An Investigation into the Nature and Development of Dance Consciousness in Choreography and Performance

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

The dancer's consciousness is an integral component of choreography and performance, but has been afforded little significant attention within dance theory or practice. This thesis aims to investigate the nature of the dancer's consciousness and it develops a model which allows dancers to access particular conscious states in choreography and performance. This model is entitled the Dance Consciousness Model.

The model is founded on consciousness theory and, within it, two states of dance consciousness have been defined: intrattentive consciousness and non-intrattentive consciousness. These are based on the states of consciousness described by consciousness researchers, dance theorists and practitioners and theatre theorists.

The Dance Consciousness Model comprises methods for examining and accessing the dance consciousness. During the formulation of these methods a variety of theories and practices were explored: phenomenological reduction, the explicitation session, somatics, sport psychology, visual and verbal processing, attention studies, Buddhist Introspection and Bodyweather. Relevant components were extracted from each theory and practice and applied to the discipline of dance. This resulted in the development of a series of methods for examining and accessing states of intrattention and non-intrattention. These methods were explored, by trained dancers, in three empirical projects which comprised exploratory workshops, choreographic and rehearsal processes and performances.

The projects were recorded on video and the dancers were interviewed at regular intervals. The analysis of the information collected was combined with the consciousness theory established at the start of the study and resulted in the formulation of a consciousness training programme and the Dance Consciousness Model. The training precedes the application of the model and comprises a series of workshops in which dancers are taught to access, examine and switch between states of intrattention and non-intrattention. The Dance Consciousness Model is believed to be the first of its kind and is intended for application by dancers in the choreography and performance of contemporary dance.

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Introduction

Research focus – the dancer's body and mind

In the creation, performance and viewing of current Western contemporary dance utmost attention is paid to ensuring the dancer's body, as a physical form, is primed for performance. Dance is frequently considered as an aesthetic activity that is concerned with the moving body; as Smith acknowledges, 'in dance ... the body is the locus of the art' (2002, p.125). It is commonly considered that a dancer's body should be trained and shaped in a particular fashion, with the main purpose being to use the body as a means to perform movement. Jowitt claims that dance takes 'account only of the body' (1988, p.77), and Foster recognises that dance 'stresses the body's ability (and inability) to conform to specified shapes at a given time' (2000, p.xiv). Little relevance is placed on the facts that a dancer also has a mind and that dance is not merely a structure of different shapes, actions and dynamics to be presented by a body.

One could suggest that, within the Western contemporary dance context, there exists a set of aesthetic values relating to the dancer's body that underpin concepts of dance. For example, as Jowitt claims, the reason that some people view dance is that it offers an 'excuse for watching pretty, lightly clad women disporting themselves' (1988, p.77). Even Duncan, who displayed fairly revolutionary thinking at the turn of the twentieth century when she began to place emphasis on what she called the 'dancer's soul', admitted that it is really only the 'body that had to be primed for dancing' (cited in Jowitt, 1988, p.78).

The dancer's mind is not prepared to the same degree and one could suggest that a 'dualistic point of view' about the body and mind 'has always been widespread in the dance community' (Fortin *et al.*, 2002, p.173). According to Leach and Stevens, many 'dancers inwardly believe' that the dancing mind 'is a separate entity from the dancing body' and 'most feel, and try to behave as though, the mind and body are not functionally united' (1996, p.113). Dance theorist McCaw notes that 'I had an image of myself as consisting of a mind and a separate body' (2001, pp.7–8). Jowitt goes so

far as to say that, 'a dancerly body and mind set' are 'not only *not* prerequisites; they might actually get in the way' (1988, p.317). Fortin *et al.* consider that:

> The goal orientated environment of professional dance schools encourages students to emphasise the representational body [which is] how the body looks from a third person viewpoint.
> (2002, p.172)

Smith notes that dancers often have 'perceptions of a mind-body split', perform with a 'body mind disconnection' and consider the 'body as object' (2002, pp.124–7). Smith continues with the comment that often, whilst dancers are performing, they are 'perceiving themselves as objects to be studied ... rather than through experience of the body as being' (2002, p.128). In the light of all this, one might consider that dancers have lost 'connection with [themselves] as psychophysical totalities' (McCaw, 2001, p.8) and view only the body as the 'instrument of dance' (Sparshott, 1988, p.18).

Specific research focus – the dancer's consciousness

With the neglect of the dancer's mind comes a neglect of the dancer's consciousness. Few dance theorists have considered the varying dispositions of a dancer's consciousness or provided solutions to the question posed by Sheets-Johnstone; 'what is a dancer conscious of while dancing?' (1966, p.39). One may ask why it matters. Why is the dancer's mind, or more specifically the dancer's consciousness, of importance within dance – a discipline that seems so concerned with the body?

There were three aspects underlying the motivation for this thesis which were prompted by Sheets-Johnstone's question 'what is a dancer conscious of while dancing?'

(1) Dance consciousness in process and performance

Consider for a moment the fact that it is customary, within conventional, Western contemporary dance, for the choreographer to spend the choreography and rehearsal time stressing the importance of an increased body awareness. Within the dance process the dancer is often required to attend to each individual movement in order to

polish and perfect it. The choreographer then directs the dancer to go on stage and just perform.[1] How is the dancer to make the transition from such a reflective process to a non-reflective performance? After weeks of performing, with increased awareness directed intently towards every detail of the content and form of the dance, how can the dancer then move on simply to just perform?

The ability to do so necessitates the dancer having control not only over the dancing body but also over the dancing mind, namely the dancing consciousness. Although dancers are not trained explicitly to use their dance consciousness, they are nevertheless expected to use it in specific ways within the dance process and within dance performance. It would appear, however, that there is a lack of consideration of the nature and significance of the dancer's consciousness.

(2) Dance consciousness as an altered state of consciousness

It seems that dance necessitates a certain type of consciousness: a dance consciousness. One may wonder why a dance consciousness is different from any other type of consciousness. The answer presented here and in Shacklock (2005), is that 'dance can act as a means of access to altered states of consciousness' (Shacklock, 2005). The term 'states' is intended here to mean states of consciousness and the term 'altered' refers to a situation in which states of consciousness have changed in character in some way or another, those which are different from one's ordinary and everyday states of consciousness. Many theorists of philosophy, spiritualism and dance, such as Haggendorn (2004), Natale (1995) and Fraleigh (1987), have endorsed the viewpoint that dance can alter consciousness, a viewpoint which is by no means new. For example, trance dance, a practice in which people use rhythm and dance to alter their state of consciousness and 'enter non-ordinary reality' (Natale, 1995, p.x) with the intention of transforming and/or healing the mind and body, is said to date back around '40,000 years or more' (*ibid.*). Another example is the Sufi dance, which was first practised in Turkey in the mid thirteenth

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[1] 'Just perform' was precisely the direction that I personally received from Kevin Finnan from Motionhouse Dance Theatre. I worked with Finnan for six weeks, during which he encouraged eight other dancers and me to choreograph and rehearse with attention focussed absolutely on the way in which our bodies were moving. On the night of the first performance Finnan stated that 'the process is over now, go on, don't think about anything, lose yourself, and just perform' (February, 2002).

century and which acted as a means of access to a heightened consciousness or a type of ecstasy and was believed to bring the dancer into closer contact with God.[2]

Within the Western contemporary dance context, the altered state view is also endorsed. Dance theorists such as Fraleigh speak of dance as an experience of 'pure consciousness' (1987, p.40) that is 'beyond ordinary consciousness' (1987, p.5); Hawkins refers to a 'special state of consciousness' (1991, p.9), Adler to a 'superconsciousness' (1987, pp.14–15), Geissinger *et al.* to an 'increased consciousness' (2003),[3] and McCaw considers that dancers can develop a 'heightened awareness' (2001, p.8). Fraleigh (1987) suggests that, as a dancer embodies the dance, he or she moves away from the thinking, speaking, moving, everyday consciousness, beyond normal limitations, into a dance consciousness. In addition, Smith acknowledges that:

> In dance ... we are presented with many opportunities to go beyond our daily self, to shift our ordinary perceptions of self-identity into other ways of feeling, seeing, believing, and experiencing the world. (2002, p.128)

It seems then that, as noted by Meyer-Dinkgrafe, the artist's experiences 'represent states of consciousness that are certainly not common, or everyday' (2005, p.20). If this is the case, and choreographers are expecting dancers to access such states, one can perhaps see why the question relating to the nature of the dancer's consciousness is so significant.

(3) Dance consciousness as the key to performance

One may consider that a dancer's ability to access such non-ordinary states of consciousness might alter the way in which the dancer performs. Part of the initial motivation for undertaking this research was an observation, made during personal experiences as a dancer, that the experiential sensation of performing can differ from performance to performance, or even within the same performance. The observation that one can be completely unaware of self or the experience of the performance during some performances, whereas one can be utterly aware of self and the

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[2] See www.sfusd.k12.ca.us/schwww/sch618/Music/Dance2.html and www.towardtheone.com/sufidance/about.htm for information on Sufi dance.
[3] www.movingjournal.org

experience in other performances of a technically identical dance, is particularly significant. An important consideration here is whether these differences in experience are intrinsically interrelated with consciousness and the states of dance consciousness being accessed by the dancer in the performance.

The above observation is also related to the notion that, whilst viewing a performance, there can be a strong desire to watch a particular performer and not others, almost as if a powerful connection of some sort exists between self as audience and that performer. In this respect, Hagendoorn poses the following question:

> Why is it that we are sometimes fascinated by one or several people moving about on a stage, while at other times it leaves us completely indifferent?
> (2004)[4]

Barba asks a similar question – although he is in this instance referring to actors, the observation is of the same nature and can perhaps be applied generically to different types of performers.

> Why when I see two actors doing the same thing, I get fascinated by one and not by the other?
> (1985, p.12)

Theorists have different views in relation to this observation, as illustrated by Hagendoorn and Barba. For example, it was this simple observation that inspired Hagendoorn to combine a 'phenomenological analysis of dance with what is known about individual brain processes' in order to examine 'what might be going on inside the brain when watching a dance performance' (2004, *ibid.*). For Hagendoorn, the answer to the question of 'why [we are] drawn to some performers and not others' is related to the audience's state of consciousness (*ibid.*). For Barba, the fascination is related to the performer's technical ability. In the context of this thesis, the answer lies within the dancer's consciousness which is connected to the dancer's experience of that consciousness. Indeed, one may consider that the state of consciousness that the dancer accesses during performance may have a significant effect on the way in which the dancer performs. This, in turn, may affect the audience's perception of the

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[4] www.ivarhagendoorn.com/research/perception.html

performance. The nature of the dancer's consciousness is therefore of great importance.

Preliminary research questions

If one considers that: (1) choreographers implicitly require dancers to control their conscious states and to enter particular states of dance consciousness within dance process and performance; (2) the states that are required are altered states and certainly not common nor everyday; (3) the states that the dancer accesses during performance affect the way in which the dancer performs, then one may begin to see why the question – what is a dancer conscious of while dancing? – is so significant. This thesis therefore considers dancers as psychophysical totalities and its specific research focus is the dancer's consciousness. The preliminary research questions of this thesis are as follows:

- What is the nature of the states of consciousness that are experienced by dancers within the choreography and performance of Western contemporary dance?

- How can dancers access and control such states of consciousness within the choreography and performance of Western contemporary dance?

With regard to these questions it is important to identify what is intended by the terms 'choreography' and 'performance'. The term 'choreography' is used within the context of this thesis to encapsulate a process in which movement is constructed. Such movement may be structured methodically by a dancer or generated through improvisation. Such movement may also be created for the purposes of teaching it to another dancer or indeed may be learnt by a dancer when taught by a choreographer.[5] The choreographic process may thus comprise the improvisation, learning, teaching and structuring of movement. The term 'performance' is used within the context of this thesis to encapsulate a process in which movement is performed either in a formal setting, such as a theatre, or an informal setting, such as during training workshops or the choreographic process. The terms 'choreography' and

[5] The term 'teaching' is used within the thesis and should always be understood in relation to the choreographic process. The term is not intended to refer to the practice of teaching within an education context, but to the process of a dancer or choreographer teaching movement material to another dancer.

'performance' will be applied in accordance with the above definitions for the remainder of this thesis.

Research methodologies

The research methods used to answer the above preliminary research questions can be categorised as theoretical and empirical research methodologies. The theoretical methodology was crucial in obtaining a comprehensive and conceptual understanding of the nature of consciousness and supplying possible methods through which conscious states can be accessed. The aim of the empirical methodology was to validate such conceptual understanding and to provide opportunities for testing out any proposed methods of access.

Indeed, is it possible to understand the nature of a state of consciousness without empirically experiencing that state and, equally, is it possible to understand what that experience is conceptually without theoretical knowledge? Similarly, how can one purposefully and empirically access a particular state of consciousness without the theoretical knowledge of how to do so, and how can one validate such theoretical knowledge without empirically accessing the states? In the context of this thesis the theoretical and empirical methodologies, therefore, are entirely co-dependent in that the former informs the latter and *vice versa*, thus resulting in an inter-reliant cycle of development which has culminated in the formulation of the research outcome, which is introduced in Chapter 1.

Despite the existence of this inter-reliant cycle, it is essential to clarify that, whilst the theoretical methodologies are used for the purposes of supporting and informing the empirical methodologies, and the research outcome, they are not directly applied within the empirical methodologies, or the research outcome. For example, theoretical methodologies such as phenomenological reduction inform the research outcome, however under no circumstances is phenomenological reduction actually applied within the empirical research undertaken in order to formulate the research outcome. It is for this reason that Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis appear to be predominantly concerned with theoretical methodologies and Chapter 7 focuses almost completely on empirical methodologies. However, the chapters of this thesis

by no means represent a chronological overview of the research. Rather, the reader is asked to maintain an awareness of the fact that the theoretical content of Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 evolved simultaneously with the empirical content of Chapter 7 and that both the theoretical and the empirical research was undertaken through a cyclical process.

Both the theoretical and empirical methodologies used within this research employ a framework of triangulation. Triangulation can be considered as the combining of 'methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon' (2005).[6] It is 'a process used to validate the data obtained in a study' (2005)[7] and to establish the 'accuracy of information by comparing three or more types of independent points of view' (2005).[8] Triangulation allows 'a more complete picture' and a 'more credible interpretation of the data' (2005).[9] Throughout this research, therefore, first-, second- and third-person perspectives have been considered and the methodologies subsequently incorporate first-, second- and third-person information. In the context of this thesis:

- First-person information has been collected from the phenomenological accounts of dance theorists, such as Sheets-Johnstone (1966) and Fraleigh (1987), and the experiences of the dancers involved in the empirical projects;

- Second-person information has been supplied by the researcher – author of this thesis;

- Third-person information has been extracted from consensus accounts on consciousness, such as those supplied by Chalmers (1996).

The notion of first-, second- and third-person methodologies and the use of triangulation within the empirical methodology, are discussed in detail in Chapter 3, in which methods for empirically examining consciousness are considered. The use of triangulation within the theoretical methodology is more straightforward, and all

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[6] http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/evaluation/glossary/glossary_t.htm
[7] http://education.massey.ac.nz/wellington_online/bedu6205/course/205dictqual.htm
[8] http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/evaluation/glossary/glossary_t.htm
[9] http://web.isp.cz/jcrane/IB/Qualitative.html

the theoretical information presented in this thesis takes into account first-, second- and third-person information.

The research for this thesis was carried out over a period of three years. Work undertaken during the first year comprised only the theoretical methodology which included a review of current literature, a clarification of the concepts of dance consciousness to be examined, the researching and formulation of a method for examining the concepts of consciousness and the researching and formulation of methods for accessing consciousness.

In the second year, with the help of a group of eight dancers, all of this theory was applied in Empirical Project 1 and Empirical Project 2. Within these projects the nature of the concepts of consciousness was determined and methods for examining and accessing the states of consciousness were explored and refined. This empirical methodology was supported by the theoretical methodology. Each new finding that arose during the empirical projects prompted a new direction for the theoretical research. For example, an observation made by one dancer in Empirical Project 1 with reference to the way in which they processed information led to research into visual and verbal processing theories. This theoretical research, in turn, affected the empirical research and resulted in a new method of empirical access being formulated.

At the end of the second year, all the information from the theoretical and empirical research was collated, interpreted and analysed. This information took the form of third-person theoretical accounts, first-person experiential accounts and second-person observed accounts. The information was both qualitative and quantitative and was collected through video recordings, structured and unstructured interviews, questionnaires and recorded discussions. The analysis of the information led to the design of the research outcome and the final empirical project.

Year three of the research comprised Empirical Project 3, in which four dancers applied the research outcome. The dancers applied, explored and refined the concepts of consciousness, the methods of examination and the methods of access defined in years one and two. Again, first-, second- and third-person information was taken into consideration and collated from video recordings, structured and unstructured

interviews, questionnaires and recorded discussions. This theoretically- and empirically-based information was used to examine the results of the research and present conclusions with regard to the efficacy of the outcome of the research.

The theoretical and empirical methodologies used to conduct the research for this thesis are identified in Chapter 1.

Chapter 1

Why is the dancer's consciousness significant?

Review of Literature

Chapter 1 begins with a review of the current literature available within the dance discipline that is dealing with, or claiming to deal with, the dance consciousness. In addition to the theorists mentioned in the Introduction; Smith, Jowitt, Fortin *et al.*, Leach and Stevens, McCaw, Adler, Foster, Hawkins, Geissinger *et al.*, Sparshott and Hagendoorn, the views of Kleist and Hoffman are presented. The principal sources that are considered are *The Phenomenology of Dance* by Sheets-Johnstone (1966) and *Dance and the Lived Body* by Fraleigh (1987). Chapter 1 presents an examination of the views of Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh on the dancer's body and mind, the dancer's consciousness and methods for accessing the dancer's consciousness. It continues with a critique on the lack of dance consciousness literature that is available, and an explanation as to why it is essential to seek ideas and information outside the dance discipline.

The literature currently available within the theatre discipline concerning the actor's consciousness is also reviewed, and it is ascertained why this may be of use. In relation to the actor's consciousness and methods for accessing the actor's consciousness, the views of the following theorists are considered: Stanislavski, Strasberg, Grotowski, Schechner, Diderot, Meyerhold, Brecht, Barba, Bloch and Meyer-Dinkgrafe.

Chapter 1 then returns to the preliminary research questions raised in the Introduction, and assesses whether the literature discussed might provide any insight into these questions. In doing so, it is ascertained that the questions are valid and worthy of investigation. Finally, the proposed research outcome of this thesis is clarified, a series of focussed research questions is posed and the research methods are revisited. Chapter 1 concludes with a preview of the subsequent chapters in this thesis and a final note.

A note about the context and the literature

It must be emphasised that the subject of this thesis is the dance consciousness within the context of Western contemporary dance. This by no means implies that the notion of the dance consciousness is less significant in different genres, such as ballet or Eastern practices like Butoh. It is essential, however, to place some limitations on the thesis and to define clearly the parameters of the research. Likewise, although any proposals or methods that are formulated are intended for use within this context, there is no implication that such proposals or methods are not transferable into other genres or practices. In fact, such proposals and methods have been informed by other genres and practices. For example, the practice of Buddhist Introspection is considered in Chapter 5 and some of its principles are extracted for application to the methods formulated for use within the Western contemporary dance context.

The purpose of reviewing the relevant literature in this chapter is to highlight previous research concerning the dance consciousness and to provide some background information; thus much of the literature discussed in this chapter is not referred to in subsequent chapters. Many of the sources reviewed were of great use in determining the boundaries of this thesis. The concepts, theories and methods presented within these sources did not, however, directly inform the concepts, theories and methods formulated within this thesis. The selection of literature from various other disciplines, such as sport psychology, attention studies and somatic practices, which did directly inform these formulated concepts, theories and methods are reviewed in subsequent chapters.

It should be noted, however, that the dance and theatre literature presented in this chapter should by no means be considered as exhaustive. A certain amount of selectivity was essential as it would have been difficult, within this one chapter, to review all the literature which explicitly or implicitly considers the dancer's consciousness. The dance literature that is discussed represents the general research undertaken to date and the literature presented by two of the dance theorists, Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh, can be considered as the most significant within the subject of the dance consciousness. The theatre literature that is discussed extends various viewpoints, some of which contradict each other, and different theorists have

different objectives. Only the literature that was deemed to be most useful in the very specific context of dance consciousness was selected.

A review of current literature within the dance discipline

According to Best, the subject of the dancer's consciousness 'does not appeal to many people' (1974, p.76) within the dance discipline and Sheets-Johnstone acknowledges that 'as far as is evident, no one has been concerned with the question, 'what is a dancer conscious of while dancing?' (1966, p.39). Although both these statements were made over three decades ago, they still hold some weight.

Some dance theorists do claim to be dealing with the dance consciousness, but in many cases there is little evidence of in-depth research. For example Foster notes that 'dancing is always and already sacred in the way that it conjoins body and consciousness' (2000, p.xvii) and, in her article 'Dancing Bodies', explicitly claims in the introduction that:

> My comments fall into two sections: the first focuses on the formation of dancing bodily consciousness ... the second situates this bodily consciousness in a cultural and aesthetic moment.
> (1997, p.236)

Despite this, it is difficult to ascertain exactly what Foster intends by her term 'dancing bodily consciousness' and the article deals more with the dancer's body, in its aesthetic form within varying dance techniques, as opposed to the dancer's consciousness.

In her book *Moving from Within* (1991), Hawkins also makes reference to a dance consciousness, and even distinguishes between its role in the dance process and dance performance. Hawkins states that, in choreography, the dancer's task is 'to discover ways of gaining access to the special state of consciousness that makes creativity possible' (1991, p.9). Whilst Hawkins is thus acknowledging that the dance consciousness is a special sort of consciousness and that a method of access is required, this is as far as the discussion goes. Although Hawkins supplies a concise framework for choreography, which is broken down into sections such as expressing,

seeing, transforming and forming, she does not consider this preliminary reference to the dance consciousness in relation to these processes.

Sheets-Johnstone's conceptualisation of the dance consciousness

The dancer's body and mind

In her book *The Phenomenology of Dance* (1966), Sheets-Johnstone offers more insight into the dance consciousness than the sources mentioned above. Utilising a phenomenological approach, in which she attempts to look at dance from the inside, Sheets-Johnstone considers the lived experience of dance in great detail; she claims that 'it is the lived experience which is of paramount significance' (1966, p.4). Sheets-Johnstone does not define the dance consciousness *per se*, but she does make reference to pre-reflective and reflective states. Having employed such terms throughout her book, Sheets-Johnstone does not, however, describe in detail what she means by them.

The dance consciousness

Sheets-Johnstone asserts that 'the consciousness of dance is a pre-reflective consciousness' (1966, p.13). She also dismisses the notion of a reflective dance consciousness in the statements 'the dancer is not conscious of ... the dance as an object, and neither is she explicitly aware of herself' (*ibid.* p.37) and 'consciousness is able to take a point of view on all things in the world except its own body, which it can only live' (*ibid.* p.26). Sheets-Johnstone appears to favour a pre-reflective dance consciousness; she claims that the dance 'comes alive in all its rich fullness only as the dancers are reflectively aware neither of themselves, nor of the dance' (*ibid.* p.6) and 'it is only as the dancer reflects upon herself apart from the dance that she is no longer one with it' (*ibid.* p.39). In addition, Sheets-Johnstone suggests that the audience may be able to detect the dancer's conscious state in her claim that:

> It is evident in performance when a dancer becomes explicitly aware of herself. As soon as she becomes self-conscious, the audience is aware of a separation of the dancer from the dance.
> (*ibid.* p.39)

Here it is clear that Sheets-Johnstone is referring specifically to the performance of dance and one could presume that, in her claim that 'the consciousness of dance is a

pre-reflective consciousness' (1966, p.13), she is also referring specifically to the dance performance. This is confirmed later in her book when she notes that:

> For choreographers and dancers, reflection may afford insight into approaches to choreography, a deeper understanding of what it means to create and perform dance, perhaps a growing ability to create dance, and to develop as dancers.
> (*ibid.* p.7)

Perhaps, then, Sheets-Johnstone favours a reflective dance consciousness within the dance process and a pre-reflective dance consciousness within dance performance. She thus not only acknowledges that different states of dance consciousness exist but, in addition, believes that they may be accessed in different phases of dance practice.

Accessing the dance consciousness

Sheet-Johnstone, however, does not provide any clarification as to how a dancer may access such states, make the transition from a reflective process into a pre-reflective performance or control the dance consciousness. Sheets-Johnstone merely claims that in order to access the pre-reflective dance consciousness, for example, 'one must only stop reflecting – analyzing, interpreting, judging – long enough to grasp it (1966, p.137). This description does not really offer much insight into an actual method of access or control. How is one able just to stop reflecting? Surely, if one is aware of having to stop reflecting, then there exists reflection about stopping, thus halting any sense of a pre-reflective consciousness.

Fraleigh's conceptualisation of the dance consciousness

The dancer's body and mind

Like Sheets-Johnstone, Fraleigh is interested in the phenomenal experience of the dancer and thus, in her book *Dance and the Lived Body* (1987), she utilises existential phenomenology in her consideration of the dancer's mind, body and finally the dancer's consciousness. Fraleigh stresses the importance of a 'minded body, not a mind in command of something separable, called body' (1987, p.9). She refers to this minded body as the 'lived body' (1987, p.9), so one can see how her term involves intrinsically a non-dualistic view of the mind and body. Similarly Todd

attempts to ascribe lived attributes to the dancing body and coined the idiom the 'thinking body' (1959).

Fraleigh describes the 'lived body' as a concept which attempts to 'cut beneath the subject-object split' and claims that she does not recognise a 'dualism of ... body-mind ... and assumes an invisible unity of body ... and mind' (1987, p.4). Fraleigh states that 'when the dancer succeeds, neither body nor mind is held at a distance; they are the same in action' (*ibid.* p.11). It is within this 'lived body' that there exists a dance consciousness and Fraleigh categorises the same two states to which Sheets-Johnstone refers: reflective and pre-reflective states (1987). Fraleigh, however, unlike Sheets-Johnstone, does present clear definitions of these states, as given below.

The dancer's consciousness

Fraleigh claims that a reflective state occurs when '[the dancer becomes] aware of [his or her] body as something to be reckoned with ... [and] when [he or she focuses] on [his or her] body' (*ibid.* p.14). A reflective dance consciousness can be defined as a state in which the object of attention is the dancing self. Fraleigh states that a reflective state 'refers either to the body when it becomes the object of attention or to an objective attitude toward the body' (*ibid.*). In addition, a reflective state can be considered as a state in which one functions predominantly in a comparative or evaluative manner, 'when [one stands] back to observe and learn' (*ibid.*). Fraleigh's reflective state of dance consciousness is not only a lived state but also a known state.

By 'pre-reflective' Fraleigh is referring to a state in which a dancer is explicitly unaware of the dancing self, a state 'when she is not reflecting on her self or her action' (*ibid.* p.13). The pre-reflective is a state of consciousness in which the dancer is entirely present-centred; as Fraleigh notes, it is when the dancer is 'living the present-centred moment in her dance' (*ibid.*). This presumes a sense of spontaneity, a sense of living in one moment and Fraleigh refers to the experience as follows:

> I live as my body spontaneously ... not noticing it, not looking back upon it, and not anticipating or imagining it in some future state ... my lived and complete wholeness.
> (1987, p.14)

In such a state the dancer is not overtly reflecting on anything; it is a state which occurs prior to one reflecting on it – hence the term 'pre-reflective'. Indeed, Fraleigh describes it as 'before noticing' (1987, p.14). In contrast to the reflective consciousness, the concept of the pre-reflective dance consciousness is a state that is entirely lived and not known.

Similar to Sheets-Johnstone, Fraleigh not only supplies a distinction between these two different states of dance consciousness but also establishes that being pre-reflective should be of paramount importance for a dancer. Fraleigh claims that the dancer should not be 'reflecting on her self or her action' (*ibid.*) and should be in a state in which 'the dance is lived not as an object but as pure consciousness' (*ibid.* p.40). In addition to this, she notes that 'the dancer is at her best ... when she becomes present-centred' (*ibid.* p.23), which is a prerequisite of the pre-reflective dance consciousness.

Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh are not the only dance theorists who consider this to be the case. Hoffman, for example, also promotes pre-reflection in his claim that the most effective dance state is a state of 'no thought', which arises when dancers are 'in the moment' (1997).[10] Similarly, Kleist considers that a marionette can perform more effectively than a live dancer, as the marionette is not bound by consciousness. The marionette is not reflectively aware of self and thus is able to exist entirely in the dance. Such reflection can be considered as detrimental to performance as it obstructs spontaneity of movement and energy and disrupts any sense of being fully in the present. In *Dance and the Lived Body*, Fraleigh presents Kleist's view that 'perfect grace is not possible in conscious human movement, but appears only in the lack of consciousness of the marionette' (1987, p.24). In 'Puppet Theatre', written in 1810, Kleist refers to a reflective type of consciousness and notes that he recognises 'what a disturbing effect consciousness' can have 'upon the natural grace of human beings' (in Cohen and Copeland, 1983, p.182). With such a view, one could consider that Kleist is clearly promoting a pre-reflective state of dance consciousness. This thesis is not concerned, however, with which state of dance consciousness is more or less effective, but instead is concerned predominantly with the nature of such states and how one can access them.

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[10] www.nbcds.org/articles/erik1.html

Accessing the dance consciousness

Although Fraleigh does provide some insight into the nature of the dance consciousness through distinguishing between two distinct states, along with Sheets-Johnstone, she does seem to disregard the need for some sort of methodology for accessing, controlling or even practically investigating the states that she defines. Although Fraleigh claims that a dancer is 'at her best' whilst pre-reflective, and acknowledges that dancers have some sort of control over consciousness – 'consciousness is intentional' and 'I am not just a helpless recipient of stimuli; I participate in and control my own destiny' (1987, pp.15–16) – she does not ascertain how a dancer may actually access and/or control such a state.

In addition, unlike Sheets-Johnstone, Fraleigh does not distinguish between the process of dance making and the performance of dance – a distinction which it is important to acknowledge in order to understand its significance. One must certainly not presume that the experiences, and the conscious states, encountered within these two independent events are necessarily the same or even slightly similar. One must also consider whether the states experienced in the process have any effect on those encountered in the performance.

Summary

The literature of Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh represents the dominant research undertaken within the dance discipline on the subject of the dance consciousness. It is interesting to note that Sheets-Johnstone's *The Phenomenology of Dance* was written in 1966 and Fraleigh's *Dance and the Lived Body* in 1987. One would have hoped for some more recent dance consciousness research, especially considering the speed at which consciousness research beyond the dance discipline is developing. During a conversation between Fraleigh and the author of this thesis, held at the 'Daiwa International Butoh Festival' in London in October 2005, Fraleigh herself stated that 'there doesn't appear to be any dance theorists who are currently dealing with the subject of the dancer's consciousness' (2005). It is also interesting to note that Fraleigh was a student of Sheets- Johnstone, which suggests that the breadth of research being undertaken throughout the dance community is very narrow.

Although neither Sheets-Johnstone nor Fraleigh really cover the second preliminary research question outlined in the Introduction – how can dancers access and control states of consciousness within the choreography and performance of Western contemporary dance? – both theorists do present some insight into the nature of the dance consciousness and explicitly discuss two dance states: reflective and pre-reflective. It is not clear whether these concepts were formulated by Sheets-Johnstone or by Fraleigh. Both theorists utilise the terms, but only Fraleigh defines them. This perhaps indicates that Sheets-Johnstone introduced them but Fraleigh later clarified them. Whatever the case, both their accounts are constrained by their phenomenological research approaches, which 'take the form of first-person description' (Fraleigh, 1987, p.xiv).

Fraleigh acknowledges that her perspective is one of involvement as opposed to her having a detached approach (*ibid.* p.xxix) and Sheets-Johnstone notes that, as a phenomenologist, she 'describes the immediate encounter with dance, the lived experience of dance' (1966, p.12). Although, as Sheets-Johnstone states, any phenomenological accounts of the nature of the dance consciousness should be 'apart from any prejudice, expectation, or reflection' (*ibid.*), one cannot disregard the first-person nature of the accounts and the possibility that they may contain some opinion. Such opinion is evident in Sheets-Johnstone's claim that the reflective dance consciousness is desirable for the dance process and the pre-reflective dance consciousness is preferable for performance, and in Fraleigh's note that the pre-reflective dance consciousness is the more effective state for dance performance.

Despite this, Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh do go some way in assisting with the first preliminary research question outlined in the Introduction – what is the nature of the states of consciousness that are experienced by dancers within the choreography and performance of Western contemporary dance. Considering, however, that neither source presents third-person consciousness theory and that Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh's sources are the dominant sources within current dance literature, it is necessary to review other literature outside the dance discipline. A review of current literature within the theatre discipline, literature that implicitly considers the preliminary research questions identified in the Introduction, is of value here. Such literature is of course related to the nature of the actor's, as opposed to the dancer's,

states of consciousness, but it is possible to borrow relevant identified concepts of consciousness and methods of access.

A review of current literature within the theatre discipline

The actor's body and mind

Within the theatre discipline, both the actor's body and actor's mind are attributed much significance, although views vary about the importance of one over the other and it does seem that dualism is present within the theatre literature. Within this there is a sense of the objective versus the subjective and, as Zarrilli notes, 'objectivism and subjectivism remain two sides of the same problematic, dualistic coin' (2002, p.10). For many theorists and practitioners, there is a 'dichotomy or gap thought to exist between the cognitive, conceptual, formal or rational' and the 'bodily, perceptual, material and emotional' (*ibid.* p.11) and, as a result, actors often experience 'a real *disjuncture* between their minds and their bodies' (*ibid.* p.13).

Viewpoints also differ greatly within the theatre discipline in terms of the role of the body within training and practice. Whilst Meyer-Dinkgrafe claims that it is a 'general tendency among contemporary theatre theorists and artists to stress the importance of the actor's body' (2005, p.77), Dietchman notes that:

> Very often, I think the body is ignored or cut off in actor training [and] body training is either kept separate or ignored altogether' (1990, p.11).

Likewise, the disposition of the actor's body is also considered from varying perspectives. Some theorists, such as Moore (1979), consider the body as the actor's tool or instrument, whereas other theorists explicitly discard objectivist suppositions about the body existing as an instrument and Schechner advises 'don't treat your body as a thing. Your body is not your instrument; your body is you' (1973, p.145).

Considering the body from a more subjective, as opposed to objective, perspective may present the opportunity to reduce the sense of dualism. Schrag claims that one should consider the body as Merleau-Ponty does, as 'an experienced phenomenon ... in the immediacy of its lived concreteness' and 'not as a representable object ... for

the abstractive gaze' (1969, p.130). Merleau-Ponty refers not to the 'possible body which we may legitimately think of as an information machine' but to the 'actual body I call mine' (1964, p.160–1). This viewpoint is similar to Fraleigh's notion of a thinking body and is encapsulated here by Schechner:

> All performance work begins and ends in the body. When I talk of spirit or mind or feelings or psyche, I mean dimensions of the body. The body is an organism of endless adaptability. A knee can think, a finger can laugh, a belly cry, a brain walk and a buttock listen.
> (1973, p.132)

Such a viewpoint places more significance on the mind in conjunction with the body, which may enable the actor to 'be engaged in a total psychophysical process' in which 'the performer might realize an organic connection between the body and mind' (Zarrilli, 2002, p.14). It does seem, then, that some theorists, such as Schechner (1973), Zarrilli (2002) and Meyer-Dinkgrafe (2005), consider the significance of both the actor's body and the actor's mind and, in doing so, these theorists make reference to the actor's consciousness.

The actor's consciousness

According to Meyer-Dinkgrafe 'theatre can affect the actor's ... consciousness' (2005, p.195). He states:

> Theatre has unfathomed and to a large extent unused potential in enabling, in theatre actors and audiences, a holistic experience which is non-ordinary, non-day-to-day.
> (*ibid.* p.6)

This is similar to the claims made by dance theorists discussed earlier – that dance can act as a means of access to altered states of consciousness. Since the early 1990s interest in the connection between theatre and consciousness has really begun to develop and the year 2000 saw the launch of the web-based journal *Consciousness, Literature and the Arts*.[11] Meyer-Dinkgrafe is one of the leading theorists explicitly presenting a connection between acting, theatre and consciousness. He organised the 'International Conference on Consciousness, Literature and the Arts' at the University of Aberystwyth in May 2005, which aimed to connect consciousness and

[11] See www.aber.ac.uk/tfts/journal

the arts. Although many of the papers presented were concerned with connecting acting and consciousness, only one concerned dance and consciousness. This latter paper, 'Delving into the Dancer's Consciousness', was presented by the author of this thesis (Shacklock, 2006). The lack of dance papers at this international conference confirms that there is very little current research into the dancer's consciousness. Meyer-Dinkgrafe's views on the actor's consciousness are reviewed later in this chapter.

It is also of great use to consider some literature which does not explicitly make a connection between acting and consciousness *per se*, but which does present a supposition about the degree to which the actor should be involved with the character. In doing so, there is an implication that particular states of consciousness are desirable for an actor. For example, in stating that an actor must not be involved emotionally with the character he or she is playing, but must instead be aware of that character and, through the use of specific techniques, of how to represent that character, one may be claiming implicitly that the actor should be in a reflective state of consciousness. On the other hand, in stating that an actor must be involved emotionally with the character and exist completely as that character with no awareness of technique, one may be claiming implicitly that the actor should be in, what Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh would term, a pre-reflective state of consciousness.

This chapter now considers the theories and methods presented by Diderot, Stanislavski, Strasberg, Grotowski, Schechner, Meyerhold, Brecht, Barba and Bloch. This list of theorists and practitioners is by no means exhaustive and those mentioned here have been selected because their theories and methods have had a significant impact on contemporary Western theatre practice. It is important to note that the following discussion has taken these theories and methods out of context, and here they are being considered in relation to consciousness and in relation to dance as opposed to the theatre discipline. Each theory and method will be considered cautiously and in as much detail as is deemed necessary for this particular discussion; thus Stanislavski's method, for example, will not be discussed in its entirety and only principles that are considered relevant will be extracted.

Pre-reflective states

Diderot (1955) was one of the first Western theorists to consider the degree to which the actor should be emotionally involved with the character and with the acting itself, and he considers this to be the paradox of acting. Diderot distinguishes clearly between two sorts of involvement and, in fact, two types of actor. One type of actor is:

> The one [who] plays from the heart, from sensibility, immersing himself, while acting, in the feelings of the character he plays.
> (Meyer-Dinkgrafe, 2005, p.56)

This type of actor seems to be similar to the pre-reflective dancer, described by Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh, who lives 'the present-centred moment in her dance' (Fraleigh, 1987, p.13). Unlike Fraleigh, however, who considers the pre-reflective dancer as the most successful dancer, Diderot considers this kind of acting as the least effective and notes that it is 'alternately strong and feeble, fury and cold, dull and sublime' (1955, p.15). Diderot claims that this type of acting is unpredictable and uncontrollable and too reliant on chance, and that the performance may vary significantly each time, as the actor will lack self-control.

Stanislavski (1986) takes the opposite view to Diderot and the former's views seem more in keeping with those of Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh. Stanislavski formulated a particular system of actor training – a system which has had a major influence on Western theatre – which promotes the notion that:

> An actor is under obligation to live his part inwardly, and then to give to his experience an external embodiment.
> (1986, p.15)

For Stanislavski, the aim of acting is 'the creation of this inner life of a human spirit, and its expression in an artistic form' (1986, p14). It is essential that this inner life is created and truly and holistically lived in every single performance; the actor must 'fit his own human qualities to the life of this other person' and 'pour into it all of his own soul' (*ibid.*). In addition:

> The work of the actor is not to create feelings but only to produce the given circumstances in which true feelings will spontaneously be engendered.
> (Stanislavski, 1949, p.266)

Stanislavski believes that the actor must live the character as opposed to being knowingly aware of the character and using technique to represent the character. This ensures that the acting and the character are 'real, live and human, not dead, conventional, or theatrical' (1986, p.119). In his book *An Actor Prepares*, Stanislavski notes:

> The very best thing that can happen is to have the actor completely carried away by the play. Then regardless of his own will he lives the part, not noticing *how* he feels, not thinking about *what* he does, and it all moves of its own accord, subconsciously and intuitively.
> (1986, p.13)

The above statement implies that the actor might lose control, but Stanislavski does warn 'never lose yourself on the stage. Always act as your own person, as an artist' (*ibid.* p.177). He therefore formulated a series of techniques which can be used to access subconscious material, whilst maintaining self-control, in the form of a conscious control of the acting.

One technique created by Stanislavski is that of emotion memory, which is intended to allow the actor to achieve control and repeatable access to the subconscious. The actor must use personal past emotions and experiences and those 'feelings that we have had in sympathising with the emotions of others' (*ibid.* p.190) in order to create and live a new experience, the experience of the character. Stanislavski describes emotion memory in the following text:

> Just as your visual memory can reconstruct an inner image of some forgotten thing, place, or person, your emotion-memory can bring back feelings you have already experienced. They may seem to be beyond recall, when suddenly a suggestion, a thought, a familiar object will bring them back in full force. Sometimes the emotions are as strong as ever, sometimes weaker, sometimes the same strong feelings will come back but in a somewhat different guise.
> (*ibid.* p.168)

Not only, then, does Stanislavski define a particular type of acting consciousness, a pre-reflective consciousness in which the actor is not explicitly aware of self or the character, he also attempts to provide techniques which may be used in order to access such a state.

Strasberg (1988) developed and modified Stanislavski's system and his predominant interest was Stanislavski's 'magic if'. The latter, for Strasberg, is a series of questions relating to character that the actor must ask self prior to performance or even prior to creating the role. Questions take the form of, for example:

> Given the particular circumstances of the play, how would you behave, what would you do, how would you feel, how would you react?
> (Strasberg, 1988, p.85)

Strasberg ascertains that using the 'magic if' assists the actor in becoming 'close to the ... psychological experience' (*ibid.*) and experience of consciousness.

To accompany Stanislavski's 'magic if', Strasberg formulated a motivation technique, which encourages the actor to consider the following question:

> The circumstances of the scene indicate that the character must behave in a particular way; what would motivate you, the actor, to behave in that particular way?
> (*ibid.*)

One may presume that, in order to apply this question, the actor must imagine himself or herself to be the character and to be involved in the particular situation. Strasberg did not, however, wish this to be the case and so formulated the substitution technique, which also uses emotion memory and is described as follows:

> The actor is not limited to the way in which he would behave within the particular circumstances set for the character; rather, he seeks a substitute reality different from that set forth in the play that will help him to behave truthfully according to the demands of the role. It is not necessarily the way he himself would behave under the same circumstances, and thus does not limit him to his own natural behaviour.
> (*ibid.* p.60)

This sort of substitution supposedly allows the actor to access an altered state of consciousness. Grotowski (1969) also refers to an altered or heightened state of consciousness, and Meyer-Dinkgrafe notes that 'theatre created by Grotowski strives to achieve non-ordinary states of consciousness in ... actors' (2005, p.111). Grotowski refers to accessing these non-ordinary states of consciousness as a process of 'translumination' (1969).

Grotowski considers the 'personal and scenic technique of the actor as the core of theatre art' (*ibid.* p.15). His method of translumination promotes authenticity and real experience and disregards techniques behind which the actor can hide – again promoting a sense of a pre-reflective, as opposed to a reflective, state of consciousness for the actor. In translumination, the actor must open himself or herself up, present part of his or her private self and personality, and completely strip the self emotionally and psychologically in order to present pure inner self.

In order to do this, Grotowski believes that the actor must reach a state of mind characterised by 'passive readiness to realise an active role' (*ibid.* p.7). He formulated a series of physical training techniques, the aims of which are to transcend any form of body mind dualism, surpass incompleteness and achieve a holistic totality. The actor must become completely absorbed in the present moment of the action and achieve a certain state of altered or heightened consciousness, which seems analogous with Fraleigh's pre-reflective state of consciousness. Grotowski defines this state of consciousness or translumination as a 'transcendental state of being' (*ibid.* p.16).

Schechner (1985) also speaks of accessing altered states, which seem to have a pre-reflective and experiential nature as opposed to a knowingly reflective nature. He defines a state of transportation, which exists in performances when the actor is 'taken somewhere', after which the actor will 're-enter ordinary life just about where they went in' (1985, p.125) to the performance. Schechner describes this transportation as follows:

> The performer goes from the "ordinary world" to the "performance world", from one time/space reference to another, from one personality to one or more others. He plays a character, battles demons, goes into trance, travels to the sky or under the sea or earth: he is transformed, able to do things "in performance" he cannot do ordinarily. But when the performance is over, or even as a final phase of the performance, he returns to where he started.
> (1985, p.125)

In addition, Schechner defines a state of transformation, which appears to be a heightened and more intense pre-reflective state, and which may result from an intensive series of transportations. Having accessed the performance world and been transported a number of times in a number of performances, a performer, according to Schechner, may begin to transform pre-reflectively and will no longer return unchanged to the ordinary world – as is the case in transportation.

It seems, then, that many theatre theorists and practitioners – namely Diderot, Stanislavski, Strasberg, Grotowski and Schechner – define and promote states, and in some cases even provide methods of access to these states, that seem analogous with Sheets-Johnstone's and Fraleigh's state of the pre-reflective dance consciousness. This is not the case, however, for all the theorists and practitioners and some refer to more reflective states, as discussed below.

Reflective states

As mentioned earlier in this chapter Diderot distinguishes between two types of actor: the first is the actor who acts from the heart; the second is the actor who has 'in himself an unmoved and disinterested onlooker. He must have, consequently, 'penetration and no sensibility' (Diderot, 1955, p.56). Such an actor must have the capacity to gain complete insight into and have total understanding of the character, without becoming emotionally involved with that character. This experience is known and intellectually controlled, rather than simply lived in the moment.

This type of actor, deemed to be most successful by Diderot, appears to be very similar to Sheets-Johnstone's and Fraleigh's reflective dancer, who is 'aware of [the] body as something to be reckoned with' (Fraleigh, 1987, p.14). The actor must almost observe the character objectively rather than exist as the character and, having observed, must non-emotively imitate the patterns and behaviour of that character

and recreate the outward signs of feeling. In other words, the actor must represent non-emotively the character's emotions. Diderot explains that, in this instance, the actor is someone 'who, having learnt the words set down for him by the author, fools you thoroughly' into believing that the emotions are being experienced by someone onstage (1955, p.37).

Meyerhold (1969) also considers this to be the case and notes that actors should not involve themselves emotionally with their characters, but should maintain a reflective state and 'consciously comment on the character by remaining clearly distinct from it' (cited in Leiter, 1991, p.57). Meyerhold formulated an acting method called 'biomechanics' (1969), which places great significance on the actor's physical training and promotes a reflective consciousness. According to Meyerhold, through mastering the physical method of biomechanics the actor should be able to position the body accurately and move it in a way which stimulates an emotional state within the actor. The physical movements act as stimuli to the emotions, as opposed to being the effect of emotions. Meyerhold believes that it is possible to create emotions by manipulating the body in particular ways.

Brecht (1940) also promotes a reflective state of consciousness in which the actor is distinct from the character:

> The actor does not allow himself to become completely transformed on the stage into the character he is portraying.
> (*ibid.* p.95)

In order to maintain such a distance from the character, Brecht formulated the concept of the 'alienation effect' (1940). The aim is for the actor to demonstrate the character and reproduce the words and movements of the character as authentically as possible. The actor must find meaningful actions, by externalising the character's emotions, which illustrate what is going on internally, without necessarily having to connect via empathy to such emotions. Brecht notes that:

> [The actor] produces [the character's] remarks as authentically as he can; he puts forward their way of behaving to the best of his abilities and knowledge of men; but he never tries to persuade himself (and thereby others) that this amounts to a complete transformation.
> (*ibid.* p.95)

This is not to say that Brecht discourages emotions, indeed his epic theatre employed emotional effects. He believes that the actor must present the emotions reflectively and intellectually, rather than pre-reflectively and emotionally. Brecht notes that 'the actor should refrain from living himself into the part' (1940, p.94).

Pre-reflective and reflective states

Having ascertained that some theorists and practitioners promote pre-reflective states, and some promote reflective states, it is interesting that yet others advocate states of pre-reflection *and* states of reflection. Earlier in this chapter it was noted that dance theorist Sheets-Johnstone attributes states of reflection to the dance process – namely choreography and rehearsal – and states of pre-reflection to dance performance. Some theatre theorists and practitioners hold a similar viewpoint and some even support a dual consciousness, in which the two states exist concurrently.

Barba (1985) considers the psycho-physiological nature of acting and is concerned with theatre anthropology and specifically the actor's presence. By presence, Barba is referring to a particular state of consciousness, a state of pure consciousness. He ascertains that three distinct concepts are inherent to presence: 1) extra-daily behaviour, 2) the organ of u-topia and 3) the elusive third organ (*ibid.*).

Barba defines two different types of behaviour: daily behaviour and extra-daily behaviour. Daily behaviour comprises mainly pre-reflective, unconscious 'processes through which our bodies and voices absorb and reflect the culture in which we live' (*ibid.* p.32). Extra-daily behaviour comprises particular codes of movement that are relevant to specific forms of performance, which are different from the codes in daily behaviour in terms of their aesthetic function (*ibid.*).

It is this notion of extra-daily behaviour which is inherent in the concept of presence. According to Barba, the actor must master extra-daily behaviour to be able to perform with complete presence. In order to do so, the actor must initially dispose of any pre-reflective automatic or unconscious behaviour and replace it with more artificial reflective extra-daily behaviour. Presence may be achieved when this artificial behaviour becomes pre-reflective, automatic and unconscious. In this process it is evident that the actor must move from states of pre-reflection to states of

reflection and then again to states of pre-reflection. Barba is therefore promoting two distinct states of consciousness which must be used alternately.

In addition, though, it seems as if Barba is promoting a simultaneous experiencing of these two distinct states. One may consider that, even during the pre-reflective stages, there must still be a controlling agent, something which observes reflectively and monitors the behaviour whilst the behaviour exists pre-reflectively. Barba refers to a principle supported by Grotowski and notes that:

> If an actor wants to express, then he is divided. One part of him is doing the willing, another the expressing; one part is commanding and another is carrying out the commands.
> (1995, p.33)

Thus not only are the two states experienced subsequent to one another, but they are also experienced concurrently in the form of a dual consciousness. Barba notes that actors are trained to use extra-daily behaviour through distancing self from 'incultured' spontaneity and performing with 'accultured' spontaneity (1995). Within this, the actor must learn to recognise the difference between self in daily behaviour and self in extra-daily behaviour (Barba, 1989, p.312). The problem is that the more the actor becomes conscious of the extra-daily behaviour, the more difficult it is simply to exist within that behaviour – this is why 'accultured' spontaneity is desirable.

According to Barba, this extra-daily behaviour, along with the organ of utopia – which transforms the technique and raises it 'to a social and spiritual dimension', and the elusive third organ – which 'renders our actions incandescent', allow actors to establish presence (1988, p.291). Although he acknowledges that actors can be trained to understand kinaesthetically extra-daily, as opposed to daily behaviour, Barba does not feel that the elusive third organ can be trained. He notes that it is 'our personal identity. If we don't have it, no one can teach it to us' (1988, p.291). Thus he does not think that presence, or the particular state of consciousness represented by his term presence, can be trained either and therefore provides no real method of access to the state of which he speaks so highly.

Bloch also advocates a type of dual consciousness and developed a technique called 'Alba Emoting' (1993), which attempts to collate pre-reflective principles, such as those promoted by Stanislavski, and reflective principles, such as those endorsed by Diderot. The technique requires the actor to recreate reflectively the 'emotional effector patterns', which comprise the facial expressions, posture and breathing patterns which correspond to the emotions of the character (Bloch, 1993, p.121). Bloch claims that:

> If instructions for reproducing an emotional effector pattern are correctly followed, the appropriate actions will trigger the corresponding subjective experience in the performer.
> (*ibid.* p.127)

The effect is that, despite the emotions being reflectively and technically recreated, the physiological parameters of the emotions arise pre-reflectively and thus it appears as if the emotions are really being experienced without the technique. In this instance, then, the actor would be experiencing reflection and pre-reflection concurrently in the form of a dual consciousness.

Bloch claims that the effect of Alba Emoting can be so strong that 'step out' and 'switch off' (1993, p.127) techniques are needed in order for the actor to stop feeling the emotions of the character. These techniques indicate even more strongly that a dual consciousness is necessary. Indeed, in order to apply a technique at all and use methods such as the step out, one must maintain some sense of control over consciousness. One cannot delve completely and holistically into the realms of the pre-reflective, because how would one administer such techniques? A dual consciousness comprising reflection and pre-reflection is thus considered to be essential.

Accessing the actor's consciousness

Having reviewed the accounts presented by Diderot, Stanislavski, Strasberg, Grotowski, Schechner, Meyerhold, Brecht, Barba and Bloch, it is possible to discern the nature of various types of an actor's consciousness – reflective, pre-reflective and dual. What is not so clear, however, is how one may access such states.

Mnouchkine refers to a particular type of consciousness that she defines as 'state', and claims that 'state' should be the 'primary passion which preoccupies the actor' (cited in Williams, 1999, p.95). Although Mnouchkine claims that she can define this particular type of consciousness and can identify the moments in which the actor is, and is not, in the desired state, she also acknowledges that she has no method with which to equip actors with the ability to access or achieve that desired state.

According to Meyer-Dinkgrafe, 'performative means have to be developed' which ensure that 'the performer is enabled to experience higher states of consciousness during performance' (2005, p.91). There does not, however, seem to be a general and consensus method of access to such states within either the theatre or dance discipline. Meyer-Dinkgrafe notes that, although theorists and practitioners are able to describe their reflective and pre-reflective experiences, they do 'not have technique[s] to facilitate the same experience to recur systematically in themselves or in others' (*ibid.* p.171). Theorists and practitioners such as Grotowski have apparently as yet 'failed to find systematic methods' for accessing the states 'which they had encountered coincidentally' (*ibid.* p.189), and theorists have:

> ... so far not really succeeded in developing a set of techniques which allows the systematic development of higher states of consciousness in the theatre.
> (*ibid.* p.79)

In his book *Theatre and Consciousness* (2005), Meyer-Dinkgrafe faces up to this problem; he discusses the relationship between theatre and consciousness and also questions 'whether the actor should be emotionally involved with the emotions their characters are supposed to be feeling' (*ibid.* p.55). Within this he considers two key issues:

> ... whether we can better understand theatre as a result of such an analysis [and] the implications of the *Natyashastra's*[12] claim that theatre may serve as a tool to the development of ... higher states of consciousness.
> (2005, p.1)

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[12] The *Natyashastra* is the 'main treatise in Indian philosophy that deals with theatre aesthetics' (Meyer-Dinkgrafe, 2005, p.1).

Unlike the theorists and practitioners discussed so far in this chapter, Meyer-Dinkgrafe considers these two key issues completely from within the context of consciousness studies and his theories are based on sound consciousness theory.

Meyer-Dinkgrafe notes that:

> Since the main focus of Indian philosophy has been human consciousness and practical techniques for its development, it is worth looking at theatre aesthetics provided within the framework of Indian philosophy.
> (2005, p.173)

Meyer-Dinkgrafe believes that the classical Indian treatise on drama and theatre, the *Natyashastra*, might assist with the problem of the absence of a method of access. He claims that the *Natyashastra* serves 'as a means of development of consciousness for the ... actor' (*ibid.* p.125) as it presents 'yogic techniques' which can condition 'the mind and body to function in higher states of consciousness' (*ibid.* p.91). Meyer-Dinkgrafe also believes that the *Natyashastra*, along with some 'general aspects of Indian philosophy', has had a significant influence on 'eminent nineteenth- and twentieth-century theatre artists, Stanislavski, Artaud, Grotowski, Barba and Brook' (*ibid.* p.105).

The *Natyashastra* refers to a state of pure consciousness – or *Samadhi* in Sanskrit – a state that 'is without contents but fully awake' (*ibid.* p.23). Meyer-Dinkgrafe suggests that: 'everyone can gain access to pure consciousness within their own minds' either 'coincidentally, or through the practice of appropriate meditation techniques' (*ibid.* p.31) and states:

> It is possible not only to have occasional experiences of higher states of consciousness ... but to systematically develop much more advanced states of consciousness as phenomena of permanent daily experience.
> (*ibid.* p.25)

The precise nature of the state of pure consciousness referred to within the *Natyashastra* is not easy to ascertain. Meyer-Dinkgrafe speaks of 'the impossibility of expressing the experience [of pure consciousness] in conventional language' and notes that 'the experience simply cannot be put into words' (*ibid.* p.30). Despite this,

the *Natyashastra* appears to promote that the 'actor has to fully identify with the character he plays' (2005, p.97) and exist in the moment as that character. It therefore seems that the *Natyashastra* is encouraging the actor to encounter a state of consciousness similar to Fraleigh's pre-reflective dance consciousness. The treatise also states, however, that 'tears and horripilation should respectively be shown by persons who are not [actually] sorry or happy' (*ibid*.p.97) and the actor should therefore knowingly use technique to create them. It thus appears that the *Natyashastra* is also encouraging the actor to encounter states of reflection. A paradox is therefore apparent. As Meyer-Dinkgrafe notes:

> In requesting the actor to be of utmost concentrated mind, [the *Natyashastra*] appears to suggest involvement. In stating that the temperamental states ... should be shown by persons (i.e. actors) who are not actually feeling the emotions that cause those states, the text appears to suggest emotional non-involvement on the part of the actor. (*ibid*. p.99)

There seems, therefore, to be a contradiction between reflective involvement and pre-reflective non-involvement; two different conscious states. Perhaps, though, this is not a contradiction; perhaps it is implying the use of a dual consciousness or it is acknowledging that the two states are of use in different contexts, as acknowledged by Barba, Bloch and Sheets-Johnstone.

It is worth noting here that this notion of dual consciousness can be found within the Indian dance of *Kathakali*, a contemporary Indian dance form that incorporates some of the principles presented within the *Natyashastra*. *Kathakali* dancer Nair notes that:

> A good actor is one who understands the character very well, thus becoming the character itself. [But] we should not forget ourselves while acting. While acting, half of the actor is the role he does and half will be himself.
> (cited in Schechner and Appel, 1990, p.36)

This acknowledges that the *Natyashastra* subscribes to the concept of a dual consciousness. The question remains, however: how can the actor access this state of consciousness? Meyer-Dinkgrafe has researched the subject and, in 2000, he conducted an exploratory study 'into the potential of using theatre training to achieve an impact on consciousness' (2005, p.80). The study focussed entirely on using the

Indian *Natyashastra* and another eclectic method as a means of access to states of pure consciousness. The conclusion of the exploratory study was that:

> Much work is needed to find ways of systematically applying the range of insights I propose ... in theatre training and practice.
> (Meyer-Dinkgrafe, 2005, p.196)

Meyer-Dinkgrafe also questions whether 'theatre following Western aesthetics [can] achieve effects similar to those *Natyashastra*-based theatre claims for itself' (*ibid.* p.165). In response to this, Meyer-Dinkgrafe notes that in order to reach any substantial answers to this question 'further theoretical elaboration is needed, leading eventually to practical, empirical testing of relevant cogent hypotheses' (*ibid.*). Although Meyer-Dinkgrafe has begun to make connections between theatre and consciousness, and has suggestions as to appropriate methods that may be of use in accessing particular states, he has yet to present a theoretical model.

Summary

It is possible to locate more literature concerning theatre and consciousness than that concerning dance and consciousness. Since the early 1990s, the subject of theatre and consciousness has increased in significance within the theatre discipline. There is an increasing number of publications devoted entirely to the relationship between theatre and consciousness, and the idea that theatre can enable theatre artists and audiences to have holistic and non-ordinary experiences. Examples are Meyer-Dinkgrafe's *Theatre and Consciousness* (2005), Demastes' *Staging Consciousness: Theatre and the Materialization of Mind* (2002), Yarrow's *Neutral Consciousness in the Experience of Theatre* (1987) and Malekin and Yarrow's *Consciousness, Literature and Theatre: Theory and Beyond* (1997). In addition, there is a web-journal and international conference *Consciousness, Literature and the Arts* and an acting school, The School of the Science of Acting[13] based in London, which trains actors to consider the consciousness of their character.

There are also many theatre sources that, through presenting ideas relating to the extent to which actors should be involved with their character, provide theories and

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[13] See www.scienceofacting.org.uk

methods relating to the actor's conscious state. Theorists and practitioners Stanislavski, Strasberg, Grotowski and Schechner promote a pre-reflective state of consciousness for the actor. Theorists and practitioners Diderot, Meyerhold and Brecht advocate a reflective state of consciousness for the actor. Barba, Bloch, and Meyer-Dinkgrafe in his consideration of the *Natyashastra*, promote a dual consciousness for the actor comprising both pre-reflection and reflection.

These sources indicate that there is some consensus on the nature of the states of the actor's consciousness, states which seem to be analogous with those presented within the dance literature in relation to the dancer's consciousness. Such sources may assist with answering the first preliminary research question outlined in the Introduction; which was to ascertain the nature of the states of consciousness that are experienced by dancers within the choreography and performance of Western contemporary dance.

In addition to ascertaining the nature of the actor's consciousness – explicitly or implicitly – some of the theories and methods discussed also attempt to provide methods which may be used to access such states. Although Meyer-Dinkgrafe uses the principles of the *Natyashastra*, he acknowledges that further empirical investigation is necessary before it will be possible to transfer the techniques into Western theatre practice. Many of the theatre theorists who implicitly discuss states of consciousness also present methods of access. For example, Stanislavski's system enables actors to access their character, and thus one could consider that this permits access to a pre-reflective state of consciousness. Such methods may be of use in the context of this thesis and may assist in reaching conclusions regarding the second preliminary research question outlined in the Introduction – how can dancers access and control states of consciousness within the choreography and performance of Western contemporary dance?

It is important to note here, however, a significant distinction between the purpose of the methods of access presented by Stanislavski, for example, and the purpose of the method of access required in the study presented in this thesis. All of the methods of access presented by theatre theorists such as Stanislavski and Brecht, regardless of whether they are promoting reflective or pre-reflective actors, are concerned

predominantly with the extent to which the actor is involved, reflectively or pre-reflectively, with the character. Thus, although the methods do allow actors to access particular states of consciousness, the means of access to these states is the character itself.

In Stanislavski's system, for example, it is the use of emotion memory that enables the actor to become emotionally involved with the character and exist as that character, and subsequently to function pre-reflectively. The character is therefore the means of access to the pre-reflection. Conversely, with Diderot's method, for example, the actor is able to function reflectively by removing self from the character, becoming a disinterested onlooker with no sensibility, imitating non-emotively the patterns and behaviour of that character and recreating the outward signs of feeling. In this case, the character is the means of access to the reflection. In both instances the character acts as the means of access, and without the character the method would be purposeless. One might even argue that the state of consciousness being accessed within these methods is actually the character's consciousness as opposed to the actor's consciousness. This, however, is a completely separate discussion that is outside the scope of this research in which it is purely the dancer's consciousness that is of interest.

It is intended that the method of access presented within this thesis be easily comprehensible and appropriate for all forms of contemporary dance, whether literal or non-literal.[14] The method of access must allow the dancer to enter particular states through means that are not necessarily related to character, as of course, not all dances require the dancer to portray a character. The theatre theories and methods discussed above are of use in discerning the nature of the different types of the actor's consciousness, which may in turn inform any discussion on the dancer's consciousness. They are not, however, of great use in ascertaining a method of access that can be used to enable dancers to access particular states of consciousness.

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[14] The terms literal and non-literal are intended here to distinguish respectively between movement that is accurate, exact and truthful, and movement that is figurative, symbolic, abstract, metaphoric or allegorical.

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Revisiting the preliminary research questions

Having considered the relevant available literature within both the dance and theatre disciplines it is now pertinent to return to the preliminary research questions outlined in the Introduction. It is important to assess whether the literature discussed has provided any insight into the questions outlined, in order to ascertain the research outcome of this thesis. Indeed, had the available literature provided complete insight into the questions outlined then this thesis may have been deemed invalid and unnecessary.

Evidence of various different states of dance and acting consciousness can be found within the literature discussed. All the literature acknowledges that such states of consciousness are beyond ordinary consciousness or at least differ in some way from the everyday consciousness. Different sources promote various states, although most seem to acknowledge the existence of a particularly reflective state, in which the dancer or actor is aware of self, and also the existence of a non-reflective state, in which the dancer or actor is not aware of self. Some sources even combine these states and ascertain that it is possible for them to exist simultaneously. These concepts are of use for this research and go some way to providing insight into the first preliminary question outlined in the Introduction:

- What is the nature of the states of consciousness that are experienced by dancers within the choreography and performance of Western contemporary dance?

Further investigation is required, however, in order to substantiate the existence of such states. As noted earlier in this chapter, the accounts supplied by dance theorists Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh are both based predominantly in the first person and lack third person consciousness theory. This is also the case in the majority of the concepts presented by the theatre theorists. An understanding of the dance consciousness is without doubt dependent entirely on an initial understanding of consciousness itself.

Chapter 2, therefore, considers third-person consciousness theory in some depth. It is interesting to note that despite, for example, neuroscientist Freeman stating that

dance is central to human consciousness (1998)[15] and consciousness theorist Ginsburg claiming that 'everything we know of consciousness is connected to movement' (1999, p.79), there is very little literature within consciousness studies that even goes so far as to mention dance. Thus the literature that is considered is selected sensitively and applied to the discipline of dance in order to make sense of the concepts of the dance consciousness. Following such a consideration, the accounts presented in Chapter 1 are then conflated with the third-person theory, and Chapter 2 presents two independent and theoretically informed concepts of the dance consciousness. Such concepts do not currently exist within dance, theatre or consciousness literature.

In addition, it does not seem that a method for accessing the different states of the dance consciousness is currently in existence within the dance literature. Although some methods of access are presented within the theatre literature, as noted above these are of limited use as they are interrelated with the notion of character. The literature reviewed thus far in this chapter can therefore contribute little to the second preliminary question presented in the Introduction:

- How can dancers access and control such states of consciousness within the choreography and performance of Western contemporary dance?

It is essential, therefore, to move again outside the discipline of dance and search for methods of access which appear in other disciplines, but which might be adapted effectively and applied to the discipline of dance. Such methods are discussed in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 and relevant principles are extracted. The second preliminary research question presented above indicates that, for the purposes of this research, it is necessary to search for methods that enable dancers to access and control particular states of dance consciousness – namely those of a reflective and pre-reflective nature.[16]

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[15] www.paulagordon.com/shows/freeman

[16] Until the exact nature of these states is determined in Chapter 2 they are referred to as reflective and pre-reflective states.

The research outcome – The Dance Consciousness Model

Having considered the significance of the dancer's consciousness and the validity of the preliminary research questions, it is now possible to disclose the overall research outcome of this thesis, which is:

- To create a model that can be used to enable dancers to access particular conscious states for performance.

This model is entitled the:

- Dance Consciousness Model

The model comprises four strands and attempts to provide dancers with a method for accessing heightened and altered states of consciousness, specifically the reflective and pre-reflective states that are defined in Chapter 2. The model presents means of access to these states within choreography, rehearsal, and performance. Unlike much of the literature presented in this chapter, the Dance Consciousness Model does not promote any particular state as being more or less effective, but instead allows the dancer to select actively the desired state and access it successfully.

Having provided some background information on the subject of the dancer's consciousness and ascertained the research outcome of this thesis, it is now possible to present the focussed research questions of this thesis. It would not have been beneficial to introduce the focussed research questions in the Introduction, as an understanding of them is dependent on an appreciation of the significance of the dancer's consciousness and on the background information discussed in this chapter. The questions are encapsulated within the preliminary research questions; the focussed research questions are, however, more defined and detailed.

Focussed research questions and revisiting the research methodology

The focussed research questions of this thesis are:

1. What is the nature of the dance consciousness?

2. How can one examine the dance consciousness?

3. How can one access the intrattentive[17] dance consciousness?

4. How can one access the non-intrattentive[18] dance consciousness?

5. How can one switch between the intrattentive dance consciousness and the non-intrattentive dance consciousness?

6. What constitutes the full Dance Consciousness Model?

7. How effective is the Dance Consciousness Model?

Each of these focussed research questions has been investigated theoretically and empirically.

The theoretical and empirical methodologies used to conduct the research are identified in Table 1 in outline and in general terms only, since each subsequent chapter provides detailed description of the specific methods employed to investigate the research questions. For example, the focus of Chapter 3 is the method used to examine empirically the states of dance consciousness and Chapters 4, 5 and 6 focus on the methods used to access empirically states of dance consciousness. The structural breakdown for each chapter is provided subsequent to Table 1.

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[17] The term 'intrattentive' is introduced and defined in Chapter 2. For now, however, it may be considered as an alternative to the term 'reflective' utilised by theorists such as Fraleigh (1987).
[18] The term 'non-intrattentive' is also defined in Chapter 2. For now, however, it can be considered as an alternative to the term 'pre-reflective' utilised by theorists such as Fraleigh (1987).

Table 1: Theoretical and empirical methodologies

Theoretical methodology	**Empirical methodology**
Consideration of focussed research question 1 led to: • Research into consciousness studies, in order to ascertain the nature of consciousness according to consciousness theorists. This resulted in the formulation of two independently created concepts of dance consciousness to be investigated empirically.	
Consideration of focussed research question 2 led to: • Theoretical research into existing methods for examining consciousness. This resulted in the formulation of an independently created method of examination to be tested empirically.	
Consideration of focussed research question 3 led to: • Theoretical research into existing methods for accessing the intrattentive consciousness. This resulted in the formulation of a series of independently created methods of access to be tested empirically.	Empirical Project 1 included: • The application of the independently created method of examination. • The application of the independently created methods of intrattentive access and the experimentation on and subsequent refining of these methods.
Consideration of focussed research question 4 led to: • Theoretical research into existing methods for accessing the non-intrattentive consciousness. This resulted in the formulation of a series of independently created methods of access to be tested empirically.	Empirical Project 2: • The application of the independently created method of examination. • The application of the independently created methods of non-intrattentive access and the experimentation on and subsequent refining of these methods.
Consideration of focussed research questions 5 and 6 led to: • A theoretical analysis of the methods of examination and methods of access, based on the empirical evidence. This resulted in the creation of a method for switching states and the final formulation of the research outcome.	Empirical Project 3: • The application of the independently created method of examination. • The application of the switching states method and the final research outcome.

Theoretical methodology	Empirical methodology
Consideration of focussed research question 7 led to: • A theoretical analysis of the efficacy of the research outcome based on the empirical evidence. This resulted in the formulation of the conclusion for this research.	

Breakdown of subsequent chapters

Chapter 2: What is the nature of the dance consciousness?

Understanding the states of the dance consciousness necessitates a preliminary appreciation of the ordinary everyday states on which they are based. Chapter 2 therefore takes a trans-disciplinary approach, entailing a thorough exploration into consciousness theory within philosophy, psychology and cognitive science. This exploration aims to ascertain and explain the meaning, theoretical conceptualisation and nature of the dance consciousness. Chapter 2 explores different researchers' views on the nature of consciousness and then considers the hierarchical levels of consciousness. A distinction is made between fundamental and supplementary states and the levels are discussed as distinct concepts, with a clear explanation as to any varying degrees of consciousness within each of the concepts. Finally, Chapter 2 distinguishes between two particular types of dance consciousness and presents the concepts and terminology that have been created for the purpose of this research, and the Dance Consciousness Model, to represent these states.

Chapter 3: How can one examine the dance consciousness?

Creating a method for a dancer to articulate the experience of his or her conscious state during and after the experience itself is essential in order to allow dancers to understand fully the Dance Consciousness Model and its inherent states. Chapter 3 therefore discusses methods of examination. Within this, there is a consideration of what constitutes a suitable and dependable method for the examination of conscious experience. Chapter 3 contemplates objective versus subjective methods and distinguishes between first-, second- and third-person methods. Each of these

methods is explained, and then a conclusion reached as to which methods are utilised within the Dance Consciousness Model's method of examination.

Existing methods of examination that are presented in current dance literature and in current consciousness literature are then discussed. Within this, two particular theories are introduced – phenomenological reduction and the explicitation session. These theories are referred to as the chapter proceeds to discuss present-centred and retrospective accounts, and verbal and non-verbal information. The chapter then presents the actual method of examination used within the Dance Consciousness Model and clarifies how the method is applied within this context. Finally, the nature of the Dance Consciousness Model itself is introduced, along with a diagram showing the skeletal structure of the model.

Chapter 4: How can one access the intrattentive dance consciousness?

Chapter 4 presents the first strand of the Dance Consciousness Model – the intrattentive strand. Discussion focuses on three existing practices and theories which contributed to the formulation of the intrattentive strand and the training that precedes its use. These practices and theories are: somatic practices – specifically the Feldenkrais Method; sports psychology – including theories on imagery and self-talk; and visual and verbal processing theories – in particular the Dual Coding Theory. Each discussion culminates with a summary explaining exactly how the practice or theory contributed to the Dance Consciousness Model.

The intrattentive training that is required for the intrattentive strand of the model is then described. This description includes how to access fundamental and higher states of intrattention and a breakdown of each intrattentive training workshop. Finally, the chapter presents a description of the intrattentive strand and a clarification as to how it is applied within choreography, rehearsal and performance in order to create an intrattentive dance consciousness.

Chapter 5: How can one access the non-intrattentive dance consciousness?

Chapter 5 takes a similar structure to Chapter 4 in presenting the second strand of the Dance Consciousness Model – the non-intrattentive strand. Discussion centres on three existent practices which contributed to formulation of the non-intrattentive strand and the training that precedes its use. These practices are: attention studies,

Buddhist Introspection and Bodyweather.[19] Each discussion culminates with a summary of exactly how the practice contributed to the non-intrattentive strand.

A description is provided as to the nature of the non-intrattentive training that is required. This description includes how to access fundamental and higher states of intrattention in order to access non-intrattention and a breakdown of each non-intrattentive training workshop. Finally, this chapter describes the non-intrattentive strand and clarifies how it is applied within choreography, rehearsal and performance in order to create a non-intrattentive dance consciousness.

Chapter 6: How can one switch between the intrattentive dance consciousness and the non-intrattentive dance consciousness? What constitutes the full Dance Consciousness Model?

Again Chapter 6 takes a similar structure to Chapters 4 and 5 but presents the third and fourth strands of the Dance Consciousness Model – the intrattentive to non-intrattentive strand (I-NI) and the non-intrattentive to intrattentive strand (NI-I). Chapter 6 introduces the two strands and the training that is required for the strands – the switching states training. Within this is a clarification as to why the ability to switch states is essential and in what context this switching may take place. The chapter moves on to discuss switching states within the dance process and describes the purpose and content of Workshop 1 of the switching states training. Following this is a discussion on switching states within dance performance. The 'Cyclic State Training' that is utilised within the practice of Bodyweather is introduced, and the idea of interchanging within the Cyclic State Training is considered. After ascertaining the influence of the Cyclic State Training on the switching states training, this chapter describes a consciousness circuit and the purpose and content of Workshop 2. Finally Chapter 6 presents the Dance Consciousness Model in its entirety.

Chapter 7: How effective is the Dance Consciousness Model?

Chapter 7 begins with descriptions and brief analyses of Empirical Projects 1 and 2 in which the intrattentive and the non-intrattentive strands were created. Chapter 7

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[19] Bodyweather is a practice which was established in Japan in the early 1980's, which conflates Eastern and Western philosophy and draws on a variety of dance and physical training practices, such as martial arts, contemporary dance, yoga and Shiatsu.

then presents an in-depth analysis of Empirical Project 3, which comprises seven phases, and the first complete application of the Dance Consciousness Model. Subsequently, Chapter 7 formulates a conclusion regarding the efficacy of the Dance Consciousness Model in the context of Western contemporary dance. Within this, possible modifications for the model are suggested and it is indicated how the research could develop further in the future. Chapter 7 closes with a hypothesis concerning the possible significance of the model within current dance practice and its potential as a new practice.

A final note

As the above preview of the chapters demonstrates, this thesis presents the Dance Consciousness Model in progressive stages. Each chapter discusses different existing theories which have been adapted and subsequently applied to dance to inform conceptualisation and development of the model. The existing theories that have been adapted for application come from various disciplines, practices, contexts and cultures and for this reason they were carefully selected and interpreted. This thesis endeavours to explain as fully as possible and necessary the theories which are considered relevant for the Dance Consciousness Model.

When applying theories, especially those from different cultures such as Buddhist Introspection, it is not the intention to import a different culture *per se*. Any specific principles from such theories that are selected are done so extremely sensitively with a continual awareness of the origin and intended purpose of the theory. One may consider that it would be less problematic to use only Western theories, and thus negate the difficulties concerned with borrowing from, for example, an Eastern culture. The decision to extract principles from practices such as Buddhist Introspection, however, is considered to be justified; it is felt that non-Western philosophy has much to offer on the subject of consciousness as, according to Koltai, 'the search for transformation of consciousness – both individual and collective – is relatively recent in Western contemporary culture' (2002, p.47). Meyer-Dinkgrafe also notes that in non-Western philosophy:

> ... a more holistic, all encompassing view of consciousness is not only theorised, but ... numerous physical and mental techniques are provided.
> (2005, p.22)

Bearing this in mind, it would not have been feasible to disregard non-Western practices and theories. Although the existent theories referred to have been carefully selected, they are by no means the only theories that could have been used in this context, nor the only theories that can provide answers to the focussed research questions. One may find the practices of Butoh[20] or authentic movement,[21] for example, just as applicable. Clearly it would be difficult to utilise all the many practices that could be considered pertinent; the few that were selected were considered the most relevant in this particular context.

Through the application and amalgamation of various existing theories, new theories have been formulated. These new theories, alongside much independent thought and empirical research, have culminated in the Dance Consciousness Model – an original model that does not currently exist within the discipline of dance. Although this thesis deems the model to be effective and convincing, there is no intention to imply that the model is exclusive or exhaustive, or that it provides all the definitive answers relating to dance and consciousness.

The Dance Consciousness Model presented within this thesis is open, of course, to further theoretical modification and supplementary empirical research. Indeed, the model has thus far been empirically tested only within a few particular dance processes and performances. The remarks made in Chapter 7 regarding the significance of the model within current Western dance practice, therefore, stand as comprehensively argued hypotheses that are open for further theoretical debate and empirical investigation. To concur with Meyer-Dinkgrafe, 'while I claim to present alternative, new thoughts in relation to ... theory and practice, I do not claim exclusivity. Other approaches to consciousness exist' (2005, p.195).

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[20] The experiential dance consciousness can be recognised in some Eastern forms of dance such as Butoh. According to Fraleigh, 'Butoh taps the subconscious body' (1999, p.6) and is essentially based upon the experiential inner consciousness; Butoh is not 'objectively calculated; it sprang from subjective, felt life' (*ibid.* p.46).

[21] According to the *Moving Journal* web-site, which is dedicated to authentic movement, 'people engage in authentic movement ... to increase consciousness' (Geissinger, 2003). Ramsay notes that authentic movement allows an 'active dialogue between conscious and unconscious material emerging from one's psyche and leading to creative expression' (2002, p.18).

Chapter 2

What is the nature of the dance consciousness?

Introduction

In Chapter 1 the proposed research outcome of this thesis was identified as the Dance Consciousness Model, a model that can be used to enable dancers to access particular conscious states for performance. In order to create such a model it is essential to consider primarily the first focussed research question: What is the nature of the dance consciousness? To substantiate any conclusions regarding this question, one must essentially consider: What is consciousness?

The initial problem faced by consciousness researchers is the uncertainty about what the phenomenon of consciousness is. Dance consciousness researchers are faced with the additional problem of what the nature of the phenomenon of the dance consciousness is. From research into the literature, it seems that no comprehensive definition for dance consciousness has been proposed to date. As indicated in Chapter 1, dance researchers Sheets-Johnstone (1966) and Fraleigh (1987) make reference to the dance consciousness in general and superficial terms only. Fraleigh merely claims that 'consciousness is consciousness *of* something' (1987, p.6), and thus goes no further than Sheets-Johnstone who notes that 'it is phenomenologically evident that consciousness is consciousness of something' (1966, p.35).

The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to provide further insight into the nature of consciousness and subsequently into the nature of the dance consciousness. Although it may not be possible to find ultimate definitions, it is necessary to at least secure ostensible definitions to underpin research that explores the essence of consciousness in the dance context.

Chapter breakdown

This chapter begins with an exploration into the history of the study of consciousness, within which is a consideration of various models of understanding of consciousness theory. Chapter 2 discusses monist and dualist theories; the former

include materialist, epiphenomenonalist, mentalist and idealist theories and the discussion of the latter includes an examination of the relationship between body and mind within interactionism and psychophysical parallelism. A summary of psychology theories is then given, and the effect existentialism, phenomenology and introspection has had on the development of consciousness studies is examined. Having ascertained that the study of consciousness has remained dormant for some time, Chapter 2 then provides a synopsis of the return of attention to consciousness theory and an indication as to its modern-day significance.

The question 'what is consciousness?' is then posed and followed by a discussion of everyday concepts of consciousness and concepts of consciousness in consciousness studies. Included in this discussion are philosophical, psychological and scientific concepts – namely relational concepts, causal concepts, non-causal concepts, functionalist concepts, the Global Workspace Theory (Baars, 1988) and the concept of 'what it is like to be...' (Nagel, 1974).

Chapter 2 then addresses the problem of consciousness and ascertains that a generally accepted definition of consciousness does not exist. As a result, the chapter provides a consideration of the hierarchical levels of consciousness disclosed by consciousness researchers from various disciplines. This discussion includes fundamental states and supplementary states, within which the varying degrees of these states are discussed. This knowledge and understanding is then applied to the discipline of dance and the chapter introduces two concepts of dance consciousness. The concepts are thus entirely grounded within consciousness theory, unlike the concepts provided within dance literature to date. Finally, the chapter explains the terminology to be used to represent the newly-formulated concepts of dance consciousness, and closes with a chapter summary.

Important note

Although this chapter discusses the concepts of consciousness, it is not possible to consider all concepts in existence or to provide any final or innovative solutions to the definitive mystery of the nature of consciousness. The information presented has been extracted from a wide range of sources within psychology, philosophy, science and the dance discipline in order to provide a more rounded depiction of the nature of

consciousness. The information is considered sufficient for the context in that it aids understanding of the dance consciousness for dancers and choreographers as well as theorists.

The concepts and ostensible definitions provided within this chapter are specifically for use within the context of this research and the Dance Consciousness Model. It is not intended that the concepts should be used in another context, for example within general consciousness studies. The Dance Consciousness Model is a highly accessible model which was created to be used, applied and understood by any dancer or choreographer, and thus does not necessitate an in-depth philosophical, psychological or scientific understanding of consciousness.

The history of consciousness

The nature of consciousness has engaged the minds of psychologists, philosophers, cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, spiritualists, artificial intelligence researchers and many others for centuries[22] and the subject is a 'multidisciplinary subject' (Blackmore, 2003, p.2). One can trace implicit theories on consciousness, such as ideologies relating to 'inner thought', back to the third century BC.[23] It seems, however, that the term conscious was not used with such preoccupation prior to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The term conscious derives from the Latin words *cum*, meaning together with, and *scire*, meaning knowing. In this conjunction the prefix is emphatic so that 'being conscious of something simply means knowing it, or knowing it well' (Lormand, 1996).[24]

Consciousness theorists 'over the millennia have struggled' (Blackmore, 2003, p.9) with the nature of consciousness and central to this struggle is ascertaining the relationship between mind and matter. Since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries different theories of consciousness have developed and subsequently been disposed of. These theories can be roughly divided into two categories: monism and dualism.

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[22] For an in-depth discussion on 'The Problem of Consciousness' see Metzinger (1995).
[23] For a detailed account on both pre-Cartesian (pre Descartes) and post-Cartesian (post Descartes) ideologies on consciousness see Lormand (1996).
[24] www.consciousness.arizona.edu

Monist theories

Monist theories assert that 'there is only one kind of stuff in the world' (Blackmore, 2003, p.9) or that 'all reality is basically of one kind' (Hanfling, 1973, p.20). One monist theory is that of materialism which endorses the view that only matter exists. Classical materialists, such as Democritus and later Hobbes, held the view that the 'world should be deemed as a clockwork mechanism of bodies which push each other like cogwheels' (Popper and Eccles, 1977, p.6). This type of materialist thinking is evident within current dance literature; Blom and Chaplin, for example, state explicitly that 'a dancer's instrument is her body' (1982, p.16) and Banes notes that 'audiences and critics have loved Paxton for his revelation of the body as a physical machine' (1987, p.57).

Materialists such as Popper and Eccles consider that conscious processes do not exist, rather that 'their existence can be repudiated' (1977, p.51). Although some materialists do accept the existence of a mind, it is considered merely as a 'collateral product ... without any power' (Hanfling, 1973, p.35). This is a general theory of epiphenomenalism which encapsulates the idea that the 'mind is a mere epiphenomena attached to a certain material phenomena' (Vesey, 1964, p.248). Epiphenomenalists, such as Huxley, believe that, although physical events cause mental events, mental events do not have any causal effect on physical events and thus they have no actual causal role to play. Thus although epiphenomenalists do not refute the existence of consciousness entirely they do consider that consciousness has no causal influence.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century some theorists, such as Berkeley, discarded materialism as a theory of consciousness, as they felt that it reduced the subjective and phenomenal nature of consciousness, and they replaced physical matter with the sensations of the mind. This supports a different monist theory – mentalism or idealism – which endorses the view that only the mental exists. Some mentalists and idealists attribute little significance to the role of the body and emphasise the subjective consciousness; for example Plato believed that:

> The true self or the real man is somehow within, and ... the body is an appendage or a framework of some sort.
> (cited in Macquarrie, 1973, p.68)

Some radical idealists, such as Berkeley, even went so far as to refute the existence of physical matter and claim that 'the notion that there are material things outside our consciousness is an illusion' (Hanfling, 1973, p.20).

Dualist theories

Dualist theories assert that there are 'two kinds of stuff in the world' (Blackmore, 2003, p.9) or that 'reality is two-fold' (Hanfling, 1973, p.20). The most prominent dualist was French philosopher Descartes, whose understanding of dualistic consciousness is referred to as Cartesian dualism. Descartes believes that consciousness is separate from the physical body, but that there is some kind of interaction between consciousness and body. Descartes generally speaks of being conscious as referring to a supposedly intimate source of knowledge about one's own mental occurrences. In the 'Conversation with Burman' he stated that 'to be conscious is both to think and to reflect on one's thought' (cited in Lormand, 1996),[25] indicating some sort of internal knowledge. This definition may well account for many of the modern uses of the terms conscious and unconscious, and their use in marking the distinction between two mental states.

Dualist thought encapsulates the idea that the consciousness and the mind are not detached from what one can identify as the physical, but instead consciousness and the body are intrinsically bound. One could perhaps consider them as 'diasporatic' (Sheets-Johnstone, 1966, p.18), meaning that although there may be some distinction between them, their existence is mutually dependent and there is a fundamental unity between them. As Merleau Ponty states, 'they can never be distinguished absolutely without ceasing to be' (1963, p.185). Dualism encapsulates a sense of the human being in its entirety and, as Fraleigh maintains, 'dancing requires a concentration of the whole person as a minded body' (1987, p.9).

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[25] www.consciousness.arizona.edu/

Within dualist theories there is some dispute as to the nature of the relationship between mind and body, with theorists questioning whether the mind controls the body and thus the 'mind is the pilot of the ship – the body' (Popper and Eccles, 1977, p.120), or whether the body controls the mind and thus the mind is 'the ghost in the machine' (Ryle, 1949, p.17). The theory of psychophysical parallelism repudiates such ideas and employs the notion that, rather than the relationship being one of cause and effect, it is merely one of accompaniment in which the body and mind 'habitually accompany one another' (Ayer cited in Hanfling, 1973, p.30). Theories of psychophysical parallelism promote an integrated body, what Todd (1959) and Fraleigh (1987) refer to as a 'thinking body'.

Psychology theories, existentialism, phenomenology and introspection

Such forms of dualism were rejected at the end of the eighteenth century with the emergence of psychology and, in fact, 'almost all contemporary scientists and philosophers' have dismissed dualism and 'there are very few dualists today' (Blackmore, 2003, p.13).[26] The term psychology was first used to describe the philosophy of mental life and, at the end of the nineteenth century, psychology became a science. This was aided by James' *The Principles of Psychology* (1890). Consciousness was central to James's psychology and it was he who coined the phrase 'the stream of consciousness' (1890). Sully noted that psychology, or mental science, is 'the science that investigates and explains the phenomena of mind, or the inner world of our conscious experience' (1892, p.1).

The development of the study of consciousness was assisted further by the surfacing of existentialism, phenomenology and introspection. Existential phenomenology can be considered as 'both a philosophy and a psychology based on putting subjective experience first' (Blackmore, 2003, p.15). Existential phenomenology was brought to prominence by Husserl (1917), who believed that humanity should go back to things in themselves, to the immediate and subjective conscious experience.[27] Introspection was initially developed by Wundt and provides a method of examining subjective

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[26] Popper and Eccles remain some of the only dualist theorists and propose a modern theory of dualist interactionism (1977).

[27] Husserl's suggestion as to how this is possible is encapsulated within his theory of phenomenological reduction, which is discussed in Chapter 3.

experiences, the experiences of consciousness. Wundt trained people to observe introspectively and examine their own inner experiences.

Existentialism, phenomenology and introspection can all be considered as first-person approaches to consciousness, approaches which explain the nature of consciousness through one's first-person experience of consciousness. Such approaches were dismissed at the beginning of the twentieth century and were replaced with behaviourist theories in which psychologists, such as Watson, noted that psychology could manage without concepts of consciousness. Watson claimed that psychology would become a 'purely objective branch of natural sciences' (1913, p.158). Watson's biographer, Cohen, notes that 'behaviourism was a self-conscious revolution against consciousness' (1987, p.72). In 1962 Miller stated:

> Consciousness is a word worn smooth by a million tongues. Depending upon the figure of speech chosen it is a state of being, a substance, a process, a place, an epiphenomenon, an emergent aspect of matter, or the only true reality. Maybe we should ban the word for a decade or two until we can develop more precise terms for the several uses which "consciousness" now obscures.
> (1962, p.40)

Indeed, the study of consciousness and attempts to conceptualise, define or examine it remained comparatively absent within philosophy, psychology and the sciences until the 1990s.

The study of consciousness returns

1994 saw the first Tucson conference on consciousness,[28] at which Australian philosopher Chalmers reintroduced what he entitled the 'hard problem' of consciousness, 'how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience' (1995, p.63). Chalmers openly questioned the nature of consciousness, which resulted in four special issues of the peer reviewed *Journal of Consciousness Studies*.[29] Since then consciousness studies as a distinct discipline, or science, has

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[28] This is now a biannual conference called *Towards a Science of Consciousness* and facilitated by the Centre for Consciousness Studies at the University of Arizona in Tucson. See www.consciousness.arizona.edu

[29] The journal was also founded in 1994 and by the year 2002 it had increased its publication to eight issues per year. See www.imprint.co.uk/Welcome.html

thrived. In 1996 the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness[30] was founded, along with the journal *Consciousness and Cognition.* Meyer-Dinkgrafe notes that 'for the last ten years, many disciplines of learning have seen a remarkable rise of interest in human consciousness' (2005, p.1).

Such developments within consciousness studies have resulted in a number of philosophers, psychologists and scientists resurrecting the attempt to conceptualise and define the nature of consciousness. It is these concepts which provide the foundation for the concepts of the dance consciousness introduced within this chapter.

What is consciousness?

Everyday concepts of consciousness

So what exactly is consciousness? How is it defined or conceptualised within contemporary society and within current consciousness research? The term consciousness is commonly utilised within present everyday life; for example, the term is often contrasted with the term unconscious and is intended to imply a sense of being responsive, awake or engaged. The term is also interchanged with synonyms such as awareness, attention or knowing and used in relation to subjectivity or phenomenal and personal experience.

The Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind defines consciousness as 'self-awareness' (2004)[31] similarly *WordNet*, an online lexical database for the English language, defines consciousness as 'an alert cognitive state in which you are aware of yourself and your situation' (2005).[32] According to *WordNet* this awareness is related intrinsically to knowledge and it states that 'awareness [is] having knowledge of' (*ibid.*). Consciousness researcher Blackmore believes that 'consciousness is our first-

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[30] See http://assc.caltech.edu/
[31] www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/consciousness
[32] www.cogsci.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/webwn

person view on the world' (2003, p.3). In the light of this one could consider consciousness to be 'subjective experience' (2004).[33]

The above definitions may be seen as slightly vague, but 'if we always insisted on precise definitions we all would be speechless almost all of the time' (Weiskrantz, 1988, p.183). The definitions can be considered as ostensible definitions which are little more than a 'useful shorthand that are temporarily employed in a restricted linguistic setting' (Antony, 1999, p.43) in order to provide some clarity and consensus understanding.

Some consciousness researchers, such as Churchland (1986), however, claim that such definitions may not be constructive, functional and valuable as they have little or no scientific or philosophical significance and, therefore, are not suitable for a research study. Although the definitions formulated for specific use within the context of this study have to be comprehensible to dance exponents generally, and not require a deep conceptual or intuitive understanding of the nature of consciousness, it is essential that they are based in sound conceptual and theoretical consciousness theory. Thus the provision of further detail and a consideration of the concepts employed by current consciousness researchers are necessary.

Concepts of consciousness within consciousness studies

At the time of writing, the term consciousness continues to be readily interchanged by, for example, scientists, psychologists and philosophers who have used the term within the context of topics such as: knowledge, introspection, intentionality, phenomenal experience, qualia, awareness, attention and subjectivity. Lycan states that this diverse collection is not a subject, but a 'flea market or jumble sale' (2002),[34] Clark considers that there are many different subjects all 'corralled under one heading by a regrettable ambiguity in our terminology' (2001, p.48), and Bieri notes that 'the word consciousness does not designate a homogenous phenomenon. The word is ambiguous, its use is plastic' (1995, p.45).

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[33] www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/consciousness
[34] www.consciousness.arizona.edu/

This ambiguity surrounding the term has become of such significance that the consciousness research area has seen an upsurge of literature dealing directly with the lack of consensus, with papers such as 'Is Consciousness Ambiguous' (Antony, 2001), 'The Plurality of Consciousness' (Lycan, 2002) and 'The Vicissitudes of Consciousness' (Clark, 2002) being published. In fact, as Antony notes:

> In spite of there being little widespread agreement among researchers on most matters falling within the domain of consciousness studies, when it come to "consciousness" it is virtually universally agreed that the term is multiply ambiguous.
> (2001, p.19)

Despite this, some consciousness researchers have attempted to define concepts of consciousness. One concept is that consciousness is a type of 'internal monologue that is always present' (Birch and Malim, 1998, p.204). Such a monologue is the product of a reflection of the exterior world, which is created through an integration of the information processed through aesthesis – which can be considered as sensory perception and is the means through which one perceives the world. Crook believes consciousness is an 'internal analogue of the exterior world' (1980, p.29) and that our inner consciousness is dominated by our visual perception. Crook contemplates that this 'internal analogue' is not merely an 'interpretation' but a 'representation' of experience (*ibid.* pp.29–30) and that, in the subjective sense, 'an individual is his experience, is his consciousness' and 'consciousness is being' (*ibid.* p.30).

Although consciousness is related intrinsically to experience and being, as inferred by the more ostensible definitions, it is not of common consensus that consciousness always involves an internal monologue. It would appear that, within some states of consciousness, one may encounter an internal monologue; it is not necessarily, however, a prerequisite of consciousness. The definition provided by Crook, for example, is not considered to be a consensus definition.

Other consciousness researchers attempt to define consciousness through reference to the type of actions which would supply public or external confirmation for consciousness. An example of this is Block's claim that a conscious state is one which is obtainable for verbal account (1995). This notion, however, is disregarded by many consciousness researchers who claim that verbal accountability is not an

essential condition of consciousness. Such a definition does not, for example, account for individuals with speech impediments who may be unable to report verbally on their conscious states – and these states should not be automatically rendered as unconscious. Nor does it take into account states of consciousness which may be too brief or too detached provisionally from report possibilities to connect with the apparatus of verbal account. The definition would also exclude animals from having states of consciousness; it is not a certainty that animals are consciously aware, but it is a possibility, despite their lack of account capability. Finally, it would also imply that machines and robots could encounter conscious states, as they may be capable of giving accounts of their internal states through particular programming, this would not, however, be sufficient to confer awareness of those states. Such a relational definition is also, therefore, not a consensus definition.

Many different concepts of consciousness exist within current consciousness research. It would be difficult to discuss each of these concepts in this chapter but a few are summarised below:

- Some consciousness researchers, such as Dennett (1995), present functionalist concepts of consciousness, in which they deem consciousness to be completely functional. Functionalists believe that 'the functions carried out by the system are what matters, and there is no consciousness separate from these abilities and performances' (Blackmore, 2003, p.48).

- Consciousness researcher Baars formulated the Global Workspace Theory (GWT) in 1988. In the GWT, unconscious processes contend with one another for 'access to the bright spotlight of attention that shines on the stage' from which 'information is broadcast globally to the unconscious audience', and it is this 'global broadcast that constitutes consciousness' (Blackmore, 2003, p.48). Baars (1988) claims that consciousness is normally reserved for messages that are in some way informative. Here he means informative in the technical sense of reducing uncertainty. He claims that when uncertainty is at, or close to zero, messages tend to be removed from consciousness.

- Another common approach is to present representational concepts and define consciousness with reference to self-knowledge, self monitoring or higher order

reflection. Consciousness researchers such as Lycan (2002), Armstrong (1980) and Rosenthal (2002) endorse this approach which proposes that for a state, S1, to be conscious, the holder of S1 must have an additional state, S2, which is conscious of S1 at the exact time of its happening.

- Some consciousness researchers, such as dualist interactionists Popper and Eccles (1977), offer causal concepts of consciousness in which they claim that consciousness causes brain events. For example, if consciousness were to desire a drink, consciousness would interact with the brain and cause the brain to carry out that desire by sending information to the appropriate sources.

- Other consciousness researchers dismiss the notion that consciousness can cause events or have any effect on the brain and present non-causal concepts of consciousness. In this instance, if consciousness were to desire a drink, it would have no effect on brain processing. The existence of consciousness is not repudiated, but it does not have any causal effect.

It is clear from the above that many different concepts of consciousness are utilised by current consciousness researchers. The question remains however: does a consensus definition exist?

What is it like to be...?

In 1974 philosopher Nagel posed the question: what is it like to be a bat? Nagel states that, when one says that another organism is conscious, one is intending that 'there is something it is like to *be* that organism ... something it is like *for* the organism' (1974, p.436). This is, for consciousness theorists such as Blackmore, the:

> ... closest we can come to a definition of consciousness – that consciousness is subjectivity, or what it is like to be ...
> (2003, p.23)

According to Blackmore, Nagel's question 'clarifies the central meaning of the term consciousness' (*ibid.* p.24). Nagel's definition could perhaps be considered as the closest to a consensus definition of consciousness.

So what is it like to be? What is it like to smell freshly cut grass? What is it like to see the colour red? What is it like to hear birds singing? What is it like to feel hungry? What it is like to have these experiences can be private and somewhat ineffable. Each of these experiences has its own particular quality. Within modern philosophy these qualities are defined as qualia. One's smell of grass is a quale, one's vision of red is a quale, the sound of birds one hears is a quale and one's feeling of hunger is a quale.

According to consciousness theorists, such as Chalmers (1996), consciousness comprises qualia, not knowledge, and one's conscious experiences are thus made up of quale. Chalmers notes that no amount of knowledge or understanding can be a substitute for what it is like, for example, to smell freshly cut grass. Thus, it is impossible to know what it is like to be a bat, for the answer remains within the consciousness of the bat. Likewise, what it is like to be you can really only be understood through your consciousness, as what it is like is your consciousness. Applying this concept of consciousness to the discipline of dance, one can discern that the dance consciousness comprises what it is like to dance and therefore this would be its definition. If the definition of consciousness is what it is like to be, then the dance consciousness could be defined as what it is like to be whilst dancing. But exactly what is it like to be whilst dancing?

The quandary of consciousness

Although the above definition appears to be incomplete, the concept that consciousness is 'what it is like to be' is as near to a consensus definition as consciousness theorists have reached. It is apparently generally agreed amongst consciousness researchers that, although defining consciousness has 'historically been an elusive endeavour' (Katz, 2001), 'human consciousness is just about the last surviving mystery' (Dennett, 1991, p.21). Chalmers notes that:

> Consciousness poses the most baffling problems in the science of the mind. There is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious experience, but there is nothing that is harder to explain.
> (1995a, p.200)

Similarly, philosopher McGinn claims that:

> You can look into your mind until you burst, and you will not discover neurons and synapses and all the rest; and you can stare at someone's brain from dawn till dusk and you will not perceive the consciousness that is so apparent to the person whose brain you are so rudely eye-balling.
> (1999, p.47)

It seems, then, that theorists have yet to solve definitively the consciousness mystery. Perhaps this is because there is still a significant gap within consciousness knowledge which philosophers, such as Levine (1983), have referred to as the 'explanatory gap'.[35] Flanagan's 'Unified Theory of Consciousness' (1992) indicates that closing the explanatory gap is possible only through combining science, philosophy and psychology, and amalgamating philosophical and theoretical enquiry with empirical practice. Flanagan indicates that this could result in an interdisciplinary science of consciousness, which would be open for theoretical and empirical understanding. Some consciousness researchers claim, however, that the quandary of consciousness can be solved only with 'a real humdinger of a solution' (Churchland, 1996, p.40), which comprises a new and fundamental understanding of the universe. So where does this leave this chapter and the intention to answer the first focussed research question and discern the nature of the dance consciousness?

It is of use, here, to consider some other existing concepts presented by current consciousness researchers. Although many of these researchers do not define consciousness as a homogenous phenomenon *per se*, they do often refer to, and distinguish between, particular types or levels of consciousness. It may therefore be helpful to clarify exactly what type or hierarchical level of consciousness one is referring to, rather than attempt to define consciousness itself.

Hierarchical levels of consciousness

Although various terms are utilised by consciousness and dance consciousness researchers to represent different types or levels of consciousness, it does seem that they can all be categorised similarly. Most of the terminology for types or levels of consciousness offered by consciousness researchers from across the research fields comes in pairs for example 'phenomenal' and 'access' consciousness (Block, 1995).

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[35] Marback discusses the 'explanatory gap' and possible ways in which to overcome it, in 'Building materials for the Explanatory Bridge (1999, pp.252–6).

What is indicated by each of these pairs is a sense that there are two antithetical concepts of consciousness.

Each of these pairs represents a distinction of the same type, and it seems that there exists some sort of consciousness scale with opposing components situated at each end. This reflects Farthing's suggestion of a 'non-conscious – conscious continuum' (Atkinson *et al*, 1996, p.190). It could be considered that consciousness moves from one extremity of wholly unconscious processes, through innumerable phases, to the other extreme of the most reflective form of consciousness (*ibid.*).

There are thus two distinct categories which encapsulate clearly different levels of engagement of the consciousness. This thesis defines these as fundamental conscious states and supplementary conscious states, as it seems generally that those in the second category occur in addition to those in the first. The terms fundamental and supplementary have been selected for specific use within this thesis and are not utilised by other consciousness researchers. Clearly, there is a conceptual distinction to be made between the fundamental conscious states and the supplementary conscious states, a distinction between different ways in which a mental state can be conscious.

Fundamental consciousness

Fundamental states of consciousness can be considered as the primary and essential conscious states of experience which consist of qualia. Numerous different terms are used to encapsulate this concept, some of which are illustrated in Table 2. Following the advice of Flanagan and his 'Unified Theory of Consciousness' (1992), these examples have been taken from science, philosophy, psychology and, in addition and relevant here, from dance sources. It is important to note that these terms have been categorised for the purpose of this particular study and have not been presented by other researchers in such a way. The meanings represented by each of these terms are not necessarily completely analogous with each other, but can be considered to hold similar principles or meanings.

Table 2: Concepts of fundamental consciousness

Term	Source	Discipline origination
Phenomenal consciousness	Block, 1995	Consciousness studies
Intransitive creature consciousness	Rosenthal, 1998	Consciousness studies
Pre-reflective consciousness	Fraleigh, 1987	Dance theory
Target states	Rosenthal, 2002	Consciousness studies
Non-introspective consciousness	Vermersch, 1999	Philosophy
Habituation	Birch and Malim, 1998	Psychology
Flow	Csikszentmihalyi, 2002	Psychology
Subjective consciousness	Crook, 1980	Cognitive science
Trophotropic states	Fischer, 1971	Psychology

The basic meaning of all the concepts within the fundamental category is summarised by the definition provided for the concept of 'intransitive creature consciousness' (Rosenthal, 1998). Intransitive consciousness applies primarily to people and other sentient creatures when they are awake and receptive to qualitative sensory input. In addition, Armstrong considers that a creature is conscious only if there is some mental activity currently taking place (1980, p.58). This concept is often used to distinguish between someone being in an ordinary state of wakefulness and being asleep.

It could be said, however, that more is being represented within some of these concepts than the mere idea of one being awake. Of course, one is also conscious, but to what sort of consciousness are these concepts referring? They are referring to states that are conscious but not reflectively or introspectively so, states which are indeed 'non-introspective' (Vermersch, 1999, pp.17–42). Fraleigh notes that a pre-reflective state is one in which a dancer is explicitly unaware of self and 'is not reflecting on her self or her action' (1987, p.13). In other words, the fundamental concepts relate to states in which one is conscious in a casual, unattended way that is characteristic of what one may consider to be an ordinary conscious state. Block

refers to fundamental states of consciousness as 'phenomenal consciousness' and 'P-consciousness' (1995, pp.227–88).

It is difficult to supply a definitive meaning of the concept of fundamental consciousness and Block himself states, 'I cannot define P-consciousness in any remotely non-circular way' (1995a),[36] which may be because phenomenally conscious experiences are 'non-physical or at least inexplicable in the manner of other physical entities' (Lormand, 1996).[37] Some consciousness theorists resort to examples such as the way things look and the way pain feels. Examples of phenomenal consciousness include sensory experiences such as smelling freshly baked bread, hearing music or having a headache, and also the experience of having a mental image or feeling an emotion. According to Chalmers, colour sensations provide the 'paradigm examples of conscious experience' (1996, p.6); seeing the colour red is an example commonly used by theorists. It seems, therefore, that fundamental states have a qualitative character and comprise sensory qualities. Block describes phenomenal consciousness as follows:

> P-consciousness is experience. P-consciousness properties are experiential ones. P-conscious states are experiential, that is, a state is P-conscious if it has experiential properties. The totality of the experiential properties of a state are "what it is like" to have it ... We have P-conscious states when we see, hear, smell, taste and have pains. P-conscious properties include the experiential properties of sensations, feelings and perceptions ... thoughts, wants and emotions. (1995, p.230)

Phenomenal consciousness can be considered as the subjective, qualitative character of experience. In such a fundamental conscious state, one would not necessarily be aware that one is in such a state; one has the experiences but is not explicitly conscious of having them. Crook describes subjective consciousness as being 'when human self is unaware of itself' (1980, p.312) and when one is 'aware of his actions but not of the awareness itself' (*ibid.* p.323). Fraleigh describes the pre-reflective consciousness as 'a state of being when the dance is lived not as an object but as pure consciousness' (1987, p.40).

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[36] www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/
[37] www.consciousness.arizona.edu/

The pre-reflective is, Fraleigh believes, a state of consciousness in which one is entirely present-centred; it is when the dancer is 'living the present-centred moment in her dance' (1987, p.13). Fundamental states can therefore be considered as states that are 'lived and not known' (Sartre, 1969, p.300), which is certainly what Rosenthal intends by his concept of a 'target state' as one which is lived in the present and then may later be known by a 'higher order thought' (Rosenthal, 2002). Block states that 'P-conscious states are experiential' (1995, p.230) and Chalmers claims that 'what it means for a state to be phenomenal is for it to feel a certain way' (1996, p.12). Although Block and Chalmers are referring specifically to the concept of phenomenal consciousness, it would be possible to interchange any of the other concepts within the fundamental category with the concept of phenomenal consciousness and in doing so these claims would remain valid.

Varying degrees of fundamental consciousness

The gradations on the consciousness continuum are equally as significant as the dominant concepts located at either end, but it seems that some theorists, such as Fraleigh (1987), fail to identify these gradations. Although, for example, Fraleigh defines a fundamental state of dance consciousness, there is no acknowledgement that it may be encountered to varying degrees and that there are far more states upon the consciousness continuum. One may contemplate whether the nature of some of the fundamental concepts discussed above could also be used to represent ordinary states of consciousness; indeed one may experience moments in which one is particularly unaware and non-reflective in everyday life. Thus why can dance be said to permit access to altered states?[38]

The concept of 'habituation' (Birch and Malim, 1998), for example, refers to a wholly experiential state in which one is not explicitly aware of oneself or one's surroundings. The reason for this lack of awareness is due to the fact that, if something is repeatedly encountered, there will generally be a gradual reduction in the focal awareness invested in that something. If the stimuli or processes become so constant that they do not attract any focal attention, one will have encountered complete stimulus habituation and the message will be removed from consciousness; Blackmore refers to this as 'automatisation' (2003, p.44). It is quite feasible to

[38] The notion that dance permits access to altered states was discussed in the Introduction.

imagine experiencing such states, for example when one is driving or brushing one's teeth. It seems that this concept is much the same as that which is intended by the phenomenal, intransitive, target states, non-introspective and subjective concepts.

At what could be considered as a further extreme of these conscious states, however, is the concept of 'flow' (Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). This relates to 'the state in which people are so involved in an activity that nothing else seems to matter' (*ibid.* p.4), it is 'so intense that there is no attention left over to think about anything irrelevant [and] self-consciousness disappears' (*ibid.* p.71); one is transported 'into a new reality' (*ibid.* p.74). This differs from the everyday sensation of habituation, as it is not a result of stimuli becoming constant that one is unaware of oneself but of giving oneself completely to the task in hand. It has been observed that dancers often claim to experience such a sensation when performing on stage and Fraleigh's concept of the pre-reflective seems to be dealing with this very experience. It appears that it is an altered and heightened sense of fundamental consciousness that is apart from that of an everyday experience; it is a 'peak experience' which is 'beyond ordinary consciousness' (Maslow cited in Fraleigh, 1987, p.5). Csikszentmihalyi also confirms that it is not entirely the same as losing awareness in everyday life, which is called 'micro-flow' (2002) and which is the sort of state one may encounter when watching television, doodling, or smoking. It seems that micro-flow is more comparable to the concepts mentioned above with respect to habituation.

Fischer also distinguishes between the varying degrees of consciousness in what he terms a 'trophotropic state' (1971), which is characterised by a decrease of arousal. Within this concept Fischer identifies a scale on which trophotropic states can be charted from tranquil, to hypoaroused, to *yoga samadhi*. The latter is described as a state in which 'the conscious mind drops back into ... unconscious oblivion' (2005).[39] It is proposed here that a tranquil state is comparable with an everyday state of consciousness and, at the other extreme, a *yoga samadhi* state is comparable with an altered state which is beyond ordinary consciousness (Fischer, 1971, pp.897–904).

It is acknowledged in this thesis that the distinction between habituation and flow, tranquil and *yoga samadhi*, and their counterparts, may not be entirely clear. It is a

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[39] www.holistic-online.com/Yoga/yoga_ashtanga_samadhi.htm

particularly intangible distinction and one that is entirely dependent on an understanding gained through experiencing the states. It is a felt difference and consequently exceptionally problematic to describe in words. It is evident, though, that there are various degrees within the concept of fundamental consciousness. Whilst it is difficult to appraise exactly where the existing concepts would be located on a continuum, it is clear that there are at least two distinguishable phases.

A dancer may therefore experience an ordinary everyday state of fundamental consciousness whilst dancing and be unaware of the dance as a result of being habituated to the movement. In this instance, perhaps because of thorough rehearsal, the dancer is able to execute the movement without particularly attending to it. At the other extreme, a dancer may experience a heightened fundamental consciousness whilst dancing and be completely unaware of the dance as a result of being utterly within the dance and existing as the dance. The experiential sensation, for the dancing body and mind, of a heightened state differs from that of an ordinary state and can be considered as an altered state.

The concept of fundamental consciousness

As noted above, although the concepts of fundamental consciousness are not completely comparable, it is possible to identify a list of conditions inherent in all the concepts presented. These are summarised below:

A fundamental state is one:

- Which is experiential, subjective, qualitative, lived and not known;
- In which one is awake, receptive to sensory input and present-centred;
- In which there is current mental activity;
- In which one is non-introspective and explicitly unaware of self;
- In which one is conscious in a casual, unattended way that is characteristic of what one may consider to be an ordinary conscious state;

- In which one would not necessarily be aware that one is in such a state. One has the experiences but is not explicitly conscious of having them;

- In which there are two distinguishable phases – an ordinary fundamental consciousness and a higher order fundamental consciousness.

Through amalgamating the concepts and conditions above, it is possible to formulate an all-encompassing ostensible definition for fundamental consciousness to be used within the context of this thesis.

The fundamental consciousness is a fundamental state, based inherently on pure experience, which is wholly experiential, qualitative and lived as opposed to being known. It is a state in which one is entirely awake and engaged in experiences and mental activity but nonetheless explicitly unaware of those experiences and that mental activity and, indeed, oneself. Hence one is undoubtedly conscious, but in a state of fundamentally unattended consciousness. Such a state may occur either as a result of stimulus habituation or total involvement in a task. Thus there is a differentiation between varying levels of engagement within one's fundamental consciousness, and the experiential sensation of these levels differs.

It is considered that the ostensible definition above gives sufficient insight into the nature of a fundamental conscious state. It was noted at the beginning of this chapter that gaining an understanding of the nature of the concepts of consciousness would help in understanding the nature of the concepts of the dance consciousness. Through applying the understanding and knowledge gained from the discussion thus far in this chapter, for the purposes of this thesis it is also possible to provide an ostensible definition for the fundamental state of dance consciousness.

The fundamental state of dance consciousness is a state in which a dancer is purely living and experiencing the dance, without thought or knowledge of that experience. The dancer is in a state of unattended consciousness and is awake and engaged in the qualitative experience of the dance, but is nonetheless explicitly unaware of what the experience is or what the dancing body and mind are doing. Such a state may occur as a result of the dancer having become either habituated to the dance or totally

involved in the dance, the experiential sensation for which is different for the dancing body and mind.

Having defined the fundamental dance consciousness this chapter now moves on to consider the states of consciousness that are situated at the opposite end of the consciousness continuum – supplementary states.

Supplementary consciousness

Supplementary states of consciousness can be considered as states which arise in addition to fundamental states. Different theorists use various terms to encapsulate this concept, some of which are presented in Table 3. Again following the recommendation of Flanagan in his 'Unified Theory of Consciousness' (1992), the examples below have been extracted from science, philosophy, psychology and dance sources. As with the fundamental terms discussed earlier in this chapter, the supplementary terms have been independently categorised for the purpose of this particular study and have not been presented by other researchers in such a way. The meanings corresponding to each of these terms are not necessarily entirely analogous, but can be deemed to hold similar principles or roots of meaning.

Table 3: Concepts of supplementary consciousness

Term	**Source**	**Discipline origination**
Access consciousness	Block, 1995	Consciousness studies
Transitive creature consciousness	Rosenthal, 1998	Consciousness studies
Reflective consciousness	Fraleigh, 1987	Dance theory
Higher order thoughts	Rosenthal, 2002	Consciousness studies
Introspective consciousness	Vermersch, 1999	Philosophy
Monitoring consciousness	Block, 1995	Consciousness studies
Objective consciousness	Crook, 1980	Cognitive science
Ergotropic states	Fischer, 1971	Psychology

The majority of the above terms can be linked with the fundamental terms discussed earlier in this chapter to form pairs of opposites. For example: Rosenthal refers to a fundamental state of 'intransitive' consciousness and a supplementary state of 'transitive consciousness' (1998); Fraleigh refers to a fundamental state of 'pre-reflective' consciousness and a supplementary state of 'reflective' consciousness (1987); Vermersch makes reference to 'non-introspective' and 'introspective' states (1999); Crook refers to 'subjective' and 'objective' consciousness (1980); and Fischer refers to 'trophotropic' and 'ergotropic' states (1971).

The basic meaning of all the concepts within the supplementary category is summarised clearly by the definition provided for the concept of 'transitive creature consciousness' (Rosenthal, 1998). Transitive consciousness concerns a person being 'deliberately and attentively' conscious *of* something (Rosenthal, 2002).[40] Thus transitive consciousness always has a specific object and that object is often oneself. This is certainly encapsulated by Crook in his description of the aptly termed 'objective' consciousness (1980) which he claims to be a state in which the object of attention is the actual subject or the human self. Fraleigh notes that a reflective state arises when she becomes 'aware of [her] body as something to be reckoned with … when [she focuses] on [her] body' (1987, p.14). A reflective state 'refers either to the body when it becomes the object of attention or to an objective attitude toward the body' (*ibid.*).

In addition, Crook notes that a distinctive element of this state is that it functions predominantly in a comparative or evaluative manner (1980, pp.312–3). Similarly, Block describes 'access consciousness' as a 'cognitive or intentional or functional' concept (1994, p.213) and Katz describes it as involving 'directed attention, cognitive awareness, decision making' (2001).[41] Fraleigh notes that a reflective state occurs when 'when we stand back to observe and learn' (1987, p.14).

Unlike fundamental states, supplementary states do not have a qualitative nature and are typically intentional mental states, which characteristically lack sensory qualities. Fundamental states comprise qualia and one could therefore consider qualia as the object of attention for the fundamental state. Supplementary states are directed

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[40] www.consciousness.arizona.edu/
[41] www.consciousness.arizona.edu/

towards fundamental states and thus, in this case, the fundamental states are the object of attention. Supplementary states, such as desires, doubts, yearnings, hopes, and thoughts, do not comprise qualia and thus have no qualitative character, although they are accompanied by fundamental qualitative states.

Contrasting with fundamental states, supplementary states can be considered as states which are known as opposed to just lived. For example, Fraleigh's state of pre-reflective consciousness could be said to be just lived in the moment, whereas a state of reflective consciousness is not only lived but also simultaneously reflected upon and subsequently immediately known about. This also applies to Rosenthal's concept of a 'target state', which is lived in the present and then may later be known by a 'higher order thought' (2002). Although Fraleigh and Rosenthal are referring specifically to their own concepts, it does seem that it would be possible to interchange any of the other concepts within the supplementary category and these claims would remain valid.

There is a certain sense of immediacy that characterises one's knowledge or awareness of one's conscious states. Rosenthal refers to this direct sense of immediacy as 'subjective immediacy'[42] which necessitates that being conscious of one's conscious states must be spontaneous and uncaused, and thus supplementary states 'are based on no inference of which one is aware' (1998).[43] This means that supplementary states must not occur because of some external suggestion that one is in a particular state, or through some intentional objective deduction such as gaining knowledge of one's state from another, or through applying a theory to oneself. Supplementary states should therefore be considered to be states that are lived and non-inferentially known.

This knowing that one is in a state of supplementary consciousness may permit one to report on the experience of the state. This is summarised here by Block: 'in the case of language using organisms such as ourselves, a major symptom of access consciousness would be reportability' (1994a).[44] In fact, one could consider that

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[42] The term 'subjective' used by Rosenthal in this context should not be confused with Crook's use of the same term in relation to fundamental consciousness.
[43] www.consciousness.arizona.edu/
[44] www.consciousness.arizona.edu/

reportability 'is the best practical guide to [access] consciousness' (Block, 1995a),[45] although it is not absolutely essential.[46] Reportability is a term that Block and other consciousness researchers use which is defined as the ability to give an account of one's experience. This obviously differs from the concepts of fundamental consciousness in which one is not aware of one's states and therefore one would presume that it would be difficult to report on them whilst actually experiencing them. It could be considered that one's ability to report mental states non-inferentially is what underlies the traditional intuition that one has access to, and is consequently able to have thoughts about or reflect on one's mental states (Sellars, 1963, p.127). Rosenthal considers that the:

> ... best explanation of this ability to report one's mental states non-inferentially is that one actually has the [higher order thoughts] that those reports would express.
> (2002a)[47]

Varying degrees of supplementary consciousness

As with the fundamental consciousness category, it is important to note that, within the supplementary consciousness concept, there are varying degrees or phases which can be placed on the consciousness continuum. Again, although Fraleigh, for example, defines a supplementary state of dance consciousness, there is no acknowledgement that it may be encountered to varying degrees. Given the nature of some of the supplementary states described above, they could also be used to represent ordinary states of consciousness experienced during everyday life when one is particularly aware and reflective. Why, therefore, can dance be said to permit access to altered states?

Although many of the concepts are very similar in nature, there are some oppositional extremes even within this tight category and, in some instances, within the concept itself. Block, for example, acknowledges that 'access comes in varying

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[45] www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/
[46] As explained earlier in this chapter, if reportability were an essential condition then this would presume that, for example, subjects with speech impediments are not conscious. Reportability is therefore not essential for validating the existence of a supplementary state, although it can be used to do so.
[47] www.consciousness.arizona.edu/

degrees' (1995a)[48] and defines these simply, though fairly arbitrarily, as (1) really high quality access, (2) medium access and (3) poor access (*ibid.*).

Fischer also acknowledges a scale within his concept of 'ergotropic states' (1971), which are characterised by an increase in arousal. Ergotropic states can be charted on a scale ranging from aroused, to hyperaroused, to ecstatic. An aroused state is comparable with an everyday supplementary state of consciousness and, at the other extreme, an ecstatic state is comparable with an altered state, a supplementary state beyond ordinary consciousness (Fischer, 1971, pp.897–904).

Rosenthal's concept of higher order thought is slightly more complex. The basis of this concept of is that it is possible to have a higher order thought, or sensation or perception, about another mental state known as the target state. Higher order thoughts are essentially about fundamental states of consciousness. This particular concept, however, also gives rise to another supplementary level and considers that one may not only be conscious of one's own mental states, but may also be conscious concurrently that one is conscious of them. Rosenthal refers to this as having a third order thought. This third order thought gives rise to a certain sort of introspection which is the intentional examination of one's own mental states. Dance theorist Hay (2000) also makes reference to similar hierarchical levels and believes that it is possible to observe self observing self. According to dance theorist Foster:

> Hay projects the existence of an observer who is watching her exploration of bodily cellular consciousness. Hay further projects a second observer who watches the first. Hay's moving body is thus watching itself moving and watching itself watching itself.
> (2000, p.xviii)

Fischer's, Rosenthal's and Hay's ideas seem to go a step further than the foundations of the supplementary concepts, and perhaps even further than Block's very high quality access. Whilst it is difficult to appraise exactly where the existent concepts would sit in relation to one another on a continuum, it is clear that there are at least two phases that should be distinguished.

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[48] www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/

A dancer may therefore experience an ordinary everyday state of supplementary consciousness whilst dancing, in which the dancer's attention is focused entirely on the dance and the dancer is aware of what the dancing body is doing. At the other end of the scale, it is possible for a dancer to experience a heightened supplementary state in which the dancer directs absolute attention towards the dance, and is concurrently fully aware and in control of that attention. The dancer has complete access to the experience of the dance and exists entirely within the supplementary consciousness. The experiential sensation of this heightened state is entirely different from the ordinary state, and can be considered as an altered state.

The concept of supplementary consciousness

As noted above, although the concepts of supplementary consciousness are not completely analogous, it is possible to compile a list of conditions inherent in all the concepts. These are summarised below:

A supplementary state is a state:

- Which is non-inferentially known as well as lived;
- In which one is deliberately and attentively conscious *of* something;
- In which the objects of attention are the actual subject/human self, one's experiences and additionally one's mental activity;
- In which one functions predominantly in a comparative or evaluative manner;
- Which has no qualitative character in itself, although it is accompanied by and dependent on fundamental qualitative states;
- On which one is able to report non-inferentially providing one has effective report-making mechanisms;
- In which there are two distinguishable phases – an ordinary supplementary consciousness and a higher order supplementary consciousness.

Through amalgamating the concepts and conditions described above, it is possible to formulate an all-encompassing ostensible definition for supplementary consciousness, to be used within the context of this thesis, as follows:

The supplementary consciousness is a supplementary state: which is intrinsically dependent on a fundamental qualitative conscious state; which involves having full consciousness *of* something, an explicit object of attention; which is active, intentional, and attentive; in which one holds awareness of one's experiences, mental activity and oneself and which is not only experiential but also exists in conjunction with non-inferential knowing. Such a state may involve an ordinary sense of supplementary consciousness in which there are varying levels or, in addition to this, the state may hold an elevated sense of supplementary consciousness. Thus there is a differentiation between varying degrees of introspection. Such a state may be ascertained by one's ability to report non-inferentially on it.

It is considered that the ostensible definition above provides adequate insight into the nature of a supplementary conscious state. Through applying this ostensible definition and the understanding and knowledge gained through the discussion thus far in this chapter, it is also possible to present an ostensible definition for the supplementary state of dance consciousness. For the purposes of this thesis, the definition is as follows:

The supplementary state of dance consciousness is a state in which a dancer not only experiences the dance, but also is knowingly, intentionally, attentively and non-inferentially aware of the dance. The dance is the dancer's explicit object of attention. The dancer is actively aware of the qualitative experience of the dance, including the dancing body, the dancing mind and external factors surrounding the dance. In addition, the dancer is aware of any mental activity concerned with the dance. The dancer may experience either an ordinary state of supplementary consciousness in which complete awareness is focussed on the dance, or a higher state of supplementary consciousness in which the dancer is additionally able to monitor introspectively that awareness – the experiential sensation of which differs for the dancing body and mind. The dancer is able to report non-inferentially on the state.

Having defined the fundamental and supplementary dance consciousness, this chapter now moves on to ascertain the appropriate terminology that may be utilised to represent these two concepts.

The terminology

Each of the concepts provided by the varying consciousness researchers uses different terminology. Having formulated two concepts it was decided that using existing terminology to represent such concepts would be problematic and a cause of confusion. In addition, it was considered that the available terminology was not sufficient for use in the context of the dance consciousness. Table 4 is a brief synopsis as to why the terminology was dismissed.

Table 4: Terminology from other authors and reasons for its dismissal

Term	**Reason for dismissal**
Phenomenal and access/monitoring consciousness (Block, 1995)	Too many ambiguities surrounding the term 'phenomenal'; within consciousness studies there is much debate concerning its actual meaning. The term may, for some, have connotations of something being extraordinary. The term 'access' does imply a state that is available for accessing; it does not, however, involve any sense of attention or evaluation. The term 'monitoring' is more apt; it does not, however, infer a sense that the monitoring is internal.
Intransitive and transitive creature consciousness (Rosenthal, 1998)	The term 'intransitive' means not taking the direct object and 'transitive' means taking the direct object. Although these terms imply the appropriate direction of attention, they do not indicate that the attention is internal.
Pre-reflective and reflective consciousness (Fraleigh, 1987)	The term 'pre-reflective' clearly encapsulates a state in which one is not presently reflecting. The prefix 'pre' is, however, rather restrictive as it implies that the state being described is one that is experienced prior to reflection, which in turn implies that it is always a state that is reflected upon. Not all states are necessarily reflected upon and some remain non-reflective.
Target states and higher order thought (Rosenthal, 2002)	The term 'target state' is used alongside the concept of 'higher order thought' and the term can be used only in conjunction with the supplementary state. Not all fundamental states are accompanied by supplementary states; many do exist independently. The term 'higher order thought' implies that the supplementary state must always be a thought; but it may also be, for example, a belief, want or emotion.

Term	Reason for dismissal
Non-introspective and introspective consciousness (Vermersch, 1999)	The term 'introspective' refers to the internal examination of one's self and one's thoughts. Thus non-introspection refers to not examining one's self or one's thoughts. The supplementary state formulated above does not necessitate examination – although this may arise – only awareness and attention.
Habituation (Birch and Malim, 1998)	Although the concept of 'habituation' represents an ordinary state of fundamental consciousness, it is not considered to accommodate heightened states and therefore does not take account of the various phases of the continuum.
Flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 2002)	Although the concept of 'flow' draws attention to a heightened state of fundamental consciousness, it does not include any acknowledgement of an ordinary state and therefore does not take account of the varying phases of the continuum. The term 'flow' is also not considered to represent the complete nature of the fundamental consciousness.
Subjective and objective consciousness (Crook, 1980)	The term 'subjective' has many meanings within consciousness studies and is also used in different disciplines, for example, to imply that something is dependent on personal opinion. The term 'objective', when utilised in relation to 'subjective', may hold inappropriate connotations of a distinction between the real and un-real, and imply that the objective deals with something external to the mind.
Trophotropic and ergotropic states (Fischer, 1971)	The terms 'trophotropic' and 'ergotropic' were coined by Fischer to represent what he refers to as particular 'mystic states' (1971). It would thus not be appropriate to extract these terms from that particular context and apply them to the independent concepts formulated for use within the dance context.

Having dismissed the available existing terms, for the purpose of this study, two new terms have been independently coined. For use specifically within the dance consciousness context, these terms are an oppositional pair and represent the concept of the fundamental dance consciousness and the supplementary dance consciousness.

The fundamental and supplementary concepts defined in this chapter share two characteristics which were considered to be particularly relevant and which should therefore be captured within the terms to be coined. These characteristics are:

- The wholly internal nature of the experience of the individual;

- The focus on the lack of attentive awareness or presence of intentional awareness on the part of the individual.

The independently coined terminology therefore contain the prefix 'intra' and the term 'attend', chosen because 'intra' means 'on the inside' and 'within' (Hoad, 1996, p.240) and to 'attend' means to 'direct the mental or physical faculties' and to 'apply oneself' (*ibid.* p.27). The combination of 'intra' and 'attend' gives an impression of internally attending – which is analogous with the concept of supplementary consciousness and, at the other extreme, of not internally attending – which is analogous with the concept of fundamental consciousness.

This study therefore refers to the fundamental dance consciousness as:

Non-intrattentive consciousness

And the supplementary dance consciousness as:

Intrattentive consciousness

It was also considered essential that the terms should capture the idea that, within the non-intrattentive consciousness and intrattentive consciousness, there may be varying degrees of consciousness and thus a higher order state. As a result, one may also refer to:

Higher order non-intrattention

Higher order intrattention

Summary

Following a consideration of the history of consciousness theory, the quandary of consciousness, concepts of consciousness and the available terminology used to represent states of consciousness, this chapter answered the first focussed research question: What is the nature of the dance consciousness?

The answer led to the introduction of two independently formulated terms for dance consciousness – intrattentive and non-intrattentive – which are intended for use specifically within the context of the dance discipline. The remainder of this thesis focuses entirely on the concepts captured by these two terms and the means through which dancers are able to access the states they describe.

Chapter 3 considers how dancers are able to examine states of intrattention and non-intrattention.

Chapter 3

How can one examine the dance consciousness?

Introduction

This thesis is ultimately concerned with the two states of dance consciousness identified in Chapter 2 – the intrattentive dance consciousness and the non-intrattentive dance consciousness – and the means through which dancers are able to access and control such states. Subsequent chapters will identify how dancers can be trained to access states of intrattention and states of non-intrattention. Such training is fundamental in enabling dancers to apply the Dance Consciousness Model. In addition, it is essential that the dancers learn how to understand, examine and gain the knowledge that they are actually experiencing these states of intrattention and non-intrattention. This is facilitated through a method of examination, which provides dancers with techniques for communicating and describing conscious states. Consciousness theorist Chalmers acknowledges that, in order to examine states of consciousness, 'we need good methodologies for collecting the data' – methods of communication – 'and good languages and formalisms for expressing them' – methods of description (1999).[49] Otherwise how is a dancer able to know whether or not he or she has successfully accessed the desired state?

To put this into context, imagine a situation in which a dancer is training to access non-intrattention whilst improvising. At the end of the improvisation, the dancer claims that they definitely accessed non-intrattention during the improvisation. When asked by the choreographer how they know this, the dancer replies "because I was aware of it", not realising that non-intrattention is a state of which one is not aware. There are a number of reasons why the dancer may have made the above statement:

- The dancer did not **access** non-intrattention at all and was actually in some type of intrattentive state;

- The dancer did access non-intrattention, but did not know how to **communicate** how he or she knew that he or she was in a state of non-intrattention;

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[49] http://consc.net/papers/firstperson.html

- Although the dancer did access the desired state and was able to communicate that he or she knew that he or she was in a state of non-intrattention, the dancer was unable to **describe** the experience sufficiently; for example what the dancer had intended by the term aware; may not have been what the choreographer understood by the same term.

Having demonstrated, with the above example, the importance of dancers having methods of access, communication and description to enable them to use the Dance Consciousness Model effectively, this chapter considers the second focussed research question: How can one examine the dance consciousness?

Methods of examination are not only essential for dancers using the Dance Consciousness Model, but they were also necessary for the formulation of the Dance Consciousness Model as it was not possible to complete the model without first being able to examine the states to be included in it. In the Introduction and in Chapter 1, theoretical and empirical research methodologies were discussed and it was noted that particular methods of research exist within these methodologies. The method of examination described in this chapter can be considered as one such method of research – indeed, the method of examination is the method through which the dance consciousness was researched in Empirical Project 1 and 2 for the formulation of the Dance Consciousness Model. The purpose of the method of examination in the context of this research is thus two-fold – a method of research and a method for application.

In this chapter, different methods for examining consciousness are considered, including methods of communication and description. This provides background information for Chapters 4, 5 and 6 which describe the methods of access to intrattention and non-intrattention as well as the sequence and content of the access training workshops. It should be noted that the dancers who participated in the research were not trained to use methods of examination prior to the access training workshops. This is because the examination training occurs alongside the access training as the methods are co-dependent. Throughout the access training workshops the dancers were taught both how to examine their conscious states and how to assess their access to these states.

Chapter breakdown

This chapter begins with a consideration of what a method of examination actually is and what would constitute a suitable and dependable method for the examination of conscious experience. Within this, the chapter contemplates objective versus subjective methods and distinguishes between first-, second- and third-person methods. Each of these different methods is explained and reasons given for those chosen for use in the Dance Consciousness Model's method of examination.

Chapter 3 then discusses existing methods of examination which appear in current dance literature and current consciousness literature. Two theories which are particularly relevant to this research are introduced: phenomenological reduction and the explicitation session. As the chapter progresses, reference is made to these two theories in a discussion of present-centred and retrospective accounts, and verbal and non-verbal information. The chapter then describes the method of examination used to create the Dance Consciousness Model and proposed for use within the application of the model. Finally the Dance Consciousness Model is introduced and a diagram of the skeletal structure of the model is provided.

Methods of examination

As mentioned in the chapter introduction, the method of examination, in the context of the Dance Consciousness Model, comprises methods of communication and methods of description. Methods of communication are the means through which a dancer is able to communicate whether or not he or she has accessed, and is maintaining a state of, intrattention or non-intrattention. Methods of description are the means through which a dancer is able to describe the intrattentive or non-intrattentive experience in order to validate it.

Before it was decided which methods of examination were to be used during the research, however, it was necessary to ascertain which types of methods would be suitable for use in the context of the Dance Consciousness Model. For example, should a method of examination take an objective or a subjective perspective? Within the research into consciousness, there is a clear schism between the beliefs of

the neuroscientists and cognitive scientists and those of the philosophers and psychologists with respect to the validity of objective as opposed to subjective methods of examination. Objective methods tend to take a third-person perspective whereas subjective methods tend to take a first-person perspective.

First-, second- and third-person methods

Consciousness, whilst difficult to define, undoubtedly relates to one's inner experience, which is a concealed and somewhat exclusive world which is continually transcending, developing and disappearing. Consequently, one may claim that one's consciousness is a phenomenon that is bound to one's individual perspectives of experience and 'our direct knowledge of subjective experiences stems from our first-person access to them' (Chalmers, 1999).[50] First-person methods are concerned directly with the experience of the subject from the subject's point of view and require the subject to reflect introspectively on his or her own experience and provide an account of the experience.

It may, therefore, be appropriate to use a first-person method rather than using only a purely objective method when examining consciousness, especially since the very essence of objective methods is that they are disassociated as much as possible from the individual phenomenological perspective. Chalmers echoes this view in his statement that 'first person data can't be expressed wholly in terms of third person data' (*ibid.*) and Varela and Shear claim that to:

> ... deprive our scientific examination of this phenomenal realm amounts to either amputating human life of its most intimate domains, or else denying science explanatory access to it ...
> (1999, p.4)

If one is to rely solely on the first person then some issues need be considered. Should the first person be made aware of the research, the purpose of the examination and any third-person theory relating to the method? If the first person is uninformed, their accounts may not be of use or sufficiently descriptive, they may include subjective judgements or be completely irrelevant. An informed first person, on the other hand, may offer reports which are shaped by the knowledge of the

[50] http://consc.net/papers/firstperson.html

purpose of the examination or by third-person theory or, as Overgaard considers, subjects 'may become overtly co-operative, giving the answers you want' (2001).[51] Despite this 'informed subjects ... are much preferred ... because no matter how much methodological criticism we might point out' (*ibid.*) an informed first person is likely to provide 'better access to and description of subjective experience' (Vermersch, 1999, p.22).

Although first-person accounts can provide direct insight into subjective experience, it is important to note that they are not valid enough to be turned into a 'body of regulated knowledge' (Varela and Shear, 1999, p.1). Chalmers believes that, 'when it comes to first person methodologies, there are well known obstacles' (1999).[52] Such obstacles are commonly disputed within consciousness literature and it is often considered that (1) there is a 'lack of incorrigible access to our experience'; (2) 'introspecting an experience changes the experience'; (3) it may be impossible to access 'all our experience at once' (*ibid*). Perhaps, then, first-person methods should not be used in isolation.

Varela and Shear state that 'the progress in becoming familiar with a particular method requires mediation' (1999, p.8). What is intended here by the term 'mediation' is that a second person provides a 'curious intermediate position' (*ibid.*) between those in the positions of the first person and the third person. The second person can observe the first person and subsequently interview them about the experience. The second person must be 'eccentric to the lived experience' of the first person but nevertheless 'takes a position of one who has been there to some degree, and thus provides hints and further training' (*ibid.*). Varela and Shear suggest that the second person is 'an emphatic resonator with experiences that are familiar to him and which find in himself a resonant chord' (*ibid.* p.10).

It is essential that whilst in the second-person position, however, one must renounce explicitly one's detachments in order to become 'identified with the kind of understanding and internal coherence of [one's] source' (*ibid.*). The second person can guide, in a non-inductive manner, and assist the first person to develop the ability to access, communicate and describe the lived experience. As Vermersch suggests, a

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[51] http://humanities.ucsc.edu/NEH/kelly.html
[52] http://consc.net/papers/firstperson.html

second person may assist the first person with the 'unfolding of the internal act' and thus make access to the lived experience possible, and may then 'guide the process of verbalisation' (1999, p.35). The role of the second person should be:

> ... grounded on a sensitivity to the subtle indices of his interlocutor's phrasing, bodily language and expressiveness, seeking for indices (more or less explicit) which are inroads into the common experiential ground.
> (Varela and Shear, 1999, p.10)

It is important to consider, however, that the second person's expertise might also affect the reports of the first person. The second person might, for example, 'induce the content of the replies by the formulation of questions' (Vermersch, 1999, p.36) and consequently might eliminate spontaneous answers. When interviewing, the second person must be sure to 'avoid infiltrating his own presupposition' (Peugeot, 1999, p.47). It therefore seems that, although a second person is of use within a method of examination, one must take care to compare and contrast the accounts of the second person with those of the first person.

Varela and Shear also make reference to a third person, which they describe as the 'standard observer of scientific discourse' (1999, p.9). Third-person accounts are generally more objective and offer an opportunity to prove or verify accounts provided by first and second persons. They are therefore more likely to indicate general consensus; Varela and Shear describe them as accounts that 'can be turned from individual accounts into a body of regulated knowledge' (*ibid.* p.1).

Although third-person accounts cannot access the inner phenomenal quality of conscious experience and cannot 'express precisely the data we want to explain ... they may play a central role' in methods of examination (Chalmers, 1999).[53] It is not advisable, therefore, for third person methods to be used in isolation but rather they should be used to complement first- and second- person accounts.

The above discussion indicates that, whilst first-, second- and third-person methods of examination can all be of use and have certain positive qualities, each method also has disadvantages. It is for these reasons that the method of examination used in the

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[53] http://consc.net/papers/firstperson.html

creation and application of the Dance Consciousness Model incorporates first-person verbal information, second-person observable information and third-person verified and theoretical information.[54] In doing so the advice of Vermersch, who states that all the methods should be 'retained and employed in a complementary manner' (1999, p.35), has been followed. Varela and Shear also believe that:

> It would be futile to stay with first-person descriptions in isolation ... we need to harmonize and constrain them by building the appropriate links with third-person studies.
> (1999, p.2)

Chalmers notes that the 'job ... is to connect the first-person data to third-person data' to come up with 'systematic theoretical connections between the two' (1999)[55] in order to move towards an 'integrated or global perspective on mind' where neither 'experience nor external mechanisms have the final word' (Varela and Shear, 1999, p.2). Such connections have been developed in relation to the Dance Consciousness Model and are described below.

In the context of the Dance Consciousness Model, the first person is the dancer who is experiencing the states of intrattention or non-intrattention. The dancer is informed of the purpose of the method of examination. It is the dancer's phenomenal realm that requires explanatory access and it is important that the dancer is able to enter his or her intimate domains.

It could be argued that a more valuable result would be provided by an account from a dancer who is being choreographed or trained by a choreographer who has at some time entered into the experience under examination and who has first-hand knowledge and an emphatic understanding of that experience. The dancer is, therefore, assisted to examine his or her conscious state by a second person who, in the context of the Dance Consciousness Model, is the choreographer. The choreographer trains the dancer to use the model and, for the purposes of this research, is also regarded as the consciousness trainer. The choreographer is able to validate the experience of the dancer, through observing or interviewing him or her,

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[54] This notion of triangulation was introduced in the Introduction with reference to the research methodologies used for this thesis.
[55] http://consc.net/papers/firstperson.html

and thus ensure that the process or experience of the dancer is neither private nor solipsistic.

An effective framework through which the choreographer is able to extract the dancer's reports is therefore crucial. The success of an effective framework is highly dependent on the interview technique used. The technique should encourage wholly descriptive statements; questions need to be open, but structured and focussed; and the questions should direct attention to a relatively well-defined and identifiable moment. The choreographer must take care not to influence the dancer's experience or choice of words to describe that experience as, even if detached or objective, the choreographer 'is still bound by ... his preconceptions, his implicit blinkers, his unconscious projections' (Vermersch, 1999, p.38).

A successful framework can provide the dancer and choreographer with opportunities to indulge in an intellectual exchange concerning the nature of the intrattentive or non-intrattentive experience and subsequently propose how access to these states might be improved and developed. In addition, through conflating the dancer's accounts with those of the choreographer, one may be able to identify some information which can be verified by more than one person and thus holds general consensus. This information can therefore be considered as a third-person account.

The validity of such an account is dependent on both the dancer and choreographer having some third-person knowledge. For the dancer and choreographer to provide accounts that can be considered reliable and informed, they must have an understanding of the concepts of intrattentive and non-intrattentive consciousness and of the method of examination described later in this chapter. The concepts and method represent the third-person accounts used within the context of the Dance Consciousness Model.

To summarise, first-, second- and third-person methods are all incorporated within the Dance Consciousness Model as follows:

- The dancer acts as the first person and is able to provide reliable first-person accounts because of his or her knowledge of third-person accounts;

- The choreographer acts as the second person and is able to present second-person accounts through the observation and interviewing of the first person;

- Existent theories, which hold a general consensus as they have been proven or verified by more than one person, provide third-person accounts.

Having ascertained the nature of the method of examination for the context of the Dance Consciousness Model, it is now important to interrogate any methods of examination from current dance research and current consciousness research. The purpose of this interrogation is to determine; whether any existing methods of examination may be used as third-person accounts, how dancers can provide first-person accounts, and how choreographers can provide second-person accounts.

Methods of examination in current dance research

Some dance consciousness theorists, such as Sheets-Johnstone (1966) and Fraleigh (1987), comment on what they consider to be the most successful type of dance consciousness. For example 'the dancer is at her best when she becomes present-centred' (Fraleigh, 1987, p.23) – which is a prerequisite of a pre-reflective, or non-intrattentive state – and 'the dance comes alive in all its rich fullness only as the dancers are reflectively aware neither of themselves, nor of the dance' (Sheets-Johnstone, 1966, p.6). Neither theorist, however, offers a clear explanation as to exactly how one might examine such an experience in order to maintain that the state accessed is the state as claimed. In fact, in current dance literature, there is an absence of a verified method for examining first-person conscious experiences. This absence is summarised by Alexander in her claim that dance 'lacks a framework for reflecting on or evaluating the first person experience' (2003, p.19).

Some dance consciousness researchers do, however, provide certain suggestions; for example in her book *The Phenomenology of Dance* (1966) Sheets-Johnstone recommends that one should use phenomenology to gain insight into the dancer's consciousness. An intrinsic quality of phenomenology is that it 'often takes the form of first-person description' (Fraleigh, 1987, p.xiv) and thus the method promoted by Sheets-Johnstone can be considered as a first-person method. In Fraleigh's book

Dance and the Lived Body (1987), the reader learns predominantly of the dance consciousness as experienced by Fraleigh herself. Fraleigh states that the existential phenomenological approach she takes is one of involvement rather than detachment (1987, p.xxix). Although the suggestion of Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh to apply phenomenology is useful, neither theorist really provides insight into how it may be an accessible method of examination, and neither provides any applicable third-person theory or an intimation about whether they advocate the use of a second person.

It is necessary, therefore, to move beyond the dance discipline into current consciousness theory to assess whether a verified method of examination exists. In Chapter 2 it was ascertained that an understanding of consciousness theory exterior to the dance discipline is imperative in ensuring a coherent understanding of the dance consciousness, and thus moving momentarily away from the dance discipline in order to establish methods of examination is not problematic.

Methods of examination in current consciousness research

According to consciousness theorist Chalmers, 'when it comes to the third-person data' methods of examination 'are very well-developed' (1999).[56] For example, psychologists have formulated complex methods for studying behaviour and neuroscientists have 'developed an ever-expanding group of ingenious methods for getting at what is going on in the brain' such as 'EEG, brain imaging [and] single cell studies' (*ibid.*). In addition, there are 'multiple formalisms for expressing these data' such as 'plain language, neurophysiological classification, various sorts of images and diagrams [and] computational models' (*ibid.*). It is apparent, then, that methods for communicating and describing consciousness do exist within a third-person format. Such methods are, however, of limited use within the context of the Dance Consciousness Model; for example, it was not practical to use brain imaging during the formulation of the model in Empirical Project 1 and 2, nor is it feasible to use it within the dance consciousness training. Do any other methods of examination exist which take on more of a first-person format?

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[56] http://consc.net/papers/firstperson.html

As indicated by Chalmers, 'when it comes to first-person data, things aren't nearly so well developed' as there are very few methods for investigating first-person information and even fewer formalisms for expressing it (1999).[57] It seems that a first-person, general and verified method for examining consciousness does not exist within the multidisciplinary science and philosophy of consciousness.

Although the majority of consciousness theorists omit to consider first-person methods, this does not necessarily mean that some consciousness researchers are not aware of the need for such methods. Indeed, consciousness theorists such as Flanagan (1992), Searle (1992) and Chalmers (1996) state that consciousness research necessitates a specific method, and particularly one which incorporates the subjective or experiential element of consciousness and an objective understanding of consciousness, but this statement is not backed up by any solid methodological advances. Some attempts at examination methods which incorporate first-, second- and third-person accounts that have been developed were made by '19th century psychological introspectionists, 20th century philosophical phenomenologists, and centuries of meditative studies in Eastern thought' (Chalmers, 1999, *ibid.*). Theories expounded by psychological introspectionists and philosophical phenomenologists, namely the 'explicitation session' and 'phenomenological reduction', were of use in the formulation of the method of examination for the Dance Consciousness Model.[58]

The explicitation session and phenomenological reduction

The explicitation session was developed by Vermersch (1999) and is a systematic method which attempts to examine the phenomenon of the subjective experience of intuition, which Vermersch considers to be wholly experiential and completely spontaneous. Although Vermersch does not prescribe which, if any, type of conscious state an intuitive experience should inhabit, one could consider that the nature of an intuitive experience holds similar characteristics to states of intrattention and non-intrattention in that the experiences are absolutely experiential. It is this same characteristic that makes states of intrattention and non-intrattention difficult to

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[57] http://consc.net/papers/firstperson.html

[58] Eastern meditative studies, namely Buddhist Introspection, were also of use within the formulation of methods of access. These are considered in Chapter 5.

examine. The explicitation session provides some indication as to how one may examine such an experiential state.

Phenomenological reduction is the definitive and fundamental method of phenomenology. It is a method for rendering access to and examining an internal and phenomenological experience. Husserl founded phenomenology at the beginning of the twentieth century and theorists such as Heidegger (1954), Sartre (1969), Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Schutz (1967) developed it in various ways. Gallagher claims that 'phenomenology proposes an analysis of the body as we live it' (2000).[59] The inherent ambivalence in phenomenology is its duality of the subject, as both theoretical and existential concurrently. The co-existence of a theoretical dimension and a practical, embodied and existential dimension is at the very centre of phenomenological reduction. Husserl acknowledges that 'phenomenological reduction is needed if consciousness is to be systematically investigated in its pure immanence' (1917).[60]

The explicitation session and phenomenological reduction exist within their own discipline and were formulated for reasons outside the scope of this study. They, therefore, are not necessarily intended for application as methods of examination and are not related to dance *per se*. As they deal with examining states of consciousness, however, these theories have been carefully analysed, interpreted and adapted for use within the method of examination in the Dance Consciousness Model. Both theories aided a predominant decision to be made in preparing to test the model, which was whether to use present-centred and/or retrospective accounts and what form of communication and description should capture these accounts.

Present-centred accounts

It could be suggested that, in order to ensure that the experience of an intrattentive or non-intrattentive state is accurately described and communicated, the dancer must do so whilst actually accessing the intrattention or non-intrattention. The purpose of this is to produce what this thesis defines as a present-centred account. Philosophical and psychological experiments have been undertaken using such present-centred accounts. Schooler and Dougal, for example, describe research in which 'individuals

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[59] www2.canisius.edu/-gallaghr/paris2000.html
[60] www3.baylor.edu/-Scott_Moore/essays/Husserl.html

were reporting thoughts as they occurred rather than trying to reproduce thoughts that happened some time ago' (1999, p.285).

In the case of an intrattentive experience, the provision of present-centred accounts is not likely to be particularly problematic for the dancer, as the nature of such a state is that it is a state of which one is aware. States of intrattention are not only lived, but also known. Thus, asking a dancer to confirm whether or not he or she is intrattentive, and to describe what that feels like, whilst actually experiencing an intrattentive state is perfectly feasible. Present-centred accounts of intrattentive experiences can therefore be considered as legitimate methods of examination.

Problems arise, however, when attempting to communicate states of non-intrattention. If the nature of a non-intrattentive state is that one is not aware of oneself or the experience, how could one reliably communicate that one is in a state of non-intrattention, let alone describe the experience? How can a dancer know whether or not he or she has accessed a non-intrattentive conscious state and whether he or she has managed to maintain it? Peugeot acknowledges that the pre-thought nature of a subjective experience renders it difficult to 'elaborate a method which would enable one to become aware of it and describe it' (1999, p.44). One must also consider whether becoming aware of it and describing it would actually be eliminating the very existence of the non-intrattentive state. Dance theorist Adler acknowledges that problems may occur when the 'mover is thinking about what is happening instead of experiencing what is happening' (2002, p.19). Does this mean that the characteristic of being 'lived and not known' (Sartre, 1969, p.300), which is inherent in any truly non-intrattentive state, abolishes all potentiality of description?

The phenomenological reduction method does not consider this to be the case and does, in fact, advocate present-centred accounts, which it defines as a certain type of temporal lag – a retentional lag. Phenomenological reduction endorses a process of splitting consciousness. Depraz describes the gesture, or act, of phenomenological reduction as follows:

> Literally, I lead back my own experience, which gives itself immediately to me. This means explicating layers of the experience and freeing myself from the object in order to take note of the act of consciousness directed towards this object. In this way, I enlarge my field of experience by intensifying it, by allowing another dimension to emerge from it, a dimension which precisely frees me from the ordinary pre-giveness of the world.
> (1999, p.98)

The aim of phenomenological reduction, therefore, is to make the subject, in this case the dancer, both an 'agent working at a transformation of the world via the transformation of ... self' and at 'a mode of self-observation which places [the dancer] in the overreaching position of an impartial ... spectator' (*ibid.* p.97). Phenomenological reduction suggests that, for a present-centred examination of a lived state such as non-intrattention, one can place the subject in a position from which they can concurrently experience non-intrattentively and observe intrattentively. To put this in context, the object of the intrattention would be the non-intrattention and the non-intrattention would simply exist whilst the intrattention examines it.[61]

One must consider, however, that allowing two states to co-exist in this way could have some unforeseen consequence. Depraz acknowledges that eventually the two states, intrattention and non-intrattention, begin to 'fertilise' each other, 'thereby intensifying each other to the point of becoming virtually indistinguishable from each other' (*ibid.*). In this situation, the intrattention could modify the non-intrattention to such an extent that eventually a genuinely non-intrattentive state would no longer exist.

Depraz also notes that, in fact, both states can rarely exist completely simultaneously; instead there is a continual exchange between the two:

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[61] A similar method of splitting consciousness is introduced in Chapter 5 with reference to methods for accessing non-intrattention. In this instance, however, the object of the intrattention is not the non-intrattention but other external stimuli. The possibility of dual consciousness was also mentioned in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, where two states of intrattention were discussed, one which observes the other.

> There is a retention of the object in the act by which it is immediately apprehended, even a possible to and fro between the object perceived and the perceptual act, but never, it seems, complete coincidence of the two.
> (1999, p.99)

It seems, then, that experiencing states of intrattention and non-intrattention simultaneously, in which the object of the intrattention is the non-intrattention, may not be possible.

In an attempt to overcome this the explicitation session attempts to allow subjects an awareness of the intuitive experience through a suspension in thought. Peugeot describes this as a 'break with [one's] habitual attitude, which consists of acting without knowing how [one] does it, without knowing what [one] knows' (1999, p.46). The explicitation session encourages a suspension of activity, in the form of an interview mediated by an interviewer, thus providing a moment of time for the interviewee to become aware of the experience. It is essential that this experience is singular, specific, clearly defined and 'precisely situated in time and space' (*ibid.*).

The explicitation session defines two processes through which such awareness is made possible, one of which is entitled 'living the experience in the present' (*ibid.* pp.46–7), which is comparable to the present-centred accounts defined in this chapter. In this instance, in order for awareness to develop, the subject must allow two states of consciousness to arise. The subject experiences a state of non-intrattention and then, through a suspension in thought, allows a state of intrattention to exist in order to examine the non-intrattention. Phenomenological reduction presents an analogous notion in the form of an *epoche*. Depraz describes the *epoche* as a 'suspension with regard to the habitual course of one's thoughts, brought about by an interruption of their continuous flowing' (1999, p.99). The *epoche* is used to access and examine completely lived states, states of non-intrattention.

It is vital to consider, however, whether the *epoche* promoted by phenomenological reduction, and the suspensions in thought endorsed by the explicitation session, can actually provide present-centred accounts at all. Indeed, if one is intrattending between moments of non-intrattending, it could be claimed that the intrattention

occurs only after the non-intrattentive experience; thus the intrattention is attending retrospectively to the non-intrattention and so it is not present-centred.

To put this into the context of dance, if a dancer is dancing and then turns his or her attention away from the experience of the dancing, in order to take note of the manner in which he or she is experiencing the dance, the dancer would already be in the aftermath of the actual experience. When the dancer steps back from the dance, metaphorically, in order to take account of the modality of the act in which he or she is engaged, he or she is no longer able to attend so readily to experiencing the experience of the dance, as he or she would already be 'further off in time' (Depraz, 1999, p.98). Thus the dancer would not be able to provide a present-centred account, as retrospection would already be present. Perhaps, then, one should resign oneself to any reliable accounts of non-intrattention being constructed retrospectively. Would it not be far more efficient to wait for a dancer to have a non-intrattentive experience, and then relive that experience in order to communicate and describe it?

Retrospective accounts

One could consider using what the explicitation session defines as 'reliving a past experience' (Peugeot, 1999, pp.46–7), phenomenological reduction refers to as remembering, and this study calls retrospective accounts, instead of present-centred accounts. Various philosophers, for example Vermersch (1999) and Depraz (1999), claim that some information is accessible only in the context of a consciousness that is directed retrospectively, and such philosophers therefore use retrospection as a method of examination. In the context of the Dance Consciousness Model, using retrospective accounts would require the dancer to communicate and describe the intrattentive or non-intrattentive experience subsequent to having the experience. Retrospective accounts would consequently overcome the problem of having to create intrattentive awareness within a non-intrattentive experience and, unlike present-centred accounts, may therefore be of use not only for intrattentive states but also for non-intrattentive states.

The provision of retrospective accounts raises further concerns of reliability and viability. Ginsburg acknowledges some of these difficulties in the following statement:

> My experience was not, cannot be raw sense data. I can describe it because I experienced it, but when I am remembering I am not re-experiencing exactly, but bringing forth fragments of the experience. (1999, p.81)

Vermersch is concerned about:

> ... the reliability of memory and the necessity of establishing the nature of the link between what is described from the past and what is lived at the very moment it is being recalled and described. (1999, p.19)

Dance theorist Adler notes that retrospective accounts may affect the actual experience:

> The intention to remember the precise experience after moving can for some movers result in an awkwardness at first, the effort becoming a distraction from being present while moving. (2002, p.18)

The concerns of Ginsburg, Vermersch and Adler focus on the lack of reliability and whether it is possible to re-create experiences accurately enough to be able to communicate and describe them. One must question whether, by applying a retrospective method to an experience, one is not altering, distorting or even creating that experience. One must therefore determine whether it is really any more effective to look back on an experience than it is to look inside one. Vermersch is of the opinion that retrospection 'succeeds in dodging the difficulty by replacing observation in the present by observation bearing upon presentification of past lived experience' (1999, p.19).

The notion of reliving a past experience presented within the explicitation session attempts to rid any problems concerned with memory and remembering. The explicitation session attempts to encourage the subject to relive the experience already encountered, including all the emotional and sensorial dimensions of the experience. This part of the process helps the subject to:

> ... operate a thinking through of his experience – that is to pass his know how from the level of action to the level of representation. (Peugeot, 1999, p.46)

A main concern within the method is that of authenticity. The aim is to bring the subject 'to the point where he describes what he really does and not what he thinks or imagines he does' (Peugeot, 1999, p.46). As the session involves an interviewer, it is a second-person method as well as a first-person method. The interviewer guides the subject to a 'position of embodied speech in order to help him evoke a particular experience from the past' (*ibid.*). It is intended that this occur to such an extent that, for the subject, the 'past situation becomes more present than does the situation of being interviewed' (*ibid.*). The explicitation session defines this particular state of consciousness as a 'state of evocation' (*ibid.*).

The session provides various techniques that the interviewer can use to guide the subject to a state of evocation. The main technique assists the subject to rediscover all the emotions, sensations and images that are associated with the experience.[62] In order to do so, the subject must turn attention to the internal self and the act of the experience. The explicitation procedure aims at:

> ... provoking a reversal of the subject's attention to his internal process and a slowing down of the film of his experience.
> (*ibid.* p.47)

Such a slowing down can be achieved by asking the subject directly to slow down the rhythm of speech and 'to take his time' (*ibid.*). This ensures that the subject is not merely reciting 'ready-to-use knowledge' but is 'becoming aware of his experiences which until then were pre-thought' (*ibid.*)

One must, however, question the reliability of such techniques. How can one be sure that one is actually reliving the experience, as opposed to merely believing that one is reliving the experience? In addition, how can a second person detect whether or not the subject's experience, and subsequently communicated account of that experience, is genuine and valid? The explicitation session notes that there are some indications that may enable the interviewer to verify the authenticity of the subject's experience, for example 'letting go of eye contact, unfocusing [and] using the present tense

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[62] This method is similar to one that is used in studies of memory – the model of affective memory – in which subjects are asked to recreate experiences through sensorial images. The model of affective memory is also used in method acting when encouraging actors to use memories of past experiences to create naturalistic emotions and expressions in the present.

instead of the past' (Peugeot, 1999, pp.46–7). Adler also acknowledges the benefit of using the present tense and states that:

> The present tense reminds us, holds us encourages us to remain in the embodied, moving experience ... learning to speak experience rather than speaking about it means learning how to speak without abandoning the authenticity of the moving experience.
> (2002, p.13)

Both Peugeot and Adler believe that it is possible to relive an experience and produce an authentic retrospective account.

Two types of account

There are two distinct types of method of examination presented here: communicating and describing 'during the unfolding of the mental event' (Richard, 1999, p.277) and thus producing a present-centred account; and communicating and describing 'afterwards during a recollection of the event' (*ibid.*) and thus producing a retrospective account. It appears as if both present-centred and retrospective accounts have undesirable outcomes and the 'influence of observation on what is observed is a major epistemological problem' (Vermersch, 1999, p.19). The distortion or creation of the experience is called the 'excavation fallacy' or 'hermeneutical objection' by philosophers such as Shear and Jevning (1999, p.13).

Which type of account is more damaging to the experience itself? Is it merely a matter of determining the method which is more viable or should a new method be formulated by conflating these two? The methods of communication and description used during the formulation of the Dance Consciousness Model and in the training for the model provide the capacity for both present-centred and retrospective accounts to be made, based on the assumption that two accounts are more effective than one. There should, however, be a continual awareness that neither account can be considered entirely neutral, as an interpretative structure is always present in the gathering of phenomenal information. The information that is accumulated is therefore not taken as absolute fact, but instead as a valid intersubjective account which is worthy of examination. It is now important to ascertain exactly what sort of phenomenal information such accounts are able to produce.

Verbal information

The most accessible and commonly used system for communicating and describing phenomenal experience is simple language. Simple language is pure description which omits superfluous theoretical knowledge, commentaries, interpretation, judgements, beliefs and opinions. In the explicitation session, this process is known as 'putting into words' and it enables the subject to clarify the represented experience (Peugeot, 1999, p.47). The interviewer encourages the use of simple language by careful questioning which must encourage descriptions that 'privilege the hows to the exclusion of the whys' and the language used by the second person must be 'empty of content' (*ibid.*). Such language has been entitled Ericksonian language.[63] If the second person were to include such 'whys' there is a risk that the first person would veer off course 'towards a position of abstract speech' (*ibid.*). In the context of the Dance Consciousness Model, dancers can use simple language to describe their experience retrospectively and, in the case of intrattention, in the form of a present-centred account.

Language, however, may impose restraints. Some experiences seem to be particularly difficult to express in words. Adler notes that 'there is a longing for a language that could describe direct experience, that which is indescribable' (2002, p.xix). Chalmers acknowledges that simple language could be deemed 'coarse grained and imprecise' (1999)[64] and Peugeot, when referring to some empirical work in which the explicitation session was used, claims:

> It was difficult, if not impossible, for several of the subjects to live out (or to relive) an intuitive experience and simultaneously to put it into words.
> (1999, p.47)

Describing an experience in words, especially if a confident conceptual understanding is lacking, may unintentionally exclude an intrinsic component of that experience. One could consider that a huge, varied and significant division of our mental reality is immune to linguistic analysis because its contents cannot be named (Bailey, 1999, p.150). The quality of an account depends on the linguistic ability of

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[63] Referring to the American psychotherapist Erickson whose technique has been adapted by Vermersch. For further information see Bandler and Grinders (1975).
[64] http://consc.net/papers/firstperson.html

the person making it and the words used may not truly reflect the very personal experience. As Overgaard states:

> It would ... be possible to argue that two persons who give identical descriptions of something in fact are experiencing the object in question in two different ways.
> (2001)[65]

In addition, such a description relies heavily on the second person – the choreographer – having had exactly the same phenomenal experience. This is the only way to ensure that the description is complete, and meaningful to the choreographer.

Non-verbal information

In the light of the above, one must consider what other means of communicating and describing are at one's disposal. In parallel with verbal reports, one could collect information which is non-verbal, para-verbal and epi-verbal (Vermersch, 1999, p.37). Can evidence of one's conscious state, and one's experience of that state, be found in one's facial expressions, focus, body language, assurance, precision or confidence? The explicitation session endorses the view that information can be collected from non-verbal signals such as the direction of the subject's gaze, which Peugeot states indicates the 'sensorial register of where the subject is' (1999, p.47). This suggests that it is possible for a second person to collect non-, para- or epi-verbal present-centred information which can be used to support retrospective accounts collected through retrospective verbal report.

In the context of the Dance Consciousness Model, a choreographer can observe the dancer whilst the dancer is performing either intrattentively or non-intrattentively, and so can attempt to discern the dancer's conscious state and ascertain the experience of that state. Whilst such a means of collecting information may not be of optimum use as an independent source, it can prove beneficial if used in conjunction with verbal report. During the formulation of the model in Empirical Projects 1 and 2 and within the Dance Consciousness Model, therefore, verbal and non-verbal information are collected both retrospectively and within a present-centred context.

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[65] http://humanities.ucsc.edu/NEH/kelly.html

The Dance Consciousness Model's method of examination

Having considered the existing theories and methods of examination 'there is no reason that [one] should be forced to choose one [method] to the exclusion of another' (Wallace, 1999, p.186). The Dance Consciousness Model's method of examination thus comprises the following components:

- First-, second- and third-person methods;
- Present-centred and retrospective accounts;
- Verbal and non-verbal information;
- Theories from phenomenological reduction and the explicitation session.

These components have been combined, which has facilitated the creation of a completely new method of examination to be used solely within the context of the Dance Consciousness Model. As noted earlier in the chapter, no such method currently exists within dance literature. It is anticipated that such a method can go beyond the phenomenological methods of Sheets-Johnstone (1966) and Fraleigh (1987), as it does not choose one examination method to the exclusion of another. The exact nature of the method of examination that was used during the formulation of the model and is also used by dancers when training to apply the model is explained below.

The method of examination

- **First person:** The dancer involved in accessing the intrattentive and non-intrattentive states acts as the first person and provides first person-accounts. The dancer is informed of the purpose of the method of examination and of the Dance Consciousness Model and is given the opportunity to acquire a comprehensive understanding of the different states – intrattention and non-intrattention – and the characteristics of these states. This understanding is based upon third-person theories, such as those presented in Chapter 2, and first-person accounts, such as those provided by Fraleigh in her book *Dance and the Lived Body* (1987). In

addition, the dancer's knowledge is guided by the second person – the choreographer – who attempts to ensure continual understanding and development.

- **Second person:** The choreographer's role within the context of the Dance Consciousness Model is primarily that of consciousness trainer. The choreographer also, however, acts as the second person and provides second-person accounts. The choreographer is informed of the purpose of the method of examination and of the Dance Consciousness Model. It is essential that the choreographer has a sound understanding of the different states – intrattention and non-intrattention – in order to guide the first person – the dancer. This understanding is based upon third-person theories and first-person experience. It is crucial that the choreographer has participated in the consciousness training as a first person before undertaking the role of the second person. This allows the choreographer to be empathetic and make the necessary connection with the dancer. The choreographer must also have an understanding, and preferably experience, of appropriate interview and observation techniques.

- **Third person:** A selection of verified and consensus consciousness theories provides the third-person accounts which inform the first person – the dancer – and the second person – the choreographer. Within these third-person accounts are definitions of the intrattentive and non-intrattentive states of consciousness, and a breakdown of the precise nature of these concepts and the terminology to be applied. The exact nature of the various methods of access, which are all based upon third-person theories, are also included in the third-person account.[66] The third-person accounts provide sufficient information to equip the first and second person with the understanding and knowledge that is required in order to apply the methods of examination and the methods of access, and thus the Dance Consciousness Model.

- **Present-centred accounts and non-verbal information:** Present-centred accounts are collected in the form of non-verbal information. The choreographer observes the dancer accessing states of intrattention or non-intrattention and

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[66] These methods of access and the third person theories on which they are based are discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

makes notes of any non-verbal information that may provide insight into the dancer's experience. This information may include the dancer's body language, focus, movement pace, quality, dynamic or posture. There are some non-verbal indices and signals inherent in, and characteristic of, the two different states of consciousness. For example, when performing intrattentively, the dancer's movement is often very structured and precise, the pace tends to be fairly slow and the dancer's focus is likely to be inwardly directed. On the other hand, when performing non-intrattentively the dancer's movement is often very free and spontaneous, the pace tends to be fairly fast and the dancer's focus is likely to be externally directed.[67] The choreographer is able to interpret the non-verbal information because he or she has an empathetic understanding of the dancer's experience. This understanding is gained by the choreographer having prior experience of being the first person before being the second person and through having an understanding of third-person theory.

The dancer is also likely to disclose some more obvious signals which are of use in determining whether he or she is accessing the desired state effectively. The design of the methods of access makes it possible to collect such information. One means of access to intrattentive states, for example, requires dancers to dance and simultaneously to describe verbally what their bodies are doing.[68] A significant pause in the dancer's verbal report might indicate that the dancer's intrattention has ceased. Through observing this sort of present-centred experience, the choreographer should be able to discern, to some extent, whether or not the dancer is intrattentive or non-intrattentive. It is proposed, however, that information collected in this way is not used in isolation, but is combined with the retrospective accounts provided by the dancer.

- **Retrospective accounts and verbal information:** Retrospective accounts are provided verbally. The choreographer interviews the dancer immediately after the latter has accessed states of intrattention or non-intrattention and the dancer provides a verbal account of the experience during the interview. The choreographer uses Ericksonian language as much as possible and employs a

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[67] These distinctive aesthetic movement qualities that are inherent in the different states are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.
[68] This particular means of access and others are discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5.

particular framework to ensure interpretation and pre-conceptions affect the information as little as possible. This framework, given below, comprises open questions, encourages the dancer to use simple language and concentrates on single experiences. The structured interview is in three parts:

(1) Retrospective open discussion. The choreographer begins by asking the dancer if they have any initial comments about their experience. This allows the dancer a 'free rein' and encourages independent and honest reflection which is not shaped by questioning.

(2) Retrospective questioning – experience (qualitative) and stimulus (quantitative) related. The dancer is asked a series of specific questions about the qualitative nature of the experience. The dancer is expected, therefore, to remember as much about the experience as possible. In addition, within the non-intrattentive training, the dancer is asked stimulus-based questions, which provide quantitative information.[69]

(3) Viewing of recording. The dancer and choreographer view a video recording of the intrattentive or non-intrattentive experience. This activity allows the dancer to explain and clarify any answers provided during the interview if necessary, to jog their memory about particular moments and to reflect on whether or not they were intrattentive or non-intrattentive. The video recording also enables the choreographer to point out particular moments to the dancer and to re-analyse any non-verbal information. In addition, the recording provides an opportunity for the dancer to work with the choreographer in mapping the dancer's conscious states throughout the task.

Applying the Dance Consciousness Model's method of examination

Dancers use the method of examination when they are being trained to apply the Dance Consciousness Model. The method of examination enables dancers to ensure that they are effectively accessing states of intrattention or non-intrattention. The use

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[69] These questions are a crucial part of the non-intrattentive training. They are not discussed any further here, however, as an understanding of them is entirely dependent on having knowledge of the non-intrattentive method of access. This method of access is discussed, and the exact nature of stimulus-based questioning clarified, in Chapter 5.

of the method is absolutely essential during the consciousness training whilst dancers are learning how to access conscious states intentionally, perhaps for the first time. The method teaches the dancers to check introspectively that they are accessing the desired state and that they are maintaining that state. It also gives the dancers some insight into potential reasons why they might not able to access particular states so that they can subsequently overcome such problems.

The dancers are informed about the method of examination prior to taking part in the first consciousness-training workshop and the method is then applied throughout the training. Following the consciousness training, and when the time comes for actually applying the Dance Consciousness Model within a choreography and performance context, the method is not necessarily essential. It is anticipated that, by this point, the dancers will be successfully accessing states of intrattention or non-intrattention, will have control over the access and will thus no longer need to examine the access. The method of examination, however, is always there should a dancer experience problems within the application of the model; in such an instance, the dancer may wish to return to the method in order to become introspective.

The method of examination as a method of research

The Dance Consciousness Model was created during Empirical Projects 1 and 2. Within these projects, eight dancers explored various methods of accessing states of intrattention and non-intrattention. The method of examination used, and the results collected, during these projects led directly to the formulation of the methods of access used in the Dance Consciousness Model, and to the model itself. As indicated at the outset of this chapter, it was only by being able to examine the nature of intrattentive or non-intrattentive states that the dancers could ever have known whether they were accessing these states. More fundamentally, the method of examination also enabled the dancers to understand the states of intrattention and non-intrattention in order that they knew what it was they were trying to access.

The method of examination was thus used as a method of research during Empirical Projects 1 and 2, to assist with the research being undertaken into the nature of the states of dance consciousness and the means through which dancers can access the states. The formulation of the Dance Consciousness Model was entirely dependent,

therefore, on the method of examination as it was this method which provided the necessary insight into the dance consciousness.

The purpose of the Dance Consciousness Model

This Chapter has thus far explored existing methods of examination and presented the method of examination which was applied in order to formulate the Dance Consciousness Model. As noted above, it was this method of examination that enabled the evolution of the model. It is therefore now pertinent to ascertain the precise purpose of the model.

The purpose of the Dance Consciousness Model is to allow choreographers and dancers to actively select the dance consciousness in which the dancer is to choreograph and perform, and to subsequently access and control that chosen state, whether it be intrattentive and/or non-intrattentive. In doing so, the model affords choreographers and dancers more insight into the experience of the dance during the choreographic process and performance. Such insight may permit a greater understanding of the dance and the ways in which it can be experienced. Such insight may also permit a greater means of communication between choreographers and dancers. For example, as noted in the Introduction, it is common for choreographers to relay, to dancers, instructions such as 'focus on what your body is doing', or alternatively 'forget about what you are doing and just experience the dance'. The Dance Consciousness Model not only assists in ascertaining what these experiences are and how it is possible to access them, but additionally allows choreographers to communicate such intentions to their dancers.

It is important to note that the model is not essentially intended as a means for improving the efficacy of choreography or performance in terms of its artistic or aesthetic merit or validity. Indeed, the model does not stand as a method for choreography or performance in itself. In other words, it is not to be used to ensure successful choreography or performance and as such should not be used in isolation. The Dance Consciousness Model is to be seen as an addition to choreographic process and performance, rather than necessarily replacing conventional choreographic or performance techniques. As such, the application of the model will

ensure that the subjectivity of experience is considered as well as the objectivity of the product outcome.

Having ascertained the purpose of the Dance Consciousness Model, it is now possible to introduce the model itself.

Introduction to the Dance Consciousness Model

The Dance Consciousness Model can be used for:

- Improvised movement including completely free improvisation or structured improvisation;

- Self-generated movement that has been choreographed by the dancer, either for the dancer and/or to teach to another dancer;

- Other generated movement that has been choreographed by another dancer or the choreographer and is taught to the dancer.

The Dance Consciousness Model comprises four different strands:

- Intrattentive;
- Non-intrattentive;
- Intrattentive-non-intrattentive (I-NI);
- Non-intrattentive-intrattentive (NI-I).

In addition, the Dance Consciousness Model comprises three different phases:

- Choreography;
- Rehearsal;
- Performance.

Thus within the Dance Consciousness Model:

- The intrattentive strand allows dancers, through a particular method of access, to access intrattention within the choreography, rehearsal and performance of improvised, self-generated or other generated movement material;

- The non-intrattentive strand allows dancers, through a particular method of access, to access non-intrattention within the choreography, rehearsal and performance of improvised, self-generated or other generated movement material;

- The I-NI strand allows dancers to access intrattention within the choreography and rehearsal, and non-intrattention within the rehearsal and performance of improvised, self-generated or other generated movement material;

- The NI-I strand allows dancers to access non-intrattention within the choreography and rehearsal, and intrattention within the rehearsal and performance of improvised, self-generated or other generated movement material.

It is important to note that the model does not assume that all movement material is choreographed before rehearsal begins and thus it is not necessary to remain within only one phase of the model at any one time. Indeed, within a dance process it is common for dancers to be choreographing some material and rehearsing other material in the same session. For example, within one session a dancer may use the intrattentive strand to rehearse a phrase of movement and the non-intrattentive strand to choreograph a new phrase of movement. Whilst it is possible to be present in two different phases of the model simultaneously, it is essential that every single piece of movement that is improvised, choreographed or learnt follows each phase of the model in sequence. One should not, therefore, choreograph a phrase without applying any of the strands and then subsequently apply a strand whilst rehearsing or performing, as this would affect the efficacy of the model.

The choreographer or dance company facilitates the application of the Dance Consciousness Model. The model has been designed to ensure that it can be applied within any dance process and performance. Choreographers are advised to engage in a 'normal process' and simply use the model as an addition to this process. This ensures that the model is particularly accessible as the model can slot into any dance process. Once a choreographer or dancer has completed the training for the first time

it is anticipated that they will have mastered the methods of access. The initial training needs to be completed only once by an individual; it does not need to be repeated every time the choreographer or dancer embarks on a new project. When proficient in using the Dance Consciousness Model, choreographers and dancers can utilise it within any process.

It is the responsibility of the choreographer, or company to structure and facilitate the process. The only prerequisite for the choreographer or company is an awareness of which conscious state(s) is required for the execution of movement. The conscious state(s) to be used is determined by the nature of the piece and the intentions of the choreographer and dancers. Within any one piece, any combination of strands may be applied. It is not necessary for these strands to be agreed prior to the dance process; indeed the model permits experimentation and the strands to be applied may not be established until some time into the process. It is the responsibility of both the choreographer and dancer to ensure that the chosen strand(s) is effectively implemented during the process and that the dancer is prepared sufficiently for performance. It is the dancer's sole responsibility to apply the strand during the actual performance. If the dancer has completed the necessary training and the chosen strand(s) is applied effectively, the dancer should be able to successfully access and control the desired dance consciousness.

It is not possible to acquire complete understanding of the Dance Consciousness Model before being clear about the nature of the four different strands – which are described in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. It is possible at this point, however, to present the skeletal structure of the Dance Consciousness Model. In Figure 1 the three phases – choreography, rehearsal and performance – are represented, as are the dance components; improvisation and self and other generated material. Although the location of the four strands is depicted in the diagram, the nature of these four strands is not illustrated. In subsequent chapters the nature of these strands is described and, as the thesis progresses, the model will become more comprehensible.

In Figure 1 the four different strands are represented by the numbers 1 to 4:

1 Intrattentive strand

2 Non-intrattentive strand

3 Intrattentive to non-intrattentive strand

4 Non-intrattentive to intrattentive strand

Figure 1: The skeletal structure of the Dance Consciousness Model



Summary

Following a consideration of objective and subjective methods, first-, second- and third-person methods, phenomenological reduction, the explicitation session, present-centred and retrospective accounts, this chapter has answered the second focussed research question: How can one examine the dance consciousness?

The independently formulated method of examination provided in this chapter is intended for use specifically in the context of the dance discipline and the Dance Consciousness Model. It has been described how the method is applied within this context and the skeletal structure of the Dance Consciousness Model, with its four inherent strands, has been introduced.

Chapter 4 presents the first strand of the model and describes how dancers are able to access states of intrattention.

Chapter 4

How can one access the intrattentive dance consciousness?

Introduction

In Chapter 3 the Dance Consciousness Model was introduced and it was explained that the model comprises four strands. This chapter describes the first strand of the model; the intrattentive strand, and reaches conclusions regarding the third focussed research question: How can one access the intrattentive dance consciousness?

In its most basic form the intrattentive strand represents the idea that, in order to experience an intrattentive performance, the dancer must experience an intrattentive process, which includes choreography and rehearsal. The way in which a dancer is able to access such intrattentive experiences is discussed in this chapter and subsequently an understanding of the intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model, and the training that is required in order to utilise the strand, can be gained.

Making the intrattentive strand the first strand, resulting in dancers being trained to access intrattention before they are trained to access non-intrattention, was a deliberate choice. The nature of an intrattentive state is that it is supplementary to the fundamental non-intrattentive state. It may be presumed, therefore, that methods for accessing the fundamental state should be addressed first. Non-intrattention is, however, a state in which there is an absence of intrattention. In order for one to be able to recognise such an absence, one must primarily be equipped to identify and understand intrattention. Indeed, to be able to state that something is absent one must firstly be able to state what that something is. In addition, the means of access that have been formulated for states of non-intrattention are entirely dependent on states of intrattention.[70] It was therefore considered necessary to train dancers to access the supplementary intrattentive states before training them to access the fundamental non-intrattentive states and consequently to entitle the intrattentive strand the first strand.

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[70] The premise behind the notion that in order to access non-intrattention one must initially also engage in intrattention is discussed fully in Chapter 5.

Chapter breakdown

This chapter begins with the definition of an intrattentive dance state which was introduced in Chapter 2. Three practices and theories that contributed to the formulation of the intrattentive strand, and the training which precedes its use, are then discussed. These are: somatic practices, specifically the Feldenkrais Method; sport psychology, specifically theories on imagery and self-talk; and visual and verbal processing theories, specifically the Dual Coding Theory. Each theory and practice has foundations in particular disciplines outside the dance discipline and thus is not necessarily related to dance. In addition, it is not the case that they exist within their own disciplines as methods or models for accessing states of an intrattentive nature.

Many different Eastern and Western traditions, philosophies and martial arts are incorporated into the various somatic practices that are discussed. The theories of self-talk and imagery used within sport psychology are clearly related to a different discipline altogether – sport and exercise – and are based on Western psychology and philosophy. The visual and verbal processing theories and the Dual Coding Theory are inherent in psychology and the study of mnemonics. A certain amount of selectivity, analysis, interpretation, adaptation and application was essential in order to make use of these practices and theories in the formulation of the intrattentive strand. The theories and practices discussed in this chapter are considered to be the most applicable in this context. They are, however, by no means the only ones which could offer a means of accessing states of an intrattentive nature. The three theories and practices chosen are explained as fully as is necessary in this context without disregarding their intended origin, purpose or meaning and each explanation culminates in a summary clarifying exactly how the practice or theory contributed to the Dance Consciousness Model.

Following these discussions, the chapter then describes the intrattentive training that is required for the intrattentive strand, including how to access fundamental and higher states of intrattention, and provides a breakdown of each intrattentive training workshop. Finally, the exact nature of the intrattentive strand is described and it is

clarified how this strand is applied within choreography, rehearsal and performance in order to create an intrattentive dance consciousness.

Intrattention

An intrattentive state of dance consciousness is:

> A state in which a dancer not only experiences the dance, but also is knowingly, intentionally, attentively and non-inferentially aware of the dance. The dance is the dancer's explicit object of attention. The dancer is actively aware of the qualitative experience of the dance, including the dancing body, the dancing mind and external factors surrounding the dance. In addition, the dancer is aware of any mental activity concerned with the dance. The dancer may experience either an ordinary state of supplementary consciousness in which complete awareness is focussed on the dance, or a higher state of supplementary consciousness in which the dancer is additionally able to monitor introspectively that awareness – the experiential sensation of which differs for the dancing body and mind. The dancer is able to report non-inferentially on the state.

The intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model provides access to an intrattentive state of dance consciousness. In order to utilise this strand of the model, and subsequently give an intrattentive performance, a dancer must initially be trained to access states of intrattention whilst dancing.

So, how is it possible to experience or access intrattention? Try now two different activities. Firstly, try to have a generally intrattentive experience; in other words, try to be particularly aware of your self and your surroundings. This is not as simple a task as one would expect. Of course, one undoubtedly experiences numerous intrattentive moments each day, but trying purposefully to create these moments and experiences is particularly difficult. Secondly, try to be particularly aware of your hand and focus all your conscious attention on to your hand – what it looks like and feels like. In this second activity, purposefully directing attention and accessing a state of focussed intrattentive consciousness, in which attention is directed toward a specific object, seems more achievable than creating a general state of intrattention in

which one is consciously aware of everything, as in the first activity. Whilst focussing intrattentively on your hand, everything else continues to exist, and can be attended to through a non-intrattentive conscious state.

Although focussed attention might be considered as more straightforward to maintain, it is still possible for the mind to wander and begin to attend to other objects; thus the quality of the directed intrattention decreases. In order to access a truly intrattentive state of dance consciousness, therefore, all intrattention must be directed towards the dance – including the actual experience of the dance, the dancing body, the dancing mind and external factors surrounding the dance such as the music – and this intrattention must be maintained throughout the experience. Everything outside the dance must be attended to through a non-intrattentive conscious state.

How, then, can a dancer direct all conscious attention towards the dance? The intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model and the intrattentive training allow dancers to understand how this is possible and provide the means through which dancers can achieve intrattention. In order to formulate the intrattentive training and the intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model, research was undertaken into existing practices that seem, in one way or another, to deal with the experiencing or accessing of intrattention.

Methods for accessing intrattention

Somatic practices

Although somatic practices do not claim to deal specifically with consciousness, many of the principles were considered within the formulation of the intrattentive strand and the intrattentive training. Some insight into the nature of somatic practices will clarify why.

The term somatics, which was coined by Hanna in 1976, comes from the Greek term *soma*. The term *soma* originally refers literally to the body. In current practice, however, the use of the term has been developed by practitioners who refer to it as

'the body experienced from within' (Kampe, 2003).[71] Hanna claims that somatics is 'the field which studies the soma: namely the body as perceived from within by first person perception' (1986, p.4). She continues to state that:

> The soma, being internally perceived, is categorically distinct from a body, not because the subject is different but because the mode of viewpoint is different.
> (1986, p.4)

As with the Dance Consciousness Model, it is the experience of the subject that is of importance within somatics, an experience that is peculiar to and understood by the one experiencing it. As Fortin *et al.* acknowledge, 'the process orientation of somatics favours the experiential soma (how the body feels from a first-person viewpoint)' (2002, p.172). Fitt describes this as 'knowing oneself from the inside out' (1996, p.304).

Currently, there are several different established somatic practices, such as the Barteneiff Fundamentals Technique, the Skinner Releasing Technique and Authentic Movement, which, according to Foster, construct the 'body as a site of exploration to which the dancer must remain vigilantly attentive' (2000, p.xiv). Although, such practices were not all specifically formulated for use within a dance context, they are 'becoming well established in the dance community' with an 'expanding and diverse literature', the development of an 'international community of educators and, more recently, a community of researchers' (Fortin, 2003, p.3). Somatics is also increasingly used in dance education and it is possible to train at both undergraduate and postgraduate level in somatic practice.[72] It is felt that somatic practice has a great deal to offer the discipline of dance. For example, in referring to their research, Fortin *et al.* state that:

> By integrating somatics ... we encouraged dancers to attend to themselves from a first person perspective. This has enormous repercussions. Not only is the representational body validated but the experiential one that is the inner experience of the dancer.
> (2002, p.175)

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[71] Lecture given by Kampe on 14 February 2003 at the University of Leeds, Bretton Hall Campus, entitled 'Body, soma, self – Somatic perspectives on dance education and training'.
[72] At institutes such as University College Chichester. See www.ucc.ac.uk/cfm/courses/courseresults.cfm?courses=dance

The principles of somatics noted by Fortin *et al.* are analogous with the purposes of the intrattentive strand. For example, Fortin *et al.* believe that somatic practices require the subject to have an increased awareness of their experience. This view corresponds with that of other writers, for example: Smith claims that the somatic aim is 'developing self-awareness' (2002, p.123); Ginsburg states that somatics is a 'practice of embodied awareness' (1999, p.83); and Minton claims that somatics is about 'being aware of your body' (1989, p.49).

Within somatics and the intrattentive strand, ability to control and direct attention is crucial in order to accomplish awareness of self. Fortin claims that:

> Shifting of attention is a key concept of somatic practices. We can construct a radically different world via the direction of our attention. (2003, p.7)

So how can one control and direct attention in order to increase awareness and create an intrattentive state? According to Fortin, 'we can teach the movement of attention, as we do with any other movement' (*ibid.* p.8). Hanna describes attention as 'functioning somewhat like a lens [which can be] pointed and focussed' (1986, p.4) and Skelton likens the process of controlling attention to the process of tuning a radio:

> ... because it involves the image of listening; listening to the information as it comes through the source, that is the whole self (psychophysical being) and responding to it. [This tuning in requires an] act of paying acute attention to the alignment of certain wavelengths ... in order to arrive at a clear transmission. (2003, p.24)

In order to gain further insight into the means through which it is possible to increase awareness of self, it is of use to consider one particular somatic practice which claims self-awareness as its aim. This practice is the Feldenkrais Method.

The Feldenkrais Method

The Feldenkrais Method is a technique developed by Feldenkrais after he experienced a knee injury. The method enables people to move more efficiently in everyday life, to detect habitual movement mistakes and correct them, and to ease pain and to develop the body and mind so that they can work together harmoniously

(Feldenkrais, 1981). Feldenkrais (1972) believes that it is essential to know what our bodies are doing in order for them to do what we want them to do, and thus the method promotes self-awareness.

With the rise in somatic dance education, the Feldenkrais Method is, at the time of writing, being integrated into dance, creating almost a new practice which Galeota-Wozny claims is 'not being appreciated by either the dance community or the Feldenkrais community' (2001, p.12). Nevertheless, practitioners such as Paine (2001) run workshops which specifically explore connections between contemporary dance and the Feldenkrais principles. The method is also being integrated into some dance education. Some practitioners use the method before performance as a preparatory exercise or as a warm-up at the beginning of a choreographic workshop or rehearsal. Strauch notes that 'world class ... performers have enhanced their performance using the method' (1996, p.2).

The Feldenkrais Method is, however, very much a method of training which exists apart from dance practice. In other words, the method may be used by dancers to improve or enhance awareness of their bodies and the way their bodies move, but it has yet to be integrated into choreography or performance; as Fortin *et al.* state:

> The transfer to stage performance is a primary goal for the incorporation of somatic education into dance [and] the incorporation of somatics into dance programmes has more or less relied on wishful thinking.
> (2002, p.160)

Unlike somatic practices, the intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model attempts to transfer training principles, similar to those used in the Feldenkrais Method, into the dance process – choreography and rehearsal – and performance, and it utilises the principles as a form of training.

Awareness through Movement and Functional Integration

The Feldenkrais method has two components, Awareness through Movement and Functional Integration, both of which have a similar purpose but each has a slightly different format. The Awareness through Movement component is a group session in

which a Feldenkrais practitioner guides participants through a series of movement exercises which:

> ... increase the level of awareness of the participant, and at the same time increase the level of sensitivity to the nuances of kinaesthetic sensation.
> (Ginsburg, 1999, p.83)

The Functional Integration component is a one-to-one session in which the practitioner works a participant through a personalised series of physical exercises using direct contact. It is felt that the method:

> ... stimulates the innate learning capacity of the human brain and nervous system through simple, directed movements performed with focussed awareness.
> (Paine, 2001, p.47)

One of the aims of both the Feldenkrais method and the intrattentive strand is to encourage the body to move with 'conscious intention rather than through acquired habit' (McCaw, 2001, p.8). Galeota-Wozny notes that 'embedded in Feldenkrais are numerous opportunities to self observe, self reflect and self organise' (2001, p.12). Reflecting on oneself encourages one to attend to and think about oneself whilst moving; as Feldenkrais states, his training ensures that the participant 'learns to act while he thinks and to think while he acts' (1990, p.60).

The Feldenkrais Method is particularly thorough in that it does not merely enhance awareness of one particular body part during the execution of a movement, but works methodically through various body parts, regardless of whether or not they are involved directly in the execution of the movement. The method therefore encourages full body awareness as a means to creating full body integration. An arm movement, for example, involves not just the movement of the arm but also many other body parts, such as the back, which are affected in the execution of the arm movement. In this instance, the arm is the directly involved body part and the back is an indirectly involved body part. McCaw notes that the method is:

> ... achieved by the sensual experiencing of all the component parts of a particular movement: for example, the lesson invites you to engage the pelvis as you turn your head.
> (2001, p.9)

The intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model and the intrattentive training also encompass full body integration. Dancers are encouraged to attend systematically to all the body parts involved in the execution of a movement during rehearsals. This is to ensure that, by the time of the performance, every movement and every body part involved, directly or indirectly, in that movement has at some point during the process been attended to specifically.

As previously explained, the main aim of the Feldenkrais Method is similar to that of the intrattentive strand. What was needed during the formulation of this strand, however, was not merely the identification of a parallel aim but also a means of accomplishing this aim. Below is an example of a particular Feldenkrais Awareness through Movement lesson, the purpose of which is to expand awareness. Similar to many of the lessons of Feldenkrais, this example contains an element of exploration, during which the individual is encouraged to experiment with directing attention to different body parts whilst moving in various ways. In this instance the aim is to direct attention to the quality of the execution rather than the size of the movement:

> Sit cross-legged on the floor. Put hands together in a praying position with elbows out. Keeping the palms together, separate the fingers without moving the elbows. Experiment with both hands simultaneously, and then with each individual hand. Turn the hands so that the fingers point away from the body. Repeat the movements. Imagine that the right eye contains a small telescope. Look to the right and then up and around to make a slow circular movement with the right eye. Whilst doing so attend to any parts of the movement that are not smooth and easy. Experiment with making circles in different directions. Finally combine the hand movement with the eye movement.
> (Ginsburg, 1999, p.83)

Ginsburg notes the following about his personal experience of the above exercise:

> Phenomenologically one feels one's right eye in a new way. Initially as I begin to move my right eye in a circular motion, imagining the eye as a telescope, I move the eye in accordance with this image, feeling the movement of the eye with an attention that I normally do

> not bring to moving my eye. At first I may find it difficult to make the circle round; at certain points I find that I cannot move the eye the way I want. Slowly as I move, directing my attention to where I can move with quality ... I find that I can approach the difficult places in the circle and begin to make a complete smooth and enjoyable movement ... Eventually I am directed to return to the movement of the hands, and find my right hand more supple and moveable.
> (1999, p.84)

By moving 'very slowly, delicately and attentively' through the 'difficult portions of the movement, one begins to improve the quality of moving' (Ginsburg, 1999, p.83). Ginsburg claims that this is a 'clear demonstration of the effect of directed conscious awareness' (*ibid.* p.84). This effect is of interest, but has little direct relevance to the formulation of the intrattentive strand and intrattentive training; of greater relevance is how the attention is directed.

In the example above, the method of directing attention seems to be a type of self-observation, which leads to a particularly attentive state that can be likened to intrattention. In the intrattentive training a similar type of observation is used. For the purposes of this research and in the context of the Dance Consciousness Model, this observation has been termed physical observation. Within the intrattentive training, dancers are encouraged to observe their bodies physically whilst moving. Through this intentional and analytical observation, the dancer's attention becomes knowingly and entirely directed towards his or her body, thus creating a state of intrattention. Physical observation can, therefore, be considered as a means of access to intrattention, and this particular means of access was inspired by the self-observation practised within the Feldenkrais Method.

In the Functional Integration part of the Feldenkrais Method, the practitioner touches and feels the dancer whilst the latter executes simple movements. The aim is:

> ... enhanced awareness in which the person touched realises new possibilities of kinaesthetic sensing and feeling, and experiences shifts in the body (movement image).
> (*ibid.*)

What is of particular interest here is not these realisations, but the idea that one person can enhance the awareness of another person. One person directing his or her conscious attention to a second person's body can cause that second person to direct

conscious attention to his or her own body. This idea is used in the mover/observer exercises which have been created specifically for the intrattentive training.

In one mover/observer exercise dancer A moves, usually through improvisation, and physically observes his or her own body. In addition, dancer B physically observes dancer A as he or she moves. Dancer B does not merely sit and watch dancer A, but moves with dancer A, observing every detail from every angle possible. The observation for both dancers is intentional and active, rather than passive; that is the dancers do not merely receive a passing image of the body, but instead focus actively and reflect on the image. Dancer A is instructed to attend entirely to his or her own body and not pay any attention to dancer B, in other words to direct a state of non-intrattention towards dancer B. This is achieved through the process of allowing all the attention in dancer A's capacity to be directed towards self. Dancer B is instructed to give all their attention to dancer A and allow his or her own body to move around dancer A in a non-intrattentive manner. This is achieved through the process of dancer B giving every part of his or her attention within their capacity to dancer A.

During the formulation of the intrattentive strand and the intrattentive training in Empirical Project 1, it was claimed by all the dancers that having another dancer physically observe their bodies, whilst they were simultaneously physically observing their own bodies, increased the quality of attention directed towards self and undoubtedly allowed access to concentrated states of intrattention. People are often more self conscious when being watched, and dancers often claim that they too are more self conscious when performing in front of an audience than when rehearsing in a studio. It is clear, then, why a process of external physical observation is of use in producing states of intrattention.

In addition, again during the formulation of the intrattentive training in Empirical Project 1, the dancers claimed that working in the role of dancer B allowed them a kinaesthetic understanding of how it is possible to intrattend to another body. Exercises such as the mover/observer exercises play a vital role in the intrattentive training in preparing dancers to access states of intrattention whilst working in a duet. The exercises act as a transition between intrattentive solo work and

intrattentive duet work. This transition is crucial; this view was supported by dancers during Empirical Project 1 who confirmed that learning to focus attention on another's body as well one's own body, having just been trained to focus all attention on to one's own body, is particularly difficult. In duet work one must be able to split the intrattention between self and other. The mover/observer exercises help dancers to understand what it feels like to intrattend to another rather than to self before they have to progress to intrattending to both self and other.

Being able to attend entirely to another body is by no means straightforward. With reference to Functional Integration, Ginsburg claims:

> As practitioner, I find that I am effective when I shift to an open awareness, shut down my usual verbal self chatter, and give up any attachment to producing results.
> (1999, p.85)

This ridding of verbal self chatter and any preoccupation of completing the exercise successfully, or moving in an aesthetically pleasing way whilst executing the observation, is something that the dancers are encouraged to do in the intrattentive training workshops when working with another dancer. Dancers are required to pay no attention to any extraneous thoughts that may occur whilst they are attending to their partner; this includes thoughts about self. Dancers are advised that, should these thoughts occur, it is vital to re-focus, even if this means stopping momentarily and taking hold of the attention, and then returning to the physical observation.

It is worth noting here another somatic practice that utilises the mover/observer technique; the practice of Authentic Movement. Adler, who is considered to have an authoritative voice in the field of Authentic Movement, describes the practice as follows:

> The architecture of the discipline of Authentic Movement is based on the relationship between a mover and a witness ... Each work is centred in the development of the inner witness, which is one way of understanding the development of consciousness. In this discipline the inner witness is externalised, embodied by a person who is called the outer witness. Another person, called the mover, embodies the moving self.
> (2002, p.xvi)

In the practice of Authentic Movement, the outer witness is responsible for the consciousness of the mover and, through observation, directs the mover's awareness towards self. The mover is able to bring awareness toward what the body is doing and, within this, consider the sensation of the moving (Adler, 2003, p.21). In Authentic Movement 'the witness's experience is completely dependent on the presence of the mover' likewise, 'the mover's experience is completely dependent on the presence of the witness' (*ibid.* p.61). This is not the case within the intrattentive training. The intrattentive mover/observer exercises merely act as tools to encourage the dancer's awareness towards self, through the self becoming objectified as a result of the observation from an observer. The dancer's awareness of self is not, however, dependent on the observer, merely aided by it. Indeed, the training essentially encourages dancers to access intrattention independently.

Summary of the contribution of somatic practices to the intrattentive strand and training

Within the formulation of the intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model and the intrattentive training, some of the principles of somatic practices, especially the Feldenkrais Method, were taken into consideration. These are summarised below:

- In common with the general ideology underlying somatic practice, the intrattentive strand encourages the dancer to have increased awareness of his or her experience of moving and to direct and control his or her conscious attention in order to access and maintain an intrattentive dance consciousness.

- Although somatic principles are employed within dance training, it is difficult to identify how the principles can be transferred into choreography, rehearsal or performance. The intrattentive strand, therefore, provides a process of transferral from training to practice and includes, within the training, a method of applying the various means of access within the contexts of choreography, rehearsal and performance.

- In common with the Feldenkrais Method, the intrattentive strand and training encompass full-body integration and awareness, and encourage dancers to attend systematically to all the body parts involved in the execution of movement.

- Within the intrattentive training dancers are taught to utilise physical observation as a means of access to non-intrattentive states of consciousness. This observation is similar to the self-observation encouraged by the Feldenkrais Method.

- Through the mover/observer exercise the intrattentive training teaches that one person can enhance the awareness of another person. Unlike the process of Functional Integration this does not necessitate physical contact between two dancers; instead it requires merely a shared direction of attention.

Sport psychology

Sport and exercise psychology is a multidisciplinary subject and incorporates theories and approaches of psychology. According to Gill:

> Sport and exercise psychology ... [involve] the scientific study of human behaviour in sport and exercise, and the practical application of that knowledge in sport and exercise settings.
> (2000, p.7)

In addition, according to Abernethy *et al.*:

> Performance of movement skills in both sport and exercise settings appears, intuitively at least, to be inextricably linked to the act of paying attention to the task in hand.
> (1998, p.173)

The preoccupation with the human experience in the field of sport psychology and the human's ability to pay attention are the reasons that the practice was considered for potential use during the formulation of the Dance Consciousness Model and consciousness training.

The study of an athlete's attention and focussing abilities is of key interest in sport psychology as it is felt that 'cognitive skills, such as the ability to focus and maintain attention, have clear implications for performance' (Gill, 2000, p.57). It is of general consensus that successful athletes are those who are able to direct attention to the task in hand and block out any extraneous or negative thoughts. This is noted here by Gill:

> We understand that the ability to selectively attend to cues, events, or thoughts while disregarding others is a key to successful performance.
> (2000, p.58)

In sport psychology, much research has been undertaken into the techniques that athletes use in order to focus mentally and prepare for their sport, and these techniques are considered to be psychological skills:

> Attention and cognitive styles are key to psychological skills, and sport psychology consultants devote considerable time to concentration exercises and imagery rehearsal.
> (Gill, 2000, p.57)

Gill maintains that 'the cognitive characteristics most prominent in [sport psychology] are attention and imagery' (*ibid.*).

Within sport psychology, there is evidence of a consciousness continuum, meaning that varying states of consciousness are identified; from highly reflective states – intrattentive states – to states in which the athlete has little awareness of self – non-intrattentive states. Sport psychology does not deal specifically with intrattention and non-intrattention; however, confirmation that they are considered can be found in statements such as:

> One distinction particularly relevant to athletes is control versus automatic processing. Control processing, which the individual does deliberately ... is slow and effortful. Automatic processing, which typically occurs with well learned skills, is fast and effortless and not under conscious control.
> (Gill, 2000, p.58)

Control processing holds similar characteristics to intrattentive consciousness, and automatic processing seems to be referring more to a non-intrattentive consciousness.

It is of common consensus that different athletes are in different states of consciousness when they perform. In their study of marathon runners, Morgan and Pollock (1977) found that some runners use dissociative techniques and others use associative techniques. A dissociative attentional style uses techniques of distraction and focussing on things external to self, for example thinking about what to have for

dinner or what to put on the shopping list.[73] Such techniques are likely to cause a non-intrattentive consciousness directed towards the running. The subject matter of these external thoughts is not important to dissociative runners, as long as it does not include thoughts about the present experience of running. An associative attentional style uses techniques of focussing entirely on self and the present experience of running, such as the physical sensations in the body. This is likely to cause an intrattentive consciousness.

There is some debate within sport psychology as to which type of processing or attentional state is more effective. Morgan and Pollock (1977) support the idea that control processing and an associative attentional style are generally more effective for sport. Gill (2000), however, supports the opposite view. Gill and Strom facilitated a laboratory experiment in 1985 in which:

> ... female athletes performed an endurance task ... for as many repetitions as possible using either a narrow-internal focus on feelings in their legs or a narrow external focus on a collage of pictures.
> (Gill, 2000, p.64)

Here Gill is making reference to associative and dissociative techniques and she claims that 'not only did the external focus', the dissociative technique, 'lead to more repetitions, but nearly all participants preferred that style' (*ibid.*).[74] Despite the results of this experiment, it is difficult to prove whether associative or dissociative, or intrattentive or non-intrattentive, techniques lead to more effective performance. Indeed, 'dissociation may be useful for some tasks and association more effective for others' (*ibid.*).[75] Whilst this is an interesting discussion, this particular chapter is concerned essentially with sport psychology's notions of control processing and associative techniques. These techniques are the most relevant in terms of the focus of this chapter – intrattentive consciousness – and hence were of use during the formulation of the intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model and the intrattentive training.

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[73] These sorts of techniques are used within the Dance Consciousness Model in relation to non-intrattention and are discussed in Chapter 5.
[74] See Gill and Strom (1985) for more information.
[75] It is partly for these reasons that the Dance Consciousness Model incorporates both an intrattentive strand and a non-intrattentive strand. Unlike other current practices, such as those used in sport psychology, the Dance Consciousness Model also offers the possibility of utilising both intrattentive and non-intrattentive techniques – see Chapter 6.

Cognitive control strategies

Within sport psychology it is thought that, in order to ensure control processing and an associative style, attentional control and concentration strategies must be developed by the athlete, as 'the focus of attention is crucial' (Hardy *et al.*, 2001, p.174) and 'concentration is a key psychological skill' (Gill, 2000, p.175). Being able to control attention and concentration is essential in order to access and maintain an intrattentive state of consciousness knowingly and intentionally. However, according to Hardy *et al.* 'maintaining concentration can be a problem for sports performers' (2001, p.174) and by extrapolation, in the context of this study, for dancers.

As noted previously in this chapter, controlling attention and concentration is not necessarily straightforward:

> As with most psychological skills, it is much easier to tell someone (or ourselves) to concentrate than to convey how to do it.
> (Gill, 2000, p.175)

This may be because 'concentration is not an innate ability, but a skill acquired through training and practice' (*ibid.* p.177). Some sports psychologists, such as Hardy, Jones and Gould, have suggested how one may control attention in this way: 'concentration is about focussing the mind upon one source of information, often to the exclusion of others' (2001, p.174). Despite this, few have actually provided any specific techniques.

Nideffer (1993) provides a series of control techniques using 'Attentional Control Training' (ACT). The aim of ACT is to 'develop a personalised intervention program to target an individual's specific problem areas' (Gill, 2000, p.175) in terms of their attention capacity. The predominant focus within ACT is on centering, which involves 'relaxing muscles, breathing deeply, and focussing on feelings with exhalation' (*ibid.*). Sports psychologists do not appear to have accepted the ACT because there is a lack of empirical evidence of its success.

Schmid and Peper (1998) developed a series of cognitive control strategies which encompass both external and internal concentration techniques. The strategies involve various types of rehearsal:

- Dress rehearsal;
- Rehearsal of simulated competition experiences (simulation training);
- Mental rehearsal.

The internal strategies of Schmid and Peper (1998) involve various types of attentional control:

- Using verbal or kinaesthetic attentional cues and triggers to focus concentration. For example a swimmer might focus on 'the feel of the hand pulling through the water' (Gill, 2000, p.176).

- Turning failure into success. For example, 'one mentally rehearses a successful performance immediately after a failure' (Gill, 2000, p.176).

- Using electrodermal feedback. The purpose of this is, for example, 'to show how thoughts affect the body, to monitor relaxation, to identify stressful points during imagery, and to facilitate concentration training' (Gill, 2000, p.176).

- Developing performing protocols such as performance rituals. Sport psychologists such as Boutcher and Crews (1987) believe that pre-performance routines instantaneously generate focussed attention. Many athletes develop and practise their own personal protocols and mental strategies.

These cognitive control strategies all encourage a focussed and reflective state of consciousness – an intrattentive state – and also provide some particular techniques. Some of these techniques can be used to enable dancers to access and maintain an intrattentive consciousness.

In sport:

> [t]he competitive environment clearly includes various factors which are not present to the same degree, or even at all, in the training environment.
> (Hardy *et al.*, 2001, p.189)

This is also the case in dance; physical factors, such as the audience, and mental factors, such as anxiety, which may be present in a performance produce a different

environment from that during the rehearsal. The capacity to maintain focus and not be distracted by these factors is essential in order for a dancer to sustain an intrattentive state of consciousness. A technique which is commonly used by athletes 'to enhance their attention control in highly pressured and potentially distracting situations' is that of 'simulation training' (Hardy *et al.*, 2001, p.189).

Simulation training typically takes two forms: 'physical practice in the presence of simulated competition stressors' – similar to a dress rehearsal in the dance context – 'and mental rehearsal of the actual competitive event' (*ibid.*) – the performance. In the dance context, the dress rehearsal is a crucial part of the dance process and, as such, has been incorporated into conventional dance practice. Simulation training, or mental rehearsal, does not play such a predominant role in conventional dance practice; however it has been incorporated into the intrattentive training and the intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model because it can be used as a means of access to intrattention.

During the intrattentive training, dancers are taught to use simulation training and are trained to sit with eyes closed and mentally rehearse their movement material as part of the choreographic and rehearsal process. Working with the eyes closed is an essential part of this process; Adler confirms that with 'eyes closed and with focus inward, there is an intention toward staying present' and 'toward practising the art of concentration' (2002, p.xix). Within the intrattentive training, this mental rehearsal is considered to be a means of access to intrattentive states of consciousness and is referred to as motionless blind sensing. This term has been coined for use specifically within the context of this research and the Dance Consciousness Model.

Whilst using motionless blind sensing, dancers are encouraged to implement some of the techniques specified by Schmid and Peper (1998), such as attentional cues and triggers and electrodermal feedback. For example, dancers are directed to imagine the kinaesthetic sensation of a particular movement and to allow electrodermal feedback to occur. In other words, through imagining the kinaesthetic sensation of a jump, the kinaesthetic experience of that jump can be recreated within the body without the dancer actually executing the jump physically. Dancers are also encouraged to create performing protocols, as recommended by Schmid and Peper

(1998), in which they develop a personalised performance ritual which is incorporated into the preparation for every performance. For example, a dancer may decide that, prior to a performance, he or she will execute a particular motionless blind sensing exercise to enable them instantly to generate focussed attention in order to access an intrattentive state of consciousness.

Imagery is related intrinsically to the mental rehearsal and simulation training in sport psychology, and to the motionless blind sensing used in the intrattentive training. Imagery plays an important role in sport psychology and it is 'often a key component in the mental training programs developed and implemented by sport psychologists' (Hall, 1998, p.165). In addition, 'coaches often encourage their athletes to use imagery to help them learn new skills' and to 'improve skills they already possess' (*ibid.*). According to Hall, 'athletes, coaches, and sport psychologists all realise mental imagery is a valuable technique for improving performance' (*ibid.*). So, what exactly is mental imagery?

Mental imagery

According to Hardy, Jones and Gould, 'imagery can be defined as a symbolic sensory experience that may occur in any sensory mode' (2001, p.28) and Gill believes that 'imagery involves using all the senses to create or recreate an experience mentally' (2000, p.181). Thomas states that:

> Mental imagery, often informally described as seeing in the mind's eye, visualization, etc., is quasi-perceptual experience: it significantly resembles perceptual experience, but occurs in the absence of the appropriate perceptual stimuli.
> (2004)[76]

Imagery can be considered to be a mental, sensory representation of a perceptual experience, which is distinct from the actual perceptual experience. How, though, can one create such a representation? It is possible to train one's mind to use imagery to become more efficient in creating high quality images which are vivid and controlled (Hardy *et al.*, 2001, p.42). Psychologists Gould and Damarjian (1996)

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[76] http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/nthomas/mipia.htm

created a list of instructions that they deem essential for imagery training. Some of these instructions are also used in the intrattentive training and are:[77]

- Practise imagery regularly;
- Use all the senses to enhance imagery vividness;
- Emphasise dynamic kinaesthetic imagery;
- Use relaxation techniques in conjunction with imagery techniques;
- Imagine in real time;
- Use internal and external outlooks.

(Gould and Damarjian, 1996, p.32)

Within the intrattentive strand and training, dancers are exposed continually to tasks, such as motionless blind sensing, which require them to create images of self in order to access states of intrattention. Whilst using imagery, dancers are encouraged to recreate all the sensual and kinaesthetic sensations involved with the image of self in order to enhance the vividness of the image. Before they undertake any tasks involving this type of imagery, dancers are reminded that they must relax the body and mind to ensure that extraneous thoughts do not disrupt the imagery. They are encouraged to imagine in real time and therefore motionless blind sensing should take as long as the actual physical rehearsal of the movement.

In addition, dancers are trained to understand that 'different visual imagery perspectives may be desirable for different tasks' (Hardy *et al.*, 2001, p.42) and that they should therefore use internal and external outlooks. An internal outlook requires the dancer to create images from a first-person viewpoint and have an 'approximation of the real life phenomenology'; the dancer actually imagines being inside his or her body and experiencing those sensations which might be expected in the actual situation (Mahoney and Avener, 1977, p.137). An external outlook requires the dancer to view himself or herself from the perspective of an external observer, and so create images from a third-person viewpoint. The use of both internal and external outlooks can increase the quality of an image.

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[77] Note that Gould and Damarjian list many more conditions than those listed here. Only the ones deemed to be relevant to this research have been included. For a comprehensive list see Gould and Damarjian (1996, pp.32-3).

Self-talk

Another cognitive control strategy commonly used by athletes is self-talk which helps them to control their attention and subsequently their performance. Bunker *et al.* state that self-talk is 'the key to cognitive control' (1993, p.226). The concept underlying this strategy is that 'behaviour can be modified by means of specific forms of external and internal talking' (Hackfort and Schwenkmezger, 1993, p.335), where external means spoken out loud and internal means inside the head.

Self-talk is often used by athletes in association with verbal persuasion or self-coaching, when athletes tell themselves that they are capable of succeeding. It is also used to initiate positive thinking, and much research has been undertaken to explore the notions of changing negative thoughts to positive ones and reframing these thoughts. Experiments have shown that this type of self-talk has positive effects on the athlete's performance; for example, Gould, Eklund and Jackson (1992) report that self-talk is a common technique for nurturing optimistic expectations and focussing attention for Olympic wrestlers. According to Williams and Leffingwell (1996), self-talk has many benefits and can be used to correct bad habits which have become automatic, build self-confidence, increase efficacy, maintain exercise behaviour and help athletes reach an optimal emotional state.

All of these benefits are associated with having control over the direction of attention. The Dance Consciousness Model has adopted a technique similar to self-talk, its predominant purpose within the model and the intrattentive training being that of controlling and directing dancers' attention in order to access an intrattentive state of consciousness. For the purpose of this research and in the context of the Dance Conscious Model, this technique has been termed verbal report. Dancers are taught to provide a verbal report, first externally and then internally, and dance concurrently. The subjects of this report are the self and the movement being executed by self, and the report is used to ensure that intrattention is maintained and not interrupted by any extraneous thoughts.

Even whilst using verbal report, dancers may occasionally find that their mind wanders. During the intrattentive training, dancers are encouraged to use a higher order state of intrattention alongside the fundamental state that is being accessed

through the verbal report. The subject of the fundamental state is the self, the subject of the higher order state is the fundamental state. The higher order state can therefore be used to monitor the verbal report and ensure that it remains constant and effective.

In sport psychology, specific techniques have been created to teach athletes to use 'thought stopping' as a 'cue to interpret unwanted thoughts as they occur' (Gill, 2000, p.179). One such technique commonly used by athletes is 'quickly and clearly [to] say (or yell), stop! as soon as [an] unwanted thought comes into [the] mind' (*ibid.*). Another is to 'use visual cues (e.g. visualising a red stoplight) or physical cues (e.g. snapping the fingers)' (*ibid.*). Dancers are taught these techniques in the intrattentive training. The technique which the dancer chooses on a given occasion depends on the means of access being used. For example, whilst verbally reporting, dancers often use a verbal cue, but whilst using motionless blind sensing dancers often use a visual cue.

Broad/narrow and internal/external focus

Verbal report, in which the subject is the self, is particularly effective whilst a dancer is working as a solo, but not as effective whilst working as part of a duet or a group. In the latter instance, the verbal report must accommodate self and other(s). Within sport psychology, there is little research into how self-talk can be effective within group situations; most of the current research seems to be concerned with the individual. The Dance Consciousness Model and intrattentive training teach dancers the difference between using verbal report as a solo and as a group activity as it is essential to ensure that intrattentive consciousness directed towards self differs from an intrattentive consciousness directed towards self and other(s).

Nideffer's (1976) model of attention supports the idea that 'varying combinations of attentional width and direction are appropriate for varying activities' and use of 'the appropriate attentional focus can enhance performance' (Gill, 2000, p.60) and thus it comprises two dimensions: width and direction. According to Gill:

> Width ranges from narrow to broad; narrow and broad attention focus on a limited and wide range of cues, respectively [and] direction shifts on a continuum from an internal focus on one's own thoughts and feelings to an external focus on objects and events outside of the body. (*ibid.*)

It is of common consensus that 'most activities require shifting of attention' (*ibid.* p.61). For example:

> The soccer goalie might use a broad-external focus in preparing for a shot, shift to a narrow-external focus to make the save, and perhaps use some broad-internal analysis to set up the shift to the offence.
> (Gill, 2000, p.61)

Hardy, Jones and Gould also note the significance of being able to shift between states: 'the performer's ability to switch attention from one stimulus to another ... is particularly important'; 'of particular interest is how elite performers are able to switch rapidly from one style to another' and how 'they have developed this attentional flexibility' (2001, p.180-3). Gill warns that using an inappropriate form of attention may be detrimental, for example:

> A performer using a broad-internal style might become preoccupied with analysis and miss the action. And although a broad-external focus allows one to take in important information, taking in too much irrelevant information may lead to confusion or overreaction. On the other hand, an inappropriate narrow-internal focus could lead a performer to miss relevant external information.
> (2000, p.61)

Nideffer's (1976) model of attention was of use during the formulation of the intrattentive strand. In the intrattentive training dancers are encouraged to experiment with the width and direction of their intrattention. They are taught that the width and direction are dependent on the nature, structure and form of the dance, for example in terms of the number of dancers involved or other external factors such as music or set. Each dance is different in terms of structure and form and therefore each dance necessitates an independent examination of whether it requires narrow or broad, and internal or external focus. For example: dancing a solo may require a narrow-internal focus; dancing interactively as a duet or part of a group may require a broad-external focus; dancing a solo as part of a group may require a narrow-external focus.

In some performances, a dancer may need to shift between dancing as a solo and dancing as part of a duet or group and *vice versa*. Consider an example in which dancer A performs a repetitive solo with narrow-internal intrattention. The cue for dancer A to finish the solo is the entrance of dancer B. If dancer A's intrattentive

focus is too narrow and internal, it is possible that he or she will not notice the entrance of dancer B and subsequently miss the cue. It is therefore essential that the dancer is equipped with the ability to broaden or narrow and externalise or internalise the conscious attention, and shift between intrattentive states. For the purposes of this research and the intrattentive training, this has been termed intrattentive flexibility. During the training, dancers are encouraged to gain an understanding of the different types of intrattention. They are given exercises in which they are directed to explore actively moving from working as a solo to working in a duet or a group. Mover/observer transition exercises, as discussed in the previous section on the Feldenkrais Method, are also used in order to assist dancers with their ability to shift focus.

Summary of the contribution of sport psychology to the intrattentive strand and training

In the formulation of the intrattentive strand and training, some of the principles and techniques used in sport psychology were taken into consideration. These techniques were then adapted and integrated into the model and the training, with an awareness of how they can be transferred effectively from the training, into choreography, rehearsal and performance. Gill notes the importance of this transition in sport psychology:

> The transition from the ... lab to the playing field can be a big leap. Exercises that incorporate some of these focusing techniques in the actual sport or exercise setting are likely to be more effective than exercises that do not have transitional steps to tie the skills to the activity.
> (2000, p.176)

The extracted principles and techniques are summarised below:

- The ability to control attention and concentration is of high importance within sport psychology and the intrattentive training, in which dancers are taught to utilise psychological and cognitive skills in order to access intrattentive states.

- Dancers use simulation training in the form of motionless blind sensing in order to access and maintain intrattention. They are taught how to employ some cognitive

control strategies, similar to those used by athletes, such as attentional cues and triggers, electrodermal feedback and personalised performance rituals.

- Imagery is used in some of the intrattentive means of access. Dancers are encouraged to consider the instructions identified by Gould and Damarjian (1996, p.32) and are to recreate sensual and kinaesthetic sensations, relax their bodies and minds, prevent extraneous thoughts, imagine in real time and use internal and external outlooks.

- Verbal report is used in the intrattentive strand, as a form of self-talk, and involves the dancer literally describing the dance whilst executing it in order to access an intrattentive state.

- Dancers learn how to access a higher order state of intrattention so that they can monitor the fundamental state. Whilst in the higher order state, they are able to implement specific thought-stopping techniques, similar to those used by athletes, in order to stop the mind becoming distracted.

- Attentional flexibility is a key component within sport psychology, as is intrattentive flexibility within the Dance Consciousness Model. Dancers are taught that the width and direction of intrattention is dependent on the nature, structure and form of the dance.

Visual and verbal processing theories

The idea of controlling consciousness is inextricably linked to that of mental processing; the methods, or means of access, of the practices and theories discussed thus far in this chapter all bear some relation to visual and verbal processing. For example, the Feldenkrais Method and simulation training, which were the inspiration for physical observation and blind sensing, both require visual processing, and self-talk, which was the inspiration for verbal report, requires verbal processing.

During the formulation of the intrattentive strand and the intrattentive training, an understanding of visual and verbal processing was therefore essential. Although the relevant visual and verbal processing theories do not present actual means of access

to intrattentive states, and do not deal with dance, they were nevertheless deemed to be of use in terms of their contribution in relation to understanding the mental processing involved.

The act of visual and verbal processing is referred to as visual and verbal thinking, or the inner eye and inner voice, by cognitive psychologists such as Paivio (1986), the visuo-spatial scratch pad and articulatory loop by mnemonic researchers such as Gross and McIlveen (1998) and mental imagery and self talk by sports psychologists such as Gill (2000). Indeed, many practices explicitly use similar theories involving visual and verbal processing. The Dance Consciousness Model is concerned with visual and verbal processing in terms of the role it plays within the means of access used in the intrattentive strand – physical observation, blind sensing and verbal report. The two most relevant theories are the Dual Coding Theory, which is based in psychology, and a theory used in memory research.

The Dual Coding Theory

Psychologist Paivio (1986) formulated the Dual Coding Theory (DCT), which describes how the mind processes and stores information. The DCT places equal significance on verbal and non-verbal processes. The theory can be applied to many cognitive phenomena and has been used in mnemonics, the study of intelligence and educational psychology.

Paivio states that:

> Human cognition is unique in that it has become specialized for dealing simultaneously with language and with non-verbal objects and events.
> (1986, p.53)

The human language system is distinctive in that it deals absolutely with linguistic input and output, either in the form of speech or writing, whilst simultaneously performing a symbolic function in relation to non-verbal objects, events, and behaviours. Cooper provides the following example:

> One can think of a house by thinking of the word "house", or by forming a mental image of a house. The verbal and image systems are connected and related, for one can think of the mental image of the

> house and then describe it in words, or read or listen to words and then form a mental image.
> (2004)[78]

The DCT argues that there are two cognitive subsystems which process knowledge simultaneously. One of these subsystems, the visual subsystem, is dedicated to the representation of non-verbal objects, events and processes and it stores images and pictorial information. The other subsystem, the verbal subsystem, is dedicated to language and processes and stores linguistic information. Paivio also describes two different types of representation units within these subsystems. These are defined as imagens and logogens. Imagens are the representational unit for mental images and logogens for verbal entities. According to Cooper, 'imagens operate synchronously or in parallel' (2004),[79] meaning that they appear as complete images inside the head and are instantly accessible. On the other hand 'logogens operate sequentially' (*ibid.*), meaning that they do not appear as a complete whole. Instead 'words come one at a time in a syntactically appropriate sequence in a sentence' (*ibid.*). The imagens and logogens serve very different purposes and function within the discrete visual and verbal subsystems.

Memory research

Within mnemonics, a similar differentiation is made between the two different subsystems that are used for processing or, in the context of memorising, for storing and recalling information. Memory researchers, such as Gross and McIlveen, refer to the 'articulatory loop' which is 'a verbal rehearsal loop' (1998, p.239). The articulatory loop is comparable with Paivio's verbal subsystem. The loop can be used, for example, when '[one tries] to remember a telephone number for a few seconds by saying it to [oneself]' and 'it is also used to hold words [one is] preparing to speak aloud' (*ibid.*). In common with Paivio's logogen representational units, the articulatory loop uses articulatory code, sometimes referred to as an acoustic representation, 'in which information is represented as it would be spoken' (*ibid.*). For these reasons it is sometimes referred to as 'the inner voice' (*ibid.*).

Memory researchers also refer to 'the visuo-spatial scratch pad' (*ibid.*), which is comparable with Paivio's visual subsystem. The visuo-spatial scratch pad also

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[78] http://www.konnections.net/lifecircles/paivio.htm
[79] http://www.konnections.net/lifecircles/paivio.htm

rehearses information, but it 'deals with visual and/or spatial information' (*ibid.*). It is used, for example, when 'we drive along a familiar road, approach a bend, and think about the road's spatial layout beyond the bend' (*ibid.*). Similar to the imagen representational units defined by Paivio, the visuo-spatial scratch pad uses a visual code, which represents 'information in the form of its visual features such as size, shape and colour' (Gross and McIlveen, 1998, p.239). It is sometimes referred to, especially by philosophers, as the inner eye.

Visual versus verbal: Visual imprints and internal monologues

Different people use their verbal subsystem/articulatory loop and their visual subsystem/visuo-spatial scratch pad to different degrees. Some people claim to think in words, meaning that they speak or hear words inside the mind. Others claim to think in images, meaning that they actually see images inside the mind. Atkinson *et al.* state that 'there are innumerable stories about scientists and artists producing their most creative work through visual thinking' (1996, p.323) and indeed:

> Albert Einstein … said he rarely thought in words; rather, he worked out his ideas in terms of more or less clear images which can be voluntarily reproduced and combined.
> (*ibid.* pp.322–3)

Yet others claim to think in both words and images. One simple exercise which can help individuals to determine which subsystem and representational units they use is as follows:

> When you look up a phone number and retain it until you have dialled it, in what form do you represent the digits? Is the representation visual – a mental picture of the digits? Is it acoustic – the sounds of the names of the digits?
> (*ibid.* p.260)

Although people often prefer either visual or verbal representation, it is of common consensus amongst psychologists and memory researchers, such as Atkinson *et al.*, that different systems are useful for different tasks. For example:

> When a person must store non-verbal items (such as pictures that are difficult to describe and therefore difficult to rehearse acoustically), the visual code becomes more important.
> (*ibid.* p.260–1)

Similarly, regardless of whether a person has a preference for visual representation, there are undoubtedly times when verbal representations, or the 'acoustic code', are more appropriate. In addition, there is some evidence that both visual and verbal representation can be used simultaneously in the processing of information, although quite often one is more dominant than the other. It is this connection between the two systems that allows the dual coding of information – which is one of the principles underlying Paivio's DCT. Another is that recall and recognition can be enhanced by presenting information in both visual and verbal form, as using two types of representation simultaneously can be more effective in terms of mental processing.

It is evident, then, that humans tend to think in a combination of words and images and psychologists consider it essential that any representational theory should integrate this dual functionality – which is also incorporated within the Dance Consciousness Model. The model and consciousness training therefore encourage dancers to use visual and verbal processing through three different means of access, two of which deal with visual processing and one which deals with verbal processing.

Within the intrattentive training dancers are taught to report externally and internally about their bodies whilst dancing; the purpose of the internal report is to create logogens or acoustic code inside their verbal subsystem or articulatory loop. Dancers are also taught to observe externally and internally; the purpose of the internal observation is to create imagens or visual code inside their visual subsystem or visuo-spatial scratch pad. In the context of the Dance Consciousness Model, the creating of logogens is referred to as an internal monologue and the creating of imagens as a visual imprint. The visual imprints are also created during blind sensing.

Within psychology it is considered that verbal and visual processing can occur simultaneously and, as stated earlier and according to the DCT, connecting them in this way can improve information processing and recall. The Dance Consciousness Model adopts this idea. In the intrattentive training the dancers are taught to use physical observation, or blind sensing, and verbal report simultaneously. This ensures that the dancer is using visual and verbal processing and thus potentially

increasing the ability to access intrattention. The intrattentive strand therefore also encourages dancers to access visual imprints combined with internal monologues. In the context of the intrattentive strand, connecting visual and verbal processes has been termed internal intrattention.

Summary of the contribution of visual and verbal processing theories to the intrattentive strand and training

Within the formulation of the intrattentive strand, some of the principles underlying visual and verbal processing theories assisted with understanding the mental processes involved in, for example, the Feldenkrais Method and the method of self-talk. This provided a better understanding of the means of access to intrattentive states of dance consciousness which, in turn, contributed to the formulation of the intrattentive strand and training. A summary of the principles extracted from the visual and verbal processing theories is provided below:

- Integrated within the intrattentive strand is a sense of dual functionality, and equal significance is placed on verbal and non-verbal processing as advocated, for example, by the DCT. The intrattentive strand therefore assumes that there are two cognitive subsystems which can be used when accessing intrattention.

- Through using physical observation or blind sensing, dancers are encouraged to create visual imprints, which are comparable with imagens. By using verbal report, dancers are able to create internal monologues, which are comparable with logogens. These visual imprints and internal monologues are used to create intrattentive states of dance consciousness.

- Dancers are taught that, although they may have a preference for either the visual or verbal means of access, different means of access are useful for different tasks. For example, head movement cannot be observed physically by self and verbal report is therefore the appropriate means of access to be used.

- Dancers are taught that using two means of access simultaneously allows the dual coding of information, which may be more effective in the accessing of intrattention.

Intrattentive training and the intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model

Having discussed somatic practices, sport psychology and visual and verbal processing theories – all of which were taken into consideration in the intrattentive strand – this chapter now describes the exact nature of both the intrattentive training and the intrattentive strand of the model.

Intrattentive training

During the intrattentive training, through a series of three workshops, dancers are taught how to access intrattention. They learn to use a fundamental state of intrattention which is directed towards self and a higher order state of intrattention which is directed towards the fundamental intrattentive state.

Fundamental intrattention

The training for accessing a fundamental state of intrattention involves learning how to use three different means of intrattentive access:

- Intrattentive verbal report;
- Intrattentive physical observation;
- Intrattentive blind sensing.

Various dance components are explored during the training and dancers are taught to use the means of access whilst:

- Improvising – within both free and structured improvisation;
- Choreographing material;
- Learning material – which has been choreographed by another dancer or the choreographer;
- Teaching material – to another dancer;
- Rehearsing material;
- Performing.

Dancers are also trained to use the means of access whilst working as a:

- Solo;
- Duet;
- Group.

At the beginning of each workshop, dancers are required to participate in a warm-up which embraces the means of access and therefore prepares both the mind and the body. During the workshops the dancers are asked to access intrattention only for short periods of time initially. These time periods are gradually increased in duration, until dancers can eventually access the state for an hour or more.

Higher order intrattention

The higher order state is used to monitor the fundamental intrattentive state and ensure that it does not become affected by non-intrattention. Whilst in the higher order state, dancers use specific thought-stopping techniques in order to prevent the mind from becoming distracted. The techniques used may be visual, verbal or physical, depending on the fundamental means of access.

Training dancers to use a higher order state involves providing them with an understanding of the nature of the state and encouraging a heightened sense of awareness. It may take some time for a dancer to begin to experience a heightened state of intrattention in conjunction with the fundamental state. In the first workshop, for example, a dancer may unintentionally stop attending to self and the mind may wander, allowing non-intrattention to affect the intrattention. Without the presence of the higher state, the dancer may fail to notice this intruding non-intrattention. It is therefore the responsibility of the choreographer or trainer to inform the dancer of this failure and encourage him or her to reflect on the experiential sensation of the occurrence – the way in which the choreographer or trainer is able to detect this is in the discussion about the methods of examination described in Chapter 3. Equipped with this new experiential understanding, the dancer is ready to begin to access a heightened state of intrattention in subsequent workshops.

Intrattentive stimuli

It is essential that all intrattentive states have a direct object of attention or stimulus. In the intrattentive training, the principal object of attention is the dancing self. Whilst using any of the three means of access within a solo, the dancer is attending absolutely to the dancing self. This includes the actual movements and the experiential sensation of the movements. Whilst using any of the three means of access within a duet or group, the dancer is attending absolutely to the dancing self and dancing other. This includes the actual movements executed by self and other, and the experiential sensation of the movements. Although the direct object of attention must be the dancing self or dancing self and other, it is possible to broaden the intrattention slightly to accommodate other stimuli which are related directly to the dancing self or other, for example the music, props or set. Allowing intrattention to broaden in this way must not be allowed to cause the direct intrattention to drift away from the dancing self or other.

Dancers are trained to execute intrattentive flexibility, which allows them to control the direction of their intrattention and shift effectively between the various stimuli. Through intrattentive flexibility, dancers are able to broaden or narrow and internalise or externalise their intrattention. Dancers are taught that the width and direction of intrattention is dependent on the nature, structure and form of the dance. Intrattentive flexibility is absolutely essential to ensure that the intrattentive dancer is efficient not only when dancing individually, but also when dancing with others. During training, dancers are provided with exercises which help them to explore actively the shift from working as a solo to working as a duet or a group. Mover/observer exercises which act as transitions between attending to self, and attending to self and other(s), are also used in order to assist dancers in this respect.

Intrattentive verbal report

Intrattentive verbal report requires the dancer to talk about what the dancing self/other is doing, whilst actually doing it. Dancers are taught to recognise the difference between pre-, post- and present-report. The nature of pre-report is that it occurs pre-movement, and so the dancer is essentially describing a movement and then executing it. The effect of this is that, whilst the dancer may have been

intrattentive prior to the execution of the movement whilst delivering the pre-report, it is possible that they may become non-intrattentive whilst actually executing the movement, as they have no direct means of access to the intrattention. When a dancer intrattentively post-reports, they are executing the movement and then providing a report and, again, may not have access to intrattention during the actual execution of the movement. The desirable intrattentive verbal report therefore has a present-centred nature. Dancers are taught to report precisely whilst executing the movement, thus allowing an intrattentive execution. Once mastered, this present-report is used throughout the intrattentive training and in the application of the intrattentive strand.

Dancers learn to recognise the difference between the three types of report by experimentation and practice. In the first training workshop, dancers are asked to stand in a circle and each is asked, in turn, to execute one movement or one short movement phrase. On the first occasion, they are asked to report and then execute, on the second to execute and then report and on the third to report and execute simultaneously. This exercise gradually develops so that, eventually, the dancers are able to improvise using the three different types of report. This physical experimentation gives dancers the opportunity to experience and understand the different reports and to appreciate that the present-report is the most effective method of accessing non-intrattention.

What to talk about?

The verbal report consists of descriptions of the dance, including the actual movements being executed and the experiential sensations involved. The dancer may therefore, for example, describe the shape, size, dynamic, pace, quality and kinaesthetic sensation of the movement. In addition, the dancer may attend to the movement's structure and form in relation to the overall phrase or dance and whether the movement makes up part of a motif, is a repetition or is a development of a motif.

When working with verbal report, it is initially common for dancers to slow their movements down in order to provide a detailed report for each movement. The idea of full-body integration is promoted, which encourages awareness that the whole body is involved in each movement. With this in mind, dancers often become

anxious about neglecting a body part and find it difficult to understand how it is possible, for example, to describe every body part involved in a jump in the time it takes to do the jump. Dancers are reassured that they are not expected to report verbally on every body part whilst executing every movement, but that they should have an intrattentive state directed towards the full body. Any confusion is overcome by taking the following steps:

- Firstly, dancers are taught that each time they rehearse a specific movement, such as a jump, they should attend to a different body part involved in the movement. By the time they perform the jump, each body part has been attended to at some point during the rehearsal process.

- Secondly, dancers are reminded that, whilst reporting on one body part, they are often still aware of another body part. The verbal report is simply a means of focussing their intrattention and it does not need to encompass the entire content of the intrattention.

- Thirdly, as the dancers become more proficient at using verbal report, it is acceptable for them to create their own verbal language and to create their own terms which incorporate an awareness of numerous different body parts.[80]

Intrattentive physical observation

Intrattentive physical observation requires the dancer to observe visual stimuli, which are the dancing self or dancing self and dancing other, whilst dancing. Through intentional and analytical observation, the dancer's attention becomes directed entirely towards his or her body, thus creating a state of intrattention. It is essential that the observation is physical, meaning that it must be an active observation. The dancer is taught to position the body in order to observe actively every detail of the dancing self or the dancing other(s).

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[80] Examples of dancers using intrattentive verbal report whilst improvising, choreographing and learning material as a solo and duet can be found in Chapters 2 and 7 and Chapters 11 to 17 of the DVD which accompanies this thesis.

The dancers are taught the difference between observing passively and actively. For example, dancers are asked to observe one arm. They have the option of merely looking at their arm and passively receiving the image of it, or they can observe their arm attentively and increase their awareness of every detail such as the shape, size, movement and kinaesthetic sensation of the arm. Through observing actively, it is possible to objectify the arm so that it appears almost as if it is distinct from the body. This active and physical observation provides dancers with a means of access to an intrattentive state of consciousness. The use of only passive observation is less likely to result in the ability to access intrattention and it is more likely that non-intrattention is directed towards the arm. Taking this example one step further, the use of physical observation allows dancers to objectify their entire body and gain the ability to view the dancing self as if from a third-person perspective. In conjunction with attention being directed towards the kinaesthetic sensation of the dancing self, this allows the dancer to access thoroughly an intrattentive dance consciousness.

What to observe?

Bearing in mind that the intrattentive strand promotes full body integration, dancers are trained to work methodically through the different body parts, irrespective of whether each part is directly involved in the execution of a particular movement, whilst using physical observation. One simple way for the dancers to practise is simultaneously to walk and to observe physically. The choreographer or trainer directs this task by initially instructing the dancers to observe one foot whilst they walk, then to observe their lower leg, followed by their upper leg and so on. This observation must be made from every possible angle so that, by the time the dancers reach the top of the body, each body part has been attended to. This ensures that the dancers have accessed a wholly intrattentive dance consciousness. As in the verbal report training, the dancers are reminded that, even if they are not physically observing a body part, it does not mean that they need not be intrattending it.[81]

[81] Examples of dancers using intrattentive physical observation whilst improvising, choreographing and learning material as a solo and duet can be found on Chapters 3 and 8 and Chapters 11 to 17 of the DVD which accompanies this thesis.

Intrattentive blind sensing

Physical observation allows dancers to create realistic and detailed visual imprints of the moving body which enable them to engage in motionless blind sensing and rehearse the movement mentally. Without the initial observation of the body, the visual imprints created during blind sensing may be inaccurate and may prohibit a genuine connection between the dancing body and the dancing mind, which in turn may affect the quality of the intrattention.

Following the motionless blind sensing, dancers are asked to rehearse the movement using motion blind sensing. Motion blind sensing involves the dancer physically rehearsing the movement with eyes closed and, whilst doing so, the dancer is able to see his or her body move clearly inside the mind just as an observer sees it moving. When the dancer uses motion blind sensing effectively, it is possible to perform the movement as precisely as with eyes open in terms of the movement itself, the temporal quality of the movement and the spatial orientation.

In Empirical Project 1, which comprised the exploratory workshops for the formulation of the intrattentive strand and training, dancers became so competent at using motion blind sensing in a group that they were able to improvise across the room with eyes closed and locate each other immediately because they were so intrattentively aware of self and other(s). In addition, during Empirical Project 1, and as part of a formal theatre performance in front of an audience, two dancers improvised together whilst motion blind sensing for half an hour. In this time the dancers moved with contact and apart from each other with complete intrattention, and behaved exactly as if they could see each other. Both dancers claimed that the key to this performance was spending time prior to the performance intensively and physically observing each other whilst improvising, and then maintaining clear visual imprints throughout the performance.

How to create visual imprints?

In order to sustain a state of intrattention it is vital that the dancer maintains visual imprints whilst blind sensing. Maintaining imprints is a more complex process than maintaining verbal report for the simple reason that it is so internal. Having to talk out loud whilst dancing puts dancers under the pressure of keeping the report

continuous, as otherwise it is instantly recognisable from a third-person perspective. Whilst using blind sensing, the dancer has only self with whom to contend and, should the mind wander away from the visual imprints of the dancing self or dancing other, only the dancer will know. In some instances, with the absence of a higher order state of intrattention, even the dancer may not detect the lapse in intrattention directed towards the dance. Dancers are therefore exposed continually to blind sensing tasks to ensure that they have plenty of practice. They are also given a list of guidelines which assist with the efficacy of their blind sensing:

- Precede any blind sensing task with relaxing the body and mind;
- Recreate all the sensual and kinaesthetic sensations involved with the movement;
- Imagine in real time;
- Use external and internal outlooks;
- Use attentional cues and triggers;
- Use electrodermal feedback.[82]

All three intrattentive means

Dancers are trained initially to use the three means of access independently and are likely to develop a preference towards one particular means of access, which tends to be the one that they generally find most effective. Within Empirical Project 1, although each dancer did have a preference about the means of access, they acknowledged that different means of access were more effective for different tasks and circumstances. It is important that the dancer discover these preferences fairly quickly and gain some control over the way in which they access an intrattentive dance consciousness.

After this initial training, dancers are taught to use more than one means of access at a time, for example verbal report and physical observation or verbal report and blind sensing. It is possible to use only two means of access simultaneously; it would, of course, be impossible to use physical observation and blind sensing concurrently.

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[82] Examples of dancers using intrattentive blind sensing whilst improvising as a solo and duet can be found on Chapters 4 and 9 of the DVD which accompanies this thesis. Various other chapters, for example Chapters 12, 14 and 16, also illustrate the use of motion and motionless blind sensing within the choreographic and rehearsal process.

One could, however, use verbal report and physical observation and then use verbal report and blind sensing, thus using all three means of access.

Dancers may have already engaged in combining means of access prior to reaching this part of the training. During Empirical Project 1, for example, dancers who had a preference over verbal report quite often claimed that they used it during motionless blind sensing. When using more than one means of access to access an intrattentive dance state, the means of access is entitled external intrattention.

The training helps dancers to recognise for themselves which means of access, or which combination, is most effective for a particular task. During Empirical Project 1, the dancers agreed that having all three means of access available to them, but not necessarily using two simultaneously, was the most effective means of accessing intrattention.[83]

Three intrattentive states

Dancers are taught to use some of the means of access internally – for example verbally reporting inside the head – as well as externally. Training in the use of intrattentive verbal report, intrattentive physical observation, intrattentive blind sensing and external intrattention enables dancers to access an external state of intrattention. Training in the use of intrattentive internal report, intrattentive internal observation and internal intrattention enables them to access an internal state of intrattention. Dancers are encouraged to master external means of access before moving on to internalise the means of access. Using external and internal means of access to an intrattentive dance state allows the dancer's mind and body to experience and understand how it feels to be in an intrattentive state of dance consciousness. Having gained this understanding, dancers are trained to maintain access to the state without actually using the means of access. Dancers are therefore asked to experience the state kinaesthetically; which is termed kinaesthetic intrattention.

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[83] Examples of dancers using external intrattention whilst improvising, choreographing and learning material as a solo and duet can be found on Chapters 5, 6 and 10 and Chapters 11 to 16 of the DVD which accompanies this thesis.

The external and internal intrattention are therefore the means of access to the kinaesthetic intrattention. Once the dancer's mind has achieved that intrattention, it is present to just experience. Although the external and internal means are of immense use within the training, they are not necessarily appropriate for a performance. It is for this reason that dancers are trained to exist kinaesthetically within the intrattentive state that they have achieved through a process of intrattentive training. Kinaesthetic intrattention is the target state of the intrattentive training and intrattentive strand. It may take some time initially for dancers to reach the kinaesthetic state; with continual exposure, however, dancers should become accomplished in all three states by the end of the intrattentive training. Table 5 summarises the three different intrattentive states.

Table 5: Three intrattentive states

	Means of access:	**Achieved through:**
State 1: External intrattention	• Intrattentive verbal report • Intrattentive physical observation • Intrattentive blind sensing	• Verbal stimuli • Visual stimuli • Visual stimuli
State 2: Internal intrattention	• Intrattentive internal report • Intrattentive internal observation	• Internal monologue • Visual imprints
State 3: Kinaesthetic intrattention		

Intrattentive training summary

The intrattentive training involves training dancers to:

- Access an intrattentive dance state whilst improvising, choreographing, learning, teaching, rehearsing and performing as a solo, duet or group;

- Access fundamental states of intrattention, directed at the dancing self/other, and higher order states of intrattention which can be used to monitor the fundamental intrattentive state;

- Use intrattentive flexibility and shift freely between narrow and broad and internal and external states of intrattention;

- Understand the importance of continual exposure and of preparing the body both mentally and physically through a specific warm-up;

- Use each of the external means of intrattentive access, verbal report, physical observation and blind sensing, in order to achieve an external state of intrattention;

- Apply internal means of intrattentive access including internal report and internal observation, through the use of internal monologues and visual imprints, in order to achieve an internal state of intrattention;

- Access a kinaesthetic state of intrattention, in which the means of access are no longer needed and the dancer is able to exist intrattentively in the dance.

During the training, the dancers also use the method of examination described in Chapter 3. Using this method helps the dancers to examine their experiences and ensure effective access to states of intrattention.

Tables 6, 7 and 8 show the structure for each intrattentive training workshop:[84]

Table 6: Intrattentive training: Workshop 1

Task number	**Task**	**Means of access**
1	Warm up	No means
2	Solo improvisation	Pre-movement intrattentive verbal report

[84] Only the workshop structures are included here because the workshop descriptions are particularly lengthy. A sample intrattentive workshop description can be found in Appendix A. Chapters 2 to 17 on the DVD which accompanies this thesis provide some examples of dancers applying the intrattentive training and the intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model.

Task number	Task	Means of access
3	Solo improvisation	Post-movement intrattentive verbal report
4	Solo improvisation	Present movement intrattentive verbal report
5	Solo improvisation	Intrattentive verbal report > intrattentive internal report
6	Solo set movement and performance	Intrattentive verbal report > intrattentive internal report
7	Solo choreography and performance	Intrattentive verbal report > intrattentive internal report
8	Mover/observer improvisation	Intrattentive verbal report
9	Duet improvisation	Intrattentive verbal report
10	Duet improvisation	Intrattentive verbal report > intrattentive internal report
11	Duet choreography and performance	Intrattentive verbal report > intrattentive internal report
12	Group improvisation	Intrattentive verbal report > intrattentive internal report
13	Group choreography and performance	Intrattentive verbal report > intrattentive internal report

Table 7: Intrattentive training: Workshop 2

Task number	Task	Means of access
1	Warm up	Intrattentive verbal report
2	Solo improvisation	Intrattentive physical observation

Task number	Task	Means of access
3	Solo improvisation	Intrattentive physical observation / intrattentive blind sensing > intrattentive internal observation
4	Solo set movement and performance	Intrattentive physical observation / intrattentive blind sensing > intrattentive internal observation
5	Solo choreography and performance	Intrattentive physical observation / intrattentive blind sensing > intrattentive internal observation
6	Mover/observer improvisation	Intrattentive physical observation / intrattentive blind sensing
7	Duet improvisation	Intrattentive physical observation
8	Duet improvisation	Intrattentive physical observation / intrattentive blind sensing > intrattentive internal observation
9	Duet choreography and performance	Intrattentive physical observation / intrattentive blind sensing > intrattentive internal observation
10	Group improvisation	Intrattentive physical observation / intrattentive blind sensing > intrattentive internal observation
11	Group choreography and performance	Intrattentive physical observation / intrattentive blind sensing > intrattentive internal observation

Table 8: Intrattentive training: Workshop 3

Task number	Task	Means of access
1	Warm up	Intrattentive physical observation / intrattentive blind sensing
2	Solo improvisation	Intrattentive verbal report and physical observation
3	Solo improvisation	External intrattention > internal intrattention > kinaesthetic intrattention

Task number	Task	Means of access
4	Solo set movement and performance	External intrattention > internal intrattention > kinaesthetic intrattention
5	Solo choreography and performance	External intrattention > internal intrattention > kinaesthetic intrattention
6	Mover/observer improvisation	External intrattention
7	Duet improvisation	Intrattentive verbal report and physical observation
8	Duet improvisation	External intrattention > internal intrattention > kinaesthetic intrattention
9	Duet choreography and performance	External intrattention > internal intrattention > kinaesthetic intrattention
10	Group improvisation	External intrattention > internal intrattention > kinaesthetic intrattention
11	Group choreography and performance	External intrattention > internal intrattention > kinaesthetic intrattention

The intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model

Having completed the three training workshops, dancers are equipped to use the intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model which is depicted in Figure 2.

The intrattentive strand consists of three different phases: choreographic process, rehearsal process and performance. Within the choreographic process the dancer uses external intrattention. Whether the dancer is improvising, generating material for self or another dancer, or learning the choreographer's or another dancer's material, external means of access are used in order for the dancer to access an intrattentive state. Once the movement has been choreographed, the dancer rehearses it using external means of access. Following this the dancer rehearses the material using

internal means of access and finally rehearses it using kinaesthetic intrattention. This part of the rehearsal process prepares the dancer for the intrattentive performance, as this final rehearsal state is the same as the performance state. If the dancer has had the necessary training and the intrattentive strand is used effectively, the dancer should be able to access a controlled kinaesthetic intrattentive dance consciousness during the performance.

Figure 2: The intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model



Summary

Following a thorough consideration of the three practices and theories which contributed to the formulation of the intrattentive strand – somatic practices, sport psychology and visual and verbal processing theories, this chapter has answered the third focussed research question: How can one access the intrattentive dance consciousness?

This chapter has described the intrattentive training that is required for accessing intrattention and has also described the process by which the intrattentive strand was independently formulated and the relevant training programme designed. This

training and strand are intended for specific use within the context of the dance discipline and the Dance Consciousness Model. It has been explained how the strand is applied within choreography, rehearsal and performance in order to create an intrattentive dance consciousness.

Chapter 5 presents the second strand of the model and explains how dancers are able to access states of non-intrattention.

Chapter 5

How can one access the non-intrattentive dance consciousness?

Introduction

In Chapter 3 the Dance Consciousness Model was introduced and it was ascertained that the model comprises four strands. This chapter introduces the second strand of the model; the non-intrattentive strand, and answers the fourth focussed research question: How can one access the non-intrattentive dance consciousness?

In its most basic form the non-intrattentive strand represents the idea that, in order to experience a non-intrattentive performance, the dancer must experience a non-intrattentive process, which includes choreography and rehearsal. The way in which a dancer is able to access such non-intrattentive experiences is discussed in this chapter and, subsequently, an understanding of the non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model, and the training that is required in order to utilise the strand, can be gained.

Chapter breakdown

This chapter begins with a reiteration of the definition of a non-intrattentive dance state which was introduced in Chapter 2. Attention studies, Buddhist Introspection and Bodyweather, all of which contributed to the formulation of the non-intrattentive strand and the training which precedes its use, are then discussed. These theories and practices each have their foundations in three distinct areas. Attention studies and the notion of splitting consciousness come from the Western study of psychology; Buddhist Introspection comes from the Eastern tradition of Buddhism, and the practice of Bodyweather amalgamates both Eastern and Western ideology.

The comments made in Chapter 4 with reference to the use of such theories and practices also apply in this chapter,[85] and thus a certain amount of selectivity,

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[85] See Chapter 4, page 112.

analysis, interpretation, adaptation and application was essential in order to make use of the practices and theories in the formulation of the non-intrattentive strand.

The account of Buddhist Introspection, in particular, has been dealt with very cautiously as it is acknowledged that there may be problems with 'detaching a technique from its cultural background' (Pickering, 1999, p.275):

> Of course, some engagement with meditation practices is possible without any commitment to the beliefs and values of the tradition from which these practices come [but] it is unlikely ... that they will have the same power to reveal the mind as they do when employed by someone who practices them in full knowledge of their wider soteriological significance.
> (*ibid.*)

To 'employ Buddhist practices fully may require a deeper engagement with the whole ethos of Buddhism' (*ibid.*).

The account of Buddhist Introspection made in this chapter therefore attempts to provide sufficient information for a basic comprehension of the practice but it may omit some of the inherent principles and beliefs. This is the case for all of the theories and practices discussed in this chapter and each discussion culminates in a summary explaining how the practice or theory contributed to the Dance Consciousness Model.

This is followed by a description of the non-intrattentive training, which includes how to access fundamental and higher states of non-intrattention, and each non-intrattentive training workshop. Finally, the non-intrattentive strand is explained and it is clarified how the strand is applied within choreography, rehearsal and performance in order to create a non-intrattentive dance consciousness.

Non-intrattention

A non-intrattentive state of dance consciousness is:

A state in which a dancer is purely living and experiencing the dance, without thought or knowledge of that experience. The dancer is in a state of unattended

consciousness and is awake and engaged in the qualitative experience of the dance, but is nonetheless explicitly unaware of what the experience is or what the dancing body and mind are doing. Such a state may occur as a result of the dancer having become either habituated to the dance or totally involved in the dance, the experiential sensation for which is different for the dancing body and mind.

The non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model provides access to a non-intrattentive state of dance consciousness. In order to utilise this strand of the model, and subsequently give a non-intrattentive performance, a dancer must initially be trained to access states of non-intrattention whilst dancing.

How is it possible to experience or access non-intrattention? Try now to have a non-intrattentive experience. In other words try not to think about anything at all, empty your mind and lose awareness of yourself and your surroundings. This seemingly simple task is actually very difficult for most people. Of course, one undoubtedly experiences numerous non-intrattentive moments each day, but to try purposefully to create these moments and experiences is particularly complex. When faced with the task of thinking of nothing, often one's immediate response is to think of everything and become anxious about what, or what not, to think about. If, however, one is asked to think hard about something in particular, for example the words on this page, then it is likely that one will automatically not think about, for example, the temperature in the room or how comfortable the chair is. In this instance, one would have created a state of non-intrattention without even realising it. Indeed, if one were to realise it then one might instantaneously shift from a non-intrattentive experiential state to a reflective state of intrattention and consequently eliminate the non-intrattention.

Once one has directed the attention to the act of focussing intrattentively on something in particular, one can then experience everything else non-intrattentively. In the above example, one would be accessing a state of intrattention for the purpose of thinking about the words on this page, and concurrently accessing a state of non-intrattention for everything else but the words on the page. In this case, one would be splitting consciousness which, in this instance, seems to be more effective than trying only to create a state of non-intrattention.

The non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model uses the idea of splitting consciousness to enable dancers to access non-intrattention, and thus intrattention is an integral part of the non-intrattentive strand. How can splitting one's consciousness and introducing intrattention be an effective method for enabling a dancer to experience non-intrattention? Is splitting consciousness actually possible? The non-intrattentive strand and the non-intrattentive training allow dancers to understand how splitting consciousness is possible, and provide the means through which dancers can achieve non-intrattention. In order to formulate the non-intrattentive training and the non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model, research was undertaken into existing theories and practices that, in one way or another, deal with the experiencing or accessing of non-intrattention.

Methods for accessing non-intrattention

Attention studies

Many theorists associate consciousness with paying attention, and attention studies deal with states of consciousness. Crick states that 'consciousness is closely associated with attention' (1994, p.15) and Zeman describes attention as 'the sentry at the gate of consciousness' (2001, p.1274). In common with other theorists, Velmans asserts that:

> What is at the focus of our attention enters our consciousness. What is outside the focus of attention remains preconscious or unconscious. (2000, p.255)

Over a century ago, James stated that:

> Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others. (1890, pp.403-4)

It is this idea of withdrawing 'from some things in order to deal effectively with others' that is of interest here. If one is presented with a task which requires complete attention in order to execute the task effectively, then one may be withdrawing

attention from something else. If this is the case, consciousness could be said to be split between the task and the something else. This split would create a state of intrattention and a state of non-intrattention, the intrattention being directed towards the task and the non-intrattention towards the something else. If the something else were the act of dancing, then one would have accessed a non-intrattentive state of dance consciousness. It is this notion which connects the non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model and the theories presented within attention studies.

Splitting consciousness through dual- and multi-tasking

Attention studies deal with the concept of splitting consciousness through dual- and multi-tasking. Gross and McIlveen claim that 'dual task performance' involves 'divided attention' (1998, p.219). It is important to note that 'historically and critically ... claims about the possibility of splitting consciousness have not fared well' (Lyons, 1999, p.245). Philosophers such as Lyons do not believe that:

> ... [one] could split fully attentive consciousness into two, whether that be for the purpose of engaging in two tasks or two experiences – both of which required careful attention.
> (1999, p.245)

Despite this, many experiments have been undertaken within studies of attention to examine the possibility of splitting consciousness and to assess the effect that dual-tasking has on a task, with positive results.

Experiments in which the subject is asked to read and write simultaneously are fairly common.[86] Often the initial outcome is that, whilst it is possible to direct one's focal attention to two discrete tasks, the quality with which the tasks are undertaken is lower than if the subject were to perform only one task at once. It appears as if the subject is simultaneously directing conscious attention to both tasks. Analysis of such experiments indicates, however, that what is in fact occurring is that the subject is continually alternating between paying conscious attention, intrattention, with paying pre-reflective attention, non-intrattention, to each task in turn. In other words, one's consciousness of one of the tasks moves between being very aware of it to having a lack of awareness of it. In the above example, therefore, when one pays

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[86] See Spelke et al. (1994, pp.54–63) for a full account on methodology and results.

significant attention to the act of reading, the attention to the writing drops, and *vice versa*.

Lyons describes an experiment which he calls 'the two handed tracing game' (1999, p.245), in which a subject is asked to trace continuously, in an anti-clockwise direction, a circle around the top of the head with the right hand. The subject is also asked to trace simultaneously, in a clockwise direction, a square around the perimeter of the abdomen, with the left hand. Lyons claims that in order to master this task 'one might attempt to oscillate one's attention rapidly from one task to the other' (*ibid.*). Similarly, Mangan describes the 'cocktail party effect', in which two conversations are in earshot but the listener is unable to attend entirely to both at the same moment (1999, p.251). Mangan also claims that the best that one can do in such an instance is to 'shift attention back and forth' (*ibid.*).

Experiments have shown, however, a vast improvement in the ability to master such dual-tasking following continual exposure.[87] The non-intrattentive training embraces this notion and promotes continual exposure as a key factor in the developing ability of a dancer to split attention effectively in order to access a non-intrattentive dance state. Over a relatively short period of time, one can become so adept at performing two particular tasks, using dual-tasking skills, that the quality with which each task is performed is not affected at all. Is this because one is finally able to divide one's consciousness equally – as opposed to merely paying attention alternately to each task – or because the alternation becomes more rapid? Another possibility is, as Lyons claims with reference to the two-handed tracing game, that:

> ... [the] best one can do is to render one of the operations automatic ... to withdraw it from the realm of the subject's experiences, so that in consequence consciousness is not now split and splintered but directed at any one moment to just one of the tasks.
> (1999, p.245)

Is it possible, then, in the above example, to reach a point in which one can focus all conscious attention on the act of reading, and experience an intrattentive state, and concurrently focus no conscious attention to the writing, thus simultaneously

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[87] Continual exposure is a term coined for the purpose of this thesis and was discussed in Chapter 4 with reference to the intrattentive strand.

experiencing a non-intrattentive state? In addition, is it possible to do so without an adverse effect on quality?

Mangan's opinion is that, in the case of the cocktail party, the only option is a 'trade-off strategy' (1999, p.251). He explains that if one were to hear both conversations simultaneously then one would be able to do so only with 'an intermediate level of clarity' as 'when something becomes clear, something else becomes vague [but] the sum of articulation remains at least roughly constant' (*ibid.*). According to Gross and McIlveen, on the other hand, 'with sufficient practice many processes [can] become automatic and make no demand on attention' and 'as skill on a task increases ... less capacity is needed' (1998, pp.119–20).

There is much evidence to suggest that it is possible to perform routine tasks with a high quality even if one is not intrattentively aware of the task, such as brushing one's teeth or driving a car, which suggests that, after sufficient practice, dancing non-intrattentively does not necessarily result in a decrease in performance quality. The learning of new tasks, for example a new movement sequence, often requires much focal attention, but it is possible for this attention to be reduced. During the formulation of the non-intrattentive strand in Empirical Project 2 it was discovered that it is possible to train a dancer to attend less and less to the experience of dancing whilst concurrently maintaining an awareness of another task; for example talking.

Directing attention

It is clear that, fundamental to one purposefully experiencing a non-intrattentive state whilst dancing is the retention of some control over one's consciousness. In all the examples provided above, it is the subject who decides to direct the conscious attention. In a dance context, therefore, the dancer is responsible for controlling the conscious attention. In doing so, he or she is not merely able to experience a process of exchange of consciousness from one task to another, and from intrattention to non-intrattention, but can also direct intrattentive consciousness to one particular task. This allows another task to be performed completely non-intrattentively.

The dancer must therefore have access to a method for directing attention, but how are 'decisions ... made to channel attention'? (Gross and McIlveen, 1998, pp.220–1) and 'how exactly do we direct our attention?' (Atkinson *et al.*, 1996, p.170).

According to Gross and McIlveen, 'humans must selectively attend to only some information and somehow tune out the rest' (1998, p.210) and Atkinson *et al.* suggest that 'the simplest means is by physically reorienting our sensory receptors so as to favour those objects' (1996, p.210).

What is necessary, together with continual exposure, is a certain amount of will. To return to the example of directing attention to the words on this page; try for a moment to do so whilst actively willing yourself to complete the task effectively. Now try to focus attention on to the words whilst actually willing yourself to look away from the words and direct your intrattention on to the chair on which you are sitting. It should be clear, from this example, that one's willpower plays a part in the efficiency of consciousness control. During the non-intrattentive training, therefore, dancers are informed of the purpose of the non-intrattentive strand so that they have a clear understanding of the effect of its use on the performance and the dancer. In addition, dancers are reminded constantly that, to access non-intrattention whilst dancing, they must have the will to access that non-intrattention.

In the non-intrattentive strand and the training that precedes its use, a further condition is necessary. It is of common consensus in studies of attention that the more complex a task is the more attention it demands. Simple tasks are subject to what Manstead and Semin (1980) describe as open-looped control, which is the equivalent of an automatic process, and therefore require attention of a non-intrattentive nature. Complex tasks are described as being subject to closed-loop control, which is the equivalent to controlled processing, and therefore require attention of an intrattentive nature.

Within the non-intrattentive training, dancers are asked to perform fairly complex tasks, which are subject to closed-loop control, to ensure that intrattention is achievable. If the task is that dancers are to dance and talk simultaneously, for example, the talking must require optimum attention in order to allow the dancing to take place non-intrattentively. The verbal element of the task must not merely be a recitation of lists or text learned by rote, for example the days of the week, as this may encourage open-loop control and thus non-intrattention. Asking a dancer to hold

a conversation or work out a series of multiplications, for example, encourages closed-loop control and thus a state of intrattention.

Summary of the contribution of attention studies to the non-intrattentive strand and training

Within the formulation of the non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model, some of the principles presented within studies of attention were taken into consideration. These are summarised below:

- The idea of splitting consciousness in order to create an experiential state of non-intrattention alongside a state of intrattention is fully acknowledged. The purpose of this intrattention is merely to exist – as its subject is not the dance. The intrattention is literally the means through which the dancer is able to experience non-intrattention.

- Dancers are asked to perform numerous dual- and multi-tasking exercises. Successful completion of the exercises is dependent on the dancers being able to direct intrattention to a non dance-related task, such as talking or listening, and simultaneously allow their bodies to dance non-intrattentively. These tasks are sufficiently complex to warrant closed-loop control and a state of intrattention.

- Studies of attention have noted that, when first presented with a dual task the subject's attention may intuitively oscillate rapidly back and forth. The non-intrattentive training, therefore, enforces a process of continual exposure to decrease the possibility of switching attention from one task to another.

- In common with the general ideology within studies of attention, the intrattentive strand acknowledges the importance of willpower in the directing of consciousness.

Buddhist Introspection

The mind and consciousness are the principal subjects of Buddhist introspective examination. In *The View From Within* (1999) Wallace supplies a concise account of Buddhist tradition which provides insight into the nature of Buddhist Introspection.

According to Wallace, within the Buddhist tradition it is of common consensus that one's consciousness is located upon a continuum – a factor that was also discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis – which comprises a series of consecutive instances of cognition, which may exist in two forms: instances of pure awareness – intrattentive states; and instances of awareness that hold non-ascertaining[88] cognition – non-intrattentive states (1999, p.177).

In Buddhist tradition it is believed that the mind should be trained to connect with these states of consciousness and that this is possible through the controlling of attention. Wallace describes how Buddha established a series of techniques for stabilising and cultivating one's attention and how, over 2,500 years, Buddhist contemplatives have developed such techniques, resulting in the formulation of highly complex theories on the mind and on the nature of consciousness (1999, p.176). Buddhist Introspection is one such technique that may be used as a means to connect with one's consciousness, and consequently was used as a source of reference during the formulation of the Dance Consciousness Model.

Mindfulness and introspection – accessing intrattention

Wallace notes that the first task in Buddhist Introspection is to refine conscious attention to such a degree that the mind becomes entirely utilitarian (1999, p.176). In doing so one would succeed in maintaining a placid state known as *Samatha*. This is considered as a discipline and according to Wallace the principal objective in the fostering of *Samatha* is the advancing of attentional stability and vividness (*ibid.*). The aim of *Samatha* is to focus attention onto a specific image. Other techniques which have a similar aim, such as Transcendental Meditation, use a 'mantra', which is a sound or phrase without any particular meaning, which is repeated 'until the mind becomes absorbed and settles down relaxedly' (Shear and Jevning, 1999, p.193).

Wallace explains that in *Samatha* the image may be a physical object such as a pebble but, very often, Buddhists use images with a religious significance such as a sculpture of Buddha (1999, p.177). The act of maintaining attention on an object and resisting temptation to be distracted away from it is called mindfulness. At the stage

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[88] What is intended by the term non-ascertaining is that, in such a state, objects appear to the consciousness but are not reflected on.

of the *Samatha* training at which one feels complete familiarity with the object on which one is focussing, one may then advance to the part of the method known as reconstructing. One attempts to reconstruct a mental image of the object within the mind – a visual imprint – and focus attention completely on to this mental image (*ibid.* p.178).

According to Wallace, at this point the 'mental perception apprehends the form of the pebble by the power of the visual perception of it' (*ibid.*). The mind does not 'apprehend the pebble directly' but rather 'recollects it on the basis of the immediately preceding visual perception of that object' (*ibid.*). It is thus the task of mindfulness to maintain the recollection of the image and to examine it inwardly and intrattentively in a way which is comparable to the actual, visual viewing of the object.

In using the technique, it is not only important to rid consciousness of any non-ascertaining attention, but also to ensure that the mind does not surrender unintentionally to the hindrances of attentional excitation and attentional laxity. Attentional excitation is an 'agitated intentional mental process that follows after attractive objects' and it is a 'derivative of compulsive desire' (*ibid.* p.176). Attentional laxity is an 'intentional mental process' that occurs when 'attention becomes slack and the meditative object is not apprehended with vividness and forcefulness' (*ibid.*). Introspection, which is a 'type of metacognition that operates as the quality control' (*ibid.* p.178), is therefore essential. Indeed, it is claimed that 'the antidote for excitation and passivity is introspection' (2005).[89] Thus, whilst the mindfulness attends to the image or visual imprint, it is the function of introspection to monitor the mindfulness, and track any materialisation of excitation or laxity. Within *Samatha*, therefore, there are two states: mindfulness and introspection.

It is important to establish why the discipline of *Samatha* was of use in the formulation of the non-intrattentive strand, when both mindfulness and introspection clearly promote intrattention. In *Samatha*, one must attend intrattentively to one particular object to the exclusion of everything else and simultaneously monitor this attention intrattentively. So, how does one attend to everything else – one's

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[89] http://www.dharmafellowship.org/library/essays/nine-stages-of-abiding.htm#first

surroundings, one's emotions and so on? The conscious position of everything else is one of non-intrattention. One could suggest, therefore, that in order to become non-intrattentive it is vital to become primarily highly intrattentive. This is not a general intrattention, however, but a specifically focussed intrattention which can simultaneously allow an immense amount of non-intrattention. This seems to be consistent with the idea of a dual or split consciousness.

Within the non-intrattentive strand there are two intrattentive states: a fundamental intrattentive state that observes the object, and a heightened intrattentive state that observes the act of observing the object. In addition there is a non-intrattentive state which is reserved for the dancing. Thus, although the focus of Buddhist Introspection is the state of intrattention and the *Samatha*, the basic principles of this practice have been extracted and adapted for use in the non-intrattentive strand in order to ensure that the focus is on the states of non-intrattention.

In the intrattentive training dancers are initially shown a series of physical images, on a television screen for example, to observe intrattentively whilst dancing. Dancers are required to attend to the images with intrattentive mindfulness, and to attend to the mindfulness with intrattentive introspection. After some time the images are taken away. The dancer is required to continue dancing and to recreate the images in the form of visual imprints within the mind and to sustain mindfulness and introspection, thus maintaining the intrattention. The dancers are therefore trained at a first level to use the images externally – which is entitled external non-intrattention – and then trained at a second level to use the images internally – which is entitled internal non-intrattention.

This development is necessary for two main reasons. Firstly, within the non-intrattentive strand, a third level is introduced in which the dancers are required to access kinaesthetic non-intrattention, and this third level is completely dependent on the dancer having previously achieved internal non-intrattention.[90] Secondly, it is impractical for a dancer to use an external image, such as on a television screen, whilst performing; the ability to internalise and reconstruct these images in the form of visual imprints is therefore essential.

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[90] The terms external, internal and kinaesthetic non-intrattention are described later in this chapter.

Mindfulness and introspection are developed in *Samatha* in nine sequential attentional states. It is essential that the subject becomes fully accomplished at a state before advancing to the next state. An understanding of these states was of use in the formulation of the non-intrattentive strand and the three levels introduced above – external, internal, and kinaesthetic – and they are therefore described below:[91]

1. 'Attentional placement' (Wallace, 1999, p.180) or 'Stabilizing' (2005).[92] Within this first state, the subject must endeavour to develop a succession of moments of sustained intentional attention. In the early stages of the development of the technique, however, it is normal for the subject to be continuously disturbed by excitation. Wallace also notes that when the intention is to direct attention to a single object, it is common for the mind to roam around compulsively to a greater extent than in ordinary situations (1999, p.180).

According to the attention studies literature, the capacity for sustained attention is particularly limited and it is normal to be able to maintain focussed attention for little more than one to three seconds. In addition, experiments have shown that even voluntary attention, when one purposefully wishes to attend, cannot be sustained for more than a few seconds. It is on the basis of such experiments that James states that 'no-one can possibly attend consciously to an object that does not change' (1890, p.420).

It is of common consensus within studies of attention that changing images are more likely than unchanging images to require closed-loop control. It is therefore more probable that one can sustain attention on a changing image than on a static image. Despite this, those who adhere to the Buddhist tradition believe that the ability to attend to one static image can be enhanced. The non-intrattentive training, however, does not use static images in order to increase the dancer's potential ability to sustain intentional attention instead, for example, moving images are presented via a television screen.

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[91] The nine sequential states are defined in various ways. The following description takes account of the states discussed by Wallace in his article 'The Buddhist Tradition of Samatha' (1999, pp.175-187) and the states defined in the Dharma Fellowship Library (2005, http://www.dharmafellowship.org/library/essays/nine-stages-of-abiding.htm#first).

[92] http://www.dharmafellowship.org/library/essays/nine-stages-of-abiding.htm#first

According to Wallace attentional placement takes some time to master, as one needs to remain alert continuously and be aware of any impending presence of laxity and excitation, although even this is not enough (1999, p.180). Apparently one must additionally take all possible steps to counteract laxity or excitation occurring by intervention, effort and immense willpower. Wallace describes how students of *Samatha* are encouraged to undertake many short sessions of attentional placement each day; as many as eighteen fifteen-minute sessions are recommended (*ibid.*).

Although the non-intrattentive strand does adopt some of the principles of Buddhist Introspection, it is not possible to include as many sessions of attentional placement, as the strand must be accessible and fit with some ease into an ordinary choreographic process. This does not mean, however, that the non-intrattentive strand does not effectively achieve states of intrattention; the training induces attentional placement through means additional to the observation of an image. For example, dancers are not only asked to observe an image whilst dancing, but also to describe the image. Amalgamating two intrattentive tasks in this way requires optimum attention to be directed towards the image and increases the possibility of attentional placement with an absence of laxity or excitation. This ensures that a multitude of training sessions is not essential.

2. 'Continual placement' (Wallace, 1999, p.180) or 'Continuous stabilizing' (2005).[93] In this second state 'one must use remembrance and watchfulness to bring the object of meditation close' (2005, *ibid.*). Here one may experience 'brief periods of attentional continuity, for up to a minute or so' (Wallace, 1999, p.181), in which one's mind does not disengage from the image. The subject may now feel as if his or her attention is permanently fixed on the mental image. According to Wallace, however, disengagement does occur but it is so brief that the subject believes he or she is experiencing attentional continuity (*ibid.*). There are also still moments in which the image is neglected altogether because other thoughts and sensory impressions intervene. As attentional continuity improves, the frequency of the sessions may decrease and the duration of the sessions increase. This process is used in the non-intrattentive training, with dancers initially being asked to improvise, for example, for only a minute at a time and then gradually increasing the time

[93] http://www.dharmafellowship.org/library/essays/nine-stages-of-abiding.htm#first

throughout the training. This ensures that, eventually, dancers can maintain attentional continuity for the performance of a whole piece should it be required.

3. 'Patched placement' (Wallace, 1999, p.181) or 'Habitual stabilization' (2005).[94] In the third state, attention is focussed mostly on the image and attentional continuity increases in duration, but occasionally significant excitation still prevails.

4. 'Close placement' (Wallace, 1999, p. 181) or 'Near stabilization' (2005, *ibid.*). In this state, attention is fully stabilised and one no longer experiences disengagement from the image.

5. and 6. 'Taming' and 'Pacification' (Wallace, 1999, p.181) or 'Habituation' and 'Pacifying' (2005, *ibid.*). Attention is tamed and pacified through introspection, which the subject uses to monitor the attentional processes. Excitation and laxity no longer occur, 'gone also are the other distractions of the inner emotional and mental events' (2005, *ibid.*) and even the problem of peripheral distractions is surmounted. This is the first point within the nine states that introspection is utilised. Throughout the non-intrattentive training, dancers are encouraged to use introspection, and a higher state of intrattention, with the latter normally becoming more sophisticated as progress is made.

7. and 8. 'Complete pacification' and 'Single pointed attention' (Wallace, 1999, p.182) or 'Thorough pacification' and 'Becoming one-pointed' (2005, *ibid.*). A genuine desire to achieve these states is essential for their attainment in both Buddhist Introspection and the non-intrattentive strand and training. By the eighth state the subject should be able to maintain complete stability and vividness – intrattention – apparently 'there is no disturbance at all [and] concentration is possible for about four hours' (2005, *ibid.*) The mind can now 'remain continually in absorption on the object of concentration' (2005),[95] allowing everything else to be attended to solely by the non-intrattentive consciousness.

9. 'Balanced placement' (Wallace, 1999, p.182) or 'Entrance into *Samadhi*' (2005, *ibid.*) By this point, little will or effort is required in order to sustain attentional

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[94] http://www.dharmafellowship.org/library/essays/nine-stages-of-abiding.htm#first
[95] http://www.dharmafellowship.org/library/essays/nine-stages-of-abiding.htm#first

continuity and vividness and one is able to slip instantaneously into the state of balanced placement. At 'this stage there is no limit to the length of fixed concentration' and according to the 'meditator's feelings, his mind and the object become one' (2005, *ibid.*).

Mindfulness and introspection – accessing non-intrattention

Within Buddhist Introspection and the non-intrattentive strand, over time one is able to embrace intrattention towards a specific image. The non-intrattentive strand, however, is ultimately used for the accessing of a non-intrattentive state of dance consciousness, not an intrattentive state. One may wonder whether it is absolutely necessary for intrattention to play such a large part in the non-intrattentive strand; after all, can a dancer really be wholly non-intrattentive whilst simultaneously accessing intrattentive states? During the development of the non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model, it was found that it is indeed possible for all the intrattention to be removed part way through the choreographic process. The inspiration for this removal came from the ninth attentional state of *Samatha* – balanced placement.

According to Buddhist tradition, even when one has accomplished the ninth state, '*Samatha* has still not been fully achieved' (Wallace, 1999, p.182). In order to attain *Samatha*, a complete reversal must be performed and one 'disengages the attention from the previous meditative object' (*ibid.*). At this point, attention is withdrawn from the physical senses and it becomes entirely internal and non-conceptual and apparently 'many new and extraordinary experiences come, which have never been experienced before' (2005).[96]

In contrast with the process used in all the prior intrattentive states thus far, one is now required to release the image and no longer recall it. This results in one's consciousness focusing on no object and one exists only in the moment. So, in fact, one has absolute and pure non-intrattention. Wallace describes the experience of *Samatha* in the following statement:

> Any thoughts that arise are not sustained, nor do they proliferate; rather they vanish of their own accord, like bubbles emerging from

[96] http://www.dharmafellowship.org/library/essays/nine-stages-of-abiding.htm#first

> water. One has no sense of one's own body, and it seems as if one's mind has become invisible with space.
> (1999, p.182)

Sekida describes a similar experience:

> The time comes when no reflection appears at all. One comes to notice nothing, feel nothing, hear nothing, see nothing ... But it is not vacant emptiness. Rather it is the purest condition of our existence.
> (cited in Shear and Jevning, 1999, p.193)

The non-intrattentive strand and training adopt a similar reversal, through which a dancer is able to experience the dance kinaesthetically with a non-intrattentive state of consciousness – this was referred to as the third level earlier in this chapter. The process of initially combining intrattention and non-intrattention develops into one in which a complete and single experience of non-intrattentive consciousness is eventually cultivated. The intrattention, therefore, acts as a means of access to the non-intrattention.

Summary of the contribution of Buddhist Introspection to the non-intrattentive strand and training

During the formulation of the non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model, some of the principles of Buddhist Introspection were taken into consideration. These are summarised below:

- Dancers are taught to stabilise and refine attention through focussing attention on to a visual image, in order to access intrattention and allow movement to occur non-intrattentively.

- Whilst the focus of Buddhist Introspection is the intrattention, the focus of the non-intrattentive strand is the non-intrattention.

- A series of changing images is shown to the dancers initially and then removed, leaving each dancer to reconstruct an image within the mind.

- Dancers are informed about compulsive attention, in which the mind is distracted elsewhere, and are also taught to recognise negligent attention, in which one's

attention becomes careless and slack and vividness is lost. The terms attentional excitation and laxity are not used in the non-intrattentive training to avoid the possibility of misinterpretation or an adaptation of the meaning of the terms through the application into a Western practice. The terms compulsive attention and negligent attention, which have been coined for use within the Dance Consciousness Model, are used instead.

- Dancers are taught to use a heightened state of intrattention alongside the fundamental intrattention, in order to monitor the presence of compulsive or negligent attention. This is similar to the introspection that is used alongside mindfulness in the practice of Buddhist Introspection.

- The non-intrattentive strand uses three states – external, internal and kinaesthetic – which encompass the main principles from the nine attentional states of Buddhist Introspection.

- The kinaesthetic state abolishes the dual or split consciousness and allows the dancer to experience a full non-intrattentive state. The intrattention, therefore, acts as a means of access to the non-intrattention.

Bodyweather

Tanaka established the philosophical foundation for Bodyweather in the early 1980s.[97] The practice has since been developed worldwide by practitioners who have worked first-hand with Tanaka. The practice conflates Eastern and Western philosophy and draws on a variety of dance and physical training practices, such as martial arts, contemporary dance, yoga and shiatsu. The practice of Bodyweather requires one to experience a state in which the mind is expressed through the body, and the body is expressed through the mind. This is a state in which one focuses neutrally and impartially on both self and other, and strives to experience nothingness.

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[97] In the early 1970s Tanaka created original dance works which explored the meaning of the body and movement through improvisation. He worked closely with Hijikata, founder of Butoh. The power within Butoh derives from the individual dancer in a mental and physical sense. In 1985, Tanaka founded Bodyweather Farm, a co-operative environment for dancers and artists who explore the origins of dance through farming life. See http://www.iugte.com/projects/Min_Tanaka.php

Although the practice of Bodyweather does not claim to deal with consciousness, the state described above is very similar to the state of non-intrattention defined in this study. An exploration into Bodyweather is therefore of use here. As the practice of Bodyweather has evolved fairly recently, there are very few research sources available[98] and anyone interested in Bodyweather at present is likely to be taught by a practitioner who has been trained by Tanaka in person. Lynch is one such practitioner and is currently artistic director of Paradance Theatre. Lynch uses the Bodyweather techniques within his company. Fundamental to the company's practice, known as Bodyweather Paradance, is the 24-hour performance. The ideology behind this performance is that the dancers are:

> ... at their best not when they are engaged in abstract reflection, critique or objective consideration, but when they are intensely and passionately involved in being.
> (Lynch, 2004)[99]

Bodyweather, as taught by Lynch, involves a physical training method called MB, which stands for muscle and bones, or mind and body. The MB comprises twelve sections which contain coordinative and choreographic phrases, improvisation, and acrobatic and sensorial exercises. The aim of the MB is to create an authentic, uninhibited and self-expressed body and although it does not offer a method of access to consciousness in itself, it does emphasise the importance of preparing the body and mind in an appropriate way.

Following the MB, the practice of Bodyweather involves what is called the Bodyweather laboratory. The laboratory includes a variety of exercises which connect the dancer's body and mind. One exercise, for example, is omni-central imaging, in which dancers create internal images within their minds and then allow their bodies to react physically to these images. Lynch also works with what he calls the Paradance arena, which involves performance research. This research includes, for example, improvisational methodologies that can operate both as techniques for

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[98] Some of these articles can be found on http://www.bodyweather.net/mainframe1.html This site was created by De Quincey who is a former member of the Mai-Juko Performance Company – the company run by Tanaka. De Quincey introduced the philosophy and methodology of Bodyweather to Australia in 1988.

[99] This quote was recorded during a Bodyweather workshop London 22 May 2004.

generating performance material and as ends in themselves, and cyclic state training (CST), which is a sequential rehearsal and choreographic technique.[100]

Lynch notes that in Bodyweather the emphasis is on dancers experiencing neutrality and he encourages dancers to live the experience in the present, to 'just move' and not engage in any kind of reflection – a state in which one allows the 'internal monologue to just dissolve' (Lynch, 2004).[101] This is, of course, particularly difficult in the same way that just thinking of nothing, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is difficult. Not all the exercises in Lynch's workshops and performances are directed towards thinking of nothing. In other words, not all of the Bodyweather practice is concerned with non-intrattentive states. Some exercises encourage intrattention and some exercises encourage a switch between non-intrattention and intrattention. Such exercises are discussed in Chapter 6. Below are some examples of Bodyweather exercises, as taught by Lynch, which were of use in the formulation of the non-intrattentive training.

Using Bodyweather Paradance as a method of access

Some of the exercises used in the Bodyweather laboratory are based around an exercise referred to as nose-finger. A dancer, places a finger under another dancer's nose; the former leads the latter around the space by their nose. The distance between the nose and finger must remain constant at all times and the follower should attempt to keep the nose on the same level as the finger. A development of this exercise is the hand-hand exercise in which two dancers hold their hands up opposite each other, palm to palm, about half a metre apart, and one dancer leads the other dancer. In this task it appears as if the hands are mirroring each other and when a genuine connection occurs, it is difficult to identify who is leading and who is following.

These two exercises can be executed concurrently, and accompanied by verbal report. Two dancers (A and B) hold hands and use their spare hands as a pair of leading hands – as if they are one dancer – for the hand-hand exercise. Two more dancers (C and D) take the roles needed by the nose-finger exercise, with C's finger leading D by the nose. D follows C's finger with the nose; concurrently, D uses his

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[100] The CST is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
[101] This quote was recorded during a Bodyweather workshop Brussels 4 – 6 June 2004.

or her hands to follow both the leading hands of A and B. The positions of each dancer are shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Bodyweather exercise

D = Follower

C = Finger leader

A B = Hand leaders

It is the responsibility of the finger leader (C) to hold the group together and to direct the group around the space. The hand leaders (A and B) have to ensure that they stay directly behind the finger leader (C) at all times and that their hands are visible to the follower (D). After some time, the follower (D) is required to undertake the additional task of talking. The follower (D) is therefore talking, whilst following with his or her nose, as well as mirroring with the hands.

For dancer D, the follower, this exercise involves multi-tasking and forces him or her to direct different amounts of attention onto the different tasks. Attention is capacity limited and it is difficult to focus fully on all three tasks at once. The follower may therefore choose to split consciousness and attend intrattentively, at any one time, to one of the tasks and leave the other two tasks to be executed non-intrattentively. This exercise is very similar to those in studies of attention, such as the two-handed tracing game (Lyons, 1999, p.245), discussed earlier in this chapter, with respect to splitting consciousness and multi-tasking in order to create a dual consciousness.

The practice of Bodyweather was considered during the formulation of the non-intrattentive strand and training not only because it seems to deal with non-intrattention and splitting consciousness, but additionally, unlike the other two practices discussed in this chapter, Bodyweather has its foundation in movement. It is important to note, however, that Bodyweather is a way of being and its purpose is not to provide a model for accessing non-intrattention. I have been fortunate enough to work with Lynch to gain some understanding of the practice, in both workshop and performance contexts. During the Bodyweather workshops my interest in

consciousness encouraged me to adapt the exercises and techniques supplied by Lynch for the purpose of using them as a method of access to non-intrattention.

In my experience of the Bodyweather exercise depicted in Figure 3, most of my conscious attention was directed towards the talking, as this was the task that I felt required most focus. As a result, the movement I executed became more intuitive as I did not have the capacity to think about it or consciously to attend to it. This multi-tasking allowed a dual consciousness and enabled me to move my body non-intrattentively. For some dancers the attention may, of course, have been allocated differently, with no intrattention on the talking and maximum attention on the movement. The very fact that I wanted to attend only to the talking, however, seemed to increase the probability of that being the case.

Although the purpose of such exercises, in the context of Bodyweather, is to work with co-ordination skills, it is clear that the exercises are also of use for accessing states of non-intrattention. Similar exercises are therefore used in the non-intrattentive training to enable dancers to dance non-intrattentively. Within the training the dancers are informed that the purpose of such exercises is to allow movement to occur non-intrattentively and the dancers are encouraged to use his or her willpower to direct all attention to, for example, the talking.

Summary of the contribution of Bodyweather to the non-intrattentive strand and training

During the formulation of the non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model, some of the principles of Bodyweather were taken into consideration. These are summarised below:

- Within the practice of Bodyweather, the MB warm-up is a crucial part of the process of connecting body and mind. The non-intrattentive training incorporates a similar warm-up at the start of each training workshop, which prepares the body physically and encourages a state of non-intrattention.

- The Bodyweather exercises illustrated above involve multi-tasking and, providing that a certain degree of will is present, can allow one to move non-intrattentively. Similar exercises are used within the non-intrattentive training, in which, for

example, the dancers are asked to report and observe intrattentively, whilst non-intrattentively dancing.

Non-intrattentive training and the non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model

Having discussed attention studies, Buddhist Introspection and Bodyweather, all of which were taken into consideration in the non-intrattentive strand, this chapter now describes the nature of both the training and the model.

Non-intrattentive training

Dancers are trained, in a series of four workshops, how to access non-intrattention. They are taught to use a fundamental state of intrattention, which is directed towards exterior stimuli, to access a state of non-intrattention. They are also encouraged to use a higher order state of intrattention, which is directed towards the fundamental intrattentive state, in order to access a higher order state of non-intrattention.

Fundamental non-intrattention

The training for accessing a fundamental state of non-intrattention involves learning how to use three different means of non-intrattentive access:

- Non-intrattentive verbal report;
- Non-intrattentive physical observation;
- Non-intrattentive active listening.

As with the intrattentive training described in Chapter 4, dancers are taught to use the means of access whilst:

- Improvising – within both free and structured improvisation;
- Choreographing material;
- Learning material – which has been choreographed by another dancer or the choreographer;
- Teaching material – to another dancer;

- Rehearsing material;
- Performing.

Again, the dancers are trained to use the means of access whilst working as a:

- Solo;
- Duet;
- Group.

As with the intrattentive training, dancers are initially asked to access non-intrattention only for short intervals. With continual exposure and practice, these intervals are gradually increased in duration until dancers are eventually able to access the state actively for an hour or more at a time. Dancers are again required to participate in a warm-up at the beginning of each workshop, which embraces the means of access and therefore prepares both the mind and the body.

Higher order non-intrattention

Similar to the intrattentive training, teaching dancers to use a higher order state involves providing them with an understanding of the nature of such a state and encouraging them to have a heightened sense of awareness. It is crucial, of course, that this heightened sense of awareness is not directed to the self or the dance, but towards the intrattentive state which is attending to the external stimuli. It may take some time for a dancer to begin to use a heightened state alongside the fundamental state and it is partly the responsibility of the choreographer/trainer to inform the dancer of moments in which non-intrattention has ceased – this sort of mediation was discussed in Chapter 3, in relation to the method of examination. Equipped with this new experiential understanding, in subsequent workshops the dancer may begin to increase awareness and detect compulsive or negligent attention. Gradually, through continual exposure, the dancer gains an understanding of how to use the heightened state to monitor the non-intrattention.

Non-intrattentive stimuli

Each of the non-intrattentive means of access utilises a particular type of stimulus – verbal, visual or aural. These stimuli provide the key to the access and it is therefore essential that they require a state of intrattention to be achieved in order to allow the dancer to dance non-intrattentively. There are three necessary conditions for the stimuli:

- The stimuli are changing stimuli;
- The stimuli are such that they inspire an adequate amount of active thinking which involves interpretation, evaluation and/or analysis;
- The stimuli are sufficiently complex to warrant a state of intrattention up to the point where there is no intrattention remaining for the dancing, but not so complex that they cause the dancer to disengage that intrattention.

Non-intrattentive verbal report

The purpose of non-intrattentive verbal report is to direct the dancer's intrattention completely away from the dancing self. Intrattentive verbal report therefore requires the dancer to talk, whilst dancing, about things that are external to self. It is essential that the non-intrattentive verbal report is a present-report as opposed to a pre- or post-report. This distinction and the exercises utilised to illustrate it are discussed in Chapter 4. The same exercises are used in both the intrattentive and non-intrattentive training.

What to talk about?

In the non-intrattentive training dancers are trained to use different verbal stimuli, including both of the following:

- Random reports, in which the dancer talks about anything external to self that comes to mind;

- Structured reports, containing lists of either numbers or words; for example multiplication tables.

Dancers are trained to use these reports within any of the dance components and whilst working alone or with others. When working as a duet or part of a group, dancers can use two additional types of report:

- Conversation/discussion;
- Question/answer.

Sharing a report in this way, whilst non-intrattentively sharing movement, allows a relationship between dancers to develop without which dancing non-intrattentively with another dancer(s) may feel disconnected.

Dancers are trained initially to use all of the different verbal stimuli. Eventually, in most cases, dancers tend to develop a preference towards one or two particular verbal stimuli. The preferred stimuli should be those that are most effective, rather than those that the dancer finds the simplest or most enjoyable to use. An effective stimulus is one that allows complete access to intrattention. The most effective stimuli are generally those which require closed-loop control, and they are therefore usually the stimuli that the dancer considers to be complex.

If the intrattentive stimulus is too simple, the dancer may execute the report non-intrattentively and devote the intrattention to the dancing, or even split the intrattention so that some is directed towards the reporting and some is reserved for the dancing. If, however, the intrattentive stimulus is too complex, the dancer may become overloaded and switch off. In doing so, the dancer may allow the non-directed intrattention to affect the non-intrattention and thus may begin to dance intrattentively. Alternatively, in some cases, the dancer may become so concerned with the complex intrattentive stimulus that he or she stops dancing altogether.

It is, therefore, not always straightforward to find stimuli which offer a balance between appropriate levels of complexity and effectiveness. The aims of having a balance are to warrant complete intrattention and, at the same time, enable the dancer

to direct the intrattention and maintain control of the non-intrattention without becoming overloaded.[102]

Non-intrattentive physical observation

Non-intrattentive physical observation requires the dancer to observe something exterior to self whilst dancing, in order to create an intrattentive state directed toward the external object and a non-intrattentive state directed towards the self and the dance. The exterior object or image is entitled the visual stimulus. Within this means of access, it is essential that the observation of the visual stimulus is physical and active. Dancers are taught to position their bodies physically in order to observe every detail of an exterior object or image actively, and they are reminded of the difference between passive and active observation – which they were introduced to within the intrattentive training described in Chapter 4.

What to observe?

Within the training dancers are exposed to constantly changing visual stimuli that are, for example, pre-recorded and presented through a television screen or projected onto a wall. Ideally, the images are projected on to all four walls so that the dancer is provided with images to observe irrespective of the direction of the movement being executed. It is not essential, however, that images are pre-recorded and projected or presented through a television as, of course, this requires some specific equipment. A choreographer may wish, instead, to present the visual stimuli by, for example, placing a series of pictures or objects around the room. Four different types of visual stimuli may be used:

- Random film;
- Lists of words;
- Lists of numbers;
- Questions.

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[102] Examples of dancers using non-intrattentive verbal report whilst improvising, choreographing and learning material as a solo and duet can be found in Chapters 18 and 23 and Chapters 27 to 33 of the DVD which accompanies this thesis.

Some visual stimuli are more effective than others for each dancer. The dancers are trained initially to experiment with each of the different visual stimuli before selecting those that they find the most effective. This selection can sometimes be difficult when dancers are working in pairs or groups as, of course, the dancers may have different preferences. In such an event, the trainer or choreographer must create a balance and present the dancers with visual stimuli which attempt to accommodate each of the dancer's needs by, for example, interchanging the different stimuli. In Empirical Project 2, which comprised the exploratory workshops for the formulation of the non-intrattentive training, it was reported that interchanging between different types of visual stimuli was not a problem; in fact most dancers claimed that it actually increased their intrattention.[103]

Non-intrattentive active listening

Dancers are exposed to aural stimuli which are pre-recorded and projected through speakers, or a choreographer may instead wish to present the aural stimuli live. It is essential that the way in which the dancer listens to the aural stimuli is active as opposed to passive.

What to listen to?

Four different types of aural stimuli may be used:

- Random noises – such as those from a television or radio;
- Lists of words;
- Lists of numbers;
- Questions.

Dancers are likely to prefer some aural stimuli to others and, in the early stages of the training, they are encouraged to experiment with each of the different aural stimuli prior to selecting the most effective.

The aural stimuli are presented in three different forms:

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[103] Examples of dancers using non-intrattentive physical observation whilst improvising, choreographing and learning material as a solo and duet can be found in Chapters 19 and 24 and Chapters 27 to 33 of the DVD which accompanies this thesis.

- Single presentation – in which the dancer hears only one type of stimulus, for example a list of words. The aural stimulus is directed at both ears and seems to originate in the middle of the head.

- Dichotic presentation – in which the dancer hears two types of aural stimulus concurrently, for example a list of words and list of numbers. One 'message is presented to each ear' so that the messages are 'discrete and appear to come from different directions' (Komatsu, 1994, p.34).

- Binaural presentation – in which the dancer hears two types of aural stimulus concurrently. Two messages are 'presented to both ears so that the messages are superimposed on one another' and seem to 'originate in the middle of the subject's head' (Komatsu, 1994, p.34).

Dichotic and binaural presentations can be created for pre-recorded aural stimuli, however differentiating between the two types of presentation is not essential. It is, therefore, not a problem if one does not have the means to create the two different types of recording. If one chooses to create the aural stimuli live, then two people talking at once is sufficient.

The dichotic and binaural presentations have been introduced into the training because some dancers find that actively listening to a single presentation is not sufficient to warrant intrattention. The difference between dichotic and binaural presentation is minimal; evidence from Empirical Project 2 suggests, however, that some dancers do find one more effective than the other. Dancers are asked to use the most effective presentation, with the most effective aural stimuli. This can sometimes be difficult when dancers are working in pairs or groups, because the dancers may have different preferences. If necessary, it is possible to use personal stereos with headphones. Alternatively the choreographer may prefer to create a balance by presenting the dancers with various aural stimuli that accommodate the needs of all dancers; for example by interchanging between the different types of recording.[104]

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[104] Examples of dancers using non-intrattentive active listening whilst improvising, choreographing and learning material as a solo and duet can be found in Chapters 20 and 25 and Chapters 27 to 33 of the DVD which accompanies this thesis.

All three non-intrattentive means

As with the intrattentive training, the dancers are trained to work initially with a single means of access individually and then with two or three concurrently. Dancers may have engaged in combining means of access before reaching this part of the training; for example, when using verbal report whilst working with a group, dancers are permitted to engage in a conversation and therefore use both verbal report and active listening. Within the context of this thesis and the Dance Consciousness Model, the term external non-intrattention indicates that a dancer is using two or more means of access simultaneously in order to access a non-intrattentive dance state.

As with the intrattentive training, dancers are trained to recognise for themselves which means of access or which combination is the most effective for a task and must remain aware of the possibility of overload. It was of common consensus during Empirical Project 2 that having all three means of access available, but not necessarily utilising all three simultaneously, is the most effective means of access. This provides the dancer with the opportunity to interchange freely between the different means of access and use every combination that is effective at a particular time.

The verbal, visual and aural stimuli presented when using more than one means of access can either be complementary or juxtaposing, depending on whether one wishes to increase or decrease the level of complexity. An example of using complementary stimuli is observing a list of numbers and simultaneously actively listening to the same list of numbers. An example of using juxtaposing stimuli is observing a list of numbers and simultaneously actively listening to a different list of numbers or a list of words. Complementary stimuli tend to be less complex than juxtaposing. Again, any combination is possible and each dancer is likely to have a preference about whether complementary or juxtaposing is more effective within each combination of the means of access and within the different dance components.

When being trained to use all three means of access together, dancers are asked to:

- Observe alternately the four visual stimuli;

- Actively listen to a single, binaural or dichotic presentation of the four alternating aural stimuli;

- Describe, shadow or answer what they see and hear.

The dancer can use the report to complement or juxtapose the visual and/or aural stimuli. The dancer takes complete control over the report and must actively select what they want to report on and when; they may report on both the stimuli, one of the stimuli or neither of the stimuli. Table 9 shows the possible combinations for the three means of access:[105]

Table 9: The possible combinations for the non-intrattentive means of access

Stimuli	**Access combinations**						
	Verbal report	Physical observation	Active listening	Verbal report and physical observation	Physical observation and active listening	Active listening and verbal report	External non-intrattention
Random report	*			*		*	*
Random film		*		*	*		*
Random text			*		*	*	*
Recite words	*			*		*	*
Observe words		*		*	*		*
Listen to words			*		*	*	*
Recite numbers	*			*		*	*

[105] Examples of dancers using external non-intrattention whilst improvising, choreographing and learning material as a solo and duet can be found in Chapters 21 and 22 and Chapters 26 to 33 of the DVD which accompanies this thesis.

Stimuli	Access combinations						
	Verbal report	Physical observation	Active listening	Verbal report and physical observation	Physical observation and active listening	Active listening and verbal report	External non-intrattention
Observe numbers		*		*	*		*
Listen numbers			*		*	*	*
Answer questions				*		*	*
Observe questions		*		*	*		*
Listen to questions			*		*	*	*

Three non-intrattentive states

Similar to the intrattentive training, the dancers learn to use means of access externally and internally. Dancers are trained to use non-intrattentive verbal report, non-intrattentive active listening, non-intrattentive physical observation and external non-intrattention. These means allow dancers to access an external state of non-intrattention. Dancers are also trained to use non-intrattentive internal reports, non-intrattentive internal observation, non-intrattentive internal listening and internal non-intrattention as means of access. These means allow dancers to access an internal state of non-intrattention. It is important to note that:

- Internal report is achieved through the creation of an internal monologue, during which the dancer continues to use the verbal stimuli.

- Internal listening is achieved through the creation of an internal monologue, during which the dancer continues to use the aural stimuli.

- Internal observation is achieved through the creation of visual imprints, during which the dancer continues to use the visual stimuli.

- Internal non-intrattention, like external non-intrattention, requires the dancer to use more than one means of access at a time, or at least to have the three means of access available for use. Whilst using internal non-intrattention as a means of access, dancers are therefore encouraged to create an internal monologue and visual imprints simultaneously.

Dancers are encouraged to master external means of access before moving on to internalise the means of access. Using external and then internal means of access to a non-intrattentive dance state allows the dancer's mind and body to experience and understand how it feels to be in a non-intrattentive state of dance consciousness. The dancer's body begins to understand how it feels to move without the mind attending to the movement explicitly. Having gained this understanding, dancers are trained to maintain access to the state without using the means of access; they are therefore asked to experience the state kinaesthetically – kinaesthetic non-intrattention. In order to achieve kinaesthetic non-intrattention, the dancer must disengage the intrattention, cease the report and allow the consciousness no object.

Similar to the intrattentive strand, the external and internal non-intrattention is therefore the means of access to the kinaesthetic non-intrattention. Once the dancer's mind has achieved that access, or non-intrattention, it is present to just experience. Kinaesthetic non-intrattention is the target state of the non-intrattentive training and strand. It may initially take dancers some time to reach the kinaesthetic state. With continual exposure, however, dancers should have mastered all three states by the end of the training. Table 10 summarises the three different non-intrattentive states.

Table 10: Three non-intrattentive states

	Means of access:	**Achieved through:**
State 1: External non-intrattention	• Non-intrattentive verbal report • Non-intrattentive physical observation • Non-intrattentive active listening	• Verbal stimuli • Visual stimuli • Aural stimuli

	Means of access:	Achieved through:
State 2: Internal non-intrattention	• Non-intrattentive internal report • Non-intrattentive internal observation • Non-intrattentive internal listening	• Internal monologue • Visual imprint • Internal monologue
State 3: Kinaesthetic non-intrattention		

Non-intrattentive training summary

The non-intrattentive training involves teaching dancers to:

- Access states of intrattention in order to access a non-intrattentive dance state whilst improvising, choreographing, learning, teaching, rehearsing and performing, as a solo, duet or group;

- Access fundamental states of non-intrattention and higher order states of non-intrattention;

- Understand the significance of continual exposure and willpower, and the importance of preparing the body both mentally and physically through a specific warm up;

- Recognise and use effective stimuli – verbal, visual and aural – which are changing, sufficiently complex and require active thinking;

- Use external means of non-intrattentive access, including verbal report, physical observation and active listening, in order to achieve an external state of non-intrattention;

- Use internal means of non-intrattentive access, including internal report, internal observation, and internal listening through the use of internal monologues and visual imprints, in order to achieve an internal state of non-intrattention;

- Access a kinaesthetic state of non-intrattention, in which the means of access are no longer needed and the dancer is able to exist non-intrattentively in the dance.

During the training, the dancers also use the method of examination described in Chapter 3. The use of this method allows the dancers to examine their experiences and ensure effective access to states of non-intrattention. In Chapter 3 it was noted that the method of examination for the non-intrattentive dance consciousness not only involves qualitative questions, but also quantitative stimulus-based questions.[106] Following each task within the non-intrattentive training, the dancers are asked questions relating to the verbal, visual and aural stimuli that they encountered within that specific task. The questions are very precise, for example 'how many times did you hear the number ten' or 'name five objects that appeared on the screen'.

Such questions provide quantitative information with regard to the dancer's intrattention and enable an assessment to be made about specific periods during which the dancer's attention may have wavered. For example, if a dancer were unable to remember a series of images from the middle of the task, despite clearly recollecting all the images from the beginning and end, this suggests that the dancer's intrattention wavered. One could question the dancer further on the awareness of self in an attempt to detect whether the intrattention moved away from the images in the middle of the task and on to the self. In addition, if dancers are informed before the task that they will have to answer questions on, for example, the formation of numbers, their will to intrattend may increase, which may subsequently increase their ability to attend. This stimulus-based questioning can provide great insight into the dancer's experience and is used throughout the non-intrattentive training workshops.

The structure for each non-intrattentive training workshop is presented in Tables 11, 12, 13 and 14:[107]

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[106] The nature and purpose of these questions could not be provided in Chapter 3 as they are dependent on the means of access which have been described in this chapter.

[107] Only the workshop structures are included here because the workshop descriptions are particularly lengthy. A sample non-intrattentive workshop description can be found in Appendix B. Chapters 18 to 33 on the DVD which accompanies this thesis provide some examples of dancers applying the non-intrattentive training and the non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model.

Table 11: Non-intrattentive training: Workshop 1

Task number	**Task**	**Means of access**
1	Warm up	No means
2	Solo improvisation	Random non-intrattentive verbal report
3	Solo improvisation	Structured non-intrattentive verbal report – numbers
4	Solo improvisation	Structured non-intrattentive verbal report – words
5	Solo improvisation	Non-intrattentive verbal report > non-intrattentive internal report
6	Solo set movement and performance	Non-intrattentive verbal report > non-intrattentive internal report
7	Solo choreography and performance	Non-intrattentive verbal report > non-intrattentive internal report
8	Mover/observer improvisation	Non-intrattentive verbal report
9	Duet improvisation	Non-intrattentive verbal report
10	Duet improvisation	Non-intrattentive verbal report > non-intrattentive internal report
11	Duet choreography and performance	Non-intrattentive verbal report > non-intrattentive internal report
12	Group improvisation	Non-intrattentive verbal report > non-intrattentive internal report
13	Group choreography and performance	Non-intrattentive verbal report > non-intrattentive internal report

Table 12: Non-intrattentive training: Workshop 2

Task number	**Task**	**Means of access**
1	Warm up	Non-intrattentive verbal report
2	Solo improvisation	Non-intrattentive physical observation
3	Solo improvisation	Non-intrattentive physical observation > non-intrattentive internal observation
4	Solo set movement and performance	Non-intrattentive physical observation > non-intrattentive internal observation
5	Solo choreography and performance	Non-intrattentive physical observation > non-intrattentive internal observation
6	Duet improvisation	Non-intrattentive physical observation
7	Duet improvisation	Non-intrattentive physical observation > non-intrattentive internal observation
8	Duet choreography and performance	Non-intrattentive physical observation > non-intrattentive internal observation
9	Group improvisation	Non-intrattentive physical observation > non-intrattentive internal observation
10	Group choreography and performance	Non-intrattentive physical observation > non-intrattentive internal observation

Table 13: Non-intrattentive training: Workshop 3

Task number	**Task**	**Means of access**
1	Warm up	Non-intrattentive physical observation
2	Solo improvisation	Single non-intrattentive active listening
3	Solo improvisation	Dichotic/binaural non-intrattentive active listening
4	Solo improvisation	Non-intrattentive active listening > non-intrattentive internal listening
5	Solo set movement and performance	Non-intrattentive active listening > non-intrattentive internal listening
6	Solo choreography and performance	Non-intrattentive active listening > non-intrattentive internal listening
7	Mover/observer improvisation	Non-intrattentive active listening
8	Duet improvisation	Non-intrattentive active listening
9	Duet improvisation	Non-intrattentive active listening > non-intrattentive internal listening
10	Duet choreography and performance	Non-intrattentive active listening > non-intrattentive internal listening
11	Group improvisation	Non-intrattentive active listening > non-intrattentive internal listening
12	Group choreography and performance	Non-intrattentive active listening > non-intrattentive internal listening

Table 14: Non-intrattentive training: Workshop 4

Task number	**Task**	**Means of access**
1	Warm up	Non-intrattentive active listening
2	Solo improvisation	Non-intrattentive verbal report and physical observation
3	Solo improvisation	Non-intrattentive verbal report and active listening
4	Solo improvisation	Non-intrattentive physical observation and active listening
5	Solo improvisation	External non-intrattention > internal non-intrattention > kinaesthetic non-intrattention
6	Solo set movement and performance	External non-intrattention > internal non-intrattention > kinaesthetic non-intrattention
7	Solo choreography and performance	External non-intrattention > internal non-intrattention > kinaesthetic non-intrattention
8	Mover/observer improvisation	External non-intrattention
9	Duet improvisation	External non-intrattention
10	Duet improvisation	External non-intrattention > internal non-intrattention > kinaesthetic non-intrattention
11	Duet choreography and performance	External non-intrattention > internal non-intrattention > kinaesthetic non-intrattention
12	Group improvisation	External non-intrattention > internal non-intrattention > kinaesthetic non-intrattention

Task number	Task	Means of access
13	Group choreography and performance	External non-intrattention > internal non-intrattention > kinaesthetic non-intrattention

The non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model

Having completed the four training workshops, dancers are equipped to use the non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model which is depicted in Figure 4.

Figure 4: The non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model



The non-intrattentive strand, like the intrattentive strand presented in Chapter 4, consists of three different phases: choreographic process, rehearsal process and performance. Within the choreographic process the dancer uses external non-intrattention. Whether the dancer is improvising, generating material for self or another dancer, or learning the choreographer's or another dancer's material, external means of access are used in order for the dancer to access a non-intrattentive state.

Once the movement has been choreographed, the dancer rehearses it using external means of access. Following this the dancer rehearses the material using internal means of access and then using kinaesthetic non-intrattention. This final part of the rehearsal process ultimately prepares the dancer for the non-intrattentive performance, as this final rehearsal state is the same as the performance state. If the dancer has had the necessary training and the non-intrattentive strand is used effectively, the dancer will be able to access a controlled kinaesthetic non-intrattentive dance consciousness during the performance.

Summary

Following a discussion of the three existing practices and theories which contributed to the formulation of the non-intrattentive strand – attention studies, Buddhist Introspection and Bodyweather – this chapter has answered the fourth focussed research question: How can one access the non-intrattentive dance consciousness?

This chapter has described the exact nature of the non-intrattentive training which is required for accessing non-intrattention and has also introduced the independently formulated non-intrattentive strand. This training and strand are intended for specific use within the context of the dance discipline and the Dance Consciousness Model. In addition, the chapter has explained how the strand is applied within choreography, rehearsal and performance in order to create a non-intrattentive dance consciousness.

Chapter 6 discusses the third and fourth strands of the model and indicates how dancers are able to switch between states of intrattention and states of non-intrattention.

Chapter 6

How can one switch between the intrattentive dance consciousness and the non-intrattentive dance consciousness? What constitutes the full Dance Consciousness Model?

Introduction

In Chapter 3 the Dance Consciousness Model was introduced and it was ascertained that the model comprises four strands. This chapter describes the third and fourth strands: the intrattentive to non-intrattentive (I-NI), and the non-intrattentive to intrattentive (NI-I). In doing so, it provides conclusions regarding the fifth focussed research question: How can one switch between the intrattentive dance consciousness and the non-intrattentive dance consciousness? In addition, the chapter presents the complete model and answers the sixth focussed research question: What constitutes the full Dance Consciousness Model?

The I-NI strand represents the idea that, in order to experience a non-intrattentive performance, the dancer may experience an intrattentive process, as shown in Figure 5.

The NI-I strand represents the idea that, in order to experience an intrattentive performance, the dancer may experience a non-intrattentive process as show in Figure 6.

The way in which a dancer is able to have such experiences is discussed in this chapter.

Figure 5: The intrattentive to non-intrattentive (I-NI) strand of the Dance Consciousness Model



Figure 6: The non-intrattentive to intrattentive (NI-I) strand of the Dance Consciousness Model



Chapter breakdown

This chapter begins by introducing the I-NI and NI-I strands and the switching states training that is required in order to use the strands. The reason why the ability to switch states is essential is explained and the context in which the switching may take place clarified. The chapter discusses switching states within the dance process and describes the purpose and content of Workshop 1 of the switching states training. Following this is a discussion on switching states within dance performance. The idea of interchanging between states in Cyclic State Training, which is used in the practice of Bodyweather, is introduced. After explaining the influence of the Cyclic State Training on the switching states training, the chapter describes a consciousness circuit and the purpose and content of Workshop 2. Finally this chapter presents the Dance Consciousness Model in its entirety.

The intrattentive to non-intrattentive (I-NI) and non-intrattentive to intrattentive (NI-I) strands

The I-NI and NI-I strands encompass both intrattention and non-intrattention. The I-NI strand involves an intrattentive process and non-intrattentive performance, and the NI-I strand involves a non-intrattentive process and an intrattentive performance. Within the Dance Consciousness Model there are four possible combinations, as shown in Table 15.

Table 15: Four possible combinations in the Dance Consciousness Model

	Process	**Performance**
1	Intrattentive choreography/rehearsal	Intrattentive rehearsal/performance
2	Non-intrattentive choreography/rehearsal	Non-intrattentive rehearsal/performance
3	Intrattentive choreography/rehearsal	Non-intrattentive rehearsal/performance
4	Non-intrattentive choreography/rehearsal	Intrattentive rehearsal/performance

Intrattentive and non-intrattentive training summary

In order to use the I-NI and NI-I strands, the dancer must participate initially in the intrattentive training and the non-intrattentive training as outlined in Chapters 4 and 5. The dancer must be able to apply the intrattentive and non-intrattentive strands when practising the I-NI and NI-I strands. Table 16 provides a summary of the intrattentive and non-intrattentive training:

Table 16: Summary of the intrattentive and non-intrattentive training

Training	**Means of access**
Intrattentive	Intrattentive verbal report Intrattentive physical observation Intrattentive blind sensing External intrattention Intrattentive internal report Intrattentive internal observation Internal intrattention Kinaesthetic intrattention
Non-intrattentive	Non-intrattentive verbal report Non-intrattentive physical observation Non-intrattentive active listening External non-intrattention Non-intrattentive internal report Non-intrattentive internal observation Non-intrattentive internal listening Internal non-intrattention Kinaesthetic non-intrattention

Training for the I-NI and NI-I strands

The format of the training for the I-NI and NI-I strands is different from that of the first two strands; it is not centred on teaching dancers to access particular states of consciousness as, by this point, they already know how to access the desired states. In the training for the I-NI and NI-I strands, entitled switching states training, dancers do practise the intrattentive and non-intrattentive training but the main focus is on teaching the dancers to interchange between the various types of access and the

different conscious states. In the switching states training, dancers therefore use the following and learn how to interchange between them:

- External intrattention;
- Internal intrattention;
- Kinaesthetic intrattention;
- External non-intrattention;
- Internal non-intrattention;
- Kinaesthetic non-intrattention.

Switching states

If a dancer is already competent in accessing intrattentive and non-intrattentive states during the dance process in order to create a particular state for performance, why does the dancer need to learn to interchange between these states? It may be that the choreographer wishes to aim for an intrattentive process but a non-intrattentive performance, or *vice versa*, or for a performance which involves moments of intrattention and moments of non-intrattention. In both these examples, the ability to switch states is essential. The switching states training therefore involves, in Workshop 1, teaching dancers to switch states in the process and, in Workshop 2, teaching dancers to switch states in performance.

Switching states during the process

In the Introduction, it was noted that it is customary within conventional Western contemporary dance that the choreographer stresses the importance of increased body awareness during the choreography and rehearsal time and then requires the dancer to go on stage and just perform. The question was posed: how is a dancer to make the transition from an intrattentive process, to a non-intrattentive performance? The I-NI strand of the Dance Consciousness Model offers a solution to this problem. Similarly the NI-I strand offers a solution to those occasions when a dancer is asked to make the transition from a non-intrattentive process to an intrattentive performance. The I-NI and NI-I strands and the switching states training provide

dancers with a progressive structure which promotes an efficient and seamless transition and gradual development from choreography, to rehearsal, to performance.

The four strands are summarised in Table 17.

Table 17: The four strands of the Dance Consciousness Model

Strand	**Dance phase**	**Means of access**
Intrattentive	Choreographic process	External intrattention
	Rehearsal process	External intrattention > internal intrattention > kinaesthetic intrattention
	Performance	Kinaesthetic intrattention
Non-intrattentive	Choreographic process	External non-intrattention
	Rehearsal process	External non-intrattention > internal non-intrattention > kinaesthetic non-intrattention
	Performance	Kinaesthetic non-intrattention
Intrattentive to non-intrattentive	Choreographic process	External intrattention
	Rehearsal process	External intrattention > external non-intrattention > internal non-intrattention > kinaesthetic non-intrattention
	Performance	Kinaesthetic non-intrattention
Non-intrattentive to intrattentive	Choreographic process	External non-intrattention
	Rehearsal process	External non-intrattention > external intrattention > internal intrattention > kinaesthetic intrattention
	Performance	Kinaesthetic intrattention

Workshop 1

Workshop 1 trains dancers how to use the I-NI and NI-I strands of the Dance Consciousness Model. As with the other strands, dancers are taught to use the I-NI and NI-I strands whilst:

- Improvising – within both free and structured improvisation;
- Choreographing material;
- Learning material;
- Teaching material;
- Rehearsing material;
- Performing.

Whilst working as a:

- Solo;
- Duet;
- Group.

The structure for Workshop 1 of the switching states training is shown in Table 18. The tasks in this workshop involve applying the strands within these different contexts. So, for example, dancers are trained to apply the I-NI strand within the context of a self-generated solo – see task 4 in Table 18. In this instance, each dancer choreographs and begins to rehearse his or her solo using external intrattention and then internal non-intrattention. The dancer then rehearses the solo using kinaesthetic non-intrattention in preparation for the performance and finally performs the solo using kinaesthetic non-intrattention. The dancers are also trained, for example, to apply the NI-I strand in the context of group choreography – see task 8 in Table 18. In this instance, the dancers choreograph and begin to rehearse their group piece using external non-intrattention. The dancers then rehearse the group piece using internal intrattention and progress to using kinaesthetic intrattention in preparation for the performance. Finally, they perform the piece using kinaesthetic intrattention.

During the training, the dancers also practise the method of examination outlined in Chapter 3. This method allows the dancers to examine their experiences and ensure that they are switching states effectively.[108]

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[108] Chapters 34 to 39 on the DVD which accompanies this thesis provide some examples of dancers applying the I-NI and NI-I strands of the Dance Consciousness Model.

Table 18: Switching states training: Workshop 1

Task number	**Task**	**Means of access**
1	Warm up	External, internal and kinaesthetic intrattention and external, internal and kinaesthetic non-intrattention
2	Solo improvisation in choreography, rehearsal and performance – I-NI strand	External intrattention for choreography External intrattention for initial rehearsal External > internal > kinaesthetic non-intrattention for rehearsal Kinaesthetic non-intrattention for performance
3	Solo set movement in choreography, rehearsal and performance – NI-I strand	External non-intrattention for choreography External non-intrattention for initial rehearsal External > internal > kinaesthetic intrattention for rehearsal Kinaesthetic intrattention for performance
4	Solo choreography in choreography, rehearsal and performance – I-NI strand	External intrattention for choreography External intrattention for initial rehearsal External > internal > kinaesthetic non-intrattention for rehearsal Kinaesthetic non-intrattention for performance

Task number	Task	Means of access
5	Duet improvisation in choreography, rehearsal and performance – NI-I strand	External non-intrattention for choreography External non-intrattention for initial rehearsal External > internal > kinaesthetic intrattention for rehearsal Kinaesthetic intrattention for performance
6	Duet choreography in choreography, rehearsal and performance – I-NI strand	External intrattention for choreography External intrattention for initial rehearsal External > internal > kinaesthetic non-intrattention for rehearsal Kinaesthetic non-intrattention for performance
7	Group improvisation in choreography, rehearsal and performance – I-NI	External intrattention for choreography External intrattention for initial rehearsal External > internal > kinaesthetic non-intrattention for rehearsal Kinaesthetic non-intrattention for performance
8	Group choreography in choreography, rehearsal and performance – NI-I strand	External non-intrattention for choreography External non-intrattention for initial rehearsal External > internal > kinaesthetic intrattention for rehearsal Kinaesthetic intrattention for performance

Having successfully completed Workshop 1, dancers have the ability to switch states effectively within the dance process and thus are able to apply the I-NI and the NI-I

strands of the Dance Consciousness Model. There may be instances, however, in which a more instantaneous switching between states is required, such as within the actual performance.

Switching states during performance

Some choreographers and dancers may create performances that are wholly intrattentive or wholly non-intrattentive, for which the intrattentive and non-intrattentive strands are applicable. Others may prefer to create performances in which the dancers sometimes perform intrattentively and sometimes non-intrattentively. For example, a dancer may non-intrattentively perform an improvised solo and then move straight into performing a highly structured and detailed contact duet which necessitates an intrattentive consciousness. The ability to switch states instantaneously within the performance is therefore vital.

The training for dancers to switch between states instantaneously is not, however, encompassed within any particular strand of the Dance Consciousness Model. The ability to switch states in performance results from using more than one strand during the dance process – indeed the very nature of the model is that its four strands may be used in any one dance piece. The performance switching training teaches dancers to use more than one strand of the model and comprises a consciousness circuit. The inspiration for this circuit came from the Cyclic State Training (CST) that is used within the practice of Bodyweather.

Cyclic State Training (CST)

The CST is a sequential rehearsal and choreographic technique which comprises a circuit with various different stations. The purpose of the CST is to train dancers to move efficiently around the circuit and to enter fully into the movement task associated with each station. The circuit provides a structure for an improvisation. The CST can take various formats with any number of stations, but a typical format comprises seven to fourteen different stations.

Table 19 provides details of an example of a simple CST circuit and the remainder of this section explains the actions which were observed by the author of this thesis at a Bodyweather workshop held by Lynch in Oslo in October 2004. In the example, at

least one person is positioned at each station initially and there must continue to be at least one person at each station during the circuit. The stations are numbered, as shown, and are positioned consecutively around the room. Dancers are instructed to move clockwise to the next station when 'change' is shouted by the dancer at station 1, stopping at each in turn and carrying out the task for that station.

Table 19: Cyclic State Training circuit

Station	Task	Action for each dancer at the station
1	Watching the clock	Observe the clock for one minute and then shout 'change' as the signal for all dancers to move round to the next station. The time may be decreased in stages from one minute to thirty seconds, then to twenty, ten and five seconds.
2	Copying improvisation	Copy the movements of the dancer positioned at station 8.
3	Sprinting	Sprint on the spot as fast as possible.
4	Bisuko	Execute Bisuko, which is a slow walk. The speed of this walk is determined prior to the dancers commencing the circuit. Dancers may be instructed to walk at, for example, one sixty-fourth of the speed of their normal walk. Dancers are trained to do this at an earlier point in the Bodyweather workshop.
5	Head improvisation	Improvise using the head to lead the body.
6	Stretching	Stretch the body in any way that feels effective.
7	Observing	Sit and observe all the other dancers.
8	Free improvisation	Improvise freely around the space.

Interchanging in the CST

During the Oslo Bodyweather workshop it was observed that the dancers' physical transition from station to station is accompanied by a mental transition. The dancer's body has to adapt physically and instantaneously to make the changes, for example, from running very quickly to walking very slowly, or from sitting observing to improvising freely. Dancers seem able to manage the physical changes and move

fairly efficiently from station to station. The dancer's mind, or conscious state, however, does not seem to adapt so easily. What is happening during the transitions, and the effect this has on movement prior to and following the transitions, is of great interest for this study. Between some stations the change in consciousness is considerable and the dancer's ability to deal with this change can have an effect on the execution of the actual tasks.

At station 7, the dancer is expected not merely to observe, but also to increase his or her awareness of the circuit as a whole and reflect and evaluate the actions of all the other dancers. This station requires an intrattentive state of consciousness. At station 8, the dancer is expected to improvise spontaneously, with little reflection or awareness of self, other dancers, or the circuit as a whole. This station requires a non-intrattentive state of consciousness. Moving from station 7 to station 8 not only requires a physical change in activity, therefore, but also a change in consciousness.

Although it is not the purpose of the CST circuit, this interchanging of conscious states is required throughout the circuit: from an intrattentive clock watch in which the dancer has a heightened awareness of time, and an intrattentive copying improvisation in which the dancer has a heightened awareness of the movement of another dancer; to a non-intrattentive sprint in which the dancer has little awareness of what the body is actually doing; to an intrattentive slow walk in which the dancer is very aware of speed, precision and balance; to a non-intrattentive head improvisation and so on.

On the first lap of the circuit, entering fully into each task can be difficult. For example, when starting the non-intrattentive improvisation at station 8, the dancer's consciousness may be initially slightly intrattentive as a result of the observation just completed at station 7. When it is sensed that the dancer at station 1 is about to shout 'change', it may feel as if consciousness automatically begins to prepare for the clock watching at station 1 and consciousness may become slightly intrattentive again. In continuing to feel the conscious effects of station 7 and preparing mentally for station 1, it may be difficult to improvise with a truly non-intrattentive conscious state.

Physically moving from one station to another seems to require an intrattentive consciousness, regardless of whether the preceding or subsequent station is an intrattentive or non-intrattentive station. During the transitions, dancers may slip into a more everyday state of consciousness compared with the dance state they appear to be in during the time spent completing each task. The dancers sometimes use this everyday state as an opportunity to cough, check watches or adjust clothes. The dancers subsequently may take a while to become truly engaged in the next task. During the first lap of the circuit, the dancers may have little control over consciousness and interchanging might not be executed effectively, with each conscious state affecting the next conscious state.

The empirical testing implies that after the third repetition of the circuit, the transitions are smoother and dancers begin to enter more instantaneously into each task. The transitions might even disappear and the dancers can then move seamlessly from task to task. It seems that the physical rehearsal of moving around the circuit improves the quality with which dancers are able to move from station to station. The mental rehearsal, in terms of consciousness, also appears to improve the dancers' ability to fulfil the aim of the CST of being able to move efficiently around the circuit and to enter fully into the movement task presented at each station.

The consciousness circuit

Although the purpose of the CST is not to train dancers to interchange between different conscious states, it does seem that it could be used for this purpose. As a result, a similar circuit entitled the consciousness circuit is used in the switching states training. The consciousness circuit consists of eight stations – four intrattentive and four non-intrattentive. At each of these stations, the dancers are asked to perform specified movement tasks, such as walking, running, improvising or standing still. The dancers spend one minute at each station before moving to the next station and therefore switching states. This training gives the dancers the opportunity to practise switching instantaneously between intrattentive and non-intrattentive states.

The exercises in the example below comprise simple movements which can be used for a generic consciousness circuit. A key aim of the consciousness circuit is that each station requires the dancer to use a different conscious state – either intrattentive

or non-intrattentive – from that used at the previous station; the actual nature of the exercises is of secondary importance. It is therefore possible and legitimate for a choreographer to replace the exercises with an activity more relevant to, and appropriate for, a particular context. For example, a choreographer may decide that, whilst the walking exercise in the example below is applicable within the context of a piece, it is more appropriate to ask the dancer to walk in role as their character. In addition, the choreographer may decide that having more or fewer stations would be appropriate, depending on the number of dancers participating in the consciousness circuit.

Workshop 2

In Workshop 2, before commencing the circuit, dancers are trained how to execute all the exercises and to do so whilst accessing the correct conscious state. During this preparation, dancers are encouraged to access these states externally, internally and kinaesthetically. The dancers are then asked to walk through the circuit with the choreographer as he or she explains the rules of the circuit and makes it clear which state of consciousness is required at each station.

A basic circuit involves the dancers moving round all the stations a minimum of three times but, at the discretion of the choreographer, more revolutions may be completed. The first time the dancers go round the circuit, they are asked to externalise the means of access they are using, either intrattentive or non-intrattentive, the second time round they are asked to internalise the means of access, and the third time round to experience the state kinaesthetically without the use of the means of access. With three repetitions and one minute clock watches the circuit lasts for around 25 minutes. Should the choreographer wish for the circuit to last longer, it is possible to move more gradually from external means of access to kinaesthetic with, for example, three repetitions of the circuit using external, three using internal and three using kinaesthetic. Regardless of the number of repetitions, by the time the dancers reach the kinaesthetic execution of the circuit, they are switching states in the manner that is required within performance. This circuit therefore provides the necessary performance switching training.

A sample consciousness circuit, which is for eight dancers, is shown in Table 20. If there are fewer dancers, a second clock watch task must be added to ensure that a dancer is always present to shout 'change'.

Table 20: Consciousness circuit

Station	Task	Action for each participant at the station
1	Non-intrattentive free improvisation	Non-intrattentively and freely improvise around the space.
2	Intrattentive slow walk	Intrattentively slow walk at roughly one sixty-fourth the speed of a normal walk.
3	Non-intrattentive sprint	Non-intrattentively sprint on the spot as fast as possible.
4	Intrattentive observation and clock watch	Sit and intrattentively observe the other dancers and also observe the clock. After one minute shout 'change'.
5	Non-intrattentive closing and opening of hands	Open one hand and simultaneously close the other. The action must be extremely slow to allow intrattentive awareness to be directed to every detail of the movement.
6	Intrattentive mirroring	Intrattentively mirror any of the other dancers.
7	Non-intrattentive stillness	Stand still, but maintain a non-intrattentive consciousness, trying not to observe others or reflect on self, but trying just to exist in the stillness.

Station	Task	Action for each participant at the station
8	Intrattentive set phrase	Intrattentively rehearse a set phrase of movement. This phrase will be taught to, or choreographed by, the dancer prior to the commencement of the circuit. The movement can, of course, be specific to the piece.

At different intervals during the consciousness circuit, the dancers are instructed by the choreographer to exit the room or performance space. After varying amounts of time they are then asked to return to the same station and to continue with the task. Not only is it essential that the dancers are able to switch from one state to another whilst performing, it is also vital that they are able to enter a performance in a particular state, thus switching from their off stage everyday state to a performance state. The dancers are encouraged to maintain the appropriate state of consciousness whilst off stage and to continue to use the suitable means of access rather than switching off.

The structure for Workshop 2 of the switching states training is shown in Table 21.[109]

Table 21: Switching states training: Workshop 2

Task number	Task	Means of access
1	Warm up	External intrattention and external non-intrattention
2	Solo improvisation	External non-intrattention > internal non-intrattention > kinaesthetic non-intrattention
3	Speed walk	External intrattention > internal intrattention > kinaesthetic intrattention

[109] Only the workshop structures for the switching states training have been included in this chapter because the workshop descriptions are particularly lengthy. A sample switching states workshop description can be found in Appendix C and Chapter 40 on the DVD which accompanies this thesis provides an example of two dancers participating in a consciousness circuit.

Task number	Task	Means of access
4	Running and observing	External non-intrattention > internal non-intrattention > kinaesthetic non-intrattention External intrattention > internal intrattention > kinaesthetic intrattention
5	Closing/opening hands	External non-intrattention > internal non-intrattention > kinaesthetic non-intrattention
6	Improvisation and mirroring	External intrattention > internal intrattention > kinaesthetic intrattention
7	Stillness	External non-intrattention > internal non-intrattention > kinaesthetic non-intrattention
8	Choreograph/learn/rehearse set phrase	External intrattention > internal intrattention > kinaesthetic intrattention
9	Entering and exiting	External non-intrattention > internal non-intrattention > kinaesthetic non-intrattention External intrattention > internal intrattention > kinaesthetic intrattention
10	Consciousness circuit	External non-intrattention > internal non-intrattention > kinaesthetic non-intrattention External intrattention > internal intrattention > kinaesthetic intrattention

Having successfully completed Workshop 2, dancers have the ability to switch states effectively within dance performance and are therefore capable of applying more than one strand of the Dance Consciousness Model in any one dance piece.

The complete Dance Consciousness Model

Having completed all of the switching states training dancers are equipped to apply the Dance Consciousness Model. Each of the four strands of the model can be used independently or in conjunction with one another, giving choreographers and dancers

control over the conscious state for the dance process and dance performance. Figure 7 represents the complete Dance Consciousness Model.

Figure 7: The Dance Consciousness Model



Summary

Following a thorough consideration as to why the ability to switch states in process and performance is necessary and a review of Cyclic State Training, this chapter proposed an answer to the fifth focussed research question: How can one switch between the intrattentive dance consciousness and the non-intrattentive dance consciousness?

This chapter has described the switching states training and the I-NI and NI-I strands of the Dance Consciousness Model. In doing so, the presentation of the Dance Consciousness Model has been completed, as was required by the sixth focussed research question: What constitutes the full Dance Consciousness Model?

Chapter 7 considers the effectiveness of the Dance Consciousness Model.

Chapter 7

How effective is the Dance Consciousness Model?

Introduction

The following is a summary of each preceding chapter and an explanation of how the research questions have been addressed and the way in which the outcome of this research has been developed.

- Chapter 1: Why is the dancer's consciousness significant? Following a review of the existing literature dealing with the dance consciousness, the chapter introduced the intended outcome of this research: To create a model that can be used to enable dancers to access particular conscious states for performance – the Dance Consciousness Model. Seven focussed research questions were asked, six of which have been answered in Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.

- Chapter 2: What is the nature of the dance consciousness? In addition to examining various concepts of consciousness, this chapter formulated two concepts which provide insight into the nature of the dance consciousness: the intrattentive and non-intrattentive dance consciousness.

- Chapter 3: How can one examine the dance consciousness? This chapter discussed existent methods for examining consciousness, namely phenomenological reduction and the explicitation session, and introduced the method of examination that was formulated for use within the context of the Dance Consciousness Model.

- Chapter 4: How can one access the intrattentive dance consciousness? The theories and practices that inspired the intrattentive strand, namely somatic practices, sport psychology, and visual and verbal processing theories, were discussed. Chapter 4 explained the intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model, which can be used to access the intrattentive dance consciousness, and described the intrattentive training that precedes its use.

- Chapter 5: How can one access the non-intrattentive dance consciousness? This chapter discussed the theories and practices that inspired the non-intrattentive strand, namely attention studies, Buddhist Introspection and Bodyweather. It then explained the non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model, which can be used to access the non-intrattentive dance consciousness, and described the non-intrattentive training that precedes its use.

- Chapter 6: How can one switch between the intrattentive dance consciousness and the non-intrattentive dance consciousness? What constitutes the full Dance Consciousness Model? Having introduced the intrattentive to non-intrattentive (I-NI) and non-intrattentive to intrattentive (NI-I) strands of the Dance Consciousness Model, this chapter described the switching states training that precede their use. Included in this description was an explanation of Cyclic State Training, and how it inspired the switching states training. Finally, the complete Dance Consciousness Model was presented.

Chapter 7 considers the final research question: How effective is the Dance Consciousness Model?

Chapter breakdown

The Dance Consciousness Model has been formulated gradually over three years. During this time, three empirical projects have been undertaken with a group of trained dancers. Chapter 7 describes Empirical Project 1 and Empirical Project 2, in which the intrattentive strand and the non-intrattentive strand respectively were formulated. Empirical Project 3, which comprises seven phases, is then analysed. Phases 1 to 3 are considered in some detail. Phase 4 is broken down into the following parts:

- Fundamental intrattention;
- Higher order intrattention;
- Intrattentive stimuli;
- Intrattentive verbal report;
- Intrattentive physical observation;
- Intrattentive blind sensing;

- Three means of intrattentive access;
- Three intrattentive states;
- Intrattentive training summary.

Phase 5 is broken down as follows:

- Fundamental non-intrattention;
- Higher order non-intrattention;
- Non-intrattentive stimuli;
- Non-intrattentive verbal report;
- Non-intrattentive physical observation;
- Non-intrattentive active listening;
- Three means of non-intrattentive access;
- Three non-intrattentive states;
- Non-intrattentive training summary.

Phase 6 comprises process switching and performance switching. The analysis of Phase 7 includes a consideration of the effect of the model within choreography, rehearsal and performance.

A conclusion regarding the efficacy of the Dance Consciousness Model within the context of Western contemporary dance is then reached. Within this, the chapter considers possible improvements that could be made to the model and indicates how it is intended that this dance consciousness research will develop further in the future. This is followed by a hypothesis concerning the possible significance of the model within current dance practice and it is questioned whether the Dance Consciousness Model might be considered as a proposal for new practice.

Ethics in research

The research undertaken in the three empirical projects complied with the ethical guidelines of the University of Leeds. The dancers who participated in the empirical projects all consented to comply with the guidelines and their accounts of their experiences and feelings were provided freely. The dancers were informed of the purpose of the empirical projects and their role within the projects. It was also

clarified why the projects were being undertaken and who would be conducting the research. The dancers were informed that, if necessary, they had the right to abstain from the project in which they were involved. In addition, the dancers were notified that, at any point during the project, they had the right to withdraw or renegotiate any consent given in relation to the use of their accounts or video recordings in which they appeared. The dancers were also informed that they were welcome to reject the use of recording equipment if they felt it inappropriate.

In Empirical Project 1 it was necessary to withhold some information from particular dancers in order to examine the effect that being uninformed had on each dancer's ability to access certain states. These dancers were provided with as much information as possible at the earliest opportunity and, on completion of the project, were informed fully of the information that had been withheld and the reasons for it being withheld. At this point the dancers were notified that they had the right to withdraw their accounts should they deem it necessary.

At the outset of each empirical project, it was confirmed to the dancers that their accounts would be kept confidential, would remain anonymous and would be stored in a secure manner. This was also the case for any related research records, for example video recordings. The dancers were informed that they would be given access to their own records on request. In the disclosure and analysis of the dancers' accounts included in this chapter, the dancers are not referred to in any way that could result in their direct identification. The accounts provided in this chapter and the transcript presented in Appendix D[110] have been shown to the relevant dancers to ensure accuracy and to give them the right to refuse the disclosure of any particular part of their accounts. The dancers were informed that any personal information made known to the author of this thesis during the empirical projects would be retained in a confidential manner.

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[110] All of the dancers' discussions and interviews were video recorded. It is not possible to include in this thesis the transcripts for all discussions and interviews and so a sample is provided in Appendix D.

Empirical Project 1 – intrattention

Between March and October 2003, six trained dancers participated in the intrattentive Empirical Project. The project was filmed with a video camera and the dancers were interviewed throughout. The project consisted of four phases.

Phase 1 was undertaken by two dancers (D1 and D2) and comprised six exploratory research workshops. The purpose of Phase 1 was to investigate the intrattentive consciousness through a variety of tasks, in order to find some possible methods for accessing intrattention within the dance process. It was intended that such methods would be used subsequently to transfer intrattention into dance performance. The dancers were informed of the purpose of the research and the Dance Consciousness Model and the concepts and terminology discussed in Chapter 2. They therefore had a comprehensive understanding of the different states and the characteristics of these states. The dancers were also taught to use the methods of examination explained in Chapter 3.

The design of the tasks incorporated the theories discussed in Chapter 4, namely somatic practices, sport psychology, and visual and verbal processing theories. Many of the tasks proved successful, such as the physical observation tasks. Some tasks, such as the verbal report and blind sensing tasks, required constant modification. For example in the first workshop the notion of using present report as opposed to pre- or post-report had not been decided and some experimentation with the verbal report was necessary before it was ascertained that the present-report was most effective. Another example is the motion blind sensing tasks which required modification in terms of the way in which they developed. It was eventually decided that a gradual progression into the tasks was necessary to ensure that the dancers felt comfortable and able to maintain focussed intrattention.

Several tasks were discarded when they were not considered sufficiently effective for the accessing of intrattention. One such task involved the physical manipulating of one's own body. This task, entitled physical manipulation, required the dancer to move his or her body parts only when moved by another body part. For example, in order to move a leg the dancer would have to lift the leg with the arm. Although this

task encouraged some intrattention, the dancers found it difficult to focus the intrattention and the task proved slightly impractical and limiting in terms of the actual movement material. Another discarded task was a mover/observer task in which the observer used verbal report to direct the movements of the mover. The mover therefore only moved in response to the observer's directions. Whilst this task resulted in some interesting movement material, those in the mover role found themselves responding on impulse to the directions and not finding time to focus intrattentively on the movement, and those in the observer role claimed that they were not really focussing on the mover at all as they became preoccupied with having to constantly list movement directions.

From the analysis of the effective, modified and discarded tasks, the experiences of the two dancers – which were determined according to the methods of examination described in Chapter 3 – and the theories discussed in Chapter 4, the intrattentive means of access were created. As a result, at the end of Phase 1, five intrattentive workshops were formulated.

Phase 2 was undertaken by four dancers and comprised the application of the five intrattentive workshops that were defined at the end of Phase 1. The two dancers (D1 and D2) who had participated in Phase 1 were joined by two more dancers (D3 and D4). Unlike D1 and D2, D3 and D4 were not informed about the Dance Consciousness Model or the underlying concepts and terminology. The reason for this difference in approach was to ascertain whether being informed of the purpose of the tasks had any effects on the way the tasks were completed and/or each dancer's ability to access effectively the desired states of consciousness.

The five workshops were entitled:

- Improvisation and verbal report;
- Improvisation, physical observation and blind sensing;
- Other imposed movement, verbal report, physical observation and blind sensing;
- Self-imposed movement, verbal report, physical observation and blind sensing;
- Using all three means of access.

These workshops took a similar, although less refined, format to those described in Chapter 4. At the end of Phase 2, the workshops were analysed and a working model was created for accessing states of intrattention. This working model was later modified and refined to become the intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model.

In Phase 3, the working model created at the end of Phase 2 was applied in practice. The six dancers who participated in Phase 3 included: the two (D1 and D2) from Phase 1, who were fully informed about the purpose of the project and the means of access; the two (D3 and D4) who joined for Phase 2 and who had experienced using the means of access but had not been told all details about the project and were therefore deemed to be partially informed, and two additional dancers (D5 and D6) who were completely uninformed about either project purpose or means of access.

Phase 3 took the form of a choreographic and rehearsal process, in which the dancers choreographed and rehearsed two 45-minute dance pieces. The first was a set piece in which all the movement, a combination of literal and non-literal, was precisely structured. The second piece was an improvisation in which the structure was determined but the movement content was not. The informed D1 and D2 and the partially informed D3 and D4 all choreographed and rehearsed the movement using the working model, and thus used intrattentive means of access. The uninformed D5 and D6, however, did not use the model and instead treated the process as they normally would in conventional dance practice. The purpose of this was not only to ascertain whether being informed was more or less effective in terms of using the model, but also to discern the difference between applying and not applying the model.

Phase 4 was undertaken by the same six dancers and comprised the performance of the two dance pieces. During the first piece, D1, D2, D3 and D4 performed whilst using internal means of intrattentive access – internal report and internal observation – and D5 and D6 performed in a conventional way. During the second piece, D1, D2, D3 and D4 performed using external means of intrattentive access – verbal report, physical observation and blind sensing – and D5 and D6 performed as normal. The pieces were performed on two separate nights in a theatre before an audience of at

least one hundred people. The performances were recorded on video and all six dancers were interviewed.

The video footage and the results of the dancers' interviews throughout all four phases were analysed. As a result of the analysis:

- The methods of access explored in Phase 1 were adapted and eventually defined;

- The workshops formulated in Phase 2 were modified significantly and now act as the training which precedes the use of the intrattentive strand;

- The working model was revised and re-formulated to become the intrattentive strand;

- The training and model were considered to be effective because of the feedback from dancers in the interviews. Dancers' comments included, for example, 'I felt completely in control of my consciousness and able to access intrattention at will during both performances' (D2, 2003).

It was discerned that those dancers who were informed seemed to be more able to access intrattentive states effectively than those who were completely uninformed; one dancer claimed that being informed provided an understanding of 'the dance consciousness and the nature of the states that [the dancers were] trying to access' (D2, 2003). In addition, the analysis of the information also suggested that having uninformed dancers alongside informed dancers was not especially beneficial. The informed dancers commented that, at times, the uninformed dancers acted as a distraction when the informed dancers were attempting to use the means of access. In addition, the uninformed dancers felt that they were not able to engage in a conventional process when surrounded by dancers engaging in a non-conventional process. In planning and implementing Empirical Project 2, all of the above observations were taken into account when the extent to which dancers should be informed was being decided.[111]

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[111] Some footage of Empirical Project 1 can be found on Chapter 46 of the DVD which accompanies this thesis.

Empirical Project 2 – non-intrattention

Empirical Project 2, relating to non-intrattention, was undertaken between February and June 2004. The project was filmed with a video camera and the dancers were interviewed throughout. Taking the analysis of Empirical Project 1 into consideration, it was decided that Project 2 should consist of only two phases – Phase 1 for exploration and Phase 2 for application – and only two dancers (D7 and D8). D7 and D8 were completely informed from the outset and the dancers were at no point joined by partially informed or completely uninformed dancers, as this was deemed to be unnecessary.

Phase 1 of Project 2 comprised eight exploratory research workshops. The purpose of Phase 1 was to investigate the non-intrattentive consciousness through a variety of tasks, in order to find some possible methods for accessing non-intrattention within the dance process. It was intended that such methods would be used subsequently to transfer non-intrattention into dance performance. The dancers were informed of the purpose of the research and the concepts and terminology described in Chapter 2 and taught to use the methods of examination discussed in Chapter 3.

The theories and practices explored in Chapter 5, namely attention studies, Buddhist Introspection and Bodyweather, were used as a basis for the design of the tasks for use in the workshops. The workshops took a similar, but less refined, format to those discussed in Chapter 5 and were entitled:

- Introducing non-intrattention;
- Non-intrattentive verbal report;
- Non-intrattentive active listening;
- Non-intrattentive physical observation;
- Non-intrattentive verbal report and active listening;
- Non-intrattentive verbal report and physical observation;
- Non-intrattentive active listening and physical observation;
- All three means of access.

These exploratory task-based workshops took a similar structure to the intrattentive training formulated at the end of Empirical Project 1. As in the first phase of Empirical Project 1, many of the tasks proved successful, some required constant modification and several were discarded. Successful tasks were the verbal report tasks, which benefited immensely from the modifications made in Empirical Project 1 regarding the use of present- as opposed to pre- or post-report. The active listening tasks required some modification and the dancers experimented with using personal stereos and headphones prior to deciding that using over-head speakers was more practical. The dancers also experimented with using various single presentation recordings before deciding that binaural and dichotic presentations encouraged higher states of intrattention.

Discarded tasks included ones which required the dancers to write and talk simultaneously. The premise behind such tasks was that they would encourage the dancers to become accustomed to moving, even if it were only moving the hand, and talking at the time same time. The dancers would thus have experienced dual-tasking and the splitting of consciousness prior to having to apply it whilst dancing. The dancers reported, however, that such tasks were unnecessary and it was difficult to direct the intrattention solely to the talking as the writing was too complex to execute non-intrattentively.

From the analysis of the effective, modified and discarded tasks, the experiences of the two dancers – which again were determined using the methods of examination introduced in Chapter 3 – and the theory discussed in Chapter 5, the non-intrattentive means of access were created, the non-intrattentive training determined and a working model formulated for accessing states of non-intrattention.

Phase 2 comprised the application of the working model created at the end of Phase 1. In a formal performance workshop presented before an audience, D7 and D8 presented a practical application of the non-intrattentive working model, using external, internal and kinaesthetic non-intrattention within improvisation and set movement, both as a solo and duet. The performance workshop was recorded with a video camera and subsequent to the workshop the dancers participated in an open discussion and interviews.

The video footage, the dancer interviews, the questionnaires obtained as a result of the dancers using the method of examination, and the open discussion were all analysed. As a result of the analysis:

- The methods of access explored in Phase 1 were adapted and eventually defined, and the workshops formulated in Phase 1 were modified significantly to form the training which precedes the use of the non-intrattentive strand;

- The working model was revised and re-formulated to become the non-intrattentive strand;

- The training and model were considered effective because of the feedback from dancers. For example:

> I was not aware of what my body was doing – although looking back at the video I know that I was successfully choreographing, rehearsing and performing successful movement material. I really feel as if I am able to access states of non-intrattention.
> (D7, 2004)[112]

Empirical Project 3 – applying the Dance Consciousness Model

Between September and February 2005, four trained dancers (D9, D10, D11 and D12) participated in the first full application of the Dance Consciousness Model and the training that precedes its use. The model was formulated after the first two empirical projects had been analysed with reference to the theories discussed within this thesis. As in the previous two projects, Empirical Project 3 was filmed with a video camera and the dancers were interviewed throughout the process. Project 3 comprised seven phases which correspond with the seven chapters in this thesis, and thus the titles of each phase and each chapter are the same. The seven phases also correspond with the focussed research questions presented in Chapter 1 and were structured as follows:

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[112] Some footage of Empirical Project 2 can be found on Chapter 46 of the DVD which accompanies this thesis.

- Phase 1: Why is the dancer's consciousness significant? The dancers participated in a discussion about the purpose of the Dance Consciousness Model in relation to the research questions and research outcome defined in Chapter 1.

- Phase 2: What is the nature of the dance consciousness? The dancers were informed of the concepts of consciousness as described in Chapter 2, intrattention and non-intrattention, and the relevant terminology.

- Phase 3: How can one examine the dance consciousness? The dancers were informed of the method of examination, as introduced in Chapter 3, and taught how to apply the method.

- Phase 4: How can one access the intrattentive dance consciousness? The dancers participated in the three intrattentive training workshops as described in Chapter 4 and, in doing so, learnt how to apply the intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model. During the training the dancers also applied the method of examination, which provided assurance that they were accessing the intrattentive states effectively and applying the intrattentive strand accurately.

- Phase 5: How can one access the non-intrattentive dance consciousness? The dancers participated in the four non-intrattentive training workshops as described in Chapter 5 and, in doing so, learnt how to apply the non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model. During the training the dancers also applied the method of examination, which provided assurance that they were accessing the non-intrattentive states effectively and applying the non-intrattentive strand accurately.

- Phase 6: How can one switch states between the intrattentive dance consciousness and the non-intrattentive dance consciousness? What constitutes the full Dance Consciousness Model? The dancers participated in the two switching states training workshops as detailed in Chapter 6 and, in doing so, learnt how to switch states in both process and performance and thus apply the I-NI and the NI-I strands of the Dance Consciousness Model. During the training the dancers also applied the method of examination, which provided assurance that they were

switching states effectively. The dancers were provided with the illustration of the Dance Consciousness Model that is presented in Chapter 6.

- Phase 7: How effective is the Dance Consciousness Model? The dancers applied the Dance Consciousness Model within the choreography, rehearsal and performance of a dance piece lasting an hour and a half. Each section of movement was choreographed and rehearsed using different strands of the model, ensuring a combination of intrattentive and non-intrattentive movement material which, in turn, enabled the dancers to switch states in both process and performance. The piece was performed on three separate occasions, in a theatre, to audiences of at least fifty people. During the performances the dancers accessed the desired states of consciousness kinaesthetically and had complete control over this access. Following the third performance, each dancer participated in an interview in which they answered questions about the training and the application of the model in choreography, rehearsal and performance. The dancers were also invited to reflect on the experience of the Dance Consciousness Model and to compare this experience with normal, conventional practice. Finally, the dancers were asked to hypothesise about the effect the Dance Consciousness Model might have on Western contemporary dance practice.[113]

Analysis of Empirical Project 3

The results of the four dancers' (D9, D10, D11 and D12) discussions during workshops and of their final interview at the end Project 3, together with the observations of the choreographer, were collated and analysed.

The information was collected by implementing the method of examination defined in Chapter 3, as summarised below:

- The use of the method of examination generates the accounts of an informed first person, the dancer, with the accounts of an informed second person, the choreographer/consciousness trainer. The fact that both persons are informed ensures that the accounts are based on third-person theory.

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[113] Some footage from these interviews can be found in Chapters 41 to 45 of the DVD which accompanies this thesis.

- Throughout Empirical Project 3, the dancers were observed and present-centred non-verbal information, which gave an insight into the dancers' experience, was collected. This information included comments about, for example: body language; focus; movement pace, quality and dynamics; posture; and a break in the use of the means of access.

- Retrospective verbal accounts were provided through interviews. During the interviews the choreographer used Ericksonian language, asked open questions, encouraged the dancer to use simple language and focussed attention on single experiences.[114] All interviews were in three parts: (1) retrospective open discussion, (2) retrospective questioning and (3) viewing of recording.

The method of examination was applied in order to ensure that the information collected was as reliable and valid, and contained as little interpretation and pre-conception, as possible. The analysis of each of the seven phases is detailed below.

Phases 1 and 2: Why is the dancer's consciousness significant? What is the nature of the dance consciousness?

The general consensus of the dancers was that Phases 1 and 2 acted as an effective introduction to the project and provided them with a sufficient understanding of the training and of the Dance Consciousness Model itself. The dancers had no real difficultly in grasping the concepts or the relevant terminology and claimed that having this understanding aided them significantly during the training and the application of the model.

It is important to note, however, that the success of the training and model is by no means entirely dependent on this understanding. Indeed, the model has been designed so that it can be used by any dancer, regardless of age, intellect, or prior training or knowledge of the purpose, concepts or theory underlying the model. In Phase 2 of Empirical Project 1, two uninformed dancers were trained to access intrattentive states and to apply the intrattentive strand of the model. Whilst it is difficult to determine or quantify whether being informed permits a more effective

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[114] See Chapter 3, pages 97 to 99, for a description of these interview techniques.

application of the model, it is considered that being uninformed does not seem to be problematic. Further theoretical and empirical research would be necessary, however, in order to reach any firm conclusions.

Phase 3: How can one examine the dance consciousness?

The dancers understood the importance of the method of examination in reflecting on their own experience and providing valuable information for the research. This understanding grew as time went on and, in consequence, the quality of the accounts supplied by the dancers improved. The dancers also claimed that their understanding of intrattention and non-intrattention developed as their ability to access the states and examine their experiences improved. The dancers noted that, in the first workshop, they found it difficult to determine whether or not they had accessed the desired state but, by the final workshop and by the time they applied the model, they were able to examine their own dance consciousness with confidence.

The method of examination was considered to be invaluable to the training by the dancers and to be equally important to the analysis presented in this chapter. It was the method of examination which allowed valid information to be collated regarding the efficacy of the training and the Dance Consciousness Model itself.

Phase 4: How can one access the intrattentive dance consciousness?

The dancers found the intrattentive means of access very effective and, according to D9, 'they definitely acted as a method for [one] to access states of intrattention'; whilst using them it is possible ' to become aware of self, the dance and every single detail to do with the movement [to the extent that one] cannot think of anything else' (2005). D10 stated that the intrattentive workshops were 'unlike anything else [she had] done before' and '[she] saw [herself] in a way [she] had not seen [herself] before' (2005).

In order to provide a systematic and thorough analysis, each element of Phase 4 is compared with each of the headings from Chapter 4, where the intrattentive strand and intrattentive training were first discussed. The headings in Chapter 4 therefore

act as the framework of analysis for the intrattentive training. For ease of reference, these headings are repeated here:

- Fundamental intrattention;
- Higher order intrattention;
- Intrattentive stimuli;
- Intrattentive verbal report;
- Intrattentive physical observation;
- Intrattentive blind sensing;
- All three intrattentive means;
- Three intrattentive states;
- Intrattentive training summary.

Fundamental intrattention

Each dancer had a preferred means of intrattentive access. D12 noted that 'we all had preferences and all developed our own ways of working with the means of access' (2005) and D10 felt that this was dependent 'on the way [one works] and whether [one is] a visual or verbal thinker' (2005). This comment substantiates the decision, introduced in Chapter 4, to incorporate a sense of dual functionality into the model and to place equal significance on verbal and visual processing. In offering different processing options, through teaching the dancers to use all three means of access in every combination, the Dance Consciousness Model enables dancers to select their preferred means.

Not only did each dancer have a preferred means of access in general, but each one also found different means of access of use within specific dance components. For example, the dancers noted that verbal report was particularly effective when choreographing, teaching, learning, rehearsing and performing, but was sometimes less effective when improvising. Physical observation was considered to be of great use whilst improvising, choreographing, learning and rehearsing, but of less use when teaching and performing. Blind sensing was a valuable technique during improvisation and rehearsal, but less practical for choreographing, learning, teaching and performing. The dancers noted that experimenting during the training with all of the dance components ensured a more effective application of the actual model as, by

the time they applied it, they had actively sampled and evaluated every means of access within each dance component.

The efficacy of the means of access also seemed to be dependent on whether the dancers were working alone or with others. For example, some dancers claimed to have preferred physical observation when working with others than when working on their own. Blind sensing, on the other hand, was more popular when dancing solo. The dancers experimented with using a combination of means when working as a duet or a group; for example, they rehearsed movement with one dancer reporting whilst another observed. In general, however, all the dancers felt that, when not dancing solo, it was most effective if all of the dancers were using the same means of access because this promoted a greater connection between self and others. Despite this, when using blind sensing in a group or duet, the dancers often found it beneficial for some dancers to use verbal report whilst others used blind sensing.

Higher order intrattention

It took some time for the dancers to begin to use higher order intrattention and, in the first workshop for example, they were far more concerned with mastering access to fundamental states. In these instances the dancers were sometimes unaware of the moments in which their intrattention lapsed. It was observed that there were occasions when a dancer stopped attending to self and allowed the mind to wander; perhaps, for example, this was to look at the clock on the wall, someone else moving in the space, or something outside the window. At such times, it appeared as if the dancer concerned was unintentionally allowing non-intrattention to impose upon the intrattention and thus affect the quality of that intrattention, or even negate it. Without the presence of a higher order state, the dancers did not detect the presence of the intruding non-intrattention or even the redirection of intrattention from self to an external object. Retrospective discussions were of great use here, as they enabled the choreographer to inform the dancers of the moments in which they appeared to lose the intrattention and encourage them to reflect back on the sensation experienced during those occurrences.

These discussions helped the dancers to understand lapses in intrattention and, as the training progressed, the dancers claimed to be using the higher states and began to

have more control over the fundamental intrattention. Dancers seemed to be more competent in maintaining the fundamental state for longer periods, perhaps as a result of continual exposure. On the occasions when their minds did seem to wander, the dancers were able to apply thought-stopping techniques and redirect attention instantaneously to the fundamental state. The dancers each developed their own techniques, but they noted that, in general, the thought-stopping is not something:

> ... [one has] to apply actively. It ... becomes second nature for the word 'stop' or 'refocus' to enter the report when the mind is straying, or for a red light to appear when [one is] physically observing ...
> (D9, 2005)

Dancers also commented that accessing a heightened state 'is not really something [one] can be trained to do, there are no real techniques' instead it is 'more about having an increased awareness, it's something that after a while [one] can just do' (D9, 2005). In addition, the dancers reported that they were not necessarily aware of accessing the higher states. Despite this, all the dancers claimed that they believed that developing the ability to access higher states was an essential part of the training process.

Intrattentive stimuli

The dancers had no problem at all, with the aid of the means of access, in attending to self, and they noted that whilst using the means of access during solo work:

> ... it was possible to enter completely into [one's] own little world ... and in that world only the dancing self exists ... it's all [one thinks] about ... .
> (D11, 2005)

The dancers noted that the mover/observer exercises assisted with the transition between attending to self, and attending to self and other. They stated that such exercises allowed an experiential understanding of how it felt to attend entirely to other. The dancers noted that, through amalgamating that experiential understanding with the experiential understanding of how it felt to attend solely to self, they were able subsequently to attend to self and other concurrently.

The dancers asserted that intrattending to self and other concurrently is possible and very effective, although it is more difficult than attending solely to self. Whilst working as a duet, many of the dancers claimed that they allowed the intrattention to move between attending to self, attending to other, and attending to self and other. They noted that this was often dependent on, for example, whether they were making contact with their partner, whether they could see their partner, or whether they were moving in unison or canon.

Whilst working as a group, the dancers sometimes found it difficult to split the attention four ways, and they were forced constantly to keep redirecting the intrattention, depending on the nature of the movement. They felt that the intrattention sometimes became more generalised and, rather than being directed to individual people, it encompassed the group as a whole. Physical observation was of particular use here as it allowed the dancers to create a visual imprint of the whole group and this, in turn, provided access to the intrattention. Verbal report, on the other hand, was not as effective, as the dancers struggled to have time to report concurrently on the movement of every dancer.

Intrattentive verbal report

Verbal report was the first means of access to which the dancers were exposed; it took them some time to become comfortable with it, especially as some of the dancers were not accustomed to working with their voices. Despite this, verbal report quickly became the most popular means of access for D10 and D12. These dancers both claimed to process things verbally as opposed to visually in everyday life, and this may have been the reason for their strong preference. All the dancers noted that this means of access was particularly easy to use once they had mastered it. For some of the dancers it became 'second nature ... and every time [they moved their] body [they] just instantaneously [began] to report' (D10, 2005). D1 from Empirical Project 1 also noted that:

> At the start of the training using verbal report seemed unnatural, but by the end of the training using verbal report was spontaneous, habitual and unconstrained.
> (2003)

The first few verbal report tasks focussed on equipping the dancers with an understanding of the difference between pre-, post- and present-report and the knowledge that the desirable intrattentive verbal report has a present-centred nature. The dancers stated that these tasks, in which they experimented physically with the different types of report, were a crucial part of the training process and provided a thorough insight into the nature and purpose of the report.

The dancers were informed that their verbal report should include a consideration of the movements being executed and the sensations being experienced during that execution. The dancers reported on the shape, size, dynamic, pace and/or kinaesthetic sensation of the dance and, at times, also reported on the structure or form of the movement in relation to the overall phrase. One example of such a report is: 'I bend my left leg which is a repetition of an earlier movement and makes up part of the movement motif' (D9, 2005).

When the dancers first began working with the verbal report it was common for the pace of the movement to be slow and the movement to be almost staccato. It seemed that the dancers often slowed the pace down and disconnected each movement in order to allow plenty of time to report on it. This undesirable result was exacerbated by the fact that the training also promotes full body integration, which encourages awareness that the whole body is involved in each movement. The dancers therefore became very anxious about neglecting a body part and, at first, had difficulty in comprehending how they could possibly describe every single body part at all times without this affecting the pace and dynamic of the movement.

Continual exposure, however, definitely improved the dancers' ability to use verbal report. As the workshops progressed, the dancers began to overcome their anxiety by ensuring that, each time they rehearsed a movement, they attended to a different body part. In addition, the dancers began to understand that, when reporting on one body part, it was still possible to be aware simultaneously of another body part. They also started to create their own verbal language and developed blanket terms which each incorporated an awareness of numerous body parts rather than just one. D1, from Empirical Project 1, stated:

> At the beginning I would have to explain every single movement, but now I have short cuts, words that I can use that still encompass every detail. I no longer have to say it, to be aware of it.
> (2003)

D12 claimed 'you begin to talk in your own language or vocabulary' (2005), D10 said 'you sometimes use words which you associate with the movement rather than just describing words' (2005) and D9 stated 'sometimes you can't say every detail but you are still aware of every detail' (2005). In addition, the dancers noted that the verbal reports seemed sometimes to correspond with the movement in terms of the pace, quality and dynamic. In other words, the dancers manipulated their pronunciation and vocal speed to fit the movement and, according to the dancers, 'this really helped to connect the report with the movement and allowed a higher state of intrattention' (D12, 2005). As the training progressed, the dancers' ability to report developed considerably and, by the time it came to applying the model, the dancers seemed to be reporting with ease and were providing very complex and detailed reports. For some dancers, the reports became conversational rather than merely descriptive; they began to report in the third person and often corrected and praised themselves.

All the dancers agreed that verbal report was a highly effective means of access to intrattention and that it was especially successful when working with others. D11 said:

> [Whilst using verbal report in group choreography] we were able to choreograph incredibly quickly and we came up with really interesting and connected movement material, it was like we were at one with each other.
> (2005)

D10 stated that the intrattentive verbal report 'triggered off a sense of ensemble' and it is possible to 'become really in tune with each other and aware of the group movement' (2005). Using verbal report within a duet or group appeared to produce empathetic and trusting relationships and a sense of complicité. D9 remarked:

> Normally the focus is on self within a duet but [verbal report] enables us to focus on both people, so I know exactly what my partner is doing even when my back is turned because I have reported on it.

> Verbal report seems to create a shared bodily rhythm. When working as a group I know exactly what everyone else is doing.
> (2005)

Similarly, D11 commented that, when using verbal report, one is 'more connected to [one's] partner, whereas in normal practice dancers often dismiss the partner and are less sensitive' (2005). The dancers felt that, not only were they more connected, but the movement 'seemed tighter and more precise' (D10, 2005) and 'every single time it was exactly the same' (D11, 2005). The use of verbal report when learning movement was deemed to be very effective, especially if the teacher was also reporting, as it enabled the dancers to learn the movement exactly as it had been choreographed. It was also claimed that verbal report was useful for remembering movement; this is possible because one is equipped with two memory resources, the body and the mind, which can both be used to retrieve the movement. It seems, then, that not only was verbal report effective as a means of access to intrattention, it also offered many other benefits which could positively affect both the dance process and dance performance.

Intrattentive physical observation

The dancers were taught the difference between observing passively and actively and they considered that this was a vital part of the training as it allowed them to see their dancing bodies objectively, rather than their merely being aware of them. In relation to this, D12 stated:

> Sometimes technique teachers or choreographers do tell you to, for example, "watch your arm as you move" but all you do is look at it, you don't actively observe it and really objectify it, you just direct your gaze in its direction. With physical observation the observation is completely active.
> (2005)

Physical observation was the means of access preferred by D9 and D11, both of whom claimed to be visual thinkers. All the dancers agreed that physical observation was effective in acting as a means of access to intrattention; it did, however, require discipline to maintain as it was easier for the mind to wander when using physical observation than when using verbal report. This may have been because the report is external and open to third-person observation. There is therefore more pressure to maintain the report, as it is easily discernable when the report ceases, whereas it is

not always as straightforward for a third person to detect when active observation becomes passive. Using a higher order state alongside the fundamental state whilst physically observing is therefore imperative.

The dancers were again reminded of the notion of full body integration and they were able to apply this with some ease, without exhibiting the same anxiety they had experienced when learning to use the verbal report. The dancers were able to work methodically through the different body parts, regardless of whether the latter were involved directly in the actual execution of the movement or not. The dancers noted that their ability to apply full body integration was enhanced by the initial physical observation tasks in which they were required just to walk and observe self methodically; one dancer said, for example:

> Even if I was physically observing my feet, I could still be simultaneously intrattentively aware of my hands as I always had an image of my whole body moving.
> (D12, 2005)

D10 stated, 'it made you think about not just where the limbs are going' but also 'what your pelvis and torso are doing at the same time and you don't normally think about that' (2005). D11 claimed, 'it made you completely aware of the rest of your body' and one would constantly question 'oh what's the rest of my body doing now?' (2005). Whilst maintaining a whole body image, the dancers were also able to zoom in and out and focus on specific body parts. This indicates that they felt as if they had real control over their intrattention and had mastered the physical observation. One dancer said:

> I realised that in all my training I had never taken the time to really physically observe my own body moving. I noticed that my body does not necessarily move how I thought it did. Physical observation really made me much more aware of how my body does actually move rather than how I imagine it moves ... and I saw myself dancing in a different way than I ever had before.
> (D10, 2005)

D1, from Empirical Project 1, noted, 'I have never been so aware of my own body and how it moved' (2003). D9 stated, 'I could clearly visualise myself' and 'I have never had such a clear sense of my partners and how they are moving' (2005). The

dancers seemed to have encountered a kind of disembodiment, in which it feels as if they were 'watching [themselves] on film' (D10, 2005). D1 claimed, 'it's like having a set of three-dimensional photographs' (2003) and D11 stated:

> It feels like you are looking in a mirror and the image seems to refract ... You can really detach your body parts ... It can feel as if your head is not part of your body, and you are looking at your body from another angle, as if your head is over there looking at you over here. (2005)

One dancer noted that, in addition to allowing access to intrattentive states, physical observation forced the dancers to 'move in new ways' and 'created a really interesting movement quality' (D10, 2005). Other dancers agreed and made the following statements: 'similar to verbal report, it can ensure that the movement is very precise' and 'using images of self and the choreographer it is possible to correct the movement' (D11, 2005); 'first of all you imagine the choreographer doing it and then you gradually imagine yourself doing it' (D12, 2005); 'this makes the movement more precise than normal' (D9, 2005). D10 commented:

> You haven't got a choice not to finish off your movements, because you've seen it, and that's the whole process of learning it, observing it first, really thoroughly ... and you don't normally do that you normally just watch and copy ... and then rely on someone else to correct you. (2005)

The dancers occasionally acted as audience members and observed each other whilst completing workshop tasks. Through doing this, the dancers were able to gain some insight into the experience of an audience member when viewing an intrattentive dancer and they noted that physical observation 'directs the audience's attention to the body part that [one is] observing' (D10, 2005). D9 noted that, 'it makes the audience at one with the dancer and a tiny shift in the dancer's focus can shift the audience's attention' (2005).

Despite its apparent efficacy as a means of access, and the additional benefits illustrated within the dancers' feedback, physical observation was not judged to be of great use when teaching or choreographing material. This is because it distorts the movement, as the dancer is constantly moving the head and repositioning the body in order to observe. As a result, it is difficult for the dancer to ascertain exactly what the

movement is. Whilst teaching a phrase, clarity of movement is, of course, imperative in ensuring an accurate recapitulation on the part of the dancer. Likewise, whilst choreographing, it is essential for the dancer to discern exactly what the movement will be; this is difficult when the movement is changing constantly as a result of the observation. Thus physical observation must be applied tentatively during the teaching and choreographing process and the teacher and dancer must have a continual awareness of the potential resultant effect of this means of access.

Intrattentive blind sensing

The dancers found the motion blind sensing the most difficult means of access to practise. The dancers found that working with their eyes closed could sometimes be very effective as it allowed them to direct all their attention inwardly. At other times, however, it was very distracting as it affected their technical ability to execute movement. They claimed that they often found it difficult to keep their balance with eyes closed and found turning repeatedly particularly challenging. D12 stated: although 'blind sensing was useful whilst choreographing as it increased awareness, it became distracting during performance' (2005). D9 thought that this was because it is possible to 'almost became too aware' which resulted 'in the movement being affected, as [the dancer] might change movement in order to execute it effectively' (2005). D10 claimed:

> Blind sensing is difficult to maintain because of the possible collisions ... once you've had a collision you become overly aware and then begin to adapt movement so that you feel in control.
> (D10, 2005)

At times, though, the dancers executed the motion blind sensing very successfully and it was possible to observe moments during which the dancers moved as if they had eyes open in terms of the actual movement, the temporal qualities of the movement and the spatial orientation. In some workshops the dancers were able to execute complex contact duets whilst blind sensing, thus indicating a high state of intrattention. In such duets the dancers walked with ease and assurance and were able to locate each other very quickly and move seamlessly into improvisation that was not uncertain or anxious. D10 considered that, in order for this sort of occurrence to become more regular, 'more time would be needed working with blind sensing with

the actual group that [one] is working with' in order to ensure 'that everyone becomes really comfortable and completely aware of each other' (2005).

The dancers also stated that, in order to apply motion blind sensing successfully, the physical observation process must be thorough. One said:

> Even with eyes closed I would still direct my head towards the body part that I was imagining and that would really help with the visual imprints and enable me to really apply motion blind sensing.
> (D10, 2005)

The motionless blind sensing was deemed to be very effective for the dancers and they all claimed that it was an important part of the rehearsal process. It allowed them to thoroughly understand the movement and observe every detail. D12 stated:

> When I sit with my eyes closed I see a video of myself inside my head, it's like I can completely observe myself.
> (2005)

D11 noted, when using motionless blind sensing:

> I could see the shape my body was making and having reflected on this I would look at it even more. I've never been so aware of the shapes I was making. Now, afterwards, I feel like I could draw every shape that I created as I have such clear images of them.
> (2005)

These accounts imply a sense of observing self almost from a third-person perspective, a perspective which can truly permit a heightened state of intrattentive awareness as it allows one to place the body as the explicit object of attention. D9, however, claimed:

> When I am using motionless blind sensing I still experience the movement, I feel myself rehearsing the movement in great detail even though I am sitting down. Motionless blind sensing allows me to slow the movement right down so I can see every little detail and work out exactly what each movement is.
> (2005)

D9 seemed to be able to recreate all the sensual and kinaesthetic sensations involved with the movement and was thus able to engage in electrodermal feedback. As stated

in Chapter 4, it is possible to create visual imprints from external and internal outlooks. It seems that what D12 and D11 described above is an external outlook, whereas D9 described an internal outlook. D1 from Empirical Project 1 noted a similar experience to D9:

> I visualise the movement in slow motion, which gives me time to observe every detail from every angle, and although I am just sitting I can feel the motion in my body.
> (2003)

Some of the dancers claimed to experience the visual imprints from both internal and external perspectives; D9 noted:

> I kept switching from looking at my body from my own perspective and looking at it from a third person perspective and imagining how someone else would see it.
> (2005)

Using both perspectives can increase the intrattention and allow the dancer more intrattentive insight into the dancing self.

In summary, it appears that the motion and motionless blind sensing are effective means of access. As it was quite challenging, however, especially in a group, it would be advisable to allot more time within the training for dancers to become familiar with the motion blind sensing technique.

All three means

The dancers claimed that, when using external intrattention, they did not necessarily always use more than one means concurrently, but interchanged between them, intermittently using whichever means or combination of means they deemed to be effective for the task in hand. The dancers noted that combining visual and verbal processing in this way increased their ability to access intrattention and also enhanced the quality of that intrattention.

Prior to the external intrattention workshop, some of the dancers had already begun to experiment with utilising more than one means of access at a time. For example, when using blind sensing, the dancers sometimes also used verbal report as they felt that using the two concurrently increased their ability to access intrattention. D10

claimed that 'blind sensing with report is very effective and it is possible to create clear visual imprints' (2005). When it came to using external intrattention, therefore, the dancers did not find it too challenging and adapted very quickly. It was of common consensus that using external intrattention was generally more effective, in the majority of the dance components, than using a single means of access. D9 noted, 'it is a different sensation when you are using all three means, you are even more aware and know exactly what you are doing' (2005). D12 stated that, when learning movement material, 'verbal report and physical observation were very effective, especially when used together' (2005). D11 agreed, saying, 'I would physically observe different body parts to the parts I was verbally reporting on' and was therefore 'more aware of more parts' (2005). D12 continued:

> We would physically observe the choreographer doing the phrase and at the same time we, and the choreographer, would use verbal report. This would allow us to create visual imprints of the phrase and you could even hear the report that the choreographer was using whilst rehearsing on your own – in the form of an inner monologue. This would enable you to perfectly recreate it.
> (2005)

The dancers suggested that the combination of physical observation and verbal report was also effective as the former can be used to create an overall image and then the latter to zoom in to a particular body part. In addition, D10 noted that, when using these means of access, the movement 'got into the body really quickly and really accurately, it would strangely just be within the body' (2005). The dancers considered that the external intrattention allowed 'quicker and deeper access and [one was] more likely to maintain that access' (D11, 2005). Having the different means available ensured that 'in the moments that [one] would normally lose the intrattention, [one could] just swap to a different means' (D9, 2005).

The dancers commented that, at first, the decision to interchange between means or to apply more than one means simultaneously was a conscious one. After continual exposure, however, they claimed that the interchanging and simultaneous use became more natural and spontaneous. Some of the dancers preferred to interchange intermittently, some interchanged methodically and some did not interchange but used more than one means simultaneously.

It seems, then, that external intrattention is an effective means of access to intrattention and it was deemed by many of the dancers to be the most effective of all the means. Other benefits were also identified. D9, for example, said, 'you can work really fast with this means of access, much faster and much more thoroughly than in a normal process' (2005). D12 suggested that it was possible to 'learn movement really quickly' (2005). This is perhaps a result of the stimulation of two senses – sight and hearing. External intrattention did indeed seem to have a significant impact on the dancers' ability to learn and remember movement. D11 stated:

> It will be invaluable to use intrattention during choreography and this will really save time in the rehearsal process. It really helps you to have more sensitivity towards other dancers. Intrattention leaves nothing to chance.
> (2005)

Another observation was that using external intrattention improved the dancer's ability to mimic stylistically the movement of another dancer or the choreographer. In other words, the dancers were able not only to pick up the actions of another dancer or those taught by the choreographer, but also to take those movements into their own bodies. D11 claimed:

> Sometimes I found myself doing a movement how I normally would do it in my style ... so I would physically observe and report on the choreographer and then re-observe myself and be able to recognise and correct the differences. I wouldn't normally be so aware of my own style coming in, it's normally something that is subconscious and goes unnoticed. Using this technique allowed me to recognise these points and alter them. This technique prompts you to attend to people's idiosyncratic details and embody them yourself. The movement doesn't feel like someone else's movement, it feels like your own.
> (2005)

Similarly, D12 suggested that 'it was starting to really look like people were inheriting each other's style' and 'normally when learning someone else's movement dancers still inject their own style' (2005). This is perhaps a result of the degree to which the dancers were able to access states of intrattention.

Three intrattentive states

Before the training process started, it had been anticipated that using internal means of access would be more difficult than using external means, as internal means require less physical action and are not subject to third-person observation. Although the dancers at first found it difficult to maintain internal means of access, after continual exposure and the use of higher order states of intrattention, they felt as if the internal means were just as effective as the external means. The internal means require even more discipline to maintain than the external means of access and this discipline must be nurtured continuously. Each of the dancers seemed to have his or her own method for maintaining the internal intrattention and all were in agreement with D12 who said:

> Once you've got the hang of it, it's easy to maintain an internal report as it's not that dissimilar from an external report, and it's even easier to maintain visual imprints as you are accustomed to doing this in blind sensing.
> (2005)

The dancers claimed that they were able to 'maintain the reflection [they] had created during the external process' (D9, 2005) in each of the dance components and whilst working as a solo, duet and as a group. One of the dancers from Empirical Project 1 even suggested that the internal access was more effective than the external and claimed that:

> The visual imprints became far more vivid with the internal means and far more accessible ... they became three dimensional mapped images rather than the more translucent ones from the beginning.
> (D2, 2003)

This, however, may have been a result of other factors such as continual exposure, a development in the dancer's ability to access, and/or a development in the dancer's ability to examine. All the dancers in Empirical Project 3 were of the opinion that internal means of access are an essential part of the process, but that their use is dependent entirely on primarily being able to use external means of access.

The dancers were also taught to experience the intrattention kinaesthetically without the means of access. It had been anticipated that the dancers might find this state difficult to access as, by this point, they are no longer equipped with any particular

means of access and are expected simply to allow their bodies and minds to experience the state. The dancers felt, however, that accessing kinaesthetic intrattention was not problematic at all. One stated, as a result of having mastered the external and internal means of access, 'my thinking body and dancing mind is now able to experience and understand the sensation of an intrattentive state' (D12, 2005) and therefore 'I am able to simply exist in the intrattention' (D9, 2005). D11 claimed, 'it didn't feel difficult at all'; it felt 'completely natural, you just take away the means of access and you are left with pure intrattention' (2005) and D10 maintained:

> I no longer needed the means of access. Although they had allowed me to understand the state in the first place ... they just weren't needed any more ... I can now access intrattention without them.
> (D10, 2005)

From feedback such as the above, it is considered that kinaesthetic intrattention can be accessed effectively. This access, however, is dependent entirely on the external and internal means of access. Each of the three states – external, internal and kinaesthetic – is important in the training and in the application of the Dance Consciousness Model itself.

Intrattentive training summary

From the above analysis, it can be assumed that the intrattentive training worked effectively and enabled trained dancers to access states of intrattention whilst improvising, choreographing, learning, teaching, rehearsing and performing as a solo, in a duet or group. The dancers were able to access these states externally, internally and kinaesthetically.

At the end of Phase 4, the dancers claimed that the training allowed a clear 'connection between body and mind' (D11, 2005) and, after the intrattentive training, D12 affirmed, 'I am generally much more aware of my body' (2005). There was, in addition, evidence to suggest that the dancers were even transferring the accessing skills into other dance contexts. For example, having successfully completed the intrattentive training, D10 said, 'I have been much more aware of myself in technique class' (2005). This is worthy of note and perhaps indicates that the means of access can be applied within contexts other than choreography, rehearsal and performance. Indeed, D12 claimed:

> The intrattentive means have really helped me as a teacher, especially with my younger students. I now use a ... simplified version of the model with my students, in which I use verbal report when teaching them movement ... and I ask them to use physical observation on themselves.
> (D12, 2005)

It is considered, then, that the model promotes skills which are transferable into different parts of Western contemporary dance practice, such as technique class and dance teaching.

Whilst the dancers were using the external intrattentive means of access, it was possible, of course, for the choreographer or trainer to hear them talking or watch them observing. Although the internal and kinaesthetic access could not be witnessed in such a way, it was still always possible to discern whether or not the dancers had accessed intrattention. There are some non-verbal indices and signals that seem to be inherent in, and characteristic of, intrattentive states.[115]

When dancing intrattentively the dancer is focussed and not distracted by external factors, such as other people moving or talking in the room. The eyes are usually directed downwards or straight forward and the facial expression is one of concentration. The dancer appears to be completely absorbed in the task and, at the same time, thoughtful and reflective. The body is most often controlled and the movement is precise, dynamically strong, neatly structured and formed. It was possible to observe all these qualities in the dancers and thus discern that they were accessing states of intrattention. At times it was possible to observe, for example, a change in focus, a relaxing of the body or an increase in pace, and this normally indicated a lapse in the intrattention. Observations about such changes more often than not correlated with the reports of the dancers in relation to the moments in which they had not managed to maintain access.

To summarise, the intrattentive training allowed dancers not only to experience the dance but also knowingly, attentively and intentionally to be aware of the dance. In

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[115] Although the purpose of the model, as outlined in Chapter 3, is concerned with the dancer's experience of the dance, as opposed to the nature or quality of the choreography or performance, it is of interest to make note of the following observations. One must maintain an awareness, however, that such observations are not the criterion upon which the effectiveness of the Dance Consciousness Model is judged.

the majority of instances, the dance became the dancers' explicit object of attention. Through the means of access the dancers were able to be aware of the experience of the dance, including the dancing body, the dancing mind and other external factors surrounding the dance. At times the dancers experienced ordinary states of intrattention in which complete awareness was focussed on the dance. They also experienced heightened states of intrattention during which they were able to monitor their awareness introspectively. The dancers were able to report non-inferentially on these intrattentive experiences. Finally, it was possible for a third-party, such as the choreographer or trainer, to witness the dancers' experience through observation.

It is worth noting, however, that music, properties and set, when they were used in later phases for the first time, had a significant impact on the dancers. This late introduction of key elements of the performance may have been a flaw. Although the dancers became used to working with these elements during later phases, the dancers expressed the view that it would have been beneficial if these elements had been introduced during the intrattentive training in Phase 4.

Phase 5: How can one access the non-intrattentive dance consciousness?

The dancers found the non-intrattentive means very valuable; comments included: 'the non-intrattentive means of access allowed me to access non-intrattentive states' (D12, 2005); 'I was able to dance without thinking about what I was doing' (D11, 2005); the non-intrattentive workshops 'enabled me to dance in a way I have never really experienced before' (D9, 2005).

The analysis of Phase 5 is more concise than that of Phase 4 as many of the observations and information from interviews and questionnaires applied to both phases and have been included above. The headings in Chapter 5, in which the non-intrattentive strand and non-intrattentive training were first introduced, provide a convenient framework for the systematic and thorough analysis of Phase 5 and, in effect, the non-intrattentive training. For ease of reference the headings in Chapter 5 are repeated below:

- Fundamental non-intrattention;
- Higher order non-intrattention;

- Non-intrattentive stimuli;
- Non-intrattentive verbal report;
- Non-intrattentive physical observation;
- Non-intrattentive active listening;
- All three non-intrattentive means;
- Three non-intrattentive states;
- Non-intrattentive training summary.

Fundamental non-intrattention

As in Phase 4, during which dancers each expressed or demonstrated a preference for particular means of access to an intrattentive state, they each developed a preference in Phase 5 for accessing non-intrattention. This again supports the decision to incorporate a sense of dual functionality into the model and to place equal significance on verbal and visual processing, and to teach the dancers to use all three means of non-intrattentive access in every combination.

Again, the dancers found different means of access of use within different dance components. For example, all the dancers noted that non-intrattentive verbal report was particularly effective when improvising, choreographing, learning, rehearsing and performing, but was less effective when teaching. Non-intrattentive physical observation was considered to be of great use whilst improvising and rehearsing, but of less use when learning, teaching, choreographing and performing. Active listening proved helpful for improvisation, learning, rehearsal and choreography, but less practical for teaching and performing. Once more, all the dancers noted that experimenting during the training with all of the dance components ensured a more effective application of the actual model. The decision to incorporate every dance component into each workshop was therefore considered to have been valid.

As in Phase 4, the dancers were trained during Phase 5 to use the means of access whilst working in solo, duet and group contexts and, once again, the efficacy of the means of access seemed to be dependent on whether the dancers were working alone or with others. For example, although all the dancers claimed that verbal report was a fairly effective means of access whilst choreographing a solo, it was significantly more effective whilst a group piece was being choreographed as the dancers were

able to share a report and engage in a conversation. Consistent with their experiences during Phase 4, some dancers claimed to have preferred using particular means of access, for example verbal report, when working with other dancers than when working with that means on their own. Other means of access, for example physical observation, were more popular for solo work.

Higher order non-intrattention

The dancers grasped the notion of and utilised higher order states in Phase 4, and thus they were able to apply this understanding in Phase 5 without any difficulty. The difference in using this higher order state in Phase 5, however, is that it is essential that the awareness is not directed towards the self or the dance, but towards the fundamental intrattentive state, which is in turn directed towards exterior stimuli. This slight difference did not appear to be problematic and the dancers claimed to be using the heightened states very early on in Phase 5. The dancers' ability to use the heightened states seemed to develop in much the same manner as it did in Phase 4 and, by the end of Phase 5, the dancers considered that they had 'complete control over the heightened state' (D9, 2005) and were able to use it 'to its maximum potential' (D11, 2005), to 'ensure that intrattention did not affect the non-intrattention' (D12, 2005).

Non-intrattentive stimuli

Within each means of access the dancers had their preferred stimuli. For example, some dancers chose to use random words rather than structured numbers when reporting, some opted to observe random images rather than words, and some favoured listening to structured stories rather than random noises. Some of the dancers noted that swapping sporadically between the different stimuli was most effective as it 'kept [them] on [their] toes' (D8, 2004).

Ensuring that the dancers understood the purpose of the stimuli was essential. It was crucial that each dancer's choice of stimulus was not necessarily the stimulus they found easiest to use, but the one that was most effective in terms of allowing them to access states of non-intrattention. D12, for example, claimed:

> I prefer using numbers when verbal reporting. If I recite my five times table then I find the task quite easy to do and I am able to report on something exterior and dance at the same time.
> (2005)

Being able to dance and report at the same time seemed, to D12, to constitute an effective application of the non-intrattentive means of access. This was not, however, consistently the case during the training, as observed by the trainer/choreographer. D12 was using a report, the five times table, which did not require much intrattention and D12 was therefore left with enough intrattention within the capacity-limited store to direct to the movement. As a result the dancer was able to dance and report concurrently, but the dancing was executed intrattentively as opposed to non-intrattentively. In a discussion with D12, it was explained that it is essential that the stimulus is sufficiently complex to allow a state of intrattention to such an extent that there is no intrattention remaining for the dancing. D12 admitted that, although the use of numbers was preferable, in this instance it was not necessarily sufficiently effective as a means of access to non-intrattention.

At the other extreme, it is essential that the stimulus is not so complex that it causes the dancer to disengage with the intrattention. D12's first reaction to the discussion mentioned above was to begin to use very complicated verbal reports, challenging herself to remember and recite an increasing list of random objects. The result of this was that, occasionally, D12 actually stopped dancing in order to remember an object. On other occasions, D12 stopped reporting and, again, the intrattention directed itself to the dance. Although the stimulus must be changing and necessitate active thinking, it must not cause the dancer to become overloaded. During Phase 5, this became known as stimulus overload. Finding a balance in terms of stimulus complexity is thus essential and much of Phase 5 was spent with individual dancers in establishing what the balance was for each. By the end of Phase 5, the problem had been resolved and, for example, one dancer claimed:

> I have now really grasped the idea that the stimulus must require complete intrattention, but not be too difficult. I have now found a balance for myself ... this balance is different from everyone else's but it works for me and makes it possible to really access non-intrattention.
> (D12, 2005)

Whilst working as a solo, the dancers were free to choose a stimulus and were therefore completely in control of making sure that the one they used was effective for them. Whilst working as a duet or group, this control was not always possible, as the stimulus sometimes had to be shared; for example, when using verbal report within a duet or group, conversations and discussions were permitted. The dancers noted that using the non-intrattentive means as part of a group or a duet was more enjoyable and immediately effective than when working as a solo. They claimed that the very act of working with another dancer provided many more stimuli towards which they could direct the intrattention. One dancer commented:

> Talking to someone else is much more interesting than talking to yourself and so it's easier to engage in the intrattention and allow your body to move on its own whilst you're not thinking about it.
> (D9, 2005)

The dancers agreed that sharing an intrattentive report, for example, whilst non-intrattentively sharing movement promoted a rapport amongst the dancers and this, in turn, often resulted in more connected movement. Without this rapport, dancing non-intrattentively with another dancer sometimes resulted in the dancers feeling disconnected from each other.

Non-intrattentive verbal report

Verbal report was the first non-intrattentive means to which the dancers were exposed. Having worked with report in Phase 4, the dancers did not find it very difficult to work with body and voice simultaneously and seemed to slip into the tasks with ease, immediately using present-centred, as opposed to pre- or post-, verbal report. D10 and D12, the verbal thinkers, once again stated that verbal report was their preferred means of access. All the dancers claimed that this means of access was particularly usable and effective, especially in terms of ascertaining a stimulus complexity balance. One dancer, for example, said:

> Using non-intrattentive verbal report really allowed me to dance without thinking at all about what I was doing, my body just seemed to dance along on its own whilst my mind was elsewhere, thinking about trivial things such as what is the sum of 176 and 892.
> (D9, 2005)

All the dancers claimed to have experiences in which they had 'no idea about what [the] body was doing' (D11, 2005) and 'afterwards [they] could not remember at all what [they] did' (D10, 2005), indicating that they had accessed states of non-intrattention.

It was noted in the analysis of Phase 4 that the means of access can have an effect on the movement. When the dancers first used the non-intrattentive verbal report whilst improvising, it seemed to make the movement very sporadic. Sometimes the dancers stood still for a moment, neither dancing nor reporting, and then suddenly and rapidly executed a short phrase whilst reporting, before once again stopping and standing still. The dancers' competence quickly developed, however, and after a couple of tasks they were able to report and dance concurrently and continuously and 'the movement seemed to become automatic' (D9, 2005).

It was also observed by the dancers and the choreographer that the non-intrattentive movement executed during improvisations was often very repetitious and not very challenging with little complex contact work. It did seem, however, to be very unique, the dancers often executing movement which was quite different from their normal idiosyncratic repertoire. A typical response, when questioned about this was:

> I think the movement we do is quite simple as it may be dangerous to do lots of difficult contact improvisation when neither of you is thinking at all about what you are doing ... I think the movement is very original though as it is completely spontaneous ... it is real and lived and comes from the heart not the mind.
> (D11, 2005)

One dancer commented, 'the style of the movement is affected by the conversations we are having at the time' (D10, 2005). For example, when the conversations flowed and the dancers were reporting at an energised and rapid pace, the movement seemed to reflect this. This was not problematic with respect to the improvisations, but it might be problematic when one is choreographing to a brief. For example, if a dancer is asked to choreograph a slow and sensual duet, and, whilst doing so, the report is fast and sporadic, what would the effect be on the movement? This is something which might be researched further, in conjunction with an exploration of whether it is preferable for the choreographer to determine the nature of the report as well as the movement.

It was of general consensus that the non-intrattentive verbal report was a particularly effective means of access to states of non-intrattention. With continual exposure the dancers were able to apply the means effectively whilst working as a solo, duet and group and within each of the dance components. In addition, the dancers commented that this particular means of access enabled them to work very fast as a group; one dancer said, 'we could not believe how quickly we were able to choreograph a successful, long and complex group piece' (D10, 2005).

Non-intrattentive physical observation

Having become familiar with the difference between passive and active observation during Phase 4, the dancers were able to work immediately with non-intrattentive physical observation, which was the non-intrattentive means of access preferred by D9 and D11, the visual thinkers. All the dancers noted that physical observation was effective in acting as a means of access to non-intrattention, although – similar to the intrattentive physical observation – it did require discipline to maintain. Despite this, the dancers noted that it felt quite natural to move non-intrattentively and concurrently to observe intrattentively. The reason for this may have been that undertaking such a task is a fairly familiar activity; the dancers' discussion about this subject was encapsulated by one who said:

> We are used to watching television and doing things at the same time. Often these things are simple tasks that involve movement, but that we can do without thought, for example I quite often do the ironing whilst watching television. I guess you could say that I iron non-intrattentively whilst watching the television intrattentively!
> (D10, 2005)

The dancers all confirmed that they could complete routine tasks, to which they are habituated, whilst observing external stimuli and agreed that, if one were able to allow the dance to occur habitually and, at the same time, observe external stimuli, one should be able to dance non-intrattentively.

After some of the physical observation tasks, the dancers were asked questions or required to complete questionnaires regarding the visual stimuli they had just observed. The purpose of these interviews and questionnaires was primarily to provide insight into the extent to which the dancers had observed actively the visual stimuli and subsequently to consider whether the dancers moved non-intrattentively

or not. However, there must be reservations about the validity of the information collected from the interviews and questionnaires, not least because such methods of collecting information retrospectively are reliant entirely on the capacity of each dancer's memory. In confirmation of this, the dancers often found it difficult to complete the questionnaires and insisted that this was not as a result of a lack of intrattentive observation, but because of their inability to remember the stimuli.

The dancers did note, however, that the questionnaires and interviews had an unanticipated value in that they provided an 'incentive to attend' (D8, 2004). For example, D12 stated:

> Knowing that you were going to be questioned about the stimuli after the task definitely made you more intrattentive towards the stimuli and therefore less intrattentive towards yourself.
> (2005)

The dancers claimed that, at the beginning of the training, this incentive was of great use in forcing them into the desired state but, after some continual exposure, it was no longer necessary as they had achieved control.

Non-intrattentive physical observation created a particular type of movement and a dynamic that was completely different from that created during the non-intrattentive verbal report. One dancer claimed, 'when I'm using physical observation I seem to do movement that I would never normally do' (D9, 2005) and another said, '[the movement] is very organic and not at all forced' (D10, 2005).

The movement was certainly affected by the dancers having to be forward-facing for the majority of their movement, because the images were projected on to one wall only. This was not especially problematic during improvisation, but it was very restricting for choreography or set movement as it resulted in the dancers rarely turning round or working on the floor. An additional problem was that, when the dancers worked as a duet or in a group, they hardly ever looked at each other and sometimes knocked into one another. D12 also noted, '[it is] difficult to connect with each other when just using physical observation' as 'your focus is completely away from you and your partner' (2005). External physical observation was, however, the only method which restricted the dancers to being almost entirely forward-facing.

When the dancers were working with all three means concurrently, the problem was insignificant as they were able to interchange between the different means when they wanted to turn away from the front. Having projections on all four walls of the studio would surmount the problem.

The various visual stimuli affected the movement in different ways. For example, if the images were fast changing, the movement seemed to speed up and travel through space; if the dancers were asked a question which required some thought, the movement often slowed down. Very occasionally, the dancers even stopped dancing momentarily to observe the screen; this was attributed to stimulus overload and the dancers were reminded to utilise fully their heightened states to minimise the frequency of these instances.

The dancers found that physical observation was particularly effective for improvisation, but difficult to use whilst learning material. The difficulty arose fundamentally because, whilst learning, the dancers had to observe two different stimuli at once, the choreographer and the visual stimulus. Without verbal report, the dancers had to rely entirely on observing the choreographer in order to learn the movement, and this did prove to be problematic. Although the dancers usually managed to pick up the movement through observation, they noted that using this method had a negative effect on the quality of the non-intrattention. They claimed that using verbal report and/or active listening was far more effective for the learning of material. Despite this, the dancers agreed that physical observation was an effective means of access for non-intrattention, with the proviso that its use needed to be appropriate to the context.

Non-intrattentive active listening

The dancers found active listening simple to use and a particularly manageable means of access. Based on their understanding of passive and active observation, they were quickly able to distinguish between passive and active listening and utilise a heightened state to monitor the nature of the listening. One dancer commented:

> Active listening is accessible as it completely surrounds you ... It's all around you all the time ... Unlike physical observation you can't get away from it [and] you just have to be careful not to let yourself switch off.
> (D10, 2005)

The aural stimuli – random noises, lists of words, lists of numbers and questions – were projected fairly loudly through speakers and thus the sound engulfed the dancers completely, allowing non-intrattentive movement to arise. A potential danger was for the dancers to become habituated to the aural stimuli and so move the focus of the intrattention so that the stimuli existed only as background noise. In such a situation, the dancers may unintentionally redirect the intrattention towards self and eradicate the possibility of dancing non-intrattentively.

Out of the three means of access, active listening requires least action; verbal report involves the act of talking and physical observation requires the act of positioning the body in order to observe. The dancers claimed that active listening was most effective when used in conjunction with other means of access, and in particular with verbal report during which the dancers were able to answer questions or shadow the words on the recording. Some of the dancers noted that, in order to increase the intrattention whilst working with active listening as a single means of access, they often utilised internal monologues as well; they therefore still answered the questions or shadowed the words, but did so inside their heads. One of the dancers even claimed to use visual imprints and imagined the words in her mind or created connotative images.

Ensuring a balance in terms of the complexity of the stimulus was essential for this means of access. If the aural stimuli were too simple, they became background noise; if they were too complex, listening to them resulted in stimulus overload. Either situation might result in a lack of intrattention. The dancers developed preferences about the different aural stimuli, with questions proving particularly popular as they permitted a clear internal monologue and required more intrattention than, for example, random noises.

The aural stimuli interchanged between being presented singularly, dichotically and binaurally. In general, the dancers found the single presentations too simple and

stated that 'they did not require much intrattention' (D11, 2005). The dichotic and binaural presentations, however, required more intrattention as they comprised two different aural stimuli which were either complementary or juxtaposing. Some dancers noted that the greater complexity was preferable as it 'enabled [them] to choose actively what [they] wanted to listen to and [they] could swap between the stimuli' (D10, 2005). The binaural presentations were found to be more effective for some dancers as, in order to listen to them, they had to separate the two voices for themselves, which required very active intrattention. This, though, proved to be too much for some dancers.

All three non-intrattentive means

Some of the dancers had already begun to experiment with using more than one means of access before the external non-intrattention workshop. For example, when using physical observation or active listening, the dancers had sometimes intuitively also used verbal report, as they felt that using the two concurrently increased their ability to access non-intrattention.

The dancers noted that stimulus overload was more likely to occur when using all three means of access simultaneously than when using a single means of access. In the first couple of tasks in this part of the training, the dancers appeared overloaded and occasional lapses in non-intrattention were observed. It is essential that the dancers maintain control of their consciousness and interchange between the means of access when necessary, rather than becoming overloaded through receiving simultaneously all three stimuli.

The dancers felt that using external non-intrattention whilst working as part of a duet or a group was particularly effective; this allowed the dancers to connect not only physically through the body, but also through the dancing mind by sharing the means of access. The dancers stated that it was 'exciting to be able to work together without having to worry about what to do with the body' (D12, 2005) and D11 noted that 'this would be a good way to start a workshop or introduce new people to working with each other' (2005). The dancers also claimed that the variety of stimuli facilitated the introduction of new movement and it was possible 'to feed off the energy of the stimuli which kept the movement fresh and spontaneous' (D9, 2005).

As noted in earlier observations, there appeared to be a distinct correlation between the stimuli and the movement. This suggests that there may be potential new ways of choreographing, with the choreographer choosing stimuli which might sub-consciously influence the dancer's movement, instead of the dancer being restricted to a set brief.

Although the external non-intrattention proved particularly effective for improvisation, rehearsal, choreography and performance, it was not as useful for the learning or teaching of movement material because it was difficult for the dancers to replicate the movement. Throughout Phase 5, the dancers found it very difficult to learn any of the set phrases precisely as they were taught. Despite this, they did pick up most of the movement; it seemed as if they were able to absorb it intuitively. The dancers experienced the movement and subsequently interpreted it within their own dancing body. The dancers claimed that they 'were able to pick up the general shape and structure of the piece, but not the actual detail contained within the movement' (D12, 2005). This resulted in unexpected movement material and some interesting developments and variations on the original material. The dancers claimed that this 'was a very different way of working with movement, but it had an exciting and organic result' (D10, 2005).

During the performance of material the dancers were often surprised, when observing each other, just how successful the improvisation or choreography actually was. The dancers claimed that they 'picked up more movement or created more movement than [they] would have expected' (D9, 2005). In talking about one particular occasion, D10 stated:

> I had no awareness of the duet whilst we were choreographing it, and in fact no awareness that we were even creating a duet ... but when it came to the performance we were able to perform a whole duet. Looking back at the recording I can see that it was well structured and contained moments of unison and canon. It was like seeing a duet that I had never seen before.
> (2005)

Indeed, it seemed as if two bodies were able to create a duet and perform it to a satisfactory standard without the minds having to be involved actively in the choreography, rehearsal or performance.

The dancers claimed that they had found the external non-intrattention in which they used all three means of access very effective, more so than the single means of access, and they felt in control of their consciousness. They interchanged between the different stimuli at will, without this having a detrimental effect on the non-intrattention. They also expressed the opinion that undoubtedly intrattention towards self arose occasionally, for example if a dancer bumped into something, but they now felt as if they could control these interruptions and immediately re-access non-intrattention.

Three non-intrattentive states

It had been anticipated that using internal non-intrattentive means would be more difficult than external non-intrattentive means. Although the dancers found, at first, that it was demanding to maintain internal means, with continual exposure and the use of higher order states they realised that the internal means were just as effective as the external means. D10 stated, 'during internal I definitely don't start thinking about myself' (2005). The dancers also noted that it was essential to have techniques for maintaining the internal means. D9, for example, claimed, 'I internalise the stimuli and recap the words I have heard, inside my head' (2005). D12 noted:

> Normally I can hear a constant drone of voices inside my head that represent the voices on the active listening recording ... but occasionally these run out and when they do I start to report internally and create new internal monologues.
> (2005)

Although all the dancers claimed to have some control over their consciousness, they agreed that making the transition from using external means of non-intrattentive access to using internal means of access was difficult. This was not the case with the intrattentive means, as the nature of the intrattentive state is, of course, reflective and thus asking self to progress to internal means is not problematic. With the non-intrattentive means, however, the state is non-reflective and non-aware and thus how can one ask oneself to stop reporting externally, for example, and start reporting internally without one's awareness moving to self? D12 described this transition in the following statement:

> When it comes to the transition of internalising it's very strange, it's like a light going off and on. There's a transitional moment in which you have to make the decision to stop externalising and in doing this you attend to self. It needs to be more progressive though ... it just needs to develop from external to internal. When it's first quiet – when the voices and recordings stop – all my attention momentarily comes back to me just because I suddenly feel aware of me in the space again.
> (2005)

One can try to make these transitions as seamless as possible, but it is imperative to remember that it may not be possible to rid performances completely of intrattention. Indeed, there may always be moments in which intrattention arises for one reason or another. Of paramount importance, though, is the dancer's control over his or her conscious state, and the ability to re-focus immediately and slip straight back into a non-intrattentive state. D12 continued:

> It's really important for performance because you do need to be able to just instantaneously swap states and therefore you need these means of access. What you need is control.
> (2005)

The dancers confessed that, at times, their attention did move to self in this transition, and occasionally they were tempted to allow it to stay there in order to reflect on, or remember, the movement. They reported, however, that allowing it to remain was by no means beneficial. D8, from Empirical Project 2, said:

> During one task I cheated and allowed my attention to turn back to myself as we moved to the internal means. This was not a good idea though ... the result was that I couldn't remember what I was doing and I was completely thrown. I wasn't sure what to do with the information I suddenly had in my head ... and couldn't perform the phrase.
> (2004)

On this occasion, the dancer had choreographed a phrase non-intrattentively using external means of access and was then required to perform it using internal means. Whilst choreographing the phrase, at no point did the dancer reflect on it or allow the mind to attend to it. As a result only the dancer's body had learnt the phrase, not the dancer's mind, as the mind had been focussed elsewhere. When it came to the performance and using internal means, the dancer decided to allow attention to move

to the phrase and let the mind, rather than the body, remember the movement. The problem appeared to be that the mind did not know the movement and therefore could not execute it effectively. Had the dancer relaxed, maintained the non-intrattention, and allowed the thinking body to stay in control and execute the movement, the dancer may not have faced the same difficulties. Whilst using the non-intrattentive means it is essential that the dancers trust their bodies to work independently.

It had been anticipated that the dancers might have found kinaesthetic non-intrattention difficult to access as, by this point, they were no longer equipped with any particular means of access or any object for their intrattention. It is essential that the dancer trusts the body to continue to dance non-intrattentively, as it has whilst using the means of access. This involves giving up the means of access, letting the intrattention disperse and allowing the body and mind simply to experience the state. The following was noted:

> Accessing kinaesthetic intrattention was not problematic at all. If you had gone through using external and internal means in the correct way it just felt natural to experience the state kinaesthetically. You just reach a stage where you can exist in the state and you don't need the means of access anymore.
> (D10, 2005)

D12 added:

> By this point your body knows how it feels to dance non-intrattentively, and so it's not a problem just to relax and be kinaesthetically non-intrattentive.
> (2005)

It seems, then, that kinaesthetic non-intrattention can be accessed effectively. This access is entirely dependent, however, on the external and internal means of access, and thus each of the three states is imperative to the training and the Dance Consciousness Model itself.

Non-intrattentive training summary

From the analysis above, it can be assumed that the non-intrattentive training worked effectively in the empirical research contexts. At the end of the Phase 5, the dancers

claimed that the training allowed them to 'be completely free' (D9, 2005), 'to dance completely spontaneously' (D10, 2005), 'to be present-centred' (D12, 2005) and 'to just exist in the dance rather than anticipating it or reflecting on it' (D11, 2005). D12 stated:

> I can't believe that it's possible to choreograph non-intrattentively ... but it is and it's really effective. You would always somehow remember what you had done and without knowing it you could perform a three minute dance piece that you didn't even know you had created. The movement we came up with was very different to that which we would choreograph normally. It was more of an impulse reaction to your partner and so interesting ... and with one particular group section we did, we did it completely non-intrattentively and it worked really well for that section and I really think that if we hadn't done it non-intrattentively it wouldn't have worked at all.
> (2005)

All the dancers commented on the intense connection it was possible to experience with other dancers despite the lack of attention towards self or other. D10 noted:

> It was amazing to have the connection with another person without having to think about them. Just knowing they are there, but not planning or reflecting, just doing.
> (2005)

The non-intrattentive training allows the body to be in control of itself; it has to be, because the mind is somewhere else. The body becomes a thinking body and is able to move itself independently through time and space. Trusting the body to execute the movement without the mind directly attending to it is difficult, and the dancers claimed that this is because '[one is] so used to thinking about what [one's] body is doing whilst dancing' (D9, 2005). It is essential, though, that the dancer allows the body to take control and allows self to experience kinaesthetically the non-intrattentive dance consciousness. At the end of Phase 5, D11 commented:

> It's really exciting to just let the mind go and allow your body to take over ... and it's so nice to see movement that's just the body existing, with the body thinking for itself.
> (2005)

It was possible to observe the dancers using external means of access, as one could hear them talking or see them observing. The nature of the internal and kinaesthetic

access meant that they could not be observed in such a way, but it was still always possible to discern whether or not the dancers had accessed non-intrattention. There are some non-verbal indices and signals that are inherent in, and characteristic of, non-intrattentive states.[116]

When dancing non-intrattentively the dancer appears unconstrained, uninhibited and spontaneous. The eyes and face are relaxed and the gaze seems to wander. The dancer appears completely absorbed in the task, but at the same time, thoughtless and free. The body is very relaxed and appears comfortable, and the movement is flowing, unbound and sometimes indefinite. The movement pace tends to be fairly fast and continuous. It was possible to observe all these qualities in the dancers and thus discern that they were accessing states of non-intrattention. At times, it was possible to observe a change in focus, for example a tensing of the body or a decrease in pace, and this often indicated a lapse in the non-intrattention and the presence of intrattention directed towards self. These observations, more often than not, correlated with the parts of the dancers' reports in which they noted that they had not managed to maintain access.

To summarise, the non-intrattentive training allowed the dancers to live and experience the dance purely, without thought or knowledge of that experience. The dancers were able to access states of fundamental, unattended consciousness whilst remaining awake and engaged in the experience of the dance. Nonetheless, they were unaware of what the experience was or what the dancing body or mind was doing. At times, the dancers experienced ordinary states of non-intrattention in which they became habituated to the dance. At other times, the dancers experienced heightened states of non-intrattention in which they became totally involved in the dance.

As noted earlier in this chapter in relation to Phase 4, it is worth considering that the use of music, set and properties was overlooked in the training and was not introduced until a later phase. Being able to use these elements within a non-intrattentive performance is fairly complex and, again, this should perhaps be

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[116] As noted in relation to Phase 4, although the purpose of the model is concerned with the dancer's experience of the dance, as opposed to the nature or quality of the choreography or performance, it is of interest to make note of the following observations. Again, however, one must maintain an awareness that such observations are not the criterion upon which the effectiveness of the Dance Consciousness Model is judged.

something that is incorporated into the non-intrattentive training workshops in Phase 5.

Phase 6: How can one switch between the intrattentive dance consciousness and the non-intrattentive dance consciousness? What constitutes the full Dance Consciousness Model?

The dancers considered that the switching states training was very valuable and that 'this part of the training clarified how the model was going to work' (D11, 2005). D9 said, 'it definitely taught me how to switch states' (2005) and D12 stated, '[it is] essential to have control of your dance consciousness' and to be able to 'swap between different states', without this sort of training 'I don't know how anyone could expect to be able to do it' (2005).

The headings in Chapter 6, in which the I-NI and NI-I strands and switching states training were first described, provide a convenient framework for the systematic and thorough analysis of Phase 6. For ease of reference the headings in Chapter 6 are repeated below:

- Switching states during the process;
- Switching states during performance;
- Summary.

Switching states during the process

It had been anticipated that the dancers might find it difficult to switch between intrattention and non-intrattention part-way through a process, having become accustomed to working either completely intrattentively or completely non-intrattentively. This was, however, by no means what occurred. On the contrary, for example, the dancers were immediately able to choreograph and rehearse a phrase intrattentively, and then rehearse and perform it non-intrattentively. The dancers stated that their ability to interchange with such ease was a result of gaining control over their consciousness in the previous training. The dancers noted:

> We were already used to interchanging ... because in some of the previous tasks we lost intrattention, for example, and entered non-intrattention, we then had to control our consciousness and switch immediately back to the intrattention. When it came to the process switching we didn't find it very difficult at all.
> (D9, 2005)

This control became increasingly evident in the process switching training. The dancers noted that, although they found the training fairly easy, they did not dispute its significance. They agreed that this part of the training was essential as it gave them a real understanding of the nature and potential of the Dance Consciousness Model.

The dancers were very interested in how the various strands affected the movement in different ways. In the analysis presented earlier in this chapter in relation to Phases 4 and 5, the distinctive nature of intrattentive movement and non-intrattentive movement was discussed. Using the I-NI strand and the NI-I strand:

> ... not only allowed [the dancers] to have different conscious experiences to those [they] had already encountered, but also affected the movement in different ways.
> (D10, 2005)

The I-NI strand allowed movement which was precise and structured, to be performed spontaneously, as if for the first time. On the other hand, the NI-I strand allowed movement, which appeared free and unbound, to be performed with precision, ensuring that it was performed exactly the same in every execution. At this point, the dancers gained considerable insight into the model having the potential to create various experiences as well as particularised movement. For example, one dancer noted:

> We really enjoyed being able to choreograph something non-intrattentively ... and then later gain some insight into what the movement actually was, and intrattentively rehearse it and refine it, so we knew exactly what it was without taking away from its organic nature. We also enjoyed choreographing intrattentively and then freeing the movement later on in a non-intrattentive performance.
> (D12, 2005)

It is apparent, therefore, that the process switching training fulfilled its aim of teaching dancers to switch between states of intrattention and non-intrattention.

Switching states during performance

Within the performance switching training, the dancers were first taught to execute all the movement exercises that were to be used in the circuit, using external, internal and kinaesthetic means, and the dancers were able to do this with ease. The dancers then participated in three laps of the consciousness circuit, in which they were required to switch states each time they moved to a new station. The first time round, the dancers used external means, the second time internal means and the third time they experienced the states kinaesthetically. D12 stated:

> The circuit was really effective in teaching you to switch states and that is so valuable because that's what a performance is, all performances require you to switch states. You've got to be able to switch at will when you need to.
> (2005)

The dancers also found that the movement tasks were effective. One stated, for example, 'the slow walk really made you aware of yourself and in the fast run you had no time to be aware' (D11, 2005). Some stations were considered to be more effective than others, however, and some tasks made it easier to maintain access than others. For example, the intrattentive mirroring allowed the dancers to access a high quality state of intrattention, in which they were forced to attend with focus to self and other in order to be able to copy the other precisely. On the other hand, the non-intrattentive stillness station proved more problematic. D12 claimed:

> During the stillness it was difficult to maintain the non-intrattentive state and that is always the case on stage. I became quite aware. It's difficult to just be. But it got better each time we went through the circuit.
> (2005)

It is difficult to just stand and exist completely in stillness, with no thought for self, and without constant reflection on how one is standing and for how long one has been standing. The circuit allowed the dancers to experience such stillness, and then to move immediately into an intrattentive state at the next station. It might also have been of use to have allowed the dancers to experience the circuit in its opposite form,

so that the intrattentive stations become non-intrattentive and *vice versa*. This would have allowed the dancers, for example, to experience the stillness in an intrattentive state and then move from it into a non-intrattentive state.

The dancers observed that, on the first lap, the transitions between the different stations, and therefore the different states, were quite obvious. As they progressed, however, the 'switching got easier' (D9, 2005) and 'the transitions became less and less like transitions' (D12, 2005). This indicates a development in the dancers' ability to interchange between the states and supports the notion of continual exposure. D12 noted:

> The circuit became really absorbing ... on the second and third execution ... and it felt really natural. I felt as if I could have carried on for ages.
> (2005)

The dancers were asked whether they detected much difference between the external and internal executions of the circuit. D12 commented, 'there wasn't much difference as we are so used to moving from external to internal' (2005) and D10 added, 'we all still use the means inside our head so there isn't much difference at all' (2005). The dancers were then asked to describe their experience of the kinaesthetic lap and D11 replied:

> The kinaesthetic lap was fine because of the progression, and because ... we had warmed up physically and mentally by then.
> (D11, 2005)

When the dancers were asked whether they thought they would be able to enter into the kinaesthetic lap without first participating in the first two laps, D9 commented, 'with practice you should be able to train your mind to just switch on' (2005). This indicates that a consciousness warm-up is important. If a dancer is expected to enter a kinaesthetic state the moment he or she steps on stage, it is essential to prepare the consciousness off stage and work through a warm-up involving external and internal intrattention.

One aim of performance switching is to prepare dancers for stepping on and off stage and maintaining their conscious states, which is why, during the circuit, the dancers

were asked to exit the studio at three points. After varying amounts of time, the dancers were asked to return and to continue immediately with the same task. The dancers noted that this was an important part of the circuit; one commented, 'the exits and entrances were effective, especially if you attempted to maintain the state whilst off stage' (D9, 2005).

The dancers' comments indicated that the performance switching training was effective and prepared the dancers for utilising more than one strand in a performance.

Summary

From the above analysis, it can be assumed that the switching states training works effectively and trains dancers to interchange successfully between states of intrattention and non-intrattention within the dance process and dance performance.

At the end of Phase 6, the dancers claimed that the training 'definitely fulfilled its purpose' (D10, 2005) and by this time they 'felt really strong and able to access the states' (D12, 2005). D10 commented:

> [The switching states training] came just at the right time ... just when I felt like I had grasped the methods. I don't think it would have been so effective if we had tried it earlier in the process. It's a real skill, something we had to build up to. It's not really something that you can just do, which is interesting considering that most choreographers just expect you to be able to do it. I definitely couldn't have done it so well and with so much control without the training.
> (D10, 2005)

Before moving on to Phase 7, the dancers were each interviewed about their overall experience of the consciousness training. In response, comments included:

> Access is becoming much easier and much more instantaneous, it feels like we can switch with ease between everyday states and dance states. Now, after the training, I feel a lot more aware of myself as a dancer and of my own personal movement style. I think that when you know yourself better, that's when you can really push yourself as a dancer and push your boundaries more. That's what I feel like I am able to do now. This training will really help me to develop as a dancer. Now I have an awareness that I can move in these two different states I can start to work with them more and push myself

more instead of just existing in my normal dance state ... It's like I have a whole new dancer in me.
(D9, 2005)

People tell you to think about your movement or not to think about your movement, but no-one tells you how to. Even if you do normally access these states you don't always know how you have accessed them. I feel like the training has really developed and changed me as a dancer. In technique classes I have become so much more aware of my body. It's a good way to get you moving in a different style [and] you might even find out that a different way of moving suits you better.
(D10, 2005)

After the training I feel as if I understand what it means to be a dancer and I can now trust in my own body to exist in the different states. It's almost like you've been given a key to access yourself and your states, and realise who you really are. It enables you to recognise what sort of mover you are. When I started I was a non-intrattentive dancer, not that I knew this, now I have access to other ways of moving, intrattentive ways. This gives me insight into the experiences that other dancers might have, experiences I wasn't even aware of before as I was always non-intrattentive. This has widened my capabilities and movement possibilities. Now I have an awareness of both ways of moving, rather than thinking there is only one way, although never really knowing what that one way is. I never knew that other dancers' experiences were different from mine.
(D11, 2005)

The training is so comparable to everyday life in which you are constantly changing states and so it should be obvious how to do it, but when you are dancing it's just not. That's why the training is so important. Having trained to access two different states I feel more complete as a dancer and I feel like the training has increased my movement vocabulary. I now have two different styles that I am able to access at will. The techniques really help you to make connections inside yourself and make connections with other dancers. I feel like I have mastered control of my dance consciousness and I don't know of any other training that allows you to do this.
(D12, 2005)

The switching states training marked the end of the consciousness training and, at the end of Phase 6, the dancers were presented with an illustration of the Dance Consciousness Model.[117]

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[117] See Chapter 6, page 216.

Phase 7: How effective is the Dance Consciousness Model?

Having completed all the training the dancers were equipped to apply the Dance Consciousness Model within the choreography, rehearsal and performance of a full-scale dance piece, the purpose of which was to assess the effectiveness of the model. In order to consider whether the model is effective or not, it is vital to ascertain what is intended by the term 'effective' – effective in what sense? It is of use here to return to the purpose of the Dance Consciousness Model which was provided in Chapter 3:

- The purpose of the Dance Consciousness Model is to allow choreographers and dancers to actively select the dance consciousness in which the dancer is to choreograph and perform and to subsequently access and control that chosen state, whether it be intrattentive and/or non-intrattentive.

Thus, in order to be deemed effective in the context of Phase 7 of Empirical Project 3, the model must have allowed the dancers to select, access and control their dance consciousness during the choreography, rehearsal and performance of the full scale dance piece. An analytical account of these processes is presented below.

Choreography and rehearsal

Every section of the hour and a half dance piece was choreographed and rehearsed using the Dance Consciousness Model. Each of the four strands was used for different sections of the piece, the chosen strand being selected to suit the nature of the section being choreographed. For example, when it was anticipated that a section would require very structured and precise movement, the intrattentive strand was applied. For some sections, it was not apparent, prior to the start of the choreographic process, which strand would be most appropriate. In these instances the dancers experimented with the different strands whilst improvising and gradually decided which strand would be the most applicable for that particular section or concept.

As a result of using each of the four different strands, the final dance piece contained both intrattentive and non-intrattentive movement material and the dancers were therefore required to switch states within the performance. Consequently, the dance piece contained a variety of movements, some of which appeared to be very free and

spontaneous whereas others appeared to be structured and precise. The nature of the choreography also required the dancers to enter and exit the stage numerous times, again permitting the dancers to apply their ability to switch states.

The dancers were fairly disciplined in the use of the model during the choreographic process and applied it effectively within the choreography of each section. The dancers were very adept at using the means of access and accessing the states externally, internally and kinaesthetically. By this point, the dancers had developed strong preferences and had begun predominantly to use the means of access which were most effective for them personally, often to the exclusion of other means of access. This was not considered too problematic, although the dancers were constantly reminded that they had many different means available to them, and that it was always important to at least consider the means on offer and then decide which was the most appropriate for the task in hand.

The model was easily incorporated into the choreographic process and it did not seem to disturb the process. The dancers endorsed this observation, and one claimed, for example:

> Using the model during choreography seemed really natural. By this point I really understood the model and how to access the different states. It was not at all difficult to use the model when we were choreographing. It just seemed really useful and I can't believe I ever used to choreograph without it.
> (D12, 2005)

The dancers felt that using the model had a significant effect on the movement and one remarked:

> For some sections it would seem so obvious that it needed to be choreographed intrattentively, for example, and it seems strange that we never would have considered this before and would have just choreographed without even considering what should be going on inside our minds, inside our dance consciousness.
> (D11, 2005)

The dancers claimed that switching states was a very effective technique and not only allowed them to move on and off stage seamlessly, but also to move effortlessly from one section to another. D10 stated:

> The first section of the piece began non-intrattentively and then suddenly went into a very intrattentive bit, and that was really interesting. The effect of the switching on the movement quality was significant, as well as the difference in the mind. I don't think you could move so well from one sort of section to another without switching states.
> (2005)

There is no denying that a thorough application of the model can be expensive in terms of time. For example, when choreographing and rehearsing an intrattentive section the dancers often choreographed using verbal report and physical observation. They progressed to rehearsing the movement using motionless blind sensing and then motion blind sensing. The dancers then reassessed the movement and noted any sections that required further attention after which, if it was felt to be necessary, they rehearsed again using verbal report and physical observation. Following this, the dancers then rehearsed using internal means of access and then finally rehearsed whilst kinaesthetically accessing intrattention. This is a more lengthy process than the conventional process in current dance practice, in which the dancers simply choreograph and then rehearse. The choreography for the dance piece did therefore take some time, but the resultant movement was thoroughly considered and the dancers noted that it was 'more effective than if [they] had choreographed it normally' (D9, 2005).

By the time it came to the rehearsal process, the demands of producing a full-scale dance piece became very apparent. The dancers were suddenly faced with deadlines and a fast-approaching performance. They became less disciplined in using the model and seemed to be taking short cuts. At times, it was noticed that the dancers were rehearsing material without applying the model and the choreographer had to remind the dancers to use it. When reminded, the dancers did generally seem able to apply the model again immediately but, on some occasions, it took them 'a while to get back into it' (D11, 2005).

As with any technique, it is important to practise it continually in order to ensure one remains proficient. The dancers noted that the sporadic rehearsal schedule contributed to the lack of discipline and their occasional failure to apply the model. The other commitments of the dancers resulted in the time between rehearsals being quite long; the rehearsals were short, three-hour sessions held twice a week over

three months. It would have been preferable to have had a continuous process, with choreography or rehearsal sessions held every day over a couple of weeks. The dancers agreed and their comments included the following:

> I felt like the model was really effective, but having the rehearsals spread out made it difficult to get back into the model. It would be really effective to do it much more intensively. At points I do feel as if I neglected the model and coming back to it was sometimes difficult, more difficult than if I had been disciplined throughout.
> (D10, 2005)

> Ideally you would be practising the model every day and if you had a continual process it would have been even more effective. I definitely used the model during the rehearsal ... but I think you need to keep revisiting it and keep refreshing it especially if it's a long process. I wouldn't say that I ever neglected the model ... personally I used verbal report throughout – both intrattentive and non-intrattentive. It did need reinforcing by the choreographer though ... especially when it got to the point that we knew the movement really well. It was really useful to keep bringing the model back in and it really helped with the performance states, specific details and movement quality. I think had the process been more intensive there would have been no problem.
> (D12, 2005)

Despite these occasional lapses in the use of the model, the dancers did apply it effectively within both the choreography and rehearsal of all of the material.

It is worth emphasising that Empirical Project 3 was a research project. In contrast to conventional dance practice in which the aim is normally the creation and performance of a dance piece, the main aim of this project was to apply the model within a dance process and dance performance and to assess its efficacy. The achievement of this main aim was the dominant driving force and occasionally the quality of the piece suffered in terms of cohesion and the overall concept. The dancers recognised this and one stated:

> It didn't matter what we were choreographing as long as we were using the model. I don't think this would have happened if we were applying the model in a normal process.
> (D9, 2005)

Outside a research context, the Dance Consciousness Model should be seen as an addition to the normal choreographic process. It should not become the purpose of the choreographic process. The model is not a tool for generating successful choreography or ensuring a successful technical performance. Nor is it intended that the model replace conventional choreographic and performance techniques. Choreographers and dancers are advised to use the model as a valuable addition to the techniques they normally employ. In the context of Empirical Project 3, the model was not always applied as an additional tool but used as an independent tool, and this undoubtedly resulted in a less successful piece of choreography in relation to structure and form. As a preliminary investigative empirical project, however, Empirical Project 3 supplied usable and valid information regarding the efficiency of the Dance Consciousness Model as a model for accessing particular states of the dance consciousness.

Performance

The research outcome of this thesis was defined as follows:

- To create a model that can be used to enable dancers to access particular conscious states for performance – the Dance Consciousness Model.

The final part of Empirical Project 3 was designed to lead to an assessment as to whether this research outcome had been fulfilled and, if so, to what extent. Would the consciousness training, and the fact that the Dance Consciousness Model had been applied in the process, enable the dancers to access and control their dance consciousness within the performance?

Having completed the application of the model in the choreographic and rehearsal process, the dancers were then faced with the prospect of the live performances. They were interviewed after the performances and asked to reflect on their use of the model. The following comments are representative of their answers:

In the performances I felt like I had control of my consciousness. Although I used the model most of the time and was therefore experiencing the states kinaesthetically, I would occasionally slip out of it. I don't think this is a problem though as unlike in other performances I was able to control my consciousness and get back into the performance. Normally this isn't possible, for example normally you can't just slip into that performance state especially if something goes wrong. It's really hard to keep with it normally. I didn't have this problem in these performances. I used the model all the time.
(D9, 2005)

I used the model throughout the piece, and constantly switched between different states of consciousness. Even off stage you never switched off. The transitions between on and off stage were seamless. It wasn't the case that you would have to use the means of access, you were able to access the states kinaesthetically. You came on and just did it. When we performed in a different venue, I began being very intrattentive. I was much more aware of external factors, things that you shouldn't have been aware of, almost as if my consciousness was straying. But because of the training I was able to control this and hone it back and pull the attention back to myself. I definitely kept up with the model and the best performance was the one that I kept true to the model.
(D10, 2005)

I think I maintained the model throughout, I definitely felt in control of my consciousness and the sections we rehearsed intrattentively I performed intrattentively and the sections we rehearsed non-intrattentively I performed non-intrattentively. Also the nature of the piece required very quick switches especially going on and off stage. And we were able to switch because of the training. There is one particular section and I can remember being so aware, of the music, of my body, of others bodies, of unison and canon, of space and time and even toward the end I was aware of what's happening next, anticipating the next sections, and then suddenly I was just moving non-intrattentively with no thought at all.
(D11, 2005)

In the performances I kept to the model as much as possible. I personally preferred the intrattentive sections, although this is just personal taste. Despite this I was definitely able to access both of the states. For most of the performance I experienced the states kinaesthetically, but occasionally I would need to use internal means if I became distracted, for example by the set or the audience.
(D12, 2005)

The comments presented above provide evidence to indicate that all of the dancers felt in control of their dance consciousness during the performance and were able to

access kinaesthetic intrattention and non-intrattention effectively. In addition to these comments, and of particular interest with respect to the dancers' experiences, are the accounts of a section in the first performance during which some technical elements went wrong. The dancers were using ropes which they had to bring from off stage and set up in a particular way on the stage. The ropes became very tangled off stage and the dancers were unable to execute the movement as rehearsed. This was a real test of the dancers' ability to maintain their conscious states and sustain their control over these states. The dancers were questioned about this technical problem and a selection of their responses about what they had experienced in terms of their consciousness is given below:

> When things went wrong to do with props we had to improvise. This scene is normally performed very intrattentively, and we choreographed it intrattentively as well. But when it went wrong ... I chose to execute the movement non-intrattentively and let my body just move itself. I knew I could trust it do this because of the training. This was so important as it allowed my mind to reflect on how to deal with the situation. My body and mind were doing different things. My body was moving non-intrattentively to allow my mind to work intrattentively. This allowed me to carry on performing and still figure out what to do. I was pleased that I was able to control everything like this.
> (D12, 2005)

> There were points where I was almost half and half, so I would be non-intrattentively dancing but having some intrattentive thoughts like "I need to go off and get a torch so I can see to untangle the ropes". I was also switching all the time as I was on and off quite a lot to sort the ropes out. I remember the off stage moments really well. I was very intrattentive and we were even talking and discussing what to do. At the time I was very aware. I would then have to come on again and switch ... back into the performance. I haven't got a clue what I did, I was completely non-intrattentive, but because of the training I knew I was able to dance like this ... I was able to switch back and forth. I just did it kinaesthetically. I didn't use the means of access as such, just switched in and out.
> (D10, 2005)

Although the movement outcome of the non-intrattentive improvisation may not have been appropriate at that point in the dance, it seems from the dancers' responses that use of model proved effective and that they were able to access particular states of consciousness within the performances and control these states – even when things went wrong. This was also observable from an informed audience perspective.

As noted in relation to Phase 4 and Phase 5, there are some non-verbal indices and signals inherent in, and characteristic of, the two different states of consciousness. It was clear that the dancers' focus was interchanging between sections and the dancers seemed to move from being very aware of everything to just performing. The movement style seemed to change alongside this. Whether an uninformed audience would detect these changes in consciousness, or even the changes in movement quality, is difficult to discern. It would also be interesting to monitor how changes in the dancers' consciousness affect the audience, and specifically the audience's consciousness, and this is an area into which this research could extend in the future.[118]

Summary

All the empirical evidence suggests that the consciousness training and the application of the Dance Consciousness Model were effective in enabling the dancers to actively select, access and control their dance consciousness within the choreography and performance of the piece. The dancers were invited to reflect on the overall experience of the Dance Consciousness Model and to compare this experience with conventional practice. The dancers were also asked to hypothesise about the effect the Dance Consciousness Model might have on Western contemporary dance practice. Their responses included the following:

> Normally your conscious states aren't pointed out to you. I've never been told before what sort of state I should be in when performing, but it's so important! Dancers will benefit so much from the model. It does requires training though and perhaps for me a bit more intensive training would have benefited me even more.
> (D9, 2005)

> I haven't ever done anything like the training before and definitely never used anything like the model before. It's completely different to how I have been taught to work normally. From now I will definitely always consider my dancing consciousness, as well as my dancing body, and I think all other dancers should too!
> (D10, 2005)

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[118] Haggendorn (2004) has undertaken some research into what happens within audience members' minds whilst they watch dance, and this may be of use for any further research which considers this aspect of performance.

> I will definitely use the model again, I don't think I could work without it now, it's sort of within me and now when I'm dancing I'm always thinking 'hey what sort of state should I be in?'. I'm just so much more aware of myself as a dancer, and I think that awareness of self is essential for all dancers.
> (D11, 2005)

> Normally what happens with professional and non-professional choreographers is that they just train you, and train you in terms of your body and will then tell you to go on stage, let go, don't think and just perform. So, in saying that, they are telling you to perform non-intrattentively. But how can you, when you don't know how to access those states? This training is really important and I think once you've been trained to use the model, you will always apply it a little bit in everything you do.
> (D12, 2005)

It appears that all of the dancers felt that the overall experience of the Dance Consciousness Model differed significantly from the conventional practice in which they ordinarily engaged. All of the dancers found the experience a positive and beneficial one and considered that the Dance Consciousness Model would have a positive impact on their future practice. The dancers also noted that the model would be of use to other dancers working within the Western contemporary dance context.

Concluding remarks

The analysis of the empirical projects presented in this chapter indicates that this research has ascertained the nature of the states of consciousness that are experienced by dancers within the choreography and performance of contemporary dance, and has clarified the means through which dancers might access and control such states of consciousness. In doing so, the research has answered the focussed research questions, listed again here for ease of reference:

- What is the nature of the dance consciousness?
- How can one examine the dance consciousness?
- How can one access the intrattentive dance consciousness?
- How can one access the non-intrattentive dance consciousness?

- How can one switch between the intrattentive dance consciousness and the non-intrattentive dance consciousness?

As a result this thesis has demonstrated that a model has been created which enables dancers to access particular conscious states for performance: the Dance Consciousness Model.

As indicated earlier, the final research question is:

- How effective is the Dance Consciousness Model?

This question must be considered in relation to the overall purpose of the model which is outlined in Chapter 3. Bearing this in mind, it is possible to present the following conclusion.

From the accounts of the dancers who participated in the first complete application of the model, it is feasible to conclude that the answer is that the Dance Consciousness Model is effective, as it allows dancers to actively select, access and control their dance consciousness within choreography and performance. In doing so, the model has also been effective in affording the dancers more insight into, and understanding of, the experience of the dance and the ways in which it can be experienced. In addition, the model has been effective in allowing greater means of communication between the choreographer and the dancers through enabling both parties to understand the nature of different dance consciousness experiences, how the dancers can access these experiences and how these relate to the intentions of the dance. It seems, therefore, that the Dance Consciousness Model can be deemed effective in encouraging a consideration of the subjectivity of the dance experience.

In addition, it is worth noting that, although the model is not essentially intended as a means for improving the efficacy of choreography or performance in terms of its artistic or aesthetic merit or validity, according to reports of participants in the research, it does seem to have had some resultant effect on both these processes. During all three empirical projects, the dancers, the choreographer and numerous audience members commented on the high quality of performance and the commitment and focus through which the movement was executed. However, any

judgement regarding whether the model enables more effective outcomes in relation to some choreographic processes/performances as opposed to other choreographic processes/performances is, at this point, rather subjective. Although quality in choreography and/or performance has not been a criterion for assessment in relation to the effectiveness of the model in this particular study, it may indeed be an area of research to be explored in the future – for example: what effect does a dancer's consciousness have on the execution of movement and the standard of performance? Such areas of potential further investigation are presented later in this chapter.

Regardless of further investigation, it is fair to state that it can be concluded that the Dance Consciousness Model is effective in relation to its main purpose. There is always value, however, in casting a critical eye upon a research outcome and noting any components which may require modification to further enhance its efficacy.

Potential modifications

Although all the dancers asserted that the Dance Consciousness Model was effective, their accounts suggest that some modifications would potentially improve the model significantly. The proposals for the research and evaluation of such modifications are as shown in Table 22.

Table 22: Potential modifications

Problem	**Solution**
Within the consciousness training applied in Empirical Project 3, it was not considered what effect, if any, the music, set, properties, and costume, and other design tools and techniques such as lighting and projections, would have on the dancer's consciousness.	In future applications of the consciousness training, an additional workshop will be offered in which dancers are trained to apply the model when these external components, which are intrinsically related to dance, are in place. Such a workshop will consider how a dancer can, for example, move non-intrattentively whilst maintaining awareness of the music or other design components, or dance intrattentively without having to extend intrattentive awareness to external factors. This workshop will be optional depending on what sort of dance practice the dancer ordinarily engages in; for example, the workshop would be essential for a dancer

Problem	Solution
	who works in a dance theatre context.
Some of the dancers who participated in Empirical Project 3 expressed the opinion that it would have been beneficial to have more consciousness training.	There are three alternative methods of extending the training, which will be explored in the future. Firstly, doubling the number of training workshops would allow each means of access to be explored in more depth; one workshop would teach how to use the means of access and dancers would apply the means in a subsequent workshop. Secondly, the duration of each workshop could be increased from three hours to a full day. The third possibility is to offer a one-day top-up workshop for those who, having previously learnt how to use the different means of access, are able to practise using the means in a controlled environment.
The dancers from Empirical Project 3 noted that motion blind sensing is particularly difficult and requires a significant amount of skill, especially when a dancer is working with a group comprising dancers who have not previously worked together.	The dancers suggested that it would be beneficial to allow more time for the motion blind sensing tasks to develop. This will be implemented within future applications of the consciousness training.
All the tasks in the training allow the dancers to progress though external and internal states before moving to the kinaesthetic states. In live performance, however, dancers are expected to enter straight into kinaesthetic states.	The training tasks will be modified slightly to include the instantaneous accessing of kinaesthetic states. For example, dancers will be asked to choreograph a phrase in one workshop and then perform it kinaesthetically in a subsequent workshop. This will allow dancers to practise this immediate access.
All the dancers claimed that the switching states consciousness circuit was particularly effective and that it was progressively so – with each application they became more adept at switching states. They also noted, however, that they felt as if they wanted to carry on with more repetitions of the circuit.	Further research will be undertaken to investigate whether, and to what extent, it is beneficial to extend the circuit and allow the dancers to execute more repetitions of the circuit and/or for dancers to execute the circuit in reverse so that intrattentive stations become non-intrattentive and *vice versa*. This will give the dancers more practice at switching states and will also allow them to experience each station in a different state.
It was noted that the non-intrattentive physical observation tasks were hindered by the fact that the dancers had to remain facing forward in order to	This is a difficult matter to resolve as it is dependent on technical equipment. It would be beneficial to have images projected on to all four walls, but this may

Problem	Solution
observe the images, as they were projected only on to one wall.	not always be possible. In the light of this, it is worth considering other means of presenting visual stimuli, such as pictures on the wall or objects around the room. It is worth noting, however, that the forward facing issue is problematic only during the training when the dancers are using solely the physical observation and not when they are using the three means concurrently and accessing the states internally and kinaesthetically. Although it is not necessarily ideal, therefore, one projection screen does serve its purpose.

Indication of further investigation

Throughout the formulation of the Dance Consciousness Model and the analysis of its application, many related issues have arisen that it has not been possible to consider in any depth within the confines of this particular research but which potentially represent areas for further investigation. A summary of these issues is presented in Table 23 with indications as to the direction in which this study may develop in the future.

Table 23: Indication of further investigation

Research issue	Indication of content of further research
The effect of the Dance Consciousness Model on uninformed dancers.	Although uninformed dancers were used in Empirical Project 2, further theoretical and empirical research is required before any definitive conclusions can be reached regarding the effect of the training and model on uniformed as opposed to informed dancers.
The effect of integrating dancers who are using the model with dancers who are not.	Some of the dancers from Empirical Project 3 noted that they had attempted to use the model in different processes, but that their attempts had been hindered by the dancers who were not using the model. Can the Dance Consciousness Model still be effective in this context? What effect would use of the model by some dancers

Research issue	Indication of content of further research
	have on the dancers who are not using it?
The dance consciousness within other dance contexts.	Analysis of the research projects suggests that the model and its inherent concepts of dance consciousness are applicable within other contemporary dance contexts. The dancers commented that they had applied some aspects of the model within technique classes, and one of the dancers who works as a dance teacher, claimed that the model had greatly informed her teaching practice. The research undertaken already could be extended to explore these and possibly other contexts to determine whether the model is applicable as it stands, whether it needs to be adapted to a particular context, and whether further models should be formulated for use within different contexts.
The effect of the Dance Consciousness Model on audience members.	Further exploration of this effect might include an examination of the nature of the audience's consciousness, of whether the dancers' conscious state correlates in any way with audience members' consciousness, and thus whether an inter-subjective consciousness is possible. Such research might be extended to explore the effect the presence of an audience has on the dancers' consciousness.
The effectiveness of the Dance Consciousness Model in a wider environment.	Contemporary dance companies could be approached and invited to implement the model within their practice and to provide feedback on their experiences and the overall efficacy of the model.
The effect that the dancers' conscious state has on the actual movement they are executing.	The intrattentive choreography often resulted in movement that was particularly structured and precise, whereas the non-intrattentive choreography often resulted in movement that appeared free and unbound. There would be value in researching the effect of particular conscious states in the choreographic process in relation to intention and its realisation in content, form and expression.
The effect of the non-intrattentive stimuli.	It was noted by the dancers during Empirical Projects 2 and 3 that the nature

Research issue	Indication of content of further research
	of the stimuli affected the nature of the movement they were executing. Observation also suggested that there was a definite correlation between the stimuli and the movement. This presents potential for new ways of choreographing, in which choreographers can influence the dancers' movements by their choice of stimuli, without having to restrict dancers to a brief or a particularly reflective and constrained process.
The effect of using character on the model.	The performance in Empirical Project 3 required the dancers to perform as particular characters, and the dancers successfully applied the Dance Consciousness Model within this context. It would be interesting, however, to explore whether any additional training in the use of character on the model would be beneficial when preparing specifically for performances in which dancers are portraying particular characters. The acting theories discussed in Chapter 1 may be of use here in ascertaining how it is possible to access different states of consciousness through character.[119]
The Dance Consciousness Model in contexts other than dance.	The model could be extended to performers or actors working in non-literal theatre, such as physical theatre. The Dance Consciousness Model presents a different pathway, and one which is more founded in consciousness theory, from those currently available within theatre literature. The Dance Consciousness Model might, for example, be used to inform existing theatre practices or used in conjunction with existing practices within the theatre context

[119] These acting theories are summarised briefly in the following section.

The Dance Consciousness Model as a proposal for new practice

Regardless of the potential modifications and possible further research, there is no doubt that the Dance Consciousness Model has proved effective in its aim of allowing dancers to access particular states of consciousness within performance. It is important to consider, however, how it compares with dance consciousness theories, concepts and methods which already exist within dance literature. Similar considerations might be made with respect to theatre literature focussing on actors' consciousness. Is the Dance Consciousness Model innovative and can it be considered as a proposal for new practice?

Chapter 1 concluded that there is a distinct lack of literature dealing with the dancer's consciousness. It was noted that the literature of Sheets-Johnstone (1966) and Fraleigh (1987) represents the principal research undertaken within the dance discipline into the subject of the dance consciousness. Although both theorists do provide some insight into the nature of the dance consciousness and explicitly define two dance states, reflective and pre-reflective, the breadth of their discourse is constrained by their first-person phenomenological research approaches. This is similar to the situation within the theatre literature in which theorists and practitioners such as Stanislavski (1949, 1961, 1986), Strasberg (1988), Grotowski (1969) and Schechner (1973, 1985, 1990) promote a non-intrattentive state of consciousness for the actor, and Diderot (1955), Meyerhold (1969) and Brecht (1940) advocate an intrattentive state of consciousness.

There is little or no indication that the dance or theatre theorists' concepts are founded in third-person consciousness theory. The concepts of the intrattentive and non-intrattentive consciousness in the Dance Consciousness Model, however, are based on third-person theory. In addition, having been empirically investigated and examined by dancers and the consciousness trainer, the concepts of intrattention and non-intrattention also take account of the first- and second-person. The concepts within the Dance Consciousness Model could therefore be considered to be more authoritative than those of the dance and theatre theorists.

Both Fraleigh and Sheets-Johnstone consider how one can examine the dance consciousness and they note that phenomenology can provide some insight into the

states. The reliability and validity of resultant accounts must be questioned, however, because of their first-person nature. The method of examination used in relation to the Dance Consciousness Model also takes account of phenomenology and thus incorporates the first person into the method. In addition, however, the Dance Consciousness Model also incorporates second- and third-person theory into the method and attempts to provide a practical and accessible method that the dancers can readily apply in order to examine their own states. The combination of first-, second- and third-person examination methods in the Dance Consciousness Model provides more comprehensive, reliable and valid research information.

Neither Sheets-Johnstone nor Fraleigh suggests any methods of access to the states of reflection and pre-reflection that they define. Within theatre literature, it is possible to locate some methods, such as those of Brecht and Stanislavski, which do allow actors to access states that have an intrattentive or non-intrattentive nature. It is important to recall here, however, the significant distinction discussed in Chapter 1 regarding the difference between the methods provided by theatre literature and the means of access in the Dance Consciousness Model. The methods of access provided by theatre theorists are predominantly concerned with character. It is intended that the Dance Consciousness Model, on the other hand, be appropriate for all forms of contemporary dance, literal and non-literal, allowing dancers to access the states through means that are not necessarily related to character. The Dance Consciousness Model, therefore, offers accessible and practical means of access to states of intrattention and states of non-intrattention and methods of switching between them. This is a significant development in comparison with the theories of the above-mentioned dance theorists. The model also ensures that these means of access are applicable within all types of contemporary dance.

Although Sheets-Johnstone implies that dancers should experience a reflective process and pre-reflective performance, neither Sheets-Johnstone nor Fraleigh suggests how one might change states. In addition, although acting theorists Barba (1985, 1988, 1989, 1995) and Bloch (1993) promote the concept of a dual consciousness comprising both intrattention and non-intrattention, they do not clearly describe practical means for accessing these states or moving from one state to another. Meyer-Dinkgrafe (2005) offers a method in relation to the *Natyashastra*, but

he himself notes that further empirical investigation is necessary before the method can be transferred into Western theatre practice. The Dance Consciousness Model, in contrast, provides dancers with a clear progression from an intrattentive process to non-intrattentive performance and *vice versa* and, in doing so, allows dancers to switch states within the process.

Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh also imply that the pre-reflective dance consciousness is the ideal state for performance. The Dance Consciousness Model, however, refrains from promoting either intrattentive or non-intrattentive states as more effective than the other. Instead, the model gives dancers the choice of four different strands which enable them to experience an intrattentive performance, non-intrattentive performance, or a performance that comprises both states – and thus they are able to switch states within performance.

Having reconsidered the existing literature which deals with, or is applicable to, the dancers' consciousness, it is evident that the consciousness training and the Dance Consciousness Model develop significantly the research undertaken to date within current dance practice. This thesis has demonstrated how, through the application and amalgamation of a variety of existing theories with much independent thought and practice, new theories have been formulated. The culmination of this activity is the Dance Consciousness Model, for which there is no comparable alternative within the discipline of dance.

The Dance Consciousness Model may benefit any dancer working within the context of Western contemporary dance and can be applied within any type of choreographic process and performance. It is important to re-emphasise, however, that the model should be seen as an addition to choreographic process and performance, as opposed to existing independently. The Dance Consciousness Model is not explicitly concerned with product and thus it is not intended that the model replace conventional choreographic or performance techniques. Whilst applying the model dancers and choreographers are advised to also apply criteria and models for practice that focus on theme, intention, content, form, expression, style, production elements and so on in the choreography context and style, technique and skills in the performance context.

There are of course many different tried and tested approaches and techniques embraced in the conventional practice of choreography and performance, many of which focus on the product and on achieving artistic and aesthetic merit within the cultural milieu of current dance practice. The Dance Consciousness Model should be seen as a valuable and perhaps essential addition to these approaches and techniques in order to ensure that the subjectivity of experience is considered alongside the objectivity of the product outcome.

The Introduction and Chapter 1 discussed how the dancer's mind, specifically the dancer's consciousness, is attributed little significance compared with that of the dancer's body. The Dance Consciousness Model readjusts the balance and negates the 'dualistic point of view' about the body and mind that 'has always been widespread in the dance community' (Fortin *et al.*, 2002, p.173). The Dance Consciousness Model should be seen as an innovative proposal for new practice and it is hoped that the model will encourage more dancers, choreographers and dance theorists to ask 'what is a dancer conscious of while dancing?' (Sheets-Johnstone, 1966, p.39). It is anticipated that the model will have a significant impact on current dance practice within the context of Western contemporary dance by providing dancers, for the first time, with a means of access to their dance consciousness.

Appendix A

Sample intrattentive training workshop

Intrattentive training: Workshop 2 structure and content

Duration: approximately 3 hours

Means of access to be applied: Intrattentive physical observation and intrattentive blind sensing

Key:

Intrattentive physical observation	IPO
Intrattentive blind sensing	IBS
Intrattentive internal observation	IIO

- Introduction: Discussion with dancers, led by the choreographer/consciousness trainer, about the nature of IPO and IBS and their use as means of access to states of intrattentive consciousness. Explanation regarding the differences between IPO and IBS, versus IIO.

- Task 1: Warm up – Group and individual warm up using intrattentive verbal report.

- Task 2: Solo improvisation with IPO – Dancers walk around the studio and simultaneously observe their own bodies. This self-observation must occur from every angle and be active as opposed to passive. Dancers are informed of the differences between observing then moving (pre-observation), moving then observing (post-observation), and observing whilst moving (present-observation). In a circle, each participant performs a movement of their choice whilst simultaneously observing their movement with present-observation. This process develops and dancers begin to execute and self observe short phrases of movement and then move into free improvisation.

- Task 3: Solo improvisation with IPO, IBS and IIO – Dancers walk around the studio and simultaneously observe their own bodies and the space around them in as much detail as possible. They create a visual imprint of their bodies and the studio inside their minds, close their eyes and begin to use blind sensing as they

walk around. The dancers are informed of the importance of maintaining the visual imprints, which they constructed when observing, whilst blind sensing. Dancers improvise freely with blind sensing and, finally, whilst internalising the observation.

- Task 4: Solo set movement and performance with IPO, IBS and IIO – Dancers learn a set short movement phrase and simultaneously physically observe the movement being executed. The dancers rehearse the movement initially with the observation and then create a visual imprint for use with blind sensing. The dancers engage in motionless blind sensing – in which they rehearse the movement completely in their minds and not with their bodies – and then with motion blind sensing – in which they physically rehearse with eyes closed. Finally the dancers rehearse whilst internalising the observation. The dancers are informed of the importance of maintaining the intrattention whilst internally observing. They perform the set material once with the observation, once with the blind sensing and then twice whilst internalising the observation.

- Task 5: Solo choreography and performance with IPO, IBS and IIO – Dancers choreograph a short solo phrase whilst concurrently physically observing. Dancers rehearse the movement initially with the observation and then with blind sensing (including motionless and motion sensing) and finally with internal observation. They perform the choreography once with the physical observation, once with blind sensing and then twice whilst internalising the observation.

- Task 6: Mover/observer improvisation with IPO and IBS – Dancers work as a duet and choose between two roles; mover and observer. The mover improvises freely and physically observes their body and the observer also physically observes the mover's body. Once they have gained a visual imprint of the mover, both the mover and the observer are given the opportunity to blind sense (the observer will be motionless). This task acts as preparation for task 7.

- Task 7: Duet improvisation with IPO – Two dancers improvise as part of a duet and simultaneously physically observe the duet. This observation may include movements executed by self and/or other.

- Task 8: Duet improvisation with IPO, IBS and IIO – Dancers improvise as a duet initially utilising physical observation and then gradually moving into blind sensing. Dancers then improvise without physical observation or blind sensing and internalise the observation. Dancers are informed that, if necessary, it is permitted to move back to the physical observation in order to re-focus.

- Task 9: Duet choreography and performance with IPO, IBS and IIO – Dancers choreograph a short duet phrase whilst concurrently physically observing self and other. Dancers rehearse the movement initially with physical observation and then with blind sensing (including motionless sensing) and finally with internal observation. The dancers perform the choreography once with the physical observation, once with blind sensing and then twice whilst internalising the observation.

- Task 10: Group improvisation with IPO, IBS and IIO – Dancers improvise as a group and continually observe both self and others. The dancers are informed that, at the point at which they feel they have the ability to execute group movement alongside physical observation, they may begin to use blind sensing. Subsequently the dancers improvise with internal observation. Dancers are informed that, if necessary, it is permitted to move back to the physical observation in order to re-focus. Dancers must maintain an awareness of the group throughout.

- Task 11: Group choreography and performance with IPO, IBS and IIO – Dancers choreograph a short group phrase whilst concurrently physically observing self and others. Dancers rehearse the movement initially with physical observation and then with blind sensing (including motionless sensing) and, finally, with internal observation. The dancers perform the choreography once with physical observation, once with blind sensing and then twice whilst internalising the observation.

Appendix B

Sample non-intrattentive training workshop

Non-intrattentive training: Workshop 4 structure and content

Duration: approximately 3 hours

Means of access to be applied: A combination of non-intrattentive verbal report, physical observation and active listening to create external, internal and kinaesthetic non-intrattention

Key:

Non-intrattentive verbal report	NIVR
Non-intrattentive physical observation	NIPO
Non-intrattentive active listening	NIAL
External non-intrattention	ENI
Internal non-intrattention	INI
Kinaesthetic non-intrattention	KNI

- Introduction: Discussion with dancers, led by the choreographer/consciousness trainer, about the notion of combining NIVR, NIPO and NIAL in order to create ENI, INI and KNI respectively.

- Task 1: Warm up – Group and individual warm up using NIAL.

- Task 2: Solo improvisation with NIVR and NIPO – Dancers walk around the studio and gradually move into free improvisation. As they do so they are presented with the four alternating visual stimuli – random film, lists of words, lists of numbers and questions – to physically observe. In addition, they provide a non-intrattentive verbal report in which they describe or shadow the visual stimuli (recite the words or numbers) or answer the questions that appear. The dancers focus their attention on to the stimuli and the report and not on the movement.

- Task 3: Solo improvisation with NIVR and NIAL – Dancers begin by walking around the studio and gradually move into free improvisation. As they do so, they are presented with a single, binaural or dichotic presentation (depending on equipment available) of the four alternating aural stimuli – random text, lists of

words, lists of numbers and questions – to which they must actively listen. In addition they use a non-intrattentive verbal report either to shadow what they hear or to answer the questions. The dancers focus their attention on to the stimuli and the report and not the movement.

- Task 4: Solo improvisation with NIPO and NIAL – Dancers begin by walking around the studio and gradually move into free improvisation. As they do so, they are presented with the four alternating visual stimuli to physically observe and a single, binaural or dichotic presentation of the four alternating aural stimuli to which they must actively listen. The aural stimuli intermittently complement and juxtapose the visual stimuli. The dancers focus attention on to the visual and aural stimuli and not the movement.

- Task 5: Solo improvisation with ENI, INI and KNI – Dancers begin by walking round the studio and then move into free improvisation. As they do so they are presented with the four alternating visual stimuli to physically observe and a complementary or juxtaposing single, binaural or dichotic presentation of the four alternating aural stimuli to which they must actively listen. In addition, the dancers describe, shadow or answer what they see and hear. The dancers have control over this report and can actively choose what they want to report and when, the report must, however, remain constant. The dancers focus the attention on to the stimuli and the report and not the movement. After some time, the visual and aural stimuli cease and the dancers stop verbally reporting, they are, however, expected to maintain the conscious state. Eventually the dancers disengage the intrattention and enter kinaesthetic non-intrattention.

- Task 6: Solo set movement and performance with ENI, INI and KNI – Dancers learn a short movement phrase whilst being presented with the four alternating visual stimuli and a complementary or juxtaposing single, binaural or dichotic presentation of the four alternating aural stimuli. In addition, the dancers describe, shadow or answer what they see and hear. The dancers have control over this report and can actively choose what they want to report and when, the report must, however, remain constant. The dancers focus attention on to the stimuli and the report and not the movement. The dancers rehearse the movement with the

external intrattention. Part way through the rehearsal the projections, recordings and report cease, however the dancers maintain their conscious state. Towards the end of the rehearsal and for the performance the dancers disengage the intrattention and access kinaesthetic non-intrattention.

- Task 7: Solo choreography and performance with ENI, INI and KNI – Dancers choreograph a short solo phrase whilst being presented with the four alternating visual stimuli and a complementary or juxtaposing single, binaural or dichotic presentation of the four alternating aural stimuli. In addition, they describe, shadow or answer what they see and hear. The dancers have control over the report and can actively choose what they want to report and when, the report must, however, remain constant. The dancers focus attention on to the stimuli and the report and not the movement. The dancers rehearse the movement with the external non-intrattention. Part way through the rehearsal, the projections, recordings and report cease, the dancers must, however, maintain their conscious state. Towards the end of the rehearsal and for the performance, the dancers disengage the intrattention and access kinaesthetic non-intrattention.

- Task 8: Mover/observer improvisation with ENI – Dancers work as a duet and choose between two roles; mover and observer. The mover improvises freely and the observer watches the mover. At the same time they both simultaneously physically observe the projected stimuli, actively listen to the aural stimuli and provide non-intrattentive verbal reports of their choice. Dancers focus attention on to the stimuli and report, and not the movement. This task acts as preparation for task 9, and trains the dancers to observe passively without focal attention and allows the dancers to be in the space with one another without having to attend to one another.

- Task 9: Duet improvisation with ENI – Dancers improvise as part of a duet whilst physically observing the projected stimuli, actively listening to the single, dichotic or binaural aural stimuli and providing a non-intrattentive verbal report of their choice. They also have the option to use discussion as part of the verbal report. The dancers focus attention on to the stimuli and not the movement

- Task 10: Duet improvisation with ENI, INI and KNI – Dancers improvise as a duet whilst concurrently physically observing the visual stimuli, actively listening to the aural stimuli and providing a report, including discussion, of their choice. Part way through the improvisation the projections, recordings and reports cease – the dancers must, however, maintain their conscious state whilst using internal non-intrattention. Towards the end of the improvisation the dancers disengage the intrattention and access kinaesthetic non-intrattention.

- Task 11: Duet choreography and performance with ENI, INI and KNI – Dancers choreograph a short duet phrase whilst concurrently physically observing the visual stimuli, actively listening to the aural stimuli and providing a report, including discussion, of their choice. The dancers focus attention on to the stimuli and report and not the movement. The dancers rehearse the duet with the external non-intrattention. Part way through the rehearsal the projections, recordings and reports cease, the dancers must, however, maintain their conscious state. Towards the end of the rehearsal and for the performance the dancers disengage the intrattention and access kinaesthetic non-intrattention.

- Task 12: Group improvisation with ENI, INI and KNI – Dancers improvise as a group and continually physically observe the visual stimuli, actively listen to the single, dichotic or binaural aural stimuli and provide a verbal report, including group discussion, of their choice. The dancers focus attention on to the stimuli and reports and not the movement. Part way through the improvisation the projections, recordings and reports cease, the dancers must, however, maintain their conscious state. Towards the end of the improvisation the dancers disengage the intrattention and access kinaesthetic non-intrattention.

- Task 13: Group choreography with ENI, INI and KNI – Dancers choreograph a short group phrase whilst concurrently physically observing the visual stimuli, actively listening to the aural stimuli and providing a verbal report, including a discussion of their choice. The dancers rehearse the movement with the external non-intrattention. Part way through the rehearsal the projections, recordings and reports cease, the dancers must, however, maintain their conscious state. Towards

the end of the rehearsal and for the performance the dancers disengage the intrattention and access kinaesthetic non-intrattention.

Appendix C

Sample switching states training workshop

Switching states training: Workshop 2 structure and content

Duration: approximately 3 hours

Means of access to be applied: External, internal and kinaesthetic intrattention and external, internal and kinaesthetic non-intrattention.

Key:

External intrattention	EI
Internal intrattention	II
Kinaesthetic intrattention	KI
External non-intrattention	ENI
Internal non-intrattention	INI
Kinaesthetic non-intrattention	KNI

- Introduction: Discussion with dancers, led by the choreographer/consciousness trainer, about the nature of the switching states training as a means to controlling the intrattentive and non-intrattentive consciousness – using EI, II, KI, ENI, INI and KNI.

- Task 1: Warm up – Group and individual warm up using a combination of intrattentive and non-intrattentive means of access.

- Task 2: Solo improvisation with ENI, INI and KNI – Dancers improvise freely whilst using the means of access of their choice in order to maintain a non-intrattentive state. The dancers externalise, internalise and finally kinaesthetically experience the non-intrattention.

- Task 3: Speed walk with EI, II and KI – Dancers walk at normal speed, half speed, quarter speed, one eighth speed, one sixteenth speed, one thirty-second speed and one sixty-fourth speed whilst using the means of access of their choice in order to maintain an intrattentive state. The dancers externalise, internalise and, finally, kinaesthetically experience the intrattention.

- Task 4: Running with ENI, INI and KNI and observing with EI, II and KI – The dancers work in pairs. One participant runs on the spot whilst using the means of access of their choice in order to maintain a non-intrattentive state. The participant uses external, internal and, finally, kinaesthetic non-intrattention. The other participant observes the first participant running, whilst using the means of access of their choice in order to maintain an intrattentive state. The participant uses external, internal and, finally, kinaesthetic intrattention. The dancers switch roles.

- Task 5: Closing and opening hands with ENI, INI and KNI – Dancers sit cross legged and rest their hands on their knees. They simultaneously open one hand and close the other hand into a fist, at around one sixty-fourth their normal speed. The dancers use the means of access of their choice in order to maintain a non-intrattentive state. The dancers externalise, internalise and, finally, kinaesthetically experience the non-intrattention.

- Task 6: Mirroring and improvising with EI, II and KI – Dancers work in pairs. One participant improvises feely and the other mirrors their movement. Both dancers use the means of access of their choice in order to maintain an intrattentive state. The dancers externalise, internalise and, finally, kinaesthetically experience the intrattention. The dancers switch roles.

- Task 7: Stillness with ENI, INI and KNI – Dancers stand completely still whilst using the means of access of their choice in order to maintain a non-intrattentive state. The dancers externalise, internalise and, finally, kinaesthetically experience the non-intrattention. The dancers are expected to simply experience the stillness and not engage in any reflective thought, such as how long they have been standing still.

- Task 8: Rehearse a set phrase with EI, II and KI – Dancers rehearse a set phrase from the previous workshop whilst using the means of access of their choice in order to maintain an intrattentive state. The dancers externalise, internalise and, finally, kinaesthetically experience the intrattention.

- Task 9: Entering and exiting with ENI, INI, KNI, EI, II and KI – Dancers enter and exit the studio with an intrattentive state of consciousness and then enter and

exit with a non-intrattentive state of consciousness. It is each participant's responsibility to choose the means by which they access and maintain these states. The dancers repeat the intrattentive task three times, externalising, internalising and kinaesthetically experiencing, the intrattention. The dancers also repeat the non-intrattentive task three times, externalising, internalising and kinaesthetically experiencing, the non-intrattention

- Task 10: Switching states consciousness circuit with ENI, INI, KNI, EI, II and KI – Dancers take part in a switching states consciousness circuit. The circuit consists of eight stations – four of which are intrattentive stations and four of which are non-intrattentive stations. Dancers carry out the particular tasks associated with each station and the tasks are based on those included in the previous exercises. At various intervals during the circuit, the dancers are instructed to exit the studio. After varying amounts of time, they are instructed to return to their station and to continue with the task. The dancers move continually around the circuit, which they complete three times with at least three exits and entrances. The first time round the circuit they are asked to externalise the state, the second time to internalise it, and the third time to experience the state kinaesthetically.

Appendix D

Sample transcription

An open discussion between D9, D10, D11, D12 and an informed audience member immediately after the switching states training.

Question asked by the choreographer: How do you feel after completing the switching states training?

Responses from dancers:

D10: It felt really good.

D12: It did, yes, after a few stations you got in to it and moving between stations wasn't so much a transition it was fine, you just became used to doing it.

D10: It definitely felt like you were switching states between intrattention and non-intrattention, especially from, for example, the walk to the run, with that you could really feel an obvious change in state.

D9: Yes, and the exits and entrances were effective, especially if you attempted to maintain the state whilst off stage. It definitely taught me how to switch states.

D12: The circuit became really absorbing and on the second and third execution I felt really into it and it felt really natural. I felt as if I could have carried on for ages.

D11: Yes, I definitely felt like I could have just carried on doing it. The whole thing felt very short.

D9: Even when you looked at the clock at the clock watch station you didn't pay any attention to what time it was and so you kind of lost your awareness of time as a whole.

D12: I couldn't believe it when it finished.

Comment and question asked by audience member: It was all fascinating, absolutely fascinating. What difference did it make when you had to internalise the means of access?

D12: Well there wasn't much difference as we are so used to moving from external to internal so I guess it wasn't really a shock and you still talk or observe inside your head.

D10: Yes for me I'm still talking or something inside my head. I think we all still use the means inside our head so there isn't much difference at all.

D11: But then on the last lap you lose those internal monologues and just kinaesthetically enter the states.

D12: I really enjoyed the kinaesthetic actually.

D11: It was a really gradual progression. I don't know how different it would have been if we had gone straight into the kinaesthetic state though. Because I felt by the third lap that I had warmed up mentally and physically.

D10: Yes the progression really helped.

Question asked by audience member: So how did it change between the second and third lap, from the internal to the kinaesthetic?

Responses from dancers:

D12: It's really hard to explain, it's just a feeling. I mean you just don't need to talk or observe in your mind anymore.

D10: Yes it's just experiential. And I was able to kinaesthetically enter the states. Occasionally I did use the internal means on the third lap, just if I lost it, to help me re-access. Sometimes at the beginning of a new station I would have to begin by using internal and then a few seconds later when you could feel it a bit more you just experienced it. Especially with the non-intrattentive, otherwise I might have become

aware of having to be unaware and then of course you'd be intrattentive. So I would use the internal momentarily and then move into kinaesthetic.

D11: For me it just happened, I just felt it. The kinaesthetic lap was fine because of the progression, and because, like I said earlier, we had warmed up physically and mentally by then.

Question asked by audience member: Do you think you would be able to enter that state straight away?

Responses from dancers:

D10: As long as you've had a chance to warm up using the external and internal. So if you were using it for a performance, you could warm up off stage using the external and internal and then I think you would be prepared to access kinaesthetic straight away in the performance.

D11: Yes, you can definitely, with practice, and I think it's just about training yourself to be more receptive to the kinaesthetic states.

D9: I agree, with practice you should be able to train your mind to just switch on. I think we could do that now actually.

Question asked by audience member: How have you found the training as a whole?

Responses from dancers:

D10: I've seriously in classes being using it so much.

D11: Yes, we've been saying how we can't believe what an effect it has had.

D10: I really notice it in my ballet lessons, I'm so much more aware of where my legs and arms are for example.

D9: Yes I feel so much more aware of myself and my states.

D11: I think, as well, you have more trust in yourself – not just your body but also your mind – to know what you should be doing. You don't need anyone else to correct your movement for example, because you know exactly what you are doing. You can trust your body to understand the movement.

D12: And you realise how in everyday life you are always switching states. So really it's very like everyday life and so you should be able to do it, but somehow it's more difficult when dancing, not now I've had the training though. I understand how to bring that everyday switching into my dancing.

D9: Access is becoming much easier and much more instantaneous, it feels like we can switch with ease between everyday states and dance states. Now, after the training, I feel a lot more aware of myself as a dancer and of my own personal movement style. I think that when you know yourself better, that's when you can really push yourself as a dancer and push your boundaries more. That's what I feel like I am able to do now. This training will really help me develop as a dancer. Now I have an awareness that I can move in these two different states I can start to work with them more and push myself more instead of just existing in my normal dance state.

D10: It's great to experiment with the different states. The movement you create when intrattentive is different from the movement you create when non-intrattentive and now I know how to access these different states I can experiment more with the two styles. It's definitely a good way to get you moving in a different style. It's opened my eyes to a new way of moving.

D11: It's not that one way is better than the other, but at least now you have an awareness of the different states.

D9: Yes for me it's been good, as before I was more of a non-intrattentive dancer, I mean that's the sort of state I would normally dance in. But now I can see a totally different side and it's been really interesting to see how far I can go with the intrattentive side. It's like I have a whole new dancer in me. Before people would say that I would never finish movement properly but now I can because I am more aware.

D11: It's so useful to use the intrattentive when rehearsing, even if you then go on to use non-intrattention in the performance, it's so good to get that clarity. Especially with duets for example, you don't normally have such an awareness of your partner, and I realised that before I was never really aware of exactly what they were doing.

D12: Yes they would just be there wouldn't they, they are just your partner and you're not necessarily mentally aware of what they are doing and thinking.

D11: But now I am far more sensitive and aware of my self and others. It's amazing.

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