Nuclear Deterrence Norms and Normative Learning: The Development of Japanese Nuclear Deterrence Policy

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Abstract

Japan today primarily relies on US Extended Nuclear Deterrence (END) and the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter nuclear threats, which has often led to Japanese policymakers advocating global denuclearization on the world stage on one hand while providing a full-throated defense of the US nuclear arsenal on the other, opening Japanese policymakers to accusations of 'nuclear hypocrisy'. Such a belief in the necessity of nuclear retaliation to deter nuclear threats has not changed even after the addition of a Japanese Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in 2003 to mitigate the threat of nuclear ballistic missiles. For scholars of nuclear deterrence, such a phenomenon is not uniquely 'Japanese' and is widely seen as an accepted 'fact' of how nuclear deterrence operates. For such scholars, given the nuclear threats that Japan faces in China and a newly nuclearized North Korea, as well as the multiple restrictions, both domestic and international, that prevent Japan from pursuing a domestic nuclear program, it is thus no surprise that Japanese policymakers continue to defend US nuclear weapons even at great political cost.

This thesis, however, argues that such Japanese perspectives, rather than being factual statements and a natural conclusion of any state operating in the international system, are instead theoretically assumed nuclear deterrence 'norms' that have been constructed and institutionalized into policy by Japanese policymakers as a result of a 'deterrence socialization' process. By examining two key normative perspectives of nuclear weapons present in Japan's nuclear deterrence policy, this thesis will demonstrate how such a process of deterrence socialization has seen the US, Japan's main security ally, 'teach' and persuade Japanese policymakers to adopt their perspectives and conceptualization of how nuclear deterrence operates, which in turn leads to Japanese policymakers 'learning' and constructing such norms in accordance with Japan's socio-political context and institutionalizing them as policy.

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Declaration

I, the author, confirm that this Thesis is my own work. I am aware of the University's Guidance on the Use of Unfair Means (www.sheffield.ac.uk/ssid/unfair-means). This work has not been previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, university.

TOH JUNHAN

Chapter 1: Introduction

In 2010, when President Barack Obama's administration was carrying out the nuclear posture review of the United States (US), Japanese policymakers and officials reportedly lobbied aggressively against the inclusion of a 'no first strike' or 'sole purpose' doctrine, which was said to be under consideration by US policymakers following President Obama's landmark speech on nuclear disarmament in Prague in 2009.[1] Japanese officials were afraid that the adoption of such doctrines would demonstrate weakness in the extended nuclear deterrence provided by the US and preferred the policy flexibility provided by the continued omission of such doctrines.[2] For a country that has often been termed as a passive 'free-rider' of the US's security guarantees since the Cold War, the aggressive efforts of Japanese policymakers in 2010 to intervene in US nuclear policymaking was called 'surprising' by nuclear expert Jeffrey Lewis.[3]

The lobbying efforts of Japanese policymakers in 2010, however, are just one of several examples that have constantly highlighted the importance of the US's extended nuclear deterrent (END) to Japanese security planning, and the sensitivity of Japanese policymakers towards any changes in the international environment that might lead to limitations on the US's nuclear arsenal. Such sensitivity has sometimes led to Japan stymieing global nuclear disarmament efforts which it perceives might weaken the US nuclear arsenal. In 2012, for example, Japan refused to sponsor a joint statement on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament at the UN's General Assembly (GA), only joining the statement in 2013.[4] Japan has further refused to sign a "Humanitarian Pledge", sponsored by Austria in 2014, that called for a legal framework to prohibit nuclear weapons, fearing its implications for the US nuclear arsenal.[5] Similarly, in 2017, Japan boycotted a UN conference aimed at negotiating a nuclear

[1] *The Chūgoku Shimbun,* "Japan lobbied for robust nuclear umbrella before power shift." 24th November 2009.
https://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/?p=14766. Accessed 25/11/2024.
[2] United States Government, The White House, "Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered." 5th April 2009.
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered. Accessed 25/11/2024.
[3] *The Chūgoku Shimbun,* "Japan lobbied for robust nuclear umbrella before power shift." 24th November 2009.
[4] "Japan Endorses U.N. First Committee Disarmament Statement," Global Security Newswire, 22 October 2013, www.nti.org.
[5] Government of Austria, "Pledge presented at the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons by Austrian Deputy Foreign Minister Michael Linhart," 9th December 2014. www.bmeia.gv.at. Accessed 25/11/2024.

ban treaty[6] and has refused to sign the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which has been ratified by 73 states as of 2024.[7]

The strenuous efforts undertaken by Japanese policymakers to 'protect' the US nuclear arsenal, their source of extended nuclear deterrence, stands in sharp contrast to Japan's anti-proliferation efforts on the global stage. As the only country to have been attacked by nuclear weapons, Japan has constantly used its status to advocate for multilateral nonproliferation and disarmament efforts since the 1970s and has constantly advocated for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In 1974, former Prime Minister Satō Eisaku, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his Three Non-Nuclear Principles, used his Nobel lecture to express Japan's hope that global nuclear disarmament would happen in the near future, despite being the same politician who placed Japan under the US nuclear umbrella.[8] In more modern times, Japan continues to be a member in good standing with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has submitted disarmament resolutions to the UN GA since 1994.[9] It ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1997,[10] strongly supported a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and in 2008, established the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and launched the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative together with Australia.[11] Japan's consistent support for global nuclear disarmament efforts and its compliance with international regimes governing nuclearization thus stand in sharp contrast to its one-sided protection of the US nuclear arsenal.

The Research Puzzle

The contradiction between Japan's strenuous efforts to 'defend' the US nuclear arsenal from global nuclear disarmament efforts on the one hand, and Japanese policymakers' consistent efforts to advocate for a world free of nuclear weapons, on the other, thus form an interesting puzzle when it comes to Japanese policy towards nuclear weapons. Why would Japanese

[6] *The Japan Times,* "Japan abstains as nuclear arms ban treaty talks start at U.N.," 28th March 2017. http://www.japantimes.co.jp. Accessed 25/11/2024.
[7] United Nations Treaty Collection, "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons." 7th July 2017. https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-9&chapter=26. Accessed 25/11/2024.
[8] Satō Eisaku, "Nobel Lecture—The Pursuit of Peace and Japan in the Nuclear Age," 11th December 1974.
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1974/satō/lecture/. Accessed 25/11/2024.
[9] Government of Japan, "Japan's Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy (Fourth Edition) https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/pamph0812.html. Accessed 25/11/2024.
[10] Government of Japan, "Japan's Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy (Fourth Edition) https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/pamph0812.html. Accessed 25/11/2024.
[11] International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, www.icnnd.org.

policymakers and politicians continue to expand so much political capital in supporting the continued presence of the US nuclear arsenal, and risk damaging their anti-nuclear credentials?

Such a stance has already seen Japanese leaders criticized in the past by nuclear disarmament movements for their apparent hypocrisy in defending the US nuclear arsenal on one hand while preaching nuclear disarmament on the other.[12] Similarly, Japanese policymakers have on multiple occasions, faced anger and criticism from the wider Japanese public, which is stringently anti-nuclear, at any hint that policymakers might strengthen US nuclear deterrence over Japan.[13] Why, then, would Japanese policymakers take such a political risk in continuing to publicly defend the US nuclear arsenal?

Japanese support for US END: Nuclear threats and Japanese circumstances

Previous studies of Japan's security policy and East Asian geopolitics have argued that the steadfast support shown by Japanese policymakers for US END, and the political risk they undertake in doing so, is largely powered by two key factors---the nuclear threats that Japan faces and the unique circumstances of Japan when it comes to pursuing an independent nuclear deterrence policy.

These two factors are often the key focus for researchers of Japan's nuclear deterrence policy, with the first factor of nuclear threats being widely identified as the basic factor for Japan to seek nuclear deterrence in the first place. Building on Waltz's structural realist theory of an anarchical international structure that 'naturally' forces states to search for security and practice deterrence and balancing against other states[14] and nuclear deterrence against nuclear states,[15] several scholars have pointed out that the need to practice such nuclear deterrence against nuclear threats is thus the primary driver of Japanese demands for nuclear protection.

[12] *The Japan Times,* "Japan's hypocritical nuclear stance." 3rd November 2016. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/11/03/editorials/japans-hypocritical-nuclear-stance/. Accessed 25/11/2024.
[13] *The Chūgoku Shimbun,* "Hibakusha kara fuman no koe: Shushō aisatsu de hikaku sangensoku furezu. Hiroshima Genbaku no Hi." 7th August 2015. https://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/?p=49271. Accessed 25/11/2024.
[14] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 126.
[15] Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).

These scholars have further pointed out that there is no shortage of such threats facing Japan, with scholars like Terence Roehrig,[16] Fintan Hoey,[17] Mike Mochizuki[18] and Andrew O'Neil[19] identifying the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the USSR as the primary nuclear threats Japan faced during the Cold War, with both being communist states that had nuclear arsenals capable of destroying Japan several times over. In more recent times, despite the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, a complicated relationship shaped by unresolved historical and territorial disputes continues to exist between Japan and a PRC that has modernized both its military and its nuclear arsenal rapidly in the 21st century, which Japan has described as an 'unprecedented security challenge' in its latest National Security Strategy (NSS).[20] A new threat, meanwhile, has also arisen with the successful nuclearization of North Korea in 2009 and its ballistic missile program, which has shown itself capable of developing missiles that can strike Japanese territory.[21]

It is the second factor of Japan's unique circumstances as an explanatory tool for why Japan has specifically sought out and continues to defend US END to meet its need for nuclear protection and the deterrence of nuclear threats, rather than pursue other alternatives such as indigenous nuclearization, however, where the existing literature on Japanese nuclear deterrence begins to diverge. Japanese nuclear deterrence research has provided a variety of explanations for why Japan has specifically chosen US END and continues to defend US END as its chosen form of nuclear deterrence, with different researchers following different theoretical traditions and emphasizing different factors.

Some, such as Thomas Berger, have utilized a constructivist lens, and argued that the culture of antimilitarism that took root in the Japanese public's consciousness post-World War II acts as a restraining brake on the more extremist members of the Japanese leadership, which has prevented said leadership from advocating for more extreme security policies, like greater Japanese involvement in the US-Japan alliance, military modernization, or an indigenous

[16] Terence Roehrig, *Japan, South Korea, and the United States Umbrella: Deterrence after the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).
[17] Fintan Hoey, "Japan and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Security and Non-Proliferation," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 4 Volume 39 (2016): 489.
[18] Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japan tests the nuclear taboo," *The Nonproliferation Review* 2 Volume 14 (2007): 312-313.
[19] Andrew O'Neil*, Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence* (New York: Routledge, 2013).
[20] [20] Government of Japan, "National Security Strategy of Japan," December 2022. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshō/nss-e.pdf. Accessed 07/12/2024.
[21] Terence Roehrig, *Japan, South Korea, and the United States Umbrella: Deterrence after the Cold War.*

nuclear deterrent.[22] Others, like Jennifer Lind, meanwhile, have explained Japan's choice of dependence on US END not as forced by circumstances, but as a strategy with consistent with the theory of realist buck-passing. According to Lind's interpretation of realist international theory, when faced with security threats, countries like Japan can sometimes choose 'pass the buck' of security burdens like nuclear deterrence to their allies, rather than practice deterrence, in order to avoid devoting resources to military spending and nuclearization.[23] Liberal international relations scholars, meanwhile, with their focus on the role of international institutions in taming the anarchical nature of the international system, have posited that Japan's dependence on US END, rather than pursuit of its own deterrent, is an example of how international institutions like the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have succeeded in providing enough assurance to states like Japan, to the point where they can opt out of power competition.[24]

Finally, there has also been research, rather than taking any particular international relations theoretical tradition, instead incorporates all these factors into a specific case study analysis of Japan's nuclear deterrence policy. Scholars, such as the abovementioned Terence Roehrig and Andrew O'Neil, have argued that Japan's specific choices were both result of both internal factors like the specific political circumstances and deliberations of Japanese politicians like Satō Eisaku as well as external factors like the intense pressure applied by the US on Japan to sign up to and abide by global non-proliferation standards, both historically and in the present day.[25] For scholars taking this approach, Japan's choice, and continued defense of, US END is thus the result of Japanese policymakers maintaining an effective nuclear deterrence policy to the best of their ability within Japan's multiple internal and external political and social limitations.[26]

[22] Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-Militarism," *International Security* 4 Volume 17 (1993): 120.
[23] Jennifer M. Lind, "Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy," *International Security* 1 Volume 29 (2004): 93.
[24] Joseph S. Nye, "Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime, "*International Organization* 1 Volume 35 (1981): 32-33.
[25] Terence Roehrig, *Japan, South Korea, and the United States Umbrella: Deterrence after the Cold War,* 99-100; Andrew O'Neil*, Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence,* 84-85*.*
[26] See for example, Llewelyn Hughes, "Why Japan will not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan," *International Security* 4 Volume 31 (2007) or Fintan Hoey, "Japan and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Security and Non-proliferation," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 4 Volume 39 (2016).

An overlooked area: Japanese Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence?

It is a separate and underexamined area of Japan's nuclear deterrence policy development, however, that this thesis is most interested in and forms the basis of this thesis's research question. In examining the existing literature on Japanese nuclear deterrence policy, it is made clear that the reason Japanese policymakers so fervently pursue some form of nuclear deterrent as a deterrence policy against nuclear weapons, is because there exists a certain unified viewpoint amongst Japanese policymakers that nuclear weapons are the sole deterrent against nuclear threats, hence necessitating nuclear weapons to practice nuclear deterrence.

Such an existing consensus is often given a cursory acknowledgement in existing research, often in the form of a single line or two that notes its existence as an unquestioned fact. For example, Fintan Hoey, in his article on Japan's dependence on US END, notes that 'For Japan, (US END) acts…as a deterrent against nuclear attack.'[27] For analysts of Japanese nuclear deterrence policy, such a view of nuclear deterrence thus seems to be nothing unique. It is a 'self-evident' phenomenon, and a viewpoint that exists across most, if not all, states operating in the international system faced with nuclear threats. For such scholars, such a consensus is thus simply a 'fact' of how nuclear deterrence 'is' for states in the international system and an objective reality.

The Research Question

I question, however, whether such a unified viewpoint on nuclear deterrence within Japanese policymaking is really as 'self-evident' as made out to be and a 'fact' of international nuclear deterrence. Such a claim ignores two key points. The first is that despite claims that Japan's prevailing consensus on nuclear deterrence is not a subjective perspective and simply a self-evident 'fact' of how nuclear deterrence works, it has never been conclusively proven that it is indeed an established truth that *only* nuclear weapons can deter nuclear attack, despite the theoretical arguments for such a case. To quote Patrick Morgan, "Successful deterrence has often been more assumed than demonstrated."[28] During the early Cold War, for example, there have been many cases where nuclear states were supposedly on the verge of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, only to refrain from doing so due to other reasons, such as the case of the US deciding not to use nuclear weapons on China during the Korean War.[29]

[27] Fintan Hoey, "Japan and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Security and Non-Proliferation," 485-486.
[28] Patrick Morgan, *Deterrence Now* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
[29] In the case of Korea, there are contradictory arguments on why the US showed restraint. Some have argued that it was due to a lack of viable/effective targets. See Andrew P.N. Eardmann, 'War No

Similarly, several scholars have argued that in cases where nuclear states refrained from using nuclear weapons against fellow nuclear states, such restraint was *not* because of the threat of retaliation, but because of other factors as well, such as the nuclear taboo.[30] Indeed, Chairman Mao Zedong of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was famously dismissive of the threat of nuclear weapons, describing them as a 'paper tiger' in 1946.[31]

Meanwhile, the unproven nature of the relationship between nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons means that policymakers are still unable to agree on the exact level of nuclear retaliation required to deter nuclear threats, with countries such as China, for example, pursuing a 'minimum deterrent' concept,[32] while countries such as the US have historically tried to ensure superiority in both the quantity and quality of their nuclear arsenal. The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons against nuclear threats, far from being scientifically proven, thus all the more seems to purely exist as a constructed reality based on widespread agreement and adherence to shared understandings of completely theoretical arguments. Given such circumstances, how Japan came to share such understandings thus becomes crucial to understanding Japan's continued belief in the necessity of nuclear weapons to deter nuclear threats.

Secondly, ignoring the question of how such a consensus on the role of exclusive role of nuclear weapons can develop and change amongst Japanese policymakers and treating their existence as accepted, 'self-evident' facts of how nuclear deterrence operates in reality fails to address the logical inconsistencies of states, like Japan, that have added and operate Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) alongside nuclear retaliation as part of their nuclear deterrence policy. For Japan, this occurred in 2003, and Japan currently operates BMD as a complementary but necessary deterrence against nuclear weapons alongside threats of nuclear retaliation.

Longer Has Any Logic Whatever': Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution," In *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, ed. John Gaddis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 16-17.

[30] Richard Hanaia, "Tracing the Development of the Nuclear Taboo," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 2 Volume 19 (2017): 43-44; Nina Tannenwald, "Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo," *International Security* 4 Volume 29 (2005): 5-6.

[31] Guang Zhang Shu, "Between 'Paper' and 'Real Tigers': Mao's View of Nuclear Weapons," In *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, ed. John Gaddis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 2-3.

[32] Terence Roehrig, *Japan, South Korea, and the United States Umbrella: Deterrence after the Cold War,* 78. The 'minimum deterrence' concept argues that matching an adversary's nuclear arsenal is not necessary, and the destructive magnitude of even a minimum number of nuclear weapons would be enough to deter nuclear use.

BMD, as its name suggests, involves the use of anti-missile systems to shoot down incoming nuclear ballistic missiles (by far the most common and deadliest form of nuclear weapons delivery) before they hit their intended targets, thus providing some form of deterrence by denial against nuclear strikes. However, according to nuclear deterrence theory, such a method of deterrence complementing nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation is supposed to be a scientific impossibility. Theoretically, for stable nuclear deterrence based on nuclear retaliation, mutual vulnerability is a necessary condition. It is the fear that both sides can completely annihilate each other after all, that deters states from launching a nuclear attack.[33] BMD, which could provide some form of defense for the side that practices it, however, would impact this vulnerability, and merely lead to an arms race, as states began developing more nuclear weapons to overcome each other's BMD system. Rather than complement nuclear weapons, BMD would thus destabilize a deterrence mechanism based on nuclear retaliation.[34]

If this is the case, then Japan's adoption of BMD to complement nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation would thus appear to be self-sabotage and an illogical act. Why then, would Japan commit itself to such a policy? As such, rather than an actual representation of how nuclear deterrence 'is', it would make more sense to envision Japan's perspectives of BMD in nuclear deterrence, like its belief in the necessity of nuclear weapons to deter nuclear threats, to be unproven claims and contested perspectives of nuclear deterrence that construct and represent a certain subjective nuclear deterrence reality, rather than a factual, objective one. By doing so, it is thus possible to rationalize Japan's sudden move to accept BMD as part of its nuclear deterrence policy not as an act of illogical self-sabotage, but as a result of said subjective reality undergoing change and development.

As such, the research question this thesis is interested in asking, based on such a premise, is how did Japanese policymakers develop such an established, shared viewpoint on the role of nuclear weapons and construct a subjective nuclear deterrence reality that assumed that nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear retaliation were a necessity to deter nuclear attack, and that BMD was a complement of nuclear deterrence rather than an obstacle?

[33] A. Vinod Kumar," How can Missile Defenses Affect Nuclear Deterrence? An Offense-Defense Theoretical Perspective," *Strategic Analysis* 1 Volume 46 (2022): 35-39.
[34] Indeed, maintaining mutual vulnerability was a key objective of the global nuclear deterrence regime and the purpose of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), signed between the US and USSR in 1972. Japan itself was a strong supporter of this treaty.

Main Argument

In a 2010 article examining the development of deterrence theory, Amir Lupovici pointed to the emergence of what he termed the 'fourth wave of deterrence theory research' that had emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War. This new wave, unlike the first three waves of deterrence theory, was distinguished both by an empirical and interpretive turn.[35] While the empiricists have focused on applying existing theories and concepts to new threats that have emerged in the post-Cold War era and testing them, the interpretivists instead focused on using concepts developed in newer international relations theories, such as Constructivism and Critical Theory to examine the development of deterrence theory in the first three waves.[36]

Building on concepts developed by Alexander Wendt[37] and Nicholas Onuf[38] within Constructivist theory that stress the importance of analyzing international relations concepts not as objective facts, but as shared, constructed concepts and subjective viewpoints created by individual actors, each holding different motivations, shaped by different societal contexts and operating with different levels of agency, interpretivists have thus argued that far from being 'self-evident' facts, nuclear deterrence and the concepts and theories that govern it, like other concepts in international deterrence, can possibly be seen as a socially constructed and a subjective viewpoint of international deterrence 'reality' based on a common shared understanding amongst various actors within the international system.

In other words, the current theories and practice of nuclear deterrence, rather than 'self-evident' and objective representations of deterrence reality, are actually a subjective construction of nuclear deterrence reality that has been learnt, understood and established as a common consensus amongst multiple states.[39] It is the socialization and spreading of this shared viewpoint on nuclear deterrence reality that has allowed nuclear deterrence to function effectively as it is, rather than the inherent 'logic' and 'truth' of nuclear deterrence.[40] Furthermore, interpretivists argue that during this process, nuclear deterrence concepts do not

[35] Amir Lupovici, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Towards a New Research Agenda," *International Studies Quarterly* 3 Volume 54 (2010): 710.
[36] Amir Lupovici, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Towards a New Research Agenda,", 710-712.
[37] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 2 Volume 46 (1992): 396-407.
[38] Nicholas Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism in Social Theory and International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2012): 4-20.
[39] Amir Lupovici, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Towards a New Research Agenda,", 712-718.
[40] Amir Lupovici, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Towards a New Research Agenda,", 712-718.

remain static. Instead, concepts and principles are thus reconstructed and redefined by the different actors, who establish, redefine, and contest converging and competing understandings of deterrence through the use of speech acts.[41]

Based on such an argument, such interpretivists have thus argued that rather than being a 'self-evident' and objective representation of nuclear deterrence, the nuclear deterrence principles that are taken for 'fact' by multiple states, such as the necessity of nuclear weapons to deter nuclear threats, should thus be seen as the result of active attempts at constructing a shared understanding of nuclear deterrence, led by policymakers and deterrence theorists primarily within the US and USSR, and based on nuclear developments within the context of the Cold War.

For those who have tried to conceptualize this process of how this process of creating a shared understanding of nuclear deterrence reality operates between states, there are many that have tried to do so by conceptualizing such nuclear deterrence principles as norms, and the process of socializing and establishing them as a form of normative transfer between states.[42] Such a process, such theorists have argued, resembles a form of ' nuclear normative learning' or 'nuclear learning', in which certain states---usually those with greater influence and power within the international system, possess nuclear weapons, or are more active in developing nuclear doctrines and policies---'teach' and convince other states to 'learn' and adopt their nuclear deterrence norms, thus creating a globally shared understanding of nuclear deterrence.

Based on this concept of nuclear normative learning, I thus contend that rather than objective facts of nuclear deterrence that were independently developed, the unified viewpoint that Japanese policymakers share on the necessity of nuclear deterrence to deter nuclear threats actually represent a subjective view of nuclear deterrence reality that did not necessarily exist in Japan prior to the normative learning process. This representation, in turn, is made up of normative perspectives on nuclear deterrence that were primarily developed by Japan's key ally (and major nuclear power), the US, and adopted by Japan as a result of this process of normative transfer.

In order to analyze and evaluate such a nuclear normative learning process between the US and Japan, I have developed a theoretical model of how such a process operates, which I have

[41] Amir Lupovici, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Towards a New Research Agenda,", 712-718.
[42] Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004): 34; Jeffrey W. Knopf, "The concept of Nuclear Learning," *The Nonproliferation Review* 1 Volume 19 (2012): 79.

termed deterrence socialization. According to the deterrence socialization theoretical framework, such a process begins with the stage of external socialization, where such perspectives and arguments, which were first developed and practiced by US policymakers, were transferred from the external environment to Japan in the form of nuclear deterrence norms via the US-Japanese interactions within the US-Japanese alliance. Following their transfer, such norms would begin circulating amongst policymakers and a basic understanding of such norms would develop. More complex learning and understanding of such norms, however, would only occur following a crisis, which would prompt the transition from external to internal socialization. During the stage of internal socialization, Japanese policymakers, in order to manage the crisis, would then debate and reinterpret such norms within Japan's socio-political context and security requirements. The results of such reinterpretations and debates would then be normalized as a common understanding amongst Japanese policymakers, leading to the entrenchment of said nuclear deterrence perspectives and their institutionalization as policy. Policymakers would then pursue nuclear objectives based on said perspectives.

It is this process of deterrence socialization, I argue, which has thus led to certain normative perspectives of nuclear deterrence being socialized and adopted by Japanese policymakers, before being institutionalized and constructed as policy, a shared consensus, and a widely agreed upon but subjective viewpoint of how nuclear deterrence operates. Such a shared perspective of nuclear deterrence, which stresses the importance and necessity of nuclear weapons in deterring nuclear threats thus, in turn, explains Japan's continued balancing act between its antiproliferation efforts on one hand, and its shielding of the US nuclear arsenal---Japan's source of nuclear deterrent---on the other.

Japan's perspectives of Nuclear Deterrence

As stated in my main argument, this thesis is interested in analyzing how the Japanese consensus on the importance and necessity of nuclear weapons and US END in deterring nuclear threats, came to be entrenched in Japan. In order to analyze how such a shared subjective view of nuclear deterrence developed in Japan, however, it is first necessary to identify the exact nature and logical chain of the key perspectives of nuclear deterrence that, as mentioned above, were socialized and institutionalized Japan as a result of the deterrence socialization process and contribute to this unified viewpoint. By examining officially published Japanese nuclear deterrence policy, I have thus identified two specific perspectives

of nuclear deterrence that dominate Japanese nuclear deterrence thought, as seen from the fact that they are established as official policy. The first is that nuclear weapons are necessary to deter nuclear threats, and that it is the unique retaliatory power of nuclear weapons that makes them necessary to do so. The second is the perspective that BMD is a necessary and important, but purely complementary, form of nuclear deterrence to nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation. Both, by stressing the retaliatory power of nuclear weapons as a necessity to deter nuclear threats and limiting the role of BMD as purely complementary, thus contribute to the unified consensus on the importance and necessity of nuclear weapons in deterring nuclear threats for Japan.

The first perspective can largely be extrapolated from Japan's Four Nuclear Pillars, which has remained the foundation of Japanese nuclear deterrence policy since 1970.[43] Unlike the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as the nuclear weapon states, that have officially stated their nuclear doctrines in great detail,[44] Japan is hesitant to discuss its status under US END publicly and it is unclear whether Japan even has a nuclear doctrine or established plans on how US END works in Japanese contingencies. Japanese policymakers have only made vague references to the threats that US END is supposed to deter without greater detail, and whether US and Japanese officials have discussed when and how exactly US nuclear weapons will be used to defend Japan remains uncertain. Instead, when questioned on such issues, Japanese policymakers have constantly referred to the fourth of the Four Nuclear Pillars, which simply states that 'Against the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will rely on US Extended Nuclear Deterrence (END)'[45].

This general statement of relying on US nuclear weapons to protect Japan from the nuclear threats it faces has remained unchanged since it was first announced in 1970 and has been emphasized in every iteration of Japan's National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) since was first published in 1977.[46] While there has been no official statement released on how this deterrent effect operates, the wider consensus of how Japanese policymakers understand and

[43] Shūgiin Honkaigi Dai 3 Gō (Records of the Plenary Session, House of Representatives, no.3), 30th January 1968.
https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPSC/19680130.O2J.html. Accessed 25/11/2024.
[44] As an example of NATO's current nuclear doctrine, see NATO, "NATO's nuclear deterrence policy and forces." 30th November 2023.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm. Accessed 25/11/2024.
[45] Shūgiin Honkaigi Dai 3 Gō (Records of the Plenary Session, House of Representatives, no.3), 30th January 1968.
https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPSC/19680130.O2J.html. Accessed 25/11/2024.
[46] See for example, the 2019 NDPG.
https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/20181218_e.pdf.

believe it operates has been revealed in comments made by various policymakers since 1970, with multiple Prime Ministers of multiple political affiliations and defense officials across different periods referring to nuclear weapons' retaliatory power and the "intolerable" damage they can inflict as the basis of the nuclear deterrent's deterrent effect. Prime Minister Satō, for example, explained that nuclear deterrence has "retaliatory power" which would "force an opponent to refrain from a nuclear attack."[47] Prime Minister Murayama, the first Socialist Prime Minister after the Cold War, meanwhile, has also stated that nuclear weapons discourage aggression "by making the other party clearly aware that it would suffer intolerable damage if it were to commit aggression."[48] Based on the longevity of the Four Pillars and the repeated references to retaliatory power, it is thus clear that one of the perspectives of nuclear deterrence that is firmly entrenched in Japanese nuclear deterrence thought is that nuclear weapons are necessary to deter nuclear threats by virtue of their unique retaliatory power.

The second perspective, meanwhile, can be extrapolated from Japan's official statement announcing its addition of BMD to nuclear deterrence, and its statements on BMD since then. The official statement announcing BMD in 2003[49] and Guidelines published from 2005 onwards state that that Japan will use BMD 'alongside' US END in an appropriate an effective manner against the new threats it faces.[50] The 2019 NDPG, meanwhile, simply states that for Japan, 'US nuclear deterrence is essential', but that Japan would also take 'appropriate measures' through its own efforts, like BMD.[51] From such statements, it is clear that Japanese policymakers share the perspective that BMD can be complementary to US nuclear weapons in an effective manner in deterring nuclear threats. However, at the same time, they do not believe that BMD can replace US END completely, with official statements still regarding nuclear deterrence by nuclear weapons as 'essential'.

In order to answer the research question of how Japanese policymakers came to see nuclear deterrence by nuclear weapons as absolutely essential in deterring nuclear threats, this thesis

[47] Sangiin yosaniinkai Dai 8 Gō (Records of the Budget Committee, House of Councilors, no.8), 7th March 1966.
[48] "Wagaguni ni okeru kakuseisaku ni kansuru shitsumon ni taisuru tōbensho" (Written Answer to the Questions on Japan's Nuclear Policy) 15th March 1995.
[49] Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kaigi, "Dantō Misairu Bōgyo Shisutemu no Seibitō ni tsuite,", 19th December 2003.
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyoukaigi/Missile.pdf. Accessed 25/11/2024.
[50] Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kaigi, "Heisei 17-nendo ikōni kakaru Bōgyo Keikaku no Taikō ni tsuite,", 10th December 2004.
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kakugikettei/2004/1210taikō.pdf. Accessed 25/11/2024.
[51] Government of Japan, 2019 NDPG. 18th December 2018.
https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/20181218_e.pdf. Accessed 25/11/2024.

will be thus be exploring how these two perspectives, both which contribute to the consensus amongst Japanese policymakers that nuclear weapons are absolutely essential for Japan in deterring nuclear threats, came to become definitive Japanese perspectives on nuclear deterrence, to the point where they are entrenched in official policy.

Research Methodology

Based on my research question and theoretical framework, the primary objective of my research is to examine how these two nuclear deterrence perspectives that Japanese policymakers currently hold, as identified from their official pronouncements on nuclear deterrence, were first introduced, socialized, constructed and established as official views on nuclear deterrence via a process of deterrence socialization. In examining the deterrence socialization processes of these two nuclear deterrence perspectives, I will primarily be taking a qualitative approach and relying on the case study method and the method of historical discourse analysis.

My utilization of the case study method will classify each nuclear deterrence normative perspective as a singular case and utilize an over-time comparison to examine the deterrence socialization process as such norms become successfully institutionalized as policy. Over time -case comparison refers to the comparison of the case's status at a certain time with its status at another point in time.[52] My main argument is that prior to the deterrence socialization process, Japanese policymakers and politicians did not necessarily hold certain perspectives on nuclear deterrence, only developing them after the deterrence socialization process and institutionalizing them as official views in the form of policy. In my over-time comparison, I will thus essentially be comparing the perspectives of Japanese policymakers on certain aspects of nuclear deterrence prior to the deterrence socialization process to the views of the same policymakers after the deterrence socialization process. Through this over-time comparison and noting how the views of such policymakers may or may not have changed in accordance with the nuclear deterrence normative perspective of each individual case, I can thus demonstrate whether or not deterrence socialization has taken place.

In addition to using over-time comparisons on each individual case to determine whether deterrence socialization has taken place, I will be primarily relying on historical discourse analysis to examine how exactly the process of deterrence socialization has occurred for each

[52] Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, "Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield," *Comparative Political Studies* 2 Volume 40 (2007): 176.

nuclear deterrence normative perspective in Japan. The key reason for focusing on developments in the discourse surrounding deterrence as a representation of deterrence socialization is primarily due to the importance of discourse in constructing and socializing deterrence norms.

As mentioned above, one of the key findings of interpretivist deterrence scholars is the importance of discourse, or speech acts, in constructing, shaping and socializing deterrence norms.[53] For interpretivists, discourse allows actors to communicate, understand and construct certain perspectives of deterrence. Discourse enables this by introducing rules and routines on nuclear deterrence that aid actors in interpretation and aids in the construction of realities of deterrence in a certain manner.[54] Furthermore, discourse, and the repetition of discourse, can further strengthen such constructions of deterrence by attaching policymakers to certain deterrence strategies.[55] Based on such findings, I thus argue that in order to examine normative change in Japan, it is clear that emphasis must be placed on how Japanese policymakers communicate such normative change via their discourse, as it is through this discourse via which they will shape normative concepts and enact normative change. My deterrence socialization framework, in turn, examine how changes and shifts in the discourse, responsible for normative construction, is shaped by the historical and political context of Japan and turned into policy.

Historical discourse analysis, which focuses on such an interplay between history, politics and changes in discourse,[56] is thus well-suited for my examination of the deterrence socialization process. For each deterrence socialization process, my analysis of the discourse surrounding nuclear deterrence in the external socialization stage will thus first focus on the way certain nuclear deterrence perspectives and arguments were first introduced into Japan through US military plans for East Asia, and how they utilized such arguments during discussions with their counterparts. I will examine how and whether Japanese politicians repurposed and repeated similar arguments, and my analysis, which focuses on historical and political context and the way it impacts discourse, will thus examine how the power relationship between a Japan that

[53] Amir Lupovici, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Towards a New Research Agenda,", 717.
[54] Pertti Joenniemi, "Deterrence: A story in decline?" *Current Research on Peace and Violence* 2 Volume 12 (1989): 45.
[55] Amir Lupovici, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Towards a New Research Agenda,", 717-718.
[56] Ingolfur Asgeir Johannesson, "The politics of historical discourse analysis: a qualitative research method?" *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education* 2 Volume 31 (2010): 252-253.

is highly dependent on the US-Japan alliance for security needs impacted the way the US introduced such arguments, and the way Japanese policymakers received them.

In my analysis of the internal socialization stage I will then focus on the discourse of policymakers that have tried to apply the perspectives that were introduced in external socialization to solve the particular crises that Japan faced in each case. My examination of such attempts will focus on the way policymakers have tried to reinterpret or redefine certain nuclear deterrence concepts to fit Japan's particular situation and societal context. In keeping with historical discourse analysis's focus on the political and historical context of Japan, I will also evaluate the impact of certain important policymakers as key political actors and the importance of their actions at redefinition and their subsequent attempts at institutionalizing and constructing their nuclear deterrence perspectives as official policy. Similarly, I will examine the compatibility between the nuclear deterrence normative perspectives being introduced and some of the key features of Japan's social context that relate to nuclear weapons, such as Japan's stringent anti-nuclearism or its strict restrictions on military action, and how such conditions affected the ease or difficulty of normative construction and institutionalization.

My analysis will focus on four kinds of sources. The first are the memoirs of policymakers that were crucial in the deterrence socialization process, such as Satō Eisaku, and the recollections of their aides and officials. Through my examination of such memoirs, I will attempt to examine how the thoughts of such policymakers on nuclear deterrence changed over time as the deterrence socialization process continued, and how such changes were influenced by the various meetings and discussions that they had with policy experts and their fellow policymakers. The second are parliamentary debate records of the Japanese Diet. These records are freely available on the Japanese Diet website, and by examining the shifts and developments in the arguments utilized by policymakers as they debate nuclear deterrence policy, I will thus further determine how their conceptualizations and understanding of nuclear deterrence changed over the deterrence socialization process.

Similarly, as an expression of policymakers' and researchers changing understanding of nuclear deterrence throughout the deterrence socialization process, I will also be examining official government reports commissioned during each socialization process. My analysis will focus on how the arguments used by such reports to explain or justify various nuclear deterrence perspectives changed across the deterrence socialization process in each case. Finally, my analysis of the development in the discourse surrounding nuclear deterrence in each deterrence

socialization process will also rely on newspaper reports and official meeting records of certain key meetings and press conferences where nuclear deterrence was discussed. In examining such documents, I will thus focus on the changes in how nuclear deterrence was described or explained by politicians at such meetings and press conferences and how this reflected a development in policymakers' perspectives of nuclear deterrence. My analysis of these four kinds of sources will also be further supplemented by a wide range of secondary sources in both English and Japanese, such as academic articles or manuscripts analyzing Japanese nuclear deterrence policy from well-established academics in the field of Japanese international relations and nuclear deterrence policy.

Thesis Rationale

The findings of this thesis have key implications for the study of Japan's nuclear deterrence policy and foreign relations and the future of non-proliferation in East Asia. As has been argued by many analysts, Japan, with the geopolitical environment it operates in and its advanced nuclear program, would appear to be a country on the brink of nuclearization, with only US provision of END, as well as its own limitations, preventing it from doing so. Such analysis takes Japanese demand for nuclear weapons to deter nuclear threats as a natural feature of the international system. For such scholars, should US END be unable to provide sufficient levels of nuclear deterrence protection to meet Japanese expectations, or should Japan overcome its own limitations and restrictions on indigenous nuclearization, a Japanese nuclear deterrent would be an inevitability. Such research usually then follows by exploring how the US can continue to provide sufficient levels of END protection to meet Japanese expectations by, for example, enhancing the credibility of US END through more consultative mechanisms between US and Japan,[57] or examining the restrictions Japan faces in indigenous nuclearization and examining whether such restrictions will hold in the face of geopolitical pressure on Japan to nuclearize.[58]

This thesis, however, while acknowledging that Japanese demand for US END is primarily driven by its need to deter the nuclear threats it faces and its own limitations on developing an indigenous nuclear deterrent, argues that this shared viewpoint amongst Japanese policymakers that nuclear weapons is necessary to deter nuclear threats is not a 'self-evident' fact and an

[57] Gregory Kulacki, "The Nuclear Deterrence Strategy of the US-Japan Alliance is Failing but Can Be Fixed," *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* 2 Volume 4 (2021): 231-232.
[58] Llewelyn Hughes, "Why Japan will not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan," *International Security* 4 Volume 31 (2007).

objective and 'real' representation of how nuclear deterrence operates. Instead, I argue that the perspectives that power this viewpoint, rather than a logical inevitability, must be historicized and understood as the result of processes and normative teaching and learning at certain points in Japanese history, These normative teaching and learning processes saw perspectives of nuclear deterrence, developed by the US across different contexts and periods in international security, transferred to Japan, shaping the nuclear deterrence perspectives of its policymakers. Viewing the formation of Japanese nuclear deterrence perspectives that have to be actively nurtured and socialized through such a lens thus allows us to challenge the supposed 'inevitability' of nuclear deterrence demand for Japan as a product of the international structure and consider new avenues for reducing Japan's 'demand' for nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation through the same method of normative teaching and learning, by, for example, transferring different normative concepts and perspectives of nuclear deterrence to Japan. Given that, as argued by Andrew O'Neil, the continued presence of US END in Japan is primarily driven by such Japanese demand rather than US intentions,[59] the possibility of reducing Japanese demand for nuclear deterrence could thus have a major impact on the future of nuclear nonproliferation as well as the future of the US nuclear posture in East Asia.

Furthermore, by taking a constructivist approach to Japanese nuclear deterrence policy, this thesis provides a novel perspective on Japanese nuclear deterrence and security policy development, contributing to the literature on Japanese international relations and its importance in East Asian regional developments. Through its examination of the role of key Japanese politicians like Satō and Koizumi in the deterrence socialization process and their role as 'norm entrepreneurs' in constructing and 'selling' their perspectives of nuclear deterrence to Japanese policymakers and the Japanese public, this thesis provides a thorough analysis of such perspectives first took hold of said politicians and more importantly, how their own socio-political background and the political circumstances they faced shaped how they navigated this process, thus providing a more nuanced analysis of how Japanese policymakers view security and nuclear issues, as well as the relationship between the security perspectives of Japanese policymakers and the formation of security policy in Japan. In addition, by utilizing constructivism and norms specifically as its theoretical approach in examining Japanese nuclear deterrence policy formation, this thesis builds on the strong tradition of normative

[59] Andrew O'Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*, 4.

research in Japanese studies, while also departing from its traditional focus on the role of norms in Japan's unique antimilitarist identity.[60]

More generally, the findings of this thesis provide a unique theoretical and empirical contribution to the discipline of international relations and security studies as well, specifically within the realm of 4th wave interpretivist deterrence research. As mentioned above, 4th wave interpretivists focus on examining how the way nuclear deterrence is perceived and practiced today was the result of a normative construction process within a unique Cold War environment. However, as I will point out in the literature review in my next chapter, said interpretivists have tended to focus on the construction and establishment of said global nuclear deterrence regime primarily as a process undertaken between the US and USSR.

While this is understandable given that these two states were the major nuclear superpowers during the Cold War, this also means that there is a lack of focus on other forms of normative teaching and learning processes, like those between that of a superpower which has extended nuclear deterrence protection to its allies and integrated them into the global nuclear deterrence regime.[61] Given that extended nuclear deterrence was, and still is, a key part of the global interpretation and practice of nuclear deterrence,[62] there is thus clearly a need to examine how such a practice can be established and influenced by the transfer of nuclear deterrence norms between a superpower and its allies in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the nuclear normative learning process.

By analyzing the nuclear normative learning process between the US, a superpower, and Japan, its ally, this thesis can thus empirically demonstrate how theories of normative transfer play out between allied states. The findings of this thesis can thus contribute to our understanding of the US-Japan relationship and the unique Japanese factors that have allowed for the extent of the US's influence on how Japan approaches security and nuclear deterrence. Furthermore, as a case study of deterrence socialization between allied states, this thesis can thus also act as a foundational case study for further comparative analysis of how nuclear deterrence normative

[60] Normative research in Japan has largely been concentrated on its role in developing Japan's antimilitarist identity and Japanese anti-nuclearism as a form of Japanese exceptionalism and 'otherism', amongst others. Examples include Linus Hagstrom, "The 'abnormal' state: Identity, norm/exception and Japan," *European Journal of International Relations* 1 Volume 21 (2015): 122-145 and Linus Hagstrom and Karl Gustafsson, "Japan and identity change: why it matters in International Relations," *The Pacific Review* 1 Volume 28 (2015): 1-22.

[61] Primarily, this would be the US and its NATO and its East Asian allies.

[62] Currently, the US still offers extended nuclear deterrence guarantees to NATO, Japan and South Korea. Some academics have debated whether Australia is included under this group as well. See Andrew O'Neil*, Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*, 94-95.

transfer had influenced Japan on the one hand, and how such a process might play out amongst other US allies that have requested and are receiving US END protection,[63] further contributing to the growing literature in interpretivist deterrence research.

Finally, examining and demonstrating how common nuclear deterrence arguments and principles far from being universal truths that are 'self-evident', are instead normative perspectives that had to be actively taught and established across multiple states like Japan through a process of nuclear teaching and learning can have implications for the global disarmament and anti-proliferation movement as well. The continued practice of nuclear deterrence by multiple nuclear states, and the nuclear ambitions of several states are often justified on the basis of certain nuclear deterrence principles that are assumed as 'facts', such as the argument nuclear weapons are the only way they can ensure their safety from nuclear attack.[64]

Such principles and their status as 'facts' and objective representations of the international nuclear deterrence reality goes largely unquestioned, and are seen as self-explanatory, despite not having been conclusively proven,[65] due to the fact that multiple states operating under multiple political systems and ideologies had seemingly come to the same conclusion, thus seemingly strengthening their universal and 'self-evident' nature. Demonstrating how it was normative transfer and institutionalization, rather than the independent thought processes of multiple policymakers operating across different political environments coming to similar conclusions on nuclear deterrence, that was possibly responsible for this phenomenon thus questions the 'self-evident' and inevitable nature of nuclear deterrence and challenges their nature as 'facts'. This thus weakens the justification for continued practice of nuclear deterrence based on such arguments, which could be an additional aspect of the nuclear deterrence debate for disarmament and anti-proliferation advocates to consider and develop.

Thesis Structure

This thesis will be structured as follows. Having introduced my research puzzle, research question, main argument and methodology in this introductory chapter, the second chapter of my thesis will be the literature review. In my literature review, I will begin by analyzing and examining existing research on Japanese nuclear deterrence policy which, as mentioned above,

[63] Examples include South Korea and the member states of NATO.
[64] The assumption that nuclear weapons are needed to deter nuclear threats are part of the UK's, France's, India's, Pakistan's, China's and the US's nuclear doctrine.
[65] Patrick Morgan, *Deterrence Now* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

focuses on primarily the threats that drive Japan's pursuit of nuclear deterrence and the unique circumstances of Japan that push it towards US END. Through my analysis, I will craft a more thorough picture of the gap existing in such research, which I have briefly pointed out earlier in this chapter.

The second half of my literature review will then be dedicated to demonstrating how I developed my theoretical framework of deterrence socialization, which is aimed at addressing this research gap. I will first provide an analysis of existing literature on nuclear normative learning, before demonstrating some of the limitations of such literature that makes it unsuitable to be used solely to develop a theoretical framework for understanding normative learning between the US and Japan. I will then move on to examine various theoretical models from within the wider normative learning literature, rather than just nuclear normative learning, and identify some of key aspects of the normative learning process that said models focus on, before providing a thorough explanation of my thesis's deterrence socialization theoretical framework and how it builds on the arguments of these models. In the third chapter, I then move on to my research methodology. In this chapter, I will provide a comprehensive explanation of the research methods that I will be using to examine how exactly the two nuclear deterrence normative perspectives identified in my main argument became socialized and entrenched in Japanese policymaking and contributed to the Japanese consensus on the necessity of nuclear deterrence. My research methods will primarily be centered around the use of case studies and discourse analysis. In this chapter, I will justify why such an approach is suitable to analyzing changes and development in nuclear normative perspectives, before providing a brief outline of each of the cases I will be analyzing, and the key aspects of each case I will focus on.

The next three chapters of my thesis will then examine how the two Japanese nuclear deterrence perspectives highlighted earlier in this chapter came to be institutionalized and entrenched in Japanese policymaking and contribute to Japanese policymakers' views on the necessity of nuclear deterrence. Each perspective will be studied as a singular case study, with each case study thus providing an example of how the nuclear deterrence principles adopted by states like Japan, rather than 'self-evident' principles, are actually the result of socialization.

In the fourth chapter, I will first analyze the case of Japan's perspective on the unique retaliatory power of nuclear weapons, and how it became institutionalized as part of the Four Nuclear Pillars. In analyzing this deterrence socialization process, I will focus on the increasing

importance of nuclear weapons in the US's global strategy from 1951-1964 and their changing views on the utility of nuclear weapons, and how such views began taking root in Japan. I will then examine how the nuclearization of China in 1964 forced Japan to begin seriously contemplating nuclear deterrence from 1964-1970, and how Japanese politicians and policymakers alike began to construct a nuclear deterrence policy based on perspectives and arguments that they had acquired from the US from 1951-1964. In examining this process, I will, in particular, focus on the role of Satō Eisaku, who was the Prime Minister responsible for developing the Four Nuclear Pillars, as well as the Cabinet Research Office (CRO), a group of researchers that was commissioned by the Prime Minister's Office to compile three reports on Japan's nuclear options from 1964-1970. My analysis will thus focus on the presentation of such reports to Satō, and how the arguments utilized in these three reports slowly refined and defined Satō's conceptualization of nuclear deterrence, which he would then institutionalize as the Four Nuclear Pillars.

In the fifth chapter, I will then move on to the first part of my second case study on Japan's developing understanding of the relationship between Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and nuclear deterrence and examine the failed deterrence socialization process of BMD under the US's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) from 1985-1988. My analysis will focus on President Ronald Reagan as the impetus for BMD development under SDI, and how his understanding and conceptualization of SDI as a global missile shield that was shared between multiple superpowers and would render nuclear deterrence 'obsolete' was a radical departure from any form of nuclear deterrence that had been conceptualized up to that point. I will examine how Reagan tried to and failed to share such a perspective with multiple allies, including Japan. By demonstrating the radical nature of the BMD concept under Reagan's SDI and how it failed to take root in Japan, the study of this failed process of deterrence socialization will thus provide a more comprehensive picture of how nuclear deterrence perspectives and their socialization are important in determining the eventual views of nuclear deterrence of countries like Japan. By comparing the failure of this process and the success of the second socialization process of BMD that was successful but imagined BMD in a much more limited way, I will thus show that the failure of one deterrence socialization process and the success of another can provide a more thorough explanation of Japan's shifting views on the relationship between deterrence by nuclear retaliation and BMD.

This thus brings me to the sixth chapter, which will cover the second part of my case study on the socialization and establishment of Japan's perspectives of BMD into nuclear deterrence

policy. In this chapter, I examine the second deterrence socialization process of the BMD norm into Japan from 1993-2003. I will first show how under the reorganized Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), BMD was reconceptualized by the US with a much more limited mandate as a suitable complement to nuclear weapons, and that it was such a conceptualization that the US had tried to transfer to Japan from 1993-1998, only to be met by skepticism and hesitation from Japanese policymakers during this period. I will then demonstrate how the 1998 North Korean Missile Launch quickly saw an increase in the number of Japanese politicians accepting such an argument and planning for an integration of BMD with nuclear deterrence, only to face multiple obstacles and difficulties in reinterpreting and justifying BMD under Japan's normative consensus on the limits of Japanese military activity. This, I argue, would only end with the election of Koizumi Junichirō, who would utilize the changed geopolitical environment to push his own reinterpretation of the Japanese normative consensus on military activity, which eventually paved the way for the perspective that BMD was a necessary complement to nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation to be constructed and institutionalized as Japanese nuclear deterrence policy in 2003. Through my analysis of this process, I will thus show that Japan's shifting views on the ability of BMD to complement nuclear deterrence, which is often taken as 'self-evident', was actually a result of shifts in perspectives as a result of deterrence socialization.

The seventh and last chapter of my thesis will then be my concluding chapter. In this last chapter, I will conclude with an overall assessment of the developments in Japan's perspectives of nuclear deterrence and some of the important trends and key factors in the normative socialization process that can be identified across all three examples of deterrence socialization. I will then point out some of the implications of my findings and evaluate the potential impact of deterrence socialization on future changes in Japan's perspectives on nuclear deterrence, given the relatively unchanged perspectives of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence held by the US since the development of BMD.

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

In the previous chapter, I have introduced my thesis's research puzzle---Japan's steadfast defense of the US nuclear arsenal on one hand, and its leadership in global disarmament efforts on the other. I have demonstrated how Japan's drive for nuclear deterrence is primarily driven by a consensus amongst its policymakers that it requires nuclear weapons to deter nuclear threats, which has been taken as an objective assessment of nuclear deterrence in the international environment. My thesis focuses on questioning the characterization of such a principle as an 'objective reality', and, using interpretivist deterrence theory, argues that said Japanese consensus on the necessity of nuclear weapons to deter nuclear threats is instead a constructed, subjective assessment of how nuclear deterrence operates, based on nuclear deterrence normative principles that had been primarily established in the US and transferred to Japan via a process of normative learning that I have termed deterrence socialization.

Having done so in my introductory chapter, in this chapter I thus move on to my literature review and the development of my theoretical framework. This chapter will be divided into four sections. In the first section, I will begin this literature review by analyzing existing literature examining Japanese nuclear deterrence policy. As I have briefly mentioned in the introductory chapter, such research primarily attributes Japan's drive for nuclear deterrence to the nuclear threats it faces, while diverging in their explanations of why they turned specifically to US Extended Nuclear Deterrence (END) to fulfil such a need. As I will demonstrate through my analysis, while such research is important in our understanding of Japan's relationship with nuclear deterrence and how it has developed, they also share a theoretical gap, with such studies taking the pursuit of nuclear weapons of countries like Japan as a response to nuclear threats as an objective reality of how deterrence operates, even though such an assumption fails to account for several key problems in examining Japan's nuclear choices. By doing so, I thus justify my approach of examining such supposed objective facts as subjective perspectives that had been socialized, constructed and established as policy in Japan.

This thus leads into my second section, where I will analyze research that has challenged the 'self-evident' nature of nuclear deterrence and tried to conceptualize how states develop subjective nuclear deterrence perspectives and knowledge by framing common nuclear deterrence principles as norms and explaining the spreading and development of such knowledge across multiple states as a process of normative teaching and learning. In my analysis, I will show that while such research provides an important foundation for us to

understand how nuclear deterrence knowledge may have been transferred from country to country, it nevertheless has certain key weaknesses when applied to the case of US-Japan which requires us to draw on concepts from the wider literature on the transfer and development of international norms in general, rather than just nuclear deterrence norms. This then leads to my third section, where I analyze four theoretical models of international normative transfer and identify certain key concepts and arguments that they share. In the last section of this chapter, I then utilize such concepts in constructing my theoretical framework of deterrence socialization, explains how it envisions the process of normative transfer, and identify the key aspects of the normative transfer process that it will focus on and evaluate.

Section I: Japan and Nuclear Weapons

Japan's relationship with nuclear weapons is a widely researched topic in international relations. As one of the world's most advanced technological powers that is just a step away from developing nuclear weapons,[66] much research has been devoted to understanding Japan's nuclear deterrence policy and the various factors that drive it.

While studies of Japan's nuclear deterrence policy are spread across a variety of time periods and cover multiple academic disciplines, there are certain common points that are shared across scholarly research of Japan's relationship with nuclear deterrence. As mentioned briefly in the introductory chapter, almost all scholarly research, for example, takes a structural realist approach in identifying international nuclear threats as the primary catalyst, and continued driver, of Japanese demand for nuclear deterrence. Such an approach is an application of Kenneth Waltz's neorealist argument that the anarchical nature of the international system will inevitably force states to practice deterrence in the search for security,[67] and that the unique nature of nuclear weapons means that nuclear weapons would be needed to practice deterrence against nuclear weapons.[68] Such scholars thus uniformly point to China's successful nuclearization in 1964 as the beginning of Japan's interest in deterring nuclear weapons.[69]

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[66] Mark Fitzpatrick, associate fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, for example, gives an estimate of 1-2 years for Japan to nuclearize successfully. See Mark Fitzpatrick, "How Japan could Go Nuclear" *Foreign Affairs,* 3rd October 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2019-10-03/how-japan-could-go-nuclear. Accessed 20/11/2024.

[67] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: McGraw-Hill 1979), 126.

[68] Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).

[69] Examples include Andrew O'Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence* (New York: Routledge 2013); Terence Roehrig, *Japan, South Korea, and the United States Umbrella: Deterrence after the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press 2013); Kurosaki Akira, *Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei—Amerika no Kaku Fu Kakusan Gaikō to Nihon no Sentaku 1960-1976* (Tōkyō: Yūshisha

Several are also united in their analysis of the push factors that continue to drive Japan's interest in nuclear deterrence policy, identifying both the continued threat of China's nuclear arsenal and a newly nuclearized North Korea as the main factors for Japan's nuclear deterrence policy.[70]

From this shared neorealist approach however, such research begins to diverge when answering the more important question of why Japan had diverged from neorealist prescriptions and instead chose to rely on US END as its source of nuclear deterrence against nuclear threats, rather than pursue a policy of indigenous nuclearization. There has been research that, for example, rather than focusing specifically on Japan's dependence on US END and its nuclear deterrence policy, instead examines the issue of nuclear deterrence as part of a broader analysis of Japan's military and security policy and why Japan continues to depend on the US-Japan alliance for its security needs.

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, such research includes research by Thomas Berger, who, writing in the 1990s, has attributed Japan's limited militarization following its defeat in World War II to the construction of antimilitarist norms within the wider Japanese public.[71] According to Berger, despite continued predictions from neorealist international relations scholars that the pressures of the international structure would force Japan onto the path to remilitarization during the Cold War, such a development has not occurred, and Japan has continued to restrict its military spending and refused to commit a greater share of its industry to arms manufacturing.[72] Berger attributes this continued reluctance to a strong antimilitarist sentiment amongst the Japanese public that developed in the unique political and social conditions of Japan following their defeat in World War II, which prevents Japanese politicians, who are far more eager to pursue a more active security posture, from pursuing more extreme security policies.[73] While Berger does not focus specifically on the nuclear issue, his explanation of antimilitarist norms can thus act as a foundational explanation of Japan's

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2006); Satō Yukio, *Sashi Kakerareta Kasa: Beikoku no Kaku Yokushi Ryoku to Nihon no Anzen Hoshō* (Tōkyō: Jiji Tsūshinsha 2017) and Kusunoki Ayako, "The Satō Cabinet and the Making of Japan's Non-Nuclear Policy," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations Special Volume—Cold War Across the Pacific* Volume 15 (2008): 25-50.

[70] Andrew O'Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*, 89-90; Terence Roehrig, *Japan, South Korea, and the United States Umbrella: Deterrence after the Cold War*, 64-65.

[71] Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-Militarism," *International Security* 4 Volume 17 (1993): 120.

[72] Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-Militarism," 126-127.

[73] Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-Militarism," 134-137.

continued choice of dependence on US END as part of the wider limitations provided by antimilitarist norms on Japanese security policy.

Similar to Berger's approach, Jennifer Lind also examines Japanese security policy from a wider perspective but explains Japan's continued dependence on the US for much of its security needs not as a result of restrictions placed on its policymakers by antimilitarism, but rather a strategy of buck-passing that is consistent with realist-based rational state action within an anarchical international system. Lind, like the other scholars mentioned so far, initially takes a neorealist approach and point to the international geopolitical threats that Japan faces as push factors for Japan to rearm, and possibly even pursue nuclearization. Lind, however, explains the fact that Japan has not done so as a result of Japan hoping to 'pass the buck' of security costs and the cost of balancing against rival states on to its major ally, the US, rather than doing so itself.[74] Lind argues that Japanese security policy during the Cold War resembles the strategy of buck-passing, in which Japan 'passed the buck' of deterrence to the US during periods where it faced a lower level of threat, such as from the 1950s-1970s, while increasing military spending during the 1970s, when faced with a more aggressive USSR and declining US protection.[75] Again, like Berger, while Lind does not focus specifically on Japan's nuclear deterrence policy, her explanation of Japanese buck-passing as a wider security and military policy can serve as a general explanation of Japan 'buck-passing' nuclear deterrence onto the US.

The general, theory-testing, approach taken by scholars such as Lind and Berger in examining Japan's wider security policy, rather than focusing on Japanese nuclear deterrence policy specifically, has its greatest strength in that such an approach provides a wider explanation of the forces at play in Japanese security planning and policy development, rather than just focusing on nuclear deterrence policy. Such an approach also allows for the testing of international relations theory, which other scholars can then build on in applying said theories to other states, or other aspects of Japanese security policy, to develop more general hypotheses. This approach thus allows for both contributions specifically to Japanese studies, as well as the wider international relations discipline. The weakness of such an approach, however, is also a result of its strength. Due to its focus on providing a more general explanation of Japanese security policy rather than specifically nuclear deterrence policy, such an approach cannot

[74] Jennifer M. Lind, "Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy," *International Security* 1 Volume 29 (2004): 93.
[75] Jennifer M. Lind, "Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy," 115-116.

account for the unique factors and limitations specific to nuclear deterrence policy that Japan faced. According to Lind's buck-passing theory, for example, Japan, in accordance with its increased military spending in the 1970s when faced with increased Soviet aggression, should have stopped passing the buck on nuclear deterrence and pushed for Japanese nuclearization as well. That it did not do so thus speaks to more specific factors when it comes to nuclear deterrence policy that cannot be explained by wider theoretical explanations of Japan's security posture.

This thus brings us to research that focuses specifically on Japanese nuclear deterrence policy, and its dependence on US END. Scholars have taken multiple approaches to the issue, with some focusing specifically on examining the origins of Japan's nuclear deterrence policy as the key to explaining Japan's nuclear deterrence choices. Such research tends to focus on the period from 1960-1970 and the role played by Prime Minister Satō Eisaku and the unique limitations and circumstances that he faced at that exact point in time in order to explain Japan's choice and often conclude with Satō's announcement of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and Four Nuclear Pillars in 1969, which continue to shape Japanese nuclear deterrence policy. [76]

Kusunoki Ayako's research on the Satō Cabinet's decision-making process from 1964-1970,[77] and Kurosaki Akira's analysis of the same period,[78] for example, argue that Satō's decision to pursue US END was primarily a result of compromise, and that while Satō strongly desired a Japanese nuclear deterrent, he was limited by factors both within and outside of Japan. Kusunoki and Kurosaki, however, each give different weight to what these limiting factors are. Kusunoki points to internal limitations as the main factor and argues that Satō's own need to fend off challenges from the opposition regarding nuclear deterrence and his determination to achieve the nuclear-less revision of Okinawa from the US during his time in office as the main driver of Satō's bargaining with the US.[79] In contrast, Kurosaki gives more weight to external

[76] The Three Non-Nuclear Principles state that Japan will not produce, host, or allow nuclear weapons to transit through its territorial boundaries. The Four Nuclear Pillars state that Japan will 1) Aim for global nuclear disarmament, 2) Focus on the peaceful use of nuclear energy 3) Abide by the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and 4) Rely on US END against the threat of nuclear weapons for as long as necessary. See Shūgiin Honkaigi Dai 3 Gō (Records of the Plenary Session, House of Representatives, no.3), 30th January 1968.
https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPSC/19680130.O2J.html. Accessed 20/11/2024.
[77] Kusunoki Ayako, "The Satō Cabinet and the Making of Japan's Non-Nuclear Policy,"
[78] Kurosaki Akira, *Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei—Amerika no Kaku Fu Kakusan Gaikō to Nihon no Sentaku 1960-1976.*
[79] Kusunoki Ayako, "The Satō Cabinet and the Making of Japan's Non-Nuclear Policy," 41.

limiting factors and points to the US's negotiations with Japan to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that were occurring at the same time as the key factor for Satō's choice.

There have also been scholars like Kase Yuri, who, while similarly focusing on Satō's policy decisions, hypothesize that choosing US END was a deliberate choice based on security and strategic reasons, rather than limitations.[80] Scholars that take this approach often focus on three reports prepared by the Cabinet Research Office (CRO) for Satō during this period and the strategic arguments they made for Japan to pursue US END as the basis for Satō's choices, rather than the limitations he faced, with the 1968/70 report, in particular, being the focus of Kase's argument. Kase points out that the report stated that with China's nuclearization, Japan had to contend with two nuclear powers in East Asia (China and the USSR) and thus could not possibly hope to deter both with an indigenous deterrent.[81] The report also further highlights that Japan's geographic disadvantages means that it is particularly ill-suited to practicing nuclear deterrence by means of nuclear retaliation, and thus recommended pursual of US END on the basis of such calculations.[82] On the basis of such a report that was prepared for Satō, Kase thus seems to suggest that the basis of Satō's choice was mostly strategic.

Research focused on this period also sometimes shifts away from governmental decision-making in favor of carrying out an in-depth examination of some of the key limiting factors Satō faced in the period from 1960-1970, such as the Japanese public's well-known anti-nuclear sentiment. Kurosaki Akira's research on the role of the development of anti-nuclear sentiments in Japanese scientists, in particular, is a good example of such research.[83] While most research in this category focuses on the growth of anti-nuclear civil society movements such as the Hidankyō[84] in the 1950s, Kurosaki instead focuses on the growth of intellectual anti-nuclearism amongst the scientific community and how prominent physicists such as Hideki Yukawa and Shinichirō Tomonaga, having been influenced by the details of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that were coming to light in the 1950s, as well as the Lucky Dragon No.5 incident in 1954, joined the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs.

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[80] Kase Yuri, "The Costs and Benefits of Japan's Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report," *The Nonproliferation Review* 2 Volume 8 (2001): 55-68.
[81] Kase Yuri, "The Costs and Benefits of Japan's Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report," 59-63.
[82] Kase Yuri, "The Costs and Benefits of Japan's Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report," 59-63.
[83] Kurosaki Akira, "Japanese Scientists' Critique of Nuclear Deterrence Theory and Its Influence on Pugwash, 1954-1964," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 1 Volume 20 (2018): 101-139.
[84] Examples include Lawrence S. Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).

Kurosaki then examines their contributions to the international debate on global nuclear disarmament, in particular noting the arguments of Tomonaga, who, rather than arguing from the basis of a moral distaste for nuclear weapons, as was common in the anti-nuclear movement, instead took on nuclear deterrence theorists on their own turf and pointed out a list of logical inconsistencies and theoretical weaknesses in nuclear deterrence theory in 1961.[85] Kurosaki notes that while the arguments of these scientists were largely ignored during the period, their contributions were nevertheless noteworthy as a case of Japanese academics challenging nuclear deterrence theory on the theoretical level, as well as noting that Tomonaga's arguments on the logical and theoretical inconsistencies of nuclear deterrence remain relevant for the international community even today, which continues to rely on said theory when it comes to nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence.[86]

Research into the origins of Japanese dependence on US END as its main nuclear deterrence policy is no doubt important, given that Satō's choices, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and the Four Nuclear Pillars continue to influence Japanese nuclear strategy even today. As briefly stated in the introduction however, such research tends to take Japan's demand for nuclear deterrence in the face of nuclear threats as an objective reality of how nuclear deterrence operates in the international system. Kusunoki, Kurosaki and Kase, for example, while noting that the catalyst for Satō and his government to pursue nuclearization was China's nuclearization in 1964, also do not question such an approach further. Similarly, Kurosaki, while highlighting the intellectual contributions of Tomonaga and his arguments against the logical inconsistencies of nuclear deterrence in his research on Pugwash, does not probe further beyond an acknowledgement that such arguments were dismissed by the Japanese government.[87] This is despite the fact that, as laid out earlier in the introductory chapter, this supposed 'objective reality' of nuclear weapons being necessary to deter nuclear threats has never been proven and has more often been 'assumed'.

Furthermore, by focusing on the origins of Japanese nuclear deterrence policy, such research thus fails to account for developments and changes in Japan's dependence on US END following its developments from 1960-1970, such as its addition of Ballistic Missile Defense

[85] Kurosaki Akira, "Japanese Scientists' Critique of Nuclear Deterrence Theory and Its Influence on Pugwash, 1954-1964," 129.
[86] Kurosaki Akira, "Japanese Scientists' Critique of Nuclear Deterrence Theory and Its Influence on Pugwash, 1954-1964," 138-139.
[87] Kurosaki Akira, "Japanese Scientists' Critique of Nuclear Deterrence Theory and Its Influence on Pugwash, 1954-1964," 138.

(BMD) to its nuclear deterrence options in 2003. With its focus on Satō and the specific limitations and threats Japan faced from 1960-1970, such research thus cannot explain Japan's reasoning when it adopted BMD in 2003. Given that BMD forms a crucial part of Japan's nuclear deterrence policy in the modern day and as explained in the introduction, is logically inconsistent with the mutual vulnerability required for nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation, such an omission is thus a key issue when it comes to research that focuses specifically on the origins of Japan's dependence on US END.

In order to address these weaknesses, there has thus also been research that focuses modern Japanese nuclear deterrence policy and examines continued Japanese reliance on US END in the Post-Cold War era, before debating whether a change is imminent. Such studies often undertake a comparative approach consider whether the circumstances that led to Satō's choices in 1964 still hold true for Japan and whether there are new push factors for Japan to consider a change in policy. This then acts as the foundation for further analysis into different aspects of US END, such as whether its credibility over Japan needs to or can even be strengthened, and whether it is even possible for Japan pursue a different nuclear deterrence policy. While the research approaches taken by such scholars often vary in terms of theoretical perspective and the factors they prioritize in their analysis, most seem to follow a similar argument in stating that while it is indeed the case that Japan faces new threats, and that the increasing 'normalization' and overturning of several restrictions on military activity in Japan may have seemingly created a more permissive environment for Japan to consider changes in nuclear deterrence policy, such changes are unlikely in Japan's case.[88] Scholars then give different explanations to why this is the case, with most pointing political, cultural and institutional barriers in Japan and emphasize that such barriers, which are similar to the ones Satō faced in 1964, are likely to continue to be effective in preventing indigenous nuclearization in Japan.

Llewelyn Hughes, for example, examines the pressures on Japan to nuclearize in recent years in a 2007 paper, and argues that while international threats to Japan have grown, the domestic political, legislative and institutional constraints that first prevented Japan from seeking a

[88] This is a position taken by, for example, by Andrew O'Neil, Terence Roehrig, Llewelyn Hughes and Richard Samuels and James L. Schoff. See Andrew O'Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence* 92-93; Terence Roehrig, *Japan, South Korea, and the United States Umbrella: Deterrence after the Cold War*, 120-122; Llewelyn Hughes, "Why Japan will not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan," *International Security* 4 Volume 31 (2007):68-69; Richard J. Samuels and James L. Schoff, "Japan's Nuclear Hedge: Beyond "Allergy" and Breakout," *Political Science Quarterly* 3 Volume 130 (2015): 478.

domestic nuclear deterrent in 1964 still hold true for Japan today. Referencing Satō's Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the Japanese Constitution, Japan's Basic Atomic Energy Law that forbids the non-peaceful use of nuclear energy and overall public sentiment against nuclear weapons, Hughes argues that anti-nuclearism remains a powerful force in Japan today, and that it is more likely that Japan will continue to rely on strengthening US END as a countermeasure to the emerging threats it faces.[89]

A similar approach is taken by both Andrew O'Neil and Terence Roehrig, who both compare the geopolitical threats that Japan faced in 1964 and the threats it faces today and argue that the continued existence of such nuclear threats makes nuclear deterrence indispensable even for Japan today. Their respective conclusions, both which forecast further strengthening of US END over Japan as Japan's choice of nuclear deterrent, however, differ from Hughes' in one respect. Both scholars, while acknowledging the multiple restraints on Japanese indigenous nuclearization, have pointed to the increasing role of US END as important symbol of US alliance commitment to Japan following the end of the Cold War as a factor for Japan's continued dependence on US END. O'Neil and Roehrig both argue that the increasing importance of US extended nuclear deterrence symbolism for Japan is occurring within the wider context of increasing Japanese doubts over the deterrent effect of the US-Japan alliance and the commitment of the US to East Asia and point out the steps Japan has taken to strengthen the alliance post-Cold War by increasing its military involvement in the alliance.[90]

The importance of this symbolism and the alliance relationship with Japan, both argue, means that indigenous nuclearization is unlikely for Japan. Instead, for both O'Neil and Roehrig, it is likely that Japan will continue to strengthen the mechanisms of US END over Japan and ask for greater demonstrations of the credibility of US END.[91] Similarly, both have tried to address Japan's developments in BMD as part of its efforts at strengthening US END and the US-Japan alliance in general, in line with Japanese policymakers' fears that the credibility of the US-Japan alliance is faltering. O'Neil and Roehrig however, differ in their assessment of whether such changes in the status of US END can assuage Japan's fears. While Roehrig believes that

[89] Llewelyn Hughes, "Why Japan will not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan,", 80-90.
[90] Andrew O'Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*, 89-90; Terence Roehrig, *Japan, South Korea, and the United States Umbrella: Deterrence after the Cold War*, 116-120.
[91] Andrew O'Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*, 92-93; Terence Roehrig, *Japan, South Korea, and the United States Umbrella: Deterrence after the Cold War*, 122-123.

policy changes on the US's part can fulfil such requests,[92] O'Neil is more skeptical and questions whether it is even possible for the US, given the increasing military equilibrium between the US and China, to assure Japan of the US END's credibility at a satisfactory level in the 21st century.[93]

Carrying on from O'Neil's doubts of whether US END can ever reassure Japanese anxieties in the modern day, the possibility of US END being an insufficient policy is further explored in research by Gregory Kulacki. Kulacki examines the strategic doctrine of US END over Japan in the modern day and argues that it is a failing strategy that needs to be fixed.[94] Kulacki, like O'Neil and Roehrig, posits that the primary threat that US END is aimed at today is China, but argues that US END strategy, which is based specifically on the threat to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict with China, is unreliable and unproductive. Continuing US END policy as it is, Kulacki argues, is therefore a dead end. Instead, using various deterrence scenarios and theoretical calculations, Kulacki states that the US and Japan should adopt a new END strategy based on a publicly announced 'no-first use' rule, ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and reversing any plans for potential deployment of US nuclear weapons to East Asia.[95]

Such research into Japan's continued dependence on US END in the modern day thus address several of the gaps left by research which purely focuses on the origins of Japan's dependence on US END and provides a more complete picture of the trajectory of Japan's nuclear deterrence policy. However, I argue that, like research that focuses purely on the historical aspect of Japan's nuclear deterrence policy, such research shares a similar weakness in that it fails to question the concept of the need for nuclear weapons to deter nuclear threats as an objective fact and a 'self-evident' characteristic of the international system. In their research, Hughes, O'Neil, Roehrig and Kulacki all point out China's nuclear arsenal and North Korea's nuclearization as the nuclear threats that drives Japanese demand for nuclear weapons. However, like other research in this section, they fail to prove that Japan would not be able to deter such threats without nuclear weapons, accepting this as a default state of affairs. This is despite the fact that, as has been constantly stated throughout this thesis, such 'nuclear

[92] Terence Roehrig, *Japan, South Korea, and the United States Umbrella: Deterrence after the Cold War*, 122-123.
[93] Andrew O'Neil*, Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*, 92-93.
[94] Gregory Kulacki, "The Nuclear Deterrence Strategy of the US-Japan Alliance is Failing but Can Be Fixed," *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* 2 Volume 4 (2021): 231-232.
[95] Gregory Kulacki, "The Nuclear Deterrence Strategy of the US-Japan Alliance is Failing but Can Be Fixed,", 228-231.

deterrence', rather than an objective fact of international relations that has been conclusively proven, is more akin to a contested perspective shaped by theoretical arguments.

Furthermore, while O'Neil and Roehrig both address Japan's development of BMD as a method by which Japanese policymakers has chosen to strengthen US END over Japan, in keeping with the growing concerns of Japanese policymakers over US END's reliability,[96] they still do not address the logical inconsistency of such a policy, and how BMD is supposed to be made compatible with nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation's need for mutual vulnerability.

In examining how the current consensus within Japanese policymaking on the need for nuclear weapons to deter nuclear threats and the complementary role of BMD to nuclear weapons, I thus aim to address these key research gaps in the existing literature on Japanese nuclear deterrence policy development. By arguing that Japan's need to deter nuclear threats using nuclear weapons is not an objective fact of deterrence practice but a subjective view of nuclear deterrence that has been constructed and socialized, I thus aim to emphasize that it is not the fact that only nuclear weapons can deter nuclear threats that is responsible for Japan's demand for US END, but rather Japanese policymakers' perspective as such, that is more important in explaining such a phenomenon. Similarly, by exploring nuclear deterrence facts not as facts but as subjective perspectives, I thus resolve the supposed logical inconsistencies of Japan pursuing BMD alongside nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation by arguing that such a policy is not Japan performing an act of self-sabotage, but rather in keeping with Japanese shifts in subjective perspectives of BMD that were a result of normative shifts and developments. By doing so, I thus aim to provide a more nuanced and comprehensive explanation of Japan's demand for US END.

Section II: Deterrence Socialization, Nuclear Deterrence norms and the interpretivist turn

Having addressed the issues present in existing research on Japan's nuclear deterrence policies, I now turn to the analysis of literature that will act as the foundation for my theoretical framework of deterrence socialization. As stated in the introductory chapter, there are two key points in deterrence socialization. The first is a conceptualization of commonly established nuclear deterrence theoretical principles not as fixed, objective facts of reality, but rather as nuclear deterrence norms that represent a subjective perspective of reality whose prescriptive

[96] Andrew O'Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*, 90-91; Terence Roehrig, *Japan, South Korea, and the United States Umbrella: Deterrence after the Cold War*, 117-118.

nature is dependent on how widely they are accepted and utilized by the international community. The second is the argument that the possession and utilization of such principles by policymakers in nuclear deterrence policymaking, rather than being a 'self-evident' process that occurs independently, is a process driven by individual actors with agency, who drive the transference of such norms from one country to another, such as from the US to Japan.

Nuclear Deterrence Norms: A definition

Norms are a well-defined concept in international relations literature. Building on the arguments made by Alexnader Wendt that define international relations concepts and theories not as objective depictions of reality but as shared, subjective viewpoints,[97] norms have thus been defined in Constructivism as the rules and expectations of actors' behavior in the international environment that are crucial in shaping this shared reality. [98] They do so, Constructivist scholars argue, by acting as a set of instructions that simplify political decision-making by compelling political actors to make decisions and act within said shared expectations.[99] It is furthermore important to point out that the development of such rules and shared expectations, while affected by the international structure, cannot be seen as purely the result of international structure. Instead, as Nicholas Onuf argues, the construction of such shared expectations of appropriate behavior, or norms, between a collective of actors, involves multiple political actors, each with varying degrees of agency to shape such norms and each holding different political and social viewpoints as a result of their political and social background.[100] Finally, it is important to note that norms, by virtue of being 'social facts', are not scientifically proven facts, and have power to prescribe and define international reality in so far as they are widely and collectively understood amongst political actors. [101]

Across these multiple definitions, there are two common principles which I will be using in defining the concept of a nuclear deterrence norm. Firstly, a commonly acknowledged characteristic of a norm is that it is a widely shared, commonly held belief that prescribes a

[97] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 2 Volume 46 (1992): 394-395.
[98] Maria Rost Rublee and Avner Cohen, "Nuclear norms in global governance: A progressive research agenda," *Contemporary Security Policy* 3 Volume 39 (2018): 321.
[99] Friedrich Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989): 69-70.
[100] Nicholas Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism in Social Theory and International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge 2012): 4-13.
[101] Jeffrey W. Knopf, "The concept of Nuclear Learning," *The Nonproliferation Review* 1 Volume 19 (2012): 83-84.

certain course of action in response to a certain situation. The community aspect of a norm is crucial to its definition, and across all the various definitions of norms there is a shared focus on the fact that a norm derives part of its persuasive and prescriptive power from the size of the community that believes in it and subscribes to its principles. This is thus related to the second characteristic--a norm should be a belief, or an understanding, rather than a scientifically proven fact. It is precisely because the arguments that make up norms are based on a certain deductive reasoning and logical progression that has never been proven to be completely true, that they must derive part of their persuasive power from being widely believed, as per the first principle. To summarize, a norm is thus an argument that has not been completely proven to be accurate that prescribes a certain course of action, which draws on its persuasive and prescriptive power on the basis of being widely shared and believed within a community of actors.

A nuclear deterrence norm, in turn, is thus a specific argument or principle related to nuclear deterrence that has not been completely proven but nevertheless is used to carry out the practice of nuclear deterrence and predict and police the actions of various actors when it comes to nuclear deterrence. Based on such a definition, I argue that most, if not all, of what the academic and policymaking community considers nuclear strategic principles and 'common knowledge', which they apply in nuclear deterrence policymaking and crisis simulations, can be considered as nuclear deterrence norms. Consider, for example, the argument that only nuclear weapons can deter nuclear attack, and that deterrence of nuclear attack thus requires nuclear deterrence. The argument is certainly a persuasive one and features in in the calculations of several nuclear strategists, especially in the US,[102] and has been constantly used by nuclear weapon states (NWS) as a justification for continued possession of a nuclear arsenal. The argument operates on a simple logic. Nuclear weapons possess a destructive magnitude unlike any other weapon, and there are no foolproof methods to prevent nuclear weapons from hitting their targets. Therefore, the only way to deter nuclear attack is through the threat of a retaliatory strike that inflicts losses of a magnitude so great that will cause the adversary to pause and reconsider its decision to launch a nuclear attack, with such destruction being only possible with a retaliatory nuclear strike.[103] As such, the only way to deter a nuclear strike is through possession of a nuclear arsenal.

[102] Paul C. Avey, "MAD and Taboo: US Expert Views on Nuclear Deterrence, Coercion and Non-Use Norms," 2-3.
[103] Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 2004): 34.

A closer examination of this principle, however, reveals that much of its logical deduction of how states act and react when it comes to nuclear weapons is not proven, but rather based on interpretation and assumption by nuclear deterrence theorists. To once again quote Patrick Morgan, "Successful deterrence has often been more assumed than demonstrated." Consider, for example, the principle's argument that only the threat of a nuclear retaliatory strike will deter an NWS from launching a nuclear attack. While there have been multiple case studies of NWS not launching nuclear weapons when it was expected that they might do so, there has been no study that conclusively proves a casual mechanism in such cases between the NWS halting a nuclear attack because of its adversary's nuclear arsenal and its fear of a retaliatory nuclear strike.[104] While certain scholars have certainly provided interpretations and arguments that this is the case, there have been multiple different interpretations that suggest otherwise, with many scholars, for example, pointing to the role of the nuclear taboo.[105] Furthermore, even if a casual mechanism could be established between nuclear deterrence and nuclear possession, it would be difficult, if not almost impossible to prove that the deterrent effect provided by a nuclear arsenal could not be replaced by any other weapon of that possessed an equal level of destructive potential. As such, rather than a principle that is based on a scientific understanding of how logical states would operate in deterrence scenarios, this principle seems more like a belief that is widely shared, repeated and accepted to be true amongst the international community, thus normalizing it as an international 'nuclear deterrence norm'.[106]

Nuclear Deterrence and Normative Learning

While the study of international norms is an established discipline in Constructivism, the study of nuclear deterrence as norms, how such norms are transferred via a process of normative learning and how such a process results in policy changes is a far more niche area of study. In terms of theoretical construction and formation, one of the more influential studies is perhaps Lawarence Freedman's *Deterrence*, in which Freedman charts the history of deterrence theory development and posits new ways to think about deterrence by utilizing concepts of deterrence

[104] Almost all deterrence scholars have all struggled with this methodological problem, as deterrence, when successful, is demonstrated by the absence of incidents, which can be due to a wide variety of reasons. For example, see Rajesh Rajagopalan, "Deterrence and Nuclear Confrontations: The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Sino-Soviet Border War," *Strategic Analysis* 3 Volume 24 (2000): 441-442.
[105] Richard Hanaia, "Tracing the Development of the Nuclear Taboo," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 2 Volume 19 (2017): 43-44; Nina Tannenwald, "Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo," *International Security* 4 Volume 29 (2005): 5-6.
[106] Indeed, in recent years South Korea, in particular, has begun challenging this norm and is currently experimenting with the concept of 'nuclear deterrence without nuclear weapons.' See Park Hwee-Rhak, "A non-nuclear US ally's nuclear preparedness dilemma: South Korea's "Three-Axis System"," *Defense Studies* 2 Volume 24 (2024): 260-261.

from criminal psychology, whose chief advantage, Freedman argues, is that it has thousands of cases to draw upon in order to refine its concepts, in contrast to state deterrence, which has far fewer cases.[107] Freedman's study, while primarily historical in nature, does establish a foundation for linking the concept of norms with deterrence, with Freedman linking normative study to deterrence in three different ways: he argues that behavioral norms can be internalized to the point where deterrence is no longer needed, that normative behavior can be analyzed as a factor for deterrence success and that deterrence itself is a norm.[108] While Freedman does not go into case-based analysis to test his new propositions, his propositions do act as a good theoretical foundation for thinking about the relationship between norms and nuclear deterrence, and is one of the few studies that primarily focuses on theoretical development.

Other than Freedman's *Deterrence*, research by Jeffrey Knopf has also tried to link the study of norms with nuclear deterrence. Knopf goes further than Freedman in this regard, not only linking the study of nuclear deterrence to norms but arguing for the study of nuclear deterrence knowledge construction as a process of nuclear deterrence normative transfer, which he terms 'nuclear learning'.[109] Knopf argues that there are two sides to the concepts of nuclear learning—the nuclear aspect and the learning aspect. The nuclear aspect involves asking what exactly one can learn with regard to nuclear weapons, which Knopf divides into factual and inferential concepts.[110] Factual concepts are those that are scientifically established, such as the power of a nuclear explosion or the trajectory of a missile. Inferential learning, meanwhile, involves concepts surrounding nuclear weapons that can only be inferred and go beyond scientific testing, such as whether nuclear weapons stabilize or destabilize a state, how many nuclear weapons are necessary for deterrence or when do states use nuclear weapons. The learning aspect, meanwhile, Knopf argues, can be divided and studied in three ways, which Knopf describes as 1) whether learning is value-neutral or value-laden, 2) whether learning leads to changes in policy methods or changes in policy objectives and 3) at what level (policymakers, governmental, official) does the learning take place.[111] Knopf ultimately draws no conclusions on the best way to study the concept, instead ending his article with a list of possible questions and possible areas for nuclear learning research.[112]

[107] Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence*, 31-32.
[108] Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence*, 42.
[109] Jeffrey W. Knopf, "The concept of Nuclear Learning," 79.
[110] Jeffrey W. Knopf, "The concept of Nuclear Learning," 82-84.
[111] Jeffrey W. Knopf, "The concept of Nuclear Learning," 84-89.
[112] Jeffrey W. Knopf, "The concept of Nuclear Learning," 90-91.

Examples of studies that have utilized the concept of nuclear deterrence normative learning to study state interactions and security policy development, meanwhile, include research by Joseph Nye and Emanuel Adler. Nye, who would later coin the term 'soft power' and serve in the Clinton Administration, first published an article on nuclear learning and the creation of international regimes between the US and USSR in 1987. Nye's study of normative learning is highly tied to the concept of regimes, through which states interact, carry out transactional exchanges and how such processes can help states to 'relearn', redefine and understand each other's national interests.[113] Nye's key argument is that such a regime existing between the US and the USSR during the Cold War, through which both states managed to learn how nuclear deterrence operates in each other's security policy and thus create a core of consensual, normative knowledge that, while based on assumptions, abstractions and counterfactual arguments, nevertheless was acknowledged and utilized in both states.[114] Nye classifies such shared normative knowledge into four areas—the destructive power of nuclear weapons, the importance of nuclear weapons command and control and the dangers of escalation, the dangers of nuclear proliferation and the volatility of the arms race. In these four areas, Nye argues that some degree of normative learning and consensus had emerged between the two states on nuclear weapons, referring for example to the learning process of both countries that nuclear proliferation outside of the US and USSR is inherently destabilizing for both sides, whereas both countries believed that nuclear technology sharing with allies could be controlled in the 1950s-1960s.[115]

In contrast to Nye, Emanuel Adler's research on nuclear normative learning instead focuses on learning and normative transfer within a singular state's ---the US---different institutions and actors. Adler uses the example of the linking of arms control to nuclear deterrence strategy as an example of normative development and explores how this normative development spread from the arms control epistemic community to US policymakers, before being used by said policymakers as the basis for negotiations with the USSR that ended with the signing of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.[116] Adler begins his argument by stating that in the 1960s-1970s, there were largely two schools of thought when it came to the relationship

[113] Joseph S. Nye, Jr, "Nuclear learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes," *International Organization* 3 Volume 41 (1987): 374-378.
[114] Joseph S. Nye, Jr, "Nuclear learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes,"391-392.
[115] Joseph S. Nye, Jr, "Nuclear learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes,"383.
[116] Emanuel Adler, "The emergence of cooperation: national epistemic communities and the international evolution of the idea of nuclear arms control," *International Organization* 1 Volume 46 (1992): 101.

between arms control and nuclear deterrence. The first saw arms control and nuclear deterrence to be inherently linked, and that a global arms control regime was necessary in order to build trust between the two superpowers and allow for effective nuclear deterrence to be practiced that would not result in misperception and the outbreak of nuclear war. The second meanwhile, saw arms control as inherently incompatible with nuclear deterrence and argued that nuclear war would not be a result of misperception, but rather a failure of deterrence.[117] For such scholars, arms control and cooperation with the enemy would merely hobble effective deterrence practice and lead to instability. Adler then charts how the first group slowly managed to carve out a space in US policymaking and 'teach' policymakers how to normatively understand and link arms control with effective nuclear deterrence policymaking using their status as presidential advisors, members of influential think-tanks and influential university intellectuals. Adler emphasizes the importance of the RAND Corporation in particular and notes how the arguments and deterrence modelling principles utilized by scholars at RAND that strongly emphasized the necessity of arms control for nuclear deterrence would later be transmitted to government institutions involved in nuclear policymaking as scholars from RAND went on to work in said institutions from the 1960s. Through this pipeline, Adler argues, scholars that linked arms control with effective nuclear deterrence were thus able to propagate their ideas and find a space for them in the debate on nuclear deterrence.[118] Such ideas would then form the basis for the ABM Treaty negotiations.

Nuclear Deterrence Norms and the Interpretivist Turn in Deterrence Theory

As briefly mentioned in the introductory chapter, the study of nuclear deterrence theory as normative concepts and the normalization of such norms into unquestionable principles across states as a process of normative learning is itself part of the growing new wave of deterrence theory research that has developed in the aftermath of the Cold War, which Amir Lupovici has dubbed the '4th wave' of deterrence theory research.[119] Lupovici argues that in contrast to the first three waves of deterrence theory development, this wave consists of both an empirical and an interpretivist turn, which the study of nuclear deterrence theory as norms belongs to. While the empirical turn focuses on applying existing theories and concepts to new threats that have

[117] Emanuel Adler, "The emergence of cooperation: national epistemic communities and the international evolution of the idea of nuclear arms control,", 109-110.
[118] Emanuel Adler, "The emergence of cooperation: national epistemic communities and the international evolution of the idea of nuclear arms control,", 112-116.
[119] Amir Lupovici, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Towards a New Research Agenda,", 705-706.

emerged in the post-Cold War era and testing them, the interpretivist turn instead focuses on using concepts developed in newer international relations theories, such as Constructivism and Critical Theory to examine the development of deterrence theory in the first three waves.[120]

Based on such a premise, interpretivist 4th wave deterrence theory has thus questioned, for example, the nature of the objective reality of deterrence outlined by deterrence scholars of the first three waves, and, as seen from the examples of Freedman, Knopf, Nye and Adler, examined how the link between nuclear weapons and deterrence was formulated, constructed, and established as a global standard as a form of normative transfer within the unique context of the Cold War.[121] From his analysis of this wave, Lupovici thus identifies four important, general principles that interpretivist deterrence theorists have identified regarding said process of constructing the 'objective' international reality of deterrence, with interpretivists arguing that deterrence can be learned; that socialization affects the practice of deterrence; that deterrence is a social construction and that speech acts are important in all these three processes.[122]

The Interpretivist turn and nuclear learning: Theoretical Problems?

The research on nuclear deterrence norms and the process of nuclear learning as a form of normative transfer is undoubtedly useful in providing a foundation for analyzing the process of particular nuclear deterrence perspectives develop in countries, such as Japan, as a result of normative transfer. Such research has demonstrated how nuclear deterrence principles can be studied as norms, provided case studies of how such normative transfer between different actors and established four important principles which can act as a useful framework for thinking about the process of nuclear deterrence normative transfer. There are, nevertheless, key problems with the nuclear deterrence normative learning literature which challenge its suitability as a framework for analyzing US-Japan nuclear deterrence normative transfer.

The first major research gap is the absence of any focus on learning between allied or friendly states. As can be quite clearly seen from the research so far, much of the literature on nuclear normative learning has focused on the construction and learning of nuclear norms between the

[120] Amir Lupovici, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Towards a New Research Agenda,", 710-712.
[121] This is not restricted strictly to norms however, and there has been research that analyzes this construction of subjective deterrence reality via the transference of ritualistic deterrence practice, for example. See Maria Malksoo, "A ritual approach to deterrence: I am, therefore I deter," *European Journal of International Relations* 1 Volume 27 (2020): 54-55.
[122] Amir Lupovici, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Towards a New Research Agenda,", 712-718.

US and USSR during the Cold War, which is of course intended by 4th wave interpretivist scholars. However, even in research that does not focus on US/USSR learning, there is little focus on allied learning, with Knopf, for example, referencing India/Pakistan as an important case for nuclear learning scholars to focus on.[123] Adler, meanwhile, focuses on intrastate learning between institutions and policymakers within the US. While the study of nuclear learning between adversarial states is no doubt important given that deterrence policy is usually directed at adversaries rather than allies, the emphasis given to learning between rival states means that there is thus little existing research to suggest how a normative learning process between allies, as in the case of the US and Japan might look like within the nuclear learning literature, which I argue is likely to be very different from the learning process between superpower rivals. This is especially given the fact that the allied relationship between the US and Japan is a highly unequal one with the US having substantial influence over Japan's security policy. There thus is a need to consult research from within the wider literature international learning and normative transfer in order to consider how such a process might take place.

This thus brings us to the second problem with nuclear learning. As can be quite clearly seen from the examples of nuclear learning research covered in this chapter, none of them actually theorizes a concrete model of what the process of nuclear learning from state to state looks like. Nye's research on the US/USSR deterrence regime for example, is aimed at primarily proving the existence of such a regime, defining the norms that govern said regime, and demonstrating that the regime is undoubtedly a product of nuclear learning between the US and USSR. Knopf's article on nuclear learning, meanwhile, is focused on justifying the definitions and terms used in nuclear learning, and the studying of nuclear learning as a process. It is an important starting point but does not actually provide a model for how such a process might take place. Adler's research perhaps comes closest to providing a model of nuclear normative learning, identifying the actors (epistemic community) and the processes involved (teaching in different institutions, access to policymakers). However, Adler does not use the case study of the US's epistemic community to generalize a larger model of learning and instead focuses specifically on just the case of how normative learning took place within the US during a specific time period. The usefulness of the learning process described by Adler in studying US-Japan nuclear normative learning is therefore questionable.

[123] Jeffrey W. Knopf, "The concept of Nuclear Learning," 80.

As such, the existing research that codifies nuclear deterrence principles as nuclear norms and studies the creation of nuclear deterrence regimes via various learning processes, while providing an excellent theoretical foundation for the study of nuclear normative transfer between the US and Japan, is nevertheless insufficient as a theoretical framework to analyze the normative transfer process between the US and Japan due to its focus on adversarial-based learning and lack of analytical focus on the intricacies of the learning process. In my deterrence socialization theoretical framework, I will thus be referring to concepts taken from models of normative learning from within the wider international learning literature beyond the concept nuclear learning, which will be the subject of the next section's analysis.

Section III: International Learning and Models of Normative Transfer

Existing research on nuclear normative learning, as demonstrated above, possesses certain weaknesses which limit its usefulness in analyzing the case of US-Japan nuclear deterrence normative transfer. However, the conceptualization of nuclear deterrence principles as norms means that I have not limited myself to just research on nuclear deterrence normative learning and have instead drawn on literature on the study of international norms in general, and how such norms are transferred and institutionalized amongst states in constructing the theoretical framework of deterrence socialization. By referencing such literature, I have thus been able to construct and conceptualize a more concrete model of what the transfer of nuclear deterrence norms may look like. In this section, I will thus provide a brief analysis of some of the key models of normative learning I have chosen that link normative learning and policy development. These models---such as Frank Schimmelfennig's international socialization,[124] Jeffrey Checkel's diffusion, [125] John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan's hegemonic socialization [126], Ann Florini's Normative Evolution, [127] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn

[124] Frank Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment," *European Journal of International Affairs* 1 Volume 6 (2000): 110-111.
[125] Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," *International Studies Quarterly* 1 Volume 43 (1999): 85-86.
[126] G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and hegemonic power," *International Organization* 3 Volume 44 (1990): 285-286.
[127] Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms," *International Studies Quarterly* 3 Volume 40 (1996): 364.

Sikkink's Normative Life Cycle[128] and Amitav Acharya's localization[129], amongst others[130]---while constructing the process of normative learning in different ways, all share certain common arguments in evaluating the various factors affecting the normative transfer process which I have utilized in constructing my theoretical framework.

Who learns: The actors involved in Normative Transfer

The question of which actors to focus on when studying the process of nuclear deterrence normative transfer is a basic one and perhaps one that has seen the most consensus, both in models that analyze international normative learning and the more niche area of nuclear deterrence normative learning. Across all such research, there is a focus on the political and policymaking elite as the key actors involved in normative learning, and it is clear that how such actors learn and interpret norms is the focus of such research. While there is still some vagueness as to who is doing the teaching and learning within the nuclear learning literature, with Knopf making references to either 'India' learning [norms] or 'Pakistan' learning [norms] and Nye referring to the 'USSR' learning nuclear deterrence or the 'US' constructing a normative regime,[131] it is clear, at least from the examples and references that Nye uses to make his case, that his concept of nuclear learning focuses almost exclusively on policymaking elites. This is made even more explicit by Adler's research, which focuses on how ideas and norms are transmitted amongst academics and government officials and developed into policy.

This elite-focused aspect of nuclear learning is matched by the four models on normative learning and policymaking. Schimmelfennig's international socialization studies how the Western European states socialized Western European democratic values to Eastern European states following the end of the Cold War and how Eastern European state officials adopted such norms to change national policy in order to be accepted into the growing European community in exchange for economic benefits.[132] Ikenberry and Kupchan's hegemonic socialization model compares the US's success in socialization post-World War II against its failure post-World

[128] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 4 Volume 52 (1998): 895.
[129] Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," *International Organization* Volume 58 (2004): 241-242.
[130] Other normative models I have consulted include Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," *International Organization* 3 Volume 52 (1998): 613-644.
[131] Jeffrey W. Knopf, "The concept of Nuclear Learning," 80; Joseph S. Nye, Jr, "Nuclear learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes,"391-392.
[132] Frank Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment," 116.

War I and argues that it is precisely because the US managed to pressure the political leadership of the European countries following World War II, while failing to do so post-World War I, that resulted in it being able to 'teach' norms to the European states, resulting in changes in international and economic policy.[133]

Acharya, while not focusing on intra-state socialization, focuses on the role of policymaking elites in accepting, disseminating and socializing external norms into the regional organization of ASEAN, focusing in particular on the importance of personages like the Thai Foreign Minister.[134] Checkel meanwhile, focuses on the effect of elite learning in the changing norms on citizenship in post-Cold War Germany, highlighting in particular the intraparty tension in the ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU) between younger and older CDU politicians.[135] Across the four models, there thus seems to be an emphasis on studying normative learning within policymaking and political elites in order to analyze its effects on policymaking, which would be well suited to analyzing learning in nuclear deterrence policy, given that nuclear deterrence policymaking and normative construction has often been limited to political elites.

However, there are deviations as well. Florini's Normative Evolution and Finnemore and Sikkink's Normative Life Cycle, for example, while also referencing the importance of individual actors within states who trigger the normative learning process, such as policymakers or activists, do not seem to focus on such individual actors in their models. Rather, their models appear to be concerned with treating the state as a unitary actor within the international environment in order to examine how norms that arise in one state are then transferred and 'learned' by other states once this learning is triggered.[136] Florini, for example, while referencing 'norm entrepreneurs' as important individuals or organizations who are responsible for beginning the process of normative change, ultimately cite the advantage of 'powerful states' as norm entrepreneurs and subsequently charts how such norms spread with the aid of states, using the example of the US as a 'norm entrepreneur ' in developing the norm of international transparency after World War II.[137] Similarly, Finnemore and Sikkink, while referencing the role of individual norm entrepreneurs in the normative life cycle, are highly focused on the process of the 'norm cascade', in which states, as individual actors, begin

[133] G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and hegemonic power," 298.
[134] Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," 260-265.
[135] Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," 101-102.
[136] Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms," 375-376; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 902-903.
[137] Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms," 381-382.

submitting to international pressure and normative change and begin to adopt individual norms at a rapid pace.[138] Both Florini and Finnemore and Sikkink, in examining this process, both stress the importance of 'critical states'---states with massive global power and influence---as adopters and disseminators of norms as well, further emphasizing their models' focus on states as unitary actors carrying out normative teaching and learning.[139] Nevertheless, Florini and Finnemore and Sikkink's references to individual norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms does seem to further support a focus on policymakers and policymaking elite when examining the nuclear normative learning process in Japan, as it is such elites that are likely to be in possession of such capabilities in Japan.

When is learning triggered: The importance of a crisis

The question of when states start to learn is one that is examined by all models of normative learning, with Acharya's, Ikenberry and Kupchan's, and Florini's models all emphasizing the need for some form of crisis to catalyze normative learning in states. Meanwhile, Richard Price's case study analysis of global land mine bans further reaffirms such an argument, with Price arguing that the movement to ban land mines only gained traction in the 1990s because of the efforts of civil society activists in constructing the horrors and destruction that land mines posed as an international crisis that needed to be resolved.[140]

Furthermore, according to such theoretical models of normative learning, what constitutes a crisis that would trigger normative learning could be highly varied as well, ranging from war, a breakdown of international society, or a collapse in the existing international order.[141] Acharya and Florini both further develop this argument, and both authors have pointed out that the key reason for such crises to trigger normative learning is that it is usually in the aftermath such events when states find they can no longer reliably rely on the norms that they have utilized to manage the newly emerged situation, which leads to states looking for new norms that are capable of doing so .[142]

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[138] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 902-903.
[139] Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms," 375; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 901.
[140] Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," 622.
[141] Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," 247; G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and hegemonic power," 292-293.
[142] Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," 247; Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms," 378.

Similarly, while both Checkel's and Schimmelfennig's models do not explicitly define a particular trigger for states to undertaking normative learning,[143] both scholars have utilized case studies from a similar period in time to test their models of normative transfer, with Schimmelfennig utilizing the case of former East European states trying to join Western European organizations in the aftermath of the Cold War,[144] while Checkel deals with changing conceptions of citizenship within the European community in the aftermath of the Cold War and how such norms were rejected by Germany.[145] Both cases, by being focused on the immediate post-Cold War period, when the international system was in flux, thus seem to support the need for a crisis to trigger normative change.

Finnemore and Sikkink's model of Normative Life Cycles, in contrast, does not identify the need for a crisis to trigger states to begin normative learning. Instead, Finnemore and Sikkink argue that while 'norm entrepreneurs' would need to organize and make use of international platforms to promote their norms and persuade and pressure a number of states on normative adoption initially,[146] most states in the international system will begin the adoption of particular norms automatically once a critical mass of initial 'early adopter' states have adopted said norms, which Finnemore and Sikkink refer to as a 'tipping point'.[147] Finnemore and Sikkink argue that once this point has been reached, a 'norm cascade' then occurs, and more and more states will begin adopting said norms in order to conform to what has become a newly defined 'appropriate behavior' (the new norms) in the international community. Further pressures on states to conform to new normative standards of behavior, meanwhile, can also be introduced by the international community in the form of international diplomatic praise (for conforming) or censure (for deviation) or more material punishments, like economic sanctions.[148] In contrast to Acharya, Ikenberry and Kupchan and Florini, Finnemore and Sikkink thus seem to suggest that it is widespread adoption and 'group pressure' that will trigger normative change, even if there is no crisis that requires such changes.

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[143] Checkel does note that an 'institutionally thick' environment must be present for the promotion of norms. However, he does not really specify when this promotion of norms begins. See Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," 93.
[144] Frank Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment," 109-110.
[145] Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," 93.
[146] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 896-900.
[147] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 901.
[148] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 902.

While both the 'crisis' model and the 'tipping point' model can and have pointed to multiple examples in the international system as proof of their arguments, I argue that the 'crisis' model is better suited to examining the particular case of US-Japan nuclear normative deterrence socialization. As demonstrated in the first section of this chapter, one of the important contributions of previous studies on developments in Japanese nuclear deterrence policy was to demonstrate that much of the key changes in Japanese nuclear deterrence policy occurred only after certain important regional crises and security developments triggered the need for policy change in Japan. The formation of the Four Nuclear Pillars, for example, was identified by multiple studies as a response to Chinese nuclearization, while Japan's growing interest in BMD was argued to be a direct response to the fluctuating security environment following the end of the Cold War.

Furthermore, in the case of the Four Nuclear Pillars, while Japanese discussions on obtaining a nuclear deterrent seemed to have intensified following the increased number of states officially adopting a nuclear deterrent, extended or otherwise, as part of their security policy in the 1950s,[149] thus lending some credence to the norm cascade model, it is important to note that such discussions and more importantly, the efforts made by policymakers to institutionalize such discussions into policy only occurred specifically after Chinese nuclearization in 1964, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 4. Given the importance of key international developments when it comes to changes in Japanese nuclear deterrence policy, it would thus seem that following the 'crisis' model and examining how Japanese policymakers were unable to deal with such crises using existing norms and policies and were therefore forced to begin the normative learning process would result in a more accurate analysis of Japanese nuclear deterrence normative learning.

[149] The primary states to incorporate nuclear deterrence in the 1950s were the United Kingdom, which nuclearized in 1952 and the NATO member states, which came under US extended nuclear protection in 1949 with the publication of the 'Strategic Concept of the Defense of the North Atlantic Area,'. The US subsequently deployed nuclear weapons on European territory in 1952. See David S. Yost, "The US debate on NATO nuclear deterrence," *International Affairs* 6 Volume 87 (2011): 1402.Following key disagreements with the US in the 1950s, France would then successfully nuclearize by 1960.

When has learning taken place: Key indicators of normative learning

The question of how we can determine, with certainty, whether normative learning is taking place and/or has successfully taken place at state-level is one that is conclusively answered by most models of normative learning, with said models focusing primarily on the process of norm institutionalization as an indicator of normative learning. Normative institutionalization, in such cases, refers to policy changes in individual states, the signing of treaties, the establishment of laws and the political debates, arguments and speeches utilized by policymakers to argue for the adoption of such norms during the process of said normative institutionalization. Schimmelfennig, for example, argues that successful socialization, or 'teaching', has taken place when states implement political and economic transformation that meet an international organization's normative standards and are thus, deemed to have 'learned' such norms,[150] using the example of how member states of the Council of Europe slowly granted guest membership status and then full membership status to former Central and East European States as they changed their policies. Ikenberry and Kupchan, meanwhile, focused on policy changes made by the US government during the postwar reconstruction of Japan which resulted in norms such as civil rights and the right of women to vote being successfully 'taught' and institutionalized in Japan's new political apparatus.[151]

Similarly, Acharya's analysis of normative localization which compares the case of normative localization of Cooperative Security and Flexible Engagement into ASEAN differentiates success and failure between the localization of either norm by evaluating whether ASEAN policies and regulations have changed or develop in tandem with the principles of such norms,[152] noting success for the former but failure for the latter. Richard Price's analysis of the campaign against land mines, meanwhile, points to the signing of a comprehensive ban treaty on land mines by 122 states as the conclusion of the normative socialization process.[153] Finally, Checkel's four-step research method of understanding normative diffusion defines successful learning by identifying whether there have been constitutive effects and policy changes in a given state in line with the norms being diffused and 'taught'.[154] Using the example of new

[150] Frank Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment," 122.
[151] G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and hegemonic power," 305-307.
[152] Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," 265.
[153] Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," 618-619.
[154] Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," 91.

normative conceptions of dual citizenship that were developing in post-Cold War Europe and whether such norms were taught successfully in the case of Germany, Checkel thus argues that this learning has not occurred. Checkel points out that while a group of younger Christian Democrat (CDU) politicians seemed to have successfully learned new European norms on dual citizenship, as evidenced by argumentative changes in their speeches,[155] this has not occurred at the national level and policy changes based on such norms have been resisted by the German government, thus demonstrating learning has not taken place, pointing to Germany's refusal to sign the European Council's new Framework Convention on National Minorities unless provisions on dual citizenship were removed.[156]

The only model to deviate somewhat from this common interpretation is, once again, Finnemore and Sikkink's Normative Life Cycle, which points to 'internalization' as the definitive conclusion of normative learning, in which individuals have 'internalized' and automatically conform with the norms being taught, even without strict policy institutionalization and enforcement.[157] Nevertheless, despite this focus on internalization as the final stage of normative learning, Finnemore and Sikkink do seem to emphasize the importance of institutionalization as part of the process leading to internalization, with their analysis on normative shift in international norms on the treatment of medical personnel in war as well as land mine use both pointing to the importance of laws, treaties and the development of international organizations to manage and monitor normative compliance as an indicator of normative learning.[158] For Finnemore and Sikkink, institutionalization would thus seem to be a key stage in the normative learning process, despite not being its final outcome.

An important point of contention, however, can be seen between Schimmelfennig and Acharya's models when it comes to evaluating the role of normative change as an indicator of the learning process. Amongst the models of normative learning examined so far, Schimmelfennig and Acharya's models are two which, in particular, have emphasized the potential of normative change during the process of learning, arguing that while states may be taught norms, the way they learn, interpret and implement such norms may not always be a

[155] Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," 101-102.
[156] Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," 103.
[157] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 904-905.
[158] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 900-902.

complete reproduction and may be subject to changes based on a state's normative hierarchy, domestic political situation or the normative interpretation of particularly influential local norm takers. Of the two models, Schimmelfennig, however, is more dismissive of normative change during the process of learning, terming such changes 'rhetorical manipulation' by state actors and arguing that such changes are usually the attempts of states trying to lower normative standards to minimize the economic and political costs of normative adoption and policy changes.[159] Schimmelfennig puts forward four key methods of normative manipulation—swotting, burden passing, manipulation of identity and appeal to community norms, and points out examples of European states that have utilized such methods, such as Romania when trying to join the Council of Europe or the Czech Republic when trying to push for NATO expansion and inclusion of East European states.[160] Schimmelfennig though, ultimately does not evaluate the success rate of such rhetorical methods, limiting himself to detailing it as a process that could occur in the process of socialization and normative learning.

In contrast, Acharya is more interested in the process of normative change and indeed seems to view it as an inevitable part of the normative learning process if it is to be successful. Acharya defines the occurrence of normative change during learning as a process of 'norm localization', in which local norm takers (the actors most interested in adopting the norm) in the learning state reinterpret, graft and reconstruct an international norm so that it fits better into the learning state's existing norm hierarchy.[161] Acharya argues that such a process is often necessary for international norms to be adopted and 'learned' by the state. Acharya visualizes this process as a four-stage process consisting of pre-localization, local initiative and framing, adaptation and then amplification. In the pre-localization stage, local actors are initially suspicious about the global norms and there is a hard time adapting them to the local context. This is then followed by local initiative and framing, where entrepreneurial local actors, seeing that global norms might provide some utility, start undertaking the task of redefining the global norms to fit local conditions. This is then followed by adaptation, whereby the global norm is adapted and grafted to fit into the local normative hierarchy. Such a version of the norm is then

[159] Frank Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment," 118-119.
[160] Frank Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment," 129-132.
[161] Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," 244. The use of 'grafting' as a term to describe normative learning and localization has been used by Theo Farrell as well. See Theo Farrell, "Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland's Professional Army," *European Journal of International Relations* 1 Volume 7 (2001): 63-102.

amplified and universalized in the last stage of amplification, making it part of the local normative consensus.[162]

As part of his argument, Acharya points to the norm of Cooperative Security and how it became part of ASEAN's normative consensus as an example of how normative change and 'localization' is crucial to normative adoption. Acharya details how initially proposals to adopt Cooperative Security, which was based on European idea of common security and initially framed as such, as part of ASEAN were initially feared by ASEAN as a potential disruptive force that could undermine its existing security norms and practices, in particular its avoidance of military-security cooperation.[163] Such fears were amplified by the fact that such proposals came from sources outside of ASEAN. Acharya then points to the important role of the local norm taker of the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), which was key in bringing together Asian and Western scholars and reframing common security as Cooperative Security in order to bring it in line with existing ASEAN processes and norms.[164] This paved the way for successful learning at the institutional level, and Cooperative Security was soon institutionalized as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a regional forum for cooperative security discussion that soon grew to encompass key global powers like China, the US and Japan.[165]

The question that this thesis must ask at this point is therefore which view of normative change is better suited to exploring US-Japan deterrence socialization? I argue that, given interpretivist deterrence theory's focus on deterrence as a social construction, and the importance of political actors in constructing, and not just adopting deterrence norms, it would likely be more productive to approach the question of normative change from Acharya's perspective, and highlight the possibility, and indeed, greater likelihood of normative change during the learning process as part of normative construction. Such a position, as will be seen later in this chapter, will be reflected in my theoretical framework of deterrence socialization.

[162] Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," 251.
[163] Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," 256.
[164] Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," 257-258.
[165] Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," 258-259.

How do states teach and learn: Key Characteristics of the Normative Transfer Process

This is the area that is perhaps the most glossed-over by nuclear learning research and an area where the wider literature on international normative learning has much to offer. Several normative learning models, unlike the more case-based and exploratory approach taken by the nuclear learning examples, have constructed theoretical models that explain exactly the process of teaching and learning and parameters by which researchers can determine whether a state can or has carried out teaching/learning and have pointed out several key characteristics of the normative learning process. In this section, I identify three which I argue are likely to be crucial to understanding the nuclear normative process between the US and Japan and have chosen to utilize in my construction of the deterrence socialization process.

The first is a focus on power. Models of normative transfer which focus especially on the process of normative teaching, such as those of Schimmelfennig and Ikenberry and Kupchan, all identify differences in power between states as a prerequisite for teaching to take place.[166] It is this power difference, both models argue, that determines whose norms are taught and who learns said norms. Both models share certain key similarities in defining power as well, arguing that the power of the teaching state stems from it being able to gatekeep certain resources that the learning state requires. Through slowly providing access to said resources in exchange for gradual adaptation of the norms it is trying to transfer, the teaching state is thus able to 'teach' the learning states the norms that it is trying to transfer.[167]

This focus on power is perhaps surprising, given normative learning's roots in Constructivist international relations. Power, too, is hardly mentioned as a factor in the models of nuclear normative learning that have been examined above. However, normative learning's focus on power does have precedent within Constructivist international relations, and Wendt himself has noted the importance of power in international relations.[168] Furthermore, there have been attempts to theoretically develop a form of 'realist constructivism' that blends Realist international relations theory's emphasis on power with Constructivism's emphasis on constructed subjective realities. Samuel Barkin's concept of 'realist constructivism' for

[166] Frank Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment," 117; G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and hegemonic power," 293.
[167] Frank Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment," 117; G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and hegemonic power," 293.
[168] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 13-14.

example, argues that Constructivism's focus on ideals and constructed realities can be matched with classical realism, which, unlike structural realism, contends that any study of international politics cannot ignore the element of morality and ideals in world order, and focuses on the practical balancing of power and morality.[169] Barkin, as part of his definition of 'realist constructivism', thus argues for continuing to maintain Constructivism's focus on ideals and constructed realities but taking into account the role of power in allowing such ideals to take root and enact change.[170]

This focus on power as a factor in deciding the process of normative construction is thus seen in both the examples used by Schimmelfennig and Ikenberry and Kupchan. Schimmelfennig's model uses the case of former Eastern European states trying to join Western European regional organizations such as the Council of Europe and the European Union after the end of the Cold War to illustrate the role of power, arguing that Western European states were able to teach and compel Eastern European states to learn their norms as Eastern European states were desperate for economic and material resources necessary for them to transition to democracy and free market economies after the end of the Cold War.[171] Similarly, Ikenberry and Kupchan compares the attempts of the US to introduce US liberal norms such as recognition of self-determination and decolonization in Europe post-World War I and post-World War II and notes that it was far more successful on the latter occasion. This, Ikenberry and Kupchan argues, is due to the power that the US derived from providing access to key economic resources, which in turn were desperately needed by European states for rebuilding after World War II in the form of the Marshall Plan.[172]

Furthermore, even models of normative transfer that do not specify material power differences as a crucial factor in enabling the teaching process seem to acknowledge that power has an important role to play in the normative transfer process, even if they do not explicitly define what a 'powerful' state is. Both Florini and Finnemore and Sikkink, for example, while not referring to the material power of states explicitly in their models of normative transfer, have argued that 'powerful' states are more effective as norm entrepreneurs[173] (Florini) and that

[169] J Samuel Barkin, "Realist Constructivism," *International Studies Review* 3 Volume 5 (2003): 336-338.
[170] J Samuel Barkin, "Realist Constructivism,"336-338.
[171] Frank Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment," 124-125.
[172] G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and hegemonic power," 301-302.
[173] Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms," 375.

certain 'critical states' are crucial in determining the rate at which norms are distributed and adopted by states within the international environment[174] (Finnemore and Sikkink).

Based on such a premise, I thus argue that power is likely to be important in studying normative learning between the US and Japan. As identified by the existing literature on Japanese nuclear deterrence and security policy, one of the key features of the US-Japan alliance was how unequal it was when it was first established in 1960, with the US being obligated to defend Japan while not obligating Japan to do the same.[175] Japan's dependence on the US further allowed it to focus on economic rebuilding as well, a strategy which has been termed the 'Yoshida Doctrine' by multiple researchers.[176] Using Schimmelfennig and Ikenberry and Kupchan's definition of power as derived from resource gatekeeping, I thus argue that such a situation can thus be seen as one where the US gatekeeps and controls a resource (security) that Japan depends on, thus establishing an unequal power relationship. The extent to which the US is able to gatekeep Japan's need for security and thus, derive a level of power over Japan is thus likely to have an important role in influencing the nuclear normative transfer process between the US and Japan.

The second is a focus on the importance of local norm takers in the learning process, which is only given focus in Acharya's model, but which I argue is likely to be crucial for evaluating deterrence socialization in Japan's case. Acharya's model of normative 'localization' focuses heavily on the importance of local politicians and policymakers as 'norm takers'---actors who are responsible for learning, introducing and reconstructing international norms within a domestic context. Unlike most models of normative transfer covered in this literature review, which have tended to focus on transnational norm entrepreneurs, powerful states as unitary norm 'teachers' and the role of international society in pressuring states to conform with international standards and thus learn and adopt external norms, Acharya instead argues that while the international dimension is important, it is 'local norm takers', whose role it is to interpret and teach in a way that is acceptable to the local normative consensus that are the most influential in ensuring that such norms are successfully adopted and 'learnt' by the learner

[174] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 901.
[175] Government of Japan, "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America." 19th January 1960.
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html. Accessed 25/11/2024.
[176] Andrew O'Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*, 72.

state,[177] with the chances of normative learning succeeding largely dependent on the characteristics of each individual local norm taker.

Using two examples of international norms that international organizations have tried to introduce into the regional organization of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)----Cooperative Security, which succeeded and Flexible Engagement, which failed----Acharya examines the role of local norm takers and in particular, focuses on why the local norm taker was motivated to learn and adopt international norms, how it interpreted and adapted such norms in such a way that would fit with the existing local normative consensus, and how it used its political networks, authority and power, to build support for its interpretation. Based on his analysis of these two case studies, Acharya thus argues that having a local norm taker that is interested in adopting the norm regionally and has the negotiation skills, charisma and political influence to do so is of crucial importance in normative learning.

In the first case of the norm of Cooperative Security, Acharya first identifies the local norm taker as the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), whose scholars were interested in localizing the international norm of Common Security in order to lead the creation of a new cooperative security institution in Southeast Asia after the end of the Cold War and give ASEAN an enhanced role in the Asia-Pacific. It was ASEAN-ISIS, Acharya argues, who reinterpreted this international norm of Common Security into 'Cooperative Security', which was based on existing ASEAN norms of rejecting collective defense and deterrence and pursuing security multilaterally, and thus made it more palatable to ASEAN ministers.[178] This in turn, was aided by ASEAN-ISIS's status as a network of Southeast Asian scholars that for decades had organized multiple "Second Track" meetings and informal discussions between policymakers and scholars on cooperative security. For Acharya, how ASEAN-ISIS, as a local norm taker, reinterpreted international norms and used its political capital to build agreement for its reinterpretation was thus crucial to the normative transfer process.

In contrasting the success of Cooperative Security, Acharya in turn examines the case of Flexible Engagement and identifies the local norm taker as the new Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan, who was critical of ASEAN's established norm of mutual non-intervention following

[177] Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," 248.
[178] Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," 248.

the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, and believed it to have resulted in the lack of a regional financial surveillance system, which had resulted in the crisis.[179] Pitsuwan thus sought a normative change where ASEAN states were able to share opinions and concerns on domestic matters deemed serious enough to have transnational effects, in line other, more intervention-based international organizations, which he crafted as a form of 'flexible engagement'.[180] Pitsuwan's interpretation of 'flexible engagement', however, was seen as overly intrusive and unfitting with the existing ASEAN normative consensus on non-intervention, despite Pitsuwan trying to craft and interpret greater mutual intervention amongst ASEAN states as a way to build consensus and solid ground for regional action. Furthermore, unlike ASEAN-ISIS, as a new foreign minister, Pitsuwan lacked the political capital and regional networks that had been established over decades, and his proposal attracted many critics and few supporters. Acharya thus argues that Pitsuwan's failure as a local norm taker in interpreting the international norm of greater intervention and building support for his interpretation was thus a contributing factor to the failure of Flexible Engagement in ASEAN.

While this focus on the importance of local norm takers in the process of normative learning is only given focus by Acharya's model, I argue that it is likely to be crucial for any analysis of deterrence socialization between the US and Japan. As established in the analysis of existing research on Japanese nuclear deterrence policy at the beginning of this chapter, one of the most important points of focus for such research was the role of individual Japanese domestic actors like Prime Minister Satō Eisaku in developing Japan's nuclear deterrence policy, with multiple scholars terming him the 'architect' and 'author' of Japan's Three Non-Nuclear Principles and Four Nuclear Pillars. Such research also almost exclusively explores Satō's political deliberations and Satō's political choices as key factors that led up to Japan's nuclear deterrence policy. Given such a focus on individual politicians and policymakers like Satō when it comes to nuclear deterrence policy development in Japan, I thus argue that, in a similar vein, how local norm takers like Satō learned and constructed nuclear deterrence norms, is likely to be key to analyzing deterrence socialization and its role in crafting Japanese nuclear deterrence perspectives and norms.

The final characteristic crucial to examining the deterrence socialization process between the US and Japan relates to the normative compatibility between the norms being introduced, and

[179] Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," 257.
[180] Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," 260-261.

the existing norms within a state, and how differences in compatibility can determine the ease of learning. Normative compatibility is something that has been identified as crucial to the normative learning process in all normative learning models examined in this literature review, and while each model has used different terms to define normative compatibility, all normative learning models have put forward the argument that greater norm compatibility will facilitate an easier learning process and a higher chance for the norm to be successfully integrated. For example, Checkel points out the importance of 'cultural match' between states and international norms, defining it as a situation where "prescriptions embodied in an international norm are convergent with domestic norms".[181] Checkel then states that cultural match is not a dichotomous variable and scales along a spectrum, with 'positive' or 'null' cultural matches likely resulting in international norms being adopted and influencing domestic policies, while 'negative' cultural matches result in the opposite.

Ikenberry and Kupchan, too, point out that the degree to which socialization takes place is dependent on the 'conceptual distance' between the norms being proposed and the existent norms in the learning state's elite community, with norms that do not require as much normative shift from elites being more likely to be successfully socialized.[182] Florini's Normative Evolution, meanwhile, points to the importance of normative 'coherence', and argues that new norms are more likely to be accepted within a community when they 'fit' coherently with prevailing norms in said society.[183] Similarly, Finnemore and Sikkink use the concept of path dependency, and argue that norms that are more closely related to or 'adjacent' to existing norms are more likely to be influential and adopted, since they 'fit' within existing normative frameworks.[184]

Finally, Acharya argues that the 'existential compatibility between foreign and local norms must not be ignored' and points out that if a prior local norm makes similar claims or proposes similar arguments to the international norm being taught, it would be easier for local actors to introduce the international norm,[185] thus referencing the importance of normative compatibility. At this point, however, it is important to once again note Acharya's emphasis on the role of local norm takers in influencing normative compatibility. Unlike other models of normative

[181] Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," 87.
[182] G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and hegemonic power," 293.
[183] Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms," 376.
[184] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 908-909.
[185] Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," 250.

learning, which seem to define international norms as either 'coherent' or 'incoherent' with a state's existing normative hierarchy and thus, affecting its chances of being successfully adopted, Acharya, while stressing the importance of normative compatibility, has also clearly emphasized the importance of local norm takers in interpreting and constructing international norms in a manner that is coherent with the existing normative hierarchy within a state, as mentioned above. For Acharya, normative compatibility thus appears not to be a fixed constant, instead being highly dependent on the process of normative interpretation and construction by local norm takers.

Normative compatibility is likely to be a key issue when examining the deterrence socialization in Japan. As has been well-documented, the Japanese public is highly anti-nuclear, and public opprobrium has forced Japanese politicians on many occasions to withdraw comments viewed as pro-nuclear. In contrast, the possibility of deterring nuclear missiles by purely conventional anti-missile systems via BMD would appear to be less controversial and more normatively compatible with the Japanese security normative consensus. As a result of such differences in normative compatibility, the process of how local norm takers like Satō managed to frame and construct nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation as a means of deterrence compatible with Japan's existing normative consensus during the Cold War is thus highly likely to be different from how local norm takers like Koizumi Junichirō framed the BMD debate in the post-Cold War era and will likely be an important feature of the deterrence socialization process.

Normative Learning Models: Connecting the Dots

From these models of normative teaching and learning within the wider literature of normative learning, we can thus begin to construct how a process of nuclear normative learning might look like. Building from the principle that deterrence can be learned, we see from the models of normative teaching and learning that this learning process might involve both teaching and learning, is focused on policymakers, and is heavily affected by power, the role of local norm takers, and the normative compatibility between the international norm and local norms. The principle that socialization affects the process of deterrence, and that deterrence must be constructed, meanwhile, is further elaborated upon by Acharya and his concept of localization and normative change, suggesting that in the process of construction and socialization, change can occur as policymakers graft and adapt international norms to better fit the local normative consensus. Meanwhile, the principle of normative compatibility and its relation to successful learning suggests that the process of construction and socialization will have a higher chance

of success if the nuclear deterrence norm does not clash with existing deterrence norms within the state undergoing the learning process. Finally, the importance of speech acts in nuclear deterrence normative construction is also given further explanation by models of normative transfer, which state that it is through these speech acts where norms are reshaped and reconstructed, and that it is only through definitive speech acts that has reshaped and reconstructed norms while also implementing such reconstructions as policy changes that we can evaluate whether normative transfer has succeeded or failed.

Section IV: Deterrence Socialization and the case of Japan

Building on the arguments in interpretivist nuclear deterrence literature and the four models of international normative learning that I have analyzed, I have thus developed my own theoretical framework of Deterrence Socialization, which I will be using to analyze the case of normative transfer between the US and Japan. Deterrence socialization contends that normative transfer consists of two stages—external socialization, followed by internal socialization, with the end result being the institutionalization and 'normalization' of nuclear deterrence norms by the state being taught in the form of being implemented into nuclear deterrence policy that reflects the norms involved. Building on previous theoretical models of normative learning and taking into account definitions used by previous scholars of normative transfer, deterrence socialization argues that there are three developments that take place during this process---teaching, learning and construction (of norms).

Deterrence socialization begins with the stage of external socialization. In this stage, two developments take place—teaching, and learning. The state that wishes to spread its nuclear deterrence concepts and principles begins the process of socializing, or teaching, its allied state its interpretation and logical understanding of such norms. Teaching, as it is used here, basically means a form of knowledge transfer and persuasion, in which the international norm proponent tries to get the targeted state to adopt its arguments and interpretation of nuclear deterrence. The 'teaching' process, as stated by Schimmelfennig and Ikenberry and Kupchan, for example, could include more benign efforts such as interaction between state officials and academic collaboration, or more forceful methods, such as conditioning the provision of support and resources on the basis of accepting the norms that are being taught.

While the international norm proponent carries out teaching, the targeted state also begins learning during the process of external socialization. At this point, I argue that it is likely that learning is still relatively simplistic in nature. Policymakers of the targeted state may begin

echoing the talking points of the international norm proponent or make general policy changes to accommodate the demands of its ally. This is especially the case if resource access is dependent on such changes. At this point, policymakers' understanding of the nuclear deterrence norm is largely more directed towards how it affects the general deterrence posture and alliance security as a whole but has yet failed to construct or properly grasp how the nuclear deterrence norm relates to their own nuclear deterrence policy. An important point to note at this point is that when deterrence socialization refers to policymakers, it refers primarily to politicians that are part of the ruling party, as it is them who will primarily be capable of negotiating on behalf of the country with the norm proponent and make policy changes.

For external socialization to transition to the second stage of internal socialization, a catalyst is needed in the form of a crisis. As mentioned earlier in Section III, this appears to be the case especially for Japan in nuclear deterrence normative learning as compared to the 'norms cascade' model, given the emphasis that previous studies of Japanese nuclear deterrence policy have placed on various global nuclear developments in determining Japan's nuclear deterrence policy changes. This crisis forces the targeted state, in this case Japan, to begin to search and consider new nuclear deterrence norms in order to deal with the crisis, especially if existing norms are incapable of dealing with said crisis. In the normative transfer of nuclear deterrence norms, such crises often take the form of a nuclearization of a geopolitical rival, the introduction of a new form of nuclear deterrence technology or even a change in the international system, such as the one brought about by the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. The occurrence of a crisis thus leads to the next stage of internal socialization.

Internal socialization is the second stage in deterrence socialization. In this stage, the policymakers and politicians of the targeted state begin to utilize the norms they had begun learning in the external socialization stage to construct new policies that can deal with the crisis. In this stage, I argue that two developments take place—learning and construction. Policymakers, at this point, will continue to learn more about the nuclear deterrence norms they were first exposed to in the external socialization stage. Learning at this point becomes more complex however and sees politicians trying to understand how to fit and adapt such norms based on the unique security circumstances the state faces, as well as its unique socio-political context. Such learning can take place through debate with their fellow policymakers, specialized researchers or feedback from public sentiment (polls, election, newspaper criticism). As policymakers slowly learn and understand how to adapt said norms, this thus leads to the next process of construction. In this stage, adapted norms become more concrete

and written into policy suggestions, which are then further debated, refined, and altered/constructed before being implemented as nuclear deterrence policy, which marks the end of the deterrence socialization process. For ease of understanding, I have summarized this process as a diagram, as seen below in Figure 1.1.



Fig 1.1. The Process of Deterrence Socialization

Deterrence Socialization: Areas of Evaluation

The Role of Power

Power is an important concept in deterrence socialization and plays a central role in the external socialization stage. affecting the processes of teaching and learning. In the external socialization stage, the power difference between the norm proponent and the state being socialized affects two key points---the teaching methods used by the norm proponent, and the willingness of the state being socialized to learn/agree to policy accommodations. I utilize Ikenberry and Kupchan's classification of teaching methods (normative persuasion, external inducement and internal reconstruction)[186] and argue that dependent on the level of power the proponent holds over the targeted state, it will lean towards usage of certain methods in order

[186] G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and hegemonic power," 290.

to ensure success. Complete power will result in internal reconstruction (highest chance of success and most intrusive), lesser but still dominant power will result in external inducement (bargaining and offering potential access to resources) while little power difference will see normative persuasion (ideological persuasion via diplomatic channels, foreign study, cultural exchanges, etc.).

My definition of power in turn, makes use of both Schimmelfennig and Ikenberry and Kupchan's focus on power as derived from structural asymmetry and resource control. Both Schimmelfennig and Ikenberry and Kupchan define power as being derived from the control of strategic and important resources.[187] By providing such resources, one state is thus able to influence the other, which is then defined as power. Taken within the context of deterrence socialization in Japan, the power that the US has over Japan, and how this power affects the external socialization process, can thus be defined as the extent to which the US is able to provide and gatekeep a certain resource that Japan desperately needs---in this case, security and military protection, via the alliance. Such a concept is similar to Glenn Snyder's alliance theory's reference to dependence on the alliance as a measure of power, with Snyder arguing that the more a state is dependent on the security provided by an alliance, the greater the bargaining power its ally has over it.[188]

As mentioned above, in the case of the allied relationship between Japan and US, it is well recognized that the US-Japan alliance is a highly unequal one, and that the US's power over Japan was at its greatest extent during the Occupation and during the early 1950s-1960s. While the US is still a major influence in Japanese security, with the US-Japan alliance being the foundation of Japanese security policy, the power relationship between the two allies has also developed into a more equal relationship in recent times, with Japan taking on greater responsibility for its own security and being less reliant on the US for all security issues. How this power shift affected the normative transfer process will be a key area of analysis across my case studies in the external socialization phase.

The role of Local Norm Takers and the importance of Normative Change

As mentioned above, the role of local norm takers and the importance of normative change, or as Acharya calls it, norm 'localization', is important in determining the eventual result of

[187] Frank Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment," 117; G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and hegemonic power," 293.
[188] Glenn Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997): 166-168.

normative socialization. Rather than structural pressures, Acharya argues, it is local norm takers, who, as individual actors with agency, each possessing their own unique socio-political background on which they base their interpretation of international norms as well as their own political motivations, that are responsible for interpreting international norms. Furthermore, it is this reinterpretation and construction of international norms in a way that fits with the existing normative consensus within a country, Acharya argues, that ensures a higher chance of successful normative socialization. This was seen by both Acharya's examination of ASEAN-ISIS, who succeeded in learning and constructing the international norm of cooperative security in ASEAN, and Thai Foreign Minister Pitsuwan, who failed at doing the same for Flexible Engagement. This, I have argued, is likely to be similar in Japan's case, with existing literature giving much credit to individual politicians like Prime Minister Satō and developing and framing key aspects of Japan's nuclear deterrence policy.[189]

In evaluating the deterrence socialization process of Japan, I shall thus be focusing on the role of local norm takers such as Prime Minister Satō and Prime Minister Koizumi as well. Using Acharya's analysis of local norm takers and the importance of such norm takers engaging in normative reinterpretation and change as a basis, I will evaluate how important the reinterpretation and reconstruction of international nuclear deterrence norms by local norm takers such as Satō and Koizumi was to such norms being successfully socialized and institutionalized as part of Japan's nuclear deterrence normative consensus in each of the cases I am examining.

Norms and Normative Compatibility

The relationship between normative socialization and compatibility is the final key concept that I will be evaluating as part of the construction process in internal socialization and is partially linked to the role of local norm takers and their role in carrying out normative reinterpretation. As mentioned previously, normative compatibility is stated to be a key factor in the normative transfer process by all models of normative learning, with said models basically arguing that if the external norms are highly compatible with existing norms in the country, there is a higher chance of such norms being successfully transferred and institutionalized. In contrast, if the external norms being introduced are a radical departure from the existing norms of a country, there is a higher chance of socialization failing. At this point, for Acharya, the normative coherence between external norms and the internal normative

[189] Kusunoki Ayako, "The Satō Cabinet and the Making of Japan's Non-Nuclear Policy," 25-26.

hierarchy would then affect the efforts of policymakers and politicians to reinterpret and construct external norms, with more divergent nuclear deterrence norms requiring interpretation and construction at a more complex level if success is to be ensured.

As mentioned above, in the case of Japan, normative compatibility is likely to have a key impact on the deterrence socialization process, given the Japanese public's well-known aversion to nuclear weapons, and the differences between the two key normative perspectives this thesis is analyzing, with one focusing on nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation (nuclear) and the other focusing on BMD as a complement to nuclear weapons (non-nuclear). This would thus seem to suggest that nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation would be far more incompatible with Japan's normative consensus, as compared to BMD. In examining how normative compatibility affected the deterrence socialization process for these two perspectives, I shall thus focus on examining and comparing the normative compatibility issue for both nuclear weapons and BMD and evaluate whether such an assumption can be proven. Linking back to deterrence socialization's focus on the importance of local norm takers and their reinterpretation and reconstruction of international norms to the success of socialization, I will then also examine how local norm takers in each case managed to bridge the compatibility gap and thus also evaluate the relative difficulty of each deterrence socialization process.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology

This chapter covers my thesis's research methodology and how I will analyze the process of deterrence socialization and its role in institutionalizing the two nuclear deterrence normative perspectives which make up the consensus on how Japanese policymakers view nuclear deterrence even today. The continued adherence to these two normative perspectives, as stated in my thesis's main argument, explains why Japan continues to remain so sensitive to changes in US extended nuclear deterrence (END) posture. This chapter will be divided into three sections. In the first section, I will provide a brief overview of my two research methods of historical discourse analysis and over-time case study analysis and provide a brief explanation of why I have chosen these two methods to examine deterrence socialization. In the second section, I will then provide a brief outline of the two cases I have selected to study Japan's deterrence socialization, explain how I will structure each case analysis and justify my case selection. In the final section of this chapter, I will then specify the evidence I will be relying on in order to build my cases, and how I will parse said evidence as part of my case building.

Section I: Over-Time Case Analysis and Historical Discourse Analysis

As briefly summarized in the introductory chapter, my analysis of the formation of Japan's two key nuclear deterrence perspectives divides the socialization, construction and institutionalization of said perspectives into three instances of deterrence socialization across two case studies. As is clear from my research question and main argument, I am not just concerned about the significance of the result of the deterrence socialization process---the perspective/policy institutionalized—but am instead concerned with how specific factors and developments in the deterrence socialization process influenced how such perspectives were developed and socialized in Japan to become the resulting policy. I will therefore be using case study analysis to study such a process.

Case study analysis is of course not new to the study of international relations (IR) and has been described by Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman as a qualitative approach that is at least as important to the field of IR as quantitative approaches.[190] Case study analysis, at its most basic, refers to the investigation or analysis of a particular unit/case, in order to answer specific research questions. Such research is usually focused on the processes in a case, and the relationship between the processes in a case and the results of the case, rather than just the

[190] Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, "Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield," *Comparative Political Studies* 2 Volume 40 (2007): 170.

significance of the results themselves, as is usually the case with quantitative research.[191] The nature of case study research thus means case study analysis primarily relies on qualitative methods, such as interviews or archival research.[192] Such an approach means that it is well suited for my focus on the process of deterrence socialization.

In utilizing case study analysis, I will first be using an over-time case study structure analysis, in order to first demonstrate that nuclear deterrence perspectives have changed following a specific deterrence socialization process. An over-time case study analysis is suitable for such a task, and entails comparing the status of the case---in this case, Japan's nuclear deterrence perspectives and nuclear policy, at a certain point in time, before the deterrence socialization process, and its nuclear deterrence perspectives after the deterrence socialization process.[193] By noting the differences, or lack thereof, in nuclear perspectives, I will therefore demonstrate whether deterrence socialization has or has not taken place in a particular Japanese case.

However, it is not just the fact that Japanese perspectives on nuclear deterrence have changed following a particular period in time that is significant for my argument. Rather, it is examining and exploring how such a change has occurred via deterrence socialization, in accordance with the theoretical framework I have developed, that is crucial to my research question. In order to analyze the process of deterrence socialization and determine how the normative perspectives of policymakers have shifted in accordance with the nuclear deterrence norms they have been exposed to, I will thus be relying on historical discourse analysis.

As noted in the introductory chapter and the literature review, it is through discourse, argue interpretivist deterrence scholars, that actors spread deterrence norms and introduce rules and routines on nuclear deterrence. It is also through discourse on nuclear deterrence that such actors interpret and construct perspectives on various nuclear deterrence norms.[194] Such perspectives are strengthened by the definition of discourse as well. It is thus Japanese policymakers' discourse on nuclear deterrence during the deterrence process, and how their interpretation and construction of nuclear deterrence norms is dependent on such discourse and changes in accordance with developments in said discourse that I will examine as part of deterrence socialization process.

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[191] Bill Gillham, *Case Study Research Methods* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2000): 11.
[192] Bill Gillham, *Case Study Research Methods,* 10-11.
[193] Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, "Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield," 176.
[194] Amir Lupovici, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Towards a New Research Agenda," *International Studies Quarterly* 3 Volume 54 (2010): 717-718.

In analyzing the discourse on nuclear deterrence throughout all three deterrence socialization processes, I will be mainly relying on historical discourse analysis, which takes into account my deterrence socialization's theoretical framework's focus on evaluating the role of power in both the external socialization stage, as well as the importance of local norm takers and normative compatibility between the norm being socialized and the existing normative consensus of Japan in the internal socialization, in affecting the deterrence socialization process. While discourse analysis may pick out changes in deterrence perspectives and the construction of new normative perspectives as part of the deterrence socialization process, it is historical discourse analysis that can provide additional explanation as to why and how such changes occurred the way they did. Historical discourse analysis focuses on how the historical and political conditions of a certain case affect the way certain subjects are spoken about, and how said subjects are constructed and established.[195] In the case of deterrence socialization, historical discourse analysis can thus enable me to draw a link between the socio-political beliefs of a particular actor in the deterrence socialization process at a certain point in history, for example, Japanese Prime Minister Satō Eisaku, and how such beliefs caused him to explain or construct deterrence in a certain way. Such socio-political beliefs, in turn, must be examined in relation to the particular political context of Japan during each individual case and how such conditions constricted the way policymakers crafted their discourse on deterrence. It is thus through historical discourse analysis which I will examine and evaluate the effect of power relations between the US and Japan on the external socialization process, as well as the impact of local norm takers and normative compatibility on the internal socialization process.

Section II: Case Selection and Structure

In this section, I provide a brief overview of the cases that I have selected to demonstrate deterrence socialization's impact on the development of Japan's two key perspectives on nuclear deterrence. For the purposes of my argument, I have selected two cases, with the second case being split into two parts. The first case is Japan's initial exposure to nuclear deterrence through its alliance with the US, Prime Minister Satō Eisaku's request for US END, and the formation of the Four Nuclear Pillars from 1951-1970. The second case meanwhile, concerns the integration of BMD into Japanese nuclear deterrence policy and consists of two parts. The first is the failure of the US to introduce Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) as a replacement for nuclear deterrence into Japan under the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program from 1985-

[195] Ingolfur Asgeir Johannesson, "The politics of historical discourse analysis: a qualitative research method?" *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education* 2 Volume 31 (2010): 252-253.

1988, and the second is Japan's reexamination of BMD policy and its eventual decision to adopt BMD as an additional form of nuclear deterrence from 1993-2003.[196] As part of my overview of each case, I will explain the key aspects of each case I will focus on, as well as how I will structure each case in accordance with the deterrence socialization framework. I will then provide a brief justification for each of the cases I have selected.

Case Study I: Japan and the Four Nuclear Pillars

This case study will document the changes in Japanese nuclear deterrence policy from 1951-1970 that saw the nuclear deterrence perspective that nuclear threats must be deterred and that only nuclear weapons are capable of doing so enter Japan via the process of deterrence socialization and ended with Prime Minister Satō's announcement of the Four Nuclear Pillars,[197] which institutionalized and established such a perspective as official Japanese policy on nuclear deterrence since then. Analysis of this case study will largely be divided into two periods, 1951-1964, and 1964-1970, with each period corresponding to the stages of external socialization and internal socialization respectively. Previous research analyzing the formation of the Four Pillars and Japan's decision to depend on US END has largely utilized 1964 as a starting point, with several scholars pointing to China's successful nuclear test in October 1964 as the trigger for Japan's 'nuclear awakening'.[198] While acknowledging the importance of 1964 as a trigger for Japanese policymakers to begin seriously debating nuclear deterrence policy, I have however, included the period from 1951-1964, which I argue is crucial in explaining where the principles which influenced Japanese nuclear deterrence debate from 1964-1970 originate from, per my thesis's argument of deterrence socialization.

From 1951-1964, my case study analysis will thus be focused on examining alliance relations between the US and Japan, and how Japan slowly became integrated within the US's wider

[196] Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kaigi, "Dandō Misairu Bōgyo Shisutemu no Seibitō ni tsuite,", 19th December 2003.
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyoukaigi/Missile.pdf. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[197] Shūgiin Honkaigi Dai 3 Gō (Records of the Plenary Session, House of Representatives, no.3), 30th January 1968.
https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPSC/19680130.O2J.html. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[198] Examples include Kusunoki Ayako, "The Satō Cabinet and the Making of Japan's Non-Nuclear Policy," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* Special Volume—Cold War Across the Pacific Volume 15 (2008), Kurosaki Akira, *Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei—Amerika no Kaku Fu Kakusan Gaikō to Nihon no Sentaku 1960-1976* (Tōkyō: Yūshisha 2006); Andrew O'Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence* (New York: Routledge 2013) and Terence Roehrig, *Japan, South Korea, and the United States Umbrella: Deterrence after the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press 2013),

global strategy against the USSR as the US's key ally in East Asia.[199] In analyzing this process, I will focus especially on the expanding role of nuclear weapons in the US's deterrence strategy,[200] necessitating the US 'teach' the nuclear deterrence principles on which its deterrence strategy was based to its allies, and how this influenced the nuclear deterrence debate amongst Japanese policymakers. In particular, I will focus on two processes through which this 'teaching' occurred in Japan---secret nuclear arrangements between US and Japanese officials, and the education of a new generation of Japanese security specialists at US institutions---and examine the similarities and differences between the two. In accordance with my use of discourse analysis, I will focus on the discourse used by US policymakers and Japanese politicians, such as remarks made in meetings, comments made in the Japanese Diet, government reports and official policy statements, to describe nuclear deterrence, how it deters and what it deters as a representation of their perspectives on nuclear deterrence, and how such perspectives and discourse changed across the external socialization process. As deterrence socialization focuses on power as the key factor influencing the process of external socialization, I will also evaluate what effect did the US's relatively high levels of power and influence over the Japanese security debate as Japan's main security provider[201] during this period have on its discourse and how it utilized such discourse with Japan when transferring nuclear deterrence norms.

My analysis of the internal socialization stage from 1964-1970, meanwhile, will focus primarily on Prime Minister Satō Eisaku's reaction to China's successful nuclearization and his views on the necessity of nuclear weapons for Japan to implement a successful nuclear deterrence strategy. In particular, I will focus on his meetings with the Cabinet Research Office (CRO), an organization of researchers and specialists which prepared three reports for Satō, each at crucial points in Satō's formulation of nuclear deterrence policy.[202] I will examine how Satō's perspectives of nuclear weapons and their role in nuclear deterrence developed after

[199] 1951 is used as the starting point because it is the year Japan regained its independence and signed a security treaty with the US.
[200] This started with the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953 and his policy of 'Massive Retaliation.'
[201] During this period, Japan was largely responsible for internal policing and focused on economic recovery, while leaving external defense to the US in exchange for allowing the construction of US military bases in Japan. This was the policy of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, which later became known as the Yoshida Doctrine.
[202] The First Report was presented to Satō in 1964, before he first asked for US END from President Johnson. The Second Report was presented in 1967, before he officially announced US END as Japanese nuclear deterrence strategy. The Third was presented in 1970, before Japan signed the NPT.

each meeting with the CRO and how such views incorporated and reconstructed US nuclear deterrence norms that Japanese policymakers and researchers were exposed to in the external socialization stage previously. In accordance with my focus on discourse analysis and my evaluation of Satō's role as a local norm taker and how it relates to the issue of normative compatibility, I will thus be focusing on Satō's remarks when announcing the Four Nuclear Pillars, how he reconstructed and reinterpreted nuclear deterrence norms in a way that was consistent with the Japanese normative consensus, the terms he used when discussing nuclear deterrence policies with his fellow politicians and the arguments made by the CRO reports as a representation of nuclear deterrence perspective shifts during the internal socialization process.

The Four Nuclear Pillars: Why this case study?

There are two key reasons why I have selected the case of the Four Nuclear Pillars,[203] and their formation from 1951-1970 as a case example of how to examine deterrence socialization's impact on how Japanese politicians came to view nuclear weapons as being absolutely essential to deter nuclear threats. The first is due to the importance and longevity of the Four Nuclear Pillars in representing Japanese perspectives on how nuclear deterrence operates. As mentioned in my introduction, despite the fact that the Four Pillars policy was first announced in 1969, it continues to represent Japanese nuclear deterrence perspectives and policy even in modern times and has continued to do so largely unchanged. As seen from the fact that it has been referenced every iteration of Japan's NDPG and Japan's National Security Strategy (NSS), has been brought up multiple times in Japanese defense white papers even after the end of the Cold War[204], and was mentioned by politicians on multiple occasions when asked to comment on the threat of nuclear weapons, most recently by Prime Minister Kishida in 2022,[205] the Four Pillars clearly continues to serve as an important example of the institutionalization and officialization of the concept that Japan will rely on US END, and thus, the threat of nuclear retaliation, to deter the threat of nuclear weapons as its main nuclear deterrence policy, which is one of the two key normative nuclear deterrence perspectives of Japan that this thesis has

[203] The Four Nuclear Pillars state that Japan will contribute to international disarmament, that it will adhere to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, that it will abide by the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and most important of all, that it will rely on US END for nuclear deterrence as long as necessary.
[204] See, for example, Japan Defense Agency, "Dairyō Hakai Heiki no Kakusan Mondai nitsuite", a report published by the JDA in 1995.
[205] Asahi Shimbun, "Kishida Shushō, Abe-shi ga genkyū no Kaku Kyōyū wo Hitei Hikakusangensaku wo kenji.", 28th February 2022, https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASQ2X4H22Q2XUTFK00C.html. Accessed 19/10/2024.

identified. As the most important and longest representation of this nuclear deterrence normative perspective in Japanese nuclear deterrence policy, it is thus crucial for this thesis's main argument to examine how the Four Pillars were formed through a process of deterrence socialization from 1951-1970.

The second reason for selecting this case is that Japan's exposure to nuclear deterrence concepts from 1951-1964 and its internal nuclear deterrence debate and discussion from 1964-1970 represents one of the best examples of the deterrence socialization process, when it comes to the nuclear deterrence perspectives that this thesis is examining. The process from 1951-1970 is the most comprehensive attempt (or at least, the attempt with the most archival resources and material available to researchers) by US policymakers to introduce nuclear deterrence concepts and persuade Japanese policymakers to abide by US conceptualizations of how nuclear weapons should be utilized since the beginning of the US-Japan alliance. Similarly, it is also the most comprehensive attempt by Japanese policymakers to discuss nuclear weapons specifically and construct, normatively, the role of nuclear weapons in Japan's security policy. Since 1970, there has never been an equally intense and prolonged period of discussion in Japan reviewing specifically the role of nuclear weapons in Japan's nuclear deterrence policy, debating Japan's indigenous nuclearization options, or questioning the normative concept of nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation and how it operates for Japan. An analysis carried out by the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) in 1995 on Japan's nuclearization options comes the closest to doing so but was still less rigorous than the efforts undertaken by Japanese policymakers from 1951-1970.[206] This is perhaps best demonstrated by the three reports on Japan's nuclear deterrence options, ordered by the Prime Minister's Office and published by the CRO during this period, which are far more detailed than the JDA report in 1995. The wealth of material available for the 1951-1970 deterrence socialization process and the thoroughness of the debate over how nuclear deterrence should be conceptualized by Japan from 1951-1970 thus makes this process the best case for examining deterrence socialization and its impact on how Japan came to adopt the perspective that nuclear threats needed to be deterred and that nuclear weapons were absolutely necessary for doing so.

Case Study 2: Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

My second case study is a longer case study that will examine how the perspective that BMD is a necessary and complementary system of nuclear deterrence, which is the second of the two

[206] Japan Defense Agency, "Dairyō Hakai Heiki no Kakusan Mondai nitsuite".

key normative perspectives I have identified, was institutionalized and established as an official perspective of nuclear deterrence in Japan. I argue that this entire process is actually made up of two different deterrence socialization processes and as such, have divided this case study into two parts, with each part covered by an individual chapter in my thesis. The first part will cover the period from 1985-1988 and Japan's deterrence socialization process when the US tried to persuade Japan to participate in its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, which was the US's first attempt at introducing the concept of BMD as a new form of nuclear deterrence that does not depend on nuclear weapons and nuclear retaliation.[207] This attempt, I argue, was a failure and ultimately did not result in any changes in Japan's perspectives on nuclear deterrence strategy. The second part of the case study, meanwhile, will cover the period from 1993-2003, and the US's second attempt at introducing BMD as a nuclear deterrence concept to Japan. This time, under the reorganized Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO),[208] the US would instead conceptualize BMD as a complement to nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation, acting as an additional defense and shooting down the nuclear ballistic missiles of adversarial states that could not be deterred by threats of nuclear retaliation.

Japan and BMD: Part 1—The SDI

The first part of this case study examines the deterrence socialization process Japan went through from 1985-1988. I will examine this process as a failure of deterrence socialization, as the end of the deterrence socialization process did not see Japan develop a BMD policy that demonstrated that it had institutionalized or established new perspectives on how BMD plays a role in nuclear deterrence.[209] My analysis of this period of Japan's BMD development will therefore focus on attempting to explain why and how deterrence socialization failed, and how the failure of deterrence socialization from 1985-1988 is part of the larger development of how BMD and its relation to nuclear deterrence has come to be normatively understood by Japanese policymakers today.

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[207] As stated by Ronald Reagan, it was supposed to make nuclear deterrence 'obsolete'.
Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security,", 23rd March 1983, *Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum.*
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-defense-and-national-security.
Accessed 19/10/2024.

[208] The Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO) was reorganized as the BMDO under the Clinton Administration in 1993.

[209] The end result of the process from 1985-1988 was primarily Nakasone's Five SDI Principles, which did not specific what role the SDI played in Japanese nuclear deterrence. See JAXA, *Nakasone Yasuhiro SDI Sanka Gogensoku.* 16th September 1986.
https://www.jaxa.jp/library/space_law/chapter_3/3-1-1-5_j.html.

My examination of this case begins in 1985, when the US first extended an invitation to Japan to participate in its SDI program,[210] which I argue constitutes the beginning of the external socialization stage of deterrence socialization. In examining the external socialization stage, I will be focusing on the US's teaching of BMD norms through two processes. The first is President Reagan's personal interactions with Prime Minister Nakasone, how he tried to convince Nakasone to participate in SDI, and how did such interactions affect Nakasone's own conceptualization of SDI and its relationship with Japanese nuclear deterrence. The second process meanwhile, involves official exchanges between US and Japanese officials over SDI. This was primarily in the form of three scientific investigatory teams that were sent to the US by Japan, following Nakasone's meetings with Reagan, in order to better understand the SDI project before deciding whether to participate.[211] As with the first case study, I will compare the two processes and how each of the actors conceptualized, 'taught' and 'learned' the concept of BMD and its relationship with nuclear deterrence. In examining the two processes, I will once again be primarily examining the discourse utilized by Nakasone and Reagan, and US and Japanese officials. Such discourse will primarily be taken from the conversation Reagan and Nakasone had during a meeting over SDI in 1985, as well as Diet committee sessions featuring specific Japanese policymakers who took part in SDI discussion with their US counterparts, who then shared their discussions and findings with other members of the Diet committee. In particular, as it is well established that there was a massive disagreement between Reagan and his officials on how BMD operates as nuclear deterrence under SDI,[212] I will analyze the possible normative differences and similarities in the way BMD technology and its intended purpose was described to the Japanese by Reagan and his officials.

I will then demonstrate that the deterrence socialization process of BMD under the SDI ended at the external socialization stage with no transition to the internal socialization stage, marking the failure of the deterrence socialization process from 1985-1988. My analysis and evaluation of this case will then focus on why deterrence socialization failed. As mentioned above, the deterrence socialization framework focuses on the role of power in the external socialization process, and how it affects the teaching methods of the US. Using historical discourse analysis, my analysis will therefore focus on whether the changes in the power relationship between the

[210] Segawa Takao, "Nihon no SDI Kenkyū Sanka wo Meguru Seisaku Kettei Katei: 1985-1987," *Kōkyō Seisaku Gaku Nenhō* Volume 9 (2015): 92.
[211] Segawa Takao, "Nihon no SDI Kenkyū Sanka wo Meguru Seisaku Kettei Katei: 1985-1987," 99.
[212] Beth A. Fischer, *The Myth of Triumphalism: Rethinking President Reagan's Cold War Legacy* (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2020): 72-73. Specifically, there was a power struggle between Reagan and his officials over what exactly SDI was supposed to do.

US and Japan had any effect on the discourse of the US during the process of external socialization. I will further evaluate how this could have impacted the deterrence socialization process and whether it led to the failure of deterrence socialization.

I argue that it is necessary to include the deterrence socialization process from 1985-1988 in examining how Japan formed its second key nuclear normative perspective despite it not resulting in normative change in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of how the deterrence socialization is crucial in institutionalizing and establishing the view that BMD is a necessary but limited complement to nuclear weapons in Japan. In the case of the deterrence socialization process from 1985-1988, I contend that it is exactly the fact that it is a failed case that allows it to act as a contrast to the successful deterrence socialization process later from 1993-2003 and thus emphasize the importance of deterrence socialization by acting as an example of a 'missed opportunity' for Japan. As I will demonstrate in the case study, the normative concept of BMD and its relationship with nuclear deterrence under the SDI was completely different from its conceptualization under the BMDO, with President Reagan viewing BMD as a complete replacement for nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation and necessitating modification of the existing nuclear deterrence regime on a massive scale.[213] Had Reagan succeeded with such a socialization process, non-nuclear nuclear deterrence could very well have become an established perspective in Japan, given the influence of the US had on Japanese nuclear deterrence perspectives. By contrasting how the SDI failed to 'teach' this conceptualization to Japan from 1985-1988, and how the BMDO succeeded in 'teaching' the normative conceptualization of BMD as a complement, rather than replacement, to nuclear deterrence by retaliation, I thus emphasize how two deterrence socialization processes, with one failing and one succeeding, were both crucial in determining Japan's second key nuclear perspective. This, I argue, further demonstrates the importance of deterrence socialization by showing a possible 'counterfactual' scenario.

Japan and BMD: Part 2---The 1998 North Korean Missile Crisis

Japan's eventual adoption of a BMD system in 2003 under its new BMD policy was based on the perspective that such a system was necessary as a complement to US END against the new threats that Japan faced, and that both systems can be utilized as nuclear deterrence in an effective manner. The deterrence socialization process that resulted in Japanese policymakers adopting such a nuclear deterrence perspective, I argue, takes place from 1993, when the US

[213] Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (New York: Pocket Books, 1990): 550.

first approached Japan again on BMD technological development under a new conceptualization, to 2003, when Japan finally announced that it would be outfitting its naval vessels with the AEGIS sea-based BMD system. In examining this deterrence socialization process, I thus begin with examining the external socialization process from 1993-1998, when the US first reconceptualized and started trying to convince Japanese officials of the value of BMD as a necessary complement to nuclear weapons against the less destructive, but more varied and unpredictable threats of the post-Cold War environment. My examination of the external socialization process will focus on discussions at the policymaker level between the US and Japan, as US officials under the newly reorganized Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) tried to convince Japanese officials, once again, on the necessity of participation in US-led BMD development using a different normative conceptualization of BMD and its relationship with nuclear deterrence. Using discourse analysis, I will analyze various documents, statements and remarks made on BMD during this period, and how US officials described BMD and its purpose to Japanese officials. On the Japanese side, I will also examine reports, statements and remarks made by Japanese officials when commenting on BMD, and how they interpreted the purpose of this new technology, and how such interpretations contextualized US explanations for Japanese purposes.

In accordance with my theoretical framework's focus on power as an important factor affecting the teaching methods and the discourse of the US in the external socialization period, my analysis of external socialization will focus on changing power dynamics between the US and Japan following the end of the Cold War, and how it affected US normative teaching. I will examine how Japanese fears of US withdrawal from East Asia prior to 1995 led to changes in the power relationship between the US and Japan during this period, which led to US discourse that was more stringent and harsher in requesting Japanese cooperation. I will then examine how Japan responded to such demands, and how this affected the external socialization process.

Analysis of the internal socialization process, meanwhile, will be divided into three phases, with each phase featuring debate and discourse on a different aspect of BMD. The first phase, from 1998-1999, will focus on the Diet discussions in the immediate aftermath of the 1998 North Korean Missile Launch, and how there was a near consensus on the need for Japan to have some form of missile defense and the rapid socialization and construction of BMD as an additional, necessary, nuclear deterrence strategy, which quickly led to an announcement in October 1998 that Japan was entering into a Joint Technical Research Agreement with the US

on BMD development.[214] In analyzing this phase, I will focus on the speeches made by defense officials and Diet members in parliament and how they explained BMD and the ways it could contribute to Japan's security.

The second phase, from 1999-2001, will focus on the expansion of the BMD debate and how Japanese officials, like Satō during the Cold War, started to face the problem of integrating BMD in accordance with Japan's socio-political context and normative restrictions on Japanese participation in military action. This primarily involved struggling with the constitutional problems of Japan hosting a BMD system in conjunction with the US and the associated problem of collective self-defense, which was forbidden under Japanese constitutional interpretation, as well as the problem of supporting BMD given its staunch support for the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), which forbade the US and Russia to construct such systems.[215] In examining the discourse of this phase, I will thus focus on how proponents of BMD tried to square the circle and justify BMD while opponents of BMD questioned their explanations.

The third phase, from 2001-2003, comes after the rise of Koizumi Junichirō to Prime Minister in 2001 and examines how Koizumi utilized the shocking events of 9/11 to restructure and reshape Japanese normative consensus to be compatible with collective self-defense and a more active Japanese security posture as a way to ease the integration of BMD and its associated problems into Japan's nuclear deterrence policy. Discourse analysis in this period will thus focus primarily on the speeches and remarks of Koizumi himself, and how he tried to transform collective self-defense and a more active Japanese security policy from a normative perspective that clashed with Japanese normative consensus, to one that was in line with Japan's historical desire to act as a upstanding member of the international community and move in line with international standards, using the increased concern over terrorism that had developed following 9/11.

As with the first case study, my evaluation of the internal socialization process focuses on the role of local norm takers, as well as the normative compatibility between the norm being introduced (Japanese BMD) and Japan's existing normative consensus. In this case study, I compare Koizumi as a local norm taker to Satō and how he pursued a more different and radical

[214] Naikaku Kanbō Chōkan, "Dandō Misairu Bōei ni Kakaru Nichibei Kyōdō Gijutsu Kenkyū ni kansuru Naikaku Kanbō Chōkan danwa," 25th October 1998. http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2006/2006/html/is260000.html. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[215] U.S. Department of State, *Treaty between The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,* 26th May 1972. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/101888.htm. Accessed 19/10/2024.

form of normative reconstruction and reinterpretation as compared to Satō, that saw him reconstructing the existing Japanese normative consensus to fit the norm, rather than the norm to fit the normative consensus. In particular, I will evaluate how Koizumi was the beneficiary of several administrative changes in Japan's government structure during this period which granted him this power to make such radical changes, as well as the massive changes in Japan's geopolitical environment during the period that were already fracturing Japan's existing security consensus, best represented by the shocking events of 9/11, which Koizumi skillfully used to advance his agenda. In evaluating the norm compatibility of BMD as a nuclear deterrence strategy with Japan's normative consensus, I will focus on evaluating whether the non-nuclear nature of BMD as a nuclear deterrence norm made it more compatible with Japan's anti-nuclear sentiments, as compared to the Japanese deterrence of nuclear threats by relying on nuclear weapons. At the same time however, normative compatibility would also be affected by the more participative nature of BMD, which necessitated Japanese involvement, and challenged Japan's 'absolute defense' security policy and constitutional restrictions. How this compares against US END, which was a 'nuclear' form of nuclear deterrence but more passive in terms of Japanese participation in the act of deterrence will be part of my analysis as well.

Japan's BMD Policy: Why this case study?

There are two key reasons why I have chosen the case of Japan's BMD policy development for my investigation into the impact of deterrence socialization on Japan's current fixation on nuclear retaliation and US END as a necessary form of nuclear deterrence for its security policy. The first, like the case of Japan's Four Nuclear Pillars before it, is due to its significance. As mentioned in the introduction, BMD policy, and how BMD acts a form of nuclear deterrence for Japan, remains one of the key nuclear deterrence perspectives that has been officially institutionalized in the form of Japanese nuclear deterrence policy. Since being announced in the form of a Cabinet Committee statement in 2003, stating that BMD was to be used against weapons of mass destruction, in tandem with US END, and pointing out the threats Japan faces as a result of the proliferation of such weapons to rogue states and terrorist organizations,[216]this statement has been included in every iteration of Japan's NDPG since 2005. BMD as a nuclear deterrence strategy has also been constantly acknowledged and discussed by the Japanese government as well, with editorial pieces discussing the strategy of BMD nuclear deterrence

[216] Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kaigi, "Dandō Misairu Bōgyo Shisutemu no Seibitō ni tsuite,", 19th December 2003.
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyoukaigi/Missile.pdf. Accessed 19/10/2024.

in detail appearing in Ministry of Defense White Papers as well.[217] This thus further emphasizes the importance of this nuclear deterrence perspective in shaping Japanese views of nuclear deterrence.

The second key reason for choosing this case study is due to the impact of how Japan's particular perspective on BMD has shaped its perspectives of nuclear deterrence as well. This thesis's main argument is that the two nuclear deterrence perspectives that Japan currently hold is responsible for its continued focus on US END and the threat of nuclear retaliation as a form of nuclear deterrence. One of those two perspectives, which is the Japanese view that BMD as a necessary but strictly complementary deterrent method to US END that addresses the new threats that Japan faces, I argue, contributes to this continued focus on US END by emphasizing its irreplaceability through its emphasis on BMD's strictly complementary nature. As I will note in the case study, due to its perspective of BMD as a strictly complementary tool, Japan has not moved to expand BMD beyond its complementary mandate since adopting BMD and has not discussed Reagan's abandoned vision with the US as well, thus ensuring that US END remains central to Japan's nuclear deterrence policy. Understanding the deterrence socialization process that led to the institutionalization and officialization of such a perspective of BMD in Japan is thus crucial to examining how deterrence socialization contributed to Japan's continued focus on the US nuclear arsenal.

The final reason for this case study is that the addition of BMD as a form of nuclear deterrence by denial, and Japan's participation and involvement in said deterrence system, represents the most significant change for Japan's nuclear deterrence policy in the post-Cold War era. Despite significant changes in its overall security posture to play a more active role in the US-Japan alliance from 1995-97,[218] Japanese support for US operations in Iraq in 2003[219] and a reinterpretation of the constitution in 2014 to allow for the Self-Defense Force (SDF) to participate in collective defense,[220] this has not been matched by equivalent changes in its nuclear deterrence policy, excluding the development of BMD. Japan's dependence on US

[217] See for example, Japan Defense Agency, "Dai 4 Shō-Yorianteishitaanzenhoshōkankyō no kōchiku e no kōken—Kaisetsu: I-jis Shistemu tōsai goeikan haken no igi,", *Heisei 15-nen ban Bōeihakusho*, 2003.
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2003/2003/colindex.html. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[218] Japan Defense Agency, "The Guidelines for Japan-US cooperation," 23rd September 1997.
https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/anpo/pdf/19970923.pdf.
Accessed 19/10/2024.
[219] Leszek Buszynski, "Japan's Security Policy in the Koizumi Era," *Security Challenges* 3 Volume 2 (2006): 95-96.
[220] Sheila A. Smith, "Reinterpreting Japan's Constitution." *Council on Foreign Relations.*
https://www.cfr.org/blog/reinterpreting-japans-constitution. Accessed 19/10/2024.

END as a form of nuclear deterrence by threat of nuclear retaliation, which was its only nuclear deterrence strategy for much of the Cold War, has remained essentially unchanged in the post-Cold War era. Despite closer consultation and cooperation,[221] the way US END is conducted in Japan has remained static, with Japan continuing to play little to no role in US nuclear deterrence strategic planning and holding no control over US nuclear weapons. There has been no sign of US nuclear weapons being deployed on Japanese territory as well, despite clamors from certain Japanese politicians such as former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo.[222] The adoption of BMD and an introduction of a new form of nuclear deterrence by denial by Japan in 2003, and more importantly, Japan's active participation in the deployment of the BMD system, thus probably constitutes the most significant change in Japanese nuclear deterrence norms since the end of the Cold War.

Section III: Building the Cases and Evidence Collection

In the first section of this chapter, I have laid out my research methods of historical discourse analysis and over-time case comparison, while in the second section, I have detailed how I have structured my case studies and the kinds of discourse that I focus on in each case study. In this section, I thus provide some examples and a brief explanation of the materials I will be relying on for each case study.

Case Study 1: Satō and the Four Nuclear Pillars

Satō's development of the Four Nuclear Pillars and his decision to request US END is often seen as the starting point for Japan's nuclear deterrence policy development. This case is thus the one with probably the most material available, and the earlier historical period it takes place in as compared to the other two cases means that such material is easier to access as well. In the case of the external socialization stage and tracing the efforts of US officials to teach Japanese policymakers from 1951-1960, I will be primarily relying on documentary evidence from the US's archives, such as the *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) repository,*[223] which has the minutes of several meetings between Satō and the US ambassador discussing nuclear deterrence. I will be relying on the memoirs of Japanese politicians recording their changing views on nuclear deterrence, such as Prime Minister Yoshida

[221] Andrew O'Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*, 91.
[222] Asahi Shimbun, "Kishida Shushō, Abe-shi ga genkyū no Kaku Kyōyū wo Hitei Hikakusangensaku wo kenji.", 28th February 2022, https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASQ2X4H22Q2XUTFK00C.html. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[223] Office of the Historian, "Foreign Relations of the United States—About." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/about-frus, Accessed 19/10/2024.

Shigeru's *Kaisō Junen*[224] and Ikeda Hayato's *Ikeda Hayato: Sono sei to Shi.*[225] Diet debates in which politicians made comments on the legality of nuclear weapons will be used as well, such as the Diet committee meeting where Kishi debated the legality of nuclear weapons under the Japanese Constitution. Newspaper reports which document such meetings between US officials and speeches made by Japanese officials and contain specific quotes on nuclear weapons made by policymakers will be used as well, such as those found in the Diet Archives and newspapers like the Asahi Shimbun and the Nihon Keizai Shimbun.[226]

To supplement my primary sources, I will be relying on secondary sources as well, which mainly consist of scholarly articles that investigate and document the abovementioned events. Examples of such articles include Kusunoki Ayako's investigation into the development of the Yoshida Doctrine,[227] and Kurosaki Akira's research on the secret arrangements between Japan and the US made in the 1950s with regards to the transit of US nuclear submarines.[228] Other secondary sources I will use are modern Japanese government-backed investigations into the said secret arrangements, and the scholarly work of Japanese experts such as Ota Masakatsu, whose book, *Meiyaku no Yami*, provides a comprehensive analysis of the multitude of secret arrangements made between US and Japanese officials with regards to nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 1960s.[229] My examination of how researchers who studied in the US and were thus influenced and 'taught' US concepts of nuclear deterrence, meanwhile, will primarily rely on research articles tracing the development of international relations as a scholarly field in Japan that have documented and analyzed this phenomenon. I will also directly examine the academic articles and periodicals published by this group of researchers following their return to Japan and how the ideas in such articles would later be reflected in their work for the Cabinet Research Office (CRO). Examples include an article by Saeki Kiichi that questioned French

[224] Translated into English as Yoshida Shigeru, *Yoshida Shigeru: Last Meiji Man* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers Inc. 2007).
[225] Ito Masaya, *Ikeda Hayato sono Sei to Shi* (Tōkyō: 1966).
[226] As an example, see Prime Minister Kishi's speech to the Budget Committee in 1959. Sangiin Yosan Giinkai Dai 9 Go (Records of the Budget Committee, House of Councilors, no.9), 12th March 1959. https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=103115261X00919590312&current=1. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[227] Kusunoki Ayako, "Yoshida Shigeru to Anzen Hoshō Seisaku: Nichibei no Sengo Kōsō, Anzen Hoshō Kōsō no Sōgo Sayo no naka," *Kokusai Seiji* 144, Volume 3 (2006): 99-115.
[228] Kurosaki Akira, "Anpo Kaitei Kōshō Izen no Kakumochikomi wo Meguru Kokkairongi to Nichibei Gaikō no Saikenshō: KakuMitsuyaku no Engen wo Motomete," *Prime* 33 Volume 3 (2011): 3-21.
[229] Ōta Masakatsu, *Meiyaku no Yami: Kaku no Kasa to Nichibei Dōmei* (Tōkyō: Nihon Heironsha 2009).

General Gallois's 'Force de frappe' nuclear strategy[230] and an article by Kōsaka Masataka attacking the pacifist view of international relations when it came to deterrence policy.[231]

In the internal socialization stage, focus turns to the interactions between Satō and the CRO, and the three occasions when scholars of the CRO presented their reports on Japanese nuclearization for Satō's perusal. In gauging Satō's thoughts and how they changed after each meeting, I will be primarily relying on the diaries of Kusuda Minoru,[232] Satō's Chief Cabinet Secretary and one of his closest aides. I will also refer to Satō's speeches on Japan's nuclear trajectory, specifically his speeches in the Diet announcing the Four Nuclear Pillars in 1970 and the Three Non-Nuclear Principles in 1968,[233] as well as his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in 1974.[234] In order to examine how the scholars of the CRO have constructed nuclear deterrence, I will also analyze the three reports on nuclearization prepared by the CRO, which are available to researchers at online archives.

Secondary sources I will rely on include scholarly research that has tried to document and analyze the process of such meetings, the creation of the three reports, and the content of the reports themselves. Examples include Kusunoki Ayako's article on the Satō Eisaku Cabinet's decision-making process from 1964-1970,[235] Kurosaki Akira's book on the impact of the US's nonproliferation initiative during the period on Satō's choices,[236] Kishi Toshimitsu's analysis of the three CRO reports[237] and Kase Yuri's analysis of the third CRO report.[238]

[230] Saeki Kiichi, "Kakujiidai no Shudan Bōei: Gallois Shogun no Kakusenryaku ni Taisuru Gimon," *Jiyu* 6 (1964).
[231] Kōsaka Masataka, "Genjitsu Shugisha no Heiwa Ron" in Kōsaka Masataka, Kanko Iinkai, ed., Kōsaka Masataka Chosaku Shu (Tōkyō: Toshi Shuppan, 1998).
[232] Kusuda Minoru, *Kusuda Minoru Nikki* (Tōkyō: Chuō Kōron Shinsha 2001).
[233] Shūgiin Honkaigi Dai 3 Gō (Records of the Plenary Session, House of Representatives, no.3), 30th January 1968.
https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPSC/19680130.O2J.html. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[234] Eisaku Satō, "Nobel Lecture—The Pursuit of Peace and Japan in the Nuclear Age." 11th December 1974.
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1974/satō/lecture/. Accessed 25/11/2024.
[235] Kusunoki Ayako, "The Satō Cabinet and the Making of Japan's Non-Nuclear Policy,",25-50.
[236] Kurosaki Akira, *Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei—Amerika no Kaku Fu Kakusan Gaikō to Nihon no Sentaku 1960-1976*.
[237] Kishi Toshimitsu, "Deliberations on Japanese Nuclear Policy During the Satō Administration: Studies by the Cabinet Research Office" *GRIPS Discussion Paper 17-15* (2018).
[238] Kase Yuri, "The Costs and Benefits of Japan's Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report," *The Nonproliferation Review* 2 Volume 8 (2001): 55-68.

Case Study 2 Part I: Japan and the SDI, 1985-1988

Compared to the second part of this case study and the case study on Japan's development of the Four Nuclear Pillars, Japan's engagement with the SDI remains a more unexplored area of Japan's nuclear deterrence policy development, and there is less information available regarding the normative development of BMD as a replacement for nuclear deterrence during this period. However, this does not mean that there is no information available.

As outlined in earlier in the chapter, this case study will primarily focus on the external socialization stage, which takes place through two key processes---interactions between President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone, and interactions between Japanese and US officials. Analysis of the interaction between President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone and the external socialization process will thus utilize the official transcripts issued to the public following their meetings, as well as newspaper reports documenting said meetings.[239] Prime Minister Nakasone would also reveal certain parts of what Reagan said to him in said meetings later during his meetings with other leaders of the G7, with his comments being both documented in his autobiography and newspaper reports, which I will be utilizing as well.[240] In addition, I will be cross referencing the details of such interactions between Reagan and Nakasone with Reagan's interactions with the NATO states, and how Reagan's approach to NATO compared to his meeting with Nakasone. In examining the details of such incidents, I will therefore be relying on FRUS documents and Reagan's biography, as well as secondary sources such as academic literature examining the SDI and the Reagan Administration's foreign policy record.[241]

Similarly, in analyzing the scientific exchanges between Japanese and US officials, I rely primarily on the reports that they published and presented to Diet Committees following their return. The investigative teams also had to present their findings to the Diet, and a record of their exchanges is publicly available.[242] Through my analysis of such sources, I will thus examine how Reagan and US officials communicated the concept of the SDI to Nakasone and

[239] See, for example, Government of Japan, "Press Remarks of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro," 2nd January 1985.
https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPUS/19850102.O1J.html. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[240] For example, Asahi Shimbun, "Nichibei Shunō Kaigi, SDI Kenkyū Sanka Yousei; Nakasone Shusō wa Ketsuron Horyū" 3rd May 1985. Asahi Kikuzō Digital Archive. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[241] For example, Ralph L. Dietl, *The Strategic Defense Initiative: Ronald Reagan, NATO Europe, and the Nuclear and Space Talks 1981-1988* (London: Rowan and Littlefield Publishing Group, 2018).
[242] For example, Sangiin Gaimu Iin Kai Dai 8 Gō (Records of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Councilors, no.8), 25th April 1985.
https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=110213968X00819850425&current=1. Accessed 19/10/2024.

Japanese officials respectively. My analysis of how Nakasone and his officials later presented such concepts to other G7 leaders and the Diet Committees then further demonstrates how they learned and understood BMD as a concept and its relationship with nuclear deterrence. My analysis of these primary sources will be supplemented by academic research examining the development of BMD during this period, such as those written by Jimbo Ken.[243]

Case Study 2 Part II: Japan and BMD, 1993-2003

The decision to adopt BMD as part of its nuclear deterrence policy and more importantly, to actively participate in practicing said deterrence can be argued to be one of the most consequential changes of Japanese security policy in the post-Cold War. As outlined in the case study structure earlier in this chapter, the socialization of BMD norms into Japan under the BMDO began in 1993, with the external socialization stage lasting from 1993-1998. This stage could largely be divided into two phases—1993-1995 and 1995-1998, with the Nye report and the recommitment of the US to East Asia largely dividing the two phases and affecting the process of external socialization.

My examination of external socialization of BMD norms during this phase will thus largely rely on official statements released by Japanese and US officials on their discussion of BMD, focusing in particular on how the US characterized BMD as an additional precautionary policy. I will thus also examine official Japanese responses to such comments by the US, released by officials and the relevant government ministries, which, due to the less sensitive nature of BMD as a nuclear deterrence option, are more readily available. With the two phases of external socialization being separated by the changes in power relations between the US and Japan, I will particularly examine whether there is any shift in the way the US tried to 'teach' Japan BMD norms, such as whether there is any shift from a more coercive to persuasive tone in the teaching process, and how this affected the readiness of Japanese officials to learn BMD. In order to measure this readiness and willingness of Japanese officials to 'learn', I will be comparing the comments released by the relevant government ministries prior to 1995, and how this shifted as the Government of Japan began commissioning more detailed reports into the use of BMD for Japan following 1995, focusing in particular on how such reports described the utility of BMD and its relation to US-Japan relations and nuclear deterrence. Besides official government transcripts and reports, I will also rely on newspaper reports of such

[243] Kawakami Takashi and Ken Jimbo, "Dandō Misairu Bōei to Nichibei Dōmei," in Misairu Bōgyo: Atarashii Kokusai Anzen Hoshō no Kōzu, ed. Morimoto Satōshi (Tōkyō: Taihei-Sha, 2006).

announcements as well, such as those from the *Asahi Shimbun.* My analysis of this change in the power relationship will be supplemented by a wide range of secondary sources, such as research carried out Michael Green[244] and Kenneth Pyle,[245] that have analyzed the changing relationship between the two countries during this period within the wider framework of Japan's changing security posture.

My analysis of the internal socialization stage will also be heavily dependent on the individual comments made by politicians and officials, and how they reflect the changing attitudes towards BMD following the 1998 North Korean missile launch. My analysis of internal socialization, however, will focus more on the comments made by such officials at the particular Diet Committee meetings, especially the meetings which resulted in the 1998 decision to participate with the US in joint BMD research and the 2003 meeting which eventually led to Japan officially announcing its intention to deploy BMD. As mentioned above, between the 1998 decision to participate in joint research with the US and the 2001 appointment of Koizumi as Prime Minister, who quickly pushed forward the decision to deploy BMD, there was a period of introspection and hesitation as Japanese officials struggled to grapple with the various constitutional and legal problems of BMD. In examining this period, I will focus on the official press briefings of Japanese government officials to construct and justify BMD in accordance with Japanese laws. I will also note the comments made by officials from departments supposedly opposed to BMD, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and how they sought to portray BMD. In particular, I will focus on how Japan tried to justify BMD within their continued support for the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, and how their understanding of Japanese BMD and its relationship with US BMD developed amid rumors that the US was thinking of abrogating the ABM treaty. I will supplement my analysis of such sources with secondary sources such as a report commissioned by RAND detailing BMD development in Japan during the period.[246]

The final phase of the internal socialization stage, which saw Koizumi approve BMD amidst a multitude of changes to Japan's defense policy, will focus less on how Koizumi constructed and socialized BMD normatively, and more on how he sought to construct and socialize the changes he made to Japan's legal constraints on security policy, which made BMD approval

[244] Michael Green, *Arming Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995),
[245] ; Kenneth Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007).
[246] Michael D. Swaine, Rachel M. Swanger and Kawakami Takashi, "Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense," *RAND Center for Asia-Pacific Policy* (2001).

possible, as part of the wider changes necessary for Japan to maintain its security following the September 11 attacks. In examining how Koizumi constructed and changed security norms in Japan, I will focus on his remarks immediately after the September 11 attacks[247] and how he linked the terrorist threat to the more visible threat of North Korea in order to justify his changes. As my theoretical framework focuses on the role of political power in internal socialization, I will also analyze how Koizumi's political power, acquired through his popularity as a politician and changes in the Japanese policymaking apparatus, affected his ability to construct his vision of necessary security changes, which ultimately paved the way for BMD to be approved.[248] In examining such changes, I will focus on officially published policy that detailed the changes in Japan's policymaking apparatus and the official reports that recommended such changes, such as the 'Final Report of the Administrative Reform Council.'[249] My analysis of such sources will also be supplemented by a range of secondary sources that have examined and analyzed said changes in Japanese policymaking that include research carried out by Andrew Oros,[250] Christopher Hughes[251] and Richard Samuels.[252]

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have thus provided a summary of the case study research method that I will be using to support my argument, the cases I will be using, and the kind of evidence that I will be utilizing in building my cases. As part of my summary, I have demonstrated that the two cases I have selected---Japan's Four Nuclear Pillars and Japan's BMD Policy---while having been selected partly due to methodological necessity, are nevertheless key nuclear deterrence perspectives that continue to be influential in shaping Japanese nuclear deterrence policy today. I have further argued that the implementation process of these two policies, and the political debate and discussion that surrounded their individual implementation process also represent some of the most thorough discussions and debate in Japan on the role of nuclear weapons and

[247] Japan's measures in response to simultaneous terrorist attacks in the United States," Statement by the Prime Minister, 19th September 2001.
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumispeech/2001/0919terosoti_e.html. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[248] Such changes are detailed by Richard J. Samuels, Securing *Japan: Tōkyō's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2007).
[249] Administrative Reform Council, "Final Report of the Administrative Reform Council," 3rd December 1997.
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/971228finalreport.html. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[250] Andrew Oros, *Normalizing Japan*.
[251] Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power*.
[252] Richard J. Samuels, Securing *Japan: Tōkyō's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*.

nuclear deterrence in Japanese security policy and are thus a good example of the deterrence socialization process.

In the next chapter of this thesis, I will thus begin my first case analysis, and examine how the process of deterrence socialization and the teaching and learning of nuclear deterrence norms from 1951-1970 affected Prime Minister Satō's understanding of nuclear deterrence and how he utilized such concepts, alongside his interpretation of Japan's socio-political context, to craft a nuclear deterrence policy that, while entrenching in Japan the perspective that nuclear weapons must be deterred and that only the threat of nuclear retaliation can provide said deterrence, nevertheless decided to rely on US nuclear weapons and US END in order to do so. Such a concept thus became Japan's primary nuclear deterrence strategy and has continued unchanged in the modern day, which continues to contribute to Japan's balancing act of advocating for global nuclear disarmament while rallying against any perceived weakening of US END.

Chapter 4: Japan and the Four Nuclear Pillars

This chapter covers my first case study and examine how the process of deterrence socialization resulted in the development, construction and institutionalization of the first of Japan's two key nuclear deterrence perspectives---that the unique destructive power and retaliatory capability of nuclear weapons are absolutely necessary to deter nuclear threats. As stated in my main argument, this perspective, along with the perspective that Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) can only act as a complementary system to nuclear retaliation, are both crucial in reinforcing and maintaining the subjective deterrence reality amongst Japanese policymakers that nuclear weapons are necessary to deter nuclear threats for Japan. In turn, it is this unified consensus on nuclear deterrence that explains Japan's continued preoccupation with US Extended Nuclear Deterrence (END) even as it champions global nuclear disarmament.

The institutionalization of such a nuclear deterrence perspective as an official Japanese nuclear deterrence perspective was confirmed with the announcement of the Four Nuclear Pillars in 1969. In particular, I refer to the Third Pillar, which states that "Japan, in order to deter nuclear weapons, will rely on US Extended Nuclear Deterrence (END)."[253] The announcement of such a policy, along with Prime Minister Satō Eisaku's remarks in 1966 that nuclear threats would be deterred by US END because of the unique retaliatory power (hōfukuryoku) of nuclear weapons,[254] made it clear that Japanese policymakers had established an understanding of deterring nuclear threats that is dependent on the unique destructiveness of nuclear retaliation in 1970. Such a principle would subsequently be included in every iteration of Japan's National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), and further clarifications on the unique retaliatory power of nuclear weapons as the explanation for such weapons being essential for nuclear deterrence would be provided by various policymakers since.[255]

There are two key reasons why the case of the Four Nuclear Pillars, and their formation from 1951-1970 remain important to our understanding of Japanese nuclear deterrence perspectives. The first is the historical significance of this case. This case represents the first attempt by

[253] Shūgiin Honkaigi Dai 3 Gō (Records of the Plenary Session, House of Representatives, no.3), 30th January 1968.
https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPSC/19680130.O2J.html. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[254] Sangiin Yosaniinkaigi Dai 8 Gō (Records of the Budget Committee, House of Councilors, no.8), 7th March 1966.
https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=105115261X00819660307&current=1. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[255] Deterrence by retaliation as the main way nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapons would be referenced by the Murayama cabinet (1995), JDA director Ishiba Shigeru (2003) and Secretary of Defense Ōno(2005). See Kawai Kimiaki, "Mission Unaccounted: Japan's Shift of Role in US Extended Nuclear Deterrence," *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* 2 Volume 5 (2022): 431-432.

Japanese policymakers to form and institutionalize a perspective on the role of nuclear weapons in Japanese security policy. Prior to the formation of the Pillars from 1951-1970, there had been no official policy on the relationship between nuclear weapons and Japanese security, even as Japan continued to depend on its alliance with the US, a nuclear power, for its security. The significance of the Four Nuclear Pillars as a nuclear deterrence policy and its development is further buttressed by its longevity as a guiding perspective. As seen from the fact that it has continued to be included in Japan's NDPG, the Four Pillars, and the perspective of nuclear weapons being uniquely necessary for nuclear deterrence that they represent clearly continues to guide Japanese nuclear deterrence policy today.[256]

The second reason this case is important, meanwhile, is due to the particular way in which the Four Pillars have shaped Japanese nuclear deterrence perspectives. The Four Pillars and the nuclear deterrence perspective it represents conclusively excludes any other form of deterrence against nuclear weapons other than a nuclear deterrent, based on the unique retaliatory power of nuclear weapons. By shaping Japanese views in such a way that Japan is unable to countenance any other way of deterring nuclear threats other than nuclear weapons, such a perspective has thus essentially made US END necessary for Japan. Such a perspective has thus ensured the continued focus of Japanese policymakers on the status of US END.

The importance of the Four Nuclear Pillars as Japan's first nuclear deterrence doctrine and the influence it continues to exert on Japanese nuclear deterrence policy today means that it is a widely researched topic in the literature, both as a historical case study and as a comparative case to Japan's modern nuclear dilemmas. As outlined in the literature review, scholars who have studied the Four Nuclear Pillars have uniformly pointed to China's nuclearization as the trigger for Satō's pursuit of nuclear deterrence,[257] even as they continue to debate Satō's choice of US END as Japan's nuclear deterrence policy, and which of the various factors that

[256] Prime Minister Kishida, for example, referenced such a principle in 2022. See Asahi Shimbun, "Kishida Shushō, Abe-shi ga genkyū no Kaku Kyōyū wo Hitei Hikakusangensaku wo kenji.", 28th February 2022.

[257] Examples include Andrew O'Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence* (New York: Routledge 2013) and Terence Roehrig, *Japan, South Korea, and the United States Umbrella: Deterrence after the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press 2013), both which use the Four Pillars as a starting point to examine changes in Japanese nuclear deterrence policy up to the 21st century. Fintan Hoey, meanwhile, examines the Four Pillars in a chapter in his book covering Satō's political career as Prime Minister and links it strongly with the Okinawa reversion, which he focuses on. See Fintan Hoey, *Satō, America and the Cold War: US-Japanese Relations, 1964-1972* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2015). Japanese research, meanwhile, includes Kurosaki Akira, *Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei—Amerika no Kaku Fu Kakusan Gaikō to Nihon no Sentaku 1960-1976* (Tōkyō: Yūshisha 2006) and Satō Yukio, *Sashi Kakerareta Kasa: Beikoku no Kaku Yokushi Ryoku to Nihon no Anzen Hoshō* (Tōkyō: Jiji Tsūshinsha 2017).

contributed to Satō's choice was the most impactful. Scholars who examine modern day Japanese nuclear dilemmas meanwhile, have also utilized the Four Nuclear Pillars as a comparative case study, examining the circumstances and restrictions on nuclear policy Satō faced in 1964 and debating whether such circumstances and restrictions still hold true today as part of a wider examination into the possibility of Japanese indigenous nuclearization.[258]

My main contention, however, is that such research assumes Satō's perspectives on the unique retaliatory power of nuclear weapons as a necessary deterrent against the nuclear threat of China as an objective view of nuclear deterrence reality, to be expected of any state operating in the international system that faced nuclear threats. The problem with such an assumption, as I have pointed out, is that this supposed objective reality has more often been 'assumed than demonstrated'[259] and has never been proven to be a scientific truth. Furthermore, in the case of Japan, such a viewpoint of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence, despite being supposedly a 'self-demonstrating' fact of nuclear deterrence reality, was not expressed by any major Japanese politician in the 1950s despite the threat of Soviet nuclear weapons.[260] Rather than being something that is 'self-evident' and simply 'is' an objective part of the international system, such an understanding of nuclear deterrence amongst Japanese policymakers would thus appear to be a subjective viewpoint of nuclear deterrence that had to be nurtured and developed. Few, however, have examined how Satō and other Japanese policymakers came to hold such a tailored view of nuclear deterrence and examined the Four Nuclear Pillars as an institutionalization of such a consensus of nuclear deterrence viewpoints, with Ayako Kusunoki's examination of the Satō Cabinet's choices from 1964-1970 that provides a brief summary of the development of nuclear deterrence thought in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and how such concepts were passed down to Satō coming the closest to doing so.[261]

My analysis of Satō's formation of the Four Pillars through the framework of deterrence socialization thus aims to address this research gap and focuses on the process of how Satō came to acquire such nuclear deterrence perspectives and turn them into an official perspective

[258] Llewelyn Hughes, "Why Japan will not Go Nuclear (Yet)," *International Security* 4 Volume 31 (2007): 67-96.
[259] Patrick Morgan, *Deterrence Now* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
[260] Major early topics in Japanese deterrence instead focused on conventional forces, as seen from the 1957, 1961, 1966 and 1972 Basic Defense Build Up plans, which preceded the NDPG. See Chijiwa Yasuaki, "Unfinished "Beyond-the-Threat Theory"—Japan's Basic Defense Force Concept Revisited, "NIDS *Journal of Defense and Security* 17 (2016), 86.
[261] Kusunoki Ayako, "The Satō Cabinet and the Making of Japan's Non-Nuclear Policy," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* Special Volume—Cold War Across the Pacific Volume 15 (2008): 29-30.

of nuclear weapons that continues to influence Japan even today. By analyzing US-Japanese diplomatic history from 1951-1964 and the increasing refinement of Satō's conceptualization of how nuclear deterrence operates from 1964-1970, I will show how the establishment and institutionalization of Japan's conviction that nuclear states must be deterred, and that nuclear retaliation is the only way of doing so, rather than being a 'self-evident' development, instead resembled a process of deterrence socialization. This process, I argue, saw US nuclear deterrence theory enter Japan and influence Japanese policymakers and researchers via the transference of nuclear deterrence norms from the US to Japan via a process of normative 'teaching' and 'learning', as seen from the diagram in Figure 1.2. Such norms, especially the key normative perspective that threats of nuclear retaliation were necessary for deterring nuclear threats, as demonstrated in the diagram, would then go on to influence Satō's perspectives of nuclear deterrence before being institutionalized as an official perspective of nuclear deterrence with the establishment of the Four Nuclear Pillars.



Figure 1.2. Deterrence Socialization in Japan, 1951-1970

Stage 1: External Socialization

According to the deterrence socialization framework, the deterrence socialization process begins with the stage of external socialization. In this stage, policymakers and politicians of the state being socialized (in this case, Japan) are exposed to and 'taught' certain nuclear deterrence concepts and normative standards through their interactions with the norm proponent (in this case, the US). These policymakers and politicians thus 'learn' such norms and it affects the local debate on nuclear deterrence, which then later affects the construction of nuclear deterrence normative perspectives and policies during the stage of internal socialization.

In the case of Japan and the Four Nuclear Pillars, I argue that this process of external socialization took place between 1951-1964 and saw nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons, as a part of security and defense policy, become actively debated within Japanese policymaking and academic circles. I will demonstrate that this process of external socialization took place largely through two separate processes---discussions at the policymaker level between US and Japanese officials over the presence of US nuclear weapons in Japanese territory, and the education of a new generation of Japanese security scholars and military officials at US educational institutions.

Through an analysis of the remarks made by politicians during this period on nuclear weapons, and an examination of the scholarly work of these security researchers, I show how despite external socialization taking place through both processes, there was a gap in the normative understanding on the role of nuclear weapons between these two groups, with Japanese policymakers and politicians only developing a growing but still relatively vague awareness of the importance of nuclear weapons and a general understanding of their value as tools of deterrence as a result of the first process. In contrast, an increasingly sophisticated debate within academia, focused on questions of how exactly nuclear weapons deterred threats, what specific threats they deterred, whether Japan needed such deterrence and the applicability of various nuclear deterrence doctrines for Japan would begin to form as a result of the second process. Despite such variances, however, the end result of these two processes both point to increasing signs that the normative learning had taken place in Japan, and the results of both processes of normative learning would play a crucial role in the internal socialization process from 1964-1970.

Process 1: US Nuclear Contingencies in Japan

The first of the two processes through which external socialization occurred was the discussion and secret planning that occurred between Japanese officials and their US counterparts with regards to the deployment, utilization and transition of US nuclear weapons in Japanese territory in the event of confrontation with the Communist bloc during the 1950s.[262] This process was the beginning of US nuclear projection into Japan, establishing a link between US nuclear weapons and Japanese security for Japanese policymakers.

US deployment of nuclear weapons to Japan and its surrounding territories began in the 1950s, with the Eisenhower Administration's 'Massive Retaliation' policy, which sought to reduce the US's military budget by cutting the size of conventional forces and instead leverage the US's nuclear advantage in order to deter Soviet aggression.[263] As part of this shift towards Massive Retaliation, the Eisenhower Administration had already begun stationing nuclear weapons on Okinawa in 1954, which was still under US control during the period.[264] The US, however, had greater ambitions for Japan, and Department of Defense officials envisioned establishing a nuclear stockpile on the Japanese mainland itself.[265] Further impetus for this plan, meanwhile, was provided by the US's withdrawal of more than half of its 200,000 troops in Japan, both due to the New Look policy, as well as increasing unhappiness from the Japanese citizenry over the huge US troop presence in Japan.[266]

The US, however, was well aware of Japan's sensitivity to nuclear weapons. Initial proposals by the Department of Defense to station nuclear weapons secretly in US bases on the Japanese mainland without informing their Japanese counterparts in order to bypass Japanese opposition were quickly vetoed by the State Department.[267] Nevertheless, the US began testing the waters in 1954 by stationing the non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons in US bases in Japan,

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[262] This included both US nuclear naval vessels moving into Japanese territory, and the stationing of US nuclear weapons in US bases on Japanese territory. See Ōta Masakatsu, *Meiyaku no Yami: Kaku no Kasa to Nichibei Dōmei* (Tōkyō: Nihon Heironsha 2009) 27-30; Kurosaki Akira, "Anpo Kaitei Kōshō Izen no Kakumochikomi wo Meguru Kokkairongi to Nichibei Gaikō no Saikenshō: KakuMitsuyaku no Engen wo Motomete," *Prime* 33 Volume 3 (2011): 3-21.
[263] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961) 79, 84.
[264] Ōta Masakatsu, "Conceptual Twist of Japanese Nuclear Policy: Its ambivalence and coherence under the US Umbrella," *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* 1 Volume 1 (2018): 196-197.
[265] Ōta Masakatsu, "Conceptual Twist of Japanese Nuclear Policy: Its ambivalence and coherence under the US Umbrella,"197.
[266] An extreme example of tension between Japanese citizens and US troops is the Girard Crisis of 1957. See Neil Curtin, "" We Might As Well Write Japan Off": The State Department Deals with the Girard Crisis of 1957," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2 Volume 19 (2012): 112.
[267] Ōta Masakatsu, *Meiyaku no Yami: Kaku no Kasa to Nichibei Dōmei,* 27-30.

while opening a dialogue with their Japanese counterparts over the possible introduction of Honest John nuclear missiles to Japan in 1955.[268] Douglas MacArthur II, then US ambassador to Japan, for example, recalled discussing the possibility of deploying US nuclear weapons on the Japanese mainland with the Japanese government in 1955.[269]

While this thesis has not been able to find records of what sort of arguments US officials used in their meetings with their Japanese counterparts in order to persuade them on the issue of nuclear weapons during this period, educated guesses can be made from the remarks of Japanese politicians on the issue of nuclear weapons which began to appear more regularly in Diet debates from this period on. For example, in March 1955, when Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō was questioned on the rumors of nuclear weapons deployment in Japan, Hatoyama suggested that "Japan has no reason to decline the US deployment of nuclear weapons to Japan if power sustains peace."[270] Hatoyama would further clarify this argument in a Diet meeting in the same month, arguing that "we must think of this problem [nuclear deployment] from the perspective of preserving peace. If it is something that can preserve peace and prevent aggression and war, is it not ok to consider such a development?"[271] Such arguments would thus seem to suggest that US officials utilized a general argument of deterring aggression through nuclear deterrence in their conversations with their Japanese counterparts.

It was not just nuclear weapons deployment on the Japanese mainland, however, which saw US officials discuss the importance of nuclear deterrence with Japanese policymakers. Another issue which saw nuclear issues discussed between Japanese officials and their US counterparts was the issue of US nuclear submarines transiting through Japanese territorial waters that took place from 1956-1960.

The issue began in 1956, as a result of ongoing treaty renegotiations between the US and Japan over the US-Japan security treaty. Both Japan and US officials were well aware of the wider Japanese public's growing resentment at their subordinate position under the 1951 treaty and

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[268] Nakatani Hiroshi, PhD Dissertation, *The Development of US Extended Nuclear Deterrence over Japan: A Study of Invisible Deterrence between 1945 and* 1970, University of Reading (2019): 118-119; Kurosaki Akira, "Anpo Kaitei Kōshō Izen no Kakumochikomi wo Meguru Kokkairongi to Nichibei Gaikō no Saikenshō: KakuMitsuyaku no Engen wo Motomete,", 5-7.

[269] Yomiuri Shimbun, "Watashi no Zainin Chū wa Mochikominai: Makkasa Moto Taishi Kataru," *Yomiuri Shimbun* (19 May 1981).

[270] Asahi Shimbun, "Nihon ni Genbaku Chozō Yamunashi," 14 March 1955. Asahi Kikuzō Digital Archive. Accessed 10/5/2024.

[271] Shūgiin Honkaigi Dai 5 Gō (Records of the Plenary Session, House of Representatives, no.5), 24th March 1955.
https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=102205254X00519550324&current=1. Accessed 19/10/2024.

were concerned about the growing neutralist movement in Japan during this period.[272] Kishi Nobusuke, a highly pro-American leader who was appointed as Prime Minister in 1956, thus decided to open treaty negotiations with the US to secure better terms and ensure the continued presence of US forces in Japan. On the whole, treaty negotiations were successful, and a more equal treaty was signed in 1960.[273] The problem of nuclear transit, however, arose during treaty negotiations, when Japan requested greater consultation and control over US usage of bases on Japanese territory, which was granted by Article VI of the new treaty. According to notes exchanged between Secretary of State Herter and Prime Minister Kishi on 19th January 1960 over the new treaty, "Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, major changes in the equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations…will be the subjects of prior consultation with the agreement of Japan."[274], as based on Article VI. Under such an agreement, the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan was defined as a 'major change' and would thus require governmental consultation. The question of whether US nuclear submarines docking in Japanese ports and transiting through Japanese waters, which was already occurring regularly as part of US security policy in the region, would count as 'introduction' under this new regime thus became a problem for both the US and Japan to navigate.

The US, especially the Navy, were especially concerned regarding this issue and US officials made it clear in the treaty negotiations with the Japanese that their expectations were that the transit of US vessels and aircraft, regardless of their equipment, through Japanese ports and airbases would not require prior consultation.[275] Like the meetings between US and Japanese officials over issues of nuclear deployment, however, this thesis has been unable to find records of what exactly was said at these meetings, and what arguments US officials used. During this period of discussion, a general remark was made by Douglas MacArthur II in a meeting with

[272] Shigemitsu Mamoru, foreign minister under Hatoyama, for example, referred to Japan being 'subjugated under the old treaty'. See Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Vol. 23, Part I, Japan, Document 183. Kishi Nobusuke would also lead efforts to eliminate unequal provisions in the treaty. See FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol 23, Part I, Japan, Document 187.
[273] The 1960 treaty continues to act as the basis for the US-Japan security relationship and has never been amended since 1960. For the full text of the treaty, see Government of Japan, "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America." 19th January 1960. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[274] The World and Japan Database "Exchanged Notes, Regarding the Implementation of Article VI of Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America." 19th January 1960.
https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/docs/19600119.T2E.html. Accessed 19/10/2024,
[275] The US made their views clear at a declassified exchange of notes on 6th January 1960. See Yushikisha Iinkai, "Iwayuru 'Mitsuyaku' Mondai ni Kansuru Yushikisha Iinkai Hōkokusho," (2010).

Foreign Minister Fujiyama however, with MacArthur II arguing that Japan's anti-nuclearism would isolate it and provide an opening for the Communists to take control of Japan as a means of persuasion.[276] Nevertheless, what is known however, is that Japanese officials accepted the arguments of the US and in January 1960, signed a confidential paper called the "Record of Discussion" which stipulated that "Prior consultation will not be interpreted as affecting present procedures regarding…the entry of United States military aircraft and the entry into Japanese waters and ports by United States naval vessels".[277]

What then, was the effect of the discussion over these two issues between Japanese and US officials on the normative transfer process? Policy-wise, at least, US attempts at normalizing the presence of US nuclear weapons and US nuclear deterrence in Japan was a failure. In terms of deployment of US weapons on Japanese soil, the US eventually gave up on such attempts, instead settling instead for continuing their policy of storing nuclear components on Okinawa and installing non-nuclear components in Japan, with said nuclear components to be airlifted and installed rapidly in the event of a confrontation with the USSR or China.[278] The issue of nuclear vessels transiting through Japanese waters, meanwhile, was so sensitive that the secret agreement was only publicly revealed in the 21st century.[279] Indeed, prior to 2010, when pressed on this issue, Japanese officials would deploy a form of circular reasoning and simply state that the Treaty required 'Prior Consultation' if nuclear-armed vessels were transiting through Japanese waters. Since there was no such request for consultation from the US government, said officials argued, it is thus clear that there were no nuclear weapons on said vessels.[280]

In terms of normative learning, however, there is evidence to suggest that Japanese politicians and policymakers began developing a growing awareness of the role of nuclear weapons as an important tool in deterring aggression and maintaining peace. Prior to the 1950s, before nuclear deterrence became an important talking point in US defense strategy for Japan, there was little talk of deterring aggression through nuclear weapons, with Japan's defense planning in the 1950s largely being concerned with conventional threats and equipment procurement.[281]

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[276] Kurosaki Akira, "Anpo Kaitei Kōshō Izen no Kakumochikomi wo Meguru Kokkairongi to Nichibei Gaikō no Saikenshō: KakuMitsuyaku no Engen wo Motomete,", 12.
[277] Yushikisha Iinkai, "Iwayuru 'Mitsuyaku' Mondai ni Kansuru Yushikisha Iinkai Hōkokusho," (2010).
[278] This was known as Exercise High Gear. See Ōta Masakatsu, *Meiyaku no Yami: Kaku no Kasa to Nichibei Dōmei*, 9-12.
[279] This was the so-called 'secret deal' (Mitsuyaku) that was the subject of much academic debate following 2010, that the Government commissioned an official report into the issue. See Yushikisha Giinkai, "Iwayuru 'Mitsuyaku' Mondai ni Kansuru Yushikisha Iinkai Hōkokusho," (2010).
[280] In 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki, for example, would use this argument.
[281] See Chijiwa Yasuaki, "Unfinished "Beyond-the-Threat Theory"—Japan's Basic Defense Force Concept Revisited, ", 86.

Indeed, according to Yoshida Shigeru, who worked extensively with the US and later became one of the most influential postwar Prime Ministers, the primary concern was the internal threat that communism posed for Japan, and how Japanese communists could exploit poor economic conditions to seize political authority via the ballot box in Japan, rather than Soviet aggression and the outbreak of war.[282]

Throughout the 1950s, however, policymakers and politicians of the LDP would grow more concerned about Soviet aggression and the outbreak of war, rather than communist subversion. As noted above, politicians like Hatoyama would speak of the need to 'maintain peace' and 'prevent war' in Diet sessions in 1955[283], while Kishi would also share his concerns with MacArthur II over the possibility of general war, with MacArthur II recalling that Kishi had acknowledged to him the need to 'prevent general war'.[284] More importantly, such policymakers and politicians would also grow increasingly receptive to nuclear weapons as their tool of choice to deter general aggression, with Hatoyama, as stated above, pointing out the role of nuclear weapons in preventing war and maintaining 'peace through strength'. Hatoyama would continue to maintain such a stance even as he was forced to walk back on his March 1955 statement that US nuclear weapons could be stationed on Japanese territory. In a 29th March Diet Session, for example, Hatoyama would state that there was 'no need' to store nuclear weapons in Japan but maintain his view that 'we [Japan] can maintain peace through strength with the US possession of US nuclear weapons.'.[285] Kishi, meanwhile, would remark to MacArthur II, specifically, that 'Japan is dependent on the US nuclear deterrent to prevent general war,'[286] and in 1959 would state that nuclear weapons were possibly 'technically permissible under Japan's Constitution.'[287] Ikeda Hayato, Prime Minister after Kishi, was also

[282] This was famously utilized by Yoshida as a justification for focusing on economic recovery instead of rebuilding militarily. See Yoshida Shigeru, *Yoshida Shigeru: Last Meiji Man* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers Inc. 2007) and Kusunoki Ayako, "Yoshida Shigeru to Anzen Hoshō Seisaku: Nichibei no Sengo Kōsō, Anzen Hoshō Kōsō no Sōgo Sayo no naka," *Kokusai Seiji* 144, Volume 3 (2006): 100-107.
[283] Shūgiin Honkaigi Dai 5 Gō (Records of the Plenary Session, House of Representatives, no.5), 24th March 1955.
[284] FRUS 1955-1957, Japan, Vol.23, Part 1, Document 159.
[285] Sangiin Yosaniinkai Dai 3 Gō (Records of the Budget Committee, House of Councilors, no. 3) 29th March 1955.
https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=102215261X00319550329&current=1. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[286] FRUS 1955-1957, Japan, Vol.23, Part 1, Document 159.
[287] Sangiin Yosan Giinkai Dai 9 Go (Records of the Budget Committee, House of Councilors, no.9), 12th March 1959.
https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=103115261X00919590312&current=1. Accessed 19/10/2024.

recorded to have stated that Japan's voice would be 'ten times louder in the international arena if it had nuclear weapons.'[288]

It should be noted however, while a growing understanding of the importance of nuclear weapons as a general deterrence mechanism against aggression and a tool of strength amongst Japanese policymakers did result from that this exchange of ideas between US and Japanese officials, there was still no conceptualization, amongst Japanese policymakers, at this point of nuclear weapons specifically as a tool of deterrence against nuclear threats. As can be seen from the comments of politicians like Hatoyama and Kishi, their primary understanding was either a general one--that nuclear weapons maintain peace and prevent general war---or speculative, like Kishi's musings on the legality of nuclear weapons. Ikeda, meanwhile, associated nuclear weapons purely with a general notion of significance in the international arena. Instead, the growing conceptualization of nuclear weapons as a necessity for deterring nuclear threats would only be seen in the second process---the education of Japanese security specialists and the growing academic debate in Japan during the same period. In the meantime, however, such a general understanding of nuclear weapons as a tool of strength that deters aggression would be passed down from Hatoyama and Kishi to Satō, acting as a foundation for Satō's conceptualization of nuclear weapons that would be refined through his discussions with the researchers of his Cabinet Research Office (CRO), as will be seen in the internal socialization phase later.

Process 2: Educating a new generation of Japanese IR Scholars

The second process of the external socialization of Japan from 1951-1964 and arguably, the more important of the two processes in determining the construction of Japanese nuclear deterrence perspectives, was the development and education of a new generation of Japanese military officials and international relations, security, and deterrence scholars, in US institutions. This process was crucial in providing the intellectual foundation on which politicians could later base their arguments for deterring nuclear threats through nuclear deterrence. This is especially the case with regards to the education of academic researchers, who, utilizing the deterrence theories that they had gained in the US, would refine the nuclear deterrence debate in Japan to focus on the deterrence of nuclear attack specifically with nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear retaliation in the 1950s/60s. Several of these scholars would later join the Cabinet Research Office (CRO) and utilize such a perspective of nuclear weapons

[288] Itō Masaya, *Ikeda Hayato sono Sei to Shi* (Tōkyō: 1966), 199-200.

when compiling the three reports which examined Japan's nuclear options following China's nuclearization in 1964. As I will demonstrate in the internal socialization section later, the CRO and these three reports would shape Satō's perspectives on nuclear weapons and their role in nuclear deterrence significantly.

The education of a new generation of Japanese scholars on security studies and international relations began in the 1950s. when certain scholars, including Kōsaka Masataka, Wakaizumi Kei, Nagai Yōnosuke, and Saeki Kiichi, amongst others, became the beneficiaries of various US endowments and scholarships and carried out research on international relations and security affairs at US universities.[289] This was especially crucial to the development of general deterrence theoretical concepts and international relations arguments based on power and war amongst Japanese scholars, primarily due to the fact that such studies were widely discouraged in Japan in the 1950s, amidst the fear of glorifying pre-war militarism and reviving militarist sentiments.[290] Indeed, up until the 1950s, the Japanese academic debate on foreign policy and security was mostly dominated either by pacifists or neutralists such as Tannō Shinichi, who argued that the best way of avoiding nuclear attack was to declare neutrality in order to avoid painting a nuclear target on Japan.[291]

As such, following their education in the US, it would be this group of scholars that ignited the academic debate in Japan in the 1960s on the importance of nuclear weapons for Japan's security and the exact role they played in Japan's defense using concepts from deterrence theory, as part of their wider attack on the pacifist and neutralist movements in Japan. Kōsaka Masataka, often seen as a pioneer scholar on security studies during this period, for example, would end up writing an article titled "The Nuclear Challenge and Japan.",[292] which was aimed first and foremost at criticizing Hidaka Rokurō, a pacifist that had suggested that because of the increasing destructive power of nuclear weapons and the growing number of nuclearized states, that Japan pursue a policy of complete disarmament and rejection of any form of military force

[289] Murata Koji, "The Evolution of Japanese Studies of International Relations,", 357.
[290] Hideo Ōtake, *Saigunbi to Nashonarisumu: Hoshu, Riberaru, Shakai, Minshu Shugisha no Bōeikan* (Tōkyō: Chuō Kōronsha 1988. For example, the National Institute of Defense Studies, a think-tank for the Japanese Defense Agency, was only formed in 1952. The JSDF meanwhile, was only formed in 1954.
[291] Tanno Shinichi, *Beikoku no Taiso Senryaku (New Look Senryaku) to Nihon* (Tōkyō: Toyo Shuppansha 1960).
[292] Kōsaka Masataka, "Kaku no Chōsen to Nippon", in Kōsaka Masataka, Kanko Iinkai, ed., *Kōsaka Masataka Chosaku Shu* (Tōkyō: Toshi Shuppan, 1998), 107-128. Another article of Kōsaka's, "Genjitsu Shugisha no Heiwa Ron", while not focused on nuclear deterrence, would also focus on criticizing pacifism.

since there was no viable way to defend Japan via conventional forces against the destructive power of nuclear weapons anyway.[293]

In his article, Kōsaka would first stress there is some truth in Hidaka's argument, but that it misses the wider global picture. For Kōsaka, nuclear weapons had become perceived and treated as an epoch-defining weapon globally because of its ability to 'level the playing field between middle powers and great powers.'[294] Kōsaka argues that this is because even a small number of nuclear weapons can allow countries to easily reach the maximum level of 'destructive saturation', meaning that any further expansion will not amplify the deterrence effect of the arsenal.[295] Kōsaka then references France's Gallois, whose pursual of a small but independent French nuclear deterrent perfectly captures this sentiment, and who, in an interview with the Asahi Shimbun, had suggested Japan do the same as the 'only solution to defend Japan from nuclear weapons.'[296]

Kōsaka then argues for Japanese dependence on US END as a nuclear deterrence strategy by first questioning both Hidaka and Gallois's arguments, focusing in particular on Gallois's characterization of domestic indigenous nuclearization as the 'only solution' for Japan.[297] Kōsaka, while agreeing with Gallois's conceptualization of nuclear weapons as a deterrence equalizer, disagrees that only the reliability of a domestic deterrent will make adversaries reconsider. For Kōsaka, the retaliatory destructive power of nuclear weapons, from which they derive their deterrent effect, is so great that even the possibility of warfare escalation with a non-nuclear state that had an alliance with a nuclear state, such as the case with Japan and the US, which might carry even the smallest possibility of nuclear war breaking out would be sufficient for nuclear deterrence.[298] Based on this uncertainty, Kōsaka thus argues that a well-established alliance with the a nuclear state which included promises of extended nuclear deterrence, can thus prove to be an equally effective deterrent. Similarly, Kōsaka questions Hidaka's argument on the futility of conventional military forces. Kōsaka thus argues that Japan should "maintain good relations with the US, but at the same time, develop military forces that are at the very least, capable of resisting an invasion of Japan so as to strengthen the

[293] Kōsaka Masataka, "Kaku no Chōsen to Nippon", 117.
[294] Kōsaka Masataka, "Kaku no Chōsen to Nippon", 107-112.
[295] Kōsaka Masataka, "Kaku no Chōsen to Nippon", 107-112. The exact term he uses is Hōwa (saturation).
[296] Kōsaka Masataka, "Kaku no Chōsen to Nippon", 118.
[297] Kōsaka Masataka, "Kaku no Chōsen to Nippon", 118-120.
[298] Kōsaka Masataka, "Kaku no Chōsen to Nippon", 120-127.

deterrent effect of the US-Japan alliance.".[299] As such, for Kōsaka, while nuclear deterrence is still about deterring nuclear weapons through the fear of nuclear retaliation, such retaliation need not necessarily be of the country's own, due to the destructive potential of nuclear weapons, which means that even the slight possibility of a nuclear ally being drawn in would be sufficient.

While Kōsaka himself would not play a role in the construction of nuclear deterrence norms during the internal socialization process, as will be seen later in this chapter, several of his arguments would be taken up by his fellow scholars such as Wakaizumi and Saeki in articles and commentary that they penned during this period. Such scholars, many of whom would then later participate in the Cabinet Research Office (CRO), would utilize similar arguments in the reports they prepared for Satō on Japan's nuclear choices during the internal socialization process. The arguments utilized by these scholars, like Kōsaka's, would emphasize the destructive potential of nuclear weapons, and hence why nuclear weapons were necessary for Japan to deter nuclear weapons, while at the same time dedicating much effort to debating Gallois' claims that indigenous nuclearization was the best solution for Japan, questioning whether a reliable and indigenous but small nuclear arsenal would be an effective nuclear deterrent and further highlighting the massive costs Japan would have to bear if it chose to pursue this option.

In an article written for the Chūō Kōron magazine, for example, Wakaizumi Kei argues that nuclear weapons provide countries with an easy means to protect themselves through deterrence by punishment, due to the inherent destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the impossibility of any defense system being able to stop all nuclear attacks.[300] Wakaizumi thus further concludes that only nuclear weapons can deter nuclear weapons via deterrence by punishment, and that therefore it was necessary for to obtain a nuclear deterrent of its own.[301]

Wakaizumi, like Kōsaka, however, cautions against thinking that indigenous nuclearization is the 'only way' for Japan. In his article, Wakaizumi argues against an independent Japanese nuclear deterrent, believing that it would lead to a nuclear arms race in East Asia and consume Japan's resources at an unsustainable level, referencing the problem of the 'security

[299] Kōsaka Masataka, "Kaku no Chōsen to Nippon", 118-120.
[300] Wakaizumi Kei, "Chugoku no Kakubuso to Nihon no Anzen Hosho," *Chūō Kōron*, February 1966.
[301] Wakaizumi Kei, "Chugoku no Kakubuso to Nihon no Anzen Hosho,".

dilemma'.[302] This is an argument that would be picked up by Saeki Kiichi[303] as well, who argued that while Japan needed nuclear weapons to deter nuclear weapons, an indigenous nuclear deterrent would merely spur a preliminary attack from the USSR and China that Japan would be incapable of defending against.[304] Even if such an attack did not happen, Saeki argues, Japan would be forced to engage in a nuclear arms race with China that would be unsustainable for Japan.

Such scholars thus formed a theoretical contrast with the pacifists and neutralists in Japan's debate on security and foreign policy at that time and were responsible for introducing several key nuclear deterrence concepts into the academic debate in Japan and parsing such concepts in line with Japan's security needs. More importantly, as compared to the general perception of nuclear weapons as a tool against aggression that was circulating amongst politicians, these scholars would focus specifically on the question of deterring nuclear attack, and the role of nuclear weapons in such situations. While their arguments on deterring nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons would remain theoretical and largely contained within academia at this point in the deterrence socialization process, several scholars who ended up joining the CRO and prepared the three reports on Japan's nuclearization options, as mentioned above, would end up utilizing similar arguments in their reports, making this second external socialization process an important one for the deterrence socialization process of Japan and its development of the Four Nuclear Pillars.

In examining the education of scholars in the US as a process of external socialization and introducing normative perspectives of deterrence into Japan, I must of course admit that this thesis cannot, with complete certainty, establish a causal relationship between the education of these scholars in the US, and their utilization of deterrence theory and concepts in their arguments. Nevertheless, I argue that there is a case to be made for a correlation between the deterrence concepts utilized by said scholars and their education in the US, based on their shared educational background, the absence of a nuclear deterrence studies tradition in Japan and the antimilitarist sentiment in Japan during this period which meant there was little to no development of security and deterrence studies within Japanese academic institutions.

[302] Wakaizumi Kei, "Chugoku no Kakubuso to Nihon no Anzen Hosho,".
[303] Saeki Kiichi would later become President of the National Defense College and present similar arguments to Satō in March 1967.
[304] Saeki Kiichi, "Nihon no Anzen Hoshō" *Bōei Ronshu* 7 (1968).

External Socialization and the role of Power

As stated in Chapter 2, power, as derived from gatekeeping resource access, plays a central role in the process of external socialization. Deterrence socialization contends that power is directly linked to the normative transfer methods used by the norm proponent during the external socialization process, with higher levels of power likely resulting in the norm proponent using more intrusive methods with a higher success rate, such as reconstructing the entire political system and political direction of the socialized state, while lower levels of power sees the norm proponent resort to less intrusive but also less effective methods, like promising resources in exchange for policy changes, or normative persuasion. As I have further pointed out in Chapter 2, the US-Japan alliance, in terms of power, is a highly unequal one. This was especially the case during the 1960s, when the US was largely responsible for Japanese security, in exchange for being able to use Japan as a staging ground for its security policy in East Asia. I have thus contended that with the US gatekeeping a resource (security) that Japan needed, it is thus likely that the power it derived from such a relationship would play an important role in the external socialization process and affect its teaching methods. In the case of the US and Japan from 1951-1960, how, then, should the normative teaching methods used by the US be classified, and how did this match up with the level of power the US had over Japan?

I argue that the teaching methods used by the US during the external socialization stage from 1951-1960 can largely be defined as normative persuasion, which is defined as teaching dependent on ideological persuasion that is undertaken through channels such as diplomatic and cultural exchanges and foreign study.[305] As can be seen from the description of the two processes above, this matches largely the external socialization process of the Japanese from 1951-1960, with US diplomats such as MacArthur II, for example, largely relying on ideological reasoning to persuade Japanese politicians, pointing out the threat of communism, rather than threatening to withdraw military protection.

The question is then why the US resorted to the less intrusive methods of normative persuasion from 1951-1964 rather than more forceful methods of external inducement, even if it was no longer able to resort to internal reconstruction. After all, at this point, Japan remained highly dependent on the US for security and would have faced difficulties refusing any request from the US were the US to threaten to withdraw military aid. Furthermore, US nuclear plans for

[305] G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and hegemonic power," *International Organization* 3 Volume 44 (1990): 290.

Japan were of vital importance for the US's Cold War strategy in East Asia, which made complete and rapid implementation all the more necessary. Why then, were more forceful plans, such as the Department of Defense's requests to override potential Japanese objections and install US nuclear weapons on the Japanese mainland refused by US policymakers?

I argue that there are two key reasons that explain the discrepancies between the power of the US, and the teaching methods that it utilized from 1951-1964. The first reason relates to the power relationship between the US and Japan. In the theories of normative learning that this thesis has examined and deterrence socialization's theoretical framework, the power relationship between two states engaged in a teaching/learning process is supposedly absolute, with the teaching state holding power over the learner state via its role as a hegemon and its ability to gatekeep resources.[306] The teacher is thus able to freely choose its methods, dependent on the level of power it possesses over the learner. In the case of the US and Japan from 1951-1960, however, it is clear that while the US held power over Japan due to Japan's need for US military protection, Japan, too, had a certain degree of power over the US, as well. As the US's 'unsinkable aircraft carrier', having Japan as an ally would provide US forces with a vital staging point from which they could strike the USSR, as well as act as protect the US's democratic allies in the region in the event of conflict.[307] The US was thus highly motivated to ensure that Japan remained a close ally of the US and was wary of being overly forceful in terms of dictating security policy, for fear that the cooperative LDP might turn against them, or that Japan would elect a socialist/communist government to replace the LDP, were they to be seen as overly pro-American while ignoring the views of the Japanese populace.[308]

Indeed, this fear was at its height during the late 1950s, when there were mass protests over the Kishi Cabinet's renegotiation of the security treaty, forcing Eisenhower to cancel a visit to Japan and sparked fears amongst the State Department that the US had to 'write off' Japan.[309]

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[306] G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and hegemonic power," 293; Frank Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment," *European Journal of International Affairs* 1 Volume 6 (2000): 117-118.

[307] Hans Kristensen, "Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella", Supporting Documents Global Problem-Solving nuke policy, 21st July 1999. https://nautilus.org/supporting-documents/japan-under-the-us-nuclear-umbrella/?view=pdf. Accessed 10/5/2024.

[308] This resembles James D. Morrow's Autonomy-Security Trade-off model of alliance politics, which argues that in an asymmetric alliance, the smaller power in the alliance can still derive power from providing operational 'autonomy' (bases, logistics) for the larger power. In return, the smaller power derives 'security' from the alliance. See James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," *Political Science* 4 Volume 35 (1991): 910-915.

[309] Nick Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromise after Anpo* (London: Harvard University Press 2018): 35-36.

This timing matches up with the US's more persuasive approach, as seen by the Kishi Cabinet's negotiations with MacArthur II in 1959. Japan's necessity to the US thus ensured that US policymakers, especially those in the State Department, were more cautious when came to normative socialization by more forceful methods despite their power. Such caution also ensured that when it seemed like there was no way to move forward in certain issues, such as stationing Honest John missiles on Japanese soil, the US government chose to back down, instead of forcefully enacting policy. Contrary to theoretical assumptions, the experience of Japan and the US from 1951-1960 thus shows that when two states in a military alliance engage in a teaching/learning process, while the teaching state may have power over the learner state and has some leeway to select its methods dependent on the power it holds, conversely, the learner state might have power over its teacher as well within the alliance relationship, due to various factors such as geopolitical necessity, which might force the teacher to moderate its methods. When theorizing the power relationship between two states in an alliance relationship engaged in normative transfer, Japan and the US thus shows that such a relationship could be multidirectional rather than a one-way relationship between teacher and learner.

The second reason why the US utilized normative persuasion in this period has to do with the willingness of Japan's policymakers to learn and implement US nuclear deterrence norms, which itself is a result of the US's utilization of its power over Japan prior to 1951. As can be seen from the two processes of external socialization (especially in the case of secret nuclear contingency planning), Japanese policymakers were seemingly willing to accommodate US requests and learn and understand US arguments over the importance of nuclear weapons in Japanese security. Fujimiya, in his meeting with MacArthur II, for example, stated that he completely agreed with MacArthur II that Japan's anti-nuclearism would isolate it and make it an easy target for the Communists.[310] Multiple Japanese Prime Ministers, from Hatoyama to Kishi, meanwhile, were not as anti-nuclear as the Japanese public.[311] Meanwhile, after his discussions with Kishi, MacArthur II would also describe Kishi an 'able leader of Japan'[312] and Frank Nash, special consultant to the President, would call Kishi the US's 'best bet'.[313] While deterrence socialization does not draw a link between teaching methods and the

[310] Kurosaki Akira, "Anpo Kaitei Kōshō Izen no Kakumochikomi wo Meguru Kokkairongi to Nichibei Gaikō no Saikenshō: KakuMitsuyaku no Engen wo Motomete,", 12.
[311] One of the most influential was Yoshida Shigeru, author of the Yoshida Doctrine. Yoshida increasingly held pro-nuclear views once he had retired from office. See Yoshida's speech at the American-Japan Society, 1962, in *Ningen Yoshida Shigeru* (Tōkyō: Ushiobō Kōjinshinsha 1997) 485-489.
[312] FRUS 1955-1957, Japan, Vol.23, Part 1, Document 159.
[313] FRUS 1955-1957, Japan, Vol.23, Part 1, Document 339.

willingness of the learner to learn, based on the experience of Japan from 1951-1964, it could be argued that the US, faced with a group of elites that was willing to accommodate its requests and implement its norms regarding nuclear deterrence and fearing a Communist takeover if more forceful nuclear approaches was taken to overwrite Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment, thus decided to moderate its approach.

I argue, however, that the US had such receptive 'students' from 1951-1964 was itself a result of its exercise of power over Japan prior to 1951 that laid the foundations for the external socialization of US nuclear deterrence norms. As mentioned above, Japan only regained its independence in 1951, after being under US Occupation from 1945-1951. It was under this period of Occupation, when the US exercised almost complete control over the reconstruction of the Japanese state, where it could be argued that the foundation for external socialization of US norms was laid. Per the classification of teaching methods, I argue that during this period, the US engaged in internal reconstruction, changing the entire political dynamic of Japan and rebuilding Japan completely.

As the sole occupying allied power on the Japanese mainland from 1945-1950, the US had quickly decided that Japan would become central to their strategy to containing Communism in East Asia[314], and thus quickly exercised their power and enacted a series of political and social reconstructions to ensure that Japan would be reconstructed as a state that would be more willing to ally with the West, in what has become termed the 'reverse course'. The most important of such changes was probably the 'de-purging' of hundreds of officials initially deemed to be part of the militarist regime. Such changes quickly suppressed the Japanese communists as a viable political force in postwar Japan and saw more pro-US politicians like Yoshida Shigeru, who developed the Yoshida Doctrine, take power. As recounted in Yoshida's memoirs, Yoshida himself always had a pro-Anglo-Saxon bias and regarded Japan's split with the UK and the US prior to World War II as the militarists' greatest diplomatic mistake.[315] Yoshida himself viewed allying with the US, aligning Japanese security policy with US objectives and depending on US military protection to be the most viable path for postwar Japan.[316] In allowing Yoshida and politicians aligned to his political beliefs to take power, the US thus ensured that Japanese policymakers would inevitably view deterrence, especially

[314] See Kusunoki Ayako, "Yoshida Shigeru to Anzen Hoshō Seisaku: Nichibei no Sengo Kōsō, Anzen Hoshō Kōsō no Sōgo Sayo no naka,",144.
[315] Yoshida Shigeru, *Yoshida Shigeru: Last Meiji Man,* 3-12.
[316] Kusunoki Ayako, "Yoshida Shigeru to Anzen Hoshō Seisaku: Nichibei no Sengo Kōsō, Anzen Hoshō Kōsō no Sōgo Sayo no naka,".

deterrence of communism, as a key part of their security policy, due to their need to alliance with the West. This openness to deterrence as an important objective for Japan thus laid the foundation for a generation of Japanese policymakers in 1951-1960 to be more receptive to US arguments for nuclear deterrence, perhaps best represented by Hatoyama's remarks that 'peace' must be achieved through 'strength'.

In examining the role of power in external socialization between the US and Japan from 1951-1964, I thus argue that while the external socialization processes show some discrepancies between the power of the US and the methods that it has utilized, such deviations can be explained by the power Japan itself had over the US despite its role as a learner, as well as the US's utilization of more intrusive methods prior to 1951 when it had even more power over Japan, thus laying the foundation for less intrusive methods from 1951-1964.

As such, by 1964, despite the anti-nuclear movement in Japan blooming in Japan as the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki slowly became known to the public alongside Japan experiencing a third nuclear incident with the 1954 Lucky Dragon No.5 incident, such anti-nuclear sentiments were clearly not shared by all of Japan's policymaking elite, with Japanese ministers understanding of the importance of US nuclear weapons in security in a general sense while a generation of academics began debating Japan's need to deter nuclear weapons. This would provide the backdrop for Japan's eventual discussions over its nuclear deterrence policy, following the catalytic event that was China's nuclearization in 1964.

Stage 2: Internal Socialization

Deterrence socialization states that a catalytic event in the form of a crisis is necessary to transition the learner state from external to internal socialization, when policymakers and politicians further refine their understanding of the norms they have begun learning in the external socialization stage and then engage in the process of constructing such norms based on their understanding of their own country's unique circumstances, before turning such norms into policy. This could be seen to be the case for Japan and its formation of the Four Nuclear Pillars. Despite the growing number of NATO states exploring the nuclear deterrent in the 1950s, with the majority eventually opting for US END,[317] this apparent 'nuclear norm cascade' did not materialize in Japan, and serious discussion of Japan's nuclear options and a transition from external to internal socialization would only be catalyzed by China's nuclearization on

[317] David S. Yost, "The US debate on NATO nuclear deterrence," 1402.

16th October 1964, which made China the world's 5th nuclear power in the world, as well as the first Asian nuclear power. The Japanese government was outwardly unresponsive at that time,[318] but Prime Minister Satō Eisaku, who took power just one month after China's successful test, would end up initiating the internal socialization process that led considered Japan's nuclear options and led to the formation of Japan's Four Nuclear Pillars.

For Japan, I argue that this internal socialization process is defined by a series of interactions between Satō and the Cabinet Research Office (CRO), an organization of researchers first formed in 1952 directly under the Prime Minister's Office. As I will demonstrate in this section, the interactions between the CRO and Satō, which occurred in 1964, 1967 and 1968,[319] all followed a similar pattern. Satō and the CRO would first meet, and the CRO would present Satō with a report on Japan's nuclear options. Not long after each meeting, respectively in 1965, 1967/68 and 1970, Satō would then make major changes in Japanese nuclear deterrence policy that slowly institutionalized and constructed the concept of deterring nuclear weapons by threatening nuclear retaliation in Japanese security policy. At the same time, Satō's public statements on nuclear weapons and deterrence would go through an evolution, shifting from a general stance of nuclear weapons being necessary for Japan's security (but not specifying why) to specifically focusing on the use of nuclear weapons in deterring nuclear threats, which I argue, is a sign of the continued normative learning process in internal socialization. This process would then eventually conclude in the reemphasis of the Four Pillars and the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970, representing Japan's stringent belief that while nuclear weapons would be necessary to deter the nuclear threats that Japan faced, US END was the only source of such a deterrent for Japan.

Satō's views of nuclear weapons pre-1964

It is hard to gauge Satō's views on the strategic potential of nuclear weapons prior to his interactions with the CRO from 1964-1970 with Satō rarely commenting specifically on the use of nuclear weapons in Japanese security and how they would fit into Japan's defense policy.[320] At the very least however, it is probably reasonable to assume that Satō, as a protégé

[318] Asahi Shimbun, "Chūgoku, Hatsu no Kaku Jikken. Sakuyū, Nishibu Chiku de Daikoku no Kaku Dokusen ni Taikō," 17th October 1964. Asahi Kikuzō Digital Archive. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[319] Kishi Toshimitsu, "Deliberations on Japanese Nuclear Policy During the Satō Administration: Studies by the Cabinet Research Office" *GRIPS Discussion Paper 17-15* (2018).
[320] This was largely a function of his position in the Cabinet, as prior to his appointment as Prime Minister, Satō had largely never been involved in foreign/military affairs, except for a brief stint as Minister for Finance from 1959-1960 and Minister for International Trade and Industry from 1961-1962.

of Yoshida, was not opposed to their use, as long as nuclear weapons and military security in general did not damage Japan's economic recovery.[321] Satō, however, did comment once on nuclear weapons prior to any of his meetings with the CRO, remarking in a December 1964 with Ambassador Reischauer that "if other fellow nations had nuclear weapons, it was only common sense for Japan to also have them."[322]. This, while an understanding of nuclear weapons that was not theoretically polished, did at least demonstrate that Satō understood that international circumstances might force Japan to nuclearize and that he was not opposed to pursuing such policies if necessary. As will be demonstrated in this section, through his meetings with the CRO, however, Satō would gain an increasingly nuanced and thorough understanding of nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence and Japanese security in general.

The First Meeting: December 1964: From 'Common Sense' to Nuclear Deterrence

The first meeting with the CRO occurred in early December 1964 and saw Satō begin to gain a deeper understanding of how nuclear weapons, and the unique retaliatory power they possessed, were necessary to deter nuclear threats. At this meeting, Satō was presented with a report authored by Wakaizumi Kei[323] on 2nd December 1964, titled 'The People's Republic of China's Nuclear Test and Japan's Security: The Basic Policy Direction that Should be Taken by Our Country'.[324] The report contains several similar themes to an article that, as mentioned above, Wakaizumi had written for the Chūō Kōron magazine a few weeks prior and sets out a path for Japan's nuclear deterrence strategy. In the report, Wakaizumi first argues for greater scrutiny of China's nuclear weapons program and how it would affect Japanese security. Wakaizumi then posits that there was no doubt that China's nuclearization was something that needed to be deterred by Japan. This is followed by a criticism of the SDP's notion of demilitarized neutrality as a solution for dealing with the Chinese threat, arguing that carrying out such a policy and abrogating the US-Japan security alliance in the name of peace would

[321] Kusunoki Ayako, "The Satō Cabinet and the Making of Japan's Non-Nuclear Policy," 30-32.
[322] . Reischauer to Rusk, 29 Dec. 1964, Doc. 00400, in National Security Archive, ed., Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, 1960-1976
[323] Wakaizumi was highly trusted by Satō as a scholar and later also became his special envoy to the US on Okinawa reversion issues, especially as Satō's suspicion of Takeo Miki and the Foreign Ministry grew. See Wakaizumi Kei, *The Best Course Available* (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press 2002).
[324] Wakaizumi Kei, "Chūkyō no Kakujiken to Nihon no Anzen Hoshō—Waga Kuni no torubeki Kihon Seisaku no Hōkō ni tsuite," *Archives of Shigaki Minro, Japan Digital Archives Center, 2nd* December 1964.

merely embolden China, which he substantiates by using the example of India, which was attacked by China in 1962 despite adopting a non-aligned policy.[325]

Wakaizumi then addresses the issue of nuclear armament, stressing that it is his view that indeed, only a nuclear arsenal could deter China's nuclear arsenal by means of the threat of nuclear retaliation. Wakaizumi however, argues for US END by stating that deterrence of China and the USSR would require Japan to construct an arsenal that can compete with China and the USSR's arsenals, an economic and political impossibility for Japan.[326] Wakaizumi nevertheless argues for Japan to maintain 'nuclear latency', that is, the latent ability to go nuclear at a moment's notice, with the advancement and maintenance of nuclear technology in Japan superior to that of China.[327]

Following the meeting with the CRO and Wakaizumi's report, Satō would begin utilizing the nuclear deterrence language of Wakaizumi, and shift from a general 'common sense' that Japan should have nuclear weapons to specifically identifying nuclear weapons as crucial for nuclear deterrence. Such changes would be first seen during Satō's meeting with President Johnson in 1965, when Satō specifically hinted at the possibility that Japan's defense might require nuclear deterrence, and questioned whether the US would commit to providing said nuclear deterrence. Johnson answered in the positive, thus verbally confirming US END's presence over Japan for the first time. Further changes would be seen following this meeting, and Satō's understanding of nuclear weapons would seemingly have developed over this period in accordance with Wakaizumi's arguments. For example, in a Diet Session in 1966, Satō would refer to the 'retaliatory power' of nuclear weapons as its key deterrence factor which would force opponents to 'refrain from a nuclear attack.'[328] As the internal socialization process continued, Satō's understanding of retaliation as the main deterrent factor of nuclear weapons would thus develop further.

Following the first meeting, the second key meeting between Satō and the CRO would occur on 8th March 1967, 9 months before the next significant development in Japan's nuclear

[325] Wakaizumi Kei, "Chūkyō no Kakujiken to Nihon no Anzen Hoshō—Waga Kuni no torubeki Kihon Seisaku no Hōkō ni tsuite".
[326] Wakaizumi Kei, "Chūkyō no Kakujiken to Nihon no Anzen Hoshō—Waga Kuni no torubeki Kihon Seisaku no Hōkō ni tsuite".
[327] Wakaizumi Kei, "Chūkyō no Kakujiken to Nihon no Anzen Hoshō—Waga Kuni no torubeki Kihon Seisaku no Hōkō ni tsuite".
[328] Sangiin Yosaniinkaigi Dai 8 Gō (Records of the Budget Committee, House of Councilors, no.8), 7th March 1966.
https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=105115261X00819660307&current=1. Accessed 19/10/2024.

deterrence policy---the announcement of the Four Nuclear Pillars, which was the first public announcement of Japan's nuclear deterrence policy. In between the first and second meetings, there is no record of Satō's views on nuclear deterrence undergoing further significant change, nor did Satō seemingly have any intention of publicizing his agreement with Johnson. Indeed, Satō would instead discuss nuclear deterrence privately with US officials and reaffirm talking points from 1964/65 on multiple occasions during this period. In meetings with Dean Rusk in 1966 and Robert McNamara in 1967, for example, Satō would repeat his strong convictions that nuclear China was a threat that absolutely needed to be deterred, with Satō describing nuclear China as a 'madman with a knife' to Rusk in 1966.[329] Satō's implementation of further changes to Japanese nuclear deterrence policy, such as a shift from secret agreement to public announcement, only after meetings with the CRO thus seem to further reinforce the role of the CRO in the internal socialization process and Satō's continued learning and construction of Japanese nuclear deterrence norms.

The Second Meeting: March 1967: The need for an official announcement

In this second meeting, Yabe Teiji,[330] Saeki Kiichi[331] and Otsu Hideo[332] presented a report on Japan's nuclear policies that they had compiled in 1966.[333] In the section dedicated to nuclear deterrence and strategy, the report basically reinforces the concepts and norms of nuclear deterrence outlined in the first report. This report, however, also began to draw attention to the link between Japan's nuclear choices and the impact said choices may have on the deterrence effect provided by the US-Japan alliance. The report, besides endorsing reliance on US END due to economic reasons and political opposition, also cites how the development of a Japanese nuclear deterrent might demonstrate to Japan's adversaries, especially China, that Japan does not have complete faith in the US-Japan alliance, which would undermine the overall deterrent effect of the US-Japan Security treaty, and weaken Japan's security policy as a whole.[334] The report, while approving of the decision to rely on US END, thus makes further suggestions for Japan to formalize recognition of US END as Japan's nuclear deterrence strategy, which up to this point had largely been determined by verbal exchanges between Satō and Johnson, by

[329] Satō-Rusk Talks, 6 Dec. 1966, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Diplomatic Record Office (DRO),
[330] President of Takushoku University.
[331] Former President, National Defense College.
[332] Head of the Cabinet Research Office.
[333] Kishi Toshimitsu, "Deliberations on Japanese Nuclear Policy During the Satō Administration: Studies by the Cabinet Research Office" *GRIPS Discussion Paper 17-15* (2018).
[334] Kishi Toshimitsu, "Deliberations on Japanese Nuclear Policy During the Satō Administration: Studies by the Cabinet Research Office" *GRIPS Discussion Paper 17-15* (2018).

publicly announcing it as official policy and to pursue policies that would institutionally and normatively strengthen the presence of US END over Japan in order to further demonstrate Japan's faith in US END and enhance the deterrent effect of the US-Japan alliance. The report, for example, proposes the development of communication channels between US and Japanese officials over nuclear issues, reviewing Japanese policies to prepare for the introduction of US nuclear weapons into Japanese territory and participating in discussions with the US regarding the deployment and management of US nuclear forces.[335]

As can be seen from the contents of this report, in terms of normative development, there was not much change from the first to second report. The second report continued to emphasize the need to deter China's nuclear weapons and continued to emphasize the need for nuclear weapons to do, while also arguing that indigenous nuclearization was an impossibility for Japan using economic reasons. It did, however, seemingly bring to Satō's attention the importance of publicly institutionalizing and announcing Japan's dependence on US END to deter nuclear weapons into Japan's security policy by arguing that public affirmations of Japanese belief in US END would demonstrate to adversaries the strength of the US-Japan alliance. Following the meeting, Satō would thus begin to lay the foundation for institutionalizing and announcing dependence on US END as Japan's nuclear deterrence policy. This process would not be an easy one and would force Satō to make several adaptations in his construction of nuclear deterrence norms, which would end up being reflected by the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and the Four Nuclear Pillars.

In pursuing the institutionalization and official announcement of dependence on US END as Japan's official nuclear deterrence strategy, Satō knew that a major obstacle would be Japan's anti-nuclear public, who might object to any semblance of Japan forming a relationship with nuclear weapons, even if it was depending on another country's nuclear arsenal. Satō thus decided to test the public's anti-nuclearism using the reversion of Okinawa, a highly anticipated and popular policy amongst the Japanese that Satō was negotiating with the US, alongside issues of extended nuclear guarantees and Japan's ascension to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Regime. Negotiations with the US over Okinawa had stalled along a number of points, chief amongst them the US military's worries that returning Okinawa would deprive US forces of a crucial nuclear outpost in East Asia.[336] In order to soothe US worries and seemingly test

[335] Kishi Toshimitsu, "Deliberations on Japanese Nuclear Policy During the Satō Administration: Studies by the Cabinet Research Office" *GRIPS Discussion Paper 17-15* (2018).
[336] Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, "Strategic Importance of Okinawa", 1 May 1958,

his people's nuclear allergy against their desire for Okinawan reversion at the same time, Satō thus hinted at the possibility that he might consider allowing for the continued stationing of nuclear weapons in US bases in Okinawa if it meant a sped-up reversion process. This he did by boldly declaring at a press conference in November 1967 that "should the Japanese have a firm determination to defend the country by themselves, Okinawa would be returned to Japan in even less than three years," before going on to claim that "the reversion of a nuclear attached Okinawa was worth considering.".[337]

The blowback from Satō's actions was immediate. Japanese anger over Satō's remarks was so visceral that Satō immediately understood that the necessity of officially placing Japan under US END had to be moderated against the anti-nuclear sentiments of the public.[338] The unique nature of Japan's anti-nuclearism during this period though, should be emphasized. It should be noted that the wider Japanese public, while having a problem with nuclear weapons, did not seemingly object to the necessity of Japan relying on nuclear deterrence specifically at this point. Rather, their apprehension seemed to be aimed at the idea of Japan itself practicing nuclear deterrence, as well as physical reminders of being under nuclear protection, such as nuclear weapons on Japanese soil, or, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the transition of US nuclear submarines through Japanese territory.[339] It is of course, difficult to prove that it is nuclear weapons and indigenous nuclear deterrence specifically that the Japanese people found problematic, rather than nuclear deterrence specifically. However, it is telling that the most controversial nuclear incidents during this period in Japan involved the possibility that Japan might itself practice nuclear deterrence (a nuclear Okinawa)[340] or otherwise physically reminded Japan of the military application of nuclear energy (docking of the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise at Sasebo in January 1968).[341] Indeed, this unique brand of anti-nuclearism would even feature in Satō's presentation of the Four Pillars to the Diet in January 1968.

Following the public outcry in November 1967, Satō thus quickly focused on the question of how to avoid symbols of nuclear deterrence in Japanese territory while also officially and

[337] Nihon Keizai Shimbun, "Kuni wo Mamoru Ketsui wo: Shushō Kisha Kaiken", 21st November 1967.
[338] At the same time, the politically astute Satō managed to use US desire for Japan to sign the NPT to persuade the US to allow a nuclear-free Okinawa reversion, arguing that a nuclear Okinawa would be incompatible with Japan signing the NPT. See Satō-Rogers Talks, 31st July 1969.
[339] Kurosaki Akira, "Anpo Kaitei Kōshō Izen no Kakumochikomi wo Meguru Kokkairongi to Nichibei Gaikō no Saikenshō: KakuMitsuyaku no Engen wo Motomete,", 12.
[340] Nihon Keizai Shimbun, "Kuni wo Mamoru Ketsui wo: Shushō Kisha Kaiken", 21st November 1967.
[341] Reuters Historical Collection, "Japan: Demonstrators battle with police in Tōkyō over visit of USS Enterprise," *British Pathe.*
https://www.britishpathe.com/asset/213998/. Accessed 19/10/2024.

publicly announcing Japanese dependence on US END as Japan's nuclear deterrence policy. This became the topic of a series of discussions for Satō and his ministers at the end of 1967 that would result in the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and then the Four Nuclear Pillars. In a meeting with the LDP Committee on General Affairs, Satō, well aware of the public's disdain for nuclear weapons but still abiding by his perspective that US END was necessary for Japan, first showed a rough draft of the first two principles of (Japanese) non-possession and non-production of nuclear weapons to LDP committee members.[342] While the Principles would be non-binding, Satō believed that expressing such sentiments would be sufficient to placate the public and thus, help him to hold off the challenge from leftist radicals in the Diet. Ikeda Masanosuke and Nakasone Yasuhiro, both Cabinet members, however, persuaded Satō that two principles would not be enough, and requested the addition of the principle of non-introduction of nuclear weapons onto Japanese territory to make it even more palatable for the Japanese public.[343] Satō duly complied and in December 1967, first announced the Three Non-Nuclear Principles to the Diet.

Privately, Satō felt that the Principles were 'nonsense'.[344] However, he was well aware that in normalizing US END over Japan, the Principles were necessary to demonstrate to the public that Japan's adoption US END was something that would not be present on Japanese territory, and something that Japan would strictly not be participating in, which he had realized was the chief concern of the Japanese public following the blowback from his remarks on Okinawa in November 1967. Indeed, from December 1967 onwards, 'invisibility', 'non-participation' and 'dependence' would be his focus as he tried to normalize Japan's dependence on US END as Japan's nuclear deterrence policy. This would be demonstrated most clearly in the January 1968 Diet Session when Satō announced the Four Pillars.

The debate on nuclear deterrence began with Ōhira Masayoshi remarking on the need for Japan to adhere to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and not to develop its own nuclear weapons, while working towards global nuclear disarmament.[345] Ōhira then specifically mentions that the Japanese public is reassured by Satō's promises to not allow nuclear weapons into Japanese territory, and that the LDP understands that the USS Enterprise docking issue caused much

[342] Kusuda Minoru, *Kusuda Minoru Nikki* (Tōkyō: Chuō Kōron Shinsha 2001), Entry of 26 Jan 1968
[343] Kusuda Minoru, *Kusuda Minoru Nikki* (Tōkyō: Chuō Kōron Shinsha 2001), Entry of 26 Jan 1968, 159.
[344] Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Vol 29, Part 2, 314.
[345] Shūgiin Honkaigi Dai 3 Gō (Records of the Plenary Session, House of Representatives, no.3), 30th January 1968.
https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPSC/19680130.O2J.html. Accessed 19/10/2024.

public anger because it reminded the people of their longstanding nuclear aversion, before suggesting that the party needed to work harder on US-Japan relations and nuclear issues.[346] From such statements, it is once again emphasized that the objections of the Japanese people to nuclear deterrence was with regards to the possibility of Japan practicing it (developing nuclear weapons) and being reminded of it (docking of nuclear vessels).

In answering Masayoshi's questions, Satō answered that he was well aware of the public's apprehension about nuclear weapons and the possibility that Japan might pursue nuclear development. He had therefore previously come up with the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, which would become part of his Four Nuclear Pillars policy, which publicly stated that Japan would depend on US END against the threat of nuclear weapons.[347] In justifying Japan's dependence on US END while not practicing nuclear deterrence itself, Satō noted the dangerous global situation and the need for Japan to depend on the US-Japan alliance for some form of security for Japan's continued development.[348] Again, the language used here in constructing the nuclear deterrent is important, with Satō referring to 'dependence' (izon) on US END.[349]

At this point, it is once again important to note the evolution of Satō's discourse on nuclear weapons. As was the case after the first meeting in 1964, Satō would again demonstrate a more thorough understanding of nuclear deterrence on multiple occasions in 1968 following the 1967 meeting, arguing that it was the 'nuclear retaliatory power' of the US that would protect Japan.[350] However, in accordance with the construction and institutionalization of Japanese dependence on US END that he understood was necessary for the Japanese public, he would also state that Japan 'relies' on such deterrence and that he 'does not know what kind of weapons the US has.',[351] creating a sense that Japan was indeed, not involved in the overall

[346] Shūgiin Honkaigi Dai 3 Gō (Records of the Plenary Session, House of Representatives, no.3), 30th January 1968.
https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPSC/19680130.O2J.html. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[347] Shūgiin Honkaigi Dai 3 Gō (Records of the Plenary Session, House of Representatives, no.3), 30th January 1968.
[348] Shūgiin Honkaigi Dai 3 Gō (Records of the Plenary Session, House of Representatives, no.3), 30th January 1968.
[349] The change between 'dependence' and 'cooperation' would be important in the post-Cold War years, as Japan shifted from 'dependence' on US END to 'cooperating with the US' to 'strengthen US END',
[350] Shūgiin Yosaniinkai Dai 6 Gō (Records of the Budget Committee, House of Representatives, no.6), 26th February 1968.
https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=105805261X00619680226&current=1. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[351] Sangiin Yosaniinkai Dai 10 Gō (Records of the Budget Committee, House of Councilors, no.10), 30th March 1968.
https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=105815261X01019680330&current=1. Accessed 19/10/2024.

structure of US END over Japan. This evolution and its importance would be reflected, as mentioned above, in the Four Nuclear Pillars where it was stated that Japan 'depends' on US END. Furthermore, the language of 'dependence' on US END would not be changed until the late 1990s as part of Japan's shift to a more active role in its own defense. Satō's growing understanding of nuclear deterrence, and his focus on 'dependence' would thus characterize Japanese nuclear deterrence for the next 20-25 years.

At this point, the learning and construction of the nuclear deterrence norms by Satō into Japan's official nuclear deterrence policy was largely complete, seen by the official announcement of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and the Four Nuclear Pillars. However, a third meeting and report by the CRO in 1970 would further solidify and institutionalize the norms that made up Japanese nuclear deterrence policy.

The Third Meeting: 1970: Signing the NPT

The third meeting in 1970 saw the Cabinet Research Office (CRO) present a comprehensive report reviewing Japan's nuclear deterrence choices up to that point that was commissioned in 1968, shortly after the announcement of the Four Nuclear Pillars. As compared to the first two reports, this report goes into far more detail about how Japanese researchers conceptualized the logic of nuclear deterrence for Japan during the period and for many scholars of Japan's nuclear history, this report is often studied as a supplement alongside Satō's Four Pillars in order to gain a greater understanding of the logic of Japan's nuclear deterrence strategy.[352]

The third report, like the first two reports, supports continued Japanese dependence on US END and covers similar themes but does so in greater detail. Like the first report, it argues that China's nuclearization is a threat that must be deterred but argues against an indigenous nuclear deterrent, warning that it would place an economic burden on Japan that was simply unviable, carrying out what was essentially a more detailed cost breakdown of the first report's economic arguments against indigenous nuclearization. The report estimated the costs of developing and maintaining a 'modest nuclear' force that could compete with China and the USSR to be 61.2 billion yen per year for 10 years, while a 'high performance nuclear force' was estimated to cost 201.6 billion yen per year for 10 years, which would be a huge financial strain on Japan,

[352] Examples of such research include Kase Yuri, "The Costs and Benefits of Japan's Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report," *The Nonproliferation Review* 2 Volume 8 (2001): 55-68, Kurosaki Akira, " Nihon Kakubusō Kenkyū to ha nandattaka," *Kokusai Seiji* Volume 182 (2015): 125-139 and Kishi Toshimitsu, "Deliberations on Japanese Nuclear Policy During the Satō Administration: Studies by the Cabinet Research Office" *GRIPS Discussion Paper 17-15* (2018).

whose military spending was just 247 billion yen in 1970.[353] Economically, Japan thus simply did not have the resources to compete with China and the USSR in a nuclear arms race.[354]

It is the geographical argument against indigenous nuclearization, however, that is unique to this report and seemingly presents more insight into Japan's nuclear deterrence calculus. The report argues that even if Japan did possess a nuclear arsenal, Japan simply did not have the geographical advantages required to deter Chinese nuclear attack by itself. The report states that in a theoretical nuclear exchange between China and Japan, only 400 nuclear weapons would be sufficient to destroy more than half of Japan's population, while China's population would only be reduced by 11% if over 1000 cities were destroyed in China.[355] Such a disparity, the report argues, would make effectiveness of any indigenous Japanese nuclear deterrent questionable.

Unlike the First and Second Reports, however, in terms of its impact on the learning, construction and changes in the institutionalization of nuclear deterrence norms in Japan from 1964-1970, it is hard to gauge the importance of the Third Report. By the time the third report was presented to Satō in January 1970, much of Japan's nuclear deterrence policy had already been decided. Moreover, the report did not challenge what had already been decided but rather provided a stronger logical foundation for Japan's dependence on US END, utilizing geographic disadvantages in justifying why indigenous Japanese nuclear deterrence would be unfeasible. Subsequently, unlike the first two reports, there were little further changes in Japan's institutionalization and construction of dependence on US END as its nuclear deterrence policy following the Third Report, with the only major change being Japan's signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in February 1970, which further acted as a confirmatory step of the nuclear policy that Japan had pursued thus far.[356] Nevertheless, I argue that the Third Report is an important, additional piece of evidence in demonstrating how the arguments which were used by authors of the First and Second reports were further refined as the deterrence socialization process continued and further supports my conceptualization of Japan's deterrence socialization process from 1951-1964 of how US nuclear deterrence norms were

[353] The Cabinet Research Office, "The 1968/70 Report". September 1968. Available from the archives of the Union of Concerned Scientists. https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/japan-and-americas-nuclear-posture#.Wa2RqrLyjIU. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[354] The Cabinet Research Office, "The 1968/70 Report".
[355] The Cabinet Research Office, "The 1968/70 Report".
[356] UN Treaties, "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,", 3rd February 1970. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showActionDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280120a1c&clang=_en. Accessed 19/10/2024. Japan would ratify the Treaty in June 1976.

transferred from the US to Japan via the education of Japanese scholars and then used in reports submitted to Japanese policymakers which then influenced nuclear deterrence policymaking.

Internal Socialization and the role of Local Norm Takers

As outlined in Chapter 2, local norm takers play an important role in the internal socialization process, with my deterrence socialization theoretical framework arguing that it is the reconstruction and reinterpretation of international nuclear deterrence by local norm takers, in accordance with a country's existing normative consensus that ensures the success of normative socialization. As can be seen from the chapter so far, there can be no doubt that the most important local norm taker in the case of Japan's Four Nuclear Pillars that the most important local norm taker was Prime Minister Satō. How important then, was Satō's interpretation of nuclear weapons and the importance of nuclear retaliation in deterring nuclear attack, as well his reconstruction of Japan's nuclear deterrence policy as a policy of reliance (izon) on US END to the success of the normative socialization process?

I argue that, as a local norm taker, it was Satō's reinterpretation, reconstruction and recrafting of Japan's nuclear deterrence policy as a policy of 'reluctant dependence' on US END that was arguably more crucial to the successful socialization of the norm of nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation into Japan's normative consensus. Satō's interpretation of nuclear weapons as a deterrent against nuclear threats, was no doubt important, as it was Satō, as Prime Minister, who first made the link between nuclear retaliation and deterring nuclear threats specifically, with his predecessors such as Hatoyama and Kishi largely focusing on nuclear weapons and their role in 'deterring aggression' and maintaining peace.[357] Satō, while initially not possessing a thorough understanding of the mechanism of nuclear deterrence, was ostensibly one of the first Japanese politicians to build such a link, and by 1966, as seen above, this thus saw Satō shift from a position of nuclear weapons as 'common sense' to identifying the unique destructive power (hōfukuryoku) of nuclear weapons as being necessary to deter nuclear threat.[358] The key impact of Satō making this link was his introduction of such an interpretation to the political debate. It was Satō, through his speeches in the Diet that explained the mechanism of nuclear deterrence, who introduced and solidified the concept of nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation in the Japanese political debate, where it could be further

[357] Sangiin Yosaniinkai Dai 3 Gō (Records of the Budget Committee, House of Councilors, no. 3) 29th March 1955.
[358] Sangiin Yosaniinkaigi Dai 8 Gō (Records of the Budget Committee, House of Councilors, no.8), 7th March 1966.

discussed and constructed into policy. This was an important development for the socialization process, given that as demonstrated in the external socialization section, such arguments had largely been restricted to academic circles prior to the 1960s. Despite the importance of doing so however, I argue that his interpretation of nuclear deterrence was largely driven by, and echoed the arguments that had been prepared by the researchers of the CRO in the three CRO reports that were presented to him, which can be seen by how he made adjustments in normative interpretation after each meeting with the CRO. As such, I argue that as a local norm taker, Satō's role in the interpreting the role nuclear weapons as a deterrent against nuclear threat was arguably less important than his role in reinterpreting and reconstructing said norm along lines that could fit into Japan's existing normative consensus.

This thus brings me to the process of reinterpreting, reconstructing and adapting Japan's use of nuclear weapons to deter nuclear threats as a 'dependence' on US END. It was arguably in this process where Satō's impact as a local norm taker and his skill in normative reconstruction was more decisive to the success of the normative socialization process. While Satō himself had no objections to nuclear weapons and was convinced of the necessary role they played in deterring nuclear threats, he was also quick to understand the anti-nuclearism of the Japanese public, as seen from the backlash he faced from suggesting the reversion of a nuclear Okinawa. Satō was thus quick to recraft Japanese nuclear deterrence policy as 'dependence' (izon) on US END, rather than utilization. Unlike his predecessors, such as Kishi, who were focused on navigating the difficult issue of constitutional permissibility and insistent on arguing that nuclear weapons were somehow 'legal' under the Constitution,[359] Satō quickly realized that public anger meant that even if such ownership was technically possible, the public would never accept indigenous nuclearization and focused not just on shifting the burden of nuclear deterrence to the US, but ensuring that it did not even make an appearance on Japanese territory as well, via the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. As seen from his announcement of the Four Pillars in the Diet in 1968, Satō was quick to portray such 'dependence' on US END as a reluctant response of Japan to the dangerous global situation as well.[360] Through his interpretation and construction of Japan's dependence on US END as purely a form of reluctant 'dependence' in response to global conditions that Japan cannot change, Satō was thus able to ensure that the perspective that nuclear weapons would be needed for nuclear deterrence would be accepted by Japan.

[359] Sangiin Yosan Giinkai Dai 9 Go (Records of the Budget Committee, House of Councilors, no.9), 12th March 1959.
[360] Shūgiin Honkaigi Dai 3 Gō (Records of the Plenary Session, House of Representatives, no.3), 30th January 1968.

Internal Socialization and Norm Compatibility

Satō's attempts at carefully crafting Japanese acceptance of nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation as a 'dependence' on US END rather than an 'utilization' of nuclear weapons thus brings me to the second point of how internal socialization and the normative construction process was affected by compatibility between the norm of nuclear deterrence by threat of nuclear retaliation, and Japan's existing normative standards surrounding security and nuclear issues in general. As noted in my explanation of the deterrence theoretical framework, normative compatibility is the second factor that I will evaluate when examining internal socialization and affects the efforts of the local norm taker at normative construction.

As established in Chapter 2, in the case of norms that are highly compatible with existing normative structures, local norm takers would be able to more easily craft and interpret them in a way that fits with the existing normative consensus. In contrast, when learning and introducing norms that are highly divergent from existing normative hierarchies, local norm takers would then need to utilize more creativity and nuance in fitting said norms within the existing normative structure. In examining the case of how Satō constructed the Four Nuclear Pillars and placed Japan under US END protection, the question is then how compliant was the norm of nuclear deterrence via nuclear retaliation as a nuclear norm with Japan's existing norms on nuclear weapons and Japanese security during the period and more importantly, how did this affect Satō's efforts at institutionalizing the norm of nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation as a nuclear deterrence policy in Japan?

At first glance, it would seem that the construction of a nuclear deterrence policy based on the deterrence of nuclear weapons via the threat of nuclear retaliation would conflict greatly with Japan's existing norms on security and nuclear issues from 1951-1960, with Postwar Japan seeing a strong antinuclear movement develop in the 1950s.[361] It could thus be expected that Japanese leaders who wanted to enact nuclear deterrence policy in the 1950s-1960s, even if it was just depending on extended nuclear deterrence, would need to carry out normative reconstruction and reinterpretation on a massive scale in order to overcome the incompatibility between Japanese anti-nuclearism and dependence on nuclear weapons for nuclear deterrence.

However, I would argue that the incompatibility between Japan's existing anti-nuclear norms and developing a nuclear deterrence policy based on the norm of nuclear deterrence via threat

[361] Kurosaki Akira, "Japanese Scientists' Critique of Nuclear Deterrence Theory and its Influence on Pugwash, 1954-1964," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 1 Volume 20 (2018): 112-113.

of nuclear retaliation is not as massive at it seems. This is based on two points---the strength and popularity of existing anti-nuclear norms, and the exact definition of Japanese anti-nuclearism. I argue that first of all, while anti-nuclear identity was strong in Japan, it was by no means universal, with much of the LDP leadership not sharing the populace's general aversion to nuclear weapons, as demonstrated earlier by the comments of Ikeda, Kishi and Satō. The strength of this anti-nuclear sentiment within the Japanese public has to be questioned as well, as while it did result in public backlash when Japanese politicians made pro-nuclear deterrence comments, it was never critically politically damaging, as long as said politicians quickly retracted their statements or qualified them as purely theoretical. Kishi, for example, was able to remain Prime Minister despite the controversy over his statement that nuclear weapons were constitutionally permissible after qualifying such statements as referring to a possible future scenario[362], being only forced out in 1960 after the chaos of the 1960 Anpo protests surrounding the renegotiation of the US-Japan security treaty. Meanwhile, despite stating their ambivalence, rather than outright opposition, to nuclear weapons on multiple occasions, the LDP had largely escaped being punished at the ballot box, ruling with outright, albeit largely decreasing, majorities in the Diet for much of the Cold War.[363]

This thus brings me to my second point and the exact nature of anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan. Besides questioning the strength and universality of anti-nuclear norms in Japan from 1951-1970, it is also worth asking the question of what exactly Japanese anti-nuclearism means. For Japanese anti-nuclear organizations like the Gensuikyō or the Nihon Hidankyō, anti-nuclear identity is clearly aimed at a ban on global nuclear testing, global denuclearization and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide.[364] However, whether this is the case for much of the Japan when it comes to 'anti-nuclear' norms remains questionable. As stated earlier in this chapter, it would seem that while the anti-nuclear movement is certainly aiming for complete global nuclear disarmament, for the majority of the Japanese populace, their anti-nuclear identity only extends to ensuring Japan disassociates itself from the use of nuclear

[362] Specifically, Kishi argued that constitutionally, Japan could not possess nuclear weapons 'as they were' in the 1950s-1960s, but speculated this might not be the case for nuclear weapons developed in future.
[363] This was the so-called 1955 system. For more information on the 1955 system and its developments during the Cold War, see Masumi Junnosuke, "The 1955 System in Japan and Its Subsequent Development," *Asian Survey* 3 Volume 28 (1988): 286-306.
[364] Gensuikyō, "About Gensuikyō".
http://www.antiatom.org/english/profile/. Accessed 19/10/2024.
Nihon Hidankyō, "About Hidankyō: Main objectives".
https://www.ne.jp/asahi/hidankyō/nihon/english/about/about1-01.html. Accessed 19/10/2024.

weapons and ensuring that Japan remains 'uncontaminated' by the physical presence of nuclear weapons.

As has been illustrated throughout this chapter, what seemed to concern the Japanese public in general when it came to nuclear deterrence was not so much the fact that Japan might need to rely on it or that it existed, but rather the fact that Japan might physically practice nuclear deterrence, which would associate Japan as a country with offensive weaponry (nuclear weapons) and hint at military aggression, thus triggering the stringent antimilitarist identity that had been entrenched in Japan following World War II.[365] The controversies that Japanese leaders took pain to avoid, for example, such as transition of nuclear submarines, docking of US nuclear powered vessels or nuclear weapons stationed in US bases on the Japanese mainland, were all problems of association with military nuclear weapons, rather than nuclear deterrence as a security policy. Even Ōhira's question in the Diet, which saw Satō announce the Four Pillars in response, was based on expressing the worries of the Japanese public that Japan might pursue military use of nuclear energy and practice nuclear deterrence itself as part of a shift in Japanese security doctrine, rather than relying on nuclear deterrence and nuclear energy per say.[366] Satō's famous Three Non-Nuclear Principles that was lauded by the Japanese public, meanwhile, was also a more a policy of disassociation rather than an outright rejection of nuclear deterrence.

Thus, taking into consideration these two factors, I would argue that while, at an initial glance, nuclear deterrence via the threat of nuclear retaliation would seem to be completely incompatible with Japan's existing norms, the strength of anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan, and the focus of said anti-nuclear sentiment specifically on the possibility of Japan's association with nuclear weapons and their relation to an aggressive military posture, rather than the wider concept of extended nuclear deterrence, means that crafting a policy that integrates the norm of deterring nuclear attack through the threat of nuclear retaliation is not as incompatible with Japan's existing norms as it seems. Indeed, this has been demonstrated by the experiences of Satō, as recounted in this chapter as well, who managed to get the Japanese public to accept being protected by nuclear weapons by ensuring that it was not Japan itself that was utilizing said weapons, thus 'disassociating' Japan from being framed as shifting to an aggressive

[365] Andrew Oros, *Normalizing Japan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 45-48.
[366] Shūgiin Honkaigi Dai 3 Gō (Records of the Plenary Session, House of Representatives, no.3), 30th January 1968.
https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPSC/19680130.O2J.html. Accessed 19/10/2024.

military posture, as well as ensuring that such weapons would not have a physical presence in Japanese territory.[367]

Conclusion: The Four Nuclear Pillars and Japanese nuclear deterrence

The normative perspective that the massive retaliatory prowess of nuclear weapons is necessary to deter nuclear threats, as expressed by the Third Pillar, has been one of two key nuclear normative perspectives that has defined the Japanese relationship with nuclear weapons since 1970. Even today, the Third Pillar continues to remain Japan's official response when questioned over nuclear weapons, and politicians continue to refer to the unique retaliatory power (hōfukuryoku) of nuclear weapons that makes them indispensable to Japanese nuclear deterrence policy. As this thesis argues, such a perspective, rather than being a natural and 'self-evident' perspective that any state operating in the international system holds, should be seen a result of a process of nuclear normative learning, which saw such principles being taught to, and being learnt by, Japanese policymakers as nuclear deterrence norms, who then institutionalized and normalized said norms as nuclear deterrence policy. Such a perspective, which views nuclear weapons as undeniably necessary in deterring nuclear threats, thus in turn explains Japan's continued focus on any signs of weakness in US END, even as it campaigns for global nuclear disarmament.

In this chapter, I have shown how such perspectives first found their origin in nuclear discussions between US and Japanese officials during the 1950s, which saw Japanese officials increasingly come to the conclusion that the US's, and hence Japan's, deterrence of general war and aggression was based heavily on the threat of nuclear retaliation. Simultaneously, a more sophisticated debate was taking place in the academic sector, where scholars who had studied in the US were beginning to debate the necessity of nuclear weapons in deterring nuclear threats. Scholars such as Kōsaka, Saeki, and Wakaizumi, would debate Gallois's 'force de frappe' strategy and, while agreeing with Gallois that the destructive power of nuclear weapons made them the only tool capable of deterring nuclear weapons, would also argue against Gallois's insistence that an independent nuclear deterrent was necessary for such a deterrent effect.

[367] The practice of such a unique deterrence posture in order to satisfy the Japanese public has been termed 'Invisible' END by Dr Nakatani Hiroshi, an analyst at the Japanese Ministry of Defense. See Nakatani Hiroshi, PhD Dissertation, *The Development of US Extended Nuclear Deterrence over Japan: A Study of Invisible Deterrence between 1945 and* 1970, University of Reading (2019): 8.

Both strands of external socialization would then play a role in the formation and institutionalization of nuclear deterrence perspectives that took place after China's nuclearization in 1964 through Prime Minister Satō Eisaku and his interactions with the Cabinet Research Office (CRO). Through such a process, Satō would increasingly refine his perspective of nuclear weapons in line with the arguments presented by the CRO in 1964, 1967 and 1970. As a result, Satō would develop a more thorough understanding of the retaliatory mechanism of nuclear weapons that made them so crucial to nuclear deterrence, going from a general 'common sense for the other side to have them' argument (1964), to referring to the retaliatory power of nuclear weapons as their main deterrent factor (1966) before referring to the 'nuclear retaliatory power of the US deterrent' in 1968. It would be such perspectives that he tried to, and largely succeeded in, institutionalizing as policy in the form of the Four Pillars. Similarly, during this process of construction and institutionalization, Satō would become increasingly aware of Japan's unique form of anti-nuclearism, which would lead him to stress 'dependence' on US nuclear retaliation as Japan's nuclear deterrent, thus creating a sense of distance for the Japanese public.

Throughout this process of deterrence socialization, power would play a key role in the external socialization process, with the US's power over Japan as Japan's chief security provider, and conversely, Japan's power over the US as its key ally in East Asia, affecting the teaching methods of the US, who while holding much power over Japan as its key ally, was understandably reluctant to use more forceful methods of normative teaching, for fear of losing Japan to an anti-American political leadership and losing access to US military bases in Japan. Meanwhile, internal socialization would be primarily influenced by the role of Satō as a local norm taker and his reinterpretation and reconstruction of the nuclear deterrence norms the US were trying to teach, as well as the normative compatibility between such norms and Japan's existing normative consensus on nuclear deterrence. As a local norm taker, Satō's efforts at reconstructing Japan's nuclear deterrence policy as a form of 'dependence' on US END, rather than 'participation', was arguably his most important contribution to ensuring that nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation, as a nuclear deterrence norm, was successfully accepted as part of Japan's nuclear deterrence normative consensus and institutionalized as policy. Satō's attempts at normative reconstruction meanwhile, were aided by the unique nature of Japanese anti-nuclearism, which seemed to be based more on the Japanese public's strong aversion to any indication that Japan might practice nuclear deterrence and any physical reminders of nuclear weapons on Japanese territory, rather than the general concept of nuclear deterrence

via nuclear weapons. As a result, the normative compatibility gap between Japan and nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation was arguably not as wide as it is usually seen, with only minor tweaks rather than major concessions needed to achieve normative compatibility, which Satō achieved with the Four Nuclear Pillars.

Through this chapter, I have thus examined how the perspective that nuclear weapons are absolutely necessary to deter nuclear weapons came to be socialized and institutionalized as nuclear deterrence policy in Japan as the Four Nuclear Pillars. However, this is not the only key normative perspective present in Japanese views of nuclear deterrence. In 2003, Japan would adopt a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system as an additional means of nuclear deterrence.[368] However, as demonstrated by the statement announcing this change and subsequent developments in BMD technology in Japan, Japan would never see this system as anything more than a complement to nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation and would never make any move to expand its remit.[369] Such a perspective, as I stated in my main argument, is the second key Japanese nuclear deterrence perspective which reinforces the necessity of nuclear weapons as a means of nuclear deterrence for Japan. In my next chapter, I thus begin my analysis of how such a perspective of BMD came to be socialized and adopted by Japan in 2003 by first examining the Japan's deterrence socialization of BMD nuclear deterrence concept from 1985-1988 under the US's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which failed and did not result in BMD being adopted by Japan in 1988. As I will demonstrate in the chapter, BMD under SDI was conceptualized as a totally different nuclear deterrence concept as compared to the way it was eventually socialized and institutionalized by Japan, and it would be this failure, and the success of the deterrence socialization process from 1993-2003, which resulted in current Japanese perspectives on BMD as a limited but complementary mechanism to nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation.

[368] Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kaigi, "Dandō Misairu Bōgyo Shisutemu no Seibitō ni tsuite,", 19th December 2003.
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyoukaigi/Missile.pdf. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[369] Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kaigi, "Dandō Misairu Bōgyo Shisutemu no Seibitō ni tsuite,".

Chapter 5: Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Part I: 1985-1988

In the previous chapter, using the deterrence socialization theoretical framework, I analyzed how Japan came to construct the Four Nuclear Pillars as a nuclear deterrence strategy in the 1960s-1970s, which institutionalized the nuclear normative perspective that nuclear retaliation was a necessary deterrent against nuclear threats as one of two normative perspectives that make up Japanese policymakers' views of how nuclear deterrence operates in the international system. Such a normative perspective, which excluded any other possible means of deterring nuclear threats in favor of nuclear weapons and nuclear retaliation, has thus ensured Japan's continued fixation on US END and its sensitivity towards any planned reductions for the US nuclear arsenal, even as it champions global nuclear disarmament.

However, the necessity of nuclear retaliation to deter nuclear threats is not the only perspective that makes up Japan's normative consensus on how to manage nuclear threats. In 2003, following a decision by the Cabinet Security Committee, Japan decided to adopt a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system as a complementary deterrent system against the threat of nuclear missiles.[370] As stated in the 2005 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), "Against the new threats facing Japan such as rogue states and terrorist organizations, this [BMD], along with the US Extended Nuclear Deterrent (END) will be used in collaboration in an appropriate and effective manner.".[371] BMD, alongside US END, thus became one of Japan's officially acknowledged nuclear deterrence strategies.

From the wording of Japan's official BMD policy, it is thus clear that Japanese policymakers have, since 2003, come to perceive BMD as a complementary deterrent strategy, to be used against nuclear threats that potentially cannot be deterred by retaliatory threats, such as rogue states and terrorist organizations. As stated in the main argument of my thesis, this view of BMD as a necessary, but limited complement to nuclear deterrence via nuclear weapons is one of the key normative perspectives that contribute to Japan's continued focus on US END. After all, if the deterrence of nuclear attack by threats of nuclear retaliation is viewed as indispensable, even with the addition of BMD, according to Japanese nuclear deterrence policy, then it would

[370] Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kaigi, "Dandō Misairu Bōgyo Shisutemu no Seibitō ni tsuite,", 19th December 2003.
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyoukaigi/Missile.pdf. Accessed 07/11/2024.
[371] Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kaigi, "Heisei 17-nendo ikōni kakaru Bōgyo Keikaku no Taikō ni tsuite,", 10th December 2004.
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kakugikettei/2004/1210taikō.pdf. Accessed 07/11/2024.

logically follow that Japan would continue to focus on US END and express anxiety over any sign of weakness in the US nuclear umbrella.

The increasing adoption of BMD amongst states in the post-Cold War period,[372] as demonstrated by Japan, is often argued by scholars of international relations to be a natural development for states that was aimed at addressing the new global threats have sprung up in the post-Cold War period.[373] As I have pointed out in my introductory chapter, however, such a view fails to address the issue that BMD is not a new technology and had first been explored during the Cold War. However, according to the logic of nuclear deterrence, BMD was deemed inherently incompatible with nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation. In order for a stable nuclear deterrence regime based on nuclear retaliation to exist, mutual vulnerability is required, as it is only the possibility of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) by nuclear weapons that will cause states to be deterred from launching nuclear attacks.[374] The addition of BMD, which might provide an additional defense against a retaliatory nuclear strike, might instead remove this hesitation from state officials. The need to overcome the adversary's BMD system and restore the threat of nuclear retaliation, in turn, would spur states to develop even more advanced nuclear weapons in greater quantities, leading to an arms race.[375] Even if states like Japan needed to address emerging threats in the post-Cold War period, why then, would they choose to do so via a policy that would destabilize the nuclear deterrence regime?

In addressing such contradictions, I thus argue that in Japan's case, such a supposedly illogical policy shift can be explained by deterrence socialization, and how it managed to establish a particular normative perspective in Japan that BMD could and would only act as a complement to nuclear retaliation and US END, as expressed by Japan's official pronouncement on BMD. Specifically, I argue that there were two attempts at the socialization of BMD as a nuclear deterrence solution in Japan—1985-1988, under the US's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and 1993-2003, under the US's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). It is the failure of the first socialization process under the SDI, which did not challenge BMD's inherent

[372] Currently the US, Israel, Russia, China, Japan and South Korea, amongst others all operate some form of BMD/limited BMD.
[373] The development of NATO's missile defense system, for example, has been argued to be a response to the rise of new nuclear states, to whom conventional nuclear deterrence calculations do not apply. See Sean Kay, "NATO's Missile Defense—Realigning Collective Defense for the 21st Century," *Perceptions* 1 Volume 17 (2012): 38-39.
[374] A. Vinod Kumar," How can Missile Defenses Affect Nuclear Deterrence? An Offense-Defense Theoretical Perspective," *Strategic Analysis* 1 Volume 46 (2022): 35-39.
[375] A. Vinod Kumar," How can Missile Defenses Affect Nuclear Deterrence? An Offense-Defense Theoretical Perspective," 35-39.

incompatibility with nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation and conceptualized BMD as a complete replacement for conventional nuclear deterrence, and the success of the second under the BMDO, which conceptualized BMD in far more limited terms and began introducing the idea that BMD would only complement nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation, that saw Japan being taught and successfully learning and constructing the norm of BMD as a necessary but limited complement to nuclear deterrence, as reflected in its 2003 announcement. Through the failure of the socialization process from 1985-1988 and the success of the socialization process from 1993-2003, I thus argue that Japan's deterrence socialization process has contributed further to its continued focus on US END as a nuclear deterrence strategy.

This chapter covers the first process of the wider case study of Japan's BMD deterrence socialization and will analyze the failed deterrence socialization process of Japan and its initial introduction to BMD as a nuclear deterrence norm under the US's SDI from 1985-1988, which did not result in any changes to Japanese nuclear deterrence policy. This period is often given less focus by Western scholars, with many studies of Japanese BMD policy development instead choosing to focus on its successful adoption of a BMD system from 1993-2003.[376] While there is more Japanese research on the period,[377] few Japanese scholars have focused on examining the vast differences in which BMD was presented to, and understood by, Japan in 1985 as compared to 1993 and how this impacted Japan's view of the relationship between BMD and conventional nuclear deterrence.

My analysis of the deterrence socialization process from 1985-1988 addresses this research gap and examine how Reagan and the SDI attempted to 'teach' the radical idea of BMD as a complete replacement for nuclear deterrence and failed, contributing to the way BMD was eventually conceptualized, constructed and implemented as policy by Japan following the second socialization process from 1993-2003. It is important to stress just how different US objectives for BMD were under the SDI and the BMDO later on. Under the Reagan

[376] See, for example, Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power,* (Oxon: Routledge, 2005); Andrew Oros, *Normalizing Japan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008) and Richard J. Samuels, Securing *Japan: Tōkyō's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2007). All three authors explore Japan's BMD development as part of its changes in security policy in the 1990s.

[377] A notable exception is Kawakami Takahashi and Jimbo Ken's historical analysis of Japanese BMD, which covers both 1985-1988 and 1993-2003 in great detail and notes the importance of the Nakasone-Reagan talks in 1985. See Kawakami Takashi and Ken Jimbo, "Dandō Misairu Bōei to Nichibei Dōmei," in Misairu Bōgyo: Atarashii Kokusai Anzen Hoshō no Kōzu, ed. Morimoto Satōshi (Tōkyō: Taihei-Sha, 2006). However, even Jimbo's analysis does not focus on the vast difference in which BMD was conceptualized by the US under the SDI and the BMDO and the different ways BMD was introduced to Japan across the two periods.

Administration's SDI, the idea that BMD would only weaken or destabilize a nuclear deterrence regime and was incompatible with nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation was not disputed. This, however, was seen as an opportunity rather than a problem by Reagan, and BMD was truly envisioned as a transformational technology and seen as the first step on the path to complete nuclear disarmament. To quote Reagan, it was supposed to make nuclear deterrence (by nuclear weapons) 'obsolete'.[378] As Reagan envisioned it, the SDI would operate BMD as a jointly shared technology between the US and the USSR. The SDI would provide absolute nuclear security by shooting down any potentially launched nuclear ballistic missile.[379] With SDI rendering nuclear missiles futile and assuring states of their security against nuclear weapons, global disarmament would then follow.[380] Such a conceptualization of BMD challenged the global consensus on nuclear deterrence in the Cold War[381] and had it succeeded, would have no doubt changed the practice of nuclear deterrence, both globally and in Japan.

Examining diplomatic documents and the record of Diet meetings from 1985-1988, I will thus show how the US first attempted to introduce the BMD under the SDI as part of the process of external socialization, initially via a meeting between President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone, but later primarily through an invitation for Japan to officially participate in joint SDI research. By examining the statements of the Prime Minister's Office and Nakasone's own recollections of his meeting with Reagan, as well as the evidence provided by the specialists that were sent to US to learn about SDI in order to consult the Japanese government on SDI participation, I will show that the external socialization process from 1985-1988, in contrast to the other instances of deterrence socialization in this thesis, did not involve substantial normative transfer, with the external socialization process largely focused on discussing SDI's technological and scientific potential. This, I will demonstrate, was due to an unusual hesitancy by US officials to carry out normative teaching and share with their Japanese counterparts the

[378] Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security,", 23rd March 1983, *Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum.* https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-defense-and-national-security. Accessed 07/11/2024.
[379] Ralph L. Dietl, *The Strategic Defense Initiative: Ronald Reagan, NATO Europe, and the Nuclear and Space Talks 1981-1988* (London: Rowan and Littlefield Publishing Group, 2018): 19-20.
[380] Ralph L. Dietl, *The Strategic Defense Initiative: Ronald Reagan, NATO Europe, and the Nuclear and Space Talks 1981-1988,* 19-20.
[381] The nuclear deterrence regime in the 1980s was still based on a position of mutual vulnerability and destruction, with the fear of being completely destroyed by the opposing side's nuclear weapons acting as the key deterrent against the usage of nuclear weapons. See William E. Odom, "The Origins and Design of Presidential Decision-59," in Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice ed. Henry D. Sokolski, 2004, 175-196.

exact relationship of the SDI with nuclear deterrence and what role the Reagan administration envisioned it would play in the future of nuclear deterrence. I will then examine how this lack of normative teaching by the US impacted Japanese policymakers' discussion and conceptualization of BMD and the SDI from 1985-1988 and how this resulted in the failure of deterrence socialization, as seen in Figure 1.3. The failure of this process then saw initial interest in BMD in Japan not followed by any move towards internal socialization and integration of BMD as a nuclear deterrence norm into Japan's nuclear policy.



Figure 1.3. Deterrence Socialization in Japan, 1985-1988

Stage 1: External Socialization

As with the normative concept of deterring nuclear threats via the threat of nuclear retaliation, it was the US, under the SDI, that first began seriously considering the possibility of replacing deterrence via nuclear weapons with BMD and introduced the concept to Japan. Prior to this period, there was the little discussion over the utility of BMD as a nuclear deterrence strategy in Japan, with only a single reference made to a potential missile defense system as being 'technologically unfeasible' in the 1970 report from the Cabinet Research Office (CRO) that

advocated for US END as Japan's nuclear deterrent strategy.[382] Such a position was, of course, not confined to Japan. As previously mentioned, developments of nuclear weapons technology and the growth of nuclear arsenals in the 1960s-70s had led to most nuclear deterrence theorists and policymakers concluding that mutual vulnerability and the threat of destruction was a necessary condition for stable nuclear deterrence via nuclear retaliation, and that BMD, which increased the probability of survival, would merely hinder said vulnerability and destabilize the nuclear deterrence regime.[383]

Reagan's announcement in 1983 and his intentions to make nuclear deterrence 'obsolete' in 1983 thus spurred a new debate over the role of US nuclear weapons amongst US policymakers. It is important to note however, that at this point in 1983 reaction amongst the US's allied countries, including Japan, was still muted and there was little to no discussion of BMD and replacing conventional nuclear deterrence. It was not until two years later, in 1985, when the US first began carrying out the external socialization of BMD into Japan, that the norm of BMD and its relationship with nuclear weapons started becoming a major topic of discussion in Japanese policymaking circles. As with the case of nuclear deterrence via nuclear weapons, external socialization of the norm of BMD as a replacement for nuclear deterrence largely took place through two processes. The first was a meeting between President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone in January 1985, where Reagan discussed the SDI with Nakasone, outlining his ambitions for the project and inviting Japan to participate in joint development.[384] The second, meanwhile, took place at the policymaker level, and involved an official invitation to join the SDI being sent out to 18 countries, including Japan, by the US on 26th March 1985.[385] This would then be followed by Japanese officials visiting the US and discussing the technical details of SDI with their US counterparts, before reporting their findings to Japanese policymakers via a series of Diet Committee meetings. Through these two processes, US policymakers thus began to slowly expose their Japanese counterparts to the possibilities of

[382] The Cabinet Research Office, "The 1968/70 Report". September 1968. Available from the archives of the Union of Concerned Scientists.
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/japan-and-americas-nuclear-posture#.Wa2RqrLyjIU. Accessed 07/11/2024.
[383] This was partly the reason for the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the US and USSR, which forbade either superpower from building missile defense systems that would impact said vulnerability and trigger an arms race. See U.S. Department of State, *Treaty between The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,* 26th May 1972.
https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/101888.htm. Accessed 07/11/2024.
[384] Segawa Takao, "Nihon no SDI Kenkyū Sanka wo Meguru Seisaku Kettei Katei: 1985-1987," *Kōkyō Seisaku Gaku Nenhō* Volume 9 (2015): 90.
[385] Segawa Takao, "Nihon no SDI Kenkyū Sanka wo Meguru Seisaku Kettei Katei: 1985-1987," 92.

BMD, and the ways it could be used in nuclear deterrence. As I will demonstrate in describing the two processes however, US discussions with their Japanese counterparts over BMD would feature little normative discussion during this period, primarily due to the fact that US officials and Reagan himself were seemingly hesitant to provide a comprehensive explanation of Reagan's initial conceptualization of BMD and the SDI as a global, jointly-controlled missile defense system and how it would replace nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation to their Japanese counterparts, instead focusing on presenting BMD and the SDI as a means for technological and economic development. This hesitancy on the US's part, as I will demonstrate, would lead to an understanding of BMD and the SDI in Japan that completely left out its supposed role in replacing nuclear deterrence, contributing to the eventual failure of the deterrence socialization process.

Process 1: Reagan's meeting with Nakasone, January 1985

The meeting between Prime Minister Nakasone and President Reagan in January 1985 where Reagan invited Japan to participate in joint SDI technological development initially seemed poised to be a channel for Reagan to 'teach' his vision of a BMD that would replace nuclear deterrence to Nakasone and socialize the norm of BMD as a nuclear deterrence strategy. This, however, turned out not to be the case, as mentioned above, and there appears to have been little to no discussion between Reagan and Nakasone over the role BMD would play in US nuclear deterrence policy and how it would affect US END guarantees to Japan, which I argue was likely a result of Reagan's seeming hesitancy to 'teach' Nakasone and share his conceptualization of BMD as a replacement for nuclear deterrence. Such a hypothesis is unfortunately, not possible to confirm with official records of the meeting, with official statements released to the press only noted that Reagan and Nakasone discussed international relations with the USSR, US-USSR arms controls negotiations, and areas in which US-Japan relations could be strengthened.[386] I argue, however, that it is possible to postulate that Reagan's hesitancy at normative teaching and transference can be seen primarily from Nakasone's comments immediately after the meeting, his discussion of SDI with European leaders later in 1985, and the way US officials would discuss the SDI with their Japanese counterparts in the process of external socialization.

[386] Government of Japan, "Press Remarks of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro," 2nd January 1985. https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPUS/19850102.O1J.html. Accessed 07/11/2024.

Following the January 1985 meeting, Nakasone would address the issue of SDI on multiple occasions, referring to his discussions with Reagan both within Japan and with his international counterparts. However, in such discussions, he would demonstrate a conceptualization of BMD and the SDI that seemed to be devoid of Reagan's vision, or at least showed an incomplete understanding of it. Immediately following the January 1985 meeting, for example, Nakasone stated that on a personal level, he would be interested in 'supporting' the SDI, although he was forced to moderate his tone to 'understanding' the need for SDI under pressure from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[387] Nakasone would then further stress that his understanding and support for SDI was based on the fact that it was not a new nuclear weapon, that it was purely defensive and that it was the path towards nuclear elimination.[388] Nakasone would subsequently refer to the meeting on two more occasions. The first was a meeting between Nakasone and German Chancellor Kohl on 30th April 1985, before the 1985 G7 meeting. In the meeting, Kohl expressed his worries over the future of US END in Europe and claimed that the US wanted to use SDI as a replacement for US END, further pointing out that the US had used the SDI to attack the immorality of MAD. In response, Nakasone claimed that it was his understanding that SDI was part of US END, rather than a replacement.[389]

The second, meanwhile, was a meeting between Nakasone and French President Mitterrand in July 1985 during which both leaders shared their understanding of BMD development under the SDI. Mitterrand was the leader most opposed to BMD development and told Nakasone that based on what he understood the US was hoping to achieve with the SDI (nuclear deterrence replacement) and how it would involve the militarization of space, he could not agree to development of BMD or the SDI.[390] In response, Nakasone argued that SDI development would be a gradual change taking over 20 to 50 years, was important for addressing the offensive/defensive balance of nuclear deterrence and would take place within the framework of the ABM. More importantly, Nakasone pointed out that in his discussions with Reagan, Reagan did not request that Japan necessarily adopt US plans for BMD and nuclear deterrence under the SDI and only requested technical cooperation and assistance from Japan.[391]

[387] Urayama Kaori, PhD Dissertation, *Missile Defense, US-Japan Alliance and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1983-2007,* Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences (2008): 52.
[388] Segawa Takao, "Nihon no SDI Kenkyū Sanka wo Meguru Seisaku Kettei Katei: 1985-1987," 91.
[389] Miyazaki Taishi Hatsu Gaimudaijin Ate Dai 1229 Gō "Dai Ikkai Nichidoku Shunō Kaidan".
[390] Motono Taishi Hatsu Gaimudaijin Ate Dai 3137 Gō "Sōri Hōfutsu".
[391] Motono Taishi Hatsu Gaimudaijin Ate Dai 3137 Gō "Sōri Hōfutsu".

As we can see from these three occasions when Nakasone referred to his discussion with Reagan yet made no mention of Reagan's plan to eliminate nuclear deterrence through the development of a global missile defense shield, Nakasone seemingly was not privy to Reagan's vision when it came to BMD, SDI, and nuclear deterrence elimination. It is possible, of course, that Nakasone's comments that he understood BMD and the SDI as part of US END could have been political rhetoric in the case of his conversations with the French and German leaders and an attempt by Nakasone to downplay incompatibility between SDI and the existing nuclear deterrence regime in order to secure French and German participation.[392] However, Nakasone's remarks immediately after his meeting with Reagan, where he stated that the SDI was defensive, non-nuclear and the path to nuclear elimination, while technically an accurate representation of BMD and the SDI, was also light on detail and did not demonstrate that he had been exposed to any deeper understanding and normative socialization of Reagan's conceptualization how the SDI would pave the way for nuclear elimination by creating a globally controlled missile shield.

Following his meetings in 1985 with European leaders, Nakasone would continue advocating for Japanese SDI participation. Such advocacy, however, would still fail to mention the normative importance of BMD and how it could possibly allow for 'nuclear-free' nuclear deterrence. This is perhaps best exhibited by his Five SDI principles, which were first announced in the Diet in September 1986.[393] The Five SDI Principles were an initiative by Nakasone to convince Japanese policymakers to approve participation in the SDI and was meant to reassure them that Nakasone's government would only participate in research with the US on BMD technology under five key principles: that the SDI must not be used to achieve superiority over the Soviet Union, that it must not lead to a weakening of deterrence, that it must not violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, that nuclear disarmament must continue, and that SDI development must not proceed without allied consultation.[394] These Five Principles, while no doubt important in setting limitations and reassuring Japan's policymakers, nevertheless once again did not point out Nakasone's vision for how BMD could contribute to Japanese nuclear deterrence, and how BMD would interact with US nuclear

[392] Securing European cooperation and presenting a united 'Western' front on SDI was of particular concern to Nakasone. One of his key preoccupations with the SDI was the European nations' suspicions of it, as seen from his diaries. See Nakasone Yasuhiro, *Nakasone Yasuhiro ga Kataru Sengo Nihon Gaikō* (Tōkyō: Shinchosha 2012): 401-402.
[393] JAXA, *Nakasone Yasuhiro SDI Sanka Gogensoku.* 16th September 1986. https://www.jaxa.jp/library/space_law/chapter_3/3-1-1-5_j.html. Accessed 07/11/2024.
[394] JAXA, *Nakasone Yasuhiro SDI Sanka Gogensoku.* 16th September 1986. https://www.jaxa.jp/library/space_law/chapter_3/3-1-1-5_j.html. Accessed 07/11/2024.

weapons and its extended nuclear deterrence guarantees, given Reagan's vision of eliminating nuclear weapons through BMD.

From Nakasone's own recollections of his meeting with Reagan to Kohl and Mitterrand, his advocacy efforts for SDI from 1985-1986, as well as the key points he focused on in the development of the Five Principles, Nakasone thus seemed to exhibit limited understanding of Reagan's conceptualization and vision for the SDI and BMD. This would thus seem to suggest that this first process of external socialization from 1985-1988, in contrast to the previous case study of the Four Pillars and the transfer of nuclear deterrence norms, focused largely on technological and economic cooperation and involved little to no normative transfer, as stated at the beginning of this section. The absence of normative transfer, in turn, could stem from two possible scenarios. It is possible that while Reagan did introduce the concept of the SDI to Nakasone and asked for his cooperation in technological development in the meeting, this was not matched by a transfer of Reagan's unique conceptualization of BMD under the SDI. This would thus point to the failure of external socialization and normative transfer as resulting from Reagan's failure to 'teach' Nakasone. It is, however, also possible that Nakasone, unlike the LDP leaders of the 1950s who seemingly 'learnt' the importance of nuclear deterrence from their interactions with the US and began echoing the importance of nuclear weapons from a deterrence and security standpoint, simply failed to understand or grasp Reagan's vision, which would point to a failure in normative 'learning', rather than teaching. By cross-referencing Reagan and Nakasone's meeting with the second external socialization process of discussions between US and Japanese officials on the SDI during this same period however, I argue that the former is more likely than the latter.

Process 2: Meetings between Japanese and US Officials, 1985-1988

This thus brings me to the second process of external socialization from 1985-1988, which would primarily involve meetings between US and Japanese officials in order to discuss the SDI and Japan's potential contributions. Following the US's initial invitation to 18 countries to participate in SDI at the end of March 1985, Japanese officials began requesting for more information from the US regarding the SDI. In response, the US sent experts from the Department of Defense on 3rd April 1985, both to explain the technical details of the BMD system to the Japanese, and to investigate potential collaboration and contribution possibilities

from Japanese optics and laser technology.[395] This would then culminate in a meeting between US and Japanese experts on 23rd April 1985. Subsequently, such efforts would be followed by more socialization efforts towards the end of 1985, following Nakasone's meetings with European leaders over SDI in mid-1985. Following the lead of the British and the Germans, who sent SDI investigative teams to the US in August 1985, the Japanese would send their first investigative team, made up of officials from four ministerial departments (defense, trade and industry, foreign affairs, science and technology), to the US to learn about BMD development under the SDI.[396] This would be followed by the second and third investigative teams, sent in January and March 1986 respectively. The Third Investigative team would subsequently detail their findings in a report published in April 1986.[397]

Similar to the meeting between Nakasone and Reagan, such meetings and discussions between US and Japanese policymakers would appear to have focused on SDI's technological and economic potential and potential areas of cooperation for the US and Japan, instead of focusing on the SDI's purpose as a global missile shield that was meant to eliminate nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation, the possible transformative effects it would have on US nuclear strategy, and what implications this would have for Japanese dependence on US END and nuclear retaliation as a form of nuclear deterrence. In the case of US and Japanese officials however, it would be clear that this resulted from a failure of US officials to transfer and 'teach' Reagan's conceptualization of BMD and the SDI, instead focusing on stressing the technological impact of SDI with their Japanese counterparts and presenting BMD purely as a form of 'non-nuclear' nuclear deterrence, rather than a path to global denuclearization through a shared missile defense shield. The testimony provided by Kuriyama Takakazu, Director-General of the North American Bureau who participated in the first set of meetings in April 1985 is enlightening in this context.

Following the meeting on 23rd April 1985, Kuriyama would recount the contents of the meeting to the Upper House Foreign Affairs Committee on 25th April 1985. According to Kuriyama, there were three topics of discussion between US and Japanese officials at the meetings---the

[395] Sangiin Gaimu Iin Kai Dai 8 Gō (Records of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Councilors, no.8), 25th April 1985.
https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=110213968X00819850425&current=1. Accessed 07/11/2024.
[396] Segawa Takao, "Nihon no SDI Kenkyū Sanka wo Meguru Seisaku Kettei Katei: 1985-1987," 99; Kibino Yasuhi, *Nichibei Haiteku Masatsu: SDI to Nihon no Mirai* (Tōkyō: Gijutsu to Ningen 1987): 178-179.
[397] Asahi Shimbun, "SDI Kanmin Gōdō Chōsadan no Hōkoku Yōshi", 23rd April 1986. Asahi Kikuzō Digital Archive. Accessed 19/10/2024.

technological requirements and specifications of the SDI, the budgetary estimates of the SDI, and finally, the strategic role of the SDI in nuclear deterrence strategy.[398] In relation to the impact of SDI on nuclear deterrence strategy, Kuriyama specifically stated that it was his understanding that "Reagan and the US were pursuing SDI research with the main objective of developing a defense system based on non-nuclear methods of nuclear deterrence."[399] Subsequently, members of the Committee would then focus on the supposed 'non-nuclear' nature of the SDI, questioning Kuriyama over whether the various weapon systems would utilize nuclear energy and whether the SDI would be a path for Japan to participate in non-nuclear nuclear deterrence and promote global denuclearization objectives.[400] Non-nuclear nuclear deterrence thus became the key characteristic of BMD and the SDI in Japan, rather than global denuclearization through joint control. Indeed, joint control with the USSR was not mentioned at all.

Such statements by Kuriyama would thus seem to suggest that meetings between the US and Japan on the SDI focused on technological and economic issues of the SDI, with two of the three topics discussed during the April 1985 meeting focusing on such issues. Furthermore, it is clear that even when the topic turned to the role of BMD in US nuclear deterrence strategy, the way the SDI was conceptualized and presented by US officials in the April 1985 meetings was vastly different from Reagan's concept of shared control with the USSR over the missile defense shield and how this precondition was crucial to the SDI achieving its objective of global denuclearization, instead being described by said officials as a US 'non-nuclear' defense system. The focus on technological and economic benefits, as well as the lack of any attempt by US officials to present Reagan's vision of global denuclearization through the SDI would thus seem to suggest that the lack of normative transfer across this external socialization process was largely the result of a failure of 'teaching', rather than 'learning'.

This focus on technological and economic cooperation, rather than transformation of nuclear deterrence policy, would seem to define the interactions between the investigative teams sent to the US and US officials from 1985-1986 as well. As with the case of the meeting between

[398] Sangiin Gaimu Iin Kai Dai 8 Gō (Records of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Councilors, no.8), 25th April 1985. https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=110213968X00819850425&current=1. Accessed 07/11/2024.
[399] Sangiin Gaimu Iin Kai Dai 8 Gō (Records of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Councilors, no.8), 25th April 1985. https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=110213968X00819850425&current=1. Accessed 07/11/2024.
[400] Sangiin Gaimu Iin Kai Dai 8 Gō (Records of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Councilors, no.8), 25th April 1985. https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=110213968X00819850425&current=1. Accessed 07/11/2024.

Nakasone and Reagan in 1985, I have been unable to find complete records of what was discussed between US officials and Japanese policymakers over the course of the three investigations. However, the third investigative team did publish a report on its findings upon returning Japan in April 1986. The report prepared by the investigative team argued for US-Japanese cooperation in BMD development under the SDI. As was the case with previous Japanese statements on BMD and the SDI, however, the report did not justify this on the grounds of providing a more effective deterrent posture, and in terms of security outlook, the report made no recommendations on whether Japan should deploy this technology and how it would affect Japan's security policy and deterrence posture. Instead, the report states that the main benefit of participating in SDI was the potentially massive technological gains for Japanese science and technology, specifically stating that "Based on our investigations, if we [Japan] participate in SDI research in sectors that we specialize in, we can except to see significant Japanese technological developments in said sectors." [401] When viewed together with the absence of normative teaching in the April 1985 meeting by US officials, such a report would thus once again seem to demonstrate how nuclear normative transfer seem to have been minimal in interactions between US and Japanese officials, primarily as a result of the hesitation of US officials in 'teaching' Reagan's normative conceptualization of the BMD and SDI.

Overall Impact of the Two Processes and the failure of Deterrence Socialization

As can be seen from the two processes, nuclear deterrence normative transfer was notably absent from discussions between the US and Japan. While it was unclear whether this was a failure on the US's part to 'teach' norms or Japan's part to 'learn' norms when it comes to the meeting between Reagan and Nakasone, it was made clear from the second process of meetings between US and Japanese officials that the US seemed unusually hesitant in communicating Reagan's vision of replacing nuclear weapons through the SDI to Japan, instead stressing the technological potential, the economic benefits and the non-nuclear nature of SDI and avoiding the more problematic issues of how it would work with existing US END commitments. What then, was the overall impact of such an external socialization process?

As has been mentioned above, we can already see how such a normative transfer altered the way SDI was discussed amongst certain Japanese policymakers, with Nakasone and his

[401] Asahi Shimbun, "SDI Kanmin Gōdō Chōsadan no Hōkoku Yōshi", 23rd April 1986. Asahi Kikuzō Digital Archive. Accessed 19/10/2024.

policymakers both failing to mention Reagan's vision of global denuclearization through international SDI control and instead referring to SDI as a new form of non-nuclear nuclear deterrence and basing their commitment to the project on the supposition that it would not upend the international nuclear deterrence regime. In the case of Japanese policymakers, we have also seen how the discussion of the SDI began shifting towards examining the possible technological and economic benefits, rather than how SDI and BMD works as a deterrence mechanism. While the April 1985 did still feature some discussion on the 'non-nuclear' deterrence provided by SDI, such issues would soon be overshadowed by the increasing contextualization of SDI and the BMD as an economic and technological opportunity, as can be seen by the Third Investigative Team's support for SDI participation based on gains in 'technological development.' The increasing shift in Japanese policymakers' discussion of SDI and BMD towards its economic benefits is made even more clear when contrasted with the deterrence norms-focused discussions of the Japanese policymakers which featured in the other two external socialization processes explored in this thesis, with Chapter 4's external socialization discussion on nuclear weapons, for example, focusing on nuclear weapons as a means of 'deterrence against war'[402] and the role of nuclear weapons in 'peace through strength'.[403]

The contextualization of SDI and BMD as an economic opportunity, stripped of its potential transformative role in nuclear deterrence, would soon extend to Japanese industry as well. Unlike conventional nuclear deterrence policies whose sensitivity meant that they were only discussed within a small group of government officials, SDI participation would involve Japanese firms collaborating with US firms on technological development as well, resulting in SDI participation becoming a topic of discussion amongst Japanese firms and financial institutions. Naturally, such institutions would discuss and look at SDI not in terms of its impact on nuclear deterrent strategy, but as a technological opportunity for Japanese firms. Vice-President of Daiichi Kangyō Bank Aoki Tatsuo, for example, commented that SDI was not a space weapon but a high technology development project with huge benefits for Japan.[404] Meanwhile, firms like Mitsubishi became interested in SDI primarily as to acquiring space technology that, in their view, would be necessary for the technological arms race of the 21st

[402] FRUS 1955-1957, Japan, Vol.23, Part 1, Document 159.
[403] Sangiin Yosaniinkai Dai 3 Gō (Records of the Budget Committee, House of Councilors, no. 3) 29th March 1955.
https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=102215261X00319550329&current=1. Accessed 19/10/2024.
[404] Kibino Yasuhi, *Nichibei Haiteku Masatsu: SDI to Nihon no Mirai* (Tōkyō: Gijutsu to Ningen 1987): 180.

century.[405] Skeptics in turn, rather than focusing on the viability of SDI as a nuclear deterrent strategy for Japan, would also begin focusing on questioning the supposed technological gains from Japan's participation, arguing that US security legislation would likely prevent Japan from acquiring the most crucial technological developments from the SDI.[406] Such arguments would only be further bolstered by US statements and developments during this period, such as a 1985 defense bill passed in Congress which proposed a 'buy American' policy for the SDI and a statement released by the Pentagon which stated that US military leaders were reluctant to entrust key areas of SDI to Japan.[407]

By 1986, even the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) would get involved and release a statement opposing Japanese participation not on the basis of security and deterrence, instead questioning the supposed technological benefits that Japan would gain from participation,[408] further anchoring the conceptualization of SDI and BMD as an economic problem rather than an issue of security. Indeed, by the end of this period of external socialization, technological and economic protection would be the key concern of Japanese policymakers, as seen from the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) termed the "Agreement Concerning Japanese Participation in Research for the Strategic Defense Initiative" between the US and Japan signed in July 1987.[409] The MOU, which was drafted following the presentation of the Third Investigative team's report in a Diet session on 5th May 1986,[410] made no reference to the role that Japan envisioned BMD would play in Japanese nuclear deterrence under the SDI, instead limiting itself to economic and business issues. It specified certain basic protections for Japanese firms participating in SDI, such as the right to withdraw from the SDI

[405] Urayama Kaori, PhD Dissertation, *Missile Defense, US-Japan Alliance and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1983-2007,* Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences (2008): 63.
[406] "Tōkyō heads gingerly toward joining SDI," *Christian Science Monitor,* 22nd April 1986. https://www.csmonitor.com/1986/0422/otoky.html. Accessed 07/11/2024. The question of techno-nationalism and potentially limited gains from joint US-Japanese projects would once again occur in the FSX Controversy from 1988.
[407] Japanese Agree to 'Star Wars' Research; U.S. Expects Limited Help," *The New York Times,* 10th September 1986. https://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/10/world/japanese-agree-to-star-wars-research-us-expects-limited-help.html. Accessed 07/11/2024.
[408] Kibino Yasuhi, *Nichibei Haiteku Masatsu: SDI to Nihon no Mirai*, 186.
[409] Government of Japan, *Waga Kuni no SDI Kenkyū Sanka ni Kansuru Kyōtei,* 22nd July 1987. http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1989/w1989_9150.html. Accessed 07/11/2024.
[410] Sangiin Kagakugijutsu Tokubetsu Iin Kai Dai 6 Gō (Records of the Special Committee on Science and Technology, House of Councilors, no.6), 5th May 1986. https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=110413928X00619860507&current=1. Accessed 07/11/2024.

at any time and the right of Japanese companies not to be excluded from the results of SDI technological developments on the basis of US confidentiality requirements.[411]

The end of the external socialization stage in deterrence socialization is usually signaled by the occurrence of a crisis, which sees policymakers shift from 'learning' norms from international sources to further developing their understanding of such norms and constructing new policies based on such norms to address the crisis in the stage of internal socialization. The end of the external socialization stage in this deterrence socialization process from 1985-1988, as a case of failed deterrence socialization, however, is an exception and was not marked by a shift to internal socialization and the integration of BMD into Japan's nuclear deterrence policy. Instead, the end of the external socialization stage would be marked by the end of intensive US efforts in convincing Japan to participate in BMD technology research, and a shift towards the development of joint ventures between US and Japanese firms that followed the signing of the MOU.

With the MOU signed and Japanese cooperation secured, both US officials and Reagan no longer needed to convince their Japanese counterparts of the necessity of participating in the SDI, and US-Japan discussions at the official level over the technological benefits it would bring and its potentially transformative role in nuclear deterrence thus naturally came to a close. Instead, Japanese firms would cautiously begin exploring BMD development with US firms under the SDI, with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries taking the lead.[412] While such initiatives would later develop into US-Japan joint research projects such as the J-TMDAS and WESTPAC, both which lobbied for joint BMD deployment between the US and Japan to no avail,[413] there would be no further serious discussion of how BMD, as a form of non-nuclear nuclear deterrence, could play a role in Japan's nuclear deterrence strategy and its relationship with Japan's dependance on US END. Following Reagan's departure from office in 1989 and the rapid developments in the Cold War during the period, his conceptualization of BMD as a global missile defense shield to replace nuclear weapons would be near-completely abandoned by the US as well. Debate on BMD in Japan, this time as a limited complement to nuclear weapons, would only be revived in 1993 following the US's second attempt at deterrence

[411] Government of Japan, *Waga Kuni no SDI Kenkyū Sanka ni Kansuru Kyōtei,* 22nd July 1987. http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1989/w1989_9150.html. Accessed 07/11/2024.
[412] Kawakami Takashi and Ken Jimbo, "Dandō Misairu Bōei to Nichibei Dōmei," in Misairu Bōgyo: Atarashii Kokusai Anzen Hoshō no Kōzu, ed. Morimoto Satōshi (Tōkyō: Taihei-Sha, 2006): 263.
[413] Kawakami Takashi and Ken Jimbo, "Dandō Misairu Bōei to Nichibei Dōmei," in Misairu Bōgyo: Atarashii Kokusai Anzen Hoshō no Kōzu, ed. Morimoto Satōshi (Tōkyō: Taihei-Sha, 2006): 263.

socialization that, for Japan, was also marked by the threat of an increasingly belligerent North Korea.

Deterrence Socialization: Why did it fail?

The deterrence socialization process from 1985-1988 is unique amongst the deterrence socialization processes that are examined in this thesis in that it is a process that did not result in the institutionalization and normalization of US nuclear deterrence perspectives into Japanese nuclear deterrence policy, with socialization stopping at the external socialization stage. A key reason for this, as demonstrated in this chapter, is the fact that the external socialization of BMD under the SDI was characterized by the absence of normative transfer, with debate and discussion instead focusing on economic and technological questions, rather than the question of how BMD would fit into the existing Japanese consensus on nuclear weapons and deterrence by nuclear retaliation. A huge part of this, in turn, was a result of the US's seeming hesitancy in 'teaching' their Japanese counterparts and their failure to share Reagan's grand objective of overturning the entire nuclear deterrence regime through BMD and the SDI, with both Reagan and US officials contextualizing the SDI as a limited form of 'non-nuclear' nuclear deterrence and an economic and technological opportunity. In other words, as compared to the two other deterrence socialization processes examined in this thesis, the US was, to use the words of Florini and Finnemore and Sikkink, not an effective 'norm entrepreneur' in the case of SDI. What then, were the causes of US hesitancy in normative teaching in this case?

External Socialization and the role of Power

The key factor impacting the external socialization process and the teaching methods of the US that deterrence socialization focuses on is the power that the US possesses over Japan as its key security provider, thus gatekeeping a resource (security) that Japan requires. In the case of the Four Pillars, however, we have seen that this power, as derived from structural gatekeeping to crucial resources, works both ways. While the US, by virtue of its position in the US-Japan alliance as Japan's key security provider, can gatekeep the resource of security from Japan, Japan, as a key US ally in East Asia, too can gatekeep a crucial resource (strategic autonomy) from the US, with Japan acting as a key staging ground for US security plans in East Asia. The power relationship between the US and Japan is thus multidirectional, rather than the US simply having power over Japan, which thus partly explained the US's utilization of less forceful teaching methods in the case of the Four Pillars for fear of losing Japan to anti-

American politicians. Building on from the concept that the power relationship between the US and Japan was multidirectional, could this increased hesitation on the US's part when it came to 'teaching' Japan Reagan's conceptualization of the SDI be a result of a decrease in the power of the US over Japan, and an increase in Japan's power over the US, during this period?

I argue that at first glance, while there are signs that shifts in the power relationship between the US and Japan may appear to be a factor for the US's hesitancy in imposing its BMD norms on Japan from 1985-1988, this is unlikely to be the case. Examination of Japan's security policy during the 1970s to the 1980s does reveal that Japan was seemingly attempting to take a more proactive and independent security posture as a result of strains within the US-Japan relationship, which would have resulted in increased Japanese power over the US within the US, with the US fearing the loss of its strategic 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' in East Asia.[414] Named the Nakasone Initiative after Nakasone Yasuhiro, who became Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Director-General, the initiative saw Nakasone, for example, first proposing in 1970 to expand Japanese defense spending so as to pursue an "autonomous self-defense".[415]

While Nakasone's "autonomous self-defense" proposal would quickly be repudiated by Japanese policymakers, who feared that it would destabilize the region and revive fears of Japanese militarism amongst Japan's neighbors,[416] the Nixon shocks in 1971 and Nixon's visit to China in 1972 once again saw cleavages develop between the US and Japan. Nixon's attempts at normalizing relations with China without informing Japan in advance was perceived as a great betrayal and "deception" by Japanese policymakers and generated much anxiety within US policymakers over the status of the US-Japan relationship.[417] Indeed, US declassified documents from this period reveal that the Defense Program Review Committee Working Group, a National Security Council (NSC) interdepartmental group, had produced a paper arguing that there was a possibility of Japan reorientating itself away from the US and denying US access to military facilities in Japan.[418] The East Asian and Pacific Interdepartmental Group (EAIG),[419] meanwhile, authored a paper which asserted that Japan

[414] Komine Yukinori, "Whither a "Resurgent Japan": The Nixon Doctrine and Japan's Defense Buildup, 1969-1976," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3 Volume 16 (2014): 89.
[415] Komine Yukinori, "Whither a "Resurgent Japan": The Nixon Doctrine and Japan's Defense Buildup, 1969-1976," 99.
[416] Komine Yukinori, "Whither a "Resurgent Japan": The Nixon Doctrine and Japan's Defense Buildup, 1969-1976," 101.
[417] Komine Yukinori, "Whither a "Resurgent Japan": The Nixon Doctrine and Japan's Defense Buildup, 1969-1976," 104.
[418] "NSSM 69: US Strategy and Forces for Asia," 29th July 1971, DRPC Working Group.
[419] The East Asia Interdepartmental Group was a research group under the State Department.

might demand a more 'independent' foreign policy in response to the Nixon Shocks.[420] It was clear then, that in the 1970s-1980s, that the strategic value of Japan as a military staging ground for US security policy in East Asia was substantial, as seen from the intense anxiety of US policymakers. Could the power of Japan over the US, derived from its strategic value, and US fears of losing Japan over the Nixon Shocks in the 1970s thus explain US hesitancy in utilizing more 'forceful' methods to 'teach' its BMD norms under the SDI from 1985-1988?

I argue that this is highly unlikely to be the case. While there were indeed signs that Japan had attempted to take a more independent security posture from the 1970s-1980s, it is important to note that such attempts were not successful. As mentioned above, Nakasone's attempts at pursuing a more autonomous security policy were quickly repudiated by other Japanese policymakers and by 1971, he was removed from his post as JDA Director-General and made chair of the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) Policy Research Council instead.[421] Furthermore, following the US's anxiety over losing Japan in the wake of the Nixon shocks, US policymakers themselves had quickly realized that Japan must be reassured that it remained a vital ally to the US and had undertaken a series of efforts from 1974-1976, including the visit of President Gerald Ford to Japan in 1974 (the first official trip by a sitting US President), that gradually smoothed over US-Japan frictions.[422] The easing of US-Japan tensions was perhaps best demonstrated by Japan's publication of the first National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in 1976[423] and subsequent policies pursued by the Japanese Government, which reaffirmed the US-Japan alliance and, while announcing a greater role for Japan in East Asian security, clearly envisioned said role within the US-Japan alliance framework, referencing increased joint military planning and coordination with the US.[424]

As such, despite Japan's push for greater autonomy and the downturn in relations caused by the Nixon shocks, I argue that it is clear that by 1976, such issues were largely resolved, and the US was not at risk of losing Japan as a key security ally in East Asia. Furthermore, with the

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[420] "NSSM 122: Policy toward Japan---Summary," 2nd August 1971, East Asia Interdepartmental Group.
[421] Komine Yukinori, "Whither a "Resurgent Japan": The Nixon Doctrine and Japan's Defense Buildup, 1969-1976," 101.
[422] *Japan Today,* "Japan Yesterday---U.S. President Gerald Ford's historic visit to Japan in 1974," 23rd March 2022. https://japantoday.com/category/features/japan-yesterday/president-gerald-ford-historic-visit-to-japan-in-1974. Accessed 07/11/2024.
[423] Government of Japan, 1976 NDPO. 29th October 1976. http://www.ioc.u-tōkyō.ac.jp/worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19761029.O1E.html. Accessed 07/11/2024.
[424] Komine Yukinori, "Whither a "Resurgent Japan": The Nixon Doctrine and Japan's Defense Buildup, 1969-1976," 122.

publication of the NDPO in 1976, Japan had reconfirmed its dependence on the US as its key security ally, even as it agreed to take on greater roles within the alliance. There should thus have not been any power shifts between the US and Japan, in terms of the US's power over Japan as its key security provider, and Japan's power over the US as the vital lynchpin of US strategy in East Asia. Power shifts thus seemingly cannot explain the US's hesitancy in normative transfer during the external socialization process.

External Socialization: Failure, Internal Confusion within the US and the Focus on Europe

Rather than changes in the power relationship being the main reason for unusual hesitancy on the US's part when it came to methods of normative transfer, I argue instead that there are two key reasons, unique to the case of BMD under SDI, that explains why the US did not focus on nuclear deterrence normative teaching in its discussions with Japan during this period, hence resulting in the failure of the deterrence socialization process. These two reasons are internal confusion and continued political wrangling over the role of BMD under the SDI within the US itself, as well as the US's socialization efforts amongst NATO allies, prior to its attempts with Japan.

It is important to note that unlike the other two instances of deterrence socialization in this thesis, where the US policymaking establishment had largely established a consensus on the way they perceived nuclear weapons and the norms by which they were utilized in deterrence strategy, no such consensus was established over the role of BMD under SDI when the US first approached its allied countries in 1985 to participate in BMD research. The SDI and the utilization of BMD as a replacement deterrence strategy for nuclear deterrence was the brainchild of President Reagan, who was horrified by the implications of nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation and Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and announced his intentions to replace them with the SDI in 1983.[425] His advisors and much of the US defense establishment, however, did not share his aversion to nuclear deterrence.[426] Indeed, most of them were incredulous at the most radical of his ideas, which included the suggestion of sharing US missile defense technology with the Soviets as part of a globally controlled missile defense shield under the SDI. Secretary of State Alexander Haig for example, considered Reagan's views 'naïve',[427] and Haig's successor, George Shultz stated that as advisors, they had to

[425] Beth A. Fischer, *The Myth of Triumphalism: Rethinking President Reagan's Cold War Legacy* (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2020): 61.
[426] Beth A. Fischer, *The Myth of Triumphalism: Rethinking President Reagan's Cold War Legacy,* 65-67.
[427] Lou Cannon, *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991): 301.

"convince him [Reagan] that he was barking up the wrong tree" when it came to nuclear weapons.[428] Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State, meanwhile, said that Reagan's vision for SDI would "unilaterally destroy the foundation of the Western alliance."[429]

The numerous objections of Reagan's officials, however, did not stop the SDI program, due to Reagan's own insistence on the need to address what he perceived as the dangers of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Instead, a situation developed where multiple competing perspectives of the SDI would exist alongside each other as the program developed from 1983-1985, with no unifying perspective on what the SDI was supposed to achieve. Reagan's officials, for example, came to see the SDI and the potential technological superiority it would confer upon the US as a useful bargaining chip that could be traded away for reductions in the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal.[430] Indeed, this was the main argument that Robert McFarlane[431] used when requesting funding for SDI from the US Congress.[432] Reagan himself, however, would continue to insist that SDI was not be used as a bargaining chip until 1987, remarking in a discussion with his foreign policy advisors in July 1986 that "The SDI is not a bargaining chip."[433]

Internal differences and disagreement over the SDI meant that by 1985, when Reagan first pitched SDI participation to Japan, the US still had not established a consensus on what exactly SDI meant for US nuclear deterrence, and whether Reagan's vision could even be achieved. Furthermore, how to convince the Soviet Union, whose cooperation was needed to fulfil Reagan's vision of joint control ending nuclear deterrence was still a problem, with the Soviet Union continuing to view the SDI as an attempt by the US to achieve superiority over the USSR.[434] In the Nuclear and Space Talks of January 1985 between the US and USSR, for example, the USSR refused to accept Shultz's explanation of Reagan's vision and viewed the SDI as "part of a general offensive plan."[435]

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[428] George Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993): 189.
[429] Beth A. Fischer, *The Myth of Triumphalism: Rethinking President Reagan's Cold War Legacy,* 67.
[430] Paul Lettow, *Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Random House, 2005): 145-170.
[431] National Security Advisor to President Reagan, 1983-1985.
[432] Beth A. Fischer, *The Myth of Triumphalism: Rethinking President Reagan's Cold War Legacy,* 69.
[433] Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (New York: Pocket Books, 1990): 665-666.
[434] Ralph L. Dietl, *The Strategic Defense Initiative: Ronald Reagan, NATO Europe, and the Nuclear and Space Talks 1981-1988,* 50.
[435] Ralph L. Dietl, *The Strategic Defense Initiative: Ronald Reagan, NATO Europe, and the Nuclear and Space Talks 1981-1988,* 50.

I thus argue that this constant wrangling over SDI and BMD and the failure to define it normatively and its relationship with US practice of nuclear deterrence is likely one of the reasons for the US's failure in normative teaching. The inability to come to a consensus within the US on what exactly the SDI's purpose was limited Reagan and US officials in what they could 'teach' Japan, with the uncertainty of whether he could even achieve his vision of joint control with the USSR, for example, likely contributing to Reagan's decision to focus on a vague reference to SDI as a technological project to Nakasone, rather than a normative transformation. Similarly, with much of the Reagan Administration focused on maximizing technological developments under the SDI to gain a bargaining edge with the Soviet Union, it is thus not surprising that they focused on technological cooperation and development with Japan and acquiring potential benefits, rather than sharing Reagan's vision and transferring new nuclear deterrence norms related to the SDI and BMD.

The second factor of the US's attempts at external socialization of the SDI in Europe however, likely also played a role in the US's hesitant normative transfer efforts in Japan. Unlike the case of nuclear weapons during the early Cold War, as seen in the previous case study, or the case of BMD later in the 1990s, which will be seen in the next chapter, Japan was not as crucial a player in the US's, and especially Reagan's vision, of eliminating nuclear weapons through the replacement of US nuclear deterrence with a missile defense shield. Instead, it was the European members of NATO, several that hosted US nuclear weapons and two (UK and France) which were fully fledged nuclear powers that the US had to persuade to accept this potential new arrangement. After all, Reagan's dream of complete nuclear disarmament would both require the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe and could only be achieved if the UK and France, convinced of the security provided by a global missile defense shield, gave up their nuclear weapons as well.

It was also the NATO member states, however, who were most opposed to Reagan's vision, with many questioning SDI as a concept and fearing US joint control with the USSR would decouple US-European security.[436] Several NATO states for example, saw SDI as a "Hollywood B-Movie rather than a credible defense strategy."[437] Of the two European nuclear weapon states, Margaret Thatcher, the UK's Prime Minister, remarked that "SDI was a major step to a nuclear weapon -free world—something which I believed was neither attainable nor

[436] Ralph L. Dietl, *The Strategic Defense Initiative: Ronald Reagan, NATO Europe, and the Nuclear and Space Talks 1981-1988,* 37.
[437] Richard Aldous, *Reagan and Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship* (New York: Random House, 2012): 131.

desirable."[438] Similarly, France was highly opposed to the SDI, and in June 1984 hinted at their intentions, via the French Ambassador to the US, that they would submit a paper to the upcoming UN Conference of Disarmament that would propose a ban on high-altitude anti-satellite weapons, effectively attempting to torpedo the SDI.[439]

Much of the Reagan Administration's efforts from 1983, when the SDI was first announced, to 1985, when the invitation for allied states to participate in SDI research was first issued, was thus spent on convincing the NATO states of the benefits of SDI and missile defense, rather than Japan. This proved to be a challenging task, with plenty of back-and-forth between the US and NATO states. 1984, for example, saw an intense meeting between the US and UK officials at Camp David where Reagan made clear to Thatcher his vision for international control of the SDI and that technological developments had made his dream of complete nuclear disarmament a distinct possibility, before asking for the UK's support in order to demonstrate Western solidarity. Thatcher reluctantly acquiesced and publicly endorsed the global SDI concept.[440] Privately, however, like much of the British policymaking establishment, Thatcher would remain "horrified"[441] at the thought of technology sharing with the USSR and the US and the UK would once again spar over the SDI in 1985 when Geoffrey Howe (deputy PM) of the UK criticized the SDI as a flawed concept in a speech.[442]

Eventually, the US, and Reagan, won grudging acceptance of a preliminary concept for the SDI project amongst the NATO states. This, however, came at the cost of excluding all the aspects of SDI that hinted at normative change in US nuclear deterrence practice and committed the US to discussions with all NATO allies in future before any SDI deployments.[443] Indeed, so sensitive were the NATO states to any hint that the SDI would replace nuclear deterrence that the UK government objected to a clause in the communique of the 37th NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meeting which hinted at nuclear deterrence 'inadequacy' and an equilibrium ineffectiveness between defensive weapons (BMD) and offensive weapons (nuclear

[438] Magaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: HarperCollins, 1995): 463.
[439] Ralph L. Dietl, *The Strategic Defense Initiative: Ronald Reagan, NATO Europe, and the Nuclear and Space Talks 1981-1988,* 41.
[440] Ralph L. Dietl, *The Strategic Defense Initiative: Ronald Reagan, NATO Europe, and the Nuclear and Space Talks 1981-1988,* 49.
[441] Magaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: HarperCollins, 1995): 466.
[442] Geoffrey Howe, "Defense and Security in the Nuclear Age." Lecture given at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 15th March 1985.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071848508522693. Accessed 07/11/2024.
[443] Ralph L. Dietl, *The Strategic Defense Initiative: Ronald Reagan, NATO Europe, and the Nuclear and Space Talks 1981-1988,* 53.

deterrence).[444] Subsequently, NATO member states would view participation in the SDI as a potential way to steer the project further away from Reagan's vision. This, however, also left the purpose of SDI unclear beyond technological development, and it was this version of SDI that was first presented to Japan in 1985. The hesitancy of Reagan and US officials in committing to normative teaching and transfer of Reagan's conceptualization of BMD as a replacement for US END was thus not just because of the struggle within US administration officials that left the purpose of SDI undefined. It was also the result of much of the original purpose and conceptualization of SDI as a replacement for US nuclear deterrence being removed in order to secure the cooperation of NATO states. By the time external socialization of the SDI to Japan began, it was thus unclear what purpose SDI and BMD served in nuclear deterrence, and whether there were even proper nuclear deterrence principles guiding the utilization of BMD in nuclear deterrence strategy.

Failure of Deterrence Socialization: Absence of a crisis?

In examining the causes of deterrence socialization's failure under the SDI, I have pointed out that US external socialization attempts, in contrast to the other two deterrence socialization processes I will examine in this thesis, was characterized by hesitation on the US's part to convey Reagan's overarching vision of SDI to Japan, which I have attributed as the key cause for the absence of normative transfer. The US's hesitation in normative 'teaching' in turn, I argue, was a result of the US's own internal conflict over the purpose of SDI, as well as a result of its deterrence socialization efforts in Europe, where it was forced to remove much of the SDI's ideological and normative approach. However, the absence of normative transfer during the external socialization process is not the only phenomenon which differentiates the case of SDI from the other two processes of deterrence socialization in this thesis. The other key difference between the case of SDI and the other two instances of deterrence socialization is the absence of a crisis. According to the deterrence socialization theoretical framework, a crisis is necessary to catalyze the transition from external to internal socialization, as it is crisis, especially a crisis which the nuclear deterrence policies and norms of the learning state (Japan) cannot resolve, that prompts further discussion by policymakers of the new norms and concepts that they have been introduced to in the external socialization stage and the construction and interpretation of said norms into policy. Could the failure of deterrence socialization in the case

[444] Ralph L. Dietl, *The Strategic Defense Initiative: Ronald Reagan, NATO Europe, and the Nuclear and Space Talks 1981-1988,* 53.

of BMD under the SDI be attributed to the absence of a crisis rather than US hesitancy and the absence of normative transfer in the external socialization process then?

I argue that while the absence of a crisis is a crucial factor in the external socialization process failing to transition to internal socialization in general, it is ultimately US hesitancy and an absence of normative transfer that should be considered the more important factor in the stalling of the deterrence socialization process with regards to BMD and the SDI. It is important to note that in order for the crisis to catalyze a shift to internal socialization, some normative transfer in the form of normative teaching and learning must have taken place in the external socialization stage, as it is the norms that have been 'taught' in the external socialization stage that would be reinterpreted in order to manage the crisis and form the basis for the construction of policy in the internal socialization stage. We have already seen this once in the case study of Satō and the Four Nuclear Pillars, where it was the norms on using nuclear weapons as a form of deterrence against general aggression, first transferred to Japanese politicians in the external socialization stage, that formed the basis of Satō's decision to pursue the threat of nuclear retaliation as a response against the crisis of China's nuclearization. It was said norms which he then further institutionalized and shaped in accordance with Japan's needs during the internal socialization process. As such, given that by the end of the external socialization process, Japan was already discussing and debating BMD and the SDI as a technological and economic project, or as a component of conventional nuclear deterrence, it is highly unlikely that even were a crisis to occur, such as a breakdown in the existing nuclear deterrence regime or the appearance of an adversary not deterred by nuclear deterrence threats, it would resort to reinterpreting and reconstructing BMD and SDI as a new form of nuclear deterrence that might be capable of handling such threats. US hesitancy and the absence of normative transfer, therefore, should be considered the key factor in the failure of the deterrence socialization process.

Conclusion

Ultimately, despite the initial interest and debate generated globally by Reagan's SDI announcement in 1983, Japan's participation in SDI remained miniscule at best and Reagan's vision of a deterrence regime based on a global missile defense shield jointly controlled by the nuclear powers would never come to pass. The US, while expending much effort in convincing Japan to participate in SDI research, was seemingly hesitant to 'teach' Japan Reagan's normative vision of a deterrence regime based on a global missile defense shield, resulting in

the absence of normative transfer during the external socialization phase. This hesitancy in US attempts to carry out normative teaching, in turn, was likely due to the internal struggle within the US itself over the viability of such a transformation and socialization efforts amongst the NATO states paring away much of the ideological element of SDI, rather than power shifts between the US and Japan within the alliance framework. The absence of normative teaching meant that, in turn, SDI would become contextualized as either a form of non-nuclear nuclear deterrence that would not infringe on the existing nuclear deterrence regime, or an opportunity for Japan to make technological and economic gains through cooperation with the US. This was best exemplified by Nakasone's Five SDI Principles and his discussion of SDI with European leaders, as well as the MOU signed between Japan and the US at the end of the external socialization process, which focused on economic and technological protection issues, rather than the role of SDI and BMD in nuclear deterrence and security. The economic promise of the SDI, meanwhile, would slowly lose its luster amongst Japanese firms except for a few exceptions that continued their joint research with US companies and lobbied the Japanese government for joint BMD deployment with the US to no avail. It would not be until 1993 before BMD would once again become a serious topic of discussion in Japanese policymaking.

The deterrence socialization process of BMD under the SDI can thus be considered a failure of deterrence socialization, with Japanese nuclear deterrence policy not undergoing any change during this period, and current Japanese BMD policy not being shaped or affected by the SDI's conceptualization of BMD. As I have stated at the start of this chapter, while this deterrence socialization process was a failure, it still remains important to understanding how deterrence socialization and normative transfer shaped Japanese perceptions of nuclear deterrence as it represents a missed opportunity for Japan to undergo a normative shift in their perspectives of nuclear deterrence. Reagan's vision of BMD and how it would replace nuclear weapons was truly transformational, and had he succeeded in implementing such a regime globally socializing such a normative conceptualization of BMD to Japan, Japan's perception of nuclear weapons and its consensus on the importance of nuclear weapons for deterring nuclear threats, and hence its insistence on the importance of US END to its nuclear deterrent strategy, would likely have varied greatly from its current state.

Such a vision for BMD, however, would never be resurrected after Reagan left office with the collapse of the USSR and the changing global environment.[445] Instead, as will be seen in the

[445] The George H.W. Bush did at least seem interested in superpower co-management and creation of a defense system. See Ralph L. Dietl, *The Strategic Defense Initiative: Ronald Reagan, NATO*

next chapter, a more limited role for BMD as purely a complement to nuclear deterrence to address additional threats would become the normative consensus in the US under the Clinton Administration's reorganization of the SDI office into Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO).[446] It would be under the BMDO regime that deterrence socialization would once again take place in Japan from 1993-2003. This deterrence socialization process in contrast to the socialization process under the SDI, would then see Japan adopt BMD in 2003 as a necessary, albeit purely complementary, nuclear deterrence strategy to conventional nuclear deterrence,[447] further reinforcing the established Japanese consensus of conventional nuclear deterrence as absolutely necessary to deter the nuclear threats facing Japan and contributing to its continued focus on the status of US END.

Europe, and the Nuclear and Space Talks 1981-1988, 123-124. However, Reagan's concept would be fully buried by the reorganization of BMD during the first Clinton Administration (1993-1997).

[446] *Leslie Aspin,* Historical Office: Office of the Secretary of Defense. https://history.defense.gov/Multimedia/Biographies/Article-View/Article/571283/leslie-aspin/. Accessed 07/11/2024.

[447] Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kaigi, "Dandō Misairu Bōgyo Shisutemu no Seibitō ni tsuite,", 19th December 2003. https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyoukaigi/Missile.pdf. Accessed 07/11/2024.

Chapter 6: Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Part II: 1993-2003

This chapter continues on from the previous chapter and covers the second of the two deterrence socialization processes that saw Japan successfully adopt BMD as part of its nuclear deterrence policy in 2003, based on the view that Japanese BMD was a necessary, albeit limited, complement to US END in Japanese nuclear deterrence strategy. As stated in the previous chapter, unlike Reagan's dream of a global missile defense shield that would provide security for all nuclear powers and thus lead to global nuclear disarmament, the adoption of BMD by Japan on such a premise, alongside its continued view that nuclear weapons (in the form of US END) and nuclear retaliation was necessary to deter nuclear threats, would make up the standard consensus amongst Japanese policymakers on nuclear deterrence. Such a consensus on how nuclear deterrence is practiced, I argue, would in turn explain the continued fixation of Japan's policymakers on the status of the US's nuclear umbrella.

Japan's views on BMD are succinctly explained in the 2005 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which states that Japan had decided that "Against the new threats facing Japan such as rogue states and terrorist organizations, this [BMD], along with the US Extended Nuclear Deterrent (END) will be used in collaboration in an appropriate and effective manner".[448] This clearly demonstrates that it envisions Japanese BMD operating alongside US END, acting as a complement. More importantly, the use of the word 'use' rather than 'rely on', as had been the case with US END, clearly demonstrates Japan envisioning a more active role in BMD that would be used in Japan's new threat environment. Such a view has been backed up by Japanese developments in BMD deployment since the 2005 announcement as well, with Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) white papers outlining how BMD would be utilized by Japanese ships.[449] Furthermore, Japan has made no move to expand its BMD system beyond its limited remit, nor discuss Reagan's vision for BMD with the US. Instead, it has focused on

[448] Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kaigi, "Heisei 17-nendo ikōni kakaru Bōgyo Keikaku no Taikō ni tsuite,", 10th December 2004.
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kakugikettei/2004/1210taikō.pdf. Accessed 16/11/2024.
[449] Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kaigi, "Heisei 17-nendo ikōni kakaru Bōgyo Keikaku no Taikō ni tsuite,", 10th December 2004.
[449] Japan Defense Agency, "Dai 4 Shō-Yorianteishitaanzenhoshōkankyō no kōchiku e no kōken—Kaisetsu: I-jis Shistemu tōsai goeikan haken no igi,", *Heisei 15-nen ban Bōeihakusho*, 2003.
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2003/2003/colindex.html. Accessed 16/11/2024.; Japan Defense Agency, "Dai 3 Shō-Dandō Misairu Kougeki e no taiō,", *Heisei 17-nen ban Bōeihakusho,* 2005.
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2005/2005/index.html. Accessed 16/11/2024.

further strengthening BMD within its limited role and is currently aiming to deploy two new AEGIS-equipped ships in 2027 and 2028.[450]

The question is then how did such a view of BMD, and not Reagan's grand view of nuclear disarmament through global missile defense, come to be established as the definitive view of BMD amongst Japanese policymakers and used to determine the relationship between BMD and nuclear deterrence in Japan? The significance of this change in Japan's deterrence posture means that there has been much more research on this period of development in Japan's BMD policy than Japanese developments under the SDI. Such scholarship has often taken a neorealist, threat-focused approach, focusing on the change in the international structure and the emergence of new threats following the end of the Cold War and identifying the rising threat of North Korea's missile program as the main focus of Japan's BMD program. In particular, the 1998 North Korean Missile Launch, which saw a North Korean Taepodong-II missile fly over Japanese territory, is often referred to as the key catalyst for Japan's interest in BMD. Such research on Japan's BMD program often further highlights Japan's involvement in the deployment of BMD and compares it to the passive approach it has taken to security during the Cold War. Such changes are then often analyzed within the framework of alliance politics, with such scholars then pointing out that a secondary factor for Japan's active BMD involvement as a Japanese response to US requests for greater Japanese contributions and involvement in regional security following the downturn in alliance relations that accompanied the end of the Cold War.[451]

These studies are of course crucial to our understanding of the shifts in Japanese security posture since the end of the Cold War and provide a convincing explanation of the origins of Japan's interest in BMD. The threat-based explanation has only grown more compelling in the 21st century as North Korea's successful nuclearization and development of nuclear ballistic missiles continue to be matched by Japanese attempts to continually improve its BMD system, as seen from its commissioning of additional AEGIS-equipped naval vessels.[452] Nevertheless,

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[450] Jiji News, "Bōei Sho, AEGIS tōsaikan de kenzō keiyaku 27,28 nendō shuyaku mezasu". 18th September 2024.
https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2024091801021&g=pol. Accessed 16/11/2024.

[451] Richard J. Samuels, Securing *Japan: Tōkyō's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2007). The identification of North Korea as the key threat and the comparison between a more passive Japan and a more active Japan in the post-Cold War era is also an approach taken by Andrew Oros, Chris Hughes, Linus Hagstrom, Andrew O'Neil and Terence Roehrig.

[452] Jiji News, "Bōei Sho, AEGIS tōsaikan de kenzō keiyaku 27,28 nendō shuyaku mezasu". 18th September 2024.

as I have stated in the main argument, one of the key weaknesses of focusing purely on a threat-based explanation is that such an explanation fails to reconcile the supposed incompatibility of BMD with nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation that was widely held to be an objective truth to states who practiced nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation. As mentioned in Chapter 5, one of the key premises of nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation was that mutual vulnerability was necessary for a stable nuclear deterrence regime, and that the possession of BMD by one side, which would increase chances of surviving a nuclear strike, would merely destabilize such an arrangement and spark an arms race. Japan quite clearly followed this theoretical concept as well, and prior to this implementation of BMD, Japan was not a strong supporter of BMD, nor was there a strong consensus amongst its policymakers that nuclear deterrence by denial (BMD) was possible.[453] Indeed, prior to its deployment of BMD, Japan was a strong supporter of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, which was crafted precisely to maintain this mutual vulnerability between the US and USSR and prevent an arms race.[454] Given Japan's practice of nuclear deterrence via nuclear retaliation via its dependence on US END, its support for the ABM and the apparent incompatibility of BMD with nuclear deterrence via nuclear retaliation, why then, would Japan think that BMD was an appropriate strategy to respond to North Korea's missile program? Was it not worried that its adoption of BMD might destabilize nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation and trigger an arms race with regional nuclear powers?

Furthermore, even if we accepted the secondary explanation of Japan adopting a BMD system as a response to US pressure for Japan be more involved in regional security in the 1990s, there were other, perhaps more effective ways to do so. Developing a BMD system was costly for Japan, which had a cap on military spending,[455] and such resources could have theoretically been allocated to other priorities such as modernizing the equipment of the Japan Self-Defense

[453] Indeed, BMD was once deemed technologically unfeasible in the 1968/70 Report submitted to Satō. See the Cabinet Research Office, "The 1968/70 Report". September 1968. Available from the archives of the Union of Concerned Scientists. https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/japan-and-americas-nuclear-posture#.Wa2RqrLyjIU. Accessed 16/11/2024.

[454] As late as 2000, for example, Prime Minister Mori released a statement that while it understood why the US was possibly renouncing the ABM, it did not necessarily support such a decision. See Asahi Shimbun, ""Bei NMD ni Rikai wo Shimesu—Sanin Honkaigi de Mori Shusō", 2nd August 2000. Asahi Kikuzō Digital Archive. Accessed 16/11/2024.

[455] Japan has a self-imposed military spending cap of 1% of GDP. While this was instituted in 1958 and withdrawn in 1976, Japan has subsequently only broken 1% twice up to 2003. (1.013% in FY1988, 1.006% in FY 1989). See John Wright, "Japan's Self-Imposed One Percent: Does it really matter?" *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs*, 12th July 2022. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3089775/japans-self-imposed-one-percent-does-it-really-matter/. Accessed 16/11/2024.

Forces (JSDF) or improving intelligence capabilities and equipment. The threat-based approach focused on North Korea and alliance politics thus fails to explain this particular strategy of BMD chosen by Japan. In this chapter and my analysis of BMD development, I thus aim to address this research gap and examine how Japan ended up choosing BMD as its policy against emerging threats and how its policymakers manage to resolve the problem of incompatibility between nuclear weapons and BMD in order to utilize both systems as part of its nuclear deterrence strategy.

By examining diplomatic documents, the reports published by various US governmental departments and the investigative reports carried out by Japanese governmental agencies, as well as the debate between Japanese politicians and the officials of various governmental ministries, I will thus show that while North Korean missiles were indeed an important factor in triggering Japan's drive for adopting BMD, its adoption of Japanese BMD specifically as a response to the new kind of threats that North Korea represented and that Japan faced in the post-Cold War environment was a result of deterrence socialization. As seen in Figure 1.4, this process of deterrence socialization, I argue, saw the US begin to teach Japanese policymakers a new conceptualization of BMD, which envisioned it as a limited and complementary system to nuclear deterrence that would address new, emerging threats that did not abide by conventional nuclear deterrence calculations. By pointing to the rise of such threats in East Asia, US officials would slowly 'teach' and convince their Japanese counterparts of the necessity of such a complementary system, even if it risked destabilizing nuclear deterrence based on mutual vulnerability, during the external socialization phase, and Japanese officials would slowly 'learn' and grow increasingly convinced of the need to address 'undeterrable' threats.

Following the crisis that was the 1998 North Korean Missile launch, such a conceptualization of BMD would then be discussed and utilized by Japanese policymakers when constructing an appropriate response to the threat of North Korea, whose bellicosity acted as a representation of the new security environment that Japan faced. By focusing on conceptualizing BMD as a exclusively defense-oriented strategy during the internal socialization stage in addition to further emphasizing its purely complementary nature to Japanese dependence on US END, Japanese policymakers would thus successfully construct and update Japan's nuclear deterrence policy which, while incorporating Japanese BMD as a necessary precaution in the post-Cold War environment, nevertheless ensured that it remained limited in scope, with nuclear deterrence still largely dependent on US END and the threat of nuclear retaliation.



Figure 1.3. Deterrence Socialization in Japan, 1993-2003

Stage 1: External Socialization

Like the previous cases in this thesis, deterrence socialization begins with the process of external socialization, during which the US begins introducing new nuclear deterrence concepts and normative standards into Japan. Following the initial approach by the US from August-September 1993, this external socialization process would take place in two phases: Phase 1 under the Perry Initiative from 1993-94, and Phase 2 under the Theater Missile Defense-Working Group (TMD-WG) from 1995-1998.

BMD: A new concept and the initial approach

External socialization of the US's new conceptualization of BMD first began in 1993, following the reorganization of US BMD policy under the Clinton Administration, which resulted in the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO) being repurposed as the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO).[456] BMD conceptualization had undergone a sea change in the intervening period, and in contrast to the grandiose aims of Reagan's SDI

[456] *Leslie Aspin,* Historical Office: Office of the Secretary of Defense. https://history.defense.gov/Multimedia/Biographies/Article-View/Article/571283/leslie-aspin/. Accessed 16/11/2024.

initiative to replace nuclear deterrence completely with a global BMD system, Clinton's ambitions for BMD were initially informed by US experiences of facing Iraqi SCUD missiles in the Gulf War and focused on Theatre Missile Defense (TMD), a form of BMD deployed in various 'theatres' of war, such as East Asia and Japan, that would protect US and allied troops from limited strikes and act as a complement to the US's nuclear arsenal [457] by deterring/defending the attacks of actors that were not deterred by threats of retaliation. From the beginning, it was thus clear that the BMDO's remit for BMD was thus more limited, which would reinforce its feasibility as well.

Furthermore, the feasibility of the US's new conceptualization for BMD would be enhanced by its exclusivity as well. While this new conceptualization of BMD would later greatly expand in scope, with US officials envisioning a National Missile Defense (NMD) system that covered the US mainland,[458] it is important to note that despite expansions in scope and coverage, this new conceptualization of BMD would be characterized by its exclusivity and one-sided deployment by the US and its allies as a means to achieve deterrence by denial while also keeping their nuclear arsenals and the threat of nuclear retaliation. This is in contrast to Reagan's dream of a joint control mechanism between rivals over a global missile shield that would lead to the uselessness of deterrence by nuclear retaliation which would then lead to global disarmament, which would require cooperation from the USSR, which he was ultimately unable to acquire. The focus on purely allied deployment, rather than requiring the cooperation of rival states as well, thus further enhanced the feasibility of the project.

Finally, it is also important to note that unlike the conceptual battle between Reagan and his officials, there was far less contestation on what BMD was supposed to be, or what role it was supposed to fulfil, due to its less grandiose aims and the greater feasibility of the project. This was aided by the fact that such a limited interpretation of BMD, while challenging the theoretical incompatibility of BMD and nuclear deterrence, did not challenge the overall nuclear deterrence orthodoxy that viewed nuclear deterrence as a necessary system that had prevented nuclear war. The incompatibility of BMD and a nuclear deterrence system based on mutual vulnerability, as well as the limits of technology in 1990s meant that there were of course objections with regards to its costs and questions regarding its potential performance

[457] Laura Spain, "The Dream of Missile Defense," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 5 Volume 51 (1995): 49; David Mosher and Raymond Hall, "The Clinton Plan for Theater Missile Defenses: Costs and Alternatives," *Arms Control Today* 7 Volume 24 (1994): 15-16.
[458] United States Congress. "National Missile Defense Act of 1999." Passed in the Senate 18/05/1999. https://www.congress.gov/bill/106th-congress/house-bill/4. Accessed 16/11/2024.

and reliability. However, unlike Reagan and his officials, who constantly clashed over whether the SDI was supposed to really be about nuclear elimination or a bargaining chip to be used in negotiations with the USSR, the BMDO and the Clinton Administration were seemingly unified at least in conceptualizing and presenting BMD as a limited, complementary system that was aimed primarily at addressing emerging threats to the US's allies.

As a result of this unified approach and the increased clarity over BMD's purpose, as well as the increased confidence in the feasibility of deploying a limited BMD system, US officials would, unlike the SDI, be more direct and straightforward in approaching Japan and convincing Japanese officials to adopt BMD as a necessary, limited complement to nuclear deterrence during the process of external socialization. The process would begin in August 1993, when US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Frank Wisner pressed Japan to introduce a Japanese BMD system, primarily as a defense against a limited strike from North Korea in his meeting with Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Director-General Keisuke Nakanishi. [459] As can be seen from Wisner's identification of North Korea as a threat and BMD as a necessary solution to said threat, the new US approach thus clearly emphasized transfer of its new normative conceptualization of BMD from the start.

Wisner, in his meeting with Nakanishi, would further point out that North Korea had just test-fired four Nodong missiles that fell into the Sea of Japan in May 1993, three months prior, highlighting the North Korean threat. The threat of Nodong had already became a talking point amongst certain Japanese officials, with JDA Vice-Administrative Minister Hatakeyama pointing out Japan's vulnerability to North Korean missiles, [460] and thus, US officials quickly followed up on this approach. By 22nd September 1993, US officials would present an official proposal to Japan to work together on Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and for Japan to purchase PAC-3 for a two-tiered BMD system.[461]

At this point, it is thus important to note a key difference in the US's socialization efforts from 1993-2003, as compared to the other instances of deterrence socialization. Unlike the case of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, where the US only required Japan to allow for the

[459] Vago Muradian, "Japanese may Deploy a Version of THAAD," *Defense News*, 20 September 1993.
[460] Jimbo, Ken. "Dandō Misairu Bōei to Nichibei Dōmei," *Nichibei kyōdō Kenkyū no Seisaku Katei to dōmei no Senryaku Chōsei* (2002): 44.
[461] "U.S. Proposes joint missile defense project," *The Japan Times*, 23 September 1993. Japan Times Digital Archive.

stationing or transit of US nuclear weapons,[462] or SDI, where the US only requested Japanese technological assistance in developing a US-led global missile shield,[463] the US's teaching efforts in the external socialization phase emphasized not just BMD as a necessary solution to the new threats facing Japan, but *Japanese* BMD. Wisner, rather than offering to deploy US BMD systems in Japan, tried to persuade Nakanishi to deploy a Japanese BMD system. The September proposal, rather than suggesting US BMD systems in Japan, urged Japan to purchase its own PAC-3 missiles. In other words, rather than a more passive role, the US was instead interested in persuading Japan to participate in the development and deployment of its own BMD system, albeit in conjunction with the US. 'Dependence' (izon) was no longer an option for Japan. As will be seen in as the overall deterrence socialization process continued, it would be the emphasis on the Japan-centric nature of the BMD solution proposed by the US, rather than the US's concept of BMD as a necessary deterrent against Japan's new threat environment itself, that would become the main focus of normative teaching, learning and construction amongst Japanese policymakers.

Phase 1: The Perry Initiative, 1993-94

Following the September proposal, external socialization of BMD would subsequently take place under the US's Perry Initiative in 1993--the first policy initiative under which US officials tried to conceptualize how US-Japan BMD cooperation would develop in this period. Under the Perry's Initiative focus on trade issues and supposed Japanese free riding on US defense technological development,[464] getting Japan to participate in BMD development quickly became the main priority of the US, even as US continued to refer to the necessity of BMD as a deterrent against the new threats Japan faced. Under the Perry Initiative, as part of US-Japan joint BMD development, US officials would insist on reciprocal technological sharing between Japanese and US firms as and US access to critical areas of Japanese industry that had so far been protected by the Japanese government. By 3rd November 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin had made clear an expectation by the US that technology transfer would be part of US-Japan BMD cooperation,[465] and on 19th November a Department of Defense official had openly

[462] Kurosaki Akira, "Anpo Kaitei Kōshō Izen no Kakumochikomi wo Meguru Kokkairongi to Nichibei Gaikō no Saikenshō: KakuMitsuyaku no Engen wo Motomete," *Prime* 33 Volume 3 (2011): 3-21.
[463] Segawa Takao, "Nihon no SDI Kenkyū Sanka wo Meguru Seisaku Kettei Katei: 1985-1987," *Kōkyō Seisaku Gaku Nenhō* Volume 9 (2015): 90.
[464] Steven A. Hildreth, and Gary J. Pagliano, "Theater Missile Defense and Technology Cooperation: Implications for the US-Japan Relationship," Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service (1995): 9.
[465] Asahi Shimbun, "Nihon no hanyō gijitsu ni kitai: Misairu Bōeikōsō de Asupin Beikoku Bōeichō kan ga hyōmei," *Asahi Shimbun*, 4th November 1993. Asahi Kikuzō Archives. Accessed 16/11/2024.

stated in an interview that technology transfer via BMD cooperation was necessary to achieve 'balance' in the unequal US-Japan technological relationship.[466]

Such an approach, however, was viewed highly negatively by the Japanese and merely stoked Japanese suspicions that US efforts at introducing BMD norms to Japan were an excuse to access coveted Japanese technology, rather than aid Japan in developing BMD.[467] The Nikkei Weekly, meanwhile, accused the TMD program of "seeking Japanese civilian technologies under the guise of joint development."[468] With US officials such as Aspin continuing to remark that TMD participation would reduce Japan's trade surplus with the US[469] and US officials stating that they expected the cooperative arrangement to benefit the US industrial base,[470] such suspicions would continue to deepen. The Japanese thus immediately tried to separate BMD discussions from the Perry Initiative, and by October 1993 the Department of Defense (DoD) had agreed to do so.[471]

Phase 2: The TMD-WG, 1995-1998

Subsequently, external socialization of BMD norms would take place under the framework of the US-Japan TMD Working Group (TMD WG), created in December 1993 under the Security Subcommittee of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC).[472] Under the TMD WG, the US would continue to emphasize the importance of Japanese participation in the deployment and execution of BMD policy in Japan. However, insistence on technological transfer would be dropped. Instead, as was the case with the SDI, the US began emphasizing the importance of participation in BMD development and deployment for Japan's technological development. Under this new approach, the US's BMDO first submitted a report in June 1994 under the new TMD WG framework and presented four BMD options for Japan:

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[466] Asahi Shimbun, "Nihon no hanyō gijitsu kitai: TMD Kyōryoku iyoku Beikoku Bōjikan hodairi," 20th November 1993. Asahi Kikuzō Archives. Accessed 16/11/2024.
[467] Patrick Cronin, Paul Giarra, and Michael Green, "The Alliance Implications of Theater Missile Defense," in The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future, eds. Michael Green and Patrick Cronin (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998): 170-188. Part of the skepticism of Japanese officials were based on Japanese experience of the joint FSX project with the US.
[468] Aaron Matthews, PhD Dissertation, *Japan's approach to missile defence cooperation from 1993 to 2003: Examining the Structure of cooperation to determine the relative influence of key security objectives*, University of New South Wales, Sydney (2007): 144.
[469] "Missile defense pact remains elusive," *The Japan Times,* 29th September 1993, The Japan Times Archive.
https://jt-archives-jp.sheffield.idm.oclc.org/goHome.do. Accessed 16/11/2024.
[470] Michael Green, "Balance of Power," in US-Japan Relations in a Changing World, eds. Steven K. Vogel (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 25.
[471] Michael Green, *Arming Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 140-141.
[472] Michael D. Swaine, Rachel M. Swanger and Kawakami Takashi, "Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense," *RAND Center for Asia-Pacific Policy* (2001): 32.

1) Equipping existing Japanese Aegis destroyers with TMD and Japanese Patriot batteries with PAC-3 missiles, ($4.5 billion)

2) Purchasing eight additional Aegis destroyers, a new radar system and upgrading Japanese Patriot with PAC-3, ($16.3 billion)

3) obtaining six-land based Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) units and upgrading Japanese Patriot to PAC-3, ($4.6 billion)

4) Equipping existing Japanese Aegis destroyers with TMD, upgrading to PAC-3 and deploying THAAD. ($8.9 billion)[473]

As can be seen from the wording of these proposals, the expectation of *Japanese* BMD had not changed, with the BMDO proposal suggesting joint development and production between US and the Japan for the Aegis-based TMD system, the THAAD system and the new radar system, expecting Japan to pay for the costs of establishing a Japanese BMD system and planning for Japanese ships to be equipped with the BMD system. The proposal, however, made no mention of access to key Japanese industrial sectors, instead pointing out the potential technological gains and US assistance in upgrading Japanese defensive equipment should they work with the US, while also subtly hinting that such opportunities for Japanese firms might be lost if Japan continued to delay.[474]

External Socialization results: Problems with normative transfer?

How then, did the Japanese respond to such arguments and proposals from the US? Unlike the issue of nuclear deterrence for Japan during the Cold War, where Japanese policymakers proved receptive to US arguments over the utility and necessity of nuclear deterrence for Japan's security during the external socialization phase, external socialization would prove much more problematic with regards to the issue of BMD from 1993-1998. US attempts at transferring the concept of BMD as a complementary deterrence strategy against new threats faced by Japan, for example, largely provoked suspicion amongst Japanese policymakers from 1993-1994, with learning only slowly gaining pace from 1995-1998, and accelerating further following the 1998 North Korean Missile Launch.

[473] Michael Green, *Arming Japan*, 138.
[474] Michael Green, *Arming Japan*, 139.

From 1993-1994, for example, several Japanese policymakers would continue to question the US's claim of North Korea being one of the supposed 'new threats' that necessitated BMD,[475] and Japan would continue to approach North Korea in the early 1990s in an attempt to mend relations.[476] As late as 1994, the official view of the Japanese Government was that "Japan does not regard North Korea as its adversary.".[477] Furthermore, even amongst those that were already receptive to the US arguments of a BMD system being necessary against such threats, such as Hatakeyama, there were doubts as to whether BMD was the most suitable response, with several Japanese experts pointing out the failure rate of the US-PATRIOT system during the Gulf War.[478]

From 1995 however, a shift began occurring and it was clear that Japanese policymakers (largely defense officials) were growing more receptive to the argument of some form of BMD as a necessary complement to existing deterrent strategies, and cognitive change and normative learning was taking place. This could largely be seen by the accelerated phase at which studies on BMD were commissioned by the Japanese government, and the conclusions of said studies. By 1995, for example, there was enough political interest in BMD that the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) was able establish its own Office of Ballistic Missile Defense Research. The JDA would subsequently produce multiple reports on the issue, [479] with a 1995 report titled 'On Research Concerning Ballistic Missile Defense' conclusively stating that Japan needed some form of missile defense system as an additional precaution against the new threats that Japan faced.[480] A research project conducted by a Japanese think tank for the Japanese government meanwhile, concluded that ballistic missile proliferation had passed the 'point of no return' and that TMD would be the most effective counter-proliferation methods.[481] Such

[475] The Socialist Prime Minister Murayama (1994-1996), and his party, the JSP in particular, would be highly skeptical. See Michael Green, *Arming Japan*, 137-138.
[476] Such attempts were only paused after protests from South Korea and the 1993-94 North Korean Nuclear Crisis. See David Fouse, "Japan's Post-Cold War North Korea Policy: Hedging toward Autonomy?", *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 2 Volume 31 (2004): 105-106.
[477] Leon Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999): 118.
[478] Asahi Shimbun, "Kita Chōsen Karumi Kanshin shimesu ga Kyogakuna buntan nanmon—Bei Misairu Bōei Kōsō", 23rd September 1993. Asahi Kikuzō Digital Archive. Accessed 16/11/2024.
[479] Michael D. Swaine, Rachel M. Swanger and Kawakami Takashi, "Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense," 32-33.
[480] Michael D. Swaine, Rachel M. Swanger and Kawakami Takashi, "Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense," 30-31.
[481] Ozawa Toshirō, "Regional Perspectives: Northeast Asia," *International Perspectives on Missile Proliferation and Defense* (2001): 67-70.

conclusions would be endorsed by both the Prime Minister's Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[482]

Spurring this increased receptiveness to the argument of BMD as a deterrent against new threats were the actions of North Korea during the 1993-94 North Korean nuclear crisis, as well as China's actions during the 1995-1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis, which could be seen as a pivotal moment for the shift in Japanese thinking regarding the necessity of BMD against the new security environment. Even when faced with the threat of US intervention and possible escalation during the Crisis, China did not back down, and continued firing missiles into the Taiwan Strait. For the Japanese, China's actions thus seemed to completely overturn their understanding of conventional nuclear deterrence theory and their dependence on US END, which had been based on the argument that mutual vulnerability and the threat of nuclear escalation and retaliation would be sufficient to deter nuclear powers like China from conflict escalation with other nuclear states or states that have extended nuclear deterrence guarantees. China's actions during the Crisis seemed to demonstrate that this was not the case, and that Japan would be at risk from Chinese threats, even with US END assurances.

Indeed, a Japanese researcher, based on interviews with Japanese politicians and government officials, would point to the Taiwan Straits Crisis as having left 'an immense scar' on Japan's security psyche and leading many to doubt China's 'no first use' policy.[483] Jimbo Ken, another Japanese expert meanwhile, concluded that Chinese missile tests "forced the Japanese government to consider that it might be threatened by Chinese intermediate-range missiles in future."[484] Spurred on by the changes in North Korean and Chinese behavior, the Japanese government would thus spend around 550 million yen from 1995-1998 studying BMD.[485]

In contrast to the normative concept of BMD as a complementary measure against new threats that slowly gained acceptance amongst Japanese policymakers, the Japanese would prove far more hesitant over the issue of greater Japanese participation and involvement in the deployment and management of this new system. This was already seen early on under the

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[482] Steven A. Hildreth, and Gary J. Pagliano, "Theater Missile Defense and Technology Cooperation: Implications for the US-Japan Relationship," 13.
[483] Urayama Kori, "Chinese Perspectives on Theater Missile Defense," *Asian Survey* 4 Volume 40 (2000): 616.
[484] Jimbo Ken, "A Japanese Perspective on Missile Defense and Strategic Coordination," *The Nonproliferation Review* 2 Volume 9 (2002): 56-62.
[485] The Japanese Government spent 290 million yen in 1995-96, 160 million in 1996-1997 and 100 million in 1997-1998, according to the Asahi Shimbun. See Asahi Shimbun, "TMD Kyōdō Kenkyū Hi Miokuri—Chūgoku e no Hairyo Yūsen, Gaisan Yōkyu de Bōeichō Hōshin", 20th August 1998. Asahi Kikuzō Digital Archive. Accessed 16/11/2024.

Perry Initiative, where objections were based on accusations of technological theft. Even after the switch to the TMD-WG and the increasing awareness of BMD as a necessary response to new threats however, Japanese policymakers would continue to find Japanese participation in BMD problematic, with objections this time being focused on costs, legal issues, and contradictions with existing Japanese norms on military participation and pacifism. In September 1993, for example, Japan Socialist Party (JSP) leader Tomiichi Murayama,[486] commenting on the possibility of TMD joint research, would state that the "JSP would not support a proposal to strengthen peace through military strengthening."[487] JDA officials, who were nominally the most receptive to BMD arguments from the US, meanwhile also exhibited a cautious attitude on Japanese participation, releasing a statement in 1993 highlighting the possibility that joint TMD research and deployment would pose issues for Japan's ban on the peaceful use of outer space.[488]

The problematic question of Japanese involvement in BMD would continue to persist even as external socialization continued. In line with the bellicose actions of North Korea in 1993-94 and the subsequent actions of China in the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits Crisis that prompted a shift in Japanese policymakers' perspective of BMD as a potential deterrent against emerging threats, however, Japanese politicians begin to show signs of cautiously 'learning' and accepting the norm of Japanese participation in the deployment of BMD in Japan. By late 1994, there was at least some agreement amongst Japanese policymakers that alongside research and studies carried out by purely Japanese officials and scholars, such as the JDA's Office of Ballistic Missile Defense Research, joint studies with the US would have be carried out in order to first identify areas of cooperation in BMD development with the US, even if Japan had yet to commit to participation.

Accordingly, an official agreement between Japan and the US to commence a bilateral study was thus reached in October 1994 and funds for the bilateral study would be earmarked in the Mid-Term Defense build-up plan for 1996-2000.[489] There were no further developments with regards to the issue of Japanese participation however, during this period. The learning,

[486] Murayama was also the Prime Minister from 1994-96.
[487] *Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) in Northeast Asia: An Annotated Chronology 1990-present.* A database produced by the East Asia Nonproliferation Project, Monterey Institute of International Studies.
http://cns.miis.edu/research/neasia/bmdchron.pdf. Accessed 16/11/2024.
[488] Asahi Shimbun, "Kita Chōsen Karumi Kanshin shimesu ga Kyogakuna buntan nanmon—Bei Misairu Bōei Kōsō", 23rd September 1993. Asahi Kikuzō Digital Archive. Accessed 16/11/2024.
[489] Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2000* (Tōkyō: Urban Connections, 2000): 270.

construction and institutionalization of the question Japanese participation in BMD would only see increased discussion and resolution in the internal socialization stage which followed the crisis that was the 1998 North Korean Missile Launch.

External Socialization and the Role of Power

According to the deterrence socialization theoretical framework, the power relationship between the US and Japan, as derived from resource gatekeeping as a result of the alliance structure, is crucial to explaining developments in the external socialization process. In Chapter 4, we have seen how a multidirectional power relationship between the US and Japan, for example, saw the US use less coercive methods to transfer its norms on nuclear deterrence to Japan. As pointed out in the chapter, this was due to the fact that while the US no doubt had power over Japan as its key security provider and thus, gatekeeping a resource (security) that Japan needed, Japan also had a certain degree of power over the US as well, acting as the US's 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' in East Asia, thus gatekeeping a resource (strategic autonomy) that the US needed as well. This multidirectional power relationship thus saw US officials refrain from using overly forceful imposing nuclear deterrence norms on Japan in the 1950s to the 1960s, despite the urgency of doing so for US East Asian strategy, for fear of losing Japan. How then, can the normative teaching methods of the US from 1993-1998 be best described, and how were they impacted by the power relationship between the US and Japan during this period?

As seen from the US's actions during the external socialization process, it is clear that in contrast to the 1960s-1970s, where the US relied primarily on normative persuasion in teaching nuclear norms to Japan, the US's normative teaching methods from 1993-1998 resembled a mix of normative persuasion and external inducement. The use of normative persuasion as a method, for example, is most apparent with regards to the transfer of the norm of BMD as a necessary complement against the new, emerging threats facing Japan. Wisner's conversation with Nakanishi in August 1993, for example, saw him attempt to persuade Nakanishi, purely via words, of the threat of North Korea and the necessity and suitability of BMD as a deterrent strategy against such threats. When Japan expressed skepticism towards the US's arguments for BMD as a deterrent against new threats, the US also did not attempt to change Japan's mind using threats or promises of access to resources, such as threatening to withdraw alliance protection if Japan did not accept their arguments for BMD, sticking purely to persuasive argument. This would continue throughout the external socialization process.

In contrast, US insistence on the 'Japanese' nature of Japan's adoption of BMD—in other words, its insistence on Japanese participation---was characterized by the US's utilization of more forceful teaching methods. Instead of purely trying to use normative persuasion to induce Japanese ownership of its own BMD systems, the US instead utilized external inducement and seemingly made US assistance in the deployment of Japanese BMD conditional on Japan playing a crucial role, thus making new US security measures for Japan dependent on Japanese participation. This was first seen in the Perry Initiative, where US assistance with the Japanese development of BMD was made conditional on US access to Japanese technology. Even after the shift from the Perry Initiative to the TMD-WG, US insistence on Japanese participation was clear, with all options for BMD deployment in Japan requiring Japan to contribute to the research costs and for the deployment of the system itself to be handled by the JSDF. While the US did not state outright that there would be no US assistance for BMD in Japan unless Japan itself participated in the deployment, the implications from the US proposals throughout the external socialization process were clear. The US would not, as they had with the US nuclear umbrella, allow Japan to 'rely' on a purely US BMD system.

This shift in the US's teaching methods and its utilization of more forceful methods in the form of external inducement, I argue, can be explained by changes in the power relationship between the US and Japan during this period that had occurred as a result of the end of the Cold War. Primarily, this was due to the fact that the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR meant that the value of Japan as a key strategic base for US strategy in East Asia, and thus, the power that Japan had over the US within the alliance, decrease. With the need to deter Soviet communism in East Asia no longer a pressing need following the end of the Cold War, Japan's power over the US as a key strategic base for US operations in East Asia decreased. While the US would continue to treat Japan as a valued ally, this decrease in Japan's value to the US as purely a strategic base in East Asia also meant that the US would also begin to grow more confident in demanding that Japan address the issue of Japanese overdependence on US security provision and play a larger role within the US-Japan alliance in order to ensure a fairer partnership, which it had found difficult to raise previously for fear of losing Japan. Indeed, there had already been signs of a similar phenomenon occurring during the Cold War in the 1970s-1980s when tensions decreased between the US and the USSR, and the US began

demanding more strongly that its allies bear a greater share of the burden of security under the Nixon Doctrine.[490]

The end of the Cold War would thus further see saw two key occasions where the US would request, and Japan would fail, to promise support for US security operations. On both occasions, rather than accept Japanese explanations, the US would heavily criticize Japan, thus clearly demonstrating the loss of Japanese power over the US within the US-Japan alliance. The first was the Gulf War, where following the Japanese failure to provide support for US operations in Iraq, US Ambassador to Japan Michael Armacost would cable Washington in March 1991 and criticize Japan for an ineffective bureaucracy and an inadequate crisis management system, further stating that 'Japan could not be counted as a great power.'[491]

More scathing criticism however, would come from US officials during 1993-94 North Korean Nuclear Crisis.[492] In 1994, when George Mitchell visited Tōkyō and questioned a number of Diet members over what Japan would do to support the US in a North Korean contingency, he was answered with the ambiguous reply of "We [Japan] will do what we can within our Constitution."[493] Exasperated at the ambiguity of such a statement, Mitchell angrily remarked "this [North Korea] is your neighboring country, and this crisis might occur within your territorial waters. Despite this, you say you would only do things within constitutional limits? In that case, what are these exact limits?"[494] The Diet members could only grimace and remained silent.[495] Such increased confidence in criticizing Japan for failing to live up to US expectations, I argue, could thus be seen as a loss of Japanese power over the US.

It is this loss of Japanese power over the US, I argue, that explains the US's utilization of both normative persuasion and external inducement. No longer as worried of losing Japan as it was during the early Cold War, the US had become more insistent on Japan bearing a greater share of its own security burden and was open in criticizing Japan when it failed to meet US expectations. As such, when faced with Japanese resistance to *Japanese BMD*---in other words, greater Japanese involvement and Japanese responsibility for its own BMD system---from

[490] United States Government, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS): 1969-1972.* https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d29. Accessed 16/11/2024.
[491] Ambassador Michael Armacost, Declassified Cable. Posted by the National Security Archives on 14th December 2005, at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB175/index.htm.
[492] Richard J. Samuels, Securing *Japan: Tōkyō's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia,* 66-67; Funabashi Yōichi, *Dōmei Hyōryū* (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shōten 1997), 319-320.
[493] Funabashi Yōichi, *Dōmei Hyōryū,* 314-315.
[494] Funabashi Yōichi, *Dōmei Hyōryū,* 314-315.
[495] Funabashi Yōichi, *Dōmei Hyōryū,* 314-315.

1993-1998, the US was free to shift to more forceful methods, such as external inducement, as a result of this loss of Japanese power over the US. Such a shift to external inducement thus saw the US hint that assistance for Japanese BMD development was contingent on Japan accepting a greater share of the burden for its own BMD system. By enabling the US to shift to more forceful normative teaching methods when faced with resistance from 1993-1998, I thus argue that power—primarily, the decreased power that Japan had over the US as a valued staging ground for US security planning in East Asia—had a key role to play in the external socialization process and the US's normative teaching methods from 1993-1998.

Crisis: The 1998 North Korean Missile Launch

The shift from external socialization, where teaching is the main focus and learning is still in its early stages, to internal socialization, where normative learning and construction becomes the main focus, is triggered by the onset of a crisis, particularly if the crisis is one that existing nuclear deterrence norms are unable to manage. This was especially the case for Japan and its relationship with BMD as well. Unlike the Four Nuclear Pillars, where an alternative explanation of a 'norm cascade' being possibly influential in Japan's shift from external to internal socialization can be put forward, given the mass of NATO states adopting US END in the 1950s prior to Japan's debate on nuclear deterrence, the absence of states enthusiastically adopting BMD at this point in time[496] discounts the possibility of widespread norm adoption influencing Japan's decision to seriously consider and eventually adopt BMD as a nuclear deterrence policy.

Instead, for Japan, a crisis would once again be primarily responsible for the shift from external to internal socialization, with said crisis being the 1998 North Korean missile launch. The launch occurred on 31st August 1998, and saw North Korea fire a Taepodong-1 missile, part of which fell into the Sea of Japan, while part of it flew over Japanese territory, before falling into the Pacific Ocean.[497] The Taepodong-1 was the first North Korean missile to successfully fly over Japanese territory.

Japan's immediate response was to file a protest with North Korea, calling the test 'highly regrettable'. A Japanese Foreign Ministry official called the launch a 'serious concern to Japanese security', and Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō quickly suspended the signing of an

[496] At this point in time, both Russia and China objected strongly to BMD, while NATO states like Germany and France had also stressed the importance of upholding the ABM Treaty.
[497] Jamie McIntyre, Reuters. "North Korea test missile flies over Japan into Pacific," CNN.com, August 31st, 1998, http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9808/31/nkorea.missile.02/

agreement to provide North Korea with two nuclear reactors.[498] Subsequently, the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) carried out a series of analyses on the 1st and 2nd of September 1998, sending out ships and aircraft to look for missile debris in the areas where it was believed the missile had fallen.

The 1998 North Korean missile launch was a severe blow to Japanese understanding of nuclear deterrence. Japanese dependence on US END as a form of deterrence against nuclear missiles was based on the premise that the fear of a retaliatory nuclear strike from the US would prevent any state from launching a nuclear attack on Japan.[499] That North Korea, which had nuclear ambitions, would ignore such a possibility and fire a missile that flew over Japan, shocked Japanese policymakers and led to further discussion on how to cope with the threats like North Korea that were apparently unfazed by the threat of nuclear retaliation. This would thus begin the internal socialization phase, as Japan began integrating BMD as part of its nuclear deterrence policy.

Stage 2: Internal Socialization

Internal socialization, according to the deterrence socialization framework, involves policymakers learning and constructing the norms they had been taught and had begun learning in the external socialization phase into actual policy in accordance with a country's socio-political context. In Chapter 4, we have already seen this with Satō's understanding and construction of Japanese nuclear deterrence policy. Such a process would occur in the case of BMD as well, following the North Korean missile launch. This process, from 1998-2003, can be divided into three phases and would see Japanese policymakers quickly learn and institutionalize the perspective of Japanese BMD as a necessary complement to US END as a deterrent against the new threats that Japan faced that they had been first exposed to in the first phase from 1998-1999. Subsequently, the second phase from 1999-2001 would see Japanese policymakers struggle over the 'Japanese' part of the normative perspective---in other words, Japanese participation---- and how this aspect of the norm could be learned and constructed in accordance with Japan's existing legal restrictions on military activity. This deadlock would then only be broken under the leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō in the third phase from 2001-2003, which would see Japan adopt and deploy BMD as a deterrent against

[498] Jamie McIntyre, Reuters. "North Korea test missile flies over Japan into Pacific," CNN.com, August 31st, 1998, http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9808/31/nkorea.missile.02/
[499] This was the explanation provided in the 1968/70 Report, which led to the Four Nuclear Pillars and Japanese dependence on US END as its nuclear deterrence policy.

new threats that were undeterred by threats of nuclear retaliation, while still relying on US END for the majority of its nuclear deterrence needs.

Phase 1: 1998-1999

The response of the Japanese government in the immediate aftermath of the missile launch was one of rapid activity and focused on construction and institutionalization of the norm that Japan needed BMD as an additional complement against the new threats it faced, as represented by North Korea. As shown in the external socialization section, Japanese policymakers had increasingly undergone normative learning from 1995-1998 and grew increasingly aware of the utility of BMD as a complementary deterrent strategy. Such learning would continue at an increased pace from 1998-1999. As recalled by Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) officials, policymakers that once doubted the efficacy of BMD now reprimanded JDA for not having a missile defense system in place.[500] In the Diet, meanwhile, there was massive support for the arguments of supporters of BMD, such as Director General(s) of the JDA Kawara Riki (1999-2000) and Norota Hōsei (1998-1999), with both officials stressing the necessity of BMD as a deterrence solution for Japan, while further pointing out the purely defensive nature of BMD as compatible with the Japanese security doctrine of 'defensive defense'. At this point, however, certain Diet members like Yutaka Kuwabara of the Socialist Party would also begin pointing out the possibility of BMD triggering regional militarization, which might see regional rivals such as China pursue even more powerful nuclear weapons to overcome Japanese BMD. This scenario, as mentioned previously, was one of the key reasons that BMD was viewed as incompatible with nuclear deterrence by nuclear weapons and nuclear retaliation.

Against such concerns, pro-BMD officials would continue to emphasize that BMD was the 'only' solution for Japan, while also arguing that a regional BMD/TMD system, which was the main focus of both US and Japanese studies up to this point, would not trigger destabilization in the nuclear deterrence regime if explained properly to regional rivals, as it was a defensive measure that would only cover Japan. Pro-BMD officials like Kawara and Norota thus essentially attempted to solve the problem of BMD's supposed incompatibility with nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation by arguing that it was the scale of potential BMD systems that would trigger nuclear deterrence regime destabilization and result in incompatibility with nuclear deterrence by nuclear weapons, rather than the inherent nature of BMD as a form of

[500] Urayama Kaori, PhD Dissertation, *Missile Defense, US-Japan Alliance and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1983-2007,* Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences (2008): 152.

nuclear deterrence by denial. Kawara, for example, in a November 1999 Security Committee meeting, specifically stated that "BMD was the only solution for Japan to protect its citizens"[501] as justification for his support for BMD. At the same meeting, Norota would point out that BMD was a "purely defensive system" and "would not contribute to regional militarization" while being compatible with Japan's "defensive defense" security doctrine.[502] These two concepts of BMD as the 'only solution' against new threats facing Japan and a 'purely defensive system' that would not trigger an arms race if explained properly to surrounding states would be a common refrain amongst Japanese policymakers,[503] and indeed, would later be outright referred to in the official communique announcing Japan's decision to participate in US-Japan joint BMD research.[504]

Throughout such meetings, officials would also increasingly refer to the new threat environment that Japan faced and the issue of missile proliferation as an "important issue for the security of our country".[505] All these changes thus represent a marked change from the doubts expressed by Japanese policymakers in the early 1990s that Japan faced a new threat environment, and thus would seem to signal that deterrence norms were being learned and utilized by Japanese policymakers.[506]

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[501] Shūgiin Anzen Hoshō Iin Kai Dai 4 Gō (Records of the Security Committee, House of Representatives, no.4), 18th November 1999.
https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=114603815X00419991118&spkNum=69&current=1. Accessed 16/11/2024.

[502] Shūgiin Anzen Hoshō Iin Kai Dai 4 Gō (Records of the Security Committee, House of Representatives, no.4), 18th November 1999.
https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=114603815X00419991118&spkNum=69&current=1. Accessed 16/11/2024.

[503] Such arguments would be repeated in further meetings of the Security Committee in the House of Representatives, and in the Special Committee on the Guidelines for US-Japan Cooperation in the House of Councilors. See Shūgiin Anzen Hoshō Iin Kai Dai 4 Gō (Records of the Security Committee, House of Representatives, no.4), 13th May 1999.
https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=114503815X00419990513&spkNum=111&current=3. Accessed 16/11/2024; Sangiin Nichibei Bōei Kyōryoku no tame no shishin ni kansuru Tokubetsu Iinkai Dai 11 Gō (Records of the Special Committee on the Guidelines for US-Japan Cooperation, House of Councilors, no.11), 24th May 1999.
https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=114514963X01119990524&current=1. Accessed 16/11/2024.

[504] Naikaku Kanbō Chōkan, "Dandō Misairu Bōei ni Kakaru Nichibei Kyōdō Gijutsu Kenkyū ni kansuru Naikaku Kanbō Chōkan danwa," 25th October 1998.
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2006/2006/html/is260000.html. Accessed 16/11/2024.

[505] Shūgiin Anzen Hoshō Iin Kai Dai 4 Gō (Records of the Security Committee, House of Representatives, no.4), 18th November 1999.

[506] Of course, there were opposing views that still questioned the threat posed by rogue states and the necessity of BMD as a defense for Japan against such threats. Yutaka Kuwabara of the Socialist Party, for example, questioned the true nature of the threat of North Korea and whether BMD was even needed against North Korea. See Shūgiin Anzen Hoshō Iin Kai Dai 4 Gō (Records of the Security Committee, House of Representatives, no.4), 18th November 1999.
These views, however, largely became a minority following the 1998 missile launch.

Meanwhile, there were also a small but growing group of Japanese policymakers who, while agreeing with officials like Kawara and Norota that the drastic changes in Japan's security environment necessitated the adoption of BMD for Japan, did not try to downplay the risks of Japanese adoption of BMD possibly triggering regional militarization and destabilization of the nuclear deterrence regime, instead arguing that the massive changes Japan's security environment was undergoing warranted pursual of Japanese BMD, in spite of such risks. For such policymakers, the behavior of China during the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits Crisis, in addition to North Korea's 1998 missile launch, was further evidence of this massive shift in the status of regional security, and evidence that that the possibility of conflict/nuclear escalation might not always be sufficient to deter existing nuclear powers, hence necessitating the need for BMD as a defense against Chinese missiles as well. Indeed, according to Kaori Urayama, a scholar of Japanese missile defense policy, one DPJ politician had outright stated to her that 'the ultimate of BMD is China'.[507]

For such policymakers, adopting BMD as a necessary measure to Japan's changed security environment was thus seemingly worth risking regional militarization and destabilizing nuclear deterrence. Indeed, some officials have went even further, and in interviews with Urayama, mentioned that it was hoped that China might divert considerable financial resources to overcome Japanese BMD if it was deployed, straining its military budget,[508] seemingly supporting an arms race with China. While such views would continue to be a minority during this phase and would not explicitly refer China for fear of damaging Sino-Japanese ties, the view that BMD was necessary to deter new and emergent threats in spite of the risk it posed would grow stronger and become the dominant argument at the end of the internal socialization process, as US plans for its joint development of BMD with Japan grew larger and it became increasingly impossible for Japan to downplay Japanese BMD as a regional system that would pose no risk of destabilizing Japanese nuclear deterrence arrangements.

In general, supporters of BMD were thus successful in their efforts, and there was a growing consensus amongst Japanese policymakers that Japanese BMD was needed as a necessary complement alongside US END to address the new threats Japan faced. This meant that by October 1998, the Japanese Government had gathered enough support to announce it was

[507] Urayama Kaori, PhD Dissertation, *Missile Defense, US-Japan Alliance and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1983-2007,* Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences (2008): 157-158.
[508] Urayama Kaori, PhD Dissertation, *Missile Defense, US-Japan Alliance and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1983-2007,* Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences (2008): 157-158.

entering into a joint technical research agreement on BMD with the US,[509] essentially shifting from its position of looking for areas of cooperation with the US, to cooperating with the US on BMD research. As mentioned above, the statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary announcing the decision stated that 'there are no alternatives to the BMD system',[510] when it came to defending Japan, thus seemingly ensured that this aspect of the norm had essentially been institutionalized. The statement however, ended with the caveat that while Japan had decided to cooperate with joint research, deployment was a different question, and would require further consideration dependent on the results of US-Japan joint research efforts.[511] This would hint at the central issues of the internal socialization from this point on, as Japan turned from the aspect of BMD as a suitable response to its new threat environment to the 'Japanese BMD' aspect---in other words, Japanese participation and deployment of BMD.

Phase 2: 1999-2001

The problematic nature of *Japanese* participation and deployment of BMD in Japan, which, as demonstrated above, had proven to be the norm that faced more resistance in the external socialization phase due to its potential clashes with Japan's constitutional restrictions would grow even more problematic in the internal socialization stage and preoccupy Japanese policymakers from the end of 1999 onwards. This was primarily due to changes in the US's normative conceptualization of the jointly developed US-Japanese BMD system, which proved to be an additional challenge for Japanese policymakers to interpret and construct in a way that would fit with Japan's existing consensus on nuclear deterrence.

As has been mentioned throughout this chapter, initial US plans for BMD were focused on Theatre Missile Defense (TMD), regional missile defense systems that would protect various 'theatres' in which US troops operated. As such a form of BMD was more limited in scope, pro-BMD Japanese officials were thus able to argue that Japanese development and deployment of Japanese BMD alongside the US would only protect Japanese territory against newly emergent threats and, if explained properly, might not destabilize the global nuclear deterrence regime by triggering an arms race. The October 1998 agreement with the US was signed alongside such lines, and by constructing and conceptualizing Japanese BMD as a

[509]Naikaku Kanbō Chōkan, "Dandō Misairu Bōei ni Kakaru Nichibei Kyōdō Gijutsu Kenkyū ni kansuru Naikaku Kanbō Chōkan danwa," 25th October 1998. http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2006/2006/html/is260000.html. Accessed 20/06/2024.
[510] Naikaku Kanbō Chōkan, "Dandō Misairu Bōei ni Kakaru Nichibei Kyōdō Gijutsu Kenkyū ni kansuru Naikaku Kanbō Chōkan danwa," 25th October 1998.
[511] Naikaku Kanbō Chōkan, "Dandō Misairu Bōei ni Kakaru Nichibei Kyōdō Gijutsu Kenkyū ni kansuru Naikaku Kanbō Chōkan danwa," 25th October 1998.

limited system that would not trigger a nuclear arms race and destabilize the global deterrence regime, said Japanese officials were thus able to solve, at least conceptually, the problem of BMD's incompatibility with the existing nuclear deterrence regime.

Developments in the US at this point, however, would challenge this conceptualization of Japanese BMD. Following discussions that first started in 1998, in November 1999, US Undersecretary of Defense Walter Slocombe announced changes in US BMD policy by highlighting that, in addition to TMD developments the US were pursing with its allies, the US intended to deploy a National Missile Defense (NMD) system, utilizing various ground and sea-based interceptors to protect the continental US, thus protecting US territory (NMD) as well as US forces operating in various theatres of war (TMD).[512] This 'mission creep' would prove controversial, as the prohibition on building national missile defense systems for both the US and the USSR (now Russia) had been a central pillar of the global nuclear deterrence regime since the signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty between the US and USSR in 1972[513] and a way to ensure mutual vulnerability and prevent a superpower arms race. While the US, with much difficulty, had negotiated with Russia to allow for limited TMD development under the ABM regime,[514] it was clear that NMD would be completely incompatible with its provisions. As such, even while the US announced that it would continue attempts to renegotiate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia in order to do so, it also suggested that it might abrogate the ABM treaty unilaterally if negotiations failed.[515]

This change in the US's plans would become a major issue for Japan and complicate the internal socialization process. Firstly, as noted above, Japanese policymakers from 1998-1999 had largely tried to conceptualize the potential jointly-developed US-Japanese BMD in a manner that was compatible with the existing Japanese consensus on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence by arguing that as a regional system, the more limited scale of Japanese

[512] Elizabeth Becker, "U.S. Pushes Missile Defense Despite Allies Opposition," *The New York Times,* 6th November 1999. https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/global/110699missile-us.html. Accessed 16/11/2024.
[513] U.S. Department of State, *Treaty between The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,* 26th May 1972. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/101888.htm. Accessed 16/11/2024.
[514] *Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Demarcation and Succession Agreements: Background and Issues.* Congressional Research Report (CRS) 98-496F, 27th April 2000. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/98-496.html. Accessed 16/11/2024.
[515] Elizabeth Becker, "U.S. Pushes Missile Defense Despite Allies Opposition," *The New York Times,* 6th November 1999. https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/global/110699missile-us.html. Accessed 20/06/2024.

BMD would not trigger a global arms race and destabilize existing nuclear deterrence arrangements if explained properly to regional rivals. However, if the US were planning to develop a NMD system that would cover the entire US mainland and link up with regional BMD/TMD systems, it would greatly weaken the retaliatory nuclear power of the US's nuclear rivals by strengthening the US's defenses against nuclear strikes. This, in turn, according to nuclear deterrence theory, might prompt the US's nuclear rivals to pursue more sophisticated nuclear weapons or larger nuclear arsenals in order to overcome the US's NMD. It would thus be clearly impossible to argue that the adoption of such a NMD system would not risk a complete destabilization of the existing global nuclear deterrence regime, which Japan itself strongly supported.[516] With distinction between NMD and US-Japanese BMD/TMD being unclear at best, there was thus a high possibility that Japan would be developing a system (BMD/NMD) that was fundamentally incompatible with Japan's dependence on a stable nuclear deterrence regime based on nuclear retaliation and mutual vulnerability.

In addition to the potential adoption of NMD/BMD destabilizing and challenging the existing nuclear deterrence regime, the unclear distinction between NMD and TMD/Japanese BMD, meant that there was now a chance, however minute, that Japan's BMD system, which simultaneously acted as a regional TMD for US bases in Japanese territory, would be connected to the wider NMD network that protected the US mainland. For Japan, this would be constitutionally problematic and would directly challenge Japan's self-imposed restrictions on collective self-defense, put in place by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) since 1981.[517] A scenario where the US requests Japan shoot down a ballistic missile heading for the US mainland using Japan's own BMD system, for example, would be highly problematic for Japan to fulfil. Indeed, as questioned by noted journalist Funabashi Yōichi in 2000, "Was it the US's intention to expand its missile defense system into a global command and control system where each TMD system functions as a regional terminal? If so, what will this mean for Japan's own defense and foreign policy and its alliance with the US?"[518] Later, Umemoto Tetsuya would also point out that the increasing unclear distinction between NMD and TMD/Japanese BMD meant that intelligence sharing between the US and Japan would also be a problem and a

[516] Urayama Kaori, PhD Dissertation, *Missile Defense, US-Japan Alliance and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1983-2007,* Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences (2008): 181-182.
[517] According to a legal interpretation by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) in 1981, Japan has the right to collective self-defense, but no right to exercise it due to constitutional limitations. See Yamamoto Kentarō and Yamaoka Norio, "Shūdanteki Jieiken wo meguru dōkō," *Chōsa to Jōhō—Issue Brief*--- 827 (2014): 5.
[518] Funabashi Yōichi, "Tōkyō's Temperance," *Washington Quarterly* 3 Volume 23 (2000): 139-140, 142.

potential point of alliance friction as well. According to Umemoto, if a missile directed at the US mainland were to be picked up by the satellites of Japan's BMD system and forwarded to the US, any military retaliation by the US would see the Japanese transmission of information as part of said response, thus violating Japan's constitutional restrictions on the use of force.[519] Conversely, if Japan were to withhold such information, it might lead to irreversible damage to the alliance. The decision of the US to pursue NMD, the unclear distinction between NMD and TMD, and the NMD concept's incompatibility with Japanese perspectives of security, global arms control and existing norms on collective security thus became the major theme of internal socialization from 1999-2001.

Despite this potential shift in US plans for BMD, Japan did not pause its joint development and research efforts with the US. From 1999-2001, however, Japanese policymakers would try and emphasize the normative conceptualization and construction of Japanese BMD as a purely regional system that was compatible with existing nuclear deterrence arrangements and would not trigger an arms race by stressing and drawing a clear line between Japanese BMD and US plans for NMD as two separate systems. Essentially, Japanese policymakers were thus making the argument that while US plans for NMD may or may not destabilize the existing global nuclear deterrence regime, *Japanese* BMD, which was completely separate from US NMD, would not.

Primarily, this normative construction would take place in the form of public statements, with Japanese policymakers stating on multiple occasions during this period that Japanese BMD and NMD would be completely separate systems. When asked to comment on the news of a failed US NMD interception test on 8th July 2000, for example, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) would comment that TMD has little in common with NMD and that its joint research and development schedule with the US would remain unchanged.[520] In a March 2000 interview with Urayama Kaori, a scholar of Japanese security policy, meanwhile, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) would be more direct, stating that "NMD and ABM negotiations are not Japan's business."[521] Meanwhile, as it became increasingly clear that the US would abrogate the ABM treaty under the Bush Administration's new BMD policy and develop NMD,

[519] Umemoto Tetsuya, "Missile Defense and Extended Deterrence in the Japan-US Alliance," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 2 Volume 12 (2000).
[520] Asahi Shimbun, "Settoku Ushinau NMD: Kurinton Seiken ni Dageki <Kaisetsu>," 9th July 2000. Asahi Kikuzō Digital Archive. Accessed 16/11/2024.
[521] Urayama Kaori, PhD Dissertation, *Missile Defense, US-Japan Alliance and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1983-2007,* Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences (2008): 173.

Japanese policymakers would grow even more strident in drawing the line between TMD/Japanese BMD and US NMD. In an appearance on TV Asahi on 17th June 2001, JDA Director-General Nakatani Gen publicly stated that "the [US initiative] refers to what the US is doing itself and at the moment, Japan will not take part in it.[522] Nakatani would also later state unequivocally that "If Japan were to possess a BMD system, it would be designed to protect the nation [Japan]'s territory and operated by Japan independently".[523]

Other than trying to draw a clear line between US NMD and the US-Japan jointly researched Japanese BMD/TMD, Japanese officials would also continue to try and distance their pursual of Japanese BMD with the US from US NMD plans by continuing to show their support for the ABM, albeit in limited ways so as not to alienate the US. In 2000, Prime Minister Mori stated that the Japanese government 'understood' why the US was possibly renouncing the ABM, but did not necessarily support said decision.[524] Later, in 2001, following the Bush Administration's announcement that it was definitely withdrawing from the ABM, the Japanese government released a five-point statement on BMD, with the fifth point explicitly stating that Japan hoped that the BMD issue would be dealt in a manner conducive to the improvement of the international security environment, including in the areas of arms control and disarmament.[525]

Despite such efforts from Japanese policymakers however, the distinction between Japanese BMD and US plans for NMD would remain unclear at best. As noted succinctly by Funabashi Yōichi, "TMD essentially represents Japan's version of the NMD. It is not possible to say that Japan's NMD is ok, while NMD for the US is not."[526] Nevertheless, Japan's joint research with the US into BMD would continue, and Japanese policymakers would continue to struggle with problem of how to construct and conceptualize a version of Japanese BMD that would not violate constitutional restrictions and would be normatively compatible with the existing Japanese consensus on nuclear deterrence even if it might potentially be linked to US NMD.

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[522] Asahi Shimbun, "Shin Misairu Bōei [Gen Jiten no Sankanai] Nakatani Bōeichō Chōkan, Kyōryoku Gentei." 18th June 2001. Asahi Kikuzō Digital Archive. Accessed 16/11/2024.
[523] Asahi Shimbun, "Nichibei Bōei Shunō Kaidan: Shutaisei ni Saware, Senshu Bōei Kyōchō" 23rd June 2001. Asahi Kikuzō Digital Archive. Accessed 16/11/2024.
[524] Asahi Shimbun, ""Bei NMD ni Rikai wo Shimesu—Sanin Honkaigi de Mori Shusō", 2nd August 2000. Asahi Kikuzō Digital Archive. Accessed 16/11/2024.
[525] MOFA Press Conference, 11th May 2001. https://warp.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11454275/www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2001/5/511.html#6. Accessed 20/06/2001.
[526] "Arata na [Heiwa to Antei] wo Sammito to [Heiwa no Ishizue]," *Asahi Shimbun*, 24th July 2000. Asahi Kikuzō Archives.

This problem, however, would only be solved by Japanese policymakers following the election of Koizumi Junichirō in April 2001.

Phase 3: 2001-2003

Koizumi's appointment in April 2001 as Prime Minister marks the start of the last phase of the internal socialization process. With the necessity of BMD as a complementary deterrent mechanism against the new threats that Japan faced having largely been accepted in the first phase from 1998-1999, Koizumi's primary contribution was to settle the question of the 'Japanese' part of the norm that had troubled Japanese policymakers from 1999-2001, and learn, adapt and construct Japanese participation in BMD in a way that was consistent with Japan's existing norms on security. There were thus two key issues that Koizumi had to solve. The first was the incompatibility of Japanese claims that Japanese BMD would not lead to destabilization of the existing nuclear deterrence regime with US plans to potentially integrate regional TMD/BMD systems with its plans for a NMD system. The second was the possibility that such a linkage might lead to issues with Japanese constitutional restrictions on collective self-defense. How then, did Koizumi contribute to the process of internal socialization?

Interestingly enough, Koizumi's approach to socialization would be the direct opposite of Satō Eisaku's attempts at learning and constructing a perspective of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence that was consistent with Japan's existing antinuclear sentiments. Instead of trying to adapt and construct BMD in a way that was consistent with Japan's existing norms on collective defense and its adherence to the existing nuclear deterrence regime, Koizumi would focus on pushing a reinterpretation of the existing Japanese security consensus that would allow for greater acceptance of Japanese BMD from 2001-2003. Koizumi would pursue this reconstruction and reinterpretation of existing Japanese security norms through two key arguments: stressing the need for changes in the existing Japanese consensus on deterrence and security to meet the new security threats Japan faced, even if it challenged existing Japanese normative restrictions, while also downplaying the extent to which such new perspectives were radically different from the existing Japanese normative consensus.

In developing the first argument, Koizumi argued that regardless of whether Japan chose to pursue a more proactive security policy and shift its existing security consensus, it was already an established fact that the end of the Cold War had meant the rise of a more complex security environment for Japan, and a new wave of serious, security threats for Japan. Such threats, Koizumi argued, were of a magnitude that necessitated new perspectives and new policies,

such as BMD, in order to address them, even if such changes might challenge Japan's existing security consensus.[527] In short, Koizumi was essentially adapting the views that had begun developing amongst a minority of Japanese policymakers in the first phase of internal socialization from 1998-1999. Rather than trying to downplay the risks of Japan's new policy direction, Koizumi was arguing that changes in Japan's security environment were of such a great magnitude that such policy changes were necessary.

Koizumi's arguments were strongly bolstered by the 9/11 attacks, and he was quick to portray the 9/11 attacks as not a US-exclusive incident, but as part of the growing threat of terrorism that was exactly one of the new threats that Japan would have to address by changes in security norms, even if such changes might entail risk for Japan. In order to do so, Koizumi would invoke a sense of closeness based on Japan's relationship with the US, and just one week after the attacks, Koizumi would specifically state in a press conference that the Japanese government regarded terrorism as "its own security issue".[528] In order to further emphasize terrorism's threat to Japan, Koizumi would also invoke Japan's role as a member of the international community, and that since said international community was threatened by terrorism in certain regions, so too, was Japan. This argument was utilized on 29th October 2001, when the Japanese government passed the SDF Anti-Terrorism bill drafted by Koizumi's cabinet which would allow the SDF to send troops overseas during an armed conflict, provide logistical support and participate in search-and-rescue operations as well as humanitarian relief activities for the first time, all in the name of antiterrorist activities,[529] In justifying the bill, Koizumi would argue that the bill was necessary "to ensure the peace and security of the international community, including Japan itself.".[530] By using the example of terrorism, Koizumi thus tried to paint a picture of the new threat environment facing Japan, one that could not be addressed by clinging on to existing norms on security that prevented Japanese cooperation with its allies.

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[527] Leszek Buszynski, "Japan's Security Policy in the Koizumi Era," *Security Challenges* 3 Volume 2 (2006): 95-96; John H. Miller, "The Glacier Moves: Japan's Response to U.S. Security," *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 2 Volume 30 (2003): 136-137.

[528] "Japan's measures in response to simultaneous terrorist attacks in the United States," Statement by the Prime Minister, 19th September 2001. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumispeech/2001/0919terosoti_e.html. Accessed 20/06/2024,

[529] Leszek Buszynski, "Japan's Security Policy in the Koizumi Era," 95.

[530] Statement by Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi on the Passing of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill. 29th October 2001. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumispeech/2001/1029danwa_e.html. Accessed 20/06/2024.

However, it was not just Koizumi's rhetorical skill at reinterpreting Japanese security norms that was significant. Koizumi's attempts at reframing and reconstructing the discourse on Japanese security norms was bolstered as well by a series of legislative changes that began in the 1990s which consolidated greater political power in the Prime Minister's Office and the Cabinet and which were beginning to take effect after 1999.[531] Under Prime Minister Hashimoto, government administration was reformed greatly via the "Law to Establish the Cabinet Office" and the "Law to amend the Cabinet Law", implemented in 1999.[532]

There were three important effects from these two laws that allowed Koizumi to push his agenda of shifting Japan's security normative consensus. The first was that the Prime Minister was given the power to initiate basic national policy in the cabinet without first gaining broad ministerial support, thus strengthening the executive power of the Prime Minister. The second was the reformation of the Cabinet Secretariat, increasing its authority to draft policy and initiate policy development. The third was the establishment of the Cabinet Office, which reported directly to the Prime Minister and had the power to establish ministers for 'special missions', broadly defined.[533] It was these two laws, for example, that allowed Koizumi to quickly establish multiple policy teams in the aftermath of 9/11 and seize the initiative to present terrorism as an international threat and an example of the new threat environment facing Japan. Using these laws, Koizumi and the Prime Minister's Office were thus able to seize the initiative in how to present the new international environment in which Japan was operating to the Diet and the Japanese public in general, forming policy groups such as the Iraq Response Team, which he himself chaired.[534]

The effects of Koizumi's arguments and his ability to set the agenda on shifting the normative debate on Japanese security were significant. Following the Anti-Terrorism Bill, Koizumi would ask the Diet to approve the War Contingency Bills in July 2003, which would allow Japan to dispatch forces abroad in the event of a military emergency. This was then followed by the dispatch of SDF forces to Iraq.[535] Koizumi's arguments on the dangerous new threat

[531] Such changes were the results of efforts of revisionists in the Diet who were unsatisfied with Japan's failure to respond to US calls for assistance during the Gulf War.
[532] Such changes were recommended by the Administrative Reform Council established under Hashimoto Ryūtarō's government. For the full list of recommended changes, see Administrative Reform Council, "Final Report of the Administrative Reform Council," 3rd December 1997. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/971228finalreport.html. Accessed 20/06/2024.
[533] Government of Japan, "Central Government Reform of Japan." https://japan.kantei.go.jp/central_government/frame.html. Accessed 20/06/2024.
[534] Richard J. Samuels, Securing *Japan: Tōkyō's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*, 75.
[535] Leszek Buszynski, "Japan's Security Policy in the Koizumi Era," 95-96.

environment facing Japan would be further bolstered by the revelation of North Korea's role in the abduction of Japanese citizens from 1977 to 1983 and its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),[536] and in November 2003, Japanese voters returned Koizumi to power in the general election.[537] That Japanese voters did not punish Koizumi for overturning so many of Japan's restrictions on security issues seems to indicate that by this point that Koizumi's efforts had borne fruit and Japanese policymakers and the Japanese public, more generally, had underwent a change in normative perspectives that acknowledged Koizumi's argument of the need for Japan to play a more active role in security given Japan's new threat environment.[538] As will be shown later in this period, such a perspective shift would be crucial in getting opponents of Japanese BMD to accept that Japanese BMD was just one of the necessary measures taken by Japan to address the said new threats faced by Japan, even if doing so might challenge existing Japanese constitutional restrictions on collective self-defense or risk regional instability.

However, Koizumi did not just rely on the argument that a new threat environment required a rethink and reconceptualization of existing Japanese norms on collective defense and security. The second of Koizumi's methods was to downplay the ways in which his new policies and reconstruction of Japanese security norms were completely removed from Japan's existing security consensus. While Koizumi's policies and approach to security policymaking was radically different from his predecessors, he would anchor his policies and reconceptualization of Japanese security norms in Japanese pacifism and desires for global peace. Koizumi did this by first of all, portraying his efforts for a more active Japanese security posture not as a scenario where Japan was participating in an overseas conflict and aiding an ally (the US) in a military conflict, but rather as part of Japanese role in peacekeeping as a global citizen. As stated by Koizumi, "the whole world is working together resolutely against terror; Japan too in its fight

[536] According to multiple scholars (Richard Samuels, Linus Hagstrom, Williams and Mobrand), the abduction issue has even overtaken the nuclear issue amongst Japanese public when it comes to evaluating the threat from North Korea. For example, see Linus Hagstrom and Ulv Hanssen, "The North Korean abduction issue: emotions, securitization and the reconstruction of Japanese identity from 'aggressor' to 'victim' and from 'pacifist' to 'normal'," *The Pacific Review* 1 Volume 28 (2015): 72-73.

[537] Government of Japan. House of Representatives. "Dai 43-kai Shūgiin sōsenkyo." https://www.Shūgiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_annai.nsf/html/statics/ugoki/h15ugoki/syuse/43syuse.htm/. Accessed 16/11/2024.

[538] Arguments have been made that this speaks to a greater societal change within Japan that is more accepting of military action in dealing with security issues. See Michael Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power* (New York: Palgrave, 2000): 47-50, 73-75 and Richard Samuels, *Securing Japan.*

against terror will subjectively tackle this issue as if it were our own problem". [539] Koizumi's attempts at alignment of his more proactive security policy with existing Japanese belief in maintaining global peace would see Koizumi, for example, setting limits on the SDF's participation in Iraq, not allowing SDF troops into combat areas, and framing their mission as one of reconstruction, before further arguing that such overseas operations were allowed under the Japanese Constitution according to previous legal interpretation by the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB). [540] By portraying Japanese activities as peacekeeping and humanitarian missions and the latest in the long line of Japan's efforts to aid the world, Koizumi was thus able to allay opposition fears of constitutional violation, with his Antiterrorism and War Contingency Bills earning approval even amongst JCP members.[541]

It would be Koizumi's efforts in weakening the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB), however, that would prove even more critical in his efforts to downplay the contradictions between a more proactive Japanese security posture and Japan's constitutional obligations. The CLB, as an advisory body, had the responsibility of interpreting government legislation and the constitution and was once one of the most powerful bureaucratic organizations within the Japanese government,[542] even if its interpretation of Japan's constitutional restraints tended towards the conservative end.[543] It derived much of its power from the fact that for the longest period of time, the Japanese government was willing to defer to its rulings, especially on security issues. The CLB's authority, however, had already taken a huge hit in 1999 when Ozawa Ichirō of the Liberal Party demanded and was granted greater control over the CLB in exchange for coalition partnership with the LDP.[544] Koizumi would weaken its power further by breaking with tradition and refusing to be lectured by the CLB on multiple occasions. Unlike previous Prime Ministers, Koizumi simply did not listen to CLB advice. When he was lectured by the CLB over the permissibility of the various parts of his draft Anti-terror bill, Koizumi confronted the CLB director-general directly, and was never lectured again by the CLB.[545] By

[539] Shūgiin Honkaigi Dai 3 Gō (Records of Plenary Session, House of Representatives, no.3), 2nd October 2001.
https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=115305254X00320011002&current=1. Accessed 16/11/2024.
[540] Rikki Kersten, "Japanese security policy formation: assessing the Koizumi Revolution," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 1 Volume 65 (2011): 9.
[541] Leszek Buszynski, "Japan's Security Policy in the Koizumi Era," 95.
[542] Richard J. Samuels, Securing *Japan: Tōkyō's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*, 50.
[543] For example, it was the CLB's interpretation of Japan's legal constraints on dispatching SDF forces abroad that was primarily responsible for Japan's Gulf War debacle. See Nishikawa Shinichi, "Naikaku Hōsei Kyoku: Sono Seidoteki Kenryoku e no Sekin," Meiji Daigaku Seikiei Ronsō 5-6 Volume 65 (1997): 235.
[544] Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tōkyō's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, 76.
[545] Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tōkyō's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, 95.

2003, Koizumi was confident enough that his Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary openly stated that "the CLB had been providing misleading explanations on collective defense."[546] With the CLB thus weakened, there was thus little to no opposition that could challenge Koizumi's interpretation of existing norms and his attempts at downplaying the gap between existing restrictions on Japanese security norms and his new, proactive security approach.

Koizumi's attempts at justifying his pursual of new security policies and reconstructing existing Japanese norms as a necessity against the new threats Japan faces was largely successful. By 2003, other than the overseas dispatch of SDF troops, Koizumi's Cabinet had already completely overturned, or had at least begun challenging, multiple important limitations on Japanese security policymaking, such as Japan's laws on arms exports, its laws requiring complete civilian control of the armed forces, and its law on the peaceful use of outer space.[547] As a further signifier of the consensus between Japanese policymakers that a new threat environment required new policies and new norms on deterrence, Japan had even remained largely silent on the Bush Administration's unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2001,[548] which, as mentioned above, was supposed to prevent the US from pursuing NMD and sparking a potential nuclear arms race, and which Japan used to fully support. In such an environment, stretching limits to accommodate joint US-Japan BMD participation thus became just an accepted measure that was necessary to address the new threats Japan faced.

By early 2003, political momentum for Japanese BMD deployment appeared unstoppable. In March 2003, even the President of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)[549] Kan Naoto, remarked that Japan should consider introducing BMD to counter North Korean missiles.[550] Such a change was significant, as center-left/leftist parties like the DPJ had largely opposed Japanese BMD up to this point on grounds that it might trigger regional instability. Kan's statement thus seems to show that by this point, joint BMD deployment and development with

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[546] Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tōkyō's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, 99.
[547] This is a well-documented phenomenon that has been termed 'normalization' by Andrew Oros, the 'slicing' of the Yoshida Doctrine's 'Pacifist Loaf' by Richard Samuels, and Japan's re-emergence as a 'normal' military power by Christopher Hughes. See Richard J. Samuels, Securing *Japan: Tōkyō's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*; Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power,* (Oxon: Routledge, 2005); Andrew Oros, *Normalizing Japan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).
[548] The official statement released by MOFA would simply state that the US had withdrawn from the ABM in order to deal with the post-Cold War issue of global missile proliferation. See Government of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "ABM Treaty". 1st November 2001. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/beiro/abm.html. Accessed 16/11/2024.
[549] The DPJ was the largest opposition party in the Diet following the 2003 election.
[550] "Kan lauds missile defense plan," *The Japan Times,* 25th March 2003, The Japan Times Archive. https://jt-archives-jp.sheffield.idm.oclc.org/search.do. Accessed 20/06/2024,

the US was apparently uncontroversial and Japanese policymakers like Koizumi had successfully institutionalized the norm that Japanese BMD was a limited, but necessary complement to US END against the new threats that Japan faced, even if risked provoking nuclear rivals. Indeed, Japanese officials were already executing policy based on such a normative perspective and JDA Director-General Ishiba Shigeru and Moriya Takemasa, for example, were already holding meetings with their US counterparts on the assumption that Japan would jointly deploy BMD with the US within 3 to 4 years.[551]

The final impetus to move from development of BMD to a policy of immediate deployment of BMD in the form of AEGIS in 2003, however, was once again largely down to sudden changes in US policy. In December 2002, the Bush Administration announced that it would no longer wait for joint research on BMD with Japan to be completed, instead pursuing a policy of deploying BMD systems as they became available.[552] Ishiba and Takemasa, who were in the US for consultations over BMD, were only informed one day in advance. Japan thus had to make a quick decision whether to follow suit. The two officials thus told the US that Japan was willing to move in tandem with the US. Subsequently, the Japanese government scheduled multiple joint US-Japan BMD tests,[553] and began including the budgetary costs of the BMD system in the soon to be published 2004-5 NDPO.[554] By December 2003, the Security Committee would announce its deployment of AEGIS and thus confirm its adoption of BMD as an additional precautionary measure against the new threats Japan faced, while continuing to rely on US END for most of its nuclear deterrence needs.

Internal Socialization and the role of Local Norm Takers

As with the case of Satō and the Four Pillars, local norm takers played an important role in the reconstruction and reinterpretation of norms in the case of deterrence socialization from 1993-2003. In this case, the most important norm taker is no doubt Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō, who was crucial in ensuring the success of normative socialization in the third phase of the internal socialization process from 2001-2003. With the necessity of BMD as an additional complement to nuclear deterrence being largely agreed upon by Japanese policymakers by the

[551] Asahi Shimbun, *Jietai: Shirarezaru Henyō* (Tōkyō: Asahi Shimbun-sha, 2005): 242.
[552] United States Government, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary "President Bush Announcement on Missile Defense Deployments, 17th December 2002—Statement by the President." 17th December 2002.
https://www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/docs/0212/doc06.htm. Accessed 16/11/2024.
[553] "Japan, US to Test Joint Missile System," *The Washington Post*, 17th February 2003.
[554] Government of Japan, 2005 NDPO. 10th December 2004.
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kakugikettei/2004/1210taikou.pdf. Accessed 16/11/2024.

time Koizumi became Prime Minister, Koizumi's role was to reconcile the normative incompatibilities between BMD and Japan's dependence on nuclear deterrence, which necessitated a mutual vulnerability that BMD would threaten, as well the possibility that joint US-Japanese BMD deployment might threaten several existing Japanese constitutional restrictions on collective self-defense. Koizumi's role, and his reinterpretation and reconstruction of norms in order to solve such incompatibilities, however, prove to be difficult to evaluate and can be perhaps considered a unique case for the deterrence socialization framework.

According to the deterrence socialization framework, normative reinterpretation and reconstruction during the process of internal socialization is supposed to focus on external norms, with local norm takers reinterpreting and reconstructing said external norms in a way that adheres with a country's normative consensus. Koizumi, however, did not do so. Indeed, as seen from above, Koizumi rarely spoke on BMD during his tenure as Prime Minister and made no important reinterpretations or reconstructions on Japanese normative understanding of BMD. The eventual Japanese conceptualization of BMD, meanwhile, remained largely unchanged from when it was first introduced during the external socialization process. Instead, Koizumi focused reconstructing Japan's existing normative consensus in such a way that it was able to accommodate Japanese BMD and its initial incompatibilities with Japan's existing consensus on security and nuclear deterrence. and the possibility that it might be used collectively with the US.

Faced with the two issues of Japanese BMD/NMD possibly threatening Japan's dependence on nuclear deterrence by triggering an arms race as well as the possibility that Japanese BMD might break constitutional restrictions on collective self-defense, Koizumi made the case that Japan's new threat environment meant that such perspectives needed to be discarded anyway, in order to forge a new normative consensus, while also ensuring that the normative interpretation and changes he was making were still linked to various established Japanese normative traditions. By doing so, Koizumi was thus able to successfully reinterpret and reconstruct the existing normative consensus to fit with Japan's joint development and deployment of BMD with the US.

Koizumi's importance as a local norm taker is thus perhaps difficult to evaluate, given deterrence socialization's focus on evaluating the local norm taker through his/her reinterpretation and reconstruction of external norms to fit the existing normative consensus,

rather than the other way around. However, I contend that Koizumi's importance in redefining the existing Japanese security and nuclear deterrence normative consensus was arguably just as crucial to the success of the internal socialization process for BMD as Satō's reinterpretation and reconstruction of external nuclear deterrence norms was for the Four Pillars.

As can be seen from the internal socialization process, prior to Koizumi's involvement, Japanese policymakers' primary method of resolving and reinterpreting BMD so that it could fit with Japan's normative consensus was to either downplay such incompatibilities or disassociate said incompatibilities with Japanese BMD. For example, when faced with the argument that Japanese BMD might result regional rivals to develop more powerful nuclear weapons in order to overcome Japanese BMD and thus trigger a regional arms race and was thus incompatible with Japanese dependence on nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation, the rebuttal of defense officials like Kawara and Norota from 1998-1999 was to argue that because of the small scale of Japanese BMD, such a scenario can be avoided if properly explained to regional rivals. Meanwhile, when faced with the possibility that Japanese BMD might be linked to US NMD and thus, destabilize the entire global nuclear deterrence regime, as well as possibly requiring Japan break several of its constitutional restrictions on collective self-defense, Japanese officials tried their best to disassociate Japanese BMD from US NMD in order to resolve such incompatibilities.

Such a solution, while possible in the short term, was likely to be unsustainable in the long term, and was likely to have led to an unsuccessful internal socialization process, given the ever-increasing links between US and Japanese BMD development and the assistance of the US in Japanese BMD research. As such, I argue that Koizumi, by going in the opposite direction and fully acknowledging that these incompatibilities existed and that changes in Japan's security and nuclear deterrence consensus were needed to solve such issues, rather than downplay them, thus arguably ensured the successful integration and adoption of BMD into Japan's nuclear deterrence policies.

Internal socialization and Normative compatibility

The impact of normative compatibility on the internal socialization is part of deterrence socialization's analytical framework, which argues that greater divergence between the norms being socialized and the existing Japanese norms on nuclear deterrence and security would require greater effort on policymakers' part in order to interpret the new norm in a manner that is consistent with existing norms and construct and institutionalized such as interpretation as

official policy. As a form of deterrence against limited missile strikes, nuclear or otherwise, BMD, as compared to nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation, should thus theoretically be less controversial for the Japanese nuclear deterrence consensus, due to its non-nuclear nature. Indeed, as we have seen in Chapter 5, the non-nuclear nature of BMD was what interested Nakasone during the 1980s.

This, however, turned out not to be the case. Despite its non-nuclear nature, Japanese BMD proved to be problematic for the existing Japanese normative consensus and as can be seen by Japan's internal socialization process, the successful integration of BMD as a nuclear deterrence norm was only possible with Prime Minister Koizumi's complete reinterpretation and reconstruction of Japan's existing security and normative consensus, as compared to Satō's reconstruction and relatively minor changes of nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation, as seen in Chapter 4. Can we thus conclusively state that BMD, as a nuclear deterrence norm, is, contrary to expectations, less normatively compatible with Japan's normative consensus on security and nuclear deterrence as compared to nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation?

I argue that this is not the case. Instead, I contend that Koizumi's move towards reconstruction and reinterpretation of the existing normative consensus instead of BMD norms, rather than demonstrating a huge compatibility gap between Japan's security normative consensus and BMD as a nuclear deterrence strategy, was instead a rare case where it was easier for the policymaker (Koizumi) to reconstruct and reframe the existing normative consensus, rather than interpret and reconstruct BMD in a way that was acceptable to the existing normative consensus.

As noted by theories of normative learning, this is usually not the case, and difficulties in reconstruction of external norms usually results in failure to adopt the external norm, rather than a move by policymakers to instead reconstruct the existing normative consensus.[555] In this case, Koizumi, however, was helped by the changing political environment of Japan during this period. While it was indeed the case that there was an existing normative consensus that strictly restricted Japanese choices on security policy in the early 1990s, such a consensus had already begun fragmenting by the time Koizumi became Prime Minister. The attempts by LDP policymakers to challenge such restrictions during the Gulf War and the revision to the Guidelines on US-Japan cooperation from 1995-1997 to allow for a more active Japan within

[555] Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," 254.

the alliance had already hinted at an increasing realization, amongst Japanese policymakers, that a less restrictive security and deterrent posture was needed.[556] The minority of policymakers acknowledged that BMD was needed as a deterrence solution against China and seemed to welcome an arms race in the first phase of internal socialization from 1998-1999, meanwhile, further demonstrated that the existing Japanese security and nuclear deterrence normative consensus was already undergoing change. When Koizumi came to power, he was thus already operating within an environment where the existing normative consensus was changing. Rather than a demonstration of the gulf in compatibility between BMD and Japan's existing security normative consensus, I thus argue that Koizumi's focus on reframing the normative consensus to suit Japanese BMD, rather than the other way round, is thus simply a result of the existing Japanese security consensus already fragmenting and undergoing change when Koizumi became Prime Minister, making it easier for Koizumi to focus on shifting the consensus, rather than reinterpreting and reconstructing the norm of BMD.

Conclusion

Japan's adoption of BMD in 2003 marks the end of a long process that first began in 1985 when Reagan first approached Nakasone over the possibility of 'non-nuclear' nuclear deterrence. As seen in the previous chapter however, such an effort failed to successfully transfer Reagan's visionary concept for BMD to Japan. The US, however, would reconceptualize BMD and approach Japan again in 1993, this time painting Japanese BMD as a complement to Japan's reliance on nuclear weapons, necessary to deter the new threats facing Japan in the post-Cold War environment that did not always necessarily respond to deterrence by threats of retaliation. Such an argument proved convincing to Japanese policymakers who were alarmed by the increasingly belligerent actions of China and North Korea in the early 1990s. The 1998 North Korean Missile Launch would subsequently solidify such fears, and for Japanese policymakers after 1998 it was no longer a case of whether Japanese BMD was indeed a necessary complement to deter new threats but rather how Japanese BMD could be successfully reinterpreted and reconstructed within Japan's existing strict limitations on military activity.

This deadlock would then only be successfully broken by Prime Minister Koizumi, who argued that Japan's new threat environment necessitated changes in Japan's existing restrictions on security to accommodate BMD as well---an argument that increasingly found favor within a

[556] Richard J. Samuels, Securing *Japan: Tōkyō's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia,* 86-108.

Japan that was already reevaluating its relationship with security following the end of the Cold War. This would finally pave the way for Japan's adoption of AEGIS in 2003. Japan's faith and interest in BMD has only grown since then. Despite such continued belief in BMD however, Japanese conceptualization of BMD has constantly stuck to the way BMD was socialized into Japan, with Japanese policymakers perceiving it solely as a complement to US END and to be used 'alongside' US END in an effective manner, rather than harboring any dreams of working with the US to expand BMD's remit and fulfil Reagan's vision. Such a conceptualization of BMD has thus contributed to Japan's continued fixation with US END, even as it continues to strengthen its BMD systems. The deterrence socialization process that led to institutionalization of BMD as a limited, albeit necessary complement to US END as Japanese nuclear deterrence policy, I argue, is thus a clear example of how the deterrence socialization process of nuclear deterrence norms has contributed to Japan's continued fixation with US END.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Japan's nuclear deterrence: Recent developments

In the latest iteration of Japan's National Security Strategy, published in 2022, Japan stated unequivocally that 'Japan will further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including extended deterrence by the U.S. that is backed by its full range of capabilities, including nuclear."[557] The current Prime Minister of Japan, Ishiba Shigeru, meanwhile, gave an interview in September 2024 in which he called for some form of nuclear sharing with the US, similar to its arrangements with the NATO states.[558] For Japan, nuclear weapons and the unique role they play in Japan's security policy thus clearly remain unchanged in the modern day, despite the changing geopolitical environment and circumstances Japan finds itself facing.

Japanese views of nuclear deterrence

As has been demonstrated by this thesis, there are two key perspectives on nuclear weapons and the role they play in nuclear deterrence that continue to influence and dominate Japanese policymakers' consensus on nuclear deterrence and how it deters nuclear threats. The first is an almost unshakable belief in the argument that only the unique destructive power of a retaliatory nuclear strike is capable of inflicting enough damage to an adversary to deter said adversary from even considering a nuclear attack on Japan in the first place, hence necessitating threats of nuclear retaliation as a method of deterrence against nuclear weapons. The second, established in 2003, is the perception that while Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is a necessary and complementary form of nuclear deterrence by denial, it cannot replace the fundamental role of threats of nuclear retaliation in preventing nuclear attack on Japan. Both perspectives have been succinctly expressed in official Japanese security policy, most importantly the Third of the Four Nuclear Pillars, which states that 'Against the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will rely on US END'[559] and the 2003 announcement of Japanese BMD policy, which states that

[557] Government of Japan, "National Security Strategy of Japan," December 2022. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshō/nss-e.pdf. Accessed 07/12/2024.
[558] Hudson Institute, "Shigeru Ishiba on Japan's New Security Era: The Future of Japan's Foreign Policy," 25th September 2024. https://www.hudson.org/politics-government/shigeru-ishiba-japans-new-security-era-future-japans-foreign-policy. Accessed 07/12/2024.
[559] Shūgiin Honkaigi Dai 3 Gō (Records of the Plenary Session, House of Representatives, no.3), 30th January 1968. https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPSC/19680130.O2J.html. Accessed 07/12/2024.

against the new threats Japan faces, 'BMD, alongside US END, will be used in an effective manner.'[560]

How these two perspectives came to form Japanese policymakers' consensus on how nuclear deterrence operates is not a well-understood process, with scholars of Japanese international relations largely treating the presence of such tenets not as subjective views, but rather an objective assessment of how nuclear deterrence operates in the international structure and simply 'is'. Such scholars thus instead focus on examining the nuclear deterrence policies that Japanese policymakers have pursued in response to this 'nuclear reality', with their analysis examining the nuclear threats that Japan has faced over the years and the limitations it faces, both in terms of its highly nuclear-sensitive public and a need to manage an alliance relationship with a mercurial US that has constantly veered between pressuring Japan to play a more active role in security even as it continues to discourage Japan from crossing the nuclear threshold.

Japanese Perspectives of Nuclear Deterrence: The role of normative transfer

As has been theorized by interpretivist deterrence theorists reexamining the formation of the global nuclear deterrence regime between the US and USSR during the Cold War however, much of what we assume is an objective reality of how nuclear deterrence operates in the international system is less an 'actual' reality and more of a certain 'subjective', assumed view of reality that has been created and established through the spreading and adoption of theoretical principles and concepts developed through nuclear deterrence theory. In theorizing how this distribution and adoption of nuclear deterrence principles had occurred, a common theoretical framework that interpretivists have adopted is the definition of common nuclear principles and concepts as nuclear deterrence 'norms', and that the spreading and distribution of such norms can be analyzed and examined as a process of 'normative' teaching and learning. In this process, interpretivists have argued, states can carry out normative 'teaching' and try to persuade and press fellow states to adopt their conceptualization of nuclear deterrence and nuclear norms, as well as undergo normative 'learning', through which they understand and interpret nuclear deterrence norms before constructing and institutionalizing such norms as nuclear deterrence policy. Through such a process of teaching and learning, multiple states thus

[560] Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kaigi, "Dandō Misairu Bōgyo Shisutemu no Seibitō ni tsuite,", 19th December 2003.
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyoukaigi/Missile.pdf. Accessed 07/12/2024.

adopt similar nuclear deterrence perspectives and practice nuclear deterrence utilizing similar principles, resulting in the establishment of a subjective understanding of nuclear deterrence (that is nevertheless shared by multiple states) being treated as an objective reality of how nuclear deterrence operates.

Based on the concepts first introduced by interpretivist deterrence theorists, I have thus, in this thesis, sought to examine and analyze the position of these two nuclear deterrence perspectives in the Japanese nuclear deterrence consensus as a result of the process of normative teaching and learning. Rather than such perspectives being an objective assessment of nuclear deterrence reality the natural response of any state operating in the international system, I argue that the dominance of these two nuclear deterrence perspectives in Japan's nuclear deterrence consensus can be explained by Japan undergoing a unique process of normative teaching and learning that I have termed 'deterrence socialization'.

Using an over-time case comparison of how Japanese policymakers' discourse on nuclear weapons have changed across individual deterrence socialization processes, and analyzing said change in discourse as a representation of how the nuclear deterrence normative perspectives of Japanese policymakers have changed in accordance with the normative teaching and learning process, I have, in this thesis, examined two such cases of deterrence socialization. Through my examination of such cases, I demonstrate that this process of deterrence socialization has seen US policymakers and specialists, responsible for much of the makeup of the nuclear deterrence regime globally as a nuclear superpower alongside the USSR, 'teach' these two nuclear deterrence perspectives through their interactions with Japanese policymakers, who in turn internalize and 'learn' such norms in a development I have termed 'external socialization'. When faced with nuclear crises that existing Japanese security policy is unable to handle, such norms are then further 'learnt', reinterpreted, applied, and reconstructed into official Japanese views of nuclear deterrence in a process I term 'internal socialization', which then determine how policymakers craft nuclear deterrence policy. As such, I argue that it is this repeated process of deterrence socialization that has led to these two perspectives making up Japan's nuclear deterrence consensus and nuclear deterrence policy,

The Four Nuclear Pillars: Establishing the foundation

My thesis first examined the case of the Four Nuclear Pillars, and how the perspective of requiring nuclear weapons as a deterrent against nuclear threats due to their unique retaliatory power became established in Japan from 1951-1970 and influenced Prime Minister Satō Eisaku

into requesting US END as Japan's main form of deterrence against nuclear threats. In my examination of the case from 1951-1970, I have shown how, following its reestablishment as a sovereign country in 1951, nuclear weapons quickly became a central focus of the Japanese security debate, owing to the Cold War and its monumental decision to form an alliance with the US and act as the US's 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' against Communism in East Asia. Such a decision quickly resulted in US officials planning to station US nuclear weapons in Japanese territory and leverage the US's nuclear superiority as a general deterrent against Soviet aggression in the 1950s.[561] Well aware of Japan's anti-nuclear sentiments however, such plans required planning and discussion with their Japanese counterparts and a series of meetings and discussions between US and Japanese officials thus became the first strand of normative teaching in this case study, as Japanese politicians such as Hatoyama and Kishi quickly gained a wider appreciation and increased understanding for the importance of nuclear weapons in deterring general aggression against Japan via their discussions with US officials.[562] This then resulted in multiple policymakers making positive statements on the role of nuclear weapons in deterring war and maintaining peace for Japan, primarily in the Diet. The general public, however, did not share Japanese policymakers' enthusiasm for nuclear weapons, and US policies introducing nuclear weapons to Japan were either quietly shelved or became the subject of secret arrangements.[563]

Meanwhile, a second process of normative teaching had begun as well, and the education of a generation of Japanese scholars in US institutions in the 1950s saw such scholars return to Japan and spark a debate on Japanese nuclear deterrence policy and raise the importance of nuclear weapons specifically in deterring nuclear threats. Scholars such as Kōsaka Masataka, Wakaizumi Kei and Saeki Kiichi, many who would later end up advising Satō on nuclear deterrence, began highlighting the massive destructive power of nuclear weapons as an important characteristic of the necessary level of retaliatory power (hōfukuryoku) that is crucial

[561] Ōta Masakatsu, "Conceptual Twist of Japanese Nuclear Policy: Its ambivalence and coherence under the US Umbrella," *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* 1 Volume 1 (2018): 196-197.
[562] Shūgiin Honkaigi Dai 5 Gō (Records of the Plenary Session, House of Representatives, no.5), 24th March 1955.
https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=102205254X00519550324&current=1. Accessed 07/12/2024.
[563] Ōta Masakatsu, *Meiyaku no Yami: Kaku no Kasa to Nichibei Dōmei* (Tōkyō: Nihon Heironsha, 2009): 9-12.

to deterring nuclear weapons, even as they continued to debate what the source of such nuclear weapons should be for Japan.[564]

The perspectives that nuclear weapons were a useful tool of deterrence against general aggression and that their massive destructive power was necessary as a deterrent against nuclear threats would then both come to the fore in the internal socialization process, which began with China's successful nuclearization in 1964. From the start of the internal socialization process, Satō, who became Prime Minister in 1964, had a general understanding of nuclear weapons, that while not sophisticated, was not against their use as a tool for deterrence, describing the possession of such weapons as 'common sense'.[565] Given his position as the successor to Prime Ministers such as Hatoyama and Kishi, this was perhaps not surprising. Such views would be increasingly refined through his meetings with the Cabinet Research Office (CRO), a research group made up of several scholars who sparked the nuclear debate prior to 1964. Scholars such as Wakaizumi Kei and Saeki Kiichi, in their capacity as members of the CRO, would compile and present three reports to Satō in 1964, 1967, and 1970.[566]

Each report would build on the arguments of the previous report and, using the principles and arguments that they had first espoused prior to 1964, present an increasingly sophisticated argument for the necessity of nuclear weapons to deter China's nuclear threat and for the source of such weapons for Japan to be US Extended Nuclear Deterrence (END). Such arguments, meanwhile, were based on the premise that only nuclear weapons possessed the necessary destructive potential to deter nuclear attack---an argument first utilized by Wakaizumi and Saeki, amongst others, in the academic debate on nuclear weapons. In turn, Satō would slowly construct and establish Japanese nuclear deterrence policy based on the arguments in each report, making key policy decisions following the presentation of each report. This would begin with Satō asking for US END protection from Johnson in 1965 following the first report,[567] making the presence and dependence of Japan on such protection official after the second report

[564] Kōsaka Masataka, "Kaku no Chōsen to Nippon", in Kōsaka Masataka, Kanko Iinkai, ed., *Kōsaka Masataka Chosaku Shu* (Tōkyō: Toshi Shuppan, 1998), 107-128; Wakaizumi Kei, "Chūgoku no Kakubuso to Nihon no Anzen Hosho," *Chuō Kōron*, February 1966.
[565] Reischauer to Rusk, 29 Dec. 1964, Doc. 00400, in National Security Archive, ed., Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, 1960-1976.
[566] Kishi Toshimitsu, "Deliberations on Japanese Nuclear Policy During the Satō Administration: Studies by the Cabinet Research Office" *GRIPS Discussion Paper 17-15* (2018).
[567] Kusunoki Ayako, "The Satō Cabinet and the Making of Japan's Non-Nuclear Policy," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* Special Volume—Cold War Across the Pacific Volume 15 (2008): 31.

via his announcement of the Four Nuclear Pillars in 1967/1968,[568] and finally signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970 following the third report.[569]

Throughout the internal socialization process, Satō's role as a key local norm taker would be instrumental to successful socialization. While not initially demonstrating a thorough understanding of nuclear weapons, Satō would also begin developing a more sophisticated understanding of nuclear weapons based on the nuclear deterrence perspectives presented to him in the CRO reports, mentioning specifically the retaliatory power of nuclear weapons as their main deterrent effect, for example, in 1966 and 1968 and establishing the necessity of nuclear weapons to deter nuclear threats by virtue of their unique retaliatory power in the Japanese political debate.[570] Even as Satō began to understand and craft nuclear deterrence policy in accordance with such perspectives however, he would face several challenges, primarily in the form normative incompatibility between Japan's anti-nuclearism and Japan's potential adoption of a nuclear deterrence policy.

Satō's skill as a local norm taker was crucial at this point, and he quickly managed to grasp the difference Japanese anti-nuclearism's focus on the possibility of Japanese *participation* in nuclear deterrence, as opposed to *dependence* (izon). By 1968 Satō thus managed to thread the needle and construct Japan's adoption of the norm of deterring nuclear threats by nuclear retaliation as a form of reluctant 'dependence' on US END. Satō then further solidified this reconstruction and reinterpretation of this nuclear deterrence normative perspective by proclaiming the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, which rendered nuclear deterrence 'invisible' within Japanese territory. Satō's reconstruction of nuclear deterrence norms was largely successful and was further confirmed by his government's decision to sign the NPT in 1970, further reinforcing Japanese 'dependence' on US END by foreclosing any domestic nuclearization ambitions. This marked the end of the deterrence socialization process, and the nuclear deterrence perspective that only nuclear retaliation can deter nuclear threats by virtue of their unique retaliatory power was institutionalized as an official Japanese perspective of

[568] Shūgiin Honkaigi Dai 3 Gō (Records of the Plenary Session, House of Representatives, no.3), 30th January 1968.
https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPSC/19680130.O2J.html. Accessed 07/12/2024.
[569] UN Treaties, "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,", 3rd February 1970.
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showActionDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280120a1c&clang=_en.
Accessed 07/12/2024.
[570] Shūgiin Yosaniinkai Dai 6 Gō (Records of the Budget Committee, House of Representatives, no.6), 26th February 1968.
https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=105805261X00619680226&current=1. Accessed 07/12/2024.

nuclear deterrence, while dependence on US END to achieve such a form of retaliation became Japan's official nuclear deterrence policy.

BMD and Nuclear Weapons: A complicated relationship

The perspective that Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) could act as a complement to nuclear deterrence by retaliation, in contrast, proved to be far more complicated to establish as an official normative perspective in Japan. Unlike the first perspective, which was socialized and institutionalized across one deterrence socialization process from 1951-1970, it would take two separate instances of deterrence socialization from 1985-1988 and 1993-2003, with the former failing and the latter succeeding, before Japanese policymakers would institutionalize the role of BMD in complementing but not replacing nuclear deterrence. Japan's first serious exposure and consideration of the role of BMD in nuclear deterrence began in 1985, when the Reagan Administration approached Japan to develop a BMD system under the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Up to that point, Japan, like many other countries, including the US itself, had thought BMD impractical for nuclear deterrence and potentially damaging for the mutual vulnerability needed for nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation. President Reagan, however, would have a different view. While acknowledging the incompatibility between BMD and nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation, Reagan detested the latter, fearing the consequences of nuclear miscalculation.[571] Reagan thus sought a complete revolution in the global nuclear deterrence regime that would see nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation completely replaced by a global ballistic missile defense shield that would be jointly developed and controlled by the US and USSR and detect and shoot down any potential missile launch. With safety assured by this jointly controlled missile shield, Reagan reasoned, complete global nuclear disarmament would no longer be an unrealistic vision.[572]

Reagan and the US's initial approach to Japan in 1985 however, appeared to be completely devoid of such a conceptualization of BMD, instead focusing on explaining the SDI as a technological and scientific developmental opportunity. Across multiple meetings between US and Japanese officials, US officials would focus on the technological aspect of BMD and describe BMD to their Japanese counterparts as a form of new, 'non-nuclear' deterrence,

[571] Beth A. Fischer, *The Myth of Triumphalism: Rethinking President Reagan's Cold War Legacy* (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2020): 61.
[572] Ralph L. Dietl, *The Strategic Defense Initiative: Ronald Reagan, NATO Europe, and the Nuclear and Space Talks 1981-1988* (London: Rowan and Littlefield Publishing Group, 2018): 19-20.

instead of focusing on its supposed revolutionary purpose.[573] As a result of such an external socialization process, Japanese officials that were receptive to the SDI concept thus began arguing for SDI not on the basis that it would make nuclear deterrence 'obsolete' but rather because it was a form of 'non-nuclear' nuclear deterrence, as well as the fact that it would provide Japanese firms with massive technological and economic opportunities, constructing the SDI as an economic project.[574] Similarly, officials that questioned the SDI would do so on the basis of questioning the estimated economic gains of participating in the project, rather than the suitability or role of BMD in Japan's nuclear deterrence strategy.[575]

Reagan, meanwhile, in his meetings with Prime Minister Nakasone, was seemingly hesitant in sharing the normative aspect of the SDI project as well, instead focusing on convincing Nakasone and Japan to take part by stressing the technological aspect and avoiding any pressure on Nakasone to implement BMD as a nuclear deterrence policy. Indeed, as revealed by the Five SDI principles[576] drafted by Nakasone following his conversation with Reagan, as well as his conversations with fellow European leaders on the SDI in 1985,[577] Nakasone seemingly understood SDI as primarily a non-nuclear deterrence system that would not interfere with the existing nuclear deterrence regime and one that would require only technological buy-in rather than normative adoption from US allies----a conceptualization that was completely different from Reagan's grand vision. While the idea of BMD as a technological development project would receive buy-in from some Japanese firms, ultimately, the failure to define how BMD would operate as part of Japan's nuclear deterrence strategy or act as a replacement for nuclear retaliation meant that Reagan's conceptualization of BMD as a global, jointly-controlled missile shield would never be socialized or normatively learned by Japanese policymakers and the socialization process would end in 1988 with no changes to Japanese nuclear deterrence strategy.

Instead, a second deterrence socialization process would begin from 1993 until 2003, which resulted in Japan adopting BMD as part of its nuclear deterrence strategy. Deterrence

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[573] Sangiin Gaimu Iin Kai Dai 8 Gō (Records of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Councilors, no.8), 25th April 1985. https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=110213968X00819850425&current=1. Accessed 07/12/2024.
[574] Segawa Takao, "Nihon no SDI Kenkyū Sanka wo Meguru Seisaku Kettei Katei: 1985-1987," *Kōkyō Seisaku Gaku Nenhō* Volume 9 (2015).
[575] Kibino Yasuhi, *Nichibei Haiteku Masatsu: SDI to Nihon no Mirai* (Tōkyō: Gijutsu to Ningen 1987): 186.
[576] JAXA, *Nakasone Yasuhiro SDI Sanka Gogensoku.* 16th September 1986. https://www.jaxa.jp/library/space_law/chapter_3/3-1-1-5_j.html. Accessed 07/12/2024.
[577] Segawa Takao, "Nihon no SDI Kenkyū Sanka wo Meguru Seisaku Kettei Katei: 1985-1987," 91.

socialization this time would see the US first approach Japan in 1993 under the newly reorganized Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) about adopting BMD not as a replacement for nuclear deterrence by retaliation, but rather as a possible complement that would provide an extra layer of protection for Japan from states that were not deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation, making it clear that normative socialization over the role of BMD in nuclear deterrence, rather than the discussion of BMD as an economic opportunity, would be the main focus of the US this time. Rather than simply asking for technological cooperation or for the Japanese to allow the deployment of US BMD on Japanese territory however, the US this time would advocate for US-Japan joint development and deployment of a Japanese BMD system in Japan as a protective shield against the multitude of new and varied threats that had sprung up since the end of the Cold War in 1991.[578] Such arguments were bolstered by the firing of a Nodong missile by North Korea in 1993, as well as the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits Crisis, and Japanese policymakers proved receptive to the conceptualization of BMD as an additional precaution against missile strikes, although there were also worries that BMD could destabilize the mutual vulnerability that nuclear deterrence depended on and trigger an arms race in the region. The question of Japanese participation in development and deployment proved to be even more controversial. Initial US approaches on the issue under the Perry Initiative were seen by the Japanese as an attempt by the US to gain access to valuable Japanese technological developments and address trade issues between the US and Japan rather than a sincere desire to cooperate with the Japanese.[579] While the Japanese would prove more open to US arguments for Japanese participation in BMD following the switch from the Perry Initiative to the Theatre Missile Defense-Working Group (TMD-WG), even commissioning their own reports looking into BMD and concluding that BMD was indeed necessary as an additional complement to nuclear deterrence for Japan,[580] Japanese BMD would continue to raise questions of costs and constitutional permissibility for Japanese policymakers.

The 1998 North Korean Missile Launch would act as a catalyst that triggered the shift from external to internal socialization, during which it would be made even clearer how BMD was framed within the context of nuclear deterrence normative construction and conceptualization.

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[578] "U.S. Proposes joint missile defense project," *The Japan Times*, 23 September 1993. Japan Times Digital Archive.
[579] Patrick Cronin, Paul Giarra, and Michael Green, "The Alliance Implications of Theater Missile Defense," in The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future, eds. Michael Green and Patrick Cronin (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998): 170-188.
[580] Michael D. Swaine, Rachel M. Swanger and Kawakami Takashi, "Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense," *RAND Center for Asia-Pacific Policy* (2001): 30-31.

Unlike the SDI, where supporters of BMD would focus on technological and economic opportunities and the 'non-nuclear' nature of BMD, supporters of BMD during this deterrence socialization process would successfully construct the concept of BMD as a necessary complement against emerging threats that were not deterred by Japan's protection under US END by emphasizing BMD 'the only way' to safeguard Japan in this new threat environment. Questions of BMD destabilizing nuclear deterrence and triggering an arms race meanwhile, were settled with an emphasis on BMD's 'completely defensive' nature' which officials suggested could prevent an arms race, if the policy was thoroughly explained to regional rivals.[581] This focus on the 'defensive' nature of BMD as a deterrent would thus stand in sharp contrast to the way it was constructed and portrayed from 1985-1988 as a 'non-nuclear' deterrent, once again demonstrating the importance of discourse in normative learning and construction. With widespread agreement amongst Japanese policymakers that BMD was the 'only way' to safeguard Japan and consensus on its status as a 'defensive' and relatively risk-free deterrent, such debate thus saw Japan quickly announce an agreement with the US to pursue joint BMD research, development and deployment in 1998.[582]

However, the internal socialization and adoption of BMD under such a premise quickly ran into problems from 1999-2001. Following the US's announcement in 1999 that it was considering the abrogation of the ABM treaty and expanding its BMD plans to include a National Missile Defense (NMD) system[583] which would operate jointly with US allies' (including Japan) regional BMD systems, Japanese policymakers soon quickly found themselves struggling with how to reconcile the possibility that Japanese BMD would be used to defend US territory with Japan's strict constitutional prohibitions on collective self-defense, as well as the fact that Japanese BMD may now possibly become part of a system (US NMD) that would likely trigger an arms race and destabilize the global nuclear deterrence regime, which Japanese policymakers had wanted to avoid at all costs. Faced with such contradictions during this period, Japanese policymakers would adopt a strategy of disassociation and try to

[581] Shūgiin Anzen Hoshō Iin Kai Dai 4 Gō (Records of the Security Committee, House of Representatives, no.4), 18th November 1999.
https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=114603815X00419991118&spkNum=69&current=1. Accessed 07/12/2024.
[582] Naikaku Kanbō Chōkan, "Dandō Misairu Bōei ni Kakaru Nichibei Kyōdō Gijutsu Kenkyū ni kansuru Naikaku Kanbō Chōkan danwa," 25th October 1998.
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2006/2006/html/is260000.html. Accessed 07/12/2024.
[583] Elizabeth Becker, "U.S. Pushes Missile Defense Despite Allies Opposition," *The New York Times,* 6th November 1999.
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/global/110699missile-us.html. Accessed 07/12/2024.

construct and conceptualize Japanese BMD as completely separate from US NMD, stating publicly that Japanese BMD would not be a part of US NMD and that such US plans would not change Japanese strategy.[584] In 2001, JDA Director-General Gen Nakatani would try to draw a line on the issue, publicly stating on television that Japanese BMD would only be used to defend Japanese territory.[585]

Such a conceptualization was far from accepted however, and the question of Japanese participation in Japanese BMD and how it would link up to global US BMD policy would undergo one final twist from 2001-2003 with the appointment of Koizumi Junichirō as Prime Minister in 2001. Koizumi, rather than downplaying the possibility of destabilization and trying to disassociate Japanese BMD from US NMD in order to make it normatively compatible with Japan's security consensus, instead adopted a different strategy and reinterpreted and reconceptualized Japan's entire security consensus to remove BMD's incompatibilities with Japan's security consensus. Koizumi carried this out both by arguing that Japan's new security environment and the emergent threats facing Japan necessitated such changes, as well as trying to link such changes to certain aspects of the existing security consensus in order to downplay their magnitude. Koizumi's argument of new threats necessitating changes in the security consensus was bolstered by the 9/11 attacks, which Koizumi was quick to portray as the international threat of terrorism that confronted Japan as well, rather than an isolated incident in the US.

Koizumi's arguments were largely successful, and he was soon able to make multiple changes to Japanese security policy in the name of necessity. Under Koizumi, Japan would find itself sending JSDF troops to support US operations in Iraq, as well as sending naval vessels to carry out sea-lane patrols in the Indian Ocean.[586] Koizumi would maintain continued support for such changes by portraying such loosening of restrictions not as a violation of Japan's strictly antimilitarist tradition, but rather as consistent with post-1945 Japan's desire to maintain international peace and security as a responsible member of the global community and necessary given new threats and challenges globally.[587] In such a political environment, the

[584] Asahi Shimbun, "Settoku Ushinau NMD: Kurinton Seiken ni Dageki <Kaisetsu>," 9th July 2000. Asahi Kikuzō Digital Archive. Accessed 16/11/2024.
[585] Asahi Shimbun, "Shin Misairu Bōei [Gen Jiten no Sankanai] Nakatani Bōeichō Chōkan, Kyōryoku Gentei." 18th June 2001. Asahi Kikuzō Digital Archive. Accessed 16/11/2024.
[586] Leszek Buszynski, "Japan's Security Policy in the Koizumi Era," *Security Challenges* 3 Volume 2 (2006): 95-96.
[587] Statement by Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi on the Passing of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill. 29th October 2001.
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumispeech/2001/1029danwa_e.html. Accessed 07/12/2024.

problem of collective self-defense that BMD might have posed was quickly removed, and the risk that Japanese BMD alongside US NMD would destabilize the global nuclear deterrence regime soon became seen as just a risk that was necessary for Japan to take in response to the new threats that it faced. By 2003, with the US deciding that it would deploy different parts of the BMD system as they became available, rather than waiting for joint research efforts with the Japanese to be completed before deploying the entire system, Japan had to quickly make a decision on its next step. Japanese policymakers, spurred on by the changed conceptualization of collective self-defense as a norm in line with Japanese efforts to maintain global stability, thus decided on the deployment of AEGIS and the integration of BMD as a deterrent against the new threats Japan faced, to be 'used alongside US END in an effective manner'.[588]

Power, Local Norm Takers, Normative Compatibility and Normative Socialization

Deterrence socialization emphasizes power is a key factor for external socialization, with the power that the US has over Japan being crucial in determining that the US can act as the normative 'teacher' and Japan will consent to being the normative 'learner'. The power of the US meanwhile, is derived from the unequal structure of the US-Japan alliance, which positions the US as Japan's main security provider and allows the US to carry out resource gatekeeping and control access to a resource (security) that Japan need in exchange for Japan adopting and 'learning' the norms that the US is trying to transfer. However, from the two cases covered in this thesis, we can see while theoretical models of normative have often assumed that the power relationship between states is unidirectional, with one state having power over the other, this is not the case for the US-Japan alliance, and just as the US has power over Japan as its main security provider, Japan too has power over the US as the lynchpin of the US's strategy in East Asia during the Cold War, providing the US with multiple military bases from which it can project its power into the region. This multidirectional power relationship has meant that just as Japan may be persuaded to comply with the US's normative transfer due to the US's key role in Japanese security, so too, is the US wary of pushing Japan too hard on normative adoption, for fear of losing Japan as a valuable military ally.

We see this play out in both the deterrence socialization processes of nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation as well as BMD. In the case of nuclear weapons and the issue of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, for example, despite the power that the US possessed over

[588] Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kaigi, "Heisei 17-nendo ikōni kakaru Bōgyo Keikaku no Taikō nit suite,", 10th December 2004.
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kakugikettei/2004/1210taikō.pdf. Accessed 07/12/2024.

Japan as its key military ally, it did not resort to more forceful teaching methods, such as threatening the withdrawal of military support, in order to get Japanese policymakers to accept its arguments on nuclear weapons and the deterrence of aggression, despite the urgency of doing so. Troubled by Japanese anti-US sentiment, as expressed by the Girard Incident and the massive Anpo protests from 1957-1960,[589] US officials were wary of pushing Japan too hard from 1951-1964 and losing Japan to a Communist takeover, which would have upended US strategy in East Asia completely. As a result of Japan's value to US strategy, US officials thus instead utilized normative persuasion, hoping to convince Japanese politicians of the necessity of adopting US nuclear norms purely through rhetorical argument.

Similarly, the case study of BMD socialization from 1993-2003 has shown how shifting power relations between the US and Japan gave the US more freedom to use more forceful teaching methods in order to get Japan to accept its arguments on Japan's more participatory role in Japanese BMD. Unlike during the Cold War, where Japan by virtue of its geographic position was able to demonstrate its value to the US, the end of the Cold War meant that the power Japan derived from such a position had fallen, with the US expecting more from its ally, and Japan failing to meet those expectations.[590] Such a change in power relations thus saw the US impose stricter demands on Japan, insisting on Japanese participation in new BMD developments and deployments, rather than just depending on the US again for protection. This was the case both under the Perry Initiative and the TMD-WG, and while the US was less insistent on access to Japanese technological sectors during the external socialization process under the latter, its insistence on Japanese participation in BMD development and deployment would never change, despite Japanese hesitation to make such a major commitment.

In contrast to the external socialization process, which was more heavily impacted by the power relationship between the US and Japan, the internal socialization process would for Japan would see the normative reconstruction skills of Japanese local norm takers, as well as the normative compatibility between external norms and Japan's normative consensus take center stage. As can be seen from both the cases of the Four Nuclear Pillars from 1951-1970, as well as the case of BMD specifically from 1993-2003, local norm takers like Prime Minister Satō

[589] Nick Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromise after Anpo* (London: Harvard University Press 2018): 35-36; Neil Curtin, "" We Might As Well Write Japan Off": The State Department Deals with the Girard Crisis of 1957," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2 Volume 19 (2012): 112.
[590] Richard J. Samuels, Securing *Japan: Tōkyō's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2007): 66-67.

Eisaku and Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō were crucial in building cohesion between external norms and existing norms in order to ensure successful socialization. How they ensured successful socialization and integration of external nuclear deterrence norms with Japan's existing consensus on nuclear deterrence, however, was vastly different. While Satō skillfully reconstructed the norm of nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation such that Japan would be 'depending' on it and not 'practicing' it in order to placate Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment, Koizumi would make little changes to the conceptualization of Japanese BMD as a possible and necessary complement to Japanese dependence US END. Instead, Koizumi would reframe and reinterpret Japan's existing consensus on nuclear deterrence and security such that the key obstacles that was challenging effective Japanese integration of BMD into Japanese nuclear deterrence policy---that it would break existing Japanese constitutional restrictions on collective self-defense and might trigger a nuclear arms race that would destabilize the nuclear deterrence regime---were dwarfed in importance by the need to craft a new security consensus that was capable of responding to the new security environment and emergent security threats that Japan faced.

Having detailed the importance of both politicians in their respective normative socialization processes, a logical question to ask is perhaps who was the 'better' or more skillful local norm taker. Despite the wider scope of Koizumi's normative reconstructive efforts seemingly giving the edge to Koizumi, it is hard to argue that Koizumi was a more skillful norm taker than Satō. While seemingly a more difficult solution than Satō's careful reconstruction and reinterpretation of a single nuclear deterrence norm, Koizumi's reframing of Japan's security consensus on the basis of necessity was highly bolstered by the 9/11 attacks, which Koizumi successfully constructed as a threat of global terrorism that would affect Japan as well and representative the new and unpredictable threats that Japan faced that would not be deterred by nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear retaliation. The 9/11 attacks, in addition to the numerous incidents and security challenges that Japan had faced in the immediate post-Cold War environment and were unable to deal with effectively, thus combined to make Koizumi's case that Japan's existing security consensus was no longer fit for purpose even more convincing. Koizumi's reconstruction and shifting of the Japanese normative consensus on security and nuclear deterrence was further aided by a slew of legislative changes in the Japanese government which began in the 1990s and concentrated more power in the Prime Minister's office, thus allowing him to control the normative debate and political agenda more easily. Given such differences in Satō and Koizumi's circumstances, I would thus argue that

while both politicians were important and clearly crucial in their respective socialization processes, it is not possible to make a fair evaluation of who was a more skillful norm taker simply based on the magnitude of the normative reconstruction that each politician carried out.

Comparing the degree to which Satō and Koizumi each had to carry out normative reconstruction and reinterpretation brings us to the question of how normative compatibility affected the deterrence socialization process in both cases. According to deterrence socialization, normative compatibility between established norms on nuclear deterrence and the nuclear deterrence norm being socialized is the second key factor affecting the deterrence socialization process, with norms that are more compatible with the existing normative consensus would be easier to socialize, as compared to norms that were vastly different. In Japan's case, one would therefore assume that because of the Japanese public's stringent anti-nuclear sentiments, socializing the normative perspective that Japan needs to be protected from nuclear attack by possessing the means to retaliate through nuclear weapons would be far harder than getting Japan to normalize deterrence by BMD as a complement to nuclear deterrence, given BMD's non-nuclear nature.

Instead, the opposite turned out to be the case. While Satō was able to pursue a policy of placing Japan under US END protection from 1967-1968 by constructing extended nuclear deterrence as something that Japan 'depended' on, rather than a part of, as well as making it 'invisible' in Japan through his use of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, socializing and establishing Japanese BMD as a complement to dependence on US END took far longer, from 1998-2003, and was only resolved when Koizumi utilized changes in Japan's security environment to overturn the entire Japanese security consensus in order to make Japanese participation in BMD consistent with Japanese security, rather than the other way around.

This, I have argued, is likely explained by Japan's unique strand of anti-nuclearism. As I have pointed out, while anti-nuclear civil societies in Japan like the Hidankyō may have aimed for complete global nuclear disarmament from the 1960s, the majority Japan's anti-nuclear sentiment seems to be based more on being against the presence of nuclear weapons in Japan, and thus being reminded of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the possibility that placing Japan under the nuclear umbrella would mean Japan practicing some form of nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation. For most Japanese, it seems that the problem was therefore one of association with nuclear weapons, rather than a complete rejection of all forms of nuclear deterrence. By using the Three Non-Nuclear Principles to disassociate Japan with any military

use of nuclear energy, and the constant references to Japan's 'dependence' (izon) on US END,[591] Satō could thus far more easily reassure the public and construct US END in accordance with Japan's normative consensus on nuclear deterrence.

Japan's Nuclear Deterrence Policy: Implications for the Future

There are several implications that can be drawn from the findings of this thesis. The first of which is the importance of the US in shaping Japanese perspectives on nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons, and thus, the future of nuclearization in both Japan and East Asia. The US's role in Japanese nuclear deterrence policy is already considered significant, with several scholars pointing to the US's commitment of US END to Japan as a major reason for Japan not nuclearizing, despite its advanced domestic nuclear program and the increasing threats it faces in East Asia. This is argued to be the case for the US's other major ally in the region, South Korea, as well, and Andrew O'Neil has referred to the presence of US END over Japan as being 'demand-driven'.[592] Such research thus seems to suggest that nuclear demands from allies like Japan are inevitable given the geopolitical threats they face, and that the US has no choice but to oblige, should it want to prevent indigenous nuclearization amongst its allies.

As this thesis has demonstrated however, the US itself played an important role in cultivating such a demand for nuclear weapons amongst Japanese policymakers in the first place. From 1951-1970, it was the US's attempts at getting Japanese policymakers to accept US nuclear strategy and policy, as well as its education of a new generation of Japanese scholars on US nuclear deterrence strategy and theory, that saw Japan quickly become focused on nuclear weapons as a key component of US global strategy and Japanese security, and a necessity to deter nuclear weapons. It was the internalization and construction of such US concepts into policies applicable for Japan, that saw Japanese politicians such as Satō develop an understanding of nuclear weapons which focused on the unique retaliatory power (hōfukuryoku) of nuclear weapons as necessary for deterring nuclear weapons, that led to such demands for nuclear weapons amongst Japanese policymakers in the first place. Similarly, by failing to follow through on Reagan's attempts to conceptualize BMD as a complete replacement for nuclear weapons and instead 'selling' it to Japan as a limited complement to nuclear deterrence, the US would further ensure that nuclear weapons and US END would become even more

[591] Sangiin Yosaniinkai Dai 10 Go (Records of the Budget Committee, House of Councilors, no.10), 30th March 1968.
https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=105815261X01019680330&current=1. Accessed 07/12/2024.
[592] Andrew O'Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence* (New York: Routledge, 2013): 4.

irreplaceable for Japan's nuclear deterrence policy. The importance of the US's role in shaping Japanese demand for nuclear weapons, as seen from this thesis, thus seems to possibly imply that a shift in US nuclear deterrence norms and strategy that deprioritizes the destructive power of nuclear weapons in deterring nuclear threats and major developments in nuclear deterrence theory that espouse similar arguments might also lead to reduced demand for nuclear deterrence and US END within Japan, if such shifts were transferred to Japan via deterrence socialization.

Such a shift in the US nuclear deterrence debate, however, is unlikely to happen, and the second implication that can be drawn from this thesis's analysis of Japanese nuclear deterrence perspectives is that the entrenchment and institutionalization of these two perspectives in Japanese nuclear deterrence thought is unlikely to change in the near future. One of the key trends that can be seen from this thesis is how little the debate on nuclear deterrence has shifted, both in the US and in Japan, since the normalization of nuclear retaliation as a form of nuclear deterrence in the 1960s, and how little their importance in nuclear deterrence has changed. Other than Reagan's attempt at challenging nuclear deterrence orthodoxy in the 1980s and the introduction of BMD in the 1990s, there seems to have been no serious attempt at questioning or challenging the role of nuclear retaliation as a necessity for nuclear deterrence.[593] Despite the end of the Cold War and the reduction of nuclear arsenals worldwide, there does not seem to have been a major revolution in ideas on how to use such weapons, and states like Japan have continued to abide by the maxim that only nuclear destruction can deter nuclear weapons as their justification the necessity of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, other than the reconceptualization of BMD as a complement to nuclear weapons in deterring nuclear threats, the US has seemed disinterested in challenging the continued prominence of nuclear weapons in deterring nuclear threats and there have been no major attempts at reconceptualizing nuclear deterrence along the lines of Reagan's grand vision during the 1980s. Given the influence of the US in shifting Japanese normative perspectives on nuclear deterrence, the absence of any major shift in US nuclear deterrence perspectives thus seems to suggest that Japanese nuclear deterrence policy will likely continue to be determined by these two perspectives for the near future.

The third and final implication that can be drawn from this thesis's findings, meanwhile, concerns the possibility of Japanese nuclearization. Speculation on the possibility of Japan

[593] The latest US NPR, for example, still refers to using US nuclear weapons as a deterrent against nuclear threat. See U.S. Government, "2022 NPR Review Fact Sheet," https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Spotlight/2022/NDS/NUCLEAR%20STRATEGY%20AND%20POLICY%20-%20NPR%20Factsheet.pdf. Accessed 07/12/2024.

pursuing an indigenous nuclear program has been a constant presence in studies of Japanese security since it first made the choice to depend on US END. Some experts have stated that it is a matter of 'not if, but when', for Japanese nuclearization, arguing that the rising geopolitical challenges in the region make it inevitable.[594] Others, such as Llewelyn Hughes, meanwhile, have pointed out both domestic and international factors that continue to limit the possibility of Japan nuclearization, such as the possibility of damaging relations with the US, Japan's reputation as a responsible member of the international community, the difficulties of sourcing nuclear fuel and Japan's own highly anti-nuclear public.[595] I argue that findings of this thesis and Japan's experience of deterrence socialization imply that the latter conclusion is more likely, and it is unlikely that Japan would pursue an indigenous nuclear deterrent in the absence of massive geopolitical shifts.

Such implications can largely be drawn from the way the first normative perspective of requiring nuclear weapons and nuclear retaliation in order to practice nuclear deterrence was socialized into Japan and has continued to shape Japanese nuclear deterrence policy even today in the form of the Four Nuclear Pillars. At first glance, it would seem that such a definitive perspective leaves no recourse other than nuclear weapons if a state is to deter nuclear threats, and thus instead would encourage Japan to pursue indigenous nuclearization. However, looking at the deterrence socialization process from 1951-1970, we can see that while such an argument was the main thrust of the nuclear deterrence norm, the way Japanese policymakers socialized, constructed and institutionalized such a norm was not so straightforward. As seen by the reports compiled by the CRO, while Japanese policymakers and researchers understood and agreed that only the massive retaliatory power of nuclear weapons could deter nuclear threats, they also held the perspective that no state could carry out nuclear deterrence by itself, let alone Japan.[596] They were also cognizant of the fact that indigenous nuclearization, while being more reliable, would trigger an arms race, and disagreed with General Gallois's argument that it was the 'only solution for Japan'.[597] The 1968/70 report is even more revealing in this case, and it makes the argument that nuclear deterrence by Japan itself would not be effective, given the geographical disadvantages of Japan vis-à-vis China. The report, as mentioned in Chapter 4,

[594] Arthur Waldron, "Japan's Choices in a Changed Security Environment," *Asia Pacific Review* 2 Volume 21 (2014): 208-209.
[595] Llewelyn Hughes, "Why Japan will not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan," *International Security* 4 Volume 31 (2007):68-69.
[596] Kase Yuri, "The Costs and Benefits of Japan's Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report," *The Nonproliferation Review* 2 Volume 8 (2001): 55-68.
[597] Kōsaka Masataka, "Kaku no Chōsen to Nippon", 118-120.

points out that an indigenous Japanese nuclear deterrent would at best, destroy 11% of China's population, as compared to 50% of Japan's for a Chinese nuclear strike, thus rendering indigenous nuclear deterrence's effectiveness questionable.[598]

Given that Japanese socialization and construction of the perspective that nuclear retaliation was necessary for nuclear deterrence threats included such caveats and thus, settled on US END as the source of its nuclear retaliatory threats, it seems unlikely, that indigenous nuclearization would suddenly be considered an option for Japan. Of course, this could change if such nuclear deterrence normative perspectives shift. However, as mentioned above, the Four Nuclear Pillars, and the nuclear deterrence perspectives it is based on, seem to continue to dominate Japanese thought on nuclear deterrence strategy. Furthermore, there does not seem to have been any major effort by Japan to completely review such perspectives and arguments, similar to the process from 1964-1970. While there have been remarks from various Japanese politicians questioning the reliability of US END, the response of Japanese policymakers has been to strengthen it, rather than contemplate indigenous nuclearization, seemingly suggesting that while Japanese policymakers continue to perceive nuclear weapons as necessary to deter nuclear threats, only US nuclear weapons would be able to fulfil such an objective for Japan. Even recent calls for radical changes in Japan's nuclear deterrence policy, such as former Prime Minister Abe's and Prime Minister Ishiba's call for nuclear sharing with the US,[599] have been arguments along this line of strengthening US END, rather than Japan pursuing indigenous nuclearization. In addition to the multiple restrictions on Japanese nuclear deterrence policy, I thus argue that, based on this thesis's analysis of how nuclear deterrence by nuclear retaliation was understood and socialized by Japan, and how such perceptions have not changed, it is thus unlikely that Japan would pursue the path of indigenous nuclearization in the near future.

Final Thoughts: Uncertainty ahead?

As mentioned above, this thesis has concluded that Japan's nuclear deterrence perspectives, and thus its nuclear deterrence policies, will likely remain fixed for the near future, given the importance of the US in driving normative change in Japan forward, and the US's own stasis in this regard. The international normative consensus on nuclear weapons and nuclear

[598] The Cabinet Research Office, "The 1968/70 Report". September 1968. Available from the archives of the Union of Concerned Scientists.
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/japan-and-americas-nuclear-posture#.Wa2RqrLyjIU. Accessed 07/12/2024.
[599] Hudson Institute, "Shigeru Ishiba on Japan's New Security Era: The Future of Japan's Foreign Policy," 25th September 2024.

deterrence, however, once again appears to be once again at a major turning point. When I first began research on this thesis, the first Trump Administration had just ended and the Biden Administration had taken power, seemingly suggesting a much-welcomed return to 'normalcy', at least for US allies, who had been shocked by the Trump Administration's cavalier remarks on nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation.[600] The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the victory of Trump in the 2024 US Presidential election, however, has once again thrown doubts on the current international order, especially when it comes to the norms governing nuclear deterrence. While the First Trump Administration saw the US withdraw from key nuclear arms reduction treaties like the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF),[601] in terms of an assault on global nuclear deterrence normative standards this was nothing compared to changes in Russian nuclear doctrine in 2024 following its difficulties in Ukraine, which seem to have lowered the threshold for Russia to use nuclear weapons.[602] Russian officials, meanwhile, have hinted at the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine on multiple occasions.[603] Given such changes, it is not totally unimaginable for a US under the second Trump Administration to reconsider the role of nuclear weapons in US deterrence strategy or for US nuclear deterrence theory to undergo a paradigmatic shift. Such shifts, for better or worse, will likely go on to influence Japanese normative perspectives on nuclear deterrence via deterrence socialization.

[600] CBS News, "Donald Trump: Japan, South Korea might need nuclear weapons," 29th March 2016. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-japan-south-korea-might-need-nuclear-weapons/. Accessed 07/12/2024.
[601] U.S. Department of Defense, "U.S. Withdraws from Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty," 2nd August 2019. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/article/article/1924779/us-withdraws-from-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-treaty/. Accessed 07/12/2024.
[602] BBC News, "Putin approves changes to Russia's nuclear doctrine." 19th November 2024. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cj4v0rey0jzo. Accessed 07/12/2024.
[603] Stephen Blank, "Russian Nuclear Strategy in the Ukraine War: An Interim Report," *National Institute for Public Policy* (2022).

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