2006. 'State and Non-State Justice in Yemen', conference paper prepared for *The Conference on the Relationship between State and Non-State Justice Systems in Afghanistan*. Kabul: United States Institute of Peace.

Alexander, Larry and Ferzan, Kimberly Kessler, 2009. *Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Alkarama, 2011. 'Yemen: Detainees' Families Protest Against Political Security Forces', 14 February, 2011. Geneva: Alkarama.

Allan, Emily Andersen; Harer, Miles D.; Steffensmeier, Darrell J., and Streifel, Cathy, 1989. 'Age and the Distribution of Crime'. In The University of Chicago, 1989. *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 94, no. 4, January 1989. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Alley, April Longley, 2011. 'Yemen on the Brink: Will Saleh's Resignation Lead to Democratic Reform?'. In Council of Foreign Relations, 2011. *Foreign Affairs*, April 4<sup>th</sup>, 2011. Buffalo: Council on Foreign Relations.

Anderson, Michael and Torres, Magui Moreno, 2004. *Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction*. London: Department for International Development.

Anderson, Tammy L, 2008. *Neither Villain nor Victim: Empowerment and Agency Among Women Substance Abusers*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.

Anthony, David; Asiya, Mohammed, Carty, Dermot; Hofmeister, Marika; Knudsen, Christine; Morgan, Ann; Thormann, Monique, 2010. *UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Partnering for Children in Emergencies*. New York: United Nations Children's Fund. Available at: <http://www.unicef.org/> [Accessed 19 July 2010].

Antoine, Louise B, 2002. *Substance Abuse: a Global View*. Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Group.

Ashworth, Andrew, 2006. *Principles of Criminal Law: Fifth Edition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Aszmann, Anna; Boyce, William; Godeau, Emmanuelle; Harel, Yossi; King, Mathew; Mazur, Joanna; Olcho, Michel; Overpeck, Mary; Scheldt, Peter; Schmid, Holger; Simpson, Kelly; Szabo, Monica and Pickett, Will, 2002. 'Multiple Risk Behaviour and Injury: An International Analysis of Young People'. In Ding, Sharon; Fraser, Sandy; Kellet, Mary; Lewis, Vicky; Robinson, Chris (eds.), 2004. *The Reality of Research with Children and Young People*. London: Sage Publications in association with the Open University.

Babiak, Paul; Neumann, Craig S., and Hare, Robert D 2010. 'Corporate psychopathy: Talking the walk'. In John Wiley and Sons, 2010. *Behavioural Sciences and the Law*, vol. 28, no. 2. New Jersey: Wiley.

Bäckström, Teresa Vigil; Mays, G. Larry; and Winfree, L. Thomas Jr., 1994. *Social Learning Theory, Self-Reported Delinquency, and Youth Gangs: A New Twist on a General Theory of Crime and Delinquency*. New Mexico: New Mexico State University.

Bali moune-Lutz, Mina and McGillivray, Mark, 2011. 'State Fragility: Concept and Measurement'. In McGillivray, Mark; Naudé, Wim and Santos-Paulino, Amelia, 2011. *Fragile States: Causes, Costs and Responses*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bandura, Albert, 1977. *Social Learning Theory*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Barakat, Sultan; Connolly, David; Deely, Sean and Lewis, Alexandra, 2011a. 'Reassessing State Fragility and Policy Responses in Yemen'. In *Parliamentary Brief*, June, 2011. London: Parliamentary Brief.

--, 2011b. *On the Edge of Failure: Conflict and Fragility in Yemen*. York: Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York.

Bauman, Karl E.; Foreshee, Vangie A. and Linder, G. Fletcher, 1999. 'Family Violence and the Perpetration of Adolescent Violence: Examining Social Learning and Social Control Processes'. In the *Journal of Marriage and Family*, vol. 61, no. 2, 1999. Minneapolis: National Council on Family Relations.

Baylis, John; Smith, Steve and Owens, Patricia, 2011. *The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Berberoglu, Naile, 2011. *Children's Childhoods: Exploring Childhood Through Children's Interpretations of Television Advertisements in North Cyprus* [Doctoral Thesis]. York: University of York (Unpublished).

Bergstrøm, Cassandra and Molteberg, Elisabeth, 2000. *Our Common Discourse: Diversity and Paradigms in Development Studies*, Working Paper. Aas: Centre for International Environment and Development Studies.

Bertocchi, Graziella and Guerzoni, Andrea, 2011. *The Fragile Definition of State Fragility*. Modena: University of Modena and Reggio Emilia.

Berzonsky, Michael D., 2002. 'Social Cognition'. In Salkind, Neil J. (ed.), 2002. *Child Development*. New York: Macmillan Reference Group.

Bilgin, Pinar, 2002. 'Beyond Statism in Security Studies? Human Agency and Security in the Middle East'. In *The Review of International Affairs*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2002. London: Frank Cass.

Boreham, Richard; Cronberg, Alexandra; Dollin, Laura and Pudney, Steve, 2007. *The Arrestee Survey, 2003 – 2006*, second edition. London: Home Office.

Boucek, Christopher, 2010. *War In Sa'ada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge*, Carnegie Paper Series, no. 110. Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment.

Bourguignon, François, 1999. 'Crime, Violence and Inequitable Development', conference paper prepared for the *World Conference on Development Economics*. Washington DC: World Bank Group.

Brannen, Julia, 2005. *Mixed Methods Research: A Discussion Paper*, ESRC National Centre for Research Methods Review Paper. London: Economic and Social Research Council.

Brenner, Suzanne, 2011. 'Private Moralities in the Public Sphere: Democratisation, Islam, and Gender in Indonesia'. In The American Anthropological Association, 2011. *American Anthropologist*, vol. 113, no. 3. Malden: Wiley.

Brewer, John D.; Lockhart, Bill and Rogers, Paula, 1998. 'Informal Social Control and Crime Management in Belfast'. In *The British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 49, no. 4, 1998. Oxford: Blackwell Publishings.

British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2011. 'Middle East and North Africa: Yemen'. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Available at: <http://www.fco.gov.uk/> [accessed 24 August 2011].

British Educational Research Association, 2004. *Revised Ethical Guidelines for Educational Research*. Notts: British Educational Research Association. Available at: <http://www.bera.ac.uk/> [accessed 7 November 2010].

Brown, Graham and Stewart, Frances, 2010. *Fragile States*. Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity.

Brown, Nathan J, 2010. *Arab Judicial Structures: A Study Presented to the United Nations Development Project*. Beirut: United Nations Development Project Programme on Governance in the Arab Region.

Brown, Nathan J.; Crystal, Jill and Nasr, Hesham, 2004. *Criminal Justice and Prosecution in the Arab World*. Beirut: United Nations Development Project Programme on Governance in the Arab Region.

Bruderlein, Claude and Leaning, Jennifer, 1999. 'New Challenges for Humanitarian Protection'. In *BMI: British Medical Journal*, vol. 319, no. 7207, 1999. London: BMI Publishing Group.

Burton, John, 1997. *Violence Explained: The sources of conflict, violence and crime and their prevention*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Bushway, Shawn and Reuter, Peter, 1996. 'Labour Market and Crime Factors'. In Sherman, Lawrence W, 1996. *Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising*. York: York book Binding.

Buzan, Barry, 1991. *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. London: Pearson, Longman.

--, 1997. 'Rethinking Security After the Cold War'. In *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 32, no. 1, 1997. Sage Journals Online. Available at: <http://cac.sagepub.com/> [accessed 24 November 2009].

Byrne, Jonathon and Topping, John, 2012. 'Policing, Terrorism and the Conundrum of Community: A Northern Ireland Perspective'. In Spalek, Basia, 2012. *Counter Terrorism: Community-Based Approaches to Preventing Terror Crime*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Caplan, Richard. *International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Carment, David; Prest, Stewart and Samy, Yiagadeesen, 2008. *Determinants of State Fragility and Implications for Aid Allocation: An Assessment Based on the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy*. Helsinki: United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research.

--, 2011. 'The Causes and Measurement of State Fragility'. In McGillivray, Mark; Naudé, Wim and Santos-Paulino, Amelia, 2011. *Fragile States: Causes, Costs and Responses*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Carpenter, Don; Slason, Gayla Jo and Snyder, Johnny, 2006. *MySpace.com – A Social Networking site and Social Contract Theory*. Colorado: CIS Mesa State College.

Carrington, Kerry, 2009. *Offending Youth: Sex, Crime and Justice*. Leichhardt: The Federation Press.

Carroll, Kathleen M. and Miller, William R, 2006. *Rethinking Substance Abuse: What that Science Shows, and What We Should Do About It*. New York: Guilford Press.

Casey, John, 2010. 'Implementing Community Policing in Different Countries and Cultures'. In Pakistan Society of Criminology, 2010. *Pakistan Journal of Criminology*, vol. 2, no. 4, 2010. Peshawar: Pakistan Society of Criminology.

Central Intelligence Agency, 2010. *The World Factbook*. Washington: Central Intelligence Agency. Available at: <http://www.cia.gov/> [accessed 2 December 2010].

--, 2011. *The World Factbook*. Washington: Central Intelligence Agency. Available at: <http://www.cia.gov/> [accessed 12 May 2011].

Central Statistical Organisation, 2004. *Security and Justice, 2003*. Sana'a Republic of Yemen.

--, 2010. *Security and Justice, 2009*. Sana'a Republic of Yemen.

--, 2004. *Statistical Yearbook, 2003*. Sana'a: Republic of Yemen.

--, 2005. *Statistical Yearbook, 2004*. Sana'a: Republic of Yemen.

--, 2006. *Statistical Yearbook, 2005*. Sana'a: Republic of Yemen.

--, 2007. *Statistical Yearbook, 2006*. Sana'a: Republic of Yemen.

--, 2008. *Statistical Yearbook, 2007*. Sana'a: Republic of Yemen.

--, 2009. *Statistical Yearbook, 2008*. Sana'a: Republic of Yemen.

--, 2010. *Statistical Yearbook, 2009*. Sana'a: Republic of Yemen.

Chao, Wei; Conger, Rand D.; Elder, Glen H. and Simons, Ronald L, 2001. 'Quality of Parenting as Mediator of the Effect of Childhood Defiance on Adolescent Friendship Choices and Delinquency: A Growth Curve Analysis'. In the *Journal of Marriage and Family*, vol. 63, no. 1, 2001. Minneapolis: National Council on Family Relations.

Charles, Vikki; Crow, Graham; Heath, Sue and Wiles, Rose, 2006. 'Anonymity and Confidentiality', conference paper presented at the *ESRC Research Methods Festival*. Oxford: University of Oxford.

Chataigner, Jean-Marc and Gaulme, Francois, 2005. *Beyond the Fragile State: Taking Action to Assist fragile Actors and Societies*. Paris: Agence Francaise de Developpement.

Chatham House, 2010. *Tipping the Balance: A Regional Approach to Yemen's Economic Challenges*, meeting summary, May, 2010. London: Chatham House. Available online at: <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/> [accessed 15 August 2010].

Chauvet, Lisa; Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke, 2007. 'The Cost of Failing States and the Limits of Sovereignty'. Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economics Research.

Christian, Johnie; Mason, David T. and Quinn, Jason, 2007. *Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence*. Eugene: All Academic. Available online at: <http://www.allacademic.com/> [accessed 4 June 2010].

Clark, Victoria, 2010. *Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes*. London: Yale University Press.

Cleaver, Hedy; Nicholson, Don and Tarr, Sukey, 2007. *Child Protection, Domestic Violence and Parental Substance Misuse: Family Experiences and Effective Practice*. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.

- Collier, Paul, 2000. 'Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective'. In Berdal, Mats and Malone, David M, 2000. *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*. London: Lynne Rienner.
- Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke, 2002. 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War'. In The Centre for Study of African Economies, 2002. *The Centre for African Economies Working Paper Series*, no. 160. Oxford: Berkley Electronic Press.
- Collier, Paul; Elliot, V.L.; Hegre, Håvard; Hoeffler, Anke; Reynal-Querol, Marta and Sambanis, Nicholas, 2003. *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. New York: World Bank.
- Comminos, Alex, 2011. *Twitter Revolutions and Cyber Crackdowns: User-Generated Content and Social Networking in the Arab Spring and Beyond*. Melville: Association for Progressive Communications.
- Cooper, Geoff, 2001. 'Conceptualising Social Life'. In Gilbert, Nigel (ed.), 2001. *Researching Social Life*. London: Sage Publications.
- Coughlin, Chris and Vuchinich, Samuel, 1996. 'Family Experience in Preadolescence and the Development of Male Delinquency'. In *Journal of Marriage and Family*, vol. 58, no. 2, May, 1996. Minneapolis: National Council on Family Relations.
- Dawood, Ahmed, 2012. 'Strikes Keep Courts Closed and Threaten Airport Shutdown'. *Yemen Times*, 8 May, 2012. Sana'a: The Yemen Times. Available at: <http://www.yementimes.com/> [accessed 14 May 2012].
- De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno and Morrow, James D, 1999. 'Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions'. In Brown, Michael E.; Coté, Owen R. Jr.; Lynn-Jones, Sean M. and Miller, Steven E, 2000. *Rational Choice and Security Studies: Stephen Walt and His Critics*. London: MIT Press.
- De Zulueta, Felicity, 2006. *From Pain to Violence: The Traumatic Root of Destructiveness*, second edition. Chichester: Whurr Publishers Limited.
- Dembo, Richard; Henderson, Craig E. and Young, Douglas W, 2007. *A National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment for Juvenile Offenders*. Rockville Pike: National Center for Biotechnology Information.
- Denscombe, Martyn, 1998. *The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Research Projects*, second edition, 2003. Philadelphia: Open University Press.
- Department for International Development, 2006. 'Aid Effectiveness in Fragile States'. London: The National Archives. Available at: <http://webarchives.nationalarchives.gov.uk/> [accessed 01/12/11/].
- Diamond, Larry, 2009. 'Democratic Governance and the Performance of Democracy'. Presentation to the *Conference on Democracy that Delivers*. Washington, D.C: Centre for International Private Enterprise.
- Douglas, Ian; Gleichmann, Colin; Odenwald, Michael; Steenken, Kees and Wilkinson, Adrian, 2004. *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide*. Frankfurt: GTZ.
- Dresch, Paul, 1993. *Tribes, Government and History in Yemen*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Dubai School of Government, 2011. *Arab Social Media Report*, vol. 1, no. 2, May, 2011. Dubai: Dubai School of Government.
- Duffield, Mark, 2002. 'Governing the Borderlands: Decoding the Power of Aid'. *Disasters* 25(4), pp. 308-320. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010. *Country Report: Yemen*. London: Economist Intelligence Unit.

Economist, The, 2011. 'The tormented isthmus'. In *The Economist*, vol. 399, no. 8729, April 16<sup>th</sup>, 2011. Washington D.C: The Economist.

Education Development Centre, 2008. *Yemen Cross-Sectoral Youth Assessment: Final Report*. Cairo: United States Agency for International Development.

Environment Protection Authority, 2009. *National Adaptation Plan of Action*. Sana'a: Environment Protection Authority, Government of Yemen.

Eith, Christine A, 2005. *Delinquency, Schools and the Social Bond*. El Paso: LFB Scholarly Publishing.

El-Mikawi, Noha, 2005. *Judicial Reform in Yemen*. Sana'a: United Nations Development Project.

Elliott, Amanda; Elliott, Delbert S.; Huizinga, David; Menard, Scott; Rankin, Bruce and Wilson, William Julius, 2006. *Good Kids from Bad Neighbourhoods: Successful Development in Social Context*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Elobaid, Elobaid Ahmed, 2010. *Harmonisation of Yemeni Laws with Human Rights Obligations*. Sana'a: United Nations Development Project with the Ministry of Human Rights.

Engelhardt-Wendt, Eva and Poluda, Julian, 2008. *Independent Evaluation of UNHCR's Efforts to Prevent and Respond to Sexual and Gender Based Violence in Situations of Forced Displacement*. Postdam: Health Focus GMBH.

Fagan, Jeffrey and Tyler, Tom R, 2008. 'Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?' In the *Ohio State Journal of Law*, vol. 6, no. 231, 2008. Columbus: Moritz College of Law.

Farrington, David P., 2004. 'Conduct Disorder, Aggression and Delinquency'. In Lerner, Richard M. and Steinberg, Laurence (eds.), 2004. *Handbook of Adolescent Psychology*, second edition. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.

Fearon, James, D. and Laitin, David D., 2003. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War'. In American Political Science Association, 2003. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 97, no. 1. Los Angeles: Cambridge University Press.

Ferguson, Charles H., 2011. *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent into Chaos*. New York: Public Affairs, 2008.

Fleishman, Jeffrey, 2009. 'In Yemen, tribal tradition trumps education', 24 December, 2009. In *Los Angeles Times*. Los Angeles: Los Angeles Times. Available at: <http://articles.latimes.com/> [accessed 10 June 2012].

Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, 2010. *Failed States Index*. Washington, D.C: The Slate Group. Available at: <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/> [accessed 24 February 2011].

Frank, Thomas, 2003. 'Officials: Hundreds of Iraqis Killed by Faulty Grenades'. In *Associated Press*, June 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2003. New York: Associated Press.

Fraser Erica and McLean Hilker, Lyndsay, 2009. *Youth Exclusion, Violence and Fragile States: Report Prepared for DFID's Equity and Rights Team*. London: Social Development Direct.

Freedom House, 2002. 'Freedom in the World – Yemen'. Washington D.C: Freedom House. Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/> [accessed 12 October 2011].

Gadd, David and Jefferson, Tony, 2007. *Psychosocial Criminology: An Introduction*. London: Sage Publications.

- Ghani, Ashraf and Lockhart, Clare, 2008. *Fixing Fragile States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gillan, Audrey, 2000. 'Did bad parenting really turn these boys into killers?' In *The Guardian*, 1 November, 2000. Manchester: The Guardian.
- Jonathan, Githens-Mazer's, 2009. 'The Blowback of Repression and the Dynamics of North African Radicalisation'. In Chatham House, 2009. *International Affairs*, vol. 85, no. 5, 2009. London: Blackwell.
- Global Security, 2010. *Yemeni Civil War – 1994*. Alexandria: GlobalSecurity.org. Available at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org> [accessed 3 May 2011].
- Goath, Mohammed, 2003. 'Internet Cafés in Yemen: The Good and the Bad', April 12<sup>th</sup>, 2003. Sana'a: Yemen Observer. Available at: <http://www.yobserver.com/> [accessed 26 March 2012].
- Goldson, Edward, 1993. 'War is Not Good For Children'. In Leavitt, Lewis A. and Fox, Nathan A., 1993. *The Psychological Effects of War and Violence on Children*. London: Laurence Erlbaum Associates.
- Gore, Charles, 2000. 'The rise and fall of the Washington consensus as a paradigm for developing countries'. In Elsevier Science, 2000. *World Development*, vol. 28, no. 5. London: Elsevier Reed.
- Gottfredson, Denise C, 1996. 'School-Based Crime Prevention'. In Sherman, Lawrence W, 1996. *Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising*. York: York book Binding.
- Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, 2011. *Measuring and Assessing State Fragility*. Birmingham: University of Birmingham. Available at: [www.gsdr.org/](http://www.gsdr.org/) [accessed 21 July 2012].
- Government of Yemen, 2009. *Stimulating Yemen's Economic Turnaround through the 10-Point Program*. Sana'a: Government of Yemen.
- Government of Yemen, World Bank and United Nations Development Project, 2007. *Yemen Poverty Assessment*. Sana'a: The Government of Yemen, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Project.
- Gray, Collin S, 1999. *Modern Strategy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Greenawalt, Kent, 1985. 'The Natural Duty to Obey the Law'. In *The Michigan Law Review*, 1985. Ann Arbor: The Michigan Law Review Association.
- Grono, Nick, 2010. *Fragile States and Conflict*. New York: International Crisis Group. Available at: [www.crisisgroup.org/](http://www.crisisgroup.org/) [accessed 18 July 2012].
- Groves, Betsy McAlister, 2002. *Children Who See Too Much: Lessons from the Child Witness to Violence Project*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Halliday, Fred, 1990. *Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South Yemen 1967-1987*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hancké, Bob, 2010. 'The Challenge of Research Design'. In Marsh, David and Stoker, Gerry, 2010. *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, Third Edition. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Harding, Simon, 2011. 'Mindful Violence: The Role of the Urban Street Gang in the Riots in London', conference paper prepared for *Urban Unrest, Social Resentment and Justice*. York: Centre for Urban Research, University of York.

- Henderson, Elizabeth Connell, 2001. *Understanding Addiction*. Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi.
- Hill, Ginny and Nonneman, Gerd, 2011. *Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: Elite Politics, Street Protests and Regional Diplomacy*. London: Chatham House.
- Hirschi, Travis, 2002. *The Causes of Delinquency*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Hofheinz, Albrecht, 2007. 'Arab Internet Use: Popular Trends and Public Impact'. In Sklar, Naomi (ed.), 2007. *Arab Media and Political Renewal: Community, Legitimacy and Public Life*. New York: IB Tauris.
- Horton, Michael, 2011. 'Political Unrest in Yemen', conference paper prepared for the *2011 Middle East and North Africa Conference*, April 20<sup>th</sup>, 2011. Jamestown: The Jamestown Foundation.
- Howitt, Dennis, 2002. *Introduction to Forensic & Criminal Psychology*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, 2009. London: Loughborough University.
- HuffPost World, 2011. 'Children "Blow Themselves Up" in Suicide Bomb Game in Afghanistan or Pakistan'. The Huffington Post: Available at: <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/> [accessed 15 April 2011].
- Human Rights Watch, 2010. *All Quiet on the Northern Front? Uninvestigated Laws of War Violations in Yemen's War with Huthi Rebels*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- , 2009. *Country Summary*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- , 2009a. *Disappearances and Arbitrary Arrests in the Armed Conflict with Huthi Rebels in the North of Yemen*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- , 2009b. *In the Name of Unity: The Yemeni Government's Brutal Response to Southern Movement Protests*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- , 2008. *The Last Holdouts: Ending the Juvenile Death Penalty in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Pakistan and Yemen*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Humphrey, Michael, 2011. *Citizen Security: Democratisation and Violence in Latin America*, public lecture organised by the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit, November 28<sup>th</sup>, 2011. York: Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit.
- Integrated Regional Information Network, 2007. 'Yemen: Growing calls for closure of private prisons', May 2nd, 2010. Geneva: RefWorld. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/> [accessed 25 April 2011].
- , 2010. 'Yemen: Gun culture takes its toll on boys', August 29<sup>th</sup>, 2010. Geneva: RefWorld. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/> [accessed 15 April 2011].
- , 2011. 'Yemen: Political upheaval likely to increase child labour', October 6<sup>th</sup>, 2011. Geneva: RefWorld. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/> [accessed 11 June 2012].
- Interagency Panel on Juvenile Justice, 2011. *Data*. Geneva: Interagency Panel on Juvenile Justice. Available at: [www.ipjj.org/](http://www.ipjj.org/) [accessed 16 May 2012].
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre with the Norwegian Refugee Council, 2009. *Yemen: Constrained Response to the Needs of IDPs and Returnees*. Relief Web. Available at: <http://www.reliefweb.int/> [accessed 15 November 2010].
- International Crisis Group, 2009. *Yemen: Diffusing the Sa'ada Time Bomb*. Brussels: International Crisis Group.

International Labour Organisation, 2008. *Decent Work Programme 2008-2010*. Sana'a: International Labour Organisation.

International Security Sector Advisory Team, 2010. *Key Issues and Challenges for the Rule of Law in Yemen*. Sana'a: International Security Sector Advisory Team.

Internet World Stats, 2012. *Yemen Internet Usage and Telecommunications Report*. Bogotta: Miniwatts Marketing Group.

Jacobs, Bruce A. and Wright, Richard, 2006. *Street Justice: Retaliation in the Criminal Underworld*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

John, Peter, 2002. 'Quantitative Methods'. In Marsh, David and Stoker, Gerry (eds.), 2010. *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, Third Edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Johnson, Gregory, 2011. 'The Al-Ahmar Family: Who's Who', June 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2011. In Johnson, Gregory, 2011. *Waq al-Waq: A Blog on Yemen*. Big Think. Available at: <http://bigthink.com/> [accessed 24 October 2011].

Johnson, James Turner, 1998. 'Human Rights and Violence in Contemporary Context'. In *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, vol. 26, no. 2, 1998. Oxford: Blackwell.

Jones, Richard Wyn, 1999. *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Kaldor, Mary, 2000. *Global Insecurity: Restructuring the Global Military Sector*. London: Pinter.

--, 1999. *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Keen, David, 2007. 'War and Peace: What's the Difference?'. In London School of Economics and Politics, 2007. *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 7, no. 4, 2007. London: Routledge.

Kelling, George L.; Moore, Mark H. and Trojanowicz, Robert C., 1988. 'Crime and Policing'. In National Institute of Justice, 1988. *Perspectives on Policing*, June, 1988. Washington D.C: National Institute of Justice.

Kenney, Dennis Jay, 2008. *Public Perceptions of the Police in Yemen: Nationwide Surveys of Residents and Police*. New York: John Jay College, City University of New York.

Kenney, Michael, 2008. *Crime, Insurgency and Political Violence*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University.

Kershaw, Chris; Nicholas, Sian and Walker, Alison (eds.), 2007. *Crime in England and Wales 2006/07*, fourth edition. London: Home Office, National Statistics.

Khalil, Rana and MacDonald, Neil, 2009. *Report of the assessment towards 'a whole of EU' approach to state building in Yemen: Addressing fragility to prevent state failure*. (Draft)

Khan, Riz, 2010. 'Yemen: A Failed State?', video interview with Barbara Bodine and Christopher Boucek. On *The Riz Kahn Show*, January 4<sup>th</sup>, 2010. Al Jazeera. Available at: <http://english.aljazeera.net/> [accessed 17 December 2010].

Kleinig, John, 2008. *Ethics and Criminal Justice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Knysh, Alexander, 2011. 'Political Unrest in Yemen', conference paper prepared for the *2011 Middle East and North Africa Conference*, April 20<sup>th</sup>, 2011. Jamestown: The Jamestown Foundation.

- Kostelny, Kathleen, 2006. 'A Culture-Based, Integrative Approach: Helping War-Affected Children'. In Boothby, Neil; Strang, Alison and Wessells, Michael, 2006. *A World Turned Upside Down: Social Ecological Approaches to Children in War Zones*. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press.
- Lewis, Alexandra, 2011. 'Stabilising Yemen'. In *Atlantic-Community.org*. Atlantic Community. Berlin: Atlantic-Community.org. Available at: <http://atlantic-community.org/> [accessed 31 May 2011].
- Lind, Bronwyn and Wetherburn, Don, 2001. *Delinquent-Prone Communities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lindsay, Geoff, 2000. 'Researching Children's Perspectives: Ethical Issues'. In Lewis, Anna and Lindsay, Geoff (eds.), 2000. *Researching Children's Perspectives*. Buckingham, Open University Press.
- Little, Daniel, 1991. *Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Science*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Livingstone, Sonia, 2008. 'Taking risky opportunities in youthful content creation: teenagers' use of social networking sites for intimacy, privacy and self-expression. In Sage, 2008. *New Media and Society*, vol. 10, no. 393. London: Sage Publications.
- Locke, John, 1690. *The Second Treaties of Civil Government*. Constitution Society, 2002, <http://www.constitution.org/> [accessed 20 Mach 2010].
- Loidolt, Bryce; Salmoni, Barak A. and Wells, Madeleine, 2010. *Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Houthi Phenomenon*. Arlington: RAND National Defence Research Institute.
- Luttwak, Edward N, 1987. *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*. London: Harvard University Press.
- MacDonald, David, 2007. *Drugs in Afghanistan: Opium, Outlaws and Scorpion Tales*. London: Pluto Press.
- MacGinty, Roger, 2012. 'Against Stabilisation'. In Muggah, Robert (ed.), 2012. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, vol. 1, no. 1, 2012. London: Ubiquity Press.
- Makki, Ahmed Mohamed and Saleh, Maan A. Bari Qasem, 2008. 'Mental Health in Yemen: Obstacles and Challenges'. In University of London, 2008. *International Psychiatry*, vol. 5, no. 4, October 2008. London: University of London.
- Malešević, Siniša, 2008. 'The Sociology of New Wars? Assessing the Causes and Objectives of Contemporary Violent Conflict'. In Wiley-Blackwell, 2008. *International Political Sociology*, vol. 2, no. 2. London: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Malik, Shiv, 2011. 'UNHCR Report Says Refugee Numbers at 15-Year High'. In *The Guardian*, March 20<sup>th</sup>, 2011. London: The Guardian. Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/> [accessed 26/12/2011].
- Manea, Elham M., 1996. 'Yemen, the tribe and the state', conference paper presented at the *International Colloquium on Islam and Social Change*. Lausanne: University of Lausanne.
- Manheim, Jarol B. and Rich, Richard C., 1991. *Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science*, third edition. London: Longman.
- Marina, José Antonio, 2000. 'Genealogy of Morality and Law'. In *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 2000. New York: Springer.

- Marshall, Catherine and Rossman, Gretchen B, 2006. *Designing Qualitative Research*. London: Sage Publications.
- Martínez, Angélica Durán, 2007. *Organised Crime, the State and Democracy: The Cases of Central America and the Caribbean*. Madrid: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior.
- Martinussen, John, 1997. *Society, State and Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of Development*. London: Zed Books.
- McKie, Lind, 2005. *Families, Violence and Social Change*. Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill Education.
- McNally, Richard, 2004. 'Conceptual Problems with the DSM-IV Criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder'. In Rosen, Gerald M., 2004. *Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: Issues and Controversies*. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.
- Menocal, Alina Rochal, 2010. "State-Building for Peace" - A New Paradigm for International Engagement in Post-Conflict Fragile States, EU Working Paper. Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.
- Messick, Brinkley, 1983. 'Prosecution in Yemen: The Introduction of the Niyaba'. In *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, no. 15, 1983. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Miller, Derek B., 2003. *Demand, Stockpiles and Social Controls: Small Arms in Yemen*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.
- Ministry of Education, United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and World Bank, 2010. *Household and School Survey on the Impact of School-Fee Abolition*. Sana'a: Republic of Yemen.
- Ministry of Health and Population, Central Statistical Organisation, and the League of Arab States, 2004. *The Yemen Family Health Survey*. Sana'a: Republic of Yemen.
- Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2010. *National Reform Agenda, Phase II, 2009-2010*. Sana'a: Republic of Yemen. [Final Draft.]
- , 2009a. *National Reform Agenda: Phase II, 2009-2010*. Sana'a: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.
- , Republic of Yemen, 2009b. *Report on the Mid-Term Review of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Socio-Economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction 2006-2010*. Sana'a: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.
- Mizen, Richard, 2003. 'A contribution towards an analytical theory of violence'. In The Society of Analytical Psychology, 2003. *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, no. 48. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Moffet, Matthew, 2009. 'Argentina Crime Wave Becomes Election Focus'. New York: The Wall Street Journal, 28 May, 2009. Available at: <http://wjs.com/> [accessed 13 January 2010].
- Moghram, Mohamed Abdo, 2004. *Political Culture of Corruption and State of Corruption in Yemen*. Sana'a: Sana'a University.
- Moore, Dawn, 2007. *Criminal Artefacts: Governing Drugs and Users*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- Morris, Miranda, 2007. 'The pre-literate non-Arabic languages of Oman and Yemen'. London: The British Yemeni Society.

- Mueller, John, 2004. *The Remnants of War*. London: Cornell University Press.
- Muncie, John, 1996. 'The Construction and Deconstruction of Crime'. In McLaughlin, Eugene and Muncie, John (eds), 1996. *The Problem of Crime*. London: Sage Publications in association with the Open University.
- Mundy, Jacob, 2011. 'Deconstructing Civil Wars: Beyond the New Wars Debate'. In *Security Dialogue*, vol. 3, no. 43, 2011. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute.
- Münkler, Herfried, 2002. *The New Wars*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Murphy, Martin N., 2010. *Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the modern World*. London: C. Hurts & Co.
- Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, 2006. *Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present: Philosophy in the Land of Prophecy*. New York: State University of New York.
- Neocosmos, Michael, 2008. 'The Politics of Fear and the Fear of Politics: Reflections on Xenophobic Violence in South Africa'. In Sage, 2008. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, vol. 43, no. 6. London: Sage.
- Newman, Edward, 2004. 'The "New Wars" Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed'. In Sage, 2004. *Security Dialogue*, vol. 35, no. 173. London: Sage.
- Niskanen, William A., 1994. *Policy Analysis: Crime, Police and Root Causes*. Washington D.C: The Cato Institute.
- Nye, F. Ivan, 1958. *Family Relationships and Delinquent Behaviour*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1990. *Convention on the Rights of the Child*. Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/> [accessed 2 March 2010].
- Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2010. *Humanitarian Response Plan for Yemen 2011*, Executive Summary. New York: Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Available at: <http://ochaonline.un.org/> [accessed 12 May 2011].
- Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2009. *Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development*. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development.
- , 2008. *Service Delivery in Fragile Situations: Key Concepts, Findings and Lessons*. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development.
- Organisation of African Unity, 1990. *African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child*. Geneva: RefWorld. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/> [accessed 20 April 2011].
- Overseas Development Institute, 2011. *Fragile States: Beyond Quick Wins*, Policy Brief. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Oxford Analytica, 2009. *Yemen Country Report: A Report Produced for UNICEF MENARO*. Oxford: Oxford Analytica Ltd.
- Pederson, Jon and Sommerfelt, Tone, 2007. 'Studying Children in Armed Conflict: Data Production, Social Indicators and Analysis'. In Michalos, A.C., 2007. *Social Indicators Research*, vol. 84, no.3, 2007. London: Springer.

- Peralta, Eyder, 2011. 'US freezes aid to Yemen'. In *Wall Street Journal*, April 8<sup>th</sup>, 2011. New York: Dow Jones & Company.
- Peters, Gretchen and Ressler, Don, 2010. *Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan*. West Point: Military Academy, Combating Terrorism Center.
- Phillips, Sarah, 2011. *Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis*. London: Routledge.
- , 2010. 'What Comes Next in Yemen? Al Qaeda, the Tribes, and State Building'. In Carnegie Endowment, 2010. *Yemen: On the Brink*. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment.
- Preston, Peter, 1996. *Development Theory: An Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Prins, Herschel, 1995. *Offenders, deviants or patients?* Second Edition. London: Routledge.
- Programme Office on Governance in the Arab Region, 2010. *Structure of the Public Prosecution Office in Yemen*. Beirut: United Nations.
- Reiss, Albert J. Jr, 1951. 'Delinquency as the Failure of Personal and Social Controls'. In American Sociological Association, 1951. *American Sociological Review*, no. XVI, 1951. Washington D.C: American Sociological Association.
- Republic of Yemen with the United Nations Development Project and the World Bank, 2007. *Yemen Poverty Assessment*. Sana'a: Republic of Yemen.
- Rieff, David, 2002. *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis*. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.
- Roach, Jason and Pease, Ken, 2011. 'Evolution and the Prevention of Violent Crime'. In Scientific Research, 2011. *Psychology*, no. 2. Irvine: Scientific Research Publishing.
- Rotberg, Robert I., 2004. 'The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair'. In Rotberg, Robert I., 2004. *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Saeed, Ali, 2011. 'Somali refugees speak up about police harassment'. *Yemen Times*, 14010, 24 January, 2011. Sana'a: The Yemen Times. Available at: <http://www.yementimes.com/> [accessed 25 April 2011].
- Salmon, Andy, 2012. 'Catalysts and Networks for Stability'. In *Stability: The International Journal of Security and Development*, vol. 1, no. 1, November 2012. London: Ubiquity Press.
- Sardesai, Shonali and Wam, Per, 2002. 'The Conflict Analysis Framework: Identifying Conflict-Related Obstacles to Development'. New York: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit of The World Bank.
- Scott, John, 1990. *A Matter of Public Record: Documentary Sources in Social Research*. Oxford: Wiley.
- Serajzadeh, Seyed Hossein, 2002. 'Islam and Crime: The Moral Community of Muslims'. In the *Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies*, no. 4. Lancaster: Lancaster University.
- Sharqieh, Ibrahim, 2013. *A Lasting Peace? Yemen's Long Journey to National Reconciliation*. Doha: Brookings Doha Centre.
- Shaw, Mark, 2002. *Crime and Policing in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Transforming Under Fire*. London: Hurst & Company.

- , 1997. 'The State of Globalisation: Towards a Theory of State Transformation'. In *Review of International Political Economy*, vol. 4, no. 3, 1997. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis.
- Shelley, Louise, 2007. 'Human trafficking as a form of transnational crime'. In Lee, Maggie (ed.), 2007. *Human Trafficking*. London: Willan Publishing.
- Sherman, Lawrence W, 1996. 'Communities and Crime Prevention'. In Sherman, Lawrence W, 1996. *Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising*. York: York book Binding.
- , 1996. 'Family-Based Crime Prevention'. In Sherman, Lawrence W, 1996. *Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising*. York: York book Binding.
- Slim, Hugo, 2003. 'Why Protect Civilians? Innocence, Immunity and Enmity in War'. In *International Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 3, 2003. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Small Arms Survey, 2010. *Fault Lines: Tracking Armed Violence in Yemen*. Geneva: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.
- , 2001. *Small Arms Survey: Profiling the Problem*. Geneva: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.
- Smith, Susan J, 1983. 'Crime and the Structure of Social Relations'. In *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, New Series, vol. 9, no. 4, 1984. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Soares, Rodrigo R, 2002. 'Development, Crime and Punishment: Accounting for the International Differences in Crime Rates'. In Elsevier, 2004. *Journal of Development Economics*. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier.
- Social Bakers, 2012. *Yemen Facebook Statistics*. Social Bakers. Available at: <http://www.socialbakers.com/> [accessed 21 March 2012].
- Stavridis, James, 2012. 'A Navy Admiral's thoughts on global security', conference paper delivered at *TED Global*, June 2012. Edinburgh: Ted Conferences. Available at: <http://www.ted.com/> [accessed 13/11/2012].
- Stewart, Frances, 2002. 'Root Causes of Violent Conflict in Developing Countries'. In BMJ Group, 2002. *BMJ*, vol. 324, February, 2002. London: BMJ Group.
- Stracke, Nicole, 2007. 'Arab Prisons: A Place for Dialogue and Reform'. In *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 1, no. 4, 2007. Open Journal System. Available at: <http://terrorismanalysts.com/> [accessed 12 October, 2011].
- Sumner, Andy and Tribe, Michael, 2008. *International Development Studies: Theories and Methods in Research and Practice*. London: Sage.
- Talibiddeen Jr, 2009. *Living in Yemen*. Sana'a: TJ Yemen. Available at: <http://tjyemen.wordpress.com/> [accessed 26 March 2012].
- Tannenbaum, Frank, 1938. *Crime and Community*. London: Columbia University Press.
- Taylor, James, 1998. 'Transformation and Development: A South African Perspective'. In the *Community Development Journal*, vol. 33, no. 4. Oxford: Oxford Journals.
- Toby, Jackson, 1957. 'Social Disorganisation and Stake in Conformity: Complementary Factors in the Predatory Behaviour of Hoodlums'. In Northwest University, 1957. *The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*, vol. 48, no. 1, May-June, 1957. Kirkland: Northwest University

Transparency International, 2010. *Corruption Perceptions Index, 2010*. Berlin: Transparency International.

United Nations, 2003. *World Youth Report: The Global Situation of Young People*. United Nations.

--, 2010. *Yemen: Mid-Year Review, Consolidated Appeal*. New York: United Nations.

United Nations Capital Development Fund, 2008. *Yemen: Decentralisation and Local Development Support Programme*. New York: United Nations Capital Development Fund.

United Nations Country Team, Child Protection Sub-Cluster, 2010. *Inter-Agency Comprehensive Child Protection Assessment In Conflict-Affected Governorates in North Yemen*. Sana'a: United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund.

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2009. *World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision*. New York: United Nations Data. Available at: <http://data.un.org/> [accessed 2 December 2010].

United Nations Development Project, 2010a. *Human Development Index, 2010*. New York: United Nations Development Project.

--, 2010b. *Re-thinking Approaches to Local Governance Programming in Conflict-Affected Countries in the Arab Region: An Exploratory Study (Draft)*. Cairo: Regional Bureau of Arab States, United Nations Development Project.

United Nations Development Programme, and the Republic of Yemen, 2010. *Yemen Report 2010: Millennium Development Goals*. Sana'a: Republic of Yemen.

United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2011. 'What is good Governance'. Bangkok: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.

United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, 2010. 'Clashes in Southern Yemen Spark New Displacement', September 24<sup>th</sup>, 2010. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/> [accessed 15 November 2010].

--, 2011. 'Yemen: Global Needs Assessment', January, 2011. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/> [accessed 17 January 2011].

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and the Gender-Development Research & Studies Centre, 2008. *Situation Analysis on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C) in Yemen*. Sana'a: United Nations Children's Fund.

--, 2011. *The State of the World's Children 2011: Adolescence – An Age of Opportunity*. New York: United Nations Children's Fund.

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and Government of Yemen, 2009. 'Mid-Term review Report', *2007-2011 Programme of Cooperation*. Sana'a: Republic of Yemen.

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund with the Higher Council for Motherhood and Childhood, 2008. *Abuse During Childhood: A Field Study on Yemeni University Students*. Sana'a: Republic of Yemen.

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, Ministry of Health and Population, and Pan-Arab Project for Family Health, 2006. *Yemen: Monitoring the Situation of Children and Women (Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey)*. Sana'a: United Nations Children's Emergency Fund.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2005. *The United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems*. Geneva: United Nations.

--, 2010. 'UNODC and Yemen launch five year integrated country programme to tackle organised crime'. Geneva: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Available at: <http://www.unodc.org/> [accessed 22 May 2011].

United States Agency for International Development, 2006. *Yemen Corruption Assessment*. Burlington: United States Agency for International Development.

Urbas, Gregor, 2000. 'The Age of Criminal Liability'. In *Trends & Issues in Criminal Justice*, no. 181, 2000. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.

Van Schendel, Willem, 2005. 'Spaces of Engagement: How Borderlands, Illegal Flows, and Territorial States Interlock'. In Abraham, Itty and Van Schendel, Willem, 2005. *Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalisation*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Verrill, Stephen W, 2008. *Social Structure-Social Learning and Delinquency: Mediation or Moderation?* El Paso: LFB Scholarly Publishing.

Vromen, Ariande, 2010. 'Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches'. In Marsh, David and Stoker, Gerry, 2010. *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, Third Edition. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Walmsley, Roy, 2007. *World Prison Population List*, seventh edition. London: International Centre for Prison Studies, Kings College London.

--, 2009. *World Prison Population List*, eighth edition. London: International Centre for Prison Studies, Kings College London.

Walt, Stephen M, 1999. 'Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies'. In Brown, Michael E.; Coté, Owen R. Jr.; Lynn-Jones, Sean M. and Miller, Steven E, 2000. *Rational Choice and Security Studies: Stephen Walt and His Critics*. London: MIT Press.

Weber, Max, 1918. 'Science as a vocation', translated by Hans Heinrich Gerth, Charles Wright Mills. In Gerth, Hans Heinrich and Wright Mills, Charles, 1946. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wedeen, Lisa, 2008. *Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Weitzer, Ronald, 1995. *Policing Under Fire: Ethnic Conflict and Police-Community Relations in Northern Ireland*. New York: State University of New York Press.

Whitaker, Brian, 2009. *The Birth of Modern Day Yemen*. Al-Bab. Available at: <http://www.al-bab.com/> [accessed 22 October 2010].

--, 1995. 'National Unity and Democracy in Yemen: A Marriage of Inconvenience', Conference Paper. Al-Bab. Available at: <http://www.al-bab.com/> [accessed 22 October 2010].

Whitson, Sarah Leah, 2011. 'Human Rights Watch Condemns Disappearance of Opposition Leaders'. Sana'a: National Yemen.

Wikileaks, 2010. 'Saudi Air Strikes at Yemen Border', 09SANAA2040. Wikileaks Mirror. Available at: <http://wikileaks.info/> [accessed 16 December 2010].

Williams, Phil, 2009. 'Organised Crime and Corruption in Iraq'. In Cooper, Neil, 2009. *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 16, no. 1, 2009. Taylor and Francis.

Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, 2007. *Iraqi Refugee Women and Youth in Jordan: Reproductive Health Findings*. New York: International Rescue Committee.

Women's National Committee and the Council of Ministers, 2008. *Report on the Status of Women in Yemen 2008*. Sana'a: Republic of Yemen.

World Bank, 2010a. *Assessing the Impact of Climate Change and Variability on the Water and Agriculture Sectors, and the Policy Implications*. Sana'a: The World Bank Group.

--, 2005. *Fragile States – Good Practices in Country Assistance Strategies*. Washington D.C: The World Bank Group.

--, 2007. *Poverty Assessment in Yemen*. Sana'a: The World Bank Group.

--, 2011. *World Development Report, 2011: Conflict, Security and Development*. Washington D.C: The World Bank Group.

--, 2010b. *Yemen Quarterly Economic Review*. Sana'a: The World Bank Group.

World Food Programme, 2010. *Comprehensive Food Security Survey*. Sana'a: World Food Programme with the Republic of Yemen.

--, 2008. *Food Security Assessment for the Flood-Affected Populations in Hadramout and Al-Mahra Governorates*. Sana'a: World Food Programme.

World Health Organisation, 2011. *Yemen: Health Profile*. Geneva: world Health Organisation.

Yemen Polling Centre, 2013. *Public Perceptions of the Security Sector and Police Work in Yemen*. Sana'a: Yemen Polling Centre.

Yemen Post, 2011. 'Sana'a Airport Cancels Flights Due to Clashes; Yemen on Verge of Chaos', August 5<sup>th</sup>, 2011. Sana'a: The Yemen Post. Available at: <http://www.yemenpost.net/> [accessed 6 August, 2011].

Yemen Rights Monitor, 2011. 'Tribes adopt values of non-violent resistance: From Kalashnikov to Ghandi', April 17<sup>th</sup>, 2011. Sana'a. Yemen Rights Monitor. Available at: <http://yemenrightsmonitor.blogspot.com/> [Accessed 21 April 2011].

Yin, Robert K, 2004. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, fourth edition, 2009. London: Sage.

Yoshikawa, Hirokazu, 1994. 'Prevention as cumulative protection: Effects of early family support and education on chronic delinquency and its risks'. In Hinshaw, Stephen P., 1994. *Psychological Bulletin*, vol. 115, no. 1, Jan 1994. Washington D.C: American Psychological Association.

Zoellick, Robert, 2009. 'Fragile States: Securing Development'. In International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009. *Survival*, vol. 50, no. 6, December, 2009. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.