"Punctuated Equilibrium and Agenda-Setting in Energy Politics: Explaining Stability and Radical Policy Change Towards Increased State Intervention in Mexico's Oil Sector"

David Salazar Gorjon

PhD

University of York

Politics and International Relations

March 2025

ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses Mexico's recent radical policy change in its oil sector, reflecting a global energy paradigm shift towards greater state intervention. Historically, Mexico relied on crude oil exports to the US and refined product imports, making its energy security vulnerable to price volatility and trade policies. In 2018, President López Obrador redirected oil production towards domestic refining and limited extraction to 1.8 mbd, shifting PEMEX's focus from maximising oil exports to increasing production of fuels, petrochemicals, and fertilisers. The research question is 'Why, after a long period of policy stability and incremental changes, has refining suddenly emerged as one of the most pressing policy-issues on Mexico's political agenda?' The aim is to deepen understanding of key factors shaping attention dynamics and driving policy change in Mexican energy politics. Two arguments are made. First, López Obrador, as policy entrepreneur, instrumentalised attention-grabbing strategies and leveraged a nationalist discourse to build support for his energy policy. Second, the National Regeneration Movement and allied parties played a key role exercising their *de jure* legislative power to form parliamentary majorities and pass the energy budget, as well as their *de facto* convening power to draw macro-level attention and mobilise masses. This study applies Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, using qualitative analysis and data triangulation through semi-structured interviews, discourse analysis of López Obrador's campaign speeches, 1,423 morning conferences, government and party advertising campaigns, and parliamentary debates. It reviews primary and secondary sources, along with macroeconomic, budgetary, and PEMEX indicators (2000-2024), covering four presidents from three major parties. This thesis primary contributes to theory highlighting the role of policy entrepreneurs and political parties as key drivers of attention dynamics and policy change. It enhances the Punctuated Equilibrium model introducing two complementary explanatory factors: conflict expansion between institutional venues and party politics, emphasising competition, partisan conflict, and differentiation incentives.

Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

List of Abbreviations

AMLO: Andrés Manuel López Obrador

ACF: Advocacy Coalitions Framework

CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis

CFE: Federal Commission of Electricity

CRE: Energy Regulatory Commission

CCE: Business Coordinating Council

EU: European Union

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

IEA: International Energy Agency

IMF: International Monetary Fund

INE: Instituto Nacional Electoral

INEGI: National Institute of Statistics and Geography

IEPS: Special Tax on Production and Services

INPC: National Consumer Price Index

PRI: Institutional Revolutionary Party

MORENA: National Regeneration Movement

MSF: Multiple Stream Framework

PAN: National Action Party

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation

OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PEMEX: *Petróleos Mexicanos*

PET: Punctuated Equilibrium Theory

PT: Labor Party

PVEM: Ecological Green Party of Mexico

PROFECO: Federal Consumer Protection Agency

PEF: Federal Expenditure Budget

SEMARNAT: Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources

SHCP: Secretariat of the Treasury and Public Credit

SENER: Secretariat of Energy

SE: Secretariat of Economy

UK: United Kingdom

VAT: Value Added Tax

Acknowledgements

Declaration

I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work, and I am the sole author. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, University. All sources are acknowledged as References.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Energy security is now firmly at the forefront of government agendas, driven not only by the urgency of addressing the climate emergency and accelerating the energy transition to renewables, but also by geopolitical tensions in critical oil and gas exporting regions. Macro-level attention on conflicts such as Russia's war in Ukraine and instability in the Middle- East, have increased volatility in fuel markets, amplifying concerns about fuel prices and their energy security implications.

Rising fuel prices have triggered protests in fuel-dependent developing countries such as Sri Lanka; Ecuador, Panama, Peru, South Africa, and Mozambique (BBC, 2022a; BBC, 2022b; Reuters, 2022a; NYTimes, 2022d; Bloomberg, 2022a), demanding greater state intervention. Meanwhile, developed countries are increasingly calling for a faster shift to renewables and reduced reliance on fuel imports, often accompanied by demands for stronger state intervention in the energy sector. In response, the US released crude oil from its strategic reserve, increased domestic production, suspended fuel taxes, and provided fuel subsidies (Reuters, 2021a). Similarly, the EU imposed price caps, offered fuel subsidies and coordinated collective fuel purchases (EU, 2023). These government interventions, despite their differing natural energy endowments, with the US as the largest oil and gas producer and the EU as the largest importer, reflect a broader global shift in energy paradigm, from liberalism to interventionism. Examining the energy paradigm shifts highlighted by Goldthau (2012) is crucial as the global energy sector evolves. He emphasises that the market's dominance in energy governance is increasingly being challenged as policy agendas shift from a liberal market model to a more interventionist approach. Goldthau's energy paradigm shifts clearly illustrate the transitions the Mexican oil sector has undergone, from statism to liberalism, and more recently towards increased interventionism. This original approach to analysing Mexico's energy shifts has not been explored in the existing literature, which predominantly focuses on state interventions to urgently advance renewable energy in countries with scarce domestic fuel resources due to concerns over security of supply. In contrast, less attention has been given to interventions in fossil-fuel-rich developing countries, such as Mexico, that aimed at reducing dependence on crude oil exports by increasing domestic fuel production, expanding refining capacity, and

ensuring security of demand (Kuzemko et al., 2016), while gradually extending their energy mix to include renewables. This makes this case study relevant and insightful for understanding the global energy challenges faced by both importer and producer states.

This case study on Mexico is particularly valuable given the recent radical and rapid policy change in its oil and refining sector, mirroring a global trend and paradigm shift towards greater state intervention in the energy sector to address energy security. While considerable attention has been paid to the world's major oil producers and petrostates (Fattouh and Sen, 2021; Fattouh, 2020; Goldthau and Westphal, 2019; Fattouh et al., 2019; Tagliapietra, 2019; Raimondi and Tagliapietra, 2020; Rodríguez et al., 2012; Fattouh and Economou, 2019; Luciani and Moerenhout, 2020; Arezki, 2017; Shehabi, 2019), Mexico, currently a mid-sized oil producer and a former petrostate during the 1977-1985 Mexican oil boom, experienced a sharp decline in production after its largest oil field, Cantarell, peaked in 2004, due to overexploitation to maximise crude oil exports (Macleod, 2004; Morales, 2020; Solorio and Tosun, 2023; Sánchez-Cano, 2014; Gil-Valdivia, 2008; Gavin, 1996; Pastor and Wise, 2005; Snoeck, 1989). As a result, it has received comparatively less scholarly attention. Despite Mexico's moderately diversified economy (OECD, 2024), its position as one of the G20's largest economies, and its broad range of industries and services including manufacturing (notably automobiles, electronics and aerospace), agriculture, energy, mining, telecommunications, financial services, and tourism, it remains underexplored in academic research.

Mexico, as a fossil-fuel-rich developing country, represents an interesting case of economic diversification, shifting from a few traditional sectors to a broad range of high-value industries and services (OECD, 2024). This shift has made Mexico the US's biggest trading partner and the top importer of Mexican products (US Census Bureau, 2024). However, the energy sector, particularly, oil revenues continue to play a significant role in public finances and economic stability, primarily through the state-owned oil company *Petróleos Mexicanos* (PEMEX) (Presidency, 2024). Mexico consistently ranks among the world's top 15 oil producers and is the fourth largest in the Americas, after the US, Canada and Brazil (IEA, 2024). Despite this, Mexico is often neglected in empirical studies, primarily because not considered one of the main players. Nevertheless, nearly a quarter of the global oil production comes from fossil-fuel-rich developing countries like Mexico (IEA, 2023), many of which remain highly vulnerable to economic fluctuations and their impact on public finances due to their heavy

reliance on crude oil exports. Particularly Mexico has historically exported crude oil to the US while importing refined products in return, making it vulnerable to fuel price volatility and trade policies, and leaving its energy security heavily dependent on the US (PEMEX, 2021). This oversight in literature emphasises the importance of this explanatory case study. This thesis is not only timely but also crucial for understanding the mechanisms through which macro-level attention drives policy change in energy politics. This research also provides valuable insights into broader policy dynamics, including the role of policy entrepreneurs and political parties within the framework of Baumgartner and Jones' (1993; 2009) Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), addressing a gap in PET literature, and offering perspectives that can illustrate similar policy change processes in other fossil-fuel-rich developing countries.

This thesis seeks to answer the central research question: Why, after a long period of policy stability and incremental changes, has refining suddenly emerged as one of the most pressing policy-issues on Mexico's political agenda? The central aim of this research is to better understand why some policy-issues emerge as a priority on the government agenda and other do not. Specifically, it seeks to examine why and how the focus of the attention in the Mexican oil and refining sector has shifted over time. This analysis will help explain the factors and actors behind periods of stability and policy change, identify the dominant policy image at different points in time and the political actors that promoted them, ultimately revealing the key factors and mechanisms that drive policy change in Mexican energy politics.

In recent years, following a long period of policy stability and incremental changes under a liberal energy model that prioritised crude oil exports over domestic refining, the Mexican energy sector has experienced a paradigm shift towards increased state interventionism. The state-owned oil company, PEMEX, following the example of other oil companies, has adopted strategies in response to different scenarios. These include expanding its downstream oil segment, integrating renewable energies solutions, and diversifying its energy investment portfolio. This shift from liberalism to interventionism in the energy paradigm resulted from a policy change process initiated in 2018 with the election of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) and his newly established political party, the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA). This shift reconfigured the political landscape and the institutional venues, which had previously been dominated by the traditional two parties, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the National Action Party (PAN). AMLO instrumentalised several attention-grabbing strategies, including leveraging media through his morning conferences for venue-

shopping (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009), expanding conflict (Schattschneider, 1960; Cobb and Elder, 1983; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), mobilising the masses (Birkland, 1998), shifting policy image and venues (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), associating policy image to core social values (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), and using causal narratives and blame attribution (Cairney, 2019). Particularly, AMLO leveraged a nationalist political discourse to build support for his preferred policy image for the energy sector's direction (Dresser, 2022; Panibratov et al., 2022; Tornel, 2021; Covarrubias and Gallegos, 2024). The MORENA party, together with allied political parties, the Labor Party (PT) and the Ecological Green Party of Mexico (PVEM), played a crucial role in this process. By exercising both their *de facto* convening power and *de jure* legislative power, they drew macro-level attention, shaped AMLO's policy image, and advanced his energy agenda.

Under AMLO's administration, and in line with increased state intervention, PEMEX has implemented strategies aimed at strengthening its position in the energy sector. AMLO's new policy focuses on redirecting crude oil production towards domestic refining, with crude oil extraction limited to 1.8 mbd (Presidency, 2023). This strategy includes expanding PEMEX's downstream segment to increase domestic production of fuels, petrochemicals, and fertilizers, while integrating its value chain to diversify its revenue base (Presidency, 2024). Simultaneously, the government's strategy supports the gradual transition of domestic energy demand towards renewable sources, led by the state-owned Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) (CFE, 2024). AMLO's new downstream oil policy marks a radical departure from PEMEX's traditional business model, which focused on overexploitation of oil reserves to maximise oil exports. The shift now prioritises increasing domestic sales by focussing on oil processing and refining rather than relying on crude oil exports. It also involves unprecedented levels of public investment aimed at strengthening and revitalising the aging refining sector. As a result, with the support of MORENA and allied political parties to approve the energy budget, AMLO initiated key energy projects, including the modernization, construction, acquisition and expansion of new refineries in Mexico and the US. These projects included the new USD 20 billion *Olmeca* refinery in Tabasco, Mexico (Tornel, 2021; Bloomberg, 2022b; Reuters, 2023a), and the Deer Park refinery in Texas, US (El Economista, 2021; Reuters, 2021b), as well as development of green hydrogen plants, petrochemical facilities, and fertilizer complexes. This policy shift represents a radical transformation in Mexico's energy production, energy security, and self-sufficiency (PEMEX, 2024).

In this context, this case study examines the policy shifts in Mexico's oil and refining sector, a critical area of focus due to the implications for energy transitions in other fossil-fuel-rich developing countries. By analysing this policy change, this thesis provides valuable insights into the potential trajectory of energy transitions as well as the attention dynamics that influence energy policy in political systems similar to Mexico's. In this sense, understanding the shifts in Mexico's energy policy sheds light on why and how fossil-fuel-rich developing countries may approach the trade-offs between accelerating the transition to renewables, gradually integrating them, or deepening their dependence on fossil fuels. Moreover, case studies like this one on Mexico offer valuable insights into how actors drive stability or policy change, as well as the mechanisms they use to advance their political agendas (Cairney, 2019).

Using Baumgartner and Jones' (1993; 2009) Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) of agenda-setting, this research explains why, after a long period of policy stability and incremental changes, refining has suddenly become an urgent policy-issue on Mexico's political agenda. PET is particularly useful for explaining rapid and radical shifts in the Mexican oil and downstream sector with a historical perspective. This is because Baumgartner and Jones' (1993; 2009) PET model offers the strongest framework for constructing historical narratives by considering both periods of stability and policy change. Compared to other theories of the policy-making process, this dual focus facilitates a longitudinal analysis of patterns and policy dynamics in the energy sector over an extended period. Additionally, the PET model offers the best set of theoretical concepts to explain both, stability periods (equilibrium) and policy change periods (punctuations). It provides the most comprehensive tools for understanding how policy change takes place in the complex area of energy policy. Furthermore, this framework emphasises the role of political power, highlighting how institutions and political actors often seek the policy status-quo, while opposing groups take advantage of focusing events and attention-grabbing strategies to drive policy change.

Previous studies using PET model of agenda setting such as Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 2009); Jones, Baumgartner, and True (2006); Green-Pedersen and Wolfe (2009), have analysed the dynamics of attention to policy-issues in different political systems. These studies reveal that, from the PET perspective, multiple-venues political systems like that of the US tends to generate faster attention to environmental policy issues compared to a single-venue system like Denmark. This is attributed to the presence of internal and external competing forces in multiple venues systems. These studies demonstrate that PET model can be applied to different

countries and institutional settings, while highlighting that variations in the political venues can produce divergent patterns of policy attention. Mexico, officially known as the United Mexican States, has a macro-political system that closely resembles the original US-PET model, featuring multiple institutional venues including the executive (president), legislative (bicameral system: the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate), and judiciary branches (courts), along with state and local governments. However, Mexico's current multi-party-political system differs from the US, because it uses a hybrid electoral system rather than pure representation. Its bicameral legislature includes multiple parties, with Deputies elected in two ways: direct voting (relative majority) and proportional representation via the parties' electoral lists. This system favours minority parties by limiting majority dominance, requiring coalition-building to pass legislation. Senators are elected through three methods: the candidate with the most votes (relative majority), the runner-up (first minority), and national parties' lists (proportional representation) (INE, 2021). These distinctive characteristics make the Mexican electoral system and party politics more complex and dynamic than in other countries, influencing party incentives to draw attention to specific policy issues at regional and national level, while also distinguishing themselves from other parties.

Baumgartner et al. (2017) highlights that the analysis of the role of political parties has emerged as a new area of research within PET model, reflecting the increasing application and evolution of the original PET model of agenda-setting (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 2009). Similarly, Kuhlmann and van der Heijden (2018) observe an increasing emphasis on the role of political parties in PET studies, suggesting potential gaps within the PET framework. However, only a limited number of studies emphasising the role of political parties have focused on countries outside the US, the UK, or other European contexts, while case studies from developing countries remaining notably rare. In this respect, Carter and Jacobs (2014) argue that political parties played a key role in policy making in the UK climate policy. However, they note that the original PET model only briefly acknowledged the influence of party politics. Similarly, Farstad et al. (2022) find that party politics significantly shaped agenda-setting and decision-making in Norway. These recent studies proposed revising the PET framework to explicitly account for the role of political parties in driving policy change in different political systems.

To address the main research question, three analytical chapters present empirical evidence and aim to answer specific subsets of related questions. Chapter 6 focuses on the following questions: What are the key factors that explain the equilibrium period in the Mexican refining

sector? Specifically, why did PEMEX not adjust its refining policy in response to changes in national fuel consumption? Chapter 7 aims to answer the following related questions: Why is AMLO's policy image for the direction of the sector considered a radical change in energy paradigm? What role did the focusing event and policy entrepreneur play in this change? Did the shift in policy image and venue shift contribute to policy change in the refining sector? What are the key factors that explain the punctuation period in the refining sector? Moreover, to critically examine the role of political parties in the Mexican energy sector and contribute to the main research question of this thesis, Chapter 8 seeks to answer the following questions: What role did political parties play in the policy change process? What incentives did parties have for calling attention to the issue of rising fuel prices? How did political parties influence the period of policy stability, including the 2013 energy reform?

This thesis contributes to knowledge theoretically by proposing the inclusion of two complementary explanatory factors in the PET model, aimed at enhancing the PET framework applicability to political systems comparable to that of Mexico. This research highlights the instrumentalization of conflict expansion between institutional venues as a complementary explanatory factor. In the Mexican case such conflict between the executive and judiciary over AMLO's energy policy, helped draw macro-level attention and facilitated key mechanisms of the PET model, mainly shifts in policy images and institutional venues. Consequently, adding the expansion of political conflict between institutional venues as explanatory factor into the PET framework could enhance its explanatory scope, particularly in multi-venue political systems similar to Mexico's. Future PET research would benefit from taking this factor into account to more effectively explain the dynamics of such political systems. In this regard, this thesis provides a valuable contribution to the literature on the PET model examining focusing events, conflict expansion and the role of policy entrepreneur in agenda-setting (Birkland and Warnement, 2013; Birkland, 1998; Kingdon, 2003; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; True et al., 2007; Schattschneider, 1960; and Cobb and Elder, 1983).

This thesis also proposes adding party politics into the PET model as a complementary explanatory factor. The findings in this thesis, which aligned with previous research on the role of political parties within PET model, suggest that political parties can help explain periods of stability and policy change in muti-party political systems like Mexico's. Future research could benefit from focusing on the mechanisms through which political parties facilitate policy change, including their *de jure* legislative power to form parliamentary majorities for approving

the energy budget and passing energy legislation, as well as their *de facto* convening power to draw macro-level attention to policy-issues and mobilise the masses. Particular attention should be given to the incentives that drive political parties to compete, engage in partisan conflict and differentiate themselves. In this regard, this thesis provides a valuable contribution to the literature on the PET model and the role of political parties across different political systems (Farstad et al., 2022; Baumgartner et al., 2017; Carter and Jacobs, 2014; Walgrave et al., 2006; Baumgartner et al., 2006; Peter, 2006; Walgrave and Varone, 2008; Green-Pedersen, 2007; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008; Green-Pedersen and Wolfe; 2009).

Moreover, this thesis makes significant empirical contributions to the field of global energy politics, particularly on two key areas. First, it provides evidence on the policy implications for Mexico's energy security following the recent changes aimed at strengthening its downstream oil segment to reduce crude oil exports and meet domestic fuel demand, while gradually integrating renewables. This policy change was implemented before the COVID-19 pandemic and during the 2022 global fuel crisis due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. As a result, it provides crucial perspectives shaped by these events that contribute to broader debates in the literature on the potential pathways of energy transitions, particularly in fossil-fuel-rich developing countries like Mexico. In this regard, this thesis provides a valuable contribution to the literature on the potential trajectory of energy transition, as well as to debates surrounding the challenges of sustainable transition and the role of the state (Van de Graaf and Sovacool, 2020; Kuzemko at al., 2016; Newell, 2021; Johnstone, and Newell, 2017; Burke and Stephens, 2018; Goldthau, 2010; Hafner and Tagliapietra, 2020; Van de Graaf and Bradshaw, 2018; Kuzemko at al., 2019; West and Fattouh, 2019; Van de Graaf, 2018; Johnston et al., 2020; Goldthau, 2017; Kuzemko, 2019; Goldthau and Westphal, 2019). Second, this thesis offers empirical insights on the challenges faced by Mexico's fuel price stability policy implemented during the punctuation period, which relies on fiscal stimulus and results in an opportunity cost for the public finances. Additionally, this thesis provides valuable analysis of the fiscal approaches and challenges of fuel subsidies during the equilibrium period. These findings make a significant contribution to the literature on fuel-related fiscal incentives and their tax implications for public finances, while enriching debates on PEMEX, oil revenues and the need for diversifying fiscal resources (Rivera de Jesus and López -Reynosa, 2023; Rivera de Jesus 2024; Villarreal-Paez and Michel-Gutierrez, 2013; Segal, 2012; Plante and Jordan, 2013; Dominguez-Ordonez, 2015). These debates highlight the trade-offs and challenges of accelerating the transition to renewables, gradually integrating them, or increasing dependence

on fossil fuels. The empirical findings of this thesis on shifts in macro-level attention, driven by the elimination of fuel subsidies and the introduction of taxes following the 2013 energy reform, are crucial for governments designing policies aimed at a just and balanced energy transition, including the gradual phase-out of fuel subsidies.

To unravel the complex dynamics of macro-level attention to policy-issues in the Mexican oil and refining sector, this explanatory case study-focused thesis uses qualitative analysis, text-as-data, data triangulation, and machine collaboration to cross-verify findings, enhance credibility, and reduce bias (Workman et al., 2022; Flick, 2018). This research uses a range of key approaches to diversify data sources and perspectives across different actors, locations and time periods. The key data is sourced from in-depth semi-structured interviews with key policy actors such as government officials, energy experts, academics, businessmen, deputies, and party leaders directly involved in the events, complemented with critical discourse analysis of presidential statements, including AMLO's campaign speeches and his 1,423 morning press conferences held between 2018 and 2024. Additionally, this study analyses government and party advertising campaigns on energy policy-issues in the media to cross-verify and enhance the reliability of findings. The key objectives of discourse analysis include identifying trends, energy policy images and dominant ideas in language such as recurring themes, phases, keywords, language structures, and rhetorical strategies. It also focuses on understanding the context in which the language is used by analysing the potential social, political, economic, or cultural factors, influencing a specific use of language (Rapley, 2018; Johnson and McLean, 2020; Fairclough, 2013; Gee, 2014; Van Dijk, 2011; Wodak, and Meyer, 2015; Johnstone, 2018; Manzi, 2012). Additionally, this thesis analyses parliamentary debates and political party positions, alongside an extensive documentary review of historical material to reveal textual and contextual evidence from primary and secondary sources such as PEMEX reports, documents from the Energy, Finance, Economy, and Treasury secretariats, legislative acts, public opinion surveys, energy academic journals, and news media. Furthermore, this thesis analyses key context-specific macroeconomic, budgetary, and PEMEX indicators to identify trends and policy dynamics in the oil sector from 2000 to 2024, a period covering four Mexican Presidents: Fox (2000-2006), Calderón (2006-2012), Peña Nieto (2012-2018), and López Obrador (2018-2024), representing the three major political parties: PAN, PRI, and MORENA.

Given that the primary contribution of this thesis is theoretical, it enhances the PET model (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 2009) by introducing two complementary explanatory factors:

conflict expansion across institutional venues and party politics, emphasising competition, partisan conflict, and differentiation incentives. The initial chapters of this thesis begin by explaining the PET's core components, key mechanisms and potential gaps within the model. Subsequently, the thesis applies the lens of punctuated equilibrium to examine stability and policy changes in Mexico's oil sector, and their potential alignment with the global energy paradigms shifts highlighted by Goldthau (2012). Ultimately, this thesis analyses the explanatory factors, mechanisms, and incentives that shape the attention dynamics driving policy change in Mexican energy politics, with a particular focus on the policy entrepreneur and political parties.

This thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 examines the theory of punctuated equilibrium, supported by literature review, and justifies PET's selection by contrasting alternative theories explaining the policymaking. Organised chronologically, the chapter traces the evolution of PET model, reviews relevant case studies, addresses key critiques, and evaluates its applicability for this research. Chapter 3 examines PET's core components, explaining periods of stability (equilibrium) and policy change (punctuation). This chapter focuses on the role of policy entrepreneur and role of political parties in driving policy change, highlighting potential gaps within the PET framework. Chapter 4 reviews the research design and analytical approaches, outlining the interviewees selection process, addressing challenges such as selection bias and non-response. This chapter also explains how the collected data from presidential statements, government and political parties advertising campaigns, and parliamentary debates was analysed, along with criteria for selecting key context-related macroeconomic, budgetary, and PEMEX indicators. Chapter 5 explores how recent energy policies in oil-producing developing countries, including Mexico, potentially align with Goldthau's global energy paradigm shifts. This chapter provides background on Mexico's transition from a statist energy model to a neoliberal one. The next three chapters present the collected qualitative evidence. Chapter 6 analyses the neoliberal energy model continuity and incrementalism during the equilibrium period. Chapter 7 focuses on the shift towards interventionist and the role of the policy entrepreneur during the punctuation period. Chapter 8 examines the significant role of political parties within the PET model. Chapter 9 provides a recapitulation of key findings, limitations and contributions, aligning them with previous studies. This concluding chapter also provides recommendations for future research based on the insights gained.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

This Chapter critically examines contrasting theories that seek to explain the policymaking process with the particular focus on Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET). It traces PET's development from its original assumptions to its later expansions, illustrating both phases with empirical studies. Additionally, it reviews key critiques and categorises PET empirical studies by emerging areas, countries and combined concepts. This analysis highlights potential expansion of PET, including the underexplored role of political parties within PET model. Addressing this gap in the literature, this thesis examines the role of policy entrepreneurs and political parties in Mexico's oil sector through the lens of punctuated equilibrium theory. The following Chapter 3 will examine the core components of PET model, focusing on concepts that explain periods of stability (equilibrium) and policy change (punctuation), the role of policy entrepreneurs, and the influence of parties, while identifying gaps in PET framework.

Understanding public policies and their changes is crucial, as policies directly or indirectly affect many social, political, and economic aspects of countries. Cairney (2019) defines public policy as the sum of government actions and decisions, including everything from signals of intent to the final outcomes. Similarly, decisions by governments to maintain the status quo are just as much a part of the policymaking as decisions to push for policy change (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003). The study of public policies can focus on different types of government decisions aimed at addressing specific policy issues. For example, public policy analysis may explore why a government introduced an energy reform or why certain groups emerge as 'winners' or 'losers' when such decisions are made (Cairney, 2019). Walgrave and Varone (2008) place policy change at the heart of the policy making process. Kingdon (2003) conceptualises this process as a series of stages, including setting the agenda, outlining alternatives for decision-making, making an authoritative choice among them, and implementation the decision. This thesis explores why and how attention is directed towards energy policy-issues that have shaped Mexico's political agenda and energy policies. Grounded in PET and insights from relevant PET empirical studies, this research examines the roles of the political actors such as political parties and policy entrepreneurs in influencing which policy-issues capture attention in public debates.

This chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 evaluates and contrasts key theories explaining the policymaking process. Section 2.3 traces the evolution of PET from its original formulation to later expansions using a chronological approach. Section 2.4 presents empirical examples illustrating both phases. Section 2.5 examines notable critiques of PET, while Section 2.6 reviews PET empirical studies categorised by policy area, emerging areas, countries and combined concepts, highlighting potential gaps in the PET model.

2.2. Contrasting theories of the policymaking process

Over the years, the public policy discipline has specifically developed several theories to better comprehend changes in governmental decision-making processes (Michaud, 2019). A theory is defined as a set of analytical principles designed to structure observations and explanations of the world (Cairney, 2019). Some of the most relevant theories that seek to explain the policymaking process include Incrementalism (Lindblom, 1959 and Wildavsky, 1964); Diffusion of Innovation Theory (Roger, 1962); Multiple Streams Framework (Kingdon, 1984); Advocacy Coalitions (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993); and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 2009).

The first generation of policy process models, developed primarily in the 1950s and 1960s, viewed policy decision-making as incremental, assuming a stable political order (Baumgartner and Jones, 2012). This theory is known as Lindblom's Incrementalism. Lindblom (1959) argued that change in nearly all policy sectors typically occurs incrementally (Carter and Jacobs, 2014). Lindblom developed and defended an incremental approach, arguing that policymakers treat their current actions as given and make small, incremental, and marginal adjustments in the existing behaviour. In this way, policymakers do not need to spend considerable time defining their goals, as the comparisons between the current situation and the small adjustments are easily manageable (Kingdon, 2003). Later, Wildavsky (1964) and Davis et al. (1966) argue that the budgetary process works incrementally, building on Lindblom's incrementalism, they point out that policymakers rarely review an entire budget from scratch, as attempting to do so would overwhelm them with information. Instead, they typically make small adjustments either adding or subtracting increments to the existing base.

Other theories developed during this period include Rogers' Diffusion of Innovation Theory (Roger, 1962), later cited by scholars as 'policy diffusion'. According to Michaud (2019),

Rogers' Diffusion centres on how policies are replicated and spread over other geographic areas, often referred as "best practices". Rogers categorised different levels of innovation adopters into five groups: innovators, early adopters, early majority, later majority, and laggards. A key aspect of this theory is the role that media plays in either accelerating or slowing the diffusion process, which occurs gradually over time.

An additional relevant theory that seeks to explain the policymaking process is Kingdon's Multiple Streams Theory (Kingdon, 1984), also known as the Multiple Stream Framework (MSF). Kingdon's MSF is a model used to explain the policy process and policy change, suggesting that policy changes occurs when three separate and simultaneous processes or 'streams': problems, policies, and politics, converge to open a 'policy window', defined by Kingdon (2003: 165) as "an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems". Problems stream consists of various conditions that are perceived and interpreted as policy problems, deemed appropriate for governmental action (Kingdon, 2003: 110). The policies stream consists of the policy primeval soup (Kingdon, 2003: 200), which includes new ideas and solutions developed by specialists in specific policy areas. The politics stream has its own dynamics and rules, according to Kingdon (2003: 162), is composed of factors such as the national mood, election results, changes of administrations, changes of ideological or partisan distributions in congress, and interest group pressure campaigns. Policy windows stay open for only short periods, making it crucial for 'policy entrepreneurs' to be capitalised on them. Policy entrepreneurs are described by Kingdon (2003: 179) "as advocates who are willing to invest their resources-time, energy, reputation, money-to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits". According to Kingdon's MSF model, policy entrepreneurs serve as agents of change by aligning the streams and taking advantage of the policy window to drive policy change.

Advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), provides a valuable framework to understand policy change over extended periods. According to Sabatier (1988: 139), Advocacy Coalitions Framework (ACF) explains the interaction between competing advocacy coalitions which are joined by "people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers) who share a particular belief system- i.e. a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions - and who show a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time". ACF helps to understand how multiple actors use

various mechanisms and strategies to drive change, aiming to secure decisions favoured by government authorities (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993).

Since the early 1990s, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) has become one of the leading frameworks for understanding the policy process. PET explains long periods of stability punctuated by rapid and radical policy change, it was developed in "Agendas and Instability in American Politics" by the scholars Baumgartner and Jones (1993; 2009). They argue that the trajectory of public policy in the United States is not gradual and incremental, but rather disjointed and episodic, with long periods of stability are interrupted by bursts of rapid and radical policy change. According to Michaud (2019). The term punctuated equilibrium was borrowed from its original application in the natural sciences to describe dramatic shifts, rather than gradual progress in evolution. In the public policy discipline, 'equilibrium' (balance or stability) results from the dominance of governmental structures in maintaining the status quo, while 'punctuation' refers to a significant policy change or shift, driven by data or new perspectives that influence the decisions of policymakers.

Baumgartner and Jones' PET model (1993; 2009) is a very useful framework for this research because it provides a strong basis for a historical narrative, considering both periods of stability and policy change. This enables a longitudinal analysis that examines patterns, trends, and policy dynamics in a specific sector over an extended period. In this context, PET serves as an insightful framework to explain radical shifts in the Mexican oil sector from a historical perspective. Moreover, PET framework offers the best set of theoretical concepts to explain both, stability periods (equilibrium) and policy change periods (punctuations). It provides the most robust toolkit for understanding how policy change can occur in the complex field of energy policy. Additionally, this framework also highlights the roles of political power, illustrating how institutions and actors often work to maintain the policy status quo, while opposing groups instrumentalise focusing events and attention-grabbing strategies to drive policy punctuations. It also important to note that PET framework is well-suited for a Mexican case study. While initially developed to explain policy change in the US, a federal political system, many scholars have shown that PET is equally applicable to other political systems, including parliamentary and non-federal polities. Mexico, officially the United Mexican States, is organised as a federal republic with political structures similar to those of the US., making it an ideal context for applying PET's key concepts and examples provided by Baumgartner and Jones (1993; 2009).

Compared to the other theories explaining the policymaking process discussed above, PET is the framework that best aligns with this research, as it offers a robust set of concepts to explain both periods of stability and rapid and radical policy change. This is due to the following reasons: Lindblom's incrementalism (Lindblom, 1959) focuses on small incremental changes rather than substantial radical changes. While Roger (1962) considers that diffusion of innovation occurs over-time. The Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) developed by Kingdon (1984) can be very useful but focuses on change alone, while Baumgartner and Jones (1993; 2009) examine both stability and change (Carter and Jacobs, 2014: 127). In contrast, Advocacy Coalitions (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith,1993) emphasises long-term change rather than short-term radical shifts, it suggests that coalitions are large, diverse and therefore often very stable over-time. For instance, policy brokers must negotiate with these coalitions to reach a compromise, a process that requires considerable time.

Therefore, PET is the most suitable framework for this research as it addresses both stability (equilibrium), and rapid change (punctuations). However, to enhance the case study analysis of this thesis, PET can be complemented with additional established theories of the policy process or single theoretical concepts. As a result, this research combines PET with individual concepts such as those from MSF (Kingdon, 1984), including 'policy windows' and 'policy entrepreneurs'; mobilisation (Birkland, 1998); and conflict expansion (Schattschneider, 1960; and Cobb and Elder, 1972).

2.3. The Evolution of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory

Within PET, two types of studies can be distinguished: those that build on earlier work (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 2002; 2009), and those that expanded upon later research (Baumgartner and Jones, 2005; 2012). The first type examines policy dynamics through case studies focused on a specific issue, while the second analyses distributions of change across a wide range of policy issues. This thesis applies the original PET model to a case study of Mexico, focusing on a specific policy issue within the oil sector.

The 'original' PET, based on case studies and individual policy issues, as explained by Baumgartner and Jones (1993; 2009), is founded on the observation that policymaking often follows a dual pattern: prolonged periods of stability, interrupted by brief periods of rapid policy change. Similarly, Princen (2013), highlights that the initial PET aimed to explain a

specific pattern of policy change, where long periods of stability and incremental adjustments are 'punctuated' by bursts of policy activity and radical change. However, over time, PET evolved into a broader theory of policymaking, emphasising the distribution of change and the role of disproportionate information processing. The evolution of the theory of punctuated equilibrium is also observed by Kuhlmann and van der Heijden (2018), who point to a bifurcation of PET literature, a division of PET into two branches. The initial PET approach that aimed at analysing policy stability and change towards a more general theory of information processing (Baumgartner and Jones, 2005). The analysis of the existing literature and publication of PET confirms the bifurcation thesis observed within PET literature. PET includes two distinct groups or branches: the first, the original or initial PET, which focuses on communities and agenda-setting approaches through case studies of individual issues; and the second, later PET approaches, which includes the analysis of budget dynamics and information processing. The latter branch emphasises the overall distributions of policy change across a wide range of issues and examines information processing of the political system as a whole.

The 'original' PET applies two approaches, policy communities and agenda-setting. Studies using the policy communities' approach have often focused on the power of experts to dominate the policy process in their areas. Policy communities are also known in the literature as "policy whirlpools," "iron triangles," "policy networks," "subsystems," or "subgovernments." More generally, political scientists studying interest-group behaviour have focused on the development of diffuse "issue networks" or "policy communities". Baumgartner and Jones (1993; 2009) consider policy communities as systems of limited participation that consist of interest groups and expert public officials from a particular policy field, which lead to a constant, close, and typically frequent relationship between a small number of influential interest groups and the government. These policy community relationships are maintained as participants share a general mutual agreement on a policy issue and often attempt to restrict or exclude other participants to maintain the status quo and control the policy area from broader political forces and excluded groups.

Baumgartner and Jones (2009: 43) highlight that studies of policy subsystems are closely related to studies of agenda-setting because of the impact of the nature of the policy community on the policy process. This link between policy community and agenda-setting approaches can be seen, for instance, in case studies where the nature of a policy community changes from small, consensual, and homogeneous, to large, conflictual, and heterogeneous, which often

increases the probability that a given policy issue will rise higher on the national political agenda (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). In this regard, Birkland (1998) agrees that policy communities are closely related to studies of agenda-setting since the organisation of policy subsystems is an important factor in agenda-setting. However, he makes the important point that agenda- setting, and group politics vary considerably depending on the type of event and the nature of the policy community. In other words, it frequently assumed that policy communities that addressing similar events are similarly structured, when, in fact, their composition can differ considerably.

The 'original' PET of agenda-setting approach is regarded as one of the most influential frameworks for explaining major policy shifts (Kuhlmann and van der Heijden, 2018). Baumgartner and Jones (1993; 2009) consider policy change to be a matter of agenda-setting. Agenda setting is defined by Cairney (2019: 169) as "the study of public, media, and government attention to policy issues". While the term 'agenda' is conceived by Kingdon (2003: 3) as "the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time". Kingdon (2003) explains that the role of agenda-setting process is to narrow this set subjects or problems to the set that actually becomes the focus of attention. Cobb and Elder (1972: 85) identify two types of political agendas: the 'systemic agenda' and 'formal agenda'. The first type of agenda "consists of all issues that are commonly perceived by members of the political community as meriting public attention and as involving matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing governmental authority". The second type of agenda, the 'formal agenda' is defined as "set of items explicitly up for the active and serious consideration of authoritative decision-makers".

As shown, all these definitions of the agenda share a common focus on the attention given to policy issues. This is because, "the agenda-setting literature is now replete with evidence that increased political attention can result in radical policy change" (Carter and Jacobs, 2014: 126). In this context, a key condition for policy change is political issue-attention. An issue can be placed on the political agenda and consequently attract resources such as time, money, and expertise. However, considerable attention from the media, the public and the government is necessary before any policy change takes place (Baumgartner and Jones, 2005). As a result, Cairney (2019) highlights that the agenda setting literature focuses on the levels of attention

given to specific issues by the public, the media, and the government, as well as the factors that cause this attention to rise or fall.

According to Cairney (2019) studies on PET of agenda setting place particular emphasis on three main factors that influence agenda attention: The first factor is pre-existing prejudices of the audience, which mean that different audiences will be receptive to different policy issues. As a result, various issues may rise to the top of the agenda in different arenas. The media play a key role in linking and shifting attention across these diverse audiences. According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 107) the media can be considered a privileged means of communication, as they help link all other arenas together. As defined by Cairney (2019: 169) the media are understood as "forms of mass communication which foster collective attention such as TV, radio, print, and online news, and social media". In this respect, Kingdon (2003: 57) highlights that media are considered powerful agenda setters because they clearly influence public opinion. The public's attention to government issues closely mirrors media coverage of those issues. The second factor is the significance and immediacy of issues. Some policy problems are more critical than others, while some demand immediate action. For example, economic issues remain prominent on the political agenda, whereas issues such as natural catastrophes or emergencies are temporary on the agenda and require swift decisions. The third factor relates to the ability of actors to exercise power in drawing attention to one issue at the expense of another. Agenda setting describes an ongoing competition among issue advocates to attract the attention of the media, the public, and policy elites (Cairney, 2019). Due to this competition between actors, the public opinion is just as important as media, often referred to as 'public mood', this measures the public's tolerance for issues such as a new tax policy or a new energy policy. In this sense, Kingdon (2003: 65) highlights that public opinion can have both positive and negative effects. As a result, while public opinion may occasionally drive the government to act, it more often serves to constrain governments from implementing certain policies.

2.4. Comparative review of original and later PET empirical studies

Several case studies used the 'original' PET approach (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 2009), including: Walgrave and Varone (2008) applied PET approach of agenda-setting, along with the core concept of 'policy image' and 'policy venue' shifts, to explain the policy change and the adoption of major reforms, following the focusing event of Dutroux Crisis in Belgium.

Other empirical studies, such as Burns et al. (2018) explain policy change in the EU financial reform, following the 2008 financial crisis by applying the original punctuated equilibrium approach. They analyse two cases, financial regulation and privatization policy, one in which they expected change, but it failed to emerge, and the other where they did not expect change, but significant policy change occurred. Additional case studies using the original PET approach include Ohemeng and Anebo (2012), who conducted an extensive documentary analysis to investigate why administrative reforms in Ghana failed to achieve their intended impact.

The original PET focuses on policy issue-attention of individual cases, whereas the 'later' PET approaches shift the focus to how policymakers and policymaking institutions respond to changes in attention, rather than the causes driving those shifts. Koski and Workman (2018) highlight that many scholars initially focus on PET as a framework for explaining major change resulting from exogenous shocks, such as event-triggered issues or focusing events. On the other hand, later developments in PET suggests that large scale changes can also emerge from the level of friction induced by the institutions and the constraints they imposed on the policy-making process (Baumgartner and Jones, 2005), as well as from the way information is processed within the policymaking system (Baumgartner and Jones, 2012). These 'later' PET approaches are mainly divided into two types. The first builds on the later work by Baumgartner and Jones (2005), shifting the focus from explaining individual cases, as in their earlier work by Baumgartner and Jones (1993; 2009), to rather examining the overall distributions and patterns of policy change. This approach moves the emphasis from individual cases of policy change to overall patterns of change. In this respect, Princen (2013: 857) highlights that change distributions offer an opportunity to examine patterns of punctuated equilibrium across a wide range of issues within a political system or venue in its entirety. The second type of 'later' PET approach developed by Baumgartner and Jones (2012) focuses on the role of information processing within the entire political system.

Some examples of this 'later' PET literature (Baumgartner and Jones, 2005; 2012) include: Citi (2013) uses the EU budgetary data as a proxy of policy change, aggregating thousands of items per budgetary year are aggregated into six macro areas of expenditure from 1984 to 2011. The aim is to determine whether the dynamics of EU budget follow an incremental or punctuated equilibrium frequency distribution, specifically, whether they align with a normal distribution or leptokurtic (fat-tailed) distributions. In the same way, Flink (2017) applies the 'later' PET approach (Baumgartner and Jones, 2005; 2012), to find patterns and explanations of budgetary

changes, focusing on endogenous organisational aspects such as institutional friction and disproportionate information processing. Other studies such as Fernández-i-Marín et al. (2020) apply also the 'later' PET approach to uncover systemic dynamics of policy change by analysing two large datasets covering social, environmental, and morality policy outputs in 13 Western European countries over a period of 34 years (1980-2013). They assessed the distributional patterns of policy change within these datasets. Other scholars using the 'later' PET approaches include Vannoni (2019), who conducts frequency distribution analysis in tobacco taxation and regulation across multiple countries. Hegelich et al. (2015) use the case of nuclear energy policy in the US to demonstrate how decisive budget changes (frequency distribution) can be linked to attention of congress and the President. Lam and Chan (2015) use the later PET approach to find out that the dynamics of government attention in Hong Kong generally follow a leptokurtic distribution. Benson and Russel (2015) use PET to find patterns of change in the EU Energy Policy. They conduct an extensive longitudinal analysis and measure the legislative output as an indicator of policy change.

2.5. Key critiques of PET

These are some of the most notable critiques made over time regarding both to the 'initial' and 'later' PET approaches. The 'original' PET, which relies on case studies to analyse policy issue-attention of individual issues (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 2009), has faced criticism particularly concerning its applicability beyond the United States. One of the key critiques is its focus on federalist structures and its relative neglect of the role of political parties (Baumgartner and Jones, 2012). However, many scholars have empirically found that the PET model is still well-suited for other countries with similar political structure, including parliamentary and non-federal systems across various sectors in Europe, though some adaptation to different political contexts is required (Carter and Jacobs, 2014), Nonetheless, scholars have also point out that there is room for improvement, particularly in better accounting for the role of political parties.

There are both costs and benefits when comparing the 'later' PET (Baumgartner and Jones, 2005; 2012), with the 'original' PET (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 2009). According to Baumgartner and Jones (2012) one of the benefits is the shift towards a more comprehensive theory of policy change. The 'later' PET approaches allow to compare different issues within a political system, or the same issues across political systems over-time (Princen, 2013: 859).

For instance, Green-Pedersen and Wilkerson (2006) and Green-Pedersen and Wolfe (2009) compared attention to health and environmental issues in Denmark and the United States, respectively, thus analysing two policy issues between two different political systems.

At the same time, however, there are some drawbacks. For instance, analysing change distribution using the 'later' PET approach requires large-scale, systematic data to conduct statistical analysis needed to study overall patterns of punctuated equilibrium (Princen, 2013: 863). Moreover, the 'later' PET approach offers a more general framework, in contrast to the detailed analysis provided by the case studies in the 'initial' PET, which is considered the cornerstone of PET model (Baumgartner and Jones, 2012). In the same way, Princen (2013: 859) highlights that the focus on overall change distributions in 'later' PET "has come at the cost of obscuring the underlying substantive policy issues, which are central to the case-study based approach in PET".

2.6. Review of PET studies: countries and theoretical development.

The benefits of PET as a research approach have made it one of the most influential models for analysing the policymaking process (Kuhlmann and van der Heijden, 2018). It is widely cited, and its different approaches have been applied across different policy areas and countries. Originally developed in the US in the 1990s, PET has since become a model applied in a wide range of countries and policy fields.

In this respect, Kuhlmann and van der Heijden (2018) find that the PET assumptions initially developed in the US have now extended to different countries. Based on a sample of 86 PET empirical articles published between 1996 and 2016, they highlight the geographical distribution of PET research studies, noting that studies on the US remain dominant. US-based papers account for more than half of the publications in their sample, with 51 US-based articles, comprising 59% of the analysed sample. Moreover, they also find that the number of articles focusing on other countries is relatively much smaller. However, a significant number of articles addresses other Anglo-countries, particularly the United Kingdom, with 12 UK-based articles, which account 14% of the sample. PET has also become an increasingly popular framework for analyse policy change in other European countries beyond the UK. For instance, Denmark accounts for 9 articles (10% of the articles), while both Belgium and the Netherlands each contribute 8 articles, representing 10% of the total sample.

In contrast, Kuhlmann and van der Heijden (2018) highlight that PET studies with a focus on developing countries, particularly those outside Anglo and European contexts, are much rarer. These are the case of Turkey, Israel, Bhutan, Korea, Taiwan, Ghana, South Africa, each represented by one single article in the analysed sample.

This study conducted by Kuhlmann and van der Heijden (2018) provides a clear example of the limited number of published articles that have applied PET as a framework to case studies in developing countries. This emphasises the significance contribution of this thesis, which focuses on Mexico, a developing country. By doing so, this thesis expands the scope of PET applications and contributes to both the theoretical and empirical literature on PET, specifically applied in the context of developing countries.

Analysing policy areas and theoretical development in PET studies also provides valuable insights into the significance of this thesis. Kuhlmann and van der Heijden (2018) indicate that some policy areas are more dominant in PET studies than others. The two most dominant policy areas are environmental and energy policy (treated as single policy area), and budget policy. Specifically, 23 articles (27%) of the analysed sample focus on environmental and energy policy, including fields such as fishery policy and wildfire policy. In addition, 19 articles (22%) examine budget-related issues, aligning with Baumgartner and Jones's 'later' PET approach that analyses budget changes and distributions. Kuhlmann and van der Heijden (2018) also identify 8 articles (9%) focused on health policy such as tobacco regulation. A smaller, but notable area is education policy, with 5 articles (6%) of the total of articles. Moreover, PET is frequently combined with other established theories of the policy process or single theoretical concepts. From the sample of 86 analysed articles, Kuhlmann and van der Heijden (2018) find that 50 articles (58%) introduced additional theories, theoretical concepts, and explanatory factors. This suggests that theory development within PET remains rather selective and unsystematic. Of these 50 of articles (58%), only 5 (10%) included the role of political parties.

This highlights the significance contribution of this thesis, which examines how political parties influence attention dynamics and drive policy change in Mexican energy politics. In this context, this literature review provides insights into the potential expansion and development of PET, particularly in emerging areas such as the inclusion of political parties in PET empirical studies, which remains underexplored. Chapter 3, Section 3.6 further examines the role of political parties within PET, highlighting potential gaps in the PET framework.

Furthermore, empirical studies that have integrated PET with additional theories or single concepts provide important perspectives on the evolution and development of PET. Kuhlmann and van der Heijden (2018) identify that, of the total 50 papers, 9 papers (18%) combined PET with the MSF, or single concepts from it, such as 'policy entrepreneurs' or 'policy windows.' A smaller group of 4 papers (8%) combined PET with the ACF or single concepts like advocacy coalitions. Some examples of empirical studies that have integrated PET with additional theories, frameworks, and individual concepts include, for instance, Carter and Jacobs (2014), combined Kingdon's (1995) Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) of problem, politics, policy, and policy entrepreneur, with Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) of agenda-setting (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 2009), to explain radical policy change, particularly to the case of climate change and energy policy under the British Labour government (2006-10). In the same way, Farstad, et al. (2022) combined MSF and PET of agenda-setting to explain radical policy change, specifically to the Norwegian climate policy and the ban on cultivating peatlands. Other scholars, Fowler et al. (2017) integrated theories on cultural change with punctuated equilibrium to explain the evolution of US energy policy. Therefore, it can be argued that theoretical developments, concepts, and explanatory factors introduced or combined with PET are often highly case-specific.

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Introduction

This chapter examines the theoretical framework of this thesis based on the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) developed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993; 2009). Chapter 4 will focus on the research design and methodology of this explanatory case-study-centred thesis, along with the analytical approaches applied in this research project.

Punctuated equilibrium theory seeks to explain a political process generally characterised by long periods of policy stability and incrementalism, disrupted by short period of rapid and radical policy change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 2009). PET model consists of core components and key concepts that facilitate understanding policy shifts, which will be explained in this chapter. These include macro-level attention, focusing event, policy entrepreneur, competition of policy images, venue-shopping, and interactions across multiple institutional venues. However, the PET model places less emphasis to the instrumentalization and expansion of conflict between institutional venues and party politics as explanatory factors for drawing attention to policy-issues, highlighting potential gaps in the PET framework.

The PET conceptual framework offers a systematic and well-established approach to understanding the attention dynamics during periods of policy stability and radical and rapid policy change within complex political systems. As discussed in this chapter, the PET model outlines a methodical process characterised by sequential events that follow long period of equilibrium, which are then interrupted by sudden punctuations. According to Baumgartner and Jones (2009), these events are triggered by macro-level attention to policy-issues, which lead to focusing events. Birkland (1998) defines a focusing event as attention-grabbing event such as a crisis that attracts the public, media, and government attention to an issue previously lower on the political agenda. These focusing events are then strategically leveraged by policy entrepreneurs through venue-shopping, an attention-grabbing strategy aimed at capturing the attention of more receptive audiences (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). This process generates positive feedback, stimulates policy images competition, and drives shifts in policy images and venues, resulting in rapid and radical policy change (Baumgartner et al., 2011).

This chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 examines the core components of the PET model. Section 3.3 discusses key concepts that explain periods of policy stability (equilibrium). Section 3.4 focuses on the key concepts driving policy change (punctuation). Section 3.5 examines the role of policy entrepreneurs in the policy change process. Finally, Section 3.6 emphasises the significant role of political parties in punctuated equilibrium, highlighting potential gaps in the PET framework.

3.2. Core components of the PET framework

This thesis uses the punctuated equilibrium model of agenda-setting to examine how 'focusing events' influence public opinion, media coverage, and the government agenda, leading to rapid and radical policy change following periods of stability. According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993; 2009), this policy process can take place through the interaction between the policy image and venue shift, both of which are core components of PET of agenda-setting. Baumgartner and Jones (1993; 2009) argued that long periods of policy stability, punctuated by short periods of intense change, can be explained by the critical interactions between 'policy images' and 'policy venues.'

The concept of 'policy images', according to Baumgartner and Jones (2009: 25) refers to "how policies are understood and discussed by the public and policymakers". Because a single policy can have multiple implications and impact different groups of people in different ways, individuals may perceive dissimilar images of the same policy. That is because, "policy images are always a mixture of empirical information and emotive appeals" (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009: 26). In this sense, a single policy can have multiple images, both negative and positive. People perceive diverse 'policy images' based on how the policy-issue is framed, and how the policy problem is defined. For instance, the same policy issue may evolve over time, initially framed as a technical matter, requiring expert management by policy experts, but later re-framed in simplifier terms to attract more participants in multiple venues.

The concept of 'policy venues' also known as 'institutional venues' refers to the arenas or locations where policy decisions are made. As defined by Baumgartner and Jones (2009: 32) "policy venues are the institutional locations where authoritative decisions are made concerning a given issue". Some examples include the presidential office, government departments, congress committees, courts, different levels in the government such as the states

and municipal or regional. Baumgartner and Jones (2009) make the important point that policy venues may be monopolistic, meaning that, a policy issue falls within the jurisdiction of only one institution. Or, policy venues can also be shared, this happens when a single policy issue can be at the same time subject to the jurisdiction of many institutions.

In this respect, Baumgartner and Jones (1993; 2009) place particular emphasis on the interaction between these two core components of the punctuated equilibrium model of agenda setting. They argue that changes in a policy image can drive changes in policy venues, just as shifts in institutional venues can influence policy images. This reciprocal relationship means that the interaction between policy images and policy venues can trigger further changes, potentially leading to periods of punctuation or significant radical and rapid policy change. The interaction between policy images and institutional venues can be complex since both, the images and venues can evolve over time. Moreover, an issue may simultaneously have multiple images and fall under the jurisdiction of multiple institutional venues. Furthermore, certain types of images may be well-received or positively perceived in one venue; but perceived or regarded as inappropriate in different institutional venues or by different audiences (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009).

In this context, PET model is particularly useful because it allows for the analyse of two key periods in the policy process: stability and policy change. According to PET's assumptions, stability and policy change are not separate processes, but rather two sides of the same coin (Princen, 2013). Radical shifts occur because policy issues are often ignored, and the negative perceptions of existing policies persist during periods of policy stability. Consequently, the lack of attention to these policy issues during a long time in stability periods can culminate in radical and rapid policy change.

3.3. Key PET concepts for understanding stability (equilibrium)

PET of agenda setting (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009) assumes that policymakers face limited capacity for attention due to cognitive constraints (bounded rationality). As a result, the governmental agenda space is naturally scarce. The absence of attention to most policy issues explains why some policies stay the same for long periods, while others change very quickly and dramatically (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). The concept of 'bounded rationality' suggests that policymakers can focus intensely only on a limited number of policy issues. That

is because, there are more issues than governments can possibly attend to, and policymakers have limited attention spans. Therefore, only a select few policy issues rise to the top of the agenda, while others are overlooked and consequently ignored or disregarded. Baumgartner and Jones (2012: 3) explain that bounded rationality challenges the notion of 'comprehensive rationality' that assumes that individuals systematically evaluate the costs and benefits from a potential decision and then, choosing the best course of action, a process known as 'maximising the potential returns.' Instead, policymakers are driven by their emotions and influenced by their cognitive limitations such as constrained attention capacity.

According to Baumgartner et al. (2011), policymakers face not only cognitive limitations (bounded rationality) but also information processing challenges. Scholars of agenda setting such as Workman et al. (2009); Baumgartner et al. (2011); Baumgartner and Jones (2012); Koski and Workman (2018), agree that the central problem of policymaking is not a deficit of information, but an oversupply of information and limited attention. In this sense, PET challenges the assumption that governments cannot make decisions because a lack of information. Instead, it argues that governments have too much information, and therefore, they face important information processing challenges such as prioritising information.

According to Workman et al. (2009: 79) information can be processed through two different mechanisms: 'parallel processing' and 'serial processing'. The concept of "parallel processing refers to the ability of organisations to address multiple, diverse issues simultaneously". While 'serial processing' refers to the information process that considers one issue at a time. Workman et al. (2009) make the important point that political institutions promote parallel processing in response to an oversupply of information, serving as a mechanism to economise on the limited attention capacity of individual policymakers. This may explain why much public policy is often developed through small and specialised policy communities or policy subsystems that process 'technical' issues in a parallel manner within specific levels of government. This process is not particularly visible to the public and with minimal involvement from senior decisionmakers (Cairney, 2019). Parallel processing takes place in policy subsystems composed by experts and issue specialists, and such "systems are characterised by stability, incremental adjustments, and bargaining" (Workman et al., 2009: 79).

PET describes a combination of parallel and serial processing operating simultaneously. This implies that some policy issues are kept in parallel processing at the subsystem level, while

crisis-relevant ones are transferred to and handled in a 'serial, one-at-a-time mode' at the system level (Fernández-i-Marín et al., 2020). Several reasons can explain this combination and the shift from parallel to serial processing.

According to Workman et al. (2009) the transfer from parallel processing to serial (one-at-a-time mode) is triggered by a focusing event or policy failure, increasing attention to the policy issue. The shift from parallel to seral processing can also be triggered by the re-definition of the issue that bring previously ignored aspects of the policy problems to the forefront. Parallel processing therefore fails when attention is very high due to a focusing event, policy failure, or the re-framing of the policy issue. In such instances, serial processing takes over, and the policy issue moves from the subsystem to the system level. Simon (1985) describes this mechanism as the 'bottleneck of attention' (cited in Workman et al., 2009: 80; and Baumgartner and Jones, 2009: 250) The 'bottleneck of attention' represents the limitations of attention in the institutional information processing. The bottleneck is the point where a policy issue, handled by independent policy subsystems operating simultaneously and following a parallel processing, meets the serial processing of decision-makers at the highest level of the political system. Due to this attention bottleneck and the limited attention of policymakers, there are periods during which some problems gain disproportionate attention, causing institutions to overrespond as they are processing serially, while under-responding to others because attention is focused elsewhere. This helps to explain why periods of policy stability occur. The 'bottleneck attention' (Simon, 1985) implies that when a policy issue receives disproportionate attention and rises to the top of the agenda, it prompts a decision at the highest level of the political system. However, Downs (1972) and his 'issue-attention cycle', challenges Simon (1985) assumption, arguing that reaching the top of the agenda does not guarantee action, which may explain why some policies remain stable over time.

In this context, in addition to bounded rationality of policymakers, and information processing challenges due to the simultaneous mechanisms of parallel and serial processing, there are other key concepts that help explain stability and incremental policymaking, including the Downs' (1972: 38) 'issue-attention cycle'. Downs argues that public attention to policy issues generally follows a cyclical pattern. According to Downs' view, most policy issues suddenly gain prominence, stay in the spotlight for a short time, and then, despite remaining largely unresolved, they gradually fade from the centre of public attention.

Downs (1972) divides the issue-attention cycle into five stages, which typically occur in the following sequence: First, the pre-problem stage characterised by low public attention, even though some experts or interest groups may already be concerned about it. Second, the alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm stage occurs, in which the public suddenly becomes both aware of and alarmed by the issue. This alarmed discovery is accompanied by euphoric enthusiasm to address the problem, with the public believing that every obstacle can be overcome, and every issue solved without any reordering of society if sufficient effort is devoted. The third stage follows with the realisation of the high cost of significant progress. In this stage, the public comes to understand that 'solving' the problem is very expensive, requiring not only significant financial resources but also major sacrifices by large groups. This awareness leads to the fourth stage: a gradual decline of public interest. As more people recognise the difficulty and costs involved in addressing the problem, people get discouraged, attention fades, and other issues enter the alarmed discoveries phase, capturing public attention and demanding even more urgent action. The final stage is the post-problem stage. While the issue may have been replaced by others; Downs (1972: 41) makes the important point that new institutions, programmes, and policies may have been created during the period when intense focus was placed on the problem, which could help address the issue in the long term.

Baumgartner, and Jones (2009: 86) argue that Downs' issue-attention cycle provides a pessimistic view of the agenda-setting process, as it suggests that meaningful action may never take place. In their view, Downs' issue-attention cycle implies an agenda-setting process of never-ending series of "alarmed discoveries". However, Downs (1972: 41) also highlight some exceptions, pointing out that not all major social problems progress through the issue-attention cycle. Those which do often have three characteristics. First, the majority of people do not experience the problem as intensively as the minority, meaning that most will not be constantly reminded of the problem through personal suffering. Second, the harms caused by the problem are generated by social arrangements that provide significant benefits to the majority or a powerful minority. As a result, efforts to address the issue threaten these influential groups in society. Third, the problem lacks inherent excitement or has lost it no over time. This causes the media's focus on the problem to quickly lose the interest of the public, once the media realise that their emphasis on the problem is boring, they will shift their attention to a 'new' problem. According to Downs (1972), when all three of the above conditions are met, it is likely that the issue will progress through the entire issue-attention cycle.

Other key concepts such as policy subsystem, policy monopoly, dominant policy image, and negative feedback, help explain policy stability periods (equilibrium). PET's equilibrium is described by Baumgartner and Jones (1993) as a period when an issue is captured by a policy subsystem. True et al. (2007: 63) defines this period as the 'politics of equilibrium' which are the politics of subsystem, the politics of the policy monopoly, incrementalism, a period of a widely accepted supportive policy image and negative feedback.

In PET framework, the concept of 'policy subsystem' is central to explaining why some policies exhibit long-term or incremental changes. This is because that the policy agenda is generally controlled by stable networks of politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups operating at subsystem level within each area of government. True et al. (2007: 60) state that "when dominated by a single interest, a subsystem is best thought of as a policy monopoly". Policy monopolies are "structural arrangements that are supported by powerful ideas" (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 4). Such arrangements have carried out many labels: policy subsystems; islands of functional power; systems of limited participation; iron triangles; power elites. Each of these terms have in common that all suggest structural arrangements that benefit elites. Policy subsystems are defined by a topical area, a geographic territory, and the policy actors involved. They involve officials from any level of government and non-government policy actors including those from the private sector, non-profits, academia, consulting firms, the news media, engaged citizens, and others (Cairney and Weible, 2015: 93). In essence, policy subsystems can be defined by a substantive issue area or domain, a geographical scope, and a relatively stable set of actors that interact within well-defined institutional boundaries, Moreover, Fernández-i-Marín et al. (2019) make the important point that policy subsystems are generally considered to be driven by dynamics that are endogenous to the subsystem as they are often isolated and controlled by stable elites.

According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 7), a 'policy monopoly' has two important characteristics. First, a definable institutional structure, a policy subsystem, responsible for policymaking within a specific issue area, and limits access to the policy process. Second, a powerful idea or a 'dominant policy image', which supports how a policy issue is addressed and framed. Although, there exist various ways to frame the same problem, policy subsystems tend to maintain the status quo by addressing an issue based on existing policies, which are generally agreed by closed circles of policy experts who defend and reinforce the dominant policy image. This image is usually connected to core political values and can be

communicated simply and directly to the public though a positive image or rhetoric, for instance, patriotism, independence from foreign domination, progress, farness, progress, economic growth (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).

In this regard, "constructing a positive and dominant image, then, is closely related to the creation of a policy monopoly" (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 7). However, this process may be influenced by 'negative feedback', which includes signals that contradict the existing policies. A political system is considered to maintain a successful policy monopoly when can supress or contain a negative feedback process. In this context, 'negative feedback' refers to the process of dampening signals that challenge or contradict to the dominant policy image, ensuring that they do not disturb the status quo (True et al., 2007). In this sense, negative feedback, as stated by True et al. (2007: 61) "maintains stability in a system, somewhat like a thermostat maintains constant temperature in a room". As a result, a system that successfully contains a negative feedback process (contradictory signals), dampens pressures for change, and reinforce the status quo and incremental changes. Yet, as pointed out by True et al. (2007), policy monopolies are not invulnerable forever. Sometimes, external shocks cause subsystem issues reach macro-level attention, interrupting long periods of stability and leading to fundamental policy change (Fernández-i-Marín et al., 2019). Macro-level attention leads to 'macro-politics' which is the 'politics of punctuations' (True et al. 2007).

3.4. Key PET concepts for understanding policy change (punctuation)

As discussed, PET consists of periods of equilibrium (stability), when an issue is captured by a policy subsystem, and periods of punctuations (policy change), when the issue is forced onto the macro-political agenda. True et al. (2007: 63) states that "macro-politics is the politics of punctuation, the politics of large-scale change, competing policy images, political manipulation, and positive feedback". They point out key concepts that help explain periods of 'punctuations' such as competing policy images and positive feedback. Other key concepts involved in this process are outlined below and include: 'focusing event'; policy image and venues shifting; and 'venue-shopping' (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Birkland, 1998). Combined with single theoretical concepts from MSF (Kingdon, 1984) such as 'policy windows' and 'policy entrepreneurs', and some of the most important 'attention-grabbing strategies' (Cairney, 2019) such as mass mobilization (Birkland, 1998), and conflict expansion proposed by Schattschneider (1960) and later by Cobb and Elder (1972).

PET rests on the idea that policy change may occur because of large-scale 'focusing events' draw attention to ignored policy issues in periods of policy stability (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Similarly, O'Neil (2012) points out that in PET, long periods of stability are disrupted by short episodes of rapid change, which are triggered by focusing events. In this respect, Birkland (1998) highlights that most focusing events change the dominant issues on the agenda. They are also known as 'attention-grabbing events' because they serve to focus the attention of the media, government, and public on an issue that previously ranked lower on the political agenda. In the same way, Kingdon (2003) highlights that policy issues are not self-evident. They need a little push to attract the attention of people in and around government, that push is sometimes provided by a focusing event. Birkland (1998: 54) defines a 'focusing event' as an "event that is sudden; relatively uncommon; can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater future harms; has harms that are concentrated in a particular geographical area or community of interest; and that is known to policymakers and the public simultaneously". In essence, focusing events can be characterised by five key features: they are sudden; uncommon; harmful; concentrated on a geographical area or community; and known to policymakers and the public simultaneously.

Moreover, literature suggests that attention-grabbing events (focusing events) influence the government agenda after the shock disrupts the system, as they generate external pressure for status-quo-oriented groups to respond (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Birkland, 1998). They must internally respond to external shocks which implies complex information processing due to the 'bottleneck of attention' (Simon, 1985), which explains that policymakers have limited time, attention and cognitive abilities. In this regard, Fernández-i-Marín et al. (2019) explain the process that is triggered by external shocks and how these shocks impact the relative position of subsystem demands and competition for political attention at the system level. They highlight that external shock require policymakers to assess demands from different policy subsystems in terms of their crisis implications, which functions as a 'filter of relevance'. The political system experiences pressure to redirect its focus of attention towards those policy subsystems that are closely associated with the shock. As a result, policy demands that have no direct relevance to the crisis are put aside on the governmental agenda and kept in parallel processing at subsystem level, while policy demands associated with the shock are handle in serial processing at system level.

According to Birkland (1998) focusing events serve as key opportunities for pro-change groups (also referred as disadvantaged groups; out-of-power groups, opposing groups, contending groups, or simply interest groups), government leaders, policy entrepreneurs, the media, or other members of the public, to send messages of discontent with the existing policies that had been effectively suppressed by dominant groups (also known as pro-status-quo groups). These signals of discontent may involve challenging the existing policy image, potentially leading to a search for alternative solutions following a perception of policy failure. As a result, this can open an 'policy window' for groups seeking for policy change.

According to Kingdon (2003: 165), a "the policy window is an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems". Kingdon (2003) explains that a policy window can open because of a change or shift in the national mood (also called the climate of the country; changes in the public opinion; or broad social movements), or it may open because a new problem captures the attention of governmental officials. There are also occasions when a problem become pressing, creating an opportunity for advocate group. For instance, he points out energy shortages, which often capture the government's attention. These policy windows or opportunities for action, present themselves and stay open for only short periods, therefore, advocates of proposals rush to take advantage of them, seizing the opportunity (Kingdon, 2003).

Similarly to Kingdon's policy window, Birkland (1998) highlights that a focusing event on its own is insufficient to produce policy change. It requires that pro-change actors to capitalise on the event, expand the pro-change participants, and apply greater pressure on status-quo-oriented groups. Similarly to Downs' (1972) 'issue-attention cycle', Birkland (1998) considers that focusing events do not automatically lead to policy changes. The impact of external events on policies depends on media coverage and social mobilization (external pressure), as well as on the political actors' positions within the policy domain (internal response). Policy change can be expected after a focusing event if the nature and harm caused by the event are visible, which involves mediatization, if an interest group is mobilised, and if this group can instrumentalise this event to promote its own values, beliefs, and interests (Walgrave and Varone, 2008). In the same way, Cairney (2019) supports the view that a focusing event on its own is not sufficient as a problem "already in the back of people's minds" (Kingdon, 1984: 103) may require to be reinforced.

3.5. The role of the policy entrepreneur in the punctuation process

According to Kingdon (2003), policy entrepreneurs can capitalise on a focusing event and take advantage of the policy window to push their demands. Policy entrepreneurs are described by Kingdon (2003) as advocates who are willing to invest their resources (time, energy, reputation, money) to promote a position in exchange for anticipated future gains in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits. These entrepreneurs can be in or out government, in elected positions, in interest groups or research organisations. In essence, policy entrepreneurs are individuals willing to invest their resources in return for the future implementation of policies they favour. Kingdon (2003) highlights that policy entrepreneurs can be motivated by combinations of reasons, such as their genuine concern about problems, their pursuit of self-serving benefit, claiming credit for accomplishments, promoting their policy values, and enjoying participating. Thus, policy entrepreneurs push for problem definitions that favour its view and motivations.

According to Michaud (2019) crises serve as triggering event, focusing the media, government, political parties, and public attention on issues that were previously lower on the political agenda. This creates a window of opportunity to policy entrepreneurs and excluded groups from the policymaking process to push forth their long-standing demands. Attention is linked to the ability of pro-change actors or policy entrepreneurs to convince more participants to support their cause. This may involve a battle or political conflict over the existing policy image and the 'rival' or 'new' policy image (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). This battle over policy images may explain why focusing events can lead to interest group mobilization. Hence, pro-status-quo and pro-change groups often actively seek to expand the conflict or contain issues after a focusing event takes place (Birkland, 1998). Nevertheless, triggering or focusing events are only one element of the policy process. They create opportunities for advocacy, which policy entrepreneurs can leverage to advance their preferred problem frames and solutions related to a policy issue (Cairney, 2019). In this respect, policy entrepreneurs can take advantage of these events by using a combination of attention-grabbing strategies, such as appealing to those not currently involved in the debate (Cairney, 2019: 35), using conflict expansion techniques outlined by the conflict expanders Schattschneider (1960) and Cobb and Elder (1983), and promoting mass mobilization of interest groups (Birkland, 1998).

These attention-grabbing strategies may imply policy image manipulation. For instance, the association of the new policy image with core political values can be communicated by policy entrepreneurs directly and simply through image and rhetoric, using ideas such as 'progress, participation', 'patriotism', 'independence from foreign domination', 'fairness', 'economic growth' (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009: 7). Additional strategies that can be used by policy entrepreneurs to advance their preferred policy images and solutions include, assigning responsibility and using 'causal stories' that highlight the root cause of the problem and identify those to blame (Cairney, 2019). An additional attention-grabbing strategy involves the use of measurement of policy problems (Cairney, 2019: 158), which may be so complex or ambiguous, and subject to as much interpretation and debate as issue framing. This can also be used by policy entrepreneur to push their long-standing demands and preferred policy image and policy solutions. Moreover, policy entrepreneurs can also capitalise on focusing events by using a dual strategy: presenting a 'new' or 'rival' policy image while simultaneously seeking more receptive policy venues (Cairney, 2019: 36). This strategy involves re-framing the problem and image manipulation as key element that may lead to policy image and venue shifts and venue shopping. As previously explained, the interaction between policy images and venue shifts is a core concept of PET framework This interaction process may amplify positive feedback and facilitate policy change (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).

The combination of these attention-grabbing strategies, aimed at exerting external pressure from pro-change groups, may provoke an internal response from pro-status-quo groups. In this context, political actors within the policy domain may attempt to restrict participation or promote countermobilization to preserve their advantageous position (Birkland, 1998: 73). The actors may also frame the policy issue to make it appear technical and relevant only to experts (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). They may argue that the focusing event is not as significant as opposing groups claim and that the policy proposed by the contending groups would be ineffective or counterproductive (Birkland, 1998: 57).

As a result, policy entrepreneurs may appeal to those not currently involved in the debate, expanding the sphere of participation. According to Cairney (2019), attention seeking strategies, such as expanding public participation and mobilization, can help disrupt the equilibrium and stimulate punctuation. Issue expansion requires re-framing from a focus on self-interest to a problem that resonates with the public. The battle between pro-change and pro-status-quo, therefore, implies a political struggle, involving conflict over the definition of

policy images, between the existing policy image and the 'new' rival policy image (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009: 28). This political struggle or political conflict is identified by Schattschneider (1975: 65), who states that politics deals with the effort to use conflict. "The most powerful instrument for the control of conflict is conflict itself". True et al. (2007: 63) build on Schattschneider's work, they highlight that macro-level attention leads to macro-politics which is the politics of 'punctuation', the politics of large-scale change, competing policy images, political manipulation, and positive feedback. They emphasise on the notions of macrolevel, large-scale politics and competing policy images. In this respect, Baumgartner and Jones (2009: 36) provide support to the idea of macro-politics and conflict expansion, they state that "the most powerful strategy of politics is to enlarge or limit the scope of the debate to include or exclude those groups whom one can predict will be for or against one's position".

Schattschneider's (1960) conception of conflict expansion suggests that the "losers" in a policy debate, also referred as opposing groups, contending groups or pro-change groups by Birkland (1998), are motivated to expand the number of participants in search for allies. They achieve this by appealing to those not currently involved in the debate. By attracting the right group of potential participants, they may be able to change their 'losing' position into a 'winning' one, as more people join and actively support their side in the debate (cited in Baumgartner and Jones, 2009: 35). In this sense, Schattschneider (1960) noted that the essence of political conflict lies in the scope of participation. The competition between 'winners' and 'losers' in the policy dispute gives incentives for the "losers" to expand the scope of conflict and seek for outside support by bringing new participants. Schattschneider (1975: 16), explains that competitiveness serves as the mechanism for expanding the scope of conflict. "It is the loser who calls in outside help". That is because of the 'expanding universe of politics.' On the contrary, "any attempt to monopolize politics is almost by definition an attempt to limit the scope of conflict".

Cobb and Elder (1972; 1983) build on Schattschneider's conflict expansion work, suggesting that conflict expansion is a process of mobilising increasingly larger groups to enlarge the share of participation. They argue that conflict expands from specialists to attentive publics, then to the informed general public, and finally reaches the public agenda, often leading to dismantling of policy monopolies (cited in Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). Schattschneider's (1960) conception of conflict expansion and later work by Cobb and Elder (1972), form the basis of Baumgartner and Jones (2009) notion of expanding participation, including venue shift, venue-

shopping, and the importance of policy image. Baumgartner and Jones (2009: 9) picture this policy images battle between 'losers' and 'winners' as the epic battle between poor David and powerful Goliath, with the latter holding the advantageous position due to his technical expertise, inside contacts, and legal skills. However, the much poorer David improves his position by appealing to those previously uninvolved, seeking outside help from the excluded, and choosing a venue where his special skills are reinforced.

There are many strategies through which pro-change group seek to expand the sphere of participation in a policy image dispute. Cobb et al. (1976: 127) make the important point that expanding awareness of the policy issue, whether to promote or prevent expansion, involves re-definition of the issue, which implies "the substitution of one issue for another, usually a more specific issue being re-defined into a more general one". As a result, an expansion process is likely to involve several re-definitions of the issues as increasingly diverse groups become involved. This re-definition of the policy issue may involve framing 'casual stories', assigning responsibility and proposing new solutions. According to Stone (1989; 2002) assigning responsibility is a strategy aimed at prompting or justifying policy intervention. This strategy often involves using causal stories to highlight the underlying cause of the problem, identifying who is responsible and who should be blamed. In most cases, multiple competing narratives and stories of blame are likely to emerge (cited in Cairney, 2019). Moreover, policy issues only become problems when a solution is proposed (Kingdon, 1984). Therefore, attracting more participants to the conflict often requires presenting new solutions for address the policy problem. However, since policy problems may be highly complex or ambiguous, Cairney (2019) highlights that the measurement used by governments are open to interpretation. As a result, policy entrepreneurs may manipulate or strategically frame a policy image by changing the scope of their measurements to provide different interpretations, ultimately drawing more participants to the debate.

Policy entrepreneurs may also follow a dual strategy of policy image and venue shift. Baumgartner and Jones (2009: 36) identifies a dual strategy that relies less on mass mobilization compared to the approach proposed by the conflict expanders (Schattschneider, 1960; and Cobb and Elder, 1972). This dual strategy consists of presenting policy images and seeking for a more receptive venue. These strategies may be more complex and targeted than mass mobilisation, as they involve identifying allies in specific venues that are more favourable to considering the 'new' policy image(s). a key element of this strategy is policy image

manipulation (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). Some examples of these venues include congressional committees, state government organisations, courts, private businesses, or any other relevant institution that can serve as venue for potential allies.

As policy entrepreneurs seek to attract the attention of a new groups in different venues, they may need to explain why the issue is appropriate for consideration within that specific venue. Consequently, they often modify the policy image through strategic framing and manipulation to make it more appealing to their target venue (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009: 36). This is possible because policy issues are multifaceted, providing a wide range of images that can be instrumentalised to resonate in different venues. This strategy implies a process of re-framing. "Framing involves the definition of a policy's image, to portray and categorise issues in specific ways" (Cairney, 2019: 156). For instance, policy entrepreneurs can frame policy problems to link them to broader social values, reinforcing participation and attracting attention. They may link ideas to popular values such as "progress, participation, patriotism, independence from foreign domination, fairness, economic growth" (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 7).

A change in policy image is an essential pre-condition for a change in venue because the allocation of an issue to a specific venue is reinforced by a policy image that justifies its placement. Changing the policy image leads to a shift in the venue responsible for addressing the issue (Princen, 2013). In PET (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009), this process is referred by Baumgartner and Jones (2009) as 'venue-shopping', an attention-grabbing strategy used by policy entrepreneurs to seek more favourable policy venues. As additional venues become involved, they contribute to the further re-definition of the issue, creating a dynamic where shifts in image and venue constantly reinforce each other. According to Baumgartner and Jones (2009: 37) "with each change in venue comes an increased attention to a new image, leading to further changes in venue, as more and more groups within the political system become aware of the question". As a result, policy entrepreneurs and pro-change groups may try to promote the shift from one venue to another as this interaction increases their changes to improve their political position that facilitate policy change. In this respect, Baumgartner and Jones (2009) highlight that venue and policy image shifts are likely to have a continuing effect, as a single change in venue may lead to later changes in policy image, leading to additional changes in venue, and still further changes in policy images.

The interaction between policy image and venue shift is a central mechanism in PET model as it plays a crucial role in driving policy change. Baumgartner and Jones (2009: 37) states that "the interactions of image and venue may produce a self-reinforcing system characterised by positive feedback". In PET, positive feedback occurs when a change in policy image and venues amplifies future changes. Some terms used to describe such process include: 'feeding frenzy', 'cascade'; 'tipping point'; 'momentum'; or 'bandwagon effect' (True et al., 2007: 61). That is because positive feedback may lead to rapid change, cascading policy change, and establishing a new policy equilibrium.

Birkland (1998) argues that pro-status-quo groups may respond defensively to the attention-grabbing strategies used by pro-change groups after a focusing event disrupts the system. That is because pro-status-quo groups also referred as 'powerful groups' or 'favoured groups', may perceive public mobilisation and conflict expansion as threats that may reduce their power to control the agenda. In this respect, Schattschneider's (1960) points out that as part of the process of conflict expansion, the winning side may attempt to restrict participation to preserve its advantageous position. In the same way, Cobb et al. (1976: 127) state that "issue expansion is far from automatic. Opponents will actively attempt to contain expansion, in particular if the status quo is to their advantage". There are many defensive strategies that can be implemented by pro-status-quo groups to maintain their advantageous position. For instance, favoured groups may attempt to undermine the significance of the focusing event by arguing that it is less important than claimed by opposing groups, minimising the impact of the focusing event. They may also argue that the existing policies are able to deal with any problems; or that, if a new policy is needed, the policy proposed by the contending groups would be ineffective or counterproductive (Birkland, 1998: 57). Moreover, more powerful groups may attempt to discourage new participants by providing them with alternative explanations of the meaning and significance of the focusing event, re-framing the problem, due to the fact that policy issues are multifaceted, pro-status-quo groups may frame policy problems to make them appear complex and technical, hence relevant only to experts, (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009: 7), discouraging public attention. Governments can also change the scope of their measurements as policy problems can be ambiguous and therefore, with room for interpretation (Cairney, 2019).

Birkland (1998: 73) assumes that the mobilization of one group inevitably triggers the countermobilization of another, since powerful groups perceive serious threats to their

privileged position. When pro-change group gains political advantage, opposing groups mobilize to defend their interests. He states that "a focusing event can trigger extensive interest group mobilisation but can also be followed by aggressive efforts at countermobilization". However, Baumgartner and Jones (2009: 4-5) note some important instances where countermobilizations have not occurred. In their view, major political decisions shaping the political system are often made in the absence of countermobilization. In this regard, according to PET (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009), punctuated equilibrium occurs if the defensive strategies implemented by pro-status-quo are unsuccessful. The result may be a long period of policy stability disrupted by rapid policy change, in which the existing policy monopoly is destroyed and a new approach to solving the problem is legitimised. As stated by Cairney (2019: 150), PET implies a process in which "some policy monopolies are created and maintained while others are destroyed".

3.6. The role of political parties in punctuated equilibrium

According to Baumgartner et al. (2017) the analysis of the role of parties has emerged a new area of research in PET, reflecting the increasing application and expansion of the original PET model of agenda-setting (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 2009). In the same way, Kuhlmann and van der Heijden (2018) find that there is a growing emphasis on the role of political parties in PET studies, which may reveal potential gaps in the PET framework. However, only a small number of empirical studies focusing on the role of political parties in PET have examined countries outside the US, the UK, or other European contexts. Case studies on developing countries, particularly non-Anglo and non-European countries, are even rarer, highlighting a significant gap in literature.

In this respect, Carter and Jacobs (2014) support the view that parties play a key role in policy-making. However, they note that party politics was only briefly mentioned in the original version of the PET model. Similarly, Farstad et al. (2022), find that the role of party politics in Norway is significant in setting the political agenda and shaping decision-making. Therefore, they suggest revising PET framework to better integrate the influence of political parties. Therefore, it is crucial to analyse the contribution of political parties in punctuated equilibrium, as they can either maintain the status quo by institutionalizing attention and blocking policy change; or facilitate and drive radical policy change.

Several case studies on agenda-setting, based on qualitative evidence, have confirmed the central role of political parties in influencing attention dynamics and driving policy change. For instance, Walgrave and Varone (2008) highlight that parties can deliberately push a policy or keep it off the political agenda in Belgium. That is because in some political systems, political parties are key players in the policy-making process and the leaders of the political parties are present in all crucial decisions and in all institutional venues. They argue that political parties can be resilient, resisting policy change by blocking it, even after disruptive focusing events deeply shock the political system and exert significant pressure on decision-makers. Despite this, political parties remain in control and can block any change due to the dominance of party systems.

Political scientists like Clark et al. (2012) categorise democracies based on the type of party system they exhibit, typically distinguishing between them by the number and size of the parties involved. Clark et al. (2012: 611) identify five different types of party systems: non-partisan democracy; single-party system; one-party dominant system; two-party system, and multi-party system. They highlight that single-party systems exist only in dictatorships, where only one political party is legally allowed to hold power. While non-partisan and one-party dominant systems are relatively rare in democracies, they explain that a non-partisan democracy is a democracy with no official political parties. In contrast, a one-party dominant system is one in which multiple parties may legally operate, but only one party has control over the political system, has a realistic chance of gaining power, and whose future defeat cannot be foreseen or is unlikely to take place in the near future since it has continuously won elections. Moreover, a two-party system is one in which only two major political parties or alliances have a realistic chance of holding power and forming a majority, while other parties may co-exist but are very minor or only in specific regions. A multi-party system is one in which more than two parties, either separately or in coalition, have a realistic change of holding power and gaining control over the executive power or other government offices (Clark et al., 2012).

Other empirical studies applying PET such as Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008) find that political parties play a key role in determining which issues rise to the top of the agenda and which remain off it. This is, to some extent, to the fact that in some political systems, parties maintain a strong institutionalization of attention (Green-Pedersen and Wolfe, 2009). Baumgartner and Jones (1993; 2009) highlight that policy monopolies induce and maintain long-term stability. The idea of policy monopolies suggests that attention and policies become

institutionalized, which in turn generates long-term stability. In this respect, Green-Pedersen and Wolfe (2009) explain that policy monopolies imply a political system that contains powerful mechanisms to institutionalize attention. That is, a political system in which attention to political issues disappears after an initial punctuation due to control or monopoly of attention.

The existing literature within PET of agenda-setting points to different mechanisms of institutionalizing attention in dominant party systems (Walgrave et al., 2006; Baumgartner et al., 2006; Peter, 2006; Green-Pedersen, 2007; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008; Green-Pedersen and Wolfe; 2009). First, the existence of relatively stable groups of policymakers and non-governmental interests who share a policy image, with their interaction organised through political institutions such as the executive branch. Second, the party system is, if not the single political venue, at least the dominant one, making the system resistant to new policy issues due to the lack of alterative political venues and dominance of parties as access points. Third, there are no conflict lines, or are very stable overtime due to lack of party competition or because of parties' selective emphasis rather than direct confrontation. Fourth, the policy issue-attention in party dominant systems is difficult to capture because they nearly monopolise attention, with small, consensual, and homogenous policy subsystems.

In the same way that the absence of partisan competition and the lack of political conflict are elements that help explain political stability, the monopoly of attention also blocks radical policy change (Walgrave and Varone, 2008). In this sense, partisan competition for the electorate and parties' incentives to distinguish themselves are central to understanding period of punctuations. This is because party competition and political friction in a multi-party-political systems contribute to draw attention to policy-issues (Walgrave and Varone, 2008). In this respect, Carter and Jacobs (2014) particularly emphasize the critical role of party competition in explaining why radical policy change became possible. Similarly, Farstad et al. (2022) find that political parties have played a crucial role as policy entrepreneurs, since competition between parties influences the policy process. Therefore, examining how political parties compete to set the political agenda is the result of the expansion of PET and the development of a new research agenda (Baumgartner et al., 2017).

Most scholars agree that political parties respond to their competitors driven by incentives, such as the need to distinguish themselves from other parties to attract the electorate. Empirical

case studies such as Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008) in Denmark and Sweden, focus on political parties' incentives to compete and draw attention to different policy-issues. According to Green-Pedersen (2007) and Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008), party competition can be understood through the two principles of dominance and dispersion developed by Riker (1996). Parties are attentive to the electorate but drawing attention to an issue on which all parties have share views is not attractive. Therefore, parties will try to divert attention from such issues, this is the principle of dispersion. For a political party, it is therefore much more profitable to focus on policy-issues where the electorate is on its side, or where it has "issue ownership" (Petrocik, 1996), and where there is a conflict with other parties. Riker calls this the "dominance principle". That is because, parties in multi-party systems have the incentive and interest to politicize an issue to distinguish themselves from other parties and draw them to the political conflict (Green-Pedersen, 2007).

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

4.1. Introduction

This chapter outlines the methodological design, explains the data analysis process, and justifies the chosen qualitative analytical approaches. This thesis employs an explanatory case study to investigate why and how attention to new policy-issues emerges in Mexican energy politics. According to Yin (2017), a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are unclear, and the researcher has limited control over the events. Explanatory case studies focus on establishing casual relationships rather than describing a situation, identifying causes, presenting data, constructing a narrative to explain explanation policy shifts. This study takes into consideration methodologies to establish casual inference, including process tracing and congruence analysis (George and Bennett, 2005), pattern matching (Berg, 2007), and explanation building (Yin, 2017). Process tracing and congruence analysis assess whether and how specific causes influenced a change. Pattern matching compares theoretical predictions with observed empirical patterns, while explanation building extends patterns matching to construct casual links explaining how and why events unfolded.

This explanatory case study on Mexico is particularly valuable given the recent radical and rapid policy change in its oil and refining sector, reflecting a global energy paradigm shift towards greater state intervention. While considerable attention has been paid to the world's major oil producers and petrostates (Fattouh and Sen, 2021; Fattouh, 2020; Goldthau and Westphal, 2019; Fattouh et al., 2019; Tagliapietra, 2019; Raimondi and Tagliapietra, 2020; Rodríguez et al., 2012; Fattouh and Economou, 2019; Luciani and Moerenhout, 2020; Arezki, 2017; Shehabi, 2019), Mexico, currently a mid-sized oil producer and a former petrostate during the 1977-1985 Mexican oil boom, experienced a sharp decline in production after its largest oil field, Cantarell, peaked in 2004, due to overexploitation to maximise crude oil exports (Macleod, 2004; Morales, 2020; Solorio and Tosun, 2023; Sánchez-Cano, 2014; Gil-Valdivia, 2008; Gavin, 1996; Pastor and Wise, 2005; Snoeck, 1989). As a result, it has received comparatively less scholarly attention. Yet, Mexico's energy sector, particularly, oil revenues

continue to play a significant role in public finances and economic stability, primarily through PEMEX (Presidency, 2024). Mexico consistently ranks among the world's top 15 oil producers and is the fourth largest in the Americas, after the US, Canada and Brazil (IEA, 2024). Despite this, Mexico is often neglected in empirical studies, primarily because not considered one of the main players. Nevertheless, nearly a quarter of the global oil production comes from fossil-fuel-rich developing countries like Mexico (IEA, 2023), many of which remain highly vulnerable to economic fluctuations and their impact on public finances due to their heavy reliance on crude oil exports. Particularly Mexico has historically exported crude oil to the US while importing refined products in return, making it vulnerable to fuel price volatility and trade policies, and leaving its energy security heavily dependent on the US (PEMEX, 2021). This oversight in literature highlights the importance of this explanatory case study, which is both timely and essential for understanding the mechanisms through which macro-level attention drives policy change in Mexican energy politics. It also offers perspectives that can illustrate similar policy change processes in other fossil fuel-rich developing countries.

This Chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 outlines the methodological approaches used to analyse the collected data, detailing the three key steps of the analysis process. Section 4.3 reviews the qualitative analytical approaches, explaining the rationale behind their selection and addressing anticipated challenges. Section 4.4. discusses the data collection period and the challenges expected before conducting field research. Section 4.5. examines the challenges encountered during the field research and the strategies implemented to address them. Finally, Section 4.6. provides a recapitulation of the analysed data included in this study.

4.2. Methodological approaches for analysing the collected data

Punctuated Equilibrium characterises agenda-setting and policy change in long periods of incremental reform and short bursts of dramatic change (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). This approach emphasises how policy actors and political systems allocate attention to problems and prioritise issues that present trade-offs (Baumgartner and Jones, 2005). This explanatory study applies Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, employing qualitative analysis and data triangulation through integrated approaches to ensure a comprehensive examination of collected data. The analysis proceeds through three key steps, which are structured as follows:

The first approach uses text-as-data (Workman et al., 2022), applying the lens of punctuated equilibrium model, this thesis identifies PET's core components in the case of Mexico's oil sector, including the dominant energy policy image at different points in time, interacting institutional venues, focusing events, policy actors and policy entrepreneurs (Chapter 3, Section 3.2). As highlighted by Workman et al. (2022), the agenda-setting component of punctuated equilibrium requires measuring the discourse about policy topics across time. There are two key initial questions: First, how does the discourse on oil and refining evolve within Mexican energy politics? Specifically, how much attention does the Mexican political system allocate to oil and refining issues? Second, how does the overall oil and refining policymaking agenda shift over time? This is achieved through qualitative analysis of interview transcripts, identifying recurring themes, persistent phases, keywords, and dominant ideas, as well as the key actors involved in the events. This analysis employs text-as-data to highlight how discourse connects policy-issues with policy solutions (Workman et al., 2022). These findings are then triangulated with critical discourse analysis of presidential statements from four administrations: Fox, Calderón, Peña Nieto and AMLO, focusing particularly on López Obrador's campaign speech and his 1,423 daily morning press conferences. Additionally, government and party advertising campaigns in the media, along with parliamentary debates on energy policy-issues, are analysed to highlight the links between these themes in party-political discourse. Furthermore, to enhance reliability, mitigate potential biases, and address interpretative challenges inherent in qualitative data, findings are cross verified with longitudinal data from primary and secondary sources. This thesis specifically examines macroeconomic, budgetary, and PEMEX context-related indicators (2000-2024) to identify trends, detect patterns, and distinguish periods of equilibrium, characterised by stability and incremental changes, from moments of punctuation, marked by rapid and radical shifts in Mexico's oil and refining sector.

Second, after analysing the core elements of PET model in the Mexican context, the focus shifts to identifying the characteristics of Mexico's energy model during periods of equilibrium and punctuation, as well as its potential alignment with global shifts in energy paradigms described by Goldthau (2012) (Chapter 5, Section 5.3). This study examines the characteristics of statism, neoliberalism, and interventionism energy paradigms, along with their respective policy agenda priorities and governance patterns. This is achieved by categorising text into a topical classification system across time and space (Workman et al., 2022). This research conducts a discourse analysis of interviews transcripts, presidential statements, and

government advertising campaigns from the presidencies of Fox, Calderón, Peña Nieto and AMLO. Particular attention is paid to the dominant policy image each president projected for the direction of the energy sector and their policy agenda priorities. This analysis classifies themes, keywords and dominant ideas used in political discourse based on Goldthau's (2012) framework for changing energy paradigms. For instance, the liberal energy paradigm is characterised by a policy agenda that prioritises private sector involvement, viewing energy as a market commodity. Its governance patterns emphasise the 'de-integration' of the energy value chain, 'free-market' exchange, and a 'state role' limited to rule-setting and regulation. In contrast, keywords reflecting the state-interventionist approach treat energy as a 'strategic asset'. The interventionist energy paradigm follows a 'vertically integrated' governance pattern and a 'backward-integrated' value chain, with the state acting as the primary stakeholder responsible for safeguarding the 'public interest' (Goldthau, 2012). To provide context and identify patterns in the oil and refining sector, the analysis integrates a historical review from primary and secondary sources. This approach offers deeper insight into the underlying attention dynamics shaped by the policy challenges encountered during these presidential terms, such as the rising of fuel prices.

Third, this thesis then examines the actors, mechanisms, and incentives that shape attention dynamics in driving policy change within Mexican energy politics, with a particular emphasis on the policy entrepreneur and political parties. To this end, this thesis analyses AMLO's instrumentalization of several attention-grabbing strategies in his political discourse, including leveraging media through his morning conferences for venue-shopping (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009), expanding conflict (Schattschneider, 1960; Cobb and Elder, 1983; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), mobilising the masses (Birkland, 1998), shifting policy image and venues (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), associating policy image to core social values (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), using casual narratives and blame attribution (Cairney, 2019), and leveraging a nationalist political discourse to build support for his preferred policy image for the energy sector's direction (Tornel, 2021; Dresser, 2022; Panibratov et al., 2022; Covarrubias and Gallegos, 2024). This is achieved through machine collaboration (Workman et al., 2022), using tools like Amlopedia (2024) to identify recurring themes, keywords, dominant energy policy images, narratives, and rhetoric strategies. Amlopedia, an AI-powered search engine that aggregates information from AMLO's 1,423 daily morning conferences held between 2018 and 2024, all publicly accessible on the presidency's YouTube channel. Amlopedia systematically catalogues every word spoken by the president since the beginning of his term,

enabling the identification of patterns and strategies. This supports both qualitative and quantitative analysis of large textual, visual or audio-visual datasets, with particular focus on AMLO's nationalistic narrative and rhetoric strategies. The findings are then cross verified through data triangulation, including the examination of interview transcripts and government advertising campaigns in the media. Moreover, to understand the role of political parties in either blocking or driving policy change, as well as their incentives to draw attention to energy policy-issues, this thesis analyses the interview transcripts with policymakers directly involved in these events, such as Deputies from the major political parties. It also examines parliamentary debates and party position on energy policy-issues, and party advertising campaigns in the media. This analysis is further supported by an extensive review of party manifestos, parliamentary documents, and legislative records, including the 2008 and 2013 energy reforms.

4.3. Qualitative analytical approaches and data triangulation

This study examines how macro-level attention shapes policy-issues in the Mexico's oil and refining sector. By comparing the theoretical assumptions of the PET model with the empirical observations, it seeks to establish causal links explaining why and how energy policy-issues gain macro-level attention on the Mexican political agenda. To enhance reliability and validity of the findings, this research integrates qualitative analytical approaches with data triangulation, a methodological strategy that mitigates potential biases and limitations of relying on a single approach or data source (Flick, 2018). Data triangulation combines multiples qualitative approaches such as interviews, surveys, and observations across different actors, locations and time periods. This approach to cross-verify findings strengthens, credibility, reduces bias, and provides a more comprehensive understanding of the complex research questions (Flick, 2018).

The key qualitative methods include intensive semi-structured interviews with key policy actors, discourse analysis of presidential statements, examination of government and party advertising campaigns, parliamentary debates and political party positions on energy policy-issues. Additionally, a documentary review of historical material provides contextual evidence from primary and secondary sources. To identify patterns, trends and policy dynamics in the oil and refining sector from 2000 to 2024, the analysis integrates longitudinal data on key macroeconomic, budgetary, and PEMEX context-related indicators.

4.3.1. Semi-structured interviews with key policy actors

The qualitative analysis includes conducting a set of intensive semi-structured interviews with key governmental and non-governmental policy actors involved in Mexico's energy and refining sector. A selection criterion has been developed to identify relevant stakeholders who participated in the agenda-setting and policymaking process. This section also outlines anticipated challenges in conducting interviews and the strategies to overcome them. The primary objective of the interviews is to gather qualitative insights from the stakeholders involved in the process of stability and recent policy change in the Mexican oil sector. These interviews aim to understand why some policy issues gain prominence on the government agenda, specifically, why and how attention shifts within Mexico's political agenda. The interviews seek to unravel why, after a long period of political stability and incremental changes, refining suddenly emerged as a top priority on Mexico's energy agenda. The interviews will also help identify competing policy images, the groups behind them, and any policy entrepreneurs, who may have instrumentalized the focusing event to attract macro-level attention to the energy sector.

4.3.1.1. Criteria for selecting and conducting interviews

The selection criterion follows the PET model of agenda setting (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 2009), which explains how external shocks or 'focusing events', draw public, media, and government attention. Pro-change actors or 'policy entrepreneurs', leverage these attention-grabbing events to shift policy images and venues, re-define issues and expand participation, often using media and mass mobilizations (True et al., 2007). Given PET's emphasis on the roles of the government, media, and the public in the policymaking process, interview candidates are selected based on the criteria aligned with the categories identified by Cairney and Weible (2015), which distinguish both governmental and non-governmental policy actors involved in the process.

The selection criterion divides expert interviews into two main groups: governmental and non-governmental policy actors. The first group include political figures directly engaged in the policymaking process such as politicians, public officials, deputies, senators, and legislators in energy commissions, as well as bureaucrats involved during the stability (or 'equilibrium period') period and the policy change ('punctuation') period, as defined by Baumgartner and

Jones (1993; 2009). The second group comprises non-governmental policy actors, including energy reports and journalists, private sector industry leaders, businesspeople, industry consultants, non-profit organisations, and academics[1].

Relevant policymaker actors include public officials with past or current roles in government agencies directly or indirectly related to the energy sector, such as the Secretariat of Energy (SENER), the Secretariat of Economy (SE), the Secretariat of Environment (SEMARNAT); the Secretariat of the Treasury and Public Credit (SHCP), as well as state-owned companies such as *Petróleos Mexicanos* (PEMEX), and autonomous bodies like the Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE). This category also encompasses political party leaders and party members. Given that most policy issues are multifaceted, these policy actors are expected to offer diverse perspectives on the same issue, reflecting a wide range of policy images (Cairney, 2019). The media group includes various platforms such as television, print and digital media, all of which are considered key actors in the process of PET of agenda-setting. According to Baumgartner and Jones (2009), the media plays a critical role in the policymaking process by directing attention to different aspects of the policy issue over time and shifting attention from one issue to another (Kingdon, 2003). Though mediatization, the media helps to move the policy issue from the policy subsystem to the macro-level attention. As stated by Baumgartner and Jones (2009: 103) "the media reflect most forcefully the intense hopes and fears present in policy arguments surrounding public policies". Some examples of potential interviews include energy journalists who have covered key events such as the period before and after the 2013 energy reform, the liberalization of gasoline prices, and the 2017 protests (a focusing event), as well as the recent process of policy change in the refining sector. Notable events such as Mexico's purchase of the Deer Park refinery in the US, and construction of the new refinery in Tabasco, Mexico, have been widely mediatised. The private sector-industry group includes interviewees such as business leaders from the energy sector and from industries highly reliant on fuels and basic petrochemicals. These industries include the petrochemicals, transportation, plastics, and fertilizer, among others. Notably refineries produce not only fuels like gasolines, diesel, and jet fuel, but also essential petrochemicals for several industries. As a result, changes in Mexico's oil and refining policy have significant implications for these industries. The category of consulting firms includes interviewees such as energy consultants who have worked on energy projects or related to the refining sector in Mexico, either before and after

---

[1] See Annex 1: List of Interviewees

the 2013 energy reform or following the implementation 2018 AMLO's oil and refining policy. The 'non-profit' sector includes NGOs focused on the energy sector, while the academia category comprises interviewees affiliated with an academic institution, research institute, or think-tank conducting research on Mexico's energy sector.

4.3.1.2. Interviews challenges and strategies

Conducting field research in Mexico presents several anticipated challenges, particularly in selecting interviewees and conducting interviews, which may significantly impact the research outcomes. Below, two key problems are addressed along with strategies to mitigate them: the problems of selection bias and non-response or non-cooperation.

The method used to select the interviewees in this research implies that a random process is not carried out, which can lead to the problem of selection bias. According to King et al. (2021) random selection is not generally appropriate in small-n research, abandoning randomness introduces potential sources of bias. Therefore, the decisions regarding which interviewees to select are crucial for the validity of this this research's outcomes. The most obvious example of selection bias is knowing in advance that some of the interviewees are more likely to confirm a favourite hypothesis, explanation, or the expected outcome of the research (King et al., 2021). Similarly, Drzewiecka (2007), drawing from her field research experience in Ukraine, found that one way to avoid the problem of selection bias and produce more reliable results, was not only to conduct interviews with experts in the capital Kyiv, but also extend her research and conduct interviews in Kharkiv, the country's industrial hub. As a result, to avoid selection bias and enhance the reliability and outcome of this research on Mexico, interviews will be conducted not only in Mexico City, the country's capital, where residents have traditionally favoured left-wing parties like MORENA, with the city being their most significant stronghold in recent decades. Part of the interviews will be conducted in two additional cities: Monterrey and Durango. The city of Monterrey, located in the northeastern state of Nuevo Leon, is an important industrial hub and home to powerful business groups and multinationals. It is also in Nuevo Leon where PEMEX's Cadereyta refinery is located. In contrast, the city of Durango, in the northern state of Durango, has traditionally been governed by the PRI and PAN parties.

The second anticipated challenge relates to the problem of non-response or non-cooperation. Contacting potential interviewees and ensuring the interviews take place may represent a major

challenge. Public officials are expected to have limited time and tight agendas. Therefore, it is crucial to identify the right expert willing to cooperate and having availability. As Drzewiecka (2007: 296) notes, based on her experience conducting interviews in Ukraine, "one of the most difficult tasks is likely to be that of making contact with the person empowered to decide whether the interview will take place at all". She further highlights that even if the minister approves the interview, there is no guarantee that the desired expert will attend. There is still the possibility that the interviewee simply fails to show up. As a result, to overcome the anticipated challenges, strategies beyond patience and persistence include approaching potential interviewees at energy-related events. one example is the International Energy Meeting (EIEEM), held annually in Mexico City. These events provide opportunities to connect with potential interviewees; however, personal contacts are expected to remain one of the most effective methods for reaching them. Drzewiecka (2007) recognizes that political affiliations and personal networks are the most important ways to contacting potential interviewees. Furthermore, a commonly used strategy for recruiting participants when it is difficult to find potential interviewees is the snowball technique. This method is called a 'snowball' much like a snowball rolling downhill, it gathers more participants in the processes. The technique involves an initial interviewee recruiting additional participants for the study. Researchers frequently used this strategy to increase expand the pool of participants. Another option viable option is conducting interviews remotely. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the use of platforms such as Zoom has significantly increased, making interviewees more accessible online.

4.3.2. Discourse analysis of presidential statements

The term 'discourse analysis' has many meanings. Johnson and McLean (2020) define discourse analysis as a qualitative research method used to study the relationships between language-in-use and the social world. Manzi (2012) considers discourse analysis as a process that explores how interpretations of meaning influence, rather than merely reflect, social life. This approach involves examining discourses within broader historical and political contexts to understand the influence of language on norms, power structures and ideologies in a society.

There are many contemporary varieties of discourse analysis such as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA examines language to uncover underlying power dynamics, ideologies, and social inequalities. It seeks to understand how language contributes to maintaining or

challenging societal structures, focusing on the relationship between language and power (Johnson and McLean, 2020). For example, the impact of language on power dynamics of neoliberal capitalism (Fairclough, 2013). According to Rapley (2018) the primary focus of discourse analysis is on how language is used within certain contexts which can range from a specific moment in a conversation to a broader historical period. Some of the key objectives of discourse analysis include identifying patterns or dominant ideas in language such as recurring themes, phases and keywords, language structures, or rhetorical strategies. It also focuses on understanding the context in which the language is used, analysing the social, political, economic, or cultural factors influencing a specific use of language. Moreover, discourse analysis also explores power and political dynamics, analysing how language reflects, enforces or challenges power relations (Fairclough, 2013; Gee, 2014; Van Dijk, 2011; Wodak, and Meyer, 2015; Johnstone, 2018).

In this context, the critical-political discourse analysis of presidential statements provides valuable knowledge about the importance of energy policy-issues on the executive's political agenda and his government priorities[2]. The analysis of political discourse is a key analytical approach of thesis, broadly understood as the examination of written, oral, audio-visual or other forms of communication that explicitly or implicitly carry political ideas. There is a substantial amount of material to be analysed, as AMLO is the first president in Mexican history to provide daily briefings to journalists through the so-called "morning conferences". These conferences are broadcast live from Monday to Friday, typically running from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m., often extending until 10:00 am. Additional conferences also take place on days of national importance or during government events. These conferences are publicly available on the presidency's YouTube channel. These conferences have evolved into a key governing strategy, allowing AMLO to set Mexico's political agenda and issue directives to his cabinet to address specific issues. Government officials frequently participate, depending on the topic to be discussed, highlighting a shift in communication strategy compared to his predecessors (BBC, 2019), For example, every Monday energy-related topics such as gasoline, diesel and natural gas prices are analysed, with comparison of fuel brands and their respective prices presented to the public.

---

[2] See Annex 2: Statements

Since taking office in 2018, AMLO has led 1,423 morning press conferences as of 2024 (Milenio, 2024). The advancement of new technologies, particularly software solutions, now enables for a systematic qualitative and quantitative analysis of large amounts of textual, visual or audio-visual data. This study uses the Amlopedia (2024) search engine, which leverages Artificial Intelligence (AI) to enhance the search and analysis of information in AMLO's daily morning conferences. Amlopedia catalogues every word spoken by the president since the beginning of his term (El Pais, 2023a). Analysing these conferences, along with AMLO's campaign speeches, provides useful insight into his administration's priorities, political agenda, and policy image for the energy sector's direction (Chapter 7, Section 7.3.5.)[3]. Moreover, the use of the media to broadcast AMLO's morning conference has expanded their reach, attracting ever-larger audiences across various platforms and multiple venues, facilitating more strategic 'venue-shopping' (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 2009). Since the conferences are frequently held in different states, they are not only viewed by millions of people through numerous media but also have widespread impact across the country. In 2023, AMLO's daily morning press conference broadcasts attracted nearly 50 million views on YouTube (Infobae, 2023a), allowing him, during his political tours, to connect with the local policy issues and directly engage with regional concerns in local venues.

4.3.3. Analysis of government and party advertising campaigns

According to Van der Goot et al. (2023), in a multi-party-political system, the strategies political parties use in advertisements influence citizens' political participation. Political advertising can contribute to polarisation by framing specific energy policies in a positive, negative, or even fear way. As a result, political debates, cleavages, and divisions over energy policy are often reflected in political advertising campaigns. As highlighted by Huber et al. (2021), a party's discourse on energy and climate illustrates how a party frames the nature of the issues and their preferred policy solutions.

In this context, analysing governments[4] and political parties[5] advertising campaigns on energy policy issues in the media serves as a key analytical approach of this explanatory case study. These advertising campaigns are essential tools for highlighting energy policy issues, shaping

---

[3] See Table 10: Keywords in AMLO's morning conference
[4] See Annex 3: Government advertising campaigns
[5] See Annex 4: Party advertising campaigns

public perceptions, advancing their political agendas, and attracting support for their preferred policy image for the direction of the energy sector. Governments and political parties strategically frame and communicate their energy policy proposals to address public concerns and influence public opinion, focusing for instance in aspects such as economic impacts, climate considerations, energy sovereignty, energy independence, and energy security.

The analysis Chapter 6 makes use of government advertising campaigns to reflect the political discourse, energy policy image and preferred policy solutions communicated during the equilibrium period (Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2. and 6.4.2.). Chapter 8 analyses the government advertising campaigns used to justify the 2013 energy reform (Chapter 8, Section 8.4.1.), along with an analysis of parties advertising and their role in shaping the focusing event (Chapter 8, Section 8.2.4.), and contributing to the political debate on 2013 energy reform (Chapter 8, Section 8.4.2.).

4.3.4. Analysis of parliamentary debates and party positions

According to Huber et al. (2021), analysing political discourse and party positions helps determine how parties frame energy issues and advocate for their preferred policies. This study uses an additional analytical approach by examining parliamentary debates and the positions of political parties on energy issues. This includes analysing documents produced by energy-related commissions of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, such as the parliamentary debates on the federal income law for fiscal year 2017 (Congress, 2016), the 2013 energy reform debates (Congress, 2013); and the Senate's opinion on the 2013 energy reform (Senate, 2013). This approach integrates the analysis of both primary sources. Primary sources include texts related to the review of legislative acts, parliamentary debates, surveys conducted by Congress. Secondary sources consist of interpretive articles on the legislative process during the period under analysis, particularly during the 2013 energy reform. Another key set of documents analysed include those produce by the Chamber of Deputies and its specialised commissions on budget and energy. For instance, the budget and public accounts commissions play a crucial role in formulating opinions on the federal expenditure budget and evaluating tax increases on energy and fuels. As discussed in Chapter 8, which focuses on the role of political parties in punctuated equilibrium, understanding political cleavage and the energy policy images promoted by political parties is crucial in explaining their incentives to highlight energy policy issues in Mexico's multiparty system. Chapter 8 specifically analyses party

debates on energy policy, including parliamentary discussions on the approval of fuel price liberalisation (Chapter 8, section 8.2.4), and debates surrounding the 2013 energy reform (Chapter 8, section 8.4.2.).

4.3.5. Documentary analysis of historical material

This thesis conducts an extensive documentary review of historical material to uncover textual and contextual evidence from primary and secondary sources, including PEMEX business plans and reports, documents from the Energy, Finance, Economy, and Treasury secretariats, public opinion surveys, energy academic journals, and news media. This documentary analysis examines historical records to deepen the contextual understanding of the attention dynamics surrounding energy policy issues, such as the sudden and excessive increases in fuel prices, as well as evolving narratives shaping energy sector over time.

Specifically, this historical investigation seeks to improve understanding on the government, public, and, media issue-attention, as they are key actors in shaping macro-level attention within the PET framework (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 2009). To examine government issue-attention, the analysis includes documents such as National Development Plans, which outline government priorities, diagnose national challenges, and propose policy solutions over a six-year projection. Similarly, to investigate media issue-attention, this study analyses television, print and digital news media, recognising their role as key agenda-setters within PET model. Given their influence on public opinion, the media play an important role in shaping policy debates and driving shifts in attention to energy issues (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008). To examine public issue-attention, this study analyses public opinion polls that measure the "national mood" and shift in public sentiment. Public opinion is as influential as the media, as it reflects people's tolerance for policy changes (Cairney, 2019), such as energy or tax reforms that could lead to higher prices. In this context, approval rating polls are particularly valuable, as they provide insight into public support for the status quo or demand for policy change. For example, Oraculus (2022), compared the approval ratings of recent administrations, offering a perspective on shifts in the public sentiment over time. Similarly, a public opinion survey conducted by the Centre for Social Studies and Public Opinion of the Chamber of Deputies of Mexico, assessed public reactions to gasoline prices increases following the 2017 fuel protests (CESOP, 2017), illustrating how public attitudes influence Mexican energy politics.

This historical investigation also includes longitudinal data, from primary and secondary sources, on key macroeconomic, budgetary, and PEMEX indicators to identify patterns, trends and policy dynamics in the oil and refining sector from 2000 to 2024.

The nine macroeconomic indicators[6] provide economic context by drawing data from various official sources: fuel prices from the Federal Consumer Protection Agency (PROFECO), the USD/MXN exchange rate and Mexican crude oil mix prices from the Bank of Mexico, annual inflation from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), and inflation indexes such as the National Consumer Price Index (INPC) and investments in the energy sector from the Ministry of Finance and Economy. These macroeconomic indicators aim to enhance the understanding of the international and national context during periods of stability and policy change, particularly focusing on the time before and after the 2013 energy reform and the 2017 Mexican protests. These indicators also help to explain why these administrations paid considerable attention to specific policy issues while other were neglected. For example, some administrations faced high inflation levels, depreciation of the Mexican peso, rising crude oil prices, or record levels of violence due to the Mexican drug war, which could have diverted attention from the political agenda. In addition, other potential factors that contributed to the 2017 *gasolinazo* protest (Chapter 6, Section 6.5.1), such as social tension related to inequality, corruption, unemployment, poverty, lack of access to basic services, likely intensified the scenario of social unrest. Collectively, these macroeconomic indicators provide essential context for understanding why and how government attention to energy policy issues shifted over time.

The six budgetary indicators provide insight into public finance, sourcing data from the Federal Expenditure Budget (PEF). They encompass federal budget allocated to PEMEX, the historical budget trends, total funding for the energy sector, and the distribution of investment expenditures among subsidiary entities, including exploration and production, refineries, gas, and petrochemicals. Additionally, these indicators track oil revenues from crude oil exports, expenditures on gasoline imports, and tax revenues from the Special Tax on Production and Services (IEPS) and Value Added Tax (VAT) on fuel sales. These budgetary indicators are crucial in shaping public resources allocation to the energy sector, offering a broad perspective on periods of stability and policy change. As highlighted by Cairney (2019: 169) "the best

---

[6] See Annex 5: Key macroeconomic, budgetary and PEMEX indicators

demonstration of this picture of stability and change can be found in budgeting". Therefore, this thesis examines the budget trends to identify stability, incrementalism, and rapid and radical shifts. The key budgetary indicators originate from the PEF, one of Mexico's most critical public policy documents, prepared annually by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. Given the volatility of crude oil prices and fuel imports, these indicators play a vital role in federal and PEMEX budget decisions, directly influencing policy. For instance, the Mexican State may opt subsidize gasoline prices through a fiscal incentive like the IEPS (Chapter 7, Section 7.4.4.) or reduce VAT to mitigate fuel prices. These actions can have profound effects on public finances.

The six PEMEX indicators provide key insight into the company's performance, drawing from its reports and financial statements. They include revenues, net income, debt, revenues from fuel sales (gasolines, diesel and jet fuel), crude oil export volume and value, crude oil production levels. These indicators are essential for understanding PEMEX capacity to export crude oil, mange fuel imports, and sustain production, since they have significantly fluctuated with policy shifts and economic conditions during periods of stability and policy change. By tracking trends in crude oil extraction, refining, and fuel commercialization, they reveal the company's impact on internal sales, revenues, investment, debt, and overall financial resilience.

4.4. Data collection period and anticipated challenges

The data collection period covers from 2000 to 2024, which includes the presidencies of Vicente Fox, Felipe Calderón, Enrique Peña Nieto, and Andrés Manuel López Obrador (six-year terms), representing the three major political parties: PRI, PAN, and MORENA. This explanatory case study focuses on this period because it encompasses periods of stability, incrementalism, and rapid and radical policy change in the energy sector. From 2000 to 2018, the two-party system under the PAN and PRI implemented a neoliberal energy model[7], continuously from 2000 and incrementally from 2006 to 2018 (Chapter 6). The election of AMLO in 2018 marked a shift towards a multi-party-political system and a change in the energy model, characterised by a more interventionist approach (Chapter 7). This period also

---

[7] See Table 2: Party systems and energy paradigms in Mexico

highlights the growing influence of political parties in shaping punctuated equilibrium dynamics (Chapter 8).

Some of the anticipated challenges in gathering data in Mexico may arise from limitations in information availability and accessibility. Official websites often feature outdated or incomplete data, and in some cases only limited information is accessible to the public. In addition to technological limitations, cultural and political factors may pose challenges, high-level officials may be reluctant to share information, especially regarding periods that have attracted significant public attention due to allegations of corruption. An example of this is the Odebrecht case, in which senior officials, including the former PEMEX CEO Emilio Lozoya (2012- 2016), remain under investigation (BBC, 2020a). Furthermore, since the energy sector in Mexico is considered strategic and vital for national security, certain data may be withheld by the government. A notable example is the new Dos Bocas refinery, where PEMEX has classified information as "confidential", citing concerns that disclosing such details could compromise Mexico's security and economic interests (El Universal, 2021a).

4.5. Challenges and strategies during field research

The interviews were conducted in Mexico between December 2022 and April 2023. A total of 20 interviews were carried out with a diverse range of participants[8], including government officials, deputies, party leaders, businesspeople, energy consultants, think-tanks representatives, and academics. The questionnaire was designed to gather insights on both equilibrium and punctuation periods while capturing first-hand accounts of key events such as the 2013 energy reform and the 2017 *gasolinazo* protests. The semi-structured interview approach not only revealed explicit perspectives but also uncovered implicit information. The interviewees openly shared their views and opinions on the Mexican energy and refining sector, providing valuable information from their experiences and expertise. At the same time, the interviews also revealed implicit details, offering clues about the dynamics of the energy sector, institutional venues, and the party-political system, Notably, the absence of comments on a certain topic such as corruption in the energy sector under previous administrations was revealing, particularly when interviewees were affiliated with the implicated political parties.

---

[8] See Annex 1: List of interviewees

The potential for bias was anticipated as a challenge prior to conducting field research (Section 4.3.1.2.). To address this, a strategy was implemented to ensure balanced geographical distribution of interviewees. The interviews in Mexico were conducted across three cities: Mexico City, capital and stronghold of left-wing parties such as MORENA; Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, home to multinationals corporations, business groups, and PEMEX's Cadereyta refinery; and Durango, governed by traditional political parties PRI and PAN. Non-response and non-cooperation were significant challenges during the field research. With government officials being the most difficult group to interview due to their limited time and packed schedules. Many of the previously scheduled interviews were cancelled at the last minute or required long hours in the waiting room. To address these challenges, several strategies were implemented. For instance, contacting the person responsible for managing the interviewee's agenda or their superior was highly effective in securing the meeting. Additionally, reaching out to interviewees at energy-related events, such as the participation in the International Energy Meeting in Mexico City in November 2022, was crucial for expanding the pool of participants, with Politics department's support playing a key role. Personal contacts also proved to be the most effective strategy for overcoming non-cooperation and ensuring access to interviewees. The snowball technique was particularly useful during long waits, as informal conversations often led to new interviewees being recruited. Lastly, remote interviews, facilitated by COVID restrictions, greatly improved interviewee availability and cooperation.

4.6. Recap of analysed data included in this study

Chapters 6, 7, and 8 present the findings based on the evidence collected from the five data sources, as detailed in Section 4.3 of this chapter. The data included in this study are summarised as follows. A total of 20 interviews were conducted with a diverse range of participants. The findings from these interviews, presented in the three analysis chapters, are triangulated and cross-verified with the additional data sources to ensure reliability. Regarding the discourse analysis of presidential statements, this study analysed 23 presidential statements from the equilibrium period from 2000 to 2018, covering the administration of Vicente Fox, Felipe Calderón and Enrique Peña Nieto, as discussed in Chapter 6. Additionally, it includes an analysis of 1,423 morning press conferences and campaign speeches by Andrés Manuel López Obrador from the punctuation period from 2018 to 2024, as examined in Chapter 7. The government and political party advertising campaigns includes nine advertisements from the Calderón and Peña Nieto administrations, representing PAN and PRI governments

respectively. These advertisements focus on government campaigns related to the 2008 PEMEX reform and the 2013 energy reform, examined in Chapter 6. Additionally, the study reviews three political parties' advertisements, two from MORENA party and one from PT party, which are analysed in Chapter 8. The examination of parliamentary debates and party positions provides an in-depth analysis of discussions on the 2013 energy reform, comparing the positions of PAN, PRI and PRD regarding the challenges of the oil sector and highlighting their similarities and differences in their proposed reforms. This analysis, included in Chapter 8, also reviews party voting on 10 energy-related laws and the approval of six federal expenditure budgets from 2019 to 2024. Finally, the documentary analysis of historical material integrates a review of PEMEX business plans and reports, official documents from the Energy, Finance, Economy, and Treasury secretariats, public opinion surveys, energy academic journals, and news media. This historical investigation also examines key macroeconomic (9), budgetary (6), and PEMEX (6) context-related indicators to identify trends and policy dynamics in the oil and refining sector from 2000 to 2024. By triangulating data from these five sources, this study provides a comprehensive analysis of the explanatory factors shaping attention dynamics and driving policy change in Mexican energy politics, with a particular focus on the policy entrepreneur and political parties.

CHAPTER 5

BACKGROUND: CONTEXTUALIZING ENERGY PARADIGM SHIFTS IN MEXICO'S OIL SECTOR

5.1. Introduction

This chapter explores the opportunities and challenges that fossil-fuel-rich developing countries, such as Mexico, face in the global energy transition. It critically examines Van de Graaf and Sovacool's (2020) assumption of "losers" and "winners" in this shift by examining the energy strategies of major oil producers. Additionally, this chapter evaluates how some of these energy policies align with Goldthau's (2012) perspective on the recent global paradigm shift towards greater state interventionism in the energy sector, using country-specific examples to highlight Mexico's position within this broader trend. Furthermore, this chapter contextualizes the transition from a statist to a neoliberal energy model in Mexico's oil and refining sector, emphasizing its implications for energy security and fuel import dependency.

The next three analytical chapters will present qualitative evidence to explain why, after a long period of policy stability and incremental changes, refining has suddenly emerged as one of the most pressing policy-issues on Mexico's political agenda. Chapter 6 examines the continuity and incrementalism of the neoliberal energy model during the equilibrium period. Chapter 7 analyses the shift towards an interventionist energy paradigm and the role of the policy entrepreneur during the punctuation period. Finally, Chapter 8 focuses specifically on the significant role of political parties in PET.

As part of a global trend, the energy paradigm is shifting towards greater state interventionism (Goldthau, 2012). In response, some fossil-fuel-rich developing countries are adopting strategies aligned with this shift, designed to remain viable under a variety of scenarios. One strategy involves expanding their downstream segment while simultaneously diversifying their energy portfolios to integrate renewables (Fattouh and Sen, 2021; Fattouh et al., 2018; Goldthau and Westphal, 2019). Examining the energy paradigm shifts, highlighted by Goldthau (2012), is crucial as they clearly illustrate the transitions the Mexico's oil sector, from statism to liberalism and, more recently towards increased interventionism. Given Mexico's recent policy changes, this original approach to analysing Mexico's energy transitions remains largely unexplored in existing literature, making this case study both timely and valuable.

This chapter outlines the shift from a statist energy paradigm to neoliberalism in Mexico's oil sector. The literature suggests that PEMEX's financial problems, along with the 1982 economic crisis, marked the end of the era of energy statism, during which PEMEX, as a state monopoly controlled the entire value chain. The statist model focused on the vertical integration, aiming at energy self-sufficiency and industrial development (Macleod, 2004; Solorio and Tosun, 2023). In contrast, the market-driven policies of PRI presidents De la Madrid, Salinas, and Zedillo, dismantled PEMEX by closing refineries and privatizing its subsidiaries, including those in petrochemicals, fertilizers, and natural gas (Sánchez-Cano, 2014; Gil-Valdivia, 2008; Gavin, 1996; Pastor and Wise, 2005; Snoeck, 1989). As will be discussed in this chapter, the neoliberal energy model emphasised privatization, deregulation, and reducing union influence. This shift, focused on maximizing crude oil exports, increased reliance on oil revenues and imports of fuels, making a departure from the statist model that sought to domestically process crude oil into value-added products such as refined products and petrochemicals to strengthen Mexico's industry (Presidency, 2024; Morales, 2020; PEMEX, 2024).

This chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 explores the opportunities and challenges faced by fossil-fuel-rich developing countries in the global energy transition. Section 5.3 examines how the energy policies of major oil producers align with the global paradigm shift in the energy sector, providing country-specific examples to explain Mexico's position within this trend. Section 5.4. and section 5.5 contextualize the shift from a statist to a neoliberal energy model in Mexico's oil and refining sector.

5.2. The energy transition: winners and losers?

This section challenges Van de Graaf and Sovacool's (2020) assumption that, in the global energy transition process, fossil-fuel-rich developing countries are the "losers" and fossil fuel importers are the "winners". This thesis argues that, despite several challenges posed by the global energy transition to renewables, fossil-fuel-rich developing countries have many opportunities to succeed.

The global energy transition has many geopolitical implications for fossil-fuel-rich developing countries, as it involves a significant shift away from fossil fuels, which are both "fixed and finite" (Kuzemko et al., 2016: 160), and found in specific countries and locations, to alternative

energy sources that are dispersed and renewable (Van de Graaf and Sovacool, 2020). In this regard, Kuzemko et al. (2016) explain that the "fixed and finite" nature of fossil fuels such as oil and gas, have been an issue and reasons for conflict between states since fossil fuels are limited to a specific geographic area, and therefore, to the sovereignty of the territory to the state to which they belong. On the other hand, renewables, as explained by Van de Graaf and Sovacool (2020) are changing the geopolitics of energy because renewables contrary to energy from fossil fuels are much more dispersed. Therefore, countries have access to different forms of renewable energy sources within their territories, such as sun and wind, which are inexhaustible and less vulnerable to disruptions by tensions or conflicts between nations. In this context, the potential acceleration of the transition from fossil fuels to renewables could lead to changes in the relations between fossil fuel-exporting and importing countries.

Van de Graaf and Sovacool (2020:70) estimate that the increased use of renewables will create both "losers" and "winners". They argue that, in this global energy transformation, "the obvious losers are those countries highly dependent on fossil fuel export revenues" such as Angola, Kuwait and Nigeria, since they must confront significant economic, social and political challenges, they are at a clear disadvantage unless measures to transform and diversify their economies are implemented. In the same way, the NRGI (2020) considers that fossil fuel producers, especially low- and middle-income ones, risk serious long-term distress and decline if they remain dependent on export revenues. In this regard, Fattouh et al. (2019) recognise that high dependence on oil revenues and lack of fiscal diversification are key challenges faced by fossil-fuel-rich developing countries. That is because oil and gas are the primary source of fiscal revenues in countries such as Kuwait, Qatar, Algeria (Tagliapietra, 2019)[9], Venezuela (Rodríguez et al., 2012)[10], and Saudi Arabia (KPMG, 2019)[11], leaving their government budgets highly exposed to fluctuations in global oil prices.

Van de Graaf and Sovacool (2020: 70) not only point out potential "losers" in the energy transition process but also state that "the winners are the importers of fossil fuels", as they will no longer depend on imports and will begin producing energy domestically. This shift will provide them with greater autonomy in foreign policy and improve their trade balance. However, even the so-called "winners" will face challenges, including uncertainties about the

---

[9] In 2017, oil and gas revenues constituted 90% of fiscal revenues in Kuwait, 75% in Qatar and 60% in Algeria.
[10] Oil income accounts for, on average, 61% of total government income in Venezuela.
[11] In Saudia Arabia, oil continues to be the main source of government revenue, accounting for 68% of the total.

speed of the transition due to global crises, competition, and disputes over control of critical energy transition minerals (Sanderson, 2023).

Scholars such as Sovacool (2016); Simms and Newell (2017) highlight the significant uncertainty surrounding the pace of energy transitions. Similarly, Newell (2021: 49) points out that there are still unsolved questions about when and how these transitions will occur. "This includes debates about their temporality and whether they can be accelerated and, if so, over what sorts of time frame". The recent energy crisis triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine has shown how geopolitical shocks can hinder the speed of energy transition. European countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, considered often as "fast-decarbonizers" (Goldthau and Westphal, 2019), are struggling to replace oil and gas imports from Russia, while reopening coal plants and delaying the closure of nuclear plants (DW, 2022[12]; Business Standard, 2022; Euractiv, 2022; Reuters, 2023). Another factor often overlooked when categorising fossil fuel importers as "winners" is the increasing demand and global competition for access and control of critical minerals essential for the energy transition. Many of these minerals such as copper, lithium, nickel, and cobalt, are found in developing countries (IEA, 2021), potentially creating new energy security challenges for fast-decarbonizers (Sanderson, 2023).

Due to the uncertainty surrounding the pace of the energy transitions, other scholars such as Fattouh and Sen (2021); Fattouh et al. (2018); and Goldthau and Westphal (2019), have found that oil producers, particularly fossil-fuel-rich developing countries are implementing several strategies to remain competitive in different scenarios. These strategies include economic diversification, expansion of their downstream segment, and integration of renewables into their investment portfolios. For example, some oil-exporting countries have leveraged their oil and gas sectors to stimulate the development of new industries and diversity into new sectors. The UAE, for instance, has invested heavily in the services industries, notably banking, financial services, and tourism, as well as in the manufacturing and construction sectors. This diversification strategy has gradually increased non-oil revenues over the last decades (Malik and Nagesh, 2020)[13]. In this respect, according to Fattouh and Sen (2021), the economic

---

[12] Germany is heavily reliant on Russian hydrocarbon imports to meet its energy needs, with 50% of its coal, 55% of its gas, and 35% of its oil sourced from Russia.

[13] In 2011, oil export revenues accounted for 77% of the UAE's government budget while, in 2017 oil contributed 35% to the UAE government revenues.

diversification has been a key developmental goal for the Arab oil-exporting countries, since they recognise that oil rents are not sufficient and will not generate sustainable revenues to support long-term economic growth.

Fattouh et al. (2018) makes the important point that, given the uncertainty about the speed of the transition, oil exporters must adopt strategies that remain viable under a wide range of future market conditions. As highlighted by Fattouh and Sen (2021), while renewables may gradually replace hydrocarbon resources in the domestic energy mix, they will not immediately replace them as a source of government budgets. Therefore, Fattouh et al. (2018: 5) support the idea that these "countries need to gradually 'extend' their energy model rather than completely 'shift' from hydrocarbons to renewables and integrate renewables into their hydrocarbon assets", since oil-exporting countries cannot simply transform into renewable exporting countries.

Recent developments in the energy sector highlight two key strategies implemented by some fossil-fuel-rich developing countries: the first involves expanding of their downstream segment, while the second focuses on diversifying their energy portfolios to include renewables. Fattouh and Sen (2021: 86) explain that some oil-producers have opted to expand their downstream sector, as extending the value chain beyond simply producing and exporting crude oil could, in principle, help address some of the challenges such as decline in crude oil export revenues in their government budgets. As a result, they found that "oil producers are increasingly looking at petrochemicals projects as well as refinery expansions as a way of pursuing higher and more resilient margins". This is because petrochemicals are projected to be the primary drivers of crude oil consumption by 2030 (IEA, 2018a). For instance, several countries expanding their downstream sector include Nigeria, Angola, Kuwait, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman, Kazakhstan, Brazil, India, and China (Africanews, 2021; Energycapitalpower, 2021; GlobalData, 2022; S&P, 2021; Astana-Times, 2022; Argus, 2022; Fortune India, 2021; Bloomberg, 2024; Reuters, 2024).

Similarly, the state-owned oil company PEMEX has recently implemented strategies to expand its downstream oil segment, aiming to increase domestic production of fuels, petrochemicals and fertilizers, while seeking to diversify its investment portfolio (PEMEX, 2024). As will be discuss in Chapter 7, Section 7.4.2., PEMEX key projects include the modernization, construction, acquisition and expansion of new refineries in Mexico and the United States, as

well as development of green hydrogen plants, petrochemical and fertilizer complexes. This policy shift represents a radical transformation in Mexico's energy production, energy security and self-sufficiency (Presidency, 2024).

Goldthau and Westphal (2019) highlight that this strategy is creating new export opportunities for fossil-fuel-rich developing countries that have already started moving up the energy value chain by building refining capacity and developing a viable petrochemical industry. While oil-producing countries expand their downstream sector, fast-decarbonizers are phasing out some of their most energy-intensive sectors and promoting refinery closures (Fuels Europe, 2021).

Nevertheless, in the long run, diversifying their energy sector beyond oil and gas is probably unavoidable, as is increasing the use of biofuels and biochemicals (Dhamodharan et al., 2020; Hingsamer and Jungmeier, 2019; Scarlat and Dallemand, 2018; Lago et al., 2019; Bailey, 2021). Therefore, oil companies are also extending their energy portfolios to include renewables, increasingly investing in renewable energy projects such as solar and wind power, and hydrogen. For instance, the state-owned Saudi Aramco is making significant investments in solar and wind projects (NYTimes, 2024); the Brazilian state-owned Petrobras is investing in biofuels, and solar and wind projects (FT, 2024); the state-owned Malaysia's Petronas is expanding renewable energy, hydrogen and green mobility (Reuters, 2022); the state-owned QatarEnergy has unveiled a plan to build solar power plants (Renewablesnow, 2024). While other oil companies have increasingly invested in lithium to expand into renewable energy sources, storage, and batteries. For instance, ExxonMobil, Chevron and Equinor are diversifying into lithium (ExxonMobil, 2023; Financial Times, 2023; Upstream, 2024; Reuters, 2024). While Brazil's state-run oil giant Petrobras has signalled interest in investing in Bolivia's lithium (Reuters, 2023). Similar to Brazil's Petrobras, Mexico's PEMEX is diversifying its income sources by projecting to invest in Mexican lithium (MexicoBusiness, 2024). Mexico's reserves of both fossil fuels and critical minerals challenge Van de Graaf and Sovacool's (2020) view on the winners and losers of this shift. In 2023, following his nationalist discourse, AMLO nationalized the Mexican lithium, placing it under control of the government and declaring it a metal of public utility (Euronews, 2023). The new law banned the granting of concessions for its exploitation (El Financiero, 2022). As a result, PEMEX is planning to expand its operations by establishing subsidiaries (Globalenergy, 2024), with PEMEX-litio managing the lithium value chain in Mexico.

5.3. A global energy paradigm shift

This section examines Goldthau's (2012) shifting energy paradigms and their competing energy perspectives. These shifts are relevant for this study as they highlight the evolution of the energy policy agenda and help understand the recent global paradigm shift towards greater state interventionism in the energy sector. They provide insights into the resurgence of political discourse surrounding energy sovereignty, resource nationalism, and energy independence, as well as the re-evaluation of energy as a national asset from a geopolitical perspective (Kuzemko et al., 2016).

The IEA defines energy security as the uninterrupted availability of energy supply at an affordable price. This means that energy security is considered by energy-importing countries as an energy supply issue, as their dependence on external energy sources makes them vulnerable to price fluctuations. In contrasts, for most energy-exporters, ensuring reliable demand is the priority (Kuzemko et al., 2016). As the energy transition process accelerates, fossil fuel-exporting countries are increasingly reassessing the need for a more active role of the state in ensuring reliable demand, while simultaneously diversifying their sources of revenue, particularly developing countries that are heavily dependent on revenues from hydrocarbon exports (Goldthau, 2010; Hafner and Tagliapietra, 2020; Van de Graaf and Bradshaw, 2018; Kuzemko at al., 2019; West and Fattouh, 2019; Van de Graaf, 2018; Johnston et al., 2020; Goldthau, 2017; Kuzemko, 2019; Goldthau and Westphal, 2019).

In this context, Goldthau (2012) considers that a state interventionism approach has started to dominate the energy sector, driven by concerns over energy security, geopolitical power shifts, and climate change. Goldthau (2012) argues that the market as the dominant perspective in the energy sector is increasingly contested, since many countries have grown reluctant to continue implementing the rules of economic liberalism and have instead embraced a more interventionist approach. This shift has caused international tensions, pushing energy security back on the forefront of the global agenda and driving the "securitisation" and "re-politicisation" of energy. Kuzemko, et al. (2016: 150) support this view by highlighting that the key factor driving international energy away from the era of neoliberalism is securitisation and its consequences. In this respect, Buzan et al. (1998) and Buzan and Waver (2003) who coined the term of "securitisation of energy", describe securitisation as a process by which an actor or group of actors frames an issue to be broadly perceived and discussed in security terms.

They highlight that once an issue is securitised and framed as "national security" extraordinary measures can be justified, as a sense of importance and urgency is attributed to addressing it. While the 're-politicisation' of energy is a consequence of the perception that energy is not only a source of power but can also pose a threat, impacting economic growth and geopolitical power (Kuzemko et al., 2016). They point to recent power shifts as examples, including the emerging alliances of developing countries within the original BRICs, the growing energy demand of China and India, and the return of Russia as an international and military power with vast oil and gas reserves. These developments are fuelling the growing emphasis on the importance of access to and control over energy resources (Kuzemko et al., 2016). Moreover, the recent election of Donald Trump as US president in 2024, along with his 'drill, baby, drill' energy policy focused on increasing oil extraction, has intensified concerns about its broader impact on global energy dynamics (BBC, 2024; BBC, 2025).

As a result of this process of "securitisation" and "re-politicisation" of energy. Goldthau (2012) highlight that the energy sector is reflecting shifting economic paradigms on a global scale. These paradigms are often closely linked to policy agendas, and finding the right policy solutions depends on how one defines the core of the problem. In this context, Goldthau (2012) identifies four energy paradigms through which the energy agenda has evolved, each characterised by its specific patterns of governance. These energy paradigms include statism, liberalism, interventionism, and fragmentation. The statism paradigm spans the period from post-World War II reconstruction to the 1970s. The energy agenda took the form of state-centrism, where energy was provided by state-owned companies to ensure the delivery of large-scale and affordable energy services, with little attention paid to cost and efficiency. The governance model was one of the State as owner, managing a monopoly with vertical integration. However, between the 1980s and 1990s, there was a radical and abrupt paradigm shift, and the energy agenda transitioned from being state-driven to market-driven. The liberal perspective argued that energy security was better served by the market and private sector companies than by state-owned monopolies (Goldthau, 2012). This energy paradigm shifts from statism to liberalism placed energy supply in private hands, justifying that state-owned enterprises are not profit-driven, and therefore inefficient. As a result, liberalism initiated a process of privatization of state assets, deregulation, and liberalization of the sector, in which energy was regarded as a private good. The governance model shifted to a free-market exchange, including the disintegration of the energy value chain, with the State serving merely as regulator and conciliator (Goldthau, 2012).

More recently, Goldthau (2012) argues that the energy agendas have shifted back to a more interventionist paradigm, where energy policy has moved from a liberal approach to one focused on state intervention. According to Goldthau (2012), the paradigm of energy interventionism often follows a dirigiste style and frequently translates into energy policies aimed at creating clear direction. Dirigisme is understood as an economic doctrine in which the state plays a strong directive role, as opposed to merely regulating within a free-market paradigm. The governance patterns of the interventionist paradigm include the state as an actor representing the "public interest", which leads to a vertical integration of the value chain.

In this respect, Kuzemko et al. (2016: 90) state that "after decades of the neo-liberal economic paradigm, the pendulum had started to swing back towards a more state-centric approach". The reasons for this shift are both ideological and driven by new challenges, such as the fight against climate change and the prospect of energy security becoming a threat for both exporting and importing countries. For example, in both the United States and Europe, debates around energy independence have re-emerged in response to several major oil producers bringing their energy sectors back under state control, highlighting the decline of the neoliberal paradigm (Kuzemko et al., 2016).

Other scholars such as Johnstone and Newell (2017); Burke and Stevens (2018); Kuzemko et al. (2019); Kuzemko (2019) have pointed out some of the challenges that the free-market model faces under the neoliberal paradigm. For example, neoliberal ideologies are often associated with social inequalities that arise in free-market economies, where privatizations and large profit-driven corporations have frequently captured significant economic and political power (Burke and Stephens, 2018). In these countries, neoliberal ideas have often undermined the role of the state in energy sectors, with support from global economic institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Johnstone and Newell, 2017). However, with energy security and energy transition now at the forefront of the global political agenda, the role of the state in energy has become increasingly relevant. Kuzemko et al. (2019) finds that many countries have increased state involvement, particularly in their energy policy agendas aimed at ensuring energy security. This growing state engagement, along with constant calls to enhance its role, reflects the growing urgency and global need to address climate change and energy security.

In this context, Goldthau (2012) suggests the return of the state rather a retreat in the energy sector. He predicts that instead of coming back to a state-ownership model, an inevitable transition to a new hybrid or fragmented model will take place, with elements of both state interventionism (interventionism paradigm) and free-market (liberalism paradigm) coexisting. This new fragmentation paradigm could also reshape countries' energy agendas, since governance becomes more "à la carte", and each country adapting the necessary measures based on what it considers to be in the "nation interest". This could lead to tensions and divergent perspectives on energy security.

According to Kuzemko et al. (2016), there are two frequently opposing and contrasting perspectives in terms of energy security: the perspective of economic liberalism and the geopolitical perspective. This divide arises from the widespread perception that market dynamics are often in conflict with the imperatives of state sovereignty. Kuzemko et al. (2016) explain that, from a geopolitical perspective, fossil fuels and natural resources are limited within national borders, meaning that the territory of a sovereign state and its resources are territorially fixed and finite. This limitation makes international energy relations more complicated as access to sovereign territory becomes restricted. Consequently, the resurgence of energy sovereignty in the political discourse of fossil-fuel-rich developing countries, along with the resource nationalism, energy independence, and the rethinking of energy as a national asset, raises concerns regarding energy security. These concerns reflect the drivers of the paradigm shift from statism to liberalism. Moreover, Kuzemko et al. (2016) make the important point that the geopolitical perspective of energy emphasises the concept of sovereignty, specifically, the role of the state, and how the political perspectives on energy are reflected in international conflicts and cooperation between states. Furthermore, the geopolitical perspective highlights the international role of the state in securing energy of supply and demand, engaging in strategic alliances, and exercising military power to access to energy resources. For instance, through greater state involvement and foreign policy initiatives through aimed at securing bilateral agreements with emerging consumer markets such as India and China (Kuzemko et al., 2016). In this respect, Goldthau (2010) highlights that the rise of national oil companies, and the return of inter-state energy diplomacy, directly oppose the free-market principles. Unlike market liberalism, the geopolitical perspective ties energy security to strategic foreign policy, ensuring supply for importing nations and securing demand for exporters. Consequently, energy diplomacy plays a crucial role from a geopolitical perspective.

5.4. Energy paradigm shifts in Mexico's oil sector

This section contextualizes the period of energy statism and its transition to the liberal energy paradigm, highlighting the expropriation of the Mexican oil industry, the creation of PEMEX, and its vertical integration, all aimed at achieving energy self-sufficiency. This section then explores how the Mexican oil boom and subsequent economic crises led to a shift towards an oil-export-oriented energy policy. Additionally, this section examines the implementation of the neoliberal energy paradigm under PRI's market-oriented presidents, who prioritised maximizing oil extraction for export in international markets and facilitated the disintegration of PEMEX's value chain. This period spans from the 1982 economic crisis, triggered by the decline in oil prices, until the first PAN's presidency in 2000.

In Mexico, the global energy paradigm shifts described by Goldthau (2012)[14] have had several policy implications for the oil sector. During the period of statism under the PRI (1929-1982), the governance patterns responded to a state monopoly, leading to the vertical integration of the state-owned PEMEX. As this chapter will explain, during this period PEMEX developed most of its infrastructure and refineries, integrating its value chain from upstream to downstream. The political agenda prioritised public energy provision, with energy framed as a symbol of sovereignty, and the main policy challenge was ensuring a stable supply of energy (Macleod, 2004; Gil-Valdivia, 2008; Gavin, 1996; Pastor and Wise, 2005; Snoeck, 1989). With the shift towards energy liberalism under the PRI and PAN (1982-2018) (Chapter 6)[15], governance patterns shifted towards the disintegration of PEMEX's value chain, aligning with a free-market approach in which the state played a mere rule-setter and regulator. The policy agenda increasingly emphasised private over public energy provision, treating energy as a market commodity, while also introducing new policy challenges such as energy security. In contrast, the interventionism energy paradigm under MORENA from 2018-2024 (Chapter 7), radically shifted the governance patterns by focusing on the integration of PEMEX's value chain and positioning the state as they key stakeholder of the "public interest". In this paradigm, the state played a strong steering role as opposed to the laissez-faire of the free-market paradigm. The policy agenda followed an interventionist approach, where energy was regarded

---

[14] See Table 2: Party systems and energy paradigms in Mexico
[15] As explained in Chapter 6: the energy neoliberal paradigm was introduced in 1982 by the PRI under its market-oriented presidents and later continued by PAN and PRI administrations. From 2000 onward, it was implemented continuously, with incremental changes from 2006 to 2018, driven by the 2008 and 2013 energy reforms.

as a strategic good and addressing policy challenges such as energy security and energy poverty in a state-dirigiste manner (Solorio and Tosun, 2023; Morales, 2020; Sánchez-Cano, 2014).

5.5. The Mexican oil sector: from State to market

This section examines the statism energy paradigm and its adoption within the constitutional framework, a period that spans from the expropriation and nationalization of oil companies, and the construction of new refineries in the search for vertical integration in the oil sector. It covers the economic crisis of 1982, which marked the end of energy statism and the shift towards a neoliberal energy model under the technocratic presidents. This shift led to the disintegration of PEMEX, including the closure of refineries, the sale of PEMEX subsidiaries, and other state-owned companies involved in the production of natural gas, petrochemicals, and fertilizers. This section reviews documents and historical material from various sources such as PEMEX business plans, the energy legal framework in the Mexican Constitution, and academic energy journals.

5.5.1. The statism energy paradigm and PEMEX's vertical integration

The economic policies implemented by the PRI[16] in the Mexico's post-revolutionary era up until 1982 reflected a broader paradigm known as statism. As explained by Mahdavy (1970) in a statist system, the government becomes the dominant factor in the economy. Goldthau (2012) further describes the statist approach in the energy sector as one in which energy services are subject to publicly provided and are managed by a state-owned company. The Mexican Constitution of 1917[17] provided the legal foundation for the adoption of the statism model, radically transforming the state's role in the economy. Oil, once controlled by foreign capital, was nationalised and became property of the state. Article 27 defined oil within the national territory as property of the nation and established that no concessions or contracts would be granted to foreign entities (Macleod, 2004). The statist approach in the Constitution of 1917 enhanced the role of the state, positioning the oil industry as the most important symbol of reclaiming of national sovereignty from the dominance of foreign oil companies (Gil-Valdivia,

---

[16] The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) originally founded in 1929, held uninterrupted power in Mexico as the dominant state party for 71 years, from 1929 to 2000.
[17] The Constitution of 1917 embodied the revolution's goals by including provisions for state intervention. Particularly in Articles 25, 26, 27, 28 and 90, which focus on the state's economic role.

2008; Gavin, 1996). Although Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution declared national ownership of resources, it was not until 1938 that President Lazaro Cárdenas (1934-40), made this takeover effective by decreeing the oil expropriation on March 18, 1938 (Morales, 2020). Later that year, on June 7, 1938, the state-owned oil company, PEMEX, was founded with exclusive rights over oil exploration, extraction, refining, and commercialisation in Mexican territory (Macleod, 2004). With the creation of PEMEX, an integration policy was initiated, covering everything from oil and gas exploration and production to refining and petrochemicals (Gil-Valdivia, 2008).

From President Cardenas expropriation in 1938 until 1970. PEMEX's main goal was to assure a timely and sufficient supply of fuels at subsidized prices (Snoeck, 1989), achieving energy self-sufficiency was the main objective, as a result, PEMEX developed into a highly integrated public company (Morales, 2020). The refining industry developed rapidly, with several refineries being nationalised, and a system of refineries was established. Some examples of these refineries include the Lazaro Cardenas refinery; the Francisco I. Madero Refinery; and the Azcapotzalco Refinery (PEMEX, 2021)[18]. Moreover, to increase domestic fuel production, in addition to the refineries expropriated by President Cardenas, a new refinery was built by PEMEX in 1950, the Ing. Antonio M. Amor (RIAMA) refinery. However, the low-price policy, led to an increase in fuel consumption from 1938 to 1970. As a result, refineries production became insufficient to meet domestic demand. PEMEX faced supply challenges due to the obsolescence of the expropriated refineries, which were designed to process light crude oil, and because the refineries were located far from the main consumption centres (Snoeck,1989).

5.5.2. The Mexican oil boom and PEMEX's new refineries

During the 1970s, the state-owned PEMEX experienced a rapid expansion due to the 'Mexican oil boom' (1977-1985), driven by the discoveries of untapped oil reserves particularly Cantarell Complex[19]. As Mexico's most productive oil field, Cantarell contributed over 50% of the national crude oil production (Sánchez-Cano, 2014). Between, 1970 to 1982, this discovery marked a period of expansion for Mexico's oil, refining, and petrochemical industries.

---

[18] See Figure 23: Geographic reference of the national refinery system
[19] Discovered by PEMEX in 1976, Cantarell was a supergiant offshore oil field located 80 km off the coast of Campeche, Mexico. At its peak, it was one of the world's largest, second only to Ghawar field in Saudi Arabia.

Particularly, from 1977 onwards, the national surplus supply of crude oil surged, transforming Mexico into one of the world's leading oil exporters (Macleod, 2004).

According to Gavin (1996) from 1973 onwards, rising oil exports combined with high oil prices provided major benefits for public revenues, particularly during President José López Portillo period (1976-1982). His government agenda prioritised an aggressive and rapid expansion of oil field output, aiming to maximise crude oil production. During this period the government optimistically coined the phrase "manage the abundance", reflecting its policy goal of managing the nation's growing oil wealth (Morales, 2020).

The high oil prices experienced during the Mexican oil boom catalysed PEMEX's integration. PEMEX developed its own technology for exploration and production, while building new refineries, petrochemical plants, and pipelines (Morales, 2020). According to Gil-Valdivia (2008) these new developments had a significant impact in productive sectors such as derived petrochemicals, fertilizers, industry, agriculture, construction and transportation. For instance, three new refineries, which remain part of the national refining system today, were constructed during this period (PEMEX, 2021)[20]: Tula refinery (1976), Cadereyta refinery (1979), and Salina Cruz refinery (1979). According to Snoeck (1989) the objective of these three new refineries was to progressively replace crude oil and natural gas exports with higher-value derivatives like refined products and petrochemicals. However, this initiative failed, as will be explained in the following section, due to PEMEX's financial crisis in 1981 and the broader economic crisis in 1982.

5.5.3. The economic crisis and the decline of energy statism

The PEMEX financial crisis, which began in mid-1981, forced the government to suspend the refinery expansion projects (Snoeck, 1989). Three factors contributed to PEMEX's over-indebtedness: the cross-subsidy policy, the fuel subsidy policy, and the fiscal regime policy. The cross-subsidy policy involved shifting the financial burden from unprofitable companies to profitable ones. Macleod (2004) finds that PEMEX, a profitable public company paid large sums to the general treasury which were in turn transferred through cross-subsidies to

---

[20] See Figure 23: Geographic reference of the national refinery system 1970-1982 period, three new refineries were added to the national refining system: Tula refinery (1976), Cadereyta refinery (1979), and Salina Cruz refinery (1979).

unprofitable public companies. "PEMEX took on a massive external debt while subsidizing other parts of the federal government budget and other public companies through the taxes it paid" (Macleod, 2004: 45). The fuel subsidy policy was also a significant factor in the PEMEX crisis. According to Snoeck (1989), this policy restricted PEMEX's income, making it difficult to finance investments. As a result, from 1981 onwards, PEMEX's financial crisis limited the resources available for investment in the refining sector.

Another factor contributing to PEMEX's crisis was the excessive tax regime to which the company was subject. Macleod (2004: 45) considers that "public firms were actually milked to make up for the shortfall of tax revenues from the private sector", particularly after the discovery of Cantarell oil field, when the state entered a deep fiscal crisis. Gil-Valdivia (2008) points out that the government saw the high volume of crude oil exports as means to generate tax revenues. As a result, PEMEX was subjected to an excessive tax regime, which limited the resources for its own development.

In addition to PEMEX's financial troubles, a series of events led to the end of the period of energy statism and the search for an alternative model. In particular, the macroeconomic crisis that broke out between 1981 and 1982, which brought an end to the oil bonanza period driven by large oil field discoveries and high oil prices (Morales, 2020). In this respect, according to Zaid (2012) the economic crisis faced by López Portillo (1976-1982) in the last years of his administration was a result of the Mexican economy's dependency on volatile oil prices, which combined with the wasteful economic policies, led to a massive fiscal deficit and foreign debt, and over-indebtedness financed by foreign banks. Despite the President López Portillo's attempts to stabilize the economy, as pointed out by Macleod (2004), the nationalization of the banking system marked the final statist policy that caused a rupture between the state and capital. This led to the so-called "lost decade" and the beginning of a new period of neoliberal policies centred on the sale of public companies (Macleod, 2004).

5.5.4. The technocratic presidents and neoliberalism

The economic crisis of 1982 paved the way for the adoption and implementation of neoliberal policies to address the economic crisis (Morales, 2020). The PRI and its technocratic

presidents[21]: De la Madrid (1982-1988); Salinas (1988-1994) and Zedillo (1994-2000), educated in economic disciplines at the elite US universities, were strong supporters of market-oriented policies (Beezley and Meyer, 2010). The 'technocrats' emerged with President Miguel de la Madrid, who initiated the process of economic liberalization and adopted neoliberal policies. This marked a turning point in Mexico's economic and energy model, shifting from state-led to market-oriented (Macleod, 2004)[22].

During the De la Madrid period (1982-1988), there was a global shift in economic thinking, influenced by neoliberal ideas such as free-markets, privatization, trade liberalisation, deregulation, minimal state intervention, and fiscal austerity (Silvers, 2023; Foroohar, 2022; and Stiglitz, 2019; Klein, 2008). In the developed world, the US and the UK were key advocates of neoliberalism. In the US, the President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) initiated a shift towards market-oriented policies, while UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979 to 1990), implemented extensive neoliberal policies. According to Gerstle (2022)[23] neoliberal advocates believed that market forces needed to be liberated from government regulatory controls that hindered growth, innovation, and freedom. He defines neoliberalism as "a creed that prizes free trade and celebrates deregulation as an economic good that results when governments can no longer interfere with the operation of markets" (Gerstle, 2022: 5). While Silvers (2023) describes the neoliberalism as a global order that is characterized by private power and public weakness.

Other scholars such as Van de Graaf and Sovacool (2020) point out that the oil market was not immune to the ideological shifts brought by the neoliberal ideas that spread globally in the 1980s, which advocated for the removal of government intervention from both domestic and international oil markets. Similarly, Kuzemko et al. (2016) highlight that, under neoliberalism, energy was viewed as a commodity, marketable and substitutable, rather than a strategic asset or public good. The privatization of state assets was considered a fundamental principle for improving efficiency. Similarly, Goldthau (2012) takes the view that the neoliberal policy agenda aimed to transform energy into a private good through deregulation, privatisation, and disintegration of the energy value chain.

---

[21] See Table 3: Equilibrium Presidents: stability and incremental changes 1982-2018
[22] President Miguel de la Madrid took office on December 1, 1982, three months to the day after outgoing President López Portillo's decision to nationalize banks system, following Mexico's bankruptcy.
[23] Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman, advocated for free markets and limited government intervention, Friedman, a leading figure of the Chicago School of Economics, served as advisor to Reagan and Thatcher.

5.5.5. The neoliberal energy model and PEMEX's disintegration

In Mexico, as in many Latin-American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile, the implementation of neoliberal policies became central to the conditions for development aid loans to face the economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s in what is known as the 'Washington Consensus' (Kuzemko, et al., 2016; Klein, 2008; Gerstle, 2022; Silvers, 2023)[24]. According to Macleod (2004), Mexico's privatization programme between 1983 and 2000 represents one of the most remarkable cases of privatisation in the developing world. That is because after 50 years of growing state intervention, Mexico abruptly abandoned public ownership. The list of privatizations ranges from basic infrastructure to "strategic" sectors, such as natural gas, the generation of electricity, petrochemicals, and fertiliser complexes, satellite, communications, ports, airports, and railroads (Presidency, 2023)[25]. With the collapse of international oil prices, important changes took place in PEMEX's petrochemical sector in 1986. For instance, the state withdrew from basic petrochemicals and redefined 36 categories as secondary, thus, opening them up to private investment (Macleod, 2004). According to Angeles-Cornejo (1990), the privatization of basic petrochemicals production and their re-classification as secondary, marked the beginning of the disintegration process of PEMEX.

Under this policy of disintegration of PEMEX that began during the administration of De la Madrid, the production of basic petrochemicals was therefore given to foreign petrochemical companies and national private groups, which, according to Angeles-Cornejo (1990), breached the Constitution, particularly the 1958 presidential decree that granted PEMEX exclusivity in the production of basic petrochemicals. This measure represented a setback to the policy PEMEX had followed up until then, advancing the integration of the oil industry during the period of statism.

During the neoliberal period, other subsidiaries of PEMEX Gas and PEMEX Petrochemicals were privatized, along with state-owned companies such as '*Hules Mexicanos*', a secondary petrochemical company, which produced synthetic rubber, supplies for tire manufacturing, rubber for footwear and other products. Additionally, other public natural gas distribution

---

[24] The proponents of the Washington Consensus, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, set loan conditions for reducing state intervention through privatisation, trade and financial liberalisation, deregulation, weakening the unions, and tax cuts, particularly for the business sector.

[25] See Table 5: Types of privatised public firms by presidential term 1988-2018

companies such as the natural gas distributor of the State of Mexico (DIGANAMEX) and the natural gas distributor of Queretaro (DIGAQRO), were privatised (Angeles-Cornejo, 1990). De la Madrid's government began the privatization of some PEMEX's subsidiaries, but more than 50% of the privatization or the so-called "disincorporation" of basic petrochemicals companies were carried out by his successor, Salinas de Gortari (Angeles-Cornejo, 1990).

Salinas de Gortari administration (1988-1994) undertook larger and more complex privatizations of public firms, along with the re-privatization of banking system (Presidency, 2023)[26]. Between 1990 and 1993, the state sold some of the largest public firms, including two steel mills, a fertilizer plant (Fertimex), a diesel truck and engine plants (DINA), Telmex (telephone monopoly) and the state-run television corporation (Macleod, 2004). In the energy sector, during the Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), the state-owned PEMEX remained in the public sector. However, his administration continued the privatization process that had begun during De la Madrid period, removing 15 more products from the definition of basic petrochemicals that were previously reserved for state development (Mcleod, 2004). In this respect, Angeles-Cornejo (1990) highlights that the production of basic petrochemicals that were reclassified as secondary, allowed private companies to advance in the integration of their production chains, while PEMEX deepened its process of productive disintegration. During this period, PEMEX's petrochemical production dropped to a quarter of its produced pre-1986 reclassification level. Specifically, of the 72 basic petrochemicals PEMEX had produced then, by 1990 it only producing about 20 (Angeles-Cornejo, 1990).

Salinas went further in breaking up PEMEX. In 1992, he carried out a major restructuring of PEMEX to divide the oil giant into four decentralized divisions. This plan included the total and partial restructuring and "disincorporation" of many PEMEX's subsidiaries in gas, petrochemicals, and fertilizers, including labour restructuring (Mcleod, 2004)[27]. In the refining sector, President Salinas de Gortari decreed the closure of the '18 de Marzo' Refinery, also known as the Azcapotzalco Refinery (El Universal, 2017).

The major restructuring of PEMEX into decentralized divisions during the Salinas de Gortari government was accomplished by a strict labour restructuring within PEMEX, reducing the

---

[26] See Table 5: Types of privatised public firms by presidential term 1988-2018
[27] See Table 4: Timeline - Major events in the Mexican oil sector

influence of the unions. This labour restructuring was carried out, as highlighted by Angeles-Cornejo (1990), using military force. The Salinas government used the army to arrest the powerful leader of the PEMEX workers' union Mr. Joaquín Hernández Galicia, known as 'La Quina', on charges of corruption, according to Angeles-Cornejo (1990), Salinas saw Hernández Galicia as an obstacle to the implementation and deepening of the neoliberal model in PEMEX, which involved the disintegration and privatization of the company, along with the establishment of a new worker-employer relationship. In this respect, according to Mcleod (2004), Salinas replaced Hernandez Galicia with equally unrepresentative leaders, who consented to a reorganisation and restructuring of PEMEX, including job cuts and major changes to the collective bargaining agreement.

President Zedillo Ponce de León's term (1994-2000) began with the Mexican Peso Crisis, also known as the 'December Mistake' or the 'Tequila Crisis', a currency crisis that led to a severe devaluation of the Mexican peso. According to Mcleod (2004), the economic crisis of 1994 prompted Zedillo's privatization plan, initiated by his predecessors, Salinas de Gortari and De la Madrid, particularly in two key sectors: energy and communications and transportation (Presidency, 2023). Zedillo became the last technocratic PRI president and the last PRI president to hold power successively for 71 years. In 2000, Vicente Fox became the first PAN president, as will be discussed in the next Chapter 6. Fox (2000-2006) continued the neoliberal economic policies implemented by his predecessors. As will be explored in Chapter 6, the neoliberal energy model adopted in 1982 by the PRI and its market-oriented presidents, was subsequently implemented by both PAN and PRI presidents, continuously from 2000 onwards, and incrementally from 2006 to 2018, until a shift to an interventionist energy paradigm occurred with the arrival of AMLO to the executive in 2018 (Chapter 7), who drew attention at the macro-level with a policy image focused on greater state intervention in the energy sector.

CHAPTER 6

EXPLANING POLICY STABILITY AND INCREMENTAL CHANGES IN MEXICO'S OIL SECTOR

6.1. Introduction

The previous Chapter 5 examined the context in which the liberal energy paradigm was adopted in Mexico. This chapter focuses on the period from 2000 to 2018, during which the Mexican presidents: Fox (2000-2006), Calderón (2006-2012), and Peña Nieto (2012-2018), continued and incrementally adjusted a market-oriented neoliberal energy model, primarily aimed at maximizing crude oil extraction for export to the international markets. This chapter is particularly insightful because it examines why, despite a growing domestic demand for fuels, Mexico experienced a 43-year period without the construction of new refineries. This chapter aims to answer the following critical questions: What are the factors that help explain the equilibrium period in Mexico's oil and refining sector? More specifically, why did PEMEX not adjust its refining policy according to changes in national fuel consumption?

This analysis chapter will begin by providing evidence through a political discourse analysis to identify the agenda priorities, and the energy policy image that dominated in the energy sector during the equilibrium period. To ensure reliability, validity and minimise bias, this chapter will triangulate data sources by cross-verifying findings through the analysis of presidential statements, interviews with different actors and locations, and government advertising campaigns in the media. The aim is to illustrate how the dominant policy image of the neoliberal energy model within the political narrative, combined with the contextual factors, led to the obsolescence of PEMEX refineries and increasing fuel imports, ultimately, leaving Mexico highly dependent on fuel imports. Next, the chapter will present both primary and secondary data to identify the policy challenges faced during this period, with particular attention to the market-oriented incremental changes introduced by the 2008 and 2013 energy reforms. Finally, the chapter will focus on the 2017 *gasolinazo* protests, a focusing event that drew macro-level attention from the public, the media, political parties and government to the energy policy agenda. It will also identify contextual factors that contributed to social unrest.

This chapter makes a significant empirical contribution by illustrating how dominant policy images within political narratives such as neoliberalism, have maintained periods of policy stability, specifically in the context of the Mexico's oil and refining sector. It also provides valuable insights into Mexico's fuel subsidy withdrawal policy implemented during the equilibrium period, highlighting the fiscal and political challenges governments face when implementing the phase-out of fuel subsidies. These findings enrich the literature on fuel-related fiscal incentives and their tax implications for public finances, while contributing to debates on PEMEX, oil revenues and the need for fiscal diversification (Rivera de Jesus and López -Reynosa, 2023; Rivera de Jesus 2024; Villarreal-Paez and Michel-Gutierrez, 2013; Segal, 2012; Plante and Jordan, 2013; Dominguez-Ordonez, 2015). The empirical evidence on shifts in macro-level attention, driven by the elimination of fuel subsidies and the introduction of taxes after the 2013 energy reform, is crucial for governments designing policies that promote a just and balanced energy transition.

This chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 looks at Fox's political discourse to highlight his agenda priorities and policy image. It addresses key challenges during his period such as the collapse of Cantarell, Mexico's largest oil field, and its impacts on refined products, oil revenues, and fuel subsidy policy. Section 6.3 examines on Calderón's political discourse, political agenda and energy policy image, highlighting the market-oriented incremental changes introduced by the 2008 energy reform. It also explores Calderón's energy policy challenges, including the decline in oil production and revenues, increase in fuel imports and his refinery project. Section 6.4 analyses Peña Nieto's political discourse, his agenda priorities and energy policy image, highlighting his 2013 energy reform as the culmination of the sector's liberalisation, deepening PEMEX's disintegration and allowing private participation. It also examines his energy policy challenges such as decline in oil production, exports, revenues and fuel subsidy removal. Section 6.5 analyses the political implications of the 2017 *gasolinazo* protests, as well as the additional contextual factors that may have contributed to the protests.

6.2. Fox period and the continuation of a neoliberal energy model

This section examines Fox's political discourse, agenda priorities, and policy image, highlighting the continuation of a neoliberal energy model focused on maximizing oil exports. It also analyses key energy policy challenges, including Cantarell's decline, the imbalance between oil revenues and refined products, and the implication of fuel subsides. This section

will look at presidential statements, interviews, and documentary sources such as PEMEX business plans, government reports, and energy publications.

6.2.1. Discourse analysis of Fox's energy policy image and agenda priorities

In 2000, Vicente Fox Quesada became Mexico's first president from the PAN, ending 71 years of interrupted PRI rule. Fox promised sweeping changes but maintained the neoliberal economic policies established by his PRI predecessors since 1980s (Mosco and Schiller, 2001). Fox's political agenda reflected a bipartisan PRI-PAN system with limited political manoeuvrability due to PRI resistance (Pastor and Wise, 2005). Only 31 constitutional reforms were passed, compared to 78 under Zedillo, highlighting resistance to change (Congress, 2024). Fox strongly advocated for the continuation of the neoliberal energy model adopted since 1982 (Chapter 5, Section 5.5.4). his administration embraced the liberal energy paradigm outlined by Goldthau (2012), which emphasised key neoliberal principles: making energy subject to private rather than public supply, the market as the dominant governance model in the energy sector, privatizing PEMEX's assets (including petrochemical, gas, and fertilizers complexes), maximizing crude oil exports, disintegrating PEMEX's value chain, liberalizing fuel prices, and limiting state's role.

Analysing political discourse in presidential statements provides valuable insights into the importance of energy policy-issues within the government's priorities. Political discourse analysis, in this context, refers to the examination of written, audio-visual or other forms of communication that explicitly or implicitly carry dominant political ideas (Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2). The analysis of Fox's statements reveals that his energy policy image framed the energy supply as better managed by the market and private sector companies than by the state-owned PEMEX. Fox's political discourse was straightforward; he argued that the absence of profit motive in public companies often leads to inefficiency. Therefore, the private sector should be more efficient than the public in providing energy. He stated that public control of the energy sector guarantees failure due to corruption and poor administration **(Fox, 1996a)**[28]**.** In his view, the entire oil value chain (upstream, midstream and downstream), should be privatized, as he considered the State corrupt, inefficient and lacking technology **(Fox, 1996b)**[29]**.** Fox provided

---

[28] See Fox's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[29] See Fox's statement in Annex 2: Statements

insights into the rationale behind his energy policy image, arguing that the state-owned PEMEX is not worth investing in, describing it as "a bottomless barrel", lacking technology and resources, particularly refining **(Fox, 2019)[30].** He envisioned the private sector as more effective than the public in the supply of energy, citing government inefficiencies in administration (Milenio, 2023; Sin-embargo, 2019).

6.2.2. Fox's energy policy challenges and the continuation of oil export maximization

This section analyses key energy policy challenges during Fox's term, including the collapse of Cantarell, refined products imbalances and Fox's refinery project, shifts in oil revenues and fuel subsides. Despite these issues, Fox's administration prioritised maximizing crude oil exports over adjusting PEMEX's refining policy to domestic consumption. This section explores key macroeconomic, budgetary and PEMEX indicators from primary and secondary sources (Chapter 4, Section 4.3.5.), to identify trends and review specific aspects of oil and refining policies.

6.2.2.1. Cantarell, refined products imbalance and Fox's refinery project

Fox continued the energy policy focused on maximising oil exports that had been initiated since the Mexican oil boom (Chapter 5, Section 5.5.2). His administration benefited from high oil prices and high oil production and exports. Early in Fox's administration, oil prices began a new upward cycle, which continued during and beyond his presidency. However, while crude oil prices remained at record levels (Bank of Mexico, 2023)[31], Cantarell, the oil field that had made Mexico one of the world's leading crude oil exporters, peaked in 2004. Subsequently, Mexican oil production entered a decline, falling in 2004 from 3.883 mbpd to 1.833 mbpd in 2018 (Presidency, 2023)[32].

According to Morales (2020) PEMEX had never produced such high levels of oil, but from 2004, production rapidly decline due to the drop in Cantarell, which had contributed 63% of total production. This decline was caused by overexploitation, due to nitrogen injections to increase production, which accelerated the deterioration of the oil field (Indigo, 2019). Fox's

---

[30] See Fox's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[31] See Figure 2: Mexican crude oil price 2000-2018
[32] See Figure 7: PEMEX hydrocarbon production 2004-2018

energy policy focused on maximizing of oil exports contributed to this overexploitation. Lajous (2014) highlights that political pressure to maximize PEMEX production overlooked technical and geological limiting factors, accelerating the decline of the oil field. Fox's energy policy image which prioritised maximizing crude oil exports over refining, led to a growing imbalance between domestic oil production and consumption, increasing imported fuels to meet domestic demand. In the words of an Interviewee, *"Between 1990 and 2004, the government neglected refining. However, it received more attention when Cantarell's oil production declined with Fox, and later due to the gasolinazos under Calderón and Peña, which triggered sharp increases in fuel costs"* **(Interviewee 19).**

During Fox's period, three factors contributed to an imbalance in refined products in Mexico's oil sector. First, an increase in domestic consumption of refined products, particularly gasoline and diesel, grew at annual average rates of 2.25% and 2.55%, respectively (Morales, 2020; SENER, 2020)[33]. This increase was driven by a surge in the number of vehicles, which rose by nearly 10 million during Fox's administration (INEGI, 2023)[34]. According to INEGI (2023), Mexico vehicle fleet grew from 5.76 million in 1980 to 15.6 in 2000, and skyrocketed to 55,1 in 2022. Second factor contributing to the imbalance was a decrease in national production of refined products. Despite rising consumption of refined products, Fox continued with a refining system that had fewer refineries following the closure of Azcapotzalco Refinery in 1991 (Chapter 5, Section 5.5.5), and relied on aging refineries with decreasing output. Third, imports of refined products increased as domestic production struggled to meet demand. Starting in 2004, gasoline and diesel imports skyrocketed during Fox's administration, maintaining an upward trend until 2018 (Morales, 2020; SENER, 2020).

From 2004 onwards, the growing imbalance between national production and the consumption of refined products increased dependence on imported fuels. A key question arises: Why did PEMEX not adjust its refining policy according to changes in national fuel consumption? The evidence points out two factors: first, a dominant policy image based on a free-market, model, which views fuels as a commodity that can be freely imported and exported in a globalised world. Second the influence of low fuel prices in the US. However, both factors overlook the geopolitical perspective on energy security (Kuzemko et al., 2016, Chapter 5, Section 5.3), and

---

[33] See Figure 10: Mexico: Final consumption of oil products 1991-2017
[34] See Figure 1: Motor vehicles registered in Mexico 1980-2021

the risks associated with an increasing dependence on fuel imports in a volatile world. In the words of an Interviewee, *"Mexico growing dependence on fuel and gas imports from the US, has increased risks to its energy security. Past governments adopted a policy of buying cheap fuels, as the neighbour practically gave it away at low cost. However, they mistakenly assumed that this situation would last forever"* **(Interviewee 14).**

To address the imbalance between increasing domestic consumption of refined products, declining domestic production, and increasing fuel imports. Fox's administration held discussions on a refinery project within the Puebla-Panama Plan. Announced by Fox in 2001 and relaunched in 2004. The initiative aimed to build a refinery with private capital in Central America. However, the project never progressed or materialized (El País, 2007; BBC 2007).

6.2.2.2. Oil revenues and fuel subsidy policy

Despite a decrease in oil production, Fox benefited from significant oil revenues during his six-year period, as oil prices entered a new upward cycle (Bank of Mexico, 2023). This is due to the contribution of oil revenues to total government budget maintains a high correlation with the price of the Mexican crude oil mix (PEMEX, 2019). According to PEMEX (2019)[35] report, between 2000 and 2006, Fox administration obtained a total oil revenue of 5.947 billion MXN. This surplus of public resources from oil revenues facilitated Fox's administration to subsidize the price of gasoline. Despite the skyrocketing price of crude oil, the price of Magna gasoline remained stable: In 2000 the gasoline price was 5.27 in MXN per litre, at the end of his six-year term. in 2006 increased to 6.71 (El Universal, 2016).

Moreno (2017) highlights that in a competitive market, rising crude oil prices lead to higher fuel prices as seen in the US. However, in Mexico, fuel prices were strongly subsidised by Fox's administration. Data from the Bank of Mexico (2023)[36] on the price of the Mexican oil mix shows that during Fox's term, oil prices rebounded strongly, However, despite a 185% increase in crude oil price from USD 16.73 in 2000 to USD 63.39 in 2006, fuel prices rose only 28% due to fuel subsidies. As a result, during Fox's administration, according to data from the

---

[35] See Figure 9: Public sector oil revenues 1990-2018
[36] See Figure 2: Mexican crude oil price 2000-2018

Ministry of Finance[37], IEPS[38] revenue fell from 112,221 million MXN in 2002 to -42,217 in 2006, due to Fox's fuel subsidy policy (Luna and Jasso, 2021). Villarreal and Michel (2013) attributes these fuel subsidies due to the price gap between international prices and Fox's control over fuel prices, driven by fears of inflation and political repercussions.

6.3. Calderón period and the incremental market-oriented changes

This section examines Calderón's political discourse, agenda priorities and policy image, highlighting the continuation of an energy policy based on maximizing oil exports. It focuses on the 2008 energy reform and its incremental changes toward privatization. This section also analyses Calderón's energy policy challenges such as decline in oil production, oil revenues and fuel subsidy, increase in fuel imports, and Calderón's refinery project. To cross-verify and enhance findings, this section uses triangulation of qualitative evidence, using discourse analysis of presidential statements, government advertising campaigns, and interviews. This is complemented by a review of historical information from diverse sources, including the Congress, PEMEX, the Bank of Mexico and the Presidency.

6.3.1. Discourse analysis of Calderón's energy policy image and agenda priorities

In 2006, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa (2006-2012) of the PAN narrowly won the Presidency. This narrow result affected his manoeuvrability in a polarised Congress as highlighted by Solorio and Tosun (2023). However, the PAN-PRI two-party system enabled Calderón to advance his political agenda, achieving 110 constitutional reforms (Congress, 2024)[39]. Calderón consolidated five major reforms: fiscal (2007), public pension (2007), energy reform (2008), competition (2010) labour (2012) (Gutiérrez, 2014).

Despite new reforms, Calderón's political agenda and public attention were dominated by security issues due to the "Mexican war on drugs", making his mandate monothematic. In PET model, macro-level attention is a critical to radical policy change. However, Calderón's focus on security diverted public attention from energy policy, helping explain its stability despite

---

[37] See Figure 14: The Special Tax on Production and Services (IEPS) 2000-2018
[38] In Mexico, the fuel subsidy scheme operates through the IEPS which is adjusted with crude oil prices: it becomes negative to subsidise gasoline when prices are high and positive to generate revenue when prices are low.
[39] See Table 7: Constitutional reforms by presidential period 1982-2024

incremental changes towards the privatization. In the words of an Interviewee, *"the central focus of Calderón's political agenda was security, making it largely mono-thematic and limiting the ability to generate a multi-thematic political communication strategy"* **(Interviewee 20).** Calderón's security-focused and monothematic agenda, however, likely did not diminish his awareness of the looming crisis in the oil sector. According to an Interviewee, *"After Cantarell collapsed, the financial dependence on PEMEX became the key issue on the energy agenda. As a result, Calderón advocated for legal mechanisms to open PEMEX to private investment"* **(Interviewee 4).**

Calderón's policy image, based on a neoliberal energy model, was reinforced by a political discourse emphasising a sense of urgency to carry out an energy reform. To build support and justify the contracting of private companies in a sector, historically dominated by the State through PEMEX, the presidency launched an intense advertising campaign in the media. For many Interviewees, Calderón made use of a discursive strategy to legitimise the sector's privatization, which was based on two criticisms of the statist model. First, justifying the need for clean energy, and second, pointing out the inefficiencies of the state's public companies. In the words of an Interviewee, *"the government's advertising campaign on the 2008 energy reform exemplified 'energy populism'. Calderón promoted clean and competitive energies. Contrasting with the opposition ads, presenting AMLO as the fuel statist, defender of national sovereignty"* **(Interviewee 4).** The financial resources allocated to the government's advertising campaign reflect Calderón's advocacy efforts. According to data from the Presidency (2019)[40], between 2007-2012, government spending on official advertising in the media, between 2007-2012, the Calderón administration spent 56,362 million MXN on advertising in the media. In 2008, the year the energy reform was promoted, the government spent 9,112 million MXN to advertising.

In the view of an Interviewee, *"Calderón's advertising campaign for his energy reform focused on disseminating three ideas: First, Mexico's large oil reserves are nearly depleted and will last only a few years. Second, PEMEX lacks technology from foreign companies to explore in deep waters. Third, PEMEX lacks the financial resources to address challenges"* **(Interviewee 17).** In this respect, according to Angeles-Cornejo (2009), Calderón's ads campaign for his energy reform highlighted three "catastrophic" approaches, emphasised through repeated

---

[40] See Figure 4: Official advertising expenditure 2007-2018

Calderón's statements and recurrent government media ads. Analysing his political discourse reveals that these approaches aimed at gaining support for his reform, while also illustrating his energy policy image, the policy issue framing, and preference for a neoliberal energy model. In his statements, Calderón claimed that the country's oil reserves would be depleted in 9 years **(Calderón, 2008a)[41].** He proposed contracting of foreign companies and their technology as the policy solution, arguing that potential oil reserves lie in deep waters, and PEMEX lacks the necessary technology. With time and oil running out, he emphasised that contracting foreign companies was vital for the sector survival **(Calderón, 2008b)[42]**. Calderón framed the policy issue of increasing dependence of fuel imports a result of PEMEX's limited refining capacity and proposed contracting foreign companies to build and operate new refiners on behalf of PEMEX **(Calderón, 2008c)[43].**

The government's advertising campaigns in the media to promote Calderón's energy reform, provide evidence of the policy-issue framing of rising fuel prices and imports, suggesting that contracting of foreign companies' technology and privatization were potential policy solutions for neoliberal governments **(Ad Presidency, 2008a[44]; Ad Presidency, 2008b)[45].** For many Interviewees, Calderón's political discourse and government advertising campaign, responded to the need to counteract possible negative feedback. Given that in Mexico, oil is a highly sensitive issue in nature due to the legacy of oil nationalisation (Chapter 5, Section 5.5). According to Melgar (2010:100) "oil has been equated with national sovereignty, and the state's absolute control over oil resources, exploration, production, and processing is a fundamental emblem of the country's identity". Particularly among the opposition sectors, Calderón's energy reform was seen, according to Angeles-Cornejo (2009), as an escalation in the disintegration of PEMEX and privatization model by allowing the entry of private sector in activities constitutionally reserved for PEMEX.

6.3.2. The 2008 energy reform and the incremental changes towards privatization

The Calderón government's ad campaign emphasised that the key goals of the 2008 energy reform were to address declining production and rising imports of refined products. However,

---

[41] See Calderón's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[42] See Calderón's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[43] See Calderón's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[44] See Annex 3: Government advertising campaigns
[45] See Annex 3: Government advertising campaigns

Melgar (2010) highlights that the primary underlying objective was to prevent the collapse of government finances. As one Interviewee pointed out, *"Cantarell was Mexico's gold mine, as oil was easily accessible. When Cantarell began to decline, it was very serious because 30% of Mexican finances depended on oil revenues"* **(Interviewee 14)**. Similarly, other Interviewee highlighted that, *"PEMEX and public budget discussions are closely linked, as Mexico has relied on oil revenues for financing its development plans"* **(Interviewee 19).**

Therefore, the initiative sought to increase private participation through contracts, focusing mainly on the oil sector. Calderón's 2008, energy reform proposed modifying the regulatory law of constitutional article 27 to allow private companies in the transportation, storage and distribution of refined products, gas, and petrochemicals, through administrative permits (Congress, 2008). Angeles-Cornejo (2009) points out that the reform proposed not only foreign companies' participation through contracts in activities reserved for PEMEX, but also the opening of PEMEX entire value chain such as refining.

To reduce contradictory signals and opposition to Calderón's energy reform, ideologically like-minded stakeholders were included in the policy process to legitimize the reform, and pro-statist model supporters were excluded. In the words of an Interviewee, *"environmental NGOs like Greenpeace, Cemda, and the Mexican Centre for Environmental Rights told me that they were used to legitimize Calderón's energy reform"* **(Interviewee 4)**. According to Solorio and Tosun (2023: 9) "Calderón's close relationship with the business groups was directly linked to the right-wing and liberal market ideology" and therefore, Calderón mostly included in the reform policy process, ideologically like-minded environmental NGOs, market-liberal think tanks, and business groups that aligned with his economically liberal orientation. While old players in the energy sector were largely excluded, such as unions, especially those representing the interests of PEMEX and the oil workers, the opposition parties, and organisations that stood for the statist energy policy model (Solorio and Tosun, 2023). Many Interviewees cited the extinction of the stated-owned electricity company (LyFC), as an example of Calderón's exclusion of statist model actors, with his statements highlighting its inefficiencies **(Calderón, 2009)**[46]. In the words of an Interviewee *"Calderón delivered the final blow to one of the last strongholds actors of resistance to the liberal energy model: the LyFC and its union"* **(Interviewee 4)**. According to another Interviewee's view, this measure was

---

[46] See Calderón's statement in Annex 2: Statements

taken because *"unlike private companies, CFE and PEMEX are inefficient and bureaucratic"* **(Interviewee 7)**.

Despite the exclusion of large sectors, Calderón's energy reform was approved by the Congress. In his nationwide broadcast, he stated that the reform would allow PEMEX to contract technology from foreign companies and increase deepwater oil extraction **(Calderón, 2008d)**[47]. Calderón's 2008 energy reform allowed foreign companies to enter service contracts with PEMEX for oil exploration and production, representing a significant incremental change towards the privatization. However, PEMEX retained ownership and control over oil reserves, introducing market-oriented changes without completely liberalizing the oil sector, as it did not allow private companies to own oil reserves or enter profit-sharing contracts (Congress, 2008).

6.3.3. Calderón's energy policy challenges and continuation of oil export policy

This subsection analyses key energy policy challenges during Calderón's period such as decline in oil production, oil revenues, and fuel subsidies, increase in fuel imports. It illustrates Calderón's refinery project as an example of Downs's (1972) "issue-attention cycle" (Chapter 3, Section 3.3). This section uses data triangulation to cross-verify findings from interviews transcripts with key macroeconomic, budgetary and PEMEX indicators, identifying patterns, trends, and evaluating specific aspects of oil and refining policies.

6.3.3.1. Decline in oil production, oil revenues and oil price volatility

Due to the decline in Cantarell, Calderón's administration confronted a significant drop in crude oil production starting in 2005, a trend that continued, with oil production and oil exports declining sharply between 2006-2012 (Presidency, 2023)[48]. In the words of an Interviewee, *"with the decline of Cantarell, Mexico ceased to be an oil power. In the early 2000s, Fox and Calderón oversaw a significant oil boom, pumping out more than 3 million bbl/d. However, the situation changed by the end of Calderón's term"* **(Interviewee 15).** In this respect, Solorio and Tosun (2023) highlight that the rapid drop in oil production faced by Calderón's administration had negative impacts on the security of energy supply. As a result, during

---

[47] See Calderón's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[48] See Figure 7: PEMEX hydrocarbon production 2004-2018

Calderón's period, the political discourse of strengthening energy security and reforming PEMEX took more space on the political agenda (Morales, 2020), especially through legal mechanisms that allowed private participation to stop the downward trend of 2005.

During Calderón's period, the oil industry underwent major changes and price volatility due to the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. The price of the Mexican oil mix plummeted in 2008, and rebound in 2011, maintaining an upward trend until the end of Calderón's term in 2012 (Bank of Mexico, 2024)[49]. Nevertheless, Calderón had the highest oil revenues compared to its predecessors. In 2008, public oil revenues reached a record 1,953 billion MXN (PEMEX, 2019)[50]. The high oil revenues during the Calderón period can be explained due to the higher average oil prices from in 2007-2012. As a result, the price effect offset the decline in Cantarell, allowing revenues from oil exports to rise (Gutiérrez, 2014).

6.3.3.2. Increase in fuel imports and decrease in fuel subsidies

During Calderón's period, the drop in oil production led to a fall in oil exports and refining, particularly from 2012. In turn, a growing demand for fuels caused an increase in fuel imports, which skyrocketed since 2005 (Morales 2020; SENER, 2020). These changes contributed to a reassess of the fuel subsidy policy. In this respect, Moreno (2017) highlights that Calderón dismantled the gasoline subsidy scheme, gradually increasing fuel prices to bring them closer to international prices. According to the Bank of Mexico (2013). Calderón's fuel subsidy policy comprised monthly adjustments to fuel prices based on the price in the international markets and the expected inflation in the economy. This policy was applied as long as global prices remain stable or decrease. However, because oil prices remained on the rise for most of the 2006-2012 period, as highlighted by Moreno (2017), oil prices rose much faster than gasoline prices, leading to more than sixty increases to fuel prices during Calderón period. Data from Presidency (2023)[51] shows an upward trend in magna and premium gasoline prices, as well as diesel, particularly between 2006 and 2012, the price of magna gasoline rose by 22.9% in Calderón's period. Gasoline price increases occurred despite a negative IEPS, with a tax on gasoline and diesel falling by over 620,000 million MX during Calderón's term (Moreno,

---

[49] See Figure 5: Mexican oil mix price from 2000-2020
[50] See Figure 9: Public sector oil revenues 1990-2018
[51] See Figure 12: Evolution of the real price of magna gasoline; premium gasoline and diesel, 2006-2023

2017)[52]. In the view of an Interviewee, *"Calderón's adjustments to diesel and gasoline led to increase in price, causing discontent among producers and transporters. However, keeping prices artificially low had a negative impact on the public finances"* **(Interviewee 7).**

6.3.3.3. Calderón's refinery project

To address the growing fuel imports, in 2008 Calderón made a significant announcement: the construction of a new refinery in Mexico, highlining that would be the first in 30 years **(Calderón, 2008e)[53]**. Calderón new refinery caught everyone's attention and expectations (Sin-embargo, 2022; Radio-formula, 2022; BBC, 2016). According to an Interviewee, *"Calderón's announcement of a new refinery marked the reactivation of a paralyzed sector. While Mexico began refining during the oil boom, no investment was made, causing the refineries to become obsolete"* **(Interviewee 19).** In 2009, PEMEX's CEO, Reyes-Heroles announced that the new refinery was to be built in Tula, where the greatest demand for oil products was required (Reyes-Heroles, 2009)[54]. Despite attracting significant media attention, just months before the end of Calderón's term, the new refinery was less than 1% complete. Nevertheless, in 2012, Calderón stated that the project was still underway and assured that it would be carried out **(Calderón, 2012)[55].**

According to an Interviewee, *"Calderón's new refinery was a respond to political and social pressures from rising gasoline prices. However, he did not anticipate, the economic challenge of investing billions into a project in the middle of a financial crisis"* **(Interviewee 8).** Similarly, an Interviewee stated that, *"Calderón's new refinery project was an important one, however, after investing in the land, fencing and feasibility studies, it was ultimately unviable"* **(Interviewee 7).** Likewise, in the view of an Interviewee, *"Calderón's refinery was not affordable, despite initial spending on making fencing. He was advised against undertake this project"* **(Interviewee 6).** Calderón's refinery can be an illustrative example of the Downs (1972) "issue-attention cycle" (Chapter 3, Section 3.3), which explains that hitting the public agenda does not guarantee action. Public attention to policy-issues may gain prominence, remain there for a short time, and then, despite remaining unresolved, gradually fade from the

---

[52] See Figure 13: From Calderón's fuel subsidies to Peña-Nieto's IEPS collection, 2006-2016
[53] See Calderón's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[54] See Reyes-Heroles statement in Annex 2: Statements
[55] See Calderón's statement in Annex 2: Statements

public attention and be replaced by others. Calderón's refinery initially drew the attention of the public, the media, and the political parties, but eventually disappeared from the agenda. According to an Interviewee, *"Calderón's refinery initially attracted attention, but did not have the expected impact in political communication, because just two weeks later, he was dressed as a soldier in army vehicles, talking about the war on drugs as his main political agenda"* **(Interviewee 20).**

6.4. Peña Nieto period and the incremental changes towards privatization

This section examines Peña Nieto's political discourse, agenda priorities and policy image, highlighting continuation of oil exports maximization policy. It focuses on the 2013 energy reform and its incremental changes towards privatization that deepened PEMEX's disintegration, consolidating the implementation of a neoliberal energy model. This section also analyses Peña Nieto's energy policy challenges such as the decline in oil production, exports, oil price, public oil revenues and fuel subsidy removal. This section will look at qualitative data such as presidential statement; interviewees; governments advertising campaigns; and documents from PEMEX, Congress and Senate; Ministry of Finance; energy journals and newspapers.

6.4.1. Discourse analysis of Peña Nieto's energy policy image and agenda priorities

In 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto became President of Mexico, marking the PRI returned after 12 years of PAN. His multi-thematic political agenda prioritised structural reforms in education, finance, energy, telecommunications, finance, social security and electoral matters (Presidency, 2014). In the words of an Interviewee, *"unlike Calderón's security-focused mono-thematic agenda. Peña Nieto emphasised on structural reforms, which made his agenda multi-thematic, attracting people's attention on different policy areas"* **(Interviewee 20).**

Peña Nieto's energy reform was one of the most eye-catching, striking and controversial reforms, proposing constitutional changes aimed at allowing private participation in a sector constitutionally reserved to the state. After the presidential campaign, high expectations emerged from Peña Nieto's commitments. His statements promised reduced energy costs

(Peña Nieto, 2012a)[56], major investments in energy-related megaprojects (El Economista, 2012), and the construction of a new refinery in Tula **(Peña Nieto, 2012b)[57],** a project previously promised by Calderón (Expansion, 2012; El Financiero, 2015; Sin-embargo, 2022). Once in office, Peña Nieto reiterated the priorities of his political agenda and reaffirmed his commitment to implementing a more comprehensive energy reform than Calderón's 2008 energy reform **(Peña Nieto, 2012c)[58].**

In 2013, to promote his energy reform and address potential negative signals from the opposition, Peña Nieto's government launched an intense advertising campaign in the media. With this objective, Peña Nieto's allocated significant public financial resources, his administration spent 60,233 million MXN on official advertising between 2013 and 2018 (Presidency, 2019)[59]. According to data from the public Social Communication System (Comsoc), advertising was concentrated mainly in two TV providers: Televise and TV Azteca (Fundar, 2014; Fundar, 2017). The government's campaign in media framed the opening of the energy sector to private participation as the only viable option to stop the decline in oil; production **(Ad Presidency, 2013a)[60]**; access to better technology **(Ad Presidency, 2013b)[61]**; reduce energy prices and create jobs **(Ad Presidency 2013c; Ad Presidency, 2013f)[62].** The advertising campaign also highlighted that any alternative policy would be counterproductive, since the corruption of previous governments had made PEMEX inefficient. According to the campaign, the only way to take advantage of Mexico's large oil reserves was to allow foreign companies participation **(Ad Presidency, 2013d)[63],** as they have the capital, the technology and they are more efficient than the State **(Ad Presidency, 2013e)[64].**

6.4.2. The 2013 energy reform and the privatization of the oil sector

In his political discourse, Peña Nieto highlighted that the energy reform aimed to further opening the sector to private investment, technology and competition to lower energy prices,

---

[56] See Peña Nieto's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[57] See Peña Nieto's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[58] See Peña Nieto's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[59] Figure 4: Official advertising expenditure 2007-2018
[60] See Annex 3: Government's advertising campaigns
[61] See Annex 3: Government's advertising campaigns
[62] See Annex 3: Government's advertising campaigns
[63] See Annex 3: Government's advertising campaigns
[64] See Annex 3: Government advertising campaigns

enhance energy security and increase deepwater oil extraction **(Peña Nieto, 2013c)**[65]**.** In 2013, Peña Nieto sent his initiative to the Senate to reform articles 27 and 28 of the Constitution, including several secondary laws and regulations. Gonzalez Marquez (2022: 35) states that the energy reform "aimed to consolidate the opening of the energy sector, which had already been underway since the 1990s, through a series of reforms to the secondary energy legislation".

For many Interviewees, Peña Nieto's energy reform represented the consolidation of the neoliberal model in the sector, achieved through incremental legal changes that allowed increasing foreign companies participation in the entire oil value chain, which had previously been reserved for the State. In the words of an Interviewee, *"with the aim of increasing competition, the reform not only opened the sector to private participation in oil extraction, but also across different segments of the value chain"* **(Interviewee 16).** According to another Interviewee, *"the reform aimed to make the sector more competitive through private participation, due to the financial need of the state. The reform deepened the transition of energy model, since PEMEX was unable to increase production on its own"* **(Interviewee 4).** Similarly, from an Interviewee's viewpoint, *"despite market inefficiencies, the reform and the proposed market model is seen as the best option, as it enables competition among participants, provided there are adequate regulations in place"* **(Interviewee 13).** Likewise, according to another Interviewee, *"the reform changes were often associated to oil extraction, but also changed the downstream. Fuel distribution and liberalization of fuel prices, allowed foreign companies to enter the market"* **(Interviewee 12).** In this respect, Ramirez and Massa (2019) highlight that the energy reform involved changes from the early stages of the value chain to midstream and downstream activities, involving the vertical and horizontal disintegration of PEMEX to establish contracts with private companies.

Peña Nieto's policy style played a significant role in the energy reform policy process, influencing the inclusion and exclusion of political actors for and against his energy reform. That is because, as pointed out by an Interviewee, *"making changes to the constitutional articles for the energy reform is both complex and controversial, because it challenged nationalist ideology. Energy sovereignty is a deeply rooted narrative, with historical ties to President Cardenas and the Mexican oil expropriation"* **(Interviewee 20).** According to Solorio and Tosun (2023: 619) "Peña Nieto's policy style was different from that of his

---

[65] See Peña Nieto's statement in Annex 2: Statements

predecessor, since he included intermediaries in the policy process only after the policies had effectively been designed with the help of experts". This view supported by an Interviewee, who highlighted that *"Melgar[66] told me that Peña Nieto initially designed the energy reform, with inputs from policy experts who advised him. From there, he opened the process and engaged with business organisations"* **(Interviewee 4).** To legitimise the reform, Peña Nieto's government openly held meetings with market-liberal think-tanks and ideologically like-minded business groups such as the Business Coordinating Council (CCE) and the Employers Confederation of Mexico (COPARMEX). In the view of an Interviewee from the CCE, this process was inclusive due to Peña Nieto's government, in his words: *"the private sector was invited to participate. They considered our opinions, listened to us, and then they decided whether we were right or not"* **(Interviewee 13).** In this respect, Solorio and Tosun (2023) highlight that overall, Peña Nieto's energy reform policy progress was only consensual at early stages, particularly with business groups and think-thanks. However, it became exclusive, especially towards opposition political parties, which were largely excluded from the process. Likewise, In the words of an Interviewee, *"many actors were excluded from the energy reform process, opposition legislators who proposed amendments were ignored. The reform was passed with police surrounding Congress, preventing protests"* **(Interviewee 4).**

6.4.3. Peña Nieto's energy policy challenges and continuation of oil export policy

This section analyses key energy policy challenges during Peña Nieto's period such as decline in oil production, exports, oil price and public revenues and the fuel subsidy elimination. It also explores the imbalance between domestic production and imports of fuels. This section examines qualitative evidence from interviews, along with key macroeconomic, budgetary and PEMEX indicators to identify patterns, trends, and evaluate specific aspects of oil and refining policies.

6.4.3.1. Decline in oil production, exports, and prices

Like his predecessors, Peña Nieto, failed to stop the decline in oil production, establishing a pattern of growing trade deficits. As a result, Mexico increasingly exports less and less oil, and

---

[66] Melgar served as Mexico's deputy secretary of energy for hydrocarbons and member of PEMEX's board of directors from 2014 to 2016. She was Mexico's under-secretary for electricity from 2012 to 2014.

while importing more and more gas and gasoline from the US (Ramirez and Massa, 2019). Collected data from the Presidency (2023)[67] shows that during Peña Nieto's period PEMEX's oil production drop from 2.5 mbpd in 2012 to 1.7 mbpd in 2018, while Cantrell's production was marginal[68]. According to an Interviewee, *"in contrast to the policies of the 80s, Peña Nieto's period marked the end of Cantarell's production, oil ceased to be the great engine of Mexican growth and lever of development"* **(Interviewee 15).**

Nevertheless, evidence indicates that Peña Nieto continued with the implementation of an energy policy based on maximizing oil extraction for export to international markets. Collected data from The Federation Expenditure Budget (PEF, 2013) shows that most of PEMEX's investment was allocated to exploration and production, that is, 78.6% of PEMEX's total investment, while only 17.2% was allocated to refining. Similar findings show that 85% of the investment was allocated to upstream, while 11% to refining (Morales, 2020). However, when the oil price collapsed in 2015, and plummeted in 2016 (Bank of Mexico, 2022)[69]. This price had a devastating impact on the budget allocated to PEMEX. Its budget decreased from MXN 752,593 million in 2015 to MXN 538,114 million in 2018 (CEFP, 2022)[70], reducing investment in all PEMEX activities except upstream. According to PEMEX (2019), despite PEMEX's investments in upstream during Peña Nieto's period, the decline in oil production could not be stopped. One reason for this is the focus on deepwater, despite the fact the most productive fields are in shallow water and onshore.

6.4.3.2. Decrease in public oil revenues and fuel subsidy removal

During Peña Nieto's period, the decline in production, exports and oil price contributed to the decrease in oil revenues, which had a downward trend. The public oil revenues received by the Peña Nieto's administration were MXN 1.703 billion, which plummeted to MXN 893 billion in 2017 (PEMEX, 2019)[71]. To address the federal budget deficit due to the drop in oil prices, Peña Nieto's administration reassessed the fuel subsidy policy. This involved the eliminating the fiscal stimulus (fuel subsidy) and replace it with a tax collection through IEPS to fill the gap in public finances (El Economista, 2017). In this respect, in the view of an Interviewee,

---

[67] See Figure 7: PEMEX hydrocarbon production 2004-2018
[68] See Figure 15: PEMEX Historical production active Cantarell 2000-2022
[69] See Figure 16: Price of the Mexican oil mix in 2015 and 2016
[70] See Figure 17: PEMEX budget 2006-2021
[71] See Figure 9: Public sector oil revenues 1990-2018

"because public finances relied heavily on oil, tax collection was not a priority. However, the 2015 oil crisis forced Peña Nieto to reduce subsidies and make taxes more efficient" **(Interviewee 3).** Similarly, In the words of another Interviewee, *"the oil sector was once seen as "the goose that laid the golden eggs". However, due to limited resource availability and low efficiency, fuel price subsidies became a heavy burden on the budget"* **(Interviewee 20).** Likewise, another Interviewee stated that, *"The elimination of fuel subsidies was a response to the fall in oil prices, since there was no surplus revenue from oil sales, and tax incentives were unsustainable"* **(Interviewee 1).**

The political narrative, however, focused on the anticipated benefits of the liberalization of fuel prices, promoted by Peña Nieto's political discourse during the energy reform campaign. He highlighted that liberalisation, and free competition would lead to lower energy and fuel prices **(Peña Nieto, 2012a)**[72]. The collapse of oil prices in 2015 and 2016, accelerated the process of fuel price liberalization along with increases in fuel taxes (El Economista, 2016). With public attention concerns over increases in gasoline price, the Secretary of the Treasury, Jose Antonio Meade, explained on national TV that fuel prices could no longer be subsidized, because the burden they impose on public finances (Meade, 2016)[73].

According to an Interviewee, a PAN's deputy, who voted for the Federal Income Law for 2017, *"Gasoline prices should be set by the market, not by the government. However. In 2017, the fuel price liberalization turned out to be a lie. While fuel prices were released, taxes specifically IEPS and VAT were increased for tax collection"* **(Interviewee 6).** According to Moreno (2017), gasoline prices increased systematically even when there was a collapse in oil prices. Because Peña Nieto's government sought to collect taxes through IEPS. The negative IEPS of the Calderón period was turned into a highly positive IEPS in Peña Nieto's period (Luna and Jasso, 2021). Therefore, when crude oil prices fell in 2015 and 2016, it was not the market logic that prevailed but rather a focus on tax collection. According to an Interviewee, *"Peña Nieto's energy reform and the tax reform were closely linked, since the lack of oil revenue had to be compensated through a tax reform"* **(Interviewee 15).** Likewise, from an Interviewee's viewpoint, *"fuel taxes were increased because the State stopped receiving oil revenues, leading the government cut subsidies to fill the gap"* **(Interviewee 7).**

---

[72] See Peña Nieto's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[73] See Meade's statement in Annex 2: Statements

On January 1, 2017, fuel subsidies were eliminated, leading to mass protests that drew macro-level attention, known as the "2017 *gasolinazo* protests", which were a series of demonstrations against a rapid and excessive increase in gasoline prices. Thousands of protestors marched, blocked motorways, and shut down petrol stations, over 1,461 people were arrested, and five lost their lives. Due to its political repercussions, political analysts labelled Peña Nieto's fuel price liberalization as "the worst political mistake" (Dresser, 2017)[74].

For many interviewees, instead of deregulating gasoline prices, as promised in the energy reform, the government increased fuel taxes. According to an Interviewee, *"initially, the reform promised lower fuel prices. However, as oil prices dropped the narrative changed, IEPS was introduced to compensate for the loss in oil revenues. When oil price rose USD 100, the continued imposition of IEPS could no longer be justified"* **(Interviewee 14).** As a result, from an Interviewee's viewpoint, *"Mexico shifted from relying on oil revenues to depending on gasoline revenues. Public finances are no longer 'petrolized', but rather 'gasolinized'"* **(Interviewee 15).**

Among the Interviewees, opinions on fuel subsidies were divided. One interviewee, for example considered that *"the subsidy is not only regressive, but represents an opportunity cost, creates a budget deficit and benefits only a small sector. It is literally burning money on some drivers' cars"* **(Interviewee 20).** However, other Interviewees point out benefits. According to an Interviewee, *"the increase in fuel prices impacts the economy, it does not just affect drivers, but above all, it also drives inflation, affecting products and services, as it is an inflationary factor"* **(Interviewee 19).** While another Interviewee highlighted that *"using a fiscal stimulus to contain inflation is not the best approach, as it sends the wrong signals to the market. The government collects less and, inflation is not a fiscal problem but a monetary one"* **(Interviewee 2).**

6.4.3.3. Refined products imbalance: domestic production and imports

During the Peña Nieto period, Mexican refineries experienced a downward trend in oil processing. Collected data from the Presidency (2023) show that oil processing in the refineries reached a downward record in 2018, practically half of what was processed in 2013. Similar

---

[74] See Dresser's statement in Annex 2: Statements

figures show this downtrend trend (Morales, 2020). The decline in domestic production of refined products led to an increase in fuel imports. According to the Government of Mexico (2021)[75], during Peña Nieto's administration fuel imports followed an upward trend. In 2013, gasoline imports represented 45% of national consumption, increasing rapidly in five years, up to 79% in 2018. This trend was also observed with diesel imports, which in 2013 represented 27% of national consumption, increasing to 77% in 2018.

In 2018, fuel imports (gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel) reached an all-time high. This was due to national refineries producing barely 359,000 bpd out of the 1,25 mbpd needed to meet domestic demand of fuels, resulting in a deficit of 901,000 bpd, which was covered by fuel imports (PEMEX, 2023)[76]. Despite this downward trend in oil processing. The project of a new refinery that aimed to increase the production of refined products, initially promised by Calderón and later by Peña Nieto, was cancelled in 2014, after considering that "it was not profitable" (BBC, 2016; Milenio, 2022). News headlines on the cancellation described it as a "policy failure", stating that "from the oil dream, only the fence remains" (Radio-formula, 2022).

According to an Interviewee, *"since 2015, Mexico has become a net oil importer of refined products. Previously, we exported crude oil and imported gasoline, maintaining a positive balance of payments. However, under Peña Nieto, this trend reversed, and we became net importers"* **(Interviewee 1).** Similarly, as stated by Ramirez and Massa (2019: 61) "as a result of this disequilibrium, Mexico holds a persistent commercial deficit with the US in oil, diesel, gasoline, and gas of 12,500 million USD, a truly alarming sum for a country rich in natural resources". This imbalance between domestic production and imports of fuels highlights a lack of integration in PEMEX's policy, particularly in downstream activities.

6.5. The 2017 *gasolinazo* protests

This section examines the political repercussions of the 2017 *gasolinazo* protests as a focusing event, triggering that drew macro-level attention. It analyses how these protests attracted the attention of the public, the media, political parties and the government on the energy policy agenda. additionally, this section examines contextual factors that may have amplified the

---

[75] See Figure 24: Gasoline and diesel imports and national consumption levels in Mexico (2011-2021)
[76] See Figure 25: Evolution and projection of the fuel deficit (gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel)

gasolinazo protests. To ensure reliability, enhance validity and minimise bias, qualitative data is analysed through triangulation of data from different sources such as presidential statements, interviewees, government's advertising in the media, surveys conducted by Congress, energy journals, and newspapers.

6.5.1. The *gasolinazo* protests as focusing event

PET model (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 2009)[77] rests on the idea that policy change may occur because of a large-scale policy event such as external shock. Focusing events may trigger macro-level attention, affecting public opinion and generating negative or positive feedback.

On January 1, 2017, as a result of Peña Nieto's energy reform implementation, the liberalisation of gasoline prices came into effect and the prices skyrocketed. This situation triggered a series of demonstrations against the excessive and sudden increased in the gasoline prices. These protests are known as the 2017 *gasolinazo* protests (Guardian, 2017; Aljezeera, 2017). The 2017 *gasolinazo* protests served as a focusing event, attracting macro-level attention from the public, the media, political parties, and government on the energy policy agenda. Most importantly, the *gasolinazo* protests triggered a policy failure perception, a re-definition of the problem and the search for alternative solutions.

Surveys conducted in January 2017 by the Congress (CESOP, 2017) gathered data from 602 citizens with landlines nationwide about the *gasolinazo* protests. The findings show that 46% blamed the poor economic management, while 93% held the federal government and president responsible. Anger was the most common reaction, with 98% expecting fuel hikes to rise basic good prices and 90% already noticing increases. Similar to the survey findings, Cunningham (2019:122) highlights that "many people blame Peña Nieto's privatization of the energy sector as the driver of higher fuel prices". Likewise, according to an Interviewee, *"Peña Nieto's energy reform was widely seen as the cause of the gasolinazo protests, because the reform promised competitive fuel prices, but instead people only saw increases in fuel taxes and cuts in fuel subsidies"* **(Interviewee 19).** According to Moreno (2017), public's discontent during the 2017 *gasolinazo* resulted from various factors. First, the abrupt fuel price hike, fuel prices increased without gradualness which was a severe blow to households' budgets. Second,

---

[77] See Figure 22: Model of mutual influence (external pressure vs internal response)

gasoline prices showed a continuous upward trend, regardless of the fluctuations in oil prices. Third, increases in fuel prices impacted the entire population, either directly or indirectly by transferring the cost to transportation and final goods such as food.

Many Interviewees believed that the government underestimated the impact that eliminating fuel subsidies and increasing fuel taxes on the population. According to an Interviewee, *"the gasolinazo was politically mishandled. In 2017, fuel prices skyrocketed, and people took to the streets, the government should have foreseen it. The price of gasoline is a very sensitive issue since it directly affects people's lives"* **(Interviewee 17).** In the words of an Interviewee, *"the policy to mitigate increases in gasoline prices is not just an economic issue, it is a governability issue. The gasolinazo protests resulted in a severe unrest, including the loss of lives, widespread looting, petrol stations were set on fire, and cars were burned"* **(Interviewee 12).** For another an Interviewee, *"the gasolinazo of 2017 was the culmination of the people's desperation with a government that had failed to deliver, the gasoline price rise was the last straw that broke the camel's back"* **(Interviewee 15).**

The analysis of Peña Nieto's political discourse reveals that the reduction in fuel prices was presented as an expected benefit to promote energy reform. He claimed that the energy reform would prevent the excessive and rapid increase in fuel prices **(Peña Nieto, 2015)**[78]. However, In 2017, fuel taxes increases pushed gasoline price to a record 21.22 pesos per litre, sparking social unrest and drawing attention from the public, the media, political parties and government. Finance Minister, Jose Antonio Meade, explained that government could no longer afford to keep gasoline prices artificially low (Meade, 2016)[79]. Collected data from the Presidency (2023)[80] on the evolution on the price of gasoline show that, magna gasoline's price increased by +42.8% in real terms, while premium gasoline and diesel increased by 46% and 48.6%, respectively. Under Peña Nieto, the gasoline price rose from 15.59 MXN per litre in 2012 to 22.07 MXN in 2018, continuing a rise that began in 2006 (Presidency, 2023).

Many Interviewees considered the political communication, which was based on selling the idea that competition would immediately lower prices, a political mistake. As a result, when gasoline prices hit a record high in 2017, people felt that the energy reform had failed to deliver

---

[78] See Peña Nieto's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[79] See Meade's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[80] See Figure 12: Evolution of real price of magna and premium gasoline and diesel 2006-2023

the expected effects. In the words of an Interviewee, *"the political communication surrounding the energy reform was poorly executed, claiming that one of the outcomes would be a decrease in fuel prices was a big mistake"* **(Interviewee 15).** According to another Interviewee, *"After the energy reform, instead of fuel prices falling, people observed gasoline prices rising even as crude oil prices dropped. This led to anger and frustration, as it contradicted the promised that had been made"* **(Interviewee 7).** In words of another Interviewee, *"Beyond the technical part, the government failed to effectively communicate the liberalization of gasoline prices, leading to widespread protests. The rise in gasoline prices is a hard blow to people's pockets"* **(Interviewee 20).** According to Interviewee, *"This is a mistake often made by many economic experts who believe that simply 'introducing competition' will lead to lower prices. However, Mexico is a price-taker for oil and gasoline, and the political narrative falsely promised that gasoline prices would decrease"* **(Interviewee 15).** Likewise, for another Interviewee, *"Competition was promised in the fuel market, with the expectation that which would drive prices down. However, the benefits of Peña Nieto's energy reform were overestimated; In reality, prices remained unchanged, foreign companies established a brand presence but did not compete on price for market share, and some even engaged in collusion"* **(Interviewee 19).** While, for another Interviewee, *"more time was needed for competition to take effect and for prices to decrease. Critics of the reform rightly argue that the promised benefits were not achieved, but the reform needed more time to fully take shape"* **(Interviewee 16).**

To contain negative feedback after the 2017 *gasolinazo* protests, a government launched a media campaign, including television ads. The analysis of these advertisements reveals that their aim focus was on addressing shortcoming in political communication, particularly the exaggerated promises of the energy reform's benefits. Some government's ads provided explanations for the increase of gasoline price, pointing out factors such as the international oil prices and the increase in the dollar as key contributors **(Ad Presidency, 2017)[81].**

In addition, to reinforce the government's campaign, Peña Nieto addressed the nation to justify the increases in fuel prices. Among the three key reasons he provided in support of his energy reform were: First, the increase in gasoline price was driven by international factors, came from abroad, not by the energy reform or additional fuel taxes **(Peña Nieto, 2017a)[82].** Second,

---

[81] See Annex 3: Government advertising campaigns
[82] See Peña Nieto's statement in Annex 2: Statements

subsidising the price of gasoline, was subsidising primarily benefit the rich and implied reducing the budget for supporting the poor **(Peña Nieto, 2017a)[83]**; and third, Mexico's oil reserves were depleted, as stated by Peña Nieto *"the goose that laid the golden eggs, Cantarell, dried up"* **(Peña Nieto, 2017b)[84].**

For some Interviewees, the government's campaign focused on emphasising that the fuel increases were not caused by the energy reform, while also reinforcing the benefits of opening the sector to private participation. According to an Interviewee, *"It was necessary to explain to the public that PEMEX could no longer afford to continue exploration on its own, especially in deep waters. Allowing private participation meant sharing the financial risk"* **(Interviewee 20)** Likewise, according to another Interviewee, *"PEMEX lacked the financial resources to continue exploring new fields and was not in position to take on the risks of investing in new fields"* **(Interviewee 15).** Despite the intense government campaign in the media, neither the president nor his administration was able to reverse their negative image in public opinion. The political consequences of the *gasolinazo* protests in 2017 were so severe that by the end of his term, in his sixth and last government report, Peña Nieto continued to defend his position on the *gasolinazo* in a nationally broadcast TV spot, "assuming the political cost of his decision" due to its significant impact on the people **(Peña Nieto, 2018)[85].**

6.5.1. Additional factors that contributed to *gasolinazo* protests

Other contextual factors played a significant role in the *gasolinazo* protest, making it a focusing event. As one Interviewee highlighted, *"The government ended subsidizes and increased fuel taxes at a time people were already exhausted by social, political, economic and even security challenges, partially because of the wave of violence. People felt the need to protest, and the issue that resonated most with them was the price of gasoline"* **(Interviewee 15).** The political disruption and anger sparked by the *gasolinazo* protests were fuelled by Peña Nieto's low approval ratings. According to Oraculus (2023)[86], Peña Nieto had the lowest, standing at just 18%, compared to his predecessors, Calderón, Fox and Zedillo, who had an approval of 55%, 56%, and 61%, respectively. In contrast, AMLO enjoyed a significantly higher approval rating

---

[83] See Peña Nieto's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[84] See Peña Nieto's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[85] See Peña Nieto's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[86] See Figure 20: EPN's approval rating compared to other Mexican presidents

of 66%. In addition, several other contextual factors influenced the *gasolinazo* protests such as high-profile corruption cases, and political and macroeconomic issues such as high inflation and a weakening Mexican peso (FT, 2016), influenced by Trump's election as US president and his trade and immigration policies. According to an Interviewee, *"Other factors fuelled people's discontent, such as widespread corruption, news of funds being diverted from the budget, and Donald Trump's presidency, in which many felt that the Mexican government was not being respected"* **(Interviewee 19).**

In addition, several other contextual factors influenced the *gasolinazo* protests, including International politics, combined with the political impact of widespread violence due to the Mexican drug war (FT, 2013), leading to homicide figures reaching record high during Peña Nieto's period (DW, 2017; BBC, 2018); the escape of drug lord Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán from a maximum security prison (BBC, 2015); human rights violations under Peña Nieto's government such as the disappearance of 43 students in *Ayotzinapa* in 2014 (BBC, 2014). According to Sánchez-Gutierrez (2019: 287), during Peña Nieto's period, "corruption in politics had become more rampant and visible than ever before. The disappearance and murder of 43 student teachers in *Ayotzinapa* trapped the government in a labyrinth with no clear way out".

The corruption of the authorities was widely seen as one of the primary drivers of public discontent (BBC, 2016), corruption cases like the "Casa Blanca" (France24, 2018) caught the public's attention. Other the corruption cases linked to the energy sector and PEMEX, also fuelled public anger over gasoline prices, such as the cases of Agro-Nigrogenados and Fertinal scandals, where PEMEX overpaid for two fertilizer companies (Forbes, 2022b; Maldonado, 2021), and the case of Ethylene XXI, a petrochemical complex tied to the Brazilian multinational Odebrecht, which was implicated in one of the largest corruption cases in Latin America(El universal, 2021; Forbes, 2020). Public discontent was also fuelled by increasing fuel theft from PEMEX pipelines known in Mexico as "*Huachicol*" (El Economista, 2019), which refers to the illegal tapping of PEMEX gasoline pipelines, while "fiscal *Huachicol*" involves the illegal importation of fuels (Expansion, 2023). According to an Interviewee, *"the "huachicol" worsened under Peña Nieto, significantly impacting fuel supply. Likewise, when the fiscal stimulus was removed with a stroke of a pen, the "fiscal huachicol" skyrocketed, along with an increase in fuel smuggling"* **(Interviewee 12).**

According to Morales (2020:16) Corruption within PEMEX is not a new issue, but under Peña Nieto's administration, "it appears to have reached unprecedented levels. Besides the accelerated illegal tapping of fuel, there is evidence of bribery and contract-buying carried out by the Odebrecht company". For many Interviewees, the multiple cases of corruption scandals contributed to public anger and protests over gasoline prices. More importantly, initiated a process in which people began to look for alternative solutions to the energy model that had been in place for the past 36 years. According to an Interviewee, *"Public perception was that the expected benefits of the reform were never achieved due to corruption. Large bribes were paid to the government to secure contracts for foreign companies such as Odebrecht. The CEO of PEMEX, Emilio Lozoya, is currently detention in connection with these scandals"* **(Interviewee 17).** Likewise, in the words of an Interviewee, *"Cases like Odebrecht and Lozoya were pure corruption. The reform was aimed at eliminating corruption. But the reform failed. Because the contracts were given to Lozoya's friends, or to Peña Nieto's friends"* **(Interviewee 6).** For another Interviewee, *"there was a widespread perception of policy failure due to corruption, as many leonine contracts with PEMEX were seen as highly advantageous for foreign companies, while offering little benefit to PEMEX"* **(Interviewee 7).** Similarly, according to an Interviewee, *"The trial of the former CEO of PEMEX, Lozoya, exposed the corruption that flourished during Peña Nieto's administration, fuelling public outrage. Corruption scandals linked to Odebrecht were unprecedented"* **(Interviewee 14).**

6.6. Findings and conclusions

Key findings revealed that PEMEX's reluctance to adjust its refining policy to changes in national fuel consumption can be explained by the adoption of a neoliberal energy model during the equilibrium period. This model prioritised maximising crude oil exports over refining and value-added products. The dominant neoliberal policy image assumed that in a free-market world, goods could be freely exported and imported without tariffs or restrictions, disregarding geopolitical perspectives of energy security risks, prioritising an economic liberalism perspective (Kuzemko et al. 2016, Chapter 5, Section 5.3). As result, Mexico's oil production collapsed, PEMEX's refineries became obsolete, and no new refineries were built in Mexico in 43 years, leading to an increasing dependence on fuel imports. Furthermore, findings suggest that the 2017 *gasolinazo* protest was the focusing event that challenged the neoliberal energy model. This event triggered a competition of policy images over the sector's direction, drawing macro-level attention from the government, the media, political parties, and

the public to the energy political agenda. There is an extensive perception that 2013 energy reform was blamed for this rise in fuel prices, largely due to ineffective political communication that exaggerated its expected benefits, such as the government's promise to lower gasoline prices. Findings also suggests that the perceived policy failure, driven by the removal of fuel subsidies; increased fuel taxes; and rising energy prices, played a major role in galvanizing social unrest and fuelling the protests.

The analysis of the political agenda from 2000 to 20018 period, covering the administrations of Fox, Calderón and Peña Nieto, reveals a deliberate effort to liberalise the sector. Building on the efforts of their predecessors, these presidents provided continuity through incremental legal and market-oriented changes. Their political agendas focused on maximizing oil extraction for export, disintegration of PEMEX's value chain, and the opening of the sector to private sector participation in activities previously reserved for the State, particularly through the 2008 and 2013 energy reforms. The most significant factor influencing the energy policy agenda during this period was the implementation of a dominant neoliberal policy image. This dominant policy image argues that the provision of energy is better taken care of by the market and private sector companies than by the state-run PEMEX. That is because, according to the neoliberal idea, public companies lack profit motive, which often leads to inefficiencies, while private companies, driven by profit, are expected to deliver better results. The dominant neoliberal policy image of the equilibrium period also considered that profits were found in crude oil exports rather than in refining, as a result, the energy policy agenda focused primarily on reversing the drop in crude oil that began in 2004 with the collapse of Cantarell, while the much-promised new refineries under Fox, Calderón and Peña Nieto were never carried out, leading to a 43-year gap in which no new refinery was built in Mexico[87].

The discourse analysis and triangulation of the presidential statements, interviews transcripts and government's media campaign suggest that the perceived corruption of previous governments and the inefficiencies of PEMEX, were used as justifications within the political narrative to hand over the sector to foreign companies that were perceived as more efficient, due to their access to capital and technology for deepwater oil extraction. The obsolescence and aging of PEMEX refineries, is therefore, the result of a 36-year period during which the

---

[87] See Table 1: Punctuated equilibrium in the Mexican oil sector 1982-2024. There is a 43-year gap between the construction of the last refineries in 1979 and the new Olmeca refinery in 2022.

energy policy agenda prioritise oil extraction over refining. Consequently, by the end of the equilibrium period, PEMEX refineries lacked maintenance and the technology to process heavy crude oil, leading to a decline in fuel production and leaving Mexico highly dependent on fuel imports (Government of Mexico, 2021).

The findings of Section 6.2 indicate that under Fox's administration (2000-2006), despite the collapse of Cantarell's oil production, energy policy agenda remained focused primarily on maximizing crude oil extraction for export in the international markets. This policy persisted without adjusting PEMEX's refining policy to changes in domestic consumption, particularly to the national production of transport fuels. Key evidence suggests that the continuation of the neoliberal energy model was driven not only by an alignment with the policies of Fox's PRI-predecessors, but also to an increase in public oil revenues and low prices of fuel imports from the US. However, Fox's policy image for the sector's direction did not take into consideration the geopolitical implications that this policy implied, particularly in terms of Mexico's energy security.

Section 6.3 present evidence supporting the idea that Calderón's monothematic security-driven political agenda, may have contributed to the lack of macro-level attention to energy policy issues. This contributed to maintain the policy stability of the sector, as macro-level attention to policy-issues is a key element to radical policy change in PET model. Additionally, the analysis of Calderón's political discourse and government advertising campaigns reveal that, his administration use "catastrophic" narratives about PEMEX's future to legitimize private participation in a sector historically reserved for the state. Similar to Fox's administration, evidence suggests that Calderón showed reluctance to adjust PEMEX's refining policy to align changes in national fuel consumption. Instead, his administration continued with an energy policy focused on maximizing oil exports, reducing fuel subsidies and increasing fuel imports. Calderón incrementally implemented a neoliberal energy model through legal mechanisms. The 2008 energy reform introduced incremental market-oriented changes, including private participation through contracts. However, it did not fully liberalize the oil sector, as it did not allow foreign companies to own oil reserves or enter into profit-sharing contracts.

The findings in Section 6.4. support the argument that Peña Nieto's multi-thematic political agenda not only continued an energy policy based on maximizing oil exports, but also deepened the incremental legal changes made by Calderón's energy reform to further consolidate a

neoliberal energy model. The 2013 energy reform introduced significant incremental market-oriented changes, including allowing foreign companies to own oil reserves, enter into profit-sharing contracts, and participate in all PEMEX activities, from upstream to downstream. Evidence also suggests that the disintegration of PEMEX value chain contributed to the growing imbalance between domestic production and fuel imports, increasing dependence on fuel imports to levels never seen before. Furthermore, key findings reveal that the withdrawal of fuel subsidies and increases in fuel taxes were exacerbated by the perception of an ineffective political communication of government energy policies. Specifically, the exaggeration of the energy reform benefits and the anticipated effects of competition on reducing fuel prices.

Section 6.5 presents evidence suggesting that the *gasolinazo* protests triggered macro-level attention by attracting the attention of the public, the media, political parties and government, which in turn. As highlighted by PET model, this attention initiated and facilitated a policy image competition process on the direction of the sector. A key takeaway from this section is that the political shock caused by the *gasolinazo* remains fresh in public's memory. There is a widespread perception that many people blamed Peña Nieto's privatization model for the rise in fuel prices. Additional contextual factors contributing to mass mobilisation included high inflation, currency depreciation, widespread violence due to the Mexican Drug War, Peña Nieto's low approval rating and major corruption scandals. This empirical evidence highlights the political risks and consequences of ineffective political communication, especially when energy policies are "oversold" with excessive claims about expected benefits and policy solutions when addressing energy challenges. As a result, despite the recurring political narrative favouring a dominant neoliberal policy image and intense government media campaigns aimed at reducing contradictory signals, the *gasolinazo* protests, as focusing event, not only marked the end of Peña Nieto's administration, but also marked the end of the equilibrium period, in which the political agenda prioritised implementing a neoliberal energy model to address the challenges of the sector.

The next Chapter 7 will analyse how the policy entrepreneur leveraged the 2017 *gasolinazo* protests to advance his agenda, policy image and preferred policies for the energy sector.

CHAPTER 7

EXPLANING RAPID AND RADICAL POLICY CHANGE
IN MEXICO'S OIL SECTOR

7.1. Introduction

According to PET model (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 2009), stability and policy change are not two separate processes, but two sides of the same coin. Both are crucial for understanding the dynamics of attention to energy policy-issues and the factors driving policy change. The previous Chapter 6 examined the stability and incremental changes of the equilibrium period from 2000 to 2018 in Mexico's oil sector. This Chapter will focus on the radical and rapid policy change during punctuation period from 2018 to 2024. This chapter will address the following key questions: Why is AMLO's policy image for the direction of the sector considered a radical change in energy paradigm? What role did the focusing event and policy entrepreneur play in this change? Did the shift in policy image and venue shift contribute to policy change in the refining sector? What are the key factors that explain the punctuation period in the refining sector?

In 2018, Under AMLO, an energy paradigm shift took place, transitioning from a neoliberal, oil-export-oriented to an interventionist approach focused on fuel self-sufficiency. This shift introduced a new business strategy for PEMEX, strengthened value chain integration, and revised upstream and downstream oil policies. AMLO's new policy focuses on redirecting crude oil production towards domestic refining, with crude oil extraction limited to 1.8 mbd (Presidency, 2023). This strategy includes expanding PEMEX's downstream segment to increase domestic production of fuels, petrochemicals, and fertilizers, while integrating its value chain to diversify its revenue base (Presidency, 2024). In this context, this chapter explores this rapid and radical policy change in the oil and refining sector by analysing AMLO's political discourse, his agenda priorities, preferred policy image and the rationale behind his state interventionism model. Employing a qualitative approach to enhance reliability and minimise bias, it uses data triangulation to cross-verify findings from his presidential statements, interviews transcripts, and official documents, identifying recurring themes, phases, keywords, dominant policy images, and rhetoric strategies. Additionally, this chapter examines how AMLO's instrumentalised the *gasolinazo* protests to draw macro-level attention

to his energy agenda, along with attention-grabbing strategies that facilitated a shift in PET's mechanism of policy image and venue. It also analyses key policy challenges during AMLO's presidential term, such as rising fuel prices due to the Ukraine war, which evidently reinforced his political discourse and strengthened support for his fuel price stability policy and revitalisation of the oil and refining sector.

This chapter contributes to PET studies by highlighting AMLO's role as policy entrepreneur, instrumentalising the 2017 *gasolinazo* as a focusing event, and leveraging nationalistic discourse to advocate for greater state intervention. By challenging the dominant neoliberal policy image, he aimed to drive policy change and build support for his preferred policy image for the energy sector's direction (Dresser, 2022; Panibratov et al., 2022; Tornel, 2021; Covarrubias and Gallegos, 2024). As this chapter will explain, AMLO instrumentalised several attention-grabbing strategies, leveraging media through his daily morning conferences for venue-shopping (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009), expanding conflict across institutional venues such as between the executive and judiciary (Schattschneider, 1960; Cobb and Elder, 1983; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), mobilising the masses (Birkland, 1998), shifting policy image and venues (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), associating policy image to core social values (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), and using causal narratives and blame attribution (Cairney, 2019).

Consequently, this chapter suggests that integrating the expansion of political conflict between institutional venues as a complementary explanatory factor into the PET framework could enhance its explanatory scope, particularly in multi-venue political systems similar to Mexico's. Future PET research would benefit from taking this factor into account to more effectively explain the dynamics of such political systems. In this regard, this thesis makes a significant theoretical contribution to the literature on the PET model examining focusing events, conflict expansion, and the role of policy entrepreneur in agenda-setting (Birkland and Warnement, 2013; Birkland, 1998; Kingdon, 2003; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; True et al., 2007; Schattschneider, 1960; and Cobb and Elder, 1983).

Moreover, this chapter makes significant empirical contributions to the field of global energy politics, particularly on two key areas. First, it provides evidence on the policy implications for Mexico's energy security following the recent changes aimed at strengthening its downstream oil segment to reduce crude oil exports and meet domestic fuel demand, while gradually

integrating renewables. This policy change was implemented before the COVID-19 pandemic and during the 2022 global fuel crisis due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. As a result, it provides crucial perspectives shaped by these events that contribute to broader debates in the literature on the potential pathways of energy transitions, particularly in fossil-fuel-rich developing countries like Mexico. In this regard, this thesis provides a valuable contribution to the literature on the potential trajectory of energy transition, as well as to debates surrounding the challenges of sustainable transition and the role of the state (Van de Graaf and Sovacool, 2020; Kuzemko at al., 2016; Newell, 2021; Johnstone, and Newell, 2017; Burke and Stephens, 2018; Goldthau, 2010; Hafner and Tagliapietra, 2020; Van de Graaf and Bradshaw, 2018; Kuzemko at al., 2019; West and Fattouh, 2019; Van de Graaf, 2018; Johnston et al., 2020; Goldthau, 2017; Kuzemko, 2019; Goldthau and Westphal, 2019).

Second, this chapter also offers empirical insights on the challenges faced by Mexico's fuel price stability policy implemented during the punctuation period, which relies on fiscal stimulus and results in an opportunity cost for the public finances. These findings make a significant contribution to the literature on fuel-related fiscal incentives and their tax implications for public finances, while enriching debates on PEMEX, oil revenues, and the need for diversifying fiscal resources (Rivera de Jesus and López -Reynosa, 2023; Rivera de Jesus 2024; Villarreal-Paez and Michel-Gutierrez, 2013; Segal, 2012; Plante and Jordan, 2013; Dominguez-Ordonez, 2015).

This chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.2 analyses the rationale behind AMLO's radical policy shift in energy paradigm, focusing on his political discourse, agenda priorities and policy image for the direction of the sector. Section 7.3 examines how AMLO, as policy entrepreneur, instrumentalised several attention-grabbing strategies to promote his policy image and push for radical policy change in the refining sector. Section 7.4 focuses on AMLO's discourse on key challenges, including PEMEX's new downstream strategy and fuel price stability measures. This chapter will look at a combination of qualitative evidence, including presidential statements, interviews transcripts; documentary analysis and key macroeconomic, budgetary and PEMEX indicators to identify trends and evaluate specific aspects of oil and refining policies.

7.2. AMLO's discourse and agenda priorities: towards an interventionist energy model

This section analyses why AMLO's policy image for the direction of the sector represents a radical shift in Mexico's energy model, transitioning from a neoliberal to interventionism energy paradigm. It examines AMLO's political discourse, his agenda priorities, favoured policy image, and preferred policies, with particular focus on PEMEX's value chain integration policy. To cross-verify findings and enhance reliability, this section examines presidential statements, transcripts of semi-structure interviews, and relevant documents such as the Alternative Nation Project (2018-2024); the National Development Plan (2019-2024); PEMEX business plans; and official documents from the Secretariat of Energy.

7.2.1. AMLO's policy image and preferred policies for the oil and refining sector.

On July 1, 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) became president of Mexico, representing MORENA and allied political parties. During his presidential campaign, AMLO promised "the fourth transformation" of Mexico (4T)[88], offering an alternative vision for the nation, including greater state intervention. This vision was detailed in the Alternative Nation Project 2018-2024' (ANP, 2017), AMLO's electoral platform and government Programme, which proposed significant public policy changes, including radical changes to the energy sector, shifting from the previous 36 years of neoliberal energy policy.

The ANP served as a cornerstone for AMLO's electoral platform, emphasising the key role of the state in increasing national fuel production to attain energy self-sufficiency. The document clearly highlights that "It is essential to recover energy self-sufficiency, as a principle of national security, making PEMEX refineries operable and, where appropriate, evaluating the construction of refineries with a capacity of 300 thousand barrels per day or the installation of biorefineries for the production of biodiesel" (ANP, 2017: 16). In this respect, Hernandez and Bonilla (2020) highlight that the energy policy under the 4T, represents a significant shift in energy policy, introducing profound changes by prioritising the revitalization of the oil sector and the state oil company PEMEX. This marks a radical departure from to previous pro-market policies, which emphasised greater private sector participation and reduced state intervention

---

[88] The "Fourth transformation" or '4T', after the three historical transformations in Mexico: The Independence from Spain (1810–21), the Reform (1854–76), and the Revolution (1910–17).

in the energy sector. Similarly, Sánchez-Talanquer (2020: 403) points out that "the 4T marks a complete rupture with the neoliberal age that precedes it, a period inaugurated by market reforms in the eighties and including oligarchic governments by both the PRI and the PAN".

AMLO's electoral platform capitalised on the recent *gasolinazo* protests, which remained vivid in people's minds and resonated strongly with the public during the presidential campaign. The *gasolinazo* protests, triggered a policy failure perception (Chapter 6, Section 6.5.1), but also initiated a redefinition of the problem of rising gasoline prices, which led to search for alternative policy solutions. The analysis of AMLO's political discourse reveals that he instrumentalised increasing fuel prices for electoral gain. on December 22, 2017, during his presidential campaign, AMLO promised that if elected in 2018, there would be no more *gasolinazos* **(López Obrador, 2017)[89].** In AMLO's statements, the *gasolinazo* became a central policy-issues in his presidential campaign, serving to differentiate his energy policy. It has remained a key policy-issue in his political agenda, in which he has aimed to mark a contrast between his state interventionist approach and the policies of previous administrations.

Many interviewees support the view that AMLO placed significant emphasis on refining policies to distinguish his electoral campaign and his government's approach. In the words of an Interviewee, *"López Obrador politicized the issue of gasoline, making it a central theme and key proposal in his political campaign. He advocated for fuel independence, emphasising the importance of refining our own gasoline with the argument that would lead to lower prices"* **(Interviewee 17).** According to another Interviewee, *"López Obrador addressed the gasolinazos issue in the electoral period, using it as the banner of his campaign. Later, as president, he kept this issue on the public agenda to differentiate his government's energy policies from those of previous administrations, in which gasoline increases occurred"* **(Interviewee 20).**

AMLO's statements highlight the priority of refining policies within his government agenda. In his inauguration speech on December 1, 2018, before the Congress, he reaffirmed his commitment to eliminating *gasolinazos* and reducing gasoline prices **(López Obrador, 2018)[90].** On the same day, AMLO several commitments, six of which were linked to PEMEX,

---

[89] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[90] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements

four of them representing radical changes in oil production and refining (Presidency, 2020; PEMEX, 2019)[91]. These included: increasing public investment to urgently produce oil, gas, and energy (commitment 70); rehabilitating the six existing refineries and starting the construction of a new refinery in Dos Bocas, Tabasco, to significantly increase gasoline production (commitment 71); treating fuel theft (*huachicol*), as a serious crime and with no right to bail (commitment 57), and maintaining the policy of not authorising fracking (commitment 76). AMLO's commitments were included in the 2019-2024 National Development Plan (PND). In which energy is considered as of strategic importance for national security, particularly the rescue of PEMEX "as lever of national development" (PND, 2019: 59), placing as priority, "the rehabilitation of existing refineries, and the construction of a new refinery". The PND also prioritize the recovery of PEMEX's value chain, including the rehabilitation of fertilizer plants and petrochemicals. The PND objectives were reaffirmed by AMLO's statements throughout his six-year term **(López Obrador, 2019)[92].** Many interviewees align on AMLO's development priorities. In the words of Interviewee, *"López Obrador has focused attention on the refining sector, making it a key of pillar of his development plan to strengthen energy security and promote regional economic growth in the Southeastern of Mexico"* **(Interviewee 19).** According to another Interviewee, *"Andrés Manuel has a national developmental vision, where the productive sectors must be promoted by state companies"* **(Interviewee 4).**

AMLO's policy image for the energy sector was reflected not only in the ANP (2017) and the PND (2019), but also in the new PEMEX's business plan. Under AMLO's administration, the state-owned PEMEX plays a central role in achieving the PND's goals. According to PEMEX business plan 2021-2025, PEMEX's new objective is to guarantee national energy security and energy sovereignty by attaining energy self-sufficiency in national fuel production. The new business plan aims to review PEMEX's tax burdens, fight fuel theft, modernize the six existing refineries, build a new refinery, and two coker plants. According (PEMEX, 2019: 60) the new business plan, "will enable PEMEX to produce cleaner fuels and contribute to energy sovereignty. As domestic production of transportation fuels increases, imports will decline". This aligns with the view expressed by an Interviewee, *"since 2018, the energy policy has*

---

[91] See Table 9: AMLO's commitments as President of Mexico
[92] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements

centred on PEMEX as the main actor, prioritising investments in refinery construction and focusing on domestic oil processing rather than crude oil exports" **(Interviewee 17).**

Other documents analysed further confirm AMLO's policy agenda for the sector, emphasising his focus on refining. According to the Secretariat of Energy (SENER, 2020), the objective is to achieve energy self-sufficiency, recover energy sovereignty, and improve energy security by gradually eliminating fuel imports, improving the trade balance, and promoting economic development, through fair fuel prices. In this respect, Hernandez and Bonilla (2020) highlight that for the hydrocarbons sector, energy sovereignty and energy security are the twin goals of AMLO's energy policy. This energy policy prioritises greater state involvement and a strong oil sector led by PEMEX, aiming for energy self-sufficiency in the medium term by reducing fuel imports and ensuring a stable fuel supply at affordable prices.

AMLO constantly reinforced the objectives of energy sovereignty and energy security, along with his preferred policies for the oil and refining sector, during his morning conferences. These conferences have become a new form of political communication in Mexico, allowing the president to establish a direct relationship with the public and set the political agenda. Broadcast on digital media and social networks, as discussed later, this media approach serves as a powerful attention-grabbing strategy implemented by AMLO. For instance, in these conferences, he repeatedly reaffirmed his policy objectives aimed at achieving fuel self-sufficiency **(López Obrador, 2023a)**[93]. In AMLO's view, the country is entering to a post-neoliberalism era, a fourth transformation, in which the state plays a key role in ensuring public goods and addressing policy challenges such as energy security, energy sovereignty and energy independence. This aligns with the view expressed by an Interviewee, *"under Obrador, a shift occurred as he aimed to increase oil production and refineries to achieve energy independence and sovereignty, making a clear departure form Peña Nieto's energy reform"* **(Interviewee 18).**

7.2.2. AMLO's energy polices and the interventionism energy paradigm.

AMLO's energy policy image for the direction of the sector is based on an interventionism energy paradigm, as described by Goldthau (2012) (Chapter 5, Section 5.3), the interventionist

---

[93] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements

policy agenda recognises energy as a strategic good and crucial for other policy sectors, places the state as the most important stakeholder safeguarding the "public interest" and, addressing in a rather state dirigiste manner, a much more complex set of policy-issues such as energy poverty and energy security. In AMLO's interventionism energy model, the state assumes a strong directive role, contrasting with the regulatory and laissez-faire approach of the free-market neoliberal model that dominated in Mexico since 1982. As discussed in Chapter 6, neoliberal energy policies during the equilibrium period led to the dis-integration of PEMEX's value chain. In contrast, the governance patterns of the interventionist energy paradigm promote backward integration (Goldthau, 2012), in which a company owns and controls its entire value chain

According to PEMEX's business plan (2023-2027)[94], under AMLO's direction polices to add value to crude oil have been implemented, resulting in a greater integration of PEMEX's value chain, particularly in downstream sector. The 'PEMEX industrial transformation' (refining, oil, and gas process), has been merged with petrochemicals and fertilizers, the latter of which was previously a separate subsidiary, 'PEMEX fertilizers'[95]. These changes in PEMEX's value chain reflect the governance pattern of integration characteristic of the interventionism energy model. In his statements, AMLO, highlights the benefits of PEMEX's value chain integration policy, emphasising his role in enhancing energy security. He specifically points out the advantages of integrating refining, fertilizer, and petrochemical processes **(López Obrador, 2013)[96.]** In the view of an Interviewee, *"Obrador's policy is focused on achieving energy security, as over 65% of the gasoline, gas and fertilizers used in the country are imported"* **(Interviewee 7).**

Many interviewees believe that López Obrador has a clear policy image for the energy sector. Interviewees agree that AMLO's energy policy has centred on strengthening the state control over the sector, making a significant break from the pro-market policies of the equilibrium period, representing a disruption and a radical shift in the sector's direction. According to an Interviewee, *"previous administration focused on oil extraction. While under AMLO, there has been a shift towards refining. A new refinery is being built, and PEMEX has been allocated more fiscal resources. These actions reflect a change not only in the rhetoric but also in the*

---

[94] See Figure 27: PEMEX's value chain and products and services (as of 2023)
[95] See Figure 26: PEMEX's main value chain products and services (as of 2019)
[96] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements

management of the energy sector" **(Interviewee 1).** According to another Interviewee *"AMLO's government is not opposed to renewable energies. It does not prefer coal or fuel oil over the sun or wind, rather it favours state investment over private involvement. The issue is one of statism versus the free market, rather than the type of energy itself"* **(Interviewee 16).** In the same way, an Interviewee highlights that *"the president believes that the State is the one that should be making the investments in the sector and not the private sector"* **(Interviewee 13).**

However, Interviewees differ in their explanations of why AMLO is implementing this interventionist model. This divergence may stem from the polarization of the political views of interviewees, as support for liberal and interventionist energy models has become an issue of political cleavage within the political system. Some Interviewees view AMLO's energy model as outdated or resistant to private participation, for instance, an Interviewee highlights that, *"under Andrés Manuel, there is a complete shift in the sector. He lived in a Mexico in which PEMEX and CFE as strategic companies, were the drivers of development, and it is this outdated model that he continues to uphold"* **(Interviewee 4).** According to another Interviewee, *"in contrast to the sector's dynamics in previous administrations, 2018 marked a shift in direction, characterised by concepts such as energy self-sufficiency, energy sovereignty, and strengthening PEMEX. This shift has primary affected the participation of private companies in the sector"* **(Interviewee 16).**

One of the themes that emerged in several interviews was the issue of national security. In the words of an Interviewee, *"AMLO's nationalist policies are a response to Peña Nieto's energy reform, in which energy security was completely handed over and placed in the hands of private companies. Energy security is a matter of national security that cannot simply left to the market"* **(Interviewee 14).** In the same way, according to another Interviewee, *"under Peña Nieto, the contracts awarded to foreign companies through auctions were seen as excessively favourable. With AMLO, the aim is to strike a balance between the State and the market. The State must regulate and grant concessions to private companies, but without losing control over this strategic sector"* **(Interviewee 14).** These views support the idea that, under AMLO's presidency, the energy agenda has shifted form a liberal paradigm to an interventionist. As highlighted by Solorio and Tosun (2023: 614) "López Obrador's energy policy so far has consisted in attempting to push back private energy companies and to re-establish a state-centred energy policy with the CFE and PEMEX and as the key actors".

7.3. The focusing event and the role of AMLO as policy entrepreneur.

This section focuses on the role of AMLO as policy entrepreneur, highlighting how he instrumentalised the focusing event and implemented several attention-grabbing strategies. These actions pushed his long-standing demands, favoured policy image, and preferred policies for the energy sector, facilitating a shift in policy image and venue, ultimately driving a radical policy change in the oil and refining sector. To enhance credibility, reduce bias, and cross-verify findings, this section examines documents from diverse sources, including energy journals, newspapers, and official documents from the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN), Presidency, Congress, and Senate, along with interviews transcripts and presidential statements.

7.3.1. The *gasolinazo* protests and policy images competition on sector's direction

For many interviewees, Andrés Manuel López Obrador emerged as the most prominent and identifiable policy entrepreneur challenging the pro-market direction of the energy sector. He was a lead figure during the 2017 *gasolinazo* protests (Aljezeera, 2017), which offered him with a policy window as the national mood shifted, driven by macro-level attention, extensive media coverage and mass mobilisations. Many interviewees perceived that AMLO seized this opportunity and instrumentalised the *gasolinazo* protests as an attention-grabbing event, to promote his favoured policy image and preferred energy policies for sector. As previously discussed, the *gasolinazo* was a central policy-issue during his presidential campaign and has remained a key policy-issue of attention during his administration. Nevertheless, the *gasolinazo* protests, as focusing event, was insufficient on its own to produce change but triggered the "macro-politics of punctuation", "the politics of large-scale change, competing policy images, political manipulation, and positive feedback" (True et al., 2007: 63). AMLO's instrumentalization of the focusing event to promote his policy image and policies, led to a policy images competition, a political battle in which a competition took place between the existing dominant policy image and a "new" policy image.

According to many interviewees, two recognisable groups of actors can be identified, each supporting opposing energy models: neoliberalism and interventionism. In words of an Interviewee, *"under AMLO, the focus of the sector completely shifted to supporting PEMEX and CFE. This marked a collision of two competing narratives, visions and ideologies that*

have been in conflict since before 2018. On one side are the supporters of the 2013 energy reform, advocating for a more technical side, market-driven approach. On the other, are the supporters of AMLO's energy policy, which take a more political and interventionist stance" **(Interviewee 12).** As acknowledged by Solorio and Tosun (2023), the political debate has essentially been polarized between those in favour and those against AMLO's energy policy.

One of the key themes that emerged from the interviews was the debate of private and foreign participation versus state control in the sector. Interviewees considered this issue as central to the division between the two groups supporting and opposing the two energy policy images/models. In the words of an Interviewee, *"López Obrador's nationalism and emphasis on energy sovereignty, have gained significant support from Mexican society. However, his policies and narrative have also divided society into supporters and opponents"* **(Interviewee 19).** According to an Interviewee, *"there are two clear visions being debated on how to address the challenges facing the refining sector: one favours allowing foreign investment to prevent gasolinazos, while the other advocates for handling the issue internally through the state-owned PEMEX"* **(Interviewee 18).** According to another Interviewee *"the core conflict between the two models lies in the role that the State should or should not play in relation to private companies. AMLO's shift in direction is ideological, centred on redefining the role of the State in the sector"* **(Interviewee 4).**

7.3.2. Policy entrepreneur and instrumentalization of attention-grabbing strategies

According to PET model, the policy images battle entails many attention-grabbing strategies that are instrumentalised by policy entrepreneurs. Policy entrepreneurs are political actor willing to invest their resources (time, energy, reputation, money), to convince others in multiple venues to generate positive feedback on their preferred policies to drive policy change (Kingdon, 2003). AMLO has been implementing several attention-grabbing strategies to gain support for his preferred energy policies, emphasizing the negative effects of the *gasolinazo*, a problem still fresh in people's minds. AMLO has implemented several attention-grabbing strategies available for policy entrepreneurs (Chapter 3, Section 3.5), such as 'conflict expansion' as outlined by the conflict expanders Schattschneider, 1960; Cobb and Elder, 1983, and later by Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 2009); 'mass mobilisation' (Birkland, 1998); 'policy image and venue shift' (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), policy image association to core social values (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993); 'casual stories and blame' (Cairney, 2019).

7.3.3. AMLO's attention-grabbing strategy of conflict expansion and mass mobilisation

According to PET model, attention seeking strategies such as expanding public participation and mobilisation, help to disrupt the equilibrium and stimulate punctuation. Baumgartner and Jones (2009: 36) provide support to the idea of conflict expansion, they state that "the most powerful strategy of politics is to enlarge or limit the scope of the debate to include or exclude those groups whom one can predict will be for or against one's position". As a policy entrepreneur, AMLO has implemented a conflict expansion strategy to enlarge the scope of the sphere of participation and gain support for his preferred energy polices. Issue expansion requires re-framing, re-definition of the policy-issue, and proposal of a "new" policy image, along with preferred policies to address the problem. This strategy involves, as highlighted by (Cairney, 2019), shaping a political discourse that reframes the focus from self-interest to a problem the public can identify with

According to many Interviewees, AMLO's has strategically framed his energy policy to promote and legitimize it. Solorio et al. (2021: 251) highlight that "AMLO has been widely recognised for his performance as a political entrepreneur engaged in strategic framing, through his discursive strategies to persuade and generate antagonism". AMLO first identifies grievances and assigns blame to perpetrators, then proposes his preferred policies, identifies strategies. He develops a strategic framing effort designed to encourage action and define adversarial boundaries, distinguishing between "us" and "them" or "ally and "enemy" actors. In the words of an Interviewee, *as a populist president, López Obrador's political discourse revolves around "them" versus "us" narrative, at the heart of his project is the goal of reclaiming the leadership of the State in strategic industries, aiming to serve the interests of the people"* **(Interviewee 4).** Another possible reason for AMLO's strong connection with the people is the simplicity of his political discourse. As highlighted by Sánchez-Gutiérrez (2019: 287) "López Obrador success lay in the construction of a political discourse that citizens could easily understand and in the closeness to the people". In the same way, Solorio and Tosun (2023: 618) point out that AMLO "has developed a distinct "narrative" for this sector, which aligns with public perceptions of it and helps him to win and maintain public support for dismantling the previous energy policy reforms".

As part of his strategic framing, AMLO makes use of 'causal stories and blame' to gain support for his energy policies. Sánchez-Gutiérrez (2019) highlights that López Obrador's rhetoric can

be summarized as a campaign to discredit the past 35 years of governments, which he refers to as Mexico's "neoliberal era". During this period, he claims that a "mafia" took power, neglected the people, and built a system of privileges for an elite that corrupted and plundered the nation. The analysis of AMLO's statements provides valuable insights and confirms the strategic use of framing. In his rhetoric, AMLO positions the people as "allies" and previous neoliberal and conservative governments under the PRI-PAN as "adversaries". He accuses these governments of operating for 36 years in corruption, dismantling the oil industry, weakening the State to benefit a small minority and, stripping Mexicans of their national assets for privatization **(López Obrador, 2019: 22[97]; López Obrador, 2019: 36[98];López Obrador, 2023b[99]; López Obrador, 2019: 34)[100].** In this respect, Solorio et al. (2021: 251) highlight that "AMLO has developed a discursive strategy consisting of dividing the political field into two antagonistic parts: 'the people', whose demands and interests are supposedly defended by his popular project and 'the conservatives', the corrupt elite". In this context, AMLO has positioned himself in his political discourse as a strong defender of PEMEX and energy sovereignty. In the view of an Interviewee, *"The central theme of Andrés Manuel's political discourse is energy sovereignty. He consistently emphasises that previous governments dismantled key national assets, but under his leadership, he aims to restore PEMEX and CFE as a lever for national development"* **(Interviewee 4).**

By re-framing the policy-issue, AMLO has relied on the mass mobilisation of increasingly larger groups to gain support for his preferred energy policies. As examined in Chapter 3, mass mobilisation is considered by conflict expanders such as Schattschneider (1960); Cobb and Elder (1983); Birkland (1998), an attention-grabbing strategy to advance policy entrepreneurs' preferred policies. AMLO has extensive experience in organising demonstrations and mobilizations related to the oil sector. For example, in 1996, in his native state of Tabasco, López Obrador blocked 51 oil wells to demand compensation from farmers and fishermen whose communities had been harmed by PEMEX operations (El Pais, 2019; Reporte-Indigo, 2021). More recently, as President, AMLO called for a mass mobilization on March 18, 2023, to support of his government's energy policy, marking the 85th anniversary of the oil expropriation. In his conference on the March 6, 2023, AMLO announced that a celebration

---

[97] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[98] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[99] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[100] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements

would take place to mark the "rescue" of PEMEX. **(López Obrador, 2023c)[101],** and he called to gathering to celebrate the country's "energy independence" (Expansion-politica, 2023; Animal-politico, 2023; debate, 2023). AMLO's invitation to commemorate the nationalisation of oil reserves and foreign-owned oil companies, an event seen now as a symbol of Mexican patriotism, strengthen the argument for his strategic framing and his closeness and connection with the people. This is particularly evident in his use of popular core social values that resonate with people.

It notable that in his call for mobilization **(López Obrador, 2023c)[102],** AMLO as part of his attention-grabbing strategy, aimed to associate his energy policy image with core social values[103]. He positioned himself as the defender of the people against the foreign and conservative interests, drawing a political parallelism between his energy policy and the "popular" and "patriotic" policy of President Cardenas and oil expropriation (Chapter 5, section 5.5.1). AMLO emphasised the importance of taking people's support to the streets and public squares to continue defending the national sovereignty. More recently, on March 10, 2024, AMLO affirmed his call to defend the energy industry against foreign investors, while citing López Mateos' (1960) historic and patriotic speech on the nationalisation of the electricity sector **(López Obrador, 2024c)[104].** In this respect, in the view of an Interviewee, *"as part of his framing, Andrés Manuel, taps into the historical roots of Mexican nationalism to foster the sense of nationalism in the energy sector. He revisits the nationalisations of the oil and electricity industries by Cardenas and López Mateos, using this narrative to unite his base, and legitimize his energy policy. In doing so, he emphasises the need to recover energy sovereignty and mobilise citizens to support his vision"* **(Interviewee 4).**

7.3.4. AMLO's attention-grabbing strategy of policy image and venue shift

Baumgartner and Jones (2009:36) identifies a dual strategy that relies less on mass mobilization and more in the presentation of a strategic policy image and the search for more receptive venues. These attention-grabbing strategies are more complex and targeted than mass mobilisation because, they involve looking for allies in specific venues that are more

---

[101] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[102] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[103] See Figure 40: Explaining policy change in the refining sector
[104] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements

favourable for considering of the 'new' policy image. This approach requires the key element of image instrumentalization to influence public perception on specific policy-issues. For many Interviewees, AMLO in his efforts to engage new groups across different venues makes use of a process of re-framing to attract their attention. "Framing involves the definition of a policy's image, to portray and categorise issues in specific ways" (Cairney, 2019: 156). AMLO re-framed the policy-issues of the energy sectors to appeal more perceptive venues in search of allies, connecting them to wider social values to reinforce participation and attract attention of those who were either uninvolved or excluded.

One of the key themes that emerged from the interviews was AMLO's political ability in aligning his energy policy image with core popular values such as progress, participation, energy-sufficiency, patriotism, energy sovereignty, energy independence from foreign domination, fairness on energy prices, economic growth. In doing so, he positioned himself as a strong defender of PEMEX and energy sovereignty. In the words of an Interviewee, *"when López Obrador speaks about energy sovereignty and PEMEX, he revives the nationalism feeling of many ordinary Mexicans. His narrative, which highlights the exploitation and abuse of national natural resources by foreign companies in the exploitation, has gather significant support for his energy policies"* **(Interviewee 19).**

In contrast, other Interviewees argue that AMLO's use of popular core social values in his narrative is a form of populism and relies on an outdated narrative. In the words of an Interviewee, *"AMLO's narrative of energy independence and sovereignty versus free market, is a populist strategy frequently seen in Latin America, often used to justify costly projects by securing popular support"* **(Interviewee 18).** In the view of another Interviewee, *"In López Obrador's narrative, Mexicans are the rightful owners of oil and must make our own fuels, as he portrays foreigners as only seeking to exploit our resources. AMLO's rhetoric resonates themes from the Spanish colonial era, and while his emphasis on energy sovereignty, self-sufficiency, and state control over oil may resonate with the people, it has ultimately contributed to PEMEX stagnation"* **(Interviewee 15).** A possible reason for discrepancies among Interviewees regarding the effects of AMLO's polices could be the deep political polarization surrounding different energy models. However, most Interviewees seem to agree that AMLO effectively instrumentalized core social values to gain support for his energy policies. In this respect, Cunningham (2019:122) highlights that "there is a certain nationalist

appeal to AMLO's energy policy. Reviving PEMEX, historically a source of national pride, is highly symbolic".

The recent geopolitical context has played a significant role in facilitating AMLO's discursive strategy. With Donald Trump as US president, his statements about Mexicans, and his repeated threats to close the US-Mexico border, have revitalized AMLOs political discourse on Mexican nationalism. Additionally, the recent conflicts and changing weather conditions, have generated serious and constant concerns, prompting the Mexican public to re-evaluate the role of the state in securing energy and ensuring access to vital energy resources. Moreover, there is a widespread perception among Interviewees that importing gasoline from the US is both costly and unpopular. As a result, expanding refining capacity seems appealing to many, especially as memories of the *gasolinazo* protests remain fresh. As discussed in Chapter 6, many people blame Peña Nieto's privatization of the energy sector as driver of higher fuel prices and view López Obrador as defender of oil industry and PEMEX. The analysis of AMLO's statements, which appear to have resonated with people, supports to his re-framing and political discourse strategy centred around "energy sovereignty", "resource nationalism", and "energy independence". This narrative also emphasises the re-definition of energy as a "national asset" and a matter of national security.

In his statements, AMLO highlighted the risk of Mexico's continued dependence on imported fuels. He pointed out that the country has gasoline reserves for only 10 days and called for Mexico to achieve energy self-sufficient in fuels (Infobae, 2021; El Heraldo, 2021; Energiadebate, 2021; Milenio, 2021). He exemplified that if foreign nations were to refuse to sell gasoline to Mexico due to geopolitics or adverse weather conditions, the country's limited national reserve would quickly be depleted, leading to significant disruption and chaos. Therefore, he reiterated that oil production should be focus only on processing and internal consumption **(López Obrador, 2021)[105].** An example of adverse weather conditions occurred in February 2021, when a winter storm in Texas caused natural gas pipelines to freeze, leading to a disruption in energy supply. Nearly 5 million people in northern Mexico were left without power as natural gas shortages disrupted electricity production (Aljazeera, 2021). Moreover, on March 18, 2023, he reaffirmed his goal of making the country energy self-sufficient,

---

[105] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements

emphasising that Mexico as a sovereign nation must work towards independence in its energy production **(López Obrador, 2023d)**[106]**.**

7.3.5. AMLO's discursive strategy and the use of media for venue-shopping

As part of his attention-grabbing strategies, AMLO has extensively made use of media to reach different audiences and venues. This practice of venue-shopping has been key to gain support for his energy policy image and preferred policies. According to PET model, media plays a significant role linking and shifting attention in other audiences and venues, facilitating larger support for his energy agenda[107].The most notable example of AMLO's use of media can be seen in his daily conferences. AMLO is the first president in Mexican history to offer daily briefings to journalists, known as the "morning conferences". These conferences have evolved into a key governing strategy, allowing AMLO to set and shape Mexico's political agenda. he gives directives to his cabinet for solving specific problems and government officials often participate, depending on the topic being discussed (BBC, 2019). For example, every Monday energy-related issues such as the price of gasoline, diesel and natural gas are analysed, accompanied by detailed comparison of fuel brands and their prices.

For many Interviewees, AMLO's morning conferences have been instrumental in facilitated venue-shopping and engaging with different types of audiences, including those more receptive and favourable to his energy policy image, particularly on social media platforms. AMLO is considered one of the most-watched "streamers" in Latin America. In 2023 alone, his morning conferences broadcast on YouTube attracted nearly 50 million views (Infobae, 2023a), highlighting the significant reach and influence of his political communication strategy. This approach has enhanced López Obrador's venue-shopping efforts, as his live streams are not viewed on his official YouTube channel, but also on re-broadcast by other organisations and companies, seeking to diversify their audiences and maximize their reach. Data from Streams Charts, a platform that collects data and analyses data from streaming services such as Twitch, Kick, Rumble, AfreecaTV and YouTube (Infobae, 2023a); revealed that between January 1 and December 27, 2023, López Obrador dedicated an impressive 724 hours and 40 minutes to his morning conference. These events held from Monday to Friday, typically start at 7:00 a.m.

---

[106] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[107] See Figure 22: Model of mutual influence (external pressure vs internal response)

and run until 9:00 a.m., often extending until 10:00 am. In total, AMLO was "Live" through YouTube for the equivalent of 30 days.

AMLO's use of media to broadcast his morning conferences has expanded his reach, allowing him to engage with broader audiences and venues, reflecting his influence in shaping Mexico's political agenda. These conferences viewed by millions, also enable AMLO to connect with the local policy-issues during his political tours, as the conferences are frequently held in different states. In the words of an Interviewee, *"López Obrador skilfully sets the political agenda through his morning conferences, efficiently managing the media, a communication strategy rarely seen in Latin America, particularly on issues like security, he expertly shifts the focus by introducing an attractive soundbite to capture attention and distract the media spotlight. By discussing gasoline prices, for example, he keeps progress on his energy policy at the forefront of the political agenda"* **(Interviewee 20).**

AMLO continuously reinforces support for his energy policy in this morning conferences. Data collected from Amlopedia (2024), an AI-powered search engine that aggregates information from AMLO's 1,423 morning conferences held between 2018 and 2024, highlights recurring themes, phases and keywords. This search engine systematically catalogues every word spoken by the president since the beginning of his term in 2018. Finding revealed that[108], between December 03, 2018, and February 02, 2024, several recurring themes and keywords emerged in AMLO's morning conferences, reinforcing his energy policy. These keywords included: "neoliberal"; "energy reform"; "sovereignty"; "energy"; "PEMEX" "self-sufficiency"; "gasoline"; "*gasolinazo*". The analysis of these keywords from AMLO's morning conferences offers valuable insights into the importance of his energy policy within his political agenda, the priorities of his government and his dominant ideas and narrative strategies. As of February 02, 2024, the keywords such as "neoliberal" was mentioned 3,493 times in 974 conferences; "energy" 3,181 times in 710 conferences; gasoline: 3,591 times in 732 conferences; other keywords highlighted in this analysis include: "refinery" was mentioned 2,259 times in 518 conferences, "Dos Bocas" was mentioned 645 times in 307 conferences; "Deer Park" was mentioned 142 times in 51 conferences and; "coker unit" was mentioned 196 times in 103 conferences.

---

[108] See Table 10: Keywords in AMLO's morning conference

Additional data on AMLO's popularity indicates that his extensive use of media facilitated positive feedback, reinforcing his political agenda and shaping perceptions of his energy policy image on the sector's direction. According to Oraculus (2024), AMLO's approval ratings reveal that, as of January 2024, 69% of Mexicans approved his administration, the highest level of presidential approval among his four predecessors. In comparison, after 61 months in office, the approval rating of the previous presidential were: Peña Nieto (25%); Calderón (59%); Fox (61%); and Zedillo (66%)

7.3.6. Executive vs judiciary, the use of political conflict in a multiple venue system

According to Baumgartner and Jones (2009), the battle between the existing policy image and the rival policy image involves political friction. This political conflict is initially identified by Schattschneider (1975: 65), who states that politics deals with the effort to use conflict, "the most powerful instrument for the control of conflict is conflict itself". For many interviewees, AMLO's political communication strategy and political discourse have sparked political friction between institutional venues, influencing the inclusion or exclusion of many groups. On of the most notable example of this political conflict is the relationship between the executive and the judiciary. The Supreme Court has become a key arena for political friction, in which the two competing energy policy images, representing the liberal and interventionism energy paradigms, are in direct opposition. It has also been an institutional venue in which opposing views on energy policy-issues have been debated. In the words of an Interviewee, *"Today there is a legitimate power dispute between the executive, the legislative and the judicial. For example, it can be seen in the supreme court of justice. Minister President Piña maintains independence and is not aligned with the President of the Republic"* **(Interviewee 20).**

For many interviewees, AMLO's rise to power in 2018 triggered political conflict between the executive and judiciary. This is because, at the time, the eleven Ministers that made up the court in 2018 were nominated by PRI-PAN presidents. These Ministers are selected by the President and ratified by the PRI-PAN majority in Congress, serving for a period of 15 years[109]. In this respect, according to an Interviewee, *"for a long time, Mexico operated under a "simulated republic", where it was appeared that the three powers existed as established by*

---

[109] See Table 12: Ministers of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation 2018-2024

the constitution. However, in reality, presidentialism dominated, with the power concentrated in the presidency under the control of the PRI and later the PAN, the traditional parties, when AMLO was elected president, this dynamic was disrupted, leading to a political rupture between the three powers" **(Interviewee 17).** This aligns with the view expressed by Carlos Slim, a Mexican business magnate, former richest person in the world from 2010 to 2013 by Forbes, and shareholder in the Zama oil field. He highlighted in his statement that "in previous governments, there was an immense influence from the executive to the judiciary. Now, the judiciary is making decisions that go against the executive" (Slim, 2024)[110]. The SCJN ruling against the law of the electricity industry highlights and illustrate the political conflict between the executive and judiciary. AMLO's electricity law, which prioritised the state-owned CFE in energy dispatch, was challenged by private companies. After a four-year battle, the supreme court ruled in favour of six private companies, announcing the changes proposed by AMLO unconstitutional (El Economista, 2024a).

There is an extensive perception that the political conflict between the Executive and the Judiciary has amplified macro-level attention on AMLO's energy agenda, further reinforcing his political discourse of "us" versus "them" or "ally versus "opponent". For AMLO, this legal conflict provided a powerful instrument to draw attention to his political discourse, framing the judges, appointed by previous PRI-PAN governments, as opponents of his interventionist policy image, and thus, to the policy change he aims to implement in the energy sector. In his statements, AMLO declared that "the judiciary is kidnapped by the oligarchy" and against the people's interests **(López Obrador, 2024a)[111].** This political battle reflects AMLO's distinct policy style, which contrast with his predecessors. According to Solorio and Tosun (2023: 619), López Obrador's policy style is "characterised by an approach in which the public is treated as the ultimate litmus test for any policy decision". That is because, AMLO's primary goal is secure public support for his energy policy projects.

According to Solorio and Tosun (2023: 621) AMLO's overall policy style can be considered as exclusive towards political opposition, think tanks, cooperation agencies and business groups, and imposition towards conventional intermediaries such as state companies and PEMEX and CFE trade unions, but inclusive towards society organizations and the public,

---

[110] See Slim's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[111] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements

"which he uses to push through his political goals without even attempting to reach or compromise with the opposition". AMLO is particularly open to include ideologically like-minded society organizations. However, those who do not align with his ideology are pushed out of the policy process. This is because, in AMLO's political discourse, some institutions and civil organizations were established by PRI-PAN governments to defend the neoliberal policies **(López Obrador, 2024b)[112].** As a result, AMLO's policy style in a multiple venues political system has led to political friction and confrontation with institutional venues, particularly the judiciary and many policy intermediaries, while simultaneously attracting attention and reinforcing his political discourse.

7.4. AMLO's energy policy challenges and implementation of new policies.

This section examines on AMLO's political discourse in addressing some most pressing energy policy challenges of the sector such as the oil price volatility due to Russia-Ukraine war. It also explores how his rhetoric is used to justify the implementation of new policies, including PEMEX's new upstream and downstream oil policy, and a new fuel price stability policy. To cross-verify findings, this section looks at data from diverse sources such as presidential statements, interviews transcripts and official documents from PEMEX business plans; reports from the ministry of finance and energy; and publications from the presidency and congress; academic energy journals.

7.4.1. Changes in oil production and PEMEX's new upstream oil policy

AMLO's political discourse focuses on a state-interventionist approach as key to ensure energy security, particularly in reversing the decline in crude oil extraction. In contrast to the narratives of Peña Nieto and Calderón, which argued that oil was running out and promoted foreign companies' capital and technology to boost oil production. AMLO's political discourse has centred on ensuring that, under PEMEX's leadership, Mexico has increased production and oil reserves for the next 30 years. However, in AMLO's energy model, crude oil will no longer be exported, it will be processed and refined domestically. In his statement, AMLO revealed that, with investments under PEMEX's new upstream policy, oil reserves have been secured for

---

[112] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements

over than 25 to 30 years, ensuring a stable oil supply until the energy transition is fully realised **(López Obrador, 2023f)**[113].

The analysis of AMLO's statements reveals that his political narrative has centred on reinforcing the perception of failure of the privatization policies, implemented by previous governments. He has focused mainly on five key justifications to support his radical policy change in the country's upstream oil policy. First, in AMLO's political discourse, PEMEX should take charge because the 2013 energy which allowed participation of foreign companies in profit-sharing oil reserves contracts, failed to deliver the expected benefits and did not lead to an increase in the oil platform. Data collected from PEMEX (2024)[114] reveals that, from 2016-2023 private companies have marginally contributed to the total oil production. In 2022, only 3% came from private companies, while 97% from PEMEX (PEMEX, 2023)[115]. According to Morales (2020), under AMLO's new model, private contractors still participate, his upstream oil policy has not cancelled contracts from Peña Nieto's administration. However, future auctions for new fields to obtain more licenses or shared-profits contracts have been suspended, with PEMEX in change of increasing oil production. An example of the type associations is the Zama oil field operated by PEMEX together with private companies. Zama oil field in shallow waters of the Gulf of Mexico, was the first discovery by the private sector following the opening of the sector in Peña Nieto's administration. It has reserves of over 850 million barrels of crude oil and will begin production in 2025 (El Economista, 2023b; Expansion, 2023; Infobae, 2023b; America-economia, 2023).

The second justification in AMLO's political discourse for placing PEMEX in charge of oil production is the rebound in oil production during his six-year term. According to AMLO's statement, crude oil production is rebounding after 15 years of downward trend **(López Obrador, 2023e)**[116]**.** Collected data from PEMEX (2023)[117] reveals that crude oil production during AMLO's administration increased from 1.701 mbpd in 2019 to 1.950 mbpd in 2023. According to data Presidency (2023)[118], during AMLO's term, the downward trend that began in 2004 reversed in 2019, leading to a new upward trend with moderate growth in crude oil

---

[113] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[114] See Figure 30: Production of liquid hydrocarbons with private companies 2016-2023
[115] See Figure 29: PEMEX total crude oil production in 2022
[116] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[117] See Figure 31: Production of liquid hydrocarbons 2018-2024
[118] See Figure 32: production of liquid hydrocarbons - annual average 2004-2023

production from 2019 to 2023. In AMLO's political discourse, the third justification for PEMEX's new upstream policy is that not only are there more oil reserves, but they are also lower costs in extraction. PEMEX has discovered additional oil on land and in shallow waters, where extraction costs are lower. According to AMLO's statements, the new model ensures that future governments will not face oil shortages, as there is enough supply of oil and at a lower cost **(López Obrador, 2023e)[119].** The fourth justification in AMLO's political discourse for PEMEX's new upstream oil policy is that by not granting new contracts to foreign companies, corruption is prevented. In his statements, AMLO reinforces the perception of corruption experienced in the equilibrium period, in which according to his narrative, foreign companies benefited from oil extraction contracts in deep waters in the northern part of the country, areas with little or no oil or where extraction costs were very high **(López Obrador, 2023e)[120].** The fifth justification for PEMEX's new upstream policy in AMLO's political discourse has focused on the benefits of reducing oil exports and increasing domestic sales. According to the statements of PEMEX's CEO, Romero Oropeza, PEMEX's main revenues currently come from domestic sales, reducing the share of crude oil export sales (Romero Oropeza, 2024)[121]. Data collected from PEMEX (2024)[122] reveals that in 2023, 70.8% of PEMEX's total revenue came from domestic sales and an estimated 83.3% by 2024. This represents a radical change in PEMEX's business model, contrasting with previous administrations, which as analysed in Chapter 6, prioritised maximizing oil extraction for export in international markets.

7.4.2. The four pillars of PEMEX's new downstream oil policy

AMLO's oil policy focuses on processing and refining crude oil domestically to close the gap on fuel imports. PEMEX's new downstream oil policy is built on four pillars (Presidency, 2023). All aimed at achieving AMLO's objective of attaining fuel self-sufficiency and energy security, by increasing PEMEX's refining production and reducing dependence on imported fuels **(López Obrador, 2023g)[123].**

---

[119] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[120] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[121] See PEMEX's CEO, Romero Oropeza statement in Annex 2: Statements
[122] See Figure 33: Evolution of the participation of internal sales in the total income of PEMEX
[123] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements

The four pillars of PEMEX's new downstream oil policy are as follows: First, the improvement and modernization of the six existing refineries that made up the aging national refining system. Second, the construction of new coker units in Tula, Hidalgo and in Salina Cruz, Oaxaca, along with new petrochemical complexes to convert more residual oil into gasoline. Third, the acquisition of the Deer Park refinery in Texas, US., to immediately increase PEMEX's production of gasoline and diesel. Fourth, the construction of the Olmec refinery in Dos Bocas, Tabasco, to increase refining capacity and process heavy crude oil.

The four pillars of AMLO's new downstream oil policy will be analysed in more detail below. The first pillar involves the modernization of the infrastructure of the six aging refineries that make up the national refining system (SNR)[124]. The six refineries have a combined capacity of 1,6 million barrels per day, but they have been processing far below their capacity because processing heavy oil is more difficult and expensive, and refineries have lowered their output rates to narrow their losses (Cunningham, 2019), only three refineries have coker units (Energycapital, 2021) which are required to produce less fuel oil, a less profitable product. Therefore, as part of the SNR Rehabilitation Programme, significant public investments have been made to update the aging refineries to process oil more efficiently (SENER, 2022). According to the Secretary of Energy, Nahle García, public investments have been increasing every year, between 2019-2023, they represent a total of 62,898 million MXN (Nahle Garcia, 2024), which shows the government's commitment to increasing the production of refined products. As a part of this modernisation process stands out the rehabilitation of the Cangrejera petrochemical complex. Nahle Garcia (2021) revealed that the objective of investing in *Cangrejera* is to supply a significant amount of hydrogen to Minatitlan refinery, to reduce the imports of gasoline and optimise gasoline production to contribute to energy sovereignty.

However, some Interviewees argue that AMLO's goal of energy sovereignty, through the modernization of refineries, is unlikely to be achieved. In the words of an Interviewee, *"AMLO's quest for energy sovereignty, disguised as energy security, is leading us to refine gasoline. But this is not viable and is a waste of money. The refineries are outdated, and the investment required is much greater, they are just being patched"* **(Interviewee 15).** In the same way, another Interviewee considers that, *"In globalization, the idea of energy self-sufficiency is obsolete. In recent decades, refining has operated at a loss. So why add costly*

---

[124] See Figure 23: Geographic reference of the national refining system

value to it? If gasoline can be imported at a third of the cost of producing it domestically, it makes more sense to export crude oil and import gasoline" **(Interviewee 13).**

The second pillar of AMLO's new downstream policy involves the construction, with public investment, of two new coker units in Tula, Hidalgo and in Salina Cruz, Oaxaca. Coker units serve to convert the residual oil from the refineries into higher-value fuels. According to PEMEX (2019), the new coker unit in the Tula refinery will allow to process 90% of the fuel oil produced in the Tula and Salamanca refineries, increasing gasoline and diesel production, while the new coker unit in Oaxaca will eliminate the fuel oil produced at the Salina Cruz refinery (El Financiero, 2022). Nahle Garcia (2024) reveals that with the coker unit, the production in Tula will increase by 75.6%. While the production in Salina Cruz refinery will increase by 48.3%. In his statements, AMLO highlighted that with these projects in Tula and Salina Cruz, Mexico is moving towards energy self-sufficiency and reaffirmed that this goal will be achieved by 2024 **(López Obrador, 2023h)[125].** Regarding the investment in the new coker units, an Interviewee pointed out that, *"PEMEX investments in coker units are headed in the right direction. In the US, an efficient refinery produces about 1.5% fuel oil. Whereas here in Mexico, we are at 35%, that means, for every barrel processed over a third is converted into fuel"* **(Interviewee 13).**

The third pillar of AMLO's new downstream oil policy was the acquisition of Deer Park refinery in Texas, US. Purchased from Royal Dutch Shell in May 2021, this marked the first time PEMEX acquired a refinery abroad in history (El Economista, 2021). As a result, the national refining system was reconfigured to include seven refineries, six in Mexico and one in the US[126]. According to AMLO's statement, "the acquisition of Deer Park was made possible without credit, without debt, but through savings, for not allowing corruption, for creating an honest and austere government without luxuries" **(López Obrador, 2021b)[127].** According to PEMEX's CEO, Romero Oropeza (2024)[128], this was an important move for the government because in 2022, Deer Park processed 278 thousand barrels per day, which combine with the six refineries in Mexico, PEMEX can now process over one million barrels per day, significantly increasing its fuel production overnight. In this respect, many Interviewees

---

[125] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[126] See Figure 35: PEMEX's refineries, including Deer Park and Dos Bocas
[127] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[128] See Figure 36: Crude oil process in refineries, observed 2018-2023 and projections 2024-2025

consider PEMEX's investment in Deer Park refinery to be both appropriate and profitable. In the words of an Interviewee, *"Deer Park refinery was not a bad idea. The first barrels of gasoline have already been arrived from Texas. Given the global context of the war in Ukraine, oil companies are benefiting from oil and gas prices, and while Europe faces an energy shortage, we are experiencing it differently, in part because of projects like Deer Park"* **(Interviewee 17).** According to another Interviewee, *"Deer Park refinery was a profitable investment, generating immediate returns. However, the investment in Dos Bocas refinery has been more substantial and has yet to produce a single barrel of gasoline"* **(Interviewee 14).** In the way, another Interviewee points out that *"Deer Park was the best decision this government has made in terms of hydrocarbons, as it is already operational. In contrast, Dos Bocas refinery has proven to be an illusion, poorly planned and clearly exceeding the budget"* **(Interviewee 15).**

The fourth pillar of AMLO's refining policy is the construction of a new refinery in Dos Bocas, Tabasco Mexico, designed to process Maya heavy crude oil (Reuters, 2022e; Reuters, 2023a). Given that the last refineries built in Mexico date back to 1979, this final pillar of AMLO's policy agenda is represents a radical shift in refining policy. It ends a 43-year period of policy stability, between the construction of the last refineries in 1979 and the inauguration of the new Olmec refinery in 2022. With the addition of this new refinery, the national refining system was expanded to include eight refineries: seven in Mexico and one in US (Presidency, 2023)[129]. In his statements, AMLO highlighted the importance of this new refinery to achieve fuel self-sufficiency **(López Obrador, 2023i)[130].** In this respect, according to figures from PEMEX's Business plan 2019-2023, it is estimated that this refinery will be processing in its 17 processing plants, 340,000 barrels per day of Maya heavy crude oil of which 280,000 barrels per day will be of gasoline. Most recent estimates, presented by the CEO of PEMEX, Romero Oropeza (2024) project that by 2024, with the entry into operations of the new Olmec refinery, in addition to the Deer Park refinery, and the improvements in the national refining system, at the end of the year, 1 million 152 thousand barrels per day will be processed (Presidency, 2024)[131]. The promised launch date has not been the only challenge of the new refinery, which has faced multiple delays, there has also been a significant cost overrun. Initial government estimates ranged between USD 10 billion and USD 12 billion, however, the final cost is now

---

[129] See Figure 35: PEMEX's refineries, including Deer Park and Dos Bocas
[130] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[131] See Figure 36: Crude oil process in refineries, observed 2018-2023 and projections 2024-2025

projected to approach 20 billion (Bloomberg, 2022b), so that the refinery can produce about 295,000 barrels per day of gasoline and diesel (Reuters, 2023a; Reuters, 2023b).

The construction of the new refinery Olmec has provoked debate in public opinion, with many Interviewees holding divergent views on the new project. According to an Interviewee, *"the new refinery may have a positive impact in the short-medium term by refining cheaper fuel. However, excessive public resources are being invested in outdated technologies that will become obsolete in the long term, rather than in new technologies and the energy transition"* **(Interviewee 20).** In contrast, according to another Interviewee, *"the new refinery represents a significant investment. However, the war in Ukraine has shifted the global energy sector, slowing the pace of the energy transition. As a result, there has been a resurgence and a boom in refining, petrochemicals and LNG, driven by very high profit margins, with more than 470 refining projects currently underway around the world"* **(Interviewee 12).**

Overall, the four pillars of AMLO's new downstream oil policy represents a rapid change in PEMEX's business model. This shift not only enhances PEMEX's dominance in the sector but also radically change the focus towards increasing domestic sales by processing and refining crude oil rather than exporting it (PEMEX, 2024)[132]. Additionally, the policy also involves significant public investment aimed at revitalising the aging refining sector, through modernisation, construction, acquisition and expansion of new refineries, coker units, hydrogen plants and petrochemical complexes Despite the effective political communication aimed at reinforcing support for AMLO's policy image in the sector, it is still too early to determine whether his goal of fuel self-sufficiency will be achieved. In the words of an Interviewee, *"I believe it is still too soon to know if AMLO's new refining policy will succeed in reducing dependence on gasoline imports"* **(Interviewee 1).**

Collected data from PEMEX (2024)[133] revealed that since 2019, fuel imports (deficit) have significantly decreased, while crude oil processing has progressively increased. However, fuel self-sufficiency is projected to be achieved by 2026. The most recent estimates presented by the CEO of PEMEX, Romero Oropeza (2024), project that by 2024, a total of 1.344 mbpd of gasoline, diesel and jet fuel will be produced. While, by the year 2025, PEMEX projects an

---

[132] See Figure 33: Evolution of the participation of internal sales in the total income of PEMEX
[133] See Figure 37: Evolution and projections of fuel deficit (gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel) 2018-2026

increase in fuel production, reaching 1.371 mbpd. However, some critics of the AMLO's policy image and his goal of achieving fuel self-sufficiency argue that his policy lacks viability. In the view of an Interviewee, "*The focus on energy self-sufficiency and energy sovereignty through fuels promotes a model that hinders sector development. It would be better to turn the page and move on to invest in alternative resources and types of technologies such as green hydrogen*" **(Interviewee 16).**

With AMLO's term set to conclude on October 1, 2024, a key theme that emerged from the Interviewees' comments, was the potential continuity of his policies and energy model. Many Interviewees anticipated continuity regardless of the outcome of the 2024 presidential election, citing the investments made in refining infrastructure and the political costs of reversing course, and the extended time required to put in place transition policies. In the words of an Interviewee, "*the current energy policy will likely continue, as investments in the new Dos Bocas refinery are nearly complete. Cancelling the project would be a very serious financial mistake. It would also be a political mistake with potential repercussions at the polls, because increasing gasoline price are a highly sensitive issue for the people*" **(Interviewee 19).** As highlighted by an Interviewee, "*we still have cars from the 70's and 80's on the road. There is a lot of talk about Tesla in Monterrey and lithium nationalization, but the transition will not be that simple. Electric cars will take time to become available and affordable, and people need gasoline today to get to work*" **(Interviewee 7).** In the words of another Interviewee, "*shifting away from oil and transportation fuels will be challenging and cannot happen quickly, making renewable energy accessible will take time, and will not happen overnight*" **(Interviewee 14).** In the same way, according to an Interviewee, "*for the next 30 years, cars and trucks that use gasoline will remain essential. The high prices of electric vehicles represent a significant challenge. Making the transition to electric car a very gradual process, especially in a developing country like Mexico, it will take longer than expected*" **(Interviewee 13).** In the view of an Interviewee, "*I do see a market that will move quickly, but it is also true that this transition will not be fully completed, even if it is claimed that by 2030 there will not be a single gasoline vehicle, that it is not true, gasoline vehicles will still exit, even if no new ones are produced anymore*" **(Interviewee 15).** According to an Interviewee, "*politically, the continuity of MORENA suggests persistence of AMLO's energy policy. However, factors such as gasoline prices, PEMEX's debt, and energy transition, will likely lead to a hybrid model, in which a strong State will remains, but recognising the need to cooperate with other actors*" **(Interviewee 4).**

7.4.3. Crude oil price volatility: COVID-19 and Russian-Ukraine war

During AMLO's period (2018-2024), two global events significantly impacted crude oil price and consequently gasoline prices, the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, and the global fuel crisis in 2022 due to the Russia's invasion of Ukraine. COVID-19 pandemic led a historic collapse in crude oil prices. Collected data from the Bank of Mexico (2023)[134] shows that the price of the Mexican mix fell on April 19, 2020, to negative numbers quoting -2.37 dollars per barrel. In Mexico, the collapse of oil prices was a hard blow for PEMEX's investment plans and AMLO's changes in oil policy, although it did not have such a serious effect on public finances, due to the diversification of sources of income (BBC, 2020). As COVID-19 spread around the world in 2020, many refineries became unprofitable and were either closed, had their capacity reduced, or were sold. Many of the refinery closures took place in developed countries, including the US (Reuters, 2022d) and Europe (Fuels Europe, 2021). In contrast, countries like Mexico benefited from the sale of refineries at that time, acquiring them at low cost to expand their refining capacity. An example of this was the case of the purchase of Shell's Deer Park refinery in Texas, US.

The second global event was the 2022 global fuel crisis due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, which also had an impact on the price of crude oil. Collected data from the Bank of Mexico (2023)[135] shows that the price of the Mexican oil mix, went from being negative at -2.37 on April 19, 2020, due to the impact of COVID-19 effect. However, it rebounded with an upward trend, reaching 115 USD per barrel on June 8, 2022, driven by the crisis caused by the war, which led to an international energy crisis in the energy and fuel markets. In Mexico, fuel prices did not increase during the Russian Ukrainian war (Presidency, 2024)[136]. As will be discussed in the next section, partially because of the implementation of a fuel price stability policy. While in the US and Europe were struggling to replace imports of oil, gas, and refined products from Russia, with those from other countries such as Qatar and Algeria (Bouckaert and Dupont, 2022). Some countries like Nigeria, Iraq and other Middle Eastern oil producers benefited from this fuel crisis (GlobalData, 2022). Mexico had already begun, in the pre-pandemic period, to expand and modernise its domestic refining production, positioning itself to take advantage of this change in the energy market. As pointed out by an

---

[134] See Figure 38: Price of the Mexican mix (impact of COVID-19)
[135] See Figure 38: Price of the Mexican mix (two impacts COVID-19 and 2022 global fuel crisis)
[136] See Figure 12: Evolution of real price of magna and premium gasoline and diesel, 2006-2023

Interviewee, *"as the world experienced a growing international trend to state intervention in the energy sector due to the war in Ukraine, Mexico, under Andrés Manuel, had already embraced energy state-led investments well before the COVID period, preparing the country to better manage the challenges in the sector"* **(Interviewee 4).** A clear example of the benefits resulting from the 2022 energy crisis was the unprecedented profits generated by the Deer Park refinery. The CEO of PEMEX, Romero Oropeza (2024) indicated that PEMEX's Deer Park refinery had not achieved results like those seen in 2022-23 since 2007 (Romero Oropeza, 2024)[137].

7.4.4. Fuel price stability policy via IEPS.

During AMLO's administration fuel prices increases have been contained through a fiscal stimulus via IEPS. This fuel price stability policy contrasts with the policy implemented during Peña Nieto's administration, which aimed at collecting taxes via IEPS to generate tax revenue to offset declining crude oil exports (Chapter 6, Section 6.4.3.2.). According to PROFECO (2022a) during most of AMLO's administration, a fiscal stimulus was implemented via IEPS to maintain stable fuel prices. This approach was particularly significant in 2022, with the increase in oil prices due to the War in Ukraine (Bank of Mexico, 2023). During AMLO's administration, a historic subsidy was applied to the IEPS to stabilise fuel prices. On March 14, 2022, the government applied a -100% tax incentive, a negative IEPS to gasoline and diesel to keep prices stable. As a result, the average fuel prices were as follows: Magna gasoline at 21.44 MXN, Premium gasoline at 23.30 and diesel at 22.55, even as the price of the Mexican crude oil mix reached 102 USD per barrel (Presidency, 2023).

In his statements, AMLO highlighted that the historic tax incentives via IEPS to stabilize the gasoline prices were made possible by his administration's new policy in the energy sector **(López Obrador, 2022)[138]** and due to PEMEX's 80% market share of the fuel market **(López Obrador, 2024a)[139].** In this respect, the CEO of PEMEX, Romero Oropeza (2024), pointed out that PEMEX's participation in the fuel market (gasoline, diesel and jet fuel) declined to 76% in 2021 following the energy reform, was reduced. However, due to the implementation of a new policy, PEMEX regained market share, increasing to 81.9% in 2022, and 82.1% in 2023,

---

[137] See the CEO of PEMEX Romero Oropeza Statement in Annex 2: Statements
[138] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[139] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements

projections estimate that by 2024, PEMEX's participation in the national fuel market will be 84%. In this sense, the fiscal stimulus via IEPS, combined with increasing PEMEX's market share and its control over pricing of more than 80% of the domestic fuel market, have significantly contributed to AMLO administration's objective of maintaining stable fuel prices, particularly in turbulent times due to 2022 global fuel crisis.

Collected data from the Presidency (2023)[140] on the evolution of fuel prices shows that, during AMLO's administration, from 2019 to 2023, the price magna gasoline, the most consumed in the country, decreased in -7.9%. in contrast to the increase of +42.8% during Peña Nieto's administration and +22.9% in Calderón's administration. In this respect, according to an Interviewee, *"The IEPS policy has proven useful in stabilizing fuel prices. In 2022, when oil and gasoline prices rose due to the war in Ukraine, the fiscal stimulus cushioned the impact. Unlike in the US, gasoline prices in Mexico remained stable, without this policy, they could have reached 28.83 MXN per litre in June"* **(Interviewee 12).** Findings suggest that the impacts of the 2022 fuel crisis on fuel prices in Mexico followed a different trajectory due to the government's intervention policy. Collected data from PROFECO (2022b) shows that Mexico recorded the lowest fuel prices at 22.42 MXN per litre of gasoline, compared to selected countries such as the US (Los Angeles Times, 2022a; NYTimes, 2022b; CNN, 2022; Reuters, 2022b; NYTimes, 2022c), and other countries. In 2022 The price per litre of gasoline in selected countries was as follows: Germany (45.60 MXN); France (43.82 MXN); Spain (39.74 MXN); United States (32.62 MXN); Canada (30.96 MXN); and China (28.61 MXN). According to PROFECO (2022b) this lower gasoline price in Mexico was a result of the policy changes implemented by the new administration. However, in the view of some interviewees, the fuel price stability policy also prevents fuel prices from decreasing. According to data collected from the Bank of Mexico (Bank of Mexico, 2024)[141]. In 2023, despite a downward trend in oil price, the price of the Mexican oil mix dropped from 115 USD per barrel on March 6, 2022, to the price was 57 USD on March 16, 2023, due to the policy to stabilise fuel prices via IEPS, the price of magna gasoline was maintained at 21.95 MXN. In the words of an Interviewee, *"In 2023, the IEPS policy prevented fuel prices from decreasing as seen internationally, because the same policy that keeps gasoline prices from increasing also prevents them from falling when the price of crude oil drop"* **(Interviewee 12).**

---

[140] See Figure 12: Evolution of real price of magna and premium gasoline and diesel, 2006-2023
[141] See Figure 39: Price of the Mexican oil mix in March 2022 and 2023

For many interviewees, the differing opinions on AMLO's fuel price stability policy result from its implications for public revenues and inflation in the country. According to some interviewees, AMLO's fuel price stability policy contributes to keeping inflation at low levels and provides political stability. In the words of an Interviewee, *"PEMEX face a lot of criticism for prioritising efforts to mitigate fuel prices, rather than keeping historic profits. However, stabilising fuel prices helps mitigate inflation, which is vital after, given the economic fragile many people faced post-COVID. The high price of fuel can be enough to push people to protest"* **(Interviewee 12).** In the view of another Interviewee, *"the increase in fuel prices has an impact on the entire economy, affecting not only car owners but also inflation and the costs of all products and services, since it is a key inflationary driver"* **(Interviewee 19).** In the same way, according to an Interviewee, *"AMLO's policy of stabilising gasoline prices has been effective in controlling energy inflation. Without this policy, the Ukraine conflict would have driven prices up, as goods and services need transportations fuels"* **(Interviewee 14).** According to another interviewee, *"had the gasoline subsidy had not been provided, we would have seen an increase in public transportation costs"* **(Interviewee 1).**

In this respect, in his statements, AMLO highlighted that the ongoing downward inflationary trend in inflation, attribution it to his government's intervention in fuel prices" **(López Obrador, 2023j)[142].** These figures were acknowledged by the OECD, which highlighted Mexico's low energy inflation due to its fuel subsidy policy (El Economista, 2022a; El Economista, 2022b; El Economista, 2023a). However, some interviewees pointed out several implications for the public budget related to the fuel price stability policy implemented by the AMLO administration, including opportunity costs. According to an Interviewee, *"gasoline subsidies result in reduced tax collection. In 2022, the tax incentives applied to the IEPS on gasoline is estimated to have incurred a fiscal cost of MXN 397, 298 million"* **(Interviewee 10).** According to another interviewee, in 2022, due to the fuel price stability policy, *"the Treasury reported a negative income of MXN 79,162 million from IEPS on fuels. Adding the MXN 318,136 million approved in the Federal Income Law 2022, which were not collected, the estimated direct tax expense for IEPS on fuels totalled MXN 397,298 million, an amount equivalent to 10.4% of tax revenues"* **(Interviewee 11).**

---

[142] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements

One of the points in favour of the fuel subsidy policy that emerged during the interviews was that the state offsets the IEPS as a fiscal expense, particularly since in 2022-23, since it received higher income from crude oil sales. According to an Interviewee, in 2022, *"higher oil revenues were generated due to the increase in the Mexican export oil mix price. A collection of MXN 394,565 million was reported, exceeding expectations, though this amount remains lower than the fiscal expenditure on IEPS"* **(Interviewee 10).** According to another Interviewee, *"the figures show us that the gains from the higher oil prices are not on the same scale as the losses incurred by not collecting taxes from IEPS. To avoid the political cost, the government is willing to keep fuel price low, even at the expense of a collapse in revenue"* **(Interviewee 15).** In the words of an interviewee, *"there is an 'opportunity cost' involved in controlling the price of gasoline through tax incentives, as it means diverting resources away from public infrastructure investment to maintain a fuel subsidy policy"* **(Interviewee 11).** In the same way, according to an Interviewee, *"Mexico has limited tax collection, and a constrained federal budget, so, there is an opportunity cost of losing revenue from subsidizing gasoline"* **(Interviewee 3).** According to an Interviewee, *"PEMEX should contribute to public finances, rather than rely on them for support PEMEX, a comprehensive review of the fiscal structure is needed, particularly its tax burden"* **(Interviewee 1).**

7.5. Findings and conclusions

In 2018, with AMLO arrival to the executive an energy paradigm shift took place, transitioning from a neoliberal, oil-export-oriented model to one based on interventionism and energy self-sufficiency. This policy change marked a new business model for PEMEX and a shift towards a value chain integration policy, strengthening PEMEX's downstream segment to gradually increase domestic fuel production, reduce fuel imports and attain fuel self-sufficiency. This radical and rapid change in refining policy led to a significant reduction of fuel imports, falling from 75% in 2018 to 4% in 2024 (PEMEX, 2024). The four axes of AMLO's oil policy represent a radical shift, focusing on increasing domestic sales by processing and refining crude oil rather than exporting it. This transformation is driven by significant public investment aimed at strengthening the aging refining sector, including the construction, acquisition, and expansion of new refineries, coker units, hydrogen plants and petrochemical complexes. Notably, the new Dos Bocas refinery in Mexico and Deer Park refinery in the United States symbolise a paradigm shift, as they marked the first refinery project in 43 years, changing the trend of maintaining stability in the refining sector.

Section 7.2. findings suggest that AMLO's energy policy, particularly in relation to domestic refining, marks a clear departure from previous pro-market administrations, which primarily focused on crude oil exports and fuel imports to meet domestic demand. A key finding is that PEMEX's new model reflects a shift towards a value chain integration, particularly in the transformation of crude oil into fuels, fertilizers, and petrochemicals. This represents a radical paradigm shift compared to PEMEX disintegration during the equilibrium period. The findings of section 7.3. suggest that AMLO strategically instrumentalised the *gasolinazo* protests and implemented several attention-grabbing strategies that contributed to macro-level attention, and to PET's mechanism of policy image and venue shift, ultimately leading to a radical policy change in the sector. Section 7.4. findings highlight challenges in PEMEX's business model, which prioritised refining over maximizing oil exports. Recent data from 2024 shows a significant reduction in fuel imports since 2019, maintaining a downward trend, however, fuel self-sufficiency is expected to be achieved closer to 2026 (Presidency, 2024). A key finding suggests that the fiscal stimulus through IEPS helped stabilise fuel prices during oil price volatility, particularly during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, PEMEX increased market share, supplying more than 80% of the fuel sold in the country (PEMEX, 2024), is considered to have further supported the stability of fuel prices.

AMLO has been a prominent figure on the Mexican political agenda for many years, having run as a presidential candidate in three consecutive periods, 2006, 2012 and 2018. His political discourse has deeply influenced Mexican politics, practically throughout the 21st century. His actions and political narrative, challenging the neoliberal energy paradigm as the dominant policy image, have consequently attracted significant media attention. AMLO's mutual influence relationship with the media in his morning conferences, was found to be highly effective in setting the political agenda and reinforcing support for his energy policy image. The analysis of AMLO's statements reveals that key words in his political discourse such as self-sufficiency, sovereignty, and energy security, have been constantly repeated throughout his presidency. AMLO's influence on media has played a crucial role in venue-shopping, effectively shifting attention and linking his dominant policy image based on state interventionism to diverse audiences and venues. This strategy has allowed him to engage with groups that were previously uninvolved or excluded from political debates. This effective political communication strategy has been instrumental in facilitating PET's mechanism of policy image and venue shift. It also aligns with key PET explanatory factors such as macro-level attention, focusing event, the role of the policy entrepreneur and positive feedback.

The key findings in this chapter indicate that AMLO, as a policy entrepreneur, played a significant role during the punctuation period. The analysis of AMLO's political discourse reveals that he strategically instrumentalised the 2017 *gasolinazo* protests as focusing event to advance his long-standing demands, favoured policy image, and preferred policies for the energy sector. Moreover, findings suggest that to facilitate PET's mechanism of policy images and venues shift, AMLO instrumentalised several attention-grabbing strategies. These included expanding political conflict and mobilising mass support, using a nationalist discourse that resonated with people through an interventionist policy image associated with core social values, constructing causal narratives and assigning blame to neoliberal governments, and using media for venue-shopping. A key finding in AMLO's multi-venues political system, was his strategic use of the political conflict with the judiciary, which served to strengthen AMLO's political discourse and facilitated macro-level attention to his energy policies.

Therefore, future research on stability and policy change should focus particularly on the macropolitical system. As discussed in this empirical study on Mexico, in a multi-venues political system, political conflict between institutional venues can serve a complementary explanatory factor, potentially facilitating macro-level attention to policy-issues and enhancing PET's mechanism of policy image and venue shift.

CHAPTER 8

POLITICAL PARTIES AND PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM
IN MEXICO'S OIL SECTOR

8.1. Introduction

This chapter examines the alignment between the political shift from a stable two-party system to a dynamic multi-party system and the rapid and radical policy changes in the energy sector. Recent events suggests that political parties can either maintain the status-quo, ensuring political stability by institutionalizing attention and blocking radical policy change, or drive rapid policy change by amplifying macro-level attention on key policy-issues. To critically analyse the role of political parties in the Mexican oil sector's punctuated equilibrium, this chapter aims to answer the following questions: What role did political parties play in the policy change process? What incentives did parties have for calling attention to the issue of rising fuel prices? How did political parties influence the period of policy stability period, such as during the 2013 energy reform?

The equilibrium period from 1982 to 2018 includes periods of policy stability and incremental changes, characterised by two types of party systems: a one-party dominant system under the PRI 1982-2000 (Chapter 5), followed by a two-party system dominated by the traditional PAN-PRI parties 2000-2018, during which a neoliberal energy model was implemented (Chapter 6). In contrast, the punctuation period 2018-2024, was marked by the implementation of an interventionist energy model (Chapter 7), with partisan competition and political conflict, particularly following AMLO's election as president under the newly established MORENA party, leading to political fragmentation. This resulted in a multi-party system with multiple venues, in which multiple political parties gained the capacity to control different levels of government offices, either independently or in coalition. During this period of radical policy change in the energy sector, the role of political parties became increasingly prominent, either by exercising their '*de facto*'[143] convening power to draw attention to policy-issues and call for mass mobilisations, or by using their '*de jure*'[144] legislative power to approve the federal energy budget or amend the constitutional energy framework.

---

[143] "*de facto*" describes situations that exist in practice, even if they are not officially recognised.

[144] "*de jure*" refers to practices that are legally recognised, especially in law and government.

According to Baumgartner et al. (2017) the analysis of the role of parties has emerged as a new research area in PET, reflecting the increasing application and evolution of the original PET model (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 2009). Likewise, Kuhlmann and van der Heijden (2018), Carter and Jacobs (2014), and Farstad et al. (2022) identify an increasing focus on the role of political parties in PET studies, suggesting potential gaps (Chapter 3, Section 3.6). However, only a small cluster of empirical studies have stressed the role of parties within PET framework. Hence, this chapter aims to contribute to theoretical development within PET of agenda-setting literature, by adding party politics into the PET model as a complementary explanatory factor, this approach emphases the elements of competition, partisan conflict, and differentiation incentives in facilitating policy change, particularly in multi-party-political systems and multiple venues similar to Mexico's. Future research could benefit from focusing on the mechanisms through which political parties facilitate policy change, including their *de jure* legislative power to form parliamentary majorities for approving the energy budget and passing energy legislation, as well as their *de facto* convening power to draw macro-level attention to policy-issues and mobilise the masses. Particular attention should be given to the incentives that drive political parties to compete, engage in partisan conflict and differentiate themselves. In this regard, this thesis provides a valuable contribution to the literature on the PET model and the role of political parties across different political systems (Farstad et al., 2022; Baumgartner et al., 2017; Carter and Jacobs, 2014; Walgrave et al., 2006; Baumgartner et al., 2006; Peter, 2006; Walgrave and Varone, 2008; Green-Pedersen, 2007; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008; Green-Pedersen and Wolfe; 2009).

This chapter is organised as follows: Section 8.2 analyses the role of political parties in the punctuation period, focusing on MORENA's use of legislative and convening powers to facilitate policy change. It also explores partisan competition and political conflict, highlighting how MORENA and its allies may have capitalised on the 2017 *gasolinazo* protests. Section 8.3 focuses on how political parties contributed to stability in the equilibrium period, highlighting three party mechanisms: the PRI's control over attention, its management of partisan conflict through concessions to PAN, and PAN-PRI's strategy of selective emphasis over direct confrontation. Section 8.4 examines two party mechanisms in the 2013 energy reform: PRI-PAN's '*de jure*' legislative power and PRD-PT's '*de facto*' convening power to call for mass mobilization and shape the political narrative. To investigate and analyse these key party mechanisms and incentives, this chapter uses text-as-data and data triangulation to cross-verify finding from presidential statements, interviews transcripts, parliamentary debates, political

parties' advertisements in the media, and official documents from the presidency, Congress and Senate; including documents and reports from the 'Pact for Mexico'; parties' proposals for the 2013 energy reforms, energy journals and newspapers.

8.2. The role of political parties in the punctuation policy process

To analyse the role played by political parties during the punctuation period. This section will examine two parties' mechanisms: *'de jure'* legislative power and *'de facto'* convening power[145]. Specifically, it will investigate how MORENA party contributed to policy change. Additionally, this section will analyse two parties' incentives: partisan competition and political conflict, that may have driven MORENA and its allies to draw attention to the *gasolinazo* protests. This section will look at parliamentary debates, parties' positions, and key energy law votes; approved constitutional reforms (as proxy of political friction); parties' political manifestos, parties' advertisements in the media; presidential statements; and testimonies of interviewed legislators who witnessed the events firsthand.

8.2.1. AMLO's period in a multi-party-political system

AMLO's period (2018-2024) is characterised by a political system in which multiple political parties have the capacity to gain control of government offices, separately or in coalition. With AMLO election as president in 2018 under the newly established MORENA party, Mexico's party system shifted from a two-party structure dominated by the traditional PRI-PAN parties to a multi-party-political system, including parties such as MORENA, PVEM, PT, PRI, PAN, PRD, MC, and local parties (INE, 2022)[146]. The National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) has been Mexico's ruling party since 2018, in coalition with the Ecological Green Party of Mexico (PVEM) and the Labour party (PT), however, multiple political parties now control various position within the government structure. Opposition parties hold key regional governments, leading to power fragmentation, and causing the Congress to split into multiple fractions (INE, 2021)[147], with some parties supporting the implementation of AMLO's energy policy and other blocking it.

---

[145] See Figure 43: Parties' role in the Mexican oil sector's punctuated equilibrium
[146] See Table 27: Main national political parties in Mexico as of 2018
[147] See Figure 41: LXIV Legislature of the Congress of the Union of Mexico

Collected data from the National Electoral Institute (INE, 2024a)[148] shows that before the punctuation period, during the 2015-2018 term in the Chamber of Deputies, MORENA, AMLO's newly founded party, secured only 10% of the seats in its first participation. In contrast, the traditional PRI-PAN parties held 61% of the Chamber of Deputies and 71% of the Senate. However, in the 2018 elections, in which AMLO was elected president, MORENA increased its representation to 50% of the Chamber of Deputies and 47% of the Senate. This rapid and radical growth that MORENA experienced in just three years of electoral participation enable the party, along with its allies, to secure a simple (absolute) majority in both chambers. In contrast, the PRI-PAN held only 26% of the seats in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, respectively (INE, 2024b)[149].

In 2018, alongside the presidential election, the competition for the electorate experienced between traditional parties PRI-PAN and pro-AMLO parties led not only to political fragmentation in the executive, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, but also in several highly populated states and key municipalities. For example, the states of Nuevo Leon, Jalisco, Tabasco and Veracruz experienced a shift in government, with control passing to parties different from the traditional PRI-PAN (INE, 2024b). In this context, the 2018 election reshaped the political landscape, redrawing the balance of power among political parties at national level, changing the distribution of parties' influence across branches and levels of governments. For example, many municipalities were governed for the first time by parties other than the PRI or PAN. In key capital cities such as Monterrey, Guadalajara and Oaxaca (Pollsmx, 2023)[150], and over 1,795 municipalities (Pollsmx, 2024)[151], traditional and newly established national parties faced competition not only from each other but also from local and independent political parties. This dynamic further deepened the fragmentation of political forces at the national, regional, and state and municipal levels.

As a result of the multi-party-political system and power fragmentation, AMLO has been unable to make major constitutional changes in the energy sector, as these changes require a qualified majority, that is, two-thirds of the votes or 334 out of 500 in the Chamber of Deputies. However, AMLO's party, MORENA along with its allies holds a simple majority, 50% plus

---

[148] See Table 28: Chamber of Deputies and Senate by political parties, from two-party to multi-party
[149] See Table 29: Chamber of Deputies, Senate, and major states by political parties
[150] See Figure 42: Political parties' fragmentation in capital cities
[151] See Table 26: Political parties' fragmentation at municipal level

one vote in Congress (INE, 2024b), allowing them to unilaterally reform secondary laws. This enables them to approve the federal budget, including the budget for the energy sector and major projects in the refining sector, without negotiating with the opposition. As a result, they have been able to facilitate a radical shift in the energy paradigm from liberalism to interventionism (Chapter 7, Section 7.2), rapidly implementing AMLO's political agenda, preferred policies, and policy image for the direction of the energy sector.

8.2.2. Partisan competition and political conflict in the punctuation period

In a multi-party-political system, party competition and political friction (or conflict) are considered key drivers in policy change (Chapter 3, Section 3.6). Carter and Jacobs (2014) particularly emphasise the critical role of party competition in explaining how radical policy change became possible. Similarly, Farstad et al. (2022) find that political parties have served as key policy entrepreneurs, since competition among them directly influences the policy process. In the case of the Mexican energy sector, findings suggest that party competition generated political friction during the punctuation period, especially in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The number of constitutional reforms approved during each presidential period can serve as proxy for measuring this political friction. AMLO's period in a multi-party system has been marked by a lower number of approved constitutional reforms, with only 62 articles of the constitution amended. In contrast, Peña Nieto and Calderón implemented incremental reforms to 115 and 110 constitutional articles, respectively (Congress, 2024)[152].

These findings suggest that AMLO and his party, MORENA, are not primarily focused on constitutional amendments but on reshaping the practices within the energy sector, which can be achieved by modifying secondary law through a simple majority in the legislative. These findings align with the perspective of an Interviewee who highlighted that *"In 2018, under López Obrador, Mexico's energy policy underwent a complete transformation. However, unlike the 2013-2014 energy reform approved under Peña Nieto, this new shift is not confined to legal changes. Instead, it represents a "de facto" transformation of the energy market, eliminating competition, without modifying constitutional laws"* **(Interviewee 15).**

---

[152] See Table 7: Constitutional reforms by presidential period 1982-2024

As the analysis of AMLO's political discourse shows, although he lacked the qualified majority to amend the constitutional framework on energy matters, the political parties supporting his energy policy image facilitated the approval of the federal budget for energy projects. In his statements, AMLO emphasised during his conference on June 8, 2021, that the coalition of MORENA, PT and PVEM, holds an absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies, allowing them to approve the federal budget without requiring support from any other political force **(López Obrador, 2021c)[153]**. The analysis of the federal budget approvals in Congress (PEF Congress, 2024)[154] reveals that the parties forming the alliance "Together we make history" (JHH), have faced no obstacles in approving the annual federal budgets from 2010 to 2024. This is because their combined political forces consistently exceed the absolute majority threshold. In this context, MORENA and his allies holding an absolute majority were able to approve AMLO's budget for refining megaprojects. However, lacking qualified majority, they were unable to implement changes in the energy framework. This granted the opposition a crucial role as a "brake" in policy process.

This situation demonstrates the significant role political parties play in the exercising their '*de jure*' power within the legislative policy-making process. In the words of an Interviewee *"political parties play a very important role in approving the budget and, in doing so, impose a political line. Currently, the majority in Congress belongs to MORENA, whose founding leader AMLO, has been a strong advocate for refining. If you analyse the voting patterns in Congress, all MORENA legislators and their allies constantly vote in alignment with AMLO's political direction"* **(Interviewee 2).** According to another Interviewee, *"since 2018 election, MORENA has held the majority in both Chambers, giving them a clear advantage in approving AMLO's energy projects. While the Executive can propose initiatives, it is the legislative that must validate and approved the budget to be executed each year"* **(Interviewee 17).**

Hence, the simple majority in the Chamber of Deputies composed by MORENA, PVEM and PT, played a key role not only in facilitating the approval of AMLO's budget for the refining sector, but also in passing secondary energy sector laws, such as the Electrical Industry Law (Chapter 7, Section 7.3.6). In this regard, in his statements, AMLO noted that while his coalition could negotiate with a small segment of the opposition to secure a qualified majority,

---

153 See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements
154 See Table 30: Parties vote on the Federation Expenditure budget 2019-2024

this was unnecessary, as MORENA already holds an absolute majority **(López Obrador, 2021d)**[155]. Collected data from INE (2024) shows that the LXIV Legislature of Congress, which began on September 1, 2018, and concluded on August 31, 2021, was the first since the 1997 federal elections (LVII Legislature) to have a clear absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies. MORENA and its coalition held an absolute majority in both chambers, a phenomenon not seen since the LVI Legislature, which ran from November 1, 1994, to August 31, 1997. This key phenomenon occurred due to a modification to the legal framework governing the Chamber of Deputies in 1996, limiting any party to the maximum of 300 deputies. Article 54 of the Constitution requires MORENA to form alliances with the PT and the Green Party, as no party can independently surpass 300 deputies by itself, combining both relative majority and proportional representation (plurinominal). This prevents MORENA to have a qualified majority on its own, as 334 out of 500 are required for constitutional reforms. Therefore, MORENA, in addition to its allies PT and PVEM, must negotiate with at least 34 deputies from other parties to secure a qualified majority. This legal change has led opposition parties during AMLO's period to play a role in either facilitating or blocking major constitutional changes, as two-thirds of the votes are required for such changes. Similar to other PET empirical studies such as Walgrave and Varone (2008), which find that high level of attention may not result in policy change if parties block reform in Belgium, the opposition parties in Mexico, played a "brake" role in AMLO's energy policy process by blocking constitutional reforms. A notable example is the electricity reform proposed by AMLO in October 2021, which was ultimately blocked by the opposition in April 2022 (El Economista, 2024; Reuters, 2022).

8.2.3. Political parties' incentives and policy images competition

Empirical studies on party politics in policy change within PET model (Chapter 3, Section 3.6) such as Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008) in Denmark and Sweden, focus on the incentives that drive political parties to prioritise and draw attention to policy-issues. In the case of the Mexican energy sector, findings suggest that political parties were incentivised to focus on refining as a policy-issue for two main reasons. First, parties can gain electorate advantages by directly confrontation competing energy models (liberalism vs interventionism). Second, since parties are attentive and responsive to the electorate, increasing fuel prices and refining become

---

[155] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements

an emerging policy-issue that attracts public and media attention. This, in turn creates a dynamic of mutual influence, further attracting the attention of political parties. According to Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008), this relationship between the media and politicians is likely to be one of "mutual influence"[156]. According to Green-Pedersen (2007) and Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008), party competition can be understood through the two principles of dominance and dispersion as developed by Riker (1996). Parties are attentive to the electorate, but drawing attention to an issue on which all parties have similar views is not attractive. As a result, parties will try to divert attention from such issues following the principle of dispersion. For a political party, it is therefore much more profitable to highlight policy-issues where the electorate is on its side, or where it has "issue ownership". The concept of issue-ownership suggests that a political party "owns" a particular issue if voters perceive it as the most competent to solve it. A party tends to do better if its issues play a central role in the election campaign (Petrocik, 1996), Riker (1996) calls this the "dominance principle".

MORENA's ideology and policy image for the energy sector diverge from the consensus of traditional parties, mainly due to its emphasis on state interventionism. As highlighted in its party platform, the party advocates for promoting Mexican humanism, with an anti-neoliberal vision, prioritising social justice and well-being. The party promotes a mixed economy, energy sovereignty (with a focus on PEMEX and CFE), and the State's social responsibility in managing the economy (MORENA, 2024). MORENA's political framing of the energy sector, linking energy sovereignty, the state, and nationalism, and other core social values, were instrumentalised by AMLO in his political discourse to gain support for his policy image and preferred policies in the energy sector (Chapter 7, Section 7.2). This political framing provides MORENA a distinct policy-issue to distinguish itself from the traditional parties, particularly from the liberal energy policies implemented over 36 years by the PRI-PAN during the equilibrium period. In this context, MORENA's emphasis on rising gasoline prices and its calls for state-owned PEMEX to refine domestically, distinctly advocating against growing dependence on fuel imports from the US, provides MORENA with a clear party position and reinforces its principle of dominance (Riker, 1996) in the existing conflict within the Mexican energy sector, which is defined by the level of participation of the state and market in the energy sector. In 2018 elections, for example, with the *gasolinazo* still fresh in people's minds, parties' political campaigns focused on distinguishing themselves from other parties by confronting

---

[156] See Figure 22: Model of mutual influence (external pressure vs internal response).

their positions on the energy sector. This resulted in a policy image competition between the main parties. MORENA and its allies supported to an interventionism energy paradigm, driven by AMLO's political agenda, policy image and preferred policies for a state-led sector. In contrast, the opposition parties, PRI-PAN-PRD directly confronted this approach, by advocating for a liberalism energy paradigm, which included promoting private and foreign investments in the sector, disintegrating PEMEX's value chain, and limiting state participation.

The State's role versus private participation in the energy sector has been one of the most contentious political issues in the party system, as revealed during the interviews. Interviewees from the traditional parties PRI-PAN-PRD on the one hand, and MORENA's on the other, tended to differentiate themselves by framing recent changes in the energy sector as either progress or setback. This dynamic may suggest that parties recognised the potential of drawing attention to energy policy-issues as a political strategy to gain support from the electorate. In this respect, according to Interviewee, a parliamentary expert from PRI in the LXIII legislature, *"the opposition PAN and PRI and their ally PRD, have continued advocating for the privatization proposals in the energy sector, while MORENA and allies have skilfully handled the current electoral context. They have generated a new perception by highlighting the Deer Park and Dos Bocas refineries, effectively communicating positive expectations regarding gasoline prices"* **(Interviewee 20).** This dynamic may suggest that MORENA incentivised by the existing conflict in the energy sector, recognised an opportunity to claim "issue-ownership" by positioning itself as the defender of PEMEX and national sovereignty. MORENA party appealed to the electorate by advocating for greater state participation in the sector. In contrast, the PRI-PAN-PRD aimed to appeal to a segment of the electorate in favour of a neoliberal energy model. In the words of an Interviewee, a federal deputy from PRD in the LVI; LXI; LXIII legislatures, *"López Obrador and his party MORENA, have sought to modify the laws to prevent private investments, aiming to consolidate power in the State, practically returning to the state monopolies of PEMEX and CFE. From PRD's view, investing in a new refinery, represents a demagogic approach rooted in outdated populism and anachronistic nationalism"* **(Interviewee 5).** According to another Interviewee, a federal deputy from PAN in the LXIII legislature, *"I believe that the Mexican State should focus on politics, not on acting as a producer or refiner as MORENA proposes. These responsibilities must be left to private companies. I believe that the private sector should manage both the extraction and the refining, while paying a percentage to the Mexican State"* **(Interviewee 6).**

These findings suggest that conflict in the energy sector has served as a powerful motivational factor for political parties. Interviewees seem to agree that AMLO's policy change in the oil and refining sector is closely tied to an ongoing conflict within the party system, in which political forces have framed the issue in a way that positions their parties in direct confrontation and clear differentiation between them. That is because, in multi-party systems, parties have the incentive and interest to politicize an issue to distinguish themselves from their competitors and draw attention to political conflict (Green-Pedersen, 2007). In the case of the Mexican energy sector, party positions have been either supported a policy agenda based on a neoliberal energy paradigm, or an interventionist energy paradigm, aligning either in favour of or against AMLO's energy policies. As it will be analysed later, the illustrative cases of the party votes in the Chamber of Deputies for the liberalization of the gasoline prices in 2017 and the energy reform in 2013, provide additional examples on the parties' differentiation strategies.

8.2.4. Political parties' role in the *gasolinazo* protests as focusing event.

Many interviewees point out to two important sequential events: the congress approval of gasoline price liberalisation in 2016, and the *gasolinazo* protests in 2017. They believed that political parties played a significant role in triggering the policy change process. As previously discussed, according to the PET model, focusing events are macro-level stimulus of attention that disrupt the political system and initiate a process of policy change. The first event was the 2016 approval by the congress (LXIII Legislature) of the federal income law for fiscal year 2017, which liberalised gasoline prices and increased fuel taxes. In this process, political parties, exercising their '*de jure*' power, played a role of either facilitating or blocking changes to the legal framework. Parliamentary voting and debates provide clear evidence of the parties' positions on gasoline liberalisation and additional fuel taxes. This fiscal law was approved with 406 votes in favour (Congress, 2016)[157], of which 193 came from PRI, 102 from PAN, 42 from PRD, 20 from MC, 10 from PANAL, and 5 from PES. In contrast, the proposal was opposed by MORENA with 43 votes against, along with 8 opposing votes from PRD. Some of the most influential supporters of the new law were representatives from the traditional parties, who emphasised the following points: from PRI the deputy Jorge Estefan Chidiac highlighted that, "*Today, we legislate to promote free competition, ensuring that in the medium and long term, gasoline prices will decrease along with crude oil prices*" **(Parliamentary debate - Congress,**

---

[157] See Table 23: Parties vote on the Federal Income Law for Fiscal Year 2017

2016). While PES deputy, Hugo Eric Flores Cervantes expressed that, *"subsidies to IEPS for gasoline distort the real price of fuel. Therefore, we believe the time has come to allow gasoline prices to be fully liberalised"* **(Parliamentary debate - Congress, 2016).**

In this respect, as expressed by an Interviewee, who was present at the parliamentary debate and vote on this law, a federal deputy from PAN during the LXIII legislature, *"when we discuss the tax increase in 2016 and the gasolinazo, I am from the PAN, but those from the PRI never attended the debate sessions. Yet, when it was time to vote, they were all there, and they approved whatever they wanted because they held the majority. The PRI did this at the time, and now MORENA is doing the same"* **(Interviewee 6).** As discussed in the next section, this testimony supports the argument that legislators often vote in alignment with their parties' positions rather than independently, in other words, parties tend to vote as unified blocs.

Among the most notable opponents of the fuel price liberalisation and additional taxes on fuels were the representatives of MORENA and some deputies of PRD, for instance, deputy Vidal Llerenas Morales from MORENA expressed strong opposition to these measures, he stated that *"whoever votes for the income law will be voting for the gasoline price hike and the increased tax. An estimate of 80 billion pesos in the special tax on gasoline is expected, which clearly indicates the price will rise. Let's not lie to the people"* **(Parliamentary debate - Congress, 2016).** From the PRD, deputy Jesús Zambrano Grijalva was also against the proposal for the gasoline liberalization, he indicated that *"the energy reform of 2013-2014 has been a failure, now they are pushing to approve the liberalisation of the gasoline prices for 2017, claiming lower fuel costs, but that is unlikely to happen"* **(Parliamentary debate - Congress, 2016).** Moreover, MORENA's deputy, Ariadna Montiel Reyes, spoke out against the *"gasolinazo law"* and clarified that her party does not support the liberalisation of the fuel price because, *"it will not lower prices, instead, it will increase them, and therefore, there will be no control over the costs"* **(Parliamentary debate - Congress, 2016).** Additionally, MORENA's deputy, Blanca Margarita Cuata Domínguez indicated that, with the liberalization of gasoline prices, *"the gasolinazos, which have caused so much harm to our country's economy, will once again be permitted"* **(Parliamentary debate - Congress, 2016).** Lastly, deputy Rodrigo Abdala Dartigues from MORENA, highlighted that *"MORENA will vote against it because the gasoline price increase is simply a robbery"* **(Parliamentary debate - Congress, 2016).**

The second event which followed sequentially was the *gasolinazo* protests in 2017. Many interviewees considered that political parties played a crucial role in the policy change process, particularly by exercising their *'de facto'* convening power. They drew attention to the issue of increasing fuel prices and called for mass mobilizations, which together with the media, and AMLO as a policy entrepreneur, these efforts contributed to put this policy-issue to a prominent place on the Mexican political agenda. According to Birkland (1998) a focusing event can trigger extensive interest group mobilisation. To expand the partisan conflict, some parties opposed the liberalization of gasoline prices in 2017 and, called for mass mobilizations in their attempt to capitalise on social unrest. For example, following the *gasolinazo*, MORENA launched an intense campaign in Mexico City to oppose the fuel price increase, along with organising protests against the *gasolinazo* (Telesur, 2017). That was possible because the interest of political parties and external pressure events, such the *gasolinazo*, are in reality no separate worlds but closely intertwined. As highlighted by Walgrave, et al. (2006), political parties respond to external pressure events by adopting new ideas and integrating them into the policy process. In this sense, evidence suggests that political parties in the Mexican political system played a crucial role in drawing attention to policy-issues and mobilizing the masses. As one Interviewee, a regional leader from the PRD, put it, *"the number one mobilisation machine in Mexican democracy continues to be the political parties, they are the ones who continue to take people to the streets, they have a significant convening power and organisational strength"* **(Interviewee 9).** In this sense, the social unrest caused by the *gasolinazo* and additional factors of discontent, provided a policy window and positive feedback for policy change, which was instrumentalized by AMLO to push his long-standing demands, policy image and preferred policies for the energy sector, particularly in the refining sector. In his statement on December 29, 2016, following Congress's approval of the law to liberalise gasoline prices and impose additional taxes, AMLO as the President of MORENA, reacted by holding the PRI and PAN responsible for the "*gasolinazo* law" **(López Obrador, 2016)[158].** Thus, the *gasolinazo* protests provided MORENA with a political issue that was already on people's minds, allowing the party to distinguish itself from other parties such as the traditional PAN and PRI. As pointed out by Walgrave, et al. (2006), political parties play an instrumental role during periods of positive feedback by translating external stimuli from a policy event into their policy images, solutions, preferences, and interests.

---

[158] See AMLO's statement in Annex 2: Statements

In this context, MORENA capitalised on the increased attention to gasoline price increases, which attracted macro-level attention, by launching a campaign in 2017 to encourage support for the party and advocate new proposals for the oil and refining sector. As highlighted by Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008), for a political party, it is much more advantageous to highlight issues where the electorate aligns with its position. In television ads and digital media, MORENA outlined its policy proposals for the oil and refining sector, including the construction of new refineries to achieve fuel self-sufficiency **(Ad political party - MORENA, 2017a[159]; Ad political party - MORENA, 2017b)**[160]. The political discourse analysis of the political parties advertising campaigns on energy-issues revealed that MORENA challenges the existing political structure by portraying PRI-PAN traditional governments as obstacles to modernising the refinery system, ultimately hindering affordable fuel prices for the people. MORENA's advertisements reflect strong nationalistic themes, constantly advocating for greater state-intervention and aligning AMLO's energy policy image and preferred policies. Recurring themes, phases and keywords in their narrative and rhetoric strategies include national self-sufficiency, energy sovereignty, refineries, domestic fuel production, lower fuel prices, energy independence, and autonomous development. This evidence suggests that a political party can thus benefit from a policy-issue by placing it on its party agenda. However, this opportunity may also depend on the level of politicization and media attention the policy-issue receives. Since the relationship between the mass media and political parties is likely to be one of mutual influence (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008). For example, in the case of the *gasolinazo* protests as focusing event, findings suggest that when the *gasolinazo* gained widespread media attention, and generated both positive and negative feedback, MORENA exercised its *'de facto'* convening power. This in turn attracted even more media coverage, contributing along with the policy entrepreneur and media to increased macro-level political attention. This dynamic of attention led to greater competition between parties and their policy images, intensifying political conflict as parties aimed to differentiate themselves from one another. Meanwhile, the policy entrepreneur promoted the policy-issue to the media, shifting and linking attention across different audiences (Chapter 7, Section 7.3.5), ultimately influencing the parties' political and energy agendas. Therefore, this mutual influence between the policy-issue, political parties, policy entrepreneur, media, and the public, highlights the

---

[159] See Annex 4: Party advertising campaigns
[160] See Annex 4: Party advertising campaigns

need to reconsider the crucial role of parties and how they could be more effectively integrated into the PET of agenda-setting model.

This Section 8.2 examined how MORENA's exercised its *de jure* power through an absolute majority in the legislative, facilitating the implementation of AMLO's policy image in the oil and refining sector. A key finding is that MORENA and its allies held an absolute majority in both chambers during AMLO's period (2018-2024), a phenomenon not seen since 1997, allowing them to pass the federal energy budget without opposition. The findings also revealed that MORENA played a key role by contributing to the paradigm shift from liberalism to interventionism, by exercising its *de facto* convening power. This includes drawing attention to rising fuel prices, and calling for mass mobilizations, particularly during the 2017 *gasolinazo* protests, and later in the 2017-18 electoral campaign. Additionally, evidence suggests that partisan competition for the electorate, along with the political conflict between parties, were key factors that incentivising MORENA to distinguish itself from PRI-PAN, through a direct confrontation with the previous energy policies.

This section examined the incentives and mechanisms used by political parties to facilitate policy change in the punctuation policy process. The next section will analyse the mechanisms used by parties to ensure political stability and block radical policy change in the equilibrium period.

8.3. The role of political parties in the equilibrium period

To analyse the role played by political parties in the equilibrium period[161]. This section focuses on three mechanisms that may have contributed to political stability by blocking radical policy change. These three mechanisms are[162]: the PRI's strong control and institutionalization of attention; its management of partisan conflict through strategic concessions to PAN; and the selective emphasis on issues rather than direct confrontation. This stability may have resulted from a lack of incentives, including the absence of partisan competition and the lack of conflict. This section analyses the composition of political parties in the Congress and the Senate; their voting patterns on key energy-related laws, constitutional reforms and relevant parliamentary

---

[161] See Table 41: Punctuated equilibrium in the Mexican oil sector 1982-2024
[162] See Figure 43: Parties' role in the Mexican oil sector's punctuated equilibrium

documentation, including the 2008 energy reform and energy journals. Additionally, it analyses testimonies from interviewees to cross-verify findings and provide further insights.

8.3.1. PRI's dominant one-party system and lack of partisan competition

Empirical studies of PET of agenda-setting using qualitative evidence have confirmed the central role of political parties in punctuated equilibrium, for instance, Walgrave and Varone (2008), highlight that parties can deliberately push a policy or keep it off the political agenda. That is because, in many political systems, political parties are key players in the policy-making process, with party leaders involved in all crucial decisions and institutional venues. They argue that parties can be resilient, resisting change by blocking it, even after sweeping focusing events that deeply shock the political system and put pressure on decision-makers. Despite such disruption, Walgrave and Varone (2008) point out that parties often maintain control and can prevent radical change due to their dominance within the political systems.

In the case of Mexico, during the PRI's 71 years of uninterrupted power, the state party controlled not only the presidency but also both chambers, including deputies, and senators. In the Chamber of Deputies, the PRI maintained a qualify majority until 1988 and absolute majority until 1997 (Nohlen, 2005). In the Senate, the state party maintained a qualify majority until 1997 and an absolute majority until 2000. That year, after seven decades as the dominant state party, the PRI lost the presidency of the Republic, until its return to power from 2012-2018. Overall, the PRI ruled for most of the 20th century in Mexico as the dominant political party, controlling the courts, the chamber of deputies and senators, governorships, and umbrella organisations and states companies. This consolidation of power created a single-venue political system, with the state party as the exclusive access point for political influence. In this context, due to PRI's hegemony, the transition from a statist energy paradigm to a neoliberal energy paradigm took place under the same political system (Chapter 5, Section 5.5)[163]. The PRI, as the dominant party in a single-venue system, maintaining minimal partisan competition and political conflict, due to its strong control and institutionalisation of attention. However, the shift from a neoliberal to an interventionist energy paradigm (Chapter 7, Section 7.2), triggered a radical and rapid change in the political system, transitioning from a two-party system dominated by the PAN-PRI to a multi-party-political system with multiple venues,

---

[163] See Table 2: Party systems and energy paradigms in Mexico

172

increased party competition and intensified political conflict. To improve analysis, it is therefore essential to highlight the two distinct party systems that shaped the equilibrium period: the first, a dominant one-party political system under the PRI from 1982 to 2000. The second, a two-party political system dominated by PAN-PRI from 2000-2018.

8.3.2. PRI's strong control and institutionalisation of attention

PET empirical studies such as Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008) find that parties play a key role in determining which issues occupy a prominent place on the political agenda and which remain excluded from it. This is because in some political systems, parties maintain a strong institutionalization of attention (Green-Pedersen and Wolfe, 2009). In this respect, Baumgartner and Jones (1993; 2009) stress that policy monopolies induce and maintain long-term stability. The idea of policy monopolies suggests that attention and policies become institutionalized, which in turn generates long-term stability. Green-Pedersen and Wolfe (2009) explain that policy monopolies imply a political system that contains powerful mechanisms to institutionalize attention. That is, a political system in which attention to political issues fades after an initial punctuation due to the control or monopoly over attention.

The existing literature within PET of agenda-setting points out to several mechanisms through which attention is institutionalized in dominant party systems (Walgrave et al., 2006; Baumgartner et al., 2006; Peter, 2006; Green-Pedersen, 2007; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008; Green-Pedersen and Wolfe; 2009). First, the existence of relatively stable groups of policymakers and nongovernmental interests who share a common policy image, with their interaction organised through political institutions such as the executive branch. Second, the party systems are, if not the single political venue, at least the dominant one, creating a system that is close to new policy issues due to the absence of alterative political venues and, the dominance of parties as the primary access point. Third, conflict lines are either non-existent or remain very stable overtime due to the lack of parties' competition or because parties focus on selective emphasis rather than engaging in direct confrontation. Fourth, in party-dominant systems, policy issue-attention is difficult to track because parties hold nearly a monopoly of attention, due to small, consensual, and homogenous policy subsystems.

During equilibrium period, the state party PRI used a combination of mechanisms that provided political stability, which were closely linked to the political-economic model implemented in

this period. The political system, characterised by "PRI-style", so-called "*Prista*" presidentialism, contributed to political stability under the PRI, as the president held near-absolute powers during his six-term in office until he appointed his successor. According to Macleod (2004), the president dominated the military and public bureaucracy as well as public firms in strategic sectors. In addition, the president controlled the state and local organisations affiliated with the PRI, allowing them to manage government relations with the media, business leaders, and foreign powers, all while operating in the absence of real checks and balances from the legislature or the judiciary. The Peruvian writer and Nobel prize in literature, Mario Vargas Llosa often referred to the Mexican presidential regime under the PRI as "the perfect dictatorship", due to its prolonged period in power and dominance of a single party (El Pais, 1990). As a result, during the 20th century, the PRI became the most influential institution promoting economic development, controlling nearly every sector of Mexican society, and serving as the focal point for both economic and political organisation. True to its name, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), institutionalized attention of the political and economic life of the country as the state party served as the only access point for raising policy issues. According to Mcleod (2004) the PRI institutionalized attention though the structural power of state, maintaining institutional relationships with actors such as public firms' syndicate leaders and pro-government Mexican capitalists. The state party was able to maintain the status-quo though its control over the media, resources, transportation, telecommunications, production, and finance. Hence, the PRI was the only access point and institutional venue, making the political system of this period a one-party dominant and single-venue system.

During the statism period, the party-state used public firms to control popular sectors and appease the Mexican capitalist. However, after the 1982 crisis and the adoption of neoliberal policies (Chapter 5, Section 5.5.3)[164], it shifted to the market and capitalists for support, offering the privatization of the public companies in exchange for backing, except for PEMEX, which remained untouched due to political concerns and its contribution to public revenues (Mcleod, 2004: 254). Despite the transformation of the PRI's structure that took place during the technocratic presidents' period (Chapter 5, Section 5.5.4)[165], which made it less dependent on popular sectors, the state maintained strong control over the unions and greater support from the private sector. This created an institutional framework where challenging the dominant

---

[164] See Table 2: Party systems and energy paradigms in Mexico
[165] See Table 3: Equilibrium Presidents: stability and incremental changes 1982-2018

neoliberal policy image in a one-party dominant and single-venue political system, would have been difficult (Mcleod, 2004).

8.3.3. PRI's control over partisan conflict through concessions to PAN.

Despite the existence of other political parties, the lack of real competition during the PRI, ensured policy stability in the energy sector. Later, the PAN presidency in a two-party system continued this stabilising role, maintaining the neoliberal policies implemented by the PRI's technocratic presidents. This was particularly evident during Salinas and Zedillo administrations, as PRI lost its qualify majority in Congress in 1988 and its absolute majority in 1997. The PRI-PAN alliance provided the necessary support to pass key reforms (Mcleod, 2004). Collected data from the Congress indicates that party conflict lines remained very stable in the legislative during Salinas and Zedillo periods, for instance, the PRI in alliance with the PAN, secured the approve of 55 and 78 constitutional reforms respectively, with most of them passing due to PAN's support (Congress, 2024)[166]. One of the most illustrative examples of the PAN-PRI alliance was the approval of FOBAPROA, a bailout of Mexico's largest banks. This measure not only transferred the banking system to the state but also absorbed the liabilities of large business groups and prominent businessmen, many of whom own the banks (Expansion-Politica, 2023); Business-insider, 2020). According to data from the Chamber of Deputies (Congress, 1998)[167], the FOBAPROA reforms were approved with 326 votes in favour, including 226 votes from the PRI and 99 from the PAN. In this respect, in the words of an Interviewee, *"the FOBAPROA was a clear example of neoliberalism in action, reflecting the principle of, 'privatizing profits while socializing losses', the debts of a few were transferred to all Mexicans, a burden we continue to bear today"* **(Interviewee 17).** In this respect, other Interviewee stated that *"in strict theory, PAN-PRI deputies are meant to represent all Mexicans. However, in practice, they often prioritise partisan interests over the greater needs of the Mexican people"* **(Interviewee 7).**

According to Mcleod (2004: 97) the perception of negative effects of neoliberal policies combined with Salinas' strategy to "transform the structure of the PRI by reducing its dependence on organised peasants, workers and popular sector" together with increasing

---

[166] See Table 7: Constitutional reforms by presidential period 1982-2024
[167] See Table 14: Distribution of votes by political party on FOBAPROA

pressure from PAN for greater participation in politics, contributed to the political debacle of the PRI. As stated by Mcleod (2004: 244) business leaders continued to push for further privatizations, "they pressured the PRI by sponsoring candidates for public office thought the PAN". Notably, all state governors were from the PRI until 1989, when PAN, won the governorship of North Baja California, making the first time a non-PRI candidate had been elected since the PRI establishment. Collected data from the National Electoral Institute shows that the PRI began losing ground in the electoral arena, particularly through electoral concessions to PAN, starting with the post-López Portillo presidential elections. The PRI share of the vote progressively declined. López Portillo secured 93.5%; De la Madrid won 68.43%; Salinas received 50.36%; Zedillo obtained 48.69% of the total votes (INE, 2018)[168]. This situation helped consolidate a two-party political system under PAN-PRI, facilitating political stability and the continuous implementation of neoliberal policies in the energy sector from 2000 to 2006, and incrementally from 2006 to 2018. Notably both parties supported key energy reforms in 2008 and 2013, with the PRI-PAN coalition, holding majorities in the chambers (INE, 2024a), and voting jointly in favour (Congress, 2008g; Congress 2013; Senate 2013).

8.3.4. PAN-PRI's two-party system, selective emphasis rather than direct confrontation

In 2000, Vicente Fox Quesada, was elected president of Mexico, ending 71 years of PRI rule. Despite this, the PRI retained great political power, particularly its territorial structure in the states and influence in both chambers (Mcleod, 2004). In the words of an Interviewee, *"Fox, Calderón, and Peña Nieto, served as presidents, but to govern effectively, their parties needed to form alliances in Congress to secure the majority, as both the PRI and the PAN held significant legislative power"* **(Interviewee 7).** Collected data from the National Electoral Institute (INE, 2024b)[169] revealed that in 2000 election, the PAN secured 40% of the seats in the Senate, while the PRI controlled 47% of the upper house for a six-year period. In the Chamber of Deputies, the PAN obtained 41% of the seats while the PRI held 42% for three-year term. According to Pastor and Wise (2005), with PAN's minority position in Congress, Fox faced constraints from the start of his presidency and had to rely on negotiations with the PRI to advance his agenda. In this context, the PAN-PRI dominance in the legislative resulted in a *de facto* two-party system, with the two major political parties, PRI and PAN, jointly

---

[168] See Table 6: Presidential election results in Mexico 1934-2012
[169] See Table 29: Chamber of Deputies, Senate, and major states by political parties

controlling 87% of the Senate and 83% of the Congress (INE, 2024a)[170]. Although other parties existed, their influence remained minor or limited to specific regions. The PRI also retained control over key states with significant voter populations, such as the State of Mexico, and major oil-producing states such as Veracruz, Campeche, and Tabasco, home to Mexico's largest oil reserves (INE, 2024a).

This power-sharing dynamic between the PAN and PRI became even more challenging in the 2003 mid-term elections. Fox's party experienced an unprecedented defeat, further complicating relations between the executive and Congress, hindering progress on reforms (Pastor and Wise, 2005). In the 2003-2006 congress election the PAN obtained only 30% of the seats, while the PRI controlled 45% of the Congress (INE, 2024b). The composition of the Congress and Senate reveals that the PRI, with its significant number of legislative seats, played a role in the policymaking process by ensuring political stability and continuity of the neoliberal agenda, while effectively blocking any radical policy change. As pointed out by Walgrave and Varone (2008) parties can either push a policy forward or deliberately keep it off the political agenda, acting as 'brakes' in the policy process. In this respect, Pastor and Wise (2005) highlight that Fox's administration experienced the stagnation of key policies, particularly those aimed to reducing the country's income inequality, due to the relationship with PRI in Congress, while the energy sector remained largely intact, maintaining the status-quo. Collected data from the Congress (Congress, 2024)[171] on the number of constitutional reforms passed during Fox's period (2000-2006), serves as a useful proxy for political friction in the policy process and highlights parties' reluctance to implement policy change. During Fox's administration, only 31 constitutional reforms were approved by the Congress, while his predecessor Zedillo (1994-2000) implemented 78 constitutional reforms. Most constitutional reforms during the Fox's government were aimed at continuing the neoliberal agenda adopted by the PRI in the 1980s. For example, like his predecessors, Fox continued with the privatization of public firms and granted large concessions to private and foreign companies in sectors such as mining, communications, and transportation.

In 2006, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, the PAN's right-wing candidate, was elected president, securing less than one percent more of the vote than his left-wing candidate opponent, Andrés

---

Manuel López Obrador (INE, 2018)[172]. According to Solorio and Tosun (2023), this narrow electoral result in the 2006 presidential election undermined Calderón's political legitimacy and his ability to manoeuvre in a polarised Congress. Collected data from the National Electoral Institute (INE, 2024b)[173]shows that in the 2006-2009 Congress elections, the Chamber of Deputies was divided, with the PAN securing 41% of the seats, the PRI holding 21% and the PRD obtaining 25%. Despite the advance of the left represented by the PRD, the PAN-PRI alliance continued to dominate both chambers, jointly controlling 62% of Congress in 2006-9 and 67% of the Senate until 2009 (INE, 2024a)[174]. This situation changed in the intermediate elections for the 2009-2012 congress. In the chamber of deputies, the PRI obtained 48%, the PAN secured 28% of the seats, and the PRD secured 13%. The PAN-PRI alliance jointly controlling 76% of Congress (INE, 2024a), creating a policy window for major incremental changes to the neoliberal project, with relatively little opposition. As a result, between 2006 and 2012, during Calderón's administration, 110 constitutional reforms were carried out, making the major amendments to the constitution in decades. In contrast, only 31 changes to the constitution were made in Fox's period (Congress, 2024)[175], this indicates that the PAN-PRI alliance strengthened during Calderón's period. The PRI controlling 48% of Congress in 2009-2012 ensured to the continuity of the neoliberal policies implemented by PRI presidents since 1982. This also paved the way for incremental changes, particularly in the transport and communications, mining, and energy sectors (La Jornada, 2007; Expansion, 2007).

According to Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008), in some political systems, parties compete by emphasising different issues rather than by taking opposing positions on the same issues, thus avoiding direct confrontation. Collected data from the Congress on party votes on the seven energy-related laws included in the 2008 energy reform promoted by Calderón revealed that the PRI-PAN focused on selective emphasis rather than direct confrontation in the energy sector, their joint approval of these laws reinforced the dominance of the two-party system. In Calderón's 2008 energy reform, the first law was jointly approved by PRI and PAN legislators, with 101 and 205 votes, respectively. This law reformed the Energy Regulatory Commission (Congress, 2008a)[176]. In the second law, the Law for the Sustainable Use of Energy, the PRI

---

[172] See Table 6: Presidential election results in Mexico 1934-2012
[173] See Table 29: Chamber of Deputies, Senate, and major states by political parties
[174] See Table 28: Chamber of Deputies and Senate by political parties, from two-party to multi-party
[175] See Table 7: Constitutional reforms by presidential period 1982-2024
[176] See Table 15: Parties vote on reform of the Energy Regulatory Commission Law

and PAN legislators voted jointly in favour, securing 305 votes (Congress, 2008b)[177]. With respect to the Law of the National Hydrocarbons Commission, PRI and PAN legislators approved it together with 304 votes (Congress, 2008c)[178]. The fourth law, the Law for the Use of Renewable Energies and Financing of the Energy Transition, was approved by PAN-PRI alliance with 305 votes (Congress, 2008d)[179]. In the fifth energy-related law, the PRI-PAN legislators jointly approved it with 297 votes (Congress, 2008e)[180]. In the sixth law, PRI-PAN legislators jointly voted in favour, securing 302 votes to reform the Regulatory Law of Constitutional Article 27 (Congress, 2008f)[181]. Regarding the Mexican Petroleum Law, the seventh law included in Calderón's 2008 energy reform, PRI and PAN legislators jointly voted in favour, approving it with 99 and 203 votes, respectively (Congress, 2008g)[182]. The PRI-PAN approval of the incremental changes in Calderón's "PEMEX reform", united the opposition around the movement initiated by AMLO, a campaign defending oil and opposing the privatization of PEMEX. This movement was later formalised with the founding of MORENA as a political party.

In 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto was elected President of Mexico, defeating his opponent Andrés Manuel López Obrador (INE, 2018)[183].This presidential election marked the PRI's returned to presidential power, reinforcing in a two-party system dominated by the PAN-PRI. Collected data from the election results for the Congress 2012-2015 (INE, 2024b)[184] show that, the PRI was strengthened its position with 212 seats, or 42% of the Congress, while the PAN obtained 114 seats (23%) and the PVEM, allied with the PRI, gained 20 deputies (6%). Together the PRI, PAN and PVEM secured 355 votes, granting Peña Nieto with a qualified majority during the first three years of his government. The PRI-PAN alliance held 65% of the Congress and 71% of the Senate (INE, 2024a)[185]. Similar results were seen in the midterm Congress elections of the 2015-2018 period, where the three political forces: PRI, PAN and PVEM, maintained significant influence. The PRI obtained 202 seats (40%), the secured PAN 107 seats (21%) and the PVEM gained 38 seats (8%). While, in its first participation as a political party, MORENA obtained 50 seats (10%) in Congress (INE, 2024b).

---

[177] See Table 16: Parties vote on reform of the Law for the Sustainable Use of Energy
[178] See Table 17: Parties vote on reform of the Law of the National Hydrocarbons Commission
[179] See Table 18: Parties vote on reform of Law for Use Renewable Energies and Financing Energy Transition
[180] See Table 10: Parties vote on the reform of article 33 of Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration
[181] See Table 20: Parties vote on the reform of the Regulatory Law of Constitutional Article 27
[182] See Table 21: Parties vote on the reform of the Mexican Petroleum Law
[183] See Table 6: Presidential election results in Mexico 1934-2012
[184] See Table 29: Chamber of Deputies, Senate, and major states by political parties
[185] See Table 28: Chamber of Deputies and Senate by political parties, from two-party to multi-party

PRI-PAN qualified majority, combined with the absence of competition and political conflict in a two-party system, facilitated Peña Nieto's multi-thematic political agenda and incremental changes to the constitutional framework (Chapter 6, Section 6.4). Collected data from the Congress (Congress, 2024)[186] shows that between 2012 and 2018, during Peña Nieto's administration, 155 constitutional reforms were carried out, including the 2013 energy reform. This reform was initially promoted by PRI-PAN-PRD through "Pact for Mexico", with each political force presenting its own energy reform initiative, emphasizing different aspects to avoid an initial confrontation over the issue of the sector privatization. However, as it will be discussed in the next section, the 2013 energy reform was ultimately jointly approved by PRI, and PAN with PRD voting against.

This Section 8.3 analysed the PRI-PAN mechanisms that provided political stability and blocked radical policy change in the equilibrium period. Key findings revealed that the absence of party competition and political conflict during this period can be attributed to the relative stability of the political system, with limited party incentives for change, driven by three party mechanisms: First, the PRI's strong control and institutionalisation of attention. Second, The PRI's management of partisan conflict through concessions to PAN. Third, the selective emphasis on issues rather than direct confrontation within the PAN-PRI two-party system. An additional key finding during the equilibrium period is the significant number of constitutional reforms passed during Calderón's and Peña Nieto's administrations, also referred as the 'incremental changes period'. Between 1982 to 2018, a total of 495 reforms were carried out, with 265 (or 54%) occurring between 2006 and 2018. This period included the two polarizing energy reforms: Calderón's 2008 "PEMEX reform" and Peña Nieto's 2013 energy reform. This evidence supports the idea that the absence of political friction in the legislative during the PRI-PAN two-party system contributed to the stability and incremental changes of a neoliberal energy model.

This section examined three parties' mechanisms that provided political stability and blocked radical policy change in the equilibrium period. The next section will focus in detail on one example: the parties' role in the 2013 energy reform.

---

[186] See Table 7: Constitutional reforms by presidential period 1982-2024

8.4. The role of political parties in the 2013 energy reform

This section analyses two mechanisms used by political parties to influence the 2013 energy reform policy-process. First, the PRI-PAN's *de jure* legislative power to secure parliamentary majorities and pass the constitutional energy reform. Second, PRD-PT's *de facto* convening power to call for mass mobilization and draw political attention to the reform policy-process, including the initial framing of an issue-ownership narrative. This section examines documents from the cross-party alliance known as the 'Pact for Mexico'; the reform proposals from the Executive (PRI), PAN and PRD to identify similarities and divergences in party positions. It also analyses parliamentary debates, party votes and parties' advertising in the media; presidential statements; and testimonies of interviewed deputies and parliamentary experts.

8.4.1. The 'Pact for Mexico' and the Executive's energy reform initiative

The political process of EPN's energy reform can be divided into three stages based on the documents generated in each phase[187].The first, the political stage in 2012, includes negotiations between the traditional political parties PRI, PAN, and PRD, which culminated in the "Pact for Mexico" and the initial executive proposal for energy reform. The second, the legislative stage in 2013-14, in which the PRI, PAN, and PRD presented their energy initiatives to the chambers, and the subsequent approval in fast-track by PRI and PAN. The third stage, the fiscal-implementation stage in 2017-8, (Chapter 6, Section 6.5) in which additional legislation including increased fuel taxes and an accelerated fuels price liberalisation process triggered the 2017 *gazolinazo* protests.

The first stage, the political stage in 2012, involved negotiations between PRI, PAN, and PRD, which resulted in the "Pact for Mexico" and the executive's proposed energy reform initiative. To build the political consensus needed to advance his structural reforms agenda, Peña Nieto established the "Pact for Mexico", a cross-party alliance uniting the traditional political parties PRI, PAN, and PRD. The Pact was signed on December 2, 2012, just one day after Peña Nieto took office, marking its importance on his political agenda. The rationale behind this alliance was straightforward: the PRI had regained power without securing the two-thirds majority necessary in Congress to pass constitutional reforms (Solorio and Tosun, 2022). As a part of

---

[187] See Table 13: the three stages of the policy progress of the 2013 energy reform

the agreements and commitments established in the "Pact for Mexico", the implementation of an energy reform was a key priority (Sánchez-Gutierrez, 2019). The signed document outlined plans to expand the exploration and production of hydrocarbons, while promoting competition in the refining, petrochemical and hydrocarbon transportation by allowing private participation. After securing a consensus with traditional political parties through the 'Pact for Mexico' to achieve a two-thirds in Congress, the government launched an intense advertising campaign in the media to promote Peña Nieto's constitutional energy reform. In his statements, Peña Nieto highlighted the expected benefits of private sector participation such as lower energy costs, reduced prices for consumers, more affordable fertilizers, and increased food availability at better prices **(Peña Nieto, 2013a)[188].** Peña Nieto also addressed the nation to present the energy reform initiative, highlighting the potential for hiring private companies to drive the sector's growth **(Peña Nieto, 2013b)[189].** As discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.4., Peña Nieto's presidential statements provide clear evidence of his energy policy image based on a liberalism energy paradigm.

The analysis of the initiative of energy reform sent by Peña Nieto to the Senate provides further insight into the Executive and PRI's policy image for the direction of the sector. The document (Senate, 2013)[190] outlines a diagnosis of the challenges in crude oil extraction and refining, while proposing the preferred policies by Peña Nieto's administration to address the policy issue. In terms of crude oil extraction, Peña Nieto's initiative argues that easily accessible oil in shallow waters is rapidly depleting. Since, most of the remaining oil is in fields that require advanced technology and significant investment, resources that can only be secured through private sector privatization. As the initiative notes, "Drilling costs in deep waters are approximately 10 times higher than those in shallow waters and 100 times higher than those in onshore deposits" (Senate, 2013: 54). Consequently, the initiative considers that it is not advisable for PEMEX to assume all the risk alone.

Regarding refined and petrochemical products, the initiative acknowledges the heavy dependence on imported fuels and petrochemical inputs, due to limited refining capacity. "Having to import approximately half of the gasoline and a third of the diesel consumed in the country. While in 1997 gasoline imports represented 25% of national consumption, by 2012

---

[188] See Peña Nieto's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[189] See Peña Nieto 's statement in Annex 2: Statements
[190] See Table 24: Parties' initiatives of energy reform

they reached 49%" (Senate, 2013: 57). Hence, to address the identified policy challenges, Peña Nieto's energy reform initiative proposed amending constitutional articles, specifically the initiative aimed at removing the restriction in Article 27 that prevents the State from contracting with private entities for the exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons (Senate, 2013). This entails removing the prohibition on the State from entering into contracts for the exploitation of hydrocarbons, thus allowing private and foreign companies to engage in profit-sharing contracts for oil and gas exploration and extraction. This move marked a significant incremental change in the neoliberal energy agenda, because Calderón's 2008 energy reform had only modified the regulatory laws to allow PEMEX to contract services from private companies, without permitting them to invest or share oil rents in areas of hydrocarbon exploration and extraction. The executive's initiative also proposed amending Article 28 of the Constitution to remove basic petrochemicals from the list of strategic sectors (Senate, 2013). This entails removing basic petrochemicals from the strategic areas of the State, allowing private participation in the activities of the production chain, such as natural gas processing and oil refining, as well as refined transportation, storage, distribution, and marketing. As a result, this further accelerates and deepens the vertical and horizontal disintegration of PEMEX. According to Peña Nieto's initiative, the expected benefits of increasing the participation of private companies in the sector include: "Increase oil production, from the 2.5 million barrels per day currently generated, to 3 million in 2018, as well as 3.5 million in 2025" (Senate, 2013: 69). In addition, Peña Nieto's preferred policy solution pointed out other benefits, "the reform will promote greater integration in the value chain from the extraction of hydrocarbons, which will allow a sufficient supply of gasoline, methane gas and liquefied petroleum gas, at competitive prices" (Senate, 2013: 69).

Many experts agree with the diagnosis presented in Peña Nieto's energy reform initiative. For instance, Ramírez and Massa (2019), highlight that the decline in crude oil production and growing national demand for fuels, provided clear justifications for the need of an energy reform. However, the views of many interviewees and the opinions of experts and policymakers, diverged on the preferred policies proposed by Peña Nieto to address the issues in the energy sector. These divergences seem to support the notion of polarization, with either in favour of or against private participation in the energy sector, often overlooking the nuances that each model might entail. Among the reasons cited by interviewees in favour of the energy reform and opening the sector to profit-sharing agreements with private and foreign companies, four key factors were the most mentioned: increased investment; enhanced competition; risk-

sharing; and the freeing up of public resources. The following three interviewees reflect these points: According to an Interviewee, *"the 2013 energy reform aimed to ensure a reliable energy supply at competitive prices. However, in Mexico, oil has long been tied to nationalism. In 2012, faced with limited state resources, the government opened the sector to private investment and competition. As a result, PEMEX and CFE now compete for market-share within a market-driven model. In my view, if the private sector can deliver energy at comparable or lower cost, the government should allow it and redirect those resources to higher priority projects"* **(Interviewee 13).** According to another interviewee, *"the government's goal with the 2013 energy reform was to transfer the oil exploration risk to private sector. Under this model, if the private companies failed to discover deposits, they were still obligated to fulfil the signed contracts and make payments as agreed"* **(Interviewee 15).** According to another Interviewee, "*Peña Nieto's energy reform assumed that the decline in oil production and the challenges of revitalising refineries, were beyond the federal budget's capacity, due to the large investment needed to make them competitive. As a result, the reform reinforced previous efforts aimed at opening the sector to private companies to increase oil production and free up public resources* **(Interviewee 19).**

However, other interviewees offered divergent views on the objectives of Peña Nieto's energy reform, arguing that energy security is an issue of national security and should be not entrusted to the private sector. In the words of an Interviewee *"the reform narrative focused on privatising and auctioning the sector, emphasising lower energy prices and competitiveness. However, food and energy security are national priorities crucial for national security and should not be left to the free-market and private companies for profit. The real issue lies in the mismanagement of PEMEX and CFE, but the solution is not to hand them over to the private sector. Instead, we should focus on managing them better"* **(Interviewee 14).**

8.4.2. The role of parties in the legislative stage of the energy reform

This section analyses the role of parties in the second stage of the energy reform, the legislative stage from 2013-14. During this period, PRI, PAN and PRD presented their energy initiatives to the Chamber of Deputies, which were followed by legislative debates, and culminated in the final vote. The comparison of the energy reform initiatives of the PRI, PAN and PRD reflect the similarities and differences in their positions, especially the PRI-PAN direct confrontation with the PRD over the type, depth, and scope of private participation in the sector. While the

parties' initiatives share similarities in their diagnoses and problems facing the oil sector (Senate, 2013)[191], there are marked differences regarding the causes that originated the problems. The initiative of PAN and PRI pointed out as the main problem of the sector the decline of easily accessible oil deposits and PEMEX's lack of technology to extract resources in deep waters. In contrast, PRD initiative argues that the causes are the high dependence of public finances on oil revenues, which has for many years prevented PEMEX from securing sufficient resources (Senate, 2013).

There are also clear parties' differences between the energy reform proposals of the PAN, PRI, and PRD (Senate, 2013)[192]. For instance, The PRD proposed keeping constitutional Articles 27 and 28 unchanged, which restrict private participation in the sector. In contrast, the PRI and PAN initiatives advocate for the opening of the sector to private sector participation through concessions and profit-sharing contracts for exploration and exploitation (Senate, 2013). These positions suggest that the private companies' participation in the energy sector became an issue of political cleavage and division between PRI-PAN and PRD-PT, reflecting a broader political conflict in the political system. This divide was polarised into the two opposing narratives used by political parties: one advocating for a larger, more State interventionist versus the other for a smaller, minimal State in the energy sector. In the words of an Interviewee, a federal deputy from PAN in the LXIII legislature, *"with the energy reform of 2013, what we wanted in the PAN was increased private sector participation, greater competitiveness, and ultimately, a reduction in energy costs"* **(Interviewee 6).** The differences in the type, depth, and scope of private sector involvement in the energy sector directly confronted the energy reform proposals put forward by PRI-PAN and PRD-PT. This direct confrontation ultimately led the PRD to withdraw from the 'Pact for Mexico' (Reuters, 2013), and to advocate for modernizing PEMEX without privatizing it (Aristegui, 2013a; Imagen-Noticias, 2013; Milenio, 2013).

As an Interviewee, a deputy from PRD who served in the LVI; LXI; LXIII legislatures and was involved in the 'Pact for Mexico' negotiations, stated *"When the energy reform was implemented under Peña Nieto, we made proposals from the PRD that included an entire chapter for PEMEX, aimed at investing in new technologies to enable long-term progress. However, the PRI and PAN rejected our proposals, prompting us to vote against the reform"* **(Interviewee 5).** According to another Interviewee, a party leader from PRD, *"The PRD*

---

[191] See Table 24: Parties' initiatives of energy reform: comparison of diagnoses and problems of oil sector
[192] See Table 25: Parties similarities and differences between their initiatives of energy reform

withdrew from the 'Pact for Mexico' due to some sections of Peña Nieto's energy reform initiative. We were determined not to allow PEMEX to be weakened. Peña Nieto's government wanted to sell PEMEX and hand it over to foreign capital, while we in the PRD were focused on strengthening PEMEX. We believed in the State's capacity to manage the country's resources and advocated for its control over them" **(Interviewee 9).** The differences in energy reform proposals, particularly the PRD-PT's emphasis on strengthening and modernising PEMEX versus, the PRI-PAN's push for opening of the sector to private participation and continuing the disintegration of PEMEX's value chain, triggered a policy images competition. This led to contrasting narratives supporting each model, which in turn incentivised political parties to further differentiate themselves. As a result in the differences in energy reform proposals, the PRD-PT exercised their convening power to spark political attention and mobilize against the PRI-PAN energy reform (Aristegui, 2013b; BBC, 2013b; Excelsior, 2013). In the words of an Interviewee, a party leader from PRD, *"political parties play a crucial role in the public life because politics is not confined to the Chambers of legislators, its extents to the streets as well. Parties remain the primary drivers of mobilisation and public engagement"* **(Interviewee 9).** Political parties along with the media, played an important role in the 2013 energy reform policy-process by linking attention across audiences and calling for mobilization. This dynamic can be attributed to the mutual influence between political parties and the media. One example of this is the Labour Party advertising campaign in the media, which aimed at calling attention to prevent the privatization of PEMEX **(Ad political party - PT, 2013)[193].** The discourse analysis of this advertising revealed that the dominant energy policy image promoted by the PT, was one of increased state intervention, appealing to nationalism. It called Mexicans to protect PEMEX from being handed over to foreign companies, arguing that privatization would lead to higher gasoline prices and increased taxes.

Despite the massive mobilizations opposing the reform, the Senate began the discussion on the constitutional reform of the energy sector on December 10, 2013. The debate lasted over 20 hours before the reform was approved with 95 votes in favour and 28 against. Subsequently, on December 11, 2013, the bill passed to the Chamber of Deputies, where an intense debate took place. Some of the most notable positions against the reform came from opposition parties. The PT Deputy José Alberto Benavides Castañeda expressed his rejection, stating that *"This reform will imply government obedience to comply with the interests of major foreign oil*

---

[193] See Annex 4: Party advertising campaigns

companies" **(Parliamentary debate - Congress, 2013a).** While, the parliamentary coordinator of the Citizen Movement (MC), Deputy Ricardo Monreal Ávila, indicated that *"This reform revives the privatization of Porfirio Díaz, it is a privatizing measure that will lead to greater wealth for only a few"*, he further argue that it would *"strip the Mexican nation of control over its oil and electrical energy"* **(Parliamentary debate - Congress, 2013a; Congress, 2013b).** Meanwhile, Deputy Luis Ángel Xariel Espinosa Cházaro (PRD) voted against the reform, arguing that proposed opening would *"lead to the foreignization of the energy sector, handing over oil and electricity to professional speculators operating in the markets. It privatizes and denationalizes oil resources, natural gas and hydrocarbons, as well as production fields and key areas of interest for crude oil"*.

Some of the most significant positions in favour of the reform came from traditional parties and allies. the PRI Deputy, Javier Treviño Cantú, pointed out that *"the era of easy oil is over. Extracting resources now requires advanced technology and strategic action to ensured energy security"* **(Parliamentary debate - Congress, 2013b).** In this respect, Paulina Alejandra del Moral Vela (PRI) stated that *"using cutting-edge technology from other countries and attracting investment to explore deposits in deep waters will offer significant advantages"* **(Parliamentary debate - Congress, 2013b).** For the PVEM, Deputy Ricardo Astudillo Suárez argued that the *"reform fosters economic and technological development and greater competitiveness. It opens the doors to energy security and provides transparency and clarity in the exploitation and exploration of hydrocarbons"* **(Parliamentary debate - Congress, 2013b).** Meanwhile, Deputy Luis Alberto Villarreal García, coordinator of the PAN parliamentary group, stated that *"the reform will create jobs, stimulate economic growth, enhance competitiveness and restore energy sovereignty that the country has lost"* **(Parliamentary debate - Congress, 2013a)**

The positions of the PRD-PT-MC deputies against the energy reform appear to be the initial steps in shaping a political narrative that frames their parties as owners of the issue, the champions of opposing the "foreignization" and privatization of the energy sector. They aim to position themselves as defenders of national resources and sovereignty, advocating for the State as the most competent authority to manage the energy sector. In contrast, the interventions of the PRI-PAN-PVEM deputies presented a political narrative emphasising the private sector as a key driver capable of delivering the desired outcomes in the energy sector. However, some of the parliamentary experts interviewed pointed out that legislators' positions during the

debates often do not align with their actual voting behaviour. Based on their experience, legislators typically follow a "voting line", meaning that parties tend to vote as blocs. This suggests that the ability of parties to modify the constitution is closely tied to the number of legislators they have, as voting tends to occur in unified blocs. As one Interviewee put it, *"when I was working in Congress, I observed that there are two levels of discussions, one in committees or hallways, and another in plenary. In energy commissions, experts are invited, and there are discussions with legislators. However, when it comes to voting in the plenary, parties' coordinators dictate how deputies should vote. Every deputy follows a 'voting line'. There is no independence to vote according to what they believe is best, instead, they vote based on what party's political communication directs. There is a lot of political drama in the plenary, but the votes are ultimately determined by party politics"* **(Interviewee 2).** In the words of another Interviewee, *"Politicians enter the chambers through political parties, each of which has statutes, declarations of principles, and ideologies that guide party legislators in making specific decisions"* **(Interviewee 9).**

After the intense debate on December 11, 2013, in an alternate room of Congress, triggered by PRD deputies seizing the rostrum to block the Chamber in protest of the energy reform (BBC, 2013a), the PRI-PAN, using of their *'de jure'* power to form qualify majorities with PVEM and PANAL, swiftly approved the reform through a fast-track process (Arestegui, 2020). According to collected data from the Congress on parliamentary voting (Congress, 2013)[194], the energy reform was approved with 354 votes in favour and 134 against. Legislators from the PRI, PAN, PVEM and PANAL blocked the opposition's reservations from PRD, PT and MC, forming a qualified majority to approve Peña Nieto's 2013 energy initiative. The parties that supported the reform and secured a qualified majority included: PRI (209 votes); PAN (107); PVEM (28); and PANAL (10). In contrast, the parties that opposed the reform were PRD (95 votes); PT (13) and MC (19). As a result, on December 12, 201, Mexicans woke up with the public's attention divided between the celebration of the day of the Virgin of Guadalupe and an energy reform, which opened the oil sector to private participation (Infobae, 2022).

This Section 8.4. analysed the political and legislative stages of the 2013 Peña Nieto's energy reform, revealing the decisive role played by PRI-PAN in exercising their *de jure* legislative power to secure qualified majorities, which led to significant incremental changes in the energy

---

[194] See Table 22: Parties vote on Peña Nieto's 2013 energy reform

sector during the final years of the equilibrium period. While PRD-PT exercised their *de facto* convening power by drawing political attention and mobilizing opposition against the PRI-PAN energy reform. A key finding indicates that the debate over the private participation versus State control in the sector marked a clear cleavage between PRI-PAN and PRD-PT. Evidence also suggests that the direct confrontation over the energy models incentivised parties to further differentiate themselves, particularly PRD-PT which constructed an initial narrative positioning themselves as the owners of the issue of the "privatization" and "foreignization" of the energy sector.

This section discussed two key mechanisms used by political parties in the policy-process of the 2013 energy reform. The following section will present the overall findings and conclusions of this analysis chapter.

8.5. Findings and conclusions

This chapter aims to contribute to the theoretical development within PET of agenda-setting literature, by emphasising the role of political parties. It highlights how partisan competition and conflict serve as complementary explanatory factors in explaining both stability and policy change, particularly in multi-party-political systems with multiple venues such as Mexico's.

To understand periods of stability and policy change periods in the Mexican energy sector, it is essential to consider three party systems that shaped the equilibrium and punctuation periods: the first was the PRI-dominant one-party political system (1982 to 2000). The second, a two-party political system under the PAN-PRI (2000-2018). Third one, a multi-party system (2018 to 2024), which aligns with a radical and rapid policy change in the energy sector. The shift from a statist to a neoliberal energy paradigm occurred under the PRI's rule in a one-party dominant and single-venue political system, marked by a strong control and institutionalisation of attention, with an absence of partisan competition and lack of political conflict. In contrast, the shift from a liberalism to an interventionism energy paradigm experienced a radical and rapid change, from a two-party system under the PAN-PRI to a multi-party-political system, leading to party competition, political conflict and multi-venues.

During the punctuation period, findings suggest that MORENA's exercised its *de jure* legislative power through an absolute majority, facilitating the implementation of AMLO's

policy image in the oil and refining sector. Such a majority had not been seen since 1997, allowing MORENA and allies to pass the federal energy budget without opposition. Additionally, findings revealed that the presence of partisan competition and political conflict incentivised parties to distinguish themselves and vote in blocs, either supporting a state-interventionist energy model or favouring greater private participation. MORENA also enabled a paradigm shift from liberalism to interventionism by exercising its *de facto* convening power, drawing attention to rising fuel prices, calling for mass mobilizations, and claiming issue-ownership, particularly during the 2017 *gasolinazo* protests, and the 2017-18 electoral campaign. These findings suggest that MORENA's narrative of issue-ownership, portraying itself as the most nationalistic and competent party to manage the energy sector and deliver the desired outcomes, resonated with voters in 2018, particularly on the issue of avoiding *gasolinazos* (rising gasoline prices). This perception may result from the way PRI and PAN, long-governing parties are viewed in their handling of the energy sector issues, especially following the exaggeration of expectations surrounding the 2013 energy reform.

Hence, evidence suggests that partisan competition for the electorate, along with the political conflict between parties, were key factors driving MORENA to distinguish itself from PRI-PAN, through a direct confrontation to the energy policies of the previous model. Findings also suggest that during the punctuation period, the competition to persuade the electorate, driven by dominance and dispersion principles, led not only to party conflict, but also to macro-level attention, involving government, the media, parties, and the public. In this multiple-venue political system, the media played a more crucial role, linking and shifting attention in audiences through mutual influence of public opinion, media and politicians. The interaction between multiple venues, many controlled by opposition parties due to the political fragmentation of 2018, further exacerbated political conflict and partisan competition between different levels of government. This was especially evident between the executive and legislative, given the need for simple majorities to approve the energy budget or qualified majority to amend the constitutional energy legal framework.

During the equilibrium period, evidence suggests that the absence of partisan competition and political conflict was due to the relative stability of the political system, which was maintained by three party mechanisms: First, the PRI's strong control and institutionalisation of attention. Second, The PRI's control over the partisan conflict through concessions to PAN. Third, the focus on selective emphasis rather than direct confrontation under the PAN-PRI in a two-party

political system, which provided stable conflict lines. The number of constitutional reforms passed during Calderón's and Peña Nieto's periods (as proxy of political fiction), provides evidence of the incremental changes between 2006 and 2018. Notably, 54% of the reforms carried out in the equilibrium period took place during these two six-year terms, including the two polarizing energy reforms: Calderón's 2008 PEMEX reform and Peña Nieto's 2013 energy reform. This evidence supports the idea that minimal political conflict within the legislature, and between the executive and legislative (institutional venues) in a two-party system under the PRI-PAN.

The analysed political and legislative stages of 2013 Peña Nieto's energy reform reveals the decisive role played by PRI-PAN in exercising their *de jure* legislative power. By securing qualified majorities, they were able to drive significant incremental changes. Meanwhile, PRD-PT exercised their *de facto* convening power by sparking political attention and mobilising opposition to PRI-PAN's energy reform. A main finding indicates that the debate over private participation versus State control in the sector created a clear political cleavage between PRI-PAN and PRD-PT, the divide later shifted to MORENA-PT when AMLO left the PRD to run for the presidential election in 2018. Evidence also suggests that the direct confrontation between parties over these models created strong incentives to further differentiate themselves, particularly during the 2017 *gasolinazo* protests. This focusing event presented MORENA with a political issue that resonated with the people, allowing MORENA to distinguish itself from traditional parties such as PAN-PRI. This focusing event also helped to shaped MORENA's political narrative, positioning the party as the primary advocate against the "privatization" and "foreignization" of the energy sector.

CHAPTER 9

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

9.1. Summarising purpose and key findings

This final chapter has two main objectives. First, it will review the key findings, contributions, and limitations of this research, offering a concise recapitulation and discussing how they align with previous research. Second, with the aim of opening new avenues for further studies, this chapter will also provide suggestions for future research, based on the experience and insights gained during this study.

Using the PET model (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 2009), this thesis aimed to unravel the complex dynamics of policy issue-attention to explain why, after a long period of policy stability and incremental changes, refining has suddenly emerged as one of the most pressing policy-issue on Mexico's political agenda. The analysis of qualitative evidence from both equilibrium and punctuation periods in the Mexican oil and refining sector, using data triangulation, supports the PET's assumption, which posits that rapid and radical policy change occurs when policy images and venues shift. This thesis confirms that in the case of Mexican oil sector, the PET mechanism of policy images and venue shift took place as the energy model shifted from a liberal to an interventionist approach, aligning with the global energy paradigms shifts highlighted by Goldthau (2012). The primary theoretical contribution of this thesis centres on role played by the policy entrepreneur and political parties in conflict expansion. Findings suggest that they are key explanatory factors shaping the attention dynamics that drive policy change in Mexican energy politics.

Key findings from the analysis of the equilibrium period reveal that PEMEX's reluctance to adjust its refining policy to changes in national fuel consumption can be explained by the adoption of a neoliberal energy paradigm. This model prioritised maximising crude oil exports over refining and value-added products. The dominant neoliberal policy image assumed that in a free-market world, goods could be freely exported and imported without tariffs or restrictions, disregarding geopolitical perspectives of energy security and risks highlighted by Kuzemko et al. (2016). As result, Mexico's oil production collapsed, PEMEX's refineries became obsolete, and no new refineries were built in Mexico in 43 years, leading to an increasing dependence

on fuel imports. Furthermore, findings suggest that the 2017 *gasolinazo* protest was the focusing event that challenged the neoliberal energy model. This attention-grabbing event triggered a competition between the liberal and interventionist policy images over the energy sector's direction, drawing macro-level attention from the government, the media, political parties, and the public to the energy policy agenda. Evidence indicates a widespread perception that the 2013 energy reform was blamed for the rise in fuel prices, largely due to ineffective political communication that exaggerated and overstated the reform's expected benefits, including the government's promise to lower gasoline prices. Findings also suggests that the perceived policy failure, driven by the removal of fuel subsidies, increased fuel taxes, and rising energy prices, played a major role in galvanizing social unrest and fuelling the protests. This evidence makes a valuable empirical contribution by offering perspectives that can illustrate similar policy change processes in other fossil-fuel-rich developing countries. It highlights the complex dynamics of macro-level attention triggered by focusing events, such as the *gasolinazo* protests linked to rising fuels prices. These findings are particularly valuable for governments considering the implementation of policies aimed at phase out fuel subsidies and increase fuel taxes to reduce fossil fuel consumption. These findings also contribute to broader literature on the challenges and potential trajectory of energy transition in fossil-fuel-rich developing countries, as well as to debates surrounding the role of the state in shaping the direction of the energy sector (Van de Graaf and Sovacool, 2020; Kuzemko at al., 2016; Newell, 2021; Johnstone, and Newell, 2017; Burke and Stephens, 2018; Goldthau, 2010; Hafner and Tagliapietra, 2020; Van de Graaf and Bradshaw, 2018; Kuzemko at al., 2019; West and Fattouh, 2019; Van de Graaf, 2018; Johnston et al., 2020; Goldthau, 2017; Kuzemko, 2019; Goldthau and Westphal, 2019).

Moreover, key findings from the analysis of the punctuation period indicate that AMLO, as a policy entrepreneur, played a significant role during this period. The analysis of AMLO's political discourse during the electoral campaign and his 1,423 morning conferences reveals that he strategically instrumentalised the 2017 *gasolinazo* protests as a focusing event, to advance his long-standing demands, interventionist policy image, and preferred policies for the energy sector's direction. In 2018, with the start of AMLO's presidency an energy paradigm shift took place, transitioning from a neoliberal, oil-export-oriented model to one based on interventionism and energy self-sufficiency. Under AMLO's new energy policy, crude extraction is limited to 1.8 mbd, with a primary focus on redirecting PEMEX's crude oil production towards domestic refining. This aims to increase domestic production of fuels,

petrochemicals, and fertilizers, while integrating PEMEX's value chain to diversify its sources of income (Presidency, 2024). Meanwhile, domestic energy demand is gradually shifting towards renewable energy sources (CFE, 2024). This policy change marked a new business model for PEMEX and a shift towards a value chain integration policy, strengthening PEMEX's downstream segment to gradually increase domestic fuel production, reduce fuel imports and attain fuel self-sufficiency (Presidency, 2023). This radical and rapid shift in refining policy resulted in a dramatic reduction of fuel imports, dropping from 75% in 2018 to 4% in 2024 (PEMEX, 2024). This change also transformed PEMEX's main source of income, shifting from crude oil exports to domestic fuel sales, which now account for 83% of the state-owned company's total revenue (PEMEX, 2024). Moreover, findings suggest that to facilitate PET's mechanism of policy images and venues shift, AMLO instrumentalised several attention-grabbing strategies. These included expanding conflict and mobilising mass support, leveraging a nationalist discourse that resonated with people through an interventionist policy image associated with core social values, constructing causal narratives assigning blame to neoliberal governments, and using the media for venue-shopping. AMLO's mutual influence relationship with the media during his daily morning press conferences, was found to be highly effective in setting the political agenda and reinforcing support for his energy policy image. A key finding in AMLO's multiple-venue system, was his strategic use of conflict expansion with the judiciary, which not only strengthened AMLO's political discourse but also drew macro-level attention to his energy policies. In this regard, this thesis makes a valuable contribution to the literature on the PET model, particularly in studies examining focusing events, conflict expansion and the role of policy entrepreneurs (Birkland and Warnement, 2013; Birkland, 1998; Kingdon, 2003; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; True et al., 2007; Schattschneider, 1960; and Cobb and Elder, 1983). These findings also offer a broader empirical contribution by highlighting the political and economic trade-offs associated with accelerating the transition to renewables, gradually integrating them, or increasing dependence on fossil fuels, especially in fossil-fuel-rich developing countries like Mexico.

The findings, focusing on party politics within PET model, suggest that political parties played a crucial role in explaining periods of policy stability and radical change in Mexico's energy sector. This research found that MORENA party exercised its *de jure* legislative power by forming an absolute legislative majority, enabling MORENA and its allies PT and PVEM, to pass the federal energy budget, facilitating the implementation of AMLO's energy policy image during the punctuation period. The findings also revealed that MORENA party

contributed to a paradigm shift from liberalism to interventionism by exercising its *de facto* convening power, drawing attention to rising fuel prices, calling for mass mobilizations, and claiming issue-ownership, particularly during the 2017 *gasolinazo* protests, and the 2017-18 electoral campaign. These findings suggest that MORENA's narrative of issue-ownership, portraying itself as the most nationalistic and competent party to manage the energy sector and deliver the desired outcomes, resonated with voters in 2018, particularly on the issue of avoiding *gasolinazos* (rising gasoline prices), allowing MORENA to distinguish itself from traditional parties. This focusing event also helped shape MORENA's political narrative, positioning the party as the leading advocate against the "privatization" and "foreignization" of the energy sector. This perception may result from the way PRI and PAN, long-governing parties are viewed in their handling of the energy sector issues during the equilibrium, especially following the exaggeration of expectations surrounding the 2013 energy reform. The analysis of the political and legislative stages of Peña Nieto's 2013 energy reform reveals the decisive role played by PRI and PAN in exercising their *de jure* legislative power. By securing qualified majorities, they were able to drive significant incremental changes. Meanwhile, PRD and PT parties exercised their *de facto* convening power by sparking political attention and mobilizing opposition to PRI-PAN energy reform. A main finding indicates that the debate over private participation versus State intervention in the energy sector contributed to a clear political cleavage between PRI-PAN and PRD-PT. Lelieveldt and Princen (2023) defines a political cleavage as a conflict between parties driven by social divisions, shaping divergent policy perspectives, and fuelling party competition.

This divide later shifted to MORENA-PT, when AMLO left the PRD to run for the presidential election in 2018. The analysis of parties' position on legislative voting suggests that the direct confrontations between parties over neoliberal vs interventionist energy models, created strong incentives for parties to further differentiate themselves. Additionally, the analysis of the Deputies' interviews suggests that partisan competition for the electorate, along with the political conflict between parties, were key factors driving MORENA's incentives to distinguish itself from traditional parties PRI and PAN, particularly through a direct confrontation to the energy policies of the previous neoliberal energy model. Findings also suggest that during the punctuation period, the competition to persuade the electorate, driven by Riker's (1993) dominance and dispersion principles, led MORENA to abandon issues dominated by opponents and focus on policy-issues that reinforce political cleavages within society, particularly with potential to become winning issues. In Mexico's energy sector, this

fuelled party conflict and drew macro-level attention to the energy model, engaging the government, media, political parties, and the public. That is because in Mexico's multi-venue political system, the use of media played a crucial role in linking and shifting attention in audiences through the "mutual influence" of public opinion, media and politicians highlighted by Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008). Moreover, findings reveal that the interaction between multiple venues, many controlled by opposition parties due to the political fragmentation of 2018, further exacerbated political conflict and partisan competition between different levels of government. This was especially evident between the executive and legislative, given the need for absolute majorities to approve the energy budget and qualified majority to amend the constitutional energy legal framework.

Moreover, findings suggest that the absence of party competition and lack of political conflict during the equilibrium period, can be attributed to the relative stability of the political system and lack of party incentives due to three party mechanisms: First, the PRI's strong control and institutionalisation of attention. Second, the PRI's control over the partisan conflict through concessions to PAN. Third, the selective emphasis rather than direct confrontation under the PAN-PRI in a two-party political system, which provided very stable conflict lines. The number of constitutional reforms passed during Calderón's and Peña Nieto's administrations, used as a proxy of political fiction, provides evidence of the absence of direct confrontation between PRI-PAN. Notably, 54% of the reforms carried out during the equilibrium period took place between 2006 and 2018 (Congress, 2024), including the 2008 PEMEX reform and the 2013 energy reform. This evidence supports the idea that minimal political conflict, resulting from lack of direct confrontation both within the legislature and between the executive and legislative (institutional venues), prevented radical policy change in a two-party system under the PRI-PAN. In this regard, this thesis provides a valuable contribution to the literature on the PET model, highlighting the role of political parties in blocking or driving policy change across diverse political systems and varying institutional venues (Farstad et al., 2022; Baumgartner et al., 2017; Carter and Jacobs, 2014; Walgrave et al., 2006; Baumgartner et al., 2006; Peter, 2006; Walgrave and Varone, 2008; Green-Pedersen, 2007; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008; Green-Pedersen and Wolfe; 2009).

Hence, the findings from the analysis of qualitative evidence from both equilibrium and punctuation periods in the Mexican oil and refining sector, using data triangulation, supports the PET's assumption that a rapid and radical policy change took place because a shift in policy

images and venues. However, this evidence also suggests that, in addition to the policy images and venues shift mechanism posited by PET, two changes in the dynamics of the political system aligned with changes in the energy sector. First, a change in the institutional venues to a multiple venues system, driven by AMLO's presidency (2018-2024) and a radical shift towards an increased interventionist energy model, this change contributed to policy images competition and political conflict between institutional venues, amplifying attention to energy policy-issues. Second, a shift in the party system from a two-party to a multi-party system, which facilitated calls to mass mobilisations, provided political parties with incentives to compete, distinguish themselves, and build parliamentary majorities to approve AMLO's energy budget for new refining infrastructure megaprojects. In this regard, this thesis supports the view, aligned with recent research (Section 9.2) that PET studies, focusing on policy images competition and multiple-venues interactions, should be complemented by emphasising the role of the policy entrepreneur and political parties in driving both the expansion of conflict and policy change. This approach can help explain the still under-researched area of how attention to new policy-issues is generated in different political systems.

9.2. Relationship with previous research

These findings on the dynamics of attention to policy-issues in different political systems are broadly consistent with those of researchers such as Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 2009); Jones, Baumgartner, and True (2006); Green-Pedersen and Wolfe (2009) who, similarly to this thesis, find that through the lens of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, multiple-venues political systems like the US tends to generate faster attention to environmental policy issues, due to internal and external competing forces compared to a single-venue system like Denmark. These studies demonstrate that PET model can be applied to different countries and institutional settings. However, differences in the number of political venues can lead to divergent patterns of policy attention. In the case of Mexico, officially known as the United Mexican States, the current macro-political system closely resembles the original US-PET model, featuring multiple institutional venues, including the executive (president), legislative (bicameral system: the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate), and judiciary branches (courts), along with state and local governments. The findings in this thesis suggests that the macro-level attention is generated more quicky in Mexico's multiple-venue political system than in a PRI-dominant, one-venue system or a two-party PRI-PAN political system. Although previous work has not specifically addressed political conflict between institutional venues for increasing attention to

policy-issues, the conflict expanders Schattschneider (1960); Cobb and Elder (1983); Birkland (1998); and later Baumgartner and Jones (1993; 2009), have brought to light several attention-grabbing strategies for conflict expansion, such as the use of focusing events, mass mobilisation, venue-shopping, and the instrumentalization of a political discourse based on a policy image association to core social values, casual stories and blame. Among which this research finds that the use of conflict expansion between institutional venues, particularly between the executive, judiciary, and legislative contributed to generate macro-level attention on energy policy-issues. In the Mexican case such conflict particularly between the executive and judiciary over AMLO's energy policy, helped draw macro-level attention and facilitated key mechanisms of the PET model, mainly shifts in policy images and institutional venues. Furthermore, the findings of this thesis on the role of political parties in explaining policy change in the Mexican energy sector, are similar to those of Carter and Jacobs (2014) and Farstad et al. (2022), who find that parties played a key role in setting the political agenda and shaping policymaking in the case of the UK and Norwegian energy and climate policy, respectively, and therefore, suggest revising the PET framework to include party politics. In this regard, in line with previous research, including Walgrave and Varone (2008); Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008); Walgrave et al. (2006); Green-Pedersen (2007); Baumgartner at al. (2006); Peter (2006), this thesis highlights the critical role of political parties in explaining periods of stability and policy change. This also aligned findings from Baumgartner et al. (2017) and Kuhlmann and van der Heijden (2018), who emphasise the increasing focus on the role of political parties in PET studies, revealing gaps in the PET framework.

9.3. Thesis contributions to knowledge

This thesis contributes to knowledge theoretically by proposing the inclusion of two complementary explanatory factors in the PET model, aimed at enhancing the PET framework applicability to political systems comparable to that of Mexico. This research highlights the instrumentalization of conflict expansion between institutional venues as a complementary explanatory factor. In the Mexican case such conflict between the executive and judiciary over AMLO's energy policy, helped draw macro-level attention and facilitated key mechanisms of the PET model, mainly shifts in policy images and institutional venues. Consequently, adding the expansion of political conflict between institutional venues as explanatory factor into the PET framework could enhance its explanatory scope, particularly in multi-venue political systems similar to Mexico's. Future PET research would benefit from taking this factor into

account to more effectively explain the dynamics of such political systems. In this regard, this thesis provides a valuable contribution to the literature on the PET model examining focusing events, conflict expansion and the role of policy entrepreneur in agenda-setting (Birkland and Warnement, 2013; Birkland, 1998; Kingdon, 2003; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; True et al., 2007; Schattschneider, 1960; and Cobb and Elder, 1983).

This thesis also proposes adding party politics into the PET model as a complementary explanatory factor. The findings in this thesis, which aligned with previous research on the role of political parties within the PET model, suggest that political parties can help explain periods of stability and policy change in muti-party political systems like Mexico's. Future research could benefit from focusing on the mechanisms through which political parties facilitate policy change, including their *de jure* legislative power to form parliamentary majorities for approving the energy budget and passing energy legislation, as well as their *de facto* convening power to draw macro-level attention to policy-issues and mobilize the masses. Moreover, particular attention should be given to the incentives that drive political parties to compete, engage in partisan conflict and differentiate themselves. In this sense, this thesis provides a valuable contribution to the literature on the PET model and the role of political parties across different political systems (Farstad et al., 2022; Baumgartner et al., 2017; Carter and Jacobs, 2014; Walgrave et al., 2006; Baumgartner et al., 2006; Peter, 2006; Walgrave and Varone, 2008; Green-Pedersen, 2007; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008; Green-Pedersen and Wolfe; 2009).

Additionally, this thesis makes significant empirical contributions to the field of global energy politics, particularly on two key areas. First, it provides evidence on the policy implications for Mexico's energy security following the recent changes aimed at strengthening its downstream oil segment to reduce crude oil exports and meet domestic fuel demand, while gradually integrating renewables. This policy change was implemented before the COVID-19 pandemic and during the 2022 global fuel crisis due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. As a result, it provides crucial perspectives shaped by these events that contribute to broader debates in the literature on the potential pathways of energy transitions, particularly in fossil-fuel-rich developing countries like Mexico. In this regard, this thesis provides a valuable contribution to the literature on the potential trajectory of energy transition, as well as to debates surrounding the challenges of sustainable transition and the role of the state (Van de Graaf and Sovacool, 2020; Kuzemko at al., 2016; Newell, 2021; Johnstone, and Newell, 2017; Burke and Stephens,

2018; Goldthau, 2010; Hafner and Tagliapietra, 2020; Van de Graaf and Bradshaw, 2018; Kuzemko at al., 2019; West and Fattouh, 2019; Van de Graaf, 2018; Johnston et al., 2020; Goldthau, 2017; Kuzemko, 2019; Goldthau and Westphal, 2019).

Second, this thesis offers empirical insights on the challenges faced by Mexico's fuel price stability policy implemented during the punctuation period, which relies on fiscal stimulus and results in an opportunity cost for the public finances. Additionally, this thesis provides valuable analysis of the fiscal approaches and challenges of fuel subsidies during the equilibrium period. These findings make a significant contribution to the literature on fuel-related fiscal incentives and their tax implications for public finances, while enriching debates on PEMEX, oil revenues and the need for diversifying fiscal resources (Rivera de Jesus and López -Reynosa, 2023; Rivera de Jesus 2024; Villarreal-Paez and Michel-Gutierrez, 2013; Segal, 2012; Plante and Jordan, 2013; Dominguez-Ordonez, 2015). These debates highlight the trade-offs and challenges of accelerating the transition to renewables, gradually integrating them, or increasing dependence on fossil fuels. The empirical findings of this thesis on shifts in macro-level attention, driven by the elimination of fuel subsidies and the introduction of taxes following the 2013 energy reform, are crucial for governments designing policies aimed at a just and balanced energy transition, including the gradual phase-out of fuel subsidies.

9.4. Limitations of this research

It should be emphasised that this study has primarily focused on the dynamics of attention to Mexican energy policy-issues in the oil and refining sector. Therefore, the findings of this thesis are closely linked to political systems similar to Mexico's, characterised by multiple venues, as in the original US-PET model. Nevertheless, empirical studies such as Carter and Jacobs (2014); Farstad et al. (2022); Walgrave et al. (2006); Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008), demonstrate that PET model can be applied to different institutional settings such as constitutional monarchies with parliamentary democracies like the UK, Norway, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden. Similarly, Mexico's current multi-party-political system differs from the US, because it uses a hybrid electoral system rather than pure representation. Its bicameral legislature includes multiple parties, with Deputies elected in two ways: direct voting (relative majority) and proportional representation via the parties' electoral lists. This system favours minority parties by limiting majority dominance, requiring coalition-building to pass legislation. Senators are elected through three methods: the candidate with the most votes

(relative majority), the runner-up (first minority), and national parties' lists (proportional representation) (INE, 2021). These distinctive characteristics make the Mexican electoral system and party politics more complex and dynamic than in other countries, influencing party incentives to draw attention to specific policy issues at regional and national level, while also distinguishing themselves from other parties.

These differences in the political system, including the number of political parties or institutional venues, do not necessary mean that the PET framework cannot be universally applied, albeit with some adaptations. Certain PET concepts are sufficiently abstract to remain relevant across different political systems, as demonstrated by many case studies from countries with diverse political structures. Furthermore, this study has focused primary on role of the policy entrepreneur and political parties within the PET model of agenda-setting. The role of media as an industry is beyond the scope of this research and the type of questions asked to interviewees. In the context of this case study, it remains unclear whether mass media plays a critical role in agenda-setting beyond media coverage and the mutual influence relationship between politicians and mass media, highlighted by Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008). This mutual influence was particularly noticeable during the media coverage of AMLO's daily morning conferences, and the media attention given to his soundbites. Therefore, future research could investigate the role of media as a powerful actor driving policy change.

9.5. Implications of findings

In political systems classed as highly democratic, power is deliberately shared between different institutional venues, including the executive, legislative and judiciary. Each branch is empowered to have the capacity to check each other, ensuring all actors keep to the rules. For instance, courts to make sure the state acts within the law, while opposition parties in the Congress have the freedom to propose, approve, scrutinise and challenge government laws and policies. Additionally, citizens are free to protest, mobilise and vote. The initial US-PET model (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 2009) assumes a democratic political system with separate powers with independent institutional venues and responsibilities, designed to prevent the concentration of power and provide for checks and balances. However, the Mexican political system and its democratic elements are continuously evolving (Aguiar et al., 2025; Gomez Diaz de Leon, 2024; Monsiváis-Carrillo, 2024). Mexico transitioned from an autocratic one-party dominant system under the PRI, to a hybrid regime in the 21st century (Democracy Index,

2022). In 2018, with the rise of AMLO to power and the emergence of his newly established political party MORENA, the Mexican political system experienced a fragmentation of power in the Congress, Senate, state and municipal governments, reshaping a multi-party-political system. Meanwhile, in the judiciary, the fact that most Ministers of the Supreme Court had been appointed by PRI-PAN presidents and ratified by previous PRI-PAN majority parliaments contributed to its political autonomy (Aguiar, 2024). This autonomy played a significant role in fostering the expansion of political conflict, which in turn incentivised institutional venues to engage in debates over competing policy images for the direction of the energy sector, attracting macro-level attention from the public, government, media and political parties to the energy policy agenda. However, the upcoming 2024 presidential elections, along with AMLO's proposal to reform the judiciary, could accelerate changes to this autonomy within Mexico's dynamic political system.

In this regard, this thesis supports the idea that political systems with multiple venues and multi-party-political systems are more likely to attract macro-level attention more quickly (Green-Pedersen and Wolfe, 2009). This is evident in the case of the Mexican punctuation period of analysis, where a multi-venue, multi-party-political system helped attract macro-level attention to a focusing event, facilitating competition between contrasting energy policy images. These findings suggest that, as categorised by Clark et al. (2012), the number of parties in a democratic political system plays a crucial role in explaining radical and rapid policy change, particularly in a political system like Mexico's. These findings also suggest that, in contrast to single-venue and one-party dominant political systems, such as Mexico's 71-year period under the PRI, where attention was effectively institutionalised, multiple venues and multi-party systems are less prone to falling into Down's (1972) "issue-attention cycle". This occurs because the presence of partisan competition and political conflict between political parties and institutional venues offer mobilization incentives to draw attention to policy-issues. These incentives include distinguishing themselves from other parties and convincing their electorate to support specific energy policies.

9.6. Recommendations for future research

Future research could explore how new forms of political information diffusion generate macro-level attention to emerging policy-issues, particularly across different political systems such as single-and multiples venues systems; as well as one-party, two-party, and multi-party

systems. Without further research on media usage and its role in the policy change process, the extent of the media's power in setting the political agenda cannot be fully determined. Further studies in political discourse analysis could focus on leveraging new technologies, such as advanced software for a systematic qualitative or quantitative analysis of large textual, visual or audio-visual datasets. Recent empirical work, such as Ahmed et al. (2025), exemplifies this approach by using artificial intelligence to examine energy transition narratives. This thesis uses data from Amlopedia (2024), an AI-powered search engine that aggregates content from AMLO's 1,423 daily morning press conferences held between 2018 and 2024. Amlopedia catalogues every word spoken by the president, helping identify recurring themes, keywords, dominant energy narratives, and rhetoric strategies. Findings (Chapter 7, Section 7.3.5.) reveal that recurring themes and energy-related keywords reflect AMLO's dominant ideas and narrative strategies aimed at attracting macro-level attention, reinforcing support for his energy policy, and driving policy change.

Exploring the political narratives in the context of Mexican oil sector has also revealed its alignment with the global energy paradigm shifts highlighted by Goldthau (2012). This confirms the widespread perception that energy agendas have increasingly followed the return of a more interventionist approach, with energy policy shifting from a liberal to a state-driven model. In this respect, Kuzemko et al. (2016: 90) state that "after decades of the neo-liberal economic paradigm, the pendulum had started to swing back towards a more state-centric approach". The reasons for this shift appear to be driven by both ideological factors and new challenges, such as the effects of climate change, the growing threat to energy security for both energy exporting and importing countries, and the emergence of a new political order (Gerstle, 2022; Silvers, 2023; Klein, 2008). In both the US and Europe, debates surrounding energy security, energy independence, energy sovereignty and strategic autonomy, have re-emerged as major oil producers reclaimed control over their energy sectors. This shift highlights the decline of the liberal energy model and the diminishing influence of a free market without tariffs. The recent election of Donald Trump as US president in 2024, along with his 'drill, baby, drill' energy policy aimed at ramping up fossil fuel extraction, has intensified concerns regarding the potential trajectories of the energy transition in fossil-fuel-rich developing countries, and its broader impact on global energy dynamics (BBC, 2024; BBC, 2025). Consequently, future research on energy transition pathways could focus on the new policy changes and challenges reshaping energy transition narratives across different regions and political systems.

Tables.

Table 1: Punctuated equilibrium in Mexico's oil sector 1982-2024

Timeline	1929 (Chapter 5)	1982	2000 (Chapter 6)	2018 (Chapter 7)	2024
Party system (Chapter 8)	PRI (1929-1982) One-party dominant system	PRI (1982-2000) One-party dominant system	PAN-PRI (2000-2018) Two-party system	MORENA-PVEM-PT-PRI-PAN-PRD-MC (2018- 2024) Multi-party system	
PET periods	**Oil expropriation** Energy self-sufficiency policy	**Mexican oil boom** policy oriented towards oil exports.	**Equilibrium period** 1982-2018 (36 years)	2017 Gasolinazo protests / **Punctuation period:** rapid and radical policy change	
	Last refineries built in 1979		(1982-2006) **Stability**	(2006-2018) **Incremental changes**	**New refinery Olmeca 2022**
			43 years gap	Upgrading 6 refineries / 2021 Deer Park Refinery / 2 new coker units	
Energy paradigm	Statism energy paradigm under the PRI	Liberalism energy paradigm under the PRI	Liberalism energy paradigm under PAN-PRI	Interventionism energy paradigm under MORENA	

204

Table 2: Party systems and energy paradigms in Mexico

	1929	1982	2000	2018	2024
Party system	One-party dominant system	One-party dominant system	Two-party system	Multi-party system	Multi-party system (forming alliances and coalitions)
		Equilibrium		Punctuation	Post-Punctuation
Period	PRI period 1929-1982	PRI period 1982-2000	PAN-PRI period 2000-2018	MORENA-PVEM-PT-PRI-PAN-PRD-MC period 2018 on -	Strategic alliances and coalitions 2024 on-
Congress and Senate	PRI's super-majority	PRI's super-majority to simple majority	Qualified majority PAN-PRI	MORENA's simple majority	Congress and senate, parties' fragmentation
Energy paradigm	**Statism**	**Liberalism**	**Liberalism**	**Interventionism**	**Fragmentation** (Elements of liberalism and interventionism co-existing)
Governance patterns	Vertical integration, state-run monopoly, state as owner	De-integration of energy value chain, free market exchange; state as rule setter and regulator	De-integration of energy value chain; free market exchange; state as rule setter and regulator	Backward integration; energy mercantilism, state as stakeholder of the 'public interest', the state plays a strong directive role opposed to laissez-faire in free market	State-market hybrids; energy governance a la carte
Policy agenda	Public provision (Energy as sovereignty)	Private provision (Energy as a market commodity)	Private provision (Energy as a market commodity)	State interventionist approach (Energy as strategic asset)	'Pigovian' cum Colbertist (interventionist) approach
Policy challenge	Energy supply	Energy supply	Energy security, Climate change, Energy poverty,	Energy security, Climate change, Energy poverty, (Addressing challenges in a state dirigiste manner)	Energy security, Climate change, Energy poverty, Low carbon transition

Notes: Based on Goldthau (2012).

Table 3: Equilibrium Presidents: stability and incremental changes 1982-2018

Equilibrium Period	Presidential term	President	Political party	Energy paradigm	Party system
Policy stability *(Technocratic presidents)*	1982-1988	Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado	PRI	Neoliberalism	**One-party dominant system**
	1988-1994	Carlos Salinas de Gortari	PRI	Neoliberalism	
	1994-2000	Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon	PRI	Neoliberalism	
	2000-2006	Vicente Fox Quesada	PAN	Neoliberalism	**Two-party system**
Incremental changes	2006-2012	Felipe Calderón Hinojosa	PAN	Neoliberalism	
	2012-2018	Enrique Peña Nieto	PRI	Neoliberalism	

Notes: Based on Beezley and Meyer (2010).

Table 4: Timeline - Major events in Mexico's oil sector

Year	Major events
1938	Oil expropriation on March 18, 1938, Mexico nationalized its oil industry (nationalization of all oil reserves, facilities, and foreign oil companies in Mexico), leading to the establishment of the state-owned company, *Petróleos Mexicanos* (PEMEX) by President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940)
1938-1940	Nationalization of refineries and construction: initiated the construction of the first Mexican refineries, including the refineries: Minatitlan refinery (refinery Gral. Lazaro Cardenas) in Veracruz, and Madero refinery (refinery Francisco I. Madero) in Tamaulipas, Mexico.
1938-2013	PEMEX as a state monopoly. PEMEX operated as a state monopoly, with exclusive control over exploration, production, and distribution. Private participation was limited.
1950	Salamanca refinery (Refinery Ing. Antonio M. Amor) was completed.
1976	Tula Refinery (Refinery Miguel Hidalgo) was completed
1979	Cadereyta Refinery (Refinery Cadereyta) and Salina Cruz Refinery (Refinery Antonio Dovalí Jaime) were completed.
1989	PEMEX disintegration – Petrochemicals and natural gas: Partial privatization of the petrochemical and natural gas subsidiaries of PEMEX during President Miguel de la Madrid administration (1982-1988).
1992	PEMEX disintegration – Petrochemicals, gas, and fertilizers: the presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari continued privatizations of the petrochemical and gas subsidiaries of PEMEX, together with the fertilizer subsidiary.
2008	PEMEX - constitutional reform: the reform allowed private companies to enter into service contracts with PEMEX, for exploration and production activities. However, PEMEX maintained ownership over the oil reserves, and therefore, did not allow private companies to own reserves.
2008	President Felipe Calderón promised the construction of a new refinery in Tula, Hidalgo.
2012	President Enrique Peña Nieto promised the construction of a new refinery in Tula, Hidalgo.

2013-2014	The 2013 Energy reform - comprehensive constitutional reform that aimed to liberalize and attract investment in both oil and electricity sectors, including allowing private and foreign companies to enter into profit-sharing contrast and licenses with Mexican government to explore and extract oil and gas reserves.
2013-2018	Opening to private investment, during this period, Mexico conducted multiple bidding rounds, known as Round One, to attract private companies for exploration and production activities. Contracts were awarded, and joint ventures between private companies and PEMEX were established.
2017	'*Gasolinazo*' sparked massive protests.
2018	Present: President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) took office, new administration prioritizes strengthening PEMEX and achieving energy self-sufficiency.
2019	Policy Change: The new government under President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) implemented policy reversals and suspended future oil bidding rounds. The focus shifted towards strengthening PEMEX and prioritizing state-led energy development.
2019	PEMEX begins the modernization of its six refineries: Minatitlan; Madero; Salamanca; Tula; Salina Cruz; and Cadereyta.
2020	Former CEO of PEMEX from 2012 to 2016, Emilio Lozoya Austin is arrested, accused of corruption.
2021	PEMEX acquires the Deer Park refinery in the US.
2022	Inauguration of the new PEMEX refinery, Olmeca refinery in Tabasco, Mexico

Table 5: Types of privatised public firms by presidential term 1988-2018

Period and presidents	Party and public firms privatised under their administrations
(1988-1994) Carlos Salinas de Gortari	
(1994-2000) Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon	
(2000-2006) Vicente Fox Quesada	
(2006-2012) Felipe Calderón Hinojosa	
(2012-2018) Enrique Peña Nieto	

Notes:
- 1988-1994 Carlos Salinas de Gortari: Telmex; Imevisión (Azteca Uno); Bancomer; Serfin; Banamex; Altos Hornos de México; Fertimex; and Dina.
- 1994-2000 Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon: Ferrocarriles Nacionales de México; Aeropuertos y Servicios Auxiliares; and Nafinsa.
- 2000-2006: Vicente Fox Quesada: Mexicana de aviacion; Aseguradora Hidalgo (Ahisa); and Puerto de México.
- 2006-2012 Felipe Calderón Hinojosa: Aeromexico; Luz y Fuerza; and Grupo Azucarero de México.
- 2012-2018 Enrique Peña Nieto: Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX)

Source: Presidency (2023) Morning press conference from the National Palace. May 25, 2023.
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QB101K3jIB0 (accessed 13/06/2023)

Table 6: Presidential election results in Mexico 1934-2012

Election year, winner, and political party	percentage obtained from total voters	Election year, winner, and political party	percentage obtained from total voters
1934 Lazaro Cardenas (PNR)	98.19%	1976 Jose López Portillo (PRI)	93.5%
1940 Manuel Avila Camacho (PRM)	93.9%	1982 Miguel de la Madrid (PRI)	68.43%
1946 Miguel Aleman Valdes (PRI)	77.9%	1988 Carlos Salinas de Gortari (PRI)	50.36%
1952 Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (PRI)	74.32%	1994 Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon (PRI)	48.69%
1958 Adolfo López Mateos (PRI)	89.81%	**2000 Vicente Fox Quesada (PAN)**	**42.52%**
1964 Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (PRI)	87.69%	**2006 Felipe Calderón Hinojosa (PAN)**	**35.91%**
1970 Luis Echeverria Alvarez (PRI)	84.32%	Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI)	38.21%

Source: INE (2018) National Electoral Institute, Mexico. Presidential election results in Mexico. Available at: https://www.ine.mx/voto-y-elecciones/ (accessed 13/04/2021)

Table 7: Constitutional reforms by presidential period 1982-2024

Period	Years	President	Political party	Constitutional Reforms
Equilibrium Period: **Policy stability** *Technocratic presidents*	1982-1988	Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (MMH)	PRI	**66**
	1988-1994	Carlos Salinas de Gortari (CSG)	PRI	**55**
	1994-2000	Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon (EZPL)	PRI	**78**
	2000-2006	Vicente Fox Quesada (VFQ)	PAN	**31**
Incremental changes	**2006-2012**	**Felipe Calderón Hinojosa (FCH)**	**PAN**	**110**
	2012-2018	**Enrique Peña Nieto (EPN)**	**PRI**	**155**
Punctuation period: **Policy change**	**2018-2024**	**Andrés Manuel López Obrador**	**MORENA**	**62 articles reformed as of January 24, 2024**

Source: Congress (2024) "Constitutional Reforms by Presidential Period". Chamber of Deputies. Mexico. Available at: https://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/cpeum_per.htm (accessed 21/11/2024)

Table 8: Explanatory factors in equilibrium period

Political parties	PRI	PRI	PAN	PRI
		EQUILIBRIUM PERIOD Policy stability and incremental changes		
Explanatory factors	1929	1982	2000	2012	2018

Explanatory factors		
Party system and energy paradigm	One-party dominant system: PRI (1929-2000) Energy paradigm under PRI: 1929-1976 - Statism 1982-2000 - Liberalism	Two-party system: PAN-PRI (2000-2018) Energy paradigm under PAN-PRI: 2000-2018 - Liberalism
Policy issue-attention	Strong institutionalisation of attention; monopoly of attention. Policy issue-attention captured by one-party system.	Limited institutionalisation of attention. Narrowly questioned policy image. Issue-attention captured by policy subsystem. But media playing role due to public opinion-media-politicians 'mutual influence'. Bounded rationality e.g., 'drug war'
Policy image(s)	A widely accepted/controlled dominant policy image, PRI's policy monopoly: -1938-1976: energy self-sufficiency -1982-2000: oil export-oriented policy	A market-oriented policy in energy sector as the dominant policy image implemented by PAN-PRI: continuously from 2000, incrementally from 2006-2018.
Policy subsystem	Small, consensual particularly towards ideologically like-minded, and homogeneous	Small, consensual particularly towards ideologically like-minded, and homogeneous
Venue(s)	Single-venue system; the institutional venue, no alternative policy venues	Single-venue system; the institutional venue, (Congress) limited alternative policy venues, mainly external such as social movements led by AMLO.
External Pressure /Shock (Focusing events)	Political system easily contained 'negative feedback' from any focusing event, policy-issue entrepreneurs not available	Political system able to reduce contradictory signals to existing policy image from focusing event, policy-issue entrepreneurs, and policy windows narrowly available
Party competition	No party competition, one party dominates the political system.	No party competition rather 'selective emphasis', e.g., 'the Pact for Mexico' - 2013 energy reform. Consociational partitocracy
Political conflict	No conflict, one party dominates the political system.	Conflict lines very stable due to 'selective emphasis' rather than direct confrontation, and concessions between the two main parties

Table 9: AMLO's one hundred commitments as president

Among the 100 commitments that AMLO made as president of Mexico before the Congress on December 1, 2018, six stand out for the direct connection to PEMEX

Increase public investment to urgently produce more oil, gas, and energy	Commitment 70
Rehabilitate the six existing refineries and immediately begin the construction of a refinery in Dos Bocas, Paraiso, Tabasco, to significantly increase gasoline production.	Commitment 71
Consider fuel theft '*huachicol*' a serious crime and without the right to bail	Commitment 57
Do not use raw material extraction methods that affect nature and deplete water sources. (fracking)	Commitment 76
Increase the availability of raw materials and begin the operation of the fertilizer plant in Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz	Commitment 20
Create an economic and commercial corridor in the isthmus of Tehuantepec to connect Asia and the east coast of the United States.	Commitment 69

Source:
PEMEX (2019) PEMEX Business plan 2019-2023. Available at:
https://www.pemex.com/acerca/plan-de-negocios/Documents/pn_2019-2023_total.pdf (accessed 20/11/2021)
Presidency (2020) AMLO's one hundred commitments as president. Available at:
https://www.gob.mx/presidencia/documentos/100-compromisos-del-presidente-Andrés-manuel-López-obrador-al-1-de-septiembre-de-2020 (accessed 20/11/2021)

Table 10: Keywords in AMLO's morning conference as of February 02, 2024

Keywords in AMLO's morning conferences	# of times mentioned	# of conferences
Neoliberal (*neoliberal*)	3493	974
Neoliberalism (*neoliberalismo*)	421	304
Sovereignty (*soberanía*)	838	436
Energy (*energia*)	3181	710
Energy (*energética*) Including keywords such as energy reform; energy sovereignty; energy self-sufficiency, Energy independence.	992	427
Gasoline (*gasolina*)	3591	732
Gasolinazo	201	166
Refinery (*refinería*)	2259	518
PEMEX	5479	855
Dos Bocas	645	307
Deer Park	142	51
Coker unit (*coquizadora*)	196	103

Source: Amlopedia (2024). Available at: https://amlopedia.org/comofuncionaamlopedia (accessed 11/12/2024)

Table 11: Punctuation explanatory factors 2018-2024

Political parties	PRI		PAN	PRI	MORENA
			EQUILIBRIUM: **Policy stability** **and incremental changes**		**PUNCTUATION:** **Rapid and radical change**
Explanatory factors	**1929** **1976** **1982**		**2000** **2006** **2012**		**2018** **2024**
Party system and energy paradigm	**One-party dominant system: PRI (1929-2000)** Energy paradigm under PRI: 1929-197 - Statism 1982-2000 - Liberalism		**Two-party system: PAN-PRI (2000-2018)** Energy paradigm under PAN-PRI: 2000-2018 - Liberalism		**Multi-party system: MORENA-PVEM-PT-PRI-PAN-PRD-MC (2018-2024)** Energy paradigm under MORENA: 2018-2024 Interventionism
Policy issue-attention	Strong institutionalisation of attention; monopoly of attention. Policy issue-attention captured by one-party system		Institutionalisation of attention. Narrowly questioned policy image. Bounded rationality e.g., 'drug war'		Macro-level attention, involving government, media, parties, and public; with political parties calling attention to their referred policy-issues, e.g., '2017 'gasolinazo' protests. Media playing role due to public opinion-media-politicians 'mutual influence'.
Venue(s)	Single-venue system; the institutional venue, no alternative policy venues		Single-venue system; the institutional venue, limited alternative policy venues.		Multiple-venue system; interaction between venues and alternative policy venues (executive, congress, senate, courts; local congress, regional, state, and municipal governments) many of which governed by opposition parties.
Party competition	No party competition, one party dominates the political system.		No party competition, due to selective emphasis rather than direct confrontation, e.g., 'the Pact for Mexico' and 2013 energy reform.		Party competition, selective emphasis, and direct confrontation co-existing. Aligned in many opposing blocks with respect to the energy sector.
Political conflict	No conflict, one party dominates the political system.		Conflict lines very stable due to 'selective emphasis' rather than direct confrontation, and concessions between the two main parties.		Conflict due to parties' incentives to distinguish themselves from other parties. Party politics strategies such as 'issue ownership' and 'dominance and dispersion principles'.

Table 12: Ministers of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (2018-2024)

	Minister's Name	Nominated by	Start (current duration)
1	Luis María Aguilar Morales	Felipe Calderón Hinojosa	December 1, 2009 (14 years, 5 months and 30 days)
2	Jorge Mario Pardo Rebolledo	Felipe Calderón Hinojosa	February 10, 2011 (13 years, 3 months and 21 days)
3	Alfredo Gutiérrez Ortiz Mena	Felipe Calderón Hinojosa	December 1, 2012 (11 years, 5 months and 30 days)
4	Alberto Pérez Dayán	Felipe Calderón Hinojosa	December 1, 2012 (11 years, 5 months and 30 days)
5	Javier Laynez Potisek	Enrique Peña Nieto	December 10, 2015 (8 years, 5 months and 21 days)
6	Norma Lucía Piña Hernández	Enrique Peña Nieto	December 10, 2015 (8 years, 5 months and 21 days)
7	**Predecessor:** José Ramón Cossío Díaz Juan Luis González Alcántara Carrancá	Vicente Fox Quesada Andrés Manuel López Obrador	1 Decembre de 2003-30 Novembre de 2018 December 20, 2018 (5 years, 5 months and 14 days)
8	**Predecessor:** Margarita Beatriz Luna Ramos Yasmín Esquivel Mossa	Vicente Fox Quesada Andrés Manuel López Obrador	19 February de 2004-18 February de 2019 20 Decembre de 2018 (5 years, 5 months, and 14 days)
9	**Predecessor:** Eduardo Medina-Mora Ana Margarita Ríos Farjat	Enrique Peña Nieto Andrés Manuel López Obrador	10 March 2015-8 October 2019 5 Decembre de 2019 (4 years, 5 months and 29 days)
10	**Predecessor:** José Fernando Franco González Salas Loretta Ortiz Ahlf	Vicente Fox Quesada Andrés Manuel López Obrador	12 Decembre de 2006-11 Decembre 2021 12 Decembre 2021 (2 years, 5 months and 22 days)
11	**Predecessor:** Arturo Zaldívar Lelo de Larrea Lenia Batres Guadarrama	Felipe Calderón Hinojosa Andrés Manuel López Obrador	1 Decembre 2009-15 Novembre 2023 14 Decembre 2023 (5 months and 20 days)

Source: SCJN. Available at: https://www.scjn.gob.mx/ (accessed 11/03/2024)

Table 13: Three stages of the policy progress of the 2013 energy reform

Stages	Description
2012 **Political stage**	Political party negotiations, 'Pact for Mexico' (PAN-PRI-PRD), and the executive proposed initiative of energy reform.
2013-2014 **Legislative stage**	PAN; PRI; PRD initiatives and legislative debates, congress vote; political parties' positions on 2013 energy reform.
2017-2018 **Fiscal-implementation stage**	The implementation of the energy reform as the 2016 federal income law. Congress approval of the new IEPS on gasoline. Vote in the chamber of deputies on the Federal Income Law for Fiscal Year 2017

Table 14: Distribution of votes by political party on FOBAPROA.

Votes	Total	PRI	PRD	PAN	PT	PVEM	Indep
In favour	326	226	0	99	0	0	1
Against	158	7	124	11	6	5	5
Abstention	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Quórum *	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Absent	14	5	1	7	1	0	0
Total	500	238	125	119	7	5	6

Notes:
According to the official history of the Chamber of Deputies, on December 12, 1998, the reforms to the laws of the Bank of Mexico, Credit Institutions, the Stock Market and to regulate Financial Groups (Fobaproa) were approved with 326 votes in favor (226 PRI; 99 PAN) of a total of 500.
-Decree by which the Bank Savings Protection Law is issued, and various provisions of the Laws of the Bank of Mexico, of Credit Institutions, of the Stock Market and to regulate Financial Groups (FOBAPROA) are amended, added and repealed. General and particular.

Source: Congress (1998) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, distribution of votes by political party in congress to approve FOBAPROA. Available at:
http://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Votaciones/57/tabla2or1-18.php3

Table 15: Parties vote on the reform of the Energy Regulatory Commission Law

Votes	Total	PAN	PRD	PRI	PVEM	COV	PT	PNA	PASC
In favour	416	205	72	101	17	12	0	6	3
Against	63	0	50	0	0	2	9	0	2
Abstention	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
Absent	18	2	5	4	0	3	1	3	0
Total	**499**	**207**	**127**	**106**	**17**	**17**	**11**	**9**	**5**

Notes:
-October 28, 2008. Parliamentary Gazette, LX Legislature, Chamber of Deputies, Mexico City.
-From the Energy Commission, with a draft decree by which various articles of the Energy Regulatory Commission Law are reformed, added and repealed (in general and in particular).

Source: Congress (2008a) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, LX Legislature, Parties vote in reform of the Energy Regulatory Commission Law. Available at: https://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Votaciones/60/tabla3or1-42.php3

Table 16: Parties vote on the reform of the Law for the Sustainable Use of Energy

Votes	Total	PAN	PRD	PRI	PVEM	COV	PT	PNA	PASC
In favour	412	205	68	100	17	12	0	7	3
Against	62	0	49	0	0	1	10	0	2
Abstention	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Absent	24	2	9	6	0	4	1	2	0
Total	**499**	**207**	**127**	**106**	**17**	**17**	**11**	**9**	**5**

Notes:
-October 28, 2008, Parliamentary Gazette, LX Legislature, Chamber of Deputies, Mexico City
-From the Energy Commission, with a draft decree issuing the Law for the Sustainable Use of Energy.

Source: Congress (2008b) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, LX Legislature, Parties vote in reform of the Law for the Sustainable Use of Energy. Available at: https://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Votaciones/60/tabla3or1-43.php3

Table 17: Parties vote on the reform of the National Hydrocarbons Commission

Votes	Total	PAN	PRD	PRI	PVEM	COV	PT	PNA	PASC
In favour	411	205	69	99	17	11	0	7	3
Against	61	0	49	0	0	1	9	0	2
Abstention	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quorum *	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Absent	26	2	9	7	0	5	1	2	0
Total	**499**	**207**	**127**	**106**	**17**	**17**	**11**	**9**	**5**

Notes:
-October 28, 2008, Parliamentary Gazette, LX Legislature, Chamber of Deputies, Mexico City
-From the Energy Commission, with a draft decree issuing the Law of the National Hydrocarbons Commission. * Quorum, means that the attendance roll was taken and did not vote

Source: Congress (2008c) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, LX Legislature Parties vote in reform of the Law of the National Hydrocarbons Commission. Available at:https://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Votaciones/60/tabla3or1-44.php3

Table 18: Parties vote on the reform of Law for the Use of Renewable Energies and Financing of the Energy Transition.

Votes	Total	PAN	PRD	PRI	PVEM	COV	PT	PNA	PASC
In favour	407	206	65	99	17	11	0	6	3
Against	68	0	55	0	0	1	10	0	2
Abstention	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quorum *	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Absent	24	1	7	7	0	5	1	3	0
Total	**499**	**207**	**127**	**106**	**17**	**17**	**11**	**9**	**5**

Notes:
-October 28, 2008, Parliamentary Gazette, LX Legislature, Chamber of Deputies, Mexico City
-From the Energy Commission, with a draft decree creating the Law for the Use of Renewable Energies and the Financing of the Energy Transition. * Quorum, means that the attendance roll was taken and did not vote

Source: Congress (2008d) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, LX Legislature. Parties vote in reform of Law for the Use of Renewable Energies and Financing of the Energy Transition. Available at: https://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Votaciones/60/tabla3or1-46.php3

Table 19: Parties vote on the reform of article 33 of the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration.

Votes	Total	PAN	PRD	PRI	PVEM	COV	PT	PNA	PASC
In favour	401	203	68	94	17	11	0	5	3
Against	64	0	50	1	0	2	10	0	2
Abstention	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quorum *	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
Absent	31	4	8	9	0	4	1	4	0
Total	**499**	**207**	**127**	**106**	**17**	**17**	**11**	**9**	**5**

Notes:
-October 28, 2008, Parliamentary Gazette, LX Legislature, Chamber of Deputies, Mexico City
- From the Energy Commission, with a draft decree that reforms and adds article 33 of the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration.

Source: Congress (2008e) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, LX Legislature. Parties vote in the reform of article 33 of the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration. Available at: https://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Votaciones/60/tabla3or1-48.php3

Table 20: Parties vote on the reform of the Regulatory Law of Constitutional Article 27.

Votes	Total	PAN	PRD	PRI	PVEM	COV	PT	PNA	PASC
In favour	391	201	63	101	17	0	0	5	3
Against	69	0	44	0	0	13	10	0	2
Abstention	2	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Quorum *	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Absent	36	6	18	5	0	3	1	4	0
Total	**499**	**207**	**127**	**106**	**17**	**17**	**11**	**9**	**5**

Notes:
-October 28, 2008, Parliamentary Gazette, LX Legislature, Chamber of Deputies, Mexico City
- From the Energy Commission, with a draft decree that reforms and adds various provisions of the Regulatory Law of Constitutional Article 27 in the Petroleum Branch.

Source: Congress (2008f) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, LX Legislature. Parties vote in the reform of the Regulatory Law of Constitutional Article 27. Available at: https://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Votaciones/60/tabla3or1-50.php3

Table 21: Parties vote on the reform of the Mexican Petroleum Law

Votes	Total	PAN	PRD	PRI	PVEM	COV	PT	PNA	PASC
In favour	395	203	67	99	17	0	0	6	3
Against	82	0	54	1	0	14	11	0	2
Abstention	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quorum *	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Absent	22	4	6	6	0	3	0	3	0
Total	**499**	**207**	**127**	**106**	**17**	**17**	**11**	**9**	**5**

Notes:
-October 28, 2008, Parliamentary Gazette, LX Legislature, Chamber of Deputies, Mexico City
- From the Energy Commission, with a draft decree issuing the Mexican Petroleum Law.

Source: Congress (2008g) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, LX Legislature, Parties vote in the reform of the Mexican Petroleum Law. Available at: https://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Votaciones/60/tabla3or1-52.php3

Table 22: Parties vote on Peña Nieto's 2013 energy reform.

Votes	Total	PRI	PAN	PRD	PVEM	PT	PNA	MC
In favour	354	209	107	0	28	0	10	0
Against	131	1	3	95	0	13	0	19
Abstention	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quorum*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Absent	15	3	4	6	0	1	0	1
Total	500	213	114	101	28	14	10	20

Notes:
-December 11, 2013, Parliamentary Gazette, LXII Legislature, Chamber of Deputies, Mexico City.
-Minutes of the Chamber of Senators, with a draft decree, by which various provisions of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States are reformed and added
* Quorum, means that the attendance roll was taken and did not vote

Source: Congress (2013c) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, LX Legislature. Parties vote in congress on Peña Nieto's 2013 energy reform. Available at: https://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Votaciones/62/tabla2or1-136.php3

Table 23: Parties vote on the Federal Income Law for Fiscal Year 2017

Votes	Total	PRI	PAN	PRD	PVEM	MORENA	MC	PNA	PES	IND
In favour	406	193	102	42	29	0	20	10	9	1
Against	43	0	0	8	0	35	0	0	0	0
Abstention	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quorum*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Absent	51	15	7	10	13	1	4	1	0	0
Total	500	208	109	60	42	36	24	11	9	1

Notes:
-October 20, 2016, Parliamentary Gazette, LXIII Legislature, Chamber of Deputies, Mexico City.
-From the Finance and Public Credit Commission, with the draft Federal Income Law for the 2017 Fiscal Yea
* Quorum, means that the attendance roll was taken and did not vote

Source: Congress (2016b) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, LX Legislature. Parties vote in the chamber of deputies on the Federal Income Law for Fiscal Year 2017. Available at:
https://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Votaciones/63/tabla2or1-29.php3

Table 24: Parties' initiatives of energy reform: comparison of diagnoses and problems of oil sector

Theme	PAN	PRI	PRD
Oil industry			
High dependence of public finances on oil revenues.	√	√	√
Aggressive fiscal regime and strict control of the expenditure budget that prevent Pemex from allocating sufficient resources to maintain and expand infrastructure.	√	√	√
Decrease in the level of production of hydrocarbons, petroleum, and petrochemicals due to lack of sufficient resources for investment. The scarce resources are only allocated to the most profitable (crude oil extraction) to the detriment of the rest of the productive activities.	√	√	√
Loss of competitiveness of the country because many industrial companies are returning to the United States due to the lowering of natural gas prices that has caused the shale extraction "boom."	√	√	
The decline of Cantarell forces us to search for oil in deep and shallow waters, on the continent and in unconventional deposits.	√	√	√
Mexico is not taking advantage of its shale hydrocarbon deposits. Its exploitation is complex and is not as profitable as conventional fields.	√	√	
Pemex does not have the explicit mandate to guarantee energy security. Its de facto mandate is to provide income to the treasury.	√	√	√
The creation of organizations within Pemex made it give importance to the extraction of crude oil and has increased its costs and administrative expenses.		√	√
Fuel subsidies do not go to those who need them most.			√
PEMEX and CFE			
Neither CFE nor Pemex operate as "real" companies	√	√	√
CFE and Pemex do not have financial, budgetary, or management autonomy. They must ask permission for almost "everything."	√	√	√
Labour liabilities are drowning CFE and Pemex.	√	√	

Source: Senate (2013) Senate of the Republic, Energy reform, Dictamen of the United Commissions on Constitutional Points; of Energy; as well as Legislative Studies, First, of the Chamber of Senators of the LXII Legislature of the Congress of the Union. Available at: https://www.senado.gob.mx/comisiones/puntos_constitucionales/docs/DICTAMEN_REFORMA_ENERGETICA.pdf

Table 25: Parties similarities and differences between their initiatives of energy reform

Theme	PAN	PRI	PRD
Oil industry			
Maintain ownership and control of resources in the Nation.	√	√	√
Create a fund that receives and manages oil income	√		√
The signing of contracts for exploration and exploitation linked to results is allowed		√	
The granting of concessions for exploration and exploitation is allowed.	√		
The current prohibition to grant contracts and concessions is maintained (only current service and public works contracts can be used).			√
Keep constitutional articles 27 and 28 unchanged.			√
Reserve replacement rate at 100% and an average life of these of at least 10 years.			√
Make subsidies transparent.			√
That the social and private sector can invest in refining; gas processing; basic petrochemicals, and transportation, storage and distribution of hydrocarbons and petroleum products. Pemex will coexist with them.	√	√	
Tax regime of rights depending on each field. The new regime should allow Pemex to have an additional 150,000 million pesos annually after a transition period.			√
Tax regime in line with Pemex's investment needs.		√	
Pemex has the right to choose the fields ("round zero").	√	√	
PEMEX and CFE			
Transform the CRE and the CNH into decentralized organizations, whose members must be approved by the Senate.			√
Give constitutional autonomy to the CRE and the CNH.	√		
Give greater autonomy to Pemex and CFE with respect to SHCP authorizations.	√	√	
Exclude Pemex and CFE from the controls and authorizations of the SHCP.			√
Disappear the subsidiary organizations of Pemex.		√	√
New composition of the Board of Directors of Pemex and CFE with nine members: the Secretary of Energy as representative of the State and President of the			√

Council; seven Professional Advisors appointed by the President and ratified by the Senate of the Republic, and the General Director of the CFE; everyone with the right to speak and vote. The opinions of the other Secretaries of State are ignored. Representatives of the Union will not be part of the Council.			
Appointment shared with the Senate of the General Directors of Pemex and CFE.			√
Link the sector's research institutes so that they have a single common agenda: IIE, ININ and IMP.			√

Source: Senate (2013) Senate of the Republic, Energy reform, Dictamen of the United Commissions on Constitutional Points; of Energy; as well as Legislative Studies, First, of the Chamber of Senators of the LXII Legislature of the Congress of the Union. Available at: https://www.senado.gob.mx/comisiones/puntos_constitucionales/docs/DICTAMEN_REFORMA_ENERGETICA.pdf

Table 26: Political parties' fragmentation at municipal level.

The fragmentation of the political forces in the 1,795 municipalities

Party	Number of municipalities
PRI	422
MORENA	415
PAN	292
PVEM	139
MC	128
PRD	103
PT	95
Local parties	64
PANAL	43
PES	38
Fuerza Mexico	21
RSP	12
IND.	23

Source: Pollsmx (2024) Political parties in municipalities as of 2024. Available at: https://polls.mx/quien-gobierna-los-municipios-en-juego/ (accessed 11/12/2024)

Table 27: Main national political parties in Mexico as of 2018

Main national political parties as of 2018	
	National Action Party (PAN)
	Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
	Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD)
	Labour Party (PT)
	Ecologist Green Party of Mexico (PVEM)
	Movimiento Ciudadano (MC)
	New Alliance Party (PANAL)
	National Regeneration Movement (MORENA)
	Social Encounter Party (PES)

Source: INE (2022) Instituto Nacional Electoral. Main national political parties in Mexico as of 2018. Available at: https://www.ine.mx/ (accessed 06/02/2023)

Table 28: Chamber of Deputies and Senate by political parties, two-party to multi-party

Source: Bank of Mexico (2024) Available at: https://www.banxico.org.mx/apps/gc/precios-spot-del-petroleo-gra.html; INE (2024a) National Electoral Institute. Chamber of Deputies and Senate by political parties. Available at: https://www.ine.mx/ (accessed 11/12/2024)

Table 29: Chamber of Deputies, Senate, and major states by political parties

Chamber of Deputies by parties (three-year term; 500 seats)

2000–2003 LVIII Legislature

Party	#	%
PAN	206	41%
PRI	211	42%
PRD	50	10%
PVEM	17	3%
MC	3	1%
PT	8	2%
PAS	3	1%
PNS	2	-1%

2003–2006 LIX Legislature

Party	#	%
PAN	147	30%
PRI	223	45%
PRD	95	19%
PVEM	17	3%
MC	5	1%
PT	6	1%

2006–2009 LX Legislature

Party	#	%
PAN	206	41%
PRI	106	21%
PRD	127	25%
PVEM	17	3%
MC	16	3%
PT	15	3%
PNA	9	2%
PSD	4	1%

2009–2012 LXI Legislature

Party	#	%
PAN	142	28%
PRI	242	48%
PRD	63	13%
PVEM	22	4%
MC	6	1%
PT	14	3%
PNA	8	2%
Ind	3	1%

2012–2015 LXII Legislature

Party	#	%
PAN	114	23%
PRI	212	42%
PRD	104	21%
PVEM	29	6%
MC	16	3%
PT	15	3%
PNA	10	2%

2015–2018 LXIII Legislature

Party	#	%
MORENA	50	10%
PAN	107	21%
PRI	202	40%
PRD	51	10%
PVEM	38	8%
MC	21	4%
Ind	7	1%
NA	13	2%
PES	11	2%

2018–2021 LXIV Legislature

Party	#	%
MORENA	252	50%
PAN	79	16%
PRI	49	10%
PRD	12	2%
PVEM	11	2%
MC	24	5%
PT	44	9%
Ind	6	1%
PES	23	5%

2021–2024 LXV Legislature

Party	#	%
MORENA	201	40%
PAN	114	23%
PRI	69	14%
MC	27	5%
PVEM	41	8%
PT	33	7%
PRD	15	3%

Senate by parties (six-year term; 128 seats)

Party	#	%
PAN	51	40%
PRI	60	47%
PRD	17	13%

Party	#	%
PAN	52	41%
PRI	33	26%
PRD	26	20%
PVEM	6	5%
MC	6	5%
PT	4	3%
NA	1	1%

Party	#	%
PAN	38	30%
PRI	52	41%
PRD	22	17%
PVEM	9	7%
MC	2	2%
PT	4	3%
NA	1	1%

Party	#	%
MORENA	60	47%
PAN	20	16%
PRI	13	10%
PRD	3	2%
PVEM	6	5%
MC	12	9%
PT	6	5%
Ind	4	3%
PES	4	3%

Major states by political parties

Ciudad de Mexico: PRD	Ciudad de Mexico: PRD	Ciudad de Mexico: PRD	Ciudad de Mexico: MORENA
Nuevo Leon: PAN (1997–2003) PRI (2003–2009)	Nuevo Leon: PRI (2009–2015)	Nuevo Leon: Ind (2015–2021)	Nuevo Leon: MC (2021–)
Jalisco: PAN	Jalisco: PAN	Jalisco: PRI	Jalisco: MC
Estado de Mexico: PRI	Estado de Mexico: PRI	Estado de Mexico: PRI	Estado de Mexico: PRI
Veracruz: PRI	Veracruz: PRI	Veracruz: PAN (2016–2018)	Veracruz: MORENA
Tabasco: PRI	Tabasco: PRI	Tabasco: PRI	Tabasco: MORENA

Source: INE (2024b) National Electoral Institute. Chamber of Deputies, Senate, and major states by political parties. Available at: https://www.ine.mx/ (accessed 11/12/2024)

Table 30: Parties vote on the Federation Expenditure budget 2019-2024

PEF/Year	JHH electoral alliance (mainly MORENA, PT, PVEM)	Opposition parties (mainly PRI-PAN-PRD)
PEF 2019	312 votes in favour	154 against
PEF 2020	321 votes in favour	78 against
PEF 2021	305 votes in favour	151 against
PEF 2022	274 votes in favour	219 against
PEF 2023	273 votes in favour	222 against
PEF 2024	263 votes in favour	216 against

Notes:

In Mexico, the Chamber of Deputies is exclusively responsible for the annual discussion and approval of the Expenditure Budget. A simple majority (50% + 1) is required for the approval of the Federation Expenditure Budget.

PEF: Federation Expenditure Budget (*Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación)*

JHH: Together We Make History (*Juntos Hacemos Historia*) was a Mexican electoral alliance formed by the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA), the Labor Party (PT), and the Ecologist Green Party of Mexico (PVEM)

**Source:** PEF-Congress (2024) Chamber of deputies, Mexico, Parties vote in the Federation Expenditure budget Available at: http://www5.diputados.gob.mx/index.php/camara/Comunicacion/Boletines/2018/Diciembre/23/0808-Aprueba-la-Camara-de-Diputados-el-Presupuesto-de-Egresos-de-la-Federacion-2019 (accessed 11/12/2024)

Figures.

**Figure 1: Motor vehicles registered in Mexico 1980-2021**

National total of vehicles
Registered motor vehicles in circulation
55,167,421

Notes: Unofficial vehicles imported from the US known as '*Chocolatos* cars', should be considered in Mexico's official vehicles circulation figures. According to Manuel Nieblas, Lead Partner of the Manufacturing Industry at Deloitte Mexico, these vehicles are estimated to number around 18 million (Excelsior, 2019). Regarding electric and hybrid vehicles, less than one percent of the vehicle fleet is hybrid, even though sales of hybrid and electric vehicles have increased in Mexico, they still represent an extremely small fraction compared to the total sales of conventional combustion vehicles. According to INEGI (2023), from 2016 to 2020 a total of 69,869 hybrid and electric vehicles were sold, of which only 1,116 were electric, and the rest were hybrid vehicles.

Source: INEGI (2023) "Motor vehicles registered in Mexico 1980-2022", The National Institute of Statistics and Geography, INEGI. Mexico. Available at: https://www.inegi.org.mx/temas/vehiculos/ (accessed 12/11/2024)

Figure 2: Mexican crude oil price 2000-2018

USD per barrel
Source: Bank of Mexico (2023), "Mexican crude oil price 2000-2018". Available at:
https://www.banxico.org.mx/apps/gc/precios-spot-del-petroleo-gra.html (accessed 12/11/2024)

Figure 3: Major Mexico's oil fields (Cantarell)

Source: *Southwest Economy*, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Second Quarter 2014

Source: https://comptroller.texas.gov/economy/fiscal-notes/2015/june/energy.php
(accessed 12/11/2024)

Figure 4: Official advertising expenditure 2007-2018

Figures in millions MXN
Source: Presidency (2019) "Conference on social communication policy". Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKU7D6J-R5E&t=1772s (accessed 12/11/2024)

Figure 5: Mexican oil mix price 2000-2020

USD per barrel
Source: Bank of Mexico (2024) "Mexican oil mix price". Available at:
https://www.banxico.org.mx/apps/gc/precios-spot-del-petroleo-gra.html
(accessed 12/11/2024)

**Figure 6: Mexico production and consumption of gross energy 1965-2017**

Source: SENER, n.d.; BP 2018.

In Morales (2020)

Figure 7: PEMEX hydrocarbon production 2004-2018

Thousands of barrels per day

Source: Presidency (2023) PEMEX exploration and production, Morning press conference. August 21, 2023. Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=agX8SSRWNF8&ab_channel=Andr%C3%A9sManuelL%C3%B3pezObrador (accessed 12/11/2023)

233

Figure 8: Mexico: Major trends in the crude oil industry 1980-2017
Thousand Barrels per Day

In Morales (2020)

Figure 9: Public sector oil revenues 1990-2018

The contribution of oil revenues to total government budget revenues maintains a high correlation with the price of the Mexican Export Crude Oil Mix.

Notes: The total public oil revenues: Salinas (2,522 MXN billion); Zedillo (3,604); Fox (5,947); and Calderón (9,771) and Peña Nieto (7,046)

Figure 10: 'Mexico: Final consumption of oil products 1991-2017'

In Morales (2020)

Figure 11: 'Mexico: Trade balance of main petroleum products 1990-2017'

In Morales (2020)

Figure 12: 'Evolution of real price of magna and premium gasoline and diesel, 2006-2023'

Gasoline Magna

Gasoline Premium

Diesel

Figures in MXN

Source: Presidency (2023) Conference: "Evolution of real price of magna and premium gasoline and diesel, 2006-2023'. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2cvbCfUi3fs (accessed 12/11/2024)

Figure 13: From Calderón's fuel subsidies to Peña-Nieto's IEPS collection, 2006-2016

Figures in Millions MXN

Source: Moreno (2017)

Figure 14: 'The Special Tax on Production and Services (IEPS), 2000-2018'

Figures in Millions MXN

Source: Luna and Jasso (2021)

Figure 15: 'PEMEX Historical production active Cantarell (2000-2022)'

Notes: Figures in Thousands of barrels per day
Source: Presidency (2023), Morning press conferences. January 23, 2023. Available at:
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dz3kGAiqHxo (accessed 12/11/2024)

Figure 16: Price of the Mexican oil mix in 2015 and 2016

Source: Bank of Mexico (2022). Available at:
https://www.banxico.org.mx/apps/gc/precios-spot-del-petroleo-gra.html
(accessed 12/11/2024)

Figure 17: PEMEX budget 2006-2021

In MXN Millions

Source: CEFP (2022) "PEMEX budget 2006-2021", Centre for Finance Studies of the Chamber of Deputies. Available at: https://www.cefp.gob.mx/cefpnew/index.php

Figure 18: Incorporation of new oil fields 2007-2023

Source: Presidency (2023) Mexico advances towards energy self-sufficiency. Morning press conference. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cqjp1LnPCfs (accessed 12/11/2024)

Figure 19: Exploration investment by type of field

(MXN Billion (Constant 2019)

Legend:
- Others (Non-Associated Gas; Non-Conventional; Pre-Investment and Auxiliary)
- Onshore
- Deep Water
- Shallow Water

Data labels by year: 9 (2000), 8 (2001), 15 (2002), 31 (2003), 38 (2004), 25 (2005), 21 (2006), 22 (2007), 37 (2008), 45 (2009), 39 (2010), 43 (2011), 44 (2012), 41 (2013), 43 (2014), 42 (2015), 43 (2016), 37 (2017), 38 (2018), 48 (2019)

MXN Billion	Accumulated Amount 2000 – 2019	Investment Distribution		
		2000-2010	2011-2019	2000-2019
Deep waters	213	14%	45%	32%
Shallow waters	258	45%	33%	39%
Non-Associated Gas	53	11%	6%	8%
Non-Conventional	6	0%	2%	1%
Onshore	131	28%	13%	20%
Pre-Investment and auxiliary activities	8	2%	1%	1%
Total	**669**	100%	100%	100%

Source: PEMEX (2019) PEMEX Business plan 2019-2023.Available at:
https://www.pemex.com/acerca/plan-de-negocios/Documents/PEMEX_BUSINESS_PLAN_2019_2023.pdf

Figure 20: EPN approval rating compared to other Mexican presidents.

50 meses en el cargo

AMLO **66**% [62-69%]
EZPL **61**% [54-68%]
VFQ **56**% [52-60%]
FCH **55**% [52-59%]
EPN **18**% [15-22%]

AÑOS

Source: Oraculus (2023) Available at:
https://oraculus.mx/aprobacion-presidencial/

240

Figure 21: Illegal pipeline tapping in Mexico 2000-2018

Source: Morales (2020)

Figure 22: Model of mutual influence (external pressure vs internal response)

Mutual influence of actors exercising power to draw attention to the policy-issue.

Agenda setting roles and competition among issue proponents to gain the attention of media, public and policy elites, also involves a battle between external pressure (issue-expansion) and internal response (contain expansion).

Notes: Based on Baumgartner and Jones (1993; 2009); Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008); Fernandez-i-Marin et al. (2019); Birkland (1998), and Downs' (1972)

Figure 23: Geographic reference of the national refinery system

Source: PEMEX (2021), PEMEX Business plan 2021-2025. Available at:
https://www.pemex.com/acerca/plan-de-negocios/Documents/pn_2021-2025-completo.pdf

Figure 24: Gasoline and diesel imports and national consumption levels 2011-2021

Source: Government of Mexico (2021), "Live press conference, from the National Palace", Published
May 26, 2021, Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gp4Yon6j5b0

Figure 25: Evolution and projection of the fuel deficit (gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel)

Source:
PEMEX (2023) Presidency of the Republic. Morning press conference from the National Palace. July 5, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KtcZRPAJlh0

Figure 26: PEMEX's main value chain products and services as of 2019

Source: PEMEX (2019) Business plan 2019-2023. Available at:
https://www.pemex.com/acerca/plan-de-negocios/Documents/PEMEX_BUSINESS_PLAN_2019_2023.pdf

Figure 27: PEMEX's value chain and products and services as of 2023

Source: PEMEX Business plan 2023-2027. Available at: https://www.pemex.com/acerca/plan-de-negocios/Documents/business_plan_2023-2027.pdf

Figure 28: PEMEX Industrial Transformation Infrastructure

Source: PEMEX (2019) Business plan 2019-2023. Available at:
https://www.pemex.com/acerca/plan-de-negocios/Documents/PEMEX_BUSINESS_PLAN_2019_2023.pdf

Figure 29: PEMEX total crude oil production in 2022

PEMEX 97% vs private companies 3%

Source: Presidency (2023); PEMEX (2023) President AMLO's Morning press conference from the National Palace. Monday January 23, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dz3kGAiqHxo&ab_channel=Andr%C3%A9sManuelL%C3%B3 pezObrador

Figure 30: Production of liquid hydrocarbons with private companies 2016-2023

Thousands of barrels per day-annual average

Source: Presidency (2024); PEMEX (2024) "4T rescued Pemex and strengthened Mexico's energy self-sufficiency". President AMLO's morning press conference from the National Palace. Thursday January 4, 2024. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CPW31LEcvKs&ab_channel=Andr%C3%A9sManuelL%C3%B 3pezObrador

Figure 31: Production of liquid hydrocarbons 2018-2024
Thousands of barrels per day

Source: Presidency (2024); PEMEX (2023) "Mexico advances towards energy self-sufficiency; in 2024 it will be consolidated". President AMLO's morning press conference from the National Palace. Thursday March 16, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cqjp1LnPCfs&t=3045s

Figure 32: production of liquid hydrocarbons – annual average 2004-2023
Thousands of barrels per day

Source: Presidency (2023); PEMEX (2023) "Mexico has economic stability, resources, culture and a great people". President AMLO's morning press conference from the National Palace. Monday December 11, 2023. Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ny4PJQ1ijAg&t=2306s

Figure 33: Evolution of the participation of internal sales in the total income of PEMEX
Percentages

Notes:
PEMEX's main income comes from domestic sales, decreasing its share in crude oil export sales. By 2024, the generation of income from internal sales will be consolidated due to the contribution of products that the new Olmeca refinery will make.

Source: Presidency (2024); PEMEX (2024) "4T rescued Pemex and strengthened Mexico's energy self-sufficiency". President AMLO's morning press conference from the National Palace. Thursday January 4, 2024. Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CPW31LEcvKs&ab_channel=Andr%C3%A9sManuelL%C3%B3pezObrador

Figure 34: PEMEX production of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel, 2004-2018
thousand barrels per day

Source: Presidency (2023); PEMEX (2023). Mexico advances towards energy self-sufficiency; in 2024, it will be consolidated. AMLO Presidential Conference. Thursday March 16, 2023, President AMLO. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cqjp1LnPCfs

Figure 35: PEMEX's refineries, including Deer Park and Dos Bocas

Source: Presidency (2023) Mexico advances towards energy self-sufficiency; in 2024 it will be consolidated. President AMLO conference. Thursday March 16, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cqjp1LnPCfs

Figure 36: Crude oil process in refineries, observed 2018-2023 and projections 2024-2025

Thousands of barrels per day

Source: Presidency (2024) 4T rescued Pemex and strengthened Mexico's energy self-sufficiency. AMLO Presidential Conference Thursday, January 4, 2024. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CPW31LEcvKs

Figure 37: Evolution and projections of fuel deficit (gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel) 2018-2026

Source: Presidency (2024) 4T rescued Pemex and strengthened Mexico's energy self-sufficiency. Morning press conference, from the National Palace. Thursday January 4, 2024. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CPW31LEcvKs

Figure 38: Price of the Mexican oil mix (impacts COVID-19 and 2022 global fuel crisis)

COVID-19 in early 2020:

Global fuel crisis in 2022:

Dollars per barrel
Source: Bank of Mexico (2023). Price of the Mexican oil mix (impacts COVID-19 and 2022 global fuel crisis). Available at: https://www.banxico.org.mx/apps/gc/precios-spot-del-petroleo-gra.html

Figure 39: Price of the Mexican oil mix in March 2022 and 2023

6 Mar 2022
Mezcla mexicana: 115.66

16 Mar 2023
Mezcla mexicana: 57.12

Source: Bank of Mexico (2024). Price of the Mexican oil mix in March 2022 and 2023.
Available at: https://www.banxico.org.mx/apps/gc/precios-spot-del-petroleo-gra.html

Figure 40: Explaining policy change in the refining sector.

Figure 41: LXIV Legislature of the Congress of the Union of Mexico

LXIV Legislature: September 1, 2018, to August 31, 2021
Deputies by district (300)

Chamber composition by district:

▌Held by PAN ▌Held by PRI ▌Held by PRD
Held by PT ▌Held by PVEM ▌Held by MC ▌Held by MRN(MORENA) ▌Held by PES

Notes:

The Chamber of Deputies is composed of 500 seats, elected from 300 single-member federal electoral districts and 40 apiece from five proportional representation electoral regions.

Source: INE (2021) National Electoral Institute. LXIV Legislature of the Congress of the Union of Mexico. Available at: https://www.ine.mx/

Figure 42: Political parties' fragmentation in capital cities

Source: Pollsmx (2023) Political parties' fragmentation in capital cities. Available at:
https://polls.mx/que-partidos-gobiernan-las-capitales-del-pais-2/

Figure 43: Parties' role in the Mexican oil sector's punctuated equilibrium

```
                                                        ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
                                                        │ Parties' de jure legislative power │
                               ┌─────────────────────┐  │ -Parties vote as blocks            │
                               │ Two party mechanisms│→ └──────────────────────────────────┘
                               │ (facilitate policy  │
                               │  change)            │  ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
                               └─────────────────────┘  │ Parties' de facto convening power  │
                                                      →  │ -drawing attention to policy-issue │
                                                         │ -calling to mass mobilise          │
                                                         │ -Parties-media 'mutual influence'  │
  ┌──────────────────────────┐                           └──────────────────────────────────┘
  │ (2018-2024)              │
  │ Punctuation period       │
  │ (multi-party-political   │                           ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
  │  system)                 │                           │ Partisan competition for electorate│
  └──────────────────────────┘                         → │ -Policy images competition         │
                               ┌─────────────────────┐   └──────────────────────────────────┘
                               │ Two party incentives│
                               └─────────────────────┘   ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
                                                          │ Political conflict to distinguish  │
                                                        → │ themselves from other parties.     │
                                                          │ -Principles dominance and dispersion│
                                                          │ -Political cleavage on energy models│
                                                          │ -Issue ownership                   │
                                                          └──────────────────────────────────┘
```

```
                               ┌─────────────────────┐   ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
                               │ Three Party mechanisms│ │ PRI's strong control and           │
                               │ (Provide political  │ → │ institutionalisation of attention  │
                               │ stability           │   └──────────────────────────────────┘
                               │ and block radical   │
                               │ change, or          │   ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
                               │ contrary to existing│ → │ PRI's control over partisan conflict│
                               │ policy image)       │   │ through concessions to PAN         │
                               └─────────────────────┘   └──────────────────────────────────┘
  ┌──────────────────────────┐
  │ (1982-2018)              │                           ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
  │ Equilibrium period       │                           │ PAN-PRI two-party system, selective│
  │ (one-party dominant and  │                         → │ emphasis rather than direct        │
  │ Two-party systems under  │                           │ confrontation                      │
  │  PRI-PAN)                │                           └──────────────────────────────────┘
  └──────────────────────────┘
                                                          ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
                               ┌─────────────────────┐  → │ Absence of partisan competition    │
                               │ Lack of party       │    └──────────────────────────────────┘
                               │ incentives          │
                               └─────────────────────┘   ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
                                                        → │ Stable political conflict          │
                                                          └──────────────────────────────────┘
```

Annexes.

Annex 1: List of interviewees

Interviewees		
(1)	Interviewee 1	Think Tank, Centre for Economic and Budgetary Research (CIEP)
(2)	Interviewee 2	Think Tank, Centre for Economic and Budgetary Research (CIEP)
(3)	Interviewee 3	Think Tank, Centre for Economic and Budgetary Research (CIEP)
(4)	Interviewee 4	Academia, UNAM Staff
(5)	Interviewee 5	Legislative body, federal deputy (PRD) - LVI; LXI; LXIII legislatures
(6)	Interviewee 6	Legislative body, federal deputy (PAN) - LXIII legislature
(7)	Interviewee 7	Former officer, Secretariat of Natural Resources and Environment (SRNMA)
(8)	Interviewee 8	Former officer, Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT)
(9)	Interviewee 9	Political party, party leader (PRD)
(10)	Interviewee 10	Academic, Researcher at ITESM
(11)	Interviewee 11	Former officer, Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT)
(12)	Interviewee 12	Energy consultant, PETROIntelligence
(13)	Interviewee 13	Business group, Business Coordinating Council (CCE)
(14)	Interviewee 14	Academia, UJED Staff
(15)	Interviewee 15	SICEnrgy Consulting, energy consultant, Academia, UNAM Staff, former officer at the Energy regulatory commission (CRE)
(16)	Interviewee 16	ENGO, the Natural Resources Governance Institute (NRGI)
(17)	Interviewee 17	Energy consultant; academia, ITESM staff
(18)	Interviewee 18	Energy consultant
(19)	Interviewee 19	Academia, UJED Staff
(20)	Interviewee 20	Parliamentary expert and political consultant, (PRI) LXIII legislature

Criteria for selecting interviewees

Evidence source	Focus	Potential Interviewees	Venues
Governmental policy actors	**Government** Policy issue-attention	Public servants and officials from any level of government; executive branch; deputies and senators, particularly legislators in energy and budget related commissions.	Multiple institutional venues such as the federal government; chamber of deputies; senate of the republic; courts; states and municipalities.
Governmental policy actors	**Political parties** Policy issue-attention	Official representatives of the political parties; national, regional, and local party leaders and party members.	Political parties' headquarters, representative offices at regional and local level, party members at the congress and different government branches. Political parties' institutes.
Non-Governmental policy actors	**Public** Policy issue-attention	Consultants and energy experts, businessman, academics; NGOs.	Consulting firms; business organisations; industry, think-tanks, universities, NGOs.
Non-Governmental policy actors	**Media** Policy issue-attention	Energy reporters, journalists in the energy, politics, finance/budget space.	Print media (newspapers, energy newsmagazines), broadcast news (radio and television), and the Internet (online newspapers, news blogs, news videos, live news streaming).

Annex 2: Statements

Statements (Equilibrium period):

Reference	Statement
Fox, V. (1996a)	"Private hands do not necessarily guarantee success, what seems to be almost true is that public hands are a guarantee of failure, normally corruption and bad administration because governments have another task".
Fox, V (1996b)	"In my point of view, processing, distributing, marketing, and selling oil can be privatized, it is my opinion that Mexicans as owners of oil must be open to finding the best way to enrich the nation through processing that liquid, and in that sense, being open to that alternative, being open to privatizing. I would never do it primarily abroad but rather privatize in the hands of Mexicans." […] "the least suited to manage this process has been PEMEX itself, which has frequently found itself in major corruption scandals, major problems of inefficiency, and great economic inability to keep the process and technology modernized, and therefore, I do not see why we should not contemplate the alternative that it could be done by others." […] "privatization can be partially done (via the entry of foreign capital) and this could even be favourable."
Fox, V. (2019)	"It is not even worth it, it is the worst investment, PEMEX is a bottomless barrel, without technology and without resources. The investment is of very low return, the worst is refining". "PEMEX deteriorated because all governments are lousy administrators, the correct solution is the energy reform, it removes the investment burden from PEMEX and puts it in private investment."
Calderón, F. (2008a)	"The country's oil reserves are decreasing, at the current production rate, we have proven reserves for just over nine years of production, production has fallen and today we extract three hundred thousand barrels a day less than three years ago, this means that we are stopping receiving something like 100 billion pesos annually"
Calderón, F. (2008b)	"We have important deposits on land and very close to the coasts, but above all it is estimated that more than half of our potential reserves are in deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico. We must take advantage of that wealth […] I propose to establish a new administrative structure for Petróleos Mexicanos, and provide the company with greater powers of decision-making, administration, contracting, so that you can have access to cutting-edge technology […] We must act now because time and oil are running out. While other countries have been exploiting their oil in deep waters for many years, in Mexico we have not been able to start."
Calderón, F. (2008c)	"Despite being a country rich in oil, four out of every 10 litres of gasoline that we consume in our cars come from other countries, since PEMEX does not have the necessary capacity to refine oil [...] In order not to have to import gasoline, diesel, and other products from abroad, as we are doing today, that is, to reduce our dependence on refined petroleum products from abroad and to truly strengthen our energy sovereignty, it is proposed to allow PEMEX to contract companies specialized for the construction and operation, on behalf of *Petróleos Mexicanos,* of new refineries."

Calderón, F. (2008d)	"This is the most important reform in this matter since 1938 when the oil industry was nationalized[...] thanks to the reform, progress was made on very sensitive issues for the operation of PEMEX, the company will now be able to have greater surplus resources from its own income, in order to contract the most advanced technologies and thereby explore new deposits and oil fields, it will also have sufficient autonomy to decide which projects to invest in and will have a more flexible and efficient contracting scheme."
Calderón, F. (2008e)	"For the first time in 30 years we will build a new refinery with an initial investment of 12 billion pesos in the first year. With them, thousands of direct and indirect jobs will be generated, strengthening the national economy. Recovering the position that Mexico deserves in the world as a true oil power, we will be able to promote the growth and development of the country".
Calderón, F. (2009)	"In the face of the international crisis, it is time to join forces with a common goal: the economic recovery of the country. Given the efforts of everyone, the Federal Government is the first one obliged to make more efficient use of the resources of Mexicans and correct the inefficiencies and excessive expenses in the Government itself; That is what we are doing today *at Luz y Fuerza del Centro"*.
Reyes-Heroles, J. (2009)	"*Petróleos Mexicanos* carried out technical-economic analyses that indicated that the best project to advance the modernization of the national refining system is to build a new refinery in the central area of the country."
Calderón, F. (2012)	"The new refinery that we have put into operation, not only have those lands been acquired with full rights, [..]. the main engineering of the Tula refinery has already been put out to tender, and was finally awarded through bidding, and therefore, it is moving forward as we had planned at *Petróleos Mexicanos"*.
Peña Nieto, E. (2012a)	"Here in Tabasco, they are concerned about the high cost of electricity, I am committed to promoting energy and fiscal reform that allows us to lower electricity rates for the people of Mexico."
Peña Nieto, E. (2012b)	"We are going to build the refinery, which has only been a promise, and we will make it a reality"
Peña Nieto, E. (2012c)	"I reiterate my commitment to achieving consensus to promote an energy reform, a tax reform, and a reform of our social security system. Let's move forward. It is time to break together the myths and paradigms and everything that has limited our development".
Peña Nieto, E. (2013a)	"This day I will be sending to the Senate of the Republic an initiative to reform articles 27 and 28 of the Constitution […] with the reform that we are presenting we will make the energy sector one of the most powerful engines of the national economy".
Peña Nieto, E. (2013b)	"The energy reform that I have presented will allow the Mexican state to hire private companies when it is in the national interest and thereby generate cheaper energy for all Mexican families." "[…] If we carry out this reform, the price of electricity and gas will drop. The price of fertilizers will also drop and consequently our fields will produce more. There will be more food and at better prices."
Peña Nieto, E. (2013c)	"It is a reform [...] to open the energy sector to investment, technology, and competition, allowing the country to have more energy at lower costs" [...].

	"With the reform, Mexico's energy security will increase, […] With this decision we will be able to exploit the abundant hydrocarbon deposits, which until now have not been profitable for PEMEX, or to which we still do not have access, like those in deep waters, or in shales, like shale gas" [..] "With the reform, the country will have more financial resources from the private sector, and cutting-edge technologies, to take advantage of its vast energy resources without putting the country into debt. Thanks to the reform, we will increase oil and gas production and achieve proven reserve replacement rates of more than 100 percent".
Meade, A. (2016).	"Mexico is the fourth largest consumer of gasoline in the world per capita, every day in Mexico, more or less, 190 million litres of gasoline are consumed, it is a price that is impossible to manage, if we wanted to manage the price, that is something that Mexico did, and is ceasing to do, and if we wanted the price to be set by the government, instead of being set by market and cost conditions, the impact on public finances would be very important".
Dresser, D. (2017)	"The price of gasoline is not liberalized as promised with the energy reform due to the tax that the government has placed on gasoline, that tax that tries to cover the hole in government income that has fallen as a result of the fall in the export of oil, the sale of oil, and the fact that the Mexican state does not collect enough"
Peña Nieto, E. (2015)	"Thanks to the energy reform, for the first time the cost of electricity that families pay, is beginning to drop. Furthermore, from this moment on, in 2015 there will no longer be gasolinazos. Thanks to the tax reform, for the first time in five years, there will no longer be monthly increases in the prices of gasoline, diesel, and LP gas."
Meade, A. (2016)	"We have recognized what Congress mandated, as of January 1, 2017, the adjustment band will be released, consequently, according to the cost, the price of gasoline will begin to rise and fall as the cost of its fundamental input (crude oil), begins to rise and fall" [...] "Increasing the price of gasoline was the best option [...] It was what benefited the country the most [...] We were keeping gasoline prices artificially low, and an important price of a good that is consumed, as much as gasoline is consumed in Mexico, cannot be managed by the government because it ends up having an impact on public finances […] We no longer have the capacity to do so.
Peña Nieto, E. (2017b)	"Cantarell, only Cantarell, managed to produce, not long ago, six years ago, two million two hundred thousand barrels of oil per day, today only 200 thousand are produced, the goose that laid the golden eggs was drying up, we were running out, we ran out […]". "What we will have to observe in the future will be that the price of gasoline, like that of other products that we consume of different kinds, will move daily, sometimes slightly up, sometimes slightly down, this is what it is correct, and it is what works in the most developed economies."
Peña Nieto, E. (2018)	"The Gasolinazo of January 2017, to liberalize the price of gasoline, so that gasoline reflects its real costs, without having to use resources to make it cheaper through a subsidy that was unsustainable. When the decision was made, we already owed more than 200 billion pesos." "[…] it was an inconsistency that those most favoured by subsidizing the price of gasoline were the people with the highest incomes" […],

	"This was a very difficult decision, I took, and I fully assume the responsibility that it was, having decided to free the price of gasoline, either we did this, or we should have made cuts in public spending".
Peña Nieto, E. (2017a)	"The increase in the price of gasoline, I know that there is a lot of annoyance and anger about this situation […] "This adjustment in the price of gasoline is not due to the energy reform, nor is it due to an increase in taxes. The price of gasoline increased because in the last year, throughout the world, the price of oil increased nearly 60 percent. This, in turn, has increased the international price of gasoline, which affects us directly, since for years, Mexico has imported more than half of the fuel we consume. In short, it is an increase that comes from abroad, the government will not receive a single cent more in taxes for this increase" […]. "Maintaining artificial gasoline prices would mean taking resources from the poorest Mexicans to give them to those who have the most" […] "subsidizing gasoline would have forced us to cut social programs." "In the past, other governments decided to keep the price of gasoline artificially low, to avoid political costs, they were able to do so because the country produced more oil, which was sold more expensive than ever in history, and the government had surplus income, millions were lost subsidizing gasoline, and I say that they were lost because it was literally money that was burned giving away gasoline, instead of investing in more productive things such as schools, universities and hospitals".

Sources of statements by presidential term

Vicente Fox Quesada 2000-2006:

Fox, V. (1996a) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Vicente Fox Quesada, on the privatization of the petrochemical industry and the privatization of PEMEX. CNI Canal 40 on June 23, 1996. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBtUX0-MHNo

Fox, V. (1996b) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Vicente Fox Quesada, on the privatization of the petrochemical industry and the privatization of PEMEX. CNI Canal 40 on June 23, 1996. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBtUX0-MHNo

Fox, V. (2019) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Vicente Fox Quesada, on the privatization of privatization of PEMEX and refining, on May 4, 2019. Available at: https://twitter.com/VicenteFoxQue

Felipe Calderón Hinojosa 2006-2012:

Calderón, F. (2008a) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, Message to the nation on the Energy Reform proposal on April 8. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7hyM09Udg9w&ab_channel=InformacionMexico

Calderón, F. (2008b) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, Message to the nation on the Energy Reform proposal on April 8. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7hyM09Udg9w&ab_channel=InformacionMexico

Calderón, F. (2008c) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, Message to the nation on the Energy Reform proposal on April 8. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7hyM09Udg9w&ab_channel=InformacionMexico

Calderón, F. (2008d) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, Message to the nation on the approval of the 2008 energy reform on October 28. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vtucZ8leKE4&ab_channel=DanielMarquez

Calderón, F. (2008e) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, Message to the nation on the approval of the 2008 energy reform on October 28. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vtucZ8leKE4&ab_channel=DanielMarquez

Calderón, F. (2009) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, Message to the nation on the extinction of Luz y Fuerza del Centro, October 12. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6QgyTvWA5yc&t=63s&ab_channel=PresidenciaFelipeCalder%C3%B3nHinojosa

Calderón, F. (2012) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, Speech at the Ceremony of the Tanker Mariano Abasolo, PEMEX, Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz, on Marzo 18. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tSRazeHD47w

Reyes-Heroles González-Garza, J. (2009) Stenographic version of the CEO of PEMEX, Press Conference: Announcement Bicentenario Refinery, Tula, Hidalgo, on August 18. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R6Sez-Aai-A&ab_channel=PresidenciaFelipeCalder%C3%B3nHinojosa

Enrique Peña Nieto 2012-2018:

Peña Nieto, E. (2012a) Presidential campaign act, PRI candidate, Enrique Peña Nieto's commitment to promote energy and fiscal reform, Villahermosa, Tabasco, April 25, 2012. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z57lGrujuNY

Peña Nieto, E. (2012b) Presidential campaign act, PRI candidate, Enrique Peña Nieto promises refinery, Pachuca, Hidalgo on May 20, 2012. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-UpnsDRilOc&t=104s

Peña Nieto, E. (2012c) First Message as President, Enrique Peña Nieto, president of Mexico, at the National Palace on December 1, 2012. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kdVlhfJAR34&ab_channel=PresidenciaEnriquePe%C3%B1aNieto

Peña Nieto, E. (2013a) President of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto, speech at the event of presentation of the initiative of the energy reform. on August 13, 2013. Available at: https://youtu.be/naeZgzcSNPk?si=mg3RAMh2Tfh6-jLY

Peña Nieto, E. (2013b) President of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto, Message to the Nation on the Presentation of the initiative of EPN's Energy Reform, broadcast nationally on August 13, 2013. Available at: https://youtu.be/3m0kLU7boKk?si=TBURjl56opfoFy1A

Peña Nieto, E. (2013c) Enrique Peña Nieto, President of Mexico, speech on the enactment of the Energy Reform on December 20, 2013. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gacf5a22aEA&ab_channel=PresidenciaEnriquePe%C3%B1aNieto

Peña Nieto, E. (2015) Message to the Nation from President of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=abeURY102Rs

Dresser, D. (2017) "Gasolinazo, the worst political mistake": Dresser in Mesa Política. Available at: https://youtu.be/TsoaV5h_tDA?si=6WzbqS_WcPwG2U__

Meade, A. (2016) Head of the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, José Antonio Meade on the increase in gasoline price, Despierta con Loret. Available at: https://youtu.be/UYGmEH3AkiE?si=q2-c6yVIrmTzWb0B

Peña Nieto, E. (2017a) Message to the Nation on the beginning of the year 2017, about the increase in the price of gasoline, on January 5, 2017. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhiGVJQ1yCo&ab_channel=PresidenciaEnriquePe%C3%B1aNieto

Peña Nieto, E. (2017b) speech on increase in the gasoline price, "the goose that laid the golden eggs [Pemex] dried up.", on January 12, 2017. Available at: https://youtu.be/hncw7c_lJLk?si=xtFmzRcO_pR5xCwK

Peña Nieto, E. (2018) Enrique Peña Nieto, President of Mexico, message on his sixth and last government report, on the gasolinazo in 2017, broadcast nationally on September 3, 2018. Available at: https://youtu.be/ZjiN5MXQQLg?si=nF8zfSJNvIQGTnqR

Statements (Punctuation period):

Reference	Statement
López Obrador, A. (2016)	"PRI and PAN approved the energy reform and the 'gasolinazo law', we must be very aware of this issue and insist that PRI and PAN are the same" (López Obrador, 2016).
López Obrador, A. (2017)	"The price of gasoline, gas, and diesel will not continue to increase [...] crude oil is export, and gasoline is bought; it is as if we were selling oranges and buying orange juice." [...] "Crude oil will no longer be sold abroad, and gasoline will instead be produced in the country." […] It was said that with the energy reform, there would be a lot of dollars, investment and employment, and oil production would increase, but the only thing that increased was the price of gasoline, because oil production is plummeting" (López Obrador, 2017).
López Obrador, A. (2018)	"There will be no need to increase taxes, in real terms, and that is a commitment I am making, nor will fuel prices increase beyond inflation." […] "I make the responsible commitment, that soon, very soon, when we finish the refinery that we are going to build in Mexico, and the six refineries are rehabilitated, the price of gasoline, and all fuels, will drop" (López Obrador, 2018).
López Obrador, A. (2019: 90)	"We are rescuing Pemex, with public investment and by reducing its taxes, to increase oil production in the next two years, and we are contemplating that, in the second half of the six-year term, this public company will become a lever for national development" (López Obrador, 2019: 90).
López Obrador, A. (2023a)	"The purpose is not to sell crude oil, but to process it […] to stop buying gasoline from abroad, to be self-sufficient, and we have invested like never before in refining, the six refineries are being modernized, the refinery in Dos Bocas is completed, the Deer Park refinery was purchased, and we are building two coker plants, one in Tula and another in Salina Cruz, and with that next year, we are going to become self-sufficient, we are no longer going to buy gasoline and diesel abroad […] the objective is for all gasoline to be produced in Mexico" (López Obrador, 2023a).
López Obrador, A. (2013: 91)	"All neoliberal governments have always wanted to ruin the national oil industry to privatize it. In fact, they have made progress in its dismantling and have practically left it as a simple supplier of crude oil. It is foreign companies that are in charge of adding value to our raw materials and benefit from the refining and petrochemical processes, and from the production and sale of gas" (López Obrador, 2013: 91).
López Obrador, A. (2019: 22)	"The neoliberal period between 1983 and 2018, it far surpassed the previous corruption. In those 36 years, the system as a whole operated for corruption" (López Obrador, 2019: 22)
López Obrador, A. (2023b)	"All constitutional reforms that PRI and PAN made jointly were to favour the privatization model, to strip the people of Mexico of their assets, not a single one for the benefit of the people" (López Obrador, 2023b)
López Obrador, A. (2019: 34)	"The energy reform that they supposedly told us would come to save us, only meant a drop in oil production and an excessive increase in the prices of gasoline, diesel, gas, and electricity" (López Obrador, 2019: 34)

López Obrador, A. (2019: 36)	"The damage caused to the energy sector during neoliberalism was so serious that a new refinery has not been built in 40 years. Before neoliberalism, we were self-sufficient in gasoline, diesel, gas, and electricity. Now, we buy more than half of what we consume" (López Obrador, 2019: 36)
López Obrador, A. (2023c)	"We must remember this historical fact of oil expropriation because it faced foreign and conservative interests who opposed the popular and patriotic policy of General Lázaro Cárdenas [..] I invite you all to the Zócalo on the 18th, we are going to continue doing our demonstrations, it is important to take these issues to the streets and the public square" (López Obrador, 2023c)
López Obrador, A. (2024c)	"Let us remember not only General Cárdenas but also President Adolfo López Mateos, who in 1960 warned us": "Do not trust yourself because in future years some bad Mexicans identified with the worst causes of the country will try by subtle means to deliver the oil and our resources again to foreign investors"(López Obrador, 2024c)
López Obrador, A. (2021a)	"Imagine if any foreign nation decided not to sell us gasoline, we only have reserves for 10 days, it would be chaos". "We are carrying out a profound change in oil policy, the main objective is to no longer sell crude oil abroad, but to transform our crude oil, refine it, so we stop buying gasoline abroad, to be self-sufficient, because that is safer, it is a matter of national security" (López Obrador, 2021a)
López Obrador, A. (2021b)	"I am pleased to inform you that PEMEX purchased the shares of the Deer Park refinery in Houston, which has the capacity to process 340 thousand barrels per day. In essence, we received six refineries in poor condition, which we are modernizing, and we are going to deliver eight refineries. We are going to stop buying gasoline and diesel abroad, to process all our crude oil, and become self-sufficient" (López Obrador, 2021b)
López Obrador, A. (2021c)	"With the simple majority, which is 50% plus one, we have it comfortably: we already have the Budget" (López Obrador, 2021c).
López Obrador, A. (2021d)	"An agreement could be reached with a fraction of legislators from the PRI or another party, but not many are needed for constitutional reform" (López Obrador, 2021d).
López Obrador, A. (2023d).	"Mexico is an independent and free country, not a colony, not a protectorate of the United States. We will never allow them to violate our sovereignty and trample on the dignity of our country". "We can assure that oil sovereignty is being guaranteed. Next year we are not going to buy gasoline or diesel, nor other oil products abroad, we are going to process all our raw materials" (López Obrador, 2023d).
Slim, C. (2024).	"It seems extraordinary to me that, in this six-year term, the three powers of the nation, of the State, have differences, that the supreme court decides differently than the executive was not usual, not only was it not usual, but they did not do it, in previous governments there was an enormous influence from the Executive to the Judiciary, now the Judiciary decides things that are against the Executive" (Slim, 2024).
López Obrador, A. (2024a).	"The judiciary is kidnapped by the oligarchy, it is at the service of a rapacious minority, they do not help the people at all, they do not represent the people of Mexico" (López Obrador, 2024a).

López Obrador, A. (2024b)	"Neoliberalism or neo-porfirism or the policy of plunder imposed by the oligarchs relied on all these supposedly independent organizations of the so-called 'civil society', the oligarchy and conservatism created all these supposedly independent organizations" (López Obrador, 2024b)
López Obrador, A. (2023e)	"We had oil production falling for 14 or 15 years, and it has cost us, but now the average production we have is 1 million 878 barrels" (López Obrador, 2023e)
López Obrador, A. (2023f)	"We invested in exploring new oil fields and we were lucky to find oil, there are reserves that allow us to have oil for up to 25, 30 years, from proven reserves. I would like to see more clean energy used and that process is in progress, but it will not happen overnight, we are guaranteed oil until the energy transition arrives" (López Obrador, 2023f)
López Obrador, A. (2023e)	"We now have more oil reserves discovered. In other words, the next governments will not have a problem, there is enough oil and at a lower cost, Because the new fields that were discovered are on land and in shallow water, and it costs less to extract the oil" (López Obrador, 2023e)
López Obrador, A. (2023e)	"Before, most of PEMEX's investment was allocated to the north of the country where there is no oil, or where, if there is any, it is located in deep waters, and it costs a lot to extract it. They did it because of corruption, because they gave the contracts to foreign companies, and they extracted very little gas and oil and very expensive, companies like Repsol and some Americans, were the only ones to benefit, they were good business for the companies and bad business for the public treasury" (López Obrador, 2023e)
Romero Oropeza, O. (2024)	"Before, the share of Pemex's income depended heavily on the sale of crude oil, in this administration internal sales in 2021 were 66%, in 2023 we rose to 70%, and we estimate, by 2024, 83%, and as the coker units come into operation, and more crude oil is processed in the refineries, This will tend to reach 100%, and crude oil exports to zero. Because the idea is to process our crude oil to sell gasoline and for that to be the fundamental income of PEMEX" (Romero Oropeza, 2024)
López Obrador, A. (2023g)	"With the purchase we made of Deer Park refinery and with the two coking plants that we are building, plus the new refinery in Dos Bocas, it will allow us, as planned, that next year we will no longer buy gasoline abroad, that all gasoline be produced in Mexico, that we achieve energy self-sufficiency" (López Obrador, 2023g).
López Obrador, A. (2023h)	"We are building two coker plants that are like refineries, to process fuel oil and convert it into gasoline, because gasoline has a higher price and pollute less than fuel oil. These two plants in Tula and Salina Cruz represent a total investment of ten billion dollars and will be producing more than 80 thousand barrels of gasoline" (López Obrador, 2023h).
López Obrador, A. (2023i)	"The Dos Bocas refinery is a Magna work. We are talking about processing 340,000 barrels of crude oil per day, to extract 280,000 barrels of gasoline. This refinery will produce 25% of all the gasoline we consume. It is an investment of 14 billion dollars, without credits, with a public budget, with money from the people" (López Obrador, 2023i)
Romero Oropeza, O. (2024)	"The president's decision to acquire the Deer Park refinery was very good. The profit we had in the first year in 2022 was USD 954 million, and the refinery cost us less than USD 600 million. Deer Park has never had a profit of this

	magnitude; in 2023, a profit of USD 711 million is estimated. This is explained because in 2022, with the Russia-Ukraine war, the price of crude oil was on average USD 94 per barrel, and in 2023 it was on average 79 USD. This barrel price differential causes profits to decrease in 2023, but USD 711 million is still much higher than previous years" (Romero Oropeza, 2024).
López Obrador, A. (2024a)	"The state has the possibility of intervening so that there are no *gasolinazos*, because despite the privatization of the oil industry, with the opening of the sale of gasoline, PEMEX has an 80% share in the gasoline market, there is a state policy of not increasing the price of gasoline and establishing fair prices" (López Obrador, 2024a)
López Obrador, A. (2023j)	"There is less inflation in energy because there is direct intervention and there is more possibility of controlling the price of fuel that have not increased" (López Obrador, 2023j)

Source of statements:

López Obrador, A. (2013) "The great temptation. Mexico's oil". Penguin Random House Grupo Editorial México.

López Obrador, A. (2016) Stenographic version of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), National President of MORENA political party, December 29, 2016. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gJZcw_D-8Pc&ab_channel=NM%C3%A1s

López Obrador, A. (2017) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), promise to end the 'gasolinazos'. December 22, 2017. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H2QXLE-7UJs

López, Obrador, A. (2018) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), promise to lower the price of gasoline. December 1, 2018. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y-4jD-J0rSk

López Obrador, A. (2019) "Towards a moral economy". Planeta México.

López Obrador, A. (2021a) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), speech before PEMEX's workers at the Francisco I. Madero refinery, Ciudad Madero, Tamaulipas. November 5, 2021. Available at:

https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2021/11/05/amlo-superviso-los-trabajos-de-la-refineria-madero-vamos-hacia-la-autosuficiencia-energetica/?outputType=amp-type

López Obrador, A. (2021b) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), Pemex buys Deer Park refinery in Houston, Texas. May 24, 2021 Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_70WOW5sF50, also available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E-mEiJwRfF0

López Obrador, A. (2021c) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) on the composition of congress in 2021. Morning press conference from the National Palace, June 8, 2021. Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l6QSYf9IJZc&ab_channel=GobiernodeM%C3%A9xico

López Obrador, A. (2021d) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) on the composition of congress in 2021. Morning press conference from the National Palace, June 8, 2021. Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l6QSYf9IJZc&ab_channel=GobiernodeM%C3%A9xico

López Obrador, A. (2022) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), Historic IEPS subsidy keeps fuel prices stable. Morning press conference from the National Palace. March 14, 2022. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D_gQ8WO_oTA

López Obrador, A. (2023a) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), Chalco-Santa Martha trolleybus. Morning press conference from the National Palace. July 21, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RngkG-oiOj4&ab_channel=Andr%C3%A9sManuelL%C3%B3pezObrador

López Obrador, A. (2023b) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), Economy grows 3.7 percent in the first quarter and inflation is low. Morning press conference from the National Palace. May 26, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gm03jfb38qk&ab_channel=Andr%C3%A9sManuelL%C3%B3pezObrador

López Obrador, A. (2023c) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). Morning press conference from the National Palace. March 6, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qWgpx_rU6u4

López Obrador, A. (2023d) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). 85 Years of Oil Expropriation, from the Zócalo of Mexico City. March 18, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_66lxwcHS88&ab_channel=GobiernodeM%C3%A9xico

López Obrador, A. (2023e) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). Mexico has economic stability, resources, culture and a great people. AMLO Presidential Conference Morning press conference from the National Palace. December 11, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ny4PJQ1ijAg&t=11312s,
also available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k5Rz95oxgtw&t=216

López Obrador (2023f) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). "We have oil reserves for 30 years, reveals AMLO: Until the transition comes". Morning press conference from the National Palace. December 19, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uhxls2dSGM0,
also available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o5T8OsT2NO8

López Obrador, A. (2023g) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). AMLO, on Textbook conferences will combat disinformation campaign. Morning press conference, from the National Palace. August 8, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0eDpTHYTYkc&ab_channel=Andr%C3%A9sManuelL%C3%B3pezObrador

López Obrador, A. (2023h) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). Textbook conferences will combat disinformation campaign. Morning press conference from the National Palace. August 8, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0eDpTHYTYkc&ab_channel=Andr%C3%A9sManuelL%C3%B3pezObrador

López Obrador, A. (2023i) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). Textbook conferences will combat disinformation campaign. Morning press conference from the National Palace. August 8, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0eDpTHYTYkc&ab_channel=Andr%C3%A9sManuelL%C3%B3pezObrador

López Obrador, A. (2023j) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). In 2023 inflation in Mexico will go down. Morning press conference from the National Palace. January 23, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kbfuxwa9eHM&t=7772s

López Obrador, A. (2023k) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). Morning press conference from the National Palace. October 16, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z-GrLSe1quw

López Obrador, A. (2024a) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). Morning press conference from the National Palace. February 1, 2024. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FeArGDnJdhM

López Obrador, A. (2024b) Stenographic version of the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). Morning press conference from the National Palace. January 8, 2024. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VNPIqe1sPOs
Also available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FeArGDnJdhM

López Obrador, A. (2024c) "AMLO rules out closure of refineries". Proceso. March 10, 2024. Available at: https://www.proceso.com.mx/nacional/elecciones-2024/2024/3/10/amlo-descarta-cierre-de-refinerias-esto-le-respondio-xochitl-galvez-325370.html

Romero Oropeza, O. (2024) Stenographic version of CEO of PEMEX. "4T rescued Pemex and strengthened Mexico's energy self-sufficiency". Morning press conference from the National Palace. January 4, 2024. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CPW31LEcvKs&ab_channel=Andr%C3%A9sManuelL%C3%B3pezObrador

Nahle Garcia, R. (2021) Stenographic version of Mexican government's Secretary of Energy, Rocío Nahle García. Morning press conference from the National Palace. December 28, 2021. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4t-YHjmw7MU&t=4256s&ab_channel=GobiernodeM%C3%A9xico

Nahle Garcia, R. (2024) Stenographic version of Mexican government's Secretary of Energy, Rocío Nahle García. Mexico advances towards energy self-sufficiency; in 2024 it will be consolidated. AMLO Presidential Conference. Morning press conference from the National Palace. March 16, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cqjp1LnPCfs

Slim, C. (2024) "Slim talks about the privatization of Telmex, his relationship with AMLO and what he expects from the next Government". February 13, 2024. Available at: https://youtu.be/VLzPog3dBnk?si=iiVUin_MtNWURjCM

Annex 3: Government advertising campaigns

Reference	Description
Ad Presidency (2008a)	"Mexicans want more refineries, build more pipelines, bring in experts to explore in deep waters, fight corruption, if the Pemex reform is rejected, we will have less oil, we would have to import more and more gas and gasoline. They would be increasingly more expensive, that is why we must support the Pemex reform proposed by the President."
Ad Presidency (2008b)	"Mexico has a great treasure, a treasure hidden under the seabed, oil is our treasure […] the largest reserves of oil are found in deep waters three thousand meters under the sea […] it is necessary to get there to be able to extract it […] this means new and enormous challenges […] working in deep waters requires cutting-edge technology […] Mexico can take advantage of the technology and experience of those who already extract oil in deep waters […] we must strengthen Pemex so that you can hire the best technology and reach our oil in deep waters"
Ad Presidency (2013a)	TV spot on oil revenues: "The oil is ours and the oil revenues, which is the money we earn with oil, is also ours. With the energy reform that the government of the Republic is proposing today, there will be private participation which will allow us to extract more oil."
Ad Presidency (2013b)	TV spot on progress reforms: "Oil will always be ours, but we will have better technology to take advantage of it, countries that have carried out an energy reform are doing better, they obtain more resources, they take better care of the environment and advance in technology."
Ad Presidency (2013c)	TV spot on reduce your electricity and gas bill: "Two of the biggest effects that will be achieved with the energy reform, one that lowers your electricity bill and two that lowers your gas bill".
Ad Presidency (2013d)	TV spot on oil fields: "Did you know that Mexico and the US geographically share one of the largest oil reserves on the planet? This is what the US is taking advantage of in its territory, and this is what we take advantage of. Let's change it if energy reform is possible."
Ad Presidency (2013e)	TV spot on oil sector in other countries: "Did you know that oil producers around the world have carried out energy reforms like the one promoted today by Mexico as well as countries like Cuba, Norway, China, Brazil, or Colombia, guess who isn't, Mexico - let's change this if energy reform is possible."
Ad Presidency (2013f)	TV spot energy jobs: "With the energy reform, not 1, not 100, not 100 thousand, but almost 500 thousand jobs will be created in the next 5 years, and with the energy reform new companies will open, and with it, 2 and a half million of jobs by 2025."
Ad Presidency (2017)	"In Mexico, we import more than half of the gasoline we consume, and we pay for it in dollars, as in 2016 the international price of gasoline increased, the price of the dollar also increased, today gasoline costs more, if the international price falls in the future of gasoline or the cost of the dollar decreases, gasoline will cost less".

Source of Government advertising campaigns by presidential term

Felipe Calderón Hinojosa (FCH) 2006-2012:

Ad Presidency (2008a) Campaign promoting Calderón's 2008 energy reform, national TV Spot: 'PEMEX Reform'. Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NevUNfn4iak

Ad Presidency (2008b), campaign promoting Calderón's 2008 energy reform, national TV spot: 'PEMEX: The Treasure of Mexico'. Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NKtxNlITppo

Enrique Peña Nieto (EPN) 2012-2018:

Ad Presidency (2013a) Government of Mexico, Presidency of the Republic, Secretary of Energy, Energy reform campaign, TV spot: "Oil Revenues". Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gFRRdQv7_Nk

Ad Presidency (2013b) Government of Mexico, Presidency of the Republic, Secretary of Energy, Energy reform campaign, TV spot: "Progress reforms". Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GmflfmMylzA

Ad Presidency (2013c) Government of Mexico, Presidency of the Republic, Secretary of Energy, Energy reform campaign, TV spot "Reduce your Electricity and Gas bill". Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CuBDuASKo_8

Ad Presidency (2013d) Government of Mexico, Presidency of the Republic, Secretary of Energy, Energy reform campaign, TV spot "Oil fields". Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PdnyDuDYOVc

Ad Presidency (2013e) Government of Mexico, Presidency of the Republic, Secretary of Energy, Energy reform campaign, TV spot "Oil sector in other countries". Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eaDmENUv3Qo

Ad Presidency (2013f) Government of Mexico, Presidency of the Republic, Secretary of Energy, Energy reform campaign, TV spot "Jobs". Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L-a-C1mhVxo

Ad Presidency (2017), TV spot, 'Gasoline price opening', on January 12, 2017. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g1sFlSxayfE

Annex 4: Party advertising campaigns

Reference	Description
MORENA (2017a)	"We buy gasoline from countries to which we sell crude oil, it is as if we were exporting oranges and importing orange juice. The PRI and PAN governments have not only cancelled the construction of new refineries but have lowered gasoline production. At MORENA, we propose to modernize the six refineries and build two more to supply fuel at affordable prices to the entire country. Being self-sufficient in energy matters is a proposal from MORENA" (MORENA, 2017a).
MORENA (2017b)	"Building two more refineries and ensuring the optimal functioning of the six existing refineries would lower fuel prices, this would solve national self-consumption in fuel, at MORENA we propose to promote the production and distribution of fuels at low prices and thereby promote development autonomous of the country" (MORENA, 2017b).
PT (2013)	"PEMEX belongs to all Mexicans and should not be handed over to national or foreign businessmen, if Pemex is privatized, we will pay more taxes on gasoline and it will be more expensive, there will be no investment and development, and control over oil will be lost, not the privatization of PEMEX, the proudly left-wing labour party" (PT, 2013).

Source:

MORENA (2017a) MORENA party, spot on refineries, February 6, 2017. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yWPMGeap9uE&ab_channel=Andr%C3%A9sManuelL%C3%B3pezObrador

MORENA (2017b) MORENA party, spot on gasolinazo, February 3, 2017. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fYj3YuEPjoI&ab_channel=Andr%C3%A9sManuelL%C3%B3pezObrador

PT (2013) Labour party, spot on 2013 energy reform and privatization of PEMEX, August 13, 2013. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgdODboC3CE

Annex 5: Key macroeconomic, budgetary and PEMEX indicators

Type of key Indicator	Indicator	Period of analysis	Data source
Macroeconomic	Real price of gasoline (premium)	2000-2024	PROFECO
Macroeconomic	Real price of gasoline (magna)	2000-2024	PROFECO
Macroeconomic	Real price of diesel	2000-2024	PROFECO
Macroeconomic	Change in the exchange rate of the peso against the US dollar (annual)	2000-2024	Bloomberg
Macroeconomic	Exchange rate of the Mexican peso with respect to the US dollar	2000-2024	Bank of Mexico
Macroeconomic	Annual inflation in Mexico	2000-2024	INEGI
Macroeconomic	Evolution of the daily minimum wage	2000-2024	SHCP – IMSS-CONASAMI
Macroeconomic	National Consumer Price Index (INPC)	2000-2024	INEGI
Macroeconomic	Foreign direct investment	2000-2024	Ministry of Economy
Budgetary	Assigned budget to Pemex - Historical behaviour of the budget (Total Assigned to the Energy sector in the PEF)	2000-2024	PEF
Budgetary	Distribution of investment expenditure among subsidiary entities: exploration and production; Refineries; Gas and basic petrochemicals; Petrochemistry.	2000-2024	PEF
Budgetary	Oil revenues - crude oil exports	2000-2024	PEF
Budgetary	Expenditure - gasoline imports	2000-2024	PEF
Budgetary	IEPS on gasolines	2000-2024	PEF
Budgetary	VAT on gasolines	2000-2024	PEF
PEMEX	Total revenues	2000-2024	PEMEX financials
PEMEX	Total debt	2000-2024	PEMEX financials
PEMEX	Net Income	2000-2024	PEMEX financials
PEMEX	Total revenues from sales of gasolines, diesel, jet fuel	2000-2024	PEMEX financials
PEMEX	Crude oil export volume and value	2000-2024	PEMEX financials
PEMEX	Crude oil extraction volume (production)	2000-2024	PEMEX financials

References

Angeles-Cornejo, S. (1990) "Privatization and denationalization of PEMEX, how far?" Development Problems: Latin American Journal of Economics, Volume: 21, Edition: 81, Page: 135-155.

Arezki, R. (2017) "Getting There. Oil-producing Countries must focus on How to diversify their Economies". Finance & Development 54 (4), pp. 14–17.

Aleklett, K. (2006) "Oil: A bumpy road ahead". World Watch Magazine, January/February, pp. 10–12. In Van de Graaf, Thijs; Sovacool, Benjamin K. Global Energy Politics

Ahmed F., Ahmed, R., Poelzer, G., Poelzer, G., Soderberg, C., Zapata, O., and Guilmette, E. (2025) "Exploring energy transition narratives through mayoral insights using artificial intelligence". Energy Research & Social Science.

Aguiar, A., Cornejo, R., and Monsiváis-Carrillo, A. (2025). "Is Mexico at the Gates of Authoritarianism?". Journal of Democracy, Volume 36, Number 1, Johns Hopkins University Press.

Aguiar, A. (2024) "Subverting judicial legitimacy: Presidential rhetoric and democratic erosion in Mexico". In C. E. University (Ed.), DI working papers 2024/23 (pp. 1–33). C. E. University.

Aljezeera (2017) "*Gasolinazo* protests flare as petrol price surges 20%". Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/1/6/gasolinazo-protests-flare-as-petrol-price-surges-20 (accessed 04/07/2022)

Aljazeera (2021) "Texas freeze leaves millions in northern Mexico without power". Published Feb 16, 2021. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/16/texas-freeze-leaves-millions-in-northern-mexico-without-power (accessed 10/05/2021)

Aljazeera (2022) "In India rising fuel prices start to bite recent sharp hike in fuel costs is pushing up prices of fruits, vegetables & packaged milk, hurting citizens". Available at:

https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/4/20/in-india-rising-fuel-prices-start-to-bite (accessed 11/04/2022)

Argus (2022) "India refineries run at max on firm demand view, cracks". Available at: https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2305762-india-refineries-run-at-max-on-firm-demand-view-cracks (accessed 11/01/2022)

Argus-media (2022) "Mexico's Olmeca refinery". Available at: https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2305813-mexicos-olmeca-refinery-only-50pc-complete (access 11/01/2022)

Aristegui (2013a) "PRD leaves the Pact for Mexico". Available at: https://aristeguinoticias.com/2811/mexico/el-prd-se-sale-del-pacto-por-mexico/ (accessed 11/03/2021)

Aristegui (2013b) "Demonstrations in Mexico City against the Energy Reform". Available at: https://aristeguinoticias.com/1903/mexico/marchan-en-la-ciudad-de-mexico-contra-la-reforma-energetica/ (accessed 20/09/2021)

Aristegui (2019) "Seven scandals involving Carlos Romero Deschamps". Available at: https://aristeguinoticias.com/1610/mexico/7-escandalos-que-involucran-a-carlos-romero-deschamps/ (accessed 08/06/2021)

Aristegui (2020) "These are the legislators who approved Peña Nieto's Energy Reform". Available at: https://aristeguinoticias.com/1507/mexico/estos-son-los-legisladores-que-aprobaron-la-reforma-energetica-de-Peña-nieto/ (accessed 20/03/2021)

AMLO (2017) "AMLO talks about gasoline prices in Mexico and the United States". Available at:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yUAdmG77ZVc&ab_channel=Andr%C3%A9sManuelL%C3%B3pezObrador (accessed 21/11/2021)

Articulo19 (2013) "It is urgent to control spending on official advertising". Available at: https://articulo19.org/urge-controlar-gasto-en-publicidad-oficial/ (accessed 06/03/2021)

Amlopedia (2024) the search engine of AMLO's presidential conferences. Available at: https://amlopedia.org/ (accessed 20/09/2024)

Africanews (2021) "Angola seeks investors for 200,000 bpd Lobito refinery". Available at: https://www.africanews.com/2021/07/12/angola-seeks-investors-for-200-000-bpd-lobito-refinery//#:~:text=Angola%20is%20building%20two%20more,of%20oil%20per%20day%20locally (accessed 12/11/2021)

America-Economia (2023) "Carlos Slim's Grupo Carso buys 49.9% of Talos Energy to promote development of the Zama oil field". Available at: https://www.americaeconomia.com/negocios-e-industrias/grupo-carso-de-carlos-slim-compra-el-499-de-talos-energy-para-impulsar (accessed 02/12/2023)

Animal-Politico (2023). "AMLO calls for a new massive event for March 18; opposition will manifest in February". Available at: https://animalpolitico.com/politica/amlo-evento-expropiacion-petrolera-oposicion-manifestara-febrero

ANP (2017) The Alternative Nation Project 2018-2024. Available at: https://repositoriodocumental.ine.mx/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/94367/CG2ex201712-22-rp-5-2-a2.pdf (accessed 02/11/2021)

Astana-Times (2022) "Oil Refining Capacity Expected to Reach 17.9 Million Tons in 2022". Available at: https://astanatimes.com/2022/02/oil-refining-capacity-expected-to-reach-17-9-million-tons-in-2022-says-top-official/ (accessed 03/12/2022)

Berg, B. L. (2007) "Qualitative research methods for the social sciences". 6th ed. Boston: Pearson/Allyn & Bacon.

Baumgartner F., and Jones B. (1993) "Agendas and instability in American politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Baumgartner, F., and Jones, B. (2002) "Policy dynamics". Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Baumgartner, F., and Jones B. (2005) "The politics of attention". Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Baumgartner, F., Green-Pedersen, C. and Jones, B. (2006) "Comparative Studies of Policy Agendas." Journal of European Public Policy 13 (7): 959–974.

Baumgartner, F., and Jones B. (2009) "Agendas and Instability in American Politics", 2nd edition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Baumgartner, F., Jones B., and Wilkerson, J. (2011) "Comparative studies of policy dynamics", Comparative political studies. 44(8) 947-972

Baumgartner, F., and Jones B. (2012) "From there to here: Punctuated equilibrium to the general punctuation thesis to a theory of government information processing". Policy Studies Journal, 40(1), 1–19.

Baumgartner, F. R., Jones, B. D., and Mortensen, P. B. (2017) "Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Explaining stability and change in public policymaking. In C. M. Weible & P. A. Sabatier (Eds.), Theories of the policy process (4th ed., pp. 55–101). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Baumgartner, F., Jones, B., Mortensen, P. (2018) "Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in Public Policymaking" In Weible, C., and Sabatier, P. (2018) "Theories of the Policy Process", Routledge, 4th Edition, New York

Burns, C., Clifton, J., Quaglia, L. (2018) "Explaining policy change in the EU: financial reform after the crisis", Journal of European Public Policy, Pages 728-746.

Benson, D. and Russel, D. (2015) "Patterns of EU Energy Policy Outputs: Incrementalism or Punctuated Equilibrium?", West European Politics, Volume 38, Number 1, 2 January 2015, pp. 185-205(21)

Birkland, T. (1998) "Focusing Events, Mobilization, and Agenda Setting". Journal of Public Policy, 18 (1), 53–74.

Birkland, T. and Warnement, M, (2013) "Defining, Explaining, and Testing the Role of Focusing Events in Agenda Change: 30 Years of Focusing Event Theory". APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper, American Political Science Association.

Burke, M., and Stephens, J. (2018) "Political power and renewable energy futures: A critical review", Energy Research & Social Science, Volume 35, Pages 78-93.

Beezley, W., and Meyer, M. (2010) "The Oxford History of Mexico". Oxford University Press. Buzan, B. and Waever, O. (2003) "Regions and powers: the structure of international security", Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.

Buzan, B. Wæver, O. and de Wilde, J. (1998) "Security: a new framework for analysis". Lynne Rienner, Boulder

Báez Silva, C. (2002) "The Institutional Revolutionary Party. Some Notes on its Immediate Past for its Understanding at a Moment of Reorientation. Recent Years". Convergencia. Revista de Ciencias Sociales, vol. 9, núm. 27, enero-abril, 2002, Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México.

Bressand, A. (2013) "The Role of Markets and Investment in Global Energy", chapter 1,In The Handbook of Global Energy Policy, First Edition. Edited by Andreas Goldthau. C 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2013 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Bouckaert, R. and Dupont, C. (2022) "Turning to Algeria to replace Russian gas: a false solution". Policy and research report 02/2022, Ghent University. Available at: https://www.ugent.be/eb/publiek-management/en/news-events/enclosures/policybriefturning

Bloomberg (2019), "Fracking Banned in the U.K. on Concern About Earthquakes". Published Nov 02, 2019. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-02/fracking-banned-in-u-k-after-concern-about-earthquakes-climate (accessed 20/11/2019)

Bloomberg (2021) "China's Oil Giant Sees New Refineries". Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-16/china-s-growing-refining-capacity-to-hurt-global-fuel-margins (accessed 11/09/2021)

Bloomberg (2022a) "Surging Fuel Costs Pressure African States as Protests Build". Available at:https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-08/protests-build-across-africa-over-surging-fuel-prices-shortages (accessed 04/07/2022)

Bloomberg (2022b) "Mexico's New Oil Refinery's Cost Doubles to as Much as \$18 Billion". Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-22/mexico-s-new-oil-refinery-s-cost-rises-to-as-much-as-18-billion?embedded-checkout=true

BBC (2007) "Summit of the Puebla-Panama Plan ends". Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_6543000/6543481.stm (accessed 20/03/2021)

BBC (2013a) "Mexico: PRD deputies block the Lower House in protest over energy reform". Available at: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/ultimas_noticias/2013/12/131211_ultnot_mexico_diputados_prd_toman_camara_msd (accessed 04/11/2021)

BBC (2013b) "Mexicans protest against Peña Nieto's energy reform". Available at: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/ultimas_noticias/2013/12/131201_ultnot_mexico_protesta_Peña_nieto_en (accessed 05/11/2021)

BBC (2016) "Mexico: the controversial refinery in which US\$620 million was spent and only a wall was built". Available at: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-37758957 (accessed 19/03/2021)

BBC (2015a) "The billion-dollar losses caused by fuel theft in Mexico". Available at: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2015/02/150128_mexico_pesadilla_robo_combustible_an (accessed 06/01/2021)

BBC (2015b) "Mexico: images of the moment of Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán's escape are released". Available at:

https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2015/07/150714_chapo_divulgan_imagenes_fuga_lav (accessed 10/09/2021)

BBC (2016) "Mexico: the controversial refinery in which US$620 million was spent and only a wall was built". Available at: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-37758957 (accessed 02/11/2021)

BBC (2018) "Mexico's war on drugs: Arrests fail to drive down violence". Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-42803801 (accessed 08/04/2021)

BBC (2019) "AMLO's "mornings": what the early conferences with which López Obrador sets Mexico's political agenda are like". Available at: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-47066862 (accessed 20/03/2021)

BBC (2020a) "Emilio Lozoya: Former Mexican oil boss leaves Spain to face charges". Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-53425825 (accessed 02/11/2021)

BBC (2020b) "Fall in oil price: the consequences for Latin America of the fall in the value of crude oil in the midst of the coronavirus crisis". Available at: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-51807458 (accessed 02/11/2021)

BBC (2022a) "Ecuador promises fuel price cuts amid protests", Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-61951632 (accessed 04/07/2022)

BBC (2022b) "Panama president reduces petrol prices following protests". Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-62120055 (accessed 04/07/2022)

BBC (2024a) "Russian oil getting into UK via refinery loophole". Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-68018660 (accessed 12/12/2024)

BBC (2024b) "Trump victory is a major setback for climate action, experts say". Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5ygplyg09ro (accessed 12/12/2024)

BBC (2025) "How Trump's 'drill, baby, drill' pledge is affecting other countries". Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce85709xdk4o (accessed 01/03/2025)

BS (2022) Business Standard "Highest fuel prices in Europe recorded in Netherlands, Denmark, Germany". Available at: https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/highest-fuel-prices-in-europe-recorded-in-netherlands-denmark-germany-122041200240_1.html (accessed 11/04/2022)

Bnamericas (2022) "Latin America's top 10 solar projects". Available at: https://www.bnamericas.com/en/features/latin-americas-top-10-solar-projects (accessed 19/08/2022)

Business Insider (2020) "Learn about Fobaproa, the bank debt that Mexicans will continue to pay for half a century". Available at: https://businessinsider.mx/que-es-fobaproa-historia-mexicanos-pagan-deuda-bancaria/ (accessed 07/04/2022)

Bank of Mexico (2013) "Gasoline Price Sliding Policy and Inflation Expectations". Available at: https://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-prensa/informes-trimestrales/recuadros/%7B6DC9A972-A05A-A9E2-6A4C-8848375EAEFA%7D.pdf (accessed 09/03/2022)

Bailey, C. (2021) "Oil companies are going all-in on petrochemicals and green chemistry needs help to compete". The conversation. Published May 25, 2021. Available at: https://theconversation.com/oil-companies-are-going-all-in-on-petrochemicals-and-green-chemistry-needs-help-to-compete-153598 (accessed 14/07/2021)

BP Energy outlook (2018). BP energy economics. Available at: https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/energy-outlook/bp-energy-outlook-2018.pdf (accessed 14/07/2021)

BP report (2020a) "Statistical review of world energy (oil)". Available at: https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/oil.html (accessed 12/11/2021)

BP report (2020b) "Statistical review of world energy (natural gas)". Available at: https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/natural-gas.html (accessed 11/11/2021)

BP report (2020c) "Statistical review of world energy (coal)". Available at: https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/coal.html (accessed 09/11/2021)

BP report (2020e). Energy Outlook 2020. The Energy Outlook explores the forces shaping the global energy transition out to 2050. Available at: https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/energy-outlook/bp-energy-outlook-2020.pdf (accessed 03/02/2021)

Cunningham, N. (2019) "Fuel Feuds in Mexico". NACLA Report on the Americas Volume 51, 2019 - Issue 2: Corruption Wars: New Narratives of Graft, Influence, and Power in the Americas.

Cairney, P. (2019) "Understanding Public Policy: Theories and Issues". Second edition. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Cairney, P, and Weible, C. (2015) "Comparing and Contrasting Peter Hall's Paradigms and Ideas with the Advocacy Coalition Framework." In Policy Paradigms in Theory and Practice—Discourses, Ideas and Anomalies in Public Policy Dynamics, ed. John Hogan, and Michael Howlett. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 83–99.

Cobb, R., Ross, J., and Ross, M (1976) "Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process". American Political Science Review 70: 126–38.

Cobb, R and Elder, C., (1983) "The Political Uses of Symbols". New York: Longman.

Carter, N. and Jacobs, M. (2014) "Explaining radical policy change: the case of climate change and energy policy under the British Labour government 2006–10". Public Administration 92 (1), 125–141

Clark, W., Golder, M., and Golder, S. (2012)." Principles of Comparative Politics". SAGE

Citi, M. (2013) "EU budgetary dynamics: incremental or punctuated equilibrium?", Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 20, Number 8, pp. 1157-1173(17)

Covarrubias, I., and Gallegos, C. (2024) "Democracy under fire? Ethics, distress and populism in current Mexico", working papers, Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales (IAEN).

Carrillo-Castro, A., and Garcia-Ramirez, S. (1983) "Public companies in Mexico". Mexico City: Porrua.

Clayton, B. C. (2015) "Market Madness: A Century of Oil Panics, Crises, and Crashes". New York: Oxford University Press. In Van de Graaf, Thijs; Sovacool, Benjamin K.. Global Energy Politics

Cherp, A. and Jewell, J. (2011) "Measuring Energy Security: From Universal Indicators to Contextualised Frameworks", in Sovacool, B. (ed.), The Routledge

Cherp, A., & Jewell, J. (2014) "The concept of energy security: Beyond the four As". Energy Policy, 75, 415–21.

Congress (1998) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, distribution of votes by political party in congress to approve FOBAPROA. Available at: http://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Votaciones/57/tabla2or1-18.php3 (accessed 12/04/2022)

Congress (2008a) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, LX Legislature, Parties vote in reform of the Energy Regulatory Commission Law. Available at: https://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Votaciones/60/tabla3or1-42.php3 (accessed 09/11/2021)

Congress (2008b) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, LX Legislature, Parties vote in reform of the Law for the Sustainable Use of Energy. Available at:

https://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Votaciones/60/tabla3or1-43.php3 (accessed 09/11/2021)

Congress (2008c) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, LX Legislature Parties vote in reform of the Law of the National Hydrocarbons Commission. Available at:https://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Votaciones/60/tabla3or1-44.php3 (accessed 09/11/2021)

Congress (2008d) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, LX Legislature. Parties vote in reform of Law for the Use of Renewable Energies and Financing of the Energy Transition. Available at: https://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Votaciones/60/tabla3or1-46.php3 (accessed 09/11/2021)

Congress (2008e) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, LX Legislature. Parties vote in the reform of article 33 of the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration. Available at: https://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Votaciones/60/tabla3or1-48.php3 (accessed 09/11/2021)

Congress (2008f) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, LX Legislature. Parties vote in the reform of the Regulatory Law of Constitutional Article 27. Available at: https://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Votaciones/60/tabla3or1-50.php3 (accessed 09/11/2021)

Congress (2008g) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, LX Legislature, Parties vote in the reform of the Mexican Petroleum Law. Available at: https://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Votaciones/60/tabla3or1-52.php3 (accessed 09/11/2021)

Congress (2008h) "The Reform of the Energy Sector in Mexico: the proposal of the Executive and the Reform Approved by the Legislature", Centre for Public Finance Studies of the Chamber of Deputies H. Congress of the Union, CEFP/104/2008. Available at: https://www.cefp.gob.mx/intr/edocumentos/pdf/cefp/2008/cefp1042008.pdf (accessed 15/09/2021)

Congress (2013a) "Plenary approves discussing energy reform minutes with waiver of procedures; It is urgent and obvious resolution". Chamber of Deputies of the Congress of the Union. Bulletin No. 2725. Available at: http://www3.diputados.gob.mx/camara/005_comunicacion/a_boletines/2013_2013/diciembre_diciembre/11_11/2725_pleno_aprueba_discutir_minuta_de_reforma_energetica_con_dispensa_de_tramites_es_de_urgente_y_obvia_resolucion (accessed 05/03/2021)

Congress (2013b) "Energy reform is generally approved; modifications to articles 25, 27 and 28 of the constitution". Chamber of Deputies of the Congress of the Union. Bulletin No. 2726. Available at: http://www3.diputados.gob.mx/camara/005_comunicacion/a_boletines/2013_2013/diciembre_diciembre/11_11/2726_se_aprueba_en_lo_general_reforma_energetica_modificaciones_a_los_articulos_25_27_y_28_constitucionales (accessed 04/12/2022)

Congress (2013c) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, LX Legislature. Parties vote in congress on Peña Nieto's 2013 energy reform. Available at: https://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Votaciones/62/tabla2or1-136.php3 (accessed 03/12/2022)

Congress (2016a) "Chamber of Deputies Approves Income Law for 2017". The Chamber of Deputies of the Congress of the Union. Bulletin No. 2373. 21-10-2016. Available at: http://www5.diputados.gob.mx/index.php/esl/Comunicacion/Boletines/2016/Octubre/21/2373-Aprueba-Camara-de-Diputados-Ley-de-Ingresos-para-2017 (accessed 15/11/2023)

Congress (2016b) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, LX Legislature. Parties vote in the chamber of deputies on the Federal Income Law for Fiscal Year 2017. Available at: https://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Votaciones/63/tabla2or1-29.php3 (accessed 03/12/2024)

Congress (2024) Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, constitutional Reforms by Presidential Period. Available at: https://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/cpeum_per.htm (accessed 03/12/2024)

CESOP (2017) "National survey on the increase in the price of gasoline". Centre for Social Studies and Public Opinion of the Chamber of Deputies of Mexico, Available at: http://www5.diputados.gob.mx/index.php/camara/Centros-de-Estudio/CESOP/Opinion-Publica/Encuestas/Encuesta-telefonica-nacional-Aumento-del-precio-de-la-gasolina (access 04/07/2022)

CarbonBrief (2020) "Analysis: World has already passed 'peak oil', BP figures reveal. Published September 5, 2020. Available at: https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-world-has-already-passed-peak-oil-bp-figures-reveal (accessed 03/02/2021)

Chemical Engineering (2020) "Major petroleum refinery under construction in Angola". Available at: https://www.chemengonline.com/major-petroleum-refinery-under-construction-in-angola/ (access 20/11/2021)

CFE (2024) "With the CFE, the energy transition in Mexico is advancing". Federal Electricity Commission. February 26, 2024. Available at: https://app.cfe.mx/cdn/2019/Imagenes/Boletines/Publicaciones/Suple_CFE-26feb24Final.pdf

CEFP (2022) "PEMEX budget 2006-2021". Centre for Finance Studies of the Chamber of Deputies. Available at: https://www.cefp.gob.mx/cefpnew/index.php (accessed 11/04/2023)

CNN (2021) "The UK's fuel crisis may be easing, but a winter of discontent could just be beginning". Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/world/live-news/uk-fuel-crisis-09-28-21/index.html (accessed 11/04/2022)

CNN (2022) "These two US states approved suspending the tax on gasoline. More could follow". Available at: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2022/03/21/gasolina-precio-impuestos-aumentos-estados trax/#:~:text=La%20ley%20entr%C3%B3%20en%20vigencia,32%20centavos%20sobre%20el%20diesel (accessed 03/12/2022)

Drzewiecka, A. (2007) "the joys and perils of conducting field research in Eastern Europe". Eur Polit Sci 6, 295–301.

Davis, S. J., Lewis, N. S., Shaner, M., Aggarwal, S., Arent, D., Azevedo, I. L., and Clack, C. T. (2018) "Net-zero emissions energy systems" Science, vol. 360, Issue 6396. Available at: https://science.sciencemag.org/content/360/6396/eaas9793.full

Davis, O. A., Dempster, M. A. H., and Wildavsky, A. (1966) "A Theory of the Budgetary Process". The American Political Science Review, 60(3), 529–547

Down, A. (1972) "Up and down with ecology, the 'issue-attention cycle'". Public Interest 28, p. 38.

Dominguez-Ordonez, C. (2015) "G20 subsidies to oil, gas and coal production: Mexico" Available at: https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/9967.pdf

DOF (2016) "Agreement by which the complementary quotas on IEPS to gasoline and diesel are announced, the maximum prices". Official Gazette of the Federation. Mexico. Available at: https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5455325&fecha=30/09/2016#gsc.tab=0

DW (2017) "Mexico murders hit record high". Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/mexico-records-most-violent-year-in-decades/a-41924460 (accessed 03/12/2021)

DW (2022) "Germany seeks to wean itself off Russian energy imports". Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/germany-seeks-to-wean-itself-off-russian-energy-imports/a-61257187 (accessed 11/04/2022)

Dresser, D. (2022) "Mexico's Dying Democracy: AMLO and the Toll of Authoritarian Populism" 101 Foreign Aff. 74.

Del Villar, S. (1979) "State and oil in Mexico: experiences and perspectives", Foro Internacional. Vol. 20, No. 1 (77) (Jul. - Sep. 1979), pp. 118-158, El Colegio de Mexico

Dhamodharan, K., Ahlawat, S., Kaushal, M., and Rajendran, K. (2020), "Economics and cost analysis of waste biorefineries" in Refining Biomass Residues for Sustainable Energy and Bioproducts Technology, Advances, Life Cycle Assessment, and Economics, 2020, Pages 545-565. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-818996-2.00025-9

Downtoearth (2021) "Why Shell being asked to cut emissions is a big move on Big Oil". May 27, 2021. Available at: https://www.downtoearth.org.in/blog/climate-change/why-shell-being-asked-to-cut-emissions-is-a-big-move-on-big-oil-77141 (accessed 14/07/21)

Debate (2023) "AMLO invites event on March 18". Available at: https://www.debate.com.mx/politica/Estan-invitados-todos-los-que-estan-a-favor-de-la-4T-llama-AMLO-a-llenar-el-Zocalo-el-18-de-marzo-20230306-0041.html (accessed 03/12/2024)

Democracy Index (2022) The Economist Democracy Index. Available at: https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/ (accessed 01/12/2023)

Eissler, R., Russell, A., Jones, B. (2016) "The Transformation of Ideas: The Origin and Evolution of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory", Contemporary approaches to public policy, Springer

Erisman, J. W., Sutton, M. A., Galloway, J., Klimont, Z., and Winiwarter, W. (2008) "How a century of ammonia synthesis changed the world", Nature Geoscience, 1(10), 636-639. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/ngeo325

EIA (2021) "For most of 2020, China's refineries processed more crude oil than U.S. refineries". U.S. Energy Information Administration. Available at: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=47296 (accessed 07/05/2022)

EIA (2021) U.S. Energy Information Administration. "For most of 2020, China's refineries processed more crude oil than U.S. refineries" Available at: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=47296 (accessed 22/08/2022)

EU (2023) "Joint gas purchasing: The Aggregate EU mechanism to increase energy security for Europe". European Commission. Brussels. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_2404 (accessed 14/11/2024)

Epstein, A. (2014) "the moral case for fossil fuels", Penguin, New York. USA.

Energycapital (2021) "Pemex buys Deer Park refinery from Shell; aims to self-sufficiency by 2023". Available at: https://energycapitalmedia.com/2021/05/24/pemex-buys-deer-park-refinery-from-shell-aims-to-self-sufficiency-by-2023/ (accessed 11/03/2022)

Energycapitalpower (2021) "Angola: New Refinery to be Built in Soyo". Available at: https://energycapitalpower.com/angola-new-refinery-to-be-built-in-soyo/ (accessed 09/032022)

Energiadebate (2021) "There is gasoline for 10 days, said AMLO; the strategic reserve is 5 days". Available at: https://energiaadebate.com/hay-gasolinas-para-10-dias-dijo-amlo-la-reserva-estrategica-es-de-5-dias/ (accessed 03/11/2022)

El Heraldo (2021) "AMLO recognizes that there is only gasoline for 10 days in Mexico" Available at: https://heraldodemexico.com.mx/nacional/2021/11/5/amlo-reconoce-que-solo-hay-gasolina-para-10-dias-en-mexico-351264.html (accessed 03/09/2022)

El Financiero (2015) "Fulfilled, only 28 of the 266 EPN promises". Available at: https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/cumplidas-solo-28-de-las-266-promesas-de-epn/ (accessed 14/03/2021)

El Financiero (2021) "Pemex Fertilizers Extinguished". Available at: https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/economia/extinguen-pemex-fertilizantes/ (accessed 03/12/2022)

El Financiero (2022) "AMLO announces construction of another coking plant in Salina Cruz". Available at: https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/2022/06/13/amlo-anuncia-construccion-de-otra-coquizadora-en-salina-cruz/ (accessed 19/08/2022)

El Universal (2002) "Treasury sells Ahisa at half price to Met-Life". Available at: https://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/primera/12488.html (accessed 03/09/2021)

El Universal (2016) "Evolution of the price of Magna gasoline by six-year period". Available at:https://interactivo.eluniversal.com.mx/external/graficos/online/PDF_16/PDF_int_precio-gasolina.pdf (accessed 03/09/2021)

El Universal (2017) "The city refinery that became a park". Available at: https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/entrada-de-opinion/colaboracion/mochilazo-en-el-tiempo/nacion/sociedad/2017/03/17/la-refineria-de-la/ (accessed 06/07/2023)

El Universal (2018) "The day the "system collapsed" and Salinas won". Available at: https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/colaboracion/mochilazo-en-el-tiempo/nacion/sociedad/el-dia-en-que-se-cayo-el-sistema-y-gano-salinas/ (accessed 06/07/2023)

El Universal (2019a) "Fox warns that investing in Pemex "is not even worth it". Available at:https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/politica/advierte-fox-que-invertir-en-pemex-ni-siquiera-vale-la-Peña (accessed 22/08/2022)

El Universal (2019b) "AMLO shows concessions granted in past six-year terms". Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i3EBOTmGMro&ab_channel=ElUniversal (accessed 19/11/2021)

El Universal (2021a) "Pemex puts a total lock on information from Dos Bocas". Available at: https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/cartera/pemex-pone-candado-total-a-informacion-de-dos-bocas/ (accessed 09/03/2023)

El Universal (2021b) "There was an agreement with an Odebrecht subsidiary for the Ethylene XXI plant: AMLO". Available at: https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/odebrecht-hubo-acuerdo-por-planta-de-etileno-xxi-amlo (accessed 11/03/2022)

El Universal (2023a) "The "First the Poor" did not fail, says Gerardo Esquivel, former deputy governor of Banxico". Available at: https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/cartera/el-primero-los-pobres-no-fallo-dice-gerardo-esquivel-ex-subgobernador-del-banxico/ (accessed 06/07/2023)

El Universal (2023b) "AMLO the most viewed Latin American streamer in 2023". Available at: https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/tendencias/amlo-el-streamer-mas-visto-de-latinoamerica-en-2023-le-abren-la-puerta-a-los-premios-esland/?outputType=amp (accessed 28/12/2023)

El Economista (2012a) "Government puts last state sugar mills up for sale". Available at:

https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/empresas/Gobierno-pone-a-la-venta-ultimos-ingenios-estatales-20120725-0034.html (accessed 09/05/2021)

El Economista (2012b) "Peña Nieto promises energy reform". Available at: https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/Peña-Nieto-promete-reforma-energetica--20120425-0086.html (accessed 04/03/2021)

El Economista (2013) "the Government tightens policy of fuel slippage". Available at: https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/economia/Endurece-gobierno-politica-a-desliz-de-combustibles-20130106-0106.html (accessed 09/02/2021)

El Economista (2014) "Gasolinazos, in the final stretch after seven years of being implemented". Available at: https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/economia/Gasolinazos-en-la-recta-final-tras-siete-anos-de-aplicarse-20141215-0123.html (accessed 04/08/2021)

El Economista (2016) "Senators approve freeing gasoline prices in 2017". Available at: https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/economia/Senadores-aprueban-liberar-precios-de-gasolina-en-2017--20161026-0063.html (accessed 03/04/2021)

El Economista (2017) "Gasoline is more expensive than in the Fox and Calderón governments". Available at: https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/empresas/Gasolinas-son-mas-caras-que-en-los-gobiernos-de-Fox-y-Calderón-20170111-0013.html (accessed 04/02/2021)

El Economista (2018) "Gasoline has become more expensive by 77% so far this six-year term". Available at: https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/empresas/Gasolina-se-ha-encarecido-77-en-lo-que-va-del-sexenio-20180911-0012.html (accessed 21/11/2021)

El Economista (2019a) "AMLO releases figures for mining concessions from previous six-year terms". Available at:
https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/AMLO-da-a-conocer-cifras-de-las-concesiones-mineras-de-anteriores-sexenios---20191224-0006.html (accessed 24/12/2023)

El Economista (2019b) "Huachicol grew throughout the country". Available at:

https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/Huachicol-crecio-por-todo-el-pais-20190116-0037.html (accessed 03/09/2023)

El Economista (2021) "Pemex agrees to buy the entire Deer Park refinery from Shell for 596 million dollars". Available at: https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/empresas/Pemex-acuerda-comprar-la-totalidad-de-refineria-Deer-Park-a-Shell-por-596-millones-de-dolares-20210524-0079.html (accessed 01/12/2021)

El Economista (2022a) "Mexico has the most moderate energy inflation in the OECD". November 7, 2022. Available at: https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/economia/Mexico-con-la-menor-inflacion-energetica-de-la-OCDE-20220705-0149.html (accessed 09/12/2022)

El Economista (2022b) "Mexico, with the lowest energy inflation in the OECD". July 6, 2022. Available at: https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/economia/Mexico-con-la-menor-inflacion-energetica-de-la-OCDE-20220705-0149.html (accessed 28/12/2022)

El Economista (2022c) "Mexico, with the lowest energy inflation in the OECD". Available at: https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/economia/Mexico-con-la-menor-inflacion-energetica-de-la-OCDE-20220705-0149.html (accessed 22/08/2022)

El Economista (2023a) "Disinflation of energy prices continues in OECD countries". August 3, 2023. Available at: https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/economia/Continua-desinflacion-de-precios-de-energeticos-en-paises-OCDE-20230803-0105.html (accessed 24/12/2023)

El Economista (2023b) "Zama field would begin crude oil production in 2025". Available at: https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/empresas/Campo-Zama-iniciara-produccion-de-crudo-en-2025-y-tocara-pico-en-2029-CNH-20230601-0065.html (accessed 24/12/2023)

El Economista (2024a) "SCJN invalidates AMLO's electrical reform". Available at: https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/empresas/SCJN-invalida-la-reforma-electrica-de-AMLO-20240201-0021.html (accessed 12/12/2024)

El Economista (2024b) "Mexico expropriates hydrogen plant operated by Air Liquide at the Tula refinery". Available at: https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/empresas/Mexico-expropia-

planta-de-hidrogeno-operada-porAir-Liquide-en-refineria-de-Tula-20240209-0054.html (accessed 28/12/2024)

El Economista (2024c) "SCJN invalidates AMLO's electrical reform". Available at: https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/empresas/SCJN-invalida-la-reforma-electrica-de-AMLO-20240201-0021.html (accessed 29/12/2024)

Excelsior (2013) "PRD calls for march against Energy Reform". Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iWM2ZKaVfO8&ab_channel=EXCELSIOR (accessed 15/05/2021)

Excelsior (2019) "Chocolate cars, a big problem in Mexico". Available at: https://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/autos-chocolate-un-gran-problema-en-mexico/1354237, (accessed 22/08/2022)

Expansion (2007) "The sale of Aeroméxico is laughable: Saba". Available at: https://expansion.mx/negocios/2007/10/25/la-venta-de-aeromexico-da-risa-saba (accessed 01/09/2021)

Expansion (2009) "Calderón defends process against LyFC". Available at: https://expansion.mx/actualidad/2009/10/13/decision-de-cerrar-lyfc-fue-dificil-fch (accessed 17/07/2021)

Expansion (2012) "Peña Nieto promises to "make a reality" the Bicentenario refinery in Hidalgo". Available at: https://expansion.mx/nacional/2012/05/20/Peña-nieto-promete-hacer-realidad-la-refineria-bicentenario-en-hidalgo (accessed 12/11/2021)

Expansion (2023) "These are the 18 banks that Carlos Salinas de Gortari privatized". Available at: https://expansion.mx/economia/2023/05/10/bancos-que-privatizo-salinas-de-gortari, (accessed 08/07/2023)

Expansion (2023) "How illegal fuel imports put the industry in check". Available at:

https://expansion.mx/empresas/2023/08/17/huachicol-fiscal-que-es-como-afecta (accessed 19/12/2023)

Expansion-politica (2019) "Salinas and Calderón, the ones that granted the most mining concessions". Available at https://politica.expansion.mx/presidencia/2019/12/24/salinas-y-Calderón-los-que-mas-concesiones-mineras-otorgaron (accessed 01/12/2021)

Expansion-politica (2022) ""Defend the Mexican peso like a dog", what does López Portillo's phrase mean?". Available at: https://politica.expansion.mx/mexico/2022/08/25/defender-el-peso-como-un-perro-López -portillo (accessed 06/07/2023)

Expansion-politica (2023a) "Keys to understanding what Fobaproa is and why it continues to be paid". Available at: https://politica.expansion.mx/mexico/2023/06/07/que-es-el-fobaproa (accessed 01/12/2023)

Expansion-politica (2023b) "AMLO demonstration on March 18: the 85 anniversary of the oil expropriation". Available at: https://politica.expansion.mx/mexico/2023/03/18/marcha-hoy-cdmx-amlo-minuto-a-minuto#uuid00000186-f762-dc92-a99e-ff6605b90000 (accessed 01/12/2023)

Expansion (2023) "The reconfiguration of the owners of the Zama oil field". Available at: https://expansion.mx/empresas/2023/12/27/duenos-campo-petrolero-zama (accessed 09/01/2024)

El Pais (1990) "Vargas Llosa: "Mexico is the perfect dictatorship". Available at: https://elpais.com/diario/1990/09/01/cultura/652140001_850215.html (accessed 06/07/2023)

El Pais (2007) "The construction of a large refinery divides Central America". Available at: https://elpais.com/internacional/2007/04/10/actualidad/1176156004_850215.html (accessed 01/12/2021)

El Pais (2019) "López Obrador, when he blocked 51 oil wells in 1996". Available at: https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/08/03/mexico/1564858669_898159.html (accessed 12/07/2021)

El Pais (2023a) "Amlopedia, the search engine created to investigate López Obrador's conferences". Available at: https://elpais.com/mexico/2023-04-26/amlopedia-el-motor-de-busquedas-creado-para-indagar-en-las-conferencias-de-López-obrador.html (accessed 12/01/2024)

El Pais (2023b) "López Obrador calls for a new citizen mobilization in support of his government's energy policy". Available at: https://elpais.com/mexico/2023-01-25/López-obrador-convoca-a-una-nueva-movilizacion-ciudadana-en-apoyo-a-la-politica-energetica-de-su-gobierno.html (accessed 01/12/2023)

Fernández-i-Marín, X., Hurka, S., Knill, C., Steinebach, Y. (2020) "Systemic Dynamics of Policy Change: Overcoming Some Blind Spots of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory", Policy studies Journal.

Fairclough, N. (2013) "Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language". Routledge

Foroohar, R. (2022) "The new rules for business in a post-neoliberal world". Financial Times. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/e04bc664-04b2-4ef6-90f9-64e9c4c126aa, (accessed 02/06/2023)

Fowler, L., Neaves, T., Terman, J., Cosby, A. (2017) "Cultural Penetration and Punctuated Policy Change: Explaining the Evolution of U.S. Energy Policy" Review of Policy, Volume 34, Issue 4, Pages 559-577

Farstad, F., Hermansen, E., Grasbekk, B., Brudevoll, K., Van Oort, B., (2022) "Explaining radical policy change: Norwegian climate policy and the ban on cultivating peatlands", Global Environmental Change, Volume 74.

Fattouh, B., Poudineh, R., and West, R. (2019) "The rise of renewables and energy transition: what adaptation strategy exists for oil companies and oil-exporting countries?", Energy Transitions 3:45–58, Springer

Fattouh, B., and Economou, A. (2019) "Saudi Arabia's Oil Productive Capacity: The Trade-Offs", Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, University of Oxford, UK.

Fattouh, B. (2020) "The Energy Transition & Adaptation Strategies for Oil Exporters", Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, OPEC Technical Workshop, 29 September 2020

Fattouh, B., and Sen, A. (2021) "Economic Diversification in Arab Oil-Exporting Countries in the Context of Peak Oil and the Energy Transition" In When Can Oil Economies Be Deemed Sustainable? (pp. 73-97). Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. Available at: https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/economic-diversification-in-arab-oil-exporting-countries-in-the-context-of-peak-oil-and-the-energy-transition/

Flink, C. (2017) "Rethinking Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: A Public Administration Approach to Budgetary Changes", Policy Studies Journal, Volume 45, Issue 1, Pages 101-120

Financial Times (2013) "End Mexico's disastrous 'war on drugs' once and for all". Available at:https://www.ft.com/content/b2d7be06-5850-11e3-9da6-00144feabdc0#axzz2mMRKLZpY (accessed 01/12/2021)

Financial Times (2016) "The Mexican peso and the Trump trade". Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/83bfa33c-7dcc-11e6-8e50-8ec15fb462f4 (accessed 09/08/2022)

Financial Times (2022) "Crude awakening: the German town on the front line of Russian sanctions". Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/0c5d883b-e282-436f-85d9-08b6f3ba2abf (accessed 09/06/2023)

Flick, U. (2018) "An Introduction to Qualitative Research". 6th ed.

France24 (2018) "The Peña Nieto years: the reforms, the scandals, the Chapo". Available at: https://www.france24.com/en/20180622-Peña-nieto-years-reforms-scandals-chapo (accessed 15/09/2022)

Fundar (2014) "Official advertising of the federal government from 2013 to 2016". Available at: https://www.fundar.org.mx/mexico/pdf/PublicidadOficialGobiernoFederal2014.pdf (accessed 13/10/2021)

Fundar (2017) "Official advertising of the federal government in 2014". Available at: https://fundar.org.mx/mexico/pdf/P.O.2013-2016oK2.pdf (accessed 13/10/2021)

Fortune India (2021) "Capex push! HPCL to raise refining, petchem capacity by 2024: CMD". Available at: https://www.fortuneindia.com/enterprise/capex-push-hpcl-to-raise-refining-petchem-capacity-by-2024-cmd/106164 (accessed 11/04/2022)

FuelsEurope (2021) statistical report, "Refinery closures in Europe". Available at: https://www.fuelseurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/SR_FuelsEurope-_2021_FINAL-REPORT-1.pdf (accessed 19/08/2022)

Forbes (2013a) "The mistakes that the energy reform should not repeat". Available at: https://www.forbes.com.mx/los-errores-que-no-debe-repetir-la-reforma-energetica/ (accessed 18/11/2023)

Forbes (2013b) "'La Quina', the former union leader who challenged Salinas". Available at: https://www.forbes.com.mx/fallece-la-quina-el-ex-lider-sindical-que-desafio-a-salinas/ (accessed 07/10/2022)

Forbes (2019) "The 24 families that became rich with Salinas in 1994". Available at: https://www.forbes.com.mx/las-24-familias-que-se-enriquecieron-con-salinas-en-1994-segun-amlo/ (accessed 03/07/2023)

Forbes (2020) "Odebrecht's Ethylene XXI runs out of natural gas supply". Available at: https://www.forbes.com.mx/negocios-etileno-xxi-odebrecht-sin-suministro-gas/, (accessed 19/08/2022)

Forbes (2021) "Integrate fertilizer plants into one company: AMLO". Published April 30, 2021. Available at: https://www.forbes.com.mx/plantas-fertilizantes-una-sola-empresa-amlo/ (accessed 03/08/2021)

Forbes (2022a) "Germany Reopens Coal Plants Because Of Reduced Russian Energy". Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/juliecoleman/2022/07/08/germany-reopens-coal-plants-because-of-reduced-russian-energy/?sh=2c6bf9573507 (accessed 22/08/2022)

Forbes (2022b) "Ancira pays Pemex another 2.5 million pesos to compensate damages from the junk plant, Alonso Ancira, president of Altos Hornos, made another payment to compensate for damages for the sale of a scrap plant to Pemex". Available at: https://www.forbes.com.mx/ancira-paga-a-pemex-otros-2-5-mdp-para-resarcir-danos-de-planta-chatarra/ (accessed 19/08/2022)

Forbes (2022c) "AMLO government invests 9,641 million pesos in the construction of a solar park in Puerto Peñasco". Available at: https://www.forbes.com.mx/negocios-gobierno-de-amlo-invierte-9641-mdp-en-la-construccion-de-parque-solar-en-puerto-Peñasco/ (accessed 19/08/2022)

Fronteras (2021) "Mexico Plans To Build World's 8th-Largest Solar Plant In Sonora By 2023". Available at: https://fronterasdesk.org/content/1700705/mexico-plans-build-worlds-8th-largest-solar-plant-sonora-2023 (accessed 19/08/2022)

Gutiérrez, R. (2014) "Structural reforms in Mexico during the six-year term of Felipe Calderón: energy". Economía UNAM. vol.11, n.32, pp.32-58

González Márquez, J. (2022) "The past, present and future of energy law in Mexico: energy law from 1992 to 2022". Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, Vol 40, No 1, 33–41.

Gerstle, G. (2022) "The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Order". Oxford University Press.

Goldthau and Westphal (2019) "Why the Global Energy Transition Does Not Mean the End of the Petrostate", Global Policy Volume 10, Issue 2, May 2019, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12649

Goldthau, A. (2010) "Energy Diplomacy in Trade and Investment of Oil and Gas" in Goldthau, A. and Witte, J.M. (eds.), Global Energy Governance: the New Rules of the Game. Washington, DC: Brookings Press.

Goldthau, A. (2017) 'The G20 Must Govern the Shift to Low-carbon Energy', Nature, 546 (7657), pp. 203–205.

Goldthau, A. (2014) "Rethinking the governance of energy infrastructure: Scale, decentralization and polycentrism", Energy Research & Social Science 1 (2014) 134–140

Goldthau, A. (2012) "From the State to the Market and Back: Policy Implications of Changing Energy Paradigms", Global Policy 3(2). Pages 198-210. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2011.00145.x

Green-Pedersen, C. and Wilkerson, J. (2006) "How agenda-setting attributes shape politics: basic dilemmas, problem attention and health politics developments in Denmark and the US", Journal of European Public Policy 13(7), 1039–52.

Green-Pedersen, C. (2007) "The Conflict of Conflicts in Comparative Perspective: Euthanasia as a Political Issue in Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands." Comparative Political Studies 39 (3): 273–291.

Green-Pedersen, C. and J. Krogstrup (2008) "Immigration as a Political Issue in Denmark and Sweden", European Journal of Political Research, 47, 5, 610–34.

Green-Pedersen, C. and M. Wolfe (2009) "The Institutionalization of Environmental Attention in the United States and Denmark: Multiple- versus Single-Venue Systems", Governance, 22, 4, 625–46.

George, A. L. and Bennett, A. (2005) "Case studies and theory development in the social sciences". Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

Gee, J. P. (2014) "An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method". Routledge.
Van Dijk, T. A. (2011) "Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction". Sage.

Gavin, M. (1996) "The Mexican Oil Boom: 1977-1985". Inter-American Development Bank, IDB Working Paper No. 258.

Grin, J., Rotmans, J., and Schot, J. (2010) "Transitions to Sustainable Development", Routledge, Abingdon.

Givel, M. (2010) "The Evolution of the Theoretical Foundations of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory in Public Policy", Review of Policy Research, Volume 27, Issue 2, Pages 187-198

Gil-Valdivia, G. (2008) "The oil crisis in Mexico, the national energy sector and the long-term vision of the country's development". Foro Consultivo Científico y Tecnológico, A.C

Gómez Díaz de León, C. (2024) "The crisis of democracy in Mexico: Chronicling the dismantling of democratic institutions". In: Democracy - Crises and Changes Across the Globe. IntechOpen, London, pp. 1-19. ISBN 9780854661800

Global Data's latest report (2022), 'Global Capacity and Capital Expenditure Outlook for Refineries 2022'. Available at: https://www.offshore-technology.com/comment/china-refinery-cdu-capacity-additions/ (accessed 02/02/2022)

Global Data's report (2021) 'Global Crude Oil Refinery Projects Outlook, 2021-2025'. Available at: https://www.offshore-technology.com/comment/asia-refinery-capacity-additions/ (accessed 02/02/2022)

Global Witness (2023a) "Investigation reveals the EU's 'Russian oil loophole' contributing an estimated €1.1 billion in taxes to Kremlin". Available at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/investigation-reveals-the-eus-russian-oil-loophole-contributing-an-estimated-11-billion-in-taxes-to-kremlin/ (accessed 11/11/2023)
Global Witness (2023b) "Close the refining loophole". Available at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/stop-russian-oil/close-refining-loophole/ (accessed 14/11/2023)

Guardian (2017) "Mexico protests: how gas prices lit the flame under a quietly smouldering rage". Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/09/mexico-gasoline-price-protest-gasolinazo (accessed 22/08/2022)

Guardian (2022) "Germany is reactivating coal power plants, a more polluting fossil-fuel as Russia curbs gas flow". Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/08/germany-reactivate-coal-power-plants-russia-curbs-gas-flow (accessed 22/08/2022)

Government of Mexico (2020), Presidency of the Republic, "Supervision of the Rehabilitation of the National Refining System: "La Cangrejera" Petrochemical Complex, Coatzacoalcos". Available at: https://www.gob.mx/presidencia/articulos/supervision-de-la-rehabilitacion-del-sistema-nacional-de-refinacion-complejo-petroquimico-la-cangrejera-coatzacoalcos, (accessed 22/08/2022)

Government of Mexico (2021) Press conference from the National Palace, "Gasoline and diesel imports and national consumption levels in Mexico, 2011-2021". May 26, 2021. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gp4Yon6j5b0 (accessed 14/07/21)

Government of Mexico (2022a) Press conference from the National Palace, "Pemex gasoline and diesel imports, 2018-2022". March 10, 2022. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5NMoMmL_PoU&t=4661s (accessed 10/03/22)

Government of Mexico (2022b) Press conference from the National Palace "Historic IEPS subsidy keeps fuel prices stable. President AMLO Conference". March 14, 2022. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D_gQ8WO_oTA&t=1580s (accessed 11/04/2022)

Gobernacion (2023) "Civic calendar in Mexico". Gobierno de Mexico. Available at: http://calendariocivico.segob.gob.mx/ (accessed 06/07/2023)

Herandez Ibarzábal, A. and Bonilla, D. (2020) "Examining Mexico's energy policy under the 4T" The Extractive Industries and Society, Volume 7, Issue 2, April 2020, Pages 669-675.

Hingsamer M., and Jungmeier G. (2019) "Biorefineries" in The Role of Bioenergy in the Emerging Bioeconomy, Resources, Technologies, Sustainability and Policy". Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-813056-8.00005-4

Howlett, M., and Ramesh, M. (2003) "Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems", Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hafner, M., and Tagliapietra, S. (2020) "The Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition", Lecture Notes in Energy 73.

Huber, R., Maltby, T., Szulecki, K., and Ćetković, S. (2021) "Is populism a challenge to European energy and climate policy? Empirical evidence across varieties of populism," Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 28, Issue 7, Pages 998-1017. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1918214

Hegelich, S., Fraune, C., Knollmann, D. (2015) "Point Predictions and the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: A Data Mining Approach—U.S. Nuclear Policy as Proof of Concept", Policy Studies Journal, Volume 43, Issue 2, Pages 228-256

Heffron, R., McCauley, D., and Sovacool, B. (2015) "Resolving society's energy trilemma through the Energy Justice Metric", Energy Policy, Volume 87, Pages 168-176. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2015.08.033

Helm, D. (2020) "Net Zero: How We Stop Causing Climate Change". William Collins, London
Helm, D. (2017) "Burn out: the endgame for fossil fuels". Yale University Press, London

Helm, D. (2015) "The carbon crunch: how we're getting climate change wrong—and how to fix it". Yale University Press, London

IEA (2017) "The Future of Trucks Implications for energy and the environment", Paris: IEA. Available   at: https://www.zemo.org.uk/assets/reports/TheFutureofTrucksImplicationsforEnergyandtheEnvironment.pdf (accessed 14/07/2021)

IEA (2018b) "Oil 2018. Analysis and forecast to 2023", Paris: IEA. Available at: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/4ac1a454-1a4f-4024-886a-7dc573c8215d/Market_Report_Series_Oil_2018.pdf (accessed 14/07/2021)

IEA (2018c) "Outlook for Producer Economies. What do Changing Energy Dynamics Mean for Major oil and Gas Exporters?", Paris: IEA. Available at: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/5798254b-0e2c-4104-91c4-d420f105863b/WEO_2018_Special_Report_Outlook_for_Producer_Economies.pdf (accessed 14/07/2021)

IEA (2018d) "The Future of Cooling Opportunities for energy efficient air conditioning?", Paris: IEA. Available at: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/0bb45525-277f-4c9c-8d0c-9c0cb5e7d525/The_Future_of_Cooling.pdf (accessed 14/07/2021)

IEA (2020) "Energy Technology Perspectives report 2020", Paris: IEA. Available at: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/7f8aed40-89af-4348-be19-c8a67df0b9ea/Energy_Technology_Perspectives_2020_PDF.pdf (accessed 14/07/2021)

IEA (2020) "The Oil and Gas Industry in Energy Transitions". World Energy Outlook special report, Published January 2020. Available at: https://www.iea.org/reports/the-oil-and-gas-industry-in-energy-transitions (accessed 02/05/2021)

IEA (2023) "Global crude oil production in 2023 by selected countries", U.S. Energy Information Administration. Available at: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61545 (accessed 18/11/2023)

IEA (2024) "Where does the world get its oil?". Available at: https://www.iea.org/world/oil

ICAP (2016) "Emissions Trading Worldwide" International Carbon Action Partnership" (ICAP) Status Report.

IPCC (2014) "Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers", Fifth Assessment Report

INEGI (2022) The National Institute of Statistics and Geography, INEGI. "Total of vehicles, registered in circulation". Available at: https://www.inegi.org.mx/temas/vehiculos/ (accessed 22/07/2022)

INEGI (2023) "Motor vehicles registered in Mexico 1980-2022". The National Institute of Statistics and Geography, INEGI. Mexico. Available at: https://www.inegi.org.mx/temas/vehiculos/ (accessed 21/11/2023)

Infobae (2020) "Before Odebrecht and Etileno XXI there was Oceanografía, the Pemex scandal that affected Fox and Martha Sahagún's sons". Available at: https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2020/11/08/antes-de-odebrecht-y-etileno-xxi-existio-oceanografia-el-escandalo-en-pemex-que-salpico-a-fox-y-los-hijos-de-martha-sahagun/ (accessed 21/01/2021)

Infobae (2021) "AMLO assured that the country has gasoline reserves for 10 days; called for energy self-sufficiency". Available at: https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2021/11/05/amlo-superviso-los-trabajos-de-la-refineria-madero-vamos-hacia-la-autosuficiencia-energetica/?outputType=amp-type (accessed 19/11/2022)

Infobae (2022) "Who were the families of Mexican billionaires before and after the six-year term of Salinas de Gortari". Available at: https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2022/07/15/quienes-eran-las-familias-de-multimillonarios-mexicanos-antes-y-despues-del-sexenio-de-salinas-de-gortari/ (accessed 03/07/2023)

Infobae (2022) "The reforms that happened on fast track or when Mexicans were on vacation". Available at: https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2022/04/16/las-reformas-que-pasaron-en-fast-track-o-cuando-los-mexicanos-estaban-de-vacaciones/ (accessed 13/01/2023)

Infobae (2023a) "AMLO, the most viewed streamer in Latin America in 2023: How many hours did he dedicate to 'La Mañanera'?". Available at:

https://www.infobae.com/mexico/2023/12/29/amlo-el-streamer-mas-visto-de-latinoamerica-en-2023-cuantas-horas-dedico-a-la-mananera/ (accessed 21/12/2023)

Infobae (2023b) "This is the richest oil field in the country that will be exploited by Carlos Slim with his new company". Available at: https://www.infobae.com/mexico/2023/09/29/este-es-el-campo-petrolero-mas-rico-del-pais-que-sera-explotado-por-carlos-slim-con-su-nueva-compania/ (accessed 21/12/2023)

Infobae (2023c) "AMLO the most viewed Latin American streamer in 2023". Available at: https://www.infobae.com/mexico/2023/12/29/amlo-el-streamer-mas-visto-de-latinoamerica-en-2023-cuantas-horas-dedico-a-la-mananera/?outputType=amp-type (accessed 21/12/2023)

Infobae (2023d) "What was Pemexgate, the electoral scandal in which Carlos Romero Deschamps was the protagonist". Available at:
https://www.infobae.com/mexico/2023/10/20/que-fue-el-pemexgate-el-escandalo-electoral-del-que-carlos-romero-deschamps-fue-protagonista/ (accessed 21/12/2023)

Indigo (2019) "After damaging and overexploiting it, Pemex plans to extract oil from Cantarell again". Available at: https://www.reporteindigo.com/indigonomics/luego-de-danarlo-y-sobreexplotarlo-pemex-planea-volver-a-extraer-petroleo-de-cantarell/ (accessed 05/10/2021)

Imagen-Noticias (2013) PRD "Members reject privatization of Pemex". Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aqgUH8ZmQns&ab_channel=ImagenNoticias (accessed 23/11/2023)

INE (2018) National Electoral Institute. Presidential election results, Mexico. Available at: https://www.ine.mx/voto-y-elecciones/ (accessed 03/11/2021)

INE (2021) National Electoral Institute. Mexico. LXIV Legislature of the Congress of the Union of Mexico. Available at: https://www.ine.mx/ (accessed 21/10/2023)

INE (2021) National Electoral Institute. Mexico. Senators. Available at: https://prep2024.ine.mx/publicacion/nacional/senadurias/nacional/entidades (accessed 10/08/2022)

INE (2022) National Electoral Institute. Mexico. Main national political parties in Mexico as of 2018. Available at: https://www.ine.mx/ (accessed 21/10/2023)

INE (2024a) National Electoral Institute. Mexico. Chamber of Deputies and Senate by political parties. Available at: https://www.ine.mx/ (accessed 19/05/2024)

INE (2024b) National Electoral Institute. Chamber of Deputies, Senate, and major states by political parties. Available at: https://www.ine.mx/ (accessed 11/07/2024)

IMF (2019) Country Report No. 19/291, Selected Issues paper on Saudi Arabia, International Monetary Fund Washington, D.C.

IMF (2020) "Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia", International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.

Johnstone, B. (2018) "Discourse Analysis". Wiley-Blackwell.

Johnson, M., and McLean, E. (2020) "Discourse Analysis", International Encyclopaedia of Human Geography (Second Edition), Pages 377-383.

John, P (2006) "Explaining Policy Change: The Impact of the Media, Public Opinion and Political Violence on Urban Budgets in England." Journal for European Public Policy 13 (7): 1053–1068.

Johnston, R., Blakemore, R, and Bell, R. (2020) "The Role of Oil and Gas Companies in the Energy Transition". Atlantic Council, Washington, DC. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/OGT-final-web-version.pdf

Johnstone, P., and Newell, P. (2017) "Sustainability transitions and the state", Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, Volume 27, Pages 72-82

Klein, N. (2008) "The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism". London: Penguin.

King, G., Keohane, R.O. and Verba, S. (1994) "Designing Social Inquiry", Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

King, G., Keohane, R.O. and Verba, S. (2021) "Designing Social Inquiry", Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kingdon, J. (1984) "Agendas, alternatives, and public policies". Boston, MA: Little Brown.

Kingdon, J. (1995) "Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies", 2nd edition. New York: HarperCollins.

Kingdon, J. (2003) "Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies". 2nd Edition, Addison-Wesley Longman Inc., Boston.

Kuzemko, C., Goldthau, A., and Keating, M. (2016) "The Global Energy Challenge: Environment, Development, Security", Macmillan Education, UK.

Kuzemko, C, Lawrence, A., and Watson, M. (2019) "New Directions in the International Political Economy of Energy", Review of International Political Economy, 26:1, 1-25

Kuzemko, C. (2019) "Re-scaling IPE: Local government, sustainable energy, and change", Review of International Political Economy, 26:1, 80-104.

Koski, C. and Workman, S. (2018) "Drawing practical lessons from punctuated equilibrium theory", Policy & Politics, Volume 46, Number 2, pp. 293-308(16)

Kuhlmann, J. and van der Heijden, J. (2018) "What Is Known about Punctuated Equilibrium Theory? And What Does That Tell Us about the Construction, Validation, and Replication of Knowledge in the Policy Sciences?", Review of Policy Research, Volume 35, Issue 2, Pages 326-347

KPMG (2018) "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia budget report", A review of KSA 2019 budget and recent economic developments. Available at: https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/sa/pdf/2018/kingdom-of-saudi-arabia-budget-report.pdf

Lago, C., Caldés, N., and Lechón, Y. (2019) "The Role of Bioenergy in the Emerging Bioeconomy Resources, Technologies, Sustainability and Policy". Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/C2016-0-03740-3

Luna, T., and Jasso, M. (2021) "Gasoline prices are 8% more expensive so far in the six-year term". 24 horas, Mexico. Available at: https://www.24-horas.mx/2021/03/30/se-encarecen-8-los-precios-de-las-gasolinas-en-lo-que-va-del-sexenio/ (accessed 13/01/2022)

Lelieveldt, H., and Princen, S. (2023) "The Politics of the European Union". Cambridge University Press.

Lindblom, C. (1959) "The Science of ''Muddling Through''", Public Administration Review, 19, 2, 79–88.

Lam, W., and Chan, K. (2015) "How Authoritarianism Intensifies Punctuated Equilibrium: The Dynamics of Policy Attention in Hong Kong", Governance, Volume 28, Issue 4, Pages 549-570

Luciani, G., and Moerenhout, T. (2020) "When Can Oil Economies Be Deemed Sustainable? The Political Economy of the Middle East". Available at: https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9789811557279

Los Angeles Times (2017) "Protests ignited by gasoline price hikes continue to roil Mexico". Available at: https://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexico-gas-protest-20170109-story.html (accessed 19/08/2022)

Los Angeles Times (2022) "Californians find bargain gas prices in Mexico". Available at: https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2022-03-24/la-fg-mexico-gas-prices (accessed 22/08/2022)

López Mateos, A. (1960). Message to the people of Adolfo López Mateo. Available at: https://www.memoriapoliticademexico.org/Textos/6Revolucion/1960-MP-LMA.html (accessed 18/06/2021)

Les Temps (2022) "Oil majors post record profits". Available at https://blogs.letemps.ch/laurent-horvath/2022/07/30/les-majors-petrolieres-affichent-des-benefices-records/ (accessed 19/08/2022)

La Jornada (2007) "The sale of Aeroméxico, arranged to benefit the Banamex group". Available at: https://www.jornada.com.mx/2007/10/15/index.php?section=politica&article=010n2pol(accessed 17/08/2022)

La Jornada (2008) "They will eliminate 95% of the projects of the Puebla-Panama Plan". Available at: https://www.jornada.com.mx/2008/06/28/index.php?section=politica&article=008n1pol (accessed 11/05/2021)

La Jornada (2008) "AMLO established the National Movement in Defence of oil". Available at: https://www.jornada.com.mx/2008/01/10/index.php?section=politica&article=013n1pol (accessed 01/07/2021)

La Jornada (2009) "Onerous benefits made the LFC operation unfeasible, says Calderón". Available at: https://www.jornada.com.mx/2009/10/12/index.php?section=politica&article=013n1pol (accessed 11/05/2021)

La Jornada (2015) "In 2015, Peña Nieto credited structural reforms with ending fuel increases". Available at: https://www.jornada.com.mx/2016/12/28/politica/004n2pol (accessed 04/17/2022)

Lukoil (2018) "the global trends in oil and gas market to 2025". Available at: https://www.lukoil.be/pdf/Trends_Global_Oil_ENG.pdf (accessed 14/07/2021)

Michaud, G. (2019) "Punctuating the equilibrium: A lens to understand energy and environmental policy changes", International Journal of Energy Research, Volume 43, Issue 8

MacLeod, D. (2004) "Downsizing the State: Privatization and the Limits of Neoliberal Reform in Mexico". Pennsylvania state University press.

Morales, I. (2020) "The Future of Pemex: A Return to a State-centred Model or a Means to Strengthen Mexico's Energy Resilience?". Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy.

Melgar, L. (2010) "Energy Transition: A Path Towards Sustainable Development for Mexico". Latin American Policy, Volume 1, Number 1, Pages 98–113

Monsiváis-Carrillo, A. (2024) "Deceitful autocratization: Subverting democracy through electoral reform in Mexico". Latin American Policy, Volume1 5, Issue

Meyer, L (1995) "Authoritarian liberalism: the contradictions of the Mexican political system". Mexico City, Ed. Oceano.

Moreno, M. (2017) "From Fox to Peña: This is how the price of gasoline has moved and why". Dinero en Imagen. Available at: From Fox to Peña: This is how the price of gasoline has moved and why". Available at: https://www.dineroenimagen.com/2017-01-10/82170 (accessed 06/06/2021)

Majone, G. (1994) "The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe", West European Politics, 17 (3), pp. 77–101.

Maldonado, M. (2021) "Lozoya, the traitor", Planeta Group Mexico.

Mahdavy, H. (1970) "The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in a Rentier Stare: The Case of Iran". In M. A. Cook (Ed.), "Studies in Economic History of the Middle East". London: Oxford University Press.

Miller, R. G., and Sorrell, S. R. (2014) "The future of oil supply. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences", 372(2006). In Van de Graaf, Thijs; Sovacool, Benjamin K.Global Energy Politics

Manzi, T. (2012) "Discourse Analysis, International Encyclopaedia of Housing and Home, Pages 354-358.

Mosco V., and Schiller, D. (2001) "Continental Order? Integrating North America for Cybercapitalism". Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Malik, M., and Nagesh, T. (2020) "Fiscal Sustainability and Hydrocarbon Endowment Per Capita in the GCC", Chapter 9, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford, UK, in G. Luciani, T. Moerenhout (eds.), "When Can Oil Economies Be Deemed Sustainable? The Political Economy of the Middle East". Available at: https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9789811557279

MORENA (2023) Electoral political platform. Available at: https://www.ine.mx/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/MORENA-PlataformaElectoral-VInculos.pdf (accessed 16/11/2022)

Milenio (2013) "Pemex must be modernized, without privatizing: PRD". Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=khECw62eyvI&ab_channel=MILENIO (accessed 16/05/2021)

Milenio (2016) "Where is *Pajaritos* Petrochemical Company and what do they do?" Available at: https://www.milenio.com/negocios/donde-esta-y-que-hacen-en-la-petroquimica-pajaritos (accessed 22/04/2021)

Milenio (2018) "Was there an election with a single candidate in Mexico?". Available at: https://www.milenio.com/elecciones-mexico-2018/hubo-unas-elecciones-con-un-solo-candidato-en-mexico (accessed 06/07/2023)

Milenio (2021) "Etileno XXI celebrates its 5th anniversary, a history of disagreements between Braskem and the government". Published 22.06.2021. Available at:

https://www.milenio.com/negocios/etileno-xxi-planta-etano-braskem-idesa-cumple-5-anos (accessed 25/06/2022)

Milenio (2021) "Mexico has gasoline reserves for only 10 days: AMLO; calls to be self-sufficient". Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BluusOS2UI&ab_channel=MILENIO (accessed 04/08/2022)

Milenio (2022) "What happened to the incomplete refinery that Felipe Calderón promised to build?". Available at: https://www.milenio.com/politica/esta-es-refineria-bicentenario-felipe-Calderón-prometio-construir (accessed 17/05/2023)

Milenio (2023) "Privatization is the best thing that can happen to this country". Fox responds to AMLO. Available at: https://www.milenio.com/politica/privatizacion-es-lo-mejor-que-le-puede-pasar-al-pais-dice-fox-a-amlo (accessed 22/11/2023)

Milenio (2024) "AMLO led 1,423 morning press conferences during his six-year term". Available at: https://www.milenio.com/politica/cuantas-mananeras-amlo-encabezo-en-su-gobierno (accessed 01/11/2024)

MVS (2023) "Federal Government manages to complete the purchase of Mexicana de Aviación". Available at:
https://mvsnoticias.com/nacional/2023/8/10/gobierno-federal-logra-finalizar-compra-de-mexicana-de-aviacion-602357.html (accessed 14/07/2021)

Mckinsey (2019) "Global refining: Profiting in a downstream downturn". Published September 6, 2019. Available at: https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/oil-and-gas/our-insights/global-refining-profiting-in-a-downstream-downturn (accessed 14/07/2021)

Mckinsey (2021) "Global downstream outlook to 2035, Perspective on global refining markets and projections to 2035". Published July 1, 2021. Available at: https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/oil-and-gas/our-insights/global-downstream-outlook-to-2035 (accessed 14/07/2021)

Meidan, M. (2020) "China's Emergence as a powerful player in the old and new geopolitics of energy", Issue 125, September 2020, published in the quarterly journal on energy from the

Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (Issue 126, February 2021). Available at: https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/OEF-126.pdf

Natural Resource Governance Institute (2020) "Supporting the Energy Transition in Oil- and Mineral-Rich Countries", NRGI Program Note. Available at: https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/supporting_the_energy_transition_in_oil-_and_mineral-rich_countries.pdf (accessed 13/02/2021)

Nohlen, D. (2005) "Elections in the Americas: A data handbook, Volume 2 South America". Oxford.

Newell, P. (2021) "Power Shift: The Global Political Economy of Energy Transitions". Cambridge University Press

NYTimes (2022a) "Biden will tap oil reserve, hoping to push gasoline prices down". Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/31/business/energy-environment/biden-oil-strategic-petroleum-reserve.html (accessed 22/11/2022)

NYTimes (2022b) "Some States Suspend Their Gas Taxes, Looking to Ease Pain at the Pump". Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/27/us/gas-tax-cuts.html (accessed 22/11/2022)

NYTimes (2022c) "Biden will allow summertime sales of higher-ethanol gas". Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/12/business/economy/biden-ethanol-gas.html (accessed 22/11/2022)

NYTimes (2022d) "Sri Lanka's economy is grinding to a halt without fuel". Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/09/world/asia/sri-lanka-fuel-shortage-food.html (accessed 22/11/2022)

National Centre for Social Communication's report (2022) Available at: http://mexico.mom-gmr.org/es/medios/ (accessed 06/07/2022)

Ohemeng, F. and Anebo, F. (2012) "The Politics of Administrative Reforms in Ghana: Perspectives from Path Dependency and Punctuated Equilibrium Theories", International Journal of Public Administration, Volume 35, Number 3, pp. 161-176(16)

O'Neil, D. (2012) "Micro and macro evolution". Available at: https://www2.palomar.edu/anthro/synthetic/synth_9.htm, (access 05/06/2022)

OECD (2024) "OECD Economic Surveys: Mexico 2024". Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-surveys-mexico-2024_b8d974db-en.html

Oxfam Mexico (2017) "Extreme Inequality in Mexico. Concentration of Economic and Political Power". Available at: https://oxfammexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/desigualdadextrema_informe.pdf (accessed 10/07/2023)

Oppenheimer, A. (1996) "Mexico on the border of chaos: the crisis of the nineties and the hope of the new millennium". Buenos Aires, Ed. Javier Vergara.

Oraculus (2022) Level of presidential approval. Available at: https://oraculus.mx/aprobacion-presidencial/ (accessed 12/03/2023)

Princen, S. (2013) "Punctuated equilibrium theory and the European Union", Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 20, Number 6, pp. 854-870(17)

Peter, J. (2006) "Explaining Policy Change: The Impact of the Media, Public Opinion and Political Violence on Urban Budgets in England." Journal for European Public Policy 13 (7): 1053–1068.

Petrocik, J. (1996) "Issue ownership in presidential elections with a 1980 case study". American Journal of Political Science 40(3): 825–85

Pastor, M, and Wise, C. (2005) "The Lost Sexenio: Vicente Fox and the New Politics of Economic Reform in Mexico." Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 47, no. 4, pp. 135–60. JSTOR.

Plante, M., and Jordan, A. (2013) "Getting Prices Right: Addressing Mexico's History of Fuel Subsidies". Southwest Economy, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Available at: https://www.dallasfed.org/en/research/economy/~/media/documents/research/swe/2013/swe1303d.pdf

Panibratov, A., Sánchez-Herrera, R., Castello-Esquerdo, A., and Klishevich, D. (2022) "Surviving populism: A corporate political activity approach in Mexico". Volume 6, pages 182–200.

Pollsmx (2023) Political parties' fragmentation in capital cities. Available at: https://polls.mx/que-partidos-gobiernan-las-capitales-del-pais-2/ (accessed 06/07/2024)

Pollsmx (2024) Political parties in municipalities as of 2024. Available at: https://polls.mx/quien-gobierna-los-municipios-en-juego/ (accessed 06/12/2024)

PRI (1938) "Pact, principles and program of the Party of the Mexican Revolution", March 30, 1938. Available at: https://www.pri.org.mx/bancosecretarias/files/Archivos/Pdf/278-1-10_34_06.pdf (accessed 06/07/2023)

Pruitt, S. (2020) "The Surprising Role Mexico Played in World War II". Available at: https://www.history.com/news/mexico-world-war-ii-surprising-involvement (accessed 06/07/2023)

PROFECO (2022a) Gasoline prices in Mexico. Mexico Federal Consumer Attorney. Available at: https://combustibles.profeco.gob.mx/ (accessed 19/08/2022)

PROFECO (2022b) Historic IEPS subsidy keeps fuel prices stable. Morning press conference from the National Palace. March 14, 2022. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D_gQ8WO_oTA (accessed 11/09/2022)

PND (2019) National Development Plan 2019-2024. Available at: https://framework-gb.cdn.gob.mx/landing/documentos/PND.pdf

PEMEX (2019) "Business plan 2019-2023". Available at:

https://www.pemex.com/acerca/plan-de-negocios/Documents/PEMEX_BUSINESS_PLAN_2019_2023.pdf

PEMEX (2021) "Business plan 2021-2025". Available at:
https://www.pemex.com/acerca/plan-de-negocios/Documents/pn_2021-2025-completo.pdf

PEMEX (2021) "With Deer Park, PEMEX will soon produce the fuels needed in Mexico" Available at: https://www.pemex.com/saladeprensa/boletines_nacionales/Paginas/2021-159_nacional.aspx (accesed 26/05/2021)

PEMEX (2023) PEMEX business plan 2023-2027. Available at:
https://www.pemex.com/acerca/plan-de-negocios/Paginas/default.aspx

PEMEX (2024) "4T rescued Pemex and strengthened Mexico's energy self-sufficiency". Morning press conference from the National Palace. January 4, 2024. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CPW31LEcvKs&ab_channel=Andr%C3%A9sManuelL%C3%B3pezObrador (accessed 22/05/2024)

PEMEX (2024) "Start of production at the Olmec refinery, in Paraíso, Tabasco". August 3, 2024. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/live/p7ZnWBif9kg?si=5qL_xYdj5v_9svlV (accessed 27/09/2024)

PEF (2013) Expenditure Budget of the Federation for the Fiscal Year 2013, The Centre for Finance Studies of the Chamber of Deputies (CEFP), PEMEX budget. Available at: https://www.cefp.gob.mx/publicaciones/infografias/2013/dep/infdep0082013.pdf (accessed 27/05/2021)

PEF (2016) Expenditure Budget of the Federation for the Fiscal Year 2013, The Centre for Finance Studies of the Chamber of Deputies (CEFP), PEMEX budget. Available at: https://www.cefp.gob.mx/publicaciones/infografias/2016/daip/infdaip0292016.pdf (accessed 27/05/2021)

PEF-Congress (2024) Chamber of deputies, Mexico, Parties vote in the Federation Expenditure budget   Available   at:

http://www5.diputados.gob.mx/index.php/camara/Comunicacion/Boletines/2018/Diciembre/23/0808-Aprueba-la-Camara-de-Diputados-el-Presupuesto-de-Egresos-de-la-Federacion-2019 (accessed 19/09/2024)

Piedepagina (2020) "11 years after the extinction of Luz y Fuerza del Centro". Available at: https://piedepagina.mx/11-anos-de-la-extincion-de-luz-y-fuerza-del-centro/ (accessed 04/01/2021)

Presidency (2014) "What are the reforms promoted by President Enrique Peña Nieto?". Presidency of the Republic. June 21, 2014. Available at: https://www.gob.mx/epn/articulos/cuales-son-las-reformas-impulsadas-por-el-presidente-enrique-Peña-nieto (accessed 03/02/2021)

Presidency (2019) Presentation of Social Communication Policy. Morning press conference from the National Palace. April 16, 2019. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKU7D6J-R5E (accessed 12/02/2021)

Presidency (2020) AMLO's one hundred commitments as president. Available at: https://www.gob.mx/presidencia/documentos/100-compromisos-del-presidente-Andrés-manuel-López -obrador-al-1-de-septiembre-de-2020 (accessed 02/12/2021)

Presidency (2022) Fourth Government Report. Mexico. Available at: https://López obrador.org.mx/cuarto-informe-de-gobierno/ (accessed 12/11/2023)

Presidency (2023) Behaviour of crude oil processing in refineries. Mexico advances towards energy self-sufficiency. Morning press conference from the National Palace. March 16, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cqjp1LnPCfs (accessed 02/01/2024)

Presidency (2023a) Mayan Train is a feat of the Government of the Fourth Transformation. Morning press conference from the National Palace. January 23, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dz3kGAiqHxo&ab_channel=Andr%C3%A9sManuelL%C3%B3pezObrador (accessed 22/03/2023)

Presidency (2023b) Huachicol. Morning press conference from the National Palace. October 16, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z-GrLSe1quw (accessed 10/01/2024)

Presidency (2024) 4T rescued Pemex and strengthened Mexico's energy self-sufficiency. Morning press conference from the National Palace. January 4, 2024. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CPW31LEcvKs&ab_channel=Andr%C3%A9sManuelL%C3%B3pezObrador (accessed 12/03/2024)

Rodríguez, P., Morales, J. and Monaldi, F. (2012) "Direct Distribution of Oil Revenues in Venezuela: A Viable Alternative?", Working Paper 306 September 201, Centre for Global Development, Washington, DC

Rochefort, D., and Donnelly, K. (2012) "Agenda-setting and political discourse Major analytical frameworks and their application", In Araral, E.,Fritzen, S.,Howlett, M., M Ramesh, Xun Wu (2012) "Routledge Handbook of Public Policy", Routledge, 1st Edition, London.

Rogers, E. (1962)" Diffusion of innovations". New York: Free Press of Glencoe.

Riker, W. (1996) "The strategy of rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution". New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Rapley, T. (2018) "Doing conversation, discourse and document analysis". Sage.

Radio-formula (2022) "Tula Refinery: why did Calderón cancel it and only the fence remained?". Available at: https://www.radioformula.com.mx/nacional/2022/3/26/refineria-de-tula-por-que-Calderón-la-cancelo-solo-quedo-la-barda-507619.html (accessed 21/03/2023)

Reuters (2008) "Mexico Congress approves controversial energy reform". Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/negocios-mexico-reforma-petroleo idLTASIE49R2P720081028 (accessed 08/06/2021)

Reuters (2012) "Mexico begins bankruptcy process mills to reprivatize". Available at:

https://www.reuters.com/article/negocios-azucar-mexico-ingenios idLTASIE8AS04B20121129 (accessed 14/08/2023)

Reuters (2013) "Leftist PRD Mexico temporarily withdraws from pact for reforms". Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSSIE9AR03W/ (accessed 05/09/2023)

Reuters (2016) "Mexico gasoline prices to rise as much as 20.1 percent in January: government". Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-gasoline/mexico-gasoline-prices-to-rise-as-much-as-20-1-percent-in-january-government-idUSKBN14G15M, (accessed 22/08/2022)

Reuters (2019) "Trump threatens to shut U.S.-Mexico border". Available at: https://www.reuters.com/graphics/USA-IMMIGRATION-TRUMP/0100919N1TG/index.html (accessed 03/01/2021)

Reuters (2021a) "The release and refill of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve". Available at: https://www.reuters.com/plus/the-release-and-refill-of-the-strategic-petroleum-reserve (accessed 10/03/2022)

Reuters (2021b) "Mexico says U.S. approves Deer Park refinery deal, sees completion early 2022". Available at: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/mexico-says-us-government-approves-deer-park-refinery-deal-2021-12-22/ (accessed 12/11/2022)

Reuters (2022a) "Peru imposes curfew to stymie protests over rising fuel costs". Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/peruvians-protest-surging-gas-fertilizer-prices-amid-ukraine-invasion-2022-04-05/, (accessed 04/07/2022)

Reuters (2022b) "Explainer: Why is there a worldwide oil-refining crunch?". Available at: https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/why-is-there-worldwide-oil-refining-crunch-2022-06-22/ (accessed 22/08/2022)

Reuters (2022c) "Mexico inaugurates Dos Bocas oil refinery, promising production in 2023". Available at:https://www.reuters.com/article/mexico-oil-refinery-idAFL1N2YI1IN (accessed 22/08/2022)

Reuters (2022d) "Mexico creates state-run lithium company, to go live within 6 months". Available at: https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/mexico-creates-state-run-lithium-company-go-live-within-6-months-2022-08-24/ (accessed 22/08/2022)

Reuters (2022e) "Biden taps ethanol to help lower fuel prices as consumer inflation surges" https://www.reuters.com/world/us/biden-allow-higher-ethanol-fuel-sales-summer-check-gas-prices-2022-04-12/ (Access on 11/04/2022)

Reuters (2022f) "Oil refining capacity fell for first time in 30 years in 2021". Available at: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-refining-capacity-fell-first-time-30-years-2021-iea-says-2022-01-19/ (11/04/2022)

Reuters (2022g) "Which U.S. refineries have shut since the global pandemic, and why?". Available at: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/which-us-refineries-have-shut-since-global-pandemic-why-2022-06-17/ (accessed 01/12/2023)

Reuters (2022h) "Mexican president's contentious electricity overhaul defeated in Congress" Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/mexican-lawmakers-vote-presidents-contentious-electricity-overhaul-2022-04-17/ (accessed 20/08/2023)

Reuters (2023a) "Mexico's Dos Bocas refinery to produce 290,000 barrels per day by year end: president". Available at: https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/mexicos-dos-bocas-refinery-produce-290000-bpd-by-year-end-president-2023-09-01/ (accessed 04/07/2024)

Reuters (2023b) "New Pemex oil refinery to again miss production launch". Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/new-pemex-oil-refinery-again-miss-production-launch-document-2023-05-24/ (accessed 08/11/2022)

Realestate (2021) "Tula Coker will produce 30 thousand barrels of gasoline per day". Available at:https://realestatemarket.com.mx/noticias/infraestructura-y-construccion/35310-coquizadora-de-tula-producira-30-mil-barriles-diarios-de-gasolina, (accessed 11/04/2022)

Raimondi, P., and Tagliapietra, S. (2020) "The geopolitical implications of global decarbonisation for MENA producing countries", Issue 125, September 2020, published in the quarterly journal on energy from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (Issue 126, February 2021). Available at: https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/OEF-126.pdf

Rivera de Jesus, C. (2024) "Energy policy: Fiscal challenges 2024-2030". Center for Economic and Budgetary Research (CIEP). Available at: https://ciep.mx/politica-energetica-retos-fiscales-2024-2030/

Rivera de Jesus, C., and López Reynosa, J. (2023) "Fiscal incentives on IEPS on fuels: Tax implications". Centre for Economic and Budgetary Research (CIEP). Available at: https://ciep.mx/estimulos-fiscales-sobre-el-ieps-a-combustibles-implicaciones-recaudatorias/

Ramírez Sánchez, J. and Massa Roldán, R. (2019) "Mexico's Energy Regulatory Reform in the Context of a New Trilateral Agreement (NAFTA-USMCA)". The international trade journal vol. 34, NO. 1, 55–73.

Reporte-Indigo (2021) "AMLO blocks oil wells in Tabasco". Available at: https://www.reporteindigo.com/reporte/a-25-anos-del-dia-que-descalabraron-a-amlo-por-bloquear-pozos-petroleros-en-tabasco/ (accessed 11/05/2022)

Senate (2013) "Senate of Mexico on the energy reform of 2013". Energy reform, Dictamen of the United Commissions on Constitutional Points; of Energy; as well as Legislative Studies, First, of the Chamber of Senators of the LXII Legislature of the Honourable Congress of the Union. Available at: https://www.senado.gob.mx/comisiones/puntos_constitucionales/docs/DICTAMEN_REFORMA_ENERGETICA.pdf

Scarlat, J. and Dallemand, F. (2018) "Future Role of Bioenergy" in "The Role of Bioenergy in the Emerging Bioeconomy Resources, Technologies, Sustainability and Policy". Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-813056-8.00010-8

Stewart, W. M., Dibb, D. W., Johnston, A. E., and Smyth, T. J. (2005) "The contribution of commercial fertilizer nutrients to food production". Agronomy Journal, 97(1), 1-6. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2134/agronj2005.0001

Sanderson, H. (2023) "Volt Rush: The Winners and Losers in the Race to Go Green". Oneworld Book, UK.

Segal, P. (2012) "Oil Subsidies in Mexico". Oxford Energy Forum, Publisher's version, vol. 88, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2012, pp. 11–12. Available at: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9b938fde-1efa-4973-b630-8d6905d1f936

Sabatier, P. (1988) 'An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein', Policy Sciences, 21, 2–3: 129–168.

Sabatier P. and Jenkins-Smith H. (1993) "Policy change and learning: an advocacy coalition approach". Boulder: Westview Press.

Schattschneider, E. (1960) "The Semi-Sovereign People". New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Simon, H. (1985) "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science". American Political Science Review 79: 293–304.

Stone, D. (2002) "Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making", rev. edn (London: Norton).

Stone, D. (1989) "Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas", Political Science Quarterly, 104: 281–300.

Solorio, I., Ortega, J., Romero, R., and Guzmán, J. (2021) "AMLO's populism in Mexico and the framing of the extractivist agenda: The construction of the hegemony of the people without the indigenous voices". Z Vgl Polit Wiss (2021) 15:249–273.

Solorio, I., and Tosun, J. (2023) "Presidents and intermediaries: insights from clean energy policy processes in Mexico". Volume 44, 608-626.

Snoeck, M. (1989) "The refining industry in Mexico, 1970-1985". México, El Colegio de México.

Sánchez-Cano, J. (2014) "The energy sector of Mexico in the face of change". Panorama economico, volume IX, Num. 18, pp. 77-95

Sánchez-Talanquer, M. (2020) "Mexico 2019: Personalistic Politics and Neoliberalism from the Left", CIDE México, Political science journal. Vol. 40, N° 2, 401-430.

Sovacool, B. K. (Ed.). (2010) The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security. New York: Routledge.

Shehabi, M. (2019) 'GCC economies do not need diversification; they need better diversification', Oxford Energy Forum, March, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.

Sputnik (2023) "Vicente Fox assures that 'privatization is the best thing that can happen to Mexico'". Available at: https://sputniknews.lat/20211104/vicente-fox-asegura-que-la-privatizacion-fue-lo-mejor-que-le-pudo-pasar-a-mexico-1117882201.html (accessed 08/11/2022)

Stiglitz, J. (2019) "Neoliberalism must be pronounced dead and buried. Where next?". The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/may/30/neoliberalism-must-be-pronouced-dead-and-buried-where-next (accessed 06/07/2023)

Silvers, D. (2023) "Understanding neoliberalism as a system of power". Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose, UCL. April 25, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hLtkJ-AgLuY&t=762s (accessed 03/06/2023)

Shaffer, B., and Ziyadov, T. (2012) "Beyond the Resource Curse". University of Pennsylvania Press.

SEMARNAT (2014) "Environment Report". Mexican Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources. Government of Mexico. Available at: https://apps1.semarnat.gob.mx:8443/dgeia/informe18/tema/cap2.html#:~:text=La%20superficie%20total%20del%20territorio,hect%C3%A1reas%20(INEGI%2C%202017b) (accessed 15/12/2021)

SDPnoticias (2023) "Vicente Fox believes that privatizing the country is the best". Available at:https://www.sdpnoticias.com/mexico/vicente-fox-cree-que-privatizar-al-pais-es-lo-mejor/?outputType=amp (accessed 19/08/2022)

Sin-embargo (2019) "The years passed. 29 died. And even today they claim Fox and FCH for "giving away" Mexicana and Aeroméxico". Available at: https://www.sinembargo.mx/23-04-2019/3567793 (accessed 05/04/2022)

Sin-embargo (2019) "Pemex is a bottomless barrel and rescuing it is not worth it, says Vicente Fox in SHCP announcement". Available at: https://www.sinembargo.mx/04-05-2019/3575860 (accessed 03/04/2022)

Sin-embargo (2022) "14 years ago, Calderón promised a refinery. This is the story of deception". Available at: https://www.sinembargo.mx/17-03-2022/4144137 (accessed 12/11/2021)

Shell (2021) "Shell to sell interest in Deer Park refinery to partner Pemex". Published May 24, 2021. Available at: https://www.shell.com/media/news-and-media-releases/2021/shell-to-sell-interest-in-deer-park-refinery-to-partner-pemex.html (accessed 14/07/2021)

SENER (2020) "Dos Bocas refinery". Mexican Secretariat of Energy, SENER. Government of Mexico. Available at: https://dosbocas.energia.gob.mx/ (accessed 22/02/2022)

SENER (2022) "Fourth work report 2021-2022". Mexican Secretariat of Energy, SENER. Government of Mexico. Available at: https://transparencia.energia.gob.mx/web_transparencia/3_APERTURA_GUBERNAMENTAL/3_1_INFORMACION_SOCIALMENTE_UTIL/3_1_1_2_4o%20Informe-de-labores-SENER.pdf (accessed 15/03/2022)

S&P Global (2021) "New refineries to increase Middle East product sales". Available at: https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/market-insights/latest-news/electric-power/012721-refinery-news-roundup-new-refineries-to-increase-middle-east-product-sales (accessed 27/04/2022)

Tamayo, J. (1988) "Parastatal entities in Mexico" In Mexico: 75 anos de la revolucion. Vol. 2, Desarrollo economico. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economica.

Tagliapietra, S. (2019) "The impact of the global energy transition on MENA oil and gas producers", Energy Strategy Reviews 26 (2019) 100397, ScienceDirect

True, J.L., Jones, B.D. and Baumgartner, F.R. (2007) "Punctuated-equilibrium theory: explaining stability and change in public policymaking'', in P.A. Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 155–87

Tornel, C. (2021) "Petro-populism and infrastructural energy landscapes: The case of Mexico's Dos Bocas Refinery". Nordia Geographical Publications, 49(5), 6–31.

Telesur (2017) "MORENA Call for peaceful protest against gasolinazo in Mexico". Available at: https://www.telesurtv.net/news/Convocan-a-mexicanos-a-protestar-pacificamente-ante-el-aumento-de-los-combustibles-20170105-0012.html (accessed 22/06/2022)

US Census Bureau (2024) Top Trading Partners and Imports. Available at: https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/topyr.html (accessed 03/03/2024)

Vannoni, M. (2019) "A Comparative Test of the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Policy Punctuations in Tobacco Control", Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, Volume 21, Number 4, pp. 350-365(16)

Vortexa (2022) "Oil Refining Industry Can't Keep Up with Demand". Available at: https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Oil-Refining-Industry-Cant-Keep-Up-With-Demand.html (accessed 11/04/2022)

Van de Graaf, T. and Bradshaw, M. (2018) "Stranded wealth: rethinking the politics", International Affairs, 94 (6), pp. 1309–1328.

Van de Graaf, T. (2018) "Battling for a Shrinking Market: Oil Producers, the Renewables Revolution, and the Risk of Stranded Assets", in Scholten, D. (ed.), The Geopolitics of Renewables. London: Springer, pp. 97–124.

Van de Graaf, T. and Sovacool, B. (2020) "Global Energy Politics". Publisher: Polity

Van der Goot, E., Kruikemeier, S., Vliegenthart, R., de Ridder, J. (2023) "The Online Battlefield: How Conflict Frames in Political Advertisements Affect Political Participation in a Multiparty Context". Political Studies 1–21. Available at: https://edepot.wur.nl/636848

Villarreal Páez, H., and Michel Gutiérrez, V. (2013) "In defence of the gasolinazos". Economic and budgetary research centre, CIEP. Available at: https://ciep.mx/opinion-en-defensa-de-los-gasolinazos/ (accessed 13/11/2023)

World Bank (2012) "Turn down the heat, why a 4 Degree world must be avoided", the World Bank, Washington DC.

World Bank (2014) "Turn down the heat: confronting the New Climate Normal", the World Bank, Washington DC.

World Bank (2016a) "Shocks waves managing the impacts of climate change on poverty", the World Bank, Washington DC.

World Bank (2016b) "Emission trading in practice: a handbook on design and implementation", the World Bank, Washington DC.

World Bank (2022) "Distribution of GDP in Mexico". Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/country/MX (accessed 11/08/2022)

WSJ (2022) "High Gas Prices Have Fuel Makers Raking in Cash". The Wall Street Journal. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/refiners-rake-in-cash-after-gas-prices-surge-11658405412 (access 22/08/2022)

Walgrave, S., and Varone, F. (2008) "Punctuated Equilibrium and Agenda-Setting: Bringing Parties Back in: Policy Change after the Dutroux Crisis in Belgium", Governance, Volume 21, Issue 3, Pages 365-395.

Walgrave, S., Varone, F., and Dumont, P. (2006) "Policy with or without Parties? A Comparative Analysis of Policy Priorities and Policy Change in Belgium (1991–2000)." Journal of European Public Policy 13 (7): 1021–1038.

West, R., and Fattouh, B. (2019) "The Energy Transition and Oil Companies' Hard Choices", Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, University of Oxford, UK.

Wildavsky, A. (1964) "Politics of the Budgetary Process". Boston, MA: Little, Brown.

Wodak, R., and Meyer, M. (2015) "Methods of Critical Discourse Studies" Sage.

Workman, S., Jones, B., and Jochim, A. (2009) "Information Processing and Policy Dynamics". Policy studies journal, Volume37, Issue 1, Pages 75-92.

Workman, S., Baumgartner, F., and Jones, B. (2022) "The Code and Craft of Punctuated Equilibrium." Methods of the Policy Process. 1st ed. vol. 1. UK Routledge, 51–79.

Yin, R. K. (2017) "Case study research and applications: design and methods". Sixth edition. Los Angeles: SAGE.

Zaid, G. (2012) "The presidential economy". Debolsillo.